From 0d903631163c8a33d988b5529b9d8d76049f4b2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: libroot
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2026 04:39:11 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] first commit
---
LICENSE | 140 +
README.md | 101 +
...1-Course-Introduction-Nohidden-Redacted.md | 121 +
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data/Denmark-NSA-partnership/metadata.json | 72 +
data/Digby-geolocation/Digby-geolocation.md | 9 +
data/Digby-geolocation/metadata.json | 62 +
data/Digint-Imbalance/Digint-Imbalance.md | 62 +
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.../ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_09-06.md | 434 +
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.../ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_10-10.md | 540 +
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.../ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_10-17.md | 560 +
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.../ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_10-49.md | 517 +
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.../ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_11-107.md | 386 +
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.../ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_11-57.md | 357 +
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.../metadata.json | 35 +
..._Notification_-_Incidents_of_Compliance.md | 40 +
.../metadata.json | 35 +
...der_Letter_re_NSA_Fact_Sheet_Inaccuracy.md | 67 +
.../metadata.json | 34 +
...tates_Signals_Intelligence_Directive_18.md | 1252 +
.../metadata.json | 37 +
..._January_8_2007_Interim_Competency_Test.md | 53 +
.../metadata.json | 31 +
...uary_8_2007_NSA_PowerPoint_Presentation.md | 198 +
.../metadata.json | 33 +
...ry_8_2007_NSA_Web-Based_Training_Slides.md | 954 +
.../metadata.json | 33 +
...dge_Walton_Answers_to_Questions_re_FISC.md | 1267 +
.../metadata.json | 34 +
...ctor_General_and_General_Counsel_Report.md | 87 +
.../metadata.json | 38 +
.../ACLU_-_July_20_2009_Order_of_the_FISC.md | 151 +
.../metadata.json | 32 +
...n_2009_NSA_FISA_Business_Records_Report.md | 36 +
.../metadata.json | 36 +
...09_NSA_Notification_Memorandum_to_HPSCI.md | 206 +
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...ss_and_Queries_re_FISA_Business_Records.md | 100 +
.../metadata.json | 33 +
...tion_-_BR_FISA_End-to-End_Review_Status.md | 205 +
.../metadata.json | 35 +
..._2009_Government_Memorandum_to_the_FISC.md | 104 +
.../metadata.json | 36 +
..._NSA_Alexander_2007_Shubert_Declaration.md | 1922 ++
.../metadata.json | 38 +
..._NSA_Alexander_2009_Shubert_Declaration.md | 1789 +
.../metadata.json | 45 +
...LU_-_NSA_Bonanni_2009_Jewel_Declaration.md | 2208 ++
.../metadata.json | 43 +
...U_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Introduction.md | 235 +
.../metadata.json | 44 +
.../ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_1.md | 499 +
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.../metadata.json | 44 +
...als_-_Module_6_for_Analytical_Personnel.md | 528 +
.../metadata.json | 47 +
...ials_-_Module_6_for_Technical_Personnel.md | 1179 +
.../metadata.json | 46 +
...LU_-_NSA_Fleisch_2012_Jewel_Declaration.md | 2090 ++
.../metadata.json | 45 +
..._Jewel_Shubert_Declaration_Unclassified.md | 986 +
.../metadata.json | 44 +
...endment_to_Conduct_Analysis_of_Metadata.md | 362 +
.../metadata.json | 46 +
...Point_Slide_-_Verification_Requirements.md | 13 +
.../metadata.json | 33 +
...Requirements_Unders_Section_501_of_FISA.md | 123 +
.../metadata.json | 34 +
..._Hearing_on_Patriot_Act_Reauthorization.md | 127 +
.../metadata.json | 38 +
...ay_23_2006_Government_Memorandum_of_Law.md | 2674 ++
.../metadata.json | 41 +
.../ACLU_-_Section_215_-_Primary_Order.md | 390 +
.../metadata.json | 35 +
...er_1_2009_NSA_Presentation_for_the_FISC.md | 224 +
.../metadata.json | 37 +
..._Guidelines_for_Domestic_FBI_Operations.md | 1897 +
.../metadata.json | 34 +
...006_Cover_Filing_Submission_to_the_FISC.md | 1820 +
.../metadata.json | 35 +
...ls_Intelligence_Directive_18_Appendix_J.md | 212 +
.../metadata.json | 35 +
.../ACLU_-_fisc_opinion_10-3-2011.md | 2226 ++
.../metadata.json | 40 +
...ing_fisa_amendments_act_reauthorization.md | 245 +
.../metadata.json | 37 +
...t_statement_faa_reauthorization_hearing.md | 247 +
.../metadata.json | 37 +
...s_and_ranking_member_ruppersberger_scan.md | 270 +
.../metadata.json | 43 +
...by_nsa_in_connection_with_fisa_sect_702.md | 604 +
.../metadata.json | 35 +
..._-_november_2011_fisc_opinion_and_order.md | 576 +
.../metadata.json | 35 +
...ort_of_the_US_with_Attachments_20130910.md | 2749 ++
.../metadata.json | 37 +
...008_Supplemental_Opinions_from_the_FISC.md | 217 +
.../metadata.json | 36 +
...ACLU_-_pub_Feb_12_2009_Memorandum_of_US.md | 3071 ++
.../metadata.json | 41 +
...009_Notification_of_Compliance_Incident.md | 438 +
.../metadata.json | 36 +
...r_Regarding_Prelim_Notice_of_Compliance.md | 133 +
.../metadata.json | 36 +
.../ACLU_-_pub_Jun_22_2009_Order.md | 157 +
.../metadata.json | 35 +
...irman_of_Intel_and_Judiciary_Committees.md | 96 +
.../metadata.json | 44 +
...ACLU_-_pub_March_2_2009_Order_from_FISC.md | 515 +
.../metadata.json | 36 +
.../ACLU_-_pub_May_24_2006_Order_from_FISC.md | 259 +
.../metadata.json | 35 +
...A_Business_Records_FISA_Review_20130909.md | 1487 +
.../metadata.json | 35 +
...v_5_2009_Supplemental_Opinion_and_Order.md | 196 +
.../metadata.json | 35 +
...e_Intelligence_and_Judiciary_Committees.md | 97 +
.../metadata.json | 44 +
..._pub_Sep_3_2009_Primary_Order_from_FISC.md | 475 +
.../metadata.json | 36 +
..._Regarding_Further_Compliance_Incidents.md | 131 +
.../metadata.json | 35 +
...-_september_2012_fisc_opinion_and_order.md | 215 +
.../metadata.json | 33 +
...sa_core_intelligence_oversight_training.md | 4933 +++
.../metadata.json | 47 +
...Bg-07-01-motion-stay-proceedings-131004.md | 121 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-motion-130614.md | 121 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-motion-130625.md | 118 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-motion-131021.md | 131 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-order-130617.md | 25 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-order-130626.md | 27 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-order-131011.md | 29 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-order-131022.md | 38 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
..._-_105b-g-07-01-rbw-signed-order-130715.md | 80 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-reply-in-support.md | 621 +
.../metadata.json | 29 +
.../FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-response-130715.md | 186 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-response-130913.md | 128 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-response-130930.md | 131 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
...FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-yahoo-motion-131001.md | 148 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
...03-04-05-06-motion-dropbox-leave-130923.md | 422 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_Misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-131105.md | 924 +
.../metadata.json | 73 +
.../FISC_-_Misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-131112.md | 362 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_aclu-briefing-order.md | 35 +
.../FISC_-_aclu-briefing-order/metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_aclu-misc-13-02.md | 674 +
.../FOIA/FISC_-_aclu-misc-13-02/metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_br13-02-08-09-order-131205.md | 51 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_br13-02-order-131230.md | 168 +
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.../FISC_-_br13-02-order-140107.md | 155 +
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.../FISC_-_br13-02-order-140219.md | 296 +
.../FISC_-_br13-02-order-140219/metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_br13-09-130823.md | 67 +
data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-130823/metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_br13-09-130829.md | 43 +
data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-130829/metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_br13-09-130917.md | 32 +
data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-130917/metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_br13-09-letter-131009.md | 90 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_br13-09-motion-131017.md | 244 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_br13-09-motion-131112.md | 919 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_br13-09-motion-131211.md | 253 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_br13-09-motion-131223.md | 601 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_br13-09-order-131009.md | 59 +
.../FISC_-_br13-09-order-131009/metadata.json | 27 +
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.../FISC_-_br13-09-primary-order.md | 1235 +
.../metadata.json | 32 +
.../FISC_-_br13-158-Memorandum-131218.md | 216 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_br13-158-briefing-131018.md | 22 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_br13-158-memo-131018.md | 538 +
.../FISC_-_br13-158-memo-131018/metadata.json | 32 +
.../FISC_-_br13-158-order-131015.md | 46 +
.../metadata.json | 32 +
.../FISC_-_br13-158-order-131018.md | 20 +
.../metadata.json | 32 +
.../FISC_-_br13-158-response-131108.md | 408 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_br13-158-response-131125.md | 660 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_br14-01-motion.md | 399 +
data/FOIA/FISC_-_br14-01-motion/metadata.json | 27 +
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data/FOIA/FISC_-_br14-01-order/metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_br14-01-primary-order.md | 483 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
...C_-_declaration-of-andrew-mccabe-131002.md | 1136 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_doj-opposition-motion.md | 406 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_eff-bar-membership.md | 98 +
.../FISC_-_eff-bar-membership/metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_eff-motion/FISC_-_eff-motion.md | 271 +
data/FOIA/FISC_-_eff-motion/metadata.json | 27 +
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data/FOIA/FISC_-_eff-order/metadata.json | 27 +
.../FOIA/FISC_-_exhibit-1/FISC_-_exhibit-1.md | 1036 +
data/FOIA/FISC_-_exhibit-1/metadata.json | 27 +
.../FOIA/FISC_-_exhibit-2/FISC_-_exhibit-2.md | 219 +
data/FOIA/FISC_-_exhibit-2/metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_honorable-charles-grassley.md | 619 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_honorable-patrick-leahy.md | 630 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_misc-13-01-opinion-order.md | 195 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
...c-13-02-04-brief-of-amici-curiae-130715.md | 642 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
...tion-for-leave-file-amici-curiae-130715.md | 129 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
...otion-stay-lapsed-appropriations-131004.md | 124 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_misc-13-02-brief-131127.md | 875 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
...FISC_-_misc-13-02-brief-of-amici-curiae.md | 529 +
.../metadata.json | 29 +
...-02-certification-bar-membership-130712.md | 141 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_misc-13-02-motion-131011.md | 767 +
.../metadata.json | 29 +
.../FISC_-_misc-13-02-motion-131127.md | 169 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_misc-13-02-motion-for-leave.md | 98 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_misc-13-02-order-130813.md | 542 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
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.../metadata.json | 27 +
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.../metadata.json | 27 +
...FISC_-_misc-13-02-order-response-131008.md | 113 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
...isc-13-02-reply-brief-in-support-130712.md | 672 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
...on-of-us-response-to-courts-oct-8-order.md | 118 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_misc-13-02-us-opposition-130705.md | 955 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
..._-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-action-140127.md | 159 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
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.../metadata.json | 27 +
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.../metadata.json | 27 +
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.../metadata.json | 27 +
..._-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-motion-131223.md | 376 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
..._-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-notice-140127.md | 290 +
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...c-13-03-04-05-06-07-rbw-granting-131113.md | 59 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
...isc-13-03-04-05-06-07-rbw-motion-131113.md | 27 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_misc-13-03-certification.md | 61 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
...SC_-_misc-13-03-misc-13-04-brief-130708.md | 575 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
...C_-_misc-13-03-misc-13-04-motion-130708.md | 144 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_misc-13-03-motion-130702.md | 86 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_misc-13-03-motion-131010.md | 178 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_misc-13-03-motion.md | 169 +
.../FISC_-_misc-13-03-motion/metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_misc-13-03-order-130703.md | 29 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
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.../FISC_-_misc-13-03-response.md | 82 +
.../FISC_-_misc-13-03-response/metadata.json | 27 +
..._-_misc-13-04-briefing-scheudule-130909.md | 101 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
...ent-motion-for-second-extension-of-time.md | 100 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_misc-13-04-fifth-extension.md | 98 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
...misc-13-04-microsoft-corporation-130909.md | 460 +
.../metadata.json | 30 +
.../FISC_-_misc-13-04-motion-130702.md | 89 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
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.../metadata.json | 27 +
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.../metadata.json | 27 +
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.../metadata.json | 27 +
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.../FISC_-_misc-13-04-motion/metadata.json | 29 +
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.../metadata.json | 27 +
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.../metadata.json | 27 +
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...roviders-consent-motion-for-stay-130830.md | 92 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_misc-13-04-response.md | 81 +
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.../FISC_-_misc-13-05-motion-130909.md | 318 +
.../metadata.json | 29 +
.../FISC_-_misc-13-05-motion-130913.md | 111 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_misc-13-06-motion-130909.md | 269 +
.../metadata.json | 29 +
...r-declaratory-judgement-LinkedIn-130917.md | 496 +
.../metadata.json | 29 +
.../FISC_-_misc-13-08-motion-131107.md | 1185 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_misc-13-08-motion-131206.md | 314 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_misc-13-08-order-131107.md | 25 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_misc-13-08-reply-131223.md | 648 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_misc-13-order-130718.md | 43 +
.../FISC_-_misc-13-order-130718/metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_misc-13-order-131011.md | 55 +
.../FISC_-_misc-13-order-131011/metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_misc-bar-membership-130730.md | 49 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
.../FISC_-_misc-bar-membership-130809.md | 66 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
...t-motion-for-stay-of-proceedings-131008.md | 222 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
...C_-_motion-declaratory-judgement-131002.md | 966 +
.../metadata.json | 29 +
...-_ranking-member-grassley-letter-131011.md | 1294 +
.../metadata.json | 27 +
..._-_2013-06-21_DNI_Ltr_to_Sen-_Feinstein.md | 46 +
.../metadata.json | 23 +
...r_and_Supplemental_Order_6-22-09-sealed.md | 131 +
.../metadata.json | 36 +
.../ODNI_-_CLEANEDPRTT_2.md | 2160 ++
data/FOIA/ODNI_-_CLEANEDPRTT_2/metadata.json | 34 +
...obility_Records_CN_1Sept11-Sealed-FINAL.md | 78 +
.../metadata.json | 35 +
data/FOIA/doj-14-0228/doj-14-0228.md | 820 +
data/FOIA/doj-14-0228/metadata.json | 29 +
.../metadata.json | 164 +
.../savage_foia_stellarwind_ig_report.md | 28638 ++++++++++++++++
...VERALL-BRIEFING-Third-Revision-Redacted.md | 359 +
.../metadata.json | 185 +
...g-tactics-and-man-in-the-middle-attacks.md | 39 +
.../FOXACID-Server-SOP-Redacted.md | 1230 +
.../FOXACID-Server-SOP-Redacted/metadata.json | 170 +
.../Fornsat-Technologies.md | 92 +
data/Fornsat-Technologies/metadata.json | 127 +
data/G2BCL/G2BCL.md | 105 +
data/G2BCL/metadata.json | 59 +
...puter-Network-Exploitation-presentation.md | 354 +
.../metadata.json | 83 +
data/GCHQ_PSAF_edited/GCHQ_PSAF_edited.md | 1 +
data/GCHQ_PSAF_edited/metadata.json | 39 +
data/GCSBApril2010/GCSBApril2010.md | 177 +
data/GCSBApril2010/metadata.json | 84 +
data/GCSBMarch2012/GCSBMarch2012.md | 157 +
data/GCSBMarch2012/metadata.json | 70 +
.../GSM-tower-geolocation.md | 18 +
data/GSM-tower-geolocation/metadata.json | 50 +
...r-mapping-made-easier-and-more-accurate.md | 73 +
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...r-and-the-geolocating-of-internet-cafes.md | 18 +
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.../Ghosthunter-future-capabilities-2008.md | 10 +
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.../Ghosthunter-goes-global.md | 16 +
data/Ghosthunter-goes-global/metadata.json | 46 +
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data/HIMR-Oct2011/HIMR-Oct2011.md | 209 +
data/HIMR-Oct2011/metadata.json | 80 +
...Hackers-Are-Humans-Too-Partial-Redacted.md | 299 +
.../metadata.json | 77 +
data/Homing-Pigeon/Homing-Pigeon.md | 77 +
data/Homing-Pigeon/metadata.json | 83 +
.../no-place-to-hide/no-place-to-hide.md | 40 +
data/In-Flight-GSM/In-Flight-GSM.md | 400 +
data/In-Flight-GSM/metadata.json | 79 +
...-VoiceAnalytics-Experiment-Profile-v1-0.md | 322 +
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...Instability-Creates-Opportunity-Against.md | 50 +
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...Intellipedia-Air-Gapped-Network-Threats.md | 272 +
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diff --git a/LICENSE b/LICENSE
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ff2a6f8
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+of, applicable law, Affirmer hereby overtly, fully, permanently,
+irrevocably and unconditionally waives, abandons, and surrenders all of
+Affirmer's Copyright and Related Rights and associated claims and causes
+of action, whether now known or unknown (including existing as well as
+future claims and causes of action), in the Work (i) in all territories
+worldwide, (ii) for the maximum duration provided by applicable law or
+treaty (including future time extensions), (iii) in any current or future
+medium and for any number of copies, and (iv) for any purpose whatsoever,
+including without limitation commercial, advertising or promotional
+purposes (the "Waiver"). Affirmer makes the Waiver for the benefit of each
+member of the public at large and to the detriment of Affirmer's heirs and
+successors, fully intending that such Waiver shall not be subject to
+revocation, rescission, cancellation, termination, or any other legal or
+equitable action to disrupt the quiet enjoyment of the Work by the public
+as contemplated by Affirmer's express Statement of Purpose.
+
+3. Public License Fallback. Should any part of the Waiver for any reason
+be judged legally invalid or ineffective under applicable law, then the
+Waiver shall be preserved to the maximum extent permitted taking into
+account Affirmer's express Statement of Purpose. In addition, to the
+extent the Waiver is so judged Affirmer hereby grants to each affected
+person a royalty-free, non transferable, non sublicensable, non exclusive,
+irrevocable and unconditional license to exercise Affirmer's Copyright and
+Related Rights in the Work (i) in all territories worldwide, (ii) for the
+maximum duration provided by applicable law or treaty (including future
+time extensions), (iii) in any current or future medium and for any number
+of copies, and (iv) for any purpose whatsoever, including without
+limitation commercial, advertising or promotional purposes (the
+"License"). The License shall be deemed effective as of the date CC0 was
+applied by Affirmer to the Work. Should any part of the License for any
+reason be judged legally invalid or ineffective under applicable law, such
+partial invalidity or ineffectiveness shall not invalidate the remainder
+of the License, and in such case Affirmer hereby affirms that he or she
+will not (i) exercise any of his or her remaining Copyright and Related
+Rights in the Work or (ii) assert any associated claims and causes of
+action with respect to the Work, in either case contrary to Affirmer's
+express Statement of Purpose.
+
+4. Limitations and Disclaimers.
+
+ a. No trademark or patent rights held by Affirmer are waived, abandoned,
+ surrendered, licensed or otherwise affected by this document.
+ b. Affirmer offers the Work as-is and makes no representations or
+ warranties of any kind concerning the Work, express, implied,
+ statutory or otherwise, including without limitation warranties of
+ title, merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, non
+ infringement, or the absence of latent or other defects, accuracy, or
+ the present or absence of errors, whether or not discoverable, all to
+ the greatest extent permissible under applicable law.
+ c. Affirmer disclaims responsibility for clearing rights of other persons
+ that may apply to the Work or any use thereof, including without
+ limitation any person's Copyright and Related Rights in the Work.
+ Further, Affirmer disclaims responsibility for obtaining any necessary
+ consents, permissions or other rights required for any use of the
+ Work.
+ d. Affirmer understands and acknowledges that Creative Commons is not a
+ party to this document and has no duty or obligation with respect to
+ this CC0 or use of the Work.
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9902d75
--- /dev/null
+++ b/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+# snowchive-meta
+
+Metadata and text versions for the Snowchive archive of Snowden documents.
+This repo holds only the .json and .md files.
+
+To download the PDFs, page images and thumbnails:
+
+https://snowchive.org/about#downloading-all-data
+
+The Snowchive server code lives here:
+
+https://git.disroot.org/libroot/snowchive-server
+
+## Metadata layout
+
+ data/
+ /
+ metadata.json
+ .md # text version of the document
+ versions//.md # other published document versions (some documents)
+ FOIA//... # FOIA releases (238)
+ SIDtoday-archive//... # NSA SIDtoday newsletters (2,142)
+ project/
+ assemblies.json # documents rebuilt from separately published parts
+ glossary.json # codewords and terms, with definitions
+ related.json # document id -> list of related document ids
+ changelog.json # archive change log
+
+## metadata.json
+
+| Field | Description |
+|---|---|
+| `id` | The document's stable identifier: the name of its directory and the last part of its URL (`/doc/{id}`). It is not written inside `metadata.json` - the directory name is the id. |
+| `aka_id` | Other names the same document was released under, most often the file name another publisher or a mirror gave its PDF. A list of entries, each described below. |
+| `aka_id[].id` | The other name itself. Searchable, so a document can be found by a file name it circulated under elsewhere. |
+| `aka_id[].doc_source` | The web page where the document was released under that name, linked as "page" next to the alias. |
+| `aka_id[].doc_url` | The direct link to the PDF released under that name, linked as "PDF" next to the alias. |
+| `title` | The document's title, written by the curators - usually the title the document gives itself or the one its publisher used. |
+| `description` | A short summary of what the document is and says, shown under the publication list and in search results and cards. Descriptions are the work of archivists without inside knowledge - corrections welcome. |
+| `long_description` | A longer account of the contents where one has been written, behind "Show more info" on the document page; often empty. A `description:` search looks in both descriptions. |
+| `tags` | Free-text subjects added by the curators. Unlike the other lists they are not necessarily taken from the document's own vocabulary, so they are the loosest thing to browse or search by. |
+| `type` | The kind of release: `REPORTED` (a leaked document as an outlet published it), `SIDTODAY` (an article of the NSA's internal SIDtoday newsletter from The Intercept's bulk release) or `FOIA` (obtained through a public-records request). When it is empty, a document filed in the SIDtoday or FOIA folder takes that type and any other is `REPORTED`. |
+| `collection` | Which of the three collections - the tabs on Browse - the document belongs to: `news` (Reported), `sidtoday-archive` or `foia`. Documents filed under the SIDtoday and FOIA folders belong to those collections whatever this says; elsewhere an empty value means Reported, or FOIA for a document of type `FOIA`. FOIA releases are left out of browsing and search unless you include them in Preferences. |
+| `pages` | The page count of the PDF. When it is missing, the number of page images is used instead. |
+| `pdf_sha256` | The SHA-256 of the PDF as archived. |
+| `archive_comment` | A note from the curators about this archive's copy - how it was assembled, where it was found, what differs between releases, or a known problem with it. |
+
+### .document
+
+| Field | Description |
+|---|---|
+| `document.creator` | The agency that *wrote* the document, in its short form (`NSA`, `GCHQ`, `FISC`, `DOJ`, `CSE` ...) - not the agency it is about and not the one that published it. Empty when the author is not known. |
+| `document.date_created` | When the document was written, as precise as the document allows: `2013-03-20`, `2013-03`, `2013`, or empty when unknown. Nothing is invented to fill the gaps, and nothing is guessed from the publication date. |
+| `document.banner` | The marking line **verbatim** - what the document says about itself, qualifiers and all. Intranet pages often carry a ceiling banner ("DYNAMIC PAGE - HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS ...") while their content is portion-marked unclassified; the banner records the claim, not an assessment. Empty means the artifact has no marking line - nothing is reconstructed from portion marks. |
+| `document.classification` | The curator's **assessment** of the content's classification, as component values: the level (`TOP SECRET`, `SECRET`, `CONFIDENTIAL`, `UNCLASSIFIED`) and any control systems (`COMINT`, `SI`, `TK`, `STRAP 1` ...), judged from portion marks. If a document contains multiple classifications, highest is used here. |
+| `document.dissemination` | The curator's assessment of the handling controls, as component values (`FOUO`, `NOFORN`, `ORCON`, `REL TO ...`). Assessed the same way as the classification. |
+| `document.genre` | The document's form, from a fixed vocabulary: `slides`, `report`, `wiki`, `manual`, `guide`, `newsletter`, `other`. |
+| `document.series.name` | For a document that prints a series roster (currently only in SIDtoday): the series name verbatim, as the document prints it. Documents with the same name are listed together on the document page and under Series. |
+| `document.series.part` | This document's 1-based position in the printed roster. Order comes from the artifact; parts of a series not yet in the archive show as gaps in the numbering, never renumbered away. |
+| `document.programs` | The codenames and programs the document names (`XKEYSCORE`, `PRISM`, ...), as curated values for browsing and search; the Glossary (`project/glossary.json`) explains many of them. |
+| `document.countries` | The countries the document mentions, by their English names. A mention, not a claim that the country was a target or a partner. |
+| `document.people` | The people who appear in the document: named in its text, or recognised in its images - for example Mobile Networks in My NOC World (`gchq-mobile-networks-in-my-noc-world`) lists King Charles and Queen Camilla, who appear only in a photograph on one of its slides. Usually written "Surname, Given name". A person appearing in these documents implies nothing about them beyond that appearance. The journalists who published the document are under `publication[].reporters`, not here. |
+
+### .publication[]
+
+One entry per story or book that published (or reported) the document.
+
+| Field | Description |
+|---|---|
+| `publication[].publisher` | Who published it: a news outlet, a book's publisher, or for a FOIA release the organization that obtained and released it. Browsable under Publishers - except entries marked `reporting_only`. |
+| `publication[].title` | The headline of the article, or the book's title. Shown on the document page and names the story on Articles. |
+| `publication[].link` | The URL of the article. It is the story's identity: documents whose entries share a link were published in the same report and are listed together on its article page. |
+| `publication[].date_published` | When this publication appeared, in the same `YYYY-MM-DD` / `YYYY-MM` / `YYYY` forms as the document date. |
+| `publication[].reporters` | The journalists bylined on the story, written "Surname, Given name". Browsable under Journalists and searchable with `journalist:`. |
+| `publication[].contributors` | People credited on the story without a byline - additional reporting, research, technical analysis. Shown on the document page and found by an all-fields search, but not listed among the journalists. |
+| `publication[].note` | Anything particular to this publication: that it showed only some of the pages, published them in a different order, redacted differently, or printed them in a book appendix. |
+| `publication[].version` | When this publication released a different copy from the one shown on the document page, the name of that copy in the document's `versions/` folder; its entry then links to "view this copy". Without it, the entry published the copy shown on the page. |
+| `publication[].doc_source` | The web page where this publication presented the document (the outlet's own document page, a DocumentCloud page), linked as "document page". Where a copy came from is recorded here, on the publication that released it, not on the document. |
+| `publication[].doc_url` | The direct link to the PDF file this publication released, linked as "original PDF". |
+| `publication[].reporting_only` | `true` when the outlet reported the story without publishing the document - a reporting partner. The entry keeps its byline and its article, but the outlet is not counted as one of the document's publishers and no copy is linked from it. |
+
+### .versions
+
+Other published copies of a document (e.g. less redacted, with extra pages, or a different scan) are kept in its `versions/` folder, one sub-folder per copy, each with its own PDF, text and page images. The `versions` object adds details about them, keyed by the copy's folder name.
+
+| Field | Description |
+|---|---|
+| `versions.{name}.changed_pages` | The pages of that copy, by its own page numbers, that differ from the copy shown on the document page. They are linked as "changed pages" next to the copy. |
+| `versions.{name}.pdf_sha256` | The SHA-256 of that copy's PDF. |
+
+## Issues/contact
+
+Submit issues/feedback:
+
+https://git.disroot.org/libroot/snowchive-meta
+
+or to Codeberg (mirror): https://codeberg.org/libroot/snowchive-meta
+
+Contact the maintainers via email:
+
+https://libroot.org/about
diff --git a/data/01-Course-Introduction-Nohidden-Redacted/01-Course-Introduction-Nohidden-Redacted.md b/data/01-Course-Introduction-Nohidden-Redacted/01-Course-Introduction-Nohidden-Redacted.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3a0fd6e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/01-Course-Introduction-Nohidden-Redacted/01-Course-Introduction-Nohidden-Redacted.md
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+# Wireless LAN / CNE Tool Training Course and Evaluation
+
+December 15-16, 2010
+
+[REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+# Classification
+
+The overall classification of this presentation is
+**TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN**
+
+The majority of the materiel in this presentation is
+**UNCLASSIFIED**
+
+Some information though is classified. That information will be marked in the slide title. Consider any nontitle classified slide, unclassified
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+# Example
+
+**This is unclassified**
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+# (TS//SI//NF)
+Classified Example
+
+**This slide would be classified**
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+# Primary Course Objective
+
+➢ To familiarize, educate, and certify
+students in the operational usage of
+WLAN / IEEE 802.11 CNE tools and
+techniques to include:
+➢ BLINDDATE
+➢ NIGHTSTAND
+➢ BADDECISION
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+# Secondary Course Objectives
+
+➢ Understand the fundamentals of the
+WLAN / IEEE 802.11 protocol.
+➢ Learn the end-to-end CNE process for
+close proximaty WLAN operations.
+➢ Gain familiarization in WLAN network
+protocol analysis.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+# Course Elements
+
+➢ Lectures
+➢ Demos / Labs
+➢ Evaluations
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+# Agenda
+
+➢ Review of Fundamentals
+➢ Introduction to WLAN / 802.11
+➢ BLINDDATE
+➢ WLAN CNE Operations
+➢ NIGHTSTAND
+➢ BADDECISION
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+# QUESTIONS?
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/01-Course-Introduction-Nohidden-Redacted/metadata.json b/data/01-Course-Introduction-Nohidden-Redacted/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e77a033
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/01-Course-Introduction-Nohidden-Redacted/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+{
+ "title": "Wireless LAN / CNE Tool Training Course and Evaluation",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "This document is a slide deck introducing a \"Close Access\" NSA training course to \"familiarize, educate, and certify students in the operational usage\" of various computer network exploitation tools.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [
+ "students",
+ "training",
+ "education",
+ "analysts",
+ "certification",
+ "network exploitation",
+ "WiFi",
+ "course"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2010-12-15",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN",
+ "genre": "slides",
+ "programs": [
+ "BLINDDATE",
+ "NIGHTSTAND",
+ "BADDECISION"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2016-08-19",
+ "title": "The NSA Leak Is Real, Snowden Documents Confirm",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2016/08/19/the-nsa-was-hacked-snowden-documents-confirm/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Biddle, Sam"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [
+ "Lee, Micah"
+ ],
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/3031641/01-Course-Introduction-Nohidden-Redacted.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "1ff712ff8cf339b70d8171b5aaaada2cccb448f14fed45cf7a3fd56659128337",
+ "pages": 10
+}
diff --git a/data/05-Introduction-to-WLAN-CNE-Operations-Redacted/05-Introduction-to-WLAN-CNE-Operations-Redacted.md b/data/05-Introduction-to-WLAN-CNE-Operations-Redacted/05-Introduction-to-WLAN-CNE-Operations-Redacted.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5e6dc31
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/05-Introduction-to-WLAN-CNE-Operations-Redacted/05-Introduction-to-WLAN-CNE-Operations-Redacted.md
@@ -0,0 +1,237 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+# Introduction to WLAN / 802.11 Active CNE Operations
+
+## December 15-16, 2010
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+## Classification
+
+The overall classification of this presentation is
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+All slides and materiels contained in this presentation should be considered classified TS//SI//NF
+(unless otherwise noted)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+## Section Overview
+
+- Passive to Active Operations
+- WLAN CNE Criteria / Assessment
+- Active CNE Operations
+- Introduction to FOXACID
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+## At The End...
+
+You should be able to....
+- Identify Criteria for CNE Assessment.
+- List the Active CNE Operational Process
+- Describe the purpose of FOXACID.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+## Passive to Active Operations
+
+- Primary Goal: To enable on-net access to target networks via off-net capabilities.
+- Prerequisite: We need to find the network of interest in order to target it.
+- Procedure: Conduct passive survey to locate network, then perform active op.
+- Solution: Utilize BLINDDATE and the appropriate plug-in solution(s).
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+## Passive to Active Operations
+
+- Successful operation of BLINDDATE is essential to correct usage of plug-ins.
+- Two types of plug-ins exist:
+ - Analysis Tool Aids
+ - Active CNE Tools
+- We will focus on Active CNE Tools:
+ - NIGHTSTAND
+ - HAPPYHOUR
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+## Active CNE Assessment
+
+- BLINDDATE used as both a survey and vulnerability analysis tool for 802.11 networks.
+- Operator needs to know what vulnerabilities, or criteria, to look for in order to utilize the correct Active CNE Tool (if any)
+- We will focus primarily on criteria necessary to carry out NIGHTSTAND (NS) and BADDECISION (BDN) operations.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+## Major Assessment Criteria
+
+- Clients
+- A client is a prerequisite: If no clients are on the target network, there's nothing to do yet.
+- Security
+- Encryption setting (Open, WEP, WPA, WPA2) dictates which capability can be used (if any).
+- Signal Strength
+- SNR dictates whether we can perform a successful active CNE operation.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+## Active CNE Operations
+
+- What is our end goal?
+- Provide on-net access via off-net means.
+- How do we do that?
+- Redirect the target to the TAO infrastructure.
+- How do we do that?
+- Inject payload destined for the target client.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+## Active CNE Operations
+
+- What does that do exactly?
+- Forces the target to covertly contact a FOXACID server.
+- What is FOXACID suppose to do?
+- Perform vulnerability analysis and exploitation of the target (if possible).
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+## Introduction to FOXACID
+
+- FOXACID is the cover term for a DNT/ROC project to deliver content based exploits (CBE) to web browsers.
+- The greatest vulnerability to your computer: your web browser.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+## Introduction to FOXACID
+
+- FOXACID Servers sit on Internet.
+- Publicly addressable, DNS resolved.
+- Utilizes whitelist for security, filtering.
+- Requires specially crafted URL tag to contact FA Servers (FOXACID Tag).
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+## Example Tag
+
+```
+http://Domain/PluginName/PluginName2/ListBegin/Group/ListEnd/DeploymentIDTLN_MSGID.html
+
+http://baseball2.2ndhalfplays.com/nested/attribs/bins/1/define/forms9952_z1zzz.html
+```
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+## FOXACID Tags
+
+- Designed to look ambiguous.
+- Unique for a particular target / operation.
+- All fields in the tag denote something special...
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+## Redirection to FOXACID
+
+- A FOXACID Tag is a special URL pointing to a particular FOXACID Server.
+- Contacting the FA Server will (hopefully) result in the contactor being exploited.
+- We want the target to be exploited.
+- How do we redirect the target to the FOXACID Server without being noticed.
+- Use NIGHTSTAND or BADDECISION
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+## The End.
+
+## Questions?
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/05-Introduction-to-WLAN-CNE-Operations-Redacted/metadata.json b/data/05-Introduction-to-WLAN-CNE-Operations-Redacted/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5c3e0f2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/05-Introduction-to-WLAN-CNE-Operations-Redacted/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+{
+ "title": "Introduction to WLAN / 802.11 Active CNE Operations",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "This NSA powerpoint introduces computer network exploitation (CNE) criteria and assesment as well as active CNE operations. It also introduces the FOXACID program, which is a program to deliver content based exploits to web browsers.",
+ "long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN NSA close access training presentation dated 15-16 December 2010, covering wireless LAN CNE operations for TAO operators conducting off-net physical proximity missions. The document describes the operational workflow from passive wireless survey through active CNE exploitation, with FOXACID as the central exploitation infrastructure.\n\nThe operational concept is described as \"passive to active\" — operators first conduct a passive survey to locate the target network, then transition to active operations. BLINDDATE serves dual roles as both the survey tool and the vulnerability analysis framework for 802.11 networks. Assessment criteria before launching an active operation include confirming clients are present on the network, determining the encryption setting in use (Open, WEP, WPA or WPA2 dictates which capability applies), and measuring signal-to-noise ratio to confirm sufficient signal strength for successful injection.\n\nThe active CNE goal is to redirect the target device to TAO infrastructure without being noticed. This is accomplished by injecting a payload destined for the target client that forces it to covertly contact a FOXACID server. Two active CNE tools are covered: NIGHTSTAND and BADDECISION, with HAPPYHOUR mentioned as a third plug-in option. The criteria for choosing between NIGHTSTAND and BADDECISION operations are described as the primary focus of the assessment section.\n\nFOXACID is introduced as \"the cover term for a DNT/ROC project to deliver content based exploits (CBE) to web browsers.\" FOXACID servers sit on the public internet with publicly addressable, DNS-resolved addresses, and use a whitelist for security and filtering. Access requires a specially crafted FOXACID Tag — a unique URL pointing to a specific FOXACID server, designed to look ambiguous and constructed so that all fields encode operational meaning. An example tag is provided: a URL structured as Domain/PluginName/PluginName2/ListBegin/Group/ListEnd/DeploymentID/TLN_MSGID.html, with the example domain baseball2.2ndhalfplays.com illustrating how tags are designed to appear as ordinary web addresses.",
+ "tags": [
+ "students",
+ "training",
+ "education",
+ "Tailored Access Operations",
+ "analysts",
+ "vulnerability analysis",
+ "vulnerability exploitation",
+ "vulnerabilities",
+ "certification",
+ "network exploitation",
+ "WiFi",
+ "WEP",
+ "WPA",
+ "WPA2",
+ "course",
+ "passive SIGINT",
+ "active operations",
+ "web browsers",
+ "off-net",
+ "Computer Network Exploitation",
+ "content-based exploit",
+ "CBE",
+ "browser exploitation",
+ "payload injection",
+ "wireless survey",
+ "redirection",
+ "exploit delivery"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2010-12-15",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "SI",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN",
+ "genre": "slides",
+ "programs": [
+ "FOXACID",
+ "BLINDDATE",
+ "NIGHTSTAND",
+ "HAPPYHOUR",
+ "BADDECISION"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2016-08-19",
+ "title": "The NSA Leak Is Real, Snowden Documents Confirm",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2016/08/19/the-nsa-was-hacked-snowden-documents-confirm/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Biddle, Sam"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [
+ "Lee, Micah"
+ ],
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/3031640/05-Introduction-to-WLAN-CNE-Operations-Redacted.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "c3dcd6d4e9a539d14afebdf5df5b295fb39d2b7bdfa6ffa81a1766bc309b0c3f",
+ "pages": 17
+}
diff --git a/data/07-Introduction-to-BADDECISION-Redacted/07-Introduction-to-BADDECISION-Redacted.md b/data/07-Introduction-to-BADDECISION-Redacted/07-Introduction-to-BADDECISION-Redacted.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2820303
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/07-Introduction-to-BADDECISION-Redacted/07-Introduction-to-BADDECISION-Redacted.md
@@ -0,0 +1,589 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+# Introduction to BADDECISION
+
+December 15-16, 2010
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+## Classification
+
+The overall classification of this presentation is
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+All slides and materiels contained in this presentation should be considered classified TS//SI//NF
+(unless otherwise noted)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+## Section Overview
+
+* BADDECISION Overview
+* BADDECISION Components
+* BADDECISION Prerequisites
+* BADDECISION Operational Flow
+* BADDECISION Step Through
+* Instructor-led Demos and Labs
+* BADDECISION Pros / Cons
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+## At The End...
+
+You should be able to....
+* Understand BADDECISION Components
+* Understand the BADDECISION Prereqs.
+* Conduct a BADDECISION Operation.
+* List the Pros / Cons of NIGHTSTAND.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+## BADDECISION Overview
+
+* BADDECISION is an “802.11 CNE tool that uses a true man-in-the-middle attack and a frame injection technique to redirect a target client to a FOXACID server.”
+* Takes advantage of shared open medium and the HTTP protocol.
+* Works for WPA / WPA2!
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+## BADDECISION Prerequisites
+
+* Working BLINDDATE Survey!
+* Client on the Target network
+* Security Level: WPA / WPA2
+* Ability to maintain a reliable connection to a target network.
+* Don't forget FOXACID Tag!
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+## BADDECISION Components
+
+* HAPPYHOUR
+* SECONDDATE
+* Open Sources Tools
+ * macchanger
+ * wireshark
+ * nmap
+ * ettercap
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+## BADDECISION Preparation
+
+```
+FOXACID Server
+CNN Web Server
+Internet
+Access Point
+Target Client
+Operator
+```
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+## BADDECISION Preparation
+
+```
+Target Client
+Access Point
+Operator
+```
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+## BADDECISION Preparation
+
+```
+Target Client
+cess Point
+Operator
+```
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+## BADDECISION Preparation
+
+```
+Target Client
+Access Point
+Operator
+```
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+## BADDECISION Preparation
+
+```
+Target Client
+Access Point
+Operator
+SECONDDATE
+```
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+## BADDECISION Preparation
+
+```
+Target Client
+ccess Point
+Operator
+```
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+## BADDECISION Preparation
+
+```
+Target Client
+IP: 192.168.1.2
+MAC: BB
+
+Access Point
+IP: 192.168.1.1
+MAC: AA
+
+Operator
+IP: 192.168.1.3
+MAC: CC
+```
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+## BADDECISION Preparation
+
+```
+Target Client
+IP: 192.168.1.2
+MAC: BB
+
+OK
+
+ccess Point
+IP: 192.168.1.1
+MAC: AA
+
+Hey Access Point! Send everything destined for IP 192.168.1.2 to MAC CC.
+
+Operator
+IP: 192.168.1.3
+MAC: CC
+```
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+## BADDECISION Preparation
+
+```
+OK
+
+Target Client
+IP: 192.168.1.2
+MAC: BB
+
+ccess Point
+IP: 192.168.1.1
+MAC: AA
+
+Hey Access Point! Send everything destined for IP 192.168.1.2 to MAC CC.
+
+Operator
+IP: 192.168.1.3
+MAC: CC
+```
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+## BADDECISION Preparation
+
+```
+Target Client
+IP: 192.168.1.2
+MAC: BB
+
+ccess Point
+IP: 192.168.1.1
+MAC: AA
+
+Operator
+IP: 192.168.1.3
+MAC: CC
+```
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+## BADDECISION Preparation
+
+
+```
+Target Client
+IP: 192.168.1.2
+MAC: BB
+
+ccess Point
+IP: 192.168.1.1
+MAC: AA
+
+Operator
+IP: 192.168.1.3
+MAC: CC
+```
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+# Overview of Operational Scenario
+
+* Operator with BLINDDATE System.
+* FOXACID Tag issued for Target.
+* Target Client browsing the Internet via web browser :)
+
+```
+FOXACID Server
+CNN Web Server
+Internet
+Target Client
+Access Point
+Operator
+```
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+## Webpage Request
+
+* Target issues HTTP GET Request to webpage of interest (cnn.com)
+
+
+```
+FOXACID Server
+CNN Web Server
+Internet
+Target Client
+Access Point
+Operator
+```
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+## Injection
+
+* Operate uses SECONDDATE to inject a redirection payload at Target Client.
+* Target Client's original HTTP GET Request continues on it's normal path.
+
+```
+FOXACID Server
+CNN Web Server
+Internet
+Target Client
+Access Point
+Operator
+```
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+## Refresh and Covert Request
+
+* Injected payload forces Target Client to refresh and send another HTTP GET Request to desired webpage.
+* Covert Request is issued by Target Client to FOXACID Server.
+
+```
+FOXACID Server
+CNN Web Server
+Internet
+Target Client
+Access Point
+Operator
+```
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+## FOXACID Request Received
+
+* FOXACID receives request from entity.
+* Entity is validated as Target Client by FOXACID Tag.
+* Response to original HTTP GET Request is dropped (but don't worry, that's good)
+
+```
+FOXACID Server
+CNN Web Server
+Internet
+Target Client
+cess Point
+Operator
+```
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+## FOXACID Browser Survey
+
+* FOXACID Server instantiates browser survey on Target Client to detect vulnerabilities.
+
+```
+FOXACID Server
+CNN Web Server
+Internet
+Target Client
+cess Point
+Operator
+```
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+## FOXACID Browser Survey
+
+* FOXACID Server instantiates browser survey on Target Client to detect vulnerabilities.
+
+```
+FOXACID Server
+CNN Web Server
+Internet
+Target Client
+Access Point
+Operator
+```
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+## Survey, Payload, Exploitation
+
+* Covert communicates continue between FOXACID and Target until found not vulnerabilities or exploited.
+* Target Client continues normal webpage browsing, completely unaware :)
+
+```
+FOXACID Server
+CNN Web Server
+Internet
+Targ Client
+cess Point
+Operator
+```
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+## WHACKED!
+
+* That's the ultimate goal.
+
+```
+FOXACID Server
+CNN Web Server
+Internet
+Target Client
+Whacked!!!
+Access Point
+Operator
+```
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+## BADDECISION Step Through
+
+* Let's go through this together...
+* ... because there are many more pieces!
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+## BADDECISION Demos and Labs
+
+* Grab a partner!
+* One Target Client, one Operator.
+* Have fun getting whacked!
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+## BADDECISION Pros / Cons
+
+* Pros
+ * Works for WPA/WPA2 networks.
+ * Can reliability see all communications between target and FOXACID.
+* Cons
+ * Larger signature than NIGHTSTAND.
+ * Requires higher SNR to maintain reliable communications between target and FOXACID.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+CLOSE ACCESS
+
+## The End.
+
+Questions?
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/07-Introduction-to-BADDECISION-Redacted/metadata.json b/data/07-Introduction-to-BADDECISION-Redacted/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c3a764f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/07-Introduction-to-BADDECISION-Redacted/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+{
+ "title": "Introduction to BADDECISION",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "This presentation details the use of the NSA program BADDECISION, which is a computer network exploitation tool (CNE) that uses a frame injection technique to redirect the target client to a FOXACID server.",
+ "long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN NSA close access training presentation dated 15-16 December 2010, covering the BADDECISION wireless CNE tool. It is a companion document to the WLAN/802.11 Active CNE Operations presentation, providing tool-specific training for one of the two active CNE tools named in that document.\n\nBADDECISION is defined as \"an 802.11 CNE tool that uses a true man-in-the-middle attack and a frame injection technique to redirect a target client to a FOXACID server.\" Its key distinguishing capability over NIGHTSTAND is that it works against WPA and WPA2 encrypted wireless networks — not just open networks — by exploiting the shared open medium and HTTP protocol rather than requiring the operator to decrypt the wireless traffic.\n\nThe tool comprises two NSA-developed components — HAPPYHOUR and SECONDDATE — plus open source tools including macchanger, Wireshark, nmap and ettercap. Prerequisites are a working BLINDDATE survey confirming a client is present on the target network, WPA/WPA2 encryption, ability to maintain a reliable connection, and a valid FOXACID tag for the target.\n\nThe operational flow is described step by step. The operator uses ARP poisoning to position themselves as a man-in-the-middle between the target client and the access point — instructing the access point to send all traffic destined for the target's IP to the operator's MAC address. When the target issues an HTTP GET request to a website, SECONDDATE injects a redirection payload at the target client while allowing the original request to continue. The injected payload forces the target to refresh and issue a covert request to the FOXACID server. FOXACID validates the target via the FOXACID tag, drops the response to the original request, and begins browser vulnerability surveying, proceeding through survey, payload delivery and exploitation while the target continues normal browsing unaware.\n\nThe pros and cons section is significant for the operational comparison it provides: BADDECISION's advantage is WPA/WPA2 compatibility and reliable visibility of all communications between target and FOXACID; its disadvantages are a larger operational signature than NIGHTSTAND and a higher signal-to-noise ratio requirement to maintain reliable communications.",
+ "tags": [
+ "students",
+ "training",
+ "education",
+ "Tailored Access Operations",
+ "analysts",
+ "HTTP",
+ "vulnerability analysis",
+ "vulnerability exploitation",
+ "vulnerabilities",
+ "certification",
+ "network exploitation",
+ "MITM",
+ "WiFi",
+ "WEP",
+ "WPA",
+ "WPA2",
+ "course",
+ "passive SIGINT",
+ "active operations",
+ "web browsers",
+ "open source"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2010-12-15",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN",
+ "genre": "slides",
+ "programs": [
+ "BADDECISION",
+ "NIGHTSTAND",
+ "FOXACID",
+ "BLINDDATE",
+ "HAPPYHOUR",
+ "SECONDDATE"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2016-08-19",
+ "title": "The NSA Leak Is Real, Snowden Documents Confirm",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2016/08/19/the-nsa-was-hacked-snowden-documents-confirm/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Biddle, Sam"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [
+ "Lee, Micah"
+ ],
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/3031639/07-Introduction-to-BADDECISION-Redacted.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "522f4e04483306dbe10ec1177c57badfe0605d27469b2ce336605ec70f39ca2c",
+ "pages": 31
+}
diff --git a/data/10th-Anniversary-Edition-EP-3-Damage-Assessment/10th-Anniversary-Edition-EP-3-Damage-Assessment.md b/data/10th-Anniversary-Edition-EP-3-Damage-Assessment/10th-Anniversary-Edition-EP-3-Damage-Assessment.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3c7b788
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/10th-Anniversary-Edition-EP-3-Damage-Assessment/10th-Anniversary-Edition-EP-3-Damage-Assessment.md
@@ -0,0 +1,2887 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY · UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
+
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY · UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
+
+EP-3E Collision:
+Cryptologic Damage Assessment and Incident Review
+
+Final Report
+
+Prepared by the
+EP-3 Cryptologic Assessment Team
+July 2001
+
+Classified by: NSA/CSS Classification Manual
+ Dated: 23 February 1998
+Declassify on: X1 Copy #______
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+ii
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+(U) Preface
+
+(U//FOUO) On 1 April 2001, a People's Republic of China (PRC) F-8-II fighter collided with a U.S. Navy EP-3E electronic surveillance aircraft operating over the South China Sea. The EP-3E aircraft survived the collision and subsequently recovered in the PRC at Lingshui Airfield on Hainan Island. The crew was detained by the PRC for 11 days before being repatriated to the United States. This report is a review and assessment of the EP-3E incident, as directed by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and the Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service (DIRNSA).
+
+(U//FOUO) The information used to prepare this report was derived from two rounds of debriefing the 24 EP-3E crew members, a review of documentation relevant to the conduct of airborne SIGINT surveillance operations, interviews with numerous individuals and organizations associated with the event, data collected from reenacted destruction testing, and analysis of the recovered aircraft. This report details the materials and equipments presumed compromised to the PRC and estimates the damage from the compromise. It describes the crew's reactions from the time of the collision until the crew and aircraft came under control of the PRC at Lingshui Airfield. It reviews emergency processes and procedures, potential PRC actions, foreign relations impact, counterintelligence issues, and cryptologic crisis response. Finally, the report recommends actions to minimize and manage the risk of like events in the future.
+
+(U//FOUO) This is a final report, delivered to the CNO and DIRNSA. All previous reports of cryptologic loss and impact from this event are superseded. The Commander, Naval Security Group, is responsible for coordinating analysis and reporting of any subsequent findings developed from examination of the recovered EP-3E.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+iii
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+iv
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+(U) Executive Summary
+
+(S) The collision of a PRC F-8-II with a U.S. EP-3E over the South China Sea on 1 April 2001 triggered a series of events, the outcomes of which ranged from very good to very poor. Through superb airmanship and teamwork, 24 crew members and an $80 million aircraft were saved. COMSEC keying material and ELINT data were largely jettisoned. The crew acquitted themselves well while detained. Conversely, sensitive COMINT equipment, large volumes of technical data, and SIGINT policy directives were compromised.
+
+(S) This assessment addresses two interrelated tasks. The first was to review and assess the damage to cryptologic sources and methods from the compromise of COMSEC and SIGINT material and the response of the U.S. Cryptologic System (USCS) to the crisis. The second was to review and assess emergency destruction, classified material handling, communications, and emergency procedures.
+
+(S) The USCS response to the crisis was generally good. The report makes some recommendations regarding policy and dissemination that should further improve customer support. NSA's separate internal look at its crisis procedures promises to result in additional improvements.
+
+(S) Damage to U.S. COMSEC products and methods, i.e., cryptographic devices, keying material, and encryption methodology, was low, primarily due to design philosophy. Cryptographic devices are designed in anticipation of being lost or compromised. The significant portion of the encryption process –the key– is normally changed daily. Without the key, adversaries cannot decrypt or read U.S. communications, even if they have obtained the cryptographic device and have the target communications. Procedures for superseding key are routine and efficient. In this incident, within 15 hours of the EP-3E's landing in the PRC, all keying materials, except for the Global Positioning System (GPS) worldwide key, were superseded. The crew jettisoned most of the onboard keying material.
+
+(S) There is no such holistic approach for SIGINT material. The assumption has been that sensitive SIGINT material will be protected or destroyed before it is lost or compromised. However, events again proved this premise wrong. Emergency destruction techniques have not kept pace with technology and are not always suited for an era where capabilities reside in software, not hardware. When, for a variety of reasons, emergency destruction was not carried out effectively, compromise of SIGINT capabilities to the PRC resulted. Damage to the whole of U.S. and allied SIGINT capability against the PRC is assessed to be low (i.e., little or no damage, recoverable in the normal course of operations). Damage in the realm of tactical SIGINT is assessed to be medium (i.e., significant damage, recoverable with concerted effort). These are worst-case assessments. Importantly, no national sources or methods were compromised.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+v
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+(S) The EP-3E incident revealed SIGINT emergency destruction procedures to be outdated and inadequate. Moreover, individual and crew training were deficient. Emergency destruction training –when practiced– lacked realism and context. There were no readily available means or standard procedures for timely destruction of computers, electronic media, and hardcopy material. Procedures for control of classified information were generally adequate but not followed completely. Configuration of SIGINT systems and software lacked policy standards and management guidelines. Finally, destruction activities were complicated by communication problems. The crew's ability to communicate was impacted by noise, system configuration, and the kaleidoscope of actions attendant to preparations for bailing out, then ditching, and finally, landing at Lingshui. Notwithstanding the chaotic circumstances on the aircraft following the collision, we conclude that the crew had sufficient time to jettison all sensitive materials. We believe that better policy, training, communications, and capabilities would have improved the outcome of the emergency destruction efforts.
+
+(S) Prompt corrective action is needed in many areas. Foremost is a need to address a systemic complacency regarding the safeguarding of sensitive information. This incident clearly demonstrates the power of the unitary approach taken for COMSEC material, one founded on the assumption that material will be lost or compromised and that safeguarding information, not destroying material, is the ultimate goal. This philosophy led to creation of a regime designed to prevent exploitation of U.S. communications despite loss or compromise. A similar approach to SIGINT systems and information is needed commencing with the same goal of safeguarding information by preventing exploitation. From that basis, it is possible to shape specific means (e.g., physical destruction, encryption, overwriting data) with governing standards, configuration management, and training to reduce or even eliminate damage from loss or compromise of SIGINT information.
+
+(S) In the course of our inquiries, many have suggested the need for a universal solution to SIGINT destruction. Because of the range of current capabilities in use, we have not found one. New safeguard capabilities are needed. Promising areas of development include the use of encryption techniques to render information on a laptop useless if compromised. As plans call for more and increasingly sensitive SIGINT capabilities to be fielded, new safeguard capabilities are required not only for SRO platforms, but for all SIGINT collection activities at risk.
+
+(U//FOUO) This report makes recommendations for improvements and suggests an action agency for each. Some are already completed or ongoing. All need to be tracked to completion, examined for applicability across all activities, not just SRO, and institutionalized. Failure to address these issues decisively will not just continue the likelihood of future losses, it will guarantee it.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+vi
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+(U) Key Findings
+
+(U//FOUO) The EP-3 Cryptologic Assessment Team reached the following conclusions:
+
+* (S) Potential damage to tactical U.S. SIGINT capabilities against the PRC from the compromise of tactical sources and methods is assessed to be medium.
+* (S) Potential damage to overall U.S. SIGINT capabilities against the PRC as a result of materials compromised is assessed to be low.
+* (S//SI) The greatest potential for PRC intelligence gains is in the area of analyzing and potentially emulating U.S. COMINT signals analysis equipment and methodology, especially the LUNCHBOX PROFORMA processor and MARTES analysis tools.
+* (U//FOUO) The incident revealed a systemic complacency regarding policy, planning, and training support to EP-3E SRO missions.
+* (S) Overall damage resulting from the compromise of cryptographic equipments and materials is assessed to be low.
+* (S) The greatest potential for PRC COMSEC gains is in the area of analyzing and potentially emulating U.S. COMSEC tradecraft.
+* (S//SI) The fact of the U.S. ability to acquire and locate signals associated with PRC submarines was compromised.
+* (S//SI) National-level U.S. SIGINT (e.g., Special Collection Service, Overhead, Clandestine SIGINT) sources and methods were not compromised.
+* (S//SI) As of July 2001, the U.S. Cryptologic System has not detected any changes to PRC or other countries' communications resulting from the EP-3E compromise.
+* (S//SI) Compromised signals processing capabilities will not allow the PRC to make any advances in exploiting U.S. encryption systems, nor will it allow the PRC to discover any flaws in the protection of its own communications.
+* (U//FOUO) There was no configuration management process in place for control and inventory of deployed SIGINT materials and equipments.
+* (C) The overall potential foreign relations impact from compromise of materials onboard the EP-3E is assessed to be low.
+* (C) The EP-3E incident was multifaceted (e.g., military operational, diplomatic, intelligence compromise) but data flow beyond the normal military audience was initially limited.
+* (C) Restrictions on dissemination of "raw" SIGINT led to frustration and misunderstanding among some customers.
+* (U//FOUO) No specific guidance existed regarding Mission Commander or aircrew actions should an SRO aircraft be forced or, through emergency, be required to land in the PRC.
+* (C) A substantial amount of non-mission-essential classified information was carried onboard the aircraft.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+vii
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+* (C) Inventory procedures did not require sufficient detail to identify reliably the content of classified equipments, computers, or hardcopy materials.
+* (C) Crew training for emergency destruction was minimal and did not meet squadron requirements; this deficiency was the primary cause of the compromise of classified material.
+* (C) There was sufficient time to jettison all sensitive materials from the aircraft.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+viii
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+(U) Table of Contents
+
+(U) Preface iii
+
+(U) Executive Summary v
+
+(U) Key Findings vii
+
+1.0 (U) Introduction 1
+
+2.0 (U) Methodology 3
+
+3.0 (U) Collision Incident Summary 5
+
+4.0 (U) SIGINT Review and Assessment 9
+
+ 4.1 (U) Key Findings
+ 4.2 (U) COMINT Equipment and Documentation
+ 4.3 (U) ELINT Equipment and Documentation
+ 4.4 (U) SIGINT Configuration and Materials Management
+
+5.0 (U) IA Review and Assessment 23
+
+ 5.1 (U) Key Findings
+ 5.2 (U) Cryptographic Tutorial
+ 5.3 (U) Cryptographic Materials and Equipments
+ 5.4 (C) Potential for PRC Intelligence Gain from IA Compromises
+
+6.0 (U) PRC Potential Actions and the Cryptologic Response 29
+
+ 6.1 (U) Key Finding
+ 6.2 (U) SIGINT Collection Strategy
+ 6.3 (U) Cryptologic Foreign Partner Impact
+ 6.4 (U) PRC Sharing and Previous Access to Compromised Data
+ 6.5 (U) Counterintelligence Issues
+ 6.6 (C) Potential for Recovery of Jettisoned Equipment
+
+7.0 (U) U.S. Cryptologic System Crisis Response 37
+
+ 7.1 (U) Key Findings
+ 7.2 (U) SIGINT Support
+ 7.3 (U) IA Crisis Response
+ 7.4 (U) Crisis Management
+ 7.5 (U) Communications and Interagency Coordination
+ 7.6 (U) SIGINT Policy Issues
+ 7.7 (U) Customer Views
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+ix
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+ 7.8 (U) Crew Debriefing Procedures
+ 7.9 (U) Damage Assessment Procedures
+ 7.10 (U) Recommendations
+
+8.0 (U) Emergency Processes and Procedures 43
+
+ 8.1 (U) Key Findings
+ 8.2 (U) Policy
+ 8.3 (U) Radio Communications
+ 8.4 (U) Internal Communications
+ 8.5 (U) Classified and Sensitive Material Handling
+ 8.6 (U) Emergency Destruction Policy, Procedures, and Training
+ 8.7 (U) Crew Reaction
+ 8.8 (U) Other Tactical SIGINT Platforms
+
+9.0 (U) Systemic Issues 59
+
+ 9.1 (U) Key Finding
+ 9.2 (U) Discussion
+ 9.3 (U) Recommendation
+
+(U) Glossary 61
+
+(U) Appendices
+
+Appendix A (U) Summary of Recommendations 66
+
+Appendix B (U//FOUO) List of Cryptologic Equipment and Information Compromised 72
+
+Appendix C (U//FOUO) Cryptologic Foreign Partner Impact 87
+
+Appendix D (U) Destruction Test Procedures 91
+
+Appendix E (U) EP-3E Radio Equipment and Networks 94
+
+Appendix F (U) Schematic of EP-3E with Position Identifications 96
+
+Appendix G (U) Other Tactical SIGINT Platforms 97
+
+Appendix H (U) Crisis Response Interviews 101
+
+Appendix I (U//FOUO) EP-3 Cryptologic Assessment Team Members 103
+
+Appendix J (U//FOUO) EP-3 Incident Assessment and Review Terms of Reference 104
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+x
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+1.0 (U) Introduction
+
+(C) The EP-3E incident resulted in compromise of classified and sensitive Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Communications Security (COMSEC) equipment and information. It also illuminated deficiencies in policy, emergency procedures, and classified material control.
+
+(C) For damage assessment purposes, we have assumed the worst case, i.e., the PRC will fully exploit the compromised equipments and materials and apply what it learns to maximum advantage. It may be several years before we can judge how the PRC actually applies intelligence gained from the compromised information, and any such assessment will be conducted against the backdrop of ongoing upgrades to PRC capabilities. In some instances, we are highly confident of the nature and extent of data compromised; in other cases, such as those involving electronic media or the contents of personal notes and working aids, we are less confident. Factors affecting our confidence include the effectiveness of attempted destruction of the equipment, PRC ability to recover data from damaged media, the accuracy of crew member recall regarding classified information in their control, and configuration management practices.
+
+(C) This assessment focuses on potential gains to the PRC from compromised equipments and materials. Damage could increase if the PRC shares compromised information with other nations.
+
+(C) To characterize damage to SIGINT sources and methods and COMSEC products and methods, we use low, medium, and high ratings. Each term refers to the ability of the U.S. Cryptologic System to recover from the compromise:
+
+Low: Little or no damage, recoverable with a normal level of effort.
+Medium: Significant damage, recoverable with concerted effort.
+High: Grave damage, assessed to be unrecoverable.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+1
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+2
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+2.0 (U) Methodology
+
+(C) The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and the Director, National Security Agency (DIRNSA) established the EP-3 Cryptologic Assessment Team on 27 April 2001. The team's purpose was to assess the cryptologic damage from the EP-3E's landing on Hainan Island and to make recommendations to improve processes and procedures for future Sensitive Reconnaissance Operations (SRO) missions. Representatives from the Department of the Navy, National Security Agency, Department of the Air Force, and Department of the Army served as members of the team. The team focused on all materials and equipments onboard the EP-3E when it departed its staging base in Japan, actions and decision-making during the mission and until repatriation, and the condition of recovered cryptologic materials and equipments. To accomplish the assessment, the team reviewed all materials from the crew's Hawaii debriefs, re-interviewed the entire crew in Maryland, met with Intelligence Community personnel, examined an EP-3E at Patuxent Naval Air Station, visited units engaged in SRO missions, reenacted destruction testing, and analyzed the recovered aircraft.
+
+(U//FOUO) To promote openness, Navy mishap procedures were followed. Thus, a confidentiality memorandum, authorized by the Secretary of the Navy, was offered to and accepted by each individual. This agreement stated that any information provided by the crew would be used only for the purposes of this damage assessment and would not be made available for any other purpose. The purpose for offering a promise of confidentiality was to overcome any reluctance of an individual to reveal complete and candid information surrounding the event.
+
+(U//FOUO) The team received invaluable assistance from the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) which played a primary role in repatriating the crew. JPRA personnel provided unique insight on the Hawaii debriefings and trained assessment team members on interview techniques and processes. The JPRA psychologist who accompanied the crew in Hawaii was also present with the team and the crew throughout the Maryland re-interviews.
+
+(C) Further examination of returned EP-3E systems and other carry-on materials may yield additional insight into the PRC's success in exploiting this compromise. The Commander, Naval Security Group, is responsible for coordinating analysis and reporting of any subsequent findings developed from examination of the recovered EP-3E. Also, continued vigilance by the Intelligence Community for signals, human, and imagery intelligence that might indicate that the PRC is using data gleaned from this compromise is prudent.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+3
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+4
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+3.0 (U) Collision Incident Summary
+
+(S//SI) At 1947Z on 31 March 2001, an EP-3E aircraft (Bureau Number 156511) departed Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, Japan, with 24 crew members onboard for a scheduled CINCPACFLT-tasked Sensitive Reconnaissance Operations (SRO) mission in the South China Sea. The crew's primary tasking was to monitor the signals environment of the People's Republic of China (PRC), with emphasis on PRC South Sea Fleet tactical communications, radars, and weapons systems.
+
+(S//NF) The mission aircraft proceeded southwest from Okinawa to SRO track 5Q2002 (Figure 1), flying west between Taiwan and the Philippines before following the coastline of the PRC past Hong Kong toward Hainan Island. The mission aircraft then flew steadily in a southwesterly direction approximately 60 nautical miles (nm) off the coast of Hainan Island in international airspace. Activity was light, with only Early Warning and Air Traffic Control radars and routine military communications checks intercepted. The EP-3E was steady on course 220 at 22,500 feet, flying at an airspeed of 185 knots. Weather was clear with seven-mile visibility and a broken cloud layer at 15,000 feet.
+
+(S//SI) Beginning at approximately 0043Z, Chinese linguists aboard the EP-3E and operators at the Kunia Regional Security Operations Center (KRSOC) intercepted activity on Lingshui Airfield's primary frequency. The activity included ground controller and pilot communications checks, fighter pre-flight activities, takeoff
+
+```
+SECRET NOFORN
+NDB LONGZHOU
+NDB NANNING
+NDB GAOYAO
+NDB PINGZHOU
+HONG KONG
+LINGSUI
+DOVAR
+SUNEK
+ASIAN COASTAL BUFFER ZONE
+GULF OF TONKIN
+HAINAN DAO
+HAIKOU
+TAIWAN
+PHILIPPINE
+SOUTH CHINA SEA
+VIETNAM
+20°
+SECRET NOFORN
+```
+
+Figure 1
+(S//NF) SRO Track 5Q2002
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+5
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+sequence, and ground-controlled intercept. At this time the EP-3E was approximately 70 nm due east of Lingshui near the end of its outbound leg and approaching its turnpoint to return to base. Between 0048Z-0049Z both the mission aircraft and KRSOC issued advisories on the PRC reaction to the presence of the EP-3E. At 0051Z, the mission aircraft acknowledged receipt of the KRSOC advisory via secure satellite communications.
+
+(C) The EP-3E reported visual contact with two F-8 II fighters at 0055Z. The Mission Commander and Senior Evaluator decided to make the last turn to the northeast early, before the fighters moved closer to the EP-3E. The Mission Commander initiated a slow left turn, steadying on course 070 by 0100Z. During the turn, the PRC fighters maintained a distance of approximately one mile from the EP-3E.
+
+(C) At approximately 0102Z, one fighter commenced the first of three distinct approaches to the mission aircraft from its left rear quarter while the other fighter maintained station approximately one half-mile behind, below, and to the left of the mission aircraft. On the first approach, the fighter closed to within ten feet of the mission aircraft. The PRC pilot rendered a salute and fell back to approximately 100 feet off the left wing of the EP-3E. At 0103Z, the same fighter approached the mission aircraft a second time, closing to within five feet. While in close formation with the mission aircraft, the PRC pilot was observed with his oxygen mask unfastened, gesturing to the EP-3E. The fighter then fell back to approximately 100 feet off the left wing.
+
+(S//SI) At 0104Z, the PRC fighter closed on the mission aircraft again, exhibiting a much greater closure rate than in the previous two approaches. In an apparent maneuver to decrease his closure rate, the PRC pilot increased his angle of attack. Although the maneuver did decrease the closure rate, it placed the fighter directly below, and in very close proximity to, the EP-3E's left wing. At 0105Z, the PRC pilot reported that he was unable to maneuver and was being sucked in by the EP-3E.
+
+(C) At 0105Z, the F-8 II impacted the EP-3E's left outboard propeller just forward of the F-8 II's vertical stabilizer. The resulting structural damage caused the F-8 II to break in half and lose controlled flight. At the time of the collision, the EP-3E was flying on autopilot, straight and level. Debris from the PRC fighter impact destroyed the EP-3E's nose cone and damaged the number 1 and number 3 propellers and the number 1 engine. This damage caused the EP-3E to roll left nearly inverted and descend uncontrolled more than 8000 feet before the pilot recovered partial control. Unable to maintain altitude or cabin pressurization, the EP-3E continued to descend another 6000 feet before full control was regained. The collision of the two aircraft occurred near position 1735N 11055E, approximately 70 nm southeast of Hainan Island.
+
+(C) While still in the dive, the Mission Commander ordered the crew to prepare to bail out. Then, with partial control restored but the aircraft still losing altitude, the Mission Commander gave the order to prepare to ditch. At 0113Z, the aircraft issued a MAYDAY call via its secure satellite communications and indicated a mission abort, on course 300 degrees at 240 knots. Once the flight crew was able to maintain altitude at
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+6
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+8000 feet, they weighed their bail out and ditching options. Given the uncertainty of the crew's chance of surviving a bailout and the low likelihood of the damaged and difficult-to-control EP-3E surviving a ditching attempt, the Mission Commander elected to try to land the aircraft.
+
+(C) The nature of the damage to the number 1 engine and the unknown extent of damage to the rest of the aircraft dictated that a landing take place as soon as possible, before the aircraft's condition further deteriorated. The navigator directed a course to Lingshui Airfield, where the pilot made a successful no-flap landing at 0134Z. No crew was injured during the incident. At 0141Z, the mission aircraft reported, "On deck at Lingshui," via secure satellite communications.
+
+(C) Prior to landing, repeated EP-3E MAYDAY calls and requests for assistance on an international distress frequency (243.0 MHz) went unanswered by PRC controllers at Lingshui. Continuing attempts to contact the tower without success, the EP-3E conducted a clearing pass over the airfield at Lingshui before landing. Upon landing, the aircraft taxied under truck escort, parked off the edge of the runway and continued running engines for approximately ten minutes before shutting down. Approximately 20-24 PRC military personnel were in the vicinity of the EP-3E, six to eight of whom were armed with bolt-action weapons. The PRC military personnel did not point weapons at the aircrew, but the Mission Commander assessed that they were getting impatient. At approximately 0200Z, the Mission Commander ordered the crew to deplane, placing the crew and the aircraft in PRC control.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+7
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+8
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+4.0 (U) SIGINT Review and Assessment
+
+4.1 (U) Key Findings
+
+* (S) Potential damage to tactical U.S. SIGINT capabilities against the PRC from the compromise of tactical sources and methods is assessed to be medium.
+* (S) Potential damage to overall U.S. SIGINT capabilities against the PRC as a result of materials compromised is assessed to be low.
+* (S//SI) The greatest potential for PRC intelligence gains is in the area of analyzing and potentially emulating U.S. COMINT signals analysis equipment and methodology, especially the LUNCHBOX PROFORMA processor and MARTES analysis tools.
+* (S//SI) The fact of the U.S. ability to acquire and locate signals associated with PRC submarines was compromised.
+* (S//SI) National-level U.S. SIGINT (e.g., Special Collection Service, Overhead, Clandestine SIGINT) sources and methods were not compromised.
+* (S//SI) As of July 2001, the U.S. Cryptologic System has not detected any changes to PRC or other countries' communications resulting from the EP-3E compromise.
+* (S//SI) Compromised signals processing capabilities will not allow the PRC to make any advances in exploiting U.S. encryption systems, nor will it allow the PRC to discover any flaws in the protection of its own communications.
+* (U//FOUO) There was no configuration management process in place for control and inventory of deployed SIGINT materials and equipments.
+
+4.1.1 (U) Introduction
+
+(S//SI) The EP-3E carried a complete complement of SIGINT materials and equipments necessary to conduct its SRO mission against the PRC. In addition to installed equipment, six carry-on computers were onboard. The most potentially damaging compromised items were the carry-on LUNCHBOX PROFORMA processor and a laptop computer with MARTES software tools for collecting, analyzing, and processing signals. The aircraft also had an extensive inventory of SIGINT documentation in both hardcopy and electronic media. All SIGINT materials believed compromised are listed in Appendix B.
+
+(S//SI) Damage to tactical U.S. SIGINT efforts against the PRC as a result of materials compromised is assessed to be medium. Tactical collection –those missions conducted by mobile collection platforms such as the EP-3E– represents only one facet of the overall cryptologic system sources and methods. Information on national-level U.S. SIGINT collection sources and methods, such as the Special Collection Service, Overhead, or Clandestine SIGINT, was not compromised. Additionally, SIGINT sources and methods of Second and Third Party foreign partner nations were not compromised. Overall damage, therefore, to U.S. SIGINT efforts against the PRC as a result of materials compromised is assessed to be low.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+9
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+(S) This section reviews potential damage to the U.S. SIGINT system by first examining Communications Intelligence (COMINT), and then Electronic Intelligence (ELINT). Both equipment (e.g., carry-on computers, installed equipment) and documentation (e.g., technical data, working aids, crew notes) are discussed.
+
+4.2 (U) COMINT Equipment and Documentation
+
+(U//FOUO) This section focuses on COMINT, including PROFORMA. The two most sensitive systems onboard, LUNCHBOX and MARTES, are discussed in this section.
+
+4.2.1 (U) Findings
+
+* (C) All data and software on both the SCARAB computer containing the LUNCHBOX PROFORMA processor and the laptop containing MARTES signals analysis tools were compromised.
+* (S) Overall, compromised PROFORMA-related material could provide the PRC with an understanding of U.S. PROFORMA exploitation capabilities.
+* (S//SI) Compromised working aids and PROFORMA-related USSIDs provide detail about Russian-designed PROFORMA signals used in North Korea, Russia, Vietnam, and possibly the PRC.
+* (S//SI) A tape containing enciphered and unenciphered PRC Navy communications was compromised.
+* (S//SI) SIGINT technical information, such as Signals Operating Instructions (e.g., frequencies, call signs, and target identification data) and information from 23 USSIDs or excerpt of USSIDs were compromised.
+* (S) Compromised COMINT documentation included collection tasking instructions, working aids, and notes focused on Far East Asian targets, as well as detailed crew member Job Qualification Requirements (JQR).
+* (S//SI) The most sensitive documentation compromised was collection requirement tasking against specific PRC military datalink and microwave signals. This material provides insight into U.S. exploitation of these signals.
+* (S//SI) Compromised tasking instructions revealed that the U.S. has acquired data on an advanced PRC communications system still under development.
+* (S//SI) U.S. knowledge, at the SECRET//COMINT level, of the PRC Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile program was compromised.
+* (S) Compromised SIGINT equipment and material may prompt the PRC to initiate or expedite COMSEC enhancements.
+
+4.2.2 (U) COMINT Equipment
+
+(U//FOUO) COMINT equipment onboard consisted of three carry-on computers (the SCARAB computer and two laptops) and installed COMINT equipment.
+
+4.2.2.1 (U) LUNCHBOX PROFORMA Processor
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+10
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+(S) PROFORMA signals are digital command and control data communications that relay information and instructions to and from radar systems, weapon systems (e.g., surface-to-air missiles, anti-aircraft artillery, fighter aircraft), and control centers. Exploitation of this information provides U.S. and allied warfighters nearly instantaneous situational awareness data from a target country's radar systems. This information supplements U.S. sensor systems while providing insight into the target country's decision process.
+
+(S//SI) For this particular mission, the Science and Technology (S&T) Operator was tasked to collect and process PROFORMA signals possibly associated with PRC SA-10 surface-to-air missiles and PRC short-range air navigation. The SCARAB portable computer loaded with the LUNCHBOX PROFORMA processor (Figure 2) was used for this task. The LUNCHBOX processor provides unique capabilities to process worldwide PROFORMA signals and contains electronic media documentation pertaining to many of those signals.
+
+Figure 2
+(C) Recovered LUNCHBOX PROFORMA processor
+
+(S//SI) The LUNCHBOX processor's capabilities are substantial. Its software can process 40 worldwide PROFORMA signals; some teleprinter and pager signals; U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle datalink signals (for the HUNTER and PREDATOR UAVs); and the Joint Air to Surface Stand Off Missile (JASSM) datalink. The PRC is known to use two of the signals resident in LUNCHBOX. Additionally, LUNCHBOX contained detailed working aids for 29 of the 40 PROFORMA signals.
+
+(S//SI) Two PROFORMA-related USSIDs (212 and 342) –stored on electronic media that was possibly compromised– and several working aids provided detail about Russian-designed PROFORMA signals used by North Korea, Russia, Vietnam, and possibly the PRC. This material detailed the association of signals to specific weapon systems.
+
+4.2.2.2 (U) MARTES
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+11
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+(S) MARTES is the name of a set of software tools for collecting, analyzing, and processing signals and was loaded on a laptop computer. A new version of MARTES is released approximately every six months, and it is generally divided into COMINT, FISINT, and ELINT tools. The COMINT version (1999.0.2) of MARTES was used for this deployment and was classified TOP SECRET//COMINT. It contained source code, executable, help, signal parameter files, tutorials, and sample signals. Some of the sample signals were simulated data while others were real-world intercept.
+
+(S) The MARTES laptop also included a Radio Signals Notation (RASIN) Manual, RASIN Working Aid, and associated materials. Together, the RASIN manual and the aforementioned files provided a comprehensive overview of how the U.S. Cryptologic System exploits an adversary's signal environment.
+
+(S//SI) A portable, digital player/recorder used to collect the signals analyzed by MARTES contained a tape of 45 minutes of enciphered and unenciphered PRC Navy communications. The unenciphered portions carried speech segments that identified PRC communicants. When emergency destruction procedures caused the recorder to lose power, the tape was locked in the recorder's drive. The digital recorder was returned on the recovered EP-3E; however, the tape had been removed.
+
+4.2.2.3 (U) Other COMINT Equipment
+
+(C) In addition to the carry-on SCARAB computer and MARTES laptop, other COMINT equipment included the integrated COMINT collection system and the COMINT Supervisor's laptop computer.
+
+(S) The integrated COMINT collection system onboard the EP-3E consisted of antiquated HF, VHF, and UHF receivers, a rudimentary signal distribution network, and narrowband cassette recorders. The COMINT collection system used the ALD-9 antenna and processor package. System display and control terminals did not have the capacity to store classified COMINT information. This equipment suite contained no sensitive technologies, and presents no compromise concern. The COMINT Supervisor's laptop contained technical data, USSIDs, and other COMINT documentation.
+
+4.2.3 (U) Documentation
+
+4.2.3.1 (U) USSIDs
+
+(C) Twenty-three United States Signals Intelligence Directives (USSIDs) or excerpts of USSIDs were onboard the EP-3E, either in hardcopy or on electronic media (see Appendix B for a complete listing). USSIDs are directives issued by DIRNSA as official policy documents governing SIGINT activities and resources. Separate series of USSIDs cover basic SIGINT guidance; collection; processing of raw intercept data; requirements, reporting and distribution; and tasking for specific cryptologic activities.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+12
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+4.2.3.2 (U) COMINT Documentation
+
+(S//SI) EP-3E cryptologic technicians had a variety of technical aids, tasking documents, and SIGINT governing documents to assist them in collecting PRC tactical communications from coastal and inland units in the South China Sea. This documentation outlined specific PRC units of interest to the U.S. and provided detailed information on Signals Operating Instructions (e.g., target frequencies, call signs), order of battle, and the periodicity at which this data is to be collected. This information was in hardcopy format, in documents such as the Intercept Tasking Database and Collection Requirements Number tasking messages.
+
+(C) Additionally, working aids and technical notes provided detailed background data on target emitters. Several crew members also carried their individual JQRs for training and proficiency purposes. For cryptologic trainees, a completed JQR would provide specific, classified knowledge of an Area of Operations, e.g., the Far East Asian Region, and general knowledge of cryptologic functions such as collecting and processing SIGINT data.
+
+4.2.4 (U//FOUO) COMINT Equipment Damage Assessment
+
+4.2.4.1 (U) LUNCHBOX PROFORMA Processor
+
+(S) The overall damage from the compromise of the LUNCHBOX processor is considered medium. PRC exploitation of the LUNCHBOX processor would enable them to process PROFORMA in the same manner as the U.S. This analysis would provide the PRC with an understanding of U.S. capabilities against PROFORMA signals and could lead to an understanding of U.S. capabilities in other signals analysis areas.
+
+(S) Examination of the recovered LUNCHBOX processor revealed that, while externally the recovered drive appeared to be in good condition, internally the hard drive platters were destroyed. Laboratory reenactment of the crew's LUNCHBOX destruction attempts produced no damage to the hard drive. Therefore, the crew's actions are assessed not to have caused the damage. We believe the PRC shattered the hard drives after exploiting them. (For a discussion of the laboratory destruction testing at the Aberdeen Test Center, see Appendix D.) Though the PRC returned the LUNCHBOX processor, two unique signals processing circuit boards necessary for the LUNCHBOX to process PROFORMA signals were missing. All data and software on the LUNCHBOX processor are considered compromised.
+
+(S//SI) The PRC's most effective denial methods would be to move from current over-the-air transmissions to landline transmissions, or to more advanced radio communications techniques, such as frequency hopping, that could complicate the U.S. Cryptologic System's exploitation efforts. The PRC could also potentially deny future access by encrypting these signals, although encryption is not likely. PROFORMA signals are not routinely encrypted because of their perishable nature and the requirement to provide fast, dependable data throughput. However, some PROFORMA signals are
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+13
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+carried within other encrypted communication signals and that practice could be increased. These changes, especially if shared with other countries such as Cuba, Egypt, Iran, Russia, and Vietnam, could significantly impact U.S. SIGINT support to deployed U.S. and allied forces.
+
+(C) Damage from the compromise of the HUNTER and PREDATOR UAV datalink signals and the Joint Air-to-Surface Stand-off Missile (JASSM) seeker video datalink signal is assessed to be low. These datalink signals are broadcast in the clear and are unclassified.
+
+(S) In addition to PROFORMA processing software, other signal analysis tools were loaded on the SCARAB computer. While these tools represent valuable capabilities to the U.S. Cryptologic System, they are all based on open source techniques. Potential damage from this compromise is low.
+
+4.2.4.2 (U) MARTES
+
+(S) The overall damage from compromised information on the MARTES laptop is considered medium. The MARTES laptop sustained no visible damage (Figure 3), but its recovered hard drives were found to be shattered. Technical experts assess that the crew did not cause this damage. Based on all available data, we believe that the PRC copied the laptop's hard drives and then destroyed them. All data resident on the MARTES laptop, including signal identification and processing software, working aids, and signal samples, is considered compromised.
+
+Figure 3
+(C) Recovered MARTES Laptop
+
+(S) Two factors establish the assessment of this loss as medium: (1) the laptop included signal-specific processing capabilities, and (2) the laptop had source code, help files, samples and tutorials that could enable the PRC to extend and modify the capabilities of the compromised signals analysis tools. Of particular note is that some of the signal-specific processing capabilities were designed to target PRC systems.
+
+(S) Compromised capabilities provide the PRC with a comprehensive understanding of the level of U.S. signals analysis expertise as of early 1999. The key factor that limits the severity of the compromise to medium is that these capabilities will
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+14
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+not allow the PRC to make any advances in exploiting U.S. encryption systems, nor will it allow the PRC to discover flaws in the protection of its own communications.
+
+(S) Modernized equipments would likely have prevented this compromise. Computerizing the recording capabilities and providing built-in encryption would eliminate the use of tape and the associated need for physical destruction.
+
+(S) Additionally, the depth of signal processing capabilities provided by MARTES was not required for this mission. A tailored system designed to focus on rapid signals detection, identification, collection, and processing is more appropriate to the mission.
+
+4.2.4.3 (U) Other COMINT Equipment
+
+(S//SI) Damage from the compromise of the EP-3E's integrated COMINT collection suite is considered low. The rudimentary nature of the system components will not provide the PRC with any substantial information on the U.S. ability to exploit any signals other than basic non-enciphered tactical communications. The fact that U.S. SRO assets collect tactical communications on PRC targets is already known to the PRC. The PRC could attempt to reverse engineer the ALD-9 antenna and processor system, but information and specifications on more capable systems is readily available in open source literature.
+
+(S) No physical destruction was performed on integrated COMINT equipment due to the unavailability of proper destruction devices. The crew did zeroize all receivers and partially purge the master system display and control terminal. In addition, cassette tapes were extracted from narrowband recorders, stretched, and possibly torn. These tapes remained on the aircraft.
+
+(C) Damage from the compromise of the COMINT Supervisor's laptop is considered low, due to the significant damage inflicted by the crew. Although the damage was severe, the PRC's ability to recover data from the hard drive cannot be ruled out. Damage from the possible compromise of USSIDs and other documentation on this laptop is discussed below in Section 4.2.5.
+
+4.2.5 (U) COMINT Documentation Damage Assessment
+
+(S//SI) The compromise of the largely tactical COMINT documentation is rated medium. The most sensitive and damaging documentation compromised was contained in collection requirements hardcopy documents that detail U.S. tasking against PRC military datalink and microwave signals. The tasking data, containing information such as frequencies, data rates, dish sizes, and target communicants, outlined the U.S. capability to exploit digital signals. However, U.S. national collection systems were not referenced.
+
+4.2.5.1 (U) Technical COMINT Documentation
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+15
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+(S//SI) The U.S. ability to collect PRC submarine signal transmissions and make subsequent vessel correlations was compromised. This compromise could prompt the PRC to modify the signal that the U.S. exploits to make vessel correlations. Although its ability to exploit these signals is limited, NSA is confident that the U.S. Cryptologic System could recover from any changes to the signal content. Compromised documents further revealed U.S. direction finding capabilities against PRC submarines. The PRC could respond by employing COMSEC to elude U.S. direction finding. Further, PRC communications equipment modifications could complicate NSA's exploitation efforts. The overall impact of this compromise is assessed to be medium.
+
+(S//SI) Crew training materials also compromised U.S. knowledge of the PRC's Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) program. The information outlined the SLBM program's organization, platforms, missile testing operations, and communications. Although the PRC probably believed that the U.S. possessed this information, it was probably not aware that the information could be derived from SIGINT collection and analysis. PRC efforts to deny the U.S. future information on this program could be overcome by U.S. cryptologic sources and techniques. Therefore the impact of this compromise is assessed to be medium.
+
+(S//SI) Also potentially damaging are compromised tasking documents that referred to an advanced PRC communications system currently under development. The PRC could respond by modifying the new system or implementing more rigorous COMSEC procedures potentially denying the U.S. future insight. Additionally, realizing that the U.S. has a means for acquiring data on one of its systems before it is operationally deployed could prompt the PRC to tighten security in its defense industry institutes to include COMSEC enhancements. The impact of this compromise is assessed to be medium.
+
+(S//SI) The potential damage from the compromise of Signals Operating Instructions is assessed to be low. PRC analysis of this data could reveal in part the extent to which the U.S. can and does exploit PRC military tactical communications. As a result, the PRC could change its use of frequencies or call signs, or could move to deny future airborne platforms access by changing operating times. Frequency and call sign changes occur with regular periodicity, e.g., monthly, quarterly, annually, and are a standard operating procedure. Therefore, changes of this type are factored into NSA's ability to satisfy customer requirements. Of note is that the PRC has not implemented a major communications change in 15 to 20 years (see discussion in Section 6.2.1).
+
+(S//SI) A mid- to long-term possibility is that the PRC could upgrade its communications equipments to more advanced signaling systems (e.g., frequency hopping systems), or it could increase the use of encryption in its communications. The PRC, as is the case with almost all countries, is constantly upgrading and evolving its communications capabilities so an eventual migration to more advanced signals can be anticipated. Incorporating widespread encryption into tactical communications
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+16
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+equipments is costly and cumbersome, and therefore not believed to be a likely outcome of the EP-3E compromise.
+
+(S//SI) The extent to which compromised JQRs were completed by individual crew members varied from little to very extensive detail. The most revealing and potentially damaging JQR materials compromised were completed JQRs and study guides for the PRC Navy Operator and COMEVAL positions. These JQR materials detailed specific target information (e.g., frequencies, units of interest) and described U.S. reconnaissance operating areas, programs, and collection platforms.
+
+4.2.5.2 (U) USSIDs
+
+(S//SI) While overall impact from the compromise of SIGINT directives carried on the EP-3E is low, three compromised directives are of concern. Of immediate concern is the known compromise of a hardcopy of USSID 5511, which details instructions and information on COMINT Advisory Support to Sensitive Reconnaissance Operations (NICKELBACK conditions). While this compromise will not affect the U.S. ability to perform SRO missions, the PRC could take action to deceive the SIGINT system by transmitting false information, causing the SIGINT system to provide mission aircraft with incorrect NICKELBACK conditions. Actual spoofing –imitating U.S. communications to pass false advisory support to an SRO platform– is extremely unlikely, since it would require the PRC to have both U.S. communications gear and daily crypto. NSA has evaluated this possibility and concludes that there are sufficient monitoring assets to readily detect any such denial and deception actions and to advise an SRO platform.
+
+Figure 4
+(C) Recovered COMINT Supervisor's Laptop
+
+(S//SI) The possible recovery of USSIDs 107 and 303 from the damaged COMINT Supervisor's laptop (Figure 4) is of concern. USSID 107, which focuses on special signals recognition and reporting procedures, reveals that the U.S. has the capability to identify and collect special PRC signals. Coupled with other compromised SOI data, this compromise would confirm the U.S. ability to monitor special signals transmitted by PRC submarines. Any SOI changes in these transmissions could result in significant damage; therefore, this potential compromise is assessed to be medium.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+17
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+USSID 303 (SIGINT Reporters' Instructions) specifies SIGINT interest in the PRC, North Korea, the Philippines, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Thailand. The PRC's disclosure of this information could have political implications (see Cryptologic Foreign Partner Impact, Section 6.3) and could lead to SOI changes in these nations. The damage resulting from this potential compromise is assessed as low.
+
+4.2.6 (U) Recommendations
+
+* (U//FOUO) Limit classified and sensitive materials carried onboard SRO platforms to mission-essential materials only. Minimize hardcopy materials in favor of electronic media.
+* (U//FOUO) Identify computer hard drives for priority destruction and/or jettison. Mark hard drives with a location for striking to ensure physical destruction.
+* (U//FOUO) Eliminate source code from fielded software.
+* (U//FOUO) Eliminate tape-based recording, replacing it with computer-based recorders with built-in encryption.
+* (S) Remove processing capability for the HUNTER and PREDATOR UAV and JASSM datalink signals from LUNCHBOX.
+* (S) Provide a tailored signals processing capability that fully meets mission requirements for rapid signal detection and identification.
+* (U//FOUO) Replace the SCARAB computer key-lock mechanism with a manual quick-release bolt.
+* (C) Review compromised USSID material to determine if there is a need to change, modify, or update any USSID.
+* (S//SI) Continue to monitor PRC communications for evidence of denial and deception activities related to SRO missions.
+
+4.3 (U) ELINT Equipment and Documentation
+
+(C) This section focuses on the compromised ELINT equipments and related ELINT working aids and notes.
+
+4.3.1 (U) Findings
+
+* (C) The EP-3E's installed ELINT equipment was not destroyed.
+* (C) Most classified ELINT documentation was compromised.
+* (C) All data on the ELINT Evaluator's laptop computer, including a comprehensive ELINT Order of Battle, was compromised.
+* (S) The primary impact of the compromise of ELINT documentation would be in improved PRC electronic warfare planning against the U.S. and Taiwan.
+
+4.3.2 (U) ELINT Equipment
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+18
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+(S//NF) The ELINT systems onboard the EP-3E include a disparate collection of antennas, signal distribution networks, wideband and narrowband receivers, recorders, and processing and display equipment. The bulk of these systems are off-the-shelf devices that, although designed for the ELINT mission, contain no particularly sensitive technologies. Those systems that represent a specific concern include the AN/ULQ-16 and the AN/ALQ-108. The AN/ULQ-16 is a computerized pulse processor used to make detailed timing measurements of radar signals. The AN/ALQ-108 is an enemy IFF interrogation system used to actively and passively exploit early Soviet IFF and range extension signals.
+
+(C) Emergency destruction of the installed ELINT equipment by the crew was largely ineffective. The crew did zeroize all memories and erase all mission data, but the rugged construction of critical components and lack of destruction tools prevented adequate destruction. The limited damage to this equipment can be circumvented by a competent reverse engineering effort. It is assessed that all ELINT hardware systems on the aircraft have been fully compromised.
+
+4.3.3 (U) ELINT Documentation
+
+(C) Most classified ELINT documentation was compromised. This documentation included the EPL (ELINT Parameter Limits), CTEGM (Collector Technical ELINT Guidance Manual), and a HULTEC (Hull-to-Emitter Correlation) database, and miscellaneous notes on PRC and Russian ships and weapon systems. One document described the tactical employment of the AN/ULQ-16 and discussed radar fingerprinting techniques and procedures. Equipment maintenance documentation and wiring diagrams intended for in-flight troubleshooting also remained onboard.
+
+(S) The ELINT Evaluator's laptop was left onboard and is considered compromised. The laptop contained a comprehensive (worldwide) Electronic Order of Battle (EOB). Information included locations and names of fixed radar sites, along with designations of radar systems installed at these sites. Information in the database was limited to the SECRET level. One file discussed the purpose and employment of the AN/ALQ-108 and identified similar equipment as being deployed on two U.S. aircraft, the E-3 AWACS and F-15 Eagle.
+
+4.3.4 (U) ELINT Damage Assessment
+
+(S) The potential damage from the compromise of ELINT data is assessed to be medium. The EPL reveals the sum of U.S. knowledge at the Secret-level about the parameters and operating characteristics of most known radars from both U.S. and foreign manufacturers. Signals described range from air traffic control and early warning radars to airborne intercept radars and cruise missile seekers. Included are details of U.S. and allied systems (although not wartime reserve modes), including most equipment employed by Taiwan. National-level associations with ELINT collection were not compromised.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+19
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+(S) The CTEGM details specific gaps in U.S. ELINT knowledge. It tasks collection against (and thus identifies) suspected wartime reserve modes and poorly understood operating modes of foreign emitters. It identifies knowledge gaps for both radar and PROFORMA systems. Exploitation of the EPL and CTEGM could facilitate PRC electronic warfare planning against the U.S., India, and Taiwan, and allow the employment of denial and deception techniques tailored to U.S. knowledge gaps.
+
+(S) The HULTEC database equates precise radar timing measurements (such as those provided by the AN/ULQ-16) to individual PRC ships and submarines. Exploitation could allow the PRC to implement changes to shipborne radars that could temporarily deny the U.S. identification of naval vessels through ELINT.
+
+(S) Exploitation of the EOB could provide the PRC with insights into the accuracy and extent of U.S. knowledge about PRC radars and early warning networks. Analysis could reveal the fact of U.S. shortcomings in the ability to produce high quality information on PRC early warning networks and U.S. uncertainty in identifying certain types of radars. However, the PRC would not be able to determine the full extent of U.S. knowledge concerning PRC radar installations since the compromised EOB was limited in depth.
+
+(S) The technologies resident in compromised ELINT systems would not advance present PRC technical capabilities. PRC radar and ELINT technologies are advanced to the point that they are capable of employing all techniques used on the EP-3E. The primary impact of the compromise of these systems would be in the operational lessons the PRC learns about U.S. ELINT techniques and procedures. These lessons, if properly applied, could help the PRC counter U.S. collection efforts as well as improve its tactical ELINT collection.
+
+(S) Analysis of the recovered AN/ALQ-108 reveals that it was thoroughly examined by PRC engineers. While the AN/ALQ-108 is technically incapable of exploiting PRC IFF signals, PRC analysis could reveal that such a capability is easily within U.S. reach (other U.S. assets are able to exploit PRC IFF signals, and similar efforts are ongoing). The most likely effects would be increased IFF signals security and an acceleration of PRC procurement of more advanced IFF equipment.
+
+4.3.5 (U) Recommendations
+
+(U//FOUO) The first two recommendations in Section 4.2.6 regarding limiting classified and sensitive materials and identifying computer hard drives for destruction, among others, apply to ELINT equipment and documentation.
+
+4.4 (U) SIGINT Configuration and Materials Management
+
+(C) As this report details, numerous factors contributed to the compromise of SIGINT data. The damage from this incident would have been significantly lessened if
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+20
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+there existed a unifying cryptologic strategy for preventing information from falling into an adversary's possession. Such a strategy exists in Information Assurance (IA), where it is assumed that COMSEC equipments will be compromised. The triad of controlled equipment, encrypted communications, and robust key management significantly mitigates the damage incurred through the loss or compromise of any single COMSEC element (see section 5.2). Conversely, SIGINT is founded on a "no compromise" principle. SIGINT is to be protected at all times and, if it is deemed to be in jeopardy of compromise or loss, destroyed. This approach lacks flexibility and reflects an era when SIGINT capabilities resided on hardware and in hardcopy versus today's world where increasingly these capabilities reside in software.
+
+(C) If SIGINT data cannot be protected or destroyed, then the amount of material at risk should be minimized by the use of effective controls. This did not occur. SIGINT equipments and materials were provided to the EP-3E mission in a haphazard manner Although SIGINT materials are among the most sensitive in the Intelligence Community, there was a lack of control and oversight of both hardcopy and softcopy items. Software was disseminated that contained unnecessary files, including programming source code. Additionally, there was a lack of guidance regarding SIGINT equipments, software versions, and documentation allowed onboard the platform. Adequate inventories of SIGINT materials were not maintained and the crew was allowed to carry excessive and unnecessary SIGINT materials onboard.
+
+(C) The immediate development and implementation of a governing strategy for deployable SIGINT equipment and materials is paramount. As the U.S. Cryptologic System moves toward placing more and increasingly sensitive SIGINT capabilities in the field, new safeguard capabilities are required not only for SRO platforms, but for all SIGINT collection activities potentially at risk.
+
+4.4.1 (U) Recommendations
+
+* (U//FOUO) Work with industry and the Intelligence Community to develop and implement safeguard capabilities for SIGINT equipment and materials used by SRO platforms and other SIGINT collection activities at risk.
+* (U//FOUO) Develop and implement configuration controls to govern the use of NSA-deployed software versions and maintain cognizance of field modifications; include procedures to annually overwrite all software with the most currently available software.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+21
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+22
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+5.0 (U) IA Review and Assessment
+
+5.1 (U) Key Findings
+
+* (S) Overall damage resulting from the compromise of cryptographic equipments and materials is assessed to be low.
+* (S) The greatest potential for PRC COMSEC gains is in the area of analyzing and potentially emulating U.S. COMSEC tradecraft.
+
+5.2 (U) Cryptographic Tutorial
+
+(S) U.S. cryptologic equipment contains complex mathematical encryption algorithms or cryptographic logic. Most U.S. cryptographic systems are designed for multiple operating environments, including tactical, and it is assumed from the day the equipment is issued that it eventually will fall into enemy hands.
+
+(S) Cryptographic devices are designed so that the cryptographically significant portion of the encryption process can be changed frequently, normally once per day. The variability takes the form of a stream of random numbers called key. The key basically tells the built-in encryption system how to vary itself with each character transmitted. The NSA design philosophy prevents our adversaries from reading U.S. communications without the key, even if they have obtained the logic and message traffic, provided the cryptographic system is employed properly.
+
+5.3 (U) Cryptographic Materials and Equipments
+
+5.3.1 (U) Findings
+
+* (S) Though most (estimated 95%) of the sensitive COMSEC materials (keys and codebooks) onboard were jettisoned, the limited amount of keying materials that remained onboard were compromised.
+* (C) COMSEC equipments and material carried onboard the mission aircraft exceeded mission needs.
+* (C) An accurate inventory of COMSEC material and devices on the mission aircraft was difficult to obtain in a timely manner.
+* (S) The crew zeroized all cryptographic devices left onboard.
+* (S) The crew did not destroy the cryptographic equipments left onboard.
+* (S) All communications keying materials, except for the Global Positioning System (GPS) worldwide key, were superseded within 15 hours of the EP-3E's landing in the PRC. The GPS worldwide key was superseded by 12 April 2001.
+* (S) All the cryptographic equipments left onboard have been previously compromised, though not directly to the PRC.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+23
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+* (S) Some Pacific theater communications from late March to early April could be vulnerable to PRC decryption efforts if the PRC is able to exploit or reconstruct the keying material left onboard the EP-3E.
+
+5.3.2 (U) Damage Assessment
+
+(S) The EP-3E carried the complete complement of COMSEC equipments and keying materials necessary to conduct its SRO mission, including several KY-58 secure voice and KG-84 secure data devices (Figure 5), KYK-13 and KOI-18 electronic fill devices, a KL-43 off-line encryption device, and a Global Positioning System (GPS) unit. The EP-3E also carried keying and other cryptographic materials for its various secure devices (see Appendix B for a complete list of equipments and cryptographic material onboard). Top Secret keying material in canisters, entire codebooks, and call sign lists were onboard. In all, the EP-3E carried COMSEC materials in excess of what was needed for the mission. Nearly a month's worth of keying material and codebook pages were carried that were not scheduled to become effective until well after the scheduled landing. COMSEC devices onboard included unused electronic fill devices and several installed spare encryption devices.
+
+Figure 5
+(C) Typical KG-84 and KY-58 Devices
+
+(S) The use of an electronic key loading device such as the CYZ-10 Data Transfer Device (DTD) can eliminate the risk of hardcopy keying material compromise. These devices can hold multiple keys, load multiple devices, and are easily zeroized. DTDs were in the EP-3E inventory but were not carried on the mission aircraft. Had the crew loaded the key into the DTD and left the key tape at the staging base, destruction of the key would have been easily and quickly accomplished.
+
+(S//NF) Overall damage from compromised EP-3E cryptographic materials is assessed to be low due in part to the action of the crew and the supersession of keying material at risk. All of the compromised keying materials were superseded within 15 hours except for the GPS worldwide key that was superseded by 12 April. The cryptographic equipments onboard were either jettisoned or zeroized.
+
+5.3.3 (U) Cryptographic Materials
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+24
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+(S//NF) After the flight station regained control of the EP-3E, the crew began emergency destruction of cryptographic materials (e.g., fill devices, keys, and codebooks). The crew jettisoned three of the four fill devices (i.e., the KYK-13s and KOI-18s), key tape canisters, and codebooks in a COMSEC Material System (CMS) box (see Figure 6). Materials not jettisoned included 16 specific cryptographic keys and
+
+Figure 6
+(U) Typical CMS Box
+
+codebooks, a KOI-18, and a KL-43. Before departing the aircraft, the crew hand tore the paper materials and spread them throughout the aircraft. However, since the paper materials were not destroyed with approved equipment such as a crosscut shredder, the PRC would probably be able to reconstruct the key tape. U.S. experts have demonstrated the ability to reconstruct tape from pieces torn as the crew described. Examination of the recovered EP-3E revealed that some torn keying material was retained by the PRC.
+
+(S) Compromised keying material was limited to Pacific network controlling authorities and the GPS worldwide key. NSA ensured that all non-GPS key was superseded in less than 15 hours. The GPS worldwide key, controlled by U.S. SPACECOM, was superseded by 12 April 2001. During this 11-day period, the GPS system was potentially vulnerable to PRC exploitation. The GPS key is used to authenticate GPS data for the user and the PRC could have potentially used the compromised key to spoof or mislead system users. However, no anomalies were noted during the timeframe. GPS key supersession required 11 days because of the key's global nature (250,000 end users and some foreign partner use) and the challenges associated with this first-ever global supersession. U.S. SPACECOM's lessons learned from European operations in the past two years were instrumental in supporting the massive supersession of the GPS worldwide key. The primary lesson learned by SPACECOM was to have follow-on editions of GPS key pre-positioned to support supersession.
+
+5.3.4 (U) Cryptographic Equipments
+
+(TS) Sixteen cryptographic devices remained onboard the EP-3E. All of these devices, i.e., KG-84s and KY-58s, were zeroized but not physically destroyed. During zeroization, all traces of the 128-bit key are removed from storage of any register or
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+25
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+memory. This process, which involves the multiple overwriting of memory registers with 1's and 0's, is 100 percent effective in rendering the data unrecoverable.
+
+(S) There were no maintenance manuals or other supporting documentation onboard the EP-3E that could aid the PRC in exploitation efforts. These are controlled items and were not required for this SRO mission.
+
+(S) All of the cryptographic devices that remained onboard the EP-3E have been previously compromised, though not directly to the PRC. However, there is strong evidence that the PRC has aggressively sought to obtain these equipments. Also of note is that some of these devices, for example components of KG-84 devices, have been available on popular Internet auction sites.
+
+(S//SI) Compromised cryptographic materials might enable PRC SIGINT units to decrypt limited U.S. Pacific area encrypted transmissions for 31 March and 1 April. Since the PRC possessed the crypto-device from the EP-3E, they would have been able to decrypt communications if they had:
+* Recorded and retained the communications for future exploitation, and
+* Located and reconstructed the keying material that was hand torn and left onboard the aircraft.
+
+(S//SI) If the PRC succeeded in this regard, they would have been able to read those encrypted Pacific area communications passed on 31 March and 1 April using the same key compromised from the EP-3E. To determine the extent of potential damage, NSA contacted the Pacific (network) Controlling Authorities to ascertain what communications were transmitted during these two days. Pacific Controlling Authority responses indicated that because this was a weekend, there was minimal data transmitted. Communications susceptible to decryption over this period were limited to low-level, perishable tactical reports such as KLIEGLIGHTs and TACREPs. The assessment is that this data would be of little benefit to the PRC.
+
+5.3.5 (U) Recommendations
+
+* (U//FOUO) Limit COMSEC materials and cryptologic devices onboard deployed platforms to those required to accomplish the platform's mission in a specific timeframe and in a given area of responsibility.
+* (U//FOUO) Use electronic key loading devices and leave hardcopy key tape and canisters at the staging base.
+* (U//FOUO) Maintain a comprehensive and readily available inventory of all field-deployed COMSEC materials and cryptologic devices.
+* (U/FOUO) Maintain destruction records and supersession messages at the staging base.
+* (U//FOUO) Continue to refine procedures for timely supersession of GPS worldwide key.
+* (U//FOUO) Make crosscut shredders available for emergency destruction of keying material.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+26
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+5.4 (U) Potential for PRC Intelligence Gain from IA Compromises
+
+(TS) The greatest potential for PRC intelligence gain from the loss of U.S. cryptographic information is in the area of implementation security. The U.S. incorporates high quality randomization and strong fail-safe designs into its keying material and cryptographic devices. These security measures protect encrypted U.S. communications from decryption attacks. If PRC technicians successfully exploit the compromised EP-3E cryptographic material and devices, they would gain information as to how the U.S. incorporates these security designs. This insight could provide the PRC with an impetus to incorporate similar designs in its indigenous cryptographic materials and devices, making U.S. decryption efforts more difficult.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+27
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+28
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+6.0 (U) PRC Potential Actions and the Cryptologic Response
+
+6.1 (U) Key Finding
+
+* (C) The overall potential foreign relations impact from compromise of materials onboard the EP-3E is assessed to be low.
+
+(S) This section reviews potential PRC actions and the U.S. Cryptologic System response, including the SIGINT collection strategy in the wake of the incident and cryptologic foreign partner impact. It also reviews counterintelligence issues, the potential for recovery of jettisoned equipment, and PRC interaction with the crew.
+
+6.2 (U) SIGINT Collection Strategy
+
+(S//SI) NSA does not anticipate major PRC communications procedure changes as a result of U.S. SIGINT data compromised on the EP-3E aircraft grounded on Hainan Island 1 April 2001. One potential result of the compromise might be a PRC decision to accelerate implementation of planned communications upgrades (such as a transition to fiber and increased use of encryption) or changes to communications Signals Operation Instructions (SOI).
+
+6.2.1 (U) PRC Military Communications
+
+(S//SI) The PRC military does not generally implement nationwide SOI changes at once; each service implements SOI changes according to its own plans, and tends not to adhere to a regular schedule. The last nationwide SOI change occurred over a two-year period in the early 1980s and it took NSA several months to re-establish continuity on the target. To date, recovery of that call sign allocation system is still incomplete, however, this does not affect target continuity or reporting. The most recent smaller scale SOI change occurred between December 2000 and February 2001, and NSA has almost completely recovered the changes. If the PRC implements new PLA-wide call sign systems, it could take from several months to a few years to recover the SOI for general PRC military operations completely, especially for PRC ground forces.
+
+(S//SI) The PRC regularly uses Denial and Deception (D&D) techniques. As a result of the compromise of tactical SIGINT information, the PRC could be prompted to take action to deny U.S. collection of PLA communications. One means of detecting PRC D&D efforts would be to employ covert collection assets during SRO missions. These platforms could then monitor PLA communications for departures from the norm while SRO missions are flying in the area.
+
+(S) Any PRC denial or deception effort would likely affect more than just the U.S. Cryptologic System. U.S. foreign cryptologic partners using similar SIGINT sources and methods would be impacted if the PRC implements communications changes as a result of the compromise.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+29
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+(S) NSA does not expect the PRC to make major changes in its military radars and usage, because of the prohibitive expense of refitting all of its aircraft, naval combatants, and coastal defense units. However, it would not be unusual for the PRC to modify some of the signal parameters on its military radars. If the PRC changes ELINT signal parameters, complete recovery would take relatively little time –probably a few days– but would be labor intensive, since each entity would have to be analyzed and recovered separately. NSA monitoring of PRC communications would also reveal changes in the target's air surveillance PROFORMA signals. The rapidity of recovery from a change would depend upon the extent of PRC signal modifications.
+
+6.2.2 (U) PRC Non-military Communications
+
+(S//SI) Intelligence on PRC non-military targets is gleaned from a wide variety of collection sources, none of which is likely to be affected by the compromises associated with the PRC's ability to exploit the collection systems and working aids onboard the EP-3E mission aircraft.
+
+6.3 (U) Cryptologic Foreign Partner Impact
+
+6.3.1 (U) Findings
+
+* (C) The EP-3E carried no data that would reveal Second or Third Party sources or methods.
+* (C) Tactical Signals Operating Instructions that enabled cryptologic technicians to monitor allied airspace for situational awareness and safety of transit purposes were compromised.
+* (C) One of the EP-3E's avionics systems, the AN/ULQ-16 radar pulse processor that is used by several foreign partners, was compromised.
+* (S//SI) The compromised LUNCHBOX PROFORMA processor (see Section 4.2) included weapons systems command and control signaling information of foreign partners.
+* (S) The compromised ELINT Parameters List included detailed emitter parameters for many radars and weapons systems of foreign partners.
+* (S) The compromised ELINT Order of Battle included information on foreign partners' radar systems.
+* (TS//SI) U.S. cryptologic relationships with the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand were identified in crew technical notes. Although the relationships with the UK and Australia are unclassified, the fact of relationships with Japan, South Korea, and Thailand are classified SECRET//COMINT and the fact of a relationship with Taiwan is classified TOP SECRET//COMINT.
+
+6.3.2 (U) Introduction
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+30
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+(S) Several cryptologic foreign partner relationships were compromised to the PRC. These losses are not judged to be significant, however, and the overall potential foreign relations impact of the compromised EP-3E materials is assessed to be low. Information on cryptologic foreign partner impacts and notification strategy is located in Appendix C.
+
+(TS//SI) Compromised information included data acknowledging U.S. cryptologic relationships with Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and Thailand; SOI related to the airspace of some partners, such as Taiwan; and PROFORMA data from some partner countries. This information was located onboard the EP-3E in software tools and hardcopy notes used by the cryptologic technicians. Information such as SOI enabled the aircraft to transit safely to its area of responsibility, conduct its mission, and return safely to its staging base. Other information was used to exploit communications of the PRC and several neighboring countries.
+
+6.3.3 (U) Second and Third Party Disclosures
+
+(TS//SI) The EP-3E carried no materials that would jeopardize any Second or Third Party sources and methods. U.S. cryptologic relationships with the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand were identified and compromised in crew technical notes. Although the relationships with the UK and Australia are unclassified, the fact of relationships with Japan, South Korea, and Thailand is classified SECRET//COMINT and the fact of a relationship with Taiwan is classified TOP SECRET//COMINT. Crew notes also compromised the relationship between the U.S. and Japanese airborne reconnaissance programs.
+
+(S//SI) One of the duties of the EP-3E's technicians was to support the safe transit of the aircraft to its area of responsibility through the monitoring of friendly and potentially unfriendly communications and radar. To accomplish this task, the aircraft carried significant technical data on target nations such as Russia, North Korea, and Vietnam, as well as data on friendly nations such as Taiwan. The aircraft's cryptologic technicians monitored Taiwanese tactical communications to provide situational awareness data to the EP-3E's cockpit crew as necessary.
+
+(S) Compromised technical information included PROFORMA data for nearly 50 nations. Additionally, the Electronic Order of Battle (EOB) database carried on the EP-3E provided information on the location, number, and type of radars worldwide. The EOB did not, however, contain parametric data (e.g., frequency, pulse information, power levels).
+
+6.3.4 (U) Disclosure Impact
+
+(TS//SI) The U.S. government's intelligence relationship with the UK and Australian government is unclassified, and the fact that U.S. reconnaissance aircraft monitor the external environment, e.g., Taiwan, for safe transit purposes is not a major
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+31
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+cause for concern by U.S. partners or allies. The potential impact of the compromise of the relationship between Japan and the U.S. EP-3E program (U.S. aircraft stage from Japanese territory) is considered to be low. We assess the impact of compromising U.S. relationships with South Korea and Taiwan as low for similar reasons. Regarding the U.S. relationship with Thailand, the impact of that compromise is also considered low, given the lack of any U.S. basing in country and the overt landing of U.S. reconnaissance aircraft in Thailand.
+
+(S) As it pertains to the EP-3E platform, the potential impact of the compromise of avionics systems and its impact on foreign relations is assessed to be low. The AN/ULQ-16, a radar pulse processor, was the only compromised system known to be in use by foreign nations. This early 1980s vintage system employs techniques similar to those now common in commercial telephony applications. Australia, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, Italy and Norway are among the nations that still use this system. The AN/ULQ-16 is designed to analyze the pulse characteristics of radars, and is particularly well suited for older tactical systems still widely used in the Former Soviet Union, the PRC, and Korea.
+
+(S//SI) The potential impact from PRC disclosure of the LUNCHBOX data to other countries is a concern. From a SIGINT perspective, the PRC's exploitation of LUNCHBOX and the disclosure of its PROFORMA capabilities to foreign partners could result in a loss of access to some foreign PROFORMA signals by the U.S. and its allies (see section 4.2). From a foreign relations perspective, the fact that the U.S. has the ability to monitor the command and control environment of friendly and unfriendly nations would be of minor concern to some countries. NSA has developed notification procedures and will coordinate notification of foreign partners with appropriate Intelligence Community partners.
+
+(S) The ELINT Parameter Limits (EPL) details the radar characteristics of many U.S. and allied weapon systems, including most of those in use by Taiwan. For most emitters in use by potential PRC adversaries, the PRC likely already has collected most of this information. Potential foreign partner impact from the loss of the EPL, therefore, is considered low.
+
+(S) Regarding the EOB, the compromised information could provide the PRC with a good starting point for identifying the total electronic threat posed by a country, but it is information that in all likelihood the PRC already has. Potential foreign partner impact from the loss of the EOB, therefore, is considered low.
+
+6.3.5 (U) Recommendation
+
+* (U) Coordinate notification procedures and notify foreign partners of pertinent information compromised to the PRC.
+
+6.4 (U) PRC Sharing and Previous Access to Compromised Data
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+32
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+6.4.1 (U) Other Potential Recipients of EP-3E Compromised Data
+
+(C) The PRC's leadership will undoubtedly examine its political and economic objectives and then determine the cost-benefit of sharing the intelligence data with other countries. The PRC, as with all sovereign states, will take steps necessary to safeguard its national security interests. Therefore the information, if shared, will probably be shared on a case-by-case basis.
+
+(S//SI) At a minimum, eight countries bear close scrutiny by the U.S. Cryptologic System and the Intelligence Community. These countries include North Korea, Vietnam, Cuba (all deemed to be fraternal Communist states), Russia, the Ukraine, Iraq, Belarus (which engage in military sales and technology transfer with the PRC), and Pakistan (a strategic partner). Changes in the communications infrastructure of these nations could pose significant challenges for the U.S. Cryptologic System and its ability to support policymakers. This list of countries, while not exhaustive, represents a starting point for community analytic efforts.
+
+6.4.2 (U) Previous Cryptologic Compromises to the PRC
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The EP-3E incident was not the first compromise of U.S. tactical cryptologic sources and methods or other sensitive information to the PRC or its closest partners. North Korea's seizure of the USS Pueblo in 1968 and espionage cases in the 1980s and 1990s provided the PRC with insight into the U.S. Cryptologic System's targeting of its tactical and encrypted communications. There are indications that PRC operatives have actively sought to acquire U.S. COMSEC equipments and manuals. Additionally, one of the PRC's closest partners, Russia, has acquired similar information on U.S. targeting of special submarine communications, PROFORMA, and many of the USSIDs that were onboard the EP-3E. Although there is no direct evidence that Russia has shared any of this information with the PRC, the PRC has probably benefited from information gleaned from previously compromised equipment.
+
+(S//SI) The impact of these past compromises on U.S. intelligence efforts has been mixed. In some instances, targeted communications have disappeared, i.e., either ceased transmitting or migrated to other modes of communications, and in others there were no target changes at all. Regardless of detected target changes, previous compromises have heightened the PRC's awareness of its communications vulnerabilities and increased the probability of the U.S. facing a constantly evolving and more sophisticated PRC communications target.
+
+6.5 (U) Counterintelligence Issues
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+33
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+6.5.1 (U) Findings
+
+* (C) Names and organizations of Intelligence Community and foreign partner personnel were disclosed in documentation onboard the EP-3E.
+* (C) Much of the information regarding individual identities was contained in the forwarding instructions for NSA's tasking database and in the MARTES source code.
+* (C) A substantial amount of personnel data unnecessary for the mission was onboard.
+* (C) Initial inspection of the recovered aircraft at Dobbins Air Reserve Base in Marietta, Georgia, found no evidence of PRC implants.
+* (S) No cryptologic information was compromised as a result of the PRC's interrogation of the EP-3E crew.
+
+6.5.2 (U) Compromise of Personnel
+
+(S//SI) As a result of the incident, individual identities and their affiliations with U.S. intelligence operations were revealed to the PRC. Most names were located in SIGINT documentation or software, including several dozen individuals identified as employees of NSA and NSGA Misawa.
+
+(C) Additionally, extensive personnel information was carried onboard by the crew. Names, addresses, social security numbers and official duties of crew members and personnel not on the aircraft were disclosed on travel orders and other documents.
+
+(U//FOUO) The NSA Office of Security has contacted all individuals to discuss these counterintelligence concerns. For some personnel, future assignments and travel may be adversely affected.
+
+6.5.3 (U) Inspection of Recovered Aircraft
+
+(C) Experts in counterintelligence and reverse engineering inspected the returned aircraft and its contents for equipment tampering and evidence of reverse engineering. No evidence was found of PRC implants or bugging devices, although it is possible that an implant could have been undetectable. There were signs of PRC intrusion into many pieces of equipment that could indicate PRC attempts at reverse engineering.
+
+(S) The team conducted extensive searches of the interior of the aircraft. These searches recovered a laptop computer hard drive and several fragments of cryptographic key, cassette tape, and classified paper documents. During the search process, the team removed floorboards, insulation and all soft panels, and used borescopes to inspect areas beyond physical access. Further analysis of component parts continues.
+
+(S) In all, the team removed and examined over 500 pieces of equipment from the aircraft and inspected roughly 300 items for evidence of tampering. In some cases, the
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+34
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+PRC made little or no effort to conceal its inspection efforts, replacing equipment with obvious indications that it had been removed and examined (e.g., one piece was mounted upside down, some equipment was not secured with screws, connectors were not reattached). In other cases, the PRC's efforts to reverse engineer some computer boards and chips were detectable only with a microscope.
+
+6.5.4 (U) PRC Interaction with the Crew
+
+(C) The crew did not reveal any cryptologic information during its 11-day detention. PRC personnel interacted daily with the crew and questioned crew members regarding their duties and their mission. Responses from the crew, no matter how unbelievable or mundane, were not challenged, and PRC personnel did not pressure the crew to provide information beyond what was offered. Questioning focused on the incident, and PRC personnel attempted to gain admissions of guilt or remorse for the collision. Secondarily, the PRC personnel used the sessions to make political statements regarding the humane nature of the treatment provided and the peaceful wishes of the PRC. These statements were often cited in conjunction with alleged "crimes" that the EP-3E had committed, such as causing the collision, violating PRC airspace, landing without permission, and spying. The PRC personnel also used the sessions as an opportunity to lecture crew members on PRC and world history. None of the crew expressed the view that they felt obligated or intimidated to provide information.
+
+(U//FOUO) A detailed report on the crew's activities and experiences during is being prepared by the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency.
+
+6.5.5 (U) Recommendations
+
+* (U//FOUO) Remove names of all individuals and organizations from forwarding instructions, technical material, and software carried on SRO or other sensitive SIGINT operations.
+* (U//FOUO) Reduce the amount of personnel information in mission materials to the minimum possible. Do not reference organizations, offices, or names of personnel.
+
+6.6 (U) Potential for Recovery of Jettisoned Equipment
+
+(S) There is a very low probability that the PRC would be able to recover items jettisoned from the EP-3E. Jettisoning took place over a wide area as the aircraft flew toward Hainan Island, and consisted of physically small objects. Jettisoned items were limited to COMSEC and ELINT materials, including a metal box with COMSEC keying material and codebooks, some COMSEC electronic fill devices, and two ELINT laptop computers. There is no evidence that the PRC observed the jettisoning of materials.
+
+(S//NF) The most reliable way to locate small, widely dispersed objects on the seafloor is through use of a side-scan sonar search system. The PRC has access to these
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+35
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+systems, but the large search area, bottom topography, and small size of the objects makes location and recovery of any material very unlikely.
+
+(S//NF) There have been no indications of any PRC recovery efforts other than initial search and recovery attempts focusing on the F-8 II and its pilot. The Office of Naval Intelligence is monitoring the area for signs of recovery activity, but limited U.S. collection assets in the region mean that it is possible that the PRC could conduct such a search without being detected.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+36
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+7.0 (U) U.S. Cryptologic System Crisis Response
+
+7.1 (U) Key Findings
+
+* (C) The EP-3E incident was multifaceted (e.g., military operational, diplomatic, intelligence compromise) but data flow beyond the normal military audience was initially limited.
+* (C) Restrictions on dissemination of "raw" SIGINT led to frustration and misunderstanding among some customers.
+
+7.1.1 (U) Introduction
+
+(U) This section reviews the crisis response activities of the U.S. Cryptologic System from the EP-3E collision through repatriation of the crew. It is based on interviews with officials from NSA, JCS, OSD, USCINCPAC, CIA, State, ONI, KRSOC, and the White House (see Appendix H for a complete list). The interviews revealed what worked well during the crisis, what did not work well, and areas for improvement. The findings are separated into eight areas: intelligence support, IA crisis response, crisis management, communications and interagency coordination, SIGINT policy issues, customer views, the crew debriefing process, and damage assessment procedures.
+
+7.1.2 (U) Findings
+
+* (S//SI) SIGINT support to the EP-3E via NICKELBACK advisory support procedures was good.
+* (C) The initial CRITIC series reporting the known facts of the collision met timeliness requirements.
+* (C) Within hours of the incident, the IA system moved to supersede all keying materials.
+* (C) International distress frequencies were not tasked for SIGINT collection during reconnaissance missions.
+* (C) At the time of the event, there was no record or playback capability for the Pacific Tributary Network (PTN).
+* (U//FOUO) NSA lacks the ability to immediately surge all available SIGINT collection assets.
+* (U//FOUO) Customers generally gave SIGINT support good marks.
+* (U//FOUO) Interagency communications and coordination worked well.
+* (U//FOUO) There was no extant guidance for how to conduct intelligence debriefings as part of JPRA's personnel recovery procedures.
+* (U/FOUO) The crew's pre-Easter release and subsequent 30-day leave period did not allow for a timely and comprehensive debriefing.
+* (U/FOUO) The cryptologic assessment team was not established until 26 days after the incident.
+* (U/FOUO) There were no guidance documents or directives for conducting an intelligence compromise damage assessment.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+37
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+* (U//FOUO) In general, operating forces and field activities were more web-enabled than national-level agencies and customers.
+
+7.2 (U) SIGINT Support
+
+(S//SI) Overall, SIGINT support to the EP-3E mission was good. The EP-3E flew under NICKELBACK advisory procedures and was promptly notified by KRSOC of the PRC's initial tracking activities. Until the mission landed at Lingshui, advisory conditions were issued in accordance with procedures.
+
+(S//SI) The CRITIC reporting process worked as designed, delivering the initial information on the EP-3E situation to customers worldwide and to the extended U.S. Cryptologic System. The National Security Operations Center (NSOC) orchestrated the dissemination and coordination of the CRITIC reporting series and convened a conference of senior intelligence officers at the White House, the Pentagon, the State Department, and CIA. This conferencing system, known as a NOIWON, enabled senior personnel to discuss and coordinate events throughout the early stages of the crisis.
+
+(S//SI) The Pacific Tributary Network (PTN) played a key role in providing initial insight into the unfolding crisis. NSOC's Special Support Activity (SSA), KRSOC, as well as PACROC monitored the initial maydays via the PTN. During the crisis, watch centers monitored these live communications without any capability to record and retrieve them. Although this could have potentially caused problems in verifying events, it did not become an issue. Record and playback capabilities have since been installed on the SSA's PTN system.
+
+(S//SI) NSA's ability to know at any specific time the totality of overall collection against a specific target is fragmented. In a crisis response situation, the result is that typically 24 hours or more can pass before there is an accurate accounting of all national and tactical systems arrayed against a target. Although NSA immediately began to augment or "surge" collection by working with the Intelligence Community to steer systems such as overhead satellites to increase coverage of the PRC, other collection assets were not tasked as rapidly. Such a delay can result in important collection opportunities being forfeited in the early, and perhaps most important, stages of a crisis.
+
+(S//SI) NSA's lack of collection of the EP-3E's MAYDAYs was also cited by some as an issue. NSA assets collected one broadcast minutes before the EP-3E landed at Lingshui, but only because of the re-tasking of an overhead satellite in response to the CRITIC. Many customers were unaware that the U.S. Cryptologic System does not routinely monitor international distress frequencies during SRO missions due to resource constraints and competing priorities for other collection.
+
+7.3 (U) IA Crisis Response
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+38
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+(S) Crisis procedures for NSA's Information Assurance Directorate (IAD) worked well. IAD headquarters personnel contacted representatives in Okinawa for assistance in identifying the EP-3E's COMSEC materials and equipments, and a message was sent to the appropriate Controlling Authorities on 1 April instructing the supersession of all affected COMSEC material. IAD personnel ensured that all required keying material was available in theater or could be expeditiously produced and distributed. Over-the-air-transfer of keying materials was accomplished where possible. Additionally, NSA's Joint COMSEC Monitoring Activity provided monitoring support to CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, and COMSEVENTHFLT during the entire event.
+
+7.4 (U) Crisis Management
+
+(S) NSA's National Security Operations Center (NSOC) served as the central clearinghouse for all EP-3E information with the Senior Operations Officer (SOO) handling requests from Defense, CIA, State, and White House officials. After two days, however, the deluge of calls began to impact the SOO's other duties. This led to a decision to establish an EP-3 desk to serve as the focal point for all EP-3E related matters. The EP-3 desk stood up officially on Tuesday, 3 April. Most customers praised NSOC's responsiveness and its twice-daily SIGINT updates. Although the EP-3 desk performed well, customer inquiries eventually consumed most of the desk officers' time. Some customers sought an EP-3 website where they could go for related data, but such a site was not established during this crisis. Crisis-related websites at JICPAC and KRSOC were praised for their usefulness. In general, the operating forces and field activities are more web-active than national-level organizations.
+
+(U//FOUO) Crisis management procedures are under review in the Defense Department, specifically focusing on the roles, functions, and interaction of the numerous watch centers throughout the Pentagon. Similarly, NSA is studying how to optimize its new organizational structure for crisis management. Improvements not withstanding, the current structure provided effective crisis support during the incident.
+
+7.5 (U) Communications and Interagency Coordination
+
+(S) Communications worked well throughout the incident. A number of those interviewed cited the State Department-chaired, daily video teleconferences as an excellent way to coordinate and share information. Similarly, watch officers cited "ZIRCON chat" –essentially an on-going secure chat room available over the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System secure network– as an effective method for communicating and sharing information. A limitation inherent in this type of communication, though, is that information in the chat room is not authoritative and may be misleading.
+
+(S) Interagency coordination involving the sharing of EP-3E operational information was described by several parties as problematic. Operational information that would have been useful outside of military channels was not disseminated. Non-military customers cite the fact that the EP-3E incident was more than just a military
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+39
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+operational issue; it was also a political, diplomatic, and intelligence issue. In particular, data sharing by military components during an incident such as this could have, and should have, been more robust.
+
+7.6 (U) SIGINT Policy Issues
+
+(S//SI) During the incident, a number of customers asked to see the transcript of the conversation between the PRC fighter intercept controller and the surviving PRC F-8-II pilot. This transcript, defined by NSA as "raw" SIGINT, had served as the basis for a SIGINT product report already issued. Current NSA policy allows for release of raw SIGINT to customers, in accordance with written procedures.
+
+(C) Uncertainty by NSA officials over whether or not to release the raw SIGINT ultimately led to a request for guidance from the Secretary of Defense on how NSA should handle the requests for this information. The guidance provided was to limit sharing of this information to select senior officials at the Pentagon and CIA, and only under strict handling procedures. Initially, the list did not include the JCS J2, State Department officials, or members of congressional oversight committees, though the Deputy Secretary of State and JCS J2 were added later. The Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, who had specifically requested the transcript, was not added. These actions frustrated customers and oversight officials, and fostered a perception that NSA was holding back key intelligence.
+
+(C) NSA's Signals Intelligence Directorate is reviewing and revising its policy on raw SIGINT. This review was underway prior to the EP-3E incident. The EP-3E incident highlighted misunderstandings within the U.S. Cryptologic System regarding providing raw SIGINT to customers. For example, some managers had a false impression that the requests for raw SIGINT required legal review when in fact it is a policy, not a legal issue. Also, NSA officers in the field differed in their interpretations of their responsibilities to handle raw SIGINT.
+
+7.7 (U) Customer Views
+
+(S//SI) Generally, SIGINT reporting during the incident received high marks. Specifically, the ADCI for Collection praised NSA's efforts against the PRC leadership target during negotiations for the EP-3E's crew release. Also, the CRITIC reporting series was valuable to customers.
+
+(S//SI) Customer expectations during a crisis such as this are subject to change, usually without notice. Immediately following the collision, many customers adjusted their information threshold. Data previously deemed insignificant, e.g., routine PRC transport flights in and around Lingshui airfield, quickly became unique and critical to many customers. During this crisis customers expected to be informed of what the U.S. Cryptologic System knew, what it did not know, and any additional insight, even that which would not be reported. This was deemed critical by Intelligence Community analysts for policymaker support.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+40
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+7.8 (U) Crew Debriefing Procedures
+
+(S) The Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA), part of the Joint Forces Command, is the lead organization chartered with the safe and efficient repatriation of U.S. military personnel, and in some cases, U.S. civilians and other individuals. JPRA conducted non-intelligence related debriefings of the crew and advised and trained the intelligence debriefing teams.
+
+(S) Following their 11-day detention, the repatriated crew was immediately made available for JPRA and intelligence debriefings in Hawaii. Six three-person debriefing teams were formed to debrief the 24 crew members regarding intelligence loss and compromise. Each team consisted of a representative from either the Defense HUMINT Service or Naval Criminal Investigative Service, a Navy representative with EP-3E flight experience, and an NSA subject matter expert.
+
+(S) The CINCPACFLT Director of Intelligence (N2) and Director for Cryptology (N3DC) were responsible for forming the intelligence debriefing teams and developing the methodology and questions required to assess the potential intelligence loss from this incident. CINCPACFLT N2 prepared a CONOP without benefit of written guidelines.
+
+(S) The time allotted for the initial debriefings was too short and the period between the initial intelligence debriefings and follow-up re-interviews was too long. JPRA guidance recommended at least 72 hours to complete both the JPRA and intelligence debriefs. Due to the decision to release the crew for the Easter holiday, this time was reduced to 42 hours. Furthermore, the crew was not available for follow-up debriefings for over 30 days. During this time, the crew's recall of events was affected by numerous events and interactions. By the time of their Maryland re-interviews, accuracy of the individual accounts of events had degraded. While we assess that in this case the overall accuracy of our findings was not impacted, it easily could have been had the PRC not returned certain equipments (e.g., the MARTES laptop and SCARAB computer). In order to increase the accuracy of future damage assessments, the intelligence debriefing process must be allowed sufficient time and be completed as soon as possible after such a compromise.
+
+7.9 (U) Damage Assessment Procedures
+
+(S) Although the potential damage to U.S. intelligence capabilities was an issue from the outset, the EP-3 Cryptologic Assessment Team was not established until 26 days after the incident. In hindsight, it should have been formed immediately. The team did not identify any guidance documents or directives for conducting an intelligence compromise damage assessment.
+
+7.10 (U) Recommendations
+
+* (U//FOUO) Implement streamlined NSA policy regarding raw SIGINT.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+41
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+* (U//FOUO) The Secretary of Defense in coordination with the DCI should charter a damage assessment team within 48 hours of a potential intelligence compromise involving DoD assets. The team should serve as the lead for producing findings, the damage assessment, and recommendations.
+* (U//FOUO) Implement procedures to increase the SIGINT system's responsiveness during crisis events.
+* (C) Tie the monitoring of international distress frequencies to specific NICKELBACK advisory conditions.
+* (U//FOUO) Acquire a record and playback capability immediately for all Pacific Tributary Network (PTN) broadcasts at the KRSOC.
+* (U//FOUO) Allot sufficient time for intelligence debriefings in order to allow a thorough determination of potentially compromised data.
+* (U//FOUO) Incorporate intelligence debriefing into JPRA personnel recovery procedures if there is an Intelligence Community equity.
+* (U//FOUO) The Secretary of Defense and the DCI jointly prepare a damage assessment "how to" guide for intelligence compromises.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+42
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+8.0 (U) Emergency Processes and Procedures
+
+8.1 (U) Key Findings
+
+* (U//FOUO) No specific guidance existed regarding Mission Commander or aircrew actions should an SRO aircraft be forced or, through emergency, be required to land in the PRC.
+* (C) A substantial amount of non-mission-essential classified information was carried onboard the aircraft.
+* (C) Inventory procedures did not require sufficient detail to identify reliably the content of classified equipments, computers, or hardcopy materials.
+* (C) Crew training for emergency destruction was minimal and did not meet squadron requirements; this deficiency was the primary cause of the compromise of classified material.
+* (C) There was sufficient time to jettison all sensitive materials from the aircraft.
+
+8.1.1 (U) Introduction
+
+(U) This section reviews emergency processes and procedures that applied to the EP-3E mission. It reviews policy, radio communications, internal communications, classification and material handling, emergency destruction policy, procedures, and training, and crew reaction. It also includes a discussion of procedures employed by other tactical SIGINT platforms. For reference, a schematic of the EP-3E with position identifications is included in Appendix F.
+
+8.2 (U) Policy
+
+8.2.1 (U) Findings
+
+* (U//FOUO) There was no policy guidance regarding actions to be taken in the event of hazardous maneuvers by reacting PRC fighter aircraft.
+* (U//FOUO) Faced with hazardous PRC fighter maneuvers, several of the crew remained out of their seats.
+* (C) The Mission Commander, although in communication with the Pacific Reconnaissance Operations Center after landing at Lingshui Airfield, did not request instructions or guidance from higher authority.
+* (U//FOUO) Peacetime detention training was optional for Navy aircrew; nine of the EP-3E crew members had not received the training.
+
+8.2.2 (U) Discussion
+
+(S) PRC fighter reactions to SRO missions in the South China Sea, specifically those by Lingshui-based fighters, had become increasingly aggressive in the months preceding the collision incident. Reacting aircraft frequently approached to within 100 feet of the mission aircraft, and on four occasions, within 50 feet. The closest previous
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+43
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+approach was within ten feet. The U.S. government was aware of the potential hazards imposed by such activity and delivered a demarche on the topic to Beijing in December 2000. However, neither the Pacific Command nor the JCS issued any new guidance regarding actions to be taken in the event of close encounters by reacting PRC fighter aircraft. At the time of the collision, several crew members were out of their seats. Though crew members were not injured, they could have been and this could have made a difficult situation far worse.
+
+(S) SRO flight crews operating in the Pacific theater lacked specific guidance on divert airfields under emergency conditions. There were no written policies or procedures that specified countries to which the aircraft could or could not divert under emergency situations, crew actions to be taken in the event of emergency diverts, contingency statements for crew use, specific instructions regarding disposition of materials, or whether or not the aircraft should be destroyed, and if so, how.
+
+(S) After the collision, the Mission Commander assessed his ability to fly the aircraft, the airworthiness of the aircraft, and the options available (i.e., bailout, ditch, land). The Mission Commander elected to divert to the closest airfield, at Lingshui on Hainan Island. Once the aircraft had landed, a cadre of PRC military, some of whom were armed with bolt-action rifles, almost immediately surrounded it, though none aimed weapons at the aircraft. Based on his assessment of growing PRC impatience, the Mission Commander ordered the plane powered down, thereby terminating communications with the Pacific Reconnaissance Operations Center, and ordered the crew to deplane.
+
+(S) The PRC detained the crew for 11 days. Nine of the crew, including the Mission Commander, had not received peacetime detention training. This training addresses the legal rights and responsibilities of aircrews facing precisely the circumstances this crew encountered and provides methods and techniques for dealing with detention, interrogation, and isolation. A review of the crew's detention experience is contained in a separate report issued by the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency.
+
+(S) A bilateral agreement with Russia establishes procedures for the peaceful handling and expeditious resolution of similar incidents between U.S. and Russian forces. *The Agreement Between the United States and Russia on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities* specifies procedures for both parties in the event of distress (*force majeure*) entry of U.S. forces into Russian territory. U.S. aircrews (including the incident EP-3E crew) carry specific guidance in their Flight Information Handbook covering the implementation of this agreement. This guidance includes frequencies, call signs, standard phraseology and a Russian language checklist for use after landing. No similar agreement exists between the U.S. and the PRC.
+
+8.2.3 (U) Recommendations
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+44
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+* (C) Establish written guidance for aircrew actions in the event of hazardous maneuvers by reacting fighters.
+* (C) Provide detailed guidance for Mission Commander and crew actions in the event of a forced landing of the mission aircraft in countries within range of the mission track.
+* (U//FOUO) Require peacetime detention training for all reconnaissance personnel and personnel engaged in other sensitive operations where there is a risk of detention.
+* (U//FOUO) Explore pursuing an agreement with the PRC to establish joint procedures to prevent dangerous military activities.
+
+8.3 (U) Radio Communications
+
+8.3.1 (U) Findings
+
+* (C) The flight crew defaulted to U.S. military emergency communications procedures that were ineffective in establishing contact with the PRC.
+* (C) The flight crew was unfamiliar with PRC aeronautical frequency usage and did not attempt contact with Lingshui on local airfield frequencies.
+* (C) Emergency destruction efforts directed at communications equipment placed the aircrew out of radio contact until after landing. At that time, the aircrew briefly restored secure communications with PACROC until terminating connectivity prior to deplaning.
+
+8.3.2 (U) Radio Equipment and Networks
+
+(U//FOUO) The EP-3E has numerous radios onboard and is a participant on a wide variety of radio networks. Line-of-sight communications are conducted using both plain voice and secure VHF and UHF radios. On SRO missions, long-range communications with controlling authorities are conducted via HF radio and over a number of secure UHF satellite networks. For a listing of EP-3E radio equipment and networks, see Appendix E.
+
+8.3.3 (U) Emergency Communications
+
+(U) United States and allied military aviation communications take place almost entirely within the frequency band from 225.0 MHz to 399.9 MHz. U.S. military pilots receive the majority of their training in this band, including the use of the 243.0 MHz emergency frequency. EP-3E flight station radios have an emergency setting that tunes directly to 243.0 MHz.
+
+(C) DoD Flight Information Publications carried onboard the EP-3E list several international emergency frequencies, including both 121.5 MHz and 243.0 MHz, and state in general that any may be used. No guidance is provided specific to emergency contact with the PRC.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+45
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+8.3.4 (U) Procedures Used During Incident
+
+(S) At the time of the incident, secure communications via satellite had been established with KRSOC and the Special Support Activity (SSA) in NSOC on the Pacific Tributary Network (PTN), and with KRSOC on the SENSOR PACER network. HF reception and connectivity using the Global High Frequency System (GHFS) was poor.
+
+(S) In the first moments after the collision, the secure communications operator attempted repeatedly to transmit the two-word message "GOING DOWN" on the SENSOR PACER network. This message was never received. Further transmissions were precluded by the emergency destruction of secure communications equipment.
+
+(S) The navigator transmitted MAYDAY calls on PTN. At least one transmission was received by both KRSOC and SSA, initiating CRITIC reporting. The navigator also transmitted MAYDAY calls on the GHFS frequency of 13200 kHz. These calls were never received.
+
+(S//SI) The aircrew transmitted repeated MAYDAY calls on the UHF emergency frequency 243.0 MHz. At no time did the aircrew transmit on the VHF emergency frequency of 121.5 MHz or any frequency associated with Lingshui Airfield. Training of flight station personnel did not address either the PRC usage of the VHF band for military aircraft communications or PRC emergency communications procedures. Efforts to locate Lingshui Airfield frequencies in DoD flight information publications were unsuccessful, since PRC military airfields are not listed. COMINT operators on the aircraft were familiar with the Lingshui Airfield frequency (128.5 MHz) and PRC-wide military aviation frequencies (126.0 and 130.0 MHz), but the flight station did not engage the COMINT operators on this issue.
+
+(S) Power was removed from the PTN satellite voice radio during the emergency destruction process, erasing all frequencies from the radio's memory. Although the crew destroyed the radio's cryptographic keying material and PTN frequency documentation, it did not zeroize the radio's encryption device.
+
+(S) After landing, the SEVAL was able to recall the PTN frequency and retune the radio, enabling the crew to re-establish secure two-way communications with the Pacific Reconnaissance Operations Center (PACROC), KRSOC, and Special Support Activity (SSA). The crew then transmitted the final message from the aircraft before zeroizing the PTN radio's encryption device.
+
+8.3.5 (U) Recommendations
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+46
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+* (U//FOUO) Incorporate guidance in emergency destruction procedures identifying communication equipment that should not be zeroized or destroyed until no longer needed.
+* (U//FOUO) Train flight crew personnel in the emergency communication procedures used by countries in their areas of operations.
+* (U//FOUO) Provide guidance in the DoD Flight Information Handbook specific to emergency communications with the PRC and other target nations.
+
+8.4 (U) Internal Communications
+
+8.4.1 (U) Findings
+
+* (C) A breakdown in communications and situational awareness occurred throughout the aircraft immediately following the collision.
+* (C) Public address (PA) announcements were nearly unintelligible in the noisy environment after the collision; many crew members reported an inability to clearly understand PA commands once they had donned helmets.
+* (C) The inability to effectively communicate orders and intentions contributed significantly to the incomplete destruction effort.
+* (C) The decision to land instead of ditching the aircraft was not communicated to the entire crew.
+
+8.4.2 (U) Internal Communication System
+
+(C) The EP-3E's internal communications system is the Digital Communications Management System (DCMS). All operational crew positions have access to the DCMS with headsets, with the exception of personnel in the galley and observers in the flight station. Communication paths between crew members are divided into various audio networks. The primary network is the ALL net (available at all crew stations). An internal PA system, consisting of small loudspeakers distributed throughout the aircraft cabin, is available for internal announcements. PA system announcements override DCMS traffic at every crew station. Helmets can be connected to the DCMS using the same cable that connects headsets. Helmets are tight-fitting and acoustically isolate the wearer from his or her surroundings.
+
+8.4.3 (U) Normal Mission Communications
+
+(S) There is no specific written guidance on DCMS net configuration or employment. During periods of heightened activity, such as when the aircraft is being intercepted, the entire crew usually switches to the ALL net to maximize their situational awareness. In the case of an intercept, this allows all personnel to hear observer reports on the intercepting aircraft. As an exception to this practice, the COMINT operators monitoring target nation communications may deselect the ALL net to minimize distraction and interference.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+47
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+(U//FOUO) During emergencies, the SEVAL serves as the point of contact between the Aircraft Commander in the flight station and the crew, orchestrating the safe completion of emergency procedures. The flight station also communicates to the crew aft using the PA system.
+
+(U//FOUO) It was not a procedural requirement for all EP-3E crew members to monitor DCMS during landings.
+
+8.4.4 (U) Procedures Used During Incident
+
+(S) At the time of the intercept, several crew members were not connected to the DCMS. These included a third pilot and second flight engineer acting as observers in the flight station, a roving photographer, and an ELINT operator trainee. All other crew members were monitoring the ALL net with the exception of COMINT operators engaged in collection.
+
+(C) After the collision, the first command issued by the Mission Commander was to prepare to bail out. This command was issued via the PA. All crew members removed their headsets in order to don their parachutes, survival vests and helmets.
+
+(C) High noise levels resulting from aircraft damage gave crew members wearing helmets great difficulty hearing each other, even when shouting at close range. PA announcements were also difficult to hear. At this point, communication of orders and instructions to the crew became unreliable.
+
+(C) Acting as jumpmaster, the SEVAL connected his helmet to a DCMS interface but was unable to communicate with the flight station due to a failed microphone. Consequently, he sent a runner to the cockpit to inform the Mission Commander that the crew was prepared to bail out.
+
+(C) After issuing the command to prepare to bail out, the Mission Commander regained control of the aircraft, negating the need to bail out. The Mission Commander then issued a PA announcement notifying the crew to prepare to ditch and to commence emergency destruction.
+
+(C) As emergency destruction began, crew members aft of the navigation station did not connect their helmets to the DCMS in order to have free movement for destruction activity. As a result, no one heard flight station discussions on the ALL net concerning landing at Lingshui. Although the Mission Commander did not make a PA announcement regarding the decision to attempt landing at Lingshui, the SEVAL did learn of the intention through face-to-face communication with the Mission Commander. However, he did not communicate this information to the rest of the crew.
+
+(C) Only after strapping themselves in for the expected ditching did some personnel connect their helmets to the DCMS. Some crew members cited difficulty doing so due to tangled cords or unfamiliarity with the helmet DCMS cable connection.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+48
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+Others had taken assigned ditching stations in the galley, and had no DCMS access. As a result, many crew members did not realize the aircraft was landing instead of ditching until they either saw land out a window or heard the landing gear deploy.
+
+8.4.5 (U) Recommendations
+
+* (U//FOUO) Improve the performance and intelligibility of the EP-3E PA system to operate better in all environments.
+* (U//FOUO) Increase training using helmets during drills so that crew members are proficient at communicating while wearing helmets.
+* (U//FOUO) Reemphasize the critical role of clear communications between the flight station and aircrew cabin during emergency procedure and Aircrew Coordination Training.
+* (U//FOUO) Drill emergency crew communications procedures in-flight on a routine basis, practicing alternate communication methods for all combinations of emergencies.
+* (U//FOUO) As a required part of pre-mission briefings, identify by name key personnel and alternates responsible for leading crew actions and making status reports during emergency destruction.
+* (U//FOUO) Design and implement improved emergency communications procedures and hardware on the EP-3E to enable reliable communications at all times, especially during abnormal flight conditions. Investigate wireless communications systems.
+
+8.5 (U) Classified and Sensitive Material Handling
+
+8.5.1 (U) Findings
+
+* (C//SI) Standard operating procedures did not restrict the amount of classified information that could be brought onboard the EP-3E.
+* (C//SI) The Mission Commander was unaware of and did not specifically approve any Category III COMINT materials carried onboard.
+* (C) The inventory left by the mission aircraft prior to departing on the mission was not accurate, detailed, or verified.
+* (C) Operational information such as radio call signs and networks was compromised.
+
+8.5.2 (U) Policy Directives
+
+(U//FOUO) Basic guidance for security procedures for COMINT materials for airborne SIGINT platforms is set forth in USSID 3, *Cryptologic Security Procedures*.
+
+(C//SI) USSID 3 details COMINT restrictions for airborne SIGINT platforms. The USSID specifies that material up to and including Category III (Top Secret) COMINT may be brought onboard, but a designee must review the material to determine whether it applies to the specific mission. USSID 3 further requires that ground
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+49
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+personnel conduct an inventory of all COMINT material prior to its being placed onboard the platform, and that ground personnel retain a copy of the inventory.
+
+8.5.3 (U) EP-3E Procedures
+
+(C) Standard operating procedures did not restrict the amount of classified information that could be brought onboard the aircraft.
+
+(C) Considerable operator training takes place airborne during missions. Such training is conducted on a not-to-interfere basis, usually during transit to and from the operational area. Material carried onboard to support training included classified publications and individualized study guides containing target nation orders of battle, notes on signal and weapons systems employment, and SIGINT reporting procedures.
+
+(C) Mission classified material inventories contain a list of publications and positional technical working aids by title, individual study guides, electronic media and portable equipments. This inventory does not include a complete listing of files stored on disks or computer hard drives, or detailed information on contents, sources, and extracts contained in the positional working aids.
+
+8.5.4 (U) Pre-flight Procedures
+
+(C) The aircrew produced a classified material inventory and left it with ground support personnel in Okinawa. However, the inventory was incomplete and not of sufficient detail to allow a detailed reconstruction of materials carried onboard. Some classified materials were not known to have been onboard until the aircraft was recovered.
+
+(C) The aircrew did not limit classified material to that necessary for the conduct of the mission. Technical working aids contained material covering Russia, North Korea, India, and the Persian Gulf, as well as intelligence on the PRC not relevant to the mission. Additionally, the crew carried substantial training materials and study aids not required for the mission.
+
+(C) Portable computers contained extensive classified material that was neither inventoried nor necessary for the mission. Some such material was included in classified software distributions, some was loaded for in-flight reference, and some was unintentionally and unknowingly loaded onto hard drives. Still more material had been generated during or in support of previous missions, but not removed. For material that had been removed but was not overwritten, recoverable fragments of deleted files likely remained. In most cases, the detail and scope of classified material stored on portable computers was unknown to both the aircrew and ground support personnel.
+
+(C) Personnel most responsible for classified material handling had an insufficient understanding of their responsibilities. In particular, the Mission Commander, SEVAL, and COMEVAL had incomplete knowledge of the nature, content and amount of
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+50
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+classified material on the aircraft. Additionally, individual operators were not knowledgeable of the scope and contents of files contained on electronic media, or the detailed contents of study guides.
+
+8.5.5 (U) Compromised Operational Information
+
+(C) Several radio call signs and networks and other operational information were compromised by documentation left onboard the aircraft. Information included network names, employment, frequencies; cryptographic keying material assignments; and SRO track coordinates. Damage from this compromise is low.
+
+(C) Additionally, extensive personnel information was carried onboard by the crew (see Section 6.5, Counterintelligence Issues).
+
+8.5.6 (U) Recommendations
+
+* (C) Ensure the Mission Commander and other personnel responsible for emergency destruction are fully cognizant of the scope and nature of all classified materials onboard the aircraft and are in compliance with USSID 3.
+* (C) Review USSID 3 requirements for the protection of COMINT systems and data at all classification levels.
+* (U//FOUO) Issue policy to increase the detail in material inventories to support a rapid and accurate page-for-page reconstruction of all sensitive and classified materials, including all files on hard disks, CD ROMs, and floppy disks.
+* (U//FOUO) Maintain exact backup copies of all electronic media at a ground support facility for every mission.
+* (U/FOUO) Establish written procedures designating specific ground support personnel who will verify aircraft inventories and electronic media backups prior to every mission.
+* (C) Review and change, as required, compromised operational information such as radio call signs and frequencies.
+
+8.6 (U) Emergency Destruction Policy, Procedures, and Training
+
+8.6.1 (U) Findings
+
+* (C) No specific guidance regarding emergency destruction techniques was provided by SSO Navy or NSA.
+* (C) An inventory of destroyed materials and equipments was not kept.
+
+8.6.2 (U) Policy
+
+(U//FOUO) Basic policy for emergency destruction of cryptologic materials is set forth in USSID 3, *Cryptologic Security Procedures*, USSID 702, *Automated Information Systems Security*, NSA/CSS Manual 130-2, *Media Declassification and Destruction*
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+51
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+*Manual*, and DCID 1/21, *Physical Security Standards for Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities*.
+
+(C//SI) USSID 3 states that any emergency destruction that renders classified material and systems unusable is sufficient, but provides no guidance regarding suitable techniques. USSID 702 promulgates NSA/CSS Manual 130-2, which provides a thorough and technical discussion of procedures for the routine sanitization and declassification of electronic media and for its end-of-life destruction, but does not identify suitable emergency procedures. DCID 1/21 establishes security standards for sensitive compartmented information (SCI). For aircraft, the DCID states that if a landing in unfriendly territory is anticipated, all SCI material will immediately be destroyed, but does not specify procedures or techniques. DCID 1/21 mandates emergency destruction rehearsal, but conditions requiring such rehearsal are ambiguous.
+
+(U//FOUO) Although various Navy directives mandate the existence of emergency action plans, no current Navy directive or publication provides guidance specific to the implementation of emergency destruction procedures.
+
+(C) There is no unifying concept underlying any of the guidance regarding emergency destruction. This issue is discussed in detail in Section 4.4, SIGINT Configuration and Materials Management.
+
+8.6.3 (U) EP-3E Procedures and Training
+
+(C) Squadron requirements and procedures for emergency destruction are set forth in the instruction *VQ-1 Command Emergency Action Plan (EAP)*. This official directive requires emergency destruction to take place if an aircraft is to land in hostile territory or ditch in less than 6000 feet of water. If the aircraft is expected to ditch in more than 6000 feet of water, all classified materials should be permitted to go down with the aircraft.
+
+(C) The instruction details duties for individual crew members. A separate checklist page, intended to be detached and referenced during emergency destruction, is included for each affected crew member. Other than shredding, tearing, jettisoning and striking with an axe, no destruction techniques are specified.
+
+(U//FOUO) Final responsibility for emergency destruction lies with the Mission Commander. The instruction explicitly caveats that emergency destruction is secondary to aircrew safety.
+
+(U//FOUO) The squadron emergency action plan specifies that all squadron personnel receive emergency action plan training. Aircrews are required to incorporate emergency destruction plans and practice drills into predeployment workups and to conduct an emergency destruction drill at least once while deployed.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+52
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+(U//FOUO) VQ-1 crews and NSG COMINT operators train separately. Predeployment workups and training for VQ-1 take place in the United States, while NSG COMINT operators train in Japan.
+
+(C) At the time of the incident, the EP-3E was not equipped with shredders or other destruction tools. The aircraft's fire axe, a dull hatchet approximately 16 inches long intended for cutting through bulkheads in an emergency evacuation, was used in destruction attempts.
+
+8.6.4 (U) Procedures Used During Incident
+
+(C) Emergency destruction training for the aircrew was minimal. Only one crew member reported ever having participated in an in-flight emergency destruction drill. Fifteen reported having been exposed to emergency destruction procedures in the course of their training without the benefit of drills or walk-throughs. Eight reported no training whatsoever. None had trained for emergency destruction in conjunction with any aircraft emergency. A review of crew training records revealed no documentation other than individual JQR signatures of any emergency destruction training or drills. Training was lackadaisical, with the aircrew generally unengaged and going through the motions using unrealistic scenarios.
+
+(C) The squadron emergency action plan, including crew checklists, was carried onboard the aircraft, but not consulted during the incident. Emergency destruction efforts that took place did not resemble prescribed procedures.
+
+(C) Emergency destruction procedures did not begin until several minutes after the collision. The crew initially focused on preparing to bail out. Only after regaining control of the aircraft did the pilot instruct the crew to prepare to ditch and commence emergency destruction. Many crew members did not hear the PA announcement, but began emergency destruction based on the actions of others around them.
+
+(C) At this point, no crew member aft of the navigation station was connected to the DCMS, so no one person was in a position to oversee and coordinate emergency destruction. As a result, crew activities divided themselves into three independent areas of action: the flight station, including the secure communications operator and navigator; the ELINT operators, including the SEVAL; and the COMINT operators, including the COMEVAL.
+
+(C) The pilots, flight engineers, and navigator were immersed in recovering and maintaining control of the aircraft. Classified and unclassified documents were hurriedly grabbed and passed aft for destruction in an uncoordinated fashion, resulting in the pilots' emergency checklists being removed and destroyed. The navigator gathered some classified documentation and most cryptographic material into the CMS box before it was taken from her and used to batter equipment. Off-duty flight station personnel, believing that ditching was imminent, proceeded to their ditching stations in the galley and did not participate in emergency destruction in any significant way.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+53
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+(C) ELINT personnel were unfamiliar with emergency destruction procedures, but proceeded using their best judgment. Operators packed classified material into satchels in preparation for jettisoning, zeroized installed ELINT equipment and computer systems, and physically battered exposed equipment.
+
+(C) The aircraft's fire axe was aggressively employed in attempts to destroy the three ELINT laptop computers. This technique is estimated to have been effective in destroying the hard drive of one laptop, but the other two laptop hard drives are assessed to have survived destruction attempts due in part to operator unfamiliarity with how best to destroy them. Two of the three laptops, including the destroyed laptop, were eventually jettisoned.
+
+(C) Operators also attempted destruction of installed ELINT equipment. Without guidance on how to proceed, they directed the bulk of their efforts toward the relatively fragile displays and controls most accessible at their consoles. While many such units were damaged beyond usability, critical system components such as tuners and signal processors went unscathed due to their rugged construction and relative inaccessibility. Improvised destruction tools included the aluminum CMS box, which sprung open and scattered cryptographic material while being used to smash equipment. Time was wasted gathering and repacking this material.
+
+(C) Jettisoning took place through the starboard overwing hatch. After the hatch was opened, the SEVAL threw materials from the aircraft as three crew members restrained him from being sucked through the opening. Some ELINT documentation, two of the three ELINT laptops, magnetic data tapes, and miscellaneous materials such as binders and keyboards were jettisoned before the hatch was closed. The CMS box containing cryptographic keying material and miscellaneous classified documents was also jettisoned. The crew was unable to maintain an inventory of jettisoned materials.
+
+(C//SI) COMINT personnel were also unfamiliar with emergency destruction procedures. Operators gathered classified documents and passed them forward toward the area of the starboard overwing hatch. At the COMINT Supervisor's station, materials were packed into locking leather satchels for jettisoning, but then stored in a nearby cabinet in anticipation of ditching.
+
+(C//SI) COMINT portable computers were damaged to varying degrees. The COMINT Supervisor's laptop computer (Figure 4) was struck with an axe. The SCARAB computer was thrown to the deck in an unsuccessful attempt to damage the locked-in hard drive. The MARTES laptop was stowed undamaged in the galley in anticipation of ditching.
+
+(C) As the aircraft approached land, the Mission Commander instructed the crew to take their seats and strap in, effectively ending destruction efforts. After landing, further destruction efforts were limited to tearing loose papers and tapes and scattering the resulting material about the aircraft.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+54
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+8.6.5 (U) Recommendations
+
+* (U//FOUO) Train aircrew in emergency destruction procedures in a formal setting prior to their operational deployment.
+* (U//FOUO) Include emergency destruction classroom training and in-flight drills during crew workups. Include all crew members from all commands participating in operations.
+* (U//FOUO) Require regular emergency destruction drills during detachments; include situations where destruction procedures are impeded by simultaneous emergencies (e.g., fire of unknown origin, preparations to bail out and/or ditch) and constrained by time limits.
+* (U//FOUO) Include emergency destruction responsibilities and procedures in pre-mission briefings, similar to those for ditching, bailout, and fire of unknown origin.
+* (U//FOUO) Issue individualized written emergency destruction procedures in a quick-reference format to all crew members prior to flight.
+* (U//FOUO) Include emergency destruction as a sub-area of all positional NATOPS qualifications.
+* (U//FOUO) Ensure sufficient type and quantity of emergency destruction tools are onboard mission aircraft.
+* (U//FOUO) Develop practical procedures for inventorying jettisoned or destroyed materials.
+* (U//FOUO) Conduct and document periodic emergency destruction reviews to ensure procedures are current with technology and mission environment changes.
+* (U//FOUO) For any equipment not covered by current emergency destruction procedures, require new procedures and training before allowing the equipment onboard.
+* (U//FOUO) Provide national-level guidance for jettisoning classified materials.
+
+8.7 (U) Crew Reaction
+
+8.7.1 (U) Findings
+
+* (C) Individual crew performance during the emergency destruction activities ranged from good to poor.
+* (C) Effective communication among three key officers (the Mission Commander, SEVAL and COMEVAL) after the collision would have improved the outcome of emergency destruction.
+* (C) A lack of cohesive and unified crew training adversely affected emergency destruction.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+55
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+8.7.2 (U) Discussion
+
+(C) The aircrew's overall performance in safeguarding classified materials under their charge was poor. Success where it occurred was the result of the common sense focus of a few individuals in an uncoordinated effort and occurred despite a general lack of training, practice in emergency destruction, capabilities, and sound policy.
+
+(C) The crew's efforts should be viewed in light of the severe environmental and human factors they faced. In the aftermath of the collision, every crewmember suffered from some degree of shock. While individual performance can then be expected to suffer, such conditions are not insurmountable. Aggressive, repeated, and thorough training serves to guide the thoughts and actions of personnel in extremis. The crew's execution of often-drilled emergency procedures and preparations to bail out were largely successful. However, a lack of training and practice left the crew unprepared to execute emergency destruction successfully under these adverse conditions.
+
+(C) The SEVAL did not oversee the emergency destruction efforts of the crew as a whole, focusing his attention on the ELINT and COMSEC materials carried onboard by squadron personnel. The proper disposition of COMINT materials and equipments fell to the COMEVAL. Citing time constraints, the SEVAL consciously decided not to retrieve and use the aircraft's copy of the squadron emergency action plan.
+
+(C) The SEVAL personally wielded the fire axe to destroy laptop computers and then jettisoned material through the starboard overwing hatch. By actively engaging in this activity instead of delegating it to other personnel, he isolated himself from knowledge of actions taking place in the rest of the cabin. As a result, he had no situational awareness of the status and scope of emergency destruction and was unable to effectively monitor and direct the actions of the crew.
+
+(C) Although the SEVAL learned of the Mission Commander's intent to attempt to land the aircraft at Lingshui through face-to-face communication, he did not communicate this to the rest of the crew in general or to the COMEVAL in particular.
+
+(C) The COMEVAL did not ascertain or maintain situational awareness of the aircraft's circumstances and Mission Commander's intentions. Assuming that the aircraft was going to ditch, the COMEVAL elected not to jettison classified material. This decision was not coordinated with the SEVAL or the Mission Commander. As a result, the COMEVAL was unsuccessful in meeting the responsibility to ensure destruction of sensitive classified material.
+
+(C) Several personnel, observing COMINT materials being packed and placed in a storage cabinet, were concerned that this material should instead be jettisoned. None took the initiative to assert their concerns to the COMEVAL.
+
+(C) After landing, the COMEVAL did not communicate to the SEVAL or the Mission Commander that all COMINT materials and carry-on equipments were still
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+56
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+onboard. Several crew members, also knowing that substantial amounts of classified material remained onboard, similarly failed to raise the issue to their chain of command.
+
+(C) The Mission Commander and SEVAL assumed that emergency destruction efforts were complete. They neither queried the crew to verify the disposition of classified materials nor directed or conducted any form of sweep or search of the aircraft. As he left the aircraft, the Mission Commander assumed that all classified materials had been destroyed or jettisoned and that only scraps of paper and destroyed equipment remained.
+
+(C) The Mission Commander, concerned about the apparent growing impatience of the PRC troops surrounding the aircraft, terminated secure radio communications with PACROC before PACOM authorities could be summoned. He ordered the crew to deplane, placing the crew and the aircraft in PRC control.
+
+(C) During debriefings, many crew members commented on the lack of training as a crew. There was a common view that the coordination and effortlessness that marks outstanding crews is difficult to achieve since training and preparation for the deployment occur separately, the responsibility of two different commands. Frequently, the entire crew for the mission aircraft does not meet as a unit until the first mission of the deployment.
+
+(C) In this case, the crew was not properly organized and trained in preparation for executing emergency destruction of classified material as required by the squadron emergency action plan. Emergency destruction plans and practice drills were not incorporated into aircrew predeployment workups, and no emergency destruction training or drills had been conducted during the deployment.
+
+(C) While required training of the crew would have improved the outcome of this incident, greater crew experience also would have added to the crew's likelihood of success. A few of the enlisted operators had multiple tours and thousands of hours of experience conducting SRO missions. All of the officers in leadership positions were relatively inexperienced (both the Mission Commander and the SEVAL were on their first deployment in these positions) and all were in their first tours conducting SRO missions on this platform. There was one Senior Chief Petty Officer and one First Class Petty Officer onboard. All other enlisted personnel were E5 or junior.
+
+8.7.3 (U) Recommendations
+
+* (U//FOUO) Review and formalize crew certification procedures for each deploying crew. Include demonstrated ability to execute all emergency procedures satisfactorily, and emergency destruction under less than optimal conditions.
+* (U//FOUO) As part of individual qualification, require trainees to exercise and demonstrate proper emergency destruction procedures during in-flight examination.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+57
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+* (U//FOUO) Examine current organizations with the objective of aligning crew training, cohesion, unity, and overall experience.
+
+8.8 (U) Other Tactical SIGINT Platforms
+
+(U//FOUO) Team members deployed to several locations to gather data on best practices in use on other tactical SIGINT collection platforms. The visits concentrated on gaining insights into procedures for risk management in the day-to-day conduct of tactical intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions. Appendix G contains a complete list of units visited and discussion of procedures used for various platforms.
+
+(U//FOUO) Generally, other tactical SIGINT platforms have processes and procedures similar to the EP-3E, including emergency destruction and training, as well as requirements for control of classified and sensitive equipments and documentation. Assuming the destruction plans are technically appropriate for the materials onboard, crew training and drilling will be the deciding factor in successful emergency destruction.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+58
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+9.0 (U) Systemic Issues
+
+9.1 (U) Key Finding
+
+* (C) The incident revealed a systemic complacency regarding policy, planning, and training support to EP-3E SRO missions.
+
+9.2 (U) Discussion
+
+(C) The detailed research, interviews, and data gathering conducted to evaluate this incident have brought the crew's actions, both successful and not, into sharp focus. It is clear that a better-aligned and trained crew could have substantially mitigated, and likely completely avoided, the loss of sensitive material through better communication and more effective action.
+
+(C) Less obvious, but equally as clear, is the systemic complacency of the organizations charged with supporting these Sensitive Reconnaissance Operations. The daily reconnaissance flights conducted by aircrews around the world are the final step in a process that should properly anticipate, plan for, equip, train for, and oversee these operations.
+
+(C) In this case, there was a lack of current guidance regarding a situation that was growing increasingly hazardous. Although the United States had delivered a demarche to the PRC in December 2000 declaring its concern for the actions of the PRC pilots, this concern was not translated by theater- and Washington-level organizations into specific issuance of updated guidance to aircrews.
+
+(S) There was no guidance to the Navy aircrew regarding procedures to be followed should the SRO aircraft be forced by circumstances to land in a target country. In this case, the relatively junior officer in charge of the mission was left to make his best estimate of the correct response. Guidance to crews should be developed and frequently reviewed to ensure the most appropriate response, should a platform be forced to recover in a potentially unfriendly location. Although not a factor in this case, the Navy aircrew was not required to complete peacetime detention training, leaving them less well prepared to deal with the circumstances in which they found themselves.
+
+(C) That the crew was untrained and untested in emergency destruction speaks directly to the process by which the providing commands, in this case VQ-1 and NSGA Misawa, prepared and certified the crew for deployment. Active command oversight of training by experienced, knowledgeable personnel is a prerequisite for success. Review of the procedures by which crews prepare technical materials for onboard support, inventory those materials, and train for their destruction or protection is a fundamental command responsibility. Commander, Naval Security Group Command and the Commanders of Patrol and Reconnaissance Forces should vigorously review and assess these procedures on a regular basis.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+59
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+(U) It is routine for aircrews to be comprised of personnel from multiple commands, given the range of technical skills and experience needed to successfully meet the complex requirements set for most crews. This places a special burden on providing commands to ensure that crews are trained to the highest state of preparedness. If manning and training cannot be accomplished within the commands' resources (e.g., flight hours available for in-flight emergency destruction training, travel funds for Aircrew Coordination Training), the organizations charged with resourcing those commands must engage and resolve the issue.
+
+(C) Policy for emergency destruction is inadequate and does not account for today's rapidly evolving technologies and the equipments and capabilities being routinely deployed in risky environments. DCI and DIRNSA guidance addresses the requirements for end-state destruction in rigorous detail, but does not address destruction in emergency circumstances, other than to direct that it be accomplished.
+
+(S) New guidance is required that incorporates modern methods of data protection or eradication. Increasingly, our capabilities are not embedded in hardware but reside in software. The U.S. requires a response that changes the paradigm from destruction of equipments and materials to safeguarding information with modern techniques such as encryption and rapid overwriting of hard disks. While destruction may always be preferred, it may not always be possible. Several Intelligence Community organizations are currently working on such applications and have deployed these capabilities on a limited scale. These efforts should be crosswalked, melded into a coherent program, and migrated into operational platforms and missions. This is imperative given that more classified and sensitive capability, not less, will find its way into risky environments where compromise is possible and where destruction is impractical or not possible.
+
+(C) Focused interest and active regard for the protection of classified information should not have to result from substantial, public losses. Complacency is in itself a risk factor. At a time when the intelligence and technical superiority enjoyed by the United States is challenged, we can ill afford to risk this superiority through inattention to the protection of what we do have. The protection of classified information should be on a par with any other emergency procedure that we must be proficient in. This incident has, to this point, energized the Intelligence Community and many actions have already been taken to correct deficiencies. However, follow-through and institutionalization of lessons learned, at all levels, are required to avoid the tendency for loss of focus as incidents recede, memories fade, and emergent issues strain resources. Failure to address these issues decisively will not just continue the likelihood of future losses, it will guarantee it.
+
+9.3 (U) Recommendation
+
+* (U) Implement, track, and institutionalize the study's recommendations.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+60
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+(U) Glossary
+
+| Term | Expansion | Definition/Description |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| ADCI | Assistant Director of Central Intelligence | n/a |
+| AN/ALD-9 | n/a | (U) A direction finder set that calculates the direction of arrival for received HF, VHF, and UHF signals. Installed on the EP-3E. |
+| AN/ALQ-108 | n/a | (U) An enemy IFF interrogation system used to actively and passively exploit early Russian IFF and range extension signals. Installed on the EP-3E. |
+| AN/CYZ-10 | n/a | (U) The Data Transfer Device currently used in the U.S. Electronic Key Management System. |
+| AN/ULQ-16 | n/a | (U) A computerized pulse processor, used to make radar signal measurements. Installed on the EP-3E. |
+| CINCPAC | Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command | n/a |
+| CINCPACFLT | Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet | n/a |
+| CMS Box | COMSEC Material System Box | (U) A locking metal case used to secure and transport cryptographic codebooks, keying material and cryptographic devices on the EP-3E. |
+| COMEVAL | COMINT Evaluator | (C) The senior COMINT authority aboard Naval reconnaissance aircraft. The COMEVAL supervises COMINT collection and provides interface with the ELINT collection effort for fused reporting. |
+| COMINT | Communications Intelligence | (U) Technical and intelligence information derived from foreign communications by other than intended recipients. |
+| COMINT Supervisor | n/a | (C) An experienced enlisted COMINT operator responsible for monitoring and directing the activities of the COMINT operators on the EP-3. |
+| COMNAVSECGRU | Commander, Naval Security Group | n/a |
+| COMSEC | Communications Security | (U) Technology for securing/protecting voice/data communications |
+| COMSEVENTHFLT | Commander, Seventh Fleet | n/a |
+| CRITIC | Critical Information | (U//FOUO) A report of critical information concerning possible foreign threats to U.S. national security that is so significant that it requires the immediate attention of the President and the National Security Council. CRITICs are delivered within 10 minutes to appropriate intelligence organizations, military components, and other recipients as the DCI may designate. |
+| CTEGM | Collector Technical ELINT Guidance Manual | (C) NSA collection guidance associated with target emitters and systems of technical interest. |
+| DCI | Director of Central Intelligence | n/a |
+| DCID | Director of Central Intelligence Directive | (U) Directives that serve as the principal means by which the DCI provides guidance, policy, and direction to the Intelligence Community. |
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+61
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+| Term | Expansion | Definition/Description |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| DCMS | Digital Communications Management System | (U//FOUO) The EP-3E internal system that provides audio communications between crew members as well as routing of audio signals between transmitters, receivers, navigation instruments and the PA system. |
+| DoD | Department of Defense | n/a |
+| DTD | Data Transfer Device | (U) Fill device designed to securely store, transport, and electronically transfer key. |
+| EDP | Emergency Destruction Procedures | (U) Predefined procedures dealing with the destruction of sensitive material (e.g., computers, documentation, COMSEC keying material). |
+| ELINT | Electronic Intelligence | (U) Technical and intelligence information obtained from the intercept and analysis of non-communication, electromagnetic radiations. |
+| EOB | Electronic Order of Battle | (U) A list of radar sites and the radar sets or systems that are located at these sites. |
+| EPL | ELINT Parameter Limits | (S) A technical reference document designed, maintained, and promulgated as a national-level guide to support ELINT collection, signal identification and signal analysis activities. |
+| FISINT | Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence | (U) Technical and intelligence information derived from intercept of foreign instrumentation signals which include, but are not limited to, telemetry, beaconry, and electronic interrogators. |
+| GHFS | Global High Frequency System | (U//FOUO) A worldwide network of high-power HF radio stations that provide air/ground HF command and control radio communications between ground agencies and US military aircraft and ships. |
+| HULTEC Database | Hull-to-Emitter Correlation Database | (C) A database of information that fingerprints naval platforms by emitter (ELINT) to platform correlation. |
+| HUNTER | | (U) U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle |
+| IA | Information Assurance | n/a |
+| IAD | Information Assurance Directorate | n/a |
+| JPRA | Joint Personnel Recovery Agency | (U) The DoD office of primary responsibility for DoD-wide personnel recovery matters. |
+| JQR | Job Qualifications Requirements | (U) Positional qualification system that establishes the minimum knowledge and skill level required to function effectively at a specific watchstation. |
+| KG-84 | n/a | (U) A device that provides for encryption and decryption of data traffic. |
+| KL-43 | n/a | (U) A portable off-line text encryption/decryption system ruggedized and intended for use in a tactical environment. Used aboard PACOM SRO aircraft to encrypt short messages for HF transmission. |
+| KLIEGLIGHT | n/a | (U//FOUO) Reporting vehicle used to forward time-sensitive SIGINT technical information to NSOC, SIGINT producers, and Cryptologic Support Groups. |
+| KOI-18 | n/a | (U) A small, hand-carried device that reads a standard punched tape and converts the information to a serial output. Used to provide cryptovariables to the KYK-13 or any other compatible equipment |
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+62
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+| Term | Expansion | Definition/Description |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| KY-58 | n/a | (U) A small device that provides secure voice digital communications with FM, AM, VHF, and UHF radios. Designed for mounting in an aircraft instrument panel or radio console. |
+| KYK-13 | n/a | (U) A device that stores cryptovariables for transfer to other equipments. |
+| LUNCHBOX | n/a | (U//FOUO) The unclassified nickname for a U.S. Navy PROFORMA processor. |
+| MARTES | n/a | (U//FOUO) Unclassified reference to a collection of software tools for collecting, analyzing and processing signals. |
+| Mission Commander | n/a | (U) An electronic warfare-qualified naval aviator or naval flight officer responsible for all phases of the assigned mission except for matters affecting safety of flight, which remain the exclusive responsibility of the pilot in command. |
+| NATOPS | Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization | (U) A program governing general flight and operating instructions and procedures applicable to the operation of naval aircraft and related activities. |
+| NICKELBACK | n/a | (U//FOUO) The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) unclassified nickname assigned to COMINT advisory support. |
+| NOIWON | National Operations and Intelligence Watch Officers Network | (U//FOUO) Network of senior watch officers in the Washington area. The NSOC SOO convenes NOIWON conference calls during CRITIC events. |
+| NSG | Naval Security Group | (U) Organization responsible for conducting U.S. Navy Cryptologic operations. |
+| NSGA | Naval Security Group Activity | (U) Third echelon command under Commander, Naval Security Group, e.g., NSGA Misawa. Responsibilities include providing operators in support of air, surface and subsurface collection requirements. |
+| NSOC | National Security Operations Center | (U) 7-day/24-hour watch center for U.S. Cryptologic System activities. Director, NSA/CSS' command-and-control center for time-sensitive operations and focal point for crisis response. |
+| OPNAVINST 3710.7R | Naval Operations Instruction 3710.7R | (U) Chief of Naval Operations instruction that promulgates NATOPS General Flight and Operating Instructions |
+| PA | Public Address | (U) A system of loudspeakers in the EP-3E, driven by the DCMS. |
+| PACROC | Pacific Reconnaissance Operations Center | (U) USCINCPAC coordinating authority for all Sensitive Reconnaissance Operations. |
+| PLA | People's Liberation Army | (U) The entire PRC Military is contained in the People's Liberation Army. |
+| PRC | People's Republic of China | n/a |
+| PREDATOR | n/a | (U) U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle |
+| PROFORMA | n/a | (C) Digital command and control data communications that relay information and instructions to and from radar systems, weapon systems (e.g., surface-to-air missiles, anti-aircraft artillery, fighter aircraft), and control centers. |
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+63
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+| Term | Expansion | Definition/Description |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| PTN | Pacific Tributary Network | (U//FOUO) A dedicated UHF Satellite communications net providing 24-hour voice communications support between national and Pacific theater commands. |
+| RASIN | Radio Signals Notation | (U//FOUO) The COMINT Signal Classification System for classifying and reporting a wide variety of signals with their associated parametrics and characteristics. |
+| RSOC | Regional Security Operations Center | (U) An NSA/CSS operations center that produces SIGINT on a specific region of the world, supporting regional CINCs and warfighters as well as national decision makers. |
+| SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY (S&T) OPERATOR | n/a | (U) Position designation for Station 20 onboard EP-3E aircraft, normally manned by a Cryptologic Technician Special Signals Operator. |
+| SCARAB | n/a | (U) Commercial name for a ruggedized computer used for the LUNCHBOX PROFORMA processor. Carried onboard the EP-3E. |
+| SENSOR PACER | n/a | (U//FOUO) Nickname assigned to the secure, digital, air-ground-air communications system used for SIGINT reporting and advisory support. |
+| SEVAL | Senior Evaluator | (U) The officer in charge of SIGINT collection operations aboard the EP-3E (Senior Naval Flight Officer) |
+| SOI | Signals Operating Instructions | (U) Target data such as frequencies and call signs that enables communicants to establish and maintain communications. |
+| SOO | Senior Operations Officer | (U) At NSA, the SOO is the senior officer on watch at NSOC. Represents DIRNSA afterhours. |
+| SRO | Sensitive Reconnaissance Operation | (U) Airborne and shipborne platforms operating under the Joint Chiefs of Staff Sensitive Reconnaissance Operation program. |
+| SSA | Special Support Activity | (U) At NSA, the SSA is responsible for disseminating time-sensitive, SIGINT-derived threat warning information and coordinating NICKELBACK support to SRO and other reconnaissance operations. |
+| TACREP | Tactical Report | (U//FOUO) SIGINT-derived reporting vehicle used to provide information on the status of continuing or potential threats, and other events of high interest. |
+| UAV | Unmanned Aerial Vehicle | n/a |
+| USSID | United States Signals Intelligence Directives | (U//FOUO) The mechanism through which the Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service exercises operational control of the U.S. SIGINT System |
+| VQ-1 | Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron One (FAIRECONRON ONE) | (U) U.S. Navy reconnaissance squadron based at NAS Whidbey Island, WA. VQ-1 operated the incident EP-3. |
+| ZEROIZE | n/a | (U) A process that erases the key variable or other stored material, and renders the devices essentially useless and the data unrecoverable. |
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+64
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+| Term | Expansion | Definition/Description |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| ZIRCON Chat | n/a | (U) A commercial internet relay chat application used on the secure Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System network. Allows multiple intelligence providers to communicate with deployed threat warning recipients. |
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+65
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+Appendix A
+
+(U) Summary of Recommendations
+
+(U) This appendix lists all recommendations in matrix form and suggests a responsible organization for each.
+
+| Section Reference | Recommendation / POC |
+| --- | --- |
+| (U) COMINT Equip and Documentation — Section 4.2; also 4.3 | Recommendation #1 (U//FOUO) Limit classified and sensitive materials carried onboard SRO platforms to mission-essential materials only. Minimize hardcopy materials in favor of electronic media.
POC/Action: NSA and SRO Units |
+| (U) COMINT Equip and Documentation — Section 4.2; also 4.3 | Recommendation #2 (U//FOUO) Identify computer hard drives for priority destruction and/or jettison. Mark hard drives with a location for striking to ensure physical destruction.
POC/Action: NSA and SRO Units |
+| (U) COMINT Equip and Documentation — Section 4.2 | Recommendation #3 (U//FOUO) Eliminate source code from fielded software.
POC/Action: NSA and other software originators |
+| (U) COMINT Equip and Documentation — Section 4.2 | Recommendation #4 (U//FOUO) Eliminate tape-based recording, replacing it with computer-based recorders with built-in equipment.
POC/Action: NSA and SCEs |
+| (U) COMINT Equip and Documentation — Section 4.2 | Recommendation #5 (S//SI) Remove processing capability for the HUNTER and PREDATOR UAV and JASSM datalink signals from LUNCHBOX.
POC/Action: NSA and Platform Sponsors |
+| (U) COMINT Equip and Documentation — Section 4.2 | Recommendation #6 (S) Provide a tailored signals processing capability that fully meets mission requirements for rapid signal detection and identification.
POC/Action: NSA |
+| (U) COMINT Equip and Documentation — Section 4.2 | Recommendation #7 (U//FOUO) Replace the SCARAB computer key-lock mechanism with a manual quick-release bolt.
POC/Action: SRO Units |
+| (U) COMINT Equip and Documentation — Section 4.2 | Recommendation #8 (C) Review compromised USSID material to determine if there is a need to change, modify, or update any USSID.
POC/Action: NSA |
+| (U) COMINT Equip and Documentation — Section 4.2 | Recommendation #9 (S) Continue to monitor PRC communications for evidence of denial and deception activities related to SRO missions.
POC/Action: NSA |
+| (U) SIGINT Configuration Mgmt — Section 4.4 | Recommendation #10 (U//FOUO) Work with industry and the Intelligence Community to develop and implement safeguard capabilities for SIGINT equipment and materials used by SRO platforms and other SIGINT collection activities at risk.
POC/Action: NSA |
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+66
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+| Section Reference | Recommendation / POC |
+| --- | --- |
+| (U) SIGINT Configuration Mgmt — Section 4.4 | Recommendation #11 (U//FOUO) Develop and implement configuration controls to govern the use of NSA-deployed software versions and maintain cognizance of field modifications; include procedures to annually overwrite all software with the most currently available software.
POC/Action: NSA and SCEs |
+| (U) Cryptographic Materials and Equip — Section 5.3 | Recommendation #12 (U//FOUO) Limit COMSEC materials and cryptologic devices onboard deployed platforms to those required to accomplish the platform's mission in a specific timeframe and in a given area of responsibility.
POC/Action: SRO Units |
+| (U) Cryptographic Materials and Equip — Section 5.3 | Recommendation #13 (U//FOUO) Use electronic key loading devices and leave hardcopy key tape and canisters at the staging base.
POC/Action: SRO Units |
+| (U) Cryptographic Materials and Equip — Section 5.3 | Recommendation #14 (U//FOUO) Maintain a comprehensive and readily available inventory of all field-deployed COMSEC materials and cryptologic devices.
POC/Action: NSA |
+| (U) Cryptographic Materials and Equip — Section 5.3 | Recommendation #15 (U) Maintain destruction records and supersession messages at the staging base.
POC/Action: SRO Units |
+| (U) Cryptographic Materials and Equip — Section 5.3 | Recommendation #16 (S) Continue to refine procedures for timely supersession of GPS worldwide key.
POC/Action: SPACECOM |
+| (U) Cryptographic Materials and Equip — Section 5.3 | Recommendation #17 (S) Make crosscut shredders available for emergency destruction of keying material.
POC/Action: SRO Units and SCEs |
+| (U) Cryptologic Foreign Partner Impact — Section 6.3 | Recommendation #18 (U//FOUO) Coordinate notification procedures and notify foreign partners of pertinent information compromised to the PRC.
POC/Action: NSA, in coordination with Intelligence Community |
+| (U) Counterintelligence Issues — Section 6.5 | Recommendation #19 (U//FOUO) Remove names of all individuals and organizations from forwarding instructions, technical material, and software carried on SRO or other sensitive SIGINT operations.
POC/Action: NSA and software providers |
+| (U) Counterintelligence Issues — Section 6.5 | Recommendation #20 (U//FOUO) Reduce the amount of personnel information in mission materials to the minimum possible. Do not reference organizations, offices, or names of personnel.
POC/Action: SRO Units |
+| (U) U.S. Cryptologic System Crisis Response — Section 7.10 | Recommendation #21 (U/FOUO) Implement streamlined NSA policy regarding raw SIGINT.
POC/Action: NSA |
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+67
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+| Section Reference | Recommendation / POC |
+| --- | --- |
+| (U) U.S. Cryptologic System Crisis Response — Section 7.10 | Recommendation #22 (U//FOUO) The Secretary of Defense in coordination with the DCI should charter a damage assessment team within 48 hours of a potential compromise involving DoD assets. The team should serve as the lead for producing findings, damage assessment, and recommendations.
POC/Action: OSD/CMS |
+| (U) U.S. Cryptologic System Crisis Response — Section 7.10 | Recommendation #23 (C) Implement procedures to increase the SIGINT system's responsiveness during crisis events.
POC/Action: NSA |
+| (U) U.S. Cryptologic System Crisis Response — Section 7.10 | Recommendation #24 (C) Tie the monitoring of international distress frequencies to specific NICKELBACK advisory conditions.
POC/Action: NSA |
+| (U) U.S. Cryptologic System Crisis Response — Section 7.10 | Recommendation #25 (U//FOUO) Acquire a record and playback capability immediately for all Pacific Tributary Network (PTN) broadcasts at the KRSOC.
POC/Action: NSA |
+| (U) U.S. Cryptologic System Crisis Response — Section 7.10 | Recommendation #26 (U//FOUO) Allot sufficient time for intelligence debriefings in order to allow a thorough determination of potentially compromised data.
POC/Action: JPRA |
+| (U) U.S. Cryptologic System Crisis Response — Section 7.10 | Recommendation #27 (U//FOUO) Incorporate intelligence debriefing into JPRA personnel recovery procedures if there is an Intelligence Community equity.
POC/Action: JPRA |
+| (U) U.S. Cryptologic System Crisis Response — Section 7.10 | Recommendation #28 (U//FOUO) The Secretary of Defense and the DCI jointly prepare a damage assessment "how to" guide for intelligence compromises.
POC/Action: OSD/CMS |
+| (U) Policy — Section 8.2 | Recommendation #29 (U//FOUO) Establish written guidance for aircrew actions in the event of hazardous maneuvers by reacting fighters.
POC/Action: JCS/CINCs |
+| (U) Policy — Section 8.2 | Recommendation #30 (U//FOUO) Provide detailed guidance for Mission Commander and crew actions in the event of a forced landing of the mission aircraft in countries within range of the mission track.
POC/Action: JCS/CINCs |
+| (U) Policy — Section 8.2 — Due: Jan 01 | Recommendation 31 (U//FOUO) Require peacetime detention training for all reconnaissance personnel and personnel engaged in other sensitive operations where there is a risk of detention.
POC/Action: SRO Units and SCEs |
+| (U) Policy — Section 8.2 | Recommendation #32 (U) Explore pursuing an agreement with the PRC to establish joint procedures to prevent dangerous military activities.
POC/Action: JCS/CINCs |
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+68
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+| Section Reference | Recommendation / POC |
+| --- | --- |
+| (U) Radio Communications — Section 8.3 | Recommendation #33 (U//FOUO) Incorporate guidance into emergency destruction procedures identifying communication equipment that should not be zeroized or destroyed until no longer needed.
POC/Action: SRO Units |
+| (U) Radio Communications — Section 8.3 | Recommendation #34 (U//FOUO) Train flight crew personnel in the emergency communication procedures used by countries in their areas of operations.
POC/Action: Navy Type Commanders, and other service equivalents |
+| (U) Radio Communications — Section 8.3 | Recommendation #35 (U//FOUO) Provide guidance in the DoD Flight Information Handbook specific to emergency communications with the PRC and other target nations.
POC/Action: NIMA (National Imagery & Mapping Agency) working with Theater CINCs |
+| (U) Internal Communications — Section 8.4 | Recommendation #36 (U//FOUO) Improve the performance and intelligibility of the EP-3E PA system to operate better in all environments.
POC/Action: NAVAIR |
+| (U) Internal Communications — Section 8.4 | Recommendation #37 (U//FOUO) Increase training using helmets during drills so that crew members are proficient at communicating while wearing helmets.
POC/Action: SRO Units |
+| (U) Internal Communications — Section 8.4 | Recommendation #38 (U//FOUO) Reemphasize the critical role of clear communications between the flight station and aircrew cabin during emergency procedure and Aircrew Coordination Training.
POC/Action: SRO Units |
+| (U) Internal Communications — Section 8.4 | Recommendation #39 (U//FOUO) Drill emergency crew communications procedures in-flight on a routine basis, practicing reconfiguration of internal communications and alternate communications paths for all combinations of emergencies.
POC/Action: SRO Units |
+| (U) Internal Communications — Section 8.4 | Recommendation #40 (U//FOUO) As a required part of pre-mission briefings, identify by name key personnel and alternates responsible for leading crew actions and making status reports during emergency destruction.
POC/Action: SRO Units |
+| (U) Internal Communications — Section 8.4 | Recommendation #41 (U//FOUO) Design and implement improved emergency communications procedures and hardware on the EP-3E to enable reliable communications at all times, especially during abnormal flight conditions. Investigate wireless communications systems.
POC/Action: NAVAIR |
+| (U) Classified and Sensitive Material Handling — Section 8.5 | Recommendation #42 (S//SI) Ensure the Mission Commander and other personnel responsible for emergency destruction are fully cognizant of the scope and nature of all classified materials onboard the aircraft and are in compliance with USSID 3.
POC/Action: SRO Units and SCEs |
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+69
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+| Section Reference | Recommendation / POC |
+| --- | --- |
+| (U) Classified and Sensitive Material Handling — Section 8.5 | Recommendation #43 (C) Review USSID 3 requirements for the protection of COMINT systems and data at all classification levels.
POC/Action: NSA |
+| (U) Classified and Sensitive Material Handling — Section 8.5 | Recommendation #44 (U//FOUO) Issue policy to increase the detail in material inventories to support a rapid and accurate page-for-page reconstruction of all sensitive and classified materials, including all files on hard disks, CD ROMs, and floppy disks.
POC/Action: NSA and SCEs |
+| (U) Classified and Sensitive Material Handling — Section 8.5 | Recommendation #45 (U//FOUO) Maintain exact backup copies of all electronic media at a ground support facility for every mission.
POC/Action: SSO Navy, SRO Units |
+| (U) Classified and Sensitive Material Handling — Section 8.5 | Recommendation #46 (U//FOUO) Establish written procedures designating specific ground support personnel who will verify aircraft inventories and electronic media backups prior to every mission.
POC/Action: SSO Navy, SRO Units |
+| (U) Classified and Sensitive Material Handling — Section 8.5 | Recommendation #47 (C) Review and change, as required, compromised operational information such as radio call signs and frequencies.
POC/Action: JCS/CINCs |
+| (U) Emerg Destruction Policy, Procedures, and Training — Section 8.6 | Recommendation #48 (U//FOUO) Train aircrew on emergency destruction procedures in a formal setting prior to their operational deployment.
POC/Action: SRO units and SCEs |
+| (U) Emerg Destruction Policy, Procedures, and Training — Section 8.6 | Recommendation #49 (U//FOUO) Include emergency destruction training, to include both classroom training and in-flight drills, during crew work-ups. Include all crew members from all commands participating in operations.
POC/Action: SRO Units |
+| (U) Emerg Destruction Policy, Procedures, and Training — Section 8.6 | Recommendation #50 (U//FOUO) Require regular emergency destruction drills during detachments; include situations where destruction procedures are impeded by simultaneous emergencies (e.g., fire of unknown origin, preparations to bail out and/or ditch) and constrained by time limits.
POC/Action: SRO Units |
+| (U) Emerg Destruction Policy, Procedures, and Training — Section 8.6 | Recommendation #51 (U//FOUO) Include emergency destruction responsibilities and procedures in pre-mission briefings, similar to those for ditching, bailout, and fire of unknown origin.
POC/Action: SRO Units |
+| (U) Emerg Destruction Policy, Procedures, and Training — Section 8.6 | Recommendation #52 (U//FOUO) Issue individualized written emergency destruction procedures to all crew members prior to flight.
POC/Action: SRO Units |
+| (U) Emerg Destruction Policy, Procedures, and Training — Section 8.6 | Recommendation #53 (U//FOUO) Include emergency destruction as a sub-area of all positional NATOPS qualifications.
POC/Action: Aircraft Model Managers |
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+70
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+| Section Reference | Recommendation / POC |
+| --- | --- |
+| (U) Emerg Destruction Policy, Procedures, and Training — Section 8.6 | Recommendation #54 (U//FOUO) Ensure sufficient type and quantity of emergency destruction tools are onboard mission aircraft.
POC/Action: NAVAIR, other service equivalents |
+| (U) Emerg Destruction Policy, Procedures, and Training — Section 8.6 | Recommendation #55 (U//FOUO) Develop practical procedures for inventorying jettisoned or destroyed materials.
POC/Action: NAVAIR, other service equivalents |
+| (U) Emerg Destruction Policy, Procedures, and Training — Section 8.6 | Recommendation #56 (U//FOUO) Conduct and document periodic emergency destruction reviews to ensure procedures are current with technology and mission environment changes.
POC/Action: SRO Units and SCEs |
+| (U) Emerg Destruction Policy, Procedures, and Training — Section 8.6 | Recommendation #57 (U//FOUO) For any equipment not covered by current emergency destruction procedures, require new procedures and training before allowing the equipment onboard.
POC/Action: SRO Units, NAVAIR |
+| (U) Emerg Destruction Policy, Procedures, and Training — Section 8.6 | Recommendation #58 (U//FOUO) Provide national-level guidance for jettisoning classified materials.
POC/Action: JCS |
+| (U) Crew Reaction — Section 8.7 | Recommendation #59 (U//FOUO) Review and formalize crew certification procedures for each deploying crew. Include demonstrated ability to execute all emergency procedures satisfactorily, and emergency destruction under less than optimal conditions.
POC/Action: SRO Units |
+| (U) Crew Reaction — Section 8.7 | Recommendation #60 (U//FOUO) As part of individual qualification, require trainees to exercise and demonstrate proper emergency destruction procedures during in-flight examination.
POC/Action: SRO Units |
+| (U) Crew Reaction — Section 8.7 | Recommendation #61 (U//FOUO) Examine current organizations with the objective of aligning crew training, cohesion unity, and overall experience.
POC/Action: Cryptologic and VQ communities |
+| (U) Systemic Issues — Section 9.3 | Recommendation #62 (U//FOUO) Implement, track, and institutionalize the study's recommendations.
POC/Action: CNO, DIRNSA, and SCEs |
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+71
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+Appendix B
+
+(U//FOUO) List of Cryptologic Equipment and Information Compromised
+
+1 (U) SIGINT Material and Equipment
+
+1.1 (U) Policy Documents – USSID Material
+
+1.1.1 (U) Hardcopy USSID Material
+
+(S//SI) The following USSID material was determined to compromised either entirely or partially. Most of the hardcopy USSID material was not carried onboard in its entirety, but was mentioned or partially described in Job Qualification Requirements (JQR), Working Aids, and personal notes. The following material was not destroyed and was left onboard the aircraft in a storage locker.
+
+| USSID | Title | Level of Compromise |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| 1 | SIGINT Operating policy | Excerpt |
+| 3 | SIGINT Security Procedures | Excerpts, including Annex A, Section 6 (entire) |
+| 9 | Host Government Communications | Excerpts and references |
+| 18 | Legal Compliance & Minimization Procedures | Excerpts and references |
+| 101 | COMINT Collection Instructions | Excerpts and references |
+| 110 | Collection Management Procedures | Extensive, including Annex H |
+| 205 | Standard Technical Report Using Modules (STRUM) | Excerpts and references in Pos 19 tech |
+| 212 | PROFORMA Signals Processing and Technical Reporting | Excerpts and references in POS 20 tech. |
+| 301 | Handling of Critical (CRITIC) Information | Extensive, including Annex L |
+| 369 | Time-Sensitive SIGINT Reporting | Excerpts and references in POS 4 tech material, POS 15 Working Aid, POS 19 Tech |
+| 404 | Technical Extracts from Traffic Analysis (TEXTA) | Entire USSID, excerpts from TEXTA manual |
+| 2846 | SIGINT Tasking for USN-846 | Extensive excerpts and references in POS 19 Tech |
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+72
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+| USSID | Title | Level of Compromise |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| 5511 | Advisory Support to Sensitive Reconnaissance | Detailed description of NICKELBACK conditions and terms, Annex A |
+
+1.1.2 (U) Softcopy USSID Material
+
+(S//SI) Softcopy of the following USSID material was loaded on the COMINT Supervisor's laptop that was left onboard the aircraft. Measures were taken to destroy the laptop (and hard drive). Combining what we know about these efforts, expert testimony, and analysis of the returned laptop, there is a very low likelihood that sensitive cryptologic information could be recovered. As a result, all USSID material listed below is considered as a *possible* compromise.
+
+| USSID | Title | Annexes and Changes Included |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| 3 | SIGINT Security Procedures | Annex A-F |
+| 9 | Host Government Communications | |
+| 18 | Legal Compliance and Minimization Procedures | Annex A-K |
+| 107 | Burst Signal Recognition & Reporting Procedures | Annex A, B |
+| 205 | Standard Technical Report Using Modules (SRUM) | Annex A, E |
+| 212 | PROFORMA Signals Processing and Technical Reporting | Annex A-E |
+| 214 | Preliminary Mission Summary (PREMS) | |
+| 223 | PRC Air Communications Activity Reporting | Annex A-C |
+| 301 | Handling of Critical (CRITIC) Information | Annex A-I |
+| 303 | SIGINT Reporters' Instructions | SIGINT Reporters' Instructions for: N. Korea AF, Cambodia, Vietnam, Philippines, Thailand |
+| 312 | SIGINT Reporters' Instructions for the Republics of the Former Soviet Union | |
+| 313 | Reporting of Distress Signals | |
+| 316 | Non-Codeword Reporting Program | Annex D North Korean Forces |
+| 320 | SIGINT Reporters' Instructions for the People's Republic of China | Annex A-F |
+| 321 | SIGINT Reporters' Instructions for Southeast Asia | |
+| 342 | PROFORMA Technical Reporting | |
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+73
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+| USSID | Title | Annexes and Changes Included |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| 369 | Time Sensitive SIGINT Reporting | Annex A, B; changes 1-5 |
+| 2846 | SIGINT Tasking for USN-846 | |
+| 5511 | COMINT Advisory Support to Sensitive Reconnaissance Operations | Annex A-D |
+
+1.2 (U) COMINT Material
+
+(S//SI) Hardcopy and softcopy COMINT material was carried onboard the aircraft. The hardcopy material listed below was intact or hand-shredded and left onboard the EP-3E. All material is considered to be compromised.
+
+1.2.1 (S) Hardcopy COMINT Material
+
+| | Title | Description |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| A. | PRC Air Tech | Compilation of tech data from multiple sources. Includes the following |
+| A.1 | Air Order of Battle (AOB) for PLAAF and PLANAF Air Bases | - Type of aircraft assigned including transports - Number of each Aircraft assigned |
+| A.2 | Airfields | Technical data listing document including: - Placename and Placename abbreviation (PNAB) - Geographic coordinates - Identifying data for each airfield - Runway orientation - Atmospheric pressure - Ground controller callsigns - Pilot Billet Suffix (PBS) - Airfield-specific terminology - Subordination |
+| A.3 | Maps of Airfields | - Includes current PRC deployments |
+| A.4 | Air Frames | - Capabilities - Armament |
+| A.5 | PREAMBLE Address Groups (PAGS) | - PLANAF |
+| A.6 | Activity Codes | - STRUM - IATS |
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+74
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+| | Title | Description |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| .7 | Sample Reports | - KLIEGLIGHTs (KL) - Mission Related Technical Summary (MRTS) - STRUM |
+| .8 | Civilian Airliners/Transports | - Type - Owner/operator - Home base |
+| A.9 | Military navigation call signs and cover numbers | |
+| B. | PRC Naval Tech | |
+| B.1 | PRC Navy Order of Battle | - PRC Navy Fleet subordination |
+| B.2 | Ship weapons/sensors fits | - Capabilities of weapons fits |
+| B.3 | Communications and Observations Post/Signal station listing | |
+| .4 | Preamble Address Groups (PAGS) listing | - PRC Navy |
+| B.5 | Taiwan Navy Tech | - Order of battle - Subordination |
+| .6 | Tactical signals and coverterms | |
+| .7 | WNP-27 strip (call sign encryption strip) | - Instructions - Historic records (5 year history) |
+| B.8 | ELINT associated with PRC Navy vessels | |
+| .9 | Map of Spratly Islands | |
+| B.10 | Communications Profile | - VHF/HF Frequency List - Channel Numbers - Tactical activity scenarios/identifiers |
+| C. | Supervisor's Working Aid | |
+| C.1 | Collection Requirement Number (CRN) Tasking | - PRC - N. Korea - Global World |
+| C.2 | Intercept Tasking Database (ITDB) | - PRC and Southeastern Asia - Blocks 44-52, 44-53, 44-54 |
+| C.3 | SRO Mission Track Points | Tracks - 5Q2001 - 5Q2002 - 5Q1000 - 5Q3001 |
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+75
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+| | Title | Description |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| C.4 | STRUM Codes | - Air Activity Codes - Naval Activity Codes |
+| C.5 | Miscellaneous KL Info | - FLAGS - CANS - PDDG |
+| C.6 | PRC Air Surveillance (ASV) | - Reacting Airfields - Tracking stations/methods/formats |
+| C.7 | VQ-1 Mission Commander's Notebook | - Advisory notifications summary |
+| C.8 | Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) | - Hand written notes |
+| D | COMEVAL Brief Binder | |
+| D.1 | Mission Brief | - Intel Brief - VQ-1 Misawa daily flight schedule |
+| D.2 | Airframes/Ships Weapons Fits | - PRC - Taiwan |
+| D.3 | PRC Maps | - Air bases - SAM Locations - Submarine/Naval combatants |
+| D.4 | Taiwan Maps | - Fighter disposition - Ground attack fighters |
+| D.5 | Japanese P-3 Operations Area | - Maps |
+| E | Secure Communications Operator (POS 4) Working Aid | |
+| E.1 | POS 4 Start-up procedures | |
+| E.2 | Mission Log form | - Template only |
+| E.3 | NICKLEBACK Advisory Codes | - Summary |
+| E.4 | Air Force Advisory Notifications Instruction | |
+| E.5 | Message Format Samples | - Advisory Notification - CRITIC - KLIEGLIGHT |
+| E.6 | Standard Operating Procedure for Kadena | - Callsigns - SIPRNET addresses |
+| F | Manual Morse Operator (POS 19) Working Aid | |
+| F.1 | SLIPSTICK | - Azimuth and Range tool |
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+76
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+| | Title | Description |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| F.2 | PRC/Vietnam Tech | - Air Order of Battle - Tracking Methods |
+| F.3 | PRC Defensive Position Reports | - 5Q1000 - 5Q2001 - 5Q2002 |
+| F.4 | Maps | - South China Sea - Taiwan Strait |
+| F.5 | PRC ASV & Air Order of Battle | - AZ/Range, All-China Grid, Special Reporting Grid - Arbitrary Unit Designators - WAJAD-9 - N-12 Cipher System - Basic Callsign System |
+| F.6 | Vietnamese ASV & Air Order of Battle | - Arbitrary Unit Designators |
+| F.7 | Manual Morse Breakouts | |
+| G | S&T Special Signals Operator (POS 20) Tech | |
+| G.1 | General PROFORMA Info/Descriptions | - MARKHAM - FOREJUDGE - SAM HEARTBURN - NOVELETTE - RSBN |
+| G.2 | Pacific Theater Top Twenty Signals Search Priorities | - PRC signals only |
+| G.3 | Air Order of Battle | - PRC and Vietnam |
+| G.4 | TEXSIG descriptions | - XXS S9337 - XXS K4311 - XXS K4318 - XXS K4331 |
+| H | Airborne Cryptologic Direct Support Element (CSDE) Senior Operator Study Module | |
+| H.1 | Mission Tracks | - 5Q2001 - 5Q2002 - 5Q1000 |
+| H.2 | Taiwan TACAIR Working Aid | - Air Order of Battle - Aircraft/Armament/ELINT - Airfields/Coordinates/Runway orientation - Ground Controller Recoveries - Aircraft callsigns/prefixes, including NATO |
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+77
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+| | Title | Description |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| | | - Top 20 Frequency lists - Known and recovered frequencies - Taiwan Air Defense Identification Zone |
+| H.3 | Taiwan Navy Order of Battle | - Basic Naval tactics - Pictures of naval entities |
+| I | Forms Folder | |
+| I.1 | KLIEGLIGHT Format | - Template only |
+| I.2 | STRUM Format | - Template only |
+| I.3 | PREM format | - Template only |
+| I.4 | Cond3/ Cond3 Summary NICKLEBACK | - Template only |
+| I.5 | Cond 4 NICKLEBACK | - Template only |
+| I.6 | Morse Auto KL | - Template only |
+| J | Airborne Direct Support Operations Chinese Navy Operator– JQR Signature Sheet (10 Oct 98) | - Signature list of training topics - Contains references to classified online working aids at NAIC, CTEP, and KRSOC - Some hand-written notes included |
+| K | Airborne Direct Support Operations Chinese Navy Operator - Study Guide (10 Oct 98) | - PLAN Mission, threat, disputes - PLAN Organization - Shore installations - Flotillas and squadrons - Combatant Order-of-Battle - Auxiliaries, numbering system, prefixes - VHF communications procedures - Tactical Maneuvering Communications Procedures - Tactical Activities (submarine, anti-surface/anti-air, - HF communications (HF voice/manual Morse, RIBBED (COZY III), National/fleet support broadcast - Geography - Missile systems |
+| L | Airborne Fleet Operations Chinese Intermediate JQR | - Signature list of training topics - Contains references to classified online working aids at NSA |
+| L.1 | Target Training Package: Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile Activity | - Organization, launch platforms, missile system, Areas of Operation, past SLBM launches - Missile testing operations - Communications - Vocabulary |
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+78
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+| | Title | Description |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| L.2 | Target Training Package: Air-to-Surface Attack | - PRC Aircraft (fighters and helicopters) description and armament - Range communications - Attack Phase - Vocabulary |
+| L.3 | Map of PRC airfields | |
+| M | Airborne Direct Support Operations CHILING TAC AIR Operator – JQR Signature Sheet & Study Guide (15 Sept 97) | - USN-846 overview (including supported Aircraft, SRO missions, Track numbers, fleet support missions) - EP-3E organization (positions, relationships) - Tasking and associated activities - Reporting (internal, external, CRITIC) - COMINT Advisory Support and conditions - USSID descriptions (3, 18, 101, 150, 313, 320) - PRC Air Defense (Mission, Air surveillance) - PRC Air Order of Battle (TEXTA Manual, Units & locations, Geography) - PRC Aircraft including indicators - Activity (local airfield, basic flight, combat training, reactions, live intercept, defensive patrols, navigation training and inter-airfield flights, bomber activity) - Transcription requirements |
+| N | Manual Morse Refresher (POS 19) | - JQR Signature sheet |
+| N.1 | Advisory Support Operations Information (NICKELBACK) | - Includes ground sites who can issue external conditions |
+| N.2 | Mission Covernames and descriptions | - BEGGAR HAWK - BEGGAR SHADOW - CAPSULE JACK - DISTANT WIND - DISTANT SENT |
+| O | COMEVAL JQR SIGNATURE SHEET | - Signature list of training topics with detailed notes on items (listed below) |
+| O.1 | Airborne Reconnaissance Fundamentals | - USCINCPAC Manual 5157 notes - Advisory Support (NICKELBACK) terminology - Ground Unit ADSO support - SRO platforms and mission descriptions - Mission numbers and operating areas - Squadron locations and collection capabilities |
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+79
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+| | Title | Description |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| O.2 | North Korea Tech Material | - NKAF Air Order of Battle - NKAF Fighter/Bomber characteristics - SAM indications and sites - Map of NKAF significant placenames |
+| O.3 | Hand-written notes in JQR | - USSID identification - Radio/telephone procedures - U.S. Fleet organization - Command/MCOC organization - Warfighter Communications paths (TRE, TRAP, TDDS, TOPS, TIBS) - COMINT releasability caveats (SEABOOT, SETTEE, KAMPUS, DRUID, RORIPA, NOFORN, ORCON) - Callsign definitions - NK Air Defense System - NK SAM force - UNACCENTED description (not in detail) - NK MRBM Launch indicators - NK Reacting Airfields - NK Infiltration Operations - PRC Airfields and aircraft locations - PRC Reacting Airfields - PRC Naval Auxiliary vessel classes - PRC ASV Tracking Stations - Russian PACOFAF, PVO/TAF, and SAF Airfields - Russian Naval Base missions and orders of battle - Russian weapons range activities - Russian aircraft, weapons and associated ELINT /PROFORMA - Russian Surface Order of Battle - Russian missiles, platforms, ELINT, ranges - Russian SA-10B Group of Battalions reactions and associated ELINT - Russian Case notation break-out - ONAZN-004 System, CER break-out - Russian reaction/exercise scenarios - Taiwan aircraft/combatants including mission, weapons, associated ELINT - Vietnam airfields/naval bases including mission and order of battle - Vietnam aircraft including mission, weapons, and associated ELINT - Vietnam threat airfields - Spratley Islands re-supply operations |
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+80
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+| | Title | Description |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| O.4 | Special Signals Guide | - Signals terminology - POS 20 equipment descriptions - Publications descriptions (RASIN manual, COTS manual, COMINT Parameters List, Search Environment List, PROFORMA Signals index) - References to enciphered and scrambled speech, cellular, short duration signal, ALE, low probability of intercept - PROFORMA signal descriptions, coverterms and associated target countries. |
+
+1.2.2 (U) Softcopy COMINT Material
+
+(S//SI) The COMINT Supervisor's laptop contained softcopy COMINT material (as well as USSID material detailed previously). The material listed below is considered as a *possible* compromise, given our assessment that there is a very low likelihood of recovering data from the laptop.
+
+| A | COMINT Supervisor's Laptop | Description |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| A.1 | Various Classified Webpages | Classified Webpages from internal NSA web - Includes numerous names of individuals - Internal web address information - Extensive information about KRSOC |
+| A.2 | North Korean Tech Material | - N. Korean grid key/SPC page recoveries (Apr 99) - DSA Technical Information Report (32-1-99) - N. Korean East and West Coast Voice (Case, Callsign, Class, AUD) - N. Korean East and West Coast Morse (Case, Callsign, ID, AUD) - N. Korean ELINT notations |
+| A.3 | Floppy Disk | - STRUMS (previous 24 months) - Partial PREMS (previous 6 months) |
+
+1.3 (U) COMINT Systems
+
+(S) The COMINT equipment onboard the aircraft was generally unclassified with the exception of two carry-on computers, a SCARAB computer containing the LUNCHBOX PROFORMA processor and a laptop containing MARTES analysis tools. All data resident on these two systems is considered compromised.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+81
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+| | Item | Description |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| A | SCARAB Computer | - LUNCHBOX PROFORMA Processor - XBIT Signals Analysis software (bit manipulation) - BLACKMAGIC Demodulation software |
+| B | MARTES Laptop | - MARTES (COMINT version 1999.0.2) - RASIN Manual - RASIN Manual Working Aid - Telegraphic Codes Manual |
+
+1.4 (U) ELINT Material
+
+(S) Hardcopy and softcopy ELINT material was carried onboard the aircraft. The list of materials below was left onboard the EP-3E, either intact or hand-shredded, and is considered compromised.
+
+1.4.1 (S) Hardcopy ELINT Material
+
+| | Item | Description |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| A | NRO Radar Fingerprinting document | - Australian MoD draft report on AN/ULQ-16 employment - AN/ULQ-16 wiring diagrams - Radar fingerprinting techniques and procedures - Precise radar parametric data for USCGC Jarvis |
+| B | Lab Operator Standard Notebook | |
+| B.1 | Standard ELINT operating procedures | - Signal logging and reporting procedures - TACELINT message format - Standard location and signal annotation abbreviations |
+| B.2 | ELINT recording procedures | - Procedures for recording, annotating, and forwarding recorded wideband signals |
+| B.3 | EOB downloading procedures | - Downloading and formatting procedures for MIDB EOB data at http://luna.diac.dia.ic.gov/DBAinfonet/DOWNLOAD/Files/help.html |
+| B.4 | Sonobuoy exploitation notes | - Russian sonobuoy interrogation data formats and audio frequencies |
+| B.5 | Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) and Surface-to-Surface Missile (SSM) notes | - Association of ELNOTs with missile fire control radars, beacons, seekers, and illuminators - Missile guidance signal format notes |
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+82
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+| | Title | Description |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| | | - Association of PROFORMA signals with missile systems |
+| C | Lab Operator Trainee Study Notes (POS 10) | |
+| C.1 | Russian Far East Military District (FEMD) Air Order of Battle | - Association of fighter and bomber aircraft with airfields - Standard aircraft weapon and radar fits - Association of ELNOTs with NATO names and standard parametric bands of radars |
+| C.2 | Russian FEMD Naval Order of Battle | - Standard combatant surface vessel weapon fits - Standard submarine ballistic and cruise missile fits - Association of ELNOTs with NATO names and standard parametric bands of radars |
+| C.3 | Russian SAM notes | - U.S. doctrinal ranges of Russian SAM systems - Association of ELNOTs with NATO names and standard parametric bands of SAM associated radars. |
+| C.4 | PRC Air Order of Battle | - Association of fighter and bomber aircraft with major airfields in the Shenyang, Beijing, Jinan, Nanjing, and Guangzhou Military Regions - Standard aircraft weapon and radar fits - Association of ELNOTs with NATO and commercial names and standard parametric bands of radars |
+| C.5 | PRC Naval Order of Battle | - Surface vessel weapon fits for combatant vessels of frigate size and larger, by hull - Association of submarines, by hull, to operational bases - Association of ELNOTs with NATO and commercial names and PRC military designations of maritime radars - Standard parametric bands of PRC maritime radars |
+| D | SEVAL and Mission Commander Brief Binders | - Identical to COMEVAL Brief Binder |
+| D.1 | Mission Brief | - Intel Brief - VQ-1 Misawa daily flight schedule |
+| D.2 | Airframes/Ships Weapons Fits | - PRC - Taiwan |
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+83
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+| | Title | Description |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| D.3 | PRC Maps | - Air bases - SAM Locations - Submarine/Naval combatants |
+| D.4 | Taiwan Maps | - Fighter disposition - Ground attack fighters |
+| D.5 | Japanese P-3 Operations Area | - Maps |
+| E | Mission Chart | - SRO Track 5Q2002 coordinates |
+| F | ELINT Parameter Limits (EPL) | - September 2000 Yellow EPL - March 1999 Blue EPL - Both manually updated through Feb 2001 |
+
+1.4.2 (U) Softcopy ELINT Material
+
+(S) The ELINT Evaluator's laptop computer was destroyed by the crew and left onboard the aircraft. The laptop hard drive was recovered, though not found with the laptop. Both were analyzed by NSA experts and it was determined that the hard drive probably survived crew destruction attempts only to be copied and then destroyed by the PRC. All data resident on this system is considered compromised. A zip disk and floppy disk from the Lab Operator's position were also compromised.
+
+| | Item | Description |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| A | ELINT Evaluator's Laptop Computer | |
+| A.1 | Electronic Order of Battle (EOB) | - Derived from EOB-LITE in late 2000. Contained worldwide radar location data. |
+| A.2 | VQ-1 Mission Commander Notebook | - Squadron specific guidance for implementation of USSID 5511 and CINCPACINST 5157 SRO requirements - SRO Track coordinates for all VQ-1 tracks - Misc. message templates - COMINT Sanitization Primer - AN/ALQ-108 OPSEC and employment guidance - PREMS (previous 6 months) |
+| B | Lab Operator Zip Disk | |
+| B.1 | Collector Technical ELINT Guidance Manual (CTEGM) | - Version dated 28 February 2000 |
+| B.2 | HULTEC Database | - Pacific HULTEC database derived from JICPAC database |
+| B.3 | Electronic Order of Battle (EOB) | - Derived from DIA EOB-LITE in February 2001. Contained worldwide radar location data. |
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+84
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+| | Title | Description |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| C | Lab Operator Floppy Disk | |
+| C.1 | TACELINT Reports | - Misc. VQ-1 TACELINT reports for February - March 2001 from PACOM AOR - Misc. VQ-1 TACELINT reports for October - December 2000 from CENTCOM AOR |
+
+1.4.3 (U) ELINT Systems
+
+(S) The bulk of the ELINT systems are off-the-shelf devices that, although designed for the ELINT mission, contain no particularly sensitive technologies. Two systems that represent a specific concern include the AN/ULQ-16 and the AN/ALQ-108.
+
+| | Item | Description |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| A | AN/ALQ-108 | - Passive and active exploitation of early Soviet IFF and range extension signals |
+| B | AN/ULQ-16 | - Precise radar pulse timing measurements |
+
+2. (U) COMSEC Material and Equipment
+
+2.1 (U) COMSEC Material
+
+(S) Keying material and other cryptographic material were taken onboard the EP-3E. The following items were hand-torn, remained onboard the aircraft, and are considered compromised. All keying material (with the exception of GPS world wide key) was superseded within 15 hours. The GPS was superseded within 11 days.
+
+| | Item | Dates/Segment |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| A. | AKAA 283 MARK XII Mode 3/A | 31 Mar, 01 Apr |
+| B. | AKAC 1553 TRIAD Numeral Cipher | 31 Mar, 01 Apr |
+| C. | AKAC L506USAF TRIAD Cipher | 31 Mar, 01 Apr |
+| D. | AKAL L506 USAF Strategic Operations TRIAD Airborne MATRIX Authentication System | 31 Mar, 01 Apr |
+| E. | USKAC 374 USPACOM OPSCODE | April |
+| F. | AKAK A4001 PACAF KL-43 Key | 31 Mar, 01 Apr |
+| G. | AKAT 3662 KI-1B/1C Punched tape | 31 Mar, A&B |
+| H. | AKAT A5523 KG-40A OP KEY | 31 Mar, 01 Apr |
+| I. | AKAT G2747 KY-57/58 OP KEY | Segments 3 & 4 |
+| J. | AKAT G2748 KY-57/58 OP KEY | Segments 3 & 4 |
+| K. | USKAT 1105 KY-57/58 OP KEY | 31 Mar, 01 Apr |
+| L. | USKAT 1619 KY-57/58 OP KEY | 31 Mar, 01 Apr |
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+85
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+| | Item | Dates/Segment |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| M. | USKAT 20415 ANDVT OPKEY | 31 Mar, 01 Apr |
+| N. | USKAT A5503 KG-40A OP KEY | 31 Mar |
+| O. | USKAT B5697 KYV-5 OP KEY | 31 Mar, 01 Apr |
+| P. | USKAT 12228 KG-84 OP KEY | 31 Mar, 01 Apr |
+
+2.2 (U) COMSEC Equipment
+
+(S) The following equipment was left onboard the aircraft. The recovery team determined that the equipment was at a minimum examined by the PRC. There were signs of PRC intrusion into many pieces of equipment that could indicate PRC attempts at reverse engineering.
+
+| | Title | Description |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| A. | KY58 - 8 units | Secure Voice encryption device |
+| B. | KG-84 - 2 units | Secure Data encryption device |
+| C. | KL-43 - 1 unit | Off-line encryption device |
+| D. | KIR-1C - 1 unit | Identify Friend or Foe (IFF) |
+| E. | KIT-1C - 1 unit | Identify Friend or Foe (IFF) |
+| F. | KG-40 - 1 unit | Secure Data encryption device |
+| G. | KGX-40 - 1 unit | Remote control unit for KG-40 |
+| H. | KOI-18 - 2 units | Common fill device |
+| I. | KYV-5 - 2 units | VACTOR Secure Voice encryption device (ANDVT) |
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+86
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+Appendix C
+
+(U//FOUO) Cryptologic Foreign Partner Impact
+
+(C) The EP-3 Assessment Team requested that NSA's Office of Foreign Relations provide information on the impact of the EP-3E compromise to NSA's cryptologic foreign partners. This appendix provides NSA's response and identifies internal actions that NSA will take to notify foreign partners.
+
+(U) NSA Office of Foreign Relations Determinations
+
+(TS//SI) After reviewing materials provided by the EP-3 Assessment Team, the Office of Foreign Relations has determined that the impact to NSA's foreign relations program is low. We have identified below areas of potential compromise, recommended actions, and due dates for those actions. No prior coordination with other Intelligence Community or other US government officials, unless otherwise noted in the recommended action, is required. The Office of Foreign Relations will advise the DCI/Special Assistant for Foreign Intelligence Relationships of this information. The Office of Foreign Relations and the Director, NSA will coordinate the release of this information to other national civilian, military and Intelligence Community authorities in any summary reports, briefings, or presentations.
+
+(U//FOUO) Areas of Potential Compromise and Recommended Actions
+
+1. (TS//SI) Fact of the following SIGINT relationships and associated releasability caveats:
+* South Korea (KAMPUS, SETTEE, SEABOOT)
+* Japan (RORIPA)
+* Taiwan
+* Canada
+* Australia
+* New Zealand
+* United Kingdom
+
+Action: (TS//SI) The Office of Foreign Relations will request via formal message that incountry NSA SIGINT representatives meet with partner agency counterparts to advise them of the compromise, in the cases of South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan, since those relationships are classified and protected in those nations. The Commonwealth relationships are unclassified. DUE: NLT 31 July 2001
+
+2. (S//SI) Existence of airborne reconnaissance sharing programs with:
+* United Kingdom (NIMROD)
+* Japan (Project ARIEL)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+87
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+Action: (S//SI) The Office of Foreign Relations will request via formal message that incountry NSA SIGINT representatives coordinate with in-country USN representatives an approach to the host-nation SIGINT and naval partners. In the case of Japan, in-country coordination with COS Tokyo is also recommended. The Office of Foreign Relations will request a summary from in-country representatives of their activities in this regard. DUE: NLT 31 August 2001
+
+3. (C) NSA procedures for targeting of host nation communications (USSID 9).
+
+Action: (C) The Office of Foreign Relations recommends no action be initiated with foreign governments. If leaked, the Office of Foreign Relations recommends in general that a position of not commenting on the details of US intelligence activities be maintained, but reserves the right to respond on a case-by-case basis to certain partner nations. DUE: N/A
+
+4. (TS//SI) Specific EP-3 targeting of Taiwan:
+
+Action: (TS//SI) The Office of Foreign Relations will request via formal message that the in- country NSA SIGINT representative in Taiwan advise the partner and other pertinent Taiwanese intelligence and intelligence policy leadership that signals information regarding Taiwanese military forces were compromised. The in-country representative will emphasize to the partner that this type of information was on-board for situational awareness reasons. The Office of Foreign Relations will request via email that the SIGINT Directorate coordinate with the Naval Security Group for the compilation of a list of the specific information compromised. The SIGINT Directorate will provide via appropriate means this information to the in-country NSA representative for passage to the Taiwanese partner. Concurrently, the Director of Foreign Relations will advise the senior Taiwanese representative in the United States of the compromise. DUE: NLT 31 July 2001
+
+5. (S//SI) Targeting of PROFORMA signals of a multitude of nations
+
+Action: (S//SI) The Office of Foreign Relations recommends no action be initiated with foreign governments. If leaked, the Office of Foreign Relations recommends in general that a position of not commenting on the details of US intelligence activities be maintained, but reserves the right to respond on a case-by-case basis to certain partner or Allied nations. The Office of Foreign Relations on a case-by-case basis may advise them that this type of information was on- board to provide situational / threat awareness information to the aircraft. We may note that US and other Allied PROFORMA data was included in the equipment. DUE: N/A
+
+6. (S//SI) Fact of staging of US Navy EP-3 missions from Thailand and associated targets (India/ Pakistan)
+
+Action: (TS//SI) The Office of Foreign Relations will request via formal message that the NSA representative in Thailand advise the US Embassy country team of this
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+88
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+compromise. We do not believe the Thai partner SIGINT agency or government should be advised of the compromise, because of the newness of the current partner leadership and the tenuous political situation in Thailand. The Office of Foreign Relations recommends no action be initiated with Indian or Pakistani partner governments regarding the existence or origination of these flights or of the targeting of their communications. In-country NSA representatives in India and Pakistan will be apprised via email of the compromise and asked to advise respective COS's and US Embassy country teams for their background. If leaked, the Office of Foreign Relations recommends that a position of not commenting on the details of US intelligence activities be maintained. DUE: NLT 31 July 2001
+
+7. (S//SI) PRC target data routinely shared with Asian and other partners
+
+Action: (S//SI) The Office of Foreign Relations will request via email that the SIGINT Directorate, using appropriate means, advise foreign partners involved in the targeting of PRC communications of the compromise of PRC target data, in order to prepare these partners for potential SOI changes. DUE: NLT 31 July 2001
+
+8. (S//SI) EP-3-based collection technology possibly also on partner EP-3 platforms
+
+Action: (S//SI) The Office of Foreign Relations will request that the EP-3 Assessment Team with the Naval Security Group identify compromised equipment similar to that on-board partner EP-3 aircraft and develop appropriate presentations for foreign SIGINT and naval partners. At that time an assessment regarding foreign partner approaches can be made together with the EP-3 Assessment Team and the Naval Security Group. DUE: NLT 31 July 2001
+
+9. (U//FOUO) Australian SIGINT partner tasking message
+
+Action: (U//FOUO) The Office of Foreign Relations has already advised DSD via email to in- country US liaison personnel, as to the particular compromise. No further action required. DUE: N/A
+
+10. (C) Fact of US SIGINT System and/or EP-3 targeting of India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Philippines, and Sri Lanka
+
+Action: (S//SI) The Office of Foreign Relations recommends no action be initiated with these foreign governments, only two of which are SIGINT partners. We will request via email that in- country NSA representatives in India and Pakistan advise their respective COS's and Embassy country teams, but not the partner governments, of the potential compromise. No further action is required. If leaked, the Office of Foreign Relations recommends that a position of not commenting on the details of US intelligence activities be maintained. DUE: NLT 31 July 2001
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+89
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+11. (C) Fact of geographic areas of DSD, GCHQ, and CSE TEXTA authority; Compromise of GCHQ RASIN Manual Working Aid; CSE Telegraphic Codes Manual; DSD document on AN/ULQ-16 Operations at Kangaroo 95 (ADF exercise).
+
+Action: (S//SI) The Office of Foreign Relations will request via email that NSA in-country representatives advise these Second Party partners of these compromises. No further action is required. DUE: 31 July 2001
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+90
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+Appendix D
+
+(U) Destruction Testing Procedures
+
+(C) This appendix provides the destruction testing procedures used in an attempt to recreate the crew's destruction of three pieces of equipment: the SCARAB computer, which was loaded with the LUNCHBOX PROFORMA system, the MARTES laptop, and the COMINT Supervisor's laptop. Conclusions drawn from the testing are also discussed.
+
+I. (U//FOUO) General Practices
+
+a. An Aberdeen Test Center staff member served as the Test Director.
+b. The Test Director will instrument and measure the shock inflicted on the devices under test (DUT) as well as possible given the size of the different devices and the severity of the destruction. A video record will be captured of the tests.
+c. The physical structures involved in the destruction (the floor, chairs, tabletops) have been recreated. Some care has been taken to assure that the DUTs will not fly off the test platforms and benefit from any unintended shock.
+d. At each juncture of the test, the computer hard disks will be replaced with fresh disks to determine at what point most damage was inflicted. The disks will be returned for analysis immediately following the test. At that time, a preliminary examination will determine if the disks will be viable for recovery.
+
+II. (C) SCARAB Computer
+
+e. For the SCARAB re-creation, we have procured a single SCARAB computer. We have a series of four tests to perform on the SCARAB, and will have to perform them on the same housing, although we will be trading out disks at various stages of the test.
+f. The SCARAB will never be powered up during the test sequence.
+g. There will be a series of accelerated drop tests performed in the following manner:
+ i. The DUT will be manually lifted to approximately 5ft and sent to the floor with positive force. The exact amount of force will be hard to duplicate but will be measured by the instrumentation.
+ ii. After the first drop, the computer disk will be removed and replaced.
+ iii. Then a series of four accelerated drops will be performed, after which the computer disk will be removed.
+ iv. Then repeat the single and quad drops, totaling four tests (four disks for analysis).
+ v. If at anytime the SCARAB is damaged to the point that similar mechanical stresses cannot be re-created, the testing will cease.
+h. In each of the accelerated drop tests, the SCARAB will always land on its bottom or back edge. In particular, the first drop will land on the bottom edge where the removable drive is mounted.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+91
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+i. The test will not attempt to recreate the kicking that occurred between drops.
+j. The following hard drives will be used in the following sequences:
+ i. Test – 1: Seagate MEDALIST ST34520W; SAYQ30730
+ ii. Test – 2: Seagate MEDALIST ST34520W; SAYS24316
+ iii. Test – 3: Seagate MEDALIST ST34520W; SAYS55957
+
+III. (C) MARTES Laptop – Tadpole Ultrabook IIi
+
+k. For the POS20 laptop re-creation, we have traded new Tadpole Ultrabook laptops for used inventory, which were of the same generation as the computer in question. Record the laptop serial number and identity of each of the hard disks, noting which disks are used for each of the two tests. There are two disks in the Tadpole. Refer to disk1 as the disk closest to the front left side, and disk2 as the disk in the middle left of the computer. Note disk1 will be the bootable disk and disk2 will be a "data" disk.
+ i. Laptop S# U40-1347
+ ii. Test-1; Hard disk1 S# GZLE1332
+ iii. Test-1; Hard disk2 S# GZLE8015
+ iv. Test-2; Hard disk1 S# GZLD6396
+ v. Test-2; Hard disk2 S# GZLE4022
+l. There are two basic tests that will be performed on one of the laptops. The second laptop will be held in spare as well as used to verify the operation of the disks after they have been tested and analyzed for the purposes of recovery.
+m. The laptop will have been powered-on, and the lid closed with a user logged into the computer, for five minutes prior to the recreation. The intent is to allow the computer to reach any suspended state, which would have occurred after the laptop lid had closed and other activities had taken place.
+n. Test sequence:
+ i. Tabletop drop to the floor after bouncing off the seat of a chair.
+ ii. Replace the hard disks.
+ iii. Leaning the closed laptop against a simulated chair rail, where the laptop is the hypotenuse of a triangle formed with the floor and the chair rail. Bottom of the laptop touching the rail.
+ iv. Stomp with one foot on the keyboard until the laptop is broken into pieces. Should be performed by person weighing 180 to 200 pounds.
+ v. Remove the hard disks for analysis.
+
+IV. (C) COMINT Supervisor's Laptop – Gateway Solo 2500
+
+o. For the POIC laptop re-creation, we have procured two refurbished Gateway Solo 2550 laptops. They differ in a few areas such as processor speed and amount of RAM. The battery, floppy, and hard disk are mounted in the same locations on the test systems as with the fielded system, but are secured in slightly difference fashion. Specifically, it is described that with the removal of the single screw visible on the bottom surface of the laptop, the hard disk can slide from the side of the Solo 2500. This same action on the Solo 2550 only removes a plastic cover and requires the removal of two more screws before the drive will slide out. This is not expected to have much of an impact on the
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+92
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+re-creation, but it is likely to prevent the hard disk from coming loose during the stomping tests.
+p. Record the laptop serial number and identity of each of the hard disks, noting which disks are used for each of the two tests.
+ i. Laptop SB2500380397
+ ii. Test-1; Hard disk S# T607E59247
+ iii. Test-2; Hard disk S# 5J08870645
+q. There are two basic tests that will be performed on one of the laptops. The second laptop will be held in spare as well as used to verify the operation of the disks after they have been tested and analyzed for the purposes of recovery.
+r. The laptop will have been powered-on, and the lid open with a user logged into the computer, for five minutes prior to the recreation. The intent is to allow the computer to reach any suspended state, which would have occurred after the laptop flipped into one of the F-racks and other activities had taken place.
+s. Test sequence:
+ i. Hold the laptop with the keyboard side facing down. The screen will then be hit on the surface of a table top (face down) with the desired effect to crack the spine leaving the screen bent approximately 25 degrees past the horizontal position.
+ ii. Replace the hard disk.
+ iii. Drop the laptop to the chair rails, face up, such that the back of the display is on one chair rail and the bottom of the laptop is on the other.
+ iv. Stomp with one foot on the keyboard until the laptop is broken into pieces. Should be performed by person weighing 180 to 200 pounds.
+ v. Remove the hard disk for analysis.
+
+V. (C) Results and Conclusions
+
+(C) Generally, results from the re-created destruction tests revealed the difficulty of disabling a computer system with shock by dropping, stomping, or striking the equipment. For each of the three systems tested, results did not damage the computers enough to conclude that data recovery was impossible. This underscores the importance of providing clear instructions and training for how to physically destroy computers.
+
+(C) In the end, the EP-3 Team relied on the examination of the recovered computers from the returned EP-3E aircraft as the primary basis for estimating the recoverability of data. Results from the destruction tests were used as supporting data.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+93
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+Appendix E
+
+(U) EP-3E Radio Equipment and Networks
+
+(U) Radio Equipment
+
+(U) The EP-3E is equipped with a variety of radio transmitter/receivers (transceivers).
+
+(U//FOUO) Two AN/ARC-94 HF radios are provided for long-range communication. One (HF-1) is configured for secure modem communications and is encrypted using a KG-84C encryption device. The other (HF-2) is configured for voice communications and can be encrypted using a KYV-5 encryption device.
+
+(U//FOUO) Three AN/ARC-206 radios are provided for UHF line-of-sight communications. UHF-1 and UHF-2 are controlled by the SEVAL and are configured for voice communications. Both can be encrypted using KY-58 encryption devices. A third AN/ARC-206 radio is configured for line-of-sight datalink operations.
+
+(U//FOUO) Two AN/ARC-182 radios are provided for VHF or UHF line-of-sight communications. Both are controlled from the flight station and are configured for voice communications. Both can be encrypted using KY-58 encryption devices. The control units for these radios have a switch setting allowing an easy and immediate change to the emergency frequency (243.0 MHz or 121.5 MHz) associated with the frequency band in use. A separate switch setting overrides the selected frequency band and tunes directly to 243.0 MHz.
+
+(U//FOUO) One LST-5 satellite radio is provided for secure UHF voice satellite communications. The radio can only be controlled locally at its location in an avionics bay inside the aircraft cabin. It is encrypted using a KY-58 encryption device.
+
+(U//FOUO) The OL-390 Digital Communications Group and its associated UHF radio are used for secure satellite modem communications. The radio is controlled by the secure communications operator and is encrypted using a KG-84A encryption device. This radio shares distribution and antenna equipment with the LST-5; simultaneous transmission using both radios is not possible.
+
+(U) Radio Networks
+
+(S) The Global High Frequency System (GHFS) is a worldwide network of high-power HF stations that provides air/ground HF command and control radio communications between ground agencies and U.S. military aircraft. The GHFS network supports SRO aircraft by passing encoded NICKELBACK advisory conditions, position reports and administrative traffic.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+94
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+(S) The Pacific Tributary Network (PTN) is a UHF secure voice satellite network that provides COMINT advisory support and threat warning to U.S. and allied forces in the theater. Net participants include the Pacific Reconnaissance Operations Center (PACROC), which provides coordination and flight following to SRO aircraft, KRSOC, and NSOC/SSA.
+
+(S) The SENSOR PACER network is a UHF secure low data-rate digital satellite network that provides time-sensitive SIGINT reporting, COMINT advisory support, threat warning, and administrative traffic support to SRO assets worldwide. Net participants include KRSOC and the Tactical SIGINT Interaction Center at Kadena AB, Okinawa (TSIC-K).
+
+(S) The SIERRA ONE Early Warning network is a UHF secure voice satellite network utilized by 5th and 7th Fleet P-3's and EP-3E 's for tactical reporting and coordination. Net participants include all PACOM Tactical Support Centers (TSC) and CTF 57/72, Kami Seya, Japan.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+95
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+Appendix F (U) Schematic of EP-3E with Position Identifications
+
+Pilot (Mission Commander)
+Co-Pilot
+Flight Engineer
+Secure Communications Operator
+* ELINT Operator trainee
+Navigator
+Prop plane
+Record Station
+ELINT Operator
+ELINT Operator
+Lab Operator
+Radar Operator
+ELINT Evaluator
+Senior Evaluator (SEVAL)
+Starboard Overwing Hatch
+COMINT Evaluator (COMEVAL)
+* COMEVAL trainee
+Port Overwing Hatch
+COMINT Supervisor
+Boarding Ladder
+Special Operators
+Entry Door
+S & T Operator
+Head
+* In-Flight Technician
+Curtain
+Ditching Station 23 & 24
+* 3rd Pilot
+Galley
+* 2nd Flight Engineer
+Ditching Stations 21 & 22
+
+* indicates stations for takeoff and landing
+
+PORT WING
+STBD WING
+CURTAIN
+PILOT TUBE
+MAIN ELECTRICAL LOAD CENTER
+EMERGENCY EXIT
+GALLEY
+WATER TANK
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+96
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+Appendix G
+
+(U) Other Tactical SIGINT Platforms
+
+(S//SI) EP-3 Cryptologic Assessment Team members visited several locations to gather data from other tactical SIGINT collection platforms and activities concerning their material accounting and destruction procedures. The visits focused on gaining insights into best practices for risk mitigation in the day-to-day conduct of tactical intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions. Units visited included: U.S. Air Force RC-135 COBRA BALL/COMBAT SENT/RIVET JOINT (Offutt AFB, NE); U.S. Army RC-7 ARL (Ft Bliss, TX); U.S. naval surface and subsurface assets (Norfolk Naval Base, VA); U.S. Air Force Special Operations assets (Hurlburt Field, FL), U.S. Army Special Operations assets (Ft Bragg, NC); and U.S. Marine Corps assets (Camp Lejeune, NC).
+
+(U) RC-7 (U.S. Army)
+
+(S) RC-7 Airborne Reconnaissance Low (ARL) mission aircraft include ARL Communications (ARL-C) and ARL Multifunction (ARL-M) variants. ARL missions are conducted in threat environment similar to that of the EP-3E. ARL mission crews employ Emergency Destruction Procedures (EDP) developed specifically for each aircraft configuration. The focus of these procedures is to mitigate potential loss of classified information in the event of an emergency landing.
+
+(U//FOUO) The RC-7 Mission Supervisor (MS) is the designated authority for determining mission essential materials and inventories all mission materials brought onboard. The MS inventories the mission materials again after returning to the SCIF from the mission aircraft. A copy of the inventory is kept in the Mission Operations area IAW USSID 3.
+
+(S) ARL collection operators are assigned consistent emergency destruction areas of responsibility based on assigned positions. Prior to each mission, the MS addresses individual rules of engagement and EDP areas of responsibility. Supervision of the EDP is the responsibility of the non-rated Mission Supervisor IAW the Mission Supervisors' Checklist for the particular mission aircraft. The MS EDP checklist is accessible at every position. When the EDP execution command is given, each operator complies with his/her responsibilities as listed in their individual checklist. When respective actions are completed, each operator informs the MS, who is responsible for notifying the flight deck.
+
+(U) RC-135 (U.S. Air Force)
+
+(U//FOUO) RC-135 aircraft conduct operations similar to the EP-3E, on JCS-approved SRO tracks. There are 21 total RC-135's in three variants: RIVET JOINT, with a primary SIGINT mission; COMBAT SENT, with a primary technical ELINT mission; and COBRA BALL, with a primary FISINT mission. All platforms carry
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+97
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) data. Due to the proximity of these missions to unfriendly territory, RC-135 mission crews must carry out EDP in the event of aircraft loss, force down or damage. Emergency Destruction is ordered by the pilot (aircraft commander), lead electronic warfare officer (tactical controller (TC)), or airborne mission supervisor (AMS). Once destruction is initiated, aircrew members use their position checklists, which identify their respective responsibilities. Air Intelligence Agency (AIA) personnel (COMINT operators and COMINT systems maintenance) receive EDP familiarization during operator upgrade training. The Air Combat Command (ACC) personnel (pilots, navigators and electronic warfare officers) do not receive any standard EDP training.
+
+(U//FOUO) Accountability for RC-135 mission materials is rigorous. For the COMINT compartment, the AMS verifies the inventory, signs a material receipt and files copies IAW USSID 3. After the mission, the materials are inventoried once by the AMS prior to departing the aircraft and again by the ground personnel when the materials are dropped off at the SCIF. CAT III materials may also be included on the mission inventory, but only if the AMS agrees they are required for the mission. For the ELINT compartment, the TC inventories and signs for the mission materials three times: prior to departure, before deplaning after the mission, and again when the materials are returned to the SCIF. ACC materials are generally non-SCI in nature.
+
+(U//FOUO) RC-135 EDP is divided into two phases: preliminary and complete. During preliminary destruction, all non-essential materials (e.g., back-up discs, technical orders, tapes that have been recorded on) are destroyed. Hardcopy paper material is torn into small pieces and placed into any available containers in preparation for jettisoning. During complete destruction, the AMS executes a software command to initiate a disk overwrite process for all disks loaded in drives. Other crewmembers zeroize cryptographic equipment. Shredded paper material is jettisoned from the mission aircraft via the safest available window/hatch during complete destruction. Throughout EDP, crewmembers adhere to strict crew coordination standards. The AMS reports verbally over the aircraft intercom system to the TC and AC as each step of destruction is completed. Safety of the aircrew takes precedence over emergency destruction IAW Air Force Instruction (AFI) 11-202 Volume 3.
+
+(C) A problem with the disk overwrite process is that it takes approximately three hours to complete. The goal is to decrease the time to less than 30 minutes.
+
+(C) EDP is briefed prior to each mission. Each crewmember is directed to review their position checklist to become familiar with tasked responsibilities. Completion of survival courses, including special survival training (SV-83) geared towards unplanned detention situations, is mandatory for all RC-135 crewmembers. Furthermore, all COMINT crewmembers are tested in Advisory Support and Emergency Procedures every six months. EDP drills are not conducted prior to launch nor while airborne. Finally, the AIA has minimized classified paper holdings in favor of media storage.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+98
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+(U) U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) Standard Procedures
+
+(C) AFSOC uses a Direct Support Operator (DSO) to provide direct threat warning to the supported aircrew. The DSO is normally the only SCI-indoctrinated aircrew member on AFSOC aircraft. The DSO carries a standard complement of materials, which are minimized by the station commander IAW USSID 3. The DSO accounts for and signs for sensitive equipment, which includes one UNCLASSIFIED, and one SECRET laptop. Additionally, the DSO carries a crypto storage device and one technical working aid, which is limited to SECRET information on water-soluble paper.
+
+(S) Although the support afforded by the DSO includes an SCI collection and analysis process, no SCI data is actually placed in soft or hard copy materials. Also, only sanitized SECRET reporting is passed from the DSO to the supported crew.
+
+(C) In an emergency situation, the DSO zeroizes all crypto devices, clears his laptop computers, destroys the hard drives of both laptops using a 9MM handgun or an axe, and adds water to the water soluble papers of the technical working aid.
+
+(U) U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) Standard Procedures
+
+(C) USASOC subordinated Special Forces Group (SFG) SIGINT assets deploy forward to provide threat warning for force protection of SFG elements. Collection elements deploy as a 5-person foot patrol team and all intercept equipment and associated materials are hauled via backpack. As such, they employ a "less is best" configuration and minimize crypto and technical data loads. Special Operation Team Bravo (SOT-B) teams establish a Tactical SCIF (T-SCIF) well behind the front line of defense. SOT-B T-SCIF authorities carry only the minimum crypto, tech data, and hard copy materials necessary for the mission at hand. Collection team leaders and T-SCIF Special Security Officers (SSO) are the designated authorities to monitor classified holdings and are responsible for minimizing classified materials.
+
+(U//FOUO) When enemy contact is probable, team members zeroize all non-essential equipment (radios and crypto), destroy classified material and initiate egress operations. The preferred method for rapid destruction is thermite grenade.
+
+(U) U.S. Marine Corps Standard Procedures
+
+(S) The Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF) employ Radio Battalions (RADBN) to conduct SIGINT operations to provide direct threat warning for force protection. RADBN personnel use a variety of configurations in both vehicle- and foot-based operations. Radio equipment is tailored to the specific mission and technical data is minimized due to operations in close proximity to enemy lines. SCI used by forward teams is normally limited to one cheat sheet and team leaders, as the designated deployed authority, prefer that these sheets be sanitized to the collateral SECRET level. A copy of mission material inventories is left at the headquarters location. The RADBN commander has overall authority to determine materials brought on a deployment.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+99
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+(U//FOUO) When High Mobility Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) are used, they are configured for the particular mission and the teams carry minimal crypto, technical data and hard copy materials. Radio Reconnaissance Teams (RRTs) travel on foot and use backpacks for all intercept equipment and associated materials. As such, they employ a "less is best" configuration. During ship borne operations, the RADBN personnel team with U.S. Navy operators and follow the applicable EAP for the respective ship.
+
+(U//FOUO) If enemy contact is probable, team members zeroize all non-essential equipment (radios and crypto) while executing egress operations. If enemy attack is imminent, then all classified equipment, to include the vehicle would be destroyed using thermite grenades.
+
+(U) Naval Surface Vessel Standard Procedures
+
+(S) All SCI material aboard U.S. Navy surface assets will be confined to authorized areas. For augmenting cryptologic personnel, the Operations Officer of the supporting Naval Security Group Activity (NSGA) determines what mission materials can be deployed. Additionally, the ship's Commanding Officer (CO) can place limits on the materials embarked.
+
+(U//FOUO) If the situation warrants, the ship's CO or his/her designee will direct activation of the EDP. The EDP is conducted in three phases: preliminary destruction, precautionary destruction, and total destruction. Destruction procedures are outlined on EDP cards, maintained at the watch officer desk. The cards are passed out to duty personnel, who follow the prioritized destruction guidelines.
+
+(U//FOUO) The ship's CMS Custodian is responsible for reviewing EDP cards periodically and for ensuring that appropriate emergency destruction tools are available and serviceable.
+
+(U) Naval Subsurface Standard Procedures
+
+(S) U.S. Navy subsurface assets may or may not embark an NSG SIGINT collection contingent. When NSG personnel participate in subsurface operations, the Operations Officer of the supporting NSGA determines what mission materials can be deployed. Due to extremely limited space considerations, the submarine CO may further restrict materials brought onboard. Submarine operations are generally confined to a smaller operations area, facilitating a more condensed SCI material inventory for mission accomplishment. An inventory of supporting NSGA SCI materials is maintained at their respective units.
+
+(U//FOUO) If the situation warrants, the Commanding Officer or his designee will direct activation of the EDP. NSGA personnel will destroy their materials using shredders, axes, and sledgehammers, where appropriate.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+100
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+Appendix H
+
+(U) Crisis Response Interviews
+
+(U//FOUO) Team members conducted interviews with the following individuals.
+
+NSA
+ NSOC Chief, [REDACTED]
+ NSOC D/Chief, [REDACTED]
+ SSA, LtCol [REDACTED] USMC
+ SID/DDAP, [REDACTED]
+ SID/Chief, Office of China, [REDACTED] (Crisis Manager)
+ SID/Chief, China Military Division, [REDACTED] (Chair, CMSG)
+ SOO, [REDACTED]
+ NSOC C/S, [REDACTED] (EP-3 desk)
+ NSOC Dep C/S, [REDACTED] (EP-3 desk)
+ SID/DDDA - [REDACTED]
+ SID/Reporting Policy, [REDACTED]
+ SID/Office of China, Reporting Policy, [REDACTED]
+ LAO, [REDACTED]
+ PAO, [REDACTED]
+
+PACOM
+ CINCPAC Dep J2, [REDACTED] USA
+ CINCPAC J28, [REDACTED]
+ CINCPACFLT N2, [REDACTED]
+ CINCPACFLT N3DC, [REDACTED]
+ Joint Recce Center, [REDACTED]
+ Joint Recce Center [REDACTED]
+ J284, Collection Operations, [REDACTED]
+ NCPAC, Charlie Meals
+ NCPAC Ops Chief, [REDACTED]
+ NCPAC IAD Chief, [REDACTED]
+ CSG Hawaii, [REDACTED]
+
+KRSOC
+ Commander, [REDACTED] USN
+ Dep C/S, [REDACTED]
+ J3, LtCol [REDACTED]z, USAF
+ J3 OPS, LT [REDACTED]
+
+State
+ Acting A/S for INR, [REDACTED]
+ DAS for INR, [REDACTED]
+ State/INR, [REDACTED] Asia Desk
+ State/INR, [REDACTED]
+ State/INR, [REDACTED]
+ NCR State, [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+101
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+Pentagon
+ JCS J2, RADM [REDACTED]
+ JCS J2M, CAPT [REDACTED]
+ DUSD(PS), [REDACTED]
+ DNI, RADM P[REDACTED]
+ NCR Defense, [REDACTED]
+ CSG, [REDACTED]
+ J38, Col [REDACTED] USAF
+
+White House
+ NSC Intel Director, [REDACTED]
+ Deputy Director, Situation Room, [REDACTED]
+
+CIA
+ DDCI MA, Lt Gen [REDACTED]
+ ADCI Collection, [REDACTED]
+ D/ADCI Anal & Prod, [REDACTED]
+
+Congress
+ [REDACTED], SSCI
+ [REDACTED], HPSCI
+ [REDACTED], HPSCI
+ [REDACTED] HPSCI
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+102
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+Appendix I
+
+(U//FOUO) EP-3 Cryptologic Assessment Team Members
+
+Co-Leads
+
+[REDACTED] NSA
+CAPT [REDACTED], USN NSG
+
+Members
+
+LT [REDACTED], USN ONI
+CTA2 [REDACTED] USN NSG
+Lt Col [REDACTED], USAF NSA
+[REDACTED] NSA
+[REDACTED] INSCOM
+[REDACTED] NSA
+[REDACTED] NSA
+LCDR [REDACTED], USN Patrol and Reconnaissance Wing TEN
+[REDACTED] NSA
+SMSGT [REDACTED], USAF AFCO
+[REDACTED] NSA
+[REDACTED] NSA
+LT [REDACTED], USN NSG
+
+Oversight
+
+RADM [REDACTED] USN Commander, NSG
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+103
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+Appendix J
+
+(U) EP-3 Incident Assessment and Review
+Terms of Reference
+
+4 May 2001
+
+1. (U//FOUO) Executive Issue
+
+* This document outlines the Terms of Reference for a SIGINT and Information Assurance damage assessment and incident review of the EP-3E/F-8-II collision on 1 April 2001, as directed by the Chief, Naval Operations (CNO) and the Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service (DIRNSA).
+
+2. (U//FOUO) Background
+
+* The collision incident requires a comprehensive, fully coordinated, end-to-end damage assessment, including a review of emergency procedures and actions, development of lessons learned, and recommendations for corrective action, where appropriate.
+
+3. (S//SI) Overview
+
+* *Structure*. Overall incident assessment and review to be conducted at COMNAVSECGRU HQ, Fort Meade, MD by a multi-organizational team co-chaired by Navy and the National Security Agency (NSA). The EP-3 Cryptologic Assessment Team will be comprised of two working groups. Group One will be led by NSA and tasked with conducting damage assessment and review of the Cryptologic system response and procedures. Group two will be led by the Navy and tasked with review and assessment of emergency destruction, classified material accountability, communications and connectivity and emergency procedures.
+* *Membership*. Members will be both core and extended. Core members will be detailed to the working groups for the duration of the assessment. Extended members will interface virtually or in person as appropriate. COMNAVSECGRU will oversee the effort on behalf of the CNO and the DIRNSA.
+* *Final Report*. The team will produce a final report including an incident summary, a complete list of what was compromised and the impact of that loss, lessons learned, and near-, mid-, and long-term recommendations for improvement to include proposed action agencies and timelines. The team will update COMNAVSECGRU on at least a weekly basis and will provide Congress, Defense, and Intelligence Community components updates as required.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+104
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+4. (S//SI) Working Groups
+
+* Working Group composition and focus areas.
+
+Group 1A Lead: NSA (SIGINT Directorate)
+
+Tasking: SIGINT damage assessment and review of SIGINT system crisis response
+Members: NSA (SID), Navy, CINCPAC, NCPAC, KRSOC, Service Cryptologic Elements (SCEs)
+Focus Areas:
+ (1) SIGINT Equipment and Techniques: Loss and damage
+ (2) SIGINT technical information exposure: Loss and damage
+ (3) Crisis response procedures
+ (4) Communications/connectivity
+ (5) Information management and dissemination
+ (6) Cross-organization and agency coordination
+ (7) Foreign partner impacts
+ (8) Damage Mitigation
+ (9) Collection/analysis strategy to confirm loss/damage assessment, including initial observations of target activities
+
+Group 1B Lead: NSA (IA Directorate)
+
+Tasking: IA damage assessment and review of Cryptologic Material System (CMS) equipment, medium protection capabilities, and procedures.
+Members: NSA (IAD), SCEs
+Focus Areas:
+ (1) IA information: Loss and damage
+ (2) Technical information: Loss and damage
+ (3) Crisis response procedures
+ (4) Information management and dissemination
+ (5) Cross-organization and agency coordination
+ (6) Damage mitigation
+ (7) Collection/analysis strategy to confirm loss/damage assessment
+
+Group 2 Lead: Navy
+
+Tasking: Review emergency destruction, Classified material accountability and documentation, communications and connectivity (internal/external), and emergency procedures.
+Members: Navy (OPNAV, CINCPAC, CINPACFLT, ONI), NSA(SID/IAD), NAVAIR, COMPATRECONFORPAC, SCEs
+Focus Areas:
+ (1) Classified Material Accountability and Documentation
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+105
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+ - Requirements
+ - Procedures (accountability/control)
+ - Equipment
+ - Hardcopy material
+ - Softcopy material
+ - Configuration management
+
+ (2) Emergency Destruction
+ - Requirements
+ - Procedures (priorities, methods, tools, equipment)
+ - Equipment and capabilities
+ - Technical improvements and requirements for future systems
+
+ (3) Communications and connectivity
+ (4) Emergency Procedures
+ - Flights
+ - SRO
+ - NATOPS
+ - Aircrew coordination
+
+5. (U) Interim Deliverables
+
+* Outline of Report (to CNO and DIRNSA).
+* Weekly feedback and periodic status reports (CNO, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, DIRNSA, DOD, and the Intelligence Community).
+
+6. (U//FOUO) Final Report
+
+* The final report, with an Executive Summary and briefing, will be delivered to the CNO and DIRNSA. It will include a:
+ * Summary of the incident from collision to repatriation
+ * Damage assessment of SIGINT and IA equipment, techniques, and information compromised
+ * Review and assessment of operational activities
+ * Counterintelligence assessment
+ * Review of SIGINT and IA crisis response
+ * Consolidated lessons learned and near-, mid-, and long-term recommendations, including action agencies and deliverable timelines
+
+7. (U//FOUO) Timeline Milestones
+
+* Official start of Assessment Team — 27 April
+* Draft and coordinate Terms of Reference — 27 April
+* Data gathering, to include TDY for crew debriefs — 27 April -1 June
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+106
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+
+* Release final Terms of Reference — 4 May
+* Release outline of report — 11 May
+* Integration of team inputs, drafting of final report — 4-19 June
+* Release draft final report for coordination, review — 20 June
+* Brief CNO and DIRNSA on report — Week of 25 June
+* Final report issued; Team stand down — 12 July
+
+8. (U//FOUO) Considerations
+
+* Team/group composition must balanced in size and expertise.
+* Information must be managed to avoid premature disclosure and to protect the fact finding process.
+* "Protected" lists of authorized recipients will be created to guide dissemination for each team and overall assessment. Release of information beyond the list of authorized recipients will be controlled by CNO and DIRNSA.
+* Follow-on information requirements for the EP-3E crew can be anticipated.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1
+107
diff --git a/data/10th-Anniversary-Edition-EP-3-Damage-Assessment/metadata.json b/data/10th-Anniversary-Edition-EP-3-Damage-Assessment/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..29faa79
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/10th-Anniversary-Edition-EP-3-Damage-Assessment/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+{
+ "title": "EP-3E Collision: Cryptologic Damage Assessment and Incident Review",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "A joint US Navy and NSA report from July 2001, prepared three months after a US spy plane was forced to land in China, assessing how far surveillance sources and methods were compromised and reviewing the emergency destruction that failed to prevent it. Damage to tactical SIGINT against the PRC is rated medium and overall SIGINT damage low, with the greatest loss the LUNCHBOX PROFORMA processor and MARTES signals analysis tools; COMSEC damage is rated low because keying material was superseded within 15 hours.",
+ "long_description": "On 1 April 2001 a PRC F-8-II collided with a US Navy EP-3E (Bureau Number 156511) over the South China Sea on SRO track 5Q2002, about 70nm southeast of Hainan Island. The report fixes the sequence to the minute: collision at 0105Z at position 1735N 11055E, MAYDAY at 0113Z, a no-flap landing at Lingshui at 0134Z, and the crew ordered to deplane at 0200Z. The Chief of Naval Operations and DIRNSA stood up the EP-3 Cryptologic Assessment Team on 27 April; this is its final report, delivered that July.\n\nThe report's central argument is doctrinal rather than operational. Information Assurance assumes from the day equipment is issued that it will eventually fall into enemy hands, and protects the key instead of the device; SIGINT rests on a “no compromise” principle that assumes sensitive material will be protected or destroyed before it is lost. That is why COMSEC damage came out low and SIGINT damage medium. The authors call the SIGINT approach a relic of “an era when SIGINT capabilities resided on hardware and in hardcopy versus today's world where increasingly these capabilities reside in software,” and argue for replacing destruction with safeguarding — encryption and rapid overwriting — as the governing goal.\n\nThe forensic conclusion is sharper than the destruction narrative suggests. The SCARAB computer carrying the LUNCHBOX PROFORMA processor and the laptop holding MARTES both came back with their hard drives shattered, but laboratory reenactment at the Aberdeen Test Center — instrumented, filmed, with the cabin furniture rebuilt — showed the crew's drops, stomps and axe blows could not have caused that damage. The report concludes the PRC copied the drives and then destroyed them. Two signals-processing circuit boards were missing from the returned LUNCHBOX, and the tape of 45 minutes of PRC Navy communications had been removed from its recorder. Counterintelligence specialists stripped the returned aircraft at Dobbins Air Reserve Base, removing over 500 pieces of equipment and inspecting roughly 300 for tampering; they found no implants, “although it is possible that an implant could have been undetectable.” The PRC had barely concealed its work — one component was remounted upside down and others left unscrewed — while elsewhere the reverse engineering of boards and chips was detectable only under a microscope.\n\nOn the specifics: LUNCHBOX could process 40 worldwide PROFORMA signals and carried detailed working aids for 29 of them, along with the HUNTER and PREDATOR UAV datalinks and the JASSM seeker datalink. MARTES was COMINT version 1999.0.2 and shipped with source code, tutorials, real intercept samples and the RASIN manual — together “a comprehensive overview of how the U.S. Cryptologic System exploits an adversary's signal environment.” Among the 23 compromised USSIDs, 5511 governs NICKELBACK, the COMINT advisory conditions passed to reconnaissance aircraft; its loss raised the prospect of the PRC feeding the SIGINT system false information so that advisory conditions issued to mission aircraft would be wrong, though the report judges actual spoofing “extremely unlikely, since it would require the PRC to have both U.S. communications gear and daily crypto.”\n\nAppendix C records what NSA's Office of Foreign Relations decided to tell each partner, and the decisions are as revealing as the losses. Taiwan, Japan and South Korea were to be briefed because those relationships are classified in their own countries — the fact of the Taiwan relationship is itself TOP SECRET//COMINT. The appendix also attaches the releasability caveats to the partners they protect: South Korea is KAMPUS, SETTEE and SEABOOT, Japan is RORIPA, and the airborne reconnaissance sharing programmes are NIMROD with the United Kingdom and Project ARIEL with Japan. Thailand was deliberately not told that the EP-3 missions staging from its territory had been compromised, “because of the newness of the current partner leadership and the tenuous political situation in Thailand,” and neither India nor Pakistan was to learn that those flights targeted their communications; in-country NSA representatives were briefed “but not the partner governments.” Each item carries a contingency line: “If leaked, the Office of Foreign Relations recommends that a position of not commenting on the details of US intelligence activities be maintained.”\n\nThe institutional findings go beyond the destruction itself. Inside the aircraft, helmets acoustically isolated the crew and the public address system was unintelligible over the damage noise; the SEVAL's helmet microphone failed and he sent a runner to the cockpit; crew aft of the navigation station unplugged from the intercom so they could move while destroying material, so nobody heard the decision to land, and many realised the aircraft was landing rather than ditching only when they saw land or heard the gear. The COMEVAL, assuming a ditching, chose not to jettison COMINT material and told neither the SEVAL nor the Mission Commander, who left the aircraft believing only scraps remained and ordered no sweep. The debriefing was then compressed to 42 hours against JPRA's recommended 72 because of the crew's pre-Easter release, with no follow-up for over thirty days, by which point “accuracy of the individual accounts of events had degraded”; the assessment team was not formed for 26 days, and no guidance documents or directives existed for conducting an intelligence-compromise damage assessment at all. Separately, the Secretary of Defense restricted the transcript of the exchange between the PRC intercept controller and the surviving fighter pilot to selected Pentagon and CIA officials; the Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence had specifically requested it and was not added to the list, which “fostered a perception that NSA was holding back key intelligence.” Appendix G sets the EP-3E against every other tactical SIGINT platform the team visited — AFSOC operators destroy drives with a 9mm handgun or an axe and carry working aids on water-soluble paper, Army and Marine teams use thermite grenades, submarines carry sledgehammers, and the RC-135 runs a software disk-overwrite — against which the EP-3E had one dull 16-inch fire axe. The report closes with 62 recommendations, each assigned to a named action agency, and the judgement that failing to address these issues decisively “will not just continue the likelihood of future losses, it will guarantee it.”",
+ "tags": [
+ "damage assessment",
+ "emergency destruction",
+ "surveillance aircraft",
+ "reconnaissance",
+ "Sensitive Reconnaissance Operations",
+ "aircraft collision",
+ "South China Sea",
+ "Hainan Island",
+ "Lingshui Airfield",
+ "COMSEC",
+ "cryptography",
+ "keying material",
+ "signals intelligence",
+ "signals analysis",
+ "traffic analysis",
+ "counterintelligence",
+ "crisis response",
+ "classified information",
+ "crew training",
+ "submarines",
+ "radar",
+ "Kunia",
+ "Five Eyes",
+ "foreign partners",
+ "reverse engineering",
+ "espionage",
+ "GPS",
+ "Taiwan",
+ "data destruction",
+ "PROFORMA",
+ "ELINT",
+ "USSID",
+ "detention",
+ "aviation"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2001-07",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1",
+ "genre": "report",
+ "programs": [
+ "LUNCHBOX",
+ "MARTES",
+ "NICKELBACK",
+ "SENSOR PACER",
+ "PROFORMA",
+ "HULTEC",
+ "STRUM",
+ "TEXTA",
+ "RASIN",
+ "CRITIC",
+ "KLIEGLIGHT",
+ "XBIT",
+ "BLACKMAGIC",
+ "NOIWON",
+ "ZIRCON",
+ "MIDB",
+ "EOB-LITE",
+ "NIMROD",
+ "ARIEL",
+ "COBRA BALL",
+ "COMBAT SENT",
+ "RIVET JOINT",
+ "SEABOOT",
+ "SETTEE",
+ "KAMPUS",
+ "DRUID",
+ "RORIPA",
+ "MARKHAM",
+ "FOREJUDGE",
+ "SAM HEARTBURN",
+ "NOVELETTE",
+ "RSBN",
+ "BEGGAR HAWK",
+ "BEGGAR SHADOW",
+ "CAPSULE JACK",
+ "DISTANT WIND",
+ "DISTANT SENT",
+ "CHILING",
+ "RIBBED",
+ "UNACCENTED",
+ "SLIPSTICK",
+ "SIERRA ONE"
+ ],
+ "countries": [
+ "Australia",
+ "Belarus",
+ "Cambodia",
+ "Canada",
+ "China",
+ "Cuba",
+ "Egypt",
+ "Georgia",
+ "India",
+ "Iran",
+ "Iraq",
+ "Italy",
+ "Japan",
+ "Malaysia",
+ "New Zealand",
+ "North Korea",
+ "Norway",
+ "Pakistan",
+ "Philippines",
+ "Russia",
+ "South Korea",
+ "Sri Lanka",
+ "Taiwan",
+ "Thailand",
+ "Ukraine",
+ "United Kingdom",
+ "United States",
+ "Vietnam",
+ "Hong Kong",
+ "Soviet Union"
+ ],
+ "people": [
+ "Meals, Charlie"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2017-04-10",
+ "title": "Burn After Reading",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2017/04/10/snowden-documents-reveal-scope-of-secrets-exposed-to-china-in-2001-spy-plane-incident/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Zetter, Kim"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/3546567/10th-Anniversary-Edition-EP-3-Damage-Assessment.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "archive_comment": "Typos in the document: USSID 205 is given as STRUM on one page and SRUM on the next, NICKELBACK is spelled NICKLEBACK in three places in Appendix B, and several portion markings read (U/FOUO) with a single slash.",
+ "pdf_sha256": "84c41ed71a524306c6bad8839609141ecb7655ada2feb2e3a924ade24da67d4b",
+ "pages": 117
+}
diff --git a/data/2006-11-09-Real-Time-Overview/2006-11-09-Real-Time-Overview.md b/data/2006-11-09-Real-Time-Overview/2006-11-09-Real-Time-Overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a192612
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/2006-11-09-Real-Time-Overview/2006-11-09-Real-Time-Overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,814 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
+
+# RT10 Initiative Overview
+
+Dr. James Heath
+
+Program Management & Advisors: COL Bob Harms / COL Barb Trent / Michelle Gerhard
+
+Architects: [REDACTED] / Mark Ross
+
+Presented by [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
+
+## Why Innovate?
+
+* Volume & convergence
+ * Front-end filters data
+ * Reaching limits on legacy systems
+* Latency
+ * Processing, storing, and query
+ * Difficult to enable tactical operations
+* Analyst Limitations
+ * Non-integrated tools
+ * Collaboration limited
+ * Knowledge-bases are limited
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
+
+## RT10 Initiative Overview
+
+* Real-time, distributed architecture for mobile (tactical) and fixed (national) operational environments
+* Provides
+ * Access to **more comprehensive** data in near real-time
+ * Integrated analytical workflow with complementary tools
+ * Real-time alerting, both national and tactical
+ * **Integration** across national-to-tactical SIGINT capabilities
+* Expected Results: Order of magnitude improvements in real-time SIGNIT architecture for the U.S. Cryptologic System, focused on national to tactical intelligence, enabling **better** decisions in **less** time.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
+
+---
+
+```
+RT10 Iraq Analytics
+SPIN-5 (1 Oct - 31 Dec 2006)
+
+Annex A Version 1.6
+
+Improved Products & Alerts
+
+Remote Linguistic Support Elements
+Voice Processing Overflow
+
+CSTS
+(TF-24)
+(4ID)
+
+Queries and Tasking
+
+Gists
+Trnspts
+
+Voice
+Queues
+
+Queries / Tasking Feedback
+
+"TTP
+Center
+
+TTP Testing
+Evaluate New Algorithms
+Respond to RFIs (real-time)
+Conduct Field Refresher Training
+(Vans in Baghdad)
+Open Positions: xxx
+
+Alerts / Refined Data
+
+CSG
+
+Sense Making
+New Knowledge
+
+Alerts / Refined Data
+
+NSA-Georgia
+Target Knowledge
+Linguistic Support
+Pre-deployment Training
+
+MNC-I
+(CASE)
+(CORP)
+(Marines)
+
+MNF-I
+Divisions
+Embassy
+
+A&P (NSA-W)
+(Product Line TOPIs)
+Target Knowledge
+Tool Knowledge
+
+TTPs
+RFIs
+TNG
+
+COBRA FOCUS
+Target Knowledge
+Linguistic Support
+
+Tool Tradecraft Ideas
+New Tool Recommendations
+
+MOC & Dragon Tamers
+Initial TTP Development
+TTP Maturation as needed
+Pre-deploy Training Base
+Develop Best Practices
+Host TTP & Best Practices Library
+
+SIGINT Development
+GREEN DRAGON
+& RAD Elements
+Tradecraft and Tool Recommendations
+Analytic/Governance Advice
+Algorithm (data-mining) development
+Apply new TTPs at the National Level
+
+Respond to RFIs
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
+(existing process)
+
+SECRET//COMINT//REL
+```
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
+
+---
+
+## System Block Diagram – Overview
+
+```
+Generator #1 [trailer]
+275KW
+380V, 3P, 50Hz
+Primary Power
+
+Automatic Redundant Power Switchover
+
+ATS [connex]
+Auto-Transfer
+380V, 3P, 50Hz
+AC
+Dist Panel
+
+Generator #2 [trailer]
+275KW
+380V, 3P, 50Hz
+Redundant Power
+
+Chiller [Connex]
+40Ton
+50gpm,
+50Hz
+45degF
+Water
+
+2nd UPS Connex
+{100KW Growth}
+
+100KW UPS
+208V, 3P, 50Hz
+
+Processor UPS
+
+Chiller #1
+* Chilled Water
+ for Processor
+ System Cooling
+
+Chiller [Connex]
+40Ton
+50gpm,
+50Hz
+45degF
+Water
+
+'Boot' Van
+* Security 'Screen'
+* Fan-out for Water
+ Lines
+* Controlled
+ Environmental
+ Transition
+
+CDU:
+2KW, 208V
+3P,50Hz
+
+Chiller #2
+* Chilled Water for
+ Room Cooling
+
+'Ops' Van
+* User Space
+* 36" Desks = 8 Users
+* Desktop Workstations with
+ UPS
+
+2T
+2T
+5T
+
+'Processing' Van
+* Server Room
+* Processing Racks (up to 7)
+* Comms and Support Racks (1)
+* Closed Loop Cooled Racks
+```
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
+
+## RT10 Node Architecture
+
+```
+Tactical Collection
+
+National Collection
+
+Ingestion, Validation, Normalization
+
+GOLDMINER
+Dimensional Database
+* DNR
+* DNI
+* Other Data
+
+Phoneme Data/
+Voice Prints
+
+User Authentication & Authorization
+
+RT10 Applications
+* RT10 Geo-T
+* Named Area of Interest
+* RaptorT
+* ArcGIS x.x
+* Sorting Hat/Lead
+* Renoir, Analyst Notebook
+
+Inline Algorithms
+(e.g. Dynamite,...)
+
+Queue Fed Algorithms
+(e.g. HLT Feed,...)
+
+Query-Fed Algorithms
+(e.g. SRC, ...)
+
+Alert Management and
+Alert Notification
+
+VoiceRT
+
+Action
+```
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
+TOPSECRET//COMINT//20291123
+
+## RT10 Iraq SPIN 5 (01 Oct – 31 Dec)
+
+```
+National Collection
+* GSM
+ * JUGGERNAUT
+ * MATTERHORN
+ * OBELISK
+ * Billing Records
+* Precision Geo
+ * Precision Emitters
+ (TDOA/FDOA)
+
+Ingestion, Validation, Normalization
+
+GOLDMINER
+Dimensional Database
+* GSM
+* PSTN
+
+Phoneme Data/
+Voice Prints
+
+User Authentication & Authorization
+
+RT10 Applications
+* Entity Database
+* SORTING LEAD
+* GeoT
+* SORTING HAT
+
+Inline Algorithms
+(e.g. Dynamite,...)
+
+Queue Fed Algorithms
+(e.g. HLT Feed,...)
+
+Alert Management and
+Alert Notification
+
+VoiceRT
+
+Action
+```
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
+
+## RT10 Deployments
+
+A world map shows deployment locations indicated by concentric circles:
+* JIATF-South
+* Baghdad
+* Korea
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
+
+## RT10 in Baghdad, Iraq
+
+* Baghdad, Iraq
+ * Enable find-fix-finish operations
+ * Provide immediate access to national / tactical collect
+ * Integrate collection with geospatial alerting
+ * Automatically correlate target behavior with collection, ie pattern-of-life
+ * Prototype barrier monitoring systems
+ * Expected results
+ * Near-real-time data and advanced analytical tools provided to in-country units enable tactical decisions
+ * VoiceRT provides alerting on spoken selectors, speaker identification, language identification, and content mining
+ * Checkpoint data provides SIGINT tie to targets
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
+
+## RT10 Geospatial - GeoT
+
+* Geospatial awareness
+ * GeoT
+ * Thin client similar to Google Maps and TIVO
+ * Satellite imagery / other map layers
+ * Overlay collection in real-time
+ * Integrated with targeting database
+ * Analyst defines named areas of interest
+ * Can receive alerts when targets are detected in area
+ * Display the health and coverage of SIGINT system
+ * Where are our blind spots?
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
+
+## GeoT & Real-Time Collection
+
+```
+Scenarios | Event Filtering | Decision Support | Alert Management | Tool Management |
+Enter a Target Name
+Targets To Watch
+(Click a Target or Group name to edit properties)
+[No Groups]
+
+10:12:47
+10:41:56
+
+Wed 30 Aug 06 :: 10:42:46
+Real Time
+Done
+Local intranet
+```
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
+
+## GeoT & Collection Status
+
+```
+11:32:52
+12:02:52
+
+Scenarios | Event Filtering | Decision Support | Alert Management | Tool Management |
+
+Enter a Target Name
+Targets To Watch list
+Click a Target or Group name to edit properties)
+[No Groups]
+
+* Draw Area of Interest
+RT-10 components
+ * GSM
+ * National
+ * Infrastructure
+ * Juggernaut
+ * Obelisk
+ * Air Interface
+ * Matterhorn
+ * Tactical
+ * Air Interface
+ * DRT
+ * Baseline
+ * Iraqna CBR
+ * Atheer CBR
+ * Asia Cell CBR
+ * PSTN
+ * National
+ * Infrastructure
+ * VU
+Wed 13 Sep 06 :: 12:02:52
+Real Time
+```
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
+
+## Integrated Target Database
+
+```
+RT10 Portal - Microsoft Internet Explorer
+File | Edit | View | Favorites | Tools | Help | Links RealPlayer
+Gold Miner Beta
+User Logged in as : [REDACTED] Logout from RT10
+Welcome | Events | Targets | Browse | Tools | Managers
+
+Browse Targets
+Add: Unknown Target Go
+Priority 4
+Source: Juggernaut
+Phone # Conf. 50% IMSI Conf. 50% IMEI Conf. 50% More
+E-mail Conf. 50% IP Conf. 50% MAC Addr. Conf. 50% More
+Phone # Conf. 50% Frequency Conf. 50% Serial # Conf. 50% More
+Address Conf. 50% City Conf. 50% Country Conf. 50% More
+Notes
+Cancel Add
+Expand All | Collapse all
+```
+
+| Target Name | Priority | Last Modified | Modified By | Actions |
+|-------------|----------|---------------|-------------|---------|
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]tion | Source |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | Quadraspectre |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | Goldminer |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | |
+
+```
+Done Internet
+```
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
+
+## RT10 Geospatial Integration
+
+* Logical views
+ * SORTING HAT (R62)
+ * Integrated SIGINT query
+ * Historical SIGINT reports (Innovisions Testflight)
+ * GLOBAL REACH
+ * GOLDMINER / RT10
+ * Social Relationship Clustiner (GCHQ/R62)
+ * Approximates social network analysis
+ * Uses 11 algorithms to qualitatively connect targets
+ * Analyst's Notebook and Renoir (InfoVis)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
+
+## SORTING HAT (R62)
+
+```
+SORTINGHAT GUI ["Unnamed"] (modified)
+File Edit View Tools Questions Renoir
+TOP SECRET//SI//TK//NOFORN
+
+Search Favorites
+Workspaces
+[REDACTED]
+
+DataSource status: SCRIPTINGDATASOURCE: Scripting DataSource completed successfully
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//TK//NOFORN
+
+Start | Inbox - Microsoft... | weekly_rpt_notes... | (U)Sortinghat - N... | Java Console | SORTINGHAT G... | get_all_octave.b | 10:55 AM
+```
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
+
+## Social Relationship Clustering (GCHQ/R62)
+
+### R62 Demonstrator : Social Relationship Clustering
+
+```
+12307
+154089
+2053
+6370
+165943
+71780
+4228
+317
+10876
+308
+83513
+145795
+52332
+14712
+11383
+6691
+15158
+13330
+3227
+4298
+7657
+7127
+1746
+4269
+7381
+13389
+10150
+6285
+507
+178610
+7278
+5329
+20760
+3780
+14845
+31546
+3193
+19349
+60
+1393
+16860
+692
+6333
+3247
+6320
+3243
+20076
+11142
+545
+6414
+80359
+19715
+13718
+12189
+9518
+1396
+18304
+15064
+126
+3897
+7103
+9109
+2965
+1594
+777
+5197
+2991
+16588
+18348
+677
+35499
+3981
+1435
+2930
+7
+17016
+59994
+3035
+1698
+17157
+5452
+224
+6964
+10088
+2815
+8012
+3413
+16224
+45824
+233
+222
+5410
+1247
+13954
+1262
+9648
+3648
+10685
+12235
+1476
+78175
+1043
+3218
+32260
+7642
+19
+11702
+1859
+223
+5973
+752
+12313
+2340
+9361
+27122
+6555
+759
+1101
+6029
+8580
+317
+159144
+9260
+111
+5417
+10098
+681
+1564
+42259
+6454
+83093
+24104
+8152
+13765
+262
+41104
+596
+1229
+753
+2792
+1142
+444
+2767
+27586
+19266
+19194
+6876
+871
+36262
+875
+7075
+1137
+233
+
+Scramble Shake Hidden Links Relationships External Clusters Freeze
+50+ 40 30 20 10 All
+```
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
+
+## ANB Integration (InfoVis)
+
+Renoir w/in SORTING HAT
+
+Analyst's Notebook
+
+```
+Germany
+
+TAMB THOMAS
+KEMMERER AW
+SMIRROV
+
+Ukraine
+TAM B THOMAS KEMMERER AW SMIRNOV
+* 49172540081
+* Germany
+
+B AW K EMMERER AW SPAG
+```
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
+
+## RT10 Geospatial Integration
+
+* Geospatial transform for a logical view?
+ * Single selector
+ * Last detected activity (or that within area of interest)
+ * All activity (or that within area of interest)
+ * Others: timeline view, color coded based on activity, area of interest, etc.
+ * Graph
+ * Some variation of single selector with graph overlaid
+ * Every instance of activity between two callers
+ * What transformation does the analyst expect?
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
+
+## Precise Geolocation of Handset
+
+* Increasing precision with GSM geolocation
+ * RT10 is situated at front-end
+ * More access to timing advance data
+ * Several RT10 and agency efforts
+ * Manipulate GSM infrastructure to have data from multiple cell towers
+ * SHARPFOCUS-2 (S327)
+ * TOGA (RT10 - NRO/Penn State)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
+
+## SHARPFOCUS-2 (S327)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
+
+## Automated Analysis
+
+* SORTING LEAD (R62)
+ * Characterizes GSM behavior
+ * Based on location, time-of-day, callee, etc.
+ * Identifies
+ * When target has multiple phones
+ * When target has swapped phones
+ * When target deviates in behavior
+ * Correlate DNI persona to GSM handset
+ * Enable tactical operations, tracking of DNI targets
+ * Help with internet café geolocation problem
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
+
+## DNI Correlation Example
+
+```
+Space Time Analysis
+BAGHDAD, IRAQ
+Time Inc
+30 Min
+15 Min
+05 Min
+01 Min
+Skipping
+No Skip
+Skip
+Skip -3
+
+Opacity
+
+2006.01.23 at 08:24:15
+Pause
+```
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
+
+# Questions?
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
diff --git a/data/2006-11-09-Real-Time-Overview/metadata.json b/data/2006-11-09-Real-Time-Overview/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..29d8cde
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/2006-11-09-Real-Time-Overview/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+{
+ "title": "RT10 Initiative Overview",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "Overview document for RT10, \"Real-time, distributed architecture for mobile (tactical) and fixed (national) operational environments\"",
+ "long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL presentation by Dr. James Heath on the RT10 Initiative, describing the programme before it was renamed RT-RG (Real-Time Regional Gateway). Program management credited to COL Bob Harms, COL Barb Trent and Michelle Gerhard. The document describes the architecture of the RT10 system and its Iraq deployment during SPIN 5 (October-December 2006).\n\nThe presentation frames RT10 as a response to three problems with legacy SIGINT systems: volume and convergence pushing front-end filters to their limits; latency in processing, storage and query preventing tactical support; and analyst limitations from non-integrated tools, limited collaboration and constrained knowledge bases. RT10's solution is a real-time distributed architecture bridging national and tactical environments, promising order-of-magnitude improvements in response time.\n\nThe node architecture is described in detail. GOLDMINER is the dimensional database at the core, ingesting DNR, DNI and other data alongside phoneme data and voice prints. RT10 applications include GeoT, Named Area of Interest, RaptorT, ArcGIS, SORTING HAT, SORTING LEAD, Renoir and Analyst's Notebook. The system supports inline algorithms (Dynamite), queue-fed algorithms (HLT Feed) and query-fed algorithms (SRC). VoiceRT provides alerting on spoken selectors, speaker identification, language identification and content mining.\n\nFor the Iraq SPIN 5 deployment, national GSM collection feeds from JUGGERNAUT, MATTERHORN and OBELISK, alongside billing records and precision geolocation through TDOA/FDOA emitter location. The physical infrastructure is a van-based deployable system comprising a Boot Van, Ops Van with eight user workstations and a Processing Van with up to seven server racks, powered by dual 275KW generators with automatic transfer switching and 40-ton chiller units — a self-contained tactical SIGINT processing facility.\n\nGeoT is described as a thin client similar to Google Maps and TiVo, overlaying real-time SIGINT collection on satellite imagery with named area of interest alerting and SIGINT system health monitoring showing coverage gaps. SORTING HAT integrates historical SIGINT reports from Innovisions Testflight, GLOBAL REACH and GOLDMINER for unified SIGINT querying. Social Relationship Clustering, developed jointly by GCHQ and R62, uses 11 algorithms to approximate social network analysis across collected data.\n\nSORTING LEAD characterises GSM behavioural patterns — location, time of day, callee — to identify when a target has multiple phones, has swapped phones, or has deviated from normal behaviour, and correlates DNI personas to GSM handsets to enable tracking of internet-based targets in the physical world.\n\nSHARPFOCUS-2 (S327) and TOGA (a joint RT10/NRO/Penn State effort) are named as precision GSM geolocation programmes, with RT10's front-end positioning providing access to timing advance data from multiple cell towers for increased location precision. The DNI correlation example shows space-time analysis in Baghdad at one-minute time increments.",
+ "tags": [
+ "JIATF",
+ "pattern-of-life",
+ "GSM",
+ "PSTN",
+ "internet cafes",
+ "geolocation",
+ "real-time intelligence",
+ "voice processing",
+ "voice analytics",
+ "speaker identification",
+ "language",
+ "linguistics",
+ "social networks",
+ "cell towers"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2006-11-09",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "REL"
+ ],
+ "banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL",
+ "genre": "slides",
+ "programs": [
+ "RT10",
+ "COBRA FOCUS",
+ "GREENDRAGON",
+ "GOLDMINER",
+ "JUGGERNAUT",
+ "MATTERHORN",
+ "OBELISK",
+ "SORTINGHAT",
+ "INFOVIS",
+ "SHARPFOCUS2",
+ "TOGA",
+ "SORTINGLEAD",
+ "GLOBALREACH",
+ "VOICERT",
+ "GOLDMINER",
+ "QUADRASPECTRE",
+ "RENOIR",
+ "ANALYSTSNOTEBOOK",
+ "OCTAVE",
+ "HLT",
+ "DRT",
+ "GEOT",
+ "InnoVisions"
+ ],
+ "countries": [
+ "Iraq",
+ "Korea",
+ "Argentina",
+ "Brazil",
+ "Chile",
+ "Colombia",
+ "Costa Rica",
+ "Dominican Republic",
+ "Ecuador",
+ "El Salvador",
+ "Guatemala",
+ "Honduras",
+ "Jamaica",
+ "Mexico",
+ "Panama",
+ "Peru",
+ "Germany",
+ "Ukraine"
+ ],
+ "people": [
+ "Heath, James",
+ "Harms, Bob",
+ "Trent, Barb",
+ "Gerhard, Michelle",
+ "Ross, Mark"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2018-01-19",
+ "title": "Finding Your Voice: Forget About Siri and Alexa — When It Comes to Voice Identification, the “NSA Reigns Supreme”",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2018/01/19/voice-recognition-technology-nsa/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Kofman, Ava"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2018/01/19/rt-initiative-overview/",
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/4352002/2006-11-09-Real-Time-Overview.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "c69a707467afc37f5d407e1d00ad9e1becd072c6006ce907ce16f0d0f9aadca6",
+ "pages": 23
+}
diff --git a/data/2007-02-22-NSA-Georgia-Opens-New-Audio-Forensics/2007-02-22-NSA-Georgia-Opens-New-Audio-Forensics.md b/data/2007-02-22-NSA-Georgia-Opens-New-Audio-Forensics/2007-02-22-NSA-Georgia-Opens-New-Audio-Forensics.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f902a5c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/2007-02-22-NSA-Georgia-Opens-New-Audio-Forensics/2007-02-22-NSA-Georgia-Opens-New-Audio-Forensics.md
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
+TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
+
+SIDtoday
+
+(U//FOUO) NSA Georgia Opens New Audio-Forensics Lab
+
+FROM: Marti Hix Mercer
+Chief, Corporate Communications, NSAG
+Run Date: 02/22/2007
+
+(S//SI//REL) New lab aims to help analysts fully capitalize on intercepted voice communications from our targets.
+
+(S//SI//REL) The start of the new year also saw the start of a powerful new capability at NSAG - a new audio-forensics lab funded through the Senior Language Technology Authority (SLTA). The lab -- the first of its kind anywhere within the Extended Cryptologic Enterprise -- initially will serve NSAG, with a vision toward expanding to accomodate external requests. It aims to help solve critical language processing problems confronting Language Analysts. As envisioned, the lab will provide dedicated, on-site, state-of-the-art solutions to address the problems that impair the processing of critical foreign language voice intercept.
+
+(S//SI//REL) The intent is to provide a capability to language analysts as quickly as possible and support them in the evaluation of that capability. According to [REDACTED] the lab's audio engineer, the lab is in the "early walking" phase of a crawl-walk-run approach. As the audio forensics lab at NSAG succeeds, the SLTA hopes to build similar labs at the other major regional cryptologic centers.
+
+(S//SI//REL) [REDACTED] in the audio-forensics lab
+
+(TS//SI//REL) [REDACTED] directly supports NSAG language analysts by enhancing hearability and intelligibility of audio intercepts. He does this by performing audio restoration or audio forensic analysis to help language analysts determine the content and context of high-priority GWOT*-related audio intercepts. [REDACTED] Iso works on fundamental problems associated with speech, speaker identification, age and gender determination, psychological stress in voice, speech intelligibility/comprehension, speech signal enhancement, and masking the effects of noise on speech. Specific goals of the lab are to:
+
+* Filter and enhance unintelligible/poor-quality voice intercept;
+* Assist NSAG language analysts or tactical forces with voice/speaker identification to aid in recognition of high value individuals or detainees;
+* Identify, isolate, and extract background speakers and audio sounds;
+* Develop signal databases containing speaker, context, background, and other information with the ability to index, sort, and retrieve in real time;
+* Collaborate in the analysis and processing of complex voice intercept.
+
+(S//SI//REL) The audio lab provides an unparalleled opportunity to support prototype testing and spiral development. In addition, the lab acts as a test-bed for language processing capabilities developed elsewhere. The lab will partner with the SLTA, the Research Directorate, the Human Language Technology Program Management Office, and Speech Services -- the providers of operational speech technologies ( BABBLEQUEST ) to customers across the Enterprise -- to test capabilities developed from these organizations before placing them in an operational environment.
+
+(U//FOUO) The audio lab has an open architecture so that it can readily accept new capabilities, tools, and technologies as they are developed. In addition, the lab will be net-centric so that language analysts will be able to collaborate with the lab virtually. Further, if and when similar audio labs are set up elsewhere throughout the SIGINT Enterprise, they can be networked together to leverage and utilize existing capabilities.
+
+(U//FOUO) Finally, in addition to being a fully functioning audio forensics lab, the room itself is designed to be a showcase for NSAG. Consequently, it reflects an impressive, high-tech, visually appealing environment that is pleasant to work in. [REDACTED] is very much looking forward to working with language experts throughout the Enterprise in order to increase the lab's capacity to improve the Agency's capabilities. As a plaque in the lab states, "Supporting the mission never sounded so good."
+
+(S//SI//REL) At work in the lab
+
+(U) Notes:
+\* (U) GWOT = Global War on Terrorism
+
+"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet
+without the consent of S0121 (DL sid comms)."
+
+DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
+TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
+DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/2007-02-22-NSA-Georgia-Opens-New-Audio-Forensics/metadata.json b/data/2007-02-22-NSA-Georgia-Opens-New-Audio-Forensics/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d9719c5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/2007-02-22-NSA-Georgia-Opens-New-Audio-Forensics/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+{
+ "title": "NSA Georgia Opens New Audio-Forensics Lab",
+ "type": "SIDTODAY",
+ "description": "The document discusses the launch of a new audio-forensics lab at NSAG (National Security Agency Georgia) designed to enhance the processing and analysis of intercepted voice communications. The lab, funded through the Senior Language Technology Authority (SLTA), will focus on resolving language processing challenges for language analysts by improving the intelligibility and quality of foreign-language voice intercepts.",
+ "long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY SIDToday article dated 22 February 2007, authored by Marti Hix Mercer, Chief of Corporate Communications at NSA Georgia. The article announces the opening of a new audio forensics laboratory at NSA Georgia, described as the first such facility anywhere in the Extended Cryptologic Enterprise.\n\nThe lab was funded through the Senior Language Technology Authority (SLTA) and was designed to address critical language processing problems confronting Language Analysts working on voice intercept. Its primary function is enhancing the hearability and intelligibility of poor-quality or unintelligible audio intercepts from GWOT-related collection, with the lab described as being in the \"crawl-walk-run\" early walking phase at time of writing, with a vision toward expanding to serve external requests and eventually building similar labs at other major regional cryptologic centres.\n\nThe specific capabilities of the lab span several areas: filtering and enhancing unintelligible voice intercept; speaker identification to aid recognition of high-value individuals or detainees; identifying, isolating and extracting background speakers and audio sounds; developing signal databases with real-time indexing and retrieval; and collaborating on complex voice intercept analysis. The lab's audio engineer also works on fundamental speech science problems including age and gender determination from voice, psychological stress indicators in speech, speech intelligibility and comprehension, signal enhancement and noise masking effects.\n\nThe lab was designed to function as a test-bed for language processing capabilities developed elsewhere in the enterprise before operational deployment, partnering with the SLTA, the Research Directorate, the Human Language Technology Program Management Office and Speech Services — identified as the provider of operational speech technologies under the name BABBLEQUEST. The facility has an open architecture to accept new tools as developed and a net-centric design allowing language analysts to collaborate with the lab virtually, with provision for networking with future similar labs across the enterprise.",
+ "tags": [
+ "audio forensics",
+ "NSAG",
+ "voice communications",
+ "SLTA",
+ "language analysis",
+ "language analysts",
+ "voice intercept",
+ "audio intercept",
+ "speech processing",
+ "speaker identification",
+ "age",
+ "gender"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2007-02-22",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "SI",
+ "TK"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL"
+ ],
+ "banner": "DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL",
+ "genre": "newsletter",
+ "programs": [
+ "BABBLEQUEST",
+ "HLT"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Mercer, Marti Hix"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2018-01-19",
+ "title": "Finding Your Voice: Forget About Siri and Alexa — When It Comes to Voice Identification, the “NSA Reigns Supreme”",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2018/01/19/voice-recognition-technology-nsa/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Kofman, Ava"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2018/01/19/nsa-georgia-opens-new-audio-forensics-lab/",
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/4351993/2007-02-22-NSA-Georgia-Opens-New-Audio-Forensics.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "9a3e03173cddf4e2509925da32e45ca922b58ffaf3330865a9173b463a724021",
+ "pages": 2
+}
diff --git a/data/2007-03-22-Alert-Voice-Masking-Is-Discovered-in/2007-03-22-Alert-Voice-Masking-Is-Discovered-in.md b/data/2007-03-22-Alert-Voice-Masking-Is-Discovered-in/2007-03-22-Alert-Voice-Masking-Is-Discovered-in.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..663ec67
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/2007-03-22-Alert-Voice-Masking-Is-Discovered-in/2007-03-22-Alert-Voice-Masking-Is-Discovered-in.md
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
+TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
+
+SIDtoday
+
+(TS//SI//REL) Alert: Voice Masking Is Discovered in SIGINT
+
+FROM: Adolf Cusmariu, HLT Operational Technologies (S24211), and
+[REDACTED] Deputy Chief, Levant Sunni Extremism (S2I24)
+Run Date: 03/22/2007
+
+(TS//SI//REL) Use of voice-masking devices complicate efforts to "voice ID" SIGINT targets.
+
+(TS//SI//REL) Earlier this month, Counterterrorism (S2I) Levant Sunni Extremism language
+analysts noticed that the intercepts of two prominent Al-Qai'da associated extremists in the
+Levant contained voice masking; the audio either sounded far too high, or too low in pitch.
+
+(TS//SI//REL) In one instance Saudi-based senior extremist financier Abu-Ubaydah used the
+voice-masking tool throughout his conversation dealing with his financing the travel of Yemeni
+suicide bombers to both Lebanon and Iraq. In another instance, Syria-based senior foreign
+fighter and facilitator Abu-Ghadiyah began in masked mode, went unrecognized by the
+recipient, turned the masking device off, and both had a good laugh.
+
+(TS//SI//REL) Of course, this is no laughing matter, since all efforts to identify any speaker -
+both human and automated - will fail when voice alteration is used. But why would a caller do
+this at all? Surely the recipient would also fail to recognize the speaker, so absence of this very
+human method of sound identification would only induce suspicion and mistrust. Disturbingly,
+could some terrorists be aware of efforts by SIGINT agencies to identify them by their voices and
+thus have begun to resort to masking?
+
+(TS//SI//REL) The devices used to alter voices in the few cases intercepted so far may not have
+been all that sophisticated. Simple changes in sampling rates done in mathematical software
+made the digital audiofiles sound more normal; in fact, two specific intercepts may have
+contained the same speaker. Still, automated detection of such anomalies will be difficult.
+
+(TS//SI//REL) A way to undo masking for an intended recipient would be to use the same device
+and agree on settings prior to each transmission, so that unmasking could be done near-real
+time. For example, if the sampling rates were increased by 25% to make the speaker's pitch
+sound far too low, sampling rate reduction by the same amount at the other end would return a
+normal voice. Even simpler, if only voice messaging is used, the masked recorded audio could
+be undone after playback through an (un)masking device.
+
+(TS//SI//REL) Because speaker identification services will continue to provide a key piece of the
+puzzle in tracking and capturing terrorists, voice-masking techniques need to be understood
+early. Tools developed for other intelligence applications are available and will be acquired to
+study this emerging problem.
+
+(U//FOUO) Do you have any comments on this topic? Post them on the SID today blog .
+
+"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet
+without the consent of S0121 (DL sid comms)."
+
+DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
+TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
+DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/2007-03-22-Alert-Voice-Masking-Is-Discovered-in/metadata.json b/data/2007-03-22-Alert-Voice-Masking-Is-Discovered-in/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4ab8460
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/2007-03-22-Alert-Voice-Masking-Is-Discovered-in/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+{
+ "title": "Alert: Voice Masking Is Discovered in SIGINT",
+ "type": "SIDTODAY",
+ "description": "This March 2007 post from the internal NSA newsletter SIDToday draws attention to voice-masking technology used by subjects of surveillance to frustrate the agency’s voice-recognition efforts.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [
+ "voice masking",
+ "speaker identification",
+ "Human Language Technology",
+ "speech processing",
+ "audio analysis",
+ "language analysts",
+ "surveillance countermeasures",
+ "tradecraft",
+ "counterterrorism",
+ "Al-Qaeda",
+ "sunni extremism",
+ "levant",
+ "foreign fighters",
+ "terrorism financing",
+ "target identification"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2007-03-22",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "SI"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "REL"
+ ],
+ "banner": "DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL",
+ "genre": "newsletter",
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [
+ "Saudi Arabia",
+ "Yemen",
+ "Lebanon",
+ "Iraq",
+ "Syria"
+ ],
+ "people": [
+ "Cusmariu, Adolf",
+ "Ubaydah, Abu",
+ "Ghadiyah, Abu"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2018-01-19",
+ "title": "Finding Your Voice: Forget About Siri and Alexa — When It Comes to Voice Identification, the “NSA Reigns Supreme”",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2018/01/19/voice-recognition-technology-nsa/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Kofman, Ava"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2018/01/19/alert-voice-masking-is-discovered-in-sigint/",
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/4351994/2007-03-22-Alert-Voice-Masking-Is-Discovered-in.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "pdf_sha256": "d1c9b4fbb7300732f97fe094817de3d03952b13c875c77632c789f7889506d66",
+ "pages": 1
+}
diff --git a/data/2007-07-18-sidtoday-sigint-obtains-deta-r/2007-07-18-sidtoday-sigint-obtains-deta-r.md b/data/2007-07-18-sidtoday-sigint-obtains-deta-r/2007-07-18-sidtoday-sigint-obtains-deta-r.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8ef0ff3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/2007-07-18-sidtoday-sigint-obtains-deta-r/2007-07-18-sidtoday-sigint-obtains-deta-r.md
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
+TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
+
+Welcome! Friday, 09 Nov 2012
+
+* Web search
+* Agency-all Emails
+* SID-all Emails
+* NSA Rolodex
+* SCQAWK: The SID Mailbag
+* SIDtoday Blog
+* SIDtoday Series
+* SIGINT Worldwide VTC
+
+
+* SIDtoday Article
+* Letter to the Editor
+* SIGINT-y Social Media Page
+
+(TS//SI//REL) SIGINT Obtains Details of Usama bin Laden Message to Top al-Qa'ida Leader in Iraq
+
+FROM: [REDACTED]
+Chief, Global Jihad Support Network Branch (S2I13)
+Run Date: 07/18/2007
+
+(TS//SI//REL) In late April 2007, SIGINTers uncovered a message from Usama bin Laden (UBL) intended for al-Qa'ida's #1 man in Iraq: Abu-Ayyub al-Misri. The resulting SIGINT report provided a crucial window into al-Qa'ida's strategic plans and intentions for Iraq and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
+
+(TS//SI//REL) The message shed light on UBL's mindset and revealed his knowledge of the current U.S. political situation. Much of the letter presented a timetable for the expansion of the authority of the "Islamic State of Iraq," with UBL apparently believing that they should delay until after an expected US "clash" with Iran or until the US President leaves office or loses authority in Congress. He felt that these events would leave the US in a weak position. Therefore, UBL advised Abu-Ayyub to try to prolong the war until these events took place.
+
+(U//FOUO) Abu-Ayyub al-Misri, the al-Qa'ida leader in Iraq (AFP photo)
+
+(TS//SI//REL) In addition, the letter revealed UBL's great anger towards the UAE for allowing Coalition forces to use UAE's airports and seaports. It further identified the new chief of al-Qa'ida's
+external operations as Abu-'Ubaydah al-Misri, who had been charged with directing al-Qa'ida's plans against the UAE.
+
+(TS//SI//REL) UBL's missive was dated 12 February 2007 and was passed via a communications conduit. The movement of the letter from Pakistan to Iran provided the U.S. Intelligence Community with unique insights into the communications path used by senior al-Qa'ida leaders in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan to communicate with al-Qa'ida leaders in Iran and Iraq.
+
+(TS//SI//REL) The full text of the report (3/OO/9464-07) can be found here: UBL report.
+
+(TS//SI//REL) A team of dedicated linguists and analysts in the Global Jihad Support Network Branch (S2I13) collaborated to process this key piece of traffic and partnered with their counterparts in S2I11 (Al-Qa'ida Leadership and Target Pursuit Branch) and S2I2 (CT's Middle East and Iraq Division) to ensure the production of an analytically accurate and comprehensive SIGINT intelligence report.
+
+(TS//REL) The report received rave reviews from senior U.S. policymakers, including the Vice President, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, and the Attorney General, who retained a copy of the report - a step that was described as "unprecedented."
+
+(U//FOUO) If you have specific questions or comments on this topic, please visit our homepage or contact us at DL S2I13.
+
+(U//FOUO) POC: [REDACTED], Chief/S2I13 (Global Jihad Support Network), [REDACTED]s
+
+(S) This report includes information from FBI FISA collection. Such information, and any information derived therefrom, may only be used in a U.S. legal or administrative proceeding with the advance authorization of the Attorney General. Any such recipient interested in obtaining authorization for such use in a U.S. legal or administrative proceeding should contact FBI Headquarters. Any further dissemination for any other purpose must be made through NSA. Any reproduction, dissemination, or communication (including, but not limited to, oral briefings) of this information must be accompanied by these restrictions.
+
+Comments/Suggestions about this article?
+
+"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)."
+Information Owner: [REDACTED] S0121, [REDACTED], (email)
+Page Publisher: [REDACTED], S0121, [REDACTED], (email)
+Last Modified: 11/09/2012 / Last Reviewed: 11/09/2012
+
+DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
+TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
+DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/2007-07-18-sidtoday-sigint-obtains-deta-r/metadata.json b/data/2007-07-18-sidtoday-sigint-obtains-deta-r/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f545200
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/2007-07-18-sidtoday-sigint-obtains-deta-r/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+{
+ "title": "SIGINT Obtains Details of Usama bin Laden Message to Top al-Qa'ida Leader in Iraq",
+ "type": "SIDTODAY",
+ "description": "A 2007 NSA SIDtoday article describing how SIGINT analysts intercepted and decoded a message from Osama bin Laden to al-Qaeda's leader in Iraq, revealing bin Laden's strategic thinking on the Iraq war, his anger toward the UAE, and the communications pathway used by senior al-Qaeda figures between Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq.",
+ "long_description": "This internal NSA SIDtoday article, originally published July 18, 2007, describes a significant SIGINT collection success by the Global Jihad Support Network Branch (S2I13): the interception and analysis of a letter written by Osama bin Laden on February 12, 2007, addressed to Abu-Ayyub al-Misri, al-Qaeda's senior leader in Iraq. The letter provided analysts with direct insight into bin Laden's strategic calculus at the time, revealing that he believed the U.S. was likely to enter a military confrontation with Iran, or that the sitting president would lose congressional authority — either of which he expected would leave the U.S. weakened and distracted. On this basis, bin Laden advised al-Misri to prolong the Iraq conflict and delay expanding the authority of the \"Islamic State of Iraq\" until one of these events materialized, offering a rare window into al-Qaeda's long-range strategic patience and its reading of U.S. domestic politics.\n\nThe letter also revealed bin Laden's strong anger toward the United Arab Emirates for permitting Coalition forces to use UAE airports and seaports, and identified Abu-Ubaydah al-Misri as the newly appointed chief of al-Qaeda's external operations, tasked with directing plans against the UAE. Beyond its content, the interception was operationally valuable for what it revealed about al-Qaeda's communications infrastructure: the letter's movement from Pakistan through Iran to Iraq exposed a previously documented communications conduit used by senior al-Qaeda figures in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan to reach leadership in Iran and Iraq. The report was produced collaboratively by S2I13 alongside the Al-Qaeda Leadership and Target Pursuit Branch (S2I11) and CT's Middle East and Iraq Division (S2I2).\n\nThe article notes the report received unusually strong reception among senior U.S. policymakers — including the Vice President, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Attorney General, the last of whom retained a personal copy in what was described as an \"unprecedented\" step. A footnote discloses that the report incorporates FBI FISA collection, restricting its use in legal proceedings to cases where the Attorney General has granted advance authorization — a detail that underscores the legal sensitivities surrounding the sourcing of even high-profile counterterrorism intelligence.",
+ "tags": [
+ "UBL",
+ "Al-Qaeda",
+ "Islamic State of Iraq",
+ "UAE",
+ "FATA",
+ "communications interception",
+ "counterterrorism",
+ "strategic intelligence",
+ "military intelligence",
+ "policymaker reporting",
+ "internal newsletter",
+ "Global Jihad Support Network",
+ "linguists",
+ "intelligence reporting",
+ "Vice President",
+ "Attorney General",
+ "coalition forces",
+ "iraq war"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2007-07-18",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "SI"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "REL"
+ ],
+ "banner": "DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL",
+ "genre": "newsletter",
+ "programs": [
+ "SCQAWK"
+ ],
+ "countries": [
+ "Iraq",
+ "United Arab Emirates",
+ "Iran",
+ "Pakistan"
+ ],
+ "people": [
+ "bin Laden, Osama",
+ "al-Masri, Abu Ayyub"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2015-05-18",
+ "title": "What the Snowden Files Say About the Osama Bin Laden Raid",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2015/05/18/snowden-osama-bin-laden-raid/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Currier, Cora",
+ "Fishman, Andrew",
+ "Williams, Margot"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2015/05/18/2007-sidtoday-bin-laden-message/",
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2082576/2007-07-18-sidtoday-sigint-obtains-deta-r.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "6e43928eb443f163395cd203f469078e6a76da6740d09536b42671ceede20bd5",
+ "pages": 2
+}
diff --git a/data/2007-10-06-Tips-for-a-Successful-Quick-Reaction/2007-10-06-Tips-for-a-Successful-Quick-Reaction.md b/data/2007-10-06-Tips-for-a-Successful-Quick-Reaction/2007-10-06-Tips-for-a-Successful-Quick-Reaction.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..782cd0c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/2007-10-06-Tips-for-a-Successful-Quick-Reaction/2007-10-06-Tips-for-a-Successful-Quick-Reaction.md
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20320108
+
+SIDtoday
+
+Friday, October 26, 2007
+
+(U//FOUO) Tips for a Successful Quick Reaction Capability
+
+by [REDACTED]
+
+(U) Collaboration is a way to get the job done.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Collaboration is key when you are tasked with a high priority, labor-intensive project. When the Iran Government Branch (S2E41) and the Iran Leadership Branch (S2E43) were asked to participate in a Quick Reaction Capability (QRC) for Iranian President Ahmadi-Nejad's late September 2007 trip to New York, we went into action to coordinate an effective approach to the task. In our case, QRC meant a short-term increase in special collection to provide time-sensitive information to a defined customer set. Fortunately, we were not new to QRCs, and our experience has taught us the value of collaboration. **We had learned the three most important tips for successfully carrying out a QRC: plan ahead, delegate, and share.**
+
+(U) Plan Ahead
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In response to the QRC request, we immediately began to coordinate across the division with the efforts of various other partner offices throughout the Agency as well as with other Intelligence Community agencies. To prepare, S2E41, S2E43, the BLARNEY office, and Tailored Access Operations began working with Oversight and Compliance and the Office of General Counsel to ready the necessary legal documents and obtain authorization for special FISA collection on the Iranian delegation during their stay in New York for the 62nd United Nations General Assembly.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Concurrently with obtaining the “ok” for the special collection, we had to ensure that the proper procedures would be in place to be able to efficiently tackle the anticipated influx of traffic. The Human Language Technology (HLT – S23) office provided numerous technologies to aid in the coverage:
+* Speech Activity Detection was run on all incoming traffic to help identify cuts with little-to-no speech to prevent our having to listen to dead air.
+* Speaker Identification was run to help pinpoint people of significant interest, including the Iranian Foreign Minister.
+* VoiceRt phonetic keyword searches were developed and run to help uncover key target information, such as the passing of email addresses and discussion of prominent individuals.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20320108
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20320108
+
+(TS//SI//NF) One of the branch's senior language analysts, an Excel spreadsheet guru, put together a detailed list of all 143 delegates, including not only their names and positions in the Iranian government, but their passport numbers, dates of birth and more. In addition, she included the Iranian President's and Foreign Minister's schedules. Collection information and identifications of the various hotel rooms and cell phones were also updated as soon as they were discovered. The analyst kept it updated throughout the day and provided it to everyone involved with the QRC, including the FBI.
+
+(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Meanwhile, language analysts from S2E41, S2E43, and S23 combined forces to take on the challenges of the significantly increased collection. The voice language analysts relied on one senior voice language analyst who had a knack for finding the way to best organize the traffic using NUCLEON.
+
+(U) Delegate
+
+(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) With a limited number of resources and an abundance of traffic to scan, we had to find a way to divide the work so that nothing was missed or duplicated. We were scanning approximately 2000 voice cuts a day, so organization and delegation were key. The team chief created MORPHEON rules, shared queries, shared filters, and tabs to organize and search the voice traffic. The team agreed to divide the traffic by using the filters and creating tab groups in addition to using color-coding, and a limited set of NUCLEON dispositions, e.g., if the SRI (signal-related information) data for a voice cut was red, it meant “to do,” and if blue it was “new,” and if black it had “already been done.” That way, no matter what query or filter a language analyst was using, everyone else could “see” what had been done and what was still left to do.
+
+(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Some analysts scanned and prioritized while others transcribed and gisted...everyone moved between the two jobs throughout the day as needed. This method made for very efficient scanning, which is paramount when five or six language analysts are working the same traffic at the same time.
+
+(U) Share
+
+(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) All the language analysts kept in contact throughout the day and passed on their findings, analyses and highlights via email, phone and often impromptu gatherings. With the group working extended hours, from 0400-2300, the last analyst to leave would gather together the highlights from that day's findings and share it with the other offices involved. Sharing was crucial because no two language analysts scanned the same traffic, so we had to collaborate in order to provide the most comprehensive information to the customers.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20320108
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20320108
+
+*(U) The Iranian President signs a guest book at the UN, September 24, 2007 (Reuters)*
+
+(U) Results
+
+(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Our QRC efforts had several positive outcomes:
+
+1. The discovery of several new Iranian Foreign Ministry and leadership leads.
+2. Several reports on topics ranging from Ahmadi-Nejad's sentiments about his speech at Columbia University to last minute plans for the delegation to go to Latin America.
+3. Several language analysts are now working with the Social Network Analysis office to better understand the connections between many of the Foreign Ministry and Leadership delegates.
+
+(U//FOUO) Although we are still delving into all of the data gleaned from the QRC, and there are still many uncertainties, one sure thing is it would not have been nearly as successful without the collaborative spirit.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20320108
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/2007-10-06-Tips-for-a-Successful-Quick-Reaction/metadata.json b/data/2007-10-06-Tips-for-a-Successful-Quick-Reaction/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6f07b9d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/2007-10-06-Tips-for-a-Successful-Quick-Reaction/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+{
+ "title": "Tips for a Successful Quick Reaction Capability",
+ "type": "SIDTODAY",
+ "description": "In response to Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s 2007 visit to New York, the NSA’s Iran Government and Leadership branches launched a Quick Reaction Capability (QRC) to gather time-sensitive intelligence. The QRC focused on enhanced collection techniques, collaboration across departments, and efficient data management to analyze the extensive communications traffic during the event, resulting in valuable leads on Iranian leadership activities and diplomatic plans.",
+ "long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN SIDToday article dated 26 October 2007. It describes a Quick Reaction Capability (QRC) operation conducted jointly by the Iran Government Branch (S2E41), Iran Leadership Branch (S2E43) and the Human Language Technology office (S23) against the Iranian presidential delegation during Ahmadi-Nejad's late September 2007 visit to New York for the 62nd UN General Assembly.\n\nThe legal preparation is documented in notable detail. S2E41, S2E43, the BLARNEY office and Tailored Access Operations worked with NSA's Oversight and Compliance and the Office of General Counsel to obtain FISA authorisation for special collection on the Iranian delegation during their stay in New York — confirming that FISA authority was obtained for surveillance of a foreign head of state's delegation on US soil, with the collection shared with the FBI.\n\nThe Human Language Technology office provided three automated processing capabilities to handle the volume of collection. Speech Activity Detection filtered incoming traffic to remove cuts with little or no speech. Speaker Identification was used to pinpoint persons of interest including the Iranian Foreign Minister. VoiceRt phonetic keyword searches were developed to uncover key target information including the passing of email addresses and discussion of prominent individuals.\n\nThe analytical preparation included a spreadsheet compiled by a senior language analyst covering all 143 members of the Iranian delegation — including names, government positions, passport numbers, dates of birth, hotel room assignments, cell phone numbers and schedule information for the President and Foreign Minister — updated continuously and shared with all QRC participants including the FBI. At peak the operation processed approximately 2,000 voice cuts per day, managed through NUCLEON with MORPHEON rules, shared queries, filters, tab groups and a colour-coded disposition system to coordinate five or six simultaneous language analysts without duplication.\n\nThe results included discovery of new Iranian Foreign Ministry and leadership leads, reports on topics ranging from Ahmadi-Nejad's sentiments about his Columbia University speech to last-minute plans for a Latin American trip, and social network analysis work to map connections between Foreign Ministry and leadership delegates.\n\nIn plain terms this document describes NSA obtaining court authorisation to spy on a foreign president and his entire 143-person delegation while they were on US soil for a UN meeting — intercepting their phone calls, tracking their hotel rooms, and sharing the intelligence with the FBI. The collection of passport numbers and dates of birth for all 143 delegates goes well beyond communications intelligence into the territory of comprehensive personal surveillance of a foreign government delegation on American territory.",
+ "tags": [
+ "QRC",
+ "Tailored Access Operations",
+ "OGC",
+ "collaboration",
+ "intelligence collection",
+ "FISA",
+ "united nations",
+ "Human Language Technology",
+ "voice analytics",
+ "language analysts",
+ "social network analysis",
+ "speech activity detection",
+ "speaker identification",
+ "phonetic keywords",
+ "Foreign Ministry",
+ "leadership delegates",
+ "diplomats"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2007-10-26",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20320108",
+ "genre": "newsletter",
+ "programs": [
+ "BLARNEY",
+ "NUCLEON",
+ "MORPHEON",
+ "HLT",
+ "VOICERT"
+ ],
+ "countries": [
+ "Iran"
+ ],
+ "people": [
+ "Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud",
+ "Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2018-01-19",
+ "title": "Finding Your Voice: Forget About Siri and Alexa — When It Comes to Voice Identification, the “NSA Reigns Supreme”",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2018/01/19/voice-recognition-technology-nsa/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Kofman, Ava"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2018/01/19/tips-for-a-successful-quick-reaction-capability/",
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/4351995/2007-10-06-Tips-for-a-Successful-Quick-Reaction.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "7c41d5e47d820bea5d91ccf913c84f94c2f15f9297c20f66785fcfe8cec7ebd4",
+ "pages": 3
+}
diff --git a/data/2008-05-16-SIDToday-Perseverance-Pays-Off/2008-05-16-SIDToday-Perseverance-Pays-Off.md b/data/2008-05-16-SIDToday-Perseverance-Pays-Off/2008-05-16-SIDToday-Perseverance-Pays-Off.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..306432a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/2008-05-16-SIDToday-Perseverance-Pays-Off/2008-05-16-SIDToday-Perseverance-Pays-Off.md
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
+TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
+
+SIDtoday
+
+(S//SI/REL) Perseverance Pays Off: Eight-Year SIGINT Effort Culminates in Arrest of Elusive Colombian Terrorist
+
+FROM: [REDACTED]
+NSA Texas Transnational Crime and Narcotics (FTS2F2)
+Run Date: 05/16/2008
+
+(S//SI//REL) SIGINTers have targeted Doris Adriana for 8 years; since 2004, they haveissued nearly 800 reports about her activities as a key member of the FARC Colombian terrorist group.Recently SIGINT provided actionable intelligence that resulted in her arrest...
+
+Doris Adriana
+(S//SI//REL) After 20 years as a member of the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), Nancy Conde Rubio (pictured), alias Doris Adriana, was arrested on 16 February 2008 while crossing the border from Venezuela into Colombia. NSA/CSS Texas (NSAT) Transnational Crime and Narcotics (TCN) division produced intelligence that directly contributed to the arrest of Adriana, the logistics and weapons coordinator for the FARC's 1st Front.
+
+(S//SI//REL) She was also reportedly the girlfriend of FARC 1st Front Commander "Cesar," who is reputed to be holding
+numerous high-value hostages, including three US citizens and former Colombian presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt. Adriana, a member of the FARC since the age of 16, is wanted by the U.S. on charges of cocaine trafficking and the kidnapping of the three U.S. hostages. According to Colombian authorities, Adriana took over the 1st Front's narcotrafficking activities after the arrest (and extradition to the US) of another prominent FARC member. Adriana has been a TCN target for the past eight years, and nearly 800 SIGINT reports have been published on her activities since January 2004.
+
+(S//SI//REL) NSAT/TCN discovered that Adriana was traveling from Venezuela to Colombia and produced a report indicating she would be crossing the border without valid paperwork. This actionable intelligence was provided to the Bogotá Embassy Intelligence Fusion Cell (EIFC), which was then able (through the foreign release process) to hand the information off to Colombian military forces. **TCN's reporting on the target gave Colombian authorities 24 hours of advance notice that Adriana would be attempting a border crossing, critical intelligence needed to bring her into custody.** With her successful capture, TCN is now observing FARC units experiencing logistical difficulties and shortages in food, ammunition
+and other supplies.
+
+(U//FOUO) POC: [REDACTED]
+
+"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121
+(DL sid_comms)."
+
+DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
+TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
+DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/2008-05-16-SIDToday-Perseverance-Pays-Off/metadata.json b/data/2008-05-16-SIDToday-Perseverance-Pays-Off/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a41e7d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/2008-05-16-SIDToday-Perseverance-Pays-Off/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+{
+ "title": "Perseverance Pays Off: Eight-Year SIGINT Effort Culminates in Arrest of Elusive Colombian Terrorist",
+ "type": "SIDTODAY",
+ "description": "In 2008, SIGINT from NSA Texas led to the arrest of Doris Adriana, a key FARC member, after eight years of surveillance. NSA's actionable intelligence provided Colombian authorities with crucial details about her border crossing from Venezuela, resulting in her capture and subsequent prosecution for cocaine trafficking and kidnapping U.S. citizens.",
+ "long_description": "This is a SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY SIDToday article dated 16 May 2008, authored by NSA Texas Transnational Crime and Narcotics (FTS2F2). It describes the arrest of Nancy Conde Rubio, alias Doris Adriana, as a direct result of NSA SIGINT collection and reporting.\n\nAdriana was the logistics and weapons coordinator for the FARC's 1st Front and had been a SIGINT target for eight years, with nearly 800 SIGINT reports published on her activities since January 2004. She was also reportedly the girlfriend of FARC 1st Front Commander \"Cesar,\" who was holding several high-value hostages including three US citizens and former Colombian presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt. She had been a FARC member since the age of 16 and was wanted in the US on charges of cocaine trafficking and the kidnapping of the three American hostages.\n\nThe actionable intelligence that led to her arrest was produced by NSA/CSS Texas Transnational Crime and Narcotics division, which discovered Adriana was traveling from Venezuela to Colombia without valid paperwork and produced a report providing 24 hours advance notice of her planned border crossing. This intelligence was passed to the Bogotá Embassy Intelligence Fusion Cell, which used the foreign release process to hand it to Colombian military forces, who arrested her on 16 February 2008. Following her arrest NSA observed FARC units experiencing logistical difficulties and shortages in food, ammunition and other supplies — confirming her operational significance to the organisation.\n\nThe document illustrates the end-to-end intelligence-to-arrest pipeline in a transnational crime and counterterrorism context: sustained long-term SIGINT targeting, actionable intelligence production, foreign release authorisation, Embassy Intelligence Fusion Cell coordination and foreign military action — all within a 24-hour window.",
+ "tags": [
+ "farc",
+ "NSAT",
+ "TCN",
+ "narcotics",
+ "Bogotá",
+ "EIFC",
+ "border crossing",
+ "terrorism",
+ "border security",
+ "drugs"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2008-05-16",
+ "classification": [
+ "SECRET",
+ "SI"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "REL"
+ ],
+ "banner": "DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL",
+ "genre": "newsletter",
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [
+ "Colombia",
+ "Venezuela"
+ ],
+ "people": [
+ "Adriana, Doris",
+ "Rubio, Nancy Conde",
+ "Betancourt, Ingrid"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2017-11-30",
+ "title": "NSA Secretly Helped Convict Defendants in U.S. Courts, Classified Documents Reveal",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2017/11/30/nsa-surveillance-fisa-section-702/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Aaronson, Trevor"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [
+ "Williams, Margot",
+ "Cooper, Talya"
+ ],
+ "doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2017/11/30/sidtoday-perseverance-pays-off-eight-year-sigint-effort-culminates-in-arrest-of-elusive-colombian-terrorist/",
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/4310980/2008-05-16-SIDToday-Perseverance-Pays-Off.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "pdf_sha256": "da4c7e8f25d125edac820e781375e45333180c257ddfaa865ee933046c164c69",
+ "pages": 1
+}
diff --git a/data/2008-07-30-SIDToday-New-RT-RG-Overview-Video/2008-07-30-SIDToday-New-RT-RG-Overview-Video.md b/data/2008-07-30-SIDToday-New-RT-RG-Overview-Video/2008-07-30-SIDToday-New-RT-RG-Overview-Video.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a46507f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/2008-07-30-SIDToday-New-RT-RG-Overview-Video/2008-07-30-SIDToday-New-RT-RG-Overview-Video.md
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
+TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
+
+SIDtoday
+
+(U) New RT-RG Overview Video Available on NSANet
+
+FROM: Corporate Communications, Meade Operations Center (F74)
+Run Date: 07/30/2008
+
+(U//FOUO) If you have heard of the Real-Time Regional Gateway (RT-RG) initiative and want to learn more about it, you are in luck! The Meade Operations Center Dragon TAMERS have created a 10-minute overview video that is available on your desktop. The video outlines RT-RG's goals, capabilities, and benefits. It was created in response to the intense community-wide interest in the RT-RG tool suite and high demand for briefings and demonstrations of the tools and their application.
+
+(U//FOUO) Now personnel throughout the Enterprise can access this information at their convenience, and refer back to it as needed. The video can also serve as a preparation for NETA-2014 ("RT-RG Tool Suite for GSM Analysis"), to help students gain a context for what they will learn in class.
+
+(U//FOUO) For those who require more in-depth knowledge, the Dragon TAMERS have training videos for several of the RT-RG tools (GEO-T, Goldminer, SharkFinn, and SORTINGLEAD). These videos can provide review and reinforcement following NETA-2014, or serve as initial training on the tool suite.
+
+(U) A Brief Summary
+
+(S//SI//REL) RT-RG, formerly called RT-10, is a suite of tools that provides the forward-deployed analyst access to near-real-time metadata and reporting to better support the tactical customer. The tools are web-based for easy access, employ the "find-fix-finish" concept of honing in on a target, and are exponentially faster than traditional analytic tools, enabling expeditionary cryptologists to provide useful products to the customer within a commander's decision cycle. The Dragon TAMERS team is an operational test bed for RT-RG tools, providing valuable feedback to the software developers and training analysts throughout the Enterprise in their use.
+
+(U) Recent Initiatives
+
+* (S//SI//REL) RT-RG is now operational in Afghanistan. VOICESAIL and GSM collection is getting into both theatres' servers, and developers are currently working on models to include push-to-talk radio collection in the Afghanistan system.
+* (TS//SI//REL) Additional tools have been developed, and improvements have been made to existing tools -- e.g., SORTINGLEAD has increased functionality for DTMF (dual-tone multiple frequency) analysis.
+* (S//SI//REL) VoiceRT\* upgrades include DTMF tipping, automatic tipping of specified terms of interest, and speaker identification, which will soon be able to find new voice cuts for a target that match the target's past recordings.
+* (U) RT-RG training has been formalized in NETA-2014, and students will receive National Cryptologic School credit for completing this course.
+
+(U//FOUO) To watch the RT-RG overview or any of the training videos, click here or type "go dragontamers" in your web browser. (If you have trouble accessing these links, click on RT-RG Overview Video.)
+
+(S//SI//REL) For previous SIDtoday reporting on RT-RG and the Dragon TAMERS, see How Does the MOC Contribute to RT10?.
+
+(U) Notes:
+
+* (S//SI//REL) VoiceRT indexes, tags, and searches intercepted voice to enable analysts to find relevant cuts and sort through much larger amounts of traffic based on content.
+
+"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)."
+
+DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
+TOP SECRET // SI // TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
+DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASIFY ON: 20320108
diff --git a/data/2008-07-30-SIDToday-New-RT-RG-Overview-Video/metadata.json b/data/2008-07-30-SIDToday-New-RT-RG-Overview-Video/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..267dfe2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/2008-07-30-SIDToday-New-RT-RG-Overview-Video/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+{
+ "title": "New RT-RG Overview Video Available on NSANet",
+ "type": "SIDTODAY",
+ "description": "The NSA's Meade Operations Center released a 10-minute video overview of the Real-Time Regional Gateway (RT-RG), a tool suite designed for forward-deployed analysts. The suite enables faster access to real-time metadata and reporting, improving tactical support for military operations, with new functionalities being developed for use in Afghanistan and beyond.",
+ "long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY SIDToday article dated 30 July 2008, authored by Corporate Communications at the Meade Operations Center (F74). The article announces the availability of a new overview video for the Real-Time Regional Gateway (RT-RG) tool suite, created by the Meade Operations Center Dragon TAMERS team in response to high community demand for briefings and demonstrations.\n\nRT-RG, formerly known as RT-10, is described as a suite of web-based tools providing forward-deployed analysts access to near-real-time metadata and reporting to support tactical military customers. The tools employ a \"find-it-firstest\" concept and are described as exponentially faster than traditional analytic tools, enabling expeditionary cryptologists to produce useful intelligence products within a commander's decision cycle. The Dragon TAMERS team functions as an operational test bed for RT-RG tools, providing feedback to developers and training analysts across the enterprise.\n\nThe recent initiatives section documents the operational status of RT-RG at time of writing. The suite was operational in Afghanistan, with VOICESAIL and GSM collection feeding into theatre servers, and developers working on models to include push-to-talk radio collection. SORTINGLEAD had received increased functionality for DTMF (dual-tone multiple frequency) analysis. VoiceRT upgrades included DTMF tipping, automatic tipping on specified terms of interest, and speaker identification capable of finding new voice cuts matching a target's past recordings. Training had been formalised in NETA-2014 with National Cryptologic School credit awarded on completion.\n\nThe article references four named RT-RG tools available as training videos: GEO-T, Goldminer, SharkFinn and SORTINGLEAD. VoiceRT is separately defined in a footnote as a system that indexes, tags and searches intercepted voice to enable analysts to find relevant cuts and sort through large traffic volumes based on content.",
+ "tags": [
+ "Maede Operations Center",
+ "Dragon TAMERS",
+ "tool suite",
+ "real-time metadata",
+ "tactical support",
+ "GSM",
+ "DTMF",
+ "NETA"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2008-07-30",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "SI"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "REL"
+ ],
+ "banner": "DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL",
+ "genre": "newsletter",
+ "programs": [
+ "RT-RG",
+ "GEO-T",
+ "GOLDMINER",
+ "SORTINGLEAD",
+ "VOICESAIL",
+ "VOICERT",
+ "SHARKFINN",
+ "RT10"
+ ],
+ "countries": [
+ "Afghanistan"
+ ],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2018-01-19",
+ "title": "Finding Your Voice: Forget About Siri and Alexa — When It Comes to Voice Identification, the “NSA Reigns Supreme”",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2018/01/19/voice-recognition-technology-nsa/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Kofman, Ava"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2018/01/19/sidtoday-real-time-regional-gateway-overview/",
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/4351996/2008-07-30-SIDToday-New-RT-RG-Overview-Video.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "1adaea65f41cee593b3cac771480331113216c408ff770462595fc3a8e8d9961",
+ "pages": 2
+}
diff --git a/data/2008-09-03-SIDToday-Longest-Shifts-Working/2008-09-03-SIDToday-Longest-Shifts-Working.md b/data/2008-09-03-SIDToday-Longest-Shifts-Working/2008-09-03-SIDToday-Longest-Shifts-Working.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7557529
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/2008-09-03-SIDToday-Longest-Shifts-Working/2008-09-03-SIDToday-Longest-Shifts-Working.md
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
+TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
+
+SIDtoday
+
+(U) Longest Shifts: Working Overtime in Pursuit of SIGINT (part 2: conclusion)
+
+FROM: the SIDtoday Editor
+
+Run Date: 09/03/2008
+
+(U) To mark Labor Day, SIDtoday asked its readers to tell us about the longest shift they ever worked. On Friday we presented part one of the submissions we received; here's part two:
+
+(U//FOUO) Submitted by [REDACTED]
+
+(S//REL) When I was still in the Air Force, I was a member of an NSOC Special Support Activity (SSA) team that was assigned to Joint Task Force - South at Fort Clayton, Panama, during Operation Just Cause [the US intervention in Panama] in December 1989 [see background]. Our team included three analysts and two comms maintainers. One of our team members, [REDACTED] had to go over to a U.S. Army SIGINT facility on the other side of Panama the morning before the U.S. operation began and didn't make it back to Fort Clayton in time for H-Hour. The other team member was [REDACTED] and the two of us worked at least 48 hours straight beginning about 12 hours before the operation kicked off and through the first two days and nights. We were, needless to say, very busy.
+
+(S//REL) After a while, it all became a blur and we eventually had to be ordered to get some sleep. I slept on the floor of an empty office in my sleeping bag for just four hours and woke up feeling very refreshed. I then worked 36 more hours before sleeping again. At that point, reinforcements from the SSA arrived and [REDACTED] returned from his own exciting side-trip, so we finally settled into a much more normal 12-on, 12-off schedule. I was much younger then and I can't even imagine doing something like that now.
+
+(U//FOUO) Submitted by [REDACTED]
+
+(S//REL) Back in late 2001, I was deployed to Tuzla, Bosnia, as part of Operation Joint Forge. I was the NSA Rep to the intelligence section of the Multinational Division North command, part of SFOR [Stabilization Force]-10. The unit in charge was the 29th Infantry Division (Light), a Maryland/Virginia National Guard unit, and then-Major General H Steven Blum (now chief of the National Guard Bureau) was the commanding General.
+
+(S//REL) Earlier that year, 6 members of the Algerian-based Armed Islamic Group (GIA) had been taken into custody by the Bosnian government for surveilling the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo, and for planning an attack against it. However, because much of the evidence against them came from U.S. intel, the Bosnian government didn't have access to it, and after a couple of months in custody, the six prisoners were scheduled to be released without trial. The U.S. did not want to let them go back into the general population (all had come to Bosnia as foreign fighters against the Serbs, and had married Bosnian women and remained after the war ended), however, and so MG Blum and his staff planned to take the prisoners into U.S. custody as soon as they were released by the Bosnians. The prisoners would be taken from Sarajevo up to Tuzla, normally a 2-to-4-hour trip (depending on road conditions and the amount of traffic). MG Blum wanted SIGINT coverage of the trip to ensure that no attempts were made to ambush the convoy carrying the prisoners.
+
+(S//SI//REL) My normal day had started, as usual, at 0530 in order to prepare for the 0630 morning intel brief. The prisoners were scheduled for release late in the afternoon, but the actual release was delayed for several hours due to a large demonstration outside the building they were being held in. The convoy did not leave Sarajevo until after midnight. They then decided, for security reasons, to take an alternate route to Tuzla. This trip ended up taking about 8 or so hours, before they safely arrived at Eagle Base. I remained on duty, in contact with Bad Aibling and NSA-Texas (then called Medina RSOC), who were covering the convoy movement, until about 1000 [the next day], when I finally stumbled off to bed.
+
+(U) The "gentlemen" in question are still guests of the U.S. Government, at Guantanamo Bay.
+
+(U//FOUO) Submitted by [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//REL) While on TDY to Lahore, Pakistan, on an F6 assignment, I served for quite some time as the lone Intelligence Analyst at site, located at the U.S. Consulate. Given the high-priority of the SIGINT mission in Pakistan, it was not uncommon to work about 10-12 hours a day during the week, and slightly less on weekends. The days always seemed to go by rather quickly, with lots of scanning and reporting to do. And given the security situation in Pakistan and the relevant restrictions, there wasn't much else to do other than work.
+
+(TS//SI//REL) However, the various threats to Pakistan's internal and external security would often necessitate a few extra hours spent on the job, with customers asking for the quickest and latest updates on certain events. One day in particular turned out to be much longer than anticipated. On 2 June 2008, terrorists attacked the Danish Embassy in Islamabad with a car bomb, killing at least five people and wounding about 25 others. As soon as the news of this bombing hit the airwaves (thanks, CNN!) we immediately began looking for reflections in traffic.
+
+(TS//SI//REL) Just before our scheduled return to the hotel in the evening, our exceptional voice linguist stumbled upon some police communications relaying the casualty report garnered from hospitals around Islamabad. Since the details of the bombings and fatalities were still hazy at this point, any SIGINT was considered valuable, especially since it just so happened that a Danish SIGINT delegation happened to be visiting Ft. Meade for briefings with S2A42, the Pakistan Shop. After receiving the voice transcript, I quickly drafted a First Instance Report (FIR) and then contacted the S2A42 analysts. The report was sanitized for release to Danish 3rd Party partners and was well-received, in addition to other SIGINT reports written across the SIGINT enterprise. By the time my nerves had returned to normal levels, it was about 2100. It had been about 14 hours. Definitely my longest day at the office, but probably my most rewarding as well.
+
+(U//FOUO) Submitted by [REDACTED]
+
+(S//REL) Without doubt, the longest day I worked at NSA in my 22 years was dayshift in NSOC on 9/11/01 (not in time, but in stress). I was assigned to the Transnational Issues Desk (TRAN) Team 5, on the NSOC watchfloor. I and all my team members watched with disbelief on the NSOC TV as the second hijacked airliner hit the tower. TRAN desk was responsible at the time for interaction with FAA [the Federal Aviation Administration] and Cheyenne Mountain [where NORAD is located], who both reported to me that an airliner was headed for NSA, with the hijack transponder on (turned out to be a mistake). So, between the threat of an airliner hitting NSA (getting 10-minute position updates from FAA and knowing that we in NSOC were unable to leave!) and the incredible number of rumors, circular reporting and coincidences that occurred that day (to include a helicopter crash in Baltimore City!), it turned out to be the very longest day by far of my NSA career!! Even the invasion of Iraq in 2003 pales in comparison!!
+
+(U//FOUO) Blizzards and tropical storms have also caused MANY shiftworkers (including me!) much overtime, but even those don't compare to 9/11/01!
+
+*(U) Editor's note: Here's the same event from a different perspective -- that of someone working in the Pentagon on 9/11:*
+
+(U//FOUO) Submitted by [REDACTED]
+
+(U//FOUO) It wasn't my longest shift in terms of time, but in every other way, my day watch at the Pentagon on 9/11 was certainly the most interesting. The day watch began at 4:30 AM and by 8:15, everyone had the twin tower on their TV, watching the fire. It wasn't until the second plane hit the Pentagon that the floor began to buzz. I was speaking to the NSA Rep to the FBI in New York the very moment the second plane hit the second tower. "This was no accident," the words being spoken by both of us at about the same time, and we hung up.
+
+(U//FOUO) Soon afterwards, I got a phone call from the wife of one of my soldiers asking if we were ok, and I said, "Yes, why?" She proceeded to tell me the Pentagon was just hit by a plane. In our office, no one knew it or felt it. There are many "mini-stories" on that day at the NMJIC [the National Military Joint Intelligence Center at the Pentagon]. The folks on the floor remained very professional, making all the right calls, and staying calm and collected. While there was panic elsewhere in the Pentagon with people evacuating, the folks at the NMJIC stayed the course throughout the entire day.
+
+(U//FOUO) Finally, around 10 PM, relief came and my crew and I left the Pentagon. One of my soldiers and I sat outside on the wall, listening to the dead silence and looking at the smoke coming from the other side of the Pentagon. Reagan Airport is normally busy with flights at all hours, yet, this night, there was nothing but silence. We sat there and reflected on that day, and I don't think it really hit either of us until the next day. Althought it wasn't my longest shift in terms of time, it was assuredly a long day...
+
+(U//FOUO) Submitted by [REDACTED]
+
+(U) In February 2003, I was the senior person on a desk in NSOC and was scheduled to work the 8 hour day shift on the day a major snow storm was predicted to hit the area. That morning, the snow was already falling as I drove to work, and I fully anticipated having to stay extended hours. Before my shift was over, I called the person who was scheduled to relieve me for the swing shift, who lived in the general area, and told him not to bother trying to get to work, because of the current conditions. Eight hours later, I made a similar call to the person who was scheduled to work the mid shift, who lived on the Eastern Shore, because there had been no abatement in the storm. Eight hours later, I worked the second 8 hour day shift for which I was scheduled.
+
+(U) After working four consecutive 8 hour shifts, for a total of 32 hours, I was as tired as the four or so other people in NSOC who had been there as long as I had been. However, I got a call from the person who was scheduled to work the swing shift, saying that the access from his cul de sac to the street had not been plowed and he would not be able to make it to work. So, as all the other people who had been at work in NSOC for 32 hours were relieved and went home, I got to stay for yet another eight hours, for a total shift of 40 hours. Then when the Eastern Shore resident arrived for his mid shift to relieve me, I was finally able to go out to my car and commence the process of digging my buried car out of the snow so I could make the drive home.
+
+(U) The drive took quite a while because of the road conditions, but then, when I finally got home, there was no place to park the car, and I had to dig out a place into which I could put the car off of the road, before I could go inside and rest. I was awarded a Star Award the following month for my escapade.
+
+(U/FOUO) Submitted by [REDACTED]
+
+(S//REL) Two score and some years ago I was team chief of an Air Force mobile maintenance team that serviced Minuteman missiles in their silos around Malmstrom AFB, Great Falls, Montana. The silos were spread across an area twice the size of the state of Maryland, so we spent a lot of time on the road. Quite a few times we worked beyond 16 hours, and were not allowed to drive, so a driver had to be sent out to drive us to the nearest launch control facility, where we could get some food and sleep, and then the next day we drove out to service another site. The codes that we used to authenticate ourselves when we entered a missile silo, which was unmanned, were generated right here at the Agency.
+
+(U//FOUO) Submitted by [REDACTED]
+
+(U//FOUO) It's not something that happened at an exotic locale, but it illustrates long hours are put in by all sorts of career fields. Hope you find it entertaining!
+
+The hours were long, the work rife with stress, but dedication to duty kept us at our desks;
+That fateful night when our staff was depleted, we stayed and worked til the action was completed:
+The day started early, as most day shifts do, as the sun closed the day, we were closing our desks, too.
+We had already worked more than nine hours straight, but as actions go, this one could not wait.
+The chief was on leave, our deputy in charge, having just returned from assignment at large.
+(She spent the past year at another location - elsewhere in the IC, promoting collaboration.)
+We were logging off screens, turning off the lights, when the deputy stepped over to block our flight. " An action arrived with a short suspense," she explained as she threw it over the fence.
+Sure enough, as our screens flicked back into life, an e-mail popped in with a deadline: COB tonight.
+The lights went back on, and we went straight to it, to gather the info required to do it.
+We gathered the numbers, crunched them real good, made sure justifications were well understood;
+Compiled all the data and with budget defended, our late night adventure now had ended.
+I remember distinctly the day of that tasking; I worked the day shift, and my husband worked swing.
+We finished the task at half past nine (up until then, no one noticed the time).
+With action completed, we called it a day, and that's when I called my husband to say:
+You just got off work? Well, so did I. Let's grab some dinner, relax and unwind.
+My eight-to-five day finally ended at ten, and when mission requires, I've done that again.
+For that's the support our customers expect; from business managers, that's just what they get!
+While it's no tale of glory, or PCS locale, it lets everyone know long hours are not rare.
+For every career field holds chance to excel; and everyone has a story to tell.
+
+(U//FOUO) Submitted by [REDACTED]
+
+(S//SI//REL) On the morning of 8 January 1996, a Sunday, I started off for work early because of the heavy snow that had begun overnight. It was to be first day watch of six in SILKWORTH,* a 24-hour shift operation, where I was a Senior Voice Intercept Analyst. The drive in took me three hours from Littlestown, Pennsylvania, with SUVs and other four-wheeled drive vehicles strewn about the medians and berms of roads such as I-795, I-695 and MD 295 on the way in. While it was slow going in my Toyota Tercel, with several harrowing near misses and struggles with accumulating snow on the roadway, I was able to relieve the waiting mids crew by 0700 -- two hours later than normal. Two women from the previous shift remained to augment manning, as most folks were having trouble getting out of their driveways, let along making it into work. Even folks who lived less than a few miles away could not make it into work.
+
+(U//FOUO) As it turned out, a rather select group were able to either get back and forth to work from home or simply stay through several shifts sleeping at first on the floor, and then on cots provided by the Staff Duty Officer in OPS 2A. The cafeteria was unstaffed because its own employees could not reach the building or get supplies, and the agency was closed for regular personnel for some time. It was actually illegal to cross the border between Maryland and Pennsylvania for a couple of days, except for emergency personnel, because of the dangerous road conditions and the number of accidents that had occurred. While several others shared my plight, I believe I was the only one who spent as much continuous time at the job as a result of the situation. I did not leave SILKWORTH until the close of the dayshift on Wednesday, 11 January, returned the next morning, and was stuck again until Saturday, 14 January. My boss, [REDACTED], brought in food for the workers stranded by the snow and took my clothes home to wash them (I had brought only one extra set with me on Sunday) so that I could last out the siege.
+
+*(U//FOUO) See an article from the "Prognoz" publication from 2001 regarding the closing of SILKWORTH.
+
+(U//FOUO) Submitted by [REDACTED]
+
+(U) I don't believe that I have a claim to the longest shift, but I did have a (now) humorous experience during DESERT STORM:
+
+(U//FOUO) When the conflict began, I was a Branch Chief in a cryptanalysis branch in Z23. A call had come out for 2nd and 3rd shift processors in support of DESERT STORM. Although my branch was not targeted against that region, I wanted to set an example for our area by volunteering. My choice was to work the 3rd shift (starting at midnight). My plan was to work that shift and then my normal shift in my home branch.
+
+(U//FOUO) The main glitch was that I lived 75 miles south of Ft. Meade with a travel time (one way) of about 1 1/2 hours (don't tell the State Police). After one round of doing the round trip, I realized that I needed the travel time for sleep, so I packed a sleeping bag and a pillow and slept in the parking lot (don't tell the NSA Police) in my pickup truck which was, fortunately, equipped with a cap over the back.
+
+(U//FOUO) For the benefit of my coworkers, I showered and shaved in the runners' locker room (they complained!) in the north corridor of the basement after each of my midnight shifts and arrived bright and shiny in my office each morning, on time like clockwork each day for the first time since very early in my career. The combination of the two shifts was about 17 hours, nowhere near a record, but it was sustained for over 2 months until I was no longer needed. When it was over, I didn't go to Disney World -- I went to bed!
+
+(U) Editor's note: Many thanks to all who sent in their stories the response was great! Although I couldn't post them all, I have created an entry on the SIDtoday Blog for further postings on the subject. Click HERE .
+
+"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)
+
+DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
+TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
+DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/2008-09-03-SIDToday-Longest-Shifts-Working/metadata.json b/data/2008-09-03-SIDToday-Longest-Shifts-Working/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..697ad60
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/2008-09-03-SIDToday-Longest-Shifts-Working/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+{
+ "title": "Longest Shifts: Working Overtime in Pursuit of SIGINT (part 2: conclusion)",
+ "type": "SIDTODAY",
+ "description": "To mark Labor Day, SIDtoday shared stories from NSA personnel about their longest shifts. The accounts highlighted the dedication, stress, and sacrifice involved in supporting critical SIGINT operations, from intense 48-hour shifts during military operations to working long hours in extreme conditions like snowstorms or following major events like 9/11.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2008-09-03",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "SI"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "REL"
+ ],
+ "banner": "DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL",
+ "genre": "newsletter",
+ "programs": [
+ "SILKWORTH",
+ "MINUTEMAN"
+ ],
+ "countries": [
+ "Panama",
+ "Algeria",
+ "Bosnia and Herzegovina",
+ "Serbia",
+ "Pakistan",
+ "Denmark",
+ "Iraq"
+ ],
+ "people": [
+ "Blum, H. Steven"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2016-05-16",
+ "title": "NSA Closely Involved in Guantánamo Interrogations, Documents Show",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2016/05/16/nsa-closely-involved-in-guantanamo-interrogations-documents-show/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Currier, Cora"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_url": "https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2830615-2008-09-03-SIDToday-Longest-Shifts-Working/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "3c53218bafe624a837713cc61bcca72cd77563930e1987aa62f55d006f484337",
+ "pages": 5
+}
diff --git a/data/2008-09-15-SIDToday-Voice-Biometrics-Capability/2008-09-15-SIDToday-Voice-Biometrics-Capability.md b/data/2008-09-15-SIDToday-Voice-Biometrics-Capability/2008-09-15-SIDToday-Voice-Biometrics-Capability.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..01ca225
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/2008-09-15-SIDToday-Voice-Biometrics-Capability/2008-09-15-SIDToday-Voice-Biometrics-Capability.md
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
+TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
+
+SIDtoday
+
+(U//FOUO) Voice Biometrics Capability Proven During Recent Technology Demonstration
+
+FROM: [REDACTED]
+Deputy Chief, Expeditionary Requirements Division (S14R)
+Run Date: 09/15/2008
+
+(U//FOUO) If a Crime Scene Investigator can recover forensic evidence, such as a portion of a fingerprint, characterize the patterns that make up that print, compare those fragments to a national database, identify a culprit, solve the crime and wrap-up a conviction in less than an hour-long television show, why couldn't the same occur with a voice snippet recorded at an entry control point or even during a patrol in a hostile area? A Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) project, called Coordinate Operational Resources for Voice Exploitation Technology (CORVET), managed by the Expeditionary SIGINT Services Office (ESSO), External Programs Branch, recently demonstrated a solution that promises to do just that.
+
+(U) About Biometrics
+
+(U//FOUO) Over 100 years ago, the Calcutta Anthropometric Bureau in India approved using fingerprints as a means to identify people. The Henry Classification System, developed by Azizul Haque and Hem Chandra Bose, and formalized by the United Kingdom's Edward Richard Henry, was the basis of the world's first accurate method to identify people based on quantifiable physical characteristics. The field of biometrics, which includes fingerprints, has expanded to include iris scans, hand geometry, facial recognition and DNA analysis as methods available for this purpose.
+
+(U//FOUO) CORVET's Goals
+
+(U//FOUO) The External Programs Branch (S14R2) has been involved in establishing a capability for a new method, or modality, of biometrics using voice characteristics to determine the identity of a subject. In CORVET, a model, based on an initial recording taken from a person of interest, is created and associated with other biometric data from that person and stored in a database. Subsequent voice collections can be compared with the stored models and used to identify the person of interest at a later time. Under these circumstances, voice biometrics will play a pivotal role in Department of Defense's goal of attaining "identity dominance." As a result, the adversary will no longer be able to hide behind false representations.
+
+(U//FOUO) CORVET interview station
+
+(U//FOUO) Past and Future Steps for the CORVET Project
+
+(S//REL) S14R2 serves as the Technical Manager (TM) for CORVET. This project integrates present technology to identify a person based on their voice characteristics. Current efforts combine software developed at the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) and existing biometric collection hardware to provide a means for warfighters to identify subjects that have had voice biometrics collected and processed. Under the two-year project, the demonstration focuses on detention operations and force-protection scenarios, where the tools' ability to distinguish among the individuals who come and go can be tested. As the capability refines, other scenarios will be explored.
+
+(U//FOUO) The next step for the CORVET team will be to participate in a "limited utility assessment" (LUA), scheduled to take place at the INSCOM Detainee Training Facility (IDTF) Camp Bullis, San Antonio, Texas, during 22- 26 September 2008. The purpose of the LUA is to conduct a formal, objective assessment of the voice biometric speaker-identification technology capability against stated U.S. Central Command requirements. If successful, CORVET will progress to a final technology demonstration and a final "operational utility assessment" (OUA) scheduled for summer/fall 2009.
+
+(U//FOUO) After the OUA, the technology will have matured to the level and rigor required to place the capability into the hands of the warfighter. When the capability and utility are validated, the technology will transition into a "program of record," move into the acquisition phase, and delivered to the warfighter. Ultimately, CORVET provides another arrow in the warfighter's quiver. Its goal is to accelerate the warfighter's ability to find, fix, and finish the enemy.
+
+(U) Possible Applications for SIGINT?
+
+(S//SI//REL) Current technology integrated for the CORVET project is aimed at supporting ongoing HUMINT operations; however, there are a number of SIGINT applications that stand out as possible benefactors to successful demonstration of this capability. For example, identification of a known subject using a previously unknown communication channel could aid in establishing maps of communication and social networks needed to facilitate counter-terrorism operations.
+CORVET is taking systematic steps in its approach to enable the SIGINT system. Its vision is to have this intelligence capability provide a two-way windfall: where SIGINT enables HUMINT and similarly, HUMINT enables SIGINT. Once that challenge is achieved, CORVET will provide tremendous warfighter utility.
+
+(U//FOUO) POC: [REDACTED] S14R2, [REDACTED]@nsa, [REDACTED]
+
+"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL_sid_comms)."
+
+DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
+TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
+DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/2008-09-15-SIDToday-Voice-Biometrics-Capability/metadata.json b/data/2008-09-15-SIDToday-Voice-Biometrics-Capability/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e484c72
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/2008-09-15-SIDToday-Voice-Biometrics-Capability/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+{
+ "title": "Voice Biometrics Capability Proven During Recent Technology Demonstration",
+ "type": "SIDTODAY",
+ "description": "The Coordinate Operational Resources for Voice Exploitation Technology (CORVET) project, managed by the Expeditionary SIGINT Services Office (ESSO), demonstrated a promising capability for voice biometrics that could be used in security operations to identify individuals based on voice characteristics. Similar to the long-established method of fingerprinting, CORVET aims to create a database of voice models that could be used for identification in various contexts, such as detention and force-protection scenarios.",
+ "long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY SIDToday article dated 15 September 2008, authored by the Deputy Chief of the Expeditionary Requirements Division (S14R). The article describes CORVET (Coordinate Operational Resources for Voice Exploitation Technology), a Joint Capability Technology Demonstration project managed by the External Programs Branch (S14R2) of NSA's Expeditionary SIGINT Services Office.\n\nCORVET's core capability is voice biometrics — creating a voice model from an initial recording of a person of interest, associating it with other biometric data, storing it in a database, and then comparing subsequent voice collections against stored models to identify the same person at a later time. The system integrates software developed at the Air Force Research Laboratory with existing biometric collection hardware. The project framing sits within the Department of Defense's stated goal of attaining \"identity dominance\" — preventing adversaries from hiding behind false identities.\n\nAt time of writing the project was focused on two operational scenarios: detention operations and force protection, where the ability to distinguish individuals entering and leaving controlled areas could be tested. The next planned milestone was a Limited Utility Assessment at the INSCOM Detainee Training Facility at Camp Bullis in San Antonio, Texas, scheduled for 22-26 September 2008, followed by a Final Operational Utility Assessment in summer/fall 2009 and eventual transition to a program of record for acquisition and fielding to warfighters.\n\nThe SIGINT applications section is the most operationally significant content. The article notes that while CORVET was aimed primarily at HUMINT operations, SIGINT applications include identifying a known subject using a previously unknown communication channel — enabling construction of communication maps and social networks for counter-terrorism operations. The stated vision is a two-way capability where SIGINT enables HUMINT and HUMINT enables SIGINT, with voice biometric models derived from detention interviews feeding into SIGINT targeting and vice versa.",
+ "tags": [
+ "JCTD",
+ "ESSO",
+ "AFRL",
+ "INSCOM",
+ "IDTF",
+ "speaker identification",
+ "biometrics",
+ "humint",
+ "hand geometry",
+ "technology demonstration",
+ "force protection",
+ "DoD",
+ "identity intelligence",
+ "fingerprints",
+ "irs scanning",
+ "DNA"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2008-09-15",
+ "classification": [
+ "SECRET",
+ "SI"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "REL"
+ ],
+ "banner": "DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL",
+ "genre": "newsletter",
+ "programs": [
+ "CORVET",
+ "JCTD"
+ ],
+ "countries": [
+ "India"
+ ],
+ "people": [
+ "Haque, Azizul",
+ "Bose, Hem Chandra",
+ "Henry, Edward Richard"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2018-01-19",
+ "title": "Finding Your Voice: Forget About Siri and Alexa — When It Comes to Voice Identification, the “NSA Reigns Supreme”",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2018/01/19/voice-recognition-technology-nsa/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Kofman, Ava"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2018/01/19/sidtoday-voice-biometrics-capability/",
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/4351997/2008-09-15-SIDToday-Voice-Biometrics-Capability.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "65ae6d058f2484894c01c06b723231c109ce9218bdfebd321970598720d441a5",
+ "pages": 2
+}
diff --git a/data/2009-08-05-SIDToday-Does-NSA-Look-Different-From/2009-08-05-SIDToday-Does-NSA-Look-Different-From.md b/data/2009-08-05-SIDToday-Does-NSA-Look-Different-From/2009-08-05-SIDToday-Does-NSA-Look-Different-From.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e53222b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/2009-08-05-SIDToday-Does-NSA-Look-Different-From/2009-08-05-SIDToday-Does-NSA-Look-Different-From.md
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
+TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
+
+SIDtoday
+
+(U//FOUO) Does NSA Look Different from the Outside? What's in Store for SIGINT Analysis and Production? -- An Interview with Wayne Murphy
+
+FROM: The SIDtoday Editor
+
+Run Date: 08/05/2009
+
+(U//FOUO) SID today sat down this week with SID's new Assistant Deputy Director for Analysis & Production (S2), Wayne Murphy (pictured), who recently returned to the Agency after spending four years working at FBI and participating in a study program. Here's what Mr Murphy had to say:
+
+1. (U) Did your four years away from NSA give you a different perspective on NSA than you had when working here as an
+"insider"?
+
+(U) Yes it did, in a couple of aspects... The most profound insight I gained was an appreciation for how much it means to be part of the NSA workforce. When I was working at the FBI, a lot of our time was spent advancing FBI's presence in the Intelligence Community, to try to put the Bureau's intelligence mission on an equal footing with its well-established law enforcement mission. As an NSAer, I had always taken for granted what it means to do foreign intelligence, because here at the Agency it's just a natural part of what we do. That's a tremendous advantage for NSA. But on the flip side, I came to realize that it's easy to get complacent about NSA's success and capabilities when you are surrounded by amazing people every day, and we can't succumb to that.
+
+(U) I also developed a tremendous sense of pride in having an association with NSA. People in the Community viewed NSA product as so valuable. To sit in DNI and IC forums and see firsthand how much of value the NSA representative could contribute to the discussions made me proud to have been a part of NSA.
+
+2. (U) You worked at the FBI as their Assistant Director for Intelligence for 2.5 years, leaving that position about a year ago. What was that experience like?
+
+(U//FOUO) It was one of the hardest things I've done in my professional career, but also one of the most enjoyable. To be part of the leadership team at another agency was an extraordinary opportunity. I learned to manage a HUMINT program that was global in scope. I learned to manage an analytic workforce that was working a broader range of issues than I'd experienced here at NSA. Finally, I had to think of the domestic context of the job -- something I hadn't needed to do very much at NSA. So, in those respects, it was very challenging. But I could draw upon my experiences at NSA and (hopefully) used them to good advantage at the Bureau.
+
+3. (U//FOUO) Post-9/11 you led SID's Counterterrorism Product Line, and you were involved in CT-related issues while at FBI, as well. In your view, what's the key to defeating al-Qa'ida and other international terrorist groups?
+
+(U) I certainly think the increased level of collaboration across the intelligence and operational communities has been a powerful force-multiplier, but as a nation we've also broadened our strategy to confront these groups in a more comprehensive way. By that I mean that we aren't just targeting them directly, but rather are working to undermine their ability to take hold. So, I believe a balance of force projection and diplomacy is the key to defeating them and their ideology.
+
+4. (U) What do you think separates a good manager from a poor one?
+
+(U) Good managers are those who recognize that their responsibility is to create an environment wherein the best that each of their employees can achieve is possible. It's about staying focused on creating a productive environment, rather than trying to control or dictate day-to-day operations. I think one has to be a good listener, and one must take criticism and learn from it. Managers should clear the "noise" out of the system and allow people to concentrate on their duties.
+
+5. (U//FOUO) Although you've been back at the Fort only a short time, do you have any specific goals in mind for what you would like to achieve as ADDAP? ...any particular areas you'd like to focus on?
+
+(U//FOUO) One thing I'd like to be part of is to truly deliver an environment in which S2 employees have a technological base that matches the skills they bring. I think we ask too much of the workforce when we ask them to work around technical applications rather than be enabled by them. The S2 leadership needs to take the time -- and exercise the discipline -- to develop sound requirements for the technology, and work with the developers to help them build capabilities that are matched to our needs.
+
+(U//FOUO) Also, I would like to contribute to Rick Ledgett's [SID's Deputy Director for Analysis & Production] stated goal of creating an ops [operations] tempo that is more sustainable than we have now. We need to give employees confidence that they can take leave, spend time with family and friends, get training and generally lead a more "normal" life. We've done as well as we have only because people have made extraordinary personal commitments to the mission, but we must learn to operate at a sustainable level.
+
+6. (U) In terms of analysis and production (small "a" and "p"), what are the greatest strengths and weaknesses of the USSS at this time?
+
+(U//FOUO) The greatest strength by far is the depth of target knowledge and experience that resides in the NSA workforce, by virtue of the analysts' talent and the persistent nature of our access to our targets'
+communications. A contrasting weakness is that we haven't come far enough in communicating that experience and knowledge through our products and services. We have much more to offer, and have to find a means to express it.
+
+(U//FOUO) This isn't just a matter of adding more comments to SIGINT reports, but also of using A-Space and other forums for communicating that knowledge. If you read a SIGINT report, you derive a specific benefit from it, but if you pick up the phone and talk about it with the analyst who wrote the report, or the linguist who worked with the intercept, you get a much richer experience... you get nuances based on the analyst's experience with the target. That knowledge is very powerful, and we need to find a way to get that information into our products and services.
+
+(U//FOUO) Another great strength is the operational potential that resides in much of what we do -- the capacity for our understanding of the targets to be much more involved in shaping the decision-space of a broader range of customers. We need to support policy-makers in the same way that we support warfighters; we need to provide intelligence driven by the policy-makers' calendars. In that way, we can provide information in time to affect the decisions they make. We're already doing that to some degree, but I think we can take it up a notch. For decades we thought we knew what the warfighters needed to know, but it was only when we became embedded in their operations that we discovered that there was a lot more we could do for them -- other information we could provide that would help them immensely.
+
+(U) ...How do we find out what the policy-makers need to know?
+
+(U//FOUO) We have to be exposed to them and work more closely with them, so that we can shape the intelligence to their ops tempo. We do need to be careful to keep an ethical divide between intelligence and policy -- we don't want to lose our objectivity -- but we can still get a better understanding of what they really want. For example, they may want to know what the target thinks, not just what he says or does. This is the type of information we've traditionally gotten from HUMINT, but I think we can get it from analyzing SIGINT, too. That kind of detail can be very valuable.
+
+Officials hold a meeting
+
+(S//SI//REL) For example, it's great to know the talking points a foreign official plans to address with his or her US counterpart, but maybe the target shows signs of reluctance about a certain aspect... That nuance would not necessarily be apparent if one were reading the transcript of what he actually said; it is contextual information that in the past would have been left out of a SIGINT report. Nowadays we put such information in assessment reports, and they generate some of the most enthusiastic feedback we receive... Likewise, if we do social-network analysis on a target, we may detect some surprising relationships. We can pass that along to the customers, saying "Just thought you would find this interesting." There is some risk in providing this kind of information, but I believe our workforce has the knowledge and experience to pull it off. There's a range of options we can explore for communicating this information.
+
+(U) Finally, another great strength we possess is the diversity of our workforce and our openness to listening to new ideas and different points of view. There was an atmosphere in the NSA I grew up in that one had to wait his turn to be heard, and acquire a certain amount of experience before participating in the discussion. Nowadays we are open to good ideas from any source, junior or senior, from across the entire workforce.
+
+"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)
+
+DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
+TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
+DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/2009-08-05-SIDToday-Does-NSA-Look-Different-From/metadata.json b/data/2009-08-05-SIDToday-Does-NSA-Look-Different-From/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fe74e7e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/2009-08-05-SIDToday-Does-NSA-Look-Different-From/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+{
+ "title": "Does NSA Look Different from the Outside? What's in Store for SIGINT Analysis and Production? -- An Interview with Wayne Murphy",
+ "type": "SIDTODAY",
+ "description": "In this SIDtoday interview with Wayne Murphy, the Assistant Deputy Director for Analysis & Production (S2) at NSA, he reflects on his career and vision for the future of SIGINT analysis and production. Having returned to NSA after a stint at the FBI, Murphy provides valuable insights into the importance of collaboration, both within the intelligence community and between intelligence agencies and operational teams.",
+ "long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY SIDToday interview dated 5 August 2009, conducted by the SIDToday Editor with Wayne Murphy, SID's new Assistant Deputy Director for Analysis and Production (S2). Murphy had recently returned to NSA after four years away — 2.5 years as FBI Assistant Director for Intelligence and a further period in a study program — and the interview covers his observations on NSA from an outside perspective, his goals for S2, and his assessment of the USSS's analytical strengths and weaknesses.\n\nMurphy's most substantive observations concern the gap between NSA's analytical depth and its ability to communicate that knowledge through finished products. He describes NSA's greatest strength as the depth of target knowledge residing in the workforce — enabled by persistent access to target communications — but identifies a contrasting weakness in failing to adequately express that knowledge in products and services. He advocates for analysts communicating nuance and contextual information beyond raw SIGINT report transcripts, including social network analysis findings and assessments of target psychological states — what targets think rather than merely what they say. He cites A-Space as a forum for sharing analyst knowledge and notes that assessment reports incorporating contextual information generate the most enthusiastic customer feedback.\n\nOn the policy support mission, Murphy argues NSA needs to embed more closely with policymakers in the same way it embedded with warfighters — learning their operational tempo and providing intelligence timed to their decision cycles. He explicitly distinguishes this from losing analytical objectivity, framing it as better understanding of what customers actually need.\n\nOn management, Murphy describes Rick Ledgett (SID's Deputy Director for Analysis and Production) as having stated a goal of creating a more sustainable operational tempo, with Murphy wanting to give employees confidence to take leave, seek training and maintain a normal life outside work — an acknowledgement that the post-9/11 operational pace had been maintained only through extraordinary personal commitment by the workforce.\n\nThe interview is notable for its candid institutional self-assessment from a senior NSA official who had spent four years viewing the agency from the outside, and for confirming the names and roles of senior S2 leadership — Wayne Murphy as ADDAP and Rick Ledgett as DDAP — at a specific point in time.",
+ "tags": [
+ "fbi",
+ "counterterrorism",
+ "humint",
+ "DNI",
+ "intelligence community",
+ "policy-makers",
+ "OPTEMPO",
+ "operational tempo",
+ "workforce management",
+ "management",
+ "A-Space"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2009-08-05",
+ "classification": [
+ "SECRET",
+ "SI"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "REL"
+ ],
+ "banner": "DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL",
+ "genre": "newsletter",
+ "programs": [
+ "ASPACE"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Murphy, Wayne",
+ "Ledgett, Rick"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2016-05-16",
+ "title": "What It’s Like to Read the NSA’s Newspaper for Spies",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2016/05/16/what-its-like-to-read-the-nsas-newspaper-for-spies/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Maass, Peter"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_source": "https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2830623-2009-08-05-SIDToday-Does-NSA-Look-Different-From/",
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2830623/2009-08-05-SIDToday-Does-NSA-Look-Different-From.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "755557b8f11c5ca0c4972a0f5c79f529ac6473d32a57c0ba05e896b805545018",
+ "pages": 3
+}
diff --git a/data/2009-bang/2009-bang.md b/data/2009-bang/2009-bang.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ab6c546
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/2009-bang/2009-bang.md
@@ -0,0 +1,347 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+GCSB SIGINT Development Quarterly Report
+
+OCR
+
+Quarterly Report:
+002/09
+
+July 2009
+
+To: Deputy Director Signals Intelligence
+Info: Director, [REDACTED]
+
+Target telecommunications' networks within GCSB's Area of Responsibility continue to change at a rapid pace with deregulation rampant throughout the South Pacific, and major infrastructure projects dramatically changing the Afghan communications landscape.
+
+Digicel Pacific, subsidiary of Caribbean-based telecommunications company Digicel, has gone from strength-to-strength in major regional markets such as Fiji, Tonga, Vanuatu and Samoa, and are currently building Nauru's first mobile phone network. Future plans for pan-Pacific provision of high-capacity international links using underwater cable and Medium Earth Orbit satellite bubble along, potentially providing new options for Pacific Island Governments to greatly increase their populations' connectivity to global communications.
+
+Acting OCR Team Leader
+http://www.gcsb[REDACTED]
+
+TARGET TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS
+
+South West Pacific AOR
+
+1. Solomon Islands
+
+Solomon Telekom is in a race against time with a new market entrant (almost certainly Digicel) due to launch on 1 April 2010. In the remaining months of 2009 and early 2010
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+Solomon Telekom is attempting to triple its GSM user base, double the capacity of its GSM infrastructure as well as resolve long-standing network issues and inefficiencies.
+
+As part of this push to improve and expand its network coverage, Solomon Telekom has already launched two new GSM towers in June (Kukum and Panatina) and added 1800MHz cells to five existing sites around Honiara. OCR has worked closely with the GCSB Deployed Solutions team and DSD to provide as much information on the changes as possible, thus allowing GCSB and DSD to retain situational awareness as the Solomon Telekom network has expanded and evolved. A result of this collaboration has been the fine tuning of CAPRICA collection to take advantage of as many of the new 1800MHz antennas as possible as well as the levying of a requirement with DSD for dedicated 1800MHz receivers to be deployed at site.
+
+OCR has also worked closely with DSD over the planned PREBOIL RF survey at GBR, Honiara. To this end a briefing paper was issued on the RF environment of GBR in March and subsequently updated in June. OCR has also been in direct contact with stakeholders in DSD to provide further information as required.
+
+2. Fiji
+
+Digicel has rapidly caught up with Vodafone in mobile phone coverage offered on the main islands of Fiji since its launch in October 2008 and plans to introduce 3G services in November this year, Vodafone has relied on its own 3G services and high interconnection fees between telecommunication networks to maintain its greater market share, but these competitive advantages will shortly disappear. Up until now, GCSB's major targets in the Government and RFMF have kept a preference for Vodafone services, but they are increasingly buying into the services of the alternative network.
+
+OCR assisted DSD's Military Support unit to provide a Target Systems Analysis on the Command, Control and Communications of the Fiji Government, RFMF and Fiji Police Force by collating and reporting information held by SIGDEV, Production and Access areas at GCSB on the communications and operating practices of these organisations. This study concluded that GSM voice and SMS appeared to be the 'tactical' network of choice, in preference to VHF/UHF, or a poorly maintained and very limited RFMF computer network.
+
+3. South Pacific Regional
+
+SPIN Cable
+
+Recent press reports have mentioned new developments to the SPIN project such as Tonga expressing interest and Norfolk Islands being signed on for a spur off an Auckland-Noumea leg of the cable. But, despite the increased press interest, it is still not clear that SPIN will develop into the full-featured cable all the proposals suggest. There are a few reasons for this:
+
+1. The SPIN cable project is very expensive for Pacific Island Countries (PICS) with landing costs around US$15-$30m and on-going costs usually exceeding US$1m per annum.
+
+2. Most of the countries who have expressed an interest in SPIN plan to raise the funds to join, in full or partially, from either the EU or the Asia Development Bank. Faced with several countries asking for assistance, it is not clear whether either donor will be prepared to meet this large financial demand.
+
+3. Disruptive technologies such as the O3b medium earth orbit satellite constellation, due for launch late 2010, are likely to offer much the same speed and bandwidth as a cable but at substantially cheaper initial and ongoing cost.
+
+4. Astute Pacific Island telecommunications experts have noted that the SPIN project is almost entirely French-owned and run and that the contractual terms do not provide much security for the PICs that sign on.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+Samoa
+
+On 30 March 2009, cable laying ship ILE DE RE completed a month-long cable-laying operation near Samoa. The project saw Samoa and American Samoa connected to the previously defunct PacRim East cable which used to link Hawaii and New Zealand before it was superseded by the Southern Cross Cable. The work appears to have been completed successfully and provides the two Samoas with shared connectivity to the rest of the world of 1Gbps, an approximate 40-fold increase in capacity.
+
+Unfortunately, SIGINT has already lost access to Samoan bearers due to the American Samoa Hawaii (ASH) cable. In all likelihood all but some backup carriers will be off the air by the end of the year.
+
+SECRET// REL FVEY
+ILE DE REY
+Cable laying operations
+March 2009
+APIA
+13:49′00″S
+171:46′00″W
+WS
+
+PAGO PAGO HARBOR
+14:17'00'S
+170:40'00"W
+AQ
+d. Cable lald between Pago-Pago and Apia
+a. Transit
+c. Cable re-laid
+b. PacRim East lifted
+NZ JEWSF 039-09
+
+ELINT tracking of vessel ILE DE RE produced by the Join Electronic Warfare Support Facility - green represents the vessel in transit, red and blue are probable cable operations.
+
+Digicel
+
+In late 2008, Digicel was approached by the Government of Nauru with a proposal to assist Digicel to launch in Nauru. The proposal was that Nauru would pay for the installation of
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+GSM hardware in Nauru and the hardware would then be leased back to Digicel, who would
+run a GSM service in the island state.
+
+In January the deal was agreed and both sides began the required paperwork. Digicel are likely to launch in Nauru in late 2009.
+
+Meanwhile, the Government of Kiribati has been slow to reach an acceptable deal with Digicel, which has resulted in Digicel putting off plans for a Kiribati rollout. The key sticking point is whether the network should be run out of Tarawa or Fiji. To make the project economical Digicel want to run and support the network from Fiji, but the Government of Kiribati is insisting the management and support of any Digicel network be managed locally.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Bangladesh
+
+6.Revised Target Template
+
+SIGDEV target templates are always very much a work in progress, with any relevant
+information being regularly added as a target’s telecommunications environment develops.
+The Bangladesh target template has recently been extensively overhauled and republished
+in a new format. The updated Bangladesh target template contains plenty of new
+information; including information on the Bureau’s CT targets and recent Bangladeshi
+technology developments, particular attention has been paid to updating the access and
+exploitation layers: outlining our existing accesses and collection, and also highlighting
+future key requirements.
+
+The Bangladesh target template can be accessed by following the link below.
+http://www.gcsb.govt.nz[REDACTED]
+
+7. F6 Dhaka Survey
+
+Internal GSM collection is continuing with the recent extension to the Dhaka F6
+environmental survey. Site collection resources are in the main being used for the sustained
+collection of productive GSM emitters. However the changing RF environment has also seen
+the continuation of survey activity. Resources are also regularly reallocated to revisit
+network links of interest.
+
+The value of an internal Bangladesh collection site was recently highlighted with the
+handset geo-location of a target of interest. Utilising call event data derived solely from F6
+collection, OCR was able to geo-locate cellular activity from a tasked Pakistani handset
+operating in Dhaka and also provided an image that was used in GCSB reporting.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+```
+SECRET COMINT//AUS/CAN/NZ/UK/US EYES ONLY
+GCSB - BZ SIGDEV
+DHAKA, BANGLADESH - SELECTOR NOTED ACTIVE ON GSM BTS
+FILE REFERENCE:
+SDR-014-09
+
+Projection: Mercator
+Datum & Sheroid: WGS84
+Source: MISC
+
+N
+
+FULBARIA
+Water tower
+CAPTIAN BAZAR ROAD
+THATARI BAZAR ROAD
+WARI
+DAYAGANJ
+GUPIBAGH ROAD
+ABDOY DAS ROAD
+K.M. DAS ROAD
+26
+183
+280
+218
+167
+138
+AGASADEDUE ROAD
+S. CHAKARIWARTY ROAD
+BANGSAL
+NAWABPUR ROAD
+HARE STREET
+NAWAB STREET
+HABALAK RD.
+BALA LANE
+WORKS ROAD
+335
+CHOUK BAZAR
+332
+NAYABAZAR
+KAZI
+ENGLISH
+ROAD
+TIPU SULTAN ROAD
+IMEI Seen active on this BTS 2008-11-12 and 2008-11-20
+146
+150
+Cemetery
+NARINDA
+NARINDA ROAD
+Bangladesh
+ISLAMPUR ROAD
+BABU BAZAR
+19
+PATUATULI ROAD
+SADARGHAT ROAD
+198
+262
+334
+188
+Water tower
+SARAT GUPTA ROAD
+Reservoir
+JATRA MARI
+ABDUL RAUF RD
+LAXMI BAZAR ROAD
+333
+KRISHNKESH DAS RD. R.M. DAS RD.
+Bahadur Shah Park
+JINJIRA
+Ferry
+314
+Buckland Bund
+PIYARI DAS ROAD
+BANGLA BAZAR
+410
+SADARGHAT
+FARASGANJ
+DISTILLERY ROAD
+S.K. DAS ROAD
+DINA NATH SEN ROAD
+SATIS
+Gondaria Railway Station
+
+NAMES AND BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE
+This product is for orientation and briefing purposes only
+and should not be used for navigation.
+
+CORRECT AS AT: 12 March 2009
+
+Dimensions scaled from this
+map may be inaccurate as map
+georeferenced from VMAP0.
+
+Legend
+Grameenphone BTS - 17709/10
+
+0 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
+Kilometers
+
+SECRET COMINT//AUS/CAN/NZ/UK/US EYES ONLY
+```
+
+Image: F6 collected geo-location metadata on tasked handset
+
+Recent analysis of some classified collateral has developed an understanding of the
+telecommunications systems of the Bangladesh Rapid Action Battalion (RAB). This
+information will materially add to the SIGINT communities’ knowledge of Bangladeshi
+telecommunications networks. Analysis of this collateral highlighted comprehensive
+geographical information, telecommunication transmission paths and signalling information.
+
+```
+TOP SECRET COMINT//AUS/CAN/NZ/UK/US EYES ONLY
+GCSB - BANGLADESH SIGDEV
+RAPID ACTION BATTALION - MICROWAVE STATIONS 300 MHz RANGE
+FILE REFERENCE:
+SDA-014-09
+
+Projection: Mercator
+Datum & Sheriod: WGS84
+Source: MISC
+
+India
+N
+
+Rajshahi Police RAB 5 Natore Police
+
+Pabna Police
+
+Shibalaya BAF Station
+RAB 2 RAB 3
+Bangladesh
+Faridpur RAB 4
+India Police HQ
+Magura Police Faridpur Police Comilla Police
+Daudkandi BTTB Exchange
+
+Jessore Police
+Feni Thana
+
+Khulna Police RAB 6
+
+Sitakunda Hill top
+
+Dampara Chittagong Police RAB 7
+
+NAMES AND BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE
+This product is for orientation and briefing pupeses only
+and should not be used for navigation.
+
+CORRECT AS AT: 19 March 2009
+
+Dimensions scaled from this
+map may be inaccurate as map
+georeferenced from VMAP0.
+
+Legend
+RAB Sites 300MHz
+
+0 5 10 20 30 40 50
+Kilometers
+
+Myanmar
+
+SECRET COMINT//AUS/CAN/NZ/UK/US EYES ONLY
+```
+
+Image: RAB Communications network
+
+With this collateral, F6 was able to place on collection dedicated RAB private voice
+communication to and from RAB headquarters to various RAB units. Also seen in collection
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+was a limited amount of DNI, including a test of the video teleconferencing system from RAB
+HQ to RAB-3 HQ.
+
+```
+H.263 Display
+```
+
+Image: RAB video teleconferencing intercept
+
+RAB has been an active target group for the GCSB in the past and this information could
+well be of high interest for future operations if the domestic security situation in
+Bangladesh were to deteriorate.
+
+METADATA ANALYSIS TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES
+
+8. XKEYSCORE
+
+GCSB received a visit from NSA XKEYSCORE trainers [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] in March to update our GUI, assist IRONSAND with virtualisation of their XKEYSCORE suite, and train users in anticipation of full-take collection and 2nd party sharing. IRONSAND Engineering have been working to overcome problems in storage capacity, Virtual LAN licensing, competing priorities, and low manning but plan to have full-take collection on Mission carriers running by October. DSD are very keen to share XKEYSCORE data and have already modified their GUI to meet GCSB Compliance expectations. It is hoped that sharing with DSD and GCHQ will be achieved soon after we can offer full-take collection data. GCSB auditors are now trained to audit all queries made, and an audit log is kept to track what proportion of queries have been marked as reviewed to satisfy the Inspector-General.
+
+NETWORK ANALYSIS TEAM
+
+9. OCR Integree in DSD's NAC
+
+To begin the process of developing GCSB's own network analysis capability, [REDACTED] who will be part of the GCSB SIGINT Development network analysis team when it stands up in October 2009, was posted to DSD's NAC for four months (February to May). [REDACTED] was placed initially into Access Analysis, gaining knowledge of DSD's systems and collection capabilities. One month into his deployment, he switched to the Network Infrastructure Analysis section, where he was given specific NAC tasks regarding Indonesian cellular telecommunications provider Telkomsel. Some of the tasks included investigating Call Data Records being sent over FTP, identifying X.25 over TCP communications between
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+Telkomsel GSM nodes, and researching Telkomsel iGATE 4000 STM-1 carriers. [REDACTED] benefited from very useful training and information including a one-day SS7 presentation and a three-day VPN course.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/2009-bang/metadata.json b/data/2009-bang/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..55a1d61
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/2009-bang/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+{
+ "title": "GCSB SIGINT Development Quarterly Report",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "This GCSB quarterly report from July 2009 provides a Top Secret review of major telecommunications developments in the South West Pacific, focusing on the intelligence challenges posed by competitive deregulation and new infrastructure projects, while also detailing GCSB's efforts to enhance its collection capabilities, including the fine-tuning of GSM collection in the Solomon Islands, supporting DSD analyses in Fiji, and preparing for full-take XKEYSCORE data sharing with allies.",
+ "long_description": "The GCSB SIGINT Development Quarterly Report (002/09), classified TOP SECRET and releasable to all Five Eyes partners (USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL), details the changing telecommunications landscape within GCSB's Area of Responsibility (AOR) during the second quarter of 2009. The report highlights the rapid expansion of competitor mobile networks, particularly Digicel Pacific, in markets like Fiji, Tonga, Vanuatu, and Samoa, which necessitate constant adjustments to SIGINT collection methods. It also notes potential future challenges from high-capacity international links via underwater cables (e.g., SPIN project) and new satellite constellations (O3b).\n\nSpecific operations are analyzed: In the Solomon Islands, GCSB's OCR team collaborated closely with the GCSB Deployed Solutions team and Australia's DSD (Defence Signals Directorate) to track Solomon Telekom's network expansion (specifically new GSM towers and 1800MHz cells). This resulted in fine-tuning existing \"CAPRICA\" collection and levying a requirement for DSD to deploy dedicated 1800MHz receivers. In Fiji, GCSB assisted DSD's Military Support unit with a Target Systems Analysis (TSA) of the Fiji Government, RFMF, and Police Force communications, concluding that \"GSM voice and SMS appeared to be the 'tactical' network of choice.\"\n\nFurthermore, the report details key developments in capability: XKEYSCORE implementation was progressing, with NSA trainers visiting GCSB to upgrade the system and provide training. GCSB was working to solve storage and licensing issues to achieve \"full-take collection\" by October 2009, with a clear intent to immediately pursue XKEYSCORE data sharing with DSD and GCHQ. Finally, GCSB was developing its own network analysis capability by embedding a staff member in DSD's Network Analysis Centre (NAC), where they gained experience on systems and worked on specific intelligence tasks concerning Indonesian provider Telkomsel.",
+ "tags": [
+ "South Pacific",
+ "Digicel",
+ "Caribbean",
+ "Solomon Telekom",
+ "GSM",
+ "mobile surveillance",
+ "cables",
+ "fiber optic cables",
+ "telecommunications",
+ "Honiara",
+ "DSD",
+ "Vodafone",
+ "SMS",
+ "VHF",
+ "UHF",
+ "Norfolk Island",
+ "Hawaii",
+ "Telekomsel",
+ "teleconference",
+ "video conference",
+ "target template",
+ "SIGDEV"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "GCSB",
+ "date_created": "2009-07-01",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL"
+ ],
+ "banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL",
+ "genre": "report",
+ "programs": [
+ "CAPRICA",
+ "PREBOIL",
+ "XKEYSCORE",
+ "IRONSAND"
+ ],
+ "countries": [
+ "France",
+ "New Zealand",
+ "Indonesia",
+ "Fiji",
+ "Tonga",
+ "Vanuatu",
+ "Solomon Islands",
+ "Samoa",
+ "Nauru",
+ "Kiribati",
+ "Bangladesh",
+ "Myanmar",
+ "India"
+ ],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2015-03-04",
+ "title": "New Zealand Spies on Neighbors in Secret \"Five Eyes\" Global Surveillance",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2015/03/04/new-zealand-gcsb-surveillance-waihopai-xkeyscore/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Gallagher, Ryan",
+ "Hager, Nicky"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "version": "gcsb-signit-development-quartery-report"
+ },
+ {
+ "publisher": "The New Zealand Herald",
+ "date_published": "2015-03-04",
+ "title": "Snowden revelations / The price of the Five Eyes club: Mass spying on friendly nations",
+ "link": "https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/snowden-revelations-the-price-of-the-five-eyes-club-mass-spying-on-friendly-nations/IIMOU3E4C6LSTHEUIJDVX6OOYE/?c_id=1&objectid=11411759",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Hager, Nicky",
+ "Gallagher, Ryan"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "version": "gcsb-signit-development-quartery-report"
+ },
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2015-04-15",
+ "title": "New Zealand Spy Data Shared With Bangladeshi Human Rights Abusers",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2015/04/15/new-zealand-bangladesh-gcsb-surveillance-human-rights/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Gallagher, Ryan",
+ "Hager, Nicky"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1874070/2009-bang.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "publisher": "The New Zealand Herald",
+ "date_published": "2015-04-16",
+ "title": "Secret documents shine light on GCSB spying in Bangladesh",
+ "link": "http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11433216",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Hager, Nicky",
+ "Gallagher, Ryan"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1874070/2009-bang.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "pdf_sha256": "f4c6d76c4b09a84932bac57667b717cfbcaeda0e4c5c33942ed3d5eae1d6f070",
+ "pages": 9,
+ "versions": {
+ "gcsb-signit-development-quartery-report": {
+ "pdf_sha256": "9cb481af82be9cdb83431ac18492bf437c06a9f2329189e75bce2bb9fabed855"
+ }
+ }
+}
diff --git a/data/2009-bang/versions/gcsb-signit-development-quartery-report/gcsb-signit-development-quartery-report.md b/data/2009-bang/versions/gcsb-signit-development-quartery-report/gcsb-signit-development-quartery-report.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..da6371d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/2009-bang/versions/gcsb-signit-development-quartery-report/gcsb-signit-development-quartery-report.md
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+GCSB SIGINT Development Quarterly Report
+
+OCR
+
+Quarterly Report:
+002/09
+
+July 2009
+
+To: Deputy Director Signals Intelligence
+Info: Director, [REDACTED]
+
+Target telecommunications' networks within GCSB's Area of Responsibility continue to change at a rapid pace with deregulation rampant throughout the South Pacific, and major infrastructure projects dramatically changing the Afghan communications landscape.
+
+Digicel Pacific, subsidiary of Caribbean-based telecommunications company Digicel, has gone from strength-to-strength in major regional markets such as Fiji, Tonga, Vanuatu and Samoa, and are currently building Nauru's first mobile phone network. Future plans for pan-Pacific provision of high-capacity international links using underwater cable and Medium Earth Orbit satellite bubble along, potentially providing new options for Pacific Island Governments to greatly increase their populations' connectivity to global communications.
+
+Acting OCR Team Leader
+http://www.gcsb[REDACTED]
+
+TARGET TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS
+
+South West Pacific AOR
+
+1. Solomon Islands
+
+Solomon Telekom is in a race against time with a new market entrant (almost certainly Digicel) due to launch on 1 April 2010. In the remaining months of 2009 and early 2010
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+Solomon Telekom is attempting to triple its GSM user base, double the capacity of its GSM infrastructure as well as resolve long-standing network issues and inefficiencies.
+
+As part of this push to improve and expand its network coverage, Solomon Telekom has already launched two new GSM towers in June (Kukum and Panatina) and added 1800MHz cells to five existing sites around Honiara. OCR has worked closely with the GCSB Deployed Solutions team and DSD to provide as much information on the changes as possible, thus allowing GCSB and DSD to retain situational awareness as the Solomon Telekom network has expanded and evolved. A result of this collaboration has been the fine tuning of CAPRICA collection to take advantage of as many of the new 1800MHz antennas as possible as well as the levying of a requirement with DSD for dedicated 1800MHz receivers to be deployed at site.
+
+OCR has also worked closely with DSD over the planned PREBOIL RF survey at GBR, Honiara. To this end a briefing paper was issued on the RF environment of GBR in March and subsequently updated in June. OCR has also been in direct contact with stakeholders in DSD to provide further information as required.
+
+2. Fiji
+
+Digicel has rapidly caught up with Vodafone in mobile phone coverage offered on the main islands of Fiji since its launch in October 2008 and plans to introduce 3G services in November this year, Vodafone has relied on its own 3G services and high interconnection fees between telecommunication networks to maintain its greater market share, but these competitive advantages will shortly disappear. Up until now, GCSB's major targets in the Government and RFMF have kept a preference for Vodafone services, but they are increasingly buying into the services of the alternative network.
+
+OCR assisted DSD's Military Support unit to provide a Target Systems Analysis on the Command, Control and Communications of the Fiji Government, RFMF and Fiji Police Force by collating and reporting information held by SIGDEV, Production and Access areas at GCSB on the communications and operating practices of these organisations. This study concluded that GSM voice and SMS appeared to be the 'tactical' network of choice, in preference to VHF/UHF, or a poorly maintained and very limited RFMF computer network.
+
+3. South Pacific Regional
+
+SPIN Cable
+
+Recent press reports have mentioned new developments to the SPIN project such as Tonga expressing interest and Norfolk Islands being signed on for a spur off an Auckland-Noumea leg of the cable. But, despite the increased press interest, it is still not clear that SPIN will develop into the full-featured cable all the proposals suggest. There are a few reasons for this:
+
+1. The SPIN cable project is very expensive for Pacific Island Countries (PICS) with landing costs around US$15-$30m and on-going costs usually exceeding US$1m per annum.
+
+2. Most of the countries who have expressed an interest in SPIN plan to raise the funds to join, in full or partially, from either the EU or the Asia Development Bank. Faced with several countries asking for assistance, it is not clear whether either donor will be prepared to meet this large financial demand.
+
+3. Disruptive technologies such as the O3b medium earth orbit satellite constellation, due for launch late 2010, are likely to offer much the same speed and bandwidth as a cable but at substantially cheaper initial and ongoing cost.
+
+4. Astute Pacific Island telecommunications experts have noted that the SPIN project is almost entirely French-owned and run and that the contractual terms do not provide much security for the PICs that sign on.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+Samoa
+
+On 30 March 2009, cable laying ship ILE DE RE completed a month-long cable-laying operation near Samoa. The project saw Samoa and American Samoa connected to the previously defunct PacRim East cable which used to link Hawaii and New Zealand before it was superseded by the Southern Cross Cable. The work appears to have been completed successfully and provides the two Samoas with shared connectivity to the rest of the world of 1Gbps, an approximate 40-fold increase in capacity.
+
+Unfortunately, SIGINT has already lost access to Samoan bearers due to the American Samoa Hawaii (ASH) cable. In all likelihood all but some backup carriers will be off the air by the end of the year.
+
+SECRET// REL FVEY
+ILE DE REY
+Cable laying operations
+March 2009
+APIA
+13:49′00″S
+171:46′00″W
+WS
+
+PAGO PAGO HARBOR
+14:17'00'S
+170:40'00"W
+AQ
+d. Cable lald between Pago-Pago and Apia
+a. Transit
+c. Cable re-laid
+b. PacRim East lifted
+NZ JEWSF 039-09
+
+ELINT tracking of vessel ILE DE RE produced by the Join Electronic Warfare Support Facility - green represents the vessel in transit, red and blue are probable cable operations.
+
+Digicel
+
+In late 2008, Digicel was approached by the Government of Nauru with a proposal to assist Digicel to launch in Nauru. The proposal was that Nauru would pay for the installation of
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+GSM hardware in Nauru and the hardware would then be leased back to Digicel, who would
+run a GSM service in the island state.
+
+In January the deal was agreed and both sides began the required paperwork. Digicel are likely to launch in Nauru in late 2009.
+
+Meanwhile, the Government of Kiribati has been slow to reach an acceptable deal with Digicel, which has resulted in Digicel putting off plans for a Kiribati rollout. The key sticking point is whether the network should be run out of Tarawa or Fiji. To make the project economical Digicel want to run and support the network from Fiji, but the Government of Kiribati is insisting the management and support of any Digicel network be managed locally.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+METADATA ANALYSIS TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES
+
+8. XKEYSCORE
+
+GCSB received a visit from NSA XKEYSCORE trainers [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] in March to update our GUI, assist IRONSAND with virtualisation of their XKEYSCORE suite, and train users in anticipation of full-take collection and 2nd party sharing. IRONSAND Engineering have been working to overcome problems in storage capacity, Virtual LAN licensing, competing priorities, and low manning but plan to have full-take collection on Mission carriers running by October. DSD are very keen to share XKEYSCORE data and have already modified their GUI to meet GCSB Compliance expectations. It is hoped that sharing with DSD and GCHQ will be achieved soon after we can offer full-take collection data. GCSB auditors are now trained to audit all queries made, and an audit log is kept to track what proportion of queries have been marked as reviewed to satisfy the Inspector-General.
+
+NETWORK ANALYSIS TEAM
+
+9. OCR Integree in DSD's NAC
+
+To begin the process of developing GCSB's own network analysis capability, [REDACTED] who will be part of the GCSB SIGINT Development network analysis team when it stands up in October 2009, was posted to DSD's NAC for four months (February to May). [REDACTED] was placed initially into Access Analysis, gaining knowledge of DSD's systems and collection capabilities. One month into his deployment, he switched to the Network Infrastructure Analysis section, where he was given specific NAC tasks regarding Indonesian cellular telecommunications provider Telkomsel. Some of the tasks included investigating Call Data Records being sent over FTP, identifying X.25 over TCP communications between
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+Telkomsel GSM nodes, and researching Telkomsel iGATE 4000 STM-1 carriers. [REDACTED] benefited from very useful training and information including a one-day SS7 presentation and a three-day VPN course.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/200g-iris-access/200g-iris-access.md b/data/200g-iris-access/200g-iris-access.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9ba7fae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/200g-iris-access/200g-iris-access.md
@@ -0,0 +1,284 @@
+Supporting Internet Operations
+
+# Supporting Internet Operations
+
+## Special Source Access
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+GCHQ
+
+TOP SECRET STRAP1
+
+---
+
+Supporting Internet Operations
+
+## 15 mins to cover:
+
+- What does the environment look like
+- What does the SSE Roadmap tell us:
+ * Current posture
+ * ..and where do we want to be
+- Where are we now
+- Access plans for FY 10/11
+
+GCHQ
+TOP SECRET STRAP1
+2
+
+---
+
+Operations
+
+## Old Cable Map
+
+### Moving target:
+
+* More bandwidth being lit on existing cable systems
+* Several new cable systems being introduced (just in 2010).
+* As per SSE Roadmap, we need to maintain our investment in the access footprint in order to keep up.
+
+```
+Old Cable Map
+
+Hibernia Atlantic
+TAT-14
+AC-1
+Tata TGN-Atlantic
+Apollo
+Pottington
+Sylt
+Blaabjerg
+Pangea
+NorSea Com
+UK-Germany 6
+TAT-12/13
+FA-1
+Yellow/AC-2
+Tata TGN-Atlantic
+Apollo
+TAT-12-13
+FA-1
+FLAG Europe-Asia
+Tata TGN Western Europe
+SeaMeWe-3
+
+Funningsfjördur
+Torshavn
+Banff
+Ayre of Caira
+Dunnet Bay
+Maywick
+Sandwick
+Kårtsø
+Draupner
+Ula
+Ekofisk
+Valhala
+Murdoch
+Dublin
+Southport
+Lowestoft
+Beverwijk
+Highbridge
+Plérin
+Lannion
+Penmarch
+Bilbao
+Lisbon
+Sesimbra
+Ses Covetes
+Barcelona
+Helsinki
+Stavsnas
+Stockholm
+Tallinn
+Kardla
+Ventspils-Faresund-Stockholm
+Faresund
+Irevik
+Ventspils
+Kattegat
+Scand. Ring North
+Sweden-Lithuania
+Danica North
+Danica South
+Copenhagen
+Scand. Ring South
+Sventoji
+Baltica
+Germany-
+Denmark-2
+Fehmarn Bält
+Norden
+Circé North
+Concerto
+Tangerine
+St. Velery
+Circé South
+Ponta Delgada
+
+ESAT-2
+Sirius
+UK-Ireland (Gbix)
+Celtic Solas
+ESAT-1
+Tata TGN-Northern Europe
+Ulysses
+Pan European Crossing
+```
+
+TOP SECRET STRAP 1
+3
+
+---
+
+## Old Cable Map
+
+### Moving target:
+
+* More bandwidth being lit on existing cable systems
+* Several new cable systems being introduced (just in 2010).
+* As per SSE Roadmap, we need to maintain our investment in the access footprint in order to keep up.
+
+TOP SECRET STRAP 1
+1. This is a view of the commercial cable systems transiting the UK. There are around 1600 available 10Gs within these cables.
+2. This is 25% of all internet traffic
+3. Although the total percentage processed may seem in the lower percentile range we can actually survey the majority of the 1600.
+4. This allows us to select the most valuable to switch into our processing systems.
+5. Advancing techniques will allow a greater rate of processing by using targeted techniques (bulk presence events and TIPC).
+
+3
+
+---
+
+Supporting Internet Operations
+
+## Current Capability
+
+* Following the efforts made for the July deliverable, and the progress being made towards the 100 March 2010 target, GCHQs current 10G SSE capability is:
+ - We can intercept/touch: ~800x 10Gs (See note #1)
+ - We can cyclic survey: 188
+ - We can egress to GCHQ processing: 87 (See note #2)
+* In addition we are working with GERONTIC to agree an IRU which will enable a significant reduction in annual running costs (~£2M saving p.a), along with a further 10x 10G egress.
+
+Note #1. Does not include CIRCUIT/WAYGOOD
+Note #2. HIASCO access/egress to Bude complete – awaiting extra ARCANO egress
+
+GCHQ
+TOP SECRET STRAP1
+4
+
+---
+
+Supporting Internet Operations
+
+## SSE Roadmap / Future Capability
+
+* The SSE Roadmap is still valid though needs re-visiting to update/validate the recommended intercept and egress expansion.
+* Along with TEA and SRT (and ECB) we are developing new relationships to expand our access footprint, to bring the number of 10G bearers:
+ - Intercepted by Mar 2011 to: 1513 (or there abouts...) (+70 if we include CIRCUIT/WG)
+ - Egressed to GCHQ processing systems by Mar 2011 to: 415
+
+*Eagle eyed will have noticed that this doesn't align with the projected processing and storage profile.*
+
+GCHQ
+TOP SECRET STRAP1
+5
+
+---
+
+Supporting Internet Operations
+
+## SINO Access Plans for 2010
+
+```
+HIASCO
+New! 12x 10G egress
+
+PINNAGE
+Site
+New!
+?x 10Gs
+
+Other
+Existing
+Accesses
+More! LTC
+
+Plane
+PROVE
+New!
+4x 10G
+egress each
+
+New!
+ODF
+BUDE
+150 i/p
+
+Another
+Site
+Investigation
+
+CHELTENHAM ODF
+New!
+80 i/p
+
+New!
+Extra 10x 10G
+egress
+
+ARCANO
+
+GRASP
+
+New!
+SOSTRUM
+
+KENNINGTON – 224x 10Gs
+
+?x 10Gs
+
+VISAGE
+
+LITTLE
+Site
+New!
+```
+
+GCHQ
+TOP SECRET STRAP1
+6
+
+---
+
+Supporting Internet Operations
+
+## SINO Access: Where are we
+
+* 10 x 10G from HIASCO now available at Bude: awaiting DEBIT CARD commissioning to process
+* 8 out of 10 additional ARCANO bearers for Bude - on track for March 2010
+* KENNINGTON agreement complete to enable increased SOSTRUM, GRASP and VISAGE access and egress
+* PLANE & PROVE sites available:
+ - Egress comms from PROVE to Cheltenham will be in place by March 2010 (PLANE to follow)
+ - Initial capability planned for March includes KEA, SD and FKB
+* OSDS:
+ - Bude OSDS IOC's today (capability now - 150*)
+ - Cheltenham OSDS upgraded December (capability now - 78)
+* New relationships and access – PINNAGE and LITTLE progressing but no dates yet.
+* Assessment of potential RPC-2 (and 3/4) sites underway
+
+GCHQ expandable to 300
+TOP SECRET STRAP1
+7
+
+---
+
+Supporting Internet Operations
+
+## Questions..
+
+GCHQ
+TOP SECRET STRAP1
diff --git a/data/200g-iris-access/metadata.json b/data/200g-iris-access/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..28f9c98
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/200g-iris-access/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+{
+ "title": "Supporting Internet Operations - Special Source Access",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "In this document GCHQ outlines its plans for expanding internet operations, focusing on increasing access to 10G bearers and enhancing its intercept and egress capabilities by 2011. The agency highlighted that “25 percent of all internet traffic” transits the U.K. through approximately 1,600 different 10-gigabit cables, and it noted that it could “survey the majority of the 1,600” to “select the most valuable to switch into our processing systems.”",
+ "long_description": "This is a UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 GCHQ presentation on Special Source Exploitation (SSE) internet access operations. The document provides a detailed breakdown of GCHQ's bulk cable interception capacity and expansion roadmap, covering both the physical access footprint and the processing infrastructure supporting it.\n\nThe cable environment section establishes the scale of GCHQ's passive collection opportunity. Commercial cable systems transiting the UK carry approximately 1,600 available 10-gigabit circuits representing approximately 25% of all internet traffic. GCHQ can intercept or touch approximately 800 of these 1,600 circuits, cyclically survey 188, and egress 87 to GCHQ processing systems — with the Bude processing facility and Cheltenham identified as the two primary egress destinations. The document notes that while the total percentage processed may seem low, GCHQ can survey the majority of the 1,600 circuits and select the most valuable for switching into processing systems, with advancing techniques including bulk presence events and TIPC enabling a greater processing rate.\n\nThe SSE Roadmap section describes expansion plans developed jointly with TEA, SRT and ECB to bring intercepted bearers to 1,513 and egressed bearers to 415 by March 2011 — up from about 800 intercepted and 87 egressed bearers in the current posture. The document acknowledges this does not align with projected processing and storage capacity, implying a bottleneck at the processing stage.\n\nThe access plans section lists specific named programmes and their status. HIASCO had 10 new 10G bearers available at Bude awaiting DEBIT CARD commissioning. ARCANO had 8 of 10 additional bearers for Bude on track for March 2010. KENNINGTON had completed an agreement enabling increased SOSTRUM, GRASP and VISAGE access and egress. PLANE and PROVE sites were available with egress communications from PROVE to Cheltenham planned for March 2010, with initial capability including KEA, SD and FKB. The Bude OSDS (Optical Splitter/Distribution System or equivalent) had achieved initial operational capability with approximately 150 inputs, and Cheltenham OSDS was upgraded to approximately 78 inputs. PINNAGE and LITTLE were new relationships progressing without confirmed dates. Assessment of potential RPC-2, RPC-3 and RPC-4 sites was underway, with GCHQ expandable to 300.\n\nThe document also references GERONTIC — identified from other Snowden documents as Vodafone Cable/Cable and Wireless — with an IRU (Indefeasible Right of Use) agreement providing approximately £2 million per annum in running cost savings alongside 10 additional 10G egress circuits.\n\nThe \"Old Cable Map\" shows commercial submarine cable systems landing in the UK including Hibernia Atlantic, TAT-14, AC-1, Tata TGN-Atlantic, Apollo, FLAG Europe-Asia, SeaMeWe-3 and numerous others, with landing sites from Bude and Highbridge in the south-west to Banff and Dunnet Bay in Scotland.",
+ "tags": [
+ "upstream collection",
+ "interception",
+ "SSE",
+ "10G",
+ "cables",
+ "egress",
+ "operational expansion",
+ "telecommunications",
+ "internet backbone",
+ "infrastructure access",
+ "bandiwdth",
+ "fiber optic cables",
+ "traffic analysis"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "GCHQ",
+ "date_created": "2010-01-01",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "STRAP 1"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "banner": "TOP SECRET STRAP1",
+ "genre": "slides",
+ "programs": [
+ "SINO",
+ "GERONTIC",
+ "HIASCO",
+ "ARCANO",
+ "GRASP",
+ "SOSTRUM",
+ "VISAGE",
+ "LITTLE",
+ "PROVE",
+ "PLANE",
+ "PINNAGE",
+ "DEBIT CARD",
+ "CIRCUIT",
+ "WAYGOOD",
+ "OSDS",
+ "RPC-2"
+ ],
+ "countries": [
+ "Norway",
+ "United Kingdom",
+ "Ireland",
+ "Iceland",
+ "Faroe Islands",
+ "Sweden",
+ "Finland",
+ "Estonia",
+ "Lithuania",
+ "Denmark",
+ "Germany",
+ "Poland",
+ "Russia",
+ "Netherlands",
+ "France",
+ "Spain",
+ "Portugal",
+ "Greece",
+ "Italy",
+ "Belgium"
+ ],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2015-09-25",
+ "title": "Profiled: From Radio to Porn, British Spies Track Web Users' Online Identities",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2015/09/25/gchq-radio-porn-spies-track-web-users-online-identities/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Gallagher, Ryan"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2015/09/25/200g-iris-access/",
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2432222/200g-iris-access.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "pdf_sha256": "14ab3d6a565572215abd41d9fdcc53a181d3465e61627a5c5190bea53da167a1",
+ "pages": 9
+}
diff --git a/data/2010-03-11-SIDToday-2009-a-Watershed-Year-in-the/2010-03-11-SIDToday-2009-a-Watershed-Year-in-the.md b/data/2010-03-11-SIDToday-2009-a-Watershed-Year-in-the/2010-03-11-SIDToday-2009-a-Watershed-Year-in-the.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ca2c6f5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/2010-03-11-SIDToday-2009-a-Watershed-Year-in-the/2010-03-11-SIDToday-2009-a-Watershed-Year-in-the.md
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
+TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
+
+SID Today
+
+archives
+
+Welcome! Saturday, 10 Nov 2012
+
+feedback
+
+* Web search
+* Agency-all Emails
+* SID-all Emails
+* NSA Rolodex
+* SCQAWK: The SID Mailbag
+* SIDtoday Blog
+* SIDtoday Series
+* SIGINT Worldwide VTC
+
+
+* SIDtoday Article
+* Letter to the Editor
+* SIGINT-y Social Media Page
+
+(U) 2009: A Watershed Year in the Fight Against Terrorism
+
+FROM: (U//FOUO) [REDACTED]
+Counterterrorism Mission Management Center (CT MMC)
+Run Date: 03/11/2010
+
+(S//SI//REL) On behalf of the Associate Deputy Director for Counterterrorism [REDACTED] it is our pleasure to present the Counterterrorism Year in Review for 2009. The past year was a watershed period in the fight against terrorism and radical extremist groups. SIGINT was vital to successes against Al-Qa'ida (AQ) operatives within the United States, in East Africa, in the Arabian Peninsula, and more. For example, SIGINT first identified terrorism suspect Najibullah Zazi's email connection to AQ external operations planners in Pakistan. Without that SIGINT lead on Zazi, his activities might not have come to the attention of the US intelligence and law enforcement communities until he actually conducted a terrorist attack against the US homeland. (Zazi was arrested in September.)
+
+(S//SI//REL) We adapted as the terrorist landscape changed. As the war in Iraq began winding down, we ramped up SIGINT support to the Afghanistan surge. With FBI, we hindered an AQ effort to influence the German presidential elections and thereby remove German troops from the coalition in Afghanistan. We helped thwart several Lashkar e-Tayyiba attacks against India. There were successes against AQ East Africa/al-Shabaab militants in Somalia. Additionally, the Islamic Jihad Union lost its leader and deputy leader in a missile strike. Shortly after a senior operational planner of Jemaah Islamiya (JI) made overtures to AQ senior leadership for JI to become AQ's franchise in the Asia Pacific region, he was killed by Indonesian security forces.
+
+(S//SI//REL) In many cases, NSA provided the vital intelligence that enabled capture/kill operations. In virtually all major IC, DoD and foreign partner successes, SIGINT was critical in developing the leads and pattern of life that eventually led to the successes. Additionally, NSA led the Intelligence Community in building partnerships, capabilities, strategies, and collaboration to ensure future successes.
+
+(U//FOUO) We encourage you to read this collection of successes and view them as a measure of NSA's contributions against terrorism. The efforts undertaken by our men and women working CT SIGINT worldwide, and with our partners and customers in the intelligence community, the armed forces and other partners, at home and around the world make all these successes possible. These professionals provide intelligence support needed to protect our troops and ensure operational success. Their dedication, commitment, and professionalism, are unparalleled and we owe them a huge debt of gratitude. They remain our first line of defense in the fight.
+
+(U) You will find the report HERE. (U.S. only)
+
+Comments/Suggestions about this article?
+
+"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL_sid_comms)."
+Information Owner: [REDACTED] (email)
+Page Publisher: [REDACTED] (email)
+Last Modified: 11/10/2012 / Last Reviewed: 11/10/2012
+
+DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
+TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
+DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON:
+20320108
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/2010-03-11-SIDToday-2009-a-Watershed-Year-in-the/metadata.json b/data/2010-03-11-SIDToday-2009-a-Watershed-Year-in-the/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..14b9f36
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/2010-03-11-SIDToday-2009-a-Watershed-Year-in-the/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+{
+ "title": "2009: A Watershed Year in the Fight Against Terrorism",
+ "type": "SIDTODAY",
+ "description": "SIDtoday celebrated “a watershed period in the fight against terrorism and radical extremist groups,” noting that the NSA first discovered Najibullah Zazi’s email connections to Al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [
+ "Al-Qaeda",
+ "fbi",
+ "counterterrorism",
+ "intelligence community",
+ "DoD"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2010-03-11",
+ "classification": [
+ "SECRET",
+ "SI"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "REL"
+ ],
+ "banner": "DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL",
+ "genre": "newsletter",
+ "programs": [
+ "SCQAWK"
+ ],
+ "countries": [
+ "Pakistan",
+ "Iraq",
+ "Afghanistan",
+ "Germany",
+ "India",
+ "Somalia",
+ "Indonesia"
+ ],
+ "people": [
+ "Zazi, Najibullah"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2017-11-30",
+ "title": "NSA Secretly Helped Convict Defendants in U.S. Courts, Classified Documents Reveal",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2017/11/30/nsa-surveillance-fisa-section-702/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Aaronson, Trevor"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [
+ "Williams, Margot",
+ "Cooper, Talya"
+ ],
+ "doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2017/11/28/sidtoday-2009-a-watershed-year-in-the-fight-against-terrorism/",
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/4310976/2010-03-11-SIDToday-2009-a-Watershed-Year-in-the.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "e7c5417cae781c0a2d2da9bd3fb252244fcdfe018b72f36b947daea78c22d060",
+ "pages": 2
+}
diff --git a/data/2010-04-30-SIDToday-Learning-to-Love-English/2010-04-30-SIDToday-Learning-to-Love-English.md b/data/2010-04-30-SIDToday-Learning-to-Love-English/2010-04-30-SIDToday-Learning-to-Love-English.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..583e5ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/2010-04-30-SIDToday-Learning-to-Love-English/2010-04-30-SIDToday-Learning-to-Love-English.md
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
+TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
+
+SIDtoday
+
+(U) Learning to Love English
+
+FROM: Chief Warrant Officer John F. Berry
+
+Run Date: 04/30/2010
+
+(U//FOUO) Editor's note: Here are more thoughts on writing from John Berry (pictured), an annual contributor to *SID today*. The entire article is UNCLASSIFIED.
+
+One of my best experiences in journalism occurred unexpectedly in 1992 when my editor at the *Fort Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel* told me to follow him outside during his hourly smoke break. I was then an intern trying to break into the newspaper business. My editor, always looking for an excuse to light up, took a deep drag and told me I was doing "okay" as a reporter but needed to grow up as a writer.
+
+Two decades later, after nearly 20 years in newspaper reporting, I consider his advice the moment when I removed my training wheels as a writer and started jumping curbs with English.
+
+I am Chief Warrant Officer John Berry, an Army Reservist who trains once each year in the Meade Operations Center. After a civilian career in newspapers, I am now a technical writer from Redlands, California. This is my fourth year writing articles about grammar and writing for *SID today*. I am still floored at the interest and feedback those articles generated.
+
+At the *Sun-Sentinel*, I was stunned by my editor's comment. I was getting my name into a top-notch newspaper and angling for a job there after graduation (I didn't get it). I was also getting some positive feedback from fellow reporters about my performance, so I was dumbstruck by the suggestion.
+
+My editor's point was this: I was just functioning in the language and I needed to learn an appreciation for it to get ahead in the newspaper world. He suggested several possibilities to clue me in, including reading "On Language,"* a *New York Times* column then written by wordsmith William Safire. I have pretty much read it ever since.
+
+I later took a course at the University of Florida called "History of the English Language." One requirement was reading "*The Mother Tongue*," a book by Bill Bryson that instilled pride by knowing that I had a fluent grasp on one of the most difficult languages among the estimated 600 now used around the world.
+
+That book was my shiny-penny-in-the-pool moment when my editor's comments came into focus. Too bad I waited until my mid-20s to figure it out. I wish I had read Bryson's book in high school.
+
+What makes English stand apart from all other languages is the richness of its vocabulary. To be successful, we need to use a
+
+SERIES:
+Berry on Writing
+
+1. Tips on Writing, for Members of the Military
+2. A Sequel Worthy of 'The Godfather'?: Writing Tips from a Professional Journalist
+3. Rice Cakes for Writers
+4. Learning to Love English
+
+thesaurus, a book that doesn't even exist for other languages. English abounds in synonyms, which is why we can attach a special nuance to "house" to make it a "home." (Take that, French speakers!)
+
+The next factor that makes English such an expressive language is its flexibility. We can make an almost endless list of words pull double duty as both nouns and verbs. That list includes "drink, fight, fire, sleep, run, look, act, view..."
+
+As a technical writer in civilian life, I appreciate the exactness of the language. I first learned how much other languages had problems with clarity while learning Arabic at the Defense Language Institute. In 1998, one of my Jordanian professors told me how much he appreciated how precise he could be in English (he quickly reminded me that Arabic was the language of the poets).
+
+Bryson didn't mention this in his book, but I derive unlimited amounts of gloating from knowing that English, once among a doggerel backwater of languages centuries ago, is consuming the world at Internet-fast speeds. I love that English absorbed the languages of England's invaders and produced a language that outlived its attackers. (Take that, Germanic tribes!)
+
+The respect and appreciation for English I learned in college continued throughout nearly two decades of newspaper reporting. As a crime and courts beat reporter, I acquired the confidence to explore new ways of writing stories instead of just relying on the predictable, routine and often boring "formula writing" of how such stories typically appear in the newspaper.
+
+But breaking out of the "comfort zone" of predictable writing didn't start well. I still remember one editor at my first newspaper, *The News-Press* in Fort Myers, Florida, belly laughing at some of my attempts (he meant well). I remember an editor at my second paper, *The Press-Enterprise* in Riverside, California, wondering whether I even understood basic newspaper writing (I think I was kidding).
+
+I don't recall my journalism professors telling me that creativity required a thick skin and perseverance; I guess that that was something I just had to learn the hard way.
+
+In time, my attempts to be creative and different were mimicked by reporters at competing papers (although they would never admit it). Eventually, my stories sailed through the editing process and appeared in the paper almost exactly as they had left my fingers hours before. And all that may never have happened if a chain-smoking editor (he's still alive) hadn't hauled me out onto a sidewalk and told me to evolve.
+
+To this day, I'm still looking for new and interesting ways to improve. My latest acquisition is "*Grammar Girl*," a smarmy audio book helping writers with numerous mnemonic devices, such as one explaining how to correctly use "that" and "which" in a sentence. I also like *Merriam-Webster's "Word of the Day"*, which sends me an e-mail with a challenging or mystifying word, often taken from the news.
+
+I've coached several newbie writers in journalism. I can eventually get a sense when they are just functioning in a language and when they are showing some spark. My advice to them was to accept, embrace and love English for what it is instead of fighting all of its confusion and oddities.
+
+* Since I've got your attention, I want to use this opportunity to cure a grammatical illness at NSA: misplaced punctuation with closing quotations. In American English, periods and commas always come before the closing quotation. Colons and semicolons, although rarely used in these situations, always come after the closing quotation. All other punctuation marks could go either way -- inside the final quotation if it's part of the quoted material or outside if it belongs to the entire sentence.
+
+"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL sid comms)."
+
+DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
+TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
+DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/2010-04-30-SIDToday-Learning-to-Love-English/metadata.json b/data/2010-04-30-SIDToday-Learning-to-Love-English/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..40c6d95
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/2010-04-30-SIDToday-Learning-to-Love-English/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+{
+ "title": "Learning to Love English",
+ "type": "SIDTODAY",
+ "description": "In this SIDtoday article Chief Warrant Officer John Berry reflects on his journey to appreciating the nuances of the English language, from early advice by a mentor in journalism to his experiences as a technical writer.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [
+ "English language",
+ "writing",
+ "grammar",
+ "journalism"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2010-04-30",
+ "classification": [
+ "UNCLASSIFIED"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "FOUO"
+ ],
+ "banner": "DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL",
+ "genre": "newsletter",
+ "series": {
+ "name": "Berry on Writing",
+ "part": 4
+ },
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Berry, John F."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2016-05-16",
+ "title": "What It’s Like to Read the NSA’s Newspaper for Spies",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2016/05/16/what-its-like-to-read-the-nsas-newspaper-for-spies/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Maass, Peter"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_source": "https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2830626-2010-04-30-SIDToday-Learning-to-Love-English/",
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2830626/2010-04-30-SIDToday-Learning-to-Love-English.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "25d5598d694a1df5e05986368f5ec2ac51277bc12b477cec3dab2a027ecf47c0",
+ "pages": 3
+}
diff --git a/data/2010-06-02-SIDToday-Alvin-Simon-and-Al-Qaeda/2010-06-02-SIDToday-Alvin-Simon-and-Al-Qaeda.md b/data/2010-06-02-SIDToday-Alvin-Simon-and-Al-Qaeda/2010-06-02-SIDToday-Alvin-Simon-and-Al-Qaeda.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..604d221
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/2010-06-02-SIDToday-Alvin-Simon-and-Al-Qaeda/2010-06-02-SIDToday-Alvin-Simon-and-Al-Qaeda.md
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
+TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
+
+SIDtoday
+
+(S//SI//REL) Alvin, Simon, and... Al Qaeda? Finding Modified Voice in SIGINT Traffic
+
+FROM: [REDACTED]
+Researcher, Human Language Technology Research Office (R64)
+Run Date: 06/02/2010
+
+(TS//SI//REL) Voice modification isn't only employed by the makers of Alvin and the Chipmunks; it is also being used by SIGINT targets in Yemen, Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. In the last several months, multiple targets used voice modification technology to distort their voices, most likely to avoid identification by intelligence agencies.
+
+(TS//SI//REL) In late 2009, CT analysts found two audio cuts associated with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen that contained voice that had clearly been modified (the talker sounded like a character from Alvin and the Chipmunks). R6 and CES (S31) were asked to help recover the original voice so that the talkers could be identified. Within two weeks, we had created a profile of the modification technique employed by the AQAP handset. CES has deployed a capability (now available at "go saas") to undo the modification.
+
+(TS//SI//REL) Next we asked the question: is it possible to automatically discover modified voice in SIGINT traffic? If so, then this could become a powerful tool for target discovery. In the case of AQAP, this is exactly the capability that was required: after the December 25 bombing attempt in Detroit, many AQAP selectors in Yemen went quiet. Some of these targets had used voice modification in late 2009; were they still employing voice modification but on different phone numbers?
+
+(TS//SI//REL) In response to this requirement, R64 developed a software package called HLT Lite to automatically discover modified voice. HLT Lite makes use of three core human language technology (HLT) algorithms: speech activity detection, anomaly detection, and automatic speaker recognition. HLT Lite was deployed to the Special Collection Service (SCS) site in Yemen on 9 March, 2010 to search for modified voice in JUGGERNAUT data. After being operational for only 30 minutes, HLT Lite discovered a cut containing modified voice. Since then, HLT Lite has scanned over 1,000,000 audio cuts and discovered at least 80 confirmed examples of modified voice. Four phone numbers have been tasked and many others remain to be analyzed.
+
+(TS//SI//REL) Modified voice is not restricted to AQAP in Yemen. We used HLT Lite to search 500,000 NUCLEON cuts and discovered 76 examples of modified voice across several Product Lines, including Afghanistan/Taliban, Sunni Extremism, Lashkar-e Tayyiba, and Southwest Asia Narcotics. So if you hear SIGINT traffic that sounds distorted, it may not be garbled or corrupted ... it may actually be modified! You can listen to examples of modified voice here.
+
+(TS//SI//REL) Does this article sound familiar? Long-time SID today readers will remember the March 2007 article "Alert: Voice Masking Is Discovered in SIGINT."
+
+(S//SI//REL) Note: The above image is a spectrogram of modified voice from a cut associated with AQAP in Yemen. Have comments on this topic? Post them on the SIDtoday Blog.
+
+"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL sid comms)."
+
+DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
+TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
+DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108
diff --git a/data/2010-06-02-SIDToday-Alvin-Simon-and-Al-Qaeda/metadata.json b/data/2010-06-02-SIDToday-Alvin-Simon-and-Al-Qaeda/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c4a4095
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/2010-06-02-SIDToday-Alvin-Simon-and-Al-Qaeda/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+{
+ "title": "Alvin, Simon, and... Al Qaeda? Finding Modified Voice in SIGINT Traffic",
+ "type": "SIDTODAY",
+ "description": "This SIDtoday article discusses the use of voice modification technology by Al-Qaeda and other extremist groups to evade identification in SIGINT traffic. It highlights the development of the HLT Lite software by R64, which can automatically detect modified voices in intercepted communications, enabling the identification of targets even when traditional voice recognition fails.",
+ "long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY SIDToday article dated 2 June 2010, authored by a researcher in the Human Language Technology Research Office (R64). The article describes the discovery of voice modification technology in SIGINT collection and the development of an automated detection capability in response.\n\nThe operational trigger was the discovery in late 2009 of two audio cuts associated with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen containing clearly modified voice — described as sounding like a character from Alvin and the Chipmunks. R64 and CES (S31) were tasked to recover the original voice for speaker identification purposes. Within two weeks a profile of the modification technique used by the AQAP handset had been created, and CES deployed a reversal capability available internally at \"go saas.\"\n\nThe follow-on research question was whether modified voice could be automatically detected in bulk SIGINT traffic for target discovery purposes. This became operationally urgent after the December 25 2009 underwear bombing attempt in Detroit, when many AQAP selectors in Yemen went quiet — raising the question of whether targets had switched to new phone numbers while continuing to use voice modification. In response R64 developed HLT Lite, a software package using three core algorithms: speech activity detection, anomaly detection and automatic speaker recognition. HLT Lite was deployed to the Special Collection Service site in Yemen on 9 March 2010 to search JUGGERNAUT collection data. Within 30 minutes of deployment it had discovered a cut containing modified voice. Over the following period it scanned more than one million audio cuts and found at least 80 confirmed examples, leading to the tasking of four phone numbers with more under analysis.\n\nA broader search of 500,000 NUCLEON cuts found 76 additional examples of modified voice across multiple product lines including Afghanistan/Taliban, Sunni Extremism, Lashkar-e Tayyiba and Southwest Asia Narcotics — establishing that voice modification was not limited to AQAP but was a cross-target phenomenon.",
+ "tags": [
+ "R64",
+ "voice modification",
+ "HLT Lite",
+ "Al-Qaeda",
+ "AQAP",
+ "Human Language Technology",
+ "anomaly detection",
+ "speech recognition",
+ "target discovery",
+ "counterterrorism",
+ "modified coice",
+ "Alvin and the Chipmunks"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2010-06-02",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "SI"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "REL"
+ ],
+ "banner": "DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL",
+ "genre": "newsletter",
+ "programs": [
+ "JUGGERNAUT",
+ "HLT",
+ "NUCLEON"
+ ],
+ "countries": [
+ "Yemen",
+ "Afghanistan",
+ "Iraq"
+ ],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2018-01-19",
+ "title": "Finding Your Voice: Forget About Siri and Alexa — When It Comes to Voice Identification, the “NSA Reigns Supreme”",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2018/01/19/voice-recognition-technology-nsa/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Kofman, Ava"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2018/01/19/finding-a-modified-voice-in-sigint-traffic/",
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/4351998/2010-06-02-SIDToday-Alvin-Simon-and-Al-Qaeda.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "85af9717c8ec3e567cb1054352068399d9b7d12095fc1e271b8d447ece92fe46",
+ "pages": 2
+}
diff --git a/data/2010-08-12-Come-to-SIDs-Identity-Intelligence-I2/2010-08-12-Come-to-SIDs-Identity-Intelligence-I2.md b/data/2010-08-12-Come-to-SIDs-Identity-Intelligence-I2/2010-08-12-Come-to-SIDs-Identity-Intelligence-I2.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a2ed2d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/2010-08-12-Come-to-SIDs-Identity-Intelligence-I2/2010-08-12-Come-to-SIDs-Identity-Intelligence-I2.md
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+DYNAMIC PAGE
+HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
+TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
+
+(U//FOUO) Come to SID's Identity Intelligence (I2) Day Conference and See Your Target in a Whole New Light!
+
+FROM: Identity Intelligence Tradecraft Center (I2TC, within S2)
+
+Run Date: 08/12/2010
+
+i2 Logo
+
+(S//SI//REL) Are you eager to contribute your expertise, skills, target knowledge, and analytic tradecraft to improve SIGINT against our highest priority targets? **Then come to SID's Identity Intelligence Day in the Friedman Auditorium this September 9th.** Chris Inglis, the Deputy Director, will provide opening remarks and our keynote speaker is VADM (Ret) Mike McConnell (pictured below), former DIRNSA and former Director of National Intelligence. This is an unprecedented opportunity to understand how NSA is bringing all its creative energies to bear on tracking an individual -- and using the power of SIGINT and new research capabilities to understand a "whole life" approach to a target.
+
+(U//FOUO) **What exactly is Identity Intelligence (I2)?** It is all about locating, tracking, and maintaining continuity on individuals across space and time.* It's not just the traditional communications we're after: it's taking a "full arsenal" approach that digitally exploits the clues a target leaves behind in their regular activities on the net to compile biographic and biometric information that can help the SIGINT system implement precision targeting. I2 is a crosscutting capability that supports all intelligence activities. The ability to extract identity attributes of foreign persons-of-interest from databases across the United States Government -- regardless of security domain -- is critical to establishing a target's "pattern of life" (habits, appearance, cyber persona, demeanor, etc).
+
+DNI McConnell
+
+What's on Tap
+
+(S//SI//REL) This conference will address how today's tools, tradecraft, techniques, and partnerships are being used to fill in the gaps of our target knowledge. Multiple sources of identity information are becoming increasingly available: biometrics are improving, biometrics are being linked to other forms of identifying information, and more biographic information is now available on networks of interest. These trends create new opportunities for NSA to leverage its access to a variety of sources and couple it with the creative workforce and powerful analytics we are known for.
+
+(S//SI//REL) You'll see how NSA fits into a much larger Community effort and the unique, invaluable contributions we're making every day to help others discover and track their targets. You'll also learn through case studies and discussions how we rely on our partners for lead work and the mutually supportive relationships that truly enable operations. We will end the day with a wrap-up of our current challenges and future direction.
+
+(U//FOUO) With the exception of one joint discussion with US Intelligence Community partners, the day's offerings are open to all of our cryptologic partners. Contractors may attend with permission of their COR. Register for I2 Day HERE or check us out on the web for more information (" go I2DAY ").
+
+(U) Notes:
+
+* (U//FOUO) The official definition of I2 is "the collection, analysis, protection, exploitation, and management of identity attributes and associated technologies and processes in order to locate, track, and maintain continuity on unattributed identities across multiple or disparate instances/incidents, or across space and time."
+"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)."
+
+DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
+TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
+DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/2010-08-12-Come-to-SIDs-Identity-Intelligence-I2/metadata.json b/data/2010-08-12-Come-to-SIDs-Identity-Intelligence-I2/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f7a04ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/2010-08-12-Come-to-SIDs-Identity-Intelligence-I2/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+{
+ "title": "Come to SID's Identity Intelligence (I2) Day Conference and See Your Target in a Whole New Light!",
+ "type": "SIDTODAY",
+ "description": "This SIDtoday article promotes NSA's Identity Intelligence (I2) Day Conference, highlighting the importance of using SIGINT tools and techniques to track individuals across time and space. It emphasizes the growing role of biometrics, biographic data, and digital footprints in identifying and targeting foreign persons of interest, with insights from key speakers and case studies.",
+ "long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY SIDToday article dated 12 August 2010, authored by the Identity Intelligence Tradecraft Center (I2TC, within S2). The article announces SID's Identity Intelligence Day conference scheduled for 9 September 2010 in the Friedman Auditorium, with opening remarks from Deputy Director Chris Inglis and keynote address from retired Vice Admiral Mike McConnell, former DIRNSA and former Director of National Intelligence.\n\nThe article describes Identity Intelligence (I2) as a formal discipline. The official definition given is \"the collection, analysis, protection, exploitation, and management of identity attributes and associated technologies and processes in order to locate, track, and maintain continuity on unattributed identities across multiple or disparate instances/incidents, or across space and time.\" In practice the article describes I2 as a \"full arsenal\" approach that digitally exploits the clues a target leaves behind in regular internet activities to compile biographic and biometric information enabling precision targeting — covering habits, appearance, cyber persona and demeanor as components of a target's \"pattern of life.\"\n\nThe capability described goes substantially beyond traditional communications interception. I2 explicitly involves extracting identity attributes of foreign persons of interest from databases across the entire US Government regardless of security domain — meaning NSA was accessing and correlating identity data from databases held by other agencies including law enforcement, immigration, military and civilian agencies. \n\nThe article notes that biometrics are improving, biometrics are being linked to other identifying information, and more biographic information is available on networks of interest — framing these trends as opportunities for NSA to leverage its access combined with analytics.\n\nThe conference framing reveals the institutional significance of I2 at the time — described as a crosscutting capability supporting all intelligence activities, open to all cryptologic partners with contractor attendance permitted with supervisor approval. The involvement of Chris Inglis and Mike McConnell as speakers signals that I2 was being elevated to a senior leadership priority rather than remaining a technical programme.\n\nIn plain terms this document describes NSA developing a systematic capability to build comprehensive profiles of individuals — combining intercepted communications, biometric data, online behaviour, physical appearance and movement patterns drawn from multiple government databases — to track specific people across time and space even when they change identities, phone numbers or locations. The \"whole life\" framing is explicit in the document and represents a significant expansion beyond traditional signals intelligence toward something closer to total individual surveillance.",
+ "tags": [
+ "identity intelligence",
+ "biometrics",
+ "target tracking",
+ "cyber persona",
+ "pattern-of-life",
+ "intelligence community",
+ "data exploitation",
+ "precision targeting",
+ "intelligence partnerships",
+ "target knowledge",
+ "biographical data"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2010-08-12",
+ "classification": [
+ "SECRET",
+ "SI"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "REL"
+ ],
+ "banner": "DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL",
+ "genre": "newsletter",
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Inglis, Chris",
+ "McConnell, Mike"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2018-01-19",
+ "title": "Finding Your Voice: Forget About Siri and Alexa — When It Comes to Voice Identification, the “NSA Reigns Supreme”",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2018/01/19/voice-recognition-technology-nsa/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Kofman, Ava"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2018/01/19/come-to-sids-identity-intelligence-conference/",
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/4351999/2010-08-12-Come-to-SIDs-Identity-Intelligence-I2.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "22023fc5a90be9f50bfe6df5f534e7eb6d36d00b23008f06a3d217f8b58fed30",
+ "pages": 2
+}
diff --git a/data/2010-09-14-SIDToday-SIGINTers-Use-Human-Language/2010-09-14-SIDToday-SIGINTers-Use-Human-Language.md b/data/2010-09-14-SIDToday-SIGINTers-Use-Human-Language/2010-09-14-SIDToday-SIGINTers-Use-Human-Language.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c716985
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/2010-09-14-SIDToday-SIGINTers-Use-Human-Language/2010-09-14-SIDToday-SIGINTers-Use-Human-Language.md
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
+TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
+
+SIDtoday
+
+(TS//SI//REL) SIGINTers Use Human Language Technology to Great Advantage, Isolate Conversation about Threat to US Official
+FROM: Special Collection Service (SCS) Mexico City
+Run Date: 09/14/2010
+
+(TS//SI//REL) SCS Mexico City has been a test bed for human-language technology (HLT) translation and selection software since May 2010. This capability, which the site's chief compares to a cadre of extra scanners, allows language analysts to sift through hundreds of hours of voice cuts in a matter of seconds and select items of potential interest based on keywords or speaker voice recognition. The results have been dramatic.
+
+(U) US Embassy in Mexico City
+
+(TS//SI//REL) In all of 2009, the site issued approximately 20 reports based on voice collection. By contrast, in just three months of 2010 (May - July), the site produced 33 reports, all of which were selected using HLT software. Not only does HLT allow site analysts to save hundreds of hours scanning through an impossible volume of voice cuts, it allows the site to focus on the intelligence items of greatest importance to local and national customers.
+
+(TS//SI//REL) The utility of this capability was vividly highlighted on 2 August. The site was informed that a bomb threat had been received by Mexico City's emergency hotline, with the location, make, and tag number of the vehicle where the bomb reportedly had been placed. When Mexico City police responded, they discovered that the vehicle in question belonged to a U.S. Embassy official. Though no bomb was found in or on the car, SCS Mexico City immediately began searching for reflections of this bomb threat, using HLT to sift through over 1,300 voice conversations from 1 and 2 August using the key word "bomba."
+
+(TS//SI//REL) The filter returned 40 results, and the third hit on the list turned out to be a Mexican Center for Investigation and National Security official investigating the bomb threat. HLT allowed the site to isolate the conversation of interest in less than four minutes, a task that might previously have taken all of the site's linguists the better part of the day to accomplish.
+
+(U//FOUO) Editor's note: Click HERE for info on HLT Labs, and see also a micro-video .
+
+"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)."
+
+DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
+TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
+DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/2010-09-14-SIDToday-SIGINTers-Use-Human-Language/metadata.json b/data/2010-09-14-SIDToday-SIGINTers-Use-Human-Language/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..da90aa4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/2010-09-14-SIDToday-SIGINTers-Use-Human-Language/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+{
+ "title": "SIGINTers Use Human Language Technology to Great Advantage, Isolate Conversation about Threat to US Official",
+ "type": "SIDTODAY",
+ "description": "In 2010, the Special Collection Service in Mexico City began using Human Language Technology (HLT) to streamline voice collection and analysis, significantly improving efficiency. By rapidly filtering through large volumes of audio data, HLT helped isolate critical intelligence, such as identifying a conversation related to a bomb threat targeting a U.S. Embassy official, all within minutes instead of hours.",
+ "long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY SIDToday article dated 14 September 2010, authored by Special Collection Service Mexico City. The article describes the operational impact of Human Language Technology translation and selection software deployed at the SCS Mexico City site since May 2010 and highlights a specific operational success on 2 August 2010.\n\nThe productivity impact is stated in concrete terms. In all of 2009 the site issued approximately 20 reports based on voice collection. In just three months with HLT — May through July 2010 — the site produced 33 reports, all selected using HLT software. The site chief compared the capability to having a cadre of extra scanners, allowing language analysts to sift through hundreds of hours of voice cuts in seconds based on keywords or speaker voice recognition.\n\nThe operational case study is the document's most significant content. On 2 August 2010 Mexico City police received a bomb threat specifying the location, make and licence plate of a vehicle where a bomb had reportedly been placed. When police responded they found the vehicle belonged to a US Embassy official. Though no bomb was found, SCS Mexico City immediately began searching for intelligence reflections of the threat, using HLT keyword search on \"bomba\" across more than 1,300 voice conversations from 1 and 2 August. The filter returned 40 results and the third hit was a Mexican Centro de Investigación y Seguridad Nacional (CISEN) official discussing the bomb threat investigation. The conversation of interest was isolated in under four minutes — a task the article states would previously have taken all of the site's linguists most of a day.\n\nThe document confirms that SCS Mexico City was conducting bulk voice collection against Mexican communications including those of Mexican government security officials, and that HLT keyword and speaker recognition tools were being used operationally to process that collection in near real time.",
+ "tags": [
+ "Mexico City",
+ "Human Language Technology",
+ "voice intercept",
+ "keyword scanning",
+ "speaker identification",
+ "target discovery",
+ "embassy",
+ "emergency response",
+ "intelligence efficiency",
+ "linguistics"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2010-09-14",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "SI"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "REL"
+ ],
+ "banner": "DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL",
+ "genre": "newsletter",
+ "programs": [
+ "HLT"
+ ],
+ "countries": [
+ "Mexico"
+ ],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2018-01-19",
+ "title": "Finding Your Voice: Forget About Siri and Alexa — When It Comes to Voice Identification, the “NSA Reigns Supreme”",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2018/01/19/voice-recognition-technology-nsa/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Kofman, Ava"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2018/01/19/siginters-use-human-language-technology-to-great-advantage/",
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/4352000/2010-09-14-SIDToday-SIGINTers-Use-Human-Language.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "02adf74e6a8880ad9ad7a7b4f079152550b8b32b84c67646f40a6b9f1980ef8f",
+ "pages": 1
+}
diff --git a/data/2011-05-17-sidtoday-what-does-the-death-of-usama/2011-05-17-sidtoday-what-does-the-death-of-usama.md b/data/2011-05-17-sidtoday-what-does-the-death-of-usama/2011-05-17-sidtoday-what-does-the-death-of-usama.md
new file mode 100644
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/2011-05-17-sidtoday-what-does-the-death-of-usama/2011-05-17-sidtoday-what-does-the-death-of-usama.md
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
+TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
+
+Welcome! Saturday, 10 Nov 2012
+
+* Web search
+* Agency-all Emails
+* SID-all Emails
+* NSA Rolodex
+* SCQAWK: The SID Mailbag
+* SIDtoday Blog
+* SIDtoday Series
+* SIGINT Worldwide VTC
+
+
+* SIDtoday Article
+* Letter to the Editor
+* SIGINT-y Social Media Page
+
+
+(U) What Does the Death of Usama bin Laden Mean?
+
+FROM: the SIDtoday Editor
+
+Run Date: 05/17/2011
+
+(U//FOUO) SIDtoday recently met with Jon Darby (pictured), SID's Associate Deputy Director for Counterterrorism, to find out what impact the recent killing of Usama bin Laden is likely to have.
+
+1. Q: (U) In recent years, was Usama bin Laden actually directing al-Qa'ida operations?
+...or was he just a symbolic or inspirational figure who had no real control over what al-Qa'ida affiliates around the world were doing?
+
+A: (S//REL) What we're finding from the media seized from his residence is that he was more involved in directing al-Qa'ida operations than we realized. He was definitely more than a symbolic figure. Despite the fact that he was isolated and had to conduct all of his business by courier -- in order to avoid detection -- he was effective as a leader and managed to exert influence. His strategic guidance to al-Qa'ida was to focus on attacking the US.
+
+2. (U) After 9/11, did NSA ever see reflections of UBL himself or members of his inner circle in SIGINT or did that access shut down completely?
+
+(TS//SI//REL) Our loss of SIGINT access to bin Laden actually occurred prior to 9/11 -- it happened in 1998. After the Embassy bombings in Africa, it was reported in the press that bin Laden was using INMARSAT and we never again saw him in communications. The one possible exception was in late 2001 when we may have gotten intercept of him on the radio in Tora Bora [in Afghanistan]. His #2, Zawahiri, has never been seen in SIGINT. However, people in the al-Qa'ida hierarchy at the level just below that -- the #3 leader and below -- who are responsible for coordinating operations abroad have no choice but to communicate electronically, either personally (sporadically) or via communications cut-outs (preferred), and we have seen reflections of them in SIGINT.
+
+3. (U) In NSA's assessment, how important is bin Laden's death in terms of weakening al-Qa'ida and terrorism in general?
+
+(U//FOUO) We believe this was a very significant blow to al-Qa'ida -- the single biggest blow the US has ever dealt them. Bin Laden was the one-and-only leader of al-Qa'ida, a symbolic and unifying figure. He provided operational guidance to affiliates all over the world.
+
+(U//FOUO) It is unclear who will take over that role now that he's gone. Zawahiri comes with baggage -- some members of al-Qa'ida don't like him, and he doesn't have bin Laden's fighter credentials. [Note: Usama bin Laden fought the Soviets in Afghanistan during the 1980's.] Who will step up? -- it's not clear. There is an opportunity now for us to be assertive in pressing them; they may get careless and leave themselves open for capture.
+
+(S//REL) We are now mining the media captured during the raid on his residence, looking for lead information. It consists of nearly 3 terabits of data. It will take weeks and months to go through it all. An interagency task force has been put together to analyze the data. NSA is participating on that task force. Here at NSA, the SIGINT Forensics Center and many Product Line analysts both here at Fort Meade and in the extended enterprise are also examining the seized media. There's a lot to go around!
+
+(U) Is it possible that al-Qa'ida leaders will compete with each other in a struggle for the top leadership spot?
+
+(U//FOUO) It is possible. There may be personal animosities between members of the organization that we could possibly exploit to create fissures.
+
+4. (U) Has the recent success against UBL given us any lessons learned that we can apply in future to other terrorist targets? ... Any revelations?
+
+(U) There haven't been any major revelations. It was not a surprise that he was living in a populated area -- other al-Qa'ida leaders have been captured in cities in the past. They don't all live in the FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Areas along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border].
+
+(U) I think the biggest lesson from this success is to highlight what we already knew: the power of cooperation across the Intelligence Community. No single source of intelligence alone could have provided enough pieces of the puzzle; it was only through our cooperative efforts that we achieved what we did. SIGINT, HUMINT and IMINT all contributed bits and pieces. When SIGINT would run out of leads, HUMINT would provide a clue, and then IMINT would add another key piece of information, and back to SIGINT again. They all played off each other.
+
+(U) At right: The compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, where bin Laden was found.
+
+(U) Then, once the IC had put together a complete picture, we worked seamlessly with the military to bring about the successful raid. We saw the power of a true team effort across the US government. Nowadays we cooperate like this all the time, but for people who didn't understand how far the IC has come since 9/11 in terms of working together, this success was a real eye-opener.
+
+(U) Besides the value of teamwork, another lesson learned is the need to be patient. This was a long and difficult problem and we had to stay focused on it, even though there was no tangible reward for our efforts right away.
+
+5. (U) Are there any other thoughts you have for the readers?
+
+(U//FOUO) We're under no illusions that the death of bin Laden will mean the end of al-Qa'ida... this struggle against violent jihadists could go on for decades. But this was a major blow to al-Qa'ida and it's important for all employees to know that NSA was in the middle of the operation right from the very beginning.
+
+(S//SI//REL) For example, we played a key role in identifying the compound where bin Laden was found, and during the raid itself we provided force-protection support for the SEALs. In the aftermath of the raid, we have produced SIGINT on the reactions by governments, intelligence services, and terrorists to the operation. We played a critical role... it simply could not have come off without NSA. I am incredibly proud of all the NSAers, past and present, who contributed to this incredible success.
+
+Comments/Suggestions about this article?
+
+"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)."
+Information Owner: [REDACTED], S0121, [REDACTED], (email)
+Page Publisher: [REDACTED], S0121, [REDACTED], (email)
+Last Modified: 11/10/2012 / Last Reviewed: 11/10/2012
+
+DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
+TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
+DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/2011-05-17-sidtoday-what-does-the-death-of-usama/metadata.json b/data/2011-05-17-sidtoday-what-does-the-death-of-usama/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ec0c8b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/2011-05-17-sidtoday-what-does-the-death-of-usama/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+{
+ "title": "What Does the Death of Usama bin Laden Mean?",
+ "type": "SIDTODAY",
+ "description": "A 2011 NSA SIDtoday interview with SID's Associate Deputy Director for Counterterrorism assessing the significance of Osama bin Laden's death, revealing that NSA played a central role in identifying his compound and providing force-protection support during the SEAL raid, while also disclosing that bin Laden had been invisible to SIGINT since 1998.",
+ "long_description": "This internal NSA SIDtoday article, published May 17, 2011, presents a post-raid interview with Jon Darby, SID's Associate Deputy Director for Counterterrorism, offering an immediate internal assessment of the killing of Osama bin Laden and NSA's role in it. Darby reveals that analysis of media seized from bin Laden's Abbottabad compound — nearly 3 terabits of data being processed by an interagency task force including NSA's SIGINT Forensics Center and Product Line analysts at Fort Meade and across the extended enterprise — showed bin Laden was significantly more operationally involved in directing al-Qaeda than previously understood. Despite operating entirely through couriers to avoid detection, he maintained effective strategic leadership and consistently directed al-Qaeda to focus on attacking the United States.\n\nA particularly significant disclosure concerns NSA's SIGINT access to bin Laden himself: the agency lost all signals visibility on him in 1998, following press reporting that he used INMARSAT communications after the African embassy bombings. The article notes that Ayman al-Zawahiri has never appeared in SIGINT at all, while al-Qaeda figures at the #3 level and below — responsible for coordinating external operations — have been observable because they have no choice but to communicate electronically. This candid admission maps the precise boundaries of NSA's counterterrorism SIGINT coverage of al-Qaeda's top leadership over more than a decade.\n\nDarby credits NSA with playing a \"key role\" in identifying the Abbottabad compound and providing force-protection support for the SEAL team during the raid itself, stating the operation \"simply could not have come off without NSA.\" He frames the success as a model of intelligence community cooperation, describing how SIGINT, HUMINT, and IMINT contributed sequentially and iteratively — each filling gaps left by the others — before handing off to military execution. Looking ahead, Darby expresses cautious optimism about exploiting potential leadership fissures within al-Qaeda following bin Laden's death, notes uncertainty about Zawahiri's ability to unify the organization, and warns that the broader struggle against violent jihadism could continue for decades.",
+ "tags": [
+ "UBL",
+ "Abbottabad",
+ "SEAL raid",
+ "Al-Qaeda",
+ "counterterrorism",
+ "INMARSAT",
+ "1998 embassy bombings",
+ "Tora Bora",
+ "FATA",
+ "courier network",
+ "seized media",
+ "SIGINT Forensics Center",
+ "interagency task force",
+ "force protection",
+ "humint",
+ "imint",
+ "intelligence cooperation",
+ "IC integration",
+ "post-9",
+ "fort meade",
+ "internal newsletter",
+ "leadership changes",
+ "jihad",
+ "strategic assessment",
+ "lessons learned"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2011-05-17",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "SI"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "REL"
+ ],
+ "banner": "DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL",
+ "genre": "newsletter",
+ "programs": [
+ "SCQAWK"
+ ],
+ "countries": [
+ "Afghanistan",
+ "Pakistan"
+ ],
+ "people": [
+ "bin Laden, Osama",
+ "Darby, Jon",
+ "al-Zawahiri, Ayman"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2015-05-18",
+ "title": "What the Snowden Files Say About the Osama Bin Laden Raid",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2015/05/18/snowden-osama-bin-laden-raid/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Currier, Cora",
+ "Fishman, Andrew",
+ "Williams, Margot"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2015/05/18/sidtoday-interview-ubl/",
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2082577/2011-05-17-sidtoday-what-does-the-death-of-usama.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "397fdca7c4874e632f7f9b5d17ab8e6a5c3e04860ef49093967d8c723c8fcde1",
+ "pages": 3
+}
diff --git a/data/2011-11-22-sidtoday-sigint-year-in-review/2011-11-22-sidtoday-sigint-year-in-review.md b/data/2011-11-22-sidtoday-sigint-year-in-review/2011-11-22-sidtoday-sigint-year-in-review.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c771e90
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/2011-11-22-sidtoday-sigint-year-in-review/2011-11-22-sidtoday-sigint-year-in-review.md
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
+TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
+
+Welcome! Saturday, 10 Nov 2012
+
+* Web search
+* Agency-all Emails
+* SID-all Emails
+* NSA Rolodex
+* SCQAWK: The SID Mailbag
+* SIDtoday Blog
+* SIDtoday Series
+* SIGINT Worldwide VTC
+
+
+* SIDtoday Article
+* Letter to the Editor
+* SIGINT-y Social Media Page
+
+(U) SIGINT Year in Review, November 2011
+
+FROM: Teresa H. Shea
+Director, Signals Intelligence Directorate
+Run Date: 11/22/2011
+
+(U) Introduction
+
+(U) Colleagues: As I mark my first anniversary as SIGINT Director, it seems fitting to take a look back on what the SIGINT enterprise accomplished over the past year... and what a year it was! We were challenged with supporting the military campaigns related to the war on terrorism and the crises in the Middle East, natural disasters, global technological changes -- in addition to the ongoing demands of following our enduring targets. Not only did you respond brilliantly to all of these challenges, but you also continued to move forward with long-term enhancements to our capabilities and ways of operating that will pay dividends in the months and years ahead.
+
+(U) As you read this account of what we accomplished together over the last year, I think you will be reminded that it isn't just one person or group that makes us successful, but rather every element of the Enterprise plays an indispensable role. In addition, we should always remember that we stand on the shoulders of those who have gone before us that built the SIGINT Enterprise. We owe them all a debt of gratitude.
+
+I. (U) Operations
+
+(S//SI//REL) This has been a milestone year in the **war on terrorism**. Certainly the most powerful and enduring accomplishment was the successful strike against Osama Bin Laden. For nearly a decade a dedicated group of SIGINT professionals would not let go of the search, and their persistence paid off in substantive contributions at critical points on the road to Abbottabad. In the end many of you brought your expertise to bear in the final weeks and hours, resulting in a tremendous outcome in our counterterrorism efforts. Even then you didn't rest on your laurels: you played a significant supporting role a few months later in the operations against Atiyah abd-Rahman in Pakistan and Anwar al-Awlaqi in Yemen. Key targets continue to be removed from the battlefield as a result of your outstanding SIGINT contributions.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/2011-11-22-sidtoday-sigint-year-in-review/metadata.json b/data/2011-11-22-sidtoday-sigint-year-in-review/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..996e5c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/2011-11-22-sidtoday-sigint-year-in-review/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+{
+ "title": "SIGINT Year in Review, November 2011",
+ "type": "SIDTODAY",
+ "description": "A 2011 year-in-review message from NSA SIGINT Director Teresa Shea summarizing the directorate's major operational and capability accomplishments over the past year, including SIGINT contributions to the killing of Osama bin Laden, operations against Anwar al-Awlaki and other al-Qaeda figures, and support for military campaigns and crises across the Middle East.",
+ "long_description": "This internal SIDtoday article, published November 22, 2011, is an annual review message from Teresa Shea, Director of the Signals Intelligence Directorate, marking her first anniversary in the role. Writing to the broader SIGINT enterprise, Shea surveys the year's operational highlights across counterterrorism, regional crises, natural disasters, and long-term capability development. The document's most significant operational disclosures concern NSA's direct contributions to a series of lethal counterterrorism operations: the raid that killed Osama bin Laden at Abbottabad, described as the culmination of nearly a decade of persistent SIGINT work; a subsequent operation against senior al-Qaeda figure Atiyah abd-Rahman in Pakistan; and the strike that killed Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen. The framing is explicit — SIGINT contributions led directly to these individuals being \"removed from the battlefield\" — confirming NSA's role as an operational enabler of targeted killing programs.\n\nThe document situates these successes within a broader year of operational pressure, citing simultaneous demands from Middle East crises, natural disasters, and enduring surveillance targets alongside the war on terrorism mission. Shea's message emphasizes the collective nature of the enterprise's success, crediting every element of the SIGINT organization rather than specific units, and frames the year's achievements as building on the institutional legacy of previous generations of SIGINT professionals. The reference to \"long-term enhancements to capabilities and ways of operating\" suggests ongoing investment in collection and processing infrastructure, though specifics are not elaborated in the available excerpt.",
+ "tags": [
+ "sigint directorate",
+ "year in review",
+ "UBL",
+ "Abbottabad",
+ "targeted killing",
+ "drone strikes",
+ "counterterrorism",
+ "war on terrorism",
+ "Al-Qaeda",
+ "middle east",
+ "support operations",
+ "lethal operations",
+ "SIGINT enterprise",
+ "internal newsletter",
+ "leadership message",
+ "capabilities development",
+ "fort meade",
+ "intelligence community",
+ "military support"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2011-11-22",
+ "classification": [
+ "SECRET",
+ "SI"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "REL"
+ ],
+ "banner": "DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL",
+ "genre": "newsletter",
+ "programs": [
+ "SCQAWK"
+ ],
+ "countries": [
+ "Yemen",
+ "Pakistan"
+ ],
+ "people": [
+ "Shea, Teresa H.",
+ "bin Laden, Osama",
+ "abd-Rahman, Atiyah",
+ "al-Awlaki, Anwar"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2015-05-18",
+ "title": "What the Snowden Files Say About the Osama Bin Laden Raid",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2015/05/18/snowden-osama-bin-laden-raid/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Currier, Cora",
+ "Fishman, Andrew",
+ "Williams, Margot"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2015/05/18/sidtoday-2011-review/",
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2082578/2011-11-22-sidtoday-sigint-year-in-review.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "cd1a825b8d0d5c0265397697bcf7e12860237758188876b76bcf39844553e40e",
+ "pages": 2
+}
diff --git a/data/2011-7-27-Culture-Shock-NSA-From-the-Perspective/2011-7-27-Culture-Shock-NSA-From-the-Perspective.md b/data/2011-7-27-Culture-Shock-NSA-From-the-Perspective/2011-7-27-Culture-Shock-NSA-From-the-Perspective.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b5bdd89
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/2011-7-27-Culture-Shock-NSA-From-the-Perspective/2011-7-27-Culture-Shock-NSA-From-the-Perspective.md
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
+TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
+
+SIDtoday
+
+(U//FOUO) Culture Shock: NSA from the Perspective of Summer Interns
+
+FROM [REDACTED] (left photo) and [REDACTED] (right)
+NETA2007 (Summer Intelligence Analysis Program) participants
+Run Date: 07/27/2011
+
+(U//FOUO) Editor's intro: What do college students -- whose views of NSA are based on press reports and Hollywood movies -- experience when they report to work at Fort Meade and see the real thing?
+
+(U//FOUO) Being idealistic young interns, we were excited about the big find we had just made. We were explaining the trail of SIGINT to our project lead, [REDACTED] so eager to get it all out that we barely stopped for breath between words.
+
+(S//REL) "We found this woman, Nadia Lnu, and she's our target's wife, so we're trying to track his movements that way."
+
+(U) [REDACTED] slowly began to smile as we spoke and finally asked, "Wait... what is her name?"
+
+(U//FOUO) We repeated, "Nadia Lnu, we're not sure if that's how you pronounce it, though."
+
+(U) [REDACTED] burst out laughing and did not explain himself for what seemed like an eternity. We, the starry-eyed interns, just stared blankly at each other, wondering if this longtime NSA-er had finally cracked. All we could say was, "What? What's wrong?"
+
+(U) At last he said, "Spell it."
+
+(U) We responded hesitantly, "L-N-U."
+
+(U) "That means 'last name unknown.'"
+
+(U) We fell quiet and we just hung our heads in embarrassment, knowing the story of our rookie acronym mistake would soon be public knowledge to all of S2I6.
+
+(U) This is just one example of how interns who come to the Agency motivated to soak up all the knowledge they can usually fall flat on their faces on more than one occasion. Acronyms are only one small challenge that interns like us face throughout the 12-week intelligence analysis summer program at the Agency. The NETA2007 Intelligence Analysis Summer Intern program is hosted by the Intelligence Analysis Skill Community (IASC) and the Senior Intelligence Authority (SIA) every year. Twelve undergraduate students are chosen from nearly 800 applicants nationwide, and we spend the summer before our senior year learning about SIGINT tools and working in pairs on real-world analytic projects.
+
+(U) On the very first day we arrived, we were hit with culture shock. For instance, when we stepped onto the solemnly quiet elevator, an older gentleman turned to us and asked if we were new. We answered yes -- we must have been wearing our insecurities on our sleeves.
+
+(U) All he replied was, "The only thing you need to know is we don't talk in the elevators; and the extroverts look at other people's shoes." All we could think was what have we gotten ourselves into? Since that incident, every intern in the NETA2007 Summer Intelligence Analysis Program has become acutely aware of how noisy we are in the elevators compared to traditional NSA employees.
+
+(U) As members of the Intelligence Analysis Program, we expected to come to work this summer and have all the facts and figures readily available at our fingertips. We pictured data flying through cyberspace at supersonic speeds, helping us catch terrorists in the blink of an eye.
+
+(S//SI//REL) Little did we know, you cannot simply hack into someone's Facebook account and steal all their photo albums. You also cannot access any Agency tool you want; but rather, there are hours of coursework and multiple government authorizations involved. Open source research is not as effortless as it seems in the outside world -- especially when you are accustomed to the speed of your stylish MacBook at college.
+
+(U//FOUO) We had imagined the formidable NSA Police greeting us every morning at the gate with their large submachine guns. So, there was no disappointment there. However, we also visualized work stations with some of the most advanced computer systems conceivable and high operating speeds, which turns out is not quite the case. So, we pretty much expected the entire Agency to look like the NSA/CSS Threat Operations Center (NTOC). After viewing all the popular media that depicts the NSA as the embodiment of Big Brother, we also did not expect regulations on targeting US persons to be so strict. We kept waiting to hear about the ultra secret -- a mythological level believed to be above top secret -- product line that is permitted to target domestic communications.
+
+(U) Some interns starting out at the NSA expect to be swallowed up by a spooky Big Brother organization but, instead, we find that we are cheerfully welcomed into the government. And, to our surprise, the welcoming committee wasn't wearing trench coats and sunglasses! Interns at the Agency are provided with an immense support network. From the person who interviewed you for the position to your peer mentor and project supervisors, there are plenty of people to turn to. We also have to admit that we did not expect everyone to be so accessible to young interns and willing to help us learn the ropes. NETA2007 also differs from other internship programs because of the way students are encouraged to work together and interact with one another, even outside of work. The Intelligence Analysis Interns develop a deep sense of camaraderie, which improves our overall experience at NSA.
+
+(U) Unlike other undergraduate internships, we are not just sitting in class and fetching coffee for a higher-up employee all summer long. We expected to be let loose to "run barefoot through the ether of raw SIGINT," as the Angry Lawyer from OVSC1800 ("Legal Compliance and Minimization Procedures") would say. Students in the NETA2007 program are exposed to extremely insightful classes that dispel our misconceptions about NSA and teach us how the SIGINT process really operates. We learn about deep-dive research techniques using both open source methods and cutting-edge Agency tools. We work as intelligence analysts for various product lines of our choosing and make a real contribution to their mission. In fact, any office that felt they could use an intern was able to submit a project for consideration and we make it our job to tackle that problem whole-heartedly.
+
+(U) What we are trying to express is that the NSA can be an intimidating place for a young intern. We were initially overwhelmed with a five-page long list of acronyms, a diverse array of tools with baffling names, and a challenge to overcome our assumptions about what we thought the Agency did. However, it is also an extremely rewarding place to work. With ample room for movement throughout different offices and so many diverse targets, a college student thirsting for knowledge would be hard-pressed not to find something that interested them.
+
+(U) In our opinion, it would be hard to get that rewarding feeling of defending our country anywhere other than the NSA. Sure, we might hide quietly in the background and never be famous, but that feeling of fulfillment from work is hard to replace. And, as [REDACTED] would say, who doesn't love doing the "happy happy joy joy dance of discovery"?
+
+POC: (U//FOUO) NETA2007, Summer Intelligence Analysis Program
+Ops 2A, 2A0550, NSTS: 966-2614 / NS: 301-688-1076
+
+About the Authors:
+(U) [REDACTED] is an Intelligence Studies major at [REDACTED].
+[REDACTED] is a Spanish and Chinese major at the [REDACTED]. Both plan to graduate from their respective schools in May of 2012.
+
+"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)."
+
+DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
+TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
+DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108
diff --git a/data/2011-7-27-Culture-Shock-NSA-From-the-Perspective/metadata.json b/data/2011-7-27-Culture-Shock-NSA-From-the-Perspective/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..26c8d6d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/2011-7-27-Culture-Shock-NSA-From-the-Perspective/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+{
+ "title": "Culture Shock: NSA from the Perspective of Summer Interns",
+ "type": "SIDTODAY",
+ "description": "Two interns in the 2007 NSA Intelligence Analysis Summer Program share their initial culture shock and misconceptions about the agency, from unrealistic expectations about high-tech tools to the reality of strict regulations and a supportive, collaborative environment.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [
+ "internship",
+ "NTOC",
+ "NETA",
+ "Summer Intelligence Analysis Program",
+ "iasc",
+ "Intelligence Analysis Skill Community",
+ "SIA",
+ "Senior Intelligence Authority",
+ "intern"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2011-07-27",
+ "classification": [
+ "SECRET",
+ "SI"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "REL"
+ ],
+ "banner": "DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL",
+ "genre": "newsletter",
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2016-05-16",
+ "title": "What It’s Like to Read the NSA’s Newspaper for Spies",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2016/05/16/what-its-like-to-read-the-nsas-newspaper-for-spies/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Maass, Peter"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_source": "https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2830624-2011-7-27-Culture-Shock-NSA-From-the-Perspective/",
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2830624/2011-7-27-Culture-Shock-NSA-From-the-Perspective.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "717a0683657ec618eb0849a6a1e5949952cb75f00b04970bd87c0395506c9773",
+ "pages": 3
+}
diff --git a/data/20110405-cancun-amp-reqs-redacted-small2/20110405-cancun-amp-reqs-redacted-small2.md b/data/20110405-cancun-amp-reqs-redacted-small2/20110405-cancun-amp-reqs-redacted-small2.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..26857a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/20110405-cancun-amp-reqs-redacted-small2/20110405-cancun-amp-reqs-redacted-small2.md
@@ -0,0 +1,323 @@
+GCHQ
+
+SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
+
+COP16 méxico 2010
+
+# Supporting HMG's Climate Change Ambitions
+(...or, "A GCO's tales from Cancun")
+
+27 November – 10 December 2010
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+---
+
+GCHQ
+SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
+COP16 méxico 2010
+
+## Background
+
+* International Treaty opened for signature in 1992 as the UNFCCC
+* Kyoto Protocol agreed in 1997
+* Defined first commitment period for certain 'developed' countries (2008-12)
+ - It agreed GHG emissions reductions by % of 1990 levels
+* Second commitment period needed to include commitments for 'developing' countries (a 'KP2')
+* 192 countries now party to UNFCCC
+
+---
+
+GCHQ
+SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
+COP16 méxico 2010
+
+## Why include Developing Countries?
+
+In 2010......
+
+Top 10 economies (by GDP):
+
+1. USA
+2. China
+3. Japan
+4. India
+5. Germany
+6. UK
+7. Russia
+8. France
+9. Brazil
+10. Italy
+
+Top 10 CO2 emitters
+(one unit = 1,000 tonnes)
+
+USA
+CHINA
+RUSSIA
+JAPAN
+INDIA
+GERMANY
+UK
+CANADA
+ITALY
+MEXICO
+
+6,000,000
+5,000,000
+4,000,000
+3,000,000
+2,000,000
+1,000,000
+0
+
+---
+
+GCHQ
+SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
+COP16 méxico 2010
+
+## The Players
+
+* UK – negotiates as part of EU and plays a leading role
+* Major developed countries e.g. USA and Canada
+* Major developing countries – BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, China)
+* COP hosts (Mexico)
+* Vulnerable countries – AOSIS, G77
+* Other influencers e.g. OPEC
+
+---
+
+GCHQ
+SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
+COP16 méxico 2010
+
+## Opposing views and Sticking Points
+
+* Historic responsibility of developed countries
+* Emissions reductions seen as a way of slowing growth of emerging powers
+* Money and technology for developing nations for clean energy, adaptation and mitigation (the Green Fund or „Fast-Start“)
+* Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV)
+* An agreement binding developed and developing countries
+
+---
+
+GCHQ
+SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
+COP16 méxico 2010
+
+## The road to Cancun
+
+* 2007 COP13, Bali: the first time that climate change became a serious intelligence priority – COP13 has to work!
+* Spring MEF meeting in Paris: our first GCO climate change deployment
+
+Some lessons learned!
+
+* 2008 COP14, Poznan: not expected to be a significant gathering
+* 2009 COP15, Copenhagen or bust (it bust!)
+
+"The Copenhagen Accord"
+
+Our first COP climate change GCO deployment
+
+...a success
+
+* 2010 COP16, low ambition, low expectation, but hugely important
+
+The talks must get back on track
+
+---
+
+GCHQ
+SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
+COP16 méxico 2010
+
+## What's the role for intelligence?
+
+Political decisions often made in advance
+
+* What do governments want?
+* What will they sign up to?
+* What are the negotiating positions on broad or specific issues?
+* What are their red lines?
+* Views about other countries
+* Who is aligning with who?
+* Who is lobbying who?
+* Who are the spoilers?
+* Are delegates reporting back and getting fresh instructions?
+* What are they?
+
+---
+
+GCHQ
+SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
+COP16 méxico 2010
+
+## Customers
+
+* No.10 and Cabinet Office
+* Department for Energy and Climate Change
+* FCO
+ - Diplomats
+ - SOSFCA's Special Representative
+* Department for International Development
+* Treasury
+* G20 representatives
+
+---
+
+GCHQ
+SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
+COP16 méxico 2010
+
+## Now...where did I put my sombrero?
+
+* Why did we decide to send someone to Cancun?
+ - Customers wanted us to be there
+ - High likelihood of relevant, time-sensitive intelligence
+ - First opportunity to show a new ministerial team what we can do
+* Preparations
+ - Suitable cover within UK delegation
+ - Logistics (kit, rooms, passes, delegate lists, etc)
+ - Introductions with customers
+ - Intelligence requirements
+ - Coordination in HQ
+ * With other teams and SIS
+ * Methodology for delivery
+ * Working patterns
+ * Policy clearance
+
+---
+
+GCHQ
+SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
+COP16 méxico 2010
+
+## Behind the scenes at COP16
+
+cop16 méxico 2010
+
+---
+
+---
+
+```
+Oficinas de Delegaciones
+Delegations Offices
+
+Oficinas de Delegaciones
+Delegations Offices
+
+Sombrero
+
+1244 - 1255 | 1243 - 1200
+1144 - 1155 | 1143 - 1100
+1044 - 1055 | 1043 - 1000
+
+China
+```
+
+---
+
+```
+UNITED KINGDOM
+```
+
+---
+
+---
+
+---
+
+---
+
+---
+
+---
+
+GCHQ
+SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
+COP16 méxico 2010
+
+## Why was Cancun a success?
+
+* The talks didn't fail and...
+* Agreed that emissions should peak at 2°C
+* Anchored emissions reduction pledges from the Copenhagen Accord
+* Agreed a system of MRV
+* Green Fund established
+* Agreed to reduce emissions from deforestation
+* Set up mechanisms for developed countries to access low carbon technology
+
+---
+
+GCHQ
+SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
+COP16 méxico 2010
+
+## The future
+
+* Continue to support negotiations, but...
+ - How are South Africa approaching COP17?
+ - Who is backing Qatar and South Korea in their bids for COP18?
+ - A KP2 is looking unlikely, but...
+ - ...some kind of multi-stage, bolt on agreement is probably achievable
+ - A low carbon economy through efficiency and new technology could help achieve climate change goals...good for the economy and probably trade
+
+---
+
+GCHQ
+SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
+COP16 méxico 2010
+
+## UK Customers
+
+* Department for Energy and Climate Change
+ - International negotiations
+ - Domestic and European policies (energy efficiency, achieving a low-carbon economy; meeting 2020 obligations)
+* Foreign and Commonwealth Office
+ - International diplomacy
+ - Secretary of State's Special Envoy
+* Ministry of Defence
+ - Regional instability
+ - Resource security (water, food, land)
+* Department for International Development
+ - Overseas aid
+ - Emergency relief
+* Her Majesty's Treasury
+ - The Green Fund
+* Department for Business Innovation & Skills
+ - Supporting UK inward/outward investment and international trade
+ - Developing low carbon technologies
+ - Protecting intellectual property
+
+---
+
+GCHQ
+SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
+COP16 méxico 2010
+
+## New challenges for intelligence
+
+* Policy questions
+
+Fewer disputing science – climate change happening and almost certainly man-made, so...
+
+ - Is low carbon ambition driving government and investor decisions in economies?
+ - Is UNFCCC still important or is private capital shifting to low carbon because costs and scarcity of resource make sense?
+ - Are governments making the link between extreme weather and high commodity prices?
+ - Are governments planning for instability or mass migrations caused by water/food scarcity, lack of natural resources and land-use change?
+
+* Competing intelligence priorities
+
+---
+
+GCHQ
+SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
+COP16 méxico 2010
+
+## Questions?
+
+```
+Sombrero Tequila
+```
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/20110405-cancun-amp-reqs-redacted-small2/metadata.json b/data/20110405-cancun-amp-reqs-redacted-small2/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bdbbab9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/20110405-cancun-amp-reqs-redacted-small2/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+{
+ "title": "Supporting HMG’s Climate Change Ambitions (… or, “A GCO’s tales from Cancun”)",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "This joint GCHQ/MI6 presentation from February 2011 documents the process of international climate change negotiations becoming a “serious intelligence priority” for the UK.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [
+ "climate change",
+ "climate negotiations",
+ "UN Climate Change Conference",
+ "climate summit",
+ "Cancun",
+ "Copenhagen",
+ "UNFCCC",
+ "Kyoto Protocol",
+ "united nations",
+ "diplomacy",
+ "diplomatic surveillance",
+ "economic intelligence",
+ "intelligence requirements",
+ "intelligence priorities",
+ "energy",
+ "SIS",
+ "UK delegation",
+ "G20"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "GCHQ, SIS",
+ "date_created": "2011-02",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "genre": "slides",
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [
+ "Brazil",
+ "Canada",
+ "China",
+ "France",
+ "Germany",
+ "India",
+ "Italy",
+ "Japan",
+ "Korea",
+ "Mexico",
+ "Qatar",
+ "Russia",
+ "South Africa",
+ "United Kingdom",
+ "United States",
+ "South Korea"
+ ],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "Dagbladet Information",
+ "date_published": "2014-11-01",
+ "title": "Disguised as Climate Negotiators",
+ "link": "https://www.information.dk/udland/2014/11/disguised-as-climate-negotiators",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Geist, Anton",
+ "Gjerding, Sebastian",
+ "Moltke, Henrik",
+ "Poitras, Laura"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1350176/20110405-cancun-amp-reqs-redacted-small.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "pdf_sha256": "5ca191299219e43006cd91a224e23fc80d68ad5cdc2cd82f944f141bfd94f0b4",
+ "pages": 23
+}
diff --git a/data/20111107-Summary-of-GCHQ-Info-Wrt-OC-TSS1-Excerpt/20111107-Summary-of-GCHQ-Info-Wrt-OC-TSS1-Excerpt.md b/data/20111107-Summary-of-GCHQ-Info-Wrt-OC-TSS1-Excerpt/20111107-Summary-of-GCHQ-Info-Wrt-OC-TSS1-Excerpt.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..590613c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/20111107-Summary-of-GCHQ-Info-Wrt-OC-TSS1-Excerpt/20111107-Summary-of-GCHQ-Info-Wrt-OC-TSS1-Excerpt.md
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+TOP SECRET STRAP 1
+
+| NAME | WHAT'S IT ALL ABOUT? | EQUIPMENT / DESCRIPTION |
+|---|---|---|
+| RT-RG | A PROGRAMME. To provide direct support to the Global War on Terrorism through the provision of real-time information and intelligence support to 'find, fix and finish' operations around the world. The success of RT-RG in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom led to an expansion of the programme to support operations in Korea and Afghanistan. The success of these deployments will be crucial to the adoption of the RTRG principles into mainstream Sigint doctrine. | Each deployment of RT-RG is tailored to the local environment with systems and processes based on the telecommunications technologies prevalent in the region. As such the approach is data-centric rather than system-centric; each instance of RT-RG is intended to be unique. RT-RG is positioned as an edge node within the overall Sigint architecture. To achieve comprehensive real-time coverage of a region RT-RG relies upon an array of sensors streaming full-take collection into a forward-deployed regional data repository in parallel with offline forwarding to national systems. To fully exploit voice intercept RTRG is trialling new applications to perform keyword based selection and alerting. RT-RG provides access to tactical data sources in theatre via semi automated and manual data ingest into a local RT-RG repository. National sources including events databases and all-source (DOD, CIA, NSA) reporting are also made available for authorised analysts through a national/tactical gateway. Federated query tools support multiple simultaneous cross-referencing of all these data sources, tactical and national, against incoming real-time intercept. These facilities offer huge productivity gains for analysts in rapidly assembling a complete, fully informed picture of their target. |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| ANARCHIST | Conventional Site | Mt Troodos Cyprus |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+
+2 of 9
+This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exempt on under other UK information regsitration. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ or [REDACTED]
+
+OC B TP INFO SUMMARY AS AT27 JUN 11
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/20111107-Summary-of-GCHQ-Info-Wrt-OC-TSS1-Excerpt/metadata.json b/data/20111107-Summary-of-GCHQ-Info-Wrt-OC-TSS1-Excerpt/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d410a78
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/20111107-Summary-of-GCHQ-Info-Wrt-OC-TSS1-Excerpt/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+{
+ "title": "Summary of GCHQ Info Wrt OC TSS1 Excerpt",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "GCHQ Summary of RTRG (or RT-TG). The RTRG program provides real-time intelligence support for global operations, particularly in the context of the Global War on Terrorism, using tailored systems that integrate multiple data sources to enhance target identification and analysis. The success of RT-RG in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom led to an expansion of the programme to support operations in Korea and Afghanistan, with new applications for keyword-based selection and alerting on voice intercept being trialled.",
+ "long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET STRAP1 GCHQ document — an excerpt from an OC TSS1 (Operations Centre Top Secret Strap 1) information summary dated 27 June 2011. The document is a reference table listing collection programmes and sites with brief functional descriptions and equipment notes, with the majority of entries redacted in the published version.\n\nTwo entries are visible. The RT-RG entry frames the programme explicitly in the context of the Global War on Terrorism and its \"find, fix and finish\" mission. The GCHQ description confirms RT-RG was deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and subsequently expanded to Korea and Afghanistan, with GCHQ noting that success of these deployments would be crucial to adoption of RT-RG principles into mainstream SIGINT doctrine. The technical description emphasises RT-RG's data-centric rather than system-centric architecture — each deployment tailored to local telecommunications technologies, positioned as an edge node within the broader SIGINT architecture, with full-take sensors streaming into a forward-deployed regional data repository in parallel with offline forwarding to national systems. Voice keyword selection and alerting capabilities were being trialled. A national/tactical gateway provided access to events databases and all-source reporting from DoD, CIA and NSA for authorised analysts alongside tactical data sources.\n\nThe ANARCHIST entry identifies a conventional collection site at Mount Troodos in Cyprus — a long-established signals intelligence facility on the highest peak in Cyprus operated jointly by GCHQ and NSA, well positioned to intercept communications across the Eastern Mediterranean, Middle East and into the former Soviet Union. Its identification here as a \"conventional site\" distinguishes it from other entry types in the table which are redacted.",
+ "tags": [
+ "operation iraqi freedom",
+ "real-time intelligence",
+ "voice intercept",
+ "tactical data",
+ "federated query",
+ "national systems",
+ "all-source analysis",
+ "keyword search",
+ "data repository",
+ "intelligence analysis",
+ "tactical gateway",
+ "productivity gains",
+ "edge network access",
+ "telecommunications",
+ "Mount Troodos",
+ "find fix finish",
+ "full-take collection",
+ "forward deployment"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "GCHQ",
+ "date_created": "2011-11-07",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "STRAP 1"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "banner": "TOP SECRET STRAP 1",
+ "genre": "report",
+ "programs": [
+ "RT-RG",
+ "ANARCHIST"
+ ],
+ "countries": [
+ "Cyprus",
+ "North Korea",
+ "South Korea",
+ "Afghanistan",
+ "Iraq"
+ ],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2019-05-29",
+ "title": "Mission Creep: How the NSA’s Game-Changing Targeting System Built for Iraq and Afghanistan Ended Up on the Mexico Border",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2019/05/29/nsa-data-afghanistan-iraq-mexico-border/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Moltke, Henrik"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2019/05/29/gchq-summary-of-rtrg/",
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/6025731/20111107-Summary-of-GCHQ-Info-Wrt-OC-TSS1-Excerpt.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "publisher": "NRK",
+ "date_published": "2019-05-29",
+ "title": "Norges hemmelige krig i Afghanistan",
+ "link": "https://www.nrk.no/dokumentar/xl/norges-hemmelige-krig-i-afghanistan-1.14539055",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Skille, Øyvind Bye",
+ "Døvik, Olav",
+ "Hansen, Ståle Ellingsgard",
+ "Fjørtoft, Martin"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "reporting_only": true
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "pdf_sha256": "24cc8db4438007af33468e4cd1d5ac11575f47513d516064847bc9f0dbc04740",
+ "pages": 1
+}
diff --git a/data/2012-03-30-SIDToday-Number-9-Number-9/2012-03-30-SIDToday-Number-9-Number-9.md b/data/2012-03-30-SIDToday-Number-9-Number-9/2012-03-30-SIDToday-Number-9-Number-9.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..abffe98
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/2012-03-30-SIDToday-Number-9-Number-9/2012-03-30-SIDToday-Number-9-Number-9.md
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+DYNAMIC PAGE HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
+TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
+
+SIDtoday
+
+(U) Number 9... Number 9...
+FROM: the SIDtoday Editor
+Run Date: 03/30/2012
+
+(U) There are nine justices on the Supreme Court... nine innings in baseball... the " curse of the ninth " [symphony] in classical music... and we can add one more notable "nine" to the list: SID today is about to celebrate its ninth anniversary! (The publication was launched on March 31, 2003.)
+
+(U) To mark this occasion, we present the tongue-in-cheek **top 9 reasons to read SIDtoday** :
+
+9. Avoid giving that deer-in-the-headlights look at the office staff meeting when someone refers to a recently posted SID today article and you have no clue what they are talking about.
+
+slice of vanilla birthday cake
+
+8. One of these days they'll slip up and publish an article divulging the super-secret SIGINT handshake.
+
+7. You might find out what those shadowy people on the other side of the partition are really up to.
+
+6. In her next column, Zelda might address a situation happening in your own office!
+
+5. Be the first to find out about limited-seating events, so you can quickly snag your spot.
+
+4. You can see pictures of the high-level managers. That way, if a couple of them happen to come into your office, you won't ask them what their business is here and threaten to call security.
+
+3. Look busy while you are drinking your morning coffee.
+
+2. It's more interesting than reading DRYINGPAINT today .
+
+1. Since there's no centralized SID water cooler (and the beer machines in the cafeteria are long gone), it's how you find out what's going on!
+
+(U) But seriously, we extend our sincere thanks to everyone who has contributed an article (all 4,543 of them) to SID today these past nine years. Bravo!
+
+"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)."
+
+DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
+TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
+DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/2012-03-30-SIDToday-Number-9-Number-9/metadata.json b/data/2012-03-30-SIDToday-Number-9-Number-9/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5f7442d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/2012-03-30-SIDToday-Number-9-Number-9/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+{
+ "title": "Number 9... Number 9...",
+ "type": "SIDTODAY",
+ "description": "SIDtoday is celebrating its ninth anniversary, reflecting on its history and offering a playful \"top 9 reasons to read SIDtoday,\" ranging from staying informed at staff meetings to discovering secret SIGINT handshakes. The publication has played an essential role in keeping the community connected with its regular updates. The document is notable for revealing that in the first nine years of SIDtoday’s life, more than 4,500 stories were posted on the SIDtoday website.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [
+ "office culture",
+ "community",
+ "information sharing",
+ "publication history",
+ "staff meetings",
+ "humor"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2012-03-30",
+ "classification": [
+ "UNCLASSIFIED"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "banner": "DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL",
+ "genre": "newsletter",
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2016-05-16",
+ "title": "What It’s Like to Read the NSA’s Newspaper for Spies",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2016/05/16/what-its-like-to-read-the-nsas-newspaper-for-spies/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Maass, Peter"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_source": "https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2830625-2012-03-30-SIDToday-Number-9-Number-9/",
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2830625/2012-03-30-SIDToday-Number-9-Number-9.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "archive_comment": "The document is not found from The Intercept's SIDtoday archive. The document is only linked in the article.",
+ "pdf_sha256": "1f97a5f7218ae7cbf84407beb8d5dee2f6675527653c2ad617b0fef8c2795afd",
+ "pages": 1
+}
diff --git a/data/2012-06-20-SSO-News-MYSTIC-S-SHELLTRUMPET/2012-06-20-SSO-News-MYSTIC-S-SHELLTRUMPET.md b/data/2012-06-20-SSO-News-MYSTIC-S-SHELLTRUMPET/2012-06-20-SSO-News-MYSTIC-S-SHELLTRUMPET.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7fe9489
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/2012-06-20-SSO-News-MYSTIC-S-SHELLTRUMPET/2012-06-20-SSO-News-MYSTIC-S-SHELLTRUMPET.md
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+(U//FOUO) MYSTIC's SHELLTRUMPET provides Metadata Gateway for Several SSO systems to RT-RG Texas
+By [REDACTED] on 2012-06-20 1459
+
+(S//SI//NF) Over the course of May/June 2012, SHELLTRUMPET, in close coordination with Real Time-Regional Gateway (RT-RG) and various Special Source Operations
+(SSO) programs, has provided RT-RG Texas with new accesses to metadata. Specifically, SHELLTRUMPET has enabled DANCINGOASIS and SPINNERET metadata to flow to RT-RG Texas by obfuscating the source information and filtering out
+metadata from countries of no interest to that area of responsibility (AOR). As a result, even though the two mentioned accesses are generating well over 1B records per day, SHELLTRUMPET reduces this to just ~600M/day for RT-RG Texas ingest. These two accesses now provide RT-RG Texas with 85% of their input volume, which contains
+60% of the hits on their targets. This week, SHELLTRUMPET will add FAIRVIEW to the flow, which undoubtedly will spike SSO's contributions for RT-RG Texas even higher.
+
+(U//FOUO) POC: [REDACTED], MYSTIC Tech Director, [REDACTED].
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/2012-06-20-SSO-News-MYSTIC-S-SHELLTRUMPET/metadata.json b/data/2012-06-20-SSO-News-MYSTIC-S-SHELLTRUMPET/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5fff817
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/2012-06-20-SSO-News-MYSTIC-S-SHELLTRUMPET/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+{
+ "title": "SSO News on MYSTIC SHELLTRUMPET for June 20, 2012",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "Internal NSA memo describing how SHELLTRUMPET, part of the MYSTIC program, works in conjunction with Real Time-Regional Gateway (RT-RG) and various Special Source Operations (SSO) programs to provide metadata access for RT-RG Texas. The system obfuscates source information and filters irrelevant metadata, enabling RT-RG Texas to efficiently process metadata from DANCINGOASIS and SPINNERET.",
+ "long_description": "This SSO newsletter dated 20 June 2012 describes SHELLTRUMPET's role as a metadata gateway between SSO collection programmes and RT-RG Texas.\n\nSHELLTRUMPET is identified as a component of the MYSTIC programme that acts as an intermediary between large-scale SSO collection systems and RT-RG Texas, performing two key functions: obfuscating source information and filtering out metadata from countries outside RT-RG Texas's area of responsibility. This filtering function is operationally significant — it means RT-RG Texas receives a pre-processed subset of collection rather than raw bulk data, with the source programme identity concealed from the downstream system.\n\nThe scale figures are notable. DANCINGOASIS and SPINNERET together were generating well over one billion metadata records per day at time of writing. SHELLTRUMPET's country filtering reduced this to approximately 600 million records per day for RT-RG Texas ingest. Despite this reduction, these two accesses provided 85% of RT-RG Texas's total input volume and contained 60% of hits on their targets — indicating highly efficient pre-selection. FAIRVIEW was scheduled to be added to the SHELLTRUMPET flow that same week, expected to spike SSO contributions further.\n\nThe document connects several previously identified programmes. DANCINGOASIS is named as one of the SSO accesses whose metadata SHELLTRUMPET sends to RT-RG Texas. SPINNERET is a previously unnamed SSO programme. FAIRVIEW is the major SSO programme providing access through a US telecommunications carrier.",
+ "tags": [
+ "data processing",
+ "filtering",
+ "source obfuscation"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2012-06-20",
+ "classification": [
+ "SECRET",
+ "SI"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "genre": "newsletter",
+ "programs": [
+ "MYSTIC",
+ "SHELLTRUMPET",
+ "RT-RG",
+ "DANCINGOASIS",
+ "SPINNERET",
+ "FAIRVIEW",
+ "SSO"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2019-05-29",
+ "title": "Mission Creep: How the NSA’s Game-Changing Targeting System Built for Iraq and Afghanistan Ended Up on the Mexico Border",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2019/05/29/nsa-data-afghanistan-iraq-mexico-border/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Moltke, Henrik"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2019/05/29/sso-news-on-mystic-shelltrumpet-for-june-20-2012/",
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/6061130/2012-06-20-SSO-News-MYSTIC-S-SHELLTRUMPET.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "publisher": "NRK",
+ "date_published": "2019-05-29",
+ "title": "Norges hemmelige krig i Afghanistan",
+ "link": "https://www.nrk.no/dokumentar/xl/norges-hemmelige-krig-i-afghanistan-1.14539055",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Skille, Øyvind Bye",
+ "Døvik, Olav",
+ "Hansen, Ståle Ellingsgard",
+ "Fjørtoft, Martin"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "reporting_only": true
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "pdf_sha256": "048caf26c1b9e9ac07cf268daf8d76989d25dc369c7df48be67ffad2d7bfc330",
+ "pages": 1
+}
diff --git a/data/2012-11-07-SIDToday-Attention-SIGINT-Analysts-EO/2012-11-07-SIDToday-Attention-SIGINT-Analysts-EO.md b/data/2012-11-07-SIDToday-Attention-SIGINT-Analysts-EO/2012-11-07-SIDToday-Attention-SIGINT-Analysts-EO.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..82b252c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/2012-11-07-SIDToday-Attention-SIGINT-Analysts-EO/2012-11-07-SIDToday-Attention-SIGINT-Analysts-EO.md
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
+TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
+
+SIDtoday
+
+(U//FOUO) Attention, SIGINT Analysts: E.O. 12333 Transit Communications -- What Are They?
+
+FROM: [REDACTED]
+Deputy Chief, SID Oversight & Compliance (SV)
+Run Date: 11/07/2012
+
+(U//FOUO) Introduction: This article clarifies the difference between NSA's longstanding authority to collect "transit communications" and FISA Amendment Act (FAA) Section 702 authorizations.
+
+(TS//SI//REL) In 1988, NSA received an "extra" measure of authority to collect communications contained in specific Executive Order 12333 wire communications obtained from service-provider accesses located in the United States. This extra measure of E.O. 12333 authority allows NSA to collect communications that transit the United States from a source located outside of the United States to a destination location also outside of the United States. Based on predetermined selection criteria, service providers identify and forward foreign communications transiting their networks for subsequent processing and selection. This supports transit content collection as well as transit-authorized bulk metadata.
+
+(TS//SI//REL) This E.O. 12333 transit communications authority is different from the FISA Amendments Act Section 702 authorizations, which authorize NSA to acquire communications based on specific selectors about intelligence targets associated with a foreign power, foreign territory, foreign government, foreign-based political organization, individual(s) or group(s) engaged in international terrorism, or individuals or groups engaged in proliferating weapons of mass destruction.
+
+(TS//SI//REL) The Office of Special Source Operations (SSO - S353) within SID accesses and exploits the E.O. 12333 transit communications, which include DNR and DNI (limited) traffic. There are three transit programs currently collecting E.O. 12333 transit communications: US-990, US-983, and US-3273. Data collected under SIGAD US-3251 prior to and including 17 May 2012 also falls under transit authority guidelines.
+
+(TS//SI//REL) Analysts working with E.O. 12333 transit communications data: please review an informative slide deck, recently updated by SID and OGC, by clicking HERE or by accessing the S2 Analysis and Production website and selecting the "Transit Training Information" hyperlink. (Note: You must have an NSA TOP SECRET PKI certificate in order to access these slides.)
+
+(U//FOUO) POC for this article: [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]), Communications Lead, SV.
+
+"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)."
+
+DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
+TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
+DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108
diff --git a/data/2012-11-07-SIDToday-Attention-SIGINT-Analysts-EO/metadata.json b/data/2012-11-07-SIDToday-Attention-SIGINT-Analysts-EO/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9b2f165
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/2012-11-07-SIDToday-Attention-SIGINT-Analysts-EO/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+{
+ "title": "Attention, SIGINT Analysts: E.O. 12333 Transit Communications -- What Are They?",
+ "type": "SIDTODAY",
+ "description": "This SIDtoday article clarifies the difference between NSA's longstanding authority to collect \"transit communications\" and FISA Amendment Act (FAA) Section 702 authorizations. The Office of Special Source Operations (SSO) manages these transit communications under various programs like US-990, US-983, and US-3273.",
+ "long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY SIDToday article dated 7 November 2012, authored by the Deputy Chief of SID Oversight and Compliance (SV). The article clarifies the legal basis and operational scope of NSA's transit communications collection authority for SIGINT analysts working with this data.\n\nThe article describes an authority granted to NSA in 1988 under Executive Order 12333 — separate from and additional to FISA authorities — permitting collection of foreign communications that transit the United States from an overseas source to an overseas destination. Under this authority, service providers with access points located in the United States identify and forward foreign transit communications to NSA based on predetermined selection criteria, supporting both transit content collection and transit-authorised bulk metadata collection.\n\nThe article draws a clear distinction between this E.O. 12333 transit authority and FAA Section 702 authorisations. Section 702 authorises collection based on specific selectors associated with identified intelligence targets — foreign powers, foreign territories, foreign governments, political organisations, terrorist groups or WMD proliferators. Transit authority by contrast applies to the communications themselves based on their routing characteristics rather than to identified targets, enabling bulk collection of foreign-to-foreign traffic transiting US infrastructure without selector-based targeting.\n\nThe Office of Special Source Operations (SSO, S353) within SID is identified as the office accessing and exploiting E.O. 12333 transit communications. Four SIGADs are named as operating under this authority: US-990, US-983, US-3273, and US-3251 — with US-3251 having operated under transit authority guidelines only up to and including 17 May 2012, suggesting a change in the legal basis or operational status of that programme after that date.\n\nThe document is significant for confirming the existence of a bulk collection authority predating FISA amendments entirely — rooted in a 1988 executive order — that operates through US-based service provider access points to collect foreign-to-foreign transit traffic, and for naming specific SSO programmes operating under that authority.",
+ "tags": [
+ "transit communications",
+ "Section 702",
+ "bulk metadata",
+ "foreign communications",
+ "SSO",
+ "data collection",
+ "EO 12333",
+ "FAA",
+ "foreign to foreign",
+ "service provider"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2012-11-07",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "SI"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "REL"
+ ],
+ "banner": "DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL",
+ "genre": "newsletter",
+ "programs": [
+ "SSO"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2018-06-25",
+ "title": "The Wiretap Rooms: The NSA’s Hidden Spy Hubs in Eight U.S. Cities",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2018/06/25/att-internet-nsa-spy-hubs/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Gallagher, Ryan",
+ "Moltke, Henrik"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2018/06/26/eo-12333-transit-communications-from-sidtoday/",
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/4560936/2012-11-07-SIDToday-Attention-SIGINT-Analysts-EO.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "e4165135ffda45760d7f96180536d8be9e9c37b112fcc1168289a7e8628c7131",
+ "pages": 2
+}
diff --git a/data/2012-lawful-intercept-redacted2/2012-lawful-intercept-redacted2.md b/data/2012-lawful-intercept-redacted2/2012-lawful-intercept-redacted2.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1afc8bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/2012-lawful-intercept-redacted2/2012-lawful-intercept-redacted2.md
@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+# (S//SI//REL) Exploiting Foreign Lawful Intercept (LI) Roundtable
+
+[REDACTED] S31122
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+## (U) Definition
+
+Lawful Intercept (LI) – obtaining communications network data by legal authority for analysis or evidence
+
+```
+NWO/AP/SvP's domain
+LEA
+domain
+NWO/AP/SvP's
+administration
+function
+HI1
+intercept related
+information (IRI)
+Network
+Internal
+Functions
+IRI mediation
+function
+HI2
+content of
+IIF
+communication (CC)
+INI
+CC mediation
+function
+HI3
+LEMF
+LI handover interface HI
+
+IIF: internal interception function
+INI:internal network interface
+HI1: administrative information
+HI2: intercept related information
+HI3: content of communication
+```
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+## (U) LI Standards
+
+* CALEA (US)
+* ETSI (European)
+* SORM (Russian)
+* Other
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+## (TS//SI//REL) Countries of Interest
+
+* Pakistan
+* Afghanistan
+* Iran
+* Iraq
+* Yemen
+* Syria
+* China
+* Egypt
+* Algeria
+* Mexico
+* Indonesia
+* UAE
+* Saudi Arabia
+* Russia
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+## (S//SI//REL) XKS Fingerprints (~60)
+
+* Aqsacom
+* ATIS
+* Ericsson
+* ETSI
+* Huawei
+* Motorola
+* Nokia
+* Siemens
+* Trovicor
+* Utimaco
+* ZTE
+* GENERIC
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+## (U//FOUO) Access Methods
+
+* FORNSAT
+* Microwave (F6)
+* Special Source Operations (SSO)
+* Tailored Access Operations (TAO)
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+## (S//SI//REL) Taplists
+
+* Developing advanced analytics to determine patterns in numbers being tasked
+* Creating database to store LI-related information
+* Discovering informal tasking
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+## (S//SI//REL) Mapping Networks
+
+* Telecommunication and Internet Service Providers in a region
+* LI vendors/service providers
+* IP addresses/ports of usage
+* Likely transmission medium
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+## (S//SI//REL) Processing Solution
+
+* KITTYBINGE
+* TAO custom solutions
+* STARPROC
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+## (S//SI//REL) Types of LI
+
+* Telecommunication
+* Internet
+* Differentiating between regular voice/Internet traffic from tasked traffic. Protocol indications?
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+## (S//SI//REL) LI Pod
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+## (S//SI//REL) LI Discussion Topics
+
+* Discovery
+* Access Methods
+* Taplist Analytics
+* Corporate Database
+* Corporate Processing Solution
+* Other Issues/Roadblocks
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+---
diff --git a/data/2012-lawful-intercept-redacted2/metadata.json b/data/2012-lawful-intercept-redacted2/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..74a6f39
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/2012-lawful-intercept-redacted2/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+{
+ "title": "Exploiting Foreign Lawful Intercept (LI) Roundtable",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "Top-secret PowerPoint presentation, \"Exploiting Foreign Lawful Intercept Roundtable,\" highlights the agency’s strategy to exploit vulnerabilities in lawful intercept systems from telecom companies, such as Ericsson, Motorola, and Nokia, in countries like Mexico, Indonesia, and Egypt. The presentation also discusses NSA's use of various \"Fingerprints\" for identifying data and its collaboration with industry players and foreign lawful intercept systems.",
+ "long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY presentation by S31122 on exploiting foreign Lawful Intercept infrastructure, describing a Five Eyes roundtable on the topic. The document is significant for confirming that NSA systematically targeted the lawful intercept infrastructure of foreign governments — meaning NSA was intercepting the same communications that foreign law enforcement and intelligence agencies were themselves intercepting under their own domestic legal authority, effectively piggybacking on foreign surveillance systems.\n\nThe definition slide establishes the technical framework. Lawful Intercept involves obtaining communications network data by legal authority, with a standardised architecture comprising internal interception functions, mediation functions and handover interfaces (HI1 for administrative information, HI2 for intercept-related information and HI3 for content of communication) connecting network operators to Law Enforcement Agency Monitoring Facilities. The standards landscape covers CALEA in the US, ETSI in Europe, SORM in Russia and various other national frameworks — each representing a different technical implementation that NSA needed to fingerprint and process.\n\nThe fourteen countries of interest are Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Yemen, Syria, China, Egypt, Algeria, Mexico, Indonesia, UAE, Saudi Arabia and Russia — essentially the full priority target list for NSA's counterterrorism, counterproliferation and geopolitical collection programmes.\n\nApproximately 60 XKeyscore fingerprints had been developed to identify LI-related traffic, covering twelve named vendors: Aqsacom, ATIS, Ericsson, ETSI, Huawei, Motorola, Nokia, Siemens, Trovicor, Utimaco, ZTE and a GENERIC fingerprint. The vendor list is notable — it covers the dominant global suppliers of lawful intercept infrastructure, meaning NSA had fingerprinted the LI systems of the majority of the world's telecommunications networks.\n\nFour access methods are listed: FORNSAT, Microwave (F6), Special Source Operations and TAO. The analytical work described includes developing taplist analytics to identify patterns in numbers being tasked by foreign governments for interception, creating a corporate database for LI-related information, discovering informal tasking, and mapping telecommunications and internet service providers alongside their LI vendors, IP addresses and likely transmission media. Processing solutions named are KITTYBINGE, TAO custom solutions and STARPROC.",
+ "tags": [
+ "lawful intercept",
+ "telecommunications",
+ "vulnerabilities",
+ "Aqsacom",
+ "ATIS",
+ "Ericsson",
+ "ETSI",
+ "Huawei",
+ "Motorola",
+ "Nokia",
+ "Siemens",
+ "Trovicor",
+ "Utimaco",
+ "ZTE",
+ "GENERIC",
+ "SSO",
+ "Tailored Access Operations",
+ "metadata",
+ "CALEA",
+ "SORM",
+ "Microwave (F6)",
+ "Internet Service Providers",
+ "Special Collection Service",
+ "microwave",
+ "FORNSAT",
+ "taplist analytics"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2012-01-01",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "SI"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "REL TO USA, FVEY"
+ ],
+ "banner": "TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY",
+ "genre": "slides",
+ "programs": [
+ "KITTYBINGE",
+ "STARPROC",
+ "XKEYSCORE",
+ "MICROWAVE",
+ "SSO"
+ ],
+ "countries": [
+ "Pakistan",
+ "Afghanistan",
+ "Iran",
+ "Iraq",
+ "Yemen",
+ "Syria",
+ "China",
+ "Egypt",
+ "Algeria",
+ "Mexico",
+ "Indonesia",
+ "United Arab Emirates",
+ "Saudi Arabia",
+ "Russia"
+ ],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2015-09-28",
+ "title": "A Death in Athens",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2015/09/28/death-athens-rogue-nsa-operation/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Bamford, James"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [
+ "Petropoulos, Aggelos",
+ "Gallagher, Ryan"
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "publisher": "Kathimerini",
+ "date_published": "2015-09-29",
+ "title": "Americans and Greeks started the 2004 wiretaps together",
+ "link": "https://www.ekathimerini.com/in-depth/special-report/202026/americans-and-greeks-started-the-2004-wiretaps-together/#firstPage",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Petropoulos, Aggelos"
+ ],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "pdf_sha256": "46f23d8e60536eeaa52757421389f586dc6ff4b031668676a538ea76bc677083",
+ "pages": 12
+}
diff --git a/data/20150323-CBC-CSEC_Cyber_Threat_Capabilities/20150323-CBC-CSEC_Cyber_Threat_Capabilities.md b/data/20150323-CBC-CSEC_Cyber_Threat_Capabilities/20150323-CBC-CSEC_Cyber_Threat_Capabilities.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8f7810f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/20150323-CBC-CSEC_Cyber_Threat_Capabilities/20150323-CBC-CSEC_Cyber_Threat_Capabilities.md
@@ -0,0 +1,1703 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY
+Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
+Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
+
+# CSEC Cyber Threat Capabilities
+## SIGINT and ITS: an end-to-end approach
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+1
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY
+Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
+Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
+
+## Cyber Security
+
+* What do we mean by Cyber?
+ - Detection / Discovery and Tracking of State-Sponsored Hacking
+ - Counter-Intelligence Reporting / Mitigation Advice and Defence against Cyber Threats
+
+* SIGINT Detects Cyber Activity
+ - Access Canadian and Allied collection to discover and track covert networks (counter-intelligence)
+
+* IT Security Defends against Cyber Activity
+ - Sensors Government of Canada networks to identify malicious activity and enhance defences
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+2
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY
+Communications Security Establishment Canada
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
+
+## Comprehensive Cyber Capabilities
+
+```
+A:
+Selection and Filtering
+
+B:
+Communications Security Establishment
+
+C:
+Processing and Enrichment
+Protocol Analysis
+
+D:
+Crypt Attack
+
+E:
+Data Repositories
+
+F:
+Network Analysis
+
+G:
+Cyber Analysis
+
+H:
+Intelligence
+Counter Intelligence
+Threat Evaluation
+Knowledge Transfer
+
+1: GoC
+2: S.16
+3: Canada
+4: Internet
+5
+
+1 IT Security
+2 Warranted
+3 Special Source
+4 5-Eyes Network
+5 CNE
+```
+
+3
+Canada
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY
+Communications Security Establishment Canada
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
+
+## The Grand Challenge – Detection
+
+* EONBLUE is the cyber threat detection sensor developed and deployed in SIGINT and ITS
+ * Cyber threat tracking (signature-based detection)
+ * Cyber threat discovery (anomaly-based detection)
+
+* A 6+ year effort that incorporates the best of breed detection algorithms/technology in collaboration with our 5-eyes partners
+ * Based on classified knowledge
+ * Scales to major ISP network speeds (10G)
+ * Enables rapid prototyping to adapt to ever changing threats
+
+```
+Target Discovery (Anomaly)
+Metadata Generation (Situational Awareness)
+Target Tracking (Signatures)
+EONBLUE
+```
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+4
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY
+Communications Security Establishment Canada
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
+
+## The Cyber Landscape
+
+* Adversaries and Targets
+ * Operate globally
+ * Varying degrees of sophistication
+ * Constantly changing tools and techniques
+
+* Detection / Discovery
+ * Tools must operate at all network speeds
+ * Deep Packet Inspection at scale
+ * Targeting tradecraft / protocols vs. individuals
+ * We must 'live' in cyber space
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+5
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY
+Communications Security Establishment Canada
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
+
+## Why is Cyber Critical?
+
+```
+Nodong Missile
+Range: 1300km
+Type: Ballistic
+
+Taepodong Missile
+Range: 2900km
+Type: Multistage
+Payload: Nuclear
+
+Desktop PC
+Range: the internet
+Type: IBM
+Payload: DDoS
+Cost: 500$
+
+North Korea
+```
+
+6
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY
+Communications Security Establishment Canada
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
+
+## Working in Cyber Space
+
+* Tools must adapt constantly / quickly
+ * Signature based targeting
+ * Metadata analytics
+ * Custom tradecraft for discovery
+
+* Would I do a better job from my PC at home?
+ * Enhance / Enable collaboration
+ * Adopt Internet technologies on our Classified networks
+ * SKYPE / Web 2.0 / Video Chat / Google Apps / etc
+ * Centralize our 'cyber' analytics
+ * CyberDMZ
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+7
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY
+Communications Security Establishment Canada
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
+
+## SEEDSPHERE - Discovery
+
+* EONBLUE anomaly detection utilities isolate network anomalies
+ * Discover network beacons in Warranted full-take collection
+
+* Knowledge developed is shared with CNE
+ * During CNE activities, implant is found to be cohabitating
+ * Implant is copied to CSEC HQ for reverse engineering
+
+* IT Security detects SEEDSPHERE attacks against Government of Canada weekly
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+8
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY
+Communications Security Establishment Canada
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
+
+## Repositories – At Collection Site
+
+* Global Access is pushing tradecraft to the front-end of access
+* 50 terabytes of high speed storage
+* Processing over 125GB/hour of HTTP metadata
+
+```
+Cluster throughput (file system)
+400 Mb/s
+300 Mb/s
+200 Mb/s
+100 Mb/s
+06/11 06/14 06/16 06/18 06/21 06/23 06/25
+Inbound Outbound
+
+764.8 Mb/s
+611.9 Mb/s
+458.9 Mb/s
+305.9 Mb/s
+152.9 Mb/s
+06/12 06/13 06/13 06/14 06/15 06/16 06/17 06/18 06/19 06/20 06/21 06/22 06/23 06/24 06/25
+
+CPU usage
+100%
+80%
+60%
+40%
+20%
+0%
+06/11 06/14 06/16 06/18 06/21 06/23 06/25
+System User Total
+
+Black Line: Total data into the Cluster
+Blue Line: Data Outbound from SAN
+
+Data deduplication at sight results in much better use of limited bandwidth
+
+Data into the cluster is balanced across multiple nodes. Each color denotes a separate node, automatically dividing the load amongst all systems
+```
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+9
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY
+Communications Security Establishment Canada
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
+
+## Cyber Repositories
+
+* In 2009 an average of 112,794 IP traffic items related to cyber threat collected each day from Canadian and Allied sources
+* Traditional SIGINT sources prove invaluable in cyber threat analysis
+ * Travel Tracking Databases used to attribute CNE activity along with SMS collection
+* IT Security domestic sensors store 300TB of full-take
+ * Equivalent to 'months' of traffic
+ * Enables historical analysis and anomaly detection
+* In 2009 IT Security domestic sensors enable 95 mitigation actions
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+10
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY
+Communications Security Establishment Canada
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
+
+## F: Network Analysis
+
+```
+3356
+LEVEL3 Level 3 Comms.
+
+6762
+SEABONE-NET Telecom
+Italia Sparkle
+
+25973
+MZIMA - Mzima Networks,
+Inc.
+
+15290
+ALLST-15290- Allstream
+Corp. Corp. Allstream
+
+25689
+NRONET-AS National
+Research Council
+of Canada
+
+2884
+NAP-THREE - RA-NAP
+
+2669
+CDAGOVN-Government
+Telcos. and Informatics
+Services
+
+12653
+COMTONET COMTONET
+
+41589
+VICUS-AS VICUS S.A.
+
+3491
+BTN-ASN - Beyond The
+Network America,
+Inc.
+
+703
+UUNET - MCI Comms. Services,
+Inc. d/b/a Verizon
+Business
+
+4635
+HKIX-RS1 Hong Kong
+Internet Exchange--Route
+Server 1
+
+8447
+TELEKOM-AT Telekom
+Austria AutonomousSys.
+
+10310
+YAHOO-1-Yahoo!
+
+1299
+TELIANET TeliaNet
+Global Network
+
+2914
+NTT-COMMUNICATIONS-2914
+-NTT America, Inc.
+
+701
+UUNET - MCI Comms. Services
+Inc. d/b/a Verizon
+Business
+
+2497
+IIJ Internet Initiative
+Japan Inc.
+
+3303
+SWISSCOM Swisscom
+(Switzerland) Ltd
+
+6453
+GLOBEINTERNET TATA
+Comms.
+
+577
+BACOM - Bell Canada
+
+3766
+DNDOFNET 2 - Department
+of National Defence/DISEM
+
+1239
+SPRINTLINK - Sprint
+
+3561
+SAVVIS - Savvis
+```
+
+11
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY
+Communications Security Establishment Canada
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
+
+## Cyber Analysis
+
+```
+5
+4
+3
+2
+1
+
+5 Cyber Report
+4 Network Analysis
+3 Malware Reverse Engineering
+2 Traffic Analysis
+1 Tasking and Collection
+```
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+12
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY
+Communications Security Establishment Canada
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
+
+# Mitigation
+
+* Direct protection of GC systems and information
+ * Prevention and response activity
+ * Leverage SIGINT and 5 Eyes intelligence, complemented by our own GC domestic sensor capabilities
+ * Report:
+ * Actionable technical mitigation reports provided to client's IPC
+ * Cyber threat situational awareness reports provided to departments
+ * CSEC review of incidents against systems of importance
+ * CSEC analysts deployed to capture technical evidence to develop/support mitigation activity
+ * CSEC information is merged with all-source cyber threat activities to create complete picture of cyber threats
+
+```
+Government of Canada
+Cleanup / Strengthen
+Detection
+Defence in Depth
+Discovery
+Proactive Defence
+Systems of Importance
+Active Defence
+Advice and Guidance
+```
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+13
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY
+Communications Security Establishment Canada
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
+
+## Positioning for the future
+
+```
+delivers
+OUTCOMES
+
+Defence
+
+Counter Intelligence
+
+DETECT
+(Discover and Track)
+
+DESCRIBE
+(Evaluation)
+
+DEFEND
+(Protect Government)
+
+enable by
+ACCESS
+and
+ANALYSIS
+
+MISSION
+
+CYBER THREAT PURSUIT
+
+Today
+Tommorrow
+from RESPONSE to ACTION
+```
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+14
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY
+Communications Security Establishment Canada
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
+
+## Synchronized SIGINT / ITS Mission Space
+
+```
+GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+STREAMING SENTRY
+Government of Canada
+
+Canada / Foreign
+
+Government- Tips
+
+Joint Repository
+
+Domestic to Government
+Foreign to Government
+Government to Government
+
+PHOTONIC PRISM
+
+Joint TKB
+
+TKB
+
+TKB
+
+Foreign to Domestic
+Foreign to Foreign
+(Domestic to Domestic)
+
+EONBLUE
+
+MANDATE B
+
+Lowspeed
+Rich
+Content
+
+Cyber
+Metadata
+
+Cyber
+Events
+
+Highspeed
+Cyber
+Events
+
+Cyber
+Metadata
+
+Highspeed
+Content
+
+CTEC
+
+Cross-Correlation
+of Cyber Events
+
+Cyber
+Threat
+Evaluation
+
+MANDATE A / C
+
+Warranted Domestic
+
+Warranted
+Rich
+Content
+```
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+15
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY
+Communications Security Establishment Canada
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
+
+## Situational Awareness
+
+* SA is:
+ * The perception of environmental elements within a volume of space and time
+ * The comprehension of their meaning
+ * Projection of their status in the near future
+ * Insight - the capacity to understand hidden truths
+* In the Cyber Context:
+ * Gathering and enabling access to cyber information
+ * Event Metadata / Event Content / Near Real-Time Exchange
+ * Data mining of cyber information to create understanding in broader context
+ * Predict our adversaries actions based on this knowledge
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY
+Communications Security Establishment Canada
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
+
+## Cyber Session Collection
+
+```
+Victim Computer
+
+DNS Server
+
+CNE Actor
+
+1
+3
+4
+5
+
+1. Implant performs DNS Lookup for 'evilDomain.org'
+2. DNS Server returns the value '127.0.0.1'; Implant remains idle
+3. Implant performs DNS Lookup for 'evilDomain.org'
+4. DNS Server returns the IP of CNE Actor Infrastructure
+5. Implant connects to the CNE Actor infrastructure at IP returned in step 4
+```
+
+Canada
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY
+Communications Security Establishment Canada
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
+
+## Enabled by Sydney Resolution
+
+```
+Government Of Canada
+
+ITS Event Store
+
+ITS Analyst
+
+Photonic Prism
+
+EONBLUE
+
+SPECIAL SOURCE
+
+.alert
+.pcap
+
+NSA
+GCHQ
+GCSB
+DSD
+
+NRT Alerting Engine
+
+Decision Logic
+
+.alert
+RSS
+.pcap
+
+SIGINT Analyst
+
+SIGINT Event Store
+
+Partner Messaging
+```
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+18
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY
+Communications Security Establishment Canada
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
+
+## Tipping and Cueing (Why)
+
+* SIGINT – data volumes/network speeds impose severe temporal restrictions on collection (use it or lose it)
+ * ability to extend cyber target tracking across all 5-Eyes accesses and/or analytic event stores instead of just domestic - global aperture
+ * ability to uncover covert overlay networks
+ * cyber session collection? Uncover tradecraft/binaries/exploit vectors...
+* CND - network edge vs. network core (microscope vs. telescope)
+ * enable mitigation of cyber exploitation and/or attack (dynamic defence)
+ * facilitate indications and warning – can SIGINT provide me with the true threat picture in NRT? Could we detect "test firing" of new tools/techniques?
+ * collaborative defence - can my partners see malicious activity in SIGINT against networks I need to protect? Can they tell me in NRT?
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+19
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY
+Communications Security Establishment Canada
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
+
+## SIGINT -> ITS Tipping
+
+Sample of CNO tips provided to ITS from SIGINT SSO on May 05, 2010.
+
+DS800| SEEDSPHERE - [REDACTED]
+DS800| SEEDSPHERE - [REDACTED]
+DS800| SEEDSPHERE - [REDACTED]
+DS800| SEEDSPHERE - [REDACTED]
+DS800| SEEDSPHERE - [REDACTED]
+DS800| SEEDSPHERE - [REDACTED]
+DS800| SUPERDRAKE - [REDACTED]
+DS800| SEEDSPHERE - [REDACTED]
+DS800| SUPERDRAKE - [REDACTED]
+DS800| SEEDSPHERE - [REDACTED]
+
+The Network Name is: canadian house of commons
+The Network Name is: environment canada
+The Network Name is: federal office of regional development (quebec)
+The Network Name is: forestry canada
+The Network Name is: public works and government services canada
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+20
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY
+Communications Security Establishment Canada
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
+
+## Dynamic Defense
+
+* All elements acting as one
+* Defence at:
+ * Network Edge (ITS)
+ * Localized/tailored mitigation (e.g. blocking, binary neutering, redirection)
+ * Focused response to ongoing and potential threats
+ * Network Core (SIGINT)
+ * Global mitigation possible (e.g. redirection, null routing, filtering)
+ * Large scale (but still focused!) response to ongoing and potential threats
+ * Adversary Space (CNE)
+ * Reconnaissance – probe/explore/learn adversarial network space
+ * Co-habitate covert network infrastructure for info gathering, tool extraction, etc
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+21
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY
+Communications Security Establishment Canada
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
+
+## Cyber Activity Spectrum
+
+```
+SECRET//COMINT
+
+CNE/CNA
+* CNE Implant OPSEC Monitoring
+* CNE Pursuit Recover Binaries / etc -
+* CNE Pursuit Implant Adversary Infrastructure -
+* CNE Insertion (Quantum)
+* CNE Disruption Control Adversary Infrastructure
+* CNE Disruption Disable Adversary Infrastructure -
+* CNA Destroy Adversary Infrastructure
+
+Deception Techniques
+* DARKSPACE Leverage SSO for I&W
+* Honey Token Deploy in GoC / Track in SIGINT
+* Honeypot Deploy in GoC/ Track In SIGINT
+* Honeynet Deploy in GoC/ Track in SIGINT
+* False Flag Operations - create unrest -
+* Effects Alter adversary perception
+
+Passive SIGINT Techniques
+* 2-End CDN Filter
+* Network Monitoring (Tracking Known) International -
+* Network Monitoring (Discovery) international -
+* No 2-End CDN Filter
+* Network Monitoring (Tracking Known) domestic -
+* Network Monitoring (Discovery) domestic -
+
+Dynamic Defence Technologies
+* In-line IP Blacklisting
+* Domain Name System Control (redirection / disruption / etc)
+* Traffic Alteration (inbound i.e. Neuter malware)
+* Traffic Redirection (inbound i.e. quarantine traffic)
+* Traffic Alteration (outbound i.e. Insert malware)
+
+Host Based Defence
+* Red Teaming
+* HBMIDS
+* Defensive Implant (OPSEC Monitoring)
+
+Network Monitoring Techniques
+* Network Monitoring (Tracking Known)
+* Network Monitoring (Discovery)
+* QRC (Lightweight Network Sensor)
+
+Commercial / Industry / Relationships
+
+Dept Resp
+* Commercial Defence (Anti-Virus / Firewall / ETC)
+* Influence Technology (provide Signature to AV)
+* Supply Chain
+* Political Demarche
+
+Cross Domain Solution - Tipping and Cueing
+
+* Defensive Operation
+* Passive Operation
+* Active Operation
+```
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY
+Communications Security Establishment Canada
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
+
+## Dynamic Defense Scenarios
+
+```
+Rules Engine
+Network A
+Inline Defensive Device
+Network B
+Honeynet
+INTERNET
+CNE Action
+Network C
+```
+
+Canada
+23
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY
+Communications Security Establishment Canada
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
+
+## Next Steps
+
+### Domestic
+
+* Synchronize SIGINT and ITS Mission
+* Alignment with Cyber Strategy
+* Funding
+* Joint Approach for Domestic Partners
+* Recruitment and Staffing for Growth
+* Joint Capabilities Development (Sensors and Analytics)
+
+### Consider
+
+* Legislative Amendments
+* Develop Career Framework
+
+### International
+
+* Tipping and Cueing
+* Interoperability
+* Policy Coordination
+* 5-Eyes Interoperability and Policy
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+24
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY
+Communications Security Establishment Canada
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
+
+## If you build it... they will come
+
+Rather Than
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY
+Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
+Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
+
+# CSEC Cyber Threat Capabilities
+## SIGINT and ITS: an end-to-end approach
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+1
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY
+Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
+Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
+
+## Cyber Security
+
+* What do we mean by Cyber?
+ - Detection / Discovery and Tracking of State-Sponsored Hacking
+ - Counter-Intelligence Reporting / Mitigation Advice and Defence against Cyber Threats
+
+* SIGINT Detects Cyber Activity
+ - Access Canadian and Allied collection to discover and track covert networks (counter-intelligence)
+
+* IT Security Defends against Cyber Activity
+ - Sensors Government of Canada networks to identify malicious activity and enhance defences
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+2
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY
+Communications Security Establishment Canada
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
+
+## Comprehensive Cyber Capabilities
+
+```
+A:
+Selection and Filtering
+
+B:
+Communications Security Establishment
+
+C:
+Processing and Enrichment
+Protocol Analysis
+
+D:
+Crypt Attack
+
+E:
+Data Repositories
+
+F:
+Network Analysis
+
+G:
+Cyber Analysis
+
+H:
+Intelligence
+Counter Intelligence
+Threat Evaluation
+Knowledge Transfer
+
+1: GoC
+2: S.16
+3: Canada
+4: Internet
+5
+
+1 IT Security
+2 Warranted
+3 Special Source
+4 5-Eyes Network
+5 CNE
+```
+
+3
+Canada
+
+Speak: [REDACTED] (GA4)
+
+- Added output to the 5-Eyes which is labelled as Knowledge Transfer (mention the sharing of tradecraft / techniques / tools / etc)
+- Mention how analytic work load is split among parnters
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY
+Communications Security Establishment Canada
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
+
+## The Grand Challenge – Detection
+
+* EONBLUE is the cyber threat detection sensor developed and deployed in SIGINT and ITS
+ * Cyber threat tracking (signature-based detection)
+ * Cyber threat discovery (anomaly-based detection)
+
+* A 6+ year effort that incorporates the best of breed detection algorithms/technology in collaboration with our 5-eyes partners
+ * Based on classified knowledge
+ * Scales to major ISP network speeds (10G)
+ * Enables rapid prototyping to adapt to ever changing threats
+
+Target Discovery (Anomaly)
+Metadata Generation (Situational Awareness)
+Target Tracking (Signatures)
+EONBLUE
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+4
+
+Speaker: [REDACTED] (ITS)
+
+- Message is commercial is not enough
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY
+Communications Security Establishment Canada
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
+
+## The Cyber Landscape
+
+* Adversaries and Targets
+ * Operate globally
+ * Varying degrees of sophistication
+ * Constantly changing tools and techniques
+
+* Detection / Discovery
+ * Tools must operate at all network speeds
+ * Deep Packet Inspection at scale
+ * Targeting tradecraft / protocols vs. individuals
+ * We must 'live' in cyber space
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+5
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY
+Communications Security Establishment Canada
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
+
+## Why is Cyber Critical?
+
+```
+Nodong Missile
+Range: 1300km
+Type: Ballistic
+
+Taepodong Missile
+Range: 2900km
+Type: Multistage
+Payload: Nuclear
+
+Desktop PC
+Range: The internet
+Type: IBM
+Payload: DDoS
+Cost: 500$
+
+North Korea
+```
+
+6
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY
+Communications Security Establishment Canada
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
+
+## Working in Cyber Space
+
+* Tools must adapt constantly / quickly
+ * Signature based targeting
+ * Metadata analytics
+ * Custom tradecraft for discovery
+
+* Would I do a better job from my PC at home?
+ * Enhance / Enable collaboration
+ * Adopt Internet technologies on our Classified networks
+ * SKYPE / Web 2.0 / Video Chat / Google Apps / etc
+ * Centralize our 'cyber' analytics
+ * CyberDMZ
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+7
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY
+Communications Security Establishment Canada
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
+
+## SEEDSPHERE - Discovery
+
+* EONBLUE anomaly detection utilities isolate network anomalies
+ * Discover network beacons in Warranted full-take collection
+
+* Knowledge developed is shared with CNE
+ * During CNE activities, implant is found to be cohabitating
+ * Implant is copied to CSEC HQ for reverse engineering
+
+* IT Security detects SEEDSPHERE attacks against Government of Canada weekly
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+8
+
+Speaker: [REDACTED]
+
+-Major point: How it is an all-source collection effort to get the data
+-Explain the value of COVENANT to seed new discovery
+-How CNE is now seeding new discovery
+-How ITS detects attacks into GC
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY
+Communications Security Establishment Canada
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
+
+## Repositories – At Collection Site
+
+* Global Access is pushing tradecraft to the front-end of access
+* 50 terabytes of high speed storage
+* Processing over 125GB/hour of HTTP metadata
+
+```
+Cluster throughput (file system)
+400 Mb/s
+300 Mb/s
+200 Mb/s
+100 Mb/s
+06/11 06/14 06/16 06/18 06/21 06/23 06/25
+Inbound Outbound
+
+7643 Mb/s
+6119 Mb/s
+458.9 Mb/s
+305 Mb/s
+153 Mb/s
+06/12 06/13 06/17 06/14 06/15 06/16 06/17 06/18 06/19 06/20 06/21 06/22 06/23 06/24 06/25
+
+CPU usage
+100%
+80%
+60%
+40%
+20%
+0%
+06/11 06/14 06/16 06/18 06/21 06/23 06/25
+System User Total
+
+Black Line: Total data into the Cluster
+Blue Line: Data Outbound from SAN
+
+Data deduplication at sight results in much better use of limited bandwidth
+
+Data into the cluster is balanced across multiple nodes. Each color denotes a separate node, automatically dividing the load amongst all systems
+```
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+9
+
+Speaker: [REDACTED]
+
+We are talking about the massive volumes (Reference to earlier SSO briefing). There is so much traffic we keep it at the front-end and do advanced datamining / new tradecraft development
+50TB = Library of Congress 3 times over
+125GB of data = 14 Hours of High Definition Video
+
+SIGINT 2010 – Keep stuff online
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY
+Communications Security Establishment Canada
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
+
+## Cyber Repositories
+
+* In 2009 an average of 112,794 IP traffic items related to cyber threat collected each day from Canadian and Allied sources
+* Traditional SIGINT sources prove invaluable in cyber threat analysis
+ * Travel Tracking Databases used to attribute CNE activity along with SMS collection
+* IT Security domestic sensors store 300TB of full-take
+ * Equivalent to 'months' of traffic
+ * Enables historical analysis and anomaly detection
+* In 2009 IT Security domestic sensors enable 95 mitigation actions
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+10
+
+Speaker: [REDACTED]
+
+Major Point (Traffic breakdown is 70/30 for SIGINT)
+Canadian Collect is almost all actionable
+Canadian Collect is more precise because of EONBLUE
+IT Security generates Mass quantity of valuable information on attacks (Linked to their fulltake capability)
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY
+Communications Security Establishment Canada
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
+
+## F: Network Analysis
+
+```
+3356
+LEVEL3 Level 3 Comms.
+
+6762
+SEABONE-NET Telecom
+Italia Sparkle
+
+25973
+MZIMA - Mzima Networks,
+Inc.
+
+15290
+ALLST-15290- Allstream
+Corp. Corp. Allstream
+
+25689
+NRONET-AS National
+Research Council
+of Canada
+
+2884
+NAP-THREE - RA-NAP
+
+2669
+CDAGOVN-Government
+Telcos. and Informatics
+Services
+
+12653
+41589
+VICOUS-AS VICUS S.A.
+
+3491
+BTN-ASN - Beyond The
+Network America,
+Inc.
+
+4635
+HKIX-RS1 Hong Kong
+Internet Exchange--Route
+Server 1
+
+8447
+TELEKOM AT Telekom
+Austria AutonomousSys.
+
+10310
+YAHOO-1-Yahoo!
+
+1299
+TELIANET TeliaNet
+Global Network
+
+2914
+NTT-COMMUNICATIONS-2914
+-NTT America, Inc.
+
+701
+UUNET - MCI Comms. Services
+Inc. d/b/a Verizon
+Business
+
+703
+UUNET - MCI Comms. Services,
+Inc. d/b/a Verizon Business
+
+2497
+IIJ Internet Initiative
+Japan Inc.
+
+3303
+SWISSCOM Swisscom
+(Switzerland) Ltd
+
+6453
+GLOBEINTERNET TATA
+Comms.
+
+577
+BACOM - Bell Canada
+
+3766
+DNDOFNET 2-Department
+of National Defence/DISEM
+
+1239
+SPRINTLINK - Sprint
+
+3561
+SAVVIS - Savvis
+```
+
+11
+
+Speaker: [REDACTED]
+
+- Expand on how ANT provides best point of access (TBD)
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY
+Communications Security Establishment Canada
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
+
+## Cyber Analysis
+
+```
+5
+4
+3
+2
+1
+
+5 Cyber Report
+4 Network Analysis
+3 Malware Reverse Engineering
+2 Traffic Analysis
+1 Tasking and Collection
+```
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+12
+
+Speaker: [REDACTED]
+
+Major Points – A lot goes into a Cyber Threat Report We must stay on top of Tasking, Traffic Analysis / Reverse Engineering, Network Analysis all feed into a Cyber Report. We do this quickly because of tradecraft
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY
+Communications Security Establishment Canada
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
+
+## Mitigation
+
+* Direct protection of GC systems and information
+ * Prevention and response activity
+ * Leverage SIGINT and 5 Eyes intelligence, complemented by our own GC domestic sensor capabilities
+ * Report:
+ * Actionable technical mitigation reports provided to client's IPC
+ * Cyber threat situational awareness reports provided to departments
+ * CSEC review of incidents against systems of importance
+ * CSEC analysts deployed to capture technical evidence to develop/support mitigation activity
+ * CSEC information is merged with all-source cyber threat activities to create complete picture of cyber threats
+
+```
+Government of Canada
+Cleanup / Strengthen
+Detection
+Defence in Depth
+Discovery
+Proactive Defence
+Systems of Importance
+Active Defence
+Advice and Guidance
+```
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+13
+
+Speaker: [REDACTED]
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY
+Communications Security Establishment Canada
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
+
+## Positioning for the future
+
+```
+delivers
+OUTCOMES
+
+Defence
+
+Counter Intelligence
+
+DETECT
+(Discover and Track)
+
+DESCRIBE
+(Evaluation)
+
+DEFEND
+(Protect Government)
+
+enable by
+ACCESS
+and
+ANALYSIS
+
+MISSION
+
+CYBER THREAT PURSUIT
+
+Today
+Tommorrow
+from RESPONSE to ACTION
+```
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+14
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY
+Communications Security Establishment Canada
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
+
+## Synchronized SIGINT / ITS Mission Space
+
+```
+GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+STREAMING SENTRY
+Government of Canada
+
+Canada / Foreign
+
+Government - Tips
+
+Joint Repository
+
+Domestic to Government
+Foreign to Government
+Government to Government
+
+PHOTONIC PRISM
+
+Joint TKB
+
+TKB
+
+TKB
+
+Foreign to Domestic
+Foreign to Foreign
+(Domestic to Domestic)
+
+EONBLUE
+
+MANDATE B
+
+Lowspeed
+Rich
+Content
+
+Cyber
+Metadata
+
+Cyber
+Events
+
+Highspeed
+Cyber
+Events
+
+Cyber
+Metadata
+
+Highspeed
+Content
+
+CTEC
+
+Cross-Correlation
+of Cyber Events
+
+Cyber
+Threat
+Evaluation
+
+MANDATE A / C
+
+Warranted Domestic
+
+Warranted
+Rich
+Content
+```
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+15
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY
+Communications Security Establishment Canada
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
+
+## Situational Awareness
+
+* SA is:
+ * The perception of environmental elements within a volume of space and time
+ * The comprehension of their meaning
+ * Projection of their status in the near future
+ * Insight – the capacity to understand hidden truths
+* In the Cyber Context:
+ * Gathering and enabling access to cyber information
+ * Event Metadata / Event Content / Near Real-Time Exchange
+ * Data mining of cyber information to create understanding in broader context
+ * Predict our adversaries actions based on this knowledge
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY
+Communications Security Establishment Canada
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
+
+## Cyber Session Collection
+
+```
+Victim Computer
+
+DNS Server
+
+CNE Actor
+
+1
+3
+4
+5
+
+1. Implant performs DNS Lookup for 'evilDomain.org'
+2. DNS Server returns the value '127.0.0.1'; Implant remains idle
+3. Implant performs DNS Lookup for 'evilDomain.org'
+4. DNS Server returns the IP of CNE Actor Infrastructure
+5. Implant connects to the CNE Actor infrastructure at IP returned in step 4
+```
+
+Canada
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY
+Communications Security Establishment Canada
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
+
+## Enabled by Sydney Resolution
+
+```
+Government Of Canada
+
+ITS Event Store
+
+ITS Analyst
+
+Photonic Prism
+
+EONBLUE
+
+SPECIAL SOURCE
+
+.alert
+.pcap
+
+NSA
+GCHQ
+GCSB
+DSD
+
+NRT Alerting Engine
+
+Decision Logic
+
+.alert
+RSS
+.pcap
+
+SIGINT Analyst
+
+SIGINT Event Store
+
+Partner Messaging
+```
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+18
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY
+Communications Security Establishment Canada
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
+
+## Tipping and Cueing (Why)
+
+* SIGINT – data volumes/network speeds impose severe temporal restrictions on collection (use it or lose it)
+ * ability to extend cyber target tracking across all 5-Eyes accesses and/or analytic event stores instead of just domestic – global aperture
+ * ability to uncover covert overlay networks
+ * cyber session collection? Uncover tradecraft/binaries/exploit vectors...
+* CND - network edge vs. network core (microscope vs. telescope)
+ * enable mitigation of cyber exploitation and/or attack (dynamic defence)
+ * facilitate indications and warning – can SIGINT provide me with the true threat picture in NRT? Could we detect "test firing" of new tools/techniques?
+ * collaborative defence - can my partners see malicious activity in SIGINT against networks I need to protect? Can they tell me in NRT?
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+19
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY
+Communications Security Establishment Canada
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
+
+## SIGINT -> ITS Tipping
+
+Sample of CNO tips provided to ITS from SIGINT SSO on May 05, 2010.
+
+DS800| SEEDSPHERE - [REDACTED]
+DS800| SEEDSPHERE - [REDACTED]
+DS800| SEEDSPHERE - [REDACTED]
+DS800| SEEDSPHERE - [REDACTED]
+DS800| SEEDSPHERE - [REDACTED]
+DS800| SEEDSPHERE - [REDACTED]
+DS800| SUPERDRAKE - [REDACTED]
+DS800| SEEDSPHERE - [REDACTED]
+DS800| SUPERDRAKE - [REDACTED]
+DS800| SEEDSPHERE - [REDACTED]
+
+The Network Name is: canadian house of commons
+The Network Name is: environment canada
+The Network Name is: federal office of regional development (quebec)
+The Network Name is: forestry canada
+The Network Name is: public works and government services canada
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+20
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY
+Communications Security Establishment Canada
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
+
+## Dynamic Defense
+
+* All elements acting as one
+* Defence at:
+ * Network Edge (ITS)
+ * Localized/tailored mitigation (e.g. blocking, binary neutering, redirection)
+ * Focused response to ongoing and potential threats
+ * Network Core (SIGINT)
+ * Global mitigation possible (e.g. redirection, null routing, filtering)
+ * Large scale (but still focused!) response to ongoing and potential threats
+ * Adversary Space (CNE)
+ * Reconnaissance – probe/explore/learn adversarial network space
+ * Co-habitate covert network infrastructure for info gathering, tool extraction, etc
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+21
diff --git a/data/20150323-CBC-CSEC_Cyber_Threat_Capabilities/metadata.json b/data/20150323-CBC-CSEC_Cyber_Threat_Capabilities/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e4d443e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/20150323-CBC-CSEC_Cyber_Threat_Capabilities/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+{
+ "title": "CSEC Cyber Threat Capabilities",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "This document details CSEC’s full-spectrum cyber operations architecture, integrating SIGINT and IT Security to conduct both defensive and offensive activities under the guise of “information superiority.” While early sections emphasize detection, anomaly analysis, and collaboration with Five Eyes partners, later portions reveal active measures including network infiltration (implant deployment), command-and-control tracking, traffic manipulation and redirection, DNS interference, and potential disruption or deception operations—illustrating CSEC’s capacity not only to defend Canadian networks but also to surveil, exploit, and influence foreign and domestic digital infrastructure.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [
+ "CSEC",
+ "CSE",
+ "ITS",
+ "cyber threat",
+ "anomaly detection",
+ "Computer Network Exploitation",
+ "Computer Network Attack",
+ "offensive cyber operations",
+ "network compromise",
+ "implants",
+ "malware analysis",
+ "deception",
+ "false flags",
+ "traffic manipulation",
+ "traffic redirection",
+ "DNS",
+ "DNS attacks",
+ "command and control",
+ "botnets",
+ "fast flux botnets",
+ "malware cyber situational awareness",
+ "metadata analysis",
+ "deep packet inspection",
+ "Five Eyes",
+ "information superiority",
+ "threat tracking",
+ "counterintelligence",
+ "defensive cyber",
+ "dynamic defense",
+ "network monitoring",
+ "honeypot",
+ "passive SIGINT",
+ "host-based defense",
+ "tipping",
+ "cross-domain operations",
+ "supply chain",
+ "OPSEC",
+ "cybersecurity",
+ "government networks",
+ "adversary networks",
+ "exploitation",
+ "mitigation",
+ "cyber analytics",
+ "joint capabilities",
+ "international collaboration",
+ "covert network monitoring",
+ "IP blacklisting",
+ "traffic quarantine",
+ "SIGINT event store",
+ "data repository",
+ "metadata repositories",
+ "repositories",
+ "protocol analysis",
+ "cryptanalysis",
+ "threat assessment",
+ "tradecraft",
+ "covert overlay networks",
+ "adaptive tradecraft",
+ "network defense"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "CSE",
+ "date_created": "",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "REL TO FVEY"
+ ],
+ "banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY",
+ "genre": "slides",
+ "programs": [
+ "EONBLUE",
+ "CYBERDMZ",
+ "SEEDSPHERE",
+ "PHOTONICPRISM",
+ "SPECIALSOURCE",
+ "SUPERDRAKE",
+ "DARKSPACE",
+ "QUANTUM",
+ "MANDATE",
+ "STREAMING SENTRY",
+ "SSO",
+ "TKB",
+ "COVENANT"
+ ],
+ "countries": [
+ "Canada",
+ "North Korea",
+ "Switzerland",
+ "Italy",
+ "Japan",
+ "Austria",
+ "Hong Kong"
+ ],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "CBC News",
+ "date_published": "2015-03-23",
+ "title": "Communication Security Establishment's cyberwarfare toolbox revealed",
+ "link": "https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/communication-security-establishment-s-cyberwarfare-toolbox-revealed-1.3002978",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Seglins, Dave",
+ "Hildebrandt, Amber",
+ "Pereira, Michael",
+ "Greenwald, Glenn",
+ "Gallagher, Ryan"
+ ],
+ "contributors": []
+ },
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2015-03-23",
+ "title": "Documents Reveal Canada’s Secret Hacking Tactics",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2015/03/23/canada-cse-hacking-cyberwar-secret-arsenal/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Gallagher, Ryan"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1690224/doc-6-cyber-threat-capabilities.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "pdf_sha256": "b3ab730e61527deaccbcbde7c23bf035f08c2d32743c37a0fd8844ae48182806",
+ "pages": 46
+}
diff --git a/data/20150323-CBC-Cascade_Joint_Cyber_Sensor_Architecture_Presentation/20150323-CBC-Cascade_Joint_Cyber_Sensor_Architecture_Presentation.md b/data/20150323-CBC-Cascade_Joint_Cyber_Sensor_Architecture_Presentation/20150323-CBC-Cascade_Joint_Cyber_Sensor_Architecture_Presentation.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3199f01
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/20150323-CBC-Cascade_Joint_Cyber_Sensor_Architecture_Presentation/20150323-CBC-Cascade_Joint_Cyber_Sensor_Architecture_Presentation.md
@@ -0,0 +1,1324 @@
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+# CASCADE
+## Joint Cyber Sensor Architecture
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## Overview
+
+* Project Overview
+* Current Status
+* Proposed Architecture
+* Towards 2015
+
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## Project Overview
+
+* Alignment of passive cyber sensor capabilities and architecture in the SIGINT and ITS missions
+* Goals
+ * Common sensor technology and architecture
+ * Address scalability issues in sensor deployments
+* Scope
+ * Passive sensors and supporting infrastructure are in scope
+ * Analytic tools are out of scope
+ * Host based capability is out of scope (caveat: passive messaging is in scope)
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+## Our Sensors
+
+### SIGINT / ITS
+
+* Photonic Prism
+ * Monitoring of GC Networks
+ * Includes:
+ * Full-Take Packet Capture
+ * Signature Based Detection
+ * Anomaly Based Discovery
+ * Analytic Environment
+ * Oversight Compliance Tools
+
+* EONBLUE
+ * Monitoring in Passive SIGINT
+ * Includes:
+ * Full-Take (on specific accesses)
+ * Signature Based Detection
+ * Anomaly Based Discovery
+ * Additional Functions are offloaded and exist further downstream:
+ * Analytic Environment
+ * Dataflow / Targeting
+ * Oversight and Compliance Tools
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## Shades of Blue
+
+```
+=> 10Gbps
+EONBLUE
+* DELL R610 1U Platform
+* TS//SI Processing
+* - Tracking / Discovery
+* => Content Metadata
+
+=> Multiple 10Gbps
+INDUCTION
+* Distributed Processing (Cloud)
+* TS//SI Processing
+* Tracking / Discovery
+* PXE Boot Infrastructure
+* => Content Metadata
+
+=> Multiple 1Gbps
+THIRD-EYE
+* Cyber Metadata Processor
+* UNCLASSIFIED Processing
+* Metadata Production
+* => Metadata
+
+=> 10Gbps
+CRUCIBLE
+* Secure Sensor
+* TS//SI Derived (in UNCLASS)
+* Tracking
+* => Metadata
+```
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## Current Status – SIGINT Deployments
+
+* Special Source
+ * 100% INDUCTION coverage of main SSO sites + metadata production
+ * THIRD-EYE metadata production at select new sites
+ * CRUCIBLE deployments to newly emerging sites pre-SCIF environment (survey)
+ * Increase in link speeds
+
+* Warranted Collection
+ * EONBLUE sensor deployment – full take collection
+
+* FORNSAT
+ * Recently upgraded to current EONBLUE code base, leveraging GCHQ
+ * CHOKEPOINT solution to integrate with environment (Virtualized)
+
+* Working on SUNWHEEL / SMO
+ * CHOKEPOINT system enroute to CASSIOPEIA
+ * No SUNWHEEL presence as of yet, plans to leverage CHOKEPOINT capability
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## Current Status – IT Security Deployments
+
+* Deployment at 3 edge gateway GC departments
+ * Dynamic defence is enabled at two of these sites
+
+* Deployment at the main government backbone
+ * Dual 10Gbps links (~3Gbps loading)
+ * Data volumes continue to increase due to Internet Access Point aggregation
+
+* Currently performing full take and storage of all monitored traffic
+ * System performance issues, overall analyst usability issues
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## Divergence – Sensor Deployments
+
+* While both ITS/SIGINT currently leverage EONBLUE software:
+ * The architectures are not aligned
+ * Configuration differs greatly
+ * Software versions are not standard across programs
+ * The full capability of EONBLUE is not being leveraged equally across programs
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+## Proposal
+
+### CASCADE: A Way Forward
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## Problem Statement
+
+* Divergence
+ * Sensor architectures have diverged between ITS/SIGINT
+ * Within each area, versions are not standardized
+
+* Management and Scalability
+ * Some configurations will not scale
+ * Difficult to manage current sensor environment
+ * High cost to grow existing solution (people, HW/SW costs)
+
+* Duplication of Effort
+ * Divergence creates duplication of effort
+ * Limited resources are not focused on innovation and new challenges
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## A Phased Approach
+
+| Tracking & Metadata Alignment | Full-Take Strategy | Sensor Interoperability | Unified Sensor Environment |
+| :---------------------------------------- | :----------------------------------------------- | :-------------------------------- | :------------------------------------ |
+| Address performance / stability issues with SCNET | Improve Query Performance for Full-Take Data | Extend Native Messaging Between Business Lines | Shared Mission Space |
+| Ensure that SIGINT / ITS approach to Tracking / Metadata Production are aligned | Develop / Implement strategy to better do Full-Take | Ensure Targeting is Unified | Single Interconnected Sensor Grid |
+| | | Simplify Version Management | Host / Network Interoperability |
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## Tracking and Metadata
+
+Ensure EONBLUE is deployed in a standard fashion across all environments
+
+| Upgrade SCNET to 10Gbps EONBLUE | Update all SIGINT collection sites to latest code release |
+
+Produce Standard Metadata
+
+| DNS Response Harvesting | HTTP Client / Server Headers | IP-to-IP Flow Summarizations |
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## Full-Take Strategy
+
+Address SCNET Scalability
+
+| Reconfiguration / Design of Storage Solution | Improved / Enforced data indexing and quering |
+
+Leverage Third-Eye Architecture
+
+| Distributed Collection Grid (at multiple clients) | Queries are Federated and Centrally Managed | Enables unique data ingest at client department (i.e. Firewall Logs) |
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## Full-Take Strategy
+
+* Benefits
+ * Improve Performance
+ * Better data indexing techniques
+ * Federated queries across multiple systems
+ * Reduced Cost (Storage local to client departments)
+ * 10,000$ -> 25,000$ per client
+ * Re-use of back-end Storage
+ * Enable departmental security officers / operators
+ * Capability of Third-Eye exceeds what is commercially available
+
+* Cons
+ * Requires network connections to each GC Department
+ * Requires footprint within each departments datacenter
+ * Complexity of distributed processing
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## Sensor Interoperability
+
+EONBLUE sensors exchange messages to enable more robust selection and filtering
+
+| Messages should be automatically exchanged between SIGINT and ITS/CTEC | The sensor environment will be connected to enable seamless message flows |
+
+Targeting selectors for Cyber Threats will be unified
+
+| When updates are made to SIGINT sensors the selectors will be automatically replicated for ITS | JAZZFLUTE should support ITS analysts targeting SIGINT systems |
+
+Simplify Sensor Version Management
+
+| Rapid deployment of new capability seamless across all programs / sites | Distributed Induction (Across WAN) | EBSH: Sensor has custom CLI like a switch and supports inline binary updates |
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## Interoperability enables Synchronization
+
+* ITS access to data collected by SIGINT sensors
+ * Outputs should be common to enable a common analyst platform
+ * Sensor environment should be seamlessly integrated
+* Capability remains at cutting-edge
+ * Single release for all collection programs in SIGINT, all points of presence, and across both missions
+ * Management is simplified for operators, focusing on sensor expansions
+ * Standardized OS Versions and Optimizations
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## Unified Sensor Environment
+
+### All Cyber Sensors form a complete eco-system
+
+* Access point is Mandate / Authority Agnostic
+* Sensors are Multi-Modal (Defence or Intelligence from any sensor, anytime)
+
+### Extend Messaging to Host Based Capabilities
+
+* IT Security Host Based Agents
+* CNE implants
+
+### Cyber Processing and analytic environments converge
+
+Two-Tier Environment
+
+* Automated / GUI rich environment for operators
+* Command-Line Driven RAW access for Discovery
+
+Shared Network Resources for Common Services
+
+* Wiki / Blog / Chat
+* NIS / NTP / DNS / Messaging / etc
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## Synchronized Deployment Strategy
+
+* Where do you deploy sensors to maximize detection capabilities for Foreign Intelligence collection and Network Defence
+* Coverage-based deployment considerations – what are the gaps?
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+* Threat-based deployment considerations – what are the gaps?
+ * Based on EPRs
+ * Threat trends and forecasting reports
+ * Adversary TTPs
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## Canadian Cyber Sensor Grid
+
+```
+┌─────────────────────────────────────────────┐┌─────────────────────────────┐
+│ ││ │
+│ ┌───────┐ ││ │
+│ ┌───────┐ │GC Dept│ ││ │
+│ ┌───────┐ │GC Dept│ └┬──────┘ ││ ┌────────────────┐ │
+│ │GC Dept│ └────┬──┘ │ ┌───────┐ ││ │Foreign Internet│ │
+│ └──┬────┘ │ │┌────────┼GC Dept│ ││ │Space │ │
+│ │ │ ││ └───────┘ ││ └──────────┬─────┘ │
+│ │ ┌─────┴───────┴┤ ┌───────┐ ││ │ │
+│ └─────┤Secure Channel┼────────┼GC Dept│ ││ │ │
+│ └─────────────┬┘ └──┬────┘ ││ │ │
+│ │ │ ││ │ │
+│ │ │ ││ │ │
+│ │ │ ││ │ │
+│ Defensive Monitoring │ │ ││ FORNSAT │ │
+└────────────────────────┼────────────┼───────┘└───────────────┼─────────────┘
+┌────────────────────────┼────────────┼───────┐ │
+│ ┌──────────────────┴────┐ │ │ ┌─────────────┴──┐
+│ │Canadian Internet Space├───────┘ │ │Foreign Internet│
+│ └──┬──────────────────┬┬┴───────────────┼──┤Space │
+│ │ ││ │ └────────────────┘
+│ │ │└────────────────┼──┬────────────────┐
+│ ┌─────┴────┐ ┌──┴─────────────┐ │ │Foreign Internet│
+│ │System of │ │Foreign Internet│ │ ┌┼Space ├──────────┐
+│ │Importance│ │Space │ │ │└────────────────┘ │
+│ └──────────┘ └────────────────┘ │ │ ┌────────┐ │
+│ │ │ │Foreign │ │
+│ │ │ │Internet│ │
+│ Special Source / Special Access │ │ │Space │ │
+│ Warranted Access │ │ GAZEBO Access └────────┘ │
+└─────────────────────────────────────────────┘ └────────────────────────────┘
+```
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+## Towards 2015
+### Beyond sensor unification
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## CSEC 2015
+
+* Strategic Priorities for CSEC
+ * Strengthen "Team CSEC" and Prepare for Our New Facility
+ * Adopt Innovative and Agile Business Solutions
+ * Expand Our Access Footprint
+ * Improve Analytic Tradecraft
+ * Automate Manual Processes
+ * Synchronize the Cryptologic Enterprise for Cyber Security Mission
+ * Enable "Effects" for Threat Mitigation
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## Cyber Sensor in 2015
+
+* Expand Our Access Footprint
+ * We will increase SPECIAL SOURCE access to include all international gateways accessible from Canada.
+ * We will deploy a sensor system that creates a protective grid at multiple layers over Government operations in Canada, and at all classification levels.
+* Improve Analytic Tradecraft
+ * We will equip SIGINT and cyber defence analysts with tools for flexible manipulation and customized analysis of large scale data sets.
+ * We will build analytic tradecraft that understands, anticipates, and exploits the methodology of threat agents to provide comprehensive cyber- situational awareness based on multiple sources of cryptologic data.
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## Cyber Sensor in 2015
+
+* Synchronize the Cryptologic Enterprise for the Cyber Security Mission
+ * We will improve how we anticipate, identify, track and mitigate cyber threats on government systems through new concepts of joint operations.
+ * We will design and develop joint SIGINT-ITS systems, including common data repositories, joint tasking and analytic systems.
+ * We will increase operational capacity by ensuring SIGINT, ITS, and cryptologic partner sensors interoperate seamlessly.
+ * We will synchronize and use ITS and SIGINT capabilities and complementary analyses to thwart cyber threats.
+* Enable "Effects" for Threat Mitigation
+ * We will seek the authority to conduct a wide spectrum of Effects operations in support of our mandates.
+ * We will build the technical infrastructure, policy architecture and tradecraft necessary to conduct Effects operations.
+ * We will further integrate ITS and SIGINT authorities and operations to leverage common sensors, systems and capabilities necessary for active and expanded dynamic cyber defence measures.
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## The Network Is The Sensor
+
+### Principles
+
+Security needs to be transparent to the user in order to be effective
+
+Security is a right for all Canadians
+- Federal Government
+- Municipal/Provincial Gov
+- Critical Infrastructure
+- Industry
+- The Citizen
+
+End-Users should incur little cost for security
+
+IT Assets should be distributed
+
+Access is mandate / authority agnostic
+
+### Goals
+
+Detect threats as they enter our national networks, not at the Gateway
+Identify Exfiltration, Command and Control, anywhere in our national networks
+The network is your defence for all infrastructure
+
+### Rationale
+
+We can't keep pace with our adversary
+Gateway / Device / End-Node protection is not sufficient (essential, yes)
+Rather than plugging one hole at a time, build better layered defence
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## Principles Explained
+
+* Security is Transparent
+ * If security inhibits functionality, or interferes with user experience it will be bypassed
+* Security is a right
+ * Attempting to protect everybody with end-node / gateway defenses is not feasible.
+* IT Assets should be distributed
+ * We run an open market, network providers will compete to provide access
+ * Consolidated gateways creates single points of failure
+ * Cost / Redundancy considerations
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## Goals
+
+* Detection before attack hits target
+ * If we wish to enable defence we must have intelligence to know when attacks enter our national infrastructure
+* Identify Exfiltration / Command and Control
+ * Some attacks will slip through or can't be seen (i.e. shaping)
+ * Exploit our temporal advantage - aggressively pursue these implants as they will communicate 'home' for instruction
+* The Network IS your Defence
+ * In some cases, in cooperation with our partners we can affect change at the CORE of the Internet on detection:
+ * Modify traffic routes
+ * Silently discard malicious traffic (hygiene filtering)
+ * Insert payload to disrupt adversaries
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## Rationale
+
+* Keeping pace with the Adversary
+ * From the time a malicious PDF is opened, till SEEDSPHERE has interactive control of a workstation is <3 minutes
+ * There are countless malicious actors (state, crime, generic malware)
+* Gateway / End-Node Defence by itself is insufficient
+ * It is only one part of the problem
+ * Over 600,000 Apps in the iTunes Appstore (How do you secure that?)
+ * Defence in Depth includes network monitoring, and network interaction
+* Build better Defence
+ * Our current MO is to resolve one incident at a time
+ * Automate the defence through a robust network capable of not only detection, but manipulation of malicious traffic
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## What does it Mean?
+
+* EONBLUE will be integrated into the Network
+ * Monitoring Government of Canada
+ * Monitoring Core Infrastructure (Special Source) extending the reach to view national infrastructure
+ * Monitoring foreign Internet Space
+* EONBLUE will enable defensive operations
+ * Through robust communication with host-based capabilities
+ * Through direct manipulation of network communications
+ * Through interaction with Teleco infrastructure to affect change
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+## Food for Thought
+### Changing the way we think
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## Changing the way we think
+
+* Tipping and Cueing
+ * If the purpose is to enable defence of national infrastructure it becomes unnecessary in a 5-eyes context
+ * We have full visibility of our national infrastructure
+ * The chance of 'beating' the internet for latency of an attack is minimal
+ * The network will perform the filtering
+ * What if instead T&C enables intelligence collection (Cyber Session Collection)?
+* Targeting and Tasking
+ * We all share common targets and we will all target using our national capability the cyber threats we know about
+ * No need for 2nd party tasking / targeting requests. Instead expose cyber information across the community
+ * What if instead we focus on analytic collaboration and knowledge transfer
+ * TEXPRO information, federated repositories (malware/traffic), etc
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## Changing the way we think
+
+* Foreign SIGINT Intercept
+ * Becomes the 'hunting ground' for discovery of new threats
+ * Enables attribution and counter-intelligence reporting
+ * Defence is taken care of by 'The Network'
+ * Mobile Platforms are the next frontier, what is their implication on Cyber?
+* Domestic Defence
+ * We will exhaust the treasury deploying network appliances to perform dynamic defence
+ * The same capabilities will be integrated into the CORE of the Internet
+ * Defence in Depth through complimentary capabilities on end-nodes, at the gateway, and in the core of the Internet.
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## Conclusion
+
+* CASCADE
+ * The harmonization of ITS/SIGINT Sensor capabilities
+ * Lays the foundation for long-term integration of Cyber within the Cryptologic Enterprise
+* Towards 2015
+ * The Network is the Sensor
+ * Defence, Mitigation, Intelligence all formed from a single comprehensive network creating a perimeter around Canada
+ * Extending our reach through 5-eyes partnerships to ensure mutual defence of national assets.
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+# CASCADE
+## Joint Cyber Sensor Architecture
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## Overview
+
+* Project Overview
+* Current Status
+* Proposed Architecture
+* Towards 2015
+
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## Project Overview
+
+* Alignment of passive cyber sensor capabilities and architecture in the SIGINT and ITS missions
+* Goals
+ * Common sensor technology and architecture
+ * Address scalability issues in sensor deployments
+* Scope
+ * Passive sensors and supporting infrastructure are in scope
+ * Analytic tools are out of scope
+ * Host based capability is out of scope (caveat: passive messaging is in scope)
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+What is the project about?
+Define the goal of this project
+Is it similar to projects in the past or is it a new effort?
+Define the scope of this project
+Is it an independent project or is it related to other projects?
+
+* Note that this slide is not necessary for weekly status meetings
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+## Our Sensors
+
+### SIGINT / ITS
+
+* Photonic Prism
+ * Monitoring of GC Networks
+ * Includes:
+ * Full-Take Packet Capture
+ * Signature Based Detection
+ * Anomaly Based Discovery
+ * Analytic Environment
+ * Oversight Compliance Tools
+
+* EONBLUE
+ * Monitoring in Passive SIGINT
+ * Includes:
+ * Full-Take (on specific accesses)
+ * Signature Based Detection
+ * Anomaly Based Discovery
+ * Additional Functions are offloaded and exist further downstream:
+ * Analytic Environment
+ * Dataflow / Targeting
+ * Oversight and Compliance Tools
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## Shades of Blue
+
+```
+=> 10Gbps
+EONBLUE
+* DELL R610 1U Platform
+* TS//SI Processing
+* - Tracking / Discovery
+* => Content Metadata
+
+=> Multiple 10Gbps
+INDUCTION
+* Distributed Processing (Cloud)
+* TS//SI Processing
+* Tracking / Discovery
+* PXE Boot Infrastructure
+* => Content Metadata
+
+=> Multiple 1Gbps
+THIRD-EYE
+* Cyber Metadata Processor
+* UNCLASSIFIED Processing
+* Metadata Production
+* => Metadata
+
+=> 10Gbps
+CRUCIBLE
+* Secure Sensor
+* TS//SI Derived (in UNCLASS)
+* Tracking
+* => Metadata
+```
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## Current Status – SIGINT Deployments
+
+* Special Source
+ * 100% INDUCTION coverage of main SSO sites + metadata production
+ * THIRD-EYE metadata production at select new sites
+ * CRUCIBLE deployments to newly emerging sites pre-SCIF environment (survey)
+ * Increase in link speeds
+
+* Warranted Collection
+ * EONBLUE sensor deployment – full take collection
+
+* FORNSAT
+ * Recently upgraded to current EONBLUE code base, leveraging GCHQ
+ * CHOKEPOINT solution to integrate with environment (Virtualized)
+
+* Working on SUNWHEEL / SMO
+ * CHOKEPOINT system enroute to CASSIOPEIA
+ * No SUNWHEEL presence as of yet, plans to leverage CHOKEPOINT capability
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+* If any of these issues caused a schedule delay or need to be discussed further, include details in the next slide.
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## Current Status – IT Security Deployments
+
+* Deployment at 3 edge gateway GC departments
+ * Dynamic defence is enabled at two of these sites
+
+* Deployment at the main government backbone
+ * Dual 10Gbps links (~3Gbps loading)
+ * Data volumes continue to increase due to Internet Access Point aggregation
+
+* Currently performing full take and storage of all monitored traffic
+ * System performance issues, overall analyst usability issues
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## Divergence – Sensor Deployments
+
+* While both ITS/SIGINT currently leverage EONBLUE software:
+ * The architectures are not aligned
+ * Configuration differs greatly
+ * Software versions are not standard across programs
+ * The full capability of EONBLUE is not being leveraged equally across programs
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+## Proposal
+
+### CASCADE: A Way Forward
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## Problem Statement
+
+* Divergence
+ * Sensor architectures have diverged between ITS/SIGINT
+ * Within each area, versions are not standardized
+
+* Management and Scalability
+ * Some configurations will not scale
+ * Difficult to manage current sensor environment
+ * High cost to grow existing solution (people, HW/SW costs)
+
+* Duplication of Effort
+ * Divergence creates duplication of effort
+ * Limited resources are not focused on innovation and new challenges
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+Duplicate this slide as necessary if there is more than one issue.
+This and related slides can be moved to the appendix or hidden if necessary.
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## A Phased Approach
+
+| Tracking & Metadata Alignment | Full-Take Strategy | Sensor Interoperability | Unified Sensor Environment |
+| :---------------------------------------- | :----------------------------------------------- | :-------------------------------- | :------------------------------------ |
+| Address performance / stability issues with SCNET | Improve Query Performance for Full-Take Data | Extend Native Messaging Between Business Lines | Shared Mission Space |
+| Ensure that SIGINT / ITS approach to Tracking / Metadata Production are aligned | Develop / Implement strategy to better do Full-Take | Ensure Targeting is Unified | Single Interconnected Sensor Grid |
+| | | Simplify Version Management | Host / Network Interoperability |
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## Tracking and Metadata
+
+Ensure EONBLUE is deployed in a standard fashion across all environments
+
+| Upgrade SCNET to 10Gbps EONBLUE | Update all SIGINT collection sites to latest code release |
+
+Produce Standard Metadata
+
+| DNS Response Harvesting | HTTP Client / Server Headers | IP-to-IP Flow Summarizations |
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## Full-Take Strategy
+
+Address SCNET Scalability
+
+| Reconfiguration / Design of Storage Solution | Improved / Enforced data indexing and quering |
+
+Leverage Third-Eye Architecture
+
+| Distributed Collection Grid (at multiple clients) | Queries are Federated and Centrally Managed | Enables unique data ingest at client department (i.e. Firewall Logs) |
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## Full-Take Strategy
+
+* Benefits
+ * Improve Performance
+ * Better data indexing techniques
+ * Federated queries across multiple systems
+ * Reduced Cost (Storage local to client departments)
+ * 10,000$ -> 25,000$ per client
+ * Re-use of back-end Storage
+ * Enable departmental security officers / operators
+ * Capability of Third-Eye exceeds what is commercially available
+
+* Cons
+ * Requires network connections to each GC Department
+ * Requires footprint within each departments datacenter
+ * Complexity of distributed processing
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## Sensor Interoperability
+
+EONBLUE sensors exchange messages to enable more robust selection and filtering
+
+| Messages should be automatically exchanged between SIGINT and ITS/CTEC | The sensor environment will be connected to enable seamless message flows |
+
+Targeting selectors for Cyber Threats will be unified
+
+| When updates are made to SIGINT sensors the selectors will be automatically replicated for ITS | JAZZFLUTE should support ITS analysts targeting SIGINT systems |
+
+Simplify Sensor Version Management
+
+| Rapid deployment of new capability seamless across all programs / sites | Distributed Induction (Across WAN) | EBSH: Sensor has custom CLI like a switch and supports inline binary updates |
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## Interoperability enables Synchronization
+
+* ITS access to data collected by SIGINT sensors
+ * Outputs should be common to enable a common analyst platform
+ * Sensor environment should be seamlessly integrated
+* Capability remains at cutting-edge
+ * Single release for all collection programs in SIGINT, all points of presence, and across both missions
+ * Management is simplified for operators, focusing on sensor expansions
+ * Standardized OS Versions and Optimizations
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## Unified Sensor Environment
+
+### All Cyber Sensors form a complete eco-system
+
+* Access point is Mandate / Authority Agnostic
+* Sensors are Multi-Modal (Defence or Intelligence from any sensor, anytime)
+
+### Extend Messaging to Host Based Capabilities
+
+* IT Security Host Based Agents
+* CNE implants
+
+### Cyber Processing and analytic environments converge
+
+Two-Tier Environment
+
+* Automated / GUI rich environment for operators
+* Command-Line Driven RAW access for Discovery
+
+Shared Network Resources for Common Services
+
+* Wiki / Blog / Chat
+* NIS / NTP / DNS / Messaging / etc
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## Synchronized Deployment Strategy
+
+* Where do you deploy sensors to maximize detection capabilities for Foreign Intelligence collection and Network Defence
+* Coverage-based deployment considerations – what are the gaps?
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+* Threat-based deployment considerations – what are the gaps?
+ * Based on EPRs
+ * Threat trends and forecasting reports
+ * Adversary TTPs
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## Canadian Cyber Sensor Grid
+
+```
+┌─────────────────────────────────────────────┐┌─────────────────────────────┐
+│ ││ │
+│ ┌───────┐ ││ │
+│ ┌───────┐ │GC Dept│ ││ │
+│ ┌───────┐ │GC Dept│ └┬──────┘ ││ ┌────────────────┐ │
+│ │GC Dept│ └────┬──┘ │ ┌───────┐ ││ │Foreign Internet│ │
+│ └──┬────┘ │ │┌────────┼GC Dept│ ││ │Space │ │
+│ │ │ ││ └───────┘ ││ └──────────┬─────┘ │
+│ │ ┌─────┴───────┴┤ ┌───────┐ ││ │ │
+│ └─────┤Secure Channel┼────────┼GC Dept│ ││ │ │
+│ └─────────────┬┘ └──┬────┘ ││ │ │
+│ │ │ ││ │ │
+│ │ │ ││ │ │
+│ │ │ ││ │ │
+│ Defensive Monitoring │ │ ││ FORNSAT │ │
+└────────────────────────┼────────────┼───────┘└───────────────┼─────────────┘
+┌────────────────────────┼────────────┼───────┐ │
+│ ┌──────────────────┴────┐ │ │ ┌─────────────┴──┐
+│ │Canadian Internet Space├───────┘ │ │Foreign Internet│
+│ └──┬──────────────────┬┬┴───────────────┼──┤Space │
+│ │ ││ │ └────────────────┘
+│ │ │└────────────────┼──┬────────────────┐
+│ ┌─────┴────┐ ┌──┴─────────────┐ │ │Foreign Internet│
+│ │System of │ │Foreign Internet│ │ ┌┼Space ├──────────┐
+│ │Importance│ │Space │ │ │└────────────────┘ │
+│ └──────────┘ └────────────────┘ │ │ ┌────────┐ │
+│ │ │ │Foreign │ │
+│ │ │ │Internet│ │
+│ Special Source / Special Access │ │ │Space │ │
+│ Warranted Access │ │ GAZEBO Access └────────┘ │
+└─────────────────────────────────────────────┘ └────────────────────────────┘
+```
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+## Towards 2015
+### Beyond sensor unification
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## CSEC 2015
+
+* Strategic Priorities for CSEC
+ * Strengthen "Team CSEC" and Prepare for Our New Facility
+ * Adopt Innovative and Agile Business Solutions
+ * Expand Our Access Footprint
+ * Improve Analytic Tradecraft
+ * Automate Manual Processes
+ * Synchronize the Cryptologic Enterprise for Cyber Security Mission
+ * Enable "Effects" for Threat Mitigation
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## Cyber Sensor in 2015
+
+* Expand Our Access Footprint
+ * We will increase SPECIAL SOURCE access to include all international gateways accessible from Canada.
+ * We will deploy a sensor system that creates a protective grid at multiple layers over Government operations in Canada, and at all classification levels.
+* Improve Analytic Tradecraft
+ * We will equip SIGINT and cyber defence analysts with tools for flexible manipulation and customized analysis of large scale data sets.
+ * We will build analytic tradecraft that understands, anticipates, and exploits the methodology of threat agents to provide comprehensive cyber- situational awareness based on multiple sources of cryptologic data.
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## Cyber Sensor in 2015
+
+* Synchronize the Cryptologic Enterprise for the Cyber Security Mission
+ * We will improve how we anticipate, identify, track and mitigate cyber threats on government systems through new concepts of joint operations.
+ * We will design and develop joint SIGINT-ITS systems, including common data repositories, joint tasking and analytic systems.
+ * We will increase operational capacity by ensuring SIGINT, ITS, and cryptologic partner sensors interoperate seamlessly.
+ * We will synchronize and use ITS and SIGINT capabilities and complementary analyses to thwart cyber threats.
+* Enable "Effects" for Threat Mitigation
+ * We will seek the authority to conduct a wide spectrum of Effects operations in support of our mandates.
+ * We will build the technical infrastructure, policy architecture and tradecraft necessary to conduct Effects operations.
+ * We will further integrate ITS and SIGINT authorities and operations to leverage common sensors, systems and capabilities necessary for active and expanded dynamic cyber defence measures.
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## The Network Is The Sensor
+
+### Principles
+
+Security needs to be transparent to the user in order to be effective
+
+Security is a right for all Canadians
+- Federal Government
+- Municipal/Provincial Gov
+- Critical Infrastructure
+- Industry
+- The Citizen
+
+End-Users should incur little cost for security
+
+IT Assets should be distributed
+
+Access is mandate / authority agnostic
+
+### Goals
+
+Detect threats as they enter our national networks, not at the Gateway
+Identify Exfiltration, Command and Control, anywhere in our national networks
+The network is your defence for all infrastructure
+
+### Rationale
+
+We can't keep pace with our adversary
+Gateway / Device / End-Node protection is not sufficient (essential, yes)
+Rather than plugging one hole at a time, build better layered defence
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## Principles Explained
+
+* Security is Transparent
+ * If security inhibits functionality, or interferes with user experience it will be bypassed
+* Security is a right
+ * Attempting to protect everybody with end-node / gateway defenses is not feasible.
+* IT Assets should be distributed
+ * We run an open market, network providers will compete to provide access
+ * Consolidated gateways creates single points of failure
+ * Cost / Redundancy considerations
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## Goals
+
+* Detection before attack hits target
+ * If we wish to enable defence we must have intelligence to know when attacks enter our national infrastructure
+* Identify Exfiltration / Command and Control
+ * Some attacks will slip through or can't be seen (i.e. shaping)
+ * Exploit our temporal advantage - aggressively pursue these implants as they will communicate 'home' for instruction
+* The Network IS your Defence
+ * In some cases, in cooperation with our partners we can affect change at the CORE of the Internet on detection:
+ * Modify traffic routes
+ * Silently discard malicious traffic (hygiene filtering)
+ * Insert payload to disrupt adversaries
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## Rationale
+
+* Keeping pace with the Adversary
+ * From the time a malicious PDF is opened, till SEEDSPHERE has interactive control of a workstation is <3 minutes
+ * There are countless malicious actors (state, crime, generic malware)
+* Gateway / End-Node Defence by itself is insufficient
+ * It is only one part of the problem
+ * Over 600,000 Apps in the iTunes Appstore (How do you secure that?)
+ * Defence in Depth includes network monitoring, and network interaction
+* Build better Defence
+ * Our current MO is to resolve one incident at a time
+ * Automate the defence through a robust network capable of not only detection, but manipulation of malicious traffic
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## What does it Mean?
+
+* EONBLUE will be integrated into the Network
+ * Monitoring Government of Canada
+ * Monitoring Core Infrastructure (Special Source) extending the reach to view national infrastructure
+ * Monitoring foreign Internet Space
+* EONBLUE will enable defensive operations
+ * Through robust communication with host-based capabilities
+ * Through direct manipulation of network communications
+ * Through interaction with Teleco infrastructure to affect change
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+## Food for Thought
+### Changing the way we think
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## Changing the way we think
+
+* Tipping and Cueing
+ * If the purpose is to enable defence of national infrastructure it becomes unnecessary in a 5-eyes context
+ * We have full visibility of our national infrastructure
+ * The chance of 'beating' the internet for latency of an attack is minimal
+ * The network will perform the filtering
+ * What if instead T&C enables intelligence collection (Cyber Session Collection)?
+* Targeting and Tasking
+ * We all share common targets and we will all target using our national capability the cyber threats we know about
+ * No need for 2nd party tasking / targeting requests. Instead expose cyber information across the community
+ * What if instead we focus on analytic collaboration and knowledge transfer
+ * TEXPRO information, federated repositories (malware/traffic), etc
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## Changing the way we think
+
+* Foreign SIGINT Intercept
+ * Becomes the 'hunting ground' for discovery of new threats
+ * Enables attribution and counter-intelligence reporting
+ * Defence is taken care of by 'The Network'
+ * Mobile Platforms are the next frontier, what is their implication on Cyber?
+* Domestic Defence
+ * We will exhaust the treasury deploying network appliances to perform dynamic defence
+ * The same capabilities will be integrated into the CORE of the Internet
+ * Defence in Depth through complimentary capabilities on end-nodes, at the gateway, and in the core of the Internet.
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation
+
+## Conclusion
+
+* CASCADE
+ * The harmonization of ITS/SIGINT Sensor capabilities
+ * Lays the foundation for long-term integration of Cyber within the Cryptologic Enterprise
+* Towards 2015
+ * The Network is the Sensor
+ * Defence, Mitigation, Intelligence all formed from a single comprehensive network creating a perimeter around Canada
+ * Extending our reach through 5-eyes partnerships to ensure mutual defence of national assets.
+
+CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
+
+---
+
+---
diff --git a/data/20150323-CBC-Cascade_Joint_Cyber_Sensor_Architecture_Presentation/metadata.json b/data/20150323-CBC-Cascade_Joint_Cyber_Sensor_Architecture_Presentation/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d244d5a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/20150323-CBC-Cascade_Joint_Cyber_Sensor_Architecture_Presentation/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+{
+ "title": "CASCADE - Joint Cyber Sensor Architecture",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "This presentation outlines the Communications Security Establishment’s (CSE) plans to unify and expand its cyber sensor networks (ITS and SIGINT) to create a comprehensive, multi-layered national cyber defense system, enabling threat detection, intelligence collection, and defensive operations across Canadian and foreign networks. It emphasizes standardizing sensor deployments, integrating analytic capabilities, and preparing for “Effects” operations to mitigate cyber threats by 2015. The presentation is duplicated from page 33 onwards - three slides of the duplicated slides have internal CSE comments.",
+ "long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY CSEC Global Access Cyber Defence Operation presentation describing CASCADE — the Joint Cyber Sensor Architecture project — published by CBC News and The Intercept on 23 March 2015 as part of reporting on CSEC's cyberwarfare capabilities. The document appears twice in slightly different versions, the second including presenter notes, suggesting it was prepared as both a briefing document and an internal presentation template.\n\nCASCADE is defined as a project to align passive cyber sensor capabilities and architecture across CSEC's two parallel missions — SIGINT collection and IT Security (ITS) defence of Government of Canada networks. The problem it addresses is divergence: EONBLUE software was deployed in both missions but with incompatible architectures, non-standardised configurations and differing software versions, creating duplication of effort and preventing full exploitation of available capabilities. The project proposes a four-phase approach moving from tracking and metadata alignment through full-take strategy, sensor interoperability and ultimately a unified sensor environment.\n\nThe sensor inventory section — titled \"Shades of Blue\" — provides the most detailed published description of CSEC's sensor family. EONBLUE is the primary sensor running at 10Gbps on Dell R610 1U hardware, performing Top Secret/SI processing for tracking and discovery and producing content metadata. INDUCTION is a distributed cloud-based processing system operating across multiple 10Gbps links, also performing TS/SI tracking and discovery with PXE boot infrastructure. THIRD-EYE is a cyber metadata processor operating at multiple 1Gbps links at unclassified processing level, producing metadata only. CRUCIBLE is a secure sensor operating at 10Gbps, derived from TS/SI signatures but operating in an unclassified environment for tracking — consistent with its earlier description in the CSEC Cyber Threat Detection document as a low-cost throwaway sensor deployable in non-SCIF environments.\n\nThe current deployment status reveals the operational footprint at time of writing. Under Special Source, INDUCTION had 100% coverage of main SSO sites with metadata production, THIRD-EYE was deployed at select new sites, and CRUCIBLE was being deployed to newly emerging sites in pre-SCIF environments for survey collection. Under Warranted Collection, EONBLUE was deployed for full-take collection. Under FORNSAT, EONBLUE had recently been upgraded using GCHQ's code base, with a CHOKEPOINT solution providing virtualised integration with the FORNSAT environment. SUNWHEEL/SMO work was underway with CHOKEPOINT en route to CASSIOPEIA — confirming both SUNWHEEL and CASSIOPEIA as named CSEC collection programmes. Under IT Security, EONBLUE was deployed at three edge gateway Government of Canada departments with dynamic defence enabled at two, and at the main government backbone across dual 10Gbps links.\n\nThe sensor interoperability section introduces two additional named capabilities. JAZZFLUTE is described as a system that should support ITS analysts in targeting SIGINT systems — enabling the IT Security mission to leverage SIGINT collection infrastructure. EBSH is described as a sensor with a custom CLI interface like a network switch that supports inline binary updates, enabling rapid deployment of new capability across all programmes and sites.\n\nThe Canadian Cyber Sensor Grid diagram shows the full architectural vision: Government of Canada departments connected through secure channels with defensive monitoring; Canadian Internet Space with Special Source, Special Access and Warranted Access coverage; Systems of Importance monitored separately; and three separate foreign internet space monitoring zones — one associated with FORNSAT collection and two associated with GAZEBO Access. GAZEBO appears here as a named access programme not previously seen in the archive, providing CSEC access to foreign internet space in a third distinct monitoring zone.\n\nThe Towards 2015 section describes CSEC's strategic ambition for the five-year planning horizon. Under \"Expand Our Access Footprint\" CSEC planned to increase Special Source access to include all international gateways accessible from Canada and deploy a protective sensor grid across all Government of Canada operations at all classification levels. Under \"Enable Effects for Threat Mitigation\" — the most politically sensitive section — CSEC stated it would \"seek the authority to conduct a wide spectrum of Effects operations\" and build the technical infrastructure, policy architecture and tradecraft necessary for such operations. The CBC article notes this language predates Bill C-51 and that experts believed the bill could legalise some of the 32 cyber tactics listed in a 2011 CSEC document.\n\nThe \"Network Is The Sensor\" vision section frames CSEC's ultimate architectural goal: integrating EONBLUE directly into the core of the internet rather than deploying it at gateways, enabling detection of threats before they reach targets, identification of exfiltration and command-and-control communications anywhere in national networks, and — most significantly — the ability to insert payloads to disrupt adversaries and silently discard malicious traffic at the network core. The document explicitly states that in cooperation with telecommunications partners, CSEC could modify traffic routes, perform hygiene filtering and insert payloads upon detection. The SEEDSPHERE threat actor is cited as a motivating example, with the document noting that from the time a malicious PDF is opened to SEEDSPHERE having interactive control of a workstation takes less than three minutes.\n\nThe document concludes with a reconceptualisation of tipping and cueing — arguing that in a Five Eyes context with full national infrastructure visibility, traditional T&C for defence purposes becomes unnecessary and should instead be repurposed to enable intelligence collection through cyber session collection, with analytic collaboration and knowledge transfer replacing second-party tasking requests.",
+ "tags": [
+ "CSE",
+ "cyber defense",
+ "cybersecurity",
+ "cyber warfare",
+ "network defense",
+ "ITS",
+ "full-take collection",
+ "metadata",
+ "sensor unification",
+ "sensor interoperability",
+ "joint operations",
+ "cryptology",
+ "defensive operations",
+ "Effects operations",
+ "threat mitigation",
+ "cyber threat",
+ "foreign intelligence",
+ "domestic defense",
+ "Canadian national infrastructure",
+ "internet surveillance",
+ "Special Source Access",
+ "distributed sensors",
+ "host-based capabilities",
+ "command and control",
+ "exfiltration detection",
+ "network monitoring",
+ "dynamic defense",
+ "analytic tradecraft",
+ "network situational awareness",
+ "cyber operations",
+ "scalable sensor architecture",
+ "network manipulation",
+ "international gateways",
+ "Government of Canada",
+ "malware detection",
+ "botnet monitoring",
+ "network hygiene filtering",
+ "cyber espionage",
+ "nation cybersecurity",
+ "mobile apps",
+ "mobile phones",
+ "smart phones",
+ "mobile security",
+ "DNS",
+ "HTTP",
+ "collection sites",
+ "exploitation",
+ "implants",
+ "payloads",
+ "Apple"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "CSE",
+ "date_created": "",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "REL FVEY"
+ ],
+ "banner": "TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY",
+ "genre": "slides",
+ "programs": [
+ "CASCADE",
+ "PHOTONICPRISM",
+ "EONBLUE",
+ "INDUCTION",
+ "THIRDEYE",
+ "CRUCIBLE",
+ "CHOKEPOINT",
+ "SUNWHEEL",
+ "CASSIOPEIA",
+ "SCNET",
+ "JAZZFLUTE",
+ "GAZEBO",
+ "SEEDSPHERE",
+ "TEXPRO",
+ "SSO"
+ ],
+ "countries": [
+ "Canada"
+ ],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "CBC News",
+ "date_published": "2015-03-23",
+ "title": "Communication Security Establishment's cyberwarfare toolbox revealed",
+ "link": "https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/communication-security-establishment-s-cyberwarfare-toolbox-revealed-1.3002978",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Seglins, Dave",
+ "Hildebrandt, Amber",
+ "Pereira, Michael",
+ "Greenwald, Glenn",
+ "Gallagher, Ryan"
+ ],
+ "contributors": []
+ },
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2015-03-23",
+ "title": "Documents Reveal Canada’s Secret Hacking Tactics",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2015/03/23/canada-cse-hacking-cyberwar-secret-arsenal/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Gallagher, Ryan"
+ ],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "pdf_sha256": "1ef804592b84f0df294b7f2b034c52be756addb1d89c5cf504bc206a430dc57c",
+ "pages": 66
+}
diff --git a/data/20150323-CBC-Cyber_Threat_Detection/20150323-CBC-Cyber_Threat_Detection.md b/data/20150323-CBC-Cyber_Threat_Detection/20150323-CBC-Cyber_Threat_Detection.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c7c7138
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/20150323-CBC-Cyber_Threat_Detection/20150323-CBC-Cyber_Threat_Detection.md
@@ -0,0 +1,493 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT
+Communications Security Establishment
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
+
+## Cyber Threat Detection
+
+* Passive Cyber Threat Detection Platform - EONBLUE
+ * Currently deployed alongside traditional DNI Collection (SPECIALSOURCE, Warranted Access, FORNSAT, etc)
+ * Packet Processing capability tailored to Cyber built over a 6+ year period
+ * Cyber Threat Tracking (Deep Packet Inspection signatures for 'known' intrusions)
+ * Cyber Threat Discovery (Anomaly Detection for discovering unknown intrusions)
+* In 2009 an average of 115,000 Traffic Items collected daily from Canadian and Allied Sources
+ * Collection from allies is crucial to success, but based on IP Address collection (causes over collect, sessionization corrupts data, difficult to analyze with Cyber toolkit)
+* POC: [REDACTED] Global Network Detection @cse-cst.gc.ca)
+
+Canada
+1
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT
+Communications Security Establishment
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
+
+## Holistic Cyber Threat Capability
+
+```
+?
+Selection and Filtering
+A
+
+Communications Security Establishment
+Processing and Enrichment
+Protocol Analysis
+Crypt Attack
+Data Repositories
+Network Analysis
+Cyber Analysis
+GoC
+S.16
+Canada
+Internet
+GOC Intelligence
+CSIS Counter Intelligence
+TS SEYES Mitigation
+Knowledge Transfer
+
+1. IT Security
+2. COVENANT
+3. Special Source
+4. 5-Eyes Network
+5. CNE
+```
+
+Canada
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT
+Communications Security Establishment
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
+
+## CSEC – SIGINT Supporting CND
+
+* Globally pervasive threat
+ * Covered by 5-Eyes network
+* Utilizing encryption
+ * Subject to CSEC cryptographic attack
+* Abusing telecommunications protocols
+ * Understood and reverse engineered at CSEC
+* Communicate using foreign languages
+ * Access to CSEC and partner linguistic community
+* Constantly changing modus operandi
+ * Uncovered using sophisticated analytics and anomaly detection
+* Exfiltrate valuable intelligence
+ * That we can collect and use to enhance our repositories
+* These operations are also directed against GoC networks
+ * Which we can detect and mitigate using both SIGINT and domestic sensors
+
+* CSEC elements working as one...
+* providing unparalleled situational awareness of the threat
+* monitors health and status of government networks
+* coupled with the ability to stop or mitigate attacks and intrusions directed against networks of importance to the GoC
+
+```
+facebook SEEDSHERE Applications Inbox Home Settings Logout Search
+SEEDSPHERE
+is exfiltrating information from systems located across the globe
+and has no plans to stop anytime soon.
+
+Mini-Feed
+
+Today
+
+* SEEDSPHERE downloaded images from the Japanese Embassy in Romania 1:25PM
+* SEEDSPHERE added the Poison Ivy Application 2:13PM
+* SEEDSPHERE communicated using the Poison Ivy Application 2:47PM
+ * VGhpcyBpcyBhbiBlbmNvZGVkIFN0cmluZyBUaGF0IFJIcXVpcmVzIERIY3J5cHRpb24
+
+Yesterday
+
+* SEEDSPHERE is abusing the DNS Protocol 4:36PM
+
+Last Week
+
+* SEEDSPHERE is taking the day off on Chinese New Year 12:00AM
+
+### The Wall
+
+SIENNABLUE wrote:
+すねみまけゑづぱぶぼろまおあかゆろをでぢび。ね
+てぽぴ?づてたはほよぷゅごひすせけうおへえ
+ねか「ネマソカウユブザギゴァネニタセソコタン
+
+See All Photos of Me (230)
+See All Friends (23)
+Edit My Profile
+Share +
+I am online now
+
+Friends
+23 Friends
+See All
+DIESELRATTLE
+SIENNABLUE
+DOWNGRADE
+
+Places I've Been (125,234)
+See All
+
+Groups
+See All
+
+Windows Internals, 3322.org, bosee.net,
+lovequintet.org, lovetrio.com, chinese
+underground
+```
+
+Canada
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT
+Communications Security Establishment
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
+
+## Front-end Cyber Tradecraft
+
+* Deployed high-speed clustered storage to our collection sites
+ * Enables extraction / storing and processing of all HTTP metadata to identify Cyber Threat Anomalies
+ * Leveraged by CSEC's network knowledge engine to facilitate DNS Response harvesting and de-duplication
+
+```
+Cluster throughput (file system)
+
+400 Mb/s
+300 Mb/s
+200 Mb/s
+100 Mb/s
+06/11 06/14 06/16 06/18 06/21 06/23 06/25
+Inbound Outbound
+
+CPU usage
+
+100%
+80%
+60%
+40%
+20%
+0%
+06/11 06/14 06/16 06/18 06/21 06/23 06/25
+System User Total
+
+764.8 Mb/s
+611.9 Mb/s
+458.9 Mb/s
+305.9 Mb/s
+153 Mb/s
+06/12 06/13 06/13 06/14 06/15 06/16 06/17 06/18 06/19 06/20 06/21 06/22 06/23 06/24 06/25
+
+* Black Line: Total data into the Cluster
+* Blue Line: Data Outbound from SAN
+
+* Data deduplication at sight results in much better use of limited bandwidth
+* Data into the cluster is balanced across multiple nodes. Each color denotes a separate node, automatically dividing the load amongst all systems
+```
+
+Canada
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT
+Communications Security Establishment
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
+
+## Joint Capability Development
+### SIGINT / ITS – Cyber Threat Detection
+
+* Fast Flux Botnet Detection – CROSSBOW
+ * A target-discovery algorithm deployed at CSEC SSO sites (currently operational)
+ * Detects botnets that use the DNS protocol for command and control (i.e. the technique runs exclusively on metadata)
+ * Initial planning phase Tipping/Cueing trials between SIGINT/ITS and the 5Eyes (stand-alone source code has been shared with 5Eyes, i.e. through T3IO)
+* "Throw-away" Cyber Threat Detection Sensor – CRUCIBLE
+ * A low-cost, rapidly-deployed passive cyber threat detection sensor designed for use with TS//SI signatures in a non-SCIF environment (cyber target-tracking capability)
+ * Strength of the sensor is derived primarily by the logical countermeasures (i.e. cryptographic hashes and bloom filters)
+* POC: [REDACTED] DG ITS Operations [REDACTED]@cse-cst.gc.ca)
+
+Canada
+5
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT
+Communications Security Establishment
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
+
+## Sample of Fast Flux Activity Detected
+
+Square nodes: contacted by fast flux "bots"
+Diamond nodes: fast flux "bots"
+Oval nodes: suspected fast flux domain
+
+1 week of detected fast flux activity for a particular fast flux domain at a CSEC access
+
+Canada
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT
+Communications Security Establishment
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
+
+## Joint Capability Development
+### SIGINT / ITS – Cyber Threat Detection
+
+* Scanning Detection - LODESTONE
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+
+Canada
+7
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT
+Communications Security Establishment
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
+
+## Cyber Threat Detection
+
+* Passive Cyber Threat Detection Platform - EONBLUE
+ * Currently deployed alongside traditional DNI Collection (SPECIALSOURCE, Warranted Access, FORNSAT, etc)
+ * Packet Processing capability tailored to Cyber built over a 6+ year period
+ * Cyber Threat Tracking (Deep Packet Inspection signatures for 'known' intrusions)
+ * Cyber Threat Discovery (Anomaly Detection for discovering unknown intrusions)
+* In 2009 an average of 115,000 Traffic Items collected daily from Canadian and Allied Sources
+ * Collection from allies is crucial to success, but based on IP Address collection (causes over collect, sessionization corrupts data, difficult to analyze with Cyber toolkit)
+* POC: [REDACTED] Global Network Detection @cse-cst.gc.ca)
+
+Canada
+1
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT
+Communications Security Establishment
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
+
+## Holistic Cyber Threat Capability
+
+```
+?
+Selection and Filtering
+A
+
+Communications Security Establishment
+Processing and Enrichment
+Protocol Analysis
+Crypt Attack
+Data Repositories
+Network Analysis
+Cyber Analysis
+S.16
+GoC
+Canada
+Internet
+GOC Intelligence
+CSIS Counter Intelligence
+TS SEYES Mitigation
+Knowledge Transfer
+
+1. IT Security
+2. COVENANT
+3. Special Source
+4. 5-Eyes Network
+5. CNE
+```
+
+Canada
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT
+Communications Security Establishment
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
+
+## CSEC – SIGINT Supporting CND
+
+* Globally pervasive threat
+ * Covered by 5-Eyes network
+* Utilizing encryption
+ * Subject to CSEC cryptographic attack
+* Abusing telecommunications protocols
+ * Understood and reverse engineered at CSEC
+* Communicate using foreign languages
+ * Access to CSEC and partner linguistic community
+* Constantly changing modus operandi
+ * Uncovered using sophisticated analytics and anomaly detection
+* Exfiltrate valuable intelligence
+ * That we can collect and use to enhance our repositories
+* These operations are also directed against GoC networks
+ * Which we can detect and mitigate using both SIGINT and domestic sensors
+
+* CSEC elements working as one...
+* providing unparalleled situational awareness of the threat
+* monitors health and status of government networks
+* coupled with the ability to stop or mitigate attacks and intrusions directed against networks of importance to the GoC
+
+```
+facebook SEEDSHERE Applications Inbox Home Settings Logout Search
+SEEDSPHERE
+is exfiltrating information from systems located across the globe
+and has no plans to stop anytime soon.
+
+Mini-Feed
+
+Today
+
+* SEEDSPHERE downloaded images from the Japanese Embassy in Romania 1:25PM
+* SEEDSPHERE added the Poison Ivy Application 2:13PM
+* SEEDSPHERE communicated using the Poison Ivy Application 2:47PM
+ * VGhpcyBpcyBhbiBlbmNvZGVkIFN0cmluZyBUaGF0IFJIcXVpcmVzIERIY3J5cHRpb24
+
+Yesterday
+
+* SEEDSPHERE is abusing the DNS Protocol 4:36PM
+
+Last Week
+
+* SEEDSPHERE is taking the day off on Chinese New Year 12:00AM
+
+### The Wall
+
+SIENNABLUE wrote:
+すねみまけゑづぱぶぼろまおあかゆろをでぢび。ね
+てぽぴ?づてたはほよぷゅごひすせけうおへえ
+ねか「ネマソカウユブザギゴァネニタセソコタン
+
+See All Photos of Me (230)
+See All Friends (23)
+Edit My Profile
+Share +
+I am online now
+
+Friends
+23 Friends
+See All
+DIESELRATTLE
+SIENNABLUE
+DOWNGRADE
+
+Places I've Been (125,234)
+See All
+
+Groups
+See All
+
+Windows Internals, 3322.org, bosee.net,
+lovequintet.org, lovetrio.com, chinese
+underground
+```
+
+Canada
+
+Speaker: [REDACTED]
+-Added the health and status of Government network bullet
+* Removed '4th party' and instead mention how it enhances our repositories (will introduce 4th party here)
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT
+Communications Security Establishment
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
+
+## Front-end Cyber Tradecraft
+
+* Deployed high-speed clustered storage to our collection sites
+ * Enables extraction / storing and processing of all HTTP metadata to identify Cyber Threat Anomalies
+ * Leveraged by CSEC's network knowledge engine to facilitate DNS Response harvesting and de-duplication
+
+```
+Cluster throughput (file system)
+
+400 Mb/s
+300 Mb/s
+200 Mb/s
+100 Mb/s
+06/11 06/14 06/16 06/18 06/21 06/23 06/25
+Inbound Outbound
+
+CPU usage
+
+100%
+80%
+60%
+40%
+20%
+0%
+06/11 06/14 06/16 06/18 06/21 06/23 06/25
+System User Total
+
+764.8 Mb/s
+611.9 Mb/s
+458.9 Mb/s
+305.9 Mb/s
+153 Mb/s
+06/12 06/13 06/13 06/14 06/15 06/16 06/17 06/18 06/19 06/20 06/21 06/22 06/23 06/24 06/25
+
+* Black Line: Total data into the Cluster
+* Blue Line: Data Outbound from SAN
+
+* Data deduplication at sight results in much better use of limited bandwidth
+* Data into the cluster is balanced across multiple nodes. Each color denotes a separate node, automatically dividing the load amongst all systems
+```
+
+Canada
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT
+Communications Security Establishment
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
+
+## Joint Capability Development
+### SIGINT / ITS – Cyber Threat Detection
+
+* Fast Flux Botnet Detection – CROSSBOW
+ * A target-discovery algorithm deployed at CSEC SSO sites (currently operational)
+ * Detects botnets that use the DNS protocol for command and control (i.e. the technique runs exclusively on metadata)
+ * Initial planning phase Tipping/Cueing trials between SIGINT/ITS and the 5Eyes (stand-alone source code has been shared with 5Eyes, i.e. through T3IO)
+* "Throw-away" Cyber Threat Detection Sensor – CRUCIBLE
+ * A low-cost, rapidly-deployed passive cyber threat detection sensor designed for use with TS//SI signatures in a non-SCIF environment (cyber target-tracking capability)
+ * Strength of the sensor is derived primarily by the logical countermeasures (i.e. cryptographic hashes and bloom filters)
+* POC: [REDACTED] DG ITS Operations [REDACTED]@cse-cst.gc.ca)
+
+Canada
+5
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT
+Communications Security Establishment
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
+
+## Sample of Fast Flux Activity Detected
+
+Square nodes: contacted by fast flux "bots"
+Diamond nodes: fast flux "bots"
+Oval nodes: suspected fast flux domain
+
+1 week of detected fast flux activity for a particular fast flux domain at a CSEC access
+
+Canada
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT
+Communications Security Establishment
+Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
+
+## Joint Capability Development
+### SIGINT / ITS – Cyber Threat Detection
+
+* Scanning Detection - LODESTONE
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+
+Canada
+7
diff --git a/data/20150323-CBC-Cyber_Threat_Detection/metadata.json b/data/20150323-CBC-Cyber_Threat_Detection/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..174e814
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/20150323-CBC-Cyber_Threat_Detection/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+{
+ "title": "CSEC Cyber Threat Detection",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "This document details the Communications Security Establishment’s (CSEC) cyber threat detection and intelligence infrastructure, including systems like EONBLUE, CROSSBOW, CRUCIBLE, and LODESTONE, which enable passive monitoring, anomaly detection, and botnet identification through metadata and deep packet inspection. It outlines how CSEC integrates SIGINT, cryptanalysis, and network forensics to detect and mitigate cyber intrusions using both SIGINT and domestic sensors, while collaborating with Five Eyes partners to enhance Canada’s cyber defense and situational awareness. The presentation is duplicated from page 7 onwards - one of the duplicated slide has internal CSE comments.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [
+ "CSEC",
+ "CSE",
+ "ITS",
+ "passive collection",
+ "deep packet inspection",
+ "metadata analysis",
+ "anomaly detection",
+ "botnets",
+ "botnet detection",
+ "FastFlux",
+ "DNS",
+ "network analysis",
+ "cryptanalysis",
+ "data deduplication",
+ "HTTP",
+ "Computer Network Exploitation",
+ "cyber operations",
+ "Five Eyes",
+ "GCHQ",
+ "NSA",
+ "DSD",
+ "CSIS",
+ "Government of Canada",
+ "GoC Networks",
+ "threat attribution",
+ "malware tracking",
+ "exfiltration detection",
+ "network monitoring",
+ "infrastructure",
+ "metadata repositories",
+ "protocol analysis",
+ "enrichment",
+ "counterintelligence",
+ "threat detection"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "CSE",
+ "date_created": "",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT",
+ "genre": "slides",
+ "programs": [
+ "EONBLUE",
+ "SPECIALSOURCE",
+ "WARRANTEDACCESS",
+ "COVENANT",
+ "SEEDSPHERE",
+ "DIESELRATTLE",
+ "SIENNABLUE",
+ "DOWNGRADE",
+ "CROSSBOW",
+ "CRUCIBLE",
+ "LODESTONE"
+ ],
+ "countries": [
+ "Canada",
+ "China",
+ "Japan",
+ "Romania"
+ ],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "CBC News",
+ "date_published": "2015-03-23",
+ "title": "Communication Security Establishment's cyberwarfare toolbox revealed",
+ "link": "https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/communication-security-establishment-s-cyberwarfare-toolbox-revealed-1.3002978",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Seglins, Dave",
+ "Hildebrandt, Amber",
+ "Pereira, Michael",
+ "Greenwald, Glenn",
+ "Gallagher, Ryan"
+ ],
+ "contributors": []
+ },
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2015-03-23",
+ "title": "Documents Reveal Canada’s Secret Hacking Tactics",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2015/03/23/canada-cse-hacking-cyberwar-secret-arsenal/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Gallagher, Ryan"
+ ],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "pdf_sha256": "7f6a79f3fc3db53780d122f0be8b243c14635a989277ed34b87b7b2525959c44",
+ "pages": 14
+}
diff --git a/data/20150323-CBC-NSA_Memo-on_Intelligence_Relationship_With_CSE/20150323-CBC-NSA_Memo-on_Intelligence_Relationship_With_CSE.md b/data/20150323-CBC-NSA_Memo-on_Intelligence_Relationship_With_CSE/20150323-CBC-NSA_Memo-on_Intelligence_Relationship_With_CSE.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..87f3c97
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/20150323-CBC-NSA_Memo-on_Intelligence_Relationship_With_CSE/20150323-CBC-NSA_Memo-on_Intelligence_Relationship_With_CSE.md
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL USA, FVEY
+
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
+
+National Security Agency/Central Security Service
+
+Information Paper
+
+3 April 2013
+
+Subject: (U//FOUO) NSA Intelligence Relationship with Canada's Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC)
+
+(U) Introduction
+
+(U//FOUO) The U.S.-Canada SIGINT relationship dates back to an alliance formed during World War II. In 1949, the relationship was formalized under the CANUSA Agreement signed with CSEC. The basic tenet of CANUSA is cooperation in all aspects of SIGINT except when considered prejudicial to the national interests of one of the parties. The formal Information Assurance (IA) relationship with CSEC is based on a 1986 Memorandum of Agreement. NSA has a close, cooperative relationship with CSEC that both sides would like to see expanded and strengthened.
+
+(S//REL TO USA, CAN)) CSEC is a highly valued second party partner. The relationship is driven by our mutual interest in the defense of North America as a whole. Cooperative efforts include the exchange of liaison officers and integrees, joint projects, shared activities and a strong desire for closer collaboration in the area of cyber defense. Since Canada has a limited ability to produce cryptographic devices, it is a large consumer of U.S. IA products.
+
+(C//REL TO USA, FVEY) [REDACTED] NSA civilian, guides the continued success of the CANUSA relationship in Canada. [REDACTED] staff have a close working relationship with [REDACTED] Together they enable productive interactions with Canadian intelligence organizations in support of U.S. Intelligence Community goals.
+
+(U) Key Issues: NSA and CSEC cooperate closely in the following areas:
+
+* (TS//SI//REL TO USA, CAN) active computer network access and exploitation on a variety of foreign intelligence targets, including CT, Middle East, North Africa, Europe, and Mexico;
+
+* (U//FOUO) information assurance and critical infrastructure defense; and
+
+* (U//FOUO) evolving cyber capabilities and network security standards.
+
+Classified By: [REDACTED]
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20070108
+Declassify On: 20380401
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL USA, FVEY
+
+(U) What NSA provides to the partner:
+
+(S//SI//REL TO USA, CAN) SIGINT: NSA and CSEC cooperate in targeting approximately 20 high-priority countries [REDACTED] NSA shares technological developments, cryptologic capabilities, software and resources for state-of-the-art collection, processing and analytic efforts, and IA capabilities. The intelligence exchange with CSEC covers worldwide national and transnational targets. No Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP) money is allocated to CSEC, but NSA at times pays R&D and technology costs on shared projects with CSEC.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(U) What the partner provides to NSA:
+
+(TS//SI///REL TO USA, CAN) CSEC offers resources for advanced collection, processing and analysis, and has opened covert sites at the request of NSA. CSEC shares with NSA their unique geographic access to areas unavailable to the U.S. [REDACTED] and provides cryptographic products, cryptanalysis, technology, and software. CSEC has increased
+its investment in R&D projects of mutual interest. [REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL USA, FVEY
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL USA, FVEY
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL USA, FVEY
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL USA, FVEY
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL USA, FVEY
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/20150323-CBC-NSA_Memo-on_Intelligence_Relationship_With_CSE/metadata.json b/data/20150323-CBC-NSA_Memo-on_Intelligence_Relationship_With_CSE/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8e359ba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/20150323-CBC-NSA_Memo-on_Intelligence_Relationship_With_CSE/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+{
+ "title": "NSA Intelligence Relationship with Canada's Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC)",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "This document describes the close, long-standing SIGINT partnership between the NSA and Canada’s CSEC, emphasizing cooperative efforts in global intelligence collection, cyber operations, information assurance, and critical infrastructure defense. It highlights mutual contributions, including CSEC’s unique geographic access, covert sites, cryptographic capabilities, and R&D collaboration, supporting U.S. and North American security objectives.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [
+ "CSEC",
+ "CANUSA Agreement",
+ "cyber defense",
+ "Information Assurance",
+ "cryptography",
+ "intelligence sharing",
+ "network security",
+ "cyber operations",
+ "critical infrastructure",
+ "international collaboration",
+ "covert operations",
+ "cryptanalysis",
+ "R&D collaboration",
+ "global surveillance",
+ "U.S.-Canada partnership",
+ "transnational targets",
+ "technology exchange",
+ "high-priority countries"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2013-04-03",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "SI"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "REL USA, FVEY"
+ ],
+ "banner": "TOP SECRET//SI//REL USA, FVEY",
+ "genre": "report",
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [
+ "Canada",
+ "Mexico"
+ ],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "CBC News",
+ "date_published": "2015-03-23",
+ "title": "Communication Security Establishment's cyberwarfare toolbox revealed",
+ "link": "https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/communication-security-establishment-s-cyberwarfare-toolbox-revealed-1.3002978",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Seglins, Dave",
+ "Hildebrandt, Amber",
+ "Pereira, Michael",
+ "Greenwald, Glenn",
+ "Gallagher, Ryan"
+ ],
+ "contributors": []
+ },
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2015-03-23",
+ "title": "Documents Reveal Canada’s Secret Hacking Tactics",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2015/03/23/canada-cse-hacking-cyberwar-secret-arsenal/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Gallagher, Ryan"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1690227/odni3march2015-canada-v1-0.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "publisher": "Metropolitan Books",
+ "date_published": "2014-05-13",
+ "title": "No Place to Hide",
+ "link": "https://www.glenngreenwald.net/#BookDocuments",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Greenwald, Glenn"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "version": "no-place-to-hide",
+ "note": "The pages reprinted in the document appendix of No Place to Hide (appendix page 35)."
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "pdf_sha256": "fef7638ba5af29e367393ac35449d94336f280d756dce8d76484ee5af566d282",
+ "pages": 4,
+ "versions": {
+ "no-place-to-hide": {
+ "pdf_sha256": "794e2b6440aa808f54ed965639869791bf12ed45bc7aa379b72d1d92f6746d9e"
+ }
+ }
+}
diff --git a/data/20150323-CBC-NSA_Memo-on_Intelligence_Relationship_With_CSE/versions/no-place-to-hide/no-place-to-hide.md b/data/20150323-CBC-NSA_Memo-on_Intelligence_Relationship_With_CSE/versions/no-place-to-hide/no-place-to-hide.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a0cbeac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/20150323-CBC-NSA_Memo-on_Intelligence_Relationship_With_CSE/versions/no-place-to-hide/no-place-to-hide.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+ONAL SECURITY AGEN
+UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
+
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL USA, FVEY
+National Security Agency/
+Central Security Service
+Information Paper
+
+3 April 2013
+
+Subject: (U//FOUO) NSA Intelligence Relationship with Canada's Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC)
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, CAN
+
+(U) What NSA provides to the partner:
+
+(S//SI//REL TO USA, CAN) SIGINT: NSA and CSEC cooperate in targeting approximately 20 high-priority countries [REDACTED] NSA shares technological developments, cryptologic capabilities, software and resources for state-of-the-art collection, processing and analytic efforts, and IA capabilities. The intelligence exchange with CSEC covers worldwide national and transnational targets. No Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP) money is allocated to CSEC, but NSA at times pays R&D and technology costs on shared projects with CSEC.
+
+(U) What the partner provides to NSA:
+
+(TS//SI///REL TO USA, CAN) CSEC offers resources for advanced collection, processing and analysis, and has opened covert sites at the request of NSA. CSEC shares with NSA their unique geographic access to areas unavailable to the U.S. [REDACTED] and provides cryptographic products, cryptanalysis, technology, and software. CSEC has increased its investment in R&D projects of mutual interest.
diff --git a/data/20180320-theintercept__second_look_sso_20mar2012_wstormbrewmap/20180320-theintercept__second_look_sso_20mar2012_wstormbrewmap.md b/data/20180320-theintercept__second_look_sso_20mar2012_wstormbrewmap/20180320-theintercept__second_look_sso_20mar2012_wstormbrewmap.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f355b90
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/20180320-theintercept__second_look_sso_20mar2012_wstormbrewmap/20180320-theintercept__second_look_sso_20mar2012_wstormbrewmap.md
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+# SSO Corporate Portfolio Overview
+
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20070108
+Declassify On: 20361201
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+## Corporate Portfolio
+
+FAIRVIEW
+* (C) US-990 FAIRVIEW
+
+BLARNEY
+* (C) US-984 FISA collection
+* (C) US-984X* FAA collection
+
+STORMBREW
+* (C) US-983 STORMBREW
+* (C) US-3140 MADCAPOCELOT
+
+SSO Corporate/TAO Shaping
+* (C) US-3105S1 DARKTHUNDER
+* (C) US-3105S1 STEELFLAUTA
+
+OAKSTAR
+* (C) US-3206 MONKEYROCKET*
+* (C) US-3217 SHIFTINGSHADOW
+* (C) US-3230 ORANGECRUSH
+* (C) US-3247 YACHTSHOP
+* (C) US-3251 ORANGEBLOSSOM
+* (C) US-3273 SILVERZEPHYR
+* (C) US-3277 BLUEZEPHYR
+* (C) US-3354 COBALTFALCON
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+## US-3206 MONKEYROCKET
+
+(TS//SI) US-3206 (PDDG: 6T) – Operates from a foreign access point under E.O. 12333.
+
+(C) Expected IOC: Spring 2012
+
+(TS//SI) Key Targets: CT-focused – Middle East, Europe, and Asia
+
+(S//SI) DNI Metadata & Content
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/20180320-theintercept__second_look_sso_20mar2012_wstormbrewmap/metadata.json b/data/20180320-theintercept__second_look_sso_20mar2012_wstormbrewmap/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..44c2585
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/20180320-theintercept__second_look_sso_20mar2012_wstormbrewmap/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+{
+ "title": "SSO Corporate Portfolio Overview",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "This document outlines various NSA and SSO programs and initiatives, including their collection methods, operational focuses, and key targets. These programs are part of the corporate portfolio, and the details, including specific SIGINT and metadata collection, are tied to critical intelligence targets like counterterrorism in the Middle East, Europe, and Asia.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [
+ "SSO",
+ "EO 12333",
+ "counterterrorism",
+ "middle east",
+ "Europe",
+ "Asia"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN",
+ "genre": "slides",
+ "programs": [
+ "FAIRVIEW",
+ "BLARNEY",
+ "STORMBREW",
+ "MADCAPOCELOT",
+ "DARKTHUNDER",
+ "STEELFLAUTA",
+ "MONKEYROCKET",
+ "SHIFTINGSHADOW",
+ "ORANGECRUSH",
+ "YACHTSHOP",
+ "ORANGEBLOSSOM",
+ "SILVERZEPHYR",
+ "BLUEZEPHYR",
+ "COBALTFALCON",
+ "SECONDLOOK",
+ "SSO",
+ "OAKSTAR"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2018-03-20",
+ "title": "The NSA Worked to “Track Down” Bitcoin Users, Snowden Documents Reveal",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2018/03/20/the-nsa-worked-to-track-down-bitcoin-users-snowden-documents-reveal/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Biddle, Sam"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2018/03/20/pages-from-second-look-sso20mar2012-wstormbrewmap/",
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/4408023/Pages-From-SECOND-LOOK-SSO20Mar2012-wStormbrewMap.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "pdf_sha256": "6c4b6e7af6feccfb739d5b2124a931b46dbf0325c261f3e02218bf5c594832a0",
+ "pages": 3
+}
diff --git a/data/25_apr_2013_sso_weekly_brief/25_apr_2013_sso_weekly_brief.md b/data/25_apr_2013_sso_weekly_brief/25_apr_2013_sso_weekly_brief.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6b51812
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/25_apr_2013_sso_weekly_brief/25_apr_2013_sso_weekly_brief.md
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+SECRET//SI//REL USA, GBR
+
+(U//FOUO) WINDSTOP
+SYSTEM HIGHLIGHTS
+MVR – New tasking: [REDACTED]
+
+INCENSER
+* XKS Upgrade➔1.5.11 (so-2013-01446)
+
+MUSCULAR
+* AppID reload 19Apr (IPGeo)
+
+TRANSIENT THURIBLE
+* Processing outage & SORTINGHAT outage
+
+SECRET//SI//REL USA, GBR
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/25_apr_2013_sso_weekly_brief/metadata.json b/data/25_apr_2013_sso_weekly_brief/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9a8b7d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/25_apr_2013_sso_weekly_brief/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+{
+ "title": "WINDSTOP SYSTEM HIGHLIGHTS",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "Secret document describing WINDSTOP program's highlights.",
+ "long_description": "This is a SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, GBR WINDSTOP system highlights document — a brief operational status update covering four collection programmes under the WINDSTOP umbrella, restricted to US and UK eyes only rather than full Five Eyes.\n\nWINDSTOP is the cover term for a joint NSA/GCHQ programme collecting from major internet cables and infrastructure. The document covers four named collection systems. INCENSER received an XKeyscore upgrade to version 1.5.11 under change order so-2013-01446 — INCENSER is identified from other published Snowden documents as a cable tap programme collecting from a fibre optic cable, believed to be associated with a transatlantic cable landing in the UK. MUSCULAR received an AppID reload on 19 April with IPGeo data — MUSCULAR (DS-200B) is the joint NSA/GCHQ programme tapping Google and Yahoo private fibre links between data centres. TRANSIENT THURIBLE experienced a processing outage alongside a SORTINGHAT outage. A new tasking under MVR is redacted. The inclusion of Borat picture as an apparent informal caption suggests the document was an internal operational status note with a humorous element, but the exact reason for the picture is not specified.",
+ "tags": [
+ "AppID",
+ "IP geolocation",
+ "cable tapping",
+ "fiber optic cables",
+ "Borat"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2013-04-25",
+ "classification": [
+ "SECRET",
+ "SI"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "REL USA, GBR"
+ ],
+ "banner": "SECRET//SI//REL USA, GBR",
+ "genre": "slides",
+ "programs": [
+ "WINDSTOP",
+ "MVR",
+ "INCENSER",
+ "XKEYSCORE",
+ "MUSCULAR",
+ "TRANSIENT THURIBLE",
+ "SORTINGHAT"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "WDR",
+ "date_published": "2014-11-20",
+ "title": "Vodafone – der lange Arm des britischen Geheimdienstes?",
+ "link": "http://www1.wdr.de/daserste/monitor/videos/videovodafonederlangearmdesbritischengeheimdienstes100.html",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Restle, Georg"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "reporting_only": true
+ },
+ {
+ "publisher": "Channel 4",
+ "date_published": "2014-11-20",
+ "title": "Spy cable revealed: how telecoms firm worked with GCHQ",
+ "link": "http://www.channel4.com/news/spy-cable-revealed-how-telecoms-firm-worked-with-gchq",
+ "reporters": [
+ "White, Geoff"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "reporting_only": true
+ },
+ {
+ "publisher": "NDR",
+ "date_published": "2014-11-21",
+ "title": "Der lange Arm des Geheimdienstes?",
+ "link": "http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/snowden-vodafone-101.html",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Strozyk, Jan",
+ "Moltke, Henrik",
+ "Poitras, Laura"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "reporting_only": true
+ },
+ {
+ "publisher": "Süddeutsche Zeitung",
+ "date_published": "2014-11-25",
+ "title": "Snowden-Leaks: How Vodafone-Subsidiary Cable & Wireless Aided GCHQ’s Spying Efforts",
+ "link": "http://international.sueddeutsche.de/post/103543418200/snowden-leaks-how-vodafone-subsidiary-cable",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Obermaier, Frederik",
+ "Moltke, Henrik",
+ "Poitras, Laura",
+ "Strozyk, Jan"
+ ],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "pdf_sha256": "4057a417c5ead448378461b606cf1009066ee6936516c6987049359074741575",
+ "pages": 1
+}
diff --git a/data/27_June_08_redacted/27_June_08_redacted.md b/data/27_June_08_redacted/27_June_08_redacted.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..acae5dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/27_June_08_redacted/27_June_08_redacted.md
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
+The maximum classification allowed on GCWiki is TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT. Click to report inappropriate
+content.
+For GCWiki help contact: [REDACTED] Support page
+
+MTI Access Project - Weekly Status w/e 27 June 08
+
+From GCWiki
+Jump to: navigation, search
+
+[edit] GRASP
+
+* Deployment of access equipment scheduled for end August in line with commercial timescales.
+* Risk review on Monday with GERONTIC to review and work through potential new deployment risks identified
+ by GERONTIC.
+* Egress funding identified as a possible candidate for funding under released Programme contingency budget.
+
+[edit] DRUDGE
+
+* GERONTIC have been given ccts of interest for GERONTIC internal testing of the DRUDGE enabling
+ capability.
+* If testing successful, this will enable feasibility testing using target system.
+
+[edit] FAINT
+
+* WPA being revised to include the GERONTIC remote switching proposal.
+* No further switches have been deployed this week. All remaining switches planned for deployment before the
+ end of August.
diff --git a/data/27_June_08_redacted/metadata.json b/data/27_June_08_redacted/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..84d023c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/27_June_08_redacted/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+{
+ "title": "MTI Access Project - Weekly Status w/e 27 June 08",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "The document outlines the MTI Access Project’s progress, including the deployment of access equipment, risk reviews with GERONTIC, and internal testing of surveillance capabilities like DRUDGE and remote switching. This reflects broader revelations about how companies like Cable & Wireless (now Vodafone) facilitated GCHQ’s mass surveillance, including covert access to telecom networks like FLAG through systems like GERONTIC.",
+ "long_description": "This is a UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT GCHQ GCWiki page — a weekly status update for the MTI Access Project, week ending 27 June 2008. The document covers three named access programmes, all involving GERONTIC — identified from other published Snowden documents as the codename for Vodafone Cable (formerly Cable and Wireless), one of GCHQ's primary commercial fibre access partners.\n\nGRASP — deployment of access equipment was scheduled for end of August in line with commercial timescales. A risk review was planned with GERONTIC to work through new deployment risks the company had identified. Egress funding was identified as a candidate for programme contingency budget, suggesting cost pressures on the egress infrastructure needed to carry collected data from the access point to GCHQ processing.\n\nDRUDGE — GERONTIC had been given circuits of interest for internal testing of the DRUDGE enabling capability. If testing was successful this would enable feasibility testing using a target system — suggesting DRUDGE was a new or developing access capability being trialled against live GERONTIC infrastructure before operational deployment.\n\nFAINT — a Work Package Agreement was being revised to include a GERONTIC remote switching proposal, suggesting a change to how traffic would be switched or selected at the access point. No further switches had been deployed that week, with all remaining switches planned for deployment before end of August.\n\nThe document is notable for confirming that GERONTIC was actively involved in the technical planning and risk review of GCHQ access equipment deployment — consistent with the characterisation in other Snowden documents of GERONTIC as a willing commercial partner with dedicated Sensitive Relationship Teams supporting GCHQ access operations rather than a passive target of covert interception.",
+ "tags": [
+ "GCWiki",
+ "MTI",
+ "Vodafone"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "GCHQ",
+ "date_created": "2008-06-27",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "STRAP 1",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "banner": "TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT",
+ "genre": "wiki",
+ "programs": [
+ "GRASP",
+ "GERONTIC",
+ "DRUDGE",
+ "FAINT"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "WDR",
+ "date_published": "2014-11-20",
+ "title": "Vodafone – der lange Arm des britischen Geheimdienstes?",
+ "link": "http://www1.wdr.de/daserste/monitor/videos/videovodafonederlangearmdesbritischengeheimdienstes100.html",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Restle, Georg"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "reporting_only": true
+ },
+ {
+ "publisher": "Channel 4",
+ "date_published": "2014-11-20",
+ "title": "Spy cable revealed: how telecoms firm worked with GCHQ",
+ "link": "http://www.channel4.com/news/spy-cable-revealed-how-telecoms-firm-worked-with-gchq",
+ "reporters": [
+ "White, Geoff"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "reporting_only": true
+ },
+ {
+ "publisher": "NDR",
+ "date_published": "2014-11-21",
+ "title": "Der lange Arm des Geheimdienstes?",
+ "link": "http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/snowden-vodafone-101.html",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Strozyk, Jan",
+ "Moltke, Henrik",
+ "Poitras, Laura"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "reporting_only": true
+ },
+ {
+ "publisher": "Süddeutsche Zeitung",
+ "date_published": "2014-11-25",
+ "title": "Snowden-Leaks: How Vodafone-Subsidiary Cable & Wireless Aided GCHQ’s Spying Efforts",
+ "link": "http://international.sueddeutsche.de/post/103543418200/snowden-leaks-how-vodafone-subsidiary-cable",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Obermaier, Frederik",
+ "Moltke, Henrik",
+ "Poitras, Laura",
+ "Strozyk, Jan"
+ ],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "pdf_sha256": "3880801903586439c24d5c1130295e53149a9a818c00c87eacba4f459c4b2d3d",
+ "pages": 1
+}
diff --git a/data/28715-tony-fullman-nsa-file/28715-tony-fullman-nsa-file.md b/data/28715-tony-fullman-nsa-file/28715-tony-fullman-nsa-file.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c0e5670
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/28715-tony-fullman-nsa-file/28715-tony-fullman-nsa-file.md
@@ -0,0 +1,252 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS//20320108
+
+*************************************************************
+THIS INFORMATION IS DERIVED FROM FAA COLLECTION UNDER FAA FOREIGN GOVERNMENT CERT
+******************************************
+THIS INFORMATION IS PROVIDED FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES IN AN EFFORT TO DEVELOP POTENTIAL LEADS. IT CANNOT BE USED IN AFFIDAVITS, COURT PROCEEDINGS OR SUBPOENAS, OR FOR OTHER LEGAL OR JUDICIAL PURPOSES.
+*************************************************************
+
+Photo Information
+Creation date Tue Apr 26, 2011 02:49:04
+GMT
+Uploaded IP [REDACTED] [FJ]
+Album Profile Pictures
+Caption
+Taken date Mon Apr 04, 2011 19:57:52
+GMT
+Camera make NIKON
+Camera model COOLPIX L22
+
+Comments
+Date (GMT) User Text
+Sat Jul 14, 2012 08:06:09 [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS//20320108
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS//20320108
+
+*************************************************************
+THIS INFORMATION IS DERIVED FROM FAA COLLECTION UNDER FAA COUNTERTERRORISM CERT
+******************************************
+THIS INFORMATION IS PROVIDED FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES IN AN EFFORT TO DEVELOP POTENTIAL LEADS. IT CANNOT BE USED IN AFFIDAVITS, COURT PROCEEDINGS OR SUBPOENAS, OR FOR OTHER LEGAL OR JUDICIAL PURPOSES.
+*************************************************************
+
+Photo Information
+Creation date Sat Jun 16, 2012 05:03:15 GMT
+Uploaded IP [REDACTED] [FJ]
+Album Tagged Photos
+Caption My life saver... I luv my car
+Taken date Sat Jun 16, 2012 08:39:44 GMT
+Camera make Panasonic
+Camera model DMC-FT3
+GPS coordinates [REDACTED]
+
+Tags
+Date (GMT) Creator Tagged User Status x% y%
+Sun Jul 15, 2012 06:04:34 Unknown
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS//20320108
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON-REL TO USA, NZ
+
+*************************************************************
+THIS INFORMATION IS DERIVED FROM FAA COLLECTION UNDER FAA COUNTERTERRORISM CERT
+******************************************
+THIS INFORMATION IS PROVIDED FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES IN AN EFFORT TO DEVELOP POTENTIAL LEADS. IT CANNOT BE USED IN AFFIDAVITS, COURT PROCEEDINGS OR SUBPOENAS, OR FOR OTHER LEGAL OR JUDICIAL PURPOSES.
+*************************************************************
+
+Mr Anthony Fullman
+[REDACTED]
+Australia
+
+Your account number: [REDACTED]
+
+Statement period From 26/06/12 to 24/07/12
+Your credit limit [REDACTED]
+Your available credit [REDACTED]
+Your annual interest rate [REDACTED]
+
+| Opening Balance | Credits | Debits | Closing Balance | Overdue | Current Due |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+
+| Date of Transaction | Date Processed | Card Used | Transaction Details | Credit | Debit |
+| :------------------ | :------------- | :-------- | :---------------------------------------- | :----- | :----- |
+| 25/06/12 | 26/06/12 | [REDACTED]| Retro Espresso Ltd Mangere | | $7.00 |
+| 25/06/12 | 27/06/12 | [REDACTED]| [MINIMIZED UK COMPANY] Rental Auckland Nzi| | $20.00 |
+| 25/06/12 | 27/06/12 | [REDACTED]| Z Skyway Auckland | | $40.00 |
+| 25/06/12 | 27/06/12 | [REDACTED]| [MINIMIZED US COMPANY]-605 Pt Chevalier | | $20.00 |
+| 26/06/12 | 27/06/12 | [REDACTED]| Super Liquor Pt Cheval Pt Chevalier | | $23.99 |
+| 26/06/12 | 27/06/12 | [REDACTED]| Countdown Pt Cheval Auckland Nzi | | $58.20 |
+| 26/06/12 | 27/06/12 | [REDACTED]| [MINIMIZED UK COMPANY] Prepay [MINIMIZED US COMPANY] M Auckland| | $60.00 |
+| 26/06/12 | 27/06/12 | [REDACTED]| Air NZ Online Auckland | | $175.00|
+| 27/06/12 | 28/06/12 | [REDACTED]| Awpl Auckland | | $24.99 |
+| 27/06/12 | 28/06/12 | [REDACTED]| Awpl Auckland | $5.00 | |
+| 28/06/12 | 29/06/12 | [REDACTED]| No 1 Shoes Palm Nth Palm North | | $39.99 |
+| 28/06/12 | 29/06/12 | [REDACTED]| No 1 Shoes Palm Nth Palm North | | $17.98 |
+| 28/06/12 | 29/06/12 | [REDACTED]| New World Broadway Palmerston NT | | $86.58 |
+| 28/06/12 | 29/06/12 | [REDACTED]| Rebel Palmerston Nth Palmerston NT | | $205.99|
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON-REL TO USA, NZ
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, NZ//20320108
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, NZ//20320108
+
+*************************
+THIS INFORMATION IS DERIVED FROM FAA
+COLLECTION UNDER FAA FOREIGN GOVERNMENT CERT
+*********************************************
+THIS INFORMATION IS PROVIDED FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES IN AN EFFORT TO DEVELOP POTENTIAL LEADS. IT CANNOT BE USED IN AFFIDAVITS, COURT PROCEEDINGS OR SUBPOENAS, OR FOR OTHER LEGAL OR JUDICIAL PURPOSES.
+*********************************************
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+***
+PWZA20122200316270000237733
+
+SIGAD: US-984XN
+PDDG: AX
+CASE_NOTATION: P3ESQC120018222
+DTG: 07AU0222Z12
+
+Received from:
+********************
+Date: Tue, 07 Aug 2012 11:26:53 +1000
+From: "[REDACTED]" <[REDACTED]@com.au>
+To: <[REDACTED]@gmail.com>
+Subject: Expression of Interest - Project Manager (Permanent Role)
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+[OC: The file "Tony CV @ 3 Aug 3012 for AAS.doc" attached to original e-mail has previously been sent to GCSB.]
+
+***
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, NZ//20320108
+
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20070108
+Declassify On: 20320108
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, NZ//20320108
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS//20320108
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, NZ//20320108
+
+*********************************************
+THIS INFORMATION IS DERIVED FROM FAA
+COLLECTION UNDER FAA FOREIGN GOVERNMENT CERT
+*********************************************
+THIS INFORMATION IS PROVIDED FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES IN AN EFFORT TO DEVELOP POTENTIAL LEADS. IT CANNOT BE USED IN AFFIDAVITS, COURT PROCEEDINGS OR SUBPOENAS, OR FOR OTHER LEGAL OR JUDICIAL PURPOSES.
+*********************************************
+
+[REDACTED]@gmail.com
+
+***
+
+PWZA20122211943510001555537
+
+SIGAD: US-984XN
+PDDG: AX
+CASE_NOTATION: P3ASQC120017040
+DTG: 08AU1911Z12
+
+Received from: [REDACTED]
+Subject: Bank account
+From: [REDACTED]@gmail.com
+Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2012 17:55:59 +1200
+To: "[REDACTED]@gmail.com" <[REDACTED]@gmail.com>
+
+[OC: No text in body of email.]
+
+[OC: File "Westpac balance.pdf" attached to email has been included as "tpfullman_8 Aug_P3ASQC120017040_Westpac balance_1.jpg" and "tpfullman_8 Aug_P3ASQC120017040_Westpac balance_2.jpg".]
+
+***
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, NZ//20320108
+
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20070108
+Declassify On: 20320108
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS//20320108
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS//20320108
+
+*************************************************************
+THIS INFORMATION IS DERIVED FROM FAA COLLECTION UNDER FAA COUNTERTERRORISM CERT
+******************************************
+THIS INFORMATION IS PROVIDED FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES IN AN EFFORT TO DEVELOP POTENTIAL LEADS. IT CANNOT BE USED IN AFFIDAVITS, COURT PROCEEDINGS OR SUBPOENAS, OR FOR OTHER LEGAL OR JUDICIAL PURPOSES.
+*************************************************************
+
+Westpac
+www.westpac.co.nz
+
+Westpac Electronic
+15 June 2012
+
+318 Lambton Quay Sub-Branch
+P.O. BOX 1298
+Wellington
+Telephone: 0800 400 600
+Fax: (04) 498 1786
+
+Mr A M P Fullman
+[REDACTED]
+Fiji
+
+Account name: Fullman Anthony Michael Patric
+
+Account number: [REDACTED]
+Last summary date: 15 May 2012
+This summary date: 15 June 2012
+Summary number: 110
+
+OPENING BALANCE [REDACTED]
+
+| TYPE | NAME OF OTHER PARTY | TRANSACTION PARTICULARS | DATE | MONEY OUT $ | MONEY IN $ | BALANCES |
+| :------------- | :------------------ | :---------------------- | :----- | :---------- | :--------- | :--------- |
+| Loan repayment | To [REDACTED] | | 23 May | [REDACTED] | | [REDACTED] |
+| Loan repayment | To [REDACTED] | | 06 Jun | [REDACTED] | | [REDACTED] |
+
+CLOSING BALANCE [REDACTED]
+
+CR Credit OD Overdraw
+
+As soon as you receive this statement, please check the transactions and let us know if anything is incorrect. Any transactions that have been listed under money in or money out within the last few business days of this summary may be subject to clearance. If any of these items are not paid, your balance will be adjusted, and you will be advised in your next statement.
+
+Your Westpac Electronic pricing
+
+| | NUMBER OF TRANSACTIONS YOU DID THIS MONTH | WHAT EACH COSTS | WHAT YOU PAID THIS MONTH |
+| :------------------ | :---------------------------------------- | :-------------- | :----------------------- |
+| account maintenance | | $3.50 | $0.00 |
+| transactions | | | |
+| -eftpos | 0 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
+| -other electronic | 0 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
+| -ATM | 0 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
+| -manual | 0 | $3.00 | $0.00 |
+| -non-chargeable | 2 | | |
+| total | 2 | | $0.00 |
+
+Page 1 of 2
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//RELTO USA, AUS//20320108
diff --git a/data/28715-tony-fullman-nsa-file/metadata.json b/data/28715-tony-fullman-nsa-file/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fe48e41
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/28715-tony-fullman-nsa-file/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+{
+ "title": "Tony Fullman NSA file",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "This document, a series of TOP SECRET intelligence reports from 2012, details the extensive surveillance of Anthony Fullman, a Fiji-born New Zealand citizen and pro-democracy activist. This document shows how the NSA and the New Zealand Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) utilized the PRISM program (SIGAD: US-984XN) to intercept Fullman’s private communications under a FISA Amendments Act (FAA) certification. The gathered intelligence includes personal photographs with embedded metadata, detailed credit card transaction records, private emails regarding job opportunities, and Westpac bank statements. This document serves as a case study in how \"Five Eyes\" partners share intelligence derived from FAA collection to monitor individuals for political or security reasons.",
+ "long_description": "This document illustrates the tactical application of FAA (FISA Amendments Act) Section 702 collection. The reports explicitly state that the information was derived from \"FAA collection under FAA Counterterrorism Cert\" and \"FAA Foreign Government Cert.\" This legal framework allows the NSA to compel U.S.-based internet service providers to hand over data belonging to non-U.S. persons. In Fullman’s case, this resulted in the interception of metadata from his Nikon and Panasonic cameras, revealing his exact location via GPS coordinates and IP addresses in Fiji and New Zealand.\n\nThis document highlights the granular level of personal detail obtained through SIGINT (Signals Intelligence). One section reveals a comprehensive list of Fullman’s daily expenses, including coffee at \"Retro Espresso Ltd,\" shoe purchases, and groceries at \"New World Broadway.\" By mapping these transactions, intelligence analysts could reconstruct Fullman's movements and social habits with high precision. This document also contains internal \"Case Notations\" (e.g., P3ESQC120018222), and each item is marked as provided \"in an effort to develop potential leads\", not for legal or judicial use.\n\nThis document further exposes the interception of professional and financial documents. The GCSB received copies of Fullman’s CV (\"Tony CV @ 3 Aug 2012\") and Westpac bank balances that were sent as email attachments. Despite the headers' warnings that this information is \"for intelligence purposes\" and \"cannot be used in court proceedings,\" the sheer volume of data collected—ranging from car photos (\"I luv my car\") to loan repayment schedules—demonstrates how the PRISM program captures a \"full-life\" picture of a target. This document underscores the friction between national security surveillance and the privacy rights of individuals targeted under broad certifications.",
+ "tags": [
+ "bank statements",
+ "financial surveillance",
+ "car",
+ "personal car",
+ "vehicle information",
+ "EXIF",
+ "GPS coordinates",
+ "credit card",
+ "political intelligence",
+ "activism",
+ "email interception",
+ "Gmail",
+ "job application",
+ "pacific islands",
+ "intelligence sharing",
+ "human rights",
+ "pattern-of-life"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2011-08-01",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT",
+ "SI",
+ "ORCON"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "REL TO USA, AUS"
+ ],
+ "banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS//20320108",
+ "genre": "report",
+ "programs": [
+ "PRISM"
+ ],
+ "countries": [
+ "Fiji",
+ "New Zealand",
+ "Australia"
+ ],
+ "people": [
+ "Fullman, Anthony"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2016-08-14",
+ "title": "The Raid: In Bungled Spying Operation, NSA Targeted Pro-Democracy Campaigner",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2016/08/14/nsa-gcsb-prism-surveillance-fullman-fiji/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Gallagher, Ryan",
+ "Hager, Nicky"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_source": "https://www.documentcloud.org/projects/28715-tony-fullman-nsa-file/"
+ },
+ {
+ "publisher": "TVNZ",
+ "date_published": "2016-08-15",
+ "title": "Special investigation: Inside one of the SIS's biggest anti-terrorism operations",
+ "link": "https://www.tvnz.co.nz/one-news/new-zealand/special-investigation-inside-one-siss-biggest-anti-terrorism-operations",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Hager, Nicky",
+ "Gallagher, Ryan"
+ ],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "pdf_sha256": "b5cf75bed25391d8d3f4d4fc9d42034fa654e9790a9731e3ed0862ee0fd7cd60",
+ "pages": 6
+}
diff --git a/data/28_November_08_redacted/28_November_08_redacted.md b/data/28_November_08_redacted/28_November_08_redacted.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e1da01c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/28_November_08_redacted/28_November_08_redacted.md
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
+The maximum classification allowed on GCWiki is TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT. Click to report inappropriate
+content.
+For GCWiki help contact: [REDACTED] Support page
+
+MTI Access Project - Weekly Status w/e 28 November 08
+
+From GCWiki
+Jump to: navigation, search
+
+[edit] VISAGE
+* Tasking and Requisition completed.
+* Payment made to GERONTIC on Thursday 27th (equals a significant chunck of project funding).
+
+[edit] Project
+* GERONTIC JMB (Wednesday 26th) - highlights include (Details ECI - please speak to [REDACTED] if you'd like more info):
+ * Update from GERONTIC on their new organisational structure.
+ * Prioritisation of key work (such as BULLROARER Node balancing).
+ * Update from GERONTIC on future access and shaping opportunities.
+ * Review of new cost model for bandwidth delivery (initial indications are that if this were to be applied now, it would reduce the current rental costs by approx 20%).
+* Project Risk & Issue review held.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/28_November_08_redacted/metadata.json b/data/28_November_08_redacted/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..253b2d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/28_November_08_redacted/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+{
+ "title": "MTI Access Project - Weekly Status w/e 28 November 08",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "The document details the MTI Access Project’s status in November 2008, including a significant payment to GERONTIC, updates on organizational changes, and discussions about future access opportunities and cost reductions. This aligns with broader revelations about GERONTIC’s role in supporting GCHQ's surveillance operations, facilitating access to telecom infrastructure and shaping surveillance strategies.",
+ "long_description": "This is a UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT GCHQ GCWiki page — a weekly status update for the MTI Access Project, week ending 28 November 2008, covering one named access programme and a Joint Management Board meeting with GERONTIC.\n\nVISAGE — tasking and requisition had been completed and a significant payment made to GERONTIC on 27 November, described as representing a significant chunk of project funding. This confirms the commercial nature of the arrangement — GCHQ was paying GERONTIC directly for access infrastructure rather than covertly intercepting traffic.\n\nThe Joint Management Board meeting on 26 November between GCHQ and GERONTIC covered four items, all flagged as ECI-protected with a named contact for further details. GERONTIC provided an update on their new organisational structure — relevant to GCHQ's ongoing relationship management. BULLROARER node balancing was identified as a key work priority — BULLROARER appears to be a component of the access or switching infrastructure requiring load balancing across nodes. GERONTIC provided an update on future access and shaping opportunities — confirming that the commercial partner was proactively identifying new collection opportunities for GCHQ rather than simply fulfilling existing requirements. A new cost model for bandwidth delivery was reviewed, with initial indications suggesting it would reduce current rental costs by approximately 20% if applied immediately.\n\nThe document reinforces the picture from other GCHQ access programme documents of GERONTIC as an active commercial partner with its own Joint Management Board structure, providing organisational updates, identifying new opportunities and negotiating cost models — a level of institutional integration well beyond passive compliance with legal orders.",
+ "tags": [
+ "GERONTIC JMB",
+ "GCWiki",
+ "MTI",
+ "Vodafone"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "GCHQ",
+ "date_created": "2008-11-28",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "STRAP 1",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "banner": "TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT",
+ "genre": "wiki",
+ "programs": [
+ "VISAGE",
+ "GERONTIC",
+ "BULLROARER"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "WDR",
+ "date_published": "2014-11-20",
+ "title": "Vodafone – der lange Arm des britischen Geheimdienstes?",
+ "link": "http://www1.wdr.de/daserste/monitor/videos/videovodafonederlangearmdesbritischengeheimdienstes100.html",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Restle, Georg"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "reporting_only": true
+ },
+ {
+ "publisher": "Channel 4",
+ "date_published": "2014-11-20",
+ "title": "Spy cable revealed: how telecoms firm worked with GCHQ",
+ "link": "http://www.channel4.com/news/spy-cable-revealed-how-telecoms-firm-worked-with-gchq",
+ "reporters": [
+ "White, Geoff"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "reporting_only": true
+ },
+ {
+ "publisher": "NDR",
+ "date_published": "2014-11-21",
+ "title": "Der lange Arm des Geheimdienstes?",
+ "link": "http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/snowden-vodafone-101.html",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Strozyk, Jan",
+ "Moltke, Henrik",
+ "Poitras, Laura"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "reporting_only": true
+ },
+ {
+ "publisher": "Süddeutsche Zeitung",
+ "date_published": "2014-11-25",
+ "title": "Snowden-Leaks: How Vodafone-Subsidiary Cable & Wireless Aided GCHQ’s Spying Efforts",
+ "link": "http://international.sueddeutsche.de/post/103543418200/snowden-leaks-how-vodafone-subsidiary-cable",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Obermaier, Frederik",
+ "Moltke, Henrik",
+ "Poitras, Laura",
+ "Strozyk, Jan"
+ ],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "pdf_sha256": "11737148b9934eb213d1c6d25a63640ab9b62ffa7a2ce1969a7eb0cc57e3ed84",
+ "pages": 1
+}
diff --git a/data/5CBOW/5CBOW.md b/data/5CBOW/5CBOW.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..49a9829
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/5CBOW/5CBOW.md
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+
+
+ZAIN INTRANET NETWORK ENGINEERING
+
+Report No: 26 Date: 10 June 2009
+
+Case Notations: 5CBOW Freq /Polarity: [REDACTED]
+
+Summary:
+
+* This informal report has been issued to highlight a C2C carrier Gabon to Belgium.
+
+* The carrier was sampled using TERRAIN and Srouter
+
+* ZAIN Corporation (formerly MTC Vodafone) intranet passing Technical data between ZAIN
+engineers via SMTP email Port 25.
+
+* WBT45706 issued at SITE requesting 7 days collection, any hits should be viewable
+via UDAQ.
+
+* TERRAIN sampling produced the following hit terms from the TERRAIN tacho
+dictionary.
+
+Survey Files can be viewed in CARBOY FARNDALE Global Partition filename
+"5CL03666_928000"
+
+4806 SECON 9 [REDACTED] @ZAIN.COM"
+5356 GCHQ 4 "ORANGEMALI TECHNICAL" [REDACTED] @ORANGEMALI.COM
+4806 SECON 9 [REDACTED]@ZAIN.COM" [REDACTED] @ZAIN.COM"
+4806 SECON 9 [REDACTED]D@COMIUM.CI
+5139 GCHQ 4 "SAUDI TELECOM COMPANY" FRAUD@STC.COM.SA
+4891 SECON 6 [REDACTED] @SA.ZAIN.COM"
+4806 SECON 9 [REDACTED]@TUNISIETELECOM.TN" "[REDACTED]@TUNISIETELECOM.TN"
+4894 SECON 7 "MTC TOUCH GSM LEBANON" "[REDACTED]@MTC.COM.LB
+4806 SECON 9 [REDACTED]@NE.CELTEL.COM
+4806 SECON 6 [REDACTED]@NG.CELTEL.COM
+
+Technical Details: Polarity: LHCP
+ Freq: [REDACTED]
+ Modulation: QPSK
+ Symbol Rate: 728.167
+ FEC RASIN: 3/4 TPC
+ Data Rate: 1024
+ Randomiser: A12
+ Protocol stack = Cisco/Ipv4/Icmp/Tcp/Udp/Esp
+
+Analysis: removal of fas leaves WC1A(960k)
+
+Can this carrier be tasked on the Collection System? Yes
+
+1 of 2
+
+This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under
+other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
+
+
+
+
+Contact Details [REDACTED] Email: [REDACTED]
+OPA-BUDE-([REDACTED]
+
+WIKI: http://[REDACTED]
+
+2 of 2
+
+This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under
+other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/5CBOW/metadata.json b/data/5CBOW/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..072e101
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/5CBOW/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+{
+ "title": "ZAIN INTRANET NETWORK ENGINEERING",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "2009 GCHQ report documents the sampling and tasking of a satellite data carrier linking Gabon and Belgium that carried the internal corporate intranet of telecom operator Zain (formerly MTC Vodafone), through which engineers exchanged technical data via SMTP email. The intercept surfaced email selectors belonging to staff across multiple telecom operators — including Zain subsidiaries, Orange Mali, Saudi Telecom, MTC Touch (Lebanon), Tunisie Telecom, and Celtel entities in Niger and Nigeria — reflecting the agency’s systematic targeting of telecom employees as a potential entry point into operators’ internal networks.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [
+ "Zain",
+ "telecom surveillance",
+ "satellite interception",
+ "internet interception",
+ "email selectors",
+ "corporate espionage",
+ "telecom employees",
+ "roaming",
+ "intranet",
+ "Orange Mali",
+ "Saudi Telecom",
+ "MTC Touch",
+ "Celtel",
+ "network reconnaissance"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "GCHQ",
+ "date_created": "2009-06-10",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "banner": "PROTECTIVE MARKING",
+ "genre": "other",
+ "programs": [
+ "TERRAIN",
+ "SROUTER",
+ "CARBOY",
+ "FARNDALE",
+ "UDAQ"
+ ],
+ "countries": [
+ "Gabon",
+ "Belgium",
+ "Saudi Arabia",
+ "Lebanon",
+ "Tunisia"
+ ],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "Le Monde",
+ "date_published": "2016-12-08",
+ "title": "Comment les services de renseignement font la chasse aux employés des télécoms",
+ "link": "https://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2016/12/08/comment-les-services-de-renseignement-font-la-chasse-aux-employes-des-telecoms_5045496_4408996.html",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Untersinger, Martin",
+ "Leloup, Damien"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/3229458/5CBOW.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "pdf_sha256": "337d2c29c639265fa5848c681178447ddf59bf8d44d83ad3c5256afd5ac8ac69"
+}
diff --git a/data/5DBIY/5DBIY.md b/data/5DBIY/5DBIY.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d09028a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/5DBIY/5DBIY.md
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+SECRET STRAP1 SPOKE
+
+SIERRA LEONE - BELGIUM
+
+Report No: 25 Date: 28/05/2009
+
+Case Notations: 5DBIY (Sierra Leone - Belgium) Polarity/Freq: [REDACTED]
+
+ 5DBIZ (Belgium – Sierra Leone)
+
+Summary:
+
+* This informal report has been issued to highlight the possible intelligence value of two C2C
+ carriers, providing links between Sierra Leone and Belgium on satellite INTELSAT 9F3 (5D).
+
+* Both carriers were input to TERRAIN with numerous hits noted on each carrier, listed below.
+
+Results:
+
+5DBIY
+Hits noted as follows:
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+4378 SECON 7 "OLES@OVH.NET" "OLES@OVH.NET"
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+1 of 3
+
+This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under
+other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
+
+SECRET STRAP1 SPOKE
+SECRET STRAP1 SPOKE
+
+5DBIZ
+Hits noted as follows:
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Analysis:
+
+Both carriers are employing 20 strapped timeslots of C2C (1280K).
+CISCO/IPV4/TCP/SMTP/TELNET/VOIP/VPN/APPLICATION-VOFR/SIP/SNMP/UDP/ICMP
+
+5DBIY
+Routername = RT1-FRE1-SL
+Source IP = [REDACTED]
+
+5DBIZ
+Routername = [REDACTED]
+
+2 of 3
+
+This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under
+other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
+
+SECRET STRAP1 SPOKE
+SECRET STRAP1 SPOKE
+
+Technical Details: Link = 5DBIY and 5DBIZ
+ Modulation – QPSK
+ Symbol rate = 853.333Kbps
+ Data rate = 1280Kbps
+ Fec rate = 3/4
+ Fec Type = VITERBI
+ Overhead = NONE
+ Reed Solomon = None
+ Randomizer = F20 (0,17,20)
+ Differential encoding
+
+Can this carrier be tasked on the Collection System? Yes, subject to availability of
+ resources
+
+Contact Details [REDACTED] Email: [REDACTED]
+
+ OPA-BUDE - [REDACTED]
+
+3 of 3
+
+This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under
+other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
+
+SECRET STRAP1 SPOKE
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/5DBIY/metadata.json b/data/5DBIY/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b9daba8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/5DBIY/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+{
+ "title": "SIERRA LEONE - BELGIUM",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "May 2009 GCHQ report documents the interception of two satellite carriers linking Sierra Leone and Belgium (via INTELSAT 9F3), surveyed using the TERRAIN collection suite, which identified numerous email selectors of interest carried over the link. Among the hits was the email address of “Oles” — Octave Klaba, founder and CEO of OVH, Europe’s largest internet hosting company — flagged as a target alongside diplomatic and political addresses, though his presence on the list reflects metadata collection rather than proof his message contents were intercepted.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [
+ "OVH",
+ "cloud computing",
+ "satellite interception",
+ "INTELSAT",
+ "telecommunications",
+ "espionage",
+ "email selectors",
+ "web hosting",
+ "corporate surveillance",
+ "metadata collection"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "GCHQ",
+ "date_created": "2009-05-28",
+ "classification": [
+ "SECRET",
+ "STRAP 1",
+ "SPOKE"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "banner": "SECRET STRAP1 SPOKE",
+ "genre": "other",
+ "programs": [
+ "TERRAIN"
+ ],
+ "countries": [
+ "Sierra Leone",
+ "Belgium"
+ ],
+ "people": [
+ "Klaba, Octave"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "Le Monde",
+ "date_published": "2016-12-08",
+ "title": "Les renseignements britanniques ont surveillé le patron d’OVH, premier hébergeur européen",
+ "link": "https://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2016/12/08/les-renseignements-britanniques-ont-surveille-le-patron-d-ovh-premier-hebergeur-europeen_5045500_4408996.html",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Leloup, Damien"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/3229459/5DBIY.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "publisher": "Le Monde",
+ "date_published": "2016-12-08",
+ "title": "Comment les services de renseignement font la chasse aux employés des télécoms",
+ "link": "https://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2016/12/08/comment-les-services-de-renseignement-font-la-chasse-aux-employes-des-telecoms_5045496_4408996.html",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Untersinger, Martin",
+ "Leloup, Damien"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/3229459/5DBIY.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "pdf_sha256": "38870fb722b4bf845e5032cbdf42baab576026d590d9e28f55926a2886cb1787"
+}
diff --git a/data/5iiarc-conference-september-2010-csec-briefing/5iiarc-conference-september-2010-csec-briefing.md b/data/5iiarc-conference-september-2010-csec-briefing/5iiarc-conference-september-2010-csec-briefing.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..20f19b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/5iiarc-conference-september-2010-csec-briefing/5iiarc-conference-september-2010-csec-briefing.md
@@ -0,0 +1,714 @@
+SECRET
+
+Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
+Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
+
+# Cyber Network Defence R&D Activities
+
+5IARC 2010
+[REDACTED] CSEC N3C
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+1
+
+---
+
+SECRET
+Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
+Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
+
+## CND R&D CSEC
+
+* Most cyber defence R&D resides in Cyber Defence Futures
+* Not a static picture
+
+```
+DCITS
+ DG Cyber Defence
+ Cyber Defence Operations and Capabilities Development
+ Security Posture Assessment
+ Technical Threat and Analysis
+ Cyber Defence Futures
+ Cyber Threat Evaluation Centre
+ DG Cyber Protection
+```
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+2
+
+---
+
+SECRET
+Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
+Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
+
+## Current Focus
+
+* Current operations are passive
+ - Photonic Prism (aka P2)
+ * Slipstream
+ * Popquiz
+ * Email attachment scanning (via Pony Express)
+ * Snort
+ - Host based intrusion detection
+* Soon deploying dynamic defence
+ - COTS hardware platform
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+3
+
+---
+
+SECRET
+Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
+Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
+
+## N3 Research
+
+* N3 is mostly a consumer of research
+ - Given our resources this is an appropriate model
+* Very much relationship based
+ - SIGINT
+ - R23
+ - Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC)
+ - Royal Military College of Canada (RMC)
+ - Communications Research Centre (CRC)
+* Integrees
+ - DRDC
+ - CRC
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+4
+
+---
+
+SECRET
+Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
+Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
+
+## External Partners
+
+* R23
+* SIGINT
+* *DRDC*
+* *RMC*
+* CRC
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+5
+
+---
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+## Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC)
+
+* MulVal + AssetRank
+* Joint Network Defence and Management Systems (JNDMS)
+* ARMOUR
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+Defence R&D Canada R et D pour la défense, Canada
+
+---
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+## MulVAL
+
+```
+Information about users
+
+Information about data assets
+
+Linux security behavior; Windows security behavior; Common attack techniques
+
+Attack graph
+
+System admin
+
+Security expert
+
+Reasoning System
+
+Network configuration
+
+Host configuration
+
+Apache 1.3.4 bug!
+
+CERT advisory
+```
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+Defence R&D Canada R et D pour la défense, Canada
+
+---
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+## Mulval + AssetRank ➔ Mulasses
+
+```
+execCode(databaseServer,oracle_user)
+ 8
+ RULE 2 (9) : remote exploit of a server program
+ 1 networkServiceInfo(databaseServer,oracle,tcp,1521,oracle_user)
+ 7 netAccess(databaseServer,tcp,1521)
+ 6
+ RULE 5 (28) : multi-hop access
+ 1 hacl(webServer,databaseServer,tcp,1521)
+ 5 execCode(webServer,system)
+ 4
+ RULE 2 (14) : remote exploit of a server program
+ 1 networkServiceInfo(webServer,iis,tcp,80,system)
+ 1 vulExists(webServer,iis_vulid,iis,remoteExploit,privEscalation)
+ 3 netAccess(webServer,tcp,80)
+ 6 RULE 5 (30) : multi-hop access
+ 1 hacl(userDesktop,webServer,tcp,80)
+ 5 execCode(userDesktop,joeAccount)
+ 4
+ RULE 3 (24) : remote exploit for a client program
+ 1 isCompetent(joe)
+ 1 vulExists(userDesktop,browser_vulid,privEscalation,remoteExploit,privEscalation)
+ 3 canAccessMaliciousInput(userDesktop)
+ 2
+ RULE 20 (19) : Browsing a website
+ 1 hacl(userDesktop,attackerHost,tcp,80)
+ 1 isWebBrowser(firefox)
+ 1 installed(userDesktop,firefox)
+ 1 attackerLocated(attackerHost)
+ 1 hasAccount(joe,userDesktop,joeAccount)
+ 2 RULE 6 (34) : direct network access
+ 1 hacl(attackerHost,webServer,tcp,80)
+ 1 vulExists(databaseServer,oracle_vulid,oracle,remoteExploit,privEscalation)
+
+More dangerous
+```
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+Defence R&D Canada R et D pour la défense, Canada
+
+---
+
+SECRET
+Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
+Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+## Royal Military College
+
+* Support ~ 1 grad student per year
+* Sliding Window Anomaly Detection (SWAD)
+ - Models normal traffic
+ - Applies the concept of hidden Markov model (HMM)
+ - Used to detect covert channels
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+9
+
+---
+
+SECRET
+Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
+Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
+
+## CND Development
+
+* Mix of internal development and external collaboration
+* Current CND projects
+ - Some Pony Express
+ - Software modules for COTS hardware (dynamic defence)
+ - Streaming 10 Gb/s sensor (P2)
+ - Analyst data mining tools
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+10
+
+---
+
+SECRET
+Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
+Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
+
+## Pony Express
+
+```
+Client traffic → FlowPony → SMTPPony → MailPony → MetaPony
+MetaPony → [Metadata + attachments] → ScanPony
+ScanPony → [Metadata] → AggPony → PonyExpress Output Buffer → SyncPony
+SyncPony → PonyExpress Output
+PonyExpress Output → [Metadata + Scan results] → Tonto
+Tonto → [Formatted Alerts] → Alerts Database
+
+PoolTable (Scanning Framework):
+ ScanPony → [Unencoded attachments] → Corner Pocket
+ Corner Pocket → Attachment Scanner
+ Attachment Scanner → PoolCue
+ PoolCue → [Scan results] → AggPony
+```
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+11
+
+---
+
+SECRET
+Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
+Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
+
+## Ponies of the PonyExpress
+
+* **FlowPony** (flowp)
+ - TCP Session reconstruction
+* **SMTPPon**y (smtpp)
+ - SMTP Parsing & Header Extraction
+* **MailPony** (mailp)
+ - RFC822 E-mail Parsing & MIME Attachment Extraction
+* **MetaPony** (metap)
+ - Evaluation & Scoring of Parsed Metadata
+* **ScanPony** (scanp)
+ - Analysis Pre-Processing & Scan Dispatching
+* **AggPony** (aggp)
+ - Scan Result Aggregation
+* **SyncPony** (syncp)
+ - Transfers buffered output from local disk to the SAN
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+12
+
+---
+
+SECRET
+Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
+Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
+
+## Ongoing Sensor Development (Photonic Prism)
+
+* Integration of in-house and external partner anomaly detection tools and signature based detection
+ - Sliptstream
+ - Popquiz
+ - 8Ball
+ - Snort
+* Updating our sensors for multiple 10 Gb/s sources
+* Moving to full streaming with full capture
+* Data analysis
+ - Improved analyst interface that fuse data from many sources
+ - Custom GUI (based on Eclipse framework)
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+13
+
+---
+
+SECRET
+Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
+Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
+
+## Ongoing Sensor Development (Photonic Prism)
+
+* Improved Analytics
+ - Better facilities for collaboration
+ - Near real time access to anomaly data
+ - Improved alert/pcap performance
+ - Knowledge database
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+14
+
+---
+
+SECRET
+Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
+Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
+
+## Software modules on COTS Hardware (Dynamic Defence)
+
+* Internal but close collaboration with NSA
+* ~~Active~~ Dynamic defence (inline device)
+* Modules for based device
+ - miniSSL (passive)
+ - SSLfuzzer
+ - DNS
+ - Data Extractor
+ - Synflood
+* Legal and policy work ongoing
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+15
+
+---
+
+SECRET
+Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
+Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+## Challenges
+
+* Lots of standard development work to do
+* Resources to pull through available research
+* Length of Research Activities
+* Translating classified requirements to an unclassified domain
+* Properly engaging Industry and Academia
+* Focusing external partners on R&D that is most valuable to us
+* Policy
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+16
+
+---
+
+SECRET
+Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
+Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
+
+# Cyber Network Defence R&D Activities
+
+5IARC 2010
+[REDACTED] CSEC N3C
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+1
+
+Within the Cyber Protection Branch there is an Architecture and Engineering Directorate where most of the Research and Development Activities takes place.
+
+---
+
+SECRET
+Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
+Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
+
+## CND R&D CSEC
+
+* Most cyber defence R&D resides in Cyber Defence Futures
+* Not a static picture
+
+```
+DCITS
+ DG Cyber Defence
+ Cyber Defence Operations and Capabilities Development
+ Security Posture Assessment
+ Technical Threat and Analysis
+ Cyber Defence Futures
+ Cyber Threat Evaluation Centre
+ DG Cyber Protection
+```
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+2
+
+The purpose of my talk is to characterize the R&D within CND at CSEC. I can not give a complete picture.
+
+This is just to provide some context of where cyber defence research resides with CSEC.
+
+This is a recent *partial* picture.
+
+It is not static however, the org chart is evolving.
+
+CTEC is very new and still defining its role.
+
+Some future changes:
+
+It is anticipated that **Cyber Defence Operations** and **Capabilities Development** will be become 2 separate directorates.
+
+Cyber defence futures will be split into 2 sections. Eventually those sections will for the start of the Capabilities Development directorate.
+
+---
+
+SECRET
+Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
+Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
+
+## Current Focus
+
+* Current operations are passive
+ - Photonic Prism (aka P2)
+ * Slipstream
+ * Popquiz
+ * Email attachment scanning (via Pony Express)
+ * Snort
+ - Host based intrusion detection
+* Soon deploying dynamic defence
+ - COTS hardware platform
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+3
+
+At the moment most of our efforts are on incremental improvements on the current sensor.
+
+Making it ready for > 10 Gb/s systems and beyond.
+
+Our detection capabilities are based on 4 frameworks:
+
+1. Slipstream
+2. Popquiz
+3. Pony Express
+4. Snort
+
+We should soon have our first dynamic defence deployment.
+
+---
+
+SECRET
+Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
+Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
+
+## N3 Research
+
+* N3 is mostly a consumer of research
+ - Given our resources this is an appropriate model
+* Very much relationship based
+ - SIGINT
+ - R23
+ - Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC)
+ - Royal Military College of Canada (RMC)
+ - Communications Research Centre (CRC)
+* Integrees
+ - DRDC
+ - CRC
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+4
+
+It's difficult to speak about a research program that is virtual
+
+We are a small group (but growing) trying to look at a lot of data.
+
+Given our size, our best return on investment would not come from using current resources for low level research.
+
+It make more sense to leverage the R&D of some external partners. There is already a large body of work out there that we can benefit from before we need to push it ourselves. This means our R&D program is mostly a relationship based program.
+
+In fact, this model has already proven to be extremely valuable via the success of popquiz developed by R23 and our email attachment scanner from GCHQ.
+
+In between in-house and external is the use of integrees.
+
+---
+
+SECRET
+Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
+Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
+
+## External Partners
+
+* R23
+* SIGINT
+* *DRDC*
+* *RMC*
+* CRC
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+5
+
+The next set of slides provides some overview of the research done by our external partners that we are following/tracking/consuming.
+
+Some is in use (popquiz)
+
+Some will shortly be in production (Popeyesear)
+
+Many are "for the future"
+
+Some chosen examples follow.
+
+---
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+## Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC)
+
+* MulVal + AssetRank
+* Joint Network Defence and Management Systems (JNDMS)
+* ARMOUR
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+Defence R&D Canada R et D pour la défense, Canada
+
+Defence Research and Development Canada is R&D arm of the Department of National Defence.
+
+Within DRDC Ottawa is the Network Information Operations (NIO) section.
+
+Within the Attack Detection and Analysis group, there are 3 projects of particular interest to us:
+
+Mulasses, JNDMS and ARMOUR
+
+DRDC also provides us a mechanism for working on NATO R&D projects as they already have a well established relationship with NATO.
+
+---
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+## MulVAL
+
+```
+Information about users
+
+Information about data assets
+
+Linux security behavior; Windows security behavior; Common attack techniques
+
+Attack graph
+
+System admin
+
+Security expert
+
+Reasoning System
+
+Network configuration
+
+Host configuration
+
+Apache 1.3.4 bug!
+
+CERT advisory
+```
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+Defence R&D Canada R et D pour la défense, Canada
+
+Network based vulnerability analysis project.
+
+Pure logical based reasoning engine that generates attack graphs. These attack graphs can be huge. A system to prioritize them needed to be created.
+
+Based on Xinming (Simon) Ou PhD Dissertation from Princeton.
+
+Simon is currently a professor at Kansa state University where he continues development of Mulval and related projects.
+
+These are the 5 classes of input that go into MulVAL:
+
+1. User and data asset information
+2. Network configuration (hacls) – Basically describe which computers can talk and on which ports
+3. Host configuration – software running on machines within the netwok
+4. CERT (or other advisories) that contain information about vulnerabilites
+5. Security expert information -- Logic to describe what can be accomplished on a computer given credentials
+
+This input goes into a reasoning system (MulVal) which can then generate attack paths
+
+---
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+## Mulval + AssetRank ➔ Mulasses
+
+```
+(attack graph as reproduced on slide 8)
+More dangerous
+```
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+Defence R&D Canada R et D pour la défense, Canada
+
+Asset rank is an adaptation of the original Google page rank algorithm that can prioritize nodes of an attack graph (or any other logic based graph).
+
+It is used to prioritize which network conditions (facts) are the most important to fix first in order to harden the network.
+
+Attack graph:
+
+Ellipse – AND nodes. True if all the dependencies are true.
+
+Diamond – OR nodes. True if any of the children nodes are true.
+
+Box – facts: network/host configuration, installed/running software, vulnerabilities
+
+Together Mulval + AssetRank ➔ Mulasses!
+
+Mulasses output is a prioritized list of network configuration properties to be modified to harden the network.
+
+This project has potential value in network vulnerability shop.
+
+---
+
+SECRET
+Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
+Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+## Royal Military College
+
+* Support ~ 1 grad student per year
+* Sliding Window Anomaly Detection (SWAD)
+ - Models normal traffic
+ - Applies the concept of hidden Markov model (HMM)
+ - Used to detect covert channels
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+9
+
+Hidden Markov model – State of the system is not visible to the observer, only the output. System is assumed to be a Markov process.
+
+Markov process – A stochastic process with the Markov property
+
+Markov property – random phenomenon depends only on the present state of the system, (i.e. does not depend on the past or future state).
+
+Why we are interested. Detecting covert channels is our business. If it is successful, it may prove to be a very valuable tool.
+
+Other benefits of RMC collaborations – People! Several RMC students have become CSEC employees. They are cleared, and have a education centred on our mutual interests.
+
+The current phase of the SWAD project is to built a user interface that is analyst friendly. Much of the work to date has been proof of concept work.
+
+---
+
+SECRET
+Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
+Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
+
+## CND Development
+
+* Mix of internal development and external collaboration
+* Current CND projects
+ - Some Pony Express
+ - Software modules for COTS hardware (dynamic defence)
+ - Streaming 10 Gb/s sensor (P2)
+ - Analyst data mining tools
+
+Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
+Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
+Canada
+10
+
+For the next couple of slides I will show some of our recent in-house development efforts.
+
+We really do not have what I would characterize as **"research"** within Cyber Defence.
+
+We do hope to get there.
diff --git a/data/5iiarc-conference-september-2010-csec-briefing/metadata.json b/data/5iiarc-conference-september-2010-csec-briefing/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5d8631e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/5iiarc-conference-september-2010-csec-briefing/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+{
+ "title": "Cyber Network Defence R&D Activities",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "A September 2010 CSEC briefing to the Five Eyes 5IARC conference on cyber defence R&D, giving the full PONY EXPRESS email attachment scanning architecture and the PHOTONIC PRISM sensor, with speaker notes in which the presenter concedes CSEC does little research of its own.",
+ "long_description": "A September 2010 briefing by a redacted CSEC N3C presenter to the Five Eyes 5IARC conference, titled \"Cyber Network Defence R&D Activities\" and classified SECRET. The published file contains the deck twice: sixteen slides, followed by a speaker-notes printout covering slides 1 to 10, in which the presenter's own commentary is considerably franker than the slides.\n\nThe briefing locates cyber defence R&D within CSEC's organisation — under DCITS, through DG Cyber Defence and Cyber Defence Operations and Capabilities Development, to the Cyber Defence Futures section, with the Cyber Threat Evaluation Centre described in the notes as \"very new and still defining its role\" and the org chart as \"a recent partial picture\" that is still evolving.\n \nIts central claim is that CSEC does very little research of its own. The notes state plainly that N3 is \"mostly a consumer of research\", that it is \"difficult to speak about a research program that is virtual\", and that the best return comes from leveraging external partners rather than spending a small team's resources on low-level work — naming R23, SIGINT, Defence Research and Development Canada, the Royal Military College of Canada and the Communications Research Centre, supplemented by DRDC and CRC integrees. The model is said to have already proved itself through POPQUIZ, developed by R23, and an email attachment scanner obtained from GCHQ. The closing note is blunter still: \"We really do not have what I would characterize as 'research' within Cyber Defence. We do hope to get there.\"\n \nOperationally the deck states that CSEC's collection posture in 2010 was passive, resting on the PHOTONIC PRISM (P2) sensor and four detection frameworks — SLIPSTREAM, POPQUIZ, PONY EXPRESS and SNORT — alongside host-based intrusion detection, with 8BALL added on a later slide. One slide gives the full PONY EXPRESS architecture for email attachment scanning: client traffic passes through FlowPony (TCP session reconstruction), SMTPPony (SMTP parsing and header extraction), MailPony (RFC822 parsing and MIME attachment extraction), MetaPony (evaluation and scoring of parsed metadata) and ScanPony (analysis pre-processing and scan dispatching), which forwards unencoded attachments into the PoolTable scanning framework via Corner Pocket, the Attachment Scanner and PoolCue; results return through AggPony, an output buffer and SyncPony to a SAN, and are formatted into alerts by Tonto. A further slide names the components with their short forms. This architecture is the basis of the February 2015 CBC and Intercept reporting on CSE's scanning of email sent to the Government of Canada. \n\nThe deck also records work then in progress: updating sensors for multiple 10 Gb/s sources, moving to full streaming with full capture, and a first deployment of \"dynamic defence\" — an inline device built on COTS hardware in close collaboration with NSA, carrying miniSSL, SSLfuzzer, DNS, Data Extractor and Synflood modules, with \"legal and policy work ongoing\". On that slide the word \"Active\" is struck through and replaced by \"Dynamic\", recording the rename in the document itself.\n\nThree slides are reproduced from a DRDC deck under its own UNCLASSIFIED template, covering MulVAL — a logic-based reasoning engine generating attack graphs, based on Xinming (Simon) Ou's Princeton dissertation — and its combination with AssetRank, an adaptation of Google's PageRank that prioritises attack-graph nodes, together called Mulasses, plus JNDMS and ARMOUR. The RMC slide covers Sliding Window Anomaly Detection, which applies hidden Markov models to detect covert channels; the notes add that a secondary benefit of the RMC relationship is recruitment, since several RMC students have become cleared CSEC employees. A closing slide lists the obstacles: resources, the length of research activities, translating classified requirements into an unclassified domain, engaging industry and academia, and policy.",
+ "tags": [
+ "CSEC",
+ "CSE",
+ "Computer Network Defence",
+ "CND",
+ "cyber defence research",
+ "research and development",
+ "Government of Canada",
+ "GC networks",
+ "email interception",
+ "email attachment scanning",
+ "attachment scanning",
+ "SMTP",
+ "RFC822",
+ "MIME",
+ "TCP session reconstruction",
+ "metadata",
+ "metadata scoring",
+ "passive collection",
+ "full take",
+ "packet capture",
+ "full streaming",
+ "10 Gb",
+ "s",
+ "sensor development",
+ "anomaly detection",
+ "signature-based detection",
+ "intrusion detection",
+ "host-based intrusion detection",
+ "malware",
+ "dynamic defence",
+ "active defence",
+ "inline device",
+ "COTS hardware",
+ "SSL",
+ "SSL fuzzing",
+ "DNS",
+ "synflood",
+ "data extraction",
+ "covert channels",
+ "hidden Markov model",
+ "machine learning",
+ "attack graphs",
+ "vulnerability analysis",
+ "network hardening",
+ "asset prioritisation",
+ "alerting",
+ "pcap",
+ "data mining",
+ "analyst tools",
+ "Eclipse",
+ "knowledge database",
+ "SAN",
+ "external partners",
+ "academic collaboration",
+ "integrees",
+ "NATO",
+ "NSA collaboration",
+ "GCHQ collaboration",
+ "DRDC",
+ "RMC",
+ "CRC",
+ "R23",
+ "legal and policy",
+ "Five Eyes",
+ "5IARC"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "CSE",
+ "date_created": "2010",
+ "classification": [
+ "SECRET"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "banner": "SECRET",
+ "genre": "slides",
+ "programs": [
+ "PHOTONICPRISM",
+ "PONYEXPRESS",
+ "SLIPSTREAM",
+ "POPQUIZ",
+ "8BALL",
+ "SNORT",
+ "POPEYESEAR",
+ "FLOWPONY",
+ "SMTPPONY",
+ "MAILPONY",
+ "METAPONY",
+ "SCANPONY",
+ "AGGPONY",
+ "SYNCPONY",
+ "POOLTABLE",
+ "POOLCUE",
+ "CORNERPOCKET",
+ "TONTO",
+ "MULASSES",
+ "MULVAL",
+ "ASSETRANK",
+ "JNDMS",
+ "ARMOUR",
+ "SWAD",
+ "MINISSL",
+ "SSLFUZZER",
+ "N3C",
+ "N3",
+ "CTEC",
+ "DCITS",
+ "5IARC"
+ ],
+ "countries": [
+ "Canada"
+ ],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "CBC News",
+ "date_published": "2015-02-25",
+ "title": "CSE monitors millions of Canadian emails to government",
+ "link": "http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/cse-monitors-millions-of-canadian-emails-to-government-1.2969687",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Seglins, Dave"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [
+ "Hildebrandt, Amber",
+ "Pereira, Michael",
+ "Greenwald, Glenn",
+ "Gallagher, Ryan"
+ ],
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1676540/5iiarc-conference-september-2010-csec-briefing.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2015-02-25",
+ "title": "Canadian Spies Collect Domestic Emails in Secret Security Sweep",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2015/02/25/canada-cse-pony-express-email-surveillance/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Gallagher, Ryan",
+ "Greenwald, Glenn"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1676540/5iiarc-conference-september-2010-csec-briefing.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "pdf_sha256": "adf29ba32d024e2bef92b06040d3146103fc7bdfc0b6cb25226e1042f7a0d15a"
+}
diff --git a/data/6-Months-Overview-Redacted/6-Months-Overview-Redacted.md b/data/6-Months-Overview-Redacted/6-Months-Overview-Redacted.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..77b89dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/6-Months-Overview-Redacted/6-Months-Overview-Redacted.md
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+TOP SECRET STRAP1
+
+# Significant TRF TROODOS stories over past 6 months
+
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* Regular collects of Heron TP carrying weapons
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET STRAP1
+
+Success against Syria
+
+* 17th Feb 2012 collection on an undocumented frequency of 1208MHz.
+* Ababil III (Iranian manufactured) UAV from Shayrat Airfield.
+* Tip-off procedures facilitated co-incident collect from Golf, E Section and MHS on 9th March.
+
+```
+07:04:06.366
+30
+20
+PAN=075.4
+TILT=-020.5
+ZOOM=30X
+CORT
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL FVEY
+```
+
+* Site made a further recording on 11th March.
+* Presidential level interest in further video samples.
diff --git a/data/6-Months-Overview-Redacted/metadata.json b/data/6-Months-Overview-Redacted/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2df152d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/6-Months-Overview-Redacted/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+{
+ "title": "Significant TRF TROODOS stories over past 6",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "This 2012 top-secret document outlines intelligence gathered by the NSA and GCHQ from the Troodos Communications Facility in Cyprus, which includes regular surveillance of Israeli and Iranian drones over a six-month period, particularly focusing on drone operations and weapons systems. It also mentions significant collections of UAV signals, including the Heron TP drone and Iranian Ababil III, with presidential-level interest in video samples from these operations.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [
+ "israeli",
+ "Iranian",
+ "UAV",
+ "drone surveillance",
+ "weapons systems",
+ "intelligence collection",
+ "NSA-GCHQ cooperation",
+ "presidential interest",
+ "military operations"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "GCHQ",
+ "date_created": "2012-01-01",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "STRAP 1"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "banner": "TOP SECRET STRAP1",
+ "genre": "slides",
+ "programs": [
+ "TROODOS"
+ ],
+ "countries": [
+ "Cyprus",
+ "Iran",
+ "Syria",
+ "Israel"
+ ],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2016-01-28",
+ "title": "Israeli Drone Feeds Hacked By British and American Intelligence",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2016/01/28/israeli-drone-feeds-hacked-by-british-and-american-intelligence/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Currier, Cora",
+ "Moltke, Henrik"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2699852/6-Months-Overview-Redacted.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "pdf_sha256": "4dfaa5e0979ab71439e2a39cc15912d518ef2c652d772524a2549aad012757bc",
+ "pages": 2
+}
diff --git a/data/6_February_09_redacted/6_February_09_redacted.md b/data/6_February_09_redacted/6_February_09_redacted.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..26ce31b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/6_February_09_redacted/6_February_09_redacted.md
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
+The maximum classification allowed on GCWiki is TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT. Click to report inappropriate
+content.
+For GCWiki help contact: [REDACTED] Support page
+
+MTI Access Project - Weekly Status w/e 6 February 09
+
+From GCWiki
+Jump to: navigation, search
+
+[edit] Project
+
+* [REDACTED] has joined the MTI Access Team. [REDACTED] role is as a full-time project management integree within GERONTIC.
+* MTI Bid work progressing for 'Supporting INOC' progressing well for the first IRIS review next week. Details of the scope and progress can be found at Supporting INOC.
+* RPC1 OSDS Workshop and related meetings.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/6_February_09_redacted/metadata.json b/data/6_February_09_redacted/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..01da4fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/6_February_09_redacted/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+{
+ "title": "MTI Access Project - Weekly Status w/e 6 February 09",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "This is a UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT GCHQ GCWiki page — a weekly status update for the MTI Access Project, week ending 6 February 2009.\n",
+ "long_description": "Three items are noted. A named GCHQ officer has joined the MTI Access Team in a full-time project management integree role embedded within GERONTIC — confirming that GCHQ was placing its own staff inside Vodafone Cable/Cable and Wireless as dedicated liaison personnel, a level of institutional integration that goes well beyond a standard customer-supplier relationship. MTI bid work for the \"Supporting INOC\" scope was progressing toward an IRIS review the following week, with details linked to a separate GCWiki page. An RPC1 OSDS Workshop and related meetings were scheduled — RPC1 being a collection site designation and OSDS referring to the optical splitter or distribution system providing access to cable traffic, consistent with the GCHQ SSE access expansion documents processed earlier describing RPC sites and OSDS installations at Bude and Cheltenham.",
+ "tags": [
+ "GCWiki",
+ "MTI",
+ "Vodafone"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "GCHQ",
+ "date_created": "2009-02-06",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "STRAP 1",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "banner": "TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT",
+ "genre": "wiki",
+ "programs": [
+ "GERONTIC"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "WDR",
+ "date_published": "2014-11-20",
+ "title": "Vodafone – der lange Arm des britischen Geheimdienstes?",
+ "link": "http://www1.wdr.de/daserste/monitor/videos/videovodafonederlangearmdesbritischengeheimdienstes100.html",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Restle, Georg"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "reporting_only": true
+ },
+ {
+ "publisher": "Channel 4",
+ "date_published": "2014-11-20",
+ "title": "Spy cable revealed: how telecoms firm worked with GCHQ",
+ "link": "http://www.channel4.com/news/spy-cable-revealed-how-telecoms-firm-worked-with-gchq",
+ "reporters": [
+ "White, Geoff"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "reporting_only": true
+ },
+ {
+ "publisher": "NDR",
+ "date_published": "2014-11-21",
+ "title": "Der lange Arm des Geheimdienstes?",
+ "link": "http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/snowden-vodafone-101.html",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Strozyk, Jan",
+ "Moltke, Henrik",
+ "Poitras, Laura"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "reporting_only": true
+ },
+ {
+ "publisher": "Süddeutsche Zeitung",
+ "date_published": "2014-11-25",
+ "title": "Snowden-Leaks: How Vodafone-Subsidiary Cable & Wireless Aided GCHQ’s Spying Efforts",
+ "link": "http://international.sueddeutsche.de/post/103543418200/snowden-leaks-how-vodafone-subsidiary-cable",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Obermaier, Frederik",
+ "Moltke, Henrik",
+ "Poitras, Laura",
+ "Strozyk, Jan"
+ ],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "pdf_sha256": "9fb89f558624dc77b66e64bfff0048379fa5f3f6661cc6d357b0d61d90392749",
+ "pages": 1
+}
diff --git a/data/8BBAA/8BBAA.md b/data/8BBAA/8BBAA.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..45a8bc5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/8BBAA/8BBAA.md
@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+SECRET STRAP1 SPOKE
+
+8BBAA
+JORDAN-USA
+
+Report No: 49 Date: 09/12/2008
+
+Case Notation: 8BBAA
+Polarity/Freq: [REDACTED]
+
+Summary:
+
+* This informal report has been issued to highlight a link of potential interest for tasking.
+
+* The physical gateways are JORDAN-USA, however USA is providing a logical gateway to the ROW.
+
+* The link is a fairly standard E1 employing Timeslot 31 to relay C7, which in turn provides the dialling for this
+link. Compression is achieved by utilising DTX-360B DCME equipment.
+
+* Traffic summaries indicate that both terminals are relaying transit data.
+
+Results:
+
+TS 31 (HOST)
+OPC 4-032-0 (Jordan, FAST Link GSM) DPC 3-047-7 (USA, College Park 1 SITA)
+Link activity as follows:
+
+4-032-0 to 3-049-5 using CIC range 0003-0127
+
+Transit calls to various countries include:
+
+USA, Egypt, Algeria, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Nigeria, Chad, Congo, DRC, Angola, Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda,
+South Afica, Greece, Belgium, Cryprus, Bulgaria, Hunary, Moldova, Belarus, Ukraine, Bosnia Herzegovina,
+Macedonia, Romania, Poland, Columbia, Venezuela, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, China, Turkey,
+Pakistan, Afganistan, Iran, Turkmenistan.
+
+Mapping:
+
+8BBAA was input to Depthauge
+
+1 of 5
+
+This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under
+other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
+
+SECRET STRAP1 SPOKE
+SECRET STRAP1 SPOKE
+
+SECRET STRAP 1 SPOKE
+C7 BS31 SS7
+TK3 40320-30495 CIC 0097-0127 TS 01-31
+(Activity noted in Trunk 7 but no mapping produced for this trunk)
+(All other trunks inactive ATT)
+
+Previous map:
+C7 BS31 SS7 [ISUP/CLI] 40320-30477 [0] JORDAN-UK
+TK0 INACTIVE
+TK1 INACTIVE
+TK2 40320-30404 CIC 0065-0095 TS 01-31
+TK3 40320-30404 CIC 0097-0127 TS 01-31
+TK4 INACTIVE
+TK5 INACTIVE
+TK6 40325-30404 CIC 0065-0095 TS 01-31
+TK7 40325-30404 CIC 0097-0127 TS 01-31
+\** FIRST MAP 140708 **
+
+Further signalling is being carried by the C7 channel, for which no mapping has yet been obtained.
+Possibly controls voice on another bearer:
+BS31 40320-30495 CIC 0003-0096
+
+A search of the RHS identifies 8B L4036.447 as a candidate for the RLE.
+Currently in view at Sounder.
+
+ANALYSIS: -
+8BBAA was sampled for DNR activity for approximately 96 hours over the period 02/12/2008-05/12/2008 on
+Drumkit.
+
+Results – BS31
+TS31: - Scored 113 hits, which include both tasked and de-tasked numbers listed in Corinth. Of the 113 hits, 16 were
+scored against 10 currently tasked numbers.
+
+Hits can be viewed in Drumroll under the following filename:
+8BBAA0031
+
+| TNDEntry | TNDOffice | TNDComments | TNDtask | TNDzip | TNDpri |
+|------------|------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+
+2 of 5
+
+This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under
+other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
+
+SECRET STRAP1 SPOKE
+SECRET STRAP1 SPOKE
+
+| | | | | | |
+|------------|------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | A22H | PALESTINIAN GEN DEL LISBON | N | 6039 | 0 |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | A22H | PALESTINIAN DEP AMBASSADOR ISLAMABAD MOB | N | 6039 | 0 |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | A22H | PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP DEV JO MOBILE | N | 6039 | 0 |
+| [REDACTED] | A22H | PALESTINIAN DEV | N | 6039 | 0 |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | A22H | ABU MAZIN ASSOC JO MOBILE | N | 6039 | 0 |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | A22H | TARIQ ABBAS SON OF ABU MAZIN | N | 6039 | 0 |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | A22A4 | JOD JORDANIAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON DC | N | - | 0 |
+| [REDACTED] | A22H | ABU MAZIN ASSOC JO MOBILE | N | 6039 | 0 |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | A22H | JORDANIAN ROYAL COURT | N | 6067 | 0 |
+
+3 of 5
+
+This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under
+other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
+
+SECRET STRAP1 SPOKE
+SECRET STRAP1 SPOKE
+
+| | | | | | |
+|------------|------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | A22H | YASIR SON OF ABU MAZIN | N | 6039 | 0 |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | A22H | PALESTINIAN AMBASSADOR SOUTH AFRICA | N | 6039 | 0 |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+
+Technical Details: Link = 8BBAA
+Modulation – 8PSK.
+
+Symbol rate = 780.19 Kbps
+Data rate = 2048bps
+Fec rate = 7/8
+Fec Type = TPC
+Overhead = None.
+Reed Solomon = None
+Absolute encoding.
+DCME – DTX-360b
+
+4 of 5
+
+This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under
+other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
+
+SECRET STRAP1 SPOKE
+SECRET STRAP1 SPOKE
+
+This link can be tasked on the system, subject to available resources
+
+Contact Details [REDACTED] Email: [REDACTED]
+OPA-BUDE- [REDACTED]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/8BBAA/metadata.json b/data/8BBAA/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..96fdcbe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/8BBAA/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+{
+ "title": "JORDAN-USA",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [
+ "Palestinian Authority",
+ "PLO",
+ "satellite interception",
+ "telecommunications",
+ "espionage",
+ "Middle East",
+ "Belgacom",
+ "diplomatic spying",
+ "call interception",
+ "politicians"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "GCHQ",
+ "date_created": "2008-12-09",
+ "classification": [
+ "SECRET",
+ "STRAP 1",
+ "SPOKE"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "banner": "SECRET STRAP1 SPOKE",
+ "genre": "other",
+ "programs": [
+ "SOUNDER",
+ "CORINTH",
+ "DRUMKIT",
+ "DRUMROLL",
+ "DEPTHGAUGE"
+ ],
+ "countries": [
+ "Jordan",
+ "Egypt",
+ "Algeria",
+ "Côte d'Ivoire",
+ "Liberia",
+ "Nigeria",
+ "Chad",
+ "Congo",
+ "Democratic Republic of the Congo",
+ "Jordan",
+ "Angola",
+ "Ethiopia",
+ "Somalia",
+ "Kenya",
+ "Uganda",
+ "South Africa",
+ "Greece",
+ "Belgium",
+ "Cyprus",
+ "Bulgaria",
+ "Hungary",
+ "Moldova",
+ "Belarus",
+ "Ukraine",
+ "Bosnia and Herzegovina",
+ "Macedonia",
+ "Romania",
+ "Poland",
+ "Colombia",
+ "Venezuela",
+ "Malaysia",
+ "Philippines",
+ "Singapore",
+ "Thailand",
+ "China",
+ "Turkey",
+ "Pakistan",
+ "Afghanistan",
+ "Iran",
+ "Turkmenistan"
+ ],
+ "people": [
+ "Abbas, Mahmoud",
+ "Abbas, Yasir"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "Le Monde",
+ "date_published": "2016-12-07",
+ "title": "L’Autorité palestinienne et la Jordanie espionnées par les services américains et britanniques",
+ "link": "http://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2016/12/07/l-autorite-palestinienne-et-la-jordanie-espionnees-par-les-services-americains-et-britanniques_5044883_4408996.html",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Follorou, Jacques"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/3229461/8BBAA.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "pdf_sha256": "dd7b65e1817663165b356cbd0ce89b40349755b014a892c5bd4943a688554a5f"
+}
diff --git a/data/A-Behind-the-Scenes-Look-at-the-NSA-Ethiopian/A-Behind-the-Scenes-Look-at-the-NSA-Ethiopian.md b/data/A-Behind-the-Scenes-Look-at-the-NSA-Ethiopian/A-Behind-the-Scenes-Look-at-the-NSA-Ethiopian.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eb76d78
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/A-Behind-the-Scenes-Look-at-the-NSA-Ethiopian/A-Behind-the-Scenes-Look-at-the-NSA-Ethiopian.md
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
+TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
+
+(S//SI//REL) A Behind-the-Scenes Look at the NSA-Ethiopian Relationship
+FROM: [REDACTED]
+Non-Commissioned Officer in Charge, NSA Georgia's Sudan/Horn of Africa Division (FGS2I3)
+Run Date: 07/07/2010
+
+(S//SI//REL) The NSA-Ethiopian SIGINT relationship* continues to thrive.
+
+(S//SI//REL) I recently had an opportunity to travel to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to conduct training in traffic analysis for our Ethiopian partners in SIGINT. This was my first trip to the Deployed SIGINT Operations Center (DSOC), aka Operation Lion's Pride, and an excellent opportunity for me to interact firsthand with those who work so hard in our behalf.
+
+(S//SI//REL) My first week in country included a visit to the US Embassy and briefs on each of the three missions conducted at Lion's Pride by the deployed analysts from the 741st MI Battalion. I was familiar with the outstanding work produced by the analysts and the Ethiopian linguists but I didn't have an appreciation of all the hard work that goes into running the site. Working with the partners to process traffic and produce reportable transcripts is enough to keep everyone busy, but the job doesn't end there. The additional duties each of the deployed soldiers has -- from working with vehicle contracts to the maintenance of equipment at the three remote sites -- are just as time-consuming as the mission. The language barrier is significant, and something as simple as arranging to have the grass cut at the site can easily take several hours.
+
+DSOC
+
+(S//SI//REL) I began teaching the class the following week; it was attended by both soldiers from the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) and Ethiopian civilians from the Information Network Security Agency (INSA). The relationship between the ENDF and INSA at the site is similar to the one our own military shares with NSA as the "CSS" part of NSA/CSS.
+
+(S//SI//REL) Everyone in the class was excited and eager to learn. The students' enthusiasm was important, as it helped overcome some of the challenges involved in teaching a group of non-native English speakers with varying degrees of English comprehension and SIGINT analysis experience. The proficiency level of the students ranged from soldiers with no analysis background to professionals who had many years of SIGINT experience and the ability to instantly recognize a Fibonacci sequence. The latter helped immeasurably as they worked with their colleagues in their native Amharic to ensure everyone had full comprehension of the course material.
+
+(S//SI//REL) The two-week class ended with a graduation ceremony for all 32 students. The ENDF Signal Regiment Commander was on hand to present each of the graduates with a Certificate of Training signed by the INSA Technical Intelligence Director. I felt this cross-organizational recognition was appropriate, as it was symbolic of the cooperative nature of the soldier-civilian relationship at Operation Lion's Pride.
+
+Ethiopian soldier and civilian pose together
+class photo
+
+(S//SI//REL) Left: Similar to NSA/CSS, soldiers and civilians work hand-in-hand at Lion's Pride. Right: Class photo
+
+(Click for larger view)
+
+(S//SI//REL) The trip was a great success for two very important reasons. First, this was the first time many of the students had received any type of SIGINT training. The Ethiopians who support Lion's Pride now possess the ability to conduct analysis on HF message externals where none was previously being done. More importantly, however, is the strengthening of the relationship between NSA, the ENDF and INSA. Feedback from Ethiopian leadership of both the DSOC and INSA has been positive and we in Georgia are eager to continue developing the relationship between us and our Ethiopian counterparts.
+
+(U) Notes:
+
+\* (U) See earlier articles on this topic:
+ * (U//FOUO) In the Intelligence Business, What's the Most Important Language to Understand? ...
+ English! -- An Interview with [REDACTED] (posted 10/24/08)
+ * (S//SI//REL) Third Party Relationship with Ethiopia Fills Intelligence Gap (posted 3/14/07)
+ * (S//SI//REL) NSA, Ethiopians Take SIGINT Partnership to New Level (posted 8/25/06)
+ * (S//SI//REL) Expanding Joint US-Ethiopian SIGINT Collection (posted 4/06/06)
+ * (U) LION'S PRIDE - Fighting Terrorism on the Horn of Africa (posted 3/01/05)
+
+"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)."
+Information Owner: [REDACTED] (email)
+Page Publisher: [REDACTED] (email)
+Last Modified:
+11/10/2012 / Last Reviewed:
+11/10/2012
+de:
+DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
+TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
+DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM
+1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007
+DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/A-Behind-the-Scenes-Look-at-the-NSA-Ethiopian/metadata.json b/data/A-Behind-the-Scenes-Look-at-the-NSA-Ethiopian/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e38f90c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/A-Behind-the-Scenes-Look-at-the-NSA-Ethiopian/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+{
+ "title": "A Behind-the-Scenes Look at the NSA-Ethiopian Relationship",
+ "type": "SIDTODAY",
+ "description": "This SIDtoday article details the NSA's growing collaboration with Ethiopian security agencies, particularly through the Operation Lion's Pride SIGINT program. It highlights a successful training session where Ethiopian soldiers and civilians learned traffic analysis, strengthening the relationship between the NSA, Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF), and the Information Network Security Agency (INSA).",
+ "long_description": "This is a SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY SIDToday article dated 7 July 2010, authored by the Non-Commissioned Officer in Charge of NSA Georgia's Sudan/Horn of Africa Division (FGS2I3). The article describes a traffic analysis training visit to the Deployed SIGINT Operations Center in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia — codenamed Operation Lion's Pride — and provides the most detailed published description of the NSA-Ethiopian third party SIGINT relationship.\n\nOperation Lion's Pride is described as a joint collection facility staffed by deployed analysts from the US Army's 741st Military Intelligence Battalion working alongside Ethiopian National Defense Forces personnel and civilians from Ethiopia's Information Network Security Agency (INSA). The site has three remote collection locations in addition to the main DSOC. The author draws an explicit parallel between the ENDF/INSA relationship and the NSA/CSS military-civilian structure in the US — confirming the facility mirrors the US model with both military and civilian intelligence personnel integrated into a single collection operation.\n\nThe training class covered traffic analysis of HF message externals and was attended by 32 students from both ENDF and INSA, with proficiency levels ranging from personnel with no analysis background to experienced SIGINT professionals. The training was conducted in English despite the language barrier, with advanced students assisting colleagues in Amharic. A graduation ceremony was held with the ENDF Signal Regiment Commander and the INSA Technical Intelligence Director presenting certificates — both organisations formally recognising the training, confirming the depth of institutional engagement.\n\nThe article notes this was the first time many students had received any SIGINT training, and that Ethiopians at Lion's Pride now had the ability to conduct HF message externals analysis for the first time. The article references five earlier SIDToday articles on the NSA-Ethiopian relationship dating back to 2005, indicating a sustained partnership of at least five years prior to this visit covering expanding collection, capability development and intelligence gap-filling on the Horn of Africa.",
+ "tags": [
+ "Horn of Africa",
+ "ENDF",
+ "INSA",
+ "DSOC",
+ "training",
+ "partnership",
+ "students"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2010-07-07",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "SI",
+ "TK"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL"
+ ],
+ "banner": "DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL",
+ "genre": "newsletter",
+ "programs": [
+ "LIONSPRIDE"
+ ],
+ "countries": [
+ "Ethiopia",
+ "Sudan"
+ ],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2017-09-13",
+ "title": "How the NSA Built a Secret Surveillance Network for Ethiopia",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2017/09/13/nsa-ethiopia-surveillance-human-rights/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Turse, Nick"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2017/09/12/a-behind-the-scenes-look-at-the-nsa-ethiopian-relationship/",
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/3990988/A-Behind-the-Scenes-Look-at-the-NSA-Ethiopian.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "pdf_sha256": "6eb32aa5fcff47702a93b9c21393f5543521dcf4d837ef879f334c9ad958f216",
+ "pages": 3
+}
diff --git a/data/ACLU_-_2013-12-09_NSA_Video_Games_Paper/ACLU_-_2013-12-09_NSA_Video_Games_Paper.md b/data/ACLU_-_2013-12-09_NSA_Video_Games_Paper/ACLU_-_2013-12-09_NSA_Video_Games_Paper.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c60d6c4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/ACLU_-_2013-12-09_NSA_Video_Games_Paper/ACLU_-_2013-12-09_NSA_Video_Games_Paper.md
@@ -0,0 +1,2855 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//REL) MHS and GCHQ “Get in the Game" with Target Development for
+World of Warcraft Online Gaming
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//REL) Although online gaming may seem like an innocuous form of
+entertainment, when the basic features and capabilities are examined, it could
+potentially become a target-rich communication network. Online gaming represents a
+technology that is rapidly growing in popularity worldwide. World of Warcraft (WoW) is
+one with an impressive following of gaming enthusiasts. With over 10 million users
+worldwide, WoW may be providing SIGINT targets a way to hide in plain sight. Targets
+have been spotted receiving "no reply" emails from gaming providers and GCHQ
+analysts have correlated known SIGINT targets to online gaming events. The New
+Mission Development Center at MHS, the Global Network Exploitation (OPD-GNE) and
+the Applied Research Special Topics (B18) organization at GCHQ are working together
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+7
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+to filter the FORNSAT survey environment for this traffic and extract various types of
+Wow metadata for SIGINT development and network knowledge enrichment.
+
+(U) World of Warcraft
+
+(U) Communication is at the core of online gaming
+and in Wow there are many ways to
+communicate and interact in the virtual world. A
+player has a character ID and can join different
+groups. A "party" brings players together for a
+common, defined purpose or quest. It is
+temporary and task-oriented. "Guilds," on the
+other hand, are for characters with persisting
+relationships and can take on an organizational
+structure with ranks and positions. The guild is
+more permanent and ideological. Characters can
+communicate verbally and non-verbally and may
+set up different types of channels to talk within a
+guild or privately, character to character.
+
+(TS//SI/REL) GCHQ recently asked MHS's New Mission Development Center (NMDC)
+to support an online gaming research effort focusing on Wow. Eager to assist in a new
+potential area of target development, the NMDC discussed metadata needs with GCHQ
+in order to enable Wow target and network research in the FORNSAT arena. The
+NMDC engaged SNORT, an open source packet-sniffing software, which runs on all
+FORNSAT survey packet data, to filter out Wow packets. GCHQ provided several
+Wow protocol parsing scripts to process the traffic and produce Warcraft metadata from
+all NMDC FORNSAT survey. These logs are now being forwarded back to GCHQ for
+additional analysis, target development and network knowledge enrichment. By fusing
+information from different systems, databases, and resources GCHQ has correlated
+target entities to Wow logon events and continues to uncover potential SIGINT value by
+identifying accounts, characters, and guilds related to Islamic Extremist Groups, Nuclear
+Proliferation and Arms Dealing.
+
+(TS//SI//REL) WoW certainly provides entertainment for a large number of people
+worldwide, but its gaming format can provide a virtual organizational platform for
+potential SIGINT targets as well. Furthermore, this technology can assist the target and
+simultaneously assist the SIGINT community in tracking that target. The WoW gaming
+infrastructure provides ample information for network development through the data
+passed during WoW messages, such as country and time zone information, local IP
+addresses and realm server addresses. In terms of active target development, there are
+clear parallels: traditional SIGINT development may follow emails, chat and buddy lists,
+whereas WoW target development may follow character IDs and logons, gaming
+communication channels and guilds.
+
+(TS//SI//REL) MHS and GCHQ will continue to develop and collaborate on this
+potentially lucrative venue.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMNT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+8
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20320108
+
+(S//SI) Topic: Exploiting Terrorist Use of Games & Virtual Environments
+
+(TS//SI) Issue: We know that terrorists use many feature-rich Internet communications media
+for operational purposes such as email, VoIP, chat, proxies, and web forums and it is highly
+likely they will be making wide use of the many communications features offered by Games and
+Virtual Environments (GVE) by 2010. The SIGINT Enterprise needs to begin taking action now
+to plan for collection, processing, presentation, and analysis of these communications. With a
+few exceptions, NSA can't even recognize the traffic, and therefore it is impossible to even say
+what percentage of the environment is GVE; let alone determine how targets are using the
+communications features of GVEs. However, GVEs offer a SIGINT/HUMINT opportunity space
+and more research is needed to figure out effective exploitation.
+
+(S//SI) GVEs today allow individuals to gather with like-minded others online. Many GVEs
+offer communications such as private chat (P2P), group chat, chat to an alias, and broadcast chat
+-both text and voice. Also many GVEs allow convergent technologies to intermingle such as
+XboxLive! which can be run via an Xbox360 gaming console and/or connect via a PC to normal
+MSN chat. Second Life offers the ability to anonymously text to a GSM phone (SMS) and soon
+they will offer anonymous voice calls so that phone numbers do not have to be known by either
+party and won't show up in collection. Some GVEs allow third party interfaces which allow
+limited functionality from a web browser. This overcomes obstacles such as a high-bandwidth
+requirement and or not being allowed to download software (think Internet café usage). In
+addition, many GVEs are able to be used via mobile devices connected wirelessly (phones,
+handhelds, laptops). Connected to the GVEs, specialized forums and other social networking
+sites have sprung up to provide an additional place to interact, connect, or share. These sites and
+any others can be advertised in the GVEs, so that if a terrorist web forum has to move locations it
+can be found by its members again. Areas/groups can be access-restricted, member-only. They
+are essentially private meeting places, and can be used for planning, comms, and training, etc.
+GVEs are used for collaboration; Forterra's 3D world is coming to JWICS to do this IC-wide.
+
+(U//FOUO) GVEs have been made that reinforce prejudices and cultural stereotypes while
+imparting a targeted message or lesson both from the Western point of view and in the Middle
+East. America's Army is a U.S. Army produced game that is free download from its recruitment
+page and is acknowledged to be so good at this the army no longer needs to use it for
+recruitment, they use it for training. The Lebanese Hizballah has taken this concept and the same
+basic game design and made its own version of the game called Special Forces 2 (SF2), which its
+press section acknowledges is used for recruitment and training in order to prepare their youth to
+"fight the enemy", a radicalizing medium; the ultimate goal is to become a suicide martyr. One
+cannot discount the "fun factor" involved–it is important to hold your target audience's
+attention-- and makes ingesting the message not even noticeable. SF2 features multi-player, on-
+line text and voice chat for up to 60 players simultaneously, effectively acting like a VPN or
+private chat forum. SF2 is offered at $10 a copy and so also goes to fund terrorist operations.
+
+(S//SI) These games offer realistic weapons training (what weapon to use against what target,
+what ranges can be achieved, even aiming and firing), military operations and tactics,
+photorealistic land navigation and terrain familiarization, and leadership skills. While complete
+military training is best achieved in person, perfection is not always required to accomplish the
+mission. Some of the 9-11 pilots had never flown a real plane, they had only trained using
+
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20070108
+Declassify On: 20320108
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20320108
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20320108
+
+Microsoft's Flight Simulator. When the mission is expensive, risky, or dangerous, it is often a
+wiser idea to exercise virtually, rather than really blow an operative up assembling a bomb or
+exposing a sleeper agent to law enforcement scrutiny. Militaries around the world use virtual
+simulators with great success and the Hizballah has even hooked up a Playstation controller to a
+laptop in order to guide some of its real missiles. Kuma Wars is a U.S. owned company that
+offers realistic battle simulation of real battles in Iraq usually one month after they actually
+happened. The player can re-do maneuvers in a lessons learned way for training, or you can
+switch sides and see how it works from the opposite side. It also provides real terrain features,
+such as real road signs from real roads in Iraq, and a simulated night-vision goggles
+environment.
+
+(TS//SI) Al Qaida terrorist target selectors and GVE executables have been found associated
+with XboxLive, Second Life, World of Warcraft, and other GVEs in PINWALE network traffic,
+TAO databases, and in forensic data. Other targets include Chinese hackers, an Iranian nuclear
+scientist, Hizballah, and Hamas members. GCHQ has a vigorous effort to exploit GVEs and has
+produced exploitation modules in XboxLive! and World of Warcraft. After beta testing, they
+expect reporting to begin in April 2008. The FBI, CIA and the Defense Humint Service all have
+HUMINT operations in Second Life and other GVEs and are very interested in forming a
+deconfliction and tipping group that would be able to collaborate on operations.
+
+(TS//SI) GVEs are an opportunity! We can use games for: CNE exploits, social network
+analysis, HUMINT targeting, ID tracking (photos, doc IDs), shaping activities, geo-location of
+target, and collection of comms. It has been well documented that terrorists are OPSEC and tech
+saavy and are only getting more so over time. These applications and their servers however, are
+trusted by their users and makes an connection to another computer on the Internet, which can
+then be exploited. Through target buddylists and interaction found in the gaming and on gaming
+web sites, social networks can be diagramed and previously unknown SIGINT leads and
+connections and terrorists cells discovered. GVEs can contain on-line presence indicators,
+geolocation, and ID tracking can be gleaned and used in apprehension operations.
+
+(TS//SI) Recommendation: The amount of GVEs in the world is growing but the specific ones
+that CT needs to be methodically discovered and validated. Only then can we find evidence that
+GVEs are being used for operational uses. Protocol Exploitation, SFL, and TAO should begin
+profiling their databases and the GVEs for collection and exploitation possibilities. Open source
+(APSTARS) produced GVE lists and selectors should be used to run against UTT and other
+databases to check for cross matches to develop target selectors. CT SIGDEV along with CT
+TOPIs will study the collected traffic to find and track targets of interest. There should be a
+concentrated effort to conduct research into target use of GVEs, and signatures for survey
+collection should be developed. Targets and specific apps should be chosen to exploit to ensure
+that terrorists' GVE/social site usage is covered by SIGINT and the system is not left behind the
+times. All avenues should be taken to develop PES and CNE exploits as GVEs are found on
+target computers. We need to develop a viewer/db that allows linguist/analysts to
+view/experience voice/text/video traffic together and archivee the GVE data associated with
+reporting. which will also be essential for Yahoo, Skype, webcam, VTCs and Biometrics.
+
+(S//SI) CT SIGDEV/SSG should establish a process to deconflict IC-wide ops in GVEs and to
+develop strategy for collaboration. Members from at least CIA, FBI, DIA, NSA and GCHQ
+should participate to make the coordination significant. Members should have ability to check
+tasking, traffic, and status of current operations.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20320108
+
+Games: A Look at Emerging Trends, Uses, Threats and Opportunities in Influence Activities
+
+Table of Contents
+
+FORWARD 4
+
+CHAPTER 1 - EXPLOITATION AND FUNCITON OF GAMES: AN
+INTERACTIVE INFLUENCE MEDIUM................................................................5
+
+Gaming Markets: Why We Care 6
+Demographics.............................................................................................................................6
+Popularity 6
+
+Functionality of Online Games 8
+Propaganda and Influence 8
+Communications 10
+Recruitment.............................................................................................................................10
+Training and Simulation 11
+Fundraising 12
+
+Ease of Production of Games 12
+
+CHAPTER 2 – WHY GAMES ARE AN EFFECTIVE INFLUENCE PLATFORM ....15
+
+Chapter Introduction.... 16
+
+Active Learning.... 17
+Knowledge and Skills...........................................................................................................17
+Applied Teaching Tool...........................................................................................................20
+
+Passive Messaging and Conditioning.......................................................................................21
+Value Systems 21
+Emotions .21
+
+The "Return for More" Factor 23
+Engagement 23
+Addiction 24
+
+Chapter Addendum 24
+
+CHAPTER 3 – PLAUSIBLE SCENARIOS FOR THE USE OF GAMES IN
+TERRORIST ACTIVITIES 25
+
+Chapter Introduction................................................................................................................26
+
+Possible Terrorist Use of Different Game Genres...............................................................28
+First-person Shooter Games..................................................................................................28
+MMORPGs and Virtual Worlds 29
+Mixed or Alternate Reality Games........................................................................................32
+Simulation Games 36
+Knowledge-Based Games .38
+Strategy Games......................................................................................................................40
+
+Chapter Addendum 41
+
+FOUO - Not for Public Distribution
+Page 2
+
+Games: A Look at Emerging Trends, Uses, Threats and Opportunities in Influence Activities
+
+CHAPTER 4 – EMERGING TRENDS NI THE GAMING SPACE 42
+
+Emerging Trends 45
+Broadband Diffusion.............................................................................................................45
+Third Generation (3G) and Beyond.......................................................................................47
+The Maturation of the Mobile Platform...............................................................................49
+The Rise of Virtual Worlds 51
+The Explosion of User Generated Content...........................................................................54
+Advances in Digital Rendering.............................................................................................56
+Advances in the Science of Haptics.....................................................................................57
+
+Chapter Addendum 59
+
+CHAPTER 5 – WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS VIRTUALLY.............................60
+
+Focus Areas 61
+Countering In-Game Propaganda .62
+Competing for Players with New Games.............................................................................63
+Collecting In-Game Intelligence .64
+
+Chapter Addendum 65
+
+INDEX 67
+
+REFERENCES 71
+
+FOUO - Not for Public Distribution
+Page 3
+
+Games: A Look at Emerging Trends, Uses, Threats and Opportunities in Influence Activities
+
+FORWARD
+
+Video games are a media platform that has become part of daily activity for many
+around the world. Whether it is casual gaming on a cell phone or PC, or a virtual world
+where individuals are connected via the Internet, interaction in and around games is
+increasing. Games entertain, encourage interaction, enable financial gain, and teach
+lessons. While many of these activities are meant to be harmless, they also have the
+potential to be exploited for malicious activities.
+
+Over the course of a year, extensive study was done on the common use of games and
+their applicability to terrorist activities. Academic journals and papers, newspaper and
+magazine articles, textbooks, non-fiction works, in-game exploration and personal
+interviews on games, psychology and sociology, as well as attendance at seminars on
+these issues (for example the Serious Games conference or SAIC’s Cyber-Influence
+Conference series) represent the main sources for this report.
+
+The report was written in five stand-alone papers that are compiled here as a
+comprehensive primer for the current and potential future of game usage. A majority of
+the information contained in this report identifies facts and trends and applies them to the
+realm of IC concern (Chapters 1, 2, and 4). In addition, the paper contains examples of
+fictitious scenarios that terrorists or extremists might employ (Chapter 3), technology
+advancements and trends that might enable those scenarios (Chapter 4), and recommend
+steps to ensure that those hypotheses are not realized (Chapter 5).
+
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+Games: A Look at Emerging Trends, Uses, Threats and Opportunities in Influence Activities
+
+CHAPTER 1
+
+Exploitation and Function of Games: An Interactive Influence Medium
+
+Photo from a Second Life Gathering
+
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+Games: A Look at Emerging Trends, Uses, Threats and Opportunities in Influence Activities
+
+Gaming Markets: Why We Care
+
+Demographics
+
+The gaming population crosses age, gender and cultural boundaries, making
+inroads into previously untapped markets and providing terrorist organizations with a
+powerful platform to reach core target audiences.
+
+* The core demographic for gaming is 18 – 35 year-old males. However, the
+ average age of the typical “gamer" increases by one year each year and women
+ now comprise nearly one-third of all adult gamers.i
+* The online gaming population is expected to grow rapidly in the near term,
+ resulting in an estimated 10 million online game players in the U.S. (i.e. the
+ equivalent of the entire population of New York City) and 30 million online game
+ players worldwide (i.e. the equivalent of the entire population of Shanghai,
+ Bombay and Karachi combined)."ii
+* While the majority of online gamers originate from U.S. and Asian markets, the
+ rapid expansion of Internet cafes and broadband technologies will enable the
+ growth of online gaming populations in other regions. For example, the fastest
+ growing gaming markets are occurring in Europe, the Middle East and Africa.iii
+* Gaming sales continue to increase by a compound annual rate of 19.1%. Sales
+ surpassed 23 billion USD in 2003 and are estimated to reach 56 billion USD by
+ 2008. In turn, revenues reached approximately $6 billion in 2004 and are
+ projected to reach $14.3 billion by 2009.iv
+
+Popularity
+
+Gaming has emerged as the preeminent form of entertainment among 18 – 35 year-
+old males. Consequently, the gaming industry now rivals traditional entertainment
+industries, including the film and music industries in terms of growth, revenue, and
+consumption.v
+
+* For example, the gaming industry is growing by 20% compared to 7.5%, 7.1%
+ and 2% growth rates in the film, television, and music industries during the same
+ period. Furthermore, AC Nielson predicts that within four years, the film industry
+ will be just one-third the size of the computer game market.vi
+* Game users typically spend 20-30 hours per week on online games and more than
+ 20% of online gamers identify themselves as residents of virtual worlds.vii
+* The stereotype of the lonely gamer spending long hours in social isolation is no
+ longer tenable. While some games are played by singular or a group of isolated
+ players, computer gaming now is increasingly social with the growth of Local
+
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+
+* Area Network (LAN) games played in Internet cafes and the expansion of
+ massively online multiplayer games (MMOG). Users are now interacting with
+ others in the game (i.e. guilds), online in other cyber media (i.e. web sites,
+ message boards and social networking sites) and in cybercafés providing a fertile
+ ground for terrorist activities.
+* It is widely thought that online gaming may have a similar cultural, political, and social
+ influence on today's gamers that music, religion and politics had on earlier generations.viii
+
+Global Patterns in Game Play: Time Spent, Social Interaction and Reach
+
+Games consume a great deal of time and effort by a significant number of players around the world. In a
+study done by Nick Yee at Stanford University on Massively Multiplayer Online Role Playing Games
+(MMORPG) users, 50% of the 30,000 respondents worked full time, with only 22% as full-time students.
+The average age of the respondents was 26.5, (women tended to be older than me) and on average the
+respondents spent 22.71 hours per week in their chosen MMORPG, a time involvement which suggests
+that there is a substantial level of emotional investment in the MMORPG environment.
+
+Global Market
+Counter-Strike is considered the most popular online first-person shooter
+(FPS) game in the world with the more than 200,000 players playing
+simultaneously and contributing more than 5.5 billion minutes of playing
+time each month on the official network consisting of more than 100,000
+servers. Counter-Strike is played extensively throughout Central,
+Southeast, and Southwest Asia in addition to the core U.S., European and
+Asian markets.
+
+Palestinian Market
+Reportedly, more than 25% of children between the ages of 6 and 17 in the
+Palestinian territories access the Internet through Internet centers that have
+emerged in refugee camps, rural villages, and urban areas. Palestinian
+Internet center managers and computer lab owners have reported that most
+children spend most of their time playing online games, including “pro-
+Arab" games like Special Force and Under Siege.
+
+Southwest & Southeast Asian Markets
+Kuma Games produces and distributes episodic games depicting real life
+military operations. These games are played throughout Southeast and
+Southwest Asia. During the height of media coverage on Middle East
+networks like Al-Jazeera, 20% of Kuma's total audience originated from
+the Middle East region with significant amounts of game traffic coming
+from Egypt and a notable number of players originating from Iran and Iraq.
+[See: End Note xxvii]
+
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+Games: A Look at Emerging Trends, Uses, Threats and Opportunities in Influence Activities
+
+Functionality of Online Games
+
+Games are platforms on which participants may communicate, coordinate,
+socialize, train, learn, simulate, experiment, build, proselytize and even barter virtual
+goods. Such functions indicate that the line between the ‘virtual' world and the 'real'
+world is blurring, and to some users may be non-existent.
+
+* That virtual worlds are becoming synonymous with the real world, provides and
+ interesting opportunity for terrorists to conduct a range of activities with
+ anonymity.
+
+As virtual worlds become more popular, pervasive, and sophisticated, so too will
+terrorist opportunities to exploit them.
+
+* For example, as gaming becomes increasingly popular across multiple
+ demographics and access to various gaming platforms increases (i.e. access to
+ personal computers, Internet cafes, and mobile platforms), it will become easier
+ for terrorist groups to reach core target audiences. For these reasons, many expect
+ that terrorist groups will increasingly leverage online and computer based games
+ to support their activities in the future.
+
+Propaganda and Influence
+
+Terrorist groups and sympathizers could use games to twist historical context,
+demonize enemies, disrupt the social moral compass, and desensitize users to
+violence. ix
+
+* Games designed to appeal to terrorist sympathizers leverage salient political
+ themes and typically exploit “pro-Arab” and “anti-Israel” sentiment. Such games
+ attract players because they provide them with a consonant message and an
+ opportunity to take part 'virtually' in "resistance movements."x
+* Special Force, developed by Hezbollah, plays on the common themes of "Israeli
+ occupation" and "Palestinian victimization,” and offers players the opportunity to
+ 'fight back' by 'digitally' reenacting various elements of the Intifada. For
+ instance, the introductory level of Special Force involves target practice and
+ shooting exercises, using images of Israeli Generals as the mark. Later levels
+ involve the 'digital' reenactment of battles that have occurred between the IDF
+ and Palestinians during the Israeli occupation.xi
+* Special Force was intentionally designed by Hezbollah to reinforce and
+ disseminate the group's values, concepts, and ideas among supporters and
+ sympathizers, while giving passive supporters the opportunity to experience the
+ viscera of the front lines.xii Special Force is available in Arabic, French, English,
+ and Farsi, and thus is widely available to traditional Hezbollah audiences and
+ others. xiii
+
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+* Under Ash and its sequel Under Siege were published by the Syrian company Dar
+ al-Fikr. The player takes the role of a Palestinian national opposing the occupiers
+ from Israel. Under Siege, in particular, is based on actual events, but is presented
+ from the Syrian perspective. The game employs visceral imagery and sound,
+ including scenes of Palestinian children being murdered, summary executions
+ being held in public streets, high-speed chase scenes and sounds of gunfire and
+ heart pumping music. The scenes too are designed to evoke outrage and to play
+ on common themes, including "Israeli occupation,” “Injustice," and "Revenge”.
+* The Iranian Islamic Students Association has also developed an online game,
+ Commander Bahman, in which users play the role of a special-forces unit tasked
+ with protecting Iranian nuclear capabilities from American aggression. This
+ game was developed in direct response to a Kuma Reality Games release, Assault
+ on Iran. Kuma has subsequently developed another installment, Assault on Iran,
+ Pt.3, in the hopes that this international dialogue, sparked by the depiction of
+ global affairs in the game space, will continue. Assault on Iran, Pt. 3 is planned
+ be released in Arabic, English, and Farsi. xiv
+
+Video games make particular assumptions within their environment that can
+transcend a specific message to users.
+
+* For example, the games Ummah Defense and Ummah Defense II (free for
+ download on the Internet), are set in the future, based on the premise that at some
+ point in history Muslims will have conquered the world and killed or converted
+ all non-Muslims. Users act as a member of the Intergalactic Muslim Council,
+ working to protect Earth from the sole disbeliever and in his army of robots sent
+ to destroy the Earth – it was necessary to construct robots as all other humans
+ believe in Islam. The overarching message is that establishment of the caliphate
+ is possible.xv Playing games within this context allows users to experience this
+ reality in a sensory way that makes the message "real.”
+
+Video games are an ideal influence platform because they incorporate imagery,
+narrative, camaraderie, and action.
+
+* This combination works because advanced imagery and graphics can be used to
+ engage the senses, storylines can be used to provide a context and group goals,
+ camaraderie in the form of multiple players facilitates higher levels of
+ engagement, and action in the form of participation is required. xvi
+
+Radical groups are using gaming platforms to propagate religious ideology. This
+can take place in a number of different ways. For example, a FPS game can help
+demonize a declared enemy, while educational games can offer manipulated religious
+doctrine as scripture.
+
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+
+* For example, Innovative Minds, Inc. has developed a series of six 'multi-level'
+ downloadable games, entitled “Islamic Fun” which are aimed at "teaching
+ children between the ages of 5 and 11 years of age about Islam.” “Islamic Fun" is
+ marketed as a "faith-based" alternative to “secular” games and includes many age
+ appropriate game titles, including Fishing Bear, Tree Hop, and Two Bunny Race.
+ However, embedded in this game package is another game, entitled The
+ Resistance, in which users assume the role of farmers in Southern Lebanon who
+ join the Islamic Resistance against invading Israelis. xvii Many believe that these
+ types of games encourage anti-Semitism and promote terrorism. xviii
+
+Communications
+
+Games provide attractive communications channels for terrorist groups and sympathizers
+because in-game conversations often are difficult or impossible to monitor.
+
+* Many games contain capabilities like VoIP, chat, and file transfers that allow real-time
+ communications to take place, and few sites monitor such traffics or keep log files as
+ would traditional Internet service providers (ISPs).
+* Massively Multiplayer Online Games (MMOG) are ideal locations to support secure
+ terrorist communications because of the enormous scale on which they are played. At a
+ given time thousands of subscribers can be connected to a virtual world on various game
+ servers. Potentially complicating matters are that some games can be hosted by gamers
+ on their own dedicated server or PC.
+* In-game communication channels would be difficult to collect by current Internet
+ control methods, because speech and text mingles with data from the game. This
+ increases the chances that authorities will overlook communications they would
+ normally prohibit.
+
+Recruitment
+
+Online gaming can serve as a recruiting tool. This has already proven true in the
+US, as the US Army found that 28% of players logging on to play its, "America's Army"
+online game also visited the corresponding recruitment site.
+
+* Monitoring strategy games like Counterstrike can be an effective way to track
+ individual skill levels in firearms, tactical operations, group cohesion, leadership,
+ etc. This information can then be used by interested parties to evaluate
+ qualifications for military or insurgent recruitment.
+* Participation in virtual communities can facilitate off-line activity. Members of
+ terrorist groups could enter or monitor online game environments with the intent
+ of translating 'virtual' skills and actions into real world commitments and
+ activities.
+
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+
+Training and Simulation
+
+Games can supplement field training by familiarizing recruits with the tactics,
+weaponry, and skills needed to conduct operations. Military type games can be used to
+help acquire skills in team work, communications, leadership, and operational tactics.
+This trend is likely to manifest itself in the near future, as games are increasingly
+leveraging real time data from the battle field.
+
+* Culturally accurate games can help foreign terrorists avoid profile raising
+ mistakes and assist in assimilation.
+* Combat simulators, such as those developed by BBN Technologies as part of the
+ Pentagon's DARWARS project, are used to help soldiers bound for Iraq prepare
+ for combat. Among the offerings: DARWARS Ambush! a combat simulation
+ game designed to train up to 24 soldiers at a time in military convoy operations.xix
+* Increasingly realistic virtual environments further blur the lines between the
+ virtual and real worlds - these environments create immersive environments that
+ draw users into the game world. This results in more true-to-life training grounds,
+ and enhances a game's underlying message as the user experience becomes more
+ immersive.
+* The US military is currently using games as a tool to equip personnel with
+ training in numerous key areas including, tactical planning, mission rehearsal,
+ incorporating lessons learned, and tactical language training. xx
+* COTS programs used to develop combat simulators are inexpensive, widely
+ available, and could offer terrorist groups the opportunity to simulate attacks prior
+ to their execution. Such programs could enable fairly accurate damage
+ assessments and provide insight into necessary course correction to limit risk and
+ unintended consequences associated with a particular attack. For example, the
+ Maya Unlimited fluid simulation software, available for $159, offers users the
+ ability to re-create the mushroom cloud caused by a nuclear explosion. Users can
+ control the influence of fuel and other attributes, and add key ingredients such as
+ temperature scale, buoyancy, dissipation, turbulence, and diffusion.
+* Games could also be used as part of the attack plan itself. With the rise of mobile
+ gaming, terrorist groups can use the platform to its advantage; instead of planting
+ a bomb near a crowd of people, for example, it can place one at a random location
+ and lead game players to the bomb.\*
+
+\* This is speculative based on flash mobs and mobile gaming use. Flash mobs are groups of people that
+ converge in public places for brief periods of time and dissipate quickly there after. Flash mobs have
+ occurred worldwide and are frequently organized around political protest efforts. The French riots of 2005
+ were organized largely through flash mob efforts. Paired with mobile scavenger hunting location based or
+ mixed reality games, flash mobs have the potential to concentrate people rapidly at the site of the "win."
+ See stories on flash mobs: http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3056735,00.html;
+ http://in.rediff.com/netguide/2003/oct/05flash.htm. Some examples of location based games include:
+
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+
+Fundraising
+
+Newer games offer greater opportunities for terror groups to raise and distribute funds. Funds used in online games can be uploaded in one location and downloaded in another, which is particularly easy if multiple users can access a single ID.
+
+* The goods, services, and currencies of virtual worlds have real-world impact. In 2005, E-bay category 1654, "Internet Games," had $30 million dollars in sales in the United States. Similarly in Asia, real-cash virtual item trade exceeds $100 million annually.xxi Current estimates indicate that intangible goods in digital worlds are worth $1-$2 billion.xxii
+* Because users are able to create their own content in games, entrepreneurs profit in real-world dollars by selling professional services or goods. One virtual real estate mogul in Second Life makes nearly $150,000 per year in real-world dollars.
+* Fund raising efforts are already happening in virtual worlds. In 2006, American Cancer Society (ACS) held its second virtual Relay for Life in Second Life. ACS collected over $40,000 and attracted nearly 1,000 participants. xxiii
+* Individuals organize to raise funds for charitable efforts. After Hurricane Katrina, some individuals banded together to hold live fundraising events in Second Life to help victims. xxiv
+* Organizations could use virtual worlds as a vehicle for generating income. While the money raised might not be enough to fund a sizable organization, it could be a revenue source for smaller cells.
+
+Ease of Production of Games
+
+The growing availability of middleware or mods drastically lowers the barriers of entry for game development, allowing almost anyone to become a game builder. Middleware products are available for a marginal fee (usually the cost of a game) or can be downloaded free from the Internet.
+
+* Mods are typically used to create additional content to games (partial conversions) or new games (total conversions). Popular middleware products include 3D world building packages such as Genesis 3D, Quake, Unreal, and Half-Life; multiplayer adventure games like Aurora Toolkit; and systems for handling massively multiplayer games like BigWorld, Butterfly.net, and Terazona.
+
+Botfighter series, Gunslinger series, Mogi, UnderCover series, Swordfish and Torpedo Bay, ConQwest, The Journey II, and Treasure Hunt. See a research paper of mixed reality mobile gaming: http://research.microsoft.com/~shahrami/papers/tech02.pdf#search='mixed%20reality%20gaming.
+
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+
+* Middleware products have been used to create popular commercial games such as Counterstrike (Half-Life) and America's Army (Unreal); as well as several games of a more questionable nature, including Ethnic Cleansing (Genesis 3D), Under Ash (Genesis 3D) and Special Force (Genesis 3D).
+
+Mods not only provide a developmental shortcut, but also enable game producers to "improve" existing games, whereby increasing their popularity.
+
+* Mods can be used to transform existing games. For example, unidentified gamers modified the FPS game Battlefield 2 enabling players to take on the role of extremists whose home village in Iraq suffered collateral damage during a fictional US operation.xxv
+* Another prime example of the use of mods is the CD-ROM game Ethnic Cleansing, produced by Resistance Records, to promote the white supremacy agenda. The game promotes the killing of "sub-humans" (other races and Jews) in a setting similar to New York City. The game is patterned after popular mainstream video games Quake and Doom, turning racially motivated violence into a form of "entertainment." Users are given the option of assuming the role of a KKK Member or a Skinhead.
+* Kuma Games develops free, episodic games for their users based on recent real world events. With the assistance of the Valve's Source game engine,xxvi modular software that provides enhancements in several key areas of game production, including character animation, advanced AI and real-world physics, Kuma is easily able to produce immersive, realistic games in little time. Additionally, in an effort to make the games more easily downloaded by users in the Middle East, Kuma has developed a Persia Disk that can easily be copied and redistributed. Using the disk, once the game design is loaded onto the user's PC, no Internet connection is required to play, although a low-band connection is adequate to attain new episodes, xxvii
+* Terrorist groups likely could reduce development costs further by soliciting sympathizers with the required skill sets to work for free or reduce costs as their contribution to the Jihad analogous to how religious game developers operate to reduce costs. College students provide a plausible target for recruitment.xxviii
+
+Machinima is film making within the real-time 3D virtual environment of a video game. It's the use of video game graphics technology to create animated films. Machinima combines aspects of film making, animation and game design to transform an interactive medium, a video game, into a production studio complete with sets, props, special effects and virtual actors. All that is required is a game and a desktop computer.† Like traditional movies, machinima allows for character development and the creation of plot lines.
+
+† For a machinima example that uses military characters and explains machinima, see Machinima! With Officer Dan at http://www.machinima.com/films.php?id=4676
+
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+
+* Software to make machinima productions costs little or nothing. Websites like www.fraps.com provide trial versions of machinima software, such as the one used to produce "Sonic Jihad xxix," and allow users to create quality machinima productions. Productions, such as "Sonic Jihad," which are made with trial versions of machinima software frequently place their websites directly in the center of the screen in order to drive people to their sites to purchase full versions. Productions like "Sonic Jihad" not only can promote propaganda, but direct sympathizers who wish to create similar productions to the software needed.
+* In 2005, a machinima, “French Democracy" depicted the views of the minorities during the French riots. The well-developed story carries a political message allowing one to sympathize with the minority position in the riots. The machinima was produced on November 22, just 5 days after the riots ended.
+* Similar to using mods to develop games, real-time video capture software, like Fraps, allows users to record video of the activity taking place on one's PC, during game play, for example. Once downloaded, this software "records" to capture audio and video bits up to 1152x864 and 100 frames per second.xxx The use of such software in games like Kuma/Wars would allow users to develop machinima productions of recent combat events adding their own twist.
+
+Features of Fraps Real-time Video Capture Software
+
+Screen capturing - Digital images taken by the software recording the visible items on the monitor as a screenshot in formats such as BMP, PNG and JPG.
+
+Real-time video capturing - Digital images taken by the software recording the visible items on the monitor (or another visual output device) over an extended period of time, as the action is taking place, to form a video file.
+
+Screencast/Screen Recording - Digital recording of a computer screen output, often containing audio narration.
+
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+Games: A Look at Emerging Trends, Uses, Threats and Opportunities in Influence Activities
+
+CHAPTER 2
+
+Why Games are an Effective Influence Platform
+
+Compiled photos from Global Islamic Media Front's
+Quest for Bush - The Night of Bush Capturing Game
+
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+Games: A Look at Emerging Trends, Uses, Threats and Opportunities in Influence Activities
+
+Chapter Introduction
+
+Games are an effective influence platform because they promote both "active" and "passive" learning, and are highly attractive pursuits for specific target audiences.
+
+Games, by nature, are learning experiences. Playing a game involves building skills in order to advance to new levels in the game.
+
+* Traditional teaching and conditioning methods are used to teach and develop the player.
+* Learning is central to a player's in-game success. xxxi
+
+Learning in games can be transparent (e.g. helping to refine a player's shooting technique) or hidden (developing a predisposition in a player toward a particular cause or message).
+
+* The latter often involves the promotion within the game of a particular set of values or ideologies via the storyline or setting, and the use of emotional "tools" to elicit particular reactions.
+
+Finally, games can be effective influence platforms because they are popular, captivating players and encouraging them to return for more.
+
+Video games are "weaponized" texts, or disrupters of psychic stability... I mean to say that games perform what Pierre Bourdieu calls "symbolic violence"-in other words, that "gentle, invisible form of violence, which is never recognized as such."... Like educational institutions, video games are instances of symbolic violence in the sense that they inflict themselves on players. The world of the video game is nothing more than the on-screen rendering of programmed instructions and decrees. Players are "schooled" by an aggressive bombardment of pixellated images and sounds. Every moment is a direct imperative, an attack that demands a response.
+-- Matt Garite,
+The Ideology of Interactivity (or, Video Games and the Taylorization of Leisure) xxxii
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+
+Active Learning
+
+Games can serve as a place to learn, imparting knowledge and teaching skills. The structure of games promotes learning through a rewards system.
+
+* Often, games require action without expertise, forcing players to experiment and learn.
+* Games also can reinforce previous learning experiences by allowing players to interact with issues, ideologies, products and events in active and passive ways.
+
+Knowledge and Skills
+
+Games can serve as a place to learn, imparting knowledge and teaching skills.
+
+* During prehistoric times, hunting games were used to teach young people how to handle dangerous situations in the wild.
+* Today, games are often more complex, involving dynamic platforms, sophisticated storylines, and diverse goals.
+* Individuals progress through an entire learning cycle when playing a game, beginning with openness to new situations and rules, then taking certain actions and reflecting on them, and finally "learning" how to operate successfully in the game (see Figure 1).
+* Often the learning process continues outside the game in such ways as conversations with friends, participation on fan websites, reading about the games, and player meet-ups online. xxxiii
+
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+
+Exhibit 2-1: The Learning Framework xxxiv
+
+```
+Application of the Learning Framework to Games
+
+The Learning Framework
+1990-1995 Prasad Kaira
+
+Unlearning -> Openness
+
+Reflection Action
+Conditioning (Current Reality) Manifestation (Desired Future State)
+Nurturing the Individual Influencing the External Environment
+Instinctive Learning Coaching
+Environment
+```
+
+1. Openness: When an individual plays a game, he is open to its structures, rules and messages.
+2. Action: By nature, games present a problem that a player must address and act on in order to advance in the game. Actions must take place within the rules and value systems of the game (in this diagram, the game is represented by the box "Environment") in order for the player to participate and move forward in the game.
+ a. Manifestation: The player's desired outcome in the game is to succeed and mitigate losses.
+ b. Influencing the external environment: The player takes action to try to influence the course of the game.
+ c. Coaching: The rules of the game provide guidelines on how to take action and what is permissible and acceptable.
+ d. Instinctive learning: When quick action is required, instincts will play a role in how play is performed. This often includes a mix of: lessons learned from past experiences, a player's personal values system, and physical and emotional reactions. This part of learning is generally subconscious.
+ e. Nurturing the individual: Assessments about how well the player is playing the game are made frequently throughout the game.
+
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+
+f. Conditioning: The player's actions result in an outcome, which can be the desired outcome, a different yet positive outcome, or a negative outcome.
+3. Reflection: In the wake of the outcome, a player consciously or subconsciously makes an assessment about what worked, what didn't work, what could be improved, and how to take action differently in the future.
+4. Unlearning to Openness: Reflection enables the "unlearning" of decisions and actions taken in the previous game and creates openness to trying again to succeed. This completes one learning cycle and starts another.
+
+The structure of games promotes learning through a rewards system.
+
+* Video and other games teach a "correct" course of action by providing immediate feedback on a player's initial action. As discussed with regard to the learning cycle, players then reflect on their initial action in an effort to achieve a better outcome the next time they are faced with a similar situation in the game.
+
+ Learning = Action + Feedback + Reflection xxxv
+
+* Players advance to higher levels in games by learning appropriate responses during earlier stages of the game. Games have reinforcement and punishment mechanisms such as gaining or losing points for desired responses (i.e. operant conditioning).xxxvi
+* The chainsaw model of video games visually represents the accumulation of knowledge and/or skills that leads to advancement to a higher level in a game. Players move through a series of micro-challenges that, when combined, lead to advancement.
+
+Exhibit 2-2: The Chainsaw Model of Video Game Story Structure xxxvii
+
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+Games often require action without expertise, forcing players to experiment and learn. xxxviii Such learning experiences often involve role exploration, project execution, and operating within a game producer's version of facts and history.
+
+* Role exploration – or choosing a virtual persona and acting out this role in the game - teaches players the challenges and limits of that role.xxxix
+* Multi-player games which require numerous individuals to carry out a mission teach players how to become leaders and execute a collaborative project in its entirety.†xl
+* Immersion in a game producer's version of facts or history teaches players how to operate in the defined socio-political environment. This can result in player empathy toward a particular cause.xli
+
+Applied Teaching Tool
+
+*Games can reinforce previous learning experiences by allowing players to interact with issues, ideologies, products and events in active and passive ways.*
+
+* Studies have shown that players who interact with messages, products and the like have higher recollection levels of those messages.
+* Active participation elicits emotional responses, helping the message to resonate more strongly with the player.
+* Often used following other types of learning about a specific environment, simulations teach users how to operate in environments via virtual participation in them. Effective simulation experiences result in particular responses when players are faced with similar situations in the physical world.
+
+Schools, private businesses and governments are investing in simulations, advergames and in-game promotions to reach and teach their respective target audiences. xlii
+
+* Schools are increasingly using games in their curricula. Students report feeling like learning is not "work" with games, and spend more time with the subject matter than if they were reading a book about the topic. Some studies indicate that students retain information from games more effectively than from books because of the "immersion” factor of games.
+* Many companies believe advergaming is an effective way to market and “brand” their product. Advergames target younger, tech-savvy consumers. xliii Yankee
+
+† For example, in World of Warcraft players learn how to plan and execute missions. Players meet prior to a mission to develop a strategy, determine what roles they will play and how they will execute them. Often leaders keep statistics on their players. Following the mission, individuals will review the mission's success and player performance.
+
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+* Group estimates the in-game advertising market will reach $732 million annually by 2010. xliv Already, the names or products of multinational companies such as Coca-Cola, Pepsi, Panasonic, Viewsonic, Motorola, Castrol, Nokia, McDonalds, Sprite, LG and HP have appeared in international game titles in an effort to promote their brands and products. xlv
+* Governments are using games for military training. Games such as Delta Force 2, Steel Beasts and Falcon 4.0 have been adapted by various armed forces to enhance their relevance to military training. Singapore Armed Forces' Defense Science and Technology Agency has been adapting the games Chain of Command and Operation Flashpoint to suit its needs. The Singapore School of Combat Engineers and School of Armor have modified Operation Flashpoint to their specific missions, including the use of booby traps, wire and mines. xlvi
+
+Passive Messaging and Conditioning
+
+The structure of games promotes winning through a set values system. The strong emotions that games can elicit deepen these learning experiences.
+
+* Games that elicit strong emotions can predispose a player toward a particular viewpoint or cause, or provoke specific reactions on the part of the player.
+
+Value Systems
+
+The structure of games promotes winning through a set values system.
+
+* Players often must adopt a specific set of values in order to achieve a “win" or positive outcome in the game. Sometimes, these values form the context of the game.
+* Ethnic Cleansing, which was released in 2002 by Resistance Records, is an example of a game in which a particular set of “values” form the context of the game and players are rewarded for adhering to this value system. Players choose the role of a Skinhead or KKK member, and "take out" as many black, Latino and Jewish avatars as possible. Racial slurs are made throughout the game, which also portrays negative stereotypes. xlvii
+* Teams or “clans” in massive multiplayer online role-playing games (MMORPGs) which are formed at advanced levels of games to allow players to achieve greater status, ranking and advancement, adopt their own value systems, rules and cultures. xlviii At this level, players can only be successful by adopting the clan's modus operandi.
+
+Emotions
+
+The strong emotions that games can elicit deepen learning experiences. xlix
+
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+
+* Video game play is rich in sensory experiences, engaging motor skills and promoting visual experiences like artistic characters and a compelling environment and auditory experiences like music.
+* Advancements in graphics have made characters and settings look more "real", strengthening the emotions they induce.
+* The rewards system of games that ultimately results in a reward or punishment for the player, also can elicit formidable emotions. Rewards and punishments are central to "stimulus-reinforcement" learning and "stimulus-response" learning.¹
+
+Games that elicit strong emotions can predispose a player toward a particular viewpoint or cause, or provoke specific reactions on the part of the player.
+
+* For example, the game, Dafur Is Dying, evokes sympathy for the people of Darfur. Players assume the role of a refugee from Dafur facing overwhelming challenges and dangers. If the player is captured in the game by militiamen, a caption on the screen reads: "You will likely become one of the hundreds of thousands of people already lost to this humanitarian crisis," and includes a warning about the possibility of rape."li
+* The white supremacy propaganda game Ethnic Cleansing mentioned above includes blaring racist hate music to help the game's message resonate on an emotional level with players."lii
+* Foreign Ground, a first-person training game, has been developed for the Swedish military to simulate peacekeeping operations. Graphic images of local conditions provoke an emotional response and develop peacekeepers' sense of duty (see Figure 3).
+
+Exhibit 2-3: Scenes from Foreign Ground liii
+
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+
+The "Return for More" Factor
+
+Games are effective influence platforms because they can captivate and engage target audiences, and encourage "return” learning and conditioning.
+* Games can provide significant social interaction, as well as the opportunity to live alternative virtual lives.
+* Games can be additive and lead to dependencies by players.
+
+Engagement
+Games can engage and captivate players by providing the opportunity to live alternative virtual lives.
+* Players can live a virtual existence as someone of a different race, religion, sex or socio-economic status.
+* The limitations and challenges in players' real lives can be erased.
+* Studies show that 20 percent of virtual game players feel like they live in virtual worlds.liv
+
+Games provide significant social interaction easily and enjoyably.
+* Many of today's entertainment games allow players to go beyond shooting and "lone soldiering" to developing relationships with other players.
+* In fact, games nurture social networks similar to those in the physical world.
+* Games also fulfill a need for “third places” – a place that is neither home nor work lv – to meet and interact with others.
+* Games can be more effective social connectors than other media because they provide significant breath and depth of experience, combining the visceral and the social while encouraging exploration and discovery.lvi
+* Games can result in social networking outside of games: serious game players often are part of a game “fan club" or trade tips with other players on websites or in person.
+
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+Addiction
+Games can be additive and nurture dependencies among players.
+* Emotional, social and technical rewards from play sometimes result in an addiction to a particular game.
+* Many MMORPG players spend over 20 hours per week in-game. For some players, participation in MMORPGs becomes an obligation, with MMORPGs representing a "society” with a unique culture and rules. Interactions and obligations online often mirror those in real life, blurring the line between the virtual and real world.lvii
+* Addiction recovery programs have been established to help wean people off of video game dependencies.lviii
+
+Chapter Addendum
+As a result of the research material acquired and reviewed for this report, SAIC is well-positioned to assist the client populate its games database with articles and other literature on:
+- why games represent good influence platforms, including sociology and psychology literature
+- existing and soon-to-be-released games on the market internationally and for specific target audiences
+
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+
+CHAPTER 3
+
+Plausible Scenarios for
+the Use of Games in
+Terrorist Activities
+
+Scene from the United Nations Game Food Force
+
+SAIC
+From Science to Solutions
+
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+
+Chapter Introduction
+
+Games can serve sophisticated purposes beyond entertainment, providing terrorist organizations with a powerful medium analogous to the internet to support its operational objectives. Games have already been exploited by terrorist extremists and sympathizers. Emerging trends within the game space suggest greater opportunities will exist for future exploitation enhancing a range of terrorist operations, from supporting strategic propaganda and influence activities, to more highly instrumental uses such as communication, fundraising and recruitment.lix Such activities warrant concern given the increasing popularity of gaming which seems to be transcending age, gender and cultural boundaries.
+
+Potential Uses of Games for Terrorist Activities
+* Propaganda and Influence - Terrorists and sympathizers use games to twist historical context, demonize enemies, disrupt the social moral compass, and propagate ideology.
+* Communications - Games provide attractive communications channels for terrorist groups and sympathizers because in-game conversations often are difficult to monitor.
+* Recruiting - Online gaming can serve as a recruiting tool. For example, the United States Army found that 28% of players logging on to play its *America's Army* online game also visited the corresponding recruitment site.
+* Simulation, Practice and Team Management - Games can supplement field training by familiarizing recruits with the tactics, weaponry, and skills needed to conduct operations and planning.
+* Money Laundering and Fundraising - Funds used in online games can be uploaded in one location and downloaded in another by using a single avatar to which multiple people have access via ID and password. Alternately, virtual "sweat shops" can be organized to
+
+Several plausible scenarios exist where terrorist organizations could leverage the power of the gaming medium to achieve operational goals with minimal training and expertise. This paper will outline the current capabilities and potential scenarios by game genre demonstrating how a terrorist organization might exploit the game space. The extent to which games can be used by terrorist groups to supplement their other activities depends on a variety of factors, to include:
+* Internet connectivity of game users
+* Cost and availability of hardware and/or software required to play game
+* Level and kind of interaction between players that the game allows
+* Ease of use of game
+* Degree of game skills transferability to real-world activity
+* Degree of realism in game design (such as graphics and programming sophistication)
+* Barriers to game production
+
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+The effectiveness of carrying out terrorist activities through games varies by genre. Each of the scenarios presented offers the most effective use for its respective type of game. The following chart gives an overview of each game genre and its effectiveness for enabling a specific terrorist objective:
+
+Exhibit 3-1: Best Uses of Game Genres in Influence Efforts §
+
+| Genre of Game | Enable Communication | Simulation and Training | Money Laundering/ Fund Raising | Propaganda and Influence | Tool for Recruitment |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| First-person Shooter | | | | | |
+| Educational | | | | | |
+| Simulation | | | | | |
+| Mixed or Alternate Reality | | | | | |
+| MMORPGs or MUVES | | | | | |
+| Strategy Games | | | | | |
+
+Ideal or good use
+Could be used but requires moderate effort and would be only somewhat effective
+Could be used but would not be an effective choice from a cost/benefit standpoint
+
+Note: THE SCENARIOS PRESENTED IN THIS PAPER ARE FICTITIOUS. They represent plausible uses of games for terrorist influence, planning, recruitment and training purposes.
+
+§ A qualitative assessment on the effectiveness of different game genres in enabling terrorist operations was based on information gleaned from research, industry conferences, and gaming experts.
+
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+Possible Terrorist Use of Different Game Genres
+
+First-person Shooter Games
+
+First-person shooter (FPS) games involve the player taking on a first-person character role, giving him a sense of "being there." These games usually pit players against each other or the computer to test their strategies and reflexes in a static, arena-like environment.
+
+- Some of the more popular FPS games include Doom, Half-Life, Counterstrike, Unreal Tournament, Halo, Night of Bush Capturing and Under Ash.
+
+Half-life. Give blood. Generously...
+
+Exhibit 3-2: A view from the FPS game Half-life as the opponent is shot. lx
+
+Producers often sophisticatedly incorporate various weapons in their FPS games. For example, Alliance lxi allows the user to choose an historic or contemporary weapon for use in game play. The game accurately portrays the benefits and drawbacks of the chosen weapon, as well as the correct velocity and trajectory of the ammunition.
+
+First-person Shooter Scenario
+This scenario is fictitious. A Sudanese Islamic extremist group develops a FPS game as a tool to influence audiences, train forces and raise funds. The game portrays local warlords as corrupt. Players must take up arms to help defend their towns.
+
+* The player must choose the correct weapon to fight the enemy and calculate when to reload the weapon, as well as how to move through the town safely and whom to trust. If the player shoots a civilian, the civilian will make a commotion and in moments, the player will be shot - always.
+
+* At the end of the game, when the player has either won or lost a round, a message reads, "Real heroes are those who take action in everyday life. What have you done to support your brothers and sisters today? Search the Net for the truth and
+
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+
+join the cause at www.youcanbeaterrorist.com, or by texting a message to cell phone number (98)22-123-4567 that includes the best way to contact you." The game also offers postal and PayPal addresses if players would like to contribute financially to the cause.
+
+MMORPGs and Virtual Worlds
+
+Massive Multiplayer Online Role Playing Games (MMORPGs) are online computer role-playing games in which a large number of players interact with one another in a virtual world. MMORPGs are distinguished from Role Playing Games** by their "persistence", i.e. the virtual world continues to exist and evolve even when the player is not playing the game.
+
+- Leading titles include EverQuest, Star Wars Galaxies, World of Warcraft, Lineage, Mu, and The Legend of Mir.
+
+Guild In-game ~ Team at Work ix 1
+
+"... A guild is a collection of players who come together to share knowledge, resources, and manpower. To run a large one, a guild master must be adept at many skills: attracting, evaluating, and recruiting new members; creating apprenticeship programs; orchestrating group strategy; and adjudicating disputes. Guilds routinely splinter over petty squabbles and other basic failures of management; the master must resolve them without losing valuable members, who can easily quit and join a rival guild. Never mind the virtual surroundings; these conditions provide real-world training a manager can apply directly in the workplace..."
+
+--Taken from:
+You Play World of Warcraft? You're Hired!
+by John Seeley Brown and Douglas Thomas
+Wired Magazine
+
+While MMORPGs involve undertaking missions that are eventually "won" or "lost," virtual worlds focus on daily activities and social interactions.
+
+- Virtual world environments allow users to communicate and participate in activities simultaneously with other users regardless of the physical distance between them.
+
+- Typically producers establish a virtual world and allow users to develop space and design items within the world.
+
+** RPGs require players to undertake a role and play out a narrative in simulated 'worlds' with pre-programmed characters and quests. Players can customize their characters and then interact with other players to complete goals or quests. RPGs have been produced using both first-person and third-person perspectives. Some popular examples of this genre are Ultima, Final Fantasy, Diablo, and Fallout.
+
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+- Many organizations currently use the virtual world of Second Life to conduct training workshops. A few organizations have used the virtual world to fundraise and build up groups with similar interests.
+
+- Popular examples of virtual worlds include Second Life, Cybertown, Habbo Hotel, There, and Virtual Magic Kingdom.
+
+Exhibit 3-3: Users are able to socialize in the virtual space Second Life. lxii
+
+Virtual World Scenario
+
+This scenario is fictitious. A sophisticated terrorist network joins Second Life. On a password-protected island of the virtual community, they construct replicas of sites that they are interested in attacking, and carry out realistic, virtual dry runs of their attacks.
+
+* They consider expanding their network and developing an on-going virtual terrorist training camp, complete with lessons on the manufacture of bombs, the proper use of artillery, and basic lessons on the most effective places to shoot a person to mortally wound them.
+
+Because virtual worlds can serve as a platform for hard-to-trace communications and private, sometimes password-protected meetings when members are separated by distance, the terrorist network also utilizes the virtual space for cell management and meetings.
+
+* The meetings help ensure that members are accounted for on a regular basis while drawing little attention to the gathering or the members' association.
+
+* Virtual interaction helps team members become familiar and develop trust with their teammates long before they meet face-to-face.
+
+* Working together in games or virtual worlds build teams cohesion which translates into better synergies in real-world situations.
+
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+Frequent interaction with his network helps the leader monitor the level of his team members' commitment to the cause and ensure that they do not waver from the group's tactical and strategic missions. This also helps the leader prevent members from "deflecting" or otherwise becoming a threat to the cell.
+
+Some of the terrorist network members living in a remote location with Internet access raise funds via "gold farming," a virtual form of the "sweat shop." Their laborers play games to develop the best, strongest in-game characters which are then sold online for a profit at sites like E-bay.††
+
+* Because of the games' entertainment value, terrorist network members encourage players to "work" for them or raise funds themselves by simply playing games and then selling items.
+
+Other network associates participate in traditional fundraising. Second Life allows players to contact the organizer of like-groups, perhaps "humanitarian" organizations that support particular causes, and send mass emails to encourage participation in special interest events. Donations are laundered to fund terror activities.
+
+* Terrorist groups are introduced to new sympathizers in this way.
+
+* Other associates hold invitation-only "town meetings" or "group meetings" to impress viewpoints upon potential recruits.
+
+Virtual Worlds and MMORPGs as a Film Set
+Machinima: From Game space to Video
+
+Gaming can serve as a platform for propaganda video production. For example, machinima is filmmaking within the real-time 3D virtual environment of a video game. All that is required is a game and a desktop computer. lxiv The combination of machinima software and a virtual world or video game such as Planet Battlefield, allows one to film their in-game activities as they play to develop a film which is easily distributed over the Internet.
+
+Terrorists could easily exploit this technology. Through the use of virtual characters and audio mash-ups a terrorist could anonymously create machinima films that included speeches, updates, and briefings. He could use the technology of virtual communities to create target sites to convey to cell members the next planned attack, use games to give a visual plan of how the attack should be carried out, and familiarize teammates with the terrain of the intended site with the technology of Second Life. Additionally, one could use machinima to create a likable, militant hero with whom their target audience could identify.
+
+†† During the month of December, SAIC analysts periodically checked e-Bay for characters and items for sale. It was common to see a high-level character with special skills in World of Warcraft or Everquest on sale for approximately US$2,000 with only minutes left in the auctions.
+
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+
+This technology, combined with audio mash-ups, also could be easily used to incorporate the voices of key heads of state, the US President for example, into anti-US propaganda. An original speech could be tampered to craft new, unfavorable messages.
+
+HE IS DOING HIS PART
+planet
+BATTLEFIELD
+ARE YOU DOING YOURS?
+
+Exhibit 3-4: Planet Battlefield; universal resource link located at:
+http://planetbattlefield.gamespy.com/fms/Image.php?image=http://pnmedia.gamespy.com/planetbattlefield.gamespy.com/i
+mages/bf2news/shot7.jpg
+
+Mixed or Alternate Reality Games
+
+Mixed and alternate reality games involve the use of mobile technology, GPS and online communication in a real world environment. Because these games exist in both cyberspace and the real world, the boundaries between virtual and real worlds are blurred.
+
+Alternate Reality Gaming
+
+Alternate Reality Gaming (ARG), sometimes also called Immersive Gaming or Interactive Fiction, is an emerging genre of online gaming and one of the first true art and entertainment forms developed from and exclusively for the Internet. ARGs are played in real-life spaces under fictitious auspices, usually using a cell phone, camera and/or handheld GPS device, and the Internet.
+
+* The Internet serves as a "base" for information on the game, calculating individual or team points, and managing the game.
+* Technically, ARGs are a kind of MMORPG because of the important role of the Internet in the games.
+
+Other than entertainment, ARGs can be produced for education and training, grassroots activism, and promotional campaigning.lxv
+
+* Titles of popular ARGs include *Orbital Colony, Perplex City, Studio Cyphers, Who is Benjamin Stove, The LOST Experience,* and *Ocular Effect*.
+
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+
+Exhibit 3-5: Sopranos Alternate Reality Game
+
+Sopranos Connection
+
+Many alternate or mixed reality games begin as promotional efforts. Some of the most elaborate cost more than $500,000. To promote the premiere of the Sopranos, A&E has developed a mixed reality game played both on the Internet and in the real-world and involving searches for particular advertisements and other "sightings."
+
+Alternate Reality Scenario #1
+This scenario is fictitious. A terrorist cell is planning to bomb the US embassy in Jakarta. Alternate or mixed reality games allow the cell to practice the attack in a realistic environment with unexpected people, noise, and obstacles.
+
+* During the dry run, cell members communicate through the operations coordinator, who has access to the Internet and a telephone.
+* As the members communicate during the dry run in the real world, it looks to other people like they are innocently talking on their cell phones, looking at their palm pilots, or sending text messages to friends. In fact they are calling headquarters with information on security cameras, wiring, security guards, power sources, crowd congregation locations and other data, following maps on their PDAs, and communicating with team members.
+* With location tracking devices, the coordinator could track GPS positions of cell phones or capture team members' movements with other members' cameras and video phones.
+* The cell carries out its mission in the same manner that it had practiced using mixed reality gaming tools.
+
+Alternate Reality Scenario #2
+This scenario is fictitious. A terrorist cell wishes to draw a crowd to a specific location in Seattle, and then distribute a contagious biological agent. A cell develops an alternate reality game and posts it on the alternate reality game network on the Internet.
+
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+
+The game encourages parents to take their children to famous landmarks in Seattle and teach them about Seattle's history and culture. With each landmark visit, they will gain a certain amount of points. Whoever collects 1,000 points will receive free entry to a popular local attraction on a particular day. The cell persuades the Seattle Science Museum to grant free entry to winners in exchange for publicity.
+
+* Parents and children tour the city, collecting points when they take photos of particular landmarks or barcodes pre-posted around town. When they collect 1,000 points, they are sent a text message that says they have won a free day at the Seattle Science Museum on February 15.
+* With a near-guaranteed crowd at the Science Museum, cell members distribute the biological agent on February 15. The "winners" and others there return home and spread the biological agent to families, friends and schools.
+
+Geocaching
+
+Geocaching is another treasure hunt-type game. Using hand-held GPS devices, the players use the information on the Internet to search for the treasure in real-life.
+
+* Many times the caches are not worth a significant amount of money, but it is the sense of adventure and accomplishment that draws people to the game.
+
+Searching for a Cache
+
+Exhibit 3-6: Screen Shots for Searching for a Cache
+
+To participate in geocaching, one needs a place to post geocache locations (typically, the Internet), a hand-held GPS component, and a "treasure." Typically, geocachers sign up for an account on a geocaching site. Once on the site, they can search for geocaches that others have left.
+
+* Similarly, they can hide a cache and post its coordinates for other people to find.
+* Geocaching's popularity has spread across Europe and the United States.
+* Asia and Africa also are home to many participants.
+
+The caches are ranked in terms of difficulty to find, the terrain, and the type of cache. Once a cache is found, the geocacher typically will sign a log book at the site or via the website to inform people that it has been found.
+
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+Geocaching Scenario
+This scenario is fictitious. A terrorist cell leader has cell members build and transport a bomb to a detonation spot -a naval watch station between Los Angeles and San Diego – using geocaching.
+
+1. Cell member #1 buys a component of the bomb near Reno, Nevada. He then stashes his purchase for the next member to find in south-central Nevada.
+2. Cell member #2 knows only the code name of cell member #1. He knows that #1 will be hiding a partially built bomb that requires the component that he has bought. He watches and waits for a posting by #1 of a location within the predetermined 100 miles from his base. When #1 posts, he rushes out to find the cache, takes the developing bomb, adds his component, and takes it to a place within 100 miles of the south-eastern Utah-Nevada border.
+3. Cell member #3 repeats the same process as cell member #2. This process continues until the bomb is completed.
+4. The final cell member takes the bomb to the naval watch station and detonates it as planned. No red flags were raised because the transport and purchase of the bomb components were spread out across four states.
+
+Exhibit 3-7: Geocaching Construction and Transportation Scenario
+
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+
+Simulation Games
+
+Simulation games allow gamers a chance to experience and practice a role, activity or skill in the safety of the virtual world. Popular experiences in these games include flying, racing, sporting, and building.
+
+* There are many kinds of users of simulation games. For example, to train soldiers the United States military uses simulation games including flight simulators, urban warfare simulations, and even communication simulations for deployment in foreign countries.
+* Likewise, terrorist cells could use simulation games for communication, recruitment and team management as well as for dry-runs of missions.
+* Some of the most successful titles include Microsoft Flight Simulator, Gran Turismo, Madden NFL, and SimCity.
+
+Simulation Scenario
+This scenario is fictitious. A terrorist leader wants to stage a biological and chemical attack on several Washington, DC, Metro stations simultaneously. The cell leader would like to simulate all stages of such an attack including the construction, transportation and implementation of the plan. Basic benefits of a simulated attack include:
+
+* Cell members use virtual simulation to monitor times and locations to carry out an attack across multiple stations.
+* Cell members use virtual simulation to case the environment prior to the attack in order to identify and mitigate potential obstacles.
+* The cell leader is able to integrate digital imagery and simulated sounds to acclimate operators in order that they execute the attack more effectively.
+
+Mapping programs such as Google earth can be integrated into online simulation games to reconstruct streets, buildings and other topographical features near potential attack sites.
+
+* The cell leader integrates information provided by the city inspector's office, including actual building codes and utility locations to generate more accurate game construction.
+
+A software program that simulates hospital and laboratory environments is uploaded into the game space. The software is intended for training medical staff and laboratory technicians about safe handling and storage of dangerous chemicals and biological agents. It also trains first responders on containing spills. Cell members use this program to learn safe handling, transport and deployment of the chemical and biological agents they will use.
+
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+Utilizing actual plans for the Metro system provide insight into tunnel and station
+structures. Such plans accurately portray the location and significance of key power
+sources, ventilation ducts, and other infrastructure features critical to an effective
+biological attack.
+* The cell leader utilizes software that scans the structural and architectural plans of
+key structures to create a 3-D virtual metro system. He then places the virtual
+Metro system on a password protected island in a virtual world and shares the
+password with other cell members.
+
+Additional details are entered into the virtual metro station using the same techniques.
+Cell members casing the 'real' metro system identify security checks, including camera
+and video installations and then program their locations.
+* By integrating these systems into the simulated metro system, the cell members
+identify and overcome obstacles through trial and error. Identifying and inputting
+passenger traffic patterns through the Metro system further enables accuracy in
+planning and executing attacks.
+* The breadth of data and sophistication of the software programs allows the cell to
+perform damage assessments against each scenario to help predict which
+conditions would be most effective in delivering a chemical or biological
+infections.
+
+Through their dry runs, experimentation and practice, the simulation, in its entirety,
+determine the optimal operation while maximizing the effectiveness and impact.
+As the scenarios are being planned and practice, the cell leader obtains sensors to monitor
+cell members' biological responses. Further, some games have features that allow
+leaders to monitor player statistics.
+* He hooks the cell members up to these sensors and has them perform various
+tasks related to the simulation and monitors their responses.
+* This helps the cell member determine the roles of the members based on their
+natural responses.
+* It also helps identify training or conditioning that must occur before the mission.
+* The cell member also tracks player performance and time spent in the simulation
+through in-game player performance statistics.
+
+Through the cell's dry runs, the team becomes comfortable with their roles during the
+mission, thereby reducing the margin of error.
+
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+* Each member knows their roles and what their colleagues will be doing
+simultaneously.
+* They practice scenarios that may occur during the mission and determine how to
+act.
+* They are now less susceptible to surprises.
+
+Through research and in-game simulation, it is determined that maximum impact can be
+expected using three bombers in each of four Metro stations -- Metro Center, Gallery
+Place, Union Station, Capitol South, and L'Enfant -- at 8:45 AM on a Tuesday in late-
+March. Each cell member knows their responsibilities and the timing on their
+movements.
+
+Knowledge-Based Games
+Knowledge-based games are a proven success in teaching. Many organizations have
+begun to develop video and other games to teach children about their work or mission.
+* The United Nations, for example, provides Food Force for free via the UN
+website. The game aims to teach children about global hunger and food aid.
+* Likewise, Middle Eastern groups have attempted to influence children via games.
+The Islamic Fun suite contains the game The Resistance which carries the
+following introduction to the game, "You are a farmer in South Lebanon who has
+joined the Islamic Resistance to defend your land and family from the invading
+Zionists."
+* Other popular titles include Where in the World is Carmen Sandiego?, Blue's
+Clues: Blues Big Musical and, one of the first educational video games, Oregon
+Trail.
+
+Knowledge-Based Game Scenario
+This scenario is fictitious. Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade would like to teach children about
+the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The group knows that vivid, interactive games are likely
+to entertain children while providing an effective education platform. They develop a
+game from the Palestinian point-of-view that distorts history by embellishing atrocities
+committed by the Israelis, and minimizing culpability of the Palestinians.
+* In order to win the game, the young player must answer questions correctly to
+save his family and friends.
+* A correct answer, as deemed by the sympathizer, gets the child one step closer to
+Paradise.
+* During each scenario, there are questions about religion, Israeli beliefs and moral
+responsibility [see below].
+
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+In-game Quiz Example:
+The Israeli military on the Palestinian border is positioned there to:
+A. Provide protection for all non-military citizens crossing the border between Israel and
+Palestine regardless of nationality or religion.
+B. Protect all Christian non-military citizens.
+C. Protect all Christians and kill Muslims, including women and children to
+prevent the creation of more Islamic people and to slowly claim land that is not
+theirs.
+
+* When children answer three quiz questions right, they progress to the next moral
+dilemma in the game - they are presented with a scenario out of "history." Based
+on the scenario presented, they must choose the right moral action to continue on
+with their journey towards Paradise [see Interactive Story Example below].
+
+Interactive Story Example:
+Israeli soldiers came to your home last night. You saw the men coming in time to take
+cover behind the house with your three-year-old brother. Your mother, older sister, and
+father where brutally attacked and killed. You and your younger brother survived the
+attack.
+
+Later, your neighbor's brother has come to pay his respects. He is a member of the
+Islamic resistance and offers to help you avenge the murder of your family. He assures
+you that if you choose to join the jihad you will have the opportunity to fight and should
+you sustain any injury, he promises you that your youngest brother will be cared for.
+Time is of the essence, however, and the freedom fighters are expecting your decision
+tonight. What will you do?
+
+Your options are:
+A. Refuse their offer.
+You thank the freedom fighter, but resign yourself to live under Israeli occupation. Your
+father would understand. You are trying to protect yourself and younger brother,
+although you know that the Israeli forces could come again at any time.
+
+B. Not respond to the offer.
+Your family has already been destroyed and you do not want to worsen the situation.
+Beware, however, as your failure to join the Islamic resistance essentially means that you
+are complying with the Zionist occupation.
+
+C. Join the resistance and offer yourself as a suicide bomber.
+You begin training today.
+You volunteer to serve the jihad as a suicide bomber. This is an honorable post. You will
+be rewarded and your family will be protected. You will be a hero in your community.
+
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+When you carry out your mission, you cause the death of the Israeli soldiers who killed
+your mother, sister and father. You are celebrated as a hero throughout the
+neighborhood. Your brother is taken care of and respected for your sacrifice.
+
+Strategy Games
+Strategy games focus on careful planning and resource management in order to
+achieve victory. Many of these games can be likened to traditional tabletop war games,
+occurring in either a turn-based or real-time situation.
+* Real time strategy games (RTS) have become the predominant game in this genre.
+Popular titles in turn-based or real-time strategy games include Starcraft,
+Warcraft, Civilization, Master of Orion, Command & Conquer, and Age of
+Empires.
+
+Traditionally, strategy games have focused on military movements. In today's
+information technology environment however, strategy games teach business
+management and negotiation skills.
+* Terrorists might use strategy games to teach new leaders fundraising techniques,
+mission planning, and how to manipulate cell members into complete missions.
+
+Strategy Game Scenario
+This scenario is fictitious. A terrorist group would like to engage younger players and
+distribute propaganda to a segment of the population that will be important in future Jihad
+efforts. The group would like to also determine if there are any players that fit the profile
+of their recruiters.
+
+The terrorist group develops a game that simulates the duties and camaraderie of their
+Islamic brothers in Jihad. The terrorists build into the game lodging, rank and file roles,
+benefits of those roles and a weapons structure that allows players with higher status to
+have better weapons. The strategy in the game is to not only overcome their enemies (in
+this case a corrupt official police force) but they must also become leaders of their
+brothers to obtain better weapons and benefits within the group. The setting of the game
+begins when a young, strong Iraqi sees neighbor after neighbor murdered by corrupt
+police.
+* The player must build citizen armies to counter the corrupt police forces.
+* The player must train his troops, as well as raise funds.
+* He must avoid the crowd turning against him.
+
+The game is distributed for free to reach the greatest number of people and can be played
+amongst other members by connecting to the Internet. Members of the terrorist group
+
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+which produced the game also play the game and assess other players' strategy skills and
+commitment to the cause. Cell members engage the players in conversation to determine
+information about them and ultimately determine if they would be a good candidate for
+recruitment.
+
+Chapter Addendum
+This paper discusses possible terrorist use of different types of games in training,
+planning, recruiting, communications, fundraising, and propaganda efforts. While all of
+these scenarios are possible in many areas of the world, only some may be possible in
+areas where Internet connectivity, hardware, or other dependencies are limited.
+* A follow-on study might discuss location-specific scenarios in target areas.
+
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+
+CHAPTER 4
+
+Emerging Trends in the
+Gaming Space
+
+Photo from General Motors 3-D Virtual
+Reality Technology Press Release
+
+SAIC
+From Science to Solutions
+
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+
+Chapter Introduction
+
+Emerging trends in the gaming space will have profound effects on the industry,
+fueling its expansion into previously untapped markets and affording terrorist
+organizations greater opportunities to reach and target core audiences.
+
+* Emerging trends in the gaming industry will be used to the advantage of groups
+committed to terrorizing societies to achieve their goals.‡‡ Terrorist
+organizations have already demonstrated the capability to utilize technological
+advances to enhance their operations as demonstrated with their extensive use of
+the Internet lxvi. As emerging trends come to fruition in burgeoning markets, it is
+only a matter of time before terrorist organizations further exploit these trends in
+the gaming space for similar purposes.
+* The multiple uses of an expanded game space will be numerous, and from the
+terrorists' perspective, invaluable lxvii. Terrorist will be able use the enhanced
+game space to conduct a range of operations, from supporting strategic
+propaganda and influence activities, to more highly instrumental uses such as
+communication, fundraising and recruitment.§§
+
+Emerging trends in the gaming industry will continue to drive culture, technology
+and creativity in both mature and previously untapped markets. They are expected to
+serve as a catalyst for the gaming industry's rapid growth across age, gender and
+cultural boundaries.
+
+* Many emerging gaming trends are enabled by the spread of existing
+technologies and the advent of new ones. Three major technological drivers
+propelling the gaming industry into untapped markets will be the diffusion of
+broadband Internet access, the maturation of the mobile platform, and the fruition
+of reliable wireless communication networks such as Third Generation (3G) and
+Fourth Generation (4G) networks. Collectively, these trends will improve access
+and make online gaming in nascent markets a reality.
+* Emerging trends will continue to spur the gaming space ensuring its growth
+continues at near exponential rates.\*\*\* Evidence of trends spurring the gaming
+industry can be seen in the growth of virtual worlds like *Lineage, Everquest,
+World of Warcraft (WOW)* and *Second Life*. Hugely popular, these virtual worlds
+have evolved due to technological advances such as the evolution in Computing
+Processing Units (CPUs) and Graphics Processing Units (GPUs), peak throughput
+
+‡‡ Gabriel Weimann makes this point regarding the Internet but his argument can be extended to the game
+space due to many similarities between the two mediums. For more information, see Weimann, Gabriel.
+"www.terror.net: How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet" United States Institute of Peace, Special
+Report 116.
+\*\*\* Online gaming has been growing at rapid rates in both mature and nascent markets, in particular within
+Virtual Worlds. Evidence can be seen in both the revenue generated by the gaming industry and the sheer
+number of gamers which cross cultural, gender and age boundaries.
+
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+power, the spread of broadband Internet access, and the integration of
+communication technologies. Newer technologies and emerging consumer usage
+patterns are expected to continue to spur growth in the future within the gaming
+sector.
+
+* Changes have occurred at a rapid pace within the gaming space and emerging
+trends indicate more changes are forthcoming lxviii. Many trends will change how
+players interact with games and with each other through games as trends come to
+fruition. As interactive gaming changed how an entire generation saw itself in
+relation to the world in mature markets, it will also likely change how generations
+see themselves in nascent markets.†††
+
+* The overall impact of emerging trends in burgeoning markets is expected to
+mirror the experience of more mature markets, though marked differences will
+exist. Gaming will become a powerful medium, playing an important host to a
+range of ordinary human affairs, particularly in the online space.‡‡‡ Like the
+United States and Asian experience, the line between the virtual and real world
+will blur for some and become non-existent for others lxix. However, noticeable
+differences will emerge, particularly in consumer usage patterns such as gaming
+platforms (i.e. personal computers, consoles, and handheld devices) and access
+methods (i.e. Internet Cafes and wireless networks) due to the limitations
+associated with existing infrastructures and costs of deploying new ones.§§§
+
+††† The impact of interactive gaming has profound effects beyond the game space. Evidence can be seen in
+how gamers learn, problem solve and relate to the real world. For more information on this trend see Will
+Wright's piece "Dream Machines." Wired Magazine, Issue 14.04 April 2006 and the following Cyber-
+Influence Conference Series Proceedings - Perspectives from the Entertainment Industry, SAIC, May 2005;
+Insights from Silicon Valley: Enabling Technologies. SAIC, March 2006; and Insights from Entertainment
+and Gaming: The Convergence of Narrative, Imagery, and Cyber Media, SAIC, September 2006.
+‡‡‡ For an excellent analysis on the range of activities that are occurring in online gaming, particularly
+virtual worlds, see Castronova, Edward. Synthetic Worlds: The Business and Culture of Online Games.
+§§§ Market analysts predict strong growth in new regions on different gaming platforms and access methods
+in new markets due to existing infrastructures. For more information see, "Global Entertainment and Media
+Outlook: 2006-2010. Price Water House Coopers and The 2006 Middle East Telecoms, Mobile and
+Broadband Report.
+
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+
+Emerging Trends
+The following trends are expected to significantly extend the gaming space in
+mature and nascent markets, creating a powerful medium analogous to the internet for
+terrorist organizations to reach and target core audiences.
+* While forthcoming trends in the gaming space have been separated into various
+sections for analysis, there is considerable overlap between them in that one trend
+often enables the other or is dependent on the other to come to fruition.
+Broadband. Diffusion
+The spread of broadband internet access will be a major enabler for online gaming
+and its expansion into previously untapped markets.
+* One of the most reliable historical indicators for the growth of online gaming is
+high speed Internet access.lxx Broadband growth rates in the United States and
+Asia have paralleled similar growth rates in online gaming, making the experience
+in mature gaming markets informative of what can be expected in growing
+markets.
+* European, Middle Eastern, and African (EMEA) markets are expected to see the
+biggest growth in online gaming with the increased penetration of high speed
+Internet access.lxxi Market analysts expect the number of online game participants
+in the EMEA market to more than quadruple from 4 million in 2005 to 18 million
+in 2010 growing at a compound rate of 35.1%.lxxii The projection of broadband
+access is a major reason industry analysts see the EMEA as the fastest growing
+market in the gaming industry increasing by a compound annual rate of 13%
+surpassing US$7.6 billion in 2005 and reaching US$13.9 billion by 2010.lxxiii
+* EMEA markets will mirror the expansion of broadband Internet access and online
+gaming in more mature markets, however, its adoption will have some marked
+differences. Industry analysts expect the growth of high speed Internet to initially
+be more limited to Internet Cafes in the Middle East and Africa as opposed to
+individual households due to the expense associated with deploying fixed-line or
+'wired' infrastructures. Consequently, industry analysts expect broadband
+wireless solutions to play a larger role in driving gaming in these markets,
+particularly with the launch of Third Generation (3G) wireless services.
+
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+Broadband Growth Drives Online Gaming lxxiv
+| | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005p | 2006p | 2007p | 2008p | 2009p | 2010p | CAGR* |
+| :------------------------------ | :----- | :----- | :----- | :------ | :------ | :------ | :------ | :------ | :------ | :------ |
+| Broadband Subscribers - U.S. | 62.0 | 45.1 | 38.3 | 22.2 | 17.6 | 15.2 | 11.5 | 11.3 | 9.9 | 13.10 |
+| Online Video Game Subscribers - U.S. | 77.8 | 75.0 | 50.0 | 38.1 | 32.8 | 24.7 | 20.8 | 16.4 | 14.8 | 21.7 |
+| Broadband Subscribers - Asia | 84.6 | 54.2 | 62.2 | 38.3 | 26.5 | 27.6 | 22.4 | 16.5 | 13.6 | 21.2 |
+| Online Video Game Subscribers - Asia | 133.3 | 71.4 | 66.7 | 50.0 | 33.3 | 25.0 | 32.0 | 24.2 | 19.5 | 26.7 |
+| Broadband Subscribers - EMEA | 105.8 | 75.7 | 113.3 | 31.2 | 26.4 | 20.0 | 16.3 | 12.6 | 10.9 | 17.1 |
+| Online Video Game Subscribers - EMEA | 150.0 | 180.0 | 78.6 | 60.0 | 50.0 | 50.0 | 33.3 | 25.0 | 20.0 | 35.1 |
+\*CAGR = Compound Annual Growth Rate
+
+Exhibit 4-1: Comparison of Broadband and Online Gaming
+Growth Rates in US, Asia and EMEA markets.
+
+The advent of high speed internet access fundamentally transformed gaming into a
+truly networked experience making gaming an online social experience.
+
+* Broadband connectivity makes the stereotype of the lonely gamer spending long
+hours in social isolation no longer tenable. What once was a relatively stand alone
+application on the early personal computers and console gaming platforms is now
+becoming increasingly social with the growth of Local Area Network (LAN)
+games and the expansion of Massively Multiplayer Online Games (MMOG).
+Gaming is now a social experience with users interacting with others in the game
+(i.e. teams, clans, and guilds), online in other cyber mediums (i.e. web sites,
+message boards and social networking sites), and in cybercafés.
+* Evidence is emerging of a budding online gaming culture in Central, Southeast,
+and Southwest Asia powered by broadband Internet access. Many older but
+enduring titles are being played by gamers at numerous Internet cafes.
+*Counterstrike* is played extensively throughout the region with gamers
+participating from Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, United Arab
+Emirates, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Iran, Malaysia and Indonesia.\*\*\*\*
+Also, *Kuma Games* indicated that 20% of its total audience originated in the
+Middle East region with significant amounts of game traffic coming from Egypt
+
+\*\*\*\* Counter-Strike is considered the most popular online first-person shooter (FPS) game in the world with
+the more than 200,000 players playing simultaneously and contributing more than 5.5 billion minutes of
+playing time each month on the official network consisting of more than 100,000 servers. Counter-Strike is
+played extensively throughout Central, Southeast, and Southwest Asia in addition to the core U.S.,
+European and Asian markets.
+
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+and a notable number of players originating from Iran and Iraq during the height
+of media coverage on Middle East networks like Al-Jazeera.††††
+
+Exhibit 4-2: Kuma Wars Game Play Distribution in EMEA Markets
+
+Third Generation (3G) and Beyond
+
+The emergence of reliable broadband wireless technology will make mobile gaming
+a reality in mature and nascent markets in the mid to long term.
+
+* The movement to 3G networks will facilitate the development of 3D mobile games and spur demand due to increased access speeds of up to 2 Megabits per second (Mbps). Ixxv While more mature markets in Europe and parts of Asia have well developed 3G networks, many parts of the world are more limited with 3G just in its infancy or stuck on older 2G networks.‡‡‡‡
+* Similar to the connection between the growth of online games and broadband Internet access, the maturation of wireless gaming will depend on the spread and development of high speed wireless networks. Based on anticipated growth in the wireless sector, EMEA markets are expected to see the biggest growth in wireless gaming. Market analysts project wireless gaming in the EMEA to expand from 792 million in 2005 to 2.7 billion in 2010, representing a compound annual growth rate of 27.9%.lxxvi
+
+†††† Kuma Wars is made by Kuma Games, who develops free, episodic games for their users based on recent real world events. Kuma is easily able to produce immersive, realistic games in little time with the assistance of the Valve's Source game engine, modular software that provides enhancements in several key areas of game production, including character animation, advanced AI and real-world physics.
+‡‡‡‡ For an overview of wireless generations, see CNET Review: Quick Guide to 3G Cell Phone Service. CNET. Available for download at. For more information, also see Mr. Huang's article, "Evolution from 3G to 4G and Beyond (5G)." June 2005. Available for download at http://www.daniweb.com/techtalkforums/post180324.html#post180324
+
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+* More mature markets that have achieved reliable, high speed wireless access represent what the mobile gaming space could look like with the diffusion of more advanced wireless networks. Mobile gaming has flourished in these markets with Japan representing the benchmark of mobile gaming where nearly 90% of its cell phone-owning population plays video games.lxxvii
+
+Wireless Growth Drives Online Gaming
+
+| | 2003 | 2004 | 2005p | 2006p | 2007p | 2008p | 2009p | 2010p | CAGR* |
+| :-------------------------------- | :----: | :----: | :----: | :----: | :----: | :----: | :----: | :----: | :----: |
+| Wireless Telephony Subscribers - U.S. | -3.6 | -33.3 | -23.8 | -14.0 | -24.7 | -15.6 | -21.4 | -9.6 | 7.5 |
+| Wireless game subscribers - U.S. | -36.0 | 14.8 | -38.3 | -30.9 | 4.2 | -18.9 | -26.5 | -17.3 | 37.1 |
+| Wireless Telephony Subscribers - Asia | -46.4 | -6.7 | -25.0 | -33.3 | -25.0 | 28.0 | -24.2 | -19.5 | 12.6 |
+| Wireless game subscribers - Asia | -28.4 | 49.7 | -72.5 | -15.2 | -24.3 | -18.5 | -22.6 | -13.5 | 31.8 |
+| Wireless Telephony Subscribers - EMEA | 20.0 | -56.3 | -23.6 | -16.7 | 0.0 | -33.3 | -25.0 | -20.0 | 4.0 |
+| Wireless game subscribers - EMEA | 100.0 | 155.9 | 79.3 | 67.9 | 43.9 | 32.1 | 25.5 | 21.1 | 37.1 |
+
+\*CAGR = Compound Annual Growth Rate
+
+Exhibit 4-3: Comparison of Wireless Networks and Online Gaming Growth Rates in US, Asia and EMEA markets.
+
+Fourth Generation (4G) wireless networks will enable reliable high speed wireless gaming surpassing many of the current broadband access speeds
+
+* Even though 3G has yet to fully emerge
+in many parts of the world, more
+sophisticated networks are already being
+hypothesized and tested to move beyond
+3G. Testing in Japan on a 4G prototype
+proved data transfer speeds could be
+achieved reaching 100 Megabits per
+second while moving and 1 Gigabyte
+per second while static.lxxviii Such
+speeds would enable a user to download
+a DVD within one minute.
+
+| Technology | Speeds | Features |
+| :--------- | :----- | :------- |
+| 1G | AMPS | n/a | Analog (voice only) |
+| 2G | GSM CDMA iDen | Less than 20Kbps | Voice; SMS; conference calls; caller ID; push to talk |
+| 2.5G | GPRS 1xRTT EDGE | 30 Kbps - 90 Kbps | MMS; images; Web browsing; short audio/video clips, games, applications, and ring tone downloads |
+| 3G | UMTS 1xEV-DO | 144Kbps - 2 Mbps | Full motion video; streaming music; 3D gaming, faster Web browsing |
+| 3.5G | HSDPA 1xEV-DV | 384 Kbps - 14.4 Mbps | On-demand video, videoconferencing |
+| 4G | Standard not set | 100Mbps - 1Gbps | High-quality streaming video, high-quality videoconferencing; Voice-over-IP telephony |
+
+Exhibit 4-4: Wireless Generations: Technology, Speed and Features
+
+* A major inhibitor of deploying 3G networks has been the emergence of too many standards within the industry leading some countries to cooperate on one standard. Japan and China recently signed a memorandum to cooperate on
+
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+developing and rolling out a common
+standard with a goal of deploying a 4G
+network by 2010.lxxix
+
+Wireless gaming will be more predominant than 'wired' gaming in some markets
+where existing cellular infrastructures are more prevalent.
+
+* Wireless networks are faster and cheaper in Europe and Asia where cellular networks are more abundant than fixed line infrastructures, leading many industry experts to project significant growth in the wireless gaming industry. As such many countries will build upon existing cellular networks taking market share from declining fixed-line markets. This trend can already be seen in parts of the Middle East, especially in Saudi Arabia, Oman and Qatar where they are testing 3G services following its successful introduction in Bahrain and Israel.lxxx
+* The emergence of Wi-Fi hot spots are also an important development for gaming. In many parts of the world, cities are deploying Wi-Fi hot spots to increase network connectivity and in some instances gaming companies are partnering with telecommunications firms. For instance, Nintendo recently partnered with BT Openzone to establish hot spots in the UK to enable mobile gaming.lxxxi
+
+The Maturation of the Mobile Platform
+
+Rapid growth of the mobile market in mature and emerging regions will expand the
+reach of the mobile gaming space exponentially.
+
+* Strong growth is expected in the mobile sector with expansion rates ranging from 30% to 35% a year, bringing the industry's value to an estimated worth of US$6 billion by 2010.lxxxii Rapid growth in the mobile industry will continue to be spurred by the explosion of 'data' applications (i.e. text, ring tones, streaming video) to include gaming and the further convergence of these applications, transforming the cellular phone into an integrated mobile platform moving well beyond voice.lxxxiii Such growth will expand both the mobile market and in turn the mobile gaming space.
+* Gaming has already become a major player in the mobile space competing with other popular data applications. Last year marked the first time consumers spent more downloading games than ringtones, a significant milestone considering the popularity of ringtones worldwide.lxxxiv
+* The expansion of the gaming industry in emerging and new regions is also expected to drive the growth of the mobile gaming sector.lxxxv
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+The penetration of next generation game enabled devices with internet access
+capabilities and enhanced graphics will facilitate the growth of wireless gaming.
+
+* The number of game enabled devices is expected to grow rapidly from about 40% of the 2 billion devices available worldwide today to about 97% of all mobile devices sold in 2008. lxxxvi There were 600 million mobile devices sold last year alone compared to 300 million consoles sold in the 25-year history of the videogame industry.lxxxvii
+* The increasing sophistication of new handsets will make for a more enjoyable and immersive gaming experience, thereby expanding wireless gaming. Currently, most mobile games are simple and are similar to games developed for consoles a decade ago because the graphics capabilities of handsets are still relatively limited. However, next generation devices are now being designed and marketed to highlight their gaming features like the Samsung SGH-B450.lxxxviii
+
+Exhibit 4-5:
+Samsung SGH-B450
+
+* In addition to mobile phones, portable gaming consoles like the Nintendo DS (Dual Screen) and Sony PSP will increasingly become an important part of the mobile gaming space.
+
+The expansion of the game space will be driven in a large part by mobile gaming.
+
+* A huge latent demand exists for mobile gaming with only 5% of people who own a phone ever downloading a game and 50% actually ever playing a game.lxxxix Such percentages suggest a huge untapped market segment that is very encouraging to the future of mobile gaming given the number of subscribers and handsets available worldwide.
+* Evidence of the how the game space will be driven by mobile gaming occurred recently when for the first time more games were played on mobile devices than on console games in 2006. xc In terms of revenues, of course, console gaming is far greater, but the importance of this event in mobile gaming cannot be underestimated given that the gaming industry is largely driven by console gaming. More games being played on mobile devices represents a shift in what factors will drive the expansion of the game space in years to come.
+* The significant difference in the mobile gaming market, as oppose to the personal computer and console sectors, is that the 'would be gamer' already owns and carries the platform on which they can play the game. Mobile devices also tend to be more intimate devices to their users, always available and always on. xci AS newer, more advanced technologies are deployed, market analysts expect traditional sectors like the personal computer to lose ground to mobile platforms.xcii
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+The availability and range of mobile gaming content will increase in the coming
+years.
+
+* The industry is now moving away from preloaded games to models where games are required to be downloaded over the Internet from carriers and third party providers. Such a move should enable more third party mobile game providers and distributors to enter the market space, increasing both the availability and range of mobile gaming content. Moreover, it will allow organizations to directly market mobile games to end users.
+* An examination of more mature markets suggests that gaming will move beyond casual gaming leading to further growth in the industry. Japan represents the current benchmark where many users are playing more than just casual games on their mobile devices.xciii An exceptionally large number of games are aimed at what would be considered console and hard core gamers, making the mobile phone in Japan as much a games platform as any console.xciv
+* Some gaming experts suggest that multiplayer games are the next big thing in mobile gaming as they attempt to recreate virtual worlds for mobile devices, while other analysts suggest that the next big breakout game would be a mobile game that leverages the power of mobile networks and devices integrating features like voice and GPS into the game.xcv While industry leaders have different views, all are searching for the mobile game that will drive the mobile platform similar to how the Halo, Madden Football and Zelda franchises drove sales of the Xbox, Play Station 2 and Nintendo gaming consoles respectively.xcvi Such a game would prove invaluable to expanding the mobile gaming market.
+* The skills required for a successful mobile game programmer are not insurmountable and include knowledge of Java and J2ME, BREW, Symbian OS, OpenGL ES, and/or Mophun. While a skilled programmer would currently be required to develop a mobile game using one of the aforementioned programs, the introduction of middleware or game modification software in the coming years should enable a broader group to create compelling content for mobile games.
+
+The Rise of Virtual Worlds
+
+Virtual worlds will provide the greatest opportunities to support terrorist operations,
+particularly in the areas of communication, coordination, recruitment and fundraising
+activities.§§§§ As virtual worlds expand, terrorist opportunities to exploit them will also
+increase.
+
+§§§§ For a more in depth look at the various ways terrorist organizations can exploit the game space see an earlier paper produced in this series "Exploitation and Function of Games: An Interactive Influence Medium." SAIC. September, 2006.
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+* Virtual worlds will become a powerful medium in nascent markets mirroring adoption and consumption patterns in more mature markets. As virtual worlds expand, they will increasingly play an important host to a range of ordinary human affairs in which participants may communicate, coordinate, socialize, train, learn, simulate, experiment, build, proselytize and even barter virtual goods. [^1]
+
+The emergence of virtual worlds has significant consequences because events within the virtual space at times cannot be isolated from the real world, leading some to suggest that the line between the “virtual” and “real” world is blurring, even becoming non-existent. This phenomenon can best be seen in a virtual world's social interactions, experimental learning and value of virtual goods and services.
+
+* Social interactions occurring in virtual worlds are not simulations of human interactions, rather they are human interactions merely extended in a new forum. \*\*\*\*\* Virtual worlds are places people identify with and where real and lasting bonds form, for many becoming an important source of material and emotional well being. Avatars become a representation of ones identify and immersion into the virtual world increases the identity that one feels to the virtual self. This connection with the virtual world invokes many of the same psychological triggers as in the real world [^2]. For instance, reciprocity and liking extensively come into play in relationship formation [^3] and the process of developing ones avatar seems to invoke exactly the same risk and reward structures in the brain that are invoked by personal development in the real world. As virtual worlds become more immersive and expand into newer markets, the number of gamers who identify with and form relationships within these spaces will expand.
+* The expansion of virtual worlds will provide a space for experimental learning to develop knowledge or hone a particular skill set with practical applicability in the real world. For instance, becoming an effective leader of a guild amounts to a "total-immersion" course in leadership – guild leaders are required to be adept at many skills to include "attracting, evaluating and recruiting new members; creating apprenticeship programs; orchestrating group strategy; and adjudicating disputes." [^4] Absent the virtual surroundings, these skills are prerequisites to managing and leading any organization.
+* Virtual goods, services and currencies have real world value exceeding US$100 million globally. Trades occur in games among players, between players and the preset game vendors, and on third party sites like E-Bay, IGE and numerous other sites. Current estimates indicate that a large demand for intangible goods exists within the digital world valued in the range of US$1 - $2 billion making the value of virtual goods quite real. For instance, a World of Warcraft (WOW) gold piece is
+
+\*\*\*\*\* Edward Castronova originally makes this point in regards to communication occurring the virtual space, however, it is appropriate to extend his argument to all forms of social interaction that occur within virtual worlds.
+
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+valued at .46 cents to the US Dollar, meaning a WOW gold piece is traded at higher rates to the US Dollar then real world currencies like the Algerian Dinar, Iraqi Dinar, Egyptian Pound, Syrian Pound, Pakistani Rupee, Indonesian Rupiahs, and Chinese Yuan Renminbi.††††††
+
+| Virtual World * | US Dollars | British Pounds | Euro | Algerian Dinars | Indonesian Rupiahs | Syrian Pounds | Iraqi Dinars | Egyptian Pounds | Pakistani Rupees | Chinese Yuan Renminbi |
+| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :-------- | :-------------- | :----------------- | :------------ | :----------- | :-------------- | :--------------- | :-------------------- |
+| Dark Age of Camelot | 0.71 | 0.362 | 0.546 | 50.802 | 6,416.55 | 37.625 | 937.058 | 4.048 | 43.257 | 5.543 |
+| World of Warcraft (US) | 0.46 | 0.235 | 0.354 | 32.914 | 4,157.20 | 24.377 | 607.108 | 2.622 | 28.0255 | 3.591 |
+| World of Warcraft (EU) | 0.033 | 0.0168 | 0.0254 | 2.361 | 298.23 | 1.749 | 43.553 | 0.188 | 2.0105 | 0.258 |
+| Second Life | 0.014 | 0.00711 | 0.0107 | 0.998 | 126.07 | 0.739 | 18.411 | 0.0795 | 0.8499 | 0.109 |
+| Auto Assault | 0.013 | 0.00663 | 0.0100 | 0.930 | 117.49 | 0.689 | 17.157 | 0.0741 | 0.7920 | 0.101 |
+| Everquest | 0.000237 | 0.000121 | 0.000182 | 0.017 | 2.14 | 0.0126 | 0.313 | 0.00135 | 0.0144 | 0.00185 |
+| Dungeons and Dragons | 0.00015 | 0.0000765 | 0.000115 | 0.0107 | 1.36 | 0.00795 | 0.198 | 0.00086 | 0.00914 | 0.00117 |
+| Everquest II | 0.000148 | 0.0000755 | 0.000114 | 0.0106 | 1.34 | 0.00784 | 0.195 | 0.00084 | 0.00902 | 0.00116 |
+| Final Fantasy XI | 0.0000269 | 0.0000137 | 0.0000207 | 0.00192 | 0.24 | 0.00143 | 0.0355 | 0.000153 | 0.00164 | 0.00021 |
+| Star Wars Galaxies | 0.00000104 | 0.00000053 | 0.0000008 | 0.0000744 | 0.01 | 0.0000551 | 0.00137 | 0.000006 | 0.0000634 | 0.00000812 |
+
+Exhibit 4-6: Exchange Rate between Leading Virtual Currencies and Real World Currencies ‡‡‡‡‡
+
+Virtual worlds are expanding at exponential rates rivaling the growth of email fifteen years ago. Expansion in newer markets will further spur the growth of existing and new virtual worlds.
+
+* Populations in leading virtual worlds such as Lineage II, EverQuest II and World of Warcraft are growing at phenomenal rates with many worlds exceeding 100,000 subscribers and some even one million.ciii Also, the rate at which new virtual worlds are appearing in the game space is an almost exact match to
+
+†††††† Exchange rates for virtual currency are subject to the same supply and demand rules that effect real currencies with some variations such as the game type, the server where the virtual currency resides, and the website or exchange bank a gamer uses to exchange the currencies.
+‡‡‡‡‡ SAIC utilized current rates for virtual currencies from IGE to calculate the exchange rates between virtual currencies and real world currencies were calculated on January, 11, 2007.
+
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+Moore's law with many worlds exceeding 100,000 subscribers and some even one million.civ
+* The diffusion of newer CPUs and GPUs coupled with the expansion of broadband Internet access in emerging markets will fuel continued growth, particularly in virtual worlds. Projections indicate rapid growth in virtual worlds during the coming years with more than 10 million online game players in the U.S. (approximately the size of New York City) and 30 million gamers worldwide (approximately the size of Shanghai, Bombay and Karachi combined).cv The biggest market for virtual worlds remains Asia closely followed by the United States; however, it is only a matter of time before other markets become more active in online gaming.
+* The expansion of virtual worlds and the growth rate of its populations lead some to suggest that virtual worlds may soon become the primary venue for all online activity. [^10] The immersive, persistent and interactive characteristics of virtual worlds would enable communication, socialization, and coordination in more effective ways then other mediums.
+
+The Explosion of User Generated Content
+
+User generated content will emerge as a driving force in the gaming space. It will be enabled by the increased availability of software products and programming features, lowering the barrier of entry for users to alter, modify and create games.
+
+* The growing availability of middleware or modification programs enable individuals to modify content (partial conversion) or create an entirely new game (a total conversion). Popular middleware products include 3D world building packages such as Genesis 3D, Quake, Unreal, and Half-Life; multiplayer adventure games like Aurora Toolkit; and systems for handling massively multiplayer games like BigWorld, Butterfly.net, and Terazona. These middleware products have been used to create successful games like *Counterstrike* (Half-Life) and *America's Army* (Unreal); more dubious games have also been created such as *Ethnic Cleansing* (Genesis 3D), *Under Ash* and *Under Siege* (Genesis 3D) and *Special Force* (Genesis 3D).
+* Third party software products are available and can be purchased for a marginal cost, allowing users to create a fully-customizable and easy to design game. Preloaded design packages allow a user to click and select from a multitude of gaming scenarios to design their own game. Many of these types of packages are simulation packages designed to train users on given subjects. One such package offered by Mosbe enables a user to create a simulation to provide a platform strategy development, experimentation, and rehearsal. The package includes preloaded military, civilian, and environmental settings in Iraq, Syria, and the
+
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+
+Korean Peninsula, as well as hundreds of vehicles (air and ground combat, as well as civilian) and weapons for even more accurate and realistic simulations.§§§§§
+* An emerging trend within content generation is using 3D video game graphics technology to create animated films known as Machinima. Combining aspects of film making, animation and game design, Machinima allows users to create their own film complete with sets, props, special effects, plots and virtual actors at a minimal cost. Software products also allow users to capture game video to produce and edit in game events. One of the more popular political Machinima pieces is *French Democracy*, a depiction of the 2005 French riots from the Muslim perspective.
+* High costs associated with developing games ($20-30 million per major title) have led many smaller publishers on a path to leverage user generated content, harnessing the users' creativity as a resource to 'populate' the virtual space. Opening scripting options allows users to script events ranging from object control, to avatar behavior, to mini-games and other complex programs making imagination the only limitation of what a resident can create in the virtual space. This provides a unique opportunity for organizations to promote given agendas.
+
+§§§§§ For more information on MOSBE, see TSJOnline "A Toolkit for the People"
+
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+
+Second Life Case Study: Content Generation as a Driving Force ******
+
+* Second Life's content creation engine and LSL feature allows residents to create virtually anything, protected by very real intellectual property rights. These tools and subsequent intellectual property protections have spurred the growth of a goods and services industry including entrepreneurs (e.g. real estate moguls), artisans (e.g. architects and fashion designers) and professional services (e.g. notary public), stimulating an economy generating nearly $5 million in trade between residents every month. The Second Life's content creation engine and LSL features also enable residents to be creative and have fun with other residents. One of the more notable examples of unique content is the abductions of residents by aliens whereby abductees receive a T-shirt proclaiming "I was abducted by Aliens."
+* Second Life enjoys 90,000 hours of use per day, with approximately 25% of that time spent creating. That equates to 11 user/years per day, which would require a 4,100-member content development team costing $40 million per year. In a given week, 5,000 distinct residents wrote original scripts (15%), representing 2.5 million lines of source code.
+* Second Life allows residents to promulgate any Uniform Resource Locator (URL) audio or video stream to local communities in Second Life. Second Life also permits users to export XML data from the game to external web sites. Together, this functionality lets users stream "real" events into the virtual world and "virtual" events into the real word.
+
+Advances in Digital Rendering
+
+Advances in digital rendering are forthcoming with improvements in Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) and rendering algorithms that will enable game designers to create more life like images and experiences, further increasing the immersion of users.
+
+* Existing GPUs are extremely powerful in terms of computing power enabling game designers to render life like images in games. Currently, low end GPUs surpass high end CPUs by at least two to five times in a wide variety of computing tasks. GPUs peak throughput power also is growing by a factor of two
+
+***** Second Life (abbreviated to SL) is an Internet-based virtual world which came to international attention via mainstream news media in late 2006 and early 2007. Developed by Linden Lab, a downloadable client program enables users to interact with each other through motional avatars, providing an advanced level of a social network service combined with general aspects of a metaverse. While SL is sometimes referred to as a game, in general it does not have points, scores, winners or losers, levels, an end-strategy, or most of the other characteristics of games. Users, often called "residents", can visit this virtual world almost as if it were a real place. They explore, meet other residents, socialize, participate in individual and group activities, and buy items (virtual property) and services from one another. As they spend more time in the world, they learn new skills and mature socially, learning the culture and manners of a virtual environment. The excerpt on Second Life was extracted from the Insights from Silicon Valley: Enabling Technologies Conference Proceedings.
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+
+or more every year because of the demands of the video game industry meaning
+that hardware will not be a limitation in creating life like images in games.cv11
+
+```
+Performance (Gflops)
+300
+250
+200
+150
+100
+50
+0
+1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
+GPU CPU
+```
+
+* Exhibit 4-7: GPU versus CPU Performance cviii
+
+* Advanced rendering algorithms and techniques enable game designers to create
+realistic 3D images within the game environment without sacrificing GPU
+performance and allow gamers to experience the details of the environment. One
+such method, parallax occlusion mapping, enables graphic game designers to
+simulate the illusion of depth on uneven surfaces without increasing the geometric
+complexity of rendered objects. †††††† Such innovation will allow games to create
+3D virtual environments mimicking real world environments.‡‡‡‡‡‡
+
+Advances in the Science of Haptics
+
+Advances in haptics (the study of touch and the cutaneous senses) are expected to
+grow in the coming years providing sensory feedback and furthering the level of
+immersion in games.
+
+* Haptic devices allow users to experience a sensation of touch and physical
+properties when they interact with virtual materials. They exert force in response
+to a user's action, at the point of action. They enable active 'two-way' interaction
+with virtual objects, where action and perception are brought together. cix Haptic
+devices have been making inroads in gaming for sometime, but recent and future
+
+†††††† For more information on digital rendering techniques, see Practical Parallax Occlusion Mapping with
+Approximate Soft Shadows for Detailed Surface Rendering Natalya Tatarchuk ATI Research. Available for
+download at http://ati.amd.com/developer/techreports/2006/I3D2006/Tatarchuk-POM-SI3D06.pdf
+‡‡‡‡‡‡ Some suggest that the sophistication of current computer graphics is already sufficient to enable
+unconscious immersion in virtual worlds. For more information, see Synthetic Worlds, p87.
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+
+efforts are moving beyond vibrating gaming controllers and into truly immersive
+sensory devices.
+
+* Nintendo has been at the forefront of major hardware manufactures and
+publishers in implementing haptics. Nintendogs is a popular game that elicits
+emotion through its advanced voice and touch recognition software, helping to
+create a strong emotional bond with the virtual pets. Users must talk and touch the
+dog to elicit a response from the virtual pet. Game designer Hideki Konno states,
+"It is one thing to type in a name and it is an entirely different emotional response
+to call and see the puppy turn its head and run over to greet you. cx Nintendogs
+has been an international phenomenon selling more than 4 million units
+worldwide. Also, the Wii, Nintendo's newest gaming console, offers advanced
+interaction though wireless remotes where users must use the remote like they
+would use the item in the game. For instance, tennis requires the user to swing at
+the ball using different swings and techniques. The introduction of the Wii has
+taken interactive gaming to a whole other level of immersion.
+* Future devices employing haptics are not far off with some being marketed in the
+near term. One device by Novint Technologies, expected to debut later this year,
+allows the user to feel weight, shape, texture, dimension, dynamics, 3-D motion,
+and force effects.§§§§§§ Another product lets users interact physically with virtual
+objects. For instance, by using a sensor-equipped glove and a force-reflecting
+exoskeleton, you could literally feel the shape, texture and weight of an onscreen
+3-D object.[] Such devices are used now for virtual modeling, medicine and
+the military, but as costs decrease, haptic interfaces could become more widely
+available in the gaming space increasing immersion tenfold.
+
+Exhibit 4-8: Haptic Devices by Immersion 3D
+
+§§§§§§ For more information on Haptic devices by Novint, see their webpage at http://www.novint.com/
+[] For more information on Haptic devices being developed by Immersion 3D, see their website at
+http://www.immersion.com
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+
+Chapter Addendum
+
+Emerging trends in the gaming space will be used to the advantage of groups
+committed to terrorizing societies to achieve their goals. They will be an enabler of a
+more mature and expanded gaming space, creating a powerful medium analogous to
+the internet for terrorist organizations to reach and target core audiences.
+
+* Emerging trends will drive growth in the gaming space across age, gender and
+cultural boundaries. Spread of existing technologies like broadband Internet
+access and the advent of new technologies like next generation wireless networks
+and mobile devices will mean greater access to individuals residing in burgeoning
+markets.
+* Changes within the gaming space will continue at a rapid pace. While marked
+differences will exist particularly with access methods, newer markets are
+expected to mirror the experience of more mature markets in terms of growth and
+usage patterns. Gaming will become a powerful medium playing an increasingly
+important role in a range of ordinary human affairs, particularly in virtual worlds,
+providing an extension and a virtual component to supplement their operations.
+
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+
+CHAPTER 5
+
+Winning Hearts and
+Minds Virtually
+
+Night of Bush Capturing
+ليلة القبض على بوش
+
+Photo from Global Islamic Media Front's
+Quest for Bush - The Night of Bush Capturing Game
+
+SAIC
+From Science to Solutions
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+
+Focus Areas
+
+This section identifies and discusses three areas for focusing counterterrorism
+efforts in the game space: in-game counterpropaganda, new game development, and
+intelligence collection.
+
+* These three areas are most effectively pursued concurrently and holistically,
+with operations in one area supporting operations in the other two, and with all
+operations feeding into analysis of the counterterrorist threat in the game
+space, as illustrated below.
+
+Compete for Players with
+New Games
+
+Operations
+
+Collecting In-
+Game
+Intelligence
+
+Operations
+
+Analysis
+
+Operations
+
+Counter In-
+Game
+Propaganda
+
+Exhibit 5-1: Holistic Approach to Game Involvement
+
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+
+Countering In-Game Propaganda
+
+Countering extremist propaganda in the game space can be achieved in part by being an active game player. Establishing an in-game presence allows for virtual interfacing, information exchanges, and developing influential relationships with both adversaries and allies. In-game interaction also can help shape real-life attitudes and perceptions.
+
+* Establishing an in-game presence would enable identification of influential players, their guilds and other common interest groups. These relationships can be exploited to facilitate "viral" message spread or in-game dialogue for counterpropaganda purposes.
+* Establishing an in-game presence also would enable identification of important propaganda efforts in the game space. Identification of propaganda allows for working with the game producer to eliminate harmful or misleading information from the game space and/or for developing a counterpropaganda campaign.
+* Establishing an in-game presence would aid the determination of optimal message placement areas cued by where propaganda is surfacing and how it is spreading in-game. For example, in some games there are large bulletin boards or other communication areas that are exploited.
+* In-game assets might form partnerships with "celebrity" avatars or popular game design companies for in-game public service announcements such as "anti-violence" campaigns. Generating in-game public service announcements backed by game producers, NGOs or other public interest groups is a popular phenomenon in some game spaces. For example, the Omidyar Network currently sponsors the Camp Darfur campaign, which is run on the Better World Island in Second Life. The purpose of the campaign is to educate players on the crisis in Sudan.CX1
+
+Exhibit 5-2: Snapshot of Camp Darfur, sponsored by the Omidyar Network, in Second Life.
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+
+Competing for Players with New Games
+
+Another opportunity to focus IC counterterrorism efforts in the game space is new game or modified game development to compete with extremist groups operating in the game space. Working with commercial partners, students, and others in the game space to develop a competitive game and attract the target audience would aid this effort.
+
+* Market research could provide valuable insights into the interests and habits of game players from a particular target audience. Using focus groups throughout the game production cycle also would help to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the story, graphics, and game play.
+* Partnerships with gaming industry leaders and a gaming advisory board might help the IC direct the development of new games with the best chance for success. An advisory board might be comprised of experts from a variety of academic disciplines and commercial industries, including public diplomacy, Silicon Valley, Venture capitalism, NGOs, international relations, game development, and celebrity game players.
+* Student groups also could fuel new game development. Many colleges and universities now host programs that focus on game design and production. Asset-sponsored scholarships and incentives could be used to encourage students to develop appropriately-themed game designs. For example, each year the University of Southern California (USC) sponsors a video game design contest in which students compete for a $25,000 grand prize. Students are asked to develop games that could be used for public diplomacy purposes.
+* Finally, it is important to highlight that modifying games (or "modding") is a popular and cost effective way to produce new games or additional "chapters" to existing games. Many companies allow the codes of their popular titles to surface on the Internet because modding tends to increase a game's shelf life and provides the original game producer time to build a new quality product. An organization can mod a game in-house or encourage a member of the modding community to make mods independently.
+
+Exhibit 5-3: USC promotes diplomacy via new media including games.cxaii
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+
+Collecting In-Game Intelligence
+
+Gaming is an increasingly popular activity among many demographic groups across North America, Europe, the Middle East and parts of Africa.CXIV Monitoring of in-game activities and related game-devoted areas of the Internet such as blogs, chatrooms, and virtual periodicals, provide significant intelligence collection opportunities.
+
+JOYSTICK:
+video game hype and tripe
+
+Exhibit 5-4: Joystick Gaming Blog
+
+For example, game space provides potential opportunities to identify terrorist financial operations by monitoring the flow of money in virtual economies and determining who is involved in the buying and selling of virtual goods and fundraising.
+
+* From virtual real estate to virtual clothing for avatars, the sale of virtual goods is increasing rapidly. Virtual monies hold real-world value and can be cashed-out into hard currency. Game players trade virtual products in exchange for real money via portals such as E-bay and Second Life. Intangible goods in digital worlds are estimated to be worth $1 billion to $2 billion.CXV1
+* Furthermore, players sharing account information may be utilizing game space to transfer funds from one person to another – under the auspices of a single player's account. The ability to upload in-world currency makes this plausible. Studying the activities and profiles of users selling virtual goods might help determine whether or not funds are being funneled by or to terrorists.
+* "Gold farming," or game-supported sweatshops in which workers play games to develop the strongest avatars which can then be sold on websites such as E-bay for large profits, could be used for terrorist fundraising purposes. Where gold farming is taking place and who is benefiting from the sale of avatars or goods also represents a useful area of investigation.
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+
+Exhibit 5-5: A virtual store in Second LifeCxVU
+
+Game-devoted areas of the Internet such as blogs, chatrooms, online periodicals, wikis, and forums can provide unique insights into hot trends for key target audiences of interest to the IC.
+
+* Intelligence collection of this sort would provide such basic information as which new titles are most popular and best suited for message dissemination.
+* Of particular interest would be commentary on games with political messages such as Kuma/Wars.
+
+Chapter Addendum
+
+SAIC's strategic communications division provides unique capabilities to support counterpropaganda, new game development, and intelligence collection in the game space.
+
+1. Tracking terrorist gaming trends using the SAIC Prototype
+ SAIC's automated processing capability of terrorist Web site content provides a unique opportunity to track terrorist online games. Data processing and reporting might address: (1) current popular online games and associated discourse, (2) social networks emerging in these communities, (3) gaming and community sites that are increasing or decreasing in popularity, (4) the emergence of new terrorist gaming sites in cyberspace or current game sites that have been modified, (5) the online spread of terrorist gaming activity, and (6) Web sites that host material about terrorist games.
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+
+2. Organizing a Gaming Advisory Board
+ Through the Cyber-Influence Conference Series, SAIC has expanded the IC's network of gaming experts with varied academic and technical backgrounds. SAIC might help leverage this network to develop a Gaming Advisory Board.
+
+3. Assist in the development of an IOC institutional knowledge gaming database
+ Having conducted extensive research on terrorist gaming efforts, SAIC analysts might help facilitate IOC's development of an institutional knowledge gaming database to support operations and analysis.
+
+4. Organize efforts to construct a game
+ SAIC might also help organize a game construction effort out-of-house. This effort could leverage the network of gaming professionals established via the Cyber-Influence Conference Series as well as SAIC's experience in game development.
+
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+
+INDEX
+
+#
+3-D, 37, 59
+3G, 44, 46, 48, 49, 50
+4G, 44, 48, 49, 50
+5G, 48
+
+A
+AC Nielson, 6
+Active, 17, 20
+Addiction, 24
+Addiction recovery programs, 24
+Africa, 6, 35, 46, 65
+Age of Empires, 41
+Al-Jazeera, 48
+American Cancer Society, 12
+Arabic, 8, 9
+ARG, 33
+Army, 10, 13, 55
+Asia, 12, 35, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 55
+Assault on Iran, 9
+Assault on Iran, Pt. 3, 9
+
+B
+Battlefield, 13
+Battlefield 2, 13
+BigWorld, 13, 55
+Bombay, 6, 55
+Bourdieu, Pierre 16
+BREW, 52
+Broadband, 45, 46, 47
+BT Openzone, 50
+Butterfly.net, 13, 55
+
+C
+Casual, 71
+Chain of Command, 21
+China, 49
+Civilization, 41
+College students, 13
+Combat, 11
+Command & Conquer, 41
+Commander Bahman, 9
+Communication, 27
+Conditioning, 21
+Counter, 47
+Counterstrike, 10, 13, 28, 47, 55
+CPU, 58
+Culture, 45, 71
+cybercafés. See Internet cafes
+Cybertown, 30
+
+D
+Dar al-Fikr, 9
+Darfur, 22
+DARWARS, 11
+Delta Force 2, 21
+Dinar, 54
+Dollar, 54
+Doom, 13, 28
+
+E
+E-Bay, 53
+Education, 71
+Egypt, 47
+EMEA, 46, 47, 48, 49
+Emerging trends, 26, 44, 60
+Entertainment, 45, 71
+Ethnic Cleansing, 13, 21, 22, 55
+Europe, 6, 35, 48, 50, 65
+EverQuest, 29, 54
+EverQuest II, 54
+Exchange rate, 54
+Expansion, 54
+exploit, 52
+
+F
+Falcon 4.0, 21
+Farsi, 8, 9
+film, 31
+Film, 31
+First-person Shooter, 27, 28
+Fishing Bear, 10
+Food Force, 38
+Foreign Ground, 22
+FPS, 9, 13, 28, 47
+Framework, 18, 71
+Fraps, 14
+French, 8, 11, 14, 56
+French Democracy, 14, 56
+Fundraising, 12
+
+G
+Games
+Age of Empires, 41
+Assault on Iran, 9
+Assault on Iran, Pt. 3, 9
+Battlefield, 13
+Battlefield 2, 13
+BigWorld, 13, 55
+Chain of Command, 21
+Butterfly.net, 13, 55
+Chain of Command, 21
+Civilization, 41
+Command & Conquer, 41
+
+FOUO - Not for Public Distribution
+Page 67
+
+Games: A Look at Emerging Trends, Uses, Threats and Opportunities in Influence Activities
+
+(Games Cont'd)
+Commander Bahman, 9
+Counterstrike, 10, 13, 28, 47, 55
+Cybertown, 30
+Delta Force 2, 21
+Doom, 13, 28
+Ethnic Cleansing, 13, 21, 22, 55
+EverQuest, 29, 54
+EverQuest II, 54
+Falcon 4.0, 21
+French Democracy, 14, 56
+Fishing Bear, 10
+Food Force, 38
+Foreign Ground, 22
+Islamic Fun, 10, 38
+Islamic Resistance, 10, 39
+Habbo Hotel, 30
+Half-Life, 12, 13, 28, 55
+Halo, 28, 52
+Legend of Mir, 29
+Lineage, 29, 44, 54
+Lineage II, 54
+Madden Football, 52
+Madden NFL, 36
+Master of Orion, 41
+Microsoft Flight Simulator, 36
+Mu, 29
+Night of Bush Capturing, 28
+Nintendogs, 59
+Ocular Effect, 33
+Operation Flashpoint, 21
+Orbital Colony, 33
+Oregon Trail, 39
+Perplex City, 33
+Second Life, 12, 30, 31, 44, 54, 57, 71
+SimCity, 36
+Studio Cyphers, 33
+Sonic Jihad, 14
+Sopranos, 33
+Special Force, 8, 13, 55
+Star Wars Galaxies, 29, 54
+Starcraft, 41
+Steel Beasts, 21
+Terazona, 13, 55
+The Resistance, 10, 38
+There, 30, 36, 51
+Two Bunny Race, 10
+Zelda, 52
+Virtual Magic Kingdom, 30
+Ummah Defense, 9
+Ummah Defense II, 9
+Under Ash, 9, 13, 28, 55
+Under Siege, 9, 55
+World of Warcraft, 20, 29, 31, 44, 53, 54
+Where in the World is Carmen Sandiego?, 39
+Who is Benjamin Stove, 33
+Game Engine
+Genesis 3D, 12, 13, 55
+Half-Life, 12, 13, 28, 55
+Quake, 12, 13, 55
+Unreal, 12, 13, 28, 55
+
+Genesis 3D, 12, 13, 55
+GPU, 58
+Graphic, 22
+Growth, 47, 49
+Guild, 29
+guilds, 47
+
+H
+Habbo Hotel, 30
+Half-Life, 12, 13, 28, 55
+Halo, 28, 52
+Haptic, 58, 59
+Hezbollah, 8, 71
+Hurricane Katrina, 12
+
+I
+Ideology, 16
+Imagery, 45
+Immersive, 33
+Indonesia, 47
+Industry, 45, 46
+Influence, 8, 27, 45, 52
+Injustice, 9
+Innovative Minds, Inc., 10
+Internet cafes, 6, 7, 8, 47
+Internet connection, 13
+Intifada, 8
+Iran, 9, 47
+Iranian Islamic Students Association, 9
+Iraq, 11, 13, 48, 55
+Islam, 9, 10
+Islamic Fun, 10, 38
+Islamic Resistance, 10, 39
+Israeli, 8, 9, 39, 41
+Israeli occupation, 8, 9, 41
+
+J
+J2ME, 52
+Japan, 49, 52
+Java, 52
+Jew, 21
+Jordan, 47
+
+K
+Karachi, 6, 55
+Kazakhstan, 47
+KKK, 13, 21
+Kuma, 9, 13, 14, 47, 48
+Kuwait, 47
+
+FOUO - Not for Public Distribution
+Page 68
+
+Games: A Look at Emerging Trends, Uses, Threats and Opportunities in Influence Activities
+
+L
+LAN, 7, 47, See Local Area Network
+Latino, 21
+Lebanon, 10, 39
+Legend of Mir, 29
+Lineage, 29, 44, 54
+Lineage II, 54
+Local Area Network, 7, 47
+
+M
+Machinima, 13, 14, 31, 56
+Madden Football, 52
+Madden NFL, 36
+Malaysia, 47
+Market, 45, 46, 48
+Master of Orion, 41
+message, 47
+Microsoft Flight Simulator, 36
+Middle East, 6, 13, 38, 45, 46, 47, 50, 65
+Middleware, 12, 13
+Military, 11, 71
+MMOG, 7, 10, 47
+MMORPG, 24, 33
+Mobile, 45, 49, 50, 51
+Mobile gaming, 49
+Mophun, 52
+Mosbe, 55
+Mu, 29
+Muslim, 9, 56
+
+N
+Narrative, 45
+Network, 47
+Night of Bush Capturing, 28
+New York City, 6, 13, 55
+Nintendo, 50, 51, 52, 59
+Nintendogs, 59
+Novint Technologies, 59
+
+O
+Ocular Effect, 33
+Officer Dan, 14
+Oman, 50
+Ondrejka, Cory 71
+Online gaming, 10, 44
+OpenGL ES, 52
+Operation, 21
+Operation Flashpoint, 21
+Orbital Colony, 33
+Oregon Trail, 39
+
+P
+Pakistan, 47
+Palestinian, 8, 9, 39, 71
+Participation, 10
+Passive, 21
+Pentagon, 11
+Perplex City, 33
+Planet Battlefield, 31, 32
+Platform, 50
+Play Station 2, 52
+Popularity, 6
+Pound, 54
+Production, 12
+Propaganda, 8, 27
+
+Q
+Qatar, 50
+Quake, 12, 13, 55
+Quiz, 39
+
+R
+Radical groups, 9
+Resistance, 13, 21
+Resistance Records, 13, 21
+Revenge, 9
+Role exploration, 20
+Role Playing Games, 29
+Rupee, 54
+
+S
+SAIC, 24, 31, 45, 52, 54
+Saudi Arabia, 47, 50
+Scenario, 28, 30, 33, 34, 35, 36, 39, 41
+Second Life, 12, 30, 31, 44, 54, 57, 71
+SimCity, 36
+Simulation, 11, 27, 36
+Singapore School of Combat Engineers, 21
+Skinhead, 13, 21
+Social, 53
+Social interaction, 53
+Sonic Jihad, 14
+Sopranos, 33
+Special Force, 8, 13, 55
+Star Wars Galaxies, 29, 54
+Starcraft, 41
+Steel Beasts, 21
+Story, 19, 39
+Strategy, 27, 41
+Studio Cyphers, 33
+Symbian OS, 52
+Syria, 55
+
+FOUO - Not for Public Distribution
+Page 69
+
+Games: A Look at Emerging Trends, Uses, Threats and Opportunities in Influence Activities
+
+T
+Technology, 21
+Terazona, 13, 55
+Terrorism, 44
+Terrorist, 8, 13, 28, 31, 44
+The Resistance, 10, 38
+There, 30, 36, 51
+Tool, 20, 27
+Turkmenistan, 47
+Two Bunny Race, 10
+
+U
+UK, 50
+Ummah Defense, 9
+Ummah Defense II, 9
+Under Ash, 9, 13, 28, 55
+Under Siege, 9, 55
+United Arab Emirates, 47
+United States, 12, 35, 36, 44, 45, 46, 55
+United States Institute of Peace, 44
+Unreal, 12, 13, 28, 55
+US, 10, 11, 13, 31, 32, 33, 46, 47, 49, 50, 53, 54
+USC, 71
+Uzbekistan, 47
+
+V
+Virtual Magic Kingdom, 30
+Virtual world, 29, 52, 53, 54
+VoIP, 10
+
+W
+Warcraft, 41
+Weimann, 44
+Where in the World is Carmen Sandiego?, 39
+Who is Benjamin Stove, 33
+Wi-Fi, 50
+Wii, 59
+Wireless, 49, 50
+World of Warcraft, 20, 29, 31, 44, 53, 54
+Wright, 45
+
+Y
+Yankee Group, 21
+Yuan, 54
+
+Z
+Zelda, 52
+
+FOUO - Not for Public Distribution
+Page 70
+
+Games: A Look at Emerging Trends, Uses, Threats and Opportunities in Influence Activities
+
+REFERENCES
+1. Castronova, E. (2006). *Synthetic Worlds: The Business and Culture of Online Games*. University
+ Of Chicago Press. See also International Game Developers Association (IGDA) Casual
+ Games White Paper 2005. *Wired, The Wrinkled Future of Online Gaming Synthetic*
+ worlds.
+ See also:
+ DeBenedictis, S., Robbins, B., Dunin, E., Estanislao, J., James, D., Valadares, J., et al. (2005,
+ July 31). *2005 White Paper on Casual Games*. International Game Developers Association.
+ Retrieved August 24, 2006, from
+ http://www.igda.org/casual/IGDA_CasualGames_Whitepaper_2005.pdf
+ Kushner, D. (2004, June). The Wrinkled Future of Online Gaming. *Wired Magazine*, (12.06),
+ gaming. Retrieved August 31, 2006, from Wired Magazine Web site:
+ http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/12.06/gaming.html?pg=2
+2. Ondrejka, C. (2006, February). Linden Labs: Second Life. In *Cyber-InfluenceConference*.
+ Symposium conducted at San Francisco, Ritz Carlton. Abstract obtained from Conference
+ Notes
+3. Ondrejka, C. (2006, February). Linden Labs: Second Life. In *Cyber-InfluenceConference*.
+ Symposium conducted at San Francisco, Ritz Carlton. Abstract obtained from Conference
+ Notes
+4. PriceWaterhouseCoopers. (2006, September). Global Entertainment and Media Outlook: 2006-
+ 2010. Abstract retrieved October 13, 2006, from PriceWaterhouseCoopers Web site:
+ http://www.pwcglobal.com/extweb/pwcpublications.nsf/docid/5AC172F2C9DED8F58525
+ 70210044EEA7?opendocument&vendor=none
+5. PriceWaterhouseCoopers. (2006, September). Global Entertainment and Media Outlook: 2006-
+ 2010. Abstract retrieved October 13, 2006, from PriceWaterhouseCoopers Web site:
+ http://www.pwcglobal.com/extweb/pwcpublications.nsf/docid/5AC172F2C9DED8F58525
+ 70210044EEA7?opendocument&vendor=none
+6. Bonk, C. J., & Dennen, V. P. (2005, March). *Massive Multiplayer Online Gaming: A Research*
+ *Framework for Military Training and Education*. Advanced Distributed Learning (ADL)
+ Initiative. A Technical Report for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel
+ and Readiness) Readiness and Training Directorate.
+7. Lindstrom, M. (2006, February 21). Playing the Brand Game. Retrieved August 20, 2006, from
+ Marketing Digest Web site: http://www.ameinfo.com/78477.html
+8. Yee, N. (2006, June). The Demographics, Motivations, and Derived Experiences of Users of
+ Massively Multi-User Online Graphical Environments. *Presence: Teleoperators and*
+ *Virtual Environments*, 15(3), 309-329.
+9. Jayakanthan, R. (2002). Application of computer games in the field of education. *The*
+ *Electronic Library*, 20(2), 98-102.
+10. IOC-USC/ICT. (2005, September). *Dark Use of Gaming*. Findings presented at Think Tank
+ Panel.
+11. Tawil, H. (2005). From Real to Virtual Conflict: Palestinian Kids and Online Games. Abstract
+ retrieved August 15, 2006, from AOIR database: http://www.conference.aoir.org
+12. Soussi, A. (2003, March 9). War Games Becoming All Too Real. *Sunday Herald*. Retrieved
+ October 13, 2006, from http://www.sundayherald.com/31960
+13. World Net Daily. (2003, March 3). Trouble in the Holy Land: Hezbollah's New Computer
+ Game. WorldNetDaily.com. Retrieved October 13, 2006, from
+ http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=31323
+14. (FBIS | GMP20060920736002 | 20061309 | (u) | CIRAS ID:)
+
+FOUO - Not for Public Distribution
+Page 71
+Games: A Look at Emerging Trends, Uses, Threats and Opportunities in Influence Activities
+xivBaertlein, L. (2006, June 9). US Video Game Company Seeks Dialogue with Iran. Reuters.
+Retrieved September 10, 2006, from Yahoo! News - UK Web site:
+http://uk.news.yahoo.com/09062006/80-91/u-s-video-game-company-seeks-dialogue-
+iran.html
+xv Brachman, J. M. (2006, Summer). High-Tech Terror: Al-Qaeda's Use of New Technology. The
+Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 30(2). Retrieved August 12, 2006, from
+http://fletcher.tufts.edu/forum/30-2pdfs/brachman.pdf
+xvi Rolston, D. (2006, August 16). Combining Imagery, Narrative, Camaraderie, and Action to
+Create Persuasive Virtual Worlds. In SAIC (Chair), Cyber Influence Conference Series 2.0:
+Insights from Entertainment and Gaming: The Convergence of Narrative, Imagery and
+Cyber Media. Symposium conducted at Los Angeles, California. Abstract obtained from
+Cyber-Influence Conference Series 2.0 Proceedings, 2006.
+Dille, F., & Bilson, D. (2005, May 7). Persistent Influence of Gaming. In Cyber-Influence
+Conference Series: Perspectives and Insights from Entertainment Industry. Symposium
+conducted at Los Angles, California. Abstract obtained from Conference Proceedings,
+2005.
+xvii Brachman, J. M. (2006, Summer). High-Tech Terror: Al-Qaeda's Use of New Technology.
+The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 30(2). Retrieved August 12, 2006, from
+http://fletcher.tufts.edu/forum/30-2pdfs/brachman.pdf
+xviii Innovative Minds. (n.d.). The Resistance. In Islamnic Fun CD-ROM. Retrieved August 15,
+2006, from Innovative Minds Web site: http://www.inminds.co.uk/islamic-fun.html
+xix Bray, H. (2004, December 8). War 2.0: Cambridge firm designs combat simulator to help
+soldiers bound for Iraq. Boston Globe. Retrieved August 25, 2006, from Boston Globe Web
+site: http://www.boston.com/business/technology/articles/2004/12/08/war_games_20/
+xxDOD Game Community. (2005). Army. In Department of Defense Game
+Developer's Community. Retrieved October 13, 2006, from Department of Defense Game
+Developer's Community Web site:
+http://www.dodgamecommunity.com/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=index
+&catid=&topic=1&allstories=1
+xxi Castronova, E. (2005, May). Real Products in Imaginary Worlds. Harvard Business Review,
+May 2005, 20-22. Retrieved October 11, 2006, from Thomas Gale database.
+xxii Ondrejka, C. (2006, February). Linden Labs: Second Life. In Cyber-Influence Conference.
+Symposium conducted at San Francisco, Ritz Carlton. Abstract obtained from Cyber-
+Influence Conference Series 2.0 Proceedings, 2006.
+xxiii Rolston, D. (2006, August 16). Combining Imagery, Narrative, Camaraderie, and Action to
+Create Persuasive Virtual Worlds. In SAIC (Chair), Cyber Influence Conference Series 2.0:
+Insights from Entertainment and Gaming: The Convergence of Narrative, Imagery and
+Cyber Media. Symposium conducted at Los Angeles, California. Abstract obtained from
+Cyber-Influence Conference Series 2.0 Proceedings, 2006.
+xxiv Rolston, D. (2006, August 16). Combining Imagery, Narrative, Camaraderie, and Action to
+Create Persuasive Virtual Worlds. In SAIC (Chair), Cyber Influence Conference Series 2.0:
+Insights from Entertainment and Gaming: The Convergence of Narrative, Imagery and
+Cyber Media. Symposium conducted at Los Angeles, California. Abstract obtained from
+Cyber-Influence Conference Series 2.0 Proceedings, 2006.
+xxv Morgan, D. (2006, May 5). Islamists Using US Video Games in Youth Appeal. Reuters.
+Retrieved August 7, 2006, from Yahoo! News - Singapore Web site:
+http://sg.news.yahoo.com/060504/3/40kje.html
+xxvi Henry, D. (2006, March 22). Kuma Reality Games Developing on Source. Blender Magazine.
+Retrieved August 26, 2006, from Kuma Reality Games website:
+http://www.kumawar.com/PressReleases/03-22-2006.php
+
+FOUO - Not for Public Distribution
+Page 72
+Games: A Look at Emerging Trends, Uses, Threats and Opportunities in Influence Activities
+xxvii Halper, K. (2006, August 16). Television for a Generation Raised on Interactive Games. In
+SAIC (Chair), Cyber Influence Conference Series 2.0: Insights from Entertainment and
+Gaming: The Convergence of Narrative, Imagery and Cyber Media. Symposium conducted
+at Los Angeles, California.
+xxviii Pardew, L. (2006, April 19). Intersection of Gaming and Religion. In SAIC (Chair), Cyber-
+Influence Conference Series 2.0. Symposium conducted at SAIC, McLean, Virginia.
+Abstract obtained from Insights from Social and Religious Experts: Impacting Attitudes,
+Beliefs and Perceptions, 2006. Manufacturers of Christian games in the US have used such
+religiously motivated volunteer work to reduce costs.
+xxix "Sonic Jihad" (Producer/Director/Writer). (2006). Sonic Jihad [Motion picture].
+Retrieved October 15, 2006, from Machinima.com Web site:
+http://www.machinima.com/films.php?id=2346
+xxx Fraps Realtime video capture software. (2006). Retrieved October 26, 2006, from Fraps.com
+Web site: http://www.fraps.com/
+xxxi Betrus, D. A. (2006, October 31). A Universal Game Theory: Implications for Improving
+Game-free and Game-based Instruction. Speech presented at Serious Games Summit,
+Crystal City Marriott, Arlington, Virginia.
+xxxii Garite, M. (2003). The ideology of interactivity (or, video games and the Taylorization of
+leisure) (Digital Games Research Association Conference paper). Retrieved August 10,
+2006: http://www.digra.org/dl/db/05150.15436.pdf
+xxxiii See Steinkuehler, C. (2006, October 31). World of YourCraft: Learning& Collaboration in
+Massively Multiplayer Online Games. Lecture presented at Serious Games Summit, Crystal
+City Marriott, Arlington, Virginia.
+xxxiv Kaira, P. (1995). The Learning Framework [Data file]. Retrieved August 16, 2006, from
+Institute for Learning and Knowledge Architecture Web site:
+http://www.mithya.com/learning/index.html
+xxxv Betrus, D. A. (2006, October 31). A Universal Game Theory: Implications for Improving
+Game-free and Game-based Instruction. Speech presented at Serious Games Summit,
+Crystal City Marriott, Arlington, Virginia.
+xxxvi Betrus, D. A. (2006, October 31). A Universal Game Theory: Implications for Improving
+Game-free and Game-based Instruction. Speech presented at Serious Games Summit,
+Crystal City Marriott, Arlington, Virginia.
+xxxvii Betrus, D. A. (2006, October 31). A Universal Game Theory: Implications for Improving
+Game-free and Game-based Instruction. Speech presented at Serious Games Summit,
+Crystal City Marriott, Arlington, Virginia.
+xxxviii Ondrejka, C. (2006). Finding new common ground in new worlds. Games and Culture 1(1),
+111-115.
+xxxix See Leonard, D. J. (2006). Not a hater, just keepin' it real: The importance of race- and
+gender-based game studies. Games And Culture, 1(1), 83-88. Retrieved August 1, 2006,
+from Communication Studies: A SAGE Full-Text Collection database.
+xl Steinkuehler, C. (2006, October 31). World of YourCraft: Learning& Collaboration in
+Massively Multiplayer Online Games. Lecture presented at Serious Games Summit, Crystal
+City Marriott, Arlington, Virginia.
+xli See Garite, M. (2003). The ideology of interactivity (or, video games and the Taylorization of
+leisure) (Digital Games Research Association Conference paper). Retrieved August 10,
+2006: http://www.digra.org/dl/db/05150.15436.pdf
+xlii Gupta, S. (2006, September 20). Study: Gamers Remember Ads, Brand Names. Online Media
+Daily. Retrieved September 20, 2006, from Media Post Publications Web site:
+http://publications.mediapost.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=Articles.showArticle&art_aid=48
+400
+
+FOUO - Not for Public Distribution
+Page 73
+Games: A Look at Emerging Trends, Uses, Threats and Opportunities in Influence Activities
+xliii Joshi, P. (2006, October 27). Game On! Business Standard, p. 11. Retrieved October 27, 2006,
+from Factiva database: http://global.factiva.com.ezproxy.apollolibrary.com/ha/default.aspx
+xliv Grose, T. K. (2006, May 29). On-line Ad-Ventures. Time International - Atlantic Edition,
+167(22), 38. Retrieved August 21, 2006, from Factiva database:
+http://global.factiva.com.ezproxy.apollolibrary.com/ha/default.aspx
+xlv Joshi, P. (2006, October 27). Game On! Business Standard, p. 11. Retrieved October 27, 2006,
+from Factiva database: http://global.factiva.com.ezproxy.apollolibrary.com/ha/default.aspx
+xlvi Fong, G. (2006, December). Adapting COTS Games for Military Experimentation. Simulation
+and Gaming, 37(4), 452-465. Retrieved November 21, 2006, from Defence Science and
+Technology Agency, Singapore Web site:
+http://ft.csa.com.ezproxy.apollolibrary.com/ids70/resolver.php?sessid=7587ba5eadc4797c9
+c193ed844e1d196&server=www-
+md3.csa.com&check=002ee3357836dc78f465cf554c3ada94&db=sageman-set-
+c&an=10.1177%2F1046878106291670&mode=pdf&f1=1046-
+8781%2C37%2C4%2C452%2C2006
+xlvii Anti-Defamation League (2002). Racist Groups Using Computer Gaming to Promote
+Violence Against Blacks, Latinos and Jews.
+xlviii See Yee, N. (2006). The labor of fun: How video games blur the boundaries of work and
+play. Games And Culture, 1(1), 68-71. Retrieved August 1, 2006, from Communication
+Studies: A SAGE Full-Text Collection database.
+xlix Freeman, D. (2003). Creating Emotion in Games: The Craft and Art of Emotioneering
+(chapter 1). New Rider Publications. (Original work published 2003)
+l Rolls, E. T. (2000). Memory Systems in the Brain. Annual Review of Psychology, (51), 599-630.
+Retrieved October 21, 2006, from Department of Experimental Psychology, University of
+Oxford Web site: http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdf?vid=6&hid=103&sid=38f0dd1a-
+97ab-4310-b42c-ee9e0c6fc79b%40sessionmgr109
+li Statistic.com (2006). War, Peace and Video Games: Part 3. Retrieved November 29, 2006,
+from: http://statastic.com/category/video-games/.
+lii Anti-Defamation League (2002). Racist Groups Using Computer Gaming to Promote Violence
+Against Blacks, Latinos and Jews.
+liii Statistic.com (2006). War, Peace and Video Games: Part 3. Retrieved November 29, 2006,
+from: http://statastic.com/category/video-games/.
+liv Ondrejka, Cory. (2006, February). SAIC CyberInfluence Conference Series 2.0: Insights from
+Silicon Valley.
+lv Williams, D. (2006). Why game studies now? Gamers don't bowl alone. Games and Culture
+1(1), 13-16.
+lvi Ondrejka, C. (2006). Finding new common ground in new worlds. Games and Culture 1(1),
+111-115.
+lvii Yee, N. (2006). The labor of fun: How video games blur the boundaries of work and play.
+Games And Culture, 1 (1), 68-71.
+lviii Andersen, J. (2005, September 12). Spot On: Korea Reacts to Increase in Game Addiction.
+GameSpot.com. Retrieved August 20, 2006, from GameSpot Web
+site: http://www.gamespot.com/news/2005/09/12/news_6132357.html
+Reid, D. (2006, July 21). Addiction Clinic Opens for Gamers; and BBC Click. Retrieved August
+20, 2006, from BBC News.com Web site:
+http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/click_online/5202212.stm
+lix For a more in depth look at the various ways terrorist organizations can exploit the game space
+see an earlier paper produced in this series "Exploitation and Function of Games: An
+Interactive Influence Medium." SAIC. September, 2006.
+lx http://www.ariadne.ac.uk/issue23/convergence/halflife.jpg
+
+FOUO - Not for Public Distribution
+Page 74
+Games: A Look at Emerging Trends, Uses, Threats and Opportunities in Influence Activities
+lxi Kramer, S. E. (2006, November). Life-Fire Exercise. Wired, 126-127.
+lxii Seeley Brown, J., & Thomas, D. (2006, April). You Play World of Warcraft? You're Hired!
+Wired Magazine, (14.04). Retrieved December 17, 2006, from USC's Annenberg School
+for Communications Web site: http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/14.04/learn.html
+lxiii http://www.msu.edu/~bonddenn/screenshots/secondlife.jpg
+lxiv For a machinima example that uses military characters and explains machinima, see
+Machinima! With Officer Dan at http://www.machinima.com/films.php?id=4676
+lxv Phillips, A., Thompson, B., Alexander, B., Dena, C., & Barlow, N. (2006). 2006 Alternate
+Reality Games White Paper - IDGA ARG SIG. International Game Developers Association.
+Retrieved December 1, 2006, from International Game Developers Association database:
+http://www.idga.org
+lxvi Weimann, G. (2004, March). www.terrror.net: How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet
+(Special Report No. 116). Washington, DC, United States: United States Institute of Peace.
+Retrieved December 18, 2007, from http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr116.pdf
+lxvii SAIC. (2006, September). Exploitation and Function of Games: An Interactive Influence
+Medium (Report No. 1). Vienna, VA, United States: SAIC.
+lxviii Dille, F., & Bilson, D. (2005, May 7). Persistent Influence of Gaming. In Cyber-Influence
+Conference Series: Perspectives and Insights from Entertainment Industry. Symposium
+conducted at Los Angles, California. Abstract obtained from Conference Proceedings,
+2005.
+Rolston, D. (2006, August 16). Combining Imagery, Narrative, Camaraderie, and Action to
+Create Persuasive Virtual Worlds. In SAIC (Chair), Cyber Influence Conference Series 2.0:
+Insights from Entertainment and Gaming: The Convergence of Narrative, Imagery and
+Cyber Media. Symposium conducted at Los Angeles, California. Abstract obtained from
+Cyber-Influence Conference Series 2.0 Proceedings, 2006.
+Ondrejka, C. (2006, February). Linden Labs: Second Life. Presentation at SAIC's Cyber-
+Influence Conference Series 2.0 - Insights from Silicon Valley: Enabling Technologies, San
+Francisco, California, United States.
+lxixCastronova, E. (2006). Synthetic Worlds: The Business and Culture of Online Games.
+University Of Chicago Press. See also International Game Developers Association (IGDA)
+Casual Games White Paper 2005. Wired, The Wrinkled Future of Online Gaming Synthetic
+worlds.
+lxx Castronova, E. (2006). Synthetic Worlds: The Business and Culture of Online Games (p. 66).
+Chicago, Illinois, United States: University of Chicago Press. (Original work published
+2006)
+lxxi PriceWaterhouseCoopers. (2006). Video Games. In Global Entertainment and Media Outlook
+2006-2010 (p. 377). PriceWaterhouseCoopers.
+lxxii PriceWaterhouseCoopers. (2006). Video Games. In Global Entertainment and Media Outlook
+2006-2010 (p. 382). PriceWaterhouseCoopers.
+lxxiii PriceWaterhouseCoopers. (2006). Video Games. In Global Entertainment and Media Outlook
+2006-2010 (p. 370). PriceWaterhouseCoopers.
+lxxiv PriceWaterhouseCoopers. (2006). Video Games. In Global Entertainment and Media Outlook
+2006-2010 (p. 382). PriceWaterhouseCoopers.
+lxxv PriceWaterhouseCoopers. (2006). Video Games. In Global Entertainment and Media Outlook
+2006-2010. PriceWaterhouseCoopers
+lxxvi PriceWaterhouseCoopers. (2006). Video Games. In Global Entertainment and Media Outlook
+2006-2010 (p. 383). PriceWaterhouseCoopers.
+lxxvii Mace, M. (2006, December 27). Mobile Gaming in Japan: A Different World. In Mobile
+Opportunity: At the Intersection of Web, Wireless, Entertainment and Computing.
+Retrieved January 25, 2007, from Mobile Opportunity Web site:
+
+FOUO - Not for Public Distribution
+Page 75
+Games: A Look at Emerging Trends, Uses, Threats and Opportunities in Influence Activities
+http://mobileopportunity.blogspot.com/2006/12/mobile-gaming-in-japan-different-
+world.html
+lxxviii Knight, W. (2005, September 2). 4G Prototypes Reach Blistering Speeds. New Scientist.
+Retrieved January 24, 2007, from NewScientist.com Web site:
+http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn7943
+lxxix Knight, W. (2005, September 2). 4G Prototypes Reach Blistering Speeds. New Scientist.
+Retrieved January 24, 2007, from NewScientist.com Web site:
+http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn7943
+lxxx BuddeComm. (2006, July). 2006 Middle East - Telecoms, Mobile and Broadband Abstract
+retrieved December 19, 2006, from The-InfoShop.com Web site:http://www.the-
+infoshop.com/study/pa42315-telecom-mobile.html
+lxxxi OpenZone. (2005, November 4). The Cloud and BT Openzone Partner for Launch of
+Nintendo Wi-Fi Connection in the UK. In OpenZone. Retrieved January 25,2007, from BT
+OpenZone/The Cloud Web site: http://www.btopenzone.com/news/news_2005_11_04.jsp
+lxxxii Gibson, E. (2006, December 12). Part 1 - I-play CEO David Gosen MobileIndustry.biz.
+Retrieved January 25, 2007, from
+http://www.mobileindustry.biz/article.php?article_id=2058
+Gibson, E. (2006, December 20). Part 2 - I-play CEO David Gosen MobileIndustry.biz. Retrieved
+January 25, 2007, from http://www.mobileindustry.biz/article.php?article_id=2076
+lxxxiii SAIC Abstract and Conference Summary (2006, February) Presentation at SAIC's Cyber-
+Influence Conference Series 2.0 - Insights from Silicon Valley: Enabling Technologies, San
+Francisco, California, United States.
+lxxxiv PriceWaterhouseCoopers. (2006). Video Games. In Global Entertainment and Media
+Outlook 2006-2010 (p. 376). PriceWaterhouseCoopers.
+lxxxv PriceWaterhouseCoopers. (2006). Video Games. In Global Entertainment and Media
+Outlook 2006-2010 (p. 376). PriceWaterhouseCoopers.
+lxxxvi Gibson, E. (2006, December 12). Part 1 - I-play CEO David Gosen MobileIndustry.biz.
+Retrieved January 25, 2007, from
+http://www.mobileindustry.biz/article.php?article_id=2058
+Gibson, E. (2006, December 20). Part 2 - I-play CEO David Gosen MobileIndustry.biz. Retrieved
+January 25, 2007, from http://www.mobileindustry.biz/article.php?article_id=2076
+lxxxvii Gibson, E. (2006, December 12). Part 1 - I-play CEO David Gosen MobileIndustry.biz.
+Retrieved January 25, 2007, from
+http://www.mobileindustry.biz/article.php?article_id=2058
+Gibson, E. (2006, December 20). Part 2 - I-play CEO David Gosen MobileIndustry.biz. Retrieved
+January 25, 2007, from http://www.mobileindustry.biz/article.php?article_id=2076
+lxxxviii Reg, H. (2006, July 21). Samsung Demos two-way Folder Phone for Games. The Register.
+Retrieved January 25, 2007, from
+http://www.reghardware.co.uk/2006/07/21/samsung_unveils_full_folder_phone/
+lxxxix Gibson, E. (2006, December 12). Part 1 - I-play CEO David Gosen MobileIndustry.biz.
+Retrieved January 25, 2007, from
+http://www.mobileindustry.biz/article.php?article_id=2058
+Gibson, E. (2006, December 20). Part 2 - I-play CEO David Gosen MobileIndustry.biz. Retrieved
+xc January 25, 2007, from http://www.mobileindustry.biz/article.php?article_id=2076
+Gibson, E. (2006, December 12). Part 1 - I-play CEO David Gosen MobileIndustry.biz.
+Retrieved January 25, 2007, from
+http://www.mobileindustry.biz/article.php?article_id=2058
+Gibson, E. (2006, December 20). Part 2 - I-play CEO David Gosen MobileIndustry.biz. Retrieved
+January 25, 2007, from http://www.mobileindustry.biz/article.php?article_id=2076
+
+FOUO - Not for Public Distribution
+Page 76
+Games: A Look at Emerging Trends, Uses, Threats and Opportunities in Influence Activities
+xci Rolston, D. (2006, August 16). Combining Imagery, Narrative, Camaraderie, and Action to
+Create Persuasive Virtual Worlds. In SAIC (Chair), Cyber Influence Conference Series 2.0:
+Insights from Entertainment and Gaming: The Convergence of Narrative, Imagery and
+Cyber Media. Symposium conducted at Los Angeles, California. Abstract obtained from
+Cyber-Influence Conference Series 2.0 Proceedings, 2006.
+Dille, F., & Bilson, D. (2005, May 7). Persistent Influence of Gaming. In Cyber-Influence
+Conference Series: Perspectives and Insights from Entertainment Industry. Symposium
+conducted at Los Angles, California. Abstract obtained from Conference Proceedings,
+2005.
+xcii PriceWaterhouseCoopers. (2006). Video Games. In Global Entertainment and Media Outlook
+2006-2010 (p. 368). PriceWaterhouseCoopers.
+xciii Mace, M. (2006, December 27). Mobile Gaming in Japan: A Different World. In Mobile
+Opportunity: At the Intersection of Web, Wireless, Entertainment and Computing.
+Retrieved January 25, 2007, from Mobile Opportunity Web site:
+http://mobileopportunity.blogspot.com/2006/12/mobile-gaming-in-japan-different-
+world.html
+xciv Huang, S.-L. (2005, June 23). Evolution from 3G to 4G and Beyond (5G). Retrieved
+December 19, 2006, from American Intercontinental University – Enterprise Network
+Design class (ITN620) posted on DaniWeb.com Web site:
+http://www.daniweb.com/techtalkforums/post180324.html#post180324
+xcv Ruff, C. (2004, November 3). Building a Mobile Gaming Community. Electronic Gaming
+Business. Retrieved January 25, 2007, from FindArticles.com Web site:
+http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PJQ/is_21_2/ai_n6331358
+xcvi Gibson, B. (2006, November). Entertaining Mobile. Brasingstoke, Hampshire, United
+Kingdom: Juniper Research. Abstract retrieved January 23, 2007, from Juniper Research
+Web site:
+http://www.juniperresearch.com/shop/products/whitepaper/pdf/White_Paper_Mobile%20E
+ntertainment.pdf
+xcvii Castronova, E. (2006). Synthetic Worlds: The Business and Culture of Online Games.
+University Of Chicago Press
+xcviii Castronova, E. (2001). Virtual Worlds: A First-Hand Account of Market and Society on the
+Cyberian Frontier. The Gruter Institute Working Papers on Law, Economics and
+Evolutionary Biology, 2(1) 13. Retrieved December 18, 2006, from BePress Web site:
+http://www.bepress.com/giwp/default/vol2/iss1/art1/current_article.html
+xcix Castronova, E. (2001). Virtual Worlds: A First-Hand Account of Market and Society on the
+Cyberian Frontier. The Gruter Institute Working Papers on Law, Economics and
+Evolutionary Biology, 2(1), 16. Retrieved December 18, 2006, from BePress Web site:
+http://www.bepress.com/giwp/default/vol2/iss1/art1/current_article.html
+Caildini, R., Dr. (2001). Influence: Science and Practice (4th ed.). Allyn & Bacon. (Original
+work published 1999)
+Castronova, E. (2001). Virtual Worlds: A First-Hand Account of Market and Society on the
+Cyberian Frontier. The Gruter Institute Working Papers on Law, Economics and
+Evolutionary Biology, 2(1), 16. Retrieved December 18, 2006, from BePress Web site:
+http://www.bepress.com/giwp/default/vol2/iss1/art1/current_article.html
+ci Seeley Brown, J., & Thomas, D. (2006, April). You Play World of Warcraft? You're Hired!
+Wired Magazine, (14.04). Retrieved December 17, 2006, from:
+http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/14.04/learn.html
+cii Seeley Brown, J., & Thomas, D. (2006, April). You Play World of Warcraft? You're Hired!
+Wired Magazine, (14.04). Retrieved December 17, 2006, from:
+http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/14.04/learn.html
+
+FOUO - Not for Public Distribution
+Page 77
+Games: A Look at Emerging Trends, Uses, Threats and Opportunities in Influence Activities
+ciii Castronova, E. (2006). Synthetic Worlds: The Business and Culture of Online Games (p. 56).
+Chicago, Illinois, United States: University of Chicago Press. (Original work published
+2006)
+civ Castronova, E. (2006). Synthetic Worlds: The Business and Culture of Online Games (p. 56).
+Chicago, Illinois, United States: University of Chicago Press. (Original work published
+2006)
+cv Ondrejka, C. (2006, February). Linden Labs: Second Life. Presentation at SAIC's Cyber-
+Influence Conference Series 2.0 - Insights from Silicon Valley: Enabling Technologies, San
+Francisco, California, United States
+Castronova, E. (2006). Synthetic Worlds: The Business and Culture of Online Games (p. 66).
+Chicago, Illinois, United States: University of Chicago Press. (Original work published
+2006)
+cvi Johnson, S. (2006, April). When Virtual Worlds Collide. Wired Magazine, 14.04. Retrieved
+December 16, 2006, from http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/14.04/collide.html
+cvii Tulloch, P. (2006, November 9). Supercomputing's Next Revolution. Wired Magazine.
+Retrieved December 19, 2006, from http://www.wired.com/news/technology/1,72090-
+0.html
+cviii Tulloch, P. (2006, November 9). Supercomputing's Next Revolution. Wired Magazine.
+Retrieved December 19, 2006, from http://www.wired.com/news/technology/1,72090-
+0.html
+cix McLundie, M. (2002, Spring). See Me, Touch Me, Feel Me, Hold Me? A guide to Haptics
+Applications in the Digital Realm. Research Issues in Art, Design and Media, Spring
+2002(No. 2), issn: 1474-2365. Retrieved January 31, 2007, from Birmingham Insitute of
+Art and Design, University of Central England Web site:
+http://www.biad.uce.ac.uk/research/rti/riadm/issue2/riadmIssue2.PDF
+cx Kushner, D. (2006, April). Good Nintendog! Wired Magazine, 14.04. Retrieved December 16,
+2006, from http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/14.04/nintendog_pr.html
+cxi Fouts, J. (2007, January 11). Discussion with Kara Galles (SAIC), Jeff Berkowitz (US
+Department of State), and William May (US Department of State). Interview presented at
+Washington, DC.
+cxii http://nwn.blogs.com/nwn/2006/05/guarding_darfur.html
+cxiii http://www.fengshuichat.com/sitearm/usc_annenberg_island_selected_images.htm
+cxiv PriceWaterhouseCoopers. (2006, September). Global Entertainment and Media Outlook:
+2006-2010. Abstract retrieved October 13, 2006, from PriceWaterhouseCoopers Website:
+http://www.pwcglobal.com/extweb/pwcpublications.nsf/docid/5AC172F2C9DED8F5852570
+210044EEA7?opendocument&vendor=none
+cxv http://www.kqed.org/weblog/joystick/
+cxvi Ondrejka, C. (2006, February). Linden Labs: Second Life. In Cyber-Influence Conference.
+Symposium conducted at San Francisco, Ritz Carlton. Abstract obtained from Cyber-
+Influence Conference Series 2.0 Proceedings, 2006.
+cxvii http://www.alwaysblack.com/blackbox/wanderingyaffle_03.html
+
+Other sources consulted:
+Leonard, D.J. (2006). Not a hater, just keepin' it real: The importance of race- and gender-based
+game studies. Games and Culture 1(1), 83-88.
+Williams, D. (2006). Why game studies now? Gamers don't bowl alone. Games and Culture 1(1),
+13-16.
+
+FOUO - Not for Public Distribution
+Page 78
diff --git a/data/ACLU_-_2013-12-09_NSA_Video_Games_Paper/metadata.json b/data/ACLU_-_2013-12-09_NSA_Video_Games_Paper/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0656f9a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/ACLU_-_2013-12-09_NSA_Video_Games_Paper/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+{
+ "title": "NSA Video Games Paper",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "The NSA paper entitled “Games: A Look at Emerging Trends, Uses, Threats, and Opportunities in Influence Activities” stresses the risk of leaving gaming communities under-monitored and how the NSA and GCHQ are conducting surveillance in various online games, collecting gamers' chat data, and deploying agents into World of Warcraft and Second Life.",
+ "long_description": "MHS/GCHQ World of Warcraft SIGINT:\n\nThis is a TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY document describing a joint effort by Menwith Hill Station's New Mission Development Center, GCHQ's Global Network Exploitation (OPD-GNE) and Applied Research Special Topics (B18) to exploit World of Warcraft network traffic for SIGINT target development. The NMDC engaged SNORT open source packet-sniffing software running on all FORNSAT survey packet data to filter out WoW packets. GCHQ provided protocol parsing scripts to process the traffic and produce Warcraft metadata, which was forwarded to GCHQ for target development and network knowledge enrichment. GCHQ had correlated target entities to WoW logon events and was identifying accounts, characters and guilds associated with Islamic Extremist Groups, Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Dealing. The document notes WoW's communication infrastructure — character IDs, guilds, channels — as directly analogous to traditional SIGINT target development following emails, chat and buddy lists, with country and time zone information, local IP addresses and realm server addresses available through game metadata.\n\nSAIC Games and Virtual Environments report:\n\nThis is a FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY report produced by SAIC titled \"Games: A Look at Emerging Trends, Uses, Threats and Opportunities in Influence Activities,\" comprising five chapters covering the exploitation and function of games as influence platforms, why games are effective influence tools, plausible scenarios for terrorist use of games, emerging trends in the gaming space, and recommendations for IC counterterrorism efforts in the game space.\n\nThe report was produced for an IC customer — likely NSA or a related agency given its packaging alongside the WoW operational note — and draws on SAIC's Cyber-Influence Conference Series as a primary research source. It systematically analyses how terrorist organisations could exploit online games and virtual worlds for propaganda, recruitment, communications, training, fundraising and money laundering, across game genres including first-person shooters, MMORPGs, alternate reality games, simulation games and strategy games.\n\nKey findings include: GCHQ had already produced exploitation modules for XboxLive and World of Warcraft with reporting expected to begin April 2008; al-Qa'ida target selectors and game executables had been found associated with XboxLive, Second Life, World of Warcraft and other platforms in PINWALE network traffic, TAO databases and forensic data; FBI, CIA and Defense Humint Service all had HUMINT operations in Second Life; Hezbollah's Special Force game used Genesis 3D middleware and was available in Arabic, French, English and Farsi; and Second Life's anonymous SMS capability was identified as a collection gap. The report recommends Protocol Exploitation, SFL and TAO begin profiling databases and game environments for collection and exploitation, and that CT SIGDEV establish an IC-wide deconfliction process for game space operations.",
+ "tags": [
+ "gaming",
+ "video games",
+ "online games",
+ "chat",
+ "agents",
+ "World of Warcraft",
+ "Second Life",
+ "Xbox",
+ "Computer Network Exploitation",
+ "social network analysis",
+ "ID tracking",
+ "shaping"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2008-01-01",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "REL TO USA, FVEY"
+ ],
+ "banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY",
+ "genre": "report",
+ "programs": [
+ "PINWALE",
+ "DARWARS",
+ "SFL",
+ "UTT"
+ ],
+ "countries": [
+ "Bahrain",
+ "China",
+ "Egypt",
+ "Indonesia",
+ "Iran",
+ "Iraq",
+ "Israel",
+ "Japan",
+ "Jordan",
+ "Kazakhstan",
+ "Kuwait",
+ "Lebanon",
+ "Malaysia",
+ "Oman",
+ "Pakistan",
+ "Palestine",
+ "Qatar",
+ "Saudi Arabia",
+ "Singapore",
+ "Sudan",
+ "Syria",
+ "Turkmenistan",
+ "United Arab Emirates",
+ "Uzbekistan"
+ ],
+ "people": [
+ "Garite, Matt",
+ "Prasad, Kaira",
+ "Castronova, Edward",
+ "DeBenedictis, Steven",
+ "Robbins, Brian",
+ "Dunin, Elonka",
+ "Estanislao, Jon",
+ "James, Daniel",
+ "Valadares, Jeferson",
+ "Kushner, David",
+ "Ondrejka, Corey",
+ "Bonk, Curtis J.",
+ "Dennen, Vanessa P.",
+ "Lindstrom, Martin",
+ "Yee, Nick",
+ "Jayaganthan, Rengaswamy",
+ "Tawil-Souri, Helga",
+ "Soussi, Alasdair",
+ "Baertlein, Lisa",
+ "Brachman, Jarret M.",
+ "Rolston, David",
+ "Dille, Flint",
+ "Bilson, David S.",
+ "Bray, Hiawatha",
+ "Morgan, Dan",
+ "Henry, Dean",
+ "Halper, Keith",
+ "Pardew, Leslie A.",
+ "Betrus, Anthony D.",
+ "Garite, Matt",
+ "Steinkuehler, Constance A.",
+ "Gupta, Shankar",
+ "Joshi, Mahesh P.",
+ "Fong, Gwenda",
+ "Andersen, John",
+ "Reid, David",
+ "Kramer, Stephen E.",
+ "Brown, Seely",
+ "Thomas, Douglas",
+ "Phillips, Andrea",
+ "Thompson, Brooke",
+ "Alexander, Bryan",
+ "Dena, Christy",
+ "Barlow, Nova",
+ "Weimann, Gabriel",
+ "Mace, Michael",
+ "Knight, Will",
+ "Gibson, Erin",
+ "Langley, Hugh",
+ "Huang, Shih-Lian",
+ "Ruff, Chris",
+ "Gibson, Ben",
+ "Cialdini, Robert B.",
+ "Johnson, Steven",
+ "Tulloch, Paul",
+ "McLundie, Martin",
+ "Galles, Kara",
+ "Berkowitz, Jeff",
+ "May, William",
+ "Leonard, David J.",
+ "Williams, Dmitri"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ProPublica",
+ "date_published": "2013-12-09",
+ "title": "World of Spycraft: NSA and CIA Spied in Online Games",
+ "link": "https://www.propublica.org/article/world-of-spycraft-intelligence-agencies-spied-in-online-games",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Elliott, Justin"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_source": "https://www.propublica.org/documents/item/889134-games",
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/889134/games.pdf",
+ "version": "nsa-games-paper"
+ },
+ {
+ "publisher": "The New York Times",
+ "date_published": "2013-12-09",
+ "title": "Spies Infiltrate a Fantasy Realm of Online Games",
+ "link": "https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/10/world/spies-dragnet-reaches-a-playing-field-of-elves-and-trolls.html",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Mazzetti, Mark",
+ "Elliott, Justin"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_source": "https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/12/10/us/politics/games-docs.html?ref=world",
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/889128/games.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Guardian",
+ "date_published": "2013-12-09",
+ "title": "Xbox Live among game services targeted by US and UK spy agencies",
+ "link": "https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/09/nsa-spies-online-games-world-warcraft-second-life",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Ball, James"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_source": "https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/dec/09/nsa-files-games-virtual-environments-paper-pdf",
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/889129/nsa-games-paper.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [
+ {
+ "id": "EFF_-_20131209-nyt-nsa_games"
+ },
+ {
+ "id": "2013-12-09_NSA_Video_Games_Paper"
+ },
+ {
+ "id": "nsa-gchq-spy-games"
+ },
+ {
+ "id": "nsa-spy-games"
+ }
+ ],
+ "archive_comment": "The Guardian only published two pages. ProPublica and The New York Times published the full document (82 pages).",
+ "pdf_sha256": "b5d476d87795fccf7ac9b55c7b7f763dfbe76707daa4e049d2da0a76d7bbf5c8",
+ "pages": 82,
+ "versions": {
+ "nsa-games-paper": {
+ "pdf_sha256": "4dab8fa803efa108677b6c901e6a26cf1a35cd2fa9ad23994450162406059736"
+ }
+ }
+}
diff --git a/data/ACLU_-_2013-12-09_NSA_Video_Games_Paper/versions/nsa-games-paper/nsa-games-paper.md b/data/ACLU_-_2013-12-09_NSA_Video_Games_Paper/versions/nsa-games-paper/nsa-games-paper.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e499225
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/ACLU_-_2013-12-09_NSA_Video_Games_Paper/versions/nsa-games-paper/nsa-games-paper.md
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20320108
+
+(S//SI) Topic: Exploiting Terrorist Use of Games & Virtual Environments
+
+(TS//SI) Issue: We know that terrorists use many feature-rich Internet communications media
+for operational purposes such as email, VoIP, chat, proxies, and web forums and it is highly
+likely they will be making wide use of the many communications features offered by Games and
+Virtual Environments (GVE) by 2010. The SIGINT Enterprise needs to begin taking action now
+to plan for collection, processing, presentation, and analysis of these communications. With a
+few exceptions, NSA can't even recognize the traffic, and therefore it is impossible to even say
+what percentage of the environment is GVE; let alone determine how targets are using the
+communications features of GVEs. However, GVEs offer a SIGINT/HUMINT opportunity space
+and more research is needed to figure out effective exploitation.
+
+(S//SI) GVEs today allow individuals to gather with like-minded others online. Many GVES
+offer communications such as private chat (P2P), group chat, chat to an alias, and broadcast chat
+-both text and voice. Also many GVEs allow convergent technologies to intermingle such as
+XboxLive! which can be run via an Xbox360 gaming console and/or connect via a PC to normal
+MSN chat. Second Life offers the ability to anonymously text to a GSM phone (SMS) and soon
+they will offer anonymous voice calls so that phone numbers do not have to be known by either
+party and won't show up in collection. Some GVEs allow third party interfaces which allow
+limited functionality from a web browser. This overcomes obstacles such as a high-bandwidth
+requirement and or not being allowed to download software (think Internet café usage). In
+addition, many GVEs are able to be used via mobile devices connected wirelessly (phones,
+handhelds, laptops). Connected to the GVEs, specialized forums and other social networking
+sites have sprung up to provide an additional place to interact, connect, or share. These sites and
+any others can be advertised in the GVEs, so that if a terrorist web forum has to move locations it
+can be found by its members again. Areas/groups can be access-restricted, member-only. They
+are essentially private meeting places, and can be used for planning, comms, and training, etc.
+GVEs are used for collaboration; Forterra's 3D world is coming to JWICS to do this IC-wide.
+
+(U//FOUO) GVEs have been made that reinforce prejudices and cultural stereotypes while
+imparting a targeted message or lesson both from the Western point of view and in the Middle
+East. America's Army is a U.S. Army produced game that is free download from its recruitment
+page and is acknowledged to be so good at this the army no longer needs to use it for
+recruitment, they use it for training. The Lebanese Hizballah has taken this concept and the same
+basic game design and made its own version of the game called Special Forces 2 (SF2), which its
+press section acknowledges is used for recruitment and training in order to prepare their youth to
+"fight the enemy", a radicalizing medium; the ultimate goal is to become a suicide martyr. One
+cannot discount the "fun factor" involved it is important to hold your target audience's
+attention-- and makes ingesting the message not even noticeable. SF2 features multi-player, on-
+line text and voice chat for up to 60 players simultaneously, effectively acting like a VPN or
+private chat forum. SF2 is offered at $10 a copy and so also goes to fund terrorist operations.
+
+(S//SI) These games offer realistic weapons training (what weapon to use against what target,
+what ranges can be achieved, even aiming and firing), military operations and tactics,
+photorealistic land navigation and terrain familiarization, and leadership skills. While complete
+military training is best achieved in person, perfection is not always required to accomplish the
+mission. Some of the 9-11 pilots had never flown a real plane, they had only trained using
+
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20070108
+Declassify On: 20320108
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20320108
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20320108
+
+Microsoft's Flight Simulator. When the mission is expensive, risky, or dangerous, it is often a
+wiser idea to exercise virtually, rather than really blow an operative up assembling a bomb or
+exposing a sleeper agent to law enforcement scrutiny. Militaries around the world use virtual
+simulators with great success and the Hizballah has even hooked up a Playstation controller to a
+laptop in order to guide some of its real missiles. Kuma Wars is a U.S. owned company that
+offers realistic battle simulation of real battles in Iraq usually one month after they actually
+happened. The player can re-do maneuvers in a lessons learned way for training, or you can
+switch sides and see how it works from the opposite side. It also provides real terrain features,
+such as real road signs from real roads in Iraq, and a simulated night-vision goggles
+environment.
+
+(TS//SI) Al Qaida terrorist target selectors and GVE executables have been found associated
+with XboxLive, Second Life, World of Warcraft, and other GVEs in PINWALE network traffic,
+TAO databases, and in forensic data. Other targets include Chinese hackers, an Iranian nuclear
+scientist, Hizballah, and Hamas members. GCHQ has a vigorous effort to exploit GVEs and has
+produced exploitation modules in XboxLive! and World of Warcraft. After beta testing, they
+expect reporting to begin in April 2008. The FBI, CIA and the Defense Humint Service all have
+HUMINT operations in Second Life and other GVEs and are very interested in forming a
+deconfliction and tipping group that would be able to collaborate on operations.
+
+(TS//SI) GVEs are an opportunity! We can use games for: CNE exploits, social network
+analysis, HUMINT targeting, ID tracking (photos, doc IDs), shaping activities, geo-location of
+target, and collection of comms. It has been well documented that terrorists are OPSEC and tech
+saavy and are only getting more so over time. These applications and their servers however, are
+trusted by their users and makes an connection to another computer on the Internet, which can
+then be exploited. Through target buddylists and interaction found in the gaming and on gaming
+web sites, social networks can be diagramed and previously unknown SIGINT leads and
+connections and terrorists cells discovered. GVEs can contain on-line presence indicators,
+geolocation, and ID tracking can be gleaned and used in apprehension operations.
+
+(TS//SI) Recommendation: The amount of GVEs in the world is growing but the specific ones
+that CT needs to be methodically discovered and validated. Only then can we find evidence that
+GVEs are being used for operational uses. Protocol Exploitation, SFL, and TAO should begin
+profiling their databases and the GVEs for collection and exploitation possibilities. Open source
+(APSTARS) produced GVE lists and selectors should be used to run against UTT and other
+databases to check for cross matches to develop target selectors. CT SIGDEV along with CT
+TOPIs will study the collected traffic to find and track targets of interest. There should be a
+concentrated effort to conduct research into target use of GVEs, and signatures for survey
+collection should be developed. Targets and specific apps should be chosen to exploit to ensure
+that terrorists' GVE/social site usage is covered by SIGINT and the system is not left behind the
+times. All avenues should be taken to develop PES and CNE exploits as GVEs are found on
+target computers. We need to develop a viewer/db that allows linguist/analysts to
+view/experience voice/text/video traffic together and archivee the GVE data associated with
+reporting. which will also be essential for Yahoo, Skype, webcam, VTCs and Biometrics.
+
+(S//SI) CT SIGDEV/SSG should establish a process to deconflict IC-wide ops in GVEs and to
+develop strategy for collaboration. Members from at least CIA, FBI, DIA, NSA and GCHQ
+should participate to make the coordination significant. Members should have ability to check
+tasking, traffic, and status of current operations.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20320108
diff --git a/data/ACLU_-_2013-12-10_GMS_Classification_Guide/ACLU_-_2013-12-10_GMS_Classification_Guide.md b/data/ACLU_-_2013-12-10_GMS_Classification_Guide/ACLU_-_2013-12-10_GMS_Classification_Guide.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0b47343
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/ACLU_-_2013-12-10_GMS_Classification_Guide/ACLU_-_2013-12-10_GMS_Classification_Guide.md
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//MR
+
+| Description of Information | Classification/ Markings | Reason | Declass | Remarks |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| b. (U) In association with NSA, SIGINT or Intelligence. | SECRET//COMINT | 1.4(c) | 20291123 | |
+| A3. (S//SI) The fact that NSA targets, collects, and processes GSM (encrypted or unencrypted). | SECRET//COMINT | 1.4(c) | 20291133 | (U) No additional details. |
+| A4. (S//SI) The fact that NSA can collect GSM calls through the global telecommunications infrastructure. | SECRET//COMINT | 1.4 (c) | 20291123 | |
+
+**B. (U) EQUIPMENT**
+
+| Description of Information | Classification/ Markings | Reason | Declass | Remarks |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| B1. (FOUO) Commerical and government equipment that consists of general purpose components, such as receivers, digital signal processors, personal computer, etc., when **not** running or loaded with GSM SIGINT collection software and **not** associated with a SIGINT system. | UNCLASSIFIED/ FOUO | N/A | N/A | (U) No association with NSA, SIGINT or Intelligence. |
+| B2. (S//SI) Commercial and government equipment that consists of general purpose components, such as receivers, digital signal processors, personal computer, etc, when running or loaded with GSM SIGINT collection software and associated with NSA, SIGINT or Intelligence. | SECRET//COMINT At a minimum | 1.4(c) | 20291123 | |
+
+**C. (U) PROCESSING**
+
+| Description of Information | Classification/ Markings | Reason | Declass | Remarks |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| C1. (S//SI) The fact that NSA can process **unencrypted** GSM. | SECRET//COMINT REL AUS/CAN/GBR/NZL/USA | 1.4 (c) | 20291123 | |
+| C2. (S//SI) The fact that NSA can process **encrypted** GSM when the cryptovariable is **known**. | SECRET//COMINT REL AUS/CAN/GBR/NZL/USA At a mimimum | 1.4 (c) | 20291123 | |
+| C3. (TS//SI) The fact that NSA can process **encrypted A5/1** GSM when the cryptovariable is **unknown**. | TOP SECRET// COMINT REL | 1.4 (c) | 20291123 | (U) Details may require protection via a special access |
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//MR
+
+| Description of Information | Classification/ Markings | Reason | Declass | Remarks |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| b. Technical reports (TACREPs or Klieglights) | SECRET//COMINT at a minimum | 1.4(c) | 20291123 | |
+| F3. (S//SI) Reporting locations of GSM users in:
If collect on U.S. Person is needed, seek additional authority if eligible and a valid foreign intelligence requirement. |
+| **Inadvertent** | You tasked/queried in raw SIGINT on a target you believed to be foreign. You then learned the target is a U.S. Person. | • Stop collection immediately! • Cancel reports based on that collect. • Notify your supervisor or auditor. • Write up an incident report immediately. • Submit the incident write-up for inclusion in your organization's IG Quarterly input. | If collect on U.S. Person is needed, seek additional authority if eligible and a valid foreign intelligence requirement. |
+| **Incidental** | You targeted a legitimate foreign entity and acquired information/ communications to/from/about a U.S. Person in your results. | • Apply USSID SP0018 minimization procedures. • Focus your report on the foreign end of the communication. • Obtain dissemination authority if you know your customer set requires the U.S. Person identity up front. | This does not constitute a USSID SP0018 violation, so it does not have to be reported in the IG quarterly. |
+| **Reverse** | You targeted a foreign entity who you know communicates with a U.S. Person on a regular basis just so you can get the communications of the U.S. Person. | • Stop collection immediately! • Cancel reports based on that collect. • Notify your supervisor or auditor. • Write up an incident report immediately. • Submit the incident write-up for inclusion in your organization's IG Quarterly input. | You may **not** reverse target.
- Analytic operates at the country level to determine travel/city level for co-traveler determination, and designed to provide monthly QFD roll-up
- Proxies and other shared IP settings can render IP geolocation susceptible |
+
+Future Work
+(S//SI/REL TO USA, FVEY) The TAC/Cafe/TMAC DNI Co-traveler team also considered capabilities to enable follow-on queries utilizing CHALKFUN for convergence efforts to identify roaming handsets as possible DNI target co-travelers.
+
+Other resources
+https://ncmd-satc01.ncmd.nsa.ic.gov/gambit/public/q/dni_travel_analytic_cloud_version
+
+https://wiki.nsa.ic.gov/wiki/Cafetravel_dni_co-travelers
+
+TAC/Café/TMAC DNR Co-Traveler Analytic
+Café Spin 2 (January - July 2012)
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+15
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+Background
+(TS//SI/REL TO USA, FVEY) The Café project involved TMAC, SSG, T1212, and S2I5 working in concert to develop both DNI and DNR cloud-based travel analytics. The absence of a cloud-based solution that could run over bulk data motivated this initiative. The Café objective was to merge the DNI and DNR analytics to create one complete co-travel analytic; however the DNR co-traveler analytic, described below, is currently still under development.
+
+(TS//SI/REL TO USA, FVEY) The DNR cloud-based analytic considers all known targets (tasked in OCTAVE) that have traveled within a given date range (e.g., monthly roll-up to five month range), and attempts to find their co-travelers. Co-travelers are defined as individuals that were seen in the same area (currently defined by VLRs) around the same time as the targets. The output includes both tasked and untasked selectors as possible co-travelers with the tasked seeds. Each possible co-traveler is assigned a score that indicates the probability of co-travel with the seed. Higher scores are assigned to co-travelers that are seen at more of the same locations and closer in time (pairs are given one point if seen within one hour, and a half point if seen within two hours of each other).
+
+Status and Summary
+
+| Status | Source Data | Caveats |
+|--------|-------------|---------|
+| Analytic has been tested on FASCIA data on GM-PLACE
(U) When the U.S. person is not specified, this fact is UNCLASSIFIED// FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. |
+| 2.10. (U) The fact that NSA conducts activities and/or targets and collects under FAA against an unspecified person. | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | (U//FOUO) S02 OCA decision, 25 October 2010, "Classification Decision Regarding NSA Activities Conducted under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act |
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| | | | | |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| | | | | Amendments Act" |
+| 2.11. (U) The fact that, pursuant to sections 702, 704 and/or 705 of the FAA, NSA conducts electronic surveillance activities and/or targets and collects against an unspecified person. | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | (U//FOUO) S02 OCA decision, 25 October 2010, "Classification Decision Regarding NSA Activities Conducted under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Amendments Act" |
+| 2.12. (U) The fact that NSA seeks or obtains FISA authority or sought PAA authority against unspecified terrorists or terrorist groups. | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | (U) See Sections 2.11, 2.12, and 2.15 for classification guidance when terrorists or terrorist groups are specified. |
+| 2.13. (U) The fact that NSA seeks or obtains FISA authority or sought PAA authority against specified terrorists or terrorist groups, outside the U.S. | SECRET//SI// REL TO USA, FVEY
*at a minimum* | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | (TS//SI//NF) For FBI Pen Register Trap Trace (PR/TT), classification is TOP SECRET//SI// NOFORN. |
+| 2.14. (U) The fact that NSA seeks or obtains FISA authority against specified terrorists or terrorist groups, inside the U.S. | TOP SECRET//SI// NOFORN | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | |
+| 2.15. (TS//SI//NF) The fact that NSA seeks or obtains FISA authority against communications from foreign governmental and diplomatic facilities in the U.S. | TOP SECRET//SI// NOFORN | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | (TS//SI//NF) The classification level is TOP SECRET//SI// NOFORN regardless of whether the foreign governmental or diplomatic facility in the U.S. is specified for which NSA is seeking or obtaining FISA authority. |
+| 2.16. (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) The fact that NSA seeks or obtains FISA authority against communications from foreign governmental or diplomatic facilities outside the U.S. | SECRET//SI// REL TO USA, FVEY
*at a minimum* | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) The classification level is SECRET//SI// REL TO USA, FVEY regardless of whether the foreign government or diplomatic facility outside the U.S. is specified for which NSA is seeking or obtaining FISA |
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| | | | | |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| | | | | authority. |
+| 2.17. (U) The fact that NSA seeks or obtains PAA authority against the communications of a specified foreign government, terrorist group, organization, or individual. | SECRET//SI// REL TO USA, FVEY
*at a minimum* | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | (U) Sensitivity of the target entity may also result in the application of NOFORN. |
+| 2.18. (TS//SI//NF) The fact that NSA seeks FISA authority to obtain business records (BR) for terrorist groups. | TOP SECRET//SI// NOFORN | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | (TS//SI//NF) The classification level is TOP SECRET//SI// NOFORN regardless of whether the terrorist group is specified for which NSA is seeking or obtaining FISA BR authority. |
+| 2.19. (TS//SI//NF) The fact that NSA receives or requests from FBI Pen Register Trap Trace (PR/TT) FISA warrants in order to get data about terrorist groups. | TOP SECRET//SI// NOFORN | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | (TS//SI//NF) The classification level is TOP SECRET//SI// NOFORN regardless of whether the terrorist group is specified for which NSA is seeking or obtaining FISA PR/TT authority. |
+| 2.20. (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) The identification of specific selectors (e.g., specific phone numbers; specific e-mail addresses) targeted in FISA warrants or PAA certifications. | SECRET//SI// REL TO USA, FVEY
*at a minimum* | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | (U) Classify at the same level as the classification assigned to the target (e.g., selectors for a target classified as TS//SI//NF per section 2.2, would also be classified TS//SI//NF). |
+| 2.21. (U) The identification of, or relationships with, providers. | TOP SECRET//SI// NOFORN
*at a minimum* | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | (U) Refer to appropriate ECI classification guides for additional instructions. |
+| 2.22. (U) The identification of specific communications methods/ technologies targeted/ collected/ processed under FISA or PAA. | SECRET// REL TO USA, FVEY
*at a minimum* | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | (U) Handle at the same classification level as required for the specific communications methods or technologies targeted/collected/ processed. Certain |
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| | | | | |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| | | | | facts about technologies collected under FISA or PAA may be determined to be UNCLASSIFIED, while other facts may be higher than SECRET// REL TO USA, FVEY.
(U//FOUO) If the FISA or PAA target entity is specified, refer to the classification guidance throughout Section 2. |
+| 2.23. (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Statistics or statistical trends relating to NSA FISA targets, including numbers of court orders, IRP policy approvals, targets, facilities, or selectors, or combinations or subcategories thereof, without mention of techniques involved. | TOP SECRET//SI// NOFORN | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | |
+| 2.24. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Statistics or statistical trends relating to FBI FISA targets, including numbers of court orders, targets, facilities, or selectors, or combinations or subcategories thereof, without mention of techniques involved. | SECRET// REL TO USA, FVEY | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | (TS//SI//NF) For FBI Pen Register Trap Trace (PR/TT), the classification is TOP SECRET//SI// NOFORN. |
+| 2.25. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Statistics or statistical trends relating to PAA targets, including number of certifications, targets, facilities, selectors, or combinations of subcategories thereof, without mention of techniques involved. | SECRET//SI// REL TO USA, FVEY
*at a minimum* | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | |
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| | | | | |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| **3. (U) DATA HANDLING**
+| 3.1. (TS//SI//NF) **Unminimized unevaluated** NSA FISA data (e.g., BR, large content, FAA) encrypted or unencrypted. | TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
(U) See Remarks | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | **(U//FOUO) Within NSA/CSS, the data must be labeled with appropriate RAGTIME-series markings.**
(U//FOUO) Traffic remains subject to FISA minimization procedures described in USSID SP0018, Annex A, plus supplemental minimization procedures as required.
(U//FOUO) Data may only be released to foreign partners when specifically approved by an appropriate authority on a case-by-case basis. |
+| 3.2. (U//FOUO) **Unminimized unevaluated** PAA data, encrypted or unencrypted. | TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
(U) See Remarks | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | **(U//FOUO) Within NSA/CSS, the data must be labeled with appropriate RAGTIME-series markings.**
(U//FOUO) Traffic remains subject to minimization procedures described in USSID SP0018, Annex A, and those prescribed under the respective PAA certifications.
(U//FOUO) Data may only be released to foreign partners when specifically approved by an appropriate authority on a case-by-case |
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| | | | | |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| | | | | basis |
+| 3.3. (U//FOUO) **Unminimized unevaluated** FBI FISA data, encrypted or unencrypted. | SECRET//SI//NOFORN
*at a minimum*
(U) See Remarks | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | **(U//FOUO) Within NSA/CSS, the data must be labeled with appropriate RAGTIME-series markings.**
(U//FOUO) Traffic remains subject to FISA minimization procedures, described in USSID SP0018, Annex A, plus supplemental minimization procedures as required.
(U//FOUO) Target offices will also add the additional caveat statement required for FISC reporting.
(U//FOUO) Data may only be released to foreign partners when specifically approved by an appropriate authority on a case-by-case basis. |
+| 3.4 (TS//SI//NF) **Unminimized unevaluated** FBI PR/TT FISA data, encrypted or unencrypted. | TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
(U) See Remarks | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | **(U//FOUO) Within NSA/CSS, the data must be labeled with appropriate RAGTIME-series markings.**
(U//FOUO) Traffic remains subject to FISA minimization procedures, described in USSID SP0018, Annex A, plus supplemental minimization procedures as required.
(U//FOUO) Data |
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| | | | | |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| | | | | may only be released to foreign partners when specifically approved by an appropriate authority on a case-by-case basis. |
+| **3.5.** (TS//SI//NF) Unminimized evaluated NSA FISA data (e.g., BR, large content, FAA) such as a verbatim transcript or gisted traffic, that does not disclose specific methods or techniques. | TOP SECRET//SI// NOFORN
(U) See Remarks | 1.4(c)\* | 25 Years\* | (U//FOUO) Within NSA/CSS, the data must be labeled with appropriate RAGTIME-series markings.
(U//FOUO) Traffic remains subject to FISA minimization procedures, described in USSID SP0018, Annex A, plus supplemental minimization procedures as required.
(U) Methods are governed by the classification guides applicable to the specific methods involved. (U//FOUO) Data may only be released to foreign partners when specifically approved by an appropriate authority on a case-by-case basis. |
+| **3.6.** (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) **Unminimized** evaluated PAA data, such as a verbatim transcript or gisted traffic, that does not disclose specific methods or techniques. | SECRET//SI// NOFORN
*at a minimum*
(U) See Remarks | 1.4(c)\* | 25 Years\* | **(U//FOUO) Within NSA/CSS, the data must be labeled with appropriate RAGTIME-series markings.**
(U//FOUO) Traffic remains subject to minimization procedures |
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| | | | | |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| | | | | described in USSID SP0018, Annex A, plus supplemental minimization procedures as required, and those prescribed under the respective PAA certifications.
(U) Methods are governed by the classification guides applicable to the specific methods involved.
(U//FOUO) Data may only be released to foreign partners when specifically approved by an appropriate authority on a case-by-case basis. |
+| 3.7. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) **Unminimized** evaluated FBI FISA data, such as a verbatim transcript or gisted traffic, that does not disclose specific methods or techniques. | SECRET//SI// NOFORN
*at a minimum*
(U) See Remarks | 1.4(c)\* | 25 Years\* | **(U//FOUO) Within NSA/CSS, the data must be labeled with appropriate RAGTIME-series markings.**
(U//FOUO) Traffic remains subject to FISA minimization procedures, described in USSID SP0018, Annex A, plus supplemental minimization procedures as required.
(U//FOUO) Target offices will also add the additional caveat statement required for FISC reporting.
(U) Methods are governed by the classification guides |
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| | | | | |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| | | | | applicable to the specific methods involved.
(U//FOUO) Data may only be released to foreign partners when specifically approved by an appropriate authority on a case-by-case basis. |
+| 3.8. (TS//SI//NF) **Unminimized** evaluated FBI PR/TT data that does not disclose specific methods or techniques. | TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | (U//FOUO) Data may only be released to foreign partners when specifically approved by an appropriate authority on a case-by-case basis. |
+| 3.9. (U//FOUO) **Minimized** evaluated NSA FISA data, such as verbatim transcript or gisted traffic, that does not disclose specific methods or techniques. | TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY (U) See Remarks | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | (U//FOUO) Target offices may add caveats (e.g., NOFORN, ORCON, etc.) if the intelligence product itself warrants such protection.
(U) Methods are governed by the classification guides applicable to the specific methods involved. |
+| 3.10. (TS//SI//NF) **Minimized** evaluated NSA BR and large content FISA data that does not disclose specific methods or techniques. | TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | (U) Methods are governed by the classification guides applicable to the specific methods involved. |
+| 3.11. (U//FOUO) **Minimized** evaluated PAA data, such as a verbatim transcript or gisted traffic, that does not disclose specific methods or techniques. | SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
*at a minimum* | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | (U//FOUO) Target offices may add caveats (e.g., NOFORN, ORCON, etc.) if the intelligence product itself warrants such protection.
(U) Methods are |
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| | | | | |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| | | | | governed by the classification guides applicable to the specific methods involved. |
+| 3.12. (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) **Minimized** evaluated FBI FISA data, such as a verbatim transcript or gisted traffic, that does not disclose specific methods or techniques. | SECRET//SI// REL TO USA, FVEY/ FISA
*at a minimum* | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | (U//FOUO) Target offices may add caveats (e.g., NOFORN, ORCON, etc.) if the intelligence product itself warrants such protection.
(U//FOUO) Target offices will also add the additional caveat statement required for FISC reporting.
(U) Methods are governed by the classification guides applicable to the specific methods involved. |
+| 3.13. (TS//SI//NF) **Minimized** evaluated FBI PR/TT FISA data that does not disclose specific methods or techniques. | TOP SECRET//SI// NOFORN | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | (U) Methods are governed by the classification guides applicable to the specific methods involved. |
+| **4. (U) DISSEMINATION** | | | | |
+| 4.1. (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) SIGINT product derived from encrypted or unencrypted NSA FISA collection. | TOP SECRET//SI// REL TO USA, FVEY
(U) See Remarks | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | (U//FOUO) Target offices may add caveats (e.g., ORCON, etc.) if the intelligence product itself warrants such protection. |
+| 4.2. (TS//SI//NF) SIGINT product derived from encrypted or unencrypted NSA FISA-warranted BR or large content FISA collection. | TOP SECRET//SI// NOFORN | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | (U//FOUO) Target offices may add caveats (e.g., NOFORN, ORCON, etc.) if the intelligence product itself warrants such protection. |
+| 4.3. (U//FOUO) SIGINT product derived from encrypted or unencrypted PAA-authorized collection. | SECRET//SI// REL TO USA, FVEY
*at a minimum* | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | (U//FOUO) Target offices may add caveats (e.g., NOFORN, ORCON) |
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| | | | | |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| | | | | if the intelligence product itself warrants such protection. |
+| 4.4. (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) SIGINT product derived from encrypted or unencrypted FBI FISA-warranted collection when associated with NSA or SIGINT. | SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
*at a minimum* | 1.4(c)\* | 25 Years\* | (U//FOUO) Target offices may add caveats (e.g., NOFORN, ORCON) if the intelligence product itself warrants such protection.
(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Target offices will also add the additional caveat statement required for FBI FISA reporting. |
+| 4.5. (TS//SI//NF) SIGINT product derived from encrypted or unencrypted FBI PR/TT FISA-warranted collection. | TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN | 1.4(c)\* | 25 Years\* | (U//FOUO) Target offices may add caveats (e.g., ORCON) if the intelligence product itself warrants such protection. |
+
+\*25 years: Declassification in 25 years indicates that the information is classified for 25 years from the date a document is created or 25 years from the date of this original classification decision, whichever is later.
+
+\*1.4(c): Section 1.4(c) of E.O. 12958, as amended
+
+\*Ex 3: Exemption 3 of the Freedom of Information Act
+
+(U//FOUO) Additional Remarks: The denial of any facts in this guide concerning NSA's collection/processing/analyzing/retaining/producing and then disseminating of entities under FISA/PAA/FAA authority carries the same level of classification as the fact of NSA's performing such functions.
+
+(U) Acronyms
+
+(U) BR - Business Records
+(U) ECI - Exceptionally Controlled Information
+(U) FAA - FISA Amendments Act
+(U) FISA - Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
+(U) FISC - Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+(U) IRP - Interagency Review Panel
+(U) PAA – Protect America Act
+(U) PR/TT - Pen Register Trap Trace
+(U) USSID - United States Signals Intelligence Directive
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FISA-Guide/metadata.json b/data/FISA-Guide/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..549889a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FISA-Guide/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+{
+ "title": "Classification Guide for FISA, the Protect America Act and the FISA Amendments Act",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act regulates spying for national security purposes on domestic soil. This guide lays out secrecy restrictions for various aspects of those programs. Among other things, it mentions the Large Content FISA order, a term that has not previously been disclosed. ",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [
+ "RAGTIME-C"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2012-02-08",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "SI"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "banner": "TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN",
+ "genre": "guide",
+ "programs": [
+ "RAGTIME",
+ "RAGTIME-C"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Crumm, William M.",
+ "Brand, Joseph J.",
+ "Schneider, Stephanie"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The New York Times",
+ "date_published": "2014-03-11",
+ "title": "How a Court Secretly Evolved, Extending U.S. Spies’ Reach",
+ "link": "https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/12/us/how-a-courts-secret-evolution-extended-spies-reach.html",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Savage, Charlie",
+ "Poitras, Laura"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_source": "http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/03/12/us/fisa-classification-doc.html",
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1061348/fisa-faa-classification-guide.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2017-11-30",
+ "title": "NSA Secretly Helped Convict Defendants in U.S. Courts, Classified Documents Reveal",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2017/11/30/nsa-surveillance-fisa-section-702/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Aaronson, Trevor"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [
+ "Williams, Margot",
+ "Cooper, Talya"
+ ],
+ "doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2017/11/30/nsa-classification-guide-for-fisa/",
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/4310982/FISA-Guide.pdf",
+ "version": "nsa-fisa-faa-class",
+ "note": "The Intercept published the same document that NYtimes did publish already in 2014. The Intercept's version is also more redacted, and is missing two pages."
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [
+ {
+ "id": "nsa-fisa-faa-class"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "1734f398b628f688891a0cce4284d41b6dde66abeb90ea35820eb75901fc1f33",
+ "pages": 18,
+ "versions": {
+ "nsa-fisa-faa-class": {
+ "pdf_sha256": "70a66324aa0c015825e1bdfd250ea86a41e3e93741d6c640813b08ce33ee6b3e",
+ "changed_pages": [
+ 1,
+ 6
+ ]
+ }
+ }
+}
diff --git a/data/FISA-Guide/versions/nsa-fisa-faa-class/nsa-fisa-faa-class.md b/data/FISA-Guide/versions/nsa-fisa-faa-class/nsa-fisa-faa-class.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c5a944e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FISA-Guide/versions/nsa-fisa-faa-class/nsa-fisa-faa-class.md
@@ -0,0 +1,276 @@
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
+
+(U//FOUO) CLASSIFICATION GUIDE FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (FISA)/PROTECT AMERICA ACT (PAA)/FISA AMENDMENTS ACT (FAA) ACTIVITIES (2-48)
+
+Effective Date: [REDACTED]
+
+SIGINT Director
+
+Reason(s) for Classification:
+E.O. 12958 1.4(c)
+
+Declassify on: 25 years*
+
+[REDACTED]
+Associate Director for
+Community Integration, Policy &
+Records
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+(U) Change Register
+
+| Change No. | Change | Date Made mm/dd/yy | By (initials) |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| 1. | (U) Added change register. | 02/07/12 | nnh |
+| 2. | (U//FOUO) Included the two S02 OCA decisions in the 25 October 2010, "Classification Decision Regarding NSA Activities Conducted under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Amendments Act" SPF as items 2.10. and 2.11. Renumbered the rest of section 2 appropriately. | 02/07/12 | nnh |
+| | | | |
+| | | | |
+| | | | |
+| | | | |
+| | | | |
+| | | | |
+| | | | |
+| | | | |
+| | | | |
+| | | | |
+| | | | |
+| | | | |
+| | | | |
+| | | | |
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+(U) NSA/CSS CLASSIFICATION GUIDE NUMBER: 2-48
+
+(U) PUBLICATION DATE:
+
+(U//FOUO) PROJECT ACTIVITY NAME: Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act/Protect
+America Act/FISA Amendments Act (FISA/PAA/FAA) Activities
+
+(U) OFFICE OF ORIGIN: SID Oversight & Compliance, SV
+
+(U//FOUO) POC: [REDACTED] Chief Oversight & Compliance
+
+(U) PHONE: [REDACTED]
+
+(U//FOUO) CLASSIFIED BY: S, SIGINT Director, [REDACTED]
+
+(U) DECLASSIFICATION DATE: 25 Years*
+
+(U//FOUO) This guide provides classification guidance for FISA/PAA/FAA. FISA
+governs the conduct of certain electronic surveillance activities within the United States and
+against U.S. persons, regardless of location, and requires surveillances be authorized by the
+United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (USFISC), or in certain limited
+circumstances, by the Attorney General. PAA was an interim version of the FISA modernization
+legislation and allowed the DNI and the Attorney General to jointly authorize the acquisition of
+foreign intelligence information concerning persons reasonably believed to be outside the United
+States. FAA is the permanent FISA modernization legislation and is authorized by the USFISC.
+
+(TS//NF) FISA includes all NSA FISA (to include Business Records, Large Content &
+FAA) and FBI FISA (to include Pen Register Trap Trace).
+
+(U//FOUO) The phrases, “seeks or obtains FISA authority” and “seeks or obtains PAA
+authority” used throughout this document include the fact that NSA collects/ processes/ analyzes/
+retains/ produces and then disseminates foreign intelligence information and data.
+
+(U//FOUO) Unless otherwise specified, classification guidance which concern NSA
+FISA activities apply to all forms of NSA FISA, including FAA.
+
+(U//FOUO) Consult with the Office of General Counsel or the SID Office of Oversight
+and Compliance for guidance on when FISA or other special authorities are needed to conduct
+SIGINT activities.
+
+(U//FOUO) Note: Timetable for FISA/PAA/FAA: FISA, 1978 – present; PAA and
+Continuation, August 2007 – July 2008; FAA, July 2008 – present.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+(U) FISA/PAA/FAA Activities:
+
+| Description of Information | Classification/ Markings | Reason | Declassification Date | Remarks |
+| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
+| **1. GENERAL FACTS** | | | | |
+| 1.1. (U) The fact that NSA conducts activities under Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) or Protect America Act (PAA). | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | |
+| 1.2. (U) The fact that NSA targets/collects/processes the communications of unspecified foreign governments/ organizations/ terrorist groups/ individuals under FISA/PAA. | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | (U) Section 2 provides classification guidance when communications entities are specified. |
+| 1.3. (U) The fact that unspecified selectors are targeted and collected under FISA/PAA. | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | (U) See Section 2.18 for classification guidance when selectors are specified. |
+| 1.4. (U) The fact that the PAA allows electronic surveillance of communications of persons reasonably believed to be foreign and outside the U.S. | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | |
+| 1.5. (U) The fact that NSA acquires foreign intelligence information from or with the assistance of an unspecified communications provider to collect PAA-authorized data. | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | (U) Identifying a specific communications provider would make this fact classified. |
+| 1.6. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) The fact that PAA-authorized activities were or may be conducted at an unspecified communications facility in the U.S. | SECRET// REL TO USA, FVEY | 1.4(c)\* | 25 Years\* | |
+| 1.7. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) The fact that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) approved, on 22 July 2002, a motion to allow NSA to | SECRET// REL TO USA, FVEY | 1.4(c)\* | 25 Years\* | (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) The CIA also receives this raw data. (U//FOUO) Classified based on |
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| | | | | |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| receive raw data from Court-authorized electronic surveillance and physical search acquired by the FBI of international terrorist groups, their agents, and related targets. | | | | Docket number 02-431, 22 July 2002. |
+| 1.8. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) The fact that FBI obtains FISA counterterrorism court orders on behalf of NSA. | SECRET// REL TO USA, FVEY | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | (TS//SI//NF) For FBI Pen Register Trap Trace (PR/TT), classification is TOP SECRET//SI// NOFORN. |
+| 1.9. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) The fact that FBI enables FISA-authorized surveillances, without identification of targets, on behalf of NSA. | SECRET// REL TO USA, FVEY | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) This will apply to either NSA- or FBI-secured court orders. |
+| 1.10. (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) The fact that NSA acquired or acquires signaling, dialing, routing and addressing information of electronic communications targeted under PAA from communications service providers. | SECRET//SI// REL TO USA, FVEY | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | |
+| 1.11. (U//FOUO) The association of any RAGTIME data labels, e.g., RAGTIME-C, etc., with NSA FISA or PAA activities. | UNCLASSIFIED// FOUO | Ex. 3* | N/A | (U//FOUO) These data labels will be applied to FISA raw traffic to ensure that only those who are properly trained to handle, retain, and disseminate FISA or PAA-authorized collection may do so. |
+| 1.12. (C//REL TO USA, FVEY) The fact that NSA FISA surveillances are subject to an Interagency Review Panel (IRP) policy approval process, with or without mention of the specific participants in that process or their roles. | CONFIDENTIAL// REL TO USA, FVEY | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | |
+| **2. (U) TARGETING/COLLECTION/PROCESSING** | | | | |
+| 2.1. (U) The fact that NSA seeks or obtains FISA | SECRET//SI// REL TO USA, FVEY | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | |
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| | | | | |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| authority against a specified country, with identification of specific foreign target facilities or their locations outside of the U.S. | *at a minimum* | | | |
+| 2.2. (U) The fact that NSA seeks or obtains FISA authority against a specified country, with identification of specific foreign target facilities or their locations inside the U.S. | TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | |
+| 2.3. (U) The fact that NSA seeks or obtains FISA authority against a specified country, without identification of specific foreign target facilities or their locations. | TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | (U//FOUO) When the foreign target entity or location is not specified, the default is that the activity could be taking place in the U.S., and therefore such information is classified at the TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN level in accordance with 2.2 above. |
+| 2.4. (TS//SI//NF) The fact that NSA seeks or obtains FISA authority against an international organization inside the U.S., with or without identification of specific communications entities. | TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | (TS//SI//NF) The classification level is TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN regardless of whether the international organization is specified for which NSA is seeking or obtaining FISA authority. |
+| 2.5. (TS//SI//NF) The fact that NSA seeks or obtains FISA authority against an international organization that includes 2nd Party governments, with or without identification of specific foreign target entities or locations. | TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | |
+| 2.6. (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) The fact that NSA seeks or obtains FISA authority, if necessary, | TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) The classification level is TOP SECRET//SI// |
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| | | | | |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| against an international organization outside of the U.S. that does not include 2nd Party governments, with or without identification of specific foreign target entities. | | | | REL TO USA, FVEY regardless of whether the international organization is specified for which NSA is seeking or obtaining FISA authority. |
+| 2.7. (TS//SI//NF) The fact that NSA seeks or obtains FISA authority against financial or commercial organizations, with or without identification of specific target entities or locations. | TOP SECRET//SI// NOFORN | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | (TS//SI//NF) The classification level is TOP SECRET//SI// NOFORN regardless of whether the financial or commercial organization is specified for which NSA is seeking or obtaining FISA authority. |
+| 2.8. (TS//SI//NF) The fact that NSA seeks or obtains FISA authority against an agent of a foreign power in the U.S., with or without specific foreign target entity locations. | TOP SECRET//SI// NOFORN | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | |
+| 2.9. (U//FOUO) The fact that NSA seeks or obtains FISA authority against specified U.S. persons. | TOP SECRET//SI// NOFORN | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | (U//FOUO) Refer to the FAA web site located at [REDACTED] for additional information concerning FAA authority.
(U) When the U.S. person is not specified, this fact is UNCLASSIFIED// FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. |
+| 2.10. (U) The fact that NSA conducts activities and/or targets and collects under FAA against an unspecified person. | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | (U//FOUO) S02 OCA decision, 25 October 2010, "Classification Decision Regarding NSA Activities Conducted under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act |
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| | | | | |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| | | | | Amendments Act" |
+| 2.11. (U) The fact that, pursuant to sections 702, 704 and/or 705 of the FAA, NSA conducts electronic surveillance activities and/or targets and collects against an unspecified person. | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | (U//FOUO) S02 OCA decision, 25 October 2010, "Classification Decision Regarding NSA Activities Conducted under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Amendments Act" |
+| 2.12. (U) The fact that NSA seeks or obtains FISA authority or sought PAA authority against unspecified terrorists or terrorist groups. | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | (U) See Sections 2.11, 2.12, and 2.15 for classification guidance when terrorists or terrorist groups are specified. |
+| 2.13. (U) The fact that NSA seeks or obtains FISA authority or sought PAA authority against specified terrorists or terrorist groups, outside the U.S. | SECRET//SI// REL TO USA, FVEY
*at a minimum* | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | (TS//SI//NF) For FBI Pen Register Trap Trace (PR/TT), classification is TOP SECRET//SI// NOFORN. |
+| 2.14. (U) The fact that NSA seeks or obtains FISA authority against specified terrorists or terrorist groups, inside the U.S. | TOP SECRET//SI// NOFORN | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | |
+| 2.15. (TS//SI//NF) The fact that NSA seeks or obtains FISA authority against communications from foreign governmental and diplomatic facilities in the U.S. | TOP SECRET//SI// NOFORN | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | (TS//SI//NF) The classification level is TOP SECRET//SI// NOFORN regardless of whether the foreign governmental or diplomatic facility in the U.S. is specified for which NSA is seeking or obtaining FISA authority. |
+| 2.16. (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) The fact that NSA seeks or obtains FISA authority against communications from foreign governmental or diplomatic facilities outside the U.S. | SECRET//SI// REL TO USA, FVEY
*at a minimum* | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) The classification level is SECRET//SI// REL TO USA, FVEY regardless of whether the foreign government or diplomatic facility outside the U.S. is specified for which NSA is seeking or obtaining FISA |
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| | | | | |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| | | | | authority. |
+| 2.17. (U) The fact that NSA seeks or obtains PAA authority against the communications of a specified foreign government, terrorist group, organization, or individual. | SECRET//SI// REL TO USA, FVEY
*at a minimum* | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | (U) Sensitivity of the target entity may also result in the application of NOFORN. |
+| 2.18. (TS//SI//NF) The fact that NSA seeks FISA authority to obtain business records (BR) for terrorist groups. | TOP SECRET//SI// NOFORN | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | (TS//SI//NF) The classification level is TOP SECRET//SI// NOFORN regardless of whether the terrorist group is specified for which NSA is seeking or obtaining FISA BR authority. |
+| 2.19. (TS//SI//NF) The fact that NSA receives or requests from FBI Pen Register Trap Trace (PR/TT) FISA warrants in order to get data about terrorist groups. | TOP SECRET//SI// NOFORN | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | (TS//SI//NF) The classification level is TOP SECRET//SI// NOFORN regardless of whether the terrorist group is specified for which NSA is seeking or obtaining FISA PR/TT authority. |
+| 2.20. (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) The identification of specific selectors (e.g., specific phone numbers; specific e-mail addresses) targeted in FISA warrants or PAA certifications. | SECRET//SI// REL TO USA, FVEY
*at a minimum* | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | (U) Classify at the same level as the classification assigned to the target (e.g., selectors for a target classified as TS//SI//NF per section 2.2, would also be classified TS//SI//NF). |
+| 2.21. (U) The identification of, or relationships with, providers. | TOP SECRET//SI// NOFORN
*at a minimum* | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | (U) Refer to appropriate ECI classification guides for additional instructions. |
+| 2.22. (U) The identification of specific communications methods/ technologies targeted/ collected/ processed under FISA or PAA. | SECRET// REL TO USA, FVEY
*at a minimum* | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | (U) Handle at the same classification level as required for the specific communications methods or technologies targeted/collected/ processed. Certain |
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| | | | | |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| | | | | facts about technologies collected under FISA or PAA may be determined to be UNCLASSIFIED, while other facts may be higher than SECRET// REL TO USA, FVEY.
(U//FOUO) If the FISA or PAA target entity is specified, refer to the classification guidance throughout Section 2. |
+| 2.23. (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Statistics or statistical trends relating to NSA FISA targets, including numbers of court orders, IRP policy approvals, targets, facilities, or selectors, or combinations or subcategories thereof, without mention of techniques involved. | TOP SECRET//SI// NOFORN | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | |
+| 2.24. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Statistics or statistical trends relating to FBI FISA targets, including numbers of court orders, targets, facilities, or selectors, or combinations or subcategories thereof, without mention of techniques involved. | SECRET// REL TO USA, FVEY | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | (TS//SI//NF) For FBI Pen Register Trap Trace (PR/TT), the classification is TOP SECRET//SI// NOFORN. |
+| 2.25. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Statistics or statistical trends relating to PAA targets, including number of certifications, targets, facilities, selectors, or combinations of subcategories thereof, without mention of techniques involved. | SECRET//SI// REL TO USA, FVEY
*at a minimum* | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | |
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| | | | | |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| **3. (U) DATA HANDLING**
+| 3.1. (TS//SI//NF) **Unminimized unevaluated** NSA FISA data (e.g., BR, large content, FAA) encrypted or unencrypted. | TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
(U) See Remarks | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | **(U//FOUO) Within NSA/CSS, the data must be labeled with appropriate RAGTIME-series markings.**
(U//FOUO) Traffic remains subject to FISA minimization procedures described in USSID SP0018, Annex A, plus supplemental minimization procedures as required.
(U//FOUO) Data may only be released to foreign partners when specifically approved by an appropriate authority on a case-by-case basis. |
+| 3.2. (U//FOUO) **Unminimized unevaluated** PAA data, encrypted or unencrypted. | TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
(U) See Remarks | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | **(U//FOUO) Within NSA/CSS, the data must be labeled with appropriate RAGTIME-series markings.**
(U//FOUO) Traffic remains subject to minimization procedures described in USSID SP0018, Annex A, and those prescribed under the respective PAA certifications.
(U//FOUO) Data may only be released to foreign partners when specifically approved by an appropriate authority on a case-by-case |
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| | | | | |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| | | | | basis |
+| 3.3. (U//FOUO) **Unminimized unevaluated** FBI FISA data, encrypted or unencrypted. | SECRET//SI//NOFORN
*at a minimum*
(U) See Remarks | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | **(U//FOUO) Within> NSA/CSS, the data must be labeled with appropriate RAGTIME-series markings.**
(U//FOUO) Traffic remains subject to FISA minimization procedures, described in USSID SP0018, Annex A, plus supplemental minimization procedures as required.
(U//FOUO) Target offices will also add the additional caveat statement required for FISC reporting.
(U//FOUO) Data may only be released to foreign partners when specifically approved by an appropriate authority on a case-by-case basis. |
+| 3.4 (TS//SI//NF) **Unminimized unevaluated** FBI PR/TT FISA data, encrypted or unencrypted. | TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
(U) See Remarks | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | **(U//FOUO) Within NSA/CSS, the data must be labeled with appropriate RAGTIME-series markings.**
(U//FOUO) Traffic remains subject to FISA minimization procedures, described in USSID SP0018, Annex A, plus supplemental minimization procedures as required.
(U//FOUO) Data |
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| | | | | |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| | | | | may only be released to foreign partners when specifically approved by an appropriate authority on a case-by-case basis. |
+| **3.5.** (TS//SI//NF) Unminimized evaluated NSA FISA data (e.g., BR, large content, FAA) such as a verbatim transcript or gisted traffic, that does not disclose specific methods or techniques. | TOP SECRET//SI// NOFORN
(U) See Remarks | 1.4(c)\* | 25 Years\* | (U//FOUO) Within NSA/CSS, the data must be labeled with appropriate RAGTIME-series markings.
(U//FOUO) Traffic remains subject to FISA minimization procedures, described in USSID SP0018, Annex A, plus supplemental minimization procedures as required.
(U) Methods are governed by the classification guides applicable to the specific methods involved. (U//FOUO) Data may only be released to foreign partners when specifically approved by an appropriate authority on a case-by-case basis. |
+| **3.6.** (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) **Unminimized** evaluated PAA data, such as a verbatim transcript or gisted traffic, that does not disclose specific methods or techniques. | SECRET//SI// NOFORN
*at a minimum*
(U) See Remarks | 1.4(c)\* | 25 Years\* | **(U//FOUO) Within NSA/CSS, the data must be labeled with appropriate RAGTIME-series markings.**
(U//FOUO) Traffic remains subject to minimization procedures |
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| | | | | |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| | | | | described in USSID SP0018, Annex A, plus supplemental minimization procedures as required, and those prescribed under the respective PAA certifications.
(U) Methods are governed by the classification guides applicable to the specific methods involved.
(U//FOUO) Data may only be released to foreign partners when specifically approved by an appropriate authority on a case-by-case basis. |
+| 3.7. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) **Unminimized** evaluated FBI FISA data, such as a verbatim transcript or gisted traffic, that does not disclose specific methods or techniques. | SECRET//SI// NOFORN
*at a minimum*
(U) See Remarks | 1.4(c)\* | 25 Years\* | **(U//FOUO) Within NSA/CSS, the data must be labeled with appropriate RAGTIME-series markings.**
(U//FOUO) Traffic remains subject to FISA minimization procedures, described in USSID SP0018, Annex A, plus supplemental minimization procedures as required.
(U//FOUO) Target offices will also add the additional caveat statement required for FISC reporting.
(U) Methods are governed by the classification guides |
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| | | | | |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| | | | | applicable to the specific methods involved.
(U//FOUO) Data may only be released to foreign partners when specifically approved by an appropriate authority on a case-by-case basis. |
+| 3.8. (TS//SI//NF) **Unminimized** evaluated FBI PR/TT data that does not disclose specific methods or techniques. | TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | (U//FOUO) Data may only be released to foreign partners when specifically approved by an appropriate authority on a case-by-case basis. |
+| 3.9. (U//FOUO) **Minimized** evaluated NSA FISA data, such as verbatim transcript or gisted traffic, that does not disclose specific methods or techniques. | TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY (U) See Remarks | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | (U//FOUO) Target offices may add caveats (e.g., NOFORN, ORCON, etc.) if the intelligence product itself warrants such protection.
(U) Methods are governed by the classification guides applicable to the specific methods involved. |
+| 3.10. (TS//SI//NF) **Minimized** evaluated NSA BR and large content FISA data that does not disclose specific methods or techniques. | TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | (U) Methods are governed by the classification guides applicable to the specific methods involved. |
+| 3.11. (U//FOUO) **Minimized** evaluated PAA data, such as a verbatim transcript or gisted traffic, that does not disclose specific methods or techniques. | SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
*at a minimum* | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | (U//FOUO) Target offices may add caveats (e.g., NOFORN, ORCON, etc.) if the intelligence product itself warrants such protection.
(U) Methods are |
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| | | | | |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| | | | | governed by the classification guides applicable to the specific methods involved. |
+| 3.12. (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) **Minimized** evaluated FBI FISA data, such as a verbatim transcript or gisted traffic, that does not disclose specific methods or techniques. | SECRET//SI// REL TO USA, FVEY/ FISA
*at a minimum* | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | (U//FOUO) Target offices may add caveats (e.g., NOFORN, ORCON, etc.) if the intelligence product itself warrants such protection.
(U//FOUO) Target offices will also add the additional caveat statement required for FISC reporting.
(U) Methods are governed by the classification guides applicable to the specific methods involved. |
+| 3.13. (TS//SI//NF) **Minimized** evaluated FBI PR/TT FISA data that does not disclose specific methods or techniques. | TOP SECRET//SI// NOFORN | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | (U) Methods are governed by the classification guides applicable to the specific methods involved. |
+| **4. (U) DISSEMINATION** | | | | |
+| 4.1. (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) SIGINT product derived from encrypted or unencrypted NSA FISA collection. | TOP SECRET//SI// REL TO USA, FVEY
(U) See Remarks | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | (U//FOUO) Target offices may add caveats (e.g., NOFORN, ORCON, etc.) if the intelligence product itself warrants such protection. |
+| 4.2. (TS//SI//NF) SIGINT product derived from encrypted or unencrypted NSA FISA-warranted BR or large content FISA collection. | TOP SECRET//SI// NOFORN | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | (U//FOUO) Target offices may add caveats (e.g., NOFORN, ORCON, etc.) if the intelligence product itself warrants such protection. |
+| 4.3. (U//FOUO) SIGINT product derived from encrypted or unencrypted PAA-authorized collection. | SECRET//SI// REL TO USA, FVEY
*at a minimum* | 1.4(c)* | 25 Years* | (U//FOUO) Target offices may add caveats (e.g., NOFORN, ORCON) |
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| | | | | |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| | | | | if the intelligence product itself warrants such protection. |
+| 4.4. (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) SIGINT product derived from encrypted or unencrypted FBI FISA-warranted collection when associated with NSA or SIGINT. | SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
*at a minimum* | 1.4(c)\* | 25 Years\* | (U//FOUO) Target offices may add caveats (e.g., NOFORN, ORCON) if the intelligence product itself warrants such protection.
(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Target offices will also add the additional caveat statement required for FBI FISA reporting. |
+| 4.5. (TS//SI//NF) SIGINT product derived from encrypted or unencrypted FBI PR/TT FISA-warranted collection. | TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN | 1.4(c)\* | 25 Years\* | (U//FOUO) Target offices may add caveats (e.g., ORCON) if the intelligence product itself warrants such protection. |
+
+\*25 years: Declassification in 25 years indicates that the information is classified for 25 years from the date a document is created or 25 years from the date of this original classification decision, whichever is later.
+
+\*1.4(c): Section 1.4(c) of E.O. 12958, as amended
+
+\*Ex 3: Exemption 3 of the Freedom of Information Act
+
+(U//FOUO) Additional Remarks: The denial of any facts in this guide concerning NSA's collection/processing/analyzing/retaining/producing and then disseminating of entities under FISA/PAA/FAA authority carries the same level of classification as the fact of NSA's performing such functions.
+
+(U) Acronyms
+
+(U) BR - Business Records
+(U) ECI - Exceptionally Controlled Information
+(U) FAA - FISA Amendments Act
+(U) FISA - Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
+(U) FISC - Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+(U) IRP - Interagency Review Panel
+(U) PAA – Protect America Act
+(U) PR/TT - Pen Register Trap Trace
+(U) USSID - United States Signals Intelligence Directive
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
diff --git a/data/FISA-dataflow/FISA-dataflow.md b/data/FISA-dataflow/FISA-dataflow.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5cf0e32
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FISA-dataflow/FISA-dataflow.md
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+# FISA dataflow
+
+* RAGTIME/SQF partition
+ - SIGAD:US-984J
+ - PDDG:
+ - Each FISA account has a unique Case Notation:
+ * XX.SQF[REDACTED]
+* PALMCARTE
+ * Duplicate FISA feed to the NAC
+ * TRAFFIC THIEF
+ * LOCATOR DATA-BASE
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FISA-dataflow/metadata.json b/data/FISA-dataflow/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5e40553
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FISA-dataflow/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+{
+ "title": "FISA dataflow",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "This document describes the technical SIGINT architecture for FISA data processing, specifically detailing how the RAGTIME/SQF partition and PALMCARTE system utilize unique case notations and metadata tools to route and track intercepted communications.",
+ "long_description": "This document outlines the technical architecture used by the NSA to process and distribute surveillance data collected under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). It details the routing of intercepted communications through the RAGTIME/SQF partition, where individual targets are identified by unique Case Notations, and the subsequent duplication of these feeds via the PALMCARTE system for broader analysis.\n\nThe data flow includes TRAFFIC THIEF and the LOCATOR database. This dataflow ensures that FISA-authorized collection is systematically organized and accessible to specialized analysis centers like the NAC.",
+ "tags": [
+ "FISA",
+ "case notation",
+ "NAC",
+ "data flows",
+ "surveillance architecture",
+ "metadata",
+ "target tracking"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "genre": "slides",
+ "programs": [
+ "RAGTIME",
+ "PALMCARTE",
+ "TRAFFICTHIEF",
+ "LOCATOR",
+ "SQF"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2014-07-09",
+ "title": "Meet the Muslim-American Leaders the FBI and NSA Have Been Spying On",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2014/07/09/under-surveillance/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Greenwald, Glenn",
+ "Hussain, Murtaza"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [
+ "Meyer, Josh"
+ ],
+ "doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2014/07/08/fisa-dataflow/",
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1213555/slide-redacted.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "b688c463d09b52c9cfca8b45c70aeb7b796cacaded9b76c5b76a61b8bc1996b9",
+ "pages": 1
+}
diff --git a/data/FISA-recap/FISA-recap.md b/data/FISA-recap/FISA-recap.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..56a2ba5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FISA-recap/FISA-recap.md
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20291123
+
+05 July 2005
+
+E-mail: address: badASGguy@hotmail.com
+Identity: Mohammed Raghead (ASG Sales Associate)
+
+ASG background (below is an example from a past justification)
+
+| Email Account | Created | Case Notation | Responsible Agency | Collection Status | Expire Date | Foreign Power | Nationality | Target |
+| :--------------------- | :------- | :--------------- | :----------------- | :---------------- | :---------- | :------------ | :------------ | :--------- |
+| [REDACTED] | 10/17/06 | XX.SQF[REDACTED] | NSA | Terminated | 2/1/08 | | Unknown | |
+| [REDACTED] | 10/17/06 | XX.SQF[REDACTED] | NSA | Terminated | 2/1/08 | | Unknown | |
+| [REDACTED] | 10/30/06 | XX.SQF[REDACTED] | NSA | Terminated | 2/1/08 | | Unknown | |
+| [REDACTED] | 11/1/06 | XX.SQF[REDACTED] | CIA | Terminated | 2/1/08 | | US Person | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | 11/2/06 | XX.SQF[REDACTED] | CIA | Terminated | 2/1/08 | | Unknown | |
+| [REDACTED] | 11/3/06 | XX.SQF[REDACTED] | CIA | Terminated | 2/1/08 | | Non-US Person | |
+| [REDACTED]@cair.com* | 11/9/06 | XX.SQF066476 | FBI | Terminated | 2/1/08 | | US Person | |
+| [REDACTED] | 5/29/07 | XX.SQF[REDACTED] | NSA | Terminated | 2/1/08 | | Unknown | |
+| [REDACTED] | 8/17/07 | XX.SQF[REDACTED] | FBI | Terminated | 2/1/08 | | US Person | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | 10/12/07 | XX.SQF[REDACTED] | CIA | Terminated | 2/1/08 | | Non-US Person | |
+| [REDACTED] | 10/16/07 | XX.SQF[REDACTED] | CIA | Terminated | 2/1/08 | | Non-US Person | |
+| [REDACTED] | 10/16/06 | XX.SQF[REDACTED] | NSA | Terminated | 2/7/08 | | Unknown | |
+| [REDACTED] | 10/20/06 | XX.SQF[REDACTED] | NSA | Terminated | 2/7/08 | | Unknown | |
+| [REDACTED] | 10/20/06 | XX.SQF[REDACTED] | NSA | Terminated | 2/7/08 | | Unknown | |
+| [REDACTED] | 10/20/06 | XX.SQF[REDACTED] | NSA | Terminated | 2/7/08 | | Non-US Person | |
+| [REDACTED] | 10/20/06 | XX.SQF[REDACTED] | NSA | Terminated | 2/7/08 | | Non-US Person | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | 10/30/06 | XX.SQF[REDACTED] | NSA | Terminated | 2/7/08 | | Unknown | |
+| [REDACTED] | 10/30/06 | XX.SQF[REDACTED] | NSA | Terminated | 2/7/08 | | Unknown | |
+| [REDACTED] | 10/30/06 | XX.SQF[REDACTED] | NSA | Terminated | 2/7/08 | | Non-US Person | |
+| [REDACTED] | 10/16/07 | XX.SQF[REDACTED] | NSA | Terminated | 2/7/08 | | Non-US Person | |
+| [REDACTED] | 10/18/07 | XX.SQF[REDACTED] | NSA | Terminated | 2/7/08 | | Non-US Person | |
+| [REDACTED] | 12/11/07 | XX.SQF[REDACTED] | FBI | Terminated | 2/7/08 | | US Person | |
+| [REDACTED] | 12/11/07 | XX.SQF[REDACTED] | FBI | Terminated | 2/7/08 | | US Person | |
+| [REDACTED] | 12/11/07 | XX.SQF[REDACTED] | FBI | Terminated | 2/7/08 | | US Person | |
+| [REDACTED] | 12/11/07 | XX.SQF[REDACTED] | FBI | Terminated | 2/7/08 | | US Person | |
+| [REDACTED] | 3/27/06 | XX.SQF[REDACTED] | CIA | Terminated | 2/8/08 | | Unknown | |
+| [REDACTED]@yahoo.com* | 4/17/06 | XX.SQF065444 | FBI | Terminated | 2/8/08 | | Unknown | |
+| [REDACTED] | 10/20/06 | XX.SQF[REDACTED] | | Terminated | 2/8/08 | | Non-US Person | |
+| [REDACTED]@aol.com* | 5/2/07 | XX.SQF075597 | FBI | Terminated | 2/8/08 | | US Person | |
+| [REDACTED] | 10/19/07 | XX.SQF[REDACTED] | NSA | Terminated | 2/8/08 | | Non-US Person | |
+| [REDACTED] | 10/19/07 | XX.SQF[REDACTED] | CIA | Terminated | 2/8/08 | | Non-US Person | |
+| [REDACTED] | 10/19/07 | XX.SQF[REDACTED] | NSA | Terminated | 2/8/08 | | Non-US Person | |
+
+| Email Account | Created | Case Notation | Responsible Agency | Collection Status | Expire Date |
+| :------------ | :------ | :------------ | :----------------- | :---------------- | :---------- |
+| [REDACTED]@yahoo.com* | 4/17/06 | XX.SQF065444 | FBI | Terminated | 2/8/08 |
+| [REDACTED]@aol.com* | 5/2/07 | XX.SQF075597 | FBI | Terminated | 2/8/08 |
+
+| Email Account | Created | Case Notation | Responsible Agency | Collection Status | Expire Date |
+| :------------ | :------ | :------------ | :----------------- | :---------------- | :---------- |
+| [REDACTED]@yahoo.com | 3/9/05 | XX.SQF055191 | FBI | Sustained | 3/27/08 |
+
+| Email Account | Created | Case Notation | Responsible Agency | Collection Status | Expire Date |
+| :------------ | :------ | :------------ | :----------------- | :---------------- | :---------- |
+| [REDACTED]@yahoo.com | 6/27/07 | XX.SQF075977 | FBI | Sustained | 5/23/08 |
+
+| Email Account | Created | Case Notation | Responsible Agency | Collection Status | Expire Date |
+| :------------ | :------ | :------------ | :----------------- | :---------------- | :---------- |
+| [REDACTED]@cair-net.org* | 7/17/06 | XX.SQF065811 | | Terminated | 12/8/06 |
+| [REDACTED]@juno.com* | 9/20/06 | XX.SQF066242 | FBI | Terminated | 2/1/08 |
+| [REDACTED]@cair.com* | 11/9/06 | XX.SQF066476 | FBI | Terminated | 2/1/08 |
+
+| Email Account | Created | Case Notation | Responsible Agency | Collection Status | Expire Date |
+| :------------ | :------ | :------------ | :----------------- | :---------------- | :---------- |
+| [REDACTED]@amirahmadi.com | 8/17/07 | XX.SQF076232 | FBI | Sustained | 5/16/08 |
+| [REDACTED]@rci.rutgers.edu | 11/19/07 | XX.SQF077335 | FBI | Sustained | 5/16/08 |
+| [REDACTED]@gmail.com | 2/22/08 | XX.SQF085351 | FBI | Sustained | 5/16/08 |
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FISA-recap/metadata.json b/data/FISA-recap/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5ba27ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FISA-recap/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+{
+ "title": "FISA recap",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "This document is a Top Secret NSA \"FISA Recap\" spreadsheet detailing electronic surveillance conducted between 2005 and 2008. It tracks specific email accounts targeted under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, listing the responsible agencies (NSA, FBI, and CIA), their legal \"Case Notation,\" and the duration of collection. Notably, the log includes prominent U.S. Persons and organizations, such as the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), and features a 2005 formatting guide that uses a racial slur as a placeholder for a target's identity.",
+ "long_description": "These excerpts represent raw data from a highly classified NSA spreadsheet used to track the status of surveillance targets. The logs provide a window into the scale and scope of digital monitoring authorized under FISA. The data entries span several years, primarily focusing on the mid-2000s, and categorize targets by their email addresses, the agency managing the case, and whether the surveillance is currently \"Sustained\" or \"Terminated.\"\n\nA significant aspect of this document is the explicit identification of \"US Persons\" within the surveillance dragnet. While FISA is intended to monitor foreign powers and their agents, the recap includes 8 accounts marked as US persons. Specifically, the list includes email domains associated with CAIR (Council on American-Islamic Relations) and personal accounts from providers like Yahoo, AOL, and Gmail belonging to American activists, lawyers, and academics. This highlights the \"incidental\" or direct monitoring of American citizens by the FBI and NSA during this period.\n\nThe document also includes a controversial instructional excerpt from July 2005. It provides a template for analysts on how to format justifications for surveillance, using the offensive placeholder name \"Mohammed Raghead\" for a hypothetical target. This specific detail has been cited in investigative journalism as evidence of systemic bias or profiling within the intelligence community's targeting process. The spreadsheet's structure illustrates the administrative rigor used to track its 42 listed accounts, most of them terminated.",
+ "tags": [
+ "FISA",
+ "Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court",
+ "religious profiling",
+ "racial slurs",
+ "targeted surveillance",
+ "CAIR",
+ "Council on American-Islamic Relations",
+ "email interception"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2008-05-16",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL"
+ ],
+ "banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20291123",
+ "genre": "other",
+ "programs": [
+ "SQF"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Gill, Faisal",
+ "Ghafoor, Asim",
+ "Saeed, Agha",
+ "Awad, Nihad",
+ "Amirahmadi, Hooshang"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2014-07-09",
+ "title": "Meet the Muslim-American Leaders the FBI and NSA Have Been Spying On",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2014/07/09/under-surveillance/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Greenwald, Glenn",
+ "Hussain, Murtaza"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [
+ "Meyer, Josh"
+ ]
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "archive_comment": "The people's names are not visible in the document, but the article states that they appear in this spreadsheet document.",
+ "pdf_sha256": "4831babc85af4f6542ba000c64c02a6ea803c31706bd041a39629b2823217719",
+ "pages": 7
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/2011_OIG_Report_on_Bulk_Collection/2011_OIG_Report_on_Bulk_Collection.md b/data/FOIA/2011_OIG_Report_on_Bulk_Collection/2011_OIG_Report_on_Bulk_Collection.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..22d8a08
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/2011_OIG_Report_on_Bulk_Collection/2011_OIG_Report_on_Bulk_Collection.md
@@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+
+U.S. Department of Justice
+Office of Legislative Affairs
+
+Office of the Assistant Attorney General
+
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+
+February 2, 2011
+
+The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
+Chairman
+The Honorable Saxby Chambliss
+Vice Chairman
+Select Committee on Intelligence
+United States Senate
+Washington, DC 20510
+
+Dear Madam Chairman and Mr. Vice Chairman:
+
+~~(TS)~~ Please find enclosed an updated document that describes the bulk collection programs conducted under Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act (the "business records" provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)) and Section 402 of FISA (the "pen/trap" provision). The Department and the Intelligence Community jointly prepared the enclosed document that describes these two bulk collection programs, the authorities under which they operate, the restrictions imposed by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, the National Security Agency's record of compliance, and the importance of these programs to the national security of the United States.
+
+~~(TS)~~ We believe that making this document available to all Members of Congress, as we did with a similar document in December 2009, is an effective way to inform the legislative debate about reauthorization of Section 215. However, as you know, it is critical that Members understand the importance to national security of maintaining the secrecy of these programs, and that the SSCI's plan to make the document available to other Members is subject to the strict rules set forth below.
+
+~~(TS)~~ Like the document provided to the Committee on December 13, 2009, the enclosed document is being provided on the understanding that it will be provided only to Members of Congress (and cleared SSCI, Judiciary Committee, and leadership staff), in a secure location in the SSCI's offices, for a limited time period to be agreed upon, and consistent with the rules of the SSCI regarding review of classified information and non-disclosure agreements. No
+
+~~Classified by: Assistant Attorney General, NSD~~
+~~Reason: 1.4(c)~~
+~~Declassify on: February 2, 2036~~
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+
+The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
+The Honorable Saxby Chambliss
+Page Two
+
+photocopies may be made of the document, and any notes taken by Members may not be removed from the secure location. We further understand that SSCI staff will be present at all times when the document is being reviewed, and that Executive Branch officials will be available nearby during certain, pre-established times to answer questions should they arise. We also request your support in ensuring that the Members are well informed regarding the importance of this classified and extremely sensitive information to prevent any unauthorized disclosures resulting from this process. We intend to provide the same document to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) under similar conditions, so that it may be made available to the Members of the House, as well as cleared leadership, HPSCI and House Judiciary Committee staff.
+
+(U) We look forward to continuing to work with you and your staff as Congress continues its deliberations on reauthorizing the expiring provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act.
+
+Sincerely,
+
+Ronald Weich
+Assistant Attorney General
+
+Enclosure
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+
+U.S. Department of Justice
+Office of Legislative Affairs
+
+Office of the Assistant Attorney General
+
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+
+February 2, 2011
+
+The Honorable Mike Rogers
+Chairman
+The Honorable C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger
+Ranking Minority Member
+Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
+U.S. House of Representatives
+Washington, DC 20515
+
+Dear Mr. Chairman and Congressman Ruppersberger:
+
+~~(TS)~~ Please find enclosed an updated document that describes the bulk collection programs conducted under Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act (the "business records" provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)) and Section 402 of FISA (the "pen/trap" provision). The Department and the Intelligence Community jointly prepared the enclosed document that describes these two bulk collection programs, the authorities under which they operate, the restrictions imposed by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, the National Security Agency's record of compliance, and the importance of these programs to the national security of the United States.
+
+~~(TS)~~ We believe that making this document available to all Members of Congress, as we did with a similar document in December 2009, is an effective way to inform the legislative debate about reauthorization of Section 215. However, as you know, it is critical that Members understand the importance to national security of maintaining the secrecy of these programs, and that the HPSCI's plan to make the document available to other Members is subject to the strict rules set forth below.
+
+~~(TS)~~ Like the document provided to the Committee on December 13, 2009, the enclosed document is being provided on the understanding that it will be provided only to Members of Congress (and cleared HPSCI, Judiciary Committee, and leadership staff), in a secure location in the HPSCI's offices, for a limited time period to be agreed upon, and consistent with the rules of the HPSCI regarding review of classified information and non-disclosure agreements. No
+
+~~Classified by: Assistant Attorney General, NSD~~
+~~Reason: 1.4(c)~~
+~~Declassify on: February 2, 2036~~
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+
+The Honorable Mike Rogers
+The Honorable C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger
+Page Two
+
+photocopies may be made of the document, and any notes taken by Members may not be removed from the secure location. We further understand that HPSCI staff will be present at all times when the document is being reviewed, and that Executive Branch officials will be available nearby during certain, pre-established times to answer questions should they arise. We also request your support in ensuring that the Members are well informed regarding the importance of this classified and extremely sensitive information to prevent any unauthorized disclosures resulting from this process. We intend to provide the same document to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) under similar conditions, so that it may be made available to the Members of the Senate, as well as cleared leadership, SSCI and Senate Judiciary Committee staff.
+
+(U) We look forward to continuing to work with you and your staff as Congress continues its deliberations on reauthorizing the expiring provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act.
+
+Sincerely,
+
+Ronald Weich
+Assistant Attorney General
+
+Enclosure
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+
+~~(TS//SI//NE)~~ Report on the National Security Agency's Bulk Collection Programs for USA PATRIOT Act Reauthorization
+
+(U) THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT DESCRIBES SOME OF THE MOST SENSITIVE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PROGRAMS CONDUCTED BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. THIS INFORMATION IS HIGHLY CLASSIFIED AND ONLY A LIMITED NUMBER OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH OFFICIALS HAVE ACCESS TO IT. PUBLICLY DISCLOSING ANY OF THIS INFORMATION WOULD BE EXPECTED TO CAUSE EXCEPTIONALLY GRAVE DAMAGE TO OUR NATION'S INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES AND TO NATIONAL SECURITY. THEREFORE IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT ALL WHO HAVE ACCESS TO THIS DOCUMENT ABIDE BY THEIR OBLIGATION NOT TO DISCLOSE THIS INFORMATION TO ANY PERSON UNAUTHORIZED TO RECEIVE IT.
+
+### Key Points
+
+* (U) Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, which expires at the end of February 2011, allows the government, upon approval of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISA Court"), to obtain access to certain business records for national security investigations;
+* (U) Section 402 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"), which is not subject to a sunset, allows the government, upon approval of the FISA Court, to install and use a pen register or trap and trace ("pen/trap") device for national security investigations;
+* ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ These authorities support two sensitive and important intelligence collection programs. These programs are authorized to collect in bulk certain dialing, routing, addressing and signaling information about telephone calls and electronic communications, such as the telephone numbers or e-mail addresses that were communicating and the times and dates but not the content of the calls or e-mail messages themselves;
+* ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ Although the programs collect a large amount of information, the vast majority of that information is never reviewed by any person, because the information is not responsive to the limited queries that are authorized for intelligence purposes;
+* ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ The programs are subject to an extensive regime of internal checks, particularly for U.S. persons, and are monitored by the FISA Court and Congress;
+* ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ Although there have been compliance problems in recent years, the Executive Branch has worked to resolve them, subject to oversight by the FISA Court; and
+* ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ The National Security Agency's (NSA) bulk collection programs provide important tools in the fight against terrorism, especially in identifying terrorist plots against the homeland. These tools are also unique in that they can produce intelligence not otherwise available to NSA.
+
+~~Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52~~
+~~Dated: 20070108~~
+~~Declassify On: 20360101~~
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+
+### Background
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ Since the tragedy of 9/11, the Intelligence Community has developed an array of capabilities to detect, identify and disrupt terrorist plots against the United States and its interests. Detecting threats by exploiting terrorist communications has been, and continues to be, one of the critical tools in that effort. Above all else, it is imperative that we have a capability to rapidly identify any terrorist threats emanating from within the United States.
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ Prior to the attacks of 9/11, the NSA intercepted and transcribed seven calls from hijacker Khalid al-Mihdhar to a facility associated with an al Qa'ida safehouse in Yemen. However, NSA's access point overseas did not provide the technical data indicating the location from where al-Mihdhar was calling. Lacking the originating phone number, NSA analysts concluded that al-Mihdhar was overseas. In fact, al-Mihdhar was calling from San Diego, California. According to the 9/11 Commission Report (pages 269-272):
+
+"Investigations or interrogation of them [Khalid al-Mihdhar, etc], and investigation of their travel and financial activities could have yielded evidence of connections to other participants in the 9/11 plot. The simple fact of their detention could have derailed the plan. In any case, the opportunity did not arise."
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ Today, under FISA Court authorization pursuant to the "business records" authority of the FISA (commonly referred to as "Section 215"), the government has developed a program to close the gap that allowed al-Mihdhar to plot undetected within the United States while communicating with a known terrorist overseas. This and similar programs operated pursuant to FISA, including exercise of pen/trap authorities, provide valuable intelligence information.
+
+(U) Absent legislation, Section 215 will expire on February 28, 2011, along with the so-called "lone wolf" provision and roving wiretaps (which this document does not address). The pen/trap authority does not expire.
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ The Section 215 and pen/trap authorities are used by the U.S. Government in selected cases to acquire significant foreign intelligence information that cannot otherwise be acquired either at all or on a timely basis. Any U.S. person information that is acquired is subject to strict, court-imposed restrictions on the retention, use, and dissemination of such information and is also subject to strict and frequent audit and reporting requirements.
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ The largest and most significant use of these authorities is to support two important and highly sensitive intelligence collection programs under which NSA collects and analyzes large amounts of transactional data obtained from certain telecommunications service providers in the United States. [REDACTED] Although these programs have been briefed to the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees, it is important that other Members of Congress have access to information about these two programs when considering reauthorization of the expiring
+
+2
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+
+PATRIOT Act provisions. The Executive Branch views it as essential that an appropriate statutory basis remains in place for NSA to conduct these two programs.
+
+### Section 215 and Pen-Trap Collection
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ Under the program based on Section 215, NSA is authorized to collect from certain telecommunications service providers certain business records that contain information about communications between two telephone numbers, such as the date, time, and duration of a call. There is no collection of the content of any telephone call under this program, and under longstanding Supreme Court precedent the information collected is not protected by the Fourth Amendment. In this program, court orders (generally lasting 90 days) are served on telecommunications companies [REDACTED]
+
+The orders generally require production of the business records (as described above) relating to substantially all of the telephone calls handled by the companies, including both calls made between the United States and a foreign country and calls made entirely within the United States.
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ Under the program based on the pen/trap provision in FISA, the government is authorized to collect similar kinds of information about electronic communications – such as "to" and "from" lines in e-mail, certain routing information, and the date and time an e-mail is sent - excluding the content of the e-mail and the "subject" line. Again, this information is collected pursuant to court orders (generally lasting 90 days) and, under relevant court decisions, is not protected by the Fourth Amendment.
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ Both of these programs operate on a very large scale. [REDACTED]
+
+However, as described below, only a tiny fraction of such records are ever viewed by NSA intelligence analysts.
+
+### Checks and Balances
+
+#### FISA Court Oversight
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ To conduct these bulk collection programs, the government has obtained orders from several different FISA Court judges based on legal standards set forth in Section 215 and the FISA pen/trap provision. Before obtaining any information from a telecommunications service provider, the government must establish, and the FISA Court must conclude, that the information is relevant to an authorized investigation. In addition, the government must comply with detailed "minimization procedures" required by the FISA Court that govern the retention and dissemination of the information obtained. Before NSA analysts may query bulk records, they must have reasonable articulable suspicion - referred to as "RAS" - that the number or e-mail address they submit is associated with [REDACTED]
+
+3
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+
+The RAS requirement is designed to protect against the indiscriminate querying of the collected data so that only information pertaining to one of the foreign powers listed in the relevant Court order [REDACTED] is provided to NSA personnel for further intelligence analysis. The bulk data collected under each program can be retained for 5 years.
+
+### Congressional Oversight
+
+(U) These programs have been briefed to the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees, through hearings, briefings, and visits to NSA. In addition, the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees have been fully briefed on the compliance issues discussed below.
+
+### Compliance Issues
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ In 2009, a number of technical compliance problems and human implementation errors in these two bulk collection programs were discovered as a result of Department of Justice (DOJ) reviews and internal NSA oversight. However, neither DOJ, NSA, nor the FISA Court has found any intentional or bad-faith violations.
+
+In accordance with the Court's rules, upon discovery, these inconsistencies were reported as compliance incidents to the FISA Court, which ordered appropriate remedial action. The FISA Court placed several restrictions on aspects of the business records collection program until the compliance processes were improved to its satisfaction. [REDACTED]
+
+(U) The incidents, and the Court's responses, were also reported to the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees in great detail. The Committees, the Court and the Executive Branch have responded actively to the incidents. The Court has imposed safeguards that, together with greater efforts by the Executive Branch, have resulted in significant and effective changes in the compliance program.
+
+(U) All parties will continue to report to the FISA Court and to Congress on compliance issues as they arise, and to address them effectively.
+
+4
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+
+### Intelligence Value of the Collection
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ As noted, these two collection programs significantly strengthen the Intelligence Community's early warning system for the detection of terrorists and discovery of plots against the homeland. They allow the Intelligence Community to detect phone numbers and e-mail addresses within the United States that may be contacting targeted phone numbers and e-mail addresses associated with suspected foreign terrorists abroad and vice-versa; and entirely domestic connections between entities within the United States tied to a suspected foreign terrorist abroad. NSA needs access to telephony and e-mail transactional information in bulk so that it can quickly identify and assess the network of contacts that a targeted number or address is connected to, whenever there is RAS that the targeted number or address is associated with [REDACTED] Importantly, there are no intelligence collection tools that, independently or in combination, provide an equivalent capability.
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ To maximize the operational utility of the data, the data cannot be collected prospectively once a lead is developed because important connections could be lost in data that was sent prior to the identification of the RAS phone number or e-mail address. NSA identifies the network of contacts by applying sophisticated analysis to the massive volume of metadata but always based on links to a number or e-mail address which itself is associated with a counterterrorism target. (Again, communications metadata is the dialing, routing, addressing or signaling information associated with an electronic communication, but not content) The more metadata NSA has access to, the more likely it is that NSA can identify, discover and understand the network of contacts linked to targeted numbers or addresses Information discovered through NSA's analysis of the metadata is then provided to the appropriate federal national security agencies, including the FBI, which are responsible for further investigation or analysis of any potential terrorist threat to the United States.
+
+*****
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ In conclusion, the Section 215 and pen/trap bulk collection programs provide an important capability to the Intelligence Community. The attacks of 9/11 taught us that applying lead information from foreign intelligence in a comprehensive and systemic fashion is required to protect the homeland, and the programs discussed in this paper cover a critical seam in our defense against terrorism. Recognizing that the programs have implications for the privacy interests of U.S. person data, extensive policies, safeguards, and reviews have been enacted by the FISA Court, DOJ, ODNI and NSA.
+
+5
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
diff --git a/data/FOIA/2011_OIG_Report_on_Bulk_Collection/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/2011_OIG_Report_on_Bulk_Collection/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a6bedb9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/2011_OIG_Report_on_Bulk_Collection/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+{
+ "title": "2011 OIG Report on Bulk Collection ",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "A DOJ report to the Senate Intelligence Committee describing the government's bulk collection program under Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [
+ "reports to congress",
+ "telephony metadata",
+ "Section 215",
+ "FISA",
+ "PATRIOT Act"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "DOJ",
+ "date_created": "2011-02-11",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [
+ "PATRIOT Act"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Weich, Ronald",
+ "Feinstein, Dianne",
+ "Rogers, Mike"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-06-27",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/2011-oig-report-bulk-collection-2",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [
+ {
+ "id": "ACLU_-_2011_OIG_Report_on_Bulk_Collection"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "639b82f16c8e56faa1bd9d81c95b546c3626e1f35b778932793b1f6e17d67267",
+ "pages": 9
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_1993-07-27_USSID-18_NSA-Release-November-2013/ACLU_-_1993-07-27_USSID-18_NSA-Release-November-2013.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_1993-07-27_USSID-18_NSA-Release-November-2013/ACLU_-_1993-07-27_USSID-18_NSA-Release-November-2013.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c5241e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_1993-07-27_USSID-18_NSA-Release-November-2013/ACLU_-_1993-07-27_USSID-18_NSA-Release-November-2013.md
@@ -0,0 +1,2140 @@
+All redactions taken in accordance with one or more of the following FOIA exemptions and statutes:
+(b) (1)
+(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36
+(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024(i)
+(b) (3) - 18 USC 798
+
+~~SECRET~~
+
+849
+
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
+Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
+
+UNITED STATES
+SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE
+DIRECTIVE
+18
+27 July 1993
+
+See Letter of Promulgation for instructions on reproduction or release of this document.
+
+OPC: D2
+CLASSIFIED BY NSA/CSSM 123-2
+DECLASSIFY ON: ORIGINATING AGENCY'S DETERMINATION REQUIRED
+
+~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~
+~~SECRET~~
+
+~~SECRET~~
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
+Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
+27 July 1993.
+UNITED STATES SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE
+(USSID)
+18
+LEGAL COMPLIANCE AND
+MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES (FOUO)
+LETTER OF PROMULGATION
+(U) This USSID prescribes policies and procedures and assigns responsibilities to ensure that the
+missions and functions of the United States SIGINT: System (USSS) are conducted in a manner that
+safeguards the constitutional rights of U.S. persons.
+(U) This USSID has been completely rewritten to make it shorter and easier to understand. It
+constitutes a summary of the laws and regulations directly affecting USSS operations. All USSS
+personnel who collect, process, retain, or disseminate information to, from, or about U.S. persons or
+persons in the United States must be familiar with its contents.
+(FOUO) This USSID supersedes USSID 18 and USSID 18, Annex A (distributed separately to
+selected recipients), both of which are dated: 20 October 1980, and must now be destroyed. Notify
+DIRNSA/CHOSS (USSID Manager) if this edition of USSID: 18 is destroyed because of an emergency
+action; otherwise, request approval from DIRNSA/CHCSS before destroying this USSID.
+(FOUO) Release or exposure of this document to contractors and consultants without approval
+from the USSID Manager is prohibited, instructions applicable to release or exposure of USSID to
+contractors and consultants may be found in USSID 19.
+(FOUO) Questions and comments concerning this USSID should be addressed to the Office of
+the General Counsel, NSA/CSS (Attention: [REDACTED]) NSTS 963-3121 or [REDACTED]
+
+J. M. MCCONNELL
+Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
+Director
+CLASSIFIED BY NSA/CSSM 123-2
+DECLASSIFY ON: ORIGINATING AGENCY'S DETERMINATION REQUIRED
+~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~
+
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
+Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
+28 October 1997
+UNITED STATES SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE
+DIRECTIVE
+(USSID)
+18
+LEGAL COMPLIANCE AND MINIMIZATION
+PROCEDURES (FOUO)
+CHANGE 1
+LETTER OF PROMULGATION
+(FOUO) This hard copy change provides replacement pages for your copy of USSID 18, dated
+27 July 1993.
+Actions: 1. Change references to "P05" to read "P02" in paragraphs 5.4.d.(3), 7.1. (last line),
+7.2.c.(6) (lines 3 and 5), 7.3.c.(1) (lines 2 and 3), 7.5., 8.3.b., and 8.4.b. in the basic USSID 18.
+2. From your copy of USSID 18 remove and destroy pages A-1/1 through A-1/8.
+3. Insert new pages A-1/1 through A-1/9 (replacement of pages in above action). These
+pages update the USSID to reflect current changes in standard minimization procedures for NSA elec-
+tronic surveillances.
+4. In the last paragraph of the Letter of Promulgation change to read: "Questions and
+comments concerning this USSID should be addressed to the Office of General Counsel, NSA/CSS,
+NSTS 963-3121 or [REDACTED]
+5. On the Table of Contents (page iv), change the title of Appendix 1 to Annex A to read
+"Standardized Minimization Procedures For NSA Electronic Surveillances".
+FOR THE EXECUTIVE AGENT:
+[REDACTED]
+USSID Manager
+NOTE: DESTROY THIS PAGE AFTER POSTING THE ENCLOSED CHANGE MATERIAL.
+RETAIN THE ORIGINAL LETTER OF PROMULGATION WITH USSID 18.
+~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~
+
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+CHANGE REGISTER..
+CHANGE
+ENTERED
+No.
+Date
+Authority (Msg Cite/DTG, Hard Copy (HC))
+Date
+By
+~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~
+B
+
+SECRET
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+TABLE OF CONTENTS
+SECTION 1-PREFACE
+1
+SECTION 2-REFERENCES
+1
+SECTION 3-POLICY
+2
+SECTION 4-COLLECTION
+2
+4.1. Communications to, from or About U.S. Persons and [REDACTED]
+2
+a. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Approval
+2
+b. Attorney General Approval
+2
+C. DIRNSA/CHOSS Approval
+2
+d. Emergency Situations
+3
+e. Annual Reports
+4
+4.2. [REDACTED]
+4
+4.3. Incidental Acquisition of U.S. Person Information
+4
+4.4. Nonresident Alien Targets Entering the United States
+5
+4.5. U.S. Person Targets Entering the United States
+5
+4.6. Requests to Target U.S. Persons
+5
+4.7. Direction Finding..
+5
+4.8. Distress Signals
+5
+4.9. COMSEC Monitoring and Security Testing of Automated Information Systems
+6
+SECTION 5-PROCESSING
+6
+5.1. Use of Selection Terms During Processing
+6
+5.2. Annual Review by DDO
+6
+5.3. Forwarding of Intercepted Material
+6
+5.4. Nonforeign Communications
+7
+a. Communications between Persons in the United States
+7
+b. Communications between U.S. Persons
+7
+C. Communications Involving an Officer or Employee
+7
+of the U.S. Government
+d. Exceptions
+7
+5.5. Radio Communications with a Terminal in the United States
+7
+SECTION 6-RETENTION
+8
+6.1. Retention of Communications to, from, or About U.S. Persons
+8
+a. Unenciphered Communications; and Communications Necessary
+to Maintain Technical Data Bases for Cryptanalytic or
+Traffic Analytic Purposes
+8
+b. Communications Which Could be Disseminated Under Section 7
+8
+6.2. Access
+8
+SECTION 7-DISSEMINATION
+8
+~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~
+~~SECRET~~
+~~SECRET~~
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+
+7.1. Focus of SIGINT Reports
+7.2. Dissemination of U.S. Person Identities
+ a. Consent
+ b. Publicly Available Information
+ c. Information Necessary to Understand or Assess
+7.3. Approval Authorities
+ a. DIRNSA/CHCSS
+ b. Field Units
+ c. DDO and Designees
+7.4. Privileged Communications and Criminal Activity
+7.5. Improper Dissemination
+
+SECTION 8 - RESPONSIBILITIES
+
+8.1. Inspector General
+8.2. General Counsel
+8.3. Deputy Director for Operations
+8.4. All Elements of the USSS
+
+SECTION 9 - DEFINITIONS
+
+ANNEX A - PROCEDURES IMPLEMENTING THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE ACT (U)
+
+APPENDIX 1 - STANDARIZED MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES FOR
+NSA ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES
+
+ANNEX B - OPERATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO THE FEDERAL BUREAU
+OF INVESTIGATION (U)
+
+ANNEX C - SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO U.S. AND ALLIED MILITARY
+EXERCISE COMMAND AUTHORITIES (U)
+
+ANNEX D - TESTING OF ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT (U)
+
+ANNEX E - SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS (U)
+
+ANNEX F - ILLICIT COMMUNICATIONS (C)
+
+ANNEX G - TRAINING OF PERSONNEL IN THE OPERATION AND USE OF SIGINT
+COLLECTION AND OTHER SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT (U)
+
+ANNEX H - CONSENT FORMS (U)
+
+ANNEX I - FORM FOR CERTIFICATION OF OPENLY-ACKNOWLEDGED ENTITIES (S-CCO)
+
+ANNEX J - PROCEDURES FOR MONITORING RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF
+SUSPECTED INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS (S-CCO)
+(Issued separately to selected recipients)
+
+ANNEX K - [REDACTED] (S-CCO)
+
+~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~
+~~SECRET~~
+---
+~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+
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+TOTAL COPIES 1193
+~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
+Distribution Page 1 of 6
+---
+~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+
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+5 Z109
+1 Z11
+
+~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
+Distribution Page 2 of 6
+---
+~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+
+1 Z14
+2 Z156
+1 Z3
+1 Z31
+1 Z33
+1 Z34
+1 Z41
+1 Z42
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
+Distribution Page 3 of 6
+---
+~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
+Distribution Page 4 of 6
+~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
+Distribution Page 5 of 6
+
+~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
+Distribution Page 6 of 6
+
+~~SECRET~~
+USSID 18
+LEGAL COMPLIANCE AND
+MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES (U)
+SECTION 1- PREFACE
+27 July 1993
+1.1.0 (U) The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects all U.S. persons
+anywhere in the world. and all persons within the United States from unreasonable searches and
+seizures by any person or agency acting on behalf of the U.S. Government. The Supreme Court has
+ruled that the interception of electronic communications is a search and seizure within the meaning
+of the Fourth Amendment. It is therefore mandatory that signals intelligence (SIGINT) operations be
+conducted pursuant to procedures which meet the reasonableness requirements of the Fourth.
+Amendment.
+1.2. (U) In determining whether: United States SIGINT System (USSS) operations are
+"reasonable," it is necessary to balance the U.S. Government's need for foreign intelligence
+information and the privacy interests of persons protected by the Fourth Amendment. Striking that
+balance has consumed much time and effort by all branches of the United States Government. The
+results of that effort are reflected in the references listed in Section 2. below. Together, these
+references require the minimization of U.S. person information collected, processed, retained or
+disseminated by the USSS. The purpose of this document is to implement these minimization
+requirements.
+1.3. (U) Several themes run throughout this USSID. The most important is that intelligence
+operations and the protection of constitutional rights are not incompatible. It is not necessary to
+deny legitimate foreign intelligence collection or suppress legitimate foreign intelligence
+information to protect the Fourth Amendment rights of U.S. persons.
+1.4. (U) Finally, these minimization procedures implement the constitutional principle of
+"reasonableness" by giving different categories of individuals and entities different levels of
+protection. These levels range from the stringent protection accorded U.S. citizens and permanent
+resident aliens in the United States to provisions relating to foreign diplomats in the U.S. These
+differences reflect yet another main theme of these procedures, that is, that the focus of all foreign
+intelligence operations is on foreign entities and persons.
+SECTION 2 - REFERENCES
+2.1. (U) References
+No. 95-511.
+a. 50 U.S.C. 1801, et seq., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, Public Law
+b. Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," dated 4 December 1981.
+~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~
+~~SECRET~~
+1
+
+~~SECRET~~
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+c. DoD Directive 5240.1, "Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect U.S.
+Persons," dated 25 April 1988.
+d. NSA/CSS Directive No. 10-30, "Procedures Governing Activities of NSA/CSS that Affect
+U.S. Persons," dated 20 September 1990.
+SECTION 3-POLICY
+3.1. (U) The policy of the USSS is to TARGET or COLLECT only FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS.*
+The USSS will not intentionally COLLECT communications to, from or about U.S. PERSONS or persons
+or entities in the U.S. except as set forth in this USSID. If the USSS inadvertently COLLECTS such
+communications, it will process, retain and disseminate them only in accordance with this USSID.
+SECTION 4- COLLECTION
+4.1. (S-CCO) Communications which are known to be to, from or about a U.S. PERSON
+[REDACTED] will not be intentionally intercepted, or selected through
+the use of a SELECTION TERM, except in the following instances:
+a. With the approval of the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court under
+the conditions outlined in Annex A of this USSID.
+:
+b. With the approval of the Attorney General of the United States, if:
+(1) The COLLECTION is directed against the following:
+(a) Communications to or from U.S. PERSONS outside the UNITED STATES, or
+(b) International communications to, frum,
+[REDACTED]
+or
+[REDACTED]
+:
+(c) Communications which are not to or from but merely about U.S. PERSONS
+(wherever located).
+(2) The person is an AGENT OF A FOREIGN POWER, and
+information.
+(3) The purpose of the COLLECTION is to acquire significant FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
+c. With the approval of the Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security
+Service (DIRNSA/CHCSS), so long as the COLLECTION need not be approved by the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Attorney General, and
+(1) The person has CONSENTED to the COLLECTION by executing one of the CONSENT
+forms contained in Annex H, or
+* Capitalized words in Sections 3 through 9 are defined terms in Section 9.
+~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~
+~~SECRET~~
+2
+
+~~SECRET~~
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+(2) The person is reasonably believed to be held captive by a FOREIGN POWER or group
+engaged in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, or
+(3) The TARGETED
+[REDACTED]
+and the DIRNSA/CHCSS has approved the COLLECTION in accordance with Annex 1,
+or
+
+(4) The COLLECTION is directed against
+[REDACTED]
+between a U.S.
+PERSON in the UNITED STATES and a foreign entity outside the UNITED STATES, the TARGET is the
+foreign entity, and the DIRNSA/CHCSS has approved the COLLECTION in accordance with Annex K, or
+(5) Technical devices (e.g.,
+[REDACTED]
+are employed
+to limit acquisition by the USSS to communications to or from the TARGET or to specific forms of
+communications used by the TARGET (e.g.,
+[REDACTED]
+and the COLLECTION is directed against
+[REDACTED]
+voice and facsimile
+communications with one COMMUNICANT in the UNITED STATES, and the TARGET of the
+COLLECTION is
+[REDACTED]
+(a) A non-U.S. PERSON located outside the UNITED STATES,
+[REDACTED]
+
+(9)
+(b)
+[REDACTED]
+(6) Copies of approvals granted by the DIRNSA/CHCSS under these provisions will be
+retained in the Office of General Counsel for review by the Attorney General.
+d. Emergency Situations.
+(1) In emergency situations, DIRNSA/CHCSS may authorize the COLLECTION of
+information to, from, or about a U.S. PERSON who is outside the UNITED STATES when securing the
+prior approval of the Attorney General is not practical because:
+(a) The time required to obtain such approval would result in the loss of significant
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE and would caüse substantial harm to the national security.
+danger.
+(b) A person's life or physical safety is reasonably believed to be in immediate
+(c) The physical security of a defense installation or government property is
+reasonably believed to be in immediate danger.
+(2) In those cases where the DIRNSA/CHCSS authorizes emergency COLLECTION, except
+for actions taken under paragraph d.(1)(b) above, DIRNSA/CHCSS shall find that there is probable
+cause that the TARGET meets one of the following criteria:
+(a) A person who, for or on behalf of a FOREIGN POWER, is engaged in clandestine
+intelligence activities (including covert activities intended to affect the political or governmental
+process), sabotage, or INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST activities, or activities in preparation for
+INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST activities; or who conspires with, or knowingly aids and abets a person
+engaging in such activities.
+~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~
+~~SECRET~~
+3
+
+~~SECRET~~
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+
+(b) A person who is an officer or employee of a FOREIGN POWER.
+
+(c) A person unlawfully acting for, or pursuant to the direction of, a FOREIGN
+POWER. The mere fact that a person's activities may benefit or further the aims of a FOREIGN POWER
+is not enough to bring that person under this subsection, absent evidence that the person is taking
+direction from, or acting in knowing concert with, the FOREIGN POWER.
+
+(d) A CORPORATION or other entity that is owned or controlled directly or
+indirectly by a FOREIGN POWER.
+
+(e) A person in contact with, or acting in collaboration with, an intelligence or
+security service of a foreign power for the purpose of providing access to information or material
+classified by the United States to which such person has access.
+
+(3) in all cases where emergency collection is authorized, the following steps shall be
+taken:
+
+(a) The General Counsel will be notified immediately that the COLLECTION has
+started.
+
+(b) The General Counsel will initiate immediate efforts to obtain Attorney General
+approval to continue the collection. If Attorney General approval is not obtained within seventy two
+hours, the COLLECTION will be terminated. If the Attorney General approves the COLLECTION, it may
+continue for the period specified in the approval.
+
+e. Annual reports to the Attorney General are required for COLLECTION conducted under
+paragraphs 4.1.c.(3) and (4). Responsible analytic offices will provide such reports through the Deputy
+Director for Operations (DDO) and the General Counsel to the DIRNSA/CHCSS for transmittal to the
+Attorney General by 31 January of each year.
+
+4.2. (5-CCO)
+a. [REDACTED]
+b. [REDACTED]
+
+4.3. (U) Incidental Acquisition of U.S. PERSON Information. Information to, from or about
+U.S. PERSONS acquired incidentally as a result of COLLECTION directed against appropriate FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE TARGETS may be retained and processed in accordance with Section 5 and Section 6 of
+this USSID.
+
+~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~
+~~SECRET~~
+4
+
+~~SECRET~~
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+4.4. (S-CCO) Nonresident Alien TARGETS Entering the UNITED STATES.
+
+a. If the communications of a nonresident alien located abroad are being TARGETED and
+the USSS learns that the individual has entered the UNITED STATES, COLLECTION may continue for a
+period of 72 hours provided that the DIRNSA/CHCSS is advised immediately and:
+
+(1) Immediate efforts are initiated to obtain Attorney General approval, or
+
+(2) A determination is made within the 72 hour period that the [REDACTED]
+
+b. If Attorney General approval is obtained, the COLLECTION may continue for the length
+of time specified in the approval.
+
+c. If it is determined that [REDACTED] COLLECTION may
+continue at the discretion of the operational element.
+
+d. If [REDACTED] or if Attorney General approval is not obtained
+within 72 hours, COLLECTION must be terminated [REDACTED] Attorney
+General approval is obtained, or the individual leaves the UNITED STATES.
+
+4.5. (C-ECO)U.S. PERSON TARGETS Entering the UNITED STATES.
+
+a. If communications to, from or about a U.S. PERSON located outside the UNITED STATES
+are being COLLECTED under Attorney General approval described in Section 4.1.b. above, the
+COLLECTION must stop when the USSS learns that the individual has entered the UNITED STATES.
+
+b. While the individual is in the UNITED STATES, COLLECTION may be resumed only with
+the approval of the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court as described in Annex A.
+
+4.6. (S-CCO) Requests to TARGET U.S. PERSONS. All proposals for COLLECTION against U.S.
+PERSONS, [REDACTED] must be submitted
+through the DDO and the General Counsel to the DIRNSA/CHCSS for review.
+
+4.7. (C-CCO) Direction Finding. Use of direction finding solely to determine the location of a
+transmitter located outside of the UNITED STATES does not constitute ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE or
+COLLECTION even if directed at transmitters believed to be used by U.S. PERSONS. Unless COLLECTION
+of the communications is otherwise authorized under these procedures, the contents of
+communications to which a U.S. PERSON is a party monitored in the course of direction finding may
+only be used to identify the transmitter.
+
+4.8. (U) Distress Signals. Distress signals may be intentionally collected, processed, retained,
+and disseminated without regard to the restrictions contained in this USSID.
+
+~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~
+~~SECRET~~
+5
+
+~~SECRET~~
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+4.9. (U) COMSEC Monitoring and Security Testing of Automated Information Systems.
+Monitoring for communications security purposes must be conducted with the consent of the person
+being monitored and in accordance with the procedures established in National Telecommunications
+and Information Systems Security Directive 600, Communications Security (COMSEC) Monitoring,
+dated 10 April 1990. Monitoring for communications security purposes is not governed by this USSID.
+Intrusive security testing to assess security vulnerabilities in automated information systems likewise is
+not governed by this USSID.
+
+SECTION 5 - PROCESSING
+
+5.1. (S-CCO) Use of Selection Terms During Processing. When a SELECTION TERM is intended
+to INTERCEPT a communication on the basis of the content of the communication, or because a
+communication is enciphered, rather than on the basis of the identity of the COMMUNICANT or the
+fact that the communication mentions a particular individual, the following rules apply:
+
+a. No SELECTION TERM that is reasonably likely to result, in the INTERCEPTION of
+communications to or from a U.S. PERSON (wherever located), [REDACTED]
+may be used unless there is reason to believe that FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE will be obtained by use of such SELECTION TERM.
+
+b. NO SELECTION TERM that has resulted in the INTERCEPTION of a significant number of
+communications to or from such persons or entities may be used unless there is reason to believe that
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE will be obtained.
+
+C. SELECTION TERMS that have resulted or are reasonably likely to result in the
+INTERCEPTION of communications to or from such persons or entities shall be designed to defeat, to
+the greatest extent practicable under the circumstances, the INTERCEPTION of those communications
+which do not contain FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE.
+
+5.2. (S-CCO) Annual Review by DDO.
+
+a. All SELECTION TERMS that are reasonably likely to result in the INTERCEPTION of
+communications to or from a U.S. PERSON or terms that have resulted in the INTERCEPTION of a
+significant number of such communications shall be reviewed annually by the DDO or a designee.
+
+b. The purpose of the review shall be to determine whether there is reason to believe that
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE will be obtained, or will continue to be obtained, by the use of these
+SELECTION TERMS.
+
+c. A copy of the results of the review will be provided to the Inspector General and the
+General Counsel.
+
+5.3. (C-660) Forwarding of Intercepted Material. FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS collected by
+the USSS may be forwarded as intercepted to NSA, intermediate processing facilities, and
+collaborating centers.
+
+~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~
+~~SECRET~~
+6
+
+~~SECRET~~
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+5.4. (S-CCO) Nonforeign Communications.
+
+a. Communications between persons in the UNITED STATES. Private radio
+communications solely between persons in the UNITED STATES inadvertently intercepted during the
+COLLECTION OF FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS will be promptly destroyed unless the Attorney General
+determines that the contents indicate a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any person.
+
+b. Communications between U.S. PERSONS. Communications solely between U.S.
+PERSONS will be treated as follows;
+
+(1) Communications solely between U.S. PERSONS inadvertently intercepted during
+the COLLECTION of FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS will be destroyed upon recognition, if technically
+possible, except as provided in paragraph 5.4.d. below.
+
+(2) Notwithstanding the preceding provision, cryptologic data (e.g., signal and
+encipherment information) and technical communications data (e.g., circuit usage) may be extracted
+and retained from those commünications if necessary to:
+
+(a) Establish or maintain intercept, or
+
+(b) Minimize unwanted intercept, or
+
+(c) Support cryptologic operations related to FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS.
+
+c. Communications Involving an Officer or Employee of the U.S. Government.
+Communications to or from any officer or employee of the U.S. Government, or any state or local
+government, will. not be intentionally intercepted. Inadvertent INTERCEPTIONS of such
+communications (including those between foreign TARGETS and U.S. officials) will be treated as
+indicated in paragraphs 5.4.a. and b., above.
+
+d. Exceptions: Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 5.4.b. and c., the
+DIRNSA/CHCSS may waive the destruction requirement for international communications containing,
+inter alia, the following types of information:
+
+(1) Significant FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE, or
+
+(2) Evidence of a crime or threat of death or serious bodily harm to any person, or
+
+(3) Anomalies that reveal a potential vulnerability to U.S. communications security.
+Communications for which the Attorney General or DIRNSA/CHCSS's waiver is sought should be
+forwarded to NSA/CSS, Attn: POS: PO2.
+
+5.5.(S-CCO) Radio Communications with a Terminal in the UNITED STATES.
+
+a. All radio communications that pass over channels with a terminal in the UNITED
+STATES must be processed through a computer scan dictionary or similar device unless those
+communications occur over channels üsed exclusively by a FOREIGN POWER,
+
+b. International common-access radio communications that pass over channels with a
+terminal in the UNITED STATES, other than [REDACTED] communications, may
+be processed without the use of a computer scan dictionary or similar device if necessary to determine
+whether a channel contains communications of FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE interest which NSA may wish
+
+~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~
+~~SECRET~~
+7
+
+~~SECRET~~
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+to collect. Such processing may not exceed two hours without the specific prior written approval of
+the DDO and, in any event, shall be limited to the minimum amount of time necessary to determine
+the nature of communications on the channel and the amount of such communications that include
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE. Once it is determined that the channel contains sufficient communications
+of FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE interest to warrant COLLECTION and exploitation to produce FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE, a computer scan dictionary or similar device must be used for additional processing.
+
+c. Copies of all DDO written approvals made pursuant to 5.5.b. must be provided to the
+General Counsel and the Inspector General.
+
+SECTION 6- RETENTION
+
+6.1. (5-CCO) Retention of Communications to, from or About U.S. PERSONS.
+
+a. Except as otherwise provided in Annex A, Appendix 1, Section 4, communications to,
+from or about U.S. PERSONS that are intercepted by the USSS may be retained in their original or
+transcribed form only as follows:
+
+(1) Unenciphered communications not thought to contain secret meaning may be
+retained for five years unless the DDO determines in writing that retention for a longer period is
+required to respond to authorized FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE requirements.
+
+(2) Communications necessary to maintain technical data bases for cryptanalytic or
+traffic analytic purposes may be retained for a period sufficient to allow a thorough exploitation and
+to permit access to data that are, or are reasonably believed likely to become, relevant to a current or
+future FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE requirement. Sufficient duration may vary with the nature of the
+exploitation and may consist of any period of time during which the technical data base is subject to,
+or of use in, cryptanalysis. If a U.S. PERSON'S identity is not necessary to maintaining technical data
+bases, it should be deleted or replaced by a generic term when practicable.
+
+b. Communications which could be disseminated under Section 7, below (i.e., without
+elimination of references to U.S. PERSONS) may be retained in their original or transcribed form.
+
+6.2. (5-660) Access. Access to raw traffic storage systems which contain identities of U.S.
+PERSONS must be limited to SIGINT production personnel.
+
+SECTION 7 - DISSEMINATION
+
+7.1. (C-CCO) Focus of SIGINT Reports. All SIGINT reports will be written so as to focus solely on
+the activities of foreign entities and persons and their agents. Except as provided in Section 7.2.,
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE information concerning U.S. PERSONS must be disseminated in a manner
+which does not identify the U.S. PERSON. Generic or general terms or phrases must be substituted for
+the identity (e.g., "U.S. firm" for the specific name of a U.S. CORPORATION or "U.S. PERSON" for the
+specific name of a U.S. PERSON). Files containing the identities of U.S. persons deleted from SIGINT
+reports will be maintained for a maximum period of one year and any requests from SIGINT customers
+for such identities should be referred to P65. POZ,
+
+~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~
+~~SECRET~~
+8
+
+~~SECRET~~
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+7.2. (C-CCO) Dissemination of U.S. PERSON Identities. SIGINT reports may include the
+identification of a U.S. PERSON only if one of the following conditions is met and a determination is
+made by the appropriate approval authority that the recipient has a need for the identity for the
+performance of his official duties:
+a. The U.S. PERSON has CONSENTED to the dissemination of communications of, or about,
+him or her and has executed the CONSENT form found in Annex H of this USSID, or
+b. The information is PUBLICLY AVAILABLE (i.e., the information is derived from
+unclassified information available to the general public), or
+c. The identity of the U.S. PERSON is necessary to understand the FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
+information or assess its importance. The following nonexclusive list contains examples of the type of
+information that meet this standard:
+(1) FOREIGN POWER or AGENT OF A FOREIGN POWER. The information indicates that
+the U.S. PERSON is a FOREIGN POWER or an AGENT OF A FOREIGN POWER.
+(2) Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information. The information indicates that
+the U.S. PERSON may be engaged in the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
+(3) International Narcotics Activity. The information indicates that the individual may
+be engaged in international narcotics trafficking activities. (See Annex I of this USSID for further
+information concerning individuals involved in international narcotics trafficking).
+(4) Criminal Activity. The information is evidence that the individual may be involved
+in a crime that has been, is being, or is about to be committed, provided that the dissemination is for
+law enforcement purposes.
+(5) Intelligence TARGET. The information indicates that the U.S. PERSON may be the
+TARGET of hostile intelligence activities of a FOREIGN POWER.
+(6) Threat to Safety. The information indicates that the identity of the U.S. PERSON is
+pertinent to a possible threat to the safety of any person or organization, including those who are
+TARGETS, victims or hostages of INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST organizations. Reporting units shall
+identify to P05 any report containing the identity of a U.S. PERSON reported under this subsection (6).
+Field reporting to P05 should be in the form of a CRITICOMM message (DDI XAO) and include the
+report date-time-group (DTG), product serial number and the reason for inclusion of the U.S.
+PERSON'S identity.
+(7) Senior Executive Branch Officials. The identity is that of a senior official of the
+Executive Branch of the U.S. Government. In this case only the official's title will be disseminated.
+Domestic political or personal information on such individuals will be neither disseminated nor
+retained.
+~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~
+~~SECRET~~
+9
+
+~~SECRET~~
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+7.3. (C-CCO) Approval Authorities. Approval authorities for the release of identities of U.S.
+persons under Section 7 are as follows:
+a. DIRNSA/CHCSS. DIRNSA/CHCSS must approve dissemination of:
+(1) The identities of any senator, congressman, officer, or employee of the Legislative
+Branch of the U.S. Government.
+(2) The identity of any person for law enforcement purposes.
+b. Field Units and NSA Headquarters Elements. All SIGINT production organizations are
+authorized to disseminate the identities of U.S. PERSONS when:
+(1) The identity is pertinent to the safety of any person or organization.
+(2) The identity is that of a senior official of the Executive Branch.
+(3) The U.S. PERSON has CONSENTED under paragraph 7.2.a. above.
+c. DDO and Designees.
+(1) In all other cases, U.S. PERSON identities may be released only with the prior
+approval of the Deputy Director for Operations, the Assistant Deputy Director for Operations, the
+Chief, P05, the Deputy Chief, P05, or, or, in their absence, the Senior Operations Officer of the National
+SIGINT Operations Center. The DDO or ADDO shall review all U.S. identities released by these
+designees as soon as practicable after the release is made.
+(2) For law enforcement purposes involving narcotics related information, DIRNSA has
+granted to the DDO authority to disseminate U.S. identities. This authority may not be further
+delegated.
+7.4. (U) Privileged Communications and Criminal Activity. All proposed disseminations of
+information constituting U.S. PERSON privileged communications (e.g., attorney/client,
+doctor/patient) and all information concerning criminal activities or criminal or judicial proceedings
+in the UNITED STATES must be reviewed by the Office of General Counsel prior to dissemination.
+7.5. (U) Improper Dissemination. If the name of a U.S. PERSON is improperly disseminated,
+the incident should be reported to P05 within 24 hours of discovery of the error.
+P02
+~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~
+~~SECRET~~
+10
+
+~~SECRET~~
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+SECTION 8 - RESPONSIBILITIES
+8.1. (U) Inspector General. The Inspector General shall:
+a. Conduct regular inspections and perform general oversight of NSA/CSS activities to
+ensure compliance with this USSID.
+b. Establish procedures for reporting by Key Component and Field Chiefs of their activities
+and practices for oversight purposes.
+c. Report to the DIRNSA/CHCSS, annually by 31 October, concerning NSA/CSS compliance
+with this USSID.
+d. Report quarterly with the DIRNSA/CHCSS and General Counsel to the President's
+Intelligence Oversight Board through the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence
+Oversight).
+8.2. (U) General Counsel. The General Counsel shall:
+a. Provide legal advice and assistance to all elements of the USSS regarding SIGINT
+activities. Requests for legal advice on any aspect of these procedures should be sent by CRITICOMM
+to DDI XDI, or by NSA/CSS secure telephone 963-3121, or [REDACTED]
+b. Prepare and process all applications for Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court orders
+and requests for Attorney General approvals required by these procedures.
+c. Advise the Inspector General in inspections and oversight of USSS activities.
+d. Review and assess for legal implications as requested by the DIRNSA/CHCSS, Deputy
+Director, Inspector General or Key Components Chief, all new major requirements and internally
+generated USSS activities.
+e. Advise USSS personnel of new legislation and case law that may affect USSS missions,
+functions, operations, activities, or practices.
+f. Report as required to the Attorney General and the President's Intelligence Oversight
+Board and provide copies of such reports to the DIRNSA/CHCSS and affected agency elements.
+g. Process requests from any DoD intelligence component for authority to use signals as
+described in Procedure 5, Part 5, of DoD 5240.1-R, for periods in excess of 90 days in the development,
+test, or calibration of ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE equipment and other equipment that can intercept
+communications.
+~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~
+~~SECRET~~
+11
+
+~~SECRET~~
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+8.3. (U) Deputy Director for Operations (DDO). The DDO shall:
+a. Ensure that all SIGINT production personnel understand and maintain a high degree of
+awareness and sensitivity to the requirements of this USSID.
+b. Apply the provisions of this USSID to all SIGINT production activities. The DDO staff
+focal point for USSID 18 matters is P05 (use CRITICOMM DDI XAO).
+P02
+c. Conduct necessary reviews of SIGINT production activities and practices to ensure
+consistency with this USSID.
+d. Ensure that all new major requirements levied on the USSS or internally generated
+activities are considered for review by the General Counsel. All activities that raise questions of law or
+the proper interpretation of this USSID must be reviewed by the General Counsel prior to acceptance
+or execution.
+8.4. (U) All Elements of the USSS. All elements of the USSS shall:
+a. Implement this directive upon receipt.
+b. Prepare new procedures or amend or supplement existing procedures as required to
+ensure adherence to this USSID. A copy of such procedures shall be forwarded to NSA/CSS, Attn: P05, P02,
+c. Immediately inform the DDO of any tasking or instructions that appear to require
+actions at variance with this USSID.
+d. Promptly report to the NSA Inspector General and consult with the NSA General
+Counsel on all activities that may raise a question of compliance with this USSID.
+SECTION 9 - DEFINITIONS
+9.1. (S-CCO) AGENT OF A FOREIGN POWER means:
+a. Any person, other than a U.S. PERSON, who:
+(1) Acts in the UNITED STATES as an officer or employee of a FOREIGN POWER, or as a
+member of a group engaged in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM or activities in preparation therefor; or
+(2) Acts for, or on behalf of, a FOREIGN POWER that engages in clandestine
+intelligence activities in the UNITED STATES contrary to the interests of the UNITED STATES, when the
+circumstances of such person's presence in the UNITED STATES indicate that such person may engage
+in such activities in the UNITED STATES, or when such person knowingly aids or abets any person in
+the conduct of such activities or knowingly conspires with any person to engage in such activities; or
+b. Any person, including a U.S. PERSON, who:
+(1) Knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence gathering activities for, or on behalf
+of, a FOREIGN POWER, which activities involve, or may involve, a violation of the criminal statutes of
+the UNITED STATES; or
+~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~
+~~SECRET~~
+12
+
+~~SECRET~~
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+(2) Pursuant to the direction of an intelligence service or network of a FOREIGN
+POWER, knowingly engages in any other clandestine intelligence activities for, or on behalf of, such
+FOREIGN POWER, which activities involve or are about to involve, a violation of the criminal statutes
+of the UNITED STATES; or
+(3) Knowingly engages in sabotage or INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, or activities that
+are in preparation therefor, for or on behalf of a FOREIGN POWER; or
+(4) Knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of activities described in
+paragraphs 9.1.b.(1) through (3) or knowingly conspires with any person to engage in those activities.
+c. For all purposes other than the conduct of ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE as defined by
+the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (see Annex A), the phrase "AGENT OF A FOREIGN POWER"
+also means any person, including U.S. PERSONS outside the UNITED STATES, who are officers or
+employees of a FOREIGN POWER, or who act unlawfully for or pursuant to the direction of a FOREIGN
+POWER, or who are in contact with or acting in collaboration with an intelligence or security service
+of a FOREIGN POWER for the purpose of providing access to information or material classified by the
+UNITED STATES Government and to which the person has or has had access. The mere fact that a
+person's activities may benefit or further the aims of a FOREIGN POWER is not enough to bring that
+person under this provision, absent evidence that the person is taking direction from or acting in
+knowing concert with a FOREIGN POWER.
+9.2. (C) COLLECTION means intentional tasking or SELECTION of identified nonpublic
+communications for subsequent processing aimed at reporting or retention as a file record.
+9.3. (U) COMMUNICANT means a sender or intended recipient of a communication.
+9.4. (U) COMMUNICATIONS ABOUT A U.S. PERSON are those in which the U.S. PERSON is
+identified in the communication. A U.S. PERSON is identified when the person's name, unique title,
+address, or other personal identifier is revealed in the communication in the context of activities
+conducted by that person or activities conducted by others and related to that person. A mere
+reference to a product by brand name or manufacturer's name, e.g., "Boeing 707" is not an
+identification of a U.S. person.
+9.5. (U) CONSENT, for SIGINT purposes, means an agreement by a person or organization to
+permit the USSS to take particular actions that affect the person or organization. An agreement by an
+organization with the National Security Agency to permit COLLECTION of information shall be
+deemed valid CONSENT if given on behalf of such organization by an official or governing body
+determined by the General Counsel, National Security Agency, to have actual or apparent authority
+to make such an agreement.
+9.6. (U) CORPORATIONS, for purposes of this USSID, are entities legally recognized as separate
+from the persons who formed, own, or run them. CORPORATIONS have the nationality of the nation
+state under whose laws they were formed. Thus, CORPORATIONS incorporated under UNITED STATES
+federal or state law are U.S. PERSONS.
+9.7. (U) ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE means:
+a. In the case of an electronic communication, the acquisition of a nonpublic
+communication by electronic means without the CONSENT of a person who is a party to the
+communication.
+~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~
+~~SECRET~~
+13
+
+~~SECRET~~
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+b. In the case of a nonelectronic communication, the acquisition of a nonpublic
+communication by electronic means without the CONSENT of a person who is visibly present at the
+place of communication.
+c. The term ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE does not include the use of radio direction
+finding equipment solely to determine the location of a transmitter.
+9.8.(C) FOREIGN COMMUNICATION means a communication that has at least one
+COMMUNICANT outside of the UNITED STATES, or that is entirely among FOREIGN POWERS or
+between a FOREIGN POWER and officials of a FOREIGN POWER, but does not include communications
+intercepted by ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE directed, at premises in the UNITED STATES used
+predominantly for residential purposes.
+9.9. (U) FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE means information relating to the capabilities, intentions,
+and activities of FOREIGN POWERS, organizations, or persons, and for purposes of this USSID includes
+both positive FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE and counterintelligence.
+9.10. (U) FOREIGN POWER means:
+a. A foreign government or any component thereof, whether or not recognized by the
+UNITED STATES,
+PERSONS,
+b. A faction of a foreign nation or nations, not substantially composed of UNITED STATES
+c. An entity that is openly acknowledged by a foreign government or governments to be
+directed and controlled by such foreign government or governments,
+d. A group engaged in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM or activities in preparation therefor,
+e. A foreign-based political organization, not substantially composed of UNITED STATES
+PERSONS, or
+f. An entity that is directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments.
+9.11. (U) INTERCEPTION means the acquisition by the USSS through electronic means of a
+nonpublic communication to which it is not an intended party, and the processing of the contents of
+that communication into an intelligible form, but does not include the display of signals on visual
+display devices intended to permit the examination of the technical characteristics of the signals
+without reference to the information content carried by the signal.
+
+~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~
+~~SECRET~~
+14
+
+~~SECRET~~
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+9.12. (U) INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM means activities that:
+a. Involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal
+laws of the UNITED STATES or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within
+the jurisdiction of the UNITED STATES or any State, and
+b. Appear to be intended:
+(1) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population,
+(2) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or
+(3) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping, and
+c. Occur totally outside the UNITED STATES, or transcend national boundaries in terms of
+the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to coerce or intimidate,
+or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.
+9.13. (U) PUBLICLY AVAILABLE INFORMATION means information that has been published or
+broadcast for general public consumption, is available on request to a member of the general public,
+has been seen or heard by a casual observer, or is made available at a meeting open to the general
+public.
+9.14.(C) SELECTION, as applied to manual and electronic processing activities, means the
+intentional insertion of a [REDACTED] telephone
+number, [REDACTED] into a computer scan dictionary or manual scan guide for the
+purpose of identifying messages of interest and isolating them for further processing.
+9.15. (C) SELECTION TERM means the composite of individual terms used to effect or defeat
+SELECTION of particular communications for the purpose of INTERCEPTION. It comprises the entire
+term or series of terms so used, but not any segregable term contained therein. It applies to both
+electronic and manual processing.
+9.16. (U) TARGET, OR TARGETING: See COLLECTION.
+9.17. (U) UNITED STATES, when used geographically, includes the 50 states and the District of
+Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the U.S. Virgin Islands, the Northern Mariana Islands,
+and any other territory or possession over which the UNITED STATES exercises sovereignty.
+9.18. (U) UNITED STATES PERSON:
+a. A citizen of the UNITED STATES,
+b. An alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the UNITED STATES,
+c. Unincorporated groups and associations a substantial number of the members of
+which constitute a. or b. above, or
+d. CORPORATIONS incorporated in the UNITED STATES, including U.S. flag
+nongovernmental aircraft or vessels, but not including those entities which are openly acknowledged
+by a foreign government or governments to be directed and controlled by them.
+
+~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~
+~~SECRET~~
+15
+
+~~SECRET~~
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+e. The following guidelines apply in determining whether a person is a U.S. PERSON:
+(1) A person known to be currently in the United States will be treated as a U.S.
+PERSON unless that person is reasonably identified as an alien who has not been admitted for
+permanent residence or if the nature of the person's communications or other indicia in the contents
+or circumstances of such communications give rise to a reasonable belief that such person is not a U.S.
+PERSON.
+(2) A person known to be currently outside the UNITED STATES, or whose location is
+not known, will not be treated as a U.S. PERSON unless such person is reasonably identified as such or
+the nature of the person's communications or other indicia in the contents or circumstances of such
+communications give rise to a reasonable belief that such person is a U.S. PERSON.
+(3) A person known to be an alien admitted for permanent residence may be assumed
+to have lost status as a U.S. PERSON if the person leaves the UNITED STATES and it is known that the
+person is not in compliance with the administrative formalities provided by law (8 U.S.C. Section 1203)
+that enable such persons to reenter the UNITED STATES without regard to the provisions of law that
+would otherwise restrict an alien's entry into the UNITED STATES. The failure to follow the statutory
+procedures provides a reasonable basis to conclude that such alien has abandoned any intention of
+maintaining status as a permanent resident alien.
+(4) An unincorporated association whose headquarters are located outside the
+UNITED STATES may be presumed not to be a U.S. PERSON unless the USSS has information indicating
+that a substantial number of members are citizens of the UNITED STATES or aliens lawfully admitted
+for permanent residence.
+(5) CORPORATIONS have the nationality of the nation-state in which they are
+incorporated. CORPORATIONS formed under U.S. federal or state law are thus U.S. persons, even if
+the corporate stock is foreign-owned. The only exception set forth above is CORPORATIONS which
+are openly acknowledged to be directed and controlled by foreign governments. Conversely,
+CORPORATIONS incorporated in foreign countries are not U.S. PERSONS even if that CORPORATION is
+a subsidiary of a U.S. CORPORATION.
+(6) Nongovernmental ships and aircraft are legal entities and have the nationality of
+the country in which they are registered. Ships and aircraft fly the flag and are subject to the law of
+their place of registration.
+
+~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~
+~~SECRET~~
+16
+
+~~SECRET~~
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+ANNEX A
+PROCEDURES IMPLEMENTING THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE ACT (U).
+SECTION 1-PURPOSE AND APPLICABILITY
+1.1.. (U) The Foreign Intelligence. Surveillance Act (the Act) governs the conduct of certain
+electronic surveillance activities within the United States to collect foreign intelligence information.
+A complete copy of the Act is found at Annex B to NSA/CSS Directive 10-30. The Act covers the
+intentional collection of the communications of a particular, known U.S. person who is in the United
+States, all wiretaps in the United States, the acquisition of certain radio communications where all
+parties to that communication are located in the United States, and the monitoring of information in
+which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. The Act requires that all such surveillances be
+directed only at foreign powers and their agents as defined by the Act and that all such surveillances
+be authorized by the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, or in certain limited
+circumstances, by the Attorney General.
+SECTION 2 - GENERAL
+2.1. (U) Procedures and standards for securing Court orders or Attorney General certifications
+to conduct electronic surveillances are set forth in the Act. Requests for such orders or certifications
+should be forwarded by the appropriate Key Component through the NSA General Counsel to the
+Director, NSA/Chief, CSS and should be accompanied by a statement of the facts and circumstances
+justifying a belief that the target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and that each of
+the facilities or places at which the surveillance will be directed are being used, or are about to be
+used, by that foreign power or agent. If the proposed surveillance meets the requirements of the Act
+and the Director approves the proposal, attorneys in the Office of the General Counsel will draw the
+necessary court application or request for Attorney General certification.
+SECTION 3 - MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES
+3.1.(S-CCO) Surveillances authorized by the Act are required to be carried out in accordance
+with the Act and pursuant to the court order or Attorney General certification authorizing that
+particular surveillance. In some cases, the court orders are tailored to address particular problems,
+and in those instances the NSA attorney will advise the appropriate NSA offices of the terms of the
+court's orders. In most cases, however, the court order will incorporate without any changes the
+standardized minimization procedures set forth in Appendix 1.
+
+~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~
+~~SECRET~~
+A/1
+
+~~SECRET~~
+USSID 18 ANNEX A
+27 July 1993
+SECTION 4- RESPONSIBILITIES
+4.1. (U) The General Counsel will review all requests to conduct electronic surveillances as
+defined by the Act, prepare all applications and materiais required by the Act, and provide pertinent
+legal advice and assistance to all elements of the United States SIGINT System.
+4.2. (U) The Inspector General will conduct regular inspections and oversight of all SIGINT
+activities to assure compliance with this Directive.
+4.3. (U) All SIGINT managers and supervisors with responsibilities relating to the Act will
+ensure that they and their personnel are thoroughly familiar with the Act, its implementing
+procedures, and any court orders or Attorney General certifications pertinent to their mission.
+Personnel with duties related to the Act will consult the General Counsel's office for any required
+legal advice and assistance or training of newly assigned personnel. Appropriate. records will be
+maintained demonstrating compliance with the terms of all court orders and Attorney General
+certifications, and any discrepancies in that regard will be promptly reported to the offices of the
+General Counsel and Inspector General.
+
+~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~
+~~SECRET~~
+A/2
+
+~~SECRET~~
+USSID 18 ANNEX A
+27 July 1993
+
+APPENDIX 1
+Standard Minimization Procedures for
+NSA Electronic Surveillances
+
+Table of Contents
+
+Section 1 — Applicability and Scope Section
+A-1/2
+
+Section 2— Definitions
+A-1/2
+a. Acquisition
+A-1/2
+b. Communications concerning a U.S. Person
+A-1/2
+c. Communications of a U.S. Person
+A-1/2
+d. Consent
+A-1/2
+e. Foreign communication [Domestic Communication]
+A-1/2
+f. Identification of a U.S. Person
+A-1/3
+g. Processed or Processing
+A-1/3
+h. Publicly available information
+A-1/3
+i. Technical data base
+A-1/3
+j. U.S. person
+A-1/3
+
+Section 3 — Acquisition and Processing - General
+A-1/3
+a. Acquisition
+A-1/3
+b. Verification.
+A-1/3
+c. Monitoring, Recording, and Processing
+A-1/4
+d. U.S. Persons Employed by the Foreign Power
+A-1/4
+e. Destruction of Raw Data
+A-1/4
+f. Non-Pertinent Communications
+A-1/5
+g. Change in Target's Location or Status
+A-1/5
+
+Section 4 — Acquisition and Processing - Special Procedures
+A-1/5
+a. Collection Against Residential Premises
+A-1/5
+b. Attorney-Client Communications
+A-1/6
+
+Section 5 — Domestic Communications
+A-1/6
+a. Dissemination
+A-1/6
+b. Retention
+A-1/6
+
+Section 6 - Foreign Communications of or Concerning U.S. Persons
+A-1/7
+a. Retention
+A-1/7
+b. Dissemination
+A-1/7
+
+Section 7 — Other Foreign Communications
+A-1/8
+
+Section 8 — Collaboration with Foreign Communications
+A-1/8
+
+~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~
+~~SECRET~~
+
+~~SECRET~~
+USSID 18 ANNEX A
+APPENDIX 1
+27 July 1993
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, DC
+
+STANDARDIZED MINIMIZATION
+PROCEDURES FOR NSA ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES
+
+Pursuant to Section 101 (h) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (hereinafter "the
+Act"), the following procedures have been adopted by the Attorney General and shall be followed by the NSA
+in implementing this electronic surveillance: (U)
+
+SECTION 1 - APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE (U)
+
+These procedures apply to the acquisition, retention, use, and dissemination of non-publicly
+available information concerning unconsenting United States persons that is collected in the course of elec-
+tronic surveillance as ordered by the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court under Section
+102(b) or authorized by Attorney General Certification under Section 102(a) of the Act. These procedures
+also apply to non-United States persons where specifically indicated. (U)
+
+SECTION 2 - DEFINITIONS (U)
+
+In addition to the definitions in Section 101 of the Act, the following definitions shall apply to these
+procedures:
+(a) Acquisition means the collection by NSA through electronic means of a nonpublic commu-
+nication to which it is not an intended party. (U)
+
+(b) Communications concerning a United States person include all communications in which a
+United States person is discussed or mentioned, except where such communications reveal only publicly
+available information about the person. (U)
+
+(c) Communications of a United States person include all communications to which a United
+States person is a party. (U)
+
+(d) Consent is the agreement by a person or organization to permit the NSA to take particular
+actions that affect the person or organization. To be effective, consent must be given by the affected person or
+organization with sufficient knowledge to understand the action that may be taken and the possible.conse-
+quences of that action. Consent by an organization shall be deemed valid if given on behalf of the organization
+by an official or governing body determined by the General Counsel, NSA, to have actual or apparent authority
+to make such an agreement. (U)
+
+(e) Foreign communication means a communication that has at least one communicant outside
+of the United States, or that is entirely among:
+(1) foreign powers;
+
+(2) officers and employees of foreign powers; or
+
+(3) a foreign power and officers or employees of a foreign power.
+
+All other communications are domestic communications. (S-CCO)
+
+~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~
+~~SECRET~~
+(C1-Oct 97)
+
+~~SECRET~~
+USSID 18 ANNEX A
+APPENDIX 1
+27 July 1993
+
+(f) Identification of a United States person means the name, unique title, address, or other per-
+sonal identifier of a United States person in the context of activities conducted by that person or activities
+conducted by others that are related to that person. A reference to a product by brand name, or manufactur-
+er's name or the use of a name in a descriptive sense, e.g., "Monroe Doctrine," is not an identification of a
+United States person. (S CCO)
+
+(g) Processed or processing means any step necessary to convert a communication into an in-
+telligible form intended for human inspection. (U)
+
+(h) Publicly available information means information that a member of the public could obtain on
+request, by research in public sources, or by casual observation. (U)
+
+(i) Technical data base means information retained for cryptanalytic, traffic analytic, or signal
+exploitation purposes. (S-CCO)
+
+(j) United States person means a United States person as defined in the Act. The following
+guidelines apply in determining whether a person whose status is unknown is a United States person: (U)
+
+(1) A person known to be currently in the United States will be treated as a United States person
+unless positively identified as an alien who has not been admitted for permanent residence, or unless the
+nature or circumstances of the person's communications give rise to a reasonable belief that such person is
+not a United States person. (U)
+
+(2) A person known to be currently outside the United States, or whose location is unknown, will
+not be treated as a United States person unless such person can be positively identified as such, or the nature
+or circumstances of the person's communications give rise to a reasonable belief that such person is a United
+States person. (U)
+
+(3) A person known to be an alien admitted for permanent residence loses status as a United
+States person if the person leaves the United States and is not in compliance with Title 8, United States Code,
+Section 1203 enabling re-entry into the United States. Failure to follow the statutory procedures provides a
+reasonable basis to conclude that the alien has abandoned any intention of maintaining his status as a perma-
+nent resident alien. (U)
+
+(4) An unincorporated association whose headquarters or primary office is located outside the
+United States is presumed not to be a United States person unless there is information indicating that a sub-
+stantial number of its members are citizens of the United States or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent
+residence. (U)
+
+SECTION 3 – ACQUISITION AND PROCESSING – GENERAL (U)
+
+(a) Acquisition (U)
+
+The acquisition of information by electronic surveillance shall be made in accordance with the
+certification of the Attorney General or the court order authorizing such surveillance and conducted in a man-
+ner designed, to the greatest extent reasonably feasible, to minimize the acquisition of information not rele-
+vant to the authorized purpose of the surveillance. (S CCO)
+
+(b) Verification (U)
+
+At the initiation of the electronic surveillance, the NSA or the Federal Bureau of Investigation, if
+providing operational support, shall verify that the communication lines or telephone numbers being targeted
+are the lines or numbers of the target authorized by court order or Attorney General certification. Thereafter,
+collection personnel will monitor the acquisition of raw data at regular intervals to verify that the surveillance is
+not avoidably acquiring communications outside the authorized scope of the surveillance or information con-
+cerning United States persons not related to the purpose of the surveillance. (S CCO)
+
+~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~
+~~SECRET~~
+(C1-Oct 97)
+
+~~SECRET~~
+USSID 18 ANNEX A
+APPENDIX 1
+27 July 1993
+
+(c) Monitoring, Recording, and Processing (U)
+
+(1) Electronic surveillance of the target may be monitored contemporaneously, recorded auto-
+matically, or both. (U)
+
+(2) Personnel who monitor the electronic surveillance shall exercise reasonable judgement
+in determining whether particular information acquired must be minimized and shall destroy inadvertently ac-
+quired communications of or concerning a United States person at the earliest practicable point in the proc-
+essing cycle at which such communication can be identified either as clearly not relevant to the authorized
+purpose of the surveillance (e.g., the communication does not contain foreign intelligence information) or as
+containing evidence of a crime which may be disseminated under these procedures. (S-CCO)
+
+(3) Communications of or concerning United States persons that may be related to the autho-
+rized purpose of the surveillance may be forwarded to analytic personnel responsible for producing intelli-
+gence information from the collected data. Such communications or information may be retained and dissem-
+inated only in accordance with Sections 4, 5, and 6 of these procedures. (C)
+
+(4) Magnetic tapes or other storage media that contain acquired communications may be pro-
+cessed. (S-CCO)
+
+(5) Each communication shall be reviewed to determine whether it is a domestic or foreign com-
+munication to or from the targeted premises and is reasonably believed to contain foreign intelligence infor-
+mation or evidence of a crime. Only such communications may be processed. All other communications may
+be retained or disseminated only in accordance with Sections 5 and 6 of these procedures. (S-CCO)
+
+(6) Magnetic tapes or other storage media containing foreign communications may be scanned
+by computer to identify and select communications for analysis. Computer selection terms used for scanning,
+such as telephone numbers, key words or phrases, or other discriminators, shall not include United States
+person names or identifiers and shall be limited to those selection terms reasonably likely to identify
+[REDACTED] that are authorized for intentional collection under Executive Order 12333
+implementing procedures. (S-CCO)
+
+(7) Further processing, retention and dissemination of foreign communications shall be made in
+accordance with Sections 4, 6, and 7, as applicable, below. Further processing, storage and dissemination of
+inadvertently acquired domestic communications shall be made in accordance with Sections 4 and 5 be-
+low. (S-CCO)
+
+(d) U.S. Persons Employed by the Foreign Power (C)
+
+Communications of or concerning United States persons employed by a foreign power may be
+used and retained as otherwise provided in these procedures except that:
+
+(1). Such United States persons shall not be identified in connection with any communication
+that the person places or receives on behalf of another unless the identification is permitted under Section 6 of
+these procedures; and
+
+(2) personal communications of United States persons that could not be foreign intelligence
+may only be retained, used, or disseminated in accordance with Section 5 of these procedures. (S-CCO)
+
+(e) Destruction of Raw Data (C)
+
+Communications and other information, including that reduced to graphic or "hard copy" form
+such as [REDACTED] shall be reviewed for retention in accor-
+dance with the standards set forth in these procedures. Communications and other information, in any form,
+that do not meet such retention standards and that are known to contain communications of or concerning
+United States persons shall be promptly destroyed. (S-CCO)
+
+~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~
+~~SECRET~~
+(C1-Oct 97)
+
+~~SECRET~~
+USSID 18 ANNEX A
+APPENDIX 1
+27 July 1993
+
+(f) Non-pertinent Communications (U)
+
+(1) Communications determined to fall within established categories of non-pertinent commu-
+nications, such as those set forth in subparagraph (6) of this section, should not be retained unless they con-
+tain information that may be disseminated under Sections 5, 6, or 7 below. (U)
+
+(2) Monitors may listen to all communications, including those that initially appear to fall within
+established categories until they can reasonably determine that the communication cannot be disseminated
+under Sections 5, 6, or 7 below. (S CCO)
+
+(3) Communications of United States persons will be analyzed to establish categories of com-
+munications that are not pertinent to the authorized purpose of the surveillance... (U)
+
+(4) These categories should be established after a reasonable period of monitoring the commu-
+nications of the targets. (U)
+
+(5) Information that appears to be foreign intelligence may be retained even if it is acquired as a
+part of a communication falling within a category that is generally non-pertinent. (S-CCO)
+
+(6) Categories of non-pertinent communications which may be applied in these surveillance
+include:
+(1) Calls to and from United States Government officials;
+
+(ii) Calls to and from children;
+
+(iii) Calls to and from students for information to aid them in academic endeavors;
+
+(iv) Calls between family members; and
+
+(v) Calls relating solely to personal services, such as food orders, transportation,
+etc. (S-CCO)
+
+(g) Change in Target's Location or Status (S-CCO)
+
+(1) During periods of known extended absence by a targeted agent of a foreign power from
+premises under surveillance, only communications to which the target is a party may be retained and dissemi-
+nated. (S-CCO)
+
+(2) When there is reason to believe that the target of an electronic surveillance is no longer a
+foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, or no longer occupies the premises authorized for surveillance,
+that electronic surveillance shall be immediately terminated, and shall not resume unless subsequently ap-
+proved under the Act. When any person involved in collection or processing of an electronic surveillance
+being conducted pursuant to the Act becomes aware of information tending to indicate a material change in
+the status or location of a target, the person shall immediately ensure that the NSA's Office of General Coun-
+sel is also made aware of such information. (S-CCO)
+
+SECTION 4 - ACQUISITION AND PROCESSING – SPECIAL PROCEDURES (U)
+
+(a) Collection Against Residential Premises (S-CCO)
+
+(1) An electronic surveillance directed against premises located in the United States and used
+for residential purposes shall be conducted by technical means designed to limit the information acquired to
+communications that have one communicant outside the United States, [REDACTED]
+The technical means employed shall consist of
+[REDACTED]
+
+~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~
+~~SECRET~~
+
+(C1-Oct 97)
+~~SECRET~~
+USSID 18 ANNEX A
+APPENDIX 1
+27 July 1993
+
+equipment or equipment capable of identifying international [REDACTED] or other particular international communications known to be used by the targeted foreign power and its agents. Communications to or from the target residential premises that are processed through a [REDACTED] of a foreign power or agent of a foreign power located in a foreign country, or on the foreign country or foreign city telephone direct dialing codes (area codes) for the areas in which such foreign powers of agents are located. (S-CCO).
+
+(2) [REDACTED]
+
+(S-CCO)
+
+(3) Domestic communications that are incidentally acquired during collection against residential premises shall be handled under Section 5 of these procedures. (S CCO)
+
+(b) Attorney-Client Communications (C)
+
+As soon as it becomes apparent that a communication is between a person who is known to be under criminal indictment and an attorney who represents that individual in the matter under indictment (or someone acting on behalf of the attorney), monitoring of that communication will cease and the communica- tion shall be identified as an attomey-client communication in a log maintained for that purpose. The relevant portion of the tape containing that conversation will be placed under seal and the Department of Justice, Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, shall be notified so that appropriate procedures may be established to pro- tect such communications from review or use in any criminal prosecution, while preserving foreign intelli- gence information contained therein. (SCCO)
+
+SECTION 5 - DOMESTIC COMMUNICATIONS (U)
+
+(a) Dissemination (U)
+
+Communications identified as domestic communications shall be promptly destroyed, except that:
+
+(1) domestic communications that are reasonably believed to contain foreign intelligence infor- mation shall be disseminated to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (including United States person identi- tles) for possible further dissemination by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in accordance with its minimiza- tion procedures;
+
+(2) domestic communications that do not contain foreign intelligence information, but that are reasonably believed to contain evidence of a crime that has been, is being, or is about to be committed, shall be disseminated (including United States person identities) to appropriate Federal law enforcement authori- ties, in accordance with Section 106(b) of the Act and crimes reporting procedures approved by the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General; and
+
+(3) domestic communications that are reasonably believed to contain technical data base infor- mation, as defined in Section 2(i), may be disseminated to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to other elements of the U.S. SIGINT system. (S-CCO)
+
+(b) Retention (U)
+:
+(1) Domestic communications disseminated to Federal law enforcement agencies may be re- tained by the NSA for a reasonable period of time, not to exceed six months (or any shorter period set by court order), to permit law enforcement agencies to determine whether access to original recordings of such com- munications is required for law enforcement purposes. (S-CCO)
+
+~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~
+~~SECRET~~
+
+~~SECRET~~
+USSID 18 ANNEX A
+APPENDIX 1
+27 July 1993
+
+(2) Domestic communications reasonably believed to contain technical data base information may be retained for a period sufficient to allow a thorough exploitation and to permit access to data that are, or are reasonably believed likely to become, relevant to a current or future foreign intelligence requirement. Sufficient duration may vary with the nature of the exploitation. (S-CCO)
+
+a. In the context of a cryptanalytic effort, maintenance of technical data bases requires reten- tion of all communications that are enciphered or reasonably believed to contain secret meaning, and suffi- cient duration may consist of any period of time during which encrypted material is subject to, or of use in, cryptanalysis. (S-CCO)
+
+b. In the case of communications that are not enciphered or otherwise thought to contain secret meaning, sufficient duration is one year unless the Deputy Director for Operations, NSA, determines in writing that retention for a longer period is required to respond to authorized foreign intelligence or counterintelligence requirements. (S CCO)
+
+SECTION 6 – FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS OF OR CONCERNING UNITED
+STATES PERSONS (U)
+
+(a) Retention (U)
+
+Foreign communications of or concerning United States persons acquired by the NSA in the course of an electronic surveillance subject to these procedures may be retained only:
+
+(1) if necessary for the maintenance of technical data bases. Retention for this purpose is permitted for a period sufficient to allow a thorough exploitation and to permit access to data that are, or are reasonably believed likely to become, relevant to a current or future foreign intelligence requirement. Suffi- cient duration may vary with the nature of the exploitation.
+
+a. in the context of a cryptanalytic effort, maintenance of technical data bases re- quires retention of all communications that are enciphered or reasonably believed to contain secret meaning, and sufficient duration may consist of any period of time during which encrypted material is subject to, or of use in, cryptanalysis.
+
+b. In the case of communications that are not enciphered or otherwise thought to contain secret meaning, sufficient duration is one year unless the Deputy Director for Operations, NSA, deter- mines in writing that retention for a longer period is required to respond to authorized foreign intelligence or counterintelligence requirements;
+
+(2) if dissemination of such communications with reference to such United States persons would be permitted under subsection (b) below; or
+
+(3). if the information is evidence of a crime that has been, is being, or is about to be committed and is provided to appropriate federal law enforcement authorities. (S-CCO)
+
+(b) Dissemination (U)
+:
+A report based on communications of or concerning a United States person may be dissemi- nated in accordance with Section 7 if the identity of the United States person is deleted and a generic term or symbol is substituted so that the information cannot reasonably be connected with an identifiable United States person. Otherwise dissemination of intelligence reports based on communications of or concerning a United States person may only be made to a recipient requiring the identity of such person for the performance of official duties but only if at least one of the following criteria is also met
+
+(1) the United States person has consented to dissemination or the information of or concerning the United States person is available publicly;
+
+(2) the identity of the United States person is necessary to understand foreign intelligence information or assess its importance, e.g., the identity of a senior official in the Executive Branch;
+
+~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~
+~~SECRET~~
+
+(C1 - Oct 97)
+~~SECRET~~
+USSID 18 ANNEX A
+APPENDIX 1
+27 July 1993
+
+(3) the communication or information indicates that the United States person may be:
+
+(A) an agent of a foreign power;
+
+(B). a foreign power as defined in Section 101(a) (4) or (6) of the Act;
+
+(C) residing outside the United States and holding an official position in the govern- ment or military forces of a foreign power;
+
+(D) a corporation or other entity that is owned or controlled directly or indirectly by a foreign power; or
+
+(E) acting in collaboration with an intelligence or security service of a foreign power and the United States person has, or has had, access to classified national security information or material.
+
+(4) the communication or information indicates that the United States person may be the target of intelligence activities of a foreign power,
+
+(5) the communication or information indicates that the United States person is engaged in the unauthorized disclosure of classified national security information; but only after the agency that originated the information certifies that it is properly classified;
+
+(6) the communication or information indicates that the United States person may be engaging in international terrorist activities;
+
+(7) the acquisition of the United States person's communication was authorized by a court order issued pursuant to Section 105 of the Act and the communication may relate to the foreign intelligence pur- pose of the surveillance;
+
+(8) the communication or information is reasonably believed to contain evidence that a crime has been, is being, or is about to be committed, provided that dissemination is for law enforcement purposes and is made in accordance with Section 106(b) of the Act and crimes reporting procedures approved by the Secretary of Defense and the Attomey General. (U)
+
+SECTION 7 – OTHER FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS (U)
+
+Foreign communications of or concerning a non-United States person may be retained, used, and disseminated in any form in accordance with other applicable law, regulation, and policy. (U)
+
+SECTION 8 – COLLABORATION WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS (S-CCO)
+
+(a) The sharing or exchange of foreign communications governed by these procedures with sig- nals intelligence authorities of collaborating foreign governments (Second Parties) may be undertaken by the NSA only with the written assurance of the Second Party that the use of those foreign communications will be subject to the retention and dissemination provisions of these procedures. (S-CCO)
+
+(b) Domestic communications and communications to or from United States persons shall not be shared with Second Parties. (S-CCO)
+
+(c) Foreign plain text communications may be shared with Second Parties if they are first re- viewed by NSA analysts, who shall remove references to United States persons that are not necessary to understand or assess the foreign intelligence information contained therein. (S-CCO)
+
+(d) Foreign enciphered or encoded communications may be shared with Second Parties without such prior review, provided that at least annually a representative sampling of those shared communications that can be deciphered or decoded is reviewed by the NSA to ensure that any references therein to United States persons are necessary to understand or assess the foreign intelligence information being dissemi-
+
+~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~
+~~SECRET~~
+
+(C1-Oct 97)
+~~SECRET~~
+USSID 18 ANNEX A
+APPENDIX 1
+27 July 1993
+
+nated. Corrective measures with respect to each target or line shall be undertaken as necessary to maintain compliance with the above dissemination standard. The results of each review shall be made available to the Attorney General or a designee. (S-CCO)
+
+Approved by Attorney General Janet Reno on 1 July 1997
+
+~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~
+~~SECRET~~
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+
+ANNEX B
+
+OPERATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO THE
+FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (U)
+
+SECTION 1- GENERAL
+
+1.1.. (U) In accordance with the provisions of Section 2.6 of E.O. 12333, and the NSA/FBI Memorandum of Understanding of 25 November 1980, the National Security Agency may provide specialized equipment and technical knowledge to the FBI to assist the FBI in the conduct of its lawful functions. When requesting such assistance, the FBI will certify to the General Counsel of NSA that such equipment or technical knowledge is necessary to the accomplishment of one or more of the FBI's lawful functions.
+
+1.2. (U) NSA may also provide expert personnel to assist FBI personnel in the operation or installation of specialized equipment when. that equipment is to be employed to collect foreign intelligence. When requesting the assistance of expert personnel, the FBI will certify to the General Counsel that such assistance is necessary to collect foreign intelligence and that the approval of the Attorney General (and, when necessary, a warrant from a court of competent jurisdiction) has been obtained.
+
+SECTION 2-CONTROL
+
+2.1. (U) No operational assistance as discussed in Section 1 shall be provided without the express permission of the Director, NSA/Chief, CSS, Deputy Director, NSA, the Deputy Director for Operations, or the Deputy Director for Technology and Systems. The Deputy Director for Operations and the Deputy Director for Technology and Systems may approve requests for such assistance only with the concurrence of the General Counsel.
+
+~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~
+B/1
+~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+ANNEX C
+SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO U.S. AND ALLIED MILITARY
+EXERCISE COMMAND AUTHORITIES (U)
+
+SECTION 1-POLICY
+1.1. Signals Intelligence support to U.S. and Allied military exercise command authorities is
+provided for in USSID 56 and DoD Directive 5200.17 (M-2). Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum
+MJCS111-88, 18 August 1988, and USSID 4, 16 December, 1988, establish doctrine and procedures for
+providing signals intelligence support to military commanders. The procedures in this Annex provide
+policy guidelines for safeguarding the rights of U.S. persons in the conduct of exercise SIGINT support
+activities.
+
+SECTION 2 - DEFINITIONS
+2.1. (U) The term "Military Tactical Communications" means United States and Allied military
+exercise communications, within the United States and abroad, that are necessary for the production
+of simulated foreign intelligence and counterintelligence or to permit an analysis of communications
+security.
+
+SECTION 3-PROCEDURES
+3.1. (C-CCO) The USSS may collect, process, store, and disseminate military tactical
+communications that are also communications of, or concerning, U.S. persons.
+
+a. Collection efforts will be conducted in such a manner as to avoid, to the extent feasible,
+the intercept of non-exercise-related communications.
+
+b. Military tactical communications may be stored and processed without deletion of
+references to U.S. persons if the names and communications of the U.S. persons who are exercise
+participants, whether military, government, or contractor, are contained in, or such communications
+constitute, exercise-related communications or fictitious communications or information prepared
+for the exercise.
+
+c. Communications of U.S. persons not participating in the exercise that are inadvertently
+intercepted during the exercise shall be destroyed as soon as feasible, provided that a record
+describing the signal or frequency user in technical and generic terms may be retained for signal
+identification and Collection-avoidance purposes. Inadvertently intercepted communications that
+contain anomalies in enciphered communications that reveal a potential vulnerability to United
+States communications security should be forwarded to the NSA Deputy Director for Information
+Systems Security.
+
+~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
+
+~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
+USSID 18 ANNEX C
+27 July 1993
+
+d. Dissemination of military exercise communications, exercise reports, or information
+files derived from such communications shall be limited to those authorities and persons participating
+in the exercise or conducting reviews and critiques thereof.
+
+~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
+C/2
+ANNEX D
+TESTING OF ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT (U)
+
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+
+SECTION 1-PURPOSE AND APPLICABILITY
+
+1.1. (U) This Annex applies to the testing of electronic equipment that has the capability to
+intercept communications and other non-public information. Testing includes development,
+calibration, and evaluation of such equipment, and will be conducted, to the maximum extent
+practical, without interception or monitoring of U.S. persons.
+
+SECTION 2 - PROCEDURES
+
+2.1. (U) The USSS may test electronic equipment that has the capability to intercept
+communications and other information subject to the following limitations:
+
+a. To the maximum extent practical, the following should be used:
+(1) Laboratory-generated signals,
+
+(2) Communications transmitted between terminals located outside the United States
+not used by any known U.S. person,
+
+(3) Official government agency communications with the consent of an appropriate
+official of that agency, or an individual's communications with the consent of that individual,
+
+(4) Public broadcast signals, or
+
+(5) Other communications in which there is no reasonable expectation of privacy (as
+approved in each instance by the NSA General Counsel).
+
+b. Where it is not practical to test electronic equipment solely against signals described in
+paragraph 2.1.a., above, testing may be conducted, provided:
+(1) the proposed test is coordinated with the NSA General Counsel;
+
+(2) the test is limited in scope and duration to that necessary to determine the
+capability of the equipment;
+
+(3) no particular person is targeted without consent and it is not reasonable to obtain
+the consent of the persons incidentally subjected to the surveillance; and
+
+(4) the test does not exceed 90 calendar days.
+
+~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~
+D/1
+USSID 18 ANNEX D
+27 July 1993
+
+c. Where the test involves communications other than those identified in 2.1.a. and a test
+period longer than 90 days is required, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act requires that the test
+be approved by the Attorney General. Such proposals and plans shall be submitted by USSS elements
+through the General Counsel, NSA, to the Director, NSA/Chief, CSS for transmission to the Attorney
+General. The test proposal shall state the requirement for an extended test involving such
+communications, the nature of the test, the organization that will conduct the test, and the proposed
+disposition of any signals or communications acquired during the test.
+
+2.2. (U) The content of any communication other than communications between non-U.S.
+persons outside the United States which are acquired during a test and evaluation shall be:
+
+a. retained and used only for the purpose of determining the capability of the electronic
+equipment;
+
+b. disclosed only to persons conducting or evaluating the test; and
+
+c. destroyed before or immediately upon completion of the testing.
+
+2.3. (U) The technical parameters of a communication, such as frequency, modulation, and
+time of activity of acquired electronic signals, may be retained and used for test reporting or
+collection-avoidance purposes. Such parameters may be disseminated to other DoD intelligence
+components and other entities authorized to conduct electronic surveillance, provided such
+dissemination and use are limited to testing, evaluation, or collection-avoidance purposes.
+
+~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~
+D/2
+~~SECRET~~
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+ANNEX E
+SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS (U)
+
+SECTION 1 PROCEDURES
+1.1. (U) This Annex provides the procedures for safeguarding the rights of U.S. persons when
+conducting SIGINT search and development activities.
+
+1.2. (S-ECO) The USSS may conduct search and development activities with respect to signals
+throughout the radio spectrum under the following limitations:
+
+a. Signals may be collected only for the purpose of identifying those signals that:
+(1) may contain information related to the production of foreign intelligence or
+counterintelligence;
+
+(2) are enciphered or appear to contain secret meaning;
+
+(3) are necessary to assure efficient signals intelligence collection or to avoid the
+collection of unwanted signals; or,
+
+(4) reveal vulnerabilities of United States communications security.
+
+b. Communications originated or intended for receipt in the United States or originated
+or intended for receipt by U.S. persons shall be processed in accordance with Section 5 of USSID 18,
+provided that information necessary for cataloging the constituent elements of the signal
+environment may be processed and retained if such information does not identify a U.S. person.
+Information revealing a United States communications security vulnerability may be retained.
+
+c. Information necessary for cataloging the constituent elements of the signal
+environment may be disseminated to the extent such information does not identify U.S. persons.
+Communications equipment nomenclature may be disseminated. Information that reveals a
+vulnerability to United States communications security may be disseminated to the appropriate
+communications security authorities.
+
+d. All information obtained in the process of search and development that appears to be
+of foreign intelligence value may be forwarded to the proper analytic office within NSA for
+processing and dissemination in accordance with relevant portions of USSID 18.
+
+~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~
+~~SECRET~~
+~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
+
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+
+ANNEX F
+ILLICIT COMMUNICATIONS (C)
+
+SECTION 1 - PROCEDURES
+
+1.1. The USSS may collect, retain, process, and disseminate illicit communications without reference to the requirements concerning U.S. persons.
+
+1.2. The term "illicit communications" means a communication transmitted in violation of either the Communications Act of 1934. and regulations issued thereunder or international agreements, which because of its explicit content, message characteristics, or method of transmission, is reasonably believed to be a communication to or from an agent or agents of foreign powers, whether or not U.S. persons.
+
+~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
+
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+
+ANNEX G
+TRAINING OF PERSONNEL IN THE OPERATION AND USE OF SIGINT
+COLLECTION AND OTHER SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT (U)
+
+SECTION 1- APPLICABILITY
+
+1.1. (U) This Annex applies to all USSS use of SIGINT collection and other surveillance equipment for training purposes.
+
+SECTION 2-POLICY
+
+2.1. (U) Training of USSS personnel in the operation and use of SIGINT collection equipment shall be conducted, to the maximum extent that is practical, without interception of the communications of U.S. persons or persons in the United States who have not given consent to such interception. Communications and information protected by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) (see Annex A) will not be collected for training purposes.
+
+SECTION 3-PROCEDURES
+
+3.1. (U) The training of USSS personnel in the operation and use of SIGINT collection and other surveillance equipment shall include guidance concerning the requirements and restrictions of the FISA, Executive Order 12333, and USSID 18.
+
+3.2. (U) The use of SIGINT collection and other surveillance equipment for training purposes is subject to the following limitations:
+
+a. To the maximum extent practical, use of such equipment for training purposes shall be directed against otherwise authorized intelligence targets;
+
+b. The contents of private communications of nonconsenting U.S. persons may not be acquired unless the person is an authorized target of electronic surveillance; and
+
+c. The electronic surveillance will be limited in extent and duration to that necessary to train personnel in the use of the equipment.
+
+3.3. (U) The limitations in paragraph 3.2. do not apply in the following instances:
+
+a. Public broadcasts, distress signals, or official United States Government communications may be monitored, provided that, where government agency communications are monitored, the consent of an appropriate official is obtained; and
+
+FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+USSID 18 ANNEX G
+27 July 1993
+
+b. Minimal acquisition of information is permitted as required for calibration purposes.
+
+3.4. (U) Information collected during training that involves authorized intelligence targets may be retained in accordance with Section 6 of USSID 18 and disseminated in accordance with Section 7 of USSID 18. Information other than distress signals collected during training that does not involve authorized intelligence targets or that is acquired inadvertently shall be destroyed as soon as practical or upon completion of the training and may not be disseminated outside the USSS for any purpose. Distress signals should be referred to the DDO.
+
+~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~
+619
+
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+
+ANNEX H
+CONSENT FORMS (U)
+
+SECTION 1- PURPOSE
+
+1.1. (U) The forms set forth in this Annex are for use in recording consent by U.S. persons for USSS elements to collect and disseminate foreign communications concerning that person. The first form is consent to collect and disseminate a U.S. person's communications as well as references to that person in foreign communications. The second form is consent to collect and disseminate only references to the U.S. person and does not include communications to or from that person.
+
+1.2. (U) Section 4.1.c. of USSID 18 states that the Director, NSA/Chief, CSS has authority to approve the consensual collection of communications to, from or about U.S. persons. Elements of the USSS proposing to conduct consensual collection should forward a copy of the executed consent form and any pertinent information to the Director, NSA/Chief, CSS for approval:
+
+1.3.. (U) The forms provided on the following pages may be reproduced, provided the security classifications (top and bottom) are removed. It is the responsibility of the user to properly reclassify the document in accordance with requisite security guidelines.
+
+~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~
+
+~~SECRET~~
+
+USSID 18 ANNEX H
+27 July 1993
+
+CONSENT AGREEMENT
+
+SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
+
+I, [BLANK LINE] hereby consent to the National Security Agency undertaking to seek and disseminate communications to or from or referencing me in foreign communications for the purpose of [BLANK LINE]
+
+This consent applies to administrative messages alerting elements of the United States Signals Intelligence System to this consent, as well as to any signals intelligence reports that may relate to the purpose stated above.
+
+Except as otherwise provided by Executive Order 12333 procedures, this consent covers only information that relates to the purpose stated above and is effective for the period [BLANK LINE] to [BLANK LINE]
+
+Signals intelligence reports containing information derived from communications to or from me may only be disseminated to me and to [BLANK LINE]. Signals intelligence reports containing information derived from communications referencing me may only be disseminated to me and to [BLANK LINE] except as otherwise permitted by procedures under Executive Order 12333.
+
+(SIGNATURE)
+
+(TITLE)
+
+(DATE)
+
+~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~
+~~SECRET~~
+
+~~SECRET~~
+USSID 18 ANNEX H
+27 July 1993
+
+CONSENT AGREEMENT
+SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
+
+I, [REDACTED], hereby consent to the National Security Agency
+undertaking to seek and disseminate references to me in foreign communications for the purpose of
+[REDACTED]
+
+This consent applies to administrative messages alerting elements of the United States Signals
+Intelligence System to this consent, as well as to any signals intelligence reports that may relate to the
+purpose stated above.
+
+Except as otherwise provided by Executive Order 12333 procedures, this consent covers only
+references to me in foreign communications and information therefrom that relates to the purpose
+stated above and is effective for the period [REDACTED] to [REDACTED].
+
+Signals intelligence reports containing information derived from communications referencing
+me and related to the purpose stated above may only be disseminated to me and to
+[REDACTED] except as otherwise permitted by procedures under Executive Order
+12333.
+
+(SIGNATURE)
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TITLE)
+[REDACTED]
+
+(DATE)
+[REDACTED]
+
+~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~
+~~SECRET~~
+
+~~SECRET~~
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+
+ANNEX I
+FORM FOR CERTIFICATION OF
+OPENLY ACKNOWLEDGED ENTITIES (S-CCO)
+
+The form below should be used for Director approvals for the collection of communications of
+entities that are openly acknowledged to be directed and controlled by a foreign power as specified
+in Section 4.1.c.(3) of USSID 18.
+
+DIRECTOR, NSA/CHIEF, CSS
+
+Certification for Openly Acknowledged Entities Under
+Section 4.A.1.(b) of the Classified Annex
+to DOD 5240.1R
+
+Certification to the Attorney General:
+
+~~(S-CCO~~) The Director, NSA, hereby certifies that [REDACTED]
+located in the United States and openly acknowledged to be directed and controlled by (Government
+X), is a new target of collection. The purpose of the surveillance is (to collect
+[REDACTED] intelligence regarding Government X) in accordance with valid intelligence requirements. The
+surveillance will entail intentional interception or deliberate selection of the target's international
+communications. Standard minimization procedures will be applied to any information collected that
+relates to U.S. persons.
+
+[REDACTED]
+Director, NSA/Chief, CSS
+
+Copy to: Deputy Secretary of Defense
+
+~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~
+~~SECRET~~
+
+~~SECRET~~
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+
+ANNEX K
+
+(S-CCO)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(S-CCO)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~
+~~SECRET~~
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_1993-07-27_USSID-18_NSA-Release-November-2013/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_1993-07-27_USSID-18_NSA-Release-November-2013/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..31ab1dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_1993-07-27_USSID-18_NSA-Release-November-2013/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+{
+ "title": "July 27, 1993 United States Signals Intelligence Directive 18",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "United States Intelligence Directive 18 (USSID 18) prescribing NSA policies and procedures as they relate to the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution and minimization procedures/rules governing the collection, retention, and dissemination of information about US persons. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "1993-07-27",
+ "classification": [
+ "SECRET"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "McConnell, Mike"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-18",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/july-27-1993-united-states-signals-intelligence-directive-18",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "9e520dfb6cb1247474080a3867a45ed140ac8efd21a4cfdaf2648a596f1208d8",
+ "pages": 53
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2006_Attorney_General_Report/ACLU_-_2006_Attorney_General_Report.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2006_Attorney_General_Report/ACLU_-_2006_Attorney_General_Report.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2a96a21
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2006_Attorney_General_Report/ACLU_-_2006_Attorney_General_Report.md
@@ -0,0 +1,282 @@
+U.S. Department of Justice
+Office of Legislative Affairs
+
+Office of the Assistant Attorney General
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+
+~~SECRET~~
+
+April 28, 2006
+
+The Honorable Pat Roberts
+Chairman
+Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
+United States Senate
+Washington, DC 20510
+
+Dear Mr. Chairman:
+
+In accordance with Section 1862 of the Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, (50 U.S.C. § 1862), I am
+submitting herewith the annual report of the Attorney General
+concerning all requests for access to certain business records
+(including the production of tangible things) under the Act that
+were made during calendar year 2005.
+
+Sincerely,
+Willi E. Moschella
+William E. Moschella
+Assistant Attorney General
+
+Attachment
+
+cc: The Honorable John D. Rockefeller IV
+Vice Chairman
+
+~~SECRET~~
+~~UNCLASSIFIED WHEN ATTACHMENT IS REMOVED~~
+
+~~SECRET~~
+
+THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ANNUAL REPORT ON ACCESS TO CERTAIN
+BUSINESS RECORDS FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES
+UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+APRIL 2005
+
+This report is submitted pursuant to the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the "Act"),
+50 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1862, as amended, and covers all applications
+for access to certain business records (including the production
+of tangible things) for foreign intelligence purposes under the
+Act during the calendar year 2005. (U)
+
+The Government filed 155 applications with the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) seeking authorization for
+access to certain business records (including the production of
+tangible things) for foreign intelligence purposes during this
+period. Of these 155 applications, 141 were combined pen
+register and/or trap and trace devices/business records
+applications. (b)(1) [REDACTED]
+
+The Court made substantive modifications to the Government's
+proposed orders in two applications submitted to the Court. The
+Court did not deny, in whole or in part, any application
+submitted by the Government during calendar year 2005. (S)
+
+Of the 155 applications submitted to the Court during
+calendar year 2005, (b)(1) [REDACTED]
+
+~~SECRET~~
+
+U.S. Department of Justice
+Office of Legislative Affairs
+
+Office of the Assistant Attorney General
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+
+~~SECRET~~
+
+April 28, 2006
+
+The Honorable Peter Hoekstra
+Chairman
+Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
+U.S. House of Representatives
+Washington, DC 20515
+
+Dear Mr. Chairman:
+
+In accordance with Section 1862 of the Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, (50 U.S.C. § 1862), I am
+submitting herewith the annual report of the Attorney General
+concerning all requests for access to certain business records
+(including the production of tangible things) under the Act that
+were made during calendar year 2005.
+
+Sincerely,
+Willin E. Moschella
+William E. Moschella
+Assistant Attorney General
+
+Attachment
+
+CC: The Honorable Jane Harman
+Ranking Minority Member
+
+~~SECRET~~
+~~UNCLASSIFIED WHEN ATTACHMENT IS REMOVED~~
+
+~~SECRET~~
+
+THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ANNUAL REPORT ON ACCESS TO CERTAIN
+BUSINESS RECORDS FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES
+UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+APRIL 2005
+
+This report is submitted pursuant to the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the "Act"),
+50 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1862, as amended, and covers all applications
+for access to certain business records (including the production
+of tangible things) for foreign intelligence purposes under the
+Act during the calendar year 2005. (U)
+
+The Government filed 155 applications with the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) seeking authorization for
+access to certain business records (including the production of
+tangible things) for foreign intelligence purposes during this
+period. Of these 155 applications, 141 were combined pen
+register and/or trap and trace devices/business records
+applications. (b)(1) [REDACTED]
+
+The Court made substantive modifications to the Government's
+proposed orders in two applications submitted to the Court. The
+Court did not deny, in whole or in part, any application
+submitted by the Government during calendar year 2005. (5)
+
+Of the 155 applications submitted to the Court during
+calendar year 2005, (b)(1) [REDACTED]
+
+~~SECRET~~
+
+U.S. Department of Justice
+Office of Legislative Affairs
+
+Office of the Assistant Attorney General
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+
+~~SECRET~~
+
+April 28, 2006
+
+The Honorable Arlen Specter
+Chairman
+Committee on the Judiciary
+United States Senate
+Washington, DC 20510
+
+Dear Mr. Chairman:
+
+In accordance with Section 1862 of the Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, (50 U.S.C. § 1862), I am
+submitting herewith the annual report of the Attorney General
+concerning all requests for access to certain business records
+(including the production of tangible things) under the Act that
+were made during calendar year 2005.
+
+Sincerely,
+Willin E. Moschella
+William E. Moschella
+Assistant Attorney General
+
+Attachment
+
+CC: The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
+Ranking Minority Member
+
+~~SECRET~~
+~~UNCLASSIFIED WHEN ATTACHMENT IS REMOVED~~
+
+~~SECRET~~
+
+THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ANNUAL REPORT ON ACCESS TO CERTAIN
+BUSINESS RECORDS FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES
+UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+APRIL 2005
+
+This report is submitted pursuant to the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the "Act"),
+50 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1862, as amended, and covers all applications
+for access to certain business records (including the production
+of tangible things) for foreign intelligence purposes under the
+Act during the calendar year 2005. (U)
+
+The Government filed 155 applications with the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) seeking authorization for
+access to certain business records (including the production of
+tangible things) for foreign intelligence purposes during this
+period. Of these 155 applications, 141 were combined pen
+register and/or trap and trace devices/business records
+applications. (b)(1) [REDACTED]
+
+The Court made substantive modifications to the Government's
+proposed orders in two applications submitted to the Court. The
+Court did not deny, in whole or in part, any application
+submitted by the Government during calendar year 2005. (S)
+
+Of the 155 applications submitted to the Court during
+calendar year 2005, (b)(1) [REDACTED]
+
+SECRET
+
+U.S. Department of Justice
+Office of Legislative Affairs
+
+Office of the Assistant Attorney General
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+
+April 28, 2006
+~~SECRET~~
+
+The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.
+Chairman
+Committee on the Judiciary
+U.S. House of Representatives
+Washington, DC 20515
+
+Dear Mr. Chairman:
+
+In accordance with Section 1862 of the Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, (50 U.S.C. § 1862), I am
+submitting herewith the annual report of the Attorney General
+concerning all requests for access to certain business records
+(including the production of tangible things) under the Act that
+were made during calendar year 2005.
+
+Sincerely,
+Willis E. Moschella
+William E. Moschella
+Assistant Attorney General
+
+Attachment
+
+cc: The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
+Ranking Minority Member
+
+~~SECRET~~
+~~UNCLASSIFIED WHEN ATTACHMENT IS REMOVED~~
+
+~~SECRET~~
+
+THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ANNUAL REPORT ON ACCESS TO CERTAIN
+BUSINESS RECORDS FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES
+UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+APRIL 2005
+
+This report is submitted pursuant to the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the "Act"),
+50 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1862, as amended, and covers all applications
+for access to certain business records (including the production
+of tangible things) for foreign intelligence purposes under the
+Act during the calendar year 2005. (U)
+
+The Government filed 155 applications with the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) seeking authorization for
+access to certain business records (including the production of
+tangible things) for foreign intelligence purposes during this
+period. Of these 155 applications, 141 were combined pen
+register and/or trap and trace devices/business records
+applications. (b)(1) [REDACTED]
+
+The Court made substantive modifications to the Government's
+proposed orders in two applications submitted to the Court. The
+Court did not deny, in whole or in part, any application
+submitted by the Government during calendar year 2005. (S)
+
+Of the 155 applications submitted to the Court during
+calendar year 2005, (b)(1) [REDACTED]
+
+~~SECRET~~
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2006_Attorney_General_Report/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2006_Attorney_General_Report/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..04f4b77
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2006_Attorney_General_Report/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+{
+ "title": "2006 Attorney General Report on Requests for Access to FISA Business Records ",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "An annual report from the Attorney General to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), Senate Judiciary Committee, and House Judiciary Committee concerning requests for access to business records under Section 215. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "This is a SECRET Department of Justice document dated 28 April 2006, comprising four identical cover letters from Assistant Attorney General William E. Moschella to the chairmen of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (Pat Roberts), the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Peter Hoekstra), the Senate Judiciary Committee (Arlen Specter) and the House Judiciary Committee (F. James Sensenbrenner Jr.), each transmitting the Attorney General's annual report on business records access under FISA Section 215 for calendar year 2005, released through ACLU/EFF FOIA litigation.\n\nThe attached report states that the government filed 155 applications with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court seeking authorization for access to business records during 2005, of which 141 were combined pen register and/or trap and trace devices with business records applications. The Court made substantive modifications to two of the 155 applications and did not deny any application in whole or in part during the period. The remaining content of the report — including the nature, scope and targets of the applications — is redacted under exemption b(1).\n\nThe document is significant as part of the documentary record of the legal framework underlying bulk collection programmes. Read alongside the February 2011 DOJ briefing document, the 155 applications in 2005 represent the pre-bulk-collection baseline — a period when Section 215 was being used for individual business records orders rather than the blanket bulk telephony metadata collection that was subsequently authorised. The 141 combined pen register/business records applications suggests significant overlap between the two authorities even at this early stage. The absence of any denied applications confirms the FISC was approving government requests without exception during this period.",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "DOJ",
+ "date_created": "2006-04-28",
+ "classification": [
+ "SECRET"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Roberts, Pat",
+ "Moschella, William E.",
+ "Rockefeller, John D. IV",
+ "Hoekstra, Peter",
+ "Harman, Jane",
+ "Specter, Arlen",
+ "Leahy, Patrick J.",
+ "Sensenbrenner, F. James Jr."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-18",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/2006-attorney-general-report-requests-access-fisa-business-records",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "8b45ff7eddd28c2296c8b8e1016ea9ec0eb9957021534875875941caf24cd805",
+ "pages": 8
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2007_Attorney_General_Report/ACLU_-_2007_Attorney_General_Report.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2007_Attorney_General_Report/ACLU_-_2007_Attorney_General_Report.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a056e00
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2007_Attorney_General_Report/ACLU_-_2007_Attorney_General_Report.md
@@ -0,0 +1,299 @@
+U.S. Department of Justice
+Office of Legislative Affairs
+
+Office of the Assistant Attorney General
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+
+~~SECRET~~
+
+April 27, 2007
+
+The Honorable John D. Rockefeller, IV
+Chairman
+Select Committee on Intelligence
+United States Senate
+Washington, DC 20510
+
+Dear Mr. Chairman:
+
+In accordance with Section 1862 of the Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, (50 U.S.C. § 1862), I am
+submitting herewith the annual report of the Attorney General
+concerning all requests for access to certain business records
+(including the production of tangible things) under the Act that
+were made during calendar year 2006.
+
+Sincerely,
+
+Richard A. Hertling
+Acting Assistant
+Attorney General
+
+Attachment
+
+cc: The Honorable Christopher S. Bond
+Vice Chairman
+
+~~SECRET~~
+DOWNGRADE TO UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT
+
+~~SECRET~~
+
+THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ANNUAL REPORT ON ACCESS TO CERTAIN
+BUSINESS RECORDS FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES
+UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+APRIL 2007
+
+This report is submitted pursuant to the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the "Act"), 50 U.S.C.
+§ 1862, as amended, and covers all applications for access to
+certain business records (including the production of tangible
+things) for foreign intelligence purposes under the Act during
+the calendar year 2006. (U)
+
+The Government filed 43 applications with the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) seeking authorization for
+access to certain business records (including the production of
+tangible things) for foreign intelligence purposes during this
+period. Of these 43 applications, 32 were combined pen register
+and/or trap and trace devices/business records applications.
+The FISC made substantive modifications to the Government's
+proposed orders in four applications submitted to the FISC. The
+FISC did not deny, in whole or in part, any application submitted
+by the Government during calendar year 2006. (S)
+(b)(1) [REDACTED]
+
+~~SECRET~~
+
+~~Classified by: Margaret A. Skelly Nolen, Acting~~
+~~Counsel for Intelligence Policy,~~
+~~National Security Division,~~
+~~U.S. Department of Justice~~
+~~Reason: 1.4(c)~~
+~~Declassify on: X1, X6~~
+
+U.S. Department of Justice
+Office of Legislative Affairs
+
+Office of the Assistant Attorney General
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+
+~~SECRET~~
+
+April 27, 2007
+
+The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
+Chairman
+Committee on the Judiciary
+United States Senate
+Washington, DC 20510
+
+Dear Mr. Chairman:
+
+In accordance with Section 1862 of the Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, (50 U.S.C. § 1862), I am
+submitting herewith the annual report of the Attorney General
+concerning all requests for access to certain business records
+(including the production of tangible things) under the Act that
+were made during calendar year 2006.
+
+Sincerely,
+
+Richard A. Hertling
+Acting Assistant
+Attorney General
+
+Attachment
+
+cc: The Honorable Arlen Specter
+Ranking Minority Member
+
+~~SECRET~~
+DOWNGRADE TO UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT
+
+~~SECRET~~
+
+THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ANNUAL REPORT ON ACCESS TO CERTAIN
+BUSINESS RECORDS FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES
+UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+APRIL 2007
+
+This report is submitted pursuant to the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the "Act"), 50 U.S.C.
+§ 1862, as amended, and covers all applications for access to
+certain business records (including the production of tangible
+things) for foreign intelligence purposes under the Act during
+the calendar year 2006. (U)
+
+The Government filed 43 applications with the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) seeking authorization for
+access to certain business records (including the production of
+tangible things) for foreign intelligence purposes during this
+period. Of these 43 applications, 32 were combined pen register
+and/or trap and trace devices/business records applications.
+The FISC made substantive modifications to the Government's
+proposed orders in four applications submitted to the FISC. The
+FISC did not deny, in whole or in part, any application submitted
+by the Government during calendar year 2006. (S)
+(b)(1) [REDACTED]
+
+~~SECRET~~
+
+~~Classified by: Margaret A. Skelly Nolen, Acting~~
+~~Counsel for Intelligence Policy,~~
+~~National Security Division,~~
+~~U.S. Department of Justice~~
+~~Reason: 1.4(c)~~
+~~Declassify on: X1, X6~~
+
+U.S. Department of Justice
+Office of Legislative Affairs
+
+Office of the Assistant Attorney General
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+
+~~SECRET~~
+
+April 27, 2007
+
+The Honorable Silvestre Reyes
+Chairman
+Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
+U.S. House of Representatives
+Washington, DC 20515
+
+Dear Mr. Chairman:
+
+In accordance with Section 1862 of the Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, (50 U.S.C. § 1862), I am
+submitting herewith the annual report of the Attorney General
+concerning all requests for access to certain business records
+(including the production of tangible things) under the Act that
+were made during calendar year 2006.
+
+Sincerely,
+
+Richard A. Hertling
+Acting Assistant
+Attorney General
+
+Attachment
+
+cc: The Honorable Peter Hoekstra
+Ranking Minority Member
+
+~~SECRET~~
+DOWNGRADE TO UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT
+
+~~SECRET~~
+
+THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ANNUAL REPORT ON ACCESS TO CERTAIN
+BUSINESS RECORDS FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES
+UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+APRIL 2007
+
+This report is submitted pursuant to the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the "Act"), 50 U.S.C.
+§ 1862, as amended, and covers all applications for access to
+certain business records (including the production of tangible
+things) for foreign intelligence purposes under the Act during
+the calendar year 2006. (U)
+
+The Government filed 43 applications with the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) seeking authorization for
+access to certain business records (including the production of
+tangible things) for foreign intelligence purposes during this
+period. Of these 43 applications, 32 were combined pen register
+and/or trap and trace devices/business records applications.
+The FISC made substantive modifications to the Government's
+proposed orders in four applications submitted to the FISC. The
+FISC did not deny, in whole or in part, any application submitted
+by the Government during calendar year 2006. (S)
+(b)(1) [REDACTED]
+
+~~SECRET~~
+
+~~Classified by: Margaret A. Skelly Nolen, Acting~~
+~~Counsel for Intelligence Policy,~~
+~~National Security Division,~~
+~~U.S. Department of Justice~~
+~~Reason: 1.4(c)~~
+~~Declassify on: X1, X6~~
+
+U.S. Department of Justice
+Office of Legislative Affairs
+
+Office of the Assistant Attorney General
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+
+~~SECRET~~
+
+April 27, 2007
+
+The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
+Chairman
+Committee on the Judiciary
+U.S. House of Representatives
+Washington, DC 20515
+
+Dear Mr. Chairman:
+
+In accordance with Section 1862 of the Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, (50 U.S.C. § 1862), I am
+submitting herewith the annual report of the Attorney General
+concerning all requests for access to certain business records
+(including the production of tangible things) under the Act that
+were made during calendar year 2006.
+
+Sincerely,
+
+Richard A. Hertling
+Acting Assistant
+Attorney General
+
+Attachment
+
+cc: The Honorable Lamar S. Smith
+Ranking Minority Member
+
+~~SECRET~~
+DOWNGRADE TO UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT
+
+~~SECRET~~
+
+THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ANNUAL REPORT ON ACCESS TO CERTAIN
+BUSINESS RECORDS FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES
+UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+APRIL 2007
+
+This report is submitted pursuant to the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the "Act"), 50 U.S.C.
+§ 1862, as amended, and covers all applications for access to
+certain business records (including the production of tangible
+things) for foreign intelligence purposes under the Act during
+the calendar year 2006. (U)
+
+The Government filed 43 applications with the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) seeking authorization for
+access to certain business records (including the production of
+tangible things) for foreign intelligence purposes during this
+period. Of these 43 applications, 32 were combined pen register
+and/or trap and trace devices/business records applications.
+The FISC made substantive modifications to the Government's
+proposed orders in four applications submitted to the FISC. The
+FISC did not deny, in whole or in part, any application submitted
+by the Government during calendar year 2006. (S)
+(b)(1) [REDACTED]
+
+~~SECRET~~
+
+~~Classified by: Margaret A. Skelly Nolen, Acting~~
+~~Counsel for Intelligence Policy,~~
+~~National Security Division,~~
+~~U.S. Department of Justice~~
+~~Reason: 1.4(c)~~
+~~Declassify on: X1, X6~~
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2007_Attorney_General_Report/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2007_Attorney_General_Report/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..57e18da
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2007_Attorney_General_Report/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+{
+ "title": "2007 Attorney General Report on Requests for Access to FISA Business Records ",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "An annual report from the Attorney General to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), Senate Judiciary Committee, and House Judiciary Committee concerning requests for access to business records under Section 215. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "DOJ",
+ "date_created": "2007-04-27",
+ "classification": [
+ "SECRET"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Hertling, Richard A.",
+ "Bond, Christopher S.",
+ "Leahy, Patrick J.",
+ "Specter, Arlen",
+ "Nolen, Margaret A. Skelly",
+ "Reyes, Silvestre",
+ "Conyers, John Jr."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-28",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/2007-attorney-general-report-requests-access-fisa-business-records",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "2928d373126b385d5a5d94798d6ed21eeae2fed3fdeaa8e0503beace70f71dea",
+ "pages": 8
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2008_Attorney_General_Report/ACLU_-_2008_Attorney_General_Report.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2008_Attorney_General_Report/ACLU_-_2008_Attorney_General_Report.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4755913
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2008_Attorney_General_Report/ACLU_-_2008_Attorney_General_Report.md
@@ -0,0 +1,298 @@
+U.S. Department of Justice
+Office of Legislative Affairs
+
+Office of the Assistant Attorney General
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+
+~~SECRET~~
+
+April 30, 2008
+
+The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
+Chairman
+Committee on the Judiciary
+United States Senate
+Washington, DC 20510
+
+Dear Mr. Chairman:
+
+In accordance with Section 1862 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as
+amended, (50 U.S.C. § 1862), we are submitting herewith the annual report of the Attorney
+General concerning all requests for access to certain business records (including the production
+of tangible things) under the Act that were made during calendar year 2007.
+
+Sincerely,
+
+Brian A. Benczkowski
+Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+Attachment
+
+cc: The Honorable Arlen Specter
+Ranking Member
+
+~~SECRET~~
+DOWNGRADE TO UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT
+
+---
+
+~~SECRET~~
+
+THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ANNUAL REPORT ON ACCESS TO CERTAIN
+BUSINESS RECORDS FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES
+UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+APRIL 2008
+
+This report is submitted pursuant to the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the "Act"), 50 U.S.C.
+§ 1862, as amended, and covers all applications for access to
+certain business records (including the production of tangible
+things) for foreign intelligence purposes under the Act during
+the calendar year 2007. (U)
+
+The Government filed six applications with the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) seeking authorization for
+access to certain business records (including the production of
+tangible things) for foreign intelligence purposes during this
+period. Of these six applications, none were combined pen
+register and/or trap and trace devices/business records
+applications. The FISC did not deny, in whole or in part, any
+application submitted by the Government during calendar year
+2007. (S)
+
+(b)(1)
+[REDACTED]
+
+~~SECRET~~
+~~Classified by: Matthew G. Olsen. Deputy~~
+~~Assistant Attorney General,~~
+~~National Security Division,~~
+~~U.S. Department of Justice~~
+~~Reason: 1.4(e)~~
+~~Declassify on: April 28, 2032~~
+
+---
+
+U.S. Department of Justice
+Office of Legislative Affairs
+
+Office of the Assistant Attorney General
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+
+~~SECRET~~
+
+April 30, 2008
+
+The Honorable John D. Rockefeller, IV
+Chairman
+Select Committee on Intelligence
+United States Senate
+Washington, DC 20510
+
+Dear Mr. Chairman:
+
+In accordance with Section 1862 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as
+amended, (50 U.S.C. § 1862), we are submitting herewith the annual report of the Attorney
+General concerning all requests for access to certain business records (including the production
+of tangible things) under the Act that were made during calendar year 2007.
+
+Sincerely,
+
+Brian A. Benczkowski
+Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+Attachment
+
+cc: The Honorable Christopher S. Bond
+Vice Chairman
+
+~~SECRET~~
+DOWNGRADE TO UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT
+
+---
+
+~~SECRET~~
+
+THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ANNUAL REPORT ON ACCESS TO CERTAIN
+BUSINESS RECORDS FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES
+UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+APRIL 2008
+
+This report is submitted pursuant to the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the "Act"), 50 U.S.C.
+§ 1862, as amended, and covers all applications for access to
+certain business records (including the production of tangible
+things) for foreign intelligence purposes under the Act during
+the calendar year 2007. (U)
+
+The Government filed six applications with the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) seeking authorization for
+access to certain business records (including the production of
+tangible things) for foreign intelligence purposes during this
+period. Of these six applications, none were combined pen
+register and/or trap and trace devices/business records
+applications. The FISC did not deny, in whole or in part, any
+application submitted by the Government during calendar year
+2007. (S)
+
+(b)(1) [REDACTED]
+
+~~SECRET~~
+~~Classified by: Matthew G. Olsen, Deputy~~
+~~Assistant Attorney General,~~
+~~National Security Division,~~
+~~U.S. Department of Justice~~
+~~Reason: 1.4(c)~~
+~~Declassify on: April 30, 2032~~
+
+---
+
+U.S. Department of Justice
+Office of Legislative Affairs
+
+Office of the Assistant Attorney General
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+
+~~SECRET~~
+
+April 30, 2008
+
+The Honorable Silvestre Reyes
+Chairman
+Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
+United States House of Representatives
+Washington, DC 20515
+
+Dear Mr. Chairman:
+
+In accordance with Section 1862 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as
+amended, (50 U.S.C. § 1862), we are submitting herewith the annual report of the Attorney
+General concerning all requests for access to certain business records (including the production
+of tangible things) under the Act that were made during calendar year 2007.
+
+Sincerely,
+
+Brian A. Benczkowski
+Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+Attachment
+
+cc: The Honorable Peter Hoekstra
+Ranking Member
+
+~~SECRET~~
+DOWNGRADE TO UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT
+
+---
+
+~~SECRET~~
+
+THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ANNUAL REPORT ON ACCESS TO CERTAIN
+BUSINESS RECORDS FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES
+UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+APRIL 2008
+
+This report is submitted pursuant to the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the "Act"), 50 U.S.C.
+§ 1862, as amended, and covers all applications for access to
+certain business records (including the production of tangible
+things) for foreign intelligence purposes under the Act during
+the calendar year 2007. (U)
+
+The Government filed six applications with the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) seeking authorization for
+access to certain business records (including the production of
+tangible things) for foreign intelligence purposes during this
+period. Of these six applications, none were combined pen
+register and/or trap and trace devices/business records
+applications. The FISC did not deny, in whole or in part, any
+application submitted by the Government during calendar year
+2007. (S)
+
+(b)(1) [REDACTED]
+
+~~SECRET~~
+~~Classified by: Matthew G. Olsen, Deputy~~
+~~Assistant Attorney General,~~
+~~National Security Division,~~
+~~U.S. Department of Justice~~
+~~Reason: 1.4(c)~~
+~~Declassify on: April 28, 2032~~
+
+---
+
+U.S. Department of Justice
+Office of Legislative Affairs
+
+Office of the Assistant Attorney General
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+
+~~SECRET~~
+
+April 30, 2008
+
+The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
+Chairman
+Committee on the Judiciary
+United States House of Representatives
+Washington, DC 20515
+
+Dear Mr. Chairman:
+
+In accordance with Section 1862 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as
+amended, (50 U.S.C. § 1862), we are submitting herewith the annual report of the Attorney
+General concerning all requests for access to certain business records (including the production
+of tangible things) under the Act that were made during calendar year 2007.
+
+Sincerely,
+
+Brian A. Benczkowski
+Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+Attachment
+
+cc: The Honorable Lamar S. Smith
+Ranking Member
+
+~~SECRET~~
+DOWNGRADE TO UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT
+
+---
+
+~~SECRET~~
+
+THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ANNUAL REPORT ON ACCESS TO CERTAIN
+BUSINESS RECORDS FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES
+UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+APRIL 2008
+
+This report is submitted pursuant to the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the "Act"), 50 U.S.C.
+§ 1862, as amended, and covers all applications for access to
+certain business records (including the production of tangible
+things) for foreign intelligence purposes under the Act during
+the calendar year 2007. (U)
+
+The Government filed six applications with the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) seeking authorization for
+access to certain business records (including the production of
+tangible things) for foreign intelligence purposes during this
+period. Of these six applications, none were combined pen
+register and/or trap and trace devices/business records
+applications. The FISC did not deny, in whole or in part, any
+application submitted by the Government during calendar year
+2007. (S)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+~~SECRET~~
+~~Classified by: Matthew G. Olsen, Deputy~~
+~~Assistant Attorney General,~~
+~~National Security Division,~~
+~~U.S. Department of Justice~~
+~~Reason: 1.4(c)~~
+~~Declassify on: April 28, 2032~~
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2008_Attorney_General_Report/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2008_Attorney_General_Report/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e48e402
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2008_Attorney_General_Report/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+{
+ "title": "2008 Attorney General Report on Requests for Access to FISA Business Records",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "An annual report from the Attorney General to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), Senate Judiciary Committee, and House Judiciary Committee concerning requests for access to business records under Section 215. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "DOJ",
+ "date_created": "2008-04-30",
+ "classification": [
+ "SECRET"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Leahy, Patrick J.",
+ "Benczkowski, Brian A.",
+ "Specter, Arlen",
+ "Olsen, Matthew G.",
+ "Rockefeller, John D. IV",
+ "Bond, Christopher S.",
+ "Reyes, Silvestre",
+ "Hoekstra, Peter",
+ "Conyers, John Jr.",
+ "Smith, Lamar S."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-18",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/2008-attorney-general-report-requests-access-fisa-business-records",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "c1356b95b2769a2d4ac6ba319d4018b6a486fa1b6dbe536593cf5a9e3cd3ce1a",
+ "pages": 8
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2009_Attorney_General_Report/ACLU_-_2009_Attorney_General_Report.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2009_Attorney_General_Report/ACLU_-_2009_Attorney_General_Report.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d83f873
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2009_Attorney_General_Report/ACLU_-_2009_Attorney_General_Report.md
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+~~SECRET~~
+
+U.S. Department of Justice
+Office of the Attorney General
+
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+
+THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ANNUAL REPORT ON ACCESS TO CERTAIN
+BUSINESS RECORDS FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES
+UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+2009
+
+This report is submitted pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
+1978 (the “Act”), 50 U.S.C. 1862, as amended, and covers all applications for access to
+certain business records (including the production of tangible things) for foreign
+intelligence purposes under the Act during the calendar year 2008. (U)
+
+The Government filed thirteen applications with the Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Court (FISC) seeking authorization for access to certain business records
+(including the production of tangible things) for foreign intelligence purposes during
+this period. The FISC did not deny, in whole or in part, any application for access to
+business records submitted by the Government during calendar year 2008. (S)
+
+~~SECRET~~
+
+~~Classified by: David S. Kris, Assistant Attorney General~~
+ ~~National Security Division, DOJ~~
+~~Reason: 1.4(e)~~
+~~Declassify on: May 8, 2033~~
+
+---
+
+~~SECRET~~
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+1 In its 2008 report, the Department reported that during Calendar year 2007, the Government made six applications
+to the FISC for access to certain business records (including the production of tangible things) for foreign
+intelligence purposes. Further review of the Government's records subsequently revealed that the Government had
+made seventeen applications to the FISC for access to certain business records. The FISC did not deny, in whole
+or in part, any such application filed by the Government during calendar year 2007 [REDACTED]
+
+2
+~~SECRET~~
+
+---
+
+~~SECRET~~
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2009_Attorney_General_Report/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2009_Attorney_General_Report/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cfe90a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2009_Attorney_General_Report/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+{
+ "title": "2009 Attorney General Report on Requests for Access to FISA Business Records",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "An annual report from the Attorney General to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), Senate Judiciary Committee, and House Judiciary Committee concerning requests for access to business records under Section 215. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "DOJ",
+ "date_created": "2009-01-01",
+ "classification": [
+ "SECRET"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Kris, David S."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-18",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/2009-attorney-general-report-requests-access-fisa-business-records",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "ca30e1df43642e7ce8a7a6c3eb5529aa3012b95fc2f2d5aba46db649df44935f",
+ "pages": 3
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2009_OIG_Report_on_Bulk_Collection/ACLU_-_2009_OIG_Report_on_Bulk_Collection.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2009_OIG_Report_on_Bulk_Collection/ACLU_-_2009_OIG_Report_on_Bulk_Collection.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7130409
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2009_OIG_Report_on_Bulk_Collection/ACLU_-_2009_OIG_Report_on_Bulk_Collection.md
@@ -0,0 +1,307 @@
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+
+U.S. Department of Justice
+Office of Legislative Affairs
+
+Office of the Assistant Attorney General
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+
+December 14, 2009
+
+The Honorable Silvestre Reyes
+Chairman
+Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
+United States House of Representatives
+HVC-304, The Capitol
+Washington, DC 20515
+
+Dear Chairman Reyes:
+
+~~(TS)~~ Thank you for your letter of September 30, 2009, requesting that the Department of
+Justice provide a document to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
+(HPSCI) that describes the bulk collection program conducted under Section 215 - the
+"business records" provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). We
+agree that it is important that all Members of Congress have access to information about
+this program, as well as a similar bulk collection program conducted under the pen
+register/trap and trace authority of FISA, when considering reauthorization of the
+expiring USA PATRIOT Act provisions.
+
+~~(TS)~~ The Department has therefore worked with the Intelligence Community to prepare
+the enclosed document that describes these two bulk collection programs, the authorities
+under which they operate, the restrictions imposed by the Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Court, the National Security Agency's record of compliance, and the
+importance of making this document available to all Members of Congress in an effective way to
+inform the legislative debate about reauthorization of Section 215, and any changes to the
+FISA pen register/trap and trace authority. However, as you know, it is critical that
+Members understand the importance to national security of maintaining the secrecy of
+these programs, and that the HPSCI's plan to make the document available to other
+Members is subject to strict rules.
+
+~~Classified by: Assistant Attorney General, NSD~~
+~~Reason: 1.4(c)~~
+~~Declassify on: 11 December 2034~~
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+
+---
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+
+~~(TS)~~ Therefore, the enclosed document is being provided on the understanding that it
+will be provided only to Members of Congress (and cleared HPSCI, Judiciary Committee,
+and leadership staff), in a secure location in the HPSCI's offices, for a limited time period
+to be agreed upon, and consistent with the rules of the HPSCI regarding review of
+classified information and non-disclosure agreements. No photocopies may be made of
+the document, and any notes taken by Members may not be removed from the secure
+location. We further understand that HPSCI staff will be present at all times when the
+document is being reviewed, and that Executive Branch officials will be available nearby
+during certain, pre-established times to answer questions should they arise. We also
+request your support in ensuring that the Members are well informed regarding the
+importance of this classified and extremely sensitive information to prevent any
+unauthorized disclosures resulting from this process. We intend to provide the same
+document to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) under similar conditions,
+so that it may be made available to the Members of the Senate, as well as cleared
+leadership, SSCI and Senate Judiciary Committee staff.
+
+(U) Thank you again for your letter, and we look forward to continuing to work with you
+and your staff as Congress continues its deliberations on reauthorizing the expiring
+provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act.
+
+Sincerely,
+(Signature)
+Ronald Weich
+Assistant Attorney General
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+2
+
+---
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN-~~
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ Report on the National Security Agency's Bulk Collection Programs
+Affected by USA PATRIOT Act Reauthorization
+
+(U) THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT DESCRIBES SOME OF
+THE MOST SENSITIVE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PROGRAMS
+CONDUCTED BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. THIS INFORMATION IS
+HIGHLY CLASSIFIED AND ONLY A LIMITED NUMBER OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH
+OFFICIALS HAVE ACCESS TO IT. PUBLICLY DISCLOSING ANY OF THIS
+INFORMATION WOULD BE EXPECTED TO CAUSE EXCEPTIONALLY GRAVE
+DAMAGE TO OUR NATION'S INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES AND TO NATIONAL
+SECURITY. THEREFORE IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT ALL WHO HAVE ACCESS TO THIS
+DOCUMENT ABIDE BY THEIR OBLIGATION NOT TO DISCLOSE THIS INFORMATION
+TO ANY PERSON UNAUTHORIZED TO RECEIVE IT.
+
+Key Points
+
+* ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ Provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act affected by reauthorization legislation
+ support two sensitive intelligence collection programs;
+* ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ These programs are authorized to collect in bulk certain dialing, routing,
+ addressing and signaling information about telephone calls and electronic
+ communications, such as the telephone numbers or e-mail addresses that were
+ communicating and the times and dates but not the content of the calls or e-mail
+ messages themselves;
+* ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ Although the programs collect a large amount of information, the vast
+ majority of that information is never reviewed by anyone in the government, because the
+ information is not responsive to the limited queries that are authorized for intelligence
+ purposes;
+* ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ The programs are subject to an extensive regime of internal checks,
+ particularly for U.S. persons, and are monitored by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
+ Court ("FISA Court") and Congress;
+* ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ The Executive Branch, including DOJ, ODNI, and NSA, takes any
+ compliance problems in the programs very seriously, and substantial progress has been
+ made in addressing those problems. [REDACTED] and
+* ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ NSA's bulk collection programs provide important tools in the fight against
+ terrorism, especially in identifying terrorist plots against the homeland. These tools are
+ also unique in that they can produce intelligence not otherwise available to NSA.
+
+~~Classified by: Assistant Attorney General NSD~~
+~~Reason: 1.4(c)~~
+~~Declassify on: 11 December 2034~~
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+
+---
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+
+Background
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ Since the tragedy of 9/11, the Intelligence Community has developed an
+array of capabilities to detect, identify and disrupt terrorist plots against the United States and its
+interests. Detecting threats by exploiting terrorist communications has been, and continues to be,
+one of the critical tools in that effort. Above all else, it is imperative that we have a capability to
+rapidly identify any terrorist threats emanating from within the United States.
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ Prior to the attacks of 9/11, the National Security Agency (NSA) intercepted
+and transcribed seven calls from hijacker Khalid al-Mihdhar to a facility associated with an al
+Qa'ida safehouse in Yemen. However, NSA's access point overseas did not provide the
+technical data indicating the location from where al-Mihdhar was calling. Lacking the
+originating phone number, NSA analysts concluded that al-Mihdhar was overseas. In fact, al-
+Mihdhar was calling from San Diego, California. According to the 9/11 Commission Report
+(pages 269-272):
+
+*"investigations or interrogation of them (Khalid al-Mihdhar, etc.), and investigation of
+their travel and financial activities could have yielded evidence of connections to other
+participants in the 9/11 plot. The simple fact of their detention could have derailed the
+plan. In any case, the opportunity did not arise."*
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ Today, under Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court authorization
+pursuant to the "business records" authority of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)
+(commonly referred to as "Section 215"), the government has developed a program to close the
+gap that allowed al-Mihdhar to plot undetected within the United States while communicating
+with a known terrorism target overseas. This and similar programs operated pursuant to FISA
+provide valuable intelligence information.
+
+(U) USA PATRIOT Act reauthorization legislation currently pending in both the House
+and the Senate would alter, among other things, language in two parts of FISA: Section 215 and
+the FISA "pen register/trap and trace" (or "pen-trap") authority. Absent legislation, Section 215
+will expire on December 31, 2009, along with the so-called "lone wolf" provision and roving
+wiretaps (which this document does not address). The FISA pen-trap authority does not expire,
+but the pending legislation in the Senate and House includes amendments of this provision.
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ The Section 215 and pen-trap authorities are used by the U.S. Government
+in selected cases to acquire significant foreign intelligence information that cannot otherwise be
+acquired either at all or on a timely basis. Any U.S. person information that is acquired is
+subject to strict, court-imposed restrictions on the retention, use, and dissemination of such
+information and is also subject to strict and frequent audit and reporting requirements.
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ The largest and most significant uses of these authorities are to support two
+critical and highly sensitive intelligence collection programs under which NSA collects and
+analyzes large amounts of transactional data obtained from telecommunications providers [REDACTED].
+Although these programs have been briefed to
+2
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+
+---
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+
+the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees, it is important that other Members of Congress have
+access to information about these two programs when considering reauthorization of the expiring
+PATRIOT Act provisions. The Executive Branch views it as essential that an appropriate
+statutory basis remains in place for NSA to conduct these two programs.
+
+Section 215 and Pen-Trap Collection
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ Under the program based on Section 215, NSA is authorized to collect from
+telecommunications service providers certain business records that contain information about
+communications between two telephone numbers, such as the date, time, and duration of a call.
+There is no collection of the content of any telephone call under this program, and under
+longstanding Supreme Court precedent the information collected is not protected by the Fourth
+Amendment. In this program, court orders (generally lasting 90 days) are served on
+telecommunications companies [REDACTED].
+The orders generally require production of the business records (as described
+above) relating to substantially all of the telephone calls handled by the companies, including
+both calls made between the United States and a foreign country and calls made entirely within
+the United States.
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ Under the program based on the pen-trap provisions in FISA, the
+government is authorized to collect similar kinds of information about electronic
+communications - such as "to" and "from" lines in e-mail and the time an e-mail is sent –
+excluding the content of the e-mail and the "subject" line. Again, this information is collected
+pursuant to court orders (generally lasting 90 days) and, under relevant court decisions, is not
+protected by the Fourth Amendment.
+[REDACTED]
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ Both of these programs operate on a very large scale. [REDACTED]
+
+3
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+
+---
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+
+Checks and Balances
+
+FISA Court Oversight
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ To conduct these bulk collection programs, the government has obtained
+orders from several different FISA Court judges based on legal standards set forth in Section 215
+and the FISA pen-trap provision. Before obtaining any information from a telecommunication
+service provider, the government must establish, and the FISA Court must conclude, that the
+information is relevant to an authorized investigation. In addition, the government must comply
+with detailed "minimization procedures" required by the FISA Court that govern the retention
+and dissemination of the information obtained. Before an NSA analyst may query bulk records,
+they must have reasonable articulable suspicion – referred to as "RAS" – that the number or e-
+mail address they submit is associated with [REDACTED]. The
+RAS requirement is designed to protect against the indiscriminate querying of the collected data
+so that only information pertaining to one of the foreign powers listed in the relevant Court order
+is provided to NSA personnel for further intelligence analysis. There are also
+limits on how long the collected data can be retained (5 years in the Section 215 program, and
+4½ years in the pen-trap program).
+
+Congressional Oversight
+
+(U) These programs have been briefed to the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees, to
+include hearings, briefings, and, with respect to the Intelligence Committees, visits to NSA. In
+addition, the Intelligence Committees have been fully briefed on the compliance issues discussed
+below.
+
+Compliance Issues
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ There have been a number of technical compliance problems and human
+implementation errors in these two bulk collection programs, discovered as a result of
+Department of Justice reviews and internal NSA oversight. However, neither the Department,
+NSA nor the FISA Court has found any intentional or bad-faith violations. The problems
+generally involved the implementation of highly sophisticated technology in a complex and ever-
+changing communications environment which, in some instances, resulted in the automated tools
+operating in a manner that was not completely consistent with the specific terms of the Court's
+orders. In accordance with the Court's rules, upon discovery, these inconsistencies were
+reported as compliance incidents to the FISA Court, which ordered appropriate remedial action.
+The incidents, and the Court's responses, were also reported to the Intelligence Committees in
+great detail. The Committees, the Court and the Executive Branch have responded actively to
+the incidents. The Court has imposed additional safeguards. In response to compliance
+problems, the Director of NSA also ordered "end-to-end" reviews of the Section 215 and pen-
+trap collection programs, and created a new position, the Director of Compliance, to help ensure
+the integrity of future collection. In early September of 2009, the Director of NSA made a
+presentation to the FISA Court about the steps taken to address the compliance issues. All
+4
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+
+---
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+
+parties will continue to report to the FISA Court and to Congress on compliance issues as they
+arise, and to address them effectively.
+
+Intelligence Value of the Collection
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ As noted, these two collection programs significantly strengthen the
+Intelligence Community's early warning system for the detection of terrorists and discovery of
+plots against the homeland. They allow the Intelligence Community to detect phone numbers
+and e-mail addresses within the United States contacting targeted phone numbers and e-mail
+addresses associated with suspected foreign terrorists abroad and vice-versa; and connections
+between entities within the United States tied to a suspected foreign terrorist abroad. NSA needs
+access to telephony and e-mail transactional information in bulk so that it can quickly identify
+the network of contacts that a targeted number or address is connected to, whenever there is RAS
+that the number or address is associated with [REDACTED].
+Importantly, there are no intelligence
+collection tools that, independently or in combination, provide an equivalent capability.
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ To maximize the operational utility of the data, the data cannot be collected
+prospectively once a lead is developed because important connections could be lost in data that
+was sent prior to the identification of the RAS phone number or e-mail address. NSA identifies
+the network of contacts by applying sophisticated analysis to the massive volume of metadata.
+(Communications metadata is the dialing, routing, addressing or signaling information associated
+with an electronic communication, but not content.). The more metadata NSA has access to, the
+more likely it is that NSA can identify or discover the network of contacts linked to targeted
+numbers or addresses. Information discovered through NSA's analysis of the metadata is then
+provided to the appropriate federal national security agencies, including the FBI, which are
+responsible for further investigation or analysis of any potential terrorist threat to the United
+States.
+[REDACTED]
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ In conclusion, the Section 215 and pen-trap bulk collection programs
+provide a vital capability to the Intelligence Community. The attacks of 9/11 taught us that
+applying lead information from foreign intelligence in a comprehensive and systemic fashion is
+required to protect the homeland, and the programs discussed in this paper cover a critical seam
+in our defense against terrorism. Recognizing that the programs have implications for the
+privacy interests of U.S. person data, extensive policies, safeguards, and reviews have been
+enacted by the FISA Court, DOJ, ODNI and NSA.
+
+5
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2009_OIG_Report_on_Bulk_Collection/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2009_OIG_Report_on_Bulk_Collection/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f2b68f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2009_OIG_Report_on_Bulk_Collection/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+{
+ "title": "2009 OIG Report on Bulk Collection",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "A DOJ report to the House Intelligence Committee describing the government's bulk collection program under Section 215. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "DOJ",
+ "date_created": "2009-12-14",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Reyes, Silvestre",
+ "Weich, Ronald"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-06-23",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/2009-oig-report-bulk-collection",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [
+ {
+ "id": "2009_OIG_Report_on_Bulk_Collection"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "d03403a2d6751ea399d918d19cbacde5de2e52a78e3f26002e039454cab173f4",
+ "pages": 7
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2010_Attorney_General_Report/ACLU_-_2010_Attorney_General_Report.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2010_Attorney_General_Report/ACLU_-_2010_Attorney_General_Report.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8557278
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2010_Attorney_General_Report/ACLU_-_2010_Attorney_General_Report.md
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+~~SECRET~~
+
+U.S. Department of Justice
+Office of the Attorney General
+
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+
+THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ANNUAL REPORT ON ACCESS TO CERTAIN
+BUSINESS RECORDS FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES
+UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+APRIL 2010
+
+This report is submitted pursuant to section 502 of the Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Act of 1978 (the "Act"), as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 1801, et seq., and covers all
+applications for access to certain business records (including the production of tangible
+things) for foreign intelligence purposes under the Act during the calendar year 2009.
+(U)
+
+The Government filed twenty-one applications with the Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Court (FISC) seeking authorization for access to certain business records
+(including the production of tangible things) for foreign intelligence purposes during
+this period. The FISC did not deny, in whole or in part, any application for access to
+business records submitted by the Government during calendar year 2009. The FISC
+modified the proposed orders submitted with nine applications for access to business
+records in 2009. (U)
+
+(b)(1) [REDACTED]
+
+~~SECRET~~
+
+~~Classified by: David S. Kris, Assistant Attorney General~~
+~~National Security Division, DOJ~~
+~~Reason: 1.4(e)~~
+~~Declassify on: April 30, 2035~~
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2010_Attorney_General_Report/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2010_Attorney_General_Report/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ae5dbb4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2010_Attorney_General_Report/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+{
+ "title": "2010 Attorney General Report on Requests for Access to FISA Business Records",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "An annual report from the Attorney General to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), Senate Judiciary Committee, and House Judiciary Committee concerning requests for access to business records under Section 215. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "DOJ",
+ "date_created": "2010-04-30",
+ "classification": [
+ "SECRET"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Kris, David S."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-18",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/2010-attorney-general-report-requests-access-fisa-business-records",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "8c79152bddae92e30afbf117ac34422ce9474243eeddaf931c200ded8588ff6b",
+ "pages": 2
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2011_Attorney_General_Report/ACLU_-_2011_Attorney_General_Report.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2011_Attorney_General_Report/ACLU_-_2011_Attorney_General_Report.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..109f43a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2011_Attorney_General_Report/ACLU_-_2011_Attorney_General_Report.md
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+~~SECRET~~
+
+U.S. Department of Justice
+
+Office of the Attorney General
+
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+
+THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ANNUAL REPORT ON ACCESS TO CERTAIN
+BUSINESS RECORDS FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES
+UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+April 2011
+
+This report is submitted pursuant to section 502 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
+Act of 1978 (the "Act"), as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 1801, *et seq.*, and covers all applications for
+access to certain business records (including the production of tangible things) for foreign
+intelligence purposes under the Act during the calendar year 2010. (U)
+
+The Government filed ninety-six applications with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
+Court (FISC) seeking authorization for access to certain business records (including the
+production of tangible things) for foreign intelligence purposes during this period. The FISC
+did not deny, in whole or in part, any such application submitted by the Government during
+calendar year 2010. The FISC modified the proposed orders submitted with forty-three such
+applications in 2010 (primarily requiring the Government to submit reports describing
+implementation of applicable minimization procedures). ~~(S)~~
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+~~Classified by:~~ ~~Tashina Gauhar, Deputy Assistant Attorney General~~
+~~National Security Division, DOJ~~
+~~Reason: 1.4(c)~~
+~~Declassify on: April 8, 2036~~
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2011_Attorney_General_Report/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2011_Attorney_General_Report/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..491931e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2011_Attorney_General_Report/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+{
+ "title": "2011 Attorney General Report on Requests for Access to FISA Business Records",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "An annual report from the Attorney General to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), Senate Judiciary Committee, and House Judiciary Committee concerning requests for access to business records under Section 215. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "DOJ",
+ "date_created": "2011-04-01",
+ "classification": [
+ "SECRET"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Gauhar, Tashina"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-18",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/2011-attorney-general-report-requests-access-fisa-business-records",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "665a6fa244be5bbe0e4809205dbce9c39e43b4996096a7088c583ccffef1736c",
+ "pages": 1
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2012_Attorney_General_Report/ACLU_-_2012_Attorney_General_Report.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2012_Attorney_General_Report/ACLU_-_2012_Attorney_General_Report.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2247d51
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2012_Attorney_General_Report/ACLU_-_2012_Attorney_General_Report.md
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+Office of the Assistant Attorney General
+
+U.S. Department of Justice
+Office of Legislative Affairs
+
+Washington, DC
+
+~~SECRET~~
+UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE
+
+The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
+Chairman
+Committee on the Judiciary
+United States Senate
+Washington, D.C. 20510
+
+The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
+Chairman
+Select Committee on Intelligence
+United States Senate
+Washington, D.C. 20510
+
+The Honorable Lamar S. Smith
+Chairman
+Committee on the Judiciary
+U.S. House of Representatives
+Washington, D.C. 20515
+
+The Honorable Mike Rogers
+Chairman
+Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
+U.S. House of Representatives
+Washington, D.C. 20515
+
+Dear Madam and Messrs. Chairmen:
+
+In accordance with the Attorney General's obligation, pursuant to section 502 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended (“FISA"), 50 U.S.C § 1801, et seq., we are submitting a report related to the government's use of authorities under section 501 of FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1861.
+
+The enclosed document is classified. Accordingly, it is being provided for review by Members and appropriately-cleared staff from each of the four Committees, and will be delivered in accordance with our usual practice regarding such materials.
+
+~~SECRET~~
+UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE
+
+---
+
+~~SECRET~~
+UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE
+
+The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
+The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
+The Honorable Lamar S. Smith
+The Honorable Mike Rogers
+Page Two
+
+We hope that this information is helpful. Please do not hesitate to contact this office if we may provide additional assistance regarding this or any other matter.
+
+Sincerely,
+
+Ronald Weich
+Assistant Attorney General
+
+Enclosure
+
+cc:
+The Honorable Charles E. Grassley
+Ranking Minority Member
+Senate Committee on the Judiciary
+
+The Honorable John D. Bates
+Presiding Judge
+United States Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Court
+
+The Honorable Saxby Chambliss
+Vice Chairman
+Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
+
+The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
+Ranking Minority Member
+House Committee on the Judiciary
+
+The Honorable C.A. "Dutch" Ruppersberger
+Ranking Minority Member
+House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
+
+~~SECRET~~
+UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE
+
+---
+
+~~SECRET~~
+
+U.S. Department of Justice
+Office of the Attorney General
+
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+
+THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ANNUAL REPORT ON ACCESS TO CERTAIN
+BUSINESS RECORDS FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES
+UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+April 2012
+
+This report is submitted pursuant to section 502 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the "Act"), as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 1801, *et seq*., and covers all applications for access to certain business records (including the production of tangible things) for foreign intelligence purposes under the Act during the calendar year 2011. (U)
+
+The Government filed 205 applications with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) seeking authorization for access to certain business records (including the production of tangible things) for foreign intelligence purposes during this period. The FISC did not deny, in whole or in part, any such application submitted by the Government during calendar year 2011. The FISC modified the proposed orders submitted with 176 such applications in 2011 (requiring the Government to submit reports describing implementation of applicable minimization procedures). (S)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+~~SECRET~~
+Classified by: ~~The Attorney General~~
+Reason: ~~1.4(e)~~
+Declassify on: ~~April 30, 2037~~
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2012_Attorney_General_Report/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2012_Attorney_General_Report/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e41bce4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_2012_Attorney_General_Report/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+{
+ "title": "2012 Attorney General Report on Requests for Access to FISA Business Records",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "An annual report from the Attorney General to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), Senate Judiciary Committee, and House Judiciary Committee concerning requests for access to business records under Section 215. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "DOJ",
+ "date_created": "2012-04-30",
+ "classification": [
+ "SECRET"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Leahy, Patrick J.",
+ "Smith, Lamar S.",
+ "Feinstein, Dianne",
+ "Rogers, Mike",
+ "Weich, Ronald",
+ "Grassley, Charles E.",
+ "Chambliss, Saxby",
+ "Conyers, John Jr.",
+ "Ruppersberger, C.A."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-18",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/2012-attorney-general-report-requests-access-fisa-business-records",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "325ebc84f460d8a647eb0eae5e281abe5f3b8bb4024bc7d218367aab6cc29102",
+ "pages": 3
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_April_10_2009_NSA_Notification_Memorandum_to_SSCI/ACLU_-_April_10_2009_NSA_Notification_Memorandum_to_SSCI.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_April_10_2009_NSA_Notification_Memorandum_to_SSCI/ACLU_-_April_10_2009_NSA_Notification_Memorandum_to_SSCI.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..956998b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_April_10_2009_NSA_Notification_Memorandum_to_SSCI/ACLU_-_April_10_2009_NSA_Notification_Memorandum_to_SSCI.md
@@ -0,0 +1,315 @@
+DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
+UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
+FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755
+
+APR 10 2009
+
+MEMORANDUM FOR MAJORITY STAFF DIRECTOR, SENATE
+SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
+
+SUBJECT: (U) Congressional Notification - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ I am pleased to report to the Committee the significant
+progress made to date to resolve the Business Records (BR) matter, to
+provide additional information to the Committee on other matters that have
+been addressed previously to the Committee and to notify the Committee of
+one additional matter which was only recently identified. NSA is committed
+to work each matter to a resolution that is consistent with Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) orders and our obligation to conduct
+our operations with due regard to United States Persons' privacy. It is also
+NSA's commitment to make our efforts transparent to the Committee by
+providing updates of significant developments.
+
+I. ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ Compliance with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
+Court's Business Records and Pen Register/Trap and Trace Orders:
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ NSA notified the Committee on February 25, 2009 of a
+compliance issue with the implementation of the FISC authorized Business
+Records (BR) Order. The issue of non-compliance was originally identified by
+DoJ in mid-January and reported to the FISC. In his February 13
+declaration to the Court, the Director of NSA committed to conducting end-to-
+end reviews of NSA's implementation of both the BR and Pen Register/Trap
+and Trace (PR/TT) Court Orders.
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ NSA has aggressively taken actions to correct the
+problems noted with BR FISA order compliance, avoid a reoccurrence, and
+ensure future compliance. A 60-day end-to-end system engineering and
+process review, a review of oversight and compliance training for all
+personnel who access both BR and PR/TT FISA metadata, and a redesign of
+the automated alert process for follow-on systems are being worked
+simultaneously. The end-to-end reviews involve a complex investigation of at
+least eight major system components and over 240 subcomponents, serving
+multiple functions and users. Our review of these systems and components
+has, to date, surfaced only the following issues noted in this update.
+
+(U) Current operating capability/functionality
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ On February 20 NSA implemented a change in software
+that shut off all automated accessing of metadata acquired pursuant to both
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+
+---
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+
+BR and PR/TT FISC orders. NSA accepted that this would disrupt processes
+that had no identified compliance concerns, to include those supporting
+material acquired under the PR/TT FISA Court Order; however, NSA decided
+that halting automated access to the BR and PR/TT metadata to be the most
+prudent course of action.
+
+1. (U//FOUO) BR Operations/Mitigation
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ Since the March 5, 2009 FISA Court order, the Court's
+approval has been required for each selector before it is tasked for BR FISA
+metadata analysis. On March 21 NSA resumed manual access to BR FISA
+metadata, allowing chaining [REDACTED] of FISA Court-approved
+selectors associated with [REDACTED] following multiple operational and technical reviews
+to ensure compliance. While no deficiencies in analyst training had been
+noted, NSA has taken the extra precaution of providing additional
+compliance training and testing to all analysts accessing the BR FISA
+metadata prior to being approved for access.
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ NSA has taken steps to minimize the impact of
+suspending the BR automated tipping (or alert) processes. A limited number
+of NSA analysts are now performing manual queries against 209 FISA Court-
+approved high-priority selectors daily and have adjusted collection tasking to
+ensure [REDACTED]
+
+2. (U//~~FOUO~~) BR end-to-end review
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ NSA systems engineers have made substantial progress
+on the end-to-end review of the systems and analytic tools associated with BR
+FISA metadata. NSA engineers have reviewed more than 100 requirements
+documents, dataflow diagrams and system documentation records and are
+establishing a comprehensive plan to restore capabilities. In concert with the
+engineering review, NSA's Office of Oversight and Compliance has completed
+approximately half of the 15 necessary audits of the BR FISA metadata
+queries. So far these audits have revealed inappropriate queries by two
+analysts of foreign telephone selectors. These violations were reported to the
+FISC in the Director's 25 February 2009 Supplemental Declaration, which
+the Committee previously received. In addition, several of the audits have
+identified possible compliance issues that require further investigation.
+
+3. (U//~~FOUO~~) Additional BR matters identified or undergoing
+review
+
+* ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ As a result of authorized analysis, and as previously
+reported to the Court, 275 reports containing 2,476 telephone
+numbers were disseminated to the FBI and CIA. While this
+dissemination was authorized, and the numbers were legitimately
+determined to be associated with international terrorism, they were
+also added prematurely to a list called the Station Table, a list
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+
+---
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+
+designed to store numbers determined by NSA to meet the
+reasonable articulable suspicion standard "RAS-approved". The
+problem identified is that these numbers did not undergo the
+formal NSA Office of General Counsel RAS-designation review as
+required by the Court prior to being added to the Station Table.
+* ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ NSA continues to review whether additional
+automated tools may have queried the business records metadata.
+* ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ NSA is reviewing its application of the 5-year data
+retention limitation provision of the FISC order.
+
+4. (U//~~FOUO~~) Status of BR training
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ NSA formed a team in early February to address both the
+immediate and long-term training required for analysts accessing metadata
+acquired through BR FISA and PR/TT FISA. The team initiated a redesign
+of the Agency's BR FISA training and has administered BR FISA oral
+competency tests. Training for PR/TT FISA will involve a new curriculum
+and competency exam and is projected to be available by June 1, 2009.
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ NSA also is updating its BR FISA Standard Operating
+Procedures (SOP) document. An interim version of the new SOP details the
+processes and procedures governing access to BR FISA metadata. The
+interim SOP also describes the overall process to ensure consistency with the
+FISC order. The SOP will be revised as necessary as additional analytic tools
+are reinstated and automated processes are resumed following FISC
+approval.
+
+5. (U//~~FOUO~~) Status of PR/TT Operations and Review
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ NSA is also seeking DoJ approval to reactivate automated
+querying of the PR/TT metadata to ensure compliance. Of note, no compliance issues
+were found in NSA's use of PR/TT metadata. NSA uses PR/TT metadata to
+chain across digital network selectors. However, as a result of the Court's
+order, DoJ approval is required to reactivate any of the automated PR/TT
+processes that NSA voluntarily shut down. NSA anticipates receiving
+approval to resume the automated PR/TT alerting process soon. In the
+interim, as with BR FISA, NSA has taken steps to minimize the impact of
+suspending the PR/TT automated tipping process by ensuring the highest
+priority selectors undergo manual chaining.
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ On March 31, 2009 DoJ lawyers visited NSA in
+preparation for DoJ's first "spot check" of the PR/TT FISA process in
+compliance with the FISA Court's March 5, 2009 Order. NSA demonstrated
+the analytic tools used by analysts and provided a briefing on NSA's progress
+in conducting the end-to-end system engineering and process reviews. NSA
+also described how it administers oversight and compliance of the PR/TT
+metadata flows. DoJ identified no new issues during general discussion. DoJ
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+
+---
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+
+is scheduled to visit in late April for their first formal "spot check" on PR/TT
+FISA as well as a routine review of BR FISA.
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ The end-to-end review of the PR/TT systems and
+processes is underway and will be concluded upon completion of the BR FISA
+review.
+
+II. (U//~~FOUO~~) Overcollection
+
+~~(S//SI//NF)~~ This is to update the Committee on the matter of NSA's
+incidental acquisition of data during the course of FISA Amendments Act
+(FAA) authorized collection. For example, the selector [REDACTED]
+These incidents are described as [REDACTED] Overcollection [REDACTED].
+The Committee previously received information on this matter on March 5,
+2009, in the Semiannual Report of the Department of Justice Concerning
+Acquisitions Under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008,
+prepared by the Department of Justice, and covering the period from
+September 4, 2008 through November 30, 2008 and on March 17, 2009, in the
+Semiannual Assessment of Compliance With FISA Amendments Act
+Procedures and Guidelines, prepared by the Attorney General and the
+Director of National Intelligence, covering the same time frame. The reports
+also stated that [REDACTED] had been reported to the Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Court (FISC).
+
+~~(S//SI//NF)~~ NSA supplements those reports by adding that [REDACTED] was an
+issue considered by the Court during its review of the third FAA Certification
+that the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence have
+authorized, Certification [REDACTED] covering [REDACTED]
+which was filed with the Court on January 12, 2009.
+During the Court's consideration of that certification, the FISC asked for and
+received supplemental filings wherein NSA described the causes for and the
+efforts to mitigate against [REDACTED].
+
+~~(U//FOUO)~~ These mitigation efforts involve continuous process
+improvements to prevent and/or detect overcollection at the earliest possible
+point and the application of our targeting and minimization procedures
+regarding instances of overcollection, which include apprising ODNI and
+DOJ in a timely fashion whenever such incidents may occur in the future.
+NSA addressed the concerns expressed and the questions raised by the FISC
+concerning [REDACTED].
+
+~~(S//SI//NF)~~ On April 7, 2009, the FISC approved Certification [REDACTED]
+In accordance with the reporting requirements of the FISA Amendments Act,
+the government will provide the Committee copies of the Court's Opinion and
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+
+---
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+
+Order, as well as of the government's application and pleadings in the
+matter, to include the supplemental filings referenced above.
+
+III. (U//~~FOUO~~) DIA Joint Intelligence Task Force - Combating
+Terrorism (JITF-CT) Access to Counterterrorism-related SIGINT
+Information
+
+(U) This matter was first brought to the Committee's attention by way
+of oral notification on March 31, 2009 to Committee staff directors with an
+understanding that this written notification would follow.
+
+(S//SI//NF) [REDACTED] NSA and DIA entered into a pilot
+program which allowed the DIA's Joint Intelligence Task Force - Combating
+Terrorism (JITF-CT) access to counterterrorism-related SIGINT information,
+including SIGINT collected pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
+Court's (FISC) [REDACTED]. Access to this FISA data was tightly
+controlled and was limited to JITF-CT analysts who had undergone training
+on the application of NSA minimization procedures to the FISA data and who
+were subject to NSA oversight of their activities. Moreover, these personnel
+were required to coordinate with NSA regarding dissemination of
+the information outside of JITF-CT.
+
+(U//~~FOUO~~) At the time the pilot program was created, NSA
+determined that, once JITF-CT analysts were detailed to NSA they could be
+considered NSA "employees" pursuant to the FISC order for the purposes of
+their access to the FISA data. Under NSA's analysis, although not reporting
+to an NSA management chain, once detailed to NSA, they were nevertheless
+operating under NSA control (training, oversight, accountability) when
+accessing the FISA data.
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ In 2008, NSA's Oversight and Compliance office was
+conducting a review of database access to unminimized SIGINT. As a result,
+a database known as [REDACTED] was found to lack sufficient controls over
+analyst access to data. As a corrective measure, the database was
+reconfigured, "shutting it down" and bringing it back up under
+comprehensive controls. This was the database that JITF-CT analysts used
+to access the FISA data [REDACTED]
+and these actions led to the loss of their access. The NSA Office
+of General Counsel then reconsidered the basis for its original concurrence on
+allowing JITF-CT analysts access to the FISA data.
+
+~~(C//SI//NF)~~ The NSA Office of General Counsel had questions
+concerning whether the circumstances of JITF-CT analysts "detail"
+supported the conclusion that they were NSA "employees" as originally
+determined. The facts and circumstances were reported to DoJ. Upon
+reviewing these facts, DoJ reported the matter to the FISC as a possible
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+
+---
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+
+compliance incident. NSA and DoJ continue to work to bring the matter to
+conclusion with the FISC. Until this matter is resolved, NSA will not
+reinstate JITF-CT access to this FISA data.
+
+~~(C//SI//NF)~~ [REDACTED] there is no way to determine whether,
+in fact, JITF-CT analysts accessed it without authorization. However, even if
+such access occurred, the analysts were trained in routine minimization
+procedures and were required to coordinate with NSA
+regarding dissemination of information outside of JITF-CT; thus it is unlikely
+that United States Persons' identities were disseminated improperly.
+
+IV. ~~(S//SI//NF)~~ Suspension of [REDACTED] to
+Unminimized SIGINT Collection
+
+~~(S//SI//NF)~~ This is the first report to the Committee on this matter,
+which concerns a decision to suspend [REDACTED] access to an NSA system
+called X-KEYSCORE (XKS).
+
+~~(S//SI//NF)~~ NSA allowed [REDACTED] access to a part of NSA's collection architecture
+relating to SIGINT collected under the authority of Executive Order 12333
+and which NSA refers to as X-KEYSCORE (XKS).
+[REDACTED] this access is predicated on the principle that
+collaboration against counter-terrorism is essential to discover and pre-empt
+terrorist acts
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+On review of this access NSA is considering whether allowing this
+[REDACTED] access to unminimized SIGINT collection fully complies with
+NSA procedures. The review is considering whether additional automated
+and/or manual procedures should be in place with [REDACTED] prior to
+restoring their access to this stream of SIGINT.
+
+(U) NSA is continuing to review the facts and circumstances
+concerning this matter. Should you have any questions, please contact me at
+[REDACTED]
+
+La Forrest Williams
+Deputy Associate Director of Legislative Affairs
+
+Copy Furnished:
+Minority Staff Director, Senate
+Select Committee on Intelligence
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_April_10_2009_NSA_Notification_Memorandum_to_SSCI/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_April_10_2009_NSA_Notification_Memorandum_to_SSCI/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d000a85
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_April_10_2009_NSA_Notification_Memorandum_to_SSCI/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+{
+ "title": "April 10, 2009 NSA Notification Memorandum to SSCI ",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "A memo from the NSA to Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) on the status of its ongoing review of metadata collection programs under Sections 501 and 402 of FISA. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2009-04-10",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [
+ "XKEYSCORE"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-18",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/april-10-2009-nsa-notification-memorandum-ssci-0",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "5c45bb6d0851374c9746ea3cfd508569a61e563f03fb24622f7b41948128efa4",
+ "pages": 6
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_April_1_2011_NSA_Response_re_Geolocation_Information_in_Mobility_Data/ACLU_-_April_1_2011_NSA_Response_re_Geolocation_Information_in_Mobility_Data.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_April_1_2011_NSA_Response_re_Geolocation_Information_in_Mobility_Data/ACLU_-_April_1_2011_NSA_Response_re_Geolocation_Information_in_Mobility_Data.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b019081
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_April_1_2011_NSA_Response_re_Geolocation_Information_in_Mobility_Data/ACLU_-_April_1_2011_NSA_Response_re_Geolocation_Information_in_Mobility_Data.md
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+
+All redacted information exempt under (b)(1) and (b)(3) except as otherwise noted.
+
+Evan:
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ During our telephone conversation of March 7, 2011, you asked several questions pertaining to geolocational information in mobility data. Specifically, you asked for details regarding NSA's mobility testing effort, when DOJ and the FISC were notified of this effort, and whether a legal memorandum of law on cell site locations was available. A response to your questions is provided below.
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ As pertains to the mobility testing effort, NSA tested data from the April 26, 2010 feed. On this day, NSA sampled roughly [REDACTED] (specific numbers per file identified below). This is [REDACTED] of a day's worth of data
+(a full day is [REDACTED]). The four files that were used in the sampling contained the following number of records:
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ Sample File 1: [REDACTED] records
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ Sample File 2: [REDACTED] records
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ Sample File 3: [REDACTED] records
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ Sample File 4: [REDACTED] records
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ The results of NSA's technical analysis remained with the provider's technical team. No agency outside of NSA has received these results. NSA continues to receive and analyze sample data.
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ In regards to the mobility testing effort, NSA consulted with DOJ before implementing this testing effort. Based upon our description of the proposed mobility data (cell site location information) testing plan, DOJ advised in February 2010 that obtaining the data for the described testing purposes was permissible based upon
+the current language of the Court's BR FISA order requiring the production of 'all call detail records.' It is our understanding that DOJ also orally advised the FISC, via its staff, that we had obtained a limited set of test data sampling of cellular mobility data (cell site location information) pursuant to the Court-authorized program and that we
+were exploring the possibility of acquiring such mobility data under the BR FISA program in the near future based upon the authority currently granted by the Court. Upon concurring with our proposed plan, DOJ requested that NSA keep them apprised of the status of the testing and any future productions of mobility data.
+
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20070108
+Declassify On: 20360401
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+
+---
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ Finally, during our conversation, you asked about a legal memorandum about which I was unaware. I have since discovered that DOJ is drafting a memorandum of law on this topic. Accordingly, requests for information regarding
+or copies of this legal memoranda should be made directly to the Department of Justice through their Office of Legislative Affairs."
+
+Respectfully,
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Attorney
+Office of General Counsel (Intelligence Law)
+[REDACTED]
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_April_1_2011_NSA_Response_re_Geolocation_Information_in_Mobility_Data/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_April_1_2011_NSA_Response_re_Geolocation_Information_in_Mobility_Data/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c30d742
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_April_1_2011_NSA_Response_re_Geolocation_Information_in_Mobility_Data/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+{
+ "title": "NSA Memo: Geolocation Information in Mobility Data",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "An NSA Memo to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence regarding receipt of cell site location information and test results. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2013-04-01",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-10-28",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/nsa-memo-geolocation-information-mobility-data",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "80b6d6957b0a10996a6030cfa523874ccb61be5af3f048f8290757fd1cd48b23",
+ "pages": 2
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_April_27_2005_Prepared_Attorney_General_-_FBI_Testimony/ACLU_-_April_27_2005_Prepared_Attorney_General_-_FBI_Testimony.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_April_27_2005_Prepared_Attorney_General_-_FBI_Testimony/ACLU_-_April_27_2005_Prepared_Attorney_General_-_FBI_Testimony.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b67cb50
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_April_27_2005_Prepared_Attorney_General_-_FBI_Testimony/ACLU_-_April_27_2005_Prepared_Attorney_General_-_FBI_Testimony.md
@@ -0,0 +1,494 @@
+Testimony of Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General of the United States
+and Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
+United States Department of Justice
+Before the Select Committee on Intelligence
+United States Senate
+April 27, 2005
+
+Chairman Roberts, Vice Chairman Rockefeller, and Members of the Committee:
+
+We are pleased to be here today to discuss the government's use of authorities granted to
+it by Congress under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA). In particular, we
+appreciate the opportunity to have a candid discussion about the impact of the amendments to
+FISA made by the USA PATRIOT Act and how critical they are to the government's ability to
+successfully prosecute the war on terrorism and prevent another attack like that of September 11
+from ever happening again.
+
+As we stated in our testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee, we are open to
+suggestions for strengthening and clarifying the USA PATRIOT Act, and we look forward to
+meeting with people both inside and outside of Congress who have expressed views about the
+Act. However, we will not support any proposal that would undermine our ability to combat
+terrorism effectively.
+
+I. FISA Statistics
+
+First, we would like to talk with you about the use of FISA generally. Since September
+11, the volume of applications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA court) has
+dramatically increased.
+
+* In 2000, 1,012 applications for surveillance or search were filed under FISA. As
+the Department's public annual FISA report sent to Congress on April 1, 2005
+states, in 2004 we filed 1,758 applications, a 74% increase in four years.
+
+* Of the 1,758 applications made in 2004, none were denied, although 94 were
+modified by the FISA court in some substantive way.
+
+II. Key Uses of FISA Authorities in the War on Terrorism
+
+In enacting the USA PATRIOT Act, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
+2002, and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Congress provided the
+government with vital tools that it has used regularly and effectively in its war on terrorism. The
+reforms contained in those measures affect every single application made by the Department for
+electronic surveillance or physical search of suspected terrorists and have enabled the government
+to become quicker and more flexible in gathering critical intelligence information on suspected
+terrorists. It is because of the key importance of these tools to the war on terror that we ask you
+to reauthorize the provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act scheduled to expire at the end of this
+
+ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
+HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
+DATE 11/6/2013 BY C28W34B6Y
+1871 (c) (2) PRODUCTION 1 DEC 2008 1074
+year. Of particular concern is section 206's authorization of multipoint or "roving" wiretaps,
+section 207's expansion of FISA's authorization periods for certain cases, section 214's revision of
+the legal standard for installing and using pen register/ trap and trace devices, and section 215's
+grant of the ability to obtain a Court order requesting the production of business records related
+to national security investigations.
+
+In addition, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 includes a
+"lone wolf" provision that expands the definition of "agent of a foreign power" to include a non-
+United States person, who acts alone or is believed to be acting alone and who engages in
+international terrorism or in activities in preparation therefor. This provision is also scheduled to
+sunset at the end of this year, and we ask that it be made permanent as well.
+
+A. Roving Wiretaps
+
+Section 206 of the USA PATRIOT Act extends to FISA the ability to "follow the target"
+for purposes of surveillance rather than tie the surveillance to a particular facility and provider
+when the target's actions may have the effect of thwarting that surveillance. In the Attorney
+General's testimony at the beginning of this month before the Senate Judiciary Committee, he
+declassified the fact that the FISA court issued 49 orders authorizing the use of roving
+surveillance authority under section 206 as of March 30, 2005. Use of roving surveillance has
+been available to law enforcement for many years and has been upheld as constitutional by several
+federal courts, including the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits. Some object that this provision
+gives the FBI discretion to conduct surveillance of persons who are not approved targets of
+court-authorized surveillance. This is wrong. Section 206 did not change the requirement that
+before approving electronic surveillance, the FISA court must find that there is probable cause to
+believe that the target of the surveillance is either a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power,
+such as a terrorist or spy. Without section 206, investigators will once again have to struggle to
+catch up to sophisticated terrorists trained to constantly change phones in order to avoid
+surveillance.
+
+Critics of section 206 also contend that it allows intelligence investigators to conduct
+"John Doe" roving surveillance that permits the FBI to wiretap every single phone line, mobile
+communications device, or Internet connection the suspect may use without having to identify the
+suspect by name. As a result, they fear that the FBI may violate the communications privacy of
+innocent Americans. Let me respond to this criticism in the following way. First, even when the
+government is unsure of the name of a target of such a wiretap, FISA requires the government to
+provide "the identity, if known, or a description of the target of the electronic surveillance" to the
+FISA Court prior to obtaining the surveillance order. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(3) and
+1805(c)(1)(A). As a result, each roving wiretap order is tied to a particular target whom the
+FISA Court must find probable cause to believe is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.
+In addition, the FISA Court must find that the actions of the target of the application may have
+the effect of thwarting" the surveillance, thereby requiring an analysis of the activities of a foreign
+power or an agent of a foreign power that can be identified or described. 50 U.S.C.
+
+-2-
+1871 (c) (2) PRODUCTION 1 DEC 2008 1075
+§ 1805(c)(2)(B). Finally, it is important to remember that FISA has always required that the
+government conduct every surveillance pursuant to appropriate minimization procedures that limit
+the government's acquisition, retention, and dissemination of irrelevant communications of
+innocent Americans. Both the Attorney General and the FISA Court must approve those
+minimization procedures. Taken together, we believe that these provisions adequately protect
+against unwarranted governmental intrusions into the privacy of Americans. Section 206 sunsets
+at the end of this year.
+
+B. Authorized Periods for FISA Collection
+
+Section 207 of the USA PATRIOT Act has been essential to protecting the national
+security of the United States and protecting the civil liberties of Americans. It changed the time
+periods for which electronic surveillance and physical searches are authorized under FISA and, in
+doing so, conserved limited OIPR and FBI resources. Instead of devoting time to the mechanics
+of repeatedly renewing FISA applications in certain cases - which are considerable - those
+resources can be devoted instead to other investigative activity as well as conducting appropriate
+oversight of the use of intelligence collection authorities by the FBI and other intelligence
+agencies. A few examples of how section 207 has helped are set forth below.
+
+Since its inception, FISA has permitted electronic surveillance of an individual who is an
+agent of foreign power based upon his status as a non-United States person who acts in the
+United States as "an officer or employee of a foreign power, or as a member" of an international
+terrorist group. As originally enacted, FISA permitted electronic surveillance of such targets for
+initial periods of 90 days, with extensions for additional periods of up to 90 days based upon
+subsequent applications by the government. In addition, FISA originally allowed the government
+to conduct physical searches of any agent of a foreign power (including United States persons) for
+initial periods of 45 days, with extensions for additional 45-day periods.
+
+Section 207 of the USA PATRIOT Act changed the law as to permit the government to
+conduct electronic surveillance and physical search of certain agents of foreign powers and non-
+resident alien members of international groups for initial periods of 120 days, with extensions for
+periods of up to one year. It also allows the government to obtain authorization to conduct a
+physical search of any agent of a foreign power for periods of up to 90 days. Section 207 did not
+change the time periods applicable for electronic surveillance of United States persons; which
+remain at 90 days. By making these time periods equivalent, it has enabled the Department to file
+streamlined combined electronic surveillance and physical search applications that, in the past,
+were tried but abandoned as too cumbersome to do effectively.
+
+As the Attorney General testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee, we estimate that
+the amendments in section 207 have saved OIPR approximately 60,000 hours of attorney time in
+the processing of applications. Because of section 207's success, we have proposed additional
+amendments to increase the efficiency of the FISA process. Among these would be to allow
+coverage of all non-U.S. person agents for foreign powers for 120 days initially with each renewal.
+
+-3-
+1871 (c) (2) PRODUCTION 1 DEC 2008 1076
+of such authority allowing continued coverage for one year. Had this and other proposals been
+included in the USA PATRIOT Act, the Department estimates that an additional 25,000 attorney
+hours would have been saved in the interim. Most of these ideas were specifically endorsed in the
+recent report of the WMD Commission. The WMD Commission agreed that these changes
+would allow the Department to focus its attention where it is most needed and to ensure adequate
+attention is given to cases implicating the civil liberties of Americans. Section 207 is scheduled to
+sunset at the end of this year.
+
+C. Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices
+
+Some of the most useful, and least intrusive, investigative tools available to both
+intelligence and law enforcement investigators are pen registers and trap and trace devices.
+These devices record data regarding incoming and outgoing communications, such as all of the
+telephone numbers that call, or are called by, certain phone numbers associated with a suspected
+terrorist or spy. These devices, however, do not record the substantive content of the
+communications, such as the words spoken in a telephone conversation. For that reason, the
+Supreme Court has held that there is no Fourth Amendment protected privacy interest in
+information acquired from telephone calls by a pen register. Nevertheless, information obtained
+by pen registers or trap and trace devices is extremely useful in an investigation in revealing
+the nature and extent of the contacts between a subject and his confederates. The data provides
+important leads for investigators, and may assist them in building the facts necessary to obtain
+probable cause to support a full content wiretap.
+
+Under chapter 206 of title 18, which has been in place since 1986, if an FBI agent and
+prosecutor in a criminal investigation of a bank robber or an organized crime figure want to install
+and use a pen register or trap and trace devices, the prosecutor must file an application to do so
+with a federal court. The application they must file, however, is exceedingly simple: it need only
+specify the identity of the applicant and that law enforcement agency conducting the investigation,
+as well as "a certification by the applicant that the information likely to be obtained is relevant to
+an ongoing criminal investigation being conducted by that agency." Such applications, of course,
+include other information about the facility that will be targeted and details about the
+implementation of the collection, as well as "a statement of the offense to which the information
+likely to be obtained... relates." But chapter 206 does not require an extended explanation of the
+facts of the case.
+
+In contrast, prior to the USA PATRIOT Act, in order for an FBI agent conducting an
+intelligence investigation to obtain FISA authority to use the same pen register and trap and trace
+device to investigate a spy or terrorist, the government was required to file a complicated
+application under title IV of FISA. Not only was the government's applicant required to
+include a "certification by the applicant that the information likely to be obtained is relevant to an
+ongoing foreign intelligence or international terrorism investigation being conducted by the
+Federal Bureau of Investigation under guidelines approved by the Attorney General," he also had
+to include the following:
+
+-4-
+1871 (c) (2) PRODUCTION 1 DEC 2008 1077
+information which demonstrates that there is reason to believe that the telephone line to
+which the pen register or trap and trace device is to be attached, or the communication
+instrument or device to be covered by the pen register or trap and trace device, has been
+or is about to be used in communication with--
+
+(A) an individual who is engaging or has engaged in international terrorism or
+clandestine intelligence activities that involve or may involve a violation of the
+criminal laws of the United States; or
+
+(B) a foreign power or agent of foreign power, under circumstances giving reason
+to believe that the communication concerns or concerned international terrorism or
+clandestine intelligence activities that involve or may involve a violation of the
+criminal laws of the United States.
+
+Thus, the government had to make a much different showing in order obtain a pen register
+or trap and trace authorization to find out information about a spy or a terrorist than is required to
+obtain the very same information about a drug dealer or other ordinary criminal. Sensibly, section
+214 of the USA PATRIOT Act simplified the standard that the government must meet in order to
+obtain pen/trap data in national security cases. Now, in order to obtain a national security
+pen/trap order, the applicant must certify "that the information likely to be obtained is foreign
+intelligence information not concerning a United States person, or is relevant to an investigation
+to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities." Importantly, the
+law requires that such an investigation of a United States person may not be conducted solely
+upon the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution.
+
+Section 214 should not be permitted to expire and return us to the days when it was more
+difficult to obtain pen/trap authority in important national security cases than in normal criminal
+cases. That is especially true when the law already contains provisions that adequately protect the
+civil liberties of Americans. I urge you to re-authorize section 214.
+
+D. Access to Tangible Things
+
+Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act allows the FBI to obtain an order from the FISA
+Court requesting production of any tangible thing, such as business records, if the items are
+relevant to an ongoing authorized national security investigation. While in the past, in United
+States person, cannot be based solely upon activities protected by the First Amendment to the
+Constitution. The Attorney General also declassified earlier this month the fact that the FISA
+Court has issued 35 orders requiring the production of tangible things under section 215 from the
+date of the effective date of the Act through March 30th of this year. None of those orders was
+issued to libraries and/or bookstores, and none was for medical or gun records. The provision to
+date has been used only to seek the production of driver's license records, public accommodation
+records, apartment leasing records, credit card records, and subscriber information, such as names
+and addresses, for telephone numbers captured through court-authorized pen register devices.
+
+-5-
+1871 (c) (2) PRODUCTION 1 DEC 2008 1078
+Similar to a prosecutor in a criminal case issuing a grand jury subpoena for an item
+relevant to his investigation, so too may the FISA Court issue an order requiring the production
+of records or items that are relevant to an investigation to protect against international terrorism
+or clandestine intelligence activities. Section 215 orders, however, are subject to judicial
+oversight before they are issued - unlike grand jury subpoenas. The FISA Court must explicitly
+authorize the use of section 215 to obtain business records before the government may serve the
+order on a recipient. In contrast, grand jury subpoenas are subject to judicial review only if they
+are challenged by the recipient. Section 215 orders are also subject to the same standard as grand
+jury subpoenas - a relevance standard.
+
+Section 215 has been criticized because it does not exempt libraries and booksellers. The
+absence of such an exemption is consistent with criminal investigative practice. Prosecutors have
+always been able to obtain records from libraries and bookstores through grand jury subpoenas.
+Libraries and bookstores should not enjoy a safe harbor for terrorists and spies. Last year, a
+member of a terrorist group closely affiliated with al Qaeda used Internet service provided by a
+public library to communicate with his confederates. Furthermore, we know that spies have used
+public library computers to do research to further their espionage and to communicate with their
+co-conspirators. For example, Brian Regan, a former TRW employee working at the National
+Reconnaissance Office, who was convicted of espionage, extensively used computers at five
+public libraries in Northern Virginia and Maryland to access addresses for the emission of certain
+foreign governments.
+
+Concerns that section 215 allows the government to target Americans because of the
+books they read or websites they visit are misplaced. The provision explicitly prohibits the
+government from conducting an investigation of a U.S. person based solely upon protected First
+Amendment activity. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(2)(B). However, some criticisms of section 215 have
+apparently been based on a possible ambiguity in the law. The Department has already stated its
+litigation that the recipient of a section 215 order may consult with his attorney and may challenge
+that order in court. The Department has also stated that the government may seek, and a court
+may require, only the production of records that are relevant to a national security investigation, a
+standard similar to the relevance standard that applies to grand jury subpoenas in criminal cases.
+The text of section 215, however, is not as clear as it could be in these respects. The Department,
+therefore, is willing to support amendments to Section 215 to clarify these points. Section 215
+also is scheduled to sunset at the end of this year.
+
+E. The "Wall"
+
+Before the USA PATRIOT Act, applications for orders authorizing electronic surveillance
+or physical searches under FISA had to include a certification from a high-ranking Executive
+Branch official that "the purpose" of the surveillance or search was to gather foreign intelligence
+information. As interpreted by the courts and the Justice Department, this requirement meant that
+the "primary purpose" of the collection had to be to obtain foreign intelligence information rather
+
+-6-
+1871 (c) (2) PRODUCTION 1 DEC 2008 1079
+than evidence of a crime. Over the years, the prevailing interpretation and implementation of the
+"primary purpose" standard had the effect of sharply limiting coordination and information sharing
+between intelligence and law enforcement personnel. Because the courts evaluated the
+government's purpose for using FISA at least in part by examining the nature and extent of such
+coordination, if much coordination that occurred, the more likely courts would find that law
+enforcement, rather than foreign intelligence collection, had become the primary purpose of the
+surveillance or search.
+
+During the 1980s, the Department operated under a set of largely unwritten rules that
+limited to some degree information sharing between intelligence and law enforcement officials. In
+1995, however, the Department established formal procedures that more clearly separated law
+enforcement and intelligence investigations and limited the sharing of information between
+intelligence and law enforcement personnel even more than the law required. The promulgation
+of these procedures was motivated in part by the concern that the use of FISA authorities would
+not be challenged as criminal in particular investigations if criminal prosecution began to overcome
+intelligence gathering as an investigation's primary purpose. The procedures were intended to
+permit a degree of interaction and information sharing between prosecutors and intelligence
+officers, while at the same time ensuring that the FBI would be able to maintain existing FISA
+coverage and later use the fruits of that coverage in a criminal prosecution. Over time, however,
+coordination and information sharing between intelligence and law enforcement personnel became
+more limited in a fashion that was allowed to instill a perception, wrong that improper
+information sharing could and at times, and a culture developed within the Department sharply
+limiting the exchange of information between intelligence and law enforcement officials.
+
+Sections 218 and 504 of the USA PATRIOT Act helped to bring down this "wall"
+separating intelligence and law enforcement officials. They erased the perceived statutory
+imperative for more robust information sharing between intelligence and law enforcement
+personnel. They also provided the necessary impetus for the removal of the formal administrative
+restrictions as well as the informal cultural restrictions on information sharing.
+
+Section 218 of the USA PATRIOT Act eliminated the "primary purpose" requirement.
+Under section 218, the government may conduct FISA surveillance or searches if foreign
+intelligence gathering is a "significant" purpose of the surveillance or search. This eliminated the
+need for courts to conduct the relative weight of often "foreign intelligence" and "law enforcement"
+purposes of the surveillance or search, and allows increased coordination and sharing of
+information between intelligence and law enforcement personnel. Section 218 was upheld as
+constitutional in 2002 by the FISA Court of Review. This change, significantly, did not affect the
+government's obligation to demonstrate that there is probable cause to believe that the target is a
+foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. Section 218, which is not set to sunset,
+butressed section 218 by specifically amending FISA to allow intelligence officials conducting
+FISA surveillances or searches to "consult" with federal law enforcement officials, "coordinate"
+efforts to investigate or protect against international terrorism, espionage, and other foreign
+threats to national security, and to clarify that such coordination "shall not" preclude the
+
+-7-
+1871 (c) (2) PRODUCTION 1 DEC 2008 1080
+certification of a "significant" foreign intelligence purpose or the issuance of an authorization
+order by the FISA court.
+
+The Department moved aggressively to implement sections 218 and 504. Following
+passage of the Act, the Attorney General adopted new procedures designed to increase
+information sharing between intelligence and law enforcement officials, which were affirmed by
+the FISA Court of Review in November 2002. The Attorney General has also issued other
+directives to further enhance information sharing and coordination between intelligence and law
+enforcement officials. In practical terms, a prosecutor may now consult freely with the FBI about
+what, if any, investigative tools should be used to best prevent terrorist attacks and protect the
+national security. Unlike section 504, section 218 is scheduled to sunset at the end of this year.
+
+The increased information sharing facilitated by the USA PATRIOT Act has led to
+tangible results in the war against terrorism. Attacks have been disrupted, terrorists have been
+apprehended, and convictions have been obtained in terrorism cases. Information sharing
+between intelligence and law enforcement personnel, for example, was critical in successfully
+dismantling a terror cell in Portland, Oregon, popularly known as the "Portland Seven," as well as
+a secret cell in Lackawanna, New York. Such information sharing has also been used in the
+prosecution of several persons involved in al Qaeda drugs-for-weapons plot in San Diego, two of
+whom have pleaded guilty; nine associates in Northern Virginia of a global terrorist group
+known as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba that has ties to al Qaeda, who were convicted and sentenced to prison
+terms ranging from four years to life imprisonment; two Yemeni citizens, Mohammed Ali Hasan
+Al-Moayad and Mohsen Yahya Zayed, who were charged and convicted for conspiring to
+provide material support to al Qaeda and HAMAS; Khalid Abdel Latif Dumeisi, who was
+convicted by a jury in January 2005 of illegally acting as an agent of the former government of
+Iraq as well as two counts of perjury; and Enaam Arnaout, the Executive Director of the Illinois-
+based Benevolence International Foundation, who had a long-standing relationship with Osama
+Bin Laden and obtained fidelity to a money laundering scheme, admitting that he diverted thousands of
+dollars from his charity organization to support Islamic militant groups in Bosnia and Chechnya.
+Information on sharing between intelligence and law enforcement personnel has also been extremely
+valuable in a number of other ongoing or otherwise sensitive investigations that we are not at
+liberty to discuss today.
+
+While the "wall" primarily hindered the flow of information from intelligence investigators
+to law enforcement investigators, and the set of barriers, before the passage of the USA
+PATRIOT Act, often hampered law enforcement officials from sharing information with
+intelligence personnel and others in the government responsible for protecting the national
+security. Federal law, for example, was interpreted generally to prohibit federal prosecutors from
+disclosing information from grand jury testimony and criminal investigative subpoenas to
+intelligence and national defense officials even if that information indicated that terrorists were
+planning a future attack, unless such officials were actually assisting with the criminal
+investigation. Section 203(a) (b) of the USA PATRIOT Act, however, eliminated these
+obstacles to information sharing by allowing for the dissemination of that information to assist
+Federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, and national
+
+-8-
+1871 (c) (2) PRODUCTION 1 DEC 2008 1081
+security officials in the performance of their official duties, even if their duties are unrelated to the
+criminal investigation. (Section 203(a) covers grand jury information, and section 203(b) covers
+w/wiretap information.) Section 203(d), likewise, ensures that important information that is
+obtained by law enforcement means may be shared with intelligence and other national security
+officials. This provision does so by creating a generic exception to any other law purporting to
+limit federal law enforcement, intelligence, immigration, national defense, or national security
+officials from receiving, for official use, information regarding foreign intelligence or
+counterintelligence obtained as part of a criminal investigation. Indeed, section 905 of the USA
+PATRIOT Act requires the Attorney General to expeditiously disclose to the Director of Central
+Intelligence foreign intelligence acquired by the Department of Justice in the course of a criminal
+investigation unless disclosure of such information would jeopardize an ongoing investigation or
+impair other significant law enforcement interests.
+
+The Department has relied on section 203 in disclosing vital information to the intelligence
+community and other federal officials on many occasions. Such disclosures, for instance, have
+been used to assist in the dismantling of terrorist cells in Portland, Oregon and Lackawanna, New
+York and to support the prosecution of suspected terrorists' visas.
+
+Because two provisions in section 203, sections 203(b) and 203(d) are scheduled to sunset
+at the end of the year, we provide below specific examples of the utility of those provisions.
+Examples of cases where intelligence information from a criminal investigation was appropriately
+shared with the Intelligence Community under Section 203(d) include:
+
+* Information about the organization of a violent jihad training camp including training in
+basic military skills, explosives, weapons and plans blockages, as well as a plot to bomb
+soft targets abroad, resulted from the investigation and criminal prosecution of a
+naturalized United States citizen who was associated with an al-Qaeda related group;
+
+* Travel information and the manner that monies were channeled to members of a seditious
+conspiracy who traveled from the US to fight alongside the Taliban against U.S.
+and allied forces;
+
+* Information about an assassination plot, including the use of false travel documents and
+transporting monies to a designated state sponsor of terrorism resulted from the
+investigation and prosecution of a naturalized United States citizen who had been the
+founder of a well-known United States organization;
+
+* Information about the use of fraudulent travel documents by a high-ranking member of a
+designated foreign terrorist organization emanating from his criminal investigation and
+prosecution, and intelligence information about the financial structure of the terrorist
+group's logistical support network which was shared in order to assist in protecting the
+lives of U.S. citizens;
+
+-9-
+1871 (c) (2) PRODUCTION 1 DEC 2008 1082
+* The criminal prosecution of individuals who traveled to, and participated in, a military-
+style training camp abroad yielded intelligence information in a number of areas including
+details regarding the application forms which permitted attendance at the training camp;
+after being convicted, one defendant has testified in a recent separate federal criminal trial
+about this application practice, which assisted in the admissibility of the form and
+conviction of the defendants; and
+
+* The criminal prosecution of a naturalized U.S. citizen who had traveled to an Al-Qaeda
+training camp in Afghanistan revealed information about the group's practices, logistical
+support and targeting information.
+
+Title III information has similarly been shared with the Intelligence Community through section
+203(b). The potential utility of such information to the intelligence and national security
+communities is clear: intercepts where conversations, or being monitored without prior
+knowledge may reveal all sorts of information about terrorists, terrorist plots, or other activities
+with national security implications. Furthermore, the value of this provision is not theoretical: the
+Department has made disclosures of vital information to the Intelligence community and other
+federal officials under section 203(b) on many occasions, such as:
+
+* Wiretap interceptions involving a scheme to defraud donors and the Internal Revenue
+Service and illegally transfer monies to Iraq generated not only criminal charges but
+information concerning the manner and means by which monies were funneled to Iraq; and
+
+* Intercepted communications, in conjunction with a sting operation, led to criminal charges
+and intelligence information relating to money laundering, receiving and attempting to
+transport night-vision goggles, infrared army lights and other sensitive military equipment
+relating to a foreign terrorist organization.
+
+Section 203 is also critical to the operation of the National Counterterrorism Center. The
+FBI relies upon section 203(d) to provide information obtained in criminal investigations to
+analysts in the new National Counterterrorism Center, thus assisting the Center in carrying out its
+vital counterterrorism missions. The National Counterterrorism Center represents a strong
+example of section 203 information sharing, as the Center uses information provided by law
+enforcement agencies to produce counterterrorism watchlists; to add to its list of suspected
+terrorists on the TIPOFS watchlist; and to distribute terrorism-related information across the
+federal government.
+
+In addition, last year, during a series of high-profile events - the G-8 Summit in Georgia,
+the Democratic Convention in Boston and the Republican Convention in New York, the
+November 2004 presidential election, and other events - a task force used the information sharing
+provisions under section 203(b) as part and parcel of protecting these critical duties. The 2004
+Threat Task Force was a successful inter-agency effort where there was a robust sharing of
+information at all levels of government.
+
+-10-
+1871 (c) (2) PRODUCTION 1 DEC 2008 1083
+F. Protecting Those Complying with FISA Orders
+
+Often, to conduct electronic surveillance and physical searches, the United States requires
+the assistance of private communications providers to carry out such court orders. In the criminal
+context, those who assist the government in carrying out wiretaps are provided with immunity
+from civil liability. Section 223, which is set to sunset, provides immunity from civil liability to
+communication service providers and others who assist the United States in the execution of FISA
+orders. Prior to the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, those assisting in the carrying out of
+FISA orders enjoyed no such immunity. Section 223 merely extends the immunity that has
+long existed in the criminal context to those who assist the United States in carrying out orders
+issued by the FISA court. Providing this protection to communication service providers for
+fulfilling their legal obligations helps to ensure prompt compliance with FISA orders.
+
+CONCLUSION
+
+It is critical that the elements of the USA PATRIOT Act subject to sunset in a matter of
+months be renewed. Failure to do so would take the Intelligence Community and law
+enforcement back to a time when a full exchange of information was not possible and the tools
+available to defend against terrorism were inadequate. This is unacceptable. The need to
+combat violence against terrorists wishing to attack our nation is real, and allowing USA
+PATRIOT Act provisions to sunset would damage our ability to prevent such attacks.
+
+We thank the Committee for the opportunity to discuss the importance of the USA
+PATRIOT Act to this nation's ongoing war against terrorism. This Act has a proven record of
+success in protecting the American people. Provisions subject to sunset must be renewed. We
+look forward to working with the Committee in the weeks ahead. We appreciate the
+Committee's close attention to this important issue. We would be pleased to answer any
+questions you may have. Thank you.
+
+-11-
+1871 (c) (2) PRODUCTION 1 DEC 2008 1084
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_April_27_2005_Prepared_Attorney_General_-_FBI_Testimony/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_April_27_2005_Prepared_Attorney_General_-_FBI_Testimony/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..09e1473
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_April_27_2005_Prepared_Attorney_General_-_FBI_Testimony/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+{
+ "title": "April 27, 2005 Prepared Attorney General & FBI Testimony",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "2005 testimony of Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General of the United States, and Robert S. Mueller, III, Federal Bureau of Investigation, DOJ, before the Select Committee on Intelligence on the government’s use of USA PATRIOT Act authorities. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "",
+ "date_created": "2005-04-27",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [
+ "Russia",
+ "Bosnia and Herzegovina",
+ "Iraq"
+ ],
+ "people": [
+ "Gonzales, Alberto R.",
+ "Mueller, Robert S.",
+ "Rockefeller, Jay",
+ "Arnaout, Enaam",
+ "Al-Moayad, Mohammed Ali Hasan",
+ "Zayed, Mohsen Yahya",
+ "Dumeisi, Khalid Abdel Latif",
+ "bin Laden, Osama"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-18",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/april-27-2005-prepared-attorney-general-fbi-testimony",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "pdf_sha256": "897728c3e7edad626711562f31a0bb84ceb861d179868732c85759023e8abe41",
+ "pages": 11
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_Aug-_16_2010_Letter_to_House_-_Senate_Committees_on_FISC_Documents_Related_to_Section_215/ACLU_-_Aug-_16_2010_Letter_to_House_-_Senate_Committees_on_FISC_Documents_Related_to_Section_215.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_Aug-_16_2010_Letter_to_House_-_Senate_Committees_on_FISC_Documents_Related_to_Section_215/ACLU_-_Aug-_16_2010_Letter_to_House_-_Senate_Committees_on_FISC_Documents_Related_to_Section_215.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..32a8a1f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_Aug-_16_2010_Letter_to_House_-_Senate_Committees_on_FISC_Documents_Related_to_Section_215/ACLU_-_Aug-_16_2010_Letter_to_House_-_Senate_Committees_on_FISC_Documents_Related_to_Section_215.md
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+U.S. Department of Justice
+
+Office of Legislative Affairs
+
+Office of the Assistant Attorney General Washington, DC 20530
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//HCS//G//NOFORN, ORCON~~
+UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE
+
+August 16, 2010
+
+The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
+Chairman
+Committee on the Judiciary
+United States Senate
+Washington, D.C. 20510
+
+The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
+Chairman
+Select Committee on Intelligence
+United States Senate
+Washington, D.C. 20510
+
+The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
+Chairman
+Committee on the Judiciary
+U.S. House of Representatives
+Washington, D.C. 20515
+
+The Honorable Silvestre Reyes
+Chairman
+Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
+U.S. House of Representatives
+Washington, D.C. 20515
+
+Dear Madam and Messrs. Chairmen:
+
+Pursuant to section 1871 of United States Code Title 50, we are providing the
+Committees with copies of the remaining decisions, orders, or opinions issued by the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court, and pleadings, applications, or memoranda of law associated
+therewith, that contain significant constructions or interpretations of any provision of FISA
+during the five-year period ending July 10, 2008. _See_ 50 U.S.C. §1871(c)(2). We have provided
+previously similar materials for the same time period.
+
+The enclosed documents are being produced in digital format on compact disks (CDs).
+The CDs and their contents are highly classified at the TOP SECRET//COMINT//HCS
+//G//NOFORN, ORCON level and are being provided for review by Members and appropriately
+cleared staff from the four Committees. They will be delivered in accordance with our usual
+practice regarding such materials. The documents contain redactions that the Attorney General,
+in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, authorized in accordance with Section
+1871(c)(2) as necessary to protect the national security of the United States. As required by that
+provision, these redactions are limited to the identities of targets and information concerning
+sensitive sources and methods.
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//HCS//G//NOFORN, ORCON~~
+UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE
+
+---
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//HCS//G//NOFORN, ORCON~~
+UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE
+
+The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
+The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
+The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
+The Honorable Silvestre Reyes
+Page Two
+
+Please do not hesitate to contact this office if we may provide additional assistance
+regarding this, or any other matter.
+
+Sincerely,
+
+Ronald Weich
+Assistant Attorney General
+
+Enclosures
+
+cc: The Honorable Jeff Sessions
+Ranking Minority Member
+Senate Committee on the Judiciary
+
+The Honorable Christopher S. Bond
+Vice Chairman
+Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
+
+The Honorable Lamar S. Smith
+Ranking Minority Member
+House Committee on the Judiciary
+
+The Honorable Peter Hoekstra
+Ranking Minority Member
+House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
+
+The Honorable John D. Bates
+Presiding Judge
+United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//HCS//G//NOFORN, ORCON~~
+UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_Aug-_16_2010_Letter_to_House_-_Senate_Committees_on_FISC_Documents_Related_to_Section_215/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_Aug-_16_2010_Letter_to_House_-_Senate_Committees_on_FISC_Documents_Related_to_Section_215/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4f6bc49
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_Aug-_16_2010_Letter_to_House_-_Senate_Committees_on_FISC_Documents_Related_to_Section_215/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+{
+ "title": "Cover Letter: DOJ to Congressional and Judiciary Intelligence Committees on Several FISC Documents Related to Section 215",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "A letter from the DOJ’s Office of Legislative Affairs to the Congressional Intelligence and Judiciary Committees relating to the NSA collection of bulk telephony metadata under Section 501 of FISA, as amended by Section 215 of the Patriot Act. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "DOJ",
+ "date_created": "2010-08-16",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT",
+ "HCS",
+ "G"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN, ORCON"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Leahy, Patrick J.",
+ "Conyers, John Jr.",
+ "Feinstein, Dianne",
+ "Reyes, Silvestre",
+ "Sessions, Jeff",
+ "Bond, Christopher S.",
+ "Smith, Lamar S.",
+ "Hoekstra, Peter",
+ "Bates, John D.",
+ "Weich, Ronald"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-10-28",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/cover-letter-doj-congressional-and-judiciary-intelligence-committees-several-fisc",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "7603a0c8377019e4cbb70a81a27d1e8ffe094ed26a9960d8805fef6f47b878ea",
+ "pages": 2
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_August_17_2006_NSA_Presentation_for_the_FISC/ACLU_-_August_17_2006_NSA_Presentation_for_the_FISC.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_August_17_2006_NSA_Presentation_for_the_FISC/ACLU_-_August_17_2006_NSA_Presentation_for_the_FISC.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ffc2a4f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_August_17_2006_NSA_Presentation_for_the_FISC/ACLU_-_August_17_2006_NSA_Presentation_for_the_FISC.md
@@ -0,0 +1,805 @@
+ROUTING
+
+| TO: | NAME AND ADDRESS | DATE | INITIALS |
+|-----|------------------|------|----------|
+| 1 | | | |
+| 2 | | | |
+| 3 | | | |
+| 4 | | | |
+
+| ACTION | DIRECT REPLY | PREPARE REPLY |
+|-------------|--------------|------------------|
+| APPROVAL | DISPATCH | RECOMMENDATION |
+| COMMENT | FILE | RETURN |
+| CONCURRENCE | INFORMATION | SIGNATURE |
+
+REMARKS:
+
+FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO. DATE
+
+TOP SECRET
+(Security Classification)
+
+CONTROL NO.
+
+COPY OF
+
+Handle Via
+~~CODEWORD~~
+~~COMINT~~
+~~CODEWORD
+Channels
+
+Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities:
+
+________
+
+~~CODEWORD~~
+
+NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
+Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
+
+~~TOP SECRET~~
+(Security Classification)
+
+---
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR~~
+
+NSA REPORT TO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+(BR 06-05) ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ The National Security Agency (NSA)
+submits this report as required by the May 24, 2006 Order
+of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC),
+Docket Number BR 06-05, which authorized NSA to acquire
+certain tangible things in connection with investigations
+to protect against international terrorism concerning
+[REDACTED] pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
+Act, as amended (the "Act"), 50 U.S.C. § 1861.
+
+BACKGROUND (U)
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ On May 24, 2006, the FISC issued an
+Order authorizing NSA to acquire certain tangible things
+"call detail records" maintained by
+[REDACTED] in connection with
+investigations to protect against international terrorism
+concerning [REDACTED] pursuant to the Act.1 The Court's Order
+requires that any application to renew or reinstate the
+authority shall include a report describing (i) the queries
+that have been made since this Order was granted; (ii) the
+manner in which NSA applied the procedures set forth in
+subparagraph A (which describes the access control and the
+
+1 ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ "Call detail records," or "telephony metadata," were
+defined in NSA's declaration, and similarly in the Court's Order, to
+include comprehensive communications routing information, including but
+not limited to session identifying information (e.g., originating and
+terminating telephone number, communications device identifier, etc.),
+trunk identifier, and time and duration of call, but not to include the
+substantive content of any communication, as defined by 18 U.S.C. §
+2510(8), or the name, address, or financial information of a subscriber
+or customer.
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR~~
+1
+
+---
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR~~
+
+standard for querying the data); and (iii) any proposed
+changes in the way in which call-detail records would be
+received [REDACTED] See Docket Number BR 06-05 at
+9 (para. 4.I). This report addresses the period between May
+24, 2006 and August 2, 2006, a cut-off date that was
+selected in order to allow for the gathering of data and
+composition of the report; the next report will address a
+period beginning with August 3, 2006. Because the cut-off
+date is prior to the date of the Court's August 8, 2006
+Amended Order in this matter, this report does not discuss
+NSA's activities under that Amended Order.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+ROLE OF DATA INTEGRITY ANALYSTS (C)
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ As an initial matter, NSA wants to
+clarify the fact that a small team of analysts who have
+access to the data acquired pursuant to the Order do not
+engage in call-chaining analysis for the purpose of
+discovering terrorist suspects and disseminating
+information to other appropriate elements of the
+Government; rather, their function is to support such
+efforts by continually assuring the quality, accuracy and
+utility of the information received. Because these
+analysts access the acquired data before it is archived
+into the analytic database, and do not conduct the
+operational analysis that has been detailed for the Court
+in accordance with the standard provided by the Court, NSA
+believes it important to highlight with particularity their
+role in the analytic process.
+
+~~(TS/SI//NF)~~ The successful use of the call-detail
+records acquired under the Order is made possible in part
+through the efforts of a small team of "data integrity"
+analysts. This team currently consisting of four
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR~~
+2
+
+---
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR~~
+
+individuals - has access to -- and does access -- the data
+acquired under the Order before it is archived into the
+database used by intelligence analysts to carry out their
+counter terrorism mission. The data integrity analysts
+work with the [REDACTED] providing the data to NSA and with
+the data itself to ensure NSA understands what data it is
+receiving, how the fields of data are arranged, what is
+contained in them, how they are used by the [REDACTED] and
+similar issues concerning the delivery of the data to NSA.
+These analysts also write software that facilitates the
+normalization and archiving of the incoming data into the
+NSA analytic database, review the incoming records for
+problems and irregularities, and generally ensure the
+quality of the data archived for operational purposes.
+These individuals are expert in the data itself, rather
+than in drawing conclusions about individuals based on the
+data.
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ The data integrity analysts do not query
+the archived data to perform intelligence analysis, but
+their role in supporting that analysis is a crucial one.2
+These data integrity analysts have been trained by NSA
+management and by the NSA Office of General Counsel in the
+appropriate handling of the data, the purpose for and
+conditions under which NSA receives it, and the limitations
+and conditions on its storage and use. The Government's
+filings seeking renewal of the Order make specific
+reference to the unique role of the data integrity analysis
+team.
+
+2 ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ Indeed, it was through the efforts and attention of the
+data integrity analysts that the presence of credit card information in
+a small percentage of the records, discussed below, became known to NSA
+management.
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR~~
+3
+
+---
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR~~
+
+CALL DETAIL RECORDS ACQUIRED PURSUANT TO THE COURT'S
+ORDER, AND REPORTABLE ISSUES CONCERNING THEM (S)
+
+a. The Records (U)
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ Pursuant to the Court's Order, NSA was
+authorized to acquire call detail records from
+[REDACTED] companies, and during this reporting period acquired such
+records from [REDACTED] companies, [REDACTED] The call
+detail records of [REDACTED] companies [REDACTED]
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ In all cases, the records consist of
+numerous data fields that provide information about
+telephone calls, but do not contain the content of any
+calls as defined in 18 U.S.C. 2510(8). The fields of data
+in the records contain information such as the telephone
+number of the device initiating the call, the telephone
+number of the device that was called, the date and duration
+of the call, the identifiers assigned to the communications
+trunks that carried the call, whether a call originated or
+terminated overseas, [REDACTED]
+
+3 ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ [REDACTED] It is
+referred to throughout this report a [REDACTED] subject to the Court's Order in BR 06-
+05, [REDACTED] to effect delivery of its call detail records.
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR~~
+4
+
+---
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR~~
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ Often, numerous fields within a call
+detail record contain no information. Some fields
+contained in a call detail record, such as the field
+indicating the called number, almost always contain data.
+Other fields, such as the field indicating [REDACTED]
+only contain data when the field is relevant to the
+particular call in question - in this case when the call
+[REDACTED] The number of fields in a
+record varies depending on which company provided it and
+which set of the company's records it belongs to;
+accordingly, the number of fields in a record varies from
+[REDACTED]
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ One field NSA has found particularly
+useful in making associations among users of telephone
+numbers is a field that [REDACTED]
+field and that [REDACTED]
+field. This field is sometimes blank, but sometimes
+contains a [REDACTED] indicating that
+the telephone call was made using [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+by [REDACTED]
+NSA submits that [REDACTED] do not constitute [REDACTED]
+
+Nevertheless, out of an abundance of caution, the current
+application specifically seeks authority to obtain and use
+[REDACTED]
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR~~
+5
+
+---
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR~~
+
+b. Reportable Issues During This Period (U)
+
+(e) Before elaborating on its application of the
+standard used to conduct searches of the archived call
+detail records, NSA wishes to bring to the Court's
+attention two issues that arose during the initial period
+the Order was in effect.
+
+~~(TS//SI/NF)~~ NSA averred in its Declaration in support
+of the Government's application for tangible things that
+the term "call detail records" would not include the
+substantive content of any communication, as defined by 18
+U.S.C. § 2510(8), or the name, address, or financial
+information of a subscriber or customer. The Court's Order
+adopted similar language to describe the limits of its
+authorization. Docket Number BR 06-05 at 2 (para. 2).
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ A very small percentage of the call
+detail records did, however, contain a 16-digit credit card
+number in those cases when the caller selected a credit
+card as the payment method for the call. In addition, some
+records contained proper names - in some cases just a first
+name, and in some a first and a last name - when the
+calling party sought to place a collect call.
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ While NSA OGC advised that it believes
+that the restrictions contained in the Court's Order were
+not designed to prevent NSA from receiving the particular
+information discussed below in the context it was received,
+the credit card numbers are at least arguably financial
+information, and the names are clearly names. NSA
+[REDACTED]
+
+4 ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ Upon notification of the facts surrounding the inclusion
+of the credit cards numbers as described, the NSA OGC advised that it
+was not persuaded that the inclusion of the 16-digit string of numbers
+in these records was unauthorized under the Order's terms. NSA OGC
+opined that a credit card number, standing alone, does not indicate.
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR~~
+6
+
+---
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR~~
+
+describes below the conditions surrounding its receipt of
+this information, the steps taken to eradicate it, and the
+current status of the records with respect to such
+information.
+
+1. Credit card numbers in certain records
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ (S)
+
+~~(TS//CI//NF)~~ A very small percentage of the records
+NSA acquired between May 24 and August 2 - approximately
+0.001% - contained credit card numbers in one of the
+fields. NSA did not make use of this information in any
+way. Upon recognizing that this information could be
+considered financial information, NSA management directed
+that software be written immediately to suppress - or mask
+- the digits in the archived data whenever a 16-digit
+string of numbers appeared in the relevant field. This was
+accomplished on June 19, ensuring that NSA analysts
+querying the archived data could neither see the credit
+card information nor make use of it in their analysis.
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ At the same time, NSA representatives
+initiated contact with [REDACTED] to request that the
+[REDACTED] stop sending information in the relevant data
+field whenever the contents of the field consisted of a 16-
+
+anything about the financial situation, purchasing habits, payment
+record, or any other such private information concerning a customer or
+subscriber. NSA OGC believes it is this type of private information
+about the finances of U.S. persons that the Court sought to protect in
+its Order, rather than the mechanism used to pay for a particular
+telephone call. Nonetheless, NSA OGC recognizes there exists a
+respectable argument that a credit card number is financial
+information, and also recognizes that such information could be used to
+derive more private information about an individual; therefore, NSA OGC
+believes it imperative to bring the issue to the Court's attention. As
+is set out above, NSA never did any analysis or took any other action
+with respect to the credit card numbers, and rendered the credit card
+numbers inaccessible to operational analysts 26 days after the Order
+was signed.
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR~~
+7
+
+---
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR~~
+
+digit number. On July 10, [REDACTED] stopped providing the
+16-digit string [REDACTED] NSA and [REDACTED]
+continue to take steps aimed at terminating the
+delivery to NSA of similar information.5 Again,
+however, the NSA analysts conducting searches of the
+archived data have not had credit card numbers available to
+them since June 19, 2006. Moreover, no record exists of
+any analyst having made any use of the credit card numbers,
+and no NSA methods would have called upon them to do so.
+
+2. Proper Names in some records (S)
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ In addition, a field [REDACTED]
+which is normally blank, in a small
+number of instances contained a proper name. This occurred
+even less frequently than the 0.001% frequency with which
+credit card numbers appeared, evidently when the calling
+party sought to place a collect call. When the field
+contained a proper name, it was sometimes a first name
+only, and sometimes both a first and last name.
+
+5 ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ Achieving this without endangering the operation is
+somewhat complicated. NSA data integrity analysts (discussed above)
+have written software that helps load the call detail records into the
+NSA database used to search the archived data. Part of that software's
+function is to "recognize" a field for what it is, and treat it
+accordingly in organizing the data for use. NSA cannot simply ask the
+company to summarily eliminate the field without a likely disruption of
+its operations, for two reasons: first, as discussed above, with
+respect to the vast majority of call detail records, the field does not
+contain credit card information, and does contain useful information
+that permits the association of previously unassociated individuals;
+second, because NSA data integrity analysts have written software that
+moves the information acquired pursuant to the Order into the database
+in which the archived data is searched, and because that software
+"recognizes" a particular number of fields and the contents of each
+with respect to the different types of records, the precipitous
+elimination of a field would likely disrupt the functioning of the
+system, treating data from one field as though it were data from
+another field. As was stated above, however, NSA analysts conducting
+searches of the archived data do not have access to the credit card
+information, and have never made use of it.
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR~~
+8
+
+---
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR~~
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ As was the case with respect to credit
+card information, when NSA recognized that it was receiving
+proper names in a small number of records and that this
+fact was significant under the Order, it took immediate
+steps along two paths: at the direction of management,
+software was implemented on June 19 to suppress from view
+the proper names that appeared in the archived data queried
+by the analysts, and NSA officials worked with
+[REDACTED] officials to curtail delivery of such information. On July
+9, procedures were implemented that precluded completely
+the delivery of proper names in the records
+[REDACTED] provided to NSA. NSA no longer receives proper names from
+[REDACTED] and the proper names it did receive have been
+masked from the view of analysts. NSA never received
+similar information from [REDACTED]
+
+THE STANDARD SET OUT IN THE COURT'S ORDER (U)
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ The standard set out by the Court for the
+purpose of querying data acquired pursuant to the
+authorization and referred to for purposes of the required
+report is as follows:
+
+"[a]ny search or analysis of the data archive shall
+occur only after a particular known telephone number
+has been associated with [REDACTED] More specifically, access to
+the archived data shall occur only when NSA has
+identified a known telephone number for which, based
+on the factual and practical considerations of
+everyday life on which reasonable and prudent persons
+act, there are facts giving rise to a reasonable
+articulable suspicion that the telephone number is
+associated with [REDACTED] provided, however, that a
+telephone number believed to be used by a U.S. person
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR~~
+9
+
+---
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR~~
+
+shall not be regarded as associated with [REDACTED] solely on the
+basis of activities that are protected by the First
+Amendment to the Constitution." See Docket Number BR
+06-05 at 5 (para 4.A).
+
+NSA ACTIVITIES UNDER THE AUTHORITY GRANTED BY THE
+COURT'S MAY 24, 2006 ORDER ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ The Court's Order instructed the NSA
+Office of General Counsel to brief analysts with respect to
+the authorization granted by the Order, and the limited
+circumstances in which queries of the archive are
+permitted, as well as other procedures and restrictions
+regarding the retrieval, storage and dissemination of the
+archived data. See BR 06-05 at 6 (para 4.C).
+
+a. OGC Briefings
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ During this period, NSA'S OGC conducted
+formal briefings at three different sessions, at least one
+of which was attended by every analyst authorized to query
+the archived data, as well as each the seven individuals
+authorized to approve queries of the archived data. These
+briefings consisted of descriptions of the retrieval,
+storage and dissemination procedures and restrictions
+included in the Court's Order, as well as a description of
+the standard applicable to the processing of information in
+the archive and legal advice concerning its application.
+In addition to the scheduled formal briefings, NSA'S OGC
+also provided frequent advice and counsel on these and
+similar topics throughout the period to analysts applying
+the standard and to members of management responsible for
+approving requests to query the archived data.
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ In addition, as NSA makes clear above and
+in its application for renewal and accompanying
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR~~
+10
+
+---
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR~~
+
+declaration, a small team of "data integrity" analysts
+ensure the quality of the call detail records prior to
+their inclusion in the NSA analytic database. Because they
+have access to the data, NSA required them to attend one of
+the above briefings, and each of them has done so.
+
+b. Procedures for Applying the Court Ordered
+Standard (e)
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ When a number is considered as a
+candidate to be a seed with which to query the archive, one
+of the designated approval authorities examines whatever
+supporting documentation is included with the request with
+an eye towards deciding whether, based on the factual and
+practical considerations of everyday life on which
+reasonable and prudent persons act, there are facts giving
+rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion that a
+particular known telephone number is associated with
+[REDACTED]
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ The application of this "reasonable
+person" standard is applied using a test similar to the
+"totality of the circumstances" test used by the courts.
+The decision as to whether a particular telephone number
+qualifies as a seed in connection with the Order is
+informed by a variety of factors that could give rise to a
+reasonable articulable suspicion. Some of the factors
+militating in favor of using a particular telephone number
+as a seed include (but are not limited to):
+
+* telephonic contact between the phone number in
+ question and that of a person reasonably believed
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR~~
+11
+
+---
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR~~
+
+to be a member or agent of [REDACTED]
+
+* other direct contact, as revealed through other
+ SIGINT, HUMINT, or other intelligence
+ information, in which a telephone number is
+ conveyed when that contact involves a person
+ reasonably believed to be a member or agent of
+ [REDACTED]
+
+* open source information that indicates a
+ telephone number is used by a person who is
+ reasonably believed to be a member or agent of
+ [REDACTED]
+
+c. Application of the Standard to Determine Whether
+a Telephone Number Qualifies as a Seed Number
+Under the Court's Order (TS//SI//NF)
+
+1. Queries Made as a Result of Automated
+Alerts (e)
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ NSA has compiled through its continuous
+counter-terrorism analysis, a list of telephone numbers
+that constitute an "alert list" of telephone numbers used
+by members of [REDACTED] This alert list serves as a body of
+telephone numbers employed to query the data, as is
+described more fully below.
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ Domestic numbers and foreign numbers are
+treated differently with respect to the criteria for
+including them on the alert list. With respect to foreign
+telephone numbers, NSA receives information indicating a
+tie to [REDACTED]
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR~~
+12
+
+---
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR~~
+
+[REDACTED] from a variety of sources. Principal among
+these are: reporting by the FBI, CIA or NSA; open source
+information tying a telephone number to a member of
+[REDACTED] known to the Intelligence Community; information from a
+foreign intelligence service known by the U.S. Intelligence
+Community to be reliable; and telephony contact between the
+telephone of a known [REDACTED] and another telephone.
+Each of the foreign telephone numbers that comes to the
+attention of NSA as possibly related to [REDACTED]
+is evaluated to
+determine whether the information about it provided to NSA
+satisfies the reasonable articulable suspicion standard.
+If so, the foreign telephone number is placed on the alert
+list; if not, it is not placed on the alert list.
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ The process set out above applies also to
+newly discovered domestic telephone numbers considered for
+addition to the alert list, with the additional requirement
+that NSA's Office of General Counsel reviews these numbers
+and affirms that the telephone number is not the focus of
+the analysis based solely on activities that are protected
+by the First Amendment. There are, however, two categories
+of domestic telephone numbers that were added to the NSA
+alert list prior to the date the Order took effect, and the
+basis for their addition is slightly different.
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ The first category consists of 177
+domestic numbers that are currently the subject of FISC
+authorized electronic surveillance based on the FISC'S
+finding of probable cause to believe that they are used by
+[REDACTED] Since these numbers were already reviewed
+and authorized by the Court for electronic surveillance
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR~~
+13
+
+---
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR~~
+
+purposes, they were deemed approved for meta data querying
+without the approval of an NSA official.
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ The second category consists of 199
+domestic numbers each of which was added to the NSA alert
+list after coming to NSA's attention because of its direct
+contact with a known foreign [REDACTED] seed number, and
+subsequent NSA analysis produced a sufficient level of
+suspicion that NSA generated an intelligence report about
+the telephone number to the FBI and the CIA. NSA'S OGC has
+not reviewed the domestic numbers on the alert list that
+predate the effective date of the Order, as there was no
+requirement to do so with respect to NSA's activities prior
+to the effective date of the Order. However, it is
+important to note that these numbers are not used as seeds.
+Rather, with respect to this category of telephone numbers,
+in the event of a new contact, the foreign [REDACTED]
+telephone number that originally sparked NSA's interest in
+the domestic number would be the seed. Accordingly when
+conducting contact chaining as a result of an alert list
+"hit", NSA limits the number of hops it undertakes from the
+domestic number to two.6
+
+6 ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ Note that NSA could if it chose to conduct queries
+against the original foreign seed number every day or even multiple
+times a day, so long as it continued to have a reasonable articulable
+suspicion that the foreign number was associated with [REDACTED] If NSA
+did so, every day NSA would see the contact between the foreign seed
+and the domestic number that is on the alert list, as well as all new
+foreign and domestic contacts. The inclusion of these domestic numbers
+on the alert list is merely a quicker and more efficient way of
+achieving the same result without looking at all the domestic to
+domestic contacts that would be revealed if this were done. Stated
+another way, the system is designed to bring to the attention of NSA
+the fact that a telephone number about which NSA has suspicion has had
+a new contact with a number overseas, but all of this is premised on
+the existence of a foreign seed number that originally surfaced the
+domestic number in question. Each seed number NSA uses, whether
+derived from information that was on the alert list prior to the
+effective date of the Order or after, meets the standard set out in the
+Order.
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR~~
+14
+
+---
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR~~
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ However, in order to avoid any appearance
+of circumventing the procedures, NSA will change its
+software to build the chains from the original foreign
+number and remove the 199 domestic numbers described above
+from the alert list. While the software is being
+developed, which will take approximately 45 days, NSA will
+continue to run the domestic numbers on the alert list as
+described.
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ As of the last day of the reporting
+period addressed herein, NSA had included a total of 3980
+telephone numbers on the alert list, which includes foreign
+numbers and domestic numbers, after concluding that each of
+the foreign telephone numbers satisfied the standard set
+forth in the Court's May 24, 2006, and each of the domestic
+telephone numbers was either a FISC approved number or in
+direct contact with a foreign seed that met those criteria.
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ To summarize the alert system: every
+day new contacts are automatically revealed with the 3980
+telephone numbers contained on the alert list described
+above, which themselves are present on the alert list
+either because they satisfied the reasonable articulable
+suspicion standard, or because they are domestic numbers
+that were either a FISC approved number or in direct
+contact with a number that did so. These automated queries
+identify any new telephone contacts between the numbers on
+the alert list and any other number, except that domestic
+numbers do not alert on domestic-to-domestic contacts.
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ During this reporting period, a
+combination of the alert system and queries resulting from
+leads described below in paragraph two led to analysis that
+resulted in the discovery of 138 new numbers that were
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR~~
+15
+
+---
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR~~
+
+tipped as leads to the FBI and the CIA as suspicious
+telephone numbers.
+
+2. Queries Resulting From Leads Other Than the
+Automated Alert System (e)
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ The other type of query that NSA
+analysts run are those based upon seed telephone numbers of
+which NSA became aware through means other than the
+automated alerting system. These are telephone numbers
+that NSA has learned about through other sources, such as
+communications it intercepted through other authorized
+surveillance activities or information provided to NSA by
+other elements of the U.S. Intelligence Community. A Shift
+Coordinator approves all proposed queries of the archived
+data prior to their taking place, applying the standard set
+out in the Court's Order. If the Shift Coordinator
+determines an address is known or believed to be used by a
+U.S. person, the query is sent to the NSA OGC. Otherwise,
+the Shift Coordinator authorized (or disallowed) the use of
+the address as a seed address based on the criteria
+contained in the Court's Order.7
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ During this reporting period, in response
+to lead information primarily from CIA, FBI and internal to
+NSA, NSA determined that 153 new telephone numbers
+satisfied the reasonable articulable suspicion and
+designated them as seeds; NSA then conducted analyses of
+
+7 ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ Analysts are well-versed in the rules governing queries
+of the data obtained as a result of the Court's Order. Informal
+discussion among the counter-terrorism analysts frequently precedes the
+submission of a formal request for authorization to conduct contact
+chaining [REDACTED] Accordingly, a subset of the
+potential seed numbers is discussed among the analysts and rejected as
+candidates at the analyst level. In these cases, no formal request to
+use the number as a seed number is ever made.
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR~~
+16
+
+---
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR~~
+
+the acquired data as described in the Court's Order. Also
+during this reporting period, NSA declined to process 46
+telephone numbers it had received primarily from CIA, FBI
+and internal to NSA, concluding the standard had not been
+satisfied. Of the 199 numbers proposed, 108 numbers were
+submitted to the NSA OGC because they were believed to be
+used by U.S. persons. NSA'S OGC approved 99 as seeds, and
+declined to approve 9.
+
+c. Example of Application of the Standard and
+Resulting Report (e)
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ Analysis of information obtained pursuant
+to the Court's authorization in the above-captioned matter
+resulted in querying the archived data using a known
+telephone number that satisfied the standard set out in the
+Court's Order, and a subsequent report identifying multiple
+foreign and two US-based possible terrorist-related leads.
+This new information was a direct result of meta data
+analysis of telephone numbers used by [REDACTED]
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ [REDACTED] from intelligence
+information gathered in the area, immediately after the
+raid. An NSA Shift Coordinator determined that, based on
+the factual and practical considerations of everyday life
+on which reasonable and prudent persons act, there existed
+facts giving rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR~~
+17
+
+---
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR~~
+
+that this phone number was associated with [REDACTED] The
+Shift Coordinator approved querying the archived data using
+this number as a seed, and NSA learned from several SIGINT
+sources that prior to [REDACTED] his [REDACTED]
+number had been in contact with multiple [REDACTED]
+which were subsequently in contact, [REDACTED]
+with numbers
+in the United States, Australia, Canada and the United
+Kingdom. NSA reported these foreign and domestic
+[REDACTED] contacts
+obtained through analysis of data authorized by this Court
+through BR-06-05 to FBI, CIA, and the NCTC.
+
+PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE WAY CALL DETAIL RECORDS WILL BE
+RECEIVED BY NSA ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~
+
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ NSA anticipates that, if the Order is
+renewed, it will [REDACTED]
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR~~
+18
+
+---
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR~~
+
+[REDACTED] Aside from this, NSA anticipates no changes and
+proposes no changes to the way it receives the call detail
+records.
+
+17 August 2006
+Date
+
+(Signature, name)
+SID Program Manager for [REDACTED] Projects
+National Security Agency
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR~~
+19
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_August_17_2006_NSA_Presentation_for_the_FISC/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_August_17_2006_NSA_Presentation_for_the_FISC/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4d2d046
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_August_17_2006_NSA_Presentation_for_the_FISC/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+{
+ "title": "August 17, 2006 NSA Presentation for the FISC",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "An NSA presentation for the FISC on the bulk telephony metadata program pursuant to Section 501 of FISA and notification of two compliance issues concerning the collection. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2006-08-17",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN",
+ "MR"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-18",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/august-17-2006-nsa-presentation-fisc",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "5ed8f1436097465bc16d84256ee579967fd33aeec479d2db867dedef3ba301b5",
+ "pages": 20
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_August_2009_NSA_Cryptological_School_Course/ACLU_-_August_2009_NSA_Cryptological_School_Course.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_August_2009_NSA_Cryptological_School_Course/ACLU_-_August_2009_NSA_Cryptological_School_Course.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..84bb3e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_August_2009_NSA_Cryptological_School_Course/ACLU_-_August_2009_NSA_Cryptological_School_Course.md
@@ -0,0 +1,1280 @@
+# The Office of General Counsel
+OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
+NSA
+
+---
+
+THIS PRESENTATION
+IS CLASSIFIED
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//[REDACTED]
+
+---
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+## General Principles of Law
+
+* **Principle #1: Authority**
+ (What is the authority to do my job?)
+* **Principle #2 Restrictions**
+ (Is the authority restricted in any way?)
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+---
+
+## Constitution
+## Fourth Amendment
+
+* Protects the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.
+* Requires probable cause for a search warrant.
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+---
+
+## Supreme Court Cases
+
+* **Olmstead v. U.S.**
+ **(1928)**
+* **Katz v. U.S.**
+ **(1967)**
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+---
+
+## Operation Shamrock: 1945-1975
+
+* NSA received copies of international telegrams to, from, and transiting the U.S.
+* Included virtually all international telegrams carried by major telecom carriers.
+* In later years, 150,000 telegrams per month reviewed by NSA analysts
+* Probably the largest governmental interception program affecting Americans ever undertaken
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+---
+
+## Project Minaret: 1967-1973
+## (The Watch List)
+
+* Names of U.S. persons used systematically as basis for selecting messages
+* Foreign influence on Domestic Antiwar and Civil Rights Activists
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+---
+
+E# Narcotics Collection: 1970-1973
+* Telephone Links between the U.S. and South America collected
+* Used Names of U.S. persons
+* Obtained Communications that Law Enforcement could not acquire under Title III
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+---
+
+## The Problem...
+
+* Congressional Inquiries
+ Church/Pike Committees
+* Information TO, FROM, and ABOUT U.S. Citizens was:
+ * Improperly Collected
+ * Improperly Retained
+ * Improperly Disseminated
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+---
+
+## Results of Church Committee and Other Investigations
+
+* Termination of illegal collection activities
+* Executive Order requiring the establishment of procedures relating to U.S. person information
+* Greater Executive and Legislative Oversight
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+---
+
+## Congressional/Executive Response to IC Abuses
+
+* **Federal Law**
+ * Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (as amended)
+* **Executive Order**
+ * E.O. 12333
+ * Intelligence Activities
+* **Regulations and Procedures**
+ * DoD 5240.1-R and
+ Classified Annex
+ * USSID SPOO18 (USSID 18)
+ * Minimization Procedures
+
+---
+
+## End of Module One
+
+---
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+## The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)
+
+* The FISA, was originally passed in 1978.
+* Most recently amended in the FISA Amendments Act (FAA) of 2008.
+* Defines “electronic surveillance” and requires an order from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) to conduct such surveillance.
+* As amended, by the FAA, requires that the USG obtain a court order to conduct electronic surveillance against US persons either in the US or abroad.
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+---
+
+## Definitions
+
+* Electronic Surveillance
+* U.S. Person
+* Foreign Power
+* Agent of a Foreign Power
+* Contents
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+---
+
+## FISA
+## “Electronic Surveillance”
+
+* f(1): acquisition of communications of particular known USP inside the US by targeting that person
+* f(2): acquisition of wire communication to or from a person in the US if acquisition occurs inside the US
+* f(3): acquisition of radio communications if all parties to the communication are located inside the US
+* f(4): monitoring in the US to acquire information other than from a radio or wire communication
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+
+---
+
+## Definitions -- U.S. Persons
+
+* U.S. Citizen
+* Permanent Resident Alien
+ (Green Card Holder)
+* Corporations (incorporated in the U.S.)
+* Associations (primary membership
+ composed of U.S. persons)
+* U.S. flagged ships/aircraft
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+---
+
+## Definitions -- Foreign Power
+
+* A foreign government or any component thereof
+* A faction of a foreign nation
+* An entity openly acknowledged to be directed or controlled by a foreign government(s)
+* A group engaged in international terrorism
+* A foreign based political organization
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+---
+
+## Definitions -- Agent of a foreign power
+
+* An officer or employee of a foreign power
+* A spy, terrorist, saboteur, aider/abettor, or conspirator
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+---
+
+## Definitions -- Contents
+
+* Communications
+ * Any information concerning the identity of the parties to such communications
+ * OR
+ * “Substance”
+ * “Purport”
+ * “Meaning”
+ * “Existence”
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+---
+
+## FISA Amendments Act of 2008
+
+* Became law in July 2008
+* Applies to targets overseas
+* Sections 702/703/704/705
+
+---
+
+## FISA Amendments Act of 2008
+## Section 702
+
+* Authorizes the USG to gather foreign intelligence by targeting foreign persons reasonably believed to be outside the US with authorization jointly executed by the AG and DNI.
+* The government must employ targeting procedures and minimization procedures which comply with the statute and which are reviewed by the FISC.
+* Prohibits “reverse targeting”.
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+---
+
+## FISA Amendments Act of 2008
+## Section 703
+
+* Authorizes “electronic surveillance” against a USP reasonably believed to be outside of the US, but --
+* An order from the FISC is required.
+* Target must be a “foreign power”, “agent of a foreign power”, or officer or employee of a foreign government.
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+---
+
+## FISA Amendments Act of 2008
+## Section 704
+
+* Authorizes “other acquisitions” targeting US persons overseas – but
+* An order from the FISC is required.
+* The FISC does not review surveillance techniques.
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+---
+
+## FISA Amendments Act of 2008
+## Section 705
+
+* (U) Section 705 has two parts, 705(a) and 705(b).
+* (U) 705(a) – a judge may simultaneously authorize acquisitions conducted both inside and outside of the US against a USP overseas (703 and 704).
+* (U) 705(b) – if there is an existing FISA order authorizing surveillance of target inside of the US, the AG can authorize targeting while the USP is reasonably believed to be outside of the US.
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+---
+
+## FISA Procedures
+
+* Establishes the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+* Provides criteria/requirements for applications
+* Establishes Congressional Oversight
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+---
+
+## E.O. 12333
+## United States Intelligence Activities
+
+* Provides goals, directions, and responsibilities for the Intelligence Community
+* Defines NSA's responsibilities (Part 1.7(c))
+* Requires each agency to have AG-approved procedures, for collection, processing and dissemination of U.S. person information
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+---
+
+## E.O. 12333
+## United States Intelligence Activities
+
+* Collection, Processing, and Dissemination of Signals Intelligence for National Foreign Intelligence Purposes.
+* Collection, Processing, and Dissemination for Signals Intelligence for Counterintelligence Purposes.
+* SIGINT Support for Military Operations.
+* Information Assurance.
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+---
+
+## REGULATIONS
+## DoD 5240.1-R (1982)
+
+* Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect U.S. Persons
+* NSA/CSS Policy 1-23
+* Procedures Governing the Activities of NSA/CSS that Affect U.S. Persons
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+---
+
+## End of Module Two
+
+---
+
+SECRET//COMINT//[REDACTED]
+
+(U//FOUO) FAA Sections 703, 704, & 705 Minimization Procedures
+
+(U//FOUO) Anyone targeting US persons located outside of the US under FAA is required to read and be familiar with the minimization procedures
+
+(U) The Overall Classification of this presentation is TOP SECRET//COMINT//[REDACTED]
+
+FAA Sections 703, 704, & 705
+
+SECRET//COMINT// [REDACTED]
+
+---
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+## (U) Requirements
+
+### FAA Sections 703, 704, & 705
+
+(U) The FAA may authorize collection against:
+* ✓ A US person
+* ✓ Reasonably believed to be outside of the US
+* ✓ To acquire foreign intelligence information
+
+Targeting US persons located outside of the US
+2
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+---
+
+## (U) Limitations
+### NSA Surveillance Under Sections 703, 704, and 705
+
+* (U) NSA CANNOT use FAA authorities to target:
+ * Anything/Anyone in the US
+* (U//FOUO) NSA FAA data CANNOT be:
+ * ~ Accessed without being properly trained on NSA’s FAA minimization procedures
+ * ~ Processed at locations other than those approved by SID
+
+Targeting US persons located outside of the US
+3
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+---
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+## (U) FISA Amendments Act of 2008
+### Section 703
+
+* • (U) An order from the FISC to target a US person reasonably believed to be outside the US
+* • (U) Authorizes “electronic surveillance” or the acquisition of stored electronic communications or stored electronic data
+* • (U) Authorization for up to 90 days
+
+Targeting US persons located outside of the US
+4
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+---
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+## (U) FISA Amendments Act of 2008
+### Section 704
+
+* (U) An order from the FISC to target a US person reasonably believed to be outside the US
+* (U) Authorizes “other acquisitions” targeting US persons overseas (techniques are not described to the court)
+* (U) Authorization for up to 90 days
+
+Targeting US persons located outside of the US
+5
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+---
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+## (U) FISA Amendments Act of 2008
+### Section 705
+
+* (U) Section 705 has two parts, 705(a) and 705(b).
+* (U) 705(a) authorizes the Government to request, and a judge to issue a single order authorizing 703 and 704 surveillance
+* (U) 705(b) authorizes the AG to approve surveillance of a US person overseas if the FISC has already issued an order authorizing electronic surveillance or physical search against that US person in the US
+
+Targeting US persons located outside of the US
+6
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+---
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+## NSA Minimization Procedures Under FAA Sections 703, 704, & 705
+### Minimization Procedures need to be Followed Unless...
+
+* (U//FOUO) To protect US National Security, life or property, or for Law enforcement purposes – NSA may deviate from Standard Minimization Procedures with AG approval (coordinate in advance with NSA OGC)
+* (U//FOUO) If advance coordination is not feasible and NSA needs to act in order to protect against immediate threat to human life – consult with NSA OGC who must report any such action within 7 days to DOJ.
+* (U) If you believe you must deviate from the procedures, YOU MUST GO TO NSA/OGC FIRST!!!
+
+Targeting US persons located outside of the US
+7
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+---
+
+SECRET//COMINT//[REDACTED]
+
+### NSA Minimization Procedures Under FAA Sections 703, 704, & 705
+## (U) Collection
+
+(S//SI//[REDACTED])
+
+* NSA must terminate collection promptly if NSA learns that a targeted US person is located in the US
+* Collection against a US person in the US may only be reinstated in accordance with the FISA
+* NSA may resume collection if the target departs the US during the life of the order
+* Selectors for 704 and 705 surveillances may be tasked
+[REDACTED]
+
+Targeting US persons located outside of the US
+
+SECRET//COMINT//[REDACTED]
+
+8
+
+---
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+### NSA Minimization Procedures Under FAA Sections 703, 704, & 705
+## (U) Processing
+
+* (U//FOUO) Searches or reviews of collected materials must be designed, to the extent operationally possible, to minimize the risk of returning data concerning unconsenting US person’s who are not the target of authorized surveillance
+
+Targeting US persons located outside of the US
+9
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+---
+
+SECRET//COMINT//[REDACTED]
+
+### NSA Minimization Procedures Under FAA Sections 703, 704, & 705
+## (U) Retention
+
+* (S//SI//[REDACTED]) The following communications shall be destroyed upon recognition unless the AG authorizes retention:
+ * Inadvertent collection of communications while the target enters the US
+ * Inadvertent collection of communications in which all the communicants are in the US
+ * Inadvertent collection of communications in which all the communicants are US persons who are not authorized targets
+
+Targeting US persons located outside of the US
+SECRET//COMINT//[REDACTED]
+10
+
+---
+
+SECRET//COMINT//[REDACTED]
+
+## (U) AG Destruction Waiver
+
+Inadvertent Collection:
+* All communicants inside the US
+* All communicants are US person’s who are not authorized targets
+* The authorized target is in the US
+
+Data shall be destroyed unless the AG determines that the communication contains:
+* Significant foreign intelligence
+* Evidence of a serious crime
+* Information related to a threat of serious harm to life or property
+* Technical information about a communications vulnerability
+
+(S/SI//[REDACTED])
+
+Targeting US persons located outside of the US
+SECRET//COMINT//[REDACTED]
+11
+
+---
+
+SECRET//COMINT//[REDACTED]
+
+## (U) Without AG Destruction Waiver
+
+Inadvertent Collection:
+* • Of US domestic communications
+* • Against an unauthorized target
+
+Even without a Destruction Waiver, technical data concerning such communications may be retained for collection avoidance purposes
+
+Targeting US persons located outside of the US
+SECRET//COMINT//[REDACTED]
+12
+
+---
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+## (U) Retention
+
+* (U//FOUO) NSA may retain FAA data in databases for up to 5 years without additional authorization
+* (U//FOUO) NSA’s SIGINT Director may authorize retention for a longer period in response to an authorized foreign intelligence or counterintelligence requirement
+
+Targeting US persons located outside of the US
+13
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+---
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+## (U) Incident Reporting
+
+* (U//FOUO) All incidents should be reported at the time of recognition AND again in the IG Quarterly report
+* (U//FOUO) Incidents include:
+ * Inadvertent and incidental collection
+ * Unauthorized targets
+ * Collection continued on targets inside the U S
+ * Unauthorized access to data:
+ * By unauthorized personnel
+ * By untrained personnel
+ * At non-SID-approved locations
+ * Inappropriate storage, labeling, or handling
+
+Targeting US persons located outside of the US
+14
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+---
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+## (U) Requirements for Data Access
+
+* (U//FOUO) To gain access to data both the individual user and the location must be certified
+* The user must:
+ * Complete this training (renewing it every two years)
+ * Maintain current Annual Intelligence Oversight readings
+ * Work under DIRNSA’s full operational & technical control
+ * Have a mission need
+* • The location must:
+ * Operate under DIRNSA’s full operational & technical control
+ * Possess a delegated mission
+ * Have SID approval for access to FAA data
+ * Have an established oversight infrastructure
+
+Targeting US persons located outside of the US
+15
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+---
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+### FAA Sections 703, 704, & 705
+## (U) Where to go for Help
+
+* OGC: DL GC_FISA
+ (after hours contact NSOC SOO to get in touch with OGC)
+* Oversight and Compliance: DL FISATEAM
+* Targeting Mission Management (TMM): DL OPSDICTS
+* Documents Available at SV1 Homepage: (‘go SV’)
+ * For the Minimization Procedures document
+ * Comparison charts of 703/704/705 orders
+ * Specific targets authorized under these sections
+
+Targeting US persons located outside of the US
+16
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+---
+
+SECRET//COMINT//20320108
+
+## USSID SPOO18
+### Legal Compliance and Minimization Procedures
+
+* Main body of SPO018 Compilation of responsibilities from the FISA, E.O. 12333, and DoD Regulation 5240.1-R as they apply to the U.S. SIGINT system
+* covers collection, processing, retention, and dissemination
+
+SECRET//COMINT//20320108
+
+---
+
+SECRET//COMINT//20320108
+
+## What is “Collection”?
+
+* Targeting a SPECIFIC COMMUNICANT (e.g. a terrorist, a foreign minister, a computer hacker)
+* Collecting based upon SUBJECT MATTER (e.g. nuclear proliferation, oil sales, economics)
+
+SECRET//COMINT//20320108
+
+---
+
+SECRET//COMINT//20320108
+
+## Targeting Specific Communicants SPO018 Section 4
+
+### The Four Rules
+
+* No [REDACTED] without Attorney general approval
+* No U.S. Persons in the U.S. without a Court Order
+* No U.S. persons outside the U.S. without a Court Order
+* Foreign persons outside the U.S. --- fair game
+
+SECRET//COMINT//20320108
+
+---
+
+SECRET//COMINT//20320108
+
+## Targeting by Subject Matter
+## USSID SPO018 Section 5
+
+* Selection terms that:
+ * have intercepted or
+ * are likely to intercept
+ * U.S. Person communications
+ * MUST BE DESIGNED
+ * (to the greatest extent practicable under the circumstances)
+ * to DEFEAT communications that
+ * do not contain foreign intelligence
+
+SECRET//COMINT//20320108
+
+---
+
+SECRET//COMINT//20320108
+
+## Targeting Issues
+
+Presumptions
+
+(If no other information is available)
+* In the U.S., then U.S. person
+* Outside the U.S., then foreigner
+
+SECRET//COMINT//20320108
+
+---
+
+SECRET//COMINT//20320108
+
+## Targeting Definitions
+
+Targeting U.S. Persons
+
+* INADVERTENT (Did not know is a U.S. Person)
+* INCIDENTAL (Legitimate foreign target; as a by product NSA acquires U.S. Person information/communications)
+* REVERSE (Target foreign entity to intentionally acquire U.S. Person information/communications)
+
+SECRET//COMINT//20320108
+
+---
+
+SECRET//COMINT//20320108
+
+## USSID SPOO18
+### Dissemination
+
+* Allow access to non-minimized raw traffic voice/data database
+* Provide copy of a non-minimized piece of raw traffic
+* Disclose (orally or in writing) the contents of non-minimized raw traffic
+* Disclose (orally or in writing) the identity of a U.S. person contained in an NSA product
+
+SECRET//COMINT//20320108
+
+---
+
+SECRET//COMINT//20320108
+
+## USSID SPOO18
+### Dissemination
+
+* Authorized Recipients of Raw Traffic
+* THE SIGINT PRODUCTION CHAIN
+ * People who Collect Raw Traffic
+ * People who Process Raw Traffic
+ * People who Retain Raw Traffic
+ * People who Manage the SIGINT Process
+ * People who do Oversight of the SIGINT Process
+
+SECRET//COMINT//20320108
+
+---
+
+SECRET//COMINT//20320108
+
+## USSID SPOO18
+### Dissemination
+
+Examples of Non-SIGINT Production Personnel
+
+* A Customer in Another Agency (e.g. CIA, FBI)
+* Another Agency’s Liaison Representative to NSA
+* Non-SIGINT producing NSA Organizations or Personnel (e.g Security (Q), Personnel (MD))
+* NSA Employees Detailed/Assigned to Another Agency (e.g. CIA/TMO, IOTC)
+* Any person not necessary to Produce the SIGINT Product
+
+SECRET//COMINT//20320108
+
+---
+
+## End of Module Three
+
+---
+
+SECRET//COMINT//20320108
+
+## Questions?
+
+* Who is the target?
+ * – U.S. Person or Non-U.S. Person
+* Where is the target?
+ * – In the U.S. or Outside the U.S.
+* What kind of communications will be collected?
+ * – Private (e-mail, wire, cell, encrypted) or Non-Private
+* How will the communications be collected?
+ * – Passively or Actively
+* Where will the communications be collected?
+ * – In the U.S. or Outside the U.S., or in International Waters, or from Outer Space
+
+SECRET//COMINT//20320108
+
+---
+
+## Questions?
+## Office of General Counsel
+### (Operations/Intel Law)
+
+NSOC has an attorney on call 24/7!
+
+---
+
+# Database Access Briefing
+
+## USSID SP0018 and Raw Traffic Databases
+
+---
+
+(U//FOUO) Contact O&C or the OGC if you have questions about this material
+
+NSA SID Oversight and Compliance (Database Team): [REDACTED] (nsts)
+dl u18dbtarget
+NSA SID Oversight and Compliance (Reporting Team): [REDACTED] (nsts)
+[REDACTED]
+dl ussid18
+
+---
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+## (U//FOUO) Contact O&C or the OGC if you have questions about this material
+
+NSA Office of the General Counsel (Ops): (nsts)
+dl gcoops (for NT users)
+(for UNIX systems)
+
+---
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+## (U//FOUO) Module 5
+
+## Administration and Background
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+---
+
+## (U//FOUO) Briefing Lifespan
+
+* **2 Years** – With use of USSID SP0018 sensitive databases
+* **6 Months** – Without use of USSID SP0018 sensitive databases
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+---
+
+## Why is this training required?
+
+This training covers access to and use of “Raw SIGINT” data and databases.
+
+---
+
+Raw SIGINT is: Results of collection BEFORE the information has been evaluated for foreign intelligence AND minimization purposes, per USSID CR1610.
+
+---
+
+“Analysts are not permitted … to roam freely in the universe of collected communications, examining messages which are not directly related to their assigned tasks.”
+-Office of Intelligence Policy and Review
+
+---
+
+Raw SIGINT access is restricted to those within a SIGINT Production Chain as defined by USSID CR1610.
+
+---
+
+There is no single “SPC”.
+
+There are SPCs at various levels from organic SIGINT assets in the field through the NSA Product Line level.
+
+---
+
+Raw SIGINT databases contain completely innocent U.S. person communications and non-foreign intelligence information as well as FI.
+
+Confidential//XX1
+
+---
+
+Database Queries = collection/targeting
+Dictionary Tasking = collection/targeting
+
+---
+
+Protecting U.S. Persons’ rights is only half the story. USSID SP0018, section 5.1 states that analysts must also ensure, to the greatest extent possible, that queries only target Foreign Intelligence.
+
+---
+
+## Sharing of SIGINT
+
+In this age of data and information sharing, we must remain mindful of the current regulations that prohibit the casual sharing of SIGINT.
+
+E.O.12333, section 2.3 specifically addresses this.
+
+---
+
+## Targeting for Personal Purposes
+
+If you know someone is using the SIGINT system for personal purposes, YOU have the responsibility to report the activity.
+
+---
+
+SECRET//COMINT//20291123
+
+## Auditing Requirements
+
+USSID CR1610 Annex A details auditing requirements for certain raw SIGINT systems. This auditing meets Department of Justice mandates for NSA’s operations.
+
+CONFIDENTIAL//COMINT//20291123
+
+---
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+## Derivative Databases
+
+If data is saved into another file or database, that derivative database must have the same access, auditing and retention issues that the originating database held
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+---
+
+SECRET//COMINT//20320108
+
+## Access and Retention
+
+USSID SP0018, Section 6
+
+* 5 Years on-line
+* Up to 10 years off-line – request for historical searches made to OIPR
+* Some retention exceptions
+* Recognizes intrusiveness of SIGINT
+* FISA Data: Depends upon nature of data –check USSID SP0018, Annex A, and/or call SV
+
+SECRET//COMINT//20320108
+
+---
+
+## Accountability of Access
+
+NSA must account for:
+
+* 1. Who uses SIGINT databases
+* 2. What purpose
+* 3. From what location
+* 4. Under what controls
+
+---
+
+## Therefore, accesses must be re-justified if:
+
+1. You Change Offices or Mission
+2. You Change Locations
+3. You Change Auditors
+4. Your Account Lapses Due to Inactivity for 90 days
+
+---
+
+## End of Module 5
+
+---
+
+## (U//FOUO) Module 6
+## Protections and Restrictions
+
+---
+
+## (U//FOUO) How do we protect ourselves?
+
+The best way to protect ourselves and our SIGINT is to play by the rules.
+
+No matter how inconvenient the rules may seem, if we fail to adhere to them, the next set of rules will be far stricter.
+
+---
+
+(U//FOUO) There are very few things we cannot accomplish within the existing rules, using the authorities we have and those authorities we can receive.
+
+Confidential//XX1
+
+---
+
+(U//FOUO) Each phase of Production (collection, processing, retention, and dissemination) must be:
+
+Accountable Defensible
+Repeatable Retrievable
+
+---
+
+(C/[REDACTED]) Violations of authorities must be reported:
+
+1. at the time of recognition to SID O&C
+2. as part of the E.O. 12333 quarterly report to the IG
+
+---
+
+(U//FOUO) If you determine that you have made a targeting mistake:
+1. Stop the query as soon as possible
+2. Notify your auditor
+
+---
+
+(S//SI//[REDACTED]) Anyone using NSA SIGINT databases must abide by the same rules and authorities as NSA.
+Access to these databases is restricted to persons operating under DIRNSA authority.
+
+---
+
+(C//[REDACTED]) In addition to having a National Foreign Intelligence purpose (which includes FI, Counter-intelligence and Support to Military Operations), the following general rules apply:
+
+---
+
+(C//[REDACTED]) Additional authority is required to target:
+
+* U.S. persons (anywhere) or people within U.S. territory
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+---
+
+## (C//[REDACTED]) What is a Second Party Person?
+
+In general terms, we apply the same basic definitions of a Second Party person as we apply for U.S. people.
+
+U.S. Identities in SIGINT, Section 9 contains full definitions of each Second Party person.
+
+---
+
+## (U//FOUO) End of Module 6
+
+---
+
+## (U//FOUO) Module 7
+
+### Production Guidance
+
+---
+
+## (U//FOUO) Targeting Clarifications
+
+Each query is an act of targeting.
+
+Start queries narrow; widen as necessary. Look out for queries that are too broad.
+
+Reasonableness, Not Perfection!
+
+---
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+(U//FOUO) Targeting takes place at front end via dictionaries AND at the keyboard with follow-on queries
+
+Choose qualifiers carefully
+* “AND” and “BUT NOT” will reduce your results
+* “OR” will expand your returns exponentially
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+---
+
+## (S//SI//[REDACTED]) E-Mail Address Targeting
+
+Specific e-mail addresses of valid foreign intelligence targets outside countries may be targeted regardless of email domain without additional authority.
+
+---
+
+## (S//SI//[REDACTED]) E-Mail Address Targeting
+
+Do Not:
+
+* Wildcard domains
+* Wildcard user names
+* Wildcard across domains
+
+---
+
+## (S//SI//[REDACTED]) Dissemination Clarifications
+
+E-mail addresses with U.S. domains may be included in dissemination if:
+
+a. the user is a foreign national (excluding AUS/CAN/NZL/GBR)
+b. Information is disseminated only to recipients who have a specific need for full addresses for a lawful government purpose.
+
+---
+
+## (S//SI// ) Targeting Clarifications
+
+Targeting:
+
+* Permanently assigned?
+* - Check Lookup tools BEFORE the first query
+* - Defeat domains using the same but not a part of your target
+* - Do not wildcard
+
+---
+
+## (S//SI//[REDACTED] Targeting Clarifications
+
+Avoid general search terms without valid FI selectors
+
+visa password narcotics
+ Bank
+
+(Based on USSID SP0018, Sect. 5.1.c)
+
+---
+
+## (S//SI//[REDACTED]) Sole Selectors
+
+Targeting all communications on a given will flood you with information that has no FI value or is to/from/about USPs
+
+---
+
+## (S//SI//[REDACTED]) Avoid Site SIGADS as Sole Selectors
+
+Do you need to see all information from a given site, or just select topics?
+
+---
+
+SECRET//COMINT//20320108
+
+## (S//SI//[REDACTED]) Avoid Names as Sole Selectors
+
+Use locations, associates, or activities to focus searches on your target and not just anyone with that same name
+
+SECRET//COMINT//20320108
+
+---
+
+CONFIDENTIAL//COMINT//20201123
+
+## (C//SI// ) Targeting foreign flagged ships or aircraft located in US territorial waters or airspace:
+
+* -COMINT stops at 12nm without additional authority
+* - ELINT to coastline and beyond pursuant to USSID AP2231
+
+CONFIDENTIAL//COMINT//20291123
+
+---
+
+CONFIDENTIAL//COMINT//20320108
+
+[REDACTED] allowed if specific FI selectors are used as well.
+(ex: [REDACTED]
+AND [REDACTED])
+
+---
+
+CONFIDENTIAL//COMINT//20320108
+
+## (C//[REDACTED]) Dissemination Clarifications
+
+Equipment and product designators, such as [REDACTED], and brand names may be included in SIGINT reports, if the focus is on the product, not the manufacturer of the product.
+
+---
+
+CONFIDENTIAL//COMINT//20201123
+
+## (C//SI//[REDACTED]) Targeting Deceased U.S. People or communications devices registered to them requires:
+
+a. a VERY strong foreign intelligence purpose
+b. mission driver
+c. approval of the NSA OGC
+
+CONFIDENTIAL//COMINT//20201123
+
+---
+
+CONFIDENTIAL//COMINT//20320108
+
+## (C//SI//[REDACTED]) Targeting Deceased People or communications devices registered to them requires:
+
+a. a VERY strong foreign intelligence purpose
+b. mission driver
+c. approval of the appropriate
+
+CONFIDENTIAL//COMINT//20320108
+
+---
+
+CONFIDENTIAL//COMINT//20320108
+
+## (C//SI//[REDACTED]) Dissemination Clarification
+
+Can deceased protected persons be named in dissemination?
+
+* U.S. : YES
+* : NO
+
+CONFIDENTIAL//COMINT//20320108
+
+---
+
+## (S//SI//[REDACTED]) DO NOT USE Raw Traffic repositories to verify the protected status of an entity.
+
+---
+
+(S//SI//[REDACTED]) Protected entities listed by name or context in dissemination do not imply collection is authorized.
+
+---
+
+## (C//[REDACTED]) Imminent Threat to Safety
+
+COLLECTION: USSID SP0018, 4.1.d.(1)
+
+DIRNSA may authorize the collection to, from, or about a USP outside the U.S. when life or physical safety is reasonably believed to be in immediate danger.
+***Contact NSOC***
+
+---
+
+## (C//[REDACTED]) Dissemination Clarification
+
+DISSEMINATION: USSID SP0018, 7.2.c.(6)
+
+Information indicates that the identity of the USP is pertinent to a possible threat to the safety of any person or organization, including those who are targets, victims or hostages of international terrorist organizations.
+
+---
+
+## (C//[REDACTED]) Dissemination Clarification
+
+If a person is in imminent danger and you have relevant information, you may disseminate that information unmasked in product and follow-up with SV afterwards.
+
+---
+
+## (C//[REDACTED]) Why do we still need this level of oversight?
+
+Past Abuses
+targeting of international telegrams
+
+Present Examples
+targeting of
+
+---
+
+## (C//[REDACTED]) Why do we still need this level of oversight?
+
+Past Abuses
+Phone lines into the U.S. for identities of U.S. based narcotics smugglers
+
+Present Examples
+Restaurant in Texas to identify narcotics smuggler
+
+---
+
+## (C// ) Why do we still need this level of oversight?
+
+Past Abuses
+Watch-listing U.S. people for evidence of foreign influence
+
+Present Examples
+Unauthorized targeting of suspected terrorists in U.S.
+
+---
+
+## (U//FOUO) End of Module 7
+
+---
+
+## (U//FOUO) Module 8
+
+## Dissemination Guidance
+
+---
+
+## (U//FOUO) U.S. location identifiers in reports
+
+Some US identifiers may be included when used in a LOCATIONAL SENSE (i.e. They identify a place).
+
+* RESTAURANTS
+* AIRLINE FLIGHT NUMBERS
+* HOTELS
+* AIRPORTS
+
+---
+
+## (U//FOUO) Avoid Contextual Identification
+
+Don’t provide so much detail about a masked protected identity that the reader could determine who is being referenced due to context.
+
+---
+
+## (C//[REDACTED]) Dissemination Authority
+
+
+Generally, to include the identity of a U.S. person or entity in SIGINT product (by name, title, or context):
+1) it must be necessary to understand or assess the foreign intelligence, and
+
+---
+
+2) the recipient must need that information to perform his/her official duties.
+3) You will need the approval of Chief Information Sharing Services.
+4) Keep your focus on the foreign intelligence.
+
+---
+
+## (U//FOUO) End of Module 8
+
+---
+
+(C//[REDACTED])
+
+---
+
+No chaining from or through U.S. contacts (email, phone, etc.)
+
+Contacts Masked
+
+---
+
+---
+
+(U//FOUO)
+
+---
+
+---
+
+SECRET//COMINT//20320108
+
+## (S//SI//[REDACTED]) Why do U.S. SIGINT analysts care?
+
+SECRET//COMINT//20320108
+
+---
+
+SECRET//COMINT//20320108
+
+## (S//SI// ) Tasking must comply with USSID SP0018 and [REDACTED].
+
+SECRET//COMINT//20320108
+
+---
+
+## (U//FOUO) End of Module 9
+
+---
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_August_2009_NSA_Cryptological_School_Course/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_August_2009_NSA_Cryptological_School_Course/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2a3b82e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_August_2009_NSA_Cryptological_School_Course/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+{
+ "title": "August 2009 NSA Cryptological School Course ",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "2009 NSA course materials for NSA personnel with access to bulk telephony and electronic communication metadata acquired pursuant to Sections 501 and 402 of FISA. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2009-08-01",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-18",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/august-2009-nsa-cryptological-school-course",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "a7f0a644196a9a10d18de1a6768fecd19d46aedcd48cac80c74a93779afdc606",
+ "pages": 132
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_August_29_2008_NSA_Memorandum/ACLU_-_August_29_2008_NSA_Memorandum.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_August_29_2008_NSA_Memorandum/ACLU_-_August_29_2008_NSA_Memorandum.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5981906
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_August_29_2008_NSA_Memorandum/ACLU_-_August_29_2008_NSA_Memorandum.md
@@ -0,0 +1,656 @@
+SUBJECT TO THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE ATTORNEY WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE;
+DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF NSA WITHOUT OGC APPROVAL
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+OFFICE OF DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL
+(OPERATIONS)
+
+AGC(IL)-213-08
+August 29, 2008
+
+MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY PROGRAM MANAGER FOR
+COUNTERTERRORISM SPECIAL PROJECTS, ANALYSIS AND PRODUCTION
+
+SUBJECT: (TS//SI//NF) Assessments of Reasonable Articulable Suspicion Pursuant to
+Orders of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court – INFORMATION
+MEMORANDUM
+
+1. (TS//SI//NF) This memorandum reissues OGC guidance to aid in the
+determinations SID personnel are called upon to make with respect to telephony and
+electronic metadata under the court orders addressing these subjects with respect to [REDACTED]
+
+Specifically, the memo elaborates on the legal standard applicable to the contact-chaining
+activities in which SID offices engage pursuant to Business Records Order 08-08 (as well
+as subsequent Orders for the production of telephony records), as well as to the contact
+chaining activities in which SID analysts engage pursuant to the Pen Register and Trap
+and Trace Order 08-110 (as well as subsequent Pen/Trap Orders). [REDACTED]
+
+---
+¹ (TS//SI//NF) The Business Records Order is captioned "In re Application of the Federal Bureau of
+Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED]
+² (TS//SI//NF) The Pen/Trap Order is captioned [REDACTED]
+³ (TS//SI//NF) OGC memorandum dated October 13, 2006, same subject, is canceled. This memorandum
+updates the prior memorandum to reflect changes in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC)
+authorizations, specifically authorizing an agent to the data acquired under the Orders for analysis related to
+[REDACTED]
+The substantive guidance concerning the application of the "reasonable articulable
+suspicion" standard with respect to the authorizations remains unchanged.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+1
+SUBJECT TO THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE ATTORNEY WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE;
+DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF NSA WITHOUT OGC APPROVAL
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+2. (TS//SI//NF) Both of the Orders set out a standard that allows access to the
+data when NSA has identified a known telephone number or other electronic identifier
+for which, based on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which
+reasonable and prudent persons act, there are facts giving rise to a reasonable articulable
+suspicion that the telephone number or electronic identifier⁴ is associated with [REDACTED]
+
+⁵ provided, however, that a telephone number or an account or address
+believed to be used by a U.S. person shall not be regarded as associated with [REDACTED]
+solely on the basis of activities that are protected by the First Amendment to the
+Constitution. When such a determination has been made, NSA is authorized by the
+Orders to use such numbers/electronic identifiers as "seed" addresses by querying the
+accumulated data to determine other telephone numbers and electronic identifiers the seed
+has contacted.
+
+A. Summary of the Standard
+
+3. (TS//SI//NF) The "reasonable articulable suspicion" standard embodied in the
+Court's Orders requires that before an analyst may use a telephone number or electronic
+identifier as a "seed" address to query the database of records, he/she must be able to
+articulate some fact or set of facts that causes him/her to suspect that the number is
+associated with [REDACTED] This formulation means that analysts are not
+free to use a telephone number or electronic identifier based merely on a hunch or guess,
+but must instead base their decisions on specific facts that would cause a reasonable
+person to form such a suspicion.
+
+4. (TS//SI//NF) Note that the standard does not present a particularly high
+hurdle.⁶ The level of evidence demanded by the standard is considerably less than proof
+by a preponderance of the evidence, meaning that here one need not show it is more
+likely than not that a number is associated with [REDACTED]
+
+---
+⁴ (TS//SI//NF) The term electronic identifier is intended to include not only email addresses, but also
+similar routing and addressing information that effects delivery of electronic communications.
+⁵ (TS//SI//NF) The phrase "associated terrorist organization" connotes a particular list of terrorist groups
+designated by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to have allied themselves with [REDACTED]
+The specific list is included in the FISC orders.
+⁶ (U//FOUO) The reasonable articulable suspicion standard comes from the law enforcement context and
+therefore the cases addressing it focus on actions of police officers. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
+The idea underpinning the standard is that the police may stop and briefly detain someone for investigative
+purposes if the officer involved has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal
+activity "may be afoot," even where the officer lacks probable cause to believe that this is so. See U.S. v.
+Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). The officer must be able to articulate something more than an "inchoate
+and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch.'" Terry at 27. Rather, the standard demands some "minimal
+level of objective justification" for making the stop in question. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 (1984).
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN-
+2
+SUBJECT TO THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE ATTORNEY WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE;
+DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF NSA WITHOUT OGC APPROVAL
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED] See
+Sokolow at 7. Indeed, the Courts have made clear that the level of suspicion required for
+a Terry stop - i.e. the level of suspicion required to constitute a reasonable articulable
+suspicion -- is "obviously less demanding than that for probable cause." Id. (citations
+omitted.) Further, the Sokolow Court observed that the concept of reasonable suspicion,
+like probable cause, requires an examination of the totality of the circumstances - the
+whole picture. Id., citing U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). The Sokolow Court,
+quoting one of its earlier cases, noted that "[t]he process does not deal with hard
+certainties, but with probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities was articulated as
+such, practical people formulated certain common-sense conclusions about human
+behavior; jurors as factfinders are permitted to do the same - and so are law enforcement
+officers." See Cortez at 418.
+
+5. (TS//SI//NF) In addition, for reasons set out below we understand the term
+"associated" to mean engaged in a common enterprise with [REDACTED]
+one of the groups designated by the DNI to have allied itself with [REDACTED]
+or with someone acting as an agent thereof. Finally, in a case in
+which an analyst intends to base his suspicion of a number/electronic identifier used by
+Party A solely on contact with Party B, such contact must be direct contact, and it must
+be more likely true than not true that Party B is a member or agent of [REDACTED]
+
+B. Association with [REDACTED]
+
+6. (TS//SI//NF) As we alluded to above, the meaning of the word "associated" is
+important to the analysis, since the determination that must be made is that a telephone
+number or electronic identifier is associated with [REDACTED]
+one of the groups designated by the DNI to have allied itself [REDACTED]
+While this standard does not say explicitly that the telephone
+number or electronic identifier at issue must be used by a member or agent of [REDACTED]
+and while we do not insist on such a finding here, we note that
+the dictionary definition of "associate" suggests a knowing relationship and engagement
+in a common enterprise. Therefore, in making their assessments, analysts should
+consider whether, given the totality of the circumstances, there exist articulable reasons to
+think that a telephone number or electronic identifier bears a relationship to [REDACTED]
+or one of the groups designated by the DNI to have allied itself [REDACTED]
+
+---
+⁷ (U) Reasonable articulable suspicion is a low standard of proof. The common standards of proof and
+common applications of the standards are set out in Enclosure 1.
+(TS//SI//NF) For example, if Party B is a known [REDACTED] would meet the standard for chaining. Thus, Party B's association with [REDACTED] requires a
+probable cause or higher showing.
+(U//FOUO) For example, "associate" is defined as follows: "to join as a partner, friend or companion; to
+keep company with;" and also: "to combine or join with other parts." Merriam Webster Collegiate
+Dictionary, Tenth Edition, at 70.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+3
+SUBJECT TO THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE ATTORNEY WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE;
+DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF NSA WITHOUT OGC APPROVAL
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED] of a nature that suggests it is used by someone
+engaged in a common enterprise with one of the aforementioned.
+
+7. (TS//SI//NF) We recognize too that there may be cases in which an analyst's
+reasonable articulable suspicion that a number is associated with [REDACTED]
+will be based on telephone or e-mail contacts alone. While basing a
+determination on more information than this is preferable (and indeed is required to the
+degree more information is available, since one is required to examine the totality of the
+circumstances), analysts must when premising their determinations solely on contact be
+mindful of what they actually know about the parties involved. For example, an analyst
+who has reasonable articulable suspicion with respect to a particular telephone number
+could not query the database to determine what number is three "hops" away in the
+communications chain, and then, based on such contact alone, conclude that the number
+three hops away now should be used as a seed number. Therefore, in cases in which
+communications contacts are the sole justification for concluding that a number is
+associated with [REDACTED] such contact must (1) be direct contact, and
+(2) must be with a number or electronic identifier for which we have concluded it is more
+likely than not used by a member of [REDACTED]
+
+C. First Amendment Considerations
+
+8. (TS//SI//NF) In addition, the Orders each contain a provision stating that a
+telephone number or electronic identifier believed to be used by a U.S. person shall not
+be regarded as associated with [REDACTED] solely on the basis of
+activities that are protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution.
+
+9. (TS//SI//NF) We read the Orders as barring NSA from concluding -- based on
+such things as the religion of the U.S. person, or his editorials contending that the United
+States is wrong in its war on terrorism, or his membership in groups that oppose policies
+of the United States, or the fact that he/she attends anti-war demonstrations and urges his [REDACTED]
+
+---
+¹⁰ (TS//SI//NF) In order to establish a meaningful association from contact alone between the two numbers,
+A and B, where B is a number that is already suspect, it must be more likely true than not true that number
+B is used by e.g., a member or agent of [REDACTED] Neither vague statements
+about the role of Party B in [REDACTED] nor an indirect linking of the number
+in question with Party B (e.g., Party A was in contact with Party X, who was in contact with Party B, who
+is probably a member of [REDACTED]) will suffice on their own to satisfy the standard as to Party A. Where
+the reasonable articulable suspicion comes from contact alone, such contact must be direct with a member
+or agent of [REDACTED] and it must be more likely than not that our designation
+of such member or agent is in fact accurate. This advice should help serve to prevent the potential for
+endless "bootstrapping." As we have discussed, the danger in carrying out the instructions in the Court's
+Order is a suspicion that ceases to be reasonable because of the tenuousness of the [REDACTED] connection.
+We believe that this analytic framework will go a long way to countering any such tendency that might
+exist. See enclosure 2.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN-
+4
+SUBJECT TO THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE ATTORNEY WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE;
+DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF NSA WITHOUT OGC APPROVAL
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Congressman to cut off funding for U.S. troops in Iraq – that his number or electronic
+identifier is therefore associated with [REDACTED] But, as we have already
+made clear, we do not read the Order to preclude under all circumstances the conclusion
+that a number is associated with [REDACTED] solely on the basis of
+communications [REDACTED] and, more specifically, based on its contacts with numbers about
+which NSA has the appropriate level of suspicion. Our conclusion is supported by First
+Amendment law, as we discuss below.
+
+10. (U//FOUO) The First Amendment by its terms makes clear that Congress
+can make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or abridging freedom of speech
+or of the press, or peaceable assembly, or the petitioning of the government for the
+redress of grievances.
+
+11. (U//FOUO) In addition, the Amendment has also been construed by Courts to
+protect the freedom of association, a freedom not explicitly mentioned in its text. The
+Courts have opined that the right of association implied in the Constitution mainly
+protects associations when they are derivative of other first amendment guarantees –
+normally speech, assembly and petition. For instance, in a case examining a university's
+decision to refuse recognition to a student organization, Students for a Democratic
+Society, the Supreme Court stated: "while freedom of association is not explicitly set out
+in the Amendment, it has long been held to be implicit in the freedoms of speech,
+assembly and petition. *Healy v. James*, 408 U.S. 169, 181 (1972) (citations omitted)
+(emphasis added). Similarly, in one of many cases in which the issue was whether the
+government could compel an organization to turn over lists of its members, the Supreme
+Court observed that "[i]t is now beyond dispute that freedom of association for the
+purpose of advancing ideas and airing grievances is protected by [the constitution] from
+invasion by the States." *Bates v. City of Little Rock*, 361 U.S. 516, 522-523 (1960)
+(emphasis added).¹¹
+
+12. (U//FOUO) By contrast, simple social contacts that do not rise to the level of
+organizations or associations erected for the purpose of engaging in speech do not enjoy
+the same degree of protection. For example, the Supreme Court, addressing the question
+whether the state could restrict admission to dance halls to persons between 14 and 18
+years old, rejected a challenge based on the right of association and held that the state did
+indeed have such authority. In so doing, the Court found it there does not exist a
+"generalized right of "social association" that includes chance encounters in dance halls."
+See *City of Dallas v. Stanglin*, 490 U.S. 12, 25 (1989).¹²
+
+---
+¹¹ (U) The First Amendment also protects "intimate associations" among family members, permitting the
+government to infringe on such interests only if it is a compelling interest, and to do so in the manner that
+is least intrusive. See, e.g., *Roberts v. United States Jaycees*, 468 U.S. 609, 619-620 (1984).
+¹² (TS//SI//NF) We note also that the very object of the overall effort supported by these Orders is to
+determine whether or not particular individuals are members of or are associated with the terrorist
+organizations named in the Orders. Thus, under these Orders, simply by being a member of a named group
+one becomes subject to government scrutiny.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+5
+SUBJECT TO THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE ATTORNEY WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE;
+DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF NSA WITHOUT OGC APPROVAL
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+13. (C) The fact that these Orders only concern communications routing
+information, or metadata, rather than the substance of communications, further
+underscores the limited relevance of the First Amendment in the context of association.
+The D.C. Circuit observed in 1978 that data-gathering activities using legitimate
+investigative techniques do not violate the First Amendment, at least where no Fourth
+Amendment privacy is infringed. See *Reporters' Committee for Freedom of the Press v.
+AT&T*, 593 F.2d 1030, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Since individuals do not enjoy a
+reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment in the communications
+metadata NSA acquires under these Orders, *Smith v. Maryland*, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), the
+investigative techniques NSA uses pursuant to the Orders do not run afoul of the First
+Amendment. As the Court in the *Reporters' Committee* case observed, the First
+Amendment offers no procedural or substantive protection from good faith criminal
+investigation beyond that afforded by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. *Reporters'
+Committee* at 1057.
+
+14. (TS//SI//NF) The above makes clear that the Courts have fashioned
+protections for association in order to preserve the other rights guaranteed by the
+Constitution in the First Amendment. Since the right to free association has been found
+by Courts to be protected largely as an extension of the other constitutional protections in
+order to keep these rights from being frustrated, and because the derivative right to
+associate is subsumed by the more specific rights enumerated in the Amendment, we
+conclude that the terms of the Court's Orders are not intended in the context of these
+orders to preclude/restrict the recognition of association based on communications
+contact observed in communications metadata. We therefore advise that NSA is
+obligated by the terms of these Orders to refrain from finding an association with [REDACTED]
+based solely on these activities that are explicitly afforded
+protection by the language of First Amendment. But NSA is not precluded from finding
+an association based on direct contact with a member of [REDACTED]
+so long as such contact is direct and the evidence shows it more likely than not that the
+putative member of an aforementioned group is in fact a member.
+
+D. Summary
+
+15. (TS//SI//NF) Analysts making a determination as to whether a telephone
+number or electronic identifier is eligible to be a "seed" must consider all the facts that
+they know or reasonably can know prior to engaging in contact chaining. Looking at the
+totality of the circumstances, the whole picture, they must determine whether a
+reasonable articulable suspicion exists that the telephone number or electronic identifier
+is associated with [REDACTED] is there reason to suspect that the person using [REDACTED]
+The evidence required is
+considerably less than a showing that it is more likely than not that a number is associated
+with one of the aforementioned. Rather, there must be an articulable reason, constituting
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+6
+SUBJECT TO THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE ATTORNEY WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE,
+DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF NSA WITHOUT OGC APPROVAL
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+more than a hunch, for suspecting that a number is associated with al [REDACTED]
+
+In cases where a number or identifier is suspicious based solely on its
+contact with another number or identifier, it must be more likely than not that the other
+number is used by a member or agent of [REDACTED] and the contact between
+the two numbers must be direct contact.
+
+16. (U//FOUO) We hope this information is useful to you. Enclosure 3 to this
+memorandum is a chart that sets out the most typical sources of information on which
+NSA analysts rely in making assessments of reasonable articulable suspicion. If you
+have questions or would like assistance in making determinations, please contact
+attorneys in the office of the Associate General Counsel (Intelligence Law) at [REDACTED]
+An attorney is available 24/7 and can be reached after hours through NSOC.
+
+[REDACTED]
+Deputy General Counsel
+(Operations)
+
+Encls:
+a/s
+
+cc: Chief of the Homeland Security Analysis Center
+Deputy Chief of the Homeland Security Analysis Center
+Homeland Mission Coordinators
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+7
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+Enclosure 1
+
+The following chart sets out common standards of proof, the level of proof required in
+legal actions to discharge the burden of proof, as well as common applications of the
+standard. The standards are listed from the highest standard to the lowest.
+
+| Standard of Proof | Application |
+| :----------------------------- | :-------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Beyond a Reasonable Doubt | Required for criminal conviction.¹ |
+| Clear and Convincing Evidence | Required to prevail in some civil actions.² |
+| Preponderance of Evidence | Required to prevail in most civil cases. The standard is met if the proposition is more likely to be true than not true. |
+| Probable Cause | Required for search and arrest warrants.³ |
+| Reasonable Articulable Suspicion | Required for "Terry" (investigative) stop; see pp. 2-3 of memorandum. |
+
+---
+¹ This standard historically has been reserved for criminal cases. The Supreme Court has held that "the
+Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt
+of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." In re *Winship*, 397 U.S. 358, 364
+(1970).
+² A landmark Supreme Court case reviewing the standard of proof required for involuntary commitment of
+an individual held that an individual's "interest in the outcome of a civil commitment proceeding is of such
+weight and gravity that due process requires the state to justify confinement by proof more substantial than
+a mere preponderance of the evidence." The Court held that the "clear and convincing" standard was
+required to meet due process guarantees.. *Addington v. Texas*, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979).
+³ The Supreme Court has held probable cause to mean "a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
+crime will be found." *Illinois v. Gates*, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Enclosure 2
+Use of telephone number or electronic identifier as Seed based on contact alone
+
+* Unknown Party A using [REDACTED] is in contact with Party B.
+ Absent additional information, in order to use [REDACTED] as a
+ "seed," the contact with Party B must be direct and it must be more likely than not
+ that Party B is [REDACTED]
+
+ ```mermaid
+ graph TD
+ A[Party A] --> B(Proposed seed)
+ B --> C{Yes, standard is met; using Party A's identifier as a "seed" would be authorized.}
+ B --> D[Party B (FISC approved or otherwise determined to be more likely than not [REDACTED])]
+ ```
+
+* Unknown Party A using [REDACTED]
+ who is in contact with Party B who is [REDACTED]
+ information, Party A's [REDACTED] is in contact with Party X.
+ Absent additional [REDACTED] may not be used as a "seed."
+
+ ```mermaid
+ graph TD
+ A[Party A] --> B(Proposed seed.)
+ B --> C{No, standard is not met; do not use Party A's identifier as a "seed."}
+ B --> D[Party X]
+ D --> E[Party B (FISC approved or otherwise determined to be more likely than not [REDACTED])]
+ ```
+
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20041123
+Declassify On: 30320726
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Enclosure 3
+
+The following chart sets out the most typical sources of information on which NSA
+analysts rely in making assessments of reasonable articulable suspicion. Whatever the
+source, the analyst proposing to engage in contact chaining or [REDACTED] needs to be
+able to articulate facts that give rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion that the
+telephone number or electronic identifier is associated with [REDACTED]
+
+In addition, analysts must comply with the other procedures set out by the Court
+authorization or management for effecting the chaining.
+
+| Agency | Information Satisfying the Standard |
+| :-------- | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| FBI | Information satisfying the standard that FBI has in any of the following: • Published report • Preliminary investigation • Full Field investigation • FISA¹ |
+| CIA | Information satisfying the standard that CIA has in any of the following: • Published CIA report • Electronic copy of a sensitive case file cable, which is similar to an FBI preliminary investigation or full field investigation. CIA will provide a reference with date to the cable traffic. • FISA² |
+| NCTC | Information satisfying the standard that NCTC has in any of the following: • Published report |
+| NSA | Information satisfying the standard that NSA has in any of the following: • Published NSA report • Unpublished SIGINT collection where research and analysis have led to the discovery of new accounts (and can be documented through e.g [REDACTED]) • [REDACTED] • [REDACTED] |
+
+---
+¹ The standard for chaining on a proposed seed is met when the proposed seed is in direct contact with a
+selector currently the subject of a FISC authorization pled as [REDACTED]
+provided there isn't additional conflicting information; the totality of the circumstances related to a
+proposed seed must be reviewed.
+² See footnote 1 above.
+
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20070108
+Declassify On: 20320108
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+| Agency | Information Satisfying the Standard (continued) |
+| :------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| [REDACTED] | • Collection/analysis showing [REDACTED] target using [REDACTED] • SIGDEV work which is tied to published information or part of a target development effort • Intercepted communication during which an e-mail address or telephone number [REDACTED] • Known contact with a unique electronic identifier [REDACTED] already known to be associated with [REDACTED] where the contact may not have been captured in the meta data chain and may come from other SIGINT sources • Information contained in target knowledge databases, to include the [REDACTED] and the S2I4 Station table • Information obtained through forensic analysis of seized media belonging to a member of [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | Information satisfying the standard that the [REDACTED] has in any of the following: • Published [REDACTED] report • SIGDEV work which is tied to published information |
+| [REDACTED] | Information satisfying the standard that the [REDACTED] has in any of the following: • Published report • Transcripts |
+| Public Record | Facts reliably in the public record (e.g., a newspaper article, public internet postings) |
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+FISA Metadata Collection (PRTT)
+
+FISA Collection Verification Requirements:
+
+Verify that the data is [REDACTED] described in the order.
+
+Verify that the data is of the type authorized by the order (i.e., metadata).
+
+Under no circumstances may the content of communications be collected
+under this order.
+
+Specific Court-Ordered Procedures and Restrictions:
+
+Storage
+
+Metadata must be stored separately and may not be co-mingled with other
+metadata.
+
+Data may be kept on-line for 4.5 years (54 months) from the date of acquisition.
+
+Data older than 4.5 years (54 months) from the date of acquisition must be
+destroyed.
+
+Access
+
+Access to the data is limited to specifically cleared analysts and
+administrators.
+
+All queries must have prior approval of one of the following:
+
+a) SID Deputy Program Manager for Counterterrorism Special Projects,
+Analysis and Production
+b) Chief Homeland Security Analysis Center
+c) Deputy Chief Homeland Security Center
+d) Homeland Mission Coordinator.
+
+Automatic log must be generated for each occasion when the info is accessed.
+Log must contain: a) user login, b) user IP address, c) date and time, d) retrieval
+request.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Metadata may be accessed only through the use of contact chaining [REDACTED]
+described in the FISA application.
+
+Seed accounts must be particular known accounts or addresses that meet the
+targeting standard articulated by the Court (i.e., based on the factual and practical
+considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent persons act, that
+there are facts giving rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion that such account
+or address is associated with [REDACTED]
+
+No targeting U.S. persons based upon 1st Amendment protected activities.
+
+OGC must review and approve targeting of U.S. persons to ensure that
+standards are met.
+
+No queries on the basis of seed addresses that have been validated using [REDACTED]
+information. [REDACTED]
+
+Training & Oversight
+
+OGC must train the analysts on the targeting standard and retrieval, storage, and
+dissemination procedures.
+
+OGC must monitor the designation of individuals with access to such information
+and the working of the automatic logging/auditing device.
+
+OGC must conduct two random spot checks of [REDACTED] to ensure that [REDACTED]
+are configured and functioning properly.
+
+Minimization Rules
+
+USSID 18 minimization procedures must be applied to the activity.
+
+Chief of Information Sharing must approve dissemination of USP identities as
+necessary to understand or assess the foreign intelligence.
+
+Duration of the Collection
+
+FISA order is valid for 90 days.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Reporting and Renewal Requirements
+
+File a report to the Court every 30 days containing:
+
+1. a discussion of the queries that have been made since the last report,
+and a description of how we applied the standard for targeting;
+2. any change in the description of the [REDACTED]
+
+When we seek renewal, a report that includes:
+
+1. detailed information regarding any new facilities proposed to be
+added;
+2. any changes in the proposed means of collection to include [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+FISA Business Records Telephony Metadata Collection
+
+Verification Requirement:
+
+Verify that the data is of the type authorized by the order (i.e., call-detail records/
+telephony metadata). (See page 2 of the Order.)
+
+Under no circumstances may the substantive content of communications
+be received under this order.
+
+Specific Court-Ordered Procedures and Restrictions (see pages 5-12 of the Order):
+
+Standard for Accessing Data
+
+Any search or analysis of the data archive shall occur only after a particular
+known telephone number has been associated with [REDACTED]
+
+Seed queries must be particular known telephone numbers that
+meet the targeting standard articulated by the Court --based on the factual and
+practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent persons
+act, there are facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the
+telephone number is associated with [REDACTED] provided, however, that a telephone number believed to be used by a U.S. person
+shall not be regarded as associated with [REDACTED] solely
+on the basis of activities that are protected by the First Amendment to the
+Constitution. (See Order, ¶ 3(A).)
+
+No targeting U.S. persons based upon 1st Amendment protected activities.
+
+OGC must review and approve targeting of U.S. persons to ensure that
+standards are met.
+
+Other Access Requirements
+
+Access to this data is limited to authorized analysts. NSA's OGC shall monitor
+the designation of individuals with access to the archive. Access to the archive
+shall be controlled by user name and password. When the metadata archive is
+
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20041123
+Declassify On: Source Marked X1-
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+accessed, the user's login, IP address, date and time, and retrieval request shall be
+automatically logged for auditing capability.
+
+All queries must have prior approval of one of the following:
+
+a) SID Program Manager for Counterterrorism Special Projects
+b) Chief, Homeland Security Analysis Center
+c) Deputy Chief, Homeland Security Analysis Center
+d) Homeland Mission Coordinator
+
+The above individuals must establish management controls for access to the data.
+
+Automatic log must be generated for each occasion when the info is accessed.
+Log must contain: a) user login, b) user IP address, c) date and time, d) retrieval
+request.
+
+Manner of Accessing Data
+
+NSA is permitted to perform two sorts of queries: 1) contact chaining to a third
+tier of contacts, and 2) [REDACTED]
+
+Storage
+
+Metadata must be stored and processed on a secure private network that NSA
+exclusively will operate.
+
+Metadata received under this Order may be kept online for 5 years and then
+destroyed.
+
+Training & Oversight
+
+OGC must train analysts concerning the authorization and querying standard, as
+well as other procedures and restrictions regarding the retrieval, storage, and
+dissemination of the archived data.
+
+OGC must monitor the designation of individuals with access to the data and the
+functioning of the automatic logging/auditing.
+
+OGC must conduct two random spot checks during the authorization period to
+ensure that NSA is receiving only data as authorized by the Court and not
+receiving the substantive content of communications.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR-
+
+DoJ shall conduct a review at least twice every 90 days of a sample of NSA's
+queries against the data.
+
+The IG, OGC and SID Oversight must periodically review the program.
+
+Minimization Rules
+
+USSID 18 minimization procedures must be applied to the activity.
+
+Prior to dissemination of any U.S. person identifying information, the Chief of
+Information Sharing Services must determine that information identifying U.S.
+persons is related to counterterrorism information and that it is necessary to
+understand or assess the counterterrorism information.
+
+Duration of Authorization
+
+FISC order is valid for 90 days.
+
+Reporting and Renewal Requirements
+
+NSA must file a report every 45 days with the Court that includes:
+
+1. the queries that have been made since this Order was granted;
+2. the manner in which NSA applied the standard required by the Court
+for accessing the data, and
+3. any proposed changes in the way in which the call-detail records
+would be received.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR-
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_August_29_2008_NSA_Memorandum/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_August_29_2008_NSA_Memorandum/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f2b7e8c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_August_29_2008_NSA_Memorandum/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+{
+ "title": "August 29, 2008 NSA Memorandum",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "An NSA memo providing guidance on policy as to the applicable legal standards for querying metadata pursuant to Sections 501 and 402 of FISA. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2008-08-29",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-18",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/august-29-2008-nsa-memorandum",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "b6b0562d9bee1176a2b3f8d2b76385db08d04efe69e62a5fe3184a89581333cb",
+ "pages": 17
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_DNI_Blair_2009_Jewel_State_Secrets_Declaration/ACLU_-_DNI_Blair_2009_Jewel_State_Secrets_Declaration.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_DNI_Blair_2009_Jewel_State_Secrets_Declaration/ACLU_-_DNI_Blair_2009_Jewel_State_Secrets_Declaration.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0b4ee88
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_DNI_Blair_2009_Jewel_State_Secrets_Declaration/ACLU_-_DNI_Blair_2009_Jewel_State_Secrets_Declaration.md
@@ -0,0 +1,973 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] //TSP/HCS/ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 MICHAEL F. HERTZ
+2 Acting Assistant Attorney General
+3 DOUGLAS N. LETTER
+4 Terrorism Litigation Counsel
+5 JOSEPH H. HUNT
+6 Director, Federal Programs Branch
+7 VINCENT M. GARVEY
+8 Deputy Branch Director
+9 ANTHONY J. COPPOLINO
+10 Special Litigation Counsel
+11 U.S. Department of Justice
+12 Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch
+13 20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
+14 Washington, D.C. 20001
+15 Phone: (202) 514-4782
+16 Fax: (202) 616-8460
+
+11 Attorneys for the United States and
+12 Government Defendants Sued in their
+13 Official Capacities
+
+14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
+
+15 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
+
+16 SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
+
+17 CAROLYN JEWEL, et al. ) No. 08-cv-4873-VRW
+18 Plaintiffs, )
+19 ) CLASSIFIED DECLARATION
+20 ) OF DENNIS C. BLAIR
+21 ) DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
+22 V. ) INTELLIGENCE
+23 )
+24 NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, et al. ) EX PARTE, IN CAMERA
+25 ) SUBMISSION
+26 Defendants )
+27 ) Date: June 25, 2009
+28 ) Time: 2:30 p.m.
+) Courtroom: 6, 17th Floor
+)
+) Chief Judge Vaughn R. Walker
+)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT—[REDACTED] //TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-VRW)
+1
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] //TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 I, Dennis C. Blair, do hereby state and declare as follows:
+
+2 [REDACTED] (U) INTRODUCTION
+
+4 1. [REDACTED] I am the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) of the United States. I have
+5 held this position since January 29, 2009. In 2002, I retired as an Admiral from the United
+6 States Navy after a 34-year naval career, which included my service as Commander-in-Chief of
+7 the U.S. Pacific Command. During my naval career, I also served as Director of the Joint Staff
+8 and as Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support, as well as in policy
+9 positions on the National Security Council staff. From 2003 to 2006, I was President and CEO
+10 of the Institute for Defense Analyses, an organization that analyzes and makes recommendations
+11 on national security policy matters.
+
+13 2. [REDACTED] The purpose of this declaration is to formally assert, in my capacity as the
+14 Director of National Intelligence and head of the United States Intelligence Community, the
+15 military and state secrets privilege (hereafter "state secrets privilege") and a statutory privilege
+16 under the National Security Act, see 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i)(1), in order to protect intelligence
+17 sources and methods that are at risk of disclosure in this case. The statements made herein are
+18 based on my personal knowledge as well as on information provided to me in my official
+19 capacity as the Director of National Intelligence.
+
+21 [REDACTED] (U) SUMMARY
+
+23 3. [REDACTED] In the course of my official duties, I have been advised of this lawsuit and the
+24 allegations at issue in the plaintiffs' Complaint. In personally considering this matter, I have
+25 executed a separate unclassified declaration dated April 3, 2009. Moreover, I have read and
+26 personally considered the information contained in the Public and In Camera, Ex Parte
+27 Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, Chief of Staff, National Security Agency, executed on April
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT—[REDACTED] //TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-VRW)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] //TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 3, 2009 (hereafter "Classified NSA Declaration"). Disclosure of the information covered by this
+2 privilege assertion reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the
+3 national security of the United States and, therefore, the information should be excluded from
+4 any use in this case. In addition, it is my judgment that sensitive state secrets are so central to the
+5 subject matter of the litigation that any attempt to proceed in the case will substantially risk the
+6 disclosure of the classified privileged national security information described herein and will
+7 therefore risk exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United States.
+
+9 4. (TS//SI//[REDACTED] //TSP//OC/NF) As the NSA states, see Classified NSA Decl.
+10 ¶¶ 4-7, the allegations in this lawsuit put at risk of disclosure information concerning several
+11 highly classified and critically important NSA intelligence activities that commenced after the
+12 9/11 terrorist attacks, but which are now conducted pursuant to authority of the Foreign
+13 Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"), including ongoing activities conducted under orders
+14 approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC"). Specifically, in order to
+15 address plaintiffs' allegation that the NSA, with the assistance of telecommunication companies
+16 including AT&T, has indiscriminately intercepted the content and obtained the communications
+17 records of millions of ordinary Americans as part of an alleged presidentially authorized
+18 "Program" after 9/11, see, e.g., Complaint at ¶¶ 2-13; 39-97, further litigation risks the disclosure
+21 of information concerning several classified NSA intelligence activities, sources and methods,
+23 [REDACTED] in connection with NSA's (1) targeted content surveillance aimed at al-Qaeda and
+25 affiliated terrorist organizations, pursuant to the Terrorist Surveillance Program ("TSP") [REDACTED]
+27 [REDACTED] (2) the bulk collection and targeted analysis of non-content
+28 information about telephone and Internet communications—critically important and highly
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT—[REDACTED] //TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-VRW)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] //TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 sensitive activities that are also now conducted pursuant to FISC orders and that enable the NSA
+2 to uncover the contact [REDACTED]
+4 [REDACTED] and (3) [REDACTED]
+6 [REDACTED] This lawsuit
+7 therefore puts at risk of disclosure information concerning essential foreign intelligence-
+8 gathering activities utilized to meet the extremely serious threat of another terrorist attack on the
+9 U.S. Homeland [REDACTED] (a threat which I describe further below based
+10 on recent assessments of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) prepared in January
+11 2009 and March 2009.)
+
+13 5. (TS//SI//[REDACTED] //TSP//OC/NF) Accordingly, as set forth further below, I am
+14 asserting the state secrets privilege and the DNI's authority to protect intelligence sources and
+15 methods pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i)(1) to protect against the disclosure of the highly
+16 classified intelligence sources and methods put at issue in this case and vital to the national
+17 security of the United States, including: (1) any information that would tend to confirm or deny
+18 whether particular individuals, including the named plaintiffs, have been subject to the alleged
+19 NSA intelligence activities; (2) information concerning NSA intelligence sources and methods,
+20 including facts demonstrating that the content collection under the TSP was limited to specific
+21 al-Qaeda and associated terrorist-related international communications and was not a content
+22 surveillance dragnet as plaintiffs allege; (3) facts that would tend to confirm or deny the
+23 existence of the NSA's bulk non-content (i.e., meta data) collection and use, and any information
+24 about those activities; and (4) [REDACTED]
+27 [REDACTED] I specifically concur with the NSA that
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT—[REDACTED] //TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-VRW)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] //TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 public speculation about alleged NSA activities does not diminish the need to protect intelligence
+2 sources and methods from further exposure, and that official confirmation and disclosure of the
+3 classified privileged national security information described herein would cause exceptionally
+4 grave damage to the national security. For these reasons, as set forth further below, I request that
+5 the Court uphold the state secrets and statutory privilege assertions that I am make herein, as
+6 well as the statutory privilege assertion made by the NSA pursuant to Section 6 of the National
+7 Security Agency Act, see 50 U.S.C. § 402 (note), and protect the information described in this
+8 declaration from disclosure.
+
+10 [REDACTED] (U) CLASSIFICATION OF DECLARATION
+
+12 6. (TS) Pursuant to the standards in Executive Order No. 12958, as amended by
+13 Executive Order No. 13292, this declaration is classified as: TOP SECRET//COMINT-[REDACTED]
+14 [REDACTED] //TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR. The details concerning these classification
+15 markings are set forth in the Classified NSA Declaration at ¶¶ 8-11 and are briefly summarized
+16 here. Under Executive Order No. 12958, information is classified "TOP SECRET" if
+17 unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally
+18 grave damage to the national security of the United States; "SECRET" if unauthorized disclosure
+19 of the information reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to national security;
+20 and "CONFIDENTIAL" if unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be
+21 expected to cause identifiable damage to national security. At the beginning of each paragraph
+22 of this declaration, the letters "U," "C," "S," and "TS" indicate respectively that the information
+23 is either UNCLASSIFIED, or is classified CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET.
+
+25 7. (S) Additionally, this declaration also contains Sensitive Compartmented
+27 Information (SCI), which is subject to special access and handling requirements because it
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT—[REDACTED] //TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-VRW)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] //TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 involves or derives from particularly sensitive intelligence sources and methods. This
+2 declaration references communications intelligence (COMINT), also referred to as special
+3 intelligence (SI), which is a subcategory of SCI that identifies information that was derived from
+4 exploiting cryptographic systems or other protected sources by applying methods or techniques,
+5 or from intercepted foreign communications. This declaration also references human
+6 intelligence (HCS), another subcategory of SCI that identifies information derived from
+7 individuals who provide intelligence information. [REDACTED]
+
+11 8. (TS//SI/[REDACTED] //TSP//OC/NF) This declaration also contains information
+12 about the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP), a controlled access signals intelligence program
+13 under presidential authorization in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001. Information
+14 pertaining to this program is denoted with the special marking "TSP."
+15 [REDACTED]
+16 [REDACTED]
+17 [REDACTED]
+18 [REDACTED]
+
+20 9. [REDACTED] Finally, information labeled "NOFORN" may not be released to foreign
+21 governments, foreign nationals, or non-U.S. citizens without permission of the originator and in
+22 accordance with DNI policy. The "ORCON" designator means that the originator of the
+23 information controls to whom it is released. Finally, this document is marked Manual Review
+24 ("MR") indicating that it is not subject to automatic declassification at any specific date.
+
+26 [REDACTED] (U) BACKGROUND ON DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+
+28 10. [REDACTED] The position of Director of National Intelligence was created by Congress in
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT—[REDACTED] //TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-VRW)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] //TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-458, §§ 1011(a) and
+2 118 Stat. 3638, 3643-63, 3698-99 (2004) (amending sections 102 through 104 of Title I of
+3 the National Security Act of 1947). Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the
+4 President, the Director of National Intelligence serves as the head of the U.S. Intelligence
+5 Community and as the principal adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the
+6 Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters related to the national security. See 50
+7 U.S.C. § 403(b)(1), (2).
+
+9 11. [REDACTED] The United States "Intelligence Community" includes the Office of the
+10 Director of National Intelligence; the Central Intelligence Agency; the National Security
+11 Agency; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; the
+12 National Reconnaissance Office; other offices within the Department of Defense for the
+13 collection of specialized national intelligence through reconnaissance programs; the intelligence
+14 elements of the military services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of the
+15 Treasury, the Department of Energy, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Coast
+16 Guard; the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State; the elements of the
+17 Department of Homeland Security concerned with the analysis of intelligence information; and
+19 such other elements of any other department or agency as may be designated by the President, or
+20 jointly designated by the DNI and heads of the department or agency concerned, as an element of
+21 the Intelligence Community. See 50 U.S.C. § 401a(4).
+
+23 12. [REDACTED] The responsibilities and authorities of the Director of National Intelligence
+24 are set forth in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. See 50 U.S.C. § 403-1. These
+25 responsibilities include ensuring that national intelligence is provided to the President, the heads
+26 of the departments and agencies of the Executive Branch, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT—[REDACTED] //TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-VRW)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] //TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 Staff and senior military commanders, and the Senate and House of Representatives and
+2 committees thereof. See 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(a)(1). The DNI is also charged with establishing the
+3 objectives of, determining the requirements and priorities for, and managing and directing the
+4 tasking, collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of national intelligence by elements
+5 of the Intelligence Community. Id. § 403-1(f)(1)(A)(i) and (ii). The DNI is responsible for
+6 developing and determining, based on proposals submitted by the heads of agencies and
+7 departments within the Intelligence Community, an annual consolidated budget for the National
+8 Intelligence Program for presentation to the President, and for ensuring the effective execution of
+9 the annual budget for intelligence and intelligence-related activities, and for managing and
+10 allotting appropriations for the National Intelligence Program. Id. § 403-1(c)(1)-(5).
+
+12 13. [REDACTED] In addition, the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, provides that
+13 "[t]he Director of National Intelligence shall protect intelligence sources and methods from
+14 unauthorized disclosure." 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i)(1). Consistent with this responsibility, the DNI
+15 establishes and implements guidelines for the Intelligence Community for the classification of
+16 information under applicable law, Executive orders, or other Presidential directives and access to
+17 and dissemination of information. Id. § 403-1(i)(2)(A), (B). In particular, the DNI is responsible
+19 for the establishment of uniform standards and procedures for the grant of access to Sensitive
+20 Compartmented Information ("SCI") to any officer or employee of any agency or department of
+21 the United States, and for ensuring the consistent implementation of those standards throughout
+22 such departments and agencies. Id. § 403-1(j)(1), (2).
+
+24 14. [REDACTED] By virtue of my position as the Director of National Intelligence, and unless
+25 otherwise directed by the President, I have access to all intelligence related to the national
+26 security that is collected by any department, agency, or other entity of the United States. See 50
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT—[REDACTED] //TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-VRW)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] //TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 U.S.C. § 403-1(b); Executive Order 12333 § 1.3(a), as amended. Pursuant to Executive Order
+2 No. 12958, 3 C.F.R. § 333 (1995), as amended by Executive Order 13292 (March 25, 2003),
+3 reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C.A. § 435 at 93 (Supp. 2004), the President has authorized me
+4 to exercise original TOP SECRET classification authority.
+
+6 (U) ASSERTION OF STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE
+
+7 15. (S) After careful and actual personal consideration of the matter, based upon my
+8 own knowledge and information obtained in the course of my official duties, including the
+9 information contained in the Public and Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declarations of Deborah
+10 A. Bonanni, Chief of Staff, National Security Agency, I have determined that the disclosure of
+11 certain information—as set forth herein and described in more detail in the Classified NSA
+12 Declaration—would cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United
+13 States and, therefore, must be protected from disclosure and excluded from this case. Thus, as to
+14 this information, I formally assert the state secrets privilege. In addition, it is my judgment that
+15 sensitive state secrets are so central to the subject matter of the litigation that any attempt to
+16 proceed in the case will substantially risk the disclosure of the privileged information described
+17 herein and in more detail in the classified declarations, and will therefore risk exceptionally
+18 grave damage to the national security of the United States.
+
+21 (U) ASSERTION OF STATUTORY PRIVILEGE UNDER NATIONAL SECURITY ACT
+
+22 16. (S) Through this declaration, I also hereby invoke and assert a statutory privilege
+23 held by the Director of National Intelligence under the National Security Act to protect the
+24 information described herein, see 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i)(1). My assertion of this statutory
+25 privilege for intelligence sources and methods is coextensive with my state secrets privilege
+26 assertion.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT—[REDACTED] //TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-VRW)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] //TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+2 17. (TS) In general and unclassified terms, the following categories of information are
+3 subject to my state secrets and statutory privilege assertions:
+
+5 A. (S) Information concerning the specific nature of the al-
+6 Qaeda terrorist threat; and
+
+8 B. (TS) Information that may tend to confirm or deny whether
+9 the plaintiffs have been subject to any alleged NSA
+10 intelligence activity that may be at issue in this matter; and
+
+12 C. (S) Any information concerning NSA intelligence
+13 activities, sources, or methods that may relate to or be
+14 necessary to litigate plaintiffs' allegations, including
+15 allegations that the NSA, with the assistance of
+16 telecommunications carriers such as AT&T,
+17 indiscriminately intercepts the content of communications
+18 and also collects the communication records of millions of
+19 Americans as part of an alleged presidentially-authorized
+20 "Program" after 9/11. See, e.g., Complaint at ¶¶ 2-13; 39-
+21 97.
+
+23 (U) The scope of this assertion includes but is not limited
+24 to:
+
+26 (i) (S) Information concerning the scope and
+27 operation of the now inoperative "Terrorist Surveillance
+28 Program" ("TSP") regarding the interception of the content
+of certain one-end international communications
+reasonably believed to involve a member or agent of al-
+Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization, and any other
+information related to demonstrating that the NSA does not
+otherwise engage in the content surveillance dragnet that
+the plaintiffs allege; and
+(ii) (S) Information concerning whether or not the
+NSA obtained from telecommunications companies such as
+AT&T communication transactional records as alleged in
+the Complaint; see, e.g., Complaint ¶¶ 10; 82-97; and
+(iii) (S) Information that may tend to confirm or
+deny whether AT&T (and to the extent relevant or
+necessary, any other telecommunications carrier), has
+provided assistance to the NSA in connection with any
+alleged activity.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT—[REDACTED] //TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-VRW)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] //TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+2 (U) DESCRIPTION OF INFORMATION AND HARM OF DISCLOSURE
+3 A. (TS) Information Concerning the al-Qaeda Terrorist Threat
+
+4 18. (TS) To the extent specific information about the al-Qaeda threat is relevant to
+5 litigation of plaintiffs' allegations as to post-9/11 actions taken to meet that threat, such
+6 information could not be disclosed without revealing intelligence sources, methods, and
+7 information of the United States and thereby causing exceptionally grave damage to the national
+8 security. Therefore, I assert the state secrets and statutory privilege to protect such information
+9 from disclosure.
+
+11 19. (S//OC/NF) The intelligence activities, sources, and methods that are implicated
+12 by this lawsuit, and put at risk of disclosure in further proceedings, must be viewed and
+13 understood in the context of the extremely serious threat faced by the United States. In sum, the
+14 Intelligence Community assesses that al-Qaeda remains intent on conducting terrorist attacks
+15 inside the United States. This is so notwithstanding a series of setbacks to the al-Qaeda terrorist
+16 network. [REDACTED]
+17 [REDACTED]
+18 [REDACTED]
+19 [REDACTED]
+20 [REDACTED]
+
+21 Preventing such attacks is the U.S. Intelligence Community's highest priority, and the
+22 Intelligence Community is collecting information aggressively against the al-Qaeda network to
+23 uncover indications of credible threats.1
+
+28 1 (S//OC/NF) The following summary of the current al-Qaeda threat is drawn from an
+29 Intelligence Community assessment made in January 2009.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT—[REDACTED] //TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-VRW)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] //TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 (S/NF) Al-Qaeda Remains Intent on Striking the Homeland
+
+2 20. (TS/HCS//OC/NF) [REDACTED] Al-Qaeda's strategic intent remains focused on
+3 striking the United States—[REDACTED]
+4 [REDACTED]
+5 [REDACTED]
+6 [REDACTED]
+7 [REDACTED]
+8 [REDACTED]
+9 [REDACTED]
+10 [REDACTED]
+11 [REDACTED]
+
+13 [REDACTED] A body of reporting—including public statements from senior
+14 leaders, [REDACTED] —highlights the persistent and evolving
+15 threat the group poses to the United States and our allies.
+
+16 • Usama Bin Ladin's statement in September 2007 praising the Iraq jihad and the
+17 9/11 attacks indicated that al-Qaeda saw no "innocent" American citizens because they
+18 were complicit with their government's policies, and that the solution "is to continue to
+19 escalate the killing and fighting against you."
+20 [REDACTED]
+21 [REDACTED]
+22 [REDACTED]
+23 [REDACTED]
+24 [REDACTED]
+25 [REDACTED]
+
+26 • The plot to bring down airliners between the United Kingdom and North America
+27 that was disrupted in August 2006 demonstrated al-Qaeda's continued emphasis on large
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT—[REDACTED] //TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-VRW)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] //TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 scale, high-profile attacks against the West, [REDACTED]
+
+2 • Al-Qaeda senior leaders and their successors since 9/11 have consistently focused
+3 plotting against U.S. interests on either conducting spectacular attacks against the
+4 Homeland or striking other symbolic or economic targets. [REDACTED]
+5 [REDACTED]
+6 [REDACTED]
+7 [REDACTED]
+8 [REDACTED]
+
+9 21. (TS//HCS//OC/NF) [REDACTED] The Intelligence Community is not aware of the
+10 specific details of a current plot to attack the U.S. Homeland.
+11 [REDACTED]
+12 [REDACTED]
+13 [REDACTED]
+14 [REDACTED]
+15 [REDACTED]
+16 [REDACTED]
+17 [REDACTED]
+18 [REDACTED]
+19 [REDACTED]
+20 [REDACTED]
+21 [REDACTED]
+22 [REDACTED]
+23 [REDACTED]
+24 [REDACTED]
+25 [REDACTED]
+26 [REDACTED]
+27 [REDACTED]
+28 [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT—[REDACTED] //TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-VRW)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] //TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 [REDACTED]
+2 [REDACTED]
+
+3 22. (S/NF) [REDACTED]
+4 [REDACTED]
+5 [REDACTED]
+6 [REDACTED]
+7 [REDACTED]
+8 [REDACTED]
+9 [REDACTED]
+10 [REDACTED]
+11 [REDACTED]
+12 [REDACTED]
+13 [REDACTED]
+14 [REDACTED]
+15 [REDACTED]
+16 [REDACTED]
+17 [REDACTED]
+18 [REDACTED]
+19 [REDACTED]
+20 (S/NF) Al-Qaeda's Continued Efforts to Train and Deploy Operatives
+
+21 23. (TS//HCS//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+22 [REDACTED]
+23 [REDACTED]
+24 [REDACTED]
+25 [REDACTED]
+26 [REDACTED]
+27 [REDACTED]
+28 [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT—[REDACTED] //TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-VRW)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] //TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 [REDACTED]
+2 [REDACTED]
+3 [REDACTED]
+4 [REDACTED]
+5 [REDACTED]
+6 [REDACTED]
+7 [REDACTED]
+8 [REDACTED]
+9 [REDACTED]
+10 [REDACTED]
+11 [REDACTED]
+12 [REDACTED]
+13 [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT—[REDACTED] //TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-VRW)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] //TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 [REDACTED]
+2 [REDACTED]
+3 [REDACTED]
+4 [REDACTED]
+5 [REDACTED]
+6 [REDACTED]
+7 24. (TS//HCS//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+8 [REDACTED]
+9 [REDACTED]
+10 [REDACTED]
+11 [REDACTED]
+12 [REDACTED]
+13 [REDACTED]
+14 [REDACTED]
+15 [REDACTED]
+16 [REDACTED]
+17 [REDACTED]
+18 [REDACTED]
+19 [REDACTED]
+20 [REDACTED]
+21 [REDACTED]
+22 [REDACTED]
+23 [REDACTED]
+24 [REDACTED]
+25 [REDACTED]
+26 [REDACTED]
+27 [REDACTED]
+28 [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT—[REDACTED] //TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-VRW)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] //TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 25. (TS//HCS//OC/NF) The death or detention of more than a dozen al-Qaeda
+2 senior leaders and their deputies since early 2008 represents significant losses for the group. [REDACTED]
+3 [REDACTED]
+4 [REDACTED]
+5 [REDACTED]
+6 [REDACTED]
+7 [REDACTED]
+8 [REDACTED]
+9 [REDACTED]
+10 [REDACTED]
+11 [REDACTED]
+12 [REDACTED]
+13 [REDACTED]
+
+14 26. (TS//HCS//[REDACTED]) The Internet is a contributing factor in the radicalization of some
+15 individuals, increasing the risk of self-selecting fighters attempting to establish affiliations with
+16 extremist organizations or engaging in operations independent of formal terrorist groups.
+17 Additionally, al-Qaeda and like-minded Sunni extremists are attempting [REDACTED]
+18 [REDACTED]
+19 [REDACTED]
+20 [REDACTED]
+21 [REDACTED]
+22 [REDACTED]
+23 [REDACTED]
+
+25 (S/NF) Al-Qaeda's Weapons and Tactics
+
+26 27. (S//NF) [REDACTED]
+27 [REDACTED]
+28 [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT—[REDACTED] //TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-VRW)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] //TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 [REDACTED]
+2 [REDACTED]
+3 [REDACTED]
+4 [REDACTED]
+5 [REDACTED]
+6 [REDACTED]
+7 [REDACTED]
+8 [REDACTED]
+9 [REDACTED]
+10 [REDACTED]
+11 [REDACTED]
+12 [REDACTED]
+13 [REDACTED]
+14 [REDACTED]
+15 [REDACTED]
+16 [REDACTED]
+17 [REDACTED]
+18 [REDACTED]
+19 [REDACTED]
+20 [REDACTED]
+21 [REDACTED]
+22 [REDACTED]
+23 [REDACTED]
+24 [REDACTED]
+25 [REDACTED]
+26 [REDACTED]
+27 30. (TS//SI//OC/NF) These various examples of some of our intelligence
+28 [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT—[REDACTED] //TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-VRW)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] //TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 information demonstrate that the al-Qaeda network continues to plan ways to inflict a
+2 catastrophic attack. The severity of that threat and the difficulty of tracking al-Qaeda is precisely
+3 the reason the Government is utilizing all lawful intelligence gathering capabilities. I set forth
+4 this information not only to provide the Court with crucial background as to why the intelligence
+5 activities implicated by or directly at issue in this case are being undertaken, but also to assert a
+6 claim of privilege over this threat information. Although the foregoing threat assessment
+7 demonstrates why the Government undertakes the activities described herein, the Government
+8 cannot disclose this threat information in defending the legality of the intelligence activities,
+9 sources, and methods being challenged, since to do so obviously would disclose to our
+10 adversaries what we know of their plans and how we may be obtaining information about them.
+11 Such disclosures would lead our adversaries not only to alter their plans, but also to implement
+14 greater security for their communications, thereby increasing the risk of non-detection. In
+15 addition, disclosure of threat information might reveal human sources for the United States and,
+16 thus compromise those sources and put lives in danger. Accordingly, although I believe this
+17 threat information is crucial to understanding the NSA intelligence activities, sources, and
+18 methods implicated by the plaintiffs' allegations, I must assert the states secrets privilege and
+19 the DNI's statutory privilege over this classified threat information because of the exceptionally
+20 grave damage to national security that could reasonably be expected to result from its disclosure.
+
+22 B. (U) Information That May Tend to Confirm or Deny Whether the Plaintiffs
+23 Have Been Subject to the Alleged NSA Intelligence Activities
+
+24 31. (TS) Next, I am also asserting privilege over information that would reveal
+25 whether particular individuals, including the named plaintiffs in this lawsuit, have been subject
+26 to the alleged NSA intelligence activities. Disclosure of such information would cause
+27 exceptionally grave damage to the national security.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT—[REDACTED] //TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-VRW)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] //TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 32. (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+2 [REDACTED]
+3 [REDACTED]
+4 [REDACTED]
+5 [REDACTED]
+6 [REDACTED]
+7 [REDACTED]
+8 [REDACTED]
+9 [REDACTED]
+10 [REDACTED]
+11 [REDACTED]
+
+12 33. (TS) The NSA cannot publicly confirm or deny whether any particular individual
+13 is subject to surveillance activities. If the NSA were to reveal that an individual is the target of
+14 surveillance, the collection capability relating to that individual would certainly be compromised.
+15 On the other hand, if the NSA were to reveal that an individual is not the target of surveillance,
+16 adversaries would know that a particular individual has avoided surveillance and is a secure
+17 source for communicating. Moreover, providing assurances to those individuals that are not
+18 being targeted quickly becomes unworkable when faced with a case in which an individual has
+19 in fact been targeted. If the NSA were to confirm that any specific individual is not the target of
+20 surveillance, but later refuse to confirm or deny that information in a case involving an actual
+21 target, it would be apparent that surveillance was occurring in the latter case. The only recourse
+22 for the NSA is to neither confirm nor deny whether someone has been targeted or subject to NSA
+23 activities, regardless of whether the individual has been targeted or not. To say otherwise when
+24 challenged in litigation would result in the frequent, routine exposure of NSA information,
+25 sources, and methods, and would severely undermine surveillance activities in general.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT—[REDACTED] //TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-VRW)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] //TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 C. (U) Information Concerning NSA Activities, Sources, or Methods
+
+2 34. (S) Second, I am also asserting privilege over any other facts concerning NSA
+3 intelligence activities, sources, or methods that may relate to or be necessary to adjudicate the
+4 plaintiffs' claims, including allegations that the NSA, with the assistance of telecommunication
+5 companies including AT&T, has indiscriminately intercepted the content and obtained the
+6 communications records of millions of ordinary Americans as part of the Program authorized by
+7 the President after 9/11. See, e.g., Complaint at ¶¶ 2-13; 39-97. As noted above, my privilege
+8 assertion encompasses (1) facts concerning the operation of the now-defunct Terrorist
+9 Surveillance Program, including any facts needed to demonstrate that the TSP was limited
+10 to the interception of the content2 of one-end foreign communications reasonably believed to
+11 involve a member or agent of al-Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization, and that the NSA
+12 does not otherwise conduct a dragnet of content surveillance as the plaintiffs allege; and
+
+14 (2) information concerning whether or not the NSA obtains transactional communication records
+15 from telecommunications companies such as AT&T as plaintiffs allege.
+
+17 35. (TS) As the NSA indicates, see Public NSA Declaration ¶ 14, the NSA's collection
+18 of the content of communications under the TSP was directed at international communications in
+19 which a participant was reasonably believed to be associated with al-Qaeda or an affiliated
+20 organization. Thus, as the Government has previously stated, plaintiffs' allegation that the NSA
+21 has indiscriminately collected the content of millions of communications sent or received by
+22 people inside the United States after 9/11 under the TSP is false. I concur with the NSA that to
+23 the extent it must demonstrate in this case that the TSP was not the content dragnet plaintiffs
+24 allege, or demonstrate that the NSA has not otherwise engaged in the alleged content dragnet,
+
+26 2 The term "content" is used herein to refer to the substance, meaning, or purport of a
+27 communication, as defined in 18 U.S.C.§ 2510(8).
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT—[REDACTED] //TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-VRW)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] //TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 highly classified NSA intelligence sources and methods about the operation of the TSP and other
+2 NSA intelligence activities would be disclosed which would cause exceptional harm to national
+3 security.
+
+5 36. (TS) I am also asserting privilege over information concerning whether or not the
+6 NSA obtained from telecommunications companies such as AT&T the complete and allegedly
+7 ongoing disclosure of private telephone and Internet transactional records of those companies
+8 millions of customers, see, e.g., Complaint ¶¶ 10 and 82-97. I concur with the NSA that
+9 confirmation or denial of any information concerning this allegation would cause exceptionally
+10 grave harm to national security, including by risking disclosure of whether or not the NSA
+11 utilizes particular intelligence sources and methods and, thus, the NSA's capabilities or lack
+12 thereof.
+
+14 37. (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) In particular, as set forth in the NSA's Classified
+15 Declaration, the United States faced urgent and immediate intelligence challenges after the
+16 September 11 attacks, and undertook signals intelligence activities pursuant to presidential
+17 authorization that were designed to meet those challenges and to detect and prevent future
+18 terrorist attacks by al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Those activities include the Terrorist Surveillance
+19 Program ("TSP") and similar content surveillance that later became subject to orders of the
+20 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, as well as the bulk collection of telephony and Internet
+21 non-content meta data currently authorized by the FISC and used to discover contacts [REDACTED]
+22 [REDACTED]
+23 [REDACTED]
+24 [REDACTED] See Classified NSA Declaration
+25 ¶¶ 39-67.
+
+27 38. (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) Based on my personal consideration and judgment as to
+28 the harm disclosure would cause to national security, my privilege assertion includes, but is not
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT—[REDACTED] //TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-VRW)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] //TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 limited to, the following activities discussed in the NSA classified declaration:
+2 39. (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) First, I assert privilege over facts concerning the
+3 operation of the Terrorist Surveillance Program and any other NSA intelligence activities needed
+4 to demonstrate that the TSP was limited to the interception of one-end foreign communications
+5 reasonably believed to involve a member or agent of al-Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist
+6 organization, and that the NSA does not otherwise conduct a dragnet of content surveillance as
+7 the plaintiffs allege. Such facts include those concerning (1) how targets were selected under the
+8 TSP; (2) how specific methods were used under the TSP to intercept telephone and Internet
+9 communications and to minimize the risk of collecting non-target communications and purely
+10 domestic communications; (3) the nature and identity of the targets under the TSP; [REDACTED]
+11 [REDACTED]
+12 [REDACTED]
+13 [REDACTED] (4) and additional classified details about the operation of the TSP that
+14 would be necessary to litigate the plaintiffs' allegations (to the extent relevant) including facts
+15 concerning the operational swiftness and agility of the TSP, particularly in conjunction with meta
+16 data analysis [REDACTED] and the
+17 effectiveness and success of the TSP; and (5) other NSA surveillance activities that may be
+18 needed to address and disprove the content dragnet allegations. [REDACTED]
+19 [REDACTED]
+20 See Classified NSA Declaration
+21 ¶¶ 39-47. In my judgment, revealing or risking disclosure of the foregoing NSA intelligence
+22 activities, sources, and methods in order to show that the NSA is not conducting the "dragnet" on
+23 the content of communications that plaintiffs allege would cause exceptional harm to national
+24 security by disclosing to our adversaries the ability of the United States to monitor and track their
+25 activities and communications.
+
+27 40. (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) Third, I also assert privilege over facts that would
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT—[REDACTED] //TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-VRW)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] //TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 disclose or describe the NSA's meta data collection activities. See Classified NSA Declaration
+2 ¶¶ 49-57. In my judgment, the NSA is unable to disclose any information about the existence or
+3 operation of the NSA's bulk collection or targeted analysis of Internet or telephony meta data
+4 without causing exceptionally grave harm to national security. These are among the most
+5 important intelligence tools the NSA uses, and they have never been officially confirmed or
+6 denied by the United States. Disclosing or confirming these activities would seriously
+7 undermine an essential tool for tracking possible terrorist plots and would help foreign
+8 adversaries evade detection. Such a disclosure would also undermine ongoing intelligence
+9 operations authorized by the FISC.
+
+11 41. (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) Finally, I also assert privilege over information
+12 concerning NSA activities conducted pursuant to various FISC orders and under the authority of
+13 the FISA described by the NSA. See Classified NSA Declaration ¶¶ 58-67. In my judgment,
+14 disclosure of current surveillance activities under orders and supervision of the FISC and
+15 authority of the FISA, either directly or indirectly, would seriously compromise, if not destroy,
+16 vital ongoing intelligence operations. My privilege assertion extends to the existence of and any
+17 information concerning the (i) FISC Pen Register Order, as subsequently reauthorized, see id.
+18 ¶ 59; (ii) FISC Telephone Business Records Order, as subsequently reauthorized, see id. ¶¶ 60-
+20 63; [REDACTED] (iv) FISC Foreign Telephone and Email
+22 Order, see id. ¶ 65; and (v) NSA activities conducted pursuant to the Protect America Act and
+23 the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Amendments Act of 2008, including directives issued
+24 to telecommunication carriers under those Acts, see id. ¶¶ 66-67.
+
+26 42. (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) I concur with the NSA that the activities discussed herein
+27 and described further by the NSA—in particular the meta data collection activities—are among the
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT—[REDACTED] //TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-VRW)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] //TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 most important intelligence tools available to the United States for protecting the Homeland from
+2 another catastrophic terrorist attack. I also concur that [REDACTED]
+3 [REDACTED]
+4 [REDACTED]
+
+5 In my judgment, after personal
+6 consideration of the matter, disclosing the information described herein and by the NSA would
+7 compromise these critical activities, sources, and methods, thereby helping our adversaries evade
+8 detection and causing exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United States.
+
+10 D. (U) Plaintiffs' Allegations that AT&T Provided Assistance to the NSA with
+11 the Alleged Activities
+
+12 43. (S) In addition, I am asserting privilege over information that may tend to
+13 confirm or deny whether or not AT&T (or to the extent necessary whether or not any other
+14 telecommunications provider) has assisted the NSA with alleged intelligence activities. The
+15 disclosure of any information that would tend to confirm or deny allegations of such assistance
+16 would cause exceptionally grave harm to the national security. Confirming or denying such
+17 allegations, again, would reveal to foreign adversaries whether or not the NSA utilizes particular
+18 intelligence sources and methods and, thus, either compromise actual sources and methods or
+19 disclose that the NSA does not utilize a particular source or method. Such confirmation or denial
+20 would also replace speculation with certainty for hostile foreign adversaries who are balancing
+21 the risk that a particular channel of communication may not be secure against the need to
+22 communicate efficiently.
+
+24 44. (TS//SI//[REDACTED] //TSP//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+25 [REDACTED]
+26 [REDACTED]
+27 [REDACTED]
+28 [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT—[REDACTED] //TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-VRW)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] //TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 [REDACTED]
+2 [REDACTED]
+3 [REDACTED]
+4 [REDACTED]
+5 [REDACTED]
+6 [REDACTED]
+7 [REDACTED]
+8 [REDACTED]
+9 [REDACTED]
+10 [REDACTED]
+11 [REDACTED]
+12 [REDACTED]
+13 [REDACTED]
+14 [REDACTED]
+15 [REDACTED]
+16 [REDACTED]
+17 [REDACTED]
+18 [REDACTED]
+19 [REDACTED]
+20 [REDACTED] y
+21 3. (TS//SI//[REDACTED] //TSP//OC/NF) In addition, I have reviewed the classified
+22 certification of then-Attorney General Mukasey submitted to the Court pursuant to Section 802
+23 of the FISA Act Amendments Act of 2008 and assert privilege over specific information
+24 described therein.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT—[REDACTED] //TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-VRW)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] //TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 [REDACTED]
+2 [REDACTED]
+3 [REDACTED]
+4 [REDACTED]
+5 [REDACTED]
+6 [REDACTED]
+7 [REDACTED]
+8 [REDACTED]
+9 [REDACTED]
+10 [REDACTED]
+11 [REDACTED]
+12 [REDACTED]
+13 [REDACTED]
+
+14 47. (TS//SI//[REDACTED] //TSP//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+15 [REDACTED]
+16 [REDACTED]
+17 [REDACTED]
+18 [REDACTED]
+19 [REDACTED]
+20 [REDACTED]
+21 [REDACTED]
+22 [REDACTED]
+
+23 (U) RISK OF LITIGATION
+
+24 48. (TS//SI//OC/NF) Finally, I concur with the NSA that further litigation of this
+25 case will inherently risk the disclosure of highly classified activities. While plaintiffs wrongly
+26 allege that the NSA is conducting a dragnet program of content surveillance, disproving
+27 plaintiffs' speculation would risk or require revealing NSA intelligence activities, sources and
+28 methods.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT—[REDACTED] //TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-VRW)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] //TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 methods, including bulk meta data collection activities. Those vital activities, as described
+2 herein, are highly classified, sensitive, and fragile, and any effort to disclose information about
+3 them could have grave consequences for the national security.
+
+5 50. (TS//SI//OC/NF) The stakes we face in the U.S. Intelligence Community are of
+6 the highest magnitude. We know that al-Qaeda continues to plan a mass casualty "spectacular"
+7 attack inside the United States again that would cause catastrophic loss of life, severe economic
+8 harm, or threaten the continuity of government. The NSA's activities described herein and by
+9 the NSA, including NSA sources and methods currently being utilized under authority of the
+10 FISA, are all directed at this terrible threat.
+
+12 (U) CONCLUSION
+
+13 51. (TS) In sum, I am asserting the state secrets privilege and the DNI's statutory
+14 privilege set forth in 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i)(1) to protect the classified national security
+15 information described herein and in the Classified NSA Declaration. Moreover, because
+16 proceedings in this case risk disclosure of privileged and classified intelligence-related
+17 information, I respectfully request that the Court not only protect that information from
+18 disclosure, but to take all steps necessary, including dismissal of this action, to protect the
+19 intelligence information, sources, and methods described herein in order to prevent exceptional
+20 harm to the national security of the United States.
+
+22 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
+
+24 [REDACTED]
+25 DATE: April 3, 2009
+26 DENNIS C. BLAIR
+27 Director of National Intelligence
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT—[REDACTED] //TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-VRW)
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_DNI_Blair_2009_Jewel_State_Secrets_Declaration/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_DNI_Blair_2009_Jewel_State_Secrets_Declaration/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5dacbdc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_DNI_Blair_2009_Jewel_State_Secrets_Declaration/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+{
+ "title": "DNI Blair 2009 Jewel State Secrets Declaration",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Classified declaration of Dennis C. Blair disclosing information regarding the government’s warrantless wiretapping. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "",
+ "date_created": "2009-04-03",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT",
+ "TSP",
+ "HCS",
+ "MR"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "ORCON, NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Blair, Dennis C.",
+ "Hertz, Michael F.",
+ "Letter, Douglas N.",
+ "Hunt, Joseph H.",
+ "Garvey, Vincent M.",
+ "Coppolino, Anthony J.",
+ "Jewel, Carolyn"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-12-20",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/dni-blair-2009-jewel-state-secrets-declaration",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "ebe1c22eda1fe9d79ba9e14f7e9de3a84b916fea669e8f7c3a67352b24d91964",
+ "pages": 28
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_DNI_Blair_2009_Shubert_State_Secrets_Declaration/ACLU_-_DNI_Blair_2009_Shubert_State_Secrets_Declaration.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_DNI_Blair_2009_Shubert_State_Secrets_Declaration/ACLU_-_DNI_Blair_2009_Shubert_State_Secrets_Declaration.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2fb8c4d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_DNI_Blair_2009_Shubert_State_Secrets_Declaration/ACLU_-_DNI_Blair_2009_Shubert_State_Secrets_Declaration.md
@@ -0,0 +1,1556 @@
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT- [REDACTED] //HCS//ORCON/NOFORN/ [REDACTED]
+1
+BETH S. BRINKMANN
+2
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+DOUGLAS N. LETTER
+3 Terrorism Litigation Counsel
+JOSEPH H. HUNT
+Director, Federal Programs Branch
+VINCENT M. GARVEY
+4
+5
+Deputy Branch Director
+6
+ANTHONY J. COPPOLINO
+Special Litigation Counsel
+7
+MARCIA BERMAN
+8
+Senior Litigation Counsel
+PAUL E. AHERN
+9
+Trial Attorney
+U.S. Department of Justice
+10
+Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch
+11
+20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
+Washington, D.C. 20001
+12
+Phone: (202) 514-4782
+Fax: (202) 616-8460
+13
+14
+15
+16
+17
+18
+19
+20
+21
+Attorneys for the Government Defendants
+UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
+NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
+SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
+IN RE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+TELECOMMUNICATIONS RECORDS
+LITIGATION
+) No. M:06-cv-01791-VRW
+)
+) CLASSIFIED DECLARATION
+) OF DENNIS C. BLAIR
+) DIRECTOR OF
+) NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+)
+) EX PARTE, IN CAMERA
+)
+) Date: December 15, 2009
+) Time: 10:00 a.m.
+) Courtroom 6, 17th Floor
+) Chief Judge Vaughn R. Walker
+
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20091030
+Declassify On: 20341030
+
+22
+This Document Relates Solely To:
+23
+24
+Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al.
+(Case No. 07-cv-00693-VRW)
+25
+26
+27
+28
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT- [REDACTED] //HCS//ORCON/NOFORN/ [REDACTED]
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+1
+-TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT- [REDACTED] HCS//ORCON/NOFORNA [REDACTED]
+
+1
+(U) Table of Contents
+2
+I. Introduction
+3
+II. Summary
+4
+5
+III. (U) Classification of Declaration
+6
+IV. [REDACTED] ) Background on Director of National Intelligence
+7
+V. [REDACTED] Assertion of State Secrets Privilege
+8
+VI. () Assertion of Statutory Privilege under National Security Act
+9
+VII. [REDACTED] Information Subject to Assertions of Privilege
+10
+11
+VIII. [REDACTED] Description of Information and Harm of Disclosure
+12
+A. [REDACTED] Information Concerning the al-Qaeda Terrorist Threat
+13
+1. (S/NE) Al-Qaeda Remains Intent on Striking the Homeland
+14
+2. (S/NE) Al-Qaeda Continues Efforts to Train and Deploy Operatives
+15
+16
+3. (SNF) Al-Qaeda's Weapons and Tactics
+17
+B. (U-Information that May Tend to Confirm or Deny Whether the Plaintiffs Have
+Been Subject to the Alleged NSA Intelligence Activities
+18
+C. [REDACTED] Information Concerning NSA Activities, Sources, or Methods
+19
+20
+D. [REDACTED] (Allegations that Telecommunications Companies Assisted the NSA
+21
+IX. (U) Risk of Litigation
+22
+X. (U) Conclusion
+23
+24
+25
+26
+27
+28
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT [REDACTED] /HCS//ORCON/NOFORN/ [REDACTED]
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. Unised States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+2
+TOP SECRET//TSP//C NT [REDACTED] //HCS//ORCON/NOFORN/A [REDACTED]
+
+1
+I, Dennis C. Blair, do hereby state and declare as follows:
+2
+I. [REDACTED] INTRODUCTION
+3
+1. [REDACTED] I am the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) of the United States. I have
+4
+5
+held this position since January 29, 2009. In 2002, I retired as an Admiral from the United
+6
+States Navy after a 34-year career, which included my service as Commander-in-Chief of the
+7
+U.S. Pacific Command. During my naval career, I also served as Director of the Joint Staff and
+8
+as Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support, as well as in policy positions
+9
+on the National Security Council staff. From 2003 to 2006, I was President and CEO of the
+10
+11
+Institute for Defense Analyses, an organization that analyzes and makes recommendations on
+12
+national security policy matters.
+13
+2. [REDACTED] The purpose of this declaration is to formally assert, in my capacity as the
+14
+Director of National Intelligence and head of the United States Intelligence Community, the
+15
+military and state secrets privilege (hereafter "state secrets privilege") and a statutory privilege
+16
+17
+under the National Security Act, see 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i)(1), in order to protect intelligence
+18
+sources and methods that are at risk of disclosure in this case. The statements made herein are
+19
+based on my personal knowledge as well as on information provided to me in my official
+20
+capacity as the Director of National Intelligence.
+21
+22
+II. [REDACTED] SUMMARY
+23
+3. [REDACTED] In the course of my official duties, I have been advised of this lawsuit and the
+24
+allegations at issue in the plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. In personally considering this matter,
+25
+I have executed a separate unclassified declaration dated October 30, 2009. Moreover, I have
+26
+27
+read and personally considered the information contained in the Public and In Camera, Ex Parte
+28 Declaration of Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander, Director of the National Security
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT- [REDACTED] ICS//ORCON/NOFORN// [REDACTED]
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+3
+TOP SECRET//TSP//C NT [REDACTED] /HCS//ORCON/NOFORNA [REDACTED]
+
+Agency, executed on October 30, 2009 (hereafter "Classified NSA Declaration"). Disclosure of
+1
+2
+the information covered by this privilege assertion reasonably could be expected to cause
+3 exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United States and, therefore, the
+4
+information should be excluded from any use in this case. In addition, it is my judgment that
+5
+sensitive state secrets are so central to the subject matter of the litigation that any attempt to
+6
+proceed in the case will substantially risk the disclosure of the classified privileged national
+7
+8 security information described herein and will therefore risk exceptionally grave damage to the
+9
+national security of the United States.
+10
+4. (TS//TSP//SI [REDACTED] HOC/NF) As the NSA states, see Classified NSA Decl.
+11
+[REDACTED] 4-7, the allegations in this lawsuit put at risk of disclosure information concerning several
+12
+13
+highly classified and critically important NSA intelligence activities that commenced after the
+14
+9/11 terrorist attacks, but which are now conducted pursuant to authority of the Foreign
+15
+Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"), including ongoing activities conducted under orders
+16
+approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC"). Specifically, in order to
+17
+address plaintiffs' allegation that the NSA, with the assistance of telecommunication companies,
+18
+19
+has indiscriminately intercepted the content and obtained the communications records of millions
+20
+of ordinary Americans as part of an alleged presidentially authorized "Program" after 9/11, see,
+21
+e.g., Amended Compl. [REDACTED] 1, 4-8, further litigation risks the disclosure of information concerning
+22
+several classified NSA intelligence activities, sources and methods [REDACTED]
+23
+[REDACTED] in connection with: (1)
+24
+25
+NSA's targeted content¹ surveillance aimed at al-Qaeda and affiliated terrorist organizations,
+26
+27
+(TS//SI/OC/NF) The term "content" is used in this declaration to refer to the
+28
+substance, meaning, or purport of a communication, as defined in 18 U.S.C.§ 2510(8), as
+opposed to the type of addressing or routing information referred throughout this declaration as
+"meta data."
+
+-TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT- [REDACTED] //LICS//ORCON/NOFORN/ [REDACTED]
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+4
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT- [REDACTED] /HCS//ORCON/NOFORN// [REDACTED]
+
+1
+2
+pursuant to Terrorist Surveillance Program ("TSP") [REDACTED] ; (2) the bulk
+collection and targeted analysis of non-content information about telephone and Internet
+communications-critically important and highly sensitive activities that are also now conducted
+3
+4
+pursuant to FISC orders and that enable the NSA to uncover the contacts [REDACTED]
+5
+[REDACTED] ; and (3) [REDACTED]
+6
+[REDACTED]
+7
+[REDACTED]
+8
+[REDACTED]
+9
+[REDACTED] This lawsuit therefore puts at risk of disclosure
+10
+information concerning essential ongoing foreign intelligence-gathering activities being utilized
+11
+to meet the extremely serious threat of another terrorist attack on the U.S. Homeland [REDACTED]
+12
+[REDACTED]
+13
+(a threat which I describe further below based on recent assessments of
+14
+the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) prepared in January 2009 and March 2009.)
+15
+5. (TS//TSP//SHI [REDACTED] OC/NF) Accordingly, as set forth further below, I am
+16
+asserting the state secrets privilege and the DNI's authority to protect intelligence sources and
+17
+methods pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i)(1) to protect against the disclosure of the highly
+18
+19
+classified intelligence sources and methods put at issue in this case and vital to the national
+20
+security of the United States, including: (1) any information that would tend to confirm or deny
+21
+whether particular individuals, including the named plaintiffs, have been subject to the alleged
+22
+NSA intelligence activities; (2) information concerning NSA intelligence sources and methods,
+23
+including facts demonstrating that the content collection under the TSP was limited to specific
+24
+25
+al-Qaeda and associated terrorist-related international communications and was not a content
+26
+surveillance dragnet as plaintiffs allege; (3) facts that would tend to confirm or deny the
+27
+existence of the NSA's bulk non-content (i.e., meta data) collection and use, and any information
+28
+about those activities; and (4) [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT [REDACTED] IICS//ORCON/NOFORN [REDACTED]
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+5
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT- [REDACTED] //LICS//ORCON/NOFORN [REDACTED]
+
+I specifically concur with the NSA that public
+1
+2
+speculation about alleged NSA activities does not diminish the need to protect intelligence
+3
+sources and methods from further exposure, and that official confirmation and disclosure of the
+4
+classified privileged national security information described herein would cause exceptionally
+5
+grave damage to the national security. For these reasons, as set forth further below, I request that
+6
+the Court uphold the state secrets and statutory privilege assertions that I make herein, as well as
+7
+8
+the statutory privilege assertion made by the NSA, pursuant to Section 6 of the National Security
+9
+Agency Act, see 50 U.S.C. § 402 (note), and protect the information described in this declaration
+10
+from disclosure.
+11
+III. [REDACTED] & CLASSIFICATION OF DECLARATION
+12
+6. (S//SI//NF) Pursuant to the standards in Executive Order No. 12958, as amended
+13
+14
+by Executive Order No. 13292, this declaration is classified as: TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT-
+15
+[REDACTED] HCS//ORCON/NOFORN/ [REDACTED] The details concerning these classification
+16
+markings are set forth in paragraphs 8-11 of the Classified NSA Declaration and are briefly
+17
+summarized here. Under Executive Order No. 12958, information is classified "TOP SECRET"
+18
+19
+if unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to cause
+20
+exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United States; "SECRET" if
+21
+unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to cause serious
+22
+23
+damage to national security; and "CONFIDENTIAL" if unauthorized disclosure of the
+24
+information reasonably could be expected to cause identifiable damage to national security. At
+25
+the beginning of each paragraph of this declaration, the letters "U," "C," "S," and "TS" indicate
+26
+respectively that the information is either UNCLASSIFIED, or is classified CONFIDENTIAL,
+27
+SECRET, or TOP SECRET.
+28
+7. (S/SI/NF) Additionally, this declaration also contains Sensitive Compartmented
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT- [REDACTED] /HCS//ORCON/NOFORN/ [REDACTED]
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+6
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT [REDACTED] //HCS//ORCON/NOFORN// [REDACTED]
+
+1
+Information (SCI), which is subject to special access and handling requirements because it
+2 involves or derives from particularly sensitive intelligence sources and methods. This
+3 declaration references communications intelligence (COMINT), also referred to as special
+4
+intelligence (SI), which is a subcategory of SCI that identifies information that was derived from
+5
+exploiting cryptographic systems or other protected sources by applying methods or techniques,
+6
+or from intercepted foreign communications. This declaration also references human
+7
+8
+intelligence (HCS), another subcategory of SCI that identifies information derived from
+9
+individuals who provide intelligence information. [REDACTED]
+10
+[REDACTED]
+11
+[REDACTED]
+12
+8. (TS//TSP//SI [REDACTED] //OC/NF) This declaration also contains information
+13
+14
+about the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP), a prior controlled access signals intelligence
+15
+program that operated under presidential authorization in response to the attacks of September
+16
+17
+11, 2001, until January 2007. Information pertaining to this program is denoted with the special
+marking "TSP." [REDACTED]
+18
+[REDACTED]
+19
+[REDACTED]
+20
+[REDACTED]
+21
+9. (S/SI//NF) Finally, information labeled "NOFORN" may not be released to
+22
+foreign governments, foreign nationals, or non-U.S. citizens without permission of the originator
+23
+24
+25
+and in accordance with DNI policy. The "ORCON" designator means that the originator of the
+information controls to whom it is released.
+26
+IV. [REDACTED] BACKGROUND ON DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+27
+10. [REDACTED] The position of Director of National Intelligence was created by Congress in
+28
+the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-458, §§ 1011(a) and
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT [REDACTED] //IICS//ORCON/NOFORN// [REDACTED]
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+7
+-TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT- [REDACTED] //LICS//ORCON/NOFORN/ [REDACTED]
+
+1097, 118 Stat. 3638, 3643-63, 3698-99 (2004) (amending sections 102 through 104 of Title I of
+1
+2
+the National Security Act of 1947). Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the
+3
+President, the Director of National Intelligence serves as the head of the U.S. Intelligence
+4
+Community and as the principal adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the
+5
+Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters related to the national security. See 50
+6
+U.S.C. § 403(b)(1), (2).
+7
+8
+11. [REDACTED] The United States "Intelligence Community" includes the Office of the
+9
+Director of National Intelligence; the Central Intelligence Agency; the National Security
+10
+Agency; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; the
+11
+National Reconnaissance Office; other offices within the Department of Defense for the
+12
+13
+collection of specialized national intelligence through reconnaissance programs; the intelligence
+14
+elements of the military services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of the
+15
+Treasury, the Department of Energy, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Coast
+16
+Guard; the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State; the elements of the
+17
+Department of Homeland Security concerned with the analysis of intelligence information; and
+18
+19
+such other elements of any other department or agency as may be designated by the President, or
+20 jointly designated by the DNI and heads of the department or agency concerned, as an element of
+21
+the Intelligence Community. See 50 U.S.C. § 401a(4).
+22
+12. [REDACTED] The responsibilities and authorities of the Director of National Intelligence
+23
+are set forth in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. See 50 U.S.C. § 403-1. These
+24
+25
+responsibilities include ensuring that national intelligence is provided to the President, the heads
+26
+of the departments and agencies of the Executive Branch, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
+27
+Staff and senior military commanders, and the Senate and House of Representatives and
+28
+committees thereof. See 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(a)(1). The DNI is also charged with establishing the
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT. [REDACTED] /HCS//ORCON/NOFORN// [REDACTED]
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+8
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT- [REDACTED] LICS//ORCON/NOFORN/A [REDACTED]
+
+objectives of, determining the requirements and priorities for, and managing and directing the
+1
+2
+tasking, collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of national intelligence by elements
+3
+of the Intelligence Community. Id. § 403-1(f)(1)(A)(i) and (ii). The DNI is also responsible for
+4
+developing and determining, based on proposals submitted by the heads of agencies and
+5
+departments within the Intelligence Community, an annual consolidated budget for the National
+6
+Intelligence Program for presentation to the President, and for ensuring the effective execution of
+7
+8
+the annual budget for intelligence and intelligence activities, and for managing and allotting
+9
+appropriations for the National Intelligence Program. Id. § 403-1(c)(1)-(5).
+10
+13. (U) In addition, the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, provides that
+11
+12
+"[t]he Director of National Intelligence shall protect intelligence sources and methods from
+unauthorized disclosure." 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i)(1). Consistent with this responsibility, the DNI
+13
+14
+15
+16
+establishes and implements guidelines for the Intelligence Community for the classification of
+information under applicable law, Executive orders, or other Presidential directives and access to
+and dissemination of intelligence. Id. § 403-1(i)(2)(A), (B). In particular, the DNI is responsible
+17
+18
+19
+20
+21
+for the establishment of uniform standards and procedures for the granting of access to Sensitive
+Compartmented Information ("SCI") to any officer or employee of any agency or department of
+the United States, and for ensuring the consistent implementation of those standards throughout
+such departments and agencies. Id. § 403-1(j)(1), (2).
+22
+14. [REDACTED] ) By virtue of my position as the Director of National Intelligence, and unless
+23
+24
+otherwise directed by the President, I have access to all intelligence related to the national
+25
+security that is collected by any department, agency, or other entity of the United States. See 50
+26
+U.S.C. § 403-1(b); Executive Order 12333 § 1.3(a). 46 Fed. Reg. 59941 (Dec. 4, 1981), as
+27
+amended. Pursuant to Executive Order No. 12958, 3 C.F.R. § 333 (1995), as amended by
+28
+Executive Order 13292 (March 25, 2003), reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C.A. § 435 at 93
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP// [REDACTED] ICS//ORCON/NOFORN// [REDACTED]
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+9
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT [REDACTED] /HCS//ORCON/NOFORNA [REDACTED]
+
+(Supp. 2004), the President has authorized me to exercise original TOP SECRET classification
+1
+2
+authority.
+3
+V. [REDACTED] ASSERTION OF STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE
+4
+15. [REDACTED] After careful and personal consideration of the matter, based upon my own
+5
+knowledge and information obtained in the course of my official duties, including the
+6
+information contained in the Public and Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declarations of
+7
+8
+Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander, Director of the National Security Agency, I have
+9
+determined that the disclosure of certain information-as set forth herein and described in more
+10
+detail in the Classified NSA Declaration-would cause exceptionally grave damage to the
+11
+national security of the United States and, therefore, must be protected from disclosure and
+12
+13
+excluded from this case. Thus, as to this information, I formally assert the state secrets privilege.
+14
+In addition, it is my judgment that sensitive state secrets are so central to the subject matter of the
+15
+litigation that any attempt to proceed in the case will substantially risk the disclosure of the
+16
+privileged information described herein and will therefore risk exceptionally grave damage to the
+17
+national security of the United States.
+18
+VI. [REDACTED] ASSERTION OF STATUTORY PRIVILEGE
+19
+UNDER NATIONAL SECURITY ACT
+20
+16. [REDACTED] Through this declaration, I also hereby invoke and assert a statutory privilege
+21
+22
+held by the Director of National Intelligence under the National Security Act to protect the
+23
+information described herein. See 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i)(1). My assertion of this statutory
+24
+privilege for intelligence sources and methods is coextensive with and protects the information
+25
+subject to my state secrets privilege assertion.
+26
+27
+28
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT- [REDACTED] //HCS//ORCON/NOFORN// [REDACTED]
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+10
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT- [REDACTED] //HCS//ORCON/NOFORN// [REDACTED]
+
+1
+VII. [REDACTED] INFORMATION SUBJECT TO ASSERTIONS OF PRIVILEGE
+2
+17. [REDACTED] In In general and unclassified terms, the following categories of information are
+3
+subject to my state secrets and statutory privilege assertions:
+4
+5
+A. [REDACTED] Information that may tend to confirm or deny whether
+6
+the plaintiffs have been subject to any alleged NSA
+intelligence activity that may be at issue in this matter; and
+7
+B. [REDACTED] Any information concerning NSA intelligence
+8
+activities, sources, or methods that may relate to or be
+9
+necessary to adjudicate plaintiffs' allegations, including
+10
+allegations that the NSA, with the assistance of
+11
+telecommunications carriers, indiscriminately intercepts the
+12
+content of communications and also, to the extent
+13
+applicable to plaintiffs' claim, the communications records
+14
+of millions of Americans as part of an alleged "Program"
+authorized by the President after 9/11. See, e.g., Amended
+Compl. [REDACTED] 1-8, 58.
+15
+[REDACTED] (b) The scope of this assertion includes but is not limited
+16
+to:
+17
+[REDACTED] (i)) Information concerning the scope and
+18
+operation of the now inoperative "Terrorist Surveillance
+19
+Program" ("TSP") regarding the interception of the content
+20
+of certain one-end international communications
+21
+reasonably believed to involve a member or agent of al-
+22
+Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization, and any other
+information related to demonstrating that the NSA does not
+otherwise engage in the content surveillance dragnet that
+the plaintiffs allege; and
+23
+[REDACTED] (ii) () Any other information concerning NSA
+24
+intelligence activities, sources, or methods that would be
+25
+necessary to adjudicate the plaintiffs' claims, including, to
+26
+the extent applicable, information that would tend to
+27
+confirm or deny whether or not the NSA obtained from
+28
+telecommunications companies communication
+transactional records; and
+[REDACTED] (iii) () Information that may tend to confirm or
+deny whether any telecommunications carrier has provided
+assistance to the NSA in connection with any alleged
+activity.
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINTJ [REDACTED] /HCS//ORCON/NOFORN// [REDACTED]
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+11
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT- [REDACTED] HICS//ORCON/NOFORN// [REDACTED]
+
+1
+2
+VIII. (6) DESCRIPTION OF INFORMATION AND HARM OF DISCLOSURE
+3
+A. (U) Information Concerning the al-Qaeda Terrorist Threat
+4
+18. [REDACTED] To the extent specific information about the al-Qaeda threat is relevant to
+5
+litigation of plaintiffs' allegations as to post-9/11 actions taken to meet that threat, such
+6
+information could not be disclosed without revealing intelligence sources, methods, and
+7
+8
+information of the United States and thereby causing exceptionally grave damage to the national
+9
+10
+security. Therefore, I assert the state secrets and statutory privilege to protect such information
+from disclosure.
+11
+19. (S/OC/NF) The intelligence activities, sources, and methods that are implicated
+12
+13
+by this lawsuit, and put at risk of disclosure in further proceedings, must be viewed and
+14
+understood in the context of the extremely serious threat faced by the United States. In sum, the
+15
+Intelligence Community assesses that al-Qaeda remains intent on conducting terrorist attacks
+16
+inside the United States. This is so notwithstanding a series of setbacks to the al-Qaeda terrorist
+17
+network. [REDACTED]
+18
+[REDACTED]
+19
+[REDACTED]
+20
+[REDACTED]
+21
+Preventing such attacks is the U.S. Intelligence Community's highest priority, and the
+22
+Intelligence Community is collecting information aggressively against the al-Qaeda network to
+23
+uncover indications of credible threats.2
+24
+25
+26
+27
+28
+
+2 (S/OGANE) The following summary of the current al-Qaeda threat is drawn from an
+Intelligence Community assessment made in January 2009 and more current reporting.
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT [REDACTED] //HCS//ORCON/NOFORN// [REDACTED]
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+12
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT [REDACTED] //TICS//ORCON/NOFORN/ [REDACTED]
+
+1. (S//NF) Al-Qaeda Remains Intent on Striking the Homeland
+1
+2
+20. (TS//ICS/OC/NF/ [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] A body of reporting-including public statements from senior
+leaders, [REDACTED] -highlights the persistent and evolving
+threat the group poses to the United States and our allies.
+12
+• In June and September 2009, al-Qaeda leader Usama bin Laden warned the American
+13
+14
+people to be prepared to continue reaping what was sowed by the White House during
+15
+the coming years; and al-Qaeda's third-in-command, Shaykh Sa'id al-Masri, also
+16
+reiterated in June the group's strategy of attacking the United States to drain the U.S.
+17
+economy.
+18
+• [REDACTED]
+19
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+25
+• The plot to bring down airliners between the United Kingdom and North America
+26
+that was disrupted in August 2006 demonstrated al-Qaeda's continued emphasis on
+27
+large scale, high-profile attacks against the West, [REDACTED]
+28
+
+-TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT [REDACTED] //HCS//ORCON/NOFORN/ [REDACTED]
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+13
+-TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT [REDACTED] //HCS//ORCON/NOFORN [REDACTED]
+
+21. (TS//HCS #OC/NF) The bulk of al-Qaeda's Western attack plans since 2001 have
+1
+2
+relied on operatives with citizenship or personal knowledge of their target location. [REDACTED]
+3
+[REDACTED]
+4
+[REDACTED]
+5
+[REDACTED]
+6
+[REDACTED]
+7
+[REDACTED]
+8
+[REDACTED]
+9
+[REDACTED]
+10
+[REDACTED]
+11
+[REDACTED]
+12
+[REDACTED]
+13
+[REDACTED]
+14
+[REDACTED]
+15
+[REDACTED]
+16
+[REDACTED]
+17
+[REDACTED]
+18
+[REDACTED]
+19
+[REDACTED]
+20
+[REDACTED]
+21
+[REDACTED]
+22
+[REDACTED]
+23
+[REDACTED]
+24
+[REDACTED]
+25
+[REDACTED]
+26
+[REDACTED]
+27
+[REDACTED]
+28
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT [REDACTED] //ICS//ORCON/NOFORN/ [REDACTED]
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+14
+-TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT [REDACTED] /HCS//ORCON/NOFORN/ [REDACTED]
+
+2. (S/ANF) Al-Qaeda Continues Efforts to Train and Deploy Operatives
+1
+2
+22. (TS//HCS/OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+25
+• [REDACTED]
+26
+[REDACTED]
+27
+[REDACTED]
+28
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT [REDACTED] //IICS//ORCON/NOFORN// [REDACTED]
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+15
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT- [REDACTED] AICS//ORCON/NOFORN/ [REDACTED]
+
+1
+2
+3
+25. (TS/HCS/OC/NF) The death or detention of more than a dozen al-Qaeda
+4
+senior leaders and their deputies since early 2008 represent significant losses for the group.
+5
+[REDACTED]
+6
+[REDACTED]
+7
+[REDACTED]
+8
+[REDACTED]
+9
+[REDACTED]
+10
+[REDACTED]
+11
+[REDACTED]
+12
+[REDACTED]
+13
+[REDACTED]
+14
+[REDACTED]
+15
+26. (TS [REDACTED] ) The Internet is a contributing factor in the radicalization of some
+16
+individuals, increasing the risk of self-selecting fighters attempting to establish affiliations with
+17
+extremist organizations or engaging in operations independent of formal terrorist groups.
+18
+19
+Additionally, al-Qaeda and like-minded Sunni extremists are attempting to use the Internet to
+20
+radicalize and recruit individuals to promote and conduct violent acts, perhaps contributing to the
+21
+spread of al-Qaeda -inspired violent extremism across the globe. The number of Sunni extremist
+22
+Web sites continues to grow, possibly contributing to Islamic radicalization while inspiring
+23
+24
+individuals in the United States to act on behalf of al-Qaeda or its ideology.
+25
+3. (S//NE) Al-Qaeda's Weapons and Tactics
+26
+27. (TS [REDACTED] NF [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT [REDACTED] //HCS//ORCON/NOFORN/ [REDACTED]
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+16
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT- [REDACTED] WIICS//ORCON/NOFORN/ [REDACTED]
+
+1
+[REDACTED]
+2
+[REDACTED]
+3
+[REDACTED]
+4
+[REDACTED]
+5
+[REDACTED]
+6
+[REDACTED]
+7
+[REDACTED]
+8
+[REDACTED]
+29. (TS//HCS/OC/NF// [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+27
+30. (TS// OCANE) These various examples of some of our intelligence information
+28
+demonstrate that the al-Qaeda network continues to plan ways to inflict a catastrophic attack.
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT [REDACTED] /TICS//ORCON/NOFORN/ [REDACTED]
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+17
+-TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT- [REDACTED] //HCS//ORCON/NOFORN// [REDACTED]
+
+1
+The severity of that threat and the difficulty of tracking al-Qaeda is precisely the reason the
+2
+Government is utilizing all lawful intelligence gathering capabilities. I set forth this information
+3
+not only to provide the Court with crucial background as to why the intelligence activities
+4
+implicated by or directly at issue in this case are being undertaken, but also to assert a claim of
+5
+privilege over this threat information. Although the foregoing threat assessment demonstrates
+6
+why the Government undertakes the activities described herein, the Government cannot disclose
+7
+8
+this threat information in defending the legality of the intelligence activities, sources, and
+9
+methods being challenged, since to do so obviously would disclose to our adversaries what we
+10
+know of their plans and how we may be obtaining information about them. Such disclosures
+11
+would lead our adversaries not only to alter their plans, but also to implement greater security for
+12
+13
+their communications, thereby increasing the risk of non-detection. In addition, disclosure of
+14
+threat information might reveal human sources for the United States and, thus compromise those
+15
+sources and put lives in danger. Accordingly, although I believe this threat information is crucial
+16
+to understanding the NSA intelligence activities, sources, and methods implicated by the
+17
+plaintiffs' allegations, I must assert the states secrets privilege and the DNI's statutory privilege
+18
+19
+over this classified threat information because of the exceptionally grave danger to national
+20
+security that could reasonably be expected to result from its disclosure.
+21
+22
+B. [REDACTED] Information That May Tend to Confirm or Deny Whether the Plaintiffs Have Been
+Subject to the Alleged NSA Intelligence Activities
+23
+31. [REDACTED] Next, I am also asserting privilege over information that would reveal
+24
+whether particular individuals, including the named plaintiffs in this lawsuit, have been subject
+25
+to the alleged NSA intelligence activities. Disclosure of such information would cause
+26
+27
+exceptionally grave damage to the national security.
+28
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT [REDACTED] //JICS//ORCON/NOFORN// [REDACTED]
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+18
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT [REDACTED] //HCS//ORCON/NOFORN// [REDACTED]
+
+32. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+1
+[REDACTED]
+2
+[REDACTED]
+3
+[REDACTED]
+4
+[REDACTED]
+5
+[REDACTED]
+6
+[REDACTED]
+7
+[REDACTED]
+8
+[REDACTED]
+9
+[REDACTED]
+10
+[REDACTED]
+11
+33. [REDACTED] The NSA cannot publicly confirm or deny whether any particular individual
+12
+13
+is subject to surveillance activities. If the NSA were to reveal that an individual is the target of
+14 surveillance, the collection capability of that individual would certainly be compromised. On the
+15
+other hand, if the NSA were to reveal that an individual is not the target of surveillance,
+16
+adversaries would know that a particular individual has avoided surveillance and is a secure
+17
+source for communicating. Moreover, providing assurances to those individuals that are not
+18
+19
+being targeted quickly becomes unworkable when faced with a case in which the individual has
+20
+21
+in fact been targeted. If the NSA were to confirm that any specific individual is not the target of
+surveillance, but later refuse to confirm or deny that information in a case involving an actual
+22
+target, it would be apparent that surveillance was occurring in the latter case. The only recourse
+23
+24
+for NSA is to neither confirm nor deny whether someone has been targeted or subject to NSA
+25 activities, regardless of whether the individual has been targeted or not. To say otherwise when
+26
+challenged in litigation would result in the frequent, routine exposure of NSA information,
+27
+sources, and methods, and would severely undermine surveillance activities in general.
+28
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT [REDACTED] ICS//ORCON/NOFORN// [REDACTED]
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+19
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT [REDACTED] //HCS//ORCON/NOFORNA [REDACTED]
+C. [REDACTED] Information Concerning NSA Activities, Sources, or Methods
+1
+2
+34. [REDACTED] am also asserting privilege over any other facts concerning NSA intelligence
+3
+activities, sources, or methods that may relate to or be necessary to adjudicate the plaintiffs'
+4
+claims, including, but not limited to, allegations that the NSA, with the assistance of
+5
+telecommunication companies, has indiscriminately intercepted the content and obtained large
+6
+quantities of communications records as part of the Program authorized by the President after
+7
+8
+9/11. See, e.g., Amended Compl. [REDACTED] 1-4, 58. As noted above, my privilege assertion
+9
+10
+encompasses (1) facts concerning the operation of the now-defunct Terrorist Surveillance
+Program, including any facts needed to demonstrate that the TSP was limited
+11
+to the interception of the content of one-end foreign communications reasonably believed to
+12
+13
+involve a member or agent of al-Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization, and that the NSA
+14
+does not otherwise conduct a dragnet of content surveillance as the plaintiffs allege; and
+15
+16
+(2) information concerning whether or not the NSA obtains communication transactional records
+from telecommunications companies.
+17
+35. [REDACTED] As the NSA indicates, see Public NSA Decl. ¶ 19, the NSA's collection of the
+18
+19
+content of communications under the TSP was directed at international communications in which
+20
+a participant was reasonably believed to be associated with al-Qaeda or an affiliated
+21
+organization. Thus, as the Government has previously stated, plaintiffs' allegation that the NSA
+22
+has indiscriminately collected the content of millions of communications sent or received by
+23
+people inside the United States after 9/11 under the TSP is false. I concur with the NSA that to
+24
+25
+the extent it must demonstrate in this case that the TSP was not the content dragnet plaintiffs
+26
+allege, or demonstrate that the NSA has not otherwise engaged in the alleged content dragnet,
+27
+[REDACTED]
+28
+[REDACTED]
+3 The term "content" is used herein to refer to the substance, meaning, or purport of a
+communication, as defined in 18 U.S.C.§ 2510(8).
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT [REDACTED] //HCS//ORCON/NOFORN/ [REDACTED]
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+20
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT [REDACTED] /HCS//ORCON/NOFORN/A [REDACTED]
+
+highly classified NSA intelligence sources and methods about the operation of the TSP and other
+1
+2
+NSA intelligence activities would be disclosed or at risk of disclosure which would cause
+3
+exceptionally grave harm to national security.
+4
+36. [REDACTED] () To the extent implicated by the plaintiffs' allegations in this case, I am also
+5
+asserting privilege over information concerning whether or not the NSA obtained from
+6
+telecommunications companies transactional records of those companies' customers, including
+7
+8
+the plaintiffs. See Amended Compl. [[ 5-8, 58; Classified NSA Decl. [[ 32 & n.17, 33. I concur
+9
+with the NSA that confirmation or denial of any information concerning this allegation would
+10
+cause exceptionally grave harm to national security, including by risking disclosure of whether
+11
+12
+13
+or not the NSA utilizes particular intelligence sources and methods and, thus, the NSA's
+capabilities or lack thereof.
+14
+37. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) In particular, as set forth in the NSA's Classified
+15
+Declaration, the United States faced urgent and immediate intelligence challenges after the
+16
+September 11 attacks, and undertook signals intelligence activities pursuant to presidential
+17
+authorization that were designed to meet those challenges and to detect and prevent future
+18
+19
+terrorist attacks by al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Those activities include the TSP and similar
+20
+content surveillance that later became subject to orders of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
+21
+Court, as well as the bulk collection of telephony and Internet non-content meta data currently
+22
+authorized by the FISC, which is used to discover contacts [REDACTED]
+23
+[REDACTED]
+24
+See Classified NSA Decl. 39-66.
+25
+38. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) Based on my personal consideration and judgment as to
+26
+the harm disclosure would cause to national security, my privilege assertion includes, but is not
+27
+limited to, the following activities discussed in the NSA classified declaration:
+28
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP// [REDACTED] /HCS//ORCON/NOFORN// [REDACTED]
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+21
+-TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT- [REDACTED] /HCS//ORCON/NOFORN// [REDACTED]
+
+39. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) First, I assert privilege over facts concerning the
+1
+2
+operation of the Terrorist Surveillance Program and any other NSA intelligence activities needed
+3
+to demonstrate that the TSP was limited to the interception of one-end foreign communications
+4
+reasonably believed to involve a member or agent of al-Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist
+5
+organization, and that the NSA does not otherwise conduct a dragnet of content surveillance as
+6
+the plaintiffs allege. Such facts include those concerning (1) how targets were selected under the
+7
+8
+9
+TSP; (2) how specific methods were used under the TSP to intercept telephone and Internet
+communications and to minimize the risk of collecting non-target communications and purely
+10
+domestic communications; (3) the nature and identity of the targets under the TSP, [REDACTED]
+11
+[REDACTED] (4) additional classified details about the operation of the TSP that
+12
+13
+would be necessary to adjudicate the plaintiffs' allegations (to the extent relevant) including facts
+14
+15
+concerning the operational swiftness and agility of the TSP, particularly in conjunction with meta
+data analysis, [REDACTED] and the
+16
+effectiveness and success of the TSP; and (5) other NSA surveillance activities that may be
+17
+needed to address and disprove the content dragnet allegations, [REDACTED]
+18
+[REDACTED]
+19
+[REDACTED] See Classified NSA Decl. [REDACTED] 47. In
+20
+my judgment, revealing or risking disclosure of the foregoing NSA intelligence activities,
+21
+sources, and methods in order to show that NSA is not conducting the "dragnet" on the content
+22
+of communications that plaintiffs allege would cause exceptional harm to national security by
+23
+24
+25
+disclosing to our adversaries the ability of the United States to monitor and track their activities
+and communications.
+26
+40. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) Second, I also assert privilege over facts that would
+27
+disclose or describe the NSA's non-content meta data collection activities, including over
+28
+whether or not the plaintiffs have been subject to those activities. See Classified NSA Decl. [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT- [REDACTED] /HCS//ORCON/NOFORN// [REDACTED]
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+22
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT [REDACTED] F//TICS//ORCON/NOFORN [REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED] 49-57. In my judgment, the NSA is unable to disclose any information about the existence or
+1
+2
+operation of the NSA's bulk collection or targeted analysis of Internet or telephony meta data
+3 without causing exceptionally grave harm to national security. These are among the most
+4
+important intelligence tools the NSA uses, and they have never been officially confirmed or
+5
+denied by the United States. Disclosing or confirming these activities would seriously
+6
+undermine an essential tool for tracking possible terrorist plots and would help foreign
+7
+8 adversaries evade detection. Such a disclosure would also undermine ongoing intelligence
+9
+operations authorized by the FISC.
+10
+41. (TS/SI/OC/NF) Third, I also assert privilege over information concerning NSA
+11
+activities conducted pursuant to various FISC orders and under the authority of the FISA
+12
+13
+described by the NSA. See Classified NSA Decl. [REDACTED] 57-66. In my judgment, disclosure of
+14
+current surveillance activities under orders and supervision of the FISC and authority of the
+15
+FISA, either directly or indirectly, would seriously compromise, if not destroy, vital ongoing
+16
+intelligence operations. My privilege assertion extends to the existence of and any information
+17
+concerning the (i) FISC Pen Register Order, as subsequently reauthorized, see id. [REDACTED] 58; (ii) FISC
+18
+19
+Telephone Business Records Order, as subsequently reauthorized, see id. [REDACTED] 59-62; [REDACTED]
+20
+[REDACTED] (iv) FISC Foreign Telephone and Email Order, see id.
+21
+[REDACTED] 64; and (v) NSA activities conducted pursuant to the Protect America Act and the Foreign
+22
+23
+Intelligence Surveillance Act Amendments Act of 2008, including directives issued to
+telecommunication carriers under those Acts, see id. [REDACTED] 65-66.
+24
+25
+42. (TS/SI/OC/NF) I concur with the NSA that the activities discussed herein and
+26
+described further by the NSA-in particular the meta data collection activities are among the
+27
+most important intelligence tools available to the United States for protecting the Homeland from
+28
+another catastrophic terrorist attack. I also concur that [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//TS [REDACTED] /HCS//ORCON/NOFORN// [REDACTED]
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+23
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT- [REDACTED] //HCS//ORCON/NOFORN// [REDACTED]
+
+1
+[REDACTED]
+2
+[REDACTED]
+3
+In my judgment, after personal
+4
+consideration of the matter, disclosing the information described herein and by the NSA would
+5
+compromise these critical activities, sources, and methods, thereby helping our adversaries evade
+6
+detection and causing exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United States.
+7
+8
+D. (U) Allegations that Telecommunications Companies Assisted the NSA
+9
+43. [REDACTED] In addition, I am asserting privilege over information that may tend to
+10
+confirm or deny whether or not any telecommunications provider has assisted the NSA with
+11
+alleged intelligence activities. The disclosure of any information that would tend to confirm or
+12
+13
+deny allegations of such assistance would cause exceptionally grave harm to the national
+14
+security. Confirming or denying such allegations, again, would reveal to foreign adversaries
+15
+whether or not the NSA utilizes particular intelligence sources and methods and, thus, would
+16
+either compromise actual sources and methods or disclose that the NSA does not utilize a
+17
+particular source or method. Such confirmation or denial would also replace speculation with
+18
+19
+certainty for hostile foreign adversaries who are balancing the risk that a particular channel of
+20
+communication may not be secure against the need to communicate efficiently.
+21
+44. (TS//TSP//SI- [REDACTED] OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+22
+[REDACTED]
+23
+[REDACTED]
+24
+[REDACTED]
+25
+[REDACTED]
+26
+[REDACTED] y
+27
+[REDACTED]
+28
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT- [REDACTED] AICS//ORCON/NOFORNA [REDACTED]
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+24
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT- [REDACTED] //LICS//ORCON/NOFORN/ [REDACTED]
+
+1
+[REDACTED]
+2
+[REDACTED]
+3
+45. (TS//TSP// [REDACTED] //OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+4
+[REDACTED]
+5
+[REDACTED]
+6
+[REDACTED]
+7
+[REDACTED]
+8
+[REDACTED]
+9
+[REDACTED]
+10
+[REDACTED]
+11
+[REDACTED]
+12
+[REDACTED]
+13
+[REDACTED]
+14
+[REDACTED]
+15
+[REDACTED]
+16
+[REDACTED]
+17
+46. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+4 (TS//TSP//SI [REDACTED] /OC/NF) In addition, I have reviewed the classified
+certification of then-Attorney General Mukasey submitted to the Court pursuant to Section 802
+of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 and assert privilege over specific information described
+therein, [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT [REDACTED] //LICS//ORCON/NOFORN/ [REDACTED]
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+25
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT- [REDACTED] F//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN [REDACTED]
+
+1
+[REDACTED]
+2
+[REDACTED]
+3
+[REDACTED]
+4
+[REDACTED]
+5
+[REDACTED]
+6
+[REDACTED]
+7
+[REDACTED]
+8
+[REDACTED]
+9
+[REDACTED]
+10
+47. (TS//TSP//SI- [REDACTED] HOC/NF) [REDACTED]
+11
+Accordingly, I assert the state secrets and DNI statutory privilege over such information,
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+20
+IX. [REDACTED] RISK OF LITIGATION
+48. (TS//SI/OC/NF) Finally, I concur with the NSA that further litigation of this
+21
+case will inherently risk the disclosure of highly classified activities. While plaintiffs wrongly
+22
+allege that the NSA is conducting a dragnet program of content surveillance, disproving
+23
+plaintiffs' speculation would risk or require revealing NSA intelligence activities, sources and
+24
+25
+methods, including bulk meta data collection activities. The stakes we face in the U.S.
+26 Intelligence Community are of the highest magnitude. We know that al-Qaeda continues to plan
+27
+a mass casualty "spectacular" attack inside the United States again that would cause catastrophic
+28
+loss of life, severe economic harm, or threaten the continuity of government. The NSA's
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP// MINT [REDACTED] //ICS//ORCON/NOFORN// [REDACTED]
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+26
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT- [REDACTED] /HCS//ORCON/NOFORN/ [REDACTED]
+
+activities described herein and by the NSA, including NSA sources and methods currently being
+1
+2
+utilized under authority of the FISA, are all directed at this terrible threat.
+3
+X. [REDACTED] CONCLUSION
+4
+49. [REDACTED] () In sum, I am asserting the state secrets privilege and the DNI's statutory
+5
+privilege set forth in 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i)(1) to protect the classified national security
+6
+information described herein and in the Classified NSA Declaration. Moreover, because
+7
+8
+proceedings in this case risk disclosure of privileged and classified intelligence-related
+9
+information, I respectfully request that the Court not only protect that information from
+10
+disclosure, but to take all steps necessary, including dismissal of this action, to protect the
+11
+intelligence information, sources, and methods described herein in order to prevent exceptionally
+12
+13
+grave harm to the national security of the United States.
+14
+15
+I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
+16
+17
+18
+DATE: 30 Oct 2019
+DENNIS C. BLAIR
+Mav
+19
+Director of National Intelligence
+20
+21
+22
+23
+24
+25
+26
+27
+28
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT [REDACTED] /HCS//ORCON/NOFORN/ [REDACTED]
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+27
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_DNI_Blair_2009_Shubert_State_Secrets_Declaration/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_DNI_Blair_2009_Shubert_State_Secrets_Declaration/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a0562c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_DNI_Blair_2009_Shubert_State_Secrets_Declaration/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+{
+ "title": "DNI Blair 2009 Shubert State Secrets Declaration",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Classified declaration of Dennis C. Blair disclosing information regarding the government. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "",
+ "date_created": "2009-09-30",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "TSP",
+ "COMINT",
+ "HCS"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "ORCON, NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Blair, Dennis C.",
+ "Brinkmann, Beth S.",
+ "Letter, Douglas N.",
+ "Hunt, Joseph H.",
+ "Garvey, Vincent M.",
+ "Coppolino, Anthony J.",
+ "Berman, Marcia",
+ "Ahern, Paul E.",
+ "Walker, Vaughn R."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-12-20",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/dni-blair-2009-shubert-state-secrets-declaration",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "0c1d33cc02f8ad45bbdbc8c884173e63fe61642d26e4ac00e0afff8c5dea72e0",
+ "pages": 27
+}
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@@ -0,0 +1,714 @@
+TOP SECRET//TSP/SI
+/HCS//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+1 STUART F. DELERY
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+JOSEPH H. HUNT
+2 Director, Federal Programs Branch
+3 VINCENT M. GARVEY
+Deputy Branch Director
+4 ANTHONY J. COPPOLINO
+5 Special Litigation Counsel
+.6 MARCIA BERMAN
+Senior Trial Counsel
+U.S. Department of Justice
+7 Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch
+8 20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
+Washington, D.C. 20001
+9 Phone: (202) 514-4782
+10 Fax: (202) 616-8460
+Attorneys for the United States and
+11 Government Defendants Sued in their
+Official Capacities
+12
+UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
+NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
+SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
+13
+14
+15 CAROLYN JEWEL, et al.
+16 Plaintiffs,
+17
+18 V.
+19 NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, et al.
+20 Defendants.
+
+) No. 08-cv-4873-JSW
+)
+) CLASSIFIED DECLARATION
+) OF JAMES R. CLAPPER
+) DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
+) INTELLIGENCE
+)
+) EX PARTE, IN CAMERA
+) SUBMISSION
+)
+21
+22 Date: November 2, 2012
+23 Time: 9:00 a.m.
+24 Courtroom: 11 - 19th Floor
+Judge Jeffrey S. White
+25
+I, James R. Clapper, do hereby state and declare as follows:
+26
+INTRODUCTION
+27
+28 1. (U) I am the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) of the United States. I have
+
+held this position since August 9, 2010. In my capacity as the DNI, I oversee the United States
+2 Intelligence Community and serve as the principal intelligence adviser to the President. Prior to
+3 serving as the DNI, I served as the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency from 1992 to
+4 1995, the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency from 2001 to 2006, and the
+5 Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence from 2007 to 2010, where I served as the principal
+6 staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense on intelligence,
+7 counterintelligence, and security matters for the Department of Defense. In my capacity as the
+8 Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, I simultaneously served as the Director of Defense
+9 Intelligence for the DNI.
+10
+11 2. (U) The purpose of this declaration is to formally assert, in my capacity as the
+12 Director of National Intelligence and head of the United States Intelligence Community, the state
+13 secrets privilege and a statutory privilege under the National Security Act, see 50 U.S.C. § 403-
+14 1(i)(1), in order to protect intelligence sources and methods that are at risk of disclosure in the
+15 above-captioned case as well as in Shubert v. Obama (07-cv-00693) (M: 06-cv-1791). The
+16 statements made herein are based on my personal knowledge as well as on information provided
+17 to me in my official capacity as the Director of National Intelligence.
+18
+19 SUMMARY
+20
+21 3. (U) In the course of my official duties, I have been advised of this lawsuit and the
+22 allegations at issue in the plaintiffs' complaints in the Jewel and Shubert actions. In personally
+23 considering this matter, I have executed a separate unclassified declaration dated September 12,
+24 2012. Moreover, I have read and personally considered the information contained in the Public
+25 and the In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency (NSA),
+26 executed on September 11, 2012 (hereafter "Classified NSA Declaration"). Disclosure of the
+27
+28 information covered by my and NSA's privilege assertions reasonably could be expected to
+1 cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United States and, therefore, the
+2 information should be excluded from any use in this case. In addition, it is my judgment that
+3 sensitive state secrets concerning NSA's sources, methods and activities are so central to the
+4 subject matter of the litigation that any attempt to proceed in this case will substantially risk the
+5 disclosure of the classified privileged national security information described herein and will
+6 therefore risk exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United States.
+7
+8 4. (TS//TSP/SI [REDACTED] HOC/NF) As the NSA states, the allegations in this
+9 lawsuit put at risk of disclosure information concerning several highly classified and critically
+10 important NSA intelligence activities that commenced after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which were
+11 subsequently transitioned to the authority of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"),
+12 and continue to be utilized by the NSA. See Classified NSA Declaration ¶¶ 5-11; 27-51.
+13
+14 5. (TS//TSP/SI- [REDACTED] HOC/NF) In order to address plaintiffs' allegation that
+15 the NSA, with the assistance of telecommunication companies including AT&T and Verizon, has
+16 indiscriminately intercepted the content and obtained the communications records of millions of
+17 ordinary Americans as part of an alleged presidentially authorized "Program" after 9/11, see,
+18 e.g., Jewel Complaint at ¶¶ 2-13; 39-97; Shubert Second Amended Complaint (SAC) ¶¶ 1-7, 62-
+19 91, further litigation risks the disclosure of information concerning several classified NSA
+20 intelligence activities, sources and methods, [REDACTED] in connection with NSA's (1) targeted
+21 content surveillance aimed at al-Qa'ida and affiliated terrorist organizations, pursuant to the
+22 Terrorist Surveillance Program ("TSP") and later pursuant to FISA authority; (2) the bulk
+23 collection and targeted analysis of non-content information about telephone and Internet
+24
+25 communications—critically important and highly sensitive activities that have also been
+26 conducted pursuant to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC") orders, or other
+27 authority, and that enable the NSA to uncover the contacts [REDACTED] and (3) [REDACTED].
+28 This lawsuit therefore puts at risk of disclosure
+1 information concerning essential foreign intelligence-gathering activities utilized to meet the
+2 extremely serious threat of another terrorist attack on the U.S. Homeland, a threat which I
+3 describe further below.
+4
+5 6. (TS//TSP/SI [REDACTED] HOC/NF) Accordingly, as set forth further below, I am
+6 asserting the state secrets privilege and the DNI's authority to protect intelligence sources and
+7 methods pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i)(1) to protect against the disclosure of the highly
+8 classified intelligence sources and methods put at issue in this case and vital to the national
+9 security of the United States, including: (1) any information that would tend to confirm or deny
+10 whether particular individuals, including the named plaintiffs, have been subject to the alleged
+11 NSA intelligence activities; (2) information concerning NSA intelligence sources and methods,
+12 including facts demonstrating that the content collection under the TSP was limited to specific
+13 al-Qa'ida and associated terrorist-related international communications and that the NSA did not
+14 and does not otherwise conduct a dragnet of content surveillance as plaintiffs allege; (3) facts
+15 that would tend to confirm or deny other intelligence activities authorized by the President after
+16 9/11 and later transitioned to the authority of the FISA – that is, the existence of the NSA's bulk
+17 non-content (i.e., meta data) collection, and any information about those activities; and (4)
+18 [REDACTED]
+19 I specifically concur with the NSA that public speculation about
+20 alleged NSA activities does not diminish the need to protect intelligence sources and methods
+21 from further exposure, and that official confirmation and disclosure of the classified privileged
+22 national security information described herein would cause exceptionally grave damage to the
+23 national security. For these reasons, as set forth further below, I request that the Court uphold
+24 the state secrets and statutory privilege assertions that I make herein, as well as the statutory
+25 privilege assertion made by the NSA pursuant to Section 6 of the National Security Agency Act,
+26 see 50 U.S.C. § 402 (note), and protect the information described in this declaration from
+27 disclosure.
+28
+1 (U) CLASSIFICATION OF DECLARATION
+2
+3 7. (S//SI//NF) Pursuant to the standards in Executive Order 13526, this declaration
+4 is classified as: TOP SECRET//TSP/SI [REDACTED] //HCS//ORCON/NOFORN. The details
+5 concerning these classification markings are set forth in the Classified NSA Declaration at ¶¶ 12-
+6 15 and are briefly summarized here. Under Executive Order 13526, information is classified
+7 "TOP SECRET" if unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to
+8 cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United States; "SECRET" if
+9 unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to cause serious
+10 damage to national security; and "CONFIDENTIAL" if unauthorized disclosure of the
+11 information reasonably could be expected to cause identifiable damage to national security. At
+12 the beginning of each paragraph of this declaration, the letters "U," "C," "S," and "TS" indicate
+13 respectively that the information is either UNCLASSIFIED, or is classified CONFIDENTIAL,
+14 SECRET, or TOP SECRET.
+15
+16 8. (S//SI//NF) Additionally, this declaration also contains Sensitive Compartmented
+17 Information (SCI), which is subject to special access and handling requirements because it
+18 involves or derives from particularly sensitive intelligence sources and methods. This
+19 declaration references communications intelligence, also referred to as special intelligence (SI),
+20 which is a subcategory of SCI that identifies information that was derived from exploiting
+21 cryptographic systems or other protected sources by applying methods or techniques, or from
+22 intercepted foreign communications. This declaration also references human intelligence (HCS),
+23 another subcategory of SCI that identifies information derived from individuals who provide
+24 intelligence information.
+25
+26 9. (TS//TSP/SI [REDACTED] /OC/NF) This declaration also contains information
+27 about the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP), a controlled access signals intelligence program
+28 under presidential authorization in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001. Information
+1 pertaining to this program is denoted with the special marking "TSP." [REDACTED]
+2
+3 10. (S//SI//NF) Finally, information labeled "NOFORN" may not be released to
+4 foreign governments, foreign nationals, or non-U.S. citizens without permission of the originator
+5 and in accordance with DNI policy. The "ORCON" designator means that the originator of the
+6 information controls to whom it is released.
+7
+8 (U) BACKGROUND ON DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+9
+10 11. (U) The position of Director of National Intelligence was created by Congress in
+11 the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-458, §§ 1011(a) and
+12 1097, 118 Stat. 3638, 3643-63, 3698-99 (2004) (amending sections 102 through 104 of Title I of
+13 the National Security Act of 1947). Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the
+14 President, the Director of National Intelligence serves as the head of the U.S. Intelligence
+15 Community and as the principal adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the
+16 Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters related to the national security. See 50
+17 U.S.C. § 403(b)(1), (2).
+18
+19 12. (U) The United States "Intelligence Community" includes the Office of the
+20 Director of National Intelligence; the Central Intelligence Agency; the National Security
+21 Agency; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; the
+22 National Reconnaissance Office; other offices within the Department of Defense for the
+23 collection of specialized national intelligence through reconnaissance programs; the intelligence
+24 elements of the military services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of the
+25 Treasury, the Department of Energy, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Coast
+26 Guard; the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State; the elements of the
+27 Department of Homeland Security concerned with the analysis of intelligence information; and
+28 such other elements of any other department or agency as may be designated by the President, or
+1 jointly designated by the DNI and heads of the department or agency concerned, as an element of
+2 the Intelligence Community. See 50 U.S.C. § 401a(4).
+3
+4 13. (U) The responsibilities and authorities of the Director of National Intelligence
+5 are set forth in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. See 50 U.S.C. § 403-1. These
+6 responsibilities include ensuring that national intelligence is provided to the President, the heads
+7 of the departments and agencies of the Executive Branch, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
+8 Staff and senior military commanders, and the Senate and House of Representatives and
+9 committees thereof. See 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(a)(1). The DNI is also charged with establishing the
+10 objectives of, determining the requirements and priorities for, and managing and directing the
+11 tasking, collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of national intelligence by elements
+12 of the Intelligence Community. Id. § 403-1(f)(1)(A)(i) and (ii). The DNI is also responsible for
+13 developing and determining, based on proposals submitted by the heads of agencies and
+14 departments within the Intelligence Community, an annual consolidated budget for the National
+15 Intelligence Program for presentation to the President, for ensuring the effective execution of the
+16 annual budget for intelligence and intelligence-related activities, and for managing and allotting
+17 appropriations for the National Intelligence Program. Id. § 403-1(c)(1)-(5).
+18
+19 14. (U) In addition, the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, provides that
+20 "[t]he Director of National Intelligence shall protect intelligence sources and methods from
+21 unauthorized disclosure." 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i)(1). Consistent with this responsibility, the DNI
+22 establishes and implements guidelines for the Intelligence Community for the classification of
+23 information under applicable law, Executive orders, or other Presidential directives and access to
+24 and dissemination of intelligence. Id. § 403-1(i)(2)(A), (B). In particular, the DNI is responsible
+25 for the establishment of uniform standards and procedures for the grant of access to Sensitive
+26 Compartmented Information ("SCI") to any officer or employee of any agency or department of
+27 the United States, and for ensuring the consistent implementation of those standards throughout
+28 such departments and agencies. Id. § 403-1(j)(1), (2).
+1
+2 15. (U) By virtue of my position as the Director of National Intelligence, and unless
+3 otherwise directed by the President, I have access to all intelligence related to the national
+4 security that is collected by any department, agency, or other entity of the United States. See 50
+5 U.S.C. § 403-1(b); Executive Order 12333 § 1.3(a), as amended. Pursuant to Executive Order
+6 13526, the President has authorized me to exercise original TOP SECRET classification
+7 authority.
+8
+9 (U) ASSERTION OF STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE
+10
+11 16. (U) After careful and actual personal consideration of the matter, based upon my
+12 own knowledge and information obtained in the course of my official duties, including the
+13 information contained in the Public and Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J.
+14 Fleisch, National Security Agency, I have determined that the disclosure of certain
+15 information—as set forth herein and described in more detail in the Classified NSA
+16 Declaration—would cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United
+17 States and, therefore, must be protected from disclosure and excluded from this case. Thus, as to
+18 this information, I formally assert the state secrets privilege. In addition, it is my judgment that
+19 sensitive state secrets concerning NSA's sources, methods and activities are so central to the
+20 subject matter of the litigation that any attempt to proceed in the case will substantially risk the
+21 disclosure of the privileged information described herein and in more detail in the classified
+22 declarations, and will therefore risk exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the
+23 United States.
+24
+25 (U) ASSERTION OF STATUTORY PRIVILEGE UNDER NATIONAL SECURITY ACT
+26
+27 17. (U) Through this declaration, I also hereby invoke and assert a statutory privilege
+28 held by the Director of National Intelligence under the National Security Act to protect the
+1 information described herein, see 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i)(1). My assertion of this statutory
+2 privilege for intelligence sources and methods is coextensive with my state secrets privilege
+3 assertion.
+4
+5 INFORMATION SUBJECT TO ASSERTIONS OF PRIVILEGE
+6
+7 18. (U) In general and unclassified terms, the following categories of information
+8 are subject to my state secrets and statutory privilege assertions:
+9 A. [REDACTED] Information concerning the specific nature of the
+10 terrorist threat posed by al-Qa'ida and its affiliates and
+11 other threats to the United States; and
+12 B. [REDACTED] Information that may tend to confirm or deny whether
+13 the plaintiffs have been subject to any alleged NSA
+14 intelligence activity that may be at issue in this matter; and
+15 C. (U) Any information concerning NSA intelligence
+16 activities, sources, or methods that may relate to or be
+17 necessary to adjudicate plaintiffs' allegations, including
+18 allegations that the NSA, with the assistance of
+19 telecommunications carriers such as AT&T and Verizon,
+20 indiscriminately intercepts the content of communications
+21 and also collects the communication records of millions of
+22 Americans as part of an alleged "Program" authorized by
+23 the President after 9/11. See, e.g., Jewel Complaint ¶¶ 2-13;
+24 39-97; Shubert SAC ¶¶ 1-9; 57-58; 62-91.
+25 The scope of this assertion includes but is not limited
+26 to:
+27 (i) (U) Information concerning the scope and
+28 operation of the now inoperative "Terrorist Surveillance
+1 Program" ("TSP") regarding the interception of the content
+2 of certain one-end international communications
+3 reasonably believed to involve a member or agent of al-
+4 Qa'ida or an affiliated terrorist organization, and any other
+5 information related to demonstrating that the NSA does not
+6 otherwise engage in the content surveillance dragnet that
+7 the plaintiffs allege; and
+8
+9 (ii) (U) Information concerning whether or not the
+10 NSA obtained from telecommunications companies such as
+11 AT&T and Verizon communication transactional records as
+12 alleged in the Complaint; see, e.g., Jewel Complaint ¶¶ 10;
+13 82-97; Shubert SAC ¶ 102; and
+14
+15 (iii) (U) Information that may tend to confirm or
+16 deny whether AT&T or Verizon (and to the extent relevant
+17 or necessary, any other telecommunications carrier),
+18 provided assistance to the NSA in connection with any
+19 alleged activity, see, e.g., Jewel Complaint ¶¶ 2, 7-8, 10,
+20 13, 50-97; Shubert SAC ¶¶ 6, 10-13; 66-68.
+21
+22 (U) DESCRIPTION OF INFORMATION SUBJECT TO PRIVILEGE AND HARM OF
+23 DISCLOSURE
+24
+25 A. (U) Information Concerning the al-Qa'ida Terrorist Threat
+26
+27 19. (U) The intelligence activities, sources, and methods that are implicated by this
+28 lawsuit, and put at risk of disclosure in further proceedings, must be viewed and understood in
+1 the context of the threat faced by the United States. In unclassified terms, more than a decade
+2 after the September 11th attacks, we remain in a global conflict with al-Qa'ida and we face an
+3 evolving threat from its affiliates and adherents. America's campaign against terrorism did not
+4 end with the mission at Bin Ladin's compound. Indeed, the threats we face have become more
+5 diverse. As al-Qa'ida's core leadership struggles to remain relevant, the group has turned to its
+6 affiliates and adherents to carry out attacks and to advance its ideology. These groups are from
+7 an array of countries, including Yemen, Somalia, Nigeria, and Iraq. To varying degrees, these
+8 groups coordinate their activities and follow the direction of al-Qa'ida leaders in Pakistan. Many
+9 of the extremist groups themselves are multidimensional, blurring the lines between terrorist
+10 groups, insurgency, and criminal gangs.
+11
+12 20. (U) For example, al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) remains of
+13 particular concern to the United States. The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) assesses
+14 that this is the most likely entity to attempt attacks in the west. Even in the wake of Anwar al-
+15 Aulaqi's death, this group maintains the intent and capability to conduct anti-US attacks with
+16 little to no warning. In its three attempted attacks against the US Homeland -- the airliner plot of
+17 December 2009, an attempted attack against US-bound cargo planes in October 2010, and an
+18 airliner plot in May 2012 similar to the 2009 attempt -- AQAP has shown an awareness of the
+19 capabilities of Western security procedures and demonstrated its efforts to adapt. We remain
+20 concerned about AQAP's efforts to exploit the security vacuum associated with the Arab unrest,
+21 even though the group has suffered recent setbacks in these efforts. The death of al-Aulaqi
+22 probably temporarily slowed AQAP's external plotting efforts but did not deter the group from
+23 attempting another aviation attack in May 2012.
+24
+25 21. (U) AQAP has attempted to continue publishing the English-language Inspire
+26 magazine—previously spearheaded by al-Aulaqi and now-deceased Samir Khan—in order to
+27 mobilize Western-based individuals for violent action. While the deaths of al-Aulaqi and Khan
+28 have affected the quality of the magazine, the publication endures and continues to reach a wide
+1 global audience of extremists.
+2
+3 22. (U) Similarly, since the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq in 2011, al-Qa'ida in
+4 Iraq (AQI) has conducted nearly monthly simultaneous coordinated country-wide attacks against
+5 government, security, and Shia civilian targets in Iraq. During the past two years its media
+6 statements have reaffirmed the group's commitment to al-Qa'ida's global ideology and have
+7 encouraged attacks in the West. In July 2012, AQI's leader, Abu Du'a, a.k.a. Abu Bakr al-
+8 Baghdadi, issued his first public audio statement since taking over the group in 2010 in which he
+9 threatened to attack the US Homeland, praised the US defeat in Iraq, and applauded the actions
+10 of the Syrian population in rising up against the Asad regime. The statement included the
+11 phrase, "We say to those that have fallen out of communication, oh sleeping people wake up. Oh
+12 sitting people rise," which possibly is a call to Iraqi populations in and outside the region to
+13 become more involved in AQI activities.
+14
+15 23. (U) AQI's propaganda statements have cited its support for uprisings against
+16 secular governments in the Middle East and North Africa, and in a June statement, the group
+17 expressed solidarity with the Syrian Sunni population. In January 2011, it published an
+18 explosives training video that called for lone wolf attacks in the West and against so-called
+19 apostate regimes in the Middle East.
+20
+21 24. (U) During the past two years, American and Canadian authorities have arrested
+22 several North America-based AQI associates, highlighting the potential threat posed to the
+23 United States. In May 2011, the FBI arrested Kentucky-based Iraqi nationals Waad Alwan and
+24 Shareef Hamadi for attempting to send weapons and explosives from Kentucky to Iraq and
+25 conspiring to commit terrorism while in Iraq. Alwan pled guilty to supporting terrorism in
+26 December. In January 2010, Canadian authorities arrested dual Iraqi-Canadian citizen Faruq 'Isa
+27 who is accused of vetting individuals on the internet for suicide operations in Iraq.
+28
+1 25. (U) We continue to monitor al-Shabaab and its foreign fighter cadre as a potential
+2 threat to the US Homeland, although the group is mainly focused on combating the ongoing
+3 Kenyan and Ethiopian incursions into Somalia which have eroded its territorial safehaven since
+4 late last year. The group, which formally merged with al-Qa'ida in February 2012, also remains
+5 intent on conducting attacks against regional and Western targets in East Africa, especially in
+6 countries supporting the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and allied forces in Somalia.
+7 Probable al-Shabaab sympathizers recently conducted several low-level attacks in Kenya. Al-
+8 Shabaab leaders in the past have publicly called for transnational attacks, including threatening
+9 to avenge the January 2012 death of British national and al-Shabaab senior foreign fighter Bilal
+10 Berjawi.
+11
+12 26. (U) Al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Boko Haram
+13 have shown minimal interest in targeting the US Homeland and remain focused on local and
+14 regional attack plotting, including targeting Western interests including through kidnap-for-
+15 ransom operations. AQIM is actively working with local extremists in northern Mali to establish
+16 a safehaven from which to advance future operational activities. Boko Haram probably has an
+17 emerging awareness of US persons or entities in the US with connections to Nigeria. The group's
+18 spokesman in April publicly threatened to find a way to attack a US-based news organization if
+19 its coverage of Islam did not change.
+20
+21 27. (U) In addition, while most Pakistani and Afghan militant groups pose a more
+22 direct threat to U.S. interests and our allies in that region, the Intelligence Community continues
+23 to watch for indicators that any of these groups, networks, or individuals are actively pursuing or
+24 have decided to incorporate operations outside of South Asia as a strategy to achieve their
+25 objectives. Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) leaders have repeatedly threatened attacks against
+26 the U.S., including after the death of Bin Ladin in May 2011. NCTC assesses that TTP's claim
+27 of responsibility for the failed Times Square bombing in May 2010 demonstrates its willingness
+28 to act on this intent.
+1
+2 28. (U) To the extent classified information about the al-Qa'ida threat, from
+3 September 11, 2001 to the present, or the many other threats facing the United States, would be
+4 at issue in attempting to litigate this case, such information could not be disclosed without
+5 revealing intelligence sources, methods, and information of the United States and thereby
+6 causing exceptionally grave damage to the national security. Therefore, I assert the state secrets
+7 and DNI statutory privilege to protect such information from disclosure. Some of the classified
+8 threat information is described further below.
+9
+10 29. (S//OC/NF) The NCTC's current classified threat assessment underscores the
+11 continuing threat posed by al-Qa'ida and its affiliates. While NCTC assess that "core" al-Qa'ida
+12 is probably currently unable to carry out complex, coordinated, large-scale attacks in the West,
+13 the terrorist threat to the United States has diversified to include groups affiliated or allied with
+14 al-Qa'ida. For example, the NCTC assesses that Pakistan-based al-Qaida remains intent on
+15 conducting terrorist attacks inside the United States. Although the group's operational
+16 capabilities have been severely degraded by leadership losses and setbacks in recent years, the
+17 threat has not been eliminated. NCTC assesses that these terrorist adversaries remain determined
+18 to strike, including via smaller and simpler plots that may be more difficult to detect. Preventing
+19 attacks remains the Intelligence Community's highest priority. In this evolving threat landscape,
+20 the Intelligence Community continues to work together to disrupt terrorist plots against the US at
+21 home and overseas, to significantly degrade al-Qa'ida through relentless counterterrorism (CT)
+22 pressure in key global safe havens, and to share key information with domestic and international
+23 partners.
+24
+25 (1) (S//NF) Counterterrorism Successes Against al-Qa'ida
+26
+27 30. (S//NF) Major counterterrorism successes and momentous global events in recent
+28 years have altered the terrorist threat landscape in a way that lessens the direct threat of a large-
+1 scale, operationally complex, mass-casualty attack against the U.S. Homeland in the near-term.
+2 [REDACTED]
+3
+4 31. (S//NF) The deaths of Pakistan-based al-Qa'ida leader Usama Bin Ladin and
+5 AQAP planner Anwar al-Aulaqi in 2011 removed two of the most influential drivers of the
+6 terrorist threat against the Homeland. These two leaders provided strategic oversight and
+7 operational guidance for the majority of the most notable large-scale attacks and attempted
+8 attacks against the United States since 2001. Additionally, they were responsible for providing
+9 inspiration to a global audience of al-Qa'ida members, allies, and adherents about the necessity
+10 of attacking the "far" enemy in order to achieve the longstanding goal of the global jihad. In the
+11 [REDACTED]
+12
+13 33. (S//NF) Al-Qa'ida has not conducted a successful attack in the West since 2005,
+14 and last trained and deployed operatives to the United States for attacks in 2009.
+15 [REDACTED]
+16 (2) (S//NF) The Continuing Threat of al-Qa'ida and its Global Affiliates.
+17
+18 34. (TS//HCS [REDACTED] /OC/NF) Notwithstanding the successes described above, al-
+19 Qa'ida and its global affiliates continue to pose a threat to the Nation's security. Pakistan-based
+20 al-Qa'ida continues to demonstrate some intent to conduct attacks against the US. Intelligence
+21 reporting indicates that al-Qa'ida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri is maintaining Bin Ladin's desire to
+22 strike the United States, and looking to leverage the group's affiliates as a means to overcome
+23 their own operational constraints. NCTC assesses that the group almost certainly would attempt
+24 to attack the United States if resources, including viable operatives, were available. Zawahiri
+25 [REDACTED] Al-Qa'ida's prospects for rebounding from its weakened state are low and depend on its
+26 ability to protect its Pakistan-based cadre and global influence, while addressing deficiencies in
+27 leadership and operational capabilities. Despite its shrinking leadership cadre, persistent unrest
+28 in places such as Yemen, Libya, Syria, and Egypt, and the impending withdrawal of U.S. forces
+1 from Afghanistan, may provide core al-Qa'ida an opportunity to al-Qa'ida a propaganda
+2 opportunity to claim victories over the US and reinvigorate its image as the leader of the global
+3 movement.
+4
+5 35. (TS//HCS [REDACTED] /OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+6
+7 36. (S//NF) In addition, against this backdrop of a weakened core al-Qa'ida, NCTC
+8 assesses that in the coming years the U.S. will be facing a more interdependent and diverse
+9 terrorist threat than we have experienced to date, which will likely be more difficult to detect.
+10 An expanded set of terrorist adversaries [REDACTED] in recent years have carried on al-Qa'ida's mantle and attempted to strike in and
+11 against the U.S. Homeland. Al-Qa'ida's affiliate groups are likely to remain committed to al-
+12 Qa'ida's ideology and to seek opportunities to strike US interests in their operating areas or in
+13 the West. The intent and capability of each affiliate to conduct transnational attacks varies
+14 widely, however, in large part because of their focus on achieving local and regional goals.
+15 However, increasing collaboration between al-Qa'ida's affiliates will further shift the focal point
+16 of the global jihad away from South Asia, in particular as the groups share expertise, advice and
+17 inspiration in ways that improve their attack capabilities and/or understanding of our
+18 counterterrorism capabilities and tactics.
+19
+20 37. (TS//HCS [REDACTED] /OC/NF) AQAP continues its efforts to conduct attacks against in the
+21 region and in the West. AQAP remains committed to its regional agenda [REDACTED]
+22 Additionally, periodic reporting reveals AQAP intentions to conduct
+23 attacks in neighboring Gulf States [REDACTED] AQAP is bolstering its ability to
+24 target the West by investigating diverse tactics, identifying potential targets, and seeking
+25 operatives suitable for operations in the West.
+26
+27 38. (TS//HCS/OC/NF)-AQAP as of [REDACTED] 2012 was pursuing multiple plots
+28 against [REDACTED] diplomatic officials in Sanaa, [REDACTED]
+1 39. (TS//HCS/OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+2
+3 (3) (S//NF) Al-Qa'ida's Weapons and Tactics
+4
+5 42. (S//NF) The continuing al-Qa'ida threat can also be seen in the type of weapons
+6 and tactics it may employ. [REDACTED] In its propaganda al-Qa'ida has encouraged "lone-wolf"
+7 extremists to conduct Homeland small arms attacks because firearms are easy to acquire and use
+8 effectively in the US, an assertion borne out by a number of homegrown violent extremists'
+9 small-arms attacks and disrupted plots over the past 3 years. [REDACTED] Al-Qa'ida-inspired extremists will
+10 attempt to exploit emerging consumer technologies for building, concealing and triggering IEDs,
+11 and leverage online resources to provide the know-how for new attack methods [REDACTED]
+12
+13 43. (S//NF) [REDACTED]
+14
+15 (4) (S//NF)
+16
+17 44. (TS//HCS//OC//NF) [REDACTED]
+18
+19 45. (S//NF) [REDACTED]
+20
+21 46. (U) In sum, a variety of entities continue to pose a significant threat to the
+22 nation's security. The Government is utilizing all lawful intelligence gathering capabilities,
+23 including those set forth in the Classified NSA Declaration, to meet these threats and to protect
+24 the American people. I set forth this information not only to provide the Court with background
+25 information necessary to understand why the intelligence activities implicated by or directly at
+26 issue in this case are being undertaken, but also to assert a claim of privilege over classified
+27 threat information. The Government cannot disclose classified threat information in addressing
+28 plaintiffs' allegations or other issues in this case, or even in publicly supporting its assertion of
+1 privilege, because to do so would disclose to our adversaries what we know of their plans and
+2 how we may be obtaining information about them. Such disclosures would lead our adversaries
+3 not only to alter their plans, but also to implement greater security for their communications,
+4 thereby increasing the risk of non-detection. In addition, disclosure of threat information might
+5 reveal human sources for the United States, compromise those sources, and put lives in danger.
+6 Accordingly, although I believe that classified threat information is crucial to understanding the
+7 importance to our national security of the NSA intelligence activities, sources, and methods
+8 implicated by the plaintiffs' allegations, I must assert the state secrets privilege and the DNI's
+9 statutory privilege over this classified threat information because of the exceptionally grave
+10 danger to national security that could reasonably be expected to result from its disclosure.
+11
+12 B. (U) Information That May Tend to Confirm or Deny Whether the Plaintiffs
+13 Have Been Subject to the Alleged NSA Intelligence Activities.
+14
+15 47. (U) Next, I am also asserting privilege over information that would reveal
+16 whether particular individuals, including the named plaintiffs in this lawsuit, have been subject
+17 to the alleged NSA intelligence activities. Disclosure of such information would cause
+18 exceptionally grave damage to the national security.
+19
+20 48. (TS//TSP/SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+21 Accordingly, I assert the state secrets and DNI statutory
+22 privilege as to this information.
+23
+24 49. (U) The NSA cannot publicly confirm or deny whether any particular individual
+25 is subject to surveillance activities. If the NSA were to reveal that an individual is the target of
+26 surveillance, the collection capability relating to that individual would certainly be compromised.
+27 On the other hand, if the NSA were to reveal that an individual is not the target of surveillance,
+28 adversaries would know that a particular individual has avoided surveillance and is a secure
+1 source for communicating. Moreover, providing assurances to those individuals who are not
+2 being targeted quickly becomes unworkable when faced with a case in which an individual has
+3 in fact been targeted. If the NSA were to confirm that any specific individual is not the target of
+4 surveillance, but later refuse to confirm or deny that information in a case involving an actual
+5 target, it would be apparent that surveillance was occurring in the latter case. The only recourse
+6 for the NSA is to neither confirm nor deny whether someone has been targeted or subject to NSA
+7 activities, regardless of whether the individual has been targeted or not. To say otherwise when
+8 challenged in litigation would result in the frequent, routine exposure of NSA information,
+9 sources, and methods, and would severely undermine surveillance activities in general.
+10
+11 C. (U) Information Concerning NSA Activities, Sources, or Methods.
+12
+13 50. (U) Furthermore, I am asserting privilege over any other facts concerning NSA
+14 intelligence activities, sources, or methods that may relate to or be necessary to adjudicate the
+15 plaintiffs' claims, including allegations that the NSA, with the assistance of telecommunications
+16 companies including AT&T and Verizon, has indiscriminately intercepted the content and
+17 obtained the communications records of millions of ordinary Americans as part of an alleged
+18 presidentially authorized "Program" after 9/11. See, e.g., Jewel Comp. ¶¶ 2-13; 39-97; Shubert
+19 SAC ¶¶ 1-9; 62-91 As noted above, my privilege assertion encompasses (1) facts concerning the
+20 operation of the now-defunct Terrorist Surveillance Program, including any facts needed to
+21 demonstrate that the TSP was limited to the interception of the content¹ of one-end foreign
+22 communications reasonably believed to involve a member or agent of al-Qa'ida or an affiliated
+23 terrorist organization, and that the NSA does not otherwise conduct a dragnet of content
+24 surveillance as the plaintiffs allege; and (2) information concerning whether or not the NSA
+25 obtains transactional communication records from telecommunications companies such as
+26 AT&T and Verizon as plaintiffs allege.
+27
+28 51. (U) As the NSA indicates, see Public NSA Declaration ¶ 11, the NSA's
+1 collection of the content of communications under the TSP was directed at international
+2 communications in which a participant was reasonably believed to be associated with al-Qa'ida
+3 or an affiliated organization. Thus, as the Government has previously stated, plaintiffs'
+4 allegation that the NSA has indiscriminately collected the content of millions of communications
+5 sent or received by people inside the United States after 9/11 under the TSP is false. I concur
+6 with the NSA that to the extent it must demonstrate in this case that the TSP was not the content
+7 dragnet plaintiffs allege, or demonstrate that the NSA has not otherwise engaged in the alleged
+8 content dragnet, highly classified NSA intelligence sources and methods about the operation of
+9 the TSP and other NSA intelligence activities would be disclosed which would cause exceptional
+10 harm to national security.²
+11
+12 ¹ The term "content" is used herein to refer to the substance, meaning, or purport of
+13 a communication, as defined in 18 U.S.C.§ 2510(8).
+14
+15 ² The Government has publicly confirmed that, in addition to the "Terrorist
+16 Surveillance Program," other intelligence activities were authorized by the President after the
+17 9/11 attacks in a single authorization that was periodically reauthorized. See Unclassified
+18 Inspector General Report on the President's Surveillance Program (10 July 2009) ("IG Rept.") at
+19 5, available at www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports and Pubs/report_071309.htm.
+20 However, those other intelligence activities remain highly classified, see Public IG Rept. at 5,
+21 and subject to the DNI privilege assertions. As the IG report also indicates, activities that were
+22 originally authorized by the President along with the TSP were subsequently authorized under
+23 orders issued by the FISC. See Public IG Rept. at 30. As a result of this transition, the final
+24 52. (U) I am also asserting privilege over information concerning whether or not the
+25 NSA obtained from telecommunications companies such as AT&T and Verizon the complete
+26 and allegedly ongoing disclosure of private telephone and Internet transactional records of those
+27 companies' millions of customers. I concur with the NSA that confirmation or denial of any
+28 information concerning this allegation would cause exceptionally grave harm to national
+1 security, including by risking disclosure of whether or not the NSA utilizes particular
+2 intelligence sources and methods and, thus, the NSA's capabilities or lack thereof.
+3
+4 53. (TS//TSP/SI//OC/NF) In particular, as set forth in the Classified NSA
+5 Declaration, the United States faced urgent and immediate intelligence challenges after the
+6 September 11 attacks, and undertook signals intelligence activities pursuant to presidential
+7 authorization that were designed to meet those challenges and to detect and prevent future
+8 terrorist attacks by al-Qa'ida and its affiliates. Those activities include the TSP and similar
+9 sources and methods of content surveillance that later became subject to FISA authority, as well
+10 as the bulk collection of telephony and Internet non-content meta data that was also later
+11 transitioned to FISA authority and used to discover contacts [REDACTED] See Classified NSA Declaration ¶¶ 27-51.
+12
+13 54. (U) Based on my personal consideration and judgment as to the harm disclosure
+14 would cause to national security, my privilege assertion includes, but is not limited to, the
+15 following activities discussed in the Classified NSA Declaration.
+16
+17 55. (TS//TSP/SI//OC/NF) First, I assert privilege over facts concerning the operation
+18 of the TSP and any other NSA intelligence activities needed to demonstrate that the TSP was
+19 [REDACTED] presidential authorization for the Presidential Surveillance Program activities authorized after the
+20 9/11 attacks expired on February 1, 2007. Id. at 30. To the extent plaintiffs' allegations seek to
+21 put at issue the nature of these other classified activities, they are encompassed by my privilege
+22 assertion in this litigation as well.
+23 limited to the interception of one-end foreign communications reasonably believed to involve a
+24 member or agent of al-Qa'ida or an affiliated terrorist organization, and that the NSA does not
+25 otherwise conduct a dragnet of content surveillance as the plaintiffs allege. Such facts include
+26 those concerning (1) how targets were selected under the TSP; (2) how specific methods were
+27 used under the TSP to intercept telephone and Internet communications and to minimize the risk
+28 of collecting non-target communications and purely domestic communications; (3) the nature
+1 and identity of the targets under the TSP, [REDACTED]; (4) and additional
+2 classified details about the operation of the TSP that would be necessary to litigate the plaintiffs'
+3 allegations (to the extent relevant) including facts concerning the operational swiftness and
+4 agility of the TSP, particularly in conjunction with meta data analysis; [REDACTED]; and the effectiveness and success of the TSP;
+5 and (5) other NSA surveillance activities that may be needed to address and disprove the content
+6 dragnet allegations, [REDACTED] See Classified NSA Declaration ¶¶ 63-73. In my judgment, revealing or
+7 risking disclosure of the foregoing NSA intelligence activities, sources, and methods in order to
+8 show that the NSA is not conducting the "dragnet" on the content of communications that
+9 plaintiffs allege would cause exceptional harm to national security by disclosing to our
+10 adversaries the ability of the United States to monitor and track their activities and
+11 communications.
+12
+13 56. (TS//TSP/SI//OC/NF) Second, I also assert privilege over facts that would
+14 disclose or describe the NSA's meta data collection activities. See Classified NSA Declaration
+15 ¶¶ 74-83. In my judgment, the NSA is unable to disclose any information about the existence or
+16 operation of the NSA's bulk collection or targeted analysis of Internet or telephony metadata
+17 without causing exceptionally grave harm to national security. These are among the most
+18 important intelligence tools the NSA uses, and they have never been officially confirmed or
+19 denied by the United States. Disclosing or confirming these activities would seriously
+20 undermine an essential tool for tracking possible terrorist plots and would help foreign
+21 adversaries evade detection. Such a disclosure would also undermine ongoing intelligence
+22 operations authorized by the FISC.
+23
+24 57. (TS//TSP/SI//OC/NF) Finally, I also assert privilege over information
+25 concerning NSA activities conducted pursuant to FISA authority and Executive Order 12333, as
+26 described by the NSA. See Classified NSA Declaration ¶¶ 37-51; 84. In my judgment,
+27 disclosure of current surveillance activities under these authorities, either directly or indirectly,
+28 would seriously compromise, if not destroy, vital ongoing intelligence operations. My privilege
+1 assertion extends to the existence of any information concerning the (i) FISC Pen Register Order,
+2 as subsequently reauthorized until its expiration in December, 2011, see id. ¶¶ 48-51; (ii) FISC
+3 Telephone Business Records Order, as subsequently reauthorized, see id. ¶ 47; [REDACTED] (iv) FISC Foreign Telephone and Email Order, see id.
+4 ¶¶ 38-40; (v) particular NSA sources and methods utilized under authority of the Protect
+5 America Act and the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, including directives issued to particular
+6 telecommunication carriers under those Acts, see id. ¶¶ 41-45; and (vi) NSA's use of similar
+7 sources and methods pursuant to Executive Order 12333, see id. ¶ 82.
+8
+9 58. (TS//TSP/SI//OC/NF) I concur with the NSA that the activities discussed herein
+10 and described further by the NSA--in particular the meta data collection activities--are among the
+11 most important intelligence tools available to the United States for protecting the Homeland from
+12 another catastrophic terrorist attack. I also concur that [REDACTED] In my judgment, after personal
+13 consideration of the matter, disclosing the information described herein and by the NSA would
+14 compromise these critical activities, sources, and methods, thereby helping our adversaries evade
+15 detection and causing exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United States.
+16
+17 D. (U) Plaintiffs' Allegations that Certain Telecommunications Carriers
+18 Provided Assistance to the NSA with the Alleged Activities.
+19
+20 59. (U) In addition, I am asserting privilege over information that may tend to
+21 confirm or deny whether or not AT&T, Verizon, or to the extent necessary, any other particular
+22 telecommunications provider, has assisted the NSA with alleged intelligence activities. The
+23 disclosure of any information that would tend to confirm or deny allegations of such assistance
+24 would cause exceptionally grave harm to the national security. Confirming or denying such
+25 allegations, again, would reveal to foreign adversaries whether or not the NSA utilizes particular
+26 intelligence sources and methods and, thus, either compromise actual sources and methods or
+27 disclose that the NSA does not utilize a particular source or method. Such confirmation or denial
+28 would also replace speculation with certainty for hostile foreign adversaries who are balancing
+1 the risk that a particular channel of communication may not be secure against the need to
+2 communicate efficiently.
+3
+4 60. (TS//TSP/SI [REDACTED] /OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+5
+6 63. (TS//TSP/SI/OC/NF) In addition, I have reviewed the classified
+7 certification of then-Attorney General Mukasey submitted to the Court pursuant to Section 802
+8 of the FISA Act Amendments Act of 2008 and assert privilege over specific information
+9 described therein, [REDACTED]
+10
+11 Accordingly, I assert the state secrets and DNI statutory privilege over such
+12 [REDACTED]
+13
+14 (U) RISK OF LITIGATION
+15
+16 64. (TS//TSP/SI//OC/NF) Finally, I concur with the NSA that further litigation of
+17 this case will inherently risk the disclosure of highly classified activities. While plaintiffs
+18 wrongly allege that the NSA is conducting a dragnet program of content surveillance, disproving
+19 plaintiffs' speculation would risk or require revealing NSA intelligence activities, sources and
+20 methods, including bulk metadata collection activities. Those vital activities, as described
+21 herein, are highly classified, sensitive, and fragile, and any effort to disclose information about
+22 them could have grave consequences for the national security.
+23
+24 (U) CONCLUSION
+25
+26 65. (U) In sum, I am asserting the state secrets privilege and the DNI's statutory
+27 privilege set forth in 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i)(1) to protect the classified national security
+28 information described herein and in the Classified NSA Declaration. Moreover, because
+1 proceedings in this case risk disclosure of privileged and classified intelligence-related
+2 information, I respectfully request that the Court not only protect that information from
+3 disclosure, but take all steps necessary, including dismissal of this action, to protect the
+4 intelligence information, sources, and methods described herein in order to prevent exceptional
+5 harm to the national security of the United States.
+6
+7 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
+8
+9 DATE: September 11, 2012
+10
+11 JAMES R. CLAPPER
+12 Director of National Intelligence
+13
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_DNI_Clapper_2012_Jewel_State_Secrets_Declaration/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_DNI_Clapper_2012_Jewel_State_Secrets_Declaration/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6850820
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_DNI_Clapper_2012_Jewel_State_Secrets_Declaration/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+{
+ "title": "DNI Clapper 2012 Jewel State Secrets Declaration",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Classified declaration of James R. Clapper disclosing information regarding the government. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "",
+ "date_created": "2012-09-11",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "TSP",
+ "SI",
+ "HCS"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "ORCON, NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Clapper, James R.",
+ "Delery, Stuart F.",
+ "Hunt, Joseph H.",
+ "Garvey, Vincent M.",
+ "Coppolino, Anthony J.",
+ "Berman, Marcia",
+ "Jewel, Carolyn",
+ "White, Jeffrey S."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-12-20",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/dni-clapper-2012-jewel-state-secrets-declaration",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "2483146b63e428fbc8cb530a3ede0edbbac5b9845862f8d230933a425cf83b24",
+ "pages": 33
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_DNI_Clapper_2013_Jewel_Shubert_SSP_Unclassified_Signed_Declaration/ACLU_-_DNI_Clapper_2013_Jewel_Shubert_SSP_Unclassified_Signed_Declaration.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_DNI_Clapper_2013_Jewel_Shubert_SSP_Unclassified_Signed_Declaration/ACLU_-_DNI_Clapper_2013_Jewel_Shubert_SSP_Unclassified_Signed_Declaration.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3b66999
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_DNI_Clapper_2013_Jewel_Shubert_SSP_Unclassified_Signed_Declaration/ACLU_-_DNI_Clapper_2013_Jewel_Shubert_SSP_Unclassified_Signed_Declaration.md
@@ -0,0 +1,731 @@
+STUART F. DELERY
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+JOSEPH H. HUNT
+Director, Federal Programs Branch
+ANTHONY J. COPPOLINO
+Deputy Branch Director
+JAMES J. GILLIGAN
+Special Litigation Counsel
+MARCIA BERMAN
+Senior Trial Counsel
+BRYAN DEARINGER
+RODNEY PATTON
+Trial Attorneys
+U.S. Department of Justice
+Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch
+20 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20001
+Phone: (202) 514-4782
+Fax: (202) 616-8460
+
+Attorneys for the Government Defendants
+
+UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
+NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
+SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
+
+CAROLYN JEWEL, et al.,
+)
+) No. 08-cv-4373-JSW
+Plaintiffs,
+)
+)
+v.
+)
+)
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, et al.,
+)
+)
+Defendants.
+)
+)
+VIRGINIA SHUBERT, et al.,
+) No. 07-cv-693-JSW
+)
+Plaintiffs,
+) PUBLIC DECLARATION OF
+) JAMES R. CLAPPER, DIRECTOR
+v.
+) OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+)
+BARACK OBAMA, et al.,
+) No Hearing Scheduled
+) Courtroom 11, 19th Floor
+Defendants.
+) Judge Jeffrey S. White
+
+Public Declaration of James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert, et al. v. Obama, et al., No. 07-cv-693-JSW
+1
+
+I, James R. Clapper, do hereby state and declare as follows:
+
+INTRODUCTION
+
+1. I am the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) of the United States. I have held
+this position since August 9, 2010. In my capacity as the DNI, I oversee the U.S. Intelligence
+Community (IC) and serve as the principal intelligence adviser to the President. Prior to serving
+as the DNI, I served as the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency from 1992 to 1995, the
+Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency from 2001 to 2006, and the Under
+Secretary of Defense for Intelligence from 2007 to 2010, where I served as the principal staff
+assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense on intelligence,
+counterintelligence, and security matters for the Department of Defense. In my capacity as the
+Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, I simultaneously served as the Director of Defense
+Intelligence for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).
+
+2. The purpose of this declaration is to formally assert, in my capacity as the DNI
+and head of the IC, the state secrets privilege and a statutory privilege under the National
+Security Act of 1947, as amended, see 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1), in order to protect intelligence
+sources and methods that are at risk of disclosure in the above-captioned cases. This assertion of
+privilege updates and modifies my prior assertions of privilege in this litigation. As discussed
+below, I am no longer asserting privilege over the existence of various presidentially authorized
+National Security Agency (NSA) intelligence activities, later transitioned to authority under the
+Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). I continue to assert privilege over still-classified
+information concerning the scope and operational details of these intelligence activities,
+including but not limited to information that would tend to confirm or deny that particular
+persons were targets of or subject to NSA intelligence activities or that particular
+
+Public Declaration of James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert, et al. v. Obama, et al., No. 07-cv-693-JSW
+2
+
+telecommunications service providers assisted NSA in conducting intelligence activities.
+Disclosure of this still-classified information regarding the scope and operational details of NSA
+intelligence activities implicated by plaintiffs' allegations could be expected to cause extremely
+grave damage to the national security of the United States.
+
+3. The statements made herein are based on my personal knowledge as well as on
+information provided to me in my official capacity as the DNI. I am also submitting a classified
+declaration, solely for the Court's in camera, ex parte review, which further sets forth the basis
+for my privilege assertion. See Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of James R. Clapper,
+Director of National Intelligence (Dec. 20, 2013).
+
+SUMMARY
+
+4. In the course of my official duties, I have been advised of this lawsuit and the
+allegations at issue in the plaintiffs' complaints in the Jewel and Shubert actions. In personally
+considering this matter, I have executed a separate classified declaration dated December 19,
+2013. Moreover, I have read and personally considered the information contained in the Public
+and the In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency (NSA),
+executed on December 20, 2013 (hereafter "Classified NSA Declaration"). Disclosure of the
+information covered by my and NSA's privilege assertions reasonably could be expected to
+cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United States and, therefore, the
+information should be excluded from any use in this case.
+
+5. I reach this conclusion, and make these assertions of privilege, mindful of the
+public disclosures of information about classified NSA intelligence programs, both authorized
+and unauthorized, that have taken place since June 2013. The wave of unauthorized public
+disclosures of classified information regarding NSA intelligence activities that began in June
+2013 has been extremely damaging to the national security of the United States, threatening the
+
+Public Declaration of James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert, et al. v. Obama, et al., No. 07-cv-693-JSW
+3
+
+ability of the IC to conduct operations effectively and keep our country safe. At the same time,
+these disclosures have generated great public interest in how the NSA uses its special tools and
+authorities to gather intelligence, and whether they have been used appropriately. At the
+President's direction, I have therefore declassified and publicly released numerous documents
+disclosing the existence of, and a number of details about, the NSA's collection of bulk
+telephony and Internet metadata under sections 402 and 501 of FISA, and the content of
+communications of non-U.S. persons located abroad under FISA section 702. I did this to
+facilitate informed public debate about the value and appropriateness of these programs with full
+understanding of what they allow, the oversight mechanisms in place, and the contribution these
+programs have made to the Nation's security and safety. These documents were properly
+classified and the decision to declassify and release them was not taken lightly. But I concluded,
+in consultation with elements of the IC, that in light of the unauthorized disclosures, the public
+interest in the documents outweighed the potential for additional damage to national security.
+
+6. On December 20, 2013, under authority of the President, the existence of
+collection activities authorized by President George W. Bush in October 2001 was also
+declassified. Specifically, starting on October 4, 2001, President Bush authorized the Secretary
+of Defense to employ the capabilities of the Department of Defense, including the NSA, to
+collect foreign intelligence by electronic surveillance in order to detect and prevent acts of
+terrorism within the United States. President Bush authorized the NSA to collect (1) the contents
+of certain international communications, a program that was later referred to and publicly
+acknowledged by President Bush as the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP), and (2) telephony
+and Internet non-content information (referred to as "metadata") in bulk, subject to various
+conditions.
+
+Public Declaration of James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert, et al. v. Obama, et al., No. 07-cv-693-JSW
+4
+
+7. President Bush issued authorizations approximately every 30-60 days. Although
+the precise terms changed over time, each presidential authorization required the minimization of
+information collected concerning American citizens to the extent consistent with the effective
+accomplishment of the mission of detection and prevention of acts of terrorism within the United
+States. The NSA also applied additional internal constraints on the presidentially authorized
+activities.
+
+8. Over time, the presidentially authorized activities transitioned to the authority of
+the FISA. The collection of communications content pursuant to presidential authorization
+ended in January 2007 when the U.S. Government transitioned TSP to the authority of FISA
+under orders of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC). In August 2007, Congress
+enacted the Protect America Act (PAA) as a temporary measure. The PAA expired in February
+2008 and was replaced by the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, which was enacted in 2008 and
+remains in effect today. Today, content collection is conducted pursuant to section 702 of FISA.
+The metadata activities also were transitioned to orders of the FISC. The bulk collection of
+telephony metadata transitioned to the authority of FISA in May 2006 and is collected pursuant
+to section 501 of FISA. The bulk collection of Internet metadata was transitioned to the
+authority of FISA in July 2004 and was collected pursuant to section 402 of FISA. In December
+2011, the U.S. Government decided not to seek re-authorization of the bulk collection of Internet
+metadata under section 402.
+
+9. As a result of the declassification of the information described above, the U.S.
+Government is no longer asserting privilege over the existence of these programs, whether
+conducted under presidential authority or FISC authorization. It has remained necessary,
+however, to withhold certain information about these programs, even from the publicly released
+documents, to protect sensitive sources and methods, such as particular targets and subjects of
+
+Public Declaration of James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert, et al. v. Obama, et al., No. 07-cv-693-JSW
+5
+
+surveillance, and methods of collecting and analyzing intelligence information, because public
+disclosure of this information would likely cause even graver damage to national security than
+has already been done by the unauthorized disclosures that have occurred since June 2013. As
+explained in great detail in my classified, in camera, ex parte declaration, and in the Classified
+NSA Declaration, the same is true with respect to the highly sensitive and still-classified
+information that is implicated by the plaintiffs' allegations in this litigation. For example,
+litigating plaintiffs' claims would likely risk or require the disclosure of information that would
+tend to confirm or deny whether particular telecommunications carriers have assisted with the
+NSA activities at issue. Therefore, notwithstanding the unauthorized disclosures and the official
+declassification and release of information about NSA intelligence programs that have taken
+place since June of this year, it is my judgment that disclosure of the classified, privileged
+national security information described herein, and in greater detail in my classified in camera,
+ex parte declaration, and the Classified NSA Declaration, will risk further and exceptionally
+grave damage to the national security of the United States.
+
+10. Accordingly, as set forth further below, I am asserting the state secrets privilege
+and the DNI's authority to protect intelligence sources and methods pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §
+3024(i)(1) to protect against the disclosure of highly classified and important intelligence
+information, sources and methods put at issue in this case, many of which are vital to the national
+security of the United States, including: (a) information concerning the specific nature of the
+terrorist threat posed by al-Qa'ida and its affiliates and other foreign terrorist organizations to the
+United States; (b) information that would tend to confirm or deny whether particular individuals,
+including the named plaintiffs, have been subject to any NSA intelligence activities, (c)
+information concerning the scope or operational details of NSA intelligence activities that may
+relate to or be necessary to adjudicate plaintiffs' allegations, including plaintiffs' claims that the
+
+Public Declaration of James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert, et al. v. Obama, et al., No. 07-cv-693-JSW
+6
+
+NSA indiscriminately intercepts the content of communications, and their claims regarding the
+NSA's bulk collection of telephony and Internet communications records ("metadata"); and
+(d) information that may tend to confirm or deny whether AT&T or Verizon (and to the extent
+relevant or necessary, any other telecommunications carrier) has provided assistance to the NSA
+in connection with any intelligence activity.
+
+11. I specifically concur with the NSA that public speculation about alleged NSA
+activities above and beyond what has been officially disclosed does not diminish the need to
+protect intelligence sources and methods from further exposure, and that official confirmation
+and disclosure of the classified, privileged national security information described herein, in my
+classified in camera, ex parte declaration, and in the Classified NSA Declaration, can be
+expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security. For these reasons, as set
+forth further below, I request that the Court uphold the state secrets and statutory privilege
+assertions that I make herein, as well as the statutory privilege assertion made by the NSA
+pursuant to Section 6 of the National Security Agency Act, see 50 U.S.C. § 3605 (note), and
+protect the information described in this declaration from disclosure.
+
+BACKGROUND ON DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+
+12. The position of DNI was created by Congress in the Intelligence Reform and
+Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-458, §§ 1011(a) and 1097, 118 Stat. 3638, 3643-
+63, 3698-99 (2004) (amending sections 102 through 104 of Title I of the National Security Act
+of 1947). Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President, the DNI serves as the
+head of the IC and as the principal adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and
+the Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters related to the national security. See 50
+U.S.C. § 3023(b)(1), (2).
+
+Public Declaration of James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert, et al. v. Obama, et al., No. 07-cv-693-JSW
+7
+
+13. The IC includes the ODNI; the Central Intelligence Agency; the NSA; the
+Defense Intelligence Agency; the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; the National
+Reconnaissance Office; other offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of
+specialized national intelligence through reconnaissance programs; the intelligence elements of
+the military services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of the Treasury, the
+Department of Energy, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Coast Guard; the Bureau
+of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State; the elements of the Department of
+Homeland Security concerned with the analysis of intelligence information; and such other
+elements of any other department or agency as may be designated by the President, or jointly
+designated by the DNI and heads of the department or agency concerned, as an element of the
+IC. See 50 U.S.C. § 3003(4).
+
+14. The responsibilities and authorities of the DNI are set forth in the National
+Security Act of 1947, as amended. See 50 U.S.C. § 3024. These responsibilities include
+ensuring that national intelligence is provided to the President, the heads of the departments and
+agencies of the Executive Branch, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior military
+commanders, and the Senate and House of Representatives and committees thereof. See 50
+U.S.C. § 3024(a)(1). The DNI is also charged with establishing the objectives of, determining
+the requirements and priorities for, and managing and directing the tasking, collection, analysis,
+production, and dissemination of national intelligence by elements of the IC. Id. §
+3024(f)(1)(A)(i) and (ii).
+
+15. In addition, the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, provides that "[t]he
+Director of National Intelligence shall protect intelligence sources and methods from
+unauthorized disclosure." 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1). Consistent with this responsibility, the DNI
+establishes and implements guidelines for the IC for the classification of information under
+
+Public Declaration of James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert, et al. v. Obama, et al., No. 07-cv-693-JSW
+8
+
+applicable law, Executive orders, or other Presidential directives, and access to and
+dissemination of intelligence. Id. § 3024(i)(2)(A), (B). In particular, the DNI is responsible for
+the establishment of uniform standards and procedures for the grant of access to Sensitive
+Compartmented Information (SCI) to any officer or employee of any agency or department of
+the United States, and for ensuring the consistent implementation of those standards throughout
+such departments and agencies. Id. § 3024(j)(1), (2).
+
+16. By virtue of my position as the DNI, and unless otherwise directed by the
+President, I have access to all intelligence related to the national security that is collected by any
+department, agency, or other entity of the United States. See 50 U.S.C. § 3024(b); section 1.3(a)
+of E.O. 12333, as amended. Pursuant to E.O. 13526, the President has authorized me to exercise
+original TOP SECRET classification authority.
+
+ASSERTION OF STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE
+
+17. After careful and actual personal consideration of the matter, based upon my own
+knowledge and information obtained in the course of my official duties, including the
+information contained in the public and classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declarations of Frances
+J. Fleisch, NSA, I have determined that sensitive state secrets concerning NSA sources, methods,
+and activities are implicated by allegations that lie at the core of plaintiffs' claims, and that the
+disclosure of this information—as set forth herein and described in more detail in the Classified
+NSA Declaration—can be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security
+of the United States, and therefore that information must be protected from disclosure and
+excluded from this case. Thus, as to this information, I formally assert the state secrets privilege.
+
+ASSERTION OF STATUTORY PRIVILEGE UNDER NATIONAL SECURITY ACT
+
+18. Through this declaration, I also hereby invoke and assert a statutory privilege held
+by the DNI under the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, to protect the information
+
+Public Declaration of James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert, et al. v. Obama, et al., No. 07-cv-693-JSW
+9
+
+described herein, in my classified in camera, ex parte declaration, and in the Classified NSA
+Declaration, see 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1). My assertion of this statutory privilege for intelligence
+sources and methods is coextensive with my state secrets privilege assertion.
+
+INFORMATION SUBJECT TO ASSERTIONS OF PRIVILEGE
+
+19. In general and unclassified terms, the following categories of still-classified
+information are subject to my state secrets and statutory privilege assertions:
+
+A. Threat Information: information concerning the specific nature of
+the terrorist threat posed by al-Qa'ida and its affiliates and other
+foreign terrorist organizations to the United States, including actual
+intelligence information collected from intelligence collection
+activities;
+
+B. Persons Subject to Intelligence Activities: information that would
+tend to confirm or deny whether particular individuals, including
+the named plaintiffs, have been subject to any NSA intelligence
+activities;
+
+C. Operational Information Concerning NSA Intelligence Activities:
+information concerning the scope and operational details of NSA
+intelligence activities that may relate to or be necessary to
+adjudicate plaintiffs' allegations, including:
+
+(1) Communications Content Collection: information concerning
+the scope or operational details of NSA intelligence activities
+that may relate to or be necessary to adjudicate plaintiffs'
+claims that the NSA indiscriminately intercepts the content of
+communications, see, e.g., Jewel Complaint ¶¶ 9, 10, 73-77;
+Shubert SAC ¶¶ 1, 2, 7, 64, 70, including:
+
+a) TSP information: information concerning the scope and
+operation of the now inoperative TSP regarding the
+interception of the content of certain one-end-international
+communications reasonably believed to involve a member or
+agent of al-Qa'ida or an affiliated terrorist organization;
+
+b) FISA section 702: information concerning operational
+details related to the collection of communications under
+FISA section 702; and
+
+c) any other information related to demonstrating that the NSA
+has not otherwise engaged in the content-surveillance
+dragnet that the plaintiffs allege, and
+
+Public Declaration of James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert, et al. v. Obama, et al., No. 07-cv-693-JSW
+10
+
+(2) Communications Records Collection: information concerning
+the scope or operational details of NSA intelligence activities
+that may relate to or be necessary to adjudicate plaintiffs'
+claims regarding the NSA's bulk collection of telephony and
+Internet communication records (or "metadata"), see, e.g.,
+Jewel Complaint ¶¶ 10-11, 13, 73-77, 82-97; Shubert SAC
+¶ 102;
+
+and
+
+D. Telecommunications Provider Identities: information that may
+tend to confirm or deny whether AT&T or Verizon (and to the
+extent relevant or necessary, any other telecommunications
+carrier), has provided assistance to the NSA in connection with any
+intelligence activity, including the collection of communications
+content or non-content transactional records alleged to be at issue
+in this litigation.
+
+DESCRIPTION OF INFORMATION SUBJECT TO PRIVILEGE
+AND HARM OF DISCLOSURE
+
+A. Information Concerning the Threat Posed by al-Qa'ida, Its
+Affiliates, and Other Foreign Terrorist Organizations
+
+20. The intelligence activities, sources, and methods that are implicated by this
+lawsuit, and put at risk of disclosure in further proceedings, must be viewed and understood in
+the context of the threat faced by the United States. In unclassified terms, more than a decade
+after the September 11, 2001 attacks, we remain in a global conflict with al-Qa'ida and we face
+an evolving threat from its affiliates and adherents. America's campaign against terrorism did
+not end with the mission at Bin Ladin's compound in May 2011. Indeed, the threats we face
+have become more diverse.
+
+21. In addition, to the extent classified information about the al-Qa'ida threat, from
+September 11, 2001 to the present, or the many other threats facing the United States, would be
+at issue in attempting to litigate this case (for example, to demonstrate the reasonableness of the
+intelligence-gathering activities initiated in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks, and
+
+Public Declaration of James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert, et al. v. Obama, et al., No. 07-cv-693-JSW
+11
+
+those that remain in place today), such information could not be disclosed without revealing
+intelligence sources, methods, and information of the United States and thereby causing
+exceptionally grave damage to the national security. Therefore, I assert the state secrets and DNI
+statutory privilege to protect such information from disclosure. By way of illustration, set forth
+below is an unclassified discussion of al-Qa'ida and several of its principal affiliates. My ex
+parte, in camera declaration discusses some of the classified threat information pertaining to
+these terrorist organizations that is subject to this assertion of privilege.
+
+22. Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) remains of particular concern to the
+United States. The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) assesses that this is the most
+likely entity to attempt attacks in the West. Even in the wake of Anwar al-Aulaqi's death in
+September 2011, this group maintains the intent and capability to conduct anti-United States
+attacks with little to no warning. In its three attempted attacks against the U.S. Homeland – the
+airliner plot of December 2009, an attempted attack against U.S.-bound cargo planes in October
+2010, and an airliner plot in May 2012 similar to the 2009 attempt – AQAP has shown an
+awareness of the capabilities of Western security procedures and demonstrated its efforts to
+adapt. AQAP continues to exploit Yemen's inability to disrupt its operations on a consistent
+basis to secure safe havens in the country and mount attacks against the U.S. Embassy in Sanaa.
+
+23. AQAP has also continued to publish the English-language Inspire magazine—
+previously spearheaded by now-deceased al-Aulaqi and Samir Khan—in order to mobilize
+Western-based individuals for violent action, and the publication continues to reach a wide
+global audience of extremists.
+
+24. Al-Qa'ida's affiliate in Iraq has demonstrated its capacity to mount coordinated,
+country-wide terrorist attacks is growing, as it continues at an increasing pace to kill Iraqi
+civilians by the scores, even hundreds, with near-daily car and suicide bombs over the past year,
+
+Public Declaration of James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert, et al. v. Obama, et al., No. 07-cv-693-JSW
+12
+
+while also publicly acknowledging the group had established an affiliate in Syria, the al-Nusrah
+Front, with resources diverted from its operations in Iraq. In April, AQI declared its merger with
+al-Nusrah Front to form the "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant." However, al-Nusrah Front's
+leader rejected the merger and pledged allegiance directly to al-Qa'ida leader Ayman al-
+Zawahiri. Zawahiri in June 2013 recognized al-Nusrah Front as an al-Qa'ida affiliate,
+independent of AQI/ISIL and primarily responsible for operations in Syria. Despite his
+differences with al-Qa'ida leadership over roles insides Syria, AQI/ISIL's leader last year
+espoused support for violence against the United States, and continues to support al-Qa'ida's
+global ideology.
+
+25. While al-Nusrah Front and AQI/ISIL at times openly have fought, both groups
+share the near-term goals of removing the Syrian regime from power, and creating a government,
+favorable to them, based on a strict interpretation of Sharia law. Al-Nusrah Front and AQI/ISIL
+subscribe to a global jihadist ideology, and each group probably has ambitions beyond the
+conflict in Syria. The groups potentially have access to thousands of foreign fighters, including
+some Americans, who since 2012 have traveled to Syria to participate in the conflict for a variety
+of reasons. Additionally, the groups probably have established training camps, familiarizing
+recruits with combat tactics, as well as the handling of firearms and explosives. Al-Nusrah Front
+and AQI/ISIL's access to foreign fighters, and the permissive operating environment in Syria,
+raise the IC's concerns that such individuals, Americans among them, could be leveraged and
+trained to conduct terrorist attacks in their home countries.
+
+26. AQI/ISIL leadership also continues to make public statements inciting violence
+against governments outside of Iraq and Syria. In an August 2013 statement, the group's
+spokesman called on Egyptians to attack the Egyptian military and follow the example of
+
+Public Declaration of James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert, et al. v. Obama, et al., No. 07-cv-693-JSW
+13
+
+extremists in Iraq and Syria. Both the group's spokesman and its overall leader last year
+threatened future efforts to target Americans.
+
+27. For the first time, AQI/ISIL in 2013 began releasing propaganda openly recruiting
+Westerners, including Belgian and French speakers, highlighting its intent to build a capability to
+mount attacks against the West. AQI/ISIL's spokesman in mid-2013 publicly stated the group
+plans to conduct attacks from eastern Iraq to western Lebanon, and the group's vitriolic rhetoric
+and hard-line agenda suggest the group poses a broader threat outside the region than at any time
+since it was pushed into decline by U.S. coalition forces during the Iraq conflict.
+
+28. During the past two-to-four years, American and Canadian authorities have
+arrested several North America-based AQI/ISIL associates, highlighting the potential threat
+posed to the United States. In May 2011, the FBI arrested Kentucky-based Iraqi nationals Waad
+Alwan and Shareef Hamadi for attempting to send weapons and explosives from Kentucky to
+Iraq and conspiring to commit terrorism while in Iraq. Alwan pled guilty to supporting terrorism
+in December 2011. In January 2010, Canadian authorities arrested dual Iraqi-Canadian citizen
+Faruq 'Isa who is accused of vetting individuals on the Internet for suicide operations in Iraq.
+
+29. The IC continues to monitor al-Shabaab and its foreign fighter cadre as a potential
+threat to the U.S. Homeland, although the group is mainly focused on combating African Union
+Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces battling the group in Somalia. The group, which formally
+merged with al-Qa'ida in February 2012, also remains intent on conducting attacks against
+regional and Western targets in East Africa, especially in countries contributing to the AMISOM
+mission. Al-Shabaab associated militants in September 2013 conducted an attack on a shopping
+mall in Nairobi, Kenya. Al-Shabaab leaders in the past have publicly called for transnational
+attacks, including threatening to avenge the January 2012 death of British national and al-
+Shabaab senior foreign fighter Bilal Berjawi.
+
+Public Declaration of James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert, et al. v. Obama, et al., No. 07-cv-693-JSW
+14
+
+30. Al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Boko Haram have
+shown minimal interest in targeting the U.S. Homeland, but remain focused on local and regional
+attack plotting, including targeting Western interests through kidnap-for-ransom operations and
+other means. AQIM is actively working with local extremists in northern Mali to establish a safe
+haven from which to advance future operational activities. Al-Murabitun, the extremist group
+formed in August 2013 through the merger of two AQIM offshoots – Mohtar Belmokhtar's al-
+Mulathamun Battalion and Tawhid wal Jihad in West Africa (TWJWA) – likewise appears
+focused on plotting against Western interests in North and West Africa. Boko Haram probably
+has an emerging awareness of U.S. persons or entities in the United States with connections to
+Nigeria. The group's spokesman publicly threatened to find a way to attack a U.S.-based news
+organization if its coverage of Islam did not change.
+
+31. In addition, while most Pakistani and Afghan militant groups pose a more direct
+threat to U.S. interests and our allies in that region, the IC continues to watch for indicators that
+any of these groups, networks, or individuals are actively pursuing or have decided to
+incorporate operations outside of South Asia as a strategy to achieve their objectives. Tehrik-e
+Taliban Pakistan (TTP) leaders have repeatedly threatened attacks against the United States,
+including after the death of Bin Ladin. NCTC assesses that TTP's claim of responsibility for the
+failed New York Times Square bombing in May 2010 demonstrates its willingness to act on this
+intent.
+
+32. In sum, a variety of entities continue to pose a significant threat to the nation's
+security. The U.S. Government is utilizing all lawful intelligence gathering capabilities,
+including those set forth in the Classified NSA Declaration, to meet these threats and to protect
+the American people. I set forth this information not only to provide the Court with background
+information necessary to understand why the intelligence activities implicated by or directly at
+
+Public Declaration of James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert, et al. v. Obama, et al., No. 07-cv-693-JSW
+15
+
+issue in this case are being undertaken, but also to assert a claim of privilege over classified
+threat information. The U.S. Government cannot disclose classified threat information in
+addressing plaintiffs' allegations or other issues in this case, or even in publicly supporting its
+assertion of privilege, because to do so would disclose to our adversaries what we know of their
+plans and how we may be obtaining information about them. Such disclosures would lead our
+adversaries not only to alter their plans, but also to implement greater security for their
+communications, thereby increasing the risk of non-detection. In addition, disclosure of threat
+information might reveal human sources for the United States, compromise those sources, and
+put their or their families' lives in danger. Accordingly, because I believe that classified threat
+information is crucial to understanding the importance to our national security of the NSA
+intelligence activities, sources, and methods implicated by the plaintiffs' allegations, I must
+assert the state secrets privilege and the DNI's statutory privilege over this classified threat
+information because of the exceptionally grave danger to national security that could reasonably
+be expected to result from its disclosure.
+
+B. Information That May Tend To Confirm or Deny Whether Particular
+Individuals, Including the Named Plaintiffs, Have Been Subject to NSA
+Intelligence Activities.
+
+33. Next, I am also asserting privilege over information that would tend to reveal
+whether particular individuals, including the named plaintiffs in this lawsuit, have been subject
+to NSA intelligence activities implicated by plaintiffs' allegations. Disclosure of such
+information can be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security,
+because actually demonstrating whether particular individuals have or have not been targeted by
+or subject to intelligence activities would require the disclosure of sensitive and classified details
+about NSA intelligence-gathering methods. Accordingly, I assert the state secrets and DNI
+statutory privilege as to this information.
+
+Public Declaration of James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert, et al. v. Obama, et al., No. 07-cv-693-JSW
+16
+
+34. The NSA cannot publicly confirm or deny whether any particular individual is
+subject to intelligence-gathering activities, no matter how likely or unlikely it might appear that
+the individual would be subject to surveillance. If the NSA were to reveal that an individual is
+the target or a subject of intelligence-gathering, the collection capability relating to that
+individual would certainly be compromised. On the other hand, if the NSA were to reveal that
+an individual is not the target or subject of intelligence-gathering, adversaries would know that a
+particular individual has avoided scrutiny and is a secure source for communicating. Moreover,
+providing assurances to those individuals who are not targets or subjects quickly becomes
+unworkable when faced with a situation in which an individual has in fact been a target or
+subject. If the NSA were to confirm that any specific individual is not a target or subject of
+intelligence-gathering, but later refuse to confirm or deny that fact in a situation involving an
+actual target or subject, it would be apparent that intelligence-gathering was occurring in the
+latter case. The only recourse for the NSA is to neither confirm nor deny whether someone has
+been targeted by or subject to NSA intelligence-gathering activities, regardless of whether the
+individual has been a target or subject or not. To say otherwise when challenged in litigation
+would result in the frequent, routine exposure of NSA information, sources, and methods, and
+would severely undermine surveillance activities in general.
+
+C. Information Concerning the Scope or Operational Details of NSA
+Intelligence Activities, Including NSA Sources or Methods.
+
+35. Furthermore, I am asserting privilege over any other still-classified facts
+concerning the scope or operational details of any NSA intelligence activities that may relate to
+or be necessary to adjudicate plaintiffs' allegations. As noted above, my privilege assertion
+encompasses (1) facts concerning the operation of the now-defunct TSP, including any facts
+
+Public Declaration of James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert, et al. v. Obama, et al., No. 07-cv-693-JSW
+17
+
+needed to demonstrate that the TSP was limited to the interception of the content¹ of one-end
+foreign communications reasonably believed to involve a member or agent of al-Qa'ida or an
+affiliated terrorist organization, (2) facts concerning the operation of the collection of
+communications under FISA Section 702; (3) any other information related to demonstrating that
+the NSA has not otherwise engaged in the content-surveillance dragnet that the plaintiffs allege,
+and (4) still classified information concerning the scope or operational details of NSA
+intelligence activities involving the collection of bulk communications metadata, as discussed in
+greater detail in the Classified NSA Declaration.
+
+36. As the NSA indicates, see Public NSA Declaration, the NSA's collection of the
+content of communications under the TSP was directed at international communications in which
+a participant was reasonably believed to be associated with al-Qa'ida or an affiliated
+organization. Thus, as the U.S. Government has previously stated, plaintiffs' allegation that the
+NSA has indiscriminately collected the content of millions of communications sent or received
+by people inside the United States after September 11, 2001, under the TSP is false. I concur
+with the NSA that to the extent it must demonstrate in this case that the TSP was not the content
+dragnet plaintiffs allege, or demonstrate that the NSA has not otherwise engaged in the alleged
+content dragnet, highly classified details about the scope and operation of the TSP and other
+NSA intelligence activities would be disclosed, including NSA intelligence sources and methods,
+thus risking exceptional harm to national security.
+
+37. As explained in further detail in the Classified NSA Declaration, the United States
+faced urgent and immediate intelligence challenges after the September 11, 2001, attacks, and
+undertook signals intelligence activities pursuant to presidential authorization that were designed
+to meet those challenges and to detect and prevent future terrorist attacks. In addition to the
+1 The term "content" is used herein to refer to the substance, meaning, or purport of a
+communication, as defined in 18 U.S.C.§ 2510(8).
+
+Public Declaration of James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert, et al. v. Obama, et al., No. 07-cv-693-JSW
+18
+
+TSP, those activities have included the bulk collection of telephony and Internet non-content
+metadata that was also later transitioned to FISA authority.
+
+38. Based on my personal consideration and judgment as to the harm disclosure can
+be expected to cause to national security, my privilege assertion includes, but is not limited to,
+the following information, discussed in greater detail in the Classified NSA Declaration.
+
+39. I assert privilege over still-classified facts concerning: the scope and operation of
+the TSP and any other NSA intelligence activities needed to demonstrate that the TSP was
+limited to the interception of international communications reasonably believed to involve a
+member or agent of al-Qa'ida or an affiliated terrorist organization; the collection of
+communications content under FISA section 702; and the fact that the NSA does not otherwise
+conduct a dragnet of content surveillance as the plaintiffs allege. Such facts include those
+concerning (a) how targets were selected under the TSP; (b) the specific sources methods used
+under the TSP to intercept telephone and Internet communications; (c) the nature and identity of
+the targets under the TSP; (d) any additional classified details about the operation of the TSP that
+would be necessary to litigate the plaintiffs' allegations; and (e) other NSA surveillance
+activities, including collection of communications content under FISA section 702, that may be
+needed to address and disprove the content dragnet allegation. See Classified NSA Declaration.
+In my judgment, revealing or risking disclosure of the foregoing NSA intelligence activities,
+sources, and methods in order to show that the NSA is not conducting the "dragnet" on the
+content of communications that plaintiffs allege can reasonably be expected to cause
+exceptionally grave harm to national security by disclosing to our adversaries the ability of the
+United States to monitor and track their activities and communications.
+
+40. I also assert privilege over still-classified facts that would describe the scope or
+operational details of other NSA intelligence activities, including but not necessarily limited to
+
+Public Declaration of James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert, et al. v. Obama, et al., No. 07-cv-693-JSW
+19
+
+metadata collection activities, that may relate to or be necessary to adjudicate plaintiffs' claims.
+See Classified NSA Declaration. In my judgment, the NSA is unable to disclose information
+about the scope or operation of the NSA's bulk collection or targeted analysis of Internet or
+telephony metadata (whether conducted under presidential or FISC authority), beyond that which
+has already been officially acknowledged by the U.S. Government, without risking exceptionally
+grave harm to national security. Disclosing or confirming further details about these activities
+could seriously undermine an important tool—metadata collection and analysis—for tracking
+possible terrorist plots; and could reveal methods by which NSA has targeted and continues to
+target its intelligence-gathering activities, thus helping foreign adversaries evade detection, and
+otherwise undermining ongoing intelligence operations conducted under E.O. 12333 and FISC
+authorization.
+
+41. In my judgment, disclosure of still-classified details regarding these intelligence-
+gathering activities, either directly or indirectly, would seriously compromise, if not destroy,
+important and vital ongoing intelligence operations. After personal consideration of the matter,
+it is my judgment that disclosing the information described herein and by the NSA would
+compromise important and critical activities, sources, and methods, thereby helping our
+adversaries evade detection and causing exceptionally grave damage to the national security of
+the United States.
+
+D. Information That May Tend To Confirm or Deny Whether AT&T, Verizon,
+or any Other Telecommunications Carrier Has Provided Assistance to the
+NSA in Connection With any Intelligence Activity.
+
+42. In addition, I am asserting privilege over information that may tend to confirm or
+deny whether or not AT&T, Verizon, or to the extent necessary, any other particular
+telecommunications provider, has assisted any NSA intelligence activity, including but not
+necessarily limited to the alleged intelligence activities. The disclosure of any information that
+
+Public Declaration of James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert, et al. v. Obama, et al., No. 07-cv-693-JSW
+20
+
+would tend to confirm or deny allegations of such assistance can be expected to cause
+exceptionally grave harm to the national security, for a variety of reasons.
+
+43. Confirming or denying such allegations would reveal to foreign adversaries
+whether or not the NSA utilizes particular intelligence sources and methods and, thus, either
+compromise actual sources and methods or disclose that the NSA does not utilize a particular
+source or method. For example, revealing that a particular company assists the NSA would
+compromise a range of intelligence activities by providing confirmation that certain channels of
+communications are vulnerable to NSA interception. Confirmation or denial of a carrier's
+assistance would replace speculation with certainty for hostile foreign adversaries who are
+balancing the risk that a particular channel of communication may not be secure against the need
+to communicate efficiently.
+
+44. This remains so, in my judgment, notwithstanding the U.S. Government's
+declassification of a now-expired April 25, 2013, FISC order directing Verizon Business
+Network Services (VBNS) to produce bulk telephony metadata to the NSA. Although the U.S.
+Government, in acknowledging the existence of the telephony metadata program carried out
+under FISC authorization, also confirmed the participation of VBNS in that program for the time
+period covered by that order (April 25 through July 19, 2013), it has never confirmed or denied
+the identities of any other carriers that previously participated in that program, or the identities of
+any carriers that continue to participate in the program today.
+
+CONCLUSION
+
+45. In sum, I am asserting the state secrets privilege and the DNI's statutory privilege
+set forth in 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1) to protect the classified national security information
+described herein and in the Classified NSA Declaration. I respectfully request that the Court not
+only protect that information from disclosure, but take all steps necessary to protect the
+
+Public Declaration of James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert, et al. v. Obama, et al., No. 07-cv-693-JSW
+21
+
+intelligence information, sources, and methods described herein in order to prevent exceptionally
+grave damage to the national security of the United States.
+
+I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
+
+Executed on: December 20, 2013
+
+JAMES R. CLAPPER
+Director of National Intelligence
+
+Public Declaration of James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence
+Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert, et al. v. Obama, et al., No. 07-cv-693-JSW
+22
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_DNI_Clapper_2013_Jewel_Shubert_SSP_Unclassified_Signed_Declaration/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_DNI_Clapper_2013_Jewel_Shubert_SSP_Unclassified_Signed_Declaration/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7f4dd8a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_DNI_Clapper_2013_Jewel_Shubert_SSP_Unclassified_Signed_Declaration/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+{
+ "title": "DNI Clapper 2013 Jewel Shubert SSP Unclassified Signed Declaration",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Public declaration of James R. Clapper disclosing information regarding the government. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "",
+ "date_created": "2013-12-20",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Clapper, James R.",
+ "Delery, Stuart F.",
+ "Hunt, Joseph H.",
+ "Coppolino, Anthony J.",
+ "Gilligan, James J.",
+ "Berman, Marcia",
+ "Dearinger, Bryan",
+ "Patton, Rodney",
+ "Jewel, Carolyn",
+ "White, Jeffrey S."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-12-20",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/dni-clapper-2013-jewel-shubert-ssp-unclassified-signed-declaration",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "5cd4ac62e590c3ab6000c8f7e56c87659cae9532c69eab99d24d1259103ed8da",
+ "pages": 22
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_DNI_McConnell_2007_Shubert_State_Secrets_Declaration/ACLU_-_DNI_McConnell_2007_Shubert_State_Secrets_Declaration.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_DNI_McConnell_2007_Shubert_State_Secrets_Declaration/ACLU_-_DNI_McConnell_2007_Shubert_State_Secrets_Declaration.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..36770ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_DNI_McConnell_2007_Shubert_State_Secrets_Declaration/ACLU_-_DNI_McConnell_2007_Shubert_State_Secrets_Declaration.md
@@ -0,0 +1,1544 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
+FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
+
+IN RE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+TELECOMMUNICATIONS RECORDS
+LITIGATION
+
+This Document Relates to:
+
+Shubert v. Bush, Case No. 07-693
+
+)
+)
+)
+)
+)
+)
+)
+)
+)
+)
+
+MDL Dkt. No. 06-1791-VRW
+
+CLASSIFIED DECLARATION
+OF J. MICHAEL MCCONNELL,
+DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
+INTELLIGENCE
+
+SUBMITTED IN CAMERA,
+EX PARTE
+
+Hon. Vaughn R. Walker
+
+IN CAMERA, EX PARTE DECLARATION OF J. MICHAEL McCONNELL,
+DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+
+I, J. Michael McConnell, do hereby state and declare as follows:
+
+INTRODUCTION
+
+1. [REDACTED] I am the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) of the United States. I have
+held this position since February 2007. Previously, I have served as the Executive Assistant to
+the Director of Naval Intelligence, as the Chief of Naval Forces Division at the National Security
+Agency, as Director of Intelligence for the Joint Chiefs of Staff during Operation Desert Storm,
+and as the Director of the National Security Agency.
+
+2. [REDACTED] In the course of my official duties, I have been advised of this lawsuit and the
+allegations at issue in Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. The statements made herein are based on
+my personal knowledge as well as on information provided to me in my official capacity as
+Director of National Intelligence. In particular, as set forth below, I have read and personally
+considered the information contained in the Public and In Camera, Ex Parte Declarations of Lt.
+Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director of the National Security Agency, submitted in this case.
+
+CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF J. MICHAEL MCCONNELL,
+DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] /TSP//ICS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+-TOP SECRET//COMINT- [REDACTED] TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+3. [REDACTED] As Gen. Alexander states, Plaintiffs wrongly
+claim that the NSA has conducted a "dragnet" content surveillance program involving the
+interception of “virtually every telephone, internet and/or email communication that has been
+sent from or received within the United States since 2001." Amended Compl. ¶ 1, 4.
+Nonetheless, the adjudication of this case risks the disclosure of information concerning several
+highly classified and critically important intelligence activities of the National Security Agency,
+[REDACTED]
+(1) targeted content surveillance aimed at [REDACTED] pursuant
+to the President's Terrorist Surveillance Program ("TSP") and recent orders of the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC” or “FISA Court"); (2) the bulk collection and targeted
+analysis of non-content information about telephone and Internet communications—critically
+important and highly sensitive activities that are also now conducted pursuant to FISC orders and
+that enable the NSA to uncover the contacts [REDACTED]
+(3) other highly significant intelligence
+activities that are beyond the scope of Plaintiffs' allegations but nonetheless are put at risk by
+this case [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+This lawsuit therefore puts at risk of disclosure information concerning, inter alia,
+essential foreign intelligence-gathering activities utilized to meet the extremely serious threat of
+another terrorist attack on the U.S. Homeland [REDACTED] (a threat which I
+describe further below based on recent assessments of the National Counter Terrorism Center
+(NCTC) prepared in April 2006 and February 2007.)
+
+CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF J. MICHAEL MCCONNELL,
+DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT- [REDACTED] /TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR-
+2
+
+-TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] TSP//LICS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+4. (U)-The purpose of this declaration is to formally assert, in my capacity as the
+Director of National Intelligence and head of the United States Intelligence Community, the
+military and state secrets privilege (hereafter "state secrets privilege") and a statutory privilege
+under the National Security Act, see 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i)(1), in order to protect intelligence
+information, sources, and methods that are at risk of disclosure in this case. Disclosure of the
+information covered by this privilege assertion reasonably could be expected to cause
+exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United States and, therefore, the
+information should be excluded from any use in this case. In addition, I concur with Gen.
+Alexander's conclusion that, because the very subject matter of this lawsuit concerns highly
+classified and critically important foreign intelligence activities, the risk is great that further
+litigation will lead to the disclosure of information harmful to U.S. national security and,
+accordingly, that this case should be dismissed.
+
+CLASSIFICATION OF DECLARATION
+
+5. (S) Pursuant to the standards in Executive Order No. 12958, as amended by
+Executive Order No. 13292, this declaration is classified as: TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]
+/TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN/MR. The details concerning these classification
+markings are set forth in the In Camera Alexander Declaration at ¶¶ 5-8 and are briefly
+summarized here. Under Executive Order No. 12958, information is classified "TOP SECRET"
+if unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to cause
+exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United States; "SECRET" if
+unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to cause serious
+damage to national security; and "CONFIDENTIAL" if unauthorized disclosure of the
+information reasonably could be expected to cause identifiable damage to national security. At
+
+CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF J. MICHAEL MCCONNELL,
+DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] /TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+3
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] TSP//LICS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
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+the beginning of each paragraph of this declaration, the letters "U," "C," "S," and "TS" indicate
+respectively that the information is either UNCLASSIFIED, or is classified CONFIDENTIAL,
+SECRET, or TOP SECRET.
+
+6. (S) Additionally, this declaration also contains Sensitive Compartmented
+Information (SCI), which is "subject to special access and handling requirements because it
+involves or derives from particularly sensitive intelligence sources and methods." 28 C.F.R.
+§ 17.18(a). This declaration references communications intelligence (COMINT), also referred to
+as special intelligence (SI), which is a subcategory of SCI that identifies information that was
+derived from exploiting cryptographic systems or other protected sources by applying methods
+or techniques, or from intercepted foreign communications. This declaration also references
+human intelligence (HCS), another subcategory of SCI that identifies information derived from
+individuals who provide intelligence information.
+
+7. [REDACTED] TSP//OC/NF) This declaration also contains information
+about the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP), a controlled access signals intelligence program
+authorized by the President in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001. Information
+pertaining to this program is denoted with the special marking "TSP."
+[REDACTED]
+8. (S) Finally, information labeled “NOFORN" may not be released to foreign
+governments, foreign nationals, or non-U.S. citizens without permission of the originator and in
+accordance with DNI policy. The "ORCON" designator means that the originator of the
+information controls to whom it is released. Finally, this document is marked Manual Review
+
+CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF J. MICHAEL MCCONNELL,
+DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+-TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] TSP//LICS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+4
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] TSP//LICS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR-
+
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+("MR") indicating that it is not subject to automatic declassification at any specific date.
+
+BACKGROUND ON DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+
+9. [REDACTED] The position of Director of National Intelligence was created by Congress in
+the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-458, §§ 1011(a) and
+1097, 118 Stat. 3638, 3643-63, 3698-99 (2004) (amending sections 102 through 104 of Title I of
+the National Security Act of 1947). Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the
+President, the Director of National Intelligence serves as the head of the U.S. Intelligence
+Community and as the principal adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the
+Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters related to the national security. See 50
+U.S.C. § 403(b)(1), (2).
+
+10. [REDACTED] The United States "Intelligence Community" includes the Office of the
+Director of National Intelligence; the Central Intelligence Agency; the National Security
+Agency; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; the
+National Reconnaissance Office; other offices within the Department of Defense for the
+collection of specialized national intelligence through reconnaissance programs; the intelligence
+elements of the military services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of the
+Treasury, the Department of Energy, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Coast
+Guard; the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State; the elements of the
+Department of Homeland Security concerned with the analysis of intelligence information; and
+such other elements of any other department or agency as may be designated by the President, or
+jointly designated by the DNI and heads of the department or agency concerned, as an element of
+the Intelligence Community. See 50 U.S.C. § 401a(4).
+
+11. [REDACTED] The responsibilities and authorities of the Director of National Intelligence
+
+CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF J. MICHAEL MCCONNELL,
+DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+5
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
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+are set forth in the National Security Act. See 50 U.S.C. § 403-1. These responsibilities include
+ensuring that national intelligence is provided to the President, the heads of the departments and
+agencies of the Executive Branch, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior military
+commanders, and the Senate and House of Representatives and committees thereof. 50 U.S.C.
+§ 403-1(a)(1). The DNI is also charged with establishing the objectives of, determining the
+requirements and priorities for, and managing and directing the tasking, collection, analysis,
+production, and dissemination of national intelligence by elements of the Intelligence
+Community. Id. § 403-1(f)(1)(A)(i) and (ii). The DNI is also responsible for developing and
+determining, based on proposals submitted by the heads of agencies and departments within the
+Intelligence Community, an annual consolidated budget for the National Intelligence Program
+for presentation to the President, and for ensuring the effective execution of the annual budget
+for intelligence and intelligence-related activities, and for managing and allotting appropriations
+for the National Intelligence Program. Id. § 403-1(c)(1)-(5).
+
+12. (U) In addition, the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, provides that
+"[t]he Director of National Intelligence shall protect intelligence sources and methods from
+unauthorized disclosure." 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i)(1). Consistent with this responsibility, the DNI
+establishes and implements guidelines for the Intelligence Community for the classification of
+information under applicable law, Executive orders, or other Presidential directives and access to
+and dissemination of intelligence. Id. § 403-1(i)(2)(A), (B). In particular, the DNI is responsible
+for the establishment of uniform standards and procedures for the grant of access to Sensitive
+Compartmented Information ("SCI") to any officer or employee of any agency or department of
+the United States, and for ensuring the consistent implementation of those standards throughout
+such departments and agencies. Id. § 403-1(j)(1), (2).
+
+CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF J. MICHAEL MCCONNELL,
+DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+-TOP SECRET//COMINT- [REDACTED] TSP//ICS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+6
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] TSP//LICS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
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+13. [REDACTED] By virtue of my position as the Director of National Intelligence, and unless
+otherwise directed by the President, I have access to all intelligence related to the national
+security that is collected by any department, agency, or other entity of the United States.
+Pursuant to Executive Order No. 12958, 3 C.F.R. § 333 (1995), as amended by Executive Order
+13292 (March 25, 2003), reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C.A. § 435 at 93 (Supp. 2004), the
+President has authorized me to exercise original TOP SECRET classification authority.
+
+(U) ASSERTION OF STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE
+
+14. [REDACTED] After careful and actual personal consideration of the matter, based upon my
+own knowledge and information obtained in the course of my official duties, including the
+information contained in the Public and In Camera Declarations of Gen. Alexander, I have
+determined that the disclosure of certain information—as set forth herein and described in more
+detail in the classified declaration of Gen. Alexander—would cause exceptionally grave damage
+to the national security of the United States and, therefore, must be protected from disclosure and
+excluded from this case. Thus, as to this information, I formally assert the state secrets privilege.
+In addition, it is my judgment that sensitive state secrets are so central to the subject matter of the
+litigation that any attempt to proceed in the case will substantially risk the disclosure of the
+privileged information described herein and in more detail in the classified declaration of Gen.
+Alexander and will therefore risk exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the
+United States.
+
+ASSERTION OF STATUTORY PRIVILEGE UNDER NATIONAL SECURITY ACT
+
+15. [REDACTED] Through this declaration, I also hereby invoke and assert a statutory privilege
+held by the Director of National Intelligence under the National Security Act to protect the
+information described herein, see 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i)(1). My assertion of this statutory
+
+CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF J. MICHAEL MCCONNELL,
+DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+-TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+7
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT- [REDACTED] /TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
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+privilege for intelligence sources and methods is coextensive with my state secrets privilege
+assertion.
+
+INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE
+
+16. (U) The information subject to my assertion of the state secrets and statutory
+privileges includes the following:
+
+A. [REDACTED] Information regarding the specific nature of the al
+Qaeda terrorist threat; and
+
+B. [REDACTED] Information that may tend to confirm or deny whether
+the Plaintiffs have been subject to any alleged NSA
+intelligence activity that may be at issue in this matter; and
+
+C. [REDACTED] Information concerning NSA intelligence, activities,
+sources, or methods, including:
+
+(1) [REDACTED] Information concerning the scope and operation of
+the Terrorist Surveillance Program, including information
+that may be needed to demonstrate that the TSP was limited
+to one-end foreign al Qaeda-related communications and
+that the NSA does not otherwise engage in the content
+surveillance dragnet that the Plaintiffs allege; and
+
+(2) [REDACTED] Any other information concerning NSA intelligence
+activities, sources, or methods that would be necessary to
+adjudicate the Plaintiffs' claims, including, to the extent
+applicable, information that would tend to confirm or deny
+whether the NSA collects large quantities of
+communication records information; and
+
+D. [REDACTED] Information that may tend to confirm or deny whether
+Verizon/MCI, AT&T, or any other telecommunications
+carrier has assisted the NSA with the alleged intelligence
+activities.
+
+DESCRIPTION OF INFORMATION AND HARM OF DISCLOSURE
+
+A. Information Concerning the al Qaeda Terrorist Threat
+
+17. (S//OC/NF) Based on all of the intelligence information presently available to us,
+the U.S. Intelligence Community judges the al Qaeda terrorist network has the intention and the
+
+CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF J. MICHAEL MCCONNELL,
+DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] TSP//LICS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR-
+8
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] TSP//LICS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR-
+
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+potential capability to carry out catastrophic terrorist acts on the U.S. Homeland. Indeed,
+intelligence indicates al Qaeda's central leadership is pursuing multiple, possibly related, paths to
+an attack against the Homeland. International counterterrorism efforts in 2006—especially the
+August disruption of a major aviation plot by United Kingdom (UK) and Pakistani authorities—
+have been successful, but they underscore that al Qaeda's core elements are resilient and
+continue to plot attacks against U.S. interests overseas. Preventing such attacks is the U.S.
+Intelligence Community's highest priority. The intelligence activities that are implicated by, and
+put at risk of, disclosure in this lawsuit must be understood in the context of the extremely
+serious threat faced by the United States.
+
+18. (U) With the attacks of September 11, al Qaeda demonstrated its ability to
+introduce agents into the United States undetected and to perpetrate devastating attacks. As the
+President noted in his January 23, 2007, State of the Union Address, "In the mind of the
+terrorists, this war began well before September the 11th, and will not end until their radical
+vision is fulfilled. And these past five years have given us a much clearer view of the nature of
+this enemy. . . . Our enemies are quite explicit about their intentions. They want to overthrow
+moderate governments, and establish safe havens from which to plan and carry out new attacks
+on our country."
+
+19. (S//ICS//OC/NF) Since September 11, al Qaeda leaders have repeatedly
+promised to deliver another, even more devastating attack on America. For example, in October
+2002, al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri stated in a video addressing the "citizens of the United
+States": "I promise you that the Islamic youth are preparing for you what will fill your hearts
+with horror." In an October 2004 tape, al-Zawahiri chastised the Muslim world—"Limiting the
+battle to fighting only the Jews in Palestine and leaving America without attacking it, will not
+
+CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF J. MICHAEL MCCONNELL,
+DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] /TSP//ICS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+9
+
+-TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
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+restrain America and the crusaders against us." In an audiotape released on January 19, 2006,
+Bin Ladin warned United States citizens that "operations in America" are "under preparation and
+you will see them on your very own soil as soon as they are completed, Allah willing." And
+again, in June 2006 Bin Ladin claimed, "We will continue to fight you and your allies
+everywhere, in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and Sudan to run down your resources and kill your
+men until you return defeated to your nation."
+
+20. [REDACTED] In recent months, al Qaeda has reiterated its intent to inflict a catastrophic
+terrorist attack on the United States. As recently as December 20, 2006, al-Zawahiri issued
+threats of attacking the U.S. Homeland saying, “You shall never dream of security until we truly
+experience it in Palestine and all lands of Islam . . . if we are struck in our countries, we shall
+never stop striking you in your countries . . . and as our commander, Shaykh Usama Bin Ladin . .
+told you, 'As you bomb, you will be bombed, and as you kill, you will be killed."
+
+21. (S/NF) Since the September 11 attacks, al Qaeda has staged several large-scale
+attacks around the world, including in Indonesia, London, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and
+Turkey, killing hundreds of innocent people. Foiled plots, including the plot disrupted in August
+2006 to blow up multiple airliners transiting the Atlantic Ocean en route to North American
+cities, would have claimed thousands more innocent victims had they been successful.
+
+(S//NF) Al Qaeda's Likely Presence in the United States
+
+22. (S//HCS//OC/NF) Classified intelligence information provides a more specific
+and alarming picture of the continuing terrorist threat to the Homeland posed by al Qaeda. In
+sum, the U.S. Intelligence Community believes the al Qaeda terrorist network intends to execute
+a catastrophic terrorist attack on the U.S. Homeland. For this reason, the President authorized
+the Terrorist Surveillance Program and related activities described in this Declaration. The
+
+CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF J. MICHAEL MCCONNELL,
+DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT- [REDACTED] /TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+10
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
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+intelligence activities at issue in this case are thus being utilized to meet a known, real, and
+perhaps imminent threat to the lives of thousands of Americans and, indeed, to the continuity of
+the United States Government. The threat we face cannot be understated.
+
+23. (TS//HCS/OC/NF) British and Pakistani authorities in early August 2006
+disrupted the most significant known, advancing threat to the U.S. Homeland and U.S. interests
+abroad since September 11, 2001.
+[REDACTED]
+24. (S//ICS OCANF)-In addition, based on April 2006 and February 2007
+assessments by the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), a national intelligence center that
+is an element of the ODNI, the U.S. Intelligence Community continues to receive reliable
+intelligence [REDACTED] that al Qaeda remains intent
+on conducting a grand-scale attack on the Homeland with a likely focus on U.S. symbols of
+power or economic might. Al Qaeda continues to have these intentions despite the degradation
+of its leadership, resources, and operational capability in the wake of a steady stream of deaths,
+captures, and disruptions. Intelligence sources have [REDACTED]
+As a result of our disruptions of the group's planning and increased security measures, however,
+"softer" targets have become increasingly attractive, although the 2006 US-UK aviation plot
+discussed above shows the group does not shrink from attempting targets with enhanced security.
+Specific softer targets include tourist sites, shopping centers, and passenger trains.
+
+CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF J. MICHAEL MCCONNELL,
+DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+11
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] /TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR-
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+[REDACTED]
+25. (S//HCS//NE)_We have numerous reasons to believe al Qaeda is still plotting
+another attack on U.S. soil. Besides Bin Ladin's own statements, his deputy, Ayman al-
+Zawahiri, issued threats against the United States and its interests and enjoined Muslims
+worldwide to take up violent jihad in more than a dozen audio or video taped statements in 2006
+and at least four thus far in 2007.
+
+26. (S/HCS//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+27. (S//HCS//OC) The Intelligence Community assesses al Qaeda is most likely
+employing a diversified operational planning model, involving multiple, probably autonomous,
+concurrent efforts. This is possibly in response to successful U.S. targeting of known al Qaeda
+senior leaders. [REDACTED]
+
+CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF J. MICHAEL MCCONNELL,
+DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+12
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] /TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR-
+
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+[REDACTED]
+28. (S//HCS//OC/NF) Al Qaeda has regained many of its capabilities despite the loss
+of its Afghan base and a more difficult global operating environment created by sustained U.S.
+and international counterterrorism efforts.
+[REDACTED]
+* Bin Laden and Zawahiri still make major policy decisions and dispense guidance.
+The degree of their involvement in daily matters is unknown, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF J. MICHAEL MCCONNELL,
+DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+13
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] TSP//LICS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR-
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+[REDACTED]
+29. (S//IICS//OC/NF) Our intelligence also indicates that al Qaeda is interested in
+using Mexico as a point of entry into the United States. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+Our intelligence also indicates that al Qaeda is continually looking for operatives
+capable of entering the United States without undue scrutiny, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+(S//NF) Possible al Qaeda Targets and Attacks
+
+30. (TSOC/NE) Although any attack on the Homeland would be viewed by al
+Qaeda as a success, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF J. MICHAEL MCCONNELL,
+DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] /TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+14
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
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+31. (S//HCS//OC/NE) With respect to attacks in the Homeland, the compilation of
+data on al Qaeda's plotting attempts suggests the group remains focused on its strategic targeting
+doctrine—striking major U.S. cities or industries, causing major psychological and economic
+impact. The group's signature attack is one that would be impressive in its scope or audacity and
+hits either multiple targets simultaneously or a single high profile place or person. Reporting
+[REDACTED] has identified a variety of potential targets that would be
+attractive to group operatives, such as:
+[REDACTED]
+32. (TS//ICS/OC/NE) Although intelligence regarding specific targets or
+locations is often incomplete, known target locations include large cities [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+33. (S/HES//OC/NF) Although not eliminating al Qaeda's plotting to conduct a
+spectacular attack against the U.S., constraints on al Qaeda's capabilities and increased security
+measures at airports, government buildings, and other high-profile targets in the United States
+could be making lower profile, less-protected targets increasingly attractive. An attack in the
+
+CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF J. MICHAEL MCCONNELL,
+DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] TSP//ICS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+15
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT- [REDACTED] TSP//ICS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
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+United States, like those against London's transport systems, would probably meet al Qaeda's
+objectives without requiring the planning, resources, and expertise necessary for a complex
+September 11-style attack. This shift in al Qaeda's planning has become apparent from our
+current intelligence.
+[REDACTED]
+34. (S/HCS//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+35. (S//HCS//OC/NE) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+36. (S//ICS//OC/NE) The U.S. Intelligence Community remains concerned the
+multiple terrorist attacks carried out in London in July 2005 and the foiled 2006 US-UK airline
+
+CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF J. MICHAEL MCCONNELL,
+DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+16
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
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+plot may be a harbinger of similar attacks to come in the United States in which Islamic
+extremists in Western countries—whether homegrown or sent from abroad—will mimic and
+refine the small explosives tactics used in these operations. Of specific concern to the U.S.
+Intelligence Community in the wake of the London bombings is the continuing interest al Qaeda
+and its affiliates have expressed in attacking [REDACTED] Our intelligence
+suggests any attack against [REDACTED] most likely would occur in major cities or
+against [REDACTED] serving major cities, which would be consistent with al Qaeda's expressed intent to
+inflict a high number of casualties in key centers of the economy.
+[REDACTED]
+37. (S//ICS//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+While U.S. authorities have identified instances of possible surveillance and pre-operational
+
+CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF J. MICHAEL MCCONNELL,
+DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET/COMINT [REDACTED] TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+17
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] /TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
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+activities aimed at gathering intelligence on rail transit systems, as yet there is no corroborating
+intelligence to link them to operational planning against U.S. mass transit systems.
+
+38. (S//IICS//OC/NF) The U.S. Intelligence Community also believes al Qaeda and
+its affiliates continue to target the civil aviation sector, including U.S. passengers and Western
+aircraft overseas.
+[REDACTED]
+39. (TS//ICS//OC/NF) Despite our intelligence successes, however, there are
+significant swaths of al Qaeda activity that almost certainly remain undetected. We believe it
+likely that, at any given point in time, the group has multiple plots in play against the U.S.
+Homeland, some of which could be in the advanced stages of preparation.
+[REDACTED]
+
+(S//NF) Unconventional Weapons
+
+40. (TS//HCS/OC/NF) The threat posed by al Qaeda extends beyond the realm of
+conventional weapons. We are confident al Qaeda was actively pursuing chemical, biological,
+and radiological capabilities prior to the fall of the Taliban in late 2001 and has been actively
+pursuing a nuclear capability since at least 2005. Based on the extent of senior leadership
+support for the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) efforts, a clearly stated
+intent, and reporting since 2001, we judge al Qaeda remains determined to inflict mass casualties
+
+CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF J. MICHAEL MCCONNELL,
+DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR-
+18
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT- [REDACTED] TSP//LICS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
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+against Homeland targets with CBRN. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+41. (S//NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+42. (S//NF [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+Although al Qaeda has long desired a nuclear capability, to date we assess it is
+unlikely al Qaeda has acquired sufficient materials and expertise to do so.
+
+43. (S/NE) Among al Qaeda and associated jihadist networks, information is
+proliferating on how [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] This
+continued interest and pursuit of unconventional weapons increases the likelihood al Qaeda or an
+
+CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF J. MICHAEL MCCONNELL,
+DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] /TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+19
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] TSP//LICS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
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+associated group will attempt to conduct CBRN attacks against the United States or U.S.
+interests worldwide.
+
+44. (TS/OC/NE) These various examples of some of our intelligence information
+demonstrate the al Qaeda network continues to plan ways to inflict a catastrophic attack. In sum,
+based on all of the intelligence presently available to us, the U.S. Intelligence Community judges
+al Qaeda poses a grave danger to the U.S. Homeland. The severity of that threat and the
+difficulty of tracking al Qaeda members is precisely the reason the Government is utilizing all
+lawful intelligence-gathering capabilities. I set forth this threat information not only to provide
+the Court with crucial background as to why the intelligence activities at issue in this case are
+being undertaken, but also to assert a claim of privilege over this threat information. Although
+the foregoing threat assessment demonstrates precisely why we undertake these activities, the
+Government cannot disclose this information in defending the legality of the intelligence
+activities being challenged, since to do so obviously would disclose to our adversaries what we
+know of their plans and how we may be obtaining information about them. Such disclosure
+would lead our adversaries not only to alter their plans, but also to implement greater security for
+their communications, thereby increasing the risk of non-detection. In addition, disclosure of
+threat information might reveal human sources for the United States and, thus, compromise those
+sources and put lives at danger. Accordingly, although I believe such threat information is
+crucial to understanding the context in which NSA conducts the intelligence activities put at
+issue by Plaintiffs' lawsuit, I must assert the state secrets privilege and DNI statutory privilege
+over the information because of the grave damage to national security that could reasonably be
+expected to result from its disclosure.
+
+CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF J. MICHAEL MCCONNELL,
+DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR-
+20
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
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+B. [REDACTED] Information That May Tend to Confirm or Deny Whether the Plaintiffs
+Have Been Subject to any Alleged NSA Intelligence Activities
+
+45. (U) In addition to asserting privilege over information concerning the al Qaeda
+threat, I am also asserting the state secrets privilege and the DNI statutory privilege to protect
+from disclosure information that would reveal or tend to reveal whether or not the Plaintiffs in
+this case have been subject to any NSA intelligence activities. See In Camera Alexander Decl.
+¶¶ 32-37.
+
+46. (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+As should be obvious, to confirm or deny whether someone is a target of surveillance would
+disclose either who is being targeted—thus compromising that collection—or who is not being
+targeted, thus revealing to adversaries that an individual is a secure source for communicating or,
+more broadly, the methods being used to conduct surveillance. While it may seem innocuous to
+disclose that certain citizens are not being targeted, such a disclosure may provide insight to a
+trained eye as to the scope of the NSA's activities. Moreover, providing assurances that
+someone is not being targeted becomes unworkable, and itself revealing, when cases arise where
+an individual may be targeted, because refusing to confirm or deny only in cases where
+surveillance is occurring would effectively disclose and compromise that surveillance.
+[REDACTED]
+The only recourse for the NSA is to neither confirm nor deny whether someone has
+
+CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF J. MICHAEL MCCONNELL,
+DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] TSP//ICS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR-
+21
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] FSP//LICS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
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+been targeted or subject to NSA activities, regardless of whether the individual has been targeted
+or not. To say otherwise when challenged in litigation would result in the frequent, routine
+exposure of NSA information, sources, and methods and would severely undermine surveillance
+activities in general.
+
+C. [REDACTED] Information Concerning NSA Activities, Sources, or Methods
+
+47. (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) I am also asserting privilege to protect information
+concerning the classified NSA intelligence activities, sources, and methods that are further
+described in Gen. Alexander's classified declaration. In particular, as set forth in Gen.
+Alexander's Declaration, the United States faced urgent and immediate intelligence challenges
+after the September 11 attacks, and the President authorized signals intelligence activities
+designed to meet those challenges and to detect and prevent future terrorist attacks by al Qaeda
+and its affiliates. Those activities include the Terrorist Surveillance Program ("TSP") and related
+content surveillance now subject to orders of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, as well
+as the bulk collection of telephony and Internet non-content meta data currently authorized by
+the FISC and used to discover contacts [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+48. [REDACTED] My privilege assertion covers any facts concerning NSA intelligence sources
+and methods that are put at risk of disclosure by this case, including (1) information concerning
+the scope and operation of the Terrorist Surveillance Program, including information that may be
+needed to demonstrate that the TSP was limited as the President stated to the interception of one-
+end foreign communications reasonably believed to involve a member or agent of al Qaeda or an
+affiliated terrorist organization, and that the NSA does not otherwise intercept the content of
+virtually every telephone and Internet communication sent from or received within the United
+
+CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF J. MICHAEL MCCONNELL,
+DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] TSP//ICS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR-
+22
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] TSP//ICS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
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+28
+States as the Plaintiffs allege; and (2) any other information concerning NSA intelligence
+activities, sources, or methods that would be necessary to adjudicate the Plaintiffs' claims,
+including, to the extent applicable, information that would tend to confirm or deny whether the
+NSA collects large quantities of communication records information. In my judgment, the
+disclosure of such information would cause exceptionally grave harm to national security.
+
+49. (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) Specifically, based on my personal consideration and
+judgment as to the harm disclosure would cause to national security, my privilege assertion
+includes, but is not limited to, the following activities discussed by Gen. Alexander:
+
+(1) (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) First, I assert privilege over facts concerning the operation of
+the Terrorist Surveillance Program and any other NSA intelligence activities needed to
+demonstrate that the TSP was limited as the President stated to the interception of one-end
+foreign communications reasonably believed to involve a member or agent of al Qaeda or an
+affiliated terrorist organization, and that the NSA does not otherwise conduct a dragnet of
+content surveillance as the Plaintiffs allege. Such facts include those concerning (1) how targets
+were selected under the TSP; (2) how specific methods were used under the TSP to intercept
+telephone and Internet communications and to minimize the risk of collecting non-target
+communications and purely domestic communications; (3) the nature and identity of the targets
+under the TSP, [REDACTED] and (4) other NSA surveillance activities that
+occur outside the United States or are otherwise outside the scope of FISA, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] In my judgment, the
+NSA should not be forced to confirm or reveal its actual intelligence sources and methods in
+order to show that it is not conducting the "dragnet" of surveillance that Plaintiffs allege.
+Revealing such information would cause exceptionally grave harm to the national security by
+
+CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF J. MICHAEL MCCONNELL,
+DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] /TSP//IICS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+23
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] TSP//LICS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR-
+
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+helping foreign adversaries to evade detection.
+
+(2) (TS//SI/TSP/OC/NF) Second, I assert privilege over additional classified details
+about the operation of the TSP that would be necessary to adjudicate the lawfulness of that
+program (to the extent it is at issue), including facts concerning (1) the operational swiftness and
+agility of the TSP, particularly in conjunction with meta data analysis, [REDACTED]
+and (2) the effectiveness and success of the
+TSP. In my judgment, revealing any of this information, even now that the TSP is no longer
+authorized, would disclose highly classified NSA capabilities, sources, and methods, including
+those now being utilized under the current FISC orders.
+
+(3) (TS//SI//TSP/OCANE) Third, I also assert privilege over facts that would disclose or
+describe the NSA's meta data collection activities. In my judgment, the NSA is unable to
+disclose any information about the existence or operation of the NSA's bulk collection or
+targeted analysis of Internet or telephony meta data without causing exceptionally grave harm to
+national security. These are among the most important intelligence tools the NSA uses, and they
+have never been officially confirmed or denied by the United States. Disclosing or confirming
+these activities would seriously undermine an essential tool for tracking possible terrorist plots
+and would help foreign adversaries evade detection. Such a disclosure would also undermine
+ongoing intelligence operations authorized by the FISC, as the meta data activities are currently
+conducted pursuant to FISC orders.
+
+(4) (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) Finally, I also assert privilege over information concerning
+the various FISC orders that are described by Gen. Alexander. In my judgment, disclosure of
+current surveillance activities of the FISC, either directly or indirectly, would seriously
+compromise, if not destroy, vital ongoing intelligence operations.
+
+CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF J. MICHAEL MCCONNELL,
+DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] /TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR-
+24
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] /TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1
+2
+3
+4
+5
+6
+7
+8
+9
+10
+11
+12
+13
+14
+15
+16
+17
+18
+19
+20
+21
+22
+23
+24
+25
+26
+27
+28
+50. (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) Based on my experience, I believe that the NSA activities
+discussed herein and described further by Gen. Alexander—the content and meta data collection
+activities authorized by the President after 9/11 and subsequently authorized by the FISC—are
+among the most important intelligence tools available to the United States for protecting the
+Homeland from another catastrophic terrorist attack.
+[REDACTED]
+Disclosing the information
+described herein and by Gen. Alexander would compromise these critical activities, sources, and
+methods, thereby helping our adversaries evade detection and causing exceptionally grave
+damage to the national security of the United States.
+
+D. (U) Information That May Tend to Confirm or Deny Whether Verizon/MCI,
+AT&T, or any Other Telecommunications Carrier Has Assisted the NSA
+With Alleged Intelligence Activities
+
+51. (TS//SI [REDACTED] TSP//OC/NF) Finally, I assert privilege over any
+information that would tend to confirm or deny whether Verizon/MCI, AT&T, or any other
+telecommunications carrier has assisted the NSA with intelligence activities. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF J. MICHAEL MCCONNELL,
+DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] TSP//IICS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR-
+25
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT- [REDACTED] /TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1
+2
+3
+4
+5
+6
+7
+8
+9
+10
+11
+12
+13
+14
+15
+16
+17
+18
+19
+20
+21
+22
+23
+24
+25
+26
+27
+28
+[REDACTED]
+
+CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF J. MICHAEL MCCONNELL,
+DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] TSP//LICS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR-
+26
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] /TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1
+2
+3
+4
+5
+6
+7
+8
+9
+10
+11
+12
+13
+14
+15
+16
+17
+18
+19
+20
+21
+22
+23
+24
+25
+26
+27
+28
+[REDACTED]
+Accordingly, I assert the state secrets and DNI statutory privilege over such information,
+including the information described in the In Camera Declaration of Gen. Alexander.
+
+CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF J. MICHAEL MCCONNELL,
+DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] /TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+27
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] TSP//LICS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1
+2
+3
+4
+5
+6
+7
+8
+9
+10
+11
+12
+13
+14
+15
+16
+17
+18
+19
+20
+21
+22
+23
+24
+25
+26
+27
+28
+RISK OF LITIGATION AND CONCLUSION
+
+56. (TS//SI//OC/NE) Finally, I concur with Gen. Alexander's conclusion that further
+litigation of this case will inherently risk the disclosure of highly classified activities.
+Plaintiffs wrongly allege that the NSA is conducting a dragnet program of content surveillance,
+but disproving Plaintiffs' speculation would require revealing and probing the intelligence
+activities that the NSA actually does conduct. Those vital activities, as described herein, are
+highly classified, sensitive, and fragile, and any effort to disclose information about them could
+have grave consequences for the national security.
+
+57. (TS/SI//OC/NF) The stakes we face in the U.S. Intelligence Community are of
+the highest magnitude. We know that al Qaeda is planning to attack inside the United States
+again, whether it be a "small" scale attack on shopping malls or "fun" places that kills dozens, a
+devastating attack on aviation or rail systems that kills hundreds, a catastrophic, mass-casualty
+attack that kills thousands, or an attack on government or economic sector infrastructure that
+would cause severe economic harm or threaten the continuity of government. The NSA's
+activities described herein and by Gen. Alexander are all directed at this terrible threat.
+
+58. (TS/NF) For these reasons, in addition to invoking the state secrets and DNI
+statutory privilege to protect the intelligence information, sources, and methods at issue, I
+respectfully urge the Court to dismiss this case.
+
+I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
+
+DATE: 24 MAY 07
+
+J. MICHAEL MCCONNELL
+Director of National Intelligence
+
+CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF J. MICHAEL MCCONNELL,
+DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] TSP//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN//MR-
+28
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_DNI_McConnell_2007_Shubert_State_Secrets_Declaration/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_DNI_McConnell_2007_Shubert_State_Secrets_Declaration/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0c3ff48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_DNI_McConnell_2007_Shubert_State_Secrets_Declaration/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+{
+ "title": "DNI McConnell 2007 Shubert State Secrets Declaration",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Declaration of Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander disclosing information regarding the government’s warrantless wiretapping.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "",
+ "date_created": "2007-05-24",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT",
+ "TSP",
+ "HCS",
+ "MR"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "ORCON, NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Alexander, Keith B.",
+ "Walker, Vaughn R.",
+ "McConnell, J. Michael"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-12-20",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/dni-mcconnell-2007-shubert-state-secrets-declaration",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "pdf_sha256": "db67a776ee8da1d69bdb88d4ef6eb6cd50efbea2a4f427d95c536a352887a87b",
+ "pages": 28
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_Dec-_17_2009_DOJ_Letter_to_Congressman_Scott_re_Public_Information_on_the_Use_of_Section_215/ACLU_-_Dec-_17_2009_DOJ_Letter_to_Congressman_Scott_re_Public_Information_on_the_Use_of_Section_215.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_Dec-_17_2009_DOJ_Letter_to_Congressman_Scott_re_Public_Information_on_the_Use_of_Section_215/ACLU_-_Dec-_17_2009_DOJ_Letter_to_Congressman_Scott_re_Public_Information_on_the_Use_of_Section_215.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3e703ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_Dec-_17_2009_DOJ_Letter_to_Congressman_Scott_re_Public_Information_on_the_Use_of_Section_215/ACLU_-_Dec-_17_2009_DOJ_Letter_to_Congressman_Scott_re_Public_Information_on_the_Use_of_Section_215.md
@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+U.S. Department of Justice
+Office of Legislative Affairs
+
+Office of the Assistant Attorney General
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+
+December 17, 2009
+
+The Honorable Bobby Scott
+Committee on the Judiciary
+United States House of Representatives
+1201 Longworth House Office Building
+Washington, DC 20515
+
+Dear Congressman Scott:
+
+(U) Thank you for your letter of October 5, 2009, requesting that the Department of
+Justice work to provide additional public information on the use of Section 215 of the
+USA PATRIOT Act.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Public discussion of the highly classified uses of Section 215 authority,
+including the bulk collection program conducted thereunder, is problematic because it
+would expose sensitive sources and methods involved in this critical intelligence
+collection activity. Because we are concerned that public disclosure would cause serious
+damage to national security, we cannot disclose publicly that Section 215 is used for bulk
+collection of telephony metadata. We do agree, however, that it is important that
+Members of Congress have access to information about this program, as well as a similar
+collection program conducted under the pen register/trap and trace authority of FISA,
+when considering reauthorization of the expiring USA PATRIOT Act provisions.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The Department has therefore worked with the Intelligence Community to
+prepare a document that describes these two collection programs, the authorities under
+which they operate, the restrictions imposed by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
+Court, the National Security Agency’s record of compliance, and the importance of these
+programs to the national security of the United States. We believe that making this
+document available to all Members of Congress is an effective way to inform the
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+Classified by: Assistant Attorney General, NSD
+Reason: — 1.4(c)
+Declassify on: 11 December 2034
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+legislative debate about reauthorization of Section 215 and any changes to the FISA pen
+register/trap and trace authority. We are working with both the House and Senate
+leadership and the Intelligence Committees to make this document available to all
+Members of Congress, as well as cleared leadership, intelligence and judiciary committee
+staffs, subject to strict rules designed to ensure that there is an understanding of the
+importance to national security of maintaining the secrecy of these programs.
+
+(U) We look forward to continuing to work with you and your staff as the Congress
+continues its deliberations on reauthorizing the expiring provisions of the USA
+PATRIOT Act.
+
+Sincerely,
+
+Ronald Weich
+Assistant Attorney General
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+2
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+U.S. Department of Justice
+Office of Legislative Affairs
+
+Office of the Assistant Attorney General
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+
+December 17, 2009
+
+The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
+Chairman
+Committee on the Judiciary
+United States House of Representatives
+2138 Rayburn House Office Building
+Washington, DC 20515
+
+Dear Chairman Conyers:
+
+(U) Thank you for your letter of October 5, 2009, requesting that the Department of
+Justice work to provide additional public information on the use of Section 215 of the
+USA PATRIOT Act.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Public discussion of the highly classified uses of Section 215 authority,
+including the bulk collection program conducted thereunder, is problematic because it
+would expose sensitive sources and methods involved in this critical intelligence
+collection activity. Because we are concerned that public disclosure would cause serious
+damage to national security, we cannot disclose publicly that Section 215 is used for bulk
+collection of telephony metadata. We do agree, however, that it is important that
+Members of Congress have access to information about this program, as well as a similar
+collection program conducted under the pen register/trap and trace authority of FISA,
+when considering reauthorization of the expiring USA PATRIOT Act provisions.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The Department has therefore worked with the Intelligence Community to
+prepare a document that describes these two collection programs, the authorities under
+which they operate, the restrictions imposed by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
+Court, the National Security Agency’s record of compliance, and the importance of these
+programs to the national security of the United States. We believe that making this
+document available to all Members of Congress is an effective way to inform the
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+Classified by: Assistant Attorney General, NSD
+Reason: — 1.4(c)
+Declassify on: 11 December 2034
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+legislative debate about reauthorization of Section 215 and any changes to the FISA pen
+register/trap and trace authority. We are working with both the House and Senate
+leadership and the Intelligence Committees to make this document available to all
+Members of Congress, as well as cleared leadership, intelligence and judiciary committee
+staffs, subject to strict rules designed to ensure that there is an understanding of the
+importance to national security of maintaining the secrecy of these programs.
+
+(U) We look forward to continuing to work with you and your staff as the Congress
+continues its deliberations on reauthorizing the expiring provisions of the USA
+PATRIOT Act.
+
+Sincerely,
+
+Ronald Weich
+Assistant Attorney General
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+2
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+U.S. Department of Justice
+Office of Legislative Affairs
+
+Office of the Assistant Attorney General
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+
+December 17, 2009
+
+The Honorable Jerrold Nadler
+Committee on the Judiciary
+United States House of Representatives
+2334 Rayburn House Office Building
+Washington, DC 20515
+
+Dear Congressman Nadler:
+
+(U) Thank you for your letter of October 5, 2009, requesting that the Department of
+Justice work to provide additional public information on the use of Section 215 of the
+USA PATRIOT Act.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Public discussion of the highly classified uses of Section 215 authority,
+including the bulk collection program conducted thereunder, is problematic because it
+would expose sensitive sources and methods involved in this critical intelligence
+collection activity. Because we are concerned that public disclosure would cause serious
+damage to national security, we cannot disclose publicly that Section 215 is used for bulk
+collection of telephony metadata. We do agree, however, that it is important that
+Members of Congress have access to information about this program, as well as a similar
+collection program conducted under the pen register/trap and trace authority of FISA,
+when considering reauthorization of the expiring USA PATRIOT Act provisions.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The Department has therefore worked with the Intelligence Community to
+prepare a document that describes these two collection programs, the authorities under
+which they operate, the restrictions imposed by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
+Court, the National Security Agency’s record of compliance, and the importance of these
+programs to the national security of the United States. We believe that making this
+document available to all Members of Congress is an effective way to inform the
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+Classified by: Assistant Attorney General, NSD
+Reason: — 1.4(c)
+Declassify on: 11 December 2034
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+legislative debate about reauthorization of Section 215 and any changes to the FISA pen
+register/trap and trace authority. We are working with both the House and Senate
+leadership and the Intelligence Committees to make this document available to all
+Members of Congress, as well as cleared leadership, intelligence and judiciary committee
+staffs, subject to strict rules designed to ensure that there is an understanding of the
+importance to national security of maintaining the secrecy of these programs.
+
+(U) We look forward to continuing to work with you and your staff as the Congress
+continues its deliberations on reauthorizing the expiring provisions of the USA
+PATRIOT Act.
+
+Sincerely,
+
+Ronald Weich
+Assistant Attorney General
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+2
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_Dec-_17_2009_DOJ_Letter_to_Congressman_Scott_re_Public_Information_on_the_Use_of_Section_215/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_Dec-_17_2009_DOJ_Letter_to_Congressman_Scott_re_Public_Information_on_the_Use_of_Section_215/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..575d2fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_Dec-_17_2009_DOJ_Letter_to_Congressman_Scott_re_Public_Information_on_the_Use_of_Section_215/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+{
+ "title": "DOJ Letter to Congressman Bobby Scott, John Conyers, and Jerrold Nadler re Public Information on the Use of Section 215",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "A letter from the DOJ’s Office of Legislative Affairs providing notice of Executive branch efforts with the Intelligence Committees to make a detailed report on NSA’s bulk telephony metadata program under Section 215. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "",
+ "date_created": "2009-12-17",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "SI"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Scott, Bobby",
+ "Weich, Ronald",
+ "Conyers, John Jr.",
+ "Nadler, Jerrold"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-09-28",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/doj-letter-congressman-bobby-scott-john-conyers-and-jerrold-nadler-re-public",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "f341a4c2188e76e2167f66e95ffe107d83ab2c3d835161a4abc75949078aadd8",
+ "pages": 6
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_December_1_2010_NSA_Memorandum_to_SSCI/ACLU_-_December_1_2010_NSA_Memorandum_to_SSCI.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_December_1_2010_NSA_Memorandum_to_SSCI/ACLU_-_December_1_2010_NSA_Memorandum_to_SSCI.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..67ece21
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_December_1_2010_NSA_Memorandum_to_SSCI/ACLU_-_December_1_2010_NSA_Memorandum_to_SSCI.md
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+CONFIDENTIAL [REDACTED]
+
+1 December 2010
+
+TO: Mr. [REDACTED] Professional Staff Member,
+Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
+(TS//SI//NF) PR/TT, BR Authorities with regard to Geolocation Collection
+
+QUESTION: (TS//SI//NF) What are the current authorities with regard to collecting geolocation information under PR/TT and BR FISA bulk data programs? In Section 215, BR authorities, it says NSA can collect in bulk data, but not geolocation information. Please clarify when NSA can collect FISA geolocation data, either through telephony or internet.
+
+RESPONSE: (TS//SI//NF) You asked whether the Pen Register/Trap & Trace (PR/TT) and the Business Records (BR) provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) preclude the National Security Agency (NSA) from obtaining geolocation information. As you know, pursuant to the Court-authorized PR/TT and BR bulk data collection programs, NSA obtains, respectively, electronic communications metadata and telephone call detail records. NSA’s acquisition and use of this data is governed by very detailed orders issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“the FISC”) copies of which have previously been provided to the Committee.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Under NSA’s Court-authorized bulk electronic communications metadata acquisition program, the FISC has authorized the Agency to collect [REDACTED] categories of electronic communications metadata from [REDACTED] e-mail, [REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+The FISC authorized the
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20070108
+Classify On: 20251001
+CONFIDENTIAL [REDACTED]
+CONFIDENTIAL [REDACTED]
+
+acquisition of this electronic communications metadata pursuant to the pen register and trap and trace provisions of FISA. For a more detailed explanation o categories/types of metadata we respectfully refer you to the FISC’s Memorandum Opinion in docket Number PR/TT [REDACTED] which was pr [REDACTED] vided to the Committee. [REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED] NSA does not acquire what is generally referred to as cell site location information pursuant to this Court-authorized program.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Under NSA's Court-authorized bulk telephone call detail records or telephony metadata acquisition program, the FISC has authorized the Agency to collect call detail records or telephony metadata from certain identified telecommunications companies. Telephony metadata includes comprehensive communications routing information (e.g., originating and terminating telephone number, International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) number, International Mobile Station Equipment Identity (IMEI) number, etc.) trunk identifier, telephone calling card numbers, and time and duration of call. Telephony metadata does not include the substantive content of any communication, as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8), or the name, address, or financial information of a subscriber or customer. The FISC authorized the acquisition of this telephony metadata pursuant to the tangible things provision of FISA. Some of the information currently acquired pursuant to this authority such as an area code or telephone exchange can provide some information concerning a telephone’s possible location. With the exception of a test data sampling acquired from one provider, NSA does not currently obtain cellular mobility data (cell site location information) pursuant to this Court-authorized program. NSA is, however, exploring the possibility of acquiring such mobility data under this program in the near future under the authority currently granted by the Court.
+
+(U//FOUO) If you have any questions regarding this correspondence, please feel free to contact the undersigned.
+
+POC: [REDACTED] Legislative Affairs Officer [REDACTED]
+
+DRV FM: NSA/CSSM 123-2
+Dated: 24 Feb 98
+DECL ON: X1
+CONFIDENTIAL [REDACTED]
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_December_1_2010_NSA_Memorandum_to_SSCI/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_December_1_2010_NSA_Memorandum_to_SSCI/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1165b0a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_December_1_2010_NSA_Memorandum_to_SSCI/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+{
+ "title": "December 1, 2010 NSA Memorandum to SSCI",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "A memo from the NSA to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) about cell site location information. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2010-12-01",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "SI"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-18",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/december-1-2010-nsa-memorandum-ssci",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [
+ {
+ "id": "ODNI_-_CLEANED010-_RFI_Response_SSCI_Gottte---es_1_December_2010-Sealed"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "386efa47a748dd5e564e0759bcc6a269594934f1e7705bb750c754d201d6067f",
+ "pages": 2
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Amended_Order_BR_07-10/ACLU_-_FISC_Amended_Order_BR_07-10.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Amended_Order_BR_07-10/ACLU_-_FISC_Amended_Order_BR_07-10.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ee10445
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Amended_Order_BR_07-10/ACLU_-_FISC_Amended_Order_BR_07-10.md
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+UNITED STATES
+
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
+BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
+ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION OF
+TANGIBLE THINGS FROM
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+Docket Numbers: BR 07-10
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+(TS)
+AMENDMENT TO ORDER FOR PURPOSES OF QUERYING THE
+METADATA ARCHIVE
+[REDACTED]
+
+This matter having come before this Court on the Verified Motion of the United
+States for an Amendment to Order for Purposes of Querying the Metadata Archive [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Derived From: Pleadings in the Above-Captioned Docket
+Declassify on: Determination of the President
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+[REDACTED] seeking an amendment to the Court's Order of May 3,
+2007, in Docket Number BR 07-10, and relying on (1) the Government's application and
+all supporting declarations in Docket Number BR 07-10 and the Court's Orders in
+Docket Number BR 07-10, and (2) the facts set forth in the Government's Verified
+Motion, as made by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and approved by
+the Attorney General, and it appearing to the Court that the Government's motion
+should be granted, the Court finds that:
+
+1. The motion and documents incorporated therein by reference contain all
+statements and certifications required by 50 U.S.C. § 1861.
+
+WHEREFORE, the Government's motion is hereby GRANTED, and it is
+
+FURTHER ORDERED, as follow:
+
+1. The Court's Orders in Docket Number BR 07-10 are incorporated in their
+entirety.
+
+2. The NSA may query the telephone call-detail records using as seed
+numbers the telephone numbers described in the Government's motion subject to the
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+2
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+condition that all queries be reasonably tailored to [REDACTED]
+
+3. The results of each such query shall be segregated to the extent feasible
+until BR 07-10 expires or [REDACTED] whichever comes first.
+
+4. Upon the conclusion of the [REDACTED] or at the time of the
+renewal application, whichever comes first, NSA shall submit a written report to the
+Court stating why the results of any query conducted pursuant to this Motion should not
+be destroyed.
+
+5. This amendment is strictly limited to allowing queries of the metadata
+[REDACTED] and does not apply to queries for the purpose of [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+3
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+6. The Government shall continue to comply with all of the restrictions and
+procedures described in the Court's Orders.
+
+Signed 5 31/07 12:50 PM Eastern Time
+/ Date Time
+
+This authorization expires on the 26th day of July, 2007, at 5:00 p.m., Eastern
+Time.
+
+Colleen Kollar-Kotelly
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+I, [REDACTED] Clerk,
+FISC, certify that this document
+is a true and correct copy
+of the original.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+4
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Amended_Order_BR_07-10/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Amended_Order_BR_07-10/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d168c93
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Amended_Order_BR_07-10/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+{
+ "title": "FISC Amended Order BR 07-10",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Amendment of Order BR 07-10 from the FISC For Purposes of Querying the Metadata Archive. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2007-05-31",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Kollar-Kotelly, Colleen"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2014-01-17",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/fisc-amended-order-br-07-10",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "3937155f65c21ab91c221578e2e1aa2b6cb748481c65bc596ed09fca4b65823c",
+ "pages": 4
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Amended_Order_BR_11-07/ACLU_-_FISC_Amended_Order_BR_11-07.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Amended_Order_BR_11-07/ACLU_-_FISC_Amended_Order_BR_11-07.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1a12039
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Amended_Order_BR_11-07/ACLU_-_FISC_Amended_Order_BR_11-07.md
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
+BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
+ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
+OF TANGIBLE THINGS FROM
+[REDACTED]
+Docket Number: BR 11-07
+AMENDMENT TO PRIMARY ORDER
+A verified application having been made by the Director of the Federal Bureau of
+Investigation (FBI) for orders requiring the production of certain tangible things –
+specifically, telephone call-detail records or "telephony metadata" created by
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Derived from: Pleadings in the above-captioned docket
+Declassify on: 27 January 2036
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+[REDACTED] to the National Security Agency (NSA)
+pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA or the Act), Title 50,
+United States Code (U.S.C.), § 1861, as amended, and full consideration having been
+given to the matters set forth therein, as well as the matters set forth in the Verified
+Motion for an Amendment to Primary Order,
+IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that footnote 5 of the Court's Primary Order in the
+above-captioned docket number is amended to remove the phrase
+[REDACTED] (including the preceding comma).
+IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all other provisions of the Court's Primary
+Order shall remain in full force and effect and that the Government shall continue to
+comply with all of the restrictions and procedures described therein.
+Signed 07-10-2011 00:22 Eastern Time
+Date Time
+This authorization expires on the 15th day of April, 2011, at 5:00 p.m., Eastern Time.
+MARY A. MCLAUGHLIN
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+[REDACTED] Deputy Clerk,
+FISC, certify that this document
+is a true and correct copy of
+the original [REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+2
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Amended_Order_BR_11-07/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Amended_Order_BR_11-07/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3fa1399
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Amended_Order_BR_11-07/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+{
+ "title": "FISC Amended Order BR 11-07",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Amendment to Primary Order BR 11-07, ordering that footnote 5 of the Court. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2011-02-10",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "McLaughlin, Mary A."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2014-01-17",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/fisc-amended-order-br-11-07",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "858692376530080ffcdd93f3256b0f48a5d46373d50a5fd2602a4af8e40fa360",
+ "pages": 2
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Opinion_Granting_Government_Application_Pursuant_to_Section_402/ACLU_-_FISC_Opinion_Granting_Government_Application_Pursuant_to_Section_402.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Opinion_Granting_Government_Application_Pursuant_to_Section_402/ACLU_-_FISC_Opinion_Granting_Government_Application_Pursuant_to_Section_402.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4c53e2f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Opinion_Granting_Government_Application_Pursuant_to_Section_402/ACLU_-_FISC_Opinion_Granting_Government_Application_Pursuant_to_Section_402.md
@@ -0,0 +1,2304 @@
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+FILED
+
+UNITED STATES
+U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+[REDACTED]
+Docket Number: PR/TT [REDACTED]
+
+OPINION AND ORDER
+
+This matter comes before the Court on an application of the
+Government for authority for the National Security Agency (NSA)
+to collect information regarding e-mail and certain other forms
+of Internet communications under the pen register and trap and
+trace provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
+1978 (FISA or the Act), Title 50, United States Code (U.S.C.),
+§§ 1801-1811, 1841-1846. This application seeks authority for a
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Derived from: Pleadings in the above-captioned docket
+Declassify on: [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+much broader type of collection than other pen register/trap and
+trace applications and therefore presents issues of first
+impression.¹ For that reason, it is appropriate to explain why
+the Court concludes that the application should be granted as
+modified herein.
+
+Accordingly, this Opinion and Order sets out the bases for
+the Court's findings that: (1) the collection activities
+proposed in the application involve the installation and use of
+"pen registers" and/or "trap and trace devices" as those terms
+are used in FISA, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1846; (2) the application,
+which specifies restrictions on the retention, accessing, use,
+and dissemination of information obtained from these collection
+activities, "satisfies the requirements" of 50 U.S.C. § 1842 for
+the issuance of an order "approving the installation and use of a
+pen register or trap and trace device," id. § 1842(d) (1), subject
+to modifications stated herein;² and (3) the installation and use
+of these pen registers and/or trap and trace devices pursuant to
+
+¹ The application was filed in two steps: an application
+filed on [REDACTED] followed by an addendum filed on [REDACTED]
+For ease of reference, the following discussion refers to
+both submissions collectively as the application.
+
+² The Court has authority in this case to "enter an ex
+parte order as requested, or as modified." 50 U.S.C.
+§ 1842 (d) (1).
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+2
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+this Opinion and Order will comply with the First and Fourth
+Amendments.
+
+In making these findings, the Court relies on factual
+representations made in the application, which was submitted by
+the Attorney General as applicant and verified by the Director of
+the NSA (DIRNSA); in the separate declaration of the DIRNSA
+(Attachment A to the application); and in the declaration of the
+[REDACTED] (Attachment B to the
+application). The Court has given careful consideration to the
+arguments presented in the Government's memorandum of law and
+fact (Attachment C to the application).
+
+By letter dated [REDACTED] the Court directed the
+Government to respond to two questions necessary to its ruling on
+this application. The Court relies on the Government's responses
+to these questions, which were provided in a letter submitted on
+[REDACTED]
+
+The Court also relies on information and arguments presented
+in a briefing to the Court on [REDACTED] which addressed the
+current and near-term threats posed by [REDACTED]
+
+³ One of these questions concerned First Amendment issues
+presented by the application. The other concerned the length of
+time that the Government expected the collected information to
+retain operational significance. These questions and the
+Government's responses are discussed more fully below.
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+3
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED] investigations conducted by the Federal Bureau of
+Investigation (FBI) to counter those threats, the proposed
+collection activities of the NSA (now described in the instant
+application), the expected analytical value of information so
+collected in efforts to identify and track operatives [REDACTED]
+and the legal bases for conducting these
+collection activities under FISA's pen register/trap and trace
+provisions.⁴
+
+The principal statutory issues in this matter are whether
+the proposed collection constitutes the installation and use of
+"pen registers" and/or "trap and trace devices" and, if so,
+whether the certification pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2) is
+adequate. These issues are addressed below.
+
+I. THE PROPOSED COLLECTION IS A FORM OF PEN REGISTER AND
+TRAP AND TRACE SURVEILLANCE.
+
+For purposes of 50 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1846, FISA adopts the
+definitions of "pen register" and "trap and trace device" set out
+
+⁴ This briefing was attended by (among others) the Attorney
+General, [REDACTED] the DIRNSA; the Director of the FBI; the
+Counsel to the President; the Assistant Attorney General for the
+Office of Legal Counsel; the Director of the Terrorist Threat
+Integration Center (TTIC); and the Counsel for Intelligence
+Policy.
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+4
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+in 18 U.S.C. § 3127. See 50 U.S.C. § 1841(2). Section 3127
+gives the following definitions:
+
+(3) the term "pen register" means a device or process
+which records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing,
+or signaling information transmitted by an instrument
+or facility from which a wire or electronic
+communication is transmitted, provided, however, that
+such information shall not include the contents of any
+communication, but such term does not include any
+device or process used by a provider or customer of a
+wire or electronic communication service for billing,
+or recording as an incident to billing, for
+communications services by such provider or any device
+or process used by a provider or customer of a wire
+communication service for cost accounting or other like
+purposes in the ordinary course of business;
+
+(4) the term "trap and trace device" means a device or
+process which captures the incoming electronic or other
+impulses which identify the originating number or other
+dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information
+reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or
+electronic communication, provided, however, that such
+information shall not include the contents of any
+communication.
+
+These definitions employ three other terms - "electronic
+communication," "wire communication," and "contents" - that are
+themselves governed by statutory definitions "set forth for such
+terms in section 2510" of title 18. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(1).
+
+Section 2510 defines these terms as follows:
+
+(1) "Electronic communication" is defined at 18 U.S.C.
+§ 2510 (12) as "any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images,
+sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+5
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or
+photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce,
+but does not include - (A) any wire or oral communication."⁵
+
+(2) "Wire communication" is defined at 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1)
+as
+
+any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the
+use of facilities for the transmission of
+communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like
+connection between the point of origin and the point of
+reception . . . furnished or operated by any person
+engaged in providing or operating such facilities for
+the transmission of interstate or foreign
+communications or communications affecting interstate
+or foreign commerce.
+
+(3) "Contents" is defined at 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (8) to
+"include[] any information concerning the substance, purport, or
+meaning" of a "wire, oral, or electronic communication."⁶
+
+While the definitions of "pen register" and "trap and trace
+device" each contain several elements, the application of these
+
+⁵ The other exclusions to this definition at § 2510 (12) (B) -
+(D) are not relevant to this case.
+
+⁶ Different definitions of "wire communication" and
+"contents" are provided at 50 U.S.C. § 1801(1), (n). However,
+the definitions set forth in § 1801 apply to terms "[a]s used in
+this subchapter," i.e., in 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (FISA
+subchapter on electronic surveillance), and thus have no bearing
+on the meaning of "wire communication" and "contents" as used in
+the definitions of "pen register" and "trap and trace device"
+applicable to §§ 1841-1846 (separate FISA subchapter on pen
+registers and trap and trace devices).
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+6
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+definitions to the devices described in the application presents
+two primary questions: (1) Does the information to be obtained
+constitute "dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling
+information" that does not include the "contents" of any
+communication? (2) Does the means by which such information
+would be obtained come within the definition of "pen register" or
+"trap and trace device?" In addressing these questions, the
+Court is mindful that "when the statute's language is plain, the
+sole function of the courts - at least where the disposition
+required by the text is not absurd - is to enforce it according
+to its terms." Lamie v. United States Trustee, 124 S. Ct. 1023,
+1030 (2004) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
+
+A. The Information to Be Obtained Is "Dialing, Routing,
+Addressing, or Signaling Information" and Not
+"Contents."
+
+The Government uses the umbrella term "meta data" to
+designate the categories of information it proposes to collect.
+This meta data comprises [REDACTED] categories:
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+7
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+8
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+9
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Also, the address from which
+an e-mail was sent and [REDACTED]
+are not part of the e-mail's "contents."
+
+⁸ This is the first application presented to this Court for
+authority to [REDACTED] under pen register/trap and trace
+authority. The Court understands that FBI devices implementing
+prior pen register/trap and trace surveillance authorized by this
+Court have not obtained [REDACTED] See Memorandum of Law
+and Fact at 23-24 n.14. The fact that prior applications did not
+seek authority for this specific form of collection sheds no
+light on the merits of the instant application.
+
+TOP SECRET//HCE//COMINT//NOFORN
+10
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOPORN
+
+but this isolated fact does not provide "information
+concerning the substance, purport, or meaning" of the e-mail. 18
+U.S.C. § 2510(8).⁹
+
+The DIRNSA Declaration mentions other types of information
+that are not described in the application as forms of meta data
+to be collected.¹⁰ The Court understands such references to
+pertain to information or inferences that could be gleaned from
+accumulating meta data in Categories [REDACTED] above and/or
+analyzing meta data, perhaps in conjunction with information from
+other sources. This Opinion and Order authorizes only the
+collection of information in Categories [REDACTED]
+
+⁹ The finding that the [REDACTED] meta data do not
+constitute "content" is also supported by the assurance that meta
+data "does not include information from either the 'subject' or
+'re' line of the E-mail [REDACTED] DIRNSA Declaration at 3 n.1.
+
+¹⁰ These references in the DIRNSA Declaration include
+[REDACTED] at 12, and information said to
+pertain to elements of [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//HCO//COMINT//NOFORN
+11
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+B. The Methods By Which NSA Proposes to Obtain This
+Information Involve the Use of "Pen Registers" and
+"Trap and Trace Devices."
+
+NSA proposes to obtain meta data in the above-described
+Categories [REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+12
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN-
+[REDACTED]
+Because the application of the definitions of "pen register"
+and "trap and trace device" to this means of collection involves
+a similar analysis for meta data in Categories [REDACTED], these
+groups of information are discussed separately below.
+
+1. The Methods of Collecting Categories [REDACTED]
+Fall Within the Plain Meaning of the Statutory
+Definitions.
+
+The above-described means of collecting information in
+Categories [REDACTED] satisfies each of the elements of the
+applicable statutory definition of a "pen register." It consists
+of "a device or process which records or decodes" non-content
+routing or addressing information "transmitted by an instrument
+or facility from which a wire or electronic communication is
+transmitted." 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3).
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+¹¹ "Transmit" means "1. To convey or dispatch from one
+person, thing, or place to another. . . . 4. Electron. To send
+(a signal), as by wire or radio." Webster's II New College
+Dictionary 1171 (2001).
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+13
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+Finally, the proposed collection does not involve "any device or
+process used . . . for billing, or recording as an incident to
+billing, for communications services . . . or . . . for cost
+accounting or other like purposes," which is excluded from the
+definition of "pen register" under section 3127(3).
+
+Accordingly, based on "the language employed by Congress and
+the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language
+accurately expresses the legislative purpose," Engine Mfrs. Ass'n
+v. South Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 124 S. Ct. 1756, 1761
+(2004) (internal quotations and citation omitted), the Court
+concludes that the means by which the NSA proposes to collect
+
+¹² For ease of reference, this Opinion and Order generally
+speaks of "electronic communications." The communication
+involved will usually be an "electronic communication" under the
+above-quoted definition at 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12). In the event
+that the communication consists of an "aural transfer," i.e., "a
+transfer containing the human voice at any point between and
+including the point of origin and the point of reception," id.
+§ 2510(1), then it could fall instead under the above-quoted
+definition of "wire communication" at § 2510(1). In either case,
+the communication would be "a wire or electronic communication,"
+as required to fall within the definitions at §§ 3127(3) and
+3127(4).
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+14
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+meta data in Categories [REDACTED] above falls under the
+definition of "pen register" at section 3127(3).
+
+The application also seeks authority to collect at least
+some of the same meta data by the same means under the rubric of
+a "trap and trace device" as defined at section 3127 (4).
+Although it appears to the Court that all of the collection
+authorized herein comes within the definition of "pen register,"
+the Court additionally finds that such collection, as it pertains
+to meta data in Categories [REDACTED]
+(for example, information from the "from" line of
+an e-mail), also satisfies the definition of "trap and trace
+device" under section 3127(4).
+
+Under section 3127(4), a "trap and trace device" is "a
+device or process which captures the incoming electronic or other
+impulses which identify the originating number or other [non-
+content] dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information
+reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic
+communication." As discussed above, the proposed collection
+would use a device or process to obtain non-content meta data
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//HCC//COMINT//NOFORN
+15
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+Thus, based on the plain meaning of
+
+¹³ "Capture" is defined as, inter alia, " . . . 3. To
+succeed in preserving in a permanent form." Webster's II New
+College Dictionary 166 (2001).
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Such a result could be argued to violate the "cardinal principle
+of statutory construction that we must give effect, if possible,
+to every clause and word of a statute." Williams v. Taylor, 529
+U.S. 362, 404 (2000) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+-TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+16
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+the applicable definitions, the proposed collection involves a
+form of both pen register and trap and trace surveillance.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+17
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+The Court
+accordingly finds that the plain meaning of sections 3127 (3) and
+3127(4) encompasses the proposed collection of meta data.
+
+Alternatively, the Court finds that any ambiguity on this
+point should be resolved in favor of including this proposed
+collection within these definitions, since such an interpretation
+would promote the purpose of Congress in enacting and amending
+FISA regarding the acquisition of non-content addressing
+information. Congress amended FISA in 1998, and again in 2001,
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+18
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+to relax the requirements for Court-authorized surveillance to
+obtain non-content addressing information through pen register
+and trap-and-trace devices, recognizing that such information is
+not protected by the Fourth Amendment. See page 29 below. As
+part of the USA PATRIOT Act in 2001, Congress also amended FISA
+to provide for Court orders for the production of "any tangible
+things," such as business records, under the same relevance
+standard as was adopted for pen register/trap and trace
+authorizations. See Pub. L. No. 107-56, Title II, § 215, 115
+Stat. 290, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861.
+
+[REDACTED] like other forms of meta data, is not protected
+by the Fourth Amendment because users of e-mail do not have a
+reasonable expectation of privacy in such information. See pages
+59-62 below. It is a form of non-content addressing information,
+which Congress has determined should receive a limited form of
+statutory protection under a relevance standard if obtained
+through pen register/trap and trace devices pursuant to 50 U.S.C.
+§ 1842, and/or through compelled production of business records
+(e.g., toll records for long-distance phone calls) under 50
+U.S.C. § 1861.
+
+A narrow reading of the definitions of "pen register" and
+"trap-and-trace device" to exclude [REDACTED] would
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+19
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+remove this particular type of non-content addressing information
+from the statutory framework that Congress specifically created
+for it. Based on such a narrow interpretation, this information
+could not be collected through pen register/trap and trace
+surveillance, even where it unquestionably satisfies the
+relevance standard. Nor could this information be obtained under
+the business records provision, because it is not generally
+retained by communications service providers. See page 41 below.
+
+There is no indication that Congress believed that the
+availability of non-content addressing information under the
+relevance standard should hinge on the technical means of
+collection. If anything, the legislative history, see 147 Cong.
+Rec. S11000 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (statement of Sen. Patrick
+Leahy) (supporting clarification of "the statute's proper
+application to tracing communications in an electronic
+environment . . . in a manner that is technology neutral"), and
+the adoption of an identical relevance standard for the
+production of business records and other tangible things under
+section 1861, suggest otherwise.
+
+Accordingly, the Court alternatively finds that, if the
+application of sections 3127(3) and 3127(4) to the [REDACTED]
+were thought to be ambiguous, such
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+20
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+ambiguity should be resolved in favor of an interpretation of the
+definitions of "pen register" and "trap and trace device" that
+encompasses the proposed collection.
+
+3. The Proposed Collection is Consistent With Other
+Provisions of FISA
+
+Nothing that is fairly implied by other provisions of FISA
+governing pen register and trap and trace surveillance would
+prevent authorization of the proposed collection as a form of pen
+register/trap and trace surveillance. One provision requires
+that an order authorizing a pen register or trap and trace
+surveillance specify "the identity, if known, of the person to
+whom is leased or in whose name is listed the telephone line or
+other facility to which the pen register or trap and trace device
+is to be attached or applied." 50 U.S.C. § 1842(d)(2)(A)(ii).
+Plainly, there is no requirement to state the identity of such a
+person if it is not "known." However, this provision might still
+be read to imply that Congress expected that such facilities
+would be leased or listed to some particular person, even if the
+identity of that person were unknown in some cases. However,
+even if Congress had such a general expectation, the language of
+the statute does not require that there be such a person for
+every facility to which a pen register or trap and trace device
+is to be attached or applied. Drawing the contrary conclusion
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+21
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+from the wording of § 1842(d)(2)(A)(ii) would make the
+applicability of the statute depend on the commercial or
+administrative practices of particular communications service
+providers - a result that here would serve no apparent purpose of
+Congress. Cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979)
+(finding that the "fortuity of whether or not the phone company
+elects to make [for its own commercial purposes] a quasi-
+permanent record of a particular number dialed" is irrelevant to
+whether the Fourth Amendment applies to use of a pen register).¹⁶
+
+In this case [REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+¹⁶ Similarly, for purposes of the subchapter on pen
+register/trap and trace surveillance, FISA defines an "aggrieved
+person" in relevant part, as any person "whose communication
+instrument or device was subject to the use of a pen register or
+trap and trace device . . . to capture incoming electronic or
+other communications impulses." 50 U.S.C. § 1841(3)(B). The
+term "whose" suggests a relationship between some person and "a
+communication instrument or device" that was "subject to the use
+of a pen register or trap and trace device." [REDACTED] indeed, the use of
+different language implies that these phrases can refer to
+different objects, so that the definition of "aggrieved person"
+sheds no light on whether a "facility" under § 1842(d)(2)(A)(ii)-
+(iii) is necessarily associated with an individual user.
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+22
+
+TOP-SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+The
+Court is satisfied that this Opinion and Order complies with the
+specification requirements of § 1842 (d) (2) (A).
+
+The Court recognizes that, by concluding that these
+definitions do not restrict the use of pen registers and trap and
+trace devices to communication facilities associated with
+individual users, it is finding that these definitions encompass
+an exceptionally broad form of collection. Perhaps the opposite
+result would have been appropriate under prior statutory
+language.¹⁷ However, our "starting point" must be "the existing
+
+¹⁷ Prior to amendments in 2001 by the USA PATRIOT Act,
+Public Law 107-56, Title II, § 216(c), 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3)
+defined "pen register" as "a device which records or decodes
+electronic or other impulses which identify the numbers dialed or
+otherwise transmitted on the telephone line to which such device
+is attached," and § 3127(4) defined "trap and trace device" as a
+"device which captures the incoming electronic or other impulses
+which identify the originating number of an instrument or device
+from which a wire or electronic communication was transmitted."
+18 U.S.C.A. § 3127(3), (4) (2000). Despite this textual focus
+on telephone communications, especially in § 3127(3), many
+(though not all) courts expansively construed both definitions to
+apply as well to e-mail communications. Memorandum of Law and
+Facc at 25-26 & 1.16; Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law
+(continued...)
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+23
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+statutory text," not "predecessor statutes,” Lamie, 124 S. Ct. at
+1030, and analysis of that text shows that collecting information
+in Categories [REDACTED] above by the means described in the
+application involves use of "pen registers" and "trap and trace
+devices."¹⁸
+
+Of course, merely finding that the proposed collection falls
+within these definitions does not mean that the requirements for
+an order authorizing such collection have been met. We turn now
+to those requirements.
+
+¹⁷(...continued)
+After the USA PATRIOT Act: The Big Brother That Isn't, 97 Nw. U.
+L. Rev. 607, 633-36 (2003). Extending these prior definitions to
+bulk collection regarding e-mail communications would have
+required further departure from the pre-USA PATRIOT Act statutory
+language.
+
+¹⁸ The legislative history of the USA PATRIOT Act indicates
+that Congress sought to make the definitions of "pen register"
+and "trap and trace device" "technology neutral" by confirming
+that they apply to Internet communications. See footnote 45
+below. It does not suggest that Congress specifically gave
+thought to whether the new definitions would encompass collection
+in bulk from communications facilities that are not associated
+with individual users. The silence of the legislative history on
+this point provides no basis for departing from the plain meaning
+of the current definitions. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,
+473 U.S. 479, 495 n.13 (1985).
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+24
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+II. THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS FOR ISSUING AN ORDER
+AUTHORIZING THE PROPOSED PEN REGISTER AND TRAP AND
+TRACE SURVEILLANCE HAVE BEEN MET.
+
+Under FISA's pen register/trap and trace provisions:
+
+Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the
+Attorney General . . . may make an application for an
+order . . . authorizing or approving the installation
+and use of a pen register or trap and trace device for
+any investigation to obtain foreign intelligence
+information not concerning a United States person or to
+protect against international terrorism . . . provided
+that such investigation of a United States person is
+not conducted solely upon the basis of activities
+protected by the first amendment to the Constitution
+which is being conducted by the (FBI) under such
+guidelines as the Attorney General approves pursuant to
+Executive Order No. 12333, or a successor order.
+
+50 U.S.C. § 1842(a) (1). This authority "is in addition to the
+authority . . . to conduct . . . electronic surveillance" under
+§§ 1801-1811. Id. § 1842(a) (2).
+
+Such applications shall include, inter alia,
+a certification by the applicant that the information
+likely to be obtained is foreign intelligence
+information not concerning a United States person or is
+relevant to an ongoing investigation to protect against
+international terrorism . . . provided that such
+investigation of a United States person is not
+conducted solely on the basis of activities protected
+by the first amendment to the Constitution.
+
+Id. § 1842 (c) (2). "Upon an application made pursuant to this
+section, the judge shall enter an ex parte order as requested, or
+as modified, approving the installation and use of a pen register
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+25
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+or trap and trace device if the judge finds that the application
+satisfies the requirements of [§ 1842]." Id. § 1842(d)(1).
+
+Obviously, the application has been made by the Attorney
+General, § 1842(a)(1), has been approved by the Attorney General,
+§ 1842(c), and has been submitted in writing and under oath to a
+judge of this Court. § 1842(b)(1). The application, at 5,
+identifies the DIRNSA as "the Federal officer seeking to use the
+pen register or trap and trace device." § 1842(c)(1).
+
+The application also contains a certification by the
+Attorney General, at 26, containing the language specified in
+§ 1842(c)(2). The Government argues that FISA prohibits the
+Court from engaging in any substantive review of this
+certification. In the Government's view, the Court's exclusive
+function regarding this certification would be to verify that it
+contains the words required by § 1842(c)(2); the basis for a
+properly worded certification would be of no judicial concern.
+
+See Memorandum of Law and Fact at 28-34.
+
+The Court has reviewed the Government's arguments and
+authorities and does not find them persuasive.¹⁹ However, in
+
+¹⁹ For example, the Government cites legislative history
+that "Congress intended to 'authorize[] FISA judges to issue a
+pen register or trap and trace order upon a certification that
+the information sought is relevant to' an FBI investigation.
+(continued...)
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+26
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+this case the Court need not, and does not, decide whether it
+would be obliged to accept the applicant's certification without
+any explanation of its basis. Arguing in the alternative, the
+Government has provided a detailed explanation of 1) the threat
+currently posed by [REDACTED] 2) the reason the
+bulk collection described in the application is believed
+necessary as a means for NSA [REDACTED]
+3) how that information will contribute to FBI
+investigations to protect against [REDACTED]
+and 4) what safeguards will be observed to ensure that the
+information collected will not be used for unrelated purposes or
+
+¹⁹(...continued)
+Memorandum of Law and Fact at 30 (quoting S. Rep. No. 105-185, at
+27 (1998). However, authorizing the Court to issue an order when
+a certification is made, and requiring it to do so without
+resolving doubts about the correctness of the certification, are
+quite different.
+
+The Government also cites United States v. Hallmark, 911
+F.2d 399 (10th Cir. 1990), in arguing that the Court should not
+review the basis of the certification. However, the Hallmark
+court reserved the analogous issue under Title 18 - "the precise
+nature of the court's review under 18 U.S.C. § 3123" of the
+relevancy certification in an application for a law enforcement
+pen register or trap and trace device - and expressed "no opinion
+as to whether the court may, for instance, inquire into the
+government's factual basis for believing the pen register or trap
+and trace information to be relevant to a criminal
+investigation." Id. at 402 n.3.
+
+TOP SECRET//HES//COMINT//NOFORN-
+27
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+otherwise misused. The Government also provides legal arguments
+that, under these specific circumstances, the proposed collection
+satisfies the relevancy requirement of § 1842(c)(2), despite its
+resulting in the collection of meta data from an enormous volume
+of communications, the large majority of which will be unrelated
+to international terrorism. In view of this record, the Court
+will assume for purposes of this case that it may and should
+consider the basis of the certification under § 1842(c)(2).
+
+Nonetheless, the Court is mindful that FISA does not require
+any finding of probable cause in order for pen register and trap
+and trace surveillance to be authorized. In this regard, the
+statutory provisions that govern this case contrast sharply with
+those that apply to other forms of electronic surveillance and
+physical search.²⁰ Before Congress amended FISA in 1998 to add
+§§ 1841-1846, this Court could authorize pen register and trap
+and trace surveillance only upon the same findings as would be
+required to authorize interception of the full contents of
+
+²⁰ To issue an electronic surveillance order, the Court
+must find "probable cause to believe that . . . the target of the
+electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a
+foreign power" and "each of the facilities or places at which the
+electronic surveillance is directed is being used, or is about to
+be used, by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power." 50
+U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3). Similar probable cause findings are
+required for warrants authorizing physical search under id.
+§ 1824(a)(3).
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+28
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+communications. See S. Rep. 105-185, at 27 (1998) When it
+originally enacted §§ 1841-1846 in 1998, Congress recognized that
+pen register and trap and trace information is not protected by
+the Fourth Amendment and concluded that a lower standard for
+authorization "was necessary in order to permit, as is the case
+in criminal investigations, the use of this very valuable
+investigative tool at the critical early stages of foreign
+intelligence and international terrorism investigations." Id.
+
+These 1998 provisions included a form of a "reasonable suspicion"
+standard for pen register/trap and trace authorizations.²¹ As
+part of the USA PATRIOT Act in 2001, Congress lowered the
+standard again, to the current requirement of relevance.²² Given
+this history, it is obvious that Congress intended pen register
+
+²¹ Under the provisions enacted in 1998, a pen register or
+trap and trace application had to include "information which
+demonstrates that there is reason to believe" that a
+communication facility "has been or is about to be used in
+communication with," inter alia, "an individual who is engaging
+or has engaged in international terrorism or clandestine
+intelligence activities." Public Law 105-272 § 601(2).
+
+²² The legislative history of the USA PATRIOT Act reflects
+that, "in practice," the standard passed in 1998 was "almost as
+burdensome as the requirement to show probable cause required
+for more intrusive techniques" and that the FBI "made a clear
+case that a relevance standard is appropriate for
+counterintelligence and counterterrorism investigations." 147
+Cong. Rec. S11003 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (statement of Sen.
+Leahy).
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+29
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+and trap and trace authorizations to be more readily available
+than authorizations for electronic surveillance to acquire the
+full contents of communications.
+
+The Court also recognizes that, for reasons of both
+constitutional authority and practical competence, deference
+should be given to the fully considered judgment of the executive
+branch in assessing and responding to national security threats²³
+and in determining the potential significance of intelligence-
+related information.²⁴ Such deference is particularly
+
+²³ See, e.g., Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
+Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999) ("a court would be ill equipped
+to determine [the] authenticity and utterly unable to assess
+[the] adequacy of the executive's security or foreign policy
+reasons for treating certain foreign nationals as "a special
+threat"); Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 243 (1984) (giving "the
+traditional deference to executive judgment" in foreign affairs
+in sustaining President's decision to restrict travel to Cuba
+against a Due Process Clause challenge); cf. Department of Navy
+v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988) (outside body reviewing
+executive branch decisions on eligibility for security clearances
+could not "determine what constitutes an acceptable margin of
+error in assessing the potential risk").
+
+²⁴ The Supreme Court has observed that, in deciding whether
+disclosing particular information might compromise an
+intelligence source, what "may seem trivial to the uninformed,
+may appear of great moment to one who has a broad view of the
+scene and may put the questioned item of information in its
+proper context." CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 178 (1985) (internal
+quotation and citation omitted). Accordingly, the decisions of
+[REDACTED] "who must of course be familiar with the whole
+picture, as judges are not, are worthy of great deference given
+the magnitude of the national security interests and potential
+(continued...)
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+30
+
+TOP SECRET//HCC//COMINT//NOFORM
+
+appropriate in this context, where the Court is not charged with
+making independent probable cause findings.
+
+A. The Government Has Provided Information In Support of
+the Certification of Relevance.
+
+In support of the certification of relevance, the Government
+relies on the following facts and circumstances:
+
+1. The Threat Currently Posed [REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+²⁴(...continued)
+risks at stake." Id. at 179.
+
+²⁵ For simplicity, this opinion standardizes the variant
+spellings of foreign names appearing in different documents
+submitted in support of the application.
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+31
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+32
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+2. FBI Investigations to Track and Identify [REDACTED]
+in the United States
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+33
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+3. The Use of the Internet by [REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+34
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+4. The Scope of the Proposed Collection of Meta Data
+
+In an effort both to identify unknown and to track known
+operatives [REDACTED] through their Internet
+communications, NSA seeks to acquire meta data, as described
+above, from all e-mail [REDACTED]
+are described in detail in the application and
+the DIRNSA Declaration. In brief, they are:
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+²⁷ For ease of reference, the term [REDACTED] is
+used to mean [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+35
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+36
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+37
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+38
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+The raw volume of the proposed collection is enormous. NSA
+estimates that this collection will encompass [REDACTED]
+
+In absolute
+terms, the proposed surveillance “will result in the collection
+of meta data pertaining to [REDACTED] electronic communications,
+including meta data pertaining to communications of United States
+persons located within the United States who are not the subject
+of any FBI investigation." Application at 4. Some proportion of
+these communications - less than half, but still a huge number in
+absolute terms - can be expected to be communications [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+39
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+who bear no relation to [REDACTED]
+
+5. How NSA Proposes to Use this Data to Track Known
+[REDACTED]
+
+As noted above, the purpose of this collection is to track
+known operatives and to identify unknown operatives of [REDACTED]
+through their Internet communications. NSA
+
+²⁹ As noted above, collection of meta data from [REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+40
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+states that even identified operatives [REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Through the proposed bulk collection, NSA would acquire an
+archive of meta data for large volumes of communications that, in
+NSA's estimation, represent a relatively rich environment for
+finding [REDACTED] communications through later analysis.³¹
+
+³¹ See DIRNSA Declaration at 5 [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+41
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+NSA asserts that more precisely targeted forms of collection
+against known accounts would tend to screen out the "unknowns"
+that NSA wants to discover, so that NSA needs bulk collection in
+order to identify unknown [REDACTED] communications. See
+id. at 14 ("It is not possible . . . to target collection solely
+to known terrorist E-mail accounts and at the same time use the
+advantages of meta data analysis to discover the enemy."). 15
+("To be able to fully exploit meta data, the data must be
+collected in bulk. Analysts know that terrorists' E-mails are
+located somewhere in the billions of data bits; what they cannot
+know ahead of time is exactly where.")
+
+NSA proposes to employ two analytic methods on the body of
+archived meta data it seeks to collect. Both these methods
+involve querying the archived meta data regarding a particular
+"seed" account. In the Government's proposal, an account would
+qualify as a seed account only if NSA concludes, "based on the
+factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which
+reasonable and prudent persons act, there are facts giving rise to
+a reasonable articulable suspicion that a particular known e-
+mail address is associated with [REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+42
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+Application at 19-20; accord DIRNSA
+Declaration at 19. The two methods are:
+
+(1) Contact chaining. NSA will use computer algorithms to
+identify within the archived meta data all e-mail [REDACTED]
+accounts that have been in contact with
+the seed account, as well as all accounts that have been in
+contact with an account within the first tier of accounts that
+had direct contact with the seed account, and [REDACTED]
+DIRNSA Declaration
+at 15-16.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+43
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN-
+
+An example may illustrate the claimed benefits of bulk
+collection and subsequent analysis of meta data.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Without an archive of meta data, the Government could
+target prospective collection on that account, but information
+about past use would be unavailable.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+³²
+However, if an archive of meta data were available, NSA
+could use the newly discovered account as a "seed" account.
+Accounts previously in contact with the "seed" account could be
+identified and further investigation could be pursued to
+determine if the users of those accounts are [REDACTED]
+
+³² Assuming that applicable legal requirements could be
+met, the Government also could collect the full contents of
+future messages by electronic surveillance of the account and of
+stored prior messages by physical search of the account.
+However, [REDACTED] could thwart these forms of collection also.
+
+TOP SECRET//HOS//COMINT//NOFORN
+44
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+These avenues of discovery made possible by archived meta data
+provide the basis for NSA's assertion that bulk collection to
+accumulate a meta data archive "will substantially increase NSA's
+ability to detect and identify members of [REDACTED]
+
+DIRNSA Declaration at 15.
+
+6. How FBI Investigations Would Benefit from the NSA's
+Collection and Analysis
+
+The Government asserts that NSA's collection and analysis of
+this meta data will be relevant to [REDACTED] FBI
+investigations in two ways. First, ongoing FBI investigations
+may develop grounds for reasonable suspicion that particular
+accounts are used in furtherance of [REDACTED]
+
+The FBI may identify such accounts to NSA for use as
+"seed" accounts. Using the methods described above, NSA may
+obtain from the archived data other accounts that are in contact
+with, or appear to have the same user as, the "seed" account.
+This information may then be passed to the FBI as investigative
+leads in furtherance of its investigation. Memorandum of Law and
+Fact at 27-28. Alternatively, NSA querying of the archived meta
+data based on information from sources other than the FBI may
+identify accounts that appear to be used by someone involved in
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+45
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+activities. If such accounts are relevant to
+FBI investigative responsibilities - for example, if it appears
+that their users are in the United States - then NSA will provide
+information to the FBI, which may prove relevant to ongoing FBI
+investigations or provide the predicate for new investigations of
+persons involved in [REDACTED] Under the
+proposed program, NSA estimates that roughly 400 accounts would
+be "tipped" to the FBI and CIA" annually, with an estimated
+twenty-five percent of that number associated with U.S. persons.
+DIRNSA Declaration at 20.
+
+7. The Government's Proposed Procedures for Accessing,
+Retaining, and Disseminating Collected Information
+
+The application specifies proposed procedures and
+restrictions for accessing, retaining, and disseminating
+information from this bulk collection of meta data. Application
+at 18-24. These procedures and restrictions, with certain
+modifications, are set out at pages 82-87 below.
+
+³³ As long as the proposed collection satisfies the
+standard of relevance to an FBI investigation described in
+section 1842(a)(1), (c)(2), dissemination of information to other
+agencies when it is relevant to their responsibilities is
+appropriate.
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+46
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+B. The Information To Be Obtained Is Likely to be Relevant
+to Ongoing FBI Investigations to Protect Against
+International Terrorism.
+
+As shown above, the application and supporting materials
+demonstrate that the FBI has numerous pending investigations on
+[REDACTED] subjects and that a major challenge faced by the
+FBI is the identification of [REDACTED] within the
+United States. [REDACTED]
+
+The
+application and DIRNSA declaration provide detailed explanations
+of why NSA regards bulk collection of meta data as necessary for
+contact chaining [REDACTED] and how those analytical
+methods can be expected to uncover and monitor unknown [REDACTED]
+who could otherwise elude detection. The
+DIRNSA also explains why NSA has chosen the proposed [REDACTED]
+and selection criteria in order to build a meta data archive that
+will be, in relative terms, richly populated with [REDACTED]
+related communications. On each of these points, the Court has
+received sufficient information to conclude that the Government's
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+47
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+assessments are fully considered and plausibly grounded in facts
+submitted to the Court.
+
+Accordingly, the Court accepts for purposes of this
+application that the proposed bulk collection of meta data is
+necessary for NSA to employ contact chaining [REDACTED]
+
+The Court similarly accepts that those analytic tools
+are likely to generate useful investigative leads for ongoing
+efforts by the FBI (and other agencies) to identify and track
+[REDACTED] potentially unidentifed
+operatives in place to facilitate or execute imminent large scale
+attacks within the United States.
+
+The question remains whether these circumstances adequately
+support the certification that "the information likely to be
+obtained . . . is relevant to an ongoing investigation to protect
+against international terrorism," § 1842(c)(2), even though only
+a very small percentage of the information obtained will be from
+[REDACTED] communications and therefore directly relevant
+to such an investigation. As the Government points out, the
+meaning of "relevant" is broad enough, at least in some contexts,
+to encompass information that may reasonably lead to the
+discovery of directly relevant information. Memorandum of Law
+and Fact at 34. Here, the bulk collection of meta data - i.e.,
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+48
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+the collection of both a huge volume and high percentage of
+unrelated communications - is necessary to identify the much
+smaller number of [REDACTED] communications.
+
+The Court is persuaded that, in the circumstances of this
+case, the scope of the proposed collection is consistent with the
+certification of relevance.³⁴ In so finding, the Court concludes
+that, under the circumstances of this case, the applicable
+relevance standard does not require a statistical "tight fit"
+between the volume of proposed collection and the much smaller
+proportion of information that will be directly relevant to
+[REDACTED]
+
+³⁴ The Government analogizes this case to ones in which the
+Court has authorized overbroad electronic surveillance under 50
+U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811. Memorandum of Law and Fact and Law at 42-43.
+The Court has authorized the latter form of collection where it is
+not technologically possible to acquire [REDACTED]
+
+The two
+situations are similar in that they both involve collection of an
+unusually large volume of non-foreign intelligence information as
+a necessary means of obtaining the desired foreign intelligence
+information. Yet there are also important differences between
+these cases. An overbroad electronic surveillance under 50
+U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 requires probable cause to believe that the
+target is an agent of a foreign power and uses the particular
+facility at which surveillance will be directed. § 1805(a)(3). In
+this case under 50 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1846, no probable cause
+findings are required, and the bulk collection is justified as
+necessary to discover unknown [REDACTED] persons and
+facilities, rather than to acquire communications to and from
+identified agents of a foreign power. Because of these
+differences, the authorization of bulk collection under §§ 1841-
+1846 should not be taken as precedent for similar collection of
+the full contents of communications under §§ 1801-1811.
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+49
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN-
+
+FBI investigations. In reaching this conclusion,
+the Court finds instructive Supreme Court precedents on when a
+search that is not predicated on individualized suspicion may
+nonetheless be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See
+Memorandum of Law and Fact at 43-48.³⁵
+
+The Supreme Court has recognized a "longstanding principle
+that neither a warrant nor probable cause, nor, indeed, any
+measure of individualized suspicion, is an indispensable
+component of reasonableness in every circumstance." National
+Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989);
+accord, e.g., Board of Educ. of Indep. School Dist. No. 92 of
+Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829 (2002); United
+States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-61 (1976).
+
+Specifically, the Court has held that, "where a Fourth Amendment
+intrusion serves special governmental needs, beyond the normal
+need for law enforcement, it is necessary to balance the
+individual's privacy expectations against the Government's
+
+³⁵ For the reasons explained below at pages 59-66, the
+Court finds that there is no privacy interest protected by the
+Fourth Amendment in the meta data to be collected. Nevertheless,
+the Court agrees with the Government's suggestion that the
+balancing methodology used to assess the reasonableness of a
+Fourth Amendment search or seizure is helpful in applying the
+relevance standard to this case. Memorandum of Law and Fact at
+43.
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMENT//NOFORN
+50
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+interests to determine whether it is impractical to require a
+warrant or individualized suspicion in the particular context."
+Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-66; accord, e.g., Earls, 536 U.S. at
+829.
+
+This balancing analysis considers "the nature of the privacy
+interest allegedly compromised" and "the character of the
+intrusion" upon that interest. Earls, 536 U.S. at 830, 832. The
+privacy interest in the instant meta data is not of a stature
+protected by the Fourth Amendment. See pages 59-66 below.
+Moreover, the nature of the intrusion is mitigated by the
+restrictions on accessing and disseminating this information,
+under which only a small percentage of the data collected will be
+seen by any person. Cf. Earls, 536 U.S. at 833 (finding that
+restrictions on access to drug-testing information lessen the
+testing program's intrusion on privacy).
+
+The assessment of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment
+also considers "the nature and immediacy of the government's
+concerns and the efficacy of the [program] in meeting them." Id.
+at 834. In this case, the Government's concern is to identify
+and track [REDACTED] operatives, and ultimately to thwart
+terrorist attacks. This concern clearly involves national
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+51
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+security interests beyond the normal need for law enforcement³⁶
+and is at least as compelling as other governmental interests
+that have been held to justify searches in the absence of
+individualized suspicion. See, e.g., Earls (drug testing of
+secondary school students engaged in extracurricular activities);
+Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990)
+(highway checkpoints to identify drunk drivers); Von Raab (drug
+testing of Customs Service employees applying for promotion to
+sensitive positions); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n,
+489 U.S. 602 (1989) (drug and alcohol testing of railroad
+workers).³⁷ The Government's interest here has even greater
+"immediacy" in view of the above-described intelligence reporting
+and assessment regarding ongoing plans for large scale attacks
+within the United States.
+
+As to efficacy under the Fourth Amendment analysis, the
+Government need not make a showing that it is using the least
+intrusive means available. Earls, 536 U.S. at 837; Martinez-
+
+³⁶ See In Re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 744-46 (Foreign
+Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002) (per curiam) (discussing the prevention
+of terrorist attacks as a special need beyond ordinary law
+enforcement).
+
+³⁷ Moreover, the Government's need in this case could be
+analogized to the interest in discovering or preventing danger
+from "latent or hidden conditions," which may justify
+suspicionless searches. See, e.g., Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668.
+
+TOP SECRET//RES//COMINT//NOFORN
+52
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 556-57 n.12. Rather, the question is whether
+the Government has chosen "a reasonably effective means of
+addressing" the need. Earls, 536 U.S. at 837. In structuring a
+program involving suspicionless search or seizure, e.g., in
+positioning roadblocks at certain points, "the choice among . . .
+reasonable alternatives remains with the governmental officials
+who have a unique understanding of, and a responsibility for,
+limited public resources." Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453-54; see also
+Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 566 ("deference is to be given to
+the administrative decisions of higher ranking officials"). A
+low percentage of positive outcomes among the total number of
+searches or seizures does not necessarily render a program
+ineffective.³⁸
+
+In this case, senior responsible officials, whose judgment
+on these matters is entitled to deference, see pages 30-31 above,
+have articulated why they believe that bulk collection and
+archiving of meta data are necessary to identify and monitor
+[REDACTED] operatives whose Internet communications would
+
+³⁸ See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 454 ("detention of the 126
+vehicles that entered the checkpoint resulted in the arrest of
+two drunken drivers"); Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 546 & n.1,
+554 (checkpoint near border to detect illegal migrants: out of
+"roughly 146,000 vehicles" temporarily "'seized,"' 171 were found
+to contain deportable aliens).
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+53
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+otherwise go undetected in the huge streams of [REDACTED]
+
+These officials have also explained why they
+seek to collect meta data [REDACTED] identified in the
+application. Based on these
+explanations, the proposed collection appears to be a reasonably
+effective means to this end.
+
+In summary, the bulk collection proposed in this case is
+analogous to suspicionless searches or seizures that have been
+upheld under the Fourth Amendment in that the Government's need
+is compelling and immediate, the intrusion on individual privacy
+interests is limited, and bulk collection appears to be a
+reasonably effective means of detecting and monitoring [REDACTED]
+related operatives and thereby obtaining information likely to be
+[REDACTED] to ongoing FBI investigations. In these circumstances,
+the certification of relevance is consistent with the fact that
+only a very small proportion of the huge volume of information
+collected will be directly relevant to the FBI'S [REDACTED]
+investigations.
+
+³⁹ Cf. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 557 (requiring
+reasonable suspicion for stops at highway checkpoints "on major
+routes . . . would be impractical because the flow of traffic
+tends to be too heavy to allow the particularized study of a
+given car").
+
+TOF SECRET//MCG//COMINT//NOFORN
+54
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+C. The Pertinent FBI Investigations of U.S. Persons Are
+Not Conducted Solely Upon the Basis of First Amendment
+Activities.
+
+When the information likely to be obtained concerns a U.S.
+person, § 1842(c)(2) requires a certification that the "ongoing
+investigation . . . of a United States person is not conducted
+solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first
+amendment to the Constitution." The certification in this case
+states that the pertinent investigation is not being conducted on
+such a basis. Application at 26. The application refers to
+numerous FBI National Security investigations "being conducted
+under guidelines approved by the Attorney General pursuant to
+Executive Order No. 12,333."⁴⁰ Id. at 6.
+
+Those investigations are being conducted on the basis
+of activities of [REDACTED] and unknown
+affiliates in the United States and abroad, and to the
+extent these subjects of investigation are United
+States persons, not solely on the basis of activities
+that are protected by the First Amendment to the
+Constitution.
+
+Id.
+
+Thus, the certification and application contain the proper
+assurance that the relevant investigations of U.S. persons are
+
+⁴⁰ § 1842(a)(1) permits the filing of applications for
+installation and use of pen register and trap and trace devices
+to obtain information relevant to certain investigations "under
+such guidelines as the Attorney General approves pursuant to
+Executive Order No. 12333, or a successor order."
+
+TOP SECRET//HCC//COMINT//NOFORN
+55
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+not being conducted solely on the basis of activities protected
+by the First Amendment. However, the unusual breadth of this
+collection and its relation to the pertinent FBI investigations
+calls for further attention to this issue. In the usual case,
+the FBI conducts pen register and trap and trace surveillance of
+a particular communications facility (e.g., a phone number or e-
+mail address) because it carries communications of a person who
+is the subject of an FBI investigation. The required
+certification typically varies depending on whether the subject
+is a U.S. person: if not, the certification will state, in the
+language of § 1842(c)(2), that the information likely to be
+obtained "is foreign intelligence information not concerning a
+United States person;" if the subject is a U.S. person, the
+certification will state that such information is "relevant to an
+ongoing investigation to protect against international terrorism
+. . . provided that such investigation of a United States person
+is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by
+the first amendment to the Constitution." This usual practice
+conforms to the clear statutory purpose that pen register/trap
+and trace information about the communications of U.S. persons
+will not be targeted for collection unless it is relevant to an
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+56
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+investigation that is not solely based upon First Amendment
+activities.
+
+In this case, the initial acquisition of information is not
+directed at facilities used by particular individuals of
+investigative interest, but meta data concerning the
+communications of such individuals' [REDACTED]
+
+Here, the legislative purpose is best
+effectuated at the querying stage, since it will be at a point
+that an analyst queries the archived data that information
+concerning particular individuals will first be compiled and
+reviewed. Accordingly, the Court orders that NSA apply the
+following modification of its proposed criterion for querying the
+archived data: [REDACTED] will qualify as a seed
+[REDACTED] only if NSA concludes, based on the factual
+and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable
+and prudent persons act, there are facts giving rise to a
+reasonable articulable suspicion that a particular known [REDACTED]
+is associated with [REDACTED]
+provided, however, that an [REDACTED] believed to be used by a U.S. person
+shall not be regarded as associated with [REDACTED]
+solely on the basis of activities that are protected by the First
+
+TOP SECRET//HCC//COMINT//NOFORN
+57
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Amendment to the Constitution.⁴¹ For example, an e-mail account
+used by a U.S. person could not be a seed account if the only
+information thought to support the belief that the account is
+associated with [REDACTED] is that, in sermons or in postings on a
+web site, the U.S. person espoused jihadist rhetoric that fell
+short of "advocacy . . . directed to inciting or producing
+imminent lawless action and . . . likely to incite or produce
+such action." Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per
+curiam).
+
+III. THE PROPOSED COLLECTION AND HANDLING OF META DATA
+DO NOT VIOLATE THE FIRST OR FOURTH AMENDMENTS.
+
+Because this case presents a novel use of statutory
+authorities for pen register/trap and trace surveillance, the
+Court will also explain why it is satisfied that this
+surveillance comports with the protections of the Fourth
+Amendment and the First Amendment.
+
+A. Fourth Amendment Issues
+
+The foregoing analysis has observed at various points that
+the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the proposed collection of
+
+⁴¹ This modification will realize more fully the
+Government's suggestion that "[t]he information actually viewed
+by any human being . . . will be just as limited - and will be
+based on the same targeted, individual standards - as in the case
+of an ordinary pen register or trap and trace device." [REDACTED]
+at 3. Government's Letter of [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+58
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+meta data. See, e.g., pages 19, 50-51 above. This section
+explains the basis for that conclusion.
+
+First, as a general matter, there is no reasonable
+expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment in the meta
+data to be collected. This conclusion follows directly from the
+reasoning of Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), which
+concerned the use of a pen register on a home telephone line. In
+that case, the Supreme Court found that it was doubtful that
+telephone users had a subjective expectation of privacy in the
+numbers they dialed, id. at 742-43, and that in any case such an
+expectation "is not one that society is prepared to recognize as
+reasonable.'" Id. at 743 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
+347, 361 (1967)). The Court "consistently has held that a person
+has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he
+voluntarily turns over to third parties," since he "assume[s] the
+risk" that the third party would reveal that information to the
+government. Id. at 743-44.⁴² The Court found this principle
+applicable to dialed phone numbers, regardless of the automated
+means by which the call is placed and the "fortuity of whether or
+
+⁴² This principle applies even if there is an understanding
+that the third party will treat the information as confidential.
+See SEC v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 743 (1984);
+United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
+
+TOP SECRET//HES//COMINT//NOFORN-
+59
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+not the phone company in fact elects to make a quasi-permanent
+record of a particular number dialed." Id. at 744-45.⁴³
+
+The same analysis applies to the meta data involved in this
+application. Users of e-mail [REDACTED] voluntarily
+expose addressing information for
+communications they send and receive to communications service
+providers. Having done so, they lack any legitimate expectation
+of privacy in such information for Fourth Amendment purposes.⁴⁴
+
+Moreover, the relevant statutes put this form of pen
+register/trap and trace surveillance on a par with pen
+register/trap and trace surveillance of telephone calls, on the
+
+⁴³ While Smith involved a pen register, its reasoning
+equally applies to trap and trace devices that capture the
+originating numbers of incoming calls. See, e.g., United States
+v. Hallmark, 911 F.2d 399, 402 (10th Cir. 1990).
+
+⁴⁴ Cf. Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 335-36 (6th Cir. 2001)
+(users of computer bulletin board service lacked reasonable
+expectation of privacy in subscriber information that they
+provided to systems operator); United States v. Kennedy, 81
+F.Supp.2d 1103, 1110 (D. Kan. 2000) (no reasonable expectation of
+privacy in subscriber information provided to ISP); United States
+v. Hambrick, 55 F.Supp.2d 504, 508-09 (W.D. Va. 1999) (no
+reasonable expectation of privacy in screen name and other
+information provided to ISP), aff'd, 225 F.3d 656 (4th Cir. 2000)
+(Table).
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+60
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+premise that neither form of surveillance involves a Fourth
+Amendment search or seizure.⁴⁵
+
+This conclusion is equally well-founded for the proposed
+collection of [REDACTED] Nothing in the
+Smith analysis depends on the fact that a telephone pen register
+acquires addressing information for a call while it is being
+placed, rather than from data [REDACTED]
+
+Indeed, the controlling principle - that voluntary disclosure of
+information to a third party vitiates any legitimate expectation
+that the third party will not provide it to the government - has
+been applied to records [REDACTED] See Jerry T.
+O'Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. at 737-38, 743 (records of prior stock
+
+⁴⁵ The USA PATRIOT Act amended 18 U.S.C. § 3127 to clarify
+that its definitions of "pen register" and "trap and trace
+device" applied to Internet communications. See Public Law 107-
+56, Title II, § 216(c); 147 Cong. Rec. S11000 (daily ed. Oct. 25,
+2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (noting that prior statutory
+language was "ill-equipped" for Internet communications and
+supporting clarification of "the statute's proper application to
+tracing communications in an electronic environment . . . in a
+manner that is technology neutral"). Authorization to install
+such devices requires relevance to an investigation, but not any
+showing of probable cause. See 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a)(1), (2)
+(investigation conducted under guidelines approved under
+Executive Order 12333); 50 U.S.C. § 1842(a)(1), (c)(2) [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+61
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+trading); Miller, 425 U.S. at 436-38, 443 (checks, deposit slips,
+and other bank records).⁴⁶
+
+For these reasons, it is clear that, in ordinary
+circumstances, pen register/trap and trace surveillance of
+Internet communications does not involve a Fourth Amendment
+search or seizure. However, since this application involves
+unusually broad collection and distinctive modes of analyzing
+information, the Court will explain why these special
+circumstances do not alter its conclusion that no Fourth
+Amendment search or seizure is involved.
+
+First, regarding the breadth of the proposed surveillance,
+it is noteworthy that the application of the Fourth Amendment
+depends on the government's intruding into some individual's
+reasonable expectation of privacy. Whether a large number of
+persons are otherwise affected by the government's conduct is
+irrelevant. Fourth Amendment rights "are personal in nature, and
+cannot bestow vicarious protection on those who do not have a
+reasonable expectation of privacy in the place to be searched."
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+62
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN-
+
+Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 219 (1981); accord,
+e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133 (1978) ("Fourth
+Amendment rights are personal rights which . . . may not be
+vicariously asserted.") (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394
+U.S. 165, 174 (1969)). Since the Fourth Amendment bestows "a
+personal right that must be invoked by an individual," a person
+"claim[ing] the protection of the Fourth Amendment . . . must
+demonstrate that he personally has an expectation of privacy in
+the place searched, and that his expectation is reasonable."
+Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998). So long as no
+individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in meta data,
+the large number of persons whose communications will be
+subjected to the proposed pen register/trap and trace
+surveillance is irrelevant to the issue of whether a Fourth
+Amendment search or seizure will occur.
+
+Regarding the proposed analytical uses of the archived meta
+data, it might be thought that [REDACTED] not
+immediately available from conventional pen register/trap and
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+63
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+trace surveillance might itself implicate the Fourth Amendment.⁴⁷
+However, that suggestion would be at odds with precedent that the
+subsequent use of the results of a search cannot itself involve
+an additional or continuing violation of the Fourth Amendment.
+For example, in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974),
+it was argued that each question before a grand jury "based on
+evidence obtained from an illegal search and seizure constitutes
+a fresh and independent violation of the witness' constitutional
+rights," and that such questioning involved "an additional
+intrusion" into the privacy of the witness "in violation of the
+
+⁴⁷ The public disclosure of aggregated and compiled data
+has been found to impinge on privacy interests protected under
+the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), even if the information
+was previously available to the public in a scattered, less
+accessible form. See United States Dept. of Justice v. Reporters
+Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989) (FBI "rap
+sheets," including public-record information on arrests and
+disposition of criminal charges, qualified for "personal privacy"
+exemption from disclosure under FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C));
+but cf. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712-13 (1976) (circulating a
+flyer publicizing an arrest for shoplifting did not violate
+constitutional right to privacy). In this case, because section
+1842 authorizes the Attorney General to apply for pen
+register/trap and trace authorities "[n]otwithstanding any other
+provision of law," 50 U.S.C. § 1842(a)(1), and states that the
+Court "shall enter an ex parte order . . . approving the
+installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device"
+upon a finding "that the application satisfies the requirements
+of [section 1842)," id. § 1842(d)(1), the Court has no need to
+consider how other statutes, such as the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C.
+§ 552a, might apply to the proposed activities of the Government.
+
+-TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+64
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Fourth Amendment." 414 U.S. at 353 & n.9 (internal quotations
+omitted). The Court rejected this argument, explaining:
+
+The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to prevent
+unreasonable governmental intrusions into the privacy
+of one's person, house, papers, or effects. . . .
+That wrong . . . is fully accomplished by the original
+search without probable cause. Grand jury questions
+based on evidence obtained thereby involve no
+independent governmental invasion of one's person,
+house, papers, or effects . . . . Questions based on
+illegally obtained evidence are only a derivative use
+of the product of a past unlawful search and seizure.
+They work no new Fourth Amendment wrong.
+
+414 U.S. at 354 (emphasis added); accord United States v.
+Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990); United States v.
+Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984); see also United States v.
+Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984) ("Once frustration of the
+original expectation of privacy occurs, the Fourth Amendment does
+not prohibit governmental use of the now nonprivate
+information.").
+
+In this case, sophisticated analysis of archived meta data
+may yield more information about a person's Internet
+communications than what would at first be apparent.
+
+Nevertheless, such analysis would, like the grand jury
+questioning in Calandra, involve merely a derivative use of
+information already obtained, rather than an independent
+governmental invasion of matters protected by the Fourth
+
+-TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+65
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Amendment. Accordingly, the Court finds that the proposed
+collection and analysis does not involve a search or seizure
+under the Fourth Amendment.
+
+B. First Amendment Issues
+
+By letter dated [REDACTED] the Court asked the
+Government to address "the general First Amendment implications
+of collecting and retaining this large volume of information that
+is derived, in part, from the communications of U.S. persons."
+In response, the Government acknowledges that surveillance that
+acquires "the contents of communications might in some cases
+implicate First Amendment interests, in particular the freedom of
+association," Government's Letter of [REDACTED] at 1, but
+denies or minimizes the First Amendment implications of
+surveillance that only acquires non-content addressing
+information.
+
+The weight of authority supports the conclusion that
+Government information-gathering that does not constitute a
+Fourth Amendment search or seizure will also comply with the
+First Amendment when conducted as part of a good-faith criminal
+investigation. See Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v.
+AT&T, 593 F.2d 1030, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (First Amendment
+protects activities "subject to the general and incidental
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+66
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+burdens that arise from good faith enforcement of otherwise valid
+criminal and civil laws that are not themselves" directed at
+First Amendment conduct; accordingly, subpoenas to produce
+reporters' telephone toll records without prior notice did not
+violate the First Amendment) (emphasis in original); United
+States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 705 (9th Cir. 1989) (use of
+undercover informants "to infiltrate an organization engaged in
+protected first amendment activities" must be part of
+investigation "conducted in good faith; i.e., not for the purpose
+of abridging first amendment freedoms"); United States v. Gering,
+716 F.2d 615, 620 (9th Cir. 1983) (mail covers targeting minister
+at residence and church upheld against First Amendment challenge
+absent showing "that mail covers were improperly used and
+burdened . . . free exercise or associational rights").
+
+Conversely,
+
+all investigative techniques are subject to abuse and
+can conceivably be used to oppress citizens and groups,
+rather than to further proper law enforcement goals.
+In some cases, bad faith use of these techniques may
+constitute an abridgment of the First Amendment rights
+of the citizens at whom they are directed.
+
+Reporters Comm., 593 F.2d at 1064.⁴⁸
+
+⁴⁸ Part of Judge Wilkey's opinion in Reporters Comm.
+categorically concludes that the First Amendment affords no
+protections against government investigation beyond what is
+(continued...)
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+67
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Here, the proposed collection of meta data is not for
+ordinary law enforcement purposes, but in furtherance of the
+compelling national interest of identifying and tracking
+[REDACTED] and ultimately of thwarting terrorist
+attacks. The overarching investigative effort against [REDACTED]
+is not aimed at curtailing First Amendment activities and
+satisfies the "good faith" requirement described in the above-
+cited cases. However, the extremely broad nature of this
+collection carries with it a heightened risk that collected
+information could be subject to various forms of misuse,
+potentially involving abridgement of First Amendment rights of
+innocent persons. For this reason, special restrictions on the
+accessing, retention, and dissemination of such information are
+necessary to guard against such misuse. See pages 82-87 below.
+With such restrictions in place, the proposed collection of non-
+
+⁴⁸(...continued)
+provided by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Id. at 1053-60.
+However, that part of the opinion was not joined by the other
+judge in the majority, who opined that the result of First
+Amendment analysis "may not always coincide with that attained by
+application of Fourth Amendment doctrine." Id. at 1071 n.4
+(Robinson, J.).
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+68
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+content addressing information does not violate the First
+Amendment.⁴⁹
+
+IV. TO ENSURE LAWFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS SURVEILLANCE
+AUTHORITY, NSA IS ORDERED TO COMPLY WITH THE PROPOSED
+RESTRICTIONS AND PROCEDURES, AS MODIFIED BY THE COURT.
+
+The proposed collection involves an extraordinarily broad
+implementation of a type of surveillance that Congress has
+regulated by statute, even in its conventional, more narrowly
+targeted form. To ensure that this authority is implemented in a
+lawful manner, NSA is ordered to comply with the restrictions and
+procedures set out below at pages 82-87, which the Court has
+adapted from the Government's application.⁵⁰ Adherence to them
+
+⁴⁹ The court in Paton v. La Prade, 469 F. Supp. 773, 780-82
+(D.N.J. 1978), held that a mail cover on a dissident political
+organization violated the First Amendment because it was
+authorized under a regulation that was overbroad in its use of
+the undefined term "national security." In contrast, this pen
+register/trap and trace surveillance does not target a political
+group and is authorized pursuant to statute on the grounds of
+relevance to an investigation to protect against "international
+terrorism," a term defined at 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c). This
+definition has been upheld against a claim of First Amendment
+overbreadth. See United States v. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 1306,
+1314-15 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
+
+⁵⁰ The principal changes that the Court has made from the
+procedures described in the application are the inclusion of a
+"First Amendment proviso" as part of the "reasonable suspicion"
+standard for an [REDACTED] to be used as the basis
+for querying archived meta data, see pages 57-58 above, the
+adoption of a date after which meta data may not be retained, see
+pages 70-71 below, and an enhanced role for the NSA's Office of
+(continued...)
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN-
+69
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+will help ensure that this information is used for the stated
+purpose of its collection - the identification and tracking of
+[REDACTED] their Internet communications -
+thereby safeguarding the continued validity of the certification
+of relevance under § 1842(c)(2). These procedures will also help
+effectuate 50 U.S.C. § 1845(a)(2), which directs that no
+information from a Court-authorized pen register or trap and
+trace device "may be used or disclosed by Federal officers or
+employees except for lawful purposes," and ensure that such use
+and disclosure will not abridge First Amendment rights.
+
+The Court's letter of [REDACTED] asked the Government to
+explain "[f]or how long . . . the information collected under
+this authority [would] continue to be of operational value to the
+counter-terrorism investigation(s) for which it is collected."
+The Government's letter of [REDACTED] stated that such
+information "would continue to be of significant operational
+value for at least 18 months," based on NSA's "analytic
+judgment." [REDACTED] Letter at 3. During that period, meta
+
+⁵⁰(...continued)
+General Counsel in the implementation of this authority, see
+pages 84-85 below. The Court recognizes that, as circumstances
+change and experience is gained in implementing this authority,
+the Government may propose other modifications to these
+procedures.
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+70
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+data would be available to analysts online for authorized
+querying. After 18 months, NSA "believes that there continues to
+be operational value in retaining e-mail meta data . . . in an
+'off-line' storage system," since "in certain circumstances"
+information of that age could "provide valuable leads for the
+investigation into [REDACTED] Id. However, the value of such
+information "would diminish over time," so that "NSA assesses
+that meta data would have operational value in off-line storage
+for a period of three years, and could be destroyed after that
+time (that is, a total of four and one-half years after it was
+initially collected)." Id. In accordance with this assessment,
+NSA is ordered to destroy archived meta data collected under this
+authority no later than four and one-half years after its initial
+collection.
+
+***
+
+Accordingly, a verified application having been made by the
+Attorney General of the United States for an order authorizing
+installation and use of pen registers and trap and trace devices
+pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
+(FISA or the Act), Title 50, United States Code (U.S.C.),
+§§ 1801-1811, 1841-1846, and full consideration having been given
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+71
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+to the matters set forth therein, the Court finds, on the grounds
+explained above, that:
+
+1. The Attorney General is authorized to approve
+applications for pen registers and trap and trace devices under
+the Act and to make such applications under the Act.
+
+2. The applicant has certified that the information likely
+to be obtained from the requested pen registers and trap and
+trace devices is relevant to an ongoing investigation to protect
+against international terrorism that is not being conducted
+solely upon the basis of activities protected by the First
+Amendment to the Constitution.
+
+3. [REDACTED] in the
+United States and abroad are the subjects of National Security
+investigations conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
+(FBI) under guidelines approved by the Attorney General pursuant
+to Executive Order No. 12333.
+
+4. The pen registers and trap and trace devices [REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+72
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN-
+[REDACTED]
+
+⁵¹ The Government has represented that it is overwhelmingly
+likely that at [REDACTED]
+
+⁵² The Government has represented that it is overwhelmingly
+likely that [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+73
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+74
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+⁵³ The Government has represented that it is overwhelmingly
+likely that [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+75
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+76
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN-
+[REDACTED]
+
+⁵⁴ The Government has represented that the majority of the
+communications [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//HCC//COMINT//NOFORN
+77
+
+TOP SECRET//HCC//COMINT//NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+⁵⁵ Because electronic communications will [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+78
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+79
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the application of the
+United States [REDACTED] pen registers and trap and trace
+devices, as described in the application, satisfies the
+requirements of the Act and specifically of 50 U.S.C. § 1842 and,
+therefore,
+
+IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to the authority conferred on
+this Court by the Act, that the application is GRANTED, AS
+MODIFIED HEREIN, and it is
+
+FURTHER ORDERED, as follows:
+
+(1) Installation and use of pen registers and trap and
+trace devices as requested in the Government's application is
+authorized for a period of ninety days from the date of this
+Opinion and Order, unless otherwise ordered by this Court, as
+follows: installation and use of pen registers and/or trap and
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+80
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+trace devices as described above to collect all addressing and
+routing information reasonably likely to identify the sources or
+destinations of the electronic communications identified above on
+[REDACTED] identified above, including the "to," "from," "cc,"
+and "bcc" fields for those communications [REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Collection of the contents of such communications
+as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) is not authorized.
+
+(2) The authority granted is within the United States.
+
+(3) As requested in the application, [REDACTED]
+(specified persons), are directed to furnish the NSA with
+
+⁵⁷ Although the application makes clear that the assistance
+of these specified persons is contemplated, it does not expressly
+request that the Court direct these specified persons to assist
+the surveillance. However, because the application, at 24,
+requests that the Court enter the proposed orders submitted with
+the application and those proposed orders would direct the
+specified persons to provide assistance, the application
+effectively requests the Court to direct such assistance.
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+81
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+any information, facilities, or technical assistance necessary to
+accomplish the installation and operation of pen registers and
+trap and trace devices in such a manner as will protect their
+secrecy and produce a minimum amount of interference with the
+services each specified person is providing to its subscribers.
+Each specified person shall not disclose the existence of the
+investigation or of the pen registers and trap and trace devices
+to any person, unless or until ordered by the Court, and shall
+maintain all records concerning the pen registers and trap and
+trace devices, or the aid furnished to the NSA, under the
+security procedures approved by the Attorney General [REDACTED]
+that have previously been or
+will be furnished to each specified person and are on file with
+this Court.
+
+(4) The NSA shall compensate the specified person(s)
+referred to above for reasonable expenses incurred in providing
+such assistance in connection with the installation and use of
+the pen registers and trap and trace devices herein.
+
+(5) The NSA shall follow the following procedures and
+restrictions regarding the storage, accessing, and disseminating
+of information obtained through use of the pen register and trap
+and trace devices authorized herein:
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+82
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+a. The NSA shall store such information in a manner
+that ensures that it will not be commingled with other data.
+
+b. The ability to access such information shall be
+limited to ten specially cleared analysts and to specially
+cleared administrators. The NSA shall ensure that the
+mechanism for accessing such information will automatically
+generate a log of auditing information for each occasion
+when the information is accessed, to include the accessing
+user's login, IP address, date and time, and retrieval
+request.
+
+c. Such information shall be accessed only through
+queries using the contact chaining [REDACTED]
+methods described at page 43 above. Such queries shall be
+performed only on the basis of a particular known [REDACTED]
+after the NSA has concluded, based on the
+factual and practical considerations of everyday life on
+which reasonable and prudent persons act, that there are
+facts giving rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion that
+[REDACTED] is associated with [REDACTED]
+provided, however, that [REDACTED]
+believed to be used by a U.S. person
+shall not be regarded as associated with [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+83
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+solely on the basis of
+activities that are protected by the First Amendment to the
+Constitution. Queries shall only be conducted with the
+approval of one of the following NSA officials: the Program
+Manager, Counterterrorism Advanced Analysis; the Chief or
+Deputy Chief, Counterterrorism Advanced Analysis Division;
+or a Counterterrorism Advanced Analysis Shift Coordinator in
+the Analysis and Production Directorate of the Signals
+Intelligence Directorate.
+
+d. Because the implementation of this authority
+involves distinctive legal considerations, NSA's Office of
+General Counsel shall:
+
+i) ensure that analysts with the ability to access
+such information receive appropriate training and
+guidance regarding the querying standard set out in
+paragraph c. above, as well as other procedures and
+restrictions regarding the retrieval, storage, and
+dissemination of such information.
+
+ii) monitor the designation of individuals with
+access to such information under paragraph b. above and
+the functioning of the automatic logging of auditing
+information required by paragraph b. above.
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+84
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+iii) to ensure appropriate consideration of any
+First Amendment issues, review and approve proposed
+queries of meta data in online or "off-line" storage
+based on seed accounts used by U.S. persons.⁵⁸
+
+e. The NSA shall apply the Attorney General-approved
+guidelines in United States Signals Intelligence Directive
+18 (Attachment D to the application) to minimize
+information concerning U.S. persons obtained from the pen
+registers and trap and trace devices authorized herein.
+Prior to disseminating any U.S. person information outside
+of the NSA, the Chief of Customer Response in the NSA's
+Signals Intelligence Directorate shall determine that the
+information is related to counterterrorism information and
+is necessary to understand the counterterrorism information
+or to assess its importance.
+
+f. Information obtained from the authorized pen
+registers and trap and trace devices shall be available
+
+⁵⁸ The Court notes that, in conventional pen register/trap
+and trace surveillance, there is judicial review of the
+application before any U.S. [REDACTED] In
+this case, the analogous decision to use a particular e-mail
+account as a seed account takes place [REDACTED]
+in these circumstances, it shall be incumbent on NSA's
+Office of General Counsel to review the legal adequacy for the
+basis of such queries, including the First Amendment proviso, set
+out in paragraph c. above.
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+85
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+online for querying, as described in paragraphs b. and c.
+above, for eighteen months. After such time, such
+information shall be transferred to an "off-line" tape
+system, which shall only be accessed by a cleared
+administrator in order to retrieve information that
+satisfies the standard for online accessing stated in
+paragraph c. above and is reasonably believed, despite its
+age, to be relevant to an ongoing investigation of [REDACTED]
+
+Searches of meta data
+in "off-line" storage shall be approved by one of the
+officials identified in paragraph c. above.
+
+g. Meta data shall be destroyed no later than 18
+months after it is required to be put into "off-line"
+storage, i.e., no later than four and one-half years
+after its initial collection.
+
+h. Any application to renew or reinstate the authority
+granted herein shall include:
+
+i) a report discussing queries that have been made
+since the prior application to this Court and the NSA's
+application of the standard set out in paragraph c.
+above to those queries.
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+86
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+ii) detailed information regarding [REDACTED]
+proposed to be added to such authority.
+
+iii) any changes in the description of the [REDACTED]
+above or in the nature of the
+communications [REDACTED]
+
+iv) any changes in the proposed means of
+collection, to include [REDACTED]
+the pen register and/or trap and trace
+devices [REDACTED]
+
+Signed [REDACTED] 10:30 a.m. E.D.T.
+Date [REDACTED] Time [REDACTED]
+
+This authorization regarding [REDACTED] in the United States and Abroad expires on the
+[REDACTED] at 5:00 p.m., Eastern Daylight Time.
+
+Colleen Kollar-Kotelly
+COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY
+Presiding Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//COMINT//NOFORN
+87
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Opinion_Granting_Government_Application_Pursuant_to_Section_402/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Opinion_Granting_Government_Application_Pursuant_to_Section_402/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..57ffa56
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Opinion_Granting_Government_Application_Pursuant_to_Section_402/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+{
+ "title": "FISC Opinion Granting Government Application Pursuant to Section 402",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "A FISC opinion granting the government’s application seeking collection of metadata pursuant to Section 402 of FISA. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "",
+ "date_created": "",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "HCS",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Kollar-Kotelly, Colleen"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-18",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/fisc-opinion-granting-government-application-pursuant-section-402",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "9e59b9cdd5c1fddfd418b4299bc2d3ca38b76096fbd25617d184edfa1a8b36c8",
+ "pages": 87
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_06-08/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_06-08.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_06-08/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_06-08.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a37c9b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_06-08/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_06-08.md
@@ -0,0 +1,319 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+UNITED STATES
+
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE
+FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+FOR AN ORDER REQUIRING THE
+PRODUCTION OF TANGIBLE THINGS
+FROM
+[REDACTED]
+
+Docket Number: BR
+06-08
+
+O R D E R
+
+A verified application having been made by the Director of
+the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for an order pursuant
+to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the Act),
+Title 50, United States Code (U.S.C.), § 1861, as amended,
+requiring the production to the National Security Agency (NSA)
+of the tangible things described below, and full consideration
+having been given to the matters set forth therein, the Court
+finds that:
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+Derived from: Pleadings in the above-captioned docket
+Declassify on: Determination of the President
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+1. The Director of the FBI is authorized to make an
+application for an order requiring the production of any
+tangible things for an investigation to obtain foreign
+intelligence information not concerning a United States person
+or to protect against international terrorism, provided that
+such investigation of a United States person is not conducted
+solely on the basis of activities protected by the First
+Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. [50 U.S.C.
+§ 1861(c)(1)]
+
+2. The tangible things to be produced are all call-detail
+records or "telephony meta data" created by
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Telephony meta data includes comprehensive
+communications routing information, including but not limited to
+session identifying information (e.g., originating and
+terminating telephone number, communications device identifier,
+etc.), trunk identifier, telephone calling card numbers and time
+and duration of call. Telephony meta data does not include the
+substantive content of any communication, as defined by 18
+U.S.C. § 2510(8), or the name, address, or financial information
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+2
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+of a subscriber or customer.¹ [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)(A)]
+
+3. There are reasonable grounds to believe that the
+tangible things sought are relevant to authorized investigations
+(other than threat assessments) being conducted by the FBI under
+guidelines approved by the Attorney General under Executive
+Order 12333 to protect against international terrorism, which
+investigations are not being conducted solely upon the basis of
+activities protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution
+of the United States. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)]
+
+4. The tangible things sought could be obtained with a
+subpoena duces tecum issued by a court of the United States in
+aid of a grand jury investigation or with any other order issued
+by a court of the United States directing the production of
+records or tangible things. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)(D)]
+
+WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the application of the
+United States to obtain the tangible things, as described in the
+application, satisfies the requirements of the Act and,
+therefore,
+
+IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to the authority conferred
+on this Court by the Act, that the application is GRANTED, and
+it is
+
+¹ The Court understands that the [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+3
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+FURTHER ORDERED, as follows:
+
+(1) To the extent practicable, the Custodians of Records
+[REDACTED]
+shall produce to NSA an electronic
+copy upon service of the appropriate secondary order, and
+continue production on an ongoing daily basis thereafter for the
+duration of this order, unless otherwise ordered by the Court,
+of the following tangible things: all call-detail records or
+"telephony meta data" created by such companies as described
+above;
+
+(2) NSA shall compensate [REDACTED] for
+reasonable expenses incurred in providing such tangible things;
+
+(3) With respect to any information the FBI receives as a
+result of this Order (information that is passed or "tipped" to
+it by NSA²), the FBI shall follow as minimization procedures the
+procedures set forth in The Attorney General's Guidelines for
+FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence
+Collection (October 31, 2003).
+
+(4) With respect to the information that NSA receives as a
+result of this Order, NSA shall adhere to the following
+procedures:
+
+A. The Director of NSA shall establish mandatory
+
+² The Court understands that NSA expects that it will continue to provide on
+average approximately two telephone numbers per day to the FBI.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+4
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+procedures to strictly control access to and use of
+the archived data collected pursuant to this Order.
+Any search or analysis of the data archive shall occur
+only after a particular known telephone number has
+been associated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+More specifically, access to the archived
+data shall occur only when NSA has identified a known
+telephone number for which, based on the factual and
+practical considerations of everyday life on which
+reasonable and prudent persons act, there are facts
+giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion
+that the telephone number is associated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+5
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+[REDACTED]
+provided, however, that
+a telephone number believed to be used by a U.S.
+person shall not be regarded as associated with
+[REDACTED]
+solely on
+the basis of activities that are protected by the
+First Amendment to the Constitution.
+
+B. The meta data shall be stored and processed on a
+secure private network that NSA exclusively will
+operate.
+
+C. Access to the meta data archive shall be
+accomplished through a software interface that will
+limit access to this data to authorized analysts.
+NSA’s OGC shall monitor the designation of individuals
+with access to the archive. Access to the archive
+shall be controlled by user name and password. When
+the meta data archive is accessed, the user’s login,
+IP address, date and time, and retrieval request shall
+be automatically logged for auditing capability.
+NSA’s Office of General Counsel (OGC) shall monitor
+the functioning of this automatic logging capability.
+Analysts shall be briefed by NSA’s OGC concerning the
+authorization granted by this Order and the limited
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+6
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+circumstances in which queries to the archive are
+permitted, as well as other procedures and
+restrictions regarding the retrieval, storage, and
+dissemination of the archived data. In addition,
+NSA’s OGC shall review and approve proposed queries of
+archived meta data based on seed numbers reasonably
+believed to be used by U.S. persons.
+
+D. Although the data collected under this Order will
+necessarily be broad, the use of that information for
+analysis shall be strictly tailored to identifying
+terrorist communications and shall occur solely
+according to the procedures described in the
+application, including the minimization procedures
+designed to protect U.S. person information.
+Specifically, dissemination of U.S. person information
+shall follow the standard NSA minimization procedures
+found in the Attorney General-approved guidelines
+(U.S. Signals Intelligence Directive 18). Before
+information identifying a U.S. person may be
+disseminated outside of NSA, a judgment must be made
+that the identity of the U.S. person is necessary to
+understand the foreign intelligence information or to
+assess its importance. Prior to the dissemination of
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+7
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+any U.S. person identifying information, the Chief of
+Information Sharing Services in the Signals
+Intelligence Directorate must determine that the
+information identifying the U.S. person is in fact
+related to counterterrorism information and that it is
+necessary to understand the counterterrorism
+information or assess its importance. A record shall
+be made of every such determination.
+
+E. Internal management control shall be maintained by
+requiring that queries of the archived data be
+approved by one of eight persons: the Signals
+Intelligence Directorate Deputy Program Manager for
+Counterterrorism Special Projects Analysis and
+Production; the Chief or Deputy Chief,
+Counterterrorism Advanced Analysis Division; or one of
+the five specially authorized Counterterrorism
+Advanced Analysis Shift Coordinators in the Analysis
+and Production Directorate of the Signals Intelligence
+Directorate. In addition, at least every ninety days,
+the Department of Justice shall review a sample of
+NSA’s justifications for querying the archived data.
+Telephone numbers that are currently the subject of
+FISC authorized electronic surveillance based on the
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+8
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+FISC's finding of probable cause to believe that they
+are used by agents of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+shall
+be deemed approved for meta data querying without
+approval of an NSA official due to the FISC
+authorization.
+
+F. The meta data collected under this Order may be
+kept online (that is, accessible for queries by
+cleared analysts) for five years, at which time it
+shall be destroyed.
+
+G. The Signals Intelligence Directorate Program
+Manager for Counterterrorism Special Projects; Chief
+and Deputy Chief, Counterterrorism Advanced Analysis
+Division; and Counterterrorism Advanced Analysis Shift
+Coordinators shall maintain appropriate management
+controls (e.g., records of all tasking decisions,
+audit and review procedures) for access to the
+archived data and shall use the Attorney General-
+approved guidelines (USSID 18) to minimize the
+information reported concerning U.S. persons.
+
+H. The NSA Inspector General, the NSA General
+Counsel, and the Signals Intelligence Directorate
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+9
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+Oversight and Compliance Office shall periodically
+review this program.
+
+I. Any application to renew or reinstate the
+authority granted herein shall include a report
+describing (i) the queries that have been made since
+this Order was granted; (ii) the manner in which NSA
+applied the procedures set forth in subparagraph A
+above, and (iii) any proposed changes in the way in
+which the call-detail records would be received from
+the carriers.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+10
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+J. At least twice every 90 days, NSA's OGC shall conduct random
+spot checks, consisting of an examination of a sample of call-
+detail records obtained, to ensure that NSA is receiving only
+data as authorized by the Court and not receiving the
+substantive content of communications.
+
+Signed 08-18-06A10:34 Eastern Time
+Date Time
+This authorization regarding [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+expires on
+the 15 day of November, 2006, at 5:00 p.m., Eastern Time.
+
+Malcolm J. Howard
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+I, [REDACTED] Clerk,
+FISC, certify that this document
+is a true and correct copy
+of the original.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+11
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_06-08/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_06-08/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..00328e7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_06-08/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+{
+ "title": "FISC Order BR 06-08",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Order of the FISC approving the Government. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2006-08-18",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT",
+ "MR"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Howard, Malcolm J."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2014-01-17",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/fisc-order-br-06-08",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "abca4e28f9d941a2ce7c33a5f2d86ab7ee435fb3a496a19b78107cf06a3ae3d0",
+ "pages": 11
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_06-12/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_06-12.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_06-12/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_06-12.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e71334a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_06-12/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_06-12.md
@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE
+FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+FOR AN ORDER REQUIRING THE
+PRODUCTION OF TANGIBLE THINGS
+FROM [REDACTED]
+Docket Number: BR
+06-12
+
+ORDER
+A verified application having been made by the Director of
+the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for an order pursuant
+to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the Act),
+Title 50, United States Code (U.S.C.), § 1861, as amended,
+requiring the production to the National Security Agency (NSA)
+of the tangible things described below, and full consideration
+having been given to the matters set forth therein, the Court
+finds that:
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+Derived from: Pleadings in the above-captioned docket
+Declassify on: Determination of the President
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+1. The Director of the FBI is authorized to make an
+application for an order requiring the production of any
+tangible things for an investigation to obtain foreign
+intelligence information not concerning a United States person
+or to protect against international terrorism, provided that
+such investigation of a United States person is not conducted
+solely on the basis of activities protected by the First
+Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. [50 U.S.C.
+§ 1861(c)(1)]
+
+2. The tangible things to be produced are all call-detail
+records or "telephony meta data" created by [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+Telephony meta data includes comprehensive
+communications routing information, including but not limited to
+session identifying information (e.g., originating and
+terminating telephone number, communications device identifier,
+etc.), trunk identifier, telephone calling card numbers and time
+and duration of call. Telephony meta data does not include the
+substantive content of any communication, as defined by 18
+U.S.C. § 2510(8), or the name, address, or financial information
+of a subscriber or customer.¹ [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)(A)]
+¹ The Court understands that the [REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+2
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+3. There are reasonable grounds to believe that the
+tangible things sought are relevant to authorized investigations
+(other than threat assessments) being conducted by the FBI under
+guidelines approved by the Attorney General under Executive
+Order 12333 to protect against international terrorism, which
+investigations are not being conducted solely upon the basis of
+activities protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution
+of the United States. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)]
+
+4. The tangible things sought could be obtained with a
+subpoena duces tecum issued by a court of the United States in
+aid of a grand jury investigation or with any other order issued
+by a court of the United States directing the production of
+records or tangible things. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)(D)]
+
+WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the application of the
+United States to obtain the tangible things, as described in the
+application, satisfies the requirements of the Act and,
+therefore,
+
+IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to the authority conferred
+on this Court by the Act, that the application is GRANTED, and
+it is
+
+FURTHER ORDERED, as follows:
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+3
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+(1) To the extent practicable, the Custodians of Records
+[REDACTED] shall produce to NSA upon service
+of the appropriate secondary order, and continue production on
+an ongoing daily basis thereafter for the duration of this
+order, unless otherwise ordered by the Court, an electronic copy
+of the following tangible things: all call-detail records or
+"telephony meta data" created by such companies as described
+above;
+
+(2) With respect to any information the FBI receives as a
+result of this Order (information that is passed or "tipped" to
+it by NSA²), the FBI shall follow as minimization procedures the
+procedures set forth in The Attorney General's Guidelines for
+FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence
+Collection (October 31, 2003).
+
+(3) With respect to the information that NSA receives as a
+result of this Order, NSA shall adhere to the following
+procedures:
+A. The Director of NSA shall establish mandatory
+procedures to strictly control access to and use of the
+archived data collected pursuant to this Order. Any search
+or analysis of the data archive shall occur only after a
+² The Court understands that NSA expects that it will continue to
+provide on average approximately three telephone numbers per day
+to the FBI.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+4
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+[REDACTED] particular known telephone number has been associated with
+[REDACTED]
+More specifically, access to
+the archived data shall occur only when NSA has identified
+a known telephone number for which, based on the factual
+and practical considerations of everyday life on which
+reasonable and prudent persons act, there are facts giving
+rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the
+telephone number is associated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+5
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+[REDACTED] provided, however, that a telephone
+number believed to be used by a U.S. person shall not be
+regarded as associated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] solely on the basis of activities that are protected
+by the First Amendment to the Constitution.
+B. The meta data shall be stored and processed on a
+secure private network that NSA exclusively will operate.
+C. Access to the meta data archive shall be
+accomplished through a software interface that will limit
+access to this data to authorized analysts. NSA's OGC
+shall monitor the designation of individuals with access to
+the archive. Access to the archive shall be controlled by
+user name and password. When the meta data archive is
+accessed, the user's login, Internet Protocol (IP) address,
+date and time, and retrieval request shall be automatically
+logged for auditing capability. NSA's Office of General
+Counsel (OGC) shall monitor the functioning of this
+automatic logging capability. Analysts shall be briefed by
+NSA's OGC concerning the authorization granted by this
+Order and the limited circumstances in which queries to the
+archive are permitted, as well as other procedures and
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+6
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+restrictions regarding the retrieval, storage, and
+dissemination of the archived data. In addition, NSA's OGC
+shall review and approve proposed queries of archived meta
+data based on seed numbers reasonably believed to be used
+by U.S. persons.
+
+D. Although the data collected under this Order will
+necessarily be broad, the use of that information for
+analysis shall be strictly tailored to identifying
+terrorist communications and shall occur solely according
+to the procedures described in the application, including
+the minimization procedures designed to protect U.S. person
+information. Specifically, dissemination of U.S. person
+information shall follow the standard NSA minimization
+procedures found in the Attorney General-approved
+guidelines (U.S. Signals Intelligence Directive 18).
+Before information identifying a U.S. person may be
+disseminated outside of NSA, a judgment must be made that
+the identity of the U.S. person is necessary to understand
+the foreign intelligence information or to assess its
+importance. Prior to the dissemination of any U.S. person
+identifying information, the Chief of Information Sharing
+Services in the Signals Intelligence Directorate must
+determine that the information identifying the U.S. person
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+7
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+is in fact related to counterterrorism information and that
+it is necessary to understand the counterterrorism
+information or assess its importance. A record shall be
+made of every such determination.
+
+E. Internal management control shall be maintained by
+requiring that queries of the archived data be approved by
+one of eight persons: the Signals Intelligence Directorate
+Deputy Program Manager for Counterterrorism Special
+Projects Analysis and Production; the Chief or Deputy
+Chief, Counterterrorism Advanced Analysis Division; or one
+of the five specially-authorized Counterterrorism Advanced
+Analysis Shift Coordinators in the Analysis and Production
+Directorate of the Signals Intelligence Directorate. In
+addition, at least every ninety days, the Department of
+Justice shall review a sample of NSA's justifications for
+querying the archived data. Telephone numbers that are
+currently the subject of electronic surveillance authorized
+by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) based
+on the FISC's finding of probable cause to believe that
+they are used by agents of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] including those used by U.S. persons, shall be
+deemed approved for meta data querying without approval of
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+8
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+an NSA official.
+
+F. The meta data collected under this Order may be
+kept online (that is, accessible for queries by cleared
+analysts) for five years, at which time it shall be
+destroyed.
+
+G. The Signals Intelligence Directorate Program
+Manager for Counterterrorism Special Projects; Chief and
+Deputy Chief, Counterterrorism Advanced Analysis Division;
+and Counterterrorism Advanced Analysis Shift Coordinators
+shall maintain appropriate management controls (e.g.,
+records of all tasking decisions, audit and review
+procedures) for access to the archived data and shall use
+the Attorney General-approved guidelines (USSID 18) to
+minimize the information reported concerning U.S. persons.
+
+H. At least every 90 days, the NSA Inspector General,
+the NSA General Counsel, and the Signals Intelligence
+Directorate Oversight and Compliance Office shall review
+this program.
+
+I. Any application to renew or reinstate the authority
+granted herein shall include a report describing: (i) the
+queries that have been made since this Order was granted;
+(ii) the manner in which NSA applied the procedures set
+forth in subparagraph A above; and (iii) any proposed
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+9
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+changes in the way in which the call-detail records would
+be received from the carriers.
+
+J. At least twice every 90 days, NSA's OGC shall conduct
+random spot checks, consisting of an examination of a sample of
+call-detail records obtained, to ensure that NSA is receiving
+only data as authorized by the Court and not receiving the
+substantive content of communications.
+
+Signed 11-15-06 12:30 Eastern Time
+Date Time
+This authorization regarding [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+expires on
+the 9 day of February, 2007, at 5:00 p.m., Eastern Time.
+
+FREDERICK J. SCULLIN, JR.
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+I [REDACTED] Clerk,
+certify that this document
+of the original is a true and correct copy
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+10
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_06-12/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_06-12/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2dc1123
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_06-12/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+{
+ "title": "FISC Order BR 06-12",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Order of the FISC approving the Government. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2006-11-15",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT",
+ "MR"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Scullin, Frederick J. Jr."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2014-01-17",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/fisc-order-br-06-12",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "b71b80495dc9ef412bb2cc1eca4a2b17aa3728affe35ed8926462f2d012bf76a",
+ "pages": 10
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_07-04/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_07-04.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_07-04/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_07-04.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7095012
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_07-04/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_07-04.md
@@ -0,0 +1,315 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+UNITED STATES
+
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE
+FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+FOR AN ORDER REQUIRING THE
+PRODUCTION OF TANGIBLE THINGS
+FROM
+
+Docket Number: BR
+07-04
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+ORDER
+
+A verified application having been made by the Director of
+the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for an order pursuant
+to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the Act),
+Title 50, United States Code (U.S.C.), § 1861, as amended,
+requiring the production to the National Security Agency (NSA)
+of the tangible things described below, and full consideration
+having been given to the matters set forth therein, the Court
+finds that:
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+Derived from: Pleadings in the above-captioned docket
+Declassify on: Determination of the President
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+1. The Director of the FBI is authorized to make an
+application for an order requiring the production of any
+tangible things for an investigation to obtain foreign
+intelligence information not concerning a United States person
+or to protect against international terrorism, provided that
+such investigation of a United States person is not conducted
+solely on the basis of activities protected by the First
+Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. [50 U.S.C.
+§ 1861(c)(1)]
+
+2. The tangible things to be produced are all call-detail
+records or "telephony meta data" created by
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Telephony meta data includes comprehensive
+communications routing information, including but not limited to
+session identifying information (e.g., originating and
+terminating telephone number, communications device identifier,
+etc.), trunk identifier, telephone calling card numbers and time
+and duration of call. Telephony meta data does not include the
+substantive content of any communication, as defined by 18
+U.S.C. § 2510(8), or the name, address, or financial information
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+2
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+of a subscriber or customer.¹ [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)(A)]
+
+3. There are reasonable grounds to believe that the
+tangible things sought are relevant to authorized investigations
+(other than threat assessments) being conducted by the FBI under
+guidelines approved by the Attorney General under Executive
+Order 12333 to protect against international terrorism, which
+investigations are not being conducted solely upon the basis of
+activities protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution
+of the United States. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)]
+
+4. The tangible things sought could be obtained with a
+subpoena duces tecum issued by a court of the United States in
+aid of a grand jury investigation or with any other order issued
+by a court of the United States directing the production of
+records or tangible things. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)(D)]
+
+WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the application of the
+United States to obtain the tangible things, as described in the
+application, satisfies the requirements of the Act and,
+therefore,
+
+IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to the authority conferred
+on this Court by the Act, that the application is GRANTED, and
+it is
+
+¹ The Court understands that the [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+3
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+FURTHER ORDERED, as follows:
+
+(1) To the extent practicable, the Custodians of Records
+[REDACTED]
+shall produce to NSA upon service
+of the appropriate secondary order, and continue production on
+an ongoing daily basis thereafter for the duration of this
+order, unless otherwise ordered by the Court, an electronic copy
+of the following tangible things: all call-detail records or
+"telephony meta data" created by such companies as described
+above;
+
+(2) With respect to any information the FBI receives as a
+result of this Order (information that is passed or "tipped" to
+it by NSA²), the FBI shall follow as minimization procedures the
+procedures set forth in The Attorney General's Guidelines for
+FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence
+Collection (October 31, 2003).
+
+(3) With respect to the information that NSA receives as a
+result of this Order, NSA shall adhere to the following
+procedures:
+
+A. The Director of NSA shall continue to maintain
+mandatory procedures to strictly control access to and use
+
+² The Court understands that NSA expects that it will continue to
+provide on average approximately three telephone numbers per day
+to the FBI.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+4
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+of the archived data collected pursuant to this Order. Any
+search or analysis of the data archive shall occur only
+after a particular known telephone number has been
+associated with [REDACTED] More
+specifically, access to the archived data shall occur only
+when NSA has identified a known telephone number for which,
+based on the factual and practical considerations of
+everyday life on which reasonable and prudent persons act,
+there are facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+5
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+suspicion that the telephone number is associated with [REDACTED]
+provided, however, that a
+telephone number believed to be used by a U.S. person shall
+not be regarded as associated with [REDACTED]
+solely on the basis of activities that are protected
+by the First Amendment to the Constitution.
+
+B. The meta data shall be stored and processed on a
+secure private network that NSA exclusively will operate.
+
+C. Access to the meta data archive shall be
+accomplished through a software interface that will limit
+access to this data to authorized analysts. NSA's OGC
+shall monitor the designation of individuals with access to
+the archive. Access to the archive shall be controlled by
+user name and password. When the meta data archive is
+accessed, the user's login, Internet Protocol (IP) address,
+date and time, and retrieval request shall be automatically
+logged for auditing capability. NSA's Office of General
+Counsel (OGC) shall monitor the functioning of this
+automatic logging capability. Analysts shall be briefed by
+NSA's OGC concerning the authorization granted by this
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+6
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+Order and the limited circumstances in which queries to the
+archive are permitted, as well as other procedures and
+restrictions regarding the retrieval, storage, and
+dissemination of the archived data. In addition, NSA's OGC
+shall review and must approve proposed queries of archived
+meta data based on seed numbers reasonably believed to be
+used by U.S. persons before any query is conducted.
+
+D. Although the data collected under this Order will
+necessarily be broad, the use of that information for
+analysis shall be strictly tailored to identifying
+terrorist communications and shall occur solely according
+to the procedures described in the application, including
+the minimization procedures designed to protect U.S. person
+information. Specifically, dissemination of U.S. person
+information shall follow the standard NSA minimization
+procedures found in the Attorney General-approved
+guidelines (U.S. Signals Intelligence Directive 18).
+Before information identifying a U.S. person may be
+disseminated outside of NSA, a judgment must be made that
+the identity of the U.S. person is necessary to understand
+the foreign intelligence information or to assess its
+importance. Prior to the dissemination of any U.S. person
+identifying information, the Chief of Information Sharing
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+7
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+Services in the Signals Intelligence Directorate must
+determine that the information identifying the U.S. person
+is in fact related to counterterrorism information and that
+it is necessary to understand the counterterrorism
+information or assess its importance. A record shall be
+made of every such determination.
+
+E. Internal management control shall be maintained by
+requiring that queries of the archived data be approved by
+one of eight persons: the Signals Intelligence Directorate
+Deputy Program Manager for Counterterrorism Special
+Projects Analysis and Production; the Chief or Deputy
+Chief, Counterterrorism Advanced Analysis Division; or one
+of the five specially-authorized Counterterrorism Advanced
+Analysis Shift Coordinators in the Analysis and Production
+Directorate of the Signals Intelligence Directorate. In
+addition, at least every ninety days, the Department of
+Justice shall review a sample of NSA's justifications for
+querying the archived data. **Telephone numbers that are
+currently the subject of electronic surveillance authorized
+by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) based
+on the FISC's finding of probable cause to believe that
+they are used by agents of [REDACTED]**
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+8
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+[REDACTED] including those used by U.S. persons, shall be
+deemed approved for meta data querying without approval of
+an NSA official. The preceding sentence shall not apply to
+telephone numbers under surveillance in Docket Number 06-
+2081.
+
+F. The meta data collected under this Order may be
+kept online (that is, accessible for queries by cleared
+analysts) for five years, at which time it shall be
+destroyed.
+
+G. The Signals Intelligence Directorate Program
+Manager for Counterterrorism Special Projects; Chief and
+Deputy Chief, Counterterrorism Advanced Analysis Division;
+and Counterterrorism Advanced Analysis Shift Coordinators
+shall maintain appropriate management controls (e.g.,
+records of all tasking decisions, audit and review
+procedures) for access to the archived data and shall use
+the Attorney General-approved guidelines (USSID 18) to
+minimize the information reported concerning U.S. persons.
+
+H. At least every 90 days, the NSA Inspector General,
+the NSA General Counsel, and the Signals Intelligence
+Directorate Oversight and Compliance Office shall review
+this program.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+9
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+I. Any application to renew or reinstate the authority
+granted herein shall include a report describing: (i) the
+queries that have been made since this Order was granted;
+(ii) the manner in which NSA applied the procedures set
+forth in subparagraph A above; and (iii) any proposed
+changes in the way in which the call-detail records would
+be received from the carriers.
+
+/
+/
+/
+/
+/
+/
+/
+/
+/
+/
+/
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+10
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+J. At least twice every 90 days, NSA's OGC shall
+conduct random spot checks, consisting of an examination of
+a sample of call-detail records obtained, to ensure that
+NSA is receiving only data as authorized by the Court and
+not receiving the substantive content of communications.
+
+Signed: 02-07-2007 10:39 Eastern Time
+Date Time
+
+This authorization regarding [REDACTED] expires on
+the 4th day of May, 2007, at 5:00 p.m., Eastern Time.
+
+(Signature)
+ROBERT C. BROOMFIELD
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+11
+[REDACTED]
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_07-04/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_07-04/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eecd420
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_07-04/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+{
+ "title": "FISC Order BR 07-04",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Order of the FISC approving the Government. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2007-02-07",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT",
+ "MR"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Broomfield, Robert C."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2014-01-17",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/fisc-order-br-07-04",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "be52090aa665e89d1303085214bd7c1868067f7f77db80f66d1e781db0a21f18",
+ "pages": 11
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_07-10/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_07-10.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_07-10/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_07-10.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..749fd16
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_07-10/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_07-10.md
@@ -0,0 +1,302 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+UNITED STATES
+
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE
+FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+FOR AN ORDER REQUIRING THE
+PRODUCTION OF TANGIBLE THINGS
+FROM
+[REDACTED]
+
+Docket Number: BR
+07-610
+
+ORDER
+
+A verified application having been made by the Director of
+the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for an order pursuant
+to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the Act),
+Title 50, United States Code (U.S.C.), § 1861, as amended,
+requiring the production to the National Security Agency (NSA)
+of the tangible things described below, and full consideration
+having been given to the matters set forth therein, the Court
+finds that:
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+Derived from: Pleadings in the above-captioned docket
+Declassify on: Determination of the President
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+1. The Director of the FBI is authorized to make an
+application for an order requiring the production of any
+tangible things for an investigation to obtain foreign
+intelligence information not concerning a United States person
+or to protect against international terrorism, provided that
+such investigation of a United States person is not conducted
+solely on the basis of activities protected by the First
+Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. [50 U.S.C.
+§ 1861(c)(1)]
+
+2. The tangible things to be produced are all call-detail
+records or "telephony meta data" created by [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Telephony meta data includes comprehensive
+communications routing information, including but not limited to
+session identifying information (e.g., originating and
+terminating telephone number, communications device identifier,
+etc.), trunk identifier, telephone calling card numbers and time
+and duration of call. Telephony meta data does not include the
+substantive content of any communication, as defined by 18
+U.S.C. § 2510(8), or the name, address, or financial information
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+2
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+of a subscriber or customer.¹ [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)(A)]
+
+3. There are reasonable grounds to believe that the
+tangible things sought are relevant to authorized investigations
+(other than threat assessments) being conducted by the FBI under
+guidelines approved by the Attorney General under Executive
+Order 12333 to protect against international terrorism, which
+investigations are not being conducted solely upon the basis of
+activities protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution
+of the United States. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)]
+
+4. The tangible things sought could be obtained with a
+subpoena duces tecum issued by a court of the United States in
+aid of a grand jury investigation or with any other order issued
+by a court of the United States directing the production of
+records or tangible things. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)(D)]
+
+WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the application of the
+United States to obtain the tangible things, as described in the
+application, satisfies the requirements of the Act and,
+therefore,
+
+IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to the authority conferred
+on this Court by the Act, that the application is GRANTED, and
+it is
+
+¹ The Court understands that the [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+3
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+FURTHER ORDERED, as follows:
+
+(1) To the extent practicable, the Custodians of Records
+[REDACTED] shall produce to NSA upon service
+of the appropriate secondary order, and continue production on
+an ongoing daily basis thereafter for the duration of this
+order, unless otherwise ordered by the Court, an electronic copy
+of the following tangible things: all call-detail records or
+"telephony meta data" created by such companies as described
+above;
+
+(2) With respect to any information the FBI receives as a
+result of this Order (information that is passed or "tipped" to
+it by NSA²), the FBI shall follow as minimization procedures the
+procedures set forth in The Attorney General's Guidelines for
+FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence
+Collection (October 31, 2003).
+
+(3) With respect to the information that NSA receives as a
+result of this Order, NSA shall adhere to the following
+procedures:
+
+A. The Director of NSA shall continue to maintain
+mandatory procedures to strictly control access to and use
+[REDACTED]
+
+² The Court understands that NSA expects that it will continue to
+provide on average approximately three telephone numbers per day
+to the FBI.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+4
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+of the archived data collected pursuant to this Order. Any
+search or analysis of the data archive shall occur only
+after a particular known telephone number has been
+associated with [REDACTED] More
+specifically, access to the archived data shall occur only
+when NSA has identified a known telephone number for which,
+based on the factual and practical considerations of
+everyday life on which reasonable and prudent persons act,
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+5
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+there are facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable
+suspicion that the telephone number is associated with
+[REDACTED] provided, however, that a
+telephone number believed to be used by a U.S. person shall
+not be regarded as associated with [REDACTED]
+solely on the basis of activities that are protected
+by the First Amendment to the Constitution.
+
+B. The meta data shall be stored and processed on a
+secure private network that NSA exclusively will operate.
+
+C. Access to the meta data archive shall be
+accomplished through a software interface that will limit
+access to this data to authorized analysts. NSA's OGC
+shall monitor the designation of individuals with access to
+the archive. Access to the archive shall be controlled by
+user name and password. When the meta data archive is
+accessed, the user's login, Internet Protocol (IP) address,
+date and time, and retrieval request shall be automatically
+logged for auditing capability. NSA's Office of General
+Counsel (OGC) shall monitor the functioning of this
+automatic logging capability. Analysts shall be briefed by
+NSA's OGC concerning the authorization granted by this
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+6
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+Order and the limited circumstances in which queries to the
+archive are permitted, as well as other procedures and
+restrictions regarding the retrieval, storage, and
+dissemination of the archived data. In addition, NSA's OGC
+shall review and must approve proposed queries of archived
+meta data based on seed numbers reasonably believed to be
+used by U.S. persons before any query is conducted.
+
+D. Although the data collected under this Order will
+necessarily be broad, the use of that information for
+analysis shall be strictly tailored to identifying
+terrorist communications and shall occur solely according
+to the procedures described in the application, including
+the minimization procedures designed to protect U.S. person
+information. Specifically, dissemination of U.S. person
+information shall follow the standard NSA minimization
+procedures found in the Attorney General-approved
+guidelines (U.S. Signals Intelligence Directive 18).
+Before information identifying a U.S. person may be
+disseminated outside of NSA, a judgment must be made that
+the identity of the U.S. person is necessary to understand
+the foreign intelligence information or to assess its
+importance. Prior to the dissemination of any U.S. person
+identifying information, the Chief of Information Sharing
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+7
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+Services in the Signals Intelligence Directorate must
+determine that the information identifying the U.S. person
+is in fact related to counterterrorism information and that
+it is necessary to understand the counterterrorism
+information or assess its importance. A record shall be
+made of every such determination.
+
+E. Internal management control shall be maintained by
+requiring that queries of the archived data be approved by
+one of eight persons: the Signals Intelligence Directorate
+Deputy Program Manager for Counterterrorism Special
+Projects Analysis and Production; the Chief or Deputy
+Chief, Counterterrorism Advanced Analysis Division; or one
+of the five specially-authorized Counterterrorism Advanced
+Analysis Shift Coordinators in the Analysis and Production
+Directorate of the Signals Intelligence Directorate. In
+addition, at least every ninety days, the Department of
+Justice shall review a sample of NSA's justifications for
+querying the archived data. Telephone numbers that are
+currently the subject of electronic surveillance authorized
+by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) based
+on the FISC's finding of probable cause to believe that
+[REDACTED] they are used by agents of
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+8
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+[REDACTED] including those used by U.S. persons, shall be
+deemed approved for meta data querying without approval of
+an NSA official. The preceding sentence shall not apply to
+telephone numbers under surveillance in Docket Number 06-
+2081.
+
+F. The meta data collected under this Order may be
+kept online (that is, accessible for queries by cleared
+analysts) for five years, at which time it shall be
+destroyed.
+
+G. The Signals Intelligence Directorate Program
+Manager for Counterterrorism Special Projects; Chief and
+Deputy Chief, Counterterrorism Advanced Analysis Division;
+and Counterterrorism Advanced Analysis Shift Coordinators
+shall maintain appropriate management controls (e.g.,
+records of all tasking decisions, audit and review
+procedures) for access to the archived data and shall use
+the Attorney General-approved guidelines (USSID 18) to
+minimize the information reported concerning U.S. persons.
+
+H. At least every 90 days, the NSA Inspector General,
+the NSA General Counsel, and the Signals Intelligence
+Directorate Oversight and Compliance Office shall review
+this program.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+9
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+I. Any application to renew or reinstate the authority
+granted herein shall include a report describing: (i) the
+queries that have been made since this Order was granted;
+(ii) the manner in which NSA applied the procedures set
+forth in subparagraph A above; and (iii) any proposed
+changes in the way in which the call-detail records would
+be received from the carriers.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+10
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+J. At least twice every 90 days, NSA's OGC shall
+conduct random spot checks, consisting of an examination of a
+sample of call-detail records obtained, to ensure that
+NSA is receiving only data as authorized by the Court and
+not receiving the substantive content of communications.
+
+Signed 08-31-2007 00:46 Eastern Time
+Date Time
+This authorization regarding [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+expires on
+the 26 day of July, 2007, at 5:00 p.m., Eastern Time.
+
+NATHANIEL M. GORTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+[REDACTED] Deputy Clerk
+FISC, certify that this document
+is a true and correct copy of
+the original [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+11
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_07-10/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_07-10/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..38b560c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_07-10/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+{
+ "title": "FISC Order BR 07-10",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Order of the FISC approving the Government. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2007-05-03",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT",
+ "MR"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Gorton, Nathaniel M."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2014-01-17",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/fisc-order-br-07-10",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "422dce3b3b6b89c44899789b0b3474bdfb49bc516141da2e6e200de5edca5ed8",
+ "pages": 11
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_07-14/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_07-14.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_07-14/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_07-14.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7ca0a47
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_07-14/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_07-14.md
@@ -0,0 +1,262 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+UNITED STATES
+
+
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
+BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
+ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
+OF TANGIBLE THINGS FROM
+[REDACTED] ~~(TS)~~
+
+Docket Number: BR:
+07-14
+
+ORDER
+
+A verified application having been made by the Director of
+the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for an order pursuant
+to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the Act),
+Title 50, United States Code (U.S.C.), § 1861, as amended,
+requiring the production to the National Security Agency (NSA)
+of the tangible things described below, and full consideration
+having been given to the matters set forth therein, the Court
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+Derived from: Pleadings in the above-captioned docket
+Declassify on: Determination of the President
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+finds that:
+1. The Director of the FBI is authorized to make an
+application for an order requiring the production of any
+tangible things for an investigation to obtain foreign
+intelligence information not concerning a United States person
+or to protect against international terrorism, provided that
+such investigation of a United States person is not conducted
+solely on the basis of activities protected by the First
+Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. [50 U.S.C.
+§ 1861(c)(1)]
+2. The tangible things to be produced are all call-detail
+records or "telephony meta data" created by [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+Telephony meta data includes comprehensive
+communications routing information, including but not limited to
+session identifying information (e.g., originating and
+terminating telephone number, communications device identifier,
+etc.), trunk identifier, telephone calling card numbers and time
+and duration of call. Telephony meta data does not include the
+substantive content of any communication, as defined by 18
+U.S.C. § 2510(8), or the name, address, or financial information
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+2
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+of a subscriber or customer.¹ [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)(A)]
+3. There are reasonable grounds to believe that the
+tangible things sought are relevant to authorized investigations
+(other than threat assessments) being conducted by the FBI under
+guidelines approved by the Attorney General under Executive
+Order 12333 to protect against international terrorism, which
+investigations are not being conducted solely upon the basis of
+activities protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution
+of the United States. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)]
+4. The tangible things sought could be obtained with a
+subpoena duces tecum issued by a court of the United States in
+aid of a grand jury investigation or with any other order issued
+by a court of the United States directing the production of
+records or tangible things. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2) (D)]
+WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the application of the
+United States to obtain the tangible things, as described in the
+application, satisfies the requirements of the Act and,
+therefore,
+1 The Court understands that the [REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+3
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to the authority conferred
+on this Court by the Act, that the application is GRANTED, and
+it is
+FURTHER ORDERED, as follows:
+(1) To the extent practicable, the Custodians of Records
+of [REDACTED] shall produce to NSA upon service
+of the appropriate secondary order, and continue production on
+an ongoing daily basis thereafter for the duration of this
+order, unless otherwise ordered by the Court, an electronic copy
+of the following tangible things: all call-detail records or
+"telephony meta data" created by such companies as described
+above;
+(2) With respect to any information the FBI receives as a
+result of this Order (information that is passed or "tipped" to
+it by NSA²), the FBI shall follow as minimization procedures the
+procedures set forth in The Attorney General's Guidelines for
+FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence
+Collection (October 31, 2003).
+(3) With respect to the information that NSA receives as a
+result of this Order, NSA shall adhere to the following
+procedures:
+2 The Court understands that NSA expects that it will continue to
+provide on average approximately three telephone numbers per day
+to the FBI.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+4
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+A. The Director of NSA shall continue to maintain
+mandatory procedures to strictly control access to and use
+of the archived data collected pursuant to this Order. Any
+search or analysis of the data archive shall occur only
+after a particular known telephone number has been
+associated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+5
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+[REDACTED] More specifically, access to the
+archived data shall occur only when NSA has identified a
+known telephone number for which, based on the factual and
+practical considerations of everyday life on which
+reasonable and prudent persons act, there are facts giving
+rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the
+telephone number is associated with [REDACTED],
+provided, however, that
+a telephone number believed to be a U.S. person
+shall not be regarded as associated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+6
+TOP SECRET//COMΜΙΝΤ//ΝΟΓORN//MR
+[REDACTED] solely on the
+basis of activities that are protected by the First
+Amendment to the Constitution.
+B. The meta data shall be stored and processed on a
+secure private network that NSA exclusively will operate.
+C. Access to the meta data archive shall be
+accomplished through a software interface that will limit
+access to this data to authorized analysts. NSA's OGC
+shall monitor the designation of individuals with access to
+the archive. Access to the archive shall be controlled by
+user name and password. When the meta data archive is
+accessed, the user's login, Internet Protocol (IP) address,
+date and time, and retrieval request shall be automatically
+logged for auditing capability. NSA's Office of General
+Counsel (OGC) shall monitor the functioning of this
+automatic logging capability. Analysts shall be briefed by
+NSA's OGC concerning the authorization granted by this
+Order and the limited circumstances in which queries to the
+archive are permitted, as well as other procedures and
+restrictions regarding the retrieval, storage, and
+dissemination of the archived data. In addition, NSA's OGC
+shall review and must approve proposed queries of archived
+meta data based on seed numbers reasonably believed to be
+TOP SECRET//COΜΙΝΤ//ΝΟΓORN//MR
+7
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+used by U.S. persons before any query is conducted.
+D. Although the data collected under this Order will
+necessarily be broad, the use of that information for
+analysis shall be strictly tailored to identifying
+terrorist communications and shall occur solely according
+to the procedures described in the application, including
+the minimization procedures designed to protect U.S. person
+information. Specifically, dissemination of U.S. person
+information shall follow the standard NSA minimization
+procedures found in the Attorney General-approved
+guidelines (U.S. Signals Intelligence Directive 18).
+Before information identifying a U.S. person may be
+disseminated outside of NSA, a judgment must be made that
+the identity of the U.S. person is necessary to understand
+the foreign intelligence information or to assess its
+importance. Prior to the dissemination of any U.S. person
+identifying information, the Chief of Information Sharing
+Services in the Signals Intelligence Directorate must
+determine that the information identifying the U.S. person
+is in fact related to counterterrorism information and that
+it is necessary to understand the counterterrorism
+information or assess its importance. A record shall be
+made of every such determination.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+8
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+E. Internal management control shall be maintained by
+requiring that queries of the archived data be approved by
+one of eight persons: the Signals Intelligence Directorate
+Deputy Program Manager for Counterterrorism Special
+Projects Analysis and Production; the Chief or Deputy
+Chief, Counterterrorism Advanced Analysis Division; or one
+of the five specially-authorized Counterterrorism Advanced
+Analysis Shift Coordinators in the Analysis and Production
+Directorate of the Signals Intelligence Directorate. In
+addition, at least every ninety days, the Department of
+Justice shall review a sample of NSA's justifications for
+querying the archived data. Telephone numbers that are the
+subject of electronic surveillance authorized by the
+Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) based on the
+FISC's finding of probable cause to believe that they are
+used by [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] including those used by U.S.
+persons, shall be deemed approved for meta data querying
+without approval of an NSA official. The preceding
+sentence shall not apply to the telephone numbers under
+surveillance in Docket Number 07-449 or any renewal
+thereof.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+9
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+F. The meta data collected under this Order may be
+kept online (that is, accessible for queries by cleared
+analysts) for five years, at which time it shall be
+destroyed.
+G. The Signals Intelligence Directorate Program
+Manager for Counterterrorism Special Projects; Chief and
+Deputy Chief, Counterterrorism Advanced Analysis Division;
+and Counterterrorism Advanced Analysis Shift Coordinators
+shall maintain appropriate management controls (e.g.,
+records of all tasking decisions, audit and review
+procedures) for access to the archived data and shall use
+the Attorney General-approved guidelines (USSID 18) to
+minimize the information reported concerning U.S. persons.
+H. At least every 90 days, the NSA Inspector General,
+the NSA General Counsel, and the Signals Intelligence
+Directorate Oversight and Compliance Office shall review
+this program.
+I. Any application to renew or reinstate the authority
+granted herein shall include a report describing: (i) the
+queries that have been made since this Order was granted;
+(ii) the manner in which NSA applied the procedures set
+forth in subparagraph A above; and (iii) any proposed
+changes in the way in which the call-detail records would
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+10
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+be received from the carriers.
+J. At least twice every 90 days, NSA's OGC shall
+conduct random spot checks, consisting of an examination of
+a sample of call-detail records obtained, to ensure that
+NSA is receiving only data as authorized by the Court and
+not receiving the substantive content of communications.
+
+Signed 07-25-2007 5:32 Eastern Time
+Date Time
+
+This authorization regarding [REDACTED]
+and Unknown Persons in the United States and
+Abroad Affiliated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] and Unknown Persons in the United States
+and Abroad Affiliated with [REDACTED]
+expires on the 19th day of October,
+2007, at 5:00p.m., Eastern Time.
+
+NATHANIEL M. GORTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+Deputy Clerk
+FISC, certify that this document TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+is a true and correct copy of
+the original [REDACTED]
+11
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_07-14/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_07-14/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d798f6d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_07-14/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+{
+ "title": "FISC Order BR 07-14",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Order of the FISC approving the Government. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2007-07-25",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT",
+ "MR"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Gorton, Nathaniel M."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2014-01-17",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/fisc-order-br-07-14",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "fe948f2f20122aba201c74c983d653528bf323895c40572b1ecf0f0ab6043c27",
+ "pages": 11
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_07-16/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_07-16.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_07-16/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_07-16.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..27f1aa6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_07-16/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_07-16.md
@@ -0,0 +1,271 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+UNITED STATES
+
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
+BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
+ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
+OF TANGIBLE THINGS FROM
+[REDACTED] (TS)
+
+Docket Number: BR: 07-016
+
+PRIMARY ORDER
+A verified application having been made by the Director of
+the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for an order pursuant
+to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the Act),
+Title 50, United States Code (U.S.C.), § 1861, as amended,
+requiring the production to the National Security Agency (NSA)
+of the tangible things described below, and full consideration
+having been given to the matters set forth therein, the Court
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR-
+Derived from: Pleadings in the above-captioned docket
+Declassify on: Determination of the President
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+finds that:
+1. The Director of the FBI is authorized to make an
+application for an order requiring the production of any
+tangible things for an investigation to obtain foreign
+intelligence information not concerning a United States person
+or to protect against international terrorism, provided that
+such investigation of a United States person is not conducted
+solely on the basis of activities protected by the First
+Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. [50 U.S.C.
+§ 1861(c)(1)]
+2. The tangible things to be produced are all call-detail
+records or "telephony meta data" created by
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+Telephony meta data includes comprehensive
+communications routing information, including but not limited to
+session identifying information (e.g., originating and
+terminating telephone number, communications device identifier,
+etc.), trunk identifier, telephone calling card numbers and time
+and duration of call. Telephony meta data does not include the
+substantive content of any communication, as defined by 18
+U.S.C. § 2510(8), or the name, address, or financial information
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+2
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+of a subscriber or customer.¹ [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)(A)]
+3. There are reasonable grounds to believe that the
+tangible things sought are relevant to authorized investigations
+(other than threat assessments) being conducted by the FBI under
+guidelines approved by the Attorney General under Executive
+Order 12333 to protect against international terrorism, which
+investigations are not being conducted solely upon the basis of
+activities protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution
+of the United States. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)]
+4. The tangible things sought could be obtained with a
+subpoena duces tecum issued by a court of the United States in
+aid of a grand jury investigation or with any other order issued
+by a court of the United States directing the production of
+records or tangible things. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)(D)]
+WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the application of the
+United States to obtain the tangible things, as described in the
+application, satisfies the requirements of the Act and,
+therefore,
+¹ The Court understands that the [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+3
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to the authority conferred
+on this Court by the Act, that the application is GRANTED, and
+it is
+FURTHER ORDERED, as follows:
+(1) To the extent practicable, the Custodians of Records
+of [REDACTED] shall produce to NSA upon service
+of the appropriate secondary order, and continue production on
+an ongoing daily basis thereafter for the duration of this
+order, unless otherwise ordered by the Court, an electronic copy
+of the following tangible things: all call-detail records or
+"telephony meta data" created by such companies as described
+above;
+(2) With respect to any information the FBI receives as a
+result of this Order (information that is passed or "tipped" to
+it by NSA²), the FBI shall follow as minimization procedures the
+procedures set forth in The Attorney General's Guidelines for
+FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence
+Collection (October 31, 2003).
+(3) With respect to the information that NSA receives as a
+result of this Order, NSA shall adhere to the following
+procedures:
+² The Court understands that NSA expects that it will continue to
+provide on average approximately three telephone numbers per day
+to the FBI.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+4
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+A. The Director of NSA shall continue to maintain
+mandatory procedures to strictly control access to and use
+of the archived data collected pursuant to this Order. Any
+search or analysis of the data archive shall occur only
+after a particular known telephone number has been
+associated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR-
+5
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+[REDACTED]
+More specifically, access to the
+archived data shall occur only when NSA has identified a
+known telephone number for which, based on the factual and
+practical considerations of everyday life on which
+reasonable and prudent persons act, there are facts giving
+rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the
+telephone number is associated with [REDACTED]
+provided, however, that
+a telephone number believed to be used by a U.S. person
+shall not be regarded as associated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+6
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+[REDACTED]
+solely on the
+basis of activities that are protected by the First
+Amendment to the Constitution.
+B. The meta data shall be stored and processed on a
+secure private network that NSA exclusively will operate.
+C. Access to the meta data archive shall be
+accomplished through a software interface that will limit
+access to this data to authorized analysts. NSA's OGC
+shall monitor the designation of individuals with access to
+the archive. Access to the archive shall be controlled by
+user name and password. When the meta data archive is
+accessed, the user's login, Internet Protocol (IP) address,
+date and time, and retrieval request shall be automatically
+logged for auditing capability. NSA's Office of General
+Counsel (OGC) shall monitor the functioning of this
+automatic logging capability. Analysts shall be briefed by
+NSA's OGC concerning the authorization granted by this
+Order and the limited circumstances in which queries to the
+archive are permitted, as well as other procedures and
+restrictions regarding the retrieval, storage, and
+dissemination of the archived data. In addition, NSA's OGC
+shall review and must approve proposed queries of archived
+meta data based on seed numbers reasonably believed to be
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+7
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+used by U.S. persons before any query is conducted.
+D. Although the data collected under this Order will
+necessarily be broad, the use of that information for
+analysis shall be strictly tailored to identifying
+terrorist communications and shall occur solely according
+to the procedures described in the application, including
+the minimization procedures designed to protect U.S. person
+information. Specifically, dissemination of U.S. person
+information shall follow the standard NSA minimization
+procedures found in the Attorney General-approved
+guidelines (U.S. Signals Intelligence Directive 18).
+Before information identifying a U.S. person may be
+disseminated outside of NSA, a judgment must be made that
+the identity of the U.S. person is necessary to understand
+the foreign intelligence information or to assess its
+importance. Prior to the dissemination of any U.S. person
+identifying information, the Chief of Information Sharing
+Services in the Signals Intelligence Directorate must
+determine that the information identifying the U.S. person
+is in fact related to counterterrorism information and that
+it is necessary to understand the counterterrorism
+information or assess its importance. A record shall be
+made of every such determination.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+8
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+E. Internal management control shall be maintained by
+requiring that queries of the archived data be approved by
+one of eight persons: the Signals Intelligence Directorate
+Deputy Program Manager for Counterterrorism Special
+Projects Analysis and Production; the Chief or Deputy
+Chief, Counterterrorism Advanced Analysis Division; or one
+of the five specially-authorized Counterterrorism Advanced
+Analysis Shift Coordinators in the Analysis and Production
+Directorate of the Signals Intelligence Directorate. In
+addition, at least every ninety days, the Department of
+Justice shall review a sample of NSA's justifications for
+querying the archived data. Telephone numbers that are the
+subject of electronic surveillance authorized by the
+Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) based on the
+FISC's finding of probable cause to believe that they are
+used by [REDACTED]
+including those used by U.S.
+persons, shall be deemed approved for meta data querying
+without approval of an NSA official. The preceding
+sentence shall not apply to the telephone numbers under
+surveillance pursuant to any certification of the Director
+of National Intelligence and the Attorney General pursuant
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+9
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+to Section 105B of FISA, as added by the Protect America
+Act of 2007.
+F. The meta data collected under this Order may be
+kept online (that is, accessible for queries by cleared
+analysts) for five years, at which time it shall be
+destroyed.
+G. The Signals Intelligence Directorate Program
+Manager for Counterterrorism Special Projects; Chief and
+Deputy Chief, Counterterrorism Advanced Analysis Division;
+and Counterterrorism Advanced Analysis Shift Coordinators
+shall maintain appropriate management controls (e.g.,
+records of all tasking decisions, audit and review
+procedures) for access to the archived data and shall use
+the Attorney General-approved guidelines (USSID 18) to
+minimize the information reported concerning U.S. persons.
+H. At least every 90 days, the NSA Inspector General,
+the NSA General Counsel, and the Signals Intelligence
+Directorate Oversight and Compliance Office shall review
+this program.
+I. Any application to renew or reinstate the authority
+granted herein shall include a report describing: (i) the
+queries that have been made since this Order was granted;
+(ii) the manner in which NSA applied the procedures set
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+10
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+forth in subparagraph A above; and (iii) any proposed
+changes in the way in which the call-detail records would
+be received from the carriers.
+J. At least twice every 90 days, NSA's OGC shall
+conduct random spot checks, consisting of an examination of
+a sample of call-detail records obtained, to ensure that
+NSA is receiving only data as authorized by the Court and
+not receiving the substantive content of communications.
+
+Signed 10-18-2007 P01:14 Eastern Time
+Date Time
+
+This authorization regarding [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] and Unknown Persons in the United States and
+Abroad Affiliated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] and Unknown Persons in the United States
+and Abroad Affiliated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] expires on the 11th day of January,
+2008, at 5:00 p.m., Eastern Time.
+
+ROGER VINSON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+[REDACTED] Clerk,
+is a true and correct copy
+of the original [REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+11
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_07-16/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_07-16/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bedc48e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_07-16/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+{
+ "title": "FISC Order BR 07-16",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Order of the FISC approving the Government. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2007-10-18",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT",
+ "MR"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Vinson, Roger"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2014-01-17",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/fisc-order-br-07-16",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "f65ac7f680bc6073a5eaca480bde43040d500e542e4d7441b9885736d93df79d",
+ "pages": 11
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_08-01/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_08-01.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_08-01/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_08-01.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..03255d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_08-01/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_08-01.md
@@ -0,0 +1,339 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
+BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
+ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
+OF TANGIBLE THINGS FROM
+[REDACTED]
+
+Docket Number: BR:
+08-01
+
+PRIMARY ORDER
+
+A verified application having been made by the Director of
+the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for an order pursuant
+to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the Act),
+Title 50, United States Code (U.S.C.), § 1861, as amended,
+requiring the production to the National Security Agency (NSA)
+of the tangible things described below, and full consideration
+having been given to the matters set forth therein, the Court
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+Derived from: Pleadings in the above-captioned docket
+Declassify on: Determination of the President
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+finds that:
+
+1. The Director of the FBI is authorized to make an
+application for an order requiring the production of any
+tangible things for an investigation to obtain foreign
+intelligence information not concerning a United States person
+or to protect against international terrorism, provided that
+such investigation of a United States person is not conducted
+solely on the basis of activities protected by the First
+Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. [50 U.S.C.
+§ 1861(c)(1)]
+
+2. The tangible things to be produced are all call-detail
+records or “telephony meta data” created by [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Telephony meta data includes comprehensive
+communications routing information, including but not limited to
+session identifying information (e.g., originating and
+terminating telephone number, communications device identifier,
+etc.), trunk identifier, telephone calling card numbers, and
+time and duration of call. Telephony meta data does not include
+the substantive content of any communication, as defined by 18
+U.S.C. § 2510(8), or the name, address, or financial information
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+2
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+of a subscriber or customer.¹ [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)(A)]
+
+3. There are reasonable grounds to believe that the
+tangible things sought are relevant to authorized investigations
+(other than threat assessments) being conducted by the FBI under
+guidelines approved by the Attorney General under Executive
+Order 12333 to protect against international terrorism, which
+investigations are not being conducted solely upon the basis of
+activities protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution
+of the United States. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)]
+
+4. The tangible things sought could be obtained with a
+subpoena duces tecum issued by a court of the United States in
+aid of a grand jury investigation or with any other order issued
+by a court of the United States directing the production of
+records or tangible things. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)(D)]
+
+WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the application of the
+United States to obtain the tangible things, as described in the
+application, satisfies the requirements of the Act and,
+therefore,
+
+¹ The Court understands that the [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+3
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to the authority conferred
+on this Court by the Act, that the application is GRANTED, and
+it is
+
+FURTHER ORDERED, as follows:
+
+(1) To the extent practicable, the Custodians of Records
+of [REDACTED] shall produce to NSA upon service
+of the appropriate secondary order, and continue production on
+an ongoing daily basis thereafter for the duration of this
+order, unless otherwise ordered by the Court, an electronic copy
+of the following tangible things: all call-detail records or
+“telephony meta data” created by such companies as described
+above;
+
+(2) With respect to any information the FBI receives as a
+result of this Order (information that is passed or “tipped” to
+it by NSA²), the FBI shall follow as minimization procedures the
+procedures set forth in The Attorney General’s Guidelines for
+FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence
+Collection (October 31, 2003).
+
+(3) With respect to the information that NSA receives as a
+result of this Order, NSA shall adhere to the following
+procedures:
+
+² The Court understands that NSA expects that it will continue to
+provide on average approximately three telephone numbers per day
+to the FBI.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+4
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+A. The Director of NSA shall continue to maintain
+mandatory procedures to strictly control access to and use
+of the archived data collected pursuant to this Order. Any
+search or analysis of the data archive shall occur only
+after a particular known telephone number has been
+associated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+5
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+More specifically, access to the
+archived data shall occur only when NSA has identified a
+known telephone number for which, based on the factual and
+practical considerations of everyday life on which
+reasonable and prudent persons act, there are facts giving
+rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the
+telephone number is associated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+provided, however, that
+a telephone number believed to be used by a U.S. person
+shall not be regarded as associated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] solely on the
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+6
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+basis of activities that are protected by the First
+Amendment to the Constitution.
+
+B. The meta data shall be stored and processed on a
+secure private network that NSA exclusively will operate.
+
+C. Access to the meta data archive shall be
+accomplished through a software interface that will limit
+access to this data to authorized analysts.⁵ NSA'S OGC
+shall monitor the designation of individuals with access to
+the archive. Access to the archive shall be controlled by
+user name and password. When the meta data archive is
+accessed, the user's login, Internet Protocol (IP) address,
+date and time, and retrieval request shall be automatically
+logged for auditing capability. NSA's Office of General
+Counsel (OGC) monitor the functioning of this
+automatic logging capability. Analysts shall be briefed by
+NSA'S OGC concerning the authorization granted by this
+Order and the limited circumstances in which queries to the
+archive are permitted, as well as other procedures and
+
+⁵ The Court understands that for purposes of analytical
+efficiency a copy of meta data obtained pursuant to the Court's
+Orders in this matter will be stored in the same database with
+data obtained pursuant to other NSA authorities and data
+provided to NSA from other sources. Access to such records
+shall be strictly limited in accordance with the procedures set
+forth in paragraphs A-G.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+7
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+restrictions regarding the retrieval, storage, and
+dissemination of the archived data. In addition, NSA's OGC
+shall review and must approve proposed queries of archived
+meta data based on seed numbers reasonably believed to be
+used by U.S. persons before any query is conducted.
+
+D. Although the data collected under this Order will
+necessarily be broad, the use of that information for
+analysis shall be strictly tailored to identifying
+terrorist communications and shall occur solely according
+to the procedures described in the application, including
+the minimization procedures designed to protect U.S. person
+information. Specifically, dissemination of U.S. person
+information shall follow the standard NSA minimization
+procedures found in the Attorney General-approved
+guidelines (USSID 18). Before information identifying a
+U.S. person may be disseminated outside of NSA, a judgment
+must be made that the identity of the U.S. person is
+necessary to understand the foreign intelligence
+information or to assess its importance. Prior to the
+dissemination of any U.S. person identifying information,
+the Chief of Information Sharing Services in the Signals
+Intelligence Directorate must determine that the
+information identifying the U.S. person is in fact related
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+8
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+to counterterrorism information and that it is necessary to
+understand the counterterrorism information or assess its
+importance. A record shall be made of every such
+determination.
+
+E. Internal management control shall be maintained by
+requiring that queries of the archived data be approved by
+one of eight persons: the Signals Intelligence Directorate
+Deputy Program Manager for Counterterrorism Special
+Projects Analysis and Production; the Chief or Deputy
+Chief, Homeland Security Analysis Center; or one of the
+five specially-authorized Homeland Mission Coordinators in
+the Analysis and Production Directorate of the Signals
+Intelligence Directorate. Telephone numbers that are the
+subject of electronic surveillance authorized by the
+Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) based on the
+FISC's finding of probable cause to believe that they are
+used by [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] including those used by U.S.
+persons, shall be deemed approved for meta data querying
+without approval of an NSA official. The preceding
+sentence shall not apply to the telephone numbers under
+surveillance pursuant to any certification of the Director
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+9
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+of National Intelligence and the Attorney General pursuant
+to Section 105B of FISA, as added by the Protect America
+Act of 2007. At least every ninety days, the Department of
+Justice shall review a sample of NSA’s justifications for
+querying the archived data. In addition, at least twice
+every ninety days, NSA's OGC shall conduct random spot
+checks, consisting of an examination of a sample of call-
+detail records obtained, to ensure that NSA is receiving
+only data as authorized by the Court and not receiving the
+substantive content of communications.
+
+F. The meta data collected under this Order may be
+kept online (that is, accessible for queries by cleared
+analysts) for five years, at which time it shall be
+destroyed.
+
+G. The Signals Intelligence Directorate Program
+Manager for Counterterrorism Special Projects; Chief and
+Deputy Chief, Homeland Security Analysis Center; and the
+Homeland Mission Coordinators shall maintain appropriate
+management controls (e.g., records of all tasking
+decisions, audit and review procedures) for access to the
+archived data and shall use the Attorney General-approved
+guidelines (USSID 18) to minimize the information reported
+concerning U.S. persons.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+10
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+H. At least every ninety days, the NSA Inspector
+General, the NSA General Counsel, and the Signals
+Intelligence Directorate Oversight and Compliance Office
+shall review this program.
+
+I. Any application to renew or reinstate the
+authority granted herein shall include a report describing:
+(i) the queries that have been made since this Order was
+granted; (ii) the manner in which NSA applied the
+procedures set forth in subparagraph A above; and (iii) any
+proposed changes in the way in which the call-detail
+records would be received from the carriers.
+
+/
+/
+/
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+11
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+Signed [REDACTED] Eastern Time
+Date Time
+
+This authorization regarding [REDACTED]
+and unknown persons in the United States and
+abroad affiliated with [REDACTED]
+
+and unknown persons in the United States
+and abroad affiliated with [REDACTED]
+expires on the 4th day of April, 2008,
+at 5:00 p.m., Eastern Time.
+
+MALCOLM J HOWARD
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+I, [REDACTED] Clerk,
+FISC, certify that this document
+is a true and correct copy
+of the original [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+12
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_08-01/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_08-01/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..448a598
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_08-01/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+{
+ "title": "FISC Order BR 08-01",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Order of the FISC approving the Government. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2008-01-01",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT",
+ "MR"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Howard, Malcolm J."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2014-01-17",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/fisc-order-br-08-01",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "aa0986a00688871dd1beb674019a250b8bbe48bcb90727eb734109e8cb38b8f9",
+ "pages": 12
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_08-04/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_08-04.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_08-04/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_08-04.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ffafdc8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_08-04/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_08-04.md
@@ -0,0 +1,342 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+UNITED STATES
+
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
+BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
+ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
+OF TANGIBLE THINGS FROM [REDACTED]
+
+Docket Number: BR:
+08-04
+
+PRIMARY ORDER
+
+A verified application having been made by the Director of
+the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for an order pursuant
+to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the Act),
+Title 50, United States Code (U.S.C.), § 1861, as amended,
+requiring the production to the National Security Agency (NSA)
+of the tangible things described below, and full consideration
+having been given to the matters set forth therein, the Court
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+Derived from: Pleadings in the above-captioned docket
+Declassify on: Determination of the President
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+finds that:
+
+1. The Director of the FBI is authorized to make an
+application for an order requiring the production of any
+tangible things for an investigation to obtain foreign
+intelligence information not concerning a United States person
+or to protect against international terrorism, provided that
+such investigation of a United States person is not conducted
+solely on the basis of activities protected by the First
+Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. [50 U.S.C.
+§ 1861(c)(1)]
+
+2. The tangible things to be produced are all call-detail
+records or "telephony meta data" created by
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+Telephony meta data includes comprehensive
+communications routing information, including but not limited to
+session identifying information (e.g., originating and
+terminating telephone number, communications device identifier,
+etc.), trunk identifier, telephone calling card numbers, and
+time and duration of call. Telephony meta data does not include
+the substantive content of any communication, as defined by 18
+U.S.C. § 2510(8), or the name, address, or financial information
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+2
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+of a subscriber or customer.¹ [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)(A)]
+
+3. There are reasonable grounds to believe that the
+tangible things sought are relevant to authorized investigations
+(other than threat assessments) being conducted by the FBI under
+guidelines approved by the Attorney General under Executive
+Order 12333 to protect against international terrorism, which
+investigations are not being conducted solely upon the basis of
+activities protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution
+of the United States. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)]
+
+4. The tangible things sought could be obtained with a
+subpoena duces tecum issued by a court of the United States in
+aid of a grand jury investigation or with any other order issued
+by a court of the United States directing the production of
+records or tangible things. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)(D)]
+
+WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the application of the
+United States to obtain the tangible things, as described in the
+application, satisfies the requirements of the Act and,
+therefore,
+
+¹ The Court understands that the
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+3
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to the authority conferred
+on this Court by the Act, that the application is GRANTED, and
+it is
+
+FURTHER ORDERED, as follows:
+
+(1) The Custodians of Records of [REDACTED]
+shall produce to NSA upon service of the appropriate secondary
+order, and continue production on an ongoing daily basis
+thereafter for the duration of this order, unless otherwise
+ordered by the Court, an electronic copy of the following
+tangible things: all call-detail records or "telephony meta
+data" created by such companies as described above;
+
+(2) With respect to any information the FBI receives as a
+result of this Order (information that is passed or "tipped" to
+it by NSA²), the FBI shall follow as minimization procedures the
+procedures set forth in The Attorney General's Guidelines for
+FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence
+Collection (October 31, 2003).
+
+(3) With respect to the information that NSA receives as a
+result of this Order, NSA shall adhere to the following
+procedures:
+
+A. The Director of NSA shall continue to maintain
+
+² The Court understands that NSA expects that it will continue to
+provide on average approximately three telephone numbers per day
+to the FBI.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+4
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+mandatory procedures to strictly control access to and use
+of the archived data collected pursuant to this Order. Any
+search or analysis of the data archive shall occur only
+after a particular known telephone number has been
+associated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+5
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+[REDACTED]
+More specifically, access to the
+archived data shall occur only when NSA has identified a
+known telephone number for which, based on the factual and
+practical considerations of everyday life on which
+reasonable and prudent persons act, there are facts giving
+rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the
+telephone number is associated with [REDACTED]
+provided, however, that
+a telephone number believed to be used by a U.S. person
+shall not be regarded as associated with [REDACTED]
+solely on the
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+6
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+basis of activities that are protected by the First
+Amendment to the Constitution.
+
+B. The meta data shall be stored and processed on a
+secure private network that NSA exclusively will operate.
+
+C. Access to the meta data archive shall be
+accomplished through a software interface that will limit
+access to this data to authorized analysts.⁵ NSA'S OGC
+shall monitor the designation of individuals with access to
+the archive. Access to the archive shall be controlled by
+user name and password. When the meta data archive is
+accessed, the user's login, Internet Protocol (IP) address,
+date and time, and retrieval request shall be automatically
+logged for auditing capability. NSA's Office of General
+Counsel (OGC) shall monitor the functioning of this
+automatic logging capability. Analysts shall be briefed by
+NSA'S OGC concerning the authorization granted by this
+Order and the limited circumstances in which queries to the
+archive are permitted, as well as other procedures and
+
+⁵ The Court understands that for purposes of analytical
+efficiency a copy of meta data obtained pursuant to the Court's
+Orders in this matter will be stored in the same database with
+data obtained pursuant to other NSA authorities and data
+provided to NSA from other sources. Access to such records
+shall be strictly limited in accordance with the procedures set
+forth in paragraphs A-G.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+7
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+restrictions regarding the retrieval, storage, and
+dissemination of the archived data. In addition, NSA's OGC
+shall review and must approve proposed queries of archived
+meta data based on seed numbers reasonably believed to be
+used by U.S. persons before any query is conducted.
+
+D. Although the data collected under this Order will
+necessarily be broad, the use of that information for
+analysis shall be strictly tailored to identifying
+terrorist communications and shall occur solely according
+to the procedures described in the application, including
+the minimization procedures designed to protect U.S. person
+information. Specifically, dissemination of U.S. person
+information shall follow the standard NSA minimization
+procedures found in the Attorney General-approved
+guidelines (USSID 18). Before information identifying a
+U.S. person may be disseminated outside of NSA, a judgment
+must be made that the identity of the U.S. person is
+necessary to understand the foreign intelligence
+information or to assess its importance. Prior to the
+dissemination of any U.S. person identifying information,
+the Chief of Information Sharing Services in the Signals
+Intelligence Directorate must determine that the
+information identifying the U.S. person is in fact related
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+8
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+to counterterrorism information and that it is necessary to
+understand the counterterrorism information or assess its
+importance. A record shall be made of every such
+determination.
+
+E. Internal management control shall be maintained by
+requiring that queries of the archived data be approved by
+one of twenty-three persons: the Signals Intelligence
+Directorate Deputy Program Manager for Counterterrorism
+Special Projects Analysis and Production; the Chief or
+Deputy Chief, Homeland Security Analysis Center; or one of
+the twenty specially-authorized Homeland Mission
+Coordinators in the Analysis and Production Directorate of
+the Signals Intelligence Directorate. Telephone numbers
+that are the subject of electronic surveillance authorized
+by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) based
+on the FISC's finding of probable cause to believe that
+they are used by agents of [REDACTED]
+including those used by
+U.S. persons, shall be deemed approved for meta data
+querying without approval of an NSA official. The
+preceding sentence shall not apply to the telephone numbers
+under surveillance pursuant to any certification of the
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+9
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General
+pursuant to Section 105B of FISA, as added by the Protect
+America Act of 2007. At least every ninety days, the
+Department of Justice shall review a sample of NSA's
+justifications for querying the archived data. In
+addition, at least twice every ninety days, NSA's OGC shall
+conduct random spot checks, consisting of an examination of
+a sample of call-detail records obtained, to ensure that
+NSA is receiving only data as authorized by the Court and
+not receiving the substantive content of communications.
+
+F. The meta data collected under this Order may be
+kept online (that is, accessible for queries by cleared
+analysts) for five years, at which time it shall be
+destroyed.
+
+G. The Signals Intelligence Directorate Program
+Manager for Counterterrorism Special Projects; Chief and
+Deputy Chief, Homeland Security Analysis Center; and the
+Homeland Mission Coordinators shall maintain appropriate
+management controls (e.g., records of all tasking
+decisions, audit and review procedures) for access to the
+archived data and shall use the Attorney General-approved
+guidelines (USSID 18) to minimize the information reported
+concerning U.S. persons.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+10
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+H. At least every ninety days, the NSA Inspector
+General, the NSA General Counsel, and the Signals
+Intelligence Directorate Oversight and Compliance Office
+shall review this program.
+
+I. Any application to renew or reinstate the
+authority granted herein shall include a report describing:
+(i) the queries that have been made since this Order was
+granted; (ii) the manner in which NSA applied the
+procedures set forth in subparagraph A above; and (iii) any
+proposed changes in the way in which the call-detail
+records would be received from the carriers.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+11
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+Signed 04-03-2008 P03:53 Eastern Time
+Date Time
+
+This authorization regarding [REDACTED] and unknown persons in the United States and
+abroad affiliated with [REDACTED]
+and unknown persons in the United States
+and abroad affiliated with [REDACTED]
+expires on the 27th day of June, 2008,
+at 5:00 p.m., Eastern Time.
+
+COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+12
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_08-04/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_08-04/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a5c37ee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_08-04/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+{
+ "title": "FISC Order BR 08-04",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Order of the FISC approving the Government. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2008-04-03",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT",
+ "MR"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Kollar-Kotelly, Colleen"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2014-01-17",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/fisc-order-br-08-04",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "4490e77d222941801955952966f168d7765c81b63fd2909c7e14cdc0bcdba972",
+ "pages": 12
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_08-07/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_08-07.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_08-07/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_08-07.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..12da58c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_08-07/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_08-07.md
@@ -0,0 +1,385 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+UNITED STATES
+
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
+BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
+ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
+OF TANGIBLE THINGS FROM
+[REDACTED]
+
+Docket Number: BR:
+08-07
+
+PRIMARY ORDER
+
+A verified application having been made by the Director of
+the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for an order pursuant
+to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the Act),
+Title 50, United States Code (U.S.C.), § 1861, as amended,
+requiring the production to the National Security Agency (NSA)
+of the tangible things described below, and full consideration
+having been given to the matters set forth therein, the Court
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+Derived from: Pleadings in the above-captioned docket
+Declassify on: Determination of the President
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+finds that:
+
+1. The Director of the FBI is authorized to make an
+application for an order requiring the production of any
+tangible things for an investigation to obtain foreign
+intelligence information not concerning a United States person
+or to protect against international terrorism, provided that
+such investigation of a United States person is not conducted
+solely on the basis of activities protected by the First
+Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. [50 U.S.C.
+§ 1861(c)(1)]
+
+2. The tangible things to be produced are all call-detail
+records or "telephony meta data" created by
+[REDACTED]
+Telephony meta data includes comprehensive
+communications routing information, including but not limited to
+session identifying information (e.g., originating and
+terminating telephone number, International Mobile Subscriber
+Identity (IMSI) numbers, International Mobile station Equipment
+Identity (IMEI), etc.), trunk identifier, telephone calling card
+numbers, and time and duration of call. Telephony meta data
+does not include the substantive content of any communication,
+as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8), or the name, address, or
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+2
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+financial information of a subscriber or customer.¹ [50 U.S.C. §
+1861(c)(2)(A)]
+
+3. There are reasonable grounds to believe that the
+tangible things sought are relevant to authorized investigations
+(other than threat assessments) being conducted by the FBI under
+guidelines approved by the Attorney General under Executive
+Order 12333 to protect against international terrorism, which
+investigations are not being conducted solely upon the basis of
+activities protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution
+of the United States. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)]
+
+4. The tangible things sought could be obtained with a
+subpoena duces tecum issued by a court of the United States in
+aid of a grand jury investigation or with any other order issued
+by a court of the United States directing the production of
+records or tangible things. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)(D)]
+
+WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the application of the
+United States to obtain the tangible things, as described in the
+application, satisfies the requirements of the Act and,
+therefore,
+
+IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to the authority conferred
+on this Court by the Act, that the application is GRANTED, and
+
+¹ The Court understands that the [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+3
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+it is
+
+FURTHER ORDERED, as follows:
+
+(1) The Custodians of Records of [REDACTED]
+shall produce to NSA upon service of the appropriate secondary
+order, and continue production on an ongoing daily basis
+thereafter for the duration of this order, unless otherwise
+ordered by the Court, an electronic copy of the following
+tangible things: all call-detail records or "telephony meta
+data" created by such companies as described above;
+
+(2) With respect to any information the FBI receives as a
+result of this Order (information that is passed or "tipped" to
+it by NSA²), the FBI shall follow as minimization procedures the
+procedures set forth in The Attorney General's Guidelines for
+FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence
+Collection (October 31, 2003).
+
+/
+
+/
+
+/
+
+/
+
+/
+
+² The Court understands that NSA expects that it will continue to
+provide on average approximately three telephone identifiers per
+day to the FBI.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+4
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+(3) With respect to the information that NSA receives as a
+result of this Order, NSA shall adhere to the following
+procedures:
+
+A. The Director of NSA shall continue to maintain
+mandatory procedures to strictly control access to and use
+of the archived data collected pursuant to this Order. Any
+search or analysis of the data archive shall occur only
+after a particular known telephone identifier³ has been
+
+/
+
+/
+
+/
+
+/
+
+/
+
+/
+
+/
+
+/
+
+/
+
+/
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+5
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+associated with [REDACTED]
+
+/
+
+/
+
+/
+
+/
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+6
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+More specifically, access to the
+archived data shall occur only when NSA has identified a
+known telephone identifier for which, based on the factual
+and practical considerations of everyday life on which
+reasonable and prudent persons act, there are facts giving
+rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the
+telephone identifier is associated with [REDACTED]
+provided,
+however, that a telephone identifier believed to be used by
+a U.S. person shall not be regarded as associated with
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+7
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+solely on the basis of activities that are protected by the
+First Amendment to the Constitution.
+
+B. The meta data shall be stored and processed on a
+secure private network that NSA exclusively will operate.
+
+C. Access to the meta data archive shall be
+accomplished through a software interface that will limit
+access to this data to authorized analysts.⁶ NSA'S OGC
+shall monitor the designation of individuals with access to
+the archive. Access to the archive shall be controlled by
+user name and password. When the meta data archive is
+accessed, the user's login, Internet Protocol (IP) address,
+date and time, and retrieval request shall be automatically
+logged for auditing capability. NSA's Office of General
+Counsel (OGC) shall monitor the functioning of this
+automatic logging capability. Analysts shall be briefed by
+NSA'S OGC concerning the authorization granted by this
+Order and the limited circumstances in which queries to the
+archive are permitted, as well as other procedures and
+[REDACTED]
+⁶ The Court understands that for purposes of analytical
+efficiency a copy of meta data obtained pursuant to the Court's
+Orders in this matter will be stored in the same database with
+data obtained pursuant to other NSA authorities and data
+provided to NSA from other sources. Access to such records
+shall be strictly limited in accordance with the procedures set
+forth in paragraphs A-G.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+8
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+restrictions regarding the retrieval, storage, and
+dissemination of the archived data. In addition, NSA's OGC
+shall review and must approve proposed queries of archived
+meta data based on seed numbers (i.e., telephone
+identifiers) reasonably believed to be used by U.S. persons
+before any query is conducted.
+
+D. Although the data collected under this Order will
+necessarily be broad, the use of that information for
+analysis shall be strictly tailored to identifying
+terrorist communications and shall occur solely according
+to the procedures described in the application, including
+the minimization procedures designed to protect U.S. person
+information. Specifically, dissemination of U.S. person
+information shall follow the standard NSA minimization
+procedures found in the Attorney General-approved
+guidelines (USSID 18). Before information identifying a
+U.S. person may be disseminated outside of NSA, a judgment
+must be made that the identity of the U.S. person is
+necessary to understand the foreign intelligence
+information or to assess its importance. Prior to the
+dissemination of any U.S. person identifying information,
+the Chief of Information Sharing Services in the Signals
+Intelligence Directorate must determine that the
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+9
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+information identifying the U.S. person is in fact related
+to counterterrorism information and that it is necessary to
+understand the counterterrorism information or assess its
+importance. A record shall be made of every such
+determination.
+
+E. Internal management control shall be maintained by
+requiring that queries of the archived data be approved by
+one of the following people: the Signals Intelligence
+Directorate Deputy Program Manager for Counterterrorism
+Special Projects Analysis and Production; the Chief or
+Deputy Chief, Homeland Security Analysis Center; or one of
+the twenty specially-authorized Homeland Mission
+Coordinators in the Analysis and Production Directorate of
+the Signals Intelligence Directorate. Telephone
+identifiers that are the subject of electronic surveillance
+authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+(FISC) based on the FISC's finding of probable cause to
+believe that they are used by [REDACTED]
+including
+[REDACTED] those used by U.S. persons, shall be deemed approved for
+meta data querying without approval of an NSA official.
+The preceding sentence shall not apply to the telephone
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+10
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+identifiers under surveillance pursuant to any
+certification of the Director of National Intelligence and
+the Attorney General pursuant to Section 105B of FISA, as
+added by the Protect America Act of 2007. At least once
+prior to the expiration of this Order, the Department of
+Justice shall review a sample of NSA's justifications for
+querying the archived data. In addition, at least twice
+prior to the expiration of this Order, NSA's OGC shall
+conduct random spot checks, consisting of an examination of
+a sample of call-detail records obtained, to ensure that
+NSA is receiving only data as authorized by the Court and
+not receiving the substantive content of communications.
+
+F. The meta data collected under this Order may be
+kept online (that is, accessible for queries by cleared
+analysts) for five years, at which time it shall be
+destroyed.
+
+G. The Signals Intelligence Directorate Program
+Manager for Counterterrorism Special Projects; Chief and
+Deputy Chief, Homeland Security Analysis Center; and the
+Homeland Mission Coordinators shall maintain appropriate
+management controls (e.g., records of all tasking
+decisions, audit and review procedures) for access to the
+archived data and shall use the Attorney General-approved
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+11
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+guidelines (USSID 18) to minimize the information reported
+concerning U.S. persons.
+
+H. At least once prior to the expiration of this
+Order, the NSA Inspector General, the NSA General Counsel,
+and the Signals Intelligence Directorate Oversight and
+Compliance Office shall review this program.
+
+I. Any application to renew or reinstate the
+authority granted herein shall include a report describing:
+(i) the queries that have been made since the last report
+filed with the Court; (ii) the manner in which NSA applied
+the procedures set forth in subparagraph A above; and (iii)
+any proposed changes in the way in which the call-detail
+records would be received from the carriers.
+
+/
+
+/
+
+/
+
+/
+
+/
+
+/
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+12
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+Signed 06-26-2008 A10:56 Eastern Time
+Date Time
+
+This authorization regarding [REDACTED]
+and unknown persons in the United States and
+abroad affiliated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] and unknown persons in the United States
+and abroad affiliated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] expires on 22nd day of August, 2008, at
+5:00 p.m., Eastern Time.
+
+JAMES B. ZAGEL
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+Deputy Clerk
+FISC, certify that this document:
+Is a true and correct copy of
+the original [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+13
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_08-07/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_08-07/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..14c060a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_08-07/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+{
+ "title": "FISC Order BR 08-07",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Order of the FISC approving the Government. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2008-06-26",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT",
+ "MR"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Zagel, James B."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2014-01-17",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/fisc-order-br-08-07",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "005c3079412973ec00f20a2c11f459aacdb9e704f9a3f9d69e76c70075f7e445",
+ "pages": 13
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_08-08/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_08-08.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_08-08/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_08-08.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1b2d1b3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_08-08/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_08-08.md
@@ -0,0 +1,363 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
+BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
+ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
+OF TANGIBLE THINGS FROM [REDACTED]
+
+Docket Number: BR:
+08-08
+
+PRIMARY ORDER
+
+A verified application having been made by the Director of
+the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for an order pursuant
+to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the Act),
+Title 50, United States Code (U.S.C.), § 1861, as amended,
+requiring the production to the National Security Agency (NSA)
+of the tangible things described below, and full consideration
+having been given to the matters set forth therein, the Court
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+Derived from: Pleadings in the above-captioned docket
+Declassify on: Determination of the President
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+finds that:
+
+1. The Director of the FBI is authorized to make an
+application for an order requiring the production of any
+tangible things for an investigation to obtain foreign
+intelligence information not concerning a United States person
+or to protect against international terrorism, provided that
+such investigation of a United States person is not conducted
+solely on the basis of activities protected by the First
+Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. [50 U.S.C.
+§ 1861(c)(1)]
+
+2. The tangible things to be produced are all call detail
+records or "telephony metadata" created by
+[REDACTED]
+
+Telephony metadata includes comprehensive
+communications routing information, including but not limited to
+session identifying information (e.g., originating and
+terminating telephone number, International Mobile Subscriber
+Identity (IMSI) number, International Mobile station Equipment
+Identity (IMEI) number, etc.), trunk identifier, telephone
+calling card numbers, and time and duration of call. Telephony
+metadata does not include the substantive content of any
+communication, as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8), or the name,
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+2
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+address, or financial information of a subscriber or customer.¹
+[50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)(A)]
+
+3. There are reasonable grounds to believe that the
+tangible things sought are relevant to authorized investigations
+(other than threat assessments) being conducted by the FBI under
+guidelines approved by the Attorney General under Executive
+Order 12333 to protect against international terrorism, which
+investigations are not being conducted solely upon the basis of
+activities protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution
+of the United States. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)]
+
+4. The tangible things sought could be obtained with a
+subpoena duces tecum issued by a court of the United States in
+aid of a grand jury investigation or with any other order issued
+by a court of the United States directing the production of
+records or tangible things. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)(D)]
+
+WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the application of the
+United States to obtain the tangible things, as described in the
+application, satisfies the requirements of the Act and,
+therefore,
+
+IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to the authority conferred
+on this Court by the Act, that the application is GRANTED, and
+
+¹ The Court understands that the [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+3
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+it is
+
+FURTHER ORDERED, as follows:
+
+(1) The Custodians of Records of [REDACTED]
+shall produce to NSA upon service of the appropriate secondary
+order, and continue production on an ongoing daily basis
+thereafter for the duration of this order, unless otherwise
+ordered by the Court, an electronic copy of the following
+tangible things: all call detail records or "telephony
+metadata" created by such companies as described above;
+
+(2) With respect to any information the FBI receives as a
+result of this Order (information that is passed or "tipped" to
+it by NSA²), the FBI shall follow as minimization procedures the
+procedures set forth in The Attorney General's Guidelines for
+FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence
+Collection (October 31, 2003).
+
+/
+/
+/
+/
+[REDACTED]
+
+² The Court understands that NSA expects that it will continue to
+provide on average approximately three telephone identifiers per
+day to the FBI.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+4
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+(3) With respect to the information that NSA receives as a
+result of this Order, NSA shall adhere to the following
+procedures:
+
+A. The Director of NSA shall continue to maintain
+mandatory procedures to strictly control access to and use
+of the archived data collected pursuant to this Order. Any
+search or analysis of the data archive shall occur only
+after a particular known telephone identifier³ has been
+
+/
+/
+/
+/
+/
+/
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+5
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+associated with [REDACTED]
+
+/
+/
+/
+/
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+6
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+[REDACTED] More specifically, access to the
+archived data shall occur only when NSA has identified a
+known telephone identifier for which, based on the factual
+and practical considerations of everyday life on which
+reasonable and prudent persons act, there are facts giving
+rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the
+telephone identifier is associated with [REDACTED]
+provided,
+however, that a telephone identifier believed to be used by
+a U.S. person shall not be regarded as associated with
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+7
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+[REDACTED] solely on the basis of activities protected by the First
+Amendment to the Constitution.
+
+B. The metadata shall be stored and processed on a
+secure private network that NSA exclusively will operate.
+
+C. Access to the metadata archive shall be
+accomplished through a software interface that will limit
+access to this data to authorized analysts.⁶ NSA's OGC
+shall monitor the designation of individuals with access to
+the archive. Access to the archive shall be controlled by
+user name and password. When the metadata archive is
+accessed, the user's login, Internet Protocol (IP) address,
+date and time, and retrieval request shall be automatically
+logged for auditing capability. NSA's Office of General
+Counsel (OGC) shall monitor the functioning of this
+automatic logging capability. Analysts shall be briefed by
+NSA's OGC concerning the authorization granted by this
+Order and the limited circumstances in which queries to the
+archive are permitted, as well as other procedures and
+
+⁶ The Court understands that for purposes of analytical
+efficiency a copy of metadata obtained pursuant to the Court's
+Orders in this matter will be stored in the same database with
+data obtained pursuant to other NSA authorities and data
+provided to NSA from other sources. Access to such records
+shall be strictly limited in accordance with the procedures set
+forth in paragraphs A-G.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+8
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+restrictions regarding the retrieval, storage, and
+dissemination of the archived data. In addition, NSA's OGC
+shall review and must approve proposed queries of archived
+metadata based on "seed" telephone identifiers reasonably
+believed to be used by U.S. persons before any query is
+conducted.
+
+D. Although the data collected under this Order will
+necessarily be broad, the use of that information for
+analysis shall be strictly tailored to identifying
+terrorist communications and shall occur solely according
+to the procedures described in the application, including
+the minimization procedures designed to protect U.S. person
+information. Specifically, dissemination of U.S. person
+information shall follow the standard NSA minimization
+procedures found in the Attorney General-approved
+guidelines (USSID 18). Before information identifying a
+U.S. person may be disseminated outside of NSA, a judgment
+must be made that the identity of the U.S. person is
+necessary to understand the foreign intelligence
+information or to assess its importance. Prior to the
+dissemination of any U.S. person identifying information,
+the Chief of Information Sharing Services in the Signals
+Intelligence Directorate must determine that the
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+9
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+information identifying the U.S. person is in fact related
+to counterterrorism information and that it is necessary to
+understand the counterterrorism information or assess its
+importance. A record shall be made of every such
+determination.
+
+E. Internal management control shall be maintained by
+requiring that queries of the archived data be approved by
+one of the following people: the Signals Intelligence
+Directorate Deputy Program Manager for Counterterrorism
+Special Projects Analysis and Production; the Chief or
+Deputy Chief, Homeland Security Analysis Center; or one of
+the twenty specially-authorized Homeland Mission
+Coordinators in the Analysis and Production Directorate of
+the Signals Intelligence Directorate. Telephone
+identifiers that are the subject of electronic surveillance
+authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+(FISC) based on the FISC's finding of probable cause to
+believe that they are used by agents of [REDACTED]
+including
+those used by U.S. persons, shall be deemed approved for
+metadata querying without approval of an NSA official. The
+preceding sentence shall not apply to the telephone
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+10
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+identifiers under surveillance pursuant to any
+certification of the Director of National Intelligence and
+the Attorney General pursuant to Section 105B of FISA, as
+added by the Protect America Act of 2007, or Section 702 of
+FISA, as added by the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. Nor
+shall it apply to telephone identifiers under surveillance
+pursuant to an Order of the FISC issued under Section 703
+or Section 704 of FISA, as added by the FISA Amendments Act
+of 2008. At least once every sixty days, the Department of
+Justice shall review a sample of NSA's justifications for
+querying the archived data. In addition, at least twice
+every sixty days, NSA's OGC shall conduct random spot
+checks, consisting of an examination of a sample of call
+detail records obtained, to ensure that NSA is receiving
+only data as authorized by the Court and not receiving the
+substantive content of communications.
+
+F. The metadata collected under this Order may be kept
+online (that is, accessible for queries by cleared
+analysts) for five years, at which time it shall be
+destroyed.
+
+G. The Signals Intelligence Directorate Program
+Manager for Counterterrorism Special Projects; Chief and
+Deputy Chief, Homeland Security Analysis Center; and the
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+11
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+Homeland Mission Coordinators shall maintain appropriate
+management controls (e.g., records of all tasking
+decisions, audit and review procedures) for access to the
+archived data and shall use the Attorney General-approved
+guidelines (USSID 18) to minimize the information reported
+concerning U.S. persons.
+
+H. At least once prior to the expiration of this
+Order, the NSA Inspector General, the NSA General Counsel,
+and the Signals Intelligence Directorate Oversight and
+Compliance Office shall review this program.
+
+I. Within sixty days of the issuance of this Order,
+NSA will file a report with the Court describing the
+queries that have been made since the Application was
+granted. Additionally, any application to renew or
+reinstate the authority granted herein shall include a
+report describing: (i) the queries that have been made
+since the last report filed with the Court; (ii) the manner
+in which NSA applied the procedures set forth in
+subparagraph A above; and (iii) any proposed changes in the
+way in which the call detail records would be received from
+the carriers.
+
+/
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+12
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+Signed 08-19-2008 P04:29 Eastern Time
+Date Time
+
+This authorization regarding
+[REDACTED]
+and unknown persons in the United States and
+abroad affiliated with
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+and unknown persons in the United States
+and abroad affiliated with
+[REDACTED]
+expires on 12th day of December, 2008,
+at 5:00 p.m., Eastern Time.
+
+JAMES B. ZAGEL
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+[REDACTED] Deputy Clerk
+FISC certify that this document
+is a true and correct copy of
+the original. [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+13
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_08-08/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_08-08/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f31b635
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_08-08/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+{
+ "title": "FISC Order BR 08-08",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Order of the FISC approving the Government. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2008-08-19",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT",
+ "MR"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Zagel, James B."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2014-01-17",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/fisc-order-br-08-08",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "61865f471f05d76584fbcb0fc97ce36bebe48c01baed25b388c4deeefe5bcf81",
+ "pages": 13
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_08-13/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_08-13.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_08-13/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_08-13.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..281160b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_08-13/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_08-13.md
@@ -0,0 +1,336 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+UNITED STATES
+
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
+BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
+ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
+OF TANGIBLE THINGS FROM [REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Docket Number: BR:
+08-13
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+PRIMARY ORDER
+
+A verified application having been made by the Director of
+the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for an order pursuant
+to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the Act),
+Title 50, United States Code (U.S.C.), § 1861, as amended,
+requiring the production to the National Security Agency (NSA)
+of the tangible things described below, and full consideration
+having been given to the matters set forth therein, the Court
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+Derived from: Pleadings in the above-captioned docket
+Declassify on: Determination of the President
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+finds that:
+1. The Director of the FBI is authorized to make an
+application for an order requiring the production of any
+tangible things for an investigation to obtain foreign
+intelligence information not concerning a United States person
+or to protect against international terrorism, provided that
+such investigation of a United States person is not conducted
+solely on the basis of activities protected by the First
+Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. [50 U.S.C.
+§ 1861(c) (1)]
+2. The tangible things to be produced are all call detail
+records or "telephony metadata" created by [REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Telephony metadata includes comprehensive
+communications routing information, including but not limited to
+session identifying information (e.g., originating and
+terminating telephone number, International Mobile Subscriber
+Identity (IMSI) number, International Mobile station Equipment
+Identity (IMEI) number, etc.), trunk identifier, telephone
+calling card numbers, and time and duration of call. Telephony
+metadata does not include the substantive content of any
+communication, as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8), or the name,
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+2
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+address, or financial information of a subscriber or customer.¹
+[50 U.S.C. § 1861(c) (2) (A)]
+3. There are reasonable grounds to believe that the
+tangible things sought are relevant to authorized investigations
+(other than threat assessments) being conducted by the FBI under
+guidelines approved by the Attorney General under Executive
+Order 12333 to protect against international terrorism, which
+investigations are not being conducted solely upon the basis of
+activities protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution
+of the United States. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c) (1)]
+4. The tangible things sought could be obtained with a
+subpoena duces tecum issued by a court of the United States in
+aid of a grand jury investigation or with any other order issued
+by a court of the United States directing the production of
+records or tangible things. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c) (2) (D)]
+WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the application of the
+United States to obtain the tangible things, as described in the
+application, satisfies the requirements of the Act and,
+therefore,
+
+¹ The Court understands that the [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+3
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to the authority conferred
+on this Court by the Act, that the application is GRANTED, and
+it is
+FURTHER ORDERED, as follows:
+(1) The Custodians of Records of [REDACTED]
+shall produce to NSA upon service of the appropriate secondary
+order, and continue production on an ongoing daily basis
+thereafter for the duration of this order, unless otherwise
+ordered by the Court, an electronic copy of the following
+tangible things: all call detail records or "telephony
+metadata" created by such companies as described above;
+(2) With respect to any information the FBI receives as a
+result of this Order (information that is passed or "tipped" to
+it by NSA), ² the FBI shall follow as minimization procedures the
+procedures set forth in The Attorney General's Guidelines for
+Domestic FBI Operations (September 29, 2008).
+/
+/
+/
+/
+/
+² The Court understands that NSA expects that it will continue to
+provide on average approximately three telephone identifiers per
+day to the FBI.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+4
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+(3) With respect to the information that NSA receives as a
+result of this Order, NSA shall adhere to the following
+procedures:
+A. The Director of NSA shall continue to maintain
+mandatory procedures to strictly control access to and use
+of the archived data collected pursuant to this Order. Any
+search or analysis of the data archive shall occur only
+after a particular known telephone identifier³ has
+/
+/
+/
+/
+/
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+5
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+associated with [REDACTED]
+/
+/
+/
+/
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+6
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+[REDACTED] More specifically, access to the
+archived data shall occur only when NSA has identified a
+known telephone identifier for which, based on the factual
+and practical considerations of everyday life on which
+reasonable and prudent persons act, there are facts giving
+rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the
+telephone identifier is associated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] provided,
+however, that a telephone identifier believed to be used by
+a U.S. person shall not be regarded as associated with [REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+7
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+[REDACTED]
+solely on the basis of activities that are protected by the
+First Amendment to the Constitution.
+B. The metadata shall be stored and processed on a
+secure private network that NSA exclusively will operate.
+C. Access to the metadata archive shall be
+accomplished through a software interface that will limit
+access to this data to authorized analysts. NSA's OGC
+shall monitor the designation of individuals with access to
+the archive. Access to the archive shall be controlled by
+user name and password. When the metadata archive is
+accessed, the user's login, Internet Protocol (IP) address,
+date and time, and retrieval request shall be automatically
+logged for auditing capability. NSA's Office of General
+Counsel (OGC) shall monitor the functioning of this
+automatic logging capability. Analysts shall be briefed by
+NSA's OGC concerning the authorization granted by this
+Order and the limited circumstances in which queries to the
+archive are permitted, as well as other procedures and
+restrictions regarding the retrieval, storage, and
+dissemination of the archived data. In addition, NSA's OGC
+shall review and must approve proposed queries of archived
+metadata based on "seed" telephone identifiers reasonably
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+8
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+believed to be used by U.S. persons before any query is
+conducted.
+D. Although the data collected under this Order will
+necessarily be broad, the use of that information for
+analysis shall be strictly tailored to identifying
+terrorist communications and shall occur solely according
+to the procedures described in the application, including
+the minimization procedures designed to protect U.S. person
+information. Specifically, dissemination of U.S. person
+information shall follow the standard NSA minimization
+procedures found in the Attorney General-approved
+guidelines (USSID 18). Before information identifying a
+U.S. person may be disseminated outside of NSA, a judgment
+must be made that the identity of the U.S. person is
+necessary to understand the foreign intelligence
+information or to assess its importance. Prior to the
+dissemination of any U.S. person identifying information,
+the Chief of Information Sharing Services in the Signals
+Intelligence Directorate must determine that the
+information identifying the U.S. person is in fact related
+to counterterrorism information and that it is necessary to
+understand the counterterrorism information or assess its
+importance. A record shall be made of every such
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+9
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+determination.
+E. Internal management control shall be maintained by
+requiring that queries of the archived data be approved by
+one of the following people: the Signals Intelligence
+Directorate Deputy Program Manager for Counterterrorism
+Special Projects Analysis and Production; the Chief or
+Deputy Chief, Homeland Security Analysis Center; or one of
+the twenty specially-authorized Homeland Mission
+Coordinators in the Analysis and Production Directorate of
+the Signals Intelligence Directorate. Telephone
+identifiers that are the subject of electronic surveillance
+authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+(FISC) based on the FISC's finding of probable cause to
+believe that they are used by agents of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] including
+those used by U.S. persons, may be deemed approved for
+metadata querying without approval of an NSA official. The
+preceding sentence shall not apply to the telephone
+identifiers under surveillance pursuant to any
+certification of the Director of National Intelligence and
+the Attorney General pursuant to Section 105B of FISA, as
+added by the Protect America Act of 2007, or Section 702 of
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+10
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+FISA, as added by the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. Nor
+shall it apply to telephone identifiers under surveillance
+pursuant to an Order of the FISC issued under Section 703
+or Section 704 of FISA, as added by the FISA Amendments Act
+of 2008. At least twice every ninety days, the Department
+of Justice's National Security Division shall review a
+sample of NSA's justifications for querying the archived
+data. In addition, at least twice every ninety days, NSA's
+OGC shall conduct random spot checks, consisting of an
+examination of a sample of call detail records obtained, to
+ensure that NSA is receiving only data as authorized by the
+Court and not receiving the substantive content of
+communications.
+F. The metadata collected under this Order may be kept
+online (that is, accessible for queries by cleared
+analysts) for five years, at which time it shall be
+destroyed.
+G. The Signals Intelligence Directorate Program
+Manager for Counterterrorism Special Projects; Chief and
+Deputy Chief, Homeland Security Analysis Center; and the
+Homeland Mission Coordinators shall maintain appropriate
+management controls (e.g., records of all tasking
+decisions, audit and review procedures) for access to the
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+11
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+archived data and shall use the Attorney General-approved
+guidelines (USSID 18) to minimize the information reported
+concerning U.S. persons.
+H. At least once prior to the expiration of this
+Order, the NSA Inspector General, the NSA General Counsel,
+and the Signals Intelligence Directorate Oversight and
+Compliance Office shall review this program.
+I. Within forty-five days of the issuance of this
+Order, NSA will file a report with the Court describing the
+queries made since the end of the reporting period of the
+last report filed pursuant to the Court's Order in docket
+number BR 08-08. Additionally, any application to renew or
+reinstate the authority granted herein shall include a
+report describing: (i) the queries made since the end of
+the reporting period of the last report filed with the
+Court; (ii) the manner in which NSA applied the procedures
+set forth in subparagraph A above; and (iii) any proposed
+changes in the way in which the call detail records would
+be received from the carriers.
+/
+/
+/
+/
+/
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+12
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+Signed 12-12-2008 P12:53 Eastern Time
+Date Time
+This authorization regarding [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] and unknown persons in the United States and
+abroad affiliated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] and unknown persons in the United States
+and abroad affiliated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] expires on 6th day of March, 2009, at
+5:00 p.m., Eastern Time.
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+[REDACTED] Deputy Clerk
+FISC, certify that this document
+is a true and correct copy of
+the original [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+13
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_08-13/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_08-13/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0b18798
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_08-13/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+{
+ "title": "FISC Order BR 08-13",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Order of the FISC approving the Government. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2008-12-12",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT",
+ "MR"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Walton, Reggie B."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2014-01-17",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/fisc-order-br-08-13",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "df1f032f2f9f1851701aba1c653f64eed2d4b1d8d7c6f75a3de8048fdfb9a20b",
+ "pages": 13
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_09-01/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_09-01.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_09-01/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_09-01.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..77ce4b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_09-01/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_09-01.md
@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+UNITED STATES
+
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
+BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
+ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
+OF TANGIBLE THINGS FROM [REDACTED]
+(TS)
+
+Docket Number: BR 09-01
+
+PRIMARY ORDER
+
+A verified application having been made by the Director of the Federal Bureau of
+Investigation (FBI) for an order pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as
+amended, (FISA), 50 U.S.C. §1861, requiring the production to the National Security Agency
+(NSA) of the tangible things described below, and full consideration having been given to the
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+1
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+matters set forth therein, as well as the government's filings in Docket Number BR 08-13 (the
+prior renewal of the above-captioned matter), the Court finds as follows:
+1. There are reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are relevant to
+authorized investigations (other than threat assessments) being conducted by the FBI under
+guidelines approved by the Attorney General under Executive Order 12333 to protect against
+international terrorism, which investigations are not being conducted solely upon the basis of
+activities protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 50 U.S.C.
+§1861(c)(1).
+2. The tangible things sought could be obtained with a subpoena duces tecum issued by a
+court of the United States in aid of a grand jury investigation or with any other order issued by a
+court of the United States directing the production of records or tangible things. 50 U.S.C.
+§1861(c)(2)(D).
+3. The application includes an enumeration of the minimization procedures the
+government proposes to follow with regard to the tangible things sought. Such procedures are
+substantively the same as the minimization procedures proposed by the government in the prior
+application and approved and adopted as binding by the order of this Court in Docket Number
+BR 08-13. However, for the reasons set forth in this Court's Order entered on March 2, 2009, in
+Docket Number BR 08-13 ("March 2nd Order"), the Court found that the NSA has so frequently
+and systemically violated such procedures that it can fairly be said that this critical element of the
+overall business records regime has never functioned effectively. March 2nd Order at 11.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+2
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Nevertheless, the Court permitted the government to continue to acquire the tangible things
+sought, but ordered the government to follow additional minimization procedures identified in its
+March 2nd Order, and set forth herein. Id. at 18-20.
+Accordingly, the Court finds that the application of the United States to obtain the
+tangible things, as described below, satisfies the requirements of the Act and, therefore,
+IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the application is GRANTED IN PART, and it is
+FURTHER ORDERED, as follows:
+1. The Custodians of Records of [REDACTED] shall produce to the NSA, upon service of the appropriate secondary
+order, and continue production on an ongoing daily basis thereafter for the duration of this order,
+unless otherwise ordered by the Court, an electronic copy of the following tangible things: all call
+detail records or "telephony metadata" created by [REDACTED] Telephony
+metadata shall include comprehensive communications routing information (e.g., originating and
+terminating telephone number, International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) number,
+International Mobile station Equipment Identity (IMEI) number, etc.), trunk identifier, telephone
+calling card numbers, and the time and duration of call. Telephony metadata shall not include
+the substantive content of any communication, as defined by 18 U.S.C. §2510(8), or the name,
+address, or financial information of a subscriber or customer.
+2. With respect to any information the FBI receives as a result of this order (information
+that is passed or "tipped" to the FBI by the NSA), the FBI shall follow as minimization
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+3
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+procedures the procedures set forth in The Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic FBI
+Operations (September 29, 2008).
+3. With respect to the information that the NSA receives as a result of this order, the NSA
+shall strictly adhere to the following minimization procedures:
+A. The government is hereby prohibited from accessing business record metadata
+acquired pursuant to this Court's orders in the above-captioned docket and its predecessors ("BR
+metadata") for any purpose except as described herein.
+B. The BR metadata may be accessed for the purposes of ensuring data integrity and
+developing and testing any technological measures designed to enable the NSA to comply with
+the Court's orders. Access to the BR metadata for such purposes shall be limited to the NSA
+Collection Managers, Data Integrity Analysts, and System Administrators described in
+paragraphs 17-18 of the Declaration of [REDACTED] Chief, Special FISA Oversight and
+Processing, Oversight and Compliance, Signals Intelligence Directorate, the National Security
+Agency, filed on March 4, 2009, in the above-captioned docket ("[REDACTED] Declaration").
+Additional individuals directly involved in developing and testing any technological measures
+designed to enable the NSA to comply with the Court's orders may be granted access, provided
+such access is approved by NSA's Office of General Counsel (OGC) on a case-by-case basis.
+C. The government may request through a motion, permission from the Court to use
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+4
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+specific telephone identifiers¹ that satisfy the reasonable articulable suspicion standard² to query
+[REDACTED]
+²The reasonable articulable suspicion standard is met when, based on the factual and
+practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent persons act, there are
+facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the telephone identifier is associated
+with [REDACTED] provided, however, that any telephone identifier believed to be used by a
+U.S. person shall not be regarded as associated with [REDACTED] solely on the basis
+of activities that are protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution.
+For purposes of this order
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+5
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+the BR metadata for purposes of obtaining foreign intelligence through contact chaining [REDACTED].
+[REDACTED] as described in the [REDACTED] Declaration at 6-7, on a case-by-case basis. In
+addition, if the government determines that immediate querying of the BR metadata through
+contact chaining [REDACTED] is necessary to protect against an imminent threat to human
+life, the government may query the BR metadata for such purpose. In each such case falling
+under this latter category, the government shall notify the Court of the access, in writing, no later
+than 5:00 p.m., Eastern Time on the next business day after such access. Any submission to the
+Court under this paragraph shall, at a minimum, specify the telephone identifier for which access
+is sought or was granted, provide the factual basis for the NSA's belief that the reasonable
+articulable suspicion standard has been met with regard to that identifier,³ and, if the access has
+[REDACTED]
+³For telephone identifiers that are currently the subject of this Court's authorized
+electronic surveillance, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §1805, based on this Court's finding of probable
+cause to believe that they are used by [REDACTED] including those used by U.S.
+persons, the government's submission need only provide the target's name, docket number, and
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+6
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+already taken place, a statement of the immediate threat necessitating such access. Only the
+Chief, Special FISA Oversight and Processing, Oversight and Compliance, Signals Intelligence
+Directorate; the Chief or Deputy Chief, Homeland Security Analysis Center; or one of the twenty
+specially-authorized Homeland Mission Coordinators in the Analysis and Production Directorate
+of the Signals Intelligence Directorate shall be authorized to access the BR metadata for purposes
+of implementing this sub-paragraph.
+D. The Director of the NSA shall continue to maintain mandatory procedures to strictly
+control access to and use of the BR metadata, in accordance with this Court's orders.
+E. The NSA shall obtain the BR metadata from [REDACTED] via dedicated
+secure lines, and shall store and process the BR metadata on a secure private network that the
+NSA shall exclusively operate.
+F. Any processing by technical personnel of the BR metadata acquired pursuant to this
+order shall be conducted through the NSA's private network, which shall be accessible only via
+select machines and only to cleared technical personnel, using secured encrypted
+communications.
+G. Access to the BR metadata shall be accomplished through a software interface that
+shall limit access to this data to authorized personnel. The NSA's Office of General Counsel
+(OGC) shall monitor the designation of individuals with access to the BR metadata. Access to
+the metadata shall be controlled by user name and password. When the metadata is accessed, the
+date of expiration of this Court's most recent authorization of electronic surveillance.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+7
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+user's login, Internet Protocol (IP) address, date and time, and retrieval request shall be
+automatically logged for auditing capability. The NSA's OGC shall monitor the functioning of
+this automatic logging capability. Persons authorized to access the BR metadata shall be briefed
+by the NSA's OGC concerning the authorization granted by this order and the limited
+circumstances in which queries to the metadata are permitted, as well as other procedures and
+restrictions regarding the retrieval, storage, and dissemination of the metadata.
+H. Any dissemination of U.S. person information by the NSA shall follow the standard
+NSA minimization procedures found in the Attorney General-approved guidelines (USSID 18).
+Before information identifying a U.S. person may be disseminated outside of the NSA, a
+judgment must be made that the identity of the U.S. person is necessary to understand the foreign
+intelligence information or to assess its importance. Prior to the dissemination of any U.S.
+person identifying information, the Chief of Information Sharing Services in the Signals
+Intelligence Directorate must determine that the information identifying the U.S. person is in fact
+related to counterterrorism information and that it is necessary to understand the counterterrorism
+information or assess its importance. A record shall be made of every such determination.
+I. At least twice every ninety days, the NSA's OGC shall conduct random spot checks,
+consisting of an examination of a sample of call detail records obtained, to ensure that the NSA is
+receiving only data as authorized by the Court and not receiving the substantive content of
+communications.
+J. The BR metadata collected under this Court's orders may be kept online (that is,
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+8
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN-
+accessible for queries) for five years from the date of acquisition, at which time it shall be
+destroyed.
+K. The Chief, FISA Office, Signals Intelligence Directorate (SID) Program Management
+Office for Counterterrorism Special Projects, Analysis and Production; Chief and Deputy Chief,
+Homeland Security Analysis Center; and the Homeland Mission Coordinators shall maintain
+appropriate management controls (e.g., records of all tasking decisions, audit and review
+procedures) for access to the metadata and shall use the Attorney General-approved guidelines
+(USSID 18) to minimize the information reported concerning U.S. persons.
+L. Any application to renew or reinstate the authority granted herein shall include a report
+describing: (i) the queries made since the end of the reporting period of the last report filed with
+the Court; and (ii) any proposed changes in the way in which the call detail records would be
+received from the carriers.
+M. The government shall implement the additional oversight mechanisms described in
+paragraph 10 of its application. Application at 25-26.
+N. As previously ordered on March 2, 2009, upon completion of the government's end-
+to-end system engineering and process reviews, described in Memorandum of the United States
+In Response to the Court's Order Dated January 28, 2009, Tab 1, Declaration of Lieutenant
+General Keith B. Alexander, United States Army, Director of the NSA, filed February 17, 2009
+at 21, the government shall file a report with the Court, that shall, at a minimum, include:
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+9
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+(i). an affidavit by the Director of the FBI, and affidavits by any other official responsible
+for national security that the government deems appropriate, describing the value of the BR
+metadata to the national security of the United States and certifying that the tangible things
+sought are relevant to an authorized investigation (other than a threat assessment) to obtain
+foreign intelligence information not concerning a U.S. person or to protect against international
+terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, and that such investigation of a U.S. person is not
+conducted solely on the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment;
+(ii). a description of the results of the NSA's end-to-end system engineering and process
+reviews, including any additional instances of non-compliance identified therefrom;
+(iii). a full discussion of the steps taken to remedy any additional non-compliance as well
+as the incidents described herein, and an affidavit attesting that any technological remedies have
+been tested and demonstrated to be successful; and
+(iv). the minimization and oversight procedures the government proposes to employ
+should the Court decide to authorize the government's resumption of regular access to the BR
+metadata.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+10
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+This authorization to acquire the tangible things described herein regarding [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] and unknown persons in the United States and abroad
+[REDACTED] and unknown persons in the United States and
+abroad [REDACTED] expires
+on the 29th day of May, 2009, at 5 p.m., Eastern Time. All other provisions of the Order shall
+remain in effect until otherwise ordered by the Court.
+IT IS SO ORDERED, this 5th day of March, 2009.
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign Intelligence
+Suryillance Court
+
+[REDACTED] Deputy Clerk
+FISC, certify that this document
+is a true and correct copy of
+the original. [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+11
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_09-01/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_09-01/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ad7d9e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_09-01/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+{
+ "title": "FISC Order BR 09-01",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Order of the FISC approving the Government. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2009-03-05",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Walton, Reggie B."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2014-01-17",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/fisc-order-br-09-01",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "54cd7ca1b9957502b8a49e6362c5fac10f77171b2ff74724106c6a26cdd20111",
+ "pages": 11
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_09-06/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_09-06.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_09-06/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_09-06.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..62bb514
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_09-06/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_09-06.md
@@ -0,0 +1,434 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+UNITED STATES
+
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
+BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
+ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
+OF TANGIBLE THINGS FROM [REDACTED]
+
+(TS)
+Docket Number: BR:
+09-06
+
+PRIMARY ORDER
+
+A verified application having been made by the Director of
+the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for an order pursuant
+to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the Act),
+Title 50, United States Code (U.S.C.), § 1861, as amended,
+requiring the production to the National Security Agency (NSA)
+of the tangible things described below, and full consideration
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN-
+Derived from: Pleadings in the above-captioned docket
+Declassify on: 29 May 2034
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+having been given to the matters set forth therein, the Court
+finds as follows:
+
+1. There are reasonable grounds to believe that the
+tangible things sought are relevant to authorized investigations
+(other than threat assessments) being conducted by the FBI under
+guidelines approved by the Attorney General under Executive
+Order 12333 to protect against international terrorism, which
+investigations are not being conducted solely upon the basis of
+activities protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution
+of the United States. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)]
+
+2. The tangible things sought could be obtained with a
+subpoena duces tecum issued by a court of the United States in
+aid of a grand jury investigation or with any other order issued
+by a court of the United States directing the production of
+records or tangible things. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)(D)]
+
+3. The application includes an enumeration of the
+minimization procedures the government proposes to follow with
+regard to the tangible things sought. Such procedures are
+substantively the same as the minimization procedures approved
+and adopted as binding by the order of this Court in Docket
+Number BR 09-01. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)]
+
+Accordingly, the Court finds that the application of the
+United States to obtain the tangible things, as described below,
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+2
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+satisfies the requirements of the Act and, therefore,
+
+IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to the authority conferred
+on this Court by the Act, that the application is GRANTED, and
+it is
+
+FURTHER ORDERED, as follows:
+
+(1) (A) The Custodians of Records [REDACTED] shall
+produce to NSA upon service of the appropriate secondary order,
+and continue production on an ongoing daily basis thereafter for
+the duration of this order, unless otherwise ordered by the
+Court, an electronic copy of the following tangible things: all
+call detail records or "telephony metadata"¹ created by [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+(B) The Custodian of Records of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+shall produce to NSA upon service of the appropriate
+secondary order, and continue production on an ongoing daily
+
+¹ For purposes of this Order "telephony metadata" includes
+comprehensive communications routing information (e.g.,
+originating or terminating telephone number, international
+Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) number, International Mobile
+station Equipment Identity (IMEI) number, etc.), trunk
+identifier, telephone calling card numbers, and time and
+duration of call. Telephony metadata does not include the
+substantive content of any communication, as defined by 18
+U.S.C. § 2510(8), or the name, address, or financial information
+of a subscriber or customer.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+3
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+basis thereafter for the duration of this order, unless
+otherwise ordered by the Court, an electronic copy of the
+following tangible things: all call detail records or "telephony
+metadata" created by [REDACTED] for communications (i) between the
+United States and abroad; or (ii) wholly within the United
+States, including local telephone calls.
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+(2) With respect to any information the FBI receives as a
+result of this Order (information that is passed or "tipped" to
+it by NSA), the FBI shall follow as minimization procedures the
+procedures set forth in The Attorney General's Guidelines for
+Domestic FBI Operations (September 29, 2008).
+
+(3) With respect to the information that NSA receives as a
+result of this Order, NSA shall strictly adhere to the following
+minimization procedures:
+
+A. The government is hereby prohibited from accessing
+business record metadata acquired pursuant to this Court's
+orders in the above-captioned docket and its predecessors (“BR
+metadata") for any purpose except as described herein.
+
+B. The BR metadata may be accessed for the purposes of
+ensuring data integrity and developing and testing any
+technological measures designed to enable the NSA to comply with
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+4
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+the Court's orders. Access to the BR metadata for such purposes
+shall be limited to the NSA Collection Managers, Data Integrity
+Analysts, and System Administrators described in paragraphs 17-
+19 of the Declaration of [REDACTED] Chief, Special FISA
+Oversight and Processing, Oversight and Compliance, Signals
+Intelligence Directorate, the National Security Agency, filed as
+Exhibit A to the Application in the above-captioned docket
+("[REDACTED] Declaration"). Additional individuals directly involved
+in developing and testing any technological measures designed to
+enable the NSA to comply with the Court's orders may be granted
+access, provided such access is approved by NSA's Office of
+General Counsel (OGC) on a case-by-case basis.
+
+C. The government may request through a motion, permission
+from the Court to use specific telephone identifiers² that
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+5
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+satisfy the reasonable articulable suspicion standard³ to query
+
+³ The reasonable articulable suspicion standard is met when,
+based on the factual and practical considerations of everyday
+life on which reasonable and prudent persons act, there are
+facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that
+the telephone identifier is associated with [REDACTED]
+provided, however, that any
+telephone identifier believed to be used by a U.S. person shall
+not be regarded as associated with [REDACTED]
+solely on the basis of activities that
+are protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution.
+
+For purposes of this Order, [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+6
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+the BR metadata for purposes of obtaining foreign intelligence
+information through contact chaining [REDACTED]
+as described in the [REDACTED] Declaration at 6-7, on a
+case-by-case basis. In addition, if the government determines
+that immediate querying of the BR metadata through contact
+chaining [REDACTED] is necessary to protect against an
+imminent threat to human life, the government may query the BR
+metadata for such purpose. In any case falling into this latter
+category, the government shall notify the Court of the access,
+in writing, no later than 5:00 p.m., Eastern Time on the next
+business day after such access. Any submission to the Court
+under this paragraph shall, at a minimum, specify the telephone
+identifier for which access is sought or was granted, provide
+
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+7
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+the factual basis for the NSA's belief that the reasonable
+articulable suspicion standard has been met with regard to that
+identifier⁴ and, if such access has already taken place, a
+statement of the immediate threat necessitating such access.
+Only the Chief, Special FISA Oversight and Processing, Oversight
+and Compliance, Signals Intelligence Directorate; the Chief or
+Deputy Chief, Homeland Security Analysis Center; or one of the
+twenty specially-authorized Homeland Mission Coordinators in the
+Analysis and Production Directorate of the Signals Intelligence
+Directorate shall be authorized to access the BR metadata for
+purposes of implementing this sub-paragraph.
+
+D. For the duration of the authorization granted by this
+Order, the NSA may use certain telephone identifiers previously
+approved by the Court in docket number BR 09-01, specifically,
+only those [REDACTED] telephone identifiers described in Tab 1 to the
+[REDACTED] Declaration, to conduct queries of the BR metadata for
+purposes of obtaining foreign intelligence information through
+
+⁴ For telephone identifiers that are currently subject to Court-
+authorized electronic surveillance, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §
+1805, based on this Court's finding of probable cause to believe
+that they are used by [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] including those used by U.S. persons,
+the government's submission need only provide the target's name,
+docket number, and date of expiration of this Court's most
+recent authorization of electronic surveillance.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+8
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+contact chaining [REDACTED] in accordance with this
+Order. If NSA has knowledge of the discontinued use of any such
+identifier, its analysis and minimization of information
+retrieved from the queries based on any such identifier should
+be informed by the knowledge of discontinued use of the
+identifier.
+
+E. The Director of the NSA shall continue to maintain
+mandatory procedures to strictly control access to and use of
+the BR metadata, in accordance with this Court's orders.
+
+F. The NSA shall obtain the BR metadata from [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] via dedicated secure lines, and shall store
+and process the BR metadata on a secure internal network that
+NSA exclusively will operate.
+
+G. Any processing by technical personnel of the BR metadata
+acquired pursuant to this order shall be conducted through the
+NSA's secure internal network, which shall be accessible only to
+cleared technical personnel, using accounts authorized by a user
+authentication service, based on user login and password.
+
+H. Access to the BR metadata shall be accomplished through
+a software interface that will limit access to this data to
+authorized personnel. NSA's Oversight and Compliance Office
+shall monitor the designation of individuals with access to the
+BR metadata. Access to the metadata shall be controlled by user
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+9
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+name and password. When the metadata is accessed, the user's
+login, Internet Protocol (IP) address, date and time, and
+retrieval request shall be automatically logged for auditing
+capability. NSA's OGC shall monitor the functioning of this
+automatic logging capability. Persons authorized for access to
+the BR metadata shall be briefed by NSA's OGC concerning the
+authorization granted by this Order and the limited
+circumstances in which queries to the metadata are permitted, as
+well as other procedures and restrictions regarding the
+retrieval, storage, and dissemination of the metadata.
+
+I. Any dissemination of U.S. person information shall
+follow the standard NSA minimization procedures found in USSID
+18. Before information identifying a U.S. person may be
+disseminated outside of NSA, a judgment must be made that the
+identity of the U.S. person is necessary to understand the
+foreign intelligence information or to assess its importance.
+Prior to the dissemination of any U.S. person identifying
+information, the Chief of Information Sharing Services in the
+Signals Intelligence Directorate must determine that the
+information identifying the U.S. person is in fact related to
+counterterrorism information and that it is necessary to
+understand the counterterrorism information or assess its
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+10
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+importance.⁵ A record shall be made of every such determination.
+
+J. At least once before the expiration of the authorities
+granted herein, NSA's OGC shall conduct a random spot check,
+consisting of an examination of a sample of call detail records
+obtained, to ensure that NSA is receiving only data as
+authorized by the Court and not receiving the substantive
+content of communications.
+
+K. The BR metadata collected under this Court's Orders may
+be kept online (that is, accessible for queries) for five years
+from the date of acquisition, at which time it shall be
+destroyed.
+
+L. The Chief, Special FISA Oversight and Processing,
+Oversight and Compliance, Signals Intelligence Directorate;
+Chief and Deputy Chief, Homeland Security Analysis Center; and
+the Homeland Mission Coordinators shall maintain appropriate
+management controls (e.g., records of all tasking decisions,
+audit and review procedures) for access to the metadata and
+shall use the USSID 18 to minimize the information reported
+concerning U.S. persons.
+
+M. The government shall implement the additional oversight
+mechanisms to ensure compliance with this Order:
+
+⁵ The Court understands that the Senior Operations Officer at
+NSA's National Security Operation Center is the approving
+authority for after-hours requests.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+11
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+(i) NSA's OGC shall consult with the Department of
+Justice's National Security Division (NSD) on all
+significant legal opinions that relate to the
+interpretation, scope, and/or implementation of the
+authorizations granted by the Court in this matter. When
+operationally practicable, such consultation shall occur in
+advance; otherwise, NSD shall be notified as soon as
+practicable.
+
+(ii) NSA's OGC shall promptly provide NSD with copies
+of the mandatory procedures (and all replacements,
+supplements or revisions thereto in effect now or adopted
+in the future) the Director of NSA is required to maintain
+to strictly control access to and use of the data acquired
+pursuant to orders issued by the Court in this matter.
+
+(iii) NSA's OGC shall promptly provide NSD with copies
+of all formal briefing and/or training materials (including
+all revisions thereto) currently in use or prepared and
+used in the future to brief/train NSA personnel concerning
+the authorizations granted by this Order.
+
+(iv) At least once before the expiration of the
+authorities granted herein, a meeting for the purpose of
+assessing compliance with this Court's orders in this
+matter shall be held with representatives from NSA'S OGC,
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+12
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+NSD, and appropriate individuals from NSA'S SID. The
+results of this meeting shall be reduced to writing and
+submitted to the Court as part of any application to renew
+or reinstate the authorities granted herein.
+
+(v) At least once before the expiration of the
+authorities granted herein, NSD shall meet with NSA's
+Office of Inspector General (OIG) to discuss their
+respective oversight responsibilities and assess NSA's
+compliance with the Court's orders in this matter.
+
+(vi) Prior to implementation, all proposed automated
+query processes shall be reviewed and approved by NSA's
+OGC, NSD, and the Court.
+
+N. Any application to renew or reinstate the authority
+granted herein shall include a report describing: (i) the
+queries made since the end of the reporting period of the last
+report filed with the Court; and (ii) any proposed changes in
+the way in which the call detail records would be received from
+the carriers.
+
+O. Upon completion of the government's end-to-end system
+engineering and process reviews, described in Memorandum of the
+United States In Response to the Court's Order Dated January 28,
+2009, Tab 1, Declaration of Lieutenant General Keith B.
+Alexander, United States Army, Director of the NSA, filed
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+13
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+February 17, 2009, at 21, the government shall file a report
+with the Court, that shall, at a minimum, include:
+
+(i) an affidavit by the Director of the FBI, and
+affidavits by any other official responsible for national
+security that the government deems appropriate, describing
+the value of the BR metadata to the national security of
+the United States and certifying that the tangible things
+sought are relevant to an authorized investigation (other
+than a threat assessment) to obtain foreign intelligence
+information not concerning a U.S. person or to protect
+against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence
+activities, and that such investigation of a U.S. person is
+not conducted solely on the basis of activities protected
+by the First Amendment;
+
+(ii) a description of the results of the NSA's end-to-
+end system engineering and process reviews, including any
+additional instances of non-compliance identified
+therefrom;
+
+(iii) a full discussion of the steps taken to remedy
+any additional non-compliance as well as the incidents
+described in the Court's Order of March 2, 2009 in docket
+number BR 08-13, and an affidavit attesting that any
+technological remedies have been tested and demonstrated to
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+14
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+be successful; and
+
+(iv) additional minimization and oversight procedures
+the government proposes to employ should the Court decide
+to authorize the government's resumption of regular access
+to the BR metadata.
+
+This authorization regarding [REDACTED]
+and unknown persons in the United States
+and abroad affiliated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+and unknown persons in the United States
+and abroad affiliated with [REDACTED]
+expires on 10th day of JULY 2009,
+at 5:00 p.m., Eastern Time.
+
+05-29-2009 11:43
+Signed Eastern Time
+Date Time
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+15
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_09-06/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_09-06/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..71b6ebc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_09-06/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+{
+ "title": "FISC Order BR 09-06",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Order of the FISC approving the Government. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2009-05-29",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Walton, Reggie B."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2014-01-17",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/fisc-order-br-09-06",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "3f922408ff7e8848a4b080f9bb2afe60e9c95c8ffb721532113ff04185266c52",
+ "pages": 15
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_10-10/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_10-10.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_10-10/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_10-10.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f09eb97
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_10-10/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_10-10.md
@@ -0,0 +1,540 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN-
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
+BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
+ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
+OF TANGIBLE THINGS FROM [REDACTED]
+
+Docket Number: BR
+10-10
+
+PRIMARY ORDER
+
+A verified application having been made by a designee of
+the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the
+Deputy Director of the FBI, for an order pursuant to the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the Act), Title 50,
+United States Code (U.S.C.), § 1861, as amended, requiring the
+production to the National Security Agency (NSA) of the tangible
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Derived from: Pleadings in the above-captioned docket
+Declassify on: 19 February 2035
+---
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+things described below, and full consideration having been given
+to the matters set forth therein, the Court finds as follows:
+
+1. There are reasonable grounds to believe that the
+tangible things sought are relevant to authorized investigations
+(other than threat assessments) being conducted by the FBI under
+guidelines approved by the Attorney General under Executive
+Order 12333 to protect against international terrorism, which
+investigations are not being conducted solely upon the basis of
+activities protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution
+of the United States. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)]
+
+2. The tangible things sought could be obtained with a
+subpoena duces tecum issued by a court of the United States in
+aid of a grand jury investigation or with any other order issued
+by a court of the United States directing the production of
+records or tangible things. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)(D)]
+
+3. The application includes an enumeration of the
+minimization procedures the government proposes to follow with
+regard to the tangible things sought. Such procedures are
+similar to the minimization procedures approved and adopted as
+binding by the order of this Court in Docket Number BR 09-19 and
+its predecessors. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)]
+
+Accordingly, the Court finds that the application of the
+United States to obtain the tangible things, as described below,
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+2
+---
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+satisfies the requirements of the Act and, therefore,
+
+IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to the authority conferred
+on this Court by the Act, that the application is GRANTED, and
+it is
+
+FURTHER ORDERED, as follows:
+
+(1)Α. The Custodians of Records of [REDACTED] shall
+produce to NSA upon service of the appropriate secondary order,
+and continue production on an ongoing daily basis thereafter for
+the duration of this order, unless otherwise ordered by the
+Court, an electronic copy of the following tangible things: all
+call detail records or “telephony metadata"¹ created by [REDACTED]
+
+B. The Custodian of Records of [REDACTED]
+shall produce to NSA upon service of the appropriate
+secondary order, and continue production on an ongoing daily
+
+¹ For purposes of this Order “telephony metadata" includes
+comprehensive communications routing information (e.g.,
+originating and terminating telephone number, International
+Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) number, International Mobile
+station Equipment Identity (IMEI) number, etc.), trunk
+identifier, telephone calling card numbers, and time and
+duration of call. Telephony metadata does not include the
+substantive content of any communication, as defined by 18
+U.S.C. § 2510(8), or the name, address, or financial information
+of a subscriber or customer.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+3
+---
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN-
+basis thereafter for the duration of this order, unless
+otherwise ordered by the Court, an electronic copy of the
+following tangible things: all call detail records or
+"telephony metadata" created by [REDACTED] for communications (i)
+between the United States and abroad; or (ii) wholly within the
+United States, including local telephone calls.
+[REDACTED]
+
+(2) With respect to any information the FBI receives as a
+result of this Order (information that disseminated to it by
+NSA), the FBI shall follow as minimization procedures the
+procedures set forth in The Attorney General's Guidelines for
+Domestic FBI Operations (September 29, 2008).
+
+(3) With respect to the information that NSA receives as a
+result of this Order, NSA shall strictly adhere to the following
+minimization procedures:
+
+A. The government is hereby prohibited from accessing
+business record metadata acquired pursuant to this Court's
+orders in the above-captioned docket and its predecessors (“BR
+metadata") for any purpose except as described herein.
+Notwithstanding the requirements set forth below, Executive
+Branch and Legislative Branch personnel may be permitted
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+4
+---
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+appropriate access to the BR metadata and certain information
+derived therefrom in order to facilitate their lawful oversight
+functions, which include, but are not limited to, those set
+forth below.
+
+B. The BR metadata may be accessed for the purposes of
+ensuring data integrity and developing and testing any
+technological measures designed to enable the NSA to comply with
+the Court's orders. Access to the BR metadata for such purposes
+shall be limited to the NSA Collection Managers, Data Integrity
+Analysts, and System Administrators described in paragraph 16 of
+the Declaration of [REDACTED] Chief, Special FISA Oversight
+and Processing, Oversight and Compliance, Signals Intelligence
+Directorate, the National Security Agency, filed as Exhibit A to
+the Application in the above-captioned docket ([REDACTED]
+Declaration”). Additional individuals directly involved in
+developing and testing technologies to be used with the BR
+metadata may be granted access to the BR metadata, provided such
+access is approved by NSA's Office of General Counsel (OGC) on a
+case-by-case basis. Persons who query the BR metadata pursuant
+to this paragraph may only share the results of any such query
+with other specially-cleared NSA technical personnel, unless:
+(i) sharing is permitted under paragraph 3(J); or (ii) a data
+integrity analyst conducted the query using a RAS-approved
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+5
+---
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+telephone identifier at the request of an analyst authorized to
+query the BR metadata pursuant to paragraph 3 (C) below, or an
+analyst authorized to receive query results pursuant to
+paragraph 3 (I) below.² Queries performed by the persons
+described in this paragraph shall not be subject to the approval
+process and standard set forth in paragraph (3)C below. To the
+extent NSA personnel make copies of the BR metadata for purposes
+of ensuring data integrity or developing and testing
+technological measures, such copies shall be destroyed upon the
+completion of their work.
+
+C. Subject to the restrictions and procedures below,
+up to 125 NSA analysts may be authorized to access the BR
+metadata for purposes of obtaining foreign intelligence
+information through contact chaining [REDACTED]
+("queries”) using telephone identifiers, ³ as described in
+the [REDACTED] Declaration at paragraphs 8-13.
+
+² The Court understands that only Data Integrity Analysts who
+have received the training required for access under paragraph
+3(C) will be permitted to perform queries and share query
+results with analysts as described in (ii) above.
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+6
+---
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN-
+(i) Except as provided in subparagraph (ii) below,
+all telephone identifiers to be used for queries shall be
+approved by one of the following designated approving
+officials: the Chief, Special FISA Oversight and
+Processing, Oversight and Compliance, Signals Intelligence
+Directorate; the Chief or Deputy Chief, Homeland Security
+Analysis Center; or one of the twenty specially-authorized
+Homeland Mission Coordinators in the Analysis and
+Production Directorate of the Signals Intelligence
+Directorate. Such approval shall be given only after the
+designated approving official has determined that based on
+the factual and practical considerations of everyday life
+on which reasonable and prudent persons act, there are
+facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion
+that the telephone identifier to be queried is associated
+with [REDACTED]
+billing and/or routing communications, such as IMSI, IMEI, and
+calling card numbers.
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+7
+---
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+provided, however, that NSA's OGC shall first determine
+that any telephone identifier reasonably believed to be
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+8
+---
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+used by a United States (U.S.) person is not regarded as
+associated with [REDACTED] solely on the basis of activities
+that are protected by the First Amendment to the
+Constitution.⁶
+
+(ii) Telephone identifiers that are currently
+the subject of electronic surveillance authorized by
+the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC)
+based on the FISC's finding of probable cause to
+believe that they are used by agents of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+⁶ The Court understands that from time to time the information
+available to designated approving officials will indicate that a
+telephone identifier was, but may not presently be, or is, but
+was not formerly, associated with [REDACTED] In such a circumstance, so long as the
+designated approving official can determine that the reasonable,
+articulable suspicion standard can be met for a particular
+period of time with respect the telephone identifier, NSA may
+query the BR metadata using that telephone identifier. However,
+analysts conducting queries using such telephone identifiers
+must be made aware of the time period for which the telephone
+identifier has been associated with [REDACTED] in order that the analysis and
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+9
+---
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN-
+including those used by U.S. persons, may be deemed
+approved for querying for the period of FISC-
+authorized electronic surveillance without review and
+approval by a designated approving official. The
+preceding sentence shall not apply to telephone
+identifiers under surveillance pursuant to any
+certification of the Director of National Intelligence
+and the Attorney General pursuant to Section 702 of
+FISA, as added by the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, or
+pursuant to an Order of the FISC issued under Section
+703 or Section 704 of FISA, as added by the FISA
+Amendments Act of 2008.
+
+(iii) A determination by a designated approving
+official that a telephone identifier is associated
+with [REDACTED]
+shall be effective for: one hundred
+eighty days for U.S. telephone identifiers and for any
+identifiers believed to be used by a U.S. person; one
+year for all other telephone identifiers.⁷
+minimization of the information retrieved from their queries may
+be informed by that fact.
+
+⁷ The Court understands that call detail records of foreign-to-
+foreign communications provided by [REDACTED] pursuant to this Order
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+10
+---
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN-
+D. The Director of the NSA shall continue to maintain
+mandatory procedures to strictly control access to and use of
+the BR metadata, in accordance with this Court's orders. NSA's
+OGC shall continue to promptly provide NSD with copies of these
+mandatory procedures (and all replacements, supplements or
+revisions thereto in effect now or adopted in the future). The
+Chief, Special FISA Oversight and Processing, Oversight and
+Compliance, Signals Intelligence Directorate; Chief and Deputy
+Chief, Homeland Security Analysis Center; and the Homeland
+Mission Coordinators shall maintain appropriate management
+controls (e.g., records of all tasking decisions, audit and
+review procedures) for access to the metadata.
+
+E. The NSA shall obtain the BR metadata from [REDACTED]
+via secure lines, and shall store and
+process the BR metadata on a secure internal network that NSA
+will not be used to make chain summary records. Further, such
+records will be used solely for technical purposes, including
+use by NSA's data integrity analysts to correctly interpret and
+extract contact information in [REDACTED] international records. In
+the event that an NSA analyst performs an authorized query that
+includes a search of the BR metadata, and the results of that
+query include information from [REDACTED] foreign-to-foreign call
+detail records, NSA shall handle and minimize the information in
+those records in accordance with the minimization procedures in
+this Order, regardless of the authority pursuant to which NSA
+obtained the record. In contrast, if the analyst's query does
+not include a search of the BR metadata, and the results of that
+query include information from [REDACTED] foreign-to-foreign call
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+11
+---
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+exclusively will operate.
+
+F. Any processing by technical personnel of the BR metadata
+acquired pursuant to this order shall be conducted through the
+NSA's secure internal network, which shall be accessible only to
+authorized personnel, using accounts authorized by a user
+authentication service, based on user login and password.
+
+G. Access to the metadata shall be controlled by user name
+and password. NSA's Oversight and Compliance Office shall
+monitor the designation of individuals with access to the BR
+metadata. When the BR metadata is accessed through queries
+under paragraphs (3)B or (3)C above, a software interface shall
+limit access to the BR metadata to authorized personnel, and the
+user's login, Internet Protocol (IP) address, date and time, and
+retrieval request shall be automatically logged for auditing
+capability.⁸ When the BR metadata is accessed through any other
+means under paragraph (3) B above, the user's login, date and
+time shall be automatically logged for auditing capability.
+detail records, then the minimization procedures in this Order
+shall not be applied to the information in those records.
+
+⁸ In addition, the Court understands from the Declaration of
+Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander, Director of NSA (Ex. A to
+the Report of the United States filed in docket number BR 09-09
+on August 17, 2009) that NSA has made a number of technical
+modifications that will prohibit analysts: a) from inadvertently
+accessing the BR metadata in [REDACTED] b) from querying the BR
+metadata in [REDACTED] with non-RAS-approved identifiers; and c)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+12
+---
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+NSA's Office of Oversight and Compliance shall monitor the
+functioning of this automatic logging capability. All persons
+authorized for access to the BR metadata and other NSA personnel
+who are authorized to receive query results shall receive
+appropriate and adequate training concerning the authorization
+granted by this Order, the limited circumstances in which the BR
+metadata may be accessed, and/or other procedures and
+restrictions regarding the retrieval, storage, and dissemination
+of the metadata. NSA'S OGC shall ensure that such training is
+provided.
+
+H. NSA shall treat information from queries of the BR
+metadata in accordance with USSID 18 and shall apply USSID 18 to
+minimize and disseminate information concerning U.S. persons
+obtained from the records produced pursuant to the authorities
+granted herein. Additionally, before the NSA disseminates any
+U.S. person identifying information, the Chief of Information
+Sharing Services in the Signals Intelligence Directorate, the
+Senior Operations Officer at NSA's National Security Operations
+Center, the Signals Intelligence Directorate Director, the
+Deputy Director of the NSA, or the Director of the NSA must
+determine that the information identifying the U.S. person is in
+from going beyond three "hops" from an identifier used to query
+the BR metadata in [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN-
+13
+---
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+fact related to counterterrorism information and that it is
+necessary to understand the counterterrorism information or
+assess its importance. Notwithstanding the above requirements,
+NSA may share certain information, as appropriate, derived from
+the BR metadata, including U.S. person identifying information,
+with Executive Branch and Legislative Branch personnel in order
+to enable them to fulfill their lawful oversight functions, and,
+in the case of Executive Branch personnel, to enable them to
+determine whether the information contains exculpatory or
+impeachment information or is otherwise discoverable in legal
+proceedings. By 5:00 p.m. each Friday following the
+authorization requested herein, the government shall file a
+report listing each instance during the seven-day period ending
+the previous Friday in which NSA has shared, in any form,
+information obtained or derived from the BR metadata with anyone
+outside NSA. For each such instance, the government shall
+specify the date on which the information was shared, the
+recipient of the information, and the form in which the
+information was communicated (e.g., written report, e-mail, oral
+communication, etc.). For each such instance in which U.S.
+person information has been shared, except those involving
+Executive Branch personnel seeking to identify discoverable
+information, the Chief of Information Sharing Services in the
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN-
+14
+---
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Signals Intelligence Directorate shall certify that one of the
+authorized officials identified above determined, prior to
+dissemination, that the information was related to
+counterterrorism information and necessary to understand the
+counterterrorism information or to assess its importance. This
+paragraph's reporting requirement is not intended to apply to
+instances in which BR metadata and information derived therefrom
+is shared with Executive Branch or Legislative Branch personnel
+in order to facilitate their lawful oversight functions.
+
+I. Personnel authorized to query the BR metadata in
+paragraph (3) C above may use and share the results of authorized
+queries of the BR metadata among themselves and with NSA
+personnel, including those who are not authorized to access the
+BR metadata pursuant to paragraph (3)C, provided that all NSA
+personnel receiving such query results in any form (except for
+information properly disseminated outside NSA) shall first
+receive appropriate and adequate training and guidance regarding
+the rules and restrictions governing the use, storage, and
+dissemination of such information. NSA's Oversight and
+Compliance Office shall monitor the designation of individuals
+who have received the training and guidance necessary to receive
+the results of queries of the BR metadata.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+15
+---
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN-
+J. Authorized personnel also may use and share the identity
+of high-volume telephone identifiers and [REDACTED] that they discover or have
+discovered as a result of access authorized under paragraphs
+(3)B and (3)C or as a result of technical personnel access under
+prior docket numbers in this matter, among themselves and with
+other NSA personnel, including those who are not authorized to
+access the BR metadata, for purposes of metadata reduction and
+management. The training requirements set forth in paragraph
+(3) I above for NSA personnel receiving query results shall not
+apply to personnel receiving such identifiers, which may have
+been identified through queries, so long as they are received
+solely for purposes of metadata reduction and management.
+
+Κ. The BR metadata collected under this Court's Orders may
+be kept online (that is, accessible for queries) for five years
+from the date of acquisition, at which time it shall be
+destroyed.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN-
+16
+---
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+L. At least twice before the expiration of the authorities
+granted herein, NSA's OGC shall conduct a random spot check,
+consisting of an examination of a sample of call detail records
+obtained, to ensure that NSA is receiving only data as
+authorized by the Court and not receiving the substantive
+content of communications.
+
+Μ. At least twice before the expiration of the authorities
+granted herein, the Department of Justice's National Security
+Division (NSD) will review NSA's access to the BR metadata under
+paragraph (3)C above. Such reviews shall include a sample of
+the justifications designated approving officials relied upon to
+approve telephone identifiers for querying the BR metadata, and
+a review of the queries conducted.
+
+Ν. NSA'S OGC shall consult with NSD on all significant
+legal opinions that relate to the interpretation, scope, and/or
+implementation of the authorizations granted by the Court in
+this matter. When operationally practicable, such consultation
+shall occur in advance; otherwise, NSD shall be notified as soon
+as practicable.
+
+0. NSA'S OGC shall promptly provide NSD with copies of all
+formal briefing and/or training materials (including all
+revisions thereto) currently in use or prepared and used in the
+future to brief/train NSA personnel concerning the
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+17
+---
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+authorizations granted by this Order.
+
+P. At least once before the expiration of the authorities
+granted herein, a meeting for the purpose of assessing
+compliance with this Court's orders in this matter shall be held
+with representatives from NSA'S OGC, NSD, and appropriate
+individuals from NSA's Signals Intelligence Directorate. The
+results of this meeting shall be reduced to writing and
+submitted to the Court as part of any application to renew or
+reinstate the authorities granted herein.
+
+Q. At least once before the expiration of the authorities
+granted herein, NSD shall meet with NSA's Office of Inspector
+General (OIG) to discuss their respective oversight
+responsibilities and assess NSA's compliance with the Court's
+orders in this matter.
+
+R. Prior to implementation, all proposed automated query
+processes shall be reviewed and approved by NSA's OGC, NSD, and
+the Court.
+
+S. Within forty-five days of the issuance of this Order,
+NSA shall file a report with the Court describing the queries
+made since end of the reporting period of the last report filed
+pursuant to the Court's order in docket number BR 09-19.
+Additionally, any application to renew or reinstate the
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+18
+---
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+authority granted herein shall include a report describing: (i)
+the queries made since the end of the reporting period of the
+last report filed with the Court; (ii) the manner in which NSA
+applied the procedures set forth in paragraph (3)C above; and
+(iii) any proposed changes in the way in which the call detail
+records would be received from the carriers and any significant
+changes to the systems NSA uses to receive, store, process, and
+disseminate BR metadata.
+
+This authorization regarding [REDACTED] and unknown persons in the United States
+and abroad affiliated with [REDACTED]
+and unknown persons in the United States
+and abroad affiliated with [REDACTED]
+expires on the 21st day of May, 2010, at
+5:00 p.m., Eastern Time.
+
+Signed
+
+Date 02-26-2010 03:36
+Time Eastern Time
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+[REDACTED] Deputy Clerk
+FISC, certify that this document
+is a true and correct copy of
+the original. [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+19
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_10-10/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_10-10/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2fe1596
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_10-10/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+{
+ "title": "FISC Order BR 10-10",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Order of the FISC approving the Government. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2010-02-25",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Walton, Reggie B."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2014-01-17",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/fisc-order-br-10-10",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "3ecffafe8929d4e217d417d09ea9822d2a44af0d19909960958319593f954ca2",
+ "pages": 19
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_10-17/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_10-17.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_10-17/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_10-17.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..60aced0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_10-17/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_10-17.md
@@ -0,0 +1,560 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
+BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
+ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
+OF TANGIBLE THINGS FROM [REDACTED]
+(TS)
+
+Docket Number: BR
+10-17
+
+PRIMARY ORDER
+
+A verified application having been made by a designee of
+the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the
+Deputy Director of the FBI, for an order pursuant to the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the Act), Title 50,
+United States Code (U.S.C.), § 1861, as amended, requiring the
+production to the National Security Agency (NSA) of the tangible
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Derived from: Pleadings in the above-captioned docket
+Declassify on: 14 May 2035
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+things described below, and full consideration having been given
+to the matters set forth therein, the Court finds as follows:
+
+1. There are reasonable grounds to believe that the
+tangible things sought are relevant to authorized investigations
+(other than threat assessments) being conducted by the FBI under
+guidelines approved by the Attorney General under Executive
+Order 12333 to protect against international terrorism, which
+investigations are not being conducted solely upon the basis of
+activities protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution
+of the United States. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)]
+
+2. The tangible things sought could be obtained with a
+subpoena duces tecum issued by a court of the United States in
+aid of a grand jury investigation or with any other order issued
+by a court of the United States directing the production of
+records or tangible things. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2) (D)]
+
+3. The application includes an enumeration of the
+minimization procedures the government proposes to follow with
+regard to the tangible things sought. Such procedures are
+similar to the minimization procedures approved and adopted as
+binding by the order of this Court in Docket Number BR 10-10 and
+its predecessors. [50 U.S.C. S 1861(c)(1)]
+
+Accordingly, the Court finds that the application of the
+United States to obtain the tangible things, as described below,
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+2
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+satisfies the requirements of the Act and, therefore,
+
+IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to the authority conferred
+on this Court by the Act, that the application is GRANTED, and
+it is
+
+FURTHER ORDERED, as follows:
+
+(1)Α. The Custodians of Records of [REDACTED] shall
+produce to NSA upon service of the appropriate secondary order,
+and continue production on an ongoing daily basis thereafter for
+the duration of this order, unless otherwise ordered by the
+Court, an electronic copy of the following tangible things: all
+call detail records or “telephony metadata”¹ [REDACTED]
+
+B. The Custodian of Records of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+shall produce to NSA upon service of the appropriate
+secondary order, and continue production on an ongoing daily
+
+¹ For purposes of this Order "telephony metadata" includes
+comprehensive communications routing information (e.g.,
+originating and terminating telephone number, International
+Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) number, International Mobile
+station Equipment Identity (IMEI) number, etc.), trunk
+identifier, telephone calling card numbers, and time and
+duration of call. Telephony metadata does not include the
+substantive content of any communication, as defined by 18
+U.S.C. § 2510(8), or the name, address, or financial information
+of a subscriber or customer.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+3
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+basis thereafter for the duration of this order, unless
+otherwise ordered by the Court, an electronic copy of the
+following tangible things: all call detail records or
+"telephony metadata" created by [REDACTED] for communications (i)
+between the United States and abroad; or (ii) wholly within the
+United States, including local telephone calls.
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+(2) With respect to any information the FBI receives as a
+result of this Order (information that disseminated to it by
+NSA), the FBI shall follow as minimization procedures the
+procedures set forth in The Attorney General's Guidelines for
+Domestic FBI Operations (September 29, 2008).
+
+(3) With respect to the information that NSA receives as a
+result of this Order, NSA shall strictly adhere to the following
+minimization procedures:
+
+A. The government is hereby prohibited from accessing
+business record metadata acquired pursuant to this Court's
+orders in the above-captioned docket and its predecessors (“BR
+metadata") for any purpose except as described herein.
+Notwithstanding the requirements set forth below, Executive
+Branch and Legislative Branch personnel may be permitted
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+4
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+appropriate access to the BR metadata and certain information
+derived therefrom in order to facilitate their lawful oversight
+functions, which include, but are not limited to, those set
+forth below.
+
+B. The BR metadata may be accessed for the purposes of
+ensuring data integrity and developing and testing any
+technological measures designed to enable the NSA to comply with
+the Court's orders. Access to the BR metadata for such purposes
+shall be limited to the NSA Collection Managers, Data Integrity
+Analysts, and System Administrators described in paragraph 16 of
+the Declaration of [REDACTED] Chief, Special FISA Oversight
+and Processing, Oversight and Compliance, Signals Intelligence
+Directorate, the National Security Agency, filed as Exhibit A to
+the Application in the above-captioned docket ("[REDACTED]
+Declaration"). Additional individuals directly involved in
+developing and testing technologies to be used with the BR
+metadata may be granted access to the BR metadata, provided such
+access is approved by NSA's Office of General Counsel (OGC) on a
+case-by-case basis. Persons who query the BR metadata pursuant
+to this paragraph may only share the results of any such query
+with other specially-cleared NSA technical personnel, unless:
+(i) sharing is permitted under paragraph 3(J); or (ii) a data
+integrity analyst conducted the query using a RAS-approved
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+5
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+telephone identifier at the request of an analyst authorized to
+query the BR metadata pursuant to paragraph 3 (C) below, or an
+analyst authorized to receive query results pursuant to
+paragraph 3 (I) below.² Queries performed by the persons
+described in this paragraph shall not be subject to the approval
+process and standard set forth in paragraph (3) C below. To the
+extent NSA personnel make copies of the BR metadata for purposes
+of ensuring data integrity or developing and testing
+technological measures, such copies shall be destroyed upon the
+completion of their work.
+
+C. Subject to the restrictions and procedures below,
+up to [REDACTED] NSA analysts may be authorized to access the BR
+metadata for purposes of obtaining foreign intelligence
+information through contact chaining [REDACTED]
+("queries”) using telephone identifiers,³ as described in
+the [REDACTED] Declaration at paragraphs 8-13.
+
+² The Court understands that only Data Integrity Analysts who
+have received the training required for access under paragraph
+3 (C) will be permitted to perform queries and share query
+results with analysts as described in (ii) above.
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+6
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+(i) Except as provided in subparagraph (ii) below,
+all telephone identifiers to be used for queries shall be
+approved by one of the following designated approving
+officials: the Chief, Special FISA Oversight and
+Processing, Oversight and Compliance, Signals Intelligence
+Directorate; the Chief or Deputy Chief, Homeland Security
+Analysis Center; or one of the twenty specially-authorized
+Homeland Mission Coordinators in the Analysis and
+Production Directorate of the Signals Intelligence
+Directorate. Such approval shall be given only after the
+designated approving official has determined that based on
+the factual and practical considerations of everyday life
+on which reasonable and prudent persons act, there are
+facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion
+that the telephone identifier to be queried is associated
+with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+7
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+provided, however, that NSA's OGC shall first determine
+that any telephone identifier reasonably believed to be
+used by a United States (U.S.) person is not regarded as
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+8
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+solely on the basis of activities
+that are protected by the First Amendment to the
+Constitution.⁶
+
+(ii) Telephone identifiers that are currently
+the subject of electronic surveillance authorized by
+the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC)
+based on the FISC's finding of probable cause to
+believe that they are used by [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+including those used by U.S. persons, may be deemed
+[REDACTED]
+⁶ The Court understands that from time to time the information
+available to designated approving officials will indicate that a
+telephone identifier was, but may not presently be, or is, but
+was not formerly, associated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+In such a circumstance, so long as the
+designated approving official can determine that the reasonable,
+articulable suspicion standard can be met for a particular
+period of time with respect the telephone identifier, NSA may
+query the BR metadata using that telephone identifier. However,
+analysts conducting queries using such telephone identifiers
+must be made aware of the time period for which the telephone
+identifier has been associated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+in order that the analysis and
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+9
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+approved for querying for the period of FISC-
+authorized electronic surveillance without review and
+approval by a designated approving official. The
+preceding sentence shall not apply to telephone
+identifiers under surveillance pursuant to any
+certification of the Director of National Intelligence
+and the Attorney General pursuant to Section 702 of
+FISA, as added by the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, or
+pursuant to an Order of the FISC issued under Section
+703 or Section 704 of FISA, as added by the FISA
+Amendments Act of 2008.
+
+(iii) A determination by a designated approving
+official that a telephone identifier is associated
+with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+shall be effective for: one hundred
+eighty days for U.S. telephone identifiers and for any
+identifiers believed to be used by a U.S. person; one
+year for all other telephone identifiers.⁷
+
+minimization of the information retrieved from their queries may
+be informed by that fact.
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+10
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+D. The Director of the NSA shall continue to maintain
+mandatory procedures to strictly control access to and use of
+the BR metadata, in accordance with this Court's orders. NSA's
+OGC shall continue to promptly provide NSD with copies of these
+mandatory procedures (and all replacements, supplements or
+revisions thereto in effect now or adopted in the future). The
+Chief, Special FISA Oversight and Processing, Oversight and
+Compliance, Signals Intelligence Directorate; Chief and Deputy
+Chief, Homeland Security Analysis Center; and the Homeland
+Mission Coordinators shall maintain appropriate management
+controls (e.g., records of all tasking decisions, audit and
+review procedures) for access to the metadata.
+
+E. The NSA shall obtain the BR metadata [REDACTED]
+via secure lines, and shall store and
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+11
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+process the BR metadata on a secure internal network that NSA
+exclusively will operate.
+
+F. Any processing by technical personnel of the BR metadata
+acquired pursuant to this order shall be conducted through the
+NSA's secure internal network, which shall be accessible only to
+authorized personnel, using accounts authorized by a user
+authentication service, based on user login and password.
+
+G. Access to the metadata shall be controlled by user name
+and password. NSA's Oversight and Compliance Office shall
+monitor the designation of individuals with access to the BR
+metadata. When the BR metadata is accessed through queries
+under paragraphs (3)B or (3)C above, a software interface shall
+limit access to the BR metadata to authorized personnel, and the
+user's login, Internet Protocol (IP) address, date and time, and
+retrieval request shall be automatically logged for auditing
+capability.⁸ When the BR metadata is accessed through any other
+means under paragraph (3) B above, the user's login, date and
+time shall be automatically logged for auditing capability.
+
+⁸ In addition, the Court understands from the Declaration of
+Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander, Director of NSA (Ex. A to
+the Report of the United States filed in docket number BR 09-09
+on August 17, 2009) that NSA has made a number of technical
+modifications that will prohibit analysts: a) from inadvertently
+accessing the BR metadata in [REDACTED] b) from querying the BR
+metadata in [REDACTED] with non-RAS-approved identifiers; and c)
+from going beyond three "hops" from an identifier used to query
+the BR metadata in [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+12
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+NSA's Office of Oversight and Compliance shall monitor the
+functioning of this automatic logging capability. All persons
+authorized for access to the BR metadata and other NSA personnel
+who are authorized to receive query results shall receive
+appropriate and adequate training concerning the authorization
+granted by this Order, the limited circumstances in which the BR
+metadata may be accessed, and/or other procedures and
+restrictions regarding the retrieval, storage, and dissemination
+of the metadata. NSA's OGC shall ensure that such training is
+provided.
+
+H. NSA shall treat information from queries of the BR
+metadata in accordance with USSID 18 and shall apply USSID 18 to
+minimize and disseminate information concerning U.S. persons
+obtained from the records produced pursuant to the authorities
+granted herein. Additionally, before the NSA disseminates any
+U.S. person identifying information, the Chief of Information
+Sharing Services in the Signals Intelligence Directorate, the
+Senior Operations Officer at NSA's National Security Operations
+Center, the Signals Intelligence Directorate Director, the
+Deputy Director of the NSA, or the Director of the NSA must
+determine that the information identifying the U.S. person is in
+fact related to counterterrorism information and that it is
+necessary to understand the counterterrorism information or
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+13
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+assess its importance. Notwithstanding the above requirements,
+NSA may share certain information, as appropriate, derived from
+the BR metadata, including U.S. person identifying information,
+with Executive Branch and Legislative Branch personnel in order
+to enable them to fulfill their lawful oversight functions, and,
+in the case of Executive Branch personnel, to enable them to
+determine whether the information contains exculpatory or
+impeachment information or is otherwise discoverable in legal
+proceedings. By 5:00p.m. each Friday following the
+authorization requested herein, the government shall file a
+report listing each instance during the seven-day period ending
+the previous Friday in which NSA has shared, in any form,
+information obtained or derived from the BR metadata with anyone
+outside NSA. For each such instance, the government shall
+specify the date on which the information was shared, the
+recipient of the information, and the form in which the
+information was communicated (e.g., written report, e-mail, oral
+communication, etc.). For each such instance in which U.S.
+person information has been shared, except those involving
+Executive Branch personnel seeking to identify discoverable
+information, the Chief of Information Sharing Services in the
+Signals Intelligence Directorate shall certify that one of the
+authorized officials identified above determined, prior to
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+14
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+dissemination, that the information was related to
+counterterrorism information and necessary to understand the
+counterterrorism information or to assess its importance. This
+paragraph's reporting requirement is not intended to apply to
+instances in which BR metadata and information derived therefrom
+is shared with Executive Branch or Legislative Branch personnel
+in order to facilitate their lawful oversight functions.
+
+I. Personnel authorized to query the BR metadata in
+paragraph (3) C above may use and share the results of authorized
+queries of the BR metadata among themselves and with NSA
+personnel, including those who are not authorized to access the
+BR metadata pursuant to paragraph (3)C, provided that all NSA
+personnel receiving such query results in any form (except for
+information properly disseminated outside NSA) shall first
+receive appropriate and adequate training and guidance regarding
+the rules and restrictions governing the use, storage, and
+dissemination of such information. NSA's Oversight and
+Compliance Office shall monitor the designation of individuals
+who have received the training and guidance necessary to receive
+the results of queries of the BR metadata.
+
+J. Authorized personnel also may use and share the identity
+of high-volume telephone identifiers and other types of
+identifiers not associated with specific users [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+15
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+that they discover or have
+discovered as a result of access authorized under paragraphs
+(3) Band (3) C or as a result of technical personnel access under
+prior docket numbers in this matter, among themselves and with
+other NSA personnel, including those who are not authorized to
+access the BR metadata, for purposes of metadata reduction and
+management. The training requirements set forth in paragraph
+(3) I above for NSA personnel receiving query results shall not
+apply to personnel receiving such identifiers, which may have
+been identified through queries, so long as they are received
+solely for purposes of metadata reduction and management.
+
+K. The BR metadata collected under this Court's Orders may
+be kept online (that is, accessible for queries) for five years
+from the date of acquisition, at which time it shall be
+destroyed.
+
+L. At least twice before the expiration of the authorities
+granted herein, NSA's OGC shall conduct a random spot check,
+consisting of an examination of a sample of call detail records
+obtained, to ensure that NSA is receiving only data as
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+16
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+authorized by the Court and not receiving the substantive
+content of communications.
+
+M. At least twice before the expiration of the authorities
+granted herein, the Department of Justice's National Security
+Division (NSD) will review NSA's access to the BR metadata under
+paragraph (3) C above. Such reviews shall include a sample of
+the justifications designated approving officials relied upon to
+approve telephone identifiers for querying the BR metadata, and
+a review of the queries conducted.
+
+N. NSA's OGC shall consult with NSD on all significant
+legal opinions that relate to the interpretation, scope, and/or
+implementation of the authorizations granted by the Court in
+this matter. When operationally practicable, such consultation
+shall occur in advance; otherwise, NSD shall be notified as soon
+as practicable.
+
+O. NSA's OGC shall promptly provide NSD with copies of all
+formal briefing and/or training materials (including all
+revisions thereto) currently in use or prepared and used in the
+future to brief/train NSA personnel concerning the
+authorizations granted by this Order.
+
+P. At least once before the expiration of the authorities
+granted herein, a meeting for the purpose of assessing
+compliance with this Court's orders in this matter shall be held
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+17
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+with representatives from NSA'S OGC, NSD, and appropriate
+individuals from NSA's Signals Intelligence Directorate. The
+results of this meeting shall be reduced to writing and
+submitted to the Court as part of any application to renew or
+reinstate the authorities granted herein.
+
+Q. At least once before the expiration of the authorities
+granted herein, NSD shall meet with NSA's Office of Inspector
+General (OIG) to discuss their respective oversight
+responsibilities and assess NSA's compliance with the Court's
+orders in this matter.
+
+R. Prior to implementation, all proposed automated query
+processes shall be reviewed and approved by NSA's OGC, NSD, and
+the Court.
+
+S. Within forty-five days of the issuance of this Order,
+NSA shall file a report with the Court describing the queries
+made since end of the reporting period of the last report filed
+pursuant to the Court's order in docket number BR 10-10.
+Additionally, any application to renew or reinstate the
+authority granted herein shall include a report describing: (i)
+the queries made since the end of the reporting period of the
+last report filed with the Court; (ii) the manner in which NSA
+applied the procedures set forth in paragraph (3) C above; and
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+18
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+(iii) any proposed changes in the way in which the call detail
+records would be received from the carriers and any significant
+changes to the systems NSA uses to receive, store, process, and
+disseminate BR metadata.
+
+This authorization regarding [REDACTED]
+and unknown persons in the United States
+and abroad affiliated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+and unknown persons in the United States
+and abroad affiliated with [REDACTED]
+expires on the 6ᵗʰ day of August, 2010,
+at 5:00 p.m., Eastern Time.
+
+05-14-2010 A09:38
+Signed Eastern Time
+Date Time
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+[REDACTED]
+Deputy Clerk
+FISC, certify that this document
+is a true and correct copy of
+the original.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+19
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_10-17/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_10-17/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0d7add3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_10-17/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+{
+ "title": "FISC Order BR 10-17",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Order of the FISC approving the Government. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2010-05-14",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Walton, Reggie B."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2014-01-17",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/fisc-order-br-10-17",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "5ce3d095bb16de3e6ca1981b387d70d07ca79af7786afa61622e0f9a407bce9e",
+ "pages": 19
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_10-49/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_10-49.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_10-49/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_10-49.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..58b154f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_10-49/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_10-49.md
@@ -0,0 +1,517 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+UNITED STATES
+
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
+BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
+ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
+OF TANGIBLE THINGS FROM
+[REDACTED]
+
+Docket Number: BR
+
+10-49
+
+PRIMARY ORDER
+
+A verified application having been made by the Director of
+the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for an order pursuant
+to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the Act),
+Title 50, United States Code (U.S.C.), § 1861, as amended,
+requiring the production to the National Security Agency (NSA)
+of the tangible things described below, and full consideration
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Derived from: Pleadings in the above-captioned docket
+Declassify on: 6 August 2035
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+having been given to the matters set forth therein, the Court
+finds as follows:
+
+1. There are reasonable grounds to believe that the
+tangible things sought are relevant to authorized investigations
+(other than threat assessments) being conducted by the FBI under
+guidelines approved by the Attorney General under Executive
+Order 12333 to protect against international terrorism, which
+investigations are not being conducted solely upon the basis of
+activities protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution
+of the United States. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)]
+
+2. The tangible things sought could be obtained with a
+subpoena duces tecum issued by a court of the United States in
+aid of a grand jury investigation or with any other order issued
+by a court of the United States directing the production of
+records or tangible things. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)(D)]
+
+3. The application includes an enumeration of the
+minimization procedures the government proposes to follow with
+regard to the tangible things sought. Such procedures are
+similar to the minimization procedures approved and adopted as
+binding by the order of this Court in Docket Number BR 10-17 and
+its predecessors. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)]
+
+Accordingly, the Court finds that the application of the
+United States to obtain the tangible things, as described below,
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+2
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+satisfies the requirements of the Act and, therefore,
+
+IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to the authority conferred
+on this Court by the Act, that the application is GRANTED, and
+it is
+
+FURTHER ORDERED, as follows:
+
+(1)Α. The Custodians of Records of [REDACTED] shall
+produce to NSA upon service of the appropriate secondary order,
+and continue production on an ongoing daily basis thereafter for
+the duration of this order, unless otherwise ordered by the
+Court, an electronic copy of the following tangible things: all
+call detail records or “telephony metadata"¹ created by [REDACTED]
+
+B. The Custodian of Records of [REDACTED] shall produce to NSA upon service of the appropriate
+secondary order, and continue production on an ongoing daily
+
+¹ For purposes of this Order “telephony metadata" includes
+comprehensive communications routing information (e.g.,
+originating and terminating telephone number, International
+Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) number, International Mobile
+station Equipment Identity (IMEI) number, etc.), trunk
+identifier, telephone calling card numbers, and time and
+duration of call. Telephony metadata does not include the
+substantive content of any communication, as defined by 18
+U.S.C. § 2510(8), or the name, address, or financial information
+of a subscriber or customer.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+3
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+basis thereafter for the duration of this order, unless
+otherwise ordered by the Court, an electronic copy of the
+following tangible things: all call detail records or
+"telephony metadata" created by [REDACTED] for communications (i)
+between the United States and abroad; or (ii) wholly within the
+United States, including local telephone calls.
+[REDACTED]
+
+(2) With respect to any information the FBI receives as a
+result of this Order (information that disseminated to it by
+NSA), the FBI shall follow as minimization procedures the
+procedures set forth in The Attorney General's Guidelines for
+Domestic FBI Operations (September 29, 2008).
+
+(3) With respect to the information that NSA receives as a
+result of this Order, NSA shall strictly adhere to the following
+minimization procedures:
+
+A. The government is hereby prohibited from accessing
+business record metadata acquired pursuant to this Court's
+orders in the above-captioned docket and its predecessors ("BR
+metadata") for any purpose except as described herein.
+Notwithstanding the requirements set forth below, Executive
+Branch and Legislative Branch personnel may be permitted
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+4
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+appropriate access to the BR metadata and certain information
+derived therefrom in order to facilitate their lawful oversight
+functions, which include, but are not limited to, those set
+forth below.
+
+B. The BR metadata may be accessed for the purposes of
+ensuring data integrity and developing and testing any
+technological measures designed to enable the NSA to comply with
+the Court's orders. Access to the BR metadata for such purposes
+shall be limited to the NSA Collection Managers, Data Integrity
+Analysts, and System Administrators described in paragraph 16 of
+the Declaration of [REDACTED] of the Signals Intelligence
+Directorate, the National Security Agency, filed as Exhibit A to
+the Application in the above-captioned docket ([REDACTED] Declaration").
+Additional individuals directly involved in
+developing and testing technologies to be used with the BR
+metadata may be granted access to the BR metadata, provided such
+access is approved by NSA's Office of General Counsel (OGC) on a
+case-by-case basis. Persons who query the BR metadata pursuant
+to this paragraph may only share the results of any such query
+with other specially-cleared NSA technical personnel, unless:
+(i) sharing is permitted under paragraph 3(J); or (ii) a data
+integrity analyst conducted the query using a RAS-approved
+telephone identifier at the request of an analyst authorized to
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+5
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+query the BR metadata pursuant to paragraph 3 (C) below, or an
+analyst authorized to receive query results pursuant to
+paragraph 3(I) below.² Queries performed by the persons
+described in this paragraph shall not be subject to the approval
+process and standard set forth in paragraph (3)C below. To the
+extent NSA personnel make copies of the BR metadata for purposes
+of ensuring data integrity and developing and testing
+technological measures, such copies shall be destroyed upon the
+completion of their work.
+
+C. Subject to the restrictions and procedures below,
+up to 125 NSA analysts may be authorized to access the BR
+metadata for purposes of obtaining foreign intelligence
+information through contact chaining ("queries”) using
+telephone identifiers, as described in the [REDACTED] Declaration at paragraphs 8-12.
+
+(i) Except as provided in subparagraph (ii) below,
+all telephone identifiers to be used for queries shall be
+
+² The Court understands that only Data Integrity Analysts who
+have received the training required for access under paragraph
+3(C) will be permitted to perform queries and share query
+results with analysts as described in (ii) above.
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+6
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+approved by one of the following designated approving
+officials: the Chief or Deputy Chief of the Homeland
+Security Analysis Center; or one of twenty specially-
+authorized Homeland Mission Coordinators in the Analysis
+and Production Directorate of the Signals Intelligence
+Directorate. Such approval shall be given only after the
+designated approving official has determined that based on
+the factual and practical considerations of everyday life
+on which reasonable and prudent persons act, there are
+facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion
+that the telephone identifier to be queried is associated
+with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+7
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+provided, however, that NSA's OGC shall first determine
+that any telephone identifier reasonably believed to be
+used by a United States (U.S.) person is not regarded as
+associated with [REDACTED] solely on the basis of activities
+that are protected by the First Amendment to the
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+8
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Constitution.⁶
+
+(ii) Telephone identifiers that are currently
+the subject of electronic surveillance authorized by
+the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC)
+based on the FISC's finding of probable cause to
+believe that they are used by agents of [REDACTED]
+including those used by U.S. persons, may be deemed
+approved for querying for the period of FISC-
+authorized electronic surveillance without review and
+approval by a designated approving official. The
+preceding sentence shall not apply to telephone
+identifiers under surveillance pursuant to any
+
+⁶ The Court understands that from time to time the information
+available to designated approving officials will indicate that a
+telephone identifier was, but may not presently be, or is, but
+was not formerly, associated with [REDACTED] In such a circumstance, so long as the
+designated approving official can determine that the reasonable,
+articulable suspicion standard can be met for a particular
+period of time with respect the telephone identifier, NSA may
+query the BR metadata using that telephone identifier. However,
+analysts conducting queries using such telephone identifiers
+must be made aware of the time period for which the telephone
+identifier has been associated with [REDACTED] in order that the analysis and
+minimization of the information retrieved from their queries may
+be informed by that fact.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+9
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+certification of the Director of National Intelligence
+and the Attorney General pursuant to Section 702 of
+FISA, as added by the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, or
+pursuant to an Order of the FISC issued under Section
+703 or Section 704 of FISA, as added by the FISA
+Amendments Act of 2008.
+
+(iii) A determination by a designated approving
+official that a telephone identifier is associated
+with [REDACTED] shall be effective for: one hundred
+eighty days for U.S. telephone identifiers and for any
+identifiers believed to be used by a U.S. person; one
+year for all other telephone identifiers.⁷
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+10
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+D. The Director of the NSA shall continue to maintain
+mandatory procedures to strictly control access to and use of
+the BR metadata, in accordance with this Court's orders. NSA'S
+OGC shall continue to promptly provide NSD with copies of these
+mandatory procedures (and all replacements, supplements or
+revisions thereto in effect now or adopted in the future). The
+Chief and Deputy Chief of the Homeland Security Analysis Center
+and their Homeland Mission Coordinators shall maintain
+appropriate management controls (e.g., records of all tasking
+decisions, audit and review procedures) for access to the
+metadata.
+
+Ε. The NSA shall obtain the BR metadata from [REDACTED] via secure lines, and shall store and process the BR
+metadata on a secure internal network that NSA exclusively will
+operate.
+
+F. Any processing by technical personnel of the BR metadata
+acquired pursuant to this order shall be conducted through the
+NSA's secure internal network, which shall be accessible only to
+authorized personnel, using accounts authorized by a user
+authentication service, based on user login and password.
+
+G. Access to the metadata shall be controlled by user name
+and password. NSA'S SID Oversight and Compliance Office shall
+monitor the designation of individuals with access to the BR
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+11
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+metadata. When the BR metadata is accessed through queries
+under paragraphs (3)B or (3)C above, a software interface shall
+limit access to the BR metadata to authorized personnel, and the
+user's login, Internet Protocol (IP) address, date and time, and
+retrieval request shall be automatically logged for auditing
+capability.⁸ When the BR metadata is accessed through any other
+means under paragraph (3) B above, the user's login, date and
+time shall be automatically logged for auditing capability.
+NSA'S SID Office of Oversight and Compliance shall monitor the
+functioning of this automatic logging capability. All persons
+authorized for access to the BR metadata and other NSA personnel
+who are authorized to receive query results shall receive
+appropriate and adequate training concerning the authorization
+granted by this Order, the limited circumstances in which the BR
+metadata may be accessed, and/or other procedures and
+restrictions regarding the retrieval, storage, and dissemination
+of the metadata. NSA'S OGC shall ensure that such training is
+provided.
+
+⁸ In addition, the Court understands from the Declaration of
+Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander, Director of NSA (Ex. A to
+the Report of the United States filed in docket number BR 09-09
+on August 17, 2009) that NSA has made a number of technical
+modifications that will prohibit analysts: a) from inadvertently
+accessing the BR metadata in [REDACTED] b) from querying the BR
+metadata in [REDACTED] with non-RAS-approved identifiers; and c)
+from going beyond three "hops" from an identifier used to query
+the BR metadata in [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+12
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+H. NSA shall treat information from queries of the BR
+metadata in accordance with USSID 18 and shall apply USSID 18 to
+minimize and disseminate information concerning U.S. persons
+obtained from the records produced pursuant to the authorities
+granted herein. Additionally, before the NSA disseminates any
+U.S. person identifying information, the Chief of Information
+Sharing Services in the Signals Intelligence Directorate, the
+Senior Operations Officer at NSA's National Security Operations
+Center, the Signals Intelligence Directorate Director, the
+Deputy Director of the NSA, or the Director of the NSA must
+determine that the information identifying the U.S. person is in
+fact related to counterterrorism information and that it is
+necessary to understand the counterterrorism information or
+assess its importance. Notwithstanding the above requirements,
+NSA may share certain information, as appropriate, derived from
+the BR metadata, including U.S. person identifying information,
+with Executive Branch and Legislative Branch personnel in order
+to enable them to fulfill their lawful oversight functions, and,
+in the case of Executive Branch personnel, to enable them to
+determine whether the information contains exculpatory or
+impeachment information or is otherwise discoverable in legal
+proceedings. By 5:00p.m. each Friday following the
+authorization requested herein, the government shall file a
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+13
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+report listing each instance during the seven-day period ending
+the previous Friday in which NSA has shared, in any form,
+information obtained or derived from the BR metadata with anyone
+outside NSA. For each such instance, the government shall
+specify the date on which the information was shared, the
+recipient of the information, and the form in which the
+information was communicated (e.g., written report, e-mail, oral
+communication, etc.). For each such instance in which U.S.
+person information has been shared, except those involving
+Executive Branch personnel seeking to identify discoverable
+information, the Chief of Information Sharing Services in the
+Signals Intelligence Directorate shall certify that one of the
+authorized officials identified above determined, prior to
+dissemination, that the information was related to
+counterterrorism information and necessary to understand the
+counterterrorism information or to assess its importance. This
+paragraph's reporting requirement is not intended to apply to
+instances in which BR metadata and information derived therefrom
+is shared with Executive Branch or Legislative Branch personnel
+in order to facilitate their lawful oversight functions.
+
+I. Personnel authorized to query the BR metadata in
+paragraph (3)C above may use and share the results of authorized
+queries of the BR metadata among themselves and with NSA
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+14
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+personnel, including those who are not authorized to access the
+BR metadata pursuant to paragraph (3)C, provided that all NSA
+personnel receiving such query results in any form (except for
+information properly disseminated outside NSA) shall first
+receive appropriate and adequate training and guidance regarding
+the rules and restrictions governing the use, storage, and
+dissemination of such information. NSA'S SID Oversight and
+Compliance Office shall monitor the designation of individuals
+who have received the training and guidance necessary to receive
+the results of queries of the BR metadata.
+
+J. Authorized personnel also may use and share the identity
+of high-volume telephone identifiers [REDACTED] that they discover or have
+discovered as a result of access authorized under paragraphs
+(3)B and (3)C or as a result of technical personnel access under
+prior docket numbers in this matter, among themselves and with
+other NSA personnel, including those who are not authorized to
+access the BR metadata, for purposes of metadata reduction and
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+15
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+management. The training requirements set forth in paragraph
+(3) I above for NSA personnel receiving query results shall not
+apply to personnel receiving such identifiers, which may have
+been identified through queries, so long as they are received
+solely for purposes of metadata reduction and management.
+
+Κ. The BR metadata collected under this Court's Orders may
+be kept online (that is, accessible for queries) for five years
+from the date of acquisition, at which time it shall be
+destroyed.
+
+L. At least twice before the expiration of the authorities
+granted herein, NSA's OGC shall conduct a random spot check,
+consisting of an examination of a sample of call detail records
+obtained, to ensure that NSA is receiving only data as
+authorized by the Court and not receiving the substantive
+content of communications.
+
+M. At least twice before the expiration of the authorities
+granted herein, the Department of Justice's National Security
+Division (NSD) will review NSA's access to the BR metadata under
+paragraph (3) C above. Such reviews shall include a sample of
+the justifications designated approving officials relied upon to
+approve telephone identifiers for querying the BR metadata, and
+a review of the queries conducted.
+
+N. NSA'S OGC shall consult with NSD on all significant
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+16
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+legal opinions that relate to the interpretation, scope, and/or
+implementation of the authorizations granted by the Court in
+this matter. When operationally practicable, such consultation
+shall occur in advance; otherwise, NSD shall be notified as soon
+as practicable.
+
+O. NSA'S OGC shall promptly provide NSD with copies of all
+formal briefing and/or training materials (including all
+revisions thereto) currently in use or prepared and used in the
+future to brief/train NSA personnel concerning the
+authorizations granted by this Order.
+
+P. At least once before the expiration of the authorities
+granted herein, a meeting for the purpose of assessing
+compliance with this Court's orders in this matter shall be held
+with representatives from NSA'S OGC, NSD, and appropriate
+individuals from NSA's Signals Intelligence Directorate. The
+results of this meeting shall be reduced to writing and
+submitted to the Court as part of any application to renew or
+reinstate the authorities granted herein.
+
+Q. At least once before the expiration of the authorities
+granted herein, NSD shall meet with NSA's Office of Inspector
+General (OIG) to discuss their respective oversight
+responsibilities and assess NSA's compliance with the Court's
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+17
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+orders in this matter.
+
+R. Prior to implementation, all proposed automated query
+processes shall be reviewed and approved by NSA'S OGC, NSD, and
+the Court.
+
+S. Within forty-five days of the issuance of this Order,
+NSA shall file a report with the Court describing the queries
+made since end of the reporting period of the last report filed
+pursuant to the Court's order in docket number BR 10-17.
+Additionally, any application to renew or reinstate the
+authority granted herein shall include a report describing: (i)
+the queries made since the end of the reporting period of the
+last report filed with the Court; (ii) the manner in which NSA
+applied the procedures set forth in paragraph (3) C above; and
+(iii) any proposed changes in the way in which the call detail
+records would be received from the carriers and any significant
+changes to the systems NSA uses to receive, store, process, and
+disseminate BR metadata.
+
+-- Remainder of page left intentionally blank. --
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+18
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN-
+This authorization regarding [REDACTED] and unknown persons in the United States
+and abroad affiliated with [REDACTED] and unknown persons in the United States
+and abroad affiliated with [REDACTED] expires on the 29th day of October,
+2010, at 5:00 p.m., Eastern Time.
+
+08-04-2010 P05:07
+Signed
+Date Time
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+I, [REDACTED] Deputy Clerk,
+FISC, certify that this document
+is a true and correct copy of
+the original.
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+19
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_10-49/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_10-49/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fab31b8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_10-49/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+{
+ "title": "FISC Order BR 10-49",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Order of the FISC approving the Government. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2010-08-04",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Walton, Reggie B."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2014-01-17",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/fisc-order-br-10-49",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "4b28e3871bb25718482caa177434e17a853ef0c10da2b8d45f905e9865cde3ac",
+ "pages": 19
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_10-70/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_10-70.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_10-70/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_10-70.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d721bb4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_10-70/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_10-70.md
@@ -0,0 +1,390 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D. C.
+
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
+BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
+ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
+OF TANGIBLE THINGS FROM [REDACTED]
+(TS//NF)
+
+Docket Number: BR
+10 - 70
+
+PRIMARY ORDER
+
+A verified application having been made by the Director of the Federal Bureau of
+Investigation (FBI) for an order pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
+1978 (the Act), Title 50, United States Code (U.S.C.), § 1861, as amended, requiring the
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Derived from: Pleadings in the above-captioned docket
+Declassify on: 22 October 2035
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+production to the National Security Agency (NSA) of the tangible things described
+below, and full consideration having been given to the matters set forth therein, the
+Court finds as follows:
+
+1. There are reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are
+ relevant to authorized investigations (other than threat assessments) being conducted
+ by the FBI under guidelines approved by the Attorney General under Executive Order
+ 12333 to protect against international terrorism, which investigations are not being
+ conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment to the
+ Constitution of the United States. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)]
+
+2. The tangible things sought could be obtained with a subpoena duces tecum
+ issued by a court of the United States in aid of a grand jury investigation or with any
+ other order issued by a court of the United States directing the production of records or
+ tangible things. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)(D)]
+
+3. The application includes an enumeration of the minimization procedures the
+ government proposes to follow with regard to the tangible things sought. Such
+ procedures are similar to the minimization procedures approved and adopted as
+ binding by the order of this Court in Docket Number BR 10-49 and its predecessors. [50
+ U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+2
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Accordingly, the Court finds that the application of the United States to obtain
+the tangible things, as described below, satisfies the requirements of the Act and,
+therefore,
+
+IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to the authority conferred on this Court by
+the Act, that the application is GRANTED, and it is
+
+FURTHER ORDERED, as follows:
+
+(1)A. The Custodians of Records of [REDACTED] shall produce to NSA
+upon service of the appropriate secondary order, and continue production on an
+ongoing daily basis thereafter for the duration of this order, unless otherwise ordered
+by the Court, an electronic copy of the following tangible things: all call detail records
+or "telephony metadata"¹ created by [REDACTED]
+
+B. The Custodian of Records of [REDACTED] shall produce to NSA upon service of the
+appropriate secondary order, and continue production on an ongoing daily basis
+
+¹ For purposes of this Order “telephony metadata” includes comprehensive
+communications routing information (e.g., originating and terminating telephone
+number, International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) number, International Mobile
+station Equipment Identity (IMEI) number, etc.), trunk identifier, telephone calling card
+numbers, and time and duration of call. Telephony metadata does not include the
+substantive content of any communication, as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8), or the
+name, address, or financial information of a subscriber or customer.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+3
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+thereafter for the duration of this order, unless otherwise ordered by the Court, an
+electronic copy of the following tangible things: all call detail records or “telephony
+metadata” created by [REDACTED] for communications (i) between the United States and
+abroad; or (ii) wholly within the United States, including local telephone calls.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(2) With respect to any information the FBI receives as a result of this Order
+(information that disseminated to it by NSA), the FBI shall follow as minimization
+procedures the procedures set forth in The Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic
+FBI Operations (September 29, 2008).
+
+(3) With respect to the information that NSA receives as a result of this Order,
+NSA shall strictly adhere to the following minimization procedures:
+
+A. The government is hereby prohibited from accessing business record
+metadata acquired pursuant to this Court’s orders in the above-captioned docket and its
+predecessors (“BR metadata”) for any purpose except as described herein.
+
+B. NSA shall store and process the BR metadata in repositories within secure
+networks under NSA's control.² The BR metadata shall carry unique markings such
+
+²The Court understands that NSA will maintain the BR metadata in recovery back-up
+systems for mission assurance and continuity of operations purposes. NSA will ensure
+that any access or use of the BR metadata in the event of any natural disaster, man-
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+4
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+that software and other controls (including user authentication services) can restrict
+access to it to authorized personnel who have received appropriate and adequate
+training with regard to this authority. NSA shall restrict access to the BR metadata to
+authorized personnel who have received appropriate and adequate training.³
+
+Appropriately trained and authorized technical personnel may access the BR metadata
+to perform those processes needed to make it usable for intelligence analysis. Technical
+personnel may query the BR metadata using identifiers⁴ that have not been RAS-
+approved (described below) for those purposes described above, and may share the
+results of those queries with other authorized personnel responsible for these purposes,
+but the results of any such queries will not be used for intelligence analysis purposes.
+
+An authorized technician may query the BR metadata with a non-RAS-approved
+identifier to determine whether that identifier is a high volume identifier. If so, the
+technician may share the results of that query, i.e., the identifier and the fact that it is a
+[REDACTED]
+made emergency, attack, or other unforeseen event is in compliance with the Court’s
+Order.
+
+³ The Court understands that certain technical personnel, specifically the personnel
+responsible for NSA’s underlying corporate infrastructure and the transmission of the
+BR metadata from the specified persons to NSA, will not receive special training
+regarding the authority granted herein.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+5
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+high volume identifier, with authorized personnel (including those responsible for the
+identification and defeat of high volume and other unwanted BR metadata from any of
+NSA’s various metadata repositories), but may not share any other information from
+the results of that query for intelligence analysis purposes.
+
+C. NSA shall access the BR metadata for purposes of obtaining foreign
+intelligence information only through contact chaining queries of the BR metadata
+using identifiers approved as “seeds” pursuant to the RAS approval process described
+below, as described in the [REDACTED] Declaration at paragraph 17. NSA shall ensure,
+through adequate and appropriate technical and management controls, that queries of
+[REDACTED] for intelligence analysis purposes will be initiated using only an identifier
+that has been RAS-approved. Whenever the BR metadata is accessed for foreign
+intelligence analysis purposes or using foreign intelligence analysis query tools, an
+auditable record of the activity shall be generated.
+
+(i) Except as provided in subparagraph (ii) below, all identifiers to be
+used as “seeds” with which to query the BR metadata shall be approved by any
+of the following designated approving officials: the Chief or Deputy Chief,
+Homeland Security Analysis Center; or one of the twenty specially-authorized
+Homeland Mission Coordinators in the Analysis and Production Directorate of
+the Signals Intelligence Directorate. Such approval shall be given only after the
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+6
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+designated approving official has determined that based on the factual and
+practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent
+persons act, there are facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that
+the identifier to be queried is associated with [REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+7
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+provided, however, that NSA’s OGC shall first determine that any identifier
+reasonably believed to be used by a United States (U.S.) person is not regarded as
+associated with [REDACTED] solely on the basis of
+activities that are protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution.⁷
+
+(ii) Identifiers that are currently the subject of electronic surveillance
+authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) based on the
+FISC's finding of probable cause to believe that they are used by [REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED] including those used by U.S. persons, may be
+deemed approved for querying for the period of FISC-authorized electronic
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+⁷ The Court understands that from time to time the information available to designated
+approving officials will indicate that an identifier is or was associated with a Foreign
+Power only for a specific and limited time frame. In such cases, a designated approving
+may determine that the reasonable, articulable suspicion standard is met, but the time
+frame for which the identifier is or was associated with a Foreign Power will be
+specified so that analysts conducting queries using that identifier can properly
+minimize information that may be returned within query results that fall outside of that
+timeframe.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+8
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+surveillance without review and approval by a designated approving official.
+
+The preceding sentence shall not apply to identifiers under surveillance pursuant
+to any certification of the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney
+General pursuant to Section 702 of FISA, as added by the FISA Amendments Act
+of 2008, or pursuant to an Order of the FISC issued under Section 703 or Section
+704 of FISA, as added by the FISA Amendments Act of 2008.
+
+(iii) A determination by a designated approving official that an identifier
+is associated with [REDACTED] shall be effective for:
+one hundred eighty days for U.S. identifiers and for any identifiers believed to be
+used by a U.S. person; one year for all other identifiers.⁸
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+9
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+D. Results derived from any intelligence analysis queries of the BR metadata
+may be shared, prior to minimization, for intelligence analysis purposes among NSA
+analysts, subject to the requirement that all NSA personnel who receive query results in
+any form first receive appropriate and adequate training and gudiance regarding the
+procedures and restrictions for the handling and dissemination of such information.⁹
+NSA shall apply the minimization and dissemination requirements and procedures of
+Section 7 of United States Signals Intelligence Directive SP0018 (USSID 18) to any
+results from queries of the BR metadata disseminated outside of NSA in any form.
+Additionally, prior to disseminating any U.S. person information outside NSA, one of
+the officials listed in Section 7.3(c) of USSID 18 (i.e., the Director of NSA, the Deputy
+Director of NSA, or one of the officials listed in Section 7.3(c) of USSID 18 (i.e., the
+Director of the Signals Intelligence Directorate (SID), the Deputy Director of the SID, the
+Chief of the Information Sharing Services (ISS) office, the Deputy Chief of the ISS office,
+and the Senior Operation Officer of the National Security Operations Center) must
+determine that the information identifying the U.S. person is in fact related to
+counterterrorism information and that it is necessary to understand
+
+⁹ In addition, the Court understands that NSA may apply the full range of SIGINT
+analytic tradecraft to the results of intelligence analysis queries of the collected BR
+metadata.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+10
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+counterterrorism information or assess its importance.¹⁰ Notwithstanding the above
+requirements, NSA may share results derived from intelligence analysis queries of the
+BR metadata, including U.S. person identifying information, with Executive Branch
+personnel (1) in order to enable them to determine whether the information contains
+exculpatory or impeachment information or is otherwise discoverable in legal
+proceedings or (2) to facilitate their lawful oversight functions.
+
+E. BR metadata shall be destroyed no later than five years (60 months) after its
+initial collection.
+
+F. NSA and the National Security Division of the Department of Justice
+(NSD/DoJ) shall conduct oversight of NSA's activities under this authority as outlined
+below.
+
+(i) NSA's OGC and Office of the Director of Compliance (ODOC)
+shall ensure that personnel with access to the BR metadata receive appropriate
+and adequate training and guidance regarding the procedures and restrictions
+for collection, storage, analysis, dissemination, and retention of the BR metadata
+and the results of queries of the BR metadata. NSA's OGC and ODOC shall
+
+¹⁰ In the event the Government encounters circumstances that it believes necessitate the
+alteration of these dissemination procedures, it may obtain prospectively-applicable
+modifications to the procedures upon a determination by the Court that such
+modifications are appropriate under the circumstances and in light of the size and
+nature of this bulk collection.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+11
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+further ensure that all NSA personnel who receive query results in any form first
+receive appropriate and adequate training and guidance regarding the
+procedures and restrictions for the handling and dissemination of such
+information.¹¹ NSA shall maintain records of all such training. OGC shall
+provide NSD/DoJ with copies of all formal briefing and/or training materials
+(including all revisions thereto) used to brief/train NSA personnel concerning
+this authority.
+
+(ii) NSA's ODOC shall monitor the implementation and use of the
+software and other controls (including user authentication services) and the
+logging of auditable information referenced above.
+
+(iii) NSA's OGC shall consult with NSD/DoJ on all
+significant legal opinions that relate to the interpretation, scope, and/or
+implementation of this authority. When operationally practicable, such
+consultation shall occur in advance; otherwise NSD shall be notified as soon as
+practicable.
+
+¹¹ The nature of the training that is appropriate and adequate for a particular person will
+depend on the person's responsibilities and the circumstances of his access to the BR
+metadata or the information derived therefrom.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+12
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+(iv) At least once during the authorization period, NSA's OGC shall
+review a sample of call detail records obtained to ensure that NSA is receiving
+only data as authorized by the Court and not receiving the substantive content of
+communications.
+
+(v) At least once during the authorization period, NSA's OGC,
+ODOC, NSD/DoJ, and any other appropriate NSA representatives shall meet for
+the purpose of assessing compliance with the Court's orders. The results of this
+meeting shall be reduced to writing and submitted to the Court as part of any
+application to renew or reinstate the authority requested herein.
+
+(vi) At least once during the authorization period, NSD/DoJ shall
+meet with NSA's Office of the Inspector General to discuss their respective
+oversight responsibilities and assess NSA's compliance with the Court's orders.
+
+(vii) At least once during the authorization period, NSA's OGC and
+NSD/DoJ shall review a sample of the justifications for RAS approvals for
+identifiers used to query the BR metadata.
+
+(viii) Prior to implementation, all proposed automated query
+processes shall be reviewed and approved by NSA's OGC, NSD/DoJ, and the
+Court.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+13
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+G. Approximately every thirty days, NSA shall file with the Court a report that
+includes a discussion of the queries made since the last report and NSA's application of
+the RAS standard. In addition, should the United States seek renewal of the requested
+authority, NSA shall also include in its report a description of any significant changes
+proposed in the way in which the call detail records would be received from the
+Providers and any significant changes to the controls NSA has in place to receive, store,
+process, and disseminate the BR metadata.
+
+Each report shall include a statement of the number of instances since the
+preceding report in which NSA has shared, in any form, information derived from the
+BR metadata with anyone outside NSA. For each such instance in which United States
+person information has been shared, the report shall include NSA's attestation that one
+of the officials authorized to approve such disseminations determined, prior to
+dissemination, that the information was related to counterterrorism information and
+necessary to understand counterterrorism information or to assess its importance.
+
+-- Remainder of page left intentionally blank. --
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+14
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+This authorization regarding [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+expires on the 21st day
+of January, 2011, at 5:00 p.m., Eastern Time.
+
+10-29-2010 7:10:14 Eastern Time
+Signed Date Time
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+I, [REDACTED] Deputy Clerk,
+FISC, certify that this document
+is a true and correct copy of
+the original [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+15
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_10-70/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_10-70/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bf13e15
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_10-70/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+{
+ "title": "FISC Order BR 10-70",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Order of the FISC approving the Government. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2010-10-29",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Walton, Reggie B."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2014-01-17",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/fisc-order-br-10-70",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "466fce17ce9b8c15ae9864458888f39e6ae1df1b6bfb9450ea40cab4deadffb8",
+ "pages": 15
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_11-07/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_11-07.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_11-07/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_11-07.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..820280c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_11-07/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_11-07.md
@@ -0,0 +1,388 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D. C.
+
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
+BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
+ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
+OF TANGIBLE THINGS FROM
+[REDACTED]
+
+Docket Number: BR
+11 - 07
+
+PRIMARY ORDER
+
+A verified application having been made by the Director of the Federal Bureau of
+Investigation (FBI) for an order pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
+1978 (the Act), Title 50, United States Code (U.S.C.), § 1861, as amended, requiring the
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Derived from: Pleadings in the above-captioned docket
+Declassify on: 21 January 2036
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+production to the National Security Agency (NSA) of the tangible things described
+below, and full consideration having been given to the matters set forth therein, the
+Court finds as follows:
+
+1. There are reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are
+relevant to authorized investigations (other than threat assessments) being conducted
+by the FBI under guidelines approved by the Attorney General under Executive Order
+12333 to protect against international terrorism, which investigations are not being
+conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment to the
+Constitution of the United States. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)]
+
+2. The tangible things sought could be obtained with a subpoena duces tecum
+issued by a court of the United States in aid of a grand jury investigation or with any
+other order issued by a court of the United States directing the production of records or
+tangible things. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)(D)]
+
+3. The application includes an enumeration of the minimization procedures the
+government proposes to follow with regard to the tangible things sought. Such
+procedures are similar to the minimization procedures approved and adopted as
+binding by the order of this Court in Docket Number BR 10-70 and its predecessors. [50
+U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+2
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Accordingly, the Court finds that the application of the United States to obtain
+the tangible things, as described below, satisfies the requirements of the Act and,
+therefore,
+
+IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to the authority conferred on this Court by
+the Act, that the application is GRANTED, and it is
+
+FURTHER ORDERED, as follows:
+
+(1)A. The Custodians of Records of [REDACTED] shall produce to NSA
+upon service of the appropriate secondary order, and continue production on an
+ongoing daily basis thereafter for the duration of this order, unless otherwise ordered
+by the Court, an electronic copy of the following tangible things: all call detail records
+or “telephony metadata”1 created by [REDACTED]
+
+B. The Custodian of Records of [REDACTED] shall produce to NSA upon service of the
+appropriate secondary order, and continue production on an ongoing daily basis
+
+¹ For purposes of this Order “telephony metadata” includes comprehensive communications
+routing information (e.g., originating and terminating telephone number, International Mobile
+Subscriber Identity (IMSI) number, International Mobile station Equipment Identity (IMEI)
+number, etc.), trunk identifier, telephone calling card numbers, and time and duration of call.
+Telephony metadata does not include the substantive content of any communication, as defined
+by 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8), or the name, address, or financial information of a subscriber or
+customer.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+3
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+thereafter for the duration of this order, unless otherwise ordered by the Court, an
+electronic copy of the following tangible things: all call detail records or “telephony
+metadata” created [REDACTED] for communications (i) between the United States and
+abroad; or (ii) wholly within the United States, including local telephone calls.
+[REDACTED]
+
+(2) With respect to any information the FBI receives as a result of this Order
+(information that is disseminated to it by NSA), the FBI shall follow as minimization
+procedures the procedures set forth in The Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI
+Operations (September 29, 2008).
+
+(3) With respect to the information that NSA receives as a result of this Order,
+NSA shall strictly adhere to the following minimization procedures:
+
+A. The government is hereby prohibited from accessing business record
+metadata acquired pursuant to this Court’s orders in the above-captioned docket and its
+predecessors (“BR metadata”) for any purpose except as described herein.
+
+B. NSA shall store and process the BR metadata in repositories within secure
+networks under NSA’s control.² The BR metadata shall carry unique markings such
+
+² The Court understands that NSA will maintain the BR metadata in recovery back-up systems
+for mission assurance and continuity of operations purposes. NSA will ensure that any access
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+4
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+that software and other controls (including user authentication services) can restrict
+access to it to authorized personnel who have received appropriate and adequate
+training with regard to this authority. NSA shall restrict access to the BR metadata to
+authorized personnel who have received appropriate and adequate training.³
+Appropriately trained and authorized technical personnel may access the BR metadata
+to perform those processes needed to make it usable for intelligence analysis. Technical
+personnel may query the BR metadata using identifiers⁴ that have not been RAS-
+approved (described below) for those purposes described above, and may share the
+results of those queries with other authorized personnel responsible for these purposes,
+but the results of any such queries will not be used for intelligence analysis purposes.
+An authorized technician may query the BR metadata with a non-RAS-approved
+identifier to determine whether that identifier is a high volume identifier. If so, the
+technician may share the results of that query, i.e., the identifier and the fact that it is a
+
+or use of the BR metadata in the event of any natural disaster, man-made emergency, attack, or
+other unforeseen event is in compliance with the Court’s Order.
+³ The Court understands that certain technical personnel, specifically the personnel responsible
+for NSA’s underlying corporate infrastructure and the transmission of the BR metadata from
+the specified persons to NSA, will not receive special training regarding the authority granted
+herein.
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+5
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+high volume identifier, with authorized personnel (including those responsible for the
+identification and defeat of high volume and other unwanted BR metadata from any of
+NSA’s various metadata repositories), but may not share any other information from
+the results of that query for intelligence analysis purposes.
+
+C. NSA shall access the BR metadata for purposes of obtaining foreign
+intelligence information only through contact chaining queries of the BR metadata
+using identifiers approved as “seeds” pursuant to the RAS approval process described
+below, as described in the [REDACTED] Declaration at paragraph 17. NSA shall ensure,
+through adequate and appropriate technical and management controls, that queries of
+the BR metadata for intelligence analysis purposes will be initiated using only an
+identifier that has been RAS-approved. Whenever the BR metadata is accessed for
+foreign intelligence analysis purposes or using foreign intelligence analysis query tools,
+an auditable record of the activity shall be generated.
+
+(i) Except as provided in subparagraph (ii) below, all identifiers to be
+used as “seeds” with which to query the BR metadata shall be approved by any
+of the following designated approving officials: the Chief or Deputy Chief,
+Homeland Security Analysis Center; or one of the twenty specially-authorized
+Homeland Mission Coordinators in the Analysis and Production Directorate of
+the Signals Intelligence Directorate. Such approval shall be given only after the
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+6
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+designated approving official has determined that based on the factual and
+practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent
+persons act, there are facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that
+the identifier to be queried is associated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+7
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+provided, however, that NSA’s OGC shall first determine that any identifier
+reasonably believed to be used by a United States (U.S.) person is not regarded as
+associated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] solely on the basis of
+activities that are protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution.⁷
+
+(ii) Identifiers that are currently the subject of electronic surveillance
+authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) based on the
+FISC’s finding of probable cause to believe that they are used by [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] including those used by U.S. persons, may be
+[REDACTED]
+
+⁷ The Court understands that from time to time the information available to designated
+approving officials will indicate that an identifier is or was associated with a Foreign Power
+only for a specific and limited time frame. In such cases, a designated approving may
+determine that the reasonable, articulable suspicion standard is met, but for the time frame for
+which the identifier is or was associated with a Foreign Power will be specified so that analysts
+conducting queries using that identifier can properly minimize information that may be
+returned within query results that fall outside of that timeframe.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+8
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+deemed approved for querying for the period of FISC-authorized electronic
+surveillance without review and approval by a designated approving official.
+The preceding sentence shall not apply to identifiers under surveillance pursuant
+to any certification of the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney
+General pursuant to Section 702 of FISA, as added by the FISA Amendments Act
+of 2008, or pursuant to an Order of the FISC issued under Section 703 or Section
+704 of FISA, as added by the FISA Amendments Act of 2008.
+
+(iii) A determination by a designated approving official that an identifier
+is associated with [REDACTED] shall be effective for:
+one hundred eighty days for U.S. identifiers and for any identifiers believed to be
+used by a U.S. person; one year for all other identifiers.⁸
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+9
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+D. Results derived from any intelligence analysis queries of the BR metadata
+may be shared, prior to minimization, for intelligence analysis purposes among NSA
+analysts, subject to the requirement that all NSA personnel who receive query results in
+any form first receive appropriate and adequate training and guidance regarding the
+procedures and restrictions for the handling and dissemination of such information.⁹
+NSA shall apply the minimization and dissemination requirements and procedures of
+Section 7 of United States Signals Intelligence Directive SP0018 (USSID 18) to any
+results from queries of the BR metadata disseminated outside of NSA in any form.
+Additionally, prior to disseminating any U.S. person information outside NSA, the
+Director of NSA, the Deputy Director of NSA, or one of the officials listed in Section
+7.3(c) of USSID 18 (i.e., the Director of the Signals Intelligence Directorate (SID), the
+Deputy Director of the SID, the Chief of the Information Sharing Services (ISS) office,
+the Deputy Chief of the ISS office, and the Senior Operation Officer of the National
+Security Operations Center) must determine that the information identifying the U.S.
+person is in fact related to counterterrorism information and that it is necessary to
+understand the counterterrorism information or assess its importance.¹⁰
+
+⁹ In addition, the Court understands that NSA may apply the full range of SIGINT analytic
+tradecraft to the results of intelligence analysis queries of the collected BR metadata.
+¹⁰ In the event the Government encounters circumstances that it believes necessitate the
+alteration of these dissemination procedures, it may obtain prospectively-applicable
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+10
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Notwithstanding the above requirements, NSA may share results derived from
+intelligence analysis queries of the BR metadata, including U.S. person identifying
+information, with Executive Branch personnel (1) in order to enable them to determine
+whether the information contains exculpatory or impeachment information or is
+otherwise discoverable in legal proceedings or (2) to facilitate their lawful oversight
+functions.
+
+E. BR metadata shall be destroyed no later than five years (60 months) after its
+initial collection.
+
+F. NSA and the National Security Division of the Department of Justice
+(NSD/DoJ) shall conduct oversight of NSA's activities under this authority as outlined
+below.
+
+(i) NSA's OGC and Office of the Director of Compliance (ODOC)
+shall ensure that personnel with access to the BR metadata receive appropriate
+and adequate training and guidance regarding the procedures and restrictions
+for collection, storage, analysis, dissemination, and retention of the BR metadata
+and the results of queries of the BR metadata. NSA's OGC and ODOC shall
+further ensure that all NSA personnel who receive query results in any form first
+receive appropriate and adequate training and guidance regarding the
+modifications to the procedures upon a determination by the Court that such modifications are
+appropriate under the circumstances and in light of the size and nature of this bulk collection.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+11
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+procedures and restrictions for the handling and dissemination of such
+information. NSA shall maintain records of all such training.¹¹ OGC shall
+provide NSD/DoJ with copies of all formal briefing and/or training materials
+(including all revisions thereto) used to brief/train NSA personnel concerning
+this authority.
+
+(ii) NSA's ODOC shall monitor the implementation and use of the
+software and other controls (including user authentication services) and the
+logging of auditable information referenced above.
+
+(iii) NSA's OGC shall consult with NSD/DoJ on all
+significant legal opinions that relate to the interpretation, scope, and/or
+implementation of this authority. When operationally practicable, such
+consultation shall occur in advance; otherwise NSD shall be notified as soon as
+practicable.
+
+(iv) At least once during the authorization period, NSA's OGC,
+ODOC, NSD/DoJ, and any other appropriate NSA representatives shall meet for
+the purpose of assessing compliance with this Court's orders. Included in this
+meeting will be a review of a sample of the call detail records obtained to ensure
+
+¹¹ The nature of the training that is appropriate and adequate for a particular person will
+depend on the person's responsibilities and the circumstances of his access to the BR metadata
+or the information derived therefrom..
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+12
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+that only approved metadata is being acquired. The results of this meeting shall
+be reduced to writing and submitted to the Court as part of any application to
+renew or reinstate the authority requested herein.
+
+(v) At least once during the authorization period, NSD/DoJ shall
+meet with NSA's Office of the Inspector General to discuss their respective
+oversight responsibilities and assess NSA's compliance with the Court's orders.
+
+(vi) At least once during the authorization period, NSA's OGC and
+NSD/DoJ shall review a sample of the justifications for RAS approvals for
+identifiers used to query the BR metadata.
+
+(vii) Prior to implementation, all proposed automated query
+processes shall be reviewed and approved by NSA's OGC, NSD/DoJ, and the
+Court.
+
+G. Approximately every thirty days, NSA shall file with the Court a report that
+includes a discussion of the queries made since the last report and NSA's application of
+the RAS standard. In addition, should the United States seek renewal of the requested
+authority, NSA shall also include in its report a description of any significant changes
+proposed in the way in which the call detail records would be received from the
+Providers and any significant changes to the controls NSA has in place to receive, store,
+process, and disseminate the BR metadata.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+13
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Each report shall include a statement of the number of instances since the
+preceding report in which NSA has shared, in any form, information derived from the
+BR metadata with anyone outside NSA. For each such instance in which United States
+person information has been shared, the report shall include NSA's attestation that one
+of the officials authorized to approve such disseminations determined, prior to
+dissemination, that the information was related to counterterrorism information and
+necessary to understand counterterrorism information or to assess its importance.
+
+--- Remainder of page intentionally left blank. ---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+14
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+This authorization regarding [REDACTED]
+and unknown persons in the United States and abroad affiliated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] and unknown persons in the United States and abroad affiliated with
+[REDACTED] expires on the 15th day
+of April, 2011, at 5:00 p.m., Eastern Time.
+
+01-20-2011 P02:39
+Signed Eastern Time
+Date Time
+
+JOHN D. BATES
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+I, [REDACTED] Deputy Clerk,
+FISC, certify that this document
+is a true and correct copy of
+the original [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+15
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_11-07/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_11-07/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bbe88d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_11-07/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+{
+ "title": "FISC Order BR 11-07",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Order of the FISC approving the Government. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2011-01-20",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Bates, John D."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2014-01-17",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/fisc-order-br-11-07",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "55eecd20795db070a218acda47b15cd38045a6c1662a20ed34467610fb2e8ee8",
+ "pages": 15
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_11-107/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_11-107.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_11-107/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_11-107.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..589d5c3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_11-107/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_11-107.md
@@ -0,0 +1,386 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+UNITED STATES
+
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+WASHINGTON, D. C.
+
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
+BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
+ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
+OF TANGIBLE THINGS [REDACTED]
+
+Docket Number: BR
+11 - 107
+
+PRIMARY ORDER
+
+A verified application having been made by the Director of the Federal Bureau of
+Investigation (FBI) for an order pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
+1978 (the Act), Title 50, United States Code (U.S.C.), § 1861, as amended, requiring the
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Derived from: Pleadings in the above-captioned docket
+Declassify on: 24 June 2036
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+production to the National Security Agency (NSA) of the tangible things described
+below, and full consideration having been given to the matters set forth therein, the
+Court finds as follows:
+
+1. There are reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are
+relevant to authorized investigations (other than threat assessments) being conducted
+by the FBI under guidelines approved by the Attorney General under Executive Order
+12333 to protect against international terrorism, which investigations are not being
+conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment to the
+Constitution of the United States. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)]
+
+2. The tangible things sought could be obtained with a subpoena duces tecum
+issued by a court of the United States in aid of a grand jury investigation or with any
+other order issued by a court of the United States directing the production of records or
+tangible things. [50 U.S.C. § 1861 (c)(2)(D)]
+
+3. The application includes an enumeration of the minimization procedures the
+government proposes to follow with regard to the tangible things sought. Such
+procedures are similar to the minimization procedures approved and adopted as
+binding by the order of this Court in Docket Number BR 11-57 and its predecessors. [50
+U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+2
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Accordingly, the Court finds that the application of the United States to obtain
+the tangible things, as described below, satisfies the requirements of the Act and,
+therefore,
+IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to the authority conferred on this Court by
+the Act, that the application is GRANTED, and it is
+FURTHER ORDERED, as follows:
+(1)A. [REDACTED] shall produce to NSA
+upon service of the appropriate secondary order, and continue production on an
+ongoing daily basis thereafter for the duration of this order, unless otherwise ordered
+by the Court, an electronic copy of the following tangible things: all call detail records
+or "telephony metadata"¹
+B. [REDACTED] shall produce to NSA upon service of the
+appropriate secondary order, and continue production on an ongoing daily basis
+1 For purposes of this Order "telephony metadata" includes comprehensive communications
+routing information, including but not limited to session identifying information (e.g.,
+originating and terminating telephone number, International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI)
+number, International Mobile station Equipment Identity (IMEI) number, etc.), trunk identifier,
+telephone calling card numbers, and time and duration of call. Telephony metadata does not
+include the substantive content of any communication, as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8), or the
+name, address, or financial information of a subscriber or customer.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+3
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+thereafter for the duration of this order, unless otherwise ordered by the Court, an
+electronic copy of the following tangible things: all call detail records or "telephony
+metadata" created by [REDACTED] for communications (i) between the United States and
+abroad; or (ii) wholly within the United States, including local telephone calls.
+[REDACTED]
+
+(2) With respect to any information the FBI receives as a result of this Order
+(information that is disseminated to it by NSA), the FBI shall follow as minimization
+procedures the procedures set forth in The Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic FBI
+Operations (September 29, 2008).
+
+(3) With respect to the information that NSA receives as a result of this Order,
+NSA shall strictly adhere to the following minimization procedures:
+
+A. The government is hereby prohibited from accessing business record
+metadata acquired pursuant to this Court's orders in the above-captioned docket and its
+predecessors ("BR metadata") for any purpose except as described herein.
+
+B. NSA shall store and process the BR metadata in repositories within secure
+networks under NSA's control.² The BR metadata shall carry unique markings such
+
+² The Court understands that NSA will maintain the BR metadata in recovery back-up systems
+for mission assurance and continuity of operations purposes. NSA will ensure that any access
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+4
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+that software and other controls (including user authentication services) can restrict
+access to it to authorized personnel who have received appropriate and adequate
+training with regard to this authority. NSA shall restrict access to the BR metadata to
+authorized personnel who have received appropriate and adequate training.³
+Appropriately trained and authorized technical personnel may access the BR metadata
+to perform those processes needed to make it usable for intelligence analysis. Technical
+personnel may query the BR metadata using identifiers⁴ that have not been RAS-
+approved (described below) for those purposes described above, and may share the
+results of those queries with other authorized personnel responsible for these purposes,
+but the results of any such queries will not be used for intelligence analysis purposes.
+An authorized technician may query the BR metadata with a non-RAS-approved
+identifier to determine whether that identifier is a high volume identifier. If so, the
+technician may share the results of that query, i.e., the identifier and the fact that it is a
+
+or use of the BR metadata in the event of any natural disaster, man-made emergency, attack, or
+other unforeseen event is in compliance with the Court's Order.
+³ The Court understands that certain technical personnel, specifically the personnel responsible
+for NSA's underlying corporate infrastructure and the transmission of the BR metadata from
+the specified persons to NSA, will not receive special training regarding the authority granted
+herein.
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+5
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+high volume identifier, with authorized personnel (including those responsible for the
+identification and defeat of high volume and other unwanted BR metadata from any of
+NSA's various metadata repositories), but may not share any other information from
+the results of that query for intelligence analysis purposes.
+
+C. NSA shall access the BR metadata for purposes of obtaining foreign
+intelligence information only through contact chaining queries of the BR metadata
+using identifiers approved as "seeds" pursuant to the RAS approval process described
+below, and as described in the [REDACTED] Declaration at paragraph 17. NSA shall
+ensure, through adequate and appropriate technical and management controls, that
+queries of the BR metadata for intelligence analysis purposes will be initiated using
+only an identifier that has been RAS-approved. Whenever the BR metadata is accessed
+for foreign intelligence analysis purposes or using foreign intelligence analysis query
+tools, an auditable record of the activity shall be generated.
+
+(i) Except as provided in subparagraph (ii) below, all identifiers to be
+used as "seeds" with which to query the BR metadata shall be approved by any
+of the following designated approving officials: the Chief or Deputy Chief,
+Homeland Security Analysis Center; or one of the twenty specially-authorized
+Homeland Mission Coordinators in the Analysis and Production Directorate of
+the Signals Intelligence Directorate. Such approval shall be given only after the
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+6
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+designated approving official has determined that based on the factual and
+practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent
+persons act, there are facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that
+the identifier to be queried is associated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+7
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+provided, however, that NSA's OGC shall first determine that any identifier
+reasonably believed to be used by a United States (U.S.) person is not regarded as
+associated with [REDACTED] solely on the basis of
+activities that are protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution.
+
+(ii) Identifiers that are currently the subject of electronic surveillance
+authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) based on the
+FISC's finding of probable cause to believe that they are used by agents of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] including those used by U.S. persons, may be
+deemed approved for querying for the period of FISC-authorized electronic
+surveillance without review and approval by a designated approving official.
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+8
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+The preceding sentence shall not apply to identifiers under surveillance pursuant
+to any certification of the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney
+General pursuant to Section 702 of FISA, as added by the FISA Amendments Act
+of 2008, or pursuant to an Order of the FISC issued under Section 703 or Section
+704 of FISA, as added by the FISA Amendments Act of 2008.
+
+(iii) A determination by a designated approving official that an identifier
+is associated with [REDACTED] shall be effective for:
+one hundred eighty days for U.S. identifiers and for any identifiers believed to be
+used by a U.S. person; one year for all other identifiers.⁷⁸
+
+⁷ The Court understands that from time to time the information available to designated
+approving officials will indicate that an identifier is or was associated with a Foreign Power
+only for a specific and limited time frame. In such cases, a designated approving official may
+determine that the reasonable, articulable suspicion standard is met, but the time frame for
+which the identifier is or was associated with a Foreign Power will be specified so that analysts
+conducting queries using that identifier can properly minimize information that may be
+returned within query results that fall outside of that timeframe.
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+9
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+D. Results derived from any intelligence analysis queries of the BR metadata
+may be shared, prior to minimization, for intelligence analysis purposes among NSA
+analysts, subject to the requirement that all NSA personnel who receive query results in
+any form first receive appropriate and adequate training and guidance regarding the
+procedures and restrictions for the handling and dissemination of such information.⁹
+NSA shall apply the minimization and dissemination requirements and procedures of
+Section 7 of United States Signals Intelligence Directive SP0018 (USSID 18) issued on
+January 25, 2011, to any results from queries of the BR metadata disseminated outside
+of NSA in any form. Additionally, prior to disseminating any U.S. person information
+outside NSA, the Director of NSA, the Deputy Director of NSA, or one of the officials
+listed in Section 7.3(c) of USSID 18 (i.e., the Director of the Signals Intelligence
+Directorate (SID), the Deputy Director of the SID, the Chief of the Information Sharing
+Services (ISS) office, the Deputy Chief of the ISS office, and the Senior Operations
+Officer of the National Security Operations Center) must determine that the information
+identifying the U.S. person is in fact related to counterterrorism information and that it
+[REDACTED]
+
+⁹ In addition, the Court understands that NSA may apply the full range of SIGINT analytic
+tradecraft to the results of intelligence analysis queries of the collected BR metadata.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+10
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+is necessary to understand the counterterrorism information or assess its importance.¹⁰
+Notwithstanding the above requirements, NSA may share results derived from
+intelligence analysis queries of the BR metadata, including U.S. person identifying
+information, with Executive Branch personnel (1) in order to enable them to determine
+whether the information contains exculpatory or impeachment information or is
+otherwise discoverable in legal proceedings or (2) to facilitate their lawful oversight
+functions.
+
+E. BR metadata shall be destroyed no later than five years (60 months) after its
+initial collection.
+
+F. NSA and the National Security Division of the Department of Justice
+(NSD/DoJ) shall conduct oversight of NSA's activities under this authority as outlined
+below.
+
+(i)
+NSA's OGC and Office of the Director of Compliance (ODOC)
+shall ensure that personnel with access to the BR metadata receive appropriate
+and adequate training and guidance regarding the procedures and restrictions
+for collection, storage, analysis, dissemination, and retention of the BR metadata
+and the results of queries of the BR metadata. NSA's OGC and ODOC shall
+
+¹⁰ In the event the Government encounters circumstances that it believes necessitate the
+alteration of these dissemination procedures, it may obtain prospectively-applicable
+modifications to the procedures upon a determination by the Court that such modifications are
+appropriate under the circumstances and in light of the size and nature of this bulk collection.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+11
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+further ensure that all NSA personnel who receive query results in any form first
+receive appropriate and adequate training and guidance regarding the
+procedures and restrictions for the handling and dissemination of such
+information. NSA shall maintain records of all such training.¹¹ OGC shall
+provide NSD/DoJ with copies of all formal briefing and/or training materials
+(including all revisions thereto) used to brief/train NSA personnel concerning
+this authority.
+
+(ii)
+NSA's ODOC shall monitor the implementation and use of the
+software and other controls (including user authentication services) and the
+logging of auditable information referenced above.
+
+(iii)
+NSA's OGC shall consult with NSD/DoJ on all
+significant legal opinions that relate to the interpretation, scope, and/or
+implementation of this authority. When operationally practicable, such
+consultation shall occur in advance; otherwise NSD shall be notified as soon as
+practicable.
+
+(iv)
+At least once during the authorization period, NSA's OGC,
+ODOC, NSD/DoJ, and any other appropriate NSA representatives shall meet for
+
+¹¹ The nature of the training that is appropriate and adequate for a particular person will
+depend on the person's responsibilities and the circumstances of his access to the BR metadata
+or the information derived therefrom.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+12
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+the purpose of assessing compliance with this Court's orders. Included in this
+meeting will be a review of a sample of the call detail records obtained to ensure
+that only approved metadata is being acquired. The results of this meeting shall
+be reduced to writing and submitted to the Court as part of any application to
+renew or reinstate the authority requested herein.
+
+(v) At least once during the authorization period, NSD/DoJ shall
+meet with NSA's Office of the Inspector General to discuss their respective
+oversight responsibilities and assess NSA's compliance with the Court's orders.
+
+(vi) At least once during the authorization period, NSA's OGC and
+NSD/DoJ shall review a sample of the justifications for RAS approvals for
+identifiers used to query the BR metadata.
+
+(vii) Prior to implementation, all proposed automated query
+processes shall be reviewed and approved by NSA's OGC, NSD/DoJ, and the
+Court.
+
+G. Approximately every thirty days, NSA shall file with the Court a report that
+includes a discussion of the queries made since the last report and NSA's application of
+the RAS standard. In addition, should the United States seek renewal of the requested
+authority, NSA shall also include in its report a description of any significant changes
+proposed in the way in which the call detail records would be received from the
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+13
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Providers and any significant changes to the controls NSA has in place to receive, store,
+process, and disseminate the BR metadata.
+
+Each report shall include a statement of the number of instances since the
+preceding report in which NSA has shared, in any form, information derived from the
+BR metadata with anyone outside NSA. For each such instance in which United States
+person information has been shared, the report shall include NSA's attestation that one
+of the officials authorized to approve such disseminations determined, prior to
+dissemination, that the information was related to counterterrorism information and
+necessary to understand counterterrorism information or to assess its importance.
+
+-- Remainder of page intentionally left blank. --
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+14
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+This authorization regarding [REDACTED]
+and unknown persons in the United States and abroad affiliated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] and unknown persons in the United States and abroad affiliated with
+[REDACTED] expires on the 16th day
+of September, 2011, at 5:00 p.m., Eastern Time.
+
+Signed 06-22-2011 P05:26 Eastern Time
+Date Time
+
+JOHN D. BATES
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+[REDACTED] Deputy Clerk,
+FISC, certify that this document
+is a true and correct copy of
+the original [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+15
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_11-107/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_11-107/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..17797e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_11-107/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+{
+ "title": "FISC Order BR 11-107",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Order of the FISC approving the Government. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2011-06-22",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Bates, John D."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2014-01-17",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/fisc-order-br-11-107",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "705761f8d24791fb942ae390ca4da8e9f565f493e2d97ebe364592220d633cb8",
+ "pages": 15
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_11-57/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_11-57.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_11-57/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_11-57.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..48c3961
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_11-57/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_11-57.md
@@ -0,0 +1,357 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D. C.
+
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
+BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
+ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
+OF TANGIBLE THINGS FROM [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+(TS//NF)
+
+Docket Number: BR
+11-57
+
+PRIMARY ORDER
+
+A verified application having been made by the Director of the Federal Bureau of
+Investigation (FBI) for an order pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
+1978 (the Act), Title 50, United States Code (U.S.C.), § 1861, as amended, requiring the
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Derived from: Pleadings in the above-captioned docket
+Declassify on: 5 April 2036
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+production to the National Security Agency (NSA) of the tangible things described
+below, and full consideration having been given to the matters set forth therein, the
+Court finds as follows:
+
+1. There are reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are
+relevant to authorized investigations (other than threat assessments) being conducted
+by the FBI under guidelines approved by the Attorney General under Executive Order
+12333 to protect against international terrorism, which investigations are not being
+conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment to the
+Constitution of the United States. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)]
+
+2. The tangible things sought could be obtained with a subpoena duces tecum
+issued by a court of the United States in aid of a grand jury investigation or with any
+other order issued by a court of the United States directing the production of records or
+tangible things. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)(D)]
+
+3. The application includes an enumeration of the minimization procedures the
+government proposes to follow with regard to the tangible things sought. Such
+procedures are similar to the minimization procedures approved and adopted as
+binding by the order of this Court in Docket Number BR 11-07 and its predecessors. [50
+U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+2
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Accordingly, the Court finds that the application of the United States to obtain
+the tangible things, as described below, satisfies the requirements of the Act and,
+therefore,
+
+IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to the authority conferred on this Court by
+the Act, that the application is GRANTED, and it is
+
+FURTHER ORDERED, as follows:
+
+(1)A. The Custodians of Records [REDACTED] shall produce to NSA
+upon service of the appropriate secondary order, and continue production on an
+ongoing daily basis thereafter for the duration of this order, unless otherwise ordered
+by the Court, an electronic copy of the following tangible things: all call detail records
+or "telephony metadata"¹ created by [REDACTED]
+
+B. The Custodian of Records [REDACTED] shall produce to NSA upon service of the
+appropriate secondary order, and continue production on an ongoing daily basis
+
+¹ For purposes of this Order "telephony metadata" includes comprehensive communications
+routing information (e.g., originating and terminating telephone number, International Mobile
+Subscriber Identity (IMSI) number, International Mobile station Equipment Identity (IMEI)
+number, etc.), trunk identifier, telephone calling card numbers, and time and duration of call.
+Telephony metadata does not include the substantive content of any communication, as defined
+by 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8), or the name, address, or financial information of a subscriber or
+customer.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+3
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN-
+thereafter for the duration of this order, unless otherwise ordered by the Court, an
+electronic copy of the following tangible things: all call detail records or "telephony
+metadata" created [REDACTED] for communications (i) between the United States and
+abroad; or (ii) wholly within the United States, including local telephone calls.
+[REDACTED]
+
+(2) With respect to any information the FBI receives as a result of this Order
+(information that is disseminated to it by NSA), the FBI shall follow as minimization
+procedures the procedures set forth in *The Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic FBI
+Operations* (September 29, 2008).
+
+(3) With respect to the information that NSA receives as a result of this Order,
+NSA shall strictly adhere to the following minimization procedures:
+
+A. The government is hereby prohibited from accessing business record
+metadata acquired pursuant to this Court's orders in the above-captioned docket and its
+predecessors ("BR metadata") for any purpose except as described herein.
+
+B. NSA shall store and process the BR metadata in repositories within secure
+networks under NSA's control.² The BR metadata shall carry unique markings such
+
+² The Court understands that NSA will maintain the BR metadata in recovery back-up systems
+for mission assurance and continuity of operations purposes. NSA will ensure that any access
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+4
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+that software and other controls (including user authentication services) can restrict
+access to it to authorized personnel who have received appropriate and adequate
+training with regard to this authority. NSA shall restrict access to the BR metadata to
+authorized personnel who have received appropriate and adequate training.³
+Appropriately trained and authorized technical personnel may access the BR metadata
+to perform those processes needed to make it usable for intelligence analysis. Technical
+personnel may query the BR metadata using identifiers that have not been RAS-
+approved (described below) for those purposes described above, and may share the
+results of those queries with other authorized personnel responsible for these purposes,
+but the results of any such queries will not be used for intelligence analysis purposes.
+An authorized technician may query the BR metadata with a non-RAS-approved
+identifier to determine whether that identifier is a high volume identifier. If so, the
+technician may share the results of that query, i.e., the identifier and the fact that it is a
+or use of the BR metadata in the event of any natural disaster, man-made emergency, attack, or
+other unforeseen event is in compliance with the Court's Order.
+³ The Court understands that certain technical personnel, specifically the personnel responsible
+for NSA's underlying corporate infrastructure and the transmission of the BR metadata from
+the specified persons to NSA, will not receive special training regarding the authority granted
+herein.
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+5
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+high volume identifier, with authorized personnel (including those responsible for the
+identification and defeat of high volume and other unwanted BR metadata from any of
+NSA's various metadata repositories), but may not share any other information from
+the results of that query for intelligence analysis purposes.
+
+C. NSA shall access the BR metadata for purposes of obtaining foreign
+intelligence information only through contact chaining queries of the BR metadata
+using identifiers approved as "seeds" pursuant to the RAS approval process described
+below, as described in the [REDACTED] Declaration at paragraph 17. NSA shall ensure,
+through adequate and appropriate technical and management controls, that queries of
+the BR metadata for intelligence analysis purposes will be initiated using only an
+identifier that has been RAS-approved. Whenever the BR metadata is accessed for
+foreign intelligence analysis purposes or using foreign intelligence analysis query tools,
+an auditable record of the activity shall be generated.
+
+(i) Except as provided in subparagraph (ii) below, all identifiers to be
+used as "seeds" with which to query the BR metadata shall be approved by any
+of the following designated approving officials: the Chief or Deputy Chief,
+Homeland Security Analysis Center; or one of the twenty specially-authorized
+Homeland Mission Coordinators in the Analysis and Production Directorate of
+the Signals Intelligence Directorate. Such approval shall be given only after the
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+6
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+designated approving official has determined that based on the factual and
+practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent
+persons act, there are facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that
+the identifier to be queried is associated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+7
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+provided, however, that NSA's OGC shall first determine that any identifier
+reasonably believed to be used by a United States (U.S.) person is not regarded as
+associated with [REDACTED] solely on the basis of
+activities that are protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution.⁷
+
+(ii) Identifiers that are currently the subject of electronic surveillance
+authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) based on the
+FISC's finding of probable cause to believe that they are used by [REDACTED]
+including those used by U.S. persons, may be
+[REDACTED]
+
+⁷ The Court understands that from time to time the information available to designated
+approving officials will indicate that an identifier is or was associated with a Foreign Power
+only for a specific and limited time frame. In such cases, a designated approving official may
+determine that the reasonable, articulable suspicion standard is met, but the time frame for
+which the identifier is or was associated with a Foreign Power will be specified so that analysts
+conducting queries using that identifier can properly minimize information that may be
+returned within query results that fall outside of that timeframe.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+8
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+deemed approved for querying for the period of FISC-authorized electronic
+surveillance without review and approval by a designated approving official.
+The preceding sentence shall not apply to identifiers under surveillance pursuant
+to any certification of the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney
+General pursuant to Section 702 of FISA, as added by the FISA Amendments Act
+of 2008, or pursuant to an Order of the FISC issued under Section 703 or Section
+704 of FISA, as added by the FISA Amendments Act of 2008.
+
+(iii) A determination by a designated approving official that an identifier
+is associated with [REDACTED] shall be effective for:
+one hundred eighty days for U.S. identifiers and for any identifiers believed to be
+used by a U.S. person; one year for all other identifiers.⁸
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+9
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+D. Results derived from any intelligence analysis queries of the BR metadata
+may be shared, prior to minimization, for intelligence analysis purposes among NSA
+analysts, subject to the requirement that all NSA personnel who receive query results in
+any form first receive appropriate and adequate training and guidance regarding the
+procedures and restrictions for the handling and dissemination of such information.⁹
+NSA shall apply the minimization and dissemination requirements and procedures of
+Section 7 of United States Signals Intelligence Directive SP0018 (USSID 18) issued on
+January 25, 2011, to any results from queries of the BR metadata disseminated outside
+of NSA in any form. Additionally, prior to disseminating any U.S. person information
+outside NSA, the Director of NSA, the Deputy Director of NSA, or one of the officials
+listed in Section 7.3(c) of USSID 18 (i.e., the Director of the Signals Intelligence
+Directorate (SID), the Deputy Director of the SID, the Chief of the Information Sharing
+Services (ISS) office, the Deputy Chief of the ISS office, and the Senior Operations
+Officer of the National Security Operations Center) must determine that the information
+identifying the U.S. person is in fact related to counterterrorism information and that it
+is necessary to understand the counterterrorism information or assess its importance.¹⁰
+
+⁹ In addition, the Court understands that NSA may apply the full range of SIGINT analytic
+tradecraft to the results of intelligence analysis queries of the collected BR metadata.
+¹⁰ In the event the Government encounters circumstances that it believes necessitate the
+alteration of these dissemination procedures, it may obtain prospectively-applicable
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+10
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Notwithstanding the above requirements, NSA may share results derived from
+intelligence analysis queries of the BR metadata, including U.S. person identifying
+information, with Executive Branch personnel (1) in order to enable them to determine
+whether the information contains exculpatory or impeachment information or is
+otherwise discoverable in legal proceedings or (2) to facilitate their lawful oversight
+functions.
+
+E. BR metadata shall be destroyed no later than five years (60 months) after its
+initial collection.
+
+F. NSA and the National Security Division of the Department of Justice
+(NSD/DoJ) shall conduct oversight of NSA's activities under this authority as outlined
+below.
+
+(i) NSA's OGC and Office of the Director of Compliance (ODOC)
+shall ensure that personnel with access to the BR metadata receive appropriate
+and adequate training and guidance regarding the procedures and restrictions
+for collection, storage, analysis, dissemination, and retention of the BR metadata
+and the results of queries of the BR metadata. NSA's OGC and ODOC shall
+further ensure that all NSA personnel who receive query results in any form first
+receive appropriate and adequate training and guidance regarding the
+modifications to the procedures upon a determination by the Court that such modifications are
+appropriate under the circumstances and in light of the size and nature of this bulk collection.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+11
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN-
+procedures and restrictions for the handling and dissemination of such
+information. NSA shall maintain records of all such training.¹¹ OGC shall
+provide NSD/DoJ with copies of all formal briefing and/or training materials
+(including all revisions thereto) used to brief/train NSA personnel concerning
+this authority.
+
+(ii) NSA's ODOC shall monitor the implementation and use of the
+software and other controls (including user authentication services) and the
+logging of auditable information referenced above.
+
+(iii) NSA's OGC shall consult with NSD/DoJ on all
+significant legal opinions that relate to the interpretation, scope, and/or
+implementation of this authority. When operationally practicable, such
+consultation shall occur in advance; otherwise NSD shall be notified as soon as
+practicable.
+
+(iv) At least once during the authorization period, NSA's OGC,
+ODOC, NSD/DoJ, and any other appropriate NSA representatives shall meet for
+the purpose of assessing compliance with this Court's orders. Included in this
+meeting will be a review of a sample of the call detail records obtained to ensure
+
+¹¹ The nature of the training that is appropriate and adequate for a particular person will
+depend on the person's responsibilities and the circumstances of his access to the BR metadata
+or the information derived therefrom.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+12
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+that only approved metadata is being acquired. The results of this meeting shall
+be reduced to writing and submitted to the Court as part of any application to
+renew or reinstate the authority requested herein.
+
+(v) At least once during the authorization period, NSD/DoJ shall
+meet with NSA's Office of the Inspector General to discuss their respective
+oversight responsibilities and assess NSA's compliance with the Court's orders.
+
+(vi) At least once during the authorization period, NSA's OGC and
+NSD/DoJ shall review a sample of the justifications for RAS approvals for
+identifiers used to query the BR metadata.
+
+(vii) Prior to implementation, all proposed automated query
+processes shall be reviewed and approved by NSA's OGC, NSD/DoJ, and the
+Court.
+
+G. Approximately every thirty days, NSA shall file with the Court a report that
+includes a discussion of the queries made since the last report and NSA's application of
+the RAS standard. In addition, should the United States seek renewal of the requested
+authority, NSA shall also include in its report a description of any significant changes
+proposed in the way in which the call detail records would be received from the
+Providers and any significant changes to the controls NSA has in place to receive, store,
+process, and disseminate the BR metadata.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+13
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Each report shall include a statement of the number of instances since the
+preceding report in which NSA has shared, in any form, information derived from the
+BR metadata with anyone outside NSA. For each such instance in which United States
+person information has been shared, the report shall include NSA's attestation that one
+of the officials authorized to approve such disseminations determined, prior to
+dissemination, that the information was related to counterterrorism information and
+necessary to understand counterterrorism information or to assess its importance.
+
+-- Remainder of page intentionally left blank. --
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+14
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+This authorization regarding [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] expires on the 8th day
+of July, 2011, at 5:00 p.m., Eastern Time.
+
+Signed 04-13-2011 P03:44 Eastern Time
+Date Time
+
+MARTIN L. C. FELDMAN
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+[REDACTED] Deputy Clerk,
+FISC, certify that this document
+is a true correct copy of
+the original [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN-
+15
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_11-57/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_11-57/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5531c48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_11-57/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+{
+ "title": "FISC Order BR 11-57",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Order of the FISC approving the Government. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2011-04-13",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Feldman, Martin L.C."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2014-01-17",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/fisc-order-br-11-57",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "7e65e88877b425de2c5c20892cf2f37e0199c98aa1ca17e462f8f1a76f551a5b",
+ "pages": 15
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Supplemental_Order_BR_11-107/ACLU_-_FISC_Supplemental_Order_BR_11-107.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Supplemental_Order_BR_11-107/ACLU_-_FISC_Supplemental_Order_BR_11-107.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6355b91
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Supplemental_Order_BR_11-107/ACLU_-_FISC_Supplemental_Order_BR_11-107.md
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE
+FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+FOR AN ORDER REQUIRING THE
+PRODUCTION OF TANGIBLE THINGS
+FROM [REDACTED]
+
+Docket Number: BR 11-107
+
+SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER
+On this date, the Court issued a Primary Order granting the government's application in
+the above-captioned matter. Paragraph (3)G of the Primary Order requires the National Security
+Agency (NSA) to submit reports to the Court at intervals of approximately thirty days. It is
+hereby ORDERED that such reports, in addition to the elements described in Paragraph (3)G,
+shall include a discussion of NSA's consideration and, to the extent feasible, implementation of
+methods of purging the credit card information produced by [REDACTED] and described in letters
+submitted by the government on March 1, 2011, and April 13, 2011, in Docket Nos. BR 10-49
+and BR 10-70, as discussed in the Thirty Day Reports dated May 13, 2011, and June 10, 2011 in
+Docket No. BR 11-57, and as discussed at Tab B of the application in this docket.
+ENTERED this 22ND day of June, 2011.
+
+JOHN D. BATES
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+I, [REDACTED] Deputy Clerk,
+FISC, certify that this document
+is a true and correct copy of
+the original. [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Supplemental_Order_BR_11-107/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Supplemental_Order_BR_11-107/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c6325d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Supplemental_Order_BR_11-107/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+{
+ "title": "FISC Supplemental Order BR 11-107",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Supplemental Order ordering NSA reports to include a discussion of NSA. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2011-06-22",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Bates, John D."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2014-01-17",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/fisc-supplemental-order-br-11-107",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "53018d9e29147dbd249c27e4bd6c6fecc9a3af531a910b9c046f507ea05008b4",
+ "pages": 1
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Supplemental_Order_BR_11-57/ACLU_-_FISC_Supplemental_Order_BR_11-57.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Supplemental_Order_BR_11-57/ACLU_-_FISC_Supplemental_Order_BR_11-57.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..10b2e32
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Supplemental_Order_BR_11-57/ACLU_-_FISC_Supplemental_Order_BR_11-57.md
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+TOP SECRET/COMINT/NOFORN
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
+BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
+ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
+OF TANGIBLE THINGS [REDACTED]
+
+Docket No. BR 11-57
+
+SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER
+On this date, the Court issued a Primary Order granting the government's application in
+the above-captioned matter. Paragraph (3)G of the Primary Order requires the National Security
+Agency (NSA) to submit reports to the Court at intervals of approximately thirty days. It is
+hereby ORDERED that such reports, in addition to the elements described in Paragraph (3)G,
+shall include a discussion of NSA's consideration and, to the extent feasible, implementation of
+methods of purging the credit card information produced by [REDACTED] and described in letters
+submitted by the government on March 1, 2011, and April 13, 2011, in Docket Nos. BR 10-49
+and BR 10-70.
+
+Entered this 13th day of April, 2011.
+
+MARTIN L.C. FELDMAN
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+[REDACTED] Deputy Clerk,
+FISC, certify that this document
+is a true and correct copy of
+the original [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET/COMINT/NOFORN
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Supplemental_Order_BR_11-57/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Supplemental_Order_BR_11-57/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..05f6e47
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Supplemental_Order_BR_11-57/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+{
+ "title": "FISC Supplemental Order BR 11-57",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Supplemental Order ordering NSA reports to include a discussion of NSA. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2011-04-13",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Feldman, Martin L.C."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2014-01-17",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/fisc-supplemental-order-br-11-57",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "643065a28298efce92f9772b7e0da9a11893aacbce305b715083908a3bdb3161",
+ "pages": 1
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_Feb-_25_2009_NSA_Memorandum_on_Congressional_Notification_-_Incidents_of_Compliance/ACLU_-_Feb-_25_2009_NSA_Memorandum_on_Congressional_Notification_-_Incidents_of_Compliance.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_Feb-_25_2009_NSA_Memorandum_on_Congressional_Notification_-_Incidents_of_Compliance/ACLU_-_Feb-_25_2009_NSA_Memorandum_on_Congressional_Notification_-_Incidents_of_Compliance.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..38a8b29
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_Feb-_25_2009_NSA_Memorandum_on_Congressional_Notification_-_Incidents_of_Compliance/ACLU_-_Feb-_25_2009_NSA_Memorandum_on_Congressional_Notification_-_Incidents_of_Compliance.md
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000
+
+Serial: GC/009/09
+25 February 2009
+
+MEMORANDUM FOR STAFF DIRECTOR, HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
+
+SUBJECT: (U) Congressional Notification - Incidents of Noncompliance - Information Memorandum
+
+(U) The purpose of this correspondence is to notify the Committee of compliance matters that are currently under review by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and which relate to subjects of prior testimony to the Congress.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Under two separate sets of orders issued by the Court pursuant to Sections 1841 and 1861 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended ("FISA"), the National Security Agency ("NSA" or "Agency") receives telephony and electronic communications metadata in order to produce foreign intelligence related to the activities of [REDACTED] the [REDACTED] On 15 January 2009, the Department of Justice ("DoJ") notified the Court that an automated alert process NSA used to compare the telephony metadata against a list of telephone identifiers that were of foreign intelligence interest to NSA's counterterrorism personnel did not operate in conformity with the Court's orders. The Government also advised the Court that NSA had incorrectly described the alert process in prior reports to the Court. As part of a comprehensive review ordered by the Director of NSA, the Agency identified another automated process used to query the telephony metadata that also did not operate in conformity with the Court's orders. The review also identified some manually entered queries that were noncompliant with the Court's orders. None of the compliance incidents resulted in the dissemination of any reporting from NSA to any other department or agency. Upon discovery of these compliance incidents, NSA immediately made changes to its processes to ensure that the Agency is handling and querying the telephony metadata in accordance with the Court's orders. The corrective measures include implementation of controls that prevent any automated process from querying the telephony metadata NSA receives pursuant to the Court's orders and which also guard against manual querying errors.
+
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20070108
+Declassify On: ~~20320108~~
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In response to the Government's compliance notice, on 28 January 2009, the Court directed the Government to file a brief and supporting documentation describing how the compliance and misreporting incidents occurred so the Court can determine what remedial action, if any, is warranted. Since the Court was aware that there are similarities between NSA's processing of telephony metadata and electronic communications metadata under separate orders, the Court also directed the Government to determine whether NSA has been processing the electronic communications metadata in accordance with the terms of the Court's orders for this category of material. As part of this review, the Government concluded that NSA was processing the electronic communications metadata in accordance with the terms of the Court's orders, with one exception. The review identified one particular process that the Government concluded was not in conformity with the Court's order. NSA had employed the process in a small number of cases to approve queries against the electronic communications metadata. Although the Agency had previously reported the process to the Court [REDACTED] this process, too, has been discontinued.
+
+(S) NSA and DoJ have already identified a number of steps designed to improve the Agency's ability to comply with the relevant orders and implementation of these changes has begun. Also, in addition to notifying the Court, the Government has notified a number of senior Executive Branch officials about these compliance matters. Officials who have received such notification include the President's Intelligence Oversight Board, the Director of National Intelligence, NSA's Inspector General, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. My office is also prepared to brief the Committee on these matters at the Committee's convenience.
+
+(U) Should you have any questions, please contact Jonathan E. Miller, Associate Director of Legislative Affairs, at [REDACTED]
+
+VITO T. POTENZA
+General Counsel
+
+Copy Furnished:
+Minority Staff Director, House Permanent
+Select Committee on Intelligence
+
+2
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_Feb-_25_2009_NSA_Memorandum_on_Congressional_Notification_-_Incidents_of_Compliance/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_Feb-_25_2009_NSA_Memorandum_on_Congressional_Notification_-_Incidents_of_Compliance/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a2c9245
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_Feb-_25_2009_NSA_Memorandum_on_Congressional_Notification_-_Incidents_of_Compliance/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+{
+ "title": "NSA Memo: Congressional Notification & Incidents of Compliance",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2009-02-25",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Potenza, Vito T."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-10-28",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/february-25-2009-nsa-memo-congressional-notification-incidents-compliance",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "db2f643d96fd99b73073fce200b5fcb5f91b0b557fa8bb4d38a732cb9ba0264c",
+ "pages": 2
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_General_Alexander_Letter_re_NSA_Fact_Sheet_Inaccuracy/ACLU_-_General_Alexander_Letter_re_NSA_Fact_Sheet_Inaccuracy.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_General_Alexander_Letter_re_NSA_Fact_Sheet_Inaccuracy/ACLU_-_General_Alexander_Letter_re_NSA_Fact_Sheet_Inaccuracy.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..02c2df7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_General_Alexander_Letter_re_NSA_Fact_Sheet_Inaccuracy/ACLU_-_General_Alexander_Letter_re_NSA_Fact_Sheet_Inaccuracy.md
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+DEPATMENT OF DEFENSE
+
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
+FORT GEORGE G. MEADE MARYLAND 20755-8000
+
+25 June 2013
+
+The Honorable Ron Wyden
+United States Senate
+221 Dirksen Senate Office Building
+Washington, DC 20510
+
+The Honorable Mark Udall
+United States Senate
+328 Hart Senate Office Building
+Washington, DC 20510
+
+Dear Senators Wyden and Udall:
+
+Thank you for your letter dated 24 June 2013. After reviewing your letter, I agree that
+the fact sheet that the National Security Agency posted on its website on 18 June 2013 could
+have more precisely described the requirements for collection under Section 702 of the FISA
+Amendments Act. This statute allows for "the targeting of persons reasonably believed to be
+located outside the United States to acquire foreign intelligence information." 50 U.S.C.
+1881(a). The statute provides several express limitations, namely that such acquisition:
+
+(1) may not intentionally target any person known at the time of acquisition to be located
+in the United States;
+
+(2) may not intentionally target a person reasonably believed to be located outside the
+United States if the purpose of such acquisition is to target a particular, known person
+reasonably believed to be in the United States;
+
+(3) may not intentionally target a United States person reasonably believed to be located
+outside the United States;
+
+(4) may not intentionally acquire any communication as to which the sender and all
+intended recipients are known at the time of acquisition to be located in the United
+States; and
+
+(5) shall be conducted in a manner consistent with the fourth amendment to the
+Constitution of the United States. 50 U.S.C. 1881(b).
+
+With respect to the second point raised in your 24 June 2013 letter, the fact sheet did not
+imply nor was it intended to imply "that NSA has the ability to determine how many American
+communications it has collected under section 702, or that the law does not allow the NSA to
+deliberately search for the records of particular Americans." As you correctly state, this point
+has been addressed publicly. I refer you to unclassified correspondence from the Director of
+National Intelligence dated 26 July 2012 and 24 August 2012.
+
+NSA continues to support the effort led by the Office of the Director of National
+Intelligence and the Department of Justice to make publicly available as much information as
+possible about recently disclosed intelligence programs, consistent with the need to protect
+national security and sensitive sources and methods.
+
+KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+General, U.S. Army
+Director, NSA/Chief, CSS
+
+Copies Furnished:
+
+The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
+Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence
+
+The Honorable Saxby Chambliss
+Vice Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_General_Alexander_Letter_re_NSA_Fact_Sheet_Inaccuracy/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_General_Alexander_Letter_re_NSA_Fact_Sheet_Inaccuracy/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4bc5f57
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_General_Alexander_Letter_re_NSA_Fact_Sheet_Inaccuracy/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+{
+ "title": "General Alexander Letter re NSA Fact Sheet Inaccuracy",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "A letter from General Alexander responding to Senators Wyden and Udall about the NSA's Section 702 fact sheet inaccuracy. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2013-06-25",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Wyden, Ron",
+ "Udall, Mark",
+ "Alexander, Keith B.",
+ "Feinstein, Dianne",
+ "Chambliss, Saxby"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-06-25",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/general-alexander-letter-re-nsa-fact-sheet-inaccuracy-2",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "a0f3918659098ccaacd0010176a2be3efe40b90c855cbae36cd5aa15bad32696",
+ "pages": 2
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_January_25_2011_United_States_Signals_Intelligence_Directive_18/ACLU_-_January_25_2011_United_States_Signals_Intelligence_Directive_18.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_January_25_2011_United_States_Signals_Intelligence_Directive_18/ACLU_-_January_25_2011_United_States_Signals_Intelligence_Directive_18.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..56e69f5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_January_25_2011_United_States_Signals_Intelligence_Directive_18/ACLU_-_January_25_2011_United_States_Signals_Intelligence_Directive_18.md
@@ -0,0 +1,1252 @@
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+# UNITED STATES SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE
+
+# USSID SP0018
+## (U) LEGAL COMPLIANCE AND U.S. PERSONS MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES
+
+**ISSUE DATE:** 25 January 2011
+**REVISED DATE:**
+
+## (U) OFFICE OF PRIMARY CONCERN (OPC)
+National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS),
+Signals Intelligence Directorate (SID), Office of General Counsel
+
+## (U) LETTER OF PROMULGATION, ADMINISTRATION, AND AUTHORIZATION
+
+**(U) Topic of Promulgation**
+(U) USSID SP0018 prescribes policies and procedures and assigns responsibilities to ensure that the missions and functions of the United States SIGINT System (USSS) are conducted in a manner that safeguards the constitutional rights of U.S. persons. This USSID delineates and promulgates the USSS minimization policy and procedures required to protect the privacy
+
+Approved for release by the
+National Security Agency on
+13 November 2013, FOIA
+Case #71241
+
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20070108
+Declassify On: 20370601
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+rights of U.S. persons.
+
+**(U) USSID Edition**
+(U) This USSID supersedes USSID SP0018, dated 27 July 1993, which must now be destroyed.
+
+**(U) Legal Protection of Sensitive Information**
+(U//FOUO) This USSID contains sensitive information that is legally protected from public disclosure and is to be used only for official purposes of National Security Agency/Central Security Services (NSA/CSS).
+
+**(U) Handling of USSID**
+(U//FOUO) Users must strictly adhere to all classification and handling restrictions (see NSA/CSS Classification Manual 1-52) when:
+* (U) storing hard or soft copies of this USSID, or
+* (U) hyperlinking to this USSID.
+
+(U) Users are responsible for the update and management of this USSID when it is stored locally.
+
+**(U) Location of Official USSID**
+(U//FOUO) The SIGINT Policy System Manager will maintain and update the current official USSID on NSANet. As warranted, the USSID will be available on INTELINK.
+
+**(U) Access by Contractors and Consultants**
+(U) For NSA elements to include the SIGINT Extended Enterprise:
+(U//FOUO) USSS contractors or consultants assigned to NSA/CSS Headquarters or to other elements of the SIGINT Extended Enterprise are pre-authorized for access to USSIDs via NSANet, Intelink, or in hard-copy formats as needed to perform their jobs. However, for those sensitive USSIDs for which access is password-controlled, all users, to include contractors, must undergo additional security and mission vetting.
+
+(U) Outside NSA elements:
+(U//FOUO) Non-USSS contractors or consultants working at external facilities are pre-authorized for soft-copy access to USSIDs via NSANet or in selected cases, via INTELINK, if connectivity to those systems is allowed by the contractor's NSA/CSS sponsor. Where such connectivity is not established, any hard-copy provision of USSIDs must be authorized by the SIGINT Policy System Manager (NSTS: 966-5487, STE: [REDACTED] DSN: [REDACTED]) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
+
+**(U) Access by Third Party**
+(U) This USSID is not releasable to any Third Party partner.
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+**Partners**
+(U) If a shareable version of this USSID is requested:
+* (U) refer to USSID SP0002. Annex B, and
+* (U) contact the appropriate Country Desk Officer in the Foreign Affairs Directorate.
+
+**(U) Executive Agent**
+(U) The Executive Agent for this USSID is:
+
+//s//
+ΚΕΙΤΗ Β. ALEXANDER
+General, U. S. Army
+Director, NSA/Chief, CSS
+
+## (U) TABLE OF CONTENTS
+
+**(U) Sections**
+SECTION 1- (U) PREFACE
+SECTION 2 - (U) REFERENCES
+SECTION 3 - (U) POLICY
+SECTION 4 - (U) COLLECTION
+SECTION 5 - (U) PROCESSING
+SECTION 6 - (U) RETENTION
+SECTION 7 - (U) DISSEMINATION
+SECTION 8 - (U) RESPONSIBILITIES
+SECTION 9 - (U) DEFINITIONS
+
+**(U) Annexes and Appendices**
+ANNEX A - (U) PROCEDURES IMPLEMENTING TITLE I OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
+APPENDIX 1- (U//FOUO STANDARD MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES FOR ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE CONDUCTED BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA)
+ANNEX B - (U) OPERATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+ANNEX C- (U) SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO U.S. AND ALLIED MILITARY EXERCISE COMMAND AUTHORITIES
+
+ANNEX D- (U) TESTING OF ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT
+
+ANNEX E - (U) SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS
+
+ANNEX F - (U) ILLICIT COMMUNICATIONS
+
+ANNEX G- (U) TRAINING OF PERSONNEL IN THE OPERATION AND USE OF SIGINT COLLECTION AND OTHER SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT
+
+ANNEX H - (U) CONSENT FORMS
+
+ANNEX I - (U) FORM FOR CERTIFICATION OF OPENLY ACKNOWLEDGED ENTITIES
+
+ANNEX J-(S//REL) PROCEDURES FOR MONITORING RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF SUSPECTED INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS (Issued Separately)
+
+ANNEX K-(S/REL) [REDACTED] (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i) (b)(3)-18 USC 798
+
+## SECTION 1 - (U) PREFACE
+
+**(U) Fourth Amendment Protections**
+1.1. (U) The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects all U.S. persons anywhere in the world and all persons within the United States from unreasonable searches and seizures by any person or agency acting on behalf of the U.S. Government. The Supreme Court has ruled that the interception of electronic communications is a search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. It is therefore mandatory that signals intelligence (SIGINT) operations be conducted pursuant to procedures which meet the reasonableness requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
+
+**(U) Balancing Foreign Intelligence Need and Privacy Interest**
+1.2. (U) In determining whether United States SIGINT System (USSS) operations are "reasonable," it is necessary to balance the U.S. Government's need for foreign intelligence information and the privacy interests of persons protected by the Fourth Amendment. Striking that balance has consumed much time and effort by all branches of the United States Government. The results of that effort are reflected in the references listed in Section 2 below. Together, these references require the minimization of U.S. person information collected, processed, retained or disseminated by the USSS. The purpose of this document
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+is to implement these minimization requirements.
+
+1.3. (U) Several themes run throughout this USSID. The most important is that intelligence operations and the protection of constitutional rights are not incompatible. It is not necessary to deny legitimate foreign intelligence collection or suppress legitimate foreign intelligence information to protect the Fourth Amendment rights of U.S. persons.
+
+**(U) Minimization of U.S. Person Information**
+1.4. (U) These minimization procedures implement the constitutional principle of "reasonableness" by giving different categories of individuals and entities different levels of protection. These levels range from the stringent protection accorded U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens in the United States to provisions relating to foreign diplomats in the U.S. These differences reflect yet another main theme of these procedures, that is, that the focus of all foreign intelligence operations is on foreign entities and persons.
+
+**(U) Oversight Functions**
+1.5. (U) Nothing in these procedures shall restrict the performance of lawful compliance or oversight functions over the USSS.
+
+## SECTION 2 - (U) REFERENCES
+
+**(U) References**
+2.1 (U) The following documents are references to this USSID:
+* (U) 50 U.S.C. 1801, et seq., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, as amended.
+* (U) Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," as amended 30 July 2008.
+* (U) (U) DoD Directive 5240.01, "DoD Intelligence Activities," dated 27 August 2007.
+* (U) NSA/CSS Policy No. 1-23, "Procedures Governing NSA/CSS Activities that affect U.S. Persons," as revised 29 May 2009.
+* (U) DoD Regulation 5240.1-R, "Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Person," dated December 1982.
+
+## SECTION 3 - (U) POLICY
+
+**(U) Policy and the USSS Foreign Communications Mission**
+3.1. (U) The policy of the USSS is to TARGET or COLLECT only FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS.* The USSS will not intentionally COLLECT
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+communications to, from or about U.S. PERSONS or persons or entities in the U.S. except as set forth in this USSID. If the USSS inadvertently COLLECTS such communications, it will process, retain and disseminate them only in accordance with this USSID.
+
+* (U) Capitalized words in Sections 3 through 9 are defined terms in Section 9.
+
+## SECTION 4 - (U) COLLECTION
+
+**(U) Collection**
+4.1. (S//SI//REL) Communications which are known to be to, from or about a U.S. PERSON [REDACTED] (b)(1) be intentionally intercepted, or selected through the use of a SELECTION TERM, except in the following instances:
+
+a. (U//FOUO) With the approval of the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court either under the conditions outlined in Annex A of this USSID or as permitted by other FISA authorities.
+
+b. (U) With the approval of the Attorney General of the United States, if:
+
+(1) (U) The COLLECTION is directed against the following:
+(a) (U//FOUO) Communications to or from U.S. PERSONS outside the UNITED STATES if such persons have been approved for targeting in accordance with the terms of FISA (e.g., the targeted U.S. PERSON is the subject of an order or authorization issued pursuant to Sections 105, 703, 704, or 705(b) of FISA), or
+(b) (S//SI//REL) International communications to, from, [REDACTED] (b)(1)
+(c) (U//FOUO) Communications which are not to or from but merely about U.S. PERSONS (wherever located).
+
+(2) (U) The person is an AGENT OF A FOREIGN POWER, and
+(3) (U) The purpose of the COLLECTION is to acquire significant FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE information.
+
+c. (U//FOUO) With the approval of the Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service (DIRNSA/CHCSS), so long as the COLLECTION need not be approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Attorney General, and
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+(1) (U//FOUO) The person has CONSENTED to the COLLECTION by executing one of the CONSENT forms contained in Annex H, or
+(2) (U//FOUO) The person is reasonably believed to be held captive by a FOREIGN POWER or group engaged in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, or
+(3) (S/REL) The TARGETED [REDACTED] (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i) (b)(3)-18 USC 798 and the DIRNSA/CHCSS has approved the COLLECTION in accordance with Annex I, or
+(4) (S//SI//REL) The COLLECTION is directed against [REDACTED] between a U.S. PERSON in the UNITED STATES and a foreign entity outside the UNITED STATES, the TARGET is the foreign entity, and the DIRNSA/CHCSS has approved the COLLECTION in accordance with Annex K. or
+(5) (S//SI//REL) Technical devices (e.g. [REDACTED] are employed to limit acquisition by the USSS to communications to or from the TARGET or to specific forms of communications used by the TARGET (e.g.. [REDACTED] and the COLLECTION is directed against [REDACTED] voice and facsimile communications with one COMMUNICANT in the UNITED STATES, and the TARGET of the COLLECTION is [REDACTED] (b)(1)
+(a) A non-U.S. PERSON located outside the UNITED STATES [REDACTED]
+(b) [REDACTED]
+(6) (U//FOUO) Copies of approvals granted by the DIRNSA/CHCSS under these provisions will be retained in the Office of General Counsel for review by the Attorney General.
+
+d. (U) Emergency Situations.
+(1) (U//FOUO) Unless separate authorization under FISA is required by law, 1 in emergency situations DIRNSA/CHCSS may
+
+1 (U//FOUO) Collection that constitutes "electronic surveillance" as defined by FISA can only be authorized in accordance with the terms of FISA. Under certain circumstances, the Attorney General may authorize emergency collection that constitutes "electronic surveillance" under FISA. For purposes of FISA, the term
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+authorize the COLLECTION of information to, from, or about a U.S. PERSON who is outside the UNITED STATES when securing the prior approval of the Attorney General is not practical because:
+(a) (U) The time required to obtain such approval would result in the loss of significant FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE and would cause substantial harm to the national security.
+(b) (U) A person's life or physical safety is reasonably believed to be in immediate danger.
+(c) (U) The physical security of a defense installation or government property is reasonably believed to be in immediate danger.
+
+(2) (U//FOUO) In those cases where the DIRNSA/CHCSS authorizes emergency COLLECTION, except for actions taken under paragraph d.(1)(b) above, DIRNSA/CHCSS shall find that there is probable cause that the TARGET meets one of the following criteria:
+(a) (U) A person who, for or on behalf of a FOREIGN POWER, is engaged in clandestine intelligence activities (including covert activities intended to affect the political or governmental process), sabotage, or INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST activities, or activities in preparation for INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST activities; or who conspires with, or knowingly aids and
+
+"electronic surveillance" encompasses 1) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device the contents of any wire or radio communications sent by or intended to be received by a particular, known, United States person if the contents are acquired by intentionally targeting the U.S. person under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes, absent the U.S. person's express or implied consent; 2) the acquisition by electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any wire communication to or from a person in the United States, without the consent of any party thereto, if such acquisition occurs in the United States, but does not include those communications of computer trespassers that would be permissible under section 2511(2)(i) of title 18 of the United States Code; 3) the intentional acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any radio communication, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required if the acquisition were undertaken for law enforcement purposes, and if both the sender and all intended recipients are located inside the United States; or 4) the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device in the United States for monitoring to acquire information, other than from a wire or radio communication, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required if the acquisition were undertaken for law enforcement purposes.
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+abets a person engaging in such activities.
+(b) (U) A person who is an officer or employee of a FOREIGN POWER.
+(c) (U) A person unlawfully acting for, or pursuant to the direction of, a FOREIGN POWER. The mere fact that a person's activities may benefit or further the aims of a FOREIGN POWER is not enough to bring that person under this subsection, absent evidence that the person is taking direction from, or acting in knowing concert with, the FOREIGN POWER.
+(d) (U) A CORPORATION or other entity that is owned or controlled directly or indirectly by a FOREIGN POWER.
+(e) (U) A person in contact with, or acting in collaboration with, an intelligence or security service of a foreign power for the purpose of providing access to information or material classified by the United States to which such person has access.
+
+(3) (U) In all cases where emergency collection is authorized, the following steps shall be taken:
+(a) (U//FOUO) The General Counsel will be notified immediately that the COLLECTION has started.
+(b) (U//FOUO) The General Counsel will initiate immediate efforts to obtain Attorney General approval to continue the collection. If Attorney General approval is not obtained within 72 hours, the COLLECTION will be terminated. If the Attorney General approves the COLLECTION, it may continue for the period specified in the approval.
+
+e. (U//FOUO) Annual reports to the Attorney General are required for COLLECTION conducted under paragraphs 4.1.c.(3) and (4). Responsible analytic offices will provide such reports through the Signals Intelligence Director and the General Counsel (GC) to the DIRNSA/CHCSS for transmittal to the Attorney General by 31 January of each year.
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+[REDACTED] (b)(1)
+4.2. (S//SI//REL) [REDACTED]
+a. (S//SI//REL) [REDACTED]
+b. (S//SI//REL) [REDACTED]
+
+**(U) Incidental Acquisition of U.S. Person Information**
+4.3. (U) Information to, from or about U.S. PERSONS acquired incidentally as a result of COLLECTION directed against appropriate FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE TARGETS may be retained and processed in accordance with Section 5 and Section 6 of this USSID.
+
+**(U) Nonresident Alien Targets**
+4.4. (S//SI//REL) Nonresident Alien TARGETS Entering the UNITED STATES.
+
+a. (S//SI//REL) If the communications of a nonresident alien located abroad are being TARGETED and the USSS learns that the individual has entered the UNITED STATES, COLLECTION may continue for a period of 72 hours provided that continued COLLECTION is otherwise permitted by FISA, 2 the DIRNSA/CHCSS is advised immediately, and:
+(1) Immediate efforts are initiated to obtain Attorney General approval, or
+(2) A determination is made within the 72 hour period that the [REDACTED] (b)(1)
+
+b. (U) If Attorney General approval is obtained, the COLLECTION may
+
+2 (S//SI//REL) There is no 72 hour grace period for collection that has been authorized pursuant to Sections 702, 703, 704, or 705(b) of FISA. Collection under Sections 702, 703, 704, or 705(b) of FISA must be terminated as soon as the USSS learns the target has entered the United States. Similarly, DIRNSA may not authorize use of a collection technique while the target is located inside the United States if use of the collection technique would qualify as "electronic surveillance" under FISA (see Footnote 1).
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+continue for the length of time specified in the approval.
+
+c. (U//FOUO) If it is determined that [REDACTED] (b)(1) COLLECTION may continue at the discretion of the operational element.
+
+d. (S//SI//REL) If [REDACTED] or if Attorney General approval is not obtained within 72 hours, COLLECTION must be terminated [REDACTED] Attorney General approval is obtained, or the individual leaves the UNITED STATES.
+
+**(U//FOUO) U.S. Person Targets**
+4.5. (U//FOUO) U.S. PERSON TARGETS Entering the UNITED STATES.
+
+a. (U//FOUO) If communications to, from or about a U.S. PERSON located outside the UNITED STATES are being COLLECTED under Court or Attorney General approval as described in Sections 4.1.a. and 4.1.b. above, the COLLECTION must stop when the USSS learns that the individual has entered the UNITED STATES.
+
+b. (U//FOUO) While the individual is in the UNITED STATES, COLLECTION may be resumed only with the approval of the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court as described in Annex A.
+
+4.6. (S/REL) Requests to TARGET U.S. PERSONS. All proposals for COLLECTION against U.S. PERSONS, [REDACTED] (b)(1) must be submitted through the Signals Intelligence Director and the GC to the DIRNSA/CHCSS for review.
+
+**(U) Direction Finding**
+4.7. (U//FOUO) Use of direction finding solely to determine the location of a transmitter located outside of the UNITED STATES does not constitute ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE or COLLECTION even if directed at transmitters believed to be used by U.S. PERSONS. Unless COLLECTION of the communications is otherwise authorized under these procedures, the contents of communications to which a U.S. PERSON is a party monitored in the course of direction finding may only be used to identify the transmitter.
+
+**(U) Distress Signals**
+4.8. (U) Distress signals may be intentionally collected, processed, retained, and disseminated without regard to the restrictions contained in this USSID.
+
+**(U) Automated Information Systems**
+4.9. (U) COMSEC Monitoring and Security Testing of Automated Information Systems. Monitoring for communications security purposes must be conducted with the consent of the person being monitored and in accordance with the
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+procedures established in National Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Directive 600, Communications Security (COMSEC) Monitoring, dated 10 April 1990. Monitoring for communications security purposes is not governed by this USSID. Intrusive security testing to assess security vulnerabilities in automated information systems likewise is not governed by this USSID.
+
+## SECTION 5- (U) PROCESSING
+
+**(U) Selection Terms**
+5.1. (S//SI//REL) Use of Selection Terms During Processing. When a SELECTION TERM is intended to INTERCEPT a communication on the basis of the content of the communication, or because a communication is enciphered, rather than on the basis of the identity of the COMMUNICANT or the fact that the communication mentions a particular individual, the following rules apply:
+
+a. (S//SI//REL) No SELECTION TERM that is reasonably likely to result in the INTERCEPTION of communications to or from a U.S. PERSON (wherever located), [REDACTED] (b)(1) may be used unless there is reason to believe that FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE will be obtained by use of such SELECTION TERM.
+b. (U//FOUO) No SELECTION TERM that has resulted in the INTERCEPTION of a significant number of communications to or from such persons or entities may be used unless there is reason to believe that FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE will be obtained.
+c. (U//FOUO) SELECTION TERMS that have resulted or are reasonably likely to result in the INTERCEPTION of communications to or from such persons or entities shall be designed to defeat, to the greatest extent practicable under the circumstances, the INTERCEPTION of those communications which do not contain FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE.
+
+5.2. (U//FOUO) Annual Review by the Signals Intelligence Director:
+a. (U//FOUO) All SELECTION TERMS that are reasonably likely to result in the INTERCEPTION of communications to or from a U.S. PERSON or terms that have resulted in the INTERCEPTION of a significant number of such communications shall be reviewed annually by the Signals Intelligence Director or a designee.
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+b. (U//FOUO) The purpose of the review shall be to determine whether there is reason to believe that FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE will be obtained, or will continue to be obtained, by the use of these SELECTION TERMS.
+c. (U//FOUO) A copy of the results of the review will be provided to the Inspector General (IG) and the GC.
+
+**(U) Intercepted Material**
+5.3. (U) Forwarding of Intercepted Material. FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS collected by the USSS may be forwarded as intercepted to NSA, intermediate processing facilities, and collaborating centers.
+
+5.4. (U) Non-foreign Communications.
+a. (U) Communications between persons in the UNITED STATES. Private communications solely between persons in the UNITED STATES inadvertently intercepted during the COLLECTION of FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS will be promptly destroyed unless the Attorney General determines that the contents indicate a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any person.
+
+b. (U) Communications between U.S. PERSONS. Communications solely between U.S. PERSONS will be treated as follows:
+(1) (U) Communications solely between U.S. PERSONS inadvertently intercepted during the COLLECTION of FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS will be destroyed upon recognition, if technically possible, except as provided in paragraph 5.4.d. below.
+(2) (U) Notwithstanding the preceding provision, cryptologic data (e.g., signal and encipherment information) and technical communications data (e.g., circuit usage) may be extracted and retained from those communications if necessary to:
+(a) (U) Establish or maintain intercept, or
+(b) (U) Minimize unwanted intercept, or
+(c) (U) Support cryptologic operations related to FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS.
+
+c. (U) Communications Involving an Officer or Employee of the U.S. Government. Communications to or from any officer or employee of
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+the U.S. Government, or any state or local government, will not be intentionally intercepted. Inadvertent INTERCEPTIONS of such communications (including those between foreign TARGETS and U.S. officials) will be treated as indicated in paragraphs 5.4.a. and b., above.
+
+d. (U) Exceptions: Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 5.4.b. and c., the DIRNSA/CHCSS may waive the destruction requirement for international communications containing, inter alia, the following types of information:
+(1) Significant FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE, or
+(2) Evidence of a crime or threat of death or serious bodily harm to any person, or
+(3) Anomalies that reveal a potential vulnerability to U.S. communications security. Communications for which the Attorney General or DIRNSA/CHCSS's waiver is sought should be forwarded to NSA/CSS, Attn: Signals Intelligence Directorate Office of Oversight & Compliance (SV).
+
+**(U) Radio Communications**
+5.5. (U) Radio Communications with a Terminal in the UNITED STATES.
+
+a. (S//SI//REL) All radio communications that pass over channels with a terminal in the UNITED STATES must be processed through a computer scan dictionary or similar device unless those communications occur over channels used exclusively by a FOREIGN POWER.
+
+b. (S//SI//REL) International common-access radio communications that pass over channels with a terminal in the UNITED STATES, other than [REDACTED] (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i) (b)(3)-18 USC 798 communications, may be processed without the use of a computer scan dictionary or similar device if necessary to determine whether a channel contains communications of FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE interest which NSA may wish to collect. Such processing may not exceed two hours without the specific prior written approval of the Signals Intelligence Director or a designee and, in any event, shall be limited to the minimum amount of time necessary to determine the nature of communications on the channel and the amount of such communications that include FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE. Once it is determined that the channel contains sufficient communications of FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE interest to warrant COLLECTION and exploitation to produce FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE, a computer scan dictionary or similar device must be used for additional processing.
+
+c. (U//FOUO) Copies of all written approvals made pursuant to 5.5.b. must be provided to the GC and the IG.
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+## SECTION 6- (U) RETENTION
+
+**(U) Retention of Communications**
+6.1. (U) Retention of Communications to, from or About U.S. PERSONS.
+a. (U) Except as otherwise provided in Annex A, Appendix 1, Section 4, communications to, from or about U.S. PERSONS that are intercepted by the USSS may be retained in their original or transcribed form only as follows:
+(1) (U//FOUO) Unenciphered communications not thought to contain secret meaning may be retained for five years unless the Signals Intelligence Director determines in writing that retention for a longer period is required to respond to authorized FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE requirements.
+(2) (U//FOUO) Communications necessary to maintain technical data bases for cryptanalytic or traffic analytic purposes may be retained for a period sufficient to allow a thorough exploitation and to permit access to data that are, or are reasonably believed likely to become, relevant to a current or future FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE requirement. Sufficient duration may vary with the nature of the exploitation and may consist of any period of time during which the technical data base is subject to, or of use in, cryptanalysis. If a U.S. PERSON'S identity is not necessary to maintaining technical data bases, it should be deleted or replaced by a generic term when practicable.
+
+b. (U) Communications which could be disseminated under Section 7, below (i.e., without elimination of references to U.S. PERSONS) may be retained in their original or transcribed form.
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+**(U) Access**
+6.2. (U) Access to raw traffic storage systems which contain identities of U.S. PERSONS must be limited to SIGINT production personnel or other persons who conduct signals intelligence activities under the direction, authority, or control of DIRNSA/CHCSS. For more information on access to SIGINT, refer to USSID CR1610, 2.3.
+
+## SECTION 7- (U) DISSEMINATION
+
+**(U) Focus of SIGINT Reports**
+7.1. (U) All SIGINT reports will be written so as to focus solely on the activities of foreign entities and persons and their agents. Except as provided in Section 7.2., FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE information concerning U.S. PERSONS must be disseminated in a manner which does not identify the U.S. PERSON. Generic or general terms or phrases must be substituted for the identity (e.g., "U.S. firm" for the specific name of a U.S. CORPORATION or "U.S. PERSON" for the specific name of a U.S. PERSON). Files containing the identities of U.S. persons deleted from SIGINT reports will be maintained for a maximum period of one year and any requests from SIGINT customers for such identities should be referred to the Signals Intelligence Directorate's Office of Information Sharing Services (S12).
+
+**(U) Dissemination of U.S. PERSON Identities**
+7.2. (U) SIGINT reports may include the identification of a U.S. PERSON only if one of the following conditions is met and a determination is made by the appropriate approval authority that the recipient has a need for the identity for the performance of his official duties:
+a. (U) The U.S. PERSON has CONSENTED to the dissemination of communications of, or about, him or her and has executed the CONSENT form found in Annex H of this USSID, or
+b. (U) The information is PUBLICLY AVAILABLE (i.e., the information is derived from unclassified information available to the general public), or
+c. (U) The identity of the U.S. PERSON is necessary to understand the FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE information or assess its importance. The following nonexclusive list contains examples of the type of information that meet this standard:
+(1) (U) FOREIGN POWER or AGENT OF A FOREIGN POWER. The information indicates that the U.S. PERSON is a FOREIGN POWER or an AGENT OF A FOREIGN POWER.
+(2) (U) Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information. The
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+information indicates that the U.S. PERSON may be engaged in the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
+(3) (U) International Narcotics Activity. The information indicates that the individual may be engaged in international narcotics trafficking activities. (See Annex J of this USSID for further information concerning individuals involved in international narcotics trafficking).
+(4) (U) Criminal Activity. The information is evidence that the individual may be involved in a crime that has been, is being, or is about to be committed, provided that the dissemination is for law enforcement purposes.
+(5) (U) Intelligence TARGET. The information indicates that the U.S. PERSON may be the TARGET of hostile intelligence activities of a FOREIGN POWER.
+(6) (U) Threat to Safety. The information indicates that the identity of the U.S. PERSON is pertinent to a possible threat to the safety of any person or organization, including those who are TARGETS, victims or hostages of INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST organizations. Reporting units shall identify to S12 any report containing the identity of a U.S. PERSON reported under this subsection (6). Field reporting to S12 should be in the form of a CRITICOMM message and include the report date-time-group (DTG), product serial number and the reason for inclusion of the U.S. PERSON'S identity.
+(7) (U) Senior Executive Branch Officials. The identity is that of a senior official of the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government. In this case only the official's title will be disseminated. Domestic political or personal information on such individuals will be neither disseminated nor retained.
+
+**(U) Approval Authorities**
+7.3. (U) Approval authorities for the release of identities of U.S. persons under Section 7 are as follows:
+
+a. (U) DIRNSA/CHCSS. DIRNSA/CHCSS must approve dissemination of:
+(1) The identities of any senator, congressman, officer, or employee of the Legislative Branch of the U.S. Government.
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+(2) The identity of any person for law enforcement purposes.
+
+b. (U) Field Units and NSA Headquarters Elements. All SIGINT production organizations are authorized to disseminate the identities of U.S. PERSONS when:
+(1) The identity is pertinent to the safety of any person or organization;
+(2) The identity is that of a senior official of the Executive Branch; or
+(3) The U.S. PERSON has CONSENTED under paragraph 7.2.a. above.
+
+c. (U) Signals Intelligence Director and Designees.
+(1) In all other cases, U.S. PERSON identities may be released only with the prior approval of the Signals Intelligence Director, the Deputy Signals Intelligence Director, the Chief, S12, the Deputy Chief, S12, or the Senior Operations Officer of the National Security Operations Center.
+(2) For law enforcement purposes involving narcotics related information, DIRNSA has granted to the Signals Intelligence Director authority to disseminate U.S. identities. This authority may not be further delegated.
+
+**(U) Privileged Communi-cations and Criminal Activity**
+7.4. (U) Privileged Communications and Criminal Activity. All proposed disseminations of information constituting U.S. PERSON privileged communications (e.g., attorney/client, doctor/patient) and all information concerning criminal activities or criminal or judicial proceedings in the UNITED STATES must be reviewed by the Office of General Counsel prior to dissemination.
+
+**(U) Improper Dissemination**
+7.5. (U) If the name of a U.S. PERSON is improperly disseminated, the incident should be reported to S12 and SV within 24 hours of discovery of the error.
+
+## SECTION 8 - (U) RESPONSIBILITIES
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+**(U) Inspector General**
+8.1. (U) The Inspector General shall:
+a. (U) Conduct regular inspections and perform general oversight of NSA/CSS activities to ensure compliance with this USSID.
+b. (U) Establish procedures for reporting by NSA/CSS signals intelligence elements of their activities and practices for oversight purposes.
+c. (U) Report to the DIRNSA/CHCSS, annually by 31 October, concerning NSA/CSS compliance with this USSID.
+d. (U) Report quarterly with the DIRNSA/CHCSS and General Counsel to the President's Intelligence Oversight Board through the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight).
+
+**(U) General Counsel**
+8.2. (U) The General Counsel shall:
+a. (U) Provide legal advice and assistance to all elements of the USSS regarding SIGINT activities. Requests for legal advice on any aspect of these procedures may be sent by CRITICOMM. secure email, or by NSA/CSS secure telephone 963-3121, STE [REDACTED] or non- [REDACTED] (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 secure (301) 688-5015.
+b. (U) Prepare and process all applications for Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court orders and requests for Attorney General approvals required by these procedures.
+c. (U) Advise the IG in inspections and oversight of USSS activities.
+d. (U) Review and assess for legal implications as requested by the DIRNSA/CHCSS, Deputy Director, IG, Signals Intelligence Director, or their designees, all new major requirements and internally generated USSS activities.
+e. (U) Advise USSS personnel of new legislation and case law that may affect USSS missions, functions, operations, activities, or practices.
+f. (U) Report as required to the Attorney General and the President's Intelligence Oversight Board and provide copies of such reports to the DIRNSA/CHCSS and affected agency elements.
+g. (U) Process requests from any DoD intelligence component for authority to use signals as described in Procedure 5, Part 5, of DoD 5240.1-R, for periods in excess of 90 days in the development, test, or calibration of ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE equipment and other equipment that can intercept communications.
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+**(U) Signals Intelligence Director**
+8.3. (U) The Signals Intelligence Director shall:
+a. (U) Ensure that all SIGINT production personnel understand and maintain a high degree of awareness and sensitivity to the requirements of this USSID.
+b. (U) Apply the provisions of this USSID to all SIGINT production activities. The Signals Intelligence Directorate staff focal point for USSID SP0018 (formerly USSID 18) matters is SV.
+c. (U) Conduct necessary reviews of SIGINT production activities and practices to ensure consistency with this USSID.
+d. (U) Ensure that all new major requirements levied on the USSS or internally generated activities are considered for review by the GC. All activities that raise questions of law or the proper interpretation of this USSID must be reviewed by the GC prior to acceptance or execution.
+
+**(U) All Elements of the USSS**
+8.4. (U) All elements of the USSS shall:
+a. (U) Implement this directive upon receipt.
+b. (U) Prepare new procedures or amend or supplement existing procedures as required to ensure adherence to this USSID. A copy of such procedures shall be forwarded to NSA/CSS, Attn: SV.
+c. (U) Immediately inform the Signals Intelligence Director of any tasking or instructions that appear to require actions at variance with this USSID.
+d. (U) Promptly report to the NSA IG and consult with the NSA GC on all activities that may raise a question of compliance with this USSID.
+
+## SECTION 9 - (U) DEFINITIONS
+
+**(U) Agent of Foreign Power**
+9.1. (U) AGENT OF A FOREIGN POWER means:
+a. (U) Any person, other than a U.S. PERSON, who:
+(1) (U) Acts in the UNITED STATES as an officer or employee of a FOREIGN POWER, or as a member of a group engaged in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM or activities in preparation therefore; or
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+(2) (U) Acts for, or on behalf of, a FOREIGN POWER that engages in clandestine intelligence activities in the UNITED STATES contrary to the interests of the UNITED STATES, when the circumstances of such person's presence in the UNITED STATES indicate that such person may engage in such activities in the UNITED STATES, or when such person knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of such activities or knowingly conspires with any person to engage in such activities; or
+
+b. (U) Any person, including a U.S. PERSON, who:
+(1) (U) Knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence gathering activities for, or on behalf of, a FOREIGN POWER, which activities involve, or may involve, a violation of the criminal statutes of the UNITED STATES; or
+(2) (U) Pursuant to the direction of an intelligence service or network of a FOREIGN POWER, knowingly engages in any other clandestine intelligence activities for, or on behalf of, such FOREIGN POWER, which activities involve or are about to involve, a violation of the criminal statutes of the UNITED STATES; or
+(3) (U) Knowingly engages in sabotage or INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, or activities that are in preparation thereof, for or on behalf of a FOREIGN POWER; or
+(4) (U) Knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of activities described in paragraphs 9.1.b. (1) through (3) or knowingly conspires with any person to engage in those activities.
+
+c. (U) For all purposes other than the conduct of ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE as defined by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (see Annex A), the phrase "AGENT OF A FOREIGN POWER" also means any person, including U.S. PERSONS outside the UNITED STATES, who are officers or employees of a FOREIGN POWER, or who act unlawfully for or pursuant to the direction of a FOREIGN POWER, or who are in contact with or acting in collaboration with an intelligence or security service of a FOREIGN POWER for the purpose of providing access to information or material classified by the UNITED STATES Government and to which the person has or has had access. The mere fact that a person's activities may benefit or further the aims of a FOREIGN POWER is not enough to bring that person under this provision, absent evidence that the person is taking direction from or acting in knowing concert with a FOREIGN POWER.
+
+**(U) Collection**
+9.2. (U) COLLECTION means intentional tasking or SELECTION of
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+identified nonpublic communications for subsequent processing aimed at reporting or retention as a file record.
+
+**(U) Communicant**
+9.3. (U) COMMUNICANT means a sender or intended recipient of a communication.
+
+**(U) Communications about a U.S. Person**
+9.4. (U) COMMUNICATIONS ABOUT A U.S. PERSON are those in which the U.S. PERSON is identified in the communication. A U.S. PERSON is identified when the person's name, unique title, address, or other personal identifier is revealed in the communication in the context of activities conducted by that person or activities conducted by others and related to that person. A mere reference to a product by brand name or manufacturer's name, e.g., "Boeing 707" is not an identification of a U.S. person.
+
+**(U) Consent**
+9.5. (U) CONSENT, for SIGINT purposes, means an agreement by a person or organization to permit the USSS to take particular actions that affect the person or organization. An agreement by an organization with the National Security Agency to permit COLLECTION of information shall be deemed valid CONSENT if given on behalf of such organization by an official or governing body determined by the GC, National Security Agency, to have actual or apparent authority to make such an agreement.
+
+**(U) Corporations**
+9.6. (U) CORPORATIONS, for purposes of this USSID, are entities legally recognized as separate from the persons who formed, own, or run them. CORPORATIONS have the nationality of the nation state under whose laws they were formed. Thus, CORPORATIONS incorporated under UNITED STATES federal or state law are U.S. PERSONS.
+
+**(U) Electronic Surveillance**
+9.7. (U) ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE means:
+a. (U) In the case of an electronic communication, the acquisition of a nonpublic communication by electronic means without the CONSENT of a person who is a party to the communication.
+b. (U) In the case of a nonelectronic communication, the acquisition of a nonpublic communication by electronic means without the CONSENT of a person who is visibly present at the place of communication.
+c. (U) The term ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE does not include the use of radio direction finding equipment solely to determine the location of a transmitter.
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+**(U) Foreign Communication**
+9.8. (U) FOREIGN COMMUNICATION means a communication that has at least one COMMUNICANT outside of the UNITED STATES, or that is entirely among FOREIGN POWERS or between a FOREIGN POWER and officials of a FOREIGN POWER, but does not include communications intercepted by ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE directed at premises in the UNITED STATES used predominantly for residential purposes.
+
+**(U) Foreign Intelligence**
+9.9. (U) FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE means information relating to the capabilities, intentions, and activities of FOREIGN POWERS, organizations, or persons, and for purposes of this USSID includes both positive FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE and counterintelligence.
+
+**(U) Foreign Power**
+9.10. (U) FOREIGN POWER means:
+a. (U) A foreign government or any component thereof, whether or not recognized by the UNITED STATES,
+b. (U) A faction of a foreign nation or nations, not substantially composed of UNITED STATES PERSONS,
+c. (U) An entity that is openly acknowledged by a foreign government or governments to be directed and controlled by such foreign government or governments,
+d. (U) A group engaged in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM or activities in preparation thereof,
+e. (U) A foreign-based political organization, not substantially composed of UNITED STATES PERSONS, or
+f. (U) An entity that is directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments.
+
+**(U) Interception**
+9.11. (U) INTERCEPTION means the acquisition by the USSS through electronic means of a nonpublic communication to which it is not an intended party, and the processing of the contents of that communication into an intelligible form, but does not include the display of signals on visual display devices intended to permit the examination of the technical characteristics of the signals without reference to the information content carried by the signal.
+
+**(U) International Terrorism**
+9.12. (U) INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM means activities that:
+a. (U) Involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+violation of the criminal laws of the UNITED STATES or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the UNITED STATES or any State, and
+
+b. (U) Appear to be intended:
+(1) (U) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population,
+(2) (U) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or
+(3) (U) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping, and
+
+c. (U) Occur totally outside the UNITED STATES, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.
+
+**(U) Publicly Available Information**
+9.13. (U) PUBLICLY AVAILABLE INFORMATION means information that has been published or broadcast for general public consumption, is available on request to a member of the general public, has been seen or heard by a casual observer, or is made available at a meeting open to the general public.
+
+**(U) Selection**
+9.14. (S//SI//REL) SELECTION, as applied to manual and electronic processing activities, means the intentional insertion of a [REDACTED] telephone number, email address, [REDACTED] into a computer scan dictionary or manual scan guide for the purpose of identifying messages of interest and isolating them for further processing. (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i) (b)(3)-18 USC 798
+
+**(U) Selection Term**
+9.15. (U//FOUO) SELECTION TERM means the composite of individual terms used to effect or defeat SELECTION of particular communications for the purpose of INTERCEPTION. It comprises the entire term or series of terms so used, but not any segregable term contained therein. It applies to both electronic and manual processing.
+
+**(U) Target**
+9.16. (U) TARGET, OR TARGETING: See COLLECTION.
+
+**(U) United States**
+9.17. (U) UNITED STATES, when used geographically, includes the 50 states and the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the U.S. Virgin Islands, the Northern Mariana Islands, and any other territory or
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+possession over which the UNITED STATES exercises sovereignty.
+
+**(U) United States Person**
+9.18. (U) UNITED STATES PERSON:
+a. (U) A citizen of the UNITED STATES,
+b. (U) An alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the UNITED STATES,
+c. (U) Unincorporated groups and associations a substantial number of the members of which constitute a. or b. above, or
+d. (U) CORPORATIONS incorporated in the UNITED STATES, including U.S. flag nongovernmental aircraft or vessels, but not including those entities which are openly acknowledged by a foreign government or governments to be directed and controlled by them.
+e. (U) The following guidelines apply in determining whether a person is a U.S. PERSON:
+(1) (U) A person known to be currently in the United States will be treated as a U.S. PERSON unless that person is reasonably identified as an alien who has not been admitted for permanent residence or if the nature of the person's communications or other indicia in the contents or circumstances of such communications give rise to a reasonable belief that such person is not a U.S. PERSON.
+(2) (U) A person known to be currently outside the UNITED STATES, or whose location is not known, will not be treated as a U.S. PERSON unless such person is reasonably identified as such or the nature of the person's communications or other indicia in the contents or circumstances of such communications give rise to a reasonable belief that such person is a U.S. PERSON.
+(3) (U) A person known to be an alien admitted for permanent residence may be assumed to have lost status as a U.S. PERSON if the person leaves the UNITED STATES and it is known that the person is not in compliance with the administrative formalities provided by law (8 U.S.C. Section 1203) that enable such persons to reenter the UNITED STATES without regard to the provisions of law that would otherwise restrict an alien's entry into the UNITED STATES. The failure to follow the statutory procedures provides a reasonable basis to conclude that such alien has abandoned any intention of maintaining status as a permanent resident alien.
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+(4) (U) An unincorporated association whose headquarters are located outside the UNITED STATES may be presumed not to be a U.S. PERSON unless the USSS has information indicating that a substantial number of members are citizens of the UNITED STATES or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence.
+(5) (U) CORPORATIONS have the nationality of the nation/state in which they are incorporated. CORPORATIONS formed under U.S. federal or state law are thus U.S. persons, even if the corporate stock is foreign-owned. The only exception set forth above is CORPORATIONS which are openly acknowledged to be directed and controlled by foreign governments. Conversely, CORPORATIONS incorporated in foreign countries are not U.S. PERSONS even if that CORPORATION is a subsidiary of a U.S. CORPORATION.
+(6) (U) Nongovernmental ships and aircraft are legal entities and have the nationality of the country in which they are registered. Ships and aircraft fly the flag and are subject to the law of their place of registration.
+
+# USSID SP0018
+## ANNEX A - (U) PROCEDURES IMPLEMENTING TITLE I OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+### SECTION 1 - (U) PURPOSE AND APPLICABILITY
+
+**(U) Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act**
+A1.1. (U) Title I of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (the Act) governs the conduct of certain electronic surveillance activities within the United States to collect foreign intelligence information.
+
+A1.2. (U) Title I of the Act covers the intentional collection of the communications of a particular, known U.S. person who is in the United States,
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+all wiretaps in the United States, the acquisition of certain radio communications where all parties to that communication are located in the United States, and the monitoring of information in which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.
+
+A1.3. (U) The Act requires that all such surveillances be directed only at foreign powers and their agents as defined by the Act and that all such surveillances be authorized by the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, or in certain limited circumstances, by the Attorney General.
+
+### SECTION 2 - (U) GENERAL
+
+**(U) PROCEDURE AND STANDARDS**
+A2.1. (U) Procedures and standards for securing Court orders or Attorney General certifications to conduct electronic surveillances are set forth in the Act. Requests for such orders or certifications should be forwarded by the appropriate Key Component through the NSA GC to the DIRNSA/CHCSS and should be accompanied by a statement of the facts and circumstances justifying a belief that the target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and that each of the facilities or places at which the surveillance will be directed are being used, or are about to be used, by that foreign power or agent.
+
+A2.2. (U) If the proposed surveillance meets the requirements of the Act and the Director approves the proposal, attorneys in the OGC will draw the necessary court application or request for Attorney General certification.
+
+### SECTION 3 - (U) MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES
+
+**(U) Surveillances**
+A3.1. (U//FOUO) Surveillances authorized by the Act are required to be carried out in accordance with the Act and pursuant to the court order or Attorney General certification authorizing that particular surveillance. In some cases, the court orders are tailored to address particular problems, and in those instances the NSA attorney will advise the appropriate NSA offices of the terms of the court's orders. In most cases, however, the court order will incorporate without any changes the standardized minimization procedures set forth in Appendix I.
+
+### SECTION 4 - (U) RESPONSIBILITIES
+
+**(U) General Counsel Responsibilities**
+A4.1. (U) The GC will review all requests to conduct electronic surveillances as defined by the Act, prepare all applications and materials required by the Act, and provide pertinent legal advice and assistance to all elements of the United
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+States SIGINT System.
+
+**(U) Inspector General Responsiblities**
+A4.2. (U) The IG will conduct regular inspections and oversight of all SIGINT activities to assure compliance with this Directive.
+
+**(U) SIGINT Manager and Supervisor Responsiblities**
+A4.3. (U) All SIGINT managers and supervisors with responsibilities relating to the Act will ensure that they and their personnel are thoroughly familiar with the Act, its implementing procedures, and any court orders or Attorney General certifications pertinent to their mission. Personnel with duties related to the Act will consult the GC's office for any required legal advice and assistance or training of newly assigned personnel.
+
+A4.4. (U) Appropriate records will be maintained demonstrating compliance with the terms of all court orders and Attorney General certifications, and any discrepancies in that regard will be promptly reported to the offices of the GC and IG.
+
+# USSID SP0018, ANNEX A
+## APPENDIX 1 - (U) STANDARD MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES FOR ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE CONDUCTED BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA)
+
+### UNITED STATES
+
+### FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+#### WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+### STANDARD MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES FOR ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
+#### CONDUCTED BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA)
+
+Pursuant to Section 101(h) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (hereinafter "the Act"), the following procedures have been adopted by the Attorney General and shall be followed by the NSA in implementing this electronic surveillance: (U)
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+### SECTION 1 - APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE (U)
+
+These procedures apply to the acquisition, retention, use, and dissemination of non-publicly available information concerning unconsenting United States persons that is collected in the course of electronic surveillance as ordered by the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court under Section 102(b) or authorized by Attorney General Certification under Section 102(a) of the Act. These procedures also apply to non-United States persons where specifically indicated. (U)
+
+### SECTION 2 - DEFINITIONS (U)
+
+In addition to the definitions in Section 101 of the Act, the following definitions shall apply to these procedures:
+
+(a) Acquisition means the collection by NSA through electronic means of a nonpublic communication to which it is not an intended party. (U)
+
+(b) Communications concerning a United States person include all communications in which a United States person is discussed or mentioned, except where such communications reveal only publicly available information about the person. (U)
+
+(c) Communications of a United States person include all communications to which a United States person is a party. (U)
+
+(d) Consent is the agreement by a person or organization to permit the NSA to take particular actions that affect the person or organization. To be effective, consent must be given by the affected person or organization with sufficient knowledge to understand the action that may be taken and the possible consequences of that action. Consent by an organization shall be deemed valid if given on behalf of the organization by an official or governing body determined by the General Counsel, NSA, to have actual or apparent authority to make such an agreement. (U)
+
+(e) Foreign communication means a communication that has at least one communicant outside of the United States, or that is entirely among:
+(1) foreign powers;
+(2) officers and employees of foreign powers; or
+(3) a foreign power and officers or employees of a foreign power.
+All other communications are domestic communications. (S-CCO)
+
+(f) Identification of a United States person means the name, unique title, address, or other personal identifier of a United States person in the context of activities conducted by that person or activities conducted by others that are related to that person. A reference to a product by brand name, or manufacturer's name or the use of a name in a descriptive sense, e.g., "Monroe Doctrine," is not an identification of a United States person. (S-CCO)
+
+(g) Processed or processing means any step necessary to convert a communication into an intelligible form intended for human inspection. (U)
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+(h) Publicly available information means information that a member of the public could obtain on request, by research in public sources, or by casual observation. (U)
+
+(i) Technical data base means information retained for cryptanalytic, traffic analytic, or signal exploitation purposes. (S-CCO)
+
+(j) United States person means a United States person as defined in the Act. The following guidelines apply in determining whether a person whose status is unknown is a United States person: (U)
+(1) A person known to be currently in the United States will be treated as a United States person unless positively identified as an alien who has not been admitted for permanent residence, or unless the nature or circumstances of the person's communications give rise to a reasonable belief that such person is not a United States person. (U)
+(2) A person known to be currently outside the United States, or whose location is unknown, will not be treated as a United States person unless such person can be positively identified as such, or the nature or circumstances of the person's communications give rise to a reasonable belief that such person is a United States person. (U)
+(3) A person known to be an alien admitted for permanent residence loses status as a United States person if the person leaves the United States and is not in compliance with Title 8, United States Code, Section 1203 enabling re-entry into the United States. Failure to follow the statutory procedures provides a reasonable basis to conclude that the alien has abandoned any intention of maintaining his status as a permanent resident alien. (U)
+(4) An unincorporated association whose headquarters or primary office is located outside the United States is presumed not to be a United States person unless there is information indicating that a substantial number of its members are citizens of the United States or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence. (U)
+
+### SECTION 3 - ACQUISITION AND PROCESSING – GENERAL (U)
+
+(a) Acquisition (U)
+The acquisition of information by electronic surveillance shall be made in accordance with the certification of the Attorney General or the court order authorizing such surveillance and conducted in a manner designed, to the greatest extent reasonably feasible, to minimize the acquisition of information not relevant to the authorized purpose of the surveillance. (S-CCO)
+
+(b) Verification (U)
+At the initiation of the electronic surveillance, the NSA or the Federal Bureau of Investigation, if providing operational support, shall verify that the communication lines or telephone numbers being targeted are the lines or numbers of the target authorized by court order or Attorney General certification. Thereafter, collection personnel will monitor the acquisition of raw data at regular intervals to verify that the surveillance is not avoidably acquiring communications outside the authorized scope of the surveillance or information concerning United States persons not related to the purpose of the surveillance. (S-CCO)
+
+(c) Monitoring, Recording, and Processing (U)
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+(1) Electronic surveillance of the target may be monitored contemporaneously, recorded automatically, or both. (U)
+
+(2) Personnel who monitor the electronic surveillance shall exercise reasonable judgement in determining whether particular information acquired must be minimized and shall destroy inadvertently acquired communications of or concerning a United States person at the earliest practicable point in the processing cycle at which such communication can be identified either as clearly not relevant to the authorized purpose of the surveillance (i.e., the communication does not contain foreign intelligence information) or as containing evidence of a crime which may be disseminated under these procedures. (S-CCO)
+
+(3) Communications of or concerning United States persons that may be related to the authorized purpose of the surveillance may be forwarded to analytic personnel responsible for producing intelligence information from the collected data. Such communications or information may be retained and disseminated only in accordance with Sections 4, 5, and 6 of these procedures. (C)
+
+(4) Magnetic tapes or other storage media that contain acquired communications may be processed. (S-CCO)
+
+(5) Each communication shall be reviewed to determine whether it is a domestic or foreign communication to or from the targeted premises and is reasonably believed to contain foreign intelligence information or evidence of a crime. Only such communications may be processed. All other communications may be retained or disseminated only in accordance with Sections 5 and 6 of these procedures. (S-CCO)
+
+(6) Magnetic tapes or other storage media containing foreign communications may be scanned by computer to identify and select communications for analysis. Computer selection terms used for scanning, such as telephone numbers, key words or phrases, or other discriminators, shall not include United States person names or identifiers and shall be limited to those selection terms reasonably likely to identify [REDACTED] (b)(1) that are authorized for intentional collection under Executive Order 12333 implementing procedures. (S-CCO)
+
+(7) Further processing, retention and dissemination of foreign communications shall be made in accordance with Sections 4, 6, and 7, as applicable, below. Further processing, storage and dissemination of inadvertently acquired domestic communications shall be made in accordance with Sections 4 and 5 below. (S-CCO)
+
+(d) U.S. Persons Employed by the Foreign Power (C)
+Communications of or concerning United States persons employed by a foreign power may be used and retained as otherwise provided in these procedures except that:
+(1) Such United States persons shall not be identified in connection with any communication that the person places or receives on behalf of another unless the identification is permitted under Section 6 of these procedures; and
+(2) personal communications of United States persons that could not be foreign intelligence may only be retained, used, or disseminated in accordance with Section 5 of these procedures. (S-CCO)
+
+(e) Destruction of Raw Data (C)
+Communications and other information, including that reduced to graphic or "hard copy" form such as [REDACTED] (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i) (b)(3)-18 USC 798 shall be reviewed for retention in accordance with the standards set forth in these procedures. Communications and other information, in any form, that do not meet
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+such retention standards and that are known to contain communications of or concerning United States persons shall be promptly destroyed. (S-CCO)
+
+(f) Non-pertinent Communications (U)
+(1) Communications determined to fall within established categories of non-pertinent communications, such as those set forth in subparagraph (6) of this section, should not be retained unless they contain information that may be disseminated under Sections 5, 6, or 7 below. (U)
+(2) Monitors may listen to all communications, including those that initially appear to fall within established categories until they can reasonably determine that the communication cannot be disseminated under Sections 5, 6, or 7 below. (S-CCO)
+(3) Communications of United States persons will be analyzed to establish categories of communications that are not pertinent to the authorized purpose of the surveillance. (U)
+(4) These categories should be established after a reasonable period of monitoring the communications of the targets. (U)
+(5) Information that appears to be foreign intelligence may be retained even if it is acquired as a part of a communication falling within a category that is generally non-pertinent. (S-CCO)
+(6) Categories of non-pertinent communications which may be applied in these surveillance include:
+(A) Calls to and from United States Government officials;
+(B) Calls to and from children;
+(C) Calls to and from students for information to aid them in academic endeavors;
+(D) Calls between family members; and
+(E) Calls relating solely to personal services, such as food orders, transportation, etc. (S-CCO)
+
+(g) Change in Target's Location or Status (S-CCO)
+(1) During periods of known extended absence by a targeted agent of a foreign power from premises under surveillance, only communications to which the target is a party may be retained and disseminated. (S-CCO)
+(2) When there is reason to believe that the target of an electronic surveillance is no longer a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, or no longer occupies the premises authorized for surveillance, that electronic surveillance shall be immediately terminated, and shall not resume unless subsequently approved under the Act. When any person involved in collection or processing of an electronic surveillance being conducted pursuant to the Act becomes aware of information tending to indicate a material change in the status or location of a target, the person shall immediately ensure that the NSA's Office of General Counsel is also made aware of such information. (S-CCO)
+
+### SECTION 4 - ACQUISITION AND PROCESSING - SPECIAL PROCEDURES (U)
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+(a) Collection Against Residential Premises (S-CCO)
+(1) An electronic surveillance directed against premises located in the United States and used for residential purposes shall be conducted by technical means designed to limit the information acquired to communications that have one communicant outside the United States, [REDACTED] (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i) (b)(3)-18 USC 798 The technical means employed shall consist of [REDACTED] or other equipment or equipment capable of identifying international [REDACTED] particular international communications known to be used by the targeted foreign power and its agents. Communications to or from the target residential premises that are processed [REDACTED] of a foreign power or agent of a foreign power located in a foreign country, or on the foreign country or foreign city telephone direct dialing codes (area codes) for the areas in which such foreign powers or agents are located. (S-CCO)
+
+(2) [REDACTED] (S-CCO)
+
+(3) Domestic communications that are incidentally acquired during collection against residential premises shall be handled under Section 5 of these procedures. (S-CCO)
+
+(b) Attorney-Client Communications (C)
+As soon as it becomes apparent that a communication is between a person who is known to be under criminal indictment and an attorney who represents that individual in the matter under indictment (or someone acting on behalf of the attorney), monitoring of that communication will cease and the communication shall be identified as an attorney-client communication in a log maintained for that purpose. The relevant portion of the tape containing that conversation will be placed under seal and the Department of Justice, Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, shall be notified so that appropriate procedures may be established to protect such communications from review or use in any criminal prosecution, while preserving foreign intelligence information contained therein. (S-CCO)
+
+### SECTION 5 - DOMESTIC COMMUNICATIONS (U)
+
+(a) Dissemination (U)
+Communications identified as domestic communications shall be promptly destroyed, except that:
+(1) domestic communications that are reasonably believed to contain foreign intelligence information shall be disseminated to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (including United States person identities) for possible further dissemination by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in accordance with its minimization procedures;
+(2) domestic communications that do not contain foreign intelligence information, but that are reasonably believed to contain evidence of a crime that has been, is being, or is about to be committed, shall be disseminated (including United States person identities) to appropriate Federal law enforcement authorities, in accordance with Section 106(b) of the Act and crimes reporting procedures approved by the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General; and
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+(3) domestic communications that are reasonably believed to contain technical data base information, as defined in Section 2(i), may be disseminated to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to other elements of the U.S. SIGINT system. (S-CCO)
+
+(b) Retention (U)
+(1) Domestic communications disseminated to Federal law enforcement agencies may be retained by the NSA for a reasonable period of time, not to exceed six months (or any shorter period set by court order), to permit law enforcement agencies to determine whether access to original recordings of such communications is required for law enforcement purposes. (S-CCO)
+(2) Domestic communications reasonably believed to contain technical data base information may be retained for a period sufficient to allow a thorough exploitation and to permit access to data that are, or are reasonably believed likely to become, relevant to a current or future foreign intelligence requirement. Sufficient duration may vary with the nature of the exploitation. (S-CCO)
+a. In the context of a cryptanalytic effort, maintenance of technical data bases requires retention of all communications that are enciphered or reasonably believed to contain secret meaning, and sufficient duration may consist of any period of time during which encrypted material is subject to, or of use in, cryptanalysis. S-CCO)
+b. In the case of communications that are not enciphered or otherwise thought to contain secret meaning, sufficient duration is one year unless the Deputy Director for Operations, NSA, determines in writing that retention for a longer period is required to respond to authorized foreign intelligence or counterintelligence requirements. (S-CCO)
+
+### SECTION 6 FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS OF OR CONCERNING UNITED STATES PERSONS (U)
+
+(a) Retention (U)
+Foreign communications of or concerning United States persons acquired by the NSA in the course of an electronic surveillance subject to these procedures may be retained only:
+(1) if necessary for the maintenance of technical data bases. Retention for this purpose is permitted for a period sufficient to allow a thorough exploitation and to permit access to data that are, or are reasonably believed likely to become, relevant to a current or future foreign intelligence requirement. Sufficient duration may vary with the nature of the exploitation.
+a. In the context of a cryptanalytic effort, maintenance of technical data bases requires retention of all communications that are enciphered or reasonably believed to contain secret meaning, and sufficient duration may consist of any period of time during which encrypted material is subject to, or of use in, cryptanalysis.
+b. In the case of communications that are not enciphered or otherwise thought to contain secret meaning, sufficient duration is one year unless the Deputy Director for Operations, NSA, determines in writing that retention for a longer period is required to respond to authorized foreign intelligence or counterintelligence requirements;
+(2) if dissemination of such communications with reference to such United States persons would be permitted under subsection (b) below; or
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+(3) if the information is evidence of a crime that has been, is being, or is about to be committed and is provided to appropriate federal law enforcement authorities. (S-CCO)
+
+(b) Dissemination (U)
+A report based on communications of or concerning a United States person may be disseminated in accordance with Section 7 if the identity of the United States person is deleted and a generic term or symbol is substituted so that the information cannot reasonably be connected with an identifiable United States person. Otherwise dissemination of intelligence reports based on communications of or concerning a United States person may only be made to a recipient requiring the identity of such person for the performance of official duties but only if at least one of the following criteria is also met:
+(1) the United States person has consented to dissemination or the information of or concerning the United States person is available publicly;
+(2) the identity of the United States person is necessary to understand foreign intelligence information or assess its importance, e.g., the identity of a senior official in the Executive Branch;
+(3) the communication or information indicates that the United States person may be:
+(A) an agent of a foreign power;
+(B) a foreign power as defined in Section 101(a)(4) or (6) of the Act;
+(C) residing outside the United States and holding an official position in the government or military forces of a foreign power
+(D) a corporation or other entity that is owned or controlled directly or indirectly by a foreign power; or
+(E) acting in collaboration with an intelligence or security service of a foreign power and the United States person has, or has had, access to classified national security information or material.
+(4) the communication or information indicates that the United States person may be the target of intelligence activities of a foreign power;
+(5) the communication or information indicates that the United States person is engaged in the unauthorized disclosure of classified national security information, but only after the agency that originated the information certifies that it is properly classified;
+(6) the communication or information indicates that the United States person may be engaging in international terrorist activities;
+(7) the acquisition of the United States person's communication was authorized by a court order issued pursuant to Section 105 of the Act and the communication may relate to the foreign intelligence purpose of the surveillance;
+(8) the communication or information is reasonably believed to contain evidence that a crime has been, is being, or is about to be committed, provided that dissemination is for law enforcement purposes and is made in
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+accordance with Section 106(b) of the Act and crimes reporting procedures approved by the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General. (U)
+
+### SECTION 7- OTHER FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS (U)
+
+Foreign communications of or concerning a non-United States person may be retained, used, and disseminated in any form in accordance with other applicable law, regulation, and policy. (U)
+
+### SECTION 8 - COLLABORATION WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS (S-CCO)
+
+(a) The sharing or exchange of foreign communications governed by these procedures with signals intelligence authorities of collaborating foreign governments (Second Parties) may be undertaken by the NSA only with the written assurance of the Second Party that the use of those foreign communications will be subject to the retention and dissemination provisions of these procedures. (S-CCO)
+
+(b) Domestic communications and communications to or from United States persons shall not be shared with Second Parties. (S-CCO)
+
+(c) Foreign plain text communications may be shared with Second Parties if they are first reviewed by NSA analysts, who shall remove references to United States persons that are not necessary to understand or assess the foreign intelligence information contained therein. (S-CCO)
+
+(d) Foreign enciphered or encoded communications may be shared with Second Parties without such prior review, provided that at least annually a representative sampling of those shared communications that can be deciphered or decoded is reviewed by the NSA to ensure that any references therein to United States persons are necessary to understand or assess the foreign intelligence information being disseminated. Corrective measures with respect to each target or line shall be undertaken as necessary to maintain compliance with the above dissemination standard. The results of each review shall be made available to the Attorney General or a designee. (S-CCO)
+
+Approved by Attorney General Janet Reno on 1 July 1997
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+# USSID SP0018
+## ANNEX B - (U) OPERATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+
+### SECTION 1 - (U) GENERAL
+
+**(U) Operational Assistance**
+B1.1. (U) In accordance with the provisions of Section 2.6 of E.O. 12333, and the NSA/FBI Memorandum of Understanding of 25 November 1980, the National Security Agency may provide specialized equipment and technical knowledge to the FBI to assist the FBI in the conduct of its lawful functions. When requesting such assistance, the FBI will certify to the General Counsel of NSA/CSS that such equipment or technical knowledge is necessary to the accomplishment of one or more of the FBI's lawful functions.
+
+B1.2. (U) NSA/CSS may also provide expert personnel to assist FBI personnel in the operation or installation of specialized equipment when that equipment is to be employed to collect foreign intelligence. When requesting the assistance of expert personnel, the FBI will certify to the General Counsel that such assistance is necessary to collect foreign intelligence and that the approval of the Attorney General (and, when necessary, a warrant from a court of competent jurisdiction) has been obtained.
+
+### SECTION 2 - (U) CONTROL
+
+**(U) Operational Control**
+B2.1. (U) No operational assistance as discussed in Section 1 shall be provided without the express permission of the DIRNSA/CHCSS, Deputy Director, NSA/CSS, the SIGINT Director, or the Deputy Director for Technology and Systems. The SIGINT Director and the Director of the Technology Directorate may approve requests for such assistance only with the concurrence of the General Counsel.
+
+# USSID SP0018
+## ANNEX C - (U) SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO U.S. AND ALLIED MILITARY EXERCISE COMMAND AUTHORITIES
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+### SECTION 1 - (U) POLICY
+
+**(U) SIGINT Support**
+C1.1. (U//FOUO) Signals Intelligence support to U.S. and Allied military exercise command authorities is provided for in USSID CR1221 and DoD Directive 5200.17 (M-2). Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum MJCS111-88, 18 August 1988, and USSID CR1200, 16 December 1988, establish doctrine and procedures for providing signals intelligence support to military commanders. The procedures in this Annex provide policy guidelines for safeguarding the rights of U.S. persons in the conduct of exercise SIGINT support activities.
+
+### SECTION 2 - (U) DEFINITIONS
+
+**(U) Military Tactical Communi-cations**
+C2.1. (U) United States and Allied military exercise communications, within the United States and abroad, that are necessary for the production of simulated foreign intelligence and counterintelligence or to permit an analysis of communications security.
+
+### SECTION 3 - (U) PROCEDURES
+
+**(U) Handling of Military Tactical Communi-cations**
+C3.1. (U//FOUO) The USSS may collect, process, store, and disseminate military tactical communications that are also communications of, or concerning, U.S. persons.
+
+a. (U//FOUO) Collection efforts will be conducted in such a manner as to avoid, to the extent feasible, the intercept of non-exercise-related communications.
+
+b. (U//FOUO) Military tactical communications may be stored and processed without deletion of references to U.S. persons if the names and communications of the U.S. persons who are exercise participants, whether military, government, or contractor, are contained in, or such communications constitute, exercise-related communications or fictitious communications or information prepared for the exercise.
+
+c. (U//FOUO) Communications of U.S. persons not participating in the exercise that are inadvertently intercepted during the exercise shall be destroyed as soon as feasible, provided that a record describing the signal or frequency user in technical and generic terms may be retained for signal identification and Collection-avoidance purposes.
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+Inadvertently intercepted communications that contain anomalies in enciphered communications that reveal a potential vulnerability to United States communications security should be forwarded to the Information Assurance Director.
+
+d. (U//FOUO) Dissemination of military exercise communications, exercise reports, or information files derived from such communications shall be limited to those authorities and persons participating in the exercise or conducting reviews and critiques thereof.
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+# USSID SP0018
+## ANNEX D - (U) TESTING OF ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT
+
+### SECTION 1 - (U) PURPOSE AND APPLICABILITY
+
+**(U) Testing of Electronic Equipment**
+D1.1. (U) This Annex applies to the testing of electronic equipment that has the capability to intercept communications and other non-public information. Testing includes development, calibration, and evaluation of such equipment, and will be conducted, to the maximum extent practical, without interception or monitoring of U.S. persons.
+
+### SECTION 2 - (U) PROCEDURES
+
+**(U) Testing Limitations**
+D2.1. (U) The USSS may test electronic equipment that has the capability to intercept communications and other information subject to the following limitations:
+
+a. (U) To the maximum extent practical, the following should be used:
+(1) (U) Laboratory-generated signals;
+(2) (U) Communications transmitted between terminals located outside the United States not used by any known U.S. person;
+(3) (U) Official government agency communications with the consent of an appropriate official of that agency, or an individual's communications with the consent of that individual;
+(4) (U) Public broadcast signals; or
+(5) (U) Other communications in which there is no reasonable expectation of privacy (as approved in each instance by the NSA/CSS General Counsel).
+
+b. (U) Where it is not practical to test electronic equipment solely against signals described in paragraph D2.1.a., above, testing may be conducted, provided:
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+(1) (U) The proposed test is coordinated with the NSA/CSS General Counsel;
+(2) (U) The test is limited in scope and duration to that necessary to determine the capability of the equipment;
+(3) (U) No particular person is targeted without consent and it is not reasonable to obtain the consent of the persons incidentally subjected to the surveillance; and
+(4) (U) The test does not exceed 90 calendar days.
+
+c. (U) Where the test involves communications other than those identified in paragraph D2.1.a. and a test period longer than 90 days is required, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act requires that the test be approved by the Attorney General. Such proposals and plans shall be submitted by USSS elements through the General Counsel, NSA/CSS, to the DIRNSA/CHCSS for transmission to the Attorney General. The test proposal shall state the requirement for an extended test involving such communications, the nature of the test, the organization that will conduct the test, and the proposed disposition of any signals or communications acquired during the test.
+
+D2.2. (U) The content of any communication other than communications between non-U.S. persons outside the United States which are acquired during a test and evaluation shall be:
+a. (U) Retained and used only for the purpose of determining the capability of the electronic equipment.
+b. (U) Disclosed only to persons conducting or evaluating the test; and
+c. (U) Destroyed before or immediately upon completion of the testing.
+
+D2.3. (U) The technical parameters of a communication, such as frequency, modulation, and time of activity of acquired electronic signals, may be retained and used for test reporting or collection-avoidance purposes. Such parameters may be disseminated to other DoD intelligence components and other entities authorized to conduct electronic surveillance, provided such dissemination and use are limited to testing, evaluation, or collection-avoidance purposes.
+
+# USSID SP0018
+## ANNEX E - (U) SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+### SECTION 1 - (U) PROCEDURES
+
+**(U) Procedures for Safeguarding the Rights of U.S. Persons**
+E1.1. (U) This Annex provides the procedures for safeguarding the rights of U.S. persons when conducting SIGINT search and development activities.
+
+E1.2. (U//FOUO) The USSS may conduct search and development activities with respect to signals throughout the radio spectrum under the following limitations:
+
+a. (U) Signals may be collected only for the purpose of identifying those signals that:
+(1) (U) May contain information related to the production of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence;
+(2) U) Are enciphered or appear to contain secret meaning;
+(3) (U) Are necessary to assure efficient signals intelligence collection or to avoid the collection of unwanted signals; or
+(4) (S//SI//REL) Reveal vulnerabilities of United States communications security.
+
+b. (S//SI//REL) Communications originated or intended for receipt in the United States or originated or intended for receipt by U.S. persons shall be processed in accordance with Section 5 of USSID SP0018, provided that information necessary for cataloging the constituent elements of the signal environment may be processed and retained if such information does not identify a U.S. person. Information revealing a United States communications security vulnerability may be retained.
+
+c. (S//SI//REL) Information necessary for cataloging the constituent elements of the signal environment may be disseminated to the extent such information does not identify U.S. persons. Communications equipment nomenclature may be disseminated. Information that reveals a vulnerability to United States communications security may be disseminated to the appropriate communications security authorities.
+
+d. (U) All information obtained in the process of search and development that appears to be of foreign intelligence value may be forwarded to the proper analytic office within NSA/CSS for processing and dissemination in accordance with relevant portions of this USSID.
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+# USSID SP0018
+## ANNEX F - (U) ILLICIT COMMUNICATIONS
+
+### SECTION 1 - (U) PROCEDURES
+
+**(U) Handling of Illicit Communi-cations**
+F1.1. (U) The USSS may collect, retain, process, and disseminate illicit communications without reference to the requirements concerning U.S. persons.
+
+F1.2. (U//FOUO) The term "illicit communications" means a communication transmitted in violation of either the Communications Act of 1934 and regulations issued thereunder or international agreements, which because of its explicit content, message characteristics, or method of transmission, is reasonably believed to be a communication to or from an agent or agents of foreign powers, whether or not U.S. persons.
+
+# USSID SP0018
+## ANNEX G - (U) TRAINING OF PERSONNEL IN THE OPERATION AND USE OF SIGINT COLLECTION AND OTHER SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT
+
+### SECTION 1 - (U) APPLICABILITY
+
+**(U) Purpose**
+G1.1. (U) This Annex applies to all USSS use of SIGINT collection and other surveillance equipment for training purposes.
+
+### SECTION 2 - (U) POLICY
+
+**(U) Training**
+G2.1. (U) Training of USSS personnel in the operation and use of SIGINT collection equipment shall be conducted, to the maximum extent that is practical, without interception of the communications of U.S. persons or persons in the United States who have not given consent to such interception. Communications and information protected by
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) (see Annex A) will not be collected for training purposes.
+
+### SECTION 3 - (U) PROCEDURES
+
+**(U) Training Guidance**
+G3.1. (U) The training of USSS personnel in the operation and use of SIGINT collection and other surveillance equipment shall include guidance concerning the requirements and restrictions of the FISA, Executive Order 12333, and this USSID.
+
+G3.2. (U) The use of SIGINT collection and other surveillance equipment for training purposes is subject to the following limitations:
+a. (U) To the maximum extent practical, use of such equipment for training purposes shall be directed against otherwise authorized intelligence targets;
+b. (U) The contents of private communications of nonconsenting U.S. persons may not be acquired unless the person is an authorized target of electronic surveillance; and
+c. (U) The electronic surveillance will be limited in extent and duration to that necessary to train personnel in the use of the equipment.
+
+G3.3. (U) The limitations in paragraph G3.2. do not apply in the following instances:
+a. (U) Public broadcasts, distress signals, or official United States Government communications may be monitored, provided that, where government agency communications are monitored, the consent of an appropriate official is obtained; and
+b. (U) Minimal acquisition of information is permitted as required for calibration purposes.
+
+G3.4. (U) Information collected during training that involves authorized intelligence targets may be retained in accordance with Section 6 of this USSID and disseminated in accordance with Section 7 of this USSID. Information other than distress signals collected during training that does not involve authorized intelligence targets or that is acquired inadvertently shall be destroyed as soon as practical or upon completion of the training and may not be disseminated outside the USSS for any purpose. Distress signals should be referred to the SIGINT Director.
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+# USSID SP0018
+## ANNEX H - (U) CONSENT FORMS
+
+### SECTION 1 - (U) PURPOSE
+
+**(U) Forms**
+H1.1. (U) The forms set forth in this Annex have been approved by the National Security Agency's Office of General Counsel (NSA OGC) to obtain and record the express consent of a U.S. person for elements of the United States SIGINT System (USSS) to collect and disseminate communications of or concerning that person for foreign intelligence purposes, to include but not limited to force protection, hostage recovery, and other like purposes.
+
+H1.2. (U//FOUO) Forms 1 and 2 can be used to obtain and record consent to collect and disseminate a U.S. person's communications as well as references to the U.S. person in communications. Forms 3 and 4 only provide consent to collect and disseminate references to the U.S. person but neither Form 3 nor Form 4 provides consent to collect communications to or from the U.S. person who has executed the form. Each form contained in this Annex may be reproduced, provided the security classifications (top and bottom) are removed. It is the responsibility of the user to properly reclassify the consent form that is suitable to the user's purposes in accordance with requisite security guidelines and operational considerations of the customer whom the USSS is supporting.
+
+H1.3. (U) Section 4.1.c. of United States Signals Intelligence Directive SP0018 states that the Director of NSA (DIRNSA) has authority to approve the consensual collection of communications to, from, or about U.S. persons. Elements of the USSS proposing to conduct consensual collection should forward a copy of the executed consent form and any pertinent information to the DIRNSA (or to the Senior Operations Officer of the National Security Operations Center) for approval of the proposed consensual collection activity. NSA OGC must also be notified promptly of the proposed collection activity.
+
+H1.4. (U) If operational circumstances dictate, consent may be obtained orally or may be recorded on a form other than one of the forms contained in this Annex. However, any other form or method that is used to obtain and record a U.S. person's consent for elements of the USSS to collect and disseminate communications of or concerning that person must be reviewed and approved by NSA OGC.
+
+## CONSENT FORM 1
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+### NSA SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE CONSENT AGREEMENT
+
+I, [REDACTED] hereby consent to the National Security Agency or other elements of the United States Signals Intelligence System undertaking to seek and disseminate communications to, from, or referencing me for the purpose of: [REDACTED]
+
+I understand that, unless specified otherwise in the purpose above, communications to, from, or referencing me may be sought and disseminated while I am in the U.S. during the effective period of my consent. This consent applies to administrative messages alerting elements of the United States Signals Intelligence System to this consent, as well as to any signals intelligence reports that may relate to the purpose stated above.
+
+Except as otherwise provided by law, to include procedures under Executive Order 12333, this consent covers only information that relates to the purpose stated above and is effective for the period: [REDACTED] to [REDACTED]
+
+Signals intelligence reports containing information derived from communications to, from, or referencing me may only be disseminated to me and to [REDACTED] and to [REDACTED] others as specified by the U.S. Government as otherwise permitted by law, to include procedures under Executive Order 12333.
+
+---
+Signature
+
+---
+Date
+
+---
+Title
+
+---
+PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT: Authority for collecting information is contained in Section 6 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959, Public Law 86-36, codified at 50 U.S.C. 402 note; Executive Order (E.O.) 12333, as amended; and E.O. 13526. NSA's Blanket Routine Uses found at 58 Fed. Reg. 10,531 (1993) and the specific uses found in GNSA 18 apply to this information. Disclosure of requested information is voluntary but refusal to provide requested information may prevent NSA from effecting this consent form.
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+## CONSENT FORM 2
+### CONSENT AGREEMENT
+
+I, [REDACTED] hereby consent to the U.S. Government undertaking to seek and disseminate communications to, from, or referencing me for the purpose of: [REDACTED]
+
+I understand that, unless specified otherwise in the purpose above, communications to, from, or referencing me may be sought and disseminated while I am in the U.S. during the effective period of my consent. This consent applies to administrative messages alerting elements of the U.S. Government to this consent, as well as to any reports that may relate to the purpose stated above.
+
+Except as otherwise provided by law, to include applicable U.S. Government procedures, this consent covers only information that relates to the purpose stated above and is effective for the period: [REDACTED] to [REDACTED]
+
+Reports containing information derived from communications to, from, or referencing me may only be disseminated to me and to [REDACTED] and to others as specified by the U.S. government as otherwise permitted by law, to include applicable U.S. Government procedures.
+
+---
+Signature
+
+---
+Date
+
+---
+Title
+
+---
+PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT: Authority for collecting information is contained in Executive Order 12333, as amended; and procedures issued thereto. The Department of Defense Blanket Routine Uses found at: http://privacy.defense.gov/blank_et_uses.shtml
+
+apply to this information. Disclosure of requested information is voluntary but refusal to provide requested information may prevent completion of actions to effect this consent form.
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+## CONSENT FORM 3
+### NSA SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE CONSENT AGREEMENT
+
+I, [REDACTED] hereby consent to the National Security Agency or other elements of the United States Signals Intelligence System undertaking to seek and disseminate communications referencing me for the purpose of: [REDACTED]
+
+I understand that, unless specified otherwise in the purpose above, communications referencing me may be sought and disseminated while I am in the U.S. during the effective period of my consent. This consent applies to administrative messages alerting elements of the United States Signals Intelligence System to this consent, as well as to any signals intelligence reports that may relate to the purpose stated above.
+
+Except as otherwise provided by law, to include procedures under Executive Order 12333, this consent covers only references to me in foreign communications and information therefrom that relates to the purpose stated above and is effective for the period: [REDACTED] to [REDACTED]
+
+Signals intelligence reports containing information derived from foreign communications referencing me may only be disseminated to me and to [REDACTED] and to others as specified by the U.S. Government as otherwise permitted by law, to include procedures under Executive Order 12333.
+
+---
+Signature
+
+---
+Date
+
+---
+Title
+
+---
+PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT: Authority for collecting information is contained in Section 6 of the National
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+Security Agency Act of 1959, Public Law 86-36, codified at 50 U.S.C. 402 note; Executive Order (E.O.) 12333, as amended; and E.O. 13526. NSA's Blanket Routine Uses found at 58 Fed. Reg. 10,531 (1993) and the specific uses found in GNSA 18 apply to this information. Disclosure of requested information is voluntary but refusal to provide requested information may prevent NSA from effecting this consent form.
+
+## CONSENT FORM 4
+### CONSENT AGREEMENT
+
+I, [REDACTED] hereby consent to the U.S. Government undertaking to seek and disseminate communications referencing me for the purpose of: [REDACTED]
+
+I understand that, unless specified otherwise in the purpose above, communications referencing me may be sought and disseminated while I am in the U.S. during the effective period of my consent. This consent applies to administrative messages alerting elements of the U.S. Government to this consent, as well as to any reports that may relate to the purpose stated above.
+
+Except as otherwise provided by law, to include applicable U.S. Government procedures, this consent covers only references to me in foreign communications and information therefrom that relates to the purpose stated above and is effective for the period: [REDACTED] to [REDACTED]
+
+Reports containing information derived from foreign communications referencing me may only be disseminated to me and to [REDACTED] and to others as specified by the U.S. government as otherwise permitted by law, to include applicable U.S. Government procedures.
+
+---
+Signature
+
+---
+Date
+
+---
+Title
+
+---
+PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT: Authority for collecting information is contained in Executive Order 12333, as
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+amended; and procedures issued thereto. The Department of Defense Blanket Routine Uses found at: http://privacy.defense.gov/blank_et_uses.shtml
+
+apply to this information. Disclosure of requested information is voluntary but refusal to provide requested information may prevent completion of actions to effect this consent form.
+
+# USSID SP0018
+## ANNEX I - (U) FORM FOR CERTIFICATION OF OPENLY ACKNOWLEDGED ENTITIES
+
+### SECTION 1 - CERTIFICATION FORM
+
+**(U) Certification Form**
+I1.1. (U) The form below should be used for Director approvals for the collection of communications of entities that are openly acknowledged to be directed and controlled by a foreign power as specified in Section 4 of this USSID.
+
+DIRECTOR, NSA/CHIEF, CSS
+
+Certification for Openly Acknowledged Entities Under
+Section 4.A.1.(b) of the Classified Annex
+to DOD 5240.1R
+
+Certification to the Attorney General: [REDACTED] (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)
+
+(S//SI//REE) The Director, NSA, hereby certifies that [REDACTED] located in the United States and openly acknowledged to be directed and controlled by (Government X), is a new target of collection. The purpose of the surveillance is (to collect [REDACTED] intelligence regarding Government X) in accordance with valid intelligence requirements. The surveillance will entail intentional interception or deliberate selection of the target's international communications. Standard minimization procedures will be applied to any information collected that relates to U.S. persons. (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i) (b)(3)-18 USC 798
+
+---
+Director, NSA/Chief, CSS
+
+---
+Copy to: Deputy Secretary of Defense
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+# USSID SP0018
+## ANNEX K - (S//REL) [REDACTED] (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i) (b)(3)-18 USC 798
+
+### SECTION 1- (U) [REDACTED] (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
+
+(U) [REDACTED]
+K1.1. (U) [REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED] (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i) (b)(3)-18 USC 798
+
+(S//SI//REL) [REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+DOCID: 4086222
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+**Proceed To:**
+NSA | Director | SIGINT | SIGINT Staff | SIGINT Policy Staff | USSID Index
+
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 8 January 2007
+Declassify On: 20360125
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_January_25_2011_United_States_Signals_Intelligence_Directive_18/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_January_25_2011_United_States_Signals_Intelligence_Directive_18/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4feb3aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_January_25_2011_United_States_Signals_Intelligence_Directive_18/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+{
+ "title": "January 25, 2011 United States Signals Intelligence Directive 18",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "United States Intelligence Directive 18 (USSID 18) dated January 25, 2011 prescribing NSA policies and procedures as they relate to the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution and minimization procedures/rules governing the collection, retention, and dissemination of information about US persons. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [
+ "USSID"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2011-01-25",
+ "classification": [
+ "SECRET",
+ "SI"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "REL TO USA, FVEY"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Alexander, Keith B."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-18",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/january-25-2011-united-states-signals-intelligence-directive-18",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "4cfd0329277c89c11607e0fba81d9a1632d870578d6b8d1d8cf105465a0a240c",
+ "pages": 52
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_January_8_2007_Interim_Competency_Test/ACLU_-_January_8_2007_Interim_Competency_Test.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_January_8_2007_Interim_Competency_Test/ACLU_-_January_8_2007_Interim_Competency_Test.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d101d51
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_January_8_2007_Interim_Competency_Test/ACLU_-_January_8_2007_Interim_Competency_Test.md
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//[REDACTED]
+
+### Interim Competency Test for Access to BR FISA Data
+
+1. Who can make a RAS determination?
+ The FISA Court
+2. Who is authorized to query a selector within the BR data
+ HMCs
+3. Who can query the BRF data using the [REDACTED] database?
+ HMCs
+4. If you suspect that the software tools or protection mechanisms in place to regulate access to BR FISA data are not functioning properly, what actions do you take and when?
+ Cease use of the software tools against the BR FISA data immediately. Report the suspicious software to S2I4 leadership and SV4 as soon as possible.
+5. Are analysts allowed to query the BR FISA data for different [REDACTED] of a RAS-approved number? [REDACTED] in this context refers to additional [REDACTED].
+ Current legal guidance states that each identifier must be approved by the FISC individually. Current legal guidance states that each identifier must be approved by the FISC individually.
+
+ No. Until further notice, any [REDACTED] must be included in the RAS approval justification and approved by the FISA Court before being entered into the Station Table as RAS approved. The EAR protection feature should not allow an analyst to query any variations not already entered as approved.
+6. If an analyst has a RAS-approved [REDACTED] will he or she also be able to query on non-approved [REDACTED] in the BR FISA data if they are known to be associated with the approved selector?
+ No. If the approved selector has other metadata identifiers associated with it, each distinct identifier|must be individually approved by the FISA Court for RAS approval. The EAR software will prevent any non-approved selectors from being queried.
+7. If you have new information and are certain that a selector on the RAS-approved station table no longer meets the RAS standard, what action do you take?
+
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20070108
+Declassify On: 20340401
+TOP SECRET//COMINT[REDACATED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT[REDACATED
+
+Cease querying on the selector immediately. Contact an HMC and ascertain whether other existing information could support RAS. Request that one of the three authorized senior analysts change the RAS status of the selector on the Station Table and contact SV4.
+
+8. How are activities protected under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution considered for RAS determination? [Ref. FISA Primary Court Order, docket BR 09-01]
+
+ Any activities that U.S. persons undertake that are protected by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution can not be the sole basis for RAS determination.
+9. What does RAS mean? [Ref. FISA Primary Court Order, docket BR 09-01]
+
+ The Reasonable Articulable Suspicion standard is met when, based on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent persons act, there are facts giving rise to a reasonable artuculable suspicion that the telephone identifier is associated with [REDACTED] provided, however, that any telephone believed to be used by a U.S. person shall not be regarded as associated with [REDACTED] solely on the basis of [REDACTED] activities that are protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution.
+10. How does one get RAS approval for a selector? [Business Records FISA Standard Operating Procedures, March, 2009]; [Ref. FISA Primary Court Order, docket BR 09-01]
+
+ The FISA Court is currently the only authority that can grant RAS approval for any selector.
+11. What is the EAR and what does it do?
+
+ The EAR is the Emphatic Access Restriction software that prevents a query from accessing the BR FISA repository unless the query is marked as RAS-approved within the Station Table.
+12. Can you chain in [REDACTED] data?
+
+ No. Technical actions were taken to separate this data in the previous [REDACTED] repository.
+13. Analysts working with BRFISA data have limits on the amount of hops they can chain out on RAS approved selectors. What is the limit imposed by the Court Order and the limit under current S2I policy?
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT[REDACATED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT[REDACATED]
+
+Three and Two respectively
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT/[REDACTED]
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_January_8_2007_Interim_Competency_Test/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_January_8_2007_Interim_Competency_Test/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..55bde77
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_January_8_2007_Interim_Competency_Test/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+{
+ "title": "January 8, 2007 Interim Competency Test",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "A 2007 NSA competency test for NSA analysts on legal and compliance issues concerning queries of bulk telephony metadata acquired pursuant to Section 501 of FISA. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2007-01-08",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-18",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/january-8-2007-interim-competency-test",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "d4176cd12eef38c615bfaff82f074c266cc75aa63bb13206059d67cb11c5e69d",
+ "pages": 3
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_January_8_2007_NSA_PowerPoint_Presentation/ACLU_-_January_8_2007_NSA_PowerPoint_Presentation.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_January_8_2007_NSA_PowerPoint_Presentation/ACLU_-_January_8_2007_NSA_PowerPoint_Presentation.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..937aa75
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_January_8_2007_NSA_PowerPoint_Presentation/ACLU_-_January_8_2007_NSA_PowerPoint_Presentation.md
@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+The overall classification of this presentation is
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20070108
+Declassify On: 20301108
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Welcome to OVSC1204
+Business Records (BR) FISA
+
+In this presentation you will receive information
+from the Office of General Council (OGC) that
+concerns the metadata obtained pursuant to
+the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
+(FISA) Business Records (BR).
+
+At the conclusion of this course there will be a
+test for BR database access.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Unclassified
+Legal Precautions
+
+Examples cited are for training purposes only
+
+The specific details of each operational
+situation will need to be assessed to ensure
+correct legal guidance can be provided
+
+Contact Oversight and Compliance (SV) or
+the Office of General Council (OGC) for
+assistance
+Unclassified
+
+Unclassified
+The Office of General
+Counsel
+
+OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSE
+NSA
+
+Unclassified
+
+Roles and Responsibilities of a BR
+Analyst
+
+A BR-cleared analyst must be able to:
+* Describe the framework for BR production and analysis
+* Recognize which Foreign Powers are the only authorized targets of this
+ data
+* Define the RAS standard
+* State the limitations for querying BR data
+* Apply correct minimization procedures
+* Name points of contact for questions
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+BRF Metadata
+
+➤Pursuant to Court authorization, NSA
+is provided telephony metadata
+NSA is provided the data from [REDACTED] US
+service providers?
+➤Use of data is for protection of the
+Homeland
+➤NSA is authorized to conduct contact
+chaining and [REDACTED] on the data
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Verification Requirement
+
+➤ Verify that the data is of the type
+authorized by the order, specifically,
+call detail records (telephony metadata)
+
+➤ Under NO circumstances may the
+substantive content of communications
+be received under this order
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Unclassified
+
+Specific Court-Ordered
+Procedures and Restrictions
+
+The remainder of the slides in this
+presentation pertain to specific court
+ordered procedures and restrictions
+for this authority
+Unclassified
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Standard for Accessing Data
+
+Any query of the data archive can occur
+only after a particular known telephone
+identifier has been associated with either:
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+
+AND
+* The query is based on a Reasonable
+ Articulable Suspicion (RAS)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Standard for Accessing Data
+
+Seed queries must be:
+➤ Specifically known telephone identifiers that
+meet the targeting standard articulated by the
+FISA Court (FISC)
+* Examples of Identifiers
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * Telephone numbers
+ * As well as other unique identifiers
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Standard for Accessing Data
+
+There must be facts giving rise to a
+reasonable, articulable suspicion (RAS) that
+the original telephone identifier is associated
+with [REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+RAS: Formula
+
+Analysts are NOT free to use a telephone
+selector based on a hunch or guess.
+
+RAS requires a decision based on
+specific facts that would cause a
+reasonable person to form such an
+opinion.
+
+The standard requires some minimal level
+of objective justification.
+First Amendment Considerations
+
+A telephone selector believed to be used
+by a US person shall not be regarded as
+associated with [REDACTED] solely on the
+basis of activities protected by the First
+Amendment.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Other Access Requirements
+
+An automatic audit log must be generated
+for each occasion when the information is
+accessed.
+The Log must contain:
+➤ User Login
+* User IP address
+* Date and time
+➤ Retrieval request
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Manner of Accessing Data
+
+NSA is permitted to perform two types of
+queries:
+1. Contact chaining
+2. [REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Minimization Rules
+
+USSID 18 minimization procedures must be
+applied to the activity
+
+Prior to disseminating any US person
+identifying information, the Chief of Information
+Sharing Services must determine that it is
+related to counterterrorism and that it is
+necessary to understand or assess the data
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Questions?
+
+Office of General
+Counsel
+(Operations/Intel Law)
+[REDACTED]
+DL_GCOPS
+[REDACTED]
+
+NSOC has an attorney on call 24/7!
+
+End of BR FISA Video
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_January_8_2007_NSA_PowerPoint_Presentation/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_January_8_2007_NSA_PowerPoint_Presentation/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2ddacc5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_January_8_2007_NSA_PowerPoint_Presentation/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+{
+ "title": "January 8, 2007 NSA PowerPoint Presentation",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "A 2007 NSA PowerPoint presentation for NSA personnel with access to bulk telephony metadata acquired pursuant to Section 501 of FISA. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2007-01-08",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-18",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/january-8-2007-nsa-powerpoint-presentation",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "b6b430d5b98b4c648891627180897e266f1b842757e9cb7fa5679ecd6e67ddfc",
+ "pages": 18
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_January_8_2007_NSA_Web-Based_Training_Slides/ACLU_-_January_8_2007_NSA_Web-Based_Training_Slides.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_January_8_2007_NSA_Web-Based_Training_Slides/ACLU_-_January_8_2007_NSA_Web-Based_Training_Slides.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..10dccc3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_January_8_2007_NSA_Web-Based_Training_Slides/ACLU_-_January_8_2007_NSA_Web-Based_Training_Slides.md
@@ -0,0 +1,954 @@
+TOP SECRET
+(Security Classification)
+
+ROUTING
+
+| TO: | NAME AND ADDRESS | DATE | INITIALS |
+| :------------ | :--------------- | :--- | :------- |
+| 1 | | | |
+| 2 | | | |
+| 3 | | | |
+| 4 | | | |
+| ACTION | DIRECT REPLY | PREPARE REPLY |
+| APPROVAL | DISPATCH | RECOMMENDATION |
+| COMMENT | FILE | RETURN |
+| CONCURRENCE | INFORMATION | SIGNATURE |
+| REMARKS: | | |
+
+CONTROL NO.
+
+COPY OF
+
+FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO. DATE
+
+Handle Via
+CONTAINS SENSITIVE COMINT
+COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION Channels
+
+Access to this document will be restricted to
+those approved for the following specific activities:
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+CONTAINS SENSITIVE
+COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION
+
+NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
+Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET
+(Security Classification)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+# Business Records FISA
+## Business Records (BR) FISA Course Welcome
+
+**Lesson "Welcome" Slide 1 "Welcome"**
+
+| | |
+| :-------------------------------------- | :---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| **Lesson 1** -Introduction to the | (U//FOUO) Welcome to the Business Records (BR) FISA web-based training (WBT). |
+| **Business Records (BR) FISA** | |
+| **Lesson 2** -Reasonable Articulable | (TS//SI//NF) This course provides training for analysts who will be authorized to query the raw metadata collected by the BR FISA. |
+| **Suspicion (RAS)** | |
+| **Lesson 3** - First Amendment | (U//FOUO) The course is comprised of five Lessons. |
+| **Considerations** | |
+| **Lesson 4** - The BR FISC Order**Lesson 5** - Accessing, Sharing, Dissemination, and Retention | (TS//SI//NF) The lessons contained in the BR FISA course are: |
+| | - Lesson 1-Introduction to the Business Records (BR) FISA |
+| | - Lesson 2-Reasonable Articulable Suspicion (RAS) |
+| | - Lesson 3 - First Amendment Considerations |
+| | - Lesson 4-The BR FISC Order |
+| | - Lesson 5-Accessing, Sharing, Dissemination, and Retention |
+| | Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52 |
+| | Dated: 20070108 |
+| | Declassify On: 20341001 |
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+# Business Records FISA
+## Business Records (BR) FISA Course Welcome
+
+**Lesson "Welcome" Slide 2 "Lesson Titles and Lesson objectives"**
+
+(U//FOUO) The course begins with an overview of the BR FISA authority and then moves into an overview of the Reasonable Articulable Suspicion standard. Next, students will explore First Amendment considerations before taking a closer look at the BR FISC Order. The BR Order points out special considerations that distinguish this FISA authority from other FISAs typically encountered at this Agency. The final lesson of this course provides specific rules and procedures regarding the access, sharing, dissemination, and retention of BR FISA metadata.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+## Business Records FISA
+### Business Records (BR) FISA Course Welcome
+
+**Lesson "Welcome", Slide 3 Course Objectives**
+
+- Identify terms and processes associated with the Business Records FISA
+- Identify common sources of information used for determining RAS
+- State limitations for targeting US persons under the RAS standard
+- Identify access, sharing, dissemination, and retention procedures under the BR FISA Order
+
+At the conclusion of this course you should be able to:
+
+- Identify terms and processes associated with the Business Records FISA Order
+- Identify common sources of information used for determining RAS
+- State limitations for targeting US persons under the RAS standard
+- Identify access, sharing, dissemination, and retention procedures under the BR FISA Court Order
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+# Business Records FISA
+## Business Records (BR) FISA Course Welcome
+
+**Lesson "Welcome", Slide 4 "Legal Readings Access"**
+
+(U//FOUO) As you progress through the different course lessons you may want to also access the related Legal Readings. The two core readings are the Reasonable Articulable Suspicion (RAS) memorandum written by OGC and the BR FISC Order Issued by the FISA Court.
+
+(U//FOUO) You can access these documents by clicking on the Legal Readings button located in eCampus.
+
+## Business Records FISA
+
+### Lesson 1 - Introduction to the Business Records (BR) FISA
+
+**Lesson 1 Slide 1 Introduction and Definitions**
+
+BR FISA = Specific authority given by the FISA Court (FISC) that allows NSA to obtain metadata from the business records of certain specified telecommunication companies.
+
+(TO/SWNF) The Business Records (BR) FISA is a specific authority given by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court (FISC) that allows NSA to obtain metadata from the business records of certain specified telecommunication companies.
+
+(TS/SWNF) This data consists of telephony metadata obtained from business records provided under a court order by US [REDACTED].
+
+(TS/GWWNF) This FISA is authorized because the FISC recognizes there is a counterterrorism-interest in obtaining those business records. However, because there is a great deal of US person communications within those business records, the FISC and NSA have instituted strict guidelines on the collection, processing, retention, and dissemination of the metadata.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) You can access the most current BR Order from the links on the Legal Readings button in this course.
+
+Mouse Over: [1] (TS//SI//NF) refers to electronic communications service providers located inside of the United States who are directed to assist the US Government [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20070108
+Declassify On: 20341001
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+## Business Records FISA
+
+### Lesson 1 - Introduction to the Business Records (BR) FISA
+
+**Lesson 1 Slide 2 Introduction to the BR -Objectives**
+
+**Lesson 1 - Introduction to the BR Objectives:**
+
+* Identify the purpose of the BR FISA
+* Recognize the [REDACTED] groups covered by the BR FISA Order
+* Define terms relevant to the BR FISA Order: telephony metadata, telephony identifier, hops, and Seed
+
+(TS//SI//NF) This lesson will enable you to:
+
+* Identify the purpose of the BR FISA
+* Recognize the [REDACTED] groups covered by the BR FISA Court Order
+* Define terms relevant to the BR FISA Order: telephony metadata, telephony identifier, hops, and Seed
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+## Business Records FISA
+
+### Lesson 1 - Introduction to the Business Records (BR) FISA
+
+**Lesson 1 Slide 3 Overview of RAS**
+
+**Overview of RAS**
+
+The term associated is defined in the RAS Memo to mean, "engaged in a common enterprise" with:
+
+* [REDACTED]
+
+or
+
+* One of the groups designated by the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) to have allied itself with [REDACTED]
+ * Someone acting as their agent.
+
+* No other groups other than those listed in the BR FISC Order can be used to justify access under the BR FISA authority.
+
+(U//FOUO) Before we begin, you will need to understand some key terms. To access a vocabulary list please use the legal readings link on the right side of the slide and also when you finish this course review a few of the terms you'll use in this course now.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The term associated is defined to mean "engaged in a common enterprise" with:
+
+* [REDACTED] listed in the Order or [REDACTED].
+
+* The BR FISA Order list specific groups that are known to be affiliated with [REDACTED]. These are groups designated by the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) to have allied them selves with [REDACTED].
+
+* No other groups other than those listed in the BR FISC Order can be used to justify access under the BR FISA authority. Information obtained from a Homeland Mission Coordinator (HMC). Because the FISC Order is typically renewed every 60-90 days, the list of terrorist groups is subject to change.
+
+* [1] The NCTC list also identifies known aliases for groups listed in the Order.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+## Business Records FISA
+
+### Lesson 1 - Introduction to the Business Records (BR) FISA
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Here's the definition of telephony metadata which you will need throughout this course.
+
+**Lesson 1 Slide 4 "Telephony Metadata and Telephony Identifiers"**
+
+"Telephony Metadata and Telephony Identifiers"
+**Telephony metadata**
+Metadata collected – includes comprehensive communications routing information
+
+* Originating and terminating telephone numbers
+* International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) numbers
+* Mobile Subscriber Integrated Services Digital Network (MSISDN) numbers
+* International Mobile station Equipment Identity (IMEI) numbers
+* Trunk identifiers
+* Telephone calling card numbers
+* Time and duration of calls
+
+Telephony metadata does NOT include
+
+* Substantive content of any communication
+* Name, address, or financial information about a subscriber or customer
+
+Telephony identifiers correlate to Business Records metadata collected by the providers, such as MSISDN or a calling card number. Telephony identifiers are also known as: [REDACTED] identifiers.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The Telephony Metadata obtained from the BR FISA is comprehensive communications routing information. Specifically it may contain::
+
+* Originating and terminating telephone numbers
+* International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) numbers
+* Mobile Subscriber Integrated Services Digital Network (MSISDN) numbers
+* International Mobile station Equipment Identity (IMEI) numbers
+* The trunk identifier
+* Telephone calling card numbers
+* Time and duration of call
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The BR FISA authority does not extend to the content of these communications. The BR FISA does NOT include substantive content of any communication or the name, address, or financial information about a subscriber or customer.
+
+(S//SI//REL) Telephony identifiers are also known as [REDACTED] identifiers.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+## Business Records FISA
+
+### Lesson 1 - Introduction to the Business Records (BR) FISA
+
+**Lesson 1 Slide 5 "Seed and Hops"**
+
+| First HOP | RAS-approved Seed |
+| :-------- | :---------------- |
+| | Selector One |
+| Second HOP | Selector Two |
+
+FISC authorizes third hop chaining,
+CT Policy limits chaining through 2 hops
+
+Quantity of
+contacts
+only
+
+(TS//SI//NF) A telephony identifier (selector), is called a Seed when it is being used to search the BR repository. When querying the BR metadata repository, Business Records FISA (BRF)-approved individuals, also known as BRF chainers, conduct contact chaining queries in [REDACTED] order to obtain the contacts between a seed and other telephone identifiers (numbers in contact with the RAS-approved-Seed).
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Under the BR FISA Order, a query always begins with a RAS-approved-Seed. In this case the RAS-approved-telephone identifier is called a 'Seed' because it is being used for chaining and analysis to create a 'tree' of contacts and identify new potential terrorist associations.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The BR FISC Order authorizes "3-hop chaining"; however it is CT's[.1] recommended practice to restrict chaining to two hops. This means that telephony identifiers up to two hops away from the Seed may be chained. Chaining reveals the contacts of the identifier.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+## Business Records FISA
+
+### Lesson 1 - Introduction to the Business Records (BR) FISA
+
+**Lesson 1 Slide 6 "Associations to establish a RAS nomination"**
+
+**Associations to establish a RAS nomination**
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+The Foreign Powers Pick List.
+[.2] This appears on all
+nominations
+
+**Associations to establish a RAS nomination**
+
+Reasonable Articulable Suspicion (RAS) standard - requires that an NSA analyst must be able to point to a single fact that points to the fact that a selector may be associated with a terrorist group listed in the FISC Order before we are authorized to conduct analysis on it.
+
+RAS determination - should cause a reasonable person to suspect that the identifier is associated with one of the terrorist organizations named in the Order.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Recall that the BR FISC Order allows NSA to obtain an immense amount of data and US metadata contained in the Business Records. The FISC Order contains strict guidelines on when this metadata is allowed to be accessed and when it is not. It must be associated with specific terrorist organizations named in the Order. It also must meet a standard that is referred to as the Reasonable Articulable Suspicion (RAS) Standard. In a nutshell, the RAS standard requires that an NSA analyst must be able to point to a single fact that points to the fact that a seed/telephone selector may be associated with a terrorist group listed in the FISC Order before we are authorized to conduct analysis on it.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) We will address the RAS standard in detail in the next lesson, but for now, understand that the fact or facts which make up a RAS determination should cause a reasonable person to suspect that the identifier is associated with one of the terrorist organizations named in the Order.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+## Business Records FISA
+
+### Lesson 1 - Introduction to the Business Records (BR) FISA
+
+**Lesson 1 Slide 7 "Legal Disclaimer"**
+
+**Legal Disclaimer**
+
+This course:
+
+| IS NOT designed to take the place of: | IS designed to enhance understanding of: |
+| :------------------------------------ | :--------------------------------------- |
+| Homeland Mission Coordinator (HMC) | BR FISC Order |
+| Office of Oversight & Compliance (SV) | RAS standards |
+| Office of General Counsel (OGC) | |
+
+Renewed approximately every 60-90 days
+
+Contact your local HMC, SV, or OGC for case-specific guidance.
+
+(U//FOUO) This course is not designed to take the place of specific guidance from a Homeland Mission Coordinator (HMC), the Office of Oversight & Compliance (SV), or from the Office of General Counsel (OGC). The course is designed to enhance your understanding of how to comply with the BR FISC Order and to understand the RAS standards used in concert with BR FISA.
+
+(U//FOUO) Because, the BR FISC Order is renewed approximately every 60-90 days, the FISC may change the authority or place new restrictions in a new FISC Order. It is important to understand that unique operational circumstances may result in a change in guidance from this course. Therefore, if you experience any uncertainty (delete) it is always sound advice to contact your local HMC, SV, or OGC for case-specific guidance.
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+## Business Records FISA
+
+### Lesson 1 - Introduction to the Business Records (BR) FISA
+
+**Lesson 1 Slide 8 "Summary"**
+
+**Summary**
+
+You should now be able to
+
+* Identify the purpose of the BR FISA Order
+* Recognize the [REDACTED] groups covered by the BR FISA Order
+* Define terms relevant to the BR FISA Order: telephony metadata, telephony identifier, hops, and Seed
+
+(TS//SI//NF) You have now completed the lesson that discusses the BR FISA authority.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) You should now be able to:
+
+* Identify the purpose of the BR FISA Order
+* Recognize the [REDACTED] groups covered by the BR FISA Order
+* Define terms relevant to the BR FISA Order: telephony metadata, telephony identifier, hops, and Seed
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+## Business Records FISA
+### Lesson 2: Reasonable Articulable Suspicion (RAS)
+
+**Lesson 2 Slide 1 “Lesson Objectives[.1] "**
+
+**BR FISA course lessons: Lesson 2 - Summary of the Standard**
+
+* Define the Reasonable Articulable Standard (RAS) used to justify a BR FISA metadata search
+* Identify prohibitions against instinct and hunches in contrast to facts
+* Identify common sources of information used for justifying a RAS
+* List the common sources of information on which analysts rely in making RAS determinations
+
+(TS//SI//NF) This lesson provides an overview of the Reasonable Articulable Suspicion (RAS) Standard. RAS guidance is outlined in an OGC memo. It provides definitions and descriptions that will help you understand how to satisfy RAS and how to apply it to [REDACTED] identifiers under the BR Court Order.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Recall that the BR FISA Order lists those specific terrorist groups that are associated with either [REDACTED]. You can access the most current BR Order from the links on the Legal Readings button in this course.
+
+(TS//CI//NF) The BR FISA Order also states that in order to access the BR FISA metadata, NSA must establish RAS on each selector that it wishes to query within the metadata. Only a Homeland Mission Coordinator (or named individual in the Order) may make a RAS determination and thus authorize a selector for querying. However, you are responsible for ensuring that a selector has been approved for RAS prior to querying the BR FISA metadata. You may even be responsible for drafting RAS requests outlining why a selector should be RAS approved.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) This lesson will enable you to:
+
+* Define the Reasonable Articulable Standard (RAS) used to justify a BR FISA metadata search
+* Identify prohibitions against instinct and hunches in contrast to facts
+* List the common sources of information on which analysts rely in making RAS determinations
+* List the ten most typical sources of information on which analysts rely in making assessments of Reasonable Articulable Suspicion (RAS)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20070108
+Declassify On: 20341001
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN-
+
+## Business Records FISA
+### Lesson 2: Reasonable Articulable Suspicion (RAS)
+
+**Lesson 2 Slide 2 "Summary of RAS Standard"**
+
+**Summary of RAS Standard**
+
+**BR FISC Order**
+
+Government may request to use specific identifiers to query the metadata for purposes of obtaining foreign intelligence through contact chaining or
+* telephone numbers
+* [REDACTED]
+
+"Reasonable Articulable Suspicion standard"
+
+(TS//SI/NF) You will recall from Lesson One that the BR FISA Order is authorized because the FISC recognizes there is a counterterrorism interest in obtaining those business records. However, because NSA is receiving a great deal of US person telephony records, we have strict guidelines on when NSA can access the metadata under this authority. One of the requirements is that in order to access the metadata, NSA must establish RAS on each selector prior to querying the BR FISA repositories.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The BR FISC Order states that NSA may query specific identifiers [REDACTED] that satisfy the RAS standard for purposes of obtaining counterterrorism intelligence.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In order to assist in determining when a selector has satisfied the RAS standard, the Office of General Counsel (OGC) has issued a RAS Memo to help Signals Intelligence Directorate (SID) personnel make RAS determinations on telephone identifiers. The memo contains guidelines that apply to both the BR and Pen Register and Trap and Trace (PR/TT) FISA Orders.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+## Business Records FISA
+### Lesson 2: Reasonable Articulable Suspicion (RAS)
+
+**Lesson 2 Slide 3 "RAS Standard Definition"**
+
+**RAS Standard Definition**
+
+**RAS standard requirements**
+
+* fact(s) that cause suspicion the number is associated with [REDACTED]
+* must be approved by the a Homeland Mission Coordinator or other named offical in the FISC Order before you use a telephone number identifier to query the database of records
+* no hunches or guesses to justify targeting
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In order to query the BR FISA metadata, BRF authorized individuals may only query selectors that have been RAS approved by a Homeland Mission Coordinator (HMC) (or other named officials in the FISA Order). A HMC determines, based on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life, reasonable and prudent persons act, whether or not there is a reasonable articulable suspicion that the selector is associated with [REDACTED]. There must be at least one qualifying fact giving rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion that the identifier is associated with one of the terrorist groups listed in the BR FISA Order.[.3]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The RAS must be approved BEFORE you can [.4] use an identifier to query the BR metadata. Analysts are not allowed to use a hunch or a guess to nominate selectors for RAS. RAS nominations or requests nominations must specify facts that would cause a reasonable person to form that suspicion.
+
+(U//FOUO) The RAS standard is far less than proof by "probable cause" or "a preponderance of evidence" - it merely requires one fact that can be articulated which would cause a reasonable person to form a suspicion.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+## Business Records FISA
+### Lesson 2: Reasonable Articulable Suspicion (RAS)
+
+**Lesson 2 Slide 4 "Sources of Information” (Encl. 3)**
+
+**Sources of Information**
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+1. A published NSA report
+2. Unpublished SIGINT collection
+3. [REDACTED]
+4. Content analysis
+5. SIGDEV work
+6. Any content analysis where a targeted person [REDACTED]
+7. Direct communication
+8. NSA target knowledge databases
+9. [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Searching the Business Records metadata is targeting, not analysis. Therefore to make a RAS determination, other information sources must be used for research and analysis. Remember that the RAS standard is merely a reason for suspicion through one or more stated facts, so the standard is not as high as most FISC content surveillance authorities.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Information used as a basis to satisfy the standard often comes from one of the following in-house resources[.2] :
+1. A published NSA report
+2. Unpublished SIGINT collection where new accounts have been revealed (and can be documented)
+3. [REDACTED]
+4. Content analysis that references new identifiers in phone [REDACTED] collection
+5. SIGDEV work tied to published information or part of a target development effort
+6. Any content analysis where a targeted person [REDACTED]
+7. Direct electronic communication with a identifier that is already known to be associated with the Foreign Powers through prior BR / PRTT or other SIGINT resources
+8. Information from NSA target knowledge databases such as [REDACTED]
+9. Information obtained from [REDACTED] belonging to one of the Foreign Powers
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+## Business Records FISA
+### Lesson 2: Reasonable Articulable Suspicion (RAS)
+
+**Lesson 2 Slide 5 "Sources of Information" (Encl. 3)**
+
+**Sources of Information**
+
+* SIGINT reports
+* Investigations by the CIA or FBI
+* FISA surveillance data derived from other authorized targets
+* SIGDEV work tied to published information
+* Other transcripts
+
+| FDE | Published reports |
+| :------------------ | :--------------------------- |
+| CIA | Preliminary investigations |
+| NCTC | Full field investigations |
+| [REDACTED] | FISA surveillance |
+| Public Record | SIGDEV work tied to published infor |
+| [REDACTED] | Transcripts |
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The RAS memo also lists other sources of information available for researching a RAS: These include but are not limited to:
+Published reports such as:
+* SIGINT reports
+* Investigations by the CIA or FBI
+* FISA surveillance data derived from other authorized targets
+* SIGDEV work tied to published information
+* Other transcripts
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Looking at the IC and public sector (open source) [2] sources we use, these include:
+* The Federal Bureau of Investigation
+* The Central Intelligence Agency
+* The National Counterterrorism Center
+* [REDACTED]
+
+* Public records available on the internet, news papers or other public resources[.3]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+## Business Records FISA
+### Lesson 2: Reasonable Articulable Suspicion (RAS)
+
+**Lesson 2 Slide 6 "Summary"**
+
+**SUMMARY**
+
+You should now be able to:
+
+* Define the Reasonable Articulable Standard (RAS) used to justify a BR FISA metadata search
+* Identify prohibitions against instinct and hunches in contrast to facts
+* Identify common sources of information used for justifying a RAS
+* List the common sources of information on which analysts rely in making RAS determinations
+
+(U//FOUO) You have completed the lesson summarizing the RAS standard
+
+(TS//SI//NF) You should now be able to:
+
+* Define the Reasonable Articulable Standard (RAS) used to justify a BR FISA metadata search.
+* Identify prohibitions against instinct and hunches in contrast to facts
+* Identify common sources of information used for justifying a RAS
+* List the common sources of information on which analysts rely in making RAS determinations
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//COMINT/NOFORN
+
+## Business Records FISA /
+### Lesson 3: First Amendment Considerations
+
+**Lesson 3 Slide 1 "Lesson Objectives"**
+
+**Lesson 3 - First Amendment Considerations**
+
+* List some basic protections of US persons provided by the First Amendment of the US Constitution.
+* Describe the prohibition against using First Amendment protected activities as the sole justification for a RAS involving a US person.
+
+(TS//SI/NF) This lesson is a continuation on the Reasonable Articulable Suspension (RAS) standard guidelines.
+
+(TS//SI/NF) RAS determinations are approved by a HMC (or an official named in the Order) BEFORE queries can be made using a particular selector within the BR metadata. Another restriction associated with RAS is the prohibition of making a RAS determination based solely on activities protected by the First Amendment.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) At the conclusion of this lesson, you should be able to:
+
+* List some basic protections for US persons provided by the First Amendment of the US Constitution.
+* Describe the prohibition against using First Amendment protected activities as the sole justification for RAS involving a US person (as defined in USSID SPOO18).
+
+Derived From: NOA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated. 20070108
+Declassify On: 20041001-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+## Business Records FISA
+
+### Lesson 3: First Amendment Considerations
+
+**Lesson 3 Slide 2 "The Five Protections of the First Amendment"**
+
+"The Five Protections of the First Amendment"
+
+(U//FOUO) The First Amendment of the US Constitution prohibits Congress from making any laws that would infringe on the free exercise of:
+
+* Religion
+* Speech
+* The press
+* Peaceable assembly
+* To petition the government for redress of grievances
+
+(TS//SI/NF) Remember the RAS Memo clarifies the FISC's prohibition of a RAS determination based solely on activities that are protected by the First Amendment. This applies when targeting a US person as defined in USSID SP0018 or a person reasonably believed to be located inside the United States.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+## Business Records FISA
+
+### Lesson 3: First Amendment Considerations
+
+**Lesson 3 Slide 4 "Summary"**
+
+**SUMMARY**
+
+You should now be able to:
+
+* List five basic protections for US persons provided by the First Amendment of the US Constitution
+* Describe the prohibition against using First Amendment protected activities as the sole source of justification for a selector involving a US person.
+
+(TS//SI/NF) You should now be able to:
+
+* List five basic protections for US persons provided by the First Amendment of the US Constitution.
+* Describe the prohibition against using First Amendment protected activities as the sole source of justification for an identifier.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+## Business Records FISA /
+### Lesson 4: The BR Order
+
+**Lesson 4 Slide 1 "Lesson Objectives"**
+
+In this lesson we will examine a Business Records (BR) FISA Court (FISC) Order.
+
+At the conclusion of this lesson you will be able to:
+
+* Identify BR FISC Orders as NSA's authorization to collect telephony metadata from specified US telecommunication companies in order to protect against international terrorism
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In this lesson we will examine a Business Records (BR) FISA Court (FISC) Order. At the conclusion of this lesson you will be able to:
+
+* Identify BR FISC Orders as NSA's authorization to collect telephony metadata from specified US telecommunication companies in order to protect against international terrorism
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20070108-
+Deelassify On: 20341001
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+## Business Records FISA
+### Lesson 4: The BR Order
+
+**Lesson 4 Slide 2 "What are BR Orders?"**
+
+"What are BR Orders?"
+[REDACTED]
+60 - 90 days
+
+"What are BR Orders?"
+
+The authority is for collection of tangible things gathered by the FBI to protect the US against international terrorism.
+
+* The RAS standard requires an ability to articulate an association with [REDACTED] terrorist groups listed within the order.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) BR Orders allow NSA to obtain telephony metadata from US telecommunication companies, compelled to do so under a court order. This FISA Order requires specified telecommunication providers to share business records in the form of telephony metadata with the US government.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The BR FISA authority is for collection of tangible things gathered to protect the United States against international terrorism. BR Orders are renewed approximately every 60-90 days. We will refer to the valid order as the FISA BR Order.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Since this authority is concerned only with metadata and no content of those communications, NSA has a lower burden of proof for targeting an identifier when compared to other FISA authorities.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) All that is required is that a selector meet the Reasonable Articulable Suspicion (RAS) standard that a selector is associated with a terrorist group listed in the BR FISA Order. All of the listed terrorist groups are associated with [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) All identifiers are approved by an HMC (or official named in the Order) prior to querying the authorized repositories.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) NSA can use identifiers, after they have been approved for RAS, to query the BR metadata for counterterrorism threats to the homeland. The BR Court Order only authorizes contact chaining and [REDACTED] queries within the metadata.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+## Business Records FISA
+### Lesson 4: The BR Order
+
+**Lesson 4 Slide 3 "Tangible Things as only Telephony metadata"**
+
+"Tangible Things as only Telephony metadata"
+
+**"tangible things"**
+"an electronic copy of telephony metadata (call records)."
+
+* Comprehensive communications routing information including:
+ * Origination and terminating telephone number
+ * International Mobile subscriber Identity (IMSI) number
+ * International Mobile station Equipment Identity (IMEI) number
+ * The trunk identifier
+ * Telephone calling card numbers
+ * Time and duration of call
+
+The telephony metadata does not include the substantive content of any communication or the name, address, or financial information of a subscriber or customer within these.
+
+(TS//SI/NF) The BR Order clarifies "tangible things" to mean an electronic copy of telephony metadata (call records). This includes:
+
+* Comprehensive communications routing information including:
+ * Originating and terminating telephone number
+ * International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) number
+ * International Mobile station Equipment Identity (IMEI) number
+ * The trunk identifier
+ * Telephone calling card numbers
+ * Time and duration of call
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The BR FISA Order specifically states that the telephony metadata does not include the substantive content of any communication or the name, address, or financial information of a subscriber or customer within these. The FISA Order deliberately restricts access to only communications metadata.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+## Business Records FISA
+### Lesson 4: The BR Order
+
+**Lesson 4 Slide 4 "Affiliation with Foreign Power"**
+
+"Affiliation with Foreign Power"
+
+**RAS (Reasonable Articulable Suspicion)**
+
+* Justifies the search of metadata
+* a statement of fact that supports a reasonable suspicion that the identifier is affiliated with one of the terrorist groups listed in the BR FISA Order.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The metadata obtained from the BR FISA authority is used to establish connections with terrorist organizations by using contact chaining and [REDACTED] queries. These queries look at the contacts of known terrorists to help NSA establish new connections and affiliations with terrorist groups listed in the court order (i.e. the Foreign Powers).
+
+(TS//SI/NF) Before searching the BR metadata repository, NSA must establish RAS on each selector in order to conduct a search within the metadata. RAS is a statement of fact that supports a reasonable suspicion that the identifier is affiliated with one of the terrorist groups listed in the BR FISA Order. Only Homeland Mission Coordinators and others named in the BR FISA Order can make a RAS determination.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Remember, the RAS cannot be solely based on activities which are protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) To see samples of RAS statements please open the, 'RAS statements' Job Aid located in the legal readings for this course
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//COMINT/NOFORN
+
+## Business Records FISA /
+### Lesson 4: The BR Order
+
+**Lesson 4 Slide 5 "Summary"**
+
+(TS//SI//NF) You should now be able to:
+
+* Identify BR FISC orders as NSA's authorization to collect telephony metadata from specified US telecommunication companies in order to protect against international terrorism
+
+(TS//SI//NF) You should now be able to:
+
+* Identify BR FISC orders as NSA's authorization to collect telephony metadata from specified US telecommunication companies in order to protect against international terrorism
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+## Business Records FISA /
+### Lesson 5: Accessing, Sharing, Dissemination, and Retention L5S1
+
+**Lesson Objectives**
+
+In this lesson we will continue to examine the Business Records (BR) FISA Court (FISC) Order. At the conclusion of this lesson you will be able to:
+
+* Distinguish between analysts authorized to query BR FISA metadata and individuals authorized to receive results of those queries
+* Identify further limitations on accessing, sharing, disseminating, and retaining BR FISA metadata
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In this lesson we will continue to examine the Business Records (BR) FISA Court (FISC) Order. At the conclusion of this lesson you will be able to:
+
+* Distinguish between analysts authorized to query BR FISA metadata and individuals authorized to receive results of those queries
+* Identify further limitations on accessing, sharing, disseminating, and retaining BR FISA metadata
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Derived From: NSA/CCCM-1-52
+Dated: 20070108
+Declassify On. 20341001
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+## Business Records FISA /
+### Lesson 5: Accessing, Sharing, Dissemination, and Retention L5S2
+
+**The BR FISA Query Analyst**
+
+The Director of NSA (DIRNSA) strictly controls access to and use of raw BR metadata.
+
+"The BR Analyst"
+The Director of NSA (DIRNSA) strictly controls access to and use of raw BR metadata.
+
+Query access to BR raw metadata is limited to individuals trained and designated as BR FISA Query Analysts.
+
+"The BR Analyst"
+Query access to BR raw metadata is limited to individuals trained and designated as BR FISA Query Analysts.
+
+The BR metadata is authorized to be stored in two NSA repositories- [REDACTED]
+
+"The BR Analyst"
+The BR metadata is authorized to be stored in two NSA repositories- [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The Director of NSA (DIRNSA) strictly controls access to and use of raw BR metadata.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Query access to BR raw metadata is limited to individuals trained and designated as BR FISA Query Analysts. This is the only group permitted to query raw BR FISA metadata for contact chaining and [REDACTED] purposes. The BR FISA Order limits the number of individuals who can be named in this category as well as how many can be designated as Homeland Mission Coordinators. There are several other categories of people who are authorized to access the raw metadata such as technical individuals and Data Integrity BR FISA Analysts; those who access the repository for the purpose of ensuring that the data is compliant.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The BR metadata is authorized to be stored in two NSA repositories- [REDACTED] BR Authorized Query Analysts are permitted to query BR raw metadata within [REDACTED] to receive query results.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+## Business Records FISA
+
+### Lesson 5: Accessing, Sharing, Dissemination, and Retention L5S3
+
+**Oversight for Access Restrictions**
+
+Oversight for Access Restrictions
+
+BR Court order requires logging for auditing purposes:
+
+* Query requests
+* User login
+* IP address
+* Date and time of the access
+
+(U//FOUO) This is very important so we'll reiterate it with more detail.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Signals Intelligence Directorate's Office of Oversight and Compliance has implemented a series of auditing controls designed to limit access to the BR FISA metadata only to those who have been briefed by the OGC and those who have completed all of the required training.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) When the raw metadata is accessed in order to perform a query, an automatic audit log is recorded that includes:
+
+* Query request
+* User login
+* Internet protocol address
+* Date and time of the access
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+## Business Records FISA
+
+### Lesson 5: Accessing, Sharing, Dissemination, and Retention L5S4
+
+**Distributing BR FISA query results**
+
+It is the BR FISA Query Analyst's responsibility to ensure that the recipient of the query results is approved to receive BR derived information.
+
+CRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Lesson 5 "Distributing BR FISA query results" I thin
+and the SIGINT manual. I am suggesting:
+(TS//SI//NF) With regards to distributing BP-
+disseminations. Sharing is defined as [REDACTED]
+authorized to receive BR FISA ~
+either oral or written, to be"
+(TS/SW/NF)"
+approve
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Remember only a select number of analysts are authorized to query the raw metadata.
+
+(TS//SW/NF) When distributing BR FISA query results the distributions are categorized as those (internal to NSA which will be called 'Sharing' and those outside of NSA which will be called 'Dissemination'.
+
+(TS//SI/NF) It is the BR FISA Query Analyst's responsibility to ensure that the recipient of the query results is approved to receive BR derived information.
+
+[REDACTED] ing sharing
+
+he consistent with USSID 18
+[REDACTED] have been
+[REDACTED] orized as sharing and
+[REDACTED] SA query results,
+[REDACTED] is
+[REDACTED] approx
+[REDACTED] roans
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+## Business Records FISA
+
+### Lesson 5: Accessing, Sharing, Dissemination, and Retention L5S5
+
+**Definition of query results**
+
+(U//FOUO) Before we discuss distribution, it is important to define query results. So, what are query results?
+
+(TS//SI/NF) A "query result" is a piece of information that would not have been known, or a statement of fact or opinion that would not have been made, but for information revealed following a BR or Pen Register and Trap and Trace (PR/TT) query using a RAS (Reasonable Articulable Suspicion) -approved selector.
+
+* This definition includes information in the form in which it appears immediately following a BR or PR/TT query, or [REDACTED] as well as information that has changed form, e.g., a statement describing certain links in a contact chain. Summaries derived from BR chaining are also query results.
+* This definition makes no distinction between minimized and unminimized information.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+## Business Records FISA /
+### Lesson 5: Accessing, Sharing, Dissemination, and Retention L5S6
+
+**Sharing Procedures**
+
+(TS//SI/NF) Sharing of BR FISA query results can take place formally or informally and may take place orally or in writing. Sharing can even include a phone call.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) So, when do the restrictions on the sharing of query results cease to apply?
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The term "query result" does not govern properly disseminated SIGINT products containing information derived from authorized queries of the BR or PR/TT metadata.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The term "query result" does not extend to identifiers discovered as a result of authorized queries of the BR or PR/TT metadata, to the extent those identifiers are used for tasking purposes elsewhere. E.g., a foreign identifier discovered as a result of an authorized BR query may be tasked in [REDACTED] and neither the tasking information contained in [REDACTED] nor the collection that results would continue to require the sharing restrictions applicable to BR query results.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+## Business Records FISA
+
+### Lesson 5: Accessing, Sharing, Dissemination, and Retention L5S7
+
+You are responsible for following current Order's rules when sharing BR FISA query results
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The person who is sharing a query result is responsible for ensuring that the recipient is authorized to receive it. To see your current responsibility please refer to the job-aid entitled BR FISA Query Analyst Responsibilities.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Individuals who receive BR derived information (query results) must be briefed by the OGC and have current OVSC1800 training. They will be authorized by SID Office of Oversight and Compliance SV4 to receive BR query results. Remember, authorization to receive query results does not authorize access to BR raw metadata.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ΝΟΓΟΝΝ
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORIN
+
+## Business Records FISA
+
+### Lesson 5: Accessing, Sharing, Dissemination, and Retention L5S8
+
+**Sharing Procedures**
+
+If any BR FISA derived metadata is to be shared or coordinated beyond the personnel who are approved to receive it, contact the Office of Oversight and Compliance or the Office of General Counsel BEFORE you share!
+
+(TS//SI/NF) If any BR FISA derived metadata is to be shared or coordinated beyond the personnel who are approved to receive it, contact the Office of Oversight and Compliance or OGC BEFORE you share!
+
+TOP GECRET//COMINT//ΝΟFORN
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ΝΟΓΟΝ
+
+## Business Records FISA
+
+### Lesson 5: Accessing, Sharing, Dissemination, and Retention L5S9
+
+**Dissemination Procedures**
+
+The Court Ordered procedures for disseminations of query results apply from USSID SP0018. In addition, there are a couple of unique requirements:
+
+1. Chief S12 or the NSOC SOO (or one of the three other named positions in the BR FISA Order) must approve the dissemination of US person information
+2. Any US person information disseminated must be for a counterterrorism purpose and necessary to understand the counterterrorism information or assess its importance.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The court-ordered minimization procedures for BR FISA disseminations differ from NSA's standard USSID SP0018 procedures in the following key aspects:
+
+1. The Chief of S12 (or approved officials named in the court order) or the National Security Operations Center Senior Operations Officer (NSOC SOO) must approve the dissemination of US person information. (please refer to the glossary for a definition of dissemination)
+2. Dissemination of US person information must be for a counterterrorism purpose and only if necessary to understand or assess the counterterrorism purpose. This applies to both BR FISA Query analysts and individuals who have received query results.
+3. Further, all disseminations must be reported in a weekly report to the FISC.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+## Business Records FISA
+
+### Lesson 5: Accessing, Sharing, Dissemination, and Retention L5S10
+
+**Retention**
+
+Retention of raw metadata, chain summaries, and query results is limited to 5 years
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Retention of raw metadata, chain summaries, and query results is limited to 5 years.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) This applies to all repositories holding BR FISA metadata.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ΝΟΓΟΝ
+
+## Business Records FISA
+
+### Lesson 5: Accessing, Sharing, Dissemination, and Retention L5S11
+
+**Lesson Summary**
+
+You should now be able to:
+
+* Distinguish between analysts authorized to query BR FISA metadata and individuals authorized to receive results of those queries
+* Identify further limitations on accessing, sharing, disseminating, and retaining BR FISA metadata
+
+(TS//SI//NF) You should now be able to:
+
+* Distinguish between analysts authorized to query BR FISA metadata and individuals authorized to receive results of those queries
+* Identify further limitations on accessing, sharing, disseminating, and retaining BR FISA metadata
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+## Business Records FISA
+
+**"Where do we go from here?" L5S12**
+
+Homeland Mission Coordinators:
+DL S2I41_HMC (ALIAS) S2I5
+
+Oversight and Compliance:
+SV4 DL_SV42
+
+General Counsel:
+'go gc' or [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) If you have not already done so, please read the BR Order and RAS Memo located in the Legal Readings icon. Then proceed to the Final Exam to take the test. After you have completed the test, to gain access to the metadata, SV4 will need to review and approve your access.
+
+(U//FOUO) As always, it is important to remember that your Homeland Mission Coordinator, Oversight and Compliance, and the Office of General Counsel are available to answer any specific questions you may have relating to these authorities. Remember that this is the BR FISA course and does not replace training on other FISA authorities.
+Here are some contacts:
+Homeland Mission Coordinators:
+DL S2141_HMC (ALIAS) S215
+Oversight and Compliance:
+SV4 DL_SV42
+General Counsel:
+'go gc' or [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_January_8_2007_NSA_Web-Based_Training_Slides/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_January_8_2007_NSA_Web-Based_Training_Slides/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..059cc22
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_January_8_2007_NSA_Web-Based_Training_Slides/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+{
+ "title": "January 8, 2007 NSA Web-Based Training Slides ",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "A 2007 NSA web-based training presentation on its bulk telephony metadata program pursuant to Section 501 of FISA. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2007-01-08",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-18",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/january-8-2007-nsa-web-based-training-slides",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "9b90c056d6f9a450584c05b8f204b99de0e87b2dac2e257ef6099736d955fb53",
+ "pages": 39
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_Judge_Walton_Answers_to_Questions_re_FISC/ACLU_-_Judge_Walton_Answers_to_Questions_re_FISC.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_Judge_Walton_Answers_to_Questions_re_FISC/ACLU_-_Judge_Walton_Answers_to_Questions_re_FISC.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..34b343e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_Judge_Walton_Answers_to_Questions_re_FISC/ACLU_-_Judge_Walton_Answers_to_Questions_re_FISC.md
@@ -0,0 +1,1267 @@
+UNITED STATES FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+Washington, D.C.
+
+Honorable Reggie B. Walton
+Presiding Judge
+July 29, 2013
+
+Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
+Chairman
+Committee on the Judiciary
+United States Senate
+Washington, DC 20510
+
+Dear Mr. Chairman:
+
+I am writing in response to your letter of July 18, 2013, in which you posed several
+questions about the operations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (the Court). As you
+requested, we are providing unclassified responses. We would note that, as a general matter, the
+Court’s practices have evolved over time. Various developments in the last several years —
+including statutory changes, changes in the size of the Court and its staff, the adoption of new
+Rules of Procedure in 2010, and the relocation of the Court’s facilities from the Department of
+Justice headquarters to a secure space in the federal courthouse in 2009 — have affected some of
+these practices. The responses below reflect the current practices of the Court.
+
+I. Describe the typical process that the Court follows when it considers the following: (1)
+an application for an order for electronic surveillance under Title I of FISA; (2) an
+application for an order for access to business records under Title V of FISA; and (3)
+submissions from the government under Section 702 of FISA. As to applications for
+orders for access to business records under Title V of FISA, please describe whether the
+process for the Court's consideration of such applications is different when considering
+requests for bulk collection of phone call metadata records, as recently declassified by
+the Director of National Intelligence.
+
+Each week, one of the eleven district court judges who comprise the Court is on duty in
+Washington. As discussed below, most of the Court’s work is handled by the duty judge with the
+assistance of attorneys and clerk’s office personnel who staff the Court. Some of the Court’s
+more complex or time-consuming matters are handled by judges outside of the duty-week
+system, at the discretion of the Presiding Judge. In either case, matters before the Court are
+thoroughly reviewed and analyzed by the Court.
+
+Rule 9(a) of the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Rules of Procedure
+
+Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
+July 29, 2013
+Page 2
+
+(FISC Rules of Procedure)¹ requires that except in certain circumstances (i.e., a submission
+pursuant to an emergency authorization under the statute or as otherwise permitted by the Court),
+a proposed application must be submitted by the government no later than seven days before the
+government seeks to have the matter entertained.² Upon the Court’s receipt of a proposed
+application for an order under FISA, a member of the Court’s legal staff reviews the application
+and evaluates whether it meets the legal requirements under the statute. As part of this
+evaluation, a Court attorney will often have one or more telephone conversations with the
+government³ to seek additional information and/or raise concerns about the application. A Court
+attorney then prepares a written analysis of the application for the duty judge, which includes an
+identification of any weaknesses, flaws, or other concerns. For example, the attorney may
+recommend that the judge consider requiring the addition of information to the application;
+imposing special reporting requirements;⁴ or shortening the requested duration of an
+authorization.
+
+The judge then reviews the proposed application, as well as the attorney’s written
+analysis.⁵ The judge typically makes a preliminary determination at that time about what course
+
+¹ A copy of the FISC Rules of Procedure is appended hereto as Attachment A. The rules are also
+available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/rules/FISC2010.pdf.
+
+² A proposed application is also sometimes referred to as a “read copy” and has been referred to
+in this manner in at least one recent congressional hearing. A proposed application or “read copy” is a
+near-final version of the government’s application, which does not include the signatures of executive
+branch officials required by statutory provisions such as 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(6) and 1823(a)(6). As
+described below, in most circumstances, the government will subsequently file a final copy of an
+application pursuant to Rule 9(b) of the FISC Rules of Procedure. Both the proposed and final
+applications include proposed orders.
+
+The process of using proposed applications and final applications is altogether similar to the
+process employed by other federal courts in considering applications for wiretap orders under Title III of
+the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended (“Title III”), which is codified at
+18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522.
+
+³ In discussing Court interactions with “the government” throughout this document, I am
+referring to interactions with attorneys in the Office of Intelligence of the National Security Division of
+the United States Department of Justice.
+
+⁴ Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §§ 1805(d)(3) and 1824(d)(3), the Court is authorized to assess
+compliance with the statutorily-required minimization procedures by reviewing the circumstances under
+which information concerning United States persons was acquired, retained, or disseminated.
+
+⁵ For each application, the Court retains the attorney’s written analysis and the notes made by the
+judge, so that if the government later seeks to renew the authorization, the judge who considers the next
+
+Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
+July 29, 2013
+Page 3
+
+of action to take. These courses of action might include indicating to Court staff that he or she is
+prepared to approve the application without a hearing; indicating an inclination to impose
+conditions on the approval of the application; determining that additional information is needed
+about the application; or determining that a hearing would be appropriate before deciding
+whether to grant the application. A staff attorney will then relay the judge’s inclination to the
+government, and the government will typically proceed by providing additional information, or
+by submitting a final application (sometimes with amendments, at the government’s election) for
+the Court’s ruling pursuant to Rule 9(b) of the FISC Rules of Procedure. In conjunction with its
+submission of a final application, the government has an opportunity to request a hearing, even if
+the judge did not otherwise intend to require one. The government might request a hearing, for
+example, to challenge conditions that the judge has indicated he or she would impose on the
+approval of an application. If the judge schedules a hearing, the judge decides whether to
+approve the application thereafter. Otherwise, the judge makes a determination based on the
+final written application submitted by the government. In approving an application, a judge will
+sometimes issue a Supplemental Order in addition to signing the government’s proposed orders.
+Often, a Supplemental Order imposes some form of reporting requirement on the government.
+
+If after receiving a final application, the judge is inclined to deny it, the Court will prepare
+a statement of reason(s) pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(1). In some cases, the government may
+decide not to submit a final application, or to withdraw one that has been submitted, after
+learning that the judge does not intend to approve it. The annual statistics provided to Congress
+by the Attorney General pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §§ 1807 and 1862(b) — frequently cited to in press
+reports as a suggestion that the Court’s approval rate of applications is over 99% — reflect only
+the number of final applications submitted to and acted on by the Court. These statistics do not
+reflect the fact that many applications are altered prior to final submission or even withheld from
+final submission entirely, often after an indication that a judge would not approve them.⁶
+
+Most applications under Title V of FISA are handled pursuant to the process described
+above. However, applications under Title V of FISA for bulk collection of phone call metadata
+records are normally handled by the weekly duty judge using a process that is similar to the one
+described above, albeit more exacting. The government typically submits a proposed application
+of this type more than one week in advance. The attorney who reviews the application spends a
+
+application has the benefit of the prior thoughts of the judge(s) and staff, and a written record of any
+problems with the case.
+
+⁶ Notably, the approval rate for Title III wiretap applications (see note 2 above) is higher than
+the approval rate for FISA applications, even using the Attorney General’s FISA statistics as the baseline
+for comparison, as recent statistics show that from 2008 through 2012, only five of 13,593 Title III
+wiretap applications were requested but not authorized. See Administrative Office of the United States
+Courts, Wiretap Report 2012, Table 7 (available at
+http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/statistics/wiretapreports/2012/Table7.pdf).
+
+Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
+July 29, 2013
+Page 4
+
+greater amount of time reviewing and preparing a written analysis of such an application, in part
+because the Court has always required detailed information about the government’s
+implementation of this authority. The judge likewise typically spends a greater amount of time
+than he or she normally spends on an individual application, carefully considering the extensive
+information provided by the government and determining whether to seek more information or
+hold a hearing before ruling on the application.
+
+As described above, the majority of applications submitted to the Court are handled on a
+seven-day cycle, by a judge sitting on a weekly duty schedule. Applications that are novel or
+more complex are sometimes handled on a longer time-line, usually require additional briefing,
+and are assigned by the Presiding Judge based on judges’ availability. Section 702 (i.e., 50
+U.S.C. § 1881a) applications⁷ would typically fall into this category.
+
+Where the Court’s process for handling Section 702 applications differs from the process
+described above, it is largely based on the statutory requirements of that section, which was
+enacted as part of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA). Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §§
+1881a(g)(1)(A) & (g)(2)(D)(i), prior to the implementation of an authorization under Section
+702, the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence must provide the Court with
+a written certification containing certain statutorily required elements, and that certification must
+include an effective date for the authorization that is at least 30 days after the submission of the
+written certification to the Court.⁸ Under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(B), the Court must review the
+certification, as well as the targeting and minimization procedures adopted in accordance with 50
+U.S.C. §§ 1881a(d) & (e), not later than 30 days after the date on which the certification and
+procedures are submitted. The statutorily-imposed deadline for the Court’s review typically
+coincides with the effective date identified in the final certification filed with the Court.
+
+The government’s submission of a Section 702 application typically includes a cover
+filing that highlights any special issues and identifies any changes that have been made relative to
+the prior application. The government has typically filed proposed (read copy) Section 702
+applications approximately one month before filing a final application. Proposed Section 702
+applications are reviewed by multiple members of the Court’s legal staff. At the direction of the
+Presiding Judge or a judge who has been assigned to handle the Section 702 application, the
+
+7 “Section 702 application” is used here to refer collectively to a Section 702 certification and
+supporting affidavit, as well as to the statutorily-required targeting and minimization procedures.
+
+⁸ If the acquisition has already begun (e.g., pursuant to a determination of exigent circumstances
+under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(c)(2)) or the effective date is less than 30 days after the submission of the
+written certification to the Court (e.g., because of an amendment to a certification while judicial review is
+pending, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(1)(C)), 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g)(2)(D)(ii) requires the
+certification to include the date the acquisition began or the effective date of the authorization.
+
+Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
+July 29, 2013
+Page 5
+
+Court’s legal staff may request a meeting with the government to discuss a proposed application.
+Also at the direction of the Presiding Judge or a judge who has been assigned to handle the
+Section 702 application, the Court legal staff may request additional information from the
+government or convey a judge’s concerns about the legal sufficiency of a proposed Section 702
+application. Following these interactions, the government files a final Section 702 application,
+which the government may have elected to amend based on any concerns raised by the judge.
+
+The judge reviews the final Section 702 application and may set a hearing if he or she has
+additional questions about it. If the judge finds (based on the written submission alone or the
+written submission in combination with a hearing) that the certification contains all of the
+required elements, and that the targeting and minimization procedures adopted in accordance
+with 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881a(d) & (e) are consistent with the requirements of those subsections and
+with the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, the judge enters an order
+approving the certification in accordance with 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3)(A). As required by 50
+U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3)(C), the judge also issues an opinion in support of the order. If the judge
+finds that the certification does not contain the required elements or the targeting and
+minimization procedures are inconsistent with the requirements of 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881a(d) & (e),
+or the Fourth Amendment, the judge will, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3)(B), issue an order
+directing the government to, at the government’s election and to the extent required by the
+Court’s order, either correct any deficiency identified by the Court’s order not later than 30 days
+after the date on which the Court issues the order, or cease, or not begin, the implementation of
+the authorization for which the certification was submitted. Subsequent review of any remedial
+measures taken by the government may then be required and may result in another order and
+opinion pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i).
+
+2. When considering such applications and submissions, please describe the interaction
+between the government and the Court (including both judges and court staff), including
+any hearings, meetings, or other means through which the Court has the opportunity to
+ask questions or seek additional information from the government. Please describe how
+frequently such exchanges occur, and generally what types of additional information that
+the Court might request of the government, if any. Please also describe how frequently
+the Court asks the government to make changes to its applications and submissions
+before ruling.
+
+The process through which the Court interacts with the government in reviewing
+proposed applications, seeking additional information, conveying Court concerns, and
+adjudicating final applications, is very similar to the process employed by other federal courts in
+considering applications for wiretap orders under Title III (discussed in notes 2 and 6 above).
+
+Under FISA practice, the first set of interactions often take place at the staff level. The
+Court’s legal staff frequently interacts with the government in various ways in the context of
+
+Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
+July 29, 2013
+Page 6
+
+examining the legal sufficiency of applications before they are presented in final form to a judge.
+Indeed, in the process of reviewing the government’s applications and submissions in order to
+provide advice to the judge, the legal staff interact with the government on a daily basis. These
+daily interactions typically consist of secure telephone conversations in which legal staff ask the
+government questions about the legal and factual elements of applications or submissions. These
+questions may originate with legal staff after an initial review of an application or submission, or
+they may come from a judge.
+
+At the direction of the Presiding Judge or the judge assigned to a matter, Court legal staff
+sometimes meet with the government in connection with applications and submissions. The
+Court typically requests such meetings when a proposed application or submission presents a
+special legal or factual concern about which the Court would like additional information (e.g., a
+novel use of technology or a request to use a new surveillance or search technique). The
+frequency of such meetings varies depending on the Court’s assessment of its need for additional
+information in matters before it and the most conducive means to obtain that information. Court
+legal staff may meet with the government as often as 2-3 times a week, or as few as 1-2 times a
+month, in connection with the various matters pending before the Court.
+
+Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(2)(A) and Rule 17(a) of the FISC Rules of Procedure,
+the Court also holds hearings in cases in which a judge assesses that he or she needs additional
+information in order to rule on a matter. The frequency of hearings varies depending on the
+nature and complexity of matters pending before the Court at a given time, and also, to some
+extent, based on the individual preferences of different judges. Hearings are attended, at a
+minimum, by the Department of Justice attorney who prepared the application and a fact witness
+from the agency seeking the Court’s authorization.
+
+The types of additional information sought from the government — through telephone
+conversations, meetings, or hearings — include, but are not limited to, the following: additional
+facts to justify the government’s belief that its application meets the legal requirements for the
+type of authority it is seeking (e.g., in the case of electronic surveillance, that might include
+additional information to justify the government’s belief that a target of surveillance is a foreign
+power or an agent of a foreign power, as required by 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(3)(A), or that the target
+is using or about to use a particular facility, as required by 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(3)(B)); additional
+facts about how the government intends to implement statutorily required minimization
+procedures (see, e.g., 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h); 1805(a)(3); 1824(a)(3); 1861(c)(1); 1881a(i)(3)(A);
+and 1881c(c)(1)(c)); additional information about the government’s prior implementation of a
+Court order, particularly if the government has previously failed to comply fully with a Court
+order; or additional information about novel issues of technology or law (see Rule 11 of FISC
+Rules of Procedure).
+
+In a typical week, the Court seeks additional information or modifies the terms proposed
+
+Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
+July 29, 2013
+Page 7
+
+by the government in a significant percentage of cases.⁹ (The Court has recently initiated the
+process of tracking more precisely how frequently this occurs.) The judge may determine, for
+example, that he or she cannot make the necessary findings under the statute without the addition
+of information to the application, or that he or she can approve only some of the authorities
+sought through the application. The government then has the choice to alter its final application
+or proposed orders in response to the judge’s concerns; request a hearing to address those
+concerns; submit a final application without changes; or elect not to proceed at all with a final
+application. If the government files a final application, the Court may, on its own, make changes
+to the government’s proposed orders (or issue totally redrafted orders) to address the judge’s
+concern about a given application. The judge may choose, for example, to make an authorization
+of a shorter duration than what was requested by the government, or the judge may issue a
+Supplemental Order imposing special reporting or minimization requirements on the
+government’s implementation of an authorization.
+
+3. Public FISA Court opinions and orders make clear that the Court has considered
+the views of non-governmental parties in certain cases, including a provider
+challenge to the Protect America Act of 2007. Describe instances where non-
+governmental parties have appeared before the Court. Has the Court invited or
+heard views from a nongovernmental party regarding applications or submissions
+under Title I, Title V, or Title VII of FISA? If so, how did this come about, and
+what was the process or mechanism that the Court used to enable such views to
+be considered?
+
+FISA does not provide a mechanism for the Court to invite the views of nongovernmental
+parties. In fact, the Court’s proceedings are ex parte as required by the statute (see, e.g., 50
+U.S.C. §§ 1805(a), 1824(a), 1842(d)(1) & 1861(c)(1)), and in keeping with the procedures
+followed by other courts in applications for search warrants and wiretap orders. Nevertheless,
+the statute and the FISC Rules of Procedure provide multiple opportunities for recipients of
+Court orders or government directives to challenge those orders or directives, either directly or
+through refusal to comply with orders or directives. Additionally, as detailed below, there have
+been several instances — particularly in the past several months — in which nongovernmental
+parties have appeared before the Court outside of the context of a challenge to an individual
+Court order or government directive.
+
+There has been one instance in which the Court heard arguments from a nongovernmental
+party that sought to substantively contest a directive from the government. Specifically, in 2007,
+the government issued directives to Yahoo!, Inc. (Yahoo) pursuant to Section 105B of the Protect
+America Act of 2007 (PAA). Yahoo refused to comply with the directives, and the government
+
+⁹ This assessment does not include minor technical or typographical changes, which occur more
+frequently.
+
+Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
+July 29, 2013
+Page 8
+
+filed a motion with this Court to compel compliance. The Court ordered and received briefing
+from both parties, and rendered a decision in April 2008.¹⁰
+
+As noted above, the FISC Rules of Procedure and the FISA statute provide opportunities
+for the appearance of nongovernmental parties before the Court in matters pending pursuant to
+Titles I, V and VII of the statute. For example, Rule 19(a) of the FISC Rules of Procedure
+provides that if a person or entity served with a Court order fails to comply with that order, the
+government may file a motion for an order to show cause why the recipient should not be held in
+contempt and sanctioned accordingly. Thus, a nongovernmental party served with an order may
+invite an opportunity to be heard by the Court through refusal to comply with an order.
+
+With respect to applications filed under Title V of FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)(2)(A)(i)
+provides that a person receiving a production order may challenge the legality of that order by
+filing a petition with the Court. The same section of the statute provides that the recipient of a
+production order may challenge the non-disclosure order imposed in connection with a
+production order by filing a petition to modify or set aside the nondisclosure order. Rules 33-36
+of the FISC Rules of Procedure delineate the procedures and requirements for filing such
+petitions, including the time limits on such challenges. To date, no recipient of a production
+order has opted to invoke this section of the statute.
+
+With respect to applications filed under Title VII of FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(4)(A)
+provides that an electronic communication service provider who receives a directive pursuant to
+Section 702 may file a petition to modify or set aside the directive with the Court. Sections
+1881a(h)(4)(A)-(G) of the statute, as well as Rule 28 of the FISC Rules of Procedure, delineate
+
+¹⁰ Yahoo thereafter appealed the Court’s decision to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+of Review (FISCR). See In re Directives [redacted] Pursuant to Section 105b of the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008). This is not the only instance in
+which a nongovernmental entity has appeared before the FISCR. In 2002, the FISCR accepted briefs
+filed by the ACLU and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amici curiae in In re
+Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
+
+While Yahoo’s identity as the provider that challenged these directives was previously under seal
+pursuant to the FISCR’s decision in In re Directives, 551 F.3d 1004, 1016-18, the FISCR issued an Order
+on June 26, 2013, indicating that it does not object to the release of Yahoo’s identity, and ordering,
+among other things, a new declassification review of the FISCR’s opinion in In re Directives. The
+FISCR issued this order in response to a motion by Yahoo’s counsel, and after receiving briefing by
+Yahoo and the government. Yahoo also recently filed a motion for publication of the Court’s decision
+that was appealed to the FISCR, resulting in the published opinion in In re Directives. The Court granted
+the motion. Documents related to Yahoo’s recent motion to this Court are available at
+http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/index.html under Docket No. 105B(g) 07-01.
+
+Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
+July 29, 2013
+Page 9
+
+the procedures and requirements for such challenges. Relatedly, 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(5)(A)
+provides that if an electronic communication service provider fails to comply with a directive
+issued under Section 702, the Attorney General may file a petition with the Court for an order to
+compel compliance, which would likely result in the service provider’s appearance before the
+Court through its legal representatives. (Section 1881a(h)(5), as well as Rule 29 of the FISC
+Rules of Procedure, provide further detail on the procedures and requirements for the
+enforcement of Section 702 directives.) Finally, 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(6) and Rule 31 of the
+FISC Rules of Procedure allow for the government or an electronic communication service
+provider to appeal an order of this Court under §§ 1881a(h)(4) or (5) to the FISCR. To date, no
+electronic communication service provider has opted to challenge a directive issued pursuant to
+Section 702, although, as noted above, Yahoo refused to comply with government directives
+issued under the PAA, which resulted in the government invoking a provision under that statute
+to compel compliance.
+
+As noted above, there have been a number of other instances in which nongovernmental
+parties have appeared before the Court outside of the context of a direct challenge to a court
+order or a government directive, particularly recently. Those instances are as follows:
+
+In August 2007, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed a motion with the
+Court for the release of certain records. The Court ordered and received briefing on the matter
+from the ACLU and the government, and rendered a decision in December 2007. See In re
+Motion for Release of Court Records, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484 (FISA Ct. 2007).
+
+On May 23, 2013, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) filed a motion with this
+Court for consent to disclosure of court records, or in the alternative, a determination of the effect
+of the Court’s rules on access rights under the Freedom of Information Act. Following briefing
+by EFF and the government, the Court issued an Opinion and Order on June 12, 2013. All
+documents filed in this docket are available at
+http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/index.html under Case No. Misc. 13-01.
+
+On June 12, 2013, the ACLU, the American Civil Liberties Union of the Nation’s
+Capital, and the Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic (Movants) filed a motion with
+this Court for the release of Court records. The Court ordered and has received briefing on the
+matter from the Movants and the government. On July 18, 2013, the Court granted the motions
+of (1) sixteen members of the House of Representatives and (2) a coalition of news media
+organizations for leave to file amicus curiae briefs in this case. The matter is pending before the
+Court. All documents filed in this docket are available at
+http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/index.html under Case No. Misc. 13-02.
+
+On June 18, 2013, Google, Inc. filed a motion with this Court for declaratory judgment of
+the company’s first amendment right to publish aggregate information about FISA orders. The
+
+Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
+July 29, 2013
+Page 10
+
+court ordered briefing on the matter. On July 18, 2013, the Court granted the motions of (1) a
+coalition of news media organizations and (2) the First Amendment Coalition, the ACLU, the
+Center for Democracy and Technology, the EFF, and Techfreedom for leave to file amicus curiae
+briefs in this case. The matter is pending before the Court. All documents filed in this docket
+are available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/index.html under Case No. Misc.
+13-03.
+
+On June 19, 2013, Microsoft Corporation filed a motion in this Court for declaratory
+judgment or other appropriate relief authorizing disclosure of aggregate data regarding any FISA
+orders it has received. The court ordered briefing on the matter. On July 18, 2013, the Court
+granted the motions of (1) a coalition of news media organizations and (2) the First Amendment
+Coalition, the ACLU, the Center for Democracy and Technology, the EFF, and Techfreedom for
+leave to file amicus curiae briefs in this case. The matter is pending before the Court. All
+documents filed in this docket are available at
+http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/index.html under Case No. Misc. 13-04.
+
+4. Please describe the process used by the Court to consider and resolve any instances
+where the government notifies the Court of compliance concerns with any of the FISA
+authorities.
+
+Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1803(h), the Court is empowered to ensure compliance with its
+orders. Additionally, Rule 13(a) of the FISC Rules of Procedure requires the government to file
+a written notice with the Court immediately upon discovering that any authority or approval
+granted by the Court has been implemented (either by government officials or others operating
+pursuant to Court order) in a manner that did not comply with the Court’s authorization or
+approval or with applicable law. Rule 13(a) also requires the government to notify the Court in
+writing of the facts and circumstances relevant to the non-compliance; any modifications the
+government has made or proposes to make in how it will implement any authority or approval
+granted by the Court; and how the government proposes to dispose of or treat any information
+obtained as a result of the non-compliance.
+
+When the government discovers instances of non-compliance, it files notices with the
+Court as required by Rule 13(a). Because the rule requires the government to “immediately
+inform the Judge” of a compliance incident, the government typically files a preliminary notice
+that provides whatever facts are available at the time an incident is discovered. The legal staff
+review these notices as they are received and call significant matters to the attention of the
+appropriate judge. In instances in which the non-compliance has not been fully addressed by the
+time the preliminary Rule 13(a) notice is filed, the Court may seek additional information
+through telephone calls, meetings, or hearings. Typically, the government will file a final Rule
+13(a) notice once the relevant facts are known and any unauthorized collection has been
+destroyed. However, judges sometimes issue orders directing the government to take specific
+
+Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
+July 29, 2013
+Page 11
+
+actions to address instances of non-compliance either before or after a final notice is
+filed, and, less frequently, to cease a course of action that the Court considers non-compliant.
+This process is followed for compliance issues in all matters, including matters handled under
+Title V and Section 702.
+
+I hope these responses are helpful to the Senate Judiciary Committee in its deliberations.
+
+Sincerely,
+
+Reggie B. Walton
+Presiding Judge
+
+Identical letter sent to: Honorable Charles E. Grassley
+
+TO THE BENCH, BAR AND PUBLIC:
+
+The attached Rules of Procedure for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court supersede both
+the February 17, 2006 Rules of Procedure and the May 5, 2006 Procedures for Review of
+Petitions Filed Pursuant to Section 501(f) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978,
+As Amended. These revised Rules of Procedure are effective immediately.
+
+John D. Bates
+Presiding Judge
+Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+November 1, 2010
+
+UNITED STATES FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+Washington, D.C.
+
+RULES OF PROCEDURE
+Effective November 1, 2010
+
+Rule Page
+
+Title I. Scope of Rules; Amendment
+
+1. Scope of Rules ... 1
+2. Amendment ... 1
+
+Title II. National Security Information
+
+3. National Security Information ... 1
+
+Title III. Structure and Powers of the Court
+
+4. Structure ... 1
+5. Authority of the Judges ... 1
+
+Title IV. Matters Presented to the Court
+
+6. Means of Requesting Relief from the Court ... 2
+7. Filing Applications, Certifications, Petitions,
+Motions, or Other Papers ("Submissions") ... 2
+8. Service ... 3
+9. Time and Manner of Submission of Applications ... 3
+10. Computation of Time ... 4
+11. Notice and Briefing of Novel Issues ... 4
+12. Submission of Targeting and Minimization Procedures ... 5
+13. Correction of Misstatement or Omission; Disclosure of Non-Compliance ... 5
+14. Motions to Amend Court Orders ... 5
+15. Sequestration ... 5
+16. Returns ... 6
+
+Title V. Hearings, Orders, and Enforcement
+
+17. Hearings ... 6
+18. Court Orders ... 6
+19. Enforcement of Orders ... 7
+
+Title VI. Supplemental Procedures for Proceedings Under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)
+
+20. Scope ... 7
+21. Petition to Modify or Set Aside a Directive ... 7
+22. Petition to Compel Compliance With a Directive ... 7
+23. Contents of Petition ... 8
+24. Response ... 8
+25. Length of Petition and Response; Other Papers ... 8
+26. Notification of Presiding Judge ... 8
+27. Assignment ... 8
+28. Review of Petition to Modify or Set Aside a Directive ... 9
+29. Review of Petition to Compel Compliance Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(5)(C) ... 9
+30. In Camera Review ... 9
+31. Appeal ... 9
+
+Title VII. Supplemental Procedures for Proceedings Under 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)
+
+32. Scope ... 10
+33. Petition Challenging Production or Nondisclosure Order ... 10
+34. Contents of Petition ... 10
+35. Length of Petition ... 10
+36. Request to Stay Production ... 10
+37. Notification of Presiding Judge ... 10
+38. Assignment ... 11
+39. Initial Review ... 11
+40. Response to Petition; Other Papers ... 11
+41. Rulings on Non-frivolous Petitions ... 11
+42. Failure to Comply ... 12
+43. In Camera Review ... 12
+44. Appeal ... 12
+
+Title VIII. En Banc Proceedings
+
+45. Standard for Hearing or Rehearing En Banc ... 12
+46. Initial Hearing En Banc on Request of a Party ... 12
+47. Rehearing En Banc on Petition by a Party ... 12
+48. Circulation of En Banc Petitions and Responses ... 13
+49. Court-Initiated En Banc Proceedings ... 13
+50. Polling ... 13
+51. Stay Pending En Banc Review ... 13
+52. Supplemental Briefing ... 13
+53. Order Granting or Denying En Banc Review ... 13
+
+-ii-
+
+Title IX. Appeals
+
+54. How Taken ... 14
+55. When Taken ... 14
+56. Stay Pending Appeal ... 14
+57. Motion to Transmit the Record ... 14
+58. Transmitting the Record ... 14
+59. Oral Notification to the Court of Review ... 14
+
+Title X. Administrative Provisions
+
+60. Duties of the Clerk ... 14
+61. Office Hours ... 15
+62. Release of Court Records ... 15
+63. Practice Before Court ... 15
+
+-iii-
+
+Title I. Scope of Rules; Amendment
+
+Rule 1. Scope of Rules. These rules, which are promulgated pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1803(g),
+govern all proceedings in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“the Court”). Issues not
+addressed in these rules or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, as amended (“the Act”),
+may be resolved under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Federal Rules of Civil
+Procedure.
+
+Rule 2. Amendment. Any amendment to these rules must be promulgated in accordance with
+28 U.S.C. § 2071.
+
+Title II. National Security Information
+
+Rule 3. National Security Information. In all matters, the Court and its staff shall comply with
+the security measures established pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §§ 1803(c), 1822(e), 1861(f)(4), and
+1881a(k)(1), as well as Executive Order 13526, “Classified National Security Information” (or its
+successor). Each member of the Court’s staff must possess security clearances at a level
+commensurate to the individual’s responsibilities.
+
+Title III. Structure and Powers of the Court
+
+Rule 4. Structure.
+(a) Composition. In accordance with 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a), the Court consists of United
+States District Court Judges appointed by the Chief Justice of the United States.
+(b) Presiding Judge. The Chief Justice designates the “Presiding Judge.”
+
+Rule 5. Authority of the Judges.
+(a) Scope of Authority. Each Judge may exercise the authority vested by the Act and
+such other authority as is consistent with Article III of the Constitution and other statutes
+and laws of the United States, to the extent not inconsistent with the Act.
+(b) Referring Matters to Other Judges. Except for matters involving a denial of an
+application for an order, a Judge may refer any matter to another Judge of the Court with
+that Judge’s consent. If a Judge directs the government to supplement an application, the
+Judge may direct the government to present the renewal of that application to the same
+Judge. If a matter is presented to a Judge who is unavailable or whose tenure on the
+Court expires while the matter is pending, the Presiding Judge may re-assign the matter.
+(c) Supplementation. The Judge before whom a matter is pending may order a party to
+furnish any information that the Judge deems necessary.
+
+-1-
+
+Title IV. Matters Presented to the Court
+
+Rule 6. Means of Requesting Relief from the Court.
+(a) Application. The government may, in accordance with 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804, 1823,
+1842, 1861, 1881b(b), 1881c(b), or 1881d(a), file an application for a Court order
+(“application”).
+(b) Certification. The government may, in accordance with 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g), file a
+certification concerning the targeting of non-United States persons reasonably believed to
+be located outside the United States (“certification”).
+(c) Petition. A party may, in accordance with 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861(f) and 1881a(h) and
+the Supplemental Procedures in Titles VI and VII of these Rules, file a petition for review
+of a production or nondisclosure order issued under 50 U.S.C. § 1861 or for review or
+enforcement of a directive issued under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (“petition”).
+(d) Motion. A party seeking relief, other than pursuant to an application, certification, or
+petition permitted under the Act and these Rules, must do so by motion (“motion”).
+
+Rule 7, Filing Applications, Certifications, Petitions, Motions, or Other Papers
+(“Submissions”).
+(a) Filing. A submission is filed by delivering it to the Clerk or as otherwise directed by
+the Clerk in accordance with Rule 7(k).
+(b) Original and One Copy. Except as otherwise provided, a signed original and one
+copy must be filed with the Clerk.
+(c) Form. Unless otherwise ordered, all submissions must be:
+(1) on 8'4-by-11-inch opaque white paper; and
+(2) typed (double-spaced) or reproduced in a manner that produces a clear black
+image.
+(d) Electronic Filing. The Clerk, when authorized by the Court, may accept and file
+submissions by any reliable, and appropriately secure, electronic means.
+(e) Facsimile or Scanned Signature. The Clerk may accept for filing a submission
+bearing a facsimile or scanned signature in lieu of the original signature. Upon
+acceptance, a submission bearing a facsimile or scanned signature is the original Court
+record.
+(f) Citations. Each submission must contain citations to pertinent provisions of the Act.
+(g) Contents. Each application and certification filed by the government must be
+approved and certified in accordance with the Act, and must contain the statements and
+other information required by the Act.
+(h) Contact Information in Adversarial Proceedings.
+(1) Filing by a Party Other Than the Government. A party other than the
+government must include in the initial submission the party’s full name, address,
+and telephone number, or, if the party is represented by counsel, the full name of
+the party and the party’s counsel, as well as counsel’s address, telephone number,
+facsimile number, and bar membership information.
+(2) Filing by the Government. In an adversarial proceeding, the initial
+
+-2-
+
+submission filed by the government must include the full names of the attorneys
+representing the United States and their mailing addresses, telephone numbers,
+and facsimile numbers.
+(i) Information Concerning Security Clearances in Adversarial Proceedings. A party
+other than the government must:
+(1) state in the initial submission whether the party (or the party’s responsible
+officers or employees) and counsel for the party hold security clearances;
+(2) describe the circumstances in which such clearances were granted; and
+(3) identify the federal agencies granting the clearances and the classification
+levels and compartments involved.
+(j) Ex Parte Review. At the request of the government in an adversarial proceeding, the
+Judge must review ex parte and in camera any submissions by the government, or
+portions thereof, which may include classified information. Except as otherwise ordered,
+if the government files ex parte a submission that contains classified information, the
+government must file and serve on the non-governmental party an unclassified or
+redacted version. The unclassified or redacted version, at a minimum, must clearly
+articulate the government’s legal arguments.
+(k) Instructions for Delivery to the Court. A party may obtain instructions for making
+submissions permitted under the Act and these Rules by contacting the Clerk at (202)
+357-6250.
+
+Rule 8. Service.
+(a) By a Party Other than the Government. A party other than the government must,
+at or before the time of filing a submission permitted under the Act and these Rules, serve
+a copy on the government. Instructions for effecting service must be obtained by
+contacting the Security and Emergency Planning Staff, United States Department of
+Justice, by telephone at (202) 514-2094.
+(b) By the Government. At or before the time of filing a submission in an adversarial
+proceeding, the government must, subject to Rule 7(j), serve a copy by hand delivery or
+by overnight delivery on counsel for the other party, or, if the party is not represented by
+counsel, on the party directly.
+(c) Certificate of Service. A party must include a certificate of service specifying the
+time and manner of service.
+
+Rule 9. Time and Manner of Submission of Applications.
+(a) Proposed Applications. Except when an application is being submitted following
+an emergency authorization pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §§ 1805(e), 1824(e), 1843, 1881b(d),
+or 1881c(d) (“emergency authorization”), or as otherwise permitted by the Court,
+proposed applications must be submitted by the government no later than seven days
+before the government seeks to have the matter entertained by the Court. Proposed
+applications submitted following an emergency authorization must be submitted as soon
+after such authorization as is reasonably practicable.
+(b) Final Applications. Unless the Court permits otherwise, the final application,
+
+-3-
+
+including all signatures, approvals, and certifications required by the Act, must be filed
+no later than 10:00 a.m. Eastern Time on the day the government seeks to have the matter
+entertained by the Court.
+(c) Proposed Orders. Each proposed application and final application submitted to the
+Court must include any pertinent proposed orders.
+(d) Number of Copies. Notwithstanding Rule 7(b), unless the Court directs otherwise,
+only one copy of a proposed application must be submitted and only the original final
+application must be filed.
+(e) Notice of Changes. No later than the time the final application is filed, the
+government must identify any differences between the final application and the proposed
+application.
+
+Rule 10. Computation of Time. The following rules apply in computing a time period
+specified by these Rules or by Court order:
+(a) Day of the Event Excluded. Exclude the day of the event that triggers the period.
+(b) Compute Time Using Calendar Days. Compute time using calendar days, not
+business days.
+(c) Include the Last Day. Include the last day of the period; but if the last day is a
+Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the period continues to run until the next day that is
+not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.
+
+Rule 11. Notice and Briefing of Novel Issues.
+(a) Notice to the Court. If a submission by the government for Court action involves an
+issue not previously presented to the Court — including, but not limited to, a novel issue
+of technology or law — the government must inform the Court in writing of the nature
+and significance of that issue.
+(b) Submission Relating to New Techniques. Prior to requesting authorization to use a
+new surveillance or search technique, the government must submit a memorandum to the
+Court that:
+(1) explains the technique;
+(2) describes the circumstances of the likely implementation of the technique;
+(3) discusses any legal issues apparently raised; and
+(4) describes the proposed minimization procedures to be applied.
+At the latest, the memorandum must be submitted as part of the first proposed application
+or other submission that seeks to employ the new technique.
+(c) Novel Implementation. When requesting authorization to use an existing surveillance
+or search technique in a novel context, the government must identify and address any new
+minimization or other issues in a written submission made, at the latest, as part of the
+application or other filing seeking such authorization.
+(d) Legal Memorandum. If an application or other request for action raises an issue of
+law not previously considered by the Court, the government must file a memorandum of
+law in support of its position on each new issue. At the latest, the memorandum must be
+
+-4-
+
+submitted as part of the first proposed application or other submission that raises the
+issue.
+
+Rule 12. Submission of Targeting and Minimization Procedures. In a matter involving
+Court review of targeting or minimization procedures, such procedures may be set out in full in
+the government’s submission or may be incorporated by reference to procedures approved ina
+prior docket. Procedures that are incorporated by reference to a prior docket may be
+supplemented, but not otherwise modified, in the government’s submission. Otherwise,
+proposed procedures must be set forth in a clear and self-contained manner, without resort to
+cross-referencing.
+
+Rule 13. Correction of Misstatement or Omission; Disclosure of Non-Compliance.
+(a) Correction of Material Facts. If the government discovers that a submission to the
+Court contained a misstatement or omission of material fact, the government, in writing,
+must immediately inform the Judge to whom the submission was made of:
+(1) the misstatement or omission;
+(2) any necessary correction;
+(3) the facts and circumstances relevant to the misstatement or omission;
+(4) any modifications the government has made or proposes to make in how it will
+implement any authority or approval granted by the Court; and
+(5) how the government proposes to dispose of or treat any information obtained
+as a result of the misstatement or omission.
+(b) Disclosure of Non-Compliance. If the government discovers that any authority or
+approval granted by the Court has been implemented in a manner that did not comply
+with the Court’s authorization or approval or with applicable law, the government, in
+writing, must immediately inform the Judge to whom the submission was made of:
+(1) the non-compliance;
+(2) the facts and circumstances relevant to the non-compliance;
+(3) any modifications the government has made or proposes to make in how it will
+implement any authority or approval granted by the Court; and
+(4) how the government proposes to dispose of or treat any information obtained
+as a result of the non-compliance.
+
+Rule 14. Motions to Amend Court Orders. Unless the Judge who issued the order granting an
+application directs otherwise, a motion to amend the order may be presented to any other Judge.
+
+Rule 15. Sequestration. Except as required by Court-approved minimization procedures, the
+government must not submit material for sequestration with the Court without the prior approval
+of the Presiding Judge. To obtain such approval, the government must, prior to tendering the
+material to the Court for sequestration, file a motion stating the circumstances of the material’s
+acquisition and explaining why it is necessary for such material to be retained in the custody of
+the Court.
+
+-5-
+
+Rule 16. Returns.
+(a) Time for Filing.
+(1) Search Orders. Unless the Court directs otherwise, a return must be made
+and filed either at the time of submission of a proposed renewal application or
+within 90 days of the execution of a search order, whichever is sooner.
+(2) Other Orders. The Court may direct the filing of other returns at a time and
+in a manner that it deems appropriate.
+(b) Contents. The return must:
+(1) notify the Court of the execution of the order;
+(2) describe the circumstances and results of the search or other activity including,
+where appropriate, an inventory;
+(3) certify that the execution was in conformity with the order or describe and
+explain any deviation from the order; and
+(4) include any other information as the Court may direct.
+
+Title V. Hearings, Orders, and Enforcement
+
+Rule 17. Hearings.
+(a) Scheduling. The Judge to whom a matter is presented or assigned must determine
+whether a hearing is necessary and, if so, set the time and place of the hearing.
+(b) Ex Parte. Except as the Court otherwise directs or the Rules otherwise provide, a
+hearing in a non-adversarial matter must be ex parte and conducted within the Court’s
+secure facility.
+(c) Appearances. Unless excused, the government official providing the factual
+information in an application or certification and an attorney for the applicant must attend
+the hearing, along with other representatives of the government, and any other party, as
+the Court may direct or permit.
+(d) Testimony; Oath; Recording of Proceedings. A Judge may take testimony under
+oath and receive other evidence. The testimony may be recorded electronically or as the
+Judge may otherwise direct, consistent with the security measures referenced in Rule 3.
+
+Rule 18. Court Orders.
+(a) Citations. All orders must contain citations to pertinent provisions of the Act.
+(b) Denying Applications.
+(1) Written Statement of Reasons. If a Judge denies the government’s
+application, the Judge must immediately provide a written statement of each
+reason for the decision and cause a copy of the statement to be served on the
+government.
+(2) Previously Denied Application. If a Judge denies an application or other
+request for relief by the government, any subsequent submission on the matter
+must be referred to that Judge.
+
+-6-
+
+(c) Expiration Dates. An expiration date in an order must be stated using Eastern Time
+and must be computed from the date and time of the Court’s issuance of the order, or, if
+applicable, of an emergency authorization.
+(d) Electronic Signatures. The Judge may sign an order by any reliable, appropriately
+secure electronic means, including facsimile.
+
+Rule 19. Enforcement of Orders.
+(a) Show Cause Motions. Ifa person or entity served with a Court order (the
+“recipient”) fails to comply with that order, the government may file a motion for an
+order to show cause why the recipient should not be held in contempt and sanctioned
+accordingly. The motion must be presented to the Judge who entered the underlying
+order.
+(b) Proceedings.
+(1) An order to show cause must:
+(i) confirm that the underlying order was issued;
+(ii) schedule further proceedings; and
+(iii) afford the recipient an opportunity to show cause why the recipient
+should not be held in contempt.
+(2) A Judge must conduct any proceeding on a motion to show cause in camera.
+The Clerk must maintain all records of the proceedings in conformance with 50
+U.S.C. § 1803(c).
+(3) If the recipient fails to show cause for noncompliance with the underlying
+order, the Court may find the recipient in contempt and enter any order it deems
+necessary and appropriate to compel compliance and to sanction the recipient for
+noncompliance with the underlying order.
+(4) If the recipient shows cause for noncompliance or if the Court concludes that
+the order should not be enforced as issued, the Court may enter any order it deems
+appropriate.
+
+Title VI. Supplemental Procedures for Proceedings Under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)
+
+Rule 20. Scope. Together with the generally-applicable provisions of these Rules concerning
+filing, service, and other matters, these supplemental procedures apply in proceedings under 50
+-US.C. § 1881a(h).
+
+Rule 21. Petition to Modify or Set Aside a Directive. An electronic communication service
+provider (“provider”), who receives a directive issued under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(1), may file a
+petition to modify or set aside such directive under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(4). A petition may be
+filed by the provider’s counsel.
+
+-7-
+
+Rule 22. Petition to Compel Compliance With a Directive. In the event a provider fails to
+comply with a directive issued under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(1), the government may, pursuant to
+50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(5), file a petition to compel compliance with the directive.
+
+Rule 23. Contents of Petition. The petition must:
+(a) state clearly the relief being sought;
+(b) state concisely the factual and legal grounds for modifying, setting aside, or
+compelling compliance with the directive at issue;
+(c) include a copy of the directive and state the date on which the directive was served on
+the provider; and
+(d) state whether a hearing is requested.
+
+Rule 24. Response.
+(a) By Government. The government may, within seven days following notification
+under Rule 28(b) that plenary review is necessary, file a response to a provider’s petition.
+(b) By Provider. The provider may, within seven days after service of a petition by the
+government to compel compliance, file a response to the petition.
+
+Rule 25. Length of Petition and Response; Other Papers.
+(a) Length. Unless the Court directs otherwise, a petition and response each must not
+exceed 20 pages in length, including any attachments (other than a copy of the directive at
+issue).
+(b) Other papers. No supplements, replies, or sur-replies may be filed without leave of
+the Court.
+
+Rule 26. Notification of Presiding Judge. Upon receipt, the Clerk must notify the Presiding
+Judge that a petition to modify, set aside, or compel compliance with a directive issued under 50
+U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(1) has been filed. If the Presiding Judge is not reasonably available when the
+Clerk receives a petition, the Clerk must notify each of the local Judges, in order of seniority on
+the Court, and, if necessary, each of the other Judges, in order of seniority on the Court, until a
+Judge who is reasonably available has received notification. The reasonably available Judge who
+receives notification will be the acting Presiding Judge ("Presiding Judge”) for the case.
+
+Rule 27. Assignment.
+(a) Presiding Judge. As soon as possible after receiving notification from the Clerk that
+a petition has been filed, and no later than 24 hours after the filing of the petition, the
+Presiding Judge must assign the matter to a Judge in the petition review pool established
+by 50 U.S.C. § 1803(e)(1). The Clerk must record the date and time of the assignment.
+(b) Transmitting Petition. The Clerk must transmit the petition to the assigned Judge
+as soon as possible but no later than 24 hours after being notified of the assignment by the
+Presiding Judge.
+
+-8-
+
+Rule 28. Review of Petition to Modify or Set Aside a Directive.
+(a) Initial Review Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(4)(D).
+(1) A Judge must conduct an initial review of a petition to modify or set aside a
+directive within five days after being assigned such petition.
+(2) If the Judge determines that the provider’s claims, defenses, or other legal
+contentions are not warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for
+extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law, the
+Judge must promptly deny such petition, affirm the directive, and order the
+provider to comply with the directive. Upon making such determination or
+promptly thereafter, the Judge must provide a written statement of reasons. The
+Clerk must transmit the ruling and statement of reasons to the provider and the
+government.
+(b) Plenary Review Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(4)(E).
+(1) If the Judge determines that the petition requires plenary review, the Court
+must promptly notify the parties. The Judge must provide a written statement of
+reasons for the determination.
+(2) The Judge must affirm, modify, or set aside the directive that is the subject of
+the petition within the time permitted under 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881a(h)(4)(E) and
+1881a(j)(2).
+(3) The Judge may hold a hearing or conduct proceedings solely on the papers
+filed by the provider and the government.
+(c) Burden. Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(4)(C), a Judge may grant the petition only
+if the Judge finds that the challenged directive does not meet the requirements of 50
+U.S.C. § 1881a or is otherwise unlawful.
+(d) Continued Effect. Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(4)(F), any directive not
+explicitly modified or set aside by the Judge remains in full effect.
+
+Rule 29. Review of Petition to Compel Compliance Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(5)(C).
+(a) The Judge reviewing the government’s petition to compel compliance with a directive
+must, within the time permitted under 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881a(h)(5)(C) and 1881a(j)(2), issue
+an order requiring the provider to comply with the directive or any part of it, as issued or
+as modified, if the Judge finds that the directive meets the requirements of 50 U.S.C.
+§ 1881a and is otherwise lawful.
+(b) The Judge must provide a written statement of reasons for the determination. The
+Clerk must transmit the ruling and statement of reasons to the provider and the
+government.
+
+Rule 30. In Camera Review. Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1803(e)(2), the Court must review a
+petition under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h) and conduct related proceedings in camera.
+
+Rule 31. Appeal. Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(6) and subject to Rules 54 through 59 of
+these Rules, the government or the provider may petition the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
+Court of Review (“Court of Review”) to review the Judge’s ruling.
+
+-9-
+
+Title VII. Supplemental Procedures for Proceedings Under 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)
+
+Rule 32. Scope. Together with the generally-applicable provisions of these Rules regarding
+filing, service, and other matters, these supplemental procedures apply in proceedings under 50
+U.S.C. § 1861(f).
+
+Rule 33. Petition Challenging Production or Nondisclosure Order.
+(a) Who May File. The recipient of a production order or nondisclosure order under 50
+U.S.C. § 1861 (“petitioner”) may file a petition challenging the order pursuant to 50
+U.S.C. § 1861(f). A petition may be filed by the petitioner’s counsel.
+(b) Time to File Petition.
+(1) Challenging a Production Order. The petitioner must file a petition
+challenging a production order within 20 days after the order has been served.
+(2) Challenging a Nondisclosure Order. A petitioner may not file a petition
+challenging a nondisclosure order issued under 50 U.S.C. § 1861(d) earlier than
+one year after the order was entered.
+(3) Subsequent Petition Challenging a Nondisclosure Order. If a Judge
+denies a petition to modify or set aside a nondisclosure order, the petitioner may
+not file a subsequent petition challenging the same nondisclosure order earlier
+than one year after the date of the denial.
+
+Rule 34. Contents of Petition. A petition must:
+(a) state clearly the relief being sought;
+(b) state concisely the factual and legal grounds for modifying or setting aside the
+challenged order;
+(c) include a copy of the challenged order and state the date on which it was served on the
+petitioner; and
+(d) state whether a hearing is requested.
+
+Rule 35, Length of Petition. Unless the Court directs otherwise, a petition may not exceed 20
+pages in length, including any attachments (other than a copy of the challenged order).
+
+Rule 36. Request to Stay Production.
+(a) Petition Does Not Automatically Effect a Stay. A petition does not automatically
+stay the underlying order. A production order will be stayed only if the petitioner
+requests a stay and the Judge grants such relief.
+(b) Stay May Be Requested Prior to Filing of a Petition. A petitioner may request the
+Court to stay the production order before filing a petition challenging the order.
+
+Rule 37. Notification of Presiding Judge. Upon receipt, the Clerk must notify the Presiding
+Judge that a petition challenging a production or nondisclosure order has been filed. If the
+Presiding Judge is not reasonably available when the Clerk receives the petition, the Clerk must
+
+-10-
+
+notify each of the local Judges, in order of seniority on the Court, and, if necessary, each of the
+other Judges, in order of seniority on the Court, until a Judge who is reasonably available has
+received notification. The reasonably available Judge who receives notification will be the acting
+Presiding Judge (“Presiding Judge”) for the case.
+
+Rule 38. Assignment.
+(a) Presiding Judge. Immediately after receiving notification from the Clerk that a
+petition has been filed, the Presiding Judge must assign the matter to a Judge in the
+petition pool established by 50 U.S.C. § 1803(e)(1). The Clerk must record the date and
+time of the assignment.
+(b) Transmitting Petition. The Clerk must transmit the petition to the assigned Judge
+as soon as possible but no later than 24 hours after being notified of the assignment by the
+Presiding Judge.
+
+Rule 39, Initial Review.
+(a) When. The Judge must review the petition within 72 hours after being assigned the
+petition.
+(b) Frivolous Petition. If the Judge determines that the petition is frivolous, the Judge
+must:
+(1) immediately deny the petition and affirm the challenged order;
+(2) promptly provide a written statement of the reasons for the denial; and
+(3) provide a written ruling, together with the statement of reasons, to the Clerk,
+who must transmit the ruling and statement of reasons to the petitioner and the
+government.
+(c) Non-Frivolous Petition.
+(1) Scheduling. Ifthe Judge determines that the petition is not frivolous, the
+Judge must promptly issue an order that sets a schedule for its consideration. The
+Clerk must transmit the order to the petitioner and the government.
+(2) Manner of Proceeding. The judge may hold a hearing or conduct the
+proceedings solely on the papers filed by the petitioner and the government.
+
+Rule 40. Response to Petition; Other Papers.
+(a) Government’s Response. Unless the Judge orders otherwise, the government must
+file a response within 20 days after the issuance of the initial scheduling order pursuant to
+Rule 39(c). The response must not exceed 20 pages in length, including any attachments
+(other than a copy of the challenged order).
+(b) Other Papers. No supplements, replies, or sur-replies may be filed without leave of
+the Court.
+
+Rule 41. Rulings on Non-frivolous Petitions.
+(a) Written Statement of Reasons. Ifthe Judge determines that the petition is not
+frivolous, the Judge must promptly provide a written statement of the reasons for
+modifying, setting aside, or affirming the production or nondisclosure order.
+
+-11-
+
+(b) Affirming the Order. If the Judge does not modify or set aside the production or
+nondisclosure order, the Judge must affirm it and order the recipient promptly to comply
+with it.
+(c) Transmitting the Judge’s Ruling. The Clerk must transmit the Judge’s ruling and
+written statement of reasons to the petitioner and the government.
+
+Rule 42. Failure to Comply. Ifa recipient fails to comply with an order affirmed under 50
+U.S.C. § 1861(f), the government may file a motion seeking immediate enforcement of the
+affirmed order. The Court may consider the government’s motion without receiving additional
+submissions or convening further proceedings on the matter.
+
+Rule 43. In Camera Review. Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1803(e)(2), the Court must review a
+petition under 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f) and conduct related proceedings in camera.
+
+Rule 44, Appeal. Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)(3) and subject to Rules 54 through 59 of
+these Rules, the government or the petitioner may petition the Court of Review to review the
+Judge’s ruling.
+
+Title VIII. En Banc Proceedings
+
+Rule 45. Standard for Hearing or Rehearing En Banc. Pursuant to 50 U.S.C.
+§ 1803(a)(2)(A), the Court may order a hearing or rehearing en banc only if it is necessary to
+secure or maintain uniformity of the Court’s decisions, or the proceeding involves a question of
+exceptional importance.
+
+Rule 46, Initial Hearing En Banc on Request of a Party. The government in any proceeding,
+or a party in a proceeding under 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f) or 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(4)-(5), may request
+that the matter be entertained from the outset by the full Court. However, initial hearings en banc
+are extraordinary and will be ordered only when a majority of the Judges determines that a matter
+is of such immediate and extraordinary importance that initial consideration by the en banc Court
+is necessary, and en banc review is feasible in light of applicable time constraints on Court
+action.
+
+Rule 47. Rehearing En Banc on Petition by a Party.
+(a) Timing of Petition and Response. A party may file a petition for rehearing en banc
+permitted under 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(2) no later than 30 days after the challenged order or
+decision is entered. In an adversarial proceeding in which a petition for rehearing en banc
+is permitted under § 1803(a)(2), a party must file a response to the petition within 14 days
+after filing and service of the petition.
+(b) Length of Petition and Response. Unless the Court directs otherwise, a petition for
+rehearing en banc and a response to a petition for rehearing en banc each must not exceed
+15 pages, including any attachments (other than the challenged order or decision).
+
+-12-
+
+Rule 48. Circulation of En Banc Petitions and Responses. The Clerk must, after consulting
+with the Presiding Judge and in a manner consistent with applicable security requirements,
+promptly provide a copy of any timely-filed en banc petition permitted under 50 U.S.C.
+§ 1803(a)(2), and any timely-filed response thereto, to each Judge.
+
+Rule 49. Court-Initiated En Banc Proceedings. A Judge to whom a matter has been presented
+may request that all Judges be polled with respect to whether the matter should be considered or
+reconsidered en banc. On a Judge’s request, the Clerk must, after consulting with the Presiding
+Judge and in a manner consistent with applicable security requirements, promptly provide notice
+of the request, along with a copy of pertinent materials, to every Judge.
+
+Rule 50. Polling.
+(a) Deadline for Vote. The Presiding Judge must set a deadline for the Judges to submit
+their vote to the Clerk on whether to grant a hearing or rehearing en banc. The deadline
+must be communicated to all Judges at the time the petition or polling request is
+circulated.
+(b) Vote on Stay. In the case of rehearing en banc, the Presiding Judge may request that
+all Judges also vote on whether and to what extent the challenged order or ruling should
+be stayed or remain in effect if rehearing en banc is granted, pending a decision by the en
+banc Court on the merits.
+
+Rule 51. Stay Pending En Banc Review.
+(a) Stay or Modifying Order. In accordance with 50 U.S.C. §§ 1803(a)(2)(B) and
+1803(f), the Court en banc may enter a stay or modifying order while en banc
+proceedings are pending.
+(b) Statement of Position Regarding Continued Effect of Challenged Order. A
+petition for rehearing en banc and any response to the petition each must include a
+statement of the party’s position as to whether and to what extent the challenged order
+should remain in effect if rehearing en banc is granted, pending a decision by the en banc
+Court on the merits.
+
+Rule 52. Supplemental Briefing. Upon ordering hearing or rehearing en banc, the Court may
+require the submission of supplemental briefs.
+
+Rule 53. Order Granting or Denying En Banc Review.
+(a) Entry of Order. Ifa majority of the Judges votes within the time allotted for polling
+that a matter be considered en banc, the Presiding Judge must direct the Clerk to enter an
+order granting en banc review. If a majority of the Judges does not vote to grant hearing
+or rehearing en banc within the time allotted for polling, the Presiding Judge must direct
+the Clerk to enter an order denying en banc review.
+(b) Other Issues. The Presiding Judge may set the time of an en banc hearing and the
+time and scope of any supplemental hearing in the order granting en banc review. The
+
+-]3-
+
+order may also address whether and to what extent the challenged order or ruling will be
+stayed or remain in effect pending a decision by the en banc Court on the merits.
+
+Title IX. Appeals
+
+Rule 54. How Taken. An appeal to the Court of Review, as permitted by law, may be taken by
+filing a petition for review with the Clerk.
+
+Rule 55. When Taken.
+(a) Generally. Except as the Act provides otherwise, a party must file a petition for
+review no later than 30 days after entry of the decision or order as to which review is
+sought.
+(b) Effect of En Banc Proceedings. Following the timely submission of a petition for
+rehearing en banc permitted under 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(2) or the grant of rehearing en
+banc on the Court’s own initiative, the time otherwise allowed for taking an appeal runs
+from the date on which such petition is denied or dismissed or, if en banc review is
+granted, from the date of the decision of the en banc Court on the merits.
+
+Rule 56. Stay Pending Appeal. In accordance with 50 U.S.C. § 1803(f), the Court may enter a
+stay of an order or an order modifying an order while an appeal is pending.
+
+Rule 57. Motion to Transmit the Record. Together with the petition for review, the party
+filing the appeal must also file a motion to transmit the record to the Court of Review.
+
+Rule 58. Transmitting the Record. The Clerk must arrange to transmit the record under seal to
+the Court of Review as expeditiously as possible, no later than 30 days after an appeal has been
+filed. The Clerk must include a copy of the Court’s statement of reasons for the decision or order
+appealed from as part of the record on appeal.
+
+Rule 59. Oral Notification to the Court of Review. The Clerk must orally notify the Presiding
+Judge of the Court of Review promptly upon the filing of a petition for review.
+
+Title X. Administrative Provisions
+
+Rule 60. Duties of the Clerk.
+(a) General Duties. The Clerk supports the work of the Court consistent with the
+directives of the Presiding Judge. The Presiding Judge may authorize the Clerk to
+delegate duties to staff in the Clerk’s office or other designated individuals.
+(b) Maintenance of Court Records. The Clerk:
+(1) maintains the Court’s docket and records — including records and recordings
+of proceedings before the Court — and the seal of the Court;
+
+-14-
+
+(2) accepts papers for filing;
+(3) keeps all records, pleadings, and files in a secure location, making those
+materials available only to persons authorized to have access to them; and
+(4) performs any other duties, consistent with the usual powers of a Clerk of
+Court, as the Presiding Judge may authorize.
+
+Rule 61. Office Hours. Although the Court is always open, the regular business hours of the
+Clerk’s Office are 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. daily except Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays.
+Except when the government submits an application following an emergency authorization, or
+when the Court otherwise directs, any filing outside these hours will be recorded as received at
+the start of the next business day.
+
+Rule 62. Release of Court Records.
+(a) Publication of Opinions. The Judge who authored an order, opinion, or other
+decision may sua sponte or on motion by a party request that it be published. Upon such
+request, the Presiding Judge, after consulting with other Judges of the Court, may direct
+that an order, opinion or other decision be published. Before publication, the Court may,
+as appropriate, direct the Executive Branch to review the order, opinion, or other decision
+and redact it as necessary to ensure that properly classified information is appropriately
+protected pursuant to Executive Order 13526 (or its successor).
+(b) Other Records. Except when an order, opinion, or other decision is published or
+provided to a party upon issuance, the Clerk may not release it, or other related record,
+without a Court order. Such records must be released in conformance with the security
+measures referenced in Rule 3.
+(c) Provision of Court Records to Congress.
+(1) By the Government. The government may provide copies of Court orders,
+opinions, decisions, or other Court records, to Congress, pursuant to 50 U.S.C.
+§§ 1871(a)(5), 1871(c), or 1881f(b)(1)(D), or any other statutory requirement,
+without prior motion to and order by the Court. The government, however, must
+contemporaneously notify the Court in writing whenever it provides copies of
+Court records to Congress and must include in the notice a list of the documents
+provided.
+(2) By the Court. The Presiding Judge may provide copies of Court orders,
+opinions, decisions, or other Court records to Congress. Such disclosures must be
+made in conformance with the security measures referenced in Rule 3.
+
+Rule 63. Practice Before Court. An attorney may appear on a matter with the permission of
+the Judge before whom the matter is pending. An attorney who appears before the Court must be
+a licensed attorney and a member, in good standing, of the bar of a United States district or
+circuit court, except that an attorney who is employed by and represents the United States or any
+of its agencies in a matter before the Court may appear before the Court regardless of federal bar
+membership. All attorneys appearing before the Court must have the appropriate security
+clearance.
+
+-15-
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_Judge_Walton_Answers_to_Questions_re_FISC/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_Judge_Walton_Answers_to_Questions_re_FISC/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eb4eb51
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_Judge_Walton_Answers_to_Questions_re_FISC/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+{
+ "title": "Judge Walton Answers to Questions re FISC ",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-07-29",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Leahy, Patrick J.",
+ "Walton, Reggie B.",
+ "Grassley, Charles E.",
+ "Bates, John D."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-12-20",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/judge-walton-answers-questions-re-fisc",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "pdf_sha256": "a538b2cdd963a63e6e299dd4d3143432bafdbf16a4130f814b11c8fc12ca77bc",
+ "pages": 30
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_July_17_2006_Court-Ordered_NSA_Inspector_General_and_General_Counsel_Report/ACLU_-_July_17_2006_Court-Ordered_NSA_Inspector_General_and_General_Counsel_Report.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_July_17_2006_Court-Ordered_NSA_Inspector_General_and_General_Counsel_Report/ACLU_-_July_17_2006_Court-Ordered_NSA_Inspector_General_and_General_Counsel_Report.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6ae3f34
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_July_17_2006_Court-Ordered_NSA_Inspector_General_and_General_Counsel_Report/ACLU_-_July_17_2006_Court-Ordered_NSA_Inspector_General_and_General_Counsel_Report.md
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+GENERAL SECURITY SERVICE
+FORT GEORGE G. MEADE~ MARYLAND 20755-6000
+
+17 July 2006
+
+Honorable Alberto R. Gonzales
+Attorney General
+Department of Justice
+Washington, DC 20530
+
+Dear Mr. Attorney General:
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In accordance with the Order of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court issued May 24, 2006 in *In Re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from* [REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED] Docket No. BR 06-05, attached is the report provided to me by NSA's Inspector General and General Counsel assessing the adequacy of the management controls for the processing and dissemination of U.S. person information. The Order indicated that I should provide the findings of the report to you.
+
+(U//FOUO) If you or your staff have any questions in connection with this report, please contact [REDACTED] , Assistant Inspector General for Intelligence Oversight, [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] , Associate General Counsel (Operations), National Security Agency, [REDACTED]
+
+Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
+Director, NSA/Chief, CSS
+
+Encl:
+a/s
+
+Derived From: NSA/CSS-1-52
+Dated: 23-November-2004
+Declassify On: MR
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
+
+10 July 2006
+IG- 10667-06
+
+TO: DIRECTOR, NSA
+SUBJECT: (TS//SI//NF) FISA Court Order: Telephony
+Business Records (ST-06-0018)
+
+1. (TS//SI//NF) Background and Objective. The Order of the Foreigrt Intelligence Surveillance Court issued 24 May 2006 in *In Re Application of the etc., No. BR-06-05 (Telephony Business Records)* states that "[i]tm Inspector General and the General Counsel shall submit a report to the Director of NSA 45 days after the initiation of the activity \permitted by the Order] assessing the adequacy of the management controls for the processing and dissemination of U.S. person information." This is that report. The Order further states that "[t]he Director of NSA shall provide the findings of that report to the Attorney General." Order at 8-9. The Order sets no deadline for transmissiOn of the findings to the Attorney General.
+
+2. (TS//SI//NF) Finding. The management controls designed by the Agency to govern the processing, dissemination, security, and oversight of telephony metadata and U.S. person information obtained under the Order are adequate and in several aspects exceed the terms of the Order. However, due to the risk associated with the collection and processing of telephony metadata involving U.S. person information, three additional controls should be put in place, specifically, Agency management should (1) design procedures to provide a higher level of assurance that non-compliant data will not be collected and, if inadvertently collected, will be swiftly expunged and not made available for analysis. (2) separate the authority to approve metadata queries from the capability to conduct queries of metadata under the Order; and (3) conduct periodic reconciliation of approved telephone numbers to the logs of queried numbers to verify that only authorized queries have been made under the Order.
+
+Dated: 20041125
+Declassify: MR
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+-2-
+
+3. (TS//SI) Further Review. The Inspector General will make formal recommendations to the Director, NSA/CSS, in a separate report regarding the design and implementation of the additional controls.
+
+4. (U//FOUO) We appreciate the courtesy and cooperation extended throughout ou~ review to the auditors from the Office of the Inspector General and the attorneys from the Office of the General Counsel who consulted with them. If you need clarification or additional Lrrformation please contact [REDACTED] or via e-mail at [REDACTED]@nsa.
+
+JOEL F. BRENNER
+Inspector General
+
+(U//FOUO) I endorse the conclusion that the management controls for the processing and dissemination of U.S. person information are adequate.
+
+ROBERT L. DEITZ
+General Counsel
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+-3-
+
+DISTRIBUTION:
+
+SIGINT Director
+SID Program Manager for CT Special Projects
+Chief, $2
+Chief, S,21
+Chief, $215
+Chief, $3
+Chief, $33
+OGC
+SID O&C
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_July_17_2006_Court-Ordered_NSA_Inspector_General_and_General_Counsel_Report/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_July_17_2006_Court-Ordered_NSA_Inspector_General_and_General_Counsel_Report/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9e585e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_July_17_2006_Court-Ordered_NSA_Inspector_General_and_General_Counsel_Report/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+{
+ "title": "July 17, 2006 Court-ordered NSA Inspector General and General Counsel Report",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "A court-ordered NSA report on the adequacy of management controls for the processing and dissemination of US persons information under the bulk telephony metadata program. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2006-07-17",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT",
+ "MR"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Gonzales, Alberto R.",
+ "Deitz, Robert L.",
+ "Brenner, Joel F."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-18",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/july-17-2006-court-ordered-nsa-inspector-general-and-general-counsel-report",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "68396b774fc2a16d4416f7f66f9ca2bf10f2b2aee5c7d57ad55b206b4c17435b",
+ "pages": 4
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_July_20_2009_Order_of_the_FISC/ACLU_-_July_20_2009_Order_of_the_FISC.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_July_20_2009_Order_of_the_FISC/ACLU_-_July_20_2009_Order_of_the_FISC.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2ebbb31
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_July_20_2009_Order_of_the_FISC/ACLU_-_July_20_2009_Order_of_the_FISC.md
@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+SECRET
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+2009 JUL 20 PM 1:56
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+[REDACTED]
+(S)
+Docket Number: BR 06-05
+
+MOTION TO UNSEAL (U)
+
+THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, by and through the undersigned
+Department of Justice attorney, hereby moves, pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended (hereinafter "the Act"), and Rule 7(b)(ii) of the
+Rules of Procedure of this Court, to unseal the following document in the above-
+captioned matter: Exhibit C - Memorandum of Law. (S)
+
+Pursuant to section 1871(c)(2) of the Act, the Attorney General is required to
+submit to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the Permanent Select
+Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, the Committee on the
+Judiciary of the Senate, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
+Representatives copies of any decision, order, or opinion issued by this Court during
+the five-year period ending on July 10, 2008, that includes significant construction or
+interpretation of any provision of the Act, and any pleadings, applications, or
+memoranda of law associated with such decision, order, or opinion. (U)
+
+SECRET
+SECRET
+
+In order to comply with its congressional reporting requirements, the
+Government intends to provide copies of the above-described document to the
+congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on the Judiciary of the
+Senate and the House of Representatives. The Government, accordingly, moves to
+unseal the above-described document. (S)
+
+WHEREFORE the United States of America, by counsel, respectfully requests
+that the Court unseal the document identified above. A proposed order accompanies
+this motion. (U)
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Attorney Advisor
+National Security Division
+United States Department of Justice
+
+SECRET
+2
+SECRET
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+2009 JUL 20 PM 1:56
+CLERK OF COURT
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+[REDACTED]
+(S)
+Docket Number: BR 06-05
+
+MOTION TO UNSEAL (U)
+
+THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, by and through the undersigned
+Department of Justice attorney, hereby moves, pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended (hereinafter "the Act"), and Rule 7(b)(ii) of the
+Rules of Procedure of this Court, to unseal the following document in the above-
+captioned matter: Exhibit C - Memorandum of Law. (S)
+
+Pursuant to section 1871(c)(2) of the Act, the Attorney General is required to
+submit to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the Permanent Select
+Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, the Committee on the
+Judiciary of the Senate, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
+Representatives copies of any decision, order, or opinion issued by this Court during
+the five-year period ending on July 10, 2008, that includes significant construction or
+interpretation of any provision of the Act, and any pleadings, applications, or
+memoranda of law associated with such decision, order, or opinion. (U)
+
+SECRET
+SECRET
+
+In order to comply with its congressional reporting requirements, the
+Government intends to provide copies of the above-described document to the
+congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on the Judiciary of the
+Senate and the House of Representatives. The Government, accordingly, moves to
+unseal the above-described document. (S)
+
+WHEREFORE the United States of America, by counsel, respectfully requests
+that the Court unseal the document identified above. A proposed order accompanies
+this motion. (U)
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Attorney Advisor
+National Security Division
+United States Department of Justice
+
+SECRET
+2
+SECRET
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, DC
+
+[REDACTED]
+Docket Number: BR 06-05
+
+ORDER
+
+This matter having come before this Court on the motion of the United States of
+America in the above-captioned docket number and, relying upon the facts set forth in
+the motion, it appearing to the Court that the motion should be granted,
+
+IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion of the United States to unseal Exhibit
+C - Memorandum of Law is GRANTED for the limited purpose of allowing the
+Government to submit the above-described document to the Select Committee on
+Intelligence of the Senate, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House
+of Representatives, the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, and the Committee on
+
+SECRET
+SECRET
+
+the Judiciary of the House of Representatives. In all other respects, the above-described
+document shall remain sealed until further order of the Court.
+
+Signed 07-22-2009 P04:36 Eastern Time
+Date Time
+
+ROGER VINSON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+[REDACTED]
+FISC, certify that this document
+is a true and correct copy of
+the original.[REDACTED]
+
+SECRET
+2
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_July_20_2009_Order_of_the_FISC/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_July_20_2009_Order_of_the_FISC/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..18b857f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_July_20_2009_Order_of_the_FISC/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+{
+ "title": "July 20, 2009 Order of the FISC",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "A FISC order approving the government’s request for authorization to provide the application and orders in docket number BR 06-05 to Congressional committees. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2009-07-20",
+ "classification": [
+ "SECRET"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Vinson, Roger"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-18",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/july-20-2009-order-fisc",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "1c7e0e828de6c73ff3a54a4da2b8aa7e6eef5c2e88739b699704d20dd451ef54",
+ "pages": 6
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_July_2_2009_DOJ_Letter_to_Judge_Walton_on_2009_NSA_FISA_Business_Records_Report/ACLU_-_July_2_2009_DOJ_Letter_to_Judge_Walton_on_2009_NSA_FISA_Business_Records_Report.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_July_2_2009_DOJ_Letter_to_Judge_Walton_on_2009_NSA_FISA_Business_Records_Report/ACLU_-_July_2_2009_DOJ_Letter_to_Judge_Walton_on_2009_NSA_FISA_Business_Records_Report.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9e50a7a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_July_2_2009_DOJ_Letter_to_Judge_Walton_on_2009_NSA_FISA_Business_Records_Report/ACLU_-_July_2_2009_DOJ_Letter_to_Judge_Walton_on_2009_NSA_FISA_Business_Records_Report.md
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+All redacted information exempt under (b)(6) except as otherwise noted.
+
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+
+July 2, 2009
+
+The Honorable Reggie B. Walton
+United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+333 Constitution Avenue, N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20001
+
+Re: Business Records FISA NSA Review Report dated June 25, 2009 (TS)
+
+Dear Judge Walton:
+
+On June 30, 2009, The National Security Agency (NSA) transmitted the above-referenced report to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States House of Representatives, the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives. Enclosed for the Court's information is a copy of that report. The report details the progress NSA has made thus far on the Business Records FISA end-to-end system engineering and process review. The government anticipates formally filing the enclosed report with the Court upon completion of the government's end-to-end system engineering and process review along with the additional materials/information the government was ordered by the Court to provide in paragraph 4 of its Order dated March 2, 2009 in docket number BR 08-13 and its Order dated June 22, 2009 in docket number BR 09-06. The government anticipates making its formal submission within the next sixty (60) days. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Sincerely,
+
+[REDACTED]
+Chief, Operations Section
+Office of Intelligence
+National Security Division
+U.S. Department of Justice
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Classified by: David S. Kris, Assistant
+Attorney General, NSD, DOJ
+Reason: 1.4(c)
+Declassify on: 2 July 2034
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_July_2_2009_DOJ_Letter_to_Judge_Walton_on_2009_NSA_FISA_Business_Records_Report/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_July_2_2009_DOJ_Letter_to_Judge_Walton_on_2009_NSA_FISA_Business_Records_Report/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c68ab7f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_July_2_2009_DOJ_Letter_to_Judge_Walton_on_2009_NSA_FISA_Business_Records_Report/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+{
+ "title": "July 2, 2009 - DOJ Letter to Judge Walton on 2009 NSA FISA Business Records Report",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "DOJ",
+ "date_created": "2009-07-02",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Walton, Reggie B.",
+ "Kris, David S."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-10-28",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/july-2-2009-doj-letter-judge-walton-2009-nsa-fisa-business-records-report",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "d3194fc345daed4e6c58f72e39644934a0dd980c3b5dd9173c578cd8b1475049",
+ "pages": 1
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_June_29_2009_NSA_Notification_Memorandum_to_HPSCI/ACLU_-_June_29_2009_NSA_Notification_Memorandum_to_HPSCI.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_June_29_2009_NSA_Notification_Memorandum_to_HPSCI/ACLU_-_June_29_2009_NSA_Notification_Memorandum_to_HPSCI.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c1bf529
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_June_29_2009_NSA_Notification_Memorandum_to_HPSCI/ACLU_-_June_29_2009_NSA_Notification_Memorandum_to_HPSCI.md
@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000
+
+JUN 2 9 2009
+
+MEMORANDUM FOR STAFF DIRECTOR, HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT
+COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
+
+SUBJECT: (U) Notification and Update -- INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
+
+(U) This is to provide written notification on matters brought to the Committee's
+attention by way of oral notification to Committee staff directors on June 25, 2009.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Over the past several months, working with the Department of Justice
+(DoJ) and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), NSA has been
+systematically reviewing its technologies and methods of handling the Business
+Records (BR) and Pen Register/Trap & Trace (PR/TT) data we obtain under Orders
+of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC). These reviews have
+uncovered several compliance matters that we have disclosed to the Court and this
+Committee. In large part, these compliance issues concern internal information
+systems created for the purpose of processing, distributing and storing this BR and
+PR/TT data.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Inadequate attention to these internal systems and their systems architecture
+resulted in a failure to fully comply with the procedures the Court imposed in the
+handling of data under the FISC Order. NSA is identifying, reporting, and
+remediating these matters.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) We have made substantial progress along these lines, and the enclosed
+report on the Business Records FISA end-to-end review details our progress thus
+far. As the report is highly technical in part, we offer to provide a briefing outlining
+our findings. We will provide additional information as it emerges; in particular, we
+will need to supplement the report with an additional section recently required by
+the FISC, as discussed in section 3. Once work on the additional required section
+has been completed, a supplement to the report will be prepared and provided to the
+Committee. The joint review process is ongoing, and we will continue to keep the
+Committee informed.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Consistent with this commitment, NSA has begun a comprehensive
+review of the PR/TT platform that operates pursuant to FISC authority. This
+PR/TT review will mirror closely the rigorous review process of the BR platform.
+
+(U) As these reviews uncover new issues, we will continue to work to resolve them
+with the FISC. The Court has recently approved several aspects of our work that we
+had earlier reported, and these are detailed below. At the same time, the Court
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+ordered additional new weekly reporting requirements to insure compliance with
+the Court's orders. We will continue to move through this process in the same
+spirit: rigorous self-examination; transparency with ODNI, DOJ, the FISC, and the
+Committee; and implementation of corrective actions and internal controls to
+monitor compliance.
+
+1. (TS//SI//NE) PR/TT Metadata and the Development of a Master "Defeat" List
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In a notification to the Committee dated June 12, 2009 NSA described
+its development and use of a master "defeat" list in which NSA used PR/TT
+metadata to compile a master list [REDACTED] to
+block the ingest of, or purge already ingested unwanted information from several
+NSA data repositories. As reported to the Committee, this matter was the subject
+of a FISC Order dated [REDACTED] In that [REDACTED] Order, the FISC authorized
+NSA to continue to use the master "defeat" list for an additional 20 days at which
+time the Agency had to either stop using the list or satisfy the Court as to why
+NSA's continued use of the list was necessary and appropriate, and why any
+ongoing use of PR/TT metadata in this manner was consistent with the Court's
+order and was otherwise appropriate.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) On [REDACTED] having considered the Government's response, the
+FISC issued a subsequent Order in which the Court found the defeat list reasonable
+and appropriate. Accordingly, the Order authorizes NSA to continue with its
+practices of using the existing master "defeat" list and adding new selectors to it for
+the purpose of [REDACTED] in relation to PR/TT and non-
+PR/TT metadata repositories.
+
+2. (TS//SI//NF) Sharing PR/TT Metadata Analytic Results with NSA non-PR/TT
+Cleared Analysts.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The notification of [REDACTED] also described NSA's practice of
+sharing the unminimized results of properly predicated queries of PR/TT metadata
+with non-PR/TT-cleared NSA analysts. As reported to the Committee, this matter
+was also a subject of the FISC Order dated [REDACTED] In that [REDACTED] Order,
+the FISC authorized NSA to continue with this sharing practice for an additional 20
+days at which time the Agency had to either stop the sharing practice or satisfy the
+Court as to why the sharing practice was necessary and appropriate on an ongoing
+basis.
+
+(U) On [REDACTED] having considered the Government's response, the FISC
+issued a subsequent Order in which the Court found that this sharing practice was
+acceptable under the condition that the sharing occur only with analysts who have
+received "appropriate and adequate training and guidance regarding all rules and
+restrictions governing the use, storage, and dissemination of such information."
+NSA, in coordination with DoJ, is reviewing its training of analysts on the rules and
+restrictions.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+3. (U) Compliance With FISC Ordered Minimization Procedures
+
+(TS//SI//NF) To maximize the utility of the BR and PR/TT metadata, NSA shared
+the results of some authorized NSA analysis of the metadata with analysts in the
+larger intelligence community (IC). This occurred through the dissemination of
+reports and through databases constructed to allow IC counter-terrorism analysts
+to submit requests for information (RFIs) regarding metadata analysis conducted by
+authorized NSA analysts based on RAS-approved selectors. These databases also
+facilitated the sharing of target knowledge. Over time, approximately 200 analysts
+from CIA, FBI, and NCTC were granted access to these databases. While the
+collaborative objective of the databases was achieved, NSA analysts stored
+unminimized metadata analytic results responsive to these RFIs and target
+knowledge information in these databases. The analytic results consisted of
+narrative text describing analytic findings from the results of chaining of selectors
+(but not the content of any communication) in the BR and PR/TT metadata. As the
+IC analysts had access to the databases, this practice was not consistent with the
+FISC Orders that required the application of Court-prescribed minimization
+procedures prior to dissemination of analytic results outside of NSA unless a
+determination had been made by a named official that the U.S. Person information
+was related to counterterrorism information and was necessary to understand the
+counterterrorism information or to assess its importance.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED]
+
+(U) Upon discovery of the manual connection [REDACTED] open to these NSA databases (the
+URL link), NSA blocked this access on [REDACTED] and reported the matter to
+DoJ. On [REDACTED] DoJ filed with the FISC a notice of non-compliance
+concerning this matter in accordance with Rule 10 (c) of the FISC Rules of
+Procedure.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+(TS//SI//NF) In its [REDACTED] Order, the Court folded this matter into a broader
+analysis of NSA's compliance with procedures relating to the minimization and
+dissemination of metadata containing U.S. person information. The Court
+expressed "grave" concern over the lack of apparent NSA compliance with the Court
+ordered minimization procedures, noting both the practice of sharing the metadata
+with external IC analysts [REDACTED] and NSA's lack of precise adherence
+to the procedure for disseminating U.S. person information when necessary to
+understand the counterterrorism information or to assess its importance. As to this
+latter concern, while the PR/TT Order lists, as proposed by the Government, a
+specific NSA official for this purpose and the specific determination to be made,
+some authorizations to disseminate this information were made by other senior
+officials. While these officials were responsible for making these same
+determinations concerning release of U.S. person information relating to
+intelligence collected under Executive Order 12333, the Government did not propose
+and thus the FISC Order did not list these officials for the same purpose in relation
+to the PR/TT metadata and did not permit the PR/TT metadata (or BR metadata) to
+be disseminated upon exactly the same determination permitted under Executive
+Order 12333.
+
+(TS//SI//NE) As a result, the Court ordered additional action by the Government.
+First, commencing on [REDACTED] the Government is required to file a report with
+the Court for the preceding week that lists every instance in which NSA has
+disseminated outside NSA any information, regardless of form, derived from PR/TT
+or BR FISA material. Secondly, NSA is required to include within the end-to-end
+reviews of the BR and PR/TT programs a full explanation of "why the government
+permitted the dissemination outside NSA of U.S. person information without regard
+to whether such dissemination complied with the clear and acknowledged
+requirements for sharing U.S. person information derived from the metadata
+collected pursuant to the Court's orders."
+
+4. (TS//SI//NE) Use of Correlated Selectors to Query the BR FISA Metadata
+
+(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) The analysis of SIGINT relies on many techniques to
+more fully understand the data. One technique commonly used is correlated
+selectors. A communications address, or selector, is considered correlated with
+other communications addresses when each additional address is shown to identify
+the same communicant as the original address.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+(TS//SI//NF) NSA analysts authorized to query the BR FISA metadata routinely
+used [REDACTED] to query the BR
+FISA metadata. In other words, it a reasonable articulable suspicion (RAS)
+determination was made on any one of the selectors in the correlation, all were
+considered RAS approved for purposes of the query since all were associated with
+the [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) While NSA had previously described to the FISC the practice of using
+RAS-approved correlated selectors as seeds, NSA did not request and the FISC did
+not rule upon whether it was appropriate to deem as RAS-approved all selectors in
+a correlation if a reasonable articulable suspicion (RAS) determination was made on
+any one of the selectors in that correlation. The practice was ended and on [REDACTED]
+DoJ filed a notice of non-compliance with the FISC pursuant to Rule 10 (c) of
+the FISC Rules of Procedure. We will be working with ODNI and with the Justice
+Department to seek the Court's approval to use correlated selectors to query data.
+
+(U) Because our reviews are continuing, and because of our commitment to full
+disclosure and transparency, there is a significant possibility that we will discover
+additional matters which we will report and resolve. The Committee's continued
+understanding is appreciated, and we welcome your questions.
+
+LA FORREST WILLIAMS
+Deputy Associate Director
+Legislative Affairs Office
+
+Copy Furnished:
+Minority Staff Director,
+House Permanent Select
+Committee on Intelligence
+
+Enclosure:
+End to End Review of Business Records Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act Report
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_June_29_2009_NSA_Notification_Memorandum_to_HPSCI/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_June_29_2009_NSA_Notification_Memorandum_to_HPSCI/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d78d4d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_June_29_2009_NSA_Notification_Memorandum_to_HPSCI/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+{
+ "title": "June 29, 2009 NSA Notification Memorandum to HPSCI",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "A memo from the NSA to Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) on the status of its ongoing review of metadata collection programs under Section 501 and 402 of FISA. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2009-06-29",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Williams, La Forrest"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-18",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/june-29-2009-nsa-notification-memorandum-hpsci",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "7f737f95a9b11e256176c2fc50bc1a748f6a7bc5df38b83b0a0e243fe6b14c09",
+ "pages": 5
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_March_2009_NSA_Memo_-_Guidelines_Governing_Access_and_Queries_re_FISA_Business_Records/ACLU_-_March_2009_NSA_Memo_-_Guidelines_Governing_Access_and_Queries_re_FISA_Business_Records.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_March_2009_NSA_Memo_-_Guidelines_Governing_Access_and_Queries_re_FISA_Business_Records/ACLU_-_March_2009_NSA_Memo_-_Guidelines_Governing_Access_and_Queries_re_FISA_Business_Records.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9a4c08e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_March_2009_NSA_Memo_-_Guidelines_Governing_Access_and_Queries_re_FISA_Business_Records/ACLU_-_March_2009_NSA_Memo_-_Guidelines_Governing_Access_and_Queries_re_FISA_Business_Records.md
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN/FISA//20310109-
+All redacted
+information exempt
+under (b)(1) and (b)
+(3) except as
+otherwise noted.
+
+Memorandum of Understanding for
+S214 HMCS
+Guidelines Governing Access and Queries of Data Residing in
+Business Records FISA
+
+I, [REDACTED] acknowledge that I understand the following
+guidelines regarding use of the Business Records FISA. If I encounter any situations that
+require clarification of additional guidance I will immediately contact the S2I4 Division
+Management or the Operations Chief.
+
+Background: The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) 2 March 2009 ruling
+concerning NSA use and access of BRFISA data in the pursuit of terrorist connections
+has resulted in heightened scrutiny of the analytic process. Individuals granted access to
+BRFISA data must, at present, be qualified to perform HMC functions and comply with
+the guidelines outlined below. All selectors labeled RAS approved have been subjected to
+a review and justification process through DOJ and the FISC. Only RAS selectors
+approved by the Court can be considered for chaining and analysis in [REDACTED].
+
+The following guidelines apply for access & use of BRF data in light of the FISC ruling:
+
+1. Any selector used to query this database must be RAS-Approved based on
+ justifications provided to the FISC after March 4 2009. The Emphatic Access
+ Restriction (EAR) should prevent any HMC/Analyst from chaining a non-RAS
+ approved selector in [REDACTED]. Immediately inform S214 management, Chief
+ of Ops and Division TD is you note an event where the EAR appears to be
+ inoperable. Document the event to the best of your ability.
+2. Each HMC/analyst must take great care to ensure that the numbers entered into a
+ query are accurate and reflect the actual number string in the SV provided
+ spreadsheet as RAS approved by the court.
+3. The HMC/analyst must immediately report any errors or anomalies made in the
+ query process to S2141 Branch and S2I4 Division Management.
+4. While NSA is authorized to chain 3 hops out from a RAS approved selector, S214
+ HMCs and analysts will limit their chaining to 2 hops out until provided
+ additional guidance.
+5. Until a more formal process is established by ADET and SV4, S214 Operations
+ Chief and/or Operations Coordinator will administer an oral competency
+ evaluation to ensure guidelines and legal constraints with regards to RAS are
+ understood before an individual is provided access to BR FISA data. SV will
+ observe and record the date and results of that evaluation.
+6. Technical solutions have been put in place to segregate data
+ [REDACTED] is chaining architecture is designed around many,
+ separate realms or repositories of metadata. Homeland analysts routinely have
+ had access to four metadata repositories. They are SIGINT,
+ BRFISA and PR/TT. Homeland analysts have had the ability to choose all
+
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20070108
+Declassify On: 20310109
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN/FISA//20310109-
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN/FISA//20310109
+
+metadata repositories or various combinations of the four. When performing
+contact chaining in [REDACTED] the analyst must be aware of the date ranges
+associated with each metadata realms. This knowledge is necessary to understand
+the potential source of the information being displayed in the [REDACTED]
+tool as the metadata from each realm is fused together at the display
+output in [REDACTED] The knowledge of the date ranges for each realm is not
+identified to the user by the [REDACTED] tool; the user needs to know this prior to
+using the [REDACTED] tool. The date ranges for the four data realms are:
+
+* SIGINT = late 1998 to present day
+* [REDACTED]
+* BRFISA = 24 May 2006 to present day
+* PR/TT = [REDACTED] to present day
+
+Effective March 18th, 2009, [REDACTED] has cut off all access to the [REDACTED]
+metadata realm and all accesses/permissions to this metadata realm has been
+revoked.
+
+When an HMC opens [REDACTED] turns on the 'FISABR' permission, sets the date
+range to "All" and performs a contact chain on a RAS-Approved seed selector.
+They will be provided metadata from the SIGINT realm between Mid-1998 to
+present and they will be provided metadata from the BRFISA realm between 24
+May 2006 to present.
+7. Each HMC/analyst must document their findings associated with queries on Court
+approved RAS approved selectors to indicate:
+ - assessed value of contacts
+ - data that prompts subsequent reporting or lead information for LE
+ counterparts
+ - additional lead data/seed information for the SIGINT system
+The compilation of those findings will determine the breadth of additional
+queries.
+
+[REDACTED]
+Chief, S214/HSAC
+
+Signature/Date
+
+DERV FM: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+DATED: 8 January 2007
+DECL ON: 20320108
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN/FISA//20310109
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_March_2009_NSA_Memo_-_Guidelines_Governing_Access_and_Queries_re_FISA_Business_Records/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_March_2009_NSA_Memo_-_Guidelines_Governing_Access_and_Queries_re_FISA_Business_Records/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e6ae197
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_March_2009_NSA_Memo_-_Guidelines_Governing_Access_and_Queries_re_FISA_Business_Records/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+{
+ "title": "NSA Internal Memo of Understanding",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "An NSA memo of understanding and guidelines governing FISA Business Records access and queries privileges related to data collected through the bulk telephony metadata program under Section 215. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "",
+ "date_created": "2009-03-01",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN/FISA"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-10-28",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/nsa-internal-memo-understanding",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "2278044f4ac0e931baad5891b809b16d3a2e9898617eaa765ebb26510dd4ec3c",
+ "pages": 2
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_May_7_2009_NSA_Memorandum_on_Congressional_Notification_-_BR_FISA_End-to-End_Review_Status/ACLU_-_May_7_2009_NSA_Memorandum_on_Congressional_Notification_-_BR_FISA_End-to-End_Review_Status.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_May_7_2009_NSA_Memorandum_on_Congressional_Notification_-_BR_FISA_End-to-End_Review_Status/ACLU_-_May_7_2009_NSA_Memorandum_on_Congressional_Notification_-_BR_FISA_End-to-End_Review_Status.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5d65af8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_May_7_2009_NSA_Memorandum_on_Congressional_Notification_-_BR_FISA_End-to-End_Review_Status/ACLU_-_May_7_2009_NSA_Memorandum_on_Congressional_Notification_-_BR_FISA_End-to-End_Review_Status.md
@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
+All redacted
+information exempt
+under (b)(3) except
+as otherwise noted.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000
+MAY 07 2009
+
+MEMORANDUM FOR STAFF DIRECTOR, HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT
+COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
+
+SUBJECT: (U/FOUO) Congressional Notification - BR FISA End-to-end Review Status -
+INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Consistent with my commitment to provide the earliest possible
+notification of potential issues, I wanted to give you a status report concerning our ongoing
+end-to-end review relative to the BR FISA matter. The Director of NSA, LTG Keith B.
+Alexander, ordered this review in February 2009 in light of the issues that had arisen
+concerning this matter.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The end-to-end review is wrapping up. This process has allowed us to
+identify and address several issues concerning access to and handling of the BR FISA data,
+in addition to those previously reported to the Court and the Committee. Each of these
+access and handling issues are under review to determine if the activities were consistent
+with the BR FISA order.
+
+(U//FOUO) We are reviewing the report for legal and factual accuracy, including an
+assessment of whether the new issues present any substantive privacy concerns or are
+essentially procedural issues. The final report, including the conclusions and the facts on
+which they are based, will be provided to the Committees as soon as it is complete.
+
+(U) Should you have any questions, please contact my Legislative Affairs Officer,
+[REDACTED]
+at [REDACTED]
+
+LA FORREST V. WILLIAMS
+Deputy Associate Director
+Legislative Affairs Office
+
+Copy Furnished:
+Minority Staff Director, House Permanent
+Select Committee on Intelligence
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20070108
+Declassify On: 20340507
+
+---
+
+All redacted
+information exempt
+under (b)(3) except
+as otherwise noted.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000
+MAY 07 2009
+
+MEMORANDUM FOR MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR, HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT
+COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
+
+SUBJECT: (U/FOUO) Congressional Notification - BR FISA End-to-end Review Status –
+INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Consistent with my commitment to provide the earliest possible
+notification of potential issues, I wanted to give you a status report concerning our ongoing
+end-to-end review relative to the BR FISA matter. The Director of NSA, LTG Keith B.
+Alexander, ordered this review in February 2009 in light of the issues that had arisen
+concerning this matter.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The end-to-end review is wrapping up. This process has allowed us to
+identify and address several issues concerning access to and handling of the BR FISA data,
+in addition to those previously reported to the Court and the Committee. Each of these
+access and handling issues are under review to determine if the activities were consistent
+with the BR FISA order.
+
+(U//FOUO) We are reviewing the report for legal and factual accuracy, including an
+assessment of whether the new issues present any substantive privacy concerns or are
+essentially procedural issues. The final report, including the conclusions and the facts on
+which they are based, will be provided to the Committees as soon as it is complete.
+
+(U) Should you have any questions, please contact my Legislative Affairs Officer,
+[REDACTED]
+at [REDACTED]
+
+LA FORREST V. WILLIAMS
+Deputy Associate Director
+Legislative Affairs Office
+
+Copy Furnished:
+Staff Director, House Permanent Select
+Committee on Intelligence
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20070108
+Declassify On: 20340507
+
+---
+
+All redacted
+information exempt
+under (b)(3) except
+as otherwise noted.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000
+MAY 07 2009
+
+MEMORANDUM FOR STAFF DIRECTOR, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
+INTELLIGENCE
+
+SUBJECT: (U/FOUO) Congressional Notification - BR FISA End-to-end Review Status -
+INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Consistent with my commitment to provide the earliest possible
+notification of potential issues, I wanted to give you a status report concerning our ongoing
+end-to-end review relative to the BR FISA matter. The Director of NSA, LTG Keith B.
+Alexander, ordered this review in February 2009 in light of the issues that had arisen
+concerning this matter.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The end-to-end review is wrapping up. This process has allowed us to
+identify and address several issues concerning access to and handling of the BR FISA data,
+in addition to those previously reported to the Court and the Committee. Each of these
+access and handling issues are under review to determine if the activities were consistent
+with the BR FISA order.
+
+(U//FOUO) We are reviewing the report for legal and factual accuracy, including an
+assessment of whether the new issues present any substantive privacy concerns or are
+essentially procedural issues. The final report, including the conclusions and the facts on
+which they are based, will be provided to the Committees as soon as it is complete.
+
+(U) Should you have any questions, please contact my Legislative Affairs Officer,
+[REDACTED]
+at [REDACTED]
+
+LA FORREST V. WILLIAMS
+Deputy Associate Director
+Legislative Affairs Office
+
+Copy Furnished:
+Minority Staff Director, Senate Select
+Committee on Intelligence
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Derived From:NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20070108
+Declassify On: 20340507
+
+---
+
+All redacted
+information exempt
+under (b)(3) except
+as otherwise noted.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000
+MAY 07 2009
+
+MEMORANDUM FOR MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
+ON INTELLIGENCE
+
+SUBJECT: (U/FOUO) Congressional Notification - BR FISA End-to-end Review Status
+INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Consistent with my commitment to provide the earliest possible
+notification of potential issues, I wanted to give you a status report concerning our ongoing
+end-to-end review relative to the BR FISA matter. The Director of NSA, LTG Keith B.
+Alexander, ordered this review in February 2009 in light of the issues that had arisen
+concerning this matter.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The end-to-end review is wrapping up. This process has allowed us to
+identify and address several issues concerning access to and handling of the BR FISA data,
+in addition to those previously reported to the Court and the Committee. Each of these
+access and handling issues are under review to determine if the activities were consistent
+with the BR FISA order.
+
+(U//FOUO) We are reviewing the report for legal and factual accuracy, including an
+assessment of whether the new issues present any substantive privacy concerns or are
+essentially procedural issues. The final report, including the conclusions and the facts on
+which they are based, will be provided to the Committees as soon as it is complete.
+
+(U) Should you have any questions, please contact my Legislative Affairs Officer,
+[REDACTED]
+at [REDACTED]
+
+LA FORREST V. WILLIAMS
+Deputy Associate Director
+Legislative Affairs Office
+
+Copy Furnished:
+Staff Director, Senate Select Committee
+on Intelligence
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20070108
+Declassify On: 20340507
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_May_7_2009_NSA_Memorandum_on_Congressional_Notification_-_BR_FISA_End-to-End_Review_Status/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_May_7_2009_NSA_Memorandum_on_Congressional_Notification_-_BR_FISA_End-to-End_Review_Status/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9505eda
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_May_7_2009_NSA_Memorandum_on_Congressional_Notification_-_BR_FISA_End-to-End_Review_Status/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+{
+ "title": "NSA Memo: Congressional Notification & BR FISA End-to-End Review Status",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "An NSA memo to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Selection Committee on Intelligence providing a status report about the ongoing end-to-end review of the NSA’s bulk telephony metadata collection under Section 215. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2009-05-07",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Williams, La Forrest"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-10-28",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/nsa-memo-congressional-notification-br-fisa-end-end-review-status",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "74671a379fd4cdf5232e1ede487fca6325664d39bfd6b3805f1a9342870ba6db",
+ "pages": 4
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_May_8_2009_Government_Memorandum_to_the_FISC/ACLU_-_May_8_2009_Government_Memorandum_to_the_FISC.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_May_8_2009_Government_Memorandum_to_the_FISC/ACLU_-_May_8_2009_Government_Memorandum_to_the_FISC.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..337cb68
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_May_8_2009_Government_Memorandum_to_the_FISC/ACLU_-_May_8_2009_Government_Memorandum_to_the_FISC.md
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+2009 MAY -8 PM 4:12
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+May 8, 2009
+
+The Honorable Reggie B. Walton
+United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+
+Re: Preliminary Notice of Possible Compliance Incident Involving In Re Application
+of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of
+Tangible Things from [REDACTED]
+
+Docket
+Number BR 09-01 and Previous Docket Numbers (TS)
+
+Dear Judge Walton:
+
+Pursuant to Rule 10(c) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) Rules of
+Procedure, effective February 17, 2006, this letter provides preliminary notice of a possible
+compliance incident regarding the National Security Agency's (NSA) activities pursuant to
+docket number BR 09-01 and previous docket numbers. (TS)
+
+On March 5, 2009, in docket number BR 09-01, you approved an application for tangible
+things captioned In Re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring
+the Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED] That
+authority expires on May 29, 2009. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Classified by: David S. Kris, Assistant
+Attorney General, NSD, DOJ
+Reason: 1.4(c)
+Declassify on: 8 May 2034
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+The Primary Order in docket number BR 09-01 prohibits the government "from
+accessing business records metadata acquired pursuant to this Court's orders in the above-
+captioned docket and its predecessors ('BR metadata') for any purpose except as described
+herein." Docket Number BR 09-01, Primary Order at 4. Access to the BR metadata is
+authorized "for the purposes of ensuring data integrity and developing and testing any
+technological measures designed to enable NSA to comply with the Court's orders," and for
+contact chaining and [REDACTED] using Court-approved telephone identifiers or, in the case
+of imminent threat to human life, telephone identifiers that NSA has determined meets the
+Court's reasonable articulable suspicion standard. Id. at 4-7. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+On April 30, 2009, NSA notified the Department of Justice's National Security Division
+(NSD) that as part of NSA's end-to-end system engineering and process review it was learned
+that NSA data integrity analysts place certain BR metadata [REDACTED]
+the [REDACTED] in a repository known as [REDACTED] According to NSA, [REDACTED] are
+[REDACTED] telephone identifiers that are assigned to [REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED] is a repository of identifiers and other information, including [REDACTED]
+contained in the BR metadata, that NSA has determined should not be
+queried/tasked. NSA analysts use this repository before numbers are tasked. On May 1, 2009,
+the NSD notified NSA that it should no longer place [REDACTED] contained in the BR metadata in
+[REDACTED] or any other repository for the purposes described above. On May 1, 2009, the
+NSD notified a Court advisor of this matter by telephone. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+On May 4, 2009, NSA notified the NSD that other [REDACTED] telephone identifiers
+contained in the BR metadata, not limited to [REDACTED] are placed in repositories, possibly not
+limited to [REDACTED] that NSA uses to identify selectors that should not be used for
+querying/tasking. According to NSA, a limited number of analysts at NSA, including those who
+had been authorized to access the BR metadata under Orders entered under docket number
+BR 09-01 and previous docket numbers, use these repositories to determine if a telephone
+identifier of interest should not be queried/tasked. None of these [REDACTED] telephone
+identifiers is available for contact chaining or [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] and are not
+included in the [REDACTED] database that is used for chaining and [REDACTED] of the BR
+metadata. NSA informed the NSD that this practice continued after the Court entered its initial
+Order in this matter. According to NSA, beginning on May 1, 2009, NSA took steps to identify
+the BR metadata and repositories used for the purposes described above and to block access to
+that BR metadata. NSA further stated that it would no longer place BR metadata in repositories
+for the purposes described above, absent authorization from the Court. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+2
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+On May 5, 2009, the NSD notified NSA that it should no longer place BR metadata of
+any kind in any repository for the purposes described above and should begin to take steps to
+prevent all access to any BR metadata contained in such repositories. The NSD is working with
+NSA to provide a thorough explanation of this matter, which will be provided to the Court in the
+government's report following the completion of the end-to-end system engineering and process
+reviews as required by the Court's Primary Order in BR 09-01 at pages 9 to 10. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Sincerely,
+[REDACTED]
+National Security Division
+U.S. Department of Justice
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+3
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_May_8_2009_Government_Memorandum_to_the_FISC/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_May_8_2009_Government_Memorandum_to_the_FISC/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..91d5b2f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_May_8_2009_Government_Memorandum_to_the_FISC/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+{
+ "title": "May 8, 2009 Government Memorandum to the FISC",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "A government memo to the FISC providing preliminary notice of a compliance incident related to the NSA’s bulk telephony metadata program under Section 501 of FISA. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "DOJ",
+ "date_created": "2009-05-08",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Walton, Reggie B.",
+ "Kris, David S."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-18",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/may-8-2009-government-memorandum-fisc",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "45637bc8d1338c763ef98797a7f6bee3a4ab58367d8810f114e84128c88f7543",
+ "pages": 3
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Alexander_2007_Shubert_Declaration/ACLU_-_NSA_Alexander_2007_Shubert_Declaration.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Alexander_2007_Shubert_Declaration/ACLU_-_NSA_Alexander_2007_Shubert_Declaration.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..42409b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Alexander_2007_Shubert_Declaration/ACLU_-_NSA_Alexander_2007_Shubert_Declaration.md
@@ -0,0 +1,1922 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
+FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
+
+IN RE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+TELECOMMUNICATIONS RECORDS
+LITIGATION
+
+This Document Relates to:
+
+Shubert v. Bush, Case No. 07-693
+
+MDL Dkt. No. 06-1791-VRW
+
+CLASSIFIED DECLARATION
+OF LT. GEN. KEITH B.
+ALEXANDER, DIRECTOR,
+NATIONAL SECURITY
+AGENCY
+
+SUBMITTED IN CAMERA,
+EX PARTE
+
+Hon. Vaughn R. Walker
+
+IN CAMERA, EX PARTE DECLARATION OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEITH B.
+ALEXANDER, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+
+(U) I, Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander, do hereby state and declare as follows:
+
+I. (U) Introduction
+
+1. (U) I am the Director of the National Security Agency (NSA), an intelligence
+agency within the Department of Defense. I am responsible for directing the NSA, overseeing
+the operations undertaken to carry out its mission and, by specific charge of the President and the
+Director of National Intelligence, protecting NSA activities and intelligence sources and
+methods. I have been designated an original TOP SECRET classification authority under
+Executive Order No. 12958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19825 (1995), as amended on March 25, 2003, and
+Department of Defense Directive No. 5200.1-R, Information Security Program Regulation, 32
+C.F.R. § 159a.12 (2000).
+
+2. (U) The purpose of this declaration is to support an assertion of the military and
+state secrets privilege (hereafter "state secrets privilege") by the Director of National Intelligence
+(DNI) as the head of the intelligence community, as well as the DNI's assertion of a statutory
+
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20041123
+Declassify On: MR
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 privilege under the National Security Act. Specifically, in the course of my official duties, I
+2 have been advised of this litigation and the allegations in the Plaintiffs' complaint. As described
+3 herein, various classified facts related to the Plaintiffs' claims are subject to the DNI's state
+4 secrets privilege assertion. The disclosure of this information, which relates to NSA intelligence
+5 information, activities, sources, methods, and relationships, reasonably could be expected to
+6 cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United States. In addition, it is
+7 my judgment that sensitive state secrets are so central to the subject matter of the litigation that
+8 any attempt to proceed in the case risks the disclosure of the secrets described herein and
+9 exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United States. Through this
+10 declaration, I also hereby invoke and assert the NSA's statutory privilege set forth in section 6 of
+11 the National Security Agency Act of 1959, Public Law No. 86-36 (codified as a note to 50 USC.
+12 § 402) ("NSA Act"), to protect the information related to NSA activities described below. The
+13 statements made herein are based on my personal knowledge of NSA activities and operations,
+14 and on information available to me as Director of the NSA.
+
+15 II. (U) Summary
+16 3. (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) Plaintiffs in this lawsuit allege that the NSA conducts a
+17 "dragnet" surveillance program involving the interception of "virtually every telephone, internet
+18 and/or email communication that has been sent from or received within the United States since
+19 2001." Amended Compl. ¶¶ 1, 4. That allegation is false. As set forth below, there is no such
+20 "dragnet" program, [REDACTED]
+21 Rather, as I have previously advised the Court, the NSA has conducted targeted
+22 content surveillance aimed at al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist organizations pursuant to the
+23 President's Terrorist Surveillance Program ("TSP") and recent orders of the Foreign Intelligence
+
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+2
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 Surveillance Court ("FISC" or "FISA Court"). As the Court is also aware, the NSA has
+2 collected, pursuant to Presidential authorization and subsequent FISC orders, non-content
+3 information (i.e., meta data) about telephone and Internet communications in order to enable
+4 highly sophisticated analytical tools that can uncover the contacts [REDACTED] of
+5 members or agents of [REDACTED]. To demonstrate that these or
+6 other NSA activities do not constitute the dragnet that Plaintiffs allege, however, would require
+7 the disclosure of highly classified intelligence information, sources, and methods. Indeed,
+8 although the existence of the TSP has been acknowledged, the details of that program—as well
+9 as the details of the related content surveillance authorized by the FISC—remain highly
+10 classified, and the meta data activities have never been acknowledged by the United States and
+11 likewise remain highly classified.
+12 4. (TS//SI [REDACTED]/TSP//OC/NF) In addition, Plaintiffs allege that Verizon and
+13 AT&T have cooperated in the alleged dragnet program. See Amended Compl. ¶¶ 5-8. Neither
+14 company assisted with the alleged dragnet program, because no such dragnet exists.
+15 [REDACTED]
+16 [REDACTED]
+17 [REDACTED]
+18 [REDACTED]
+19 the disclosure of [REDACTED]
+20 would cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security.
+21 5. (TS//SI [REDACTED]/TSP//OC/NF) Accordingly, the protection of the classified
+22 information put at risk by this case, including the following, is vital to the national security of the
+23 United States: (1) any information that would tend to confirm or deny whether particular
+
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+3
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 individuals such as the named Plaintiffs have been subject to any NSA intelligence activities;
+2 (2) information about NSA intelligence activities, including facts demonstrating that the TSP
+3 was limited to al Qaeda-related international communications and was not a content surveillance
+4 dragnet as Plaintiffs allege; (3) facts that would tend to confirm or deny the existence of the
+5 NSA's meta data activities, and any information about those activities; and (4) the fact that
+6 [REDACTED]. Any
+7 disclosure or official confirmation of this information would cause exceptionally grave damage
+8 to the national security.
+
+9 6. (U) For these reasons, as set forth further below, the state secrets and statutory
+10 privilege assertions that the DNI and I are making should be upheld and the information
+11 described in this declaration should be protected from disclosure. I also believe that any further
+12 litigation of this case poses exceptionally grave risks to the national security.
+
+13 (U) Table of Contents
+14 7. (TS//SI [REDACTED]/TSP//OC/NF) To facilitate the Court's review, this
+15 declaration is organized as follows:
+16 I. Introduction
+17 II. Summary
+18 III. Classification of Declaration
+19 IV. Background Information
+20 A. The National Security Agency
+21 B. September 11, 2001 and the Continuing al Qaeda Threat
+22 V. Information Protected by Privilege
+23 VI. Description of Information Subject to Privilege and the Harm of Disclosure
+
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+4
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 A. Information That May Tend to Confirm or Deny Whether or Not the Plaintiffs
+2 Have Been Subject to Any Alleged NSA Activities That May Be at Issue in This
+3 Matter
+4 1. [REDACTED]
+5 2. [REDACTED]
+6 3. Harm of Disclosure
+7 B. Information Concerning NSA Activities, Sources, and Methods, and the Harm of
+8 Disclosure
+9 1. Information Concerning Plaintiffs' Allegations of a Content Surveillance
+"Dragnet"
+10 2. Additional Classified Information Concerning the TSP
+11 3. Information Concerning Meta Data Activities
+12 4. Information Demonstrating the Success of TSP and Meta Data Activities
+13 5. Information Concerning the FISC Orders
+14 C. Information That May Tend to Confirm or Deny Whether Verizon/MCI
+15 and/or AT&T Has Assisted the NSA with the Alleged Intelligence
+16 Activities, and the [REDACTED]
+17 VII. Risks of Allowing Litigation to Proceed
+18 VIII. Summary and Conclusion
+
+19 III. (U) Classification of Declaration
+20 8. (S) This declaration is classified TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]
+21 [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR pursuant to the standards in Executive Order No.
+22 12958, as amended by Executive Order No. 13292. Under Executive Order No. 12958,
+23 information is classified "TOP SECRET" if unauthorized disclosure of the information
+24 reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the
+
+CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+5
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 expected to cause serious damage to national security; and "CONFIDENTIAL" if unauthorized
+2 disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to cause identifiable damage to
+3 national security. At the beginning of each paragraph of this declaration, the letter or letters in
+4 parentheses designate(s) the degree of classification of the information the paragraph contains.
+5 When used for this purpose, the letters "U," "C," "S," and "TS" indicate respectively that the
+6 information is either UNCLASSIFIED, or is classified CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP
+7 SECRET.¹
+
+8 9. (S) Additionally, this declaration also contains Sensitive Compartmented
+9 Information (SCI), which is "information that not only is classified for national security reasons
+10 as Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential, but also is subject to special access and handling
+11 requirements because it involves or derives from particularly sensitive intelligence sources and
+12 methods." 28 C.F.R. § 17.18(a). Because of the exceptional sensitivity and vulnerability of such
+13 information, these safeguards and access requirements exceed the access standards that are
+14 normally required for information of the same classification level. Specifically, this declaration
+15 references communications intelligence (COMINT), also referred to as special intelligence (SI),
+16 which is a subcategory of SCI. COMINT or SI identifies SCI that was derived from exploiting
+17 cryptographic systems or other protected sources by applying methods or techniques, or from
+18 intercepted foreign communications.
+19 [REDACTED]
+20 [REDACTED]
+21 [REDACTED]
+22 [REDACTED]
+23 [REDACTED]
+
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+6
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 10. (TS//SI- [REDACTED]/TSP//OC/NF) This declaration also contains information
+2 related to or derived from the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP), a controlled access signals
+3 intelligence program authorized by the President in response to the attacks of September 11,
+4 2001. Although the President publicly acknowledged the existence of the TSP in December
+5 2005, details about the program remain highly classified and strictly compartmented.
+6 Information pertaining to this program is denoted with the special marking "TSP" and requires
+7 more restrictive handling.
+8 [REDACTED]
+9 [REDACTED]
+10 [REDACTED]
+11 [REDACTED]
+12 [REDACTED]
+13 [REDACTED]
+14 11. (S) In addition to the fact that classified information contained herein may not be
+15 revealed to any person without authorization pursuant to Executive Order 12958, as amended,
+16 this declaration contains information that may not be released to foreign governments, foreign
+17 nationals, or non-U.S. citizens without permission of the originator and in accordance with DNI
+18 policy. This information is labeled "NOFORN." The "ORCON" designator means that the
+19 originator of the information controls to whom it is released. Finally, this document is marked
+20 Manual Review ("MR") indicating that it is not subject to automatic declassification at any
+21 specific date.
+22 [REDACTED]
+23 [REDACTED]
+
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]//TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+7
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 IV. (U) Background Information
+2 A. (U) Background on The National Security Agency
+3 12. (U) The NSA was established by Presidential Directive in 1952 as a separately
+4 organized agency within the Department of Defense. Under Executive Order 12333, § 1.12(b),
+5 as amended, the NSA's cryptologic mission includes three functions: (1) to collect, process, and
+6 disseminate signals intelligence (SIGINT) information, of which COMINT is a significant
+7 subset, for (a) national foreign intelligence purposes, (b) counterintelligence purposes, and (c)
+8 the support of military operations; (2) to conduct information security activities; and (3) to
+9 conduct operations security training for the U.S. Government.
+10 13. (TS//SI) Signals intelligence (SIGINT) consists of three subcategories:
+11 (1) communications intelligence (COMINT); (2) electronic intelligence (ELINT); and (3) foreign
+12 instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT). Communications intelligence (COMINT) is
+13 defined as "all procedures and methods used in the interception of communications and the
+14 obtaining of information from such communications by other than the intended recipients." 18
+15 U.S.C. § 798. COMINT includes information derived from the interception of foreign and
+16 international communications, such as voice, facsimile, and computer-to-computer information
+17 conveyed via a number of means [REDACTED]
+18 Electronic intelligence (ELINT) is technical intelligence information derived from
+19 foreign non-communications electromagnetic radiations except atomic detonation or radioactive
+20 sources—in essence, radar systems affiliated with military weapons platforms (e.g., anti-ship) and
+21 civilian systems (e.g., shipboard and air traffic control radars). Foreign instrumentation signals
+22 intelligence (FISINT) is derived from non-U.S. aerospace surfaces and subsurface systems which
+23 may have either military or civilian applications.
+
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]//TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+8
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR-
+
+1 14. (S) The NSA's SIGINT responsibilities include establishing and operating an
+2 effective unified organization to conduct SIGINT activities set forth in Executive Order No.
+3 12333, § 1.12(b), as amended. In performing its SIGINT mission, NSA has developed a
+4 sophisticated worldwide SIGINT collection network that acquires, among other things, foreign
+5 and international electronic communications and related information. The technological
+6 infrastructure that supports the NSA's foreign intelligence information collection network has
+7 taken years to develop at a cost of billions of dollars and untold human effort. It relies on
+8 sophisticated collection and processing technology.
+9 15. (U) There are two primary reasons for gathering and analyzing foreign
+10 intelligence information. The first, and most important, is to gain information required to direct
+11 U.S. resources as necessary to counter external threats. The second reason is to obtain
+12 information necessary to the formulation of U.S. foreign policy. Foreign intelligence
+13 information provided by the NSA is thus relevant to a wide range of important issues, including
+14 military order of battle; threat warnings and readiness; arms proliferation; international terrorism;
+15 and foreign aspects of international narcotics trafficking.
+16 16. (S) The NSA's ability to produce foreign intelligence information depends on its
+17 access to foreign and international electronic communications. Foreign intelligence produced by
+18 COMINT activities is an extremely important part of the overall foreign intelligence information
+19 available to the United States and is often unobtainable by other means. Public disclosure of
+20 either the capability to collect specific communications or the substance of the information
+21 derived from such collection itself can easily alert targets to the vulnerability of their
+22 communications. Disclosure of even a single communication holds the potential of revealing
+23 intelligence collection techniques that are applied against targets around the world. Once alerted,
+
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+9
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 targets can frustrate COMINT collection by using different or new encryption techniques, by
+2 disseminating disinformation, or by utilizing a different communications link. Such evasion
+3 techniques may inhibit access to the target's communications and therefore deny the United
+4 States access to information crucial to the defense of the United States both at home and abroad.
+5 COMINT is provided special statutory protection under 18 U.S.C. § 798, which makes it a crime
+6 to knowingly disclose to an unauthorized person classified information "concerning the
+7 communication intelligence activities of the United States or any foreign government."
+8 B. (U) September 11, 2001 and the al Qaeda Threat.
+9 17. (U) On September 11, 2001, the al Qaeda terrorist network launched a set of
+10 coordinated attacks along the East Coast of the United States. Four commercial jetliners, each
+11 carefully selected to be fully loaded with fuel for a transcontinental flight, were hijacked by al
+12 Qaeda operatives. Those operatives targeted the Nation's financial center in New York with two
+13 of the jetliners, which they deliberately flew into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center.
+14 Al Qaeda targeted the headquarters of the Nation's Armed Forces, the Pentagon, with the third
+15 jetliner. Al Qaeda operatives were apparently headed toward Washington, D.C. with the fourth
+16 jetliner when passengers struggled with the hijackers and the plane crashed in Shanksville,
+17 Pennsylvania. The intended target of this fourth jetliner was most evidently the White House or
+18 the Capitol, strongly suggesting that al Qaeda's intended mission was to strike a decapitation
+19 blow to the Government of the United States — to kill the President, the Vice President, or
+20 Members of Congress. The attacks of September 11 resulted in approximately 3,000 deaths—
+21 the highest single-day death toll from hostile foreign attacks in the Nation's history. In addition,
+22 these attacks shut down air travel in the United States, disrupted the Nation's financial markets
+23 and government operations, and caused billions of dollars of damage to the economy.
+
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]//TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+10
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 18. (U) On September 14, 2001, the President declared a national emergency "by
+2 reason of the terrorist attacks at the World Trade Center, New York, New York, and the
+3 Pentagon, and the continuing and immediate threat of further attacks on the United States."
+4 Proclamation No. 7463, 66 Fed. Reg. 48199 (Sept. 14, 2001). The United States also
+5 immediately began plans for a military response directed at al Qaeda's training grounds and
+6 haven in Afghanistan. On September 14, 2001, both Houses of Congress passed a Joint
+7 Resolution authorizing the President "to use all necessary and appropriate force against those
+8 nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
+9 terrorist attacks" of September 11. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40
+10 § 21(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (Sept. 18, 2001) ("Cong. Auth."). Congress also expressly
+11 acknowledged that the attacks rendered it "necessary and appropriate" for the United States to
+12 exercise its right "to protect United States citizens both at home and abroad," and acknowledged
+13 in particular that "the President has authority under the Constitution to take action to deter and
+14 prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States." Id. pmbl.
+15 19. (U) As the President made clear at the time, the attacks of September 11 "created
+16 a state of armed conflict." Military Order, § 1(a), 66 Fed. Reg. 57833, 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
+17 Indeed, shortly after the attacks, NATO took the unprecedented step of invoking article 5 of the
+18 North Atlantic Treaty, which provides that an "armed attack against one or more of [the parties]
+19 shall be considered an attack against them all." North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 5, 63
+20 Stat. 2241, 2244, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, 246. The President also determined that al Qaeda terrorists
+21 "possess both the capability and the intention to undertake further terrorist attacks against the
+22 United States that, if not detected and prevented, will cause mass deaths, mass injuries, and
+23 massive destruction of property, and may place at risk the continuity of the operations of the
+
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]//TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+11
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 United States Government," and he concluded that "an extraordinary emergency exists for
+2 national defense purposes." Military Order, § 1(c), (g), 66 Fed. Reg. at 57833-34.
+3 20. (U) As a result of the unprecedented attacks of September 11, 2001, the United
+4 States found itself immediately propelled into a worldwide war against a network of terrorist
+5 groups, centered on and affiliated with al Qaeda, that possesses the evolving capability and
+6 intention of inflicting further catastrophic attacks on the United States. That war is continuing
+7 today, at home as well as abroad. Moreover, the war against al Qaeda and its allies is a very
+8 different kind of war, against a very different enemy, than any other war or enemy the Nation has
+9 previously faced. Al Qaeda and its supporters operate not as a traditional nation-state but as a
+10 diffuse, decentralized global network of individuals, cells, and loosely associated, often disparate
+11 groups, that act sometimes in concert, sometimes independently, and sometimes in the United
+12 States, but always in secret—and their mission is to destroy lives and to disrupt a way of life
+13 through terrorist acts. Al Qaeda works in the shadows; secrecy is essential to al Qaeda's success
+14 in plotting and executing its terrorist attacks.
+15 21. (TS//SI//NF) The In Camera Declaration of Michael McConnell, Director of
+16 National Intelligence, details the particular facets of the continuing al Qaeda threat and, thus, the
+17 exigent need for the NSA intelligence activities described here. The NSA activities are directed
+18 at that threat, [REDACTED]
+19 [REDACTED]
+20 [REDACTED]
+21 global telecommunications networks, especially the Internet, have developed in recent years into
+22 a loosely interconnected system—a network of networks—that is ideally suited for the secret
+23 communications needs of loosely affiliated terrorist cells. Hundreds of Internet service
+
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]//TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+12
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 providers, or "ISPs," and other providers of communications services offer a wide variety of
+2 global communications options, often free of charge. [REDACTED]
+3 [REDACTED]
+4 [REDACTED]
+5 22. (TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED]
+6 [REDACTED]
+7 [REDACTED]
+8 [REDACTED]
+9 [REDACTED]
+10 [REDACTED]
+11 [REDACTED]
+12 [REDACTED]
+13 [REDACTED]
+14 [REDACTED]
+15 [REDACTED]
+16 [REDACTED]
+17 [REDACTED]
+18 23. (TS//SI) Our efforts against al Qaeda and its affiliates therefore present critical
+19 challenges for the Nation's communications intelligence capabilities. First, in this new kind of
+20 war, more than in any other we have ever faced, communications intelligence is essential to our
+21 ability to identify the enemy and to detect and disrupt its plans for further attacks on the United
+22 [REDACTED]
+23 ³ (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+13
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR-
+
+1 States. Communications intelligence often is the only means we have to learn the identities of
+2 particular individuals who are involved in terrorist activities and the existence of particular
+3 terrorist threats. Second, at the same time that communications intelligence is more important
+4 than ever, the decentralized, non-hierarchical nature of the enemy and their sophistication in
+5 exploiting the agility of modern telecommunications make successful communications
+6 intelligence more difficult than ever.
+
+7 C. (U) NSA Activities Critical to Meeting al Qaeda Threat.
+8 24. (TS//SI [REDACTED]/TSP//OC/NF) To meet these challenges and to help detect
+9 and prevent another catastrophic terrorist attack within the United States, the NSA has utilized a
+10 number of critically important intelligence tools. One such tool was the Terrorist Surveillance
+11 Program, which the President authorized specifically to detect and prevent al Qaeda-related
+12 terrorist attacks within the United States. Pursuant the TSP, the NSA was authorized to intercept
+13 the content⁴ of telephone and Internet communications for which there were reasonable grounds
+14 to believe that (1) such communication originated or terminated outside the United States, and
+15 (2) a party to such communication was a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist
+16 organization.⁵
+
+17 ⁴ (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) The term "content" is used herein to refer to the substance,
+18 meaning, or purport of a communication, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8), as opposed to the
+19 type of addressing or routing information referred throughout this declaration as "meta data."
+20 ⁵ (TS//SI [REDACTED]/TSP//OC/NF) The TSP was first authorized by the President on
+21 October 4, 2001, and was reauthorized approximately every 30-60 days throughout the existence
+22 of the program. The Presidential documents authorizing the TSP also contained the
+23 authorizations for the meta data activities described herein. The Presidential authorizations,
+24 moreover, evolved over time, and during certain periods authorized other activities (this
+
+CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+14
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 declaration is not intended to and does not fully describe the President's authorizations and the
+2 differences in those authorizations over time). [REDACTED]
+
+3 See In Camera, Ex Parte Classified Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander at
+4 [REDACTED]
+
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]//TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+14
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 25. (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) On January 10, 2007, the FISA Court issued two orders
+2 authorizing the Government to conduct certain electronic surveillance that had been occurring
+3 under the TSP. As explained more fully below, see Section VI.B.5, infra, the orders consisted of
+4 a [REDACTED]
+5 and a Foreign Telephone and Email Order, which authorized,
+6 inter alia, electronic surveillance of telephone and Internet communications carried over
+7 particularly listed facilities when the Government determines that there is probable cause to
+8 believe that (1) one of the communicants is a member or agent of al Qaeda or an associated
+9 terrorist organization, and (2) the communication is to or from a foreign country (i.e., a one-end
+10 foreign communication to or from the United States). The telephone numbers and email
+11 addresses to be targeted under the Foreign Telephone and Email Order were further limited to
+12 those that the NSA reasonably believes are being used by persons outside the United States.
+13 26. (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) In light of these intervening FISA Court orders, any
+14 electronic surveillance that was occurring as part of the TSP is now being conducted subject to
+15 the approval of the FISA Court, and the President determined not to reauthorize the TSP. As
+16 described further in Section VI.B.5, infra, and as the United States notified this Court on April 9,
+17 2007, a Judge of the FISA Court recently [REDACTED]
+18 declined to adopt the Government's interpretation of FISA underlying the application for the
+19 Foreign Telephone and Email Order. The initial authorization to conduct surveillance under the
+20 [REDACTED]
+
+21 ⁶2, MDL No. 06-1791-VRW (N.D. Cal.) (relating to all actions against the MCI and Verizon
+22 Defendants) (submitted Apr. 20, 2007).
+23 [REDACTED]
+
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR-
+15
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR-
+
+1 Foreign Telephone and Email Order, however, has been extended through May 31, 2007.
+2 Further proceedings before the FISA Court are ongoing, and the TSP has not been reauthorized.
+3 27. (TS//SI [REDACTED]/TSP//OC/NF) In addition to the TSP, the NSA also collects
+4 non-content communication information known as "meta data." Specifically, after the 9/11
+5 attacks, the President authorized the NSA to collect bulk meta data related to telephony
+6 communications for the purpose of conducting targeted analysis to [REDACTED]
+7 Telephony meta data is information derived from call detail records that reflect non-
+8 content information such as the date, time, and duration of telephone calls, as well as the phone
+9 numbers used to place and receive the calls.
+10 [REDACTED] since May 2006 certain telecommunication providers
+11 have been required by an order of the FISA Court to produce to the NSA on a daily basis all
+12 telephony meta data that they create ("FISC Telephone Records Order").⁶ Although this
+13 collection is broad in scope, the NSA queries the data solely with identified telephone numbers
+14 for which there are facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the number is
+15 associated with [REDACTED]. Historically, only a tiny fraction
+16 [REDACTED]
+17 of telephony meta data records collected by the NSA has actually been presented to a trained
+18 ⁷(TS//SI//OC/NF) The FISC Telephone Records Order has been reauthorized
+19 approximately every 90 days since it was first issued.
+20 ⁸(TS//SI [REDACTED]/TSP//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+21 [REDACTED]
+22 [REDACTED]
+23 ⁹(TS//SI [REDACTED]/TSP//OC/NF) Even before the FISC issued its Telephone Records
+24 Order, the NSA operated under very similar requirements for accessing the meta data collected
+
+CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]//TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+16
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 professional for analysis. While the vast majority of records are thus never viewed by a human
+2 at the NSA, it is still necessary to collect the meta data in bulk in order to utilize sophisticated
+3 analytical tools for tracking the contacts [REDACTED]
+4 Telephony meta data collection and analysis are highly valuable tools for tracking
+5 terrorists and are therefore highly classified and strictly compartmented.
+6 28. (TS//SI [REDACTED]/TSP//OC/NF) In addition, since the 9/11 attacks, the NSA
+7 has collected bulk meta data related to Internet communications. Internet meta data is
+8 header/router/addressing information, such as the "to," "from," "cc," and "bcc" lines, as opposed
+9 to the body or "re" lines, of a standard email. The collection of Internet meta data in bulk was
+10 conducted pursuant to Presidential authorization from October 2001 [REDACTED] and since
+11 July 2004 it has been conducted pursuant to an Order of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
+12 Court authorizing the use of a pen register and trap and trace device ("FISC Pen Register
+13 Order"). See 18 U.S.C. § 3127 (defining "pen register" and "trap and trace device"). Pursuant to
+14 the FISC Pen Register Order, which has been reauthorized approximately every 90 days since it
+15 was first issued, the NSA is authorized to collect, in bulk, meta data associated with electronic
+16 communications [REDACTED] on the Internet.⁹
+17 [REDACTED]
+18 [REDACTED]
+19 [REDACTED]
+20 Although the NSA collects email meta data in
+21 ¹⁰(TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+22 [REDACTED]
+23 [REDACTED]
+
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+17
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 bulk [REDACTED], it is only authorized to query the archived meta data using email
+2 addresses for which there are facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the email
+3 address is associated with [REDACTED] (similar restrictions were
+4 in place under the Presidential authorization). As with bulk telephony meta data collection, and
+5 as the FISA Court specifically recognized in finding the bulk Internet meta data collection
+6 consistent with the First and Fourth Amendments, the collection of the data in bulk is necessary
+7 to allow the NSA to use critical and unique analytical capabilities to track the contacts (even
+8 retrospectively) [REDACTED] of known terrorists. Like telephony meta data
+9 activities, Internet meta data collection and analysis are highly valuable tools for protecting the
+10 United States from attack, and, accordingly, information pertaining to those activities is highly
+11 classified and strictly compartmented.
+12 29. (TS//SI [REDACTED]/TSP//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+13 [REDACTED]
+14 [REDACTED]
+15 [REDACTED]
+16 [REDACTED]
+17 [REDACTED]
+18 [REDACTED]
+19 [REDACTED]
+20 [REDACTED]
+21 [REDACTED]
+22 [REDACTED]
+23 [REDACTED]
+
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+18
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 30. (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+2 [REDACTED]
+3 [REDACTED]
+4 [REDACTED]
+5 [REDACTED]
+6 [REDACTED]
+7 [REDACTED]
+8 [REDACTED]
+9 [REDACTED]
+10 [REDACTED]
+11 [REDACTED]
+12 On July 14, 2004, the FISC issued the Pen Register Order,
+13 restoring the bulk collection of Internet meta data as described above.
+
+14 V. (U) Information Protected by Privilege
+15 31. (U) As set forth further below, the following categories of information are subject
+16 to the DNI's assertion of the state secrets privilege and statutory privilege under the National
+17 Security Act, as well as my assertion of the NSA privilege:
+18 ¹⁰(TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+19 [REDACTED]
+20 ¹¹(TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) As noted, the President reauthorized the TSP, as well as the
+21 Internet and telephony meta data activities, approximately every 30-60 days, and each time he
+22 did so in a single document covering all three activities (and, at times, other activities). See n.5,
+23 supra.
+24 ¹²(TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+
+CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+19
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 A. (U) Information that may tend to confirm or deny whether the Plaintiffs
+2 have been subject to any alleged NSA intelligence activity that may be at issue in this matter; and
+3 B. (U) Information concerning NSA intelligence activities,
+4 sources, or methods, including:
+5 (1) (U) Information concerning the scope and operation of
+6 the Terrorist Surveillance Program, including information
+7 that may be needed to demonstrate that the TSP was limited
+8 to one-end foreign al Qaeda-related communications and
+9 that the NSA does not otherwise engage in the content
+10 surveillance dragnet that the Plaintiffs allege; and
+11 (2) (U) Any other information concerning NSA intelligence
+12 activities, sources, or methods that would be necessary to
+13 adjudicate the Plaintiffs' claims, including, to the extent
+14 applicable, information that would tend to confirm or deny
+15 whether the NSA collects large quantities of
+16 communication records information; and
+17 C. (U) Information that may tend to confirm or deny whether
+18 Verizon/MCI, AT&T, or any other telecommunications
+19 carrier has assisted the NSA with the alleged intelligence
+20 activities.
+
+21 VI. (U) Description of Information Subject to Privilege and the Harm of Disclosure
+22 A. (U) Information That May Tend to Confirm or Deny Whether the Plaintiffs Have
+23 Been Subject to Any Alleged NSA Activities That May Be at Issue in This Matter
+24 32. (U) The first category of information as to which I am supporting the DNI's
+
+CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+20
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 assertion of privilege, and asserting the NSA's own statutory privilege, concerns information as
+2 to whether particular individuals, including the named Plaintiffs in this lawsuit, have been
+3 subject to alleged NSA intelligence activities. As set forth below, confirmation or denial of such
+4 information would cause exceptionally grave harm to national security.
+
+5 1. (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF)
+6 [REDACTED]
+7 [REDACTED]
+8 [REDACTED]
+9 [REDACTED]
+10 [REDACTED]
+11 [REDACTED]
+12 [REDACTED]
+13 [REDACTED]
+14 [REDACTED]
+15 [REDACTED]
+16 [REDACTED]
+17 [REDACTED]
+18 [REDACTED]
+19 [REDACTED]
+20 [REDACTED]
+21 33. (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) The named Plaintiffs in this action—Virginia Shubert,
+22 Noha Arafa, Sarah Dranoff, and Hilary Botein—allege that the contents of their telephone and
+23 Internet communications were subject to "unlawful interception, search and seizure, and
+
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+21
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//OC/NF)
+1 2. (TS//SI//OC/NF)
+2 34. (TS//SI [REDACTED]/OC/NF)
+3 [REDACTED]
+4 [REDACTED]
+5 [REDACTED]
+6 [REDACTED]
+7 [REDACTED]
+8 [REDACTED]
+9 [REDACTED]
+10 [REDACTED]
+11 [REDACTED]
+12 [REDACTED]
+13 [REDACTED]
+
+14 3. (U) Harm of Disclosure
+15 35. (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+16 [REDACTED]
+17 First, as a matter of course, the NSA cannot publicly confirm
+18 or deny whether any individual is subject to the surveillance activities described herein, because
+19 to do so would tend to reveal actual targets. For example, if the NSA were to confirm in this
+20 case and others that specific individuals are not targets of surveillance, but later refuse to
+21 [REDACTED]
+22 ¹⁴ (TS//SI [REDACTED]/OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+23 [REDACTED]
+
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+22
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 comment (as it would have to) in a case involving an actual target, a person could easily deduce
+2 by comparing such responses that the person in the latter case is a target. The harm of revealing
+3 targets of foreign intelligence surveillance should be obvious. If an individual knows or suspects
+4 he is a target of U.S. intelligence activities, he would naturally tend to alter his behavior to take
+5 new precautions against surveillance.
+6 [REDACTED]
+7 [REDACTED]
+8 In addition, revealing
+9 who is not a target would indicate who has avoided surveillance and who may be a secure
+10 channel for communication. Such information could lead a person, secure in the knowledge that
+11 he is not under surveillance, to help a hostile foreign adversary convey information;
+12 alternatively, such a person may be unwittingly utilized or even forced to convey information
+13 through a secure channel. Revealing which channels are free from surveillance and which are
+14 not would also reveal sensitive intelligence methods and thereby could help any adversary evade
+15 detection.
+
+16 36. (TS//SI [REDACTED]/OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+17 [REDACTED]
+18 [REDACTED]
+19 [REDACTED]
+20 [REDACTED]
+21 [REDACTED]
+22 [REDACTED]
+23 [REDACTED]
+
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+23
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 [REDACTED]
+2 [REDACTED]
+3 [REDACTED]
+4 [REDACTED]
+5 37. (TS//SI [REDACTED]/OC/NF) Disclosing any of this information would reveal
+6 some of the Nation's most sensitive and important intelligence-gathering methods. For reasons
+7 already discussed, such disclosures would cause exceptionally grave damage to the national
+8 security by allowing al Qaeda and its affiliates to evade detection, as well as by alerting other
+9 foreign adversaries to these critical intelligence-gathering methods. Disclosing whether the NSA
+10 currently receives telephony or Internet meta data [REDACTED] would also
+11 violate specific provisions of the FISC Telephone Records and FISC Pen Register Orders.
+
+12 B. (U) Information Concerning NSA Activities, Sources, or Methods, and the Harm of
+13 Disclosure.
+14 38. (U) The second category of information over which I am supporting the DNI's
+15 assertion of privilege and asserting the NSA's statutory privilege is information concerning NSA
+16 intelligence activities, sources, and methods that may at issue in this case, including (1) facts
+17 concerning the operation of the Terrorist Surveillance Program and any other NSA intelligence
+18 activities needed to demonstrate that the TSP was limited as the President stated to the
+19 interception of one-end foreign communications reasonably believed to involve a member or
+20 agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization, see ¶ 24 & n.5, supra, and that the NSA
+21 does not otherwise conduct a dragnet of content surveillance as the Plaintiffs allege; (2) other
+22 classified facts about the operation of the TSP that would be necessary to adjudicate the
+23 lawfulness of that program; and (3) facts that would confirm or deny whether the NSA collects
+
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+24
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR-
+
+1 large quantities of communication records information. As set forth below, the disclosure of
+2 such information would cause exceptionally grave harm to national security.
+
+3 1. (U) Information Concerning Plaintiffs' Allegations of a Content Surveillance
+4 "Dragnet."
+5 39. (U) In December 2005, President Bush explained that, after the September 11
+6 attacks, he authorized the NSA to intercept the content of certain communications for which
+7 there are reasonable grounds to believe that (1) such communication originated or terminated
+8 outside the United States, and (2) a party to such communication is a member or agent of al
+9 Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization. The President stated at the time that this activity,
+10 now referred to as the Terrorist Surveillance Program, did not involve the collection of purely
+11 domestic communications, or international communications with no al Qaeda connection, and
+12 these facts were reiterated publicly by the Attorney General and then-Deputy Director of
+13 National Intelligence. Nonetheless, I am advised that the Plaintiffs have alleged that, pursuant to
+14 a secret NSA program, "virtually every telephone, internet and/or email communication that has
+15 been sent from or received within the United States since 2001 has been (and continues to be)
+16 searched, seized, intercepted, and subjected to surveillance without a warrant, court order or any
+17 other lawful authorization." Amended Compl. ¶ 1. As the President made clear in describing the
+18 limited scope of the TSP, such allegations of a content surveillance dragnet are false. But if the
+19 NSA had to demonstrate in this case that the TSP was limited as the President stated, and not a
+20 dragnet as the Plaintiffs claim, and that the NSA does not otherwise engage in the dragnet that
+21 Plaintiffs allege, sensitive and classified facts about the operation of the TSP and NSA
+22 intelligence activities would have to be disclosed.
+
+23 40. (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) The privileged information that must be protected from
+24 disclosure includes the following classified details demonstrating the limited nature of the TSP:
+
+CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+25
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 First, interception of the content of communications under the TSP was triggered by a range of
+2 information, including sensitive foreign intelligence, obtained or derived from various sources
+3 indicating that a particular phone number or email address is reasonably believed by the U.S.
+4 Intelligence Community to be associated with a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated
+5 terrorist organization. Professional intelligence officers at the NSA undertook a careful but
+6 expeditious analysis of that information, and considered a number of possible factors, in
+7 determining whether it would be appropriate to target a telephone number or email address under
+8 the TSP. Those factors included whether the target phone number or email address was:
+9 (1) reasonably believed by the U.S. Intelligence Community, based on other authorized
+10 collection activities or other law enforcement or intelligence sources, to be used by a member or
+11 agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization;
+12 [REDACTED]
+13 [REDACTED]
+14 [REDACTED]
+15 [REDACTED]
+16 [REDACTED]
+17 [REDACTED]
+18 [REDACTED]
+19 [REDACTED]
+20 ¹⁵ (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+21 [REDACTED]
+22 [REDACTED]
+23 [REDACTED]
+
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+26
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR-
+
+1 [REDACTED]
+2 [REDACTED]
+3 [REDACTED]
+
+4 41. (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) Once the NSA determined that there were reasonable
+5 grounds to believe that the target is a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist
+6 organization, the NSA took steps to focus the interception on the specific al Qaeda-related target
+7 and on communications of that target that are to or from a foreign country. In this respect, the
+8 NSA's collection efforts were [REDACTED] that the NSA had
+9 reasonable grounds to believe carry the "one end" foreign communications of members or agents
+10 of al Qaeda or affiliated terrorist organizations.
+
+11 42. (TS//SI [REDACTED]/TSP//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+12 [REDACTED]
+13 [REDACTED]
+14 [REDACTED]
+15 [REDACTED]
+16 [REDACTED]
+17 [REDACTED]
+18 43. (TS//SI [REDACTED]/TSP//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+19 [REDACTED]
+20 [REDACTED]
+21 [REDACTED]
+22 [REDACTED]
+23 [REDACTED]
+
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]//TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+27
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR-
+
+1 [REDACTED]
+2 [REDACTED]
+3 [REDACTED]
+4 [REDACTED]
+
+5 44. (TS//SI- [REDACTED]/TSP//OC/NF) The NSA took specific steps in the actual TSP
+6 interception process to minimize the risk that the communications of non-targets were
+7 intercepted. With respect to telephone communications, specific telephone numbers identified
+8 through the analysis outlined above were [REDACTED]
+9 so that the only communications
+10 intercepted were those to or from the targeted number of an individual who was reasonably
+11 believed to be a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization. For Internet
+12 communications, the NSA used identifying information obtained through its analysis of the
+13 target, such as email addresses [REDACTED] to target for collection the communications of
+14 individuals reasonably believed to be members or agents of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist
+15 organization.¹⁶
+
+16 ¹⁶ (TS//SI [REDACTED]/TSP//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+17 [REDACTED]
+18 content of the communications. [REDACTED] At no point did the NSA search the
+19 [REDACTED] with "key words" other than the targeted
+20 selectors themselves. Rather, the NSA targeted for collection only email addresses [REDACTED]
+associated with suspected members or agents of al Qaeda or affiliated
+21 terrorist organizations, or communications in which such [REDACTED] were mentioned.
+22 In addition, due to technical limitations of the hardware and software currently used, incidental
+23 collection of non-target communications has occurred, and in such circumstances the NSA
+24 applies its minimization procedures to ensure that communications of non-targets are not
+
+CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]//TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//IR.
+28
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR-
+
+1 disseminated. To the extent such facts would be necessary to dispel Plaintiffs' erroneous dragnet
+2 allegations, they could not be disclosed without revealing highly sensitive intelligence methods.
+
+3 45. (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) In addition to procedures designed to ensure that the TSP
+4 was limited to the international communications of al Qaeda members and affiliates, the NSA
+5 also took additional steps to ensure that the privacy rights of U.S. persons were protected.
+6 [REDACTED]
+7 [REDACTED]
+8 [REDACTED]
+9 [REDACTED]
+10 [REDACTED]
+11 [REDACTED]
+12 [REDACTED]
+13 46. (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+14 [REDACTED]
+15 [REDACTED]
+16 [REDACTED]
+17 [REDACTED]
+18 [REDACTED]
+19 ¹⁷ (U//FOUO) In addition, in implementing the TSP, the NSA applied the existing Legal
+20 Compliance and Minimization Procedures applicable to U.S. persons to the extent not
+21 inconsistent with the President's authorization. See United States Signals Intelligence Directive
+22 (USSID) 18. These procedures require that the NSA refrain from intentionally acquiring the
+23 communications of U.S. persons that are not the targets of its surveillance activities, that it
+24 destroy upon recognition any communications solely between or among persons in the U.S. that
+
+CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+29
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR-
+
+1 it inadvertently acquires, and that it refrain from identifying U.S. persons in its intelligence
+2 reports unless a senior NSA official determines that the recipient of the report requires such
+3 information in order to perform a lawful function assigned to it and the identity of the U.S.
+4 person is necessary to understand the foreign intelligence or to assess its significance.
+5 [REDACTED]
+6 [REDACTED]
+7 [REDACTED]
+8 [REDACTED]
+9 [REDACTED]
+10 [REDACTED]
+11 [REDACTED]
+12 [REDACTED]
+13 [REDACTED]
+14 [REDACTED]
+15 [REDACTED]
+16 None of these activities, however, could be disclosed to address and rebut
+17 Plaintiffs' dragnet allegations without causing exceptionally grave damage to the national
+18 security.
+
+19 2. (U) Additional Classified Information Concerning the TSP
+20 48. (U) To the extent the Plaintiffs in this case are challenging the lawfulness of the
+21 TSP itself, facts about the operation of that program (which remain highly classified) also could
+22 not be disclosed.
+23 [REDACTED]
+
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+30
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 49. (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) For example, in conjunction with meta data analysis, the
+2 TSP provided far greater operational swiftness and effectiveness for identifying the al Qaeda
+3 terrorist network in the United States than the traditional procedures that had been used under the
+4 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. In order to ascertain as rapidly as possible the potential al
+5 Qaeda terrorist threats facing the United States, the NSA must know not only what a foreign
+6 terrorist target says in a particular telephone or Internet intercept, but with whom that person has
+7 been communicating. To the extent individual court orders for all TSP targets could have been
+8 required in advance under traditional FISA procedures, the NSA would have been unable to
+9 target communications sent to and from new phone numbers or Internet accounts as quickly, and
+10 valuable intelligence could have been lost.
+11 50. (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) As noted, [REDACTED]
+12 [REDACTED]
+13 the TSP, in conjunction with meta data collection and analysis,
+14 allowed the NSA to obtain rapidly not only the content of a particular communication, but
+15 connections between that target and others who may form a web of al Qaeda conspirators. In
+16 some cases, the NSA was able to begin collection on a target phone number in [REDACTED]
+17 [REDACTED] to begin collection on a targeted phone number or
+18 email address. In contrast, if individual applications have to be prepared and approved through
+19 the traditional FISA process before the NSA can target a newly identified phone number or email
+20 account associated with al Qaeda, vital information could be lost in the interim. The traditional
+21 FISA process is a highly effective tool for many types of surveillance activities, [REDACTED]
+22 [REDACTED]
+23 [REDACTED]
+
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR-
+31
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 [REDACTED]
+2 [REDACTED]
+3 [REDACTED]
+
+4 51. (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) None of the foregoing information about the Terrorist
+5 Surveillance Program could be disclosed in this case, however, without causing exceptionally
+6 grave harm to the national security. Even though the President has determined not to reauthorize
+7 the TSP, revealing how the program operated would provide key insights to foreign adversaries
+8 as to how the NSA monitors communications. Information about the specific foreign
+9 intelligence factors that triggered interception under the TSP would obviously reveal to foreign
+10 adversaries the very facts that would most likely lead to their communications being intercepted,
+11 even under the current FISA Court Orders, thereby giving adversaries a roadmap as to how to
+12 avoid such interception.
+13 [REDACTED]
+14 [REDACTED]
+15 [REDACTED]
+16 [REDACTED]
+17 [REDACTED]
+18 [REDACTED]
+19 ¹⁸ (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+20 [REDACTED]
+21 [REDACTED]
+22 [REDACTED]
+23 [REDACTED]
+
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+32
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR-
+
+1 [REDACTED]
+2 [REDACTED]
+3 [REDACTED]
+
+4 52. (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) Likewise, information about the speed and agility with
+5 which the NSA can collect content on a target, and how long it might maintain surveillance,
+6 would provide invaluable insights for an adversary to devise new and different ways to protect
+7 their communications. In particular, disclosure of the NSA's ability to utilize the TSP (or,
+8 therefore, the current FISA Court-authorized content collection) in conjunction with contact
+9 chaining [REDACTED] would severely undermine efforts to detect terrorist activities.
+10 Armed with this knowledge, an adversary could make more robust use [REDACTED]
+11 [REDACTED] Also, as noted, [REDACTED]
+12 [REDACTED] Compromise of one NSA
+13 method of surveillance, even no longer in use, can easily lead to evasive actions as to other
+14 current methods that would deprive U.S. decision-makers of critical information needed to detect
+15 terrorist threats.
+
+16 3. (S) Information Concerning Meta Data Activities
+17 53. (TS//SI [REDACTED]/OC/NF) To the extent that the NSA's bulk collection and
+18 targeted analysis of communication meta data may be at issue in this case, those activities—as
+19 described in paragraphs 27 and 28, above—must also be protected from disclosure.
+20 54. (TS//SI [REDACTED]/OC/NF) As noted above, starting in October 2001, and now
+21 pursuant to the FISC Pen Register Order, the NSA collected bulk meta data associated with
+22 electronic communications [REDACTED]
+23 [REDACTED]
+24 [REDACTED]
+
+CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+33
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 [REDACTED]
+2 [REDACTED]
+3 pursuant to the FISC Telephone Records Order, certain telecommunication companies
+4 provide the NSA with bulk telephony meta data in the form of call detail records derived from
+5 information kept by those companies in the ordinary course of business. See ¶ 27, supra.
+6 Disclosure of the NSA's meta data collection activities, either before or after FISC authorization,
+7 would cause exceptionally grave harm to national security.
+8 55. (TS//SI [REDACTED]/OC/NF) In particular, the bulk collection of Internet and
+9 telephony meta data allows the NSA to use critical and unique analytical capabilities to track the
+10 contacts [REDACTED] of members or agents of [REDACTED]
+11 [REDACTED] through the use of two highly sophisticated tools known as "contact chaining" and
+12 "Contact-chaining allows the NSA to identify telephone numbers and email
+13 addresses that have been in contact with known [REDACTED] numbers and addresses; in
+14 turn, those contacts can be targeted for immediate query and analysis as new [REDACTED]
+15 numbers and addresses are identified. Obtaining the meta data in bulk, moreover, allows the
+16 NSA not only to track the contacts made by a particular telephone number or email address from
+17 a certain point in time going forward, but also to trace historically the contacts made with that
+18 number or address. This tool has been highly useful in detecting previously unknown terrorist
+19 operatives or agents for further surveillance.
+20 56. (TS//SI [REDACTED]/OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+21 [REDACTED]
+22 [REDACTED]
+23 [REDACTED]
+
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+34
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 [REDACTED]
+2 [REDACTED]
+3 [REDACTED]
+4 [REDACTED]
+5 [REDACTED]
+6 [REDACTED]
+7 57. (TS//SI [REDACTED]/OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+8 [REDACTED]
+9 [REDACTED]
+10 [REDACTED]
+11 [REDACTED]
+12 [REDACTED]
+13 [REDACTED]
+14 [REDACTED]
+15 [REDACTED]
+16 [REDACTED]
+17 [REDACTED]
+18 [REDACTED]
+19 [REDACTED]
+20 [REDACTED]
+21 [REDACTED]
+
+22 58. (TS//SI [REDACTED]/TSP//OC/NF) The capability provided by meta data
+23 analysis may be illustrated by an example of when this tool was not utilized. According to the
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+35
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 9/11 Commission report, when Khalid al-Mihdhar, one of the 9/11 hijackers, was in the United
+2 States from January 2000 to June 2001, he telephoned the home of his wife's family in Yemen.
+3 The phone number for this home in Yemen had well-established terrorist connections¹⁹ and was
+4 being targeted by the NSA through an overseas collection process that did not have the capability
+5 to obtain meta data to help identify the location of incoming calls. At the time, there was no
+6 FISA collection on this number, and neither the TSP program, under which the NSA targeted
+7 one-end foreign calls into the United States, nor the collection of bulk meta data, which would
+8 have allowed analysis of this number to ascertain other contact numbers, were in place. Had the
+9 Yemeni phone number been targeted using the TSP and were meta data analysis available, we
+10 should have been able to identify that al-Mihdhar was in the United States when he called the
+11 number in Yemen, which would have provided leads to investigate the matter further. Indeed,
+12 the 9/11 Commission report noted that if the FBI had known that al Mihdhar was in the United
+13 States, "investigations or interrogation of [al Mihdhar], and investigation of [his] travel and
+14 financial activities could have yielded evidence of connections to other participants in the 9/11
+15 plot. The simple fact of [his] detention could have derailed the plan. In any case, the
+16 opportunity did not arise." Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
+17 the United States ("9/11 Commission Report") at 272. While there is an element of hindsight to
+18 this example, and perhaps other actions could have detected al Mihdhar, the existence of the TSP
+19 and meta data activities would have provided a highly significant tool that may have proved
+20 valuable in detecting the 9/11 plot.
+21 [REDACTED]
+22 ¹⁹ (TS//SI//NF) In August 1998, the number was found in the pocket of one of the
+23 would-be Kenyan Embassy bombers, who had fled the bomb-ladened vehicle at the last minute.
+
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR-
+36
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//OC/NF) Based on my experience as Director of the
+1 59. (TS//SI [REDACTED]/TSP//OC/NF) Based on my experience as Director of the
+2 NSA, I believe that the meta data collection activities authorized by the President after 9/11 and
+3 subsequently authorized by the FISC are among the most important intelligence tools available
+4 to the United States for protecting the Homeland from another catastrophic terrorist attack. In
+5 my view, the NSA could not have obtained certain critical intelligence in any other way. These
+6 NSA activities have given the United States unparalleled ability to understand [REDACTED]
+7 [REDACTED] If employed on a sufficient volume of raw data,
+8 contact chaining [REDACTED] can expose [REDACTED] and contacts that
+9 were previously unknown. Meta data collection thus enables the NSA to segregate some of that
+10 very small amount of otherwise undetectable but highly valuable information from the
+11 overwhelming amount of other information that has no intelligence value whatsoever—in
+12 colloquial terms, to find at least some of the needles hidden in the haystack.
+13 [REDACTED]
+14 [REDACTED]
+15 [REDACTED]
+16 [REDACTED]
+17 [REDACTED]
+18 [REDACTED]
+19 [REDACTED]
+20 [REDACTED]
+21 [REDACTED]
+22 Disclosure or confirmation of the NSA's bulk collection and targeted analysis
+23 [REDACTED]
+
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+37
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 of telephony meta data would confirm to all of our foreign adversaries [REDACTED]
+2 the existence of these critical intelligence capabilities and thereby severely undermine
+3 NSA's ability to gather information concerning terrorist connections.
+
+4 4. (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) Information Demonstrating the Success of the
+5 TSP and Meta Data Activities.
+6 60. (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) Specific examples of how the TSP, in conjunction with
+7 meta data analysis, led to the development by the NSA of actionable intelligence and important
+8 counter-terrorism efforts help illustrate the effectiveness and need for the activities. To the
+9 extent that such examples would be relevant to any defense of this action, however, those
+10 examples could not be disclosed without revealing specific NSA intelligence information,
+11 sources, and methods. For instance:
+12 A. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+13 [REDACTED]
+14 [REDACTED]
+15 [REDACTED]
+16 [REDACTED]
+17 [REDACTED]
+18 [REDACTED]
+19 As a result of contact chaining undertaken pursuant
+20 to meta data analysis, the NSA was able to discover contacts between [REDACTED]
+21 [REDACTED]
+22 [REDACTED]
+23 [REDACTED]
+
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR-
+38
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 [REDACTED]
+2 [REDACTED]
+3 [REDACTED]
+4 [REDACTED]
+5 [REDACTED]
+6 [REDACTED]
+7 [REDACTED]
+8 [REDACTED]
+9 [REDACTED]
+10 [REDACTED]
+11 [REDACTED]
+12 [REDACTED]
+13 [REDACTED]
+14 B. (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+15 [REDACTED]
+16 [REDACTED]
+17 [REDACTED]
+18 [REDACTED]
+19 C. (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+20 [REDACTED]
+21 [REDACTED]
+22 [REDACTED]
+23 [REDACTED]
+
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR-
+39
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 [REDACTED]
+2 [REDACTED]
+3 [REDACTED]
+4 [REDACTED]
+5 [REDACTED]
+6 [REDACTED]
+7 [REDACTED]
+8 [REDACTED]
+9 [REDACTED]
+10 [REDACTED]
+11 [REDACTED]
+12 [REDACTED]
+13 [REDACTED]
+14 [REDACTED]
+15 [REDACTED]
+16 [REDACTED]
+17 [REDACTED]
+18 [REDACTED]
+
+19 D. (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+20 [REDACTED]
+21 [REDACTED]
+22 [REDACTED]
+23 [REDACTED]
+
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+40
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 [REDACTED]
+2 [REDACTED]
+3 [REDACTED]
+4 [REDACTED]
+
+5 E. (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+6 [REDACTED]
+7 [REDACTED]
+8 [REDACTED]
+9 [REDACTED]
+10 [REDACTED]
+11 [REDACTED]
+12 [REDACTED]
+13 [REDACTED]
+14 [REDACTED]
+15 [REDACTED]
+16 [REDACTED]
+17 [REDACTED]
+
+18 F. (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+19 [REDACTED]
+20 [REDACTED]
+21 [REDACTED]
+22 [REDACTED]
+23 [REDACTED]
+
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+41
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 G. (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+2 [REDACTED]
+3 [REDACTED]
+4 [REDACTED]
+5 [REDACTED]
+6 [REDACTED]
+7 [REDACTED]
+8 [REDACTED]
+9 H. (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+10 [REDACTED]
+11 [REDACTED]
+12 [REDACTED]
+13 [REDACTED]
+14 [REDACTED]
+15 I. (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+16 [REDACTED]
+17 [REDACTED]
+18 [REDACTED]
+19 [REDACTED]
+20 [REDACTED]
+21 [REDACTED]
+22 J. (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+23 [REDACTED]
+
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+42
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 [REDACTED]
+2 [REDACTED]
+3 [REDACTED]
+4 [REDACTED]
+5 [REDACTED]
+6 [REDACTED]
+7 [REDACTED]
+8 [REDACTED]
+
+9 61. (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) Information about any of the successes of NSA activities
+10 would not only be revealing of the substantive knowledge of the United States Government as to
+11 terrorist plans and activities, but would also tend to reveal or confirm to all of our foreign
+12 adversaries the sources and methods by which the United States obtained such information.
+
+13 5. (C) Information Concerning FISC Orders.
+14 62. (TS//SI [REDACTED]/TSP//OC/NF) Next, to the extent relevant to the litigation of
+15 this case, information concerning the various orders of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
+16 Court mentioned throughout this declaration must also remain protected from public disclosure.
+17 As discussed above, three NSA intelligence activities authorized by the President after the
+18 September 11 attacks to detect and prevent a further al Qaeda attack—the TSP, internet meta
+19 data collection, and telephony meta data collection—have been subject to various orders of the
+20 FISC and are no longer being conducted under Presidential authorization. The very existence of
+21 the meta data FISC orders—the FISC Pen Register Order (first issued in July 2004) and the FISC
+22 Telephone Records Order (first issued in May 2006)—remains classified. The President
+23 authorized the disclosure of the general existence of the January 10, 2007 FISC orders that
+
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+43
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 authorized electronic surveillance of [REDACTED] individuals in a manner similar to that
+2 undertaken in the TSP, and President's authorization of the TSP lapsed in February 2007.
+3 Information that may reveal the existence of the undisclosed FISC orders or the substance of any
+4 of these orders should be protected from disclosure.
+
+5 63. (TS//SI [REDACTED]/OC/NF) Disclosure of information about and within the
+6 FISC orders would obviously reveal intelligence sources and methods currently being utilized by
+7 the NSA under Court order and, thus, would cause exceptional harm to national security. For
+8 example, as discussed above, the FISC Telephone Records Order requires certain
+9 telecommunication companies to produce all of their telephony meta data to the NSA on a daily
+10 basis and authorizes the NSA to access its archive of collected telephony meta data only when
+11 the NSA has identified a known telephone number reasonably suspected to be associated with
+12 [REDACTED] The Order also provides that a telephone number
+13 believed to be used by a U.S. person shall not be regarded as associated with [REDACTED]
+14 [REDACTED] solely on the basis of activities that are protected by the First
+15 Amendment. The FISC Pen Register Order authorizes the use of a pen register and trap and
+16 trace device to collect Internet meta data [REDACTED] on similar
+17 terms. Disclosure of these facts would reveal sensitive sources and methods utilized by the NSA
+18 to obtain data utilized to track [REDACTED] contacts of [REDACTED]
+
+19 ²⁰ (TS//SI [REDACTED]/OC/NF) For this reason, the FISC Telephone Records Order and
+20 FISC Pen Register Orders prohibit any person from disclosing to any other person that the NSA
+21 has sought or obtained the telephony meta data, other than to (a) those persons to whom
+22 disclosure is necessary to comply with the Order; (b) an attorney to obtain legal advice or
+23 assistance with respect to the production of meta data in response to the Order; or (c) other
+24 persons permitted by the Director of the FBI or the Director's designee. The FISC Orders
+
+CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+44
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR-
+
+1 further provide that any person to whom disclosure is made pursuant to (a), (b), or (c) shall be
+2 subject to the nondisclosure requirements applicable to a person to whom the Order is directed in
+3 the same manner as such person.
+4 [REDACTED]
+5 [REDACTED]
+6 [REDACTED]
+7 [REDACTED]
+8 Thus, any attempt to address the lawfulness of the meta data activities under Presidential
+9 authorization prior to the FISC orders would directly risk disclosure of current NSA operations
+10 under FISC Orders.
+
+11 65. (TS//SI [REDACTED]/TSP//OC//NF) The disclosure of information concerning the
+12 recent FISC Orders authorizing electronic surveillance would also harm national security. The
+13 January 10, 2007 Foreign Telephone and Email Order authorized, among other things, electronic
+14 surveillance of telephone and Internet communications [REDACTED]
+15 when the Government determines that there is probable cause to believe that (1) one of the
+16 communicants is a member or agent of [REDACTED] and (2)
+17 the communication is to or from a foreign country, i.e., a one-end foreign communication to or
+18 from the United States.²¹
+19 The telephone numbers and email addresses to be targeted (i.e.,
+20 "selectors") under this order were further limited to those that the NSA reasonably believes are
+21 being used by persons outside the United States. Under the order, every 30 days the Government
+22 is required to submit a report to the FISA Court listing new selectors that the NSA has targeted
+23 [REDACTED] That fact, which is not relevant to this action, is, like
+24 the other details in the orders, highly classified.
+
+CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR-
+45
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR-
+
+1 during the previous 30 days and briefly summarizing the basis for the NSA's determination that
+2 the probable cause standard has been met.
+3 66. (TS//SI//OC//NF) The surveillance under this new FISC Court Foreign
+4 Telephone and Email Order, which is subject to detailed minimization and oversight procedures,
+5 was authorized for 90 days and indicated that it may be reauthorized by the FISC Court upon
+6 application by the Attorney General. The order states that, with each request for reauthorization,
+7 the Government is required to present a list of current selectors previously reported to the FISA
+8 Court that the Government intends to continue to task for collection under the reauthorization.
+9 The order further indicated that, at any time, the FISA Court may request additional information
+10 regarding particular selectors, and, if the Court finds that the applicable probable cause standard
+11 is not met, it may direct that the surveillance under the order shall cease on the selector(s) in
+12 question. This non-traditional order allowed the Government to target for collection
+13 communications related to new [REDACTED] selectors used by terrorists without
+14 having to seek advance approval from the FISC Court for each individual selector. Upon the
+15 initiation of the surveillance authorized under the Foreign Telephone and Email Order, the NSA
+16 monitored over [REDACTED] foreign selectors. [REDACTED] the reporting of these initial
+17 selectors occurred over a 90-day period.
+
+18 67. (TS//SI//TSP//OC//NF) [REDACTED]
+19 [REDACTED]
+20 [REDACTED]
+21 [REDACTED]
+22 [REDACTED]
+23 [REDACTED]
+
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+46
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 [REDACTED]
+2 [REDACTED]
+3 [REDACTED]
+4 [REDACTED]
+5 [REDACTED]
+6 [REDACTED]
+7 [REDACTED]
+8 [REDACTED]
+
+9 ²² While the general existence of the January 2007 orders,
+10 as described publicly by the Attorney General, is not classified, the number, nature, and contents
+11 of the specific orders described herein are highly classified. Among other things, disclosing to
+12 our enemies what surveillance activities, targets and methods are or are not covered by FISA
+13 Court orders would reveal sources and methods of intelligence gathering, and enable the enemy
+14 to alter its communications to evade detection.
+
+15 68. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+16 [REDACTED]
+17 [REDACTED]
+18 [REDACTED]
+19 ²³ (TS//SI//TSP//OC//NF) [REDACTED]
+20 [REDACTED]
+21 [REDACTED]
+22 it plans to do so by a
+23 process in which it will obtain authorization of the FISA Court for each individual selector.
+
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+47
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 [REDACTED]
+2 [REDACTED]
+3 [REDACTED]
+
+4 surveillance authority in the Foreign Telephone and Email Order (concerning surveillance
+5 targeting telephone numbers and e-mail addresses reasonably believed to be used by persons
+6 outside the United States). Rather, it issued an Order and Memorandum opinion on April 3,
+7 2007, declining to adopt the interpretation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
+8 underlying the Government's application for the Foreign Telephone and Email Order. The Court
+9 nevertheless ordered that the Government could submit an application for a single extension of
+10 the Foreign Telephone and Email Order to May 31, 2007. The Court contemplated that an
+11 extension of surveillance authority to May 31 would allow the Government to submit an
+12 application that might permit the Court "to authorize at least part of the [requested] surveillance
+13 in a manner consistent with [its] order and opinion." On the Government's application, the
+14 Court granted a separate order issued on April 5, 2007, extending the surveillance authority
+15 granted by the Foreign Telephone and Email Order to May 31, 2007.
+
+16 69. (TS//SI//OC/NF) The Government has reviewed the new FISA Court orders and
+17 is working closely with the FISA Court in the hopes of developing an approach for continuing
+18 the authorized surveillance beyond May 31, 2007, in a manner consistent with the April 3, 2007,
+19 order of the FISC Court. The details of these orders, and targets implicated by the orders, like
+20 the operational details and targets of the ongoing FISC Court-approved surveillance, are highly
+21 classified. Thus, information about the nature of these recent FISC orders should not be
+22 disclosed in this case.
+23 [REDACTED]
+
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+48
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 C. (U) Information That May Tend to Confirm or Deny Whether Verizon/MCI and/or
+2 AT&T Has Assisted the NSA with the Alleged Intelligence Activities
+3 70. (U) The third major category of information as to which I am supporting the
+4 DNI's assertion of privilege, and asserting the NSA's statutory privilege, concerns information
+5 that may tend to confirm or deny whether Verizon/MCI and/or AT&T has assisted the NSA with
+6 the alleged intelligence activities. As set forth below, confirmation or denial of such information
+7 would cause exceptionally grave harm to national security.
+
+8 1. (TS//SI [REDACTED]/OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+9 71. (TS//SI [REDACTED]/TSP//OC/NF) Plaintiffs allege that they are customers of
+10 Verizon and/or AT&T, and that those companies participate in the content surveillance dragnet
+11 that Plaintiffs allege. See Amended Compl. ¶¶ 5-8. Neither company has participated in the
+12 alleged dragnet, because such a program does not exist.
+13 [REDACTED]
+14 [REDACTED]
+15 [REDACTED]
+16 [REDACTED]
+17 [REDACTED]
+18 [REDACTED]
+19 [REDACTED]
+20 [REDACTED]
+21 [REDACTED]
+22 [REDACTED]/OC/NF)
+23 [REDACTED]
+
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+49
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 [REDACTED]
+2 [REDACTED]
+
+3 72. (TS//SI [REDACTED]/OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+4 [REDACTED]
+5 [REDACTED]
+6 [REDACTED]
+7 [REDACTED]
+8 [REDACTED]
+9 [REDACTED]
+10 [REDACTED]
+11 [REDACTED]
+12 [REDACTED]
+13 [REDACTED]
+14 [REDACTED]
+15 [REDACTED]
+16 [REDACTED]
+17 [REDACTED]
+18 [REDACTED]
+19 [REDACTED]
+20 [REDACTED]
+21 [REDACTED]
+22 ²⁴ (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+23 [REDACTED]
+
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+50
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR-
+
+1 73. (TS//SI [REDACTED]/TSP//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+2 [REDACTED]
+3 [REDACTED]
+4 [REDACTED]
+5 [REDACTED]
+6 [REDACTED]
+7 [REDACTED]
+8 [REDACTED]
+9 [REDACTED]
+10 [REDACTED]
+11 [REDACTED]
+12 [REDACTED]
+13 [REDACTED]
+14 [REDACTED]
+15 [REDACTED]
+16 74. (TS//SI [REDACTED]/OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+17 [REDACTED]
+18 [REDACTED]
+19 [REDACTED]
+20 [REDACTED]
+21 [REDACTED]
+22 ²⁶ (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+23 [REDACTED]
+
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+51
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 [REDACTED]
+2 [REDACTED]
+3 [REDACTED]
+4 [REDACTED]
+5 [REDACTED]
+6 [REDACTED]
+7 [REDACTED]
+8 [REDACTED]
+9 75. (TS//SI [REDACTED]/OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+10 [REDACTED]
+11 [REDACTED]
+12 [REDACTED]
+13 [REDACTED]
+14 [REDACTED]
+15 [REDACTED]
+16 [REDACTED]
+17 [REDACTED]
+18 76. (TS//SI [REDACTED]/TSP//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+19 [REDACTED]
+20 [REDACTED]
+21 [REDACTED]
+22 [REDACTED]
+23 [REDACTED]
+
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+52
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR-
+
+1 [REDACTED]
+2 [REDACTED]
+3 [REDACTED]
+4 [REDACTED]
+5 [REDACTED]
+6 [REDACTED]
+7 [REDACTED]
+8 [REDACTED]
+9 [REDACTED]
+10 [REDACTED]
+11 [REDACTED]
+12 [REDACTED]
+13 [REDACTED]
+14 [REDACTED]
+
+15 2. (TS//SI [REDACTED]/OC/NF) Harm of Confirming or Denying Verizon/MCI
+16 and/or AT&T Assistance
+17 77. (TS//SI [REDACTED]/OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+18 [REDACTED]
+19 [REDACTED]
+20 [REDACTED]
+21 [REDACTED]
+22 ²⁷ (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+23 [REDACTED]
+
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR-
+53
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR-
+
+1 [REDACTED]
+2 [REDACTED]
+3 [REDACTED]
+4 [REDACTED]
+5 [REDACTED]
+6 [REDACTED]
+7 [REDACTED]
+8 [REDACTED]
+9 [REDACTED]
+10 [REDACTED]
+11 [REDACTED]
+12 [REDACTED]
+13 [REDACTED]
+14 [REDACTED]
+
+15 78. (TS//SI [REDACTED]/TSP//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+16 [REDACTED]
+17 [REDACTED]
+18 [REDACTED]
+19 [REDACTED]
+20 [REDACTED]
+21 [REDACTED]
+22 [REDACTED]
+23 [REDACTED]
+
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+54
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 [REDACTED]
+2 [REDACTED]
+3 [REDACTED]
+4 [REDACTED]
+5 [REDACTED]
+6 [REDACTED]
+7 [REDACTED]
+8 [REDACTED]
+9 79. (TS//SI [REDACTED]/OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+10 [REDACTED]
+11 [REDACTED]
+12 [REDACTED]
+13 [REDACTED]
+14 [REDACTED]
+15 [REDACTED]
+16 [REDACTED]
+17 [REDACTED]
+18 [REDACTED]
+19 [REDACTED]
+20 [REDACTED]
+21 [REDACTED]
+22 [REDACTED]
+23 [REDACTED]
+
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+55
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 80. (TS//SI [REDACTED]/OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+2 [REDACTED]
+3 [REDACTED]
+4 [REDACTED]
+5 [REDACTED]
+6 [REDACTED]
+7 [REDACTED]
+8 [REDACTED]
+9 [REDACTED]
+10 [REDACTED]
+11 [REDACTED]
+12 [REDACTED]
+13 [REDACTED]
+14 [REDACTED]
+15 [REDACTED]
+16 [REDACTED]
+17 [REDACTED]
+18 [REDACTED]
+19 [REDACTED]
+20 [REDACTED]
+21 [REDACTED]
+22 ²⁸ (TS//SI [REDACTED]/OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+23 [REDACTED]
+
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+56
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR-
+
+1 [REDACTED]
+2 [REDACTED]
+
+3 81. (TS//SI [REDACTED]/NF) [REDACTED]
+4 [REDACTED]
+5 [REDACTED]
+6 [REDACTED]
+7 [REDACTED]
+8 [REDACTED]
+9 [REDACTED]
+10 [REDACTED]
+11 [REDACTED]
+12 VII. (U) Risks of Allowing Litigation to Proceed
+13 82. (TS//SI [REDACTED]/OC/NF) Upon examination of the allegations, claims, facts,
+14 and issues raised by this case, it is my judgment that sensitive state secrets are so central to the
+15 subject matter of the litigation that any attempt to proceed will substantially risk the disclosure of
+16 the privileged state secrets described above. Although Plaintiffs challenge an alleged content
+17 surveillance dragnet that does not exist, proving why that is so, [REDACTED]
+18 [REDACTED] would directly implicate highly classified
+19 intelligence information and activities.
+20 [REDACTED]
+21 In my judgment, any
+22 effort to probe the outer-bounds of such classified information would pose inherent and
+23 [REDACTED]
+
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR-
+57
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 significant risks of the disclosure of that information, including critically sensitive information
+2 about NSA sources, methods, operations, targets [REDACTED]
+3 83. (S) Indeed, any effort merely to allude to those facts in a non-classified fashion
+4 could be revealing of classified details that should not be disclosed. As noted, even seemingly
+5 minor or innocuous facts, in the context of this case or other non-classified information, can tend
+6 to reveal, particularly to sophisticated foreign adversaries, a much bigger picture of U.S.
+7 intelligence gathering sources and methods.
+
+8 VIII. (U) Summary and Conclusion
+9 84. (TS//SI//NF) The United States has an overwhelming interest in detecting and
+10 thwarting further mass casualty attacks by al Qaeda. The United States has already suffered one
+11 attack that killed thousands, disrupted the Nation's financial center for days, and successfully
+12 struck at the command and control center for the Nation's military. Al Qaeda continues to
+13 possess the ability and clear, stated intent to carry out a massive attack in the United States that
+14 could result in a significant loss of life, as well as have a devastating impact on the U.S.
+15 economy. According to the most recent intelligence analysis, attacking the U.S. Homeland
+16 remains one of al Qaeda's top operational priorities, see In Camera Declaration of Michael
+17 McConnell, DNI, and al Qaeda will keep trying for high-impact attacks as long as its central
+18 command structure is functioning and affiliated groups are capable of furthering its interests.
+
+19 85. (TS//SI//NF) Al Qaeda seeks to use our own communications infrastructure
+20 against us as they secretly attempt to infiltrate agents into the United States, waiting to attack at a
+21 time of their choosing. One of the greatest challenges the United States confronts in the ongoing
+22 effort to prevent another catastrophic terrorist attack against the Homeland is the critical need to
+23 gather intelligence quickly and effectively. Time is of the essence in preventing terrorist attacks,
+
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+58
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+
+1 and the government faces significant obstacles in finding and tracking agents of al Qaeda as they
+2 manipulate modern technology in an attempt to communicate while remaining undetected. The
+3 NSA activities described herein are vital tools in this effort.
+
+4 86. (S) For the foregoing reasons, in my judgment the disclosure of the information
+5 discussed herein would cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United
+6 States. In addition to upholding the state secrets privilege and statutory privilege assertions by
+7 the Director of National Intelligence in this case, I request that the Court also uphold my
+8 assertion of NSA's statutory privilege to protect information about NSA activities. Finally, it is
+9 my view that continued litigation of this lawsuit would risk the disclosure of sensitive classified
+10 information and, accordingly, that the Court should not only protect from disclosure the
+11 classified information described herein but dismiss this lawsuit.
+
+12 [REDACTED]
+13 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
+
+14 DATE: 25 May 2007 [REDACTED]
+15 [REDACTED]
+16 LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+17 Director, National Security Agency
+18 [REDACTED]
+19 [REDACTED]
+20 [REDACTED]
+21 [REDACTED]
+22 [REDACTED]
+23 [REDACTED]
+
+24 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CASE NO. 07-693; MDL NO. 06-1791
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR
+59
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Alexander_2007_Shubert_Declaration/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Alexander_2007_Shubert_Declaration/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c766371
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Alexander_2007_Shubert_Declaration/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+{
+ "title": "NSA Alexander 2007 Shubert Declaration",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Classified declaration of Lieutenant General Keith B. disclosing information regarding the government’s warrantless wiretapping. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2007-05-25",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT",
+ "TSP",
+ "MR"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "ORCON, NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Alexander, Keith B.",
+ "Walker, Vaughn R."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-12-20",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/nsa-alexander-2007-shubert-declaration",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "e88e626eef39ec47bddcfe8ccf3c29bf03f2d9a8d890e9536d5fdfc275868dd3",
+ "pages": 59
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Alexander_2009_Shubert_Declaration/ACLU_-_NSA_Alexander_2009_Shubert_Declaration.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Alexander_2009_Shubert_Declaration/ACLU_-_NSA_Alexander_2009_Shubert_Declaration.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8990f2d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Alexander_2009_Shubert_Declaration/ACLU_-_NSA_Alexander_2009_Shubert_Declaration.md
@@ -0,0 +1,1789 @@
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+BETH S. BRINKMANN
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+DOUGLAS N. LETTER
+Terrorism Litigation Counsel
+JOSEPH H. HUNT
+Director, Federal Programs Branch
+VINCENT M. GARVEY
+Deputy Branch Director
+ANTHONY J. COPPOLINO
+Special Litigation Counsel
+MARCIA BERMAN
+Senior Litigation Counsel
+PAUL E. AHERN
+Trial Attorney
+U.S. Department of Justice
+Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch
+20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
+Washington, D.C. 20001
+Phone: (202) 514-4782
+Fax: (202) 616-8460
+
+Attorneys for the Government Defendants
+
+UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
+
+NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
+
+SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
+
+IN RE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+TELECOMMUNICATIONS RECORDS
+LITIGATION
+
+This Document Relates Solely To:
+
+Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al.
+(Case No. 07-cv-00693-VRW)
+
+No. M:06-cv-01791-VRW
+
+CLASSIFIED DECLARATION
+OF LT. GEN. KEITH B.
+ALEXANDER, DIRECTOR
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+
+EX PARTE, IN CAMERA
+
+Date: December 15, 2009
+Time: 10:00 a.m.
+Courtroom 6, 17th Floor
+Chief Judge Vaughn R. Walker
+
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20091030
+Declassify On: 20341030
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 1
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+(U) Table of Contents
+I. (U) Introduction
+II. (U) Summary
+III. (U) Classification of Declaration
+IV. (U) Background Information
+A. (U) The National Security Agency
+B. (U) September 11, 2001 and the al Qaeda Threat
+C. (U) Summary of NSA Activities After 9/11 to Meet al Qaeda Threat
+V. (U) Information Protected by Privilege
+VI. (U) Description of Information Subject to Privilege and the Harm of Disclosure
+A. (U) Information That May Tend to Confirm or Deny Whether the Plaintiffs Have
+Been Subject to Any Alleged NSA Activities
+B. (U) Information Related to NSA Activities, Sources, or Methods Implicated by
+the Plaintiffs' Allegations and the Harm to National Security of Disclosure
+1. (U) Plaintiffs' Allegations of a Communications Dragnet
+(a) (U) Information Related to the Terrorist Surveillance Program
+(b) (U) Other Classified Information Concerning NSA Activities
+(c) (S//SI//NF) Technical Details of Analytic Capabilities
+2. (TS//SI//OC/NF) Information Concerning Current FISA Authorized
+Activities and Specific FISC Orders
+3. (U) Plaintiffs' Allegations that Telecommunications Companies have
+Assisted the NSA with the Alleged Activities
+VII. (U) Risks of Allowing Litigation to Proceed
+VIII. (U) Conclusion
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 2
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+(U) I, Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander, do hereby state and declare as follows:
+I. (U) Introduction
+1. (U) I am the Director of the National Security Agency (NSA), an intelligence
+agency within the Department of Defense. I am responsible for directing the NSA, overseeing the
+operations undertaken to carry out its mission and, by specific charge of the President and the
+Director of National Intelligence, protecting NSA activities and intelligence sources and methods.
+I have been designated an original TOP SECRET classification authority under Executive Order
+No. 12958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19825 (Apr. 17, 1995), as amended by Executive Order No. 13292, 68
+Fed. Reg. 15315 (Mar. 25, 2003) (reprinted in 3 C.F.R. 2003 Comp. at 196 and at 50 U.S.C.A.
+§ 435 (Supp. 2009)), and Department of Defense Directive No. 5200.1-R, Information Security
+Program Regulation, 32 C.F.R. § 159a.12 (2000).
+2. (U) The purpose of this declaration is to support an assertion of the military and
+state secrets privilege (hereafter “state secrets privilege”) by the Director of National Intelligence
+(DNI) as the head of the intelligence community, as well as the DNI’s assertion of a statutory
+privilege under the National Security Act. Specifically, in the course of my official duties, I have
+been advised of this litigation and the allegations in the plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint. As
+described herein, various classified facts related to the plaintiffs’ claims are subject to the DNI's
+state secrets privilege assertion. The disclosure of information discussed throughout this
+declaration, which relates to NSA intelligence information, activities, sources, methods, and
+relationships, reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national
+security of the United States. In addition, it is my judgment that sensitive state secrets are so
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 3
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+central to the subject matter of the litigation that any attempt to proceed in the case risks the
+disclosure of the secrets described herein and exceptionally grave damage to the national security
+of the United States. Through this declaration, I also hereby invoke and assert the NSA’s
+statutory privilege set forth in section 6 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959, Public Law
+No. 86-36 (codified as a note to 50 U.S.C. § 402) (“NSA Act”), to protect the information related
+to NSA activities described below. The statements made herein are based on my personal
+knowledge of NSA activities and operations, and on information available to me as Director of
+the NSA.
+II. (U) Summary
+3. (U) I have reviewed the Amended Complaint in this case. Plaintiffs allege, in
+sum, that, after the 9/11 attacks, the NSA received presidential authorization to engage in
+surveillance activities far broader than the publicly acknowledged “Terrorist Surveillance
+Program” (“TSP”), which was limited to the interception of specific international
+communications involving persons reasonably believed to be associated with al Qaeda and
+affiliated terrorist organizations. Plaintiffs allege that the NSA, with the assistance of
+telecommunications companies, Amended Compl. ¶¶ 5-8, conducts a “dragnet” surveillance
+program involving the interception of “virtually every telephone, internet and/or email
+communication that has been sent from or received within the United States since 2001" as part
+of an alleged Presidentially-authorized “program” after 9/11, id. ¶¶ 1, 4. I cannot disclose on the
+public record the nature of any NSA information implicated by the plaintiffs’ allegations.
+However, as described further below, the disclosure of information related to the NSA’s
+activities, sources and methods implicated by the plaintiffs’ allegations reasonably could be
+expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United States and,
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 4
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+for this reason, are encompassed by the DNI's state secrets and statutory privilege assertions, as
+well as by my own statutory privilege assertion, and should be protected from disclosure in this
+case. In addition, it is my judgment that sensitive state secrets are so central to the subject matter
+of the litigation that any attempt to proceed in the case risks the disclosure of the classified
+privileged national security information described herein and exceptionally grave damage to the
+national security of the United States.
+4. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) The allegations in this lawsuit put at issue the disclosure
+of information concerning several highly classified and critically important NSA intelligence
+activities that commenced after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, but which are now being conducted
+pursuant to authority of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA"), including ongoing
+activities conducted under orders approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+("FISC"). Plaintiffs' allegation that the NSA undertakes indiscriminate surveillance of the
+content¹ of millions of communications sent or received by people inside the United States —
+under the now defunct-TSP or otherwise — is false, as discussed below. Likewise, the plaintiffs’
+allegations that telecommunications companies assisted with the alleged dragnet program are
+false, because the alleged dragnet does not exist. The NSA's collection of the content of
+communications under the TSP was directed at international communications in which a
+participant was reasonably believed to be associated with al Qaeda or an affiliated organization
+and did not constitute the kind of dragnet collection of the content of millions of Americans'
+telephone or Internet communications that the plaintiffs allege. Although the existence of the
+TSP has been acknowledged, the details of that program remain highly classified, along with
+
+¹ (TS//SI//NF) The term “content” is used in this Declaration to refer to the substance,
+meaning, or purport of a communication, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8), as opposed to the
+type of addressing or routing information referred throughout this declaration as “meta data.”
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 5
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+details of related content surveillance activities undertaken after the TSP ended pursuant to
+orders of the FISC. This information could not be disclosed to address or disprove or otherwise
+litigate the plaintiffs' allegation of a content dragnet without causing exceptional harm to NSA’s
+sources and methods of gathering intelligence — including methods currently used to detect and
+prevent further terrorist attacks under the authority of the FISA.
+5. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) In addition, as the Court is aware from prior classified
+declarations submitted by the NSA in this and related proceedings, the NSA has collected,
+pursuant to presidential authorization and currently under subsequent FISC orders, non-content
+information (i.e., meta data) about telephone and Internet communications in order to enable
+highly sophisticated analytical tools that can uncover the contacts [REDACTED] of
+members or agents of [REDACTED] As noted above and
+detailed below, the content surveillance subject to presidential authorization after 9/11 was not
+the content dragnet surveillance that plaintiffs allege, and the collection of non-content
+information, while significant in scope, remains a highly classified matter currently under FISA
+authorization. For the NSA to attempt to explain, clarify, disprove, or otherwise litigate
+plaintiffs’ allegations regarding a communications dragnet would require the NSA to confirm the
+existence of, or risk disclosure of facts concerning, intelligence sources and methods for the
+collection of non-content information related to communications, as well as current NSA
+operations under FISC Orders — disclosures that would cause exceptionally grave harm to
+national security.
+
+² (TS//SI//OC/NF) Certain FISC Orders are also directed at [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Because the allegations in the complaint reference activities
+authorized after 9/11, which were directed at [REDACTED] any
+further references to the FISC Orders will focus solely on activities under the orders directed at
+[REDACTED]
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 6
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+6. (TS//TSP//SI [REDACTED] //OC/NF) The plaintiffs’ allegation that
+telecommunications carriers assisted the NSA in alleged intelligence activities also cannot be
+confirmed or denied without risking exceptionally grave harm to national security. Because the
+NSA has not undertaken the alleged dragnet collection of communications content, no carrier has
+assisted in that alleged activity. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Disclosure of [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] would cause
+exceptionally grave damage to the national security.
+7. (TS//TSP//SI [REDACTED] //OC/NF) Accordingly, the DNI’s state secrets and
+statutory privilege assertions, and my own statutory privilege assertion, seek to protect against
+the disclosure of the highly classified intelligence sources and methods put at issue in this case
+and vital to the national security of the United States, including: (1) any information that would
+tend to confirm or deny whether particular individuals, including the named plaintiffs, have been
+subject to the alleged NSA intelligence activities; (2) information concerning NSA intelligence
+sources and methods, including facts demonstrating that the content collection under the TSP
+was limited to specific al Qaeda and associated terrorist-related international communications
+and was not a content surveillance dragnet as plaintiffs allege; (3) facts that would tend to
+confirm or deny the existence of the NSA's bulk meta data collection and use, and any
+information about those activities; and (4) the fact that [REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 7
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]. The fact that there has been public speculation
+about alleged NSA activities does not diminish the need to protect intelligence sources and
+methods from further exposure. Official confirmation and disclosure of the classified privileged
+national security information described herein would cause exceptionally grave damage to the
+national security. For these reasons, as set forth further below, I request that the Court uphold
+the state secrets and statutory privilege assertions that the DNI and I now make, and protect the
+information described in this declaration from disclosure.
+III. (U) Classification of Declaration
+8. (S//SI//NF) This declaration is classified TOP SECRET//TSP//SI [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] //ORCON/NOFORN pursuant to the standards in Executive Order No. 12958, as amended
+by Executive Order No. 13292. Under Executive Order No. 12958, information is classified
+“TOP SECRET” if unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to
+cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United States; “SECRET” if
+unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to cause serious
+damage to national security; and “CONFIDENTIAL” if unauthorized disclosure of the
+information reasonably could be expected to cause identifiable damage to national security. At
+the beginning of each paragraph of this declaration, the letter or letters in parentheses
+designate(s) the degree of classification of the information the paragraph contains. When used
+for this purpose, the letters “U," “C," “S,” and “TS” indicate respectively that the information is
+either UNCLASSIFIED, or is classified CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET³.
+
+³ (S//NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 8
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+9. (S//SI//NF) Additionally, this declaration also contains Sensitive Compartmented
+Information (SCI), which is “information that not only is classified for national security reasons
+as Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential, but also is subject to special access and handling
+requirements because it involves or derives from particularly sensitive intelligence sources and
+methods.” 28 C.F.R. § 17.18(a). Because of the exceptional sensitivity and vulnerability of such
+information, these safeguards and access requirements exceed the access standards that are
+normally required for information of the same classification level. Specifically, this declaration
+references communications intelligence (COMINT), also referred to as special intelligence (SI),
+which is a subcategory of SCI. COMINT or SI identifies SCI that was derived from exploiting
+cryptographic systems or other protected sources by applying methods or techniques, or from
+intercepted foreign communications.
+10. (TS//TSP//SI [REDACTED] //OC/NF) This declaration also contains information
+related to or derived from the TSP, a prior controlled access signals intelligence program that
+operated under presidential authorization in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001, until
+January 2007. Although the TSP was publicly acknowledged by then-President Bush in
+December 2005, details about the program remain highly classified and strictly compartmented.
+Information pertaining to this program is denoted with the special marking “TSP” and requires
+more restrictive handling. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 9
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+11. (S//NF) In addition to the fact that classified information contained herein may
+not be revealed to any person without authorization pursuant to Executive Order 12958, as
+amended, this declaration contains information that may not be released to foreign governments,
+foreign nationals, or non-U.S. citizens without permission of the originator and in accordance
+with DNI policy. This information is labeled “NOFORN” (NF). The “ORCON” (OR)
+designator means that the originator of the information controls to whom it is released.
+IV. (U) Background Information
+A. (U) The National Security Agency
+12. (U) The NSA was established by Presidential Directive in 1952 as a separately
+organized agency within the Department of Defense. The NSA’s foreign intelligence mission
+includes the responsibility to collect, process, analyze, produce, and disseminate signals
+intelligence (SIGINT) information, of which communications intelligence (COMINT) is a
+significant subset, for (a) national foreign intelligence purposes, (b) counterintelligence purposes,
+and (c) the support of military operations. See Executive Order 12333, § 1.7(c), 46 Fed. Reg.
+59941 (Dec. 4, 1981), as amended.⁵
+
+⁴ (S//SI//NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+⁵ (U) Section 1.7(c) of E.O. 12333, as amended, specifically authorizes the NSA to
+“Collect (including through clandestine means), process, analyze, produce, and disseminate
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 10
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+13. (TS//SI//NF) Signals intelligence (SIGINT) consists of three subcategories:
+(1) communications intelligence (COMINT); (2) electronic intelligence (ELINT); and (3) foreign
+instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT). Communications intelligence (COMINT) is
+defined as “all procedures and methods used in the interception of communications and the
+obtaining of information from such communications by other than the intended recipients." 18
+U.S.C. § 798. COMINT includes information derived from the interception of foreign and
+international communications, such as voice, facsimile, and computer-to-computer information
+conveyed via a number of means [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]. Electronic intelligence (ELINT) is technical intelligence information derived from
+foreign non-communications electromagnetic radiations except atomic detonation or radioactive
+sources – in essence, radar systems affiliated with military weapons platforms (e.g., anti-ship)
+and civilian systems (e.g., shipboard and air traffic control radars). Foreign instrumentation
+signals intelligence (FISINT) is derived from non-U.S. aerospace surfaces and subsurface
+systems which may have either military or civilian applications.
+14. (U) The NSA’s SIGINT responsibilities include establishing and operating an
+effective unified organization to conduct SIGINT activities set forth in E.O. No. 12333,
+§ 1.12(b), as amended. In performing its SIGINT mission, NSA has developed a sophisticated
+worldwide SIGINT collection network. The technological infrastructure that supports the NSA’s
+foreign intelligence information collection network has taken years to develop at a cost of
+billions of dollars and untold human effort. It relies on sophisticated collection and processing
+technology.
+
+signals intelligence information for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes to
+support national and departmental missions."
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 11
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+15. (U) There are two primary reasons for gathering and analyzing foreign
+intelligence information. The first, and most important, is to gain information required to direct
+U.S. resources as necessary to counter external threats and in support of military operations. The
+second reason is to obtain information necessary to the formulation of U.S. foreign policy.
+Foreign intelligence information provided by the NSA is thus relevant to a wide range of
+important issues, including military order of battle; threat warnings and readiness; arms
+proliferation; international terrorism; counter-intelligence; and foreign aspects of international
+narcotics trafficking.
+16. (U) Foreign intelligence produced by COMINT activities is an extremely
+important part of the overall foreign intelligence information available to the United States and is
+often unobtainable by other means. Public disclosure of either the capability to collect specific
+communications or the substance of the information derived from such collection itself can
+easily alert targets to the vulnerability of their communications. Disclosure of even a single
+communication holds the potential of revealing intelligence collection techniques that are applied
+against targets around the world. Once alerted, targets can frustrate COMINT collection by
+using different or new encryption techniques, by disseminating disinformation, or by utilizing a
+different communications link. Such evasion techniques may inhibit access to the target's
+communications and therefore deny the United States access to information crucial to the
+defense of the United States both at home and abroad. COMINT is provided special statutory
+protection under 18 U.S.C. § 798, which makes it a crime to knowingly disclose to an
+unauthorized person classified information "concerning the communication intelligence activities
+of the United States or any foreign government.”
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 12
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+B. (U) September 11, 2001 and the al Qaeda Threat
+17. (U) On September 11, 2001, the al Qaeda terrorist network launched a set of
+coordinated attacks along the East Coast of the United States. Four commercial jetliners, each
+carefully selected to be fully loaded with fuel for a transcontinental flight, were hijacked by al
+Qaeda operatives. Those operatives targeted the Nation’s financial center in New York with two
+of the jetliners, which they deliberately flew into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center.
+Al Qaeda targeted the headquarters of the Nation's Armed Forces, the Pentagon, with the third
+jetliner. Al Qaeda operatives were apparently headed toward Washington, D.C. with the fourth
+jetliner when passengers struggled with the hijackers and the plane crashed in Shanksville,
+Pennsylvania. The intended target of this fourth jetliner was most evidently the White House or
+the Capitol, strongly suggesting that al Qaeda's intended mission was to strike a decapitation
+blow to the Government of the United States—to kill the President, the Vice President, or
+Members of Congress. The attacks of September 11 resulted in approximately 3,000 deaths—
+the highest single-day death toll from hostile foreign attacks in the Nation’s history. In addition,
+these attacks shut down air travel in the United States, disrupted the Nation's financial markets
+and government operations, and caused billions of dollars of damage to the economy.
+18. (U) On September 14, 2001, a national emergency was declared “by reason of the
+terrorist attacks at the World Trade Center, New York, New York, and the Pentagon, and the
+continuing and immediate threat of further attacks on the United States.” Presidential
+Proclamation No. 7463, 66 Fed. Reg. 48199 (Sept. 14, 2001). The United States also
+immediately began plans for a military response directed at al Qaeda's training grounds and
+havens in Afghanistan. On September 14, 2001, both Houses of Congress passed a Joint
+Resolution authorizing the President of the United States “to use all necessary and appropriate
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 13
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
+committed, or aided the terrorist attacks” of September 11. Authorization for Use of Military
+Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40 § 21(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (Sept. 18, 2001). Congress also expressly
+acknowledged that the attacks rendered it “necessary and appropriate" for the United States to
+exercise its right “to protect United States citizens both at home and abroad,” and acknowledged
+in particular that “the President has authority under the Constitution to take action to deter and
+prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States.” Id. pmbl.
+19. (U) Also after the 9/11 attacks, a Military Order was issued stating that the attacks
+of September 11 “created a state of armed conflict,” see Military Order by the President § 1(a),
+66 Fed. Reg. 57833, 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001), and that al Qaeda terrorists “possess both the
+capability and the intention to undertake further terrorist attacks against the United States that, if
+not detected and prevented, will cause mass deaths, mass injuries, and massive destruction of
+property, and may place at risk the continuity of the operations of the United States
+Government,” and concluding that “an extraordinary emergency exists for national defense
+purposes,” id. § 1(c), (g), 66 Fed. Reg. at 57833-34. Indeed, shortly after the attacks, NATO
+took the unprecedented step of invoking article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which provides
+that an “armed attack against one or more of [the parties] shall be considered an attack against
+them all." North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 5, 63 Stat. 2241, 2244, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, 246.
+20. (U) As a result of the unprecedented attacks of September 11, 2001, the United
+States found itself immediately propelled into a worldwide war against a network of terrorist
+groups, centered on and affiliated with al Qaeda, that possesses the evolving capability and
+intention of inflicting further catastrophic attacks on the United States. That war is continuing
+today, at home as well as abroad. Moreover, the war against al Qaeda and its allies is a very
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 14
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+different kind of war, against a very different enemy, than any other war or enemy the Nation has
+previously faced. Al Qaeda and its supporters operate not as a traditional nation-state but as a
+diffuse, decentralized global network of individuals, cells, and loosely associated, often disparate
+groups, that act sometimes in concert, sometimes independently, and sometimes in the United
+States, but always in secret – and their mission is to destroy lives and to disrupt a way of life
+through terrorist acts. Al Qaeda works in the shadows; secrecy is essential to al Qaeda's success
+in plotting and executing its terrorist attacks.
+21. (TS//SI//NF) The Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Dennis C. Blair,
+Director of National Intelligence, details the particular facets of the continuing al Qaeda threat
+and, thus, the exigent need for the NSA intelligence activities described here. The NSA
+activities are directed at that threat, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Global telecommunications networks, especially the Internet, have
+developed in recent years into a loosely interconnected system – a network of networks – that is
+ideally suited for the secret communications needs of loosely affiliated terrorist cells. Hundreds
+of Internet service providers, or “ISPs,” and other providers of communications services offer a
+wide variety of global communications options, often free of charge. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED].⁶
+
+⁶ (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 15
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+22. (TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED].
+23. (TS//SI//NF) Our efforts against al Qaeda and its affiliates therefore present
+critical challenges for the Nation's communications intelligence capabilities. First, in this new
+kind of war, more than in any other we have ever faced, communications intelligence is essential
+to our ability to identify the enemy and to detect and disrupt its plans for further attacks on the
+United States. Communications intelligence often is the only means we have to learn the
+identities of particular individuals who are involved in terrorist activities and the existence of
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 16
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+particular terrorist threats. Second, at the same time that communications intelligence is more
+important than ever, the decentralized, non-hierarchical nature of the enemy and their
+sophistication in exploiting the agility of modern telecommunications make successful
+communications intelligence more difficult than ever. It is against this backdrop that the risks
+presented by this litigation should be assessed, in particular the risks of disclosing particular
+NSA sources and methods implicated by the claims.
+C. (U) Summary of NSA Activities After 9/11 to Meet al Qaeda Threat
+24. (U) After the September 11 attacks, the NSA received presidential authorization
+and direction to detect and prevent further terrorist attacks within the United States by
+intercepting the content⁷ of communications for which there were reasonable grounds to believe
+that (1) such communications originated or terminated outside the United States and (2) a party
+to such communication was a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization.
+The existence of this activity was disclosed by then-President Bush in December 2005 (and
+subsequently referred to as the “Terrorist Surveillance Program” or “TSP”).⁸
+25. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) In more specific and classified terms, the NSA has
+utilized a number of critically important intelligence sources and methods to meet the threat of
+another mass casualty terrorist attack on the United States – methods that were designed to work
+
+⁷ (U) The term “content” is used in this Declaration to refer to the substance, meaning, or
+purport of a communication, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8).
+⁸ (U) On January 17, 2007, the Government made public the general facts that new
+orders of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court had been issued that authorized the
+Government to target for collection international communications into or out of the United States
+where there is probable cause to believe that one of the communicants is a member or agent of al
+Qaeda or an associated terrorist organization; that, as a result of these orders, any electronic
+surveillance that had been occurring as part of the TSP was then being conducted subject to the
+approval of the FISA Court; and that, under these circumstances, the TSP was not reauthorized.
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 17
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+in tandem and continue to this day under authority of the FISA. As noted above, one such
+method involved the program publicly acknowledged by then-President Bush as the TSP, in
+which the NSA intercepted the content of telephone and Internet communications pursuant to
+presidential authorization.⁹ As described further below, under the TSP, NSA did not engage in
+plaintiffs’ alleged dragnet surveillance of communication content, but intercepted the content of
+particular communications where reasonable grounds existed to believe one party involved a
+member or agent of al Qaeda or affiliated terrorist organization based on particular “selectors”
+(phone numbers or Internet addresses) associated with that target. In addition to collecting the
+content of particular communications, the NSA has also collected non-content communication
+information known as “meta data.” Specifically, after the 9/11 attacks, the NSA collected bulk
+meta data related to telephony communications for the purpose of conducting targeted analysis to
+track al Qaeda-related networks. Telephony meta data is information derived from call detail
+records that reflect non-content information such as, but not limited to, the date, time, and
+
+⁹ (TS//TSP//SI [REDACTED] //OC/NF) The first presidential authorization of the TSP was
+on October 4, 2001, and the TSP was reauthorized approximately every 30-60 days throughout
+the existence of the program. The documents authorizing the TSP also contained the
+authorizations for the meta data activities described herein. The authorizations, moreover,
+evolved over time, and during certain periods authorized other activities (this Declaration is not
+intended to and does not fully describe the authorizations and the differences in those
+authorizations over time). [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] See Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of LTG Keith B. Alexander ¶ 62,
+MDL No. 06-1791-VRW (N.D. Cal.) (submitted Apr. 20, 2007) (relating to all actions against
+the MCI and Verizon Defendants). [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 18
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+duration of telephone calls, as well as the phone numbers used to place and receive the calls.¹⁰ In
+addition, since the 9/11 attacks, the NSA has collected bulk meta data related to Internet
+communications. Internet meta data is header/router/addressing information, such as the "to,"
+"from," "cc," and "bcc" lines, as opposed to the body or "re" lines, of a standard email.
+26. (TS//SI//OC/NF) Each of the foregoing activities continues in some form under
+authority of the FISA and, thus, the NSA utilizes the same intelligence sources and methods
+today to detect and prevent further terrorist attacks that it did after the 9/11 attacks. First, as
+noted above, on January 10, 2007, the FISC issued two orders authorizing the Government to
+conduct certain electronic surveillance that had been occurring under the TSP. The FISC Orders
+were implemented on January 17, 2007, and, thereafter, any electronic surveillance that had been
+occurring as part of the TSP became subject to the approval of the FISC and the TSP was not
+reauthorized.¹¹
+
+¹⁰ (TS//TSP//SI [REDACTED] //OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+¹¹ (TS//SI//OC/NF) As also described further, see infra ¶¶ 63-66, the FISC extended
+these orders with some modifications. What is described below as the Foreign Telephone and
+Email Order expired in August 2007 and was supplanted by authority enacted by Congress – first
+under the Protect America Act and then the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 – to authorize
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 19
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+27. (TS//SI//OC/NF) Second, with respect to the collection of telephony meta data,
+since May 2006 certain telecommunication providers have been required by an order of the FISC
+to produce to the NSA on a daily basis all telephony meta data that they create (“FISC Telephone
+Business Records Order”) The FISC Telephone Business Records Order has been reauthorized
+approximately every 90 days since it was first issued. Although this collection is broad in scope,
+the NSA was authorized by the FISC to query the archived telephony data with identified
+telephone numbers for which there are facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that
+the number is associated with [REDACTED] (hereafter referred to
+as a “RAS” determination).¹² Historically, only a tiny fraction of telephony meta data records
+collected by the NSA has actually been presented to a trained professional for analysis. As
+discussed further below, see infra ¶¶ 48-56, while the vast majority of records are thus never
+viewed by a human at the NSA, it is still necessary to collect the meta data in bulk in order to
+
+foreign intelligence surveillance of targets located overseas without individual court orders.
+¹² (TS//SI//OC/NF) As set forth further below, see infra ¶¶ 60-62, NSA’s compliance
+with this limitation in the FISC Order has been subject to further proceedings in the FISC that
+commenced with a compliance report by the government on January 15, 2009, which indicated
+that the NSA had also been querying incoming telephony meta data with selectors for
+counterterrorism targets subject to NSA surveillance under Executive Order 12333, as to which
+the NSA had not made a “RAS” determination. On March 2, 2009, the FISC renewed the Order
+authorizing the bulk provision to NSA of business records containing telephony meta data from
+telecommunications carriers, but subjected that activity to new limitations, including that the
+NSA may query the meta data only after a motion is granted on a case-by-case basis (unless
+otherwise necessary to protect against imminent threat to human life). The FISC also required
+the Government to report to the FISC on its review of revisions to the meta data collection and
+analysis process and to include affidavits describing the value of the collection of telephony meta
+data authorized by the FISC Telephone Business Records Order. The Government submitted its
+report to the FISC as required on August 17, 2009. The FISC subsequently renewed the
+Telephone Business Records Order on September 3, 2009, and, in so doing, restored to NSA the
+authority to make RAS determinations for selectors that NSA counterterrorism personnel
+nominate for analysis through contact chaining [REDACTED] (these selectors are described
+as “seeds”). This renewed Order expires on October 30, 2009.
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 20
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+utilize sophisticated and vital analytical tools for tracking the contacts [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] for protecting the national security of the United States.
+28. (TS//SI//OC/NF) Third, beginning in July 2004, the collection of Internet meta
+data in bulk has been conducted pursuant to an order of the FISC authorizing the use of a pen
+register and trap and trace device (“FISC Pen Register Order” or “PRTT Order”). See 18 U.S.C.
+§ 3127 (defining “pen register” and “trap and trace device”). Pursuant to the FISC Pen Register
+Order, which has been reauthorized approximately every 90 days since it was first issued, the
+NSA is authorized to collect, in bulk, meta data associated with electronic communications
+[REDACTED] on the Internet.¹³ [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Although the NSA collects email meta data in bulk [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] it has been authorized by the FISC to query the archived meta data only using email
+addresses for which there are facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the email
+address is associated with [REDACTED] As with bulk telephony
+meta data collection, bulk Internet meta data collection is necessary to allow the NSA to use
+critical and unique analytical capabilities to track the contacts (even retrospectively) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] of known terrorists. Like telephony meta data activities, Internet meta
+
+¹³ (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 21
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+data collection and analysis are vital tools for protecting the United States from attack, and,
+accordingly, information pertaining to those activities is highly classified.¹⁴
+V. (U) Information Protected by Privilege
+29. (U) In general and unclassified terms, the following categories of information are
+subject to the DNI’s assertion of the state secrets privilege and statutory privilege under the
+National Security Act, as well as my assertion of the NSA privilege:
+A. (U) Information that may tend to confirm or deny whether
+the plaintiffs have been subject to any alleged NSA
+intelligence activity that may be at issue in this matter; and
+B. (U) Any information concerning NSA intelligence
+activities, sources, or methods that may relate to or be
+necessary to adjudicate plaintiffs’ allegations, including
+allegations that the NSA, with the assistance of
+telecommunications carriers, indiscriminately intercepts the
+content of communications and also, to the extent
+applicable to plaintiffs’ claim, the communications records
+of millions of Americans as part of an alleged “Program”
+authorized by the President after 9/11. See, e.g., Amended
+Compl. ¶¶ 1-8, 58.
+(U) The scope of this assertion includes but is not limited
+to:
+(i) (U) Information concerning the scope and
+operation of the now inoperative “Terrorist Surveillance
+Program” (“TSP”) regarding the interception of the content
+of certain one-end international communications
+reasonably believed to involve a member or agent of al-
+Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization, and any other
+information related to demonstrating that the NSA does not
+otherwise engage in the content surveillance dragnet that
+the plaintiffs allege; and
+
+¹⁴ (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) As the NSA has previously advised the Court in related
+proceedings, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] See Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of LTG Keith B.
+Alexander ¶ 31 n.8, MDL No. 06-1791-VRW (N.D. Cal.) (submitted Apr. 20, 2007) (relating to
+all actions against the MCI and Verizon Defendants).
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 22
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+(ii) (U) Any other information concerning NSA
+intelligence activities, sources, or methods that would be
+necessary to adjudicate the plaintiffs' claims, including, to
+the extent applicable, information that would tend to
+confirm or deny whether or not the NSA obtained from
+telecommunications companies communication
+transactional records; and
+(iii) (U) Information that may tend to confirm or
+deny whether any telecommunications carrier has provided
+assistance to the NSA in connection with any alleged
+activity.
+VI. (U) Description of Information Subject to Privilege and the Harm of Disclosure
+A. (U) Information That May Tend to Confirm or Deny Whether the Plaintiffs Have
+Been Subject to Any Alleged NSA Activities
+30. (U) The first major category of information as to which I am supporting the DNI's
+assertion of privilege, and asserting the NSA’s own statutory privilege, concerns information as
+to whether particular individuals, including the named plaintiffs in this lawsuit, have been
+subject to alleged NSA intelligence activities. As set forth below, disclosure of such information
+would cause exceptionally grave harm to the national security.
+31. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) The named plaintiffs in this action – Virginia Shubert,
+Noha Arafa, Sarah Dranoff, and Hilary Botein – allege that the contents of their telephone and
+Internet communications were subject to “unlawful interception, search and seizure, and
+electronic surveillance,” Amended Compl. ¶ 87, in connection with a program of “dragnet”
+surveillance that captures the contents of “virtually every telephone, internet and/or email
+communication that has been sent from or received within the United States since 2001,” id.
+¶¶ 1, 4. As set forth herein, the NSA does not engage in “dragnet” surveillance of the content of
+communications as plaintiffs allege. [REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 23
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+32. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+¹⁵ (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 24
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+33. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+34. (U) As a matter of course, the NSA cannot publicly confirm or deny whether any
+individual is subject to surveillance activities because to do so would tend to reveal actual
+targets. For example, if the NSA were to confirm in this case and others that specific individuals
+are not targets of surveillance, but later refuse to comment (as it would have to) in a case
+involving an actual target, a person could easily deduce by comparing such responses that the
+person in the latter case is a target. The harm of revealing targets of foreign intelligence
+surveillance should be obvious. If an individual knows or suspects he is a target of U.S.
+
+¹⁶ (TS//SI//OC/NF) I previously noted that NSA has estimated that it collects Internet
+metadata associated with approximately [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] With respect to telephony meta data, I previously estimated that,
+prior to the 2006 FISC Order, about [REDACTED] telephony meta data records was
+presented to an analyst for review, see Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of LTG Keith
+B. Alexander ¶ 27 (submitted May 25, 2007), and the scope of that disparity remains generally
+the same.
+¹⁷ (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 25
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+intelligence activities, he would naturally tend to alter his behavior to take new precautions
+against surveillance. In addition, revealing who is not a target would indicate who has avoided
+surveillance and what may be a secure channel for communication. Such information could lead
+a person, secure in the knowledge that he is not under surveillance, to help a hostile foreign
+adversary convey information; alternatively, such a person may be unwittingly utilized or even
+forced to convey information through a secure channel. Revealing which channels are free from
+surveillance and which are not would also reveal sensitive intelligence methods and thereby
+could help any adversary evade detection and capitalize on limitations in NSA’s capabilities.
+35. (TS//SI [REDACTED] //OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED], the underlying meta data collection
+could not be confirmed or denied without causing exceptionally grave damage to the national
+security. In particular, disclosure of whether the NSA currently receives plaintiffs’ telephony or
+Internet meta data from any telecommunications companies would also violate specific
+provisions of the FISC Telephone Records and FISC Pen Register Orders. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 26
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+B. (U) Information Related to NSA Activities, Sources, or Methods Implicated by the
+Plaintiffs' Allegations and the Harm to National Security of Disclosure
+1. (U) Plaintiffs’ Allegations of a Communications Dragnet
+36. (U) I am also supporting the DNI's assertion of privilege and asserting the NSA’s
+statutory privilege over any other facts concerning NSA intelligence activities, sources, or
+methods that may relate to or be necessary to adjudicate the plaintiffs’ claims and allegations,
+including that (i) the NSA is indiscriminately intercepting the content of communications of
+millions of ordinary Americans, see, e.g., Amended Compl. ¶¶ 1-4, and (ii) to the extent relevant
+to this action, that the NSA is collecting the “call data” of people in the United States with the
+assistance of telecommunications carriers, presumably including information concerning the
+plaintiffs’ communications. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 5-8, 58. As described above, the scope of the
+government’s privilege assertion includes but is not limited to: (1) facts concerning the operation
+of the now inoperative Terrorist Surveillance Program and any other NSA activities needed to
+demonstrate that the TSP was limited to the interception of the content of one-end foreign
+communications reasonably believed to involve a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated
+terrorist organization and that the NSA does not otherwise conduct a dragnet of content
+surveillance as the plaintiffs allege; and (2) information concerning whether or not the NSA
+obtains transactional communications records from telecommunications companies. As set forth
+below, the disclosure of such information would cause exceptionally grave harm to national
+security.
+
+¹⁸ (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED].
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 27
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+(a) (U) Information Related to the Terrorist Surveillance Program
+37. (U) After the existence of the TSP was officially acknowledged in December
+2005, the Government stated that the NSA’s collection of the content of communications under
+the TSP was directed at international communications in which a participant was reasonably
+believed to be associated with al Qaeda or an affiliated organization. Plaintiffs’ allegation that
+the NSA has undertaken indiscriminate surveillance of the content of millions of
+communications sent or received by people inside the United States after 9/11 under the TSP is
+therefore false, again as the Government has previously stated.¹⁹ But to the extent the NSA must
+demonstrate that content surveillance was so limited, and was not plaintiffs’ alleged content
+dragnet, or demonstrate that the NSA has not otherwise engaged in the alleged content dragnet,
+highly classified NSA intelligence sources and methods about the operation of the TSP and NSA
+intelligence activities would be subject to disclosure or the risk of disclosure. The disclosure of
+whether and to what extent the NSA utilizes certain intelligence sources and methods would
+reveal to foreign adversaries the NSA’s capabilities, or lack thereof, enabling them to either
+evade particular channels of communications that are being monitored, or exploit channels of
+communications that are not subject to NSA activities – in either case risking exceptionally grave
+harm to national security.
+38. (U) The privileged information that must be protected from disclosure includes
+the following classified details concerning content surveillance under the now inoperative TSP.
+39. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) First, interception of the content of communications
+under the TSP was triggered by a range of information, including sensitive foreign intelligence,
+
+¹⁹ (U) See, e.g., Public Declaration of LTG Keith B. Alexander, Director, National
+Security Agency ¶ 16 (submitted May 25, 2007).
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 28
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+obtained or derived from various sources indicating that a particular phone number or email
+address is reasonably believed by the U.S. Intelligence Community to be associated with a
+member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization. Professional intelligence
+officers at the NSA undertook a careful but expeditious analysis of that information, and
+considered a number of possible factors, in determining whether it would be appropriate to target
+a telephone number or email address under the TSP. Those factors included whether the target
+phone number or email address was: (1) reasonably believed by the U.S. Intelligence
+Community, based on other authorized collection activities or other law enforcement or
+intelligence sources, to be used by a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist
+organization; [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+²⁰ (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 29
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED].
+40. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) Once the NSA determined that there were reasonable
+grounds to believe that the target is a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist
+organization, the NSA took steps to focus the interception on the specific al Qaeda-related target
+and on communications of that target that were to or from a foreign country. In this respect, the
+NSA’s collection efforts were [REDACTED] that the NSA had
+reasonable grounds to believe carry the “one-end” foreign communications of members or agents
+of al Qaeda or affiliated terrorist organizations.
+41. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] – [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+42. (TS//TSP//SI [REDACTED] //OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 30
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]²¹
+43. (TS//TSP//SI [REDACTED] //OC/NF) The NSA took specific steps in the actual TSP
+interception process to minimize the risk that the communications of non-targets were
+intercepted. With respect to telephone communications, specific telephone numbers identified
+through the analysis outlined above were [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] so that the only communications
+intercepted were those to or from the targeted number of an individual who was reasonably
+believed to be a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization.
+44. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) For the interception of the content of Internet
+communications under the TSP, the NSA used identifying information obtained through its
+analysis of the target, such as email addresses [REDACTED], to target for collection the
+communications of individuals reasonably believed to be members or agents of al Qaeda or an
+
+²¹ (TS//TSP//SI [REDACTED] //OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED].
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 31
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+affiliated terrorist organization. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The NSA did not search the content of the
+communications [REDACTED] with “key words” other than the targeted selectors
+themselves. Rather, the NSA targeted for collection only email addresses [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] associated with suspected members or agents of al Qaeda or affiliated terrorist
+organizations, or communications in which such [REDACTED] were mentioned. In
+addition, due to technical limitations of the hardware and software, incidental collection of non-
+target communications has occurred, and in such circumstances the NSA applies its
+minimization procedures to ensure that communications of non-targets are not disseminated. To
+the extent such facts would be necessary to dispel plaintiffs’ erroneous content dragnet
+allegations, they could not be disclosed without revealing highly sensitive intelligence methods.
+45. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) In addition to procedures designed to ensure that the TSP
+was limited to the international communications of al Qaeda members and affiliates, the NSA
+also took additional steps to ensure that the privacy rights of U.S. persons were protected. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 32
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]²²
+46. (TS//TSP//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The foregoing information about the targeted scope of content
+collection under the TSP could not be disclosed, in order to address and rebut plaintiffs'
+
+²² (U//FOUO) In addition, in implementing the TSP, the NSA applied the existing Legal
+Compliance and Minimization Procedures applicable to U.S. persons to the extent not
+inconsistent with the presidential authorization. See United States Signals Intelligence Directive
+(USSID) 18. These procedures require that the NSA refrain from intentionally acquiring the
+communications of U.S. persons who are not the targets of its surveillance activities, that it
+destroy upon recognition any communications solely between or among persons in the United
+States that it inadvertently acquires, and that it refrain from identifying U.S. persons in its
+intelligence reports unless a senior NSA official determines that the recipient of the report
+requires such information in order to perform a lawful function assigned to it and the identity of
+the U.S. person is necessary to understand the foreign intelligence or to assess its significance.
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 33
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+allegation that the NSA engaged in the alleged content dragnet, without revealing specific NSA
+sources and methods, which would cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security.
+47. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) In addition to these facts about the TSP, facts about other
+NSA intelligence activities would be needed to address or prove that the NSA does not conduct
+the alleged content dragnet. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] In short, there is no
+other “dragnet” program authorized by the President after 9/11 under which the NSA intercepts
+the content of virtually all domestic and international communications as the plaintiffs allege.
+Again, however, information about NSA content surveillance activities beyond the TSP could
+not be disclosed in order to address and rebut plaintiffs’ allegation without revealing specific
+NSA sources and methods and thereby causing exceptionally grave damage to national
+security.²³
+
+²³ (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) To the extent relevant to this case, additional facts about the
+operational details of the TSP and subsequent FISA authorized content surveillance activities
+also could not be disclosed without exceptional harm to national security, including for example
+information that would demonstrate the operational swiftness and effectiveness of utilizing
+content surveillance in conjunction with the meta data activities. As noted, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED], the TSP, in conjunction with meta data
+collection and analysis described herein, allowed the NSA to obtain rapidly not only the content
+of a particular communication, but connections between that target and others who may form a
+web of al Qaeda conspirators.
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 34
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+(b) (U) Other Classified Information Concerning NSA Activities
+48. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) To the extent that the plaintiffs’ “dragnet” allegations also
+implicate other NSA activities, such as the bulk collection of non-content communication meta
+data or the collection of communications records, see, e.g., Amended Compl. ¶ 58, addressing
+their assertions would require disclosure of NSA sources and methods that would cause
+exceptionally grave harm to national security. As also explained herein, these collection
+activities are now subject to the orders and supervision of the FISC.
+49. (TS//SI [REDACTED] //OC/NF) As noted above, starting in October 2001, and since
+2004 pursuant to the FISC Pen Register Order, the NSA collected bulk meta data associated with
+electronic communications [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] See supra ¶¶ 25, 28.²⁴ [REDACTED] [REDACTED],
+
+²⁴ (TS//TSP//SI [REDACTED] //OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 35
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED] pursuant to the FISC Telephone Records Order, certain telecommunication companies
+provide the NSA with bulk telephony meta data in the form of call detail records derived from
+information kept by those companies in the ordinary course of business. See supra ¶¶ 25, 27.
+50. (TS//SI//OC/NF) The bulk meta data collection activities that have been
+undertaken by the NSA since 9/11 are vital tools for protecting the United States from another
+catastrophic terrorist attack. Disclosure of these meta data activities, sources, or methods would
+cause exceptionally grave harm to national security. It is not possible to target collection solely
+on known terrorist telephone or Internet identifiers and effectively discover the existence,
+location, and plans of terrorist adversaries. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 36
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]. The only effective means by which NSA analysts are able continuously
+to keep track of such operatives is through meta data collection and analysis.
+(S//SI//NF) Technical Details of Analytic Capabilities
+51. (TS//SI//OC/NF) In particular, the bulk collection of Internet and telephony meta
+data allows the NSA to use critical and unique analytical capabilities to track the contacts [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+through the use of two highly sophisticated tools known as “contact-chaining” and [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Contact-chaining allows the NSA to identify telephone numbers and email addresses
+that have been in contact with known [REDACTED] numbers and addresses; in turn, those
+contacts can be targeted for immediate query and analysis as new [REDACTED] numbers
+and addresses are identified. When the NSA performs a contact-chaining query on a terrorist-
+associated telephone identifier, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+52. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 37
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+53. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+54. (TS//SI [REDACTED] //OC/NF) Because it is impossible to determine in advance
+which particular piece of meta data will turn out to identify a terrorist, collecting meta data in
+bulk is vital for the success of contact-chaining [REDACTED]. NSA analysts know that the
+terrorists’ telephone calls are located somewhere in the billions of data bits: what they cannot
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 38
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+know ahead of time is exactly where. The ability to accumulate meta data substantially increases
+NSA’s ability to detect and identify these targets. One particular advantage of bulk meta data
+collection is that it provides a historical perspective on past contact activity that cannot be
+captured in the present or prospectively. Such historical links may be vital to identifying new
+targets, because the meta data may contain links that are absolutely unique, pointing to potential
+targets that otherwise would be missed. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] These sources and methods enable the NSA to segregate some of that very
+small amount of otherwise undetectable but highly valuable information from the overwhelming
+amount of other information that has no intelligence value whatsoever – in colloquial terms, to
+find at least some of the needles hidden in the haystack. If employed on a sufficient volume of
+raw data, contact chaining [REDACTED] can expose [REDACTED] and
+contacts that were previously unknown, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+55. (TS//SI//OC/NF) The foregoing discussion is not hypothetical. Since inception
+of the first FISC Telephone Business Records Order, NSA has provided 277 reports to the FBI.
+These reports have tipped a total of 2,900 telephone identifiers as being in contact with
+identifiers associated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 39
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+56. (TS//SI//OC/NF) Accordingly, adjudication of plaintiffs’ allegations concerning
+the collection of non-content meta data and records about communication transactions would risk
+or require disclosure of critical NSA sources and methods for [REDACTED] contacts of
+terrorist communications as well as the existence of current NSA activities under FISC Orders.
+Despite media speculation about these activities, official confirmation and disclosure of the
+NSA’s bulk collection and targeted analysis of telephony meta data would confirm to all of our
+foreign adversaries [REDACTED] the existence of these critical intelligence
+capabilities and thereby severely undermine NSA’s ability to gather information concerning
+terrorist connections and cause exceptionally grave harm to national security.²⁵
+2. (TS//SI//OC/NF) Information Concerning Current FISA Authorized
+Activities and Specific FISC Orders
+57. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) I am also supporting the DNI’s state secrets privilege
+assertion, and asserting NSA’s statutory privilege, over information concerning the various
+
+²⁵ (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) In my prior classified declarations in this action, I set forth
+specific examples of how the intelligence sources and methods utilized by the NSA after the 9/11
+attacks, including content surveillance under the TSP and pursuant to subsequent FISA authority,
+as well as non-content meta data collection and analysis, have led to the development by the
+NSA of actionable intelligence and important counter-terrorism efforts. See, e.g., Classified In
+Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of LTG Keith B. Alexander ¶¶ 35-43, 58-61 (submitted May 25,
+2007). To the extent that such information would be relevant to any litigation in this action,
+however, it could not be disclosed without revealing specific NSA intelligence information,
+sources, and methods, thereby causing exceptionally grave harm to national security, and that
+information remains subject to the government’s privilege assertion.
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 40
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+orders of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court mentioned throughout this declaration that
+authorize NSA intelligence collection activities, as well as NSA surveillance activities conducted
+pursuant to the now lapsed Protect America Act (“PAA”) and current activities authorized by the
+FISA Amendments Act of 2008. As noted herein, the three NSA intelligence activities initiated
+after the September 11 attacks to detect and prevent a further al Qaeda attack – (i) content
+collection of targeted al Qaeda and associated terrorist-related communications under what later
+was called the TSP; (ii) internet meta data bulk collection; and (iii) telephony meta data bulk
+collection – have been subject to various orders of the FISC (as well as FISA statutory authority)
+and are no longer being conducted under presidential authorization. The bulk collection of non-
+content transactional data for Internet communications was first authorized by the FISC in the
+July 2004 FISC Pen Register Order, and the bulk collection of non-content telephony meta data
+was first authorized by the FISC in May 2006. The existence and operational details of these
+orders, and of subsequent FISC orders reauthorizing these activities, remain highly classified and
+disclosure of this information would cause exceptionally grave harm to national security.²⁶ In
+addition, while the Government has acknowledged the general existence of the January 10, 2007
+FISC Orders authorizing electronic surveillance similar to that undertaken in the TSP, the
+content of those orders, and facts concerning the NSA sources and methods they authorize,
+
+²⁶ (TS//SI//OC/NF) For this reason, the FISC Telephone Business Records Order and
+FISC Pen Register Orders prohibit any person from disclosing to any other person that the NSA
+has sought or obtained the telephony meta data, other than to (a) those persons to whom
+disclosure is necessary to comply with the Order; (b) an attorney to obtain legal advice or
+assistance with respect to the production of meta data in response to the Order; or (c) other
+persons as permitted by the Director of the FBI or the Director’s designee. The FISC Orders
+further provide that any person to whom disclosure is made pursuant to (a), (b), or (c) shall be
+subject to the nondisclosure requirements applicable to a person to whom the Order is directed in
+the same manner as such person.
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 41
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+cannot be disclosed without likewise causing exceptional harm to national security. Subsequent
+content surveillance sources and methods utilized by the NSA under the PAA and, currently,
+under the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 likewise cannot be disclosed. I summarize below the
+proceedings that have occurred under authority of the FISA or the FISC.
+58. (TS//SI//OC/NF) (a) Internet Meta Data: Pursuant to the FISC Pen Register
+Order, which has been reauthorized approximately every 90 days after it was first issued, NSA is
+authorized to collect in bulk, from telecommunications carriers, meta data associated with
+electronic communications [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The NSA is authorized to query the archived meta
+data collected pursuant to the FISC Pen Register Order using email addresses for which there
+were facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the email address was associated
+with [REDACTED]. The FISC Pen Register Order was most
+recently reauthorized on [REDACTED], 2009, and requires continued assistance by the providers
+through [REDACTED] 2009.
+59. (TS//SI//OC/NF) (b) Telephony Meta Data: Beginning in May 2006, the NSA’s
+bulk collection of telephony meta data, previously subject to presidential authorization, was
+authorized by the FISC Telephone Business Records Order. Like the FISC Pen Register Order,
+the FISC Telephone Business Records Order was reauthorized approximately every 90 days.
+Based on the finding that reasonable grounds existed that the production was relevant to efforts
+to protect against international terrorism, the Order required telecommunications carriers to
+produce to the NSA “call detail records” or “telephony metadata” pursuant to 50 U.S.C.
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 42
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+§ 1861[c] (authorizing the production of business records for, inter alia, an investigation to
+protect against international terrorism). Telephony meta data was compiled from call detail data
+maintained by the providers in the ordinary course of business that reflected non-content
+information such as the date, time, and duration of telephone calls, as well as the phone numbers
+used to place and receive the calls. The NSA was authorized by the FISC to query the archived
+telephony meta data solely with identified telephone numbers for which there were facts giving
+rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the number was associated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (that is, a “RAS” determination). The FISC Telephone Business
+Records Order was most recently reauthorized on September 3, 2009, with authority continuing
+until October 30, 2009.
+60. (TS//SI//OC/NF) As noted above, see supra note 12, on January 15, 2009, the
+Department of Justice (“DOJ”) submitted a compliance incident report related to the Business
+Records Order to the FISC, based on information provided to DOJ by the NSA, which indicated
+that the NSA’s prior reports to the FISC concerning implementation of the FISC Telephone
+Business Records Order had not accurately reported the extent to which NSA had been querying
+the telephony meta data acquired from carriers. In sum, this compliance incident related to a
+process whereby currently tasked telephony selectors (i.e., phone numbers) reasonably believed
+to be associated with authorized counter terrorism foreign intelligence targets under Executive
+Order 12333 were reviewed against the incoming telephony metadata to determine if that
+number had been in contact with a number in the United States. This process occurred prior to a
+formal determination by NSA that reasonable, articulable suspicion existed that the selector was
+associated with [REDACTED] and was not consistent with
+NSA’s prior descriptions of the process for querying telephony meta data.
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 43
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+61. (TS//SI//OC/NF) By Order dated March 2, 2009, the FISC directed that the NSA
+may continue to acquire call detail records of telephony meta data in accordance with the FISC
+Telephone Business Record Orders, but was prohibited from accessing data acquired except in a
+limited manner. In particular, the Government could request through a motion that the FISC
+authorize querying of the telephony meta data for purposes of obtaining foreign intelligence on a
+case-by-case basis (unless otherwise necessary to protect against imminent threat to human life,
+subject to report to the FISC the next business day). In addition, following the Government's
+disclosures concerning compliance with the FISC Orders, the FISC imposed other obligations,
+including to report on its ongoing review of the matter and to file affidavits describing the
+continuing value of the telephony meta data collection to the national security of the United
+States and to certify that the information sought is relevant to an authorized investigation. The
+Government completed its end-to-end review and submitted its report and the required affidavits
+to the FISC on August 3, 2009. In that report, the Government outlined the steps NSA had taken
+to address and correct the instances of noncompliance with FISC Orders, as well as the remedial
+safeguards put in place to monitor and ensure compliance with such Orders in the future. The
+FISC most recently renewed the Telephone Business Records Order on September 3, 2009. This
+latest renewal restored to NSA the authority to make RAS determinations on telephone
+identifiers nominated by NSA personnel to use in conducting contact chaining [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+62. (TS//TSP//SI [REDACTED] //OC/NF) NSA is committed to working with the FISC
+on this and other compliance issues to ensure that this vital intelligence tool works appropriately
+and effectively. For purposes of this litigation, and the privilege assertions now made by the
+DNI and by the NSA, the intelligence sources and methods described herein remain highly
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 44
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+classified and the disclosure that [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] would compromise vital NSA
+sources and methods and result in exceptionally grave harm to national security.
+63. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) (c) Content Collection: On January 10, 2007, the FISC
+issued orders authorizing the Government to conduct certain electronic surveillance that had
+been occurring under the TSP. Those Order included [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] the “Foreign Telephone and Email Order,” which
+authorized, inter alia, electronic surveillance of telephone and Internet communications [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] where the Government determined that there was probable
+cause to believe that (1) one of the communicants is a member or agent of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] and (2) the communication is to or from a foreign country (i.e.,
+a one-end foreign communication to or from the United States). Thereafter, any electronic
+surveillance that was occurring as part of the TSP became subject to the approval of the FISA
+Court and the TSP was not reauthorized.²⁷
+
+²⁷ (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 45
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+64. (TS//SI//OC/NF) The Foreign Telephone and Email Order remained in effect
+until the Protect America Act (“PAA”) was enacted in August 2007. Under the PAA, the FISA’s
+definition of "electronic surveillance” was clarified to exclude “surveillance directed at a person
+reasonably believed to be located outside the United States.” 50 U.S.C. § 1805A. The PAA
+authorized the DNI and the Attorney General to jointly "authorize the acquisition of
+foreign intelligence information concerning persons reasonably believed to be outside the
+United States” for up to one year, id § 1805B(a), and to issue directives to communications
+service providers requiring them to “immediately provide the Government with all information,
+facilities, and assistance necessary to accomplish the acquisition” of necessary intelligence
+information, id. § 1805B(e). Such directives were issued to telecommunications companies and
+the NSA conducted content surveillance of overseas targets under the PAA through their
+facilities.
+65. (TS//SI//OC/NF) Beginning in September 2008, expiring directives that had been
+issued under the PAA for content surveillance of overseas targets (including surveillance of
+specific [REDACTED] targets overseas) were replaced by new directives for such surveillance
+issued pursuant to the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. Title I of the FISA Amendments Act of
+2008 authorizes the targeting of persons outside of the United States without individual FISC
+orders but subject to directives issued to carriers by the Director of National Intelligence and the
+Attorney General under Section 702(h) of the FISA for the continuation of overseas surveillance
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 46
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+under this new authority. See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h) (as added by the FISA Act of 2008, P.L.
+110-261).
+66. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) In sum, the post 9/11 content surveillance activities
+undertaken by the NSA evolved from the presidentially authorized TSP to the FISC Foreign
+Telephone and Email Order, to the directives issued under the PAA and, ultimately, to the
+directives that are now being issued pursuant to the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. Each
+authorization sought to enable the NSA to undertake surveillance on numerous multiple targets
+overseas without the need to obtain advance court approval for each target, but none has entailed
+the kind of indiscriminate content surveillance dragnet on telephone and Internet
+communications that the plaintiffs allege.
+3. (U) Plaintiffs’ Allegations that Telecommunications Companies have Assisted
+the NSA with the Alleged Activities
+67. (U) The third major category of NSA intelligence sources and methods as to
+which I am supporting the DNI’s assertion of privilege, and asserting the NSA’s statutory
+privilege, concerns information that may tend to confirm or deny whether or not
+telecommunications providers have assisted the NSA with alleged intelligence activities.
+Plaintiffs allege that they are customers of telecommunications carriers such as AT&T and
+Verizon, and that these companies participated in the alleged surveillance activities that the
+plaintiffs seek to challenge. As set forth below, confirmation or denial of a relationship between
+the NSA and any telecommunications carriers on alleged intelligence activities would cause
+exceptionally grave harm to national security.
+68. (TS//TSP//SI [REDACTED] //OC/NF) Because the NSA is not engaged in the
+indiscriminate dragnet of the content of domestic and international communications as the
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 47
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+plaintiffs allege, no telecommunications carriers have assisted the NSA with any such activity.²⁸
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+69. (TS//TSP//SI [REDACTED] //OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
+
+²⁸ (TS//TSP//SI [REDACTED] //OC/NF) On September 19, 2008, then-Attorney General
+Mukasey submitted a classified declaration and certification to this Court authorized by Section
+802 of the FISA Act Amendments Act of 2008, see 50 U.S.C. § 1885a, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 48
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+70. (TS//TSP//SI [REDACTED] //OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+²⁹ (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 49
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+71. (TS//SI [REDACTED] //OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+³⁰ (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+³¹ (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED].
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 50
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED].
+72. (TS//SI [REDACTED] //OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 51
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+73. (TS//SI [REDACTED] //OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 52
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+74. (TS//SI [REDACTED] //OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+75. (TS//SI [REDACTED] //OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] – [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 53
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]³²
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+76. (TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+³² (TS//SI [REDACTED] //OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED].
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 54
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+VII. (U) Risks of Allowing Litigation to Proceed
+77. (TS//TSP//SI [REDACTED] //OC/NF) Upon examination of the allegations, claims,
+facts, and issues raised by this case, it is my judgment that sensitive state secrets are so central to
+the subject matter of the litigation that any attempt to proceed will substantially risk the
+disclosure of the privileged state secrets described above. Although plaintiffs’ alleged content
+surveillance dragnet does not occur, proving why that is so, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] would directly implicate highly classified
+intelligence information and activities. Similarly, to the extent the plaintiffs’ “dragnet”
+allegation implicates the bulk collection of non-content information and records containing
+transactional meta data about communications, addressing the plaintiffs’ claims would also
+compromise currently operative NSA sources and methods that are essential to protecting
+national security, including for detecting and preventing a terrorist attack. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] In my judgment, any effort to probe the outer-bounds of such
+classified information would pose inherent and significant risks of the disclosure of that
+
+³³ (TS//SI [REDACTED] //OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] See Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A.
+Bonanni, National Security Agency ¶¶ 78-79, Jewel v. NSA, 08-cv-4373-VRW (submitted Apr.
+3, 2009).
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 55
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+information, including critically sensitive information about NSA sources, methods, operations,
+targets, [REDACTED] Indeed, any effort merely to allude to those facts in a non-classified
+fashion could be revealing of classified details that should not be disclosed. Even seemingly
+minor or innocuous facts, in the context of this case or other non-classified information, can tend
+to reveal, particularly to sophisticated foreign adversaries, a much bigger picture of U.S.
+intelligence gathering sources and methods.
+78. (TS//SI//NF) The United States has an overwhelming interest in detecting and
+thwarting further mass casualty attacks by al Qaeda. The United States has already suffered one
+attack that killed thousands, disrupted the Nation's financial center for days, and successfully
+struck at the command and control center for the Nation’s military. Al Qaeda continues to
+possess the ability and clear, stated intent to carry out a massive attack in the United States that
+could result in a significant loss of life, as well as have a devastating impact on the U.S.
+economy. According to the most recent intelligence analysis, attacking the U.S. Homeland
+remains one of al Qaeda's top operational priorities, see Classified In Camera Ex Parte
+Declaration of Admiral Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence, and al Qaeda will
+keep trying for high-impact attacks as long as its central command structure is functioning and
+affiliated groups are capable of furthering its interests.
+79. (TS//SI//NF) Al Qaeda seeks to use our own communications infrastructure
+against us as they secretly attempt to infiltrate agents into the United States, waiting to attack at a
+time of their choosing. One of the greatest challenges the United States confronts in the ongoing
+effort to prevent another catastrophic terrorist attack against the Homeland is the critical need to
+gather intelligence quickly and effectively. Time is of the essence in preventing terrorist attacks,
+and the government faces significant obstacles in finding and tracking agents of al Qaeda as they
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 56
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+manipulate modern technology in an attempt to communicate while remaining undetected. The
+NSA sources, methods, and activities described herein are vital tools in this effort.
+VIII. (U) Conclusion
+80. (U) In sum, I support the DNI’s assertion of the state secrets privilege and
+statutory privilege to prevent the disclosure of the information described herein and detailed
+herein. I also assert a statutory privilege under Section 6 of the National Security Agency Act
+with respect to the information described herein that concerns the functions of the NSA. Public
+disclosure of the aforementioned intelligence sources, methods and activities could reasonably be
+expected to cause exceptionally grave harm to the national security of the United States.
+Consequently, because proceedings in this case risk disclosure of privileged and classified
+intelligence-related information, I respectfully request that the Court not only protect that
+information from disclosure but also dismiss this case to prevent exceptionally grave harm to the
+national security of the United States.
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 57
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
+DATE: 30 Oct 09
+KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+LTG, USA
+Director
+National Security Agency
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency 58
+Virginia Shubert, et al. v. United States of America, et al. (No. 07-cv-693-VRW; MDL No. 06-1791)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//COMINT//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Alexander_2009_Shubert_Declaration/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Alexander_2009_Shubert_Declaration/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cf7b0c6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Alexander_2009_Shubert_Declaration/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+{
+ "title": "NSA Alexander 2009 Shubert Declaration",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Classified declaration of Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander disclosing information regarding the government. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2009-10-30",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "TSP",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "ORCON, NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Alexander, Keith B.",
+ "Brinkmann, Beth S.",
+ "Letter, Douglas N.",
+ "Hunt, Joseph H.",
+ "Garvey, Vincent M.",
+ "Coppolino, Anthony J.",
+ "Berman, Marcia",
+ "Ahern, Paul E.",
+ "Walker, Vaughn R."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-12-20",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/nsa-alexander-2009-shubert-declaration",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "pdf_sha256": "8dddc861d95801dfc5db826a01fd70c0ba8cdc6746e586c60b10d7312337549a",
+ "pages": 58
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Bonanni_2009_Jewel_Declaration/ACLU_-_NSA_Bonanni_2009_Jewel_Declaration.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Bonanni_2009_Jewel_Declaration/ACLU_-_NSA_Bonanni_2009_Jewel_Declaration.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f3d280b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Bonanni_2009_Jewel_Declaration/ACLU_-_NSA_Bonanni_2009_Jewel_Declaration.md
@@ -0,0 +1,2208 @@
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+MICHAEL F. HERTZ
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+DOUGLAS N. LETTER
+Terrorism Litigation Counsel
+JOSEPH H. HUNT
+Director, Federal Programs Branch
+VINCENT M. GARVEY
+Deputy Branch Director
+ANTHONY J. COPPOLINO
+Special Litigation Counsel
+U.S. Department of Justice
+Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch
+20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
+Washington, D.C. 20001
+Phone: (202) 514-4782
+Fax: (202) 616-8460
+
+Attorneys for the United States and
+Government Defendants Sued in their
+Official Capacities
+
+UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
+
+NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
+
+CAROLYN JEWEL, et al.
+
+Plaintiffs,
+
+v.
+
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY et al.
+
+Defendants.
+
+No. 08-cv-4873-VRW
+
+CLASSIFIED DECLARATION
+OF DEBORAH A. BONANNI,
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+
+EX PARTE, IN CAMERA
+SUBMISSION
+
+Date: June 25, 2009
+Time: 2:30 p.m.
+Courtroom 6, 17th Floor
+
+Chief Judge Vaughn R. Walker
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+Derived From NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20090403
+Declassify On: 20340403
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(U) Table of Contents
+
+I. (U) Introduction
+II. (U) Summary
+III. (U) Classification of Declaration
+IV. (U) Background Information
+A. (U) The National Security Agency
+B. (U) September 11, 2001 and the al Qaeda Threat
+C. (U) Summary of NSA Activities After 9/11 to Meet al Qaeda Threat
+
+V. (U) NSA Information Protected by Privilege Assertions
+VI. (U) Description of Information Subject to Privilege and the Harm of Disclosure
+A. (U) Information That May Tend to Confirm or Deny Whether or Not the Plaintiffs Have Been Subject to the Alleged NSA Activities
+B. (U) Information Related to NSA Activities, Sources, and Methods Implicated by Plaintiffs' Allegations
+1. (U) Plaintiffs' Allegations of a Communications Dragnet
+(a) (U) Information Related to Terrorist Surveillance Program
+(b) (U) Plaintiffs' Allegations Concerning the Collection of Communication Records
+2. (TS//SI//OC//NF) Information Concerning Current FISA Authorized Activities and Specific FISC Orders.
+3. (U) Plaintiffs' Allegations that AT&T Provided Assistance to the NSA with the Alleged Activities
+VII. (U) Risks of Allowing Litigation to Proceed
+VIII. (U) Summary and Conclusion
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF DEBORAH A. BONANNI
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+
+(U) I, Deborah A. Bonanni, do hereby state and declare as follows:
+
+I. (U) Introduction
+
+1. (U) I am the Chief of Staff for the National Security Agency (NSA), an
+intelligence agency within the Department of Defense. I have held this position since February
+2006. As the Chief of Staff, under our internal regulations, and in the absence of the Deputy
+Director and the Director, I am responsible for directing the NSA, overseeing the operations
+undertaken to carry out its mission and, by specific charge of the President and the Director of
+National Intelligence, protecting NSA activities and intelligence sources and methods. I have
+been designated an original TOP SECRET classification authority under Executive Order No.
+12958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19825 (1995), as amended on March 25, 2003, and Department of Defense
+Directive No. 5200.1-R, Information Security Program Regulation, 32 C.F.R. § 159a.12 (2000).
+
+2. (U) The purpose of this declaration is to support an assertion of the military and
+state secrets privilege (hereafter "state secrets privilege") by the Director of National Intelligence
+("DNI") as the head of the intelligence community, as well as by the DNI's assertion of a statutory
+privilege under the National Security Act, to protect information related to NSA activities
+described herein below. Lieutenant General Keith Alexander, the Director of the National
+Security Agency, has been sued in his official and individual capacity in the above captioned case
+and has recused himself from the decision of whether to assert the statutory privilege in his
+official capacity. As the Deputy Director is currently out of the office on temporary duty, by
+operation of our internal regulations and by specific delegation of the Director, I am authorized to
+review the materials associated with this litigation, prepare whatever declarations I determine are
+appropriate, and determine whether to assert the NSA's statutory privilege. Through this
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+declaration, I hereby invoke and assert the NSA's statutory privilege set forth in Section 6 of the
+National Security Agency Act of 1959, Public Law No. 86-36 (codified as a note to 50 U.S.C.
+§ 402) ("NSA Act"), to protect the information related to NSA activities described herein below.
+The statements made herein are based on my personal knowledge of NSA activities and
+operations, and on information made available to me as the Chief of Staff of the NSA.
+
+II. (U) Summary
+
+3. (U) In the course of my official duties, I have been advised of this litigation and I
+have reviewed the allegations in the Complaint in this case. In sum, plaintiffs allege that, after
+the 9/11 attacks, the NSA received presidential authorization to engage in surveillance activities
+far broader than the publicly acknowledged "Terrorist Surveillance Program" ("TSP"), which
+involved the interception of specific international communications involving persons reasonably
+believed to be associated with al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist organizations. Plaintiffs allege
+that the NSA, with the assistance of telecommunication companies including AT&T, has
+indiscriminately intercepted the content and obtained the communications records of millions of
+ordinary Americans as part of an alleged presidentially-authorized "Program" after 9/11. See
+Complaint at ¶¶ 2-13; 39-97. I cannot disclose on the public record the nature of any NSA
+information implicated by the plaintiffs' allegations. However, as described further below, the
+disclosure of information related to the NSA's activities, sources and methods implicated by the
+plaintiffs' allegations reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the
+national security of the United States and, for this reason, are encompassed by the DNI's state
+secrets and statutory privilege assertions, as well as by my assertion of the NSA statutory
+[REDACTED] privilege, and should be protected from disclosure in this case. In addition, it is my judgment
+that sensitive state secrets are so central to the subject matter of the litigation that any attempt to
+proceed in the case risks the disclosure of the classified privileged national security information
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+described herein and exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United States.
+4. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) The allegations in this lawsuit put at issue the disclosure
+of information concerning several highly classified and critically important NSA intelligence
+activities that commenced after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, but which are now conducted pursuant
+to authority of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"), including ongoing activities
+conducted under orders approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC").
+Plaintiffs' allegation that the NSA undertakes indiscriminate surveillance of the *content* of
+millions of communications sent or received by people inside the United States—under the now
+defunct-TSP or otherwise—is false, as discussed below. The NSA's collection of the content of
+communications under the TSP was directed at international communications in which a
+participant was reasonably believed to be associated with al Qaeda or an affiliated organization
+and did not constitute the kind of dragnet collection of the content of millions of Americans'
+telephone or Internet communications that the plaintiffs allege. Although the existence of the
+TSP has been acknowledged, the details of that program remain highly classified, along with
+details of related content surveillance activities undertaken after the TSP pursuant to orders of
+the FISC. This information could not be disclosed to address or disprove or otherwise litigate
+the plaintiffs' allegation of a content dragnet without causing exceptional harm to NSA's sources
+and methods of gathering intelligence—including methods currently used to detect and prevent
+further terrorist attacks under the authority of the FISA.
+5. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) In addition, as the Court should also be aware from prior
+classified declarations submitted by the NSA in related proceedings, the NSA has collected,
+pursuant to presidential authorization and currently under subsequent FISC orders, non-content
+
+Footnote 1: (TS//SI//OC/NF) The term "content" is used herein to refer to the substance, meaning,
+or purport of a communication, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8), as opposed to the type of
+addressing or routing information referred throughout this declaration as "meta data."
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+information (i.e., meta data) about telephone and Internet communications in order to enable
+[REDACTED] highly sophisticated analytical tools that can uncover the contacts [REDACTED] of
+members or agents of [REDACTED]. As noted above and detailed
+below, the content surveillance subject to presidential authorization after 9/11 was not the
+content dragnet surveillance that plaintiffs allege, and the collection of non-content information,
+while significant in scope remains a highly classified matter currently under FISA authorization.
+For the NSA to attempt to explain, clarify, disprove, or otherwise litigate plaintiffs' allegations
+regarding a communications dragnet would require the NSA to confirm the existence of, or
+disclose facts concerning, intelligence sources and methods for the collection of non-content
+information related to communications, as well as current NSA operations under FISC Orders—
+disclosures that would cause exceptional harm to national security.
+
+6. (TS//SI-[REDACTED]//TSP//OC/NF) In addition, plaintiffs' allegation that
+telecommunications carriers, in particular AT&T, assisted the NSA in alleged intelligence
+activities cannot be confirmed or denied without risking exceptionally grave harm to national
+security. Because the NSA has not undertaken the alleged dragnet collection of communications
+content, no carrier has assisted in that alleged activity.
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Footnote 2: (TS//SI//OC/NF) Certain FISC Orders are also directed at [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Because the allegations in the complaint reference activities
+authorized after 9/11, which were directed at [REDACTED] any
+further references to the FISC Orders will focus solely on activities under the orders directed at
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+Disclosure of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] would cause exceptionally grave damage to the
+national security.
+
+7. (T-S//SI-[REDACTED]//TSP/OCANF) Accordingly, the DNI's state secrets and
+statutory privilege assertions, and my own statutory privilege assertion, seek to protect against
+the disclosure of the highly classified intelligence sources and methods put at issue in this case
+and vital to the national security of the United States, including: (1) any information that would
+tend to confirm or deny whether particular individuals, including the named plaintiffs, have been
+subject to the alleged NSA intelligence activities; (2) information concerning NSA intelligence
+sources and methods, including facts demonstrating that the content collection under the TSP
+was limited to specific al Qaeda and associated terrorist-related international communications
+and was not a content surveillance dragnet as plaintiffs allege; (3) facts that would tend to
+confirm or deny the existence of the NSA's bulk meta data collection and use, and any
+information about those activities; and (4) the fact that [REDACTED].
+The fact that there has been public speculation
+about alleged NSA activities does not diminish the need to protect intelligence sources and
+methods from further exposure. Official confirmation and disclosure of the classified privileged
+national security information described herein would cause exceptionally grave damage to the
+national security. For these reasons, as set forth further below, I request that the Court uphold
+the state secrets and statutory privilege assertions that the DNI and I now make, and protect the
+information described in this declaration from disclosure.
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+III. (U) Classification of Declaration
+
+8. (S//SI//NF) This declaration is classified TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-ECI
+ORCON/NOFORN pursuant to the standards in Executive Order No. 12958, as amended
+by Executive Order No. 13292. Under Executive Order No. 12958, information is classified
+"TOP SECRET" if unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to
+cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United States; "SECRET" if
+unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to cause serious
+damage to national security; and "CONFIDENTIAL" if unauthorized disclosure of the
+information reasonably could be expected to cause identifiable damage to national security. At
+the beginning of each paragraph of this declaration, the letter or letters in parentheses
+designate(s) the degree of classification of the information the paragraph contains. When used
+for this purpose, the letters "U," "C," "S," and "TS" indicate respectively that the information is
+either UNCLASSIFIED, or is classified CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET³.
+
+9. (S//SI//NF) Additionally, this declaration also contains Sensitive Compartmented
+Information (SCI), which is "information that not only is classified for national security reasons
+as Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential, but also is subject to special access and handling
+requirements because it involves or derives from particularly sensitive intelligence sources and
+methods." 28 C.F.R. § 17.18(a). Because of the exceptional sensitivity and vulnerability of such
+information, these safeguards and access requirements exceed the access standards that are
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+normally required for information of the same classification level. Specifically, this declaration
+references communications intelligence (COMINT), also referred to as special intelligence (SI),
+which is a subcategory of SCI. COMINT or SI identifies SCI that was derived from exploiting
+cryptographic systems or other protected sources by applying methods or techniques, or from
+intercepted foreign communications.
+
+10. (TS//SI-[REDACTED]//TSP//OC/NF) This declaration also contains information
+related to or derived from the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP), a controlled access signals
+intelligence program under presidential authorization in response to the attacks of September 11,
+2001. Although TSP was publicly acknowledged by then-President Bush in December 2005,
+details about the program remain highly classified and strictly compartmented. Information
+pertaining to this program is denoted with the special marking "TSP" and requires more
+restrictive handling.
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+11. (S//SI//NF) In addition to the fact that classified information contained herein
+may not be revealed to any person without authorization pursuant to Executive Order 12958, as
+amended, this declaration contains information that may not be released to foreign governments,
+foreign nationals, or non-U.S. citizens without permission of the originator and in accordance
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+that the originator of the information controls to whom it is released.
+
+IV. (U) Background Information
+
+A. (U) The National Security Agency
+
+12. (U) The NSA was established by Presidential Directive in 1952 as a separately
+organized agency within the Department of Defense. The NSA's foreign intelligence mission
+includes the responsibility to collect, process, analyze, produce, and disseminate signals
+intelligence (SIGINT) information, of which communications intelligence ("COMINT") is a
+significant subset, for (a) national foreign intelligence purposes, (b) counterintelligence purposes,
+and (c) the support of military operations. See Executive Order 12333, § 1.7(c), as amended.³
+
+13. (TS//SI//SI) signals intelligence (SIGINT) consists of three subcategories:
+(1) communications intelligence (COMINT); (2) electronic intelligence (ELINT); and (3) foreign
+instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT). Communications intelligence (COMINT) is
+defined as "all procedures and methods used in the interception of communications and the
+obtaining of information from such communications by other than the intended recipients." 18
+U.S.C. § 798. COMINT includes information derived from the interception of foreign and
+international communications, such as voice, facsimile, and computer-to-computer information
+conveyed via a number of means [REDACTED].
+Electronic intelligence (ELINT) is technical intelligence information derived from
+foreign non-communications electromagnetic radiations except atomic detonation or radioactive
+sources-in essence, radar systems affiliated with military weapons platforms (e.g., anti-ship) and
+civilian systems (e.g., shipboard and air traffic control radars). Foreign instrumentation signals
+
+Footnote 3: (U) Section 1.7(c) of E.O. 12333, as amended, specifically authorizes the NSA to
+"Collect (including through clandestine means), process, analyze, produce, and disseminate
+signals intelligence information for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes to
+support national and departmental missions."
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+intelligence (FISINT) is derived from non-U.S. aerospace surfaces and subsurface systems which
+may have either military or civilian applications.
+
+14. (S//SI//NF) The NSA's SIGINT responsibilities include establishing and
+operating an effective unified organization to conduct SIGINT activities set forth in Executive
+Order No. 12333, § 1.12(b), as amended. In performing its SIGINT mission, NSA has
+developed a sophisticated worldwide SIGINT collection network that acquires, among other
+things, foreign and international electronic communications and related information. The
+technological infrastructure that supports the NSA's foreign intelligence information collection
+network has taken years to develop at a cost of billions of dollars and untold human effort. It
+relies on sophisticated collection and processing technology.
+
+15. (U) There are two primary reasons for gathering and analyzing foreign
+intelligence information. The first, and most important, is to gain information required to direct
+U.S. resources necessary to counter external threats and in support of military operations. The
+second reason is to obtain information necessary to the formulation of U.S. foreign policy.
+Foreign intelligence information provided by the NSA is thus relevant to a wide range of
+important issues, including military order of battle; threat warnings and readiness; arms
+proliferation; international terrorism; counter-intelligence; and foreign aspects of international
+narcotics trafficking.
+
+16. (S//SI//NF) The NSA's ability to produce foreign intelligence information
+depends on its access to foreign and international electronic communications. Foreign
+intelligence produced by COMINT activities is an extremely important part of the overall foreign
+intelligence information available to the United States and is often unobtainable by other means.
+Public disclosure of either the capability to collect specific communications or the substance of
+the information derived from such collection itself can easily alert targets to the vulnerability of
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+their communications. Disclosure of even a single communication holds the potential of
+revealing intelligence collection techniques that are applied against targets around the world.
+Once alerted, targets can frustrate COMINT collection by using different or new encryption
+techniques, by disseminating disinformation, or by utilizing a different communications link.
+Such evasion techniques may inhibit access to the target's communications and therefore deny
+the United States access to information crucial to the defense of the United States both at home
+and abroad. COMINT is provided special statutory protection under 18 U.S.C. § 798, which
+makes it a crime to knowingly disclose to an unauthorized person classified information
+"concerning the communication intelligence activities of the United States or any foreign
+government."
+
+B. (U) September 11, 2001 and the al Qaeda Threat
+
+17. (U) On September 11, 2001, the al Qaeda terrorist network launched a set of
+coordinated attacks along the East Coast of the United States. Four commercial jetliners, each
+carefully selected to be fully loaded with fuel for a transcontinental flight, were hijacked by al
+Qaeda operatives. Those operatives targeted the Nation's financial center in New York with two
+of the jetliners, which they deliberately flew into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center.
+Al Qaeda targeted the headquarters of the Nation's Armed Forces, the Pentagon, with the third
+jetliner. Al Qaeda operatives were apparently headed toward Washington, D.C. with the fourth
+jetliner when passengers struggled with the hijackers and the plane crashed in Shanksville,
+Pennsylvania. The intended target of this fourth jetliner was most evidently the White House or
+the Capitol, strongly suggesting that al Qaeda's intended mission was to strike a decapitation
+blow to the Government of the United States—to kill the President, the Vice President, or
+Members of Congress. The attacks of September 11 resulted in approximately 3,000 deaths—
+the highest single-day death toll from hostile foreign attacks in the Nation's history. In addition,
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+these attacks shut down air travel in the United States, disrupted the Nation's financial markets
+and government operations, and caused billions of dollars of damage to the economy.
+
+18. (U) On September 14, 2001, a national emergency was declared "by reason of the
+terrorist attacks at the World Trade Center, New York, New York, and the Pentagon, and the
+continuing and immediate threat of further attacks on the United States." Presidential
+Proclamation No. 7463, 66 Fed. Reg. 48199 (Sept. 14, 2001). The United States also
+immediately began plans for a military response directed at al Qaeda's training grounds and
+havens in Afghanistan. On September 14, 2001, both Houses of Congress passed a Joint
+Resolution authorizing the President of the United States "to use all necessary and appropriate
+force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
+committed, or aided the terrorist attacks" of September 11. Authorization for Use of Military
+Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40 § 21(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (Sept. 18, 2001) ("Cong. Auth.").
+Congress also expressly acknowledged that the attacks rendered it "necessary and appropriate"
+for the United States to exercise its right "to protect United States citizens both at home and
+abroad," and acknowledged in particular that "the President has authority under the Constitution
+to take action to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States." Id.
+pmbl.
+
+19. (U) Also after the 9/11 attacks, a Military Order was issued stating that the attacks
+of September 11 "created a state of armed conflict," see Military Order by the President § 1(a),
+66 Fed. Reg. 57833, 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001), and that al Qaeda terrorists "possess both the
+capability and the intention to undertake further terrorist attacks against the United States that, if
+not detected and prevented, will cause mass deaths, mass injuries, and massive destruction of
+property, and may place at risk the continuity of the operations of the United States
+Government," and concluding that "an extraordinary emergency exists for national defense
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+purposes." Military Order, § 1(c), (g), 66 Fed. Reg. at 57833-34. Indeed, shortly after the
+attacks, on October 2, 2001, NATO took the unprecedented step of invoking Article 5 of the
+North Atlantic Treaty, which provides that an "armed attack against one or more of [the parties]
+shall be considered an attack against them all." North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 5, 63
+Stat. 2241, 2244, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, 246.
+
+20. (U) As a result of the unprecedented attacks of September 11, 2001, the United
+States found itself immediately propelled into a worldwide war against a network of terrorist
+groups, centered on and affiliated with al Qaeda, that possesses the evolving capability and
+intention of inflicting further catastrophic attacks on the United States. That war is continuing
+today, at home as well as abroad. Moreover, the war against al Qaeda and its allies is a different
+kind of war, against a very different enemy, than any other war or enemy the Nation has
+previously faced. Al Qaeda and its supporters operate not as a traditional nation-state but as a
+diffuse, decentralized global network of individuals, cells, and loosely associated, often disparate
+groups, that act sometimes in concert, sometimes independently, and sometimes in the United
+States, but always in secret—and their mission is to destroy lives and to disrupt a way of life
+through terrorist acts. Al Qaeda works in the shadows; secrecy is essential to al Qaeda's success
+in plotting and executing its terrorist attacks.
+
+21. (TS//SI//NF) The Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Admiral Dennis
+C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence, details the particular facets of the continuing al Qaeda
+threat and, thus, the exigent need for the NSA intelligence activities described here. The NSA
+activities are directed at that threat, [REDACTED].
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+Global telecommunications networks, especially the Internet, have
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+developed in recent years into a loosely interconnected system—a network of networks—that is
+ideally suited for the secret communications needs of loosely affiliated terrorist cells. Hundreds
+of Internet service providers, or "ISPs," and other providers of communications services offer a
+wide variety of global communications options, often free of charge.
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+22. (TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+23. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) Our efforts against al Qaeda and its affiliates therefore present
+critical challenges for the Nation's communications intelligence capabilities. First, in this new
+kind of war, more than in any other we have ever faced, communications intelligence is essential
+to our ability to identify the enemy and to detect and disrupt its plans for further attacks on the
+United States. Communications intelligence often is the only means we have to learn the
+identities of particular individuals who are involved in terrorist activities and the existence of
+particular terrorist threats. Second, at the same time that communications intelligence is more
+important than ever, the decentralized, non-hierarchical nature of the enemy and their
+sophistication in exploiting the agility of modern telecommunications make successful
+communications intelligence more difficult than ever. It is against this backdrop that the risks
+presented by this litigation should be assessed, in particular the risks of disclosing particular
+NSA sources and methods implicated by the claims.
+
+C. (U) Summary of NSA Activities After 9/11 to Meet al Qaeda Threat.
+
+24. (TS//SI//OC/NF) After the September 11 attacks, the NSA received presidential
+authorization and direction to detect and prevent further terrorist attacks within the United States
+by intercepting the content of telephone and Internet communications for which there were
+reasonable grounds to believe that (1) such communications originated or terminated outside the
+United States and (2) a party to such communication was a member or agent of al Qaeda or an
+affiliated terrorist organization. The existence of this activity was disclosed by then-President
+Bush in December 2005 (and subsequently referred to as the "Terrorist Surveillance Program" or
+"TSP").⁷
+
+Footnote 7: (U) On January 17, 2007, the Attorney General made public the general facts that new
+orders of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court had been issued that authorized the
+Government to target for collection international communications into or out of the United States
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+25. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) In more specific and classified terms, the NSA has
+utilized a number of critically important intelligence sources and methods to meet the threat of
+another mass casualty terrorist attack on the United States—methods that were designed to work
+in tandem and continue to this day under authority of the FISC. As noted above, one such
+method involved the program publicly acknowledged by then-President Bush as the TSP, in
+which the NSA intercepted the content of telephone and Internet communications pursuant to
+presidential authorization.⁸ As described further below, under the TSP, NSA did not engage in
+plaintiffs' alleged dragnet surveillance of communication content, but intercepted the content of
+particular communications where reasonable grounds existed to believe one party involved a
+member or agent of al Qaeda or affiliated terrorist organization based on particular "selectors"
+(phone numbers or Internet addresses) associated with that target. In addition to collecting the
+content of particular communications, the NSA has also collected non-content communication
+information known as "meta data." Specifically, after the 9/11 attacks, the NSA collected bulk
+meta data related to telephony communications for the purpose of conducting targeted analysis to
+[REDACTED]
+where there is probable cause to believe that one of the communicants is a member or agent of al
+Qaeda or an associated terrorist organization; that, as a result of these orders, any electronic
+surveillance that had been occurring as part of the TSP was then being conducted subject to the
+approval of the FISA Court; and that, under these circumstances, the TSP was not reauthorized.
+
+Footnote 8: (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) The first presidential authorization of the TSP was on October
+4, 2001, and the TSP was reauthorized approximately every 30-60 days throughout the existence
+of the program. The documents authorizing the TSP also contained the authorizations for the
+meta data activities described herein. The authorizations, moreover, evolved over time, and
+during certain periods authorized other activities (this declaration is not intended to and does not
+fully describe the authorizations and the differences in those authorizations over time).
+See In Camera, Ex Parte
+Classified Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander at ¶ 62, MDL No. 06-1791-VRW (N.D.
+Cal.) (relating to all actions against the MCI and Verizon Defendants) (submitted Apr. 20, 2007).
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED] Telephony meta data is information derived from call detail
+records that reflect non-content information such as, but not limited to, the date, time, and
+duration of telephone calls, as well as the phone numbers used to place and receive the calls.⁹ In
+addition, since the 9/11 attacks, the NSA has collected bulk meta data related to Internet
+communications. Internet meta data is header/router/addressing information, such as the "to,"
+"from," "cc," and "bcc" lines, as opposed to the body or "re" lines, of a standard email.
+
+26. (TS//SI//OC/NF) Each of the foregoing activities continues in some form under
+authority of the FISA and, thus, the NSA utilizes the same intelligence sources and methods
+today to detect and prevent further terrorist attacks that it did after the 9/11 attacks. First, as
+noted above, on January 10, 2007, the FISC issued two orders authorizing the Government to
+conduct certain electronic surveillance that had been occurring under the TSP. The FISC Orders
+were implemented on January 17, 2007 and, thereafter, any electronic surveillance that had been
+occurring as part of the TSP became subject to the approval of the FISC and the TSP was not
+reauthorized.¹⁰
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Footnote 9: (TS//SI-[REDACTED]//TSP//OC/NF)
+Footnote 10: (TS//SI//OC/NF) As also described further (¶¶ 64-67 *infra*), the FISC has extended
+these orders with some modifications, and the Foreign Telephone and Email Order later expired
+in August 2007 and was supplanted by authority enacted by Congress first under the Protect
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+27. (TS//SI//OC/NF) Second, with respect to the collection of telephony meta data,
+since May 2006 certain telecommunication providers have been required by an order of the FISC
+to produce to the NSA on a daily basis all telephony meta data that they create ("FISC Telephone
+Business Records Order"). The FISC Telephone Business Records Order has been reauthorized
+approximately every 90 days since it was first issued. Although this collection is broad in scope,
+the NSA was authorized by the FISC to query the archived telephony data with identified
+telephone numbers for which there are facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that
+the number is associated with [REDACTED] (hereafter referred to
+as a "RAS" determination).¹¹ Historically, only a tiny fraction of telephony meta data records
+collected by the NSA has actually been presented to a trained professional for analysis. As
+discussed further below (see ¶¶ 49-57 *infra*), while the vast majority of records are thus never
+viewed by a human at the NSA, it is still necessary to collect the meta data in bulk in order to
+[REDACTED] utilize sophisticated and vital analytical tools for tracking the contacts [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] for protecting the national security of the United States.
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+America Act and then the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 to authorize foreign intelligence
+surveillance of targets located overseas without individual court orders.
+
+Footnote 11: (TS//SI//OC/NF) As set forth further below (¶¶ 61-63 *infra*), NSA's compliance with
+this limitation in the FISC Order has been subject to further proceedings in the FISC that
+commenced with a compliance report by the government on January 15, 2009, which indicated
+that the NSA had also been querying incoming telephony meta data with selectors for
+counterterrorism targets subject to NSA surveillance under Executive Order 12333, as to which
+the NSA had not made a "RAS" determination. On March 2, 2009, the FISC renewed the Order
+authorizing the bulk provision to NSA of business records containing telephony meta data from
+telecommunications carriers [REDACTED] but subjected that activity to new limitations,
+including that the NSA may query the meta data only after a motion is granted on a case-by-case
+basis (unless otherwise necessary to protect against imminent threat to human life). The FISC
+also required the government to report to the FISC on its review of revisions to the meta data
+collection and analysis process, and that report shall include affidavits describing the value of the
+collection of telephony meta data authorized by the FISC Telephone Business Records Order.
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+28. (TS//SI//OC/NF) Third, beginning in July 2004, the collection of Internet meta
+data in bulk has been conducted pursuant to an order of the FISC authorizing the use of a pen
+register and trap and trace device ("FISC Pen Register Order" or "PRTT Order"). See 18 U.S.C.
+§ 3127 (defining "pen register" and "trap and trace device"). Pursuant to the FISC Pen Register
+Order, which has been reauthorized approximately every 90 days since it was first issued, the
+NSA is authorized to collect, in bulk, meta data associated with electronic communications
+[REDACTED] on the Internet.¹²
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Although the NSA collects email meta data in bulk,
+[REDACTED] it has been authorized by the FISC to query the archived meta data only using email
+addresses for which there are facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the email
+address is associated with [REDACTED] (similar restrictions were
+in place under the presidential authorization). As with bulk telephony meta data collection, bulk
+Internet meta data collection is necessary to allow the NSA to use critical and unique analytical
+capabilities to track the contacts (even retrospectively) [REDACTED] of
+terrorists. Like telephony meta data activities, Internet meta data collection and analysis are vital
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Footnote 12: (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+tools for protecting the United States from attack, and, accordingly, information pertaining to
+those activities is highly classified.¹³
+
+V. (U) Information Protected by Privilege
+
+29. (U) In general and unclassified terms, the following categories of information are
+subject to the DNI's assertion of the state secrets privilege and statutory privilege under the
+National Security Act, as well as my assertion of the NSA statutory privilege:
+A. Information that may tend to confirm or deny whether the
+plaintiffs have been subject to any alleged NSA intelligence
+activity that may be at issue in this matter; and
+B. Any information concerning NSA intelligence activities,
+sources, or methods that may relate to or be necessary to
+adjudicate plaintiffs' allegations, including allegations that
+the NSA, with the assistance of telecommunications
+carriers such as AT&T, indiscriminately intercepts the
+content of communications and also collects the
+communication records of millions of Americans as part of
+an alleged presidentially authorized "Program" after 9/11.
+See, e.g., Complaint at ¶¶ 2-13; 39-97.
+The scope of this assertion includes but is not limited to:
+(i) Information concerning the scope and operation
+of the now inoperative "Terrorist Surveillance Program"
+("TSP") regarding the interception of the content of certain
+one-end international communications reasonably believed
+to involve a member or agent of al-Qaeda or an affiliated
+terrorist organization, and any other information related to
+demonstrating that the NSA does not otherwise engage in
+the content surveillance dragnet that the plaintiffs allege;
+and
+(ii) Information concerning whether or not the NSA
+obtained from telecommunications companies such as
+[REDACTED]
+
+Footnote 13: (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) As the NSA has previously advised the Court in related
+proceedings, and describes further below (see note 23 *infra*), the bulk collection of Internet meta
+data pursuant to presidential authorization ceased in [REDACTED] 2004. See *In Camera, Ex Parte
+Classified Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander* at ¶ 31 n.8, MDL No. 06-1791-VRW
+(N.D. Cal.) (relating to all actions against the MCI and Verizon Defendants) (submitted Apr. 20,
+2007).
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+AT&T communication transactional records as alleged in
+the Complaint; see, e.g., Complaint ¶¶ 10; 82-97; and
+(iii) Information that may tend to confirm or deny
+whether AT&T (and to the extent relevant or necessary,
+any other telecommunications carrier), has provided
+assistance to the NSA in connection with any alleged
+activity.
+
+VI. (U) Description of Information Subject to Privilege and the Harm of Disclosure
+
+A. (U) Information That May Tend to Confirm or Deny Whether the Plaintiffs Have
+Been Subject to Any Alleged NSA Activities.
+
+30. (U) The first major category of information as to which I am supporting the DNI'S
+assertion of privilege, and asserting the NSA's own statutory privilege, concerns information as
+to whether particular individuals, including the named plaintiffs in this lawsuit, have been
+subject to alleged NSA intelligence activities. As set forth below, disclosure of such information
+would cause exceptionally grave harm to the national security.
+(TS//SI-[REDACTED])
+
+31. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) The five named plaintiffs in this case—Tash Hepting,
+Gregory Hicks, Carolyn Jewel, Erik Knutzen and Joice Walton have alleged that, pursuant to a
+presidentially authorized program after the 9/11 attacks, the NSA, with the assistance of AT&T,
+has acquired and continues to acquire the content of phone calls, emails, instant messages, text
+messages, web and other communications, both international and domestic, of millions of
+ordinary Americans—"practically every American who uses the phone system or the Internet"—
+including the plaintiffs, as well as private telephone and Internet transaction records of millions
+of AT&T customers, again including information concerning the plaintiffs' telephone and
+Internet communications. See, e.g., Complaint ¶¶ 7, 9, 10; see also ¶¶ 39-97. As set forth
+herein, the NSA does not engage in "dragnet" surveillance of the content of communications as
+plaintiffs allege, [REDACTED].
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+(TS//SI-[REDACTED])
+
+32. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Footnote 14: (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Footnote 15: (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+33. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+34. (U) As a matter of course, the NSA cannot publicly confirm or deny whether any
+individual is subject to surveillance activities because to do so would tend to reveal actual
+targets. For example, if the NSA were to confirm in this case and others that specific individuals
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Footnote 16: (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Footnote 17: (TS//SI//OC/NF) NSA has estimated that it collects Internet metadata associated with
+approximately [REDACTED].
+[REDACTED] With respect to telephony meta data, NSA has previously estimated that, prior to the
+2006 FISC Order, about [REDACTED] telephony meta data records was presented to an
+analyst for review, see *Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lieutenant General Keith
+B. Alexander* in *Shubert, et al. v. Bush, et al.*, (Case No. 07-cv-693) (dated May 25, 2007) ¶ 27,
+and the scope of that disparity remains generally the same.
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+are not targets of surveillance, but later refuse to comment (as it would have to) in a case
+involving an actual target, an actual or potential adversary of the United States could easily
+deduce by comparing such responses that the person in the latter case is a target. There can be
+great harm in revealing targets of foreign intelligence surveillance. If an individual knows or
+suspects he is a target of U.S. intelligence activities, he would naturally tend to alter his behavior
+to take new precautions against surveillance. In addition, revealing who is not a target would
+indicate who has avoided surveillance and reveal the limitations of NSA's capabilities. Such
+information could lead an actual or potential adversary, secure in the knowledge that he is not
+under surveillance, to convey information; alternatively, such a person may be unwittingly
+utilized or even forced to convey information through a secure channel to a hostile foreign
+adversary. In short, revealing which channels are free from surveillance and which are not
+would also reveal sensitive intelligence methods and thereby could help any adversary evade
+detection and capitalize on limitations in NSA's capabilities. ¹⁸
+
+35. (TS//SI-[REDACTED]//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Footnote 18: (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+B. (U) Information Related to NSA Activities, Sources, or Methods Implicated by the
+Plaintiffs' Allegations and the Harm to National Security of Its Disclosure.
+
+1. (U) Plaintiffs' Allegations of a Communications Dragnet.
+
+36. (U) I am also supporting the DNI's assertion of privilege and asserting the NSA's
+statutory privilege over any other facts concerning NSA intelligence activities, sources, or
+methods that may relate to or be necessary to litigate the plaintiffs' claims and allegations,
+including that (i) the NSA is indiscriminately intercepting the content of communications of
+millions of ordinary Americans, see, e.g., Complaint ¶¶ 7, 9, 10, and (ii) that the NSA is
+collecting the private telephone and Internet transaction records of millions of AT&T customers,
+again including information concerning the plaintiffs' telephone and Internet communications.
+See e.g., Complaint ¶¶ 7, 9, 10, 13, 82-97. As described above, the scope of the government's
+privilege assertion includes but is not limited to: (1) facts concerning the operation of the now
+inoperative Terrorist Surveillance Program and any other NSA activities needed to demonstrate
+that the TSP was limited to the interception of the content of one-end international
+communications reasonably believed to involve a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated
+terrorist organization and that the NSA does not otherwise conduct the content surveillance
+dragnet that the plaintiffs allege; and (2) information concerning whether or not the NSA obtains
+transactional communication records from telecommunications companies such as AT&T as
+[REDACTED].
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+plaintiffs allege. As set forth below, the disclosure of such information would cause
+exceptionally grave harm to national security.
+
+(a) (U) Information Related to the Terrorist Surveillance Program.
+
+37. (U) After the existence of the TSP was officially acknowledged in December
+2005, the Government stated that the NSA's collection of the content of communications under
+the TSP was directed at international communications in which a participant was reasonably
+believed to be associated with al Qaeda or an affiliated organization. Plaintiffs' allegation that
+the NSA undertakes indiscriminate surveillance of the content of millions of
+communications sent or received by people inside the United States under the TSP is
+therefore false, again as the Government has previously stated.¹⁹ But to the extent the NSA must
+demonstrate that content surveillance under the TSP was so limited, and was not plaintiffs'
+alleged content dragnet, or demonstrate that the NSA has not otherwise engaged in the alleged
+content dragnet, highly classified NSA intelligence sources and methods about the operation of
+the TSP and NSA intelligence activities would be subject to disclosure or the risk of disclosure.
+The disclosure of whether and to what extent the NSA utilizes certain intelligence sources and
+methods would reveal to foreign adversaries the NSA's capabilities, or lack thereof, enabling
+them to either evade particular channels of communications that are being monitored, or exploit
+channels of communications that are not subject to NSA activities—in either case risking
+exceptionally grave harm to national security.
+
+38. (U) The privileged information that must be protected from disclosure includes
+the following classified details concerning content surveillance under the now inoperative TSP.
+
+39. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) First, interception of the content of communications
+under the TSP was triggered by a range of information, including sensitive foreign intelligence,
+
+Footnote 19: See, e.g., *Public Declaration of NSA Director Alexander* in the *Shubert* action (07-cv-
+693-VRW) at ¶ 16.
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP-SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+obtained or derived from various sources indicating that a particular phone number or email
+address is reasonably believed by the U.S. Intelligence Community to be associated with a
+member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization. Professional intelligence
+officers at the NSA undertook a careful but expeditious analysis of that information, and
+considered a number of possible factors, in determining whether it would be appropriate to target
+a telephone number or email address under the TSP. Those factors included whether the target
+phone number or email address was: (1) reasonably believed by the U.S. Intelligence
+Community, based on other authorized collection activities or other law enforcement or
+intelligence sources, to be used by a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist
+organization; [REDACTED].
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Footnote 20: (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//MORCON/NOFORN
+40. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) Once the NSA determined that there were reasonable
+grounds to believe that the target is a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist
+organization, the NSA took steps to focus the interception on the specific al Qaeda-related target
+and on communications of that target that were to or from a foreign country. In this respect, the
+NSA's collection efforts were [REDACTED] that the NSA had
+reasonable grounds to believe carry the "one-end" foreign communications of members or agents
+of al Qaeda or affiliated terrorist organizations.
+
+41. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+42. (TS//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+43. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) The NSA took specific steps in the actual TSP
+interception process to minimize the risk that the communications of non-targets were
+intercepted. With respect to telephone communications, specific telephone numbers identified
+through the analysis outlined above were [REDACTED] so that the only communications
+intercepted were those to or from the targeted number of an individual who was reasonably
+believed to be a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization.
+
+44. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) For the interception of the content of Internet
+communications under the TSP, the NSA used identifying information obtained through its
+analysis of the target, such as email addresses [REDACTED] to target for collection the
+communications of individuals reasonably believed to be members or agents of al Qaeda or an
+affiliated terrorist organization.
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Footnote 21: (TS//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+The NSA did not search the content of the
+communications [REDACTED] with "key words" other than the targeted selectors [REDACTED]
+themselves. Rather, the NSA targeted for collection only email addresses [REDACTED]
+associated with suspected members or agents of al Qaeda or affiliated terrorist [REDACTED]
+organizations, or communications in which such [REDACTED] were mentioned. In
+addition, due to technical limitations of the hardware and software, incidental collection of non-
+target communications has occurred, and in such circumstances the NSA applies its
+minimization procedures to ensure that communications of non-targets are not disseminated. To
+the extent such facts would be necessary to dispel plaintiffs' erroneous content dragnet
+allegations, they could not be disclosed without revealing highly sensitive intelligence methods.
+
+45. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) In addition to procedures designed to ensure that the TSP
+was limited to the international communications of al Qaeda members and affiliates, the NSA
+also took additional steps to ensure that the privacy rights of U.S. persons were protected.
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+46. (TS//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+The
+foregoing information about the targeted scope of content collection under the TSP could not be
+disclosed, in order to address and rebut plaintiffs' allegation that the NSA, with the assistance of
+AT&T, engaged in the alleged content dragnet, without revealing specific NSA sources and
+methods and thereby causing exceptionally grave damage to the national security.
+
+Footnote 22: (U//FOUO) In addition, in implementing the TSP, the NSA applied the existing Legal
+Compliance and Minimization Procedures applicable to U.S. persons to the extent not
+inconsistent with the presidential authorization. See United States Signals Intelligence Directive
+(USSID) 18. These procedures require that the NSA refrain from intentionally acquiring the
+communications of U.S. persons who are not the targets of its surveillance activities, that it
+destroy upon recognition any communications solely between or among persons in the U.S. that
+it inadvertently acquires, and that it refrain from identifying U.S. persons in its intelligence
+reports unless a senior NSA official determines that the recipient of the report requires such
+information in order to perform a lawful function assigned to it and the identity of the U.S.
+person is necessary to understand the foreign intelligence or to assess its significance.
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP-SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+47. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) In addition to these facts about the TSP, facts about other
+NSA intelligence activities would be needed to address or prove that the NSA does not conduct
+the alleged content dragnet.
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] In short, there is no other "dragnet" program authorized by the President after 9/11
+under which the NSA intercepts the content of virtually all domestic and international
+communications as the plaintiffs allege. Again, however, information about NSA content
+surveillance activities beyond the TSP could not be disclosed in order to address and rebut
+plaintiffs' allegation without revealing specific NSA sources and methods and thereby causing
+exceptionally grave damage to national security.²³
+
+(b) (U) Plaintiffs' Allegations Concerning the Collection of Communication
+Records.
+
+48. (U) As noted above, plaintiffs also allege that the NSA is collecting the private
+telephone and Internet transaction records of millions of AT&T customers, again including
+information concerning the plaintiffs' telephone and Internet communications. See, e.g.,
+[REDACTED].
+
+Footnote 23: (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) To the extent relevant to this case, additional facts about the
+operational details of the TSP and subsequent FISA authorized content surveillance activities
+also could not be disclosed without exceptional harm to national security, including for example
+information that would demonstrate the operational swiftness and effectiveness of utilizing
+content surveillance in conjunction with the meta data activities. As noted, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] the TSP, in conjunction with meta data
+collection and analysis described herein, allowed the NSA to obtain rapidly not only the content of
+a particular communication, but connections between that target and others who may form a web
+of al Qaeda conspirators.
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP-SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//HORCON/NOFORN
+Complaint ¶¶ 7, 9, 10, 13, 82-97. Confirmation or denial of any information concerning whether
+the NSA collects communication records would also disclose information about whether or not
+the NSA utilizes particular intelligence sources and methods and, thus, the NSA's capabilities or
+lack thereof, and would cause exceptionally grave harm to national security.
+
+49. (TS//SI//OC/NF) In addition to implicating the NSA's content collection
+activities authorized after the 9/11 attacks, the plaintiffs' allegations also put directly at issue the
+NSA's bulk collection of non-content communication meta data. As explained above, the NSA
+has not engaged in the alleged dragnet of communication content, and, as now explained below,
+to address plaintiffs' allegations concerning the bulk collection of non-content information
+would require disclosure of NSA sources and methods that would cause exceptional harm to
+national security. As also explained herein, these meta data collection activities are now subject
+to the orders and supervision of the FISC.
+
+50. (TS//SI-[REDACTED]//OC/NF) As noted above, starting in October 2001, and since
+2004 pursuant to the FISC Pen Register Order, the NSA collected bulk meta data associated with
+electronic communications [REDACTED].
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+See ¶¶ 25, 28, *supra*.²⁴
+
+Footnote 24: (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//HORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED] pursuant to the FISC Telephone Records Order, certain telecommunication companies
+provide the NSA with bulk telephony meta data in the form of call detail records derived from
+information kept by those companies in the ordinary course of business. See ¶¶ 25, 27, *supra*.
+
+51. (TS//SI//OC/NF) The bulk meta data collection activities that have been
+undertaken by the NSA since 9/11 are vital tools for protecting the United States from another
+catastrophic terrorist attack. Disclosure of these meta data activities, sources, or methods would
+cause exceptionally grave harm to national security. It is not possible to target collection solely
+on known terrorist telephone identifiers and effectively discover the existence, location, and
+plans of terrorist adversaries.
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP-SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//HORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+The only effective means by which NSA analysts are able continuously
+to keep track of such operatives is through meta data collection and analysis.
+
+(TS//SI) Technical Details of Analytic Capabilities
+
+52. (TS//SI//OC/NF) In particular, the bulk collection of Internet and telephony meta
+data allows the NSA to use critical and unique analytical capabilities to track the contacts [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] through the use of two highly sophisticated tools known as "contact-chaining" [REDACTED].
+Contact-chaining allows the NSA to identify telephone numbers and email addresses
+that have been in contact with known [REDACTED] numbers and addresses; in turn, those
+contacts can be targeted for immediate query and analysis as new [REDACTED] numbers
+and addresses are identified. When the NSA performs a contact-chaining query on a terrorist-
+associated telephone identifier, [REDACTED].
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+53. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP-SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+54. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+55. (TS//SI-[REDACTED]//OC/NF)—Because it is impossible to determine in advance
+which particular piece of meta data will turn out to identify a terrorist, collecting meta data in
+bulk is vital for the success of contact-chaining. [REDACTED] NSA analysts know that the
+terrorists' telephone calls are located somewhere in the billions of data bits; what they cannot
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED] know ahead of time is exactly where. The ability to accumulate meta data substantially increases
+NSA's ability to detection and identify these targets. One particular advantage of bulk meta data
+collection is that it provides a historical perspective on past contact activity that cannot be
+captured in the present or prospectively. Such historical links may be vital to identifying new
+targets, because the meta data may contain links that are absolutely unique, pointing to potential
+targets that otherwise would be missed.
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] These sources and methods enable the NSA to segregate some of that very
+small amount of otherwise undetectable but highly valuable information from the overwhelming
+amount of other information that has no intelligence value whatsoever—in colloquial terms, to
+find at least some of the needles hidden in the haystack. If employed on a sufficient volume of
+data, contact chaining [REDACTED] can expose [REDACTED] and contacts
+that were previously unknown. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+56. (TS//SI//NF) The foregoing discussion is not hypothetical. As noted previously,
+since inception of the first FISC Telephone Business Records Order, NSA has provided 275
+reports to the FBI. These reports have provided a total of 2,549 telephone identifiers as being in
+contact with identifiers associated with [REDACTED].
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+57. (TS//SI//OC/NF) Accordingly, adjudication of plaintiffs' allegations concerning
+the collection of non-content meta data and records about communication transactions would risk
+or require disclosure of critical NSA sources and methods for [REDACTED] contacts of
+terrorist communications as well as the existence of current NSA activities under FISC Orders.
+Despite media speculation about these activities, official confirmation and disclosure of the
+NSA's bulk collection and targeted analysis of telephony meta data would confirm to all of our
+foreign adversaries [REDACTED] the existence of these critical intelligence
+capabilities and thereby severely undermine NSA's ability to gather information concerning
+terrorist connections and cause exceptional harm to national security.
+
+2. (TS//SI//OC/NF) Information Concerning Current FISA Authorized
+Activities and Specific FISC Orders.
+
+58. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) I am also supporting the DNI's state secrets privilege
+assertion, and asserting NSA's statutory privilege, over information concerning the various
+orders of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court mentioned throughout this declaration that
+authorize NSA intelligence collection activities, as well as NSA surveillance activities conducted
+pursuant to the Protect America Act ("PAA") and current activities authorized by the FISA
+Amendments Act of 2008. As noted herein, the three NSA intelligence activities initiated after
+the September 11 attacks to detect and prevent a further al Qaeda attack—(i) content collection
+of targeted al Qaeda and associated terrorist-related communications under what later was called
+the TSP; (ii) internet meta data bulk collection; and (iii) telephony meta data bulk collection—
+have been subject to various orders of the FISC (as well as FISA statutory authority) and are no
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP-SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP-SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+longer being conducted under presidential authorization. The bulk collection of non-content
+transactional data for internet communications was first authorized by the FISC in the July 2004
+FISC Pen Register Order, and the bulk collection of non-content telephony meta data was first
+authorized by the FISC in May 2006. The existence and operational details of these orders, and
+of subsequent FISC orders reauthorizing these activities, remain highly classified and disclosure
+of this information would cause exceptional harm to national security.²⁵ In addition, while the
+Government has acknowledged the general existence of the January 10, 2007 FISC Orders
+authorizing electronic surveillance similar to that undertaken in the TSP, the content of those
+orders, and facts concerning the NSA sources and methods they authorize, cannot be disclosed
+without likewise causing exceptional harm to national security. Subsequent content surveillance
+sources and methods utilized by the NSA under the PAA and, currently, under the FISA
+Amendments Act of 2008 likewise cannot be disclosed. I summarize below the proceedings that
+have occurred under authority of the FISA or the FISC.
+
+59. (TS//SI//OC/NF) (a) *Internet Meta Data*: Pursuant to the FISC Pen Register
+Order, which has been reauthorized approximately every 90 days after it was first issued, NSA is
+authorized to collect in bulk [REDACTED] meta data associated with
+electronic communications [REDACTED].
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Footnote 25: (TS//SI//OC/NF) For this reason, the FISC Telephone Business Records Order and
+FISC Pen Register Orders prohibit any person from disclosing to any other person that the NSA
+has sought or obtained the telephony meta data, other than (a) those persons to whom
+disclosure is necessary to comply with the Order; (b) an attorney to obtain legal advice or
+assistance with respect to the production of meta data in response to the Order; or (c) other
+persons as permitted by the Director of the FBI or the Director's designee. The FISC Orders
+further provide that any person to whom disclosure is made pursuant to (a), (b), or (c) shall be
+subject to the nondisclosure requirements applicable to a person to whom the Order is directed in
+the same manner as such person.
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP-SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//WORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The NSA is authorized to query the archived
+meta data collected pursuant to the FISC Pen Register Order using email addresses for which
+there were facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the email
+address was associated with [REDACTED]. The FISC Pen Register
+Order was most recently reauthorized on [REDACTED] 2009, and requires continued assistance by the
+providers through [REDACTED] 2009.
+
+60. (TS//SI//OC//NF) (b) *Telephony Meta Data*: Beginning in May 2006, the NSA's
+bulk collection of telephony meta data, previously subject to presidential authorization, was
+authorized by the FISC Telephone Business Records Order. Like the FISC Pen Register Order,
+the FISC Telephone Business Records Order was reauthorized approximately every 90 days.
+Based on the finding that reasonable grounds existed that the production was relevant to efforts
+to protect against international terrorism, the Order required [REDACTED] to
+produce to the NSA "call detail records" or "telephony metadata" pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §
+1861[c] (authorizing the production of business records for, inter alia, an investigation to protect
+against international terrorism). Telephony meta data was compiled from call detail data
+maintained by the providers in the ordinary course of business that reflected non-content
+information such as the date, time, and duration of telephone calls, as well as the phone numbers
+used to place and receive the calls. The NSA was authorized by the FISC to query the archived
+telephony meta data solely with identified telephone numbers for which there were facts giving
+Footnote 26: (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP-SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//WORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED] rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the number was associated with [REDACTED].
+(or a "RAS" determination). The FISC Telephone Business
+Records Order was most recently reauthorized on March 2, 2009, but subject to new specific
+limitations, which I summarize next.
+
+61. (TS//SI//OC/NF) As noted above (note 11 *supra*), on January 15, 2009, the
+Department of Justice ("DOJ") submitted a compliance incident report related to the Business
+Records Order to the FISC, based on information provided to DOJ by the NSA, which indicated
+that the NSA's prior reports to the FISC concerning implementation of the FISC Telephone
+Business Records Order had not accurately reported the extent to which NSA had been querying
+the telephony meta data acquired from carriers. In sum, this compliance incident related to a
+process whereby currently tasked telephony selectors (i.e. phone numbers) reasonably believed
+to be associated with authorized counter terrorism foreign intelligence targets associated with
+[REDACTED] under Executive Order 12333 were reviewed against
+the incoming telephony metadata to determine if that number had been in contact with a number
+in the United States. This process occurred prior to a formal determination by NSA that
+reasonable articulable suspicion existed that the selector was associated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] and was not consistent with NSA's prior descriptions of the
+process for querying telephony meta data.
+
+62. (TS//SI//OC/NF) By Order dated March 2, 2009, the FISC has directed that the
+NSA may continue to acquire call detail records of telephony meta data in accordance with the
+FISC Telephone Business Record Orders, but is prohibited from accessing data acquired except
+in a limited manner. In particular, the Government may request through a motion that the FISC
+authorize querying of the telephony meta data for purposes of obtaining foreign intelligence on a
+case-by-case basis (unless otherwise necessary to protect against imminent threat to human life,
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP-SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//WORCON/NOFORN
+subject to report to the FISC the next business day). In addition, the FISC imposed other
+obligations on the Government, including to report on its ongoing review of the matter and to file
+affidavits describing the continuing value of the telephony meta data collection to the national
+security of the United States and to certify that the information sought is relevant to an
+authorized investigation.
+
+63. (TS//TSP//SI//OC//NF) NSA is committed to working with the FISC
+on this and other compliance issues to ensure that this vital intelligence tool works appropriately
+and effectively. For purposes of this litigation, and the privilege assertions now made by the
+DNI and by the NSA, the intelligence sources and methods described herein remain highly
+classified and the disclosure that [REDACTED] would
+compromise vital NSA sources and methods and result in exceptionally grave harm to national
+security.
+
+64. (TS//TSP//SI//OC//NF) (c) *Content Collection*: On January 10, 2007, the FISC
+issued orders authorizing the Government to conduct certain electronic surveillance that had
+been occurring under the TSP. Those Orders included [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] the "Foreign Telephone and Email Order," which
+authorized, *inter alia*, electronic surveillance of telephone and Internet communications
+[REDACTED] where the Government determined that there was probable
+cause to believe that (1) one of the communicants is a member or agent of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] and (2) the communication is to or from a foreign country (i.e.,
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP-SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//HORCON/NOFORN
+a one-end foreign communication to or from the United States). Thereafter, any electronic
+surveillance that was occurring as part of the TSP became subject to the approval of the FISA
+Court and the TSP was not reauthorized.²⁷
+
+65. (TS//SI//OC//NF) The Foreign Telephone and Email Order remained in effect
+until the Protect America Act ("PAA") was enacted in August 2007. Under the PAA, the FISA's
+definition of "electronic surveillance" was clarified to exclude "surveillance directed at a person
+reasonably believed to be located outside the United States." 50 U.S.C. § 1805A. The PAA
+authorized the DNI and the Attorney General to jointly "authorize the acquisition of
+foreign intelligence information concerning persons reasonably believed to be outside the
+United States" for up to one year, *id.* § 1805B(a), and to issue directives to communications
+service providers requiring them to "immediately provide the Government with all information,
+facilities, and assistance necessary to accomplish the acquisition" of necessary intelligence
+information, *id.* § 1805B(e). Such directives were issued [REDACTED] and the NSA conducted
+content surveillance of overseas targets under the PAA [REDACTED].
+
+66. (TS//SI//OC//NF) Beginning in [REDACTED] 2008, expiring directives that had been
+issued under the PAA for content surveillance of overseas targets (including surveillance of
+specific [REDACTED] targets overseas) were replaced by new directives for such surveillance
+[REDACTED].
+
+Footnote 27: (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP-SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+issued pursuant to the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. [REDACTED] authorizes the targeting of persons outside of the United States without individual FISC
+orders but subject to directives issued to carriers by the Director of National Intelligence and the
+Attorney General under Section 702(h) of the FISA for the continuation of overseas surveillance
+under this new authority. See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h) (as added by the FISA Act of 2008, P.L.
+110-261).
+
+67. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) In sum, the post-9/11 content surveillance activities
+undertaken by the NSA evolved from the presidentially authorized TSP to the FISC Foreign
+Telephone and Email Order, to the directives issued under the PAA and, ultimately, to the
+directives that are now being issued pursuant to the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. Each
+authorization sought to enable the NSA to undertake surveillance on numerous multiple targets
+overseas without the need to obtain advance court approval for each target, but none has entailed
+the kind of indiscriminate content surveillance on telephony and Internet communications that
+the plaintiffs allege.
+
+3. (U) Plaintiffs' Allegations that AT&T Provided Assistance to the NSA with
+the Alleged Activities.
+
+68. (U) The third major category of NSA intelligence sources and methods as to
+which I am supporting the DNI's assertion of privilege, and asserting the NSA's statutory
+privilege, concerns information that may tend to confirm or deny whether or not AT&T (or to the
+extent necessary whether or not any other telecommunications provider) has assisted the NSA
+with alleged intelligence activities. Plaintiffs allege that they are customers of AT&T, and that
+AT&T participated in the alleged surveillance activities that the plaintiffs seek to challenge. As
+set forth below, confirmation or denial of a relationship between the NSA and AT&T (or other
+carriers) on alleged intelligence activities would cause exceptionally grave harm to national [REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//HORCON/NOFORN
+security.
+
+69. (TS//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//OC/NF) Because the NSA is not engaged in the
+indiscriminate dragnet of the content of domestic and international communications as the
+plaintiffs allege, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] can reasonably be
+expected to cause exceptionally grave harm to national security.
+
+70. (TS//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Footnote 28: (TS//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//OC/NF) On September 19, 2008, then-Attorney General
+Mukasey submitted a classified declaration and certification to this Court authorized by Section
+802 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Amendments Act of 2008, see 50 U.S.C.
+§ 1885a, [REDACTED].
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+71. (TS//SI-[REDACTED]//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Footnote 29: (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP-SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//WORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+72. (TS//SI-[REDACTED]//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Footnote 30: (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+73. (TS//SI-[REDACTED]//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+74. (TS//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//WORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+75. (TS//SI-[REDACTED]//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+76. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Footnote 31: (TS//SI-[REDACTED]//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+77. (TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+78. (TS//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Footnote 32: (TS//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP-SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//WORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+(a) (TS//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+(b) (TS//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//WORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+79. (TS//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Footnote 33: (TS//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Footnote 34: (TS//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP-SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//WORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+VII. (U) Risks of Allowing Litigation to Proceed
+
+80. (TS//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//OC/NF) Upon examination of the allegations, claims,
+facts, and issues raised by this case, it is my judgment that sensitive state secrets are so central to
+the subject matter of the litigation that any attempt to proceed will substantially risk the
+disclosure of the privileged state secrets described above. Although plaintiffs' alleged content
+surveillance dragnet does not occur, proving why that is so, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] would directly implicate highly classified
+intelligence information and activities. Similarly, attempting to address plaintiffs' allegations
+with respect to the bulk collection of non-content information and records containing
+transactional meta data about communications would also compromise currently operative NSA
+sources and methods that are essential to protecting national security, including for detecting and
+preventing a terrorist attack. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] In
+my judgment, any effort to probe the outer-bounds of such classified information would pose
+[REDACTED]
+
+Footnote 35: (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) In its prior classified declarations in this action, the NSA has
+set forth specific examples of how the intelligence sources and methods utilized by the NSA
+after the 9/11 attacks, including content surveillance under the TSP and pursuant to subsequent
+FISA authority, as well as non-content meta data collection and analysis, have led to the
+development by the NSA of actionable intelligence and important counter-terrorism efforts. See.
+e.g., Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of LTG Keith B. Alexander in *Shubert, et al. v.
+Bush, et al.* (Case No. 07-cv-693) (dated May 25, 2007) at 35-43, ¶¶ 58-61. To the extent that
+such information would be relevant to any litigation in this action, however, they could not be
+disclosed without revealing specific NSA intelligence information, sources, and methods, and are
+subject to the government's privilege assertion.
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//WORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED] inherent and significant risks of the disclosure of that information, including critically sensitive
+information about NSA sources, methods, operations, targets [REDACTED]. Indeed, any
+effort merely to allude to those facts in a non-classified fashion could be revealing of classified
+details that should not be disclosed. Even seemingly minor or innocuous facts, in the context of
+this case or other non-classified information, can tend to reveal, particularly to sophisticated
+foreign adversaries, a much bigger picture of U.S. intelligence gathering sources and methods.
+
+81. (TS//SI//NF) The United States has an overwhelming interest in detecting and
+thwarting further mass casualty attacks by al Qaeda. The United States has already suffered one
+attack that killed thousands, disrupted the Nation's financial center for days, and successfully
+struck at the command and control center for the Nation's military. Al Qaeda continues to
+possess the ability and clear, stated intent to carry out a massive attack in the United States that
+could result in a significant loss of life, as well as have a devastating impact on the U.S.
+economy. According to the most recent intelligence analysis, attacking the U.S. Homeland
+remains one of al Qaeda's top operational priorities, see *Classified In Camera Ex Parte*
+Declaration of Admiral Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence, and al Qaeda will
+keep trying for high-impact attacks as long as its central command structure is functioning and
+affiliated groups are capable of furthering its interests.
+
+82. (TS//SI//NF) Al Qaeda seeks to use our own communications infrastructure
+against us as they secretly attempt to infiltrate agents into the United States, waiting to attack at a
+time of their choosing. One of the greatest challenges the United States confronts in the ongoing
+effort to prevent another catastrophic terrorist attack against the Homeland is the critical need to
+gather intelligence quickly and effectively. Time is of the essence in preventing terrorist attacks,
+and the government faces significant obstacles in finding and tracking agents of al Qaeda as they
+manipulate modern technology in an attempt to communicate while remaining undetected. The
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//MORCON NOFORN
+NSA sources, methods, and activities described herein are vital tools in this effort.
+
+VIII. (U) Conclusion
+
+83. (U) In sum, I support the DNI's assertion of the state secrets privilege and
+statutory privilege to prevent the disclosure of the information described herein and detailed
+herein. I also assert a statutory privilege under Section 6 of the National Security Act with
+respect to the information described herein which concerns the functions of the NSA. Moreover,
+because proceedings in this case risk disclosure of privileged and classified intelligence-related
+information, I respectfully request that the Court not only protect that information from
+disclosure but also dismiss this case to prevent exceptional harm to the national security of the
+United States.
+
+I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
+
+DATE: 3 April 2009
+
+DEBORAH A. BONANNI
+Chief of Staff
+National Security Agency
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//FORCON/NOFORN
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Bonanni_2009_Jewel_Declaration/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Bonanni_2009_Jewel_Declaration/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d117072
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Bonanni_2009_Jewel_Declaration/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+{
+ "title": "NSA Bonanni 2009 Jewel Declaration",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Classified declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni disclosing information regarding the government. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2009-04-03",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "TSP",
+ "SI"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "ORCON, NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Hertz, Michael F.",
+ "Letter, Douglas N.",
+ "Hunt, Joseph H.",
+ "Garvey, Vincent M.",
+ "Coppolino, Anthony J.",
+ "Bonanni, Deborah A.",
+ "Walker, Vaughn R.",
+ "Jewel, Carolyn"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-12-20",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/nsa-bonanni-2009-jewel-declaration",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "fc4dca8eb04146917d246ad7c6e38cf925f9d74e09dd45eec89f11908f1399a3",
+ "pages": 57
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Introduction/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Introduction.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Introduction/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Introduction.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..960a5fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Introduction/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Introduction.md
@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Version 13 (Final)
+Last Updated 09/07/11
+Includes SME pre-pilot feedback changes
+
+COURSE: (TS//SI//NF) OVSC1205 Special Training on FISA (Analytical)
+COURSE: (TS//SI//NF) OVSC1206 Special Training on FISA (Technical)
+**Module 0: Welcome to OVSC1205**
+
+DATE/PREPARER: 5/11/11 SLS | **Topic** | **Page Classification** | **Page Number** |
+
+FRAME ID: 0010
+
+NEXT FRAME ID: 0020
+
+BACK FRAME ID: n/a
+
+ALT TAG:
+
+GRAPHIC/AV: **Interface screen with highlights added to Home, Exit, Glossary, Back, Next, Slider, Audio, Replay, Start**
+
+**Text for Mouseovers**
+**Home** returns the lesson to its first screen.
+**Exit** closes the browser window.
+**Glossary button** Opens the Glossary in a browser window.
+
+**Topic**
+Analytical version:
+(U) Welcome to OVSC1205
+Technical version:
+(U) Welcome to OVSC1206
+**Home** **Exit** **Glossary** **Back** **Next**
+
+Analytical version:
+(TS//SI/NF) Welcome to the OVSC1205 Business Records (BR) and Pen Register Trap and Trace (PR/TT) FISA Training for Analytical Personnel
+
+Technical version:
+(TS//SI/NF) Welcome to the Business Records (BR) and Pen Register Trap and Trace (PR/TT) FISA Training for Technical Personnel
+
+(U) Hover your mouse over each of the highlighted items to preview its function
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Page 1 of 7
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20070108
+Declassify On: 20350501
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+**Back** navigates backward through the topic screens.
+**Next** navigates forward through the topic screens.
+**Screen Count Display Area** The current screen number and the total number of screens for the current lesson display here.
+**Animation Slider Bar** A slider bar to fast forward and back up the animation.
+**Mute** Toggles the audio off or on.
+**Replay** Starts the animation and audio over from the beginning.
+**Play/Pause** Starts or pauses the animation and audio.
+
+For the Analytical Track audio file name OVSC_1205_M0_0010_A
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): Welcome to the OVSC1205 Business Records (BR) and Pen Register Trap and Trace (PR/TT) Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Training Course for Analytical Personnel. The overall classification of this course is TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN.
+
+(U) Before we begin, let's take a few minutes to become familiar with the training interface. Hover your mouse over each of the highlighted items to preview its function.
+
+For the Technical Track audio file name OVSC_1206 M0_0010 T
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): Welcome to the OVSC1206 Business Records (BR) and Pen Register Trap and Trace (PR/TT) Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Training Course for Technical Personnel. The overall classification of this course is TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN.
+
+(U) Before we begin, let's take a few minutes to become familiar with the training interface. Hover your mouse over each of the highlighted items to preview its function.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Page 2 of 7
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+**DATE/PREPARER:** 5/11/11 SLS | **Topic** | **Page Classification** | **Page Number**
+
+This course provides an overview of various aspects of the Bulk Metadata Programs under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The overall classification of the course is TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN. You are currently on **Module 0: Welcome to OVSC1205/1206**. There are five core modules in this course and an additional Module 6 depending on your work role.
+
+This page shows the **Core Modules** for the course. They are:
+1. (TS//SI//NF) Business Records (BR) and Pen Register Trap and Trace (PR/TT) Bulk Metadata Programs
+2. (TS//SI//NF) BR and PR/TT Metadata
+3. (U) Establishing Reasonable Articulable Suspension (RAS)
+4. (TS//SI//NF) Access, Sharing, Dissemination, and Retention Under the BR and PR/TT FISC Orders
+5. (U) The Analytical and Technical Work Roles
+
+(Insert the applicable Analytical or Technical Track paragraph here)
+
+**For the Analytical Track audio file name OVSC_1205_M0_0020_A**
+(TS//SI//NF) Because you are in an analytical role, or you are supervising staff in an analytical role, Module 6 of this course is designed with content specific to your needs in support of the BR and PR/TT Bulk Metadata Programs. Those in a technical role, or supervising staff in a technical role, will complete a separate version of the course designed with content specific to their needs in support of the BR and PR/TT Bulk Metadata Programs. Upon completion of the modules, you will be required to successfully complete a final exam. Further instructions regarding the exam will be provided later in the course.
+
+**For the Technical Track audio file name OVSC_1206_M0_0020_T**
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): This course will take you on a road trip, and along our journey we will learn about various topics with respect to the BR and PR/TT Bulk Metadata Programs. The first part of this course consists of a set of five core modules including:
+1. (TS//SI//NF) Module 1: Business Records (BR) and Pen Register Trap and Trace (PR/TT) Bulk Metadata Programs
+2. (TS//SI//NF) Module 2: BR and PR/TT Metadata
+3. (U) Module 3: Establishing Reasonable Articulable Suspicion (RAS)
+4. (TS//SI//NF) Module 4: Access, Sharing, Dissemination, and Retention Under the BR and PR/TT FISC Orders, and
+5. (U) Module 5: The Analytical and Technical Work Roles
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Page 3 of 7
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+(TS//SI//NF) Because you are in a technical work role, or you are supervising staff in a technical work role, Module 6 of this course is designed with content specific to your needs in support of the BR and PR/TT Bulk Metadata Programs. Those in an analytical role, or supervising staff in an analytical role, will complete a separate version of the course designed with content specific to their needs in support of the BR and PR/TT Bulk Metadata Programs. Upon completion of the modules, you will be required to successfully complete a final exam. Further instructions regarding the exam will be provided later in the course.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Page 4 of 7
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+**DATE/PREPARER:** 5/11/11 SLS | **Topic** | **Page Classification** | **Page Number**
+
+**Page Classification:**
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+**Page Number:**
+1 of 4
+
+**DATE/PREPARER:** 5/11/11 SLS
+
+**FRAME ID:** 0030
+
+**NEXT FRAME ID:** 0040
+
+**BACK FRAME ID:** 0020
+
+**ALT TAG:**
+
+**GRAPHIC/AV:**
+
+**Topic**
+(U) Navigating the Course
+
+**Home** **Exit** **Glossary** **Back** **Next**
+
+(U) Core Modules
+1. (TS//SI//NF) Business Records (BR) and Pen Register Trap and Trace (PR/TT) Bulk Metadata Programs
+2. (TS//SI//NF) BR and PR/TT Metadata
+3. (U) Establishing Reasonable Articulable Suspicion (RAS)
+4. (TS//SI//NF) Access, Sharing, Dissemination, and Retention Under the BR and PR/TT FISC Orders
+5. (U) The Analytical and Technical Work Roles
+
+For the Analytical Track
+6. (U) The Analytical Work Role
+
+For the Technical Track
+6. (U) The Technical Work Role
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): This course will take you on a road trip, and along our journey we will learn about various topics with respect to the BR and PR/TT Bulk Metadata Programs. The first part of this course consists of a set of five core modules including:
+1. (TS//SI//NF) Module 1: Business Records (BR) and Pen Register Trap and Trace (PR/TT) Bulk Metadata Programs
+2. (TS//SI//NF) Module 2: BR and PR/TT Metadata
+3. (U) Module 3: Establishing Reasonable Articulable Suspicion (RAS)
+4. (TS//SI//NF) Module 4: Access, Sharing, Dissemination, and Retention Under the BR and PR/TT FISC Orders, and
+5. (U) Module 5: The Analytical and Technical Work Roles
+
+(Insert the applicable Analytical or Technical Track paragraph here)
+
+**For the Analytical Track audio file name OVSC_1205_M0_0020_A**
+(TS//SI//NF) Because you are in an analytical role, or you are supervising staff in an analytical role, Module 6 of this course is designed with content specific to your needs in support of the BR and PR/TT Bulk Metadata Programs. Those in a technical role, or supervising staff in a technical role, will complete a separate version of the course designed with content specific to their needs in support of the BR and PR/TT Bulk Metadata Programs. Upon completion of the modules, you will be required to successfully complete a final exam. Further instructions regarding the exam will be provided later in the course.
+
+**For the Technical Track audio file name OVSC_1206_M0_0020_T**
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Page 3 of 7
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+(TS//SI//NF) Because you are in a technical work role, or you are supervising staff in a technical work role, Module 6 of this course is designed with content specific to your needs in support of the BR and PR/TT Bulk Metadata Programs. Those in an analytical role, or supervising staff in an analytical role, will complete a separate version of the course designed with content specific to their needs in support of the BR and PR/TT Bulk Metadata Programs. Upon completion of the modules, you will be required to successfully complete a final exam. Further instructions regarding the exam will be provided later in the course.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Page 4 of 7
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+**DATE/PREPARER:** 5/11/11 SLS | **Topic** | **Page Classification** | **Page Number**
+
+**Topic:**
+(U) Introduction to the OVSC1205 Characters
+(U) Introduction to the OVSC1206 Characters
+
+**Home** **Exit** **Glossary** **Back** **Next**
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): I would also like to take a moment to introduce myself, my name is Nancy, and I am one of the Attorneys in the National Security Agency (NSA) Office of General Counsel (OGC). I am your first tour guide on this road trip, and I will be introducing you to many of the concepts you will need to know as you support the BR and PR/TT Bulk Metadata Programs. Now, let's meet the other tour guides.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (HMC Character): My name is Marvin, and I am one of the Homeland Mission Coordinators (or HMCs) in the CounterTerrorism (CT) Production Center. I will be introducing concepts related to establishing Reasonable Articulable Suspicion (or RAS), querying the metadata, and other topics pertinent to analytical and technical staff supporting the BR and PR/TT Programs.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (SV Character): My name is John, and I work in the Signals Intelligence Directorate (or SID) Office of Oversight and Compliance (or SV). I will be discussing topics related to compliance aspects of the BR and PR/TT Programs.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (Technical Character): My name is Diana, and I will be discussing topics specifically related to the technical support provided to all aspects of
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Page 5 of 7
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+the BR and PR/TT Programs. The essential support provided by the technical personnel enables all of the roles to perform their BR- and PR/TT-related work in compliance with applicable legal documents and relevant authorities.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Page 6 of 7
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+**DATE/PREPARER:** 5/11/11 SLS | **Topic** | **Page Classification** | **Page Number**
+
+**Topic:**
+(U) Next Step
+
+**Home** **Exit** **Glossary** **Home** **Exit**
+
+**FRAME ID:** 0040
+
+**NEXT FRAME ID:** n/a
+
+**BACK FRAME ID:** 0030
+
+**ALT TAG:**
+
+**GRAPHIC/AV:**
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): So let's get started on our road trip.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Page 7 of 7
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Introduction/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Introduction/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..05d5980
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Introduction/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+{
+ "title": "NSA Course Materials: Introduction",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Introduction to 2011 NSA Course Materials regarding the agency’s metadata collection programs under Sections 501 and 402 of FISA. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [
+ "training",
+ "students",
+ "analysts",
+ "personnel",
+ "teaching"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2011-09-07",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-18",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/nsa-course-materials-introduction",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [
+ {
+ "id": "ODNI_-_CLEANEDOVSC1205_1206_L0_storyboard_v13_Final"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "c2ccf14a5c9c1e07911520ac8aeb4f46644510e9a214c9fdd7f87285875423fa",
+ "pages": 7
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_1/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_1.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_1/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_1.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6aec52c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_1/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_1.md
@@ -0,0 +1,499 @@
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Version 17 (Final)
+Last Updated 09/07/11
+Includes CAO Review feedback
+
+COURSE: (TS//SI//NF) OVSC1205 Special Training on FISA (Analytical)
+COURSE: (TS//SI//NF) OVSC1206 Special Training on FISA (Technical)
+Module 1: (TS//SI//NF) Business Records (BR) and Pen Register Trap and Trace (PR/TT) Bulk Metadata Programs
+
+DATE/PREPARER: TAP
+Topic
+(U) Module
+Introduction
+Page Classification
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Screen Number
+1 of 12
+
+Home | Exit | Glossary | Next
+
+FRAME ID: 1010
+
+(U) MODULE 1
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Business Records (BR) and Pen Register Trap and Trace (PR/TT) Bulk Metadata Programs
+
+NEXT FRAME ID: 1020
+
+BACK FRAME ID: n/a
+
+ALT TAG:
+
+GRAPHIC/AV:
+(U) Present learning objectives in the travel journal
+
+(U) This module will enable you to:
+* (TS//SI//NF) Identify the purpose of the BR and PR/TT Bulk Metadata Programs
+* (TS//SI//NF) Identify the [REDACTED] Foreign Powers covered by the BR and PR/TT Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) Orders
+* (TS//SI//NF) Contrast the differences in the authorities granted between BR FISC Orders and PR/TT FISC Orders
+* (TS//SI//NF) Recognize the role of the Bulk Metadata Programs in the context of the broader set of SIGINT authorities
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): During the first part of our road trip we will discuss the Business Records (BR) and Pen Register Trap and Trace (PR/TT) Bulk Metadata Programs at a high level. As we progress on our road trip, we will discuss various aspects of the authorities granted by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) which support the BR and PR/TT programs and the policies that NSA implements to provide reasonable assurance that we are compliant with these authorities.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 1 of 14
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20070108
+Declassify On: 20350501
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+(U) This module will enable you to:
+* (TS//SI//NF) Identify the purpose of the BR and PR/TT Bulk Metadata Programs
+* (TS//SI//NF) Identify the [REDACTED] Foreign Powers covered by the BR and PR/TT Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) Orders
+* (TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED] in the authorities granted between BR FISC Orders and PR/TT FISC Orders
+* (TS//SI//NF) Recognize the role of the Bulk Metadata Programs in the context of the broader set of SIGINT authorities
+
+Scroll over text for foreign powers:
+(TS//SI//NF) Under the FISA statute, a foreign power can include “a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefore."
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 2 of 14
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+DATE/PREPARER: TAP
+Topic
+(TS//SI//NF) The Purpose of
+the Bulk Metadata Programs
+Page Classification
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Screen Number
+2 of 12
+
+Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next
+
+FRAME ID: 1020
+
+NEXT FRAME ID: 1030
+
+BACK FRAME ID: 1010
+
+ALT TAG:
+
+GRAPHIC/AV:
+(TS//SI//NF) Possible cutaway images may include:
+* images pertinent to telephony and internet communications, terrorism and counterterrorism, and legal iconography
+* image depicting notional storage of bulk metadata and U.S. person information
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The purpose of the BR and PR/TT Bulk Metadata Programs is to support the Counterterrorism mission.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): The BR and PR/TT programs are supported by two special authorities granted by the FISC which permit NSA to obtain telephony and internet communications bulk metadata from U.S.-based telecommunications service providers. The authority was granted by the FISC in support of the Counterterrorism mission to permit NSA to learn more about a terrorist target's communications, even those terrorists potentially located in the United States.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Bulk metadata consists of “unselected” communications events, and the BR and PR/TT Bulk Metadata Programs complement NSA’s traditional selection-based intelligence collection.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) As you can probably imagine, bulk internet and telephony metadata, acquired within the United States, contains information to, from, or about U.S. persons. Therefore, because there is unminimized U.S. person information included within this type of metadata, there are special rules and procedures we must follow when acquiring, processing, accessing, storing, sharing, and disseminating this information. This metadata is highly sensitive which is why we have this specialized training.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In this course we discuss the metadata we collect, how we collect it, what we are permitted to do with it as well as other special rules and procedures we must follow.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 3 of 14
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+DATE/PREPARER: TAP
+Topic
+(TS//SI//NF) Introduction to the BR
+and PR/TT Bulk Metadata Programs
+Page Classification
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Screen Number
+3 of 12
+
+Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next
+
+FRAME ID: 1030
+
+NEXT FRAME ID: 1040
+
+BACK FRAME ID: 1020
+
+ALT TAG:
+
+GRAPHIC/AV:
+(TS//SI//NF) Possible cutaway images may include:
+* images pertinent to telecommunications and internet communications, call records, emai[REDACTED]
+* image of metadata being [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): To get started, let's discuss the individual Bulk Metadata Programs. The BR Program pertains to the acquisition of telephony metadata. The associated FISC Order allows NSA to ask specific U.S.-based telecommunications service providers for their business records. The business records, also known as call detail records, contain information about phone calls.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The PR/TT program and associated FISC Order permits the collection of bulk Internet communications metadata. [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Under both these FISC orders, NSA is prohibited from acquiring communications content. Under these Programs, NSA may not listen to phone calls, or collect the body or subject of an email [REDACTED] about the communications. The Bulk Metadata authorities permit the [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In Module 2, we will explore how each type of metadata is obtained and what specific information each order permits NSA to collect.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 4 of 14
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+DATE/PREPARER: TAP
+Topic
+(U) "Touching" the data
+Page Classification
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Screen Number
+4 of 12
+
+Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next
+
+FRAME ID: 1040
+
+NEXT FRAME ID: 1050
+
+BACK FRAME ID: 1030
+
+ALT TAG:
+
+GRAPHIC/AV:
+(TS//SI//NF) Possible cutaway images may include:
+* images pertinent to querying data [REDACTED]
+* image of query results being shared, disseminated, and retained [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): Due to the sensitivity of the data and the desire to protect the privacy of U.S. persons, the FISC imposes restrictions on how we can touch the data. For the purposes of this course, by "touch” we mean any activity where there is an opportunity to commit a violation with regards to the Orders governing these authorities. We recognize that it takes a very diverse team of individuals working to see that the data is properly acquired, routed, prepared, stored, then queried, shared and disseminated. From acquisition to dissemination, including management and compliance, if you play a role in enabling this data to be used for its intelligence value, we consider you to be someone who "touches" this data.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) NSA's goal is to provide reasonable assurance that we are complying with the law AND making the most of these authorities to support the counterterrorism mission and protect the United States.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 5 of 14
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+DATE/PREPARER: TAP
+Topic
+(TS//SI//NF) Similarities in the BR
+and PR/TT Orders
+Page Classification
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Screen Number
+5 of 12
+
+Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next
+
+FRAME ID: 1050
+
+NEXT FRAME ID: 1055
+
+BACK FRAME ID: 1040
+
+ALT TAG:
+
+GRAPHIC/AV:
+(U) Possible cutaway images may include:
+* images that depict the similarities highlighted in the script
+* Foreign Powers
+* RAS
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): BR and PR/TT are two separate orders issued by the FISC, though the general access, sharing, dissemination, and retention rules are the same for the two programs. Those similarities are why the training for both is covered in this course. Additionally, both Orders target the same groups, referred to in the Orders as the Foreign Powers. The Foreign Powers named in the orders are [REDACTED].
+
+[REDACTED] Both the BR and PR/TT prog [REDACTED] Articulable Suspicion, or RAS, to gain approval to query the bulk metadata with an identifier. We will get into much more detail about these two topics in later modules.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 6 of 14
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+DATE/PREPARER: TAP
+Topic
+(TS//SI//NF) Differences in
+the BR and PR/TT Orders
+Page Classification
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Screen Number
+6 of 12
+
+Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next
+
+FRAME ID: 1055
+
+NEXT FRAME ID: 1060
+
+BACK FRAME ID: 1050
+
+ALT TAG:
+
+GRAPHIC/AV:
+(U) Possible cutaway images may include:
+* images that depict the differences highlighted in the script
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): There are two high level differences between the Orders as well. Details of the differences will be addressed in later modules, but at a basic level, the biggest difference between the two Programs is how the metadata is obtained. [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The other point where the Bulk Metadata Programs differ is in the area of hop restrictions for contact chaining. This will be described in detail in Module 4, but for now it is important to know that according to the Orders the hop restrictions are different for the BR and PR/TT Programs.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 7 of 14
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+DATE/PREPARER: TAP
+Topic
+(U) Updates to
+the Orders
+Page Classification
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Screen Number
+7 of 12
+
+Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next
+
+FRAME ID: 1060
+
+NEXT FRAME ID: 1070
+
+BACK FRAME ID: 1020
+
+ALT TAG:
+
+GRAPHIC/AV:
+(U) Possible cutaway images may include:
+* images pertinent to annual training
+* Images depicting orders being issued every 90 days
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): NSA must reapply to the FISC every 90 days to continue operating under these authorities. This process allows for the Government to seek modifications and for the FISC to update these authorities to reflect changes that may affect NSA's collection and handling of BR and PR/TT bulk metadata. It is also crucial that all factors associated with NSA's implementation of these programs are fully compliant with the FISC Orders and guidelines.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) As new orders are issued, this training may be augmented to address significant changes. Your organization will notify you if or when additional training is necessary. Should you have questions, you are strongly encouraged to contact your manager, Counterterrorism (CT) Homeland Security Analysis Center (HSAC), Technology Directorate (TD) Compliance, SID Oversight and Compliance, or the Office of General Counsel (OGC) for assistance and guidance.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 8 of 14
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+DATE/PREPARER: SLS
+Topic
+(U) The Role of the Bulk
+Metadata Programs
+Page Classification
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Screen Number
+8 of 12
+
+Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next
+
+FRAME ID: 1070
+
+(TS//SI//NF) NSA may perform SIGINT functions under various FISA authorities to include:
+* NSA FISA
+* FBI FISA
+* FAA Section 702
+* FAA Section 704
+* FAA Section 705(b)
+
+NEXT FRAME ID: 1075
+
+BACK FRAME ID: 1060
+
+ALT TAG:
+
+GRAPHIC/AV:
+
+(TS//SI//NF) BR and PR/TT Bulk Metadata Programs provide analysts with another opportunity to gain unique collection on a target
+
+(TS//SI//NF) By leveraging various collection authorities, analysts can fill existing knowledge gaps on their target
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): Now that you have a better understanding of what the BR and PR/TT Bulk Metadata Programs are, you may be wondering where these programs fit in the context of the broader set of SIGINT authorities.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Recall from OVSC1100, the Overview of Signals Intelligence Authorities, that we learned that in addition to E.O. 12333, NSA may perform SIGINT functions under various FISA authorities to include NSA FISA, FBI FISA, FISA Amendments Act (FAA) Section 702, 704, and 705(b). While there are specific rules governing when and how these authorities may be applied, each of these authorities has the potential to provide a valuable and unique complement to our E.O. 12333 collection resources. Similarly, the BR and PR/TT Bulk Metadata Programs provide analysts with another opportunity to gain unique collection on a target. By leveraging as many of these various collection authorities available to them as permitted, analysts can fill existing knowledge gaps on their target.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) One prime example of how an analyst leveraged several of these collection authorities to close crucial knowledge gaps on a target occurred in Fall 2009, when a CT analyst pieced together information obtained from E.O. 12333, FAA 702, and BR FISA authorities to reveal a terrorist plot on the New York subway system, which was subsequently disrupted by the FBI.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 9 of 14
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+DATE/PREPARER: SLS
+Topic
+(U) The Role of the Bulk
+Metadata Programs (cont.)
+Page Classification
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Screen Number
+9 of 12
+
+Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next
+
+FRAME ID: 1075
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Similarities between SPCMA and BR & PR/TT
+* (TS//SI//NF) Both involve exclusively metadata
+* (TS//SI//NF) Both allow for querying of U.S. person identifiers under specific circumstances
+
+NEXT FRAME ID: 1080
+
+BACK FRAME ID: 1070
+
+ALT TAG:
+
+GRAPHIC/AV:
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Differences between SPCMA and BR & PR/TT
+* (TS//SI//NF) Source of the metadata
+ * SPCMA procedures apply to metadata already lawfully collected under E.O. 12333, NSA FISA, FBI FISA, FAA 702, 704, and 705(b) authorities
+ * BR and PR/TT programs authorize the acquisition of unselected, bulk metadata
+* (TS//SI//NF) To query the metadata:
+ * SPCMA requires valid and documented foreign intelligence purpose
+ * BR and PR/TT require RAS-approved identifier for a limited target set
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): It is also important to understand what the BR and PR/TT Bulk Metadata programs are not. You may have heard of SPCMA the Supplemental Procedures Governing Communications Metadata Analysis. They allow NSA to treat communications metadata differently than content in the course of the analysis of communications metadata already lawfully collected under E.O. 12333, NSA FISA, FBI FISA, FAA 702, 704, and 705(b) authorities. Specifically, given a valid and documented foreign intelligence purpose, these new procedures permit contact chaining, [REDACTED] communications metadata identifier, irrespective of nationality or location, in order to follow or discover valid foreign intelligence targets. What SPCMA and the BR and PR/TT programs have in common, then, is that they both exclusively involve metadata, and allow for queries of identifiers belonging to U.S. persons.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Unlike SPCMA, however, the BR and PR/TT Programs authorize the acquisition of unselected, bulk metadata. Because of the sensitivity of this metadata, it may only be queried with identifiers for which RAS exists to believe that the identifier is directly associated with the Foreign Powers specified in the Court Order granted by the FISC. You will learn much more about the RAS standard in Module 3.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 10 of 14
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+DATE/PREPARER:
+Topic
+(U) Knowledge
+Check
+Page Classification
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Screen Number
+10 of 12
+
+Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next
+
+FRAME ID: 1080
+
+(U) Knowledge Check
+
+NEXT FRAME ID: 1081
+
+BACK FRAME ID: 1070
+
+ALT TAG:
+
+GRAPHIC/AV:
+(U) Knowledge checks in the travel journal
+
+1. (TS//SI//NF) What is the purpose of the BR and PR/TT Bulk Metadata Programs?
+ a) (TS//SI//NF) To permit NSA to learn more about a terrorist target's communications, even those terrorists potentially located in the United States
+ b) (TS//SI//NF) To give NSA the authority to collect and analyze the content of foreign and domestic terrorist telecommunications traffic
+ c) (TS//SI//NF) To enable NSA to more effectively collect and analyze telephony and internet communications metadata associated with the [REDACTED]
+ d) (U) All of the above
+
+2. (TS//SI//NF) The BR and PR/TT Bulk Metadata Programs enable NSA to query identifiers related to...
+ a) All terrorists regardless of their affiliation and origin.
+ b) Terrorists/terrorist groups associated with [REDACTED] Foreign Powers, [REDACTED]
+ c) Any foreign intelligence target.
+ d) Terrorists/terrorist groups associated with [REDACTED]
+
+(U) (OGC Attorney): Let's make a few notes in our travel journal and check to see what you remember from this topic!
+
+ANSWERS:
+Question 1: (TS//SI//NF) Correct! The purpose of the BR and PR/TT Bulk Metadata Programs is to permit NSA to learn more about a terrorist target's communications, even those terrorists potentially located in the United States.
+(TS//SI//NF) Incorrect. The correct answer is a). The purpose of the BR and PR/TT Bulk Metadata Programs is to permit NSA to learn more about a terrorist target's communications, even those terrorists potentially located in the United States.
+
+Question 2: (TS//SI//NF) Correct! The BR and PR/TT Bulk Metadata Programs enable NSA to query identifiers related to terrorists/terrorist groups who fall under [REDACTED] Foreign Powers [REDACTED]
+(TS//SI//NF) Incorrect. The correct answer is b). The BR and PR/TT Bulk Metadata Programs enable NSA to query identifiers related to terrorists/terrorist groups who fall under [REDACTED] Foreign Powers [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 11 of 14
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+DATE/PREPARER:
+Topic
+(U) Knowledge
+Check
+Page Classification
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Screen Number
+11 of 12
+
+Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next
+
+FRAME ID: 1081
+
+(U) Knowledge Check
+
+NEXT FRAME ID: 1090
+
+BACK FRAME ID: 1080
+
+ALT TAG:
+
+GRAPHIC/AV:
+(U) Knowledge checks in the travel journal
+
+3. (TS//SI//NF) One of the differences between BR and PR/TT is that the [REDACTED] is composed of call detail records delivered by the telecommunications providers, while the [REDACTED] must be processed/extracted from live, streaming Internet communications.
+ a) bulk metadata, PR/TT metadata
+ b) PR/TT metadata, bulk metadata
+ c) PR/TT metadata, BR metadata
+ d) BR metadata, PR/TT metadata
+
+4. (TS//SI//NF) Which of the following is true of BR and PR/TT and not other authorities?
+ a) (TS//SI//NF) In the BR and PR/TT authorities, NSA is authorized to obtain metadata in bulk from U.S.-based telecommunications service providers that may not be available from other collection sources, and NSA can only query that metadata for counter proliferation purposes.
+ b) (TS//SI//NF) In the BR and PR/TT authorities, NSA is authorized to obtain content from U.S.-based telecommunications service providers that may not be available from other collection sources, and NSA can only query that content for counterterrorism purposes.
+ c) (TS//SI//NF) In the BR and PR/TT authorities, NSA is authorized to obtain metadata in bulk from U.S.-based telecommunications service providers that may not be available from other collection sources, and NSA can only query that metadata for counterterrorism purposes.
+ d) (TS//SI//NF) In the BR and PR/TT authorities, NSA is authorized to obtain metadata in bulk from foreign telecommunications service providers that may not be available from other collection sources, and NSA can query that intelligence for any foreign intelligence purpose.
+
+(No audio or transcript on this page)
+
+ANSWERS:
+Question 3. (TS//SI//NF) Correct! One of the differences between BR and PR/TT is [REDACTED]
+(TS//SI//NF) Incorrect. The correct answer is d). One of the differences between BR and PR/TT is that [REDACTED]
+
+Question 4: (TS//SI//NF) Correct! In the BR and PR/TT authorities, NSA is authorized to obtain metadata in bulk from U.S.-based telecommunications
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 12 of 14
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+service providers that may not be available from other collection sources, and NSA can only query that metadata for counterterrorism purposes.
+(TS//SI//NF) Incorrect. The correct answer is c). In the BR and PR/TT authorities, NSA is authorized to obtain metadata in bulk from U.S.-based telecommunications service providers that may not be available from other collection sources, and NSA can only query that metadata for counterterrorism purposes.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 13 of 14
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+DATE/PREPARER: TAP
+Topic
+(U) Summary
+Page Classification
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Screen Number
+12 of 12
+
+Home | Exit | Glossary | Back
+
+FRAME ID: 1090
+
+(U//FOUO) Now that we have completed this module, you should be able to:
+* (TS//SI//NF) Identify the purpose of the BR and PR/TT Bulk Metadata Programs
+* (TS//SI//NF) Identify the [REDACTED] Foreign Powers covered by the BR and PR/TT Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) Orders
+* (TS//SI//NF) Contrast the differences in the authorities granted between BR FISC Orders and PR/TT FISC Orders
+* (TS//SI//NF) Recognize the role of the Bulk Metadata Programs in the context of the broader set of SIGINT authorities
+
+NEXT FRAME ID: N/A
+
+BACK FRAME ID: 1080
+
+ALT TAG:
+
+GRAPHIC/AV:
+(U) Review learning objectives in the travel journal
+
+(U//FOUO) (OGC Attorney): Now that we have completed the first part of our road trip, you should be able to:
+* (TS//SI//NF) Identify the purpose of the BR and PR/TT Bulk Metadata Programs
+* (TS//SI//NF) Identify the [REDACTED] Foreign Powers covered by the BR and PR/TT Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) Orders
+* (TS//SI//NF) Contrast the differences in the authorities granted between BR FISC Orders and PR/TT FISC Orders
+* (TS//SI//NF) Recognize the role of the Bulk Metadata Programs in the context of the broader set of SIGINT authorities
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 14 of 14
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_1/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_1/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..be66473
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_1/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+{
+ "title": "NSA Course Materials: Module 1",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Module 1 of 2011 NSA Course Materials regarding the agency’s metadata collection programs under Sections 501 and 402 of FISA. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [
+ "training",
+ "students",
+ "analysts",
+ "personnel",
+ "teaching"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2011-09-07",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "SI"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-18",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/nsa-course-materials-module-1",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [
+ {
+ "id": "ODNI_-_CLEANEDOVSC1205_L1_storyboard_v17_Final"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "907d5fa445aea0deb1cdea1dea479495740a6fecf0c179a7fc701c96af41a498",
+ "pages": 14
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_2/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_2.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_2/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_2.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8050955
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_2/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_2.md
@@ -0,0 +1,304 @@
+## Page 1
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+* **Version:** 16 (Final)
+* **Last Updated:** 10/11/11
+* **Includes:** CAO feedback changes
+
+**COURSE:** (TS//SI//NF) OVSC1205 Special Training on FISA (Analytical)
+**COURSE:** (TS//SI//NF) OVSC1206 Special Training on FISA (Technical)
+**Module 2:** (TS//SI//NF) BR and PR/TT Metadata
+
+**DATE/PREPARER:** TAP
+**Topic:** (U) Module Introduction
+**Page Classification:** TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+**Screen Number:** 1 of 11
+
+(U) MODULE 2
+
+(TS//SI//NF) BR and PR/TT Metadata
+
+(U) This module will enable you to:
+* (TS//SI//NF) Distinguish differences between BR and PR/TT metadata
+* (TS//SI//NF) Recognize restrictions placed on BR and PR/TT metadata storage and retention by the BR and PR/TT Bulk Metadata Programs
+
+GRAPHIC/AV:
+(U) Present learning objectives in the travel journal
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): During this part of our trip we discuss the BR and PR/TT metadata in greater detail. Specifically, we look at the metadata which may be obtained, how bulk metadata is collected under these authorities, and the storage restrictions with which NSA must comply. Other modules will address restrictions related to the dissemination and processing of the bulk metadata.
+
+(U) This module will enable you to:
+* (TS//SI//NF) Distinguish differences between BR and PR/TT metadata
+* (TS//SI//NF) Recognize restrictions placed on BR and PR/TT metadata storage and retention by the BR and PR/TT Bulk Metadata Programs
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Note that other restrictions will be addressed in other modules.
+
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20070108
+Declassify On: 20350501
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 1 of 12
+
+## Page 2
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+**DATE/PREPARER:** TAP
+**Topic:** (TS//SI//NF) Differences Between BR and PR/TT Metadata
+**Page Classification:** TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+**Screen Number:** 2 of 11
+
+GRAPHIC/AV:
+(U) Possible cutaway images may include:
+* Image depicting telephony and internet communications
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): One of the key differences between BR and PR/TT metadata is the type of metadata that each Order permits NSA to obtain as well as the [REDACTED] This lesson will focus specifically on the kinds of metadata and [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 2 of 12
+
+## Page 3
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+**DATE/PREPARER:** TAP
+**Topic:** (TS//SI//NF) BR Bulk Metadata Program
+**Page Classification:** TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+**Screen Number:** 3 of 11
+
+(TS//SI//NF) These Business Records Include Examples Such As:
+* Originating and terminating telephone numbers
+* IMEI
+* Trunk identifiers
+* Telephone calling card numbers
+
+GRAPHIC/AV:
+(U) Possible cutaway images may include:
+* images pertinent to telecommunications and records, messaging such as billing
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): Let's take a look at the BR Bulk Metadata Program. As we mentioned in Module 1, the BR Primary Order pertains specifically to telephony metadata which is kept by U.S.-based telecommunications companies as part of their normal business operations. They retain this information, in part, so they can send their subscribers a bill every month.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The business records include, for example, originating and terminating telephone numbers, International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI), International Mobile Station Equipment Identity (IMEI), trunk identifiers, and telephone calling card numbers.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 3 of 12
+
+## Page 4
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+**DATE/PREPARER:** TAP
+**Topic:** (TS//SI//NF) BR Bulk Metadata Program (cont.)
+**Page Classification:** TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+**Screen Number:** 4 of 11
+
+(TS//SI//NF) These Business Records Do Not Include:
+* Content of any communication
+* Name, address, or financial information of a subscriber or customer
+
+GRAPHIC/AV:
+(U) Possible cutaway images may include:
+* images pertinent to querying metadata producing contact chaining diagrams and other query formats
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): As you can imagine, NSA is interested in the same kinds of telephony information for [REDACTED] and contact chaining analysis. Because these business records, also known as call detail records (CDRs), are retained by the U.S.-based telecommunication companies as part of their normal business operations [REDACTED] However, the FISC stipulates that we are not permitted to obtain the content of an [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Next we will take a look at the PR/TT Bulk Metadata Program, which allows NSA to collect internet communications metadata [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 4 of 12
+
+## Page 5
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+**DATE/PREPARER:** TAP
+**Topic:** (TS//SI//NF) PR/TT Bulk Metadata Program
+**Page Classification:** TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+**Screen Number:** 5 of 11
+
+GRAPHIC/AV:
+(TS//SI//NF) Possible cutaway images may include:
+* images that depict [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): In the case of Internet communications, there are no easily accessible comparable business records that could provide NSA with the kind of information in which we are interested. Subscribers do not receive a bill based on who they email [REDACTED] In order to acquire the bulk metadata for internet communications, the FISC permits NSA to [REDACTED] PR/TT metadata and forward it back to NSA for analysis.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) As we discussed in Module 1, NSA is not permitted to collect communications content under either of these Orders, so [REDACTED] in such a way as to exclude content.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 5 of 12
+
+## Page 6
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+**DATE/PREPARER:** TAP
+**Topic:** (TS//SI//NF) PR/TT Bulk Metadata Program (cont.)
+**Page Classification:** TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+**Screen Number:** 6 of 11
+
+(TS//SI//NF) For example, FISC requirements that affect PR/TT include:
+* Which U.S.-based telecommunications [REDACTED]
+* The specific [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
+* The types of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
+* Which specific [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): The FISC goes into great detail in the Orders about many aspects of the collection to provide reasonable assurance that NSA is not overreaching its authority.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) For example, FISC requirements that affect PR/TT include:
+* Which U.S.-based telecommunications [REDACTED]
+* The specific [REDACTED]
+* The types of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
+* Which specific [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 6 of 12
+
+## Page 7
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+**DATE/PREPARER:** TAP
+**Topic:** (TS//SI//NF) PR/TT Bulk Metadata Program (cont.)
+**Page Classification:** TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+**Screen Number:** 7 of 11
+
+(REMOVE THE CLICK HERE BUTTON FROM THE PROGRAMMED MODULE)
+
+GRAPHIC/AV:
+(U) Possible cutaway images may include:
+* images pertinent to email and instant message
+* Images depicting some metadata being collected from a batch of larger metadata – illustrating an aspect of sorting
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In addition, [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 7 of 12
+
+## Page 8
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+**DATE/PREPARER:** TAP
+**Topic:** (TS//SI//NF) PR/TT Bulk Metadata Program (cont.)
+**Page Classification:** TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+**Screen Number:** 8 of 11
+
+(REMOVE THE CLICK HERE BUTTON FROM THE PROGRAMMED MODULE)
+
+GRAPHIC/AV:
+(U) Possible cutaway images may include:
+* [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Keep in mind that this PR/TT metadata is [REDACTED] Next, we will talk about the storage of both the BR and PR/TT metadata.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 8 of 12
+
+## Page 9
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+**DATE/PREPARER:** TAP
+**Topic:** (TS//SI//NF) Storage of the Bulk Metadata
+**Page Classification:** TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+**Screen Number:** 9 of 11
+
+GRAPHIC/AV:
+(U) Possible cutaway images may include:
+* images pertinent to storage
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): Both Orders mandate that the BR and PR/TT bulk metadata must be stored in repositories within secure networks under NSA's control. The methods for storing the results of approved queries of the bulk metadata will be explained in Module 4. BR and PR/TT bulk metadata may only be stored in authorized and specifically designated repositories, [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The FISC also requires NSA to mark and tag the BR and PR/TT metadata so that software and other control mechanisms may provide reasonable assurance that the information is only accessed by authorized personnel who have completed the required training and have the necessary credentials.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The bulk BR and PR/TT metadata coming into the repositories has an expiration date set by the FISC. NSA does not have the authority to maintain the unselected BR and PR/TT metadata indefinitely. The FISC permits NSA to maintain this metadata for 60 months from the date of collection at which time it must be destroyed.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 9 of 12
+
+## Page 10
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+**DATE/PREPARER:** TAP
+**Topic:** (U) Knowledge Check
+**Page Classification:** TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+**Screen Number:** 10 of 11
+
+GRAPHIC/AV:
+(U) Knowledge checks in the travel journal
+
+(U) Knowledge Check
+
+1. (TS//SI//NF) Which of the following describe the BR Bulk Metadata Program:
+ a) (TS//SI//NF) The BR Order pertains to telephony metadata which is kept by U.S.-based telecommunication companies.
+ b) (TS//SI//NF) BR refers to Business Records which is information U.S.-based telecommunications companies already have in their possession and use as part of their normal business.
+ c) (TS//SI//NF) NSA uses Business Record information such as terminating telephone numbers, IMSI, IMEI and trunk identifiers for [REDACTED] contact chaining analysis.
+ d) (U) All of the above.
+
+2. (TS//SI//NF) Which of the following does not describe the PR/TT Bulk Metadata Program?
+ a) (TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED]
+ b) (TS//SI//NF) NSA only collects limited metadata from the communications of approved targets.
+ c) (TS//SI//NF) NSA collects specific categories of metadata to include the "to," "from," "cc," and "bcc" lines of an email.
+ d) (U) None of the above.
+
+3. (TS//SI//NF) Which of the following statements is true?
+ a) (TS//SI//NF) Bulk BR and PR/TT metadata may not be kept for longer than 48 months.
+ b) (TS//SI//NF) Non-U.S. person metadata may be kept at NSA indefinitely.
+ c) (TS//SI//NF) The bulk metadata is tagged to provide reasonable assurance that the data is only accessed by authorized personnel.
+ d) (U) All of the above.
+ e) (U) None of the above.
+
+(U) (OGC Attorney): Let's check what you remember from this topic!
+
+ANSWERS:
+Question 1. (TS//SI//NF) Correct! All of the above describe the BR Bulk Metadata Program.
+(TS//SI//NF) Incorrect. The correct answer is d). All of the above describe the BR Bulk Metadata Program.
+
+Question 2. (TS//SI//NF) Correct! It is NOT TRUE that for the PR/TT Bulk Metadata Program NSA only collects limited metadata from the communications of approved targets. [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 10 of 12
+
+## Page 11
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Incorrect. The correct answer is b) because it is NOT TRUE that for the PR/TT Bulk Metadata Program NSA only collects limited metadata from the communications of approved targets.
+
+Question 3. (TS//SI//NF) Right! The bulk metadata is tagged to provide reasonable assurance that the data is only accessed by authorized personnel.
+(TS//SI//NF) Incorrect. The correct answer is c). The bulk metadata is tagged to provide reasonable assurance that the data is only accessed by authorized personnel.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 11 of 12
+
+## Page 12
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+**DATE/PREPARER:** TAP
+**Topic:** (U) Summary
+**Page Classification:** TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+**Screen Number:** 11 of 11
+
+(U) Now that we have completed this part of your trip, you should be able to:
+* (TS//SI//NF) Distinguish differences between BR and PR/TT Bulk Metadata Programs
+* (TS//SI//NF) Recognize restrictions placed on metadata storage and retention by the BR and PR/TT Bulk Metadata Programs
+
+GRAPHIC/AV:
+(U) Review learning objectives in the travel journal
+
+(U) (OGC Attorney): Now that we have completed this part of our trip, you should be able to:
+* (TS//SI//NF) Distinguish differences between BR and PR/TT Bulk Metadata Programs
+* (TS//SI//NF) Recognize restrictions placed on metadata storage and retention by the BR and PR/TT Bulk Metadata Programs
+
+(TS//SI//NF) During the next portion of our trip, we will meet up with Marvin who will talk to us about the Reasonable Articulable Suspicion (RAS) standard and the requirements that must be met in order to query the bulk metadata.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 12 of 12
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_2/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_2/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b79c026
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_2/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+{
+ "title": "NSA Course Materials: Module 2",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Module 2 of 2011 NSA Course Materials regarding the agency’s metadata collection programs under Sections 501 and 402 of FISA. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [
+ "training",
+ "students",
+ "analysts",
+ "personnel",
+ "teaching"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2011-10-11",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "SI"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-18",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/nsa-course-materials-module-2",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "97cec0f34100e03ab530c384fad788a156e575fa14614d59522413731bbb5a4a",
+ "pages": 12
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_3/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_3.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_3/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_3.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..466175b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_3/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_3.md
@@ -0,0 +1,557 @@
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN Version 22 (Final)
+Updated 10/17/11
+COURSE: (TS//SI//NF) OVSC1205 Special Training on FISA (Analytical) Includes CAO Review feedback
+COURSE: (TS//SI//NF) OVSC1206 Special Training on FISA (Technical)
+Module 3: (U) Establishing Reasonable Articulable Suspicion (RAS)
+
+DATE/PREPARER: 11/09/2010 SLS Topic Page Classification Screen Number
+(U) Module Introduction TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN 1 of 13
+Home Exit Glossary Next
+FRAME ID: 3010
+(U) Module 3
+
+(U) Establishing Reasonable Articulable Suspicion (RAS)
+
+NEXT FRAME ID: 3020 (U) This module will enable you to:
+(TS//SI//NF) Recognize the direct relationship between the Foreign Powers and
+establishing RAS
+BACK FRAME ID: n/a (TS//SI//NF) Identify the key components of RAS and how it is applied to candidate
+ALT TAG: identifiers
+GRAPHIC/AV: (TS//SI//NF) Identify who can adjudicate and approve a RAS nomination
+(U) Present learning objectives in the travel (TS//SI//NF) Recognize the requirement associated with identifiers linked to U.S.
+journal persons — the OGC First Amendment Review
+(TS//SI//NF) List common sources of information used to construct a RAS
+nomination statement
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): This part of our trip will provide you with an overview of the Reasonable Articulable Suspicion (RAS) Standard including
+definitions and descriptions to help you understand how to satisfy RAS and how to apply it to identifiers under the BR and PR/TT FISC Orders. In addition
+to this training, guidance is also outlined in a RAS memo that can be obtained from the Office of General Counsel.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) This module will enable you to:
+(TS//SI//NF) Recognize the direct relationship between the Foreign Powers and establishing RAS
+(TS//SI//NF) Identify the key components of RAS and how it is applied to candidate identifiers
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20070108
+Declassify On: 20350501
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 1 of 17
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Identify who can adjudicate and approve a RAS nomination
+(TS//SI//NF) Recognize the requirement associated with identifiers linked to U.S. persons — the OGC First Amendment Review
+(TS//SI//NF) List common sources of information used to construct a RAS nomination statement
+(TS//SI//NF) At the conclusion of this module you should understand that an identifier must be RAS-approved before conducting a query. The topic of
+querying BR and PR/TT bulk metadata will be discussed in Module 4.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 2 of 17
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+DATE/PREPARER: 11/09/2010 SLS Topic Page Classification Screen Number
+(TS//SI//NF) The Two TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN 2 of 13
+Foreign Powers
+Home Exit Glossary Back Next
+FRAME ID: 3020
+(TS//SI//NF) Who can be targeted under the BR and PR/TT authorities?
+
+NEXT FRAME ID: 3030 (TS//SI//NF) The Foreign [REDACTED] Foreign Powers named in these authorities are
+
+BACK FRAME ID: 3010
+
+ALT TAG: (TS//SI//NF) NSA is not permitted to query the BR and PR/TT metadata unless there is a
+reasonable articulable suspicion that the identifier is associated with one of the FISC-
+GRAPHIC/AV:
+(U) Insert graphics/animations to illustrate approved groups.
+the umbrella groups and their affiliated
+terrorist organizations
+(U) Add graphics to illustrate contact
+chaining, seeds, and hops.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): The BR and PR/TT Orders list by name the Foreign Powers that we are permitted to target under each authority. T
+Foreign Powers are The Orders list in great detail [REDACTED]
+NSA is not permitted to query the BR and PR/TT metadata unless there
+is a reasonable articulable suspicion that the identifier is associated with one of the FISC-approved groups.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) It is important to note that you cannot query using just any foreign intelligence target. Furthermore, you cannot query using just any terrorist
+target. You CAN however query using identifiers specifically linked to [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] as named in the Orders. Note that the lists may evolve and your target may be added or removed over time, so you should reference the
+most current version of the lists for updates.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 3 of 17
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+DATE/PREPARER: 11/09/2010 SLS Topic Page Classification Screen Number
+(U) What is RAS? TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN 3 of 13
+
+Home Exit Glossary Back Next
+FRAME ID: 3030
+(U) What is Reasonable Articulable Suspicion (RAS)?
+
+(U) Reasonable Articulable Suspicion (RAS) Standard
+
+NEXT FRAME ID: 3035 (TS//SI//NF) An identifier will meet the Reasonable Articulable Suspicion Standard if based on
+the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent
+persons act, there are facts giving rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion that the identifier is
+associated with one of the specified Foreign Powers.
+BACK FRAME ID: 3020
+— Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+ALT TAG:
+
+GRAPHIC/AV:
+(U) Display pop-up with the definition of
+RAS as it is discussed.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): The FISC recognizes the potential counterterrorism advantage gained through analysis of the BR and PR/TT bulk metadata;
+however, because there is a great deal of U.S. person information included in the bulk metadata, the FISC has set strict guidelines on when and how
+analysts can access the metadata under these authorities. The RAS standard is one of these guidelines which helps to provide reasonable assurance that
+only legitimate terrorism-related identifiers are used to query the bulk metadata. This standard must be met before queries can be conducted.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) So what is RAS? RAS is a legal standard that describes the measure of proof required to support a decision whether to permit an identifier to
+be queried from the bulk metadata. The Reasonable Articulable Suspicion standard requires just that-a suspicion that you can explain in a reasonable way.
+It does not require certainty, but is more concrete than a simple hunch. It may be easiest to think of it in terms of other standards with which you may be
+familiar.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Many of you may be familiar with legal standards of proof applicable in other situations. It may be helpful to understand how the RAS standard
+compares to these other legal standards. For example, a jury in a criminal case will not convict an accused unless the evidence of guilt is "beyond a
+reasonable doubt. “This is the highest legal standard of proof. A jury in a civil case (such as a personal injury case or a contract dispute) might award a
+plaintiff money damages if the plaintiff proves the elements of his claim by ”a preponderance of the evidence.” This standard is lower than "beyond a
+reasonable doubt.“ Lower still is the standard of proof required to justify issuance of a search warrant — ”probable cause” — whether that search warrant is
+for the suspect’s home or the content of the suspect's communications. The RAS standard falls below "probable cause.”
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 4 of 17
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The FISC has determined that this lower standard of proof is reasonable for the querying of metadata because communications metadata
+does not carry with it the same privacy protections as communications content. The RAS standard falls below "probable cause” but above a mere hunch or
+guess.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 5 of 17
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+DATE/PREPARER: 11/09/2010 SLS Topic Page Classification Screen Number
+(U) What is RAS? TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN 4 of 13
+
+Home Exit Glossary Back Next
+FRAME ID: 3035
+(U) The RAS Equation
+
+(U) (Continue to display definition of RAS then pull out the RAS Equation.)
+
+NEXT FRAME ID: 3040 Reasonable Articulable Suspicion (RAS) Standard
+
+(TS//SI//NF) An identifier will meet the Reasonable Articulable Suspicion Standard if based on
+the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent
+persons act, there are facts giving rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion that the identifier is
+BACK FRAME ID: 3030 associated with one of the specified Foreign Powers.”
+
+ALT TAG: — Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+GRAPHIC/AV: RAS Equation
+(U) Continue to display definition of RAS
+then pull out the RAS Equation. Identifier + Link to Foreign Power = RAS
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): As it applies to the BR and PR/TT Orders, RAS is a suspicion that an identifier, such as an email address, telephone number,
+or other identifier type, is associated with one of the [REDACTED] Foreign Powers named in BR and PR/TT Orders [REDACTED] The
+FISC requires that NSA base that suspicion on a certain level of factual evidence -- and NSA must articulate those facts that connect the identifier with one
+of the named terrorist organizations. The requirement that these facts be articulable effectively provides reasonable assurance that analyst queries of the
+metadata are based on substantive information (meaning more than simple hunches or uninformed guesswork). So in order to obtain RAS approval for an
+identifier, analysts must provide enough factual evidence that it would lead a reasonable person to suspect that an identifier is associated with one of the
+named Foreign Powers in the BR and PR/TT Orders. We will get more into the kinds of facts that may be used and how they can support a RAS
+nomination later in this module.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In summary, based on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life, where reasonable and prudent persons act, we must first
+determine if there is a reasonable articulable suspicion that the identifier is associated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] named in the Orders. There must be at least one qualifying fact giving rise to the suspicion that the identifier is associated
+with one of the Foreign Powers listed in the BR and PR/TT Orders. Unless that determination is made, the identifier cannot be approved to query this
+metadata repository. NSA’s implementation of the BR and PR/TT Orders mandates that the RAS nomination statement must clearly link the identifier/target
+to one of the Foreign Powers and document this finding in [REDACTED] which will be discussed later in the module.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 6 of 17
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+DATE/PREPARER: 11/09/2010 SLS Topic Page Classification Screen Number
+(U) Where Does RAS TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN 5 of 13
+Fit?
+Home Exit Glossary Back Next
+FRAME ID: 3040
+
+NEXT FRAME ID: 3050
+
+BACK FRAME ID: 3035
+ALT TAG:
+
+GRAPHIC/AV:
+(U) Analyst Level of Effort Required graphic
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (HMC Character): From an Analysis and Production standpoint, let’s look at RAS in the context of the analyst level of effort required to utilize
+BR and PR/TT and other SIGINT authorities. As the illustration shows, the level of effort required by an analyst to establish RAS would normally be
+considered less than that required for FBI CT FISA or FAA 704/705b, but it is more than what is needed to utilize E.O. 12333, for example.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 7 of 17
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+DATE/PREPARER: 11/09/2010 SLS Topic Page Classification Screen Number
+(U) Who Can Make RAS | TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN 6 of 13
+Determination?
+Home Exit Glossary Back Next
+FRAME ID: 3050
+(U) Who can make a RAS determination?
+
+NEXT FRAME ID: 3060
+(U) Who can make a RAS determination?
+
+• (U//FOUO) Homeland Mission Coordinators (HMCs)
+
+BACK FRAME ID: 3040 • (U//FOUO) Chief of the CT Homeland Security Analysis Center
+
+ALT TAG:
+• (U//FOUO) Deputy Chief of the CT Homeland Security Analysis
+GRAPHIC/AV: Center
+
+(U) No one else can make this determination!
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): The FISC states that the RAS decision is based on considerations of “reasonable and prudent persons.” This does not,
+however, mean that anyone can approve an identifier for RAS. There are a select number of people within NSA who have been given the authority to
+approve identifiers for querying under these two authorities. Those individuals are called Homeland Mission Coordinators or HMCs.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (HMC Character): As was just mentioned, RAS determinations are typically made by specially trained personnel in the Office of
+Counterterrorism and its Extended Enterprise; these individuals are titled Homeland Mission Coordinators, typically abbreviated as HMCs. These
+individuals, like me, have been given special training on how to apply the RAS standard and how to apply it consistently. HMCs are specially trained
+individuals who have extensive experience working with this target set and who have extensive experience working with these authorities. The HMCs can
+take a RAS nomination, review the facts, and make a determination as to whether or not that particular identifier meets the RAS standard.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (HMC Character): According to the BR and PR/TT Orders, in addition to the HMCs, the Chief and Deputy Chief of the Counterterrorism
+Homeland Security Analysis Center are authorized to make a RAS determination; although, it is generally the HMCs who make the RAS determinations. To
+reemphasize, no one else is authorized to make RAS determinations according to the Orders.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 8 of 17
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+DATE/PREPARER: 11/09/2010 SLS Topic Page Classification Screen Number
+(U) OGC Requirement to TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN 7 of 13
+Review U.S. Person
+Identifiers
+Home Exit Glossary Back Next
+FRAME ID: 3060
+(U) OGC Requirement to review U.S. person identifiers
+
+NEXT FRAME ID: 3070
+(U) First Amendment Rights
+Religion
+• Speech
+BACK FRAME ID: 3050 • The press
+• Peaceable assembly
+ALT TAG:
+• To petition the government for redress of grievances
+GRAPHIC/AV:
+(U) Use images from the OVSC1204
+course for the First Amendment Rights
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (HMC Character): There are certain identifiers that require an extra RAS review/approval step. As you might imagine, those are the identifiers
+that are reasonably believed to be used by U.S. persons. Why does this matter? It matters because the U.S. Government is forbidden from regarding a
+U.S. person as associated with a Foreign Power solely because he or she is exercising his or her First Amendment rights.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): That’s right. Any identifier believed to be used by a U.S. person must be forwarded to the OGC by a Homeland Mission
+Coordinator following his or her approval. An OGC attorney will review the RAS nomination, as well as the RAS decision made by the Homeland Mission
+Coordinator, and make a determination as to whether or not NSA is targeting that individual based solely on activities that are protected by the First
+Amendment to the Constitution. If there is any indication that the RAS is based solely on information or evidence protected somehow by the First
+Amendment, OGC will require additional information to support the RAS nomination.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (HMC Character): If you are an analyst, should you abandon a RAS nomination if there is a potential First Amendment concern? Absolutely
+not. The presence of First Amendment evidence does not invalidate a RAS, it just cannot be the sole basis for a nomination. The OGC review is really
+transparent to the analyst, though it is a part of the process that you should be aware of.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 9 of 17
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+DATE/PREPARER: 11/09/2010 SLS Topic Page Classification Screen Number
+(U) Sources of Information TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN 8 of 13
+Used to Jusitfy RAS
+Home Exit Glossary Back Next
+FRAME ID: 3070
+(U) What sources of information can be used to justify RAS?
+
+(TS//SI//NF) FISA Orders (TS//SI//NF) IC and Public Sector
+
+NEXT FRAME ID: 3080 Existing FISA Orders • Federal Bureau of Investigation documents
+• Central Intelligence Agency documents
+(TS//SI//NF) Reports and/or RAW • National Counterterrorism Center
+SIGINT documents
+BACK FRAME ID: 3060 • Documents from other U.S. Government
+SIGINT reports Organizations
+ALT TAG:
+FISA surveillance data derived from other • Foreign Partner nations
+GRAPHIC/AV: authorized targets • Public records available on the
+Raw SIGINT (after a Reporting Source internet, newspapers, or other public
+Validation Check) resources
+SIGDEV Work
+Other transcripts
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (HMC Character): So now let’s look at the type of evidence that can be used to justify RAS. NSA can use any information that is lawfully in our
+possession. A published SIGINT report describing the results of electronic surveillance of a target might be more reliable than say pocket litter found during
+a detainee’s interrogation -- but NSA can rely on any lawfully held evidence. The HMCs are responsible for assessing the quality and reliability of the
+evidence.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): Sources that are often used to justify a RAS nomination include, but are not limited to:
+• Existing FISA Orders
+• SIGINT reports
+• FISA surveillance data derived from other authorized targets
+• SIGINT traffic, as long as the submitting analyst has performed a Reporting Source Validation Check
+• SIGDEV work (with verified sources), and
+• Other transcripts
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): If an analyst/requestor uses unpublished query results in a RAS justification, and they classify the material appropriately as
+then that information will only be visible to those [REDACTED] users with [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] credentials, as confirmed
+via
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 10 of 17
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): The following IC and public sector (open source) sources are also examples of sources that are frequently used:
+• Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) documents
+• Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) documents
+• The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) documents
+• Documents from other U.S. Government Organizations
+• Foreign Partner nations, and
+• Public records available on the internet, newspapers, or other public resources.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 11 of 17
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+DATE/PREPARER: 11/09/2010 SLS Page Classification Screen Number
+(U) [REDACTED] TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN 9 of 13
+Home Exit Glossary Back Next
+FRAME ID: 3080
+(TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED] NSA’s RAS Identifier Management System
+
+NEXT FRAME ID: 3090
+
+BACK FRAME ID: 3070
+ALT TAG: (TS//SI//NF) Supports the Homeland Defense Counterterrorism (CT) Mission.
+(TS//SI//NF) Provides the ability to request, justify, review, approve/disapprove RAS
+GRAPHIC/AV: nominations/requests.
+E6\E62 Learning (TS//SI//NF) Is the authoritative source for the list of RAS-approved identifiers and will export that list to
+Technologies\NOFORN Course other systems that require it.
+Development\Requirement_196_OVS (TS//SI//NF) Provides metrics and other information to facilitate oversight review and report generation for
+C_1205_BR- the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the FISC.
+PRT T\Graphics [REDACTED] _txt40.jpg
+(U) Time Bounded Approvals
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (HMC Character): Remember from earlier in this module, we introduced the RAS process as a simple equation: identifier + link to Foreign
+Powers = RAS. Now you may be wondering how an identifier is nominated for RAS. NSA must demonstrate and document that ev [REDACTED] er used to
+query the bulk metadata meets the RAS standard PRIOR to querying the BR and PR/TT bulk metadata repositories. NSA created [REDACTED] the RAS
+identifier management tool, to streamline the adjudication of the RAS nomination statements and documentation of RAS determinations.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (HMC Character): Typically, an intelligence analyst will gather the necessary information and draft the nomination statement in IRONMAN
+articulating the RAS equation. An HMC, also using will review the nomination statement and approve or disapprove the request. If the
+nomination statement is for a U.S. person, the tool includes functionality that allows the HMCs to forward such requests to OGC for the required
+First Amendment review. In either case, if the RAS nomination is approved, the identifier is now authorized for querying.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): Through NSA [REDACTED] documents all RAS-approved identifiers, [REDACTED] as well as the rationale used to gain RAS approval.
+IRONMAN provides the ability to [REDACTED] stify, review, approve/disapprove RAS nominations. [REDACTED] is therefore the authoritative source for the list
+of RAS-approved identifiers, and [REDACTED] exports that list to other systems that require it.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): It is important to remember that copies of the documents, such as court orders or reports, are required as part of the
+nomination process. The paper trail should enable an auditor from Department of Justice (DOJ) to clearly evaluate all of the evidence presented to support
+a RAS decision.
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 12 of 17
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): NSA has overseers, specifically the DOJ National Security Division attorneys, who examine the factual support for our RAS
+decision process. They take a look at any notes that the HMCs or someone within the NSA OGC may have included, and they decide whether or not we
+have properly applied the RAS standard to all of the identifiers that are used to query the bulk metadata. So it is critical that we take great care throughout
+the process, gathering and presenting the evidence and applying the RAS standard in a consistent manner across all identifier nominations. [REDACTED]
+also provides metrics and other information to facilitate this oversight review and report generation for the DOJ and the FISC.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney) The Court recognizes that occasionally, NSA may have information suggesting that a target may have used a particular
+identifier only for a limited time. In such cases, an HMC can determine that the RAS standard is met for the specific timeframe that the identifier was
+believed to be used by the target. Such instances are considered Time Bounded and are uniquely dealt with in [REDACTED] Analysts encountering targets
+under these circumstances should consult with an HMC on how to proceed.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 13 of 17
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+DATE/PREPARER: 11/09/2010 SLS Topic Page Classification Screen Number
+(U) Lifespan of a RAS TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN 10 of 13
+Approval
+Home Exit Glossary Back Next
+FRAME ID: 3090
+(U) What is the Lifespan of a RAS Approval?
+
+- (TS//SI//NF) RAS determinations for foreign identifiers are legally effective for one
+year. NSA CT has implemented guidance that requires RAS review/re-approval every
+NEXT FRAME ID: 3100
+180 days.
+
+- (TS//SI//NF) Although a RAS determination for an identifier reasonably believed to be
+BACK FRAME ID: 3080 used by a United States person is legally effective for 180 days, NSA CT has
+ALT TAG: implemented guidance that requires RAS review/re-approval every 90 days.
+
+GRAPHIC/AV: (TS//SI//NF) After the sunset of an identifier’s RAS approval -- or anytime before -- the
+(U) Use a graphic to show effective dates identifier can be submitted for RAS revalidation through the same process.
+for U.S. and non-U.S. person RAS
+approval
+
+(U) (Show passing of time and then a
+graphic of an identifier with a “RAS-
+APPROVED” or “DENIED” applied over the
+identifier)
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (HMC Character): RAS approvals have sunset or expiration dates which analysts must comply with. Currently a RAS approval on a foreign
+identifier, per the FISC, is legally valid for one year. However, NSA CT has taken a conservative approach and implemented guidance that mandates RAS
+review and re-approval every 180 days. Likewise, a RAS approval for an identifier believed to be used by a U.S. person has a legal lifespan of 180 days
+per the FISC, but NSA CT has implemented guidance requiring review and re-approval every 90 days. It is the analyst’s responsibility to monitor the sunset
+dates and take appropriate actions before the RAS nomination expires.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (HMC Character): Any identifier can be resubmitted for revalidation at any time. Revalidations require proof of the same categories of
+information that was required for the original request. Revalidations should try to validate that the original evidence is still true by presenting any new
+documentation to demonstrate that the identifier is still associated with the Foreign Powers named in the Orders. It is up to the HMCs to make an informed
+revalidation, based on the totality of the evidence. If you are uncertain of your evidence, submit the nomination anyway and work with the HMCs through
+the process.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 14 of 17
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+DATE/PREPARER: 11/09/2010 TAP Topic Page Classification Screen Number
+(U) Knowledge TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN 11 of 13
+Check
+Home Exit Glossary Back Next
+FRAME ID: 3100 (U) Knowledge Check
+
+NEXT FRAME ID: 3110 1. (TS//SI//NF) Why is the link between the target and the Foreign Powers an essential part of the RAS
+nomination?
+a) (TS//SI//NF) It is a key component in reaching the ‘probable cause’ standard
+b) (TS//SI//NF) It is representative of the terrorist centric scope of the BR and PR/TT authorities
+as noted in the FISC Orders
+BACK FRAME ID: 3090 c) (U) Because it is required by USSID SP0018 and DoD 5240.1-R
+d) (U) Because it is required in a DIRNSA Memo
+ALT TAG:
+
+GRAPHIC/AV: 2. (TS//SI//NF) The RAS standard requires that what two facts are articulable?
+a) (TS//SI//NF) The identifier can be tied to a terrorist target and that target can be tied to
+
+b) (TS//SI//NF) The identifier is not used by a U.S. person and they are engaged in terrorist
+activities
+c) (TS//SI//NF) The identifier can be tied to a target and that target is affiliated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+d) (TS//SI//NF) The query can be traced back to the analyst who submitted it and the identifier is
+associated with any terrorist group.
+(U) (HMC Character): Let’s check what you remember from this topic!
+
+ANSWERS:
+Question 1: (TS//SI//NF) Correct! The link between the target and the Foreign Powers is an essential part of the RAS nomination because it is
+representative of the terrorist centric scope of the BR and PR/TT authorities as noted in the FISC Orders.
+(TS//SI//NF) Incorrect. The correct answer is b). The link between the target and the Foreign Powers is an essential part of the RAS nomination because it
+is representative of the terrorist centric scope of the BR and PR/TT authorities as noted in the FISC Orders.
+
+Question 2: (TS//SI//NF) Correct! The RAS standard requires that the following two facts are articulable:
+The identifier can be tied to a terrorist target, and
+That target can be tied to [REDACTED]
+(TS//SI//NF) Incorrect. The correct answer is a). The RAS standard requires that the following two facts are articulable:
+The identifier can be tied to a terrorist target, and
+That target can be tied to [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 15 of 17
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+DATE/PREPARER: 11/09/2010 TAP Topic Page Classification Screen Number
+(U) Knowledge TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN 12 of 13
+Check
+Home Exit Glossary Back Next
+FRAME ID: 3110 (U) Knowledge Check
+
+NEXT FRAME ID: 3120 3. (TS//SI//NF) Who may make a RAS determination?
+a) (TS//SI//NF) A Homeland Mission Coordinator (HMC) or an attorney with the Department of
+Justice
+b) (TS//SI//NF) An HMC or other official named in the Orders
+c) (TS//SI//NF) Any reasonable and prudent analyst (and OGC if identifier is believed to be used by
+BACK FRAME ID: 3100 a U.S. person)
+ALT TAG: d) (TS//SI//NF) Only a judge from the FISC
+
+GRAPHIC/AV: 4. (TS//SI//NF) Which source of information may be used to justify RAS?
+(U) Knowledge checks in the travel journal a) (TS//SI//NF) SIGINT reports
+b) (TS//SI//NF) Open source information
+c) (TS//SI//NF) Second Party reports
+d) (TS//SI//NF) All of the above
+
+5. (TS//SI//NF) What additional requirement is needed for an identifier reasonably believed to be used by a
+U.S. person?
+a) (TS//SI//NF) Must be reviewed by the Attorney General
+b) (TS//SI//NF) Must be reviewed by the Chief of the Homeland Security Analysis Center
+c) (TS//SI//NF) Must be reviewed by OGC
+d) (TS//SI//NF) Two HMCs must agree on the RAS determination
+
+(No audio or transcript on this page)
+
+Question 3: (TS//SI//NF) Correct! An HMC or other official named in the Orders may make a RAS determination.
+(TS//SI//NF) Incorrect. The correct answer is b). An HMC or other official named in the Orders may make a RAS determination.
+
+Question 4: (TS//SI//NF) Correct! SIGINT reports, open source information, and Second Party reports may all be used to justify RAS.
+(TS//SI//NF) Incorrect. The correct answer is d). SIGINT reports, open source information, and Second Party reports may all be used to justify RAS.
+
+Question 5: (TS//SI//NF) Correct! If an identifier is reasonably believed to be used by a U.S. person, then it must be reviewed by OGC.
+(TS//SI//NF) Incorrect. The correct answer is c). If an identifier is reasonably believed to be used by a U.S. person, then it must be reviewed by OGC.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 16 of 17
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+DATE/PREPARER: 11/09/2010 SLS Topic Page Classification Screen Number
+(U) Summary TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN 13 of 13
+Home Exit Glossary Next
+FRAME ID: 3120
+(U) Now that we have completed this part of your trip you should be able to:
+x (TS//SI//NF) Recognize the direct relationship between the Foreign Powers and
+establishing RAS
+NEXT FRAME ID: n/a - (TS//SI//NF) Identify the key components of RAS and how it is applied to candidate
+identifiers
+x (TS//SI//NF) Identify who can adjudicate and approve a RAS nomination
+x (TS//SI//NF) Recognize the requirement associated with identifiers linked to U.S.
+BACK FRAME ID: 3110
+persons — the OGC First Amendment Review
+ALT TAG: (TS//SI//NF) List common sources of information used to construct a RAS
+GRAPHIC/AV: nomination statement
+(U) Review learning objectives in the travel
+journal
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (HMC Character): So remember, RAS nominations are approved by an HMC (or an official named in the Order) BEFORE queries can be
+made using a particular identifier within the BR or PR/TT metadata.
+
+(U) (OGC Attorney): Now that we have completed this part of the trip you should be able to:
+(TS//SI//NF) Recognize the direct relationship between the Foreign Powers and establishing RAS
+(TS//SI//NF) Identify the key components of RAS and how it is applied to candidate identifiers
+(TS//SI//NF) Identify who can adjudicate and approve a RAS nomination
+(TS//SI//NF) Recognize the requirement associated with identifiers linked to U.S. persons — the OGC First Amendment Review
+(TS//SI//NF) List common sources of information used to construct a RAS nomination statement
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 17 of 17
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_3/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_3/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8428fa5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_3/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+{
+ "title": "NSA Course Materials: Module 3",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Module 3 of 2011 NSA Course Materials regarding the agency’s metadata collection programs under Sections 501 and 402 of FISA. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [
+ "training",
+ "students",
+ "analysts",
+ "personnel",
+ "teaching"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2011-10-17",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "SI"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-18",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/nsa-course-materials-module-3",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [
+ {
+ "id": "ODNI_-_CLEANEDOVSC1205_L3_storyboard_v22_Final"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "5302b1d15c210220069b2a85b9cd88ceab71f43b35593bb059f2e6f041d9ce58",
+ "pages": 17
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_4/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_4.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_4/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_4.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f5495e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_4/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_4.md
@@ -0,0 +1,813 @@
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+Version 28 (Final)
+Updated 10/17/11
+Includes CAO Review feedback
+
+| COURSE: | (TS//SI//NF) OVSC1205 Special Training on FISA (Analytical) |
+| :------ | :------------------------------------------------------- |
+| COURSE: | (TS//SI//NF) OVSC1206 Special Training on FISA (Technical) |
+| Module 4: | (TS//SI//NF) Access, Sharing, Dissemination, and Retention Under the BR and PR/TT FISC Orders |
+
+| DATE/PREPARER: SLS | Topic (U) Module Introduction | Page Classification TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN | Screen Number 1 of 27 |
+| :----------------- | :---------------------------- | :-------------------------- | :------------------ |
+| | Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next |
+| FRAME ID: 4010 | (U) Module 4 |
+| NEXT FRAME ID: 4020 | (TS//SI//NF) Access, Sharing, Dissemination, and Retention Under the BR and PR/TT FISC Orders |
+| BACK FRAME ID: n/a | (U) This module will enable you to: |
+| ALT TAG: | * (TS//SI//NF) Distinguish between the analysts authorized to query BR and PR/TT metadata and those authorized to view query results |
+| GRAPHIC/AV: (U) Image of OGC Attorney, HMC Character, and SV Character sitting at a table | * (TS//SI//NF) Recognize the contact chaining restrictions for RAS-approved identifiers |
+| | * (TS//SI//NF) Recognize what constitutes unique BR and PR/TT query results |
+| | * (TS//SI//NF) Identify limitations that impact the access, sharing, dissemination, and retention of BR and PR/TT query results |
+| | * (TS//SI//NF) Recognize the BR and PR/TT dissemination tracking requirement and the additional CT nexus requirement for U.S. person identifiers |
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 1 of 39
+
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20070108
+Declassify On: [REDACTED]
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): During this part of our trip we will identify the limitations regarding access, sharing, disseminating, and retaining of BR and PR/TT query results.
+
+(U) This module will enable you to:
+* (TS//SI//NF) Distinguish between the analysts authorized to query BR and PR/TT metadata and those authorized to view query results
+* (TS//SI//NF) Recognize the contact chaining restrictions for RAS-approved identifiers
+* (TS//SI//NF) Recognize what constitutes unique BR and PR/TT query results
+* (TS//SI//NF) Identify limitations that impact the access, sharing, dissemination, and retention of BR and PR/TT query results
+* (TS//SI//NF) Recognize the BR and PR/TT dissemination tracking requirement and the additional CT nexus requirement for U.S. person identifiers
+
+(TS//SI//NF) If you are a technical person, you might be asking yourself if this information is directly applicable to you and your team. Compliance with the FISC Orders could be jeopardized by inadvertent or unintended changes in the infrastructure maintained by technical personnel. Therefore, an understanding of the requirements outlined in the Orders is important in the event that any technical support functions (data access, presentation, underlying system support – both hardware and software, etc.) cause changes to the support infrastructure that would bring NSA's compliance with the BR and PR/TT Court Orders into question.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 2 of 39
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| DATE/PREPARER: SLS | Topic (TS//SI//NF) BR and PR/TT Data Access and Governance | Page Classification TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN | Screen Number 2 of 27 |
+| :----------------- | :-------------------------------------------------------- | :---------------------------------------- | :------------------ |
+| | Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next |
+| FRAME ID: 4020 | (TS//SI//NF) BR and PR/TT Credentials – who can query, who can view results |
+| NEXT FRAME ID: 4025 | (TS//SI//NF) Access to BR and PR/TT raw metadata and query results is restricted to those who have the required training and appropriate credentials |
+| BACK FRAME ID: 4010 | |
+| ALT TAG: | |
+| GRAPHIC/AV: (U) Image of OGC Attorney, HMC Character, and SV Character sitting at a table | |
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (SV Character): Access to BR and PR/TT raw metadata and query results is restricted to those who have the required training and appropriate credentials. The Office of the Director of Compliance (ODOC) through the Signals Intelligence Directorate's Office of Oversight and Compliance (SV) controls access to the BR and PR/TT FISA metadata, ensuring that only those who have completed all of the required training and have been granted the appropriate credentials are permitted to touch the metadata.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Within the analyst workforce, a distinction is made between individuals who are permitted to query the data and those who are permitted only to view the query results. Individuals who are authorized to query BR and PR/TT metadata sets have [REDACTED] credentials. Division level management within a production center determines when query permissions will be granted to analysts based on a mission need, not solely on completion of BR and PR/TT FISA Training. Some technical personnel may also require query access, but their queries are for the purposes of data accuracy and integrity, not for target or intelligence analysis. Managers of technical personnel who require query permissions will make the determination in concert with their organization's compliance office, usually either SV or TV (the Technology Directorate's office of compliance).
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 3 of 39
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 4 of 39
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| DATE/PREPARER: SLS | Topic (TS//SI//NF) BR and PR/TT Data Access and Governance | Page Classification TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN | Screen Number 3 of 27 |
+| :----------------- | :-------------------------------------------------------- | :---------------------------------------- | :------------------ |
+| | Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next |
+| FRAME ID: 4025 | (TS//SI//NF) How Do I Determine Who Has the Proper Credentials? |
+| | (U) Type [REDACTED] o access [REDACTED] and check credentials. |
+| NEXT FRAME ID: 4030 | |
+| BACK FRAME ID: 4020 | |
+| ALT TAG: | |
+| GRAPHIC/AV: (U//FOUO) View of [REDACTED] or images pertinent to checking for credentials | |
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (SV Character): So, how do you determine if an analyst or technical colleague has the appropriate credentials? [REDACTED] is a tool that can help you check someone else's credentials against your own. From your NSANet machine, type [REDACTED] in your web browser. This takes you to the Lookup Utility. Insert the sid of the analyst or technical person you're working with and hit search, the formal accesses you share in common are displayed. From that you can determine if they hold the [REDACTED] credentials. If the utility is not functioning for some reason, you should contact SV4 to verify the individual's credentials before proceeding.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 5 of 39
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| DATE/PREPARER: SLS | Topic (TS//SI//NF) BR and PR/TT Data Access and Governance | Page Classification TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN | Screen Number 4 of 27 |
+| :----------------- | :-------------------------------------------------------- | :---------------------------------------- | :------------------ |
+| | Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next |
+| FRAME ID: 4030 | (U) Auditing and Access |
+| | (TS//SI//NF) The Court Orders require that when the metadata is queried for intelligence analysis purposes that an auditable record be generated. |
+| NEXT FRAME ID: 4040 | (TS//SI//NF) The [REDACTED] audit log includes: |
+| | * Query requests |
+| | * User login |
+| BACK FRAME ID: 4025 | * IP address |
+| ALT TAG: | * Date and time of the access |
+| GRAPHIC/AV: (U) Image of OGC Attorney, HMC Character, and SV Character sitting at a table | (TS//SI//NF) What is the EAR and how does it function as a compliance safeguard? |
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (SV Character): The BR and PR/TT Court Orders require that an auditable record be generated whenever metadata is queried in intelligence analysis purposes. When the raw BR and PR/TT metadata is queried in [REDACTED](note) an automatic audit log is generated to enable appropriate oversight of these authorities. SV audits [REDACTED] queries performed by both analysts and technical personnel and reviews the following on a periodic basis:
+* Query requests
+* User login
+* Internet Protocol (IP) address
+* Date and time of the access
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (HMC Character): While these audits are one way to verify that only RAS-approved identifiers are used as seeds to query the BR and PR/TT metadata, [REDACTED], an analytic tool used to query this metadata, employs an Emphatic Access Restriction (EAR)(note 2) software to provide reasonable assurance that only RAS-approved identifiers are queried by analysts. While EAR is of great benefit for compliance, it will also query collected data from other collection authorities, depending on the NSA tools and applications accessible to users. We'll discuss the EAR in greater detail later in this module.
+
+note: Comment [SLS1]: Note for audio recording, this is pronounced as a word [REDACTED]
+note 2: Comment [SLS2]: Note for audio recording, this is pronounced as a word "EAR" (not as letters)
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 6 of 39
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| DATE/PREPARER: SLS | Topic (TS//SI//NF) BR and PR/TT Data Access and Governance | Page Classification TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN | Screen Number 5 of 27 |
+| :----------------- | :-------------------------------------------------------- | :---------------------------------------- | :------------------ |
+| | Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next |
+| FRAME ID: 4040 | (TS//SI//NF) Sourcing of BR and PR/TT Metadata Records |
+| | (TS//SI//NF) Within NSA's source systems of record, BR and PR/TT metadata records are tagged as to their origin, which allows for: |
+| | * Determining if information is derived from the BR or PR/TT repository |
+| NEXT FRAME ID: 4050 | * Software and other management controls to function properly |
+| BACK FRAME ID: 4030 | |
+| ALT TAG: | |
+| GRAPHIC/AV: (U) Image of OGC Attorney, HMC Character, and SV Character sitting at a table | |
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): Another aspect of data access and governance is the requirement for the sourcing of BR and PR/TT metadata records. As we mentioned in Module 2, the metadata must carry unique markings, or tags. These tags allow the analyst to determine if a particular piece of information is derived from either the BR or PR/TT repository. In addition, these markings enable the EAR software and other management controls to function properly.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 7 of 39
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| DATE/PREPARER: 11/23/2010 SLS | Topic (U) Knowledge Check 1 | Page Classification TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN | Screen Number 6 of 27 |
+| :--------------------------- | :-------------------------- | :---------------------------------------- | :------------------ |
+| | Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next |
+| FRAME ID: 4050 | (U) Knowledge Check 1 |
+| NEXT FRAME ID: 4060 | 1. (TS//SI//NF) Identify the individuals or groups below who are authorized to receive and view results of queries that contain BR and/or PR/TT data (please select all that apply). |
+| | a) Individuals with [REDACTED] credentials |
+| | b) HMCs with [REDACTED] and analysts with [REDACTED] |
+| BACK FRAME ID: 4040 | c) Technical personnel with [REDACTED] credentials |
+| ALT TAG: | d) Your office chief and oversight personnel by virtue of their positional responsibility |
+| GRAPHIC/AV: | e) None of the above. |
+| | 2. (TS//SI//NF) What should you do before sharing the results of a BR or PR/TT query with a co-worker working on a target reasonably believed to be associated with the [REDACTED]? |
+| | a) Read your e-mail to see if your co-worker asked you for the information |
+| | b) Call one of the SOOs in the NSOC to find out if information about your target can be released to your co-worker |
+| | c) Verify that the co-worker has the proper credentials to have access to BR and PR/TT information |
+| | d) E-mail all the above |
+| | e) None of the above. |
+| | (U) (SV Character): Let's check in and make a few quick notes in our travel journal and see what we remember from this topic! |
+
+ANSWERS:
+Question 1. (TS//SI//NF) Correct! a), b), and c) describe individuals and groups holding [REDACTED] credentials.
+(TS//SI//NF) Incorrect. Positional authority does not supersede the requirement to have these specific credentials. Not all managers or SV personnel may require these credentials for their specific jobs. The correct answers are a), b), and c).
+Question 2. (TS//SI//NF) Correct! Before you share any BR or PR/TT query results with a co-worker, you must first verify that he or she has the proper credentials to have access to BR and PR/TT information.
+(TS//SI//NF) Incorrect. The answer is c). Before you share any BR or PR/TT query results with a co-worker, you must first verify that he or she has the proper credentials to have access to BR and PR/TT information.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 8 of 39
+
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+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| DATE/PREPARER: | Topic (TS//SI//NF) Querying the BR and PR/TT Metadata | Page Classification TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN | Screen Number 7 of 27 |
+| :------------- | :------------------------------------------------ | :---------------------------------------- | :------------------ |
+| | Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next |
+| FRAME ID: 4060 | (TS//SI//NF) Analyst Queries of the BR and PR/TT Metadata |
+| | (U) Have RAS, will query? How? |
+| | (TS//SI//NF) How do I recognize BR and or PR/TT results, and what are "unique" results? |
+| NEXT FRAME ID: 4070 | (U) Once I have results, how do I handle them? Are there any restrictions? |
+| BACK FRAME ID: 4050 | |
+| ALT TAG: | |
+| GRAPHIC/AV: (U) Display and fade out the questions shown as an intro to the topics to be covered in this section. (U) For the transcript paragraph spoken by the Technical Character, consider using a creative treatment that shows the character for a brief period and then fades her out (perhaps a news bulletin or a postcard??). | |
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (HMC Character): In this section of the module, we'll cover how analysts query the BR and PR/TT metadata. In addition, we'll go into detail on what constitutes BR and PR/TT results and how to tell if they are unique. Since BR and PR/TT unique results may only be shared with individuals who have the proper credentials, being able to identify unique BR and PR/TT query results will help you comply with the sharing and handling restrictions.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (Technical Character): While this section may appear to be more focused on analytic-specific tools, certain technical personnel also query these datasets to provide reasonable assurance of data integrity or to make the metadata usable for intelligence analysis. Therefore, technical personnel and their managers should also be aware of guidelines related to queries, handling instructions for query results, in any form, and the requirements related to sharing of unique query results, in any form.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 9 of 39
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| DATE/PREPARER: | Topic (TS//SI//NF) Querying the BR and PR/TT Metadata | Page Classification TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN | Screen Number 8 of 27 |
+| :------------- | :------------------------------------------------ | :---------------------------------------- | :------------------ |
+| | Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next |
+| FRAME ID: 4070 | (TS//SI//NF) How are Analyst Queries of the BR and PR/TT Metadata Conducted? |
+| NEXT FRAME ID: 4075 | (TS//SI//NF) Queries of BR and PR/TT metadata are conducted through [REDACTED] the user interface to [REDACTED]. As a default, queries are federated with data from other collection sources. (Screenshot): User Roles for [REDACTED] (1stParty) Please lick on the toggle button next to the rule set you with to use for this [REDACTED] session. You will then be able to select one or more of the underlying roles associated with that rule set. In this way you will be better able to control which databases are searched by your query. If, addition to SIGINT data, you wish to work with DOG Court-Ordered Data Sources (PENREGISTRY|FISABR), check the approriate boxes below. WARNING: SPECIAL RULES APPLY! If unsure, leave the boxed UNCHECKED and contact Homeland Mission Coordinator, 9214,963-0478s.
+| BACK FRAME ID: 4060 | |
+| ALT TAG: | |
+| GRAPHIC/AV: | |
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (HMC Character): Once RAS approved, an identifier can be used to query the BR and/or PR/TT metadata via authorized versions of [REDACTED] the user interface to [REDACTED]. When launching [REDACTED], analysts with the appropriate BR or PR/TT credentials have the option to check a box if they wish to include BR or PT/TT metadata in their queries. If an analyst checks the "FISABR Mode"(note) or "PENREGISTRY Mode" box when logging into [REDACTED] will perform a federated query. This mean that in addition eo either BR or PR/TT metadata, [REDACTED] will also query data collected under additional collection authorities, depending on the analyst's credentials. Therefore, when performing a query of the BR or PR/TT metadata, analysts will potentially receive results from all of the above collection sources. Users of more recent versions of [REDACTED] do have the option, however, to "unfederate" the query, and pick and choose amongst the collection sources that they would like to query(note2).
+
+note: Comment [SLS3]: Note for audio recording, this should be pronounced as the word FISA then the letters B R, so simply "FISA B R"
+note2: Comment [a4]: See Screenshot 1.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 10 of 39
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
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+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| DATE/PREPARER: | Topic (TS//SI//NF) Querying the BR and PR/TT Metadata | Page Classification TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN | Screen Number 9 of 27 |
+| :------------- | :------------------------------------------------ | :---------------------------------------- | :------------------ |
+| | Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next |
+| FRAME ID: 4075 | (TS//SI//NF) How are Analyst Queries of the BR and PR/TT Metadata Conducted? |
+| NEXT FRAME ID: 4077 | |
+| BACK FRAME ID: 4070 | |
+| ALT TAG: | |
+| GRAPHIC/AV: (U) Look at Annie's notes and match transcript to screen shots. | |
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (HMC Character): Once you are operating within the BR or PR/TT mode of [REDACTED] remember that you may only use a RAS-approved identifier to query the metadata. A RAS-approved identifier that is used to initiate a query of BR or PR/TT metadata is referred to as a "seed" since it is being used to produce a "chain" of metadata contacts, known as contact chaining.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED] employs the EAR software to provide reasonable assurance that only RAS-approved identifiers are queried by analysts. Before executing a query on an identifier, the EAR verifies that the identifier is RAS-approved. If an analyst attempts to query a non-RAS-approved identifier while still in BR or PR/TT query mode, the EAR will provide reasonable assurance that no results are returned for that query; this includes data not derived from BR or PR/TT. This query will, however, be reflected in SV's auditing and a justification for the query attempt may be requested. If you are unsure whether an identifier is RAS-approved, use [REDACTED] to determine the identifier's approval status.
+
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+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| DATE/PREPARER: | Topic (TS//SI//NF) Querying the BR and PR/TT Metadata | Page Classification TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN | Screen Number 10 of 27 |
+| :------------- | :------------------------------------------------ | :---------------------------------------- | :------------------- |
+| | Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next |
+| FRAME ID: 4077 | (TS//SI//NF) Contact Chaining with BR and PR/TT metadata |
+| NEXT FRAME ID: 4080 | |
+| BACK FRAME ID: 4075 | |
+| ALT TAG: | |
+| GRAPHIC/AV: (U) Image of OGC Attorney, HMC Character, and SV Character sitting at a table (U) Look at [REDACTED] notes and match transcript to screen shots. (TS//SI//NF) Create animation to explain the following: While the BR Order permits contact chaining for up to three hops, NSA has decided to limit contact chaining to only two hops away from the RAS-approved identifier without prior approval from your Division management to chain the third hop. Under PR/TT, the FISC limits the number of hops for internet communications to only two, and the hop counter will not permit these FISC-mandated levels to be exceeded | |
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (HMC Character): Once the EAR verifies that the seed that the analyst has requested to query is RAS approved, it will allow the analyst to [REDACTED]
+
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+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+"chain" on that identifier. In the BR and PR/TT Orders, the FISC sets limits on how extensive this chaining may be. We refer to this as the number of hops from a RAS-approved identifier. For example, let's say your target calls an associate [REDACTED]. That associate then calls several [REDACTED]. In this example it is one hop from your RAS-approved identifier to the associate and another hop from the associate to a recruit. In other words, the associate is a "first hop" contact of your target, and the [REDACTED] are "second hop" contacts.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): While(note) the BR Order permits contact chaining for up to three hops, NSA has decided to limit contact chaining to only two hops away from the RAS-approved identifier without prior approval from your Division management to chain the third hop. Under PR/TT, the FISC limits the number of hops for internet communications to only two. Technical controls will not permit these FISC-mandated hop levels to be exceeded.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (HMC Character): If another RAS-approved identifier is encountered within the authorized number of hops from the previous RAS-approved identifier, the number of hops resets to allow a contact chain to be generated out the authorized number of hops from the newly encountered RAS-approved identifier.
+
+note: Comment [a5]: We can probably use some of the existing screenshots we made to also illustrate the hops.
+
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+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| DATE/PREPARER: | Topic (TS//SI//NF) Querying the BR and PR/TT Metadata | Page Classification TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN | Screen Number 11 of 27 |
+| :------------- | :------------------------------------------------ | :---------------------------------------- | :------------------- |
+| | Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next |
+| FRAME ID: 4080 | (TS//SI//NF) What is a Query Result and how do I know if it is a BR or PR/TT Query Result? |
+| NEXT FRAME ID: 4090 | (TS//SI//NF) Query Result: Queries produce results in the form of a contact chain presented in [REDACTED] format; each chain is comprised of individual contacts derived from data returned from the multiple collection sources queried. Each contact/line within a chain represents an individual result(note). |
+| BACK FRAME ID: 4077 | |
+| ALT TAG: | |
+| GRAPHIC/AV: (U) Look at [REDACTED] notes and match transcript to screen shots. | |
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (HMC Character): When you query a RAS-approved identifier in [REDACTED] n BR or PR/TT modes, [REDACTED] will return a [REDACTED] file, usually referred to as a chain, which is made up of the individual first hop contacts of the seed. Bearing in mind the hop restrictions just discussed, analysts may do further chaining on those contacts. Each of these contacts, or line within the chain, represents an individual result(note2). Remember, unless you choose to unfederate your query as we described earlier, these results may have been obtained under a variety of collection authorities.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) It is possible to determine the collection source or sources of each result within the chain by examining the Producer Designator Digraph (PDDG)/SIGINT Activity Designator (SIGAD)(note3) and collection source(s) at the end(note4) of the line.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) If at least one source of a result is BR or PR/TT metadata, the classification at the beginning of the line will contain the phrases FISABR or PR/TT, respectively. In addition, in the source information at the end of the line, the SIGAD [REDACTED] BR data can be recognized by SIGADs beginning with [REDACTED]. For PR/TT, data collected after October 2010 is found [REDACTED]. For a comprehensive listing of all the BR and PR/TT SIGADs as well as information on PR/TT data collected prior to November of 2009, contact your [REDACTED].
+
+note: Comment [a6]: This is illustrated by screenshot 2
+note2: Comment [a7]: This is illustrated by screenshot 2
+note3: Comment [SLS8]: Note for audio recording, this should be pronounced as a word "SIGAD" (not spelled out in letter as S I G A D)
+note4: Comment [a9]: I really think we need some pictures to illustrate.
+
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+Page 15 of 39
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+organization's management or subject matter expert.
+(TS//SI//NF) Since it is possible that one communication event will be collected under multiple collection authorities (and multiple collection sources), not all of the results will be unique to one collection authority (or collection source). Keep in mind that the classification at the beginning of each result only indicates the highest level classification of that result, and does not necessarily reflect whether a result was unique to one collection authority (or collection source). If a result was obtained under multiple authorities (or sources), you will see more [REDACTED](note). Here are examples of results originating from multiple collection sources(note2). None of these results are considered BR- or PR/TT- [REDACTED]
+
+note: Comment [SLS10]: Note for audio recording, this acronym PDDG should be spelled out in letter "P D D G" followed by the word "SIGAD" -- so this phrase will be recorded as "Producer Designator Digraph, or PDDG or SIGAD"
+note2: Comment [a11]: Screenshot
+
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+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| DATE/PREPARER: | Topic (TS//SI//NF) BR or PR/TT Unique Query Result | Page Classification TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN | Screen Number 12 of 27 |
+| :------------- | :----------------------------------------------- | :--------------------------------------- | :------------------- |
+| | Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next |
+| FRAME ID: 4090 | (TS//SI//NF) What is a BR- or PR/TT-Unique Query Result? |
+| | (U) (Insert image of OGC Attorney and HMC Character sitting at a table discussing the talking points below shown on a white board) |
+| NEXT FRAME ID: 4100 | (TS//SI//NF) BR- or PR/TT-“unique” query results are those contacts within a chain *solely* derived from the BR or PR/TT metadata and not duplicated in the results originating from any other authorities. |
+| BACK FRAME ID: 4080 | |
+| ALT TAG: | |
+| GRAPHIC/AV: (U) Look at [REDACTED] notes and match transcript to screen shots. | |
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (HMC Character): In the examples we just discussed, none of the results were unique to any one collection authority. Frequently, however, you'll find that some of the results within the chain are unique to one particular collection authority. A BR- or PR/TT-unique query result is any piece of information that NSA would not have had but for the BR or PR/TT metadata from which it was drawn. In other words, BR or PR/TT was the ONLY source of that individual contact/query result.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Here are some examples: example A is “E.O. 12333-unique,” while B is “PR/TT-unique,” and C is “BR-unique."(note)(note2)
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Sharing restrictions in the FISC Orders only apply to unique BR or PR/TT query results. If query results are derived from multiple sources and are not unique to BR and PR/TT alone, the rules governing the other collection authority would apply. We will discuss these sharing and handling restrictions in greater depth shortly.
+
+note: Comment [a12]: Again show previous examples.
+note2: Comment [SLS13]: Note for audio recording: we will want some time in between saying example A is "E.O. 1233-unique," and wile B is "PR/TT-unique," and C is "BR-unique." to allow learner to look at the examples. Please allow some "quiet" space that can be duplicated to the amount of time needed. THANKS :)
+
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+Page 17 of 39
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| DATE/PREPARER: | Topic (TS//SI//NF) BR or PR/TT Unique Query Result | Page Classification TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN | Screen Number 13 of 27 |
+| :------------- | :----------------------------------------------- | :--------------------------------------- | :------------------- |
+| | Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next |
+| FRAME ID: 4100 | (TS//SI//NF) BR or PR/TT Query Results – Not Just a Line Within a Chain |
+| | (TS//SI//NF) Examples of BR and/or PR/TT Query Results include: |
+| NEXT FRAME ID: 4105 | * A specific identifier |
+| | * "Identifier A was in contact with Identifier B" |
+| | * A .cml file (i.e. the entire contact chain/result set) that contains BR or PR/TT query results |
+| BACK FRAME ID: 4090 | * A written or electronic depiction of a chain (i.e., the .cml file itself) or the analysis or partial analysis of a chain that includes BR or PR/TT results |
+| ALT TAG: | * A compilation or summary of first- and second-level contacts from a RAS-approved seed |
+| GRAPHIC/AV: | * A draft or a finished *but not yet disseminated* report |
+| | * Any other BR or PR/TT information returned following a RAS-approved federated query |
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
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+
+---
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+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): Before we discuss sharing and handling restrictions of BR- and PR/TT-unique query results, it is important to understand that a BR or PR/TT query result is not just a line within the chain that is presented to you after you run a BR or PR/TT query in [REDACTED]. Any information that you derive, extract, or manipulate from that particular line in the chain becomes a BR or PR/TT result. Given that a source of the result is derived from BR or PR/TT metadata, any adaptation of that result, including information provided orally or in writing, even a tip or a lead, remains a BR or PR/TT query result.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): In addition, other examples of items that have been deemed to be BR and PR/TT query results include:
+* A specific identifier
+* "Identifier A was in contact with Identifier B"
+* A [REDACTED] file (for example the entire contact chain/result set) that contains BR or PR/TT query results
+* A written or electronic depiction of a chain (like the [REDACTED] file(note) itself) or the analysis or partial analysis of a chain that includes BR or PR/TT results
+* A compilation or summary of first- and second-level contacts of a RAS-approved seed
+* A draft or a finished *but not yet disseminated* report
+* Any other BR or PR/TT information returned following a RAS-approved federated query
+
+note: Comment [SLS14]: Note for audio recording, the SMEs would like for this to be pronounced "the [REDACTED] file" – I know this might sound a little odd since we don't say things like "the dot p d f file" but just trust me on this one because we had 5 minute argument about it in a SME meeting. UGH!
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
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+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| DATE/PREPARER: | Topic (TS//SI//NF) BR or PR/TT Unique Query Result | Page Classification TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN | Screen Number 14 of 27 |
+| :------------- | :----------------------------------------------- | :--------------------------------------- | :------------------- |
+| | Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next |
+| FRAME ID: 4105 | (TS//SI//NF) BR or PR/TT Query Results – Not Just a Line Within a Chain |
+| NEXT FRAME ID: 4110 | |
+| BACK FRAME ID: 4100 | |
+| ALT TAG: | |
+| GRAPHIC/AV: | |
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (HMC Character): So, for example, if you run a BR or PR/TT query on a particular RAS-approved e-mail identifier and it returns information that depicts identifier A, the RAS-approved seed, was in direct contact with identifier B and the source of the metadata is BR or PR/TT, then just the fact that identifier A is communicating with identifier B is considered a BR or PR/TT query result.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (HMC Character): In addition, any summary of that information would also be a BR or PR/TT query result. So, if you knew that identifier A belonged to Joe and identifier B belonged to Sam, and the fact of that contact was derived from BR or PR/TT metadata, if you communicate orally or in writing that Joe talked to Sam, even if you don't include the actual e-mail account or telephone numbers that were used to communicate, this is still a BR or PR/TT query result.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): Remember, if these results are determined to be BR- or PR/TT-**UNIQUE**, they are subject to sharing and handling restrictions.
+
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+Page 20 of 39
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| DATE/PREPARER: | Topic (TS//SI//NF) Sharing and Handling Restrictions of BR or PR/TT Unique Query Results | Page Classification TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN | Screen Number 15 of 27 |
+| :------------- | :---------------------------------------------------------------------- | :---------------------------------------- | :------------------- |
+| | Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next |
+| FRAME ID: 4110 | (TS//SI//NF) Sharing and Handling Restrictions of BR- or PR/TT-Unique Query Results |
+| NEXT FRAME ID: 4120 | (TS//SI//NF) Examples of handling restrictions for BR and PR/TT unique query results: |
+| | * Any document, .cml, or other file containing BR- or PR/TT-unique information may only be stored on the analyst's personal folders, or an access-controlled, shared location |
+| | * Query results cann[REDACTED] individuals without [REDACTED] any system where the results would be shared with [REDACTED] |
+| BACK FRAME ID: 4105 | * BR- or PR/TT-unique results may not be queried in tools where user queries are visible to other analysts (who may not have [REDACTED] or can be manipulated by behind the scenes analytics(note) |
+| ALT TAG: | |
+| GRAPHIC/AV: | (TS//SI//NF) These restrictions apply to information that is SOLELY unique to BR and PR/TT and do NOT apply to information which is NOT unique to BR or PR/TT! |
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): Remember, BR- or PR/TT-unique query results are those contacts within a chain solely derived from the BR or PR/TT metadata and not duplicated in the results originating from any other authorities. Any oral or written depiction, manipulation, or summary containing that information is also a unique query result. Until they are officially disseminated, BR- or PR/TT-unique results may only be shared with individuals who hold the proper credentials to receive or view BR or PR/TT information. The requirement is imposed because of the special handling restrictions that we will discuss later in this Module. Without the proper training, the FISC-imposed handling restrictions may not be followed.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (HMC Character) Unless these unique results have been disseminated, such BR- or PR/TT-unique information may only be shared with individuals who have the proper credentials to receive or view BR or PR/TT information. Remember, use [REDACTED] (note2) to determine a user's credentials. This [REDACTED] means:
+* Any document, [REDACTED](note3) or other file containing BR- or PR/TT-unique information may only be stored on the analyst's personal folders, or an access-- [REDACTED]
+
+note: Comment [a15]: There is no such list of tools that are ok/ not ok to query, btw.
+note2: Comment [SLS16]: Note for audio recording, this is pronounced [REDCATED]
+note3: Comment [SLS17]: Please say [REDACTED]
+
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+Page 21 of 39
+
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+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+* controlled, shared location that is accessible to only BR and PR/TT cleared personnel.
+* Query results cannot be put into any system where the results would be shared with individuals without [REDACTED]
+* BR- or PR/TT-unique results may not be queried in tools where user queries are visible to other analysts (who may not have [REDACTED] or can be manipulated by behind the scenes analytics. If you have questions regarding which tools are acceptable to further research query results, please contact your management or technical director.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (SV Character) However, as we've discussed, not all BR or PR/TT results are unique. If a query result indicates it was derived from another collection source in addition to BR or PR/TT, the rules governing the other collection authority would apply to the handling and sharing of that query result. For example, this result came from both BR and E.O. 12333 collection; therefore, because it is not unique to BR information, it would be ok to inform non-BR cleared individuals of the fact of this communication, as well as task, query, and report this information according to standard E.O. 12333 guidelines.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (SV Character) In summary, if a query result has multiple collection authorities, analysts should source and/or report the non-BR or PR/TT version of that query result according to the rules governing the other authority. But if it is unique to either the BR or PR/TT authority then it is a unique query result with all of the applicable BR and PR/TT restrictions placed on it. In both cases, however, analysts should not share the actual chain containing BR or PR/TT results with analysts who do not have the credentials to receive or view BR or PR/TT information. In such an instance, if it is necessary to share the chain, analysts should re-run the query in the non-BR or non-PR/TT areas of [REDACTED] and share that .cml.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
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+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| DATE/PREPARER: 11/23/2010 SLS | Topic (U) Retention of Metadata and Query Results | Page Classification TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN | Screen Number 16 of 27 |
+| :--------------------------- | :----------------------------------------------- | :---------------------------------------- | :------------------- |
+| | Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next |
+| FRAME ID: 4120 | (U) Retention of Metadata and Query Results |
+| NEXT FRAME ID: 4130 | (TS//SI//NF) NSA must destroy BR and PR/TT metadata no later than five years (60 months) after initial collection |
+| | (TS//SI//NF) The FISC has not imposed any destruction requirement on BR or PR/TT query results |
+| BACK FRAME ID: 4110 | |
+| ALT TAG: | |
+| GRAPHIC/AV: (U) Image of OGC Attorney, HMC Character, and SV Character sitting at a table (TS//SI//NF) Possible cutaway images may include: * image depicting notional storage of bulk metadata and U.S. person information and then the destruction/deletion of the metadata * image depicting the retention of BR and PR/TT query results | |
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): The Court Orders mandate destruction of the metadata five years or 60 months after initial collection. NSA destroys the BR and PR/TT metadata no later than five years after collection. There are no exceptions to this requirement when it comes to the bulk metadata.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (HMC Character): The destruction requirement applies to the bulk metadata; it does not apply to query results that have been generated as a result of queries of RAS-approved identifiers. Once we have queried the metadata we have selected metadata, or query results, and the 60-month cutoff does not apply.
+
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+
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+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| DATE/PREPARER: 11/23/2010 SLS | Topic (U) Knowledge Check 2 | Page Classification TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN | Screen Number 17 of 27 |
+| :--------------------------- | :-------------------------- | :---------------------------------------- | :------------------- |
+| | Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next |
+| FRAME ID: 4130 | (U) Knowledge Check 2 |
+| NEXT FRAME ID: 4135 | 3. (TS//SI//NF) Please complete the following sentence. The Emphatic Access Restriction (EAR) |
+| | a) creates an automatic auditable record to allow for oversight of these authorities. |
+| | b) alerts [REDACTED] when an individual without [REDACTED] attempts to conduct a query. |
+| | c) forwards the query request to the HMC for approval. |
+| | d) prohibits non-RAS-approved identifiers from being queried in [REDACTED] |
+| BACK FRAME ID: 4120 | e) None of the above. |
+| ALT TAG: | 4. (TS//SI//NF) Assuming that the following answers describe unique BR or PR/TT query results, which of the following could be shared with co-workers who do not have [REDACTED] |
+| GRAPHIC/AV: | a) Having a fellow analyst review the draft of a report that contains PR/TT-derived information |
+| | b) A summary of direct or indirect contacts of a RAS-approved identifier |
+| | c) Telling your manager that [REDACTED] contacted [REDACTED] as noted in the PR/TT query you recently performed |
+| | d) E-mailing an electronic depiction of a BR or PR/TT contact chain or a pattern |
+| | e) None of the above. |
+| | 5. (TS//SI//NF) TRUE or FALSE: If a query result indicates that the source of information is both Executive Order 12333 collection and PR/TT collection, then the analyst must handle the E.O. 12333 result according to the PR/TT rules. |
+| | a) True |
+| | b) False |
+| | (U) (HMC Character): Let's make a few notes in our travel journal and check to see what you remember from this topic! |
+
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+
+ANSWERS:
+Question 3. (TS//SI//NF) Correct! The EAR prohibits non-RAS-approved identifiers from being queried in [REDACTED]
+(TS//SI//NF) Incorrect. The correct answer is d). The EAR prohibits non-RAS-approved identifiers from being queried in [REDACTED]
+Question 4. (TS//SI//NF) Correct! None of the examples listed should be shared with anyone outside of [REDACTED] channels.
+(TS//SI//NF) Incorrect. The correct answer is e). None of the examples listed should be shared with anyone outside of [REDACTED] channels.
+Question 5. (TS//SI//NF) Correct! If a PR/TT query result can also be sourced to Executive Order 12333, then the information is considered E.O. 12333 collection and follows the E.Ο. 12333 processes and procedures.
+(TS//SI//NF) Incorrect. If a PR/TT query result can also be sourced to Executive Order 12333, then the information is considered E.O. 12333 collection and follows the E.Ο. 12333 processes and procedures.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 25 of 39
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| DATE/PREPARER: 11/23/2010 SLS | Topic (U) Knowledge Check 2 | Page Classification TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN | Screen Number 18 of 27 |
+| :--------------------------- | :-------------------------- | :---------------------------------------- | :------------------- |
+| | Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next |
+| FRAME ID: 4135 | (U) Knowledge Check 2 |
+| | 6. (TS//SI//NF) If [REDACTED] is your RAS-approved identifier, and he e-mails [REDACTED] who then e-mails [REDACTED] who then e-mails [REDACTED] from your RAS-approved identifier? Are you allowed to chain that far in the PR/TT mode of [REDACTED]? |
+| NEXT FRAME ID: 4140 | a) 4 hops, no, unless one of the contacts between [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] is RAS approved. |
+| | b) 3 hops, no (unless one of the contacts between [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] is RAS approved). |
+| BACK FRAME ID: 4130 | c) 4 hops, yes. |
+| ALT TAG: | d) 3 hops, no. |
+| GRAPHIC/AV: | e) 2 hops, yes. |
+| | 7. (TS//SI//NF) If Badguy1's identifier is RAS-approved, and he calls Associate1, who then calls Unknownguy, who then calls Unknownguy2, how many hops is Unknownguy2 from your RAS-approved identifier? Are you allowed to chain that far in the BR mode of [REDACTED] |
+| | a) 4 hops, no, unless one of the contacts between badguy1 and unknownguy2 is RAS approved. |
+| | b) 3 hops, yes (with management approval). |
+| | c) 4 hops, yes. |
+| | d) 3 hops, no. |
+| | e) 2 hops, yes (with management approval). |
+| (No audio or transcript on this page) | |
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 26 of 39
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+ANSWERS:
+Question 6. (TS//SI//NF) Correct! The [REDACTED] is 3 hops from the RAS-approved identifier. You would not be permitted to chain this far unless one of the contacts between [REDACTED] is RAS approved.
+(TS//SI//NF) Incorrect. The correct answer is b). The [REDACTED] is 3 hops from the RAS-approved identifier. You would not be permitted to chain this far unless one of the contacts [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] is RAS approved.
+Question 7. (TS//SI//NF) Correct! The [REDACTED] is 3 hops from the RAS-approved identifier. You are permitted to chain this far with management approval.
+(TS//SI//NF) Incorrect. The answer is b). The [REDACTED] s 3 hops from the RAS-approved identifier. You are permitted to chain this far with management approval.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 27 of 39
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| DATE/PREPARER: 11/23/2010 SLS | Topic (TS//SI//NF) Dissemination of BR and PR/TT Derived Information | Page Classification TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN | Screen Number 19 of 27 |
+| :--------------------------- | :------------------------------------------------------------------ | :---------------------------------------- | :------------------- |
+| | Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next |
+| FRAME ID: 4140 | (TS//SI//NF) Dissemination of BR- and PR/TT-Derived Information |
+| | (TS//SI//NF) Dissemination of BR and PR/TT results is distributing information to external customers in any form to include oral or written form |
+| NEXT FRAME ID: 4150 | (TS//SI//NF) Topics covered: |
+| | * Information of foreign intelligence value which contains only foreign person information that IS NOT unique to BR or PR/TT |
+| BACK FRAME ID: 4135 | * Information on U.S. persons (minimized) or foreign target activity unique to BR or PR/TT metadata |
+| ALT TAG: | * Information on U.S. persons (unminimized) unique to BR or PR/TT |
+| GRAPHIC/AV: (U) Image of OGC Attorney, HMC Character, and SV Character sitting at a table (U) Possible cutaway images may include: * Sharing of information outside of NSA (perhaps with FBI or other customer) | |
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): Now let's focus our attention on the dissemination of BR and PR/TT results. We define dissemination of BR and PR/TT results as distributing information to external customers in any form to include oral or written form. Let's say you perform a BR or PR/TT query using a RAS-approved identifier, and the query returns good foreign intelligence information based on unique BR or PR/TT metadata that you would like to report to Intelligence Community customers. What should you do? In this topic we will discuss to what extent we can use standard processes and procedures for the dissemination of this information and to what extent we must use special processes and procedures for the dissemination of this special foreign intelligence information. Given the sensitive nature of this Program, you will not be surprised to hear that there are special rules that apply to the dissemination of this information.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 28 of 39
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| DATE/PREPARER: 11/23/2010 SLS | Topic (TS//SI//NF) Dissemination of BR- and PR/TT-Derived Information | Page Classification TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN | Screen Number 20 of 27 |
+| :--------------------------- | :------------------------------------------------------------------ | :---------------------------------------- | :------------------- |
+| | Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next |
+| FRAME ID: 4150 | (TS//SI//NF) Information Derived Exclusively from BR or PR/TT – Additional Requirements |
+| | (TS//SI//NF) Standard reporting practices and policies (including sourcing requirements and procedures and USSID SP0018 minimization) apply to BR and PR/TT query results |
+| NEXT FRAME ID: 4160 | (TS//SI//NF) Two additional, BR- and PR/TT-specific requirements: |
+| | * The Counterterrorism (CT) nexus requirement applies to BR- and PR/TT-derived unminimized U.S. person information, but does not apply to BR- or PR/TT-derived non-U.S. person information or BR- or PR/TT-derived minimized U.S. person information |
+| BACK FRAME ID: 4140 | * The dissemination tracking requirement applies to all BR- and PR/TT-derived information |
+| ALT TAG: | |
+| GRAPHIC/AV: (U) Image of OGC Attorney, HMC Character, and SV Character sitting at a table | |
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): First of all, every disseminated report from NSA must include sourcing information so that we know where the information came from, as well as follow all USSID SP0018(note) minimization requirements and procedures. For BR- and PR/TT-derived information, the analyst or reporte needs to make sure that the information included in that report is properly sourced to the appropriate BR or PR/TT authority.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In addition, the Court Orders for both the BR and PR/TT authorities have imposed two unique, stringent requirements with respect to disseminating information from these authorities. The first is the Counterterrorism, or CT, nexus requirement, and the second is the dissemination tracking requirement.
+
+note: Comment [SLS18]: UPDATE 7/13/11 from the SMEs: Please record USSID 18 (do not say SPEW or SPOW, just "USSID 18"
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 29 of 39
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| DATE/PREPARER: 11/23/2010 SLS | Topic (TS//SI//NF) The CT Nexus Requirement | Page Classification TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN | Screen Number 21 of 27 |
+| :--------------------------- | :------------------------------------------ | :---------------------------------------- | :------------------- |
+| | Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next |
+| FRAME ID: 4160 | (TS//SI//NF) The CT Nexus Requirement |
+| NEXT FRAME ID: 4170 | (TS//SI//NF) Prior to the dissemination of BR- or PR/TT-derived unminimized U.S. person information outside of NSA, one of the designated approval authorities must determine: |
+| | (a) that the U.S. person information is related to CT information, and |
+| BACK FRAME ID: 4150 | (b) that the U.S. person information is necessary to understand the CT information or to assess its importance |
+| ALT TAG: | |
+| GRAPHIC/AV: (U) Image of OGC Attorney, HMC Character, and SV Character sitting at a table (TS//SI//NF) Image to explain the CT Nexus | |
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): This applies ONLY to U.S. person information obtained from the BR or PR/TT authorities. If you run a query and the information returned is all foreign person information, then the CT nexus requirement does not apply to this situation. However, if your query results include U.S. person information derived from BR or PR/TT metadata, to disseminate that information to an external customer, such as the FBI, this requirement must be met prior to dissemination, in any form. Traditionally, under USSID SP0018(note), if there is a piece of unminimized U.S. person information that you would like to disseminate, one of the designated approval authorities (to be covered on the next screen) needs to determine that the information is necessary to understand the foreign intelligence in that particular intelligence report before the information can be released. For BR and PR/TT, the requirement is slightly different.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): With respect to the BR and PR/TT authorities, the unminimized U.S. person information not only has to relate to and be necessary to understand the foreign intelligence information in the report, but it has to relate to and be necessary to understand the **Counterterrorism** information.
+
+note: Comment [SLS19]: UPDATE 7/13/11 from the SMEs: Please record at USSID 18 (do not say SPEW or SPOW, just "USSID 18"
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 30 of 39
+
+---
+
+-TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (HMC Character): Recall the RAS process and how you derived this information. The identifier you used to generate this information was approved based upon the RAS standard. It was found to be an identifier reasonably believed to be used by someone [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (HMC Character): It might seem as though the information would most certainly be counterterrorism-related since, due to the RAS approval process, you wouldn't have this U.S. person information from a query of BR or PR/TT if it weren't related to counterterrorism. In the majority of cases, it will be counterterrorism-related; however, the nature of the counterterrorism target is that it often overlaps with several other areas that include counternarcotics, counterintelligence, money laundering, document forging, people and weapons trafficking, and other topics that are not CT-centric. Thus, due to the fact that these authorities provide NSA access to a high volume of U.S. person information for counterterrorism purposes, the Court Order requires an explicit finding that the information is in fact related to counterterrorism prior to dissemination. Therefore, one of the approved decision makers must document the finding using the proper terminology. It must state that the information is related to counterterrorism and that it is necessary to understand the counterterrorism information.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): While the USSID SP0018 process is the most familiar method of governing the dissemination of unminimized U.S. person information obtained from traditional SIGINT means, the CT nexus requirement is an additional protection for U.S. person information being disseminated when the BR or PR/TT authorities, and metadata obtained by virtue of those authorities, is the source of the information. The FISC wants to ensure that the authorities are being used for counterterrorism purposes as intended, so consider the CT nexus requirement a step above justifying a foreign intelligence requirement.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 31 of 39
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| DATE/PREPARER: 11/23/2010 SLS | Screen (U) Dissemination Requirements | Page Classification TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN | Screen Number 22 of 27 |
+| :--------------------------- | :------------------------------------ | :---------------------------------------- | :------------------- |
+| | Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next |
+| FRAME ID: 4170 | (TS//SI//NF) Dissemination Approval Authorities |
+| NEXT FRAME ID: 4180 | (TS//SI//NF) Only those in the following NSA positions have the authority to approve the dissemination of BR- or PR/TT-derived U.S. person(s) information: |
+| | (U) USSID SP0018 |
+| | * (U//FOUO) The Chief and Deputy Chief of Information Sharing Services |
+| BACK FRAME ID: 4160 | * (U//FOUO) The Senior Operations Officers (SOOs) of the National Security Operations Center (NSOC) |
+| ALT TAG: | * (U//FOUO) The Director and Deputy Director of the Signals Intelligence Directorate |
+| GRAPHIC/AV: (U) Image of OGC Attorney, HMC Character, and SV Character sitting at a table | * (U//FOUO) The Director and Deputy Director of NSA |
+| | (U) This approval authority cannot be delegated to anyone else! |
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): Certain positions are authorized to validate the CT nexus requirement, as we just discussed, and approve the dissemination of U.S. person(s) information that we obtain from these two authorities.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): Recall from your USSID SP0018 training, there are certain positions at NSA which have the authority to approve the dissemination of information that would identify a U.S. person either by name or by context. Those positions are listed in USSID SP0018 and include the Chief and Deputy Chief of the Information Sharing Services Office, the Senior Operations Officers (SOO)(note) within the National Security Operations Center- (NSOC)(note2), the Director and Deputy Director of the Signals Intelligence Directorate (SID), and in some cases they include the Director and Deputy Director of NSA.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (HMC Character): The list of positions which can approve the dissemination of unminimized U.S. person information derived from unique BR and PR/TT query results is the same as those named in USSID SP0018.
+
+note: Comment [SLS20]: Note for audio recording, this is pronounced as a word "SOO" (rhymes with "new", but does not rhyme with "sew a dress")
+note2: Comment [SLS21]: Note for audio recording, this is pronounced "N sock"
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 32 of 39
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): It is important to note that the authority to approve the dissemination of U.S. person information cannot be delegated. This responsibility is assigned only to the positions named in the BR and PR/TT Court Orders. Let's say, for example, that the Chief and Deputy Chief of Information Sharing Services Office, the two individuals who on a normal daily basis would be making the decision, are both on vacation on the same day. In this instance, someone else within their office may be the acting chief on that day; however, the acting chief cannot make the decision to disseminate U.S. person information.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (HMC Character): Under these circumstances, if information about a U.S. person must be disseminated on that day, then you should send your dissemination request to one of the other positions named in the Orders. This would logically be the NSOC SOO.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): With respect to non-U.S. person information, standard NSA practices and policies (such as proper sourcing information) apply.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 33 of 39
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| DATE/PREPARER: 11/23/2010 SLS | Topic (U) Dissemination Requirements | Page Classification TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN | Screen Number 23 of 27 |
+| :--------------------------- | :----------------------------------- | :---------------------------------------- | :------------------- |
+| | Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next |
+| FRAME ID: 4180 | (U) Dissemination Tracking |
+| NEXT FRAME ID: 4190 | (TS//SI//NF) NSA must report to the FISC every 30 days the number of instances since the preceding report in which NSA disseminated BR- or PR/TT-derived information, in any form (oral, written, formal, or informal), with anyone outside of NSA |
+| | (U) For more information, please contact [REDACTED] |
+| BACK FRAME ID: 4170 | |
+| ALT TAG: | |
+| GRAPHIC/AV: (U) Image of OGC Attorney, HMC Character, and SV Character sitting at a table (U) Possible cutaway images may include: * Image demonstrating the preparing and delivering of a report to the FISC | |
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): The other requirement, which applies to both U.S. person information as well as foreign person information, is the dissemination tracking requirement regarding the dissemination of BR- and PR/TT-derived information. The Orders require NSA to track and report to the FISC every instance in which NSA disseminates any information derived from either of these two authorities.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (HMC Character): This refers to information disseminated in a formal report as well as information disseminated informally such as written or oral collaboration with the FBI. We need to count every instance in which we take a piece of information derived from either of these two authorities and disseminate it outside of NSA.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (HMC Character): Normally an NSA product report is the record of a formal dissemination. In the context of the BR and PR/TT Programs, an official RFI response or Analyst Collaboration Record will also be viewed as dissemination. Because this FISC requirement goes beyond the more standard NSA procedures, additional diligence must be given to this requirement. NSA is required to report disseminations formal or informal to the FISC every 30 days.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 34 of 39
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| DATE/PREPARER: 11/23/2010 SLS | Topic (U) Dissemination Requirements | Page Classification TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN | Screen Number 24 of 27 |
+| :--------------------------- | :----------------------------------- | :---------------------------------------- | :------------------- |
+| | Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next |
+| FRAME ID: 4190 | (U) Post-Dissemination Restrictions? No, Restrictions lifted once Disseminated |
+| NEXT FRAME ID: 4200 | (TS//SI//NF) Once approved for dissemination, BR- or PR/TT-derived information can be used within NSA for any lawful purpose, and the sharing restrictions no longer apply |
+| BACK FRAME ID: 4180 | |
+| ALT TAG: | |
+| GRAPHIC/AV: (U) Image of OGC Attorney, HMC Character, and SV Character sitting at a table (U) Possible cutaway images may include: * Image that portrays the lifting of the sharing restriction once information is approved for dissemination | |
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): Once BR and PR/TT information has been disseminated (such as in a product report, RFI, or briefing), generally speaking, there are no follow-on restrictions that either NSA or our customers need to follow regarding the sharing or dissemination of that information contained in the report. The Orders do not impose any restrictions on the use of formally reported information from the BR or PR/TT authorities; therefore, this information can be used for any lawful purpose.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) If BR- or PR/TT-derived information is disseminated outside of NSA, then the restrictions on internal sharing of that same information at NSA no longer apply. For exa[REDACTED]isseminated can be shared outside of [REDACTED] channels, and the identifiers can be used in other tools such as the [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 35 of 39
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| DATE/PREPARER: 11/23/2010 SLS | Topic (U) Knowledge Check 3 | Page Classification TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN | Screen Number 25 of 27 |
+| :--------------------------- | :-------------------------- | :---------------------------------------- | :------------------- |
+| | Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next |
+| FRAME ID: 4200 | (U) Knowledge Check 3 |
+| NEXT FRAME ID: 4210 | 8. (TS//SI//NF) Identify the additional requirements regarding the dissemination of unminimized U.S. person information derived from BR or PR/TT information. |
+| | a. The Counterterrorism nexus check |
+| | b. The Counterintelligence nexus check |
+| | c. The dissemination tracking requirement |
+| BACK FRAME ID: 4190 | d. The sourcing requirement |
+| ALT TAG: | e. Both a and c) |
+| GRAPHIC/AV: | 9. (TS//SI//NF) TRUE or FALSE: the dissemination tracking requirement applies to only U.S. person BR- or PR/TT-derived information. |
+| | a. TRUE |
+| | b. FALSE |
+| | (U) (OGC Attorney): Before we move on to the next part of our trip, let's make a few notes in our travel journal. |
+
+ANSWERS:
+Question 8. (TS//SI//NF) Correct! The Court Orders for both the BR and PR/TT authorities have imposed two unique requirements with respect to disseminating information from these authorities. The first is the Counterterrorism, or CT, nexus check (which applies only to U.S. person information), and the second is the dissemination tracking requirement.
+(TS//SI//NF) Incorrect. Correct answer is e). The Court Orders for both the BR and PR/TT authorities have imposed two unique requirements with respect to disseminating information from these authorities. The first is the Counterterrorism, or CT, nexus check (which applies only to U.S. person information), and the second is the dissemination tracking requirement.
+Question 9. (TS//SI//NF) Correct! The dissemination tracking requirement applies to both U.S. person and non-U.S. person BR- or PR/TT-derived information.
+(TS//SI//NF) Incorrect. The dissemination tracking requirement applies to both U.S. person and non-U.S. person BR- and PR/TT-derived information.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 36 of 39
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| DATE/PREPARER: 11/23/2010 SLS | Topic (U) Knowledge Check 3 | Page Classification TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN | Screen Number 26 of 27 |
+| :--------------------------- | :-------------------------- | :---------------------------------------- | :------------------- |
+| | Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next |
+| FRAME ID: 4210 | (U) Knowledge Check 3 |
+| | 10. (TS//SI//NF) For the purpose of the BR and PR/TT Programs [REDACTED] refers to the distribution of information to external customers in any form. [REDACTED] is the provision of BR and PR/TT FISA query results with insiders of NSA authorized to receive BR and PR/TT query results. |
+| NEXT FRAME ID: 4220 | a) Dissemination, Distribution |
+| | b) Sharing, Dissemination |
+| | c) Dissemination, Sharing |
+| | d) Sharing, Distributing |
+| BACK FRAME ID: 4200 | 11. (TS//SI//NF) Which one of the following NSA positions does not have the authority to approve the dissemination of BR- or PR/TT-derived unminimized U.S. person information? |
+| ALT TAG: | a) The OGC's Chief OGC |
+| GRAPHIC/AV: | b) The Director and Deputy Director of the Signals Intelligence Directorate |
+| | c) The Director and Deputy Director of NSA |
+| | d) The Office of General Counsel (OGC) |
+| | e) The Chief and Deputy Chief of Information Sharing Services |
+| (No audio or transcript on this page) | |
+
+ANSWERS:
+Question 10. (TS//SI//NF) Correct! Dissemination is the more formal distribution of information to customers in either oral or written form. Sharing is the provision of BR and PR/TT FISA query results with others inside of NSA authorized to receive BR and PR/TT query results.
+(TS//SI//NF) Incorrect. The correct answer is c) Dissemination is the more formal distribution of information to external customers in either oral or written form. Sharing is the provision of BR and PR/TT FISA query results with others inside of NSA authorized to receive BR and PR/TT query results.
+Question 11. (TS//SI//NF) Correct! The dissemination tracking requirement applies to both U.S. person and non-U.S. person BR- or PR/TT-derived unminimized U.S. person information.
+(TS//SI//NF) Incorrect. The answer is d) The OGC does not have the authority to approve the dissemination of BR- or PR/TT-derived unminimized U.S. person information.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 37 of 39
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| DATE/PREPARER: 11/23/2010 SLS | Topic (U) Summary | Page Classification TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN | Screen Number 27 of 27 |
+| :--------------------------- | :---------------- | :---------------------------------------- | :------------------- |
+| | Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next |
+| FRAME ID: 4220 | (U) Now that we have completed this part of your trip you should be able to: |
+| | * (TS//SI//NF) Distinguish between the analysts authorized to query BR and PR/TT metadata and those authorized to view query results |
+| | * (TS//SI//NF) Recognize the contact chaining restrictions for RAS-approved identifiers |
+| | * (TS//SI//NF) Recognize what constitutes unique BR and PR/TT query results |
+| NEXT FRAME ID: N/A | * (TS//SI//NF) Identify limitations that impact access, sharing, dissemination and retention of BR and PR/TT query results |
+| | * (TS//SI//NF) Recognize the BR and PR/TT dissemination tracking requirement and the additional CT nexus requirement for U.S. person identifiers |
+| BACK FRAME ID: 4210 | |
+| ALT TAG: | |
+| GRAPHIC/AV: (U) Image of OGC Attorney, HMC Character, and SV Character sitting at a table | |
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): Remember, you are responsible for ensuring that the recipient of query results is authorized to receive these results. Also, you must be mindful of the special restrictions for dissemination, either oral or written, of the BR- and PR/TT-derived information.
+
+(U) (OGC Attorney): Now that we have completed this part of the trip you should be able to:
+* (TS//SI//NF) Distinguish between the analysts authorized to query BR and PR/TT metadata and those authorized to view query results
+* (TS//SI//NF) Recognize the contact chaining restrictions for RAS-approved identifiers
+* (TS//SI//NF) Recognize what constitutes unique BR and PR/TT query results
+* (TS//SI//NF) Identify limitations that impact access, sharing, dissemination, and retention of BR and PR/TT query results
+* (TS//SI//NF) Recognize the BR and PR/TT dissemination tracking requirement and the additional CT nexus requirement for U.S. person identifiers
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 38 of 39
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| | CT Nexus | Dissemination Tracking |
+| :---------------------- | :------- | :--------------------- |
+| U.S. person | X | X |
+| Minimized U.S. person Info "U.S. Person #1" | | X |
+| Foreign Person "John Doe" | X | X |
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 39 of 39
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_4/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_4/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f7ee5f7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_4/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+{
+ "title": "NSA Course Materials: Module 4",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Module 4 of 2011 NSA Course Materials regarding the agency’s metadata collection programs under Sections 501 and 402 of FISA. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [
+ "training",
+ "students",
+ "analysts",
+ "personnel",
+ "teaching"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2011-10-17",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "SI"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-18",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/nsa-course-materials-module-4",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [
+ {
+ "id": "ODNI_-_CLEANEDOVSC1205_L4_storyboard_v28_Final"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "dbc091397397d65b8cee19c0b75eece49c01b26f11e0f038dfe57fcf9adbdc25",
+ "pages": 39
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_5/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_5.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_5/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_5.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bc275c0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_5/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_5.md
@@ -0,0 +1,366 @@
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+**Version 24 (Final)**
+**Last Updated 10/6/11**
+**Includes CAO Review feedback**
+
+**COURSE:** (TS//SI//NF) OVSC1205 Special Training on FISA (Analytical)
+**COURSE:** (TS//SI//NF) OVSC1206 Special Training on FISA (Technical)
+**Module 5: (U) The Analytical and Technical Work Roles**
+
+| Topic | Page Classification | Screen Number |
+| :------------------------- | :--------------------------- | :------------ |
+| (U) Module Introduction | TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN | 1 of 8 |
+| **Home** | **Exit** | **Glossary** | **Back** | **Next** |
+
+---
+
+**DATE/PREPARER:** SLS
+**FRAME ID:** 5010
+**NEXT FRAME ID:** 5020
+**BACK FRAME ID:** n/a
+**ALT TAG:**
+
+**GRAPHIC/AV:**
+(U) Insert image of HMC Character and
+Technical Character sitting at a table
+
+**(U) Module 5**
+
+**(U) The Analytical and Technical Work Roles**
+
+**(U) This module will enable you to:**
+* (U) Compare and contrast the analytical and technical work roles
+* (U) Identify analytical and technical personnel's authorization to touch the data
+* (U) Identify how the authorities impact interactions with other roles and the data
+
+(U) (Technical Character): During this part of our trip we will compare and contrast the analytical and technical work roles and provide you with a basic knowledge of the two distinct areas. This will serve as an introduction to the more role-specific module you will complete later.
+
+**(U) This module will enable you to:**
+* (U) Compare and contrast the analytical and technical work roles
+* (U) Identify analytical and technical personnel's authorization to touch the data
+* (U) Identify how the authorities impact interactions with other roles and the data
+
+---
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 1 of 10
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20070108
+Declassify On: 20350501
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| Topic | Page Classification | Screen Number |
+| :---------------------- | :--------------------------- | :------------ |
+| (U) The Analytical Work Role | TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN | 2 of 8 |
+| **Home** | **Exit** | **Glossary** | **Back** | **Next** |
+
+---
+
+**DATE/PREPARER:** SLS
+**FRAME ID:** 5020
+**NEXT FRAME ID:** 5030
+**BACK FRAME ID:** 5010
+**ALT TAG:**
+
+**GRAPHIC/AV:**
+(U) Begin with image of HMC Character
+and Technical Character sitting at a table,
+then provide a close up of the HMC
+Character
+
+**(U) The Analytical Work Role**
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The Analytical Work Role includes these primary functions:
+* HMC
+* Those who conduct intelligence analysis queries
+* Those who can view and disseminate the results of intelligence analysis queries
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (HMC Character): The analytical work role includes three primary functions: Homeland Mission Coordinators (HMC), those who can conduct intelligence analysis queries, and those who can view and disseminate the results of intelligence analysis queries.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Homeland Mission Coordinators, or HMCs, review and approve the RAS nominations. The analysts and HMCs work through the RAS approval process together to get the identifiers RAS-approved.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Recall from the last module that not all analysts are permitted to conduct contact chaining queries. Those who are permitted to conduct queries of the bulk metadata have been granted [REDACTED] credentials. Those who are permitted to view and disseminate query results, but not conduct queries, have been granted [REDACTED] credentials.
+
+---
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 2 of 10
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| Topic | Page Classification | Screen Number |
+| :---------------------- | :--------------------------- | :------------ |
+| (U) The Technical Work Role | TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN | 3 of 8 |
+| **Home** | **Exit** | **Glossary** | **Back** | **Next** |
+
+---
+
+**DATE/PREPARER:** SLS
+**FRAME ID:** 5030
+**NEXT FRAME ID:** 5040
+**BACK FRAME ID:** 5020
+**ALT TAG:**
+
+**GRAPHIC/AV:**
+(U) Begin with image of HMC Character
+and Technical Character sitting at a table,
+then provide a close up of the Technical
+Character
+
+**(U) The Technical Work Role**
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The Technical Work Role is made up of two main functions:
+* Support to Collection and Metadata [REDACTED]
+* Support to Storage, Presentation, and Maintenance
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (Technical Character): The work performed by technical personnel in support of the Bulk Metadata Programs assists everyone working in support of these programs to maintain compliance with applicable legal documents and relevant authorities. Within the technical roles, there are two main areas of responsibility: collection and metadata [REDACTED] and the storage, presentation, and maintenance of the metadata.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Some high-level examples of how key organizations support collection and metadata [REDACTED] include:
+* [REDACTED] to gain access to BR and PR/TT metadata.
+* [REDACTED] develops protocol processing software that supports the collection and metadata [REDACTED] and standardization.
+* Mission Capabilities (TD) integrates the BR and PR/TT protocol processing software into the larger exploitation systems.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED] and Mission Capabilities also support the storage, presentation, and maintenance aspects of the Bulk Metadata Programs, and some high-level examples include:
+* Mission Capabilities manages the BR and PR/TT repositories, as well as prepares the metadata for the analysts to use.
+* [REDACTED] provides reasonable assurance that the data is normalized and presented in a usable format and provides support to intelligence analysts.
+
+---
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 3 of 10
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| Topic | Page Classification | Screen Number |
+| :------------------------ | :--------------------------- | :------------ |
+| (U) Authorization to Touch the Data | TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN | 4 of 8 |
+| **Home** | **Exit** | **Glossary** | **Back** | **Next** |
+
+---
+
+**DATE/PREPARER:** SLS
+**FRAME ID:** 5040
+**NEXT FRAME ID:** 5050
+**BACK FRAME ID:** 5030
+**ALT TAG:**
+
+**GRAPHIC/AV:**
+(U) Insert image of HMC Character and
+Technical Character sitting at a table
+
+**(U) Authorization to Touch the Data**
+
+(U) Analytical and technical personnel have different authorization to touch the metadata due to the nature of their work roles
+
+**(U) Authorization for Analytical Personnel**
+
+* (TS//SI/[REDACTED]) Perform intelligence analysis (querying the data)
+
+**(U) Authorizations for Technical Personnel**
+
+* [REDACTED] Create, test, and implement tools to make this data easier for analytic personnel to use (TS/[REDACTED])
+ * Validate that safeguards appropriately control analyst's access
+* (TS//SI/[REDACTED]) Perform processes to make the data usable
+ * Validation
+ * Defeat of collection
+ * Processing
+ * Analysis of high-volume identifiers
+ * Maintenance of records to demonstrate compliance
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (Technical Character): As we have discussed throughout the course, the sensitivity of the data drives many of the policies and restrictions that control access to the BR and PR/TT bulk metadata. However, because of the different roles and responsibilities of analytical and technical personnel, both have different authorizations to touch the metadata. Recall from Module 1 we defined "touching the data" as any form of data handling that creates an opportunity for a violation of the FISC Orders to occur. These activities may include data acquisition, modifying/preparing the data, querying, viewing results of the queries, and even oversight and compliance functions.
+
+Analytic Personnel Info (audio file name OVSC_1205_M5_5040_A):
+(TS//SI//NF) (HMC Character): Analytic personnel have authorization to touch the metadata to perform intelligence analysis. Analyst actions, such as querying the metadata for intelligence analysis purposes, must be done in a controlled way via tools designed to limit intelligence analysis access to RAS-approved identifiers and to the appropriate number of hops. Using these tools also provides reasonable assurance that these queries are tracked and
+
+---
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 4 of 10
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+audited.
+
+Technical Personnel Info (audio file name OVSC_1205_M5_5040_T):
+(TS//SI//NF) (Technical Character): Technical personnel create, test, and implement tools to make this data easier for analytic personnel to use, while validating that safeguards appropriately control analysts' access to the bulk metadata. Additionally, technical personnel may access the metadata to perform those processes needed to make the metadata usable for intelligence analysis. These processes may include metadata validation; the defeat of the collection, processing, or analysis of metadata associated with [REDACTED] identifiers; and the maintenance of records to demonstrate compliance with the terms of the authority.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In order to do this work effectively, technical personnel are allowed to access the metadata using identifiers that are not RAS-approved. In the case of [REDACTED] identifiers, technical personnel may use non-RAS-approved identifiers to query the metadata to confirm if the identifier is a [REDACTED] identifier and thus should not be included for target analysis. They may then share the identifier and the fact that it is a [REDACTED] identifier with authorized personnel. However, no other information resulting from such queries can be used for intelligence analysis purposes.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Technical personnel must take great care with their responsibilities because they may be accessing the data through tools that do not have safeguards, such as [REDACTED] that impose restrictions and minimize the chances of a violation of the FISC Orders. As a result, we need to maintain boundaries between technical and analytical personnel, and be crystal clear as to the circumstances under which the two groups can interact.
+
+---
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 5 of 10
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| Topic | Page Classification | Screen Number |
+| :---------------------- | :--------------------------- | :------------ |
+| (U) Interaction Between Analytical and Technical Personnel | TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN | 5 of 8 |
+| **Home** | **Exit** | **Glossary** | **Back** | **Next** |
+
+---
+
+**DATE/PREPARER:** SLS
+**FRAME ID:** 5050
+**NEXT FRAME ID:** 5060
+**BACK FRAME ID:** 5040
+**ALT TAG:**
+
+**GRAPHIC/AV:**
+(U) Insert image of HMC Character and
+Technical Character sitting at a table
+
+**(U) Interaction Between Analytical and Technical Personnel**
+
+(U) (Begin with image of analytical and Technical Character sitting at a table, then provide a close up of the Technical Character)
+
+(TS//SI//NF) All interactions must be based on RAS-approved identifiers and those results found within the number of hops authorized for intelligence analysis purposes
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (Technical Character): As we just discussed, analytical and technical personnel have different authorizations to touch this metadata. Because of these different authorizations, we must be careful when the two types of personnel are interacting with regard to this metadata. Specifically, outside of the sharing of [REDACTED] identifiers for defeat purposes, technical personnel should only be providing analytical personnel information under certain conditions.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (HMC Character): Sometimes, when analyzing the results of intelligence analysis queries, one or more of the specific results may seem out of the ordinary. Is it a [REDACTED] identifier that was overlooked? Is the identifier misnormalized? Is there something that just seems out of place? Or perhaps there is a particular data field in your results that you don't understand. In such instances, intelligence analysts may require assistance from certain technical personnel responsible for data integrity functions.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (Technical Character): In these instances, technical personnel may assist authorized intelligence analysts, but any and all assistance must be based on RAS-approved identifiers and those results found within the number of hops authorized for intelligence analysis purposes. Essentially, when providing information to analytical personnel in these circumstances, the technical personnel must abide by the rules for the analytical personnel.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (Technical Character): In the end, all personnel have a vested interest and shared responsibility in ensuring that only the most accurate intelligence information is reported to customers, while abiding by the policies and requirements in place for this metadata.
+
+---
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 6 of 10
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| Topic | Page Classification | Screen Number |
+| :---------------------- | :--------------------------- | :------------ |
+| (U) Knowledge Check | TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN | 6 of 8 |
+| **Home** | **Exit** | **Glossary** | **Back** | **Next** |
+
+---
+
+**DATE/PREPARER:** SLS
+**FRAME ID:** 5060
+**NEXT FRAME ID:** 5070
+**BACK FRAME ID:** 5050
+**ALT TAG:**
+
+**GRAPHIC/AV:**
+
+**(U) Knowledge Check**
+
+**1. (TS//SI//NF) TRUE or FALSE: Technical personnel and analytic work roles have the same authorization to touch the bulk metadata.**
+a) TRUE
+b) FALSE
+
+**2. (TS//SI//NF) The Analytic Work Role includes these functions: intelligence analysts who query the data, intelligence analysts who can view the results of intelligence analysis queries, and [REDACTED]**
+a) Mission Capabilities (TD)
+b) [REDACTED]
+c) Homeland Mission Coordinators (HMC)
+d) [REDACTED]
+
+**3. (TS//SI//NF) The Technical Work Roles are comprised of two general areas of responsibility including 1) [REDACTED] and 2) [REDACTED]**
+a) 1) collection and metadata [REDACTED] 2) reviewing RAS nominations
+b) 1) collection of content, 2) storage, presentation, and maintenance of the metadata
+c) 1) reviewing RAS nominations, 2) working with the telecommunications partners
+d) 1) collection and metadata [REDACTED] 2) storage, presentation, and maintenance of the metadata
+
+(U) (Technical Character): Let's make a few notes in our travel journal and see what we remember from this topic.
+
+**ANSWERS:**
+**Question 1.** (TS//SI//NF) Correct! The answer is b) FALSE. Technical personnel have authority to make the metadata usable for intelligence analysis, while analytical personnel can only touch the bulk metadata for intelligence analysis purposes using RAS-approved identifiers within the authorized number of hops.
+(TS//SI//NF) Incorrect. The correct answer is b) FALSE. Technical personnel have authority to make the metadata usable for intelligence analysis, while analytical personnel can only touch the bulk metadata for intelligence analysis purposes using RAS-approved identifiers within the authorized number of hops.
+
+---
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 7 of 10
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+**Question 2.** (TS//SI//NF) Correct! The correct answer is c). The Analytical Work Role includes analysts and Homeland Mission Coordinators (HMC).
+(TS//SI//NF) Incorrect. The correct answer is c). The Analytical Work Role includes analysts and Homeland Mission Coordinators (HMC).
+
+**Question 3.** (TS//SI//NF) Right! The correct answer is d). The Technical Work Roles are comprised of two general areas of support including collection and metadata [REDACTED] as well as storage, presentation, and maintenance of the metadata.
+(TS//SI//NF) Incorrect. The correct answer is d). The Technical Work Roles are comprised of two general areas of support including collection and metadata [REDACTED] as well as storage, presentation, and maintenance of the metadata.
+
+---
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 8 of 10
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| Topic | Page Classification | Screen Number |
+| :---------------------- | :--------------------------- | :------------ |
+| (U) Knowledge Check | TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN | 7 of 8 |
+| **Home** | **Exit** | **Glossary** | **Back** | **Next** |
+
+---
+
+**DATE/PREPARER:** SLS
+**FRAME ID:** 5070
+**NEXT FRAME ID:** 5080
+**BACK FRAME ID:** 5060
+**ALT TAG:**
+
+**GRAPHIC/AV:**
+
+**(U) Knowledge Check**
+
+**4. (TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED] staff have access to the bulk metadata in order to prepare the metadata for the analysts to use.**
+a) [REDACTED]
+b) Mission Capabilities (TD)
+c) Analytical
+d) Office of General Counsel (OGC)
+
+**5. (TS//SI//NF) If an intelligence analyst seeks assistance from technical personnel, technical personnel [REDACTED]**
+a) can query the metadata to confirm the analyst's results and point out potentially noteworthy contacts at the third or fourth hop
+b) should explain that they are unable to assist in any way, except to identify [REDACTED] identifiers
+c) may offer assistance, but must be cautious that any results shared or discussed are based on a RAS-approved identifiers and those results that fall within the number of hops authorized for intelligence analysis purposes
+d) should provide whatever assistance is needed, but make a note of it in case anyone in management has questions later
+e) should decline to assist because technical personnel should not assist intelligence analysts
+
+(No audio or transcript on this page)
+
+**Question 4.** (TS//SI//NF) Correct! Mission Capabilities staff has access to the bulk metadata in order to prepare the metadata for the analysts to use.
+(TS//SI//NF) Incorrect. The correct answer is b). Mission Capabilities staff has access to the bulk metadata in order to prepare the metadata for the analysts to use.
+
+**Question 5.** (TS//SI//NF) Correct! If an intelligence analyst seeks assistance from technical personnel, technical personnel may offer assistance, but must be cautious that any results shared or discussed are based on RAS-approved identifiers and those results that fall within the number of hops authorized for intelligence analysis purposes.
+(TS//SI//NF) Incorrect. The correct answer is c). If an intelligence analyst seeks assistance from technical personnel, technical personnel may offer assistance, but must be cautious that any results shared or discussed are based on RAS-approved identifiers and those results that fall within the number of hops authorized for intelligence analysis purposes.
+
+---
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 9 of 10
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| Topic | Page Classification | Screen Number |
+| :------------ | :--------------------------- | :------------ |
+| (U) Summary | TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN | 8 of 8 |
+| **Home** | **Exit** | **Glossary** | **Back** | **Next** |
+
+---
+
+**DATE/PREPARER:** SLS
+**FRAME ID:** 5080
+**NEXT FRAME ID:** 5090
+**BACK FRAME ID:** 5070
+**ALT TAG:**
+
+**GRAPHIC/AV:**
+(U) Insert image of HMC Character and
+Technical Character sitting at a table
+
+**(U) Summary**
+
+**(U) Now that you have completed this module you should be able to:**
+* (U) Compare and contrast the analytical and technical work roles
+* (U) Identify analytical and technical personnel's authorization to touch the data
+* (U) Identify how the authorities impact interactions with other roles and the data
+
+(U) (Technical Character): Now that we have completed this part of our road trip, you should be able to:
+* (U) Compare and contrast the analytical and technical work roles
+* (U) Identify analytical and technical personnel's authorization to touch the data
+* (U) Identify how the authorities impact interactions with other roles and the data
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (Technical Character): Now that you are aware of the various roles that support the BR and PR/TT Programs you will move on to your role-specific module that will go into additional detail on topics relevant to your responsibilities.
+
+---
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 10 of 10
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_5/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_5/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..06d0659
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_5/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+{
+ "title": "NSA Course Materials: Module 5",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Module 5 of 2011 NSA Course Materials regarding the agency’s metadata collection programs under Sections 501 and 402 of FISA. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [
+ "training",
+ "students",
+ "analysts",
+ "personnel",
+ "teaching"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2011-10-07",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "SI"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-18",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/nsa-course-materials-module-5",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [
+ {
+ "id": "ODNI_-_CLEANEDOVSC1205_L5_storyboard_v24_Final"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "c98d7f4a84c41bade243cd1d9c7a23b994e3f789c9ae6762aa6cef8680c2fa5f",
+ "pages": 10
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_6_for_Analytical_Personnel/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_6_for_Analytical_Personnel.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_6_for_Analytical_Personnel/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_6_for_Analytical_Personnel.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c18b043
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_6_for_Analytical_Personnel/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_6_for_Analytical_Personnel.md
@@ -0,0 +1,528 @@
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+**COURSE:** (TS//SI//NF) OVSC1205 Special Training on FISA (Analytical)
+**Module 6:** (U) The Analytical Work Role
+
+| Topic | Page Classification | Page Number | Version 18 (Final) Updated 10/17/11 Includes CAO feedback changes |
+| :------------------------ | :-------------------------- | :---------- | :---------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| (U) Module Introduction | TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN | 1 of 12 | |
+
+| Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next |
+| :--- | :--- | :------- | :--- | :--- |
+
+**DATE/PREPARER:**
+
+**FRAME ID:** 6010
+
+**NEXT FRAME ID:** 6020
+
+**BACK FRAME ID:** n/a
+
+**ALT TAG:**
+
+**GRAPHIC/AV:**
+
+---
+
+**(U) Module 6**
+
+**(U) The Analytical Work Role**
+
+**(U) This module will enable you to:**
+
+* (TS//SI//NF) Identify how BR and PR/TT fit into the analytic workflow
+* (TS//SI//NF) Recognize how BR and PR/TT authorities apply to real-life scenarios
+
+---
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): Throughout the first five modules of our course, we have discussed the BR and PR/TT Orders and the policies and procedures NSA has implemented to provide reasonable assurance of compliance with the Orders. We also have looked at the community of people and the work roles that are involved across the Enterprise to support that aspect of the mission.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (HMC Character): This part of our trip is designed specifically for anyone working in an analytical role, or supervising staff in an analytical role, in support of the BR and PR/TT Bulk Metadata Programs. In particular we will discuss facets of BR and PR/TT that are of interest to analysts and HMCs. This module will enable you to:
+* (FS//SI//NF) Identify how BR and PR/TT fit into the analytic workflow
+* (TS//SI//NF) Recognize how BR and PR/TT authorities apply to real-life scenarios
+
+Classified By: slsanc2
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20070108
+Declassify On: 20350501
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 1 of 12
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| Topic | Page Classification | Page Number |
+| :------------------------ | :-------------------------- | :---------- |
+| (U) The CT Analyst's Toolkit | TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN | 2 of 12 |
+
+| Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next |
+| :--- | :--- | :------- | :--- | :--- |
+
+**DATE/PREPARER:**
+
+**FRAME ID:** 6020
+
+**NEXT FRAME ID:** 6030
+
+**BACK FRAME ID:** 6010
+
+**ALT TAG:**
+
+**GRAPHIC/AV:**
+
+---
+
+(TS//SI//NF) BR and PR/TT Programs enable NSA to fill collection gaps left by our other authorities
+
+---
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (Display introductory images/graphics pertinent to the Zazi story).
+(TS//SI//NF) Graphic showing the portfolio of CT authorities with BR and PR/TT highlighted. Possible video footage of the arrest.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (HMC Character): In Module 1, we mentioned that in order to gain comprehensive insight into a target's activities, it is often necessary to leverage multiple authorities and tools. CT targets have maintained an ongoing desire to conduct attacks within the United States. Given the unique U.S.-focus of the BR and PR/TT Programs, NSA is able to fill collection gaps left by our other authorities.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) To illustrate how these various authorities can complement each other to fill critical gaps, as well as to show how BR and PR/TT fit into the analytic workflow, we'll step through the example of Najibullah Zazi and the New York subway plot.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 2 of 12
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| Topic | Page Classification | Page Number |
+| :------------------------------ | :-------------------------- | :---------- |
+| (U) Applying BR and PR/TT in the Analytic Work Flow | TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN | 3 of 12 |
+
+| Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next |
+| :--- | :--- | :------- | :--- | :--- |
+
+**DATE/PREPARER:**
+
+**FRAME ID:** 6030
+
+**NEXT FRAME ID:** 6040
+
+**BACK FRAME ID:** 6020
+
+**ALT TAG:**
+
+**GRAPHIC/AV:**
+
+---
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (HMC Character): CT analysts discovered a Pakistan-based email address associated with external operations the analysts tasked the address to FAA 702 and reviewed the subsequent traffic on a regular basis.
+
+---
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Graphic showing the portfolio of CT authorities with BR and PR/TT highlighted
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In Fall of 2009, one particular piece of content collection obtained from FAA 702 revealed an email exchange between a Pakistan-based target and an unknown individual suggesting that an unspecified terrorist operation was about to take place. Within this email, the analyst also discovered what appeared to be a U.S.-based phone number that was missing the country code(note).
+note: Comment [a1]: Graphic of 2 terrorists sending email to each other, show email indicating threat and containing a number without country code
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 3 of 12
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| Topic | Page Classification | Page Number |
+| :------------------------------ | :-------------------------- | :---------- |
+| (U) Applying BR and PR/TT in the Analytic Work Flow | TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN | 4 of 12 |
+
+| Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next |
+| :--- | :--- | :------- | :--- | :--- |
+
+**DATE/PREPARER:**
+
+**FRAME ID:** 6040
+
+**NEXT FRAME ID:** 6050
+
+**BACK FRAME ID:** 6030
+
+**ALT TAG:**
+
+**GRAPHIC/AV:**
+
+---
+
+---
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Graphic showing the portfolio of CT authorities with BR and PR/TT highlighted
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (HMC Character): NSA reported the suspicious activity and minimized U.S. phone number in a standard EGRAM. After receiving the unminimized U.S. phone number through NSA's Identity Release process, the FBI learned that the user of the unknown email address and owner of the phone number was a Colorado-based individual named Najibullah Zazi. FBI immediately started an investigation into Zazi's activities(note).
+
+note: Comment [a2]: Maybe show report or something similar - to send serial numbers
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 4 of 12
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| Topic | Page Classification | Page Number |
+| :------------------------------ | :-------------------------- | :---------- |
+| (U) Applying BR and PR/TT in the Analytic Work Flow | TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN | 5 of 12 |
+
+| Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next |
+| :--- | :--- | :------- | :--- | :--- |
+
+**DATE/PREPARER:**
+
+**FRAME ID:** 6050
+
+**NEXT FRAME ID:** 6060
+
+**BACK FRAME ID:** 6040
+
+**ALT TAG:**
+
+**GRAPHIC/AV:**
+
+---
+
+(TS//SI//NF)
+U.S. person Najibullah Zazi is the user of [REDACTED]
+According to SIGINT reporting [REDACTED] a Pakistan-based al-Qa'ida (AQ) facilitator, [REDACTED] received an email from Najibullah Zazi on 6 September 2009
+[REDACTED] Zazi also provided his [REDACTED] phone number.
+
+---
+
+(U) Show graphic of the RAS equation here.
+(TS//SI//NF) Graphic showing the portfolio of CT authorities with BR and PR/TT highlighted
+(U) Highlight the important parts of the statement
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (HMC Character): Simultaneously, to gain a fuller picture of Zazi's contacts, an NSA CT analyst submitted a RAS-approval request to an HMC on Zazi's phone number and email address. Recall from Module 3 that, in order to meet the RAS standard, an identifier must be tied to specific [REDACTED]. In this case, the analyst met the RAS standard by basing the justification on the fact that Zazi was in direct communication with the Pakistan-based email address used by a member of [REDACTED]. Because Zazi is a U.S. person, after the RAS requests on Zazi's identifiers were reviewed by an HMC, they were then sent to OGC, who performed a First Amendment review and gave the final approval(note)(note2).
+
+note: Comment [a3]: Graphic of RAS template
+note2: Comment [chr4]: With the RAS 'template' are we going to pull up the key items in text bubbles or a 'cloud' ala the rainbow slide presentation?
+
+(TS//SI//NF) When considering RAS, analysts should remember to include just the basic facts needed with supporting documentation, as was done in the Zazi case, and not clutter the justification with excess information or documentation.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 5 of 12
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| Topic | Page Classification | Page Number |
+| :------------------------------ | :-------------------------- | :---------- |
+| (U) Applying BR and PR/TT in the Analytic Work Flow | TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN | 6 of 12 |
+
+| Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next |
+| :--- | :--- | :------- | :--- | :--- |
+
+**DATE/PREPARER:**
+
+**FRAME ID:** 6060
+
+**NEXT FRAME ID:** 6070
+
+**BACK FRAME ID:** 6050
+
+**ALT TAG:**
+
+**GRAPHIC/AV:**
+
+---
+
+---
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Graphic showing the portfolio of CT authorities with BR and PR/TT highlighted
+(U) Use screen shots to illustrate main points
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (HMC Character): After the RAS requests were approved, using the BR and PR/TT modes of [REDACTED] CT analysts began running federated metadata queries on the approved identifiers, as we discussed in Module 4. The analyst querying Zazi's Colorado phone number discovered that around the time that Zazi exchanged emails with the [REDACTED] he had also contacted [REDACTED] phone numbers. Using the guidance that we discussed in Module 4, the analyst determined that Zazi's contacts with these [REDACTED] numbers were unique to BR metadata. Based on this uniqueness, the analyst began drafting a report in accordance with the dissemination guideli [REDACTED] we reviewed in Module 4. Before the report was released, the Chief of S12 determined that the report met the CT Nexus criteria and approved its release(note).
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Remember, even "fact of" statements describing what BR- or PR/TT-unique data was discovered are considered "query results" under FISC guidelines and must be handled in accordance with the Court Orders. However, once formally disseminated to customers, it no longer requires the [REDACTED] protection and is treated as normal SIGINT analysis, as is the case with the example we have just described.
+
+note: Comment [a5]: Use one of screenshots showing what a chain/query looks like
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 6 of 12
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| Topic | Page Classification | Page Number |
+| :------------------------------ | :-------------------------- | :---------- |
+| (U) Applying BR and PR/TT in the Analytic Work Flow | TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN | 7 of 12 |
+
+| Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next |
+| :--- | :--- | :------- | :--- | :--- |
+
+**DATE/PREPARER:**
+
+**FRAME ID:** 6070
+
+**NEXT FRAME ID:** 6080
+
+**BACK FRAME ID:** 6060
+
+**ALT TAG:**
+
+**GRAPHIC/AV:**
+
+---
+
+---
+
+(TS//SI//NF) News report of the arrest (Raid/conviction in New York)
+(U) Use screen shots to illustrate main points
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (HMC Character):
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 7 of 12
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| Topic | Page Classification | Screen Number |
+| :-------------------- | :-------------------------- | :------------ |
+| (U) Knowledge Check 1 | TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN | 8 of 12 |
+
+| Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next |
+| :--- | :--- | :------- | :--- | :--- |
+
+**DATE/PREPARER:** SLS
+
+**FRAME ID:** 6080
+
+**NEXT FRAME ID:** 6081
+
+**BACK FRAME ID:** 6070
+
+**ALT TAG:**
+
+**GRAPHIC/AV:**
+
+---
+
+**(U) Knowledge Check**
+
+**1. (TS//SI//NF) In the Zazi scenario, analysts used E.O. 12333 and FAA 702 collection to support RAS. Which source(s) can be used to support RAS?**
+a) (U) FBI reporting
+b) (U) Open source information
+c) (TS//SI//NF) NSA FISA collection
+d) (U) All the sources above can be used
+
+**2. (TS//SI//NF) Why was the RAS request for Zazi sent to OGC for a First Amendment review?**
+a) (TS//SI//NF) All RAS requests go to OGC for a First Amendment review
+b) (TS//SI//NF) Zazi is a U.S. person
+c) (TS//SI//NF) Zazi is a member of al-Qa'ida or an associated terrorist group
+d) (TS//SI//NF) The RAS determination was a close call
+
+---
+
+(U) (HMC Character): Let's make a few notes in our travel journal and check to see what you remember from this topic!
+
+Question 1. (U//FOUO) Correct! Any information that is lawfully in our possession may be used to support a RAS determination.
+(U//FOUO) Incorrect, the correct answer is d). Any information that is lawfully in our possession may be used to support a RAS determination.
+
+Question 2. (U//FOUO) Correct! A First Amendment review is only necessary when the identifier is believed to belong to a U.S. person.
+(U//FOUO) Incorrect, the correct answer is b). A First Amendment review is only necessary when the identifier is believed to belong to a U.S. person.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 8 of 12
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| Topic | Page Classification | Screen Number |
+| :-------------------- | :-------------------------- | :------------ |
+| (U) Knowledge Check 1 | TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN | 8 of 12 |
+
+| Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next |
+| :--- | :--- | :------- | :--- | :--- |
+
+**DATE/PREPARER:** SLS
+
+**FRAME ID:** 6081
+
+**NEXT FRAME ID:** 6100
+
+**BACK FRAME ID:** 6080
+
+**ALT TAG:**
+
+**GRAPHIC/AV:**
+
+---
+
+**(U) Knowledge Check**
+
+**3) (TS//SI//NF) In this scenario, information was discovered that was unique to the BR authority. If that same information had also been discovered in E.O. 12333 collection, a CT Nexus determination would still need to be made in order to disseminate that information because the information was in the BR repository.**
+a) (U) True
+b) (U) False
+
+**4) (TS//SI//NF) Why are students without [REDACTED] allowed to learn that Zazi had contact with other New York numbers?**
+a) (TS//SI//NF) That information is not specific enough to qualify as [REDACTED]
+b) (TS//SI//NF) The information is over one year old
+c) (TS//SI//NF) The information has been previously disseminated outside of NSA
+d) (TS//SI//NF) It is being shared for training purposes
+
+---
+
+(No audio or transcript on this page)
+
+Question 3. (TS//SI//NF) Correct! If the same information is discovered through another source, neither the BR nor PR/TT rules and requirements apply.
+(TS//SI//NF) Incorrect. The correct answer is b) (False). Neither the BR nor PR/TT rules and requirements apply if the same information is discovered through another source.
+
+Question 4. (TS//SI//NF) Correct! The information can be disclosed to those without [REDACTED] because it has previously been disseminated outside of NSA.
+(TS//SI//NF) Incorrect. The correct answer is c). The information can be disclosed to those without [REDACTED] only because it has previously been disseminated outside of NSA.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 9 of 12
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| Topic | Page Classification | Screen Number |
+| :------------------------ | :-------------------------- | :------------ |
+| (U) Practice Scenario 1 | TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN | 9 of 12 |
+
+| Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next |
+| :--- | :--- | :------- | :--- | :--- |
+
+**DATE/PREPARER:** SLS
+
+**FRAME ID:** 6090
+
+**NEXT FRAME ID:** 6100
+
+**BACK FRAME ID:** 6081
+
+**ALT TAG:**
+
+**GRAPHIC/AV:**
+
+---
+
+**(U) Practice Scenario 1**
+
+(TS//SI//NF) You are a [REDACTED] cleared analyst who, through PR/TT metadata analysis of seeds associated with a high value CT target, has identified a PR/TT-unique direct contact - email address [REDACTED] believed to be used by someone in Yemen. You are not sure whether the identifier warrants further development as a target, but to find out you place [REDACTED] in a tasking database to enable content collection from E.O. 12333 sources. This tasking database is widely available to all intelligence analysts in the SIGINT Production Chain. For this reason, you note in the comments field that this identifier was discovered through metadata analysis and is believed to be a direct contact of the high value CT target, but you deliberately avoid identifying the PR/TT metadata as the source of the identifier. Are your actions in compliance with the terms of the PR/TT Orders?
+
+**(U) Please select the your answer:**
+a) (TS//SI//NF) Yes, because you did not include the reference to PR/TT.
+b) (TS//SI//NF) No, because you failed to mark the source of the identifier as PR/TT metadata.
+c) (TS//SI//NF) Yes, because the results will be governed under E.O. 12333 rules and procedures.
+d) (TS//SI//NF) No, because you have shared a PR/TT-unique query result with a wide audience of intelligence analysts, many of whom do not hold current [REDACTED] credentials.
+
+---
+
+(U) (HMC Character): Now let's practice what we have learned using a real-life scenario. Carefully read the scenario and then select the best answer.
+
+**ANSWER:**
+a) (TS//SI//NF) Incorrect. The correct answer is d). No, because you have shared a PR/TT-unique query result with a wide audience of intelligence analysts, many of whom do not hold current [REDACTED] credentials.
+b) (TS//SI//NF) Incorrect. The correct answer is d). No, because you have shared a PR/TT-unique query result with a wide audience of intelligence analysts, many of whom do not hold current [REDACTED] credentials.
+c) (TS//SI//NF) Incorrect. The correct answer is d). No, because you have shared a PR/TT-unique query result with a wide audience of intelligence analysts, many of whom do not hold current [REDACTED] credentials.
+d) (TS//SI//NF) Correct! The right answer is d). No, because you have shared a PR/TT-unique query result with a wide audience of intelligence analysts, many of whom do not hold current [REDACTED] credentials.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 10 of 12
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| Topic | Page Classification | Page Number |
+| :---------- | :-------------------------- | :---------- |
+| (U) Summary | TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN | 10 of 12 |
+
+| Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next |
+| :--- | :--- | :------- | :--- | :--- |
+
+**DATE/PREPARER:**
+
+**FRAME ID:** 6100
+
+**NEXT FRAME ID:** 6110
+
+**BACK FRAME ID:** 6090
+
+**ALT TAG:**
+
+**GRAPHIC/AV:**
+
+---
+
+**(U//FOUO) You should now be able to:**
+
+* (TS//SI//NF) Identify how BR and PR/TT fit into the analytic workflow
+* (TS//SI//NF) Practice applying BR and PR/TT authorities in real-life scenarios
+
+(TS//SI//NF) If you have questions or wish to find out more, please contact your [REDACTED] cleared manager or any of the following BR or PR/TT points of contact:
+
+OGC email alias: DL gc_ops
+OGC Phone: [REDACTED] or 963-3121(s)
+OGC website: go GC
+
+HMCs email alias: DL CT_HMC
+
+SID Oversight and Compliance email alias: DL SV42_all
+
+---
+
+(U//FOUO) (HMC Character): Now that we have completed this part of our road trip, you should be able to:
+* (TS//SI//NF) Identify how BR and PR/TT fit into the analytic workflow
+* (TS//SI//NF) Practice applying BR and PR/TT authorities in a real-life scenario
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (HMC Character): You are encouraged to reach out to your [REDACTED] cleared manager or any of the points of contact listed here if you have any questions or if you want to find out more. Please remember that it is critical to our mission that we are 100% compliant with the requirements in the Court Orders especially with regards to collaborating, sharing, and disseminating this data through the course of your analysis work. You may review this course at any time and seek guidance from any of the points of contact listed here.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 11 of 12
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+| Topic | Page Classification | Screen Number |
+| :------------ | :-------------------------- | :------------ |
+| (U) Next Step | TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN | 11 of 12 |
+
+| Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next |
+| :--- | :--- | :------- | :--- | :--- |
+
+**DATE/PREPARER:** SLS
+
+**FRAME ID:** 6110
+
+**NEXT FRAME ID:** N/A
+
+**BACK FRAME ID:** 6100
+
+**ALT TAG:**
+
+**GRAPHIC/AV:**
+
+---
+
+**(U) PLEASE READ: Important Assessment Information**
+
+* (U) You will view the questions in a separate Assessment Questions Document
+* (U) You will enter your responses in a separate QuestionMark online answer sheet
+* (U) You will have only one attempt to successfully complete the assessment
+* (U) Allow yourself sufficient time (approximately 30 minutes) to complete the assessment
+
+**(U) To Complete the Assessment:**
+
+* (U) Click the link to open the Assessment Questions Document(note)
+* (U) Go to the VUport SumTotal Content Player page, click on the Assessment link, and follow the instructions to complete the required exam
+
+note: Comment [SLS6]: Please make this a link that will open the Assessment Question pdf for Analytical Personnel (we will actually connect the link later).
+
+(U//FOUO) (OGC Attorney): The final part of your trip will be to successfully complete the assessment for the course. Please be aware that for the assessment you will view the questions in a .pdf file and enter your responses in a separate QuestionMark online answer sheet. Please be sure that you open the .pdf with the questions first before opening the QuestionMark online answer sheet. You will have one attempt to complete the assessment. Please allow yourself sufficient time (approximately 30 minutes) to complete the assessment.
+
+(U//FOUO) Please click the Assessment Questions Document link to open the .pdf question file and keep the window open. Then go to the VUport SumTotal Content Player page, click on the Assessment link on the left, and follow the instructions to complete the required exam.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 12 of 12
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_6_for_Analytical_Personnel/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_6_for_Analytical_Personnel/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0881ea7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_6_for_Analytical_Personnel/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+{
+ "title": "NSA Course Materials: Module 6 for Analytical Personnel",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Module 6 of 2011 NSA Course Materials regarding the agency’s metadata collection programs under Sections 501 and 402 of FISA. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [
+ "training",
+ "students",
+ "analysts",
+ "personnel",
+ "teaching"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2011-10-17",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "SI"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [
+ "EGRAM",
+ "VUPORT"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-18",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/nsa-course-materials-module-6-analytical-personnel",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [
+ {
+ "id": "ODNI_-_CLEANEDOVSC1205_L6A_storyboard_v18_Final-Sealed"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "8abdc94d10bd86a312405c2107fcd7a373cc3d5b9971ef884b9e8f051dbada91",
+ "pages": 12
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_6_for_Technical_Personnel/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_6_for_Technical_Personnel.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_6_for_Technical_Personnel/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_6_for_Technical_Personnel.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4ce3aa8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_6_for_Technical_Personnel/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_6_for_Technical_Personnel.md
@@ -0,0 +1,1179 @@
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+COURSE: (TS//SI//NF) OVSC1206 Special Training on FISA (Technical)
+Module 6: (U) The Technical Work Role
+
+DATE/PREPARER: SLS
+FRAME ID: 7010
+
+NEXT FRAME ID: 7020
+
+BACK FRAME ID: n/a
+ALT TAG:
+GRAPHIC/AV:
+(U) Image of Technical Character sitting at
+a desk
+
+Topic
+(U) Module
+Introduction
+
+Page Classification
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN-
+
+Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next
+
+Version 25 (Final)
+Updated 10/13/11
+Includes CAO feedback changes
+
+Screen Number
+1 of 20
+
+(U) Module 6
+
+(U) The Technical Work Role
+
+(U) This module will enable you to:
+* (TS//SI//NF) Identify the various technical roles that support the BR and PR/TT Bulk
+Metadata Programs
+* (U) Identify the responsibilities of each of the technical roles
+* (U) Recognize key points of the compliance certification process for mission
+systems and data flows
+* (TS//SI//NF) Practice applying BR and PR/TT authorities in real-life scenarios
+applicable to technical personnel
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (OGC Attorney): During this part of our trip, we discuss several topics of particular interest to those of you in technical roles, or supervising
+staff in a technical role, supporting the BR and PR/TT Bulk Metadata Programs. It is important for you to remember that the essential support you provide
+enables all of the roles to perform their BR- and PR/TT-related work in compliance with applicable legal documents and relevant authorities. As we
+discussed in Module 5, because of this great responsibility, technical personnel have been given tremendous access to touch the data in order to make it
+available and usable for the analysts.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (Technical Character): In this module we are going to discuss the authorizations, roles, and responsibilities of the Technical Personnel. This
+module will enable you to:
+* (TS//SI//NF) Identify the various technical roles that support the BR and PR/TT Bulk Metadata Programs
+
+Classified By: slsanc2
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20070108
+Declassify On: 20350501
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 1 of 30
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+* (U) Identify the responsibilities of each of the technical roles
+* (U) Recognize key points of the compliance certification process for mission systems and data flows
+* (TS//SI//NF) Practice applying BR and PR/TT authorities in real-life scenarios applicable to technical personnel
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+Page 2 of 30
+DATE/PREPARER: SLS
+FRAME ID: 7020
+
+NEXT FRAME ID: 7030
+
+BACK FRAME ID: 7010
+ALT TAG:
+GRAPHIC/AV:
+(U) Image of Technical Character sitting at
+a desk
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Topic
+(U) Two General Categories of
+Technical Support Roles
+
+Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next
+
+Page Classification
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Screen Number
+2 of 20
+
+(U) Two General Categories of Technical Support Roles
+
+(U) Collection and Metadata [REDACTED]
+
+(U) Storage, Presentation, and Maintenance of the Metadata
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (Technical Character): In Module 5, we explained there are two major areas where technical support is provided for the BR and PR/TT Bulk
+Metadata Programs. The first is the group of technical personnel who are responsible for the collection and metadata [REDACTED] process. The second is the
+group responsible for storage, presentation, and maintenance of the BR and PR/TT metadata. In the next few screens, we will describe in more detail these
+two main areas of responsibility.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+Page 3 of 30
+DATE/PREPARER: SLS
+FRAME ID: 7030
+
+NEXT FRAME ID: 7040
+
+BACK FRAME ID: 7020
+ALT TAG:
+GRAPHIC/AV:
+(U) Have the Collection and Metadata
+box expand to reveal the
+[REDACTED] and Mission Capabilities boxes as shown
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Topic
+(U) Collection and Metadata
+[REDACTED] Support
+
+Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next
+
+Page Classification
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Screen Number
+3 of 20
+
+(U) Collection and Metadata Extraction Support
+
+(U) Collection and Metadata [REDACTED]
+
+(U) Mission Capabilities
+
+(U//FOUO) (Technical Character): Let's examine more closely the work roles responsible for the collection and metadata [REDACTED] processes. This
+category of technical staff currently includes the technical professionals in NSA's [REDACTED] and Mission
+Capabilities staff within the Technology Directorate (TD) organizations. As we proceed through this module you will find out more about the roles in each of
+these three organizations.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Note that in addition to these key roles, there are other technical roles that are important to the implementation of these programs. These roles
+include individuals involved in the acquisition, processing, presentation, storage, retention, and support to operations which are authorized under the BR
+and PR/TT Orders.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 4 of 30
+DATE/PREPARER: SLS
+FRAME ID: 7040
+
+NEXT FRAME ID: 7050
+
+BACK FRAME ID: 7030
+ALT TAG: (U//FOUO) [REDACTED] Logo
+GRAPHIC/AV
+(U) Have the [REDACTED] logo and info box appear
+and grey out the [REDACTED] and
+Mission Capabilities boxes while the [REDACTED]
+info is displayed.
+[REDACTED]_logo_sm.png
+
+-TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Topic
+(S//SI//RFI) Collection and
+Metadata [REDACTED] Support from [REDACTED]
+
+Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next
+
+Page Classification
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Screen Number
+4 of 20
+
+(U) Collection and Metadata [REDACTED] Support
+
+(U) Collection and Metadata [REDACTED]
+
+(S//ST/REL) [REDACTED] is responsible for [REDACTED]
+
+Mission Capabilities [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Some of the rules that apply to [REDACTED]:
+* Acquire data [REDACTED] authorized by the FISC
+* Identify all m[REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED] is promptly destroyed
+* Changes to systems require approval by the Chief of S3
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (Technical Character): The first Technical Work Role that supports the collection and metadata [REDACTED] processes is [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) For BR. the [REDACTED] role is similar in that [REDACTED]
+
+-TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 5 of 30
+-TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+(TS//SI//NF) Some of the rules that apply to [REDACTED] are to provide reasonable assurance that:
+* NSA is only [REDACTED] that have been authorized by the FISC
+* All of the metadata is identifiable as BR or PR/TT data
+* Data which does not fall within FISC specified requirements regarding [REDACTED] and must be
+promptly destroyed
+* Changes to systems under [REDACTED] purview are approved by the Chief of S3 before implementation
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The staff in [REDACTED] will rarely come in contact with human intelligible BR and/or PR/TT metadata. Scroll over the [REDACTED] logo
+to find out more about [REDACTED]
+Scroll over text bo [REDACTED]
+(S//SI//REL) The [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+Page 6 of 30
+DATE/PREPARER: SLS
+FRAME ID: 7050
+
+NEXT FRAME ID: 7060
+
+BACK FRAME ID: 7040
+ALT TAG: (U) [REDACTED] Logo
+GRAPHIC/AV:
+(U) Have the [REDACTED] logo and info box appear
+and grey out the [REDACTED] and Mission Cap[REDACTED]es while the [REDACTED]
+info is displayed.
+[REDACTED] Logo.jpg
+
+-TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Topic
+(S//S[REDACTED]) Collection and Metadata
+Support from [REDACTED]
+
+Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next
+
+Page Classification
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Screen Number
+5 of 20
+
+(U) Collection and Metadata [REDACTED] Support
+
+(U) Collection and Metadata [REDACTED]
+
+(U) Mission Capabilities
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Some of the roles that [REDACTED]
+* Provide reasonable assurance that all [REDACTED] are in
+compliance with FISC Orders
+* Validate that only properly [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (Technical Character): The [REDACTED] organization, and to a lesser extent the Mission Capabilities organization, supports the
+collection and metadata [REDACTED] processes for [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Some of the roles that [REDACTED] include:
+* Provide reasonable assurance that all [REDACTED] are in compliance with the
+FISC Orders.
+* Validate that only properly [REDACTED] metadata is forwarded to the [REDACTED] for analytic use.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+Page 7 of 30
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+(TS//SI//NF) These individuals have direct and continual access and interaction with both [REDACTED] Scroll over the [REDACTED]
+logo to find out more about [REDACTED]
+Scroll over text box for [REDACTED] logo: [REDACTED]
+Pop-up screen for [REDACTED] logo: (S//SI//REL) The [REDACTED] Branch analyzes new digital communication [REDACTED] and researches new digital
+network communications technologies to pro[REDACTED]quired for their exploitation.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+Page 8 of 30
+-TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+DATE/PREPARER: SLS
+FRAME ID: 7060
+
+NEXT FRAME ID: 7070
+
+BACK FRAME ID: 7050
+ALT TAG: (U) Mission Capabilities Logo
+GRAPHIC/AV:
+(U) (Have the TD logo and info box appear
+and grey out the [REDACTED] and
+[REDACTED] TD in [REDACTED]
+boxes while the [REDACTED]
+td-logo-small.gif (or td-logo-med.gif)
+
+Topic
+(U) Collection and Metadata
+Support from TD
+
+Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next
+
+Page Classification
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Screen Number
+6 of 20
+
+(U) Collection and Metadata [REDACTED] Support
+
+(U) Collection and Metadata [REDACTED]
+
+(U) Mission Capabilities
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Mission Capabilities
+staff integrates the PR/TT [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Some of the rules that apply to Mission Capabilities:
+* All metadata remains identifiable as PR/TT
+* [REDACTED] is promptly destroyed
+* [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (Technical Character): Finally the Mission Capabilities, or TD, staff support the collection and metadata [REDACTED] processes by integrating the [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Some of the rules that apply to Mission Capabilities staff within the Technology Directorate (TD) are to provide reasonable assurance that:
+* All of the metadata remains identifiable as PR/TT data
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 9 of 30
+* [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+(TS//SI//NF) This staff will rarely come in contact with human intelligible PR/TT metadata. Scroll over the logo to find out more about Mission Capabilities.
+Scroll over text box for Mission Capabilities logo: [REDACTED]
+(S//SI//REL) Mission Capabilities [REDACTED]
+
+-TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 10 of 30
+DATE/PREPARER: SLS
+FRAME ID: 7070
+
+NEXT FRAME ID: 7080
+
+BACK FRAME ID: 7060
+ALT TAG:
+GRAPHIC/AV:
+(U) NOTE: Use a matching format
+(responsibilities listed on one
+side and the organizations listed
+on the other side) so that the
+user matches up the
+organization to the appropriate
+responsibilities.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Topic
+(U)
+Knowledge
+Check 1
+
+Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next
+
+Page Classification
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Screen Number
+7 of 20
+
+(U) Knowledge Check 1
+
+(U) Match the organization to its corresponding roles and responsibilities:
+
+1. (TS//SI//NF) Staff in [REDACTED] is responsible for developing the [REDACTED]
+a) (U) Mission Capabilities
+b) [REDACTED]
+c) [REDACTED]
+d) (U) Homeland Mission Coordinators
+
+2. (TS//SI//NF) Staff in [REDACTED] is responsible for integrating the PR/TT [REDACTED]
+including conducting related testing prior to system [REDACTED]
+a) (U) Mission Capabilities
+b) [REDACTED]
+c) [REDACTED]
+d) (U) Homeland Mission Coordinators
+
+3. (TS//SI//NF) Staff in [REDACTED] is responsible for [REDACTED]
+a) (U) Mission Capabilities
+b) [REDACTED]
+c) [REDACTED]
+d) (U) Homeland Mission Coordinators
+
+(U) (Technical Character): Let's make a few notes in our travel journal and check to see what you remember from this topic!
+
+-TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 11 of 30
+-TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+For this knowledge check, simply display the correct answers using the format below:
+Question 1. (TS//SI//NF) Staff in [REDACTED] is responsible for [REDACTED]
+
+Question 2. (TS//SI//NF) Staff in Mission Capabilities is responsible for integrating the PR/TT [REDACTED]
+
+Question 3. (TS//SI//NF) Staff in [REDACTED] is responsible for [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 12 of 30
+DATE/PREPARER: SLS
+FRAME ID: 7080
+
+NEXT FRAME ID: 7090
+
+BACK FRAME ID: 7070
+ALT TAG:
+GRAPHIC/AV:
+(U) Have the Storage, Presentation, and
+Maintenance of the Metadata box expand
+to reveal the Mission Capabilities and
+[REDACTED] boxes as shown
+
+-TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Topic
+(U) Storage, Presentation, and
+Maintenance of the Metadata
+
+Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next
+
+Page Classification
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Screen Number
+8 of 20
+
+(U) Storage, Presentation, and Maintenance of the Metadata
+
+(U) Storage, Presentation, and Maintenance of the Metadata
+
+(U) Mission Capabilities [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (Technical Character): Now let's discuss the work roles responsible for the storage, presentation, and maintenance of both the BR and PR/TT
+metadata. This category of technical staff currently includes the technical professionals in Mission Capabilities and [REDACTED]
+
+-TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 13 of 30
+DATE/PREPARER: SLS
+FRAME ID: 7090
+
+NEXT FRAME ID: 7100
+
+BACK FRAME ID: 7080
+ALT TAG: (U) Mission Capabilities Logo
+GRAPHIC/AV:
+(U) Have the TD logo and info box appear
+and grey out the [REDACTED]
+boxes while the Mission Capabilities info is
+displayed
+[REDACTED] td-logo-small.gif (or td-logo-med.gif)
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Topic
+(U) Storage, Presentation, and
+Maintenance of the Metadata by TD
+
+Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next
+
+Page Classification
+TOP
+-SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Screen Number
+9 of 20
+
+(U) Storage, Presentation, and Maintenance of the Metadata
+
+(U) Storage, Presentation, and Maintenance of the Metadata
+
+(U) Mission Capabilities
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Mission Capabilities is
+responsible for:
+* Developing, maintaining, and operating
+repositories that store and present BR and
+PR/TT metadata
+* [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Some of the rules that apply to Mission Capabilities:
+* Metadata must be maintained in secure NSA repositories
+* Data must be identifiable as BR or PR/TT
+* Implement technical controls to prevent unauthorized access
+* Restrict intelligence analysis queries to RAS-approved identifiers (e.g. the EAR)
+* Ensure intelligence analysis queries remain within authorized number of hops
+* Create auditable records of all intelligence analysis queries
+* Destroy all metadata before the end of the five year authorized retention period (no
+exceptions!)
+* Changes to systems must be certified by the TD Compliance Office before
+implementation
+* Automated queries are prohibited without approval
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 14 of 30
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+(TS//SI//NF) (Technical Character): You will recall that Mission Capabilities supports collection and metadata [REDACTED] and other branches of Mission
+Capabilities support storage, presentation, and maintenance of the metadata. For the latter, the staff is typically database management and user interface
+professionals who are responsible for developing, maintaining, and operating the [REDACTED] that store and present BR and PR/TT metadata, as well as [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Some of the rules that apply to Mission Capabilities include:
+* Metadata must be maintained in secure NSA repositories
+* Data items must be identifiable as BR or PR/TT data
+* Implement technical controls to prevent unauthorized access
+* Implement technical controls to restrict intelligence analysis queries to RAS-approved identifiers (e.g. the EAR)
+* Implement technical controls to provide reasonable assurance that the results of intelligence analysis queries remain within the authorized number
+of hops
+* Create auditable records of all intelligence analysis queries
+* Destroy all metadata before the end of the five year authorized retention period (no exceptions for backup data)
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) This staff will come in contact with human intelligible BR and PR/TT metadata.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+Page 15 of 30
+DATE/PREPARER: SLS
+FRAME ID: 7100
+
+NEXT FRAME ID: 7110
+
+BACK FRAME ID: 7090
+ALT TAG: (U) [REDACTED] Logo
+GRAPHIC/AV:
+(U) Have the PE logo and info box appear
+and grey out the Mission Capabilities boxes
+while the [REDACTED] info is
+displayed
+[REDACTED] Logo.jpg
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Topic
+(U) Storage, Presentation, and
+Maintenance of the Metadata by PE
+
+Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next
+
+Page Classification
+TOP-
+-SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Screen Number
+10 of 20
+
+(U) Storage, Presentation, and Maintenance of the Metadata
+
+(U) Storage, Presentation, and Maintenance of the Metadata
+
+(U) Mission Capabilities [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Protocol Exploitation is
+responsible for:
+* Ensuring data is normalized and is
+presented in a usable format
+* Providing support to intelligence analysts
+
+(TS//SI//NF) For BR, [REDACTED] performs unique functions including:
+* Normalizing [REDACTED]
+* Reviewing data to ensure records include only data [REDACTED]
+* Assist in ensuring that data to be presented to analysts will be in a usable format
+* Providing operational support to intelligence analysts; support is limited to RAS-approved identifiers
+within the authorized number of hops
+
+(TS[REDACTED]) (Technical Character): As you recall for PR/TT, [REDACTED] provides support to [REDACTED] for
+BR, [REDACTED] performs both a
+[REDACTED] assists in ensuring accurate representation and integrity of the metadata. In this context, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] must apply the rules governing the specific
+[REDACTED] upporting role for intelligence analysts. Because of this dual role, [REDACTED]
+function it is performing at the time. When performing a technical role, the technical rules apply which allow broader access to the data. However, when
+supporting the intelligence analyst, the [REDACTED] staff must operate within the same rules applicable to the intelligence analyst which are more
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 16 of 30
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+restrictive.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) For BR, [REDACTED] performs unique functions to include:
+* Normalizing all of the disparate data formats
+* Reviewing the data to validate that the records include only data [REDACTED]
+* Assist in ensuring that the data to be presented to the analysts will be in a usable format
+* Providing operational support as necessary to intelligence analysts; support is limited to RAS-approved identifiers within the authorized number of
+hops
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 17 of 30
+DATE/PREPARER: SLS
+FRAME ID: 7110
+
+NEXT FRAME ID: 7130
+
+BACK FRAME ID: 7100
+ALT TAG:
+GRAPHIC/AV:
+
+-TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Topic
+Knowledge
+Check 2
+
+Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next
+
+Page Classification
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Screen Number
+11 of 20
+
+(U) Knowledge Check 2
+
+4. (TS//SI//NF) Which one of these is not one of the roles and responsibilities of the technical personnel?
+a) (U//FOUO) Manipulating and validating the metadata to make it usable for intelligence analysis
+purposes
+b) (TS//SI//NF) Developing new tools to support querying of BR and PR/TT metadata
+c) (S//SI//REL) Running an intelligence analysis query using a RAS-approved identifier for an analyst
+who is experiencing problems recreating their query results
+d) (S//SI//REL) Running an intelligence analysis query using a non-RAS-approved identifier for
+an analyst who is experiencing problems recreating their query results
+e) (U) Both C and D
+
+5. (TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED] provides support to the BR program by doing the following (check all
+that apply):
+a) (U) Normalizing all of the disparate data formats
+b) (U) Reviewing the data to validate that the records include data [REDACTED]
+c) (U) Ensuring metadata is maintained in secure NSA repositories.
+d) (U) Assist in ensuring that the data to be presented to the analysts will be in a usable format
+e) (U) Destroy all metadata before the end of the five year authorized retention period (no exceptions
+for backup data
+f) (S//SI/REL) Providing operational support as necessary to intelligence analysts on RAS-
+approved identifiers within the authorized number of hops
+
+6. (TS//SI//NF) Database management and user interface professionals in [REDACTED] develop,
+maintain, and operate the [REDACTED] that store and present BR and PR/TT metadata, and develop
+algorithms/processes that prepare, optimize, and characterize the metadata for analytic utilization.
+a) [REDACTED]
+b) [REDACTED]
+c) [REDACTED]
+d) (U) Homeland Mission Coordinators
+
+(U) (Technical Character): Let's check what you remember from this topic!
+
+Question 4. (TS//SI//NF) Correct! Running an intelligence analysis query using a non-RAS-approved identifier for an analyst who is experiencing problems
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 18 of 30
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+recreating their query results is not one of the roles and responsibilities of the technical personnel.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Incorrect. The correct answer is d). Running an intelligence analysis query using a non-RAS-approved identifier for an analyst who is
+experiencing problems recreating their query results is not one of the roles and responsibilities of the technical personnel.
+
+Question 5. (TS//SI//NF) Correct! [REDACTED] provides support to the BR program by doing the following:
+a) (U) Normalizing all of the disparate data formats
+b) (U) Reviewing the data to validate that the records include data [REDACTED]
+d) (U) Assist in ensuring that the data to be presented to the analysts will be in a usable format
+f) (S//SI//REL) Providing operational support as necessary to intelligence analysts on RAS-approved identifiers within the authorized
+number of hops
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Incorrect [REDACTED] provides support to the BR program by doing the following:
+a) (U) Normalizing all of the disparate data formats
+b) (U) Reviewing the data to validate that the records include data [REDACTED]
+d) (U) Assist in ensuring that the data to be presented to the analysts will be in a usable format
+f) (S//SI//REL) Providing operational support as necessary to intelligence analysts on RAS-approved identifiers within the authorized
+number of hops
+
+Question 6. (TS//SI//NF) Correct! Database management and user interface professionals in Mission Capabilities develop, maintain, and operate the [REDACTED]
+that store and present BR and PR/TT metadata, and develop algorithms/processes that prepare, optimize, and characterize the metadata [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Incorrect. The correct answer is a). Database management and user interface professionals in Mission Capabilities develop, maintain, and
+operate the [REDACTED] that store and present BR and PR/TT metadata, and develop algorithms/processes that prepare, optimize, and characterize the
+metadata [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+Page 19 of 30
+DATE/PREPARER: SLS
+FRAME ID: 7130
+
+NEXT FRAME ID: 7140
+
+BACK FRAME ID: 7110
+ALT TAG:
+GRAPHIC/AV:
+(U) Image of Technical Character sitting at
+a desk
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Topic
+(U) The Compliance
+Certification Process
+
+Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next
+
+Page Classification
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Screen Number
+12 of 20
+
+(U) The Compliance Certification Process
+
+(U//FOUO) Compliance certification is a mandatory check for all systems handling U.S.
+person or FISA data
+
+(U) Guidelines governing the certification process are maintained by the TD Compliance
+Office
+
+(U) Compliance should be integrated into the development process
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (Technical Character): Next we will discuss the compliance certification process used by technical personnel who develop mission
+technologies that include those supporting the BR and PR/TT Programs. Compliance certification is a mandatory check for all systems handling U.S. person
+or FISA data. Guidelines governing the certification process are maintained by the TD Compliance Office. This process represents compliance with the
+applicable laws and authorities and supports the NSA Way. The NSA Way is a unified framework for building large (or small), complex, primarily software
+systems that meet the diverse needs of NSA missions. An important point is that compliance should be integrated into the development process.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 20 of 30
+DATE/PREPARER: SLS
+FRAME ID: 7140
+
+NEXT FRAME ID: 7150
+
+BACK FRAME ID: 7130
+ALT TAG:
+GRAPHIC/AV:
+(U) Insert Compliance Gates image - if
+image is too large for the window, create a
+separate pop-up to view in full screen.
+Note: Compliance Gates graphic from
+Compliance_Gates_updated 2-28-11.pptx
+
+Display the screen shot of [REDACTED]
+when the "To begin the cer[REDACTED]
+process..." topic is discussed
+
+Redisplay the Compliance_Gates.png
+graphic
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Topic
+(U) The Compliance
+Certification Process
+
+Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next
+
+Page Classification
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN-
+
+Screen Number
+13 of 20
+
+(U) Following the Compliance Certification Process
+
+(U) The goal of the compliance certification process is to integrate compliance into the
+development phase
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (Technical Character): The goal of the compliance certification process is to integrate compliance into the development phase. The gates
+shown in the compliance process represent distinct requirements that must be satisfied in order to provide reasonable assurance of compliance. The
+architects of the new technology develop engineering documents to support these requirements. The TD certification group reviews the artifacts to verify
+the compliance process requirements are being met.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The compliance certification process begins by registering in [REDACTED]. Access the site by typing [REDACTED] into your web
+browser. Once registration is complete, you will receive a requirements pa[REDACTED]
+
+(U//FOUO) Compliance is an ongoing process. Any change or update to previously certified software requires recertification to remain compliant. In other
+words, if you develop a modification or upgrade to the software, then you need to register the software modification in [REDACTED] to begin the
+recertification process.
+
+-TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+Page 21 of 30
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+(TS//SI//NF) Formal approval is required for all new and/or different BR and PR/TT systems. Under no circumstances can a change be made to a software
+system (even for testing purposes) without going through the compliance certification (or recertification) process.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+Page 22 of 30
+DATE/PREPARER: SLS
+FRAME ID: 7150
+
+NEXT FRAME ID: 7170
+
+BACK FRAME ID: 7140
+ALT TAG:
+GRAPHIC/AV:
+(U) Image of Technical Character sitting at
+a desk
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Topic
+(U) The Dataflow Process
+
+Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next
+
+Page Classification
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Screen Number
+14 of 20
+
+(U) The Dataflow Process
+
+(U//FOUO) The goal of dataflow governance is to provide reasonable assurance of
+accountability and compliance for NSA mission data as it moves throughout NSA systems
+
+(U//FOUO) Triggers for entering the dataflow governance process include (but are not
+limited to):
+* Adding a [REDACTED]
+* Replacing an existing repository
+* Inserting a process or system into the flow
+* Adding a new mission element
+* Legacy migration
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (Technical Character): The Collection Strategies and Requirements Center (CSRC) is responsible for dataflow governance, which provides
+reasonable assurance of accountability and compliance for NSA mission data as it moves throughout NSA systems. This is critical to protect the data, and
+when we are talking about volumes of U.S. person data you can understand why this is so important.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The process begins by submitting a dataflow request (usually done by the system builder or access owner) for a new dataflow solution. Then
+some level of research is needed to determine the type of request and associated needs. Once the requirements are determined, a new processing
+capability may be developed, or an existing flow may be reconfigured to meet the new requirement. The solution must then be tested and obtain official
+sign-off at which time CSRC authorization to operate would be issued.
+
+(U//FOUO) In general, triggers for entering the dataflow governance process include (but are not limited to):
+* [REDACTED]
+* Replacing an existing repository
+* Inserting a process or system into the flow
+* Adding a new mission element
+* Legacy migration (moving an existing unmanaged flow to a managed flow)
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Formal approval is required for all new and/or different BR and PR/TT data flows. Under no circumstances can a change be made to a data
+flow (even for testing purposes) without going through the dataflow governance process.
+
+(U//FOUO) To find out more about the dataflow process, please refer to the Dataflow webpage by typing 'go dataflow' in your web browser.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 23 of 30
+DATE/PREPARER: SLS
+FRAME ID: 7170
+
+NEXT FRAME ID: 7180
+
+BACK FRAME ID: 7150
+ALT TAG:
+GRAPHIC/AV:
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Topic
+(U) Knowledge
+Check 3
+
+Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next
+
+Page Classification
+-TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Screen Number
+15 of 20
+
+(U) Knowledge Check 3
+
+7. (TS//SI//NF) The compliance certification process for new systems is triggered by [REDACTED]
+a) (U) Entering a ticket into [REDACTED]
+b) (U//FOUO) Contacting NSA Way Team
+c) (U//FOUO) Entering the new software or system into [REDACTED]
+d) (U) All of the above
+
+8. (TS//SI//NF) Which of the following is [REDACTED] a reason for entering the dataflow governance process?
+a) [REDACTED]
+b) (U) Replacing an existing repository
+c) (U) Inserting a process or system into the flow
+d) (U) Modifying a bulk metadata query
+e) (U) Moving an existing unmanaged flow to a managed flow
+
+9. (TS//SI//NF) Before an analytic software upgrade is released on a system that handles BR or PR/TT data,
+the developers would need to [REDACTED] in order to remain compliant.
+a) (U) contact the CSRC and undergo compliance recertification
+b) (U) register the software release in [REDACTED] and undergo compliance recertification
+c) (U) obtain OGC approval
+d) (U) register your system with ODOC
+
+(U) (Technical Character): Let's make a few notes in our travel journal and check to see what you remember from this topic!
+
+Question 7 (U//FOUO) Correct! The compliance certification process for new systems is triggered by entering the new software or system in [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]ect. The correct answer is c). The compliance certification process for new systems is triggered by entering the new software or system in [REDACTED]
+
+Question 8. (U//FOUO) Correct! Modifying a bulk metadata query is not a reason for entering the dataflow governance process.
+(U//FOUO) Incorrect. The correct answer is d). Modifying a bulk metadata query is not a reason for entering the dataflow governance process.
+
+Question 9. (U//FOUO) Correct! Before an analytic software upgrade is released on a system that handles BR or PR/TT data, the developers would need to
+register the software release in [REDACTED] and undergo compliance recertification in order to remain compliant.
+(U//FOUO) Incorrect. The correc[REDACTED] Before an analytic software upgrade is released on a system that handles BR or PR/TT data, the developers
+would need to register the software release in [REDACTED] and undergo compliance recertification in order to remain compliant.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 24 of 30
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+recreating their query results is not one of the roles and responsibilities of the technical personnel.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Incorrect. The correct answer is d). Running an intelligence analysis query using a non-RAS-approved identifier for an analyst who is
+experiencing problems recreating their query results is not one of the roles and responsibilities of the technical personnel.
+
+Question 5. (TS//SI//NF) Correct! [REDACTED] provides support to the BR program by doing the following:
+a) (U) Normalizing all of the disparate data formats
+b) (U) Reviewing the data to validate that the records include data [REDACTED]
+d) (U) Assist in ensuring that the data to be presented to the analysts will be in a usable format
+f) (S//SI//REL) Providing operational support as necessary to intelligence analysts on RAS-approved identifiers within the authorized
+number of hops
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Incorrect [REDACTED] provides support to the BR program by doing the following:
+a) (U) Normalizing all of the disparate data formats
+b) (U) Reviewing the data to validate that the records include data [REDACTED]
+d) (U) Assist in ensuring that the data to be presented to the analysts will be in a usable format
+f) (S//SI//REL) Providing operational support as necessary to intelligence analysts on RAS-approved identifiers within the authorized
+number of hops
+
+Question 6. (TS//SI//NF) Correct! Database management and user interface professionals in Mission Capabilities develop, maintain, and operate the [REDACTED]
+that store and present BR and PR/TT metadata, and develop algorithms/processes that prepare, optimize, and characterize the metadata [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Incorrect. The correct answer is a). Database management and user interface professionals in Mission Capabilities develop, maintain, and
+operate the [REDACTED] that store and present BR and PR/TT metadata, and develop algorithms/processes that prepare, optimize, and characterize the
+metadata [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+Page 19 of 30
+DATE/PREPARER: SLS
+FRAME ID: 7180
+
+NEXT FRAME ID: 7190
+
+BACK FRAME ID: 7160
+ALT TAG:
+GRAPHIC/AV:
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Topic
+(U) Practice Scenario 1
+
+Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next
+
+Page Classification
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Screen Number
+16 of 20
+
+(U) Practice Scenario 1
+(TS//SI//NF) You are one of the [REDACTED] cleared technical personnel responsible for metadata management
+within NSA's metadata repositories. You are working with other [REDACTED] -cleared developers on new query
+processes and tools. You [REDACTED] a set of properly marked recor[REDACTED] y your team for development
+purposes from the PR/TT metadata. This set of PR/TT metadata records is stored on a physically isolated system
+within NSA's secure network and is accessible only to the members of your team. Are your actions in
+compliance with the terms of the PR/TT Orders?
+
+(U) Please select the BEST answer:
+a) (TS//SI//NF) Yes, because the PR/TT Orders explicitly authorize properly trained technical
+personnel to develop and test new technologies to be used with the PR/TT metadata.
+b) (TS//SI//NF) No, because the PR/TT Orders prohibit the use of new query processes against any of
+the PR/TT metadata.
+c) (TS//SI//NF) Yes, because the [REDACTED] PR/TT metadata records still carry the unique
+markings and software controls on the physically isolated system to restrict access to
+those records to [REDACTED] cleared personnel.
+d) (U) None of the above are correct.
+
+(U) (Technical Character): Now let's practice what we have learned using real-life scenarios. Carefully read the scenario and then select the best answer.
+
+ANSWER:
+a) (TS//SI//NF) Incorrect. This statement is accurate, but this is not what makes your actions compliant. The correct answer is c). Yes, because the
+[REDACTED] PR/TT metadata records still carry the unique markings and software controls on the physically isolated system to restrict access to
+those records to [REDACTED] cleared personnel.
+b) (TS//SI//NF) Incorrect. The current Court Orders authorize NSA to develop new query processes. The correct answer is c). Yes, because the
+[REDACTED] PR/TT metadata records still carry the unique markings and software controls on the physically isolated system to restrict access to
+those records to [REDACTED] cleared personnel.
+c) (TS//SI//NF) Correct! The best answer is c). Yes, because the [REDACTED] PR/TT metadata records still carry the unique markings and
+software controls on the physically isolated system to restric[REDACTED]e records to [REDACTED] cleared personnel.
+d) (TS//SI//NF) Incorrect. The correct answer is c). Yes, because the [REDACTED] PR/TT metadata records still carry the unique markings and
+software controls on the physically isolated system to restrict access to those records to [REDACTED] cleared personnel.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 25 of 30
+DATE/PREPARER: SLS
+FRAME ID: 7190
+
+NEXT FRAME ID: 7200
+
+BACK FRAME ID: 7180
+ALT TAG:
+GRAPHIC/AV:
+
+-TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+Topic
+(U) Practice Scenario 2
+
+Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next
+
+Page Classification
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Screen Number
+17 of 20
+
+(U) Practice Scenario 2
+(TS//SI//NF) You are a [REDACTED]-cleared developer of contact chaining analytic tools. Your
+management chain has requested a briefing to demonstrate your progress on the latest version of the tool.
+You provide the briefing, which includes screen shots of the tool and query results generated by the tool. Are
+your actions in compliance with the Orders?
+
+(U) Please select the BEST answer:
+a) (U//FOUO) No, unless all of those on your development team and all those who
+attended your briefing held current [REDACTED] clearances.
+b) (U) No, because the Court Orders do not permit testing of tools under development using
+real data.
+c) (U) Yes, as long as the query results shared during the briefing are never used for
+intelligence analysis purposes.
+d) (U) None of the above are correct.
+
+ANSWER:
+a) (U) Correct! This is the best answer. You cannot provide a demonstration unless all of the individuals who attended the briefing have
+completed the required training and received the necessary accesses.
+b) (U//FOUO) Incorrect. The correct answer is a). No, unless all of those on your development team and all those who attended your briefing held
+current [REDACTED] clearances.
+c) (U//FOUO) Incorrect. The correct answer is a). No, unless all of those on your development team and all those who attended your briefing held
+current [REDACTED] clearances.
+d) (U//FOUO) Incorrect. The correct answer is a). No, unless all of those on your development team and all those who attended your briefing held
+current [REDACTED] clearances.
+
+-TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 26 of 30
+DATE/PREPARER: SLS
+FRAME ID: 7200
+
+NEXT FRAME ID: 7210
+
+BACK FRAME ID: 7190
+ALT TAG:
+GRAPHIC/AV:
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Topic
+(U) Practice Scenario 3
+
+Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next
+
+Page Classification
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Screen Number
+18 of 20
+
+(U) Practice Scenario 3
+(TS//SI//NF) You are one of the [REDACTED] cleared technical personnel responsible for metadata
+management within NSA's metadata repositories. You are responsible for the maintenance of backup
+systems and Continuity of Operations (COOP) planning and implementation. You have control over the
+backup tapes that hold PR/TT metadata collected since the inception of the PR/TT authority [REDACTED]. In
+accordance with your COOP plans, you know that if a disaster strikes and NSA's online metadata
+repositories are destroyed, you could use these backup tapes to repopulate the repositories with PR/TT
+metadata. Although the backup tapes contain information older than five years, the processes you would
+employ to repopulate the online analytic metadata repositories would select only metadata collected within
+the last five years. Is your maintenance of backup tapes holding PR/TT metadata collected more than five
+years ago in compliance with the terms of the PR/TT Orders?
+
+(U) Please select the BEST answer:
+a) (TS//SI//NF) Yes, because the older-than-five-years PR/TT metadata on the backup tapes
+will never be available for intelligence analysis purposes.
+b) (TS//SI//NF) Yes, because the PR/TT Orders specifically authorize NSA to maintain backup
+tapes of the PR/TT metadata.
+c) (TS//SI//NF) No, because the PR/TT Orders mandate the destruction of the PR/TT
+metadata no later than five years after its initial collection, with no exception for
+metadata on backup tapes.
+d) (U) None of the above are correct.
+
+ANSWER:
+a) (TS//SI//NF) Incorrect. The correct answer is c). No, because the PR/TT Orders mandate the destruction of the PR/TT metadata no later than five
+years after its initial collection, with no exception for metadata on backup tapes. This is different from other authorities, for example FAA 702 does
+not require the destruction of data in the archives.
+b) (TS//SI//NF) Incorrect. The correct answer is c). No, because the PR/TT Orders mandate the destruction of the PR/TT metadata no later than five
+years after its initial collection, with no exception for metadata on backup tapes.
+c) (TS//SI//NF) Correct! This is the best answer. No, because the PR/TT Orders mandate the destruction of the PR/TT metadata no later than
+five years after its initial collection, with no exception for metadata on backup tapes.
+d) (TS//SI//NF) Incorrect. The correct answer is c). No, because the PR/TT Orders mandate the destruction of the PR/TT metadata no later than five
+years after its initial collection, with no exception for metadata on backup tapes.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 27 of 30
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+DATE/PREPARER: SLS
+FRAME ID: 7210
+
+NEXT FRAME ID: 7220
+
+BACK FRAME ID: 7200
+ALT TAG:
+GRAPHIC/AV:
+(U) Image of Technical Character sitting at
+a desk
+
+Topic
+(U) Summary
+
+Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next
+
+Page Classification
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Screen Number
+19 of 20
+
+(U) Now that you have completed this module you should be able to:
+* (TS//SI//NF) Identify the various technical roles that support the BR and PR/TT Bulk
+Metadata Programs
+* (U) Identify the responsibilities of each of the technical roles
+* (U) Recognize key points of the compliance certification process for mission
+systems and data flows
+* (TS//SI//NF) Practice applying BR and PR/TT authorities in real-life scenarios
+applicable to technical personnel
+
+(U//FOUO) If you have questions or wish to find out more, please contact your manager or
+any of the following BR or PR/TT points of contact:
+
+TD Compliance Office website: go td compliance
+OGC email alias: [REDACTED]
+OGC Phone: [REDACTED]
+OGC website: go GC
+Oversight and Compliance email alias: DL SV42_all
+
+(TS//SI//NF) (Technical Character): As we stated earlier in the course, the bulk metadata includes sensitive data that must be protected accordingly. By
+nature of the kinds of technical support provided to the BR and PR/TT programs, technical personnel have the authority and unrestricted access to touch
+unminimized/unevaluated (or raw), and very sensitive data (that contains a lot of U.S. person identifiers). Remember, we need to maintain a clear
+distinction between the roles of technical and analytical personnel. All personnel are held to a high standard of integrity, but in your technical role you must
+be particularly cautious because the tools you work with do not provide the same safeguards as those tools used by the analytical personnel.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 28 of 30
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+(TS//SI//NF) In conclusion, it is your responsibility to keep the BR and PR/TT information within the confines of those who have the proper authorizations to
+touch and view the data.
+
+(U) Now that you have completed this part of our road trip, you should be able to:
+* (TS//SI//NF) Identify the various technical roles that support the BR and PR/TT Bulk Metadata Programs
+* (U) Identify the responsibilities of each of the technical roles
+* (U) Recognize key points of the compliance certification process for mission systems and data flows
+* (TS//SI//NF) Practice applying BR and PR/TT authorities in real-life scenarios applicable to technical personnel
+
+(U) You are encouraged to reach out to your management or to any of the points of contact listed here if you have any questions or if you want to find out
+more.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 29 of 30
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+DATE/PREPARER: SLS
+FRAME ID: 7220
+
+NEXT FRAME ID: 7230
+
+BACK FRAME ID: 7210
+ALT TAG:
+GRAPHIC/AV:
+(U) Image of Technical Character sitting at
+a desk
+
+Topic
+(U) Next Step
+
+Home | Exit | Glossary | Back | Next
+
+Page Classification
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Screen Number
+20 of 20
+
+(U) PLEASE READ: Important Assessment Information
+* (U) You will view the questions in a separate Assessment Questions Document
+* (U) You will enter your responses in a separate QuestionMark online answer sheet
+* (U) You will have only one attempt to successfully complete the assessment
+* (U) Allow yourself sufficient time (approximately 30 minutes) to complete the assessment
+
+(U) To Complete the Assessment:
+* (U) Click the link to open the Assessment Questions Document(note)
+* (U) Go to the VUport SumTotal Content Player page, click on the Assessment link, and follow the
+instructions to complete the required exam
+
+note: Comment [SLS1]: Please make this a link that will open the Assessment Question pdf for Analytical Personnel (we will actually connect the link later).
+
+(U//FOUO) (OGC Attorney): The final part of your trip will be to successfully complete the assessment for the course. Please be aware that for the
+assessment you will view the questions in a pdf file and enter your responses in a separate QuestionMark online answer sheet. Please be sure that you
+open the .pdf with the questions first before opening the QuestionMark online answer sheet. You will have one attempt to complete the assessment. Please
+allow yourself sufficient time (approximately 30 minutes) to complete the assessment.
+
+(U//FOUO) Please click the Assessment Questions Document link to open the .pdf question file and keep the window open. Then go to the VUport SumTotal Content Player page, click on the Assessment link on the left, and follow the instructions to complete the required exam.
+
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 30 of 30
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_6_for_Technical_Personnel/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_6_for_Technical_Personnel/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0c3a95f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Course_Materials_-_Module_6_for_Technical_Personnel/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+{
+ "title": "NSA Course Materials Module 6 for Technical Personnel",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Module 6 of 2011 NSA Course Materials regarding the agency’s metadata collection programs under Sections 501 and 402 of FISA. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [
+ "training",
+ "students",
+ "analysts",
+ "personnel",
+ "teaching"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2011-10-13",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "SI"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [
+ "VUPORT"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-18",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/nsa-course-materials-module-6-technical-personnel",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [
+ {
+ "id": "ODNI_-_CLEANEDOVSC1206_M6T_storyboard_v25_Final"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "2d95e76f96dffe5263b1f99c43cf0e310b1fffbd5356cefac5eb338042b6bf0a",
+ "pages": 30
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Fleisch_2012_Jewel_Declaration/ACLU_-_NSA_Fleisch_2012_Jewel_Declaration.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Fleisch_2012_Jewel_Declaration/ACLU_-_NSA_Fleisch_2012_Jewel_Declaration.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..18746e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Fleisch_2012_Jewel_Declaration/ACLU_-_NSA_Fleisch_2012_Jewel_Declaration.md
@@ -0,0 +1,2090 @@
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+STUART F. DELERY
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+JOSEPH H. HUNT
+ Director. Federal Programs Branch
+VINCENT M. GARVEY
+ Deputy Branch Director
+ANTHONY J. COPPOLINO
+ Special Litigation Counsel
+MARCIA BERMAN
+ Senior Trial Counsel
+U.S. Department of Justice
+Civil Division. Federal Programs Branch
+20 Massachusetts Avenue. NW
+ Washington, D.C. 20001
+ Phone: (202) 514-4782/Fax: (202) 616-8460
+ Attorneys for the United States and Government
+ Defendants Sued in their Official Capacities
+
+ UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
+ NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
+ SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
+
+ CAROLYN JEWEL. et al.
+ Plaintiffs.
+ V.
+ NATION.M. SECURITY AGENCY et al.
+ Defendants.
+
+ No. 08-cv-4873-JSW
+
+ CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF
+ FRANCES J. FLEISCH,
+ NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+
+ EX PARTE, IN CAMERA
+ SUBMISSION
+
+ Date: November 2. 2012
+ Time: 9:00 a.m.
+ Courtroom 11. 19th Floor
+
+ Judge Jeffrey S. White
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No.08-cy-4873-1SW)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+1
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(U) Table of Contents
+Page
+
+I. (U) Introduction
+II. (U) Summary
+III. (U) Classification of Declaration
+IV. (U) Background Information
+ A. (U) The National Security Agency
+ B. (U) September 11. 2001 and the al Qaeda Threat
+ C. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) Presidentially-Authorized NSA Activities After 9/11
+ 1. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) Basket 1—Telephony and Email Content Collection
+ 2. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) Basket 2 – Bulk Telephony Meta Data Collection
+ 3. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) Basket 3 - Bulk Internet Meta Data Collection
+ 4. [REDACTED] 27
+ D. (TS//SI//OC/NF) Current NSA Activities Transitioned from Presidential Authority
+ 1. (TS//SI//OC/NF) Collection of Communication Content
+ 2. (TS//SI//OC/NF) Collection of Bulk Telephony Meta data (Business Records)
+ 3. (TS//SI//OC/NF) Collection of Bulk Internet Meta data
+V. (U) Information Subject to DNI and NSA Privilege Assertions
+VI. (U) Harm of Disclosure of Privileged Information
+ A. (U) Information Concerning Whether the Plaintiffs Have Been Subject to the Alleged NSA Activities
+ 1. (TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED]
+ 2. (TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+2
+TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+1. 3. (TS//SI//OC/NF) Harm of Disclosing Whether Plaintiffs
+ were Subject to NSA Activities 43
+2. B. (U) Information Related to NSA Activities, Sources, or Methods
+ Implicated by Plaintiffs' Allegations of a Communications "Dragnet" 45
+3. 1. (U) Information Concerning Plaintiffs' Content Surveillance
+ Allegations 45
+4. (a) (U) Information Related to the Terrorist Surveillance
+ Program 47
+5. (b) (TS//SI//OC/NF) Information Related to Content
+ Surveillance Under Other Authority 52
+6. 2. (U) Plaintiffs' Allegations Concerning the Collection of
+ Communication Records 54
+7. 3. (TS//SI//OC/NF) Information Concerning Current FISA
+ Authorized Activities and Specific FISC Orders 60
+8. 4. (U) Information Concerning Plaintiffs' Allegations that
+ Telecommunications Carriers Provided Assistance to NSA 61
+9. (a) [REDACTED] 65
+10. (b) [REDACTED] 66
+11. (c) [REDACTED] 68
+12. (d) [REDACTED] 71
+13. (e) [REDACTED] 74
+14. VII. (U) Risks of Allowing Litigation to Proceed 78
+15. VIII. (U) Conclusion 80
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency. et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+3
+[REDACTED] ORCON/NOFORN
+CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF FRANCES J. FLEISCH
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+
+1. (U) 1. Frances J. Fleisch, do hereby state and declare as follows:
+2. 1. (U) Introduction
+3. 1. (U) I am the Executive Director for the National Security Agency (NSA), an
+ intelligence agency within the Department of Defense. I have held this position since June 2010.
+4. As the Executive Director. I serve as an adjunct to the Deputy Director for all NSA matters.
+5. Under our internal regulations, and in the absence of the Director and Deputy Director. I am
+ responsible for directing the NSA. overseeing the operations undertaken to carry out its mission
+6. and. by specific charge of the President and the Director of National Intelligence, protecting NSA
+ activities and intelligence sources and methods. I have been designated an original TOP SECRET
+ classification authority under Executive Order No. 13526. 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (2009) and
+ Department of Defense Directive No. 5200.1-R. Information and Security Program Regulation.
+7. 32 C.F.R. § 159a. 12 (2000).
+8. 2. (U) The purpose of this declaration is to support an assertion of the military and
+ state secrets privilege (hereafter, "state secrets privilege") by the Director of National Intelligence
+ ("DNI") as the head of the Intelligence Community, as well as the DNI's assertion of a statutory
+ privilege under the National Security Act. to protect information related to NSA activities
+ described herein below. General Keith B. Alexander. the Director of the National Security
+ Agency. has been sued in his official and individual capacity in the above captioned litigation and
+ has recused himself from the decision on whether to assert privilege in his official capacity. As
+ the Executive Director, and by specific delegation of the Director, I am authorized to review the
+ materials associated with this litigation. prepare whatever declarations I determine are
+ appropriate, and determine whether to assert the NSA's statutory privilege. Through this
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] ORCON/NOFORN
+4
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+declaration, I hereby invoke and assert the NSA's statutory privilege set forth in Section 6 of the
+National Security Agency Act of 1959, Public Law No. 86-36 (codified as a note to 50 U.S.C. §
+402) ("NSA Act"), to protect the information related to NSA activities described herein below.
+The statements made herein are based on my personal knowledge of NSA activities and
+operations. and on information made available to me as the Executive Director of the NSA.¹
+
+II. (U) Summary
+3. (U) In the course of my official duties, I have been advised of the above-captioned
+Jewel, Shubert. and In re NSA Telecommunications Records Litigation, and I have reviewed the
+allegations raised in this litigation, including the Complaint filed in the Jewel action on September
+18, 2008, and the Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") filed in the above-referenced Shubert
+action on May 8. 2012.² In sum. plaintiffs allege that, after the 9/11 attacks. the NSA received
+presidential authorization to engage in "dragnet" communications surveillance in concert with
+major telecommunications companies. See. e.g., Jewel Compl. ¶¶ 2-3; Shubert SAC ¶¶ 1-7.
+Plaintiffs allege that the presidentially-authorized activities at issue in this litigation went beyond
+the "Terrorist Surveillance Program" ("TSP"), which was publicly acknowledged by the President
+[REDACTED]
+
+1. (U) This declaration addresses and asserts privilege with respect to allegations raised in
+the above-captioned Jewel action as well as a separate action---Shubert v. Obama (07-cv-00693).
+In addition, the harm to national security that would result from the disclosure of NSA sources
+and methods described herein is applicable to similar allegations concerning NSA activities
+raised in other lawsuits in In re NSA Telecommunications Records Litigation (M:06-cv-1791)
+2. (TS//SI//OC/NF) Starting in 2006. the Director of National Intelligence, supported by
+declarations from the NSA like this one, has asserted the state secrets privilege and related
+statutory privileges concerning NSA intelligence sources and methods in several other cases that
+have been before this court, including in a 2006 lawsuit brought by the plaintiffs in Jewel against
+AT&T (Hepting v. AT&T) (06-cv-00672), as well as in 2007 with respect to lawsuits brought
+against Verizon Communications, and again in 2007 and 2009 in the Shubert action, and also in
+2009 in the Jewel action. This declaration concerns the same sources and methods that were at
+issue in those prior declarations. and sets forth substantially the same facts and harms to national
+security previously described to the court. In light of the passage of time, this submission
+updates. expands upon, and supplants prior privilege assertions in this litigation.
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel. et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON NOFORN
+5
+[REDACTED] ORCON NOFORN
+in December 2005 and was limited to the interception of specific international communications
+involving persons reasonably believed to be associated with al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist
+organizations. Rather, plaintiffs allege that other intelligence activities were also authorized by
+the President after 9/11, and that, with the assistance of telecommunication companies, including
+AT&T and Verizon, the NSA has indiscriminately intercepted the content and obtained the
+communications records of millions of ordinary Americans as part of an alleged presidentially-
+authorized Program after 9/11. See Jewel Compl. ¶¶ 2-13; 39-97; Shubert SAC ¶¶ 1-7:57-58:
+60-91.
+
+4. (U) I cannot disclose on the public record the specific nature of NSA information
+or activities implicated by the plaintiffs allegations. As described further below. the disclosure
+of information related to the NSA's activities. sources. and methods implicated by the plaintiffs
+allegations reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national
+security of the United States. In addition, it is my judgment that sensitive state secrets are so
+central to the subject matter of the litigation that any attempt to proceed in the case risks
+disclosure of the classified privileged national security information described herein and
+exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United States.
+
+5. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) The allegations in this lawsuit put at issue the
+disclosure of information concerning several highly classified and critically important NSA
+intelligence activities, sources and methods that cominenced under presidential authorization
+after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, but which were later transitioned to the authority of the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"), including ongoing activities conducted under orders
+approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC").³ As described in more detail
+[REDACTED]
+
+3. (TS//SI//OC/NF) As described further below. pursuant to the FISA and
+specific orders of the FISC, the intelligence activities that NSA carries out under the authority of
+the FISA and authorization of the FISC are classified. NSA's FISC-approved activities that are
+at issue here are classified at the TOP SECRET//COMINT level as their unauthorized disclosure
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] ORCON NOFORN
+6
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+below, starting in October 2001, then-President Bush issued a presidential authorization that
+directed the NSA to undertake three discrete activities after the 9/11 attacks that were designed
+to enhance NSA's capability to detect and prevent further attacks. (Collectively these activities
+were designated by the NSA code-name "STELLARWIND".)
+
+A. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) Basket 1 - Content Collection: The first presidentially-
+authorized activity after the 9/11 attacks was the collection of the content of
+certain international communications (telephone and Internet) reasonably believed
+to involve a member of a terrorist organization. From the outset this activity was
+limited by the NSA to "one-end international communications - that is, to or
+from the United States. This content collection activity was directed at groups
+engaged in international terrorism and, starting March 2004, was limited to
+international communications reasonably believed to involve an individual
+associated specifically with al Qaeda or its affiliated organizations. When
+publicly acknowledged in December 2005, this content collection activity was
+referred to as the "Terrorist Surveillance Program." The TSP authorization ended
+in February 2007 and was initially replaced by orders of the FISC, which were
+later supplanted by Congressional amendments to the FISA that authorized the
+NSA to collect certain communications of non-U.S. persons located overseas.
+B. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) Basket 2 - Telephony Meta Data: The second
+activity undertaken by the NSA after the 9/11 attacks. pursuant to the same
+presidential authorization, entailed the bulk collection of telephony "meta data" --
+which is information derived from call detail records that reflects, but is not
+limited to, the date, time, and duration of telephone calls, as well as the phone
+numbers used to place and receive the calls. As described below, this activity was
+transitioned to an order of the FISC starting in May 2006 and, while subject to
+subsequent modification by the FISC. remains in place today.
+C. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) Basket 3 - Internet Meta Data: The third
+activity undertaken by the NSA after the 9/11 attacks. again pursuant to the same
+presidential authorization, was the bulk collection of Internet meta data, which is
+header/router/addressing information, such as the "to." "from," "cc," and "bcc"
+lines on an email, as opposed to the content or subject lines of a standard email.
+As described below, this activity was transitioned to an order of the FISC starting
+in July 2004 until December 2011, when NSA decided not to seek reauthorization
+of this activity.
+
+could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the
+United States.
+
+4. (TS//SI//OC/NF) The term "content" is used herein to refer to the substance, meaning,
+or purport of a communication. as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8). as opposed to the type of
+addressing or routing information referred throughout this declaration as "meta data."
+5. (TS//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+7
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+6. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) Plaintiffs' allegations put at issue all three NSA activities
+originally authorized by the President after the 9/11 attacks and later transitioned to FISA
+authority. For example, plaintiffs in both the Jewel and Shubert actions allege that the NSA was
+authorized by the President to engage in a communications "dragnet" after 9/11 that included the
+indiscriminate collection of the content of millions of telephony and Internet communications.
+See Jewel Compl. ¶¶ 7. 9, 73. 74. 81: Shubert SAC ¶¶ 7, 70, 84. This allegation of a content
+"dragnet" is false, however. The NSA's collection of the content of communications (i.e., the
+substance, meaning or purport of the communication) under the post 9/11 presidential
+authorization was directed at one-end international communications in which a participant was
+reasonably believed to be associated with a group engaged in international terrorism (later
+limited to al Qaeda and its affiliates), and was focused on specific "selectors" (such as phone
+numbers and Internet addresses) believed to be associated with such individuals. The content
+surveillance authorized therefore did not constitute the kind of "dragnet" collection of the
+content of millions of Americans' telephone or Internet communications that the plaintiffs allege.
+Indeed, as set forth below [REDACTED]. However, the operational details of the TSP and other
+NSA content collection activities could not be disclosed to address, disprove, or otherwise
+litigate the plaintiffs' allegation of a content "dragnet" without causing exceptional harm to
+NSA's sources and methods of gathering intelligence---including methods currently used to
+detect and prevent further terrorist attacks under the authority of the FISA.
+
+7. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) Similarly, plaintiffs allegations that the NSA has
+collected certain non-content information (i.e.. meta data) about telephone and Internet
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al, v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+8
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+communications cannot be addressed without risking or requiring disclosure of highly sensitive
+sources and methods that continue to be utilized today and causing exceptionally grave damage
+to national security. As explained below. the bulk collection of meta data enables highly
+sophisticated analytical tools that can uncover the contacts [REDACTED] of
+members or agents of [REDACTED].⁶
+
+8. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) In addition, plaintiffs allegation that
+telecommunications carriers, including AT&T (at issue in Jewel) and Verizon (at issue in
+Shubert), and other carriers at issue in other lawsuits in In re NSA Telecommunications Record
+Litigation, assisted the NSA in alleged intelligence activities cannot be confirmed or denied
+without risking exceptionally grave damage to national security. Because the NSA has not
+undertaken the alleged "dragnet" collection of communications content, no carrier has assisted in
+that alleged activity.
+[REDACTED]
+9. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+6. (TS//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+9
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+10. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+11. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) For the foregoing reasons. detailed further
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+10
+[REDACTED] ORCON/NOFORN
+below, the DNI's state secrets and statutory privilege assertions, and my own statutory privilege
+assertion on behalf of the NSA, seek to protect against the disclosure of the highly classified
+intelligence sources and methods put at issue in this case, including: (1) any information that
+would tend to confirm or deny whether particular individuals, including the named plaintiffs.
+have been subject to the alleged NSA intelligence activities: (2) information concerning NSA
+intelligence sources and methods, including facts demonstrating that the content collection under
+the TSP was limited to terrorist-related international communications, and that NSA did not and
+does not otherwise engage in plaintiffs' alleged content surveillance "dragnet": (3) facts that
+would tend to confirm or deny the other intelligence activities authorized by the President after
+9/11 and later transitioned to the authority of the FISA - that is. existence of the NSA's bulk
+meta data collection, and any information about those activities; and (4) the fact that [REDACTED]. In
+particular, the fact that there has been public speculation about alleged NSA activities. including
+in media reports. books, or plaintiffs' declarations. does not diminish the need to protect
+intelligence sources and methods from further exposure. The process of sorting out what is true,
+partly true. or wholly false in public reports or in plaintiffs' allegations and declarations, would
+necessarily risk or require disclosure of what in fact the NSA has undertaken, when. how. and
+under what authority. As set forth herein, such official confirmation and disclosure of classified
+privileged national security information by the Government would remove any doubt as to
+NSA's actual sources and methods. confirm to our adversaries what channels of communication
+to avoid, and cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security. For these reasons, as set
+forth further below. I request that the Court uphold the DNI's state secrets and statutory privilege
+assertions, as well as the NSA statutory privilege assertion that I now raise, and protect the
+information described in this declaration from disclosure.
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] ORCON/NOFORN
+11
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+
+III. (U) Classification of Declaration
+
+12. (S//SI//NF) This declaration is classified TOP SECRET//TSP//SI//[REDACTED]
+//ORCON/NOFORN pursuant to the standards in Executive Order No. 13526. See 75 Fed.
+Reg. 707 (Dec. 29, 2009). Under Executive Order No. 13526, information is classified "TOP
+SECRET" if unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to cause
+exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United Sates; "SECRET" if
+unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to cause serious
+damage to national security: and "CONFIDENTIAL" if unauthorized disclosure of the
+information reasonably could be expected to cause identifiable damage to national security. At
+the beginning of each paragraph of this declaration, the letter or letters in parentheses
+designate(s) the degree of classification of the information the paragraph contains. When used
+for this purpose, the letters "U." "C," "S," and "TS" indicate respectively that the information is
+either UNCLASSIFIED, or is classified CONFIDENTIAL. SECRET. or TOP SECRET.⁷
+
+13. (U//FOUO) Additionally, this declaration also contains Sensitive Compartmented
+Information (SCI), which is "information that not only is classified for national security reasons
+as Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential, but also is subject to special access and handling
+requirements because it involves or derives from particularly sensitive intelligence sources and
+methods." 28 C.F.R. § 17.18(a). Because of the exceptional sensitivity and vulnerability of such
+information, these safeguards and access requirements exceed the access standards that are
+normally required for information of the same classification level. Specifically, this declaration
+[REDACTED]
+
+7. (S//SI//NF) [REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+12
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+references communications intelligence (COMINT), also referred to as special intelligence (SI),
+which is a subcategory of SCI. COMINT or SI identifies SCI that was derived from exploiting
+cryptographic systems or other protected sources by applying methods or techniques, or from
+foreign communications.
+
+14. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) This declaration also contains information
+related to or derived from the STELLARWIND program, a controlled access signals intelligence
+program under Presidential authorization created in response to the attacks of 9/11. In this
+declaration, information pertaining to the STELLARWIND program is denoted with the special
+marking "TSP" and requires more restrictive handling.⁸ Despite the December 2005 public
+acknowledgment of the TSP, details about the TSP program as well as the STELLARWIND
+program in its entirety, remain highly classified and strictly compartmented.
+[REDACTED]
+
+8. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) Information pertaining to the STELLARWIND
+program can also be denoted with the special marking "STLW." In prior declarations and
+briefing materials. NSA has used the "TSP" designation to refer to the portion of the program
+that was publicly disclosed by then-President Bush in December 2005.
+9. (U) [REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency. et al (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+13
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+15. (U) In addition to the fact that classified information contained herein may not be
+revealed to any person without authorization pursuant to Executive Order 13526. this declaration
+contains information that may not be released to foreign governments, foreign nationals, or non-
+U.S. citizens without permission of the originator and in accordance with DNI policy. This
+information is labeled "NOFORN." The "ORCON" designator means that the originator of the
+information controls to whom it is released.
+
+IV. (U) Background Information
+
+A. (U) The National Security Agency
+
+16. (U) The NSA was established by Presidential Directive in 1952 as a separately
+organized agency within the Department of Defense. The NSA's foreign intelligence mission
+includes the responsibility to collect, process, analyze, produce, and disseminate signals
+intelligence (SIGINT) information, of which communications intelligence ("COMINT") is a
+significant subset. for (a) national foreign intelligence purposes, (b) counterintelligence purposes,
+and (c) the support of military operations. See Executive Order 12333, § 1.7(c), as amended.¹⁰
+
+17. (TS//SI//NF) Signals intelligence (SIGINT) consists of three subcategories:
+(1) communications intelligence (COMINT); (2) electronic intelligence (ELINT); and (3) foreign
+instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT). Communications intelligence (COMINT) is
+defined as "all procedures and methods used in the interception of communications and the
+[REDACTED]
+
+10. (U) Executive Order 12333, reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C § 401 note. generally
+describes the NSA's authority to collect foreign intelligence that is not subject to the FISA
+definition of electronic surveillance, including activities undertaken abroad. Section 1.7(c) of
+E.O. 12333, as amended, specifically authorizes the NSA to "Collect (including through
+clandestine means), process, analyze, produce, and disseminate signals intelligence information
+for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes to support national and departmental
+missions."
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+14
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+obtaining of information from such communications by other than the intended recipients." 18
+U.S.C. § 798. COMINT includes information derived from the interception of foreign and
+international communications, such as voice, facsimile, and computer-to-computer information
+conveyed via a number of means [REDACTED].
+
+Electronic intelligence (ELINT) is technical intelligence information derived from
+foreign non-communications electromagnetic radiations except atomic detonation or radioactive
+sources---in essence, radar systems affiliated with military weapons platforms (e.g., anti-ship)
+and civilian systems (e.g., shipboard and air traffic control radars). Foreign instrumentation
+signals intelligence (FISINT) is derived from the intercept of foreign electromagnetic emissions
+associated with the testing and operational deployment of non-U.S. aerospace, surface, and
+subsurface systems.
+
+18. (U) The NSA's SIGINT responsibilities include establishing and operating an
+effective unified organization to conduct SIGINT activities set forth in Executive Order No.
+12333, § 1.7(c)(2), as amended. In performing its SIGINT mission, NSA has developed a
+sophisticated worldwide SIGINT collection network that acquires, among other things. foreign
+and international electronic communications and related information. The technological
+infrastructure that supports the NSA's foreign intelligence information collection network has
+taken years to develop at a cost of billions of dollars and untold human effort. It relies on
+sophisticated collection and processing technology.
+
+19. (U) There are two primary reasons for gathering and analyzing foreign
+intelligence information. The first, and most important, is to gain information required to direct
+U.S. resources as necessary to counter external threats and in support of military operations. The
+second reason is to obtain information necessary to the formulation of U.S. foreign policy.
+Foreign intelligence information provided by the NSA is thus relevant to a wide range of
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+15
+[REDACTED] ORCON/NOFORN
+important issues. including military order of battle: threat warnings and readiness; arms
+proliferation: international terrorism: counter-intelligence: and foreign aspects of international
+narcotics trafficking.
+
+20. (U) The NSA's ability to produce foreign intelligence information depends on its
+access to foreign and international electronic communications. Foreign intelligence produced by
+COMINT activities is an extremely important part of the overall foreign intelligence information
+available to the United States and is often unobtainable by other means. Public disclosure of
+either the capability to collect specific communications or the substance of the information
+derived from such collection itself can easily alert targets to the vulnerability of their
+communications. Disclosure of even a single communication holds the potential of revealing
+intelligence collection techniques that are applied against targets around the world. Once alerted.
+targets can frustrate COMINT collection by using different or new encryption techniques, by
+disseminating disinformation. or by utilizing a different communications link. Such evasion
+techniques may inhibit access to the target's communications and therefore deny the United
+States access to information crucial to the defense of the United States both at home and abroad.
+COMINT is provided special statutory protection under 18 U.S.C. § 798, which makes it a crime
+to knowingly disclose to an unauthorized person classified information "concerning the
+communication intelligence activities of the United States or any foreign government."
+
+B. (U) September 11, 2001 and the al Qaeda Threat
+
+21. (U) On September 11, 2001. the al Qaeda terrorist network launched a set of
+coordinated attacks along the East Coast of the United States. Four commercial jetliners, each
+carefully selected to be fully loaded with fuel for a transcontinental flight. were hijacked by al
+Qaeda operatives. Those operatives targeted the Nation's financial center in New York with two
+of the jetliners. which they deliberately flew into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center.
+
+Classified in Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] ORCON/NOFORN
+16
+[REDACTED] ORCON NOFORN
+Al Qaeda targeted the headquarters of the Nation's Armed Forces, the Pentagon. with the third
+jetliner. Al Qaeda operatives were apparently headed toward Washington, D.C. with the fourth
+jetliner when passengers struggled with the hijackers and the plane crashed in Shanksville.
+Pennsylvania. The intended target of this fourth jetliner was most evidently the White House or
+the Capitol, strongly suggesting that al Qaeda's intended mission was to strike a decapitation
+blow to the Government of the United States to kill the President. the Vice President, or
+Members of Congress. The attacks of September 11 resulted in approximately 3.000 deaths
+the highest single-day death toll from hostile foreign attacks in the Nation's history. In addition.
+these attacks shut down air travel in the United States, disrupted the Nation's financial markets
+and government operations, and caused billions of dollars of damage to the economy.
+
+22. (U) On September 14, 2001. a national emergency was declared "by reason of the
+terrorist attacks at the World Trade Center. New York. New York, and the Pentagon. and the
+continuing and immediate threat of further attacks on the United States." Presidential
+Proclamation No. 7463. 66 Fed. Reg. 48199 (Sept. 14. 2001). The United States also
+immediately began plans for a military response directed at al Qaeda's training grounds and
+havens in Afghanistan. On September 14, 2001, both Houses of Congress passed a Joint
+Resolution authorizing the President of the United States "to use all necessary and appropriate
+force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned. authorized.
+committed, or aided the terrorist attacks of September 11. Authorization for Use of Military
+Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40 § 21(a). 115 Stat. 224. 224 (Sept. 18. 2001) ("Cong. Auth.").
+Congress also expressly acknowledged that the attacks rendered it "necessary and appropriate"
+for the United States to exercise its right "to protect United States citizens both at home and
+abroad." and acknowledged in particular that "the President has authority under the Constitution
+to take action to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States." Id.
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] ORCON/NOFORN
+17
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+pmbl."
+
+23. (U) As a result of the unprecedented attacks of September 11, 2001, the United
+States found itself immediately propelled into a conflict with al Qaeda and its associated forces. a
+set of groups that possesses the evolving capability and intention of inflicting further attacks on
+the United States. That conflict is continuing today, at home as well as abroad. Moreover, the
+conflict against al Qaeda and its allies is a very different kind of conflict. against a very different
+enemy. than any other conflict or enemy the Nation has previously faced. Al Qaeda and its
+affiliates operate not as a traditional nation-state but as a diffuse, decentralized network of
+individuals, cells, and loosely associated, often disparate groups, that act sometimes in concert.
+sometimes independently. and sometimes in the United States, but always in secret-and their
+mission is to destroy lives and to disrupt a way of life through terrorist acts. Al Qaeda works in
+the shadows: secrecy is essential to al Qaeda's success in plotting and executing its terrorist
+attacks.
+
+24. (TS//SI//NF) The 9/11 attacks posed significant challenges for the NSA's signals
+intelligence mission because of [REDACTED].
+Global telecommunications networks, especially the Internet, have [REDACTED]
+
+11. (U) Following the 9/11 attacks. the United States also immediately began plans for a
+military response directed at al Qaeda's training grounds and havens in Afghanistan. A Military
+Order was issued stating that the attacks of September 11 "created a state of armed conflict." see
+Military Order by the President § 1(a). 66 Fed. Reg. 57833.57833 (Nov. 13, 2001), and that al
+Qaeda terrorists "possess both the capability and the intention to undertake further terrorist
+attacks against the United States that, if not detected and prevented, will cause mass deaths, mass
+injuries, and massive destruction of property, and may place at risk the continuity of the
+operations of the United States Government," and concluding that "an extraordinary emergency
+exists for national defense purposes." Military Order. § 1(c). (g), 66 Fed. Reg. at 57833-34.
+Indeed, shortly after the attacks, NATO took the unprecedented step of invoking article 5 of the
+North Atlantic Treaty, which provides that an "armed attack against one or more of [the parties]
+shall be considered an attack against them all." North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 5,63
+Stat. 2241,2244, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, 246.
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+18
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+developed in recent years into a loosely interconnected system-a network of networks-that is
+ideally suited for the secret communications needs of loosely affiliated terrorist cells. Hundreds
+of Internet service providers, or "ISPs." and other providers of communications services offer a
+wide variety of global communications options, often free of charge.
+[REDACTED]
+
+25. (TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency. et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+19
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+26. (TS//SI//NF) Our efforts against al Qaeda and its affiliates therefore present
+critical challenges for the Nation's communications intelligence capabilities. First, in this type
+of conflict, more so than in any other we have ever faced, communications intelligence is
+essential to our ability to identify the enemy and to detect and disrupt its plans for further attacks
+on the United States. Communications intelligence often is the only means we have to learn the
+identities of particular individuals who are involved in terrorist activities and the existence of
+particular terrorist threats. Second, at the same time that communications intelligence is more
+important than ever, the decentralized, non-hierarchical nature of the enemy and their
+sophistication in exploiting the agility of modern telecommunications make successful
+communications intelligence more difficult than ever. It is against this backdrop that the risks
+presented by this litigation should be assessed, in particular the risks of disclosing NSA sources
+and methods implicated by the claims being raised.
+
+C. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) Presidentially-Authorized NSA Activities After 9/11
+
+27. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) As indicated above, in December 2005 then-President
+Bush acknowledged the existence of a presidentially-authorized NSA activity called the
+"Terrorist Surveillance Program" under which NSA was authorized to intercept the content of
+specific international communications involving persons reasonably believed to be associated
+with al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist organizations. As also noted. other intelligence activities
+were authorized by the President after the 9/11 attacks in a single authorization and were
+subsequently authorized under orders issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+("FISC"). As described below, disclosure of the intelligence sources and methods involved in
+the TSP and other classified activities reasonably can be expected to cause exceptionally grave
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel. et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+20
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+damage to national security.
+
+28. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) In the extraordinary circumstances after the 9/11 attacks
+---when the Intelligence Community believed further catastrophic attacks may be imminent---
+the President directed the NSA to address important gaps in its intelligence collection activities,
+and to undertake further measures to detect and prevent future attacks. Starting in October 2001
+and continuing with modifications, the President authorized NSA to undertake three activities.¹²
+While these activities were distinct in nature, they were designed to work in tandem to meet the
+threat of another mass casualty terrorist attack by enabling NSA to not only intercept the content
+of particular terrorist communications, but to identify other phone numbers and email addresses
+with which a terrorist had been in contact - and thus. potentially, to identify other individuals
+who may be involved in plotting terrorist attacks.¹³
+
+1. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) Basket 1 - Telephony and Email Content Collection
+
+29. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) First, the NSA was authorized by the President to
+intercept the content¹⁴ of certain telephone and Internet communications for which there were
+reasonable grounds to believe that such communications originated or terminated outside the
+United States.
+[REDACTED]
+
+12. (TS//SI//OC/NF) In other lawsuits in In re NSA Telecommunications Records
+Litigation, some plaintiffs allege that NSA commenced the particular presidentially-authorized
+intelligence activities put at issue in the allegations prior to the 9/11 attacks. The activities
+described herein were authorized by the President after the 9/11 attacks.
+13. (S//NF) Each Presidential authorization (with the exception of the first such
+authorization) was supported by a threat assessment memorandum signed by the Director of
+Central Intelligence until 2005 and thereafter by the Director of National Intelligence, which
+documented the current threat to the U.S. homeland and to U.S. interests abroad from al Qaeda
+and affiliated terrorist organizations. The DNI has separately asserted privilege in order to
+prevent the disclosure of classified al Qaeda threat information.
+14. (TS//SI//OC/NF) Again, the term "content" is used herein to refer to the substance,
+meaning, or purport of a communication, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8), as distinguished
+from the type of addressing or routing information referred throughout this declaration as "meta
+data."
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+21
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+Thus, the initial scope of the authorization permitted NSA to intercept
+communications where a communicant was not only reasonably believed to be a member or
+agent of al Qaeda and affiliated organizations, but of other international terrorist organizations as
+well [REDACTED]. Starting in March 2004, the presidential authorization for
+content collection was limited to the collection of international communications where a party to
+such communication was reasonably believed to be a member or agent of al Qaeda or an
+affiliated terrorist organization. The existence of this activity was disclosed by then-President
+Bush in December 2005 and subsequently referred to as the "Terrorist Surveillance Program"
+("TSP"). The first presidential authorization of the TSP was on October 4, 2001, and the TSP
+was reauthorized approximately every 30-60 days throughout the existence of the program.¹⁵
+
+30. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) Under the TSP, NSA collected the content of
+international telephone communications, [REDACTED]
+
+15. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) The specific wording of the presidential authorizations
+evolved over time and during certain periods authorized other activities (this declaration is not
+intended to and does not fully describe the authorizations and the differences in those
+authorizations over time). For example, as already noted, the documents authorizing the TSP
+also contained the authorizations for the meta data activities described herein
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+22
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+31. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) Authorization of the TSP was intended to address an
+important gap in NSA's intelligence collection activities---namely, that significant changes in
+communications technology since the enactment of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act in
+1978 meant that NSA faced great difficulties in identifying foreign terrorist operatives who were
+communicating with individuals within the United States. FISA established the framework for
+court approval of the U.S. Government's efforts to conduct foreign intelligence surveillance of
+individuals in the United States. When FISA was enacted in 1978, most international
+communications to or from the United States were transmitted via satellite or radio technology.
+Congress intentionally excluded the vast majority of satellite or radio communications from the
+definition of "electronic surveillance" in the FISA. See 50 U.S.C. §1801(f). The interception of
+domestic communications within the United States, which were carried nearly exclusively on a
+wire. for foreign intelligence purposes, generally required a court order. As a result, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+the FISA did limit NSA's ability to collect "one-end" telephone or Internet
+international communications to or from the United States on a wire inside the United States.
+
+16. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel., et al. v National Security Agency, et al (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+23
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+32. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) Since the time FISA was enacted, sweeping advances in
+modern telecommunications technology upset the balance struck by Congress in 1978. By 2001.
+most international communications to or from the United States were on a wire and many
+domestic communications had increasingly become wireless. As a result of this change in
+communications technology, the NSA's collection from inside the United States of international
+communications (previously carried primarily via radio transmission) had shrunk considerably
+and the Government was forced to prepare FISA applications if it wished to collect the
+communications of non-U.S. persons located overseas. These circumstances presented a
+significant concern in the exceptional circumstances after 9/11. The NSA confronted the urgent
+need to identify further plots to attack U.S. interests both domestically and abroad. To do so, it
+needed to intercept the communications of terrorist operatives who, as described above.
+[REDACTED]. Further, as the
+[REDACTED]
+the United States was faced with the prospect of
+losing vital intelligence---and failing to detect another feared imminent attack---while the
+Government prepared [REDACTED] individual applications for FISA Court authorization on a
+large number of rapidly changing selectors.¹⁷
+
+33. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) Accordingly, after the 9/11 attacks, the President directed
+the NSA immediately to correct the gap in collecting the content of international
+communications from known or suspected foreign terrorists to or from the United States. As
+described below, Congress subsequently agreed to certain amendments to the FISA to address
+this collection gap and grant NSA flexibility to collect quickly on overseas, non-U.S. person
+[REDACTED]
+
+17. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+24
+[REDACTED] ORCON/NOFORN
+targets without individual FISC orders. Thus, sources and methods by which the NSA
+intercepted the content of information under the TSP are still utilized today under similar FISA
+authority and remain highly sensitive and classified information concerning the means by which
+the NSA may obtain significant foreign intelligence information. including, but not limited, to
+terrorist threats.
+
+2. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) Basket 2 – Bulk Telephony Meta Data Collection
+
+34. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) The second discrete NSA activity authorized
+by the President, again pursuant to the same presidential authorization, was the bulk collection of
+meta data related to telephony communications. As noted, telephony meta data is information
+derived from call detail records that reflect non-content information such as, but not limited to.
+the date. time, and duration of telephone calls, as well as the phone numbers used to place and
+receive the calls.¹⁸ The purpose of collecting telephony meta data in bulk is to query this
+information with particular "selectors" (i.e. phone numbers) reasonably believed to be associated
+with a member or agent of al Qaeda or affiliated terrorist organization in order to ascertain other
+contacts and patterns of communications for that selector. Thus, while the amount of telephony
+meta data obtained through the bulk collection under presidential authorization was significant.
+[REDACTED]
+
+18. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] ORCON/NOFORN
+25
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+only a tiny fraction of telephony meta data records collected by the NSA has actually been
+presented to a trained professional for analysis.¹⁹ However, the collection of meta data in bulk is
+necessary to utilize sophisticated and vital analytical tools for tracking the contacts [REDACTED]
+of al Qaeda and its affiliates. Again. the particular sources and methods
+by which the NSA collects and analyzes telephony meta data remain in use today pursuant to
+authority of the FISA and Executive Order 12333, and constitute highly significant tools for
+detecting and preventing terrorist attacks and thus for protecting national security.
+
+3. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) Basket 3 - Bulk Internet Meta Data Collection
+
+35. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) The third discrete NSA activity authorized
+by the President, again pursuant to the same presidential authorization, was the NSA collected
+bulk meta data related to Internet communications--- header/router addressing information, such
+as the "to." "from." "cc," and "bcc" lines, as opposed to the content or subject lines, of a
+standard email.²⁰ In addition to collecting the content of particular communications
+[REDACTED]
+NSA also obtained in bulk Internet meta data [REDACTED].
+As with telephony meta
+[REDACTED]
+
+19. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) NSA estimates that by the end of 2006. only [REDACTED] of the
+telephony meta data collected had actually been retrieved for analysis.
+20. (S//NF) [REDACTED]
+21. (S//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+26
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+data. NSA would then query the bulk Internet meta data with particular "selectors" (e.g. email
+address) reasonably believed to be associated with a member or agent of al Qaeda or affiliated
+terrorist organization in order to ascertain other contacts [REDACTED] of Internet communications
+for that selector (and thus. again, only a tiny fraction of Internet meta data collected was viewed
+by an analyst).
+[REDACTED]
+4. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+36. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+27
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+
+D. (TS//SI//OC/NF) Current NSA Activities Transitioned from Presidential
+Authority
+
+37. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) The three sources and methods of intelligence collection
+initially authorized by the President immediately following 9/11 have evolved over the last
+eleven years and continue to be utilized today. Thus, disclosure of the particular sources and
+methods described herein as they were utilized under presidential authorization would
+compromise the use of those sources and methods under other authority and thereby risk
+exceptionally grave damage to national security.
+
+1. (TS//SI//OC/NF) Collection of Communication Content
+
+38. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) First, in January of 2007, the content interception
+activities that had been occurring under the TSP were transitioned to authority of the FISA.²²
+Specifically, on January 10, 2007, the FISC issued orders authorizing the Government to conduct
+certain electronic surveillance that had been occurring under the TSP. Those orders included:
+[REDACTED]
+the "Foreign Telephone and
+Email Order," which authorized electronic surveillance of telephone and Internet
+communications [REDACTED] where the Government determined that there
+was probable cause to believe that (i) one of the communicants is a member or agent of [REDACTED]
+
+22. (TS//SI//OC/NF) This declaration generally describes the transition of all three
+Presidentially-authorized activities to FISA authority, but does not describe in detail the FISC
+Orders themselves, the details of their periodic renewal, specific legal issues that arose, the
+process involved in obtaining FISC approval, continual briefings to the various congressional
+oversight committees, or any subsequent compliance issues and corrective action taken as a
+result of those incidents. The FISC undertakes close oversight of NSA activities that are subject
+to the FISA. and NSA has worked extensively to ensure compliance with FISC orders, including
+those described herein.
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+28
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+; and (ii) the communication is to or from a foreign country
+(i.e., a one-end foreign communication to or from the United States). Thereafter, any electronic
+surveillance. as that term is defined in the FISA (see 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)), that was occurring as
+part of the TSP became subject to the approval of the FISA Court and the TSP was not
+reauthorized.²³
+
+39. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+23. (U) On January 17. 2007, the Attorney General made public the general facts that new
+orders of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court had been issued that authorized the
+Government to target for collection international communications into or out of the United States
+where there is probable cause to believe that one of the communicants is a member or agent of al
+Qaeda or an associated terrorist organization; that, as a result of these orders, any electronic
+surveillance that had been occurring as part of the TSP was then being conducted subject to the
+approval of the FISA Court; and that, under these circumstances, the TSP was not reauthorized.
+24. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED] the January 2007
+FISC Foreign Telephone and Email Order authorized NSA to intercept the content of
+communications of [REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+29
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+40. (TS//SI//OC/NF) The process of seeking renewal of the January 2007 FISC
+Foreign Telephone and Email Order after its original 90 day authorization ultimately led the
+Executive Branch to press for and Congress to enact amendments to the FISA that granted NSA
+greater flexibility to collect the content of international communications without the need for
+individual FISC orders for each selector targeted.
+[REDACTED]
+
+25. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+30
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+As discussed next, this prompted NSA to
+seek additional statutory authority under the FISA to intercept the content of international
+communications [REDACTED] inside the United States.
+
+41. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) In August 2007, Congress enacted the Protect America
+Act ("PAA"), which granted NSA additional flexibility under the FISA to target international
+communications without an individual court order for each selector. Under the PAA, the FISA's
+definition of "electronic surveillance" was clarified to exclude "surveillance directed at a person
+reasonably believed to be located outside the United States" 50 U.S.C. § 1805A. This change in
+the definition of electronic surveillance under the FISA permitted the NSA to intercept
+communications off of a wire inside the United States without an individual court order so long
+as the target was located outside the United States. This restored some of the operational
+flexibility needed to swiftly target rapidly changing selectors on multiple terrorist targets that
+existed under the TSP. The PAA eliminated the need for the Foreign Telephone and Email
+Order, and that Order expired after the PAA was enacted.
+
+42. (TS//SI//OC/NF) The PAA authorized the DNI and the Attorney General to
+jointly "authorize the acquisition of foreign intelligence information concerning persons
+reasonably believed to be outside the United States" for up to one year. id. § 1805B(a), and to
+issue directives to communications service providers requiring them to "immediately provide the
+[REDACTED]
+
+26. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al v National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+31
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+Government with all information, facilities, and assistance necessary to accomplish the
+acquisition of necessary intelligence information. id. § 1805B(e). Such directives were issued
+to a number of telecommunication and internet service providers.
+[REDACTED]
+and the NSA conducted content surveillance of overseas targets under the PAA with the
+assistance of those telecommunication carriers. More specifically, in August 2007, the Attorney
+General and DNI issued the requisite certifications, and, among other things. content collection
+under the PAA continued as to persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States
+involving communications of [REDACTED].
+Under the PAA, approximately [REDACTED] foreign
+selectors that had been authorized under the Foreign Telephone and Email Order were
+transitioned to collection by NSA under authority of the PAA.
+
+43. (TS//SI//OC/NF) The PAA was enacted as a temporary measure set to expire in
+180 days, and it ultimately did expire on February 16. 2008 (although directives issued under the
+PAA continued in effect until their stated expiration dates). On July 11, 2008, the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA) was signed into law. Section 702
+of the FAA created new statutory authority and procedures that permitted the targeting of non-
+United States persons reasonably believe to be outside of the United States without individual
+FISC orders but subject to directives issued to telecommunications carriers by the Director of
+National Intelligence and the Attorney General under Section 702(h) of the FISA for the
+continuation of overseas surveillance under this new authority. See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h) (as
+added by the FISA Act of 2008, P.L. 110-261). Directives that had been issued under the PAA
+for content surveillance of overseas targets (including surveillance of specific [REDACTED] targets
+overseas) were thus replaced by new directives for such surveillance issued pursuant to the FAA.
+While the existence of prior PAA authority and current FAA authority are set forth in public
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+32
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+statutory provisions, the operational details of the sources and methods used by NSA to carry out
+that authority remain highly classified.
+
+44. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) As with the TSP. the purpose of the new authority in
+Section 702 of the FAA was to account for changes in communications technology since 1978
+whereby international communications were increasingly transmitted to the United States via
+fiber optic cable and, consequently, increasingly subject to FISA's definition of electronic
+surveillance and requirements. By granting NSA the authority to conduct acquisitions inside the
+United States by targeting non-United States persons located outside the United States in order to
+acquire foreign intelligence information without the need for individualized FISC orders
+approving surveillance for each individual target, Section 702 permitted the NSA to continue to
+undertake content surveillance for overseas targets in a manner similar to that permitted under
+the TSP. As of August 2012. NSA presently has a total of approximately [REDACTED] individual
+foreign selectors under coverage pursuant to Section 702 of the FAA. Section 702 has proven to
+be a critical tool in the Government's efforts to acquire significant foreign intelligence necessary
+to protect the Nation's security and has quickly become one of the most important legal
+authorities available to the Intelligence Community.
+
+45. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) In sum, the post 9/11 content surveillance activities
+undertaken by the NSA evolved from the presidentially authorized TSP to the FISC Foreign
+Telephone and Email Order. to the directives issued under the PAA and, ultimately, to the
+directives that are now being issued pursuant to the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. Each
+authorization sought to enable the NSA to undertake content surveillance on numerous multiple
+targets overseas without the need to obtain advance court approval for each target. But, as
+explained further below, none of these content surveillance activities has entailed the kind of
+indiscriminate "dragnet" content surveillance of domestic or international telephony or Internet
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+33
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+communications that the plaintiffs allege. Rather, from the outset. content collection by the NSA
+has focused on international communications reasonably believed to involve terrorist
+organizations [REDACTED].
+
+2. (TS//SI//OC/NF) Collection of Bulk Telephony Meta data (Business Records)
+
+46. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) As set forth above. the second activity
+authorized by then-President Bush after the 9/11 attacks was the bulk collection of meta data
+related to telephony communications [REDACTED] again, information derived from call detail records that
+reflect non-content information such as, but not limited to, the date, time and duration of
+telephone calls, as well as the phone numbers used to place and received the calls. That activity,
+which began pursuant to Presidential authorization in October 2001. continues today under the
+authority of the FISA.
+
+47. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) Beginning in May 2006. the bulk collection of non-
+content telephony meta data, previously subject to Presidential authorization, was authorized by
+the FISC pursuant to what is known as the Telephone Business Records Order. The FISC found
+that. in order to protect against international terrorism, reasonable grounds existed to order
+certain telecommunication carriers to produce to the NSA in bulk "call detail records or
+"telephony meta data," pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1861(c) (authorizing the production of business
+records for, inter alia, an investigation to protect against international terrorism). While this bulk
+collection is again very broad in scope. the NSA has been authorized by the FISC to query the
+archived telephony data solely with identified telephone numbers for which there are facts giving
+rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that that the number is associated with (among other
+foreign targets) [REDACTED] (referred to as a "RAS"
+determination). Bulk telephony meta data collection, as continued to be authorized under FISA
+authority, remains a vital source and method needed to utilize sophisticated analytical tools for
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+34
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+tracking [REDACTED] contacts of [REDACTED].
+
+3. (TS//SI//OC/NF) Collection of Bulk Internet Meta data
+
+48. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) As also described above, the third activity authorized by
+then-President Bush after the 9/11 attacks was the bulk collection of meta data related to Internet
+communications. NSA carried out this bulk collection activity under presidential authorization
+[REDACTED]. During the period from [REDACTED] 2004. an
+application was prepared and submitted to the FISC to continue the bulk collection of Internet
+meta data. In July 2004, the FISC authorized the bulk collection of Internet meta data through
+the use of a pen register and trap and trace device ("FISC Pen Register Order" or "PRTT
+Order"). See 50 U.S.C. § 1841, et seq. (defining "pen register" and "trap and trace device").
+
+49. (TS//SI//OC/NF) Initially, under the PRTT Order, NSA was authorized to
+collect, in bulk. meta data associated with electronic communications [REDACTED]
+in a manner similar to that which NSA had utilized under presidential
+authorization. Specifically, the collection of Internet meta data [REDACTED] had been
+authorized because [REDACTED].
+[REDACTED]
+In addition, while NSA was authorized to collect
+Internet meta data in bulk [REDACTED] it was permitted to query the archived meta data
+only using Internet selectors for which there were facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable
+suspicion that the email address was associated with [REDACTED].
+As with bulk collection of telephony meta data
+collection, the bulk collection of Internet meta data allowed the NSA to use critical and unique
+analytical capabilities to track the contacts (even retrospectively) [REDACTED] of [REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+35
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+known terrorists.
+
+50. (TS//SI//OC/NF) The FISC Pen Register Order was reauthorized approximately
+every 90 days from July 2004 until December 2011.²⁷ In December 2011, NSA did not seek
+reauthorization of the PRTT Order after concluding that this activity was too limited in scope to
+justify further resources.
+[REDACTED]
+Thus, the disclosure of this source and method would
+compromise NSA's current collection activities and analytical capabilities and cause
+[REDACTED]
+
+27. (TS//SI//OC/NF) In accord with FISC oversight of NSA activities subject to the
+FISA, starting in [REDACTED] authorization for the PRTT Order was discontinued while
+NSA resolved certain compliance issues with the FISC. The PRTT Order was reauthorized in
+[REDACTED] until its last authorization expired in December 2011.
+28. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+36
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United States.
+
+51. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) The Jewel and Shubert plaintiffs allege that, in March
+2004, the Acting Attorney General of the Department of Justice refused to reauthorize certain
+aspects of the activities authorized by the President after the 9/11 attacks. See Jewel Compl. ¶¶
+45-49; Shubert SAC ¶¶ 97-99. I was not the Executive Director of NSA in March 2004, nor was I
+personally involved in the matter at issue, and this declaration does not describe the full details
+of this dispute [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+29. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+30. (S//NF) [REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel. et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+37
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+V. (U) Information Subject to DNI and NSA Privilege Assertions
+
+52. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) As the foregoing discussion indicates, a wide range of
+intelligence sources and methods, used over the past decade and still in use today, are at risk of
+disclosure in this lawsuit. While the plaintiffs allegations are focused on the period immediately
+following 9/11, and seek to challenge alleged activities undertaken pursuant to presidential
+authorization, the sources and methods used by NSA at that time continue to be used under
+subsequent authorizations. To expose a source and method, based on its use during one period of
+time, under one authority, would compromise, if not destroy, NSA's ability to use that method
+today. All of the presidentially authorized activities being challenged in this lawsuit (starting in
+July 2004) were placed under other FISA authority and have been subject to Congressional
+oversight. The need to protect these sources and methods continues to exist notwithstanding
+plaintiffs challenge to the lawfulness of their use under presidential authorization.
+
+53. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) Accordingly, the NSA seeks to protect from disclosure in
+this case the sources and methods its has utilized to undertake (i) content surveillance under the
+TSP, including information needed to demonstrate that the TSP was not the content "dragnet"
+plaintiffs allege; (ii) bulk collection of telephony meta data; (iii) bulk collection of Internet meta
+data, including the analytical tools for querying such data to detect terrorist contacts; (iv) facts
+concerning whether any NSA surveillance activities have been directed at or collected any
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et ol. v National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+38
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+information concerning the plaintiffs (which would risk disclosure of the existence and scope of
+the source and methods at issue); and (v) [REDACTED].
+
+54. (U) In general and unclassified terms, the following categories of information are
+subject to the DNI's assertion of the state secrets privilege and statutory privilege under the
+National Security Act. as well as my assertion of the NSA statutory privilege:
+
+A. (U) Information that may tend to confirm or deny whether
+the plaintiffs have been subject to any alleged NSA
+intelligence activity that may be at issue in this matter; and
+
+B. (U) Any information concerning NSA intelligence
+activities, sources, or methods that may relate to or be
+necessary to adjudicate plaintiffs' allegations, including
+allegations that the NSA, with the assistance of
+telecommunications carriers such as AT&T and Verizon,
+indiscriminately intercepts the content of communications
+and also collects the communication records of millions of
+Americans as part of an alleged "Program authorized by
+the President after 9/11. See. e.g., Jewel Comp. ¶¶ 2-13;
+39-97: Shubert SAC ¶¶ 1-9: 57-58: 62-91.
+
+The scope of this assertion includes but is not limited to:
+
+(i) (U) Information concerning the scope and
+operation of the now inoperative "Terrorist Surveillance
+Program" ("TSP") regarding the interception of the content
+of certain one-end international communications
+reasonably believed to involve a member or agent of al-
+Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization, and any other
+information related to demonstrating that the NSA does not
+otherwise engage in the content surveillance "dragnet" that
+the plaintiffs allege; and
+
+(ii) (U) Information concerning whether or not the
+NSA obtained from telecommunications companies such as
+AT&T and Verizon communication transactional records as
+alleged in the Complaint: see. e.g., Jewel Complaint ¶ 10;
+82-97: Shubert SAC ¶ 102: and
+
+(iii) (U) Information that may tend to confirm or
+deny whether AT&T. Verizon (and to the extent relevant or
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+39
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+necessary, any other telecommunications carrier), have
+provided assistance to the NSA in connection with any
+alleged activity; see, e.g.. Jewel Complaint ¶¶ 2, 7-8, 10; 13
+50-97: Shubert SAC ¶¶ 6. 10-13: 66-68.
+
+VI. (U) Harm of Disclosure of Privileged Information
+
+A. (U) Information Concerning Whether the Plaintiffs Have
+Been Subject to the Alleged NSA Activities
+
+55. (U) The first major category of information as to which I am supporting the DNI's
+assertion of privilege, and asserting the NSA's own statutory privilege. concerns information as
+to whether particular individuals. including the named plaintiffs in this lawsuit. have been
+subject to alleged NSA intelligence activities. As set forth below, disclosure of such information
+would cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security.
+
+1. (TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED]
+
+56. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) The named plaintiffs in the Jewel³¹ and Shubert³² cases
+allege that content of their own telephone and Internet communications have been and continue
+to be subject to unlawful search and seizure by the NSA. along with the content of
+communications of millions of ordinary Americans.³³ As set forth herein, the NSA does not
+[REDACTED]
+
+31. (U) According to the Complaint, named plaintiffs in the Jewel case are Tash Hepting.
+Gregory Hicks, Carolyn Jewel, Erik Knutzen, and Joice Walton.
+32. (U) According to the Second Amended Complaint, the named plaintiffs in the Shubert
+case are Virginia Shubert. Noha Arafa, Sarah Dranoff, and Hilary Botein.
+33. (U) Specifically. the Jewel Plaintiffs allege that pursuant to a presidentially authorized
+program after the 9/11 attacks, the NSA. with the assistance of AT&T. acquired and continues to
+acquire the content of phone calls, emails, instant messages, text messages, web and other
+communications, both international and domestic, of millions of ordinary Americans
+---"practically every American who uses the phone system or the Internet"--- including the
+Plaintiffs. See Jewel Complaint ¶¶ 7.9. 10: see also id. at 39-97. The Shubert Plaintiffs
+allege that the contents of "virtually every telephone, Internet and email communication sent
+from or received within the United States since shortly after September 11, 2001, including
+Plaintiffs communications, are being "searched, seized, intercepted, and subject to surveillance
+without a warrant, court order or any other lawful authorization in violation of the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. 50 U.S.C. § 1810." See Shubert SAC ¶ 1: see also id. ¶¶ 5.
+7.
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+40
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+engage in "dragnet" surveillance of the content of communications as plaintiffs allege [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+34. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+35. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel. et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+41
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+2. (TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED]
+
+57. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) Further, the named plaintiffs in Jewel and Shubert allege
+that the NSA has been and is continuing to collect the private telephone and Internet transaction
+records of millions of Americans, with the assistance of telecommunication carriers. again
+including information concerning the plaintiffs' telephone and Internet communications.³⁶
+[REDACTED]
+
+36. (U) Specifically, the Jewel plaintiffs allege that NSA has "unlawfully solicited and
+obtained from telecommunications companies the complete and ongoing disclosure of the private
+telephone and internet transactional records" of millions of ordinary Americans, including
+plaintiffs. See Jewel Complaint ¶¶ 7, 10, 11, 13, 82-97. The Shubert plaintiffs allege that "NSA
+now monitors huge volumes of records of domestic emails and Internet searches... [and]
+receives this so-called 'transactional' data from [REDACTED] private companies..." See Shubert SAC ¶
+102.
+37. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+38. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) During the time period covered by the Presidential
+Authorizations. NSA estimated that it collected Internet meta data associated with approximately
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al, v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+42
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+
+3. (U) Harm of Disclosing Whether Plaintiffs were Subject to NSA Activities.
+
+58. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+59. (U) As a matter of course. the NSA cannot publicly confirm or deny whether any
+individual is subject to surveillance activities because to do so would tend to reveal actual
+targets. For example, if the NSA were to confirm in these two cases and others that specific
+individuals are not targets of surveillance, but later refuse to comment (as it would have to) in a
+case involving an actual target, an actual or potential adversary of the United States could easily
+deduce by comparing such responses that the person in the latter case is a target. The harm of
+revealing targets of foreign intelligence surveillance should be obvious. If an individual knows
+or suspects he is a target of U.S. intelligence activities, he would naturally tend to alter his
+behavior to take new precautions against surveillance. In addition, revealing who is not a target
+would indicate who has avoided surveillance and what may be a secure channel for
+communication. Such information could lead an actual or potential adversary, secure in the
+[REDACTED]
+At the time
+the bulk collection of Internet meta data pursuant to orders of the FISC (the PRTT Order)
+expired in December 2011, NSA estimates that the percentage of Internet meta data that it
+collected had been reduced to approximately [REDACTED]. With respect to telephony meta
+data, NSA has previously estimated that, prior to the 2006 FISC Order, about [REDACTED]
+telephony meta data records was presented to an analyst for review.
+39. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al v Vanonal Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+43
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+knowledge that he is not under surveillance. to help a hostile foreign adversary convey
+information; alternatively, such a person may be unwittingly utilized or even forced to convey
+information through a secure channel to a hostile foreign adversary. Revealing which channels
+are free from surveillance and which are not would also reveal sensitive intelligence methods and
+thereby could help any adversary evade detection and capitalize on limitations in NSA's
+capabilities.⁴⁰
+
+60. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+40. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+
+Classified in Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+44
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+B. (U) Information Related to NSA Activities, Sources, or Methods
+Implicated by Plaintiffs' Allegations of a Communications "Dragnet"
+
+61. (U) I am also supporting the DNI's assertion of privilege and asserting the NSA's
+statutory privilege over any other facts concerning NSA intelligence activities, sources, or
+methods that may relate to or be necessary to litigate the plaintiffs claims and allegations.
+including that: (1) the NSA is indiscriminately intercepting the content of communications of
+millions of ordinary Americans, see e.g.. Jewel Complaint ¶¶ 7, 9, 10; Shubert SAC ¶¶ 1, 5, 7;
+and (2) that the NSA is collecting the private telephone and Internet transactional records of
+Americans with the assistance of telecommunications carriers, again including information
+concerning the plaintiffs' telephone and Internet communications. See Jewel Complaint ¶¶ 7.10.
+11. 13. 82-97; see Shubert SAC ¶ 102. As described above, the scope of the government's
+privilege assertion includes but is not limited to: (1) information concerning the now inoperative
+"Terrorist Surveillance Program" and any other NSA activities that would be at risk of disclosure
+or required in demonstrating that the NSA has not engaged in content "dragnet" surveillance
+activities that the plaintiffs allege; and (2) information concerning whether or not the NSA
+obtains transactional communications records from telecommunications companies. As set forth
+below, the disclosure of such information would cause exceptionally grave damage to national
+security.
+
+1. (U) Information Concerning Plaintiffs' Content Surveillance Allegations
+
+62. (U) After the existence of the TSP was officially acknowledged in December
+2005, the Government stated that this activity was limited to the interception of the content of
+certain communications for which there were reasonable grounds to believe that: (1) such
+communication originated or terminated outside the United States; and (2) a party to such
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+45
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+communication is a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization.
+Nonetheless. plaintiffs allege that the NSA indiscriminately intercepts the content of
+communications of millions of ordinary Americans. See e.g.. Jewel Complaint ¶¶ 7.9. 10: see
+Shubert SAC ¶¶ 1,5.7. As the Government has also previously stated,⁴¹ plaintiffs' allegation
+that the NSA has undertaken indiscriminate surveillance of the content⁴² of millions of
+communications sent or received by people inside the United States after 9/11 under the TSP is
+false. But to the extent the NSA must demonstrate that content surveillance under the TSP was
+so limited, and was not plaintiffs' alleged content "dragnet." or demonstrate that the NSA has not
+otherwise engaged in the alleged content "dragnet." highly classified NSA intelligence sources
+and methods about the operation of the TSP and current NSA intelligence activities would be
+subject to disclosure or the risk of disclosure. The disclosure of whether and to what extent the
+NSA utilizes certain intelligence sources and methods would reveal to foreign adversaries the
+NSA's capabilities, or lack thereof, enabling them to either evade particular channels of
+communications that are being monitored, or exploit channels of communications that are not
+subject to NSA activities - in either case risking exceptionally grave damage to national security.
+
+41. (U) See Public Declaration of Dennis Blair, Director of National Intelligence.
+¶ 15 (April 3, 2009) (Dkt. 18-3 in Jewel action (08-cv-4373): Public Declaration of Deborah A.
+Bonanni. National Security Agency ¶ 14 (Dkt. 18-4 in Jewel action (08-cv-4373): Public
+Declaration of Dennis Blair. Director of National Intelligence, ¶ 15 (October 30. 2009) (Dkt.
+680-1 in Shubert action (MDL 06-cv-1791): Public Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander.
+National Security Agency ¶ 19 (Dkt. 680-1 in Shubert action (MDL 06-cv-1791).
+42. (U) The term "content" is used herein to refer to the substance. meaning. or purport of
+a communication as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8).
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+46
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+
+(a) (U) Information Related to the Terrorist Surveillance Program
+
+63. (U) First, a range of operational details concerning the Terrorist Surveillance
+Program remains properly classified and privileged from disclosure, and could not be disclosed
+to address plaintiffs' content "dragnet" allegations including the following TSP-related
+information.
+
+64. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) First, interception of the content of communications
+under the TSP was triggered by a range of information. including sensitive foreign intelligence,
+obtained or derived from various sources, indicating that a particular phone number or email
+address was reasonably believed by the U.S. Intelligence Community to be associated with a
+member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization. Professional intelligence
+officers at the NSA undertook a careful but expeditious analysis of that information, and
+considered a number of possible factors, in determining whether it would be appropriate to target
+a telephone number or Internet selectors under the TSP. Those factors included whether the
+target phone number or email address was: (1) reasonably believed by the U.S. Intelligence
+Community, based on other authorized collection activities or other law enforcement or
+intelligence sources, to be used by a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist
+organization:
+[REDACTED]
+
+43. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+47
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+65. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) Once the NSA determined that there were reasonable
+grounds to believe that the target was a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist
+organization, the NSA took steps to focus the interception on the specific al Qaeda-related target
+and on communications of that target that were to or from a foreign country. In this respect, the
+NSA's collection efforts were [REDACTED] that the NSA had
+reasonable grounds to believe carry the "one-end foreign" communications of members or agents
+of al Qaeda or affiliated terrorist organizations.
+
+66. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+67. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+48
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+68. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) The NSA took specific steps in the actual TSP
+interception process to minimize the risk that the communications of non-targets were
+intercepted. With respect to telephone communications, specific telephone numbers identified
+through the analysis outlined above were [REDACTED] so that the only communications
+intercepted were those to or from the targeted number of an individual who was reasonably
+believed to be a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization.
+
+44. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+49
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+69. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) For the interception of the content of Internet
+communications under the TSP, the NSA used identifying information obtained through its
+analysis of the target, such as email addresses [REDACTED] to target for collection the
+communications of individuals reasonably believed to be members or agents of al Qaeda or an
+affiliated terrorist organization.
+[REDACTED]
+The NSA did not search the content of the
+communications [REDACTED] with "key words" (such as "wedding" or "jihad") other
+than the targeted selectors themselves. See Jewel Complaint ¶ 11; Shubert SAC ¶¶ 70, 72
+(alleging key word searches on communications content). Rather, the NSA targeted for
+collection only Internet addresses [REDACTED] associated with suspected
+members or agents of al Qaeda or affiliated terrorist organizations, or communications in which
+such [REDACTED] were mentioned. In addition, due to technical limitations of the
+hardware and software, incidental collection of non-target communications occurred, and in such
+circumstances the NSA applied its minimization procedures to ensure that communications of
+non-targets were not disseminated. To the extent such facts would be necessary to dispel
+plaintiffs' erroneous content "dragnet" allegations. they could not be disclosed without revealing
+highly sensitive intelligence methods.⁴⁵
+
+70. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) In addition to procedures designed to ensure that the TSP
+was limited to the international communications of al Qaeda members and affiliates. the NSA
+[REDACTED]
+
+45. (S//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+50
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+also took additional steps to ensure that the privacy rights of U.S. persons were protected.
+[REDACTED]
+
+71. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+46. (TS//SI//OC/NF) In addition, in implementing the TSP, the NSA was directed
+by the President to minimize the information collected concerning American citizens, to the
+extent consistent with the effective accomplishment of the mission of detection and prevention of
+acts of terrorism within the United States. The President further directed that any failure to
+adhere to the provisions of the authorizations should be reported to the President. Accordingly.
+NSA applied its existing Legal Compliance and Minimization Procedures applicable to U.S.
+persons to the extent not inconsistent with the presidential authorization. See United States
+Signals Intelligence Directive (USSID) 18. These procedures require that the NSA refrain from
+intentionally acquiring the communications of U.S. persons who are not the targets of its
+surveillance activities, that it destroy upon recognition any communications solely between or
+among persons in the U.S. that it inadvertently acquires, and that it minimize all U.S. person
+identities in intelligence reporting unless a senior NSA official determines upon individual
+request that the recipient of the report requires such information in order to perform a lawful
+function assigned to it and the identity of the U.S. person is necessary to understand the foreign
+intelligence or to assess its significance.
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+51
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+The foregoing information
+about the targeted scope of content collection under the TSP could not be disclosed, in order to
+address and rebut plaintiffs' allegation that the NSA, with the assistance of AT&T and Verizon,
+engaged in the alleged content "dragnet," without revealing specific NSA sources and methods
+and thereby causing exceptionally grave damage to the national security
+
+(b) (TS//SI//OC/NF) Information Related to Content Surveillance
+Under Other Authority
+
+72. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) In addition to the foregoing facts about the
+TSP, information concerning other NSA intelligence activities, sources, and methods would be at
+risk of disclosure or required to address allegations or prove that there has been no "dragnet"
+program authorized by the President after 9/11 under which the NSA intercepts the content of
+virtually all domestic and international communications as the plaintiffs allege.
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+52
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+73. (TS//SI//OC/NF) In addition, as outlined above, the content surveillance
+activities authorized under the TSP were transitioned in January 2007 to FISC-authorized
+electronic surveillance under Title I of the FISA and then, subsequently, to the Protect America
+Act of 2007, and then ultimately under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008.
+Again, while the statutory authority is publicly known, the operational details of the surveillance
+activities remain highly classified. NSA continues to utilize sources and methods for content
+surveillance similar to that utilized under the TSP whereby the content of international telephone
+and Internet communications are captured at [REDACTED]
+
+47. (S//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+53
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+by targeting [REDACTED] selectors reasonably
+believed to be associated with terrorist targets, including [REDACTED].
+Disclosure of particular sources and methods utilized under the TSP, in order to litigate
+plaintiffs "dragnet" allegations under presidential authorization, would compromise the use of
+similar sources and methods today. And disclosure of these sources and methods as currently
+utilized. in order to demonstrate there is no ongoing surveillance "dragnet," as alleged, would
+likewise compromise vital intelligence collection operations under FISA and other authority and.
+again, cause exceptionally grave damage to current efforts to detect and prevent terrorist
+attacks.⁴⁸
+
+2. (U) Plaintiffs' Allegations Concerning the Collection of Communication
+Records
+
+74. (U) Plaintiffs also allege that the NSA is collecting the private telephone and
+Internet transaction records of millions of Americans, again including information concerning
+the plaintiffs' telephone and Internet communications. See, e.g., Jewel Complaint
+¶¶ 7. 10. 11. 13, 82-97; see Shubert SAC ¶ 102. To address these allegations would risk or
+require disclosure of NSA sources and methods and reasonably could be expected to cause
+exceptionally grave damage to national security.
+
+75. (TS//SI//OC/NF) In addition to implicating the NSA's content collection
+activities authorized after the 9/11 attacks. the plaintiffs' allegations put directly at issue the
+[REDACTED]
+
+48. (TS//SI//OC/NF) To the extent relevant to this case, additional facts about the
+operational details of the TSP and subsequent FISA authorized content surveillance activities
+could not be disclosed without causing exceptionally grave damage to national security.
+including for example information that would demonstrate the operational swiftness and
+effectiveness of utilizing content surveillance in conjunction with the bulk meta data collection
+activities.
+[REDACTED]
+the TSP, in conjunction with meta data collection and analysis described herein, allowed
+the NSA to obtain rapidly not only the content of a particular communication, but connections
+between that target and others who may form a web of al Qaeda conspirators.
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+54
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+NSA's bulk collection of non-content communication meta data. As explained above. the NSA
+has not engaged in the alleged "dragnet" of communication content, and to address plaintiffs'
+allegations concerning the bulk collection of non-content information would require disclosure
+of NSA sources and methods that would cause exceptionally grave damage to national security.
+[REDACTED]
+
+76. (TS//SI//OC/NF) The bulk meta data collection activities that have been
+undertaken by the NSA since 9/11 are vital tools for protecting the United States from another
+catastrophic terrorist attack. Disclosure of these meta data activities, sources, or methods would
+cause exceptionally grave damage to national security. It is not possible to target collection
+solely on known terrorist telephone identifiers and effectively discover the existence, location,
+and plans of terrorist adversaries.
+[REDACTED]
+Meta data collection and analysis provides a vital and effective
+capability to keep track of such operatives.
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al, v Nanonal Security Igency. et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+55
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+77. (TS//SI//OC/NF) In particular. the bulk collection of Internet and telephony meta
+data allows the NSA to use critical and unique analytical capabilities to track the contacts
+[REDACTED]
+of members or agents of [REDACTED]
+through the use of two highly sophisticated tools known as "contact-chaining" and [REDACTED].
+Contact-chaining allows the NSA to identify telephone numbers and email addresses
+that have been in contact with known [REDACTED] numbers and addresses; in turn, those
+contacts can be targeted for immediate query and analysis as new [REDACTED] numbers
+and addresses are identified. When the NSA performs a contact-chaining query on a terrorist-
+associated telephone identifier.
+[REDACTED]
+
+78. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel. et al v National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+56
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+79. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+80. (TS//SI//OC/NF) Because it is impossible to determine in advance
+which particular piece of meta data will turn out to identify a terrorist, collecting meta data in
+bulk is vital for the success of contact-chaining [REDACTED]. NSA analysts know that the
+terrorists' telephone calls are located somewhere in the billions of data bits; what they cannot
+know ahead of time is exactly where. The ability to accumulate meta data substantially increases
+NSA's ability to detect and identify these targets. One particular advantage of bulk meta data
+collection is that it provides a historical perspective on past contact activity that cannot be
+captured in the present or prospectively. Such historical links may be vital to identifying new
+targets, because the meta data may contain links that are absolutely unique, pointing to potential
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+57
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+targets that otherwise would be missed.
+[REDACTED]
+
+81. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+These sources and methods enable the NSA to segregate some of that very
+small amount of otherwise undetectable but highly valuable information from the overwhelming
+amount of other information that has no intelligence value whatsoever-in colloquial terms, to
+find at least some of the needles hidden in the haystack. If employed on a sufficient volume of
+raw data, contact chaining [REDACTED] can expose [REDACTED] and
+contacts that were previously unknown.
+[REDACTED]
+
+82. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) As explained above, the bulk meta data collection
+activities that began under presidential authorization were transitioned to the authority of the
+FISA in July 2004 (PRTT Order for Internet meta data collection) and May 2006 (Business
+Records Order for telephony meta data collection). The PRTT Order was in effect until
+December 2011 and the Business Records Order remains in effect. Thus, long after the
+presidential authorization expired, NSA continued bulk meta data collection activities under
+FISA authority, [REDACTED].
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+58
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+83. (TS//SI//OC/NF) Accordingly, adjudication of plaintiffs' allegations concerning
+the collection of non-content meta data and records about communication transactions would risk
+or require disclosure of critical NSA sources and methods for tracking [REDACTED] contacts of
+terrorist communications as well as the existence of current NSA activities under FISA [REDACTED].
+Despite media speculation about these activities, official confirmation and disclosure
+of the NSA's bulk collection and targeted analysis of telephony meta data would confirm to all
+of our foreign adversaries [REDACTED] the existence of these critical
+intelligence capabilities and thereby severely undermine NSA's ability to gather information
+concerning terrorist connections and cause exceptional harm to national security.
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+59
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+
+3. (TS//SI//OC/NF) Information Concerning Current FISA Authorized
+Activities and Specific FISC Orders
+
+84. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) I am also supporting the DNI's state secrets privilege
+assertion, and asserting NSA's statutory privilege, over information concerning the various
+orders of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court mentioned throughout this declaration that
+authorize NSA intelligence collection activities, as well as NSA surveillance activities conducted
+pursuant to the now lapsed Protect America Act ("PAA") and current activities authorized by the
+FISA Amendments Act of 2008. As explained herein, the three NSA intelligence activities
+initiated after the September 11 attacks to detect and prevent a further al Qaeda attack—(i)
+content collection of targeted al Qaeda and associated terrorist-related communications under
+what later was called the TSP; (ii) internet meta data bulk collection; and (iii) telephony meta
+data bulk collection—have. beginning in January 2007, July 2004. and May 2006 respectively,
+been conducted pursuant to FISA and are no longer being conducted under presidential
+authorization. FISC Orders authorizing the bulk collection of non-content transactional data for
+internet communications commenced in the July 2004 FISC Pen Register Order and expired in
+December 2011, and FISC Orders authorizing the bulk collection of non-content telephony meta
+data commenced in May 2006 and remain ongoing. The existence and operational details of
+these orders remain highly classified, and disclosure of information concerning the orders would
+cause exceptional harm to national security by revealing the existence and nature of still sensitive
+intelligence sources and methods.⁴⁹ In addition, while the Government has acknowledged the
+[REDACTED]
+
+49. (TS//SI//OC/NF) For this reason, the FISC Telephone Business Records Order
+prohibits any person from disclosing to any other person that the NSA has sought or obtained the
+telephony meta data, other than to (a) those persons to whom disclosure is necessary to comply
+with the Order: (b) an attorney to obtain legal advice or assistance with respect to the production
+of meta data in response to the Order; or (c) other persons as permitted by the Director of the FBI
+or the Director's designee. They further provide that any person to whom disclosure is made
+pursuant to (a). (b). or (c) shall be subject to the nondisclosure requirements applicable to a
+person to whom the Order is directed in the same manner as such person. The bulk Pen Register
+orders say that the telecommunications companies who are served with them shall not "disclose
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al v. National Security Agency et al (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+60
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+general existence of the January 10, 2007 FISC Orders authorizing electronic surveillance
+similar to that undertaken in the TSP, the content of those orders, and facts concerning the NSA
+sources and methods they authorize, cannot be disclosed without likewise causing exceptional
+harm to national security. Likewise, the particular content surveillance sources and methods
+utilized by the NSA pursuant to the PAA and, currently, under the FISA Amendments Act of
+2008, likewise cannot be disclosed. For these reasons, the privilege assertion by the DNI, and
+my assertion of NSA's statutory privilege. encompass the FISC Orders and the sources and
+methods they concern.
+
+4. (U) Information Concerning Plaintiffs' Allegations that Telecommunications
+Carriers Provided Assistance to the NSA
+
+85. (U) The final major category of NSA intelligence sources and methods as to
+which I am supporting the DNI's assertion of privilege, and asserting the NSA's statutory
+privilege. concerns information that may tend to confirm or deny whether or not AT&T and
+Verizon (or to the extent necessary whether or not any other telecommunications provider) has
+assisted the NSA with alleged intelligence activities.⁵⁰ The Jewel plaintiffs and three of the
+Shubert plaintiffs allege that they are customers of AT&T. and that AT&T participated in the
+alleged surveillance activities that the plaintiffs seek to challenge. Additionally, at least one
+Shubert plaintiff also claims to be a customer of Verizon, and that Verizon similarly participated
+[REDACTED]
+the existence of the NSA's investigation, or the pen registers and/or trap and trace devices unless
+and until ordered by the Court."
+
+50. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) On September 19, 2008, then-Attorney General
+Mukasey submitted a classified declaration and certification to this Court authorized by Section
+802 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Amendments Act of 2008, see 50 U.S.C.
+§1885a, [REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+61
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+in the alleged surveillance activities that the plaintiffs seek to challenge. Confirmation or denial
+of a relationship between the NSA and AT&T. Verizon. or any other telecommunication carrier
+on alleged intelligence activities would cause exceptionally grave damage to national security.
+Confirming or denying such allegations of assistance would reveal to foreign adversaries
+whether or not NSA utilizes particular intelligence sources and methods and. thus. either
+compromise actual sources and methods or reveal that NSA does not utilize a particular source
+and method. Such facts would allow individuals. to include America's adversaries. to
+accumulate information and draw conclusions about how the U.S. Government collects
+communications, its technical capabilities. and its sources and methods. Any U.S. Government
+confirmation or denial would replace speculation with certainty for hostile foreign adversaries
+who are balancing the risk that a particular channel of communication may not be secure against
+the need to communicate efficiently. Such confirmation or denial would allow adversaries to
+focus with certainty on a particular channel that is secure.⁵¹
+
+86. (U) Indeed. Congress recognized the need to protect the identities of
+telecommunications carriers alleged to have assisted the NSA when it enacted provisions of the
+FISA Amendments Act of 2008 that barred lawsuits against telecommunication carriers alleged
+to have assisted the NSA aller the 9/11 attacks. In enacting this legislation. the Senate Select
+Committee on Intelligence, after extensive oversight of the Terrorist Surveillance Program.
+found that "electronic surveillance for law enforcement and intelligence purposes depends in
+[REDACTED]
+
+51. (U) For example, if NSA were to admit publicly in response to an information request
+that no relationship with telecommunications companies A. B. and C exists, but in response to a
+separate information request about company D state only that no response could be made. this
+would give rise to the inference that NSA has a relationship with company D. Over time. the
+accumulation of these inferences would disclose the capabilities (sources and methods) of NSA's
+intelligence activities and inform our adversaries of the degree to which NSA can successfully
+exploit particular communications. Our adversaries can then develop countermeasures to thwart
+NSA's abilities to collect their communications.
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al, v National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+62
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+great part on the cooperation of private companies that operate the nation's telecommunications
+system." S. Rep. 110-209 (2007) at 9 (accompanying S. 2248, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
+Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008). Notably, the SSCI expressly stated that. in connection
+with alleged post-9/11 assistance. "it would be inappropriate to disclose the names of the
+electronic communication service providers from which assistance was sought, the activities in
+which the Government was engaged or in which the providers assisted, or the details regarding
+any such assistance." Id. The Committee added that the "identities of persons or entities who
+provide assistance to the intelligence community are properly protected as sources and methods
+of intelligence." Id.
+
+87. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+88. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified in Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al, v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+63
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+89. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+52. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+53. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+64
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+
+90. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+(a) (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+
+91. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+92. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+54. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+65
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+(b) (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+
+93. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+94. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+95. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+55. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+
+Classified in Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+66
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+96. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+67
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+97. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+(c) (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+
+98. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+68
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+99. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+100. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No 08-cv-4873-(SW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+69
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+101. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel. et al v Nanonal Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+70
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+(d) (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+
+102. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+56. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+57. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al v. National Security Agency, et al. (No 08--1873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+71
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+103. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+104. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+72
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+58. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+59. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No 08-cv-1873-1SW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+73
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+105. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+(e) (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+
+106. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+107. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+74
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+108. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+75
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+109. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+76
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+110. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+60. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+77
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+111. (TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+VII. (U) Risks of Allowing Litigation to Proceed
+
+112. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) Upon examination of the allegations, claims.
+facts, and issues raised by these cases, it is my judgment that sensitive state secrets are so central
+to the subject matter of the litigation that any attempt to proceed will substantially risk the
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+78
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+disclosure of the privileged state secrets described above. Although plaintiffs' alleged content
+surveillance "dragnet" did not and does not occur. proving why that is so, [REDACTED]
+would directly implicate
+highly classified intelligence information and activities. Similarly. attempting to address
+plaintiffs' allegations with respect to the bulk collection of non-content information and records
+containing transactional meta data about communications would also compromise currently
+operative NSA sources and methods that are essential to protecting national security, including
+for detecting and preventing a terrorist attack.
+[REDACTED]
+In my judgment, any effort to probe the
+outer bounds of such classified information would pose inherent and significant risks of the
+disclosure of that information, including critically sensitive information about NSA sources.
+methods, operations, targets, and relationships. Indeed, any effort merely to allude to those facts
+in a non-classified fashion could be revealing of classified details that should not be disclosed.
+Even seemingly minor or innocuous facts. in the context of these cases or other non-classified
+information. can tend to reveal, particularly to sophisticated foreign adversaries, a much bigger
+picture of U.S. intelligence gathering sources and methods.
+
+113. (TS//SI//NF) The United States has an overwhelming interest in detecting and
+thwarting further mass casualty attacks by al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. The United
+States has already suffered one massive attack that killed thousands, disrupted the Nation's
+financial center for days, and successfully struck at the command and control center for the
+Nation's military. Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups continue to pursue the ability and have
+clearly stated an intent to carry out a massive attack in the United States that could result in a
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+79
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+significant loss of life, as well as have a devastating impact on the U.S. economy.
+
+114. (TS//SI//NF) As set forth above. terrorist organizations around the world seeks to
+use our own communications infrastructure against us as they secretly attempt to infiltrate agents
+into the United States. waiting to attack at a time of their choosing. One of the greatest
+challenges the United States confronts in the ongoing effort to prevent another catastrophic
+terrorist attack against the Homeland is the critical need to gather intelligence quickly and
+effectively. Time is of the essence in preventing terrorist attacks, and the government faces
+significant obstacles in finding and tracking terrorist operatives as they manipulate modern
+technology in an attempt to communicate while remaining undetected. The NSA sources.
+methods, and activities described herein are vital tools in this effort.
+
+VIII. (U) Conclusion
+
+115. (U) In sum. I support the DNI's assertion of the state secrets privilege and
+statutory privilege to prevent the disclosure of the information described herein and detailed
+herein. I also assert a statutory privilege under Section 6 of the National Security Agency Act
+with respect to the information described herein which concerns the functions and activities of
+the NSA. Moreover, because proceedings in this case risk disclosure of privileged and classified
+intelligence-related information. I respectfully request that the Court not only protect that
+information from disclosure but also dismiss this case to prevent exceptional harm to the national
+security of the United States.
+
+I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
+
+DATE: 9.11.12
+
+Frances J. Fleisch
+Executive Director
+National Security Agency
+
+Classified In Camera. Ex Parte Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch. National Security Agency
+Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW)
+[REDACTED] WORCON/NOFORN
+80
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Fleisch_2012_Jewel_Declaration/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Fleisch_2012_Jewel_Declaration/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..211227f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Fleisch_2012_Jewel_Declaration/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+{
+ "title": "NSA Fleisch 2012 Jewel Declaration",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Classified declaration of Frances J. Fleisch disclosing information regarding the government. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [
+ "Stuart F. Delery",
+ "Joseph H. Hunt",
+ "Vincent M. Garvey",
+ "Anthony J. Coppolino",
+ "Marcia Berman",
+ "Carolyn Jewel",
+ "Frances J. Fleisch",
+ "Jeffrey S. White"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2012-09-11",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "TSP",
+ "SI"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "ORCON, NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [
+ "STELLARWIND"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-12-20",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/nsa-fleisch-2012-jewel-declaration",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "e4a951f99cd7a660b49a3ef203f54c2dd6d1efc0c6fc89546222e945db5712ca",
+ "pages": 80
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Fleisch_2013_Jewel_Shubert_Declaration_Unclassified/ACLU_-_NSA_Fleisch_2013_Jewel_Shubert_Declaration_Unclassified.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Fleisch_2013_Jewel_Shubert_Declaration_Unclassified/ACLU_-_NSA_Fleisch_2013_Jewel_Shubert_Declaration_Unclassified.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..101c2af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Fleisch_2013_Jewel_Shubert_Declaration_Unclassified/ACLU_-_NSA_Fleisch_2013_Jewel_Shubert_Declaration_Unclassified.md
@@ -0,0 +1,986 @@
+STUART F. DELERY
+Assistant Attorney General
+JOSEPH H. HUNT
+Director, Federal Programs Branch
+ANTHONY J. COPPOLINO
+Deputy Branch Director
+JAMES J. GILLIGAN
+Special Litigation Counsel
+MARCIA BERMAN
+Senior Trial Counsel
+BRYAN DEARINGER
+RODNEY PATTON
+Trial Attorneys
+U.S. Department of Justice
+Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch
+20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
+Washington, D.C. 20001
+Phone: (202) 514-2205
+Fax: (202) 616-8470
+_Attorneys for the United States and Government_
+_Defendants Sued in their Official Capacities_
+
+UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
+NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
+SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
+
+CAROLYN JEWEL, _et al._
+
+Plaintiffs,
+
+v.
+
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, _et al._
+
+Defendants.
+
+Case No. 08-cv-4373-JSW
+
+VIRGINIA SHUBERT, _et al._
+
+Plaintiffs,
+
+BARACK OBAMA, et al.
+
+Defendants.
+
+Case No. 07-cv-693-JSW
+
+UNCLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF FRANCES J. FLEISCH, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+
+No Hearing Scheduled
+Courtroom 11, 19th Floor
+Judge Jeffrey S. White
+
+Unclassified Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency
+1
+Jewel. v. NSA. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert v. Obama (07-cv-0693-JSW) (M:06-cv-1791)
+
+UNCLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF FRANCES J. FLEISCH
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+
+I, Frances J. Fleisch, do hereby state and declare as follows:
+
+**I. INTRODUCTION**
+
+1. I am the Acting Deputy Director for the National Security Agency (“NSA” or “Agency”), an intelligence agency within the Department of Defense. I have held this position since December 9, 2013. Prior to holding the position of Acting Deputy Director, I was the Agency's Executive Director from June 2010 to December 8, 2013. Before moving into the Executive Director position, I served in a number of leadership and management positions since joining the agency in 1980. As Acting Deputy Director, I serve as the senior civilian leader of the NSA and act as the Agency's chief operating officer, responsible for guiding and directing strategies, operations, and policy. Under our internal regulations, and in the absence of the Director of the NSA, I am responsible for directing the NSA, overseeing the operations undertaken to carry out its mission and, by specific charge of the President and the Director of National Intelligence, protecting NSA activities and intelligence sources and methods. I have been designated an original TOP SECRET classification authority under Executive Order ("EO") No. 13526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (2009), and Department of Defense Manual No. 5200.1, Vol. 1, Information and Security Program (Feb. 24, 2012).
+
+2. The purpose of this declaration is to support an assertion of the military and state secrets privilege (hereafter, "state secrets privilege") by the Director of National Intelligence ("DNI") as the head of the Intelligence Community, as well as the DNI's assertion of a statutory privilege under the National Security Act, to protect information related to the NSA activities described below that may be necessary to adjudicate the claims at issue in this litigation.
+
+26 Through this declaration, I also hereby invoke and assert the NSA's statutory privilege set forth
+
+Unclassified Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency
+2
+Jewel. v. NSA. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert v. Obama (07-cv-0693-JSW) (M:06-cv-1791)
+
+1 in Section 6 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959, Public Law No. 86-36 (codified at 50
+2 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.) ("NSA Act"), to protect the information related to the NSA activities
+3 described herein below. General Keith B. Alexander, the Director of the NSA, has been sued in
+4 his official and individual capacities in the above-captioned litigation and has recused himself
+5 from the decision on whether to assert privilege in his official capacity. As the Acting Deputy
+6 Director, and by specific delegation of the Director, I am authorized to review the materials
+7 associated with this litigation, prepare whatever declarations I determine are appropriate, and
+8 determine whether to assert the NSA's statutory privilege. The statements made herein are based
+9 on my personal knowledge of NSA activities and operations, and on information made available
+10 to me as the Acting Deputy Director of the NSA. Contemporaneous with this declaration, I have
+11 executed a classified declaration solely for the Court's in camera, ex parte review, concerning
+12 the same matters addressed in this public declaration.
+
+13 **II. SUMMARY**
+
+14 3. In the course of my official duties, I have been advised that plaintiffs in this
+15 litigation allege that, following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the NSA, pursuant to
+16 presidential authorization and with the assistance of plaintiffs' telecommunications companies
+17 (namely, AT&T and Verizon), indiscriminately intercepted the content and obtained the
+18 communications records of millions of ordinary Americans as part of an alleged "dragnet"
+19 communications surveillance. The Government has previously asserted the state secrets
+20 privilege in these cases, most recently in September 2012, to protect from disclosure highly
+21 sensitive intelligence-gathering information relevant to confirming or negating plaintiffs'
+22 allegations. This declaration responds to the Court's order that the Government explain the
+23 impact of recent official disclosures about NSA intelligence-gathering activities on the national
+
+Unclassified Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency
+3
+Jewel. v. NSA. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert v. Obama (07-cv-0693-JSW) (M:06-cv-1791)
+
+1 security issues in the litigation, as reflected in its state secrets privilege assertion. July 23, 2013
+2 Amended Order (ECF No. 153 at 25); Sept. 27, 2013 Transcript of Proceedings at 7.¹
+
+3 4. The Government's recent official disclosures follow a series of unprecedented,
+4 unauthorized, and unlawful disclosures, by a former NSA contractor, of Top Secret documents
+5 concerning certain classified NSA surveillance programs. The media revealed those
+6 unauthorized disclosures beginning in June 2013. These disclosures are now risking, and in
+7 some cases causing, the exceptionally grave damage to national security that the Government has
+8 previously identified to the Court, including the loss of valuable intelligence and, specifically,
+9 information that may assist in detecting or preventing a future mass casualty terrorist attack.
+
+10 5. The Government responded to the recent unlawful disclosures by officially
+11 acknowledging the existence of certain programs because of the importance of correcting
+12 inaccurate information to the public about those programs, despite the harm to national security
+13 that such an official acknowledgement would cause. In sum, the Government confirmed the
+14 existence and some information concerning (1) the telephony metadata program, in which the
+15 NSA obtains, pursuant to orders issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC"),
+16 telephone company business records in bulk containing certain non-content information about
+17 phone calls made, such as the phone numbers dialed, and the date, time, and duration of the calls,
+18 and uses that information to identify unknown terrorist operatives; (2) a previous program of
+19 bulk collection of certain Internet metadata, such as the "to" and "from" lines of an email and the
+20 date and time the email was sent, also authorized by the FISC and also for counter-terrorism
+
+---
+¹ This declaration supplants all prior privilege assertions. In order to focus on the
+information which remains subject to this privilege assertion, this declaration does not repeat or
+address all topics that were addressed in prior declarations. The Court is respectfully referred to
+prior declarations for additional background.
+---
+Unclassified Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency
+4
+Jewel. v. NSA. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert v. Obama (07-cv-0693-JSW) (M:06-cv-1791)
+
+1 purposes; and (3) certain information about the Government's use of authority conferred by
+2 Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"), to collect, for foreign
+3 intelligence purposes, certain communications of non-U.S. persons located outside the United
+4 States, pursuant to approval of the FISC.
+
+5 6. In addition, the Government has now declassified the existence of the two
+6 metadata collection activities that were conducted prior to FISC authorization, under presidential
+7 authorizations issued by President Bush in the wake of the September 11 attacks. But for many
+8 reasons vital to national security, the classified sources and methods (many of which the NSA
+9 continues to utilize today), intelligence gathered, and operational details of what has been called
+10 the President's Surveillance Program ("PSP") must remain protected from public disclosure to
+11 avoid even greater damage to national security than is already occurring as a result of the
+12 unlawful disclosures. To the extent this information is at risk of disclosure in litigating
+13 plaintiffs' claims, the Government continues to assert the state secrets privilege and applicable
+14 statutory privileges over that information. In particular, and in unclassified terms, the privilege
+15 applies to information about whether plaintiffs themselves have been subject to any of the
+16 surveillance activities they complain about; classified intelligence sources and methods of the
+17 NSA programs at issue, such as the identities of any telecommunications carriers and facilities
+18 that provided assistance to the NSA; and intelligence collected under the programs.
+
+19 7. For the reasons detailed below and further detailed in my classified declaration,
+20 the Government continues to assert the state secrets privilege in these cases, as described in my
+21 declaration, notwithstanding the Government's recent official disclosures.
+
+22
+23
+24
+
+Unclassified Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency
+5
+Jewel. v. NSA. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert v. Obama (07-cv-0693-JSW) (M:06-cv-1791)
+
+1 **III. BACKGROUND**
+
+2 **A. The National Security Agency**
+
+3 8. The NSA was established by Presidential Directive in 1952 as a separately
+4 organized agency within the Department of Defense. The NSA's foreign intelligence mission
+5 includes the responsibility to collect, process, analyze, produce, and disseminate signals
+6 intelligence ("SIGINT") information, of which COMINT is a significant subset, for (a) national
+7 foreign intelligence purposes, (b) counterintelligence purposes, and (c) the support of military
+8 operations. See Executive Order 12333, § 1.7(c), as amended.²
+
+9 9. SIGINT consists of three subcategories: (1) COMINT; (2) electronic intelligence
+10 ("ELINT"); and (3) foreign instrumentation signals intelligence ("FISINT"). COMINT is
+11 defined as "all procedures and methods used in the interception of communications and the
+12 obtaining of information from such communications by other than the intended recipients." 18
+13 U.S.C. § 798. COMINT includes information derived from the interception of foreign
+14 international communications, such as voice, facsimile, and computer-to-computer information
+15 conveyed via a number of means. ELINT is technical intelligence information derived from
+16 foreign non-communications electromagnetic radiations except atomic detonation or radioactive
+17 sources---in essence, radar systems affiliated with military weapons platforms (e.g., anti-ship)
+18 and civilian systems (e.g., shipboard and air traffic control radars). FISINT is derived from the
+
+---
+² Executive Order 12333, reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C § 3001 note, generally
+describes the NSA's authority to collect foreign intelligence that is not subject to the FISA
+definition of electronic surveillance, including activities undertaken abroad. Section 1.7(c) of
+E.O. 12333, as amended, specifically authorizes the NSA to "Collect (including through
+clandestine means), process, analyze, produce, and disseminate signals intelligence information
+for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes to support national and departmental
+missions."
+---
+Unclassified Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency
+6
+Jewel. v. NSA. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert v. Obama (07-cv-0693-JSW) (M:06-cv-1791)
+
+1 intercept of foreign electromagnetic emissions associated with the testing and operational
+2 deployment of non-U.S. aerospace, surface, and subsurface systems.
+
+3 10. The NSA's SIGINT responsibilities include establishing and operating an
+4 effective unified organization to conduct SIGINT activities set forth in EO 12333, § 1.7(c)(2), as
+5 amended. In performing its SIGINT mission, the NSA has developed a sophisticated worldwide
+6 SIGINT collection network that acquires, among other things, foreign and international
+7 electronic communications and related information. The technological infrastructure that
+8 supports the NSA's foreign intelligence information collection network has taken years to
+9 develop at a cost of billions of dollars and untold human effort. It relies on sophisticated
+10 collection and processing technology.
+
+11 11. There are two primary reasons for gathering and analyzing foreign intelligence
+12 information. The first, and most important, is to gain information required to direct U.S.
+13 resources as necessary to counter external threats and in support of military operations. The
+14 second reason is to obtain information necessary to the formulation of U.S. foreign policy.
+15 Foreign intelligence information provided by the NSA is thus relevant to a wide range of
+16 important issues, including military order of battle; threat warnings and readiness; arms
+17 proliferation; international terrorism; counter-intelligence; and foreign aspects of international
+18 narcotics trafficking.
+
+19 12. The NSA's ability to produce foreign intelligence information depends on its
+20 access to foreign and international electronic communications. Foreign intelligence produced by
+21 COMINT activities is an extremely important part of the overall foreign intelligence information
+22 available to the United States and is often unobtainable by other means. Public disclosure of
+23 either the capability to collect specific communications or the substance of the information
+24 derived from such collection itself can easily alert targets to the vulnerability of their
+
+Unclassified Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency
+7
+Jewel. v. NSA. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert v. Obama (07-cv-0693-JSW) (M:06-cv-1791)
+
+1 communications. Disclosure of even a single communication holds the potential of revealing
+2 intelligence collection techniques that are applied against targets around the world. Once alerted,
+3 targets can frustrate COMINT collection by using different or new encryption techniques, by
+4 disseminating disinformation, or by utilizing a different communications link. Such evasion
+5 techniques may inhibit access to the target's communications and therefore deny the United
+6 States access to information crucial to the defense of the United States both at home and abroad.
+7 COMINT is provided special statutory protection under 18 U.S.C. § 798, which makes it a crime
+8 to knowingly disclose to an unauthorized person classified information "concerning the
+9 communication intelligence activities of the United States or any foreign government."
+
+10 **B. September 11, 2001, the al Qaeda Threat**
+
+11 13. On September 11, 2001, the al Qaeda terrorist network launched a set of
+12 coordinated attacks along the East Coast of the United States. Four commercial jetliners, each
+13 carefully selected to be fully loaded with fuel for a transcontinental flight, were hijacked by al
+14 Qaeda operatives. Those operatives targeted the Nation's financial center in New York with two
+15 of the jetliners, which they deliberately flew into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center.
+16 Al Qaeda targeted the headquarters of the Nation's Armed Forces, the Pentagon, with the third
+17 jetliner. Al Qaeda operatives were apparently headed toward Washington, D.C. with the fourth
+18 jetliner when passengers struggled with the hijackers and the plane crashed in Shanksville,
+19 Pennsylvania. The intended target of this fourth jetliner was most likely the White House or the
+20 Capitol, strongly suggesting that al Qaeda's intended mission was to strike a decapitating blow to
+21 the Government of the United States to kill the President, the Vice President, or Members of
+22 Congress. The attacks of September 11 resulted in approximately 3,000 deaths the highest
+23 single-day death toll from hostile foreign attacks in the Nation's history. In addition, these
+
+Unclassified Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency
+8
+Jewel. v. NSA. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert v. Obama (07-cv-0693-JSW) (M:06-cv-1791)
+
+1 attacks shut down air travel in the United States, disrupted the Nation's financial markets and
+2 government operations, and caused billions of dollars of damage to the economy.
+
+3 14. On September 14, 2001, a national emergency was declared "by reason of the
+4 terrorist attacks at the World Trade Center, New York, New York, and the Pentagon, and the
+5 continuing and immediate threat of further attacks on the United States." Presidential
+6 Proclamation No. 7463, 66 Fed. Reg. 48199 (Sept. 14, 2001). On September 14, 2001, both
+7 Houses of Congress passed a Joint Resolution authorizing the President of the United States "to
+8 use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he
+9 determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks" of September 11.
+10 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40 § 21(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (Sept.
+11 18, 2001) ("Cong. Auth."). Congress also expressly acknowledged that the attacks rendered it
+12 "necessary and appropriate" for the United States to exercise its right "to protect United States
+13 citizens both at home and abroad," and acknowledged in particular that "the President has
+14 authority under the Constitution to take action to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism
+15 against the United States." Id. pmbl.³
+
+---
+³ Following the 9/11 attacks, the United States also immediately began plans for a
+military response directed at al Qaeda's training grounds and havens in Afghanistan. A Military
+Order was issued stating that the attacks of September 11 "created a state of armed conflict" see
+Military Order by the President § 1(a), 66 Fed. Reg. 57833, 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001), and that al
+Qaeda terrorists "possess both the capability and the intention to undertake further terrorist
+attacks against the United States that, if not detected and prevented, will cause mass deaths, mass
+injuries, and massive destruction of property, and may place at risk the continuity of the
+operations of the United States Government," and concluding that "an extraordinary emergency
+exists for national defense purposes." Military Order, § 1(c), (g), 66 Fed. Reg. at 57833-34.
+Indeed, shortly after the attacks, NATO took the unprecedented step of invoking article 5 of the
+North Atlantic Treaty which provides that "an armed attack against one or more of [the parties]
+shall be considered an attack against them all." North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 5, 63
+Stat. 2241, 2244, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, 246.
+---
+Unclassified Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency
+9
+Jewel. v. NSA. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert v. Obama (07-cv-0693-JSW) (M:06-cv-1791)
+
+1 15. As a result of the unprecedented attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States
+2 found itself immediately propelled into a conflict with al Qaeda and its associated forces, a set of
+3 groups that possesses the evolving capability and intention of inflicting further attacks on the
+4 United States. That conflict is continuing today, at home as well as abroad. Moreover, the
+5 conflict against al Qaeda and its allies is a very different kind of conflict, against a very different
+6 enemy, than any other conflict or enemy the Nation has previously faced. Al Qaeda and its
+7 affiliates operate not as a traditional nation-state but as a diffuse, decentralized network of
+8 individuals, cells, and loosely associated, often disparate groups, that act sometimes in concert,
+9 sometimes independently, and sometimes in the United States, but always in secret—and their
+10 mission is to destroy lives and to disrupt a way of life through terrorist acts. Al Qaeda works in
+11 the shadows; secrecy is essential to al Qaeda's success in plotting and executing its terrorist
+12 attacks.
+
+13 16. The 9/11 attacks posed significant challenges for the NSA's signals intelligence
+14 mission. Global telecommunications networks, especially the Internet, have developed in recent
+15 years into a loosely interconnected system—a network of networks that is ideally suited for the
+16 secret communications needs of loosely affiliated terrorist cells. Hundreds of Internet service
+17 providers, or "ISPs," and other providers of communications services offer a wide variety of
+18 global communications options, often free of charge.
+
+19 17. Our efforts against al Qaeda and its affiliates therefore present critical challenges
+20 for the Nation's communications intelligence capabilities. First, in this type of conflict, more so
+21 than in any other we have ever faced, communications intelligence is essential to our ability to
+22 identify the enemy and to detect and disrupt its plans for further attacks on the United States.
+23 Communications intelligence often is the only means we have to learn the identities of particular
+24 individuals who are involved in terrorist activities and the existence of particular terrorist threats.
+
+Unclassified Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency
+10
+Jewel. v. NSA. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert v. Obama (07-cv-0693-JSW) (M:06-cv-1791)
+
+1 Second, at the same time that communications intelligence is more important than ever, the
+2 decentralized, non-hierarchical nature of the enemy and their sophistication in exploiting the
+3 agility of modern telecommunications make successful communications intelligence more
+4 difficult than ever. It is against this backdrop that the risks presented by this litigation should be
+5 assessed, in particular the risks of disclosing NSA sources and methods implicated by the claims
+6 being raised.
+
+7 **C. Plaintiffs' Allegations and the Government's Prior Assertions of Privilege**
+
+8 18. In the course of my official duties, I have been advised of the _Jewel_ and _Shubert_
+9 cases, and I have reviewed the allegations raised in this litigation, including the Complaint filed
+10 in the _Jewel_ action on September 18, 2008, and the Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") filed
+11 in the _Shubert_ action on May 8, 2012. In sum, plaintiffs allege that, after the 9/11 attacks, the
+12 NSA received presidential authorization to engage in "dragnet" communications surveillance in
+13 concert with major telecommunications companies. _See, e.g., Jewel Compl._ ¶¶ 2-3, _Shubert_
+14 _SAC_ ¶¶ 1-7. Plaintiffs allege that, pursuant to presidential authorization and with the assistance
+15 of telecommunication companies (including AT&T and Verizon), the NSA indiscriminately
+16 intercepted the content and obtained the communications records of millions of ordinary
+17 Americans. Plaintiffs seek relief in this litigation that would prohibit such collection activities,
+18 even though they were later transitioned to FISC-authorized programs and remain so to the
+19 extent the programs continue.
+
+20 19. In addition, I am familiar with the previous classified declarations filed in these
+21 cases in September and November 2012. In those declarations, the DNI and the NSA asserted
+22 the state secrets privilege over the following broad categories of information: (1) any
+23 information that may tend to confirm or deny whether particular individuals, including plaintiffs,
+24 have been subject to the alleged NSA intelligence activities; and (2) any information concerning
+
+Unclassified Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency
+11
+Jewel. v. NSA. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert v. Obama (07-cv-0693-JSW) (M:06-cv-1791)
+
+1 NSA intelligence activities, sources, or methods that may relate to or be necessary to adjudicate
+2 plaintiffs' allegations, including allegations that the NSA, with the assistance of
+3 telecommunications carriers such as AT&T and Verizon, indiscriminately intercepts the content
+4 of communications and collects the communication records of millions of Americans as part of
+5 an alleged program authorized by the President after 9/11. This latter category included (i)
+6 information concerning the scope and operation of the now inoperative Terrorist Surveillance
+7 Program ("TSP") regarding the interception of the content of certain international
+8 communications reasonably believed to involve a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated
+9 terrorist organization,⁴ and any other information related to demonstrating that the NSA does not
+10 otherwise engage in the content surveillance "dragnet" alleged by plaintiffs; (ii) information
+11 concerning whether or not the NSA obtained from telecommunications companies such as
+12 AT&T and Verizon communication transactional records as alleged in the complaints; and (iii)
+13 information that may tend to confirm or deny whether AT&T, Verizon, or other
+14 telecommunications carriers have provided assistance to the NSA in connection with any of the
+15 alleged activities.
+
+16 **D. Official Disclosures Since September 2012**
+
+17 20. In the wake of unauthorized disclosures, beginning in June 2013, about
+18 intelligence-gathering activities conducted by the NSA, the DNI, at the direction of the President
+19 and in light of the President's transparency initiative, has declassified and made public certain
+
+---
+⁴ In December 2005, then-President Bush publicly acknowledged the existence of a
+presidentially-authorized NSA activity that later came to be called the TSP under which the NSA
+was authorized to intercept the content of specific international communications (i.e., to or from
+the United States) involving persons reasonably believed to be associated with al Qaeda and
+affiliated terrorist organizations. The term "content" is used herein to refer to the substance,
+meaning, or purport of a communication, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8), as distinguished
+from the type of addressing or routing information referred to herein as "metadata."
+---
+Unclassified Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency
+12
+Jewel. v. NSA. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert v. Obama (07-cv-0693-JSW) (M:06-cv-1791)
+
+1 information about a number of sensitive programs undertaken under the authority of the FISA.
+2 Certain of the information that the DNI has declassified concerns the allegations raised in this
+3 litigation, and this information has been described in great detail in the classified declarations
+4 referenced above. In addition, the President has declassified the fact of the existence of two
+5 portions of the discontinued President's Surveillance Program, which also concern the
+6 allegations at issue in this litigation. I summarize these various official disclosures below.
+
+7 **1. Collection of Bulk Telephony Metadata Under Section 215 of the FISA**
+
+8 21. First, since May 2006, under a provision of the FISA known as Section 215 and
+9 codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861, the NSA obtains, pursuant to orders of the FISC, bulk telephony
+10 metadata – business records created by telecommunications service providers that include such
+11 information as the telephone numbers placing and receiving calls, and the time and duration of
+12 those calls.⁵ The Government has declassified and publicly disclosed a number of "primary"
+13 orders of the FISC to the Government authorizing it to carry out the bulk telephony metadata
+14 program. The Government has acknowledged only one "secondary" FISC order, however, to
+15 one telecommunications service provider (Verizon Business Network Services, Inc. (“VBNS”)),
+16 and for only one approximately 90-day period of time (from April 25, 2013 to July 19, 2013).
+17 The Government acknowledged this secondary order only after the order was disclosed
+18 unlawfully and without authorization. This is the only FISC order identifying any particular
+19 provider that has been declassified and, since the disclosure of this order in June 2013, the
+20 United States has continued to protect against any further disclosures of FISC orders directed at
+
+---
+⁵ Under the terms of the FISC's orders, the NSA is authorized to collect information
+including, as to each call, the telephone numbers that placed and received the call, other session-
+identifying information (e.g., International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) number,
+International Mobile station Equipment Identity (IMEI) number, etc.), trunk identifier, telephone
+calling card number, and the date, time, and duration of a call.
+---
+Unclassified Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency
+13
+Jewel. v. NSA. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert v. Obama (07-cv-0693-JSW) (M:06-cv-1791)
+
+1 any provider under the telephony metadata program. While the authentication of that order
+2 means that the identity of one participating provider has been officially acknowledged for the
+3 particular time period of that order, the order was limited to VBNS, did not identify any other
+4 provider, did not relate to any other corporate component of Verizon other than VBNS, and was
+5 of limited duration (expiring on July 19, 2013). There has been no official acknowledgement of
+6 whether or not VBNS assisted the NSA with the FISC telephony metadata program either before
+7 or after the period covered by the April 2013 order, or whether VBNS continues to participate in
+8 the program. The identities of the providers that furnish assistance to the NSA under the
+9 telephony metadata program, including VBNS, as to any other time period other than the
+10 approximately 90-day duration of that order, have not been declassified and remains currently
+11 and properly classified.
+
+12 22. The Government also disclosed that it does not collect, listen to, or record the
+13 content of any call under this program, nor does it collect the name, address, or financial
+14 information of any subscriber, customer, or party to a call, or cell site locational information.
+15 The Government obtains FISC orders under this program by submitting detailed applications
+16 from the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") explaining that the records are sought for
+17 investigations to protect against international terrorism that concern specified foreign terrorist
+18 organizations identified in the application. As required by Section 215, each application contains
+19 a statement of facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the metadata as a
+20 whole are relevant to the investigations of these organizations.
+
+21 23. The NSA stores and analyzes this information under carefully controlled
+22 circumstances and under stringent supervision and oversight by all three branches of
+23 Government. The vast majority of the metadata are never seen by any person. Rather, the NSA
+24 has been authorized to query the archived data solely with identifiers, typically telephone
+
+Unclassified Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency
+14
+Jewel. v. NSA. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert v. Obama (07-cv-0693-JSW) (M:06-cv-1791)
+
+1 numbers, for which there are facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion ("RAS") that
+2 the number is associated with one or more of the foreign terrorist organizations that are the
+3 subject of FBI investigations previously identified to the FISC. Where the identifier is
+4 reasonably believed to be used by a U.S. person, the NSA may not make the RAS determination
+5 solely based on activities protected by the First Amendment.
+
+6 24. The accessible results of an approved query are limited to records of
+7 communications within three "hops" from the seed identifier.⁶ That is, the query results may
+8 only include identifiers having a direct contact with the seed (the first "hop"), identifiers having a
+9 direct contact with the first "hop" identifiers (the second "hop"), and identifiers having a direct
+10 contact with second "hop" identifiers (the third "hop"). By querying the metadata using the RAS
+11 standard, NSA intelligence analysts are able to: (1) detect domestic identifiers calling foreign
+12 identifiers associated with one of the foreign terrorist organizations and discover identifiers that
+13 the foreign identifiers are in contact with; (2) detect foreign identifiers associated with a foreign
+14 terrorist organization calling into the U.S. and discover which domestic identifiers are in contact
+15 with the foreign identifiers; and (3) detect possible terrorist-related communications occurring
+16 between communicants located inside the U.S.
+
+17 25. The Government has also publicly disclosed FISC orders and opinions concerning
+18 various failures to fully implement and comply with FISC-ordered procedures for the telephony
+19 metadata collection program. These compliance incidents were due to human error and
+20 technological issues. In 2009, the Government reported these problems to the FISC (and
+21 Congress) and remedied them, and the FISC (after temporarily suspending the Government's
+
+---
+⁶ A "seed" is an initial identifier used to generate a query.
+---
+Unclassified Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency
+15
+Jewel. v. NSA. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert v. Obama (07-cv-0693-JSW) (M:06-cv-1791)
+
+1 authority to query the database without the court's approval) reauthorized the program in its
+2 current form.
+
+3 **2. Bulk Collection of Internet Metadata**
+
+4 26. Second, the Government has recently declassified and acknowledged the
+5 existence of FISC-authorized bulk collection of Internet metadata carried out under the "pen
+6 register, trap and trace" ("PRTT") provision of the FISA. The data collected included certain
+7 routing, addressing, and signaling information such as the "to" and "from" lines of an email and
+8 the date and time the email was sent, but not the content of an email or the subject line. Certain
+9 telecommunications service providers were compelled to provide this transactional information,
+10 which the NSA analyzed to obtain foreign intelligence information. The FISC's orders
+11 authorizing this collection required the Government to comply with minimization procedures
+12 limiting the retention and dissemination of the metadata, including a requirement of a reasonable,
+13 articulable suspicion that selection terms used to query the bulk data were associated with
+14 foreign terrorist organizations.⁷ This program of bulk Internet metadata collection was
+15 terminated in 2011, because it did not meet the operational expectations the NSA had for it.
+
+16 **3. Collection of Communications Content Pursuant to Section 702 of FISA.**
+
+17 27. Third, the Government has publicly revealed certain information about its use of
+18 authority conferred by Section 702 of the FISA to collect, for foreign intelligence purposes,
+19 certain communications of non-U.S. persons located outside the United States, pursuant to
+20 approval of the FISC. Section 702 facilitates the targeted acquisition of foreign intelligence
+
+---
+⁷ Similar to the telephony metadata program (see _supra_ ¶ 34), the Government has also
+publicly disclosed FISC orders and opinions concerning various failures to fully implement and
+comply with FISC-ordered procedures for the Internet metadata collection program. These
+compliance incidents were due to human error and technological issues. In 2009, the
+Government reported these problems to the FISC (and Congress) and remedied them.
+---
+Unclassified Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency
+16
+Jewel. v. NSA. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert v. Obama (07-cv-0693-JSW) (M:06-cv-1791)
+
+1 information concerning foreign targets located outside the United States under court oversight.
+2 Electronic communication service providers are compelled to supply information to the
+3 Government pursuant to authorized directives issued by the Attorney General and the DNI.
+
+4 28. Once targeted surveillance under Section 702 has been authorized, the NSA takes
+5 the lead in tasking relevant telephone and electronic communications selectors to target specific
+6 non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States. Consistent with
+7 the statute, the NSA's targeting procedures require that there be an appropriate, documented
+8 foreign intelligence purpose for the acquisition and that the selector be used by a non-U.S.
+9 person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States.
+
+10 29. Once a target has been approved, the NSA uses two means to acquire the target's
+11 electronic communications. First, it acquires such communications directly from compelled
+12 U.S.-based providers. This has been publicly referred to as the NSA's PRISM collection.
+13 Second, in addition to collection directly from providers, the NSA performs "upstream
+14 collection" of Internet communications. The NSA has strict minimization and dissemination
+15 procedures, and as is the case with the telephony metadata program, the NSA's Section 702
+16 collection activities are subject to extensive oversight by all three branches of the Government.
+
+17 30. As with the telephony metadata program, the Government has also disclosed
+18 compliance incidents involving its Section 702 collection activities. In an opinion issued on
+19 October 3, 2011, the FISC found the NSA's proposed minimization procedures as applied to the
+20 NSA's upstream collection of Internet transactions containing multiple communications, or
+21 "MCTs," deficient. Oct. 3, 2011 FISC Op., 2011 WL 10945618. In response, the NSA modified
+22 its proposed procedures and the FISC subsequently determined that the NSA adequately
+23 remedied the deficiencies such that the procedures met the applicable statutory and constitutional
+
+Unclassified Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency
+17
+Jewel. v. NSA. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert v. Obama (07-cv-0693-JSW) (M:06-cv-1791)
+
+1 requirements, and allowed the collection to continue. Aug. 24, 2012 FISC Op., 2012 WL
+2 9189263, at *2-3; Nov. 30, 2011 FISC Op., 2011 WL 10947772.
+
+3 **4. Presidentially Authorized NSA Activities After 9/11**
+
+4 31. In December 2005 then-President Bush acknowledged the existence of a
+5 presidentially-authorized NSA activity called the TSP under which NSA was authorized to
+6 intercept the content of specific international communications (i.e., to or from the United States)
+7 involving persons reasonably believed to be associated with al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist
+8 organizations. Other intelligence activities were authorized by the President after the 9/11
+9 attacks in a single authorization and were subsequently authorized under orders issued by the
+10 FISC. In light of the declassification decisions described above concerning the NSA's
+11 collection of telephony and Internet metadata and targeted content collection under FISC orders,
+12 the President has determined to publicly disclose the fact of the existence of those activities prior
+13 to the FISC orders, pursuant to presidential authorization. Accordingly, certain limited
+14 information concerning these activities has now been declassified:
+
+15 32. Starting on October 4, 2001, President Bush authorized the Secretary of Defense
+16 to employ the capabilities of the Department of Defense, including the NSA, to collect foreign
+17 intelligence by electronic surveillance in order to detect and prevent acts of terrorism within the
+18 United States. President Bush authorized the NSA to collect: (1) the contents of certain
+19 international communications, a program that was later referred to as the TSP; and (2) telephony
+20 and Internet non-content metadata in bulk, subject to various conditions.
+
+21 33. President Bush issued authorizations approximately every 30-60 days. Although
+22 the precise terms changed over time, each presidential authorization required the minimization of
+23 information collected concerning American citizens to the extent consistent with the effective
+
+Unclassified Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency
+18
+Jewel. v. NSA. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert v. Obama (07-cv-0693-JSW) (M:06-cv-1791)
+
+1 accomplishment of the mission of detection and prevention of acts of terrorism within the United
+2 States. The NSA applied additional internal constraints on the presidentially-authorized
+3 activities.
+
+4 34. Over time, the presidentially-authorized activities transitioned to the authority of
+5 the FISC. The collection of communications content pursuant to presidential authorization
+6 ended in January 2007 when the Government transitioned the TSP to the authority of the FISA
+7 and under the orders of the FISC. In August 2007, Congress enacted the Protect America Act
+8 ("PAA") as a temporary measure. The PAA, which expired in February 2008, was replaced by
+9 the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 ("FAA"), which was enacted in July 2008 and remains in
+10 effect today. Today, content collection is conducted pursuant to section 702 of the FISA. The
+11 metadata activities also were transitioned to orders of the FISC. The bulk collection of telephony
+12 metadata transitioned to the authority of the FISA in May 2006 and is collected pursuant to
+13 Section 215 of FISA. The bulk collection of Internet metadata was transitioned to the authority
+14 of the FISA in July 2004 and was collected pursuant to Section 402 of FISA. In December 2011,
+15 the Government decided not to seek reauthorization of the bulk collection of Internet metadata.
+
+16 **IV. INFORMATION SUBJECT TO ASSERTIONS OF PRIVILEGE**
+
+17 35. While information about the existence of the components of the PSP has now
+18 been declassified, specific operational details concerning the program's scope, operation, the
+19 sources and methods it utilized, and intelligence it produced remain properly classified and are
+20 subject to the DNI's state secrets privilege assertion and my own assertion of NSA's statutory
+21 privilege in this declaration. In general and unclassified terms, the DNI's assertion of the state
+22 secrets privilege and my statutory privilege assertion encompasses the following categories of
+23 still-classified information and properly protected national security information concerning NSA
+24 activities:
+
+Unclassified Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency
+19
+Jewel. v. NSA. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert v. Obama (07-cv-0693-JSW) (M:06-cv-1791)
+
+1 **A. Persons Subject to Intelligence Activities**: information that would tend to confirm
+2 or deny whether particular individuals, including the named plaintiffs, have been
+3 subject to any NSA intelligence activities;
+
+4 **B. Operational Information Concerning NSA Intelligence Activities**: information
+5 concerning the scope and operational details of NSA intelligence activities that may
+6 relate to or be necessary to adjudicate plaintiffs' allegations, including:
+7
+8 (1) **Communications Content Collection**: information concerning the
+9 scope or operational details of NSA intelligence activities that may relate
+10 to or be necessary to adjudicate plaintiffs' claims that the NSA
+11 indiscriminately intercepts the content of communications, _see, e.g., Jewel_
+12 _Complaint_ ¶¶ 1, 2, 7, 64-70, including
+13
+14 (a) **TSP Information**: information concerning the scope
+15 and operation of the now inoperative TSP regarding the
+16 interception of the content of certain international
+17 communications reasonably believed to involve a
+18 member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist
+19 organization;
+20
+21 (b) **FISA Section 702**: information concerning
+22 operational details related to the collection of
+23 communications under FISA Section 702; and
+24
+25 (c) **Any other information related to demonstrating that**
+26 **the NSA has not otherwise engaged in the content-**
+27 **surveillance dragnet that the plaintiffs allege.**
+28
+29 (2) **Communications Records Collection**: information concerning the
+30 scope or operational details of NSA intelligence activities that may relate
+31 to or be necessary to adjudicate plaintiffs' claims regarding the NSA's
+32 bulk collection of telephony and Internet non-content communications
+33 records ("metadata"), _see, e.g., Jewel Complaint_ ¶¶ 10, 11, 13, 73-77, 82-
+34 97; _Shubert SAC_ ¶ 102.
+35
+Unclassified Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency
+20
+Jewel. v. NSA. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert v. Obama (07-cv-0693-JSW) (M:06-cv-1791)
+
+1 **C. Telecommunication Provider Identities**: information that may tend to
+2 confirm or deny whether AT&T or Verizon (and to the extent relevant or necessary,
+3 any other telecommunications carrier) has provided assistance to the NSA in
+4 connection with any intelligence activity, including the collection of communications
+5 content or non-content transactional records alleged to be at issue in this litigation.
+6
+7 **V. HARM OF DISCLOSURE OF PRIVILEGED INFORMATION**
+
+8 **A. Information Concerning Whether Plaintiffs Have Been Subject**
+9 **to the Alleged NSA Activities**
+
+10 36. The first major category of information as to which I am supporting the DNI's
+11 assertion of privilege, and asserting the NSA's own statutory privilege, concerns information as
+12 to whether particular individuals, including the named plaintiffs in this lawsuit, have been
+13 subject to alleged NSA intelligence activities. As set forth below and in my classified
+14 declaration, confirmation or denial of such information by the NSA reasonably could be
+15 expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security. The named plaintiffs in
+16 the _Jewel_ and _Shubert_ cases allege that the content of their own telephone and Internet
+17 communications has been and continues to be subject to unlawful search and seizure by the
+18 NSA, along with the content of communications of millions of ordinary Americans.⁸ Further,
+
+---
+⁸ Specifically, the _Jewel_ plaintiffs allege that pursuant to a presidentially authorized
+program after the 9/11 attacks, the NSA, with the assistance of AT&T, acquired and continues to
+acquire the content of phone calls, emails, instant messages, text messaged, web and other
+communications, both international and domestic, of millions of ordinary Americans –
+“practically every American who uses the phone system or the Internet” – including the
+plaintiffs. See _Jewel Compl._ ¶¶ 7, 9, 10; _see also id._ ¶¶ 39-97. The _Shubert_ plaintiffs allege
+that the contents of “virtually every telephone, internet and email communication sent from or
+received within the United States since shortly after September 11, 2001,” including plaintiffs’
+communications, are being “searched, seized, intercepted, and subject to surveillance without a
+warrant, court order or any other lawful authorization in violation of the Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1810.” See _Shubert SAC_ ¶ 1; _see also id._ ¶¶ 5, 7.
+---
+Unclassified Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency
+21
+Jewel. v. NSA. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert v. Obama (07-cv-0693-JSW) (M:06-cv-1791)
+
+1 the named plaintiffs allege that the NSA has been and is continuing to collect and analyze the
+2 private telephone and Internet transaction records of millions of Americans, with the assistance
+3 of telecommunication carriers, again including information concerning the plaintiffs' telephone
+4 and Internet communications.⁹
+
+5 37. As a matter of course, the NSA cannot publicly confirm or deny whether any
+6 individual is or has been subject to intelligence-gathering activities because to do so would tend
+7 to reveal actual targets or subjects. The harm of revealing the identities of persons who are the
+8 actual targets or subjects of foreign intelligence gathering is relatively straightforward. If an
+9 individual knows or suspects he is a target or subject of U.S. intelligence activities, he would
+10 naturally tend to alter his behavior to take new precautions against such scrutiny. In addition,
+11 revealing who is not a target or subject of intelligence gathering would indicate who has avoided
+12 surveillance or collection and what may be a secure channel for communication. Such
+13 information could lead an actual or potential adversary, secure in the knowledge that he is not
+14 under government scrutiny, to help a hostile foreign adversary convey information; alternatively,
+15 such a person may be unwittingly utilized or even forced to convey information through a secure
+16 channel to a foreign adversary. Revealing which channels are free from surveillance and which
+17 are not would also reveal sensitive intelligence methods and thereby could help any adversary
+18 evade detection and capitalize on limitations in NSA's capabilities. Similar harms would result
+19 from confirming or denying whether a person's communications have been subject to collection
+
+---
+⁹ Specifically, the _Jewel_ plaintiffs allege that the NSA has "unlawfully solicited and
+obtained from telecommunications companies the complete and ongoing disclosure of the private
+telephone and internet transactional records of millions of ordinary Americans, including
+plaintiffs." See _Jewel Compl._ ¶¶ 7, 10, 11, 13, 82-97. They further claim the NSA analyzes this
+information. Id. ¶ 11. The _Shubert_ plaintiffs allege that "NSA now monitors huge volumes of
+records of domestic emails and Internet searches...[and] receives this so-called 'transactional'
+data from...private companies..." See _Shubert SAC_ ¶ 102.
+---
+Unclassified Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency
+22
+Jewel. v. NSA. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert v. Obama (07-cv-0693-JSW) (M:06-cv-1791)
+
+1 even where it may be assumed a person is law-abiding and not likely to be an actual target or
+2 subject of such activity. For example, if the NSA were to confirm that specific individuals have
+3 not been targets of or subject to collection (i.e., whether their communications have been
+4 intercepted), but later refuse to comment (as it would have to) in a situation involving an actual
+5 target or subject, an actual or potential adversary of the United States could likewise seek such
+6 confirmation or denial and then easily deduce by comparing such responses that the person in the
+7 latter instance is or has been a target of or subject to surveillance or other intelligence-gathering
+8 activity. In addition, disclosure of whether a person's communications have or have not been
+9 targeted or intercepted through the targeting of a third party would reveal whether a particular
+10 channel of communication is secure and also reveal to third-party targets whether their own
+11 communications may be secure.
+
+12 **B. Operational Information Concerning NSA Intelligence**
+13 **Activities**
+
+14 38. I am also supporting the DNI's assertion of privilege and asserting the NSA's
+15 statutory privilege over any other still-classified facts concerning NSA intelligence activities,
+16 sources, or methods that may relate to or be necessary to litigate the plaintiffs' claims and
+17 allegations, including that: (1) the NSA is indiscriminately intercepting the content of
+18 communications of millions of ordinary Americans, _see e.g., Jewel Complaint_ ¶¶ 7, 9, 10;
+19 _Shubert SAC_ ¶¶ 1, 5, 7; and (2) that the NSA is collecting the private telephone and Internet
+20 transactional records of Americans with the assistance of telecommunications carriers, again
+21 including information concerning the plaintiffs' telephone and Internet communications. _See_
+22 _Jewel Complaint_ ¶¶ 7, 10, 11, 13, 82-97; _see Shubert SAC_ ¶ 102. As described above, the scope
+23 of the Government's privilege assertion includes but is not limited to still-classified information
+24 concerning (1) the collection of communication content under the now inoperative TSP as well
+
+Unclassified Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency
+23
+Jewel. v. NSA. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert v. Obama (07-cv-0693-JSW) (M:06-cv-1791)
+
+1 as pursuant to authority of FISA Section 702, and any other NSA activities that would be at risk
+2 of disclosure or required in demonstrating that the NSA has not engaged in content "dragnet"
+3 surveillance activities that plaintiffs allege; and (2) information that may relate to or be necessary
+4 to adjudicate plaintiffs' claims regarding the NSA's bulk collection of telephony and Internet
+5 communication records. As set forth below and in my classified declaration, the disclosure of
+6 such information would cause exceptionally grave harm to national security.
+
+7 **1. Information Concerning Plaintiffs' Content Surveillance Allegations**
+
+8 39. After the existence of the TSP was officially acknowledged in December 2005,
+9 the Government stated that this activity was limited to the interception of the content of certain
+10 communications for which there were reasonable grounds to believe that: (1) such
+11 communication originated or terminated outside the United States; and (2) a party to such
+12 communication is a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization.
+
+13 Nonetheless, plaintiffs' allege that the NSA indiscriminately intercepts the content of
+14 communications of millions of ordinary Americans. _See e.g._, _Jewel Complaint_ ¶¶ 7, 9, 10; _see_
+15 _Shubert SAC_ ¶¶ 1, 5, 7. As the Government has also previously stated,¹⁰ plaintiffs' allegation
+16 that the NSA has undertaken indiscriminate surveillance of the content¹¹ of millions of
+17 communications sent or received by people inside the United States after 9/11 under the TSP is
+18 false. But in order to disprove plaintiffs' claim that the NSA indiscriminately collected the
+
+---
+¹⁰ See Public Declaration of Dennis Blair, Director of National Intelligence, ¶ 15 (April
+3, 2009) (Dkt. 18-3 in _Jewel_ action (08-cv-4373); Public Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni,
+National Security Agency ¶ 14 (Dkt. 18-4 in _Jewel_ action (08-cv-4373); Public Declaration of
+Dennis Blair, Director of National Intelligence, ¶ 15 (October 30, 2009) (Dkt. 680-1 in _Shubert_
+action (MDL 06-cv-1791); Public Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, National Security
+Agency ¶ 19 (Dkt. 680-1 in _Shubert_ action (MDL 06-cv-1791).
+
+¹¹ Again, the term "content" is used herein to refer to the substance, meaning, or purport
+of a communication as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8).
+---
+Unclassified Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency
+24
+Jewel. v. NSA. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert v. Obama (07-cv-0693-JSW) (M:06-cv-1791)
+
+1 content of the communications of millions of Americans, the NSA would have to disclose the
+2 specifics of its content collection activities. Under the TSP, the NSA was directed pursuant to
+3 presidential authorization to intercept the content of only those international telephone and
+4 Internet communications for which there were reasonable grounds to believe that such
+5 communications involved a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization.
+6 To the extent the NSA must demonstrate that content surveillance under the TSP was so limited,
+7 and was not plaintiffs' alleged content "dragnet," or demonstrate that the NSA has not otherwise
+8 engaged in the alleged content "dragnet," highly classified NSA intelligence sources and
+9 methods about the operation of the TSP and current NSA intelligence activities (including under
+10 FISA Section 702) would be subject to disclosure or the risk of disclosure. The disclosure of
+11 whether and to what extent the NSA utilizes certain intelligence sources and methods would
+12 reveal to foreign adversaries the NSA's capabilities, or lack thereof, enabling them to either
+13 evade particular channels of communications that are being monitored, or exploit channels of
+14 communication that are not subject to NSA activities, in either case risking exceptionally grave
+15 damage to national security. As set forth below and in my classified declaration, a range of
+16 operational details concerning the TSP, as well as other NSA sources and methods, remains
+17 properly classified and privileged from disclosure, and could not be revealed to address
+18 plaintiffs' content "dragnet" allegations.
+
+19 40. Authorization of the TSP was intended to address an important gap in NSA's
+20 intelligence collection activities---namely, that significant changes in communications
+21 technology since the enactment of the FISA in 1978 meant that the NSA faced great difficulties
+22 in identifying foreign terrorist operatives who were communicating with individuals within the
+23 United States. FISA established the framework for court approval of the U.S. Government's
+24 efforts to conduct foreign intelligence surveillance of individuals in the United States. When
+
+Unclassified Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency
+25
+Jewel. v. NSA. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert v. Obama (07-cv-0693-JSW) (M:06-cv-1791)
+
+1 FISA was enacted in 1978, most international communications to or from the United States were
+2 transmitted via satellite or radio technology. Congress intentionally excluded the vast majority
+3 of satellite or radio communications from the definition of "electronic surveillance" in the FISA.
+4 See 50 U.S.C. §1801(f).
+
+5 41. Since the time FISA was enacted, sweeping advances in modern
+6 telecommunications technology upset the balance struck by Congress in 1978. By 2001, most
+7 international communications to or from the United States were carried on a wire and many
+8 domestic communications had increasingly become wireless. As a result of this change in
+9 communications technology, the NSA's collection from inside the United States of international
+10 communications (previously carried primarily via radio transmission) had shrunk considerably
+11 and the Government was forced to prepare FISA applications if it wished to collect the
+12 communications of non-U.S. persons located overseas. These circumstances presented a
+13 significant concern in the exceptional circumstances after 9/11.
+
+14 **2. Information Concerning Plaintiffs' Communications Records Collection**
+15 **Allegations**
+
+16 42. Plaintiffs also allege that the NSA is collecting the private telephone and Internet
+17 transaction records of millions of Americans, again including information concerning plaintiffs'
+18 telephone and Internet communications. _See, e.g., Jewel Complaint_ ¶¶ 7, 10, 11, 13, 82-
+19 97; _see Shubert SAC_ ¶ 102. To address these allegations would risk or require disclosure of
+20 NSA sources and methods and reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave
+21 damage to national security. While the Government has declassified the existence of the
+22 telephony and Internet metadata collections, and some information concerning those programs as
+23 authorized by the FISC, significant operational details concerning these activities remain
+24 properly classified, including the identity of communication providers who may have assisted in
+25
+Unclassified Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency
+26
+Jewel. v. NSA. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert v. Obama (07-cv-0693-JSW) (M:06-cv-1791)
+
+1 this collection, and other sources and method of collection and analysis. As set forth below and
+2 in my classified declaration, disclosure of this information reasonably could be expected to cause
+3 grave damage to national security.
+
+4 **(a) Collection of Bulk Telephony Metadata**
+
+5 43. As with the operational details concerning the NSA's collection of
+6 communications content, I am supporting the DNI's state secrets privilege assertion, and
+7 asserting NSA's statutory privilege, over still-classified information that may relate to or be
+8 necessary to litigate plaintiffs' claims as they relate to the alleged collection of telephony
+9 metadata.
+
+10 44. The still classified operational details concerning the collection of telephony
+11 metadata include, but are not necessarily limited to, whether metadata of plaintiffs' telephone
+12 communications were actually collected by the NSA from plaintiffs' particular communications
+13 providers; whether any metadata of plaintiffs' telephone communications, if collected, were
+14 viewed or analyzed by anyone at the NSA; information demonstrating the scope of the telephony
+15 metadata collection program; and information demonstrating the need for and effectiveness of
+16 the program.
+
+17 45. As set forth in this declaration, following the unauthorized disclosure in June
+18 2013 of one FISC order issued as part of the telephony metadata program, the Government
+19 confirmed the authenticity of one order, issued on April 25, 2013, by the FISC to a particular
+20 Verizon Communications subsidiary, Verizon Business Network Services (VBNS), thereby
+21 confirming the participation of VBNS in the program for the duration of that order
+22 (approximately 90 days). This is the only FISC order identifying any particular provider under
+23 this program that has been declassified, and since the disclosure of this order in June 2013, the
+24
+Unclassified Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency
+27
+Jewel. v. NSA. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert v. Obama (07-cv-0693-JSW) (M:06-cv-1791)
+
+1 United States has not confirmed or denied the past or current participation of any specific
+2 provider in the telephony metadata program apart from the participation of VBNS for the
+3 approximately 90 day duration of the now-expired April 25, 2013, FISC order. As explained in
+4 my classified declaration, the continued protection of whether or not, or to what extent, a
+5 particular telecommunications provider assisted the NSA under FISC order or otherwise remains
+6 an extraordinarily sensitive and significant matter that the Government continues to protect to
+7 avoid even greater harm to national security than has already occurred since June 2013.
+
+8 **46. (b) Internet Metadata Collection**
+
+9 47. I am also supporting the DNI's privilege assertion, and asserting the NSA's
+10 statutory privilege, over still-classified operational details concerning the NSA's bulk collection
+11 of Internet metadata under presidential authorization.. Disclosure of these details, which are set
+12 forth in my classified declaration, reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave
+13 damage to national security, for the reasons set forth in my classified declaration.
+
+14 **3. Information Concerning Whether or Not Any Specific Carrier Provided**
+15 **Assistance to the NSA**
+
+16 48. I am also supporting the DNI's state secrets privilege assertion, and asserting
+17 NSA's statutory privilege, over information relating to which carriers have assisted the NSA
+18 under presidential authorization and other authorities. The _Jewel_ plaintiffs and three of the
+19 _Shubert_ plaintiffs allege that they are customers of AT&T, and that AT&T participated in the
+20 alleged intelligence-gathering activities that the plaintiffs seek to challenge. Additionally, at
+21 least one _Shubert_ plaintiff also claims to be a customer of Verizon, and that Verizon similarly
+22 participated in the alleged intelligence-gathering activities that the plaintiffs seek to challenge.
+23 The harm from officially acknowledging whether or not any specific carrier has assisted the NSA
+24 is significant, as set forth in my classified declaration, and continues to exist notwithstanding the
+25
+Unclassified Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency
+28
+Jewel. v. NSA. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert v. Obama (07-cv-0693-JSW) (M:06-cv-1791)
+
+1 recent official disclosures. While the Government has declassified some information concerning
+2 the nature and scope of the programs described above and in my classified declaration --
+3 including that it collects telephony and Internet metadata in bulk, from multiple
+4 telecommunication providers -- and has also confirmed the authenticity of a single now-expired
+5 FISC order issued to a single carrier that had been unlawfully disclosed, it has not otherwise
+6 declassified information concerning the identities of companies that are or were subject to FISC
+7 orders under NSA intelligence-gathering programs, or have otherwise assisted the NSA.
+
+8 **IV. CONCLUSION**
+
+9 49. The United States has an overwhelming interest in detecting and thwarting further
+10 plots to perpetrate mass-casualty attacks by al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. The
+11 United States has already suffered one massive attack that killed thousands, disrupted the
+12 Nation's financial center for days, and successfully struck at the command and control center for
+13 the Nation's military. It remains a key objective of al Qaeda and other terrorist groups to carry
+14 out a massive attack in the United States that could result in a significant loss of life, as well as
+15 have a devastating impact on the U.S. economy.
+
+16 50. As set forth above, terrorist organizations around the world seek to use our own
+17 communications infrastructure against us as they secretly attempt to infiltrate agents into the
+18 United States, waiting to attack at a time of their choosing. One of the greatest challenges the
+19 United States confronts in the ongoing effort to prevent another catastrophic terrorist attack
+20 against the U.S. Homeland is the critical need to gather intelligence quickly and effectively.
+21 Time is of the essence in preventing terrorist attacks, and the Government faces significant
+22 obstacles in finding and tracking terrorist operatives as they manipulate modern technology in an
+23 attempt to communicate while remaining undetected. The NSA sources, methods, and activities
+24 described herein are vital tools in this effort.
+
+Unclassified Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency
+29
+Jewel. v. NSA. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert v. Obama (07-cv-0693-JSW) (M:06-cv-1791)
+
+1 51. For the foregoing reasons, I support the DNI's assertion of the state secrets
+2 privilege and statutory privilege to prevent the disclosure of the information described herein and
+3 detailed herein. I also assert a statutory privilege under Section 6 of the National Security Act
+4 with respect to the information described herein which concerns the functions of the NSA. I
+5 respectfully request that the Court protect that information from disclosure to prevent
+6 exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United States.
+
+7 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
+
+8
+9
+10 DATE: 12.20.13
+11 Frances J. Fleisch
+12 National Security Agency
+13
+
+Unclassified Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency
+30
+Jewel. v. NSA. (No. 08-cv-4873-JSW); Shubert v. Obama (07-cv-0693-JSW) (M:06-cv-1791)
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Fleisch_2013_Jewel_Shubert_Declaration_Unclassified/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Fleisch_2013_Jewel_Shubert_Declaration_Unclassified/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..824ff0c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Fleisch_2013_Jewel_Shubert_Declaration_Unclassified/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+{
+ "title": "NSA Fleisch 2013 Jewel Shubert Declaration Unclassified",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Unclassified declaration of Frances J. Fleisch disclosing information regarding the government. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2013-12-20",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [
+ "PRISM",
+ "PSP"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Shubert, Virginia",
+ "Delery, Stuart F.",
+ "Hunt, Joseph H.",
+ "Coppolino, Anthony J.",
+ "Gilligan, James J.",
+ "Berman, Marcia",
+ "Dearinger, Bryan",
+ "Patton, Rodney",
+ "Jewel, Carolyn",
+ "Obama, Barack",
+ "White, Jeffrey S.",
+ "Fleisch, Frances J."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-12-20",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/nsa-fleisch-2013-jewel-shubert-declaration-unclassified",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "c2a0f64a6ccc5adddfa24a961f9072a7fd9fa44483e2f2a5ac44f09fa1fc77ab",
+ "pages": 30
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Memo_to_DOD_-_Proposed_Amendment_to_Conduct_Analysis_of_Metadata/ACLU_-_NSA_Memo_to_DOD_-_Proposed_Amendment_to_Conduct_Analysis_of_Metadata.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Memo_to_DOD_-_Proposed_Amendment_to_Conduct_Analysis_of_Metadata/ACLU_-_NSA_Memo_to_DOD_-_Proposed_Amendment_to_Conduct_Analysis_of_Metadata.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2d2670b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Memo_to_DOD_-_Proposed_Amendment_to_Conduct_Analysis_of_Metadata/ACLU_-_NSA_Memo_to_DOD_-_Proposed_Amendment_to_Conduct_Analysis_of_Metadata.md
@@ -0,0 +1,362 @@
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+1294739
+PS
+
+SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+November 20, 2007
+
+MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
+
+THROUGH: THE ACTING DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
+
+FROM: Kenneth L. Wainstein
+Assistant Attorney General
+National Security Division
+
+CC: Steven G. Bradbury
+Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+Office of Legal Counsel
+
+SUBJECT: Proposed Amendment to Department of Defense Procedures to Permit the National Security Agency to Conduct Analysis of Communications Metadata Associated with Persons in the United States (S//SI)
+
+PURPOSE: To Recommend Attorney General Approval Pursuant to Executive Order 12333 of a Proposed Amendment to Procedures Governing the National Security Agency's Signals Intelligence Activities (S//SI)
+
+SYNOPSIS: The Secretary of Defense seeks your approval of proposed Department of Defense Supplemental Procedures Governing Communications Metadata Analysis ("Supplemental Procedures"). The Supplemental Procedures, attached at Tab A, would clarify that the National Security Agency (NSA) may analyze communications metadata associated with United States persons and persons believed to be in the United States. These Supplemental Procedures would amend the existing procedures promulgated pursuant to Executive Order
+
+SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+Classified by: [REDACTED]
+Reason: 1.4(c)[REDACTED]
+Declassify on: 20 November, 2032
+
+SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN//X1
+
+12333.¹ That Order requires the NSA to conduct its signals intelligence activities involving the collection, retention, or dissemination of information concerning United States persons in accordance with procedures approved by the Attorney General. Accordingly, changes to these procedures, such as those proposed here, also require your approval. We conclude that the proposed Supplemental Procedures are consistent with applicable law and we recommend that you approve them.² (S//SI)
+
+The communications metadata that the NSA wishes to analyze—which relates to both telephone calls and electronic communications—is dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information that does not concern the substance, purport, or meaning of the communication. The procedures divide communications metadata into two categories: telephony metadata and electronic communications metadata. Telephony metadata includes such information as the telephone numbers of the calling and the called party. Electronic communications metadata includes such information as the e-mail address and the Internet protocol (IP) address of the computer of the sender and the recipient. This communications metadata has been obtained by various methods, including pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. § 1801, et seq., and resides in NSA databases.³ NSA plans to analyze this data primarily using a technique known as "contact chaining." Contact chaining involves the identification of telephone numbers, e-mail addresses, or IP addresses that a targeted telephone number, IP address, or e-mail address has contacted or attempted to contact. Through the use of computer algorithms, NSA creates a chain of contacts linking communicants and identifying additional telephone numbers, IP addresses, and e-mail addresses of intelligence interest. On the basis of prior informal advice of the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, NSA's present practice is to "stop" when a chain hits a telephone number or address believed to be used by a United States person. NSA believes that it is over-identifying numbers and addresses that belong to United States persons and that modifying its practice to chain through all telephone numbers and addresses, including those reasonably believed to be used by a United States person, will yield valuable foreign intelligence information primarily concerning non-United States persons outside
+
+¹ Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components That Affect United States Persons (DOD Reg. 5240.1-R)(Dec. 1982)(approved by the Attorney General on Oct. 4, 1982)("DOD Procedures") and its Classified Annex. The proposed Supplemental Procedures would clarify Procedure 5 of the DOD Procedures and its Classified Annex. (U)
+
+² This memorandum was prepared in consultation with the Office of Legal Counsel. (U)
+
+³ This memorandum assumes that the NSA's initial acquisition of the information it wishes to analyze was lawful. (U)
+
+SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN//X1
+- 2 -
+
+SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN//X1
+
+the United States. It is not clear, however, whether NSA's current procedures permit chaining through a United States telephone number, IP address or e-mail address. (S//SI)
+
+We conclude that the proposed communications metadata analysis, including contact chaining, is consistent with (i) the Fourth Amendment; (ii) FISA; and (iii) the electronic surveillance provisions contained in Title 18 of the United States Code. The Supplemental Procedures are also consistent with the requirements of Executive Order 12333. (S//SI)
+
+As you consider this proposed change, you should be aware of the following:
+
+(1) Congressional Oversight. At the request of the Secretary of Defense, NSA briefed the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States House of Representatives on this proposed change before the Secretary signed the Supplemental Procedures.
+
+(2) Oversight of NSA's Activities Under the Supplemental Procedures. Because NSA has in its databases a large amount of communications metadata associated with persons in the United States, misuse of this information could raise serious concerns. The General Counsel of NSA has provided a letter, attached at Tab B, describing how NSA will oversee access to and use of this data and committing to report annually to you on NSA's communications metadata program. As part of this reporting, NSA undertakes to inform the Department of "the kinds of information that NSA is collecting and processing as communications metadata." Particularly as technology changes, this requirement is important because the legal standards governing metadata are quite different from those governing the contents of a communication. We believe that the oversight and reporting regime that this letter describes is a reasonable one, and it informs our recommendation that you approve the Supplemental Procedures. (S//SI)
+
+(3) The Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) Interest in Conducting Similar Communications Metadata Analysis. On July 20, 2004, the General Counsel of CIA wrote to the General Counsel of NSA and to the Counsel for Intelligence Policy asking that CIA receive from NSA United States communications metadata that NSA does not currently provide to CIA. The letter from CIA is attached at Tab C. Although the proposed Supplemental Procedures do not directly address the CIA's request, they do resolve a significant legal obstacle to the dissemination of this metadata from NSA to CIA. (S//SI//NF)
+
+(4) Department of Defense's (DOD) Interest in Allowing Other DOD Entities to Have Access to this Data and to Conduct Similar Analysis. The DOD's General Counsel's Office has informed us that, in the future, other DOD entities may wish to obtain and analyze communications metadata using the same rules that NSA uses to do so. The proposed Supplemental Procedures do not apply to these other DOD entities, but you should be aware that
+
+SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN//X1
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+
+SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN//X1
+
+such a request may be forthcoming. As part of its oversight responsibilities, the National Security Division will be briefed by DOD concerning what these other DOD entities are doing, or are seeking to do, in this area before approving any such request. (S//SI)
+
+DISCUSSION: (U)
+
+The Fourth Amendment (U)
+
+The Fourth Amendment provides that:
+
+The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
+
+U.S. Const. amend. IV. This provision protects against the unreasonable search and seizure of the contents of a communication in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. See *Katz v. U.S.*, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). We conclude that a person has no such expectation, however, in dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information that does not concern the substance, purport, or meaning of communications. We reach this conclusion with respect to "metadata"
+
+⁴ As an initial matter, we note that the analysis of information legally within the possession of the Government is likely neither a "search" nor a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., *Jabara v. Webster*, 691 F.2d 272, 277-79 (6th Cir 1982) (holding that the disclosure of information by an agency that lawfully possessed it to another agency does not implicate the Fourth Amendment); Memorandum for the Attorney General from Theodore B. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: *Constitutionality of Certain National Security Agency Electronic Surveillance Activities Not Covered Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978*, at 59 (May 24 1984) ("Olson Memorandum") ("Traditional Fourth Amendment analysis holds that once evidence is constitutionally seized, its dissemination or subsequent use raises no additional Fourth Amendment question."). As noted, we assume for the purpose of this memorandum that the NSA has lawfully acquired the information it wishes to analyze. Nevertheless, the Olson Memorandum went on to consider the limits on the subsequent use of information when assessing the constitutionality of NSA's surveillance activities under the Fourth Amendment. See id. In an abundance of caution, then, we analyze the constitutional issue on the assumption that the Fourth Amendment may apply even though the Government has already obtained the information lawfully. (S//SI)
+
+SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN//X1
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+
+SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN//X1
+
+associated with both telephone calls and electronic communications.⁵ (S//SI)
+
+The Supreme Court has held that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in telephone numbers dialed because a caller must convey the numbers to the telephone company to complete the call. See *Smith v. Maryland*, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979). In *Smith*, the Court concluded that the installation of a pen register was not a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and thus that no warrant was required to collect such information. *Id.* at 745-46. This conclusion followed from the Court's previous holding in *U.S. v. Miller*, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), that an individual has no Fourth Amendment privacy interest in information released to a third party and later conveyed by that third party to a governmental entity. *Id.* at 440. Accordingly, it is well settled that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the telephony metadata the NSA proposes to analyze.⁶ (S//SI)
+
+Likewise, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in electronic communications metadata. For Fourth Amendment purposes, courts have considered e-mails to be analogous to telephone calls and to letters sent through the postal system. See *U.S. v. Charbonneau*, 979 F. Supp 1177, 1184 (S.D. Ohio 1997); *U.S. v. Maxwell*, 45 M.J. 406, 417 (C.A.A.F. 1996). Following the same approach as *Smith*, courts have consistently held that the Fourth Amendment is not implicated when the Government gathers information that appears on mail covers, including the name and address of the addressee and of the sender, the postmark, and the class of mail. See *U.S. v. Choate*, 576 F.2d 165, 174 (9th Cir. 1978); *U.S. v. DePoli*, 628 F.2d 779 (2nd Cir. 1980); *U.S. v. Huie*, 593 F.2d 14 (5th Cir. 1979)(per curiam). See also *Vreeken v. Davis*, 718 F.2d 343, 347-48 (10th Cir. 1983) (concluding that a mail cover, which records information about the sender and recipient of a letter, is "indistinguishable in any important respect from the pen register at issue in Smith"). And courts have consistently found that individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in information pertaining to the use of electronic media that
+
+⁵ It is important to note that this memorandum addresses only those types of metadata specifically identified in the Supplemental Procedures. As described above, NSA is required to report regularly to the Department on new types of information that it is treating as "metadata." If NSA does so, we will evaluate whether such new information also falls outside the Fourth Amendment. (S//SI)
+
+⁶ *Smith* continues to be cited by the Supreme Court and lower courts for the proposition that acquisition of telephone numbers does not implicate the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., *Kyllo v. United States*, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001); *U.S. Telecom Commission v. FCC*, 227 F.3d 450, 454 (D.C. Cir. 2000). (U)
+
+SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN//X1
+- 5 -
+
+SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN//X1
+
+does not reveal the substantive content of a communication.⁷ The electronic communications metadata the NSA proposes to analyze—dialing, routing, addressing or signaling information—is identical in all material respects to the information deemed not to implicate the Fourth Amendment in these lines of cases. (S//SI)
+
+Thus, when interpreting the Fourth Amendment, the courts have drawn a consistent distinction between the substantive content of the communications (found to be protected in *Katz*) and the non-content information (found to be unprotected in *Smith, Miller* and a number of lower court cases). The communications metadata implicated by the proposed Supplemental Procedures is limited to dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information and is defined specifically to exclude any information that concerns the substance, purport or meaning of the communication. Thus it falls clearly within the second, unprotected category of information. We conclude, therefore, that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in this metadata and that the communications metadata analysis proposed by NSA does not implicate the Fourth Amendment. (S//SI)
+
+FISA's Electronic Surveillance Provisions (U)
+
+To fall within FISA's coverage of "electronic surveillance," an action must satisfy one of the four definitions of that term. None of these definitions cover the communications metadata analysis at issue here.⁸ (S)
+
+⁷ See *Thygeson v. U.S. Bancorp*, WL 2066746 (D. Or. 2004) (noting the distinction between the website addresses at issue there, in which an employee had no reasonable expectation of privacy, and the contents of websites visited or e-mails sent). See also *U.S. v. Hambrick*, 225 F.3d 656 (4th Cir. 2000) (unpublished opinion) (holding that, although in certain circumstances a person may have a privacy interest in "content information" such as the substance of an e-mail, there is no privacy interest in information provided to the ISP for purposes of establishing the account, which, according to the court, is non-content information); *U.S. v. Ohnesorge*, 60 M.J. 946 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App. 2005) (holding that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy regarding information provided to an ISP). (S//SI)
+
+⁸ As noted above, some of the metadata the NSA would analyze has been acquired pursuant to FISA and thus is subject to the minimization procedures applicable to that collection. The standard NSA FISA minimization procedures contain no restrictions that would prohibit the metadata analysis described herein. The NSA will continue to comply with these procedures, including with any restrictions on the dissemination of information. In addition, to the extent that any orders authorizing, under FISA, the collection of metadata impose minimization procedures that would restrict the metadata analysis in the manner proposed here by NSA, the NSA must continue to abide by the conditions in those orders. (S//SI)
+
+SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN//X1
+- 6 -
+
+SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN//X1
+
+Three of the four definitions of electronic surveillance are satisfied only when the communication is acquired "under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes." 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(1), (3), (4). This statutory expectation-of-privacy requirement adopts a term of art from Fourth Amendment case law. See, e.g., *Katz*, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). "[W]here Congress borrows terms of art . . . it presumably knows and adopts . . . the meaning [their] use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed." *Morissette v. United States*, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952). The legislative history confirms the applicability of this presumption in this instance. It repeatedly adverts to constitutional standards when discussing this provision. See, e.g., S. Rep. 95-701, at 37, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4006 (noting that the provision "require[s] that the acquisition of information be under circumstances in which a person has a constitutionally protected right of privacy"); H.R. Rep. No. 95-1283, at 53 (same); S. Rep. No. 95-604, at 35, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3937 (same). For the reasons stated above, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the communications metadata at issue here; therefore, NSA's proposed activity would not come within the definitions of electronic surveillance contained in subsections 1801(f)(1), (3) or (4). (S)
+
+The fourth definition of electronic surveillance involves "the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any wire communication . . . ." 50 U.S.C. § 1802(f)(2). "Wire communication" is, in turn, defined as "any communication while it is being carried by a wire, cable, or other like connection furnished or operated by any person engaged as a common carrier . . . ." *Id.* § 1801(1). The data that the NSA wishes to analyze already resides in its databases. The proposed analysis thus does not involve the acquisition of a communication "while it is being carried" by a connection furnished or operated by a common carrier. (S//SI)
+
+Pen Register and Trap and Trace Provisions (U)
+
+The pen register and trap and trace surveillance provisions of FISA, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1846, and of the criminal law, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-27, do not apply to the communications metadata analysis that NSA wishes to conduct. (S//SI)
+
+First, for the purpose of these provisions, "pen register" is defined as "a device or process which records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing or signaling information." 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3); 50 U.S.C. § 1841(2). When NSA will conduct the analysis it proposes, however, the dialing and other information will have been already recorded and decoded. Second, a "trap and trace device" is defined as "a device or process which captures the incoming electronic or other impulses which identify the originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing and signaling information." 18 U.S.C. § 3127(4); 50 U.S.C. § 1841(2). Again, those impulses will already have been captured at the point that NSA conducts chaining. Thus, NSA's communications metadata analysis falls outside the coverage of these provisions. (S//SI)
+
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+- 7 -
+
+SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN//X1
+
+Title III (U)
+
+The federal criminal wiretap statute, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510, et seq., prohibits the unauthorized "intercept[ion]" of any wire, oral or electronic communication, *id.* at § 2511(1), which is defined as the acquisition of the "contents" of the communication, *id.* at § 2510(4). It also prohibits the use and disclosure of the "contents" of such a communication if it was unlawfully intercepted. See *id.* at § 2511(1). For the purpose of these prohibitions, "contents" is defined as "information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that communication." *Id.* § 2510(8); see *United States v. New York Telephone Co.*, 434 U.S. 159 (1977) (holding that Title III does not cover the acquisition of metadata with pen registers). By its terms, the Supplemental Procedures' definition of the communications metadata to be analyzed excludes information about the substance, purport, or meaning of the communication. For this reason at least, the prohibitions of section 2511(1) do not apply to the proposed communications metadata analysis. (S//SI)
+
+Executive Order 12333 and Related Procedures (U)
+
+Executive Order 12333 requires the NSA to conduct its signals intelligence activities involving the collection, retention, or dissemination of information concerning United States persons in accordance with procedures approved by the Attorney General. See *id.* § 2.3; § 2.4.⁹ These procedures must permit the collection, retention, and dissemination of certain types of information including foreign intelligence information in a manner that protects constitutional and other legal rights and limits the use of the information to lawful government purposes. See *id.* § 2.4. The Attorney General approved the current Department of Defense procedures and Classified Annex in October 1982. (U)
+
+The current DOD procedures and their Classified Annex may be read to restrict NSA's ability to conduct the desired communications metadata analysis, at least with respect to metadata associated with United States persons. In particular, this analysis may fall within the procedures' definitions of, and thus restrictions on, the "interception" and "selection" of communications.
+
+⁹ In addition, section 2.5 of Executive Order 12333 provides that the "Attorney General hereby is delegated the power to approve the use for intelligence purposes, within the United States or against a United States person abroad, of any technique for which a warrant would be required if undertaken for law enforcement purposes." Because individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the types of metadata at issue here, no warrant would be required to analyze this information for law enforcement purposes. In addition, the analysis of information legally within the possession of the government is likely neither a "search" nor a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See note 4, supra. Section 2.5 thus does not require the Attorney General to approve NSA's proposed analysis of communications metadata. (S)
+
+SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN//X1
+- 8 -
+
+SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN//X1
+
+Accordingly, the Supplemental Procedures that would govern NSA's analysis of communications metadata expressly state that the DOD Procedures and the Classified Annex do not apply to the analysis of communications metadata. Specifically, the Supplemental Procedures would clarify that "contact chaining and other metadata analysis do not qualify as the 'interception' or 'selection' of communications, nor do they qualify as 'us[ing] a selection term,' including using a selection term 'intended to intercept a communication on the basis of . . . [some] aspect of the content of the communication." Once approved, the Supplemental Procedures will clarify that the communications metadata analysis the NSA wishes to conduct is not restricted by the DOD procedures and their Classified Annex. (S//SI)
+
+The Supplemental Procedures define the terms "communications metadata," "contact chaining," and "metadata analysis." The Supplemental Procedures also state that NSA will conduct contact chaining and other metadata analysis only for valid foreign intelligence purposes; disseminate the results of its analysis in accordance with current procedures governing dissemination of information concerning U.S. persons as set forth in Section 4.A.4 of the Classified Annex; and investigate any apparent misuse or improper dissemination of metadata and report the same to the appropriate oversight organization(s). (S//SI)
+
+In addition, the NSA letter accompanying the Supplemental Procedures proposes a regulatory and oversight regime for the handling of communications metadata of U.S. persons. NSA states that access to communications metadata will be restricted to only those personnel with a need for this data in the performance of their official duties. Before gaining access to communications metadata, NSA or other personnel working under the authority of the Director of NSA will receive mandatory training approved by the General Counsel of NSA on the proper use of such databases and chaining tools. When logging into the electronic data system, users will view a banner that re-emphasizes key points regarding use of the data, chaining tools, and proper dissemination of results. NSA will also create an audit trail of every query made in each database containing U.S. communications metadata, and a network of auditors will spot-check activities in the database to ensure compliance with all procedures. In addition, the NSA Oversight and Compliance Office will conduct periodic super audits to verify that activities remain properly controlled. Finally, NSA will report any misuse of the information to the NSA's Inspector General and Office of General Counsel for inclusion in existing or future reporting mechanisms related to NSA's signals intelligence activities. (S//SI//OC, NF)
+
+NSA also states it will report any changes to this oversight regime to the Assistant Attorney General for the National Security Division, and, by October 15 of each year, will submit a report to the Attorney General regarding the kinds of information the NSA is collecting and processing as communications metadata, NSA's implementation of its compliance procedures, and any significant new legal or oversight issues that have arisen in connection with NSA's activities described in this memorandum. (C)
+
+SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN//X1
+- 9 -
+
+SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN//X1
+
+As drafted, the Supplemental Procedures meet the requirements of Executive Order 12333. Together with the current approved procedures, they continue to permit the collection of foreign intelligence and other information and, as explained above, the metadata analysis will be for lawful government purposes and consistent with the Constitution and other applicable law. (S)
+
+RECOMMENDATION: Based on the information provided by NSA and our analysis of applicable law, we conclude that there are no constitutional or statutory restrictions on NSA's proposed use of communications metadata. We therefore recommend that you approve the Supplemental Procedures. (S//SI)
+
+SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN//X1
+- 10 -
+
+A
+
+SECRET/COMINT REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL 24291123
+
+(S//SI) Department of Defense Supplemental Procedures Governing
+Communications Metadata Analysis
+
+Sec. 1: Purpose
+
+(S//SI) These procedures supplement the Procedures found in DoD Regulation
+5240.1-R and the Classified Annex thereto. These procedures govern NSA's
+analysis of data that it has already lawfully collected and do not authorize
+collection of additional data. These procedures also clarify that, except as stated
+in section 3 below, the Procedures in DoD Regulation 5240.1-R and the Classified
+Annex thereto do not apply to the analysis of communications metadata.
+
+Sec. 2: Definitions
+
+(S//SI) Communications metadata means the dialing, routing, addressing, or
+signaling information associated with a communication, but does not
+include information concerning the substance, purport or meaning of the
+communication. The two principal subsets of communications metadata are
+telephony metadata and electronic communications metadata.
+
+(a) Telephony "metadata" includes the telephone number of the calling
+party, the telephone number of the called party, and the date, time, and
+duration of the call. It does not include the substance, purport, or
+meaning of the communication.
+
+(b) For electronic communications, "metadata" includes the information
+appearing on the "to," "from," "cc," and "bcc" lines of a standard
+e-mail or other electronic communication. For e-mail communications,
+the "from" line contains the e-mail address of the sender, and the "to,"
+"cc," and "bcc" lines contain the e-mail addresses of the recipients.
+"Metadata" also means (1) information about the Internet-protocol (IP).
+address of the computer from which an e-mail or other electronic
+communication was sent and, depending on the circumstances, the IP
+address of routers and servers on the Internet that have handled the
+communication during transmission; (2) the exchange of an IP address and
+e-mail address that occurs when a user logs into a web-based e-mail
+service; and (3) for certain logins to web-based e-mail accounts, inbox
+metadata that is transmitted to the user upon accessing the account.
+"Metadata" associated with electronic communications does not include
+information from the "subject" or "re" line of an e-mail or information
+from the body of an e-mail.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+SECRET/COMINT REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL 24291123
+
+SECRET-COMINT REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL 20291123
+
+(S//SI) Contact chaining. Contact chaining is a process by which
+communications metadata is organized. It shows, for example, the telephone
+numbers or e-mail addresses that a particular telephone number or e-mail address
+has been in contact with, or has attempted to contact. Through this process,
+computer algorithms automatically identify not only the first tier of contacts made
+by the seed telephone number or e-mail address, but also the further contacts made
+by the first tier of telephone numbers or e-mail addresses and so on.
+
+Sec. 3: Procedures
+
+(a) (S//SI) NSA will conduct contact chaining and other communications
+metadata analysis only for valid foreign intelligence purposes.
+
+(b) (S//SI) NSA will disseminate the results of its contact chaining and other
+analysis of communications metadata in accordance with current procedures
+governing dissemination of information concerning US persons. See Section
+4.A.4 of the Classified Annex to Procedure 5 of DoD Regulation 5240.1-R.
+
+(c) (U//FOUO) Any apparent misuse or improper dissemination of metadata
+shall be investigated and reported to appropriate oversight organization(s). See
+Procedure 15 of DoD Regulation 5240.1-R.
+
+Sec. 4: Clarification
+
+(S//SI) For purposes of Procedure 5 of DoD Regulation 5240.1-R and the
+Classified Annex thereto, contact chaining and other metadata analysis do not
+qualify as the "interception" or "selection" of communications, nor do they qualify
+as "us[ing] a selection term," including using a selection term "intended to
+intercept a communication on the basis of . . . [some] aspect of the content of the
+communication."
+
+Dr. Robert Gates
+Secretary of Defense
+Date: 10-19-07
+
+Approved by:
+Michael B. Mukasey
+Attorney General
+of the United States
+Date: 1/3/08
+
+SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL 20291123
+
+B
+
+SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN//X1
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20788-6000
+
+Serial: GC/120/06
+28 September 2006
+
+Mr. James A. Baker
+Counsel for Intelligence Policy
+U.S. Department of Justice
+950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+
+Dear Jim:
+
+(S//SI) The National Security Agency (NSA) is requesting that the Secretary of
+Defense and the Attorney General approve an amendment to the Classified Annex to
+Department of Defense Procedures Under Executive Order 12333 (May 27, 1988). That
+amendment would permit NSA personnel analyzing communications metadata to analyze
+contacts involving U.S. telephone numbers, e-mail addresses, and other identifiers.
+While NSA has for several years engaged in such activities, it has heretofore applied
+procedures in a manner that has precluded it from chaining "from" or "through"
+communications connections with telephone numbers and electronic communications
+metadata when it has had reason to believe the communications were those of U.S.
+persons.
+
+(S//SI/OC,NF) NSA is committed to vigorous and effective oversight of all of its
+activities that affect the privacy interests of U.S. persons. With respect to the
+communications metadata of U.S. persons affected by this amendment, NSA wishes to
+inform you of the following:
+
+1. NSA acquires this communications metadata under its authority to collect,
+process, and disseminate signals intelligence information under Executive Order 12333.
+All of the communications metadata that NSA acquires under this authority should have
+at least one communicant outside the United States.
+
+2. The Oversight and Compliance Office in NSA's Signals Intelligence
+Directorate conducts oversight of NSA's activities involving communications metadata.
+
+3. NSA restricts access to communications metadata to those analytic and other
+personnel with a need for this data in the performance of their official duties.
+
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20041123
+Declassify on: 20291123
+
+SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN//X1
+
+SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN//X1
+
+4. Before NSA or other personnel working under the authority of the Director of
+NSA obtain access to communications metadata, such personnel will receive mandatory
+training, approved by the General Counsel of NSA, on the proper use of such databases
+and chaining tools. That training may be provided on-line. Users will complete and
+acknowledge the training before access. The training will highlight the sensitivity of the
+data and the users' obligations when accessing the data, the restriction on use of the data
+to foreign intelligence purposes only, and the requirement to follow required procedures
+when disseminating results.
+
+5. Before accessing the data, users will view a banner, displayed upon login and
+positively acknowledged by the user, that re-emphasizes the key points regarding use of
+the data and chaining tools, and proper dissemination of any results obtained.
+
+6. NSA creates audit trails of every query made in each database containing U.S.
+communications metadata, and has a network of auditors who will be responsible for
+spot-checking activities in the database to ensure that activities remain compliant with the
+procedures described for the data's use. The Oversight and Compliance Office conducts
+periodic super audits to verify that activities remain properly controlled.
+
+7. NSA will report any misuse of the information to NSA's Inspector General
+and Office of General Counsel for inclusion in existing or future reporting mechanisms
+relating to NSA's signals intelligence activities.
+
+(C) Should any of these statements change, NSA will promptly inform the
+Assistant Attorney General, National Security Division, U.S. Department of Justice. In
+this event, NSA will discuss with the Assistant Attorney General what other steps NSA
+should take to ensure effective oversight of communications metadata of U.S. persons.
+
+(C) In addition, each year by October 15th, I will report to the Attorney General
+on (i) the kinds of information that NSA is collecting and processing as communications
+metadata; (ii) NSA's implementation of the steps described above; and (iii) any
+significant new legal or oversight issues that have arisen in connection with NSA's
+collection, processing, or dissemination of communications metadata of U.S. persons.
+
+Sincerely,
+VITO T. POTENZA
+Acting General Counsel
+
+cc: General Counsel, Department of Defense
+General Counsel, Office of Director of National Intelligence
+Civil Liberties Protection Officer, Office of Director of National Intelligence
+
+SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN//X1
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Memo_to_DOD_-_Proposed_Amendment_to_Conduct_Analysis_of_Metadata/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Memo_to_DOD_-_Proposed_Amendment_to_Conduct_Analysis_of_Metadata/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bebcd5c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Memo_to_DOD_-_Proposed_Amendment_to_Conduct_Analysis_of_Metadata/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+{
+ "title": "NSA Memo to DOD - Proposed Amendment to Conduct Analysis of Metadata",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "A memo from the NSA to the DOD seeking approval of a proposed amendment to procedures governing the NSA's metadata analysis. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2007-11-20",
+ "classification": [
+ "SECRET",
+ "COMINT",
+ "X1"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "ORCON, NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Wainstein, Kenneth L.",
+ "Bradbury, Steven G.",
+ "Potenza, Vito T.",
+ "Gates, Robert",
+ "Mukasey, Michael B.",
+ "Baker, James A."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-06-27",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/nsa-memo-dod-proposed-amendment-conduct-analysis-metadata-2",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [
+ {
+ "id": "NSA_Memo_to_DOD_-_Proposed_Amendment_to_Conduct_Analysis_of_Metadata"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "9580b9933a35b91903b9263ac9a9934b5b5d1523a856592e1cc40ee36c220125",
+ "pages": 16
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_PowerPoint_Slide_-_Verification_Requirements/ACLU_-_NSA_PowerPoint_Slide_-_Verification_Requirements.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_PowerPoint_Slide_-_Verification_Requirements/ACLU_-_NSA_PowerPoint_Slide_-_Verification_Requirements.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..83f9b9c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_PowerPoint_Slide_-_Verification_Requirements/ACLU_-_NSA_PowerPoint_Slide_-_Verification_Requirements.md
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Verification Requirement
+
+➤ Verify that the data is of the type
+authorized by the order, specifically,
+call detail records (telephony metadata)
+
+➤ Under NO circumstances may the
+substantive content of communications
+be received under this order
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_PowerPoint_Slide_-_Verification_Requirements/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_PowerPoint_Slide_-_Verification_Requirements/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fd9335c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_PowerPoint_Slide_-_Verification_Requirements/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+{
+ "title": "NSA PowerPoint Slide: Verification Requirements",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "An undated NSA PowerPoint slide describing requirements for the collection of metadata versus content. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-18",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/nsa-powerpoint-slide-verification-requirements",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "3812edc0da26b31e110e8d4d2f0226b38b505ec13bee9d1f0dbcf8a7d3898820",
+ "pages": 1
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Summary_of_Requirements_Unders_Section_501_of_FISA/ACLU_-_NSA_Summary_of_Requirements_Unders_Section_501_of_FISA.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Summary_of_Requirements_Unders_Section_501_of_FISA/ACLU_-_NSA_Summary_of_Requirements_Unders_Section_501_of_FISA.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c372c56
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Summary_of_Requirements_Unders_Section_501_of_FISA/ACLU_-_NSA_Summary_of_Requirements_Unders_Section_501_of_FISA.md
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+received from NSA 2/20
+
+FISA Business Records Telephony Metadata Collection
+
+Verification Requirement:
+
+Verify that the data is of the type authorized by the order (i.e., call-detail records/
+telephony metadata). (See page 2 of the Order.)
+
+Under no circumstances may the substantive content of communications
+be received under this order.
+
+Specific Court-Ordered Procedures and Restrictions (see pages 5-12 of the Order):
+
+Standard for Accessing Data
+
+Any search or analysis of the data archive shall occur only after a particular
+known telephone number has been associated with [REDACTED]
+Seed queries must be particular known telephone numbers that
+meet the targeting standard articulated by the Court --based on the factual and
+practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent persons
+act, there are facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the
+telephone number is associated with [REDACTED]
+provided, however, that a telephone number believed to be used by a U.S. person
+shall not be regarded as associated with [REDACTED] solely
+on the basis of activities that are protected by the First Amendment to the
+Constitution. (See Order, ¶ 3(A).)
+
+No targeting U.S. persons based upon 1st Amendment protected activities.
+
+OGC must review and approve targeting of U.S. persons to ensure that
+standards are met.
+
+Other Access Requirements
+
+Access to this data is limited to authorized analysts. NSA's OGC shall monitor
+the designation of individuals with access to the archive. Access to the archive
+shall be controlled by user name and password. When the metadata archive is
+
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20041123
+Declassify On: Source Marked X1
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+accessed, the user's login, IP address, date and time, and retrieval request shall be
+automatically logged for auditing capability.
+
+All queries must have prior approval of one of the following:
+
+a) SID Program Manager for Counterterrorism Special Projects
+b) Chief, Homeland Security Analysis Center
+c) Deputy Chief, Homeland Security Analysis Center
+d) Homeland Mission Coordinator
+
+The above individuals must establish management controls for access to the data.
+
+Automatic log must be generated for each occasion when the info is accessed.
+Log must contain: a) user login, b) user IP address, c) date and time, d) retrieval
+request.
+
+Manner of Accessing Data
+
+NSA is permitted to perform two sorts of queries: 1) contact chaining to a third
+tier of contacts, and 2) [REDACTED]
+
+Storage
+
+Metadata must be stored and processed on a secure private network that NSA
+exclusively will operate.
+
+Metadata received under this Order may be kept online for 5 years and then
+destroyed.
+
+Training & Oversight
+
+OGC must train analysts concerning the authorization and querying standard, as
+well as other procedures and restrictions regarding the retrieval, storage, and
+dissemination of the archived data.
+
+OGC must monitor the designation of individuals with access to the data and the
+functioning of the automatic logging/auditing.
+
+OGC must conduct two random spot checks during the authorization period to
+ensure that NSA is receiving only data as authorized by the Court and not
+receiving the substantive content of communications.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+DoJ shall conduct a review at least twice every 90 days of a sample of NSA's
+queries against the data.
+
+The IG, OGC and SID Oversight must periodically review the program.
+
+Minimization Rules
+
+USSID 18 minimization procedures must be applied to the activity.
+
+Prior to dissemination of any U.S. person identifying information, the Chief of
+Information Sharing Services must determine that information identifying U.S.
+persons is related to counterterrorism information and that it is necessary to
+understand or assess the counterterrorism information.
+
+Duration of Authorization
+
+FISC order is valid for 90 days.
+
+Reporting and Renewal Requirements
+
+NSA must file a report every 45 days with the Court that includes:
+
+1. the queries that have been made since this Order was granted;
+2. the manner in which NSA applied the standard required by the Court
+for accessing the data, and
+3. any proposed changes in the way in which the call-detail records
+would be received.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Summary_of_Requirements_Unders_Section_501_of_FISA/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Summary_of_Requirements_Unders_Section_501_of_FISA/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d8f1a5c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_NSA_Summary_of_Requirements_Unders_Section_501_of_FISA/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+{
+ "title": "NSA Summary of Requirements Under Section 501 of FISA",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "An undated NSA summary on requirements for the collection of bulk telephony metadata under Section 501 of FISA. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT",
+ "MR"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-18",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/nsa-summary-requirements-under-section-501-fisa",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "662206182a5617e6fd3a7fbb9d1375f7874930aee193bde3ac5e0547b312d00f",
+ "pages": 3
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_Oct-_21_2009_NSA_Joint_Statement_Before_the_House_-_Hearing_on_Patriot_Act_Reauthorization/ACLU_-_Oct-_21_2009_NSA_Joint_Statement_Before_the_House_-_Hearing_on_Patriot_Act_Reauthorization.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_Oct-_21_2009_NSA_Joint_Statement_Before_the_House_-_Hearing_on_Patriot_Act_Reauthorization/ACLU_-_Oct-_21_2009_NSA_Joint_Statement_Before_the_House_-_Hearing_on_Patriot_Act_Reauthorization.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..486f99e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_Oct-_21_2009_NSA_Joint_Statement_Before_the_House_-_Hearing_on_Patriot_Act_Reauthorization/ACLU_-_Oct-_21_2009_NSA_Joint_Statement_Before_the_House_-_Hearing_on_Patriot_Act_Reauthorization.md
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+All redacted information
+exempt under (b)(1) and (b)
+(3) except as otherwise
+noted.
+
+JOINT STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD BY
+
+MICHAEL LEITER
+DIRECTOR
+NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER
+
+AND
+
+[REDACTED]
+ASSOCIATE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM
+SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+
+BEFORE THE
+HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
+CLOSED HEARING ON PATRIOT ACT REAUTHORIZATION
+OCTOBER 21, 2009
+
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20070108
+Declassify On: 20320108
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+(U) Introduction
+
+(U) Chairman Reyes, Ranking Member Hoekstra, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the importance of Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act of 2001 to our Nation's security.
+
+(U) Value of Section 215 Authorities to National Security
+
+(TS//SI//NF)-As this Committee well knows, since the tragedy of 9/11, the Intelligence Community has developed an array of capabilities to detect, identify and disrupt terrorist plots against the United States and its interests. Detecting threats by exploiting terrorist communications has been, and continues to be, one of the critical tools in that fight. Above all else, it is imperative that we have a capability to rapidly identify any terrorist threats emanating from within the United States. As you will see in the Illustrations area below, the Section 215 Authorities played an important role in helping the Intelligence Community understand more fully the connections associated with now indicted Najibullah Zazi.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Members will recall that, prior to the attacks of 9/11, the NSA intercepted and transcribed seven calls from hijacker Khalid al-Mihdhar to a facility associated with an al Qa'ida safehouse in Yemen. However, NSA's access point overseas did not provide the technical data indicating where al-Mihdhar was calling from. Lacking the originating phone number, and hearing nothing in the content of those calls to suggest he was in the United States, NSA analysts concluded that al-Mihdhar was overseas. In fact, al-Mihdhar was calling from San Diego, California. According to the 9/11 Commission Report (pages 269-272):
+
+"Investigations or interrogation of them [Khalid al-Mihdhar, etc], and investigation of their travel and financial activities could have yielded evidence of connections to other participants in the 9/11 plot. The simple fact of their detention could have derailed the plan. In any case, the opportunity did not arise. "¹
+
+The Business Records FISA program, operated in accordance with FISA Court authorization pursuant to Section 215, is specifically developed to close the gap that allowed al-Mihdhar to be plotting undetected within the United States while communicating with a known SIGINT terrorism target overseas.
+
+(S//SI//NF) Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act allows the FISA Court to authorize the Intelligence Community to collect the vital information that closes the critical seam between foreign threats and domestic entities. In particular, it allows the IC to detect:
+
+* Phone numbers within the United States calling targeted phone numbers associated with suspected foreign terrorists abroad;
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+* Targeted phone numbers tied to suspected foreign terrorists abroad calling phone numbers in the United States; and
+* Connections concerning communications between entities within the United States tied to a suspected foreign terrorist abroad
+
+(S//SI//NF) In this context, the term “targeted number" refers to a number or other telephone identifier for which there exists Reasonable Articulable Suspicion (RAS) to believe the number is used by [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The authority to collect information in bulk under Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act was first granted by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court in May 2006 and has been renewed approximately every 90 days thereafter. The business records orders grant access to bulk telephony business records, or telephony metadata. "Telephony business records” or “telephony metadata" are simply technical terms that include the phone number that placed a call, the phone number at the receiving end of a call, when the phone call was placed, the duration of the call, and similar information about the call. Telephony business records do not include the content of any phone calls. In other words, the business records orders issued by the FISC do not authorize the collection of what is being said in any telephone calls.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) NSA needs access to telephony business records in bulk¹ so that it can quickly identify the network of contacts that a targeted number is connected to, whenever a targeted number is detected. NSA identifies the network of contact by applying sophisticated analysis to this metadata. The more metadata NSA has access to, the higher the chances are that NSA can identify or discover the network of contacts linked to targeted numbers. Information discovered through its analysis of the bulk telephony business records is provided to the FBI, which is then responsible for further investigation of any potential terrorist threat.
+
+(U) In sum, these authorities and capabilities are about rapidly identifying individuals like al-Mihdhar who might be operational in the United States today as well as their network of contacts. The IC requires the BR FISA program to close the seam between foreign intelligence knowledge of threats and persons who may be connected to those threats in the US.
+
+Illustrations of Sec 215 authorities and NSA capabilities in action
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The foregoing discussion is not hypothetical. As of October 1, 2009, NSA has provided 295 reports to the FBI CIA and NCTC containing telephone numbers in contact with numbers associated [REDACTED] Upon receipt of the reporting from NSA, the FBI sent investigative leads to relevant FBI Field
+
+¹ (TS//SI//NF) The current Business Records Order authorizes NSA to collect the records for approximately [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Offices for investigative action. FBI representatives have indicated to NSA that the telephone contact reporting has provided leads and linkages to individuals in the United States with potential ties to terrorism who may not have otherwise been known to or identified by the FBI. In Calendar Year 2008, telephone numbers tipped from the NSA business records results either added value or led to:
+
+* the opening of over 100 Preliminary Investigations
+* the opening of over 240 Threat Assessments
+* the opening of approximately 15 Full Investigations
+* 180 National Security Letters issued.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) NSA tips derived from the Agency's analysis of BR FISA telephony metadata have contributed directly to the following specific cases.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Investigation of Najibullah Zazi. Now indicted, the Intelligence Community assesses that Najibullah Zazi -- in consultation with or under the guidance of a Pakistan-based al Qa'ida associate was conspiring to use Improvised Explosive Devices in the United States. BR FISA metadata played an important role in helping the IC understand more fully the range of Zazi's connections.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) On September 6, 2009, using authorities under the FISA Amendments Act (FAA), NSA intercepted a coded email discussion between an al Qa'ida-associated email account previously accessed in Pakistan and an unknown account. NSA analysts quickly determined that the unknown account might be located in the United States and conveyed this information to the FBI in order that the FBI could obtain FISA coverage of the suspected US-based account. Through the FBI-obtained FISA, it was determined that the user of the account and an associated telephone number was Najibullah Zazi. Further investigation revealed Zazi's presence in Colorado. The FBI passed Zazi's mobile telephone number to NSA on the evening of 9-10 September.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Shortly after receipt of Zazi's telephone number from FBI—and at approximately the same time that Zazi had obtained a one-way car rental from Colorado to New York City and had begun driving to New York—NSA issued a Business Records FISA metadata report on domestic and foreign contacts of that telephone. Among those contacts identified was a phone later confirmed as belonging to a key Zazi associate Adis Medunjanin. This was the FBI's first intelligence information about Medunjanin's telephone number and the contact corroborated other early information about Medunjanin's relationship with Zazi. It also magnified concerns about that relationship because, in that same report, NSA contextualized the Medunjanin phone as being in direct contact with three telephones (two domestic and one foreign) used by another extremist currently targeted in a priority FBI CT investigation. This detail, available only at the "second hop"² and only visible due to the blending of BR FISA and SIGINT data, quickly identified the Medunjanin number as a priority lead for the FBI. The detection
+
+² (S//SI//NF) Second Hop: if the analysts submit a particular telephone number as a query, the database is designed to return any other telephone numbers that have called, or been called by, that number. This query process can be repeated for each of the returned numbers as well, generating information about communications two or three steps removed from the original number.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+and alert of the Medunjanin connection was achieved through the agility of the BR FISA program. It provided timely, key information that was unavailable through any other sources and significantly accelerated and focused the investigation.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) While these Business Records FISA successes are significant, the true value of the program to the nation is that it strengthens the Intelligence Community's early warning system for the detection of terrorists and discovery of plots. NSA monitors terrorist communications around the world on a broad scale. The nation requires a SIGINT system that will flash bright [REDACTED] ever there is an indication of a threat to the US Homeland. There is no doubt that [REDACTED] continues their aspirations and attempts to achieve another spectacular attack in the United States. The Business Records FISA program is a strategic program for the nation, connecting the nation's counterterrorism capabilities.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The Business Records FISC Order
+
+(TS//SI//NF) As provided in the BR FISA Order, NSA's access to and use of BR FISA metadata records is governed by established minimization procedures. As the Committee is aware by way of previous written notification, on January 9, 2009, in the course of a regular review and discussion with NSA, the Department of Justice (DoJ) with NSA assistance identified what was ultimately determined to be an incident of non-compliance with the Order. Subsequently on January 15, 2009, DoJ filed a preliminary notice of non-compliance with the FISC.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+(U//FOUO) In response to the Government's compliance notice, on January 28, 2009, the Court directed the Government to file a brief and supporting documentation describing the non-compliance matter. The Government's response to the order was filed with the FISC on February 17, 2009. On February 25, 2009, written notification of the matter was provided to the Committee.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) On March 2, 2009, the FISC issued an Order restricting NSA's access to the metadata for intelligence purposes except upon Court approval on a case-by-case basis, with an exigency provision allowing for access when immediate access was necessary to protect against an imminent threat to human life. The Court also directed the Government to make certain filings: a declaration by at least the FBI Director describing the value of the metadata to national security, the results of the NSA end-to-end system engineering and process reviews, a statement concerning remedial efforts relating to matters of non-compliance and minimization and oversight procedures proposed in the event the Court were to determine to allow resumption of regular access to the BR metadata.
+
+(U//FOUO) As the Committee has been made aware, these matters were given the utmost attention and addressed through changes in processes and implementation of FISC requirements during the ensuing months. In addition, and as further demonstration of NSA's commitment to a more robust compliance regime, NSA established a Director of Compliance with authority to develop, implement, and monitor a comprehensive compliance program that would complement and reinforce the intelligence oversight program carried out by the NSA/CSS Inspector General and the oversight responsibilities of the NSA/CSS General Counsel. This program is intended to integrate compliance strategies and activities across NSA/CSS's mission, technology and policy organizations; ensure a robust compliance training and education program; and maintain and report on a comprehensive status of mission compliance at NSA/CSS, including performing trend analysis and ensuring prompt corrective actions.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) On September 3, 2009, after receiving extensive demonstrations and briefings regarding the BR FISA program, the FISC signed the Renewal Order for BR FISA. The order, which will remain in effect through October 30, 2009, restores to NSA the authority to make Reasonable Articulable Suspicion (RAS) determinations as to whether specific telephone identifiers may be used as “seeds” for querying against the BR FISA metadata. The signing of the renewal order is viewed as an indication that NSA is regaining the Court's confidence in its ability to safeguard US Person privacy while using BR FISA data for vital national security missions.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In conclusion, the BR FISA program provides a vital capability to the Intelligence Community. Recognizing that the program has implications for the privacy interests of US Person data, extensive policies, safeguards, and reviews have been enacted by the FISC, DOJ, DNI and NSA. 9/11 taught us that applying lead information from foreign intelligence in a comprehensive and systemic fashion is
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+required to protect the homeland. The Business Records FISA program operated under Section 215 of the USA Patriot act covers a critical seam in our defense against terrorism.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_Oct-_21_2009_NSA_Joint_Statement_Before_the_House_-_Hearing_on_Patriot_Act_Reauthorization/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_Oct-_21_2009_NSA_Joint_Statement_Before_the_House_-_Hearing_on_Patriot_Act_Reauthorization/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c131124
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_Oct-_21_2009_NSA_Joint_Statement_Before_the_House_-_Hearing_on_Patriot_Act_Reauthorization/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+{
+ "title": "October 21, 2009 - NSA Joint Statement Before the House - Closed Hearing on Patriot Act Reauthorization",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2009-10-21",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-10-28",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/october-21-2009-nsa-joint-statement-house-closed-hearing-patriot-act-reauthorization",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [
+ {
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+TOP SECRET//HCS//SI//NOFORN
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (S)
+Docket Number: BR:
+06-05
+
+EXHIBIT C
+
+MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR
+CERTAIN TANGIBLE THINGS FOR INVESTIGATIONS TO PROTECT
+AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//SI//NOFORN
+Derived from Application of the United States to the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court in the above-captioned
+matter.
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//SI//NOFORN
+INTRODUCTION (U)
+One of the greatest challenges the United States faces in the ongoing conflict with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] is finding operatives of the enemy. As this Court is aware, one of the most significant
+tools that the U.S. Government can use to accomplish that task is metadata analysis. Under this
+Court’s order in [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Opinion and Order, No. PR/TT [REDACTED] (“[REDACTED]”), and
+subsequent related authorizations, the National Security Agency (NSA) is currently collecting
+metadata in bulk from electronic communications and applying sophisticated analytic tools to
+identify and find [REDACTED]. The attached Application seeks this Court’s authorization
+to collect in bulk [REDACTED] [REDACTED] certain business
+records—call detail records, or “telephony metadata”—so that the NSA may use these same
+analytic tools to identify and find operatives of [REDACTED]. (TS//SI//NF)
+The attached Application for business records is made pursuant to title V of the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1861 et seq., as amended, “Access to Certain Business
+Records for Foreign Intelligence Purposes,” to capitalize upon the unique opportunities the
+United States has for identifying communications of [REDACTED]. The collection
+sought here will make possible a potentially powerful tool that the Government has to discover
+enemy communications: metadata analysis. For telephone calls, metadata essentially consists of
+routing information that includes the telephone number of the calling party, the telephone
+number of the called party, and the date, time and duration of the call. It does not include the
+substantive content of the communication or the name, address, or financial information of a
+subscriber or customer. Relying solely on such metadata, the Government can analyze the
+contacts made by a telephone number reasonably suspected to be associated with a terrorist, and
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+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//SI//NOFORN
+thereby possibly identify other, previously unknown, terrorists. The primary advantage of
+metadata analysis as applied to telephony metadata is that it enables the Government to analyze
+past connections and [REDACTED] That analysis is possible, however, only if the
+Government has collected and archived a broad set of metadata that contains within it the subset
+of communications that can later be identified as terrorist-related. In addition, individually
+targeted collection of metadata is inadequate for tracking the communications of terrorists who
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]. (TS//SI//NF)
+In the attached Application, therefore, the Government requests that this Court order the
+production, in bulk and on an ongoing basis, of certain business records [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] For billing and fraud detection purposes, [REDACTED] “call
+detail records” that contain routing information, including which telephone number called which
+other telephone number at what date and time, and for how long, i.e., “metadata.” The
+Application fully satisfies all requirements of title V of FISA. In particular, the Application
+seeks the production of tangible things “for” an international terrorism investigation. 50 U.S.C.
+§ 1861(a)(1). In addition, the Application includes a statement of facts demonstrating that there
+are reasonable grounds to believe that the business records sought are “relevant” to an authorized
+investigation. Id. § 1861(b)(2). Although the call detail records [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] contain large volumes of metadata, the vast majority of which will not be terrorist-
+related, the scope of the business records request presents no infirmity under title V. All of the
+business records to be collected here are relevant to FBI investigations into [REDACTED] because the
+NSA can effectively conduct metadata analysis only if it has the data in bulk. (TS//SI//NF)
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+2
+
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+In addition, even if the metadata from non-terrorist communications were deemed not
+relevant, nothing in title V of FISA demands that a request for the production of “any tangible
+things” under that provision collect only information that is strictly relevant to the international
+terrorism investigation at hand. Were the Court to require some tailoring to fit the information
+that will actually be terrorist-related, the business records request detailed in the Application
+would meet any proper test for reasonable tailoring. Any tailoring standard must be informed by
+a balancing of the government interest at stake against the degree of intrusion into any protected
+privacy interests. Here, the Government’s interest is the most compelling imaginable: the
+defense of the Nation in wartime from attacks that may take thousands of lives. On the other
+side of the balance, the intrusion is minimal. As the Supreme Court has held, there is no
+constitutionally protected interest in metadata, such as numbers dialed on a telephone. Any
+intrusion is further reduced because only data connected to telephone numbers reasonably
+suspected to be terrorist-associated will ever be viewed by any human being. Indeed, only a tiny
+fraction (estimated by the NSA to be 0.000025% or one in four million) of the call detail records
+collected actually will be seen by a trained NSA analyst. Under the procedures the Government
+will apply, metadata reflecting the activity of a particular telephone number will only be seen by
+a human analyst if a computer search has established a connection to a terrorist-associated
+telephone number. (TS//SI//NF)
+The Application is completely consistent with this Court’s ground breaking and
+innovative decision [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] In that case, the Court authorized the
+installation and use of pen registers and trap and trace devices to collect bulk e-mail metadata
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]. The Court found that all of “the information likely to be
+TOP SECRET//HCS//SI//NOFORN
+3
+
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+obtained” from such collection “is relevant to an ongoing investigation to protect against
+international terrorism.” 50 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2); [REDACTED] at 25-54. The Court explained
+that “the bulk collection of meta data—i.e., the collection of both a huge volume and high
+percentage of unrelated communications—is necessary to identify the much smaller number of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] communications.” Id. at 49. Moreover, as was the case in [REDACTED], this
+Application promotes both of the twin goals of FISA: facilitating the foreign-intelligence
+collection needed to protect American lives while at the same time providing judicial oversight
+to safeguard American freedoms. (S)
+BACKGROUND (U)
+A. The Al Qaeda Threat (S)
+On September 11, 2001, the al Qaeda terrorist network launched a set of coordinated
+attacks along the East Coast of the United States. Four commercial jetliners, each carefully
+selected to be fully loaded with fuel for a transcontinental flight, were hijacked by al Qaeda
+operatives. Two of the jetliners were targeted at the Nation’s financial center in New York and
+were deliberately flown into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center. The third was targeted
+at the headquarters of the Nation’s Armed Forces, the Pentagon. The fourth was apparently
+headed toward Washington, D.C., when passengers struggled with the hijackers and the plane
+crashed in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. The intended target of this fourth jetliner was evidently
+the White House or the Capitol, strongly suggesting that its intended mission was to strike a
+direct blow at the leadership of the Government of the United States. The attacks of September
+11th resulted in approximately 3,000 deaths—the highest single-day death toll from hostile
+foreign attacks in the Nation’s history. These attacks shut down air travel in the United States,
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+4
+
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+disrupted the Nation’s financial markets and government operations, and caused billions of
+dollars in damage to the economy. (U)
+Before the September 11th attacks, al Qaeda had promised to attack the United States. In
+1998, Osama bin Laden declared a “religious” war against the United States and urged that it
+was the moral obligation of all Muslims to kill U.S. civilians and military personnel. See
+Statement of Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, et al., Fatwah Urging Jihad Against
+Americans, published in Al-Quds al-’Arabi (Feb. 23, 1998) ("To kill the Americans and their
+allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any
+country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy
+mosque from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam,
+defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim.”). Al Qaeda carried out those threats with a
+vengeance; they attacked the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen, the United States Embassy in Nairobi, and
+finally the United States itself in the September 11th attacks. (U)
+It is clear that al Qaeda is not content with the damage it wrought on September 11th.
+Just a few months ago, Osama bin Laden pointed to “the explosions that . . . have take[n] place
+in the greatest European capitals” as evidence that “the mujahideen . . . have been able to break
+through all the security measures taken by” the United States and its allies. Osama bin Laden,
+audiotape released on Al-Jazeera television network (Federal Bureau of Investigation trans., Jan.
+19, 2006). He warned that "the delay of [sic] inflicting similar operations in America has not
+been due to any impossibility of breaking through your security measures[,] for those operations
+are underway and you will see them in your midst as soon as they are done." Id. Several days
+later, bin Laden’s deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, warned that the American people are destined for
+"a future colored by blood, the smoke of explosions and the shadows of terror.” Ayman al-
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+5
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//SI//NOFORN
+Zawahiri, videotape released on the Al-Jazeera television network (Jan. 30, 2006). These recent
+threats were just the latest in a series of warnings since September 11th by al Qaeda leaders who
+have repeatedly promised to deliver another, even more devastating attack on America. See, e.g.,
+Osama bin Laden, videotape released on Al-Jazeera television network (Oct. 24, 2004) (warning
+United States citizens of further attacks and asserting that “your security is in your own hands”);
+Osama bin Laden, videotape released on Al-Jazeera television network (Oct. 18, 2003) (“We,
+God willing, will continue to fight you and will continue martyrdom operations inside and
+outside the United States . . . .”); Ayman al-Zawahiri, videotape released on the Al-Jazeera
+television network (Oct. 9, 2002) (“I promise you [addressing the ‘citizens of the United States’]
+that the Islamic youth are preparing for you what will fill your hearts with horror”). As recently
+as December 7, 2005, al-Zawahiri professed that al Qaeda “is spreading, growing, and becoming
+stronger,” and that al Qaeda is “waging a great historic battle in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, and
+even in the Crusaders’ own homes.” Ayman al-Zawahiri, videotape released on Al-Jazeera
+television network (Dec. 7, 2005). Indeed, since September 11th, al Qaeda has staged several
+large-scale attacks around the world, including in Tunisia, Kenya and Indonesia, killing hundreds
+of innocent people. In addition, Ayman al-Zawahiri claimed that al Qaeda played some role in
+the July 2005 attacks on London. See Declaration of John S. Redd, Director, National
+Counterterrorism Center ¶ 35 (May 22, 2006) (Exhibit B to the Application) (“NCTC
+Declaration”). Given that al Qaeda’s leaders have repeatedly made good on their threats and that
+al Qaeda has demonstrated its ability to insert foreign agents into the United States to execute
+attacks, it is clear that the threat continues. (TS//SI//NF)
+Reliable intelligence indicates that [REDACTED] remains intent on striking the United States
+and U.S. interests. See NCTC Declaration ¶¶ 5-7, 8, 11-13. “[REDACTED] is an international
+TOP SECRET//HCS//SI//NOFORN
+6
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//SI//NOFORN
+organization with a global presence, with members located in at least 40 countries, and the
+capability to strike US interests anywhere in the world.” Id. ¶ 5. Indeed, [REDACTED] “continues its
+efforts to reconstitute communication links to a transnational network of [REDACTED] personnel and
+affiliated groups.” Id. ¶ 39. Recent intelligence suggests that [REDACTED] has become “keenly”
+interested in soft targets, especially those that are densely populated. Id. ¶¶ 17, 75. [REDACTED]
+and its affiliates consistently have expressed an interest in attacking U.S. rail and mass transit
+systems, as well as continuing to target the civil aviation sector, including U.S. passengers and
+Western aircraft overseas. Id. ¶¶ 74-80. Moreover, the Intelligence Community is concerned
+that the next [REDACTED] attack in the United States might use chemical, biological, radiological or
+nuclear weapons, “especially given [[REDACTED]] clear intent to develop such capabilities and use
+them to strike the Homeland.” Id. ¶ 81. In sum, [REDACTED] continues to present “a credible threat
+for a massive attack against the US Homeland.” Id. ¶ 91. By helping to find and identify
+[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED], particularly those who are already within the
+United States, the proposed request for business records would greatly help the United States
+prevent another such catastrophic terrorist attack, one that [REDACTED] itself has claimed would be
+larger than the attacks of September 11th. (TS//SI//HCS//OC,NF)
+B. [REDACTED] Use of Telephones to Communicate (S)
+[REDACTED] use the international telephone system to
+communicate with one another between numerous countries all over the world, including to and
+from the United States. In addition, when they are located inside the United States, [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] make domestic U.S. telephone calls. For purposes of preventing terrorist attacks
+against the United States, the most analytically significant [REDACTED] telephone communications
+are those that either have one end in the United States or that are purely domestic, because those
+TOP SECRET//HCS//SI//NOFORN
+7
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//SI//NOFORN
+communications are particularly likely to identify individuals who are associated with [REDACTED]
+in the United States whose activities may include planning attacks on the homeland. See
+Declaration of Lieut. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, U.S. Army, Director, NSA ¶ 5 (May 22, 2006)
+(Exhibit A to the Application) (“NSA Declaration”). The vast majority of the call detail records
+sought in the attached Application would include records of telephone calls that either have one
+end in the United States or are purely domestic, including local calls, although some records
+would relate to communications in which both ends were outside the United States. The United
+States needs to sort through this telephony metadata to find and identify [REDACTED] and
+thereby acquire vital intelligence that could prevent another deadly terrorist attack. (TS//SI//NF)
+C. Discovering the Enemy: Metadata Analysis (TS//SI//NF)
+Analyzing metadata from international and domestic telecommunications—such as
+information showing which telephone numbers have been in contact with which other telephone
+numbers, for how long, and when¹—can be a powerful tool for discovering communications of
+terrorist operatives. Collecting and archiving metadata is thus the best avenue for solving the
+following fundamental problem: although investigators do not know exactly where the terrorists’
+communications are hiding in the billions of telephone calls flowing through the United States
+today, we do know that they are there, and if we archive the data now, we will be able to use it
+in a targeted way to find the terrorists tomorrow. NSA Declaration ¶¶ 7-11. As the NSA has
+explained, “[t]he ability to accumulate a metadata archive and set it aside for carefully controlled
+
+¹ For telephone calls, “metadata” includes comprehensive communications routing information, including
+the telephone number of the calling party, the telephone number of the called party, and the date, time and duration
+of the call, as well as communications device and trunk identifiers. A “trunk” is a communication line between two
+switching systems. Newton’s Telecom Dictionary 853 (20th ed. 2004). Telephony metadata does not include the
+content of the communication, as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8), or the name, address, or financial information of a
+subscriber or customer. (S)
+TOP SECRET//HCS//SI//NOFORN
+8
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//SI//NOFORN
+searches and analysis will substantially increase NSA’s ability to detect and identify members of
+al Qaeda and its affiliates.” Id. ¶ 8; see also [REDACTED] at 43-45. (TS//SI//NF)
+Collecting and archiving metadata offers at least two invaluable capabilities to analysts
+that are unavailable from any other approach. First, it allows for retrospective “contact
+chaining.” For example, analysts may learn that a particular telephone number is associated with
+[REDACTED] perhaps because it was found in the cell phone directory of a recently captured [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] agent. By examining metadata that has been archived over a period of time, analysts can
+search to find the contacts that have been made by that “seed” telephone number. The ability to
+see who communicates with whom may lead to the discovery of other terrorist operatives, may
+help to identify hubs or common contacts between targets of interest who were previously
+thought to be unconnected, and may help to discover individuals willing to become FBI assets.
+Indeed, computer algorithms can identify not only the first tier of contacts made by the telephone
+number reasonably suspected to be associated with [REDACTED] but also the further contacts made
+by the first and second tiers of telephone numbers. NSA Declaration ¶ 9. Going out beyond the
+first tier enhances the ability of analysts to find terrorist connections by increasing the chances
+that they will find previously unknown terrorists. A seed telephone number, for example, may
+be in touch with several telephone numbers previously unknown to analysts. Following the
+contact chain out two additional “hops” to examine the contacts made by the first two tiers of
+telephone numbers may reveal a contact that connects back to a different terrorist-associated
+telephone number already known to the analyst. Going out to the third tier is useful for
+telephony because, unlike e-mail traffic, which includes the heavy use of “spam,” a telephonic
+device does not lend itself to simultaneous contact with large numbers of individuals.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+TOP SECRET//HCS//SI//NOFORN
+9
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//SI//NOFORN
+The capabilities offered by such searching of a collected archive of metadata are vastly
+more powerful than chaining that could be performed on data collected pursuant to national
+security letters issued by the Government under 18 U.S.C. § 2709 and targeted at individual
+telephone numbers. If investigators find a new telephone number when [REDACTED] is
+captured, and the Government issues a national security letter for the local and long distance toll
+billing records for that particular account, it would only be able to obtain the first tier of
+telephone numbers that the [REDACTED] number has been in touch with. To find an additional tier of
+contacts, new national security letters would have to be issued for each telephone number
+identified in the first tier. The time it would take to issue the new national security letters would
+necessarily mean losing valuable data. And the data loss in the most critical cases would only be
+increased by terrorists’ [REDACTED] Moreover,
+because telephone companies generally only keep call detail records in an easily accessible
+medium for up to two years, historical chaining analysis on the number may lead analysts to
+other individuals [REDACTED] by revealing the contacts that were made by a terrorist-
+associated telephone number more than two years ago. See NSA Declaration ¶ 12. (TS//SI//NF)
+The second major tool analysts can use with an archive of collected metadata is [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]. Skilled analysts can then use a
+[REDACTED] to determine whether there is another
+telephone number within the archived metadata that shows a [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Obviously, such [REDACTED] is a critical tool for
+TOP SECRET//HCS//SI//NOFORN
+10
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//SI//NOFORN
+keeping up with terrorists [REDACTED] See NSA
+Declaration ¶ 11. It provides an invaluable capability that could not be reproduced through any
+other mechanism [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]. Such analysis can be performed only if the Government has collected
+and archived the data [REDACTED]
+(TS//SI//NF)
+E. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (U)
+FISA provides a mechanism for the Government to obtain business records—here, call
+detail records—[REDACTED] containing precisely the type of
+communications data that is vital for the metadata analysis described above—including the
+telephone number of the calling party, the telephone number of the called party, and the date,
+time and duration of the call. Section 501 of FISA, as recently amended by section 106 of the
+USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat.
+192, 196-200 (Mar. 9, 2006) (“USA PATRIOT Reauthorization Act”), authorizes the Director of
+the FBI or his designee to apply to this Court
+for an order requiring the production of any tangible things (including books,
+records, papers, documents, and other items) for an investigation to obtain foreign
+intelligence information not concerning a United States person or to protect
+against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that
+such investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely on the basis
+of activities protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution.
+50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1).² (S)
+
+² The call detail records sought in the attached Application would not be collected by a “pen register” or
+“trap and trace device” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 3127. Each of these terms refers to a “device or process” which
+either “records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or
+facility from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted”—a pen register, id. § 3127(3), or “captures
+the incoming electronic or other impulses which identify the originating number or other dialing, routing,
+addressing, and signaling information reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic
+communication”—a trap and trace device, id. § 3127(4). As the definitions make clear, pen registers and trap and
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+11
+
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+LEGAL ANALYSIS (U)
+I. The Application Fully Complies with All Statutory Requirements. (U)
+Section 501(c)(1) of FISA, as amended, directs the Court to enter an ex parte order
+requiring the production of tangible things if the judge finds that the Government’s application
+meets the requirements of subsections 501(a) and (b). The most significant of those
+requirements are that the tangible things, which include business records, are “for” an
+investigation to protect against international terrorism. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1). Section
+501(b)(2)(A) indicates that this requirement is one of relevance, providing that the Government’s
+application must include
+a statement of facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
+tangible things sought are relevant to an authorized investigation (other than a threat
+assessment) conducted in accordance with subsection (a)(2) [i.e., following
+Attorney General-approved Executive Order 12333 guidelines and not conducted of
+a U.S. person solely on the basis of First Amendment-protected activities] to obtain
+foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person or to protect
+against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, such things
+being presumptively relevant to an authorized investigation if the applicant shows
+in the statement of facts that they pertain to—(i) a foreign power or an agent of a
+foreign power; (ii) the activities of a suspected agent of a foreign power who is the
+subject of such authorized investigation; or (iii) an individual in contact with, or
+known to, a suspected agent of a foreign power who is the subject of such
+authorized investigation.
+Id. § 1861(b)(2)(A).³ (U)
+
+trace devices are mechanical “device[s],” or perhaps software programs (“process[es]”), that “record” or “decode”
+data as communications signals are passing through the particular spot in the communications network where the
+“device” or “process” has been installed, or that “capture” data in a similar fashion. See, e.g., United States Telecom
+Ass’n v. FBI, 276 F.3d 620, 623 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“Pen registers are devices that record the telephone numbers
+dialed by the surveillance’s subject; trap and trace devices record the telephone numbers of the subject’s incoming
+calls.”). The mechanism by which the NSA would receive call detail records does not involve any such “device or
+process.” Instead, [REDACTED] would copy and transmit the call detail records, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] independently compile in their normal course of business, to the NSA in real or near-real time. (TS//SI//NF)
+³ Until recently, section 501(b)(2) provided only that the Government’s application “specify that the
+records concerned are sought for an authorized investigation conducted in accordance with subsection (a)(2) of this
+section to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person or to protect against
+international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.” 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2) (Supp. I 2001). According to
+the legislative history of the USA PATRIOT Reauthorization Act, the provision was amended “to clarify that the
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+12
+
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+Thus, section 501(b)(2) of FISA requires that an application for an order requiring the
+production of business records must include a statement of facts showing that there are
+“reasonable grounds to believe” that certain criteria are met: (1) that the business records are
+relevant to an authorized investigation, other than a threat assessment, that is being conducted,
+for example, to protect against international terrorism; (2) that the investigation is being
+conducted under guidelines approved by the Attorney General under Executive Order 12333; and
+(3) that the investigation is not being conducted of a U.S. person solely upon the basis of
+activities protected by the First Amendment. Id. § 1861(b)(2)(A). All of these criteria are met
+here. (U)
+Taking the last two requirements first, the attached Application establishes that the
+business records sought are for FBI investigations into [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] investigations which are being conducted under Attorney
+General-approved 12333 guidelines and that are not being conducted of any U.S. persons solely
+upon the basis of First Amendment-protected activities. In addition, the attached Application
+and accompanying declarations by the Directors of the NSA and National Counterterrorism
+Center certainly demonstrate that there are “reasonable grounds to believe” that the business
+records sought are “relevant” to authorized investigations to protect against international
+terrorism. (S)
+A. The Business Records Sought Meet the Relevance Standard. (U)
+Information is “relevant” to an authorized international terrorism investigation if it bears
+upon, or is pertinent to, that investigation. See 13 Oxford English Dictionary 561 (2d ed. 1989)
+(“relevant” means “[b]earing upon, connected with, pertinent to, the matter in hand”); Webster’s
+
+tangible things sought by [an order under section 501] must be ‘relevant’ to an authorized preliminary or full
+investigation . . . to protect against international terrorism.” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-333, at 90 (2005). (U)
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+13
+
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+Third New Int’l Dictionary 1917 (1993) (“relevant” means “bearing upon or properly applying to
+the matter at hand . . . pertinent”); see also Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340,
+351 (1978) (noting that the phrase “relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action”
+in Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 26(b)(1) has been “construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears
+on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in
+the case”); cf. Fed. R. Evid. 401 (“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to
+make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
+probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”) (emphasis added). Indeed,
+section 501(b)(2) establishes a presumption that the Government has satisfied the relevancy
+requirement if it shows that the business records sought “pertain to—(i) a foreign power or an
+agent of a foreign power; (ii) the activities of a suspected agent of a foreign power who is the
+subject of such authorized investigation; or (iii) an individual in contact with, or known to, a
+suspected agent of a foreign power who is the subject of such authorized investigation.” 50
+U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A). The USA PATRIOT Reauthorization Act added this presumption to
+section 501(b) to outline certain situations in which the Government automatically can establish
+relevance; the presumption was not intended to change the relevance standard for obtaining
+business records under section 501. See Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 106, 120 Stat. 196; H.R. Conf.
+Rep. No. 109-333, at 91 (Section 501(b)(2) “also requires a statement of facts to be included in
+the application that shows there are reasonable grounds to believe the tangible things sought are
+relevant, and, if such facts show reasonable grounds to believe that certain specified connections
+to a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power are present, the tangible things sought are
+presumptively relevant, Congress does not intend to prevent the FBI from obtaining tangible
+things that it currently can obtain under section [501].”) (emphasis added). (U)
+TOP SECRET//HCS//SI//NOFORN
+14
+
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+The FBI currently has over 1,000 open National Security Investigations targeting [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Osama bin Laden [REDACTED]
+As we have explained above, the bulk telephony metadata sought in the attached Application is
+relevant to the FBI’s investigations into [REDACTED] because, when acquired, stored, and processed,
+the telephony metadata would provide vital assistance to investigators in tracking down [REDACTED]
+operatives. Although admittedly a substantial portion of the telephony metadata that is collected
+would not relate to operatives of [REDACTED],⁴ the intelligence tool that the
+Government hopes to use to find [REDACTED] communications—metadata analysis—requires
+collecting and storing large volumes of the metadata to enable later analysis. All of the metadata
+collected is thus relevant, because the success of this investigative tool depends on bulk
+collection. (TS//SI//NF)
+Archiving and analyzing the metadata sought in the attached Application will assist the
+FBI in obtaining foreign intelligence and, in particular, in identifying the telephone numbers of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] operating within the United States. For example, contact chaining and [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] of the archived information will allow the NSA to identify telephone numbers that have
+been in contact with telephone numbers the NSA reasonably suspects to be linked to [REDACTED]
+and its affiliates. NSA may provide such information to the FBI, which can determine whether
+an investigation should be commenced to identify the users of the telephone numbers and to
+determine whether there are any links to international terrorist activities. The NSA estimates that
+roughly 800 telephone numbers will be tipped annually to the FBI, CIA, or other appropriate
+U.S. government or foreign government agencies. NSA Declaration ¶ 18. The FBI would also
+
+⁴ The NSA expects that this business records request, over the course of a year, will result in the collection
+of metadata pertaining to [REDACTED] communications. See NSA Declaration ¶ 6. (TS//SI//NF)
+TOP SECRET//HCS//SI//NOFORN
+15
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//SI//NOFORN
+be able to ask the NSA to perform contact chaining [REDACTED] on terrorist-associated
+telephone numbers known to the FBI. (TS//SI//NF)
+The call detail records sought in the attached Application are certainly “relevant” to an
+authorized investigation into [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] As this Court recently noted in [REDACTED] the requirement of relevance is a
+relatively low standard. [REDACTED] at 29. In that case, the Court was interpreting a similar,
+and quite possibly more stringent standard than that presented here. There, the Court found that
+section 402(a) of FISA was satisfied, i.e., that “the information likely to be obtained is . . .
+relevant to an ongoing investigation to protect against international terrorism.” 50 U.S.C.
+§ 1842(c) (emphasis added).⁵ Here, by contrast, the Application need only establish that there
+are “reasonable grounds to believe” that the records sought are relevant to an authorized
+international terrorism investigation.⁶ Id. § 1861(b)(2)(A). (TS//SI//NF)
+In evaluating whether metadata collected in bulk is “relevant” to investigations into [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] this Court has recognized that, “for reasons of both constitutional
+authority and practical competence, deference should be given to the fully considered judgment
+of the executive branch in assessing and responding to national security threats and in
+
+⁵ Although the Government argued that the statute did not permit the Court to look behind the
+Government’s certification of relevance, the Court assumed for purposes of the case that it should consider the basis
+for the certification. See [REDACTED] at 26-28. (TS//SI//NF)
+⁶ The “reasonable grounds to believe” standard is simply a different way of articulating the probable cause
+standard. See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)
+(“‘The substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.’”). As the
+Supreme Court has recently explained, “[t]he probable-cause standard is incapable of precise definition or
+quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances.”
+Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003). Rather than being “technical,” these probabilities “are the factual
+and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.”
+Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176; see also Pringle, 540 U.S. at 370 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983)
+(quoting Brinegar)). In addition, probable cause “does not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that a
+reasonable-doubt or even a preponderance standard demands.” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 121 (1975); see also
+Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983) (“Finely tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a
+preponderance of the evidence, useful in formal trials, have no place in the [probable cause] decision.”). (U)
+TOP SECRET//HCS//SI//NOFORN
+16
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//SI//NOFORN
+determining the potential significance of intelligence-related information. Such deference is
+particularly appropriate in this context, where the Court is not charged with making independent
+probable cause findings.” [REDACTED] at 30-31. In [REDACTED] this Court noted that the
+proposed activity would result in the collection of metadata pertaining to [REDACTED] of electronic
+communications, all but a very small fraction of which could be expected to be unrelated to [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Id. at 39-40, 48. Nonetheless, this Court found that the bulk collection
+of metadata “is necessary to identify the much smaller number of [REDACTED]
+communications” and that therefore, “the scope of the proposed collection is consistent with the
+certification of relevance.” Id. at 48-49. In part that was because the NSA had explained, as it
+does here, that “more precisely targeted forms of collection against known accounts would tend
+to screen out the ‘unknowns’ that NSA wants discover, so that NSA needs bulk collection in
+order to identify unknown [REDACTED] Id. at 42. Just as the bulk
+collection of e-mail metadata was relevant to FBI investigations into [REDACTED]
+so is the bulk collection of telephony metadata described herein. (TS//SI//NF)
+B. The Proposed Collection Is Appropriately Tailored. (U)
+Title V of FISA does not expressly impose any requirement to tailor a request for
+tangible things precisely to obtain solely records that are strictly relevant to the investigation. To
+the extent, however, the Court construes the “relevance” standard under Title V to require some
+tailoring of the requested materials to limit overbreadth, the request for tangible things proposed
+here is not overbroad. As this Court concluded in [REDACTED] “the applicable relevance
+standard does not require a statistical ‘tight fit’ between the volume of proposed collection and
+the much smaller proportion of information that will be directly relevant to [REDACTED]-related FBI
+TOP SECRET//HCS//SI//NOFORN
+17
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//SI//NOFORN
+investigations.”⁷ Id. at 49-50. Instead, it is appropriate to use as a guideline the Supreme
+Court’s “special needs” jurisprudence, which balances any intrusion into privacy against the
+government interest at stake to determine whether a warrant or individualized suspicion is
+required. See Board of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829 (2002); see generally [REDACTED]
+at 50-52.⁸ Here, the Government’s interest is overwhelming. It involves thwarting terrorist
+attacks that could take thousands of lives. “This concern clearly involves national security
+interests beyond the normal need for law enforcement and is at least as compelling as other
+governmental interests that have been held to justify searches in the absence of individualized
+suspicion.” [REDACTED] at 51-52; see also Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (“It is
+obvious and unarguable that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the
+Nation.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). The privacy interest, on the other hand, is minimal.
+As we explain below, see infra § II, the type of data at issue is not constitutionally protected; and
+it would never even be seen by any human being unless a terrorist connection were first
+established. Indeed, only a tiny fraction (estimated to be 0.000025% or one in four million) of
+the call detail records included in the archive actually would be seen by a trained analyst.⁹
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+⁷ As noted above, the relevance standard being interpreted in the pen register context in [REDACTED]
+that found in section 402 of FISA—is quite possibly more stringent than that required to be met by an application
+for business records under section 501 of FISA. (S)
+⁸ Because, as we explain below, there is no Fourth Amendment-protected interest in the telephony
+metadata at issue here, the actual standards applied under Fourth Amendment balancing are far more rigorous than
+any that the Court should read into the statutory requirement that the business records sought under section 501 be
+“relevant” to an international terrorism investigation. Nevertheless, the balancing methodology applied under the
+Fourth Amendment—balancing the Government’s interest against the privacy interest at stake—can provide a useful
+guide for analysis here. (S)
+⁹ The NSA would conduct contact chaining three “hops” out, i.e., to include the first three tiers of contacts
+made by the reasonably suspected [REDACTED] telephone number. Even though a substantial portion of the
+telephone numbers in those first three tiers of contacts may not be used by terrorist operatives, they are all
+“connected” to the seed telephone number. (TS//SI//NF)
+TOP SECRET//HCS//SI//NOFORN
+18
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//SI//NOFORN
+And, as this Court recently found, “the Government need not make a showing that it is
+using the least intrusive means available. Rather, the question is whether the Government has
+chosen ‘a reasonably effective means of addressing’ the need.” [REDACTED] at 52-53 (quoting
+Earls, 536 U.S. at 837) (internal citations omitted); see also Earls, 536 U.S. at 837 (“[T]his
+Court has repeatedly stated that reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment does not require
+employing the least intrusive means, because the logic of such elaborate less-restrictive-
+alternative arguments could raise insuperable barriers to the exercise of virtually all search-and-
+seizure powers.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S.
+646, 663 (1995) (“We have repeatedly refused to declare that only the ‘least intrusive’ search
+practicable can be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”). Here, as in [REDACTED]
+“senior responsible officials, whose judgment on these matters is entitled to deference . . . have
+articulated why they believe that bulk collection and archiving of meta data are necessary to
+identify and monitor [REDACTED] whose . . . communications would otherwise go
+undetected.” [REDACTED] at 53-54. Such bulk collection is thus a “reasonably effective
+means to this end.” Id. at 54. (TS//SI//NF)
+In sum, as this Court previously concluded in the pen register context,
+the bulk collection proposed in this case is analogous to suspicionless searches or
+seizures that have been upheld under the Fourth Amendment in that the
+Government’s need is compelling and immediate, the intrusion on individual
+privacy interests is limited, and bulk collection appears to be a reasonably
+effective means of detecting and monitoring [REDACTED] and
+thereby obtaining information likely to be relevant to ongoing FBI investigations.
+In these circumstances, the certification of relevance is consistent with the fact
+that only a very small proportion of the huge volume of information collected will
+be directly relevant to the FBI’s [REDACTED] investigations.
+Id. (TS//SI//NF)
+TOP SECRET//HCS//SI//NOFORN
+19
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//SI//NOFORN
+C. The Government Will Apply Strict Minimization Procedures to the Use of
+the Collected Data. (S)
+The Government can assure the Court that, although the data collected under the attached
+Application will necessarily be broad in order to achieve the critical intelligence objectives of
+metadata analysis, the use of that information will be strictly tailored to identifying terrorist
+communications and will occur solely according to strict procedures and safeguards, including
+particular minimization procedures designed to protect U.S. person information. These
+procedures and safeguards are almost identical to the requirements imposed by this Court in [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] which authorized collection of a similar volume of metadata. (TS//SI//NF)
+First, as described in the attached Declaration from the Director of the NSA, the NSA
+will query the archived data solely when it has identified a known telephone number for which,
+“based on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and
+prudent persons act, there are facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the
+telephone number is associated with [REDACTED]; provided,
+however, that a telephone number believed to be used by a U.S. person shall not be regarded as
+associated with [REDACTED] solely on the basis of activities
+that are protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution.” NSA Declaration ¶ 13.¹⁰
+Similarly, [REDACTED] would be undertaken only with respect to such an identified “seed”
+telephone number. For example, when an [REDACTED] operative is apprehended, his cellular
+telephone may contain a phone book listing telephone numbers. Telephone numbers listed in
+such a phone book would satisfy the “reasonable articulable suspicion” standard. This same
+
+¹⁰ For example, a telephone number of a U.S. person could not be a seed number “if the only information
+thought to support the belief that the [number] is associated with [REDACTED] is that, in sermons or in postings on a web
+site, the U.S. person espoused jihadist rhetoric that fell short of ‘advocacy . . . directed to inciting or producing
+imminent lawless action and . . . likely to incite or produce such action.’ Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447
+(1969) (per curiam).” [REDACTED] at 58. (TS//SI//NF)
+TOP SECRET//HCS//SI//NOFORN
+20
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//SI//NOFORN
+standard is, in effect, the standard applied in the criminal law context for a “Terry” stop. See
+Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 30 (1968); see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000)
+(police officer may conduct a brief, investigatory Terry stop “when the officer has a reasonable,
+articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot”).¹¹ It bears emphasis that, given the types of
+analysis the NSA will perform, no information about a telephone number will ever be accessed
+by or presented in an intelligible form to any person unless either (i) that telephone number has
+been in direct contact with a reasonably suspected terrorist-associated telephone number or is
+linked to such a number through one or two intermediaries, or (ii) a computer search has
+indicated that the telephone number has the [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//SI//NF)
+In addition, any query of the archived data would require approval from one of seven
+people: the Signals Intelligence Directorate Program Manager for Counterterrorism Special
+Projects; the Chief or Deputy Chief, Counterterrorism Advanced Analysis Division; or one of
+four specially authorized Counterterrorism Advanced Analysis Shift Coordinators in the
+Analysis and Production Directorate of the Signals Intelligence Directorate. NSA Declaration
+¶ 19. NSA’s Office of General Counsel (OGC) would review and approve proposed queries of
+archived metadata based on seed accounts reasonably believed to be used by U.S. persons. Id.
+¶ 16. Finally, NSA’s OGC will brief analysts concerning the authorization requested in the
+Application and the limited circumstances in which queries to the archive are permitted, as well
+
+¹¹ The “reasonable articulable suspicion” standard that the Government will impose on itself with respect
+to data collected through this Application is higher than that required by statute or the Constitution. Under FISA,
+the only standard to be satisfied prior to collecting information via a request for business records is that the
+information be relevant to an international terrorism investigation. The Fourth Amendment requires a “reasonable
+articulable suspicion” to justify a minimally intrusive Terry stop. Here, no Fourth Amendment interests are even
+implicated. (U)
+TOP SECRET//HCS//SI//NOFORN
+21
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//SI//NOFORN
+as other procedures and restrictions regarding the retrieval, storage and dissemination of the
+archived data. Id. (TS//SI//NF)
+Second, NSA will apply several mechanisms to ensure appropriate oversight over the use
+of the metadata. The NSA will apply the existing (Attorney General approved) guidelines in
+United States Signals Intelligence Directive 18 (1993) (“USSID 18”) (Exhibit D to the
+Application) to minimize the information reported concerning U.S. persons. NSA Declaration
+¶ 17. Prior to disseminating any U.S. person information, the Chief of Information Sharing
+Services in the Signals Intelligence Directorate must determine that the information is related to
+counterterrorism information and is in fact necessary to understand the foreign intelligence
+information or to assess its importance. Id.; see USSID 18, § 7.2 (NSA reports may include the
+identity of a U.S. person only if the recipient of the report has a need to know that information as
+part of his official duties and, inter alia, the identity of the U.S. person is necessary to understand
+the foreign intelligence information or to assess its importance). The Director of the NSA will
+direct the NSA Inspector General and General Counsel to submit an initial report to him 45 days
+after the receipt of records pursuant to the Order assessing the adequacy of the management
+controls for the processing and dissemination of U.S. person information. NSA Declaration
+¶ 22. The Director of the NSA will provide the findings of that report to the Attorney General.
+Id. (TS//SI//NF)
+In addition, every time one of the limited number of NSA analysts permitted to search the
+archived data carries out such a search, a record will be made, and the analyst’s login and IP
+address, and the date, time and details of the search will be automatically logged to ensure an
+auditing capability. NSA Declaration ¶ 16. The NSA’s OGC will monitor both the designation
+of individuals with access to the archived data and the functioning of this automatic logging
+TOP SECRET//HCS//SI//NOFORN
+22
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//SI//NOFORN
+capability. Id. The NSA Inspector General, the NSA General Counsel, and the Signals
+Intelligence Directorate Oversight Compliance Office will periodically review this program. Id.
+¶ 22. At least every ninety days, the Department of Justice will review a sample of NSA’s
+justifications for querying the archived data. Id. ¶ 19. The Director of the NSA himself will, in
+coordination with the Attorney General, inform the Congressional Intelligence Oversight
+Committees of the Court’s decision to issue the Order. Id. ¶ 23. (TS//SI//NF)
+Third, the collected metadata will not be kept online (that is, accessible for queries by
+cleared analysts) indefinitely. The NSA has determined that for operational reasons it is
+important to retain the metadata online for five years, at which time it will be destroyed. Id.
+¶ 20. The U.S. Government has a strong operational interest in retaining data online for five
+years to determine [REDACTED] contacts associated with newly-discovered “seed”
+telephone numbers. Id. In addition, moving data off-line requires significant resources, raises
+the possibility of corruption and loss of data, and would incur probable delays in moving data
+back online for it to be accessed when needed. See generally [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Order (Feb. 28, 2006). (TS//SI//NF)
+Finally, when and if the Government seeks an extension of any order from the Court
+requiring the production of business records containing telephony metadata, it will provide a
+report about the queries that have been made and the application of the reasonable articulable
+suspicion standard for determining that queried telephone numbers were terrorist related. NSA
+Declaration ¶ 24. (TS//SI//NF)
+TOP SECRET//HCS//SI//NOFORN
+23
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//SI//NOFORN
+II. The Application Fully Complies with the First and Fourth Amendments to the
+Constitution. (U)
+There is, of course, no constitutionally protected privacy interest in the information
+contained in call detail records, or telephony metadata. In Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735
+(1979), the Supreme Court squarely rejected the view that an individual can have a Fourth
+Amendment protected “legitimate expectation of privacy regarding the numbers he dialed on his
+phone.” Smith, 442 U.S. at 742 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court concluded that
+telephone subscribers know that they must convey the numbers they wish to call to the telephone
+company for the company to complete their calls. Thus, they cannot claim “any general
+expectation that the numbers they dial will remain secret.” Id. at 743; see also id. at 744
+(telephone users who “voluntarily convey[]” information to the phone company “in the ordinary
+course” of making a call “assum[e] the risk” that this information will be passed on to the
+government or others) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even if a subscriber could somehow
+claim a subjective intention to keep the numbers he dialed secret, the Court found that this was
+not an expectation that society would recognize as reasonable. To the contrary, the situation fell
+squarely into the line of cases in which the Court had ruled that “a person has no legitimate
+expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.” Id. at 743-44.¹²
+Although the telephony metadata that would be obtained here would include not only telephone
+numbers dialed, but also the length and time of the calls and other routing information, there is
+no reasonable expectation that such information, which is routinely collected by the telephone
+companies for billing and fraud detection purposes, is private. The information contained in the
+
+
+¹² See also United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“This Court has held repeatedly that the
+Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to
+Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited
+purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.”). (U)
+TOP SECRET//HCS//SI//NOFORN
+24
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//SI//NOFORN
+call detail records [REDACTED] in no way resembles the substantive
+contents of telephone communications that are protected by the Fourth Amendment. See Katz v.
+United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). (S)
+Moreover, as this Court has previously found, because of the absence of a reasonable
+expectation of privacy in metadata, the large number of individuals whose telephony metadata
+will be obtained “is irrelevant to the issue of whether a Fourth Amendment search or seizure will
+occur.” [REDACTED] at 63. Nor would the derivative use of the archived metadata through
+contact chaining or [REDACTED] be prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 63-66;
+United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974) (Grand jury “[q]uestions based on illegally
+obtained evidence are only a derivative use of the product of a past unlawful search and seizure.
+They work no new Fourth Amendment wrong.”). (TS//SI//NF)
+The proposed business records request is also consistent with the First Amendment.
+Good faith law enforcement investigation and data-gathering activities using legitimate
+investigative techniques do not violate the First Amendment, at least where they do not violate
+the Fourth Amendment. See Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. AT&T, 593 F.2d
+1030, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see also [REDACTED] at 66 (“The weight of authority supports
+the conclusion that Government information-gathering that does not constitute a Fourth
+Amendment search or seizure will also comply with the First Amendment when conducted as
+part of a good-faith criminal investigation.”); cf. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 10, 13 (1972) (the
+“subjective ‘chill’” stemming from “the mere existence, without more, of a governmental
+investigative and data-gathering activity that is alleged to be broader in scope than is reasonably
+necessary for the accomplishment of a valid governmental purpose” does not constitute a
+TOP SECRET//HCS//SI//NOFORN
+25
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//SI//NOFORN
+cognizable injury). As this Court recognized in the context of the Government’s application to
+collect e-mail metadata in bulk,
+the proposed collection of meta data is not for ordinary law enforcement
+purposes, but in furtherance of the compelling national interest of identifying and
+tracking [REDACTED] operatives and ultimately of thwarting terrorist attacks.
+The overarching investigative effort against [REDACTED] is not aimed at curtailing
+First Amendment activities and satisfies the “good faith” requirement . . . .
+Id. at 68. (TS//SI//NF)
+Nonetheless, we are mindful of this Court’s admonition that, because “the extremely
+broad nature of this collection carries with it a heightened risk that collected information could
+be subject to various forms of misuse, potentially involving abridgment of First Amendment
+rights of innocent persons . . . special restrictions on the accessing, retention, and dissemination
+of such information are necessary to guard against such misuse.” Id. The strict restrictions
+proposed here on access to, and processing and dissemination of, the data are almost identical to
+those imposed by this Court in [REDACTED] Compare NSA Declaration ¶¶ 13-24 with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] at 82-87.¹³ In addition, the Department of Justice would review a sample of NSA’s
+justifications for querying the archived data at least every ninety days. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+¹³ One minor difference is that for operational reasons the NSA seeks to retain the telephony metadata
+collected online for five, rather than four and a half, years. Compare NSA Declaration ¶ 20 with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Order [REDACTED] (approving retention
+online of the bulk e-mail metadata for four and a half years). (TS//SI//NF)
+TOP SECRET//HCS//SI//NOFORN
+26
+
+TOP SECRET//HCS//SI//NOFORN
+CONCLUSION (U)
+For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant the requested Order. (U)
+Respectfully submitted,
+Dated: May 23, 2006
+ALBERTO R. GONZALES
+Attorney General
+[REDACTED]
+Acting Assistant Attorney General,
+Office of Legal Counsel
+[REDACTED]
+Counsel for Intelligence Policy
+[REDACTED]
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
+Office of Legal Counsel
+[REDACTED]
+Senior Counsel,
+Office of Legal Counsel
+U.S. Department of Justice
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+TOP SECRET//HCS//SI//NOFORN
+27
+
+All redactions taken in accordance with
+one or more of the following FOIA
+exemptions and statutes:
+(b) (1)
+(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36
+(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024(i)
+(b) (3) - 18 USC 798
+SECRET
+848
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
+Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
+UNITED STATES
+SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE
+DIRECTIVE
+18
+27 July 1993
+See Letter of Promulgation for instructions on reproduction or release of this document.
+OPC: D2
+CLASSIFIED BY NSA/CSSM 123-2
+DECLASSIFY ON: ORIGINATING AGENCY’S DETERMINATION REQUIRED
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+
+SECRET
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
+Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
+27 July 1993
+UNITED STATES SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE
+(USSID)
+18
+LEGAL COMPLIANCE AND
+MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES (FOUO)
+LETTER OF PROMULGATION
+(U) This USSID prescribes policies and procedures and assigns responsibilities to ensure that the
+missions and functions of the United States SIGINT System (USSS) are conducted in a manner that
+safeguards the constitutional rights of U.S. persons.
+(U) This USSID has been completely rewritten to make it shorter and easier to understand. It
+constitutes a summary of the laws and regulations directly affecting USSS operations. All USSS
+personnel who collect, process, retain, or disseminate information to, from, or about U.S. persons or
+persons in the United States must be familiar with its contents.
+(FOUO) This USSID supersedes USSID 18 and USSID 18, Annex A (distributed separately to
+selected recipients), both of which are dated 20 October 1980, and must now be destroyed. Notify
+DIRNSA/CHCSS (USSID Manager) if this edition of USSID 18 is destroyed because of an emergency
+action; otherwise, request approval from DIRNSA/CHCSS before destroying this USSID.
+(FOUO) Release or exposure of this document to contractors and consultants without approval
+from the USSID Manager is prohibited. Instructions applicable to release or exposure of USSID to
+contractors and consultants may be found in USSID 19.
+(FOUO) Questions and comments concerning this USSID should be addressed to the Office of
+the General Counsel, NSA/CSS (Attention: [REDACTED] NSTS 963-3121 or [REDACTED].
+J. M. McCONNELL
+Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
+Director
+CLASSIFIED BY NSA/CSSM 123-2
+DECLASSIFY ON: ORIGINATING AGENCY’S DETERMINATION REQUIRED
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
+Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
+28 October 1997
+UNITED STATES SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE
+DIRECTIVE
+(USSID)
+18
+LEGAL COMPLIANCE AND MINIMIZATION
+PROCEDURES (FOUO)
+CHANGE 1
+LETTER OF PROMULGATION
+(FOUO) This hard copy change provides replacement pages for your copy of USSID 18, dated
+27 July 1993.
+Actions: 1. Change references to “P05” to read “P02” in paragraphs 5.4.d.(3), 7.1. (last line),
+7.2.c.(6) (lines 3 and 5), 7.3.c.(1) (lines 2 and 3), 7.5., 8.3.b., and 8.4.b. in the basic USSID 18.
+2. From your copy of USSID 18 remove and destroy pages A-1/1 through A-1/8.
+3. Insert new pages A-1/1 through A-1/9 (replacement of pages in above action). These
+pages update the USSID to reflect current changes in standard minimization procedures for NSA elec-
+tronic surveillances.
+4. In the last paragraph of the Letter of Promulgation change to read: “Questions and
+comments concerning this USSID should be addressed to the Office of General Counsel, NSA/CSS,
+NSTS 963-3121 or [REDACTED]
+5. On the Table of Contents (page iv), change the title of Appendix 1 to Annex A to read
+“Standardized Minimization Procedures For NSA Electronic Surveillances”.
+FOR THE EXECUTIVE AGENT:
+[REDACTED]
+USSID Manager
+NOTE: DESTROY THIS PAGE AFTER POSTING THE ENCLOSED CHANGE MATERIAL.
+RETAIN THE ORIGINAL LETTER OF PROMULGATION WITH USSID 18.
+FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+i
+
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+CHANGE REGISTER
+CHANGE
+ENTERED
+No. Date Authority (Msg Cite/DTG, Hard Copy (HC)) Date By
+FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+ii
+
+SECRET
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+TABLE OF CONTENTS
+SECTION 1 - PREFACE 1
+SECTION 2 - REFERENCES 1
+SECTION 3 - POLICY 2
+SECTION 4 - COLLECTION 2
+4.1. Communications to, from or About U.S. Persons and [REDACTED] 2
+[REDACTED]
+a. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Approval 2
+b. Attorney General Approval 2
+c. DIRNSA/CHCSS Approval 2
+d. Emergency Situations 3
+e. Annual Reports 4
+4.2. [REDACTED] 4
+4.3. Incidental Acquisition of U.S. Person Information 4
+4.4. Nonresident Alien Targets Entering the United States 5
+4.5. U.S. Person Targets Entering the United States 5
+4.6. Requests to Target U.S. Persons 5
+4.7. Direction Finding 5
+4.8. Distress Signals 5
+4.9. COMSEC Monitoring and Security Testing of Automated Information Systems 6
+SECTION 5 - PROCESSING 6
+5.1. Use of Selection Terms During Processing 6
+5.2. Annual Review by DDO 6
+5.3. Forwarding of Intercepted Material 6
+5.4. Nonforeign Communications 7
+a. Communications between Persons in the United States 7
+b. Communications between U.S. Persons 7
+c. Communications Involving an Officer or Employee 7
+of the U.S. Government
+d. Exceptions 7
+5.5. Radio Communications with a Terminal in the United States 7
+SECTION 6 - RETENTION 8
+6.1. Retention of Communications to, from, or About U.S. Persons 8
+a. Unenciphered Communications; and Communications Necessary 8
+to Maintain Technical Data Bases for Cryptanalytic or
+Traffic Analytic Purposes
+b. Communications Which Could be Disseminated Under Section 7 8
+6.2. Access 8
+SECTION 7 - DISSEMINATION 8
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+iii
+
+SECRET
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+7.1. Focus of SIGINT Reports 8
+7.2. Dissemination of U.S. Person Identities 9
+a. Consent 9
+b. Publicly Available Information 9
+c. Information Necessary to Understand or Assess 9
+7.3. Approval Authorities 10
+a. DIRNSA/CHCSS
+b. Field Units 10
+c. DDO and Designees 10
+7.4. Privileged Communications and Criminal Activity 10
+7.5. Improper Dissemination 10
+SECTION 8 - RESPONSIBILITIES 11
+8.1. Inspector General 11
+8.2. General Counsel 11
+8.3. Deputy Director for Operations 12
+8.4. All Elements of the USSS 12
+SECTION 9 - DEFINITIONS 12
+ANNEX A - PROCEDURES IMPLEMENTING THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE A/1
+SURVEILLANCE ACT (U)
+APPENDIX 1 - STANDARIZED MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES FOR A-1/1
+NSA ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES
+ANNEX B - OPERATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO THE FEDERAL BUREAU B/1
+OF INVESTIGATION (U)
+ANNEX C - SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO U.S. AND ALLIED MILITARY C/1
+EXERCISE COMMAND AUTHORITIES (U)
+ANNEX D - TESTING OF ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT (U) D/1
+ANNEX E - SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS (U) E/1
+ANNEX F - ILLICIT COMMUNICATIONS (C) F/1
+ANNEX G - TRAINING OF PERSONNEL IN THE OPERATION AND USE OF SIGINT G/1
+COLLECTION AND OTHER SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT (U)
+ANNEX H - CONSENT FORMS (U) H/1
+ANNEX I - FORM FOR CERTIFICATION OF OPENLY-ACKNOWLEDGED ENTITIES (S-CCO) I/1
+ANNEX J - PROCEDURES FOR MONITORING RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF J/1
+SUSPECTED INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS (S-CCO)
+(Issued separately to selected recipients)
+ANNEX K - [REDACTED] (S-CCO) K/1
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+iv
+
+CONFIDENTIAL
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+DISTRIBUTION
+2 A041
+2 A055
+3 A1095
+8 A111
+1 A112
+4 A113
+2 A114
+2 A12
+1 A13
+1 A131
+3 A132
+4 A133
+4 A134
+1 A135
+4 A136
+2 A14
+1 A153
+1 A209
+2 A21
+1 A22
+2 A23
+1 A405
+2 A42
+2 A609
+1 A62
+1 A63
+1 A64
+1 A641
+1 A65
+6 A67
+1 A72
+1 B04
+3 B05
+1 B109
+2 B209
+5 B21
+1 B22
+2 B23
+1 B26
+1 B3094
+1 B3095
+3 B31
+4 B312
+6 B32
+12 B33
+5 B34
+10 B35
+1 B351/[REDACTED]
+1 B409
+14 B41
+10 B42
+4 B43
+7 B44
+3 B45
+1 B461
+1 B5094
+6 B521
+1 B522
+1 B54
+1 B5423
+1 B55
+1 B56
+4 B609
+1 B61
+1 B63
+1 B646
+2 B709
+2 B7095
+26 B71
+3 B72
+15 B73
+4 B75
+1 CSPO
+1 CMATT
+12 D1
+6 D2
+1 D3
+1 DCN
+1 E
+1 E09
+1 E1
+1 E11
+1 E31
+3 E32
+1 E32/B
+1 E32/G
+3 E42
+1 E54
+TOTAL COPIES 1193
+CONFIDENTIAL
+Distribution Page 1 of 6
+
+CONFIDENTIAL
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+1 G01
+2 G111
+3 G112
+1 G112/[REDACTED]
+1 G133
+1 G133C
+2 G223
+2 G23
+1 G24 (SLO)
+1 G27
+2 G31
+1 G33
+1 G35
+1 G36
+1 G364
+2 G36N
+2 G41
+1 G412
+1 G42
+1 G421
+1 G44
+1 G45
+2 G5 NSOC (ASGC)
+1 G5 NSOC (BSGC)
+1 G5 NSOC (NALA)
+1 G5 NSOC (NMJIC)
+1 G5 NSOC (SRO)
+1 G5 NSOC (WSGC)
+1 G509
+1 G561
+1 G562
+1 G564
+1 G58
+1 G71
+1 I11
+2 I2
+1 J23
+1 J25
+1 J34
+1 K1
+1 K13
+2 K2
+1 K34
+1 K4
+1 K41
+2 K42
+1 K43
+3 K51
+1 K52 [REDACTED]
+1 K609
+1 K609
+1 L091
+1 LAO
+1 M091
+1 M31
+1 M5
+1 M51
+1 M52
+1 N22
+1 N252
+1 N511
+1 N5209
+1 P042
+1 P043
+1 P0433
+150 P0442 (STOCK)
+1 P05
+6 P052
+3 P0522
+1 P0533
+1 P0541
+1 P05A
+1 Q109
+1 Q32
+1 S9
+1 T09
+2 T093
+1 V09
+1 W04
+1 W05
+1 W109
+1 W15
+1 W16
+1 W17
+1 W174
+1 W18
+1 W2091
+1 W21
+1 W232
+1 W27
+1 W309
+2 W31
+1 W32
+2 W33
+1 W335 (SOC)
+1 W341
+3 W4
+1 X41
+1 Z03
+1 Z09
+5 Z109
+1 Z11
+CONFIDENTIAL
+Distribution Page 2 of 6
+
+CONFIDENTIAL
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+1 Z14
+2 Z156
+1 Z3
+1 Z31
+1 Z33
+1 Z34
+1 Z41
+1 Z42
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+CONFIDENTIAL
+Distribution Page 3 of 6
+
+CONFIDENTIAL
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+CONFIDENTIAL
+Distribution Page 4 of 6
+
+CONFIDENTIAL
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+CONFIDENTIAL
+Distribution Page 5 of 6
+
+CONFIDENTIAL
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+CONFIDENTIAL
+Distribution Page 6 of 6
+
+SECRET
+27 July 1993
+USSID 18
+LEGAL COMPLIANCE AND
+MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES (U)
+SECTION 1 - PREFACE
+1.1. (U) The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects all U.S. persons
+anywhere in the world and all persons within the United States from unreasonable searches and
+seizures by any person or agency acting on behalf of the U.S. Government. The Supreme Court has
+ruled that the interception of electronic communications is a search and seizure within the meaning
+of the Fourth Amendment. It is therefore mandatory that signals intelligence (SIGINT) operations be
+conducted pursuant to procedures which meet the reasonableness requirements of the Fourth
+Amendment.
+1.2. (U) In determining whether United States SIGINT System (USSS) operations are
+“reasonable,” it is necessary to balance the U.S. Government's need for foreign intelligence
+information and the privacy interests of persons protected by the Fourth Amendment. Striking that
+balance has consumed much time and effort by all branches of the United States Government. The
+results of that effort are reflected in the references listed in Section 2 below. Together, these
+references require the minimization of U.S. person information collected, processed, retained or
+disseminated by the USSS. The purpose of this document is to implement these minimization
+requirements.
+1.3. (U) Several themes run throughout this USSID. The most important is that intelligence
+operations and the protection of constitutional rights are not incompatible. It is not necessary to
+deny legitimate foreign intelligence collection or suppress legitimate foreign intelligence
+information to protect the Fourth Amendment rights of U.S. persons.
+1.4. (U) Finally, these minimization procedures implement the constitutional principle of
+“reasonableness” by giving different categories of individuals and entities different levels of
+protection. These levels range from the stringent protection accorded U.S. citizens and permanent
+resident aliens in the United States to provisions relating to foreign diplomats in the U.S. These
+differences reflect yet another main theme of these procedures, that is, that the focus of all foreign
+intelligence operations is on foreign entities and persons.
+SECTION 2 - REFERENCES
+2.1. (U) References
+a. 50 U.S.C. 1801, et seq., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, Public Law
+No. 95-511.
+b. Executive Order 12333, “United States Intelligence Activities,” dated 4 December 1981.
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+1
+
+SECRET
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+c. DoD Directive 5240.1, “Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect U.S.
+Persons,” dated 25 April 1988.
+d. NSA/CSS Directive No. 10-30, “Procedures Governing Activities of NSA/CSS that Affect
+U.S. Persons,” dated 20 September 1990.
+SECTION 3 - POLICY
+3.1. (U) The policy of the USSS is to TARGET or COLLECT only FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS.*
+The USSS will not intentionally COLLECT communications to, from or about U.S. PERSONS or persons
+or entities in the U.S. except as set forth in this USSID. If the USSS inadvertently COLLECTS such
+communications, it will process, retain and disseminate them only in accordance with this USSID.
+SECTION 4 - COLLECTION
+4.1. (S-CCO) Communications which are known to be to, from or about a U.S. PERSON [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] will not be intentionally intercepted, or selected through
+the use of a SELECTION TERM, except in the following instances:
+a. With the approval of the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court under
+the conditions outlined in Annex A of this USSID.
+b. With the approval of the Attorney General of the United States, if:
+(1) The COLLECTION is directed against the following:
+(a) Communications to or from U.S. PERSONS outside the UNITED STATES, or
+(b) International communications to, from, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] or
+(c) Communications which are not to or from but merely about U.S. PERSONS
+(wherever located).
+(2) The person is an AGENT OF A FOREIGN POWER, and
+(3) The purpose of the COLLECTION is to acquire significant FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
+information.
+c. With the approval of the Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security
+Service (DIRNSA/CHCSS), so long as the COLLECTION need not be approved by the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Attorney General, and
+(1) The person has CONSENTED to the COLLECTION by executing one of the CONSENT
+forms contained in Annex H, or
+
+* Capitalized words in Sections 3 through 9 are defined terms in Section 9.
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+2
+
+SECRET
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+(2) The person is reasonably believed to be held captive by a FOREIGN POWER or group
+engaged in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, or
+(3) The TARGETED [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] and the DIRNSA/CHCSS has approved the COLLECTION in accordance with Annex I,
+or
+(4) The COLLECTION is directed against [REDACTED] between a U.S.
+PERSON in the UNITED STATES and a foreign entity outside the UNITED STATES, the TARGET is the
+foreign entity, and the DIRNSA/CHCSS has approved the COLLECTION in accordance with Annex K, or
+(5) Technical devices (e.g., [REDACTED] are employed
+to limit acquisition by the USSS to communications to or from the TARGET or to specific forms of
+communications used by the TARGET (e.g., [REDACTED]
+and the COLLECTION is directed against [REDACTED] voice and facsimile
+communications with one COMMUNICANT in the UNITED STATES, and the TARGET of the
+COLLECTION is [REDACTED]
+(a) A non-U.S. PERSON located outside the UNITED STATES, [REDACTED]
+(b) [REDACTED]
+(6) Copies of approvals granted by the DIRNSA/CHCSS under these provisions will be
+retained in the Office of General Counsel for review by the Attorney General.
+d. Emergency Situations.
+(1) In emergency situations, DIRNSA/CHCSS may authorize the COLLECTION of
+information to, from, or about a U.S. PERSON who is outside the UNITED STATES when securing the
+prior approval of the Attorney General is not practical because:
+(a) The time required to obtain such approval would result in the loss of significant
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE and would cause substantial harm to the national security.
+(b) A person’s life or physical safety is reasonably believed to be in immediate
+danger.
+(c) The physical security of a defense installation or government property is
+reasonably believed to be in immediate danger.
+(2) In those cases where the DIRNSA/CHCSS authorizes emergency COLLECTION, except
+for actions taken under paragraph d.(1)(b) above, DIRNSA/CHCSS shall find that there is probable
+cause that the TARGET meets one of the following criteria:
+(a) A person who, for or on behalf of a FOREIGN POWER, is engaged in clandestine
+intelligence activities (including covert activities intended to affect the political or governmental
+process), sabotage, or INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST activities, or activities in preparation for
+INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST activities; or who conspires with, or knowingly aids and abets a person
+engaging in such activities.
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+3
+
+SECRET
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+(b) A person who is an officer or employee of a FOREIGN POWER.
+(c) A person unlawfully acting for, or pursuant to the direction of, a FOREIGN
+POWER. The mere fact that a person’s activities may benefit or further the aims of a FOREIGN POWER
+is not enough to bring that person under this subsection, absent evidence that the person is taking
+direction from, or acting in knowing concert with, the FOREIGN POWER.
+(d) A CORPORATION or other entity that is owned or controlled directly or
+indirectly by a FOREIGN POWER.
+(e) A person in contact with, or acting in collaboration with, an intelligence or
+security service of a foreign power for the purpose of providing access to information or material
+classified by the United States to which such person has access.
+(3) In all cases where emergency collection is authorized, the following steps shall be
+taken:
+(a) The General Counsel will be notified immediately that the COLLECTION has
+started.
+(b) The General Counsel will initiate immediate efforts to obtain Attorney General
+approval to continue the collection. If Attorney General approval is not obtained within seventy two
+hours, the COLLECTION will be terminated. If the Attorney General approves the COLLECTION, it may
+continue for the period specified in the approval.
+e. Annual reports to the Attorney General are required for COLLECTION conducted under
+paragraphs 4.1.c.(3) and (4). Responsible analytic offices will provide such reports through the Deputy
+Director for Operations (DDO) and the General Counsel to the DIRNSA/CHCSS for transmittal to the
+Attorney General by 31 January of each year.
+4.2. (S-CCO) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+a. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+b. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+4.3. (U) Incidental Acquisition of U.S. PERSON Information. Information to, from or about
+U.S. PERSONS acquired incidentally as a result of COLLECTION directed against appropriate FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE TARGETS may be retained and processed in accordance with Section 5 and Section 6 of
+this USSID.
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+4
+
+SECRET
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+4.4. (S-CCO) Nonresident Alien TARGETS Entering the UNITED STATES.
+a. If the communications of a nonresident alien located abroad are being TARGETED and
+the USSS learns that the individual has entered the UNITED STATES, COLLECTION may continue for a
+period of 72 hours provided that the DIRNSA/CHCSS is advised immediately and:
+(1) Immediate efforts are initiated to obtain Attorney General approval, or
+(2) A determination is made within the 72 hour period that the [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+b. If Attorney General approval is obtained, the COLLECTION may continue for the length
+of time specified in the approval.
+c. If it is determined that [REDACTED] COLLECTION may
+continue at the discretion of the operational element.
+d. If [REDACTED] or if Attorney General approval is not obtained
+within 72 hours, COLLECTION must be terminated [REDACTED] Attorney
+General approval is obtained, or the individual leaves the UNITED STATES.
+4.5. (C-CCO) U.S. PERSON TARGETS Entering the UNITED STATES.
+a. If communications to, from or about a U.S. PERSON located outside the UNITED STATES
+are being COLLECTED under Attorney General approval described in Section 4.1.b. above, the
+COLLECTION must stop when the USSS learns that the individual has entered the UNITED STATES.
+b. While the individual is in the UNITED STATES, COLLECTION may be resumed only with
+the approval of the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court as described in Annex A.
+4.6. (S-CCO) Requests to TARGET U.S. PERSONS. All proposals for COLLECTION against U.S.
+PERSONS, [REDACTED] must be submitted
+through the DDO and the General Counsel to the DIRNSA/CHCSS for review.
+4.7. (C-CCO) Direction Finding. Use of direction finding solely to determine the location of a
+transmitter located outside of the UNITED STATES does not constitute ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE or
+COLLECTION even if directed at transmitters believed to be used by U.S. PERSONS. Unless COLLECTION
+of the communications is otherwise authorized under these procedures, the contents of
+communications to which a U.S. PERSON is a party monitored in the course of direction finding may
+only be used to identify the transmitter.
+4.8. (U) Distress Signals. Distress signals may be intentionally collected, processed, retained,
+and disseminated without regard to the restrictions contained in this USSID.
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+5
+
+SECRET
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+4.9. (U) COMSEC Monitoring and Security Testing of Automated Information Systems.
+Monitoring for communications security purposes must be conducted with the consent of the person
+being monitored and in accordance with the procedures established in National Telecommunications
+and Information Systems Security Directive 600, Communications Security (COMSEC) Monitoring,
+dated 10 April 1990. Monitoring for communications security purposes is not governed by this USSID.
+Intrusive security testing to assess security vulnerabilities in automated information systems likewise is
+not governed by this USSID.
+SECTION 5 - PROCESSING
+5.1. (S-CCO) Use of Selection Terms During Processing. When a SELECTION TERM is intended
+to INTERCEPT a communication on the basis of the content of the communication, or because a
+communication is enciphered, rather than on the basis of the identity of the COMMUNICANT or the
+fact that the communication mentions a particular individual, the following rules apply:
+a. No SELECTION TERM that is reasonably likely to result in the INTERCEPTION of
+communications to or from a U.S. PERSON (wherever located), [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] may be used unless there is reason to believe that FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE will be obtained by use of such SELECTION TERM.
+b. No SELECTION TERM that has resulted in the INTERCEPTION of a significant number of
+communications to or from such persons or entities may be used unless there is reason to believe that
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE will be obtained.
+c. SELECTION TERMS that have resulted or are reasonably likely to result in the
+INTERCEPTION of communications to or from such persons or entities shall be designed to defeat, to
+the greatest extent practicable under the circumstances, the INTERCEPTION of those communications
+which do not contain FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE.
+5.2. (S-CCO) Annual Review by DDO.
+a. All SELECTION TERMS that are reasonably likely to result in the INTERCEPTION of
+communications to or from a U.S. PERSON or terms that have resulted in the INTERCEPTION of a
+significant number of such communications shall be reviewed annually by the DDO or a designee.
+b. The purpose of the review shall be to determine whether there is reason to believe that
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE will be obtained, or will continue to be obtained, by the use of these
+SELECTION TERMS.
+c. A copy of the results of the review will be provided to the Inspector General and the
+General Counsel.
+5.3. (C-CCO) Forwarding of Intercepted Material. FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS collected by
+the USSS may be forwarded as intercepted to NSA, intermediate processing facilities, and
+collaborating centers.
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+6
+
+SECRET
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+5.4. (S-CCO) Nonforeign Communications.
+a. Communications between persons in the UNITED STATES. Private radio
+communications solely between persons in the UNITED STATES inadvertently intercepted during the
+COLLECTION of FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS will be promptly destroyed unless the Attorney General
+determines that the contents indicate a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any person.
+b. Communications between U.S. PERSONS. Communications solely between U.S.
+PERSONS will be treated as follows:
+(1) Communications solely between U.S. PERSONS inadvertently intercepted during
+the COLLECTION of FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS will be destroyed upon recognition, if technically
+possible, except as provided in paragraph 5.4.d. below.
+(2) Notwithstanding the preceding provision, cryptologic data (e.g., signal and
+encipherment information) and technical communications data (e.g., circuit usage) may be extracted
+and retained from those communications if necessary to:
+(a) Establish or maintain intercept, or
+(b) Minimize unwanted intercept, or
+(c) Support cryptologic operations related to FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS.
+c. Communications Involving an Officer or Employee of the U.S. Government.
+Communications to or from any officer or employee of the U.S. Government, or any state or local
+government, will not be intentionally intercepted. Inadvertent INTERCEPTIONS of such
+communications (including those between foreign TARGETS and U.S. officials) will be treated as
+indicated in paragraphs 5.4.a. and b., above.
+d. Exceptions: Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 5.4.b. and c., the
+DIRNSA/CHCSS may waive the destruction requirement for international communications containing,
+inter alia, the following types of information:
+(1) Significant FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE, or
+(2) Evidence of a crime or threat of death or serious bodily harm to any person, or
+(3) Anomalies that reveal a potential vulnerability to U.S. communications security.
+Communications for which the Attorney General or DIRNSA/CHCSS’s waiver is sought should be
+forwarded to NSA/CSS, Attn: P05: P02.
+5.5. (S-CCO) Radio Communications with a Terminal in the UNITED STATES.
+a. All radio communications that pass over channels with a terminal in the UNITED
+STATES must be processed through a computer scan dictionary or similar device unless those
+communications occur over channels used exclusively by a FOREIGN POWER.
+b. International common-access radio communications that pass over channels with a
+terminal in the UNITED STATES, other than [REDACTED] communications, may
+be processed without the use of a computer scan dictionary or similar device if necessary to determine
+whether a channel contains communications of FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE interest which NSA may wish
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+7
+
+SECRET
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+to collect. Such processing may not exceed two hours without the specific prior written approval of
+the DDO and, in any event, shall be limited to the minimum amount of time necessary to determine
+the nature of communications on the channel and the amount of such communications that include
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE. Once it is determined that the channel contains sufficient communications
+of FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE interest to warrant COLLECTION and exploitation to produce FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE, a computer scan dictionary or similar device must be used for additional processing.
+c. Copies of all DDO written approvals made pursuant to 5.5.b. must be provided to the
+General Counsel and the Inspector General.
+SECTION 6 - RETENTION
+6.1. (S-CCO) Retention of Communications to, from or About U.S. PERSONS.
+a. Except as otherwise provided in Annex A, Appendix 1, Section 4, communications to,
+from or about U.S. PERSONS that are intercepted by the USSS may be retained in their original or
+transcribed form only as follows:
+(1) Unenciphered communications not thought to contain secret meaning may be
+retained for five years unless the DDO determines in writing that retention for a longer period is
+required to respond to authorized FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE requirements.
+(2) Communications necessary to maintain technical data bases for cryptanalytic or
+traffic analytic purposes may be retained for a period sufficient to allow a thorough exploitation and
+to permit access to data that are, or are reasonably believed likely to become, relevant to a current or
+future FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE requirement. Sufficient duration may vary with the nature of the
+exploitation and may consist of any period of time during which the technical data base is subject to,
+or of use in, cryptanalysis. If a U.S. PERSON’S identity is not necessary to maintaining technical data
+bases, it should be deleted or replaced by a generic term when practicable.
+b. Communications which could be disseminated under Section 7, below (i.e., without
+elimination of references to U.S. PERSONS) may be retained in their original or transcribed form.
+6.2. (S-CCO) Access. Access to raw traffic storage systems which contain identities of U.S.
+PERSONS must be limited to SIGINT production personnel.
+SECTION 7 - DISSEMINATION
+7.1. (C-CCO) Focus of SIGINT Reports. All SIGINT reports will be written so as to focus solely on
+the activities of foreign entities and persons and their agents. Except as provided in Section 7.2.,
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE information concerning U.S. PERSONS must be disseminated in a manner
+which does not identify the U.S. PERSON. Generic or general terms or phrases must be substituted for
+the identity (e.g., "U.S. firm" for the specific name of a U.S. CORPORATION or "U.S. PERSON" for the
+specific name of a U.S. PERSON). Files containing the identities of U.S. persons deleted from SIGINT
+reports will be maintained for a maximum period of one year and any requests from SIGINT customers
+for such identities should be referred to P05. P02.
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+8
+
+SECRET
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+7.2. (C-CCO) Dissemination of U.S. PERSON Identities. SIGINT reports may include the
+identification of a U.S. PERSON only if one of the following conditions is met and a determination is
+made by the appropriate approval authority that the recipient has a need for the identity for the
+performance of his official duties:
+a. The U.S. PERSON has CONSENTED to the dissemination of communications of, or about,
+him or her and has executed the CONSENT form found in Annex H of this USSID, or
+b. The information is PUBLICLY AVAILABLE (i.e., the information is derived from
+unclassified information available to the general public), or
+c. The identity of the U.S. PERSON is necessary to understand the FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
+information or assess its importance. The following nonexclusive list contains examples of the type of
+information that meet this standard:
+(1) FOREIGN POWER or AGENT OF A FOREIGN POWER. The information indicates that
+the U.S. PERSON is a FOREIGN POWER or an AGENT OF A FOREIGN POWER.
+(2) Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information. The information indicates that
+the U.S. PERSON may be engaged in the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
+(3) International Narcotics Activity. The information indicates that the individual may
+be engaged in international narcotics trafficking activities. (See Annex J of this USSID for further
+information concerning individuals involved in international narcotics trafficking).
+(4) Criminal Activity. The information is evidence that the individual may be involved
+in a crime that has been, is being, or is about to be committed, provided that the dissemination is for
+law enforcement purposes.
+(5) Intelligence TARGET. The information indicates that the U.S. PERSON may be the
+TARGET of hostile intelligence activities of a FOREIGN POWER.
+(6) Threat to Safety. The information indicates that the identity of the U.S. PERSON is
+pertinent to a possible threat to the safety of any person or organization, including those who are
+TARGETS, victims or hostages of INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST organizations. Reporting units shall
+identify to P05 P02 any report containing the identity of a U.S. PERSON reported under this subsection (6).
+Field reporting to P05 P02 should be in the form of a CRITICOMM message (DDI XAO) and include the
+report date-time-group (DTG), product serial number and the reason for inclusion of the U.S.
+PERSON’S identity.
+(7) Senior Executive Branch Officials. The identity is that of a senior official of the
+Executive Branch of the U.S. Government. In this case only the official’s title will be disseminated.
+Domestic political or personal information on such individuals will be neither disseminated nor
+retained.
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+9
+
+SECRET
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+7.3. (C-CCO) Approval Authorities. Approval authorities for the release of identities of U.S.
+persons under Section 7 are as follows:
+a. DIRNSA/CHCSS. DIRNSA/CHCSS must approve dissemination of:
+(1) The identities of any senator, congressman, officer, or employee of the Legislative
+Branch of the U.S. Government.
+(2) The identity of any person for law enforcement purposes.
+b. Field Units and NSA Headquarters Elements. All SIGINT production organizations are
+authorized to disseminate the identities of U.S. PERSONS when:
+(1) The identity is pertinent to the safety of any person or organization.
+(2) The identity is that of a senior official of the Executive Branch.
+(3) The U.S. PERSON has CONSENTED under paragraph 7.2.a. above.
+c. DDO and Designees.
+(1) In all other cases, U.S. PERSON identities may be released only with the prior
+approval of the Deputy Director for Operations, the Assistant Deputy Director for Operations, the
+Chief, P05 P02, the Deputy Chief, P05 P02, or, in their absence, the Senior Operations Officer of the National
+SIGINT Operations Center. The DDO or ADDO shall review all U.S. identities released by these
+designees as soon as practicable after the release is made.
+(2) For law enforcement purposes involving narcotics related information, DIRNSA has
+granted to the DDO authority to disseminate U.S. identities. This authority may not be further
+delegated.
+7.4. (U) Privileged Communications and Criminal Activity. All proposed disseminations of
+information constituting U.S. PERSON privileged communications (e.g., attorney/client,
+doctor/patient) and all information concerning criminal activities or criminal or judicial proceedings
+in the UNITED STATES must be reviewed by the Office of General Counsel prior to dissemination.
+7.5. (U) Improper Dissemination. If the name of a U.S. PERSON is improperly disseminated,
+the incident should be reported to P05 P02 within 24 hours of discovery of the error.
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+10
+
+SECRET
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+SECTION 8 - RESPONSIBILITIES
+8.1. (U) Inspector General. The Inspector General shall:
+a. Conduct regular inspections and perform general oversight of NSA/CSS activities to
+ensure compliance with this USSID.
+b. Establish procedures for reporting by Key Component and Field Chiefs of their activities
+and practices for oversight purposes.
+c. Report to the DIRNSA/CHCSS, annually by 31 October, concerning NSA/CSS compliance
+with this USSID.
+d. Report quarterly with the DIRNSA/CHCSS and General Counsel to the President’s
+Intelligence Oversight Board through the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence
+Oversight).
+8.2. (U) General Counsel. The General Counsel shall:
+a. Provide legal advice and assistance to all elements of the USSS regarding SIGINT
+activities. Requests for legal advice on any aspect of these procedures should be sent by CRITICOMM
+to DDI XDI, or by NSA/CSS secure telephone 963-3121, or [REDACTED]
+b. Prepare and process all applications for Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court orders
+and requests for Attorney General approvals required by these procedures.
+c. Advise the Inspector General in inspections and oversight of USSS activities.
+d. Review and assess for legal implications as requested by the DIRNSA/CHCSS, Deputy
+Director, Inspector General or Key Components Chief, all new major requirements and internally
+generated USSS activities.
+e. Advise USSS personnel of new legislation and case law that may affect USSS missions,
+functions, operations, activities, or practices.
+f. Report as required to the Attorney General and the President’s Intelligence Oversight
+Board and provide copies of such reports to the DIRNSA/CHCSS and affected agency elements.
+g. Process requests from any DoD intelligence component for authority to use signals as
+described in Procedure 5, Part 5, of DoD 5240.1-R, for periods in excess of 90 days in the development,
+test, or calibration of ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE equipment and other equipment that can intercept
+communications.
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+11
+
+SECRET
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+8.3. (U) Deputy Director for Operations (DDO). The DDO shall:
+a. Ensure that all SIGINT production personnel understand and maintain a high degree of
+awareness and sensitivity to the requirements of this USSID.
+b. Apply the provisions of this USSID to all SIGINT production activities. The DDO staff
+focal point for USSID 18 matters is P05 P02 (use CRITICOMM DDI XAO).
+c. Conduct necessary reviews of SIGINT production activities and practices to ensure
+consistency with this USSID.
+d. Ensure that all new major requirements levied on the USSS or internally generated
+activities are considered for review by the General Counsel. All activities that raise questions of law or
+the proper interpretation of this USSID must be reviewed by the General Counsel prior to acceptance
+or execution.
+8.4. (U) All Elements of the USSS. All elements of the USSS shall:
+a. Implement this directive upon receipt.
+b. Prepare new procedures or amend or supplement existing procedures as required to
+ensure adherence to this USSID. A copy of such procedures shall be forwarded to NSA/CSS, Attn: P05. P02.
+c. Immediately inform the DDO of any tasking or instructions that appear to require
+actions at variance with this USSID.
+d. Promptly report to the NSA Inspector General and consult with the NSA General
+Counsel on all activities that may raise a question of compliance with this USSID.
+SECTION 9 - DEFINITIONS
+9.1. (S-CCO) AGENT OF A FOREIGN POWER means:
+a. Any person, other than a U.S. PERSON, who:
+(1) Acts in the UNITED STATES as an officer or employee of a FOREIGN POWER, or as a
+member of a group engaged in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM or activities in preparation therefor; or
+(2) Acts for, or on behalf of, a FOREIGN POWER that engages in clandestine
+intelligence activities in the UNITED STATES contrary to the interests of the UNITED STATES, when the
+circumstances of such person’s presence in the UNITED STATES indicate that such person may engage
+in such activities in the UNITED STATES, or when such person knowingly aids or abets any person in
+the conduct of such activities or knowingly conspires with any person to engage in such activities; or
+b. Any person, including a U.S. PERSON, who:
+(1) Knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence gathering activities for, or on behalf
+of, a FOREIGN POWER, which activities involve, or may involve, a violation of the criminal statutes of
+the UNITED STATES; or
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+12
+
+SECRET
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+(2) Pursuant to the direction of an intelligence service or network of a FOREIGN
+POWER, knowingly engages in any other clandestine intelligence activities for, or on behalf of, such
+FOREIGN POWER, which activities involve or are about to involve, a violation of the criminal statutes
+of the UNITED STATES; or
+(3) Knowingly engages in sabotage or INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, or activities that
+are in preparation therefor, for or on behalf of a FOREIGN POWER; or
+(4) Knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of activities described in
+paragraphs 9.1.b.(1) through (3) or knowingly conspires with any person to engage in those activities.
+c. For all purposes other than the conduct of ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE as defined by
+the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (see Annex A), the phrase "AGENT OF A FOREIGN POWER"
+also means any person, including U.S. PERSONS outside the UNITED STATES, who are officers or
+employees of a FOREIGN POWER, or who act unlawfully for or pursuant to the direction of a FOREIGN
+POWER, or who are in contact with or acting in collaboration with an intelligence or security service
+of a FOREIGN POWER for the purpose of providing access to information or material classified by the
+UNITED STATES Government and to which the person has or has had access. The mere fact that a
+person’s activities may benefit or further the aims of a FOREIGN POWER is not enough to bring that
+person under this provision, absent evidence that the person is taking direction from or acting in
+knowing concert with a FOREIGN POWER.
+9.2. (C) COLLECTION means intentional tasking or SELECTION of identified nonpublic
+communications for subsequent processing aimed at reporting or retention as a file record.
+9.3. (U) COMMUNICANT means a sender or intended recipient of a communication.
+9.4. (U) COMMUNICATIONS ABOUT A U.S. PERSON are those in which the U.S. PERSON is
+identified in the communication. A U.S. PERSON is identified when the person’s name, unique title,
+address, or other personal identifier is revealed in the communication in the context of activities
+conducted by that person or activities conducted by others and related to that person. A mere
+reference to a product by brand name or manufacturer’s name, e.g., "Boeing 707" is not an
+identification of a U.S. person.
+9.5. (U) CONSENT, for SIGINT purposes, means an agreement by a person or organization to
+permit the USSS to take particular actions that affect the person or organization. An agreement by an
+organization with the National Security Agency to permit COLLECTION of information shall be
+deemed valid CONSENT if given on behalf of such organization by an official or governing body
+determined by the General Counsel, National Security Agency, to have actual or apparent authority
+to make such an agreement.
+9.6. (U) CORPORATIONS, for purposes of this USSID, are entities legally recognized as separate
+from the persons who formed, own, or run them. CORPORATIONS have the nationality of the nation
+state under whose laws they were formed. Thus, CORPORATIONS incorporated under UNITED STATES
+federal or state law are U.S. PERSONS.
+9.7. (U) ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE means:
+a. In the case of an electronic communication, the acquisition of a nonpublic
+communication by electronic means without the CONSENT of a person who is a party to the
+communication.
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+13
+
+SECRET
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+b. In the case of a nonelectronic communication, the acquisition of a nonpublic
+communication by electronic means without the CONSENT of a person who is visibly present at the
+place of communication.
+c. The term ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE does not include the use of radio direction
+finding equipment solely to determine the location of a transmitter.
+9.8. (C) FOREIGN COMMUNICATION means a communication that has at least one
+COMMUNICANT outside of the UNITED STATES, or that is entirely among FOREIGN POWERS or
+between a FOREIGN POWER and officials of a FOREIGN POWER, but does not include communications
+intercepted by ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE directed at premises in the UNITED STATES used
+predominantly for residential purposes.
+9.9. (U) FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE means information relating to the capabilities, intentions,
+and activities of FOREIGN POWERS, organizations, or persons, and for purposes of this USSID includes
+both positive FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE and counterintelligence.
+9.10. (U) FOREIGN POWER means:
+a. A foreign government or any component thereof, whether or not recognized by the
+UNITED STATES,
+b. A faction of a foreign nation or nations, not substantially composed of UNITED STATES
+PERSONS,
+c. An entity that is openly acknowledged by a foreign government or governments to be
+directed and controlled by such foreign government or governments,
+d. A group engaged in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM or activities in preparation therefor,
+e. A foreign-based political organization, not substantially composed of UNITED STATES
+PERSONS, or
+f. An entity that is directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments.
+9.11. (U) INTERCEPTION means the acquisition by the USSS through electronic means of a
+nonpublic communication to which it is not an intended party, and the processing of the contents of
+that communication into an intelligible form, but does not include the display of signals on visual
+display devices intended to permit the examination of the technical characteristics of the signals
+without reference to the information content carried by the signal.
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+14
+
+SECRET
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+9.12. (U) INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM means activities that:
+a. Involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal
+laws of the UNITED STATES or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within
+the jurisdiction of the UNITED STATES or any State, and
+b. Appear to be intended:
+(1) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population,
+(2) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or
+(3) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping, and
+c. Occur totally outside the UNITED STATES, or transcend national boundaries in terms of
+the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to coerce or intimidate,
+or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.
+9.13. (U) PUBLICLY AVAILABLE INFORMATION means information that has been published or
+broadcast for general public consumption, is available on request to a member of the general public,
+has been seen or heard by a casual observer, or is made available at a meeting open to the general
+public.
+9.14. (C) SELECTION, as applied to manual and electronic processing activities, means the
+intentional insertion of a [REDACTED] telephone
+number, [REDACTED] into a computer scan dictionary or manual scan guide for the
+purpose of identifying messages of interest and isolating them for further processing.
+9.15. (C) SELECTION TERM means the composite of individual terms used to effect or defeat
+SELECTION of particular communications for the purpose of INTERCEPTION. It comprises the entire
+term or series of terms so used, but not any segregable term contained therein. It applies to both
+electronic and manual processing.
+9.16. (U) TARGET, OR TARGETING: See COLLECTION.
+9.17. (U) UNITED STATES, when used geographically, includes the 50 states and the District of
+Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the U.S. Virgin Islands, the Northern Mariana Islands,
+and any other territory or possession over which the UNITED STATES exercises sovereignty.
+9.18. (C) UNITED STATES PERSON:
+a. A citizen of the UNITED STATES,
+b. An alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the UNITED STATES,
+c. Unincorporated groups and associations a substantial number of the members of
+which constitute a. or b. above, or
+d. CORPORATIONS incorporated in the UNITED STATES, including U.S. flag
+nongovernmental aircraft or vessels, but not including those entities which are openly acknowledged
+by a foreign government or governments to be directed and controlled by them.
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+15
+
+SECRET
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+e. The following guidelines apply in determining whether a person is a U.S. PERSON:
+(1) A person known to be currently in the United States will be treated as a U.S.
+PERSON unless that person is reasonably identified as an alien who has not been admitted for
+permanent residence or if the nature of the person’s communications or other indicia in the contents
+or circumstances of such communications give rise to a reasonable belief that such person is not a U.S.
+PERSON.
+(2) A person known to be currently outside the UNITED STATES, or whose location is
+not known, will not be treated as a U.S. PERSON unless such person is reasonably identified as such or
+the nature of the person’s communications or other indicia in the contents or circumstances of such
+communications give rise to a reasonable belief that such person is a U.S. PERSON.
+(3) A person known to be an alien admitted for permanent residence may be assumed
+to have lost status as a U.S. PERSON if the person leaves the UNITED STATES and it is known that the
+person is not in compliance with the administrative formalities provided by law (8 U.S.C. Section 1203)
+that enable such persons to reenter the UNITED STATES without regard to the provisions of law that
+would otherwise restrict an alien’s entry into the UNITED STATES. The failure to follow the statutory
+procedures provides a reasonable basis to conclude that such alien has abandoned any intention of
+maintaining status as a permanent resident alien.
+(4) An unincorporated association whose headquarters are located outside the
+UNITED STATES may be presumed not to be a U.S. PERSON unless the USSS has information indicating
+that a substantial number of members are citizens of the UNITED STATES or aliens lawfully admitted
+for permanent residence.
+(5) CORPORATIONS have the nationality of the nation-state in which they are
+incorporated. CORPORATIONS formed under U.S. federal or state law are thus U.S. persons, even if
+the corporate stock is foreign-owned. The only exception set forth above is CORPORATIONS which
+are openly acknowledged to be directed and controlled by foreign governments. Conversely,
+CORPORATIONS incorporated in foreign countries are not U.S. PERSONS even if that CORPORATION is
+a subsidiary of a U.S. CORPORATION.
+(6) Nongovernmental ships and aircraft are legal entities and have the nationality of
+the country in which they are registered. Ships and aircraft fly the flag and are subject to the law of
+their place of registration.
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+16
+
+SECRET
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+ANNEX A
+PROCEDURES IMPLEMENTING THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE ACT (U)
+SECTION 1 - PURPOSE AND APPLICABILITY
+1.1. (U) The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (the Act) governs the conduct of certain
+electronic surveillance activities within the United States to collect foreign intelligence information.
+A complete copy of the Act is found at Annex B to NSA/CSS Directive 10-30. The Act covers the
+intentional collection of the communications of a particular, known U.S. person who is in the United
+States, all wiretaps in the United States, the acquisition of certain radio communications where all
+parties to that communication are located in the United States, and the monitoring of information in
+which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. The Act requires that all such surveillances be
+directed only at foreign powers and their agents as defined by the Act and that all such surveillances
+be authorized by the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, or in certain limited
+circumstances, by the Attorney General.
+SECTION 2 - GENERAL
+2.1. (U) Procedures and standards for securing Court orders or Attorney General certifications
+to conduct electronic surveillances are set forth in the Act. Requests for such orders or certifications
+should be forwarded by the appropriate Key Component through the NSA General Counsel to the
+Director, NSA/Chief, CSS and should be accompanied by a statement of the facts and circumstances
+justifying a belief that the target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and that each of
+the facilities or places at which the surveillance will be directed are being used, or are about to be
+used, by that foreign power or agent. If the proposed surveillance meets the requirements of the Act
+and the Director approves the proposal, attorneys in the Office of the General Counsel will draw the
+necessary court application or request for Attorney General certification.
+SECTION 3 - MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES
+3.1. (S-CCO) Surveillances authorized by the Act are required to be carried out in accordance
+with the Act and pursuant to the court order or Attorney General certification authorizing that
+particular surveillance. In some cases, the court orders are tailored to address particular problems,
+and in those instances the NSA attorney will advise the appropriate NSA offices of the terms of the
+court’s orders. In most cases, however, the court order will incorporate without any changes the
+standardized minimization procedures set forth in Appendix 1.
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+A/1
+
+SECRET
+USSID 18 ANNEX A
+27 July 1993
+SECTION 4 - RESPONSIBILITIES
+4.1. (U) The General Counsel will review all requests to conduct electronic surveillances as
+defined by the Act, prepare all applications and materials required by the Act, and provide pertinent
+legal advice and assistance to all elements of the United States SIGINT System.
+4.2. (U) The Inspector General will conduct regular inspections and oversight of all SIGINT
+activities to assure compliance with this Directive.
+4.3. (U) All SIGINT managers and supervisors with responsibilities relating to the Act will
+ensure that they and their personnel are thoroughly familiar with the Act, its implementing
+procedures, and any court orders or Attorney General certifications pertinent to their mission.
+Personnel with duties related to the Act will consult the General Counsel’s office for any required
+legal advice and assistance or training of newly assigned personnel. Appropriate records will be
+maintained demonstrating compliance with the terms of all court orders and Attorney General
+certifications, and any discrepancies in that regard will be promptly reported to the offices of the
+General Counsel and Inspector General.
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+A/2
+
+SECRET
+USSID 18 ANNEX A
+27 July 1993
+APPENDIX 1
+Standard Minimization Procedures for
+NSA Electronic Surveillances
+Table of Contents
+Section 1 — Applicability and Scope Section A–1/2
+Section 2 — Definitions A–1/2
+a. Acquisition A–1/2
+b. Communications concerning a U.S. Person A–1/2
+c. Communications of a U.S. Person A–1/2
+d. Consent A–1/2
+e. Foreign communication [Domestic Communication] A–1/2
+f. Identification of a U.S. Person A–1/3
+g. Processed or Processing A–1/3
+h. Publicly available information A–1/3
+i. Technical data base A–1/3
+j. U.S. person A–1/3
+Section 3 — Acquisition and Processing – General A–1/3
+a. Acquisition A–1/3
+b. Verification A–1/3
+c. Monitoring, Recording, and Processing A–1/4
+d. U.S. Persons Employed by the Foreign Power A–1/4
+e. Destruction of Raw Data A–1/4
+f. Non–Pertinent Communications A–1/5
+g. Change in Target’s Location or Status A–1/5
+Section 4 — Acquisition and Processing – Special Procedures A–1/5
+a. Collection Against Residential Premises A–1/5
+b. Attorney–Client Communications A–1/6
+Section 5 — Domestic Communications A–1/6
+a. Dissemination A–1/6
+b. Retention A–1/6
+Section 6 — Foreign Communications of or Concerning U.S. Persons A–1/7
+a. Retention A–1/7
+b. Dissemination A–1/7
+Section 7 — Other Foreign Communications A–1/8
+Section 8 — Collaboration with Foreign Communications A–1/8
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+
+SECRET
+USSID 18 ANNEX A
+APPENDIX 1
+27 July 1993
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, DC
+STANDARDIZED MINIMIZATION
+PROCEDURES FOR NSA ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES
+Pursuant to Section 101(h) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (hereinafter “the
+Act”), the following procedures have been adopted by the Attorney General and shall be followed by the NSA
+in implementing this electronic surveillance: (U)
+SECTION 1 – APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE (U)
+These procedures apply to the acquisition, retention, use, and dissemination of non–publicly
+available information concerning unconsenting United States persons that is collected in the course of elec-
+tronic surveillance as ordered by the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court under Section
+102(b) or authorized by Attorney General Certification under Section 102(a) of the Act. These procedures
+also apply to non–United States persons where specifically indicated. (U)
+SECTION 2 – DEFINITIONS (U)
+In addition to the definitions in Section 101 of the Act, the following definitions shall apply to these
+procedures:
+(a) Acquisition means the collection by NSA through electronic means of a nonpublic commu-
+nication to which it is not an intended party. (U)
+(b) Communications concerning a United States person include all communications in which a
+United States person is discussed or mentioned, except where such communications reveal only publicly
+available information about the person. (U)
+(c) Communications of a United States person include all communications to which a United
+States person is a party. (U)
+(d) Consent is the agreement by a person or organization to permit the NSA to take particular
+actions that affect the person or organization. To be effective, consent must be given by the affected person or
+organization with sufficient knowledge to understand the action that may be taken and the possible conse-
+quences of that action. Consent by an organization shall be deemed valid if given on behalf of the organization
+by an official or governing body determined by the General Counsel, NSA, to have actual or apparent authority
+to make such an agreement. (U)
+(e) Foreign communication means a communication that has at least one communicant outside
+of the United States, or that is entirely among:
+(1) foreign powers;
+(2) officers and employees of foreign powers; or
+(3) a foreign power and officers or employees of a foreign power.
+All other communications are domestic communications. (S–CCO)
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+(C1 – Oct 97)
+
+SECRET
+USSID 18 ANNEX A
+APPENDIX 1
+27 July 1993
+(f) Identification of a United States person means the name, unique title, address, or other per-
+sonal identifier of a United States person in the context of activities conducted by that person or activities
+conducted by others that are related to that person. A reference to a product by brand name, or manufactur-
+er’s name or the use of a name in a descriptive sense, e.g., “Monroe Doctrine,” is not an identification of a
+United States person. (S–CCO)
+(g) Processed or processing means any step necessary to convert a communication into an in-
+telligible form intended for human inspection. (U)
+(h) Publicly available information means information that a member of the public could obtain on
+request, by research in public sources, or by casual observation. (U)
+(i) Technical data base means information retained for cryptanalytic, traffic analytic, or signal
+exploitation purposes. (S–CCO)
+(j) United States person means a United States person as defined in the Act. The following
+guidelines apply in determining whether a person whose status is unknown is a United States person: (U)
+(1) A person known to be currently in the United States will be treated as a United States person
+unless positively identified as an alien who has not been admitted for permanent residence, or unless the
+nature or circumstances of the person’s communications give rise to a reasonable belief that such person is
+not a United States person. (U)
+(2) A person known to be currently outside the United States, or whose location is unknown, will
+not be treated as a United States person unless such person can be positively identified as such, or the nature
+or circumstances of the person’s communications give rise to a reasonable belief that such person is a United
+States person. (U)
+(3) A person known to be an alien admitted for permanent residence loses status as a United
+States person if the person leaves the United States and is not in compliance with Title 8, United States Code,
+Section 1203 enabling re–entry into the United States. Failure to follow the statutory procedures provides a
+reasonable basis to conclude that the alien has abandoned any intention of maintaining his status as a perma-
+nent resident alien. (U)
+(4) An unincorporated association whose headquarters or primary office is located outside the
+United States is presumed not to be a United States person unless there is information indicating that a sub-
+stantial number of its members are citizens of the United States or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent
+residence. (U)
+SECTION 3 – ACQUISITION AND PROCESSING – GENERAL (U)
+(a) Acquisition (U)
+The acquisition of information by electronic surveillance shall be made in accordance with the
+certification of the Attorney General or the court order authorizing such surveillance and conducted in a man-
+ner designed, to the greatest extent reasonably feasible, to minimize the acquisition of information not rele-
+vant to the authorized purpose of the surveillance. (S–CCO)
+(b) Verification (U)
+At the initiation of the electronic surveillance, the NSA or the Federal Bureau of Investigation, if
+providing operational support, shall verify that the communication lines or telephone numbers being targeted
+are the lines or numbers of the target authorized by court order or Attorney General certification. Thereafter,
+collection personnel will monitor the acquisition of raw data at regular intervals to verify that the surveillance is
+not avoidably acquiring communications outside the authorized scope of the surveillance or information con-
+cerning United States persons not related to the purpose of the surveillance. (S–CCO)
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+(C1 – Oct 97)
+
+SECRET
+USSID 18 ANNEX A
+APPENDIX 1
+27 July 1993
+(c) Monitoring, Recording, and Processing (U)
+(1) Electronic surveillance of the target may be monitored contemporaneously, recorded auto-
+matically, or both. (U)
+(2) Personnel who monitor the electronic surveillance shall exercise reasonable judgement
+in determining whether particular information acquired must be minimized and shall destroy inadvertently ac-
+quired communications of or concerning a United States person at the earliest practicable point in the proc-
+essing cycle at which such communication can be identified either as clearly not relevant to the authorized
+purpose of the surveillance (e.g., the communication does not contain foreign intelligence information) or as
+containing evidence of a crime which may be disseminated under these procedures. (S–CCO)
+(3) Communications of or concerning United States persons that may be related to the autho-
+rized purpose of the surveillance may be forwarded to analytic personnel responsible for producing intelli-
+gence information from the collected data. Such communications or information may be retained and dissem-
+inated only in accordance with Sections 4, 5, and 6 of these procedures. (C)
+(4) Magnetic tapes or other storage media that contain acquired communications may be pro-
+cessed. (S–CCO)
+(5) Each communication shall be reviewed to determine whether it is a domestic or foreign com-
+munication to or from the targeted premises and is reasonably believed to contain foreign intelligence infor-
+mation or evidence of a crime. Only such communications may be processed. All other communications may
+be retained or disseminated only in accordance with Sections 5 and 6 of these procedures. (S–CCO)
+(6) Magnetic tapes or other storage media containing foreign communications may be scanned
+by computer to identify and select communications for analysis. Computer selection terms used for scanning,
+such as telephone numbers, key words or phrases, or other discriminators, shall not include United States
+person names or identifiers and shall be limited to those selection terms reasonably likely to identify [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] that are authorized for intentional collection under Executive Order 12333
+implementing procedures. (S–CCO)
+(7) Further processing, retention and dissemination of foreign communications shall be made in
+accordance with Sections 4, 6, and 7, as applicable, below. Further processing, storage and dissemination of
+inadvertently acquired domestic communications shall be made in accordance with Sections 4 and 5 be-
+low. (S–CCO)
+(d) U.S. Persons Employed by the Foreign Power (C)
+Communications of or concerning United States persons employed by a foreign power may be
+used and retained as otherwise provided in these procedures except that:
+(1) Such United States persons shall not be identified in connection with any communication
+that the person places or receives on behalf of another unless the identification is permitted under Section 6 of
+these procedures; and
+(2) personal communications of United States persons that could not be foreign intelligence
+may only be retained, used, or disseminated in accordance with Section 5 of these procedures. (S–CCO)
+(e) Destruction of Raw Data (C)
+Communications and other information, including that reduced to graphic or “hard copy” form
+such as [REDACTED] shall be reviewed for retention in accor-
+dance with the standards set forth in these procedures. Communications and other information, in any form,
+that do not meet such retention standards and that are known to contain communications of or concerning
+United States persons shall be promptly destroyed. (S–CCO)
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+(C1 – Oct 97)
+
+SECRET
+USSID 18 ANNEX A
+APPENDIX 1
+27 July 1993
+(f) Non–pertinent Communications (U)
+(1) Communications determined to fall within established categories of non–pertinent commu-
+nications, such as those set forth in subparagraph (6) of this section, should not be retained unless they con-
+tain information that may be disseminated under Sections 5, 6, or 7 below. (U)
+(2) Monitors may listen to all communications, including those that initially appear to fall within
+established categories until they can reasonably determine that the communication cannot be disseminated
+under Sections 5, 6, or 7 below. (S–CCO)
+(3) Communications of United States persons will be analyzed to establish categories of com-
+munications that are not pertinent to the authorized purpose of the surveillance. (U)
+(4) These categories should be established after a reasonable period of monitoring the commu-
+nications of the targets. (U)
+(5) Information that appears to be foreign intelligence may be retained even if it is acquired as a
+part of a communication falling within a category that is generally non–pertinent. (S–CCO)
+(6) Categories of non–pertinent communications which may be applied in these surveillance
+include:
+(i) Calls to and from United States Government officials;
+(ii) Calls to and from children;
+(iii) Calls to and from students for information to aid them in academic endeavors;
+(iv) Calls between family members; and
+(v) Calls relating solely to personal services, such as food orders, transportation,
+etc. (S–CCO)
+(g) Change in Target’s Location or Status (S–CCO)
+(1) During periods of known extended absence by a targeted agent of a foreign power from
+premises under surveillance, only communications to which the target is a party may be retained and dissemi-
+nated. (S–CCO)
+(2) When there is reason to believe that the target of an electronic surveillance is no longer a
+foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, or no longer occupies the premises authorized for surveillance,
+that electronic surveillance shall be immediately terminated, and shall not resume unless subsequently ap-
+proved under the Act. When any person involved in collection or processing of an electronic surveillance
+being conducted pursuant to the Act becomes aware of information tending to indicate a material change in
+the status or location of a target, the person shall immediately ensure that the NSA’s Office of General Coun-
+sel is also made aware of such information. (S–CCO)
+SECTION 4 – ACQUISITION AND PROCESSING – SPECIAL PROCEDURES (U)
+(a) Collection Against Residential Premises (S–CCO)
+(1) An electronic surveillance directed against premises located in the United States and used
+for residential purposes shall be conducted by technical means designed to limit the information acquired to
+communications that have one communicant outside the United States, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The technical means employed shall consist of [REDACTED]
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+(C1 – Oct 97)
+
+SECRET
+USSID 18 ANNEX A
+APPENDIX 1
+27 July 1993
+[REDACTED] equipment or equipment capable of identifying international [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] or other particular international communications known to be used by the targeted foreign power
+and its agents. Communications to or from the target residential premises that are processed through a [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] of a foreign power or agent of a
+foreign power located in a foreign country, or on the foreign country or foreign city telephone direct dialing
+codes (area codes) for the areas in which such foreign powers or agents are located. (S–CCO)
+(2) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (S–CCO)
+(3) Domestic communications that are incidentally acquired during collection against residential
+premises shall be handled under Section 5 of these procedures. (S–CCO)
+(b) Attorney–Client Communications (C)
+As soon as it becomes apparent that a communication is between a person who is known to be
+under criminal indictment and an attorney who represents that individual in the matter under indictment (or
+someone acting on behalf of the attorney), monitoring of that communication will cease and the communica-
+tion shall be identified as an attorney–client communication in a log maintained for that purpose. The relevant
+portion of the tape containing that conversation will be placed under seal and the Department of Justice, Office
+of Intelligence Policy and Review, shall be notified so that appropriate procedures may be established to pro-
+tect such communications from review or use in any criminal prosecution, while preserving foreign intelli-
+gence information contained therein. (S–CCO)
+SECTION 5 – DOMESTIC COMMUNICATIONS (U)
+(a) Dissemination (U)
+Communications identified as domestic communications shall be promptly destroyed, except
+that:
+(1) domestic communications that are reasonably believed to contain foreign intelligence infor-
+mation shall be disseminated to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (including United States person identi-
+ties) for possible further dissemination by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in accordance with its minimiza-
+tion procedures;
+(2) domestic communications that do not contain foreign intelligence information, but that are
+reasonably believed to contain evidence of a crime that has been, is being, or is about to be committed, shall
+be disseminated (including United States person identities) to appropriate Federal law enforcement authori-
+ties, in accordance with Section 106(b) of the Act and crimes reporting procedures approved by the Secretary
+of Defense and the Attorney General; and
+(3) domestic communications that are reasonably believed to contain technical data base infor-
+mation, as defined in Section 2(i), may be disseminated to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to other
+elements of the U.S. SIGINT system. (S–CCO)
+(b) Retention (U)
+(1) Domestic communications disseminated to Federal law enforcement agencies may be re-
+tained by the NSA for a reasonable period of time, not to exceed six months (or any shorter period set by court
+order), to permit law enforcement agencies to determine whether access to original recordings of such com-
+munications is required for law enforcement purposes. (S–CCO)
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+
+SECRET
+USSID 18 ANNEX A
+APPENDIX 1
+27 July 1993
+(2) Domestic communications reasonably believed to contain technical data base information
+may be retained for a period sufficient to allow a thorough exploitation and to permit access to data that are, or
+are reasonably believed likely to become, relevant to a current or future foreign intelligence requirement.
+Sufficient duration may vary with the nature of the exploitation. (S–CCO)
+a. In the context of a cryptanalytic effort, maintenance of technical data bases requires reten-
+tion of all communications that are enciphered or reasonably believed to contain secret meaning, and suffi-
+cient duration may consist of any period of time during which encrypted material is subject to, or of use in,
+cryptanalysis. (S–CCO)
+b. In the case of communications that are not enciphered or otherwise thought to contain secret
+meaning, sufficient duration is one year unless the Deputy Director for Operations, NSA, determines in writing
+that retention for a longer period is required to respond to authorized foreign intelligence or counterintelligence
+requirements. (S–CCO)
+SECTION 6 – FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS OF OR CONCERNING UNITED
+STATES PERSONS (U)
+(a) Retention (U)
+Foreign communications of or concerning United States persons acquired by the NSA in the
+course of an electronic surveillance subject to these procedures may be retained only:
+(1) if necessary for the maintenance of technical data bases. Retention for this purpose is
+permitted for a period sufficient to allow a thorough exploitation and to permit access to data that are, or are
+reasonably believed likely to become, relevant to a current or future foreign intelligence requirement. Suffi-
+cient duration may vary with the nature of the exploitation.
+a. In the context of a cryptanalytic effort, maintenance of technical data bases re-
+quires retention of all communications that are enciphered or reasonably believed to contain secret meaning,
+and sufficient duration may consist of any period of time during which encrypted material is subject to, or of
+use in, cryptanalysis.
+b. In the case of communications that are not enciphered or otherwise thought to
+contain secret meaning, sufficient duration is one year unless the Deputy Director for Operations, NSA, deter-
+mines in writing that retention for a longer period is required to respond to authorized foreign intelligence or
+counterintelligence requirements;
+(2) if dissemination of such communications with reference to such United States persons
+would be permitted under subsection (b) below; or
+(3) if the information is evidence of a crime that has been, is being, or is about to be committed
+and is provided to appropriate federal law enforcement authorities. (S–CCO)
+(b) Dissemination (U)
+A report based on communications of or concerning a United States person may be dissemi-
+nated in accordance with Section 7 if the identity of the United States person is deleted and a generic term or
+symbol is substituted so that the information cannot reasonably be connected with an identifiable United
+States person. Otherwise dissemination of intelligence reports based on communications of or concerning a
+United States person may only be made to a recipient requiring the identity of such person for the performance
+of official duties but only if at least one of the following criteria is also met:
+(1) the United States person has consented to dissemination or the information of or concerning
+the United States person is available publicly;
+(2) the identity of the United States person is necessary to understand foreign intelligence
+information or assess its importance, e.g., the identity of a senior official in the Executive Branch;
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+(C1 – Oct 97)
+
+SECRET
+USSID 18 ANNEX A
+APPENDIX 1
+27 July 1993
+(3) the communication or information indicates that the United States person may be:
+(A) an agent of a foreign power;
+(B) a foreign power as defined in Section 101(a)(4) or (6) of the Act;
+(C) residing outside the United States and holding an official position in the govern-
+ment or military forces of a foreign power;
+(D) a corporation or other entity that is owned or controlled directly or indirectly by a
+foreign power; or
+(E) acting in collaboration with an intelligence or security service of a foreign power
+and the United States person has, or has had, access to classified national security information or material.
+(4) the communication or information indicates that the United States person may be the target
+of intelligence activities of a foreign power;
+(5) the communication or information indicates that the United States person is engaged in the
+unauthorized disclosure of classified national security information; but only after the agency that originated
+the information certifies that it is properly classified;
+(6) the communication or information indicates that the United States person may be engaging
+in international terrorist activities;
+(7) the acquisition of the United States person’s communication was authorized by a court order
+issued pursuant to Section 105 of the Act and the communication may relate to the foreign intelligence pur-
+pose of the surveillance;
+(8) the communication or information is reasonably believed to contain evidence that a crime
+has been, is being, or is about to be committed, provided that dissemination is for law enforcement purposes
+and is made in accordance with Section 106(b) of the Act and crimes reporting procedures approved by the
+Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General. (U)
+SECTION 7 – OTHER FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS (U)
+Foreign communications of or concerning a non–United States person may be retained, used,
+and disseminated in any form in accordance with other applicable law, regulation, and policy. (U)
+SECTION 8 – COLLABORATION WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS (S–CCO)
+(a) The sharing or exchange of foreign communications governed by these procedures with sig-
+nals intelligence authorities of collaborating foreign governments (Second Parties) may be undertaken by the
+NSA only with the written assurance of the Second Party that the use of those foreign communications will be
+subject to the retention and dissemination provisions of these procedures. (S–CCO)
+(b) Domestic communications and communications to or from United States persons shall not be
+shared with Second Parties. (S–CCO)
+(c) Foreign plain text communications may be shared with Second Parties if they are first re-
+viewed by NSA analysts, who shall remove references to United States persons that are not necessary to
+understand or assess the foreign intelligence information contained therein. (S–CCO)
+(d) Foreign enciphered or encoded communications may be shared with Second Parties without
+such prior review, provided that at least annually a representative sampling of those shared communications
+that can be deciphered or decoded is reviewed by the NSA to ensure that any references therein to United
+States persons are necessary to understand or assess the foreign intelligence information being dissemi-
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+(C1 – Oct 97)
+
+SECRET
+USSID 18 ANNEX A
+APPENDIX 1
+27 July 1993
+nated. Corrective measures with respect to each target or line shall be undertaken as necessary to maintain
+compliance with the above dissemination standard. The results of each review shall be made available to the
+Attorney General or a designee. (S–CCO)
+Approved by Attorney General Janet Reno on 1 July 1997
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+(C1 – Oct 97)
+
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+ANNEX B
+OPERATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO THE
+FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (U)
+SECTION 1 - GENERAL
+1.1. (U) In accordance with the provisions of Section 2.6 of E.O. 12333, and the NSA/FBI
+Memorandum of Understanding of 25 November 1980, the National Security Agency may provide
+specialized equipment and technical knowledge to the FBI to assist the FBI in the conduct of its lawful
+functions. When requesting such assistance, the FBI will certify to the General Counsel of NSA that
+such equipment or technical knowledge is necessary to the accomplishment of one or more of the
+FBI’s lawful functions.
+1.2. (U) NSA may also provide expert personnel to assist FBI personnel in the operation or
+installation of specialized equipment when that equipment is to be employed to collect foreign
+intelligence. When requesting the assistance of expert personnel, the FBI will certify to the General
+Counsel that such assistance is necessary to collect foreign intelligence and that the approval of the
+Attorney General (and, when necessary, a warrant from a court of competent jurisdiction) has been
+obtained.
+SECTION 2 - CONTROL
+2.1. (U) No operational assistance as discussed in Section 1 shall be provided without the
+express permission of the Director, NSA/Chief, CSS, Deputy Director, NSA, the Deputy Director for
+Operations, or the Deputy Director for Technology and Systems. The Deputy Director for Operations
+and the Deputy Director for Technology and Systems may approve requests for such assistance only
+with the concurrence of the General Counsel.
+FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+B/1
+
+CONFIDENTIAL
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+ANNEX C
+SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO U.S. AND ALLIED MILITARY
+EXERCISE COMMAND AUTHORITIES (U)
+SECTION 1 - POLICY
+1.1. (C) Signals Intelligence support to U.S. and Allied military exercise command authorities is
+provided for in USSID 56 and DoD Directive 5200.17 (M-2). Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum
+MJCS111-88, 18 August 1988, and USSID 4, 16 December, 1988, establish doctrine and procedures for
+providing signals intelligence support to military commanders. The procedures in this Annex provide
+policy guidelines for safeguarding the rights of U.S. persons in the conduct of exercise SIGINT support
+activities.
+SECTION 2 - DEFINITIONS
+2.1. (U) The term "Military Tactical Communications" means United States and Allied military
+exercise communications, within the United States and abroad, that are necessary for the production
+of simulated foreign intelligence and counterintelligence or to permit an analysis of communications
+security.
+SECTION 3 - PROCEDURES
+3.1. (C-CCO) The USSS may collect, process, store, and disseminate military tactical
+communications that are also communications of, or concerning, U.S. persons.
+a. Collection efforts will be conducted in such a manner as to avoid, to the extent feasible,
+the intercept of non-exercise-related communications.
+b. Military tactical communications may be stored and processed without deletion of
+references to U.S. persons if the names and communications of the U.S. persons who are exercise
+participants, whether military, government, or contractor, are contained in, or such communications
+constitute, exercise-related communications or fictitious communications or information prepared
+for the exercise.
+c. Communications of U.S. persons not participating in the exercise that are inadvertently
+intercepted during the exercise shall be destroyed as soon as feasible, provided that a record
+describing the signal or frequency user in technical and generic terms may be retained for signal
+identification and Collection-avoidance purposes. Inadvertently intercepted communications that
+contain anomalies in enciphered communications that reveal a potential vulnerability to United
+States communications security should be forwarded to the NSA Deputy Director for Information
+Systems Security.
+CONFIDENTIAL
+C/1
+
+CONFIDENTIAL
+USSID 18 ANNEX C
+27 July 1993
+d. Dissemination of military exercise communications, exercise reports, or information
+files derived from such communications shall be limited to those authorities and persons participating
+in the exercise or conducting reviews and critiques thereof.
+CONFIDENTIAL
+C/2
+
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+ANNEX D
+TESTING OF ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT (U)
+SECTION 1 - PURPOSE AND APPLICABILITY
+1.1. (U) This Annex applies to the testing of electronic equipment that has the capability to
+intercept communications and other non-public information. Testing includes development,
+calibration, and evaluation of such equipment, and will be conducted, to the maximum extent
+practical, without interception or monitoring of U.S. persons.
+SECTION 2 - PROCEDURES
+2.1. (U) The USSS may test electronic equipment that has the capability to intercept
+communications and other information subject to the following limitations:
+a. To the maximum extent practical, the following should be used:
+(1) Laboratory-generated signals,
+(2) Communications transmitted between terminals located outside the United States
+not used by any known U.S. person,
+(3) Official government agency communications with the consent of an appropriate
+official of that agency, or an individual’s communications with the consent of that individual,
+(4) Public broadcast signals, or
+(5) Other communications in which there is no reasonable expectation of privacy (as
+approved in each instance by the NSA General Counsel).
+b. Where it is not practical to test electronic equipment solely against signals described in
+paragraph 2.1.a., above, testing may be conducted, provided:
+(1) the proposed test is coordinated with the NSA General Counsel;
+(2) the test is limited in scope and duration to that necessary to determine the
+capability of the equipment;
+(3) no particular person is targeted without consent and it is not reasonable to obtain
+the consent of the persons incidentally subjected to the surveillance; and
+(4) the test does not exceed 90 calendar days.
+FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+D/1
+
+USSID 18 ANNEX D
+27 July 1993
+c. Where the test involves communications other than those identified in 2.1.a. and a test
+period longer than 90 days is required, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act requires that the test
+be approved by the Attorney General. Such proposals and plans shall be submitted by USSS elements
+through the General Counsel, NSA, to the Director, NSA/Chief, CSS for transmission to the Attorney
+General. The test proposal shall state the requirement for an extended test involving such
+communications, the nature of the test, the organization that will conduct the test, and the proposed
+disposition of any signals or communications acquired during the test.
+2.2. (U) The content of any communication other than communications between non-U.S.
+persons outside the United States which are acquired during a test and evaluation shall be:
+a. retained and used only for the purpose of determining the capability of the electronic
+equipment;
+b. disclosed only to persons conducting or evaluating the test; and
+c. destroyed before or immediately upon completion of the testing.
+2.3. (U) The technical parameters of a communication, such as frequency, modulation, and
+time of activity of acquired electronic signals, may be retained and used for test reporting or
+collection-avoidance purposes. Such parameters may be disseminated to other DoD intelligence
+components and other entities authorized to conduct electronic surveillance, provided such
+dissemination and use are limited to testing, evaluation, or collection-avoidance purposes.
+FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+D/2
+
+SECRET
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+ANNEX E
+SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS (U)
+SECTION 1 - PROCEDURES
+1.1. (U) This Annex provides the procedures for safeguarding the rights of U.S. persons when
+conducting SIGINT search and development activities.
+1.2. (S-CCO) The USSS may conduct search and development activities with respect to signals
+throughout the radio spectrum under the following limitations:
+a. Signals may be collected only for the purpose of identifying those signals that:
+(1) may contain information related to the production of foreign intelligence or
+counterintelligence;
+(2) are enciphered or appear to contain secret meaning;
+(3) are necessary to assure efficient signals intelligence collection or to avoid the
+collection of unwanted signals; or,
+(4) reveal vulnerabilities of United States communications security.
+b. Communications originated or intended for receipt in the United States or originated
+or intended for receipt by U.S. persons shall be processed in accordance with Section 5 of USSID 18,
+provided that information necessary for cataloging the constituent elements of the signal
+environment may be processed and retained if such information does not identify a U.S. person.
+Information revealing a United States communications security vulnerability may be retained.
+c. Information necessary for cataloging the constituent elements of the signal
+environment may be disseminated to the extent such information does not identify U.S. persons.
+Communications equipment nomenclature may be disseminated. Information that reveals a
+vulnerability to United States communications security may be disseminated to the appropriate
+communications security authorities.
+d. All information obtained in the process of search and development that appears to be
+of foreign intelligence value may be forwarded to the proper analytic office within NSA for
+processing and dissemination in accordance with relevant portions of USSID 18.
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+E/1
+
+CONFIDENTIAL
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+ANNEX F
+ILLICIT COMMUNICATIONS (C)
+SECTION 1 - PROCEDURES
+1.1. (C) The USSS may collect, retain, process, and disseminate illicit communications without
+reference to the requirements concerning U.S. persons.
+1.2. (C) The term "illicit communications" means a communication transmitted in violation of
+either the Communications Act of 1934 and regulations issued thereunder or international
+agreements, which because of its explicit content, message characteristics, or method of transmission,
+is reasonably believed to be a communication to or from an agent or agents of foreign powers,
+whether or not U.S. persons.
+CONFIDENTIAL
+
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+ANNEX G
+TRAINING OF PERSONNEL IN THE OPERATION AND USE OF SIGINT
+COLLECTION AND OTHER SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT (U)
+SECTION 1 - APPLICABILITY
+1.1. (U) This Annex applies to all USSS use of SIGINT collection and other surveillance
+equipment for training purposes.
+SECTION 2 - POLICY
+2.1. (U) Training of USSS personnel in the operation and use of SIGINT collection equipment
+shall be conducted, to the maximum extent that is practical, without interception of the
+communications of U.S. persons or persons in the United States who have not given consent to such
+interception. Communications and information protected by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
+(FISA) (see Annex A) will not be collected for training purposes.
+SECTION 3 - PROCEDURES
+3.1. (U) The training of USSS personnel in the operation and use of SIGINT collection and other
+surveillance equipment shall include guidance concerning the requirements and restrictions of the
+FISA, Executive Order 12333, and USSID 18.
+3.2. (U) The use of SIGINT collection and other surveillance equipment for training purposes is
+subject to the following limitations:
+a. To the maximum extent practical, use of such equipment for training purposes shall be
+directed against otherwise authorized intelligence targets;
+b. The contents of private communications of nonconsenting U.S. persons may not be
+acquired unless the person is an authorized target of electronic surveillance; and
+c. The electronic surveillance will be limited in extent and duration to that necessary to
+train personnel in the use of the equipment.
+3.3. (U) The limitations in paragraph 3.2. do not apply in the following instances:
+a. Public broadcasts, distress signals, or official United States Government
+communications may be monitored, provided that, where government agency communications are
+monitored, the consent of an appropriate official is obtained; and
+FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+USSID 18 ANNEX G
+27 July 1993
+b. Minimal acquisition of information is permitted as required for calibration purposes.
+3.4. (U) Information collected during training that involves authorized intelligence targets
+may be retained in accordance with Section 6 of USSID 18 and disseminated in accordance with
+Section 7 of USSID 18. Information other than distress signals collected during training that does not
+involve authorized intelligence targets or that is acquired inadvertently shall be destroyed as soon as
+practical or upon completion of the training and may not be disseminated outside the USSS for any
+purpose. Distress signals should be referred to the DDO.
+FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+G/2
+
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+ANNEX H
+CONSENT FORMS (U)
+SECTION 1 - PURPOSE
+1.1. (U) The forms set forth in this Annex are for use in recording consent by U.S. persons for
+USSS elements to collect and disseminate foreign communications concerning that person. The first
+form is consent to collect and disseminate a U.S. person's communications as well as references to that
+person in foreign communications. The second form is consent to collect and disseminate only
+references to the U.S. person and does not include communications to or from that person.
+1.2. (U) Section 4.1.c. of USSID 18 states that the Director, NSA/Chief, CSS has authority to
+approve the consensual collection of communications to, from or about U.S. persons. Elements of the
+USSS proposing to conduct consensual collection should forward a copy of the executed consent form
+and any pertinent information to the Director, NSA/Chief, CSS for approval.
+1.3. (U) The forms provided on the following pages may be reproduced, provided the security
+classifications (top and bottom) are removed. It is the responsibility of the user to properly reclassify
+the document in accordance with requisite security guidelines.
+FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+SECRET
+USSID 18 ANNEX H
+27 July 1993
+CONSENT AGREEMENT
+SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
+I, ____________________, hereby consent to the National Security Agency
+undertaking to seek and disseminate communications to or from or referencing me in foreign
+communications for the purpose of ______________________________
+______________________________.
+This consent applies to administrative messages alerting elements of the United States Signals
+Intelligence System to this consent, as well as to any signals intelligence reports that may relate to the
+purpose stated above.
+Except as otherwise provided by Executive Order 12333 procedures, this consent covers only
+information that relates to the purpose stated above and is effective for the period
+__________ to __________.
+Signals intelligence reports containing information derived from communications to or from
+me may only be disseminated to me and to __________. Signals intelligence reports
+containing information derived from communications referencing me may only be disseminated to
+me and to __________ except as otherwise permitted by procedures under Executive
+Order 12333.
+____________________
+(SIGNATURE)
+____________________
+(TITLE)
+____________________
+(DATE)
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+
+SECRET
+USSID 18 ANNEX H
+27 July 1993
+CONSENT AGREEMENT
+SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
+I, ____________________, hereby consent to the National Security Agency
+undertaking to seek and disseminate references to me in foreign communications for the purpose of
+______________________________.
+This consent applies to administrative messages alerting elements of the United States Signals
+Intelligence System to this consent, as well as to any signals intelligence reports that may relate to the
+purpose stated above.
+Except as otherwise provided by Executive Order 12333 procedures, this consent covers only
+references to me in foreign communications and information therefrom that relates to the purpose
+stated above and is effective for the period __________ to __________.
+Signals intelligence reports containing information derived from communications referencing
+me and related to the purpose stated above may only be disseminated to me and to
+__________ except as otherwise permitted by procedures under Executive Order
+12333.
+____________________
+(SIGNATURE)
+____________________
+(TITLE)
+____________________
+(DATE)
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+
+SECRET
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+ANNEX I
+FORM FOR CERTIFICATION OF
+OPENLY ACKNOWLEDGED ENTITIES (S-CCO)
+The form below should be used for Director approvals for the collection of communications of
+entities that are openly acknowledged to be directed and controlled by a foreign power as specified
+in Section 4.1.c.(3) of USSID 18.
+DIRECTOR, NSA/CHIEF, CSS
+Certification for Openly Acknowledged Entities Under
+Section 4.A.1.(b) of the Classified Annex
+to DOD 5240.1R
+Certification to the Attorney General:
+(S-CCO) The Director, NSA, hereby certifies that [REDACTED]
+located in the United States and openly acknowledged to be directed and controlled by (Government
+X), is a new target of collection. The purpose of the surveillance is (to collect [REDACTED]
+intelligence regarding Government X) in accordance with valid intelligence requirements. The
+surveillance will entail intentional interception or deliberate selection of the target’s international
+communications. Standard minimization procedures will be applied to any information collected that
+relates to U.S. persons.
+Director, NSA/Chief, CSS
+Copy to: Deputy Secretary of Defense
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+
+SECRET
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+ANNEX K
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (S-CCO)
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (S-CCO) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_Production_to_Congress_of_a_May_23_2006_Government_Memorandum_of_Law/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_Production_to_Congress_of_a_May_23_2006_Government_Memorandum_of_Law/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..37e0555
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_Production_to_Congress_of_a_May_23_2006_Government_Memorandum_of_Law/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+{
+ "title": "Production to Congress of a May 23, 2006 Government Memorandum of Law",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "A memo in support of the government’s application to the FISC for authorization of metadata collection under Section 501 of FISA. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2006-05-25",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "HCS",
+ "SI"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "al-Zawahiri, Ayman",
+ "bin Laden, Osama",
+ "Redd, John Scott",
+ "Alexander, Keith B.",
+ "Gonzales, Alberto R.",
+ "McConnell, J. M."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-18",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/production-congress-may-23-2006-government-memorandum-law",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "da082bd8bd96ecce2938b960662df872fba492aa85c5d253140324e846ca45d7",
+ "pages": 81
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_Section_215_-_Primary_Order/ACLU_-_Section_215_-_Primary_Order.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_Section_215_-_Primary_Order/ACLU_-_Section_215_-_Primary_Order.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ccc6324
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_Section_215_-_Primary_Order/ACLU_-_Section_215_-_Primary_Order.md
@@ -0,0 +1,390 @@
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D. C.
+
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
+BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
+ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
+OF TANGIBLE THINGS FROM
+[REDACTED]
+
+Docket Number: BR
+13-80
+
+PRIMARY ORDER
+
+A verified application having been made by the Director of the Federal Bureau of
+Investigation (FBI) for an order pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
+1978 (the Act), Title 50, United States Code (U.S.C.), § 1861, as amended, requiring the
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Derived from: Pleadings in the above-captioned docket
+Declassify on: 12 April 2038
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+production to the National Security Agency (NSA) of the tangible things described
+below, and full consideration having been given to the matters set forth therein, the
+Court finds as follows:
+
+1. There are reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are
+relevant to authorized investigations (other than threat assessments) being conducted
+by the FBI under guidelines approved by the Attorney General under Executive Order
+12333 to protect against international terrorism, which investigations are not being
+conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment to the
+Constitution of the United States. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)]
+
+2. The tangible things sought could be obtained with a subpoena duces tecum
+issued by a court of the United States in aid of a grand jury investigation or with any
+other order issued by a court of the United States directing the production of records or
+tangible things. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)(D)]
+
+3. The application includes an enumeration of the minimization procedures the
+government proposes to follow with regard to the tangible things sought. Such
+procedures are similar to the minimization procedures approved and adopted as
+binding by the order of this Court in Docket Number [REDACTED] and its predecessors. [50
+U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+2
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Accordingly, the Court finds that the application of the United States to obtain
+the tangible things, as described below, satisfies the requirements of the Act and,
+therefore,
+
+IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to the authority conferred on this Court by
+the Act, that the application is GRANTED, and it is
+
+FURTHER ORDERED, as follows:
+
+(1)A. The Custodians of Records of [REDACTED] shall produce to NSA
+upon service of the appropriate secondary order, and continue production on an
+ongoing daily basis thereafter for the duration of this order, unless otherwise ordered
+by the Court, an electronic copy of the following tangible things: all call detail records
+or "telephony metadata"¹ created by [REDACTED]
+
+B. The Custodian of Records of [REDACTED] shall produce to NSA upon service of the
+appropriate secondary order, and continue production on an ongoing daily basis
+
+¹ For purposes of this Order "telephony metadata" includes comprehensive communications
+routing information, including but not limited to session identifying information (e.g.,
+originating and terminating telephone number, International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI)
+number, International Mobile station Equipment Identity (IMEI) number, etc.), trunk identifier,
+telephone calling card numbers, and time and duration of call. Telephony metadata does not
+include the substantive content of any communication, as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8), or the
+name, address, or financial information of a subscriber or customer.
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+3
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+thereafter for the duration of this order, unless otherwise ordered by the Court, an
+electronic copy of the following tangible things: all call detail records or "telephony
+metadata" created by [REDACTED] for communications (i) between the United States and
+abroad; or (ii) wholly within the United States, including local telephone calls.
+[REDACTED]
+
+(2) With respect to any information the FBI receives as a result of this Order
+(information that is disseminated to it by NSA), the FBI shall follow as minimization
+procedures the procedures set forth in The Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic FBI
+Operations (September 29, 2008).
+
+(3) With respect to the information that NSA receives as a result of this Order,
+NSA shall strictly adhere to the following minimization procedures:
+
+A. The government is hereby prohibited from accessing business record
+metadata acquired pursuant to this Court's orders in the above-captioned docket and its
+predecessors ("BR metadata") for any purpose except as described herein.
+
+B. NSA shall store and process the BR metadata in repositories within secure
+networks under NSA's control.² The BR metadata shall carry unique markings such
+
+² The Court understands that NSA will maintain the BR metadata in recovery back-up systems
+for mission assurance and continuity of operations purposes. NSA shall ensure that any access
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+4
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+that software and other controls (including user authentication services) can restrict
+access to it to authorized personnel who have received appropriate and adequate
+training with regard to this authority. NSA shall restrict access to the BR metadata to
+authorized personnel who have received appropriate and adequate training.³
+Appropriately trained and authorized technical personnel may access the BR metadata
+to perform those processes needed to make it usable for intelligence analysis. Technical
+personnel may query the BR metadata using selection terms that have not been RAS-
+approved (described below) for those purposes described above, and may share the
+results of those queries with other authorized personnel responsible for these purposes,
+or use of the BR metadata in the event of any natural disaster, man-made emergency, attack, or
+other unforeseen event is in compliance with the Court's Order.
+³ The Court understands that the technical personnel responsible for NSA's underlying
+corporate infrastructure and the transmission of the BR metadata from the specified persons to
+NSA, will not receive special training regarding the authority granted herein.
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+5
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+but the results of any such queries will not be used for intelligence analysis purposes.
+An authorized technician may access the BR metadata to ascertain those identifiers that
+may be high volume identifiers. The technician may share the results of any such
+access, i.e., the identifiers and the fact that they are high volume identifiers, with
+authorized personnel (including those responsible for the identification and defeat of
+high volume and other unwanted BR metadata from any of NSA's various metadata
+repositories), but may not share any other information from the results of that access for
+intelligence analysis purposes. In addition, authorized technical personnel may access
+the BR metadata for purposes of obtaining foreign intelligence information pursuant to
+the requirements of subparagraph (3)C below.
+
+C. NSA shall access the BR metadata for purposes of obtaining foreign
+intelligence information only through contact chaining queries of the BR metadata as
+described in paragraph 17 of the Declaration of [REDACTED] attached to the
+application as Exhibit A, using selection terms approved as "seeds" pursuant to the
+RAS approval process described below.⁵ NSA shall ensure, through adequate and
+
+⁵ For purposes of this Order, "National Security Agency" and "NSA personnel" are defined as
+any employees of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service ("NSA/CSS" or
+"NSA") and any other personnel engaged in Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) operations
+authorized pursuant to FISA if such operations are executed under the direction, authority, or
+control of the Director, NSA/Chief, CSS (DIRNSA). NSA personnel shall not disseminate BR
+metadata outside the NSA unless the dissemination is permitted by, and in accordance with, the
+requirements of this Order that are applicable to the NSA.
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+6
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+appropriate technical and management controls, that queries of the BR metadata for
+intelligence analysis purposes will be initiated using only a selection term that has been
+RAS-approved. Whenever the BR metadata is accessed for foreign intelligence analysis
+purposes or using foreign intelligence analysis query tools, an auditable record of the
+activity shall be generated.⁶
+
+(i) Except as provided in subparagraph (ii) below, all selection terms to be
+used as "seeds" with which to query the BR metadata shall be approved by any
+of the following designated approving officials: the Chief or Deputy Chief,
+Homeland Security Analysis Center; or one of the twenty specially-authorized
+Homeland Mission Coordinators in the Analysis and Production Directorate of
+the Signals Intelligence Directorate. Such approval shall be given only after the
+designated approving official has determined that based on the factual and
+practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent
+persons act, there are facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion (RAS)
+that the selection term to be queried is associated with [REDACTED]
+
+⁶ This auditable record requirement shall not apply to accesses of the results of RAS-approved
+queries.
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+7
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+[REDACTED] provided, however, that NSA's Office of General Counsel (OGC)
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+8
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+shall first determine that any selection term reasonably believed to be used by a
+United States (U.S.) person is not regarded as associated with [REDACTED]
+on the basis of activities that are protected by the
+First Amendment to the Constitution.
+
+(ii) Selection terms that are currently the subject of electronic surveillance
+authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) based on the
+FISC's finding of probable cause to believe that they are used by [REDACTED]
+including those used by U.S. persons, may be
+deemed approved for querying for the period of FISC-authorized electronic
+surveillance without review and approval by a designated approving official.
+The preceding sentence shall not apply to selection terms under surveillance
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+9
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+pursuant to any certification of the Director of National Intelligence and the
+Attorney General pursuant to Section 702 of FISA, as added by the FISA
+Amendments Act of 2008, or pursuant to an Order of the FISC issued under
+Section 703 or Section 704 of FISA, as added by the FISA Amendments Act of
+2008.
+
+(iii) A determination by a designated approving official that a selection
+term is associated with [REDACTED] shall be effective for:
+one hundred eighty days for any selection term reasonably believed to be used
+by a U.S. person; and one year for all other selection terms. ⁹,¹⁰
+
+⁹ The Court understands that from time to time the information available to designated
+approving officials will indicate that a selection term is or was associated with a Foreign Power
+only for a specific and limited time frame. In such cases, a designated approving official may
+determine that the reasonable, articulable suspicion standard is met, but the time frame for
+which the selection term is or was associated with a Foreign Power shall be specified. The
+automated query process described in the [REDACTED] Declaration limits the first hop query
+results to the specified time frame. Analysts conducting manual queries using that selection
+term shall continue to properly minimize information that may be returned within query results
+that fall outside of that timeframe.
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+10
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+(iv) Queries of the BR metadata using RAS-approved selection terms may
+occur either by manual analyst query or through the automated query process
+described below.¹¹ This automated query process queries the collected BR
+metadata (in a "collection store") with RAS-approved selection terms and returns
+the hop-limited results from those queries to a "corporate store." The corporate
+store may then be searched by appropriately and adequately trained personnel
+for valid foreign intelligence purposes, without the requirement that those
+searches use only RAS-approved selection terms. The specifics of the automated
+query process, as described in the [REDACTED] Declaration, are as follows:
+[REDACTED]
+
+¹¹ This automated query process was initially approved by this Court in its [REDACTED] 2012
+Order amending docket number [REDACTED]
+¹² As an added protection in case technical issues prevent the process from verifying that the
+most up-to-date list of RAS-approved selection terms is being used, this step of the automated
+process checks the expiration dates of RAS-approved selection terms to confirm that the
+approvals for those terms have not expired. This step does not use expired RAS-approved
+selection terms to create the list of "authorized query terms" (described below) regardless of
+whether the list of RAS-approved selection terms is up-to-date.
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+11
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+D. Results of any intelligence analysis queries of the BR metadata may be shared,
+prior to minimization, for intelligence analysis purposes among NSA analysts, subject
+to the requirement that all NSA personnel who receive query results in any form first
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+12
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+receive appropriate and adequate training and guidance regarding the procedures and
+restrictions for the handling and dissemination of such information.¹⁵ NSA shall apply
+the minimization and dissemination requirements and procedures of Section 7 of
+United States Signals Intelligence Directive SP0018 (USSID 18) issued on January 25,
+2011, to any results from queries of the BR metadata, in any form, before the
+information is disseminated outside of NSA in any form. Additionally, prior to
+disseminating any U.S. person information outside NSA, the Director of NSA, the
+Deputy Director of NSA, or one of the officials listed in Section 7.3(c) of USSID 18 (i.e.,
+the Director of the Signals Intelligence Directorate (SID), the Deputy Director of the SID,
+the Chief of the Information Sharing Services (ISS) office, the Deputy Chief of the ISS
+office, and the Senior Operations Officer of the National Security Operations Center)
+must determine that the information identifying the U.S. person is in fact related to
+counterterrorism information and that it is necessary to understand the
+counterterrorism information or assess its importance.¹⁶ Notwithstanding the above
+requirements, NSA may share results from intelligence analysis queries of the BR
+metadata, including U.S. person identifying information, with Executive Branch
+
+¹⁵ In addition, the Court understands that NSA may apply the full range of SIGINT analytic
+tradecraft to the results of intelligence analysis queries of the collected BR metadata.
+¹⁶ In the event the Government encounters circumstances that it believes necessitate the
+alteration of these dissemination procedures, it may obtain prospectively-applicable
+modifications to the procedures upon a determination by the Court that such modifications are
+appropriate under the circumstances and in light of the size and nature of this bulk collection.
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+13
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+personnel (1) in order to enable them to determine whether the information contains
+exculpatory or impeachment information or is otherwise discoverable in legal
+proceedings or (2) to facilitate their lawful oversight functions.
+
+E. BR metadata shall be destroyed no later than five years (60 months) after its
+initial collection.
+
+F. NSA and the National Security Division of the Department of Justice
+(NSD/DoJ) shall conduct oversight of NSA's activities under this authority as outlined
+below.
+
+(i) NSA's OGC and Office of the Director of Compliance (ODOC) shall
+ensure that personnel with access to the BR metadata receive appropriate and
+adequate training and guidance regarding the procedures and restrictions for
+collection, storage, analysis, dissemination, and retention of the BR metadata and
+the results of queries of the BR metadata. NSA's OGC and ODOC shall further
+ensure that all NSA personnel who receive query results in any form first receive
+appropriate and adequate training and guidance regarding the procedures and
+restrictions for the handling and dissemination of such information. NSA shall
+maintain records of all such training.¹⁷ OGC shall provide NSD/DoJ with copies
+
+¹⁷ The nature of the training that is appropriate and adequate for a particular person will
+depend on the person's responsibilities and the circumstances of his access to the BR metadata
+or the results from any queries of the metadata.
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+14
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+of all formal briefing and/or training materials (including all revisions thereto)
+used to brief/train NSA personnel concerning this authority.
+
+(ii) NSA's ODOC shall monitor the implementation and use of the
+software and other controls (including user authentication services) and the
+logging of auditable information referenced above.
+
+(iii) NSA's OGC shall consult with NSD/DoJ on all significant legal
+opinions that relate to the interpretation, scope, and/or implementation of this
+authority. When operationally practicable, such consultation shall occur in
+advance; otherwise NSD shall be notified as soon as practicable.
+
+(iv) At least once during the authorization period, NSA's OGC, ODOC,
+NSD/DoJ, and any other appropriate NSA representatives shall meet for the
+purpose of assessing compliance with this Court's orders. Included in this
+meeting will be a review of NSA's monitoring and assessment to ensure that
+only approved metadata is being acquired. The results of this meeting shall be
+reduced to writing and submitted to the Court as part of any application to
+renew or reinstate the authority requested herein.
+
+(v) At least once during the authorization period, NSD/DoJ shall meet
+with NSA's Office of the Inspector General to discuss their respective oversight
+responsibilities and assess NSA's compliance with the Court's orders.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+15
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+(vi) At least once during the authorization period, NSA's OGC and
+NSD/DoJ shall review a sample of the justifications for RAS approvals for
+selection terms used to query the BR metadata.
+
+(vii) Prior to implementation, all proposed automated query processes
+shall be reviewed and approved by NSA's OGC, NSD/DoJ, and the Court.
+
+G. Approximately every thirty days, NSA shall file with the Court a report that
+includes a discussion of NSA's application of the RAS standard, as well as NSA's
+implementation of the automated query process. In addition, should the United States
+seek renewal of the requested authority, NSA shall also include in its report a
+description of any significant changes proposed in the way in which the call detail
+records would be received from the Providers and any significant changes to the
+controls NSA has in place to receive, store, process, and disseminate the BR metadata.
+
+Each report shall include a statement of the number of instances since the
+preceding report in which NSA has shared, in any form, results from queries of the BR
+metadata that contain United States person information, in any form, with anyone
+outside NSA. For each such instance in which United States person information has
+been shared, the report shall include NSA's attestation that one of the officials
+authorized to approve such disseminations determined, prior to dissemination, that the
+information was related to counterterrorism information and necessary to understand
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+16
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+counterterrorism information or to assess its importance.
+
+This authorization regarding [REDACTED] expires on the 19th day
+of July, 2013, at 5:00 p.m., Eastern Time.
+
+04-25-2013 P02:26
+Signed Eastern Time
+Date Time
+
+ROGER VINSON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+17
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_Section_215_-_Primary_Order/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_Section_215_-_Primary_Order/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f4e9720
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_Section_215_-_Primary_Order/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+{
+ "title": "Section 215 - Primary Order",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-04-25",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "SI"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Vinson, Roger"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/section-215-primary-order",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "b121233f3846fc88a38c7370fcfacff6d8e6d001ef0de8eb11266787f9cb283c",
+ "pages": 17
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_September_1_2009_NSA_Presentation_for_the_FISC/ACLU_-_September_1_2009_NSA_Presentation_for_the_FISC.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_September_1_2009_NSA_Presentation_for_the_FISC/ACLU_-_September_1_2009_NSA_Presentation_for_the_FISC.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b64bc0b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_September_1_2009_NSA_Presentation_for_the_FISC/ACLU_-_September_1_2009_NSA_Presentation_for_the_FISC.md
@@ -0,0 +1,224 @@
+This Briefing is Classified TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN
+Business Records FISA
+Presentation for the
+Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+September 1, 2009
+This Briefing is Classified TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN
+1
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN
+Purpose
+Demonstrate NSA's dedication to compliance with the
+Court Orders and demonstrate how NSA uses the BR
+FISA program operationally in its counterterrorism
+missions while appropriately protecting U.S. person
+privacy.
+* Describe the BR FISA dataflow to include current
+controls and procedures.
+* Provide demonstrations of the analytic workflow to
+include how analysts log onto the system to access and
+query the BR FISA data.
+* Use OP [REDACTED] as a current
+example of NSA's use of the BR FISA Program.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN-
+2
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN
+Agenda 11:30-2:30
+1) Working Lunch and Opening Remarks (11:30 - 11:45)
+LTG Keith B. Alexander
+2) Operation [REDACTED] (11:45-12:15)
+3) BR FISA Dataflow (12:15-12:45)
+[REDACTED]
+4) Break (12:45 - 1:00)
+5) Analyst Demonstrations (1:00 – 2:00)
+Demonstration of how analysts log onto the system to access BR data
+Querying BR FISA data with non-RAS approved seeds prevented by EAR
+Querving BR FISA data with RAS-approved seeds
+[REDACTED]
+6) Oversight and Compliance (2:00 - 2:15)
+John M. DeLong
+7) Closing Discussion (2:15 – 2:30)
+3
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN
+Authorities Timeline
+1976 1978 1981
+Ε.Ο. 11905 Ε.Ο. 12036 Ε.Ο. 12333
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+1978
+FISA
+[REDACTED]
+Present
+4
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN-
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+Business Records (BR) FISA Workflow Diagram
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN
+5
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN-
+Operation [REDACTED] / [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
+Intelligence Analysts
+Counterterrorism Production Center
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN-
+6
+
+[REDACTED]
+7
+
+-TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN-
+BR FISA Dataflow
+[REDACTED]
+Deputy Chief, Information Repositories
+NSA Technology Directorate
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN
+8
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN
+Current Business Record FISA (BRF) PROCESS
+Corporate
+Flow
+Business Records
+FISA (BRF)
+SIGINT
+Metadata Input
+STATION Table
+RAS Non-Approved
+RAS Approved
+Addresses
+(Foreign & Domestic)
+-Met RAS
+-All terorist related addresses
+GUI
+NAVIGATOR"
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+BR FISA Analyst
+Decision & Reporting
+Process
+BR FISA Transaction
+Database
+9
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN//20320108
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN
+Analyst Demonstrations
+Hosted by [REDACTED] Chief, Counterterrorism Production Center
+Presented by: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
+Senior Homeland Mission Coordinators
+Homeland Security Analysis Center
+Counterterrorism Production Center
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN-
+10
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN-
+Analytic Workflow
+Station Table
+Management
+-RAS Approval
+Documentation
+-Upload of
+RAS selector
+-Limited
+access for
+Station Table
+edit capability
+Raw Data
+Queries
+-Log-in
+-Query data
+-Present
+results
+-Technical
+safeguards
+Sharing and
+Management
+of Query
+Results
+-Store results
+-Access
+controls
+-View results
+-Identify leads
+for further
+SIGINT
+analysis and/or
+reporting
+Analysis and
+Reporting
+-Evaluate results
+-Request Chief,
+Information
+Sharing Services
+approval for
+dissemination of
+unminimized
+data
+-Issue formal
+report to
+customers
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN
+11
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN
+Oversight & Compliance
+John M. DeLong
+Director of Compliance
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN
+12
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN
+Compliance Moving Forward
+* Establishment of a Director of Compliance
+- Leverages:
+ * Growth in Signals Intelligence Oversight & Compliance
+ * Stand-up of focused compliance efforts within the
+ Technology Directorate
+- Serves to ensure:
+ * A shared understanding among mission, technology, policy,
+ and authorities
+ * Focused training and awareness efforts
+ * Robust monitoring and assessments of compliance
+* Close coordination with Department of Justice
+* Special Emphasis on BR FISA
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN
+13
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN
+NSA Compliance Structure
+Director
+Deputy Director
+General
+Counsel
+Commercial Solutions O
+Education & Training O
+Inspector
+General
+Director of
+Compliance
+Signals
+Intelligence
+Technology
+Information
+Assurance
+Research
+Oversight &
+Compliance
+Oversight &
+Compliance
+Oversight &
+Compliance
+Oversight &
+Compliance
+= Directly involved in BR-FISA Activities
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN
+14
+
+Concluding Remarks
+15
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_September_1_2009_NSA_Presentation_for_the_FISC/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_September_1_2009_NSA_Presentation_for_the_FISC/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5ec2213
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_September_1_2009_NSA_Presentation_for_the_FISC/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+{
+ "title": "September 1, 2009 NSA Presentation for the FISC",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "An NSA presentation regarding NSA’s bulk telephony metadata program pursuant to Section 501 of FISA with respect to NSA’s compliance with the Court’s orders. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2009-09-01",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "ORCON, NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [
+ "NAVIGATOR"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "DeLong, John M."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-18",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/september-1-2009-nsa-presentation-fisc",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "537f0a6efc528a57b97949aec37b719078bcc6db2712c64d4d2f7711d32dd874",
+ "pages": 15
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_September_2008_Attorney_Generals_Guidelines_for_Domestic_FBI_Operations/ACLU_-_September_2008_Attorney_Generals_Guidelines_for_Domestic_FBI_Operations.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_September_2008_Attorney_Generals_Guidelines_for_Domestic_FBI_Operations/ACLU_-_September_2008_Attorney_Generals_Guidelines_for_Domestic_FBI_Operations.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..82b9eca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_September_2008_Attorney_Generals_Guidelines_for_Domestic_FBI_Operations/ACLU_-_September_2008_Attorney_Generals_Guidelines_for_Domestic_FBI_Operations.md
@@ -0,0 +1,1897 @@
+ALL TEX INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED.
+DATE 10-11-2013 BY NSICC J37J85T94
+
+THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC
+FBI OPERATIONS
+
+PREAMBLE
+
+These Guidelines are issued under the authority of the Attorney General as provided in
+sections 509, 510, 533, and 534 of title 28, United States Code, and Executive Order 12333.
+They apply to domestic investigative activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and
+other activities as provided herein.
+
+2
+
+TABLE OF CONTENTS
+
+INTRODUCTION .....................................................................5
+A. FBI RESPONSIBILITIES – FEDERAL CRIMES, THREATS TO THE
+NATIONAL SECURITY, FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ........................6
+B. THE FBI AS AN INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ................................9
+C. OVERSIGHT ...........................................................10
+I. GENERAL AUTHORITIES AND PRINCIPLES ...................................12
+A. SCOPE ................................................................12
+B. GENERAL AUTHORITIES ..............................................12
+C. USE OF AUTHORITIES AND METHODS ...................................12
+D. NATURE AND APPLICATION OF THE GUIDELINES ........................14
+II. INVESTIGATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE GATHERING ..........................16
+A. ASSESSMENTS .........................................................19
+B. PREDICATED INVESTIGATIONS ........................................20
+C. ENTERPRISE INVESTIGATIONS ........................................23
+III. ASSISTANCE TO OTHER AGENCIES ........................................25
+A. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ......................................25
+B. FEDERAL AGENCIES GENERALLY ......................................25
+C. STATE, LOCAL, OR TRIBAL AGENCIES .................................27
+D. FOREIGN AGENCIES ..................................................27
+E. APPLICABLE STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES ............................28
+IV. INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS AND PLANNING ..................................29
+A. STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS ..................................29
+B. REPORTS AND ASSESSMENTS GENERALLY ............................29
+C. INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS ..............................................29
+V. AUTHORIZED METHODS ....................................................31
+A. PARTICULAR METHODS ..............................................31
+B. SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS ............................................32
+C. OTHERWISE ILLEGAL ACTIVITY ......................................33
+VI. RETENTION AND SHARING OF INFORMATION ..............................35
+A. RETENTION OF INFORMATION ........................................35
+B. INFORMATION SHARING GENERALLY ..................................35
+C. INFORMATION RELATING TO CRIMINAL MATTERS ........................36
+D. INFORMATION RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY AND
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE MATTERS ........................................37
+
+3
+
+VII. DEFINITIONS ............................................................42
+
+4
+
+INTRODUCTION
+
+As the primary investigative agency of the federal government, the Federal Bureau of
+Investigation (FBI) has the authority and responsibility to investigate all violations of federal law
+that are not exclusively assigned to another federal agency. The FBI is further vested by law and
+by Presidential directives with the primary role in carrying out investigations within the United
+States of threats to the national security. This includes the lead domestic role in investigating
+international terrorist threats to the United States, and in conducting counterintelligence activities
+to meet foreign entities' espionage and intelligence efforts directed against the United States.
+The FBI is also vested with important functions in collecting foreign intelligence as a member
+agency of the U.S. Intelligence Community. The FBI accordingly plays crucial roles in the
+enforcement of federal law and the proper administration of justice in the United States, in the
+protection of the national security, and in obtaining information needed by the United States for
+the conduct of its foreign affairs. These roles reflect the wide range of the FBI's current
+responsibilities and obligations, which require the FBI to be both an agency that effectively
+detects, investigates, and prevents crimes, and an agency that effectively protects the national
+security and collects intelligence.
+
+The general objective of these Guidelines is the full utilization of all authorities and
+investigative methods, consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, to protect
+the United States and its people from terrorism and other threats to the national security, to
+protect the United States and its people from victimization by all crimes in violation of federal
+law, and to further the foreign intelligence objectives of the United States. At the same time, it is
+axiomatic that the FBI must conduct its investigations and other activities in a lawful and
+reasonable manner that respects liberty and privacy and avoids unnecessary intrusions into the
+lives of law-abiding people. The purpose of these Guidelines, therefore, is to establish consistent
+policy in such matters. They will enable the FBI to perform its duties with effectiveness,
+certainty, and confidence, and will provide the American people with a firm assurance that the
+FBI is acting properly under the law.
+
+The issuance of these Guidelines represents the culmination of the historical evolution of
+the FBI and the policies governing its domestic operations subsequent to the September 11, 2001,
+terrorist attacks on the United States. Reflecting decisions and directives of the President and the
+Attorney General, inquiries and enactments of Congress, and the conclusions of national
+commissions, it was recognized that the FBI's functions needed to be expanded and better
+integrated to meet contemporary realities:
+
+>[C]ontinuing coordination ... is necessary to optimize the FBI's performance in
+both national security and criminal investigations. [The] new reality requires first
+that the FBI and other agencies do a better job of gathering intelligence inside the United
+States, and second that we eliminate the remnants of the old "wall" between foreign
+intelligence and domestic law enforcement. Both tasks must be accomplished without
+sacrificing our domestic liberties and the rule of law, and both depend on building a very
+
+5
+
+different FBI from the one we had on September 10, 2001. (Report of the Commission
+on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass
+Destruction 466, 452 (2005).)
+
+In line with these objectives, the FBI has reorganized and reoriented its programs and
+missions, and the guidelines issued by the Attorney General for FBI operations have been
+extensively revised over the past several years. Nevertheless, the principal directives of the
+Attorney General governing the FBI's conduct of criminal investigations, national security
+investigations, and foreign intelligence collection have persisted as separate documents involving
+different standards and procedures for comparable activities. These Guidelines effect a more
+complete integration and harmonization of standards, thereby providing the FBI and other
+Justice Department components with clearer, more consistent, and more defensible
+guidance for their activities, and making available to the public in a single document the basic
+body of rules for the FBI's domestic operations.
+
+These Guidelines also incorporate effective oversight measures involving many
+Department of Justice and FBI components, which have been adopted to ensure that all FBI
+activities are conducted in a manner consistent with law and policy.
+
+The broad operational areas addressed by these Guidelines are the FBI's conduct of
+investigative and intelligence gathering activities, including cooperation and coordination with
+other components and agencies in such activities, and the intelligence analysis and planning
+functions of the FBI.
+
+A. FBI RESPONSIBILITIES – FEDERAL CRIMES, THREATS TO THE
+NATIONAL SECURITY, FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
+
+Part II of these Guidelines authorizes the FBI to carry out investigations to detect, obtain
+information about, or prevent or protect against federal crimes or threats to the national security
+or to collect foreign intelligence. The major subject areas of information gathering activities
+under these Guidelines – federal crimes, threats to the national security, and foreign intelligence
+– are not distinct, but rather overlap extensively. For example, an investigation relating to
+international terrorism will invariably concern these areas because international terrorism is
+included under these Guidelines' definition of "threat to the national security," because
+international terrorism subject to investigation within the United States usually involves criminal
+acts that violate federal law, and because information relating to international terrorism also falls
+within the definition of "foreign intelligence." Likewise, counterintelligence activities relating to
+espionage are likely to involve matters that constitute threats to the national security, that
+implicate violations or potential violations of federal criminal laws, and that involve
+information falling under the definition of "foreign intelligence."
+
+While some distinctions in the requirements and procedures for investigations are
+necessary in different subject areas, the general design of these Guidelines is to take a uniform
+
+6
+
+approach wherever possible, thereby promoting certainty and consistency regarding the
+applicable standards and facilitating compliance with those standards. Hence, these Guidelines
+do not require that the FBI's information gathering activities be differentially labeled as "criminal
+investigations," "national security investigations," or "foreign intelligence collections," or that
+the categories of FBI personnel who carry out investigations be segregated from each other based
+on the subject areas in which they operate. Rather, all of the FBI's legal authorities are available
+for deployment in all cases to which they apply to protect the public from crimes and threats to
+the national security and to further the United States' foreign intelligence objectives. In many
+cases, a single investigation will be supportable as an exercise of a number of these authorities
+— i.e., as an investigation of a federal crime or crimes, as an investigation of a threat to the national
+security, and/or as a collection of foreign intelligence.
+
+1. Federal Crimes
+
+The FBI has the authority to investigate all federal crimes that are not exclusively
+assigned to other agencies. In most ordinary criminal investigations, the immediate objectives
+include such matters as: determining whether a federal crime has occurred or is occurring, or if
+planning or preparation for such a crime is taking place; identifying, locating, and apprehending
+the perpetrators; and obtaining the evidence needed for prosecution. Hence, close cooperation
+and coordination with federal prosecutors in the United States Attorneys' Offices and the Justice
+Department litigating divisions are essential both to ensure that agents have the investigative
+tools and legal advice at their disposal for which prosecutorial assistance or approval is needed,
+and to ensure that investigations are conducted in a manner that will lead to successful
+prosecution. Provisions in many parts of these Guidelines establish procedures and requirements
+for such coordination.
+
+2. Threats to the National Security
+
+The FBI's authority to investigate threats to the national security derives from the
+executive order concerning U.S. intelligence activities, from delegations of functions by the
+Attorney General, and from various statutory sources. See, e.g., E.O. 12333; 50 U.S.C. 401 et
+seq.; 50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq. These Guidelines (Part VII.S) specifically define threats to the
+national security to mean: international terrorism; espionage and other intelligence activities,
+sabotage, and assassination, conducted by, for, or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or
+persons; foreign computer intrusion; and other matters determined by the Attorney General,
+consistent with Executive Order 12333 or any successor order.
+
+Activities within the definition of "threat to the national security" that are subject to
+investigation under these Guidelines commonly involve violations (or potential violations) of
+federal criminal laws. Hence, investigations of such threats may constitute an exercise both of
+the FBI's criminal investigation authority and of the FBI's authority to investigate threats to the
+national security. As with criminal investigations generally, detecting and solving the crimes,
+and eventually arresting and prosecuting the perpetrators, are likely to be among the objectives of
+
+7
+
+investigations relating to threats to the national security. But these investigations also often serve
+important purposes outside the ambit of normal criminal investigation and prosecution, by
+providing the basis for, and informing decisions concerning, other measures needed to protect the
+national security. These measures may include, for example: excluding or removing persons
+involved in terrorism or espionage from the United States; recruitment of double agents; freezing
+assets of organizations that engage in or support terrorism; securing targets of terrorism or
+espionage; providing threat information and warnings to other federal, state, local, and private
+agencies and entities; diplomatic or military actions; and actions by other intelligence agencies to
+counter international terrorism or other national security threats.
+
+In line with this broad range of purposes, investigations of threats to the national security
+present special needs for coordination with other Justice Department components, including
+particularly the Justice Department's National Security Division, and to share information and
+cooperate with other agencies with national security responsibilities, including other agencies of
+the U.S. Intelligence Community, the Department of Homeland Security, and relevant White
+House (including National Security Council and Homeland Security Council) agencies and
+entities. Various provisions in these Guidelines establish procedures and requirements to
+facilitate such coordination.
+
+3. Foreign Intelligence
+
+As with the investigation of threats to the national security, the FBI's authority to collect
+foreign intelligence derives from a mixture of administrative and statutory sources. See, e.g.,
+E.O. 12333; 50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.; 50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.; 28 U.S.C. 532 note (incorporating
+P.L. 108-458 §§ 2001-2003). These Guidelines (Part VII.F) define foreign intelligence to mean
+information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign governments or
+elements thereof, foreign organizations or foreign persons, or international terrorists.
+
+The FBI's foreign intelligence collection activities have been expanded by legislative and
+administrative reforms subsequent to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, reflecting the
+FBI's role as the primary collector of foreign intelligence within the United States, and the
+recognized imperative that the United States' foreign intelligence collection activities become
+more timely, more proactive, and more efficient in order to protect the homeland and adequately
+inform the United States' special decisions in its dealings with the rest of the world:
+
+>The collection of information is the foundation of everything that the Intelligence
+Community does. While successful collection cannot ensure a good analytical product,
+the failure to collect information ... turns analysis into guesswork. And as our review
+demonstrates, the Intelligence Community's human and technical intelligence collection
+agencies have collected far too little information on many of the issues we care about
+most. (Report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States
+Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction 351 (2005).)
+
+8
+
+These Guidelines accordingly provide standards and procedures for the FBI's foreign intelligence
+collection activities that meet current needs and realities and optimize the FBI's ability to
+discharge its foreign intelligence collection functions.
+
+The authority to collect foreign intelligence extends the sphere of the FBI's information
+gathering activities beyond federal crimes and threats to the national security, and permits the
+FBI to seek information regarding a broader range of matters relating to foreign powers,
+organizations, or persons that may be of interest to the conduct of the United States' foreign
+affairs. The FBI's role is central to the effective collection of foreign intelligence within the
+United States because the authorized domestic activities of other intelligence agencies are more
+constrained than those of the FBI under applicable statutes and Executive Order 12333. In
+collecting foreign intelligence, the FBI ordinarily is guided by nationally-determined
+intelligence requirements, including the National Intelligence Priorities Framework and the
+National HUMINT Collection Directives, or any successor directives issued under the authority
+of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). As provided in Part VII.F of these Guidelines,
+foreign intelligence requirements may also be established by the President or Intelligence
+Community officials designated by the President, and by the Attorney General, the Deputy
+Attorney General, or an official designated by the Attorney General.
+
+The general guidance of the FBI's foreign intelligence collection activities by DNI-
+authorized requirements does not, however, limit the FBI's authority to conduct investigations,
+supply tools, and legal advice at their disposal for which prosecutorial assistance or approval is needed,
+and to ensure that investigations are conducted in a manner that will lead to successful
+prosecution. Provisions in many parts of these Guidelines establish procedures and requirements
+for such coordination.
+
+Since the authority to collect foreign intelligence enables the FBI to obtain information
+pertinent to the United States' conduct of its foreign affairs, even if that information is not related
+to criminal activity or threats to the national security, the information so gathered may concern
+lawful activities. The FBI should accordingly operate openly and consensually with U.S. persons
+to the extent practicable when collecting foreign intelligence that does not concern criminal
+activities or threats to the national security.
+
+B. THE FBI AS AN INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
+
+The FBI is an intelligence agency as well as a law enforcement agency. Its basic
+functions accordingly extend beyond limited investigations of discrete matters, and include
+broader analytic and planning functions. The FBI's responsibilities in this area derive from
+various administrative and statutory sources. See, e.g., E.O. 12333; 28 U.S.C. 532 note
+(incorporating P.L. 108-458 §§ 2001-2003) and 534 note (incorporating P.L. 109-162 § 1107).
+Enhancement of the FBI's intelligence analysis capabilities and functions has consistently been
+recognized as a key priority in the legislative and administrative reform efforts following the
+
+9
+
+September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks:
+
+>[Counterterrorism] strategy should . . . encompass specific efforts to . . . enhance the
+depth and quality of domestic intelligence collection and analysis. . . . [T]he FBI should
+strengthen and improve its domestic [intelligence] capability to fully and expeditiously as
+possible by immediately instituting measures to . . . significantly improve strategic
+analytical capabilities. . . . (Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before
+and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, S. Rep. No. 351 & H.R. Rep. No.
+792, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-7 (2002) (internal pprint).)
+
+>A "smart" government would integrate all sources of information to see the enemy as a
+whole. Integrated all-source analysis should also inform and shape strategies to collect
+more intelligence. . . . The importance of integrated, all-source analysis cannot be
+overstated. Without it, it is not possible to "connect the dots." (Final Report of the
+National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 401, 408 (2004).)
+
+Part IV of these Guidelines accordingly authorizes the FBI to engage in intelligence
+analysis and planning, drawing on all lawful sources of information. The functions authorized
+under this Part include: (i) development of overviews and analyses concerning threats to and
+vulnerabilities of the United States and its interests, (ii) research and analysis to produce reports
+and assessments concerning matters relevant to investigative activities or other authorized FBI
+activities, and (iii) the operation of intelligence systems that facilitate and support investigations
+through the compilation and analysis of data and information on an ongoing basis.
+
+C. OVERSIGHT
+
+The activities authorized by these Guidelines must be conducted in a manner consistent
+with all applicable laws, regulations, and policies, including those protecting privacy and civil
+liberties. The Justice Department's National Security Division and the FBI's Inspection
+Division, Office of General Counsel, and Office of Integrity and Compliance, along with other
+components, share the responsibility to ensure that the Department meets these goals with respect
+to national security and foreign intelligence matters. In particular, the National Security
+Division's Oversight Division, in conjunction with the FBI's Office of General Counsel, is
+responsible for conducting regular reviews of all aspects of FBI national security and foreign
+intelligence activities. These reviews, conducted at FBI field offices and headquarter units,
+broadly examine such activities for compliance with these Guidelines and other applicable
+requirements.
+
+Various features of these Guidelines facilitate the National Security Division's oversight
+functions. Relevant requirements and provisions include: (i) required notification by the FBI to
+the National Security Division concerning full investigations that involve foreign intelligence
+collection or investigation of United States persons in relation to threats of the national security,
+(ii) annual reports by the FBI to the National Security Division concerning the FBI's foreign
+
+10
+
+intelligence collection program, including information on the scope and nature of foreign
+intelligence collection activities in each FBI field office, and (iii) access by the National Security
+Division to information obtained by the FBI through national security or foreign intelligence
+activities and general authority for the Assistant Attorney General for National Security to obtain
+reports from the FBI concerning these activities.
+
+Pursuant to these Guidelines, other Attorney General guidelines, and institutional
+assignments of responsibility within the Justice Department, additional Department components
+– including the Criminal Division, the United States Attorneys' Offices, and the Office of
+Privacy and Civil Liberties – are involved in the common endeavor with the FBI of ensuring that
+the activities of all Department components are lawful, appropriate, and ethical as well as
+effective. Examples include the requirement of both formal prosecutorial personnel in the
+review of undercover operations involving sensitive circumstances, notice requirements for
+investigations involving sensitive investigative matters (as defined in Part VII.N of these
+Guidelines), and notice and oversight provisions for enterprise investigations, which may involve
+a broad examination of groups implicated in the gravest criminal and national security threats.
+These requirements and procedures help to ensure that the rule of law is respected in the
+Department's activities and that public confidence is maintained in these activities.
+
+11
+
+I. GENERAL AUTHORITIES AND PRINCIPLES
+
+A. SCOPE
+
+These Guidelines apply to investigative activities conducted by the FBI within the United
+States or outside the territories of all countries. They do not apply to investigative
+activities of the FBI in foreign countries, which are governed by the Attorney General's
+Guidelines for Extraterritorial FBI Operations.
+
+B. GENERAL AUTHORITIES
+
+1. The FBI is authorized to conduct investigations to detect, obtain information
+about, and prevent and protect against federal crimes and threats to the national
+security and to collect foreign intelligence, as provided in Part II of these
+Guidelines.
+
+2. The FBI is authorized to provide investigative assistance to other federal agencies,
+state, local, or tribal agencies, and foreign agencies as provided in Part III of these
+Guidelines.
+
+3. The FBI is authorized to conduct intelligence analysis and planning as provided in
+Part IV of these Guidelines.
+
+4. The FBI is authorized to retain and share information obtained pursuant to these
+Guidelines as provided in Part VI of these Guidelines.
+
+C. USE OF AUTHORITIES AND METHODS
+
+1. Protection of the United States and Its People
+
+The FBI shall fully utilize the authorities provided and the methods authorized by
+these Guidelines to protect the United States and its people from crimes in
+violation of federal law and threats to the national security, and to further the
+foreign intelligence objectives of the United States.
+
+2. Choice of Methods
+
+a. The conduct of investigations and other activities authorized by these
+Guidelines may present choices between the use of different investigative
+methods that are each operationally sound and effective, but that are more
+or less intrusive, considering such factors as the effect on the privacy and
+civil liberties of individuals and potential damage to reputation. The least
+intrusive method feasible is to be used in such situations. It is recognized,
+
+12
+
+b. however, that the choice of methods is a matter of judgment. The FBI
+shall not hesitate to use any lawful method consistent with these
+Guidelines, even if intrusive, where the degree of intrusiveness is
+warranted in light of the seriousness of a criminal or national security
+threat or the strength of the information indicating its existence, or in light
+of the importance of foreign intelligence sought to the United States'
+interests. This point is to be particularly observed in investigations
+relating to terrorism.
+
+c. United States persons shall be dealt with openly and consensually to the
+extent practicable when collecting foreign intelligence that does not
+concern criminal activities or threats to the national security.
+
+3. Respect for Legal Rights
+
+All activities under these Guidelines must have a valid purpose consistent with
+these Guidelines, and must be carried out in conformity with the Constitution and
+all applicable statutes, executive orders, Department of Justice regulations and
+policies, and Attorney General guidelines. These Guidelines do not authorize
+investigating or collecting or maintaining information on United States persons
+solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment
+or the lawful exercise of other rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the
+United States. These Guidelines also do not authorize any conduct prohibited by
+the Guidance Regarding the Use of Race by Federal Law Enforcement Agencies.
+
+4. Undisclosed Participation in Organizations
+
+Undisclosed participation in organizations in activities under these Guidelines
+shall be conducted in accordance with FBI policy approved by the Attorney
+General.
+
+5. Maintenance of Records under the Privacy Act
+
+The Privacy Act restricts the maintenance of records relating to certain activities
+of individuals who are United States persons, with exceptions for circumstances
+in which the collection of such information is pertinent to and within the scope of
+an authorized law enforcement activity or is otherwise authorized by statute, 5
+U.S.C. 552a(e)(7). Activities authorized by these Guidelines are authorized law
+enforcement activities or activities for which there is otherwise statutory authority
+for purposes of the Privacy Act. These Guidelines, however, do not provide an
+exhaustive enumeration of authorized FBI law enforcement activities or FBI
+activities for which there is otherwise statutory authority, and no restriction is
+implied with respect to such activities carried out by the FBI pursuant to other
+
+13
+
+authorities. Further questions about the application of the Privacy Act to
+authorized activities of the FBI should be addressed to the FBI Office of the
+General Counsel, the FBI Privacy and Civil Liberties Unit, or the Department of
+Justice Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties.
+
+D. NATURE AND APPLICATION OF THE GUIDELINES
+
+1. Repealers
+
+These Guidelines supersede the following guidelines, which are hereby repealed:
+
+a. The Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering
+Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations (May 30, 2002) and all
+predecessor guidelines thereto.
+
+b. The Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security
+Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (October 31, 2003) and
+all predecessor guidelines thereto.
+
+c. The Attorney General's Supplemental Guidelines for Collection,
+Retention, and Dissemination of Foreign Intelligence (November 29,
+2006).
+
+d. The Attorney General Procedure for Reporting and Use of Information
+Concerning Violations of Law and Authorization for Participation in
+Otherwise Illegal Activity in FBI Foreign Intelligence, Counterintelligence
+or International Terrorism Intelligence Investigations (August 8, 1988).
+
+e. The Attorney General's Guidelines for Reporting on Civil Disorders and
+Demonstrations Involving a Federal Interest (April 5, 1976).
+
+2. Status as Internal Guidance
+
+These Guidelines are set forth solely for the purpose of internal Department of
+Justice guidance. They are not intended to, do not, and may not be relied upon to
+create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable by law by any party in
+any matter, civil or criminal, nor do they place any limitation on otherwise lawful
+investigative and litigative prerogatives of the Department of Justice.
+
+3. Departures from the Guidelines
+
+Departures from these Guidelines must be approved by the Director of the FBI, by
+the Deputy Director of the FBI, or by an Executive Assistant Director designated
+
+14
+
+by the Director. If a departure is necessary without such prior approval because of
+the immediacy or gravity of a threat to the safety of persons or property or to the
+national security, the Director, the Deputy Director, or a designated Executive
+Assistant Director shall be notified as soon thereafter as practicable. The FBI
+shall also timely provide notice of departures from these Guidelines to the
+Criminal Division and the National Security Division, and those divisions shall
+notify the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General. Notwithstanding
+this paragraph, all activities in all circumstances must be carried out in a manner
+consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.
+
+4. Other Activities Not Limited
+
+These Guidelines apply to FBI activities as provided herein and do not limit other
+authorized activities of the FBI, such as the FBI's responsibilities to conduct
+background checks and inquiries concerning applicants and employees under
+federal personnel security programs, the FBI's maintenance and operation of
+national criminal records systems and preparation of national crime statistics, and
+the forensic assistance and administration functions of the FBI Laboratory.
+
+15
+
+II. INVESTIGATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE GATHERING
+
+This Part of the Guidelines authorizes the FBI to conduct investigations to detect, obtain
+information about, and prevent and protect against federal crimes and threats to the national
+security and to collect foreign intelligence.
+
+When an authorized purpose exists, the focus of activities authorized by this Part may be
+whatever the circumstances warrant: the subject of such an activity may be, for example, a
+particular crime or threatened crime; conduct constituting a threat to the national security; an
+individual, group, or organization that may be involved in criminal or national security-
+threatening conduct; or a topical matter of foreign intelligence interest.
+
+Investigations may also be undertaken for protective purposes in relation to individuals,
+groups, or entities that may be targeted for criminal victimization or sexual abuse, or for
+terrorist attack or other depredations by the enemies of the United States. For example, the
+participation of the FBI in special events management, in relation to public events or other
+activities whose character may make them attractive targets for terrorist attack, is an authorized
+exercise of the authorities conveyed by these Guidelines. Likewise, for counterintelligence
+activities, such as identifying and securing facilities, personnel, or information that may be
+targeted for infiltration, recruitment, or acquisition by foreign intelligence services are authorized
+exercises of the authorities conveyed by these Guidelines.
+
+The identification and recruitment of human sources – who may be able to provide or
+obtain information relating to criminal activities, information relating to terrorism, espionage, or
+other threats to the national security, or information relating to matters of foreign intelligence
+interest – is also critical to the effectiveness of the FBI's law enforcement, national security, and
+intelligence programs, and activities undertaken for this Part are authorized and encouraged.
+
+The scope of authorized activities under this Part is not limited to "investigation" in a
+narrow sense, such as solving particular cases or obtaining evidence for use in particular criminal
+prosecutions. Rather, these activities also provide critical information needed for broader
+analytic and intelligence purposes to facilitate the detection and prevention of crime, protect the
+national security, and further foreign intelligence objectives. These purposes include use of the
+information in intelligence analysis and planning under Part IV, and dissemination of the
+information to other law enforcement, Intelligence Community, and White House agencies under
+Part VI. Information obtained at all stages of investigative activity is accordingly to be retained
+and disseminated for these purposes as provided in these Guidelines, or in FBI policy promulgated
+with these Guidelines, regardless of whether it furthers investigative objectives in a narrower or
+more immediate sense.
+
+In the course of activities under these Guidelines, the FBI may incidentally obtain
+information relating to matters outside of its areas of primary investigative responsibility. For
+example, information relating to violations of state or local law or foreign law may be
+
+16
+
+incidentally obtained in the course of investigating federal crimes or threats to the national
+security or in collecting foreign intelligence. These Guidelines do not bar the acquisition of such
+information in the course of authorized investigative activities, the retention of such information,
+or its dissemination as appropriate to the responsible authorities in other agencies or
+jurisdictions. Part VI of these Guidelines includes specific authorizations and requirements for
+sharing such information with relevant agencies and officials.
+
+This Part authorizes different levels of information gathering activity, which afford the
+FBI flexibility, under appropriate standards and procedures, to adapt the methods utilized and the
+information sought to the nature of the matter under investigation and the character of the
+information supporting the need for investigation.
+
+Assessments, authorized by Subpart A of this Part, require an authorized purpose but not
+any particular factual predication. For example, to carry out its central mission of preventing the
+commission of terrorist acts against the United States and its people, the FBI must proactively
+draw on available sources of information to identify terrorist threats and activities. It cannot be
+content to wait for leads to come in through the actions of others, but rather must be vigilant in
+detecting terrorist activities to the full extent permitted by law, with an eye towards early
+intervention and prevention of acts of terrorism before they occur. Likewise, in the exercise of
+its protective functions, the FBI is not constrained to wait until information is received indicating
+that a particular event, activity, or facility has drawn the attention of those who would threaten
+the national security. Rather, the FBI must take the initiative to secure and protect activities and
+entities whose character may make them attractive targets for terrorism or espionage. The
+proactive investigative authority conveyed in assessments is designed for, and may be utilized by,
+the FBI in the discharge of these responsibilities. For example, assessments may be conducted as
+part of the FBI's special events management activities.
+
+More broadly, detecting and interrupting criminal activities at their early stages, and
+preventing crimes from occurring in the first place, is preferable to allowing criminal plots and
+activities to come to fruition. Hence, assessments may be undertaken proactively with such
+objectives as detecting criminal activities; obtaining information on individuals, groups, or
+organizations of possible investigative interest, either because they may be involved in criminal
+or national security-threatening activities or because they may be targeted for attack or
+victimization by such activities; and identifying and assessing individuals who may have value as
+human sources. For example, assessment activities may involve proactively surfing the Internet
+to find publicly accessible websites and services through which recruitment by terrorist
+organizations and promotion of terrorist crimes is openly taking place; through which child
+pornography is advertised and traded; through which efforts are made by sexual predators to lure
+children for purposes of sexual abuse; or through which fraudulent schemes are perpetrated
+against the public.
+
+The methods authorized in assessments are generally those of relatively low
+intrusiveness, such as obtaining publicly available information, checking government records,
+
+17
+
+and requesting information from members of the public. These Guidelines do not impose
+supervisory approval requirements in assessments, given the types of techniques that are
+authorized at this stage (e.g., perusing the Internet for publicly available information). However,
+FBI policy will prescribe supervisory approval requirements for certain assessments, considering
+such matters as the purpose of the assessment and the methods being utilized.
+
+Beyond the proactive information gathering functions described above, assessments may
+be used when allegations or other information concerning crimes or threats to the national
+security is received or obtained, and the matter can be checked out or resolved through the
+relatively non-intrusive methods authorized in assessments. The checking of investigative leads
+in this manner can avoid the need to proceed to more formal levels of investigative activity, if the
+results of an assessment indicate that further investigation is not warranted.
+
+Subpart B of this Part authorizes a second level of investigative activity, predicated
+investigations. The purposes or objectives of predicated investigations are essentially the same
+as those of assessments, but predication as provided in these Guidelines is needed – generally,
+allegations, reports, facts or circumstances indicative of possible criminal or national security-
+threatening activity, or the potential for acquiring information responsive to foreign-intelligence
+requirements – and supervisory approval must be obtained, to initiate predicated investigations.
+Corresponding to the stronger predication and approval requirements, all lawful methods may be
+used in predicated investigations. A classified directive provides further specification concerning
+circumstances supporting certain predicated investigations.
+
+Predicated investigations that concern federal crimes or threats to the national security are
+subdivided into preliminary investigations and full investigations. Preliminary investigations
+may be initiated on the basis of any allegation or information indicative of possible criminal or
+national security-threatening activity, but more substantial factual predication is required for full
+investigations. While time limits are set for the completion of preliminary investigations, full
+investigations may be pursued without preset limits on their duration.
+
+The final investigative category under this Part of the Guidelines is enterprise
+investigations, authorized by Subpart C, which permit a general examination of the structure,
+scope, and nature of certain groups and organizations. Enterprise investigations are a type of full
+investigations. Hence, they are subject to the purpose, approval, and predication requirements
+that apply to full investigations, and all lawful methods may be used in carrying them out. The
+distinctive characteristic of enterprise investigations is that they concern groups or organizations
+that may be involved in the most serious criminal or national security threats to the public –
+generally, patterns of racketeering activity, terrorism or other threats to the national security, or
+the commission of offenses characteristically involved in terrorism as described in 18 U.S.C.
+2332b(g)(5)(B). A broad examination of the characteristics of groups satisfying these criteria is
+authorized in enterprise investigations, including any relationship of the group to a foreign
+power, its size and composition, its geographic dimensions and finances, its past acts and goals,
+and its capacity for harm.
+
+18
+
+A. ASSESSMENTS
+
+1. Purposes
+
+Assessments may be carried out to detect, obtain information about, or prevent or
+protect against federal crimes or threats to the national security or to collect
+foreign intelligence.
+
+2. Approval
+
+The conduct of assessments is subject to any supervisory approval requirements
+prescribed by FBI policy.
+
+3. Authorized Activities
+
+Activities that may be carried out for the purposes described in paragraph 1. in an
+assessment include:
+
+a. seeking information, proactively or in response to investigative leads,
+relating to:
+
+i. activities constituting violations of federal criminal law or threats
+to the national security,
+
+ii. the involvement or role of individuals, groups, or organizations in
+such activities; or
+
+iii. matters of foreign intelligence interest responsive to foreign
+intelligence requirements;
+
+b. identifying and obtaining information about potential targets of or
+vulnerabilities to criminal activities in violation of federal law or threats to
+the national security;
+
+c. seeking information to identify potential human sources, assess the
+suitability, credibility, or value of individuals as human sources, validate
+human sources, or maintain the cover or credibility of human sources, who
+may be able to provide or obtain information relating to criminal activities
+in violation of federal law, threats to the national security, or matters of
+foreign intelligence interest; and
+
+d. obtaining information to inform or facilitate intelligence analysis and
+planning as described in Part IV of these Guidelines.
+
+19
+
+4. Authorized Methods
+
+Only the following methods may be used in assessments:
+
+a. Obtain publicly available information.
+
+b. Access and examine FBI and other Department of Justice records, and
+obtain information from any FBI or other Department of Justice personnel.
+
+c. Access and examine records maintained by, and request information from,
+other federal, state, local, or tribal, or foreign governmental entities or
+agencies.
+
+d. Use online services and resources (whether nonprofit or commercial).
+
+e. Use and recruit human sources in conformity with the Attorney General's
+Guidelines Regarding the Use of FBI Confidential Human Sources.
+
+f. Interview or request information from members of the public and private
+entities.
+
+g. Accept information voluntarily provided by governmental or private
+entities.
+
+h. Engage in observation or surveillance not requiring a court order.
+
+i. Grand jury subpoenas for telephone or electronic mail subscriber
+information.
+
+B. PREDICATED INVESTIGATIONS
+
+1. Purposes
+
+Predicated investigations may be carried out to detect, obtain information about,
+or prevent or protect against federal crimes or threats to the national security or to
+collect foreign intelligence.
+
+2. Approval
+
+The initiation of a predicated investigation requires supervisory approval at a level
+or levels specified by FBI policy. A predicated investigation based on paragraph
+3.c. (relating to foreign intelligence) must be approved by a Special Agent in
+Charge or by an FBI Headquarters official as provided in such policy.
+
+20
+
+3. Circumstances Warranting Investigation
+
+A predicated investigation may be initiated on the basis of any of the following
+circumstances:
+
+a. An activity constituting a federal crime or a threat to the national security
+has or may have occurred, is or may be occurring, or will or may occur and
+the investigation may obtain information relating to the activity or the
+involvement or role of an individual, group, or organization in such
+activity.
+
+b. An individual, group, organization, entity, information, property, or
+activity is or may be a target of attack, victimization, acquisition,
+infiltration, or recruitment in connection with criminal activity in violation
+of federal law or a threat to the national security and the investigation may
+obtain information that would help to protect against such activity or
+threat.
+
+c. The investigation may obtain foreign intelligence that is responsive to a
+foreign intelligence requirement.
+
+4. Preliminary and Full Investigations
+
+A predicated investigation relating to a federal crime or threat to the national
+security may be conducted as a Preliminary Investigation or a Full Investigation. A
+predicated investigation that is based solely on the authority to collect foreign
+intelligence may be conducted only as a full investigation.
+
+a. Preliminary Investigations
+
+i. Predication Required for Preliminary Investigations
+
+A preliminary investigation may be initiated on the basis of
+information or an allegation indicating the existence of a
+circumstance described in paragraph 3.a.–.b.
+
+ii. Duration of Preliminary Investigations
+
+A preliminary investigation must be concluded within six months
+of its initiation, which may be extended by up to six months by the
+Special Agent in Charge. Extensions of preliminary investigations
+beyond a year must be approved by FBI Headquarters.
+
+21
+
+iii. Methods Allowed in Preliminary Investigations
+
+All lawful methods may be used in a preliminary investigation
+except for methods within the scope of Part V.A.11.–.13. of these
+Guidelines.
+
+b. Full Investigations
+
+i. Predication Required for Full Investigations
+
+A full investigation may be initiated if there is an articulable
+factual basis for the investigation that reasonably indicates that a
+circumstance described in paragraph 3.a.–.b. exists or if a
+circumstance described in paragraph 3.c. exists.
+
+ii. Methods Allowed in Full Investigations
+
+All lawful methods may be used in a full investigation.
+
+5. Notice Requirements
+
+a. An FBI field office shall notify FBI Headquarters and the United States
+Attorney or other appropriate Department of Justice official of the
+initiation by the field office of a predicated investigation involving a
+sensitive investigative matter. If the investigation is initiated by FBI
+Headquarters, FBI Headquarters shall notify the United States Attorney or
+other appropriate Department of Justice official of the initiation of such an
+investigation. If the investigation concerns a threat to the national
+security, an official of the National Security Division must be notified.
+The notice shall identify all sensitive investigative matters involved in the
+investigation.
+
+b. The FBI shall notify the National Security Division of:
+
+i. the initiation of any full investigation of a United States person
+relating to a threat to the national security; and
+
+ii. the initiation of any full investigation that is based on paragraph
+3.c. (relating to foreign intelligence).
+
+c. The notifications under subparagraphs a. and b. shall be made as soon as
+practicable, but no later than 30 days after the initiation of an
+investigation.
+
+22
+
+d. The FBI shall notify the Deputy Attorney General if FBI Headquarters
+disapproves a field office's initiation of a predicated investigation relating
+to a threat to the national security on the ground that the predication for the
+investigation is insufficient.
+
+C. ENTERPRISE INVESTIGATIONS
+
+1. Definition
+
+A full investigation of a group or organization may be initiated as an enterprise
+investigation if there is an articulable factual basis for the investigation that
+reasonably indicates that the group or organization may have engaged or may be
+engaged in, or may have or may be engaged in planning or preparation or
+provision of support for:
+
+a. a pattern of racketeering activity as defined in 18 U.S.C. 1961(5);
+
+b. international terrorism or other threat to the national security;
+
+c. domestic terrorism as defined in 18 U.S.C. 2331(5) involving a violation
+of federal criminal law;
+
+d. furthering political or social goals wholly or in part through activities that
+involve force or violence and a violation of federal criminal law; or
+
+e. an offense described in 18 U.S.C. 2332b(g)(5)(B) or 18 U.S.C. 43.
+
+2. Scope
+
+The information sought in an enterprise investigation may include a general
+examination of the structure, scope, and nature of the group or organization,
+including: its relationships, if any, to a foreign power; the identity and relationship
+of its members, employees, or other persons who may be acting in furtherance of
+its objectives; its finances and resources; its geographical dimensions; and its past
+and future activities and goals.
+
+3. Notice and Reporting Requirements
+
+a. The responsible Department of Justice component for the purpose of
+notification and reports in enterprise investigations is the National Security
+Division, except that, for the purpose of notifications and reports in an
+enterprise investigation relating to a pattern of racketeering activity that
+does not involve an offense or offenses described in 18 U.S.C.
+2332b(g)(5)(B), the responsible Department of Justice component is the
+
+23
+
+b. Organized Crime and Racketeering Section of the Criminal Division.
+
+c. An FBI field office shall notify FBI Headquarters of the initiation by the
+field office of an enterprise investigation.
+
+d. The FBI shall notify the National Security Division or the Organized
+Crime and Racketeering Section of the initiation of an enterprise
+investigation, whether by a field office or by FBI Headquarters, and the
+component so notified shall notify the Attorney General and the Deputy
+Attorney General. The FBI shall also notify any relevant United States
+Attorney's Office, except that any investigation within the scope of Part
+VI.D.1.d of these Guidelines (relating to counterintelligence
+investigations) is to be treated as provided in that provision. Notifications
+by the FBI under this subparagraph shall be provided as soon as
+practicable, but no later than 30 days after the initiation of the
+investigation.
+
+The Assistant Attorney General for National Security or the Chief of the
+Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, as appropriate, may at any
+time request the FBI to provide a report on the status of an enterprise
+investigation and the FBI will provide such reports as requested.
+
+24
+
+III. ASSISTANCE TO OTHER AGENCIES
+
+The FBI is authorized to provide investigative assistance to other federal, state, local, or
+tribal, or foreign agencies as provided in this Part.
+
+The investigative assistance authorized by this Part is often concerned with the same
+objectives as those identified in Part II of these Guidelines – investigating federal crimes and
+threats to the national security, and collecting foreign intelligence. In some cases, however,
+investigative assistance to other agencies is legally authorized for purposes other than those
+identified in Part II, such as assistance in certain contexts to state or local agencies in the
+investigation of crimes under state or local law, see 28 U.S.C. 540, 540A, 540B, and assistance
+to foreign agencies in the investigation of foreign law violations pursuant to international
+agreements. Investigative assistance for such legally authorized purposes is permitted under this
+Part, even if it is not for purposes identified as grounds for investigation under Part II.
+
+The authorities provided by this Part are cumulative to Part II and do not limit the FBI's
+investigative activities under Part II. For example, Subpart B.2 in this Part authorizes
+investigative activities by the FBI in certain circumstances to inform decisions by the President
+concerning the deployment of troops to deal with civil disorders, and Subpart B.3 authorizes
+investigative activities to facilitate demonstrations and related public health and safety measures.
+The requirements and limitations in these provisions for conducting investigations for the
+specified purposes do not limit the FBI's authority under Part II to investigate federal crimes or
+threats to the national security that occur in the context of or in connection with civil disorders or
+demonstrations.
+
+A. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
+
+The FBI may provide investigative assistance (including operational support) to
+authorized intelligence activities of other Intelligence Community agencies.
+
+B. FEDERAL AGENCIES GENERALLY
+
+1. In General
+
+The FBI may provide assistance to any federal agency in the investigation of
+federal crimes or threats to the national security or in the collection of foreign
+intelligence, and investigative assistance to any federal agency for any other
+purpose that may be legally authorized, including investigative assistance to the
+Secret Service in support of its protective responsibilities.
+
+2. The President in Relation to Civil Disorders
+
+a. At the direction of the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, or
+
+25
+
+the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division, the FBI shall
+collect information relating to actual or threatened civil disorders to assist
+the President in determining whether use of the armed forces or militia is
+required and how such forces should be deployed. The information sought
+shall concern such matters as:
+
+i. The size of the actual or threatened disorder, both in number of
+people involved or affected and in geographic area.
+
+ii. The potential for violence.
+
+iii. The potential for expansion of the disorder in light of community
+conditions and underlying causes of the disorder.
+
+iv. The relationship of the actual or threatened disorder to the
+enforcement of federal law or court orders and the likelihood that
+state or local authorities will assist in enforcing those laws or
+orders.
+
+v. The extent of state or local resources available to handle the
+disorder.
+
+b. Investigations under this paragraph will be authorized only for a period of
+30 days but the authorization may be renewed for subsequent 30 day
+periods.
+
+c. Notwithstanding Subpart E.2 of this Part, the methods that may be used in
+an investigation under this paragraph are those described in subparagraphs
+a.–d., subparagraph f. (other than pretext interviews or requests), or
+subparagraph g. of Part II.A.4 of these Guidelines. The Attorney General,
+the Deputy Attorney General, or the Assistant Attorney General for the
+Criminal Division may also authorize the use of other methods described
+in Part II.A.4.
+
+3. Public Health and Safety Authorities in Relation to Demonstrations
+
+a. At the direction of the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, or
+the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division, the FBI shall
+collect information relating to demonstration activities that are likely to
+require the federal government to take action to facilitate the activities and
+provide public health and safety measures with respect to those activities.
+The information sought in such an investigation shall be that needed to
+facilitate an adequate federal response to ensure public health and safety
+
+26
+
+and to protect the exercise of First Amendment rights, such as:
+
+i. The time, place, and type of activities planned.
+
+ii. The number of persons expected to participate.
+
+iii. The expected means and routes of travel for participants and
+expected time of arrival.
+
+iv. Any plans for lodging or housing of participants in connection with
+the demonstration.
+
+b. Notwithstanding Subpart E.2 of this Part, the methods that may be used in
+an investigation under this paragraph are those described in subparagraphs
+a.–d., subparagraph f. (other than pretext interviews or requests), or
+subparagraph g. of Part II.A.4 of these Guidelines. The Attorney General,
+the Deputy Attorney General, or the Assistant Attorney General for the
+Criminal Division may also authorize the use of other methods described
+in Part II.A.4.
+
+C. STATE, LOCAL, OR TRIBAL AGENCIES
+
+The FBI may provide investigative assistance to state, local, or tribal agencies in the
+investigation of matters that may involve federal crimes or threats to the national security,
+or for such other purposes as may be legally authorized.
+
+D. FOREIGN AGENCIES
+
+1. At the request of foreign law enforcement, intelligence, or security agencies, the
+FBI may conduct investigations or provide assistance to investigations by such
+agencies, consistent with the interests of the United States (including national
+security interests) and with due consideration of the effect on any United States
+person. Investigations or assistance under this paragraph must be approved as
+provided by FBI policy. The FBI shall notify the National Security Division
+concerning an investigation or assistance under this paragraph where: (i) FBI
+Headquarters approval for the activity is required pursuant to the approving policy
+adopted by the FBI for purposes of this paragraph, and (ii) the activity relates to a
+threat to the national security. Notifications to the National Security Division shall
+be made as soon as practicable, but no later than 30 days after the approval.
+Provisions regarding notification to or coordination with the Central Intelligence
+Agency by the FBI in memoranda of understanding or agreements with the
+Central Intelligence Agency may also apply to activities under this paragraph.
+
+2. The FBI may not provide assistance to foreign law enforcement, intelligence, or
+
+27
+
+security officers conducting investigations within the United States unless such
+officers have provided prior notification to the Attorney General as required by 18
+U.S.C. 951.
+
+3. The FBI may conduct background inquiries concerning consenting individuals
+when requested by foreign government agencies.
+
+4. The FBI may provide other material and technical assistance to foreign
+governments to the extent not otherwise prohibited by law.
+
+E. APPLICABLE STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES
+
+1. Authorized investigative assistance by the FBI to other agencies under this Part
+includes joint operations and activities with such agencies.
+
+2. All lawful methods may be used in investigative assistance activities under this
+Part.
+
+3. Where the methods used in investigative assistance activities under this Part go
+beyond the methods authorized in assessments under Part II.A.4 of these
+Guidelines, the following apply:
+
+a. Supervisory approval must be obtained for the activity at a level or levels
+specified in FBI policy.
+
+b. Notice must be provided concerning sensitive investigative matters in the
+manner described in Part II.B.5.
+
+c. A database or records system must be maintained that permits, with
+respect to each such activity, the prompt retrieval of the status of the
+activity (open or closed), the dates of opening and closing, and the basis
+for the activity. This database or records system may be combined with
+the database or records system for predicated investigations required by
+Part VI.A.2.
+
+28
+
+IV. INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS AND PLANNING
+
+The FBI is authorized to engage in analysis and planning. The FBI's analytic activities
+enable the FBI to identify and understand trends, causes, and potential indicia of criminal activity
+and other threats to the United States that would not be apparent from the investigation of
+individual cases alone. By means of intelligence analysis and strategic planning, the FBI can
+more effectively discover crimes, threats to the national security, and other matters of national
+intelligence interest and can provide the critical support needed for the effective discharge of its
+investigative responsibilities and other authorized activities. For example, analysis of threats in
+the context of special events management, concerning public events or activities that may be
+targeted for terrorist attack, is an authorized activity under this Part.
+
+In carrying out its intelligence functions under this Part, the FBI is authorized to draw on
+all lawful sources of information, including but not limited to the results of investigative
+activities under these Guidelines. Investigative activities under these Guidelines and other
+legally authorized activities through which the FBI acquires information, data, or intelligence
+may properly be utilized, structured, and prioritized so as to support and disseminate the FBI's
+intelligence mission. The remainder of this Part provides further specification concerning
+activities and functions authorized as part of that mission.
+
+A. STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
+
+The FBI is authorized to develop overviews and analyses of threats to and vulnerabilities
+of the United States and its interests in areas related to the FBI's responsibilities,
+including domestic and international criminal threats and activities; domestic and
+international activities, circumstances, and developments affecting the national security;
+and matters related to the conduct of the United States' foreign affairs. The overviews
+and analyses prepared under this Subpart may encompass present, emergent, and potential
+threats and vulnerabilities, their contexts and causes, and identification and analysis of
+means of responding to them.
+
+B. REPORTS AND ASSESSMENTS GENERALLY
+
+The FBI is authorized to conduct research, analyze information, and prepare reports and
+assessments concerning matters relevant to authorized FBI activities, such as reports and
+assessments concerning: types of criminals or criminal activities; organized crime groups;
+terrorism, espionage, or other threats to the national security; foreign intelligence matters;
+or the scope and nature of criminal activity in particular geographic areas or sectors of the
+economy.
+
+C. INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS
+
+The FBI is authorized to operate intelligence, identification, tracking, and information
+
+29
+
+systems in support of authorized investigative activities, or for such other or additional
+purposes as may be legally authorized, such as intelligence and tracking systems relating
+to terrorists, gangs, or organized crime groups.
+
+30
+
+V. AUTHORIZED METHODS
+
+A. PARTICULAR METHODS
+
+All lawful investigative methods may be used in activities under these Guidelines as
+authorized by these Guidelines. Authorized methods include, but are not limited to, those
+identified in the following list. The methods identified in the list are in some instances subject to
+special requisitions or review or approval requirements, as noted:
+
+1. The methods described in Part II.A.4 of these Guidelines.
+
+2. Mail covers.
+
+3. Physical searches of personal or real property where a warrant or court order is not
+legally required because there is no reasonable expectation of privacy (e.g., trash
+covers).
+
+4. Consensual monitoring of communications, including consensual computer
+monitoring, subject to legal review by the Chief Division Counsel or the FBI
+Office of the General Counsel. Where a sensitive monitoring circumstance is
+involved, the monitoring must be approved by the Criminal Division or, if the
+investigation concerns a threat to the national security or foreign intelligence, by
+the National Security Division.
+
+5. Use of closed-circuit television, direction finders, and other monitoring devices,
+subject to legal review by the Chief Division Counsel or the FBI Office of the
+General Counsel. (The methods described in this paragraph usually do not require
+court orders or warrants unless they involve physical trespass or non-consensual
+monitoring of communications, but legal review is necessary to ensure
+compliance with all applicable legal requirements.)
+
+6. Polygraph examinations.
+
+7. Undercover operations. In investigations relating to activities in violation of
+federal criminal law that do not concern threats to the national security or foreign
+intelligence, undercover operations must be carried out in conformity with the
+Attorney General's Guidelines on Federal Bureau of Investigation Undercover
+Operations. In investigations that are not subject to the preceding sentence
+because they concern threats to the national security or foreign intelligence,
+undercover operations involving religious or political organizations must be
+reviewed and approved by FBI Headquarters, with participation by the National
+Security Division in the review process.
+
+8. Compulsory process as authorized by law, including grand jury subpoenas and
+
+31
+
+other subpoenas, National Security Letters (15 U.S.C. 1681u, 1681v; 18 U.S.C.
+2709; 12 U.S.C. 3414(a)(A); 50 U.S.C. 436), and Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Act orders for the production of tangible things (50 U.S.C. 1861-63).
+
+9. Accessing stored wire and electronic communications and transactional records in
+conformity with chapter 121 of title 18, United States Code (18 U.S.C. 2701–
+2712).
+
+10. Use of pen registers and trap and trace devices in conformity with chapter 206 of
+title 18, United States Code (18 U.S.C. 3121-3127), or the Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Act (50 U.S.C. 1841-1846).
+
+11. Electronic surveillance in conformity with chapter 119 of title 18, United States
+Code (18 U.S.C. 2510-2522), the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or
+Executive Order 12333 § 2.5.
+
+12. Physical searches, including mail openings, in conformity with Rule 41 of the
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or
+Executive Order 12333 § 2.5. A classified directive provides additional limitation
+on certain searches.
+
+13. Acquisition of foreign intelligence information in conformity with title VII of the
+Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
+
+B. SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS
+
+Beyond the limitations noted in the list above relating to particular investigative methods,
+the following requirements are to be observed:
+
+1. Contacts with Represented Persons
+
+Contact with represented persons may implicate legal restrictions and affect the
+admissibility of resulting evidence. Hence, if an individual is known to be
+represented by counsel in a particular matter, the FBI will follow applicable law
+and Department procedure concerning contact with represented individuals in the
+absence of prior notice to counsel. The Special Agent in Charge and the United
+States Attorney or their designees shall consult periodically on applicable law and
+Department procedure. Where issues arise concerning the consistency of contacts
+with represented persons with applicable attorney conduct rules, the United States
+Attorney's Office should consult with the Professional Responsibility Advisory
+Office.
+
+32
+
+2. Use of Classified Investigative Technologies
+
+Inappropriate use of classified investigative technologies may risk the
+compromise of such technologies. Hence, in an investigation, relating to activities
+in violation of federal criminal law that does not concern a threat to the national
+security or foreign intelligence, the use of such technologies must be in
+conformity with the Procedures for the Use of Classified Investigative
+Technologies in Criminal Cases.
+
+C. OTHERWISE ILLEGAL ACTIVITY
+
+1. Otherwise illegal activity by an FBI agent or employee in an undercover operation
+relating to activity in violation of federal criminal law that does not concern a
+threat to the national security or foreign intelligence must be approved in
+conformity with the Attorney General's Guidelines on Federal Bureau of
+Investigation Undercover Operations. Approval of otherwise illegal activity in
+conformity with those guidelines is sufficient and satisfies any approval
+requirement that would otherwise apply under these Guidelines.
+
+2. Otherwise illegal activity by a human source must be approved in conformity with
+the Attorney General's Guidelines Regarding the Use of FBI Confidential Human
+Sources.
+
+3. Otherwise illegal activity by an FBI agent or employee that is not within the scope
+of paragraph 1. must be approved by a United States Attorney's Office or a
+Department of Justice Division, except that a Special Agent in Charge may
+authorize the following:
+
+a. otherwise illegal activity that would not be a felony under federal, state,
+local, or tribal law;
+
+b. consensual monitoring of communications, even if a crime under state,
+local, or tribal law;
+
+c. the controlled purchase, receipt, delivery, or sale of drugs, stolen property,
+or other contraband;
+
+d. the payment of bribes;
+
+e. the making of false representations in concealment of personal identity or
+the true ownership of a proprietary; and
+
+f. conducting a money laundering transaction, or transactions involving an
+aggregate amount not exceeding $1 million.
+
+33
+
+4. However, in an investigation relating to a threat to the national security or foreign
+intelligence collection, a Special Agent in Charge may not authorize an activity
+that may constitute a violation of export control law or law that concerns the
+proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In such an investigation, a Special
+Agent in Charge may authorize an activity that may otherwise violate prohibitions
+of material support to terrorism only in accordance with standards established by
+the Director of the FBI and agreed to by the Assistant Attorney General for
+National Security.
+
+5. The following activities may not be authorized:
+
+a. Acts of violence.
+
+b. Activities whose authorization is prohibited by law, including unlawful
+investigative methods, such as illegal electronic surveillance or illegal
+searches.
+
+Subparagraph a., however, does not limit the right of FBI agents or employees to
+engage in any lawful use of force, including the use of force-in self-defense or
+defense of others or otherwise in the lawful discharge of their duties.
+
+6. An agent or employee may engage in otherwise illegal activity that could be
+authorized under this Subpart without the authorization required by paragraph 3. if
+necessary to meet an immediate threat to the safety of persons or property or to the
+national security, or to prevent the compromise of an investigation or the loss of a
+significant investigative opportunity. In such a case, prior to engaging in the
+otherwise illegal activity, every effort should be made by the agent or employee to
+consult with the Special Agent in Charge, and by the Special Agent in Charge to
+consult with the United States Attorney's Office or appropriate Department of
+Justice Division where the authorization of that office or division would be
+required under paragraph 3. unless the circumstances preclude such consultation.
+Cases in which otherwise illegal activity occurs pursuant to this paragraph without
+the authorization required by paragraph 3. shall be reported as soon as possible to
+the Special Agent in Charge, and by the Special Agent in Charge to FBI
+Headquarters, and to the United States Attorney's Office or appropriate
+Department of Justice Division.
+
+7. In an investigation relating to a threat to the national security or foreign
+intelligence collection, the National Security Division is the approving component
+for otherwise illegal activity for which paragraph 3. requires approval beyond
+internal FBI approval. However, officials in other components may approve
+otherwise illegal activity in such investigations as authorized by the Assistant
+Attorney General for National Security.
+
+34
+
+VI. RETENTION AND SHARING OF INFORMATION
+
+A. RETENTION OF INFORMATION
+
+1. The FBI shall retain records relating to activities under these Guidelines in
+accordance with a records retention plan approved by the National Archives and
+Records Administration.
+
+2. The FBI shall maintain a database or records system that permits, with respect to
+each predicated investigation, the prompt retrieval of the status of the
+investigation (open or closed), the dates of opening and closing, and the basis for
+the investigation.
+
+B. INFORMATION SHARING GENERALLY
+
+1. Permissive Sharing
+
+Consistent with law and with any applicable agreements or understandings with
+other agencies concerning the dissemination of information they have provided,
+the FBI may disseminate information obtained or produced through activities
+under these Guidelines:
+
+a. within the FBI and to other components of the Department of Justice;
+
+b. to other federal, state, local, or tribal agencies if related to their
+responsibilities and, in relation to other Intelligence Community agencies,
+the determination whether the information is related to the recipient's
+responsibilities may be left to the recipient;
+
+c. to congressional committees as authorized by the Department of Justice
+Office of Legislative Affairs;
+
+d. to foreign agencies if the information is related to their responsibilities and
+the dissemination is consistent with the interests of the United States
+(including national security interests) and the FBI has considered the effect
+such dissemination may reasonably be expected to have on any identifiable
+United States person;
+
+e. if the information is publicly available, does not identify United States
+persons, or is disseminated with the consent of the person whom it
+concerns;
+
+f. if the dissemination is necessary to protect the safety or security of persons
+or property, to protect against or prevent a crime or threat to the national
+
+35
+
+g. security, or to obtain information for the conduct of an authorized FBI
+investigation; or
+
+h. if dissemination of the information is otherwise permitted by the Privacy
+Act (5 U.S.C. 552a).
+
+2. Required Sharing
+
+The FBI shall share and disseminate information as required by statutes, treaties,
+Executive Orders, Presidential directives, National Security Council directives,
+Homeland Security Council directives, and Attorney General-approved policies,
+memoranda of understanding, or agreements.
+
+C. INFORMATION RELATING TO CRIMINAL MATTERS
+
+1. Coordination with Prosecutors
+
+In an investigation relating to possible criminal activity in violation of federal law,
+the agent conducting the investigation shall maintain periodic written or oral
+contact with the appropriate federal prosecutor, as circumstances warrant and as
+requested by the prosecutor. When, during such an investigation, a matter appears
+arguably to warrant prosecution, the agent shall present the relevant facts to the
+appropriate federal prosecutor. Information on investigations that have been
+closed shall be available on request to a United States Attorney or his or her
+designee or an appropriate Department of Justice official.
+
+2. Criminal Matters Outside FBI Jurisdiction
+
+When credible information is received by an FBI field office concerning serious
+criminal activity not within the FBI's investigative jurisdiction, the field office
+shall promptly transmit the information or report complainant to a law
+enforcement agency having jurisdiction, except where disclosure would
+jeopardize an ongoing investigation, endanger the safety of an individual, disclose
+the identity of a human source, interfere with a human source's cooperation, or
+reveal legally privileged information. If full disclosure is not made for the reasons
+indicated, then whenever feasible, the FBI field office shall make at least limited
+disclosure to a law enforcement agency or agencies having jurisdiction, and full
+disclosure shall be made as soon as the need for restricting disclosure is no longer
+present. Where full disclosure is not made to the appropriate law enforcement
+agencies within 180 days, the FBI field office shall promptly notify FBI
+Headquarters in writing of the facts and circumstances concerning the criminal
+activity. The FBI shall make periodic reports to the Deputy Attorney General on
+such nondisclosures and incomplete disclosures, in a form suitable to protect the
+identity of human sources.
+
+36
+
+3. Reporting of Criminal Activity
+
+a. When it appears that an FBI agent or employee has engaged in criminal
+activity in the course of an investigation under these Guidelines, the FBI
+shall notify the United States Attorney's Office or an appropriate
+Department of Justice Division. When it appears that a human source has
+engaged in criminal activity in the course of an investigation under these
+Guidelines, the FBI shall proceed as provided in the Attorney General's
+Guidelines Regarding the Use of FBI Confidential Human Sources. When
+information concerning possible criminal activity by any other person
+appears in the course of an investigation under these Guidelines, the FBI
+shall initiate an investigation of the criminal activity if warranted, and
+shall proceed as provided in paragraph 1. or 2.
+
+b. The reporting requirements under this paragraph relating to criminal
+activity by FBI agents or employees or human sources do not apply to
+otherwise illegal activity that is authorized in conformity with these
+Guidelines or other Attorney General guidelines or to minor traffic
+offenses.
+
+D. INFORMATION RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE MATTERS
+
+The general principle reflected in current laws and policies is that there is a responsibility
+to provide information as consistently and fully as possible to agencies with relevant
+responsibilities to protect the United States and its people from terrorism and other threats
+to the national security, except as limited by specific constraints on such sharing. The FBI's
+responsibilities in this area include carrying out the requirements of the
+Memorandum of Understanding between the Intelligence Community and Federal Law
+Enforcement Agencies, and the Department of Homeland Security Concerning
+Information Sharing (March 4, 2003), or any successor memorandum of understanding or
+agreement. Specific requirements also exist for internal coordination and consultation
+with other Department of Justice components, and for provision of national security and
+foreign intelligence information to White House agencies, as provided in the ensuing
+paragraphs.
+
+1. Department of Justice
+
+a. The National Security Division shall have access to all information
+obtained by the FBI through activities relating to threats to the national
+security or foreign intelligence. The Director of the FBI and the Assistant
+Attorney General for National Security shall consult concerning these
+activities whenever requested by either of them, and the FBI shall provide
+such reports and information concerning these activities as the Assistant
+
+37
+
+Attorney General for National Security may request. In addition to any
+reports or information the Assistant Attorney General for National Security
+may specially request under this subparagraph, the FBI shall
+provide annual reports to the National Security Division concerning its
+foreign intelligence collection program, including information concerning
+the scope and nature of foreign intelligence collection activities in each
+FBI field office.
+
+b. The FBI shall keep the National Security Division apprised of all
+information obtained through activities under these Guidelines that is
+necessary to the ability of the United States to investigate and protect
+against threats to the national security, which shall include regular
+consultations between the FBI and the National Security Division to
+exchange advice and information relevant to addressing such threats
+through criminal prosecution or other means.
+
+c. Subject to subparagraphs a. and e., relevant United States Attorneys'
+Offices shall have access to and shall receive information from the FBI
+relating to threats to the national security, and may engage in consultations
+with the FBI relating to such threats, to the same extent as the National
+Security Division. The relevant United States Attorneys' Offices shall
+receive such access and information from the FBI field offices.
+
+d. In a counterintelligence investigation – i.e., an investigation relating to a
+matter described in Part VII.S.2 of these Guidelines – the FBI's provision
+of information to and consultation with a United States Attorney's Office
+are subject to authorization by the National Security Division. In
+consultation with the Executive Office for United States Attorneys and the
+FBI, the National Security Division shall establish policies setting forth
+circumstances in which the FBI will consult with the National Security
+Division prior to informing relevant United States Attorneys' Offices
+about such an investigation. The policies established by the National
+Security Division under this subparagraph shall (among other things)
+provide that:
+
+i. the National Security Division will, within 30 days, authorize the
+FBI to share with the United States Attorneys' Offices information
+relating to certain espionage investigations, as defined by the
+policies, unless such information is withheld because of substantial
+national security considerations; and
+
+ii. the FBI may consult freely with United States Attorneys' Offices
+concerning investigations within the scope of this subparagraph
+during an emergency, so long as the National Security Division is
+
+38
+
+notified of such consultation as soon as practical after the
+consultation.
+
+e. Information shared with a United States Attorney's Office pursuant to
+subparagraph c. or d. shall be disclosed only to the United States Attorney
+or any Assistant United States Attorneys designated by the United States
+Attorney at points of contact to receive such information. The United
+States Attorneys and designated Assistant United States Attorneys shall
+have appropriate security clearances and shall receive training in the
+handling of classified information and information derived from the
+Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, including training concerning the
+secure handling and storage of such information and training concerning
+requirements and limitations relating to the use, retention, and
+dissemination of such information.
+
+f. The disclosure and sharing of information by the FBI under this paragraph
+is subject to any limitations required in orders issued by the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court, controls imposed by the originators of
+sensitive material, and restrictions established by the Attorney General or
+the Deputy Attorney General in particular cases. The disclosure and
+sharing of information by the FBI under this paragraph that may disclose
+the identity of human sources is governed by the relevant provisions of the
+Attorney General's Guidelines Regarding the Use of FBI Confidential
+Human Sources.
+
+2. White House
+
+In order to carry out their responsibilities, the President, the Vice President, the
+Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Assistant to the
+President for Homeland Security Affairs, the National Security Council and its
+staff, the Homeland Security Council and its staff, and other White House
+officials and offices require information from all federal agencies, including
+foreign intelligence, and information relating to international terrorism and other
+threats to the national security. The FBI accordingly may disseminate to the
+White House foreign intelligence and national security information obtained
+through activities under these Guidelines, subject to the following standards and
+procedures:
+
+a. Requests to the FBI for such information from the White House shall be
+made through the National Security Council staff or Homeland Security
+Council staff including, but not limited to, the National Security Council
+Legal and Intelligence Directorates and Office of Combating Terrorism,
+or through the President's Intelligence Advisory Board or the Counsel to
+the President.
+
+39
+
+b. Compromising information concerning domestic officials or political
+organizations, or information concerning activities of United States
+persons intended to affect the political process in the United States, may
+be disseminated to the White House only with the approval of the Attorney
+General, based on a determination that such dissemination is needed for
+foreign intelligence purposes, for the purpose of protecting against
+international terrorism or other threats to the national security, or for the
+conduct of foreign affairs. However, such approval is not required for
+dissemination to the White House of information concerning efforts of
+foreign intelligence services to penetrate the White House, or concerning
+contacts by White House personnel with foreign intelligence service
+personnel.
+
+c. Examples of types of information that are suitable for dissemination to the
+White House on a routine basis include, but are not limited to:
+
+i. information concerning international terrorism;
+
+ii. information concerning activities of foreign intelligence services in
+the United States;
+
+iii. information indicative of imminent hostilities involving any
+foreign power;
+
+iv. information concerning potential cyber threats to the United States
+or its allies;
+
+v. information indicative of policy positions adopted by foreign
+officials, governments, or powers, or their reactions to United
+States foreign policy initiatives;
+
+vi. information relating to possible changes in leadership positions of
+foreign governments, parties, factions, or powers;
+
+vii. information concerning foreign economic or foreign political
+matters that might have national security ramifications; and
+
+viii. information set forth in regularly published national intelligence
+requirements.
+
+d. Communications by the FBI to the White House that relate to a national
+security matter and concern a litigation issue for a specific pending case
+must be made known to the Office of the Attorney General, the Office of
+
+40
+
+the Deputy Attorney General, or the Office of the Associate Attorney
+General. White House policy may specially limit or prescribe the White
+House personnel who may request information concerning such issues
+from the FBI.
+
+e. The limitations on dissemination of information by the FBI to the White
+House under these Guidelines do not apply to dissemination to the White
+House of information acquired in the course of an FBI investigation
+requested by the White House into the background of a potential employee
+or appointee, or responses to requests from the White House under
+Executive Order 10450.
+
+3. Special Statutory Requirements
+
+a. Dissemination of information acquired under the Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Act is, to the extent provided in that Act, subject to
+minimization procedures and other requirements specified in that Act.
+
+b. Information obtained through the use of National Security Letters under 15
+U.S.C. 1681u may be disseminated in conformity with the general
+standards of this Part. Information obtained through the use of National
+Security Letters and/or wiretaps may be disseminated in conformity with
+the general standards of this Part, subject to any applicable limitations
+in their governing statutory provisions: 12 U.S.C. 3414(a)(5)(B); 15
+U.S.C. 1681u(5); 18 U.S.C. 2709(d); 50 U.S.C. 436(e).
+
+41
+
+VII. DEFINITIONS
+
+A. CONSENSUAL MONITORING: monitoring of communications for which a court order
+or warrant is not legally required because of the consent of a party to the communication.
+
+B. EMPLOYEE: an FBI employee or an employee of another agency working under the
+direction and control of the FBI.
+
+C. FOR OR ON BEHALF OF A FOREIGN POWER: the determination that activities are
+for or on behalf of a foreign power shall be based on consideration of the extent to which
+the foreign power is involved in:
+
+1. control or policy direction;
+
+2. financial or material support; or
+
+3. leadership, assignments, or discipline.
+
+D. FOREIGN COMPUTER INTRUSION: the use or attempted use of any cyber-activity or
+other means, by, for, or on behalf of a foreign power to scan, probe, or gain unauthorized
+access into one or more U.S.-based computers.
+
+E. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE: information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or
+activities of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations or foreign
+persons, or international terrorists.
+
+F. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS:
+
+1. national intelligence requirements issued pursuant to authorization by the Director
+of National Intelligence, including the National Intelligence Priorities Framework
+and the National HUMINT Collection Directives, or any successor directives
+thereto;
+
+2. requests to collect foreign intelligence by the President or by Intelligence
+Community officials designated by the President; and
+
+3. directions to collect foreign intelligence by the Attorney General, the Deputy
+Attorney General, or an official designated by the Attorney General.
+
+G. FOREIGN POWER:
+
+1. a foreign government or any component thereof, whether or not recognized by the
+United States;
+
+42
+
+2. a faction of a foreign nation or nations, not substantially composed of United
+States persons;
+
+3. an entity that is openly acknowledged by a foreign government or governments to
+be directed and controlled by such foreign government or governments;
+
+4. a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor;
+
+5. a foreign-based political organization, not substantially composed of United
+States persons; or
+
+6. an entity that is directed or controlled by a foreign government or governments.
+
+H. HUMAN SOURCE: a Confidential Human Source as defined in the Attorney General's
+Guidelines Regarding the Use of FBI Confidential Human Sources.
+
+I. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES: any activity conducted for intelligence purposes or to
+affect political or governmental processes by, for, or on behalf of a foreign power.
+
+J. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM:
+
+Activities that:
+
+1. involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that violate federal, state,
+local, or tribal criminal law or would violate such law if committed within the
+United States or a state, local, or tribal jurisdiction;
+
+2. appear to be intended:
+
+i. to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
+
+ii. to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
+
+iii. to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping; and
+
+3. occur totally outside the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms
+of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear to be
+intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate
+or seek asylum.
+
+K. PROPRIETARY: a sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, or other business entity
+operated on a commercial basis, which is owned, controlled, or operated wholly or in part
+on behalf of the FBI, and whose relationship with the FBI is concealed from third parties.
+
+43
+
+L. PUBLICLY AVAILABLE: information that has been published or broadcast for public
+consumption, is available on request to the public, is accessible on-line or otherwise to
+the public, is available to the public by subscription or purchase, could be seen or heard
+by any casual observer, is made available at a meeting open to the public, or is obtained
+by visiting any place or attending any event that is open to the public.
+
+M. RECORDS: any records, databases, files, indices, information systems, or other retained
+information.
+
+N. SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER: an investigative matter involving the
+activities of a domestic public official or political candidate (involving corruption or a
+threat to the national security), religious or political organization or individual prominent
+in such an organization, or news media, or any other matter which, in the judgment of the
+official authorizing an investigation, should be brought to the attention of FBI
+Headquarters and other Department of Justice officials.
+
+O. SENSITIVE MONITORING CIRCUMSTANCE:
+
+1. investigation of a member of Congress, a federal judge, a member of the
+Executive Branch at Executive Level IV or above, or a person who has served in
+such capacity within the previous two years;
+
+2. investigation of the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, or Attorney General of any
+state or territory, or a judge or justice of the highest court of any state or territory,
+concerning an offense involving bribery, conflict of interest, or extortion related to
+the performance of official duties;
+
+3. a party to the communication is in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons or the
+United States Marshals Service or is being or has been afforded protection in the
+Witness Security Program; or
+
+4. the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, or an Assistant Attorney
+General has requested that the FBI obtain prior approval for the use of consensual
+monitoring in a specific investigation.
+
+P. SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE: the Special Agent in Charge of an FBI field office
+(including an Acting Special Agent in Charge), except that the functions authorized for
+Special Agents in Charge in these Guidelines may also be exercised by the Assistant
+Director in Charge of any Special Agent in Charge designated by the Assistant
+Director in Charge in an FBI field office headed by an Assistant Director, and by FBI
+Headquarters officials designated by the Director of the FBI.
+
+Q. SPECIAL EVENTS MANAGEMENT: planning and conduct of public events or
+activities whose character may make them attractive targets for terrorist attack.
+
+44
+
+R. STATE, LOCAL, OR TRIBAL: any state or territory of the United States or political
+subdivision thereof, the District of Columbia, or Indian tribe.
+
+S. THREAT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY:
+
+1. international terrorism;
+
+2. espionage and other intelligence activities, sabotage, and assassination, conducted
+by, for, or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons;
+
+3. foreign computer intrusion; and
+
+4. other matters determined by the Attorney General, consistent with Executive
+Order 12333 or a successor order.
+
+T. UNITED STATES: when used in a geographic sense, means all areas under the territorial
+sovereignty of the United States.
+
+U. UNITED STATES PERSON:
+
+Any of the following, but not including any association or corporation that is a foreign
+power as defined in Subpart G.1.–.3.:
+
+1. an individual who is a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for
+permanent residence;
+
+2. an unincorporated association substantially composed of individuals who are
+United States persons; or
+
+3. a corporation incorporated in the United States.
+
+In applying paragraph 2., if a group or organization in the United States that is affiliated
+with a foreign-based international organization operates directly under the control of the
+international organization and has no independent program or activities in the United
+States, the membership of the entire international organization shall be considered in
+determining whether it is substantially composed of United States persons. If, however,
+the U.S.-based group or organization has programs or activities separate from, or in
+addition to, those directed by the international organization, only its membership in the
+United States shall be considered in determining whether it is substantially composed of
+United States persons. A classified directive provides further guidance concerning the
+determination of United States person status.
+
+45
+
+V. USE: when used with respect to human sources, means obtaining information from,
+tasking, or otherwise operating such sources.
+
+Date: 9/29/08
+
+Michael B. Mukasey
+Attorney General
+
+46
+
+CLASSIFIED BY NSICC J37J85T94
+REASON: 1.3 (c)
+DECLASSIFY ON: 10-25-2039
+DATE: 10-25-2013
+
+SECRET//NOFORN
+
+CLASSIFIED PROVISIONS (PART VIII) OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
+GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC FBI OPERATIONS (U)
+
+VIII. CLASSIFIED PROVISIONS (U)
+
+This Part supplements the unclassified provisions of the Attorney General's Guidelines
+for Domestic FBI Operations. (U)
+
+A. LIMITATION ON CERTAIN SEARCHES (U)
+
+[REDACTED]
+b1
+b3
+b7E
+
+B. CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANTING INVESTIGATION (U)
+
+In addition to the circumstances identified in Part II.B.3 of these Guidelines as warranting
+investigation, a predicated investigation may be based on any of the following
+circumstances: (U)
+
+1. An individual, group, or organization is or may be a foreign power or an agent of
+a foreign power (as defined in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act). (U)
+
+2. An individual is or may be a non-United States person:
+
+a. [REDACTED]
+b1
+b3
+b7E
+
+EFFECTIVE: September 29, 2008
+
+Classified by: Michael B. Mukasey, Attorney General
+Reason: 1.4(c)
+Declassify on: September 29, 2033
+
+SECRET//NOFORN
+
+1
+
+b1
+b3
+b7E
+
+SECRET//NOFORN
+
+b. [REDACTED]
+
+The provisions of these Guidelines that apply to other predicated investigations apply to
+predicated investigations based on this Subpart. A predicated investigation based on this
+Subpart may be initiated as a preliminary investigation if there is information or an
+allegation indicating the existence of a circumstance described in this Subpart, and may
+be initiated as a full investigation if there is an articulable factual basis for the
+investigation that reasonably indicates that a circumstance described in this Subpart
+exists. (U)
+
+C. DETERMINATION OF UNITED STATES PERSON STATUS (U)
+
+[REDACTED]
+b1
+b3
+b7E
+
+Date: 9/29/08
+
+Michael B. Mukasey
+Attorney General
+
+SECRETR//NOFORN
+
+2
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_September_2008_Attorney_Generals_Guidelines_for_Domestic_FBI_Operations/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_September_2008_Attorney_Generals_Guidelines_for_Domestic_FBI_Operations/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..750c584
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_September_2008_Attorney_Generals_Guidelines_for_Domestic_FBI_Operations/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+{
+ "title": "September 2008 Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Attorney General guidelines establishing the framework for the FBI’s use of authorities and investigative methods for counterterrorism purposes and intelligence objectives. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "USG",
+ "date_created": "2008-09-29",
+ "classification": [
+ "SECRET"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Mukasey, Michael B."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-18",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/september-2008-attorney-generals-guidelines-domestic-fbi-operations",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "3587f400c38d5dc31db4f9716d8fbe1d62752ecbd93bea3c0139604d44d8abdb",
+ "pages": 48
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_September_5_2006_Cover_Filing_Submission_to_the_FISC/ACLU_-_September_5_2006_Cover_Filing_Submission_to_the_FISC.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_September_5_2006_Cover_Filing_Submission_to_the_FISC/ACLU_-_September_5_2006_Cover_Filing_Submission_to_the_FISC.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..51c7a4e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_September_5_2006_Cover_Filing_Submission_to_the_FISC/ACLU_-_September_5_2006_Cover_Filing_Submission_to_the_FISC.md
@@ -0,0 +1,1820 @@
+CLASSIFIED BY NSICG J37765T94
+REASON: 4 (C)
+DECLASSIFY OR 10-10-2031
+DATE: 10-10-2013
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+2006 SEP -5 PM 5:45
+
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE [REDACTED] SUTTON
+CLERK
+
+WASHINGTON, D. C.
+
+IN RE THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION :
+OF THE UNITED STATES FOR AN ORDER : Docket Number:
+[REDACTED]
+BR
+AUTHORIZING THE PRODUCTION OF ANY :
+06-09
+TANGIBLE THINGS (U) :
+
+---
+SUBMISSION OF INTERIM STANDARD MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES
+
+The United States of America, through the undersigned Department of Justice
+attorney, hereby files with this Court, pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
+Act of 1978, as amended, Title 50, United States Code (U.S.C.), Sections 1801-1861 (FISA
+or the Act), the attached interim standard minimization procedures governing the
+
+UNCLASSIFIED WHEN CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENT IS REMOVED
+---
+
+SECRET
+Classified by: James A. Baker, Counsel for Intelligence Policy, OIRR, DOI
+Reason: 1.4(c)
+Declassify on: X1
+
+---
+Removed
+[REDACTED]
+
+---
+SECRET
+
+retention and dissemination by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of any tangible
+things, or information therein, received by the FBI in response to an order under 50
+U.S.C. Section 1861. (U)
+
+WHEREFORE, the United States of America, by counsel, files with this
+Court the attached interim standard minimization procedures. (U)
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+James A. Baker
+Counsel for Intelligence Policy
+U.S. Department of Justice
+
+---
+SECRET
+2
+
+---
+Removed
+[REDACTED]
+
+---
+SECRET
+
+I hereby approve the filing of the attached interim standard minimization
+procedures with the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance [REDACTED]
+
+Alberto R. Gonzales
+Attorney General of the United States
+
+SEP -5 2006
+Date
+
+---
+SECRET
+3
+
+---
+CLASSIFIED BY NSICG J37J85T94
+REASON: 1.1 (C)
+DECLASSIFY ON: 10-2031
+DATE: 10-20-2013
+[REDACTED]
+
+---
+SECRET
+
+UNITED STATES
+
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+WASHINGTON, D. C.
+
+IN RE THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION :
+OF THE UNITED STATES FOR AN ORDER : Docket Number:
+AUTHORIZING THE PRODUCTION OF ANY :
+TANGIBLE THINGS (U) :
+
+---
+INTERIM STANDARD MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES
+
+Pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, Title
+50, United States Code (U.S.C.), Sections 1801-1861 (FISA or the Act), the following
+interim procedures have been adopted by the Attorney General, and shall be followed
+by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in retaining and disseminating tangible
+things, or information therein, obtained by the FBI in response to an order under
+
+UNCLASSIFIED WHEN CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENT IS REMOVED
+---
+
+SECRET
+Classified by: James A. Baker, Counsel for Intelligence Policy, OIPR, DOI
+Reason: 1.4(c)
+Declassify on: X1
+
+---
+Removed
+[REDACTED]
+
+---
+SECRET
+
+50 U.S.C. Section 1861:
+
+The following provisions of the Attorney General Guidelines for FBI National
+Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection effective October 31, 2003, a
+copy of which is attached as Exhibit A, are hereby adopted as the minimization
+procedures required by 50 U.S.C. Section 1861(g): Part I.B.3 ("Respect for Legal
+Rights"), Part I.C ("Determination of United States Person Status"), Paragraphs A.1 and
+B of Part VII ("Retention and Dissemination of Information"), and Part VIII
+("Definitions"). (U)
+
+In their application as minimization procedures, these adopted provisions shall
+be construed to-
+
+(A) minimize the retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly
+available information concerning unconsenting United States persons consistent with
+the need of the United States to obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence
+information;
+
+(B) require that nonpublicly available information, which is not foreign
+intelligence information, as defined in 50 U.S.C. Section 1801(e)(1), shall not be
+disseminated in a manner that identifies any United States person, without such
+
+---
+SECRET
+2
+
+---
+Removed
+[REDACTED]
+
+---
+SECRET
+
+person's consent, unless such person's identity is necessary to understand foreign
+intelligence information or assess its importance; and
+
+(C) notwithstanding (A) and (B) above, these minimization procedures shall be
+construed to allow for the retention and dissemination of information that is evidence of
+a crime which has been, is being, or is about to be committed and that is to be retained
+or disseminated for law enforcement purposes. (U)
+
+Alberto R. Gonzales
+Attorney General of the United States
+
+SEP -5 2006
+Date
+
+---
+SECRET
+3
+
+---
+FBI INFO.
+CLASSIFIED BY NSICG J37J85T94
+REASON: 1.4 (C)
+DECLASSIFY ON: 10-10-2038
+DATE: 10-10-2013
+
+---
+SECRET
+
+THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES FOR
+FBI NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS
+AND FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION (U)
+
+Classified by: John Ashcroft, Attorney General
+Reason: 1.4(c)
+Declassify on: October 31, 2028.
+
+---
+SECRET
+EFFECTIVE: October 31, 2003
+
+---
+SECRET
+
+PREAMBLE (U)
+
+The following Guidelines on national security investigations and foreign intelligence collection by
+the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) are issued under the authority of the Attorney General as
+provided in sections 509, 510, 533, and 534 of title 28, United States Code. They apply to activities
+of the FBI pursuant to Executive Order 12333 and other activities as provided herein. (U)
+
+---
+SECRET
+ii
+
+---
+SECRET
+
+TABLE OF CONTENTS (U)
+
+INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 1
+A. NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS ..................................................... 2
+B. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION .....................................................5
+C. STRATEGIC ANALYSIS ...................................................................................5
+D. RETENTION AND DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION .............................6
+I. GENERAL AUTHORITIES AND PRINCIPLES .....................................................6
+A. GENERAL AUTHORITIES ...............................................................................6
+B. USE OF AUTHORITIES AND METHODS ........................................................7
+C. DETERMINATION OF UNITED STATES PERSON STATUS ...........................9
+D. NATURE AND APPLICATION OF THE GUIDELINES ................................ 10
+II. NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS ..................................................... 11
+A. THREAT ASSESSMENTS ............................................................................. 12
+B. COMMON PROVISIONS FOR PRELIMINARY AND FULL
+ INVESTIGATIONS .................................................................................... 13
+C. PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS .............................................................. 15
+D. FULL INVESTIGATIONS .............................................................................. 16
+E. EXTRATERRITORIAL OPERATIONS .......................................................... 17
+III. INVESTIGATIVE ASSISTANCE TO STATE, LOCAL, AND FOREIGN
+ GOVERNMENTS .............................................................................................. 18
+
+---
+SECRET
+iii
+
+---
+SECRET
+
+A. STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS ..................................................... 18
+B. FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS ........................................................................ 18
+IV. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND ASSISTANCE TO
+ INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES ................................................................................ 19
+A. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION .................................................. 19
+B. OPERATIONAL SUPPORT .......................................................................... 20
+C. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
+ ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES ............................................ 20
+V. INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES ..................................................................... 21
+VI. STRATEGIC ANALYSIS .................................................................................. 23
+VII. RETENTION AND DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION ............................ 23
+A. INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND DATABASES ........................................... 23
+B. INFORMATION SHARING .......................................................................... 24
+C. SPECIAL STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS ................................................. 32
+VIII. DEFINITIONS .................................................................................................. 33
+(U)
+
+---
+SECRET
+iv
+
+---
+SECRET
+
+INTRODUCTION (U)
+
+Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the United States, the Department of
+Justice carried out a general review of existing guidelines and procedures relating to national security
+and criminal matters. These Guidelines reflect the result of that review. (U)
+
+These Guidelines generally authorize investigation by the FBI of threats to the national security
+of the United States; investigative assistance by the FBI to state, local, and foreign governments in
+relation to matters affecting the national security; the collection of foreign intelligence by the FBI; the
+production of strategic analysis by the FBI; and the retention and dissemination of information resulting
+from the foregoing activities. This includes guidance for the activities of the FBI pursuant to Executive
+Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities" (Dec. 4, 1981). (U)
+
+The general objective of these Guidelines is the full utilization of all authorities and investigative
+techniques, consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, so as to protect the United
+States and its people from terrorism and other threats to the national security. As Executive Order
+12333 provides, "[t]imely and accurate information about the activities, capabilities, plans, and
+intentions of foreign powers, organizations, and persons and their agents, is essential to the national
+security of the United States," and "[a]]] reasonable and lawful means must be used to ensure that the
+United States will receive the best intelligence available." At the same time, intelligence gathering
+activities must be carried out in a "responsible manner that is consistent with the Constitution and
+applicable law," and information concerning United States persons may be collected, retained, and
+disseminated "only in accordance with procedures... approved by the Attorney General." Executive
+Order 12333, Preamble, §§ 2.1, 2.3. These guidelines should be implemented and interpreted so as to
+realize as fully as possible the critical objectives of the Executive Order. (U)
+
+The activities of the FBI under these Guidelines are part of the overall response of the United
+States to threats to the national security, which includes cooperative efforts and sharing of information
+with other agencies, including other entities in the Intelligence Community and the Department of
+Homeland Security. The overriding priority in these efforts is preventing, preempting, and disrupting
+terrorist threats to the United States. In some cases, this priority will dictate the provision of
+information to other agencies even where doing so may affect criminal prosecutions or ongoing law
+enforcement or intelligence operations. To the greatest extent possible that is consistent with this
+overriding priority, the FBI shall also act in a manner to protect other significant interests, including the
+protection of intelligence and sensitive law enforcement sources and methods, other classified
+information, and sensitive operational and prosecutorial information. (U)
+
+---
+SECRET
+
+---
+SECRET
+2
+
+---
+SECRET
+
+A. NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS (U)
+
+These Guidelines authorize the investigation by the FBI of threats to the national security.
+Matters constituting threats to the national security, including international terrorism and espionage, are
+identified in Part I.A.1. Parts II and V of the Guidelines contain the specific provisions governing the
+conduct of investigations of these threats. (U)
+
+The investigations authorized by these Guidelines serve to protect the national security by
+providing the basis for, and informing decisions concerning, a variety of measures to deal with threats to
+the national security. These measures may include, for example, recruitment of double agents and other
+assets; excluding or removing persons involved in terrorism or espionage from the United States;
+freezing assets of organizations that engage in or support terrorism; securing targets of terrorism or
+espionage; providing threat information and warnings to other federal agencies and officials, state and
+local governments, and private entities; diplomatic or military actions; and actions by other intelligence
+agencies to counter international terrorism or other national security threats. In addition, the matters
+identified by these Guidelines as threats to the national security, including international terrorism and
+espionage, almost invariably involve possible violations of criminal statutes. Detecting, solving, and
+preventing these crimes – and in many cases, arresting and prosecuting the perpetrators – are crucial
+objectives of national security investigations under these Guidelines. Thus, these investigations are
+usually both "counterintelligence" investigations and "criminal" investigations. (U)
+
+The authority to conduct national security investigations under these Guidelines does not
+supplant or limit the authority to carry out activities under other Attorney General guidelines or pursuant
+to other lawful authorities of the FBI. Thus, matters within the scope of these Guidelines, such as
+crimes involved in international terrorism and the activities of groups and organizations that aim to
+commit such crimes, may also be investigated under the guidelines for general crimes investigations and
+criminal intelligence investigations. See the Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes,
+Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations, Part II (general crimes investigations)
+and Part III.B (terrorism enterprise investigations). Likewise, the authorization of extraterritorial
+activities under Part II.E of these Guidelines overlaps at a practical level with other guidelines the
+Attorney General has issued for extraterritorial criminal investigations and use of extraterritorial criminal
+informants. The requirements under these Guidelines to notify FBI Headquarters and other Department
+of Justice components and officials concerning the initiation and progress of investigations are intended
+in part to ensure that activities pursuant to these Guidelines are fully coordinated with investigations and
+activities under other authorities of the FBI. (U)
+
+Part II of these Guidelines authorizes three levels of investigative activity in national security
+
+---
+SECRET
+2
+
+---
+SECRET
+
+investigations: (1) threat assessments, (2) preliminary investigations, and (3) full investigations: (U)
+
+(1) Threat assessments. To carry out its central mission of preventing the commission of terrorist
+acts against the United States and its people, the FBI must proactively draw on available
+sources of information to identify terrorist threats and activities. It cannot be content to wait for
+leads to come in through the actions of others, but rather must be vigilant in detecting terrorist
+activities to the full extent permitted by law, with an eye towards early intervention and
+prevention of acts of terrorism before they occur. (U)
+
+Part II.A of these Guidelines accordingly authorizes the proactive collection of information
+concerning threats to the national security, including information on individuals, groups, and
+organizations of possible investigative interest, and information on possible targets of
+international terrorist activities or other national security threats (such as infrastructure and
+computer systems vulnerabilities). This is comparable to the authorization under Part VI of the
+Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism
+Enterprise Investigations to engage in information collection for counterterrorism or other law
+enforcement purposes without any more specific investigative predication. The particular
+methods allowed in threat assessments are relatively non-intrusive investigative techniques,
+including obtaining publicly available information, accessing information available within the FBI
+or Department of Justice, requesting information from other government entities, using online
+informational resources and services, interviewing previously established assets, non-pretextual
+interviews and requests for information from members of the public and private entities, and
+accepting information voluntarily provided by governmental or private entities. (S) (U)
+
+In addition to allowing proactive information collection for national security purposes, the
+authority to conduct threat assessments may be used in cases in which information or an
+allegation concerning possible terrorist (or other national security-threatening) activity by an
+individual, group, or organization is received, and the matter can be checked out promptly
+through the relatively non-intrusive techniques authorized in threat assessments. This can avoid
+the need to open a formal preliminary or full investigation, if the threat assessment indicates that
+further investigation is not warranted. In this function, threat assessments under these
+Guidelines are comparable to the checking of initial leads in ordinary criminal investigations.
+See the Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and
+Terrorism Enterprise Investigations, Subpart A of the Introduction. (U)
+
+(2) Preliminary investigations. Preliminary investigations are authorized, generally speaking, when
+there is information or an allegation indicating that a threat to the national security may exist.
+
+---
+SECRET
+3
+
+---
+SECRET
+
+Preliminary investigations may relate to individuals, groups, organizations, and possible criminal
+violations, as specified in Part II.B. (S) (U)
+
+Since the legal predicate for mail opening, physical searches, and electronic surveillance that
+require a judicial order or warrant generally entails more substantial information or evidence
+than would be available outside of a full investigation, the Guidelines specify that these methods
+are not available in preliminary investigations. Otherwise, all lawful investigative techniques may
+be used in preliminary investigations. A non-exhaustive listing of such techniques, including
+related review or approval requirements, appears in Part V of these Guidelines. These include
+all the techniques that may be used in threat assessments; interviews and pretext interviews of
+the subject of the investigation and other persons; use of previously established assets and
+recruitment of new assets; physical, photographic, and video surveillance not requiring
+unconsented entry; mail covers; polygraph examinations; inquiry of law enforcement,
+intelligence, and security agencies of foreign governments; physical searches not requiring a
+judicial order or warrant; undercover operations and undisclosed participation in organizations;
+consensual monitoring of communications, including consensual computer monitoring; National
+Security Letters; and pen registers and trap and trace devices. (S) (U)
+
+Preliminary investigations are limited in duration. They may initially be authorized for up to six
+months, subject to a possible six-month extension by the responsible field office. Extensions of
+preliminary investigations that continue beyond a year must be authorized by FBI Headquarters.
+(U)
+
+(3) Full investigations. Full investigations are authorized, generally speaking, when there are
+specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that a threat to the national security may
+exist. Like preliminary investigations, full investigations may relate to individuals, groups,
+organizations, and possible criminal violations, as specified in Part II.B. (S) (U)
+
+All lawful investigative techniques may be used in full investigations. These include, in addition
+to the techniques authorized in threat assessments and preliminary investigations, nonconsensual
+mail opening, physical searches, and electronic surveillance that require judicial orders or
+warrants. (S) (U)
+
+In investigating threats to the national security, the FBI may request information from foreign
+law enforcement, intelligence, and security agencies, and may, in certain circumstances, conduct
+operations outside of the United States. Part II.E of these Guidelines sets out conditions and approval
+requirements for extraterritorial activities. As provided in Part II.E, these activities require a request
+
+---
+SECRET
+4
+
+---
+SECRET
+
+from or approval of the Director of Central Intelligence or a designee. This requirement ensures that
+extraterritorial activities under these Guidelines are properly coordinated with other agencies in the
+Intelligence Community, so that their authorities and capabilities are also brought to bear as appropriate
+to protect the national security, consistent with Executive Order 12333 or a successor order. (S) (U)
+
+The FBI may also provide assistance to state and local governments, and to foreign law
+enforcement, intelligence, and security agencies, in investigations relating to threats to the national
+security. Part III of these Guidelines specifies standards and procedures for the provision of such
+assistance. (U)
+
+B. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION (U)
+
+The FBI's functions pursuant to Executive Order 12333 §§ 1.6, 1.14, 2.3, and 2.4 include
+engaging in foreign intelligence collection and providing operational support for other components of the
+U.S. Intelligence Community. This role is frequently critical in collecting foreign intelligence within the
+United States because the authorized domestic activities of other intelligence agencies are more
+constrained than those of the FBI under applicable statutory law and Executive Order 12333. (U)
+
+Part IV of these Guidelines provides standards and procedures for the provision of such
+assistance by the FBI to other federal intelligence agencies and the collection of foreign intelligence by
+the FBI. (U)
+
+C. STRATEGIC ANALYSIS (U)
+
+Executive Order 12333 § 1.14(d) states that the FBI shall "[p]roduce and disseminate foreign
+intelligence and counterintelligence." The Executive Order further provides, in § 1.1(a), that
+"[m]aximum emphasis should be given to fostering analytical competition among appropriate elements
+of the Intelligence Community." Given the magnitude and potential consequences of terrorist threats
+and other threats to the national security, it is imperative that the FBI develop and maintain a strong
+analytic capacity to identify, examine, assess, and appropriately disseminate information concerning
+terrorist threats and to produce and disseminate other analysis relating to national security matters. (U)
+
+Part VI of these Guidelines accordingly authorizes the FBI to examine and analyze information
+to produce and disseminate foreign intelligence and counterintelligence. Part VI provides that the FBI
+may draw on information from any source permitted by law in carrying out this analytic function, and
+may supplement the information in its possession, for purposes of these analytic activities, through the
+use of the methods authorized in threat assessments, such as obtaining publicly available information and
+
+---
+SECRET
+5
+
+---
+SECRET
+
+checking government records. (U)
+
+D. RETENTION AND DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION (U)
+
+Part VII of these Guidelines requires the maintenance of adequate records and information
+relating to investigations and other activities under these Guidelines, and provides standards for the
+sharing and dissemination of information obtained in such investigations and activities. (U)
+
+Part VII includes, in Subpart B.2, provisions for sharing of information and consultation with
+other Department of Justice components, which reflect legal reforms and policies adopted by the
+Attorney General following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack. Consistent with legal norms and
+standards of effective management, all relevant components, including the Criminal Division, relevant
+United States Attorneys' offices, and the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, must be fully
+informed about the nature, scope, and conduct of national security investigations and other activities
+under these Guidelines. The Attorney General can most effectively direct and control such
+investigations and activities only if all relevant Department of Justice components are able to offer
+advice and recommendations, both strategic and tactical, about their conduct and goals. The overriding
+need to protect the United States and its people from terrorism and other threats to the national security
+requires a full and free exchange of information and ideas. (U)
+
+I. GENERAL AUTHORITIES AND PRINCIPLES (U)
+
+A. GENERAL AUTHORITIES (U)
+
+1. The FBI is authorized to conduct investigations to obtain information concerning or to
+ protect against threats to the national security, including investigations of crimes
+ involved in or related to threats to the national security, as provided in Parts II and V of
+ these Guidelines. Threats to the national security are:
+ a. International terrorism.
+ b. Espionage and other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassination,
+ conducted by, for, or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons.
+ c. Foreign computer intrusions.
+ d. Other matters as determined by the Attorney General, consistent with Executive
+
+---
+SECRET
+6
+
+---
+SECRET
+
+Order 12333 or a successor order. (U)
+
+2. The FBI is authorized to assist state, local, and foreign governments as provided in Part
+ III of these Guidelines. (U)
+
+3. The FBI is authorized to collect foreign intelligence and to assist federal intelligence
+ agencies as provided in Part IV of these Guidelines. (U)
+
+4. The FBI is authorized to conduct strategic analysis as provided in Part VI of these
+ Guidelines. (U)
+
+5. The FBI is authorized to retain and disseminate information collected pursuant to these
+ Guidelines as provided in Part VII of these Guidelines. (U)
+
+B. USE OF AUTHORITIES AND METHODS (U)
+
+1. Protection of National Security (U)
+
+The FBI shall fully utilize the authorities provided and the methods authorized by these
+Guidelines to protect the national security of the United States. (U)
+
+2. Choice of Methods (U)
+
+The conduct of investigations and other activities authorized by these Guidelines may
+present choices between the use of information collection methods that are more or less
+intrusive, considering such factors as the effect on the privacy of individuals and
+potential damage to reputation. As Executive Order 12333 § 2.4 provides, "the least
+intrusive collection techniques feasible" are to be used in such situations. It is
+recognized, however, that the choice of techniques is a matter of judgment. The FBI
+shall not hesitate to use any lawful techniques consistent with these Guidelines, even if
+intrusive, where the degree of intrusiveness is warranted in light of the seriousness of a
+threat to the national security or the strength of the information indicating its existence.
+This point is to be particularly observed in investigations relating to terrorism. (U)
+
+3. Respect for Legal Rights (U)
+
+These Guidelines do not authorize investigating or maintaining information on United
+
+---
+SECRET
+7
+
+---
+SECRET
+
+States persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First
+Amendment or the lawful exercise of other rights secured by the Constitution or laws of
+the United States. Rather, all activities under these Guidelines must have a valid
+purpose consistent with these Guidelines, and must be carried out in conformity with the
+Constitution and all applicable statutes, executive orders, Department of Justice
+regulations and policies, and Attorney General guidelines. (U)
+
+4. Relationship to Other Guidelines and Authorities (U)
+ a. The authority to conduct national security investigations and other activities
+ under these Guidelines supplements, and does not supplant or limit, the
+ authority to carry out investigations and other activities under other Attorney
+ General guidelines or pursuant to other lawful authorities of the FBI. These
+ Guidelines accordingly do not limit other authorized law enforcement activities
+ of the FBI, such as those authorized by the Attorney General's Guidelines on
+ General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise
+ Investigations. (U)
+ b. National security investigations and other activities under these Guidelines shall
+ be carried out in conformity with all applicable Executive Branch directives and
+ policies, including Intelligence Community directives and policies, relating to
+ coordination of intelligence activities, information sharing, or other matters. (U)
+
+5. Maintenance of Records under the Privacy Act (U)
+
+Under the Privacy Act, the permissibility of maintaining records relating to certain
+activities of individuals who are United States persons depends in part on whether the
+collection of such information is "pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law
+enforcement activity." 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(7). By its terms, the limitation of 5 U.S.C.
+552a(e)(7) is inapplicable to activities that do not involve the maintaining of records
+within the meaning of the Privacy Act, or that occur pertinent to and within the scope of
+an authorized law enforcement activity. Activities authorized by these Guidelines are
+authorized law enforcement activities for purposes of the Privacy Act. As noted in
+paragraph 4. above, these Guidelines do not provide an exhaustive enumeration of
+authorized law enforcement activities. Questions about the application of the Privacy
+Act to other activities should be addressed to the FBI Office of the General Counsel or
+the Department of Justice Office of Information and Privacy. (U)
+
+---
+SECRET
+8
+
+---
+SECRET
+
+C. DETERMINATION OF UNITED STATES PERSON STATUS (U)
+
+In some contexts, these Guidelines provide different standards or rules depending on whether
+investigations or other activities relate to a United States person or to a non-United States
+person. This Subpart shall be applied in determining whether an individual, group, or
+organization is a United States person. (U)
+
+1. Meaning of United States Person (U)
+
+A United States person is:
+ a. an individual who is a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for
+ permanent residence;
+ b. an unincorporated association substantially composed of individuals who are
+ United States persons; or
+ c. a corporation incorporated in the United States.
+
+Notwithstanding the foregoing, a foreign power as defined in Part VIII.1.-3. of these
+Guidelines is never to be considered a United States person, including any foreign
+government or component thereof, any faction of a foreign nation or nations not
+substantially composed of individuals who are United States persons, or any entity that
+is openly acknowledged by a foreign government or governments to be directed and
+controlled by such foreign government or governments. (U)
+
+2. [REDACTED]
+
+---
+SECRET
+9
+
+---
+[REDACTED]
+
+3. Determination Whether Certain Groups are Substantially Composed of United
+ States Persons (U)
+
+In determining whether a group or organization in the United States that is affiliated
+with a foreign-based international organization is substantially composed of United
+States persons, the relationship between the two shall be considered. If the U.S.-based
+group or organization operates directly under the control of the international
+organization and has no independent program or activities in the United States, the
+membership of the entire international organization shall be considered in determining if
+it is substantially composed of United States persons. If, however, the U.S.-based
+group or organization has programs or activities separate from, or in addition to, those
+directed by the international organization, only its membership in the United States shall
+be considered in determining whether it is substantially composed of United States
+persons. (U)
+
+D. NATURE AND APPLICATION OF THE GUIDELINES (U)
+
+1. Status as Internal Guidance (U)
+
+These Guidelines are set forth solely for the purpose of internal Department of Justice
+guidance. They are not intended to, do not, and may not be relied upon to create any
+rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable by law by any party in any matter, civil or
+criminal, nor do they place any limitation on otherwise lawful investigative and litigative
+prerogatives of the Department of Justice. (U)
+
+---
+SECRET
+10
+
+---
+SECRET
+
+2. Departures from the Guidelines (U)
+
+Departures from these Guidelines must be approved by the Attorney General, the
+Deputy Attorney General, or an official designated by the Attorney General. If a
+departure from these Guidelines is necessary without such prior approval because of
+the immediacy or gravity of a threat to the national security or to the safety of persons
+or property and the need to take immediate action to protect against such a threat, the
+Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, or an official designated by the
+Attorney General shall be notified as soon thereafter as practicable. The FBI shall
+provide timely written notice of departures from these Guidelines to the Office of
+Intelligence Policy and Review. Notwithstanding this paragraph, all activities in all
+circumstances must be carried out in a manner consistent with the Constitution and laws
+of the United States. (U)
+
+3. Interpretation (U)
+
+All significant new legal questions as to the coverage and interpretation of these
+guidelines will be resolved initially by the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review and
+reviewed by the Deputy Attorney General or Attorney General as appropriate. (U)
+
+II. NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS (U)
+
+The levels of investigative activity in national security investigations are: (1) threat assessments;
+(2) preliminary investigations; and (3) full investigations. If the available information shows at any point
+that the threshold standard for a preliminary investigation or full investigation is satisfied, then that level
+of investigative activity may be initiated immediately, without progressing through more limited
+investigative stages. (U)
+
+The scope of authorized activities under this Part is not limited to "investigation" in a narrow
+sense, such as solving particular cases or obtaining evidence for use in particular criminal prosecutions.
+Rather, these activities also provide critical information needed for broader analytic and intelligence
+purposes authorized by Executive Order 12333 and these Guidelines to protect the national security,
+such as strategic analysis under Part VI, dissemination of information to other agencies in the
+Intelligence Community under Part VII.B, and dissemination of information to appropriate White House
+officials under Part VII.B. Information obtained at all stages of investigative activity - threat
+assessments, preliminary investigations, and full investigations - is accordingly to be retained and
+disseminated for these purposes as provided in these Guidelines, or in FBI policy consistent with these
+
+---
+SECRET
+11
+
+---
+SECRET
+
+Guidelines, regardless of whether it furthers investigative objectives in a narrower or more immediate
+sense. (U)
+
+A. THREAT ASSESSMENTS (U)
+
+The FBI may, without opening a preliminary or full investigation, engage in the following
+activities to investigate or collect information relating to threats to the national security, including
+information on individuals, groups, and organizations of possible investigative interest, and
+information concerning possible targets of international terrorism, espionage, foreign computer
+intrusion, or other threats to the national security:
+
+1. Obtain publicly available information. (S) (U)
+
+2. Access and examine FBI and other Department of Justice records, and obtain
+ information from any FBI or other Department of Justice personnel. (S) (U)
+
+3. Check records maintained by, and request information from, other federal, state, and
+ local government entities. (S) (U)
+
+4. Use online services and resources (whether non-profit or commercial). (S) (U)
+
+5. Interview previously established assets, informants, and cooperating witnesses (not
+ including new tasking of such persons). (S) (U)
+
+6. Interview or request information from members of the public and private entities (other
+ than pretext interviews or requests). (S) (U)
+
+7. Accept information voluntarily provided by governmental or private entities. (S) (U)
+
+The foregoing methods may also be used, without opening a preliminary or full investigation, to
+identify potential assets, or to collect information to maintain the cover or credibility of an asset
+or employee, in connection with activities related to a threat to the national security. (S) (U)
+
+---
+SECRET
+12
+
+---
+SECRET
+
+B. COMMON PROVISIONS FOR PRELIMINARY AND FULL INVESTIGATIONS
+ (U)
+
+1. Circumstances for Opening an Investigation (U)
+
+The circumstances on which the initiation of a preliminary investigation or full
+investigation may be based are:
+
+ a. An individual is or may be an international terrorist or an agent of a foreign
+ power. (S) (U)
+
+ b. A group or Organization is or may be a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
+ power. (S) [REDACTED]
+
+ c. [REDACTED]
+
+ d. An individual, group, or organization is or may be engaging, or has or may have
+ engaged, in activities constituting a threat to the national security (or related
+ preparatory or support activities) for or on behalf of a foreign power. (S) (U)
+
+ e. A crime involved in or related to a threat to the national security has or may
+ have occurred, is or may be occurring, or will or may occur. (S) (U)
+
+ f. An individual, group, or organization is, or may be, the target of a recruitment
+ or infiltration effort by an international terrorist, foreign power, or agent of a
+ foreign power under circumstances related to a threat to the national security.
+ (S) (U)
+
+ g. An individual, group, organization, entity, information, property, or activity is, or
+ may be, a target of international terrorism, espionage, foreign computer
+ intrusion, or other threat to the national security. (S) (U)
+
+2. Authorization and Notice (U)
+
+ a. An FBI field office or FBI Headquarters may initiate a preliminary or full
+ investigation. A field office shall notify FBI Headquarters within ten working
+ days of the initiation by the field office of a preliminary or full investigation. The
+
+---
+SECRET
+13
+
+---
+SECRET
+
+notice of initiation of a preliminary or full investigation, whether the investigation
+is initiated by a field office or FBI Headquarters, shall identify the grounds for
+the investigation and describe any pertinent sensitive national security matter(s).
+(S) (U)
+
+ b. FBI Headquarters shall provide the notice of the initiation of a preliminary or full
+ investigation to the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review and to the Criminal
+ Division, and the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review shall notify the
+ Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General. The notice shall be
+ provided to the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review and the Criminal
+ Division within ten working days of receipt of the notice from a field office by
+ FBI Headquarters or initiation of the investigation by FBI headquarters. The
+ FBI shall also provide the notice of initiation to any relevant United States
+ Attorney's office, subject to authorization by the Criminal Division in an
+ espionage case. Exceptions may be adopted to the requirements of this
+ subparagraph as provided in Part VII.B.2.d. (U)
+
+ c. The FBI shall notify the Deputy Attorney General if FBI Headquarters
+ disapproves a field office's initiation of a preliminary or full investigation. (U)
+
+3. Investigations of Groups and Organizations (U)
+
+ a. Preliminary and full investigations of groups and organizations should focus on
+ activities related to threats to the national security, not on unrelated First
+ Amendment activities. Any information concerning a group or organization that
+ is relevant to the investigation of a threat to the national security may be sought,
+ including information on any relationship of the group or organization to a
+ foreign power, the identity of its members, employees, or other persons who
+ may be acting in furtherance of its objectives; its finances; its geographical
+ dimensions; and its past and future activities and goals. (S) (U)
+
+ b. In the course of a preliminary or full investigation of a group or organization, it
+ may appear that investigation of an individual or individuals within or associated
+ with the group or organization is warranted, beyond the investigation of the
+ individual's activities related to the group or organization as part of the
+ investigation of the group or organization. A preliminary or full investigation of
+ such an individual may be initiated whenever the requirements for initiating a
+
+---
+SECRET
+14
+
+---
+SECRET
+
+preliminary or full investigation of an individual are satisfied. (S) (U)
+
+C. PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS (U)
+
+1. Initiation (U)
+
+A field office or FBI Headquarters may initiate a preliminary investigation:
+
+ a. when there is information or an allegation indicating the existence of a
+ circumstance described in Part II.B.1 of these Guidelines, in order to determine
+ whether the basis exists for a full investigation; or
+
+ b. in order to identify potential assets, to determine the suitability or credibility of
+ an individual as an asset, or to collect information to maintain the cover or
+ credibility of an asset or employee, in connection with activities related to a
+ threat to the national security. (S) (U)
+
+2. Approval Levels (U)
+
+A preliminary investigation initiated by a field office must be approved by the Special
+Agent in Charge if the investigation involves a sensitive national security matter. Other
+preliminary investigations may be approved by the Special Agent in Charge or, as
+authorized by the Special Agent in Charge, by an Assistant Special Agent in Charge or
+squad supervisor with responsibility for national security investigations. (S) (U)
+
+3. Authorized techniques (U)
+
+All lawful investigative techniques may be used in preliminary investigations, including
+the techniques listed in Part V of these Guidelines, other than the techniques described
+in Part V.17.-18. (mail opening, physical search, or electronic surveillance requiring
+judicial order or warrant). (S) (U)
+
+4. Duration (U)
+
+Preliminary investigations shall be completed within six months of the date of initiation.
+In a preliminary investigation initiated by a field office, the Special Agent in Charge or,
+as authorized by the Special Agent in Charge, an Assistant Special Agent in Charge
+
+---
+SECRET
+15
+
+---
+SECRET
+
+responsible for the investigation, may authorize an extension for an additional six-month
+period if warranted by facts or information obtained in the course of the investigation.
+An extension of a preliminary investigation beyond the initial one-year period requires
+FBI Headquarters approval and may be granted in six-month increments. All
+extensions shall be in writing and include the reason for the extension. If FBI
+Headquarters approves an extension of a preliminary investigation beyond the initial
+one-year period, the FBI shall notify the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review and
+provide to the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review the extension statement (as
+described in the preceding sentence) within ten working days of the transmittal of the
+approval to a field office. (S) (U)
+
+D. FULL INVESTIGATIONS (U)
+
+1. Initiation (U)
+
+FBI Headquarters or a field office may initiate a full investigation if there are specific
+and articulable facts that give reason to believe that a circumstance described in Part
+II.B.1 of these Guidelines exists. (S) (U)
+
+2. Approval Levels (U)
+
+A full investigation initiated by a field office must be approved by the Special Agent in
+Charge if the investigation involves a sensitive national security matter. A full
+investigation of a foreign official or visitor from a threat country may be approved by the
+Special Agent in Charge or, as authorized by the Special Agent in Charge, by an
+Assistant Special Agent in Charge or squad supervisor with responsibility for national
+security investigations. All other full investigations may be approved by the Special
+Agent in Charge or, as authorized by the Special Agent in Charge, by an Assistant
+Special Agent in Charge with responsibility for national security investigations. (S) (U)
+
+3. Authorized techniques (U)
+
+All lawful investigative techniques may be used in full investigations, including the
+techniques listed in Part V of these Guidelines. (S) (U)
+
+---
+SECRET
+16
+
+---
+SECRET
+
+4. Reports (U)
+
+In addition to the notice concerning the initiation of investigations required under Part
+II.B.2 of these Guidelines, the FBI shall notify the Office of Intelligence Policy and
+Review and the Criminal Division at the end of each year a full investigation continues,
+and shall prepare and provide to the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review and the
+Criminal Division at that time a summary of the investigation that includes the
+information described in Part VII.A.2 of these Guidelines as it relates to the
+investigation. The FBI shall also provide the summary to any relevant United States
+Attorney's office, subject to authorization by the Criminal Division in an espionage case.
+The Office of Intelligence Policy and Review shall notify the Attorney General and the
+Deputy Attorney General concerning full investigations that continue a year or more and
+the annual summaries in such investigations. Exceptions may be adopted to the
+requirements of this paragraph as provided in Part VII.B.2.d. (U)
+
+E. EXTRATERRITORIAL OPERATIONS (U)
+
+1. [REDACTED]
+
+2. [REDACTED]
+
+---
+SECRET
+17
+
+---
+[REDACTED]
+c. [REDACTED]
+d. [REDACTED]
+3. [REDACTED]
+
+III. INVESTIGATIVE ASSISTANCE TO STATE, LOCAL, AND FOREIGN
+ GOVERNMENTS
+
+A. STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (U)
+
+The FBI may assist state and local governments in investigations relating to threats to the
+national security. (U)
+
+B. FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS (U)
+
+1. The FBI may conduct background inquiries concerning consenting individuals when
+ requested by foreign governments or agencies. (U)
+
+2. [REDACTED]
+
+---
+SECRET
+18
+
+---
+[REDACTED]
+
+3. The FBI may not provide assistance to foreign law enforcement, intelligence, or security
+ officers conducting investigations within the United States unless such officers have
+ provided prior notification to the Department of State as required by 18 U.S.C. 951.
+ (U)
+
+4. The FBI may provide other material and technical assistance to foreign governments to
+ the extent not otherwise prohibited by law. (U)
+
+IV. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND ASSISTANCE TO
+ INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES (U)
+
+A. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION (U)
+
+1. The FBI may collect foreign intelligence in response to requirements of topical interest
+ published by an entity authorized by the Director of Central Intelligence to establish
+ such requirements, including, but not limited to, the National HUMINT Requirements
+ Tasking Center. When approved by the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney
+ General, or an official designated by the Attorney General, the FBI may collect other
+ foreign intelligence in response to tasking specifically levied on the FBI by an official of
+ the Intelligence Community designated by the President. Upon a request by an official
+ of the Intelligence Community designated by the President, the FBI may also collect
+ foreign intelligence to clarify or complete foreign intelligence previously disseminated by
+ the FBI. Copies of such requests shall be provided to the Office of Intelligence Policy
+ and Review. (U)
+
+---
+SECRET
+19
+
+---
+SECRET
+
+2. The FBI may also collect foreign intelligence, if consistent with Executive Order 12333
+ or a successor order, as directed by the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney
+ General, or an official designated by the Attorney General. (U)
+
+3. [REDACTED]
+
+B. OPERATIONAL SUPPORT (U)
+
+1. When approved by the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, or an official
+ designated by the Attorney General, the FBI may provide operational support to
+ authorized intelligence activities of other entities of the Intelligence Community upon a
+ request made or confirmed in writing by an official of the Intelligence Community
+ designated by the President. The request shall describe the type and duration of
+ support required, the reasons why the FBI is being requested to furnish the assistance,
+ and the techniques that are expected to be utilized, and shall certify that such assistance
+ is necessary to an authorized activity of the requesting entity. (U)
+
+2. The support may include techniques set forth in the approved request and, with the
+ approval of FBI Headquarters, any other technique that does not substantially alter the
+ character of the support. The FBI shall promptly notify the Office of Intelligence Policy
+ and Review of the utilization of any such additional techniques. (U)
+
+3. The FBI may recruit new assets to obtain information or services needed to furnish the
+ requested support, subject to the same standards and procedures applicable to other
+ FBI assets. (U)
+
+C. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
+ ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES (U)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+---
+SECRET
+20
+
+---
+SECRET
+
+V. INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES (U)
+
+Authorized investigative techniques under these Guidelines include, but are not limited to:
+
+1. The techniques authorized in threat assessments under Part II.A. (S) (U).
+
+2. Interviews and pretext interviews of the subject of an investigation and other persons.
+ (S) [REDACTED]
+
+3. Tasking of previously established assets, informants, and cooperating witnesses, and
+ recruitment of new assets, informants, and cooperating witnesses. (S) (U)
+
+4. Inquiry of foreign law enforcement, intelligence, or security agencies, and operations
+ outside of the United States in conformity with Part II.E. (S) [REDACTED]
+
+5. [REDACTED]
+
+6. Mail covers. (S) (U)
+
+7. Physical, photographic, and video surveillance (where such surveillance does not
+ require unconsented entry), including use of such surveillance to identify an individual in
+
+---
+SECRET
+21
+
+---
+SECRET
+
+contact with the subject of a preliminary or full investigation. (S) (U)
+
+8. Physical searches of personal or real property where a warrant or court order is not
+ legally required because there is no reasonable expectation of privacy (e.g., trash
+ covers). (S) (U)
+
+9. Use of closed circuit television, direction finders, and other monitoring devices, subject
+ to legal review by the Chief Division Counsel or the FBI Office of the General Counsel.
+ The methods described in this paragraph usually do not require court orders or
+ warrants unless they involve physical trespass or non-consensual monitoring of
+ communications, but legal review is necessary to ensure compliance with all applicable
+ legal requirements. (S) (U)
+
+10. Consensual monitoring of communications, including consensual computer monitoring,
+ subject to legal review by the Chief Division Counsel or the FBI Office of the General
+ Counsel. (S) (U)
+
+11. Polygraph examinations. (S) (U)
+
+12. Use of National Security Letters in conformity with 15 U.S.C. 1681u or 1681v
+ (relating to consumer information), 18 U.S.C. 2709 (relating to subscriber information,
+ toll billing records, and electronic communication transactional records), 12 U.S.C.
+ 3414(a)(5)(A) (relating to financial records), or 50 U.S.C. 436 (relating to financial,
+ consumer, and travel records of certain executive branch employees). (S) (U)
+
+13. Accessing stored wire and electronic communications and transactional records in
+ conformity with chapter 121 of title 18, United States Code (18 U.S.C. 2701-2712).
+ (S) (U)
+
+14. Use of pen registers and trap and trace devices in conformity with FISA (50 U.S.C.
+ 1841-1846) or chapter 206 of title 18, United States Code (18 U.S.C. 3121-3127).
+ (S) (U)
+
+15. Obtaining business records and other tangible things in conformity with FISA (50
+ U.S.C. 1861-1863). (S) (U)
+
+16. Use of grand jury subpoenas and other subpoenas as authorized by law. (S) (U)
+
+---
+SECRET
+22
+
+---
+SECRET
+
+17. Electronic surveillance in conformity with chapter 119 of title 18, United States Code
+ (18 U.S.C. 2510-2522), FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801-1811), or Executive Order 12333 §
+ [REDACTED]
+
+18. [REDACTED]
+
+VI. STRATEGIC ANALYSIS (U)
+
+The FBI may examine and analyze information in its possession in order to produce and
+disseminate foreign intelligence and counterintelligence. The FBI may draw on information from any
+source permitted by law in carrying out this function, including any information it has collected or
+obtained through investigative activities or other activities pursuant to these Guidelines. The FBI may
+also engage in the activities authorized in threat assessments under Part II.A to supplement information
+that is otherwise in its possession, for the purpose of carrying out analysis and producing and
+disseminating foreign intelligence and counterintelligence under this Part. (U)
+
+VII. RETENTION AND DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION (U)
+
+A. INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND DATABASES (U)
+
+1. The FBI shall retain records relating to preliminary and full investigations, foreign
+ intelligence collection and support activities, and other activities under these Guidelines
+ in accordance with a records retention plan approved by the National Archives and
+ Records Administration. All such records shall be available for review upon request by
+ the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, including all information in the database or
+ records system described in paragraph 2. (U)
+
+2. The FBI shall maintain a database or records system that permits the prompt retrieval
+ of the following information:
+ a. The identity and status of each preliminary or full investigation (open or closed),
+ the dates of opening and closing, the predication for the investigation, and
+ whether the investigation involves a United States person. (S) (U)
+
+---
+SECRET
+23
+
+---
+SECRET
+
+b. The number of preliminary investigations, the number of preliminary
+ investigations involving United States persons, the number of preliminary
+ investigations involving United States persons in which an extension has been
+ granted, and the number of preliminary investigations that resulted in a full
+ investigation. (S) (U)
+
+c. The number of full investigations and the number of such investigations involving
+ United States persons. (S) (U)
+
+d. The identity of each full investigation of a group in the United States
+ substantially composed of United States persons that is acting for or on behalf
+ of an international terrorist organization. If such an investigation continues a
+ year or more, the annual summary or summaries for the investigation shall
+ include an assessment of the extent to which members of the group are aware
+ of the terrorist aims of the international organization. (S) (U)
+
+e. The number of requests for assistance received from foreign law enforcement,
+ intelligence, or security agencies involving United States persons, and
+ information on the nature of each such request and whether the requested
+ assistance was furnished or declined. (S) (U)
+
+B. INFORMATION SHARING (U)
+
+Legal rules and Department of Justice policies regarding information sharing and interagency
+coordination have been significantly modified since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack by
+statutory reforms and new Attorney General guidelines. The general principle reflected in
+current laws and policies is that information should be shared as consistently and fully as
+possible among agencies with relevant responsibilities to protect the United States and its
+people from terrorism and other threats to the national security, except as limited by specific
+constraints on such sharing. Under this general principle, the FBI shall provide information
+expeditiously to other agencies in the Intelligence Community, so that these agencies can take
+action in a timely manner to protect the national security in accordance with their lawful
+functions. This Subpart provides standards and procedures for the sharing and dissemination
+of information obtained in national security investigations, foreign intelligence collection, and
+other activities under these Guidelines. (U)
+
+---
+SECRET
+24
+
+---
+SECRET
+
+1. General (U)
+
+ a. Information may be disseminated with the consent of the person whom the
+ information concerns, or where necessary to protect life or property from
+ threatened force or violence, otherwise necessary for the safety or security of
+ persons or property or for the prevention of crime, or necessary to obtain
+ information for the conduct of a lawful investigation by the FBI. (U)
+
+ b. Information that is publicly available or does not identify United States persons
+ may be disseminated for any lawful purpose. (U)
+
+ c. Dissemination of information provided to the FBI by other Intelligence
+ Community agencies is subject to applicable agreements and understandings
+ with such agencies concerning the dissemination of such information. (U)
+
+2. Department of Justice (U)
+
+ a. The FBI may share information obtained through activities under these
+ Guidelines with other components of the Department of Justice. (U)
+
+ b. The Criminal Division and the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review shall
+ have access to all information obtained through activities under these Guidelines
+ except as limited by orders issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
+ Court, controls imposed by the originators of sensitive material, or restrictions
+ established by the Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney General in
+ particular cases. (U)
+
+ c. The FBI shall keep the Criminal Division and the Office of Intelligence Policy
+ and Review apprised of all information obtained through activities under these
+ Guidelines that is necessary to the ability of the United States to investigate or
+ protect against threats to the national security, subject to the limits noted in
+ subparagraph b. The FBI shall also keep the Criminal Division and the Office
+ of Intelligence Policy and Review apprised of information concerning any crime
+ which is obtained through activities under these Guidelines. (U)
+
+ d. As part of its responsibility under subparagraphs b. and c., the FBI shall
+ provide to the Criminal Division and the Office of Intelligence Policy and
+
+---
+SECRET
+25
+
+---
+SECRET
+
+Review notices of the initiation of investigations and annual notices and
+summaries as provided in Part II.B.2 and .D.4 of these Guidelines, and shall
+make available to the Criminal Division and the Office of Intelligence Policy and
+Review relevant information from investigative files. The Criminal Division shall
+adhere to any reasonable conditions on the storage and disclosure of such
+documents and information that the FBI and the Office of Intelligence Policy
+and Review may require. The FBI and the Criminal Division may adopt by
+mutual agreement exceptions to the provision of notices of the initiation of
+investigations and annual notices and summaries to the Criminal Division, and
+the FBI and the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review may adopt by mutual
+agreement exceptions to the provision of notices of initiation of investigations
+and annual notices and summaries to the Office of Intelligence and Policy
+Review. (U)
+
+e. The FBI, the Criminal Division, and the Office of Intelligence Policy and
+ Review shall consult with each other concerning national security investigations
+ and other activities under these Guidelines, and shall meet regularly to conduct
+ such consultations. Consultations may also be conducted directly between two
+ or more components at any time. Consultations may include the exchange of
+ advice and information on all issues necessary to the ability of the United States
+ to investigate or protect against threats to the national security, including
+ protection against such threats through criminal investigation and prosecution.
+ Consultations are subject to any limitations in orders of the Foreign Intelligence
+ Surveillance Court and restrictions established by the Attorney General or the
+ Deputy Attorney General in particular cases. Disagreements arising from
+ consultations may be presented to the Deputy Attorney General or the Attorney
+ General for resolution. (U)
+
+f. Subject to subparagraphs g. and h., relevant United States Attorneys' offices
+ shall receive information and engage in consultations to the same extent as the
+ Criminal Division. Thus, the relevant United States Attorneys' offices shall have
+ access to information, shall be kept apprised of information necessary to
+ protect national security, shall be kept apprised of information concerning
+ crimes, shall receive notices of the initiation of investigations and annual
+ summaries as provided in Part II.B.2 and .D.4 of these Guidelines, and shall
+ have access to FBI files, to the same extent as the Criminal Division. The
+ relevant United States Attorneys' offices shall receive such access and
+
+---
+SECRET
+26
+
+---
+SECRET
+
+information from the FBI field offices. The relevant United States Attorneys'
+offices also may and shall engage in regular consultations with the FBI and the
+Office of Intelligence Policy and Review to the same extent as the Criminal
+Division. (U)
+
+g. In espionage cases, dissemination of information to United States Attorneys'
+ offices and consultations between the FBI and United States Attorneys' offices
+ are subject to authorization by the Criminal Division. In an emergency, the FBI
+ may disseminate information to, and consult with, a United States Attorney's
+ office concerning an espionage investigation without the approval of the
+ Criminal Division, but shall notify the Criminal Division as soon as possible
+ thereafter. (U)
+
+h. Information disseminated to a United States Attorney's office pursuant to
+ subparagraph f. shall be disseminated only to the United States Attorney
+ and/or any Assistant United States Attorneys designated to the Department of
+ Justice by the United States Attorney as points of contact to receive such
+ information. The United States Attorneys and designated Assistant United
+ States Attorneys shall have appropriate security clearances and shall receive
+ training in the handling of classified information and information derived from
+ FISA, including training concerning restrictions on the use and dissemination of
+ such information. (U)
+
+3. Intelligence Community, Federal Law Enforcement Agencies, and Department
+ of Homeland Security (U)
+
+ a. The FBI shall carry out the requirements of the Memorandum of Understanding
+ Between the Intelligence Community, Federal Law Enforcement Agencies, and
+ the Department of Homeland Security Concerning Information Sharing
+ ("Memorandum of Understanding"), signed by the Attorney General on March
+ 4, 2003. As provided in the Memorandum of Understanding and subject to its
+ provisions, these requirements include timely sharing by the FBI of covered
+ information with other covered entities having a need-to-know, based on a
+ broad interpretation of the missions of the prospective recipients. As used in
+ this paragraph:
+ 1) 'covered entity' has the same meaning as in the Memorandum of
+
+---
+SECRET
+27
+
+---
+SECRET
+
+Understanding, including any element of the Department of Homeland
+Security (and that Department itself); any element of the Intelligence
+Community (including the Central Intelligence Agency and the Terrorist
+Threat Integration Center) or of the Department of Justice; and any
+other entity having federal law enforcement responsibilities;
+
+2) 'covered information' has the same meaning as in the Memorandum of
+ Understanding, including terrorism information, weapons of mass
+ destruction information, and vulnerabilities information, as well as
+ analyses based wholly or in part on such covered information;
+
+3) 'need-to-know,' 'infrastructure,' 'terrorism information,' 'vulnerabilities
+ information,' and 'weapons of mass destruction information' have the
+ same meanings as in the Memorandum of Understanding; and
+
+4) 'timely sharing' of covered information means provision by the FBI. of
+ covered information, subject to section 3(h) and other provisions of the
+ Memorandum of Understanding, to other covered entities having a
+ need-to-know: (i) immediately where the FBI reasonably believes that
+ the information relates to a potential terrorism or weapons of mass
+ destruction threat, to the United States Homeland, its infrastructure, or
+ to United States persons or interests, and (ii) as expeditiously as
+ possible with respect to other covered information. (U)
+
+b. All procedures, guidelines, and mechanisms under the Memorandum of
+ Understanding shall be designed and implemented, and all determinations with
+ regard to sharing information covered by the Memorandum of Understanding
+ shall be made, with the understood, overriding priority of preventing,
+ preempting, and disrupting terrorist threats to the United States. In some cases,
+ this priority will dictate the provision of information even where doing so may
+ affect criminal prosecutions or ongoing law enforcement or intelligence
+ operations. However, consistent with this overriding priority, the FBI shall act
+ in a manner to protect, to the greatest extent possible, these other significant
+ interests, including the protection of intelligence and sensitive law enforcement
+ sources and methods, other classified information, and sensitive operational and
+ prosecutorial information. (U)
+
+---
+SECRET
+28
+
+---
+SECRET
+
+c. To the greatest extent possible, information should be shared among covered
+ entities with relevant missions and responsibilities, and there should be
+ transparency among them with regard to their activities to preempt, prevent,
+ and disrupt terrorist attacks against United States persons and interests.
+ Except as otherwise specified in the Memorandum of Understanding, or
+ mandated by relevant federal statutes or Presidential Directives, procedures
+ and mechanisms for information sharing, use, and handling shall be interpreted
+ and implemented consistently and reciprocally regardless of the role a particular
+ entity plays as a provider or recipient of covered information. (U)
+
+4. Federal Authorities (U)
+
+The FBI may disseminate information obtained through activities under these Guidelines
+to other federal authorities when:
+
+ a. the information relates to a crime or other violation of law or regulation which
+ falls within the recipient's investigative jurisdiction, or the information otherwise
+ relates to the recipient's authorized responsibilities;
+
+ b. the recipient is a component of the Intelligence Community, and the information
+ is provided to allow the recipient to determine whether the information is
+ relevant to its responsibilities and can be retained or used;
+
+ c. the information is required to be furnished to another federal agency by
+ Executive Order 10450 or its successor; or
+
+ d. the information is required to be disseminated by statute, Presidential directive,
+ National Security Council directive, Attorney General directive, or interagency
+ agreement approved by the Attorney General. (U)
+
+5. State and Local Authorities (U)
+
+The FBI may disseminate information obtained through activities under these Guidelines
+to state and local authorities when:
+
+ a. the information relates to a crime or other violation of law or regulation which
+ falls within the recipient's jurisdiction, and the dissemination is consistent with
+
+---
+SECRET
+29
+
+---
+SECRET
+
+national security;
+
+b. the dissemination is for the purpose of preventing or responding to a threat to
+ the national security, or to public safety, including a threat to the life, health, or
+ safety of any individual or community; or
+
+c. the information is required to be disseminated by statute, Presidential directive,
+ National Security Council directive, Attorney General directive, or
+ intergovernmental agreement approved by the Attorney General. (U)
+
+6. Foreign Authorities (U)
+
+ a. The FBI may disseminate information obtained through activities under these
+ Guidelines to foreign authorities when:
+ 1) the dissemination of the information is in the interest of the national
+ security of the United States, or the information is relevant to the
+ recipient's authorized responsibilities and its dissemination is consistent
+ with the national security interests of the United States, and the FBI has
+ considered the effect such dissemination may reasonably be expected
+ to have on any identifiable United States person; or
+ 2) the information is required to be disseminated by statute or treaty,
+ Presidential directive or executive agreement, National Security Council
+ directive, or Attorney General directive. (U)
+
+ b. Dissemination to foreign authorities having significant implications for foreign
+ relations shall be coordinated with the Department of State. (U)
+
+7. Congressional Committees (U)
+
+Except for briefings and testimony on matters of general intelligence interest, information
+obtained through activities under these Guidelines may be disseminated to appropriate
+congressional committees when authorized by the Attorney General, the Deputy
+Attorney General, or an official designated by the Attorney General. Any agency
+requesting or involved in the collection of the information shall be consulted prior to
+such dissemination. A request for United States person information that has been
+
+---
+SECRET
+30
+
+---
+SECRET
+
+withheld from dissemination under this paragraph shall be referred to the Attorney
+General, the Deputy Attorney General, or an official designated by the Attorney
+General, for resolution. (U)
+
+8. White House (U)
+
+In order to carry out their responsibilities, the President, the Vice President, the
+Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Assistant to the President
+for Homeland Security Affairs, the National Security Council and its staff, the
+Homeland Security Council and its staff, and other White House officials and offices
+require information from all federal agencies, including foreign intelligence, and
+information relating to international terrorism and other threats to the national security.
+The FBI accordingly may disseminate information obtained through activities under
+these Guidelines to the White House, subject to the following standards and
+procedures: (U)
+
+ a. Requests to the FBI for such information from the White House shall be made
+ through the National Security Council staff or Homeland Security Council staff
+ including, but not limited to, the National Security Council Legal and
+ Intelligence Directorates and Office of Combating Terrorism. (U)
+
+ b. Compromising information concerning domestic officials or political
+ organizations, or information concerning activities of United States persons
+ intended to affect the political process in the United States, may be
+ disseminated to the White House only with the approval of the Attorney
+ General, based on a determination that such dissemination is needed for foreign
+ intelligence purposes, for the purpose of protecting against international
+ terrorism or other threats to the national security, or the conduct of foreign
+ affairs. However, such approval is not required for dissemination to the White
+ House of information concerning efforts of foreign intelligence services to
+ penetrate the White House, or concerning contacts by White House personnel
+ with foreign intelligence service personnel. (U)
+
+ c. Examples of types of information that are suitable for dissemination to the White
+ House on a routine basis include, but are not limited to:
+ 1) information concerning international terrorism;
+
+---
+SECRET
+31
+
+---
+SECRET
+
+2) information concerning activities of foreign intelligence services in the
+ United States;
+
+3) information indicative of imminent hostilities involving any foreign
+ power;
+
+4) information concerning potential cyber threats to the United States or its
+ allies;
+
+5) information indicative of policy positions adopted by foreign officials,
+ governments, or powers, or their reactions to United States foreign
+ policy initiatives;
+
+6) information relating to possible changes in leadership positions of
+ foreign governments, parties, factions, or powers;
+
+7) information concerning foreign economic or foreign political matters that
+ might have national security ramifications; and
+
+8) information set forth in regularly published national intelligence
+ requirements. (U)
+
+d. The limitations on dissemination of information by the FBI to the White House
+ under these Guidelines do not apply to dissemination to the White House of
+ information acquired in the course of an FBI investigation requested by the
+ White House into the background of a potential employee or appointee, or
+ responses to requests from the White House under Executive Order 10450.
+ (U)
+
+C. SPECIAL STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS (U)
+
+1. Dissemination of information acquired under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act is
+ subject to minimization procedures approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
+ Court and other requirements specified in that Act. (U)
+
+2. Information obtained through the use of National Security Letters under 15 U.S.C.
+ 1681v may be disseminated in conformity with the general standards of this Part.
+
+---
+SECRET
+32
+
+---
+SECRET
+
+Information obtained through the use of National Security Letters under other statutes
+may be disseminated in conformity with the general standards of this Part, subject to any
+applicable limitations in their governing statutory provisions: 12 U.S.C. 3414(a)(5)(B);
+15 U.S.C. 1681u(f); 18 U.S.C. 2709(d); 50 U.S.C. 436(e). (U)
+
+VIII. DEFINITIONS (U)
+
+A. AGENT OF A FOREIGN POWER:
+
+1. any person who is not a United States person and who:
+ a. acts in the United States as an officer or employee of a foreign power, or as a
+ member of a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation
+ therefor; or
+ b. acts for or on behalf of a foreign power which engages in clandestine intelligence
+ activities in the United States contrary to the interests of the United States, when
+ the circumstances of such person's presence in the United States indicate that
+ such person may engage in such activities in the United States, or when such
+ person knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of such activities or
+ knowingly conspires with any person to engage in such activities; or
+
+2. any person who:
+ a. knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence gathering activities for or on behalf
+ of a foreign power, which activities involve or may involve a violation of the
+ criminal statutes of the United States;
+ b. pursuant to the direction of an intelligence service or network of a foreign power,
+ knowingly engages in any other clandestine intelligence activities for or on behalf
+ of such foreign power, which activities involve or are about to involve a violation
+ of the criminal statutes of the United States;
+ c. knowingly engages in sabotage or international terrorism, or activities that are in
+ preparation therefor, for or on behalf of a foreign power;
+ d. knowingly enters the United States under a false or fraudulent identity for or on
+
+---
+SECRET
+33
+
+---
+SECRET
+
+e. behalf of a foreign power or, while in the United States, knowingly assumes a
+ false or fraudulent identity for or on behalf of a foreign power; or
+
+knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of activities described in
+subparagraph a., b., or c., or knowingly conspires with any person to engage in
+such activities. (U)
+
+B. CONSENSUAL MONITORING OF COMMUNICATIONS: monitoring of oral, wire, or
+ electronic communications for which a court order or warrant is not legally required because of
+ the consent of a party to the communication. (U)
+
+C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE: information gathered and activities conducted to protect against
+ espionage or other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by, for or on
+ behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons, or international terrorist activities, but not
+ including personnel, physical, document or communications security programs. (U)
+
+D. CRIME INVOLVED IN OR RELATED TO A THREAT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY:
+ both crimes directly involved in activities constituting a threat to the national security, and crimes
+ that are preparatory for or facilitate or support such activities. For example, if international
+ terrorists engage in a bank robbery in order to finance their terrorist activities, the bank robbery
+ is a crime involved in or related to a threat to the national security. (U)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+F. FOR OR ON BEHALF OF A FOREIGN POWER: the determination that activities are for or
+ on behalf of a foreign power shall be based on consideration of the extent to which the foreign
+ power is involved in:
+ 1. control or policy direction;
+ 2. financial or material support; or
+ 3. leadership, assignments, or discipline. (U)
+
+G. FOREIGN COMPUTER INTRUSION: the use or attempted use of any cyber-activity or other
+ means by, for, or on behalf of a foreign power to scan, probe, or gain unauthorized access into
+
+---
+SECRET
+34
+
+---
+SECRET
+
+one or more U.S.-based computers. (U)
+
+H. FOREIGN CONSULAR ESTABLISHMENT: the buildings or parts of buildings and the land
+ ancillary thereto, irrespective of ownership, used exclusively by a foreign government for the
+ purposes of a consular post. (U)
+
+I. FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENT: the buildings or parts of buildings and the land
+ ancillary thereto, irrespective of ownership, used by a foreign government for the purposes of a
+ diplomatic mission, such as an embassy or other premises and including the residence of the
+ head of the mission; premises of international organizations as defined by 22 U.S.C. 288;
+ premises of establishments authorized to be treated as international organizations or diplomatic
+ missions by specific statute (e.g., 22 U.S.C. 288f-1 to 288h); and the premises of establishments
+ of foreign representatives to such international organizations. (U)
+
+J. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE: information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of
+ foreign powers, organizations, or persons, or international terrorist activities. (U)
+
+K. FOREIGN OFFICIAL: a foreign national in the United States who is acting in an official
+ capacity for a foreign power, attached to a foreign diplomatic establishment, foreign consular
+ establishment, or other establishment under the control of a foreign power, or employed by an
+ international organization or other organization established under an agreement to which the
+ United States is a party. (U)
+
+L. FOREIGN POWER:
+
+1. a foreign government or any component thereof, whether or not recognized by the
+ United States;
+
+2. a faction of a foreign nation or nations, not substantially composed of United States
+ person;
+
+3. an entity that is openly acknowledged by a foreign government or governments to be
+ directed and controlled by such foreign government or government;
+
+4. a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor;
+
+5. a foreign-based political organization, not substantially composed of United States
+
+---
+SECRET
+35
+
+---
+SECRET
+
+person; or
+
+6. an entity that is directed or controlled by a foreign government or governments. (U)
+
+M. FOREIGN VISITOR: a foreign national in the United States who is not a permanent resident
+ alien of the United States. (U)
+
+N. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES: any activity conducted for intelligence purposes or to affect
+ political or governmental processes by, for, or on behalf of a foreign power. (U)
+
+O. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM:
+
+Activities that:
+
+1. involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal
+ laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if
+ committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or any State;
+
+2. appear to be intended:
+ A. to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
+ B. to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion;
+ C. to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping; and
+
+3. occur totally outside the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the
+ means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear to be intended to
+ coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.
+ (U)
+
+P. INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST: an individual or group that knowingly engages in
+ international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor, or knowingly aids, abets, or conspires
+ with any person engaged in such activities. (U)
+
+Q. NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATION: a counterintelligence investigation, pursuant to
+ Part II of these Guidelines, conducted to obtain information concerning or to protect against a
+
+---
+SECRET
+36
+
+---
+SECRET
+
+threat to the national security as defined in Part I.A.1. (U)
+
+R. PHYSICAL SEARCH: any physical intrusion within the United States into premises or property
+ (including examination of the interior of property by technical means) that is intended to result in
+ the seizure, reproduction, inspection, or alteration of information, material, or property, under
+ circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would
+ be required for law enforcement purposes, but does not include: (1) electronic surveillance as
+ defined in FISA, or (2) the acquisition by the United States Government of foreign intelligence
+ information from international foreign communications, or foreign intelligence activities conducted
+ in accordance with otherwise applicable Federal law involving a foreign electronic
+ communications system, utilizing a means other than electronic surveillance as defined in FISA.
+ (U)
+
+S. PUBLICLY AVAILABLE: information that has been published or broadcast for public
+ consumption, is available on request to the public, is accessible on-line or otherwise to the
+ public, is available to the public by subscription or purchase, could lawfully be seen or heard by
+ any casual observer, is made available at a meeting open to the public, or is obtained by visiting
+ any place or attending any event that is open to the public. (U)
+
+T. RECORDS: any records, databases, files, indices, information systems, or other retained
+ information. (U)
+
+U. [REDACTED]
+
+V. SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE: the Special Agent in Charge of a field office, including an
+ Acting Special Agent in Charge. In a field office headed by an Assistant Director, the functions
+ authorized for Special Agents in Charge by these Guidelines may be exercised by the Assistant
+ Director in Charge, or by any Special Agent in Charge as authorized by the Assistant Director in
+ Charge. (U)
+
+W. STRATEGIC ANALYSIS: assessment and analysis of information gathered and activities
+ conducted to produce and disseminate foreign intelligence and counterintelligence. (U)
+
+---
+SECRET
+37
+
+---
+SECRET
+
+Y. UNDISCLOSED PARTICIPATION: joining or participating in the activities of an organization
+ by an FBI asset or employee without disclosure of FBI affiliation, but not including participation
+ with the knowledge and approval of an official of the organization authorized to act in relation to
+ the activities in question, attendance at an activity open to the public or to acknowledged U.S.
+ Government employees, personal activities not related to FBI employment, or attendance at an
+ academic institution to obtain education or training relevant to FBI employment or to a future
+ undercover role. (U)
+
+Z. UNITED STATES: when used in a geographical sense, means all areas under the territorial
+ sovereignty of the United States. (U)
+
+
+
+Date: October 31, 2003
+
+John Ashcroft
+Attorney General
+
+---
+SECRET
+38
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_September_5_2006_Cover_Filing_Submission_to_the_FISC/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_September_5_2006_Cover_Filing_Submission_to_the_FISC/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2e0371b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_September_5_2006_Cover_Filing_Submission_to_the_FISC/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+{
+ "title": "September 5, 2006 Cover Filing Submission to the FISC",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "An NSA submission to the FISC on the standard minimization procedures governing the FBI. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2006-09-05",
+ "classification": [
+ "SECRET"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Baker, James A.",
+ "Gonzales, Alberto R.",
+ "Ashcroft, John D.",
+ "Sutton, Maren"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-12-18",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/september-5-2006-cover-filing-submission-fisc",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "c7f88269ddd3aea91c2869193c9161a47297a0172d8b21b963fed29c2aafb95e",
+ "pages": 48
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_United_States_Signals_Intelligence_Directive_18_Appendix_J/ACLU_-_United_States_Signals_Intelligence_Directive_18_Appendix_J.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_United_States_Signals_Intelligence_Directive_18_Appendix_J/ACLU_-_United_States_Signals_Intelligence_Directive_18_Appendix_J.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e5a1d62
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_United_States_Signals_Intelligence_Directive_18_Appendix_J/ACLU_-_United_States_Signals_Intelligence_Directive_18_Appendix_J.md
@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
+DOCID: 4086223
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+UNITED STATES SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE
+
+USSID SP0018J
+(formerly USSID 18J)
+
+(U//FOUO) PROCEDURES FOR MONITORING RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF SUSPECTED INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS
+
+OPC: The Signals Intelligence Directorate's Office of Oversight and Compliance
+
+24 April 1986
+
+LETTER OF PROMULGATION
+
+(S//SI) This Annex implements Section 2.3. and Section 2.6.(b) of Executive Order 12333, Section 372 and Section 374 of Title 10, United States Code, and special Attorney General procedures. It regulates certain COMINT activities of the United States Signals Intelligence System which are directed against radio communications of suspected international narcotics traffickers. SIGINT activities directed against international narcotics traffickers or trafficking activities that are not within the purview of this Annex are regulated by the basic USSID.
+
+Approved for release by the
+National Security Agency on
+13 November 2013, FOIA
+Case #71241
+
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20070108
+Declassify On: 20370601
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+---
+DOCID: 4086223
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+(U//FOUO) This is the initial issue of this USSID SP0018, Annex J (formerly USSID 18, Annex J).
+
+(U//FOUO) This USSID contains sensitive information that is legally protected from release to any member of the public and is to be used only for official purposes of the National Security Agency and its customers. Users must strictly adhere to all classification and handling restrictions (see (see NSA/CSS Classification Manual 123-2)) when storing hard or soft copies of this USSID or when hyperlinking to this USSID. The SIGINT Policy System Manager will maintain and update this USSID on-line where users may access the most current version from the NSANet. Appropriate USSIDs will also be available on INTELINK, as warranted. Users are responsible for the update and management of this USSID when it is stored locally.
+
+(U//FOUO) United States SIGINT System (USSS) contractors or consultants assigned to NSA/CSS Headquarters or to other elements of the SIGINT Extended Enterprise are pre-authorized for access to USSIDs via NSANet, INTELINK, or in hard-copy formats as needed to perform their jobs. However, for those sensitive USSIDs for which access is password-controlled, all users, to include contractors, must undergo additional security and mission vetting. Non-USSS contractors or consultants working at external facilities are pre-authorized for soft-copy access to USSIDs via NSANet or INTELINK, if connectivity to those systems is allowed by the contractor's NSA/CSS sponsor. Where such connectivity is not established, any hard-copy provision of USSIDs must be authorized by the SIGINT Policy System Manager (NSTS: 963-3593, STU-III: (443) 479-1442, DSN: 644-7492).
+
+(U//FOUO) This USSID is not releasable to any Third Party partner. If a shareable version of this USSID is needed (see USSID SP0002, Annex B (formerly USSID 2, Annex B)), please contact the appropriate Country Desk Officer in the Foreign Affairs Directorate.
+
+THE EXECUTIVE AGENT:
+
+/s/
+WILLIAM E. ODOM
+Lieutenant General, USA
+Director, NSA/Chief, CSS
+
+---
+
+## TABLE OF CONTENTS
+
+SECTION 1 - (U) PURPOSE AND SCOPE
+
+SECTION 2 - (U) DEFINITIONS
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+---
+DOCID: 4086223
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+SECTION 3 - (U) COLLECTION
+
+SECTION 4 - (U) RETENTION
+
+SECTION 5 - (U) DISSEMINATION
+
+SECTION 6 - (U) IDENTIFICATION OF U.S. PERSONS
+
+---
+
+SECTION 1 - (U) PURPOSE AND SCOPE
+
+1.1. (S//SI)- This Annex implements Section 2.3., and Section 2.6.(b) of Executive Order 12333, Section 372, and Section 374 of Title 10, United States Code, and special Attorney General procedures. It regulates certain COMINT activities of the United States SIGINT System (USSS) which are directed against radio communications of suspected international narcotics traffickers. Nothing contained in this Annex affects the basic authority of the USSS to collect and disseminate foreign intelligence regarding aspects of international narcotics trafficking activities, including [REDACTED] other than those activities expressly addressed herein. SIGINT activities directed against international narcotics traffickers or trafficking activities that are not within the purview of this Annex are regulated by the basic USSID.
+
+1.2. (U//FOUO) The provisions of this Annex will be implemented only upon specific instruction from DIRNSA/CHSS or his designee.
+
+SECTION 2 - (U) DEFINITIONS
+
+2.1. (S//SI) The following definitions apply to this Annex only. Unless contradicted or otherwise supplemented by these definitions, the definitions contained in Section 3 of the basic USSID SP0018 (formerly USSID 18) also apply to this Annex.
+
+a. (S//SI) International Narcotics Trafficker: Any person engaged in buying, selling, manufacturing (to include any step in the process from cultivation to refining), or transporting controlled substances, as defined by the Attorney General, where such activities cross international boundaries.
+
+b. (S//SI) [REDACTED]
+
+c. (S//SI) [REDACTED]
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+---
+DOCID: 4086223
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+d. (S//SI) Wire Communications: Any communication carried in whole or part by wire, cable or other like connection furnished or operated by any person engaged as a common carrier in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign communications. Wire communications enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy. The USSS may intentionally intercept communications of a U.S. person under circumstances where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy of such communications, only with prior authorization of the Attorney General, an order of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, or prior consent of the U.S. person. Thus, [REDACTED] under this Annex.
+
+e. (S//SI) United States: When used in a geographic sense, the term, "United States," means all areas under the territorial sovereignty of the United States.
+
+f. (S//SI) Territorial Limits: The waters and airspace adjacent to the United States, its territories and possessions, to a distance of twelve miles from the coastline. A communicant whose location has not otherwise been determined will be deemed a communicant outside the territorial limits unless the nature of the communications or other elements in the content or circumstances of the communications give rise to a reasonable belief that the communicant is located inside the territorial limits of the United States.
+
+SECTION 3 - (U) COLLECTION
+
+3.1. (S//SI) The USSS is authorized to intercept and to perform direction finding against the radio communications of persons, including U.S. persons, whom the USSS reasonably suspects to be engaged in international narcotics trafficking activities when:
+
+a. (S//SI) All communicants are located outside the United States and its territorial limits and either:
+ (1) (S//SI) There exists a reasonable basis for belief that not all communicants are U.S. persons, or,
+ (2) (S//SI) At least one of the communicants is [REDACTED] and the communications are expected to contain information concerning [REDACTED] illicit narcotics.
+
+b. (S//SI) All communicants are located inside the United States and its territorial limits and:
+ (1) (S//SI) At least one of the communicants is [REDACTED] which [REDACTED]
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+---
+DOCID: 4086223
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+ (2) (S//SI) The communicants are reasonably suspected to be engaged in narcotics trafficking activities at the time of interception; and,
+
+ (3) (S//SI) Collection is solely for the purpose of acquiring information related to [REDACTED] illicit narcotics shipments.
+
+c. (S//SI) Some communicants are located inside, and others located outside, th[REDACTED] United States and either:
+ (1) (S//SI) The communicant to be targeted is located outside the territorial limits; or,
+ (2) (S//SI) The communicant to be targeted is located [REDACTED] within the territorial limits, but beyond the coastline of the United States.
+
+3.2. [REDACTED]
+
+3.3. (C//SI) Collection authorized under sub-paragraph 3.1.a. and subparagraph 3.1.c. (but not that authorized under sub-paragraph 3.1.b.) may be performed in support of the NSA foreign intelligence mission in response to foreign intelligence requirements approved by the Director of Central Intelligence.
+
+SECTION 4 - (U) RETENTION
+
+4.1. (S//SI) Information obtained in the course of the collection authorized under paragraph 3.1. that identifies U.S. persons, or communications obtained in the course of collection authorized under sub-paragraph 3.1.b. and subparagraph 3.1.c., that are solely between U.S. persons, may be retained no longer than one year from the date of intercept unless:
+
+a. (S//SI) The SIGINT Director approves a longer retention period to support technical data bases;
+
+b. (S//SI) The information is disseminated in accordance with Section 5, in which case retention is authorized for whatever period is deemed necessary to satisfy analytic requirements;
+
+c. (S//SI) The communications from which the information is derived are encrypted, or are reasonably believed to contain a secret meaning, in which case retention for an indefinite period is authorized; or,
+
+d. (S//SI) [REDACTED]
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+---
+DOCID: 4086223
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+4.2. (S//SI) Communications solely between U.S. persons acquired under subparagraph 3.1.a. (but not under subparagraph 3.1.b. and subparagraph 3.1.c.), shall be disposed of upon recognition, except that:
+
+a. (S//SI) Technical data concerning frequency and channel use (example: callsigns, broadcast schedules, signal characteristics, etc.) may be retained for collection avoidance purposes; and,
+
+b. (S//SI) Information concerning [REDACTED] illicit narcotics shipments may be retained in accordance with paragraph 4.1., when at least one communicant is [REDACTED]
+
+SECTION 5 - (U) DISSEMINATION
+
+5.1. (S//SI) Dissemination of information of, or concerning, U.S. persons, derived from collection under subparagraph 3.1.a., is governed by Section 8 of the basic USSID, except that:
+
+a. (S//SI) Information concerning [REDACTED] illicit narcotics shipments may be disseminated to appropriate federal law enforcement agencies when:
+ (1) (S//SI) Not all communicants are U.S. persons, or,
+ (2) (S//SI) All communicants are U.S. persons, and at least one communicant is [REDACTED]
+
+b. (S//SI) Technical data concerning frequency and channel use may be disseminated to appropriate federal law enforcement agencies regardless of whether the communicants are U.S. persons or not.
+
+5.2. (S//SI) Dissemination of information derived from collection under subparagraph 3.1.b. may be made only to appropriate federal law enforcement agencies, and only when the information relates to [REDACTED] illicit narcotics shipments. Technical data concerning frequency and channel use may be disseminated to appropriate law enforcement agencies even when the underlying communications do not contain information on [REDACTED] illicit narcotics shipments.
+
+5.3. (S//SI) Dissemination of information concerning U.S. persons, derived from collection performed under subparagraph 3.1.c., may be made when:
+
+a. (S//SI) The information is derived from monitoring communicants located outside the U.S. territorial limits:
+ (1) (S//SI) To appropriate federal law enforcement agencies when the information concerns [REDACTED] illicit narcotics shipments; or,
+ (2) (S//SI) In accordance with Section 8 of the basic USSID, when there exists a reasonable belief that not all communicants are U.S. persons.
+
+b. (S//SI) The information is derived from monitoring communicants located inside U.S. territorial limits:
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+---
+DOCID: 4086223
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+ (1) (S//SI) Only to appropriate federal law enforcement agencies; and
+ (2) (S//SI) Only insofar as the information relates to [REDACTED] illicit narcotics shipments.
+
+c. (S//SI) Technical data concerning frequency and channel use, and direction finding results, derived from any communication monitored under subparagraph 3.1.c. may be disseminated to appropriate law enforcement agencies.
+
+5.4. (U//FOUO) Information collected under subparagraph 3.1.a and subparagraph 3.1.c. may be disseminated to appropriate federal authorities when no information of concerning, U.S. persons is involved.
+
+5.5. (S//SI) Access to technical data bases will be restricted to SIGINT collection and analytic personnel. Requests for access from other personnel or entities shall be referred to the SIGINT Director, except that technical data concerning frequency and channel use, and direction finding results, derived from collection performed under Section 3, may be disseminated to appropriate federal law enforcement agencies without specific SIGINT Director approval.
+
+5.6. (C//SI) Information revealing a threat to human life or physical safety may be disseminated by field elements to appropriate federal authorities without prior review by the SIGINT Director. On the other hand, dissemination of such information by NSA Headquarters' elements requires prior approval of the SIGINT Director. The National Security Operations Center (NSOC), Senior Operations Officer (SOO), is authorized to approve dissemination after normal duty hours or in time-sensitive situations.
+
+5.7. (C//SI) Information derived from intercepted communications, solely between U.S. persons, which does not relate to [REDACTED] illicit narcotics, but which reveals significant foreign intelligence or counterintelligence affecting substantial national security interests, may be disseminated to appropriate federal authorities, if approved by DIRNSA.
+
+SECTION 6 - (U) IDENTIFICATION OF U.S. PERSONS
+
+6.1. (C//SI) Field elements may provide the identities of U.S. persons to federal authorities when the information relates to a threat to human life or physical safety without prior case-by-case approval of the SIGINT Director.
+
+6.2. (C//SI) In all other cases, identification of U.S. persons in information disseminated outside the SIGINT system requires approval of the SIGINT Director. After normal duty hours or in time-sensitive situations the NSOC SOO is authorized to act for the SIGINT Director.
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+---
+DOCID: 4086223
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+Proceed To:
+NSA | Director | SIGINT | SIGINT Staff | SIGINT Policy | USSID Index
+
+Derived From: NSA/CSS Manual 123-2
+Dated: 24 Feb 1998
+Declassify On: 20291123
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_United_States_Signals_Intelligence_Directive_18_Appendix_J/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_United_States_Signals_Intelligence_Directive_18_Appendix_J/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a8258e7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_United_States_Signals_Intelligence_Directive_18_Appendix_J/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+{
+ "title": "United States Signals Intelligence Directive 18 Appendix J",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Appendix J to the United States Signals Intelligence Directive 18 (USSID 18) dated April 24, 1986. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "1986-04-24",
+ "classification": [
+ "SECRET",
+ "SI"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "REL TO USA, FVEY"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Odom, William E."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-08",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/united-states-signals-intelligence-directive-18-appendix-j",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "177084994207da6e86270fc3fb431cea72f0debddd97276fdea246f99f05d135",
+ "pages": 8
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_fisc_opinion_10-3-2011/ACLU_-_fisc_opinion_10-3-2011.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_fisc_opinion_10-3-2011/ACLU_-_fisc_opinion_10-3-2011.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0444458
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_fisc_opinion_10-3-2011/ACLU_-_fisc_opinion_10-3-2011.md
@@ -0,0 +1,2226 @@
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+MEMORANDUM OPINION
+
+These matters are before the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC" or "Court")
+on: (1) the "Government's Ex Parte Submission of Reauthorization Certification and Related
+Procedures, Ex Parte Submission of Amended Certifications, and Request for an Order
+Approving Such Certification and Amended Certifications" for DNI/AG 702(g) Certifications
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+[REDACTED], which was filed on April 20, 2011; (2) the "Government's Ex Parte
+Submission of Reauthorization Certification and Related Procedures, Ex Parte Submission of
+Amended Certifications, and Request for an Order Approving Such Certification and Amended
+Certifications" for DNI/AG 702(g) Certifications [REDACTED], which
+was filed on April 22, 2011; and (3) the "Government's Ex Parte Submission of Reauthorization
+Certification and Related Procedures, Ex Parte Submission of Amended Certifications, and
+Request for an Order Approving Such Certification and Amended Certifications" for DNI/AG
+702(g) Certifications [REDACTED], which was also filed on April 22,
+2011.1
+Through these submissions, the government seeks approval of the acquisition of certain
+telephone and Internet communications pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Act ("FISA" or the "Act"), 50 U.S.C. § 1881a, which requires judicial review for
+compliance with both statutory and constitutional requirements. For the reasons set forth below,
+the government's requests for approval are granted in part and denied in part. The Court
+concludes that one aspect of the proposed collection - the "upstream collection" of Internet
+transactions containing multiple communications - is, in some respects, deficient on statutory
+and constitutional grounds.
+___
+1 For ease of reference, the Court will refer to these three filings collectively as the "April
+2011 Submissions."
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 2
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+I. BACKGROUND
+A. The Certifications and Amendments
+The April 2011 Submissions include DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED], all of which were executed by the Attorney
+General and the Director of National Intelligence ("DNI") pursuant to Section 702. [REDACTED]
+previous certifications have been submitted by the government and approved by the Court
+pursuant to Section 702. [REDACTED] (collectively, the "Prior 702
+Dockets"). Each of the April 2011 Submissions also includes supporting affidavits by the
+Director or Acting Director of the National Security Agency ("NSA"), the Director of the Federal
+Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), [REDACTED]
+two sets of targeting procedures, for use by NSA and FBI respectively; and three sets of
+minimization procedures, for use by NSA, FBI, and CIA, respectively.2
+Like the acquisitions approved by the Court in the eight Prior 702 Dockets, collection [REDACTED]
+
+2 The targeting and minimization procedures accompanying Certification [REDACTED] are
+identical to those accompanying [REDACTED]. As discussed
+below, the NSA targeting procedures and FBI minimization procedures accompanying
+Certifications [REDACTED] also are identical to the NSA targeting procedures
+and FBI minimization procedures that were submitted by the government and approved by the
+Court for use in connection with Certifications [REDACTED]. The FBI targeting
+procedures and the NSA and CIA minimization procedures that accompany the April 2011
+Submissions differ in several respects from the corresponding procedures that were submitted by
+the government and approved by the Court in connection with Certifications [REDACTED].
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 3
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+under Certifications [REDACTED] is limited to "the targeting of non-United
+States persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States," Certification [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+The April 2011 Submissions also include amendments to certifications that have been
+submitted by the government and approved by the Court in the Prior 702 Dockets. The
+amendments, which have been authorized by the Attorney General and the DNI, provide that
+information collected under the certifications in the Prior 702 Dockets will, effective upon the
+Court's approval of Certifications [REDACTED], be handled subject to the same
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 4
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+revised NSA and CIA minimization procedures that have been submitted for use in connection
+with Certifications
+[REDACTED]
+
+B. The May 2 "Clarification" Letter
+
+On May 2, 2011, the government filed with the Court a letter pursuant to FISC Rule 13(a)
+titled "Clarification of National Security Agency's Upstream Collection Pursuant to Section 702
+of FISA" ("May 2 Letter"). The May 2 Letter disclosed to the Court for the first time that NSA's
+"upstream collection" of Internet communications includes the acquisition of entire
+"transaction[s]"
+[REDACTED]
+According to the May 2 Letter, such transactions may contain data that is wholly
+unrelated to the tasked selector, including the full content of discrete communications that are not
+to, from, or about the facility tasked for collection. See id, at 2-3. The letter noted that NSA
+uses [REDACTED] to ensure that
+"the person from whom it seeks to obtain foreign intelligence information is located overseas,"
+but suggested that the government might lack confidence in the effectiveness of such measures as
+applied to Internet transactions. See id, at 3 (citation omitted).
+
+³ The term "upstream collection" refers to NSA's interception of Internet
+communications as they transit [REDACTED], rather than to acquisitions directly from Internet service providers such as
+[REDACTED].
+
+⁴ The concept of "Internet transactions" is discussed more fully below. See infra, pages
+27-41 and note 23.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 5
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+
+---
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+---
+
+C. _The Government's First Motion for Extensions of Time_
+
+On May 5, 2011, the government filed a motion seeking to extend until July 22, 2011, the
+30-day periods in which the Court must otherwise complete its review of Certifications [REDACTED]
+and the amendments to the certifications in the Prior 702 Dockets. _See_
+Motion for an Order Extending Time Limit Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(j)(2) at 1 ("May
+Motion"). The period for FISC review of Certification [REDACTED]
+was then set to expire on May 20, 2011, and the period for
+review of the other pending certifications and amendments was set to expire on May 22, 2011.
+_Id._ at 6.^5
+
+The government noted in the May Motion that its efforts to address the issues raised in
+the May 2 Letter were still ongoing and that it intended to "supplement the record . . . in a
+manner that will aid the Court in its review" of the certifications and amendments and in making
+the determinations required under Section 702. _Id._ at 7. According to the May Motion, however,
+the government would "not be in a position to supplement the record until after the statutory time
+limits for such review have expired." _Id._ The government further asserted that granting the
+requested extension of time would be consistent with national security, because, by operation of
+
+[^5] 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(1)(B) requires the Court to complete its review of the certification and accompanying targeting and minimization procedures and issue an order under subsection 1881a(i)(3) not later than 30 days after the date on which the certification and procedures are submitted. Pursuant to subsection 1881a(i)(1)(C), the same time limit applies to review of an amended certification or amended procedures. However, 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(j)(2) permits the Court, by order for reasons stated, to extend "as necessary for good cause in a manner consistent with national security," the time limit for the Court to complete its review and issue an order under Section 1881a(i)(3).
+
+---
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+---
+Page 6
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+statute, the government's acquisition of foreign intelligence information under Certifications
+[REDACTED] could continue pending completion of the Court's review. See id.
+at 9-10.
+
+On May 9, 2011, the Court entered orders granting the government's May Motion. Based
+upon the representations in the motion, the Court found that there was good cause to extend the
+time limit for its review of the certifications to July 22, 2011, and that the extensions were
+consistent with national security. May 9, 2011 Orders at 4.
+
+D. **The May 9 Briefing Order**
+Because it appeared to the Court that the acquisitions described in the May 2 Letter
+exceeded the scope of collection previously disclosed by the government and approved by the
+Court, and might, in part, fall outside the scope of Section 702, the Court issued a Briefing Order
+on May 9, 2011 ("Briefing Order"), in which it directed the government to answer a number of
+questions in writing. Briefing Order at 3-5. On June 1, 2011, the United States filed the
+"Government's Response to the Court's Briefing Order of May 9, 2011" ("June 1 Submission").
+After reviewing the June 1 Submission, the Court, through its staff, directed the government to
+answer a number of follow-up questions. On June 28, 2011, the government submitted its
+written responses to the Court's follow-up questions in the "Government's Response to the
+Court's Follow-Up Questions of June 17, 2011" ("June 28 Submission").
+
+E. **The Government's Second Motion for Extensions of Time**
+The Court met with senior officials of the Department of Justice on July 8, 2011, to
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 7
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+discuss the information provided by the government in the June 1 and June 28 Submissions.
+During the meeting, the Court informed the government that it still had serious concerns
+regarding NSA's acquisition of Internet transactions and, in particular, whether the Court could
+make the findings necessary to approve the acquisition of such transactions pursuant to Section
+702. The Court also noted its willingness to entertain any additional filings that the government
+might choose to make in an effort to address those concerns.
+On July 14, 2011, the government filed a motion seeking additional sixty-day extensions
+of the periods in which the Court must complete its review of DNI/AG 702(g) Certifications
+[REDACTED], and the amendments to the certifications in the Prior 702 Dockets.
+Motion for Orders Extending Time Limits Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(j)(2) (“July Motion”).⁶
+In its July Motion, the government indicated that it was in the process of compiling
+additional information regarding the nature and scope of NSA's upstream collection, and that it
+was “examining whether enhancements to NSA's systems or processes could be made to further
+ensure that information acquired through NSA's upstream collection is handled in accordance
+with the requirements of the Act.” *Id.* at 8. Because additional time would be needed to
+supplement the record, however, the government represented that a 60-day extension would be
+necessary. *Id.* at 8, 11. The government argued that granting the request for an additional
+extension of time would be consistent with national security, because, by operation of statute, the
+⁶ As discussed above, by operation of the Court's order of May 9, 2011, pursuant to 50
+U.S.C. § 1881a(j)(2), the Court was required to complete its review of, and issue orders under 50
+U.S.C.§ 1881a(i)(3) concerning, DNI/AG 702(g) Certifications [REDACTED]
+and the amendments to the certifications in the Prior 702 Dockets, by July 22, 2011. *Id.* at 6.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 8
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+government's acquisition of foreign intelligence information under Certifications [REDACTED]
+could continue pending completion of the Court's review. Id. at 9-10.
+On July 14, 2011, the Court entered orders granting the government's motion. Based
+upon the representations in the motion, the Court found that there was good cause to extend the
+time limit for its review of the certifications to September 20, 2011, and that the extensions were
+consistent with national security. July 14, 2011 Orders at 4.
+F.
+The August 16 and August 30 Submissions
+On August 16, 2011, the government filed a supplement to the June 1 and June 28
+Submissions ("August 16 Submission"). In the August 16 Submission, the government
+described the results of "a manual review by [NSA] of a statistically representative sample of the
+nature and scope of the Internet communications acquired through NSA's . . . Section 702
+upstream collection during a six-month period." Notice of Filing of Aug. 16 Submission at 2.
+Following a meeting between the Court staff and representatives of the Department of Justice on
+August 22, 2011, the government submitted a further filing on August 30, 2011 ("August 30
+Submission").
+G. The Hearing and the Government's Final Written Submission
+Following review of the August 30 Submission, the Court held a hearing on September 7,
+2011, to ask additional questions of NSA and the Department of Justice regarding the
+government's statistical analysis and the implications of that analysis. The government made its
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 9
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+final written submissions on September 9, 2011, and September 13, 2011 ("September 9
+Submission" and "September 13 Submission," respectively).
+H.
+The Final Extension of Time
+On September 14, 2011, the Court entered orders further extending the deadline for its
+completion of the review of the certifications and amendments filed as part of the April
+Submissions. The Court explained that "[g]iven the complexity of the issues presented in these
+matters coupled with the Court's need to fully analyze the supplemental information provided by
+the government in recent filings, the last of which was submitted to the Court on September 13,
+2011, the Court will not be able to complete its review of, and issue orders . . . concerning [the
+certifications and amendments] by September 20, 2011."
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The Court further explained that although it had originally
+intended to extend the deadline by only one week, the government had advised the Court that
+"for technical reasons, such a brief extension would compromise the government's ability to
+ensure a seamless transition from one Certification to the next."
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Accordingly, the Court extended the deadline to October 10,
+2011.
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 10
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+II. REVIEW OF CERTIFICATIONS
+
+The Court must review a certification submitted pursuant to Section 702 of FISA "to
+determine whether [it] contains all the required elements." 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(2)(A). The
+Court's examination of Certifications [REDACTED] confirms that:
+
+(1) the certifications have been made under oath by the Attorney General and the DNI, as
+required by 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g)(1)(A), see Certification [REDACTED]
+
+(2) the certifications contain each of the attestations required by 50 U.S.C.
+§ 1881a(g)(2)(A), see Certification [REDACTED];
+
+(3) as required by 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g)(2)(B), each of the certifications is accompanied
+by the applicable targeting procedures[^7] and minimization procedures[^8];
+
+(4) each of the certifications is supported by the affidavits of appropriate national security
+officials, as described in 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g)(2)(C)[^9]; and
+
+(5) each of the certifications includes an effective date for the authorization in compliance
+[REDACTED]
+
+[^7]: See April 2011 Submissions, NSA Targeting Procedures and FBI Targeting Procedures
+(attached to Certifications [REDACTED]).
+
+[^8]: See April 2011 Submissions, NSA Minimization Procedures, FBI Minimization
+Procedures, and CIA Minimization Procedures (attached to Certifications [REDACTED]).
+
+[^9]: See April 2011 Submissions, Affidavits of John C. Inglis, Acting Director, NSA
+(attached to Certifications [REDACTED]); Affidavit of Gen. Keith B. Alexander,
+U.S. Army, Director, NSA (attached to Certification [REDACTED]); Affidavits of Robert S.
+Mueller, III, Director, FBI (attached to Certifications [REDACTED]);
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 11
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+with 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g)(2)(D), see Certification [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+The Court therefore finds that Certification [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] contain all the required elements. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(2)(A).
+
+III. REVIEW OF THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CERTIFICATIONS IN THE PRIOR DOCKETS.
+
+Under the judicial review procedures that apply to amendments by virtue of Section 1881a(i)(1)(C), the Court must review each of the amended certifications "to determine whether the certification contains all the required elements." 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(2)(A). The Court has previously determined that the certifications in each of the Prior 702 Dockets, as originally submitted to the Court and previously amended, contained all the required elements.¹¹ Like the prior certifications and amendments, the amendments now before the Court were executed under oath by the Attorney General and the DNI, as required by 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g)(1)(A), and submitted to the Court within the time allowed under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(1)(C). See [REDACTED]
+
+¹⁰ The statement described in 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g)(2)(E) is not required in this case because there has been no "exigent circumstances" determination under Section 1881a(c)(2).
+¹¹ [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 12
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Certification[REDACTED]
+12 Pursuant
+to Section 1881a(g)(2)(A)(ii), the latest amendments include the attestations of the Attorney
+General and the DNI that the accompanying NSA and CIA minimization procedures meet the
+statutory definition of minimization procedures, are consistent with the requirements of the
+Fourth Amendment, and will be submitted to the Court for approval. Certification[REDACTED]. The latest amendments also
+include effective dates that comply with 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g)(2)(D) and § 1881a(i)(1).
+Certification[REDACTED] All other aspects
+of the certifications in the Prior 702 Dockets – including the further attestations made therein in
+accordance with § 1881a(g)(2)(A), the NSA targeting procedures and FBI minimization
+procedures submitted therewith in accordance with § 1881a(g)(2)(B),13 and the affidavits
+executed in support thereof in accordance with § 1881a(g)(2)(C) – are unaltered by the latest
+amendments.
+In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the certifications in the Prior 702 Dockets,
+as amended, each contain all the required elements. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(2)(A).
+
+12 The amendments to the certifications in the Prior 702 Dockets were approved by the
+Attorney General on April 11, 2011, and by the DNI on April 13, 2011. See Certification[REDACTED]
+
+13 Of course, targeting under the certifications filed in the Prior 702 Dockets will no
+longer be permitted following the Court's issuance of an order on Certifications[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 13
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+IV. REVIEW OF THE TARGETING AND MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES
+The Court is required to review the targeting and minimization procedures to determine
+whether they are consistent with the requirements of 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(d)(1) and (e)(1). See
+50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(2)(B) and (C); see also 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(1)(C) (providing that amended
+procedures must be reviewed under the same standard). Section 1881a(d)(1) provides that the
+targeting procedures must be "reasonably designed" to "ensure that any acquisition authorized
+under [the certification] is limited to targeting persons reasonably believed to be located outside
+the United States" and to "prevent the intentional acquisition of any communication as to which
+the sender and all intended recipients are known at the time of the acquisition to be located in the
+United States." Section 1881a(e)(1) requires that the minimization procedures "meet the
+definition of minimization procedures under [50 U.S.C. §§] 1801(h) or 1821(4)...." Most
+notably, that definition requires "specific procedures, which shall be adopted by the Attorney
+General, that are reasonably designed in light of the purpose and technique of the particular
+[surveillance or physical search], to minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the
+dissemination, of nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting United States
+persons consistent with the need of the United States to obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign
+intelligence information." 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h) & 1821(4). Finally, the Court must determine
+whether the targeting and minimization procedures are consistent with the requirements of the
+Fourth Amendment. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3)(A).
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 14
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+A. The Effect of the Government's Disclosures Regarding NSA's Acquisition of
+Internet Transactions on the Court's Review of the Targeting and Minimization
+Procedures
+
+The Court's review of the targeting and minimization procedures submitted with the
+April 2011 Submissions is complicated by the government's recent revelation that NSA's
+acquisition of Internet communications through its upstream collection under Section 702 is
+accomplished by acquiring Internet "transactions," which may contain a single, discrete
+communication, or multiple discrete communications, including communications that are neither
+to, from, nor about targeted facilities. June 1 Submission at 1-2. That revelation fundamentally
+alters the Court's understanding of the scope of the collection conducted pursuant to Section 702
+and requires careful reexamination of many of the assessments and presumptions underlying its
+prior approvals.
+
+In the first Section 702 docket, [REDACTED], the government disclosed that
+its Section 702 collection would include both telephone and Internet communications.
+According to the government, the acquisition of telephonic communications would be limited to
+"to/from" communications – i.e., communications to or from a tasked facility. The government
+explained, however, that the Internet communications acquired would include both to/from
+communications and "about" communications – i.e., communications containing a reference to
+the name of the tasked account. See [REDACTED]
+
+Based upon the government's descriptions of the proposed collection, the Court understood that
+the acquisition of Internet communications under Section 702 would be limited to discrete
+"to/from" communications between or among individual account users and to "about"
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+Page 15
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+communications falling within [REDACTED] specific categories that had been first described to the Court
+in prior proceedings. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The Court's analysis and ultimate
+approval of the targeting and minimization procedures in Docket No. [REDACTED], and in the
+other [REDACTED] Prior 702 Dockets, depended upon the government's representations regarding the
+scope of the collection. In conducting its review and granting those approvals, the Court did not
+take into account NSA's acquisition of Internet transactions, which now materially and
+fundamentally alters the statutory and constitutional analysis. 14
+---
+14 The Court is troubled that the government's revelations regarding NSA's acquisition
+of Internet transactions mark the third instance in less than three years in which the government
+has disclosed a substantial misrepresentation regarding the scope of a major collection program.
+In March, 2009, the Court concluded that its authorization of NSA's bulk acquisition of
+telephone call detail records from [REDACTED] in the so-called "big business
+records" matter "ha[d] been premised on a flawed depiction of how the NSA uses [the acquired]
+metadata," and that "[t]his misperception by the FISC existed from the inception of its authorized
+collection in May 2006, buttressed by repeated inaccurate statements made in the government's
+submissions, and despite a government-devised and Court-mandated oversight regime." Docket
+[REDACTED] Contrary to the government's repeated
+assurances, NSA had been routinely running queries of the metadata using querying terms that
+did not meet the required standard for querying. The Court concluded that this requirement had
+been "so frequently and systemically violated that it can fairly be said that this critical element of
+the overall . . . regime has never functioned effectively." Id.
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 16
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+The government's submissions make clear not only that NSA has been acquiring Internet
+transactions since before the Court's approval of the first Section 702 certification in 2008,¹⁵ but
+also that NSA seeks to continue the collection of Internet transactions. Because NSA's
+acquisition of Internet transactions presents difficult questions, the Court will conduct its review
+in two stages. Consistent with the approach it has followed in past reviews of Section 702
+certifications and amendments, the Court will first consider the targeting and minimization
+procedures as applied to the acquisition of communications other than Internet transactions – i.e.,
+to the discrete communications between or among the users of telephone and Internet
+communications facilities that are to or from a facility tasked for collection.¹⁶ The Court will
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+¹⁵ The government's revelations regarding the scope of NSA's upstream collection
+implicate 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a), which makes it a crime (1) to "engage[] in electronic surveillance
+under color of law except as authorized" by statute or (2) to "disclose[] or use[] information
+obtained under color of law by electronic surveillance, knowing or having reason to know that
+the information was obtained through electronic surveillance not authorized" by statute. See
+[REDACTED] (concluding that Section
+1809(a)(2) precluded the Court from approving the government's proposed use of, among other
+things, certain data acquired by NSA without statutory authority through its "upstream
+collection"). The Court will address Section 1809(a) and related issues in a separate order.
+
+¹⁶ As noted, the Court previously authorized the acquisition of [REDACTED] categories of "about"
+communications. The Court now understands that all "about" communications are acquired by
+means of NSA's acquisition of Internet transactions through its upstream collection. See June 1
+Submission at 1-2, see also Sept. 7, 2011 Hearing Tr. at 76. Accordingly, the Court considers the
+(continued...)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 17
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+then assess the effect of the recent disclosures regarding NSA's collection of Internet transactions
+on its ability to make the findings necessary to approve the certifications and the NSA targeting
+and minimization procedures,¹⁷
+
+B. The Unmodified Procedures
+
+The government represents that the NSA targeting procedures and the FBI minimization
+procedures filed with the April 2011 Submissions are identical to the corresponding procedures
+that were submitted to the Court in Docket Nos. [REDACTED]¹⁸
+
+The Court has reviewed each of these sets of procedures and confirmed that is the case. In fact,
+the NSA targeting procedures and FBI minimization procedures now before the Court are copies
+
+¹⁶(...continued)
+categories of "about" communications to be a subset of the Internet transactions that NSA
+acquires. The Court's discussion of the manner in which the government proposes to apply its
+targeting and minimization procedures to Internet transactions generally also applies to the [REDACTED]
+categories of "about" communications. *See infra*, pages 41-79.
+
+¹⁷ The FBI and the CIA do not receive unminimized communications that have been
+acquired through NSA's upstream collection of Internet communications, Sept. 7, 2011 Hearing
+Tr. at 61-62. Accordingly, the discussion of Internet transactions that appears below does not
+affect the Court's conclusions that the FBI targeting procedures, the CIA minimization
+procedures, and the FBI minimization procedures meet the statutory and constitutional
+requirements.
+
+¹⁸ *See* Government's Ex Parte Submission of Reauthorization Certification and Related
+Procedures, Ex Parte Submission of Amended Certifications, and Request for an Order
+Approving Such Certification and Amended Certifications for DNI/AG 702(g) Certifications [REDACTED], Government's Ex Parte Submission of Reauthorization
+Certification and Related Procedures, Ex Parte Submission of Amended Certifications, and
+Request for an Order Approving Such Certification and Amended Certifications for DNI/AG
+702(g) Certifications [REDACTED], Government's Ex Parte
+Submission of Reauthorization Certification and Related Procedures, Ex Parte Submission of
+Amended Certifications, and Request for an Order Approving Such Certification and Amended
+Certifications for DNI/AG 702(g) Certifications [REDACTED].
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 18
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+of the procedures that were initially filed on July 29, 2009, in Docket No. [REDACTED] 19 The
+Court found in those prior dockets that the targeting and minimization procedures were
+consistent with the requirements of 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(d)-(e) and with the Fourth Amendment.
+See Docket No. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+The Court is prepared to renew its past findings that the NSA targeting procedures
+(as applied to forms of to/from communications that have previously been described to the
+Court) and the FBI minimization procedures are consistent with the requirements of 50 U.S.C. §
+1881a(d)-(e) and with the Fourth Amendment. 20
+C. The Amended Procedures
+As noted above, the FBI targeting procedures and the NSA and CIA minimization
+procedures submitted with the April 2011 Submissions differ in a number of respects from the
+corresponding procedures that were submitted by the government and approved by the Court in
+connection with Certifications [REDACTED]. For the reasons that follow, the
+Court finds that, as applied to the previously authorized collection of discrete communications to
+or from a tasked facility, the amended FBI targeting procedures and the amended NSA and CIA
+
+19 Copies of those same procedures were also submitted in Docket Nos. [REDACTED]
+
+20 The Court notes that the FBI minimization procedures are not "set forth in a clear and
+self-contained manner, without resort to cross-referencing," as required by FISC Rule 12, which
+became effective on November 1, 2010. The Court expects that future submissions by the
+government will comport with this requirement.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 19
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+minimization procedures are consistent with the requirements of 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(d)-(e) and
+with the Fourth Amendment.
+1. The Amended FBI Targeting Procedures
+The government has made three changes to the FBI targeting procedures, all of which
+involve Section I.4. That provision requires the FBI, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+The new language proposed by the government would allow the FBI to [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+The government has advised the Court that this change was prompted
+by the fact that [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+Nevertheless,
+the current procedures require the FBI to [REDACTED] The change is intended to
+eliminate the requirement of [REDACTED]
+The second change, reflected in subparagraph (a) of Section I.4, would allow the FBI,
+under certain circumstances, to [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 20
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+The above-described changes to the FBI targeting procedures pose no obstacle to a
+• finding by the Court that the FBI targeting procedures are "reasonably designed" to "ensure that
+any acquisition authorized . . . is limited to targeting persons reasonably believed to be located
+outside the United States" and to "prevent the intentional acquisition of any communication as to
+which the sender and all intended recipients are known at the time of the acquisition to be located
+in the United States." 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(d)(1).
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 21
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+Furthermore, as the Court has previously noted, before the FBI targeting procedures are applied, NSA will have followed its own targeting procedures in determining that the user of the facility to be tasked for collection is a non-United States person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States. See Docket No. [REDACTED]. The [REDACTED]
+
+Id. The Court has previously found that [REDACTED] proposed for use in connection with Certifications [REDACTED] are reasonably designed to ensure that the users of tasked selectors are non-United States persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States and also consistent with the Fourth Amendment. See Docket No. [REDACTED]. [REDACTED]. It therefore follows that the amended FBI targeting procedures, which provide additional assurance that the users of tasked accounts are non-United States persons located outside the United States, also pass muster.
+
+2. The Amended NSA Minimization Procedures
+
+The most significant change to the NSA minimization procedures regards the rules for querying the data that NSA acquires pursuant to Section 702. The procedures previously approved by the Court effectively impose a wholesale bar on queries using United States-Person identifiers. The government has broadened Section 3(b)(5) to allow NSA to query the vast majority of its Section 702 collection using United States-Person identifiers, subject to approval
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 22
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+pursuant to internal NSA procedures and oversight by the Department of Justice.21 Like all other
+NSA queries of the Section 702 collection, queries using United States-person identifiers would
+be limited to those reasonably likely to yield foreign intelligence information. NSA
+Minimization Procedures § 3(b)(5). The Department of Justice and the Office of the DNI would
+be required to conduct oversight regarding NSA's use of United States-person identifiers in such
+queries. See id.
+This relaxation of the querying rules does not alter the Court's prior conclusion that NSA
+minimization procedures meet the statutory definition of minimization procedures.
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] contain an analogous provision allowing
+queries of unminimized FISA-acquired information using identifiers - including United States-
+person identifiers - when such queries are designed to yield foreign intelligence information.
+See [REDACTED] In granting [REDACTED] applications for electronic surveillance or
+physical search since 2008, including applications targeting United States persons and persons in
+the United States, the Court has found that the [REDACTED] meet the definitions of minimization
+procedures at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h) and 1821(4). It follows that the substantially-similar
+
+21 The government is still in the process of developing its internal procedures and will
+not permit NSA analysts to begin using United States-person identifiers as selection terms until
+those procedures are completed. June 28 Submission at 4 n.3. In addition, the government has
+clarified that United States-person identifiers will not be used to query the fruits of NSA's
+upstream collection. Aug. 30 Submission at 11. NSA's upstream collection acquires
+approximately 9% of the total Internet communications acquired by NSA under Section 702.
+Aug. 16 Submission at 2.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 23
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+querying provision found at Section 3(b)(5) of the amended NSA minimization procedures should not be problematic in a collection that is focused on non-United States persons located outside the United States and that, in the aggregate, is less likely to result in the acquisition of nonpublic information regarding non-consenting United States persons.
+A second change to the NSA minimization procedures is the addition of language specifying that the five-year retention period for communications that are not subject to earlier destruction runs from the expiration date of the certification authorizing the collection. See NSA Minimization Procedures, §§ 3(b)(1), 3(c), 5(3)(b), and 6(a)(1)(b). The NSA minimization procedures that were previously approved by the Court included a retention period of five years, but those procedures do not specify when the five-year period begins to run. The change proposed here harmonizes the procedures with the corresponding provision of the [REDACTED] minimization procedures for Section 702 that has already been approved by the Court. See [REDACTED] Minimization Procedures at 3 (¶j).
+The two remaining changes to the NSA minimization procedures are intended to clarify the scope of the existing procedures. The government has added language to Section 1 to make explicit that the procedures apply not only to NSA employees, but also to any other persons engaged in Section 702-related activities that are conducted under the direction, authority or control of the Director of NSA, NSA Minimization Procedures at 1. According to the government, this new language is intended to clarify that Central Security Service personnel conducting signals intelligence operations authorized by Section 702 are bound by the procedures, even when they are deployed with a military unit and subject to the military chain of
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 24
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+command. The second clarifying amendment is a change to the definition of "identification of a
+United States person" in Section 2. The new language eliminates a potential ambiguity that
+might have resulted in the inappropriate treatment of the name, unique title, or address of a
+United States person as non-identifying information in certain circumstances. Id, at 2. These
+amendments, which resolve any arguable ambiguity in favor of broader application of the
+protections found in the procedures, raise no concerns.
+3. The Amended CIA Minimization Procedures
+The CIA minimization procedures include a new querying provision
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The new language would allow the CIA to
+conduct queries of Section 702-acquired information using United States-person identifiers. All
+CIA queries of the Section 702 collection would be subject to review by the Department of
+Justice and the Office of the DNI.
+[REDACTED], the addition of the
+new CIA querying provision does not preclude the Court from concluding that the amended CIA
+minimization procedures satisfy the statutory definition of minimization procedures and comply
+with the Fourth Amendment.²²
+The amended CIA minimization procedures include
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+²² The Court understands that NSA does not share its upstream collection in
+unminimized form with the CIA. [REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 25
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] raises no concerns in the context of the CIA minimization procedures,
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+The government also has added [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 26
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+[REDACTED] It likewise raises no Fourth Amendment problem.
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+Finally, a new provision
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The Court likewise sees no problem with the addition
+[REDACTED] to the CIA minimization procedures.
+D. The Effect of the Government's Disclosures Regarding NSA's Acquisition of
+Internet Transactions
+Based on the government's prior representations, the Court has previously analyzed
+NSA's targeting and minimization procedures only in the context of NSA acquiring discrete
+communications. Now, however, in light of the government's revelations as to the manner in
+which NSA acquires Internet communications, it is clear that NSA acquires "Internet
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 27
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+transactions, 23 including transactions that contain a single discrete communication ("Single
+Communication Transactions" or "SCTs"), and transactions that contain multiple discrete
+communications ("Multi-[C]ommunication Transactions" or "MCTs"), see Aug. 16 Submission
+at 1.
+The Court has repeatedly noted that the government's targeting and minimization
+procedures must be considered in light of the communications actually acquired. See Docket No.
+[REDACTED] ("Substantial implementation problems can,
+notwithstanding the government's intent, speak to whether the applicable targeting procedures
+are 'reasonably designed' to acquire only the communications of non-U.S. persons outside the
+United States."), see also Docket No. [REDACTED]
+Until now, the Court had a singular understanding of the nature of NSA's acquisitions under
+Section 702. Accordingly, analysis of the implementation of the procedures focused on whether
+NSA's procedures were applied effectively in that context and whether the procedures adequately
+addressed over-collections that occurred. But, for the first time, the government has now advised
+the Court that the volume and nature of the information it has been collecting is fundamentally
+different from what the Court had been led to believe. Therefore, the Court must, as a matter of
+first impression, consider whether, in view of NSA's acquisition of Internet transactions, the
+targeting and minimization procedures satisfy the statutory standards and comport with the
+23 The government describes an Internet "transaction" as "a complement of 'packets'
+traversing the Internet that together may be understood by a device on the Internet and, where
+applicable, rendered in an intelligible form to the user of that device." June 1 Submission at 1.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 28
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Fourth Amendment.
+For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that NSA's targeting procedures, as the
+government proposes to implement them in connection with MCTs, are consistent with the
+requirements of 50 U.S.C. §1881a(d)(1). However, the Court is unable to find that NSA's
+minimization procedures, as the government proposes to apply them in connection with MCTs,
+are "reasonably designed in light of the purpose and technique of the particular [surveillance or
+physical search], to minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of
+nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting United States persons consistent
+with the need of the United States to obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence
+information." 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h)(1) &1821(4)(A). The Court is also unable to find that
+NSA's targeting and minimization procedures, as the government proposes to implement them in
+connection with MCTs, are consistent with the Fourth Amendment.
+1. The Scope of NSA's Upstream Collection
+NSA acquires more than two hundred fifty million Internet communications each year
+pursuant to Section 702, but the vast majority of these communications are obtained from
+Internet service providers and are not at issue here. 24 Sept. 9 Submission at 1; Aug. 16
+Submission at Appendix A. Indeed, NSA's upstream collection constitutes only approximately
+24 In addition to its upstream collection, NSA acquires discrete Internet communications
+from Internet service providers such as [REDACTED] Aug. 16 Submission at 2; Aug. 30 Submission at 11; see also Sept. 7, 2011 Hearing Tr.
+at 75-77. NSA refers to this non-upstream collection as its "PRISM collection." Aug. 30
+Submission at 11. The Court understands that NSA does not acquire "Internet transactions"
+through its PRISM collection. See Aug. 16 Submission at 1.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 29
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+9% of the total Internet communications being acquired by NSA under Section 702. Sept. 9
+Submission at 1; Aug. 16 Submission at 2.
+Although small in relative terms, NSA's upstream collection is significant for three
+reasons. First, NSA's upstream collection is "uniquely capable of acquiring certain types of
+targeted communications containing valuable foreign intelligence information."²⁵ Docket No.
+[REDACTED]
+
+Second, the Court now understands that, in order to collect those targeted Internet
+communications, NSA's upstream collection devices acquire Internet transactions, and NSA
+acquires millions of such transactions each year.²⁶ Third, the government has acknowledged that,
+due to the technological challenges associated with acquiring Internet transactions, NSA is
+unable to exclude certain Internet transactions from its upstream collection. See June 1
+Submission at 3-12.
+
+In its June 1 Submission, the government explained that NSA's upstream collection
+devices have technological limitations that significantly affect the scope of collection.
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+²⁵ [REDACTED]
+
+²⁶ NSA acquired more than 13.25 million Internet transactions through its upstream
+collection between January 1, 2011, and June 30, 2011. See Aug. 16 Submission at 2; see also
+Sept. 9 Submission at 1-2.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 30
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+[REDACTED] See id, at 7. Moreover, at the time of
+acquisition, NSA's upstream Internet collection devices are generally incapable of distinguishing
+between transactions containing only a single discrete communication to, from, or about a tasked
+selector and transactions containing multiple discrete communications, not all of which may be
+to, from, or about a tasked selector. 27 Id. at 2.
+As a practical matter, this means that NSA's upstream collection devices acquire any
+Internet transaction transiting the device if the transaction contains a targeted selector anywhere
+within it, and:
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+See id, at 6.
+The practical implications of NSA's acquisition of Internet transactions through its
+upstream collection for the Court's statutory and Fourth Amendment analyses are difficult to
+assess. The sheer volume of transactions acquired by NSA through its upstream collection is
+such that any meaningful review of the entire body of the transactions is not feasible. As a result,
+the Court cannot know for certain the exact number of wholly domestic communications
+acquired through this collection, nor can it know the number of non-target communications
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 31
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+acquired or the extent to which those communications are to or from United States persons or
+persons in the United States. Instead, NSA and the Court can only look at samples of the data
+and then draw whatever reasonable conclusions they can from those samples. Even if the Court
+accepts the validity of conclusions derived from statistical analyses, there are significant hurdles
+in assessing NSA's upstream collection. Internet service providers are constantly changing their
+protocols and the services they provide, and often give users the ability to customize how they
+use a particular service. 28 Id. at 24-25. As a result, it is impossible to define with any specificity
+the universe of transactions that will be acquired by NSA's upstream collection at any point in
+the future.
+
+Recognizing that further revelations concerning what NSA has actually acquired through
+its 702 collection, together with the constant evolution of the Internet, may alter the Court's
+analysis at some point in the future, the Court must, nevertheless, consider whether NSA's
+targeting and minimization procedures are consistent with FISA and the Fourth Amendment
+based on the record now before it. In view of the revelations about how NSA is actually
+conducting its upstream collection, two fundamental underpinnings of the Court's prior
+assessments no longer hold true.
+
+28 [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 32
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+First, the Court previously understood that NSA's technical measures²⁹ would prevent the acquisition of any communication as to which the sender and all intended recipients were located in the United States ("wholly domestic communication") except for "theoretically possible" cases
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+The Court now understands, however, that NSA has acquired, is acquiring, and, if the certifications and procedures now before the Court are approved, will continue to acquire, tens of thousands of wholly domestic communications. NSA's manual review of a statistically representative sample drawn from its upstream collection³⁰ reveals that NSA acquires approximately 2,000-10,000 MCTs each year that contain at least one wholly domestic communication.³¹ See Aug. 16 Submission at 9. In addition to these MCTs, NSA
+[REDACTED]
+
+29
+[REDACTED]
+
+30 In an effort to address the Court's concerns, NSA conducted a manual review of a random sample consisting of 50,440 Internet transactions taken from the more than 13.25 million Internet transactions acquired through NSA's upstream collection during a six month period. See generally Aug. 16 Submission (describing NSA's manual review and the conclusions NSA drew therefrom). The statistical conclusions reflected in this Memorandum Opinion are drawn from NSA's analysis of that random sample.
+
+31 Of the approximately 13.25 million Internet transactions acquired by NSA through its upstream collection during the six-month period, between 996 and 4,965 are MCTs that contain a wholly domestic communication not to, from, or about a tasked selector. Aug. 16 Submission at 9.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 33
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+likely acquires tens of thousands more wholly domestic communications every year,32 given that
+NSA's upstream collection devices will acquire a wholly domestic "about" SCT if it is routed
+internationally. 33 Moreover, the actual number of wholly domestic communications acquired
+
+32 NSA's manual review focused on examining the MCTs acquired through NSA's
+upstream collection in order to assess whether any contained wholly domestic communications.
+Sept. 7, 2011 Hearing Tr. at 13-14. As a result, once NSA determined that a transaction
+contained a single, discrete communication, no further analysis of that transaction was done. See
+Aug. 16 Submission at 3. After the Court expressed concern that this category of transactions
+might also contain wholly domestic communications, NSA conducted a further review. See
+Sept. 9 Submission at 4. NSA ultimately did not provide the Court with an estimate of the
+number of wholly domestic "about" SCTs that may be acquired through its upstream collection.
+Instead, NSA has concluded that "the probability of encountering wholly domestic
+communications in transactions that feature only a single, discrete communication should be
+smaller -- and certainly no greater -- than potentially encountering wholly domestic
+communications within MCT's." Sept. 13 Submission at 2.
+The Court understands this to mean that the percentage of wholly domestic
+communications within the universe of SCTs acquired through NSA's upstream collection
+should not exceed the percentage of MCTs containing a wholly domestic communication that
+NSA found when it examined all of the MCTs within its statistical sample. Since NSA found 10
+MCTs with wholly domestic communications within the 5,081 MCTs reviewed, the relevant
+percentage is .197% (10/5,081), Aug. 16 Submission at 5.
+NSA's manual review found that approximately 90% of the 50,440 transactions in the
+sample were SCTs. Id. at 3. Ninety percent of the approximately 13.25 million total Internet
+transactions acquired by NSA through its upstream collection during the six-month period, works
+out to be approximately 11,925,000 transactions. Those 11,925,000 transactions would
+constitute the universe of SCTs acquired during the six-month period, and .197% of that universe
+would be approximately 23,000 wholly domestic SCTs. Thus, NSA may be acquiring as many
+as 46,000 wholly domestic "about" SCTs each year, in addition to the 2,000-10,000 MCTs
+referenced above.
+
+33 Internet communications are “nearly always transmitted from a sender to a recipient
+through multiple legs before reaching their final destination." June 1 Submission at 6. For
+example, an e-mail message sent from the user of [REDACTED] to the user of [REDACTED]
+will at the very least travel from the [REDACTED] user's
+own computer, to [REDACTED] , to [REDACTED] and then to the computer of the [REDACTED]
+user. Id. Because the communication's route is made up of multiple legs, the transaction used to
+transmit the communication across any particular leg of the route need only identify the IP
+(continued...)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 34
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+may be still higher in view of NSA's inability conclusively to determine whether a significant
+portion of the MCTs within its sample contained wholly domestic communications. 34
+Second, the Court previously understood that NSA's upstream collection would only
+acquire the communication of a United States person or a person in the United States if: 1) that
+33(...continued)
+addresses at either end of that leg in order to properly route the communication. Id. at 7. As a
+result, for each leg of the route, the transaction header will only contain the IP addresses at either
+end of that particular leg. Id.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+34 During its manual review, NSA was unable to determine whether 224 of the 5,081
+MCTs reviewed contained any wholly domestic communications, because the transactions
+lacked sufficient information for NSA to determine the location or identity of the "active user"
+(i.e., the individual using the electronic communications account/address/identifier to interact
+with his/her Internet service provider). Aug. 16 Submission at 7. NSA then conducted an
+intensive review of all available information for each of these MCTs, including examining the
+contents of each discrete communication contained within it, but was still unable to determine
+conclusively whether any of these MCTs contained wholly domestic communications. Sept. 9
+Submission at 3. NSA asserts that "it is reasonable to presume that [the] 224 MCTs do not
+contain wholly domestic communications," but concedes that, due to the limitations of the
+technical means used to prevent the acquisition of wholly domestic communications, NSA may
+acquire wholly domestic communications. See Aug. 30 Submission at 7-8. The Court is
+prepared to accept that the number of wholly domestic communications acquired in this category
+of MCTs is relatively small, for the reasons stated in the government's August 30 Submission.
+However, when considering NSA's upstream collection as a whole, and the limitations of NSA's
+technical means, the Court is not prepared to presume that the number of wholly domestic
+communications contained within this category of communications will be zero. Accordingly,
+the Court concludes that this category of communications acquired through NSA's upstream
+collection may drive the total number of wholly domestic communications acquired slightly
+higher.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 35
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+person was in direct contact with a targeted selector, 2) the communication referenced the
+targeted selector, and the communication fell into one of [REDACTED] specific categories of "about"
+communications; or 3) despite the operation of the targeting procedures, United States persons or
+persons inside the United States were mistakenly targeted. See Docket No. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] But the Court now understands that, in addition to these
+communications, NSA's upstream collection also acquires: a) the communications of United
+States persons and persons in the United States that are not to, from, or about a tasked selector
+and that are acquired solely because the communication is contained within an MCT that
+somewhere references a tasked selector [REDACTED]
+and b) any Internet transaction that references a targeted selector, regardless of
+whether the transaction falls within one of the [REDACTED] previously identified categories of "about
+communications," see June 1 Submission at 24-27.
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+On the current record, it is difficult to assess how many MCTs acquired by NSA actually
+contain a communication of or concerning a United States person, 35 or a communication to or
+from a person in the United States. This is because NSA's manual review of its upstream
+collection focused primarily on wholly domestic communications - i.e., if one party to the
+35 NSA's minimization procedures define "[c]ommunications of a United States person"
+to include "all communications to which a United States person is a party." NSA Minimization
+Procedures § 2(c). "Communications concerning a United States person" include "all
+communications in which a United States person is discussed or mentioned, except where such
+communications reveal only publicly-available information about the person. Id. § 2(b).
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 36
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+communication was determined to be outside the United States, the communication was not
+further analyzed. Aug. 16 Submission at 1-2. Nevertheless, NSA's manual review did consider
+the location and identity of the active user for each MCT acquired, and this information -- when
+considered together with certain presumptions – shows that NSA is likely acquiring tens of
+thousands of discrete communications of non-target United States persons and persons in the
+United States, by virtue of the fact that their communications are included in MCTs selected for
+acquisition by NSA's upstream collection devices. ³⁶
+
+To illustrate, based upon NSA's analysis of the location and identity of the active user for
+the MCTs it reviewed, MCTs can be divided into four categories:
+
+1. MCTs as to which the active user is the user of the tasked facility (i.e., the target of the
+ acquisition) and is reasonably believed to be located outside the United States;³⁷
+2. MCTs as to which the active user is a non-target who is believed to be located inside
+ the United States;
+3. MCTs as to which the active user is a non-target who is believed to be located outside
+ the United States; and
+
+³⁶ Although there is some overlap between this category of communications and the tens
+of thousands of wholly domestic communications discussed above, the overlap is limited to
+MCTs containing wholly domestic communications. To the extent that the wholly domestic
+communications acquired are SCTs, they are excluded from the MCTs referenced here.
+Similarly, to the extent communications of non-target United States persons and persons in the
+United States that are contained within the tens of thousands of MCTs referenced here are not
+wholly domestic, they would not be included in the wholly domestic communications referenced
+above.
+
+³⁷ Although it is possible for an active user target to be located in the United States,
+NSA's targeting procedures require NSA to terminate collection if it determines that a target has
+entered the United States. NSA Targeting Procedures at 7-8. Accordingly, the Court excludes
+this potential category from its analysis.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 37
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+4. MCTs as to which the active user's identity or location cannot be determined.
+Aug. 16 Submission at 4-8.
+
+With regard to the first category, if the target is the active user, then it is reasonable to
+presume that all of the discrete communications within an MCT will be to or from the target.
+Although United States persons and persons in the United States may be party to any of those
+communications, NSA's acquisition of such communications is of less concern than the
+communications described in the following categories because the communicants were in direct
+communication with a tasked facility, and the acquisition presumptively serves the foreign
+intelligence purpose of the collection. NSA acquires roughly 300-400 thousand such MCT's per
+year.
+38
+For the second category, since the active user is a non-target who is located inside the
+United States, there is no reason to believe that all of the discrete communications contained
+within the MCTs will be to, from, or about the targeted selector (although there would need to be
+at least one such communication in order for NSA's upstream devices to acquire the transaction).
+Further, because the active user is in the United States, the Court presumes that the majority of
+that person's communications will be with other persons in the United States, many of whom
+will be United States persons. NSA acquires approximately 7,000-8,000 such MCTs per year,
+each of which likely contains one or more non-target discrete communications to or from other
+
+38 NSA acquired between 168,853 and 206,922 MCTs as to which the active user was the
+target over the six-month period covered by the sample. Aug. 16 Submission at 9.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 38
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+persons in the United States. 39
+
+The third category is similar to the second in that the active user is a non-target.
+Therefore, there is no reason to believe that all of the communications within the MCTs will be
+to, from, or about the targeted selector (although there would need to be at least one such
+communication in order for NSA's upstream devices to acquire the transaction). However,
+because the active user is believed to be located outside the United States, the Court presumes
+that most of that persons's communications will be with other persons who are outside the
+United States, most of whom will be non-United States persons. That said, the Court notes that
+some of these MCTs are likely to contain non-target communications of or concerning United
+States persons, or that are to or from a person in the United States. 40 The Court has no way of
+knowing precisely how many such communications are acquired. Nevertheless, it appears that
+NSA acquires at least 1.3 million such MCTs each year, 41 so even if only 1% of these MCT's
+
+39 In its manual review, NSA identified ten MCTs as to which the active user was in the
+United States and that contained at least one wholly domestic communication. See Aug. 16
+Submission at 5-7. NSA also identified seven additional MCTs as to which the active user was
+in the United States. Id, at 5. Although NSA determined that at least one party to each of the
+communications within the seven MCTs was reasonably believed to be located outside the
+United States, NSA did not indicate whether any of the communicants were United States
+persons or persons in the United States. Id. The Court sees no reason to treat these two
+categories of MCTs differently because the active users for both were in the United States.
+Seventeen MCTs constitutes .3% of the MCTs reviewed (5,081), and .3% of the 1.29-1.39
+million MCTs NSA acquires every six months (see id, at 8) is 3,870- 4,170, or 7,740-8,340 every
+year.
+
+40 The government has acknowledged as much in its submissions. See June 28
+Submission at 5.
+
+41 Based on its manual review, NSA assessed that 2668 of the 5,081 MCTs reviewed
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+(continued...)
+Page 39
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+contain a single non-target communication of or concerning a United States person, or that is to
+or from a person in the United States, NSA would be acquiring in excess of 10,000 additional
+discrete communications each year that are of or concerning United States persons, or that are to
+or from a person in the United States.
+The fourth category is the most problematic, because without the identity of the active
+user—i.e., whether the user is the target or a non-target—or the active user's location, it is
+difficult to determine what presumptions to make about these MCTs. NSA acquires
+approximately 97,000-140,000 such MCTs each year.⁴² In the context of wholly domestic
+communications, the government urges the Court to apply a series of presumptions that lead to
+the conclusion that this category would not contain any wholly domestic communications. Aug.
+30 Submission at 4-8. The Court questions the validity of those presumptions, as applied to
+wholly domestic communications, but certainly is not inclined to apply them to assessing the
+likelihood that MCTs might contain communications of or concerning United States persons, or
+communications to or from persons in the United States. The active users for some of these
+⁴¹(...continued)
+(approximately 52%) had a non-target active user who was reasonably believed to be located
+outside the United States. Aug. 16 Submission at 4-5. Fifty-two percent of the 1.29 to 1.39
+million MCTs that NSA assessed were acquired through its upstream collection every six months
+would work out to 670,800 - 722,800 MCTs, or approximately 1.3-1.4 million MCTs per year
+that have a non-target active user believed to be located outside the United States.
+⁴² NSA determined that 224 MCTs of the 5,081 MCTs acquired during a six-month
+period [REDACTED] From this, NSA concluded that it acquired between 48,609
+and 70,168 such MCTs every six months through its upstream collection (or approximately
+97,000-140,000 such MCTs each year). Id. at 9 n.27.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 40
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+MCTs may be located in the United States, and, even if the active user is located overseas, the
+MCTs may contain non-target communications of or concerning United States persons or that are
+to or from persons in the United States. Accordingly, this "unknown" category likely adds
+substantially to the number of non-target communications of or concerning United States persons
+or that are to or from persons in the United States being acquired by NSA each year.
+In sum, then, NSA's upstream collection is a small, but unique part of the government's
+overall collection under Section 702 of the FAA. NSA acquires valuable information through its
+upstream collection, but not without substantial intrusions on Fourth Amendment-protected
+interests. Indeed, the record before this Court establishes that NSA's acquisition of Internet
+transactions likely results in NSA acquiring annually tens of thousands of wholly domestic
+communications, and tens of thousands of non-target communications of persons who have little
+or no relationship to the target but who are protected under the Fourth Amendment. Both
+acquisitions raise questions as to whether NSA's targeting and minimization procedures comport
+with FISA and the Fourth Amendment.
+2. NSA's Targeting Procedures
+The Court will first consider whether NSA's acquisition of Internet transactions through
+its upstream collection, as described above, means that NSA's targeting procedures, as
+implemented, are not "reasonably designed" to: 1) "ensure that any acquisition authorized under
+[the certifications] is limited to targeting persons reasonably believed to be located outside the
+United States"; and 2) "prevent the intentional acquisition of any communication as to which the
+sender and all intended recipients are known at the time of the acquisition to be located in the
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 41
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+United States." 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(d)(1); *id.* § (1)(2)(B). The Court concludes that the manner in
+which NSA is currently implementing the targeting procedures does not prevent the Court from
+making the necessary findings, and hence NSA's targeting procedures do not offend FISA.
+a.
+*Targeting Persons Reasonably Believed to be Located*
+*Outside the United States*
+To the extent NSA is acquiring Internet transactions that contain a single discrete
+communication that is to, from, or about a tasked selector, the Court's previous analysis remains
+valid. As explained in greater detail in the Court's September 4, 2008 Memorandum Opinion, in
+this setting the person being targeted is the user of the tasked selector, and NSA's pre-targeting
+and post-targeting procedures ensure that NSA will only acquire such transactions so long as
+there is a reasonable belief that the target is located outside the United States. Docket No.
+[REDACTED]
+But NSA's acquisition of MCTs complicates the Court's analysis somewhat. With regard
+to "about" communications, the Court previously found that the user of the tasked facility was
+the "target" of the acquisition, because the government's purpose in acquiring such
+communications is to obtain information about that user. See *id.* at 18. Moreover, the
+communication is not acquired because the government has any interest in the parties to the
+communication, other than their potential relationship to the user of the tasked facility, and the
+parties to an "about" communication do not become targets unless and until they are separately
+vetted under the targeting procedures. See *id.* at 18-19.
+In the case of "about" MCTs – *i.e.*, MCTs that are acquired because a targeted selector is
+referenced somewhere in the transaction – NSA acquires not only the discrete communication
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 42
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+that references the tasked selector, but also in many cases the contents of other discrete
+communications that do not reference the tasked selector and to which no target is a party. See
+May 2 Letter at 2-3 [REDACTED] By acquiring such MCTs, NSA likely
+acquires tens of thousands of additional communications of non-targets each year, many of
+whom have no relationship whatsoever with the user of the tasked selector. While the Court has
+concerns about NSA's acquisition of these non-target communications, the Court accepts the
+government's representation that the "sole reason [a non-target's MCT] is selected for
+acquisition is that it contains the presence of a tasked selector used by a person who has been
+subjected to NSA's targeting procedures." June 1 Submission at 4. Moreover, at the time of
+acquisition, NSA's upstream collection devices often lack the capability to determine whether a
+transaction contains a single communication or multiple communications, or to identify the
+parties to any particular communication within a transaction. See id. Therefore, the Court has
+no reason to believe that NSA, by acquiring Internet transactions containing multiple
+communications, is targeting anyone other than the user of the tasked selector. See United States
+v. Chemical Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926) ("The presumption of regularity supports the
+official acts of public officers, and, in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts
+presume that they have properly discharged their official duties.").
+
+b. Acquisition of Wholly Domestic Communications
+
+NSA's acquisition of Internet transactions complicates the analysis required by Section
+1881a(d)(1)(B), since the record shows that the government knowingly acquires tens of
+thousands of wholly domestic communications each year. At first blush, it might seem obvious
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 43
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+that targeting procedures that permit such acquisitions could not be "reasonably designed . . . to
+prevent the intentional acquisition of any communication as to which the sender and all intended
+recipients are known at the time of the acquisition to be located in the United States." 50 U.S.C.
+§ 1881a(d)(1)(B). However, a closer examination of the language of the statute leads the Court
+to a different conclusion.
+The government focuses primarily on the "intentional acquisition" language in Section
+1881a(d)(1)(B). Specifically, the government argues that NSA is not "intentionally" acquiring
+wholly domestic communications because the government does not intend to acquire transactions
+containing communications that are wholly domestic and has implemented technical means to
+prevent the acquisition of such transactions. See June 28 Submission at 12. This argument fails
+for several reasons.
+NSA targets a person under Section 702 certifications by acquiring communications to,
+from, or about a selector used by that person. Therefore, to the extent NSA's upstream collection
+devices acquire an Internet transaction containing a single, discrete communication that is to,
+from, or about a tasked selector, it can hardly be said that NSA's acquisition is "unintentional."
+In fact, the government has argued, and the Court has accepted, that the government intentionally
+acquires communications to and from a target, even when NSA reasonably – albeit mistakenly –
+believes that the target is located outside the United States. See Docket No. [REDACTED]
+
+With respect to MCTs, the sole reason NSA acquires such transactions is the presence of
+a tasked selector within the transaction. Because it is technologically infeasible for NSA's
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 44
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+upstream collection devices to acquire only the discrete communication to, from, or about a
+tasked selector that may be contained within an MCT, however, the government argues that the
+only way to obtain the foreign intelligence information found within the discrete communication
+is to acquire the entire transaction in which it is contained. June 1 Submission at 21. As a result,
+the government intentionally acquires all discrete communications within an MCT, including
+those that are not to, from or about a tasked selector. See June 28 Submission at 12, 14; see also
+Sept. 7, 2011 Hearing Tr, at 33-34.
+The fact that NSA's technical measures cannot prevent NSA from acquiring transactions
+containing wholly domestic communications under certain circumstances does not render NSA's
+acquisition of those transactions "unintentional." The government repeatedly characterizes such
+acquisitions as a "failure" of NSA's "technical means." June 28 Submission at 12; see also Sept.
+7, 2011 Hearing Tr. at 35-36. However, there is nothing in the record to suggest that NSA's
+technical means are malfunctioning or otherwise failing to operate as designed. Indeed, the
+government readily concedes that NSA will acquire a wholly domestic "about" communication if
+the transaction containing the communication is routed through an international Internet link
+being monitored by NSA or is routed through a foreign server. See June 1 Submission at 29.
+And in the case of MCTs containing wholly domestic communications that are not to, from, or
+about a tasked selector, NSA has no way to determine, at the time of acquisition, that a particular
+communication within an MCT is wholly domestic. See id. Furthermore, now that NSA's
+manual review of a sample of its upstream collection has confirmed that NSA likely acquires
+tens of thousands of wholly domestic communications each year, there is no question that the
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 45
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+government is knowingly acquiring Internet transactions that contain wholly domestic
+communications through its upstream collection.⁴³
+The government argues that an NSA analyst's post-acquisition discovery that a particular
+Internet transaction contains a wholly domestic communication should retroactively render
+NSA's acquisition of that transaction "unintentional." June 28 Submission at 12. That argument
+is unavailing. NSA's collection devices are set to acquire transactions that contain a reference to
+the targeted selector. When the collection device acquires such a transaction, it is functioning
+precisely as it is intended, even when the transaction includes a wholly domestic communication.
+The language of the statute makes clear that it is the government's intention at the time of
+acquisition that matters, and the government conceded as much at the hearing in this matter.
+Sept. 7, 2011 Hearing Tr. at 37-38.
+Accordingly, the Court finds that NSA intentionally acquires Internet transactions that
+reference a tasked selector through its upstream collection with the knowledge that there are tens
+of thousands of wholly domestic communications contained within those transactions. But this
+is not the end of the analysis. To return to the language of the statute, NSA's targeting
+procedures must be reasonably designed to prevent the intentional acquisition of "any
+communication as to which the sender and all intended recipients are known at the time of
+
+⁴³ It is generally settled that a person intends to produce a consequence either (a) when he
+acts with a purpose of producing that consequence or (b) when he acts knowing that the
+consequence is substantially certain to occur. Restatement (Third) of Torts § 1 (2010); see also
+*United States v. Dyer*, 589 F.3d 520, 528 (1st Cir. 2009) (in criminal law, ""intent' ordinarily
+requires only that the defendant reasonably knew the proscribed result would occur"), *cert*,
+denied, 130 S. Ct. 2422 (2010).
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 46
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+acquisition to be located in the United States." 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(d)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
+The underscored language requires an acquisition-by-acquisition inquiry. Thus, the Court must
+consider whether, at the time NSA intentionally acquires a transaction through its upstream
+collection, NSA will know that the sender and all intended recipients of any particular
+communication within that transaction are located in the United States.
+Presently, it is not technically possible for NSA to configure its upstream collection
+devices [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] the practical
+effect of this technological limitation is that NSA cannot know at the time it acquires an Internet
+transaction whether the sender and all intended recipients of any particular discrete
+communication contained within the transaction are located inside the United States.
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+44 See supra, note 33.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 47
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Given that NSA's upstream collection devices lack the capacity to detect wholly domestic
+communications at the time an Internet transaction is acquired, the Court is inexorably led to the
+conclusion that the targeting procedures are "reasonably designed" to prevent the intentional
+acquisition of any communication as to which the sender and all intended recipients are known at
+the time of the acquisition to be located in the United States. This is true despite the fact that
+NSA knows with certainty that the upstream collection, viewed as a whole, results in the
+acquisition of wholly domestic communications.
+By expanding its Section 702 acquisitions to include the acquisition of Internet
+transactions through its upstream collection, NSA has, as a practical matter, circumvented the
+spirit of Section 1881a(b)(4) and (d)(1) with regard to that collection. NSA's knowing
+acquisition of tens of thousands of wholly domestic communications through its upstream
+collection is a cause of concern for the Court. But the meaning of the relevant statutory provision
+is clear and application to the facts before the Court does not lead to an impossible or absurd
+result. The Court's review does not end with the targeting procedures, however. The Court must
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 48
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+also consider whether NSA's minimization procedures are consistent with §1881a(e)(1) and
+whether NSA's targeting and minimization procedures are consistent with the requirements of
+the Fourth Amendment.
+3.
+*NSA's Minimization Procedures, As Applied to MCTs in the Manner Proposed by the Government, Do Not Meet FISA's Definition of "Minimization Procedures"*
+The Court next considers whether NSA's minimization procedures, as the government
+proposes to apply them to Internet transactions, meet the statutory requirements. As noted above,
+50 U.S.C. § 1881a(e) (1) requires that the minimization procedures "meet the definition of
+minimization procedures under [50 U.S.C. §§] 1801(h) or 1821(4)...." That definition requires
+"specific procedures, which shall be adopted by the Attorney General, that are reasonably
+designed in light of the purpose and technique of the particular [surveillance or physical search],
+to minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly
+available information concerning unconsenting United States persons consistent with the need of
+the United States to obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information." 50
+U.S.C. §§ 1801(h)(1) & 1821(4)(A). For the reasons stated below, the Court concludes that
+NSA's minimization procedures, as applied to MCTs in the manner proposed by the government,
+do not meet the statutory definition in all respects.
+a.
+*The Minimization Framework*
+NSA's minimization procedures do not expressly contemplate the acquisition of MCTs,
+and the language of the procedures does not lend itself to straightforward application to MCTs.
+Most notably, various provisions of the NSA minimization procedures employ the term
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 49
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+"communication" as an operative term. As explained below, for instance, the rules governing
+retention, handling, and dissemination vary depending whether or not a communication is
+deemed to constitute a "domestic communication" instead of a "foreign communication," see
+NSA Minimization Procedures §§ 2(e), 5, 6, 7; a communication "of" or "concerning" a U.S.
+person, see id. §§ 2(b)-(c), 3(b)(1)-(2), 3(c); a "communication to, from, or about a target," id.
+§ 3(b)(4); or a "communication... reasonably believed to contain foreign intelligence
+information or evidence of a crime," id. But MCTs can be fairly described as communications
+that contain several smaller communications. Applying the terms of the NSA minimization
+procedures to MCTs rather than discrete communications can produce very different results.
+In a recent submission, the government explained how NSA proposes to apply its
+minimization procedures to MCTs. See Aug. 30 Submission at 8-11.45 Before discussing the
+measures proposed by the government for handling MCTs, it is helpful to begin with a brief
+overview of the NSA minimization procedures themselves. The procedures require that all
+acquisitions "will be conducted in a manner designed, to the greatest extent feasible, to minimize
+the acquisition of information not relevant to the authorized purpose of the collection." NSA
+---
+45 Although NSA has been collecting MCTs since before the Court's approval of the first
+Section 702 certification in 2008, see June 1 Submission at 2, it has not, to date, applied the
+measures proposed here to the fruits of its upstream collection. Indeed, until NSA's manual
+review of a six-month sample of its upstream collection revealed the acquisition of wholly
+domestic communications, the government asserted that NSA had never found a wholly domestic
+communication in its upstream collection. See id.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 50
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Minimization Procedures § 3(a). Following acquisition, the procedures require that, "[a]s a
+communication is reviewed, NSA analyst(s) will determine whether it is a domestic or foreign
+communication to, from, or about a target and is reasonably believed to contain foreign
+intelligence information or evidence of a crime." *Id.* § 3(b)(4). "Foreign communication means
+a communication that has at least one communicant outside of the United States." *Id.* § 2(e).
+"All other communications, including communications in which the sender and all intended
+recipients are reasonably believed to be located in the United States at the time of acquisition, are
+domestic communications." *Id.* In addition, domestic communications include "[a]ny
+communications acquired through the targeting of a person who at the time of targeting was
+reasonably believed to be located outside the United States but is in fact located inside the United
+States at the time such communications were acquired, and any communications acquired by
+targeting a person who at the time of the targeting was believed to be a non-United States person
+but was in fact a United States person . . . ." *Id.* § 3(d)(2). A domestic communication must be
+"promptly destroyed upon recognition unless the Director (or Acting Director) of NSA
+specifically determines, in writing, that" the communication contains foreign intelligence
+
+46 Of course, NSA's separate targeting procedures, discussed above, also govern the
+manner in which communications are acquired.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 51
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+information or evidence of a crime, or that it falls into another narrow exception permitting
+retention. See id. § 5.47
+
+Upon determining that a communication is a "foreign communication," NSA must decide
+whether the communication is "of" or "concerning" a United States person. Id. § 6.
+"Communications of a United States person include all communications to which a United States
+person is a party." Id. § 2(c). "Communications concerning a United States person include all
+communications in which a United States person is discussed or mentioned, except where such
+communications reveal only publicly-available information about the person." Id. § 2(b).
+
+A foreign communication that is of or concerning a United States person and that is
+determined to contain neither foreign intelligence information nor evidence of a crime must be
+destroyed "at the earliest practicable point in the processing cycle," and "may be retained no
+longer than five years from the expiration date of the certification in any event." Id. § 3(b)(1).48
+___
+47 Once such a determination is made by the Director, the domestic communications at
+issue are effectively treated as "foreign communications" for purposes of the rules regarding
+retention and dissemination.
+
+48 Although Section 3(b)(1) by its terms applies only to "inadvertently acquired
+communications of or concerning a United States person," the government has informed the
+Court that this provision is intended to apply, and in practice is applied, to all foreign
+communications of or concerning United States persons that contain neither foreign intelligence
+information nor evidence of a crime. Docket No. 702(i)-08-01, Sept. 2, 2008 Notice of
+Clarification and Correction at 3-5. Moreover, Section 3(c) of the procedures separately provides
+that foreign communications that do not qualify for retention and that "are known to contain
+communications of or concerning United States persons will be destroyed upon recognition,"
+and, like unreviewed communications, "may be retained no longer than five years from the
+(continued...)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 52
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+A foreign communication that is of or concerning a United States person may be retained
+indefinitely if the "dissemination of such communications with reference to such United States
+persons would be permitted" under the dissemination provisions that are discussed below, or if it
+contains evidence of a crime. Id. § 6(a)(2)-(3). If the retention of a foreign communication of or
+concerning a United States person is "necessary for the maintenance of technical databases," it
+may be retained for five years to allow for technical exploitation, or for longer than five years if
+more time is required for decryption or if the NSA Signals Intelligence Director "determines in
+writing that retention for a longer period is required to respond to authorized foreign intelligence
+or counterintelligence requirements." Id. § 6(a)(1).
+As a general rule, "[a] report based on communications of or concerning a United States
+person may be disseminated" only "if the identity of the United States person is deleted and a
+generic term or symbol is substituted so that the information cannot reasonably be connected
+with an identifiable United States person." Id. § 6(b). A report including the identity of the
+United States person may be provided to a "recipient requiring the identity of such person for the
+performance of official duties," but only if at least one of eight requirements is also met – for
+instance, if "the identity of the United States person is necessary to understand foreign
+intelligence information or assess its importance," or if "information indicates the United States
+
+48(...continued)
+expiration date of the certification authorizing the collection in any event."
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 53
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+person may be . . . an agent of a foreign power" or that he is "engaging in international terrorism
+activities." *Id.* [REDACTED]
+
+b. *Proposed Minimization Measures for MCTs*
+
+The government proposes that NSA's minimization procedures be applied to MCTs in
+the following manner. After acquisition, upstream acquisitions, including MCTs, will reside in
+NSA repositories until they are accessed (e.g., in response to a query) by an NSA analyst
+performing his or her day-to-day work. NSA proposes adding a "cautionary banner" to the tools
+its analysts use to view the content of communications acquired through upstream collection
+under Section 702. *See* Aug. 30 Submission at 9. The banner, which will be "broadly displayed
+on [such] tools," will "direct analysts to consult guidance on how to identify MCTs and how to
+handle them." *Id.* at 9 & n.6. [REDACTED] Analysts will be trained to identify MCTs and to recognize
+wholly domestic communications contained within MCTs. *See id,* at 8-9.
+
+When an analyst identifies an upstream acquisition as an MCT, the analyst will decide
+whether or not he or she "seek[s] to use a discrete communication within [the] MCT,"
+***
+[REDACTED] The procedures also permit NSA to provide unminimized communications to
+[REDACTED] FBI (subject to their own minimization procedures), and to foreign governments for the
+limited purpose of obtaining "technical and linguistic assistance." NSA Minimization
+Procedures §§. 6(c), 8(b). Neither of these provisions has been used to share upstream
+acquisitions. Sept. 7, 2011 Hearing Tr. at 61-62.
+[REDACTED] The banner will not be displayed for communications that "can be first identified
+through technical means where the active user is NSA's tasked selector or that contain only a
+single, discrete communication based on particular stable and well-known protocols." Aug. 30
+Submission at 9 n.6. *See infra*, note 27, and *supra*, note 54.
+***
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 54
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+presumably by reviewing some or all of the MCT's contents. _Id._, at 8.51 "NSA analysts seeking
+to use a discrete communication contained in an MCT (for example, in a FISA application,
+intelligence report, or Section 702 targeting) will assess whether the discrete communication is
+to, from, or about a tasked selector." _Id._ The following framework will then be applied:
+* If the discrete communication that the analyst seeks to use is to, from, or about a tasked
+selector, "any U.S. person information in that communication will be handled in
+accordance with the NSA minimization procedures." _Id._ Presumably, this means that the
+discrete communication will be treated as a "foreign communication" that is "of" or
+"concerning" a United States person, as described above. The MCT containing that
+communication remains available to analysts in NSA's repositories without any marking
+to indicate that it has been identified as an MCT or as a transaction containing United
+States person information.
+* If the discrete communication sought to be used is not to, from, or about a tasked
+selector, and also not to or from an identifiable United States person, "that
+communication (including any U.S. person information therein) will be handled in
+accordance with the NSA minimization procedures." _Id._, at 8-9.52 Presumably, this
+means that the discrete communication will be treated as a "foreign communication" or, if
+it contains information concerning a United States person, as a "foreign communication"
+"concerning a United States person," as described above. The MCT itself remains
+available to analysts in NSA's repositories without any marking to indicate that it has
+been identified as an MCT or that it contains one or more communications that are not to,
+from, or about a targeted selector.
+
+51 A transaction that is identified as an SCT rather than an MCT must be handled in
+accordance with the standard minimization procedures that are discussed above.
+
+52 The Court understands that absent contrary information, NSA treats the user of an
+account who appears to be located in the United States as "an identifiable U.S. person." See
+Aug, 30 Submission at 9 n.7 ("To help determine whether a discrete communication not to, from,
+or about a tasked selector is to or from a U.S. person, NSA would perform the same sort of
+technical analysis it would perform before tasking an electronic communications
+account/address/identifier in accordance with its section 702 targeting procedures.").
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 55
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+* A discrete communication that is not to, from, or about a tasked selector but that is to or
+ from an identifiable United States person "cannot be used for any purpose other than to
+ protect against an immediate threat to human life (e.g., force protection or hostage
+ situations)." Id, at 9. Presumably, this is a reference to Section 1 of the minimization
+ procedures, which allows NSA to deviate from the procedures in such narrow
+ circumstances, subject to the requirement that prompt notice be given to the Office of the
+ Director of National Intelligence, the Department of Justice, and the Court that the
+ deviation has occurred. Regardless of whether or not the discrete communication is used
+ for this limited purpose, the MCT itself remains in NSA's databases without any marking
+ to indicate that it is an MCT, or that it contains at least one communication that is to or
+ from an identifiable United States person. See id.; Sept. 7, 2011 Hearing Tr. at 61.
+* If the discrete communication sought to be used by the analyst (or another discrete
+ communication within the MCT) is recognized as being wholly domestic, the entire MCT
+ will be purged from NSA's systems. See Aug. 30 Submission at 3.
+
+c. *Statutory Analysis*
+
+i. *Acquisition*
+
+The Court first considers how NSA's proposed handling of MCTs bears on whether
+NSA's minimization procedures are "reasonably designed in light of the purpose and technique
+of the particular surveillance, to minimize the acquisition . . . of nonpublicly available
+information concerning unconsenting United States persons consistent with the need of the
+United States to obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information." See 50
+U.S.C. § 1801(h)(1) (emphasis added). Insofar as NSA likely acquires approximately 2,000-
+10,000 MCTs each year that contain at least one wholly domestic communication that is neither
+to, from, nor about a targeted selector, and tens of thousands of communications of or
+
+53 As noted above, NSA's upstream collection also likely results in the acquisition of tens
+(continued...)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 56
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+concerning United States persons with no direct connection to any target, the Court has serious
+concerns. The acquisition of such non-target communications, which are highly unlikely to have
+foreign intelligence value, obviously does not by itself serve the government's need to "obtain,
+produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information." See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(1).
+The government submits, however, that the portions of MCTs that contain references to
+targeted selectors are likely to contain foreign intelligence information, and that it is not feasible
+for NSA to limit its collection only to the relevant portion or portions of each MCT – i.e., the
+particular discrete communications that are to, from, or about a targeted selector. The Court
+53(...continued)
+of thousands of wholly domestic SCTs that contain references to targeted selectors. See supra,
+pages 33-34 & note 33 (discussing the limits [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Although the collection of wholly
+domestic "about" SCTs is troubling, they do not raise the same minimization-related concerns as
+discrete, wholly domestic communications that are neither to, from, nor about targeted selectors,
+or as discrete communications of or concerning United States persons with no direct connection
+to any target, either of which may be contained within MCTs. The Court has effectively
+concluded that certain communications containing a reference to a targeted selector are
+reasonably likely to contain foreign intelligence information, including communications between
+non-target accounts that contain the name of the targeted facility in the body of the message. See
+Docket No. 07-449, May 31, 2007 Primary Order at 12 (finding probable cause to believe that
+certain "about" communications were "themselves being sent and/or received by one of the
+targeted foreign powers"). Insofar as the discrete, wholly domestic "about" communications at
+issue here are communications between non-target accounts that contain the name of the targeted
+facility, the same conclusion applies to them. Accordingly, in the language of FISA's definition
+of minimization procedures, the acquisition of wholly domestic communications about targeted
+selectors will generally be "consistent with the need of the United States to obtain, produce, and
+disseminate foreign intelligence information." See 50 U.S.C. 1801(h)(1). Nevertheless, the
+Court understands that in the event NSA identifies a discrete, wholly domestic "about"
+communication in its databases, the communication will be destroyed upon recognition. See
+NSA Minimization Procedures § 5.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 57
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+accepts the government's assertion that the collection of MCTs yields valuable foreign
+intelligence information that by its nature cannot be acquired except through upstream collection.
+See Sept. 7, 2011 Hearing Tr. at 69-70, 74. For purposes of this discussion, the Court further
+accepts the government's assertion that it is not feasible for NSA to avoid the collection of MCTs
+as part of its upstream collection or to limit its collection only to the specific portion or portions
+of each transaction that contains the targeted selector. See id, at 48-50; June 1 Submission at
+27.54 The Court therefore concludes that NSA's minimization procedures are, given the current
+state of NSA's technical capability, reasonably designed to minimize the acquisition of
+nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting United States persons consistent with
+the need of the United States to obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence
+information.
+[REDACTED]
+In any event, it is incumbent upon NSA to continue working to enhance its capability to
+limit acquisitions only to targeted communications.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 58
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+ii.
+Retention
+The principal problem with the government's proposed handling of MCTs relates to what
+will occur, and what will not occur, following acquisition. As noted above, the NSA
+minimization procedures generally require that, "[a]s a communication is reviewed, NSA
+analyst(s) will determine whether it is a domestic or foreign communication to, from, or about a
+target and is reasonably believed to contain foreign intelligence information or evidence of a
+crime," see NSA Minimization Procedures § 3(b)(4), so that it can be promptly afforded the
+appropriate treatment under the procedures. The measures proposed by the government for
+MCTs, however, largely dispense with the requirement of prompt disposition upon initial review
+by an analyst. Rather than attempting to identify and segregate information "not relevant to the
+authorized purpose of the acquisition" or to destroy such information promptly following
+acquisition, NSA's proposed handling of MCTs tends to maximize the retention of such
+information, including information of or concerning United States persons with no direct
+connection to any target. See id. § 3(b)(1).
+The proposed measures focus almost exclusively on the discrete communications within
+MCTs that analysts decide, after review, that they wish to use. See Aug. 30 Submission at 8-10.
+An analyst is not obligated to do anything with other portions of the MCT, including any wholly
+domestic discrete communications that are not immediately recognized as such, and
+communications of or concerning United States persons that have no direct connection to the
+targeted selector. See id.; Sept. 7, 2011 Hearing Tr. at 61. If, after reviewing the contents of an
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 59
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+entire MCT, the analyst decides that he or she does not wish to use any discrete communication
+contained therein, the analyst is not obligated to do anything unless it is immediately apparent to
+him or her that the MCT contains a wholly domestic communication (in which case the entire
+MCT is deleted).⁵⁵ See Aug. 30 Submission at 8-10.
+Except in the case of those recognized as containing at least one wholly domestic
+communication, MCTs that have been reviewed by analysts remain available to other analysts in
+NSA's repositories without any marking to identify them as MCTs. See id.; Sept. 7, 2011
+Hearing Tr. at 61. Nor will MCTs be marked to identify them as containing discrete
+communications to or from United States persons but not to or from a targeted selector, or to
+indicate that they contain United States person information. See Aug. 30 Submission at 8-10;
+Sept. 7, 2011 Hearing Tr. at 61. All MCTs except those identified as containing one or more
+wholly domestic communications will be retained for a minimum of five years. The net effect is
+that thousands of wholly domestic communications (those that are never reviewed and those that
+are not recognized by analysts as being wholly domestic), and thousands of other discrete
+---
+⁵⁵ The government's submissions make clear that, in many cases, it will be difficult for
+analysts to determine whether a discrete communication contained within an MCT is a wholly
+domestic communication. NSA's recent manual review of a six-month representative sample of
+its upstream collection demonstrates how challenging it can be for NSA to recognize wholly
+domestic communications, even when the agency's full attention and effort are directed at the
+task. See generally Aug. 16 and Aug. 30 Submissions. It is doubtful that analysts whose
+attention and effort are focused on identifying and analyzing foreign intelligence information will
+be any more successful in identifying wholly domestic communications. Indeed, each year the
+government notifies the Court of numerous compliance incidents involving good-faith mistakes
+and omissions by NSA personnel who work with the Section 702 collection.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 60
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+communications that are not to or from a targeted selector but that are to, from, or concerning a United States person, will be retained by NSA for at least five years, despite the fact that they have no direct connection to a targeted selector and, therefore, are unlikely to contain foreign intelligence information.
+
+It appears that NSA could do substantially more to minimize the retention of information concerning United States persons that is unrelated to the foreign intelligence purpose of its upstream collection. The government has not, for instance, demonstrated why it would not be feasible to limit access to upstream acquisitions to a smaller group of specially-trained analysts who could develop expertise in identifying and scrutinizing MCTs for wholly domestic communications and other discrete communications of or concerning United States persons. Alternatively, it is unclear why an analyst working within the framework proposed by the government should not be required, after identifying an MCT, to apply Section 3(b)(4) of the NSA minimization procedures to each discrete communication within the transaction. As noted above, Section 3(b)(4) states that "[a]s a communication is reviewed, NSA analyst(s) will determine whether it is a domestic or foreign communication to, from, or about a target and is reasonably believed to contain foreign intelligence information or evidence of a crime." NSA Minimization Procedures § 3(b)(4). If the MCT contains information "of" or "concerning" a United States person within the meaning of Sections (2)(b) and (2)(c) of the NSA minimization procedures, it is unclear why the analyst should not be required to mark it to identify it as such. At a minimum, it seems that the entire MCT could be marked as an MCT. Such markings would
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 61
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+alert other NSA personnel who might encounter the MCT to take care in reviewing it, thus
+reducing the risk of error that seems to be inherent in the measures proposed by the government,
+which are applied by each analyst, acting alone and without the benefit of his or her colleagues'
+prior efforts.⁵⁶ Another potentially helpful step might be to adopt a shorter retention period for
+MCTs and unreviewed upstream communications so that such information "ages off" and is
+deleted from NSA's repositories in less than five years.
+
+This discussion is not intended to provide a checklist of changes that, if made, would
+necessarily bring NSA's minimization procedures into compliance with the statute. Indeed, it
+may be that some of these measures are impracticable, and it may be that there are other plausible
+(perhaps even better) steps that could be taken that are not mentioned here. But by not fully
+exploring such options, the government has failed to demonstrate that it has struck a reasonable
+balance between its foreign intelligence needs and the requirement that information concerning
+United States persons be protected. Under the circumstances, the Court is unable to find that, as
+applied to MCTs in the manner proposed by the government, NSA's minimization procedures
+are "reasonably designed in light of the purpose and technique of the particular surveillance to
+minimize the . . . retention . . . of nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting
+
+⁵⁶ The government recently acknowledged that "it's pretty clear that it would be better" if
+NSA used such markings but that "[t]he feasibility of doing that [had not yet been] assessed,"
+Sept. 7, 2011 Hearing Tr. at 56.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 62
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+United States persons consistent with the need of the United States to obtain, produce, and
+disseminate foreign intelligence information. "57 See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h)(1) & 1821(4)(A).
+
+iii. Dissemination
+
+The Court next turns to dissemination. At the outset, it must be noted that FISA imposes
+a stricter standard for dissemination than for acquisition or retention. While the statute requires
+procedures that are reasonably designed to "minimize" the acquisition and retention of
+information concerning United States persons consistent with the need of the United States to
+obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information, the procedures must be
+reasonably designed to "prohibit" the dissemination of information concerning United States
+persons consistent with that need. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(1) (emphasis added).
+
+57 NSA's minimization procedures contain two provisions that state, in part, that "[t]he
+communications that may be retained [by NSA] include electronic communications acquired
+because of limitations
+[REDACTED]
+The government further represented that it "ha[d] not seen" such a
+circumstance in collection under the Protect America Act ("PAA"), which was the predecessor to
+Section 702. Id. at 29, 30. And although NSA apparently was acquiring Internet transactions
+under the PAA, the government made no mention of such acquisitions in connection with these
+provisions of the minimization procedures (or otherwise). See id, at 27-31. Accordingly, the
+Court does not read this language as purporting to justify the procedures proposed by the
+government for MCTs. In any event, such a reading would, for the reasons stated, be
+inconsistent with the statutory requirements for minimization.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 63
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+As the Court understands it, no United States-person-identifying information contained in any MCT will be disseminated except in accordance with the general requirements of NSA's minimization procedures for "foreign communications" "of or concerning United States persons" that are discussed above. Specifically, "[a] report based on communications of or concerning a United States person may be disseminated" only "if the identity of the United States person is deleted and a generic term or symbol is substituted so that the information cannot reasonably be connected with an identifiable United States person." NSA Minimization Procedures § 6(b). A report including the identity of the United States person may be provided to a "recipient requiring the identity of such person for the performance of official duties," but only if at least one of eight requirements is also met – for instance, if "the identity of the United States person is necessary to understand foreign intelligence information or assess its importance." Id.⁵⁸
+
+This limitation on the dissemination of United States-person-identifying information is helpful. But the pertinent portion of FISA's definition of minimization procedures applies not merely to information that identifies United States persons, but more broadly to the dissemination of "information concerning unconsenting United States persons." 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(1) (emphasis added).⁵⁹ The government has proposed several additional restrictions that
+
+⁵⁸ Although Section 6(b) uses the term "report," the Court understands it to apply to the dissemination of United States-person-identifying information in any form.
+
+⁵⁹ Another provision of the definition of minimization procedures bars the dissemination of information (other than certain forms of foreign intelligence information) "in a manner that
+(continued...)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 64
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+will have the effect of limiting the dissemination of "nonpublicly available information
+concerning unconsenting United States persons consistent with the need of the United States to
+disseminate foreign intelligence information." Id. First, as noted above, the government will
+destroy MCTs that are recognized by analysts as containing one or more discrete wholly
+domestic communications. Second, the government has asserted that NSA will not use any
+discrete communication within an MCT that is determined to be to or from a United States
+person but not to, from, or about a targeted selector, except when necessary to protect against an
+immediate threat to human life. See Aug. 30 Submission at 9. The Court understands this to
+mean, among other things, that no information from such a communication will be disseminated
+in any form unless NSA determines it is necessary to serve this specific purpose. Third, the
+government has represented that whenever it is unable to confirm that at least one party to a
+discrete communication contained in an MCT is located outside the United States, it will not use
+any information contained in the discrete communication. See Sept. 7, 2011 Hearing Tr. at 52,
+The Court understands this limitation to mean that no information from such a discrete
+communication will be disseminated by NSA in any form.
+Communications as to which a United States person or a person inside the United States
+
+^(59(...continued))
+^identifies any United States person," except when the person's identity is necessary to understand
+^foreign intelligence information or to assess its importance. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h)(2),
+^1821(4)(b). Congress's use of the distinct modifying terms "concerning" and "identifying" in
+^two adjacent and closely-related provisions was presumably intended to have meaning. See, e.g.,
+^Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983).
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 65
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+is a party are more likely than other communications to contain information concerning United
+States persons. And when such a communication is neither to, from, nor about a targeted facility,
+it is highly unlikely that the "need of the United States to disseminate foreign intelligence
+information" would be served by the dissemination of United States-person information
+contained therein. Hence, taken together, these measures will tend to prohibit the dissemination
+of information concerning unconsenting United States persons when there is no foreign-
+intelligence need to do so.60 Of course, the risk remains that information concerning United
+States persons will not be recognized by NSA despite the good-faith application of the measures
+it proposes. But the Court cannot say that the risk is so great that it undermines the
+reasonableness of the measures proposed by NSA with respect to the dissemination of
+information concerning United States persons.61 Accordingly, the Court concludes that NSA's
+
+60 Another measure that, on balance, is likely to mitigate somewhat the risk that
+information concerning United States persons will be disseminated in the absence of a foreign-
+intelligence need is the recently-proposed prohibition on running queries of the Section 702
+upstream collection using United States-person identifiers. See Aug. 30 Submission at 10-11.
+To be sure, any query, including a query based on non-United States-person information, could
+yield United States-person information. Nevertheless, it stands to reason that queries based on
+information concerning United States persons are at least somewhat more likely than other
+queries to yield United States-person information. Insofar as information concerning United
+States persons is not made available to analysts, it cannot be disseminated. Of course, this
+querying restriction does not address the retention problem that is discussed above.
+
+61 In reaching this conclusion regarding the risk that information concerning United
+States persons might be mistakenly disseminated, the Court is mindful that by taking additional
+steps to minimize the retention of such information, NSA would also be reducing the likelihood
+that it might be disseminated when the government has no foreign intelligence need to do so.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 66
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+minimization procedures are reasonably designed to "prohibit the dissemination[] of nonpublicly
+available information concerning unconsenting United States persons consistent with the need of
+the United States to... disseminate foreign intelligence information." See 50 U.S.C.
+§ 1801(h)(1).62
+4.
+NSA'S Targeting and Minimization Procedures Do Not, as
+Applied to Upstream Collection that Includes MCTs, Satisfy the
+Requirements of the Fourth Amendment
+
+The final question for the Court is whether the targeting and minimization procedures are,
+as applied to upstream collection that includes MCTs, consistent with the Fourth Amendment.
+See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3)(A)-(B), The Fourth Amendment provides:
+
+The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
+effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
+Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
+and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
+be seized.
+
+The Court has assumed in the prior Section 702 Dockets that at least in some
+circumstances, account holders have a reasonable expectation of privacy in electronic
+communications, and hence that the acquisition of such communications can result in a "search"
+or "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Docket No. [REDACTED]
+The government accepts the proposition that the acquisition of
+
+62 The Court further concludes that the NSA minimization procedures, as the government
+proposes to apply them to MCTs, satisfy the requirements of 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h)(2)-(3) and
+1821(4)(B)-(C). See supra, note 59 (discussing 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h)(2) & 1821(4)(B)). The
+requirements of 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h)(4) and 1821(4)(D) are inapplicable here.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 67
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+electronic communications can result in a "search" or "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment.
+See Sept. 7, 2011 Hearing Tr. at 66. Indeed, the government has acknowledged in prior Section
+702 matters that the acquisition of communications from facilities used by United States persons
+located outside the United States "must be in conformity with the Fourth Amendment." Docket
+Nos [REDACTED] The same is true
+of the acquisition of communications from facilities used by United States persons and others
+within the United States. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990)
+(recognizing that "aliens receive constitutional protections when they have come within the
+territory of the United States and developed substantial connections with this country").
+a. The Warrant Requirement
+The Court has previously concluded that the acquisition of foreign intelligence
+information pursuant to Section 702 falls within the "foreign intelligence exception" to the
+warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. See Docket No. [REDACTED]
+The government's recent revelations regarding NSA's acquisition of MCTs
+do not alter that conclusion. To be sure, the Court now understands that, as a result of the
+transactional nature of the upstream collection, NSA acquires a substantially larger number of
+communications of or concerning United States persons and persons inside the United States
+than previously understood. Nevertheless, the collection as a whole is still directed at [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] conducted for the purpose of national security – a
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 68
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+purpose going "well beyond any garden-variety law enforcement objective.'" See id. (quoting
+_In re Directives_, Docket No. 08-01, Opinion at 16 (FISA Ct. Rev. Aug. 22, 2008) (hereinafter
+"_In re Directives_")). ⁶³ Further, it remains true that the collection is undertaken in circumstances
+in which there is a "high degree of probability that requiring a warrant would hinder the
+government's ability to collect time-sensitive information and, thus, would impede the vital
+national security interests that are at stake.'" _Id_, at 36 (quoting _In re Directives_ at 18).
+Accordingly, the government's revelation that NSA acquires MCTs as part of its Section 702
+upstream collection does not disturb the Court's prior conclusion that the government is not
+required to obtain a warrant before conducting acquisitions under NSA's targeting and
+minimization procedures.
+b. Reasonableness
+The question therefore becomes whether, taking into account NSA's acquisition and
+proposed handling of MCTs, the agency's targeting and minimization procedures are reasonable
+under the Fourth Amendment. As the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review ("Court
+of Review") has explained, a court assessing reasonableness in this context must consider "the
+nature of the government intrusion and how the government intrusion is implemented. The more
+important the government's interest, the greater the intrusion that may be constitutionally
+
+⁶³ A redacted, de-classified version of the opinion in _In re Directives_ is published at 551
+F.3d 1004. The citations herein are to the unredacted, classified version of the opinion,
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 69
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+tolerated." _In re Directives_ at 19-20 (citations omitted), quoted in Docket No [REDACTED]. The court must therefore
+balance the interests at stake. If the protections that are in place for individual privacy Interests are sufficient in light of the government interest at stake, the constitutional scales will tilt in favor of upholding the government's actions. If, however, those protections are insufficient to alleviate the risks of government error and abuse, the scales will tip toward a finding of unconstitutionality.
+_Id_, at 20 (citations omitted), quoted in Docket No [REDACTED]
+In conducting this balancing, the Court must consider the "totality of the circumstances." _Id._ at 19. Given the all-encompassing nature of Fourth Amendment reasonableness review, the targeting and minimization procedures are most appropriately considered collectively. See Docket No. [REDACTED] (following the same approach). ⁶⁴
+The Court has previously recognized that the government's national security interest in conducting acquisitions pursuant to Section 702 ""is of the highest order of magnitude."" Docket No. [REDACTED] (quoting _In re Directives_ at 20). The Court has further accepted the government's representations that NSA's upstream collection is "uniquely capable of acquiring certain types of targeted communications containing valuable foreign intelligence information."" Docket No. [REDACTED] (quoting
+⁶⁴ Reasonableness review under the Fourth Amendment is broader than the statutory assessment previously addressed, which is necessarily limited by the terms of the pertinent provisions of FISA.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 70
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+government filing). There is no reason to believe that the collection of MCTs results in the
+acquisition of less foreign intelligence information than the Court previously understood.
+
+Nevertheless, it must be noted that NSA's upstream collection makes up only a very
+small fraction of the agency's total collection pursuant to Section 702. As explained above, the
+collection of telephone communications under Section 702 is not implicated at all by the
+government's recent disclosures regarding NSA's acquisition of MCTs. Nor do those disclosures
+affect NSA's collection of Internet communications directly from Internet service providers
+[REDACTED], which accounts for approximately 91% of the Internet
+communications acquired by NSA each year under Section 702. See Aug. 16 Submission at
+Appendix A. And the government recently advised that NSA now has the capability, at the time
+of acquisition, to identify approximately 40% of its upstream collection as constituting discrete
+communications (non-MCTs) that are to, from, or about a targeted selector. See id, at 1 n.2.
+Accordingly, only approximately 5.4% (40% of 9%) of NSA's aggregate collection of Internet
+communications (and an even smaller portion of the total collection) under Section 702 is at
+issue here. The national security interest at stake must be assessed bearing these numbers in
+mind.
+
+The government's recent disclosures regarding the acquisition of MCT's most directly
+affect the privacy side of the Fourth Amendment balance. The Court's prior approvals of the
+targeting and minimization procedures rested on its conclusion that the procedures "reasonably
+confine acquisitions to targets who are non-U.S. persons outside the United States," who thus
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 71
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+"are not protected by the Fourth Amendment." Docket No [REDACTED]
+The Court's approvals also rested upon the understanding that acquisitions under the
+procedures "will intrude on interests protected by the Fourth Amendment only to the extent that
+(1) despite the operation of the targeting procedures, U.S. persons, or persons actually in the
+United States, are mistakenly targeted; or (2) U.S. persons, or persons located in the United
+States, are parties to communications to or from tasked selectors (or, in certain circumstances,
+communications that contain a reference to a tasked selector)." _Id._ at 38. But NSA's acquisition
+of MCTs substantially broadens the circumstances in which Fourth Amendment-protected
+interests are intruded upon by NSA's Section 702 collection. Until now, the Court has not
+considered these acquisitions in its Fourth Amendment analysis.
+Both in terms of its size and its nature, the intrusion resulting from NSA's acquisition of
+MCTs is substantial. The Court now understands that each year, NSA's upstream collection
+likely results in the acquisition of roughly two to ten thousand discrete wholly domestic
+communications that are neither to, from, nor about a targeted selector, as well as tens of
+thousands of other communications that are to or from a United States person or a person in the
+United States but that are neither to, from, nor about a targeted selector.65 In arguing that NSA's
+
+65 As discussed earlier, NSA also likely acquires tens of thousands of discrete, wholly
+domestic communications that are "about" a targeted facility. Because these communications are
+reasonably likely to contain foreign intelligence information and thus, generally speaking, serve
+the government's foreign intelligence needs, they do not present the same Fourth Amendment
+concerns as the non-target communications discussed here. See _supra_, note 53.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 72
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+targeting and minimization procedures satisfy the Fourth Amendment notwithstanding the
+acquisition of MCTs, the government stresses that the number of protected communications
+acquired is relatively small in comparison to the total number of Internet communications
+obtained by NSA through its upstream collection. That is true enough, given the enormous
+volume of Internet transactions acquired by NSA through its upstream collection (approximately
+26.5 million annually). But the number is small only in that relative sense. The Court recognizes
+that the ratio of non-target, Fourth Amendment-protected communications to the total number of
+communications must be considered in the Fourth Amendment balancing. But in conducting a
+review under the Constitution that requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances, see
+In re Directives at 19, the Court must also take into account the absolute number of non-target,
+protected communications that are acquired. In absolute terms, tens of thousands of non-target,
+protected communications annually is a very large number.
+The nature of the intrusion at issue is also an important consideration in the Fourth
+Amendment balancing. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 832 (2002); Vernonia
+Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 659 (1995). At issue here are the personal [REDACTED]
+communications of U.S. persons and persons in the United States. A person's "papers" are
+among the four items that are specifically listed in the Fourth Amendment as subject to
+protection against unreasonable search and seizure. Whether they are transmitted by letter,
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 73
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+telephone or e-mail, a person's private communications are akin to personal papers. Indeed, the
+Supreme Court has held that the parties to telephone communications and the senders and
+recipients of written communications generally have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
+contents of those communications. See *Katz*, 389 U.S. at 352; *United States v. United States*
+*Dist. Ct. (Keith)*, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972); *United States v. Jacobsen*, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984).
+The intrusion resulting from the interception of the contents of electronic communications is,
+generally speaking, no less substantial.⁶⁶
+
+The government stresses that the non-target communications of concern here (discrete
+wholly domestic communications and other discrete communications to or from a United States
+person or a person in the United States that are neither to, from, nor about a targeted selector) are
+acquired incidentally rather than purposefully. See June 28 Submission at 13-14. Insofar as
+NSA acquires entire MCTs because it lacks the technical means to limit collection only to the
+discrete portion or portions of each MCT that contain a reference to the targeted selector, the
+Court is satisfied that is the case. But as the government correctly recognizes, the acquisition of
+non-target information is not necessarily reasonable under the Fourth Amendment simply
+
+⁶⁶ Of course, not every interception by the government of a personal communication
+results in a "search" or "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Whether a
+particular intrusion constitutes a search or seizure depends on the specific facts and
+circumstances involved.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 74
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+because its collection is incidental to the purpose of the search or surveillance. See id. at 14.
+There surely are circumstances in which incidental intrusions can be so substantial as to render a
+search or seizure unreasonable. To use an extreme example, if the only way for the government
+to obtain communications to or from a particular targeted [REDACTED] required also acquiring
+all communications to or from every other [REDACTED], such collection would certainly raise
+very serious Fourth Amendment concerns.
+
+Here, the quantity and nature of the information that is "incidentally" collected
+distinguishes this matter from the prior instances in which this Court and the Court of Review
+have considered incidental acquisitions. As explained above, the quantity of incidentally-
+acquired, non-target, protected communications being acquired by NSA through its upstream
+collection is, in absolute terms, very large, and the resulting intrusion is, in each instance,
+likewise very substantial. And with regard to the nature of the acquisition, the government
+acknowledged in a prior Section 702 docket that the term "incidental interception" is "most
+commonly understood to refer to an intercepted communication between a target using a facility
+subject to surveillance and a third party using a facility not subject to surveillance." Docket Nos.
+[REDACTED] This is the sort of
+acquisition that the Court of Review was addressing in In re Directives when it stated that
+"incidental collections occurring as a result of constitutionally permissible acquisitions do not
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 75
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+render those acquisitions unlawful,” _In re Directives_ at 30. But here, by contrast, the incidental
+acquisitions of concern are not direct communications between a non-target third party and the
+user of the targeted facility. Nor are they the communications of non-targets that refer directly to
+a targeted selector. Rather, the communications of concern here are acquired simply because
+they appear somewhere in the same transaction as a separate communication that is to, from, or
+about the targeted facility. 67
+
+The distinction is significant and impacts the Fourth Amendment balancing. A discrete
+communication as to which the user of the targeted facility is a party or in which the targeted
+
+67 The Court of Review plainly limited its holding regarding incidental collection to the
+facts before it. See _In re Directives_ at 30 ("On these facts, incidentally collected communications
+of non-targeted United States persons do not violate the Fourth Amendment.") (emphasis added).
+The dispute in _In re Directives_ involved the acquisition by NSA of discrete to/from
+communications from an Internet Service Provider, not NSA's upstream collection of Internet
+transactions. Accordingly, the Court of Review had no occasion to consider NSA's acquisition
+of MCTs (or even "about" communications, for that matter). Furthermore, the Court of Review
+noted that "[t]he government assures us that it does not maintain a database of incidentally
+collected information from non-targeted United States persons, and there is no evidence to the
+contrary." _Id_. Here, however, the government proposes measures that will allow NSA to retain
+non-target United States person information in its databases for at least five years.
+
+The Title III cases cited by the government (see June 28 Submission at 14-15) are
+likewise distinguishable. _Abraham v. County of Greenville_, 237 F.3d 386, 391 (4th Cir. 2001),
+did not involve incidental overhears at all. The others involved allegedly non-pertinent
+communications to or from the facilities for which wiretap authorization had been granted, rather
+than communications to or from non-targeted facilities. See _Scott v. United States_, 436 U.S.
+128, 130-31 (1978), _United States v. McKinnon_, 721 F.2d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 1983), and _United
+States v. Doolittle_, 507 F.2d 1368, 1371, aff'd en banc, 518 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1975).
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 76
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+facility is mentioned is much more likely to contain foreign intelligence information than is a
+separate communication that is acquired simply because it happens to be within the same
+transaction as a communication involving a targeted facility. Hence, the national security need
+for acquiring, retaining, and disseminating the former category of communications is greater than
+the justification for acquiring, retaining, and disseminating the latter form of communication.
+The Court of Review and this Court have recognized that the procedures governing
+retention, use, and dissemination bear on the reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment of a
+program for collecting foreign intelligence information. See In re Directives at 29-30; Docket
+No. [REDACTED] As explained in the discussion of NSA's
+minimization procedures above, the measures proposed by NSA for handling MCTs tend to
+maximize, rather than minimize, the retention of non-target information, including information
+of or concerning United States persons. Instead of requiring the prompt review and proper
+disposition of non-target information (to the extent it is feasible to do so), NSA's proposed
+measures focus almost exclusively on those portions of an MCT that an analyst decides, after
+review, that he or she wishes to use. An analyst is not required to determine whether other
+portions of the MCT constitute discrete communications to or from a United States person or a
+person in the United States, or contain information concerning a United States person or person
+inside the United States, or, having made such a determination, to do anything about it. Only
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 77
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+those MCTs that are immediately recognized as containing a wholly domestic discrete
+communication are purged, while other MCTs remain in NSA's repositories for five or more
+years, without being marked as MCTs. Nor, if an MCT contains a discrete communication of, or
+other information concerning, a United States person or person in the United States, is the MCT
+marked as such. Accordingly, each analyst who retrieves an MCT and wishes to use a portion
+thereof is left to apply the proposed minimization measures alone, from beginning to end, and
+without the benefit of his colleagues' prior review and analysis. Given the limited review of
+MCTs that is required, and the difficulty of the task of identifying protected information within
+an MCT, the government's proposed measures seem to enhance, rather than reduce, the risk of
+error, overretention, and dissemination of non-target information, including information
+protected by the Fourth Amendment.
+In sum, NSA's collection of MCTs results in the acquisition of a very large number of
+Fourth Amendment-protected communications that have no direct connection to any targeted
+facility and thus do not serve the national security needs underlying the Section 702 collection as
+a whole. Rather than attempting to identify and segregate the non-target, Fourth-Amendment
+protected information promptly following acquisition, NSA's proposed handling of MCTs tends
+to maximize the retention of such information and hence to enhance the risk that it will be used
+and disseminated. Under the totality of the circumstances, then, the Court is unable to find that
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 78
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+the government's proposed application of NSA's targeting and minimization procedures to
+MCTs is consistent with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. The Court does not
+foreclose the possibility that the government might be able to tailor the scope of NSA's upstream
+collection, or adopt more stringent post-acquisition safeguards, in a manner that would satisfy the
+reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 68
+
+V. CONCLUSION
+
+For the foregoing reasons, the government's requests for approval of the certifications
+and procedures contained in the April 2011 Submissions are granted in part and denied in part.
+The Court concludes that one aspect of the proposed collection – the "upstream collection" of
+Internet transactions containing multiple communications, or MCTs – is, in some respects,
+deficient on statutory and constitutional grounds. Specifically, the Court finds as follows:
+
+1. Certifications [REDACTED] and the amendments to the Certifications
+in the Prior 702 Dockets, contain all the required elements;
+
+68 As the government notes, see June 1 Submission at 18-19, the Supreme Court has
+"repeatedly refused to declare that only the 'least intrusive' search practicable can be reasonable
+under the Fourth Amendment." City of Ontario v. Quon, — U.S. —, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2632
+(2010) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The foregoing discussion should not be
+understood to suggest otherwise. Rather, the Court holds only that the means actually chosen by
+the government to accomplish its Section 702 upstream collection are, with respect to MCTs,
+excessively intrusive in light of the purpose of the collection as a whole.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 79
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+2. As applied to telephone communications and discrete Internet communications that
+are to or from a facility tasked for collection, to non-MCT "about" communications falling
+within the [REDACTED] categories previously described by the government, 69 and to MCTs as to which the
+"active user" is known to be a tasked selector, the targeting and minimization procedures adopted
+in accordance with 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(d)-(e) are consistent with the requirements of those
+subsections and with the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States;
+
+3. NSA's targeting procedures, as the government proposes to implement them in
+connection with the acquisition of MCTs, meet the requirements of 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(d);
+
+4. NSA's minimization procedures, as the government proposes to apply them to MCTs
+as to which the "active user” is not known to be a tasked selector, do not meet the requirements
+of 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(e) with respect to retention; and
+
+5. NSA's targeting and minimization procedures, as the government proposes to apply
+them to MCTs as to which the "active user" is not known to be a tasked selector, are inconsistent
+with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
+
+69 See Docket No. [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 80
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+Orders approving the certifications and amendments in part are being entered
+contemporaneously herewith.
+
+ENTERED this 3rd day of October, 2011.
+
+JOHN D. BATES
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+[REDACTED] Deputy Clerk,
+FISC, certify that this document
+is a true and correct copy of
+the original.
+[REDACTED]
+
+(b)(6)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 81
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+ORDER
+These matters are before the Court on: (1) the "Government's Ex Parte Submission of
+Reauthorization Certification and Related Procedures, Ex Parte Submission of Amended
+Certifications, and Request for an Order Approving Such Certification and Amended
+Certifications" for DNI/AG 702(g) Certifications [REDACTED] which was filed
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+on April 20, 2011; (2) the "Government's Ex Parte Submission of Reauthorization Certification
+and Related Procedures, Ex Parte Submission of Amended Certifications, and Request for an
+Order Approving Such Certification and Amended Certifications" for DNI/AG 702(g)
+Certifications
+[REDACTED]
+which was filed on April 22, 2011; and (3)
+the "Government's Ex Parte Submission of Reauthorization Certification and Related
+Procedures, Ex Parte Submission of Amended Certifications, and Request for an Order
+Approving Such Certification and Amended Certifications" for DNI/AG 702(g) Certifications
+[REDACTED]
+which was also filed on April 22, 2011 (collectively, the
+"April 2011 Submissions").
+
+Through the April 2011 Submissions, the government seeks approval of the acquisition of
+certain telephone and Internet communications pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA" or the "Act"), 50 U.S.C. § 1881a, which requires judicial
+review for compliance with both statutory and constitutional requirements. For the reasons set
+forth in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, the government's requests for approval are
+granted in part and denied in part. The Court concludes that one aspect of the proposed
+collection - the "upstream collection" of Internet transactions containing multiple
+communications, or "MCTs" - is, in some respects, deficient on statutory and constitutional
+grounds. Specifically, the Court finds as follows:
+
+1. DNI/AG 702(g) Certifications
+[REDACTED]
+as well as the
+amendments to the other certifications listed above and contained in the April 2011 Submissions,
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+Page 2
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+contain all the required elements;
+
+2. As applied to telephone communications and discrete Internet communications that
+are to or from a facility tasked for collection, to non-MCT "about" communications falling
+within the [REDACTED] categories previously described by the government,¹ and to MCTs as to which the
+"active user" is known to be a tasked selector, the targeting and minimization procedures adopted
+in accordance with 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(d)-(e) are consistent with the requirements of those
+subsections and with the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States;
+
+3. NSA's targeting procedures, as the government proposes to implement them in
+connection with the acquisition of MCTs, meet the requirements of 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(d);
+
+4. NSA's minimization procedures, as the government proposes to apply them to MCTs
+as to which the "active user" is not known to be a tasked selector, do not meet the requirements
+of 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(e) with respect to retention; and
+
+5. NSA's targeting and minimization procedures, as the government proposes to apply
+them to MCTs as to which the "active user" is not known to be a tasked selector, are inconsistent
+with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
+
+Accordingly, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3)(B), the government shall, at its election:
+
+(a) not later than 30 days from the issuance of this Order, correct the deficiencies
+identified in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion; or,
+
+¹ See Docket No. 702(i)-08-01, Sept. 4, Memorandum Opinion at 17-18 n.14.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 3
+(b)(1), (b)(3)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+(b) cease the implementation of the Certifications insofar as they permit the acquisition of
+MCTs as to which the "active user" is not known to be a tasked selector.
+ENTERED this 3rd day of October, 2011, at 4:55p M. Eastern Time.
+JOHN D. BATES
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 4
+[REDACTED] Deputy Clerk,
+FISC, certify that this document
+is a true and correct copy of
+the original [REDACTED]
+(b)(6)
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_fisc_opinion_10-3-2011/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_fisc_opinion_10-3-2011/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3b129b3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_fisc_opinion_10-3-2011/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+{
+ "title": "October 3, 2011 John Bates FISC Opinion",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "This FISC opinion, written by presiding judge John D. Bates, holds aspects of the NSA. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2011-10-03",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "ORCON,NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [
+ "PRISM"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Bates, John D.",
+ "Inglis, John C.",
+ "Alexander, Keith B.",
+ "Mueller, Robert S."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-08-21",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/october-3-2011-john-bates-fisc-opinion",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "a216852a3cf8b0738b25a66930d4ca96154e4563e96302c1ac3824e43ca85270",
+ "pages": 85
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_joint_statement_at_a_hearing_concerning_fisa_amendments_act_reauthorization/ACLU_-_joint_statement_at_a_hearing_concerning_fisa_amendments_act_reauthorization.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_joint_statement_at_a_hearing_concerning_fisa_amendments_act_reauthorization/ACLU_-_joint_statement_at_a_hearing_concerning_fisa_amendments_act_reauthorization.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..694e05a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_joint_statement_at_a_hearing_concerning_fisa_amendments_act_reauthorization/ACLU_-_joint_statement_at_a_hearing_concerning_fisa_amendments_act_reauthorization.md
@@ -0,0 +1,245 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+JOINT STATEMENT OF
+LISA O. MONACO
+ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
+FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
+U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
+
+JOHN C. (CHRIS) INGLIS
+DEPUTY DIRECTOR
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+
+ROBERT S. LITT
+GENERAL COUNSEL
+OFFICE OF DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+
+BEFORE THE
+SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
+UNITED STATES SENATE
+
+AT A HEARING CONCERNING
+"FISA AMENDMENTS ACT REAUTHORIZATION"
+
+PRESENTED ON
+FEBRUARY 9, 2012
+
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+---
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+Joint Statement of
+Lisa O. Monaco
+Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+U.S. Department of Justice
+
+John C. (Chris) Inglis
+Deputy Director
+National Security Agency
+
+Robert S. Litt
+General Counsel
+Office of Director of National Intelligence
+
+Before the
+Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
+United States Senate
+
+At a Hearing Concerning
+"FISA Amendments Act Reauthorization"
+
+Presented on
+February 9, 2012
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+1
+---
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+2
+---
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+3
+---
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+4
+---
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+5
+---
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(U) Recent FISC Opinion
+
+(TS//SI//NF) On October 20, 2011, the Director of NSA and the Assistant Attorney General for
+National Security testified before this Committee about an October 3, 2011 opinion of the FISC
+addressing the Government's submission of replacement certifications under section 702. In re
+DNI/AG Certification 2009-C, et. al., Docket Nos. [REDACTED] Mem. Op. As the Committee is aware, the FISC denied in part the Government's requests for
+replacement certifications because of its concerns about the rules governing the retention of
+certain non-targeted Internet communications so called multi-communication transactions or
+MCTs -- acquired through NSA's upstream collection under section 702. The FISC recognized,
+however, that the Government may be able to "tailor the scope of NSA's upstream collection, or
+adopt more stringent post-acquisition safeguards" in a manner that would satisfy its concerns,
+and suggested a number of possibilities as to how this might be done. Id. at 61-63, 78-80.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+6
+---
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+(TS//SI//NF) On October 31, 2011, after extensive consultations among the Department, ODNI,
+and NSA, the Attorney General and the DNI submitted amended minimization procedures to the
+FISC addressing the deficiencies noted by the court. These amended procedures continue to
+allow for the upstream collection of MCTs; however, they also create more rigorous rules
+governing the retention of MCTs as well as NSA analysts' exposure to, and use of, non-targeted
+communications. On balance, NSA believes that the impact of these procedures on operations is
+acceptable as a necessary requirement in order to continue upstream collection, and that these
+procedures will allow for continued useful intelligence collection and analysis. On November
+30, the FISC granted the Government's request for approval of the amended procedures, stating
+that, with regard to information acquired pursuant to the 2011 certifications, "the government has
+adequately corrected the deficiencies identified in the October 3 Opinion," and that the amended
+procedures, when "viewed as a whole, meet the applicable statutory and constitutional
+requirements."
+
+(U) The Committee has been provided with copies of the opinions and the filings by the
+Government in this matter, and we will continue to inform the Committee about any additional
+developments on this issue.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+7
+---
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+8
+---
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+9
+---
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+10
+---
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+11
+---
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+12
+---
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+13
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_joint_statement_at_a_hearing_concerning_fisa_amendments_act_reauthorization/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_joint_statement_at_a_hearing_concerning_fisa_amendments_act_reauthorization/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6401a28
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_joint_statement_at_a_hearing_concerning_fisa_amendments_act_reauthorization/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+{
+ "title": "Joint Statement at a Hearing Concerning FISA Amendments Act Reauthorization",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Statement by intelligence officials before Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on FAA reauthorization. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA/DOJ/ODNI",
+ "date_created": "2012-02-09",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "ORCON, NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Inglis, John C.",
+ "Litt, Robert S.",
+ "Monaco, Lisa O."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-08-21",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/joint-statement-hearing-concerning-fisa-amendments-act-reauthorization",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "c8e11f08cd85c0a5a0070a0882d77045f7d5583d2a289d93bbf8b94656f9418c",
+ "pages": 14
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_joint_statement_faa_reauthorization_hearing/ACLU_-_joint_statement_faa_reauthorization_hearing.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_joint_statement_faa_reauthorization_hearing/ACLU_-_joint_statement_faa_reauthorization_hearing.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3098376
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_joint_statement_faa_reauthorization_hearing/ACLU_-_joint_statement_faa_reauthorization_hearing.md
@@ -0,0 +1,247 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+JOINT STATEMENT OF
+
+LISA O. MONACO
+ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
+FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
+U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
+
+JOHN C. (CHRIS) INGLIS
+DEPUTY DIRECTOR
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+
+ROBERT S. LITT
+GENERAL COUNSEL
+OFFICE OF DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+
+BEFORE THE
+PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
+UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
+
+AT A HEARING CONCERNING
+"FISA AMENDMENTS ACT REAUTHORIZATION"
+
+PRESENTED ON
+DECEMBER 8, 2011
+
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+Joint Statement of
+
+Lisa O. Monaco
+Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+U.S. Department of Justice
+
+John C. (Chris) Inglis
+Deputy Director
+National Security Agency
+
+Robert S. Litt
+General Counsel
+Office of Director of National Intelligence
+
+Before the
+Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
+United States House of Representatives
+
+At a Hearing Concerning
+"FISA Amendments Act Reauthorization"
+
+Presented on
+December 8, 2011
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+1
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+2
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+3
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+4
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(b) (1) (A)
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+5
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+(U) Recent FISC Opinion
+
+(TS//SI//NF) On October 3, 2011, the FISC issued an opinion addressing the Government's
+submission of replacement certifications under section 702. In re DNI/AG Certification 2009-C,
+et. al., [REDACTED], Mem. Op. The FISC approved
+most of the Government's submission. It upheld NSA's and FBI's targeting procedures, CIA's
+and FBI's minimization procedures, and most of NSA's minimization procedures. Nevertheless,
+the FISC denied in part the Government's requests because of its concerns about the rules
+governing the retention of certain non-targeted Internet communications acquired through NSA's
+upstream collection. The FISC's exhaustive analysis of the Government's submission, like its
+other decisions, refutes any argument that the court is a "rubber stamp," and demonstrates the
+rigorous nature of the oversight it conducts.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+6
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(TS//SI//NF) As described above, upstream collection allows NSA to acquire, among other
+things, communications about a target where the target is not itself a communicant. In doing so,
+NSA uses [REDACTED] that are reasonably designed to screen out communications
+that are wholly domestic in nature, in accordance with section 702's requirements. Although
+reasonably designed to accomplish this result, [REDACTED] are not perfect. In addition, upstream
+collection devices acquire Internet "transactions" that include tasked selectors. Such a
+transaction may consist of a single communication (a "single-communication transaction," or
+SCT) or multiple communications sent in a single transaction ("multi-communication
+transaction," or MCT) [REDACTED] In such instances,
+upstream collection acquires the entire MCT, which in all cases will include a communication to,
+from, or about a tasked selector but in some cases may also include communications that are not
+about a tasked selector and may have no relationship, or no more than an incidental relationship,
+to the targeted selector. Thus although upstream collection only targets Internet communications
+that are not between individuals located in the United States and are to, from, or about a tasked
+account, there is some inevitable incidental collection of wholly domestic communications or
+communications not to, from, or about a tasked account that could contain U.S. person
+information. Based on a sample reviewed by NSA, the percentage of such communications is
+very small (about .02%), but given the volume of the upstream collection, the FISC concluded
+that the actual number of such communications may be in the tens of thousands annually.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The FISC upheld NSA's continued upstream acquisition of Internet
+communications under section 702 even though it includes the unintentional acquisition of
+wholly domestic communications and the incidental acquisition of MCTs that may contain one
+or more individual communications that are not to, from, or about the tasked selector. See id. at
+74, 78-79. The FISC also reaffirmed that the acquisition of foreign intelligence information
+under section 702 falls within the foreign intelligence exception to the warrant requirement of the
+Fourth Amendment, and confirmed that nothing had disturbed its "prior conclusion that the
+government is not required to obtain a warrant before conducting acquisitions under NSA's
+targeting and minimization procedures." Id. at 69.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The FISC determined, however, that the minimization procedures governing
+retention of MCTs were inconsistent with the requirements of section 702. The FISC found that
+the Government had not fully explored options regarding data retention that would be more
+protective of U.S. persons, and that the FISC thus could not determine that the Government's
+minimization procedures satisfied FISA's requirement that such procedures be "reasonably
+designed" to minimize the retention of protected U.S. person information. The FISC further held
+that, although the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement was not implicated, in light of
+NSA's proposed procedures for handling MCTS, NSA's proposed acquisition and minimization
+procedures did not satisfy the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement. The FISC
+recognized, however, that the Government may be able to "tailor the scope of NSA's upstream
+collection, or adopt more stringent post-acquisition safeguards, in a manner that would satisfy
+the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment," and suggested a number of
+possibilities as to how this might be done. Id. at 61-63, 78-80.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+7
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(TS//SI//NF) On October 31, 2011, after extensive consultations among the Department, ODNI,
+and NSA, the Attorney General submitted amended minimization procedures to the FISC
+addressing the deficiencies noted by the court. These amended procedures continue to allow for
+the upstream collection of MCTs; however, they also create more rigorous rules governing the
+retention of MCTs as well as NSA analysts' exposure to, and use of, non-targeted
+communications. On balance, NSA believes that the impact of these procedures on operations is
+acceptable as a necessary requirement in order to continue upstream collection, and that these
+procedures will allow for continued useful intelligence collection and analysis. On November
+30, the FISC granted the Government's request for approval of the amended procedures, stating
+that, with regard to information acquired pursuant to 2011 certifications, “the government has
+adequately corrected the deficiencies identified in the October 3 Opinion," and that the amended
+procedures, when "viewed as a whole, meet the applicable statutory and constitutional
+requirements."
+
+(U) The Government has provided copies of the opinions and the filings by the Government to
+this Committee, and the Government will continue to inform the Committee about developments
+in this matter.
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+8
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+9
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+10
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+11
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+12
+(b) (1) (A)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+13
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+14
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_joint_statement_faa_reauthorization_hearing/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_joint_statement_faa_reauthorization_hearing/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..386d755
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_joint_statement_faa_reauthorization_hearing/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+{
+ "title": "Joint Statement at House Hearing Concerning FAA Reauthorization",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Statement by intelligence officials before House Select Committee on Intelligence on FAA reauthorization. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA/DOJ/ODNI",
+ "date_created": "2011-12-08",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "ORCON, NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Inglis, John C.",
+ "Litt, Robert S.",
+ "Monaco, Lisa O."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-08-21",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/joint-statement-house-hearing-concerning-faa-reauthorization",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "6ccf8ea3f80ba7f311e194d6a3484645c66701ffe2491d22093a00cc1f08510e",
+ "pages": 15
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_ltr_to_hpsci_chairman_rogers_and_ranking_member_ruppersberger_scan/ACLU_-_ltr_to_hpsci_chairman_rogers_and_ranking_member_ruppersberger_scan.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_ltr_to_hpsci_chairman_rogers_and_ranking_member_ruppersberger_scan/ACLU_-_ltr_to_hpsci_chairman_rogers_and_ranking_member_ruppersberger_scan.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9a11f38
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_ltr_to_hpsci_chairman_rogers_and_ranking_member_ruppersberger_scan/ACLU_-_ltr_to_hpsci_chairman_rogers_and_ranking_member_ruppersberger_scan.md
@@ -0,0 +1,270 @@
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+MAY 04 2012
+
+The Honorable Mike Rogers
+Chairman
+The Honorable C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger
+Ranking Member
+Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
+House of Representatives
+Washington, DC 20515
+
+Dear Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Ruppersberger:
+
+(U) Please find enclosed a classified document that describes the Intelligence Community's collection programs under Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). added by the FISA Amendments Act (FAA) of 2008. The Intelligence Community and the Department of Justice jointly prepared the enclosed document, which provides an overview of all of the expiring provisions of FISA. The principal focus of the paper is the implementation, oversight, and value of section 702 of FISA.
+
+(S/NF) Section 702 of FISA has proven to be a critical tool in the Government's efforts to acquire foreign intelligence necessary to protect the Nation's security. while at the same time establishing rigorous safeguards to protect the privacy interests of U.S. persons. Section 702 has significantly enhanced the capability of the Intelligence Community to collect information about [REDACTED] Section 702, along with other important provisions of Title VII of FISA, will expire at the end of this year unless reauthorized by Congress. Reauthorization is the top legislative priority of the Intelligence Community.
+
+(S/NF) We believe that making this document available to all Members of Congress is an effective way to inform the legislative debate about reauthorization of Title VII of FISA. However, it is critical that Members understand the importance to national security of maintaining the secrecy of these programs. The enclosed document is being provided on the understanding that it will be provided only to Members of Congress (and cleared HPSCI, Judiciary Committee. and leadership staff), in a secure location in the HPSCI's spaces, and consistent with the rules of HPSC1 regarding review of classified information and non-disclosure agreements. Any notes taken by Members or staff may not be removed from the secure location. We also request your support in ensuring that Members and staff are well informed regarding the
+
+Classified By: 2381928
+Declassify On: 20320108
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-32
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+Executive Branch officials would welcome the opportunity to answer any questions should they arise. We intend to provide the same document to the House Permanent Select Cominittee on Intelligence (HPSCI) under similar conditions, so that it may be made available to the Members of the House, as well as cleared leadership, HPSCI and House Judiciary Committee staff.
+
+(U) We look forward to working with you and your staff as Congress deliberates on reauthorizing this critical legislation.
+
+Sincerely,
+
+Kathleen Turner
+Director of Legislative Affairs
+Office of the Director of National
+Intelligence
+
+Ronald Weich
+Assistant Attorney General
+Office of Legislative Affairs
+Department of Justice
+
+Enclosure
+
+2
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+MAY 04 2012
+
+The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
+Chairman
+The Honorable Saxby Chambliss
+Vice Chairman
+Select Committee on Intelligence
+United States Senate
+Washington, DC 20510
+
+Dear Madam Chairman and Vice Chairman Chambliss:
+
+(U) Please find enclosed a classified document that describes the Intelligence Community's collection programs under Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), added by the FISA Amendments Act (FAA) of 2008. The Intelligence Community and the Department of Justice jointly prepared the enclosed document, which provides an overview of all of the expiring provisions of FISA. The principal focus of the paper is the implementation, oversight, and value of section 702 of FISA.
+
+(S/NE) Section 702 of FISA has proven to be a critical tool in the Government's efforts to acquire foreign intelligence necessary to protect the Nation's security, while at the same time establishing rigorous safeguards to protect the privacy interests of U.S. persons. Section 702 has significantly enhanced the capability of the Intelligence Community to collect information about [REDACTED] Section 702, along with other important provisions of Title VII of FISA, will expire at the end of this year unless reauthorized by Congress. Reauthorization is the top legislative priority of the Intelligence Community.
+
+(S/NF) We believe that making this document available to all Members of Congress is an effective way to inform the legislative debate about reauthorization of Title VII of FISA. However, it is critical that Members understand the importance to national security of maintaining the secrecy of these programs. The enclosed document is being provided on the understanding that it will be provided only to Members of Congress (and cleared SSCI, Judiciary Committee, and leadership staff), in a secure location in the SSCI's spaces, and consistent with the rules of SSCI regarding review of classified information and non-disclosure agreements. Any notes taken by Members or staff may not be removed from the secure location. We also request your support in ensuring that Members and staff are well informed regarding the classification and sensitivity of this information to prevent any unauthorized disclosures.
+
+Classified By: 2381928
+Declassify On: 20320108
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+classification and sensitivity of this information to prevent any unauthorized disclosures. Executive Branch officials would welcome the opportunity to answer any questions should they arise. We intend to provide the same document to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) under similar conditions, so that it may be made available to the Members of the Senate, as well as cleared leadership, SSCI and Senate Judiciary Committee staff.
+
+(U) We look forward to working with you and your staff as Congress deliberates on reauthorizing this critical legislation.
+
+Sincerely.
+
+Kathleen Turner
+Director of Legislative Affairs
+Office of the Director of National
+Intelligence
+
+Ronald Weich
+Assistant Attorney General
+Office of Legislative Affairs
+Department of Justice
+
+Enclosure
+
+2
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(U) The Intelligence Community's Collection Programs
+Under Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
+
+(U) THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT DESCRIBES SOME OF THE MOST SENSITIVE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PROGRAMS CONDUCTED BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. THIS INFORMATION IS HIGHLY CLASSIFIED. PUBLICLY DISCLOSING ANY OF THIS INFORMATION WOULD BE EXPECTED TO CAUSE EXCEPTIONALLY GRAVE DAMAGE TO OUR NATION'S INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES AND TO NATIONAL SECURITY. THEREFORE IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THOSE WHO ACCESS THIS DOCUMENT ABIDE BY THEIR OBLIGATION NOT TO DISCLOSE THIS INFORMATION TO ANY PERSON UNAUTHORIZED TO RECEIVE IT.
+
+(U) Introduction
+
+(S/NE) Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), added by the FISA Amendments Act (FAA) of 2008, has proven to be a critical tool in the Government's efforts to acquire foreign intelligence necessary to protect the Nation's security, while at the same time establishing rigorous safeguards to protect the privacy interests of U.S. persons. The FAA has significantly enhanced the capability of the Intelligence Community to collect information about [REDACTED] Section 702, along with other important provisions of the FAA, will expire at the end of this year unless reauthorized by Congress. Reauthorization is the top legislative priority of the Intelligence Community. This paper provides an overview of all of the expiring provisions of the FAA, including section 704, which provides greater protection for collection activities directed against U.S. persons overseas than existed before passage of the FAA. The principal focus of the paper is section 702, including the extensive oversight of its use and the importance of this authority to our national security. An attachment contains examples of the valuable intelligence section 702 collection has provided.
+
+(U) I. Overview of Section 702
+
+(U) Legal Requirements
+
+(S/ANE) Many terrorists and other foreign intelligence targets abroad use communications services based in this country. [REDACTED]
+
+Classified By: 2381928
+Declassify On: 20320108
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+These provisions require a finding of probable cause that the overseas target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, such as an international terrorist organization, and that the target is using or about to use the targeted facility, such as a telephone number or e-mail account. The Attorney General, and subsequently the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), must approve each application. In effect, the Intelligence Community had to treat the overseas foreign target the same way as a U.S. person or person in the United States and obtain an individual order, based on a finding of probable cause by a neutral magistrate, even though the target was neither a U.S. person nor a person in the United States. Non-U.S. persons outside the United States generally are not entitled to the protections of the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the Constitution does not require this burdensome practice.
+
+(S/NF) Section 702 remedies these shortcomings and permits the Government to acquire, safely and efficiently from providers in the United States, communications where non-U.S. persons located abroad are targeted for the purpose of acquiring foreign intelligence information. At the same time, it provides a comprehensive regime of oversight by all three branches of Government to protect the constitutional and privacy interests of Americans.
+
+(U//FOUO) Under section 702, instead of issuing individual orders, the FISC, which is comprised of federal judges from around the country appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, approves annual certifications submitted by the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) that identify broad categories of foreign intelligence which may be collected. The statute stipulates several criteria for collection. First, the Attorney General and the DNI must certify that a significant purpose of an acquisition is to obtain foreign intelligence information. Second, an acquisition may intentionally target only non-U.S. persons. Third, an acquisition may not intentionally target any person known at the time of the acquisition to be in the United States. Fourth, an acquisition may not target a person outside the United States for the purpose of targeting a particular, known person in this country. Fifth, section 702 protects domestic communications by prohibiting the intentional acquisition of "any communication as to which the sender and all intended recipients are known at the time of the acquisition" to be in the United States. Finally, any acquisition must be consistent with the Fourth Amendment. The certifications are the legal basis for targeting specific individuals overseas and, based on the certifications, the Attorney General and the DNI can direct communications providers in this country to assist the Government in acquiring these targets' communications.
+
+(U) Because when originally passed Congress understood that U.S.-person communications would incidentally be acquired when targeting foreign communications, to ensure compliance with these provisions, section 702 requires the Attorney General, in consultation with the DNI, to adopt targeting and minimization procedures. Under the statute, the targeting procedures must be reasonably designed to ensure that an acquisition is limited to targeting persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States, and to prevent the intentional acquisition of purely domestic communications. The minimization procedures govern how the Intelligence Community treats the identities of any U.S. persons whose communications might be incidentally intercepted and regulate the handling of any nonpublic information concerning U.S.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+2
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+persons that is acquired. These minimization procedures must meet the same standard as the minimization procedures required by other provisions of FISA. The FISC reviews the targeting and minimization procedures for compliance with the requirements of both the statute and the Fourth Amendment, and the appropriate congressional committees receive copies of them. By approving the certifications submitted by the Attorney General and the DNI as well as the targeting and minimization procedures, the FISC plays a vital role in ensuring that acquisitions under section 702 are conducted in a lawful and appropriate manner.
+
+(U) Implementation
+
+(S//NF) Currently, the Attorney General and the DNI have authorized the acquisition of foreign intelligence information under section 702 [REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED] The Attorney General and the DNI must resubmit these certifications to the FISC for review and renewal at least once a year. Using these certifications, Intelligence Community elements participate in the tasking of selectors for telephony, as well as electronic communications accounts, such as e-mail addresses.
+
+(S//NF) NSA takes the lead in targeting and tasks both telephone and electronic communications selectors to acquire communications [REDACTED] NSA's targeting procedures require that there be an appropriate foreign intelligence purpose for the acquisition and that the selector be used by a non-U.S. person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States. To determine the location of a user, an analyst must, as appropriate, examine the lead information about the potential target or selector; [REDACTED]
+
+(S//NF) [REDACTED] Because NSA has already made a "foreignness" determination for these selectors in accordance with its FISC-approved targeting procedures, FBI's targeting role differs from that of NSA. FBI is not required to second-guess NSA's targeting determinations. It must, however, review and understand NSA's targeting determinations, [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Once a target has been approved, NSA uses two means to acquire [REDACTED] electronic communications. First, [REDACTED] it acquires such communications directly from U.S.-based ISPs. This is known as PRISM collection. Using PRISM, NSA currently collects against approximately [REDACTED] selectors at any given time.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Second, in addition to collection directly from ISPs, NSA collects telephone and electronic communications as they transit the Internet "backbone" within the United States. This
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+3
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+is known as "upstream" collection [REDACTED] the volume of communications acquired upstream is much smaller than that obtained through PRISM. In June 2011, for example, it made up only about 11% of the overall section 702 volume.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Upstream collection enables NSA to target terrorists [REDACTED] It also lets NSA collect electronic communications that contain the targeted e-mail address in the body of a communication between two third parties. Finally, NSA obtains certain international or foreign telephone communications from this collection.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Once acquired, all communications are routed to NSA. NSA also can designate the communications from specified selectors acquired through PRISM collection to be "dual-routed" to other Intelligence Community elements. Each agency that receives the collection has its own minimization procedures that have been approved by the FISC and may retain and disseminate communications acquired under section 702 only in accordance with those procedures. In general, before an agency may disseminate information identifying a U.S. person, the information must reasonably appear to be foreign intelligence or evidence of a crime, or necessary to understand or assess foreign intelligence information.
+
+(U) Compliance and Oversight
+
+(U) The Executive Branch is committed to ensuring that the Intelligence Community's use of section 702 is consistent with the law, the FISC's orders, and the protection of the privacy and civil liberties of Americans. The Intelligence Community, the Department of Justice, and the FISC all play a critical role in overseeing the use of this provision. In addition, the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees carry out essential oversight, which is discussed separately in section IV below.
+
+(S//NF) First, components in each agency, including operational components and agency Inspectors General, conduct extensive oversight. Agencies using section 702 authority must report promptly to the Department of Justice and to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) incidents of noncompliance with the targeting or minimization procedures. Members of the joint oversight team from the National Security Division (NSD) of the Department of Justice and ODNI routinely review the agencies' targeting decisions. Currently, at least once every 60 days, NSD and ODNI conduct oversight of activities under section 702. The joint oversight team evaluates and where appropriate investigates each potential incident of noncompliance, and conducts a detailed review of agencies' targeting and minimization decisions.
+
+(S//NF) Using the reviews by NSD and ODNI personnel, the Attorney General and the DNI assess semi-annually, as required by section 702, compliance with the targeting and minimization procedures. These assessments are provided twice yearly to Congress. In general,
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+4
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+the assessments have found that agencies have "continued to implement the procedures... in a manner that reflects a focused and concerted effort by agency personnel to comply with the requirements of Section 702." The number of compliance incidents has been small, with no indication of "any intentional attempt to circumvent or violate" legal requirements. Rather, agency personnel "are appropriately focused on directing their efforts at non-United States persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States." Semiannual Assessment of Compliance with Procedures and Guidelines Issued Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Submitted by the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence, Reporting Period: December 1, 2010 - May 31, 2011 at 2-3, 5. 21-22 (December 2011).
+
+(U) The Intelligence Community and the Department of Justice use the reviews and oversight to evaluate whether changes to the procedures are needed, and what other steps may be appropriate under section 702 to protect the privacy of Americans. The Government also provides the joint assessments, the major portions of the semi-annual reports, and a separate quarterly report to the FISC. Taken together, these measures provide robust oversight of the Government's use of this authority.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) One recent event demonstrates both how this oversight regime works and how challenging collection can be in the complex and rapidly evolving Internet environment. On October 3, 2011, the FISC issued an opinion addressing the Government's submission of replacement certifications under section 702. Although the FISC upheld the bulk of the Government's submission, it denied in part the Government's requests to reauthorize the certifications because of its concerns about the rules governing the retention of certain non-targeted Internet communications—so called multi-communication transactions or MCTs— acquired through NSA's upstream collection. The FISC recognized, however, that the Government may be able to "tailor the scope of NSA's upstream collection, or adopt more stringent post-acquisition safeguards" in a manner that would satisfy its concerns, and suggested a number of possibilities as to how this might be done. In response to this opinion, the NSA, Department of Justice, and ODNI worked to correct the deficiencies identified by the Court. On November 30, the FISC granted the Government's request for approval of the amended procedures, stating that, with regard to information acquired pursuant to the 2011 certifications, "the government has adequately corrected the deficiencies identified in the October 3 Opinion," and that the amended procedures, when "viewed as a whole, meet the applicable statutory and constitutional requirements." These amended procedures continue to allow for the upstream collection of MCTs; however, they also create more rigorous rules governing the retention of MCTs as well as NSA analysts' exposure to, and use of, non-targeted communications. The Government's extensive efforts over several months to address this matter, and the FISC's exhaustive analysis of it, demonstrates how well the existing oversight regime works in ensuring that collection is undertaken in conformity with the statute and Court-approved procedures. This issue was also fully briefed to the appropriate congressional committees, again highlighting the important role that Congress plays in overseeing these vital intelligence activities.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+5
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(U) II. The Importance of Section 702 Collection
+
+(S//NF) The Administration believes that a failure to renew this authority would result in a loss of critical foreign intelligence that cannot practicably be obtained through other methods.
+
+(S//NF) To require an individualized court order, based on a finding of probable cause, before acquiring the communications of a non-U.S. person overseas who is believed to be involved in international terrorist activities or who is otherwise of foreign intelligence interest would have serious adverse consequences. Where the Intelligence Community has reason to believe that a non-U.S. person located overseas is connected to international terrorist activities, but does not have enough facts to establish probable cause to conclude that the target is acting as an agent of a foreign power, such a requirement could prevent the United States from acquiring significant intelligence. Even where the United States could, over time, amass additional information from other sources to establish probable cause, a requirement that such additional information be obtained and submitted to the FISC would result in delays in collection that could prove harmful. Second, even where the Intelligence Community has facts that establish probable cause that foreign targets are acting as foreign powers or agents of foreign powers, eliminating section 702's more flexible targeting system would significantly slow the Intelligence Community's ability to acquire important foreign intelligence information. This flexibility is critical in fast-moving threat scenarios. Significant additional resources would have to be devoted to preparing and processing the FISC applications and even then, given the number of selectors tasked, it is simply not feasible to obtain individualized orders on a routine basis for the thousands of foreign persons targeted under section 702. Intelligence would be lost. Moreover, failure to renew section 702 would require redirection of a substantial portion of the oversight resources of the Intelligence Community, the Department of Justice, and the FISC from their other important national security related work to the processing of FISA applications targeting non-U.S. persons overseas who are not entitled to Fourth Amendment protections under our Constitution. In contrast, section 702 increases the Government's ability to acquire important foreign intelligence information and to act quickly against appropriate foreign targets, without sacrificing constitutional protections for Americans.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Another major benefit of section 702 is that it has made collection against foreign targets located outside the United States possible from the relative safety of collection points in the United States. [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In sum, section 702 collection is a major contributor to the Intelligence Community's reporting on counterterrorism, [REDACTED] and other topics. Attached to this paper are several examples that demonstrate the broad range of important information that the Intelligence Community has obtained from section 702 collection.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+6
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(U) III. Other Provisions of the FAA
+
+(U) In contrast to section 702, which focuses on foreign targets, section 704 addresses collection activities directed against U.S. persons overseas. Section 704 requires an individual order from the FISC in circumstances in which a U.S. person overseas has "a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required if the acquisition were conducted inside the United States for law enforcement purposes." It also requires probable cause to believe that the targeted U.S. person is "a foreign power, an agent of a foreign power, or an officer or employee of a foreign power." Previously, these activities were outside the scope of FISA and governed exclusively by section 2.5 of Executive Order 12333. By requiring the approval of the FISC, section 704 provides additional protection for civil liberties.
+
+(U) In addition to sections 702 and 704, the FAA added several other provisions to FISA. Section 701 provides definitions for the Act. Section 703 allows the FISC to authorize an application targeting a U.S. person outside the United States where the acquisition is conducted in this country. Like section 704, section 703 requires probable cause to believe that the target is a foreign power, an agent of a foreign power, or an officer or employee of a foreign power. Section 705 allows the Government to obtain various authorities simultaneously. Section 709 clarifies that nothing in the FAA is intended to limit the Government's ability to obtain authorizations under other parts of FISA. The Government supports the reauthorization of these provisions.
+
+(U) IV. Congressional Oversight
+
+(U) The Executive Branch appreciates the need for regular and meaningful Congressional oversight of the use of section 702 and the other provisions of the FAA. Twice a year, the Attorney General must "fully inform, in a manner consistent with national security," the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees about the implementation of the FAA. Additionally, with respect to section 702, the report must include copies of certifications and directives and copies of significant pleadings and FISC opinions and orders. It also must describe compliance matters, any use of emergency authorities, and the FISC's review of the Government's pleadings. With respect to sections 703 and 704, the report must include the number of applications made, and the number granted, modified, or denied by the FISC.
+
+(U) Section 702 also requires the Attorney General and the DNI to provide to the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees their assessment of compliance with the targeting and minimization procedures, described above. In addition, the Government has substantial reporting requirements imposed by FISA under which it has provided Congress information to ensure effective congressional oversight. The Government has informed the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees of acquisitions authorized under section 702; reported, in detail, on the results of the
+
+(U) Since before the enactment of the FAA, section 2.5 of Executive Order 12333 has required the Attorney General to approve the use by the Intelligence Community against U.S. persons abroad of "any technique for which a warrant would be required if undertaken for law enforcement purposes." The Attorney General must find that there is probable cause to believe that the U.S. person is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. The provisions of section 2.5 continue to apply to these activities, in addition to the requirements of section 704.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+7
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+reviews and on compliance incidents and remedial efforts; made all written reports on these reviews available to the Committees; and provided summaries of significant interpretations of FISA, as well as copies of relevant judicial opinions and pleadings.
+
+(U) V. The Need for Reauthorization
+
+(U) The Administration strongly supports the reauthorization of Title VII of FISA. The FAA was the product of bipartisan effort, and its enactment was preceded by extensive public debate. There is now a lengthy factual record on the Government's need for the FAA to acquire foreign intelligence information critical to the national security. There is also a lengthy record documenting the effectiveness of the oversight process in protecting the privacy and civil liberties of Americans. This extensive record demonstrates the proven value of these authorities, and the commitment of the Government to their lawful and responsible use.
+
+(U) Reauthorization will ensure continued certainty for the rules used by agency employees and our private partners. The Intelligence Community has invested significant human and financial resources to enable its personnel and technological systems to acquire and review vital data quickly and lawfully. Our adversaries, of course, seek to hide the most important information from us. It is at best inefficient and at worst unworkable for agencies to develop new technologies and procedures and train employees, only to have a statutory framework subject to wholesale revision. This is particularly true at a time of limited resources. We are always considering whether there are changes that could be made to improve the law in a manner consistent with the privacy and civil liberties interests of Americans. Our first priority, however, is reauthorization of these authorities in their current form. It is essential that these authorities remain in place without interruption—and without the threat of interruption—so that those who have been entrusted with their use can continue to protect our nation from its enemies.
+
+8
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+Attachment
+Value of Section 702 Collection
+
+(U) Section 702 is a critical intelligence collection tool that has helped to protect national security. The following are "real-life" examples that demonstrate the broad range of important information that the Intelligence Community has obtained.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+9
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(S//NF) Example 4: Najibullah Zazi
+
+(S//NF) The FBI's arrest in 2009 of Najibullah Zazi in Colorado, the disruption of his planned attack on the New York subway system, and his eventual guilty plea to terrorism charges were the direct result of section 702 coverage. NSA observed that an al Qa'ida external operations account, which was under section 702 coverage, sent an e-mail to Zazi in September 2009. That allowed NSA to pass Zazi's e-mail account, [REDACTED] and telephone number to the FBI. This initial report was based solely on section 702 collection. The report led to Zazi's identification and the discovery of purchases in Colorado that could be used in a terrorist attack, and ultimately to his arrest and the arrests of others involved in the plot. Thus section 702 facilitated the disruption of one of the most serious terrorist plots against the homeland since September 11th.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+10
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+11
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON/NOFORN
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_ltr_to_hpsci_chairman_rogers_and_ranking_member_ruppersberger_scan/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_ltr_to_hpsci_chairman_rogers_and_ranking_member_ruppersberger_scan/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6052359
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_ltr_to_hpsci_chairman_rogers_and_ranking_member_ruppersberger_scan/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+{
+ "title": "Letter to HPSCI Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Letter to HPSCI Chairman Rogers and Permanent Member Ruppersberger on collection programs under FAA.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "DOJ/ODNI",
+ "date_created": "2012-05-04",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "SI"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "ORCON, NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [
+ "PRISM"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Rogers, Mike",
+ "Ruppersberger, Dutch",
+ "Turner, Kathleen",
+ "Weich, Ronald",
+ "Feinstein, Dianne",
+ "Chambliss, Saxby",
+ "Zazi, Najibullah"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-08-21",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/letter-hpsci-chairman-rogers-and-ranking-member-ruppersberger",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "ba609cfae8bf330619dd04460728b84cf719563e7c9fe0b79db0249f418ef82b",
+ "pages": 15
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_minimization_procedures_used_by_nsa_in_connection_with_fisa_sect_702/ACLU_-_minimization_procedures_used_by_nsa_in_connection_with_fisa_sect_702.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_minimization_procedures_used_by_nsa_in_connection_with_fisa_sect_702/ACLU_-_minimization_procedures_used_by_nsa_in_connection_with_fisa_sect_702.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a575cb7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_minimization_procedures_used_by_nsa_in_connection_with_fisa_sect_702/ACLU_-_minimization_procedures_used_by_nsa_in_connection_with_fisa_sect_702.md
@@ -0,0 +1,604 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20310108
+
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+EXHIBIT B
+
+MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES USED BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY IN
+CONNECTION WITH ACQUISITIONS OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
+INFORMATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, AS AMENDED CLERK OF COURT
+
+Section 1 - Applicability and Scope (U)
+
+These National Security Agency (NSA) minimization procedures apply to the acquisition,
+retention, use, and dissemination of non-publicly available information concerning
+unconsenting United States persons that is acquired by targeting non-United States persons
+reasonably believed to be located outside the United States in accordance with section 702 of
+the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended ("the Act"). (U)
+
+If NSA determines that it must take action in apparent departure from these minimization
+procedures to protect against an immediate threat to human life (e.g., force protection or
+hostage situations) and that it is not feasible to obtain a timely modification of these
+procedures, NSA may take such action immediately. NSA will report the action taken to the
+Office of the Director of National Intelligence and to the National Security Division of the
+Department of Justice, which will promptly notify the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
+Court of such activity. (U)
+
+For the purposes of these procedures, the terms "National Security Agency" and "NSA
+personnel" refer to any employees of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service
+("NSA/CSS" or "NSA") and any other personnel engaged in Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
+operations authorized pursuant to section 702 of the Act if such operations are executed
+under the direction, authority, or control of the Director, NSA/Chief, CSS (DIRNSA). (U)
+
+Section 2 - Definitions (U)
+
+In addition to the definitions in sections 101 and 701 of the Act, the following definitions
+will apply to these procedures:
+
+(a) Acquisition means the collection by NSA or the FBI through electronic means of a non-
+public communication to which it is not an intended party. (U)
+
+(b) Communications concerning a United States person include all communications in which
+a United States person is discussed or mentioned, except where such communications
+reveal only publicly-available information about the person. (U)
+
+(c) Communications of a United States person include all communications to which a United
+States person is a party. (U)
+
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20070108
+Declassify On: 20320108
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20310108
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20310108
+
+(d) Consent is the agreement by a person or organization to permit the NSA to take particular
+actions that affect the person or organization. To be effective, consent must be given by
+the affected person or organization with sufficient knowledge to understand the action
+that may be taken and the possible consequences of that action. Consent by an
+organization will be deemed valid if given on behalf of the organization by an official or
+governing body determined by the General Counsel, NSA, to have actual or apparent
+authority to make such an agreement. (U)
+
+(e) Foreign communication means a communication that has at least one communicant
+outside of the United States. All other communications, including communications in
+which the sender and all intended recipients are reasonably believed to be located in the
+United States at the time of acquisition, are domestic communications. (S//SI)
+
+(f) Identification of a United States person means (1) the name, unique title, or address of a
+United States person; or (2) other personal identifiers of a United States person when
+appearing in the context of activities conducted by that person or activities conducted by
+others that are related to that person. A reference to a product by brand name, or
+manufacturer's name or the use of a name in a descriptive sense, e.g., "Monroe Doctrine,"
+is not an identification of a United States person. (S//SI)
+
+(g) Internet transaction, for purposes of these procedures, means an Internet communication
+that is acquired through NSA's upstream collection techniques. An Internet transaction
+may contain information or data representing either a discrete communication [REDACTED]
+or multiple discrete communications (TS//SI)
+
+(h) Processed or processing means any step necessary to convert a communication into an
+intelligible form intended for human inspection. (U)
+
+(i) Publicly available information means information that a member of the public could
+obtain on request, by research in public sources, or by casual observation. (U)
+
+(j) Technical data base means information retained for cryptanalytic, traffic analytic, or
+signal exploitation purposes. (S//SI)
+
+(k) United States person means a United States person as defined in the Act. The following
+guidelines apply in determining whether a person whose status is unknown is a United
+States person: (U)
+
+(1) A person known to be currently in the United States will be treated as a United States
+person unless positively identified as an alien who has not been admitted for
+permanent residence, or unless the nature or circumstances of the person's
+communications give rise to a reasonable belief that such person is not a United
+States person. (U)
+
+(2) A person known to be currently outside the United States, or whose location is
+unknown, will not be treated as a United States person unless such person can be
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20320108-
+2
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20310108-
+
+positively identified as such, or the nature or circumstances of the person's
+communications give rise to a reasonable belief that such person is a United States
+person. (U)
+
+(3) A person known to be an alien admitted for permanent residence loses status as a
+United States person if the person leaves the United States and is not in compliance
+with 8 U.S.C. § 1203 enabling re-entry into the United States. Failure to follow the
+statutory procedures provides a reasonable basis to conclude the alien has
+abandoned any intention of maintaining his status as a permanent resident alien. (U)
+
+(4) An unincorporated association whose headquarters or primary office is located
+outside the United States is presumed not to be a United States person unless there is
+information indicating that a substantial number of its members are citizens of the
+United States or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence. (U)
+
+Section 3 - Acquisition and Processing - General (U)
+
+(a) Acquisition (U)
+
+The acquisition of information by targeting non-United States persons reasonably believed to
+be located outside the United States pursuant to section 702 of the Act will be effected in
+accordance with an authorization made by the Attorney General and Director of National
+Intelligence pursuant to subsection 702(a) of the Act and will be conducted in a manner
+designed, to the greatest extent reasonably feasible, to minimize the acquisition of
+information not relevant to the authorized purpose of the acquisition. (S//SI)
+
+(b) Monitoring, Recording, and Processing (U)
+
+(1) Personnel will exercise reasonable judgment in determining whether information
+acquired must be minimized and will destroy inadvertently acquired communications
+of or concerning a United States person at the earliest practicable point in the
+processing cycle at which such communication can be identified either: as clearly not
+relevant to the authorized purpose of the acquisition (e.g., the communication does
+not contain foreign intelligence information); or, as not containing evidence of a
+crime which may be disseminated under these procedures. Except as provided for in
+subsection 3(c)(2) below, such inadvertently acquired communications of or
+concerning a United States person may be retained no longer than five years from the
+expiration date of the certification authorizing the collection in any event. (S//SI)
+
+(2) Communications of or concerning United States persons that may be related to the
+authorized purpose of the acquisition may be forwarded to analytic personnel
+responsible for producing intelligence information from the collected data. Such
+communications or information may be retained and disseminated only in accordance
+with Sections 4, 5, 6, and 8 of these procedures. (C)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20320108
+3
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20310108
+
+(3) Magnetic tapes or other storage media that contain acquired communications may be
+processed. (S)
+
+(4) As a communication is reviewed, NSA analyst(s) will determine whether it is a
+domestic or foreign communication to, from, or about a target and is reasonably
+believed to contain foreign intelligence information or evidence of a crime. Only
+such communications may be processed. All other communications may be retained
+or disseminated only in accordance with Sections 5, 6, and 8 of these procedures.
+(S//SI)
+
+(5) Processing of Internet Transactions Acquired Through NSA Upstream Collection
+Techniques (TS//SI)
+
+a. Notwithstanding any processing (e.g., decryption, translation) that may be
+required to render an Internet transaction intelligible to analysts, NSA will take
+reasonable steps post-acquisition to identify and segregate through technical
+means Internet transactions that cannot be reasonably identified as containing
+single, discrete communications where: the active user of the transaction (i.e., the
+electronic communications account/address/identifier used to send or receive the
+Internet transaction to or from a service provider) is reasonably believed to be
+located in the United States; or the location of the active user is unknown. (TS//SI)
+
+1. Internet transactions that are identified and segregated pursuant to subsection
+3(b)(5)a. will be retained in an access-controlled repository that is accessible
+only to NSA analysts who have been trained to review such transactions for
+the purpose of identifying those that contain discrete communications as to
+which the sender and all intended recipients are reasonably believed to be
+located in the United States. (TS//SI)
+
+(a) Any information contained in a segregated Internet transaction [REDACTED]
+may not be moved or copied from the segregated repository or
+otherwise used for foreign intelligence purposes unless it has been
+determined that the transaction does not contain any discrete
+communication as to which the sender and all intended recipients are
+reasonably believed to be located in the United States. Any Internet
+transaction that is identified and segregated pursuant to subsection
+3(b)(5)a. and is subsequently determined to contain a discrete
+communication as to which the sender and all intended recipients are
+reasonably believed to be located in the United States will be destroyed
+upon recognition. (TS//SI)
+
+(b) Any information moved or copied from the segregated repository into
+repositories more generally accessible to NSA analysts will be processed
+in accordance with subsection 3(b)(5)b. below and handled in accordance
+the other applicable provisions of these procedures. (TS//SI)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20320108-
+4
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20310108
+
+(c) Any information moved or copied from the segregated repository into
+repositories more generally accessible to NSA analysts will be marked,
+tagged, or otherwise identified as having been previously segregated
+pursuant to subsection 3(b)(5)a.
+
+2. Internet transactions that are not identified and segregated pursuant to
+subsection 3(b)(5)a. will be processed in accordance with subsection 3(b)(5)b.
+below and handled in accordance with the other applicable provisions of these
+procedures.
+
+b. NSA analysts seeking to use (for example, in a FISA application, intelligence
+report, or section 702 targeting) a discrete communication within an Internet
+transaction that contains multiple discrete communications will assess whether the
+discrete communication: 1) is a communication as to which the sender and all
+intended recipients are located in the United States; and 2) is to, from, or about a
+tasked selector, or otherwise contains foreign intelligence information. (TS//SI)
+
+1. If an NSA analyst seeks to use a discrete communication within an Internet
+transaction that contains multiple discrete communications, the analyst will
+first perform checks to determine the locations of the sender and intended
+recipients of that discrete communication to the extent reasonably necessary to
+determine whether the sender and all intended recipients of that
+communication are located in the United States. (TS//SI)
+
+2. If an NSA analyst seeks to use a discrete communication within an Internet
+transaction that contains multiple discrete communications, the analyst will
+assess whether the discrete communication is to, from, or about a tasked
+selector, or otherwise contains foreign intelligence information. (TS//SI)
+
+(a) If the discrete communication is to, from, or about a tasked selector, any
+U.S. person information in that communication will be handled in
+accordance with the applicable provisions of these procedures. (TS//SI)
+
+(b) If the discrete communication is not to, from, or about a tasked selector
+but otherwise contains foreign intelligence information, and the discrete
+communication is not to or from an identifiable U.S. person or a person
+reasonably believed to be located in the United States, that communication
+(including any U.S. person information therein) will be treated in
+accordance with the applicable provisions of these procedures. (TS//SI)
+
+(c) If the discrete communication is not to, from, or about a tasked selector
+but is to or from an identifiable U.S. person or a person reasonably
+believed to be located in the United States, the NSA analyst will document
+that determination in the relevant analytic repository or tool if technically
+possible or reasonably feasible. Such discrete communication cannot be
+used for any purpose other than to protect against an immediate threat to
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20320108-
+5
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20310108-
+
+human life (e.g., force protection or hostage situations). NSA will report
+any such use to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and to
+the National Security Division of the Department of Justice, which will
+promptly notify the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of such use.
+(TS//SI)-
+
+3. An NSA analyst seeking to use a discrete communication within an Internet
+transaction that contains multiple discrete communications in a FISA
+application, intelligence report, or section 702 targeting must appropriately
+document the verifications required by subsections 3(b)(5)b.1. and 2. above.
+(TS//SI)-
+
+4. [REDACTED]
+
+(6) Magnetic tapes or other storage media containing communications acquired pursuant
+to section 702 may be scanned by computer to identify and select communications for
+analysis. Computer selection terms used for scanning, such as telephone numbers,
+key words or phrases, or other discriminators, will be limited to those selection terms
+reasonably likely to return foreign intelligence information. Identifiers of an
+identifiable U.S. person may not be used as terms to identify and select for analysis
+any Internet communication acquired through NSA's upstream collection techniques.
+Any use of United States person identifiers as terms to identify and select
+communications must first be approved in accordance with NSA procedures. NSA
+will maintain records of all United States person identifiers approved for use as
+selection terms. The Department of Justice's National Security Division and the
+Office of the Director of National Intelligence will conduct oversight of NSA's
+activities with respect to United States persons that are conducted pursuant to this
+paragraph. (S//SI)
+
+(7) Further processing, retention and dissemination of foreign communications will be
+made in accordance with Sections 4, 6, 7, and 8 as applicable, below. Further
+processing, storage and dissemination of inadvertently acquired domestic
+communications will be made in accordance with Sections 4, 5, and 8 below. (S//SI)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20320108-
+6
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20310108-
+
+(c) Destruction of Raw Data (C)
+
+(1) Telephony communications, Internet communications acquired by or with the
+assistance of the Federal Bureau of Investigation from Internet Service Providers, and
+other discrete forms of information (including that reduced to graphic or "hard copy"
+form such as facsimile, telex, computer data, or equipment emanations) that do not
+meet the retention standards set forth in these procedures and that are known to
+contain communications of or concerning United States persons will be destroyed
+upon recognition, and may be retained no longer than five years from the expiration
+date of the certification authorizing the collection in any event. (S//SI)-
+
+(2) Internet transactions acquired through NSA's upstream collection techniques that do
+not contain any information that meets the retention standards set forth in these
+procedures and that are known to contain communications of or concerning United
+States persons will be destroyed upon recognition. All Internet transactions may be
+retained no longer than two years from the expiration date of the certification
+authorizing the collection in any event. The Internet transactions that may be retained
+include those that were acquired because of limitations on NSA's ability to filter
+communications. Any Internet communications acquired through NSA's upstream
+collection techniques that are retained in accordance with this subsection may be
+reviewed and processed only in accordance with the standards set forth in subsection
+3(b)(5) of these procedures. (TS//SI)
+
+(d) Change in Target's Location or Status (S//SI)
+
+(1) In the event that NSA determines that a person is reasonably believed to be located
+outside the United States and after targeting this person learns that the person is inside
+the United States, or if NSA concludes that a person who at the time of targeting was
+believed to be a non-United States person is in fact a United States person, the
+acquisition from that person will be terminated without delay. (S//SI)
+
+(2) Any communications acquired through the targeting of a person who at the time of
+targeting was reasonably believed to be located outside the United States but is in fact
+located inside the United States at the time such communications were acquired, and
+any communications acquired by targeting a person who at the time of targeting was
+believed to be a non-United States person but was in fact a United States person, will
+be treated as domestic communications under these procedures. (S//SI)
+
+Section 4 - Acquisition and Processing - Attorney-Client Communications (C)
+
+As soon as it becomes apparent that a communication is between a person who is known to
+be under criminal indictment in the United States and an attorney who represents that
+individual in the matter under indictment (or someone acting on behalf of the attorney),
+monitoring of that communication will cease and the communication will be identified as an
+attorney-client communication in a log maintained for that purpose. The relevant portion of
+the communication containing that conversation will be segregated and the National Security
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20320108
+7
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20310108
+
+Division of the Department of Justice will be notified so that appropriate procedures may be
+established to protect such communications from review or use in any criminal prosecution,
+while preserving foreign intelligence information contained therein. Additionally, all
+proposed disseminations of information constituting United States person attorney-client
+privileged communications must be reviewed by the NSA Office of General Counsel prior to
+dissemination. (S//SI)
+
+Section 5 - Domestic Communications (U)
+
+A communication identified as a domestic communication will be promptly destroyed upon
+recognition unless the Director (or Acting Director) of NSA specifically determines, in
+writing, that: (S)
+
+(1) the communication is reasonably believed to contain significant foreign intelligence
+information. Such communication may be provided to the FBI (including United
+States person identities) for possible dissemination by the FBI in accordance with its
+minimization procedures; (S)
+
+(2) the communication does not contain foreign intelligence information but is
+reasonably believed to contain evidence of a crime that has been, is being, or is about
+to be committed. Such communication may be disseminated (including United States
+person identities) to appropriate Federal law enforcement authorities, in accordance
+with 50 U.S.C. §§ 1806(b) and 1825(c), Executive Order No. 12333, and, where
+applicable, the crimes reporting procedures set out in the August 1995 "Memorandum
+of Understanding: Reporting of Information Concerning Federal Crimes," or any
+successor document. Such communications may be retained by NSA for a reasonable
+period of time, not to exceed six months unless extended in writing by the Attorney
+General, to permit law enforcement agencies to determine whether access to original
+recordings of such communications is required for law enforcement purposes; (S)
+
+(3) the communication is reasonably believed to contain technical data base information,
+as defined in Section 2(j), or information necessary to understand or assess a
+communications security vulnerability. Such communication may be provided to the
+FBI and/or disseminated to other elements of the United States Government. Such
+communications may be retained for a period sufficient to allow a thorough
+exploitation and to permit access to data that are, or are reasonably believed likely to
+become, relevant to a current or future foreign intelligence requirement. Sufficient
+duration may vary with the nature of the exploitation. (S//SI)-
+
+a. In the context of a cryptanalytic effort, maintenance of technical data bases
+requires retention of all communications that are enciphered or reasonably
+believed to contain secret meaning, and sufficient duration may consist of any
+period of time during which encrypted material is subject to, or of use in,
+cryptanalysis. (S//SI)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20320108-
+8
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20310108-
+
+b. In the case of communications that are not enciphered or otherwise thought to
+contain secret meaning, sufficient duration is five years from the expiration date
+of the certification authorizing the collection unless the Signal Intelligence
+Director, NSA, determines in writing that retention for a longer period is required
+to respond to authorized foreign intelligence or counterintelligence requirements;
+or (S//SI)
+
+(4) the communication contains information pertaining to a threat of serious harm to life
+or property. (S)
+
+Notwithstanding the above, if a domestic communication indicates that a target has
+entered the United States, NSA may advise the FBI of that fact. Moreover, technical data
+regarding domestic communications may be retained and provided to the FBI and CIA
+for collection avoidance purposes. (S//SI)
+
+Section 6 - Foreign Communications of or Concerning United States Persons (U)
+
+(a) Retention (U)
+
+Foreign communications of or concerning United States persons collected in the course of an
+acquisition authorized under section 702 of the Act may be retained only:
+
+(1) if necessary for the maintenance of technical data bases. Retention for this purpose is
+permitted for a period sufficient to allow a thorough exploitation and to permit access
+to data that are, or are reasonably believed likely to become, relevant to a current or
+future foreign intelligence requirement. Sufficient duration may vary with the nature
+of the exploitation.
+
+a. In the context of a cryptanalytic effort, maintenance of technical data bases
+requires retention of all communications that are enciphered or reasonably
+believed to contain secret meaning, and sufficient duration may consist of any
+period of time during which encrypted material is subject to, or of use in,
+cryptanalysis.
+
+b. In the case of communications that are not enciphered or otherwise thought to
+contain secret meaning, sufficient duration is five years from the expiration date
+of the certification authorizing the collection unless the Signals Intelligence
+Director, NSA, determines in writing that retention for a longer period is required
+to respond to authorized foreign intelligence or counterintelligence requirements;
+
+(2) if dissemination of such communications with reference to such United States persons
+would be permitted under subsection (b) below; or
+
+(3) if the information is evidence of a crime that has been, is being, or is about to be
+committed and is provided to appropriate federal law enforcement authorities. (S//SI)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20320108-
+9
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20310108-
+
+(b) Dissemination (U)
+
+A report based on communications of or concerning a United States person may be
+disseminated in accordance with Section 7 or 8 if the identity of the United States person is
+deleted and a generic term or symbol is substituted so that the information cannot reasonably
+be connected with an identifiable United States person. Otherwise, dissemination of
+intelligence reports based on communications of or concerning a United States person may
+only be made to a recipient requiring the identity of such person for the performance of
+official duties but only if at least one of the following criteria is also met:
+
+(1) the United States person has consented to dissemination or the information of or
+concerning the United States person is available publicly;
+
+(2) the identity of the United States person is necessary to understand foreign intelligence
+information or assess its importance, e.g., the identity of a senior official in the
+Executive Branch;
+
+(3) the communication or information indicates that the United States person may be:
+
+a. an agent of a foreign power;
+
+b. a foreign power as defined in Section 101(a) of the Act;
+
+c. residing outside the United States and holding an official position in the
+government or military forces of a foreign power;
+
+d. a corporation or other entity that is owned or controlled directly or indirectly by a
+foreign power; or
+
+e. acting in collaboration with an intelligence or security service of a foreign power
+and the United States person has, or has had, access to classified national security
+information or material;
+
+(4) the communication or information indicates that the United States person may be the
+target of intelligence activities of a foreign power;
+
+(5) the communication or information indicates that the United States person is engaged
+in the unauthorized disclosure of classified national security information or the
+United States person's identity is necessary to understand or assess a communications
+security vulnerability, but only after the agency that originated the information
+certifies that it is properly classified;
+
+(6) the communication or information indicates that the United States person may be
+engaging in international terrorist activities;
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20320108-
+10
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20310108-
+
+(7) the acquisition of the United States person's communication was authorized by a
+court order issued pursuant to the Act and the communication may relate to the
+foreign intelligence purpose of the surveillance; or
+
+(8) the communication or information is reasonably believed to contain evidence that a
+crime has been, is being, or is about to be committed, provided that dissemination is
+for law enforcement purposes and is made in accordance with 50 U.S.C. §§ 1806(b)
+and 1825(c), Executive Order No. 12333, and, where applicable, the crimes reporting
+procedures set out in the August 1995 "Memorandum of Understanding: Reporting of
+Information Concerning Federal Crimes," or any successor document. (U)
+
+(c) Provision of Unminimized Communications to CIA and FBI (S/NF)-
+
+(1) NSA may provide to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) unminimized
+communications acquired pursuant to section 702 of the Act. CIA will
+identify to NSA targets for which NSA may provide unminimized
+communications to CIA. CIA will process any such unminimized
+communications received from NSA in accordance with CIA minimization
+procedures adopted by the Attorney General, in consultation with the Director
+of National Intelligence, pursuant to subsection 702(e) of the Act. (S//SI//NF)
+
+(2) NSA may provide to the FBI unminimized communications acquired pursuant to
+section 702 of the Act. The FBI will identify to NSA targets for which NSA may
+provide unminimized communications to the FBI. The FBI will process any such
+unminimized communications received from NSA in accordance with FBI
+minimization procedures adopted by the Attorney General, in consultation with the
+Director of National Intelligence, pursuant to subsection 702(e) of the Act. (S//SI)
+
+Section 7 - Other Foreign Communications (U)
+
+Foreign communications of or concerning a non-United States person may be retained, used,
+and disseminated in any form in accordance with other applicable law, regulation, and policy.
+(U)
+
+Section 8 - Collaboration with Foreign Governments (S//SI)
+
+(a) Procedures for the dissemination of evaluated and minimized information. Pursuant to
+Section 1.7(c)(8) of Executive Order No. 12333, as amended, NSA conducts foreign
+cryptologic liaison relationships with certain foreign governments. Information acquired
+pursuant to section 702 of the Act may be disseminated to a foreign government. Except
+as provided in subsection 8(b) of these procedures, any dissemination to a foreign
+government of information of or concerning a United States person that is acquired
+pursuant to section 702 may only be done in a manner consistent with subsections 6(b)
+and 7 of these NSA minimization procedures. (S)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20320108-
+11
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20310108-
+
+(b) Procedures for technical or linguistic assistance. It is anticipated that NSA may obtain
+information or communications that, because of their technical or linguistic content, may
+require further analysis by foreign governments to assist NSA in determining their
+meaning or significance. Notwithstanding other provisions of these minimization
+procedures, NSA may disseminate computer disks, tape recordings, transcripts, or other
+information or items containing unminimized information or communications acquired
+pursuant to section 702 to foreign governments for further processing and analysis, under
+the following restrictions with respect to any materials so disseminated: (S)
+
+(1) Dissemination to foreign governments will be solely for translation or analysis
+of such information or communications, and assisting foreign governments
+will make no use of any information or any communication of or concerning
+any person except to provide technical and linguistic assistance to NSA. (S)
+
+(2) Dissemination will be only to those personnel within foreign governments
+involved in the translation or analysis of such information or communications.
+The number of such personnel will be restricted to the extent feasible. There
+will be no dissemination within foreign governments of this unminimized data.
+(S)
+
+(3) Foreign governments will make no permanent agency record of information or
+communications of or concerning any person referred to or recorded on
+computer disks, tape recordings, transcripts, or other items disseminated by
+NSA to foreign governments, provided that foreign governments may
+maintain such temporary records as are necessary to enable them to assist
+NSA with the translation or analysis of such information. Records maintained
+by foreign governments for this purpose may not be disseminated within the
+foreign governments, except to personnel involved in providing technical or
+linguistic assistance to NSA. (S)
+
+(4) Upon the conclusion of such technical or linguistic assistance to NSA,
+computer disks, tape recordings, transcripts, or other items or information
+disseminated to foreign governments will either be returned to NSA or be
+destroyed with an accounting of such destruction made to NSA. (S)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20320108
+12
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20310108
+
+(5) Any information that foreign governments provide to NSA as a result of such
+technical or linguistic assistance may be disseminated by NSA in accordance
+with these minimization procedures. (S)
+
+10-31-11
+Date
+
+Eric H. Holder, Jr.
+Attorney General of the United States
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20320108
+13
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_minimization_procedures_used_by_nsa_in_connection_with_fisa_sect_702/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_minimization_procedures_used_by_nsa_in_connection_with_fisa_sect_702/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8260e8e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_minimization_procedures_used_by_nsa_in_connection_with_fisa_sect_702/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+{
+ "title": "Minimization Procedures used by the National Counterterrorism Center in Connection with Information Acquired by the Federal Bureau of Investigation Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, As Amended",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "A description of the \"minimization procedures\" for the acquisition, retention, use, and dissemination of information about United States persons. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "",
+ "date_created": "2011-10-31",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Holder, Eric H. Jr."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-08-21",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/minimization-procedures-used-nsa-connection-fisa-section-702",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "6c649f83e5677aa79662b5c4fef39c5c6b0c8bc48a55bddd36a84e6c7f280713",
+ "pages": 13
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_november_2011_fisc_opinion_and_order/ACLU_-_november_2011_fisc_opinion_and_order.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_november_2011_fisc_opinion_and_order/ACLU_-_november_2011_fisc_opinion_and_order.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6c0b76d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_november_2011_fisc_opinion_and_order/ACLU_-_november_2011_fisc_opinion_and_order.md
@@ -0,0 +1,576 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+UNITED STATES
+
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+MEMORANDUM OPINION
+
+These matters are before the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC" or "Court")
+
+on:
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED] Through these filings (all of which were submitted on
+October 31, 2011, and hereinafter will be referred to collectively as the "October 31
+Submissions"), the government seeks approval of amended minimization procedures for the
+National Security Agency ("NSA"), which reflect changes that are intended to correct the
+deficiencies identified by the Court in its October 3, 2011 Memorandum Opinion ("October 3
+Opinion"). For the reasons stated below, the Court concludes that with regard to information
+acquired pursuant to Certifications [REDACTED], the government has adequately
+corrected the deficiencies identified in the October 3 Opinion, and the request for approval is
+therefore granted.
+
+I. BACKGROUND
+
+In the October 3 Opinion, the Court concluded that one aspect of the collection conducted
+under past Section 702 certifications and proposed under Certifications [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]—NSA's "upstream collection" of Internet transactions containing multiple
+communications, or MCTs—was, in some respects, deficient on statutory and constitutional
+grounds. The Court found in pertinent part that NSA's minimization procedures, as the
+government proposed to apply them to MCTs as to which the "active user" is not known to be a
+tasked selector, did not meet the requirements of 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(e) with respect to retention,
+and that NSA's targeting and minimization procedures, as the government proposed to apply
+them to such MCTs, were inconsistent with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. See
+October 3 Opinion at 2, 59-63, 69-80. Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3)(B), the Court directed
+the government, at its election, to correct the deficiencies identified in the October 3 Opinion
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 2
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+within 30 days, or to cease the problematic portion of the collection. See October 3, 2011 Order
+at 3-4. The government has chosen to attempt to correct the deficiencies by submitting and
+implementing the amended NSA minimization procedures that are now before the Court.
+
+II. REVIEW OF AMENDED CERTIFICATIONS
+
+The government executed and submitted the amendments to Certifications [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED], including the amended NSA minimization procedures, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §
+1881a(i)(1)(C), which provides that:
+
+The Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence may amend a
+certification submitted in accordance with subsection (g) or the targeting and
+minimization procedures adopted in accordance with subsections (d) and (e) as
+necessary at any time, including if the Court is conducting or has completed
+review of such certification or such procedures, and shall submit the amended
+certification or amended procedures to the Court not later than 7 days after
+amending such certification or such procedures. The Court shall review any
+amendment under this subparagraph under the procedures set forth in this
+subsection. The Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence may
+authorize the use of an amended certification or amended procedures pending the
+Court's review of such amended certification or amended procedures.
+
+The government submitted the amendments within the time allowed by the statute, and the
+Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence properly authorized the use of the
+amended minimization procedures pending the Court's review. See Amendment to [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] at 3.¹
+
+¹ The government has confirmed that "NSA is fully complying with the amended
+minimization procedures" with respect to information acquired pursuant to Certifications [REDACTED]. See Government's Responses to FISC Questions Re: Amended 2011
+Section 702 Certifications ("Nov. 15 Submission") at 1. As discussed more fully below, the
+government has not yet formally amended the NSA minimization procedures applicable to
+information collected under the prior Section 702 certifications, but NSA is applying a modified
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 3
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+Under the judicial review provisions that are incorporated by reference into Section
+1881a(i)(C), the Court must review the certifications, as amended, to determine whether they
+contain all the required elements. The Court concluded in the October 3 Opinion that
+Certifications [REDACTED], as originally submitted, contained all the required
+elements. See October 3 Opinion at 11-12. Like the original certifications, the amendments now
+before the Court were executed under oath by the Attorney General and the Director of National
+Intelligence, as required by 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g)(1)(A). See Amendment to [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] at 4-5.
+Pursuant to Section 1881a(g)(2)(A)(ii), the amendments include the attestation of the Attorney
+General and the Director of National Intelligence that the amended NSA minimization
+procedures meet the statutory definition of minimization procedures and have been submitted to
+the FISC for approval. See Amendment to Certification [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]. The amendments state that
+"[a]ll other aspects" of the certifications, as originally submitted, "remain unaltered and are
+incorporated herein." See Amendment to Certification [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]. Accordingly, the Court finds that
+Certifications [REDACTED], as amended, contain all the required elements.
+
+[REDACTED] version of the amended NSA minimization procedures to Internet transactions acquired pursuant
+to those certifications.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 4
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+III. REVIEW OF AMENDED NSA MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES
+
+The Court also must review the amended NSA minimization procedures included as part
+of the October 31 Submissions to determine whether they satisfy FISA's statutory definition of
+minimization procedures² and are consistent with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
+See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(2)(C), (i)(3)(A). For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes
+that NSA's amended minimization procedures satisfy the applicable requirements and thus
+correct the deficiencies found by the Court in its October 3 Opinion with respect to information
+acquired pursuant to Certifications [REDACTED].
+
+1. The Deficiencies Identified by the Court in the October 3 Opinion
+
+In the October 3 Opinion, the Court concluded that the NSA minimization procedures, as
+the government proposed to apply them to Internet transactions containing multiple
+communications, did not satisfy FISA's definition of minimization procedures with respect to the
+retention of information concerning United States persons. See Oct. 3 Opinion at 59-63. The
+NSA minimization procedures generally require that, "[a]s a communication is reviewed, NSA
+analyst(s) will determine whether it is a domestic or foreign communication to, from, or about a
+target and is reasonably believed to contain foreign intelligence information or evidence of a
+crime." See Amended NSA Minimization Procedures at 4 (§ 3(b)(4)), so that it can be promptly
+
+² FISA's definition of minimization procedures requires, in pertinent part, "specific
+procedures, which shall be adopted by the Attorney General, that are reasonably designed in light
+of the purpose and technique of the particular [surveillance or physical search], to minimize the
+acquisition and retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly available information
+concerning unconsenting United States persons consistent with the need of the United States to
+obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information." 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h)(1) &
+1821(4)(A).
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 5
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+afforded the appropriate treatment under the procedures. The measures previously proposed by
+the government for MCTs, however, largely dispensed with the requirement of prompt
+disposition upon initial review by an analyst. Rather than attempting to identify and segregate
+information not relevant to the authorized purpose of the acquisition or to destroy such
+information promptly following acquisition, NSA's proposed handling of MCTs tended to
+maximize the retention of such information, including information of or concerning United
+States persons with no direct connection to any target. Except in the case of MCTs recognized
+by analysts as containing at least one wholly domestic communication, which would be
+destroyed, MCTs that had been reviewed by analysts would remain available to other analysts in
+NSA's repositories without any marking to identify them as MCTs or as containing non-target
+information of or concerning United States persons. See Oct. 3 Opinion at 59-60. All MCTs
+except those identified as containing one or more wholly domestic communication would be
+retained for a minimum of five years. See id.
+
+The Court explained that the net effect of the government's proposal was that thousands
+of wholly domestic communications (those that are never reviewed and those that are not
+recognized by analysts as being wholly domestic), and thousands of other discrete
+communications that are not to or from a targeted selector but that are to, from, or concerning a
+United States person, would be retained by NSA for at least five years, despite the fact that they
+had no direct connection to a targeted selector and, therefore, were unlikely to contain foreign
+intelligence information. See id. at 60-61. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the NSA
+minimization procedures, as NSA proposed to apply them to MCTs, were not reasonably
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 6
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+designed to "minimize the... retention of nonpublicly available information concerning
+unconsenting United States persons consistent with the need of the United States to obtain,
+produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information." Id. at 62-63 (quoting 50 U.S.C. §
+1801(h)(1)). For largely the same reasons, the Court concluded that the procedures previously
+proposed by the government for handling MCT's were inconsistent with the requirements of the
+Fourth Amendment. See Oct. 3 Opinion at 78-79..
+
+2. Overview of NSA's New Process for Handling MCTs
+
+The measures now before the Court for handling MCTs contain three main elements: (1)
+the post-acquisition segregation of those types of transactions that are most likely to contain non-
+target information concerning United States persons or persons in the United States; (2) special
+handing and marking requirements for transactions that have been removed from or that are not
+subject to segregation; and (3) a two-year default retention period for all upstream acquisitions.
+Each of these elements is described more fully in the following discussion.
+
+Under the amended NSA minimization procedures, NSA must segregate and restrict
+access to certain portions of its upstream collection following acquisition.³ Section 3(b)(5)(a)
+requires NSA to
+
+take reasonable steps post-acquisition to identify and segregate through technical
+means Internet transactions that cannot be reasonably identified as containing
+single, discrete communications where: the active user of the transaction (i.e., the
+[user of] the electronic communications account/address/identifier used to send or
+receive the Internet transaction to or from a service provider) is reasonably
+
+³ The Court understands that NSA will not share unminimized communications acquired
+through its upstream collection pursuant to Section 6(c) or Section 8 of the amended NSA
+minimization procedures. See Nov. 15 Submission at 3.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 7
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+believed to [REDACTED] Amended NSA Minimization Procedures at 4; see also Nov. 15 Submission at 1. Transactions
+that are segregated pursuant to this provision
+
+will be retained in an access-controlled repository that is accessible only to NSA
+analysts who have been trained to review such transactions for the purpose of
+identifying those that contain discrete communications as to which the sender and
+all intended recipients are reasonably believed to be located in the United States.
+
+Amended NSA Minimization Procedures at 4 (§ 3(b)(5)(a)(1)). No segregated Internet
+transaction (and no information contained in a segregated Internet transaction) may be moved or
+copied from the segregated repository or otherwise used for foreign intelligence purposes unless
+it has been determined that the transaction does not contain any discrete wholly domestic
+communication. Id. at 4 (§ 3(b)(5)(a)(1)(a)). Any segregated transaction that is identified as
+containing a wholly domestic communication "will be destroyed upon recognition." Id.
+
+All transactions that are moved or copied from the segregated repository into repositories
+more generally accessible to NSA analysts must be "marked, tagged, or otherwise identified" as
+having previously been segregated pursuant to Section 3(b)(5)(a). Id. at 5 (§ 3(b)(5)(a)(1)(c)). In
+addition, all MCTs acquired through NSA's upstream collection, including those that have been
+copied or moved from segregation, are subject to special handling rules on top of the other
+applicable provisions of the minimization procedures. Pursuant to the special handling
+provisions, which are set forth in Sections 3(b)(5)(b)(1) and (b)(2), NSA analysts seeking to use
+(for example, in a FISA application, intelligence report, or section 702 targeting) a discrete
+communication within an Internet transaction that contains multiple discrete communications
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 8
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN-
+
+must first make a series of determinations, see id. at 5-6 (§ 3(b)(5)(b)(1)-(b)(2)), each of which
+must be documented if the discrete communication is used, see id. at 6 (§ 3(b)(5)(b)(3)).
+
+The analyst must first determine whether or not the discrete communication sought to be
+used is a wholly domestic communication. See id. at 5 (§ 3(b)(5)(b)(1)). To the extent
+reasonably necessary to make that determination, the analyst will "perform checks to determine
+the locations of the sender and intended recipients." Id. If the discrete communication sought to
+be used is a wholly domestic communication, the entire transaction must be destroyed. See Nov.
+15 Submission at 1.
+
+If the discrete communication that the analyst seeks to use is not a wholly domestic
+communication, the analyst must determine whether the discrete communication is to, from, or
+about a tasked selector. See Amended NSA Minimization Procedures at 5-6 (§ 3(b)(5)(b)(2)). If
+the analyst determines that it is not, but that it is "to or from an identifiable U.S. person or a
+person reasonably believed to be located in the U.S.," then the discrete communication "cannot
+be used for any purpose other than to protect against an immediate threat to human life (e.g.,
+force protection or hostage situations)." Id. at 5-6 (§ 3(b)(5)(b)(2)(c)). In addition, if it is
+"technically possible or reasonable feasible" to do so, the analyst must document in the relevant
+analytic repository or tool his or her determination that the transaction contains a discrete
+communication that is not to, from, or about a tasked selector but that is to or from an
+identifiable United States person or a person reasonably believed to be located in the United
+
+⁴ NSA must report any such use to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and
+to the National Security Division of the Department of Justice, which must promptly notify the
+FISC of such use. See Amended NSA Minimization Procedures at 6 (§ 3(b)(5)(b)(2)(c)).
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 9
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+States. See id.⁵ A record of the analyst's determination will remain associated with the
+transaction in NSA's systems and will be visible to any other analyst who later uses the same
+repository or tool to view the transaction.
+
+If the discrete communication that the analyst wishes to use is determined to be to, from,
+or about a tasked selector, the transaction (including any United States person information
+contained therein) must be handled in accordance with the remainder of the minimization
+procedures. Id. at 5 (§ 3(b)(5)(b)(2)(a)). The same is true of a discrete communication that is not
+to, from, or about a tasked selector but that is determined not to be to or from an identifiable
+United States person or a person reasonably believed to be located in the United States. Id. at 5
+(§ 3(b)(5)(b)(2)(b)). An analyst seeking to use (e.g., in a FISA application, in an intelligence
+report, or in a Section 702 targeting decision) a discrete communication within an Internet
+transaction that contains multiple discrete communications must document each of the
+determinations required by the special handling provisions at Sections 3(b)(5)(b)(1) and (b)(2).
+Id. at 6 (§ 3(b)(5)(b)(3)).
+
+Finally, the government has shortened the default retention period for Internet
+communications acquired by NSA through its upstream collection from five years to two years.
+Section 3(c)(2) of the amended NSA minimization procedures provides as follows:
+
+⁵ The government has explained that some, but not all, of the analytic repositories and
+tools used by its analysts are enabled to record comments by analysts. The documentation
+requirement in Section 3(b)(5)(b)(2)(c) will only apply when the analytic repository or tool being
+used is enabled to accept analyst comments. See Nov. 15 Submission at 2-3. In light of the large
+volume of non-target communications being acquired, it is the Court's expectation that NSA
+will, over time, work to expand its capability to record analyst comments, particularly in any new
+systems that will be used to handle information acquired through NSA's upstream collection.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 10
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+Internet transactions that are acquired through NSA's upstream collection techniques that
+do not contain any information that meets the retention standards set forth in these
+procedures and that are known to contain communications of or concerning
+United States persons will be destroyed upon recognition. All Internet
+transactions may be retained no longer than two years from the expiration date of
+the certification authorizing the collection in any event. The Internet transactions
+that may be retained include those that were acquired because of limitations on
+NSA's ability to filter communications.[⁶] Any Internet communications acquired
+through NSA's upstream collection techniques that are retained in accordance
+with this subsection may be reviewed and processed only in accordance with the
+standards set forth in subsection 3(b)(5) of these procedures.
+
+Id. at 7 (emphasis added.) Under this provision, any Internet transaction that has not been
+destroyed sooner will "age off" two years after the expiration of the certification authorizing the
+collection. See Nov. 15 Submission at 3.
+
+3. The Amended Procedures for Handling MCTs Satisfy the Applicable
+Requirements
+
+The amended NSA minimization procedures mark a substantial improvement over the
+measures previously proposed by the government for handling MCTs. The revised process is
+more consistent with the overall framework of the minimization procedures, which, as noted
+above, generally require NSA promptly to identify and segregate information not relevant to the
+authorized purpose of the acquisition and to destroy such information promptly following
+acquisition. Unlike the measures previously proposed by the government for MCTs, the new
+procedures require NSA, following acquisition, to identify and segregate the two categories of
+
+⁶ The Court understands this sentence to refer only to Internet transactions that contain
+wholly domestic communications but that are not recognized as such by NSA. All such
+transactions will be destroyed two years after expiration of the certification authorizing their
+collection. See Nov. 15 Submission at 3.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 11
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+Internet transactions that are most likely to contain discrete wholly domestic communications and
+non-target communications to or from United States persons or persons located in the United
+States: (1) those as to which the "active user" is located inside the United States; and (2) those as
+to which the location of the "active user" is unknown. See Amended NSA Minimization
+Procedures at 4 (§ 3(b)(5)(a)); see also Oct. 3 Opinion at 37-41. Segregated transactions cannot
+be moved or copied to repositories that are generally available to NSA analysts until a specially-
+trained analyst has determined that it contains no discrete wholly domestic communications.⁷
+See Amended NSA Minimization Procedures at 4 (§ 3(b)(5)(a)(1)). If a transaction is
+determined to contain a wholly domestic communication, it must be destroyed. See
+id. (§ 3(b)(5)(a)(1)(a)). Even after a transaction has been determined to contain no discrete
+wholly domestic communications is removed from segregation and made more generally
+available to NSA analysts, it retains a marking to identify it as having come from segregation and
+thus warranting careful scrutiny for information subject to protection under FISA and the Fourth
+Amendment. See id. at 5 (§ 3(b)(5)(a)(1)(c)).
+
+MCTs that are not segregated or that have been removed from segregation also are
+subject to additional restrictions and requirements. See id. at 4 (§ 3(b)(5)(a)(1)(b), (a)(2)). An
+analyst seeking to use a discrete communication within such a transaction must make and
+
+⁷ The effectiveness of the amended NSA minimization procedures will depend in
+substantial part on the training received by analysts with access to segregated Internet
+transactions and on the training that is provided to analysts generally regarding the rules for
+handling transactions that are not (or are no longer) segregated. The Court expects that the
+appropriate Executive Branch officials will ensure that this training is adequate and effective.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 12
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+document a series of determinations before doing so. See id. at 5-6 (§ 3(b)(5)(b)(1)-(b)(2)).⁸
+Transactions found to contain a discrete wholly domestic communication must be destroyed. See
+Nov. 15 Submission at 2. Discrete non-target communications that are to or from a United States
+person or a person in the United States must be marked as such (if such marking is feasible) and
+cannot be used except when necessary to protect against an imminent threat to human life. See
+Amended NSA Minimization Procedures at 5-6 (§ 3(b)(5)(b)(2)(c)). Other discrete
+communications (i.e., those that are to, from, or about a targeted selector and those that are not to
+or from an identifiable United States person or person in the United States) may be used and
+disseminated subject to the other applicable provisions of the NSA minimization procedures. Id.
+at 5 (§ 3(b)(5)(b)(2)(a)-(2)(b)). Taken together, these measures for handling Internet transactions
+tend to substantially reduce the risk that non-target information concerning United States persons
+or persons inside the United States will be used or disseminated by NSA.
+
+Finally, the two-year retention period for upstream acquisitions, rather than the five-year
+period previously proposed, strikes a more reasonable balance between the government's
+national security needs and the requirements that non-target information concerning United
+States persons and persons in the United States be protected. See id. at 7 (§ 3(c)(2)). The two-
+year period gives NSA substantial time to review its upstream acquisitions for foreign
+intelligence information but ensures that non-target information that is subject to protection
+[REDACTED].
+
+⁸ The act of documenting the required determinations will help to ensure that analysts do
+not use or disseminate wholly domestic communications or non-target information of or
+concerning United States persons or persons located in the United States. Moreover, the records
+created will provide a basis for subsequent auditing and oversight.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 13
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+under FISA or the Fourth Amendment is not retained any longer than is reasonably necessary.⁹
+
+Based on the foregoing discussion, the Court is satisfied that the amended NSA
+minimization procedures adequately address the deficiencies identified in the October 3 Opinion
+with respect to information acquired pursuant to Certifications [REDACTED].
+
+The principal problem with the measures previously proposed by the government for handling
+MCTs was that rather than requiring the identification and segregation of information "not
+relevant to the authorized purpose of the acquisition" or the destruction of such information
+promptly following acquisition, NSA's proposed handling of MCTs tended to promote the
+retention of such information, including information of or concerning United States persons with
+no direct connection to any target. See October 3 Opinion at 59-60. The same is not true of the
+revised process, which requires the segregation of those categories of Internet transactions that
+are most likely to contain non-target information subject to statutory or constitutional protection,
+includes special handling and marking requirements for transactions that are not segregated, and
+mandates a substantially shorter default retention period. Accordingly, the Court concludes that
+the amended NSA minimization procedures, as NSA is applying them to MCTs, are "reasonably
+designed ... to minimize the ... retention[] ... of nonpublicly available information concerning
+unconsenting United States persons consistent with the need of the United States to obtain,
+produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information." 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(1). The Court
+
+⁹ The shorter retention period is particularly appropriate given that such information is
+acquired only because of current technological limitations. As the Court emphasized in its
+October 3 Opinion, it is incumbent upon NSA to continue working to enhance its capability to
+limit acquisitions only to targeted communications. Oct. 3 Opinion at 58 n.54.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 14
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+is also satisfied that the revised minimization procedures, taken together with the applicable
+targeting procedures, are consistent with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
+
+4. The New [REDACTED] Provision
+
+The amended NSA minimization procedures contain a new provision that is not directly
+related to the government's efforts to address the deficiencies identified by the Court in its
+October 3 Opinion.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 15
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 16
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 17
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 18
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 19
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED] In light of the foregoing, the new [REDACTED] provision poses
+no obstacle to the Court's conclusion that NSA's minimization procedures, viewed as a whole,
+meet the applicable statutory and constitutional requirements.
+
+5. Handling of MCTs Acquired Under Prior Certifications
+
+The government has not yet formally amended the NSA minimization procedures
+applicable to Internet transactions acquired by NSA under prior Section 702 certifications – i.e.,
+[REDACTED]
+
+The government has recently explained, however, that in handling information collected under
+the prior certifications, NSA has been applying a modified version of the amended NSA
+minimization procedures that are discussed above. See Notice filed on Nov. 29, 2011 ("Nov. 29
+Notice") at 3-4. According to the government, it is not technically feasible for NSA to segregate
+Internet transactions acquired under the prior certifications in accordance with the requirements
+of Section 3(b)(5)(a) of the amended NSA minimization procedures. See id.; see also
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 20
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+Government's Response to the Court's Briefing Order of October 13, 2011 ("Nov. 22
+Submission") at 43. Hence, NSA has not been segregating such transactions in the manner
+discussed above and will not be able to do so. See Nov. 22 Submission at 44. The government
+reports, however, that NSA has implemented a process for reviewing upstream acquisitions made
+under the prior certifications that is consistent with the special handling requirements set forth in
+Section 3(b)(5)(b), which are discussed above. See Nov. 29 Notice at 4; Nov. 22 Submission at
+43-44. The government is also in the process of implementing the two-year retention limitation
+reflected in Section 3(c) of the amended procedures for upstream acquisitions made pursuant to
+the past Section 702 certifications. See Nov. 29 Notice at 4; Nov. 22 Submission at 43.
+
+The government is now working to formally amend the minimization procedures
+applicable to information acquired under the prior Section 702 certifications. Nov. 29 Notice at
+3-4. Once the amended minimization procedures have been approved by the Attorney General
+and Director of National Intelligence and submitted to the Court, the Court will review them in
+accordance with the requirements of FISA to determine whether the government has cured the
+deficiencies identified in the October 3 Opinion with respect to the handling of information
+acquired pursuant to the prior certifications.
+
+IV. CONCLUSION
+
+For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that, with regard to information acquired
+pursuant to Certifications [REDACTED], the government has adequately corrected
+the deficiencies identified in the October 3 Opinion. The Court therefore finds, pursuant to 50
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 21
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3)(A), that, as amended on October 31, 2011, Certifications [REDACTED]
+contain all the elements required by 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g), and that the targeting and
+minimization procedures approved for use in connection with those amended certifications are
+consistent with the requirements of 50 U.S.C. §1881a(d)-(e) and with the Fourth Amendment.
+An order approving the amended certifications and the use of the procedures is being entered
+contemporaneously herewith.
+
+ENTERED this 30th day of November, 2011.
+
+JOHN D. BATES
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+I, [REDACTED] Chief Deputy
+Clerk, FISC, certify that this document
+is a true and correct copy of the
+original [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 22
+
+SECRET
+
+UNITED STATES
+
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+ORDER
+
+For the reasons stated in the in the Memorandum Opinion issued contemporaneously
+herewith, and in reliance upon the entire record in this matter, the Court concludes that, with
+regard to information acquired pursuant to Certifications [REDACTED], the
+government has adequately corrected the deficiencies identified in the Court's Memorandum
+Opinion of October 3, 2011. The Court therefore finds, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3)(A),
+that, as amended on October 31, 2011, Certifications [REDACTED] contain all the
+elements required by 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g), and that the targeting and minimization procedures
+approved for use in connection with those amended certifications are consistent with the
+requirements of 50 U.S.C. §1881a(d)-(e) and with the Fourth Amendment.
+
+Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3)(A), that such
+
+SECRET
+
+SECRET
+
+amended certifications and the use of such procedures are approved.
+
+ENTERED this 30th day of November 2011, at 10:46 a.m. Eastern Time.
+
+JOHN D. BATES
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+I, [REDACTED] Chief Deputy
+Clerk, FISC, certify that this document
+is a true and correct copy of the
+original [REDACTED]
+
+SECRET
+Page 2
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_november_2011_fisc_opinion_and_order/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_november_2011_fisc_opinion_and_order/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f5a78d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_november_2011_fisc_opinion_and_order/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+{
+ "title": "Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Opinion and Order – November 2011",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "A FISC opinion concluding the NSA’s minimization procedures adequately address the deficiencies identified in the FISC’s ruling from October 3, 2011. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2011-11-30",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "ORCON, NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Bates, John D."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-08-21",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/foreign-intelligence-surveillance-opinion-and-order-november-2011",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "9547807e8fa243523f7968e8f6dffd4527fd91f5e25534f6070a08d566d2b129",
+ "pages": 24
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_August_19_2009_Report_of_the_US_with_Attachments_20130910/ACLU_-_pub_August_19_2009_Report_of_the_US_with_Attachments_20130910.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_August_19_2009_Report_of_the_US_with_Attachments_20130910/ACLU_-_pub_August_19_2009_Report_of_the_US_with_Attachments_20130910.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..72a2c8c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_August_19_2009_Report_of_the_US_with_Attachments_20130910/ACLU_-_pub_August_19_2009_Report_of_the_US_with_Attachments_20130910.md
@@ -0,0 +1,2749 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+UNITED STATES
+U.S. F.I.S.C.
+2009 AUG 17 PM 4:15
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, DC
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
+BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
+ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
+OF TANGIBLE THINGS FROM
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Docket Number: BR 09-09
+
+REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES (U)
+
+The United States of America, by and through the undersigned Department of Justice
+attorneys, respectfully submits this report and supporting documents in response to the Court's
+Primary Order dated July 9, 2009, and similar predecessor Orders. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The National Security Agency (NSA) has completed an end-to-end review of its handling
+of call detail records produced pursuant to the Orders. The review began earlier this year after
+the discovery that NSA had not handled the records in the manner authorized by the Court, and it
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Classified by: David S. Kris. Assistant
+Attorney General, NSD, DOJ
+Reason: 1.4(c)
+Declassify on: 17 August 2034
+
+31 August 2009 Production
+45
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+has identified several serious instances of non-compliance. Although NSA successfully
+implemented many of the Orders' requirements, in several instances it treated records collected
+pursuant to the Orders in the manner it treats information collected under other NSA collections,
+without the necessary regard for the unique nature and requirements of this Court-ordered
+collection. (TS//SI//NF)
+NSA has since remedied these instances of non-compliance, primarily through a series of
+technological fixes and improved training. It has implemented the new oversight procedures set
+forth in the Orders and self-imposed by NSA, and proposes to implement additional procedures
+in the event that the Court authorizes NSA to query the records using telephone identifiers that
+NSA has determined meet the reasonable, articulable suspicion standard. This report, the
+supporting declarations of the Directors of NSA (Exhibits A and B) and Federal Bureau of
+Investigation (FBI) (Exhibit C), and the attached NSA report (Exhibit D) (the "End-to-End
+Report") aim to provide the Court with assurance that NSA has addressed and corrected the
+instances of non-compliance and is taking the additional steps described herein to monitor and
+ensure compliance with the Court's Orders going forward. The documents describe the results of
+NSA's end-to-end review, the remedies for instances of non-compliance, the testing of
+technological remedies, and additional procedures employed and proposed to be employed.
+They also explain how valuable the collection and analysis of the records is to the national
+security. Based on these findings and actions, the Government anticipates that it will request in
+the Application seeking renewal of docket number BR 09-09 authority that NSA, including
+certain NSA analysts who obtain appropriate approval, be permitted to resume non-automated
+querying of the call detail records using selectors approved by NSA. (TS//SI//ANE)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+2
+31 August 2009 Production
+46
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+I. BACKGROUND (U)
+
+In docket number BR 06-05 and each subsequent authorization, including docket number
+BR 09-09, the Government sought, and the Court authorized NSA, pursuant to the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act's (FISA) tangible things provision, 50 U.S.C. § 1861 _et seq._, to
+collect in bulk and on an ongoing basis certain call detail records or "telephony metadata." The
+Government will refer herein to call detail records collected pursuant to the Court's
+authorizations in this matter as "BR metadata." NSA analyzes the BR metadata, using contact
+chaining [REDACTED] to find and identify known and unknown members or agents
+of [REDACTED] (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The Orders direct the Government to treat the BR metadata in accordance with
+minimization procedures adopted by the Attorney General. Among these minimization
+procedures in docket number BR 06-05 was the following:
+
+Any search or analysis of the data archive shall occur only after a particular
+known telephone number has been associated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]. More specifically, access to the archived data shall
+occur only when NSA has identified a known telephone number for which,
+based on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which
+reasonable and prudent persons act, there are facts giving rise to a[^1]
+
+[^1]: "Call detail records," or "telephony metadata," include comprehensive communications routing information, including but not limited to session identifying information (e.g., originating and terminating telephone number, International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) numbers, International Mobile station Equipment Identity (IMEI) numbers, etc.), trunk identifier, telephone calling card numbers, and time and duration of call. A "trunk" is a communication line between two switching systems. _Newton's Telecom Dictionary_ 951 (24th ed. 2008). Metadata does not include the substantive content of any communication, as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8), or the name, address, or financial information of a subscriber or customer. (FS)
+[^2]: The Primary Order in docket number BR 06-05 authorized NSA to query the BR metadata using telephone identifiers associated with [REDACTED]. Later authorizations expanded the telephone identifiers that NSA could use for queries to those associated with [REDACTED] see docket number BR 06-05 (motion to amend granted in August 2006), and, later, the [REDACTED], see docket number BR 07-10 (motion to amend granted in June 2007). The Court's authorization in docket number BR 09-09 approved querying related to [REDACTED]. See Primary Order, docket number BR 09-09, at 5-7. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+3
+31 August 2009 Production
+47
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+reasonable, articulable suspicion that the telephone number is associated
+with [REDACTED] provided, however, that
+a telephone number believed to be used by a U.S. person shall not be
+regarded as associated with [REDACTED] solely on the basis of activities that are protected by the First Amendment to
+the Constitution.
+
+Order, docket number BR 06-05, at 5 (emphasis added). For purposes of querying the BR
+metadata, all subsequent Orders in this matter required the Government to comply with the same
+standard of reasonable, articulable suspicion.³ See, e.g., Primary Order, docket number BR 09-
+09, at 5-7. As authorized by the Orders in docket numbers BR 06-05 through BR 08-13, NSA
+determined which telephone identifiers met the RAS standard and, therefore, could be used to
+query the BR metadata. In addition, the Orders contained minimization procedures that
+governed other aspects of the use, retention, and dissemination of BR metadata. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Beginning in mid-January 2009, the Government notified the Court of instances of non-
+compliance with the Court-ordered minimization procedures in this matter. The first written
+notice, filed on January 15, 2009, reported that, through an automated "alert list" process, NSA
+had conducted automated queries of the BR metadata using non-RAS-approved telephone
+identifiers. NSA shut down this automated alert list process entirely on January 24, 2009, and
+the process remains shut down. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+By Order dated January 28, 2009, the Court ordered the Government to file a written
+brief concerning the alert list process. In response to this Order, the Director of NSA ordered
+that NSA complete an end-to-end system engineering and process review of its handling of the
+BR metadata. On February 26, 2009, after it filed its brief, the Government provided written
+notice to the Court of additional non-compliance incidents. These incidents were identified as a
+
+³ In this memorandum the Government will refer to this standard as the "RAS standard" and telephone
+identifiers that satisfy the standard as "RAS-approved." (S)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+4
+31 August 2009 Production
+48
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+result of the end-to-end review and, like the alert list process, also concerned queries of the BR metadata using telephone identifiers that were not RAS-approved at the time of the queries.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+On March 2, 2009, the Court issued an Order that required NSA to seek Court approval to
+query the BR metadata on a case-by-case basis, except where necessary to protect against an
+imminent threat to human life. The Court further ordered that:
+
+Upon completion of the government's end-to-end system engineering and
+process reviews, the government shall file a report with the Court, that shall,
+at a minimum, include:
+
+a. an affidavit by the Director of the FBI, and affidavits by any other
+official responsible for national security that the government deems
+appropriate, describing the value of the BR metadata to the national
+security of the United States and certifying that the tangible things
+sought are relevant to an authorized investigation (other than a threat
+assessment) to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a
+U.S. person or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine
+intelligence activities, and that such investigation of a U.S. person is
+not conducted solely on the basis of activities protected by the First
+Amendment;
+
+b. a description of the results of the NSA's end-to-end system
+engineering and process reviews, including any additional instances of
+non-compliance identified therefrom;
+
+c. a full discussion of the steps taken to remedy any additional non-
+compliance as well as the incidents described herein, and an affidavit
+attesting that any technological remedies have been tested and
+demonstrated to be successful; and
+
+d. the minimization and oversight procedures the government proposes
+to employ should the Court decide to authorize the government's
+resumption of regular access to the BR metadata.
+
+The Court's Primary Orders in docket numbers BR 09-01, BR 09-06, and BR 09-09 contain
+these same reporting requirements. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+5
+31 August 2009 Production
+49
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Subsequent Orders have required that the Government's report include additional
+information regarding certain instances of non-compliance and/or other matters. These further
+reporting requirements are summarized in the Primary Order in docket number BR 09-09:
+
+* a full explanation of why the government has permitted dissemination outside
+ NSA of U.S. person information in violation of the Court's Orders in this matter;
+* a full explanation of the extent to which NSA has acquired call detail records of
+ foreign-to-foreign communications from [REDACTED] pursuant to
+ orders of the FISC, and whether the NSA's storage, handling, and dissemination
+ of information in those records, or derived therefrom, complied with the Court's
+ orders; and
+* either (i) a certification that any overproduced information, as described in
+ footnote 11 of the government's application [i.e., credit card information], has
+ been destroyed, and that any such information acquired pursuant to this Order is
+ being destroyed upon recognition; or (ii) a full explanation as to why it is not
+ possible or otherwise feasible to destroy such information.
+
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+II. VALUE TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY (U)
+
+Analysis of the BR metadata addresses a critical, threshold issue for the Government's
+efforts to detect and prevent terrorist acts affecting the national security of the United States:
+identifying the terrorists and their associates. Ex. B at 4-5, 15; Ex. C at 4, 19. The [REDACTED]
+analysis of the BR metadata - contact chaining [REDACTED] share this purpose.
+Contact chaining analysis identifies which telephone identifiers have been in contact with a
+telephone identifier reasonably suspected to be associated with a terrorist. Ex. B at 5-7. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+Because the BR metadata is a collection of historical telephony metadata, NSA analysts
+are able to look back in time to identify not only recent contacts and patterns, but those in the
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+6
+31 August 2009 Production
+50
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+past. Id. at 6. By the time the Government associates a telephone identifier with a terrorist, the
+terrorist who was using it may have moved on to a new one. The historical nature of the BR
+metadata, however, allows for the identification of past contacts [REDACTED]. It, therefore,
+increases the likelihood of identifying previously unknown associates and telephone identifiers.
+Id. at 6. (TS/SVANE)
+
+The BR metadata provides information on the activities of terrorists and their associates
+that is not available from other sources of telephony metadata. Collections pursuant to Title I of
+FISA, for example, do not provide NSA with information sufficient to perfonn multi-tiered
+contact chaining [REDACTED]. Id. at 8. NSA's signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection,
+because it focuses strictly on the foreign end of communications, provides only limited
+information to identify possible terrorist connections emanating from within the United States.
+Id. For telephone calls, signaling information includes the number being called (which is
+necessary to complete the call) and often does not include the number from which the call is
+made. Id. at 8-9. Calls originating inside the United States and collected overseas, therefore,
+often do not identify the caller's telephone number. Id. Without this information, NSA analysts
+cannot identify U.S. telephone numbers or, more generally, even determine that calls originated
+inside the United States. Id. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The BR metadata helps fill these foreign intelligence gaps. Unlike information NSA
+acquires during its traditional SIGINT operations outside the United States, the BR metadata
+identifies the telephone identifiers of the person placing a telephone call from within the United
+States. Id. at 9. It also identifies the U.S. telephone identifiers of persons receiving a call from a
+foreign terrorist. NSA thus is able to provide the FBI with information about contacts between a
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+7
+31 August 2009 Production
+51
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+U.S. telephone identifier and a foreign terrorist, thereby alerting it to possible terrorist-related activity within the United States. Id. at 9-10. (TS/SI/NF)
+
+According to NSA, not having this information can have grave consequences. As an illustration, prior to the September 11, 2001, attacks, NSA intercepted and transcribed seven calls made by hijacker Khalid al-Mihdhar, then living in San Diego, California, to a telephone identifier associated with an al Qaeda safe house in Yemen. Id. NSA intercepted these calls through its overseas SIGINT collection and, as noted above for telephone calls originating within the United States, the calling party identifier was not included in the signaling information. Id. Because they lacked the U.S. telephone identifier and had nothing in the content of the calls to suggest that al-Mihdhar was inside the United States, NSA analysts mistakenly concluded that al-Mihdhar remained overseas when, in fact, he was in San Diego. Id. The BR metadata, by contrast, would have included the missing information and might have permitted NSA analysts to place al-Mihdhar within the United States prior to the attacks and tip that information to the FBI. Id. (TS/SI/NF)
+
+NSA acts on and otherwise makes use of the results of its BR metadata queries. Id. at 3. Where appropriate, it provides those results to other U.S. Government and foreign government agencies. From May 2006 (when the Court issued the first Orders in this matter) through May 2009, NSA disseminated 277 reports containing approximately 2,900 telephone identifiers that NSA had identified through its analysis of the BR metadata. Id. at 12. (TS//SI/NF)
+
+The tips or leads the FBI receives are among the most important because they can act as an early warning of possible domestic terrorist activity. Ex. C at 6-7. As noted above, the BR
+
+4 The 9/11 Commission Report alluded to the failure to share information regarding a facility associated with an al Qaeda safehouse in Yemen and contact with one of the 9/11 hijackers (al Mihdhar) in San Diego, California, as an important reason the Intelligence Community did not detect al Qaeda's planning for the 9/11 attack. See "The 9/11 Commission Report," at 269-272. (U)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+8
+31 August 2009 Production
+52
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+metadata is unique in that it can provide more complete information about domestic telephone
+identifiers in contact with terrorist associates. The earlier FBI obtains information about a
+threat—in this case, information about a domestic contact—the more likely it will be able to
+protect against the threat. Id. at 6. Without BR metadata tips, the FBI might never learn about
+domestic contacts; with these tips, it learns about them promptly. Id. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The FBI has opened predicated international terrorism investigations based, at least in
+part, on BR metadata tips, including twenty-seven full investigations between May 2006 and the
+end of 2008. Id. at 7-9. In those cases, BR metadata provided predication for opening the
+investigation.⁵ Id. at 7. Examples are set forth in the accompanying Declaration of the FBI
+Director. Id. at 9-19. In other cases, BR metadata provided additional information regarding an
+existing investigation and advanced that investigation. Id. at 5-6. In any such case, the BR
+metadata was a valuable source of foreign intelligence for the FBI, assisting it in uncovering the
+operations of [REDACTED] and in
+thwarting terrorist activities targeting the United States, its citizens, and its interests abroad.⁶ Id.
+at 19. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+III. RESULTS OF THE END-TO-END REVIEW (U)
+
+The results of the NSA's end-to-end review are discussed in detail in the Director of
+NSA's Declaration (Exhibit A) and the End-to-End Report (Exhibit D). Generally, the end-to-
+end review focused on two major components of implementation of the BR FISA Orders—
+system-level technical engineering and execution within the analytical framework. The end-to-
+
+⁵ In these twenty-seven full investigations opened based on BR metadata tips, the FBI has issued forty-six
+intelligence information reports to U.S. government agencies and thirty-one intelligence information
+reports to foreign government partners. Ex. C at 9. (TS//SI//NF)
+⁶ Based on the value of the BR metadata, the FBI Director has certified that the BR metadata is relevant to
+authorized investigations (other than threat assessments) to obtain foreign intelligence information to
+protect against international terrorism. See Ex. C at 19. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+9
+31 August 2009 Production
+53
+***
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+***
+
+end review revealed that there was no single cause of the identified instances of non-compliance
+and that there were a number of successful oversight, management, and technology processes
+that operated appropriately. Nonetheless, the end-to-end review uncovered additional instances
+of non-compliance, all of which were brought to the Court's attention shortly after their
+discovery during the end-to-end review.[^7] The NSA concluded that these instances of non-
+compliance stemmed from or were exacerbated by a primary focus on analyst use of the data, the
+complexity of the overall BR FISA system, and a lack of shared understanding among the key
+stakeholders as to the full scope of the BR FISA system and the implementation of the BR FISA
+Orders. Each specific instance of non-compliance identified as part of the end-to-end review is
+briefly discussed below. The remedies for the instances of non-compliance are discussed in the
+following section. ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~
+
+A. Domestic Identifiers Designated as RAS-Approved Without Review by NSA
+OGC ~~(TS)~~
+
+The end-to-end review revealed that historically a significant number of domestic
+identifiers were added to the Station Table as RAS-approved without first undergoing the
+required review by NSA OGC. This happened in two distinct ways. First, identifiers reported to
+the Intelligence Community as having a connection with one of the Court-approved terrorist
+organizations before and after the BR FISA Orders were, until December 15, 2008, added to the
+Station Table as RAS-approved without NSA OGC review.[^8] Second, NSA discovered that
+
+[^7] As a result of the end-to-end review, NSA also discovered several areas that presented a potential for
+non-compliance or a vulnerability in management and/or oversight controls. While these areas were not
+deemed compliance matters and therefore are not discussed in detail herein, the issues and the steps NSA
+has taken to address them are discussed in the End-to-End Report in sections II.B.1, II.B.4, and II.B.5.
+(TS)
+[^8] This matter was identified as a potential instance of non-compliance on page 4 of Exhibit C to the
+Application in docket number BR 09-01 filed on March 4, 2009, and is discussed in section of II.A.4 of
+the End-to-End Report and on page 12 of Exhibit A. (S)
+
+***
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+10
+31 August 2009 Production
+54
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+historically errors were made when implementing the BR FISA Orders and consequently some
+domestic identifiers were initially RAS-approved without the required review by NSA OGC.
+^(TS//SI//NF)
+
+B. Data Integrity Analysts' Identification and Use of Non-User Specific Identifiers
+(S)
+
+NSA discovered during the end-to-end review that Data Integrity Analysts were, as part
+of their authorized access to the BR metadata, identifying identifiers not associated with specific
+users [REDACTED] and sharing
+those identifiers with analysts through out the NSA not authorized to access the BR metadata.^(10)
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+C. Use of Non-RAS-Approved Correlated Identifiers to Query the BR Metadata
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+The end-to-end review revealed that management practices and NSA tools permitted
+analysts to query the BR metadata using a non-RAS-approved identifier if that identifier was
+correlated to a RAS-approved identifier.^(11) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+historically NSA tools permitted queries of non-RAS-approved identifiers based on [REDACTED] While
+
+^9 This matter was the subject of a preliminary notice of compliance incident filed on June 29, 2009, and is discussed in section of II.B.7 of the End-to-End Report and on pages 12-13 of Exhibit A. (S)
+^10 This matter was the subject of a preliminary notice of compliance incident filed on May 8, 2009, and is discussed in section of II.B.2 of the End-to-End Report and on pages 18-20 of Exhibit A. (S)
+^11 This matter was the subject of a preliminary notice of compliance incident filed on June 15, 2009, and is discussed in section of II.B.3 of the End-to-End Report and on pages 13-15 of Exhibit A. (S)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+11
+31 August 2009 Production
+55
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+D. Improper Dissemination of the Results of BR FISA Queries (TS//SI//NF)
+As a result of the end-to-end review, it was revealed that NSA's historic, general practice as to the dissemination of U.S. person identifying information derived from BR FISA information was to apply United States Signals Intelligence Directive 18 (USSID 18) and not the more restrictive dissemination provisions of the Court's Orders. 12 In addition, NSA also uncovered two specific instances of non-compliance concerning the dissemination of BR FISA query results. First, NSA discovered that unminimized query results were available to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), FBI, and National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) analysts via an NSA database. 13 Second, NSA discovered that on one occasion unminimized U.S. person identifying information was improperly [REDACTED]
+14 (TS//SI//NF)
+E. [REDACTED] (TS//SI//NF)
+is the software tool interface used by analysts to manually query the BR metadata chain summaries. In connection with the end-to-end review, NSA developed a new version of [REDACTED] that limits the number of hops permitted
+
+12 This practice was the subject of a preliminary notice of potential compliance incident filed on June 26, 2009, and specifically mentioned in the Court's Primary Order in docket number BR 09-09. This practice is mentioned in section II.B.9 of the End-to-End Report and discussed more fully on pages 36-38 of Exhibit A. (S)
+13 This matter was the subject of a preliminary notice of compliance incident filed on June 16, 2009, and is discussed in section of II.B.8 of the End-to-End Report. A fuller explanation of this practice is set forth at pages 29-36 of Exhibit A. (S)
+14 This matter was the subject of a preliminary notice of compliance incident filed on June 29, 2009, and is discussed in section of II.B.9 of the End-to-End Report. (S)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+12
+31 August 2009 Production
+56
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+from a RAS-approved telephone identifier to three, in accordance with the Court's Orders.
+During testing of the beta version of [REDACTED], NSA determined that, despite the hop
+restriction, a feature called [REDACTED] could be invoked to
+provide an analyst with the number of unique contacts for a third-hop identifier, a type of
+information that would otherwise only be revealed by a fourth hop.¹⁵ Prior versions of [REDACTED]
+also included the [REDACTED] feature. (TS//SI/NF)
+
+IV. STEPS TAKEN TO REMEDY INSTANCES OF NON-COMPLIANCE (U)
+
+In addition to those instances of non-compliance noted above, Exhibit A and the End-to-
+End Report address three instances of noncompliance noted in the Court's March 2 Order—the
+Telephony Activity Detection Process, [REDACTED]¹⁷ and certain inappropriate queries by NSA
+analysts.¹⁸ All of these instances of non-compliance have been remedied, and the NSA Director
+has attested as to the testing and functionality of the technological remedies employed by NSA.
+Ex. A. at 28. For purposes of discussing the remedies implemented by NSA it is helpful to
+divide the instances of noncompliance into two broad categories: (1) unauthorized queries via
+automated processes and tools; and (2) operator errors within the BR FISA analytic framework.¹⁹
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+¹⁵ This matter was the subject of a preliminary notice of compliance incident filed on August 4, 2009, and
+is discussed on pages 15-17 of Exhibit A. (S)
+¹⁶ This issue is discussed in section of II.A.1 of the End-to-End Report and on pages 5-7 of Exhibit A. (S)
+¹⁷ This issue is discussed in section of II.A.2 of the End-to-End Report and on pages 7-9 of Exhibit A. (S)
+¹⁸ This issue is discussed in section of II.A.3 of the End-to-End Report and on page 9 of Exhibit A. (S)
+¹⁹ The NSA's identification and use of non-user specific identifiers is not addressed below, as that
+formerly non-compliant practice was specifically authorized by the Court in docket number BR 09-09.
+See Primary Order, docket number BR 09-09, at 12. (TS)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+13
+31 August 2009 Production
+57
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+A. Unauthorized Queries Via Automated Processes and Tools (U/POUO)
+NSA has remedied the Telephony Activity Detection Process and [REDACTED] incidents by
+eliminating their ability to access the BR metadata. Ex. A. at 6-8. Specifically, NSA shut down
+the flow of incoming BR metadata into the Telephony Activity Detection Process on January 24,
+2009. Id. at 6. Accordingly, the Telephony Activity Detection Process could no longer query the
+incoming BR metadata with the non-RAS-approved identifiers on the alert list. On February 20,
+2009, NSA prevented the Telephony Activity Detection Process, [REDACTED] or any other
+automated processes and tools from accessing the BR metadata in its [REDACTED] database by
+removing all previously used Public Key Structure (PKI) system-level certificates that gave
+processes and tools access to the BR metadata. 20 Id. at 8-9. By removing these PKI system-level
+certificates NSA revoked all automated processes and tools' access to the BR metadata in
+[REDACTED] and, therefore, rendered the automated query processes and tools inoperable. Id.
+The end-to-end review concluded that apart from the Telephony Activity Detection Process's
+querying of incoming BR metadata, no other automated processes and tools queried BR metadata
+outside of [REDACTED]. Accordingly, the removal of the PKI system-level certificates ensures
+that no automated processes or tools are now permitted to query the BR metadata. (TS//SI//NF)
+The Emphatic Access Restriction (EAR), discussed below, provides further protection
+against automated processes and tools from querying the BR metadata inappropriately.
+Specifically, even if [REDACTED] or some other tool were permitted to access the BR metadata,
+EAR would prevent it from doing so with anything but a RAS-approved identifier. EAR will
+continue to serve this function even if the Court grants NSA's request to resume querying based
+on its own RAS-approval authority. See id. at 28-29. (TS//SI//NF)
+20 A PKI system-level certificate is essentially a "ticket" used by the system to recognize and authenticate
+that the automated capability has the authority to access the database. See Ex. A at 8. (TS//SI//NF)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+14
+31 August 2009 Production
+58
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+B. Operator Errors with the BR FISA Analytic Framework (TS)
+Several instances of non-compliance resulted from analysts' actions that were inconsistent with the Court's Orders rather than the functioning of a specific technological process or tool. Although some human error is inevitable in any activity, NSA has addressed each of the identified areas prone to human error with a combination of improved oversight and training, regular reports to the Court, and technological remedies. (TS)
+
+1. Queries with Non-RAS-Approved Identifiers (S)
+As noted in the Court's March 2 Order and uncovered during the end-to-end review, analysts used non-RAS-approved identifiers to query the BR metadata. See III.C. supra; Ex. D at II.A.3. NSA eliminated the potential for this type of analyst error from being repeated by implementation of the EAR on February 20, 2009. See Ex. A at 9, 15. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The EAR is a software restrictive measure that prohibits queries to the BR metadata in [REDACTED] using non-RAS-approved seeds. Before a given query to the BR metadata is executed, the EAR in effect checks the RAS status of the seed for the query against the Station Table. If the seed for a given query is RAS-approved, the EAR permits the query to be run. If the seed for a given query is not RAS-approved, the EAR will not permit the query to be executed.21 In this way, NSA has provided a technological remedy to the potential for analysts entering non-RAS-approved identifiers as query seeds, and this remedy will continue to apply should the Court permit NSA to resume non-automated querying of the BR metadata. Ex. A at 9-10. (TS//SI//NF)-
+
+21 The EAR does not offer the same protection to the BR metadata outside of [REDACTED] in the [REDACTED] NSA's audit of queries to the [REDACTED] revealed that no inappropriate queries were run by analysts against the BR metadata contained in it. In the future NSA intends to migrate the functionality of the [REDACTED] into [REDACTED] or its successor, to bring all BR metadata under the protection of the EAR. Ex. A at 9 n.5; Ex. D. at 9, 23. (TS)
+
+TOP SECRET/COMINT//NOFORN
+15
+31 August 2009 Production
+59
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+2. Queries More Than Three Hops From RAS-Approved Identifier (S)
+As noted above, the beta version of [REDACTED] and prior versions contained the [REDACTED] feature that gave analysts contacts information that normally is available only on an unauthorized fourth hop from a RAS-approved identifier. NSA corrected [REDACTED] to disable the [REDACTED] feature for last-hop identifiers. As of July 31, 2009, analysts can access the BR metadata contact chain summary repository only through use of [REDACTED]. All prior versions of [REDACTED] have been locked out from access to the BR metadata contact chain summary repository. Ex. A at 16-17. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+3. Improper Designation of Identifiers as RAS-Approved (S)
+As uncovered during the end-to-end review, historically NSA had included on the Station Table as RAS-approved identifiers reasonably believed to be used by U.S. persons without those identifiers being reviewed by NSA OGC. See III.A. supra. The first step to remedying this non-compliance was to change the identifiers that should have been reviewed by NSA OGC from "RAS-approved" to "not-RAS-approved." NSA did this for the identifiers designated as RAS-approved based on being reported to the Intelligence Community in early February 2009. Ex. A. at 12. NSA reports that the few identifiers improperly RAS-approved in 2006 were all identified and disapproved or properly approved in 2006 shortly after they were identified. Id. at 13. Continued training and oversight mechanisms employed by NSA are designed to ensure that these incidents will not be repeated. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+4. Improper Disseminations of U.S. Person Information (S)
+As uncovered during the end-to-end review, NSA disseminated BR metadata-derived U.S. person information in a manner not consistent with the Court's Orders. See III.D. supra. The mechanism that resulted in the inappropriate dissemination [REDACTED] was shut down in
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+16
+31 August 2009 Production
+60
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+advance of the end-to-end review, and, therefore, required no remediation. Moreover, NSA
+confirmed that [REDACTED] purged the inappropriately disseminated information from its systems and
+did not further disseminate it before doing so. Ex. D at 18. NSA disabled external access to the
+database that was the other mechanism for inappropriate disseminations on June 12, 2009. Ex. A
+at 33. NSA's review concluded that approximately one-third of the 250 analysts with permission
+to access the database between August 2005 and January 2009 actually accessed it. Id. at 34.
+NSA further determined that approximately forty-seven analysts queried the database in the
+course of their counterterrorism responsibilities and accessed directories containing the results of
+BR metadata queries, including un-minimized U.S. person-related information. Id. Finally, a
+review of NSA reports containing BR metadata with U.S. person identities indicated a significant
+number of dissemination were approved by an official permitted to approve such determinations
+pursuant to USSID 18, but not the Court's Orders, and without the appropriate determination
+required by the Court's Orders. Id. at 38-39.22 (TS//SI//NF)
+As noted in section VI below, additional training and oversight, as well as the weekly
+reports to the Court on disseminations, should prevent similar instances of noncompliance. 23
+Moreover, as noted in Exhibit A and the End-to-End Report, these and other non-compliant
+dissemination practices were the product of an incomplete understanding of the dissemination
+
+22 In docket number BR 09-09, the Court approved additional individuals to approve disseminations to
+include the Chief, Information Sharing Services, the Senior Operations Officer, the Signals Intelligence
+Directorate (SID) Director, the Deputy Director of NSA, and the Director of NSA. (TS//SI//NF)
+23 In addition to the above practices, NSA's litigation support team conducts prudential searches in
+response to requests from Department of Justice or Department of Defense personnel in connection with
+criminal or detainee proceedings. The team does not perform queries of the BR metadata. See Ex. A at
+36 n.19. The Government respectfully submits that NSA's sharing of U.S. person identifying information
+in this manner does not require a dissemination determination and need not be accounted for in NSA's
+weekly dissemination report. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+17
+31 August 2009 Production
+61
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+requirements set forth in the Court's Order, and as a result of the end-to-end review NSA
+personnel are now well aware of the Court-ordered dissemination requirements. (TS//SI//NF)
+V. OTHER MATTERS (U)
+A. Storage, Handling and Dissemination of Foreign-to-Foreign Records (TS)
+NSA has acquired records of foreign-to-foreign communications from [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] With the possible exception of certain foreign-to-foreign records produced by
+[REDACTED] NSA has stored, handled and disseminated foreign-to-foreign records produced pursuant
+to the Orders in accordance with the terms of the Orders. See Ex. A at 39-44 [REDACTED] 44-46
+[REDACTED] and 46-47 [REDACTED] (TS//SI//NF)
+[REDACTED]
+24
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+18
+31 August 2009 Production
+62
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+[REDACTED] NSA advised that for the first time, in May 2009, [REDACTED] stated it produced foreign-to-foreign records [REDACTED] pursuant to the Orders. [REDACTED] stopped its production of this set of foreign-to-foreign records on May 29, 2009, after service of the Secondary Order in BR 09-06, which carves out foreign-to-foreign records from the description of records to be produced. Id. at 42-43. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+[REDACTED] Furthermore, because the records are records of foreign-to-foreign communications, almost all of them do not concern the communications of U.S. persons. To the extent any of the records concern the communications of U.S. persons, such communications would be afforded the same protections as any other U.S. person communication [REDACTED] authorities. Id. at 43. (TS//SI//NF)
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+19
+31 August 2009 Production
+63
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+B. Storage and Handling of Credit Card Information (TS)
+In the months after the issuance of Orders in docket number BR 06-05, a small
+percentage of records produced by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] contained credit card numbers in one of
+the fields when a caller used a credit card to pay for the call. See Ex. B, docket number BR 06-
+08, at 6-8. At NSA's request, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] removed credit card numbers from this field in
+the records they provided to NSA starting on July 10, 2006, and October 11, 2006, respectively.
+Ex. B, docket number BR 06-12, at 5-7. Since that time, NSA spot checks have confirmed that
+[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] continue to remove credit card numbers from the relevant field. Ex. A. at 48.
+Also since that time, NSA spot checks have identified only one record containing a credit card
+number. Id. That record, identified in a March 2008 spot check, contained a credit card number
+in a field different from the field filtered by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] Id. (TS//SI//NF)
+According to NSA, it is not feasible for NSA to destroy the records received before
+October 2006 and the one identified in March 2008 that contain credit card numbers. At this
+time, the records are stored in one of three locations: back-up tapes, [REDACTED] storage of
+raw records, and the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Destroying records stored in any of these
+25 Although NSA used the records that contain credit card numbers to make chain summaries (which in
+turn are stored in the chain summary database), the credit card numbers did not become part of the chain
+summaries and, therefore, are not stored in the chain summary database. Id. at 48 n.26. (TS//SI//NF)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+20
+31 August 2009 Production
+64
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+three locations requires significant personnel, time, and system resources that are not justified
+given the operational need for certain information and the measures to secure the records. Id. at
+48-50. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+NSA has an operational need for the non-credit card information contained in the records.
+To destroy records in the [REDACTED] that contain credit card numbers, NSA
+would have to destroy a swath of records in addition to those few containing credit card
+numbers. Id. at 49. In the event of a catastrophic failure, NSA would rebuild the contact
+chaining database with records now stored on tapes. If NSA were to destroy those records that
+contain credit card information, either in the [REDACTED] or on tapes, it would
+lack information that is necessary for operations and that otherwise it is authorized to retain
+under the Orders. Id. at 48-49. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Balanced against this significant operational loss is the reasonable measures currently
+taken by NSA to secure the records. Records contained on back-up tapes and in [REDACTED]
+raw records are not available to analysts for queries. In the [REDACTED] , NSA
+masks the credit card numbers when the records are retrieved in response to an analyst query. Id.
+at 48-50. Masking ensures that analysts do not have access to the credit card numbers, and
+analysts cannot unmask the information. Id. at 48 n.26. In the future, when NSA reconstitutes
+the [REDACTED] within another system, see Ex. D at 9, the fields
+containing credit card information will not be included in the data transfer and will be purged.
+Ex. A. at 49. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+VI. PROCEDURES DESIGNED TO MAINTAIN ONGOING COMPLIANCE WITH
+THE ORDERS (U)
+
+Beginning in docket number BR 08-13, the Government has implemented and the Court
+has imposed several requirements that will help ensure compliance with the Orders. Each of
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+21
+31 August 2009 Production
+65
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+these requirements is set forth in the Primary Order in docket number BR 09-09. In general, they
+require regular communications between NSA and the Department of Justice's National Security
+Division (NSD) on significant legal interpretations, compliance with the Orders, and oversight
+responsibilities. Primary Order, docket number BR 09-09, at 13-14. Also, by requiring the
+sharing of NSA's procedures for controlling access and use of the BR metadata and for training
+with the National Security Division, the Order gives NSD greater insight into NSA's
+implementation of its authorities. Id. at 8, 13. (TS//SI//NF)
+Other requirements and self-imposed "fixes," including technological fixes, specifically
+address the problem of unauthorized queries of the BR metadata. As noted above, NSA
+technological fixes prevent any automated querying of the BR metadata and any querying with
+non-RAS-approved identifiers. NSA also has implemented a new user interface [REDACTED]
+– that will limit the number of query hops to three, as authorized by the Orders. Ex. A at 27.
+Apart from these technological fixes, NSA has recently created the new position of Director of
+Compliance, who reports directly to the Director and Deputy Director of NSA and has full-time
+responsibility in this area. Id. at 28. (TS//SI//NF)
+The Order's requirements serve as an important backstop for these technological fixes.
+In the event that NSA seeks to implement an automated query process in the future, it must
+obtain the approval of both NSD and the Court. Primary Order, docket number BR 09-09, at 14.
+The Orders also now require that all persons accessing the data, including technical personnel, be
+briefed on the authorizations and restrictions in Orders regarding the BR metadata. Id, at 10.
+This broader training requirement is designed to prevent, among other things, the creation of
+processes to access the BR metadata by persons lacking a necessary understanding of the
+restrictions. In the event that even these safeguards fail, more explicit requirements for logging
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+access to the BR metadata are designed to identify the source of the non-compliance. See id. at
+9-10. (TS//SI//NF)
+These requirements also provide the Court with additional information regarding NSA's
+implementation of the Orders. Specifically, any renewal Application must include the report on
+the meeting between NSA and NSD regarding compliance with the Orders. Id. at 13-14. In
+addition, NSA must file a report every week describing any dissemination of BR metadata and
+certifying whether NSA followed the Order's requirements for dissemination. Id. at 10-11. The
+dissemination report and the training requirement for persons receiving results of BR metadata
+queries also address NSA's prior non-compliance with the Order's dissemination requirements.
+In addition, following renewal of the authorities in Docket Number BR 09-09 and any
+subsequent renewal, an attorney from NSD will meet with appropriate NSA personnel to brief
+such personnel on the requirements of the Court's authorization. (TS//SI//NF)—
+Last, in the Application that the Government intends to file for the renewal of docket
+number BR 09-09, it will seek authority to resume querying the BR metadata using telephone
+identifiers that NSA has determined meet the RAS standard. Although NSA's violations of the
+Orders did not concern its application of the RAS standard, the standard is the cornerstone
+minimization procedure that ensures the overall reasonableness of the production. It is
+appropriate, therefore, that in connection with the request for authority to make RAS
+determinations the Government proposes two additional minimization and oversight procedures
+concerning RAS determinations and queries. First, NSA plans to review its RAS determinations
+at regular intervals. Specifically, NSA will review a RAS determination at certain intervals: at
+least once every one hundred eighty days for U.S. telephone identifiers or any identifier believed
+to be used by a U.S. person; and at least every year for all other telephone identifiers. Ex. A at
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+23
+31 August 2009 Production
+67
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+25. Second, where such information is available, NSA will make analysts conducting queries
+aware of the time period for which a telephone identifier has been associated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+organizations, in order that the analysis and minimization of the information retrieved from the
+queries may be informed by that fact. Id, at 26, (TS//SI//NF)
+The Application will also include two oversight requirements similar to those included in
+the Order in docket number BR 08-13 and prior Orders. Specifically, twice during the ninety day
+period of authorization, NSD will review NSA's queries of the BR metadata, including a review
+of a sample of the justifications for RAS approval. Moreover, NSA will report to the Court twice
+during the ninety day period of authorization regarding, among other things, its queries of the BR
+metadata. The Court will maintain the authority to approve automated query processes upon
+request from the Government, once DOJ and NSA are comfortable requesting such authority
+from the Court. (TS//SI//NF)
+
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+31 August 2009 Production
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+
+CONCLUSION (U)
+The Government recognizes that no oversight regime will eliminate all risk of non-
+compliance. The above requirements, fixes, and proposed procedures, however, address the
+identified and systemic instances of non-compliance with the Orders and seek to protect against
+vulnerabilities with the implementation of future authorities. The Government respectfully
+submits that together these steps provide a solid foundation to monitor and promote continued
+future compliance. The Government will continue to monitor, evaluate and report to the Court
+on the effectiveness of the oversight and compliance regime discussed herein. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+David S. Kris
+Assistant Attorney General for National Security
+
+By: [REDACTED]
+
+Office of Intelligence
+National Security Division
+United States Department of Justice
+
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+U.S. F.I.S.C. COURT
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+20 AUG 17 PM 4:15
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
+BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
+ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
+OF TANGIBLE THINGS FROM
+[REDACTED]
+Docket number: BR 09-09
+
+DECLARATION OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEITH B. ALEXANDER,
+UNITED STATES ARMY,
+DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+
+(U) BACKGROUND
+
+(U) I, Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander, depose and state as follows:
+
+(U) I am the Director of the National Security Agency ("NSA" or "Agency"), an
+intelligence agency within the Department of Defense ("DoD"), and have served in this
+position since 2005. I currently hold the rank of Lieutenant General in the United States
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20070108
+Declassify On. 20320108
+
+31 August 2009 Production
+70
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Army and, concurrent with my current assignment as Director of the National Security
+Agency, I also serve as the Chief of the Central Security Service and as the Commander
+of the Joint Functional Component Command for Network Warfare. Prior to my current
+assignment, I have held other senior supervisory positions as an officer of the United
+States military, to include service as the Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS, G-2), Headquarters,
+Department of the Army; Commander of the U.S. Army's Intelligence and Security
+Command; and the Director of Intelligence, United States Central Command.
+(U) As the Director of the National Security Agency, I am responsible for
+directing and overseeing all aspects of NSA's cryptologic mission, which consists of
+three functions: to engage in signals intelligence ("SIGINT") activities for the U.S.
+government, to include support to the government's computer network attack activities;
+to conduct activities concerning the security of U.S. national security telecommunications
+and information systems; and to conduct operations security training for the U.S.
+government. Some of the information NSA acquires as part of its SIGINT mission is
+collected pursuant to Orders issued under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
+1978, as amended ("FISA").
+(U) PURPOSE AND SUMMARY
+(TS//SI//NF) This Declaration responds to the Court's Order of 2 March 2009 in
+docket number BR 08-13 and its subsequent orders in docket numbers BR 09-01, BR 09-
+06, and BR 09-09 concerning NSA's incidents of non-compliance in implementing a
+24 May 2006 Order of the Court pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (Access to Certain
+Business Records for Foreign Intelligence and International Terrorism Investigations), as
+well as subsequent renewals of the 24 May 2006 Order. NSA refers to the program in
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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+which such records are acquired and analyzed as the "Business Records FISA Order" or
+as the "BR FISA."
+(TS//SI//NF) The Orders in docket numbers BR 08-13, BR 09-01, BR 09-06, and
+BR 09-09 direct that the government file with the Court, upon completion of NSA's end-
+to-end system engineering and process reviews of its handling of the BR FISA metadata,
+a report that includes, among other things: (1) a description of the results of NSA's end-
+to-end review, to include any additional instances of non-compliance identified
+therefrom; (2) a full discussion of the steps taken to remedy any additional non-
+compliance as well as those incidents described in the Court's 2 March 2009 Order in
+docket number BR 08-13, and an affidavit attesting that any technological remedies have
+been tested and demonstrated to be successful; and (3) the additional minimization and
+oversight procedures the government proposes to employ should the Court decide to
+authorize the government's resumption of regular access¹ to the BR metadata. See, e.g.,
+Primary Order, docket number BR 09-06, at 15-16. This Declaration responds to each of
+these requirements. Each of the matters discussed in this Declaration, with the exception
+of the [REDACTED] matter, is discussed in greater depth in NSA's
+Report dated 25 June 2009 entitled "Implemention of the Foreign Intelligence
+
+¹ (TS//SI//NF) The term "regular access" refers to NSA's proposed resumption of previously authorized
+access to the BR FISA metadata, to include automated alerting and querying of the metadata, as well as the
+authority to establish whether a telephony selector meets the Reasonable Articulable Suspicion ("RAS")
+standard for analysis. I understand that in seeking renewal of the authority granted by the Court in Docket
+Number BR 09-09, the government will not be seeking the resumption of "regular access" to the BR FISA
+metadata. Rather, the government intends to seek authority: (a) for certain designated NSA officials to
+approve access to the BR metadata for purposes of obtaining foreign intelligence information through
+contact chaining [REDACTED] using telephone identifiers that those officials have determined meet
+the RAS standard; and (b) for NSA analysts who have received appropriate training on the BR FISA
+metadata ("BR-cleared analysts") to be able to access the BR metadata to perform queries. Resumption of
+automated alerting and/or querying of the BR metadata will be sought via subsequent submissions and
+commence only with the approval of the Court.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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+Surveillance Court Authorized Business Records FISA Order – NSA Review" (hereafter
+"End-to-End Report"), which is attached hereto.
+(TS//SI//NF) In summary, NSA's end-to-end review compared all aspects of its
+handling of the BR FISA metadata with the requirements of the Orders in docket number
+BR 09-06 and prior docket numbers. This review identified several new issues, in
+addition to the issues previously reported to the Court, that are of concern to NSA. This
+Declaration addresses issues, including those that required some form of technical
+remedy or "fix," which fall into four general categories: the use of automation to assist
+analytic efforts in a manner not authorized; improper analyst queries of the BR metadata
+repository; improper access to or handling of the BR metadata; and lack of a shared
+understanding of the BR program. With the exception of the [REDACTED] issue, each of
+the issues addressed herein is discussed in more detail in the End-to-End Report.
+(TS//SI//NF) The Court's Primary Order in docket number BR 09-09 requires that
+"the government's submission regarding the results of the [BR FISA] end-to-end review"
+include: (1) "a full explanation of why the government has permitted dissemination
+outside NSA of U.S. person information in violation of the Court's Orders in this matter;"
+(2) "a full explanation of the extent to which NSA has acquired call detail records of
+foreign-to-foreign communications from [REDACTED] pursuant to orders of
+the FISC, and whether the NSA's storage, handling, and dissemination of information in
+those records, or derived therefrom, complied with the Court's orders;" and (3) "either (i)
+a certification that any overproduced information, as described in footnote 10 of the
+government's application, has been destroyed, and that any such information acquired
+pursuant to this Order is being destroyed upon recognition; or (ii) a full explanation as to
+
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+why it is not possible or otherwise feasible to destroy such information." Primary Order,
+docket number BR 09-09, at 16-17. This Declaration also responds to each of these
+requirements.
+(TS//SI//NF) The statements made in this Declaration are based upon: my
+personal knowledge; information provided to me by my subordinates in the course of my
+official duties -- in particular as a result of the end-to-end systems engineering and
+process reviews conducted at NSA since the filing of my declarations in this matter on 17
+and 26 February 2009 in docket number BR 08-13; the advice of counsel; and
+conclusions reached in accordance with all of the above.
+I. (U) **END-TO-END REVIEW**
+A. (U) **RESULTS, REMEDIES, AND TESTING**
+1. (U//~~FOUO~~) ~~Use of Automation in a Manner Not Authorized~~
+(TS//SI//NF) **The Telephony Activity Detection (Alerting) Process**
+(TS//SI//NF) As previously reported in my declaration filed on 17 February 2009,
+until 24 January 2009, NSA employed an activity detection ("_alert_") process, which used
+an "_alert list_" consisting of counterterrorism telephony identifiers² to provide automated
+notification to signals intelligence analysts if one of their assigned foreign
+counterterrorism targets was in contact with a telephone identifier in the United States, or
+if one of their domestic targets associated with foreign counterterrorism was in contact
+with a foreign telephone identifier. NSA's process compared the telephony identifiers on
+² (TS//SI//NF) In the context of this Declaration, the term "identifier” means a telephone number, as that
+term is commonly understood and used, as well as other unique identifiers associated with a particular user
+or telecommunications device for purposes of billing and/or routing communications, such as International
+Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) numbers, International Mobile station Equipment Identity (IMEI)
+numbers, and calling card numbers.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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+the alert list against incoming BR FISA telephony metadata as well as against telephony
+metadata that NSA acquired pursuant to its Executive Order (EO) 12333 SIGINT
+authorities. Reports filed with the Court incorrectly stated that NSA had determined that
+all of the telephone identifiers it placed on the alert list were supported by facts giving
+rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion (RAS) that the telephone identifier was
+associated with one of the targeted Foreign Powers as required by the Court's Orders, i.e.,
+RAS approved. In fact, the majority of telephone identifiers included on the alert list had
+not been RAS approved, although the identifiers were associated with the Foreign Powers
+covered by the Business Records FISA Order.
+(TS//SI//NF) The Telephony Activity Detection Process was turned off at 1:45
+a.m. on Saturday, 24 January 2009. On Monday, 26 January 2009, the Telephony
+Activity Detection Process was restarted, but without the use of metadata obtained
+pursuant to the Business Records FISA Order. In other words, at present, NSA compares
+telephony metadata obtained pursuant to its EO 12333 SIGINT authorities against a list
+of telephone identifiers that are of interest to NSA's counterterrorism personnel. No
+BR FISA metadata is being used as an input in the Telephony Activity Detection
+Process.³
+(TS//SI//NF) The shutdown of the Telephony Activity Detection Process was
+done by technical experts assigned to NSA's Technology Directorate (TD) and witnessed
+by representatives from NSA's Signal's Intelligence Directorate (SID). A subsequent
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 2000 Production
+75
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+demonstration to SID Oversight and Compliance on 27 January 2009, following
+resumption of the Telephony Activity Detection Process using telephony metadata
+obtained pursuant to NSA's EO 12333 SIGINT authorities, confirmed that the system
+was not processing any BR FISA metadata. Tests conducted at that time demonstrated
+that no results of "BRF" (Business Records FISA) type were contained in the system, and
+no internal system processes for alerting on BR FISA metadata were running on the
+system. A sample of alert email notifications was examined and only EO 12333 alerts
+were being produced. Since that time, periodic reviews conducted by NSA's Homeland
+Security Analysis Center (HSAC) Technical Director (at least twice per month) have
+confirmed that the Telephony Activity Detection Process system has continued to
+produce only EO 12333 alerts.
+(U//FOUO) The [REDACTED] Mechanism
+(TS//SI//NF). As previously reported in my declaration filed on 26 February 2009,
+NSA analysts working counterterrorism targets had access to a tool known as
+[REDACTED] to assist them in determining if a telephony identifier of interest was
+present in NSA's EO 12333 SIGINT collection or BR FISA metadata repositories and, if
+so, what the level of calling activity was for that identifier. Although this tool could be
+used in a stand-alone manner, it was more frequently invoked by other analytic tools. On
+19 February 2009, NSA confirmed that the [REDACTED] tool enabled analysts to query the
+BR FISA metadata, as well as metadata obtained from EO 12333 SIGINT collection,
+using telephone identifiers that had not been determined to meet the RAS standard.
+(TS//SI//NF) NSA had previously disabled certain tools designed to perform
+searches against BR FISA metadata in [REDACTED] one of the data repositories used to
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+store BR FISA metadata, on 6 February 2009. To prevent additional instances of non-
+compliance in the access to the data within the [REDACTED] BR FISA contact chaining
+repository by automated tools/processes, including [REDACTED] on 20 February 2009,
+NSA removed all existing system level Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) certificates that
+afforded these tools/processes access to the BR FISA metadata in [REDACTED]
+A PKI
+system-level certificate is essentially a "ticket" used by the system to recognize and
+authenticate that the automated capability has the authority to access the database. As a
+result of the removal of system level certificates, all automated query capabilities against
+the [REDACTED] BR FISA contact chaining repository were rendered inoperable.
+Removal of the system level certificates was done by [REDACTED] technical personnel.
+A subsequent inspection conducted by both [REDACTED] technical personnel and SID's
+Oversight and Compliance verified that the certificates were no longer on the list of
+authorized BR FISA users. HSAC analysts then subsequently verified that the automated
+processes no longer worked following removal of the certificates.
+(TS//SI//NF) Subsequent inspection of the system logs, to include an audit of
+activity from 1 March - 1 June 2009, conducted by SID Oversight & Compliance,
+confirmed that the system level certificates were no longer able to access the BR FISA
+metadata in [REDACTED] These system logs, which document any person or process
+submitting queries to the [REDACTED] BR FISA contact chaining repository, indicated
+that only manual queries by individual BR-cleared analysts were performed. These logs
+were then used by SID Oversight & Compliance to audit each analyst's queries of the BR
+4
+(S) [REDACTED] discussed below, exists outside of
+[REDACTED] and, therefore, was not affected by this remedy.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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+77
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+FISA metadata. Continued periodic review of these logs will confirm that no automated processes are gaining access to the BR FISA metadata in [REDACTED] until such time that a tested and Court-approved capability is brought into operation.
+
+## 2. (TS//SI//NF) Improper Queries of the BR Metadata Repository
+
+### (U//FOUO) Improper Analyst Queries
+
+(TS//SI//NF) My declaration filed on 26 February 2009 identified and discussed queries using non-RAS approved identifiers of the BR FISA metadata by analysts who did not realize their queries were reaching into the BR FISA metadata. NSA implemented a software modification (the "Emphatic Access Restriction" or "EAR") that allows chaining on only those identifiers that have been determined to satsify the RAS standard. The EAR is designed to eliminate the possibility of this problem recurring.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) As previously reported to the Court, three NSA analysts inadvertently performed chaining within the BR FISA metadata using non-RAS approved identifiers. To ensure compliance with the Business Record FISA Order's requirement that NSA personnel use only RAS-approved identifiers to query the BR FISA metadata, NSA made system level changes to the BR FISA [REDACTED] repository (Action 1) that is used by analysts to perform contact chaining [REDACTED]. This software restrictive measure, the EAR, ensures queries are employed using only RAS-approved identifiers as seeds and prohibits queries made with non-RAS-approved identifiers as seeds against the [REDACTED] BR FISA contact chaining repository.⁵
+
+S [REDACTED] discussed below, exists outside of [REDACTED] and, therefore, queries to it are not vetted by the EAR.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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+78
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+(TS//SI//NF)[REDACTED] was the software tool
+interface used by analysts to manually query the BR FISA chain summaries in
+[REDACTED] at the time the EAR was implemented. The EAR is written into the
+middleware.⁶ As a BR-cleared analyst logs into [REDACTED], the
+Authentication Service determines if the user is approved for access to the BR FISA
+metadata. However, before the middleware will execute the query, the EAR requires that
+it access a [REDACTED] database that contains the disposition of RAS-approved
+identifiers. [REDACTED] now obtains from HSAC, on an approximately hourly basis, the
+most up-to-date Station Table with the current list of RAS-approved identifiers. (The
+Station Table serves as NSA's definitive list of identifiers that have undergone RAS
+determinations.) Upon obtaining the RAS-approval status of the query "seed," the EAR
+determines whether to allow the middleware to conduct the query or prohibit it.
+Additional "hop" queries will be permitted by EAR as long as the lineage of an identifier
+resolves back to a RAS-approved "seed." As discussed further below, NSA began to
+implement [REDACTED] in late July 2009, which, as an additional middleware software
+restrictive measure, will limit the number of hops permitted from a "seed" to three, in
+accordance with the Court's Orders. As of 31 July 2009, access to the [REDACTED] BR
+FISA contact chaining repository can only be achieved through use of [REDACTED]
+(discussed below). All prior versions of [REDACTED] have been locked out from access to
+this data.
+
+⁶ (U) Middleware is a general term for any programming that serves to "glue together" or mediate between
+two separate and usually already existing programs. A common application of middleware is to allow
+programs written for access to a particular database to access other databases.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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+(TS//SI//NF) To further mitigate the possibility of additional instances of non-
+compliant querying of the BR FISA material, NSA created a software interface (Action
+2) that requires authorized analysts affirmatively to invoke an option (or "opt in") for
+access. This "opt in" measure was designed prior to the end-to-end review to ensure that
+analysts know when they have accessed the [REDACTED] BR FISA metadata repository.
+As an additional remedy (Action 3) and to ensure queries against the BR FISA metadata
+are evaluated against the most current list of RAS-approved identifiers, NSA now ensures
+that [REDACTED], the system that is used for contact chaining [REDACTED] against
+the BR FISA repository, is updated on an hourly basis with the most current list of RAS-
+approved identifiers from the Station Table.
+(TS//SI//NF) The software measures described in Actions 1 and 2 above were
+tested by [REDACTED] technical personnel at the component level via unit tests, a
+methodology used to verify that individual units of source code are working properly.
+Each affected software component was modified as necessary, and then specific tests
+were conducted to ensure the proper operation of that software component. For Action 1,
+the test methodology for the EAR software consisted of standard component testing. The
+tests included attempts to query with both approved and non-approved identifiers.
+Queries against approved identifiers ran successfully, while queries against non-approved
+identifiers failed. As the deployment of the EAR was done with urgency to remedy this
+compliance issue, initial testing was conducted over a period of two days. For this
+reason, the full test suite was re-run the week following the EAR's implementation to re-
+verify test results. The testing was judged to be complete and no "bugs" or deficiencies
+were found. For Action 2, the test included attempts to use the approved user interface
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+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+
+(which operated correctly) and the prohibited user interfaces (which failed). Action 3
+was tested by verifying receipt of the expected update file on an hourly basis, comparing
+the file sizes of the file-sent and file-received, and automated production of an e-mail
+verifying that the status changes had been applied to the operational system. Following
+testing, the system was demonstrated to show correct operation to TD leadership,
+members of the HSAC, SID Oversight & Compliance, and NSA's Office of General
+Counsel (OGC). Subsequent inspection of system logs, to include an audit of activity
+from 1 March - 1 June 2009, conducted by SID Oversight & Compliance, provided
+additional verification that the system was operating correctly.
+**U.S. Identifiers Designated as RAS-Approved without OGC Review**
+**(TS//SI//NF) Between 24 May 2006 and 2 February 2009, NSA Homeland**
+Mission Coordinators (HMCs) or their predecessors concluded that approximately 3,000
+domestic telephone identifiers reported to Intelligence Community agencies satisfied the
+RAS standard and could be used as seed identifiers. However, at the time these domestic
+telephone identifiers were designated as RAS-approved, NSA's OGC had not reviewed
+and approved their use as "seeds" as required by the Court's Orders. NSA remedied this
+compliance incident by re-designating all such telephone identifiers as non RAS-
+approved for use as seed identifiers in early February 2009. NSA verified that although
+some of the 3,000 domestic identifiers generated alerts as a result of the Telephony
+Activity Detection Process discussed above, none of those alerts resulted in reports to
+Intelligence Community agencies.⁷
+
+²(TS//SI//NF) The alerts generated by the Telephony Activity Detection Process did not then and does not
+now, feed the NSA counterterrorism target knowledge database described in Part I.A.3 below.
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
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+(TS//SI//NF) Another historic incident of non-compliance, uncovered during the
+end-to-end review, relates to errors made in the process of implementing the initial BR
+FISA Orders in 2006, when a few domestic telephone identifiers were designated as
+RAS-approved and chained without OGC approval due to analyst errors. For example, a
+process error occurred when an analyst inadvertently selected an incorrect option which
+put the domestic telephone identifier into a large list of foreign identifiers which did not
+require OGC approval as part of the RAS approval process. The HMC failed to notice
+the domestic identifier in the large list of foreign identifiers at the time, and once the RAS
+justification was approved, the domestic telephone identifier was chained without having
+first gone through an NSA OGC First Amendment review as required by the BR FISA
+Orders. NSA estimates that this type of analyst error occurred only a few times. Each
+time an error of this type was identified through NSA's quality control regime, senior
+HMCs provided additional guidance and training to analysts, as appropriate, and the
+incorrectly approved identifier was changed to non-RAS approved and then re-submitted
+for proper approval and OGC review.
+(TS//SI//NF) Use of Correlated Identifiers to Query the BR FISA Metadata
+(TS//SI//NF) The end-to-end review uncovered the fact that NSA's practice of
+using correlated identifiers to query the BR FISA metadata had not been fully described
+to, nor approved by, the Court. An identifier is considered correlated with other
+identifiers when each identifier is shown to identify the same communicant(s). [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 2009 Production
+82
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+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+(TS//SI//NF) NSA analysts authorized to query the BR FISA metadata routinely
+[REDACTED] to query the BR FISA metadata without a
+separate RAS determination on each correlated identifier. In other words, if there was a
+successful RAS determination made on any one of the identifiers in th[REDACTED]
+correlation[REDACTED], and all of the correlated identifiers [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] were considered RAS-approved for purposes of the query because they were all
+associated with the [REDACTED] NSA obtained [REDACTED] correlations from a
+variety of sources to include Intelligence Community reporting, but the tool that the
+analysts authorized to query the BR FISA metadata primarily used to make correlations is
+called [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 2009 Production
+83
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+(TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED] - a database
+that holds correlations [REDACTED] between identifiers of
+interest, to include results from [REDACTED] was the primary means by which
+[REDACTED] correlated identifiers were used to query the BR FISA metadata. On
+6 February 2009, prior to the implementation of the EAR, [REDACTED]
+access to BR FISA metadata was disabled, preventing [REDACTED] from
+providing automated correlation results to BR FISA-authorized analysts. In addition, the
+implementation of the EAR on 20 February 2009 ended the practice of treating
+[REDACTED] correlations as RAS-approved in manual queries conducted within [REDACTED]
+since the EAR requires each identifier to be individually RAS-approved prior to it being
+used to query the BR FISA metadata. NSA ceased the practice of treating
+correlations as RAS-approved within the [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] in conjunction with the March 2009 Court Order.
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+-(TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED] Display Feature Provided
+Information Concerning Contacts of Third-Hop Identifiers
+(TS//SI//NF) As discussed above [REDACTED] is the software tool interface used by
+analysts to manually query the BR FISA chain summaries in [REDACTED] The latest
+version of [REDACTED] as noted above, limits the number of "hops"
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 2009 Production
+84
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+permitted from a "seed" to three, in accordance with the Court's Orders. During testing
+of the beta version of [REDACTED] and its hop restriction, NSA determined that, despite
+the hop restriction, a feature called [REDACTED] could
+be invoked to provide an analyst with the number of unique contacts for a third-hop
+identifier, a type of information that would otherwise only be revealed by a fourth hop.⁹
+This feature did not return to the analyst any information on the contacts of the last
+selector in a contact chain other than their total number of unique contacts. After
+consultation with NSA OGC, the [REDACTED] feature in the beta version of [REDACTED]
+was disabled for last-hop identifiers.¹⁰ This corrected version of [REDACTED] was
+deployed to select users beginning on 23 July 2009.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The [REDACTED] feature was not exclusive to the beta version of
+[REDACTED] prior versions of [REDACTED], since its first delivery beginning in late
+2001/early 2002, provided analysts the [REDACTED] feature. In prior versions of
+[REDACTED], Look Ahead was generally the same: if an analyst activated [REDACTED] in his
+or her preferences his or her BR FISA contact chaining query results would include the
+number of unique contacts for each returned identifier, including for identifiers in the
+third hop from the RAS-approved seed.
+
+²(S) NSA discovered this issue subsequent to finalization of the end to end report. DoJ, National Security
+Division (NSD) personnel were notified of the [REDACTED] feature on 29 July 2009, and
+orally notified Court Advisors on 30 July 2009. The Court was formally notified of this matter with a
+notice filed on 4 August 2009 in accordance with Rule 10(c) of the FISC Rules of Procedure.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 2008 Production
+85
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+(TS//SI//NF) On 24 July 2009, HSAC instructed all persons authorized to query
+the BR FISA metadata not already using [REDACTED] to migrate to [REDACTED] as soon
+as possible and uninstall all previous versions of the [REDACTED] software. As of 31 July
+2009, access to the [REDACTED] BR FISA contact chaining repository can only be
+achieved through use of [REDACTED]. All prior versions of [REDACTED] have been locked
+out from access to this data. Following the lock out of all prior [REDACTED] versions, the
+system was demonstrated to show correct operation to TD leadership, the Chief HSAC,
+and members of SID's Oversight & Compliance. Should the Court authorize additional
+analysts to query the BR FISA metadata, NSA will ensure that they only do so with
+[REDACTED] or its successor that likewise does not permit [REDACTED] to display the
+number of unique contacts for a third-hop identifier in the BR FISA metadata.
+(TS//SI//NF) NSA identified two common practices used by BR metadata analysts
+that mitigated [REDACTED] potential for non-compliance. First, although NSA analysts
+were permitted three hops in the BR FISA metadata from a RAS-approved seed, in
+practice NSA analysts infrequently chained out beyond the second hop. Second,
+[REDACTED] users frequently disabled [REDACTED] because its use resulted in slower
+queries. To the extent that [REDACTED] was used with BR FISA metadata, NSA has
+concluded, based on discussions with [REDACTED] users, that the information returned by
+[REDACTED] would not have been disseminated. Instead, [REDACTED] ad information was
+used by NSA personnel for target development purposes. The number of unique contacts
+of a third-hop identifier assisted analysts in determining whether the third-hop identifier
+was one of genuine interest or not, such as a [REDACTED] identifier that might be added
+to a defeat list.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 2009 Production
+86
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+
+3. (U//FOUO) Improper Access to or Handling of the BR FISA Metadata
+(TS//SI//NF) Data Integrity Analysts' Use of BR FISA Metadata
+
+(TS//SI//NF) As part of their Court-authorized function of ensuring BR FISA metadata is properly formatted for analysis, Data Integrity Analysts seek to identify numbers in the BR FISA metadata that are not associated with specific users, e.g., "high volume identifiers."
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+NSA
+determined during the end-to-end review that the Data Integrity Analysts' practice of populating non-user specific numbers in NSA databases had not been described to the Court.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) For example, NSA maintains a database, [REDACTED] which is widely used by analysts and designed to hold identifiers, to include the types of non-user specific numbers referenced above, that, based on an analytic judgment, should not be tasked to the SIGINT system. In an effort to help minimize the risk of making incorrect associations between telephony identifiers and targets, the Data Integrity Analysts provided [REDACTED] included in the BR metadata to [REDACTED] A small number of [REDACTED] BR metadata numbers were stored in a file that was accessible by the BR FISA-enabled [REDACTED] a federated query tool that allowed approximately 200 analysts to obtain as much information as possible about a particular identifier of interest. Both [REDACTED] and the BR FISA-enabled [REDACTED] allowed analysts outside of those authorized by the Court to access the non-user specific number lists.
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+31 August 2009 Production
+87
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In January 2004, [REDACTED] engineers developed a "defeat list" process to identify and remove non-user specific numbers that are deemed to be of little analytic value and that strain the system's capacity and decrease its performance. In building defeat lists, NSA identified non-user specific numbers in data acquired pursuant to the BR FISA Order as well as in data acquired pursuant to EO 12333. Since August 2008, [REDACTED] had also been sending all identifiers on the defeat list to the [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) While the positive impacts that result in making these numbers available to analysts outside of those authorized by the Court seem to be in keeping with the spirit of reducing unnecessary telephony collection and minimizing the risk of making incorrect associations between telephony identifiers and targets, upon identifying this as an area of concern NSA took several remedial actions to end these practices. As of 2 May 2009, NSA quarantined the BR-derived identifiers on [REDACTED] On 12 May 2009, NSA shut off access to the file containing the small number of BR-derived [REDACTED] identifiers by the BR FISA-enabled [REDACTED] tool. On 11 May 2009, [REDACTED] removed eight BR FISA identifiers from its SIGINT-only defeat list.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) To verify the technical measures taken were successful, from 1-2 May 2009, technical personnel segregated and deactivated BR FISA-derived data in [REDACTED] previously entered by the Data Integrity Analysts. The [REDACTED] database is hosted in a [REDACTED] database. Each record contains a STATUS field that is either set to "ACTIVE" or "DELETE." If the STATUS field is set
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 2009 Production
+88
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+to "ACTIVE,” then the selector is a valid phone number and is being used for a purpose
+of which NSA is not interested; however, the record is available for query by analysts and
+follow-on systems. If the STATUS field is set to "DELETE," then the record is
+unavailable to analysts or other systems. In order to segregate and deactivate the BR
+FISA-derived records, the decision was made to change the STATUS field from
+“ACTIVE” to “DELETE,” which means that the number is unavailable to NSA analysts
+or other systems. Due to the volume of entries, a program was written and executed to
+change the status.
+(TS//SI//NF) After testing the program on a small sampling of data and the test
+results were found to be accurate, the program was executed. Technical personnel
+monitored initial execution and performed a series of tests to validate the results. At the
+completion of program execution, Technical Personnel again performed those tests to
+validate the results. The validation testing was performed three times and results were
+consistent.
+(TS//SI//NF) The Primary Order in docket number BR 09-09, dated 9 July 2009,
+now permits NSA to use certain non-user specific numbers and [REDACTED] identifiers
+for purposes of metadata reduction and management.
+(TS//SI//NF) Handling of BR FISA Metadata
+(TS//SI//NF) The end-to-end review uncovered that NSA's data protection
+measures were not constructed exactly as the Court Order sets out. Specifically, while
+the Order requires processing of the data to be carried out on “select” machines using
+"encrypted communications," the protections NSA affords the data, though different, are
+quite effective. NSA provides strong and robust physical and security access controls,
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 2009 Production
+89
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+but there are not specifically designated machines on which the technical personnel are
+required to work nor are the communications encrypted. To accurately reflect NSA's
+data protection measures, NSA worked with the Department of Justice (DoJ) to revise the
+orders proposed to and ultimately adopted by the Court in docket number BR 09-06.
+(TS//SI//NF) Data Integrity Analysts sometimes pulled samples of BR metadata
+onto a non-audited group/shared directory to carry out authorized activities. While the
+Data Integrity Analysts are authorized to access the data, they are not authorized to move
+it from the auditable repository into a shared directory where analysts, BR-cleared and
+otherwise, could have viewed the data. This shared folder was in essence a work space in
+which the Data Integrity Analysts could perform their authorized activities. There is,
+however, no reason to believe that analysts, BR-cleared or otherwise, accessed the BR
+metadata through the shared directory: only a small group of non-cleared analysts had
+access to the files on this server and it would have been outside the scope of their duties
+to access the BR metadata samples on the group/shared directory. It is also unlikely that
+any of the cleared analysts would have accessed this data. As an extra safeguard, NSA
+has implemented additional access controls that provide appropriate storage areas for the
+samples of BR FISA metadata used by Data Integrity Analysts for technical purposes.
+(TS//SI//NF) System Developer Access to BR FISA Metadata while Testing New
+Tools
+(TS//SI//NF) During the review NSA discovered that a group of software
+developers designing a next generation metadata analysis graphical user interface (GUI),
+[REDACTED] is the replacement for [REDACTED] and
+uses the same authentication/authorization mechanism as [REDACTED], had queried the BR
+FISA metadata 20 times while running tests between September 2008 and February 2009.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 2009 Production
+90
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+This access occurred due to the dual responsibilities of the individuals involved. The
+developers on [REDACTED] also have maintenance responsibilities of the
+operational system, [REDACTED], where their access to BR FISA is warranted on a
+continual basis. While the actions were in keeping with the Court Orders in place at the
+time of the queries, under the current Court Order the developers will require OGC
+approval prior to engaging in their development and testing activities.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) When this issue surfaced, NSA implemented a software change on
+19 March 2009 to prevent the [REDACTED] GUI from accessing BR FISA
+metadata regardless of the user's access level or the RAS status of the identifier.¹¹ This
+change was tested by [REDACTED] developers and [REDACTED] technical
+personnel via a demonstration that the [REDACTED] could not be used against
+BR FISA metadata even when a BR FISA-cleared user attempted to do so. NSA also
+implemented an oversight process whereby all BR FISA-authorized technical personnel
+who have both maintenance and development responsibilities have their accesses to BR
+FISA metadata revoked when involved in new systems development, except when
+granted by NSA's OGC on a case-by-case basis. This process will ensure no inadvertent
+access to the data until such time as these technical personnel receive OGC authorization
+to access BR FISA metadata to test technological measures designed to enable
+compliance with the Court Order. SID Oversight & Compliance is notified each time
+anyone's permission to access the BR FISA metadata is changed and tracks these
+changes for compliance purposes.
+
+---
+¹¹ (TS//SI//NF) As of 20 February, EAR would have prevented any query made through the [REDACTED] GUI that included a non-RAS-approved identifier.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 2009 Production
+91
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+(TS//SI//NF) External Access to Unminimized BR FISA Metadata Query Results
+(TS//SI//NF) During the end-to-end review, NSA's Review Team learned that analysts from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) had access to unminimized BR FISA query results via an NSA counterterrorism target knowledge database. This matter is discussed in more detail below in Section II.
+4. (TS//SI//NF) Lack of a Shared Understanding of the BR Program
+(S//NF) [REDACTED] Not Audited Prior to January 2009
+(TS//SI//NF) The end-to-end review surfaced an issue concerning proper auditing of the [REDACTED] BR FISA chaining summary repository in which contact summaries are stored and where the bulk of metadata analysis takes place, a separate database, the [REDACTED] stores particular fields from each record (as opposed to summaries of those records). This database is used regularly by the Data Integrity Analysts but is also accessible by other analysts authorized to query the BR FISA metadata. When a report is to be issued based on analysis conducted in the repository of contact summaries, analysts often verify what they intend to report by accessing the records in this second data repository. The end-to-end review uncovered the fact that this second database had not been audited. In response, NSA modified the database to enhance its auditability and NSA has audited every query made in the database since February 2009 and found no indication of improper queries. 12
+12 (TS//SI//NF) Although the [REDACTED] suffered a system crash in September 2008, NSA was ultimately able to recover sufficient data to permit NSA Oversight & Compliance personnel to conduct sample audits of queries since the Order's inception. These sample audits revealed no unauthorized access to nor improper queries against the BR FISA metadata.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 2009 Production
+92
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+(TS//SI//NF)Provider Asserts That Foreign-to-Foreign Metadata Was Provided
+Pursuant to Business Records Court Order
+(TS//SI//NF) The end-to-end review team learned that [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+This matter is discussed in more detail below in
+Section III.
+B. (U) MINIMIZATION AND OVERSIGHT PROCEDURES
+(TS//SI//NF) In addition to the steps taken to remedy the specific issues identified
+above, NSA plans to institute additional oversight and compliance processes designed to
+ensure that NSA will comply with any order authorizing NSA to resume regular access to
+the BR FISA metadata.
+(TS//SI//NE) Several additional procedures already have been incorporated into
+the Court's Primary Order in docket number BR 09-09. The Primary Order now imposes
+additional access controls for technical personnel. In the past, NSA had logged queries to
+the BR metadata by analysts and briefed only those analysts on the authorization granted
+by the Orders. Now, the Orders require NSA to log access to the BR FISA metadata by
+technical personnel as well as by analysts, and to brief technical personnel, as well as
+analysts, on the authorization granted by the Orders. See Primary Order, docket number
+BR 09-09, at 9-10. These tightened controls should provide greater accountability for
+any decision to access the BR FISA metadata and will educate all personnel, particularly
+those who set up the tools and processes for accessing the BR FISA metadata, about the
+rules governing access and use. Additionally, the Primary Order now incorporates
+mechanisms to better ensure that the results of queries to the BR FISA metadata are
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 2009 Production
+93
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+treated in accordance with the Court's Orders. Specifically, NSA is now providing
+weekly dissemination reports to the Court and analysts not cleared to query the metadata
+are not permitted access to query results before they receive appropriate training. See id.
+at 10-12.
+- (TS///SI//NF) The current Primary Order also incorporates the additional
+oversight procedures first proposed by the government in its application in docket
+number BR 09-01. See id. at 8, 13-14. In general, those additional oversight procedures
+require greater coordination between various NSA components and DoJ's National
+Security Division concerning implementation and interpretation of the Orders. They also
+require that the Court approve the implementation of any automated process involved in
+the querying of the BR FISA metadata. These additional procedures are designed to
+eliminate the risk of incorrect legal interpretations, to ensure timely notice to DoJ and the
+Court of material issues, and to ensure that any automated query process has been tested
+and demonstrated to be compliant with the Orders, and approved by the Court, before
+implementation.
+(TS//SI//NF) NSA will also propose several new minimization and oversight
+procedures in the application seeking the renewal of docket number BR 09-09. The
+application will request authority for NSA to resume approving telephone identifiers for
+contact chaining [REDACTED] First, the application will propose that NSA re-
+visit its RAS determinations at certain intervals: at least once every one hundred and
+eighty days for U.S. telephone identifiers or any identifier believed to be used by a U.S.
+person; and at least every year for all other telephone identifiers. This new re-validation
+procedure is designed to ensure that for as long as NSA queries the BR FISA metadata
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 2009 Production
+94
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+with RAS-approved telephone identifiers, those identifiers will continue to meet the RAS
+standard. Second, the application will propose an express requirement that, where NSA
+has affirmative information that a RAS-approved telephone identifier was, but may not
+presently be, or is, but was not formerly, associated with a Foreign Power, analysis and
+minimization of results of queries using that identifier be informed by that fact. This
+requirement is designed to focus NSA's analysis on the period for which the RAS-
+approved telephone identifier is associated with a Foreign Power.
+[REDACTED] NSA has recently reviewed and revalidated the oversight
+documentation governing the BR FISA. This documentation consists of a set of Standard
+Operating Procedures (SOPs). These SOPs address: access to BR FISA metadata; BR
+FISA audit procedures; compliance notifications; DoJ and NSA OGC spot checks; and
+the respective roles of various NSA personnel involved in oversight and compliance
+activities.
+[REDACTED] More recently, NSA's Associate Directorate of Education and
+Training (ADET) has redesigned the BR FISA training package to ensure common and
+expert level proficiency in the rules and procedures governing appropriate handling of the
+BR FISA metadata. ADET, together with NSA OGC and the SID Oversight &
+Compliance organization, has developed and is in the process of implementing a series of
+on-line training modules, complete with competency testing, specifically addressing
+activities conducted with respect to the BR FISA Order. Moreover, an oral competency
+test is currently being administered to each Homeland Mission Coordinator at the
+completion of the training they are currently receiving to ensure they understand the
+restrictions governing access to the BR FISA metadata.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 200% Production
+95
+-TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+(TS//SI//NF) Should the Court approve the application seeking the renewal of
+docket number BR 09-09 and grant NSA authority to resume approving telephone
+identifiers for contact chaining [REDACTED] NSA will update its SOPs and
+training package for the BR FISA to account for the change in authority and the new
+procedures associated with that change.
+(TS//SI//NF) NSA has implemented and intends to implement additional software
+restrictions and changes to the BR metadata system architecture. As discussed above,
+NSA implemented a software change, [REDACTED] in July 2009 to restrict analyst
+queries to the number of hops authorized by the Orders. 13 Furthermore, NSA is
+revamping its baseline system architecture, to include formal system engineering of all
+aspects governing the interaction of analysts and processes. Using principles of system
+engineering, configuration management, and access control, NSA has explored a future
+implementation of the BR FISA program to be used should the Court authorize NSA to
+resume regular access to the BR FISA metadata. This architecture has the potential to
+offer more effective management of the system as a whole, and a team of employees will
+collaborate to manage the entire system. The single approach, providing visibility into
+the overall structure of the system to the entire team, together with the technology
+solutions discussed above, will help prevent an isolated decision to connect a tool or
+process to the BR FISA database.
+(TS//SI//NF) In addition, requirements from the Court Order will be formally
+translated by NSA into system requirements prior to any changes to the system
+
+13 (S) NSA OGC granted approval for developers to access BR FISA metadata for the specific purpose of
+testing and demonstrating [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 2009 Production
+96
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+architecture, which should prevent problems such as the misunderstanding among
+different personnel as to how the Telephony Activity Detection Process functioned.
+Finally, NSA has recently created the new position of Director of Compliance, reporting
+directly to me and the Deputy Director of NSA. The Director of Compliance has full-
+time responsibility in this area. The Director of Compliance will be responsible for
+continuous modernization and enforcement of our mission compliance strategies and
+activities to ensure their relevance and effectiveness. At the same time, this new position
+will serve as an ongoing reminder of the importance of compliance work, and provide
+greater visibility and transparency in this essential area.
+(TS//SI//NF) The Court entrusted NSA with extraordinary authority, and with it
+came the highest responsibility for compliance and protection of privacy rights. In
+several instances, NSA implemented its authority in a manner inconsistent with the
+Orders, and some of these inconsistencies were not recognized for more than two and a
+half years. These are matters I take very seriously, and the changes NSA has made and
+will make as a result of the end-to-end review, with regard to both analyst access and the
+handling of data, are intended to address them directly and to provide an environment for
+successful implementation and management of the program should the Court decide to
+authorize NSA's resumption of regular access to the BR metadata. The technological
+remedies discussed herein have remedied the identified instances of noncompliance and
+should significantly improve future compliance with the Court's Orders. I attest that each
+of these remedies has been tested and demonstrated to be successful insofar as each
+functions as intended. Although no corrective measures are infallible, I believe that this
+more robust regime and the technological remedies NSA has instituted, particularly the
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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+implementation of the EAR, represent significant steps to reduce the possibility of any
+future compliance issues and to ensure that mechanisms are in place to detect and
+respond quickly if a compliance incident were to occur.
+II. (~~TS//SI//NF~~) _PRE-JUNE 2009 BR FISA DISSEMINATION PRACTICES_
+(~~TS//SI//NF~~)-In a 16 June 2009 notice to the Court, the government reported that
+NSA had provided personnel from CIA, FBI, and NCTC access to a database that
+contained, among other things, some unminimized results of BR FISA metadata queries.
+NSA did not make all, or even most, BR FISA query results available via this database.
+Instead, NSA placed only certain BR FISA query results in the database, generally in
+response to specific requests for information received from specially-cleared personnel
+from NSA, CIA, FBI, or NCTC.
+(~~TS//SI//NE~~) In response to this compliance incident, the Court issued an order on
+22 June 2009 which directed NSA to provide the Court with "a full explanation of why
+the government has permitted the dissemination outside NSA of U.S. person information
+without regard to whether such dissemination complied with the clear and acknowledged
+requirements for sharing U.S. person information ... pursuant to the Court's orders" in the
+BR docket. This section responds to the Court's Order for a full explanation of how this
+compliance incident occurred. It also describes actions NSA has taken to investigate and
+remediate the problem.
+(~~S/NF~~)
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 2009 Production
+98
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+¹⁴(TS) The BR FISA end to end report stated that approximately 200 external analysts were permitted access to the database; further investigation revealed that the number is actually closer to approximately 250.
+
+~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~
+31 August 2009 Production 99
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+(TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+(TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+(S/NF) [REDACTED]
+(TS//SI//NF) The Court's 2006 BR FISA Order authorized NSA to acquire the [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 2009 Production
+100
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+(TS//SI//NF)
+[REDACTED]
+(U//FOUO) In contrast, USSID 18 permits NSA to disseminate outside of NSA information identifying U.S. persons if the U.S. person information is necessary to understand foreign intelligence or assess its importance. USSID 18 also permits the Deputy Chief of Information Sharing Services, among others, to approve disseminations of U.S. person identifying information.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 2008 Production
+101
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+(U) Discovery and Response to the Problem
+(TS//SI//NF) In June 2009, during the course of NSA's end-to-end review of the
+Agency's implementation of the BR Order, NSA identified as a compliance matter the
+use of the database to make unminimized BR and [REDACTED] query results available to FBI,
+CIA, and NCTC. NSA personnel also determined that, despite the disabling of the
+hyperlink button in July 2008, external analysts could have continued accessing the
+database if they retained the Uniform Resource Locator (URL) address for the database.
+After this problem was identified on 11 June 2009, NSA immediately began terminating
+individual external customer account access to the target knowledge database. NSA
+completed this action by 12 June 2009.
+(TS//SI//NF) To determine why this compliance issue occurred, NSA spoke with
+the senior analysts and oversight personnel who were aware of the Court-ordered
+minimization requirements and of how the database was used. These conversations
+revealed NSA personnel generally followed the minimization requirements when the
+Agency issued formal reports based on queries of the metadata acquired pursuant to the
+Court's BR FISA Orders. However, even though the applicability of the minimization
+requirements to the shared database is clear in hindsight, until the issue was discovered
+during NSA's end-to-end review [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] the new
+[REDACTED] dissemination procedures required by the Court's Orders.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 20093 Production
+102
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+(TS//SI//NF) Since identification of this matter, NSA has attempted to determine
+the actual extent of access to the database and/or use of the BF [REDACTED] hetadata. As
+part of that effort, the Agency has conducted a detailed audit of log-in activity of external
+analysts from each of the participating organizations. The audit revealed that no
+external analysts accessed the database after January 2009. Prior to that, [REDACTED]
+approximately 250 analysts had permission to access the
+database but only about one-third actually did so. Of that number, only approximately 47
+external analysts did more than log in and change their passwords. These approximately
+47 external analysts appear to have queried the database in the course of their
+counterterrorism responsibilities and they accessed directories that contained the results
+of [REDACTED] BR queries, including unminimized U.S. person-related information.
+The BR [REDACTED] derived U.S. person information consisted of unmasked telephone
+numbers or email addresses that were returned in response to RAS-approved queries
+made of the underlying metadata.
+(TS//SI//NF) In addition to the audits, NSA also asked CIA, FBI, and NCTC to
+describe how their personnel made use of their access to the database.¹⁷ The NCTC
+employees with access to the database reported that they did not make use of any
+unminimized BR [REDACTED] query results in any NCTC analytic products. Only two FBI
+analysts accessed this database while researching counterterrorism leads. Several other
+[REDACTED]
+
+¹⁷(S) The response from each agency covered the entire period of time that their respective personnel had
+access to the database.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 2009 Production
+103
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+FBI analysts believe they may have accessed the database while working closely with a
+team of FBI analysts [FBI Team 10] who were detailed to NSA and working under
+NSA's control. 18 The FBI reported that none of the external FBI analysts published or
+disseminated anything as a result of their access to the database and FBI believes that it is
+"highly unlikely that any FBI-published analytical products or investigative reports ever
+contained this data" from the database. CIA reported that some of its personnel who
+were approved for access to the compartmented counterterrorism program used
+information in the database for lead purposes, to include as a basis for initiating
+counterterrorism discussions between CIA and FBI personnel. However, CIA's review
+indicated that any information contained in the database, to include [REDACTED] BR
+metadata chaining results, "was used very rarely in finished intelligence products
+produced by CIA analysts for senior policymakers." Instead, information obtained from
+CIA's access to the database was usually used "in conjunction with reporting from other
+intelligence sources."
+(TS//SI//NF)
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 2009 Production
+104
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+(S//SI//NF) NSA has corrected the problem in this specific instance by
+terminating all external access to the database in question. Beyond that, the Agency
+recognizes that the underlying issue is the need to identify all areas of activity that are
+subject to these Court Orders and/or other legal restrictions and conditions, in order to
+ensure compliance. This requires several elements, including an accurate end-to-end
+picture of how data is handled -- by technical (e.g., systems administrators) and
+operational personnel alike -- from collection through dissemination; ongoing oversight,
+training, and compliance efforts; and system testing procedures that give assurance that
+data is actually being handled as required. NSA has instituted measures in all these areas,
+as described in detail in the report on the Agency's end-to-end review. In addition, as
+discussed above, NSA has created the new position of Director of Compliance to ensure
+that NSA has a comprehensive and effective compliance program and maintain
+heightened attention in this particular area. NSA continues to work to discover and
+correct any outstanding issues and avoid any recurrence.
+
+(U) Dissemination of U.S. Person Identifying Information
+(TS//SI//NF) When an NSA analyst determines that information identifying a U.S.
+person needs to be included in a report, a designated NSA approving official must
+authorize the release.¹⁹ The Information Sharing Services office is generally the
+
+¹⁹ (TS//SI//NF) The designated approving official does not make a determination to release U.S. person
+information requested by DoJ or DoD personnel in connection with prudential searches, such as those
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 2009 Production
+105
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+responsible entity for approving such releases. Within the context of EO 12333 collected
+information, the release authority includes the Chief and Deputy Chief, Information
+Sharing Services, SID Director and Deputy Director, Senior Operations Officer (SOO),²⁰
+DIRNSA, and Deputy DIRNSA. In the EO 12333 context, the approving authority must
+determine that the information is related to a foreign intelligence purpose, and that the
+U.S. person information is necessary to understand or assess the value of the information.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+NSA followed USSID 18 procedures for the dissemination of U.S. person identities and
+did not appropriately implement the additional requirements identified in the Court orders
+for a determination that the information is related to counterterrorism information.
+Furthermore, NSA did not implement appropriate procedures reflecting the fact that
+individuals other than the Chief, Information Sharing Services were not specifically
+authorized to grant the release of U.S. person information. Although NSA now
+understands the fact that only a limited set of individuals are authorized to approve these
+releases under the Court's authorization, it seemed only appropriate at the time to allow
+her Deputy or those acting in her capacity to be delegated with this authority as well.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) On 18 June 2009, NSA advised the Office of Information Sharing
+Services that the chief of that office was the only NSA official authorized to approve the
+
+---
+conducted for criminal or detainee proceedings. In the case of such requests, NSA's Litigation Support
+Team conducts specific prudential searches of NSA holdings but these prudential searches do not include
+or result in queries of the BR FISA metadata.
+
+²⁰ (S) The SOO is the Senior Operations Officer, in charge of the National Security Operations Center,
+NSA's 24/7 operations center. The SOO acts in place of the DIRNSA, when the DIRNSA is unavailable.
+The Court's Order dated 29 May 2009 recognized that the SOO may approve disseminations for after-hours
+requests.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 2009 Production
+106
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+dissemination of any U.S. person identity derived from BR FISA metadata and that the
+chief must make the required findings and document those findings prior to any such
+dissemination. Moreover, on 9 July 2009, in docket number BR 09-09, the Court
+increased the numbers of individuals permitted to approve disseminations to include the
+Chief, Information Sharing Services, the SOO, the SID Director, the Deputy Director of
+NSA, and the Director of NSA.
+(U) Review of Prior Disseminations
+(TS//SI//NF) On 29 July 2009, members of DoJ/NSD's Office of Intelligence
+Oversight Section completed a review of all BR FISA disseminations containing U.S.
+person identities in order to determine who approved the disseminations and what
+determinations were made, if any, by the approving official.
+(TS//SI//NF) The NSD review identified 280 disseminations of reports containing
+BR FISA-derived U.S. person identities. Of the 280 disseminations, 92 were approved
+by the Chief of Information Sharing Services, 170 were approved by the Deputy Chief of
+Information Sharing Services, 15 were approved by a SOO, one was approved by an
+acting Chief of Information Services, and two were approved by an acting Deputy Chief
+of Information Sharing Services. The disseminations authorized by persons other than
+the Chief of Information Sharing Services did not occur during any particular time frame.
+Rather, they were distributed throughout the lifespan of the collection.
+(TS//SI//NF) Of the 280 disseminations of reports containing BR FISA-derived
+U.S. person identities, 74 were made in 2006, 101 were made in 2007, 95 were made in
+2008, and ten were made in 2009. The waiver forms authorizing each of the
+disseminations in 2006 and 2007, 175 in total, contained no particularized finding
+relating to the purpose of the dissemination. Beginning in July 2008, however, the
+-TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 20098 Production
+107
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+authorizing waivers contained a general finding that the U.S. person identity was foreign
+intelligence or necessary to understand foreign intelligence. Of the 95 disseminations
+approved in 2008, 82 contained no finding and 13 contained the foreign intelligence
+finding. Beginning in January 2009, the authorizing waiver contained specific
+counterterrorism findings as required by the Court's orders. Eight of the ten waivers
+issued in 2009 contained this finding. The last two disseminations in 2009, one in May
+and one in June, however, had only the more general foreign intelligence finding in the
+waivers.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) NSA also reviewed its records of all reports issued that may have
+included BR FISA-derived information, including the records of reports written by
+analysts not specifically authorized to query the BR FISA metadata.²¹ NSA did not
+discover any additional reports that were issued by non-BR cleared analysts.
+
+II. (TS//SI//NE) NSA'S COLLECTION OF FOREIGN-TO-FOREIGN CALL
+DETAIL RECORDS PURSUANT TO THE BR FISA ORDERS
+(5) [REDACTED]
+(TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED]
+
+²¹ (TS//SI//NF) To identify the total number of reports produced and disseminated that contained BR-
+derived information, the NSA reviewed all analyst reporting records, including the records of reports
+written by non-BR-cleared analysts. When drafting reports, all NSA analysts, including both BR-cleared
+analysts and non-BR-cleared analysts, are trained to include in any reporting record the sources of the
+information contained in a report. The NSA's review included an examination of these records, including
+the fields of each record that might include references to BR-derived source information. The NSA then
+audited the reports that referenced BR-derived information as a source, and excluded those that referenced
+BR sources but in fact that did not contain BR-derived information. Through this methodology the NSA
+was able to determine that 280 were reports were produced and disseminated. Admittedly, this
+methodology would not account for reports issued with BR-derived data that mistakenly failed to reference
+BR sources.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 2009 Production
+108
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+(TS//SI//NF)
+[REDACTED]
+(TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 2009 Production
+109
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+(TS//SI//NF)
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 2009 Production
+110
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+(TS//SI//NF)
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In May 2009, during a discussion between NSA and [REDACTED] regarding the production of metadata, a [REDACTED] representative stated that [REDACTED] produced the records [REDACTED] pursuant to the BR FISA Orders. This was the first indication that NSA had ever received from [REDACTED] of its contrary understanding. At the May 28, 2009, hearing in docket number BR 09-06, the government informed the Court of [REDACTED]. To address the issue, based on the government's proposal, the Court issued a Secondary Order to [REDACTED] in docket number BR 09-06 that expressly excluded foreign-to-foreign call detail records from the scope of
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 2002 Production
+111
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+records to be produced. On May 29, 2009, upon service of the Secondary Order in
+docket number BR 09-06, [REDACTED] ceased providing foreign-to-foreign records [REDACTED]
+(TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED]
+(TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED]
+almost all of them concern the communications of non-U.S. persons located outside the
+United States. If NSA were to find that any of the records concerned U.S. persons, their
+dissemination would be governed by the terms of USSID 18 which are the procedures
+established pursuant to EO 12333, as amended.
+(TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 2009 Production 112
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 20094 Production
+113
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+(TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+(TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+(TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 2008 Production
+114
+(IN//IS//SL)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 2008 Production
+115
+TOP SECRET//COΜΙΝΤ//ΝΟΓORN
+(TS//SI//NF)[REDACTED]
+
+IV. (TS) NSA'S TREATMENT OF CREDIT CARD DATA CONTAINED IN BR
+FISA METADATA
+
+(TS//SI//NF) As first noted in a report to the Court in docket number BR 06-08,
+and noted in footnote 10 in the Application in docket number BR 09-09, a small
+percentage of records received from [REDACTED] contained credit card numbers in
+one of the fields when a caller used a credit card to pay for the call. Exhibit B, docket
+number BR 06-08, at 6-8. At NSA's request, [REDACTED] removed credit card
+numbers from this field in the records it provided NSA starting on 10 July 2006, and
+11 October 2006, respectively. Exhibit B, docket number BR 06-12, at 5-7. Since that
+time, NSA spot checks have confirmed that [REDACTED] continue to remove
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 2009 Production
+116
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+credit card numbers from the relevant field. Also since that time, NSA spot checks have
+identified only one record containing a credit card number. That record contained a
+credit card number in a field different from the field filtered by [REDACTED]
+NSA identified this record during a spot check in approximately March 2008.
+(TS//SI//NF)-The records containing credit card numbers received before [REDACTED]
+began filtering (i.e., records received in October 2006 and before) are stored
+on back-up tapes. 26 Records contained on back-up tapes are not available to analysts for
+queries and are not readily available to technical personnel. To destroy the individual
+records that are on back-up tapes would be an extreme resource and system intensive
+endeavor and therefore not feasible. It would require reloading the records from the tapes
+onto servers authorized to process BR metadata, uncompressing the records, converting
+them to a readable format, identifying those with a field containing a credit card number,
+and then deleting the records. Then NSA would have to test to confirm that only the
+records with credit card numbers were deleted, back-up the records again to tape storage
+and delete them from BR metadata servers. As the back-up tapes are necessary to rebuild
+the contact chaining database in the event of a catastrophic failure, to destroy the tapes
+prematurely would put at risk NSA's ability to recover information important for
+operations and still allowed under the Court Order. In the event of the need to restore the
+[REDACTED] BR FISA contact chaining repository, as the credit card numbers contained
+in those records do not become part of the chain summaries, analysts would still not have
+26 (TS//SI//NF) These records also are stored in the [REDACTED] discussed further below,
+where they were masked to analysts, and in the raw call detail record repositories, where they were
+accessible only to technical personnel. See Exhibit B, docket number BR 06-12, at 5-7, and Exhibit B,
+docket number BR 09-09, at 9-10. Analysts are not allowed to have the credit card number unmasked.
+Although these records were used to make chain summaries and stored in the chain summary database, the
+credit card numbers contained in the records did not become part of the chain summaries.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 2008 Production
+117
+-TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+access to this information. Based on the above information and that the back-up tapes
+will be destroyed upon reaching the end of their authorized retention period, NSA
+considers this information on the back-up tapes secured from user access until their
+required date of destruction.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The above records containing credit card information are also stored
+in the [REDACTED] It is not feasible to delete individual records
+based on the technical architecture of the [REDACTED] without deleting all data from
+the beginning of the BR FISA orders up to October 2006. The loss of such data would be
+so operationally detrimental that deletion is not feasible. As described in Exhibit B to the
+Application in BR 09-09, NSA's current solution to ensure NSA analysts do not have
+access to this credit card information is masking the data upon retrieval. As NSA
+reconstitutes the [REDACTED] to systems under a supported
+architecture, the fields containing credit card information will not be included in the data
+transfer and will be purged.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The one record with a credit card number identified by NSA since
+October 2006 exists only in [REDACTED] storage of raw call detail records, known as
+the [REDACTED] and on back-up tapes. As noted above, back-up
+tapes are not available to analysts. Likewise, the [REDACTED] is not accessible to analysts for
+queries. This record is not stored in the [REDACTED] database and was not
+used to build a chain summary because it was an incomplete record. In order to delete
+this single record from the [REDACTED] upon first isolating the appropriate file, NSA would
+have to uncompress the data from the provider's proprietary format, convert the data into
+a readable format, and move the data to a server that hosts the Data Integrity Analysts'
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 2009 Production
+118
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+tools to isolate and delete the one record. Removing data on back-up tapes is a difficult process as described above. Based on the above information and that the back-up tapes will be destroyed upon reaching the end of their authorized retention period, NSA considers this information on the [REDACTED] and the back-up tapes secured from user access until their required date of destruction.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In summary, I certify that the overproduced credit card information has been destroyed or secured as noted above, and that the records containing overproduced credit card information still retained by NSA cannot be accessed by an analyst, but as noted above will be destroyed no later than when the records reach the end of their authorized retention period.
+
+V. (U) Conclusion:
+(TS//SI//NF) The instances of non-compliance that have been identified in NSA's implementation of the Court's orders in the BR docket stemmed from a basic lack of shared understanding among the key NSA mission, technical, legal and oversight stakeholders concerning the full scope of the BR FISA program. With the remedial steps described above, NSA has taken significant steps to reduce the possibility of future compliance issues. Further, in moving forward, lessons learned as a result of NSA's review of BR FISA practices will be institutionalized, and we will remain constantly vigilant in ensuring that we are in strict compliance with the Court's orders. Although no corrective measures are infallible, NSA has taken significant steps to reduce the possibility of any future compliance issues and to ensure that the mechanisms are in place to detect and respond quickly if a compliance incident were to occur. Therefore, I am
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+hopeful the Court will again grant NSA regular access to the BR FISA metadata, which I
+believe is invaluable in helping the Nation detect and thwart potential terrorist threats.
+
+(U) I declare under penalty of perjury that the facts set forth above are true and
+correct.
+
+KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
+Director, National Security Agency
+
+Executed this 17 TH day of August , 2009
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+51
+31 August 2009 Production 120
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+20 AUG 17 PM 4:16
+CLERK'S COURT
+
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
+BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
+ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
+OF TANGIBLE THINGS FROM
+[REDACTED]
+
+Docket Number: BR 09-09
+
+DECLARATION OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEITH B. ALEXANDER,
+UNITED STATES ARMY,
+DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+
+(U) I, Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander, depose and state as follows:
+
+(U) I am the Director of the National Security Agency ("NSA" or "Agency"), an
+intelligence agency within the Department of Defense ("DoD"), and have served in this
+position since 2005. I currently hold the rank of Lieutenant General in the United States
+Army and, concurrent with my current assignment as Director of the National Security
+
+Derived From: NSA/CS8M 1-52
+Dated: 20070108
+Declassify On Source Marked MR
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 2009 Production
+121
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Agency, I also serve as the Chief of the Central Security Service and as the Commander
+of the Joint Functional Component Command for Network Warfare. Prior to my current
+assignment, I have held other senior supervisory positions as an officer of the United
+States military, to include service as the Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS, G-2), Headquarters,
+Department of the Army; Commander of the U.S. Army's Intelligence and Security
+Command; and the Director of Intelligence, United States Central Command.
+(U) As the Director of the National Security Agency, I am responsible for
+directing and overseeing all aspects of NSA's cryptologic mission, which consists of
+three functions: to engage in signals intelligence ("SIGINT") activities for the U.S.
+Government, to include support to the Government's computer network attack activities;
+to conduct activities concerning the security of U.S. national security telecommunications
+and information systems; and to conduct operations security training for the U.S.
+Government. Some of the information NSA acquires as part of its SIGINT mission is
+collected pursuant to Orders issued under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
+1978, as amended ("FISA").
+(U) The statements herein are based upon my personal knowledge, information
+provided to me by my subordinates in the course of my official duties, advice of counsel,
+and conclusions reached in accordance therewith.
+(U) I. Introduction
+(TS//SI//NF) Pursuant to a series of Orders issued by the Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Court ("FISC" or "Court") beginning in May 2006, NSA has been receiving
+2
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 2009 Production
+122
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+and analyzing certain call detail records or telephony metadata¹ from [REDACTED]
+telecommunications providers. NSA refers to the Orders collectively as the "Business
+Records Order" or "BR FISA." The telephony metadata NSA receives via the BR FISA
+has enabled it in the past to discover [REDACTED] and
+unknown persons in the United States and abroad affiliated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] and unknown persons in the United States and abroad affiliated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] and their communications, and act upon and
+disseminate such information to support the efforts of the United States Government,
+including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), to detect and prevent terrorist acts
+against the United States and U.S. interests. Continued receipt of the telephony metadata
+is advantageous to NSA's ability to continue its efforts to discover such terrorist
+organizations and their communications, in order to assist the FBI in detecting,
+investigating and preventing terrorist acts against the United States. Accordingly, this
+declaration is intended to provide the Court with my assessment of the value that the
+BR FISA metadata provides to the NSA and the FBI with respect to the Government's
+national security responsibilities for the detection, investigation, and prevention of
+terrorist activities by [REDACTED]
+
+¹(S) "Call detail records," or "telephony metadata," include comprehensive communications routing
+information, including but not limited to session identifying information (e.g., originating and terminating
+telephone number, International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) numbers, International Mobile station
+Equipment Identity (IMEI) numbers, etc.), trunk identifier, telephone calling card numbers, and time and
+duration of call. A "trunk" is a communication line between two switching systems. *Newton's Telecom
+Dictionary* 951 (24th ed. 2008). Telephony metadata does not include the substantive content of any
+communication or the name, address, or financial information of a subscriber or customer.
+
+3
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 2009 Production
+123
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED] (collectively, the "Foreign Powers").
+
+### (TS) II. Value of BR FISA Metadata
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The BR FISA provides access to bulk call detail records which primarily include records of telephone calls that either have one end in the United States or are purely domestic. This collection of information is not available to NSA through its other authorized foreign intelligence information collections.² This data has value to NSA analysts tasked with identifying potential threats to the U.S. homeland and U.S. interests abroad by enhancing their ability to identify, prioritize, and track terrorist operatives and their support networks both in the U.S. and abroad. By applying the Court-ordered "reasonable, articulable suspicion" or "RAS" standard to telephone identifiers³ used to query the BR FISA metadata, NSA analysts are able to: (i) detect domestic identifiers calling foreign identifiers associated with one of the Foreign Powers and discover who the foreign identifiers are in contact with; (ii) detect foreign identifiers associated with a Foreign Power calling into the United States and discover which
+
+---
+²(TS//SI//NF) For example, NSA obtains foreign intelligence information from its collection of overseas communications (SIGINT collection) authorized by Executive Order (EO) 12333, traditional Court-authorized electronic surveillance pursuant to Titles I and III of FISA, Pen Register and Trap and Trace surveillance authorized pursuant to Title IV of FISA, and, more recently, the targeting of non-United States persons reasonably believed to be located overseas pursuant to Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA). None of these authorities would allow NSA to replicate, or appropriately analyze, the call detail records it receives pursuant to the BR FISA.
+
+³(TS//SI//NF) In the context of this Declaration, the term "identifier" means a telephone number, as that term is commonly understood and used, as well as other unique identifiers associated with a particular user or telecommunications device for purposes of billing and/or routing communications, such as International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) numbers, International Mobile station Equipment Identity (IMEI) numbers, and calling card numbers.
+
+4
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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+124
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+domestic identifiers are in contact with the foreign identifiers; and (iii) detect possible
+terrorist-related communications occurring between communicants located inside the
+United States.
+(TS//SI//NF) Although NSA possesses a number of sources of information that can
+each be used to provide separate and independent indications of potential terrorist activity
+against the United States and its interests abroad, the best analysis occurs when NSA
+analysts can consider the information obtained from each of those sources together to
+compile and disseminate to the FBI as complete a picture as possible of a potential
+terrorist threat. Although BR FISA metadata is not the sole source available to NSA
+counterterrorism personnel, it provides a key component of the information NSA analysts
+rely upon to execute this threat identification and characterization role.
+
+A. The Value of BR FISA Metadata: Contact-Chaining [REDACTED]
+(TS//SI//NF) The primary advantage of metadata analysis as applied to telephony
+metadata is that it enables the Government to analyze past connections and patterns of
+communication. The ability to accumulate metadata substantially increases NSA's
+ability to detect and identify persons affiliated with the Foreign Powers. Specifically, the
+NSA performs [REDACTED] queries on the metadata: contact-chaining [REDACTED]
+(TS//SI//NF) When the NSA performs a contact-chaining query on a terrorist-
+associated telephone identifier, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Identify the further contacts made by that first tier
+of contacts. In addition, the same process can be used to identify additional tiers of
+5
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 2009 Production
+125
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+contacts, out to a maximum of three "hops" from the original identifier, as authorized by
+the Business Records Order. The collected metadata thus holds contact information that
+can be immediately accessed as new terrorist-associated telephone identifiers are
+identified. Multi-tiered contact chaining identifies not only the terrorist's direct
+associates but also indirect associates, and, therefore provides a more complete picture of
+those who associate with terrorists and/or are engaged in terrorist activities.
+(TS//SI//NF) - One advantage of the metadata collected in this matter is that it is
+historical in nature, reflecting contact activity from the past that cannot be captured in the
+present or prospectively. To the extent that historical connections are important to
+understanding a newly-identified target, metadata may contain links that are unique,
+pointing to potential targets that may otherwise be missed. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+6
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 2009 Production
+126
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+(TS//SINF) In sum, the BR FISA metadata analysis enriches the NSA analysts'
+understanding of the communications tradecraft of terrorist operatives who may be
+preparing to conduct attacks against the U.S. Terrorist operatives often take affirmative
+and intentional steps to disguise and obscure their communications. They do this by
+using a variety of tactics,
+
+7
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 2009 Production
+127
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN—
+(TS) B. Filling the Gaps: BR FISA Metadata in the Context of Other Collections
+(TS//SI//NF)-The BR FISA metadata complements information NSA collects via
+other means and is a valuable, if not the only, means available to NSA for linking
+possible terrorist-related telephone communications that occur between communicants
+based solely inside the U.S. NSA analysts use the combination of telephony metadata
+and communications content collected pursuant to EO 12333 and/or Court-authorized
+electronic surveillance in concert with BR FISA metadata to develop an accurate
+characterization of individual/network activity; potentially derive the intent of the
+individual(s) or network; and learn of new terrorist networks or cells working inside the
+U.S. NSA's access to the BR FISA metadata improves the likelihood of the Government
+being able to detect terrorist cell contacts within the U.S.
+
+(TS//SI//NF)-NSA's traditional SIGINT collection, which focuses strictly on the
+foreign end of communications, provides limited signals-related information available to
+aid analysts in identifying possible terrorist connections emanating from or within the
+U.S. Collection authorized by Section 702 of the FAA is limited to the targeting of non-
+United States persons located overseas and does not provide NSA with information
+sufficient to support contact chaining [REDACTED] Traditional Court-authorized
+electronic surveillance does not make available the full extent of metadata resident with
+the service providers and provided through the BR FISA. With the metadata provided
+by BR FISA, NSA has the information necessary to perform call chaining [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] This analysis enables NSA to obtain a fuller understanding of the target and
+provide FBI with a more complete picture of possible terrorist-related activity occurring
+inside the U.S.
+
+8
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 2009 Production
+128
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+(TS//SI//NF) The value of the BR FISA is not hypothetical. Additional detail
+available in call data records (CDRs) allows NSA to recognize that a communicant is
+based in the U.S., a detail often absent in traditional SIGINT collection. Unlike
+traditional SIGINT collection, BR FISA CDRs include the calling party number in a call
+that originates from the United States. From telecommunications provider's perspective,
+only the called number is necessary to complete a call. The originating, or calling,
+number is not required and, as unnecessary data, is often removed or manipulated by the
+U.S. telecommunications provider before leaving the U.S en route to an overseas
+provider. If the calling party information is present, it can be used by other
+telecommunication providers to understand macro traffic statistics and identify important
+business opportunities. For this reason, U.S.-origin calls collected overseas often lack a
+valid U.S. calling party number, making it difficult or impossible to identify that a
+particular call originated in the U.S.
+(TS//SI//NF) In illustration, prior to the attacks of 9/11, NSA intercepted via its
+overseas SIGINT collection and transcribed seven (7) calls made by hijacker Khalid al-
+Mihdhar, then living in San Diego, California, to a telephone identifier associated with an
+al Qaeda safe house in Yemen. However, the NSA SIGINT intercept was collected
+through an access point overseas and the calling party identifier was not available
+because it had not been transmitted with the call. Lacking this U.S. phone identifier and
+having nothing in the content of the calls to suggest that al-Mihdhar was actually inside
+the United States, NSA analysts concluded that al-Mihdhar remained overseas when, in
+fact, he was in San Diego. The BR FISA metadata addresses the information gap that
+existed at the time of the al-Mihdhar case. It potentially allows NSA to note these types
+9
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 2009 Production
+129
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+of suspicious contacts and, when appropriate, to tip them to the FBI for follow-on
+analysis or action.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Once an identifier has been detected, NSA can use BR FISA
+metadata along with other data sources to quickly identify the larger network and
+possible co-conspirators both inside and outside the U.S. for further investigation by the
+FBI with the goal of preventing future attacks. One recent example of BR FISA's
+contribution to characterizing a network of interest was the investigation referred to
+within NSA and FBI as [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) NSA's involvement with [REDACTED] began in January 2009. NSA
+analysts were following a foreign-based e-mail identifier associated with an al Qaeda
+facilitation cell in Yemen, an activity of significance due to U.S. Government concern
+with Yemen's potential to serve as an al Qaeda safe haven. This particular e-mail
+identifier was tasked under FAA authorities while numerous other network identifiers
+were monitored through EO 12333 authorities.
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Upon
+verification, NSA [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] as permitted by the Court-approved minimization procedures for NSA's
+FAA collection, informed the FBI of the U.S. location of the identifiers. Upon receipt of
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+10
+—TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 2009 Production
+130
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+the NSA information, the FBI initiated a full field investigation and sought its own FISA
+coverage on the newly-discovered domestic links.
+(TS//SI//NF) NSA used the BR FISA metadata to aid the FBI investigation by
+adding critical insight into the network's functions and intent. Analysis of the BR FISA
+metadata demonstrated foreign contacts within the suspected network stretching from
+Kansas City to New York, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen and Denmark. While BR
+FISA did not discover the person of interest in Kansas City, the telephony metadata was
+able to confirm suspicions that the FBI already had about him. It confirmed the target's
+outbound contacts with other members of the network and provided a better
+understanding of the network. This characterization would not have happened without
+leveraging both the BR FISA metadata and the FAA access in conjunction with FBI's
+investigation.
+(TS//SI//NF) As the [REDACTED] example illustrates, BR FISA metadata is an
+important resource for investigating threat leads obtained from other SIGINT collection
+or partner agencies. This is especially true for the NSA-FBI partnership. The BR FISA
+metadata enables NSA analysts to evaluate potential threats that it receives from or
+reports to the FBI in a more complete manner than if this data source was unavailable.
+Even the absence of terrorist-related contacts in the BR FISA metadata can be valuable,
+because such "negative reporting" helps to assess the credibility of a prospective threat.
+(TS//SI/ANE) A final benefit of the way in which BR FISA metadata complements
+other counterterrorist-related collection sources is by serving as a significant enabler for
+NSA intelligence analysis. It assists NSA in applying limited linguistic resources
+
+11
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 2009 Production
+131
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+available to the counterterrorism problem against links that have the highest probability
+of connection to terrorist targets. Put another way, analysis of the BR FISA metadata can
+help NSA prioritize for content analysis communications which it acquires under other
+authorities. While [REDACTED] assists in identifying terrorist communications of
+interest, content exploitation is required to achieve a full understanding and
+characterization of the associations between the telephony identifiers and users.
+
+Additionally, content is critical to deriving intent of the individuals and associated
+networks. BR FISA metadata is an important piece for steering and applying content
+analysis so the U.S. Government can gain the best possible understanding of terrorist
+target actions and intentions.
+
+(U) C. Statistics/Additional Examples
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The foregoing discussion is not hypothetical. As noted on page seven
+of NSA's end-to-end report on the Agency's implementation of the Business Records
+Order, between inception of the first Business Records Order in May 2006, and May
+2009, NSA issued 277⁵ BR FISA-based reports to FBI and, if appropriate, to other NSA
+customers. These reports tipped to the FBI roughly 2,900 identifiers that were noted to
+be in contact with identifiers associated with [REDACTED]
+
+⁵ (TS//SI//NF) The number of reports included in my Declaration of 13 February 2009 was 275. This was
+based upon information gathered on 6 February 2009. Further review has taken into account the fact that
+an additional report was issued after 6 February, but before 13 February. Some of these reports had been
+cancelled for various reasons and some of the cancelled reports were reissued with corrections. Therefore,
+the correct number of unique reports as of the 13 February 2009 declaration should have been 274. My
+Declaration also stated that there were 2,549 selectors tipped in these reports. The actual number of
+selectors tipped in the 274 reports is 2,888.
+
+12
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 2009 Production
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+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+(TS//SI//NF) A recent illustration of the use of the BR FISA metadata can be found
+in the evaluation of telephony contacts associated with [REDACTED] an
+associate and primary suspect [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+13
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 2009 Production
+133
+TOP SECRET//COMINTS//NOFORN
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In an even more recent example, on 2 June 2009 NSA received a
+request for information from the FBI pertaining to leads associated with [REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+NSA conducted initial research on the identifiers provided by the FBI in EO 12333
+metadata and subsequently sought approval from the FISC to query the identifiers against
+the BR FISA metadata.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Without the
+BR FISA metadata, a significant number of those leads would have remained
+undiscovered and NSA's ability to evaluate [REDACTED] U.S. contacts would have been
+degraded.
+
+14
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 2009 Production
+134
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+(U) IV. Conclusion
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In conclusion, while all metadata analysis is essential in the fight against terrorism, the BR FISA metadata provides NSA with additional information readily available through the providers, but which would be otherwise unavailable to NSA. The BR FISA metadata complements and enriches NSA analysts' understanding of the target and provides the capability to detect domestic identifiers calling foreign terrorist identifiers abroad; foreign terrorist-associated targets calling into the United States; and possible terrorist-related communications occurring between communicants solely in the U.S. That the BR FISA metadata is generating what may be perceived as little foreign intelligence in comparison with the volume of the data collected does not discount its value to NSA's analysis of potential terrorist threats to the U.S. and to NSA's ability to provide security for the nation. NSA's access to the BR FISA metadata addresses a key gap in the Intelligence Community's ability to connect foreign and domestic threat-related information and tip this information for appropriate follow-up investigation.
+
+15
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+31 August 2009 Production
+135
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+(U) I declare under penalty of perjury that the facts set forth above are true and
+correct.
+UR
+RO
+KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
+Director, National Security Agency
+Executed this 3^eo^ day of Augart 2009
+16
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+31 August 2009 Production
+136
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//FISA
+SECRET//CONENT//NOFORM//URT
+CIS AUG 17 PM 4:16
+UNITED STATES
+CLERK OF COURT
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
+BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
+ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
+OF TANGIBLE THINGS FROM
+[REDACTED]
+Docket No.: BR 09-09
+[REDACTED]
+
+AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT S. MUELLER. III
+
+I, Robert S. Mueller, III, hereby affirm the following:
+
+(U) I am the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), United States
+
+Department of Justice (DOJ), a component of an Executive Department of the United
+
+Derived From: Multiple Sources
+Declassify On: 20340810
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//FISA
+31 August 2009 Production
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//FISA
+
+States Government (USG). I am responsible for, among other things, the national
+security operations of the FBI, including the FBI's Counterterrorism Division (CTD).
+
+(U) The matters stated herein are based upon my personal knowledge, my review
+and consideration of documents and information available to me in my official capacity,
+information furnished by the National Security Agency (NSA) and information furnished
+by Special Agents and other employees of the FBI.
+
+(U) Purpose of the Affidavit
+
+(S/NF) This affidavit is submitted in response to the Court's Orders dated March
+2, March 5, May 29, and July 9, 2009 (Orders). It describes the FBI's assessment of the
+value of the Business Records FISA (BR FISA) metadata to FBI national security
+investigations and, more broadly, to the national security of the United States.
+
+(U) Relevance to Authorized Investigations
+
+(S/NF) [REDACTED] and unknown persons in
+the United States and abroad affiliated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] are the subject of numerous FBI predicated investigations being conducted
+under guidelines approved by the Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 12333,
+as amended. As of August 10, 2009, the FBI had approximately [REDACTED] open predicated
+investigations¹ targeting [REDACTED]
+
+¹ (U) Predicated investigations are either full investigations or preliminary investigations. A full
+investigation may be initiated if there is an articulable factual basis for the investigation that
+reasonably indicates, inter alia, that a threat to the national security has or may have occurred, is
+or may be occurring, or will or may occur and the investigation may obtain information relating
+to the activity or the involvement or role of an individual, group, or organization in such activity.
+A preliminary investigation may be initiated on the basis of information or an allegation
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//FISA
+2
+31 August 2009 Production
+129
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//FISA
+[REDACTED] As of August 10, 2009, the FBI was
+conducting approximately [REDACTED] predicated investigations of individuals believed to be
+associated with [REDACTED] under
+guidelines the Attorney General has approved pursuant to Executive Order 12333, as
+amended.
+
+(TS/SI//NF) The National Security Agency (NSA) has issued and is expected to
+continue to issue to the FBI BR FISA metadata "tippers" regarding telephone numbers
+that are associated with [REDACTED] e [REDACTED] that are
+targets of FBI investigations. The tippers provide information regarding contacts
+between these foreign telephone numbers and domestic telephone numbers. NSA
+identifies the assessed users of the foreign telephone numbers, the dates of contact
+between the foreign telephone numbers and the domestic telephone numbers, and any
+additional information, e.g., foreign telephone number's country of origin, domestic
+telephone number's city and state, etc., that NSA may have regarding the telephone
+numbers.
+
+(S//SI) FBI Processing of BR FISA Metadata Reports
+
+(S//NF) FBI employees from the Counterterrorism Division's (CTD)
+Communications Analysis Unit (CAU) are detailed full-time to the NSA's Homeland
+indicating, inter alia, that a threat to the national security has or may have occurred, is or may be
+occurring, or will or may occur and the investigation may obtain information relating to the
+activity or the involvement or role of an individual, group, or organization in such activity.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//FISA
+31 August 2009 Production
+3
+139
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//FISA
+Security Analysis Center (HSAC). These detailees, known as "Team 10," consist of a
+Supervisory Special Agent and several Intelligence Analysts. Team 10's chief
+responsibility is to identify and initially process domestic information contained in
+reports disseminated to the FBI from HSAC. Upon receiving an HSAC report, Team 10
+queries FBI databases to determine whether the FBI already has information about any of
+the domestic facilities contained in the report. Team 10 then transmits the NSA
+information together with additional analysis based on any information already known to
+the FBI to the appropriate FBI field offices. Team 10 also recommends subsequent
+investigation to the field office.
+
+(S//SI) Value of BR FISA Metadata to FBI Investigations
+(TS//SI//NF) The FBI derives value from the BR FISA metadata primarily in two
+ways. First, BR FISA metadata provides information that assists the FBI in detecting,
+preventing, and protecting against terrorist threats to the national security of the United
+States by providing the predication to open investigations, advance pending
+investigations, and revitalize stalled investigations. Second, metadata obtained via the
+BR FISA can provide warning signals that alert the FBI to individuals who are inside the
+United States and are linked to persons who pose a threat to the national security.
+
+(S//SI) I. BR FISA Metadata as Additional Information
+(S//SI) The FBI is authorized, _inter alia_, to collect intelligence and to conduct
+investigations to detect, obtain information about, and prevent and protect against
+
+(S//NF) HSAC reports include BR FISA metadata "tippers."
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//FISA
+4
+31 August 2009 Production
+140
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//FISA
+terrorist threats to national security. The more information the FBI has regarding such
+threats to the national security, the more likely it will be able to prevent and protect
+against those threats. The BR FISA metadata program is a source of information that the
+FBI uses in its mission to detect, prevent, and protect against terrorist threats to national
+security. The oft-used metaphor is that the FBI is responsible for "connecting the dots"
+to form a picture of the threats to national security. BR FISA metadata provides
+additional "dots" that the FBI uses to ascertain the nature and extent of domestic threats
+to the national security.
+[REDACTED] In certain circumstances, the FBI may already have an investigative
+interest in a particular domestic telephone number prior to receipt of a BR FISA metadata
+tipper containing that domestic telephone number. Nevertheless, the tipper may be
+valuable if it provides new information regarding the domestic telephone number that
+revitalizes the investigation or otherwise allows the FBI to focus its resources more
+efficiently and effectively.
+[REDACTED] The FBI has received BR FISA metadata tippers containing information
+not previously known to the FBI about domestic telephone numbers utilized by targets of
+pending preliminary investigations. The information from the BR FISA metadata tippers
+has provided articulable factual bases to believe that the subjects posed a threat to the
+national security such that the preliminary investigations could be converted to full
+investigations, which, in turn, led the FBI to focus resources on those targets.³ The FBI
+has also re-opened previously closed investigations based on information contained in
+
+³ (U) Because there is greater predication for a full investigation (an articulable factual basis to
+believe the subject poses a threat to the national security) than for a preliminary investigation
+(information or allegation that the subject is or may be a threat to the national security), the FBI
+tends to focus more resources on full investigations than preliminary investigations.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//FISA
+5
+31 August 2009 Production
+141
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//FISA
+BR FISA metadata tippers. In those instances, the FBI had previously exhausted all leads
+and concluded that no further investigation was warranted. The new information from
+the BR FISA metadata tippers was significant enough to warrant the re-opening of the
+investigations.
+(S//NF) Provided below are two examples of investigations [REDACTED] that were re-opened because of new information provided
+by a BR FISA metadata tipper.
+(S//SI) II. BR FISA Metadata Analysis as an "Early Warning System"
+(S//SI) The earlier the FBI obtains information about a threat to national security,
+the more likely it will be able to prevent and protect against those threats. The BR FISA
+metadata program sometimes provides information earlier than the FBI's other
+investigative methods and techniques. To use the oft-used metaphor, BR FISA metadata
+sometimes provides "dots" that the FBI may not otherwise have uncovered until much
+later in its investigation. In those instances, the BR FISA metadata program acts as an
+"early warning system" of potential threats against national security.
+(S//SI) In certain circumstances, the FBI may receive a BR FISA metadata tipper
+containing information regarding a domestic telephone number that the FBI inevitably
+would have discovered via other investigative techniques. Nevertheless, that tipper is
+valuable because it provides information earlier than the FBI would otherwise have
+obtained it. Earlier receipt of the information may advance the investigation and could
+contribute to the FBI preventing or protecting against a threat to national security that,
+absent the BR FISA metadata tipper, the FBI could not.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//FISA
+31 August 2009 Production
+6
+142
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//FISA
+(S//SI) The FBI has also received BR FISA metadata tippers regarding domestic
+telephone numbers in which the FBI had little or no prior investigative interest at the time
+the tipper was received. In those instances, the FBI opened either a preliminary or a full
+investigation of the user of the domestic telephone number. Here again, although the FBI
+may have inevitably developed an investigative interest in these domestic telephone
+numbers, it is impossible to say when that would have occurred or whether it would have
+occurred too late to prevent or protect against a terrorist attack.
+(S//SI) Provided below are two examples of preliminary investigations [REDACTED]
+that were commenced based upon BR
+FISA metadata tippers. In both cases, the investigations were eventually converted to full
+investigations based on information developed by the FBI, thus demonstrating the value
+of the BR FISA metadata information.
+
+(U) III. Statistical Information Pertaining to Full Investigations
+(TS//SI//NF) One method of quantifying the value of the BR FISA metadata to
+the FBI's efforts to protect the nation's security is the number of predicated full
+investigations that the FBI has opened or supported using BR FISA metadata provided by
+the NSA.⁴ Full investigations opened based on BR FISA metadata tippers illustrate the
+value of the BR FISA metadata in assisting the FBI to identify previously unknown
+connections between persons in the United States and [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Similarly,
+⁴(S//NF) Full investigations are typically more significant and fruitful than preliminary
+investigations. I will, therefore, limit the information discussed in this affidavit to full
+investigations that were predicated, in whole or part, or assisted by BR FISA metadata.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFOPN//FISA
+31 August 2009 Production
+7
+143
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//FISA
+the number of preliminary investigations converted to full investigations illustrates the
+importance of the BR FISA metadata in assisting the FBI to develop suspected
+connections between persons in the United States and [REDACTED]
+
+(S//NF) Below is a chart containing statistical information pertaining to
+investigations that were opened as full investigations or converted from preliminary
+investigations to full investigations based, at least in part, on information from BR FISA
+metadata since the Court first authorized the BR FISA order in 2006 through 2008.
+These statistics show that the BR FISA metadata's contribution to FBI investigations is
+not insignificant. This chart includes (1) the total number of full investigations that are
+predicated, at least in part, on BR FISA metadata;⁵ (2) the number of Intelligence
+Information Reports (IIRs) issued to foreign partners from these full investigations; and
+(3) the number of IIRs issued to other U.S. government agencies from these full
+investigations.
+
+⁵ (S//NF) The FBI's statistics include investigations that were (1) opened as full investigations
+based, at least in part, on BR FISA metadata, and (2) preliminary investigations that were
+converted to full investigations based, at least in part, on BR FISA metadata. These statistics are
+limited to investigations that are connected directly to BR FISA metadata tippers. BR FISA
+metadata tippers have also indirectly contributed to the predication for other investigations. For
+example, information obtained during the full investigation of [REDACTED] discussed
+below, led the FBI to open preliminary investigations of others suspected of engaging in similar
+activities. This affidavit is limited to investigations based directly, at least in part, on BR FISA
+metadata.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//FISA 8
+31 August 2009 Production 144
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//FISA
+
+| Year | Full Investigations Opened/Preliminary Investigations Converted to Full Investigations | Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs) Issued to Foreign Partners | IIRs issued to Other U.S. Government Agencies |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| 2006 | 3 | 1 | 3 |
+| 2007 | 9 | 6 | 8 |
+| 2008 | 15 | 24° | 35 |
+| Total | 27 | 31 | 46 |
+
+(S//SI) During the 27 full investigations that were based, at least in part, on BR
+FISA metadata tippers, the FBI has found and identified known and unknown members
+or agents of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED], and those in communication with them. The
+information NSA has tipped to the FBI has also permitted FBI to acquire additional
+information about such individuals and their activities, including criminal activities in
+support of international terrorism.
+
+(U) IV. Specific Examples of Noteworthy Full Investigations
+
+(S//SI) To illustrate the value of the BR FISA metadata program to the FBI, four
+(4) full investigations that were predicated, at least in part, on BR FISA metadata tippers
+are summarized below.
+
+^E (S//NF) Because certain IIRs were issued to multiple countries, the FBI issued a total of 51
+IIRs to foreign partners.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//FISA
+31 August 2009 Production
+9
+145
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//FISA
+
+(S) A. [REDACTED]
+
+(S) On or about [REDACTED] the FBI opened a preliminary investigation of [REDACTED] a U.S. person, based on an anonymous letter alleging that he and eight others had ties to the Muslim extremist organization [REDACTED]
+
+After pursuing all available leads, the FBI closed the preliminary investigation on [REDACTED] because it had not developed any evidence tending to show that [REDACTED] was, in fact, affiliated with [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//OC//NF) On or about [REDACTED], the FBI received an intelligence report from the NSA that included information and contact chaining analysis conducted on data obtained through the BR FISA order ("metadata report"). The metadata report established a [REDACTED] connection between a [REDACTED] telephone known to be used by [REDACTED] a [REDACTED]-based extremist with ties to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] an unlisted [REDACTED] telephone number.⁷ The FBI's [REDACTED] Division opened a preliminary investigation of the unknown user of the [REDACTED] telephone number based upon the information contained in the metadata report and information contained in FBI's databases that telephone number [REDACTED] was linked to [REDACTED] other pending FBI investigations.⁸
+
+⁷ (S//NF) The metadata tipper established that [REDACTED] telephone was in contact with another [REDACTED] telephone. That second [REDACTED] cellular telephone was in contact with [REDACTED].
+
+⁸ (S) Most notably, prior to [REDACTED] opening of the preliminary investigation, in an investigation conducted by the [REDACTED] Division, the FBI had obtained via a national security letter (NSL) telephone records for [REDACTED] the target of the investigation, who was suspected of [REDACTED]. According to the telephone records, [REDACTED] telephone number had contact with [REDACTED].
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//FISA
+31 August 2009 Production
+10
+146
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//FISA
+(TS//SI/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL) On or about [REDACTED],
+during [REDACTED] preliminary investigation, the FBI received information from the
+NSA indicating that someone named [REDACTED] using the [REDACTED] telephone number
+[REDACTED] had stated that [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] At the time, [REDACTED] was linked to the [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (S) On or about [REDACTED] was identified by the FBI as a user
+of telephone number [REDACTED].¹⁰ Based on that identification, the fact that [REDACTED]
+was formerly the subject of a [REDACTED] preliminary investigation, and the phonetic
+similarity between [REDACTED] first name [REDACTED] and the name [REDACTED] the
+Division converted the preliminary investigation of the unknown user of [REDACTED]
+into a full investigation of [REDACTED].
+(TS//SI) During the full investigation, the FBI obtained authorization from this
+Court to conduct electronic surveillance of [REDACTED].
+[REDACTED] Court-authorized electronic surveillance of
+[REDACTED] revealed that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] routinely discussed [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+Also through this investigation, the FBI has identified other
+individuals in the United States who are believed to be involved in [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+¹⁰(S) [REDACTED] provided [REDACTED] as his telephone number in a [REDACTED] he filed with the
+[REDACTED]. In addition, [REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//FISA
+31 August 2009 Production
+11
+147
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//FISA
+for [REDACTED] full investigations have been opened as a result of information
+obtained through the [REDACTED] investigation. The FBI has also identified certain methods
+and means that these individuals use to [REDACTED], including the
+suspected use of [REDACTED]
+
+(S//OC//NF) The FBI is working with the Department of Justice, National
+Security Division, and the United States Attorney's Office, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] to indict [REDACTED] on criminal charges that include, but are not limited to, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+(S) B. [REDACTED]
+(S) On or about [REDACTED], the FBI opened a full investigation of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] based on information indicating that [REDACTED] made terrorist threats
+and were connected to [REDACTED]. On or about [REDACTED] the FBI closed this
+investigation (the [REDACTED] investigation) after pursuing all available leads because the U.S.
+Attorney's Office, [REDACTED], was reluctant to proceed unless
+additional evidence could be obtained.
+(TS//OC//NF) On or about [REDACTED] the FBI received a BR FISA
+metadata report from the NSA that included information and contact chaining analysis
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//FISA 12
+31 August 2009 Production 148
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//FISA
+indicating that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] had
+each been in contact with several cellular telephone numbers in [REDACTED] that
+were believed to be used by [REDACTED]¹¹ The [REDACTED] cellular telephone
+numbers were, in turn, in contact with [REDACTED] telephone numbers believed to be
+associated with [REDACTED] which are owned
+by [REDACTED]¹² In addition, the BR FISA metadata report stated that a [REDACTED]
+telephone number, reportedly registered to [REDACTED]
+had also been in contact with two of the aforementioned [REDACTED] telephone numbers.
+(S//NF) Based upon the information obtained in the [REDACTED] investigation,
+information obtained from another investigation that had been conducted from [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]¹⁴ and on the information provided by the BR FISA metadata
+report, the FBI re-opened the full terrorism investigation of [REDACTED] on [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+(S//OC//NF) Since re-opening the investigation in [REDACTED], the FBI has received
+reports from various sources, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] are connected to and [REDACTED] to [REDACTED]
+
+¹¹(S//NF) According to NSA reporting, [REDACTED] was believed to be [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] was believed to be a
+[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were the subscribers
+¹²(S) The FBI subsequently confirmed via an NSL that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] of two of the [REDACTED] telephone numbers.
+¹³(S)-According to U.S. Intelligence Community reporting, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] that is responsible for directing and supporting [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+¹⁴(S) In [REDACTED], the FBI re-opened the full investigation of [REDACTED] based on an
+anonymous letter alleging that they supported [REDACTED]. The FBI uncovered no new additional
+evidence, and closed the investigation again in [REDACTED].
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//FISA 13
+31 August 2009 Production
+149
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//FISA
+(S) The FBI continues to investigate [REDACTED] suspected [REDACTED] for
+The FBI recently obtained renewed FISC authority to conduct electronic
+surveillance and physical searches of [REDACTED] telephone and e-mail accounts, as well
+as [REDACTED] telephone and e-mail accounts, as agents of [REDACTED]
+The FBI's investigation of [REDACTED] is ongoing.
+
+C.
+(TS//SI//OC//NF) On or about [REDACTED] the FBI received a BR FISA
+metadata report from the NSA that included information and contact chaining analysis
+indicating that associates of [REDACTED] ^15 [REDACTED]
+living in the [REDACTED] had been in contact with several U.S. [REDACTED]
+telephone numbers.^16 According to the NSA's BR FISA metadata report, two of the
+foreign telephone numbers that were in contact with [REDACTED] one [REDACTED]
+cellular number and one [REDACTED] cellular number, were also in contact with U.S. telephone
+number [REDACTED] An Internet search of [REDACTED] by the FBI revealed [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] as the apparent subscriber of the telephone number.
+Furthermore, toll billing records obtained via NSL's in [REDACTED] by the FBI in
+connection with other FBI investigations revealed that [REDACTED] had been in contact
+with telephone numbers associated with four other pending counterterrorism
+investigations. That information, in conjunction with the information obtained from the
+^15 (TS//SI//OC//NF) According to the NSA, [REDACTED] is the leader of a mainly [REDACTED]
+Islamic extremists called [REDACTED] and maintains ties to more radical members of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] an organization designated by the Interagency Intelligence
+Committee on Terrorism (IICT) as a tier 1 support entity to [REDACTED]
+^16 (S//NF) The FBI had received previous reports regarding [REDACTED] and his activities from both the
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//FISA 14
+31 August 2009 Production 150
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//FISA
+BR FISA metadata program, formed the basis for the FBI's decision to open a
+preliminary investigation of [REDACTED] The preliminary investigation was opened on [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+(S//OC//NF) During the preliminary investigation, the FBI learned that
+[REDACTED] is a [REDACTED] board member of [REDACTED]
+According to [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+On or about [REDACTED] reported to the FBI
+that [REDACTED] had been designated by [REDACTED] as a point-of-contact for [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] a senior member of [REDACTED] and that [REDACTED] has donated
+funds to [REDACTED] Based on this additional information, on [REDACTED], the FBI
+converted the preliminary investigation of [REDACTED] to a full investigation.
+(S//NF) The FBI has obtained information about several financial transactions that
+suggests [REDACTED] is providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization. On
+[REDACTED] sen [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] in [REDACTED]
+According to the CIA, [REDACTED] was a member of [REDACTED]
+as well as the [REDACTED] In addition, [REDACTED] sent [REDACTED] to [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] in [REDACTED] on [REDACTED] The CIA has reported that [REDACTED]
+is believed to be a member of [REDACTED] Finally, [REDACTED] sent [REDACTED] to [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//FISA 15
+31 August 2009 Production 151
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//FISA
+[REDACTED] in [REDACTED] on [REDACTED]. According to the CIA, [REDACTED] is a
+former senior member of [REDACTED].
+(S//NF) Although these known money transfers to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] are not particularly large, they do show connections between [REDACTED] and
+members and former members of [REDACTED]. These connections are troubling in light of
+significant account activity that occurred on [REDACTED]. On that date, [REDACTED]
+made deposits to his checking account of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] including [REDACTED] in
+foreign currency. [REDACTED] also transferred [REDACTED] to a [REDACTED] bank named [REDACTED].
+[REDACTED]. This transfer is
+suspicious because it is larger than [REDACTED] typical transactions. ^18^
+(S//NF) The FBI continues to investigate [REDACTED] and has begun to receive
+and analyze responses to eleven national security letters that were served during [REDACTED].
+[REDACTED]. The FBI is also investigating the [REDACTED] bank account that received [REDACTED] from
+[REDACTED].
+
+(S)-D. [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//OC//NF) On or about [REDACTED], the FBI received a BR FISA
+metadata report from the NSA that included information and contact chaining analysis
+[REDACTED]
+^17^ (S//NF) The CIA reported in March 2009 that [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//FISA
+31 August 2009 Production
+16
+152
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//FISA
+indicating that a [REDACTED] cellular telephone number used by several extremists associated
+with the [REDACTED] had been in contact with several U.S. telephone
+numbers, including [REDACTED] cellular number [REDACTED] The FBI's
+database contained information from another investigation indicating that the subscriber
+of the [REDACTED] telephone number was [REDACTED] Based on the information
+contained in the BR FISA metadata report, the [REDACTED] Division was instructed by FBI
+HQ to conduct a threat assessment of the user of the [REDACTED] ostensibly [REDACTED]
+
+(S//NF//OC) The [REDACTED] Division subsequently received information from a
+[REDACTED] that [REDACTED] had been killed
+on or about [REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED] Based on the BR FISA metadata, the information
+identifying the subscriber of the [REDACTED] telephone number, and [REDACTED]
+the FBI's [REDACTED] Division opened a full investigation of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] to investigate [REDACTED] alleged association with [REDACTED]
+Although [REDACTED] had been reported killed, the FBI elected to investigate, *inter alia*,
+whether the report of [REDACTED] death was accurate and whether others traveled
+overseas and took part in terrorist training with him in [REDACTED]
+
+(U) Conclusion
+
+(TS//SI) The facts set forth above demonstrate that the BR FISA metadata has
+historically proved to be a valuable source of intelligence to the FBI. Its historic value
+leads me to conclude that the BR FISA metadata will continue to be a valuable source of
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//FISA
+17
+31 August 2009 Production
+153
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//FISA
+intelligence that is relevant to numerous FBI-authorized international terrorism
+investigations. Accordingly, I hereby certify that the BR FISA metadata is relevant to an
+authorized investigation (other than a threat assessment) to obtain foreign intelligence
+information not concerning a U.S. person or to protect against international terrorism or
+clandestine intelligence activities, and that such investigation of a U.S. person is not
+conducted solely on the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment.
+
+(U) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I declare under penalty of perjury that the
+foregoing is true and correct.
+
+Executed on August 18, 2009.
+
+ROBERT S. MUELLER, III
+Director
+Federal Bureau of Investigation
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//FISA
+31 August 2009 Production
+18
+154
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_August_19_2009_Report_of_the_US_with_Attachments_20130910/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_August_19_2009_Report_of_the_US_with_Attachments_20130910/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2178ee9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_August_19_2009_Report_of_the_US_with_Attachments_20130910/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+{
+ "title": "Report of the United States",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Report of the Government describing the compliance issues uncovered during NSA’s end-to-end review, including an explanation for how the compliance issues were remedied. Attached to the Report are declarations of the value of the bulk telephony metadata program from the Directors of NSA and the FBI.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2009-08-19",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Kris, David S.",
+ "Alexander, Keith B.",
+ "Mueller, Robert S."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-10-13",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/report-united-states",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "0ed2663793f0565ccdc782d807d47a0adc628ff5480f06d38d3556ffb16197c1",
+ "pages": 110
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Dec_12_2008_Supplemental_Opinions_from_the_FISC/ACLU_-_pub_Dec_12_2008_Supplemental_Opinions_from_the_FISC.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Dec_12_2008_Supplemental_Opinions_from_the_FISC/ACLU_-_pub_Dec_12_2008_Supplemental_Opinions_from_the_FISC.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0bba7b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Dec_12_2008_Supplemental_Opinions_from_the_FISC/ACLU_-_pub_Dec_12_2008_Supplemental_Opinions_from_the_FISC.md
@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN//MR
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+IN RE PRODUCTION OF TANGIBLE THINGS FROM
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+Docket No.: BR 08-13
+
+SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION
+
+This Supplemental Opinion memorializes the Court's reasons for concluding that the
+records to be produced pursuant to the orders issued in the above-referenced docket number are
+properly subject to production pursuant to 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008),
+notwithstanding the provisions of 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2702-2703 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008),
+amended by Public Law 110-401, § 501(b)(2) (2008).
+
+As requested in the application, the Court is ordering production of telephone "call detail
+records or 'telephony metadata," which "includes comprehensive communications routing
+information, including but not limited to session identifying information ., trunk identifier,
+telephone calling card numbers, and time and duration of [the] calls," but "does not include the
+substantive content of any communication." Application at 9; Primary Order at 2. Similar
+productions have been ordered by judges of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+("FISC"). See Application at 17. However, this is the first application in which the government
+has identified the provisions of 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2702-2703 as potentially relevant to whether such
+orders could properly be issued under 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861. See Application at 6-8.
+
+Pursuant to section 1861, the government may apply to the FISC "for an order requiring
+the production of any tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other
+items)." 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861(a) (1) (emphasis added). The FISC is authorized to issue the order,
+"as requested, or as modified," upon a finding that the application meets the requirements of that
+section. Id. at § 1861(c)(1). Under the rules of statutory construction, the use of the word "any"
+in a statute naturally connotes "an expansive meaning," extending to all members of a common
+set, unless Congress employed "language limiting [its] breadth." _United States v. Gonzales_, 520
+U.S. 1, 5 (1997); accord _Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons_, 128 S. Ct. 831, 836 (2008)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN//MR
+Page 1
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN//MR
+("Congress' use of 'any' to modify 'other law enforcement officer' is most naturally read to mean
+law enforcement officers of whatever kind.").¹
+
+However, section 2702, by its terms, describes an apparently exhaustive set of
+circumstances under which a telephone service provider may provide to the government non-
+content records pertaining to a customer or subscriber. See § 2702(a)(3) (except as provided in §
+2702(c), a provider "shall not knowingly divulge a record or other [non-content] information
+pertaining to a subscriber or customer... to any governmental entity"). In complementary
+fashion, section 2703 describes an apparently exhaustive set of means by which the government
+may compel a provider to produce such records. See § 2703(c)(1) ("A governmental entity may
+require a provider... to disclose a record or other [non-content] information pertaining to a
+subscriber... or customer only when the governmental entity" proceeds in one of the ways
+described in § 2703(c)(1)(A)-(E)) (emphasis added). Production of records pursuant to a FISC
+order under section 1861 is not expressly contemplated by either section 2702(c) or section
+2703(c)(1)(A)-(E).
+
+If the above-described statutory provisions are to be reconciled, they cannot all be given
+their full, literal effect. If section 1861 can be used to compel production of call detail records,
+then the prohibitions of section 2702 and 2703 must be understood to have an implicit exception
+for production in response to a section 1861 order. On the other hand, if sections 2702 and 2703
+are understood to prohibit the use of section 1861 to compel production of call detail records,
+then the expansive description of tangible things obtainable under section 1861(a)(1) must be
+construed to exclude such records.
+
+The apparent tension between these provisions stems from amendments enacted by
+Congress in the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
+Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act ("USA PATRIOT Act"), Public Law 107-56, October 26,
+2001, 115 Stat. 272. Prior to the USA PATRIOT Act, only limited types of records, not
+
+¹ The only express limitation on the type of tangible thing that can be subject to a section
+1861 order is that the tangible thing "can be obtained with a subpoena duces tecum issued by a
+court of the United States in aid of a grand jury investigation or with any other order issued by a
+court of the United States directing the production of records or tangible things." Id. at §
+1861(c)(2)(D). Call detail records satisfy this requirement, since they may be obtained by
+(among other means) a "court order for disclosure" under 18 U.S.C.A. § 2703(d). Section
+2703(d) permits the government to obtain a court order for release of non-content records, or
+even in some cases of the contents of a communication, upon a demonstration of relevance to a
+criminal investigation.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN//MR
+Page 2
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN//MR
+including call detail records, were subject to production pursuant to FISC orders.² Section 215 of
+the USA PATRIOT Act replaced this prior language with the broad description of "any tangible
+thing" now codified at section 1861(a)(1). At the same time, the USA PATRIOT Act amended
+sections 2702 and 2703 in ways that seemingly re-affirmed that communications service
+providers could divulge records to the government only in specified circumstances,³ without
+expressly referencing FISC orders issued under section 1861.
+
+The government argues that section 1861(a)(3) supports its contention that section
+1861(a)(1) encompasses the records sought in this case. Under section 1861(a)(3), which
+Congress enacted in 2006,⁴ applications to the FISC for production of several categories of
+sensitive records, including "tax return records"⁵ and "educational records,"⁶ may be made only by
+the Director, the Deputy Director or the Executive Assistant Director for National Security of the
+Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"). 18 U.S.C.A. § 1861(a)(3). The disclosure of tax return
+records and educational records is specifically regulated by other federal statutes, which do not
+by their own terms contemplate production pursuant to a section 1861 order. Nonetheless,
+Congress clearly intended that such records could be obtained under a section 1861 order, as
+demonstrated by their inclusion in section 1861(a)(3). But, since the records of telephone service
+providers are not mentioned in section 1861(a)(3), this line of reasoning is not directly on point.
+However, it does at least demonstrate that Congress may have intended the sweeping description
+of tangible items obtainable under section 1861 to encompass the records of telephone service
+providers, even though the specific provisions of sections 2702 and 2703 were not amended in
+order to make that intent unmistakably clear.
+
+² See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1862(a) (West 2000) (applying to records of transportation carriers,
+storage facilities, vehicle rental facilities, and public accommodation facilities).
+
+³ Specifically, the USA PATRIOT Act inserted the prohibition on disclosure to
+governmental entities now codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2702(a)(3), and exceptions to this
+prohibition now codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2702(c). See USA PATRIOT Act § 212(a)(1)(B)(iii)
+& (E). The USA PATRIOT Act also amended the text of 18 U.S.C.A. § 2703(c)(1) to state that
+the government may require the disclosure of such records only in circumstances specified
+therein. See USA PATRIOT Act § 212(b)(1)(C)(i).
+
+⁴ See Public Law 109-177 § 106(a)(2) (2006).
+
+⁵ See 26 U.S.C.A. § 6103(a) (West Supp. 2008), amended by Public Law 110-328 §
+3(b)(1) (2008).
+
+⁶ See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232g(b) (West 2000 & Supp. 2008).
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN//MR
+Page 3
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN//MR
+The Court finds more instructive a separate provision of the USA PATRIOT Act, which
+also pertains to governmental access to non-content records from communications service
+providers. Section 505(a) of the USA PATRIOT Act amended provisions, codified at 18
+U.S.C.A. § 2709 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008), enabling the FBI, without prior judicial review, to
+compel a telephone service provider to produce "subscriber information and toll billing records
+information." 18 U.S.C.A. § 2709(a). Most pertinently, section 505(a)(3)(B) of the USA
+PATRIOT Act lowered the predicate required for obtaining such information to a certification
+submitted by designated FBI officials asserting its relevance to an authorized foreign intelligence
+investigation.⁸
+
+Indisputably, section 2709 provides a means for the government to obtain non-content
+information in a manner consistent with the text of sections 2702-2703.⁹ Yet section 2709
+merely requires an FBI official to provide a certification of relevance. In comparison, section
+1861 requires the government to provide to the FISC a "statement of facts showing that there are
+reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are relevant"¹⁰ to a foreign
+intelligence investigation, and the FISC to determine that the application satisfies this
+
+⁷ This process involves service of a type of administrative subpoena, commonly known
+as a "national security letter." David S. Kris & J. Douglas Wilson, _National Security
+Investigations and Prosecutions_ § 19:2 (2007).
+
+⁸ Specifically, a designated FBI official must certify that the information or records
+sought are "relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or
+clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such an investigation of a United States person is
+not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the
+Constitution of the United States." 18 U.S.C.A. § 2709(b)(1)-(2) (West Supp. 2008). Prior to
+the USA PATRIOT Act, the required predicate for obtaining "local and long distance toll billing
+records of a person or entity" was "specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that the
+person or entity... is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power." See 18 U.S.C.A. §
+2709(b)(1)(B) (West 2000).
+
+⁹ Section 2703(c)(2) permits the government to use "an administrative subpoena" to
+obtain certain categories of non-content information from a provider, and section 2709 concerns
+use of an administrative subpoena. See note 7 supra.
+
+¹⁰ 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861(b)(2)(A). More precisely, the investigation must be "an
+authorized investigation (other than a threat assessment)... to obtain foreign intelligence
+information not concerning a United States person or to protect against international terrorism or
+clandestine intelligence activities," id., "provided that such investigation of a United States
+(continued...)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN//MR
+Page 4
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN//MR
+requirement, see 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861(c)(1), before records are ordered produced. It would have
+been anomalous for Congress, in enacting the USA PATRIOT Act, to have deemed the FBI's
+application of a "relevance" standard, without prior judicial review, sufficient to obtain records
+subject to sections 2702-2703, but to have deemed the FISC's application of a closely similar
+"relevance" standard insufficient for the same purpose. This anomaly is avoided by interpreting
+sections 2702-2703 as implicitly permitting the production of records pursuant to a FISC order
+issued under section 1861.
+
+It is the Court's responsibility to attempt to interpret a statute "as a symmetrical and
+coherent regulatory scheme, and fit, if possible, all parts into an harmonious whole." _Food &
+Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp._, 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (internal
+quotations and citations omitted). For the foregoing reasons, the Court is persuaded that this
+objective is better served by the interpretation that the records sought in this case are obtainable
+pursuant to a section 1861 order.
+
+However, to the extent that any ambiguity may remain, it should be noted that the
+legislative history of the USA PATRIOT Act is consistent with this expansive interpretation of
+section 1861(a)(1). See 147 Cong. Rec. 20,703 (2001) (statement of Sen. Feingold) (section 215
+of USA PATRIOT Act "permits the Government... to compel the production of records from
+any business regarding any person if that information is sought in connection with an
+investigation of terrorism or espionage;" "all business records can be compelled, including those
+containing sensitive personal information, such as medical records from hospitals or doctors, or
+educational records, or records of what books somebody has taken out from the library")
+(emphasis added). In this regard, it is significant that Senator Feingold introduced an amendment
+to limit the scope of section 1861 orders to records "not protected by any Federal or State law
+governing access to the records for intelligence or law enforcement purposes," but this limitation
+was not adopted. See 147 Cong. Rec. 19,530 (2001).
+
+ENTERED this 12ᵗʰ day of December, 2008, regarding Docket No. BR 08-13.
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+¹⁰(...continued)
+person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the
+Constitution." Id. § 1861(a)(1). The application must also include minimization procedures in
+conformance with statutory requirements, which must also be reviewed by the FISC. Id. §
+1861(b)(2)(B), (c)(1), & (g).
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN//MR-
+Page 5
+[REDACTED]
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Dec_12_2008_Supplemental_Opinions_from_the_FISC/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Dec_12_2008_Supplemental_Opinions_from_the_FISC/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..191534d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Dec_12_2008_Supplemental_Opinions_from_the_FISC/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+{
+ "title": "Supplemental Opinion from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Opinion of the FISC concluding that the production of bulk telephony metadata records pursuant to Section 501 of FISA is not inconsistent with Sections 2702 and 2703 of Title 18 of the United States Code. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2008-12-12",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT",
+ "MR"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "ORCON, NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Walton, Reggie B."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-10-10",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/december-12-2008-supplemental-opinion-fisc",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "e82ce61a2e0940904b88353d4d145b71c0ade765cd6b33599688c090fea86eca",
+ "pages": 5
+}
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+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+2009 FEB 17 AM 9:47
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, DC
+
+IN RE PRODUCTION OF TANGIBLE THINGS
+FROM [REDACTED]
+Docket Number: BR 08-13
+
+MEMORANDUM OF THE UNITED STATES
+IN RESPONSE TO THE COURT'S ORDER DATED JANAURY 28, 2009 (U)
+
+The United States of America, by and through the undersigned Department of
+Justice attorneys, respectfully submits this memorandum and supporting Declaration of
+Lt. General Keith B. Alexander, U.S. Army, Director, National Security Agency (NSA),
+attached hereto at Tab 1 ("Alexander Declaration"), in response to the Court's Order
+Regarding Preliminary Notice of Compliance Incident Dated January 15, 2009 ("January
+28 Order"). (FS)
+
+The Government acknowledges that NSA's descriptions to the Court of the alert
+list process described in the Alexander Declaration were inaccurate and that the
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+[REDACTED]
+
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -6-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+Business Records Order did not provide the Government with authority to employ the
+alert list in the manner in which it did. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+For the reasons set forth below, however, the Court should not rescind or modify
+its Order in docket number BR 08-13. The Government has already taken significant
+steps to remedy the alert list compliance incident and has commenced a broader review
+of its handling of the metadata collected in this matter. In addition, the Government is
+taking additional steps to implement a more robust oversight regime. Finally, the
+Government respectfully submits that the Court need not take any further remedial
+action, including through the use of its contempt powers or by a referral to the
+appropriate investigative offices.¹ (TS//SI//NF)
+
+BACKGROUND (U)
+
+I. Events Preceding the Court's January 28 Order (S)
+In docket number BR 06-05, the Government sought, and the Court authorized
+NSA, pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act's (FISA) tangible things
+provision, 50 U.S.C. § 1861 et seq., to collect in bulk and on an ongoing basis certain call
+
+¹ The January 28 Order directed the Government to file a brief to help the Court assess
+how to respond to this matter and to address seven specific issues. This memorandum
+discusses the need for further Court action based, in part, on the facts in the Alexander
+Declaration, which contains detailed responses to each of the Court's specific questions. See
+Alexander Decl. at 24-39. (S)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+2
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009. -7-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+detail records or "telephony metadata," so that NSA could analyze the metadata using
+contact chainin[REDACTED] tools. ² (TS//SI//NF)
+FISA's tangible things provision authorizes the Director of the Federal Bureau of
+Investigation (FBI) or his designee to apply to this Court
+for an order requiring the production of any tangible things (including
+books, records, papers, documents, and other items) for an investigation
+to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States
+person or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine
+intelligence activities, provided that such investigation of a United States
+person is not conducted solely on the basis of activities protected by the
+first amendment to the Constitution.
+50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1). FISA's tangible things provision directs the Court to enter an ex
+parte order requiring the production of tangible things and directing that the tangible
+things produced in response to such an order be treated in accordance with
+minimization procedures adopted by the Attorney General pursuant to section 1861(g),
+if the judge finds that the Government's application meets the requirements of 50 U.S.C.
+§ 1861(a) & (b). See 50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1). (U)
+In docket number BR 06-05 and each subsequent authorization, including docket
+number BR 08-13, this Court found that the Government's application met the
+requirements of 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a) & (b) and entered an order directing that the BR
+metadata to be produced—call detail records or telephony metadata—be treated in
+
+² The Government will refer herein to call detail records collected pursuant to the
+Court's authorizations in this matter as "BR metadata." (TS)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+3
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -8-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+accordance with the minimization procedures adopted by the Attorney General.
+Among these minimization procedures was the following:
+Any search or analysis of the data archive shall occur only after a
+particular known telephone number has been associated with [REDACTED]
+[3] More specifically, access to the
+archived data shall occur only when NSA has identified a known
+telephone number for which, based on the factual and practical
+considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent persons
+act, there are facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the
+telephone number is associated with [REDACTED]
+organization; provided, however, that a telephone number believed to be
+used by a U.S. person shall not be regarded as associated with [REDACTED]
+solely on the basis of activities that are
+protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution.
+
+Order, docket number BR 06-05, at 5 (emphasis added); see also Memo. of Law in Supp.
+of Application for Certain Tangible Things for Investigations to Protect Against
+International Terrorism, docket number BR 06-05, Ex. C, at 20 (describing the above
+requirement as one of several minimization procedures to be applied to the collected
+metadata). (TS//SI//NF)
+
+3 Authorizations after this matter was initiated in May 2006 expanded the telephone
+identifiers that NSA could query to those identifiers associated with [REDACTED]
+see generally docket number BR 06-05 (motion to amend granted in August 2006), and
+later the [REDACTED] see generally docket number
+BR 07-10 (motion to amend granted in June 2007). The Court's authorization in docket number
+BR 08-13 approved querying related to [REDACTED] Primary Order, docket number
+BR 08-13, at 8. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+4 In addition, the Court's Order in docket number BR 06-05 and each subsequent
+authorization, including docket number BR 08-13, required that "[a]lthough the data collected
+under this Order will necessarily be broad, the use of that information for analysis shall be
+strictly tailored to identifying terrorist communications and shall occur solely according to the
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+4
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -9-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+On December 11, 2008, the Court granted the most recent reauthorization of the
+BR metadata collection. For purposes of querying the BR metadata, as in prior Orders
+in this matter, the Court required the Government to comply with the same standard of
+reasonable, articulable suspicion set forth above. Primary Order, docket number BR 08-
+13, at 8-9.5 (TS//SI//NF)
+
+On January 9, 2009, representatives from the Department of Justice's National
+Security Division (NSD) attended a briefing at NSA concerning the telephony metadata
+collection.6 At the briefing, NSD and NSA representatives discussed several matters,
+including the alert list. See Alexander Decl, at 17, 27-28. Following the briefing and on
+the same day, NSD sent NSA an e-mail message asking NSA to confirm NSD's
+understanding of how the alert list operated as described at the briefing. Following
+additional investigation and the collection of additional information, NSA replied on
+
+procedures described in the application, including the minimization procedures designed to
+protect U.S. person information." See, e.g., Order, docket number BR 06-05, at 6 [ D.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+5 In this memorandum the Government will refer to this standard as the "RAS standard"
+and telephone identifiers that satisfy the standard as "RAS-approved." (S)
+6 The names of the Department of Justice representatives who attended the briefing are
+included in the Alexander Declaration at page 28. The date of this meeting, January 9, 2009,
+was the date on which these individuals first learned (later confirmed) that the alert list
+compared non-RAS-approved identifiers to the incoming BR metadata. Other than these
+individuals (and other NSD personnel with whom these individuals discussed this matter
+between January 9 and January 15, 2009), and those NSA personnel otherwise identified in the
+Alexander Declaration, NSD has no record of any other executive branch personnel who knew
+that the alert list included non-RAS-approved identifiers prior to January 15, 2009. (TS//SI//NE)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+5
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -10-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+January 14, 2009, confirming much of NSD's understanding and providing some
+additional information. See id. at 27. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Following additional discussions between NSD and NSA, a preliminary notice of
+compliance incident was filed with the Court on January 15, 2009. See id. at 27-28. The
+letter reported that the alert list contained counterterrorism-associated telephone
+identifiers tasked for collection pursuant to NSA's signals intelligence (SIGINT)
+authorities under Executive Order 12333, and therefore included telephone identifiers
+that were not RAS-approved, as well as some that were.⁷ Thereafter, as previously
+reported in a supplemental notice of compliance incident filed with the Court on
+February 3, 2009, NSA unsuccessfully attempted to complete a software fix to the alert
+list process so that it comported with the above requirement in docket number BR 08-13.
+
+⁷ The preliminary notice of compliance incident filed on January 15, 2009, stated in
+pertinent part:
+NSA informed the NSD that NSA places on the alert list counterterrorism
+associated telephone identifiers that have been tasked for collection pursuant to
+NSA's signals intelligence (SIGINT) authorities under Executive Order 12333.
+Because the alert list consists of SIGINT-tasked telephone identifiers, it contains
+telephone identifiers as to which NSA has not yet determined that a reasonable
+and articulable suspicion exists that they are associated with [REDACTED] nd
+[REDACTED] ted
+As information collected pursuant the Court's Orders in
+this matter flows into an NSA database, NSA automatically compares this
+information with its alert list in order to identify U.S. telephone identifiers that
+have been in contact with a number on the alert list. Based on results of this
+comparison NSA then determines in what body of data contact chaining is
+authorized.
+Jan. 15, 2009, Preliminary Notice of Compliance Incident, docket number 08-13, at 2.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+6
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -11-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+*See id.*, at 20. NSA shut down the alert list process entirely on January 24, 2009, and the
+process remains shut down as of the date of this filing. *See id.* ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~
+II. NSA's Use of the Alert List Process to Query Telephony Metadata ~~(TS)~~
+When the Court initially authorized the collection of telephony metadata in
+docket number BR 06-05 on May 24, 2006, neither the Court's Orders nor the
+Government's application (including the attachments) discussed an alert list process.
+Rather, a description of the alert list process first appeared in the NSA report
+accompanying the renewal application in BR 06-08, filed with the Court on August 18,
+8 The supplemental notice of compliance incident filed on February 3, 2009, stated in
+pertinent part:
+On January 23, 2009, NSA provided the NSD with information regarding the
+steps it had taken to modify the alert list process in order to ensure that only
+"RAS-approved" telephone identifiers run against the data collected pursuant to
+the Court's Orders in this matter (the "BR data") would generate automated
+alerts to analysts. Specifically, NSA informed the NSD that as of January 16, 2009,
+it had modified the alert list process so that "hits" in the BR data based on non-
+RAS-approved signals intelligence (SIGINT) tasked telephone identifiers would
+be automatically deleted so that only hits in the BR data based on RAS-approved
+telephone identifiers would result in an automated alert being sent to analysts.
+NSA also indicated that it was in the process of constructing a new alert list
+consisting of only RAS-approved telephone identifiers.
+On January 24, 2009, NSA informed the NSD that it had loaded to the business
+record alert system a different list of telephone identifiers than intended. NSA
+reports that, due to uncertainty as to whether all of the telephone identifiers
+satisfied all the criteria in the business records order, the alert list process was
+shut down entirely on January 24, 2009.
+Feb. 3, 2009, Supplemental Notice of Compliance Incident, docket number 08-13, at 1-2.
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+7
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 10
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+2006. The reports filed with the Court incorrectly stated that the alert list did not
+include telephone identifiers that were not RAS-approved. In fact, the majority of
+telephone identifiers on the list were not RAS-approved. See Alexander Decl. at 4, 7-8.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+A. Creation of the Alert List for BR Metadata in May 2006 (TS)
+
+Before the Court issued its Order in BR 06-05, NSA had developed an alert list
+process to assist NSA in prioritizing its review of the telephony metadata it received.
+See id. at 8. The alert list contained telephone identifiers NSA was targeting for SIGINT
+collection and domestic identifiers that, as a result of analytical tradecraft, were deemed
+relevant to the Government's counterterrorism activity. See id. at 9. The alert list
+process notified NSA analysts if there was a contact between either (i) a foreign
+telephone identifier of counterterrorism interest on the alert list and any domestic
+telephone identifier in the incoming telephony metadata, or (ii) any domestic telephone
+identifier on the alert list related to a foreign counterterrorism target and any foreign
+telephone identifier in the incoming telephony metadata. See id. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+According to NSA's review of its records and discussions with relevant NSA
+personnel, on May 25, 2006, NSA's Signals Intelligence Directorate (SID) asked for NSA
+Office of General Counsel's (OGC) concurrence on draft procedures for implementing
+
+⁹ Similarly, the applications and declarations in subsequent renewals did not discuss the
+alert list although the reports attached to the applications and reports filed separately from
+renewal applications discussed the process. (TS)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+8
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -13-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+the Court's Order in docket number BR 06-05. See *id*, at 12. The procedures generally
+described how identifiers on the alert list would be compared against incoming BR
+metadata and provided that a supervisor would be notified if there was a match
+between an identifier on the alert list and an identifier in the incoming data. See *id*. at
+12-13 and Ex. B thereto ("BR Procedures") at 1-2. Moreover, a close reading of the BR
+Procedures indicated that the alert list contained both RAS-approved and non-RAS-
+approved telephone identifiers. **10** See Alexander Decl. at 12-13; BR Procedures at 1.
+NSA OGC concurred in the use of the BR Procedures, emphasizing that analysts could
+not access the archived BR metadata for purposes of conducting contact chaining
+[REDACTED] unless the RAS standard had been satisfied. See Alexander Decl. at 13-
+14 and Ex. A and Ex. B thereto. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+On May 26, 2006, the chief of NSA-Washington's counterterrorism organization
+in SID directed that the alert list be rebuilt to include only identifiers assigned to "bins"
+or "zip codes"**11** that NSA used to identify [REDACTED]
+
+**10** For example, after describing the notification a supervisor (i.e., Shift Coordinator and,
+later, Homeland Mission Coordinator) would receive if a foreign telephone identifier generated
+an alert based on the alert list process, the BR Procedures provided that the “Shift Coordinator
+will examine the foreign number and determine if that particular telephone number has been
+previously associated w [REDACTED] based on the standard
+articulated by the Court.” BR Procedures at 1. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+9
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -14-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+-the only targets of the Court's Order in docket number BR 06-05. See
+Alexander Decl. at 14-15. Pursuant to this overall direction, personnel in NSA's
+counterterrorism organization actually built two lists to manage the alert process. The
+first list - known as the "alert list" - included all identifiers (foreign and domestic)
+that were of interest to counterterrorism analysts who were charged with tracking [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] This list was used to compare the incoming BR metadata NSA
+was obtaining pursuant to the Court's Order and NSA's other sources of SIGINT
+collection to alert the counterterrorism organization if there was a match between a
+telephone identifier on the list and an identifier in the incoming metadata. See id, at 15.
+The alert list consisted of two partitions-one of RAS-approved identifiers that could
+result in automated chaining in the BR metadata and a second of non-RAS approved
+identifiers that could not be used to initiate automated chaining in the BR metadata.
+See id. The second list-known as the "station table" - was a historical listing of all
+telephone identifiers that had undergone a RAS determination, including the results of
+the determination. See id, at 15, 22. NSA used the "station table" to ensure that only
+RAS-approved "seed" identifiers were used to conduct chaining [REDACTED] in
+the BR metadata archive. See id, at 15. In short, the system was designed to compare
+both SIGINT and BR metadata against the identifiers on the alert list but only to permit
+A chart of the alert list process as it operated from May 2006 to January 2009 is attached
+to the Alexander Declaration as Ex. C. (S)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+10
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -15-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+alerts generated from RAS-approved telephone identifiers to be used to conduct contact
+chaining [REDACTED] of the BR metadata. As a result, the majority of telephone
+identifiers compared against the incoming BR metadata in the rebuilt alert list were not
+RAS-approved. See id, at 4, 7-8. For example, as of January 15, 2009, the date of NSD's
+first notice to the Court regarding this issue, only 1,935 of the 17,835 identifiers on the
+alert list were RAS-approved. See id. at 8. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Based upon NSA's recent review, neither NSA SID nor NSA OGC identified the
+inclusion of non-RAS-approved identifiers on the alert list as an issue requiring
+extensive analysis. See id, at 11. Moreover, NSA personnel, including the OGC
+attorney who reviewed the BR Procedures, appear to have viewed the alert process as
+merely a means of identifying a particular identifier on the alert list that might warrant
+further scrutiny, including a determination of whether the RAS standard had been
+satisfied and therefore whether contact chaining [REDACTED] could take place in
+the BR metadata archive using that particular identifier.footnote:[12] See id, at 11-12. In fact, NSA
+designed the alert list process to result in automated chaining of the BR metadata only if
+the initial alert was based on a RAS-approved telephone identifier. See id, at 14. If an
+
+---
+footnote:[12] As discussed in the Alexander Declaration, in the context of NSA's SIGINT activities
+the term "archived data" normally refers to data stored in NSA's analytical repositories and
+excludes the many processing steps NSA undertakes to make the raw collections useful to
+analysts. Accordingly, NSA analytically distinguished the initial alert process from the
+subsequent process of performing contact chaining [REDACTED] (i.e., "queries") of the
+"archived data," assessing that the Court's Order in docket number BR 06-05 only governed the
+latter. See Alexander Decl. at 3-4, 10-15. (TS//SI//NF)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+11
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+alert was based on a non-RAS-approved identifier, no automated chaining would occur
+in the BR metadata archive although automated chaining could occur in other NSA
+archives that did not require a RAS determination (e.g., non-FISA telephony collection).
+See id. (TS//SI//NF)
+B. Description of the Alert List Process Beginning in August 2006 (TS)
+The first description of the alert list process appeared in the NSA report
+accompanying the Government's renewal application filed with the Court on August 18,
+2006. The report stated in relevant part:
+(TS//SI//NF) NSA has compiled through its continuous counter-
+terrorism analysis, a list of telephone numbers that constitute an "alert
+list" of telephone numbers used by members of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] This alert list serves as a body of
+telephone numbers employed to query the data, as is described more fully
+below.
+(TS//SI//NF) Domestic numbers and foreign numbers are treated
+differently with respect to the criteria for including them on the alert list.
+With respect to foreign telephone numbers, NSA receives information
+indicating a tie to [REDACTED]
+Principal among these are:
+[REDACTED]
+Each of the foreign telephone numbers that comes
+to the attention of NSA as possibly related to [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] is evaluated to determine whether the
+information about it provided to NSA satisfies the reasonable articulable
+suspicion standard. If so, the foreign telephone number is placed on the
+alert list; if not, it is not placed on the alert list.
+(TS//SI//NF) The process set out-above-applies also to newly
+discovered domestic telephone numbers considered for addition to the
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+12
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+alert list, with the additional requirement that NSA's Office of General
+Counsel reviews these numbers and affirms that the telephone number is
+not the focus of the analysis based solely on activities that are protected by
+the First Amendment....
+
+(TS//SI//NF) As of the last day of the reporting period addressed
+herein, NSA had included a total of 3980 telephone numbers on the alert
+list, which includes foreign numbers and domestic numbers, after
+concluding that each of the foreign telephone numbers satisfied the
+standard set forth in the Court's May 24, 2006 [Order], and each of the
+domestic telephone numbers was either a FISC approved number or in
+direct contact with a foreign seed that met those criteria.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) To summarize the alert system: every day new
+contacts are automatically revealed with the 3980 telephone numbers
+contained on the alert list described above, which themselves are present
+on the alert list either because they satisfied the reasonable articulable
+suspicion standard, or because they are domestic numbers that were
+either a FISC approved number or in direct contact with a number that
+did so. These automated queries identify any new telephone contacts
+between the numbers on the alert list and any other number, except that
+domestic numbers do not alert on domestic-to-domestic contacts.
+
+NSA Report to the FISC (Aug. 18, 2006), docket number BR 06-05 (Ex. B to the
+Government's application in docket number BR 06-08), at 12-15 ("August 2006
+Report"). 13 The description above was included in similar form in all subsequent
+reports to the Court, including the report filed in December 2008. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+13 The August 2006 report also discussed two categories of domestic telephone numbers
+that were added to the alert list prior to the date the Order took effect. One category consisted
+of telephone numbers for which the Court had authorized collection and were therefore
+deemed approved for metadata querying without the approval of an NSA official. The second
+category consisted of domestic numbers added to the alert list after direct contact with a known
+foreign [REDACTED] seed number. The domestic numbers were not used as seeds themselves and
+contact chaining was limited to two hops (instead of the three hops authorized by the Court).
+See August 2006 Report, at 12-13; Alexander Decl. at Zn.1. NSA subsequently removed the
+numbers in the second category from the alert list. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+13
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+According to NSA's review of its records and discussions with relevant NSA
+personnel, the NSA OGC attorney who prepared the initial draft of the report included
+an inaccurate description of the alert list process due to a mistal[REDACTED]ert
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Upon completing the draft, the attorney circulated the draft to other OGC
+attorneys and operational personnel and requested that others review it for accuracy.
+See id. The inaccurate description, however, was not corrected before the report was
+finalized and filed with the Court on August 18, 2006. The same description remained
+in subsequent reports to the Court, including the report filed in docket number BR 08-
+13.14 (TS//SI//NF)
+
+14 At the meeting on January 9, 2009, NSD and NSA also identified that the reports filed
+with the Court have incorrectly stated the number of identifiers on the alert list. Each report
+included the number of telephone identifiers purportedly on the alert list. See, e.g., NSA 120-
+Day Report to the FISC (Dec. 11, 2008), docket number BR 08-08 (Ex. B to the Government's
+application in docket number BR 08-13), at 11 ("As of November 2, 2008, the last day of the
+reporting period herein, NSA had included a total of 27,090 telephone identifiers on the alert
+list . . . ."). In fact, NSA reports that these numbers did not reflect the total number of identifiers
+on the alert list; they actually represented the total number of identifiers included on the
+"station table" (NSA's historical record of RAS determinations) as currently RAS-approved (i.e.,
+approved for contact chaining [REDACTED] See Alexander Decl. at 8 n.3. (TS//SI//NF)-
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+14
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+DISCUSSION (U)
+
+I. THE COURT'S ORDERS SHOULD NOT BE RESCINDED AND NEED NOT BE MODIFIED (TS)
+
+In the January 28 Order, the Court directed the Government to submit a written brief designed to, among other things, assist the Court in assessing whether the Primary Order in docket number BR 08-13 should be modified or rescinded. 15 January 28 Order at 2. (S)
+
+So long as a court retains jurisdiction over a case, then, in the absence of a prohibition by statute or rule, the court retains inherent authority to "reconsider, rescind, or modify an interlocutory order for cause seen by it to be sufficient." Melancon v. Texaco, Inc., 659 F.3d 551, 553 (5th Cir. 1981). The choice of remedies rests in a court's sound discretion, see Kingsley v. United States, 968 F.2d 109, 113 (1st Cir. 1992) (citations omitted) (considering the alternative remedies for breach of a plea agreement), but in exercising that discretion a court may consider the full consequences that a particular remedy may bring about, see Alrefae v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 353, 360 (2d Cir. 2006) (citations omitted) (instructing that on remand to consider petitioner's motion to rescind order of removal, immigration judge may consider "totality of the circumstances"). Consonant with these principles, prior decisions of this Court reflect a strong preference for resolving incidents of non-compliance through the creation of
+
+15 The authorization granted by the Primary Order issued by the Court in docket number BR 08-13 expires on March 6, 2009 at 5:00 p.m. Eastern Time. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+15
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+additional procedures and safeguards to guide the Government in its ongoing collection
+efforts, rather than by imposing the extraordinary and final remedy of rescission. See,
+e.g., [REDACTED] Primary Order, docket number [REDACTED] at 11-12 (requiring, in
+response to an incident of non-compliance, NSA to file with the Court every thirty days
+a report discussing, among other things, queries made since the last report to the Court
+and NSA's application of the relevant standard); see also [REDACTED] docket numbers
+[REDACTED] (prohibiting the querying of data using "seed" accounts validated using particular
+information). (TS//SI//NF)-
+The Court's Orders in this matter did not authorize the alert list process as
+implemented to include a comparison of non-RAS-approved identifiers against
+incoming BR metadata. However, in light of the significant steps that the Government
+has already taken to remedy the alert list compliance incident and its effects, the
+significant oversight modifications the Government is in the process of implementing,
+and the value of the telephony metadata collection to the Government's national
+security mission, the Government respectfully submits that the Court should not
+rescind or modify the authority granted in docket number BR 08-13. (TS)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+16
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+A. Remedial Steps Already Undertaken by the Government Are Designed to Ensure Future Compliance with the Court's Orders and to Mitigate Effects of Past Non-Compliance (S)
+
+Since the Government first reported this matter to the Court, NSA has taken several corrective measures related to the alert process, including immediate steps to sequester and shut off its analysts' access to any alerts that were generated from comparing incoming BR metadata against non-RAS-approved identifiers. See Alexander Decl. at 19-20. NSA also immediately began to re-engineer the entire alert process to ensure that only RAS-approved telephone identifiers are compared against incoming BR metadata. See id. Most importantly, NSA shut off the alert list process on January 24, 2009, when its redesign efforts failed, and the process will remain shut down until the Government can ensure that the process will operate within the terms of the Court's Orders. See id, at 20. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+NSA has also conducted a review of all 275 reports NSA has disseminated since May 2006 as a result of contact chaining [REDACTED] of NSA's archive of BR metadata. ¹⁶ See id, at 36. Thirty-one of these reports resulted from the automated alert process. See id, at 36 n.17. NSA did not identify any report that resulted from the use of a non-RAS-approved "seed" identifier. ¹⁷ See id, at 36-37. Additionally, NSA
+
+¹⁶ A single report may tip more than one telephone identifier as being related to the seed identifier. As a result, the 275 reports have tipped a total of 2,549 telephone identifiers since May 24, 2006. See Alexander Decl. at 36 n.17. (TS//SI//NF)
+¹⁷ NSA has identified one report where the number on the alert list was not RAS-approved when the alert was generated but, after receiving the alert, a supervisor determined
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+17
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+determined that in all instances where a U.S. identifier served as the initial seed
+identifier for a report (22 of the 275 reports), the initial U.S. seed identifier was either
+already the subject of FISC-approved surveillance under the FISA or had been reviewed
+by NSA's OGC to ensure that the RAS determination was not based solely on a U.S.
+person's first amendment-protected activities. See id. at 37. (TS//SI//NF)
+Unlike reports generated from the BR metadata, which NSA disseminated
+outside NSA, the alerts generated from a comparison of the BR metadata to the alert list
+were only distributed to NSA SIGINT personnel responsible for counterterrorism
+activity.18 See id, at 38. Since this compliance incident surfaced, NSA identified and
+eliminated analyst access to all alerts that were generated from the comparison of non-
+RAS approved identifiers against the incoming BR metadata and has limited access to
+the BR alert system to only software developers assigned to NSA's Homeland Security
+Analysis Center (HSAC), and the Technical Director for the HSAC. See id, at 38-39.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+that the identifier, in fact, satisfied the RAS standard. After this determination, NSA used the
+identifier as a seed for chaining in the BR FISA data archive. Information was developed that
+led to a report to the FBI that tipped 11 new telephone identifiers. See Alexander Decl. at 37
+n.18. (TS//SI//NF)
+18 Initially, if an identifier on the alert list generated an alert that the identifier had been
+in contact with an identifier in the United States, the alert system masked (i.e., concealed from
+the analyst's view) the domestic identifier. Later, in January 2008, the SIGINT Directorate
+allowed the alerts to be sent to analysts without masking the domestic identifier. NSA made
+this change in an effort to improve the ability of SIGINT analysts, on the basis of their target
+knowledge, to prioritize their work more efficiently. See Alexander Decl. at 38. (TS//SI//NF)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+18
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+In addition to the steps NSA has taken with respect to the alert list issues, NSA has also implemented measures to review NSA's handling of the BR metadata generally. For example, the Director of NSA has ordered end-to-end system engineering and process reviews (technical and operational) of NSA's handling of BR metadata. See id. at 21. The results of this review will be made available to the Court. See id. at 21 n.13.
+
+In response to this Order, NSA also has undertaken the following:
+
+* a review of domestic identifiers on the "station table" in order to confirm that RAS determinations complied with the Court's Orders; and
+* an audit of all queries made of the BR metadata repository since November 1, 2008, to determine if any of the queries during that period were made using non-RAS-approved identifiers. [^19]
+
+See id, at 22-23. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+To better ensure that NSA operational personnel understand the Court-ordered procedures and requirements for accessing the BR metadata, NSA's SIGINT Oversight & Compliance Office also initiated an effort to redesign training for operational personnel who require access to BR metadata. This effort will include competency testing prior to access to the data. See id. at 23. In the interim, NSA management personnel, with support from NSA OGC and the SIGINT Oversight and Compliance Office, delivered
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+19
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009
+
+[^19]: Although NSA's review is still ongoing, NSA's review to date has revealed no instances of improper querying of the BR metadata, aside from those previously reported to the Court in a notice of compliance incident filed on January 26, 2009, in which it was reported that between approximately December 10, 2008, and January 23, 2009, two analysts conducted 280 queries using non-RAS-approved identifiers. See Alexander Decl. at 22-23. As discussed below, NSA is implementing software changes to the query tools used by analysts so that only RAS-approved identifiers may be used to query the BR FISA data repository. See id, at 22-23. (TS)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+in-person briefings for all NSA personnel who have access to the BR metadata data
+archive to remind them of the requirements and their responsibilities regarding the
+proper handling of BR metadata. _See id._ In addition, all NSA personnel with access to
+the BR metadata have also received a written reminder of their responsibilities. _See id._
+(TS//SI//NF)
+Finally, NSA is implementing two changes to the tools used by analysts to access
+the BR metadata. First, NSA is changing the system that analysts use to conduct contact
+chaining of the BR metadata so that the system will not be able to accept any non-RAS-
+approved identifier as the seed identifier for contact chaining. _See id._ at 24. Second,
+NSA is implementing software changes to its system that will limit to three the number
+of "hops" permitted from a RAS-approved seed identifier. _See id._ (TS//SI//NF)
+B. Additional Oversight Mechanisms the Government Will Implement (S)
+The operation of the alert list process in a manner not authorized by the Court
+and contrary to the manner in which it was described to the Court is a significant
+compliance matter. While the process has been remedied in the ways described above,
+the Government has concluded that additional oversight mechanisms are appropriate to
+ensure future compliance with the Primary Order in docket number BR 08-13 and any
+future orders renewing the authority granted therein. Accordingly, the Government
+will implement the following oversight mechanisms in addition to those contained in
+the Court's Orders:
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+20
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+- NSA's OGC will consult with NSD on all significant legal opinions that relate to the interpretation, scope and/or implementation of the authorization granted by the Court in its Primary Order in docket number BR 08-13, prior Orders issued by the Court, or any future order renewing that authorization. When operationally practicable, such consultation shall occur in advance; otherwise NSD will be notified as soon as practicable;
+- NSA's OGC will promptly provide NSD with copies of the mandatory procedures (and all replacements, supplements or revisions thereto in effect now or adopted in the future) the Director of NSA is required to maintain to strictly control access to and use of the data acquired pursuant to orders issued by the Court in this matter;
+- NSA's OGC will promptly provide NSD with copies of all formal briefing and/or training materials (including all revisions thereto) currently in use or prepared and used in the future to brief/train NSA personnel concerning the authorization granted by orders issued by the Court in this matter;
+- At least once before any future orders renewing the authorization granted in docket number BR 08-13 expire, a meeting for the purpose of assessing compliance with this Court's orders will be held with representatives from NSA's OGC, NSD, and appropriate individuals from NSA's Signals Intelligence Directorate. The results of this meeting will be reduced to writing and submitted to the Court as part of any application to renew or reinstate this authority;
+- At least once during the authorization period of all future orders, NSD will meet with NSA's Office of Inspector General (OIG) to discuss their respective oversight responsibilities and assess NSA's compliance with the Court's orders in this matter;
+- Prior to implementation, all proposed automated query processes will be reviewed and approved by NSA's OGC and NSD.
+
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+While no oversight regime is perfect, the Government submits that this more robust oversight regime will significantly reduce the likelihood of such compliance incidents occurring in the future. [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+21
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+C. The Value of the BR Metadata to the Government's National Security
+Mission (FS)
+
+The BR metadata plays a critical role in the Government's ability to find and
+identify members and agents of [REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED] As discussed in declarations previously filed with
+the Court in this matter, operatives of [REDACTED]s use the international telephone system to
+communicate with one another between numerous countries all over the world,
+including to and from the United States. Access to the accumulated pool of BR
+metadata is vital to NSA's counterterrorism intelligence mission because it enables NSA
+to discover the communications of these terrorist operatives. See Alexander Decl. at 39-
+42. While terrorist operatives often take intentional steps to disguise and obscure their
+communications and their identities using a variety of tactics, by employing its contact
+chaining [REDACTED] against the accumulated pool of metadata NSA can
+discover valuable information about the adversary. See id. Specifically, using contact
+chaining [REDACTED] NSA may be able to discover previously unknown
+telephone identifiers used by a known terrorist operative, to discover previously
+unknown terrorist operatives, to identify hubs or common contacts between targets of
+interest who were previously thought to be unconnected, and potentially to discover
+individuals willing to become U.S. Government assets. See, e.g., Decl. of Lt. Gen. Keith
+B. Alexander, docket number BR 06-05, Ex. A at ¶ 9; Decl. of [REDACTED] docket
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+22
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+number BR 08-13, Ex. A at ¶¶ 9-11.20 Such discoveries are not possible when targeting
+solely known terrorist telephone identifiers. See Alexander Decl. at 39-40.
+Demonstrating the value of the BR metadata to the U.S. Intelligence Community, the
+NSA has disseminated 275 reports and tipped over 2,500 telephone identifiers to the FBI
+and CIA for further investigative action since the inception of this collection in docket
+number BR 06-05. See id, at 42. This reporting has provided the FBI with leads and
+linkages on individuals in the U.S. with connections to terrorism that it may have
+otherwise not identified. See id. (TS//SI//NF)
+In summary, the unquestionable foreign intelligence value of this collection, the
+substantial steps NSA has already taken to ensure the BR metadata is only accessed in
+compliance with the Court's Orders, and the Government's enhanced oversight regime
+provide the Court with a substantial basis not to rescind or modify the authorization for
+this collection program. (TS)
+III.
+THE COURT NEED NOT TAKE ADDITIONAL ACTION REGARDING
+MISREPRESENTATIONS THROUGH ITS CONTEMPT POWERS OR BY
+REFERRAL TO APPROPRIATE INVESTIGATIVE OFFICES (TS)
+The January 28 Order asks "whether the Court should take action regarding
+persons responsible for any misrepresentation to the Court or violation of its Orders,
+20 Other advantages of contact chaining include
+[REDACTED]
+See Alexander Decl. at 41; Decl. d [REDACTED] docket number BR 08-
+13, Ex. A at ¶ 10. (TS//SI//NF)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+23
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -28-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+either through its contempt powers or by referral to the appropriate investigative
+offices." January 28 Order at 2. The Government respectfully submits that such actions
+are not required. Contempt is not an appropriate remedy on these facts, and no referral
+is required, because NSA already has self-reported this matter to the proper
+investigative offices. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Whether contempt is civil or criminal in nature turns on the "character and
+purpose" of the sanction involved. See Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v.
+Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 827 (1994) (quoting Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221
+U.S. 418, 441 (1911)). Criminal contempt is punitive in nature and is designed to
+vindicate the authority of the court. See Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 828 (internal quotations
+and citations omitted). It is imposed retrospectively for a "completed act of
+disobedience," and has no coercive effect because the contemnor cannot avoid or
+mitigate the sanction through later compliance. Id. at 828-29 (citations omitted).²¹
+Because NSA has stopped the alert list process and corrected the Agency's unintentional
+misstatements to the Court, any possible contempt sanction here would be in the nature
+of criminal contempt. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+²¹ By contrast, civil contempt is "remedial, and for the benefit of the complainant."
+Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441. It “is ordinarily used to compel compliance with an order of the
+court," Cobell v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1128, 1145 (D.C. Cir. 2003), and may also be designed "to
+compensate the complainant for losses sustained." United States v. United Mine Workers of
+America, 330 U.S. 258, 303-04 (1947) (citations omitted). (U)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+24
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -29-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+A finding of criminal contempt "requires both a contemptuous act and a
+wrongful state of mind." Cobell, 334 F.3d at 1147 (citations omitted). The violation of
+the order must be willful: "a volitional act by one who knows or should reasonably be
+aware that his conduct is wrongful." United States v. Greyhound Corp., 508 F.2d 529,
+531-32 (7th Cir. 1974), quoted in In re Holloway, 995 F.2d 1080, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
+(emphasis in original). For example, a criminal contempt conviction under 18 U.S.C. §
+401 requires, among other things, proof of a willful violation of a court order; i.e., where
+the defendant "acts with deliberate or reckless disregard of the obligations created by a
+court order." United States v. Rapone, 131 F.3d 188, 195 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citations
+omitted).22 (U)
+Here, there are no facts to support the necessary finding that persons at NSA
+willfully violated the Court's Orders or intentionally sought to deceive the Court. To
+the contrary, NSA operational personnel implemented the alert list based on the
+concurrence of its OGC to a set of procedures that contemplated comparing the alert
+list, including non-RAS-approved telephone identifiers, against a flow of new BR
+metadata. See Alexander Decl. at 12-14. The concurrence of NSA's OGC was based on
+NSA's understanding that, by using the term "archived data," the Court's Order in
+
+22 A person charged with contempt committed out of court is entitled to the usual
+protections of criminal law, such as the presumption of innocence and the right to a jury trial.
+Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 827-28. For criminal contempt to apply, a willful violation of an order must
+be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. Contempt occurring in the presence of the Court,
+however, is not subject to all such protections. See id. at 827 n.2. (U)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+25
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+docket number BR 06-05 only required the RAS standard to be applied to the contact
+chaining [REDACTED] conducted by accessing NSA's analytic repository of BR
+metadata. See id, at 10-14. This advice was given for the purpose of advising NSA
+operators on how to comply with the Court's Orders when using an alert list. Its goal
+plainly was not to deliberately or recklessly disregard those Orders; and in heeding this
+advice, NSA operators were not themselves seeking to deliberately or recklessly
+disregard the Court's Orders. Indeed, the NSA attorney who reviewed the procedures
+added language to the procedures to emphasize the Court's requirement that the RAS
+standard must be satisfied prior to conducting any chaining [REDACTED] of NSA's
+analytic repository of BR metadata. See id, at 13-14. (TS//SI//NF)
+NSA OGC's concurrence on the procedures the SIGINT Directorate developed for
+processing BR metadata also established the framework for numerous subsequent
+decisions and actions, including the drafting and reviewing of NSA's reports to the
+Court. NSA personnel reasonably believed, based on NSA OGC's concurrence with the
+BR Procedures, that the queries subject to the Court's Order were only contact chaining
+[REDACTED] of the aggregated pool of BR metadata. Against this backdrop,
+NSA operational personnel reasonably believed that, until contact chaining of the
+aggregated pool of BR metadata was conducted, the alert list process was not subject to
+the RAS requirement contained in the Court's Order. This, in turn, led to the
+misunderstanding between the NSA attorney who prepared the initial draft of NSA's
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+26
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+first BR report to the Court and the individual in the SIGINT Directorate who served as
+the report's primary reviewer, so that ultimately the report contained an incorrect
+description of the alert list process. See id, at 16-18.23 In other words, there was no
+deliberate effort to provide inaccurate or misleading information to the Court, nor did
+any NSA employee deliberately circumvent the RAS requirement contained in the
+Court's Orders. Based on this confluence of events, all parties involved in the drafting
+of the report believed the description of the alert list to be accurate. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+In addition, the Government has already taken steps to notify the appropriate
+investigative officials regarding this matter. Specifically, FBI's OGC was informed of
+this matter on January 23, 2009; the Director of National Intelligence was informed of
+this matter on January 30, 2009, and received additional information about the incident
+on two other occasions; and the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence was
+informed of this matter on February 10, 2009. See id, at 28-29. NSA has also notified its
+Inspector General of this matter. See id, at 28. Finally, NSA is in the process of formally
+reporting this matter to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight
+and subsequently the President's Intelligence Oversight Board. See id, at 28-29. (S)
+
+23 As described above, the alert list actually consisted of two partitions—one of RAS-
+approved identifiers that could result in automated chaining in the BR metadata and a second
+of non-RAS approved identifiers that could not be used to initiate automated chaining in the BR
+metadata. See Alexander Decl. at 15. (TS//SI//NF)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+27
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+CONCLUSION (U)
+
+For the reasons provided above, while the Government acknowledges that its
+descriptions of the alert list process to the Court were inaccurate and that the Court's
+Orders in this matter did not authorize the alert list process as implemented, the Court
+should not rescind or modify its Order in docket number BR 08-13 or take any further
+remedial action. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+Matthew G. Olsen
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+
+[REDACTED]
+Office of Intelligence
+National Security Division
+United States Department of Justice
+
+—TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+28
+1946 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2020 00
+1
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -34-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+(TS) In Re Production of Tangible Things
+from [REDACTED]
+)
+)
+) Docket No.: BR 08-13
+)
+)
+
+DECLARATION OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEITH B. ALEXANDER,
+UNITED STATES ARMY,
+DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+
+(U) I, Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander, depose and state as follows:
+
+(U) I am the Director of the National Security Agency ("NSA" or "Agency"), an
+intelligence agency within the Department of Defense ("DoD"), and have served in this
+position since 2005. I currently hold the rank of Lieutenant General in the United States
+Army and, concurrent with my current assignment as Director of the National Security
+Agency, I also serve as the Chief of the Central Security Service and as the Commander
+of the Joint Functional Component Command for Network Warfare. Prior to my current
+assignment, I have held other senior supervisory positions as an officer of the United
+States military, to include service as the Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS, G-2), Headquarters,
+Department of the Army; Commander of the US Army's Intelligence and Security
+Command; and the Director of Intelligence, United States Central Command.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+(S) As the Director of the National Security Agency, I am responsible for
+directing and overseeing all aspects of NSA's cryptologic mission, which consists of
+three functions: to engage in signals intelligence ("SIGINT") activities for the US
+Government, to include support to the Government's computer network attack activities;
+to conduct activities concerning the security of US national security telecommunications
+and information systems; and to conduct operations security training for the US
+Government. Some of the information NSA acquires as part of its SIGINT mission is
+collected pursuant to Orders issued under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
+1978, as amended ("FISA").
+(U) The statements herein are based upon my personal knowledge, information
+provided to me by my subordinates in the course of my official duties, advice of counsel,
+and conclusions reached in accordance therewith.
+I. (U) Purpose:
+(S//SI//NF) This declaration responds to the Court's Order of 28 January 2009
+("BR Compliance Order"), which directed the Government to provide the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC" or "Court") with information "to help the Court
+assess whether the Orders issued in this docket should be modified or rescinded; whether
+other remedial steps should be directed; and whether the Court should take action
+regarding persons responsible for any misrepresentations to the Court or violations of its
+Orders, either through its contempt powers or by referral to appropriate investigative
+offices."
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+- 2 -
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+(S//NF) To this end, this declaration describes the compliance matter that gave
+rise to the BR Compliance Order; NSA's analysis of the underlying activity; the root
+causes of the compliance problem; the corrective actions NSA has taken and plans to take
+to avoid a reoccurrence of the incident; answers to the seven (7) specific questions the
+Court has asked regarding the incident; and a description of the importance of this
+collection to the national security of the United States.
+II. (U) Incident:
+A. (U) Summary
+(TS//SI//NF) Pursuant to a series of Orders issued by the Court since May 2006,
+NSA has been receiving telephony metadata from telecommunications providers. NSA
+refers to the Orders collectively as the "Business Records Order" or "BR FISA." With
+each iteration of the Business Records Order, the Court has included language which says
+"access to the *archived data* shall occur only when NSA has identified a known
+telephone identifier for which . . . there are facts giving rise to a reasonable articulable
+suspicion that the telephone identifier is associated with [REDACTED]
+See, e.g.,
+Docket BR 08-13, Primary Order, 12 December 2008, *emphasis added*. For reasons
+described in more detail in the Section III.A. of this declaration, NSA personnel
+understood the term "archived data" to refer to NSA's analytic repository of BR FISA
+metadata and implemented the Business Records Order accordingly.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+-3-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+(TS//SI//NF) While NSA did not authorize contact chaining [REDACTED] to
+occur in the Agency's analytic repository of BR FISA material unless NSA had
+determined that the "seed" telephone identifier for the chaining [REDACTED]
+satisfied the reasonable articulable suspicion ("RAS") standard specified in the Order, in
+its reports to the Court regarding NSA's implementation of the Business Records Order,
+the Agency incorrectly described an intermediate step called the alert process that NSA
+applied to the incoming stream of BR FISA metadata. The alert process would notify
+counterterrorism (CT) analysts if a comparison of the incoming metadata NSA was
+receiving from the Business Records Order and other sources of SIGINT collection
+revealed a match with telephone identifiers that were on an alert list of identifiers that
+were already of interest to CT personnel.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In its reports to the Court, NSA stated the alert list only contained
+telephone identifiers that satisfied the RAS standard. In reality, the majority of identifiers
+on the alert list were CT identifiers that had not been assessed for RAS. If one of these
+non-RAS approved identifiers generated an alert, a CT analyst was notified so that NSA
+could make a RAS determination. If the Agency determined the identifier satisfied the
+RAS standard, only then would the identifier be approved as a seed for contact chaining
+[REDACTED] in the Agency's BR FISA analytic repository (i.e., the "archived
+data"). If the contact chaining [REDACTED] produced information of foreign
+intelligence value, an NSA analyst would issue a report. In other words, none of NSA's
+BR FISA reports were based on non-RAS approved identifiers across the period in
+question -- May 2006 through January 2009.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+-4-
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -38-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+-(S//SI) I wish to emphasize that neither I nor the Agency is attempting to
+downplay the significance of NSA's erroneous description of the alert process to the
+Court. In retrospect, the Business Records Order did not provide NSA with specific
+authority to employ the alert list in the manner in which it did. The Agency's failure to
+describe the alert process accurately to the Court unintentionally precluded the Court
+from determining for itself whether NSA was correctly implementing the Court's Orders.
+Although I do not believe that any NSA employee intended to provide inaccurate or
+misleading information to the Court, I fully appreciate the severity of this error.
+
+B. (U) Details
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Docket BR 08-13 is the FISC's most recent renewal of authority first
+granted to the Government in May 2006 to receive access to business records in the form
+of telephone call detail records. See Docket BR 06-05, 24 May 2006. NSA developed
+the automated alert process to notify NSA analysts of contact between a foreign
+telephone identifier of counterterrorism interest and any domestic telephone identifier; or
+any contact between a domestic telephone identifier, related to a foreign counterterrorism
+target, and any foreign telephone identifier. In its first BR FISA report to the Court in
+August 2006, the Agency described the automated alert process as follows:
+
+(TS//SI//NF) NSA has compiled through its continuous counter-
+terrorism analysis, a list of telephone numbers that constitute an "alert list"
+of telephone numbers used by members of [REDACTED]
+This alert list serves as a body of
+telephone numbers employed to query the data, as is described more fully
+below.
+(TS//SI//NF) Domestic numbers and foreign numbers are treated
+differently with respect to the criteria for including them on the alert list.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+-5-
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -39-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+With respect to foreign telephone numbers, NSA receives information
+indicating a tie to [REDACTED]
+from a variety of sources. Principal among these are: [REDACTED]
+Each of the foreign telephone numbers that comes
+to the attention of NSA as possibly related to [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] is evaluated to determine whether the
+information about it provided to NSA satisfies the reasonable articulable
+suspicion standard. If so, the foreign telephone number is placed on the
+alert list; if not, it is not placed on the alert list.
+(TS//SI//NF) The process set out above applies also to newly
+discovered domestic telephone numbers considered for addition to the
+alert list, with the additional requirement that NSA's Office of General
+Counsel reviews these numbers and affirms that the telephone number is
+not the focus of the analysis based solely on activities that are protected by
+the First Amendment. There are, however, two categories of domestic
+telephone numbers that were added to the NSA alert list [REDACTED]
+and the basis for their addition is slightly different.
+(TS//SI//NF) The first category consists of [REDACTED] domestic numbers
+that are currently the subject of FISC authorized electronic surveillance
+based on the FISC's finding of probable cause to believe that they are used
+by agents of [REDACTED]
+Since these numbers were already reviewed and authorized by the Court
+for electronic surveillance purposes, they were deemed approved for meta
+data querying without the approval of an NSA official.
+(TS//SI//NF) The second category consists of [REDACTED] domestic
+numbers each of which was added to the NSA alert list after coming to
+NSA's attention [REDACTED] and subsequent NSA analysis produced a sufficient
+level of suspicion that NSA generated an intelligence report about the
+telephone number to the FBI and the CIA [REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+-6-
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -40-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+(TS//SI//NF)-However, in order to avoid any appearance of
+circumventing the procedures, NSA will change its software to build the
+chains from the original foreign number and remove the [REDACTED] domestic
+numbers described above from the alert list. While the software is being
+developed, which will take approximately 45 days, NSA will continue to
+run the domestic numbers on the alert list as described. [1]
+(TS//SI/NF) As of the last day of the reporting period addressed
+herein, NSA had included a total of 3980 telephone numbers on the alert
+list, which includes foreign numbers and domestic numbers, after
+concluding that each of the foreign telephone numbers satisfied the
+standard set forth in the Court's May 24, 2006, and each of the domestic
+telephone numbers was either a FISC approved number or in direct
+contact with a foreign seed that met those criteria.
+(TS//SI//NF) To summarize the alert system: every day new
+contacts are automatically revealed with the 3980 telephone numbers
+contained on the alert list described above, which themselves are present
+on the alert list either because they satisfied the reasonable articulable
+suspicion standard, or because they are domestic numbers that were either
+a FISC approved number or in direct contact with a number that did so.
+These automated queries identify any new telephone contacts between the
+numbers on the alert list and any other number, except that domestic
+numbers do not alert on domestic-to-domestic contacts.
+(TS//SI//NF) During this reporting period, a combination of the
+alert system and queries resulting from leads described below in paragraph
+two led to analysis that resulted in the discovery of 138 new numbers that
+were tipped as leads to the FBI and the CIA as suspicious telephone
+numbers.
+
+See Docket BR 06-05, NSA Report to the FISC, August 18, 2006, at 12-16 (footnote
+omitted). Subsequent NSA reports to the Court contained similar representations as to
+the functioning of the alert list process. See, e.g., Docket BR 08-08, NSA 120-Day
+Report to the FISC, December 11, 2008, at 8-12.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In short, the reports filed with the Court incorrectly stated that the
+telephone identifiers on the alert list satisfied the RAS standard. In fact, the majority of
+telephone identifiers included on the alert list had not been RAS approved, although the
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+-7-
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -41-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+identifiers were associated with the same class of terrorism targets covered by the Business Records Order.² Specifically, of the 17,835 telephone identifiers that were on the alert list on 15 January 2009 (the day DoJ reported this compliance incident to the Court), only 1,935 were RAS approved.³
+
+III. (U) NSA's Analysis:
+
+(TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED]
+(The term “metadata” refers to information about a communication, such as routing information, date/time of the communication, *etc*., but does not encompass the actual contents of a communication.) As explained in greater detail in Section VII of this declaration, analysis of communications metadata can yield important foreign intelligence information, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The initial BR FISA only covered [REDACTED]
+³(TS//SI//NF) The reports filed with the Court in this matter also incorrectly stated the number of identifiers on the alert list. Each report included the number of telephone identifiers purportedly on the alert list. *See, e.g.*, Docket BR 06-08, NSA 120-Day Report to the FISC, August 18, 2006, at 15 ("As of the last day of the reporting period addressed herein, NSA has included a total of 3980 telephone numbers on the alert list . . . ."); Docket BR 08-13, NSA 120-Day Report to the FISC, December 11, 2008, at 11 ("As of November 2, 2008, the last day of the reporting period herein, NSA had included a total of 27,090 telephone identifiers on the alert list . . . ."). In fact, these numbers reported to the Court did not reflect the number of identifiers on the alert list; they actually represented the total number of identifiers included on the "station table" (discussed below at page15) as "RAS approved," *i.e*., approved for contact chaining.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+- 8 -
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 43
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+(TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED], NSA put on
+the alert list telephone identifiers from two different sources that were of interest to
+counterterrorism personnel. The first source consisted of telephony identifiers against
+which the Agency was conducting SIGINT collection for counterterrorism reasons and
+the second source consisted of domestic telephony identifiers which, as a result of
+analytic tradecraft, were also deemed relevant to the Government's counterterrorism
+activity. The key goal of this alert process was to notify NSA analysts if there was a
+contact between a foreign telephone identifier of counterterrorism interest and any
+domestic telephone identifier; or contact between any domestic telephone identifier,
+related to a foreign counterterrorism target, and any foreign telephone identifier. At the
+time, NSA considered this type of contact to be an important potential piece of foreign
+intelligence since such contact could be indicative of an impending terrorist attack against
+the US homeland.4
+
+A. (TS) The Alert List Process
+
+(TS//SI//NF) When the Court issued the first Business Records Order in May
+2006, the [REDACTED]
+The first source was the "Address
+Database" which was a master target database of foreign and domestic telephone
+identifiers that were of current foreign intelligence interest to counterterrorism personnel.
+
+4(TS//SI//NF) Neither the Agency nor the rest of the US Intelligence Community has changed this view
+regarding the importance of identifying this type of contact between counterterrorism targets and persons
+inside the United States. In fact, the 9/11 Commission Report alluded to the failure to share information
+regarding a facility associated with an al Qaeda safehouse in Yemen and contact with one of the 9/11
+hijackers (al Mihdhar) in San Diego, California, as an important reason the Intelligence Community did not
+detect al Qaeda's planning for the 9/11 attack. See, "The 9/1.1 Commission Report," at 269-272.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+-9-
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -43-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+The second source was [REDACTED] which was and continues to be a database NSA uses as
+a selection management system to manage and task identifiers for SIGINT collection.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The Business Records Order states that "access to the archived data
+shall occur only when NSA has identified a known telephone identifier for which...
+there are facts giving rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion that the telephone
+identifier is associated with [REDACTED]
+Docket BR. 08-13,
+Primary Order, 12 December 2008. The term "archived data" is of critical importance to
+understanding the rebuilt alert process NSA implemented after the Court issued the first
+Business Records Order in May 2006.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) As normally used by NSA in the context of the Agency's SIGINT
+activities, the term "archived data" refers to data stored in NSA's analytical repositories
+and excludes the many processing steps the Agency employs to make the raw collection
+useful to individual intelligence analysts.⁵ Based on internal NSA correspondence and
+from discussions with NSA personnel familiar with the way NSA processes SIGINT
+collection, I have concluded this understanding of the term "archived data" meant that the
+NSA personnel who designed the BR FISA alert list process believed that the
+requirement to satisfy the RAS standard was only triggered when access was sought to
+NSA's stored (i.e., "archived" in NSA parlance) repository of BR FISA data,
+
+⁵ (TS//SI//NF) For example, a small team of "data integrity analysts" ensures that the initial material NSA
+receives as a result of the Business Records Order is properly formatted and does not contain extraneous
+material that the Agency does not need or want before such material is made available to intelligence
+analysts.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+- 10-
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -44-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In fact, when the initial draft procedures for implementing the
+Business Records Order were created, it does not appear that either the SIGINT
+Directorate or the Office of General Counsel identified the use of non-RAS approved
+identifiers on the alert list as an issue that required in-depth analysis. NSA personnel,
+including the NSA attorney who reviewed the SIGINT Directorate's implementation
+procedures for the Business Records Order, appear to have viewed the alert system as
+merely pointing to a particular identifier on the alert list that required determination of
+whether the RAS standard had been satisfied before permitting contact chaining and/or
+pattern analysis in the archived BR FISA data. Accordingly, the Office of General
+Counsel approved the procedures but stressed that the RAS standard set out in the
+Business Records Order had to be satisfied before any access to the archived data could
+occur.
+6
+
+(TS//SI//NF) As a result, personnel in the SIGINT Directorate who understood
+how the automated alert process worked, based on their own understanding of the term
+"archived data" and the advice of NSA's Office of General Counsel, did not believe that
+NSA was required to limit the BR FISA alert list to only RAS approved telephone
+identifiers, [REDACTED]
+
+6
+(TS//SI//NF) This result is not surprising since, regardless of whether the identifiers on the alert list were
+RAS approved, NSA was lawfully authorized to collect the conversations and metadata associated with the
+non-RAS approved identifiers tasked for NSA SIGINT collection activities under Executive Order 12333
+and included on the alert list. The alert process was intended as a way for analysts to prioritize their work.
+The alerts did not provide analysts with permission to conduct contact chaining [REDACTED] of the
+BR FISA metadata. Instead, any contact chaining [REDACTED] of the BR FISA data also required a
+determination that the seed number for such chaining [REDACTED] had satisfied the RAS standard.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+- 11 -
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION: 5 MARCH 2009 -45-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+Rather, they believed the limitation in the Court's order applied only where data
+had been aggregated over time, and where the authority and ability existed to conduct
+multi-hop analysis across the entire data archive. (See Section VII for a description of
+the benefits of aggregating data for later analysis.)
+(TS//SI//NF) NSA's review of this matter has confirmed that, even prior to the
+issuance of the Business Records Order, members of the SIGINT Directorate engaged in
+discussions with representatives of NSA's Office of General Counsel to determine how
+the Agency would process the telephony metadata NSA expected to receive pursuant to
+the Court's Order. Then, on 25 May 2006 immediately after issuance of the first
+Business Records Order, representatives of NSA's Signals Intelligence Directorate asked
+NSA's Office of General Counsel to concur on a draft set of procedures the SIGINT
+Directorate had developed to implement the Business Records Order. These draft
+procedures stated:
+The [REDACTED] ALERT processing system will provide a selective
+notification to the NSA CT AAD Shift Coordinator that a FISA Business
+Record transaction has been received. This notification will contain only the
+foreign telephone number and collection bin category. This notification will
+only occur when the foreign number in the transaction matches the foreign
+telephone number residing in that collection bin. This notification will include
+no domestic numbers and occurs prior to any chaining whatsoever.
+There was no express statement that the alert list contained both RAS and non-RAS
+approved identifiers but it was clear that identifiers in the alert system would be
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//[REDACTED]NT//NOFORN//MR
+- 12 -
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -46-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+compared against incoming BR FISA data. It was also clear that, if there was a match
+between an identifier on the alert list and an identifier in the incoming data, a Shift
+Coordinator in the SIGINT Directorate's counterterrorism office would be notified.⁸
+(TS//SI//NF)-Later on 25 May 2006, [REDACTED] of the Office of
+General Counsel concurred on the use of the draft procedures after adding language to the
+procedures emphasizing that analysts could not access the archived BR FISA data in
+NSA's BR FISA data repository unless the RAS standard had been satisfied.
+[REDACTED] coordinated her review of the procedures with one of her colleagues in the
+Office of General Counsel. [REDACTED] Specifically, as initially drafted, the
+procedures stated in pertinent part:
+
+The CT AAD Shift Coordinator will examine the foreign number and determine if
+that particular telephone number has been previously associated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] based on the standard articulated by the Court.
+
+[REDACTED] revised this bullet to read:
+
+The CT AAD Shift Coordinator will examine the foreign number and determine if
+that particular telephone number has been previously associated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] based on the standard articulated by the Court.
+Reasonable articulable suspicion must be based on a totality of the circumstances
+and can be met by any number of factual scenarios. However, if a seed number is
+of interest only because of its direct contact with one other number, that other
+number must be known by some identifiable standard (probably or possibly) to be
+used by [REDACTED]. If you are unsure of
+whether the standard is met, please contact OGC.
+
+⁸(TS//SI//NF) Since preparation of the original procedures, the Agency now refers to each "Shift
+Coordinator" as a "Homeland Mission Coordinator" or "HMC."
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+- 13 -
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -47-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+also added a footnote to the procedures to read, "As articulated in the FISC
+Order, 'access to the archived data will occur only when the NSA has identified a known
+telephone number for which, based on the practical considerations of everyday life on
+which reasonable and prudent persons act, there are facts giving rise to a reasonable,
+articulable suspicion that the telephone number is associated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Section 5A."
+(TS//SI//NF) The SIGINT Directorate began using the process described in the
+procedures not long after receiving OGC's approval. A copy of the procedures approved
+by NSA's Office of General Counsel and the approval of NSA's Office of General
+Counsel are attached as Exhibits A and B, respectively.
+(TS//SI//NF) As a result, the Agency ultimately designed the alert process to
+result in automated call chaining of the BR FISA data repository if the initial alert was
+based on a RAS approved identifier. If an alert was based on a non-RAS approved
+identifier, no automated chaining would occur in the BR FISA material but automated
+chaining could occur in NSA's repositories of information that had been acquired under
+circumstances where the RAS requirement did not apply, such as telephony collection
+that was not regulated by the FISA.
+(TS//SI//NF) Specifically, on 26 May 2006, [REDACTED] who was
+serving as the chief of NSA-Washington's counterterrorism organization in NSA's
+Signals Intelligence Directorate, directed that the alert list be rebuilt to ensure that the
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+- 14 -
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+alert list would only include identifiers assigned to "bins" or "zip codes"⁹ that NSA used
+to label an identifier as being associated with [REDACTED] since these
+were the only classes of targets covered by the initial Business Records Order. Pursuant
+to this overall direction, personnel in the counterterrorism organization actually built two
+lists to manage the alert process. The first list – known as the alert list – included all
+identifiers that were of interest to counterterrorism analysts who were charged with
+tracking a [REDACTED] to include both foreign and domestic telephony
+identifiers. This list was used to compare the incoming telephony metadata NSA was
+obtaining from the Business Records Order and NSA’s other sources of SIGINT
+collection to alert the counterterrorism organization if there was a match between a
+telephone identifier on the list and an identifier in the incoming metadata. This list had
+two partitions. The first partition consisted of RAS approved identifiers which could
+result in automated chaining of the BR FISA data repository. The second partition
+consisted of non-RAS approved identifiers which could not be used to initiate automated
+chaining of the archived BR FISA material. The second list – known as the "station
+table" – served as a historical listing of all telephone identifiers that have undergone a
+RAS determination, to include the results of the determination. This list was used to
+ensure that only RAS approved "seed" identifiers would be used to conduct chaining or
+pattern analysis of NSA’s data repository for BR FISA material. For the Court’s
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+- 15 -
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -49-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+convenience, a pictorial description of the BR FISA alert process as the process operated
+from May 2006 until January 2009 is attached as Exhibit C.
+
+**B. (FS) Incorrect Description of Alert List in Reports to the FISC**
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Reviews of NSA records and discussions with relevant NSA
+personnel have revealed that [REDACTED] a managing attorney in NSA's Office
+of General Counsel, prepared the initial draft of the first BR FISA report. [REDACTED]
+appears to have included the inaccurate description of the BR FISA alert process due to a
+mistaken belief that the alert process for the Business Records Order
+
+(TS//SI//NF) After completing his initial draft of the BR FISA report, in an email
+prepared on Saturday, 12 August 2006 [REDACTED] wrote:
+> Attached is the Draft of the Report to the Court. This is NOT ready to go until
+> it is reviewed again... I have done my best to be complete and thorough, but ...
+> make sure everything I have siad (sic) is absolutely true.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+- 16-
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009-50-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+See Exhibit D. Despite the direction that the draft BR FISA report be thoroughly
+reviewed by other attorneys and NSA operational personnel for accuracy, the inaccurate
+description of the alert list that was contained in the initial draft of the report was not
+corrected before the report was finalized. In addition, the inaccurate description was not
+corrected in subsequent reports to the Court, either, until the inaccurate description was
+identified by representatives from the Department of Justice ("DoJ") during a briefing
+and roundtable discussion regarding NSA's handling of BR FISA material on 9 January
+2009. Once DoJ confirmed that the Agency's actual alert list process in the BR FISA
+was inconsistent with the past descriptions NSA had provided to the Court of the alert list
+process, DoJ filed a notice on 15 January 2009 identifying this problem to the Court.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) As alluded to above, the inaccurate description of the BR FISA alert
+list initially appears to have occurred due to a mistaken belief that the alert list for the
+BR FISA material
+This error was compounded by the fact that, as noted previously, the SIGINT
+Directorate had actually constructed the alert list with two partitions. Moreover, given
+that the Office of General Counsel prepared the initial draft of the report and had
+previously approved the procedures the SIGINT Directorate drafted for processing the
+BR FISA material, [REDACTED] as the primary reviewer of the draft report for
+the SIGINT Directorate, thought the Office of General Counsel's description of the
+automated alert process for BR FISA material, although omitting a discussion of one of
+the partitions, was legally correct since no contact chaining was
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+- 17 -
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -51-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+authorized to take place against the BR FISA archive unless the seed identifier for the
+chaining
+had undergone RAS approval.
+(S//SI) Therefore, it appears there was never a complete understanding among the
+key personnel who reviewed the report for the SIGINT Directorate and the Office of
+General Counsel regarding what each individual meant by the terminology used in the
+report. Once this initial misunderstanding occurred, the alert list description was never
+corrected since neither the SIGINT Directorate nor the Office of General Counsel
+realized there was a misunderstanding. As a result, NSA never revisited the description
+of the alert list that was included in the original report to the Court. Thus, the inaccurate
+description was also included in the subsequent reports to the Court.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The initial Business Records Order was the subject of significant
+attention from NSA's Signals Intelligence Directorate, Office of General Counsel, and
+Office of Inspector General in an effort to ensure the Agency implemented the Order
+correctly. See, e.g., NSA Office of Inspector General Report, "Assessment of
+Management Controls for Implementing the FISC Order: Telephony Business Records,"
+dated 5 September 2006 (attached as Exhibit E).¹¹ Nevertheless, it appears clear in
+hindsight from discussions with the relevant personnel as well as reviews of NSA's
+internal records that the focus was almost always on whether analysts were contact
+chaining the Agency's repository of BR FISA data in compliance with the RAS standard
+
+¹¹(TS//SI//NF) Note that some of the Exhibits included with this declaration, such as Exhibit E, contain the
+control marking [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] NSA has de-compartmented these materials solely for
+the Court's consideration of the BR FISA compliance incident that DoJ reported to the Court on 15 January
+2009.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+- 18 -
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -52-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+specified in the Order. Similarly, subsequent internal NSA oversight of NSA's use of
+BR FISA material also appears to have focused on ensuring that:
+* Homeland Mission Coordinators were applying the RAS standard correctly;
+* Proper access control and labeling procedures were in place to ensure BR FISA material was controlled appropriately;
+* The Agency was receiving and archiving the correct BR FISA telephony metadata;
+* The Agency's dissemination of BR FISA reports containing US telephone identifiers were handled consistently with the terms of the Business Records Order and NSA reporting policies; and
+* A process was put in place to conduct some auditing of the queries of the BR FISA data repository.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Furthermore, from a technical standpoint, there was no single person who had a complete technical understanding of the BR FISA system architecture. This probably also contributed to the inaccurate description of the alert list that NSA included in its BR FISA reports to the Court.
+
+IV. (U) Corrective Actions:
+
+A. (TS) The Alert List
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Since DoJ reported this compliance matter to the Court on 15 January 2009, NSA has taken a number of corrective measures, to include immediate
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+- 19 -
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -53-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+steps to sequester, and shut off analyst access to, any alerts that were generated from
+comparing incoming BR FISA material against non-RAS approved identifiers. NSA also
+immediately began to re-engineer the entire alert process to ensure that material acquired
+pursuant to the Court's Business Records Order is only compared against identifiers that
+have been determined to satisfy the RAS standard since this was the description of the
+process that the Agency had provided to the Court. After an initial effort to fix the
+problem resulted in an unintended configuration of the revised automated alert process,
+NSA shut down the automated alert process entirely on 24 January 2009. (This
+configuration error resulted in DoJ filing a Supplemental Notice of Compliance Incident
+with the Court on 3 February 2009.) The automated alert process for BR FISA data will
+remain shut down until the Agency can ensure that all the intended changes to the
+automated BR FISA alert process will operate as intended and in a manner that match the
+descriptions NSA has provide to the Court. As appropriate, NSA plans to keep DoJ and
+the Court informed concerning the progress of this effort.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In short, this redesign of the alert process will ensure that it is
+implemented in a manner that comports with the Court's Orders. NSA currently
+contemplates that there will actually be two, physically separate, alert lists. One list will
+consist solely of RAS approved identifiers and only this list will be used as a comparison
+point against the incoming BR FISA material. The second list will consist of a mix of
+RAS and non-RAS approved identifiers but will not be compared against the BR FISA
+data. In other words, BR FISA data will not be compared against non-RAS approved
+identifiers.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+- 20 -
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -54-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+B. (U) Other Measures Being Taken to Better Ensure Compliance With the
+Court's Orders
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In addition to the immediate measures the Agency took to address
+the compliance incident, I directed that the Agency complete ongoing end-to-end system
+engineering and process reviews (technical and operational) of NSA's handling of
+BR FISA material to ensure that the material is handled in strict compliance with the
+terms of the Business Records Order and the Agency's descriptions to the Court. ¹²
+Detailed below are components of this end-to-end review and other steps being taken by
+NSA to ensure compliance with the Court's Orders. ¹³
+
+(TS//SI//NF) For example, as part of the review that I have ordered, the Agency is
+examining the "Transaction Portal" analysts use to conduct one (1) hop chaining on RAS
+approved telephone identifiers for the purpose of validating network contacts, identified
+through previous, properly authorized contact chaining, for reporting on terrorist contacts
+with domestic telephone identifiers. The existing query mechanism for the Transaction
+Portal limits each query to a single "hop." In order that the results do not exceed the
+three (3) hop limit imposed by the Business Records Order the identifier entered by an
+analyst must either be RAS approved or must be within two (2) hops of the RAS
+approved identifier. Results from the query are returned to the analyst as a list of all
+individual call records associated with the identifier for the query. In theory, an analyst
+¹²(S) NSA'S SIGINT Director has directed similar reviews for some of the other sensitive activities NSA
+undertakes pursuant to its SIGINT authorities, to include certain activities that are regulated by the FISA,
+such as NSA's analysis of data received pursuant to the [REDACTED] If the Agency identifies any
+compliance issues related to activities undertaken pursuant to FISC authorization, NSA will bring such
+issues to the attention of DoJ and the Court.
+¹³ (TS//SI//NF) The results of this end-to-end review will be made available to DoJ and, upon request, to
+the FISC.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+- 21 -
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -55-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+could conduct a series of one-hop queries to effectively conduct a multi-hop chain of the
+BR FISA data. The Agency is investigating whether software safeguards can be
+developed to enforce the three hop limit imposed by the Business Records Order.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) NSA initiated a review of the domestic identifiers on the "station
+table" that NSA uses as its historical record of RAS approval decisions on approved
+telephone identifiers so that NSA will be certain the Agency is in compliance with all
+aspects of the Business Records Order, to include the Agency's previous representations
+to the Court. As NSA's historical listing of all telephone identifiers that have undergone
+a RAS determination, the station table includes the results of each determination (i.e.,
+RAS approved or not RAS approved).
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Similar to the reviews of the Transaction Portal and the station table,
+NSA is examining other aspects of the Agency's technical architecture, to ensure that
+NSA's technical infrastructure has not allowed, and will not allow, non-approved
+selectors to be used as seeds for contact chaining [REDACTED] of the BR FISA data.
+NSA will report to DoJ and the Court if this examination of the technical infrastructure
+reveals any incidents of improper querying of the BR FISA data repository.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Although the Agency and DoJ have conducted previous audits of
+queries made against the BR FISA data, in response to the BR Compliance Order as well
+as in light of recent instances of improper querying that were the subject of separate
+notices to the Court, the Agency initiated an audit of all queries made of the BR FISA
+data repository since 1 November 2008 to determine if any of the queries during this
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+- 22 -
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -56-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+timeframe were made on the basis of non-RAS approved identifiers. While this review is
+still ongoing, to date this review has revealed no instances of improper querying of the
+BR FISA data repository, aside from improper queries made by two (2) analysts who
+were the subject of a previous compliance notice to the Court. From the time these two
+analysts were granted access to the BR FISA data repository on 11 and 12 December
+2008 until the time NSA terminated their access in January 2009, these two analysts were
+responsible for 280 improper queries.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Also, in response to some earlier instances of improper analyst
+queries of the BR FISA data repository that were recently discovered and reported to the
+Court, the Agency scheduled and delivered in-person briefings for all NSA personnel
+who have access to the BR FISA data archive to remind them of the requirements and
+their responsibilities regarding the proper handling of BR FISA material. NSA
+management personnel delivered these briefings with direct support from the Office of
+General Counsel and NSA's SIGINT Oversight & Compliance Office. In addition to the
+in-person briefings, all personnel with access to the BR FISA data archive have also
+received a written reminder of their responsibilities. As a follow-on effort, NSA's
+SIGINT Oversight & Compliance Office also initiated an effort to re-design the Agency's
+training for NSA operational personnel who require access to BR FISA material. The
+new training will include competency testing. If an analyst cannot achieve a passing
+grade on the test, he or she will not receive access to the BR. FISA data repository.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In an effort to eliminate the type of querying mistakes of the
+archived data that were the subject of other, separate compliance notices to the Court,
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+- 23 -
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009-57-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+see, e.g., DoJ Rule 10(c) Notices, filed 21 January 2009 and 26 January 2009, NSA is
+implementing changes to the system that analysts use to conduct contact chaining of the
+BR FISA repository so that the system will not be able to accept any non-RAS approved
+identifier as the seed identifier for call chaining analysis. Only a limited number of NSA
+personnel will possess privileges that would allow the new safety feature to be bypassed
+temporarily. NSA anticipates that the feature would only be bypassed for time sensitive
+queries where an NSA Homeland Mission Coordinator has determined that the seed
+identifier satisfies the RAS standard but operational priorities cannot wait for the formal
+update of the list of RAS approved identifiers to take effect within the system.
+Additionally, NSA is implementing software changes to the system that will limit the
+number of chained hops to only three from any BR FISA RAS approved selector.
+
+VI. (U) Answers to Court's Specific Questions:
+(TS//SI//NF) Question 1: Prior to January 15, 2009, who, within the Executive Branch,
+knew that the "alert list" that was being used to query the Business Record database
+included telephone identifiers that had not been individually reviewed and determined to
+meet the reasonable and articulable suspicion standard? Identify each such individual
+by name, title, and specify when each individual learned this fact.
+(TS//SI//NF) Answer 1: As explained in the Agency's answer to Question 3,
+below, after DoJ identified this matter as a potential issue during DoJ's visit to NSA on
+9 January 2009, numerous NSA and DoJ personnel were briefed about the problem.
+Accordingly, the identities of the some of the key personnel informed of the compliance
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+- 24-
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -58-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+issue on or after 9 January 2009 are discussed in the answer to Question 3. The NSA
+personnel who, prior to 9 January 2009, knew, or may have known, that the alert list
+contained both RAS and non-RAS approved identifiers and were run against the
+incoming BR FISA data are as follows:
+
+| Name | Title | Date of Knowledge | Distro for Reports |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| | Program Mgr CT Special Projects, SID | May 2006 | Yes |
+| | Deputy Program Mgr, CT Special Projects, SID | May 2006 | Yes |
+| | Deputy Program Mgr, CT Special Projects, A&P, SID | May 2006 | Yes |
+| | NSA/OGC Attorney | May 2006 | Yes |
+| | NSA/OGC Attorney | May 2006 | Yes |
+| [REDACTED] | | May 2006 | No |
+| | Computer Scientist SIGINT Dev'ment Strategy & Governance | May 2006 | No |
+| | Tech Director HSAC, SID | May 2006 | No |
+| | Deputy Chief HSAC, SID | January 2009 | No |
+| | Computer Scientist HSAC, SID | May 2006 | No |
+| | Tech Support | May 2006 | No |
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+- 25 -
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -59-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+Mission Systems
+Mgmt, HSAC, SID
+
+As ordered by the Court, the listing identifies the relevant personnel by their name, the
+title of the person's position with the Agency at the time they learned, or may have
+learned, that non-RAS identifiers were being run against the incoming BR FISA data,
+and the estimated date this information did or may have come to their attention.
+[REDACTED], whose name is denoted by an asterisk (*), has retired from Government
+service. Please note that the listing also indicates whether a person on the list was also on
+distribution for NSA's reports to the Court that contained the inaccurate description of the
+alert list. This does not mean that an individual who was on distribution for the reports
+was actually familiar with the contents of the reports.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In addition to the individuals identified above, there were at least
+three (3) individuals [REDACTED] included as named addressees on her email
+concurrence to SIGINT Directorate's BR FISA implementation procedures on 25 May
+2006. These individuals - [REDACTED] (NSA/OGC),
+[REDACTED] (NSA/OGC),
+and [REDACTED] (SID Data Acquisition) - are not included in the listing since they
+appear to have received the email for information purposes only and, based on
+conversations with each, do not appear to have been familiar with the implementation
+procedures that were attached to the email.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) It should also be noted there are an indeterminate number of other
+NSA personnel who knew or may have known the alert list contained both RAS and non-
+RAS selectors, but these personnel were not formally-briefed on how the alert process
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+- 26 -
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -60-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+worked and were not responsible for its operation. Instead, they received alerts for the
+purpose of assessing RAS. Based on information available to me, I conclude it is
+unlikely that this category of personnel knew how the Agency had described the alert
+process to the Court.
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ **Question 2**: *How long has the unauthorized querying been conducted?*
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ **Answer 2**: The comparison of the incoming BR FISA material
+against the identifiers listed on the alert list began almost as soon as the first Business
+Records Order was issued by the Court on 24 May 2006.
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ **Question 3**: *How did the unauthorized querying come to light? Fully
+describe the circumstances surrounding the revelations.*
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ **Answer 3**: On 9 January 2009, representatives from the Department
+of Justice met with representatives from NSA in order to receive a briefing on NSA's
+handling of BR FISA material and then participated in a roundtable discussion of the
+BR FISA process. 14 During this briefing and follow-on discussion, DoJ representatives
+asked about the alert process. Upon receiving a description of the alert process from a
+representative of NSA's SIGINT Directorate, DoJ expressed concern that NSA may not
+have accurately described the alert list in its previous reports to the Court. After
+confirming its initial concern via an email response from NSA on 14 January 2009 to
+questions posed via email on 9 January 2009, DoJ filed a notice with the Court on
+14 ~~(TS//SI/NF)~~ NSA records indicate DoJ personnel attended at least eight BR FISA oversight sessions
+prior to the session on 9 January 2009 when the error was discovered but there is no indication that the use
+of non-RAS approved identifiers on the alert list was ever raised or discussed at these prior sessions.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+-27-
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -61-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+15 January 2009 regarding this compliance matter. The following individuals
+participated in the briefing and discussion on 9 January 2009:
+
+NSA Attendees
+[REDACTED]
+
+DoJ Attendees
+
+(S) I understand that DoJ informed the FBI's Office of General Counsel of this
+compliance incident on 23 January 2009. In addition, on 30 January 2009, I personally
+mentioned to the new Director of National Intelligence ("DNI"), Dennis Blair, that NSA
+was investigating this compliance matter. The DNI received additional information about
+the compliance incident on 4 February 2009, from the DNI General Counsel, Benjamin
+Powell, and on 12 February 2009 I provided further information to the DNI regarding the
+incident. Internally, NSA notified its Inspector General of this compliance matter
+sometime after DoJ notified the Court on 15 January 2009. In accordance with
+Department of Defense requirements, NSA is in the process of formally reporting this
+compliance matter to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight as part
+of NSA's current Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Report. In the manner specified by
+Department of Defense and DNI regulations, the Quarterly Report will also be provided
+to the President's Intelligence Oversight Board ("IOB"). I expect the notification to the
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+- 28-
+0 196 PRODUCTIO ABOU
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+IOB will occur, concurrent with, or shortly after the filing of this declaration with the
+Court. In addition to preparing the formal notification required by the Defense
+Department's procedures, on 10 February 2009 I provided detailed information about this
+compliance matter to the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, James Clapper.
+(TS//SI//NF) Question 4: The application signed by the Director of the Federal Bureau
+of Investigation, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for National Security, United
+States Department of Justice ("DOJ"), and the Deputy Attorney General of the United
+States as well as the declaration of [REDACTED] a Deputy Program Manager at the
+National Security Agency ("NSA"), represents that during the pendency of this order, the
+NSA Inspector General, the NSA General Counsel, and the NSA Signals Intelligence
+Directorate Oversight and Compliance Office each will conduct reviews of this program.
+Docket BR 08-13, Application at 27, Declaration at 11. The Court's Order directed such
+review. Id., Primary Order at 12. Why did none of these entities that were ordered to
+conduct oversight over this program identify the problem earlier? Fully describe the
+manner in which each entity has exercised its oversight responsibilities pursuant to the
+Primary Order in this docket as well as pursuant to similar predecessor Orders
+authorizing the bulk production of telephone metadata.
+(TS//SI//NF) Answer 4: As described earlier in this declaration, the oversight
+activities of NSA's Office of General Counsel, Office of Inspector General, and SIGINT
+Directorate Oversight & Compliance Office generally focused on how RAS
+determinations were made; the ingestion of BR FISA data; and ultimately on the
+querying of BR FISA data once it had been stored in the data repository NSA maintains
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+- 29 -
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -63-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+for BR FISA data. From May 2006 until January 2008, there were monthly, in-person
+"due diligence" meetings of oversight and operational personnel to monitor NSA's
+implementation of a number of sensitive NSA SIGINT activities, to include NSA's
+activities under the Business Records Order. ¹⁵ Although each office exercised regular
+oversight of the program, the initial error in the description of the alert list was not caught
+by either the Office of General Counsel nor the SIGINT Directorate's Oversight &
+Compliance Office.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Agency records indicate that, in April 2006, when the Business
+Records Order was being proposed, NSA's Office of Inspector General ("OIG")
+suggested to SID personnel that the alert process be spelled out in any prospective Order
+for clarity but this suggestion was not adopted. Later in 2006 when OIG conducted a
+study regarding the adequacy of the management controls NSA adopted for handling
+BR FISA material, OIG focused on queries of the archived data since the SIGINT
+Directorate had indicated to OIG through internal correspondence that the telephone
+identifiers on the alert list were RAS approved. OIG's interest in the alert list came from
+OIG's understanding that the alert list was used to cue automatic queries of the specific
+analytic database where the BR FISA material was stored by the Agency. At least one
+employee of the SIGINT Directorate thought that OIG had been briefed about how the
+alert process worked. Regardless of the accuracy of this employee's recollection, like
+other NSA offices OIG also believed that the "archived data" referred to in the order was
+the analytic repository where NSA stored the BR FISA material.
+
+¹⁵ (S//SI) The Agency canceled the due diligence meetings in January 2008 since NSA management
+determined that monthly, in-person meetings were no longer necessary.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+-30-
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -64-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+(TS//SI//NF) OIG continued to monitor NSA's implementation of the Business
+Records Order throughout the relevant timeframe (2006-2009) by reviewing specific
+BR FISA compliance incidents; following up with the relevant NSA organization
+regarding the status of recommendations OIG made in a Special Study report on the
+BR FISA dated 5 September 2006; and attending the due diligence meetings NSA held
+until January 2008 regarding the status of a number of sensitive NSA SIGINT activities,
+to include the BR FISA activity. With respect to OIG's monitoring of the SIGINT
+Directorate's progress in implementing recommendations from OIG's September 2006
+Special Study, OIG asked for and evaluated the SIGINT Directorate's progress
+responding to OIG's recommendations.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Since the issuance of the first Business Records Order in May 2006,
+the BR FISA activity has received oversight attention from all three NSA organizations
+charged by the Court with conducting oversight. For example, in addition to OIG's
+oversight activities mentioned above, beginning in August 2008 the SIGINT Directorate,
+with support from the Office of General Counsel, has conducted regular spot checks of
+analyst queries of the BR FISA data repository. The Office of General Counsel has also
+had regular interaction with SIGINT and oversight personnel involved in BR FISA issues
+in order to provide legal advice concerning access to BR FISA data. The Office of
+General Counsel has also conducted training for personnel who require access to
+BR FISA material; participated in due diligence meetings; and prepared materials for the
+renewal of the Business Records Order. All of these activities allowed the Office of
+General Counsel to monitor the Agency's implementation of the Business Records Order.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+-31-
+1946 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2000 65
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+(TS//SI//NF) As a further illustration of the attention the Agency paid to the BR FISA Order, attached to this declaration are, respectively, copies of the Court-ordered review of NSA's BR FISA implementation, dated 10 July 2006, which was conducted jointly by OIG and the Office of General Counsel (Exhibit F); the SIGINT Oversight & Compliance Office's BR FISA Audit Plan from 11 July 2006 (Exhibit G); OIG'S September 2006 Special Study of the BR FISA(previously identified as Exhibit E); and the implementation procedures for the Business Records Order that were reviewed and approved by NSA's Office of General Counsel (previously identified as Exhibit B).
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In addition, it is important to note that NSA personnel were always forthcoming with internal and external personnel, such as those from the Department of Justice, who conducted oversight of the Agency's activities under the Business Records Order. I have found no indications that any personnel who were knowledgeable of how NSA processed BR FISA material ever tried to withhold information from oversight personnel or that they ever deliberately provided inaccurate information to the Court.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Question 5: The preliminary notice from DOJ states that the alert list includes telephone identifiers that have been tasked for collection in accordance with NSA's SIGINT authority. What standard is applied for tasking telephone identifiers under NSA's SIGINT authority? Does NSA, pursuant to its SIGINT authority, task telephone identifiers associated with United States persons? If so, does NSA limit such identifiers to those that were not selected solely upon the basis of First Amendment protected activities?
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+-32-
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -66-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+(TS//SI//NF) Answer 5: *SIGINT Tasking Standard:* Although the alert list
+included telephone identifiers of counterterrorism targets that had not been assessed
+against the RAS standard or had been affirmatively determined by NSA personnel not to
+meet the RAS standard, such identifiers were not tasked in a vacuum. Whether or not an
+identifier is assessed against the RAS standard, NSA personnel may not task an identifier
+for any sort of collection or analytic activity pursuant to NSA's general SIGINT
+authorities under Executive Order 12333 unless, in their professional analytical judgment,
+the proposed collection or analytic activity involving the identifier is likely to produce
+information of foreign intelligence value. In addition, NSA's counterterrorism
+organization conducted reviews of the alert list two (2) times per year to ensure that the
+categories (zip codes) used to identify whether telephone identifiers on the alert list
+remained associated with [REDACTED] or one of the other target sets covered by the Business
+Records Order. Also, on occasion the SIGINT Directorate changed an identifier's status
+from RAS approved to non-RAS approved on the basis of new information available to
+the Agency.
+
+(U) *US Person Tasking:* NSA possesses some authority to task telephone
+identifiers associated with US persons for SIGINT collection. For example, with the US
+person's consent, NSA may collect foreign communications to, from, or about the US
+person. In most cases, however, NSA's authority to task a telephone number associated
+with a US person is regulated by the FISA. For the Court's convenience, a more detailed
+description of the Agency's SIGINT authorities follows, particularly with respect to the
+collection and dissemination of information to, from, or about US persons.
+
+-TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+- 33 -
+1846 2. 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2000
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+(TS//SI//NF) NSA's general SIGINT authorities are provided by Executive Order
+12333, as amended (to include the predecessors to the current Executive Order); National
+Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 6; Department of Defense Directive 5100.20;
+and other policy direction. In particular, Section 1.7(c) of Executive Order 12333
+specifically authorizes NSA to "Collect (including through clandestine means), process,
+analyze, produce, and disseminate signals intelligence information for foreign
+intelligence and counterintelligence purposes to support national and departmental
+missions." However, when executing its SIGINT mission, NSA is only authorized to
+collect, retain or disseminate information concerning United States persons in accordance
+with procedures approved by the Attorney General. 16 The current Attorney General
+approved procedures that NSA follows are contained in Department of Defense
+Regulation 5240.1-R, and a classified annex to the regulation governing NSA's electronic
+surveillance activities.
+
+(U) Moreover, some, but not all, of NSA's SIGINT activities are also regulated by
+the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. For example, since the amendment of the
+FISA in the summer of 2008, if NSA wishes to direct SIGINT activities against a US
+person located outside the United States, any SIGINT collection activity against the US
+person generally would require issuance of an order by the FISC. For SIGINT activities
+executed pursuant to an order of the FISC, NSA is required to comply with the terms of
+
+16(U) The FISA and Executive Order 12333 both contain definitions of the term "United States person"
+which generally include a citizen of the United States; a permanent resident alien; an unincorporated
+association substantially composed of US citizens or permanent resident aliens; or a corporation that is
+incorporated in the US, except for a corporation directed and controlled by a foreign government(s).
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+-34-
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -68-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+the order and Court-approved minimization procedures that satisfy the requirements of
+50 U.S.C. § 1801(h).
+
+(U) First Amendment Considerations: For the following reasons, targeting a US
+person solely on the basis of protected First Amendment activities would be inconsistent
+with restrictions applicable to NSA's SIGINT activities. As part of their annual
+intelligence oversight training, NSA personnel are required to re-familiarize themselves
+with these restrictions, particularly the provisions that govern and restrict NSA's handling
+of information of or concerning US persons. Irrespective of whether specific SIGINT
+activities are undertaken under the general SIGINT authority provided to NSA by
+Executive Order 12333 or whether such activity is also regulated by the FISA, NSA, like
+other elements of the US Intelligence Community, must conduct its activities "with full
+consideration of the rights of United States persons." See Section 1.1(a) of Executive
+Order 12333, as amended. The Executive Order further provides that US intelligence
+elements must "protect fully the legal rights of all United States persons, including
+freedoms, civil liberties, and privacy rights guaranteed by Federal law." Id. at Section
+1.1(b).
+
+(U) Consistent with the Executive Order's requirement that each intelligence
+agency develop Attorney General approved procedures that "protect constitutional and
+other legal rights" (EO 12333 at Section 2.4), DoD Regulation 5240.1-R prohibits DoD
+intelligence components, including NSA, from collecting or disseminating information
+concerning US persons' "domestic activities" which are defined as "activities that take
+place in the domestic United States that do not involve a significant connection to a
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+-35-
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -69-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+foreign power, organization, or person." See, e.g., Section C2.2.3 of DoD Regulation
+5240.1-R. In light of this language, targeting a US person solely on the basis of protected
+First Amendment activities would be inappropriate.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Question 6: In what form does the government retain and disseminate
+information derived from queries run against the business records data archive?
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Answer 6: Through 29 July 2008, NSA archived the reports the Agency
+disseminated from its analysis of data in the BR FISA data repository in a special
+program-specific limited access data repository [REDACTED] as well as on a restricted
+access group of Lotus Notes servers. Reporting was transitioned to traditional NSA “I-
+Series" format on 29 July 2008. I-Series reports are retained in NSA's limited access
+sensitive reporting data repository [REDACTED] Copies of the I-Series reports are
+also kept in [REDACTED] to allow them to be searched with special software tools. In
+addition, the I-Series reports are stored on ESECS, the Extended Enterprise Corporate
+Server. Access to these reports in ESECS is appropriately restricted. As directed by the
+Business Records Order, information in the BR FISA data archive is retained five (5)
+years.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In response to Question 6, the Agency has also conducted a review
+of all 275 reports of domestic contacts NSA has disseminated as a result of contact
+chaining [REDACTED] of the NSA's archive of BR FISA material. **17** NSA has
+
+**17** (TS//SI//NF) Note that a single report may tip more than one telephone identifier as being related to the
+seed identifier. As a result, the 275 reports have tipped a total of 2,549 telephone identifiers since 24 May
+2006. Also note that, of the 275 reports that were disseminated, 31 resulted from the automated alert
+process.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+-36-
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -70-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+identified no report that resulted from the use of a non-RAS approved identifier as the
+initial seed identifier for chaining through the BR FISA material. 18 Of the 275 reports
+that were generated, 22 reports were based on a US identifier serving as the initial seed
+identifier. For each of these reports, the initial US seed identifier was either already the
+subject of FISC-approved surveillance based on the FISC's finding of probable cause to
+believe that they are used by agents of [REDACTED] or the initial US seed
+identifier had been reviewed by NSA's Office of General Counsel as part of a RAS
+determination to ensure that the RAS determination was not based solely on a US
+person's protected First Amendment activities. Almost invariably, the RAS
+determinations that the Office of General Counsel reviewed were based on direct contact
+between the telephone identifier and another identifier already known to be associated
+with one of the terrorist organizations or entities listed in the Business Records Order.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) For the Court's convenience, a copy of the type of report that NSA
+was issuing prior to 9 January 2009 is attached to this declaration as Exhibit H so the
+Court can see how the material was reported and to whom. Also attached as Exhibit I is
+an example of an alert generated by the automated alert system, prior to the Agency's
+decision on 23 January 2009 to shut down the BR FISA alerts. (The decision was
+actually effected in the early morning hours of 24 January 2009).
+
+18 (TS//SI//NF) The Agency has identified one (1) report where the number on the alert list was not RAS
+approved when the alert was generated but, after receiving the alert, a Homeland Mission Coordinator
+determined that the identifier, in fact, satisfied the RAS standard. After this determination, the Agency
+subsequently used the identifier as a seed for chaining in the BR FISA data archive. Ultimately,
+information was developed that led to a report to the FBI that tipped 11 new telephone identifiers.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+- 37 -
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -71-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ Unlike reports, which NSA disseminated outside NSA, the alerts
+were only disseminated inside NSA to SIGINT personnel responsible for
+counterterrorism activity. Initially, if an identifier on the alert list generated an alert that
+the identifier had been in contact with an identifier in the United States, the alert system
+masked (i.e., concealed) the domestic identifier. Later, in January 2008, the SIGINT
+Directorate allowed the alerts to be sent to analysts without masking the domestic
+identifier. NSA made this change in an effort to improve the ability of SIGINT analysts,
+on the basis of their target knowledge, to prioritize their work more efficiently.
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ **Question 7:** If ordered to do so, how would the government identify and
+purge information derived from queries run against the business records data archive
+using telephone identifiers that were not assessed in advance to meet the reasonable and
+articulable suspicion standard?
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ **Answer 7:** NSA has not authorized its personnel to use non-RAS
+approved identifiers to conduct chaining or pattern analysis of NSA's analytic repository
+of BR FISA material. On those occasions where improper querying of this data archive
+has been discovered, the Agency has taken steps to purge data and correct whatever
+deficiencies that led to the querying mistakes.
+~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ With respect to the alert process, after this compliance matter
+surfaced, NSA identified and eliminated analyst access to all alerts that were generated
+from the comparison of non-RAS approved identifiers against the incoming BR FISA
+material. The only individuals who retain continued access to this class of alerts are the
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+- 38 -
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -72-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+---
+Technical Director for NSA's Homeland Security Analysis Center ("HSAC") and two
+system developers assigned to HSAC. From a technical standpoint, NSA believes it
+could purge copies of any alerts that were generated from comparisons of the incoming
+BR FISA information against non-RAS approved identifiers on the alert list. However,
+the Agency, in consultation with DoJ, would need to determine whether such action
+would conflict with a data preservation Order the Agency has received in an ongoing
+litigation matter.
+
+VII. (TS//SI//NF) Value of the BR FISA Metadata
+
+(TS//SI//NF) As discussed in prior declarations in this matter, including my
+declaration in docket number BR 06-05, access to the telephony metadata collected in
+this matter is vital to NSA's counterterrorism intelligence mission. It is not possible to
+target collection solely on known terrorist telephone identifiers and at the same time use
+the advantages of metadata analysis to discover the enemy because operatives of [REDACTED]
+(collectively, the "Foreign Powers") take affirmative and
+intentional steps to disguise and obscure their communications and their identities. They
+do this using a variety of tactics, including, regularly changing telephone numbers,
+[REDACTED]
+The only effective means by which NSA analysts are able
+continuously to keep track of the Foreign Powers, and all operatives of the Foreign
+---
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+-39-
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2000 72
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+Powers making use of such tactics, is to obtain and maintain telephony metadata that will
+permit these tactics to be uncovered.
+(TS//SI//NF) Because it is impossible to determine in advance which particular
+piece of metadata will turn out to identify a terrorist, collecting metadata is vital for
+success. To be able to exploit metadata fully, the data must be collected in bulk.
+Analysts know that the terrorists' telephone calls are located somewhere in the billions of
+data bits; what they cannot know ahead of time is exactly where. The ability to
+accumulate metadata substantially increases NSA's ability to detect and identify
+members of the Foreign Powers. Specifically, the NSA performs
+queries on the metadata: contact-chaining [REDACTED]
+(TS//SI//NF) When the NSA performs a contact-chaining query on a terrorist-
+associated telephone identifier computer algorithms will identify all the contacts made by
+that identifier and will automatically identify the further contacts made by that first tier of
+contacts. In addition, the same process is used to identify a third tier of contacts, which
+includes all identifiers in contact with the second tier of contacts. The collected metadata
+thus holds contact information that can be immediately accessed as new terrorist-
+associated telephone identifiers are identified. Multi-tiered contact analysis is useful for
+telephony, because unlike e-mail, which involves the heavy use of spam, a telephonic
+device does not lend itself to simultaneous contact with large numbers of individuals.
+(TS//SI//NF) One advantage of the metadata collected in this matter is that it is
+historical in nature, reflecting contact activity from the past that cannot be captured in the
+present or prospectively. In addition, metadata may also be very timely and well suited
+for alerting against suspect activity. To the extent that historical connections are
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+- 40 -
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+important to understanding a newly-identified target, metadata may contain links that are
+absolutely unique, pointing to potential targets that otherwise would be missed.
+[REDACTED]
+Other advantages of contact chaining include
+[REDACTED]
+(TS//SI//NF)[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+- 41 -
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+[REDACTED]
+(TS//SI//NF) The foregoing discussion is not hypothetical. As noted previously,
+since inception of the first Business Records Order, NSA has provided 275 reports to the
+FBI. These reports have tipped a total of 2,549 telephone identifiers as being in contact
+with identifiers associated with [REDACTED] and
+affiliated terrorist organizations. Upon receipt of the reporting from NSA, the FBI has
+sent investigative leads to relevant FBI Field Offices for investigative action. FBI
+representatives have indicated to NSA as recently as 9 February 2009 that the telephone
+contact reporting has provided leads and linkages to individuals in the U.S. with potential
+terrorism ties who may not have otherwise been known to or identified by the FBI. For
+example, attached as Exhibit J is feedback from the FBI on the report that NSA has
+included as Exhibit H.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+- 42 -
+1819 o 1990 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2000
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+(U) I declare under penalty of perjury that the facts set forth above are true and
+correct.
+
+KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
+Director, National Security Agency
+
+Executed this 13TH day of February, 2009
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -77-
+A
+
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -78-
+From: [REDACTED] (CIV-NSA) D21
+Sent: Thursday, May 25, 2006 6:07 PM
+To: [REDACTED] (CIV-NSA) S215; [REDACTED] (CIV-NSA)D21;
+Cc: [REDACTED] (CIV-NSA) D21; DL AADSC [REDACTED] (CIV-NSA) [REDACTED] (CIV-NSA) D21; [REDACTED] (CIV-NSA)
+Subject: (U) OGC Changes to RE: (U) Proposed Interim Procedures.
+
+Classification: TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+Shift Supervisors,
+
+OGC has added clarification language to the procedures [REDACTED] sent earlier today. Please use the modified document.
+
+If you would like to discuss further tomorrow, please contact [REDACTED] (I'm on leave).
+
+[REDACTED]
+Attorney
+Office of General Counsel
+963-3121(s)/
+Ops2B, 2B8134, Suite 6250
+
+-----Original Message----
+From: [REDACTED] (CIV-NSA) S215
+Sent: Thursday, May 25, 2006 2:13 PM
+To: [REDACTED] (CIV-NSA) D21; [REDACTED] (CIV-NSA)D21; [REDACTED]
+Cc: [REDACTED] (CIV-NSA) [REDACTED] (CIV-NSA) S [REDACTED]
+Subject: (U) Proposed Interim Procedures.
+
+Classification: TOP SECRET//COMINT//P[REDACTED]ORN//MR
+
+OGC, please review and provide comments.
+
+Thanks,
+<<...>>[REDACTED]
+
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -79-
+Counter Terrorism Primary Production Center
+963-0491, Room 2B3116
+[REDACTED]
+Suite 6276
+[REDACTED]
+Classification: TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+1946 & 1962 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2000 -80-
+B
+
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -81-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20310403
+(6) Interim procedures to ensure CT AAD is in compliance with FISC Business Records
+Order:
+1. (TS//SI/NE) All foreign telephone numbers analyzed against the FISA Business
+Records acquired under Docket Number: BR 06-05 approved on 24 May 2006
+will adhere to the following:
+* The [REDACTED] ALERT processing system will provide a selective
+notification to the NSA CT AAD Shift Coordinator that a FISA
+Business Record transaction has been received. This notification will
+contain only the foreign telephone number and collection bin category.
+This notification will only occur when the foreign number in the
+transaction matches the foreign telephone number residing in that
+collection bin. This notification will include no domestic numbers and
+occurs prior to any chaining whatsoever.
+* The CT AAD Shift Coordinator will examine the foreign number and
+determine if that particular telephone number has been previously
+associated with [REDACTED] based on
+the standard articulated by the Court¹. Reasonable articulable
+suspicion must be based on a totality of the circumstances and can be
+met by any number of factual scenarios. However, if a seed number is
+of interest only because of its direct contact with one other number,
+that other number must be known by some identifiable standard
+(probably or possibly) to be used by [REDACTED]
+organization. If you are unsure of whether the standard is met, please
+contact OGC.
+* Once the CT AAD Shift Coordinator has made a positive
+determination the number will be processed for chaining [REDACTED]
+against the FISA Business Records acquire under Docket
+Number: BR 06-05.
+2. (TS//SI/NF) All domestic and most foreign collection bins which had been
+processing [REDACTED] have been suspended. The exception is active FISC FISA approved
+telephone numbers.
+3. (TS//SI/NE) CT AAD will rebuild these collection bins starting with the selective
+notifications sent to the NSA CT AAD Shift Coordinator that a FISA Business
+Record transaction has been received. (as describe above)
+4. The CT AAD Shift must independently review each number gleaned from all
+published reports. For example NSA and CIA reporting
+
+---
+¹ As articulated in the FISC Order, "access to the archived data will occur only when the NSA has
+identified a known telephone number for which, based on the practical considerations of everyday life on
+which reasonable and prudent persons act, there are facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion
+that the telephone number is associated with [REDACTED] Section 5A.
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 152
+Dated: 20070108
+Declassify On: 20310403
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20310403
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20310403
+
+5. (TS//SI/NF) Simultaneously, the CT AAD will conduct a review of the
+approximate 12,000 [REDACTED] number which currently
+resided in these bins
+6. (TS//SI/NE) These interim steps will allow all alerting processes to continue with
+the added measure necessary to comply with FISA Business Record order, Docket
+Number: BR 06-05.
+
+FN 1: (TS//SI//NF) As articulated in the FISC Order, "access to the archived data shall
+occur only when NSA has identified a known telephone number for which, based on the
+factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent
+persons act, there are facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the
+telephone number is associated with [REDACTED]"
+(BR Order, Docket BR 06-05, Section 5(A)).
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20310403
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -83-
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -84-
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -85-
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN/20320108
+
+# Former Process (May 06 – Jan 09)
+
+## Diagram Flow:
+
+**Input Sources:**
+* Business Records FISA (BRF)
+* SIGINT
+
+**Initial Data Handling:**
+1. Both "Business Records FISA (BRF)" and "SIGINT" data feed into a "SIGINT" data store.
+2. From the "SIGINT" data store, the process evaluates "Alert RAS Status?".
+ * If "Yes", it loops back to the "SIGINT" data store for further processing.
+ * If "No", the data proceeds to a "SIGINT No Chaining Until Here" data store.
+
+**Workflow Decision:**
+1. Regardless of the "Alert RAS Status?" outcome, the process proceeds to "Workflow Decision*".
+2. From "Workflow Decision*":
+ * If "Yes", it moves to "RAS Evaluation** HMC 20 Analysts".
+ * If "No", it goes to a "Stationt" data store.
+
+**RAS Evaluation and Chaining:**
+1. "RAS Evaluation** HMC 20 Analysts" interacts bidirectionally with the "Stationt" data store.
+2. "RAS Evaluation** HMC 20 Analysts" initiates a "RAS Chaining Request".
+3. A component labeled "Automatic Chain" also influences the process:
+ * If "Yes" (from "Automatic Chain"), the flow goes to "125 Analysts Only".
+ * If "No" (from "Automatic Chain"), the flow goes to the "Stationt" data store.
+
+**Final Processing (125 Analysts Only):**
+1. The "RAS Chaining Request" is handled by "125 Analysts Only". This group of analysts also interacts with "FBI".
+2. The "125 Analysts Only" group performs "RAS" processing.
+3. The output from "RAS" is stored in "Only 125 Analysts Can Touch This Data".
+
+---
+
+## Footnotes:
+
+* Workflow decision based on available Homeland Mission Coordinators (HMC) and volume of alerts.
+** RAS decision by HMC, who evaluates all available intelligence and open source data to determine if the combined information indicates the suspect phone selector is a terrorist selector as defined by the Court.
+
+---
+
+## Document Metadata:
+
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20070108
+Declassify On: 20320108
+Page: 1
+
+---
+
+TOP SEC
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20320108
+D
+
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -86-
+From: [REDACTED] (CIV-NSA)D21
+Sent: Saturday, August 12, 2006 12:03 PM
+To: [REDACTED] (CIV-NSA) D21; [REDACTED] (CIV-NSA) [REDACTED] (CIV-NSA) S2; [REDACTED] (CIV-NSA)D21; [REDACTED] (CIV-NSA-
+NSA)D21 [REDACTED] (CIV-NSA) D21; [REDACTED] (CIV-NSA) D21; [REDACTED] (CIV-NSA) D21
+Subject: (U) Report to Court on Business Record Activity
+Importance: High
+Classification: TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN//20291123
+
+Hi all-
+
+Here is where we stand on the metadata [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] expire on Friday.
+
+All of the draft docs are in the shared directory, under OPSPROGRAM FISA/BUSINESS
+RECORDS/BR FISA AUG 06 RENEWAL, except there is a separate folder entitled REPORTS
+TO COURT in wich the BR report is located.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+We have sent to DoJ draft copies of the application for renewal, the declaraton (which [REDACTED] is
+going to complete, rather than the DIRNSA (unless DoJ squawks)), and the Orders. We should
+hear from them early in the week about any needed revisions, and they want to provide to the
+judge on Thursday am. I am hoping [REDACTED] can be in charge of changes to it, and [REDACTED] can
+supervise and/or assist her.
+
+Attached is the Draft of the Report to the Court. This is NOT ready to go until it is reviewed again
+by [REDACTED]. I have done my best to be complete and thorough, but [REDACTED] needs to make sure everything I have said is absolutely true, and you guys need to make sure it
+makes sense and will satisfy the Court. You MUST feel free to edit as you think appropriate; dont
+stick to what I have said if there is a better way to say it.
+
+Someone needs to format the thing too, make sure spacing, numbering, etc are all good [REDACTED]
+and we need to get this Into DOJ's hands as quickly as we are able.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Thanks for all your help and have a great week.
+
+[REDACTED]
+Associate General Counsel
+(Operations)
+963-3121
+
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -87-
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20041123
+Declassify On: 20291123
+Classification: TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN//20291123
+
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -88-
+E
+
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -89-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] WORCON, NOFORNI/MR
+National Security Agency/Central Security Service
+
+Further dissemination of this report outside the Office
+of the Inspector General, NSA is PROHIBITED
+without the approval of the Inspector General.
+
+THE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
+
+Inspector General Report
+
+(TS//SI//NF) REPORT ON THE ASSESSMENT OF
+MANAGEMENT CONTROLS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+ORDER: TELEPHONY BUSINESS RECORDS
+
+ST-06-0018
+5 SEPTEMBER 2006
+
+DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+DATED: 20041125
+DECLASSIFY ON: MR
+
+TOP SECRET/COMINT [REDACTED] WORCON NOFORN//MR
+
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -90-
+## (U) OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
+
+(U) Chartered by the Director, NSA/Chief, CSS, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducts inspections, audits, and investigations. Its mission is to ensure the integrity, efficiency, and effectiveness of NSA/CSS operations; to provide intelligence oversight; to protect against fraud, waste, and mismanagement of resources; and to ensure that NSA/CSS activities are conducted in compliance with the Constitution, laws, executive orders, regulations, and directives. The OIG also serves as ombudsman, assisting all NSA/CSS employees and affiliates, civilian and military.
+
+### (U) INSPECTIONS
+
+(U) The inspection function conducts management and program evaluations in the form of organizational and functional reviews, undertaken either as part of the OIG's annual plan or by management request. The inspection team's findings are designed to yield accurate and up-to-date information on the effectiveness and efficiency of entities and programs, along with an assessment of compliance with laws and regulations; the recommendations for corrections or improvements are subject to followup. The inspection office also partners with the Inspectors General of the Service Cryptologic Elements to conduct joint inspections of the consolidated cryptologic facilities.
+
+### (U) AUDITS
+
+(U) The internal audit function is designed to provide an independent assessment of programs and organizations. Performance audits evaluate the economy and efficiency of an entity or program, as well as whether program objectives are being met and operations are in compliance with regulations. Financial audits determine the accuracy of an entity's financial statements. All audits are conducted in accordance with standards established by the Comptroller General of the United States.
+
+### (U) INVESTIGATIONS AND SPECIAL INQUIRIES
+
+(U) The OIG administers a system for receiving and acting upon requests for assistance or complaints (including anonymous tips) about fraud, waste and mismanagement. Investigations and Special Inquiries may be undertaken as a result of such requests or complaints; at the request of management; as the result of irregularities that surface during an inspection or audit; or at the initiative of the Inspector General.
+
+CREATIVE IMAGING-539831 / 1019340
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -91-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] //ORCON-NOFORN//MR
+
+OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
+
+5 September 2006
+IG-10693-06
+
+TO: DISTRIBUTION
+
+SUBJECT: (TS//SI//NF) Report on the Assessment of Management Controls
+for Implementing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) Order:
+Telephony Business Records (ST-06-0018)--ACTION MEMORANDUM
+
+1. (TS//SI//NF) This report summarizes the results of our assessment
+of Management Controls for Implementing the FISC Order: Telephony
+Business Records. The report incorporates management's response to the
+draft report.
+
+2. (U//FOUO) As required by NSA/CSS Policy 1-60, NSA/CSS Office of
+the Inspector General, actions on OIG audit recommendations are subject to
+monitoring and followup until completion. Consequently, we ask that you
+provide a written status report concerning each planned corrective action
+categorized as "OPEN." The status report should provide sufficient
+information to show that corrective actions have been completed. If a planned
+action will not be completed by the original target completion date, please state
+the reason for the delay and give a revised target completion date. Status
+reports should be sent to [REDACTED] Assistant Inspector General, at
+OPS 2B, Suite 6247, within 15 calendar days after each target completion
+date.
+
+3. (U//FOUO) We appreciate the courtesy and cooperation extended to
+the auditors throughout the review. If you need clarification or additional
+information, please contact [REDACTED] Assistant Inspector General,
+on 963-2988 or via e-mail at [REDACTED]
+
+BRIAN R. MCANDREW
+Acting Inspector General
+
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20041123
+Declassify On: MR
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] //ORCON-NOFORN//MR
+i
+
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -92-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] //ORCON NOFORN//MR
+
+DISTRIBUTION:
+DIR
+D/DIR
+SIGINT Director
+SID Program Manager for CT Special Projects, S
+Chief, SID O&C
+SSG1.
+[REDACTED]
+SID Deputy Director for Customer Relationships
+SID Deputy Director for Analysis and Production
+Chief, S215
+SID Deputy Director for Data Acquisition
+Chief, S332
+GC
+AGC(O)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] //ORCON NOFORN//MR
+11
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -93-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] //ORCON,NOFORN//MR
+ST-06-0018
+(TS//SI//NF) ASSESSMENT OF MANAGEMENT
+CONTROLS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT (FISC) ORDER:
+TELEPHONY BUSINESS RECORDS
+
+(TS//SI//[REDACTED]//OC,NF) Background: The Order of the FISC issued 24 May 2006
+in. In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the
+Production of Tangible Things from [Telecommunications Providers] Relating to [REDACTED]
+in the United States and Abroad.
+No. BR-06-05 (the Order) states that "[the Inspector General and the General
+Counsel shall submit a report to the Director of NSA (DIRNSA) 45 days after the
+initiation of activity [permitted by the Order) assessing the adequacy of
+management controls for the processing and dissemination of U.S. person
+information. DIRNSA shall provide the findings of that report to the Attorney
+General." The Office of the Inspector General (OIG), with the Office of the General
+Counsel's (OGC) concurrence, issued the aforementioned report on 10 July 2006
+in a memorandum with the subject FISA Court Order: Telephony Business Records
+(ST-06-0018). Subsequently, DIRNSA sent the memorandum to the Attorney
+General. This report provides the details of our assessment of management
+controls that was reported to DIRNSA and makes formal recommendations to
+Agency management.
+
+FINDING
+(TS//ST/[REDACTED]//OGNF) The management controls designed by the
+Agency to govern the processing, dissemination, data security, and
+oversight of telephony metadata and U.S. person information obtained
+under the Order are adequate and in several aspects exceed the terms of
+the Order. Due to the risk associated with the collection and processing
+of telephony metadata involving U.S. person information, three additional
+controls should be put in place. Specifically, Agency management should:
+
+(1) design procedures to provide a higher level of assurance that
+non-compliant data will not be collected and, If inadvertently
+collected, will be swiftly expunged and not made available for
+analysis.
+
+(2) separate the authority to approve metadata queries from the
+capability to conduct queries of metadata under the Order.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] //ORCON NOFORN//MR
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -94-
+TOP
+[REDACTED]N.NOFORN//MR
+ST-06-0018
+(3) conduct periodic reconciliation of approved telephone
+numbers with the logs of queried numbers to verify that only
+authorized queries have been made under the Order.
+
+(U) Criteria
+
+(TS//SI/[REDACTED](/OC, NF) The Order. The Order authorizes NSA to
+collect and retain telephony metadata to protect against international
+terrorism and to process and disseminate this data regarding
+[REDACTED] in the United
+States. To protect U.S. privacy rights, the Order states specific terms
+and restrictions regarding the collection, processing, retention,¹
+dissemination, data security, and oversight of telephony metadata
+and U.S. person information obtained under the Order. To ensure
+compliance with these terms and restrictions, the Order also
+mandates Agency management to implement a series of procedures
+to control the access to and use of the archived data collected
+pursuant to the Order. These control procedures are clearly stated
+in the Order. Appendix B includes a summary of the key terms of
+the Order and the related mandated control procedures.
+
+(U) Standards of Internal Control. Internal control, or management
+control, comprises the plans, methods, and procedures used to meet
+missions, goals, and objectives. It provides reasonable assurance
+that an entity is effective and efficient in its operations, reliable in its
+reporting, and compliant with applicable laws and regulations. The
+General Accounting Office's Standards for Internal Control in the
+Federal Government, November 1999 (the Standards), presents the
+standards that define the minimum level of quality acceptable for
+management control in government. NSA/CSS Policy 7-3, Internal
+Control Program, advises that evaluations of internal control should
+consider the requirements outlined by the Standards. The OIG uses
+the Standards as the basis against which management control is
+evaluated.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Documented Procedures are Needed to Govern the
+Collection of Telephony Metadata
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Control procedures for collecting telephony metadata
+under the Order were not formally designed and are not clearly
+documented. As a result, management controls do not provide
+reasonable assurance that NSA will comply with the following terms
+of the Order:
+
+¹ (TS//SI) We did not assess the controls over retention at this time as the Order allows data to be retained for
+five years.
+TOP SECRET[REDACTED]VORCON,NOFORN//MR
+2
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -95-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED]//ORCON, NOFORN//MR
+ST-06-0018
+NSA may obtain telephony metadata, which includes
+comprehensive communications, routing information,
+Including but not limited to session identifying information.
+trunk identifier, and time and duration of a call. Telephony
+metadata does not include the substantive content of any
+communications, or the name, address, or financial
+Information of a subscriber or customer.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) As required by the Order, OGC plans to examine
+periodically a sample of call detail records to ensure NSA is receiving
+only data authorized by the court. (This is the only control
+procedure related to collection that is mandated by the Order.)
+Although this will detect unauthorized data that has been loaded
+into the archived database, there should also be controls in place to
+prevent unauthorized data from being loaded into the database. In
+addition, good internal control practices require that documentation
+of internal control appear in management directives, administrative
+policies, or operating manuals. At a minimum, procedures should
+be established to:
+
+* monitor incoming data on a regular basis,
+* upon discovery of unauthorized data, suppress unauthorized
+ data from analysts' view, and
+* eliminate unauthorized data from the incoming data stream.
+
+(TS//SI//[REDACTED]/NF) With these proposed control procedures in
+place, the risk that Agency personnel will mistakenly collect types of
+data that are not authorized under the Order will be minimized.
+Although the primary and secondary orders prohibit the providers
+from passing specific types of data to NSA, mistakes are possible.
+For example, in responding to our request for information, Agency
+management discovered that NSA was obtaining two types of data
+that may have been in violation of the Order: a 16-digit credit card
+number and name/partial name in the record of Operator-assisted
+calls. (It should be noted that the name/partial name was not the
+name of the subscriber from the provider's records; rather, a
+telephone operator entered name at the time of an Operator-assisted
+call.)
+
+(TS//SI//[REDACTED]/NF) In the case of the credit card number, OGC
+advised that, in its opinion, collecting this data is not what the Court
+sought to prohibit in the Order; but recommended that it still be
+suppressed on the incoming data flow if not needed for contact
+chaining purposes. In the case of the name or partial name, OGC
+advised that, while not what it believed the Court was concerned
+about when it issued the Order, collecting this information was not
+in keeping with the Order's specific terms and that it should also be
+suppressed from the incoming data flow. OGC indicated that it will
+report these issues to the Court when it seeks renewal of the
+authorization. Agency management noted that these data, types were
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT[REDACTED]//ORCON,NOFFORN//MR
+3
+
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -96-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT[REDACTED]//OR.CON,NOFORN//MR
+ST-06-0018
+blocked from the analysts' view. Management also stated that it will
+take immediate steps to suppress the data from the incoming data
+flow. These steps should be completed by July 31, 2006.
+
+Recommendation 1
+(TS//SI) Design and document procedures to provide a higher level of
+assurance that non-compliant data will not be collected and, If Inadvertently
+collected, will be swiftly expunged and not made available for analysis.
+(ACTION: Chief,
+
+(U) Management Response
+CONCUR. (TS//SI/[REDACTED]/NF)-Management concurred with the
+finding and recommendation and has already partially implemented
+the recommended procedures, to block the questionable data from
+the providers' incoming dataflow. A final system upgrade to block
+the questionable data from one remaining provider is scheduled for
+8 September 2006. Testing is currently ongoing.
+Status: OPEN
+Target Completion Date: 8 September 2006
+
+(U) OIG Comment
+(U) Planned action meets the intent of the recommendation.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Additional Controls are Needed to Govern the
+Processing of Telephony Metadata
+(TS//SI//NE) Agency management designed, and in some ways
+exceeded, the series of control procedures over the processing of
+telephony metadata that were mandated by the Order; however,
+there are currently no means to prevent an individual who is
+authorized access the telephony metadata from querying, either by
+error or intent, a telephone number that is not compliant with the
+Order. Therefore, additional controls are needed to reduce the risk of
+unauthorized processing.
+(TS//SI/[REDACTED]/OC, NF)-Processing refers to the querying, search,
+and analysis of telephony metadata. To protect the privacy of U.S.
+persons, the Order restricts the telephone numbers that may be
+queried:
+TOP SECRET//COMINT[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+4
+//ORCON NOFORN//MR
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -97-
+TOP SECRET//CO[REDACTED]//ORCON NOFORN//MR
+ST-06-0018
+Based on the factual and practical considerations of
+everyday life on which reasonable and prudent persons act,
+there are facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable
+suspicion that the telephone number is associated with [REDACTED]
+
+A telephone number believed to be used by a U.S. person
+shall not be regarded as associated with [REDACTED] solely on the basis of
+activities that are protected by the First Amendment to the
+Constitution.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Agency management designed the series of control
+procedures over the processing of telephony metadata that were
+mandated by the Order. In a short amount of time, Agency
+management modified existing systems and designed new processes
+to:
+* document justifications for querying a particular
+telephone number,
+* obtain and document OGC and other authorized
+approvals to query a particular telephone number, and
+* maintain automatic audit logs of all queries of the
+telephony metadata.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) These controls are adequate to provide reasonable
+assurance that justifications are sound, approvals are given and
+documented, and that there is a record of all queries made. Agency
+management even exceeded the intent of the Order by fully
+documenting the newly developed processes in Standard Operating
+Procedures and by developing enhanced logging capability that will,
+once completed, generate additional reports that are more usable for
+audit purposes.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Two additional control procedures are needed to
+provide reasonable assurance that only telephone numbers that
+meet the terms of the Order are queried.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The authority to approve metadata queries should be
+segregated from the capability to conduct metadata queries.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The Chief and Deputy Chief of the Advanced Analysis
+Division (AAD) and five Shift Coordinators^a each have both the
+authority to approve the querying of telephone numbers under the
+Order and the capability to conduct queries. The Standards of
+
+^a(TS//SI//NF) The Order grants approval authority to seven individuals: the SID Program Manager for CT
+Special Projects, the Chief and Deputy Chief of the AAD, and four Shift Coordinators in AAD. In practice,
+Agency management transferred the authority of the SID Program Manager for CT Special Projects to one
+additional Shift Coordinator. Approval authority therefore remains limited to seven individuals as intended by
+the Order.
+
+TOP SECRET//CO[REDACTED]//ORCON NOFORN//MR
+5
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+TOP SECRETY
+WORCON, NOFORN//MR
+ST-06-0018
+
+Internal Control in the Federal Government require that key duties
+and responsibilities be divided among different people to reduce the
+risk of error or fraud. In particular, responsibilities for authorizing
+transactions should be separate from processing and recording
+them. This lack of segregation of duties increases the risk that Shift
+Coordinators and the Chief and Deputy Chief of AAD will approve
+and query, either by error or intent, telephone numbers that do not
+meet the terms of the Order.
+
+Recommendation 2
+
+(TS//SI) Separate the authority to approve metadata queries from the
+capability to conduct queries of metadata under the Order.
+
+(ACTION: Chief, Advanced Analysis Division)
+
+(U) Management Response
+CONCUR. (TS//SI//[REDACTED]NE) Management concurred with the
+finding but stated that it could not implement the recommendation
+because of constraints in manpower and analytic expertise. As an
+alternative, management recommended that SID Oversight &
+Compliance (O&C) routinely review the audit logs of the Chief and
+Deputy Chief of the Advanced Analysis Division and Shift
+Coordinators to verify that their queries comply with the Order. This
+alternative would be developed in conjunction with actions taken to
+address Recommendation 3 and is contingent on the approval of a
+pending request to SID management to detail two computer
+programmers to the team. Management is also negotiating with
+O&C to accept the responsibility for conducting the recommended
+reconciliations.
+
+Status: OPEN
+Target Completion Date: 28 February 2007
+
+(U) OIG Comment
+(TS//SI//[REDACTED]NF) Although not ideal, management's alternative
+recommendation to monitor audit logs to detect errors will, at a
+minimum, mitigate the risk of querying telephone numbers that do
+not meet the terms of the Order. Therefore, given the existing
+manpower constraints, management's suggested alternative
+recommendation meets the intent of the recommendation.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT
+6
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+
+(TS//SI//NF) Audit logs should be routinely reconciled to the records of telephone numbers approved for querying.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Management controls are not in place to verify that those telephone numbers approved for querying pursuant to the Order are the only numbers queried. Although audit logs document all queries of the archived metadata as mandated by the Order, the logs are not currently generated in a usable format, and Agency management does not routinely use those logs to audit the telephone numbers queried. The Standards of Internal Control in the Federal Government recommends ongoing reconciliations to "make management aware of inaccuracies or exceptions that could indicate internal control problems." The lack of routine reconciliation procedures increases the risk that errors will go undetected.
+
+Recommendation 3.
+
+(TS//SI) Conduct periodic reconciliation of approved telephone numbers with the logs of queried numbers to verify that only authorized queries have been made under the Order.
+
+(ACTION: SID Special Program Manager for CT Special Projects)
+
+(U) Management Response
+CONCUR. (TS//SI//[REDACTED]NF)-Management concurred with the finding and recommendation and presented a plan to develop the necessary tools and procedures to implement the recommendation. However, management stated that completion of the planned actions is contingent on the approval of a pending request to SID management to detail two computer programmers to the team. Management is also negotiating with O&C to accept the responsibility for conducting the recommended reconciliations.
+
+Status: OPEN
+Target Completion Date: 28 February 2007
+
+(U) OIG Comment
+(U) Planned action meets the intent of the recommendation. However, should SID management not grant the request for additional computer programmers or O&C not accept responsibility for conducting the reconciliations, management must promptly inform the OIG and present an alternative plan.
+
+TOP SECRET//[REDACTED]N.NOFORN//MR
+7
+
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+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] //ORCON,NOFORN//MR
+ST-06-0018
+
+**Observation**
+
+(TS//SI//NF) At the time of our review, there was no policy in place to periodically review telephone numbers approved for querying under the Order to ensure that the telephone numbers still met the criteria of the Order. Although the Order is silent on the length of time a telephone number may be queried once approved, due diligence requires that Agency management issue a policy decision on this matter and develop procedures to execute the decision.
+
+**(TS//SI//NF) Management Controls Governing the Dissemination of U.S. Person Information are Adequate**
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Agency management implemented the series of control procedures governing the dissemination of U.S. person information mandated by the Order. O&C designs and implements controls to ensure USSID SP0018 compliance across the Agency, to include obtaining the approval of the Chief of Information Sharing Services and maintaining records of dissemination approvals, as required by the Order. No additional procedures are needed to meet the intent of the Order. Furthermore, these procedures are adequate to provide reasonable assurance that the following terms of the Order are met:
+
+* Dissemination of U.S. person information shall follow the standard NSA minimization procedures found in the Attorney General-approved guidelines (USSID 18).
+
+**(TS//SI//NF) Management Controls Governing Data Security are Adequate**
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Agency management implemented the series of control procedures governing the data security of U.S. person information as mandated by the Order, such as the use of user IDs and passwords. Agency management exceeded the terms of the Order by maintaining additional control procedures that provide an even higher level of assurance that access to telephony metadata will be limited to authorized analysts. Most of these controls had been in place prior to and aside from the issuance of the Order. Only the requirement that OGC periodically monitor individuals with access to the archive was designed in response to the Order. Combined, these procedures are adequate to provide reasonable assurance that Agency management complies with the following terms of the Order:
+
+* DIRNSA shall establish mandatory procedures strictly to control access to and use of the archived metadata collected pursuant to this Order.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT-[REDACTED]//ORCON,NOFORN//MR
+8
+
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -101-
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+ST-06-0018
+(TS//SI//NF) Additionally, O&C plans to reconcile the list of
+approved analysts with a list of authorized users to ensure
+only approved analysts have access to the metadata.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Management Controls Governing the Oversight of
+Activities Conducted Pursuant to the Order are Adequate
+
+(TS//SI//NF) As mandated by the Order, Agency management
+designed plans to provide general oversight of activities conducted
+pursuant to the Order. The Order states that,
+
+The NSA Inspector General, the NSA General Counsel, and
+the Signals Intelligence Directorate Oversight and
+Compliance Office shall periodically review this program.
+
+(TS//SI/[REDACTED]/OC,NF) Specifically, Agency management designed
+the following plans that are adequate to ensure compliance with the
+Order.
+
+* (TS//SI//NF) The OGC will report on the operations of
+the program for each renewal of the Order.
+* (TS//SI//NF) O&C plans to conduct periodic audits of
+the queries.
+* (TS//SI//NF) OIG planned to audit telephony
+metadata [REDACTED]
+Upon issuance of the
+Order, the audit was put on hold to complete the
+court-ordered report. OIG will modify the audit plan to
+include the new requirements of the Order. Once
+sufficient operations have occurred under the Order to
+allow for a full range of compliance and/or substantive
+testing, the audit will proceed.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT-[REDACTED]//ORCON NOFORN//MR
+9
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+ST-06-0018
+
+(U) Conclusion
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The activities conducted under the Order are extremely sensitive given the risk of encountering U.S. person information. The Agency must take this responsibility seriously and show good faith in its execution. Much of the foundation for a strong control system is set up by the Order itself, in the form of mandated control procedures. In many ways, Agency management has made the controls even stronger. Our recommendations will address control weaknesses not covered by the Order or Agency management and will meet Federal standards for internal control. Once the noted weaknesses are addressed, and additional controls are implemented, the management control system will provide reasonable assurance that the terms of the Order will not be violated.
+
+10
+
+TOP SECRET//[REDACTED]//ORCON,NOFORN//MR
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+ST-06-0018
+
+APPENDIX A
+(U) About the Audit.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT-[REDACTED]/ORCON,NOFORN//MR
+11
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+
+This page intentionally left blank
+
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+
+## (U) ABOUT THE AUDIT
+
+### (U) Objectives
+
+(TS//SI) The overall objective of this review was to determine whether management controls will provide reasonable assurance that Agency management complies with the terms of the Order. Specific objectives were to:
+
+* verify that Agency management has designed the control procedures mandated by the Order.
+* assess the adequacy of all management controls in accordance with the *Standards of Internal Control in the Federal Government*.
+
+### (U) Scope and Methodology
+
+(U//FOUO) The audit was conducted from May 24, 2006 to July 8, 2006.
+
+(U//FOUO) We interviewed Agency personnel and reviewed documentation to satisfy the review objectives.
+
+(TS//SI) We did not conduct a full range of compliance and/or substantive testing that would allow us to draw conclusions on the efficacy of management controls. Our assessment was limited to the overall adequacy of management controls, as directed by the Order.
+
+(TS//SI) As footnoted, we did not assess controls related to the retention of telephony metadata pursuant to the Order. As the Order authorizes NSA to retain data for up to five years, such controls would not be applicable at this time.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] //ORCON,NOFORN//MR
+13
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+
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+
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+14
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+ST-06-0018
+
+Appendix B
+
+(U//FOUO) Telephony Business Records FISC Order -
+Mandated Terms and Control Procedures
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT-[REDACTED]VORCON,NOFORN//MR
+15
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+
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+
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+
+TOP SECRET/COMINT
+FORCON NOFORN//MR
+ST-06-0018
+
+(U) Business Records FISC Order
+(U) Mandated Terms and Control Procedures
+
+| (TS//SI//NF) Control Area | Terms of the Order | Responsible Entity | Control Procedures (4)J |
+
+**[REDACTED]** TOP SECRET//COMINT FORCON NOFORN//MR
+17
+TOP STORE COMINT NOPOROS0404
+ST-06-0018
+
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+| Control Area | Terms of the Order | Responsible Entity | Control Procedures |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| Processing | Although data collected under this order will be broad, the use of that information for analysis shall be strictly tailored to identifying terrorist communications and shall occur solely according to the procedures described in the application (pg. 6, para (4)D). | | |
+| (Search & Analysis, or Querying of Archived Metadata) | Any search or analysis of the data archive shall occur only after a particular known telephone number has been associated with [REDACTED] (pg. 5, para (4)A). | OGC | OGC shall review and approve proposed queries of archived metadata based on seed account numbers reasonably believed to be used by U.S. persons (pg. 6, para (4)C). |
+| | Based on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent persons act, there are facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the telephone number is associated with [REDACTED] (pg. 5, para (4)A); | PM, Chief or D/Chief of AAD, Shift Coordinators | Queries of archived data must be approved by one of seven persons: SID PM for CT Special Projects, the Chief or Deputy Chief, Counterterrorism Advanced Analysis Division, or one of the four specially authorized CT Advanced Analysis Shift Coordinators in the Analysis and Production Directorate of SID (pg. 7, para (4)D). |
+| | A telephone number believed to be used by a U.S. person shall not be regarded as associated with [REDACTED] solely on the basis of activities that are protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution (pg. 5, para (4)A). | PM; Chief & D/Chief of AAD, & Shift Coordinators | SID PM for CT Special Projects; Chief and Deputy Chief, CT Advanced Analysis Division, and CT Advanced Analysis Shift Coordinators shall establish appropriate management controls (e.g., records of all tasking decisions, audit and review procedures) for access to the archived data (pg. 8, para (4)G). |
+| | DIRNSA shall establish mandatory procedures strictly to control access to and use of the archived data collected pursuant to this Order (pg. 5, para (4)A). | AAD Analysts | Maintain a record of justifications because at least every ninety days, the Department of Justice shall review a sample of NSA's justifications for querying the archived data (pg. 8, para (4)E). |
+| | | [REDACTED] and Technical Support | When the metadata archive is accessed, the user's login, IP address, date and time, and retrieval request shall be automatically logged for auditing capability (pg. 6, para (4)C). |
+| | | OGC | OGC will monitor the functioning of this automatic logging capability (pg. 6, para (4)C). |
+| | | OGC | Analysts shall be briefed by OGC concerning the authorization granted by this Order and the limited circumstances in which queries to the archive are permitted, as well as other procedures and restrictions regarding the retrieval, storage, and dissemination of the archived data (pg. 6, para (4)G). |
+
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+ORCON, NOFORN/MR
+ST-06-0018
+
+| Control Area | Terms of the Order | Responsible Entity | Control Procedures |
+| :----------- | :----------------- | :----------------- | :----------------- |
+| (TS//SI//NF) Dissemination of U.S. Person Information | Dissemination of U.S. person information shall follow the standard NSA minimization procedures found in the Attorney General-approved guidelines (USSID 18) (pgs, 6-7, para (4)D) & pg. 8, para (4)G). | Chief of Information Sharing Services in SID | Prior to the dissemination of any U.S. person identifying information, the Chief of Information Sharing Services in SID must determine that the information identifying the U.S. person is in fact related to Counterterrorism information and that it is necessary to understand the Counterterrorism information or assess its importance (pg. 7, para (4)D). A record shall be made of every such determination (pg. 7, para (4)D). |
+| Metadata Retention | Metadata collected under this Order may be kept online (that is, accessible for queries by cleared analysts) for five years, at which time it shall be destroyed (pg. 8, para (4)F). | [REDACTED] and Technical Support | None |
+| Data Security (TS//SI//NF) | DIRNSA shall establish mandatory procedures strictly to control access to and use of the archived data collected pursuant to this Order (pg. 5, para (4)A). | [REDACTED] and Technical Support | The metadata shall be stored and processed on a secure private network that NSA exclusively will operate (pg. 5, para (4)B). Access to the metadata archive shall be accomplished through a software interface that will limit access to this data to authorized analysts controlled by user name and password (pg. 5, para (4)C). OGC shall monitor the designation of individuals with access to the archive (pgs. 5-6, para (4)C). |
+| Oversight | The IG, GC, and the SID Oversight and Compliance Office shall periodically review this program (pg. 8, para (4)H). | OGC, IG, GC, and SID Oversight and Compliance Office | The IG and GC shall submit a report to DIRNSA 45 days after the initiation of the activity assessing the adequacy of the management controls for the processing and dissemination of U.S. person information (pg. 8, para (4)H). DIRNSA shall provide the findings of that report to the Attorney General (pg. 9, para (4)H). |
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT
+ORCON.NOFORN//MR
+19
+
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+ST-06-0018
+
+This page intentionally left blank
+
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+20
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+ST-06-0018
+
+Appendix C
+(U/FOUO) Full Text of Management Comments
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT[REDACTED]VORCON,NOFORN//MR
+21
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+
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+
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+
+PROGRAM MEMORANDUM
+
+PM-031-06 Reissued
+29 Aug 2006
+
+To: Office of the Inspector General [REDACTED]
+Cc: Office of
+Counterterrorism Production Center [REDACTED]
+Chief, SID Oversight and Compliance [REDACTED]
+SSG1 [REDACTED]
+
+SUBJECT: (TS//SI//NF) PMO Response to IG-10681-06, Subject Draft Report on the
+Assessment of Management Controls for implementing the FISA Court Order: Telephony
+Business Records (ST-06-0018)
+
+1. (U//FOUO) The SIGINT Directorate Program Office appreciates and welcomes the
+Inspector General Office's review of program operations as required by the subject court
+order. The Program Office offers the following response.
+
+2. (TS//SI//NF) This report presents three findings/recommendations. Finding one
+pertains to procedures to provide a higher level of assurance that non-compliant data will
+not be collected and, if inadvertently collected, will be swiftly expunged and not made
+available for analysis. Finding two pertains to the goal to separate the authority to
+approve metadata queries from the capability to conduct queries. Finding three pertains
+to the requirement to conduct periodic reconciliation of approved telephone numbers with
+the logs of queried numbers to verify that only authorized queries have been made.
+
+3. (TS//SI/[REDACTED]NF) With respect to Finding One, the Program Office acknowledges
+that the item is factually correct and concurs with the assessment with comment. It
+should be noted that internal management controls, known as software rules that are part
+of the [REDACTED] database, do prevent the data in question from ever being loaded into
+the operational contact chaining databases. Still, the data in question did exist in the
+dataflow and should be suppressed on the provider-end as the OIG recommends.
+
+a. (TS//SI/[REDACTED]NF) Corrective Actions: Although already partially implemented
+among the providers, the final system upgrade necessary to block the data in question
+from one provider on the incoming dataflow is scheduled to be in place by 8 September
+2006. Testing continues at this time.
+
+4. (TS//SI//NF) Finding Two recommends two additional controls. With respect to the
+first, "The authority to approve metadata queries should be segregated from the capability
+to conduct metadata queries", the Program Office agrees the assessment has merit, but
+cannot implement the required corrective actions. In theory, the OIG recommendation is
+sound and conforms fully to the standards of internal control in the Federal Government.
+In practical terms, it is not something that can be easily implemented given the
+
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20041123
+Declassify On: 20301115
+TOP SECRET//COMINT/[REDACTED]/NOFORN//20301115
+
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+risk/benefit tradeoff and real world constraints. Manpower ceilings and available analytic
+expertise are the two most significant limiting factors.
+
+5. (TS//SI//NF) The Advanced Analysis Division (S215) is comprised of personnel of
+varying grades and experience levels. Given the requirements of the court order, the Shift
+Coordinators are required to be the most experienced intelligence analysts, have the most
+training and consequently hold the most senior grade levels. They therefore are given the
+authority to approve data queries, and because of their status can also execute queries.
+Removing this dimension of their authorities would severely limit the versatility of the
+most experienced operations personnel. Also, as their title implies, they are also the most
+senior personnel present during each operational shift and in effect control the ops tempo
+on the operations floor. Replicating that senior structure to accommodate the OIG
+recommendation is not possible given current manning authorizations and ops tempo.
+
+ a. (TS//SI//NF) However, there are checks and balances already in place to help
+ mitigate the risks cited. For example, the Shift Coordinators routinely approve queries
+ into the database based on selectors meeting a reasonable articulable suspicion standard
+ LAW with NSA OGC written guidelines and verbal briefings. Any queries initiated from
+ probable U.S. selectors must be individually approved by the OGC. In this way, the risk
+ of error or fraud associated with the requirements of the court order is acceptably
+ mitigated within available manning and analytic talent constraints.
+
+ b. (TS//SI//NF) Corrective Actions: Corrective actions cannot be implemented
+ without significantly increasing manning levels of senior, highly skilled analysts. In our
+ view, the benefit gained will not justify the manpower increase required. However, it
+ may be possible to implement additional checks and audits on the query approval
+ process. As recommended in the response to Finding Three below, Oversight and
+ Compliance could, if they accept an expanded role, use (yet to be developed) new
+ automated software tools to regularly review the audit logs of all shift coordinators. With
+ software changes to the audit logs it would be possible to easily compare numbers
+ approved and their accompanying justifications against numbers chained. In this way, it
+ would be possible to review the shift coordinator's actions against the standards
+ established by the court. The Program Office recommends that this corrective action be
+ pursued as part of the long term goal discussed below.
+
+6. (TS//SI//NF) Finding Three reads "conduct periodic reconciliation of approved
+telephone numbers with the logs of queried numbers to verify that only authorized
+queries have been made under the order". The Program Office agrees with this
+assessment. However, competing priorities for the software programming talent
+necessary to implement improvements to the audit logs, as well as to perform the
+programming necessary to create automated reconciliation reports, require that this issue
+be addressed as a long term goal.
+
+ a. (TS//SI/NF) If SID management approves a pending Program Office request to
+ detail two computer programmers to the team for six-to-nine month rotations, suitable
+ procedures and software tools could be implemented. Also, the Program Office has
+ approached the office of Oversight and Compliance about accepting the responsibility of
+ conducting the recommended audits. That negotiation is ongoing.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT/[REDACTED]//NOFORN//20301115
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+
+b. (TS//SI/NF) Corrective Action: Acceptable tools and procedures can be developed
+within six months if the required manpower is allocated. Assuming the Program team's
+request is granted, this initiative can be completed by 28 February 2007. The corrective
+action will include:
+1. (U//FOUO) Improvements to the audit logs to make them more user friendly
+2. (U//FOUO) Reports that provide a useable audit trail from requester, to approver,
+to any resulting reports. These reports will be used to automatically identify any
+discrepancies in the query process (i.e. queries made, but not approved).
+3. (U//FOUO) Complete the negotiations with SID Oversight & Compliance
+7. (U//FOUO) Please contact me if you have additional questions.
+
+[REDACTED]
+29 Aug 06
+) SID Program Manager
+CT Special Programs
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT/[REDACTED]NOFORN//20301115
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -118-
+IT'S EVERYBODY'S BUSINESS
+
+TO REPORT SUSPECTED INSTANCES OF FRAUD,
+WASTE, AND MISMANAGEMENT, CALL OR VISIT
+THE NSA/CSS IG DUTY OFFICER
+ON 963-5023s/[REDACTED]
+IN OPS2A/ROOM 2A0930
+
+IF YOU WISH TO CONTACT THE OIG BY MAIL,
+ADDRESS CORRESPONDENCE TO:
+
+DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/
+CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
+ATT: INSPECTOR GENERAL
+9800 SAVAGE ROAD, STE 6247
+FT. MEADE, MD 20755-6247
+
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -119-
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+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT [REDACTED] TORCON,NOFORN//MR
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -120-
+F
+
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -121-
+OP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN AR
+
+OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
+
+10 July 2006
+IG-10667-06
+
+TO: DIRECTOR, NSA
+
+SUBJECT: (PS//SI//NF) FISA Court Order: Telephony
+Business Records (ST-06-0018)
+
+1. (TS//SI//NE) Background and Objective. The Order of the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court issued 24 May 2006 in *In Re Application of the FBI*
+etc., No. BR-06-05 (Telephony Business Records) states that "[t]he Inspector
+General and the General Counsel shall submit a report to the Director of NSA 45
+days after the initiation of the activity [permitted by the Order] assessing the
+adequacy of the management controls for the processing and dissemination of
+U.S. person information." This is that report. The Order further states that
+"[t]he Director of NSA shall provide the findings of that report to the Attorney
+General." Order at 8-9. The Order sets no deadline for transmission of the
+findings to the Attorney General.
+
+2. (TS//SI//NE) Finding. The management controls designed by the
+Agency to govern the processing, dissemination, security, and oversight of
+telephony metadata and U.S. person information obtained under the Order are
+adequate and in several aspects exceed the terms of the Order. However, due to
+the risk associated with the collection and processing of telephony metadata
+involving U.S. person information, three additional controls should be put in
+place. Specifically, Agency management should (1) design procedures to
+provide a higher level of assurance that non-compliant data will not be collected
+and, if inadvertently collected, will be swiftly expunged and not made available
+for analysis; (2) separate the authority to approve metadata queries from the
+capability to conduct queries of metadata under the Order; and (3) conduct
+periodic reconciliation of approved telephone numbers to the logs of queried
+numbers to verify that only authorized queries have been made under the
+Order.
+
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20041123
+Declassify On. MR
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN/MR
+
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -122-
+TO SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//M.
+-2-
+3. (TS//SI) Further Review. The Inspector General will make formal
+recommendations to the Director, NSA/CSS, in a separate report regarding the
+design and implementation of the additional controls.
+4. (U//FOUO) We appreciate the courtesy and cooperation extended
+throughout our review to the auditors from the Office of the Inspector General
+and the attorneys from the Office of the General Counsel who consulted with
+them. If you need clarification or additional information please contact
+[REDACTED] on 963-1421(s) or via e-mail at [REDACTED]
+
+JOEL F. BRENNER
+Inspector General
+
+(U//FOUO) I endorse the conclusion that the management controls for the
+processing and dissemination of U.S. person information are adequate.
+
+ROBERT L. DEITZ
+General Counsel
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//M.
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -123-
+OP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//AR
+-3-
+
+DISTRIBUTION:
+* SIGINT Director
+* SID Program Manager for CT Special Projects
+* Chief, S2
+* Chief, S21
+* Chief, S215
+* Chief, S3
+* Chief, S33
+* OGC
+* SID O&C
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//IMR
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -124-
+G
+
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -125-
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20301129
+
+FM: SID Oversight & Compliance
+Date: 11 July 2006
+Subject: Final Responses to the OIG – Request for Information - Business
+Records Order (U)
+
+SID Oversight and Compliance
+
+1. (TS//SI//NF) Written plans for periodically reviewing this program.
+ (TS//SI//NF) SID Oversight and Compliance will:
+ * In coordination with Program Office, conduct weekly reviews of list of
+ analysts authorized to access Business Records data and ensure that only
+ approved analysts have access. Oversight & Compliance will inform NSA's
+ Office of General Counsel (OGC) of the results of the reviews and provide
+ copies if needed to OGC.
+ * Perform periodic super audits of queries.
+ * Work with the Program Office to ensure that the data remains appropriately
+ labeled, stored and segregated according to the terms of the court order.
+
+2. (TS//SI//NF) Written procedures in addition to USSID SP0018 to
+ ensure compliance with standard NSA minimization procedures for the
+ dissemination of U.S. person information.
+ (TS//SI//NF) SID Oversight and Compliance has a documented SOP which
+ outlines the process to ensure compliance with standard NSA minimization
+ procedures:
+ * During normal duty hours, every report from this order containing U.S. or 2nd
+ Party identities is reviewed by SID Oversight and Compliance prior to
+ dissemination.
+ * SID Oversight & Compliance (SV) reviews the products (Tippers) and
+ creates a "one-time dissemination" authorization memorandum for signature
+ of the Chief or Deputy Chief of Information Sharing Services.
+ * The NSOC SOO approves dissemination authorizations after hours.
+ * S2I/Counterterrorism Production Center provides SV with a copy of any
+ report that is approved by NSOC/SOO for dissemination.
+ * Oversight and Compliance then issues a memorandum for the record
+ stipulating that the U.S. or 2nd Party identities contained in that report were
+ authorized for dissemination by the NSOC/SOO.
+
+TOP SECRET
+Derived From: NSA/CS8M 1-52
+Dated: 20041123
+Declassify On: 20301129
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20301129
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -126-
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Feb_12_2009_Memorandum_of_US/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Feb_12_2009_Memorandum_of_US/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5eed844
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Feb_12_2009_Memorandum_of_US/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+{
+ "title": "Memorandum of the United States in response to the Court's Order Dated January 28, 2009",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Memorandum of the Government providing additional information relating to the compliance incident described directly above and describing additional oversight mechanisms deployed by the Government following identification of this compliance incident. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2009-01-28",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT",
+ "MR"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [
+ "ESECS"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Alexander, Keith B.",
+ "Olsen, Matthew G.",
+ "McAndrew, Brian R.",
+ "Brenner, Joel F."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-10-10",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/memorandum-united-states-response-courts-order-dated-january-28-2009",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "fe2969cdf3f15049f27529d6a2ce825863782c273ad11d7593c8bc8fd3eae5cf",
+ "pages": 121
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Feb_26_2009_Notification_of_Compliance_Incident/ACLU_-_pub_Feb_26_2009_Notification_of_Compliance_Incident.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Feb_26_2009_Notification_of_Compliance_Incident/ACLU_-_pub_Feb_26_2009_Notification_of_Compliance_Incident.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5e55c54
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Feb_26_2009_Notification_of_Compliance_Incident/ACLU_-_pub_Feb_26_2009_Notification_of_Compliance_Incident.md
@@ -0,0 +1,438 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+2009 FEB 26 PM 3:23
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, DC
+
+IN RE PRODUCTION OF TANGIBLE THINGS
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Docket Number: BR 08-13
+
+NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE INCIDENTS (U)
+
+The United States of America, pursuant to Rule 10(c) of the Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Court Rules of Procedure, advises the Court of the circumstances
+surrounding two compliance matters in docket number BR 08-13 and prior dockets in
+this matter. In support of this notice, the Government submits the attached
+Supplemental Declaration of Lt. General Keith B. Alexander, U.S. Army, Director of the
+National Security Agency (NSA) (“Supplemental Alexander Declaration"). (FS)
+
+In response to the Court's Order of January 28, 2009, the Director of NSA ordered
+end-to-end system engineering and process reviews (technical and operational) of
+NSA's handling of the call detail records collected pursuant to the Court's
+authorizations in this matter ("BR metadata"). See Declaration of Lt. General Keith B.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+[REDACTED]
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -140-
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+Alexander, U.S. Army, Director, National Security Agency, filed February 17, 2009, at 21
+("Alexander Declaration"). The Director also ordered an audit of all queries made of the
+BR metadata repository since November 1, 2008, to determine if any of the queries
+during that period were made using telephone identifiers for which NSA had not
+determined that a reasonable, articulable suspicion exists that they are associated with
+[REDACTED] and
+[REDACTED] ns, as required by the Court's Primary Orders.¹ Id. at 22-
+23. These reviews identified the following two matters where NSA did not handle the
+BR metadata in the manner authorized by the Court.² (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Queries Using [REDACTED] On February 19, 2009, NSA notified the National
+Security Division (NSD) and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence that one
+of its analytical tools (known as [REDACTED] ) may have been used to query the BR
+metadata and that such queries may have used non-RAS-approved telephone
+identifiers. Supp. Alexander Decl. at 5. According to the Supplemental Alexander
+Declaration, [REDACTED] determined if a record of a telephone identifier was present in
+NSA databases and, if so, provided analysts with certain information regarding the
+calling activity associated with that identifier. Id. at 3, 5-6. It did not provide analysts
+with the telephone identifiers that were in contact with the telephone identifier that
+
+¹ In this notice, the Government will refer to this standard as the “RAS standard” and
+telephone identifiers that satisfy the standard as “RAS-approved.” [REDACTED]
+² NSD orally notified Court advisors of these two matters on February 20, 2009. [REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+2
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -141-
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+served as a basis for the query. Id. at 3, 6. Although [REDACTED] could operate as a
+stand-alone tool, it more often operated automatically in support of other analytic tools,
+namely [REDACTED] which is described more fully in the Supplemental
+Alexander Declaration. Id, at 3, 5-7. Since the Court's initial Order in May 2006,
+[REDACTED] would search the BR metadata and other NSA databases. Id. at 2-3, 5-6.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+According to the Supplemental Alexander Declaration, on February 18, 2009,
+NSA disabled portions of two analytic tools, including [REDACTED] that most
+often invoked [REDACTED] query mechanism. Id. at 7. On February 19, 2009, NSA
+confirmed that [REDACTED] was querying the BR metadata without requiring RAS-
+approval of the telephone identifiers used as query terms. Id. at 5. NSA then began to
+eliminate [REDACTED] access to the BR metadata. Id. at 3. On February 20, 2009, NSA
+restricted access to the BR metadata to permit only manual queries based on RAS-
+approved telephone identifiers and to prevent any automated processes from accessing
+the BR metadata. Id. at 7, 9. NSA also blocked access to the historical files that were
+generated from automated [REDACTED] queries. Id. at 7. Before re-instituting
+automated processes that would access the BR metadata, NSA and NSD will determine
+that any proposed automated process will access the BR metadata in a manner that
+complies with the Court's Orders. Id. at 9-10. (TS//SI//NF)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR-
+3
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -142-
+
+-TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+Improper Analyst Queries Since November 1, 2008. On February 20, 2009, NSA
+notified NSD that NSA's audit of queries since November 1, 2008 had identified three
+analysts who conducted chaining in the BR metadata using fourteen telephone
+identifiers that had not been RAS-approved before the queries. According to the
+Supplemental Alexander Declaration:
+
+* One analyst conducted contact chaining queries on four non-RAS-
+ approved telephone identifiers on November 5, 2008;
+* A second analyst conducted one contact chaining query on one non-RAS-
+ approved telephone identifier on November 18, 2008; and
+* A third analyst conducted contact chaining queries on three non- RAS-
+ approved telephone identifiers on December 31, 2008; one non-RAS
+ approved identifier on January 5, 2009; three non-RAS approved
+ identifiers on January 15, 2009; and two non-RAS approved identifiers on
+ January 22, 2009.
+
+Id. at 8. None of the telephone identifiers used as seeds was associated with a U.S.
+person or telephone identifier, and none of the improper queries resulted in intelligence
+reporting. Id. at 8-9. According to the Supplemental Alexander Declaration, at the time
+of the improper queries, the three analysts were conducting queries of telephone
+metadata other than the BR metadata, and each appears to have been unaware that they
+were conducting queries of the BR metadata. Id. at 9. (TS//SI//NF)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+4
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009-143-
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+As stated in the Alexander Declaration, NSA began designing a software fix to
+prevent the querying of the BR metadata with telephone identifiers that had not been
+RAS-approved. Alexander Decl. at 23-24. On February 20, 2009, NSA installed that
+software fix; as a result, no non-RAS-approved telephone identifier may be used to
+query the BR metadata. Supp. Alexander Decl. at 9. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+-- Remainder of page intentionally left blank --
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+5
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009-144-
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+* * *
+The Government acknowledges that in the above matters it did not handle the
+BR metadatá in the manner authorized by the Court. These matters were identified as a
+result of the several oversight and investigative obligations that the Government
+voluntarily undertook as a result of the Court's Order of January 28, 2009. The
+Government also has implemented certain additional restrictions on the access to the BR
+metadata that are designed to prevent the recurrence of improper access to the BR
+metadata. Accordingly, the Government respectfully submits that the Court need not
+take any further remedial action. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+Acting Section Chief, Oversight
+
+[REDACTED]
+Office of Intelligence
+
+National Security Division
+United States Department of Justice
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+6
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -145-
+
+Attachment
+
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -146-
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+(TS) In Re Production of Tangible Things
+
+[REDACTED]
+Docket No.: BR 08-13
+
+SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEITH B.
+ALEXANDER, UNITED STATES ARMY,
+DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+
+(U) I, Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander, depose and state as follows:
+
+(U) I am the Director of the National Security Agency ("NSA" or "Agency"), an
+intelligence agency within the Department of Defense ("DoD"), and have served in this
+position since 2005. I currently hold the rank of Lieutenant General in the United States
+Army and, concurrent with my current assignment as Director of the National Security
+Agency, I also serve as the Chief of the Central Security Service and as the Commander
+of the Joint Functional Component Command for Network Warfare.
+
+(U) The statements herein are based upon my personal knowledge, information
+provided to me by my subordinates in the course of my official duties, advice of counsel,
+and conclusions reached in accordance therewith.
+
+Derived From NSA/CSSM 1-52
+-Dated: 20070108..
+Declassify On: MR
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -147-
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+I. (U) Purpose:
+(TS//SI//NE) Pursuant to a series of Orders issued by the Court since May 2006,
+NSA has been receiving telephony metadata from telecommunications providers. NSA
+refers to the Orders collectively as the "Business Records Order" or "BR FISA." Among
+other things, the Business Records Order requires NSA to determine that there is a
+reasonable articulable suspicion ("RAS") to believe that a telephone identifier that NSA
+wishes to use as a "seed" for accessing the BR FISA data is associated wi
+[REDACTED]
+This supplemental declaration describes two compliance matters that NSA
+has discovered while implementing the corrective actions the Government described to
+the Court in the brief and declaration filed with the Court on 17 February 2009 regarding
+a compliance matter that the Department of Justice ("DoJ") first brought to the Court's
+attention on 15 January 2009. See, respectively, Memorandum of the United States in
+Response to Court's Order Dated January 28, 2009, ("DoJ Memo") and Declaration of
+Keith B. Alexander ("Alexander Declaration"), Docket BR 08-13.
+
+II. (U) Incidents:
+A. (U) Summary
+(TS//SI//NF) During an end-to-end review of NSA's technical infrastructure that I
+ordered in response to the compliance incident that DoJ reported to the Court on
+15 January 2009, NSA personnel determined on 18 February 2009 that an NSA analytical
+tool known as [REDACTED] was querying both E.O. 12333 and the Business Records
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+-2-
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -148-
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+data and that such queries would not have been limited to RAS approved telephone
+identifiers. As explained further below, [REDACTED] was automatically invoked to
+support certain types of analytical research. Specifically, to help analysts identify a phone
+number of interest. If an analyst conducted research supported by [REDACTED] the
+analyst would receive a generic notification that NSA's signals intelligence ("SIGINT")
+databases contained one or more references to the telephone identifier in which the
+analyst was interested; a count of how many times the identifier was present in SIGINT
+databases; the dates of the first and last call events associated with the identifier; a count
+of how many other unique telephone identifiers had direct contact with the identifier that
+was the subject of the analyst's research; the total number of calls made to or from the
+telephone identifier that was the subject of the analyst's research; the ratio of the count of
+total calls to the count of unique contacts; and the amount of time it took to process the
+analyst's query. [REDACTED] did not return to the analyst the actual telephone identifier(s)
+that were in contact with the telephone identifier that was the subject of the analyst's
+research and the analyst did not receive a listing of the individual NSA databases that
+were queried by [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) After identifying that [REDACTED] was allowing non-RAS approved
+telephone identifiers to be used to conduct queries of the BR FISA metadata to generate
+the statistical information that [REDACTED] returned to individual analysts, NSA personnel
+immediately began to eliminate [REDACTED] ability to access the BR FISA data. As of
+20 February 2009, no automated analytic process or analytical tool can access the
+telephony metadata NSA receives pursuant to the Business Records Order. Moreover,
+the system's change of 20 Feburary 2009 also prevents manual queries of the BRFISA -
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+-3-
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -149-
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+metadata unless NSA has determined that the telephone identifier that is being used to
+query the data has satisfied the RAS standard.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In addition to the problem NSA identified regarding [REDACTED]
+during a 100% audit of individual analyst queries of the BR FISA metadata, NSA
+personnel discovered that three analysts inadvertently accessed the Business Records data
+using fourteen different non-RAS approved selectors between 1 November 2008 and
+23 January 2009. None of the improper queries resulted in any intelligence reporting and
+none of the identifiers were associated with a U.S. telephone identifier or U.S. person.
+The technical change NSA implemented on 20 February 2009 to correct the problem of
+automated BR FISA queries also included another software change that prevents manual
+queries against non-RAS approved identifiers. Thus, the 20 February 2009 system
+upgrades should prevent recurrences of the improper analyst queries that are also
+discussed in detail below.
+
+B. (U) Details
+(S) Incident 1:
+(TS//SI//NF) As part of the response to the compliance problem described to the
+Court in my 17 February 2009 declaration, I ordered an examination "to ensure that
+NSA's technical infrastructure has not allowed, and will not allow, non-approved
+selectors to be used as seeds for contact chaining [REDACTED] of the BR FISA
+data." Alexander Declaration at 22. I also stated that NSA would "report to DoJ and the
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+-4-
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -150-
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+Court if this examination of the technical infrastructure reveals any incidents of improper
+querying of the BR FISA data repository.". Id.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) On 18 February 2009, NSA technical personnel notified NSA's
+Office of General Counsel that, as part of the review of NSA's technical infrastructure
+that I ordered, they discovered that the use of [REDACTED] may have resulted in queries of
+NSA's BR FISA data and that such queries would not have been limited to the use of
+RAS approved telephone identifiers. On 19 February 2009, NSA personnel confirmed
+that this was, in fact, the case. NSA informally notified DoJ and the Office of the
+Director of National Intelligence of this problem later that same day.
+
+(S//SI) As I stated above, NSA uses [REDACTED] to support analytical research
+regarding telephone identifiers that are of intelligence interest to NSA's SIGINT
+personnel. [REDACTED] determines if a telephone identifier is present in NSA data
+repositories and also reports the level of calling activity associated with any particular
+telephone identifier. Although [REDACTED] can be used as a stand-alone tool, it is used
+more often as a background process in support of other NSA analytical tools.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+-5-
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -151-
+
+-TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+The
+results of the [REDACTED] queries (the number of unique contacts found for each expanded
+telephone identifier; the total number of calls made to or from the telephone identifier
+that served as the basis for the query; the ratio of total calls to unique calls; the date of the
+first call event recorded; the date of the last call event; and the amount of time it took to
+process the query) would be displayed to the analyst [REDACTED]
+
+Although [REDACTED] 10 longer can access the
+BR FISA data, [REDACTED] greatly assists analysts to choose selectively the best
+identifiers for further target development. As I stated above, [REDACTED] does not return
+the telephone identifier(s) that were in contact with the telephone identifier that was the
+subject of the analyst's research.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) NSA has determined that the Agency had configured [REDACTED] to
+include the BR FISA data repository as one of the sources of SIGINT data that
+[REDACTED] queried since the issuance of the first Business Records Order in May 2006.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+-6-
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -152-
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+This configuration remained in place until NSA identified this problem on 18 February
+2009. As noted previously, [REDACTED] did not tell individual analysts which SIGINT
+databases [REDACTED] was querying nor did the tool provide analysts with the actual
+telephone numbers that had been in direct contact with the identifiers that served as the
+basis for [REDACTED] queries. In other words, if an analyst wanted to construct a chain
+[REDACTED] of the contacts associated with an identifier that had been the subject of a
+[REDACTED] query, the analyst was required to query the appropriate data repositories
+directly. For BR FISA data, this meant that only an analyst approved for access to
+BR FISA material could conduct such a query.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Upon identification of this problem, NSA took immediate corrective
+actions. First, on the evening of 18 February 2009, NSA's Signals Intelligence
+Directorate disabled portions of two analytical tools used most often to invoke
+[REDACTED] automatic query mechanism. Second, on the morning of 19 February 2009,
+NSA shut down [REDACTED] itself. Third, after conducting further examination of the
+problem, on the morning of 20 February 2009, the Signals Intelligence Directorate
+installed a technical safeguard called Emphatic Access Restriction, which is the
+equivalent of a firewall that prevents any automated process or subroutine from accessing
+the BR FISA data.² Fourth, on the evening of Friday, 20 February 2009, NSA blocked
+access to the historical files that were generated from automated [REDACTED] queries.
+[REDACTED] ² (TS//SI//NF) This technical safeguard had been under development since mid-January 2009, following the
+initial discovery of compliance issues associated with the Business Records Order. The safeguard also
+prevents analysts from performing manual chaining on numbers that have not been marked as RAS-
+approved.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+-7-
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -153-
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+(TS) Incident 2: Improper Analyst Queries
+(TS//SI//NF) Among the other corrective actions described to the Court in the
+Government's filing on 17 February 2009, NSA also initiated an audit of all queries made
+of the BR FISA data between 1 November 2008 and 23 January 2009. See Alexander
+Declaration at 22-23. As part of this audit, NSA has identified additional instances of
+improper analyst queries of the BR FISA data. None of the improper queries resulted in
+any intelligence reporting and none of the identifiers were associated with a U.S.
+telephone number or person.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Prior to 15 January 2009, audits of BR FISA queries were
+implemented as spot checks of analyst queries or would be limited to a single day's worth
+of queries. After one of these spot checks identified improper queries conducted by two
+analysts, the Agency decided to conduct a more comprehensive audit of all analysts
+queries of the BR FISA metadata conducted between 1 November 2008 to 23 January
+2009. See Alexander Declaration at 22-23. When NSA oversight personnel completed
+the first round of this comprehensive audit, they discovered that three analysts were
+responsible for fourteen instances of improper querying of the BR FISA data. The
+fourteen seed identifiers did not meet RAS approval prior to the analysts' queries. The
+first analyst conducted one query on one non-RAS approved seed identifier on
+18 November 2008. The second analyst chained on four different non-RAS approved
+seeds on 5 November 2008. The third analyst chained on three different non-RAS
+approved seeds on 31 December 2008; one non-RAS approved identifier on 5 January
+2009; three different non-RAS approved identifiers on 15 January 2009; and two
+different non-RAS approved identifiers on 22 January 2009. None of the improper
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+-8-
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -154-
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+queries resulted in any intelligence reporting and none of the identifiers were associated
+with a U.S. telephone identifier or U.S. person.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Each of the analysts responsible for these improper queries did not
+realize they were conducting queries in the BR FISA data. This conclusion is based on
+an audit of other queries they were conducting at the same time as well as questioning of
+the analysts by NSA's. Oversight and Compliance Office. Each analyst thought they were
+conducting queries of other repositories of telephony metadata that are not subject to the
+requirements of the Business Records Order.³ On 20 February 2009, software changes
+were made to ensure analysts could only access the BR data using this new version of the
+chaining tool.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) As the Government reported in its filing of 17 February 2009, NSA
+decided to design new software to prevent the querying of any telephone identifier within
+the BR FISA data unless the identifier has been RAS-approved. See Alexander
+Declaration at 23-24. On 20 February 2009, the software change NSA made to prevent
+automated tools from access the BR FISA metadata also prevents any non-RAS approved
+selector from being used as a seed for manual querying of the BR FISA data.
+
+III. (U) Conclusion:
+(TS//SI//NF) NSA's implementation of Emphatic Access Restriction should
+prevent recurrences of both types of compliance incidents that are the subject of this
+supplemental declaration to the Court. NSA's BR FISA data repository is currently only
+able to accept manual queries based on a RAS-approved telephone identifier. Prior to
+³ (TS//SI//NF) At the time of the improper queries, each of these analysts were using dual screen computer
+equipment that provided the analysts with simultaneous access to BR FISA data and metadata that is not
+subject to the Business Records Order.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+-9-
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -155-
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+reinstituting any automated process that would provide any sort of access to, or
+comparison against, the BR FISA data, NSA's Office of General Counsel and the
+Department of Justice will review and approve the process.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Notwithstanding implementation of Emphatic Access Restriction,
+NSA continues to examine its technical infrastructure to ensure that queries of BR FISA
+metadata are restricted to the use of RAS approved telephone identifiers. I expect that
+any further problems NSA personnel may identify with the infrastructure will be
+historical in nature. However, as indicated in my previous declaration to the Court, NSA
+will report any further problems Agency personnel may identify (whether current or
+historical) to both DoJ and the Court.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+-10-
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -156-
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+correct.
+
+(U) I declare under penalty of perjury that the facts set forth above are true and
+[REDACTED]
+KEITH B. ALEXANDER
+Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
+Director, National Security Agency
+
+Executed this 25TH day of Febuary, 2009
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+-11-
+1846 & 1862 PRODUCTION 5 MARCH 2009 -157-
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Feb_26_2009_Notification_of_Compliance_Incident/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Feb_26_2009_Notification_of_Compliance_Incident/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..07ec421
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Feb_26_2009_Notification_of_Compliance_Incident/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+{
+ "title": "FISC Notice of Compliance Incident with Supplemental Declaration",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Memorandum of the Government providing the FISC with notice of additional compliance incidents identified during NSA’s ongoing end-to-end review of the telephony metadata program. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2009-02-26",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT",
+ "MR"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Alexander, Keith B."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-09-10",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/february-26-2009-fisc-notice-compliance-incident-supplemental-declaration",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "e9a3e187c60bb45a741c15843fd5817604a6124ec228f83d6104c8fb0b4d32c2",
+ "pages": 18
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Jan_28_2009_Order_Regarding_Prelim_Notice_of_Compliance/ACLU_-_pub_Jan_28_2009_Order_Regarding_Prelim_Notice_of_Compliance.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Jan_28_2009_Order_Regarding_Prelim_Notice_of_Compliance/ACLU_-_pub_Jan_28_2009_Order_Regarding_Prelim_Notice_of_Compliance.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e171a0c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Jan_28_2009_Order_Regarding_Prelim_Notice_of_Compliance/ACLU_-_pub_Jan_28_2009_Order_Regarding_Prelim_Notice_of_Compliance.md
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE PRODUCTION OF TANGIBLE THINGS
+FROM [REDACTED]
+Docket Number: BR 08-13
+
+**ORDER REGARDING PRELIMINARY NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE INCIDENT**
+**DATED JANUARY 15, 2009**
+
+On December 11, 2008, the Court authorized the government to acquire the tangible
+things sought by the government in its application in Docket BR 08-13. The Court specifically
+ordered, however, that
+
+access to the archived data shall occur only when NSA has identified a known telephone
+identifier for which, based on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on
+which reasonable and prudent persons act, there are facts giving rise to a reasonable,
+articulable suspicion that the telephone identifier is associated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]; provided, however, that a telephone identifier believed to be used by a U.S.
+person shall not be regarded as associated with [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+[REDACTED] solely on
+the basis of activities that are protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution.
+Docket BR 08-13, Primary Order at 8.
+
+On January 15, 2009, the Department of Justice notified the Court in writing that the
+government has been querying the business records acquired pursuant to Docket BR 08-13 in a
+manner that appears to the Court to be directly contrary to the above-quoted Order and directly
+contrary to the sworn attestations of several Executive Branch officials. See _e.g._, _id._, Application
+at 10-11, & 20-21; Declaration at 8; Exhibit B (NSA 120-Day Report) at 9 & 11-12. Given the
+massive production authorized by this Order,¹ coupled with the limited information provided thus
+far by the government, the Court
+
+HEREBY ORDERS the government to file a written brief with appropriate supporting
+documentation, no later than 10:00 a.m., Tuesday, February 17, 2009, the purpose of which is to
+help the Court assess whether the Orders issued in this docket should be modified or rescinded;
+whether other remedial steps should be directed; and whether the Court should take action
+regarding persons responsible for any misrepresentations to the Court or violation of its Orders,
+either through its contempt powers or by referral to appropriate investigative offices.
+
+In addition to any other information the government wishes to provide, the brief shall
+
+¹As the government noted in its application, "[i]f authorized, the requested order will
+result in the production of call detail records pertaining to [REDACTED] telephone
+communications, including call detail records pertaining to communications of U.S. persons
+located within the United States who are not the subject of any FBI investigation." Id.,
+Application at 12.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+-2-
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+specifically address the following issues:²
+
+1. Prior to January 15, 2009, who, within the Executive Branch, knew that the "alert list"
+ that was being used to query the Business Record database included telephone identifiers
+ that had not been individually reviewed and determined to meet the reasonable and
+ articulable suspicion standard? Identify each such individual by name, title, and specify
+ when each individual learned this fact.
+
+2. How long has the unauthorized querying been conducted?
+
+3. How did the unauthorized querying come to light? Fully describe the circumstances
+ surrounding the revelations.
+
+4. The application signed by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Deputy
+ Assistant Attorney General for National Security, United States Department of Justice
+ ("DOJ"), and the Deputy Attorney General of the United States as well as the Declaration
+ of [REDACTED] a Deputy Program Manager at the National Security Agency
+ ("NSA"), represents that during the pendency of this order, the NSA Inspector General,
+ the NSA General Counsel, and the NSA Signals Intelligence Directorate Oversight and
+ Compliance Office each will conduct reviews of this program. Docket BR 08-13,
+ Application at 27, Declaration at 11. The Court's Order directed such review. Id.,
+
+²The government reports in its Forty-five Day Report in Docket BR 08-13, filed on
+January 26, 2009, that it expects to report to the Court by February 2, 2009, "the actions it has
+taken to rectify this compliance incident." To the extent that report addresses the following
+questions, the government need not repeat the answers in response to this Order. Instead, the
+government may refer the Court to the appropriate page or pages of the February 2nd report.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+-3-
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+Primary Order at 12. Why did none of these entities that were ordered to conduct
+oversight over this program identify the problem earlier? Fully describe the manner in
+which each entity has exercised its oversight responsibilities pursuant to the Primary
+Order in this docket as well as pursuant to similar predecessor Orders authorizing the
+bulk production of telephone metadata.
+
+5. The preliminary notice from DOJ states that the alert list includes telephone identifiers
+ that have been tasked for collection in accordance with NSA's SIGINT authority. What
+ standard is applied for tasking telephone identifiers under NSA's SIGINT authority?
+ Does NSA, pursuant to its SIGINT authority, task telephone identifiers associated with
+ United States persons? If so, does NSA limit such identifiers to those that were not
+ selected solely upon the basis of First Amendment protected activities?
+
+6. In what form does the government retain and disseminate information derived from
+ queries run against the business records data archive?
+
+7. If ordered to do so, how would the government identify and purge information derived
+ from queries run against the business records data archive using telephone identifiers that
+ were not assessed in advance to meet the reasonable and articulable suspicion standard?
+
+The Court is exceptionally concerned about what appears to be a flagrant violation of its
+Order in this matter and, while the Court will not direct that specific officials of the Executive
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+-4-
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+Branch provide sworn declarations in response to this Order, the Court expects that the
+declarants will be officials of sufficient stature that they have the authority to speak on behalf of
+the Executive Branch.
+
+IT IS SO ORDERED, this 28th day of January 2009.
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Court
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+-5-
+[REDACTED]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Jan_28_2009_Order_Regarding_Prelim_Notice_of_Compliance/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Jan_28_2009_Order_Regarding_Prelim_Notice_of_Compliance/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6ae030b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Jan_28_2009_Order_Regarding_Prelim_Notice_of_Compliance/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+{
+ "title": "Order Regarding Preliminary Notice of Compliance Incident Dated January 15, 2009 from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Order of the FISC directing the Government to provide additional information regarding its identification and notification that NSA had improperly queried the bulk telephony metadata by using an automated. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2009-01-28",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT",
+ "MR"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Walton, Reggie B."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-09-10",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/order-regarding-preliminary-notice-compliance-incident-dated-january-15-2009-foreign",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "4a814df1de775ce1da87d26f7166d288b148f782056597ccf396ab7be473e334",
+ "pages": 5
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Jun_22_2009_Order/ACLU_-_pub_Jun_22_2009_Order.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Jun_22_2009_Order/ACLU_-_pub_Jun_22_2009_Order.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f70b52a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Jun_22_2009_Order/ACLU_-_pub_Jun_22_2009_Order.md
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
+BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN ORDER
+REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION OF TANGIBLE
+THINGS FROM [REDACTED]
+
+DOCKET NO. BR 09-06
+
+ORDER
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+On May 29, 2009, this Court issued a Supplemental Order
+that addressed several issues. Among other things, the May 29 Supplemental Order noted the
+government's recent disclosure that the unminimized results of authorized queries o
+[REDACTED]
+metadata collected by the National Security Agency (NSA) pursuant to the Court's order in
+[REDACTED]
+and prior FISC orders
+[REDACTED]
+had been shared with NSA
+analysts other than the limited number of analysts authorized to access such metadata. May 29
+Supplemental Order at 1-2. Such sharing had not previously been disclosed to the Court. Id, at
+2. The May 29 Supplemental Order also noted the government's disclosure of an inaccuracy
+regarding the number of
+[REDACTED]
+reports described in paragraph 14 of the declaration
+attached as Exhibit A to the application in
+[REDACTED]
+
+The Court directed the government to submit, within 20 days, a declaration correcting the
+inaccuracy regarding the number of reports and to provide a complete and "updated description
+of NSA's dissemination practices." May 29 Supplemental Order at 3-4.
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Page 2
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+On June 18, 2009, the United States submitted the Government's Response to the Court's
+Supplemental Order Entered on May 29, 2009,
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Page 3
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Unfortunately, the government's responses to the Court's May 29 Supplemental Order
+also raise two additional compliance issues,
+[REDACTED]
+but also its orders in the
+[REDACTED]
+bulk business
+records collection, which was last renewed by the Court in Docket No. BR 09-06.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Page 4
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Second, the government referred in its June 18 submissions to a dissemination-related
+problem that was first brought to the Court's attention in a "preliminary notice of compliance
+incident filed with the Court on June 16, 2009." June 18
+[REDACTED]
+Declaration at 3 n.1. In the June
+16 notice and in a separate notice filed contemporaneously in Docket No. BR 09-06-the
+government informed the Court that the unminimized results of some queries of metadata
+[REDACTED]
+had been "uploaded [by NSA] into a database to which other
+intelligence agencies... had access.'
+[REDACTED]
+Preliminary Notice of Compliance Incident filed June 16,
+2009, in Docket No. BR 09-06 at 2. Providing such access, the government explained, may have
+resulted in the dissemination of U.S. person information in violation of USSID 18 and the more
+restrictive restrictions on dissemination proposed by the government and adopted by the Court in
+its current and prior orders in both of the above-captioned matters.
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Page 5
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+[REDACTED]; Preliminary Notice of
+Compliance Incident filed June 16, 2009, in Docket No. BR 09-06 at 2
+[REDACTED]
+
+The government asserts that NSA terminated access by outside agencies to
+the database at issue on June 12, 2009, and that it is still investigating the matter. Preliminary
+Notice of Compliance Incident filed June 16, 2009, in Docket No. BR 09-06 at 2;
+[REDACTED]
+
+The Court is also seriously concerned regarding NSA's placement of
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Page 6
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+unminimized metadata
+[REDACTED]
+into databases accessible by
+outside agencies, which, as the government has acknowledged, violates not only the Court's
+orders, but also NSA's minimization and dissemination procedures set forth in USSID 18.
+Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that:
+1.
+[REDACTED]
+
+2. With regard to
+[REDACTED]
+BR 09-06, the government shall, by
+5:00 p.m. each Friday, commencing on July 3, 2009,2 file with the Court a report listing each
+instance during the seven-day period ending the previous Friday in which NSA has shared, in any
+form, information obtained or derived from the
+[REDACTED]
+BR metadata collections with anyone
+outside NSA. For each such instance, the government shall specify the date on which the
+information was shared, the recipient of the information, and the form in which the information
+was communicated (e.g., written report, email, oral communication, etc.). For each such instance
+in which U.S. person information has been shared, the Chief of Information Sharing of NSA's
+Signals Intelligence Directorate shall certify that such official determined, prior to dissemination,
+the information to be related to counterterrorism information and necessary to understand the
+counterterrorism information or to assess its importance;
+3. With regard to
+[REDACTED]
+BR 09-06, the government shall
+
+2 If Friday is a holiday, the report shall be submitted on the next business day.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Page 7
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+include, in its submissions regarding the results of the end-to-end reviews, a full explanation of
+why the government has permitted the dissemination outside NSA of U.S. person information
+without regard to whether such dissemination complied with the clear and acknowledged
+requirements for sharing U.S. person information derived from the metadata collected pursuant
+to the Court's orders.
+
+IT IS SO ORDERED this 22nd day of June, 2009.
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Page 8
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Jun_22_2009_Order/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Jun_22_2009_Order/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5306319
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Jun_22_2009_Order/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+{
+ "title": "Order",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "In response to the Government’s reporting of a compliance incident related to NSA’s dissemination of certain query results discovered during NSA’s end-to-end review, the FISC ordered the Government to report on a weekly basis, any disseminations of information from the metadata telephony program outside of NSA and provide further explanation of the incident in its final report upon completion of the end-to-end review. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2009-06-22",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Walton, Reggie B."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-09-10",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/june-22-2009-order-supplemental-order-fisc",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "0bb85906ba12aca8340c83b5b7e3edc402fbca28ed14a9255a1c9b05a2cd3686",
+ "pages": 8
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Mar_5_2009_Cover_Letter_to_Chairman_of_Intel_and_Judiciary_Committees/ACLU_-_pub_Mar_5_2009_Cover_Letter_to_Chairman_of_Intel_and_Judiciary_Committees.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Mar_5_2009_Cover_Letter_to_Chairman_of_Intel_and_Judiciary_Committees/ACLU_-_pub_Mar_5_2009_Cover_Letter_to_Chairman_of_Intel_and_Judiciary_Committees.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e8706c6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Mar_5_2009_Cover_Letter_to_Chairman_of_Intel_and_Judiciary_Committees/ACLU_-_pub_Mar_5_2009_Cover_Letter_to_Chairman_of_Intel_and_Judiciary_Committees.md
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+U.S. Department of Justice
+
+Office of Legislative Affairs
+
+Washington, DC 20530
+
+Office of the Assistant Attorney General
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN,ORCON
+UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE
+
+March 5, 2009
+
+The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
+Chairman
+Committee on the Judiciary
+United States Senate
+Washington, D.C. 20510
+
+The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
+Chairman
+Select Committee on Intelligence
+United States Senate
+Washington, D.C. 20510
+
+The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
+Chairman
+Committee on the Judiciary
+U.S. House of Representatives
+Washington, D.C. 20515
+
+The Honorable Silvestre Reyes
+Chairman
+Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
+U.S. House of Representatives
+Washington, D.C. 20515
+
+Dear Madam and Messrs. Chairmen:
+
+In accordance with the Attorney General's obligation, pursuant to Sections 1846 and
+1862 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended ("FISA"), 50 U.S.C.
+§ 1801, *et. seq.*, to keep your committees fully informed concerning all uses of pen registers and
+trap and trace devices, and all requests for the production of tangible things, we are submitting
+herewith certain documents related to the government's use of such authorities. The documents
+contain redactions necessary to protect the national security of the United States, including the
+protection of sensitive sources and methods.
+
+The enclosed documents are highly classified. Accordingly, while four copies are being
+provided for review by Members and appropriately cleared staff from each of the four
+Committees, all copies are being delivered to the Intelligence Committees for appropriate
+storage.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN,ORCON
+UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE
+
+---
+
+The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
+The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
+The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
+The Honorable Silvestre Reyes
+Page Two
+
+We hope that this information is helpful. Please do not hesitate to contact this office if
+you would like additional assistance regarding this or any other matter.
+
+Sincerely,
+
+M. Faith Burton
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+
+Enclosures
+
+cc:
+The Honorable Arlen Specter
+Ranking Minority Member
+Senate Committee on the Judiciary
+
+The Honorable Christopher S. Bond
+Vice Chairman
+Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
+
+The Honorable Lamar S. Smith
+Ranking Minority Member
+House Committee on the Judiciary
+
+The Honorable Peter Hoekstra
+Ranking Minority Member
+House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
+
+The Honorable Colleen Kollar-Kotelly
+Presiding Judge
+United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN,ORCON
+UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Mar_5_2009_Cover_Letter_to_Chairman_of_Intel_and_Judiciary_Committees/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Mar_5_2009_Cover_Letter_to_Chairman_of_Intel_and_Judiciary_Committees/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bbdf236
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Mar_5_2009_Cover_Letter_to_Chairman_of_Intel_and_Judiciary_Committees/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+{
+ "title": "Cover Letter to Chairman of the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Cover letter submitting several FISC opinions and Government filings relating to the Government’s discovery and remediation of compliance incidents in its handling of bulk telephony metadata. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "DOJ",
+ "date_created": "2009-03-05",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "ORCON, NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Leahy, Patrick J.",
+ "Conyers, John Jr.",
+ "Feinstein, Dianne",
+ "Reyes, Silvestre",
+ "Burton, Faith",
+ "Specter, Arlen",
+ "Bond, Christopher S.",
+ "Smith, Lamar S.",
+ "Hoekstra, Peter",
+ "Kollar-Kotelly, Colleen"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-09-10",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/cover-letter-chairman-intelligence-and-judiciary-committees",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "1bc801a1a2e42ce270f140eaa6a84fe20390bf56cf1bb953b56f20643e9b5ebf",
+ "pages": 2
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_March_2_2009_Order_from_FISC/ACLU_-_pub_March_2_2009_Order_from_FISC.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_March_2_2009_Order_from_FISC/ACLU_-_pub_March_2_2009_Order_from_FISC.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2206aca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_March_2_2009_Order_from_FISC/ACLU_-_pub_March_2_2009_Order_from_FISC.md
@@ -0,0 +1,515 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE PRODUCTION OF TANGIBLE THINGS
+FROM [REDACTED]
+
+Docket Number: BR 08-13
+
+ORDER
+
+On December 12, 2008, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC" or "Court")
+re-authorized the government to acquire the tangible things sought by the government in its
+application in the above-captioned docket ("BR 08-13"). Specifically, the Court ordered
+[REDACTED] to produce, on an ongoing daily basis for the duration of the order, an
+electronic copy of all call detail records or "telephony metadata" created by
+[REDACTED] BR 08-13, Primary Order at 4. The Court found reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible
+things sought are relevant to authorized investigations being conducted by the Federal Bureau of
+Investigation ("FBI") to protect against international terrorism, which investigations are not
+being conducted solely upon the basis of First Amendment protected activities, as required by 50
+U.S.C. §§1861(b)(2)(A) and (c)(1). Id. at 3. In making this finding, the Court relied on the
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+1
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+assertion of the National Security Agency ("NSA") that having access to the call detail records
+"is vital to NSA's counterterrorism intelligence mission" because "[t]he only effective means by
+which NSA analysts are able continuously to keep track of [REDACTED] and all affiliates
+[REDACTED] of one of the aforementioned entities [who are taking steps to disguise and obscure their
+communications and identities], is to obtain and maintain an archive of metadata that will permit
+these tactics to be uncovered." BR 08-13, Application Exhibit A, Declaration of [REDACTED]
+Signals Intelligence Directorate Deputy Program Manager [REDACTED]
+NSA, filed Dec. 11, 2008 ([REDACTED] Declaration") at 5. NSA
+also averred that
+"[t]o be able to exploit metadata fully, the data must be collected in bulk.... The
+ability to accumulate a metadata archive and set it aside for carefully controlled
+searches and analysis will substantially increase NSA's ability to detect and
+identify members of [REDACTED]."
+Id. at 5-6.
+Because the collection would result in NSA collecting call detail records pertaining to
+[REDACTED] of telephone communications, including call detail records pertaining to
+communications of United States ("U.S.") persons located within the U.S. who are not the
+subject of any FBI investigation and whose metadata could not otherwise be legally captured in
+bulk, the government proposed stringent minimization procedures that strictly controlled the
+
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+
+acquisition, accessing, dissemination, and retention of these records by the NSA and the FBI.¹
+BR 08-13, Application at 12, 19-28. The Court's Primary Order directed the government to
+strictly adhere to these procedures, as required by 50 U.S.C. 1861(c)(1). Id. at 4-12. Among
+other things, the Court ordered that:
+access to the archived data shall occur only when NSA has identified a known
+telephone identifier for which, based on the factual and practical considerations of
+everyday life on which reasonable and prudent persons act, there are facts giving
+rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the telephone identifier is associated
+with [REDACTED]; provided, however, that a telephone identifier
+believed to be used by a U.S. person shall not be regarded as associated with
+[REDACTED] solely on the basis of activities that are protected
+by the First Amendment to the Constitution.
+Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
+In response to a Preliminary Notice of Compliance Incident dated January 15, 2009, this
+Court ordered further briefing on the non-compliance incident to help the Court assess whether
+its Orders should be modified or rescinded; whether other remedial steps should be directed; and
+whether the Court should take action regarding persons responsible for any misrepresentations to
+the Court or violations of its Orders. Order Regarding Preliminary Notice of Compliance
+Incident Dated January 15, 2009, issued Jan. 28, 2009, at 2. The government timely filed its
+Memorandum in Response to the Court's Order on February 17, 2009. Memorandum of the
+United States In Response to the Court's Order Dated January 28, 2009 ("Feb. 17, 2009
+
+¹The Court notes that the procedures set forth in the government's application and the
+[REDACTED] Declaration are described in the government's application as "minimization procedures."
+BR 08-13, Application at 20.
+
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+
+Memorandum").
+A. NSA's Unauthorized Use of the Alert List
+The government reported in the Feb. 17, 2009 Memorandum that, prior to the Court's
+initial authorization on May 24, 2006 (BR 06-05), the NSA had developed an "alert list process"
+to assist the NSA in prioritizing its review of the telephony metadata it received. Feb. 17, 2009
+Memorandum at 8. Following the Court's initial authorization, the NSA revised this alert list
+process so that it compared the telephone identifiers on the alert list against incoming FISC-
+authorized Business Record metadata ("BR metadata") and SIGINT collection from other sources,
+and notified NSA's counterterrorism organization if there was a match between an identifier on
+the alert list and an identifier in the incoming data. Feb. 17, 2009 Memorandum at 9-10. The
+revised NSA process limited any further analysis of such identifiers using the BR metadata to
+those telephone identifiers determined to have met the "reasonable articulable suspicion" standard
+(hereafter "RAS-approved identifiers") set forth above. Id. at 10-11. However, because the alert
+list included all identifiers (foreign and domestic) that were of interest to counterterrorism analysts
+who were charged with tracking [REDACTED] most of the telephone identifiers compared against the
+incoming BR metadata were not RAS-approved.² Feb. 17, 2009 Memorandum at 10-11. Thus,
+since the earliest days of the FISC-authorized collection of call-detail records by the NSA, the
+
+²As an example, the government reports that as of January 15, 2009, only 1,935 of the
+17,835 identifiers on the alert list were RAS-approved. Feb.17, 2009 Memorandum at 11.
+
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+
+NSA has on a daily basis, accessed the BR metadata for purposes of comparing thousands of non-
+RAS approved telephone identifiers on its alert list against the BR metadata in order to identify
+any matches. Such access was prohibited by the governing minimization procedures under each
+of the relevant Court orders, as the government concedes in its submission. Feb. 17, 2009
+Memorandum at 16.
+The government's submission suggests that its non-compliance with the Court's orders
+resulted from a belief by some personnel within the NSA that some of the Court's restrictions on
+access to the BR metadata applied only to "archived data," i.e., data residing within certain
+databases at the NSA. Feb. 17, 2009 Memorandum, Tab 1, Declaration of Lieutenant General
+Keith B. Alexander, United States Army, Director of the NSA ("Feb. 17, 2009 Alexander
+Declaration") at 10-11. That interpretation of the Court's Orders strains credibility. It is difficult to
+imagine why the Court would intend the applicability of the RAS requirement - a critical
+component of the procedures proposed by the government and adopted by the Court - to turn on
+whether or not the data being accessed has been "archived" by the NSA in a particular database at
+the time of the access. Indeed, to the extent that the NSA makes the decision about where to store
+incoming BR metadata and when the archiving occurs, such an illogical interpretation of the
+Court's Orders renders compliance with the RAS requirement merely optional.
+The NSA also suggests that the NSA OGC's approval of procedures allowing the use of
+non-RAS-approved identifiers on the alert list to query BR metadata not yet in the NSA's
+"archive" was not surprising, since the procedures were similar to those used in connection with
+
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+
+other NSA SIGINT collection activities. Feb 17, 2009 Alexander Declaration at 11, n.6. If this is
+the case, then the root of the non-compliance is not a terminological misunderstanding, but the
+NSA's decision to treat the accessing of all call detail records produced by
+[REDACTED] no differently than other collections under
+separate NSA authorities, to which the Court-approved minimization procedures do not apply.
+B. Misrepresentations to the Court
+The government has compounded its non-compliance with the Court's orders by
+repeatedly submitting inaccurate descriptions of the alert list process to the FISC. Due to the
+volume of U.S. person data being collected pursuant to the Court's orders, the FISC's orders have
+all required that any renewal application include a report on the implementation of the Court's
+prior orders, including a description of the manner in which the NSA applied the minimization
+procedures set forth therein. See, e.g., BR 08-13, Primary Order at 12.
+In its report to the FISC accompanying its first renewal application that was filed on
+August 18, 2006, the government described the alert list process as follows:
+NSA has compiled through its continuous counter-terrorism analysis, a list of
+telephone numbers that constitutes an "alert list" of telephone numbers used by
+members of [REDACTED]. This alert
+list serves as a body of telephone numbers employed to query the data....
+[...] Each of the foreign telephone numbers that comes to the attention of the NSA
+as possibly related to [REDACTED] is
+evaluated to determine whether the information about it provided to NSA satisfies
+the reasonable articulable suspicion standard. If so, the foreign telephone number
+is placed on the alert list; if not, it is not placed on the alert list.
+The process set out above applies also to newly discovered domestic
+
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+
+telephone numbers considered for addition to the alert list, with the additional
+requirement that NSA's Office of General Counsel reviews these numbers and
+affirms that the telephone number is not the focus of the analysis based solely on
+activities that are protected by the First Amendment....
+As of the last day of the reporting period addressed herein, NSA had
+included a total of 3980 telephone numbers on the alert list, which includes
+foreign numbers and domestic numbers, after concluding that each of the foreign
+telephone numbers satisfied the [RAS standard], and each of the domestic
+telephone numbers was ether a FISC approved number or in direct contact with a
+foreign seed that met those criteria.[3]
+To summarize the alert system: every day new contacts are automatically
+revealed with the 3980 telephone numbers contained on the alert list described
+above, which themselves are present on the alert list either because they satisfied
+the reasonable articulable suspicion standard, or because they are domestic
+numbers that were either a FISC approved number or in direct contact with a
+number that did so. These automated queries identify any new telephone contacts
+between the numbers on the alert list and any other number, except that domestic
+numbers do not alert on domestic-to-domestic contacts.
+NSA Report to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, Docket no. BR 06-05, filed Aug. 18,
+2006 at 12-15 (emphasis added). This description was included in similar form in all subsequent
+reports to the Court, including the report submitted to this Court on December 11, 2008. Feb. 17,
+2009 Memorandum at 13.
+The NSA attributes these material misrepresentations to the failure of those familiar with
+
+³The report further explained that identifiers within the second category of domestic
+numbers were not used as "seeds." NSA Report to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court,
+Docket no. BR 06-05, filed Aug. 18, 2006 at 14. Moreover, rather than conducting daily queries
+of the RAS-approved foreign telephone identifier that originally contacted the domestic number,
+the domestic numbers were included in the alert list as "merely a quicker and more efficient way
+of achieving the same result...." Id. at 14 n.6. In November 2006, the NSA reported that it ceased
+this activity on August 18, 2006. Feb. 17, 2009 Alexander Declaration at 7 n.1.
+
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+
+the program to correct inaccuracies in a draft of the report prepared in August 2006 by a
+managing attorney in the NSA's Office of General Counsel, despite his request that recipients of
+the draft "make sure everything I have siad (sic) is absolutely true." Feb. 17, 2009 Alexander
+Declaration at 16-17; see also id. at Exhibit D. Further, the NSA reports:
+it appears there was never a complete understanding among the key personnel
+who reviewed the report for the SIGINT Directorate and the Office of General
+Counsel regarding what each individual meant by the terminology used in the
+report. Once this initial misunderstanding occurred, the alert list description was
+never corrected since neither the SIGINT Directorate nor the Office of General
+Counsel realized there was a misunderstanding. As a result, NSA never revisited
+the description of the alert list that was included in the original report to the Court.
+Feb. 17, 2009 Alexander Declaration at 18. Finally, the NSA reports that "from a technical
+standpoint, there was no single person who had a complete technical understanding of the BR
+FISA system architecture. This probably also contributed to the inaccurate description of the
+alert list that NSA included in its BR FISA reports to the Court." Id, at 19.
+Regardless of what factors contributed to making these misrepresentations, the Court
+finds that the government's failure to ensure that responsible officials adequately understood the
+NSA's alert list process, and to accurately report its implementation to the Court, has prevented,
+
+"The Court notes that at a hearing held on August 18, 2006, concerning the government's
+first renewal application (BR 06-08), the NSA's affiant testified as follows:
+THE COURT: All right. Now additionally, you have cause to be - well at least I received
+it yesterday - the first report following the May 24 order, which is a 90-day report,
+and some 18 pages and I've reviewed that and you affirm that that's the best report or true and
+accurate to the best of your knowledge and belief.
+I do, sir.
+Transcript of Proceedings before the Hon. Malcolm J. Howard, U.S. FISC Judge, Docket No. BR
+06-08, Aug. 18, 2006, at 12.
+
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+
+for more than two years, both the government and the FISC from taking steps to remedy daily
+violations of the minimization procedures set forth in FISC orders and designed to protect
+call detail records pertaining to telephone communications of U.S. persons located
+within the United States who are not the subject of any FBI investigation and whose call detail
+information could not otherwise have been legally captured in bulk.
+C. Other Non-Compliance Matters
+Unfortunately, the universe of compliance matters that have arisen under the Court's
+Orders for this business records collection extends beyond the events described above. On
+October 17, 2008, the government reported to the FISC that, after the FISC authorized the NSA
+to increase the number of analysts authorized to access the BR metadata to 85, the NSA trained
+those newly authorized analysts on Court-ordered procedures. Sixty-Day Report for Filing in
+Docket Number BR 08-08, filed Oct. 17, 2008 at 7. Despite this training, however, the NSA
+subsequently determined that 31 NSA analysts had queried the BR metadata during a five day
+period in April 2008 "without being aware they were doing so." Id. (emphasis added). As a
+result, the NSA analysts used 2,373 foreign telephone identifiers to query the BR metadata
+without first determining that the reasonable articulable suspicion standard had been satisfied.
+Id.
+Upon discovering this problem, the NSA undertook a number of remedial measures,
+including suspending the 31 analysts' access pending additional training, and modifying the
+NSA's tool for accessing the data so that analysts were required specifically to enable access to
+
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+
+the BR metadata and acknowledge such access. Id. at 8. Despite taking these corrective steps,
+on December 11, 2008, the government informed the FISC that one analyst had failed to install
+the modified access tool and, as a result, inadvertently queried the data using five identifiers for
+which NSA had not determined that the reasonable articulable suspicion standard was satisfied.
+Preliminary Notice of Compliance Incident, Docket no. BR 08-08, filed Dec. 11, 2008 at 2; see
+also Notice of Compliance Incident Involving Docket Number BR 08-08, filed Jan. 22, 2009.
+Then, on January 26, 2009, the government informed the Court that, from approximately
+December 10, 2008, to January 23, 2009, two NSA analysts had used 280 foreign telephone
+identifiers to query the BR metadata without determining that the Court's reasonable articulable
+suspicion standard had been satisfied. Notice of Compliance Incident, Docket No. BR 08-13,
+filed January 26, 2009 at 2. It appears that these queries were conducted despite full
+implementation of the above-referenced software modifications to the BR metadata access tool,
+as well as the NSA's additional training of its analysts. And, as noted below with regard to the
+NSA's routine use of the [REDACTED] tool from May 2006 until February 18, 2009, the NSA
+continues to uncover examples of systemic noncompliance.
+In summary, since January 15, 2009, it has finally come to light that the FISC'S
+authorizations of this vast collection program have been premised on a flawed depiction of how
+
+⁵On October 17, 2008, the government reported that all but four analysts who no longer
+required access to the BR metadata had completed the additional training and were provided
+access to the data. Sixty-Day Report for Filing in Docket Number BR 08-08, filed Oct. 17, 2008
+at 8 n.6.
+
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+
+the NSA uses BR metadata. This misperception by the FISC existed from the inception of its
+authorized collection in May 2006, buttressed by repeated inaccurate statements made in the
+government's submissions, and despite a government-devised and Court-mandated oversight
+regime. The minimization procedures proposed by the government in each successive
+application and approved and adopted as binding by the orders of the FISC have been so
+frequently and systemically violated that it can fairly be said that this critical element of the
+overall BR regime has never functioned effectively.
+D. Reassessment of BR Metadata Authorization
+In light of the foregoing, the Court returns to fundamental principles underlying its
+authorizations. In order to compel the production of tangible things to the government, the Court
+must find that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are relevant
+to an authorized investigation (other than a threat assessment) to obtain foreign intelligence
+information not concerning a U.S. person or to protect against international terrorism or
+clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such investigation of a U.S. person is not
+conducted solely on the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment. 50 U.S.C. § 1861.
+The government's applications have all acknowledged that, of the [REDACTED] of call detail
+records NSA receives per day (currently over [REDACTED] per day), the vast majority of
+individual records that are being sought pertain neither to [REDACTED]
+See, e.g., BR 08-13, Application at 19-20. In other words,
+
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+
+nearly all of the call detail records collected pertain to communications of non-U.S. persons who
+are not the subject of an FBI investigation to obtain foreign intelligence information, are
+communications of U.S. persons who are not the subject of an FBI investigation to protect
+against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, and are data that otherwise
+could not be legally captured in bulk by the government. Ordinarily, this alone would provide
+sufficient grounds for a FISC judge to deny the application.
+Nevertheless, the FISC has authorized the bulk collection of call detail records in this
+case based upon: (1) the government's explanation, under oath, of how the collection of and
+access to such data are necessary to analytical methods that are vital to the national security of
+the United States; and (2) minimization procedures that carefully restrict access to the BR
+metadata and include specific oversight requirements. Given the Executive Branch's
+responsibility for and expertise in determining how best to protect our national security, and in
+light of the scale of this bulk collection program, the Court must rely heavily on the government
+to monitor this program to ensure that it continues to be justified, in the view of those responsible
+for our national security, and that it is being implemented in a manner that protects the privacy
+interests of U.S. persons as required by applicable minimization procedures. To approve such a
+program, the Court must have every confidence that the government is doing its utmost to ensure
+that those responsible for implementation fully comply with the Court's orders. The Court no
+longer has such confidence.
+
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+
+With regard to the value of the BR metadata program, the government points to the 275
+reports that the NSA has provided to the FBI identifying 2,549 telephone identifiers associated
+with the targets. Feb. 17, 2009 Alexander Declaration at 42. The government's submission also
+cites three examples in which the FBI opened three new preliminary investigations of persons in
+the U.S. based on tips from the BR metadata program. Id., FBI Feedback on Report, Exhibit J.
+However, the mere commencement of a preliminary investigation, by itself, does not seem
+particularly significant. Of course, if such an investigation led to the identification of a
+previously unknown terrorist operative in the United States, the Court appreciates that it would
+be of immense value to the government. In any event, this program has been ongoing for nearly
+three years. The time has come for the government to describe to the Court how, based on the
+information collected and analyzed during that time, the value of the program to the nation's
+security justifies the continued collection and retention of massive quantities of U.S. person
+information.
+Turning to the government's implementation of the Court-ordered minimization
+procedures and oversight regime, the Court takes note of the remedial measures being undertaken
+by the government as described in its recent filings. In particular, the Court welcomes the
+Director of the NSA's decision to order "end-to-end system engineering and process reviews
+(technical and operational) of NSA's handling" of BR metadata. Feb. 17, 2009 Alexander
+Declaration at 21. However, the Court is very disturbed to learn that this ongoing exercise has
+identified additional violations of the Court's orders, including the routine accessing of BR
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
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+
+metadata from May 2006 to February 18, 2009, through another NSA analytical tool known as
+[REDACTED] using telephone identifiers that had not been determined to meet the reasonable
+articulable suspicion standard. BR 08-13, Notice of Compliance Incident, filed Feb. 26, 2009
+("Feb. 26, 2009 Notice").
+In its last submission, the government describes technical measures implemented on
+February 20, 2009, designed to prevent any recurrences of the particular forms of non-
+compliance uncovered to date. This "technical safeguard" is intended to prevent "any automated
+process or subroutine," such as [REDACTED] "from accessing the BR FISA data," and to prevent
+"analysts from performing manual chaining[] on numbers that have not been marked as RAS
+approved." See Supplemental Declaration of Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander, United
+States Army, Director of NSA, filed Feb. 26, 2009 ("Feb. 26, 2009 Alexander Declaration") at 7
+& n.2. On the strength of these measures, the government submits that "the Court need not take
+any further remedial action." Feb. 26, 2009 Notice at 6. After considering these measures in the
+context of the historical record of non-compliance and in view of the Court's authority and
+responsibility to "determine [and] enforce compliance" with Court orders and Court-approved
+procedures, 50 U.S.C. § 1803(i), the Court has concluded that further action is, in fact, necessary.
+The record before the Court strongly suggests that, from the inception of this FISA BR
+
+⁶ In context, "chaining" appears to refer to the form of querying the BR metadata known
+as "contact chaining." See [REDACTED] Declaration at 6.
+
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+
+program, the NSA's data accessing technologies and practices were never adequately designed to
+comply with the governing minimization procedures. From inception, the NSA employed two
+separate automated processes - the daily alert list and the [REDACTED] tool - that routinely
+involved queries based on telephone identifiers that were not RAS-approved. See supra pp. 4-6,
+13-14. As for manual queries, the minimization procedures required analysts to use RAS-
+approved identifiers whenever they accessed BR metadata, yet thousands of violations resulted
+from the use of identifiers that had not been RAS-approved by analysts who were not even aware
+that they were accessing BR metadata. See supra pp. 9-10.
+Moreover, it appears that the NSA or at least those persons within the NSA with
+knowledge of the governing minimization procedures - are still in the process of determining
+how the NSA's own systems and personnel interact with the BR metadata. Under these
+circumstances, no one inside or outside of the NSA can represent with adequate certainty
+whether the NSA is complying with those procedures. In fact, the government acknowledges
+that, as of August 2006, "there was no single person who had a complete understanding of the
+BR FISA system architecture." Feb. 17, 2009 Alexander Declaration at 19. This situation
+ evidently had not been remedied as of February 18, 2009, when "NSA personnel determined,"
+only as a result of the "end-to-end review of NSA's technical infrastructure" ordered by the
+Director of the NSA on January 15, 2009, that the [REDACTED] tool accessed the BR metadata on
+the basis of telephone identifiers that had not been RAS-approved. Feb. 26, 2009 Alexander
+Declaration at 2-3.
+
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+
+This end-to-end review has not been completed. Id. at 10. Nonetheless, the government
+submits that the technical safeguards implemented on February 20, 2009 "should prevent
+recurrences" of the identified forms of non-compliance, id, at 9 (emphasis added), and "expect[s]
+that any further problems NSA personnel may identify with the infrastructure will be historical,”
+rather than current, id, at 10 (emphasis added). However, until this end-to-end review has been
+completed, the Court sees little reason to believe that the most recent discovery of a systemic,
+ongoing violation - on February 18, 2009 - will be the last. Nor does the Court share the
+government's optimism that technical safeguards implemented to respond to one set of problems
+will fortuitously be effective against additional problems identified in the future.
+Moreover, even with regard to the particular forms of non-compliance that have been
+identified, there is reason to question whether the newly implemented safeguards will be
+effective. For example, as discussed above, the NSA reported on October 17, 2008, that it had
+deployed software modifications that would require analysts to specifically enable access to BR
+metadata when performing manual queries, but these modifications did not prevent hundreds of
+additional violations by analysts who inadvertently accessed BR metadata through queries using
+telephone identifiers that had not been RAS-approved. See supra pp. 9-10; Feb. 26, 2009
+Alexander Declaration at 4. The Court additionally notes that, in a matter before another judge
+of the FISC, [REDACTED] the mere existence of software solutions was not sufficient to ensure their
+efficacy:
+
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+
+"NSA's representations to the Court in the August 27, 2008, hearing did not explicitly
+account, for the possibility that system configuration errors (such as those discussed in the
+government's response to question 10 below) might render NSA's overcollection filters
+ineffective, which was the root cause for some of the non-compliance incidents."
+Government's Response to the Court's Order of January 16, 2009,
+answer no. 8 at 13.
+"Troubleshooting has since revealed that a software patch that might have prevented the
+[compliance incident] was not present on the recently deployed selection system." Id.,
+answer no. 10 at 14.
+"NSA further determined [in January 2009] that the overcollection filter had not been
+functioning since this site was activated on July 30, 2008." Id.
+In light of what appear to be systemic problems, this Court cannot accept the mere introduction
+of technological remedies as a demonstration that a problem is solved. More is required. Thus,
+notwithstanding the remedial measures undertaken by the government, the Court believes that
+more is needed to protect the privacy of U.S. person information acquired and retained pursuant
+to the FISC orders issued in this matter. However, given the government's repeated
+representations that the collection of the BR metadata is vital to national security, and in light of
+the Court's prior determinations that, if the program is conducted in compliance with appropriate
+minimization procedures, such collection conforms with 50 U.S.C. §1861, the Court concludes it
+would not be prudent to order that the government's acquisition of the BR metadata cease at this
+
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+
+time. However, except as authorized below, the Court will not permit the government to access
+the data collected until such time as the government is able to restore the Court's confidence that
+the government can and will comply with previously approved procedures for accessing such
+data.
+Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED:
+1. The NSA may continue to acquire all call detail records of "telephony metadata"
+created by [REDACTED] in accordance with the orders entered in the above-
+captioned docket on December 12, 2008;
+2. The government is hereby prohibited from accessing BR metadata acquired pursuant to
+FISC orders in the above-captioned docket and its predecessors for any purpose except as
+described herein. The data may be accessed for the purpose of ensuring data integrity and
+compliance with the Court's orders. Except as provided in paragraph 3, access to the BR
+metadata shall be limited to the team of NSA data integrity analysts described in footnote 5 of the
+Declaration, and individuals directly involved in developing and testing any technological
+measures designed to enable the NSA to comply with previously approved procedures for
+accessing such data;
+3. The government may request through a motion that the Court authorize querying of
+the BR metadata for purposes of obtaining foreign intelligence on a case-by-case basis.
+However, if the government determines that immediate access is necessary to protect against an
+imminent threat to human life, the government may access the BR metadata for such purpose. In
+
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+
+each such case falling under this latter category, the government shall notify the Court of the
+access, in writing, no later than 5:00 p.m., Eastern Time on the next business day after such
+access. Any submission to the Court under this paragraph shall, at a minimum, specify the
+telephone identifier for which access is sought or was granted, provide the factual basis for the
+NSA's determination that the reasonable articulable suspicion standard has been met with regard
+to that identifier, and, if the access has already taken place, a statement of the immediate threat
+necessitating such access;
+4. Upon completion of the government's end-to-end system engineering and process
+reviews, the government shall file a report with the Court, that shall, at a minimum, include:
+a. an affidavit by the Director of the FBI, and affidavits by any other official responsible
+for national security that the government deems appropriate, describing the value of the BR
+metadata to the national security of the United States and certifying that the tangible things
+sought are relevant to an authorized investigation (other than a threat assessment) to obtain
+foreign intelligence information not concerning a U.S. person or to protect against international
+terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, and that such investigation of a U.S. person is not
+conducted solely on the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment;
+b. a description of the results of the NSA's end-to-end system engineering and process
+reviews, including any additional instances of non-compliance identified therefrom;
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+19
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+
+c. a full discussion of the steps taken to remedy any additional non-compliance as well as
+the incidents described herein, and an affidavit attesting that any technological remedies have
+been tested and demonstrated to be successful; and
+d. the minimization and oversight procedures the government proposes to employ should
+the Court decide to authorize the government's resumption of regular access to the BR metadata.
+IT IS SO ORDERED, this 2nd day of March, 2009.
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Court
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
+20
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_March_2_2009_Order_from_FISC/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_March_2_2009_Order_from_FISC/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..361428d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_March_2_2009_Order_from_FISC/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+{
+ "title": "Order from the Foreign Intelligence Court",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": " In light of the compliance incidents identified and reported by the Government, the FISC ordered NSA to seek Court approval to query the telephony metadata on a case-by-case basis, except where necessary to protect against an imminent threat to human life “until such time as the Government is able to restore the Court’s confidence that the government can and will comply with the previously approved [Court] procedures for accessing such data.” ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2009-03-02",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT",
+ "MR"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Walton, Reggie B."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-09-10",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/march-2-2009-order-fisc",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "3d4393fcc01b01b41765e322bff8b59d6fca3723b06fc42bd23ab61a9124f330",
+ "pages": 20
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_May_24_2006_Order_from_FISC/ACLU_-_pub_May_24_2006_Order_from_FISC.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_May_24_2006_Order_from_FISC/ACLU_-_pub_May_24_2006_Order_from_FISC.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..64384bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_May_24_2006_Order_from_FISC/ACLU_-_pub_May_24_2006_Order_from_FISC.md
@@ -0,0 +1,259 @@
+SECRET
+
+TAB DESCRIPTION
+1 Docket number [REDACTED]
+2 Docket number [REDACTED]
+3 Docket number [REDACTED]
+4 Docket number [REDACTED]
+5 Docket number [REDACTED]
+6 Docket number [REDACTED]
+7 Docket number [REDACTED]
+
+SECRET
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+UNITED STATES
+
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE
+FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+FOR AN ORDER REQUIRING THE
+PRODUCTION OF TANGIBLE THINGS
+FROM [REDACTED]
+Docket Number: BR 06 - 05
+
+ORDER
+An application having been made by the Director of the Federal Bureau of
+Investigation (FBI) for an order pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
+1978 (the Act), Title 50, United States Code (U.S.C.), § 1861, as amended, requiring the
+production to the National Security Agency (NSA) of the tangible things described
+below, and full consideration having been given to the matters set forth therein, the
+Court finds that:
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+1871(c)(2) PRODUCTION 1 DEC 2008 710
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+1. The Director of the FBI is authorized to make an application for an order
+requiring the production of any tangible things for an investigation to obtain foreign
+intelligence information not concerning a United States person or to protect against
+international terrorism, provided that such investigation of a United States person is not
+conducted solely on the basis of activities protect by the First Amendment to the
+Constitution of the United States. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)]
+
+2. The tangible things to be produced are all call-detail records or "telephony
+metadata" created by [REDACTED] Telephony metadata includes
+comprehensive communications routing information, including but not limited to
+session identifying information (e.g., originating and terminating telephone number,
+communications device identifier, etc:), trunk identifier, and time and duration of call.
+Telephony metadata does not include the substantive content of any communication, as
+defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8), or the name, address, or financial information of a
+subscriber or customer.¹ [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)(A)]
+
+¹ The Court understands that the vast majority of the call-detail records
+provided are expected to concern communications that are (i) between the United States
+and abroad; or (ii) wholly within the United States, including local telephone calls.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+2
+1871 (c) (2) PRODUCTION 1 DEC 2008 711
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+3. There are reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are
+relevant to authorized investigations (other than threat assessments) being conducted
+by the FBI under guidelines approved by the Attorney General under Executive Order
+12,333 to protect against international terrorism, which investigations are not being
+conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment to the
+Constitution of the United States. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)]
+
+4. The tangible things sought could be obtained with a subpoena duces tecum
+issued by a court of the United States in aid of a grand jury investigation or with any
+other order issued by a court of the United States directing the production of records or
+tangible things. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)(D)]
+
+WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the application of the United States to obtain
+the tangible things, as described in the application, satisfies the requirements of the Act
+and, therefore,
+
+IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to the authority conferred on this Court by
+the Act, that the application is GRANTED, and it is
+
+FURTHER ORDERED, as follows:
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+3
+1871 (c) (2) PRODUCTION 1 DEC 2008 712
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+(1) To the extent practicable, the Custodians of Records of [REDACTED]
+shall produce to NSA an electronic copy upon service of the appropriate
+secondary order, and continue production on an ongoing daily basis thereafter for the
+duration of this order, unless otherwise ordered by the Court, of the following tangible
+things: all call-detail records or "telephony metadata" created by such companies as
+described above;
+
+(2) NSA shall compensate [REDACTED] for reasonable expenses
+incurred in providing such tangible things;
+
+(3) With respect to any information the FBI receives as a result of this Order
+(information that is passed or "tipped" to it by NSA²), the FBI shall follow as
+minimization procedures the procedures set forth in The Attorney General's Guidelines
+for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (October 31,
+2003).
+
+(4) With respect to the information that NSA receives as a result of this Order,
+NSA shall adhere to the following procedures:
+
+² The Court understands that NSA expects that it will provide on average
+approximately two telephone numbers per day to the FBI.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+4
+1871 (c) (2) PRODUCTION 1 DEC 2008 713
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+A. The Director of NSA shall establish mandatory procedures strictly to control
+access to and use of the archived data collected pursuant to this Order. Any
+search or analysis of the data archive shall occur only after a particular known
+telephone number has been associated with [REDACTED]
+More specifically, access to the archived data shall occur only
+when NSA has identified a known telephone number for which, based on the
+factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and
+prudent persons act, there are facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable
+suspicion that the telephone number is associated with [REDACTED]
+provided, however, that a telephone number believed to
+be used by a U.S. person shall not be regarded as associated with [REDACTED]
+solely on the basis of activities that are protected
+by the First Amendment to the Constitution.
+
+B. The metadata shall be stored and processed on a secure private network that
+NSA exclusively will operate.
+
+C. Access to the metadata archive shall be accomplished through a software
+interface that will limit access to this data to authorized analysts. NSA's OGC
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+5
+1871 (c) (2) PRODUCTION 1 DEC 2008 714
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+shall monitor the designation of individuals with access to the archive. Access to
+the archive shall be controlled by user name and password. When the metadata
+archive is accessed, the user's login, IP address, date and time, and retrieval
+request shall be automatically logged for auditing capability. NSA's Office of
+General Counsel (OGC) shall monitor the functioning of this automatic logging
+capability. Analysts shall be briefed by NSA's OGC concerning the authorization
+granted by this Order and the limited circumstances in which queries to the
+archive are permitted, as well as other procedures and restrictions regarding the
+retrieval, storage, and dissemination of the archived data. In addition, NSA's
+OGC shall review and approve proposed queries of archived metadata based on
+seed accounts numbers reasonably believed to be used by U.S. persons.
+
+D. Although the data collected under this Order will necessarily be broad, the
+use of that information for analysis shall be strictly tailored to identifying
+terrorist communications and shall occur solely according to the procedures
+described in the application, including the minimization procedures designed to
+protect U.S. person information. Specifically, dissemination of U.S. person
+information shall follow the standard NSA minimization procedures found in the
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+6
+1871 (c) (2) PRODUCTION 1 DEC 2008 715
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Attorney General-approved guidelines (U.S. Signals Intelligence Directive 18)..
+Before information identifying a U.S. person may be disseminated outside of
+NSA, a judgment must be made that the identity of the U.S. person is necessary
+to understand the foreign intelligence information or to assess its importance.
+Prior to the dissemination of any U.S. person identifying information, the Chief
+of Information Sharing Services in the Signals Intelligence Directorate must
+determine that the information identifying the U.S. person is in fact related to
+counterterrorism information and that it is necessary to understand the
+counterterrorism information or assess its importance. A record shall be made of
+every such determination.
+
+E. Internal management control shall be maintained by requiring that queries of
+the archived data be approved by one of seven persons: the Signals Intelligence
+Directorate Program Manager for Counterterrorism Special Projects, the Chief or
+Deputy Chief, Counterterrorism Advanced Analysis Division; or one of the four
+specially authorized Counterterrorism Advanced Analysis Shift Coordinators in
+the Analysis and Production Directorate of the Signals Intelligence Directorate.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+7
+1871 (c) (2) PRODUCTION 1 DEC 2008 716
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+In addition, at least every ninety days, the Department of Justice shall review a
+sample of NSA's justifications for querying the archived data.
+
+F. The metadata collected under this Order may be kept online (that is, accessible
+for queries by cleared analysts) for five years, at which time it shall be destroyed.
+
+G. The Signals Intelligence Directorate Program Manager for Counterterrorism
+Special Projects; Chief and Deputy Chief, Counterterrorism Advanced Analysis
+Division; and Counterterrorism Advanced Analysis Shift Coordinators shall
+establish appropriate management controls (e.g., records of all tasking decisions,
+audit and review procedures) for access to the archived data and shall use the
+Attorney General-approved guidelines (USSID 18) to minimize the information
+reported concerning U.S. persons.
+
+H. The NSA Inspector General, the NSA General Counsel, and the Signals
+Intelligence Directorate Oversight and Compliance Office shall periodically
+review this program. The Inspector General and the General Counsel shall
+submit a report to the Director of NSA 45 days after the initiation of the activity
+assessing the adequacy of the management controls for the processing and
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+8
+1871 (c) (2) PRODUCTION 1 DEC 2008 717
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+dissemination of U.S. person information. The Director of NSA shall provide the
+findings of that report to the Attorney General.
+
+I. Any application to renew or reinstate the authority granted herein shall
+include a report describing (i) the queries that have been made since this Order
+was granted; (ii) the manner in which NSA applied the procedures set forth in
+subparagraph A above, and (iii) any proposed changes in the way in which the
+call-detail records would be received from the carriers.
+[REDACTED]
+/
+/
+/
+/
+/
+/
+/
+/
+/
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+9
+1871 (c) (2) PRODUCTION 1 DEC 2008 718
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+J. At least twice every 90 days, NSA's OGC shall conduct random spot checks,
+consisting of an examination of a sample of call-detail records obtained, to ensure
+that NSA is receiving only data as authorized by the Court and not receiving the
+substantive content of communications.
+
+Signed 05-24-06P12:19 Eastern Time
+Date Time [REDACTED]
+This authorization regarding a [REDACTED] in the United States and Abroad expires on the 18 day of
+August, 2006, at 5:00 p.m., Eastern Time.
+
+MALCOLM J. HOWARD
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+10
+1871 (c) (2) PRODUCTION 1 DEC 2008 719
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_May_24_2006_Order_from_FISC/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_May_24_2006_Order_from_FISC/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d0af837
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_May_24_2006_Order_from_FISC/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+{
+ "title": "Order from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Order of the FISC approving the Government’s request for authorization to collect bulk telephony metadata under Section 501 of FISA. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2006-05-24",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Howard, Malcolm J."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-09-10",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/order-foreign-intelligence-surveillance-court",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "76fae054d2cd9c36e1c4207071a26b0edefb8b3b1b05d97b4e110a9c7b5e985d",
+ "pages": 11
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_NSA_Business_Records_FISA_Review_20130909/ACLU_-_pub_NSA_Business_Records_FISA_Review_20130909.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_NSA_Business_Records_FISA_Review_20130909/ACLU_-_pub_NSA_Business_Records_FISA_Review_20130909.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d640318
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_NSA_Business_Records_FISA_Review_20130909/ACLU_-_pub_NSA_Business_Records_FISA_Review_20130909.md
@@ -0,0 +1,1487 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+# Business Records FISA
+# NSA Review
+
+25 June 2009
+
+Prepared by: Business Records FISA Team
+Lead, [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Implementation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+Authorized Business Records FISA - NSA Review
+25 June 2009
+
+**1. (U) Executive Summary**
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The Business Records FISA Compliance Review Team of the National
+Security Agency (NSA), in response to instructions from the Director of NSA (DIRNSA)
+and as set out in DIRNSA's Declaration of 13 February 2009 to the Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Court (FISC), conducted a comprehensive systems engineering and process
+review of the instrumentation and implementation of the Business Records (BR) FISA
+authorization. This review was focused along the two major components where
+compliance issues had been reported - system-level technical engineering and execution
+within the analytic workforce.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The review entailed 8 major system or process components of the BR FISA
+metadata workflow, 248 sub-components, and 93 requirements and resulted in 9 new
+areas of concern based on past practices as described herein. NSA has taken steps,
+described herein, to remedy the problems identified, and to ensure to the extent possible
+they will not recur. NSA has also developed plans for both the current and future
+architecture to provide more rigorous and efficient protection, control and monitoring of
+the BR FISA metadata. Implementation of the envisioned changes in architectural design
+and oversight procedures briefly described in this report will help mitigate vulnerabilities
+and correct the problems identified through the course of the end-to-end review.
+
+(C//REL TO USA, FVEY) The end-to-end review revealed that there was no single cause
+of the problems that occurred and, in fact, there were a number of successful oversight,
+management and technology processes in place that operated as designed. The problems
+NSA experienced stemmed from a basic lack of shared understanding among the key
+mission, technology, legal and oversight stakeholders of the full scope of the program to
+include its implementation and end-to-end design. The complexity of the overall
+configuration, due in part to the intricacy of the system and the differing rules associated
+with NSA's various authorizations, was also a contributing factor as was the fact that
+NSA oversight was primarily focused on analyst access to and use of the metadata.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) This report, which assumes a basic knowledge of NSA's structure and some
+familiarity with the FISC documents and DIRNSA declarations associated with the BR
+FISA program, addresses previously identified and newly uncovered areas of concern, as
+well as the corrective actions already taken, and those on-going or planned, to address
+these issues. It details the scope of the end-to-end review, the methodology employed
+and the results. It also describes the minimization and oversight procedures NSA
+proposes to employ should the FISC decide to approve NSA's resumption of previously
+authorized access to the BR FISA metadata, to include automated alerting and querying
+of the metadata, as well as the authority to establish whether a telephony selector meets
+the Reasonable Articulable Suspicion ("RAS") standard for analysis (i.e., regular
+authorized access). Additionally, the report outlines the checks, balances and safeguards
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN 2
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+engineered into the system; points to the need to clarify existing language in some cases;
+and describes enhanced training for the workforce that is designed to prevent future
+instances of non-compliance. Finally, the report includes a summary of a proposed
+technical architecture which will further protect BR FISA metadata.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In conducting the end-to-end review, NSA established a diverse team of
+technical, legal and mission experts to examine jointly the key functional areas of system
+engineering, mission operations and oversight. The NSA team created an architectural
+diagram of the end-to-end data and workflow and examined each major system
+component and sub-component to ensure a complete understanding of how the data was
+handled. In addition, NSA compiled all BR FISA-related requirements and evaluated
+each system and process component against those requirements to identify areas of
+concern or vulnerability.
+
+(U//FOUO) In moving forward, NSA will not only address the specific technical and
+process issues identified in this report, but will also implement changes in its program
+management construct to increase transparency and awareness among accountable parties
+and establish an enduring view of the full scope of the program.
+
+(U//FOUO) NSA may produce additional supplements to this report to the extent
+necessary to respond to additional items that may be of interest to the court.
+
+**II. (U//FOUO) Results of Detailed Analysis on Identified Areas of Concern**
+
+**A. (U//FOUO) Previously Reported Compliance Issues**
+
+**1. (U//FOUO) Telephony Activity Detection (Alerting) Process**
+
+(U) Description
+
+(TS//SI//NF) As previously described to the Court,¹ NSA implemented an activity
+detection (alerting) process² in a manner that was not authorized by the Court's Order,
+and then inaccurately described that process in its initial and each subsequent report to
+the Court. NSA stated that only RAS-approved selectors were included on the Activity
+Detection List when, in fact, the list included those RAS-approved and non-RAS-
+approved selectors³ which were also tasked for content collection by counterterrorism
+analysts tracking [REDACTED] and associated terrorist organizations or, subsequent to
+[REDACTED]
+
+¹ (U//FOUO) See DIRNSA Declaration dated 13 February 2009, at Sections III.A. and III.B.
+
+² (U//FOUO)-NSA now refers to the Alert Process and the Alert List as the Activity Detection Process and
+the Activity Detection List to more accurately describe their functions.
+
+³ (TS//SI//NF) In mid-January 2009, there were 1,935 RAS-approved and 15,900 non-RAS-approved
+selectors on the Activity Detection List. At that time, the Station Table (the reference database of all RAS
+evaluations) had approximately 27,000 selectors identified as RAS-approved and 63,000 selectors
+identified as non-RAS-approved.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN 3
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+the modifications of the BR FISA Court Order on 8 August 2006 and again on 14 June
+2007, [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The Activity Detection List that was used prior to 24 January 2009 to alert
+analysts to a selector of potential interest was a list independent of the Station Table, the
+historic reference database of all RAS evaluations. The Activity Detection List was
+compared against the incoming BR FISA data to assist analysts in prioritizing their work.
+Some of the selectors on the Activity Detection List had been RAS evaluated, and their
+status would have been reflected on the Station Table. Others had never been evaluated
+for RAS and would not have appeared in the Station Table. In this latter case, they were
+treated as non-RAS-approved on the alert list which meant that contact chaining did not
+take place in the complete body of archived data until and unless the particular selector
+had satisfied the RAS standard.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) NSA's description of this process to the Court reflected a similar process
+already in place for the [REDACTED] program, but NSA's
+implementation of the two processes was actually different. Further, as described to the
+Court, the NSA personnel who designed the BR FISA Activity Detection List process
+believed that the requirement to satisfy the RAS standard was only triggered when access
+was sought to NSA's stored (i.e., "archived" in NSA parlance) repository of BR FISA
+metadata. The inaccurate characterization was identified in the course of a meeting
+between NSA and representatives from the National Security Division (NSD) of the
+Department of Justice (DoJ) on 9 January 2009. During discussions, DoJ identified what
+was ultimately determined to be an incident of non-compliance with the Order. After
+additional inquiry, NSD/DoJ officially reported the incident to the FISC on 15 January
+2009.
+
+(TS//SI//NF)-Between 20 and 24 January 2009, the RAS-approved portion of the Station
+Table was mistakenly implemented as the Activity Detection List in an attempt to address
+the original problems identified with the alerting process. At that time there were
+approximately 27,000 selectors on this list, approximately 600 of which were designated
+as RAS-approved without having undergone NSA Office of General Counsel (OGC)
+review as described in Section II.A.4.
+
+(U) Remedial Steps
+
+(TS//SI//NF) NSA completely shut down the Activity Detection Process against the BR
+FISA metadata on 24 January 2009 as a corrective measure.
+
+**2. (U//FOUO) The [REDACTED] Mechanism**
+
+(TS//SI//NF) As of 8 August 2006, queries of the BR metadata for telephone identifiers reasonably
+believed to be associated [REDACTED] were permitted by the Court. As of 14 June
+2007, the authorization expanded again to include queries of the BR metadata for telephone identifiers
+reasonably believed to be associated with [REDACTED] associated terrorist organizations to
+include [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN 4
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(U) Description
+
+(TS//SI//NF) As previously reported to the Court,⁴ from May 2006 to 18 February 2009,
+NSA intelligence analysts who were working counterterrorism targets had access to a tool
+known as [REDACTED] which was used to assist them in determining whether or not a
+telephone identifier of interest was present in NSA's metadata repositories and, if so,
+what the level of calling activity was for that selector. Between these dates, [REDACTED]
+in turn, accessed the data present in the BR FISA metadata repository to assist in
+responding to these questions [REDACTED] is not a tool used for contact chaining or
+[REDACTED] Rather, for each query of a specific telephony selector, the [REDACTED]
+tool returns the number of unique contacts, the number of calls made, the dates of the first
+and last call events recorded in NSA's data repositories and the amount of time it took to
+process the query. It does not return the actual telephone identifiers in contact with the
+selector that serves as the basis for the analyst's query. Though [REDACTED] can be used
+as a stand-alone tool, it is more commonly invoked by other tools such as [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) On 19 February 2009, NSA confirmed that [REDACTED] performed queries
+against the BR FISA metadata repository using non-RAS-approved selectors. It was also
+confirmed that analysts who were not BR FISA-authorized inadvertently accessed BR
+FISA metadata without realizing it as a result of accessing [REDACTED] The results
+returned from this tool did not identify to the user whether their results came from BR
+FISA or from metadata collected pursuant to NSA's authority to collect signals
+intelligence information under Executive Order (EO) 12333, but rather combined them
+into a consolidated summary.
+
+(U) Remedial Steps:
+
+(TS//SI//NF) On 20 February 2009, NSA removed the specific system-level certificate
+(cryptologic authentication for software akin to a ticket used to confirm the bearer is
+entitled to enter) that had allowed the BR FISA-enabled [REDACTED] to access the BR FISA metadata chain
+repository.⁵ Out of an abundance of caution, NSA also made software changes on 6
+March 2009 which removed analysts' ability to manually invoke [REDACTED] against BR FISA metadata. While [REDACTED] could still automatically be [REDACTED]
+
+⁴ (U//FOUO) See DIRNSA Supplemental Declaration dated 25 February 2009 at Section II.A. & B.
+
+⁵ (TS//SI//NF) The removal of the system-level certificate cut off all access to the BR FISA metadata chain
+repository by any automated process or subroutine. [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN 5
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+invoked via the Automated Chaining Analysis Tool (ACAT), as stated, the revocation of
+the system level certificate prevented [REDACTED] from accessing the BR FISA metadata
+chain repository.
+
+**3. (U/FOUO) Improper Analyst Queries**
+
+**(U) Description**
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Among the compliance issues previously reported to the Court⁸ was NSA's
+discovery that between 1 November 2008 and 23 January 2009, three analysts
+inadvertently performed chaining within the [REDACTED] BR FISA metadata repository
+using 14 different telephone identifiers that did not meet RAS approval prior to the query.
+The analysts did not realize they were querying the BR FISA metadata and none of the
+identifiers was associated with a U.S. telephone number or person. Based on an audit of
+other queries the analysts were conducting at the same time, it appears each analyst
+thought he or she was conducting queries of other repositories of telephony metadata that
+are not subject to the requirements of the Business Records Order.
+
+**(U) Remedial Steps**
+
+(TS//SI//NF) NSA implemented the Emphatic Access Restriction (EAR) to ensure that
+contact chaining [REDACTED] in the [REDACTED] BR FISA repository is restricted
+to only those seeds that have been RAS-approved. [REDACTED] support personnel have
+conducted tests to ensure the EAR is functioning properly by monitoring manual query
+input and output, evaluating individual and connected functions, as well as examining log
+files to ensure the results of manual queries, now with the EAR in place, produce the
+desired results. Earlier NSA had also introduced a safeguard requiring the analysts to
+acknowledge that they were about to access the BR FISA metadata [REDACTED] to
+further reduce the potential for additional instances of non-compliance. More formal and
+rigorous training also emphasizes the need for caution when invoking their BR FISA
+authority. NSA is in the process of finalizing the testing of a software modification which
+will restrict the analysts to chaining no more than three hops from a RAS-approved
+selector within [REDACTED] BR FISA metadata repository.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Internal audits of the activities of NSA personnel authorized to query the
+data under the 5 March 2009 order since 17 March 2009, when the Court approved the
+first batch of BR FISA metadata selectors as meeting the RAS standard, have shown no
+further compliance issues.
+
+**4. (TS//SI//NF) U.S. Identifiers Designated as RAS-Approved without OGC**
+**Review**
+
+(U/FOUO) The relationship between the tools [REDACTED] ACAT
+can be found in the Appendix, Glossary of Terms.
+
+(U/FOUO) See DIRNSA Supplemental Declaration dated 25 February 2009 at Section II.B.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN 6
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+**(U) Description**
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Between 24 May 2006 and 2 February 2009, NSA designated
+approximately 3,000 U.S. selectors as RAS-approved on the Station Table without
+undergoing the required OGC approval. This set of numbers was derived from two time
+periods: 1 January 2005 to 23 May 2006 and 24 May 2006 to mid-December 2008.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Approximately 600 U.S. selectors that had been tipped to FBI and CIA
+between 1 January 2005 and 23 May 2006 as having ties to known, or probable, terrorist
+entities were added to the Station Table after the BR FISA Order was issued in an effort
+to "jumpstart" the BR FISA operations. These 600 U.S. selectors did not undergo OGC
+review.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Between 24 May 2006 and 6 May 2009, NSA issued 277⁹ BR FISA-based
+reports, all of which were based on contact chaining of RAS-approved selectors. Included
+in these reports were tips to customers (FBI, CIA, NCTC, and/or ODNI) of U.S.
+telephone numbers which had been in contact with a RAS-approved selector associated
+with [REDACTED] or were within
+three hops of a RAS-approved selector. For those reports issued between 24 May 2006
+and mid-December 2008, NSA took the additional step of designating as RAS-approved
+in the Station Table the subset of these domestic selectors that were tipped as having ties
+to known, or probable, terrorist entities. However, these selectors did not undergo the
+required OGC review. For this entire period (24 May 2006 to 15 December 2008), the
+total number of U.S. selectors added to the station table as RAS-approved, but without
+the OGC review, was approximately 2,400.¹⁰
+
+(TS//SI//NF) At the time the RAS-approved portion of the Station Table was mistakenly
+implemented as the Activity Detection List in mid-January 2009, as described in Section
+[REDACTED]
+
+⁹(TS//SI//NF) The number of reports included in the DIRNSA Declaration of 13 February 2009 was 275.
+This was based upon information gathered on 6 February. Further review has taken into account the fact
+that an additional report was issued after 6 February, but before 13 February. Some of these reports had
+been cancelled for various reasons and some of the cancelled reports were reissued with corrections.
+Therefore, the correct number of unique reports as of the 13 February 2009 declaration should have been
+274. Since then, additional reports have been issued for a current total of 277 (as of 6 May 2009). The
+Declaration also stated that there were 2,549 selectors tipped in these reports. The actual number of
+selectors tipped in the 274 reports is 2,888.
+
+¹⁰(TS//SI//NF) Approximately 1000 of these selectors from the post-23 May 2006 era were reported to
+customers as having only an indirect connection to known or probable terrorist selectors. It was not NSA
+policy to include this category of numbers in the Station Table as "RAS-approved." However, an error was
+made during a bulk upload to the Station Table of tipped numbers on 9 December 2008 and these numbers
+were inadvertently included. They were present on the Station Table as RAS-approved until the entire set
+of 2,400 U.S. selectors were changed to "not RAS-approved on 15 December 2008 (six days later). An
+audit of the Alert system, the [REDACTED] system and the Transaction Database showed that no chaining in
+the BR FISA metadata was performed on these numbers during this period.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN 7
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+II.A.1., approximately 600¹¹ of the U.S. selectors from the Table had not undergone the
+required OGC review. Forty-six of these approximately 600 selectors generated alerts as
+a result of the actions described in Section II.A.1; however, none of the resulting analysis
+based on these alerts yielded information that was subsequently tipped to customers.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Designating these U.S. identifiers as RAS-approved without the required
+OGC review grew out of a related practice that NSA applied briefly to its development of
+the Telephony Activity Detection List in 2006. Specifically, in its first periodic report to
+the Court as directed in the initial May 2006 Order, NSA stated that U.S. identifiers that
+had been reported to FBI and CIA prior to 24 May 2006 because of their direct contact
+with international terrorism selectors had also been added to the alert list, even though
+they had not been qualified as seed identifiers and had not been reviewed by OGC. While
+the initial report explained to the Court the NSA rationale for the belief that these
+identifiers did not need to go through the full approval process to be included on the alert
+list, the November 2006 90-day report also stated that the practice had ceased as of 18
+August 2006. Although the use of this process to add identifiers to the Alert List did
+cease on that date, NSA failed to discontinue the process of adding selectors to the
+Station Table.
+
+**(U) Remedial Steps**
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In early February 2009, all selectors that the OGC had not reviewed were
+changed to non-RAS-approved on the Station Table.
+
+**B. (U) Newly Identified Areas of Concern**
+
+**1. (S/NF)** [REDACTED] **Not Audited Prior to January**
+**2009**
+
+**(U) Description**
+
+(TS//SI//NF) January 2009 discussions between Oversight and Compliance (O&C) and
+the BR FISA-authorized analysts revealed that the [REDACTED]
+NSA's repository for individual BR FISA metadata one-hop chains, had not been audited,
+prompting further investigation as part of the end-to-end review. Prior to that time, NSA
+O&C was not aware of its existence in the technical architecture and therefore did not
+audit the database.
+
+**(U) Remedial Steps**
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Between May 2006 and January 2009 [REDACTED]
+logging capability recorded all queries via the analyst graphical user interface
+[REDACTED]
+
+¹¹(TS//SI//NF) These were the approximately 600 from the pre-FISA era; the others had been changed to
+"not RAS-approved" in mid-December 2008. The failure to remove these approximately 600 numbers was
+an oversight. The 600 selectors were changed to "non-RAS-approved" on the Station Table in early
+February 2009.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN 8
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+to the data within the [REDACTED] to include the user's login, Internet Protocol (IP) address,
+date and time, and retrieval request -- all fields required by the Order. Analysts use the
+[REDACTED] to verify the specific call event details between two individuals --
+details such as which selector initiated each call, when the call was initiated and how long
+the call lasted. However, sometimes to verify the call details of a communication event
+the analyst uses the selector that was the first or second hop result as the retrieval request.
+Because of this, the selector that was the RAS-approved seed is not always evident in the
+[REDACTED]. In January 2009, NSA took steps to augment the
+information recorded in the [REDACTED] system log to include the
+RAS-approved seed that the user was asserting to be within two hops of the selector
+being queried. O&C began auditing queries to the database in February 2009. Since this
+enhanced auditing capability was added, O&C has audited the BR FISA-authorized
+intelligence analysts' queries and found no evidence of improper queries. Although the
+[REDACTED] suffered a system crash in September 2008, NSA
+was ultimately able to recover sufficient data to permit O&C to conduct sample audits of
+queries since the Order's inception. These sample audits revealed no unauthorized
+analysts conducted queries against the BR FISA metadata and no authorized analysts
+conducted improper queries of the metadata.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) As the [REDACTED] is outside the [REDACTED] system
+architecture, it is currently not protected by the EAR. NSA will migrate [REDACTED]
+functionality into the corporate architecture to provide greater accountability and to help
+ensure compliance with the Court Order and any future requirements. Reconstituting this
+database within the corporate architecture will ensure that it is established and supported
+on systems that use corporate authentication/authorization services, use system security
+and configuration management practices, are certified and accredited with approval to
+operate on an active System Security Plan (SSP),¹² and above all employ software
+measures that minimize compliance risks.
+
+**2. (TS//SI//NF) Data Integrity Analysts' Use of BR FISA Metadata**
+
+**(U) Description**
+
+(TS//SI//NF) As part of their Court-authorized function of ensuring BR metadata is
+properly formatted for analysis, data integrity analysts seek to identify numbers in the BR
+metadata that are [REDACTED]
+Once the data
+integrity analysts had identified such [REDACTED] selectors in the BR FISA data, they
+[REDACTED]
+
+¹²(U/FOUO) An SSP is a formal document describing the implemented protection measures for the secure
+operation of a computer system.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN 9
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+would not only take steps to prevent the selectors becoming part of the analysis in the BR
+FISA context, but would also note them as [REDACTED] selectors in other NSA systems
+in order to similarly prevent them from being included in analysis conducted outside the
+BR FISA context. NSA determined that the data integrity analysts' practice of populating
+[REDACTED] numbers in NSA databases outside the BR FISA databases had not been
+described to the Court.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) For example, NSA maintains a database, [REDACTED] which is
+widely used by analysts and designed to hold identifiers, to include the types of
+[REDACTED] numbers referenced above, that, based on an analytic judgment, should not be
+tasked to the SIGINT system. In an effort to help minimize the risk of making incorrect
+associations between telephony identifiers and targets, the data integrity analysts
+provided the BR metadata [REDACTED]. A small number of [REDACTED]
+BR metadata business numbers were stored in a file that was accessible by the
+BR FISA-enabled [REDACTED] a federated query tool that allowed approximately 200
+analysts to obtain as much information as possible about a particular selector of interest.
+Both [REDACTED] and the BR FISA-enabled [REDACTED] allowed analysts outside of
+those authorized by the Court to access the [REDACTED] number lists. The end-to-end
+review has not identified any other systems that have been fed using [REDACTED]
+numbers uncovered by the data integrity analysts from the BR FISA metadata.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Similarly, in January 2004 [REDACTED] developed a 'defeat list' process to
+identify and remove [REDACTED] selectors deemed to be of little analytic value and that
+[REDACTED]. In building defeat lists, NSA
+identified [REDACTED] selectors in data acquired pursuant to the BR FISA Order as well
+as in data acquired pursuant to EO 12333. When candidate [REDACTED] selectors
+contained in the BR FISA metadata were found to have a [REDACTED]
+obtained approval from the data integrity analysts to allow
+those selectors, which come from BR FISA metadata, to be added to the defeat list. This
+resulted in all references to those selectors being removed from all of [REDACTED]
+chain databases, to include the database containing and processing data acquired pursuant
+to EO 12333. Since August 2008, [REDACTED] had also been sending all selectors on the
+defeat list to the [REDACTED]. A notice was filed with the FISC on these issues on 8
+May 2009.
+
+**(U) Remedial Steps**
+
+(TS//SI//NF) On 1 May 2009, NSA determined that the data integrity analysts' practice of
+populating [REDACTED] numbers in [REDACTED] and using BR FISA-enabled
+[REDACTED] to access this database was an area of concern. NSA immediately began
+quarantining the BR-derived identifiers in [REDACTED] completing the action by
+2 May 2009. Access to the file containing the small number of BR-derived [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN 10
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+identifiers by the BR FISA-enabled [REDACTED] was shut off on 12 May 2009, when files
+created by the data integrity analysts were moved to a protected work file system.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) NSA determined that only eight selectors from the BR FISA metadata have
+ever been added to the [REDACTED] list. Starting in November 2008
+began to maintain separate deteat lists for BR FISA [REDACTED] and
+on 11 May 2009 [REDACTED] removed the eight BR FISA selectors from its [REDACTED]
+defeat list. The BR FISA defeat list will no longer be shared
+with [REDACTED] until this issue is resolved.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) As the positive impacts that result in making these numbers available to
+analysts outside of those authorized by the Court seem to be in keeping with the spirit of
+reducing unnecessary telephony collection and minimizing the risk of making incorrect
+associations between telephony identifiers and targets, NSA will work with DoJ to seek
+Court approval to continue such practices. 13
+
+3.(TS//SI//NE Use of Correlated Selectors to Query the BR FISA Metadata
+
+(U) Description
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The end-to-end review revealed the fact that NSA's practice of using
+correlated selectors to query the BR FISA metadata had not been fully described to the
+Court. A communications address, or selector, is considered correlated with other
+communications addresses when each additional address is shown to identify the same
+communicant(s) as the original address [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NE) NSA analysts authorized to query the BR FISA metadata routinely used
+[REDACTED] to query the BR FISA
+metadata without a separate RAS determination on each correlated selector. In other
+words, if there was a successful RAS determination made on any one of the selectors in
+[REDACTED]
+
+(U/FOUO) See Appendix 1, Glossary of Terms, for expansion and definition of [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN 11
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+the correlation, all were considered RAS-approved for purposes of the query because
+they were all associated with the same [REDACTED] account
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Although NSA obtained [REDACTED] correlations from a variety of
+sources to include Intelligence Community reporting, the tool that the analysts authorized
+to query the BR FISA metadata primarily used to obtain the correlations is called
+[REDACTED]. A description of how [REDACTED] is used to correlate
+[REDACTED] was included in the government's 18 August 2008 filing to the FISA
+Court. While NSA previously described to the FISC the practice of using correlated
+selectors as seeds, the FISC never addressed whether [REDACTED] correlated selectors
+met the RAS standard when any one of the correlated selectors met the RAS standard. A
+notice was filed with the FISC on this issue on 15 June 2009.
+
+(U) Remedial Steps
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The [REDACTED] a database that
+holds correlations between selectors of interest, to include results from [REDACTED]
+was the primary means by which correlated selectors were used to query the BR FISA
+metadata. On 6 February 2009, prior to the implementation of the EAR, [REDACTED] access
+to BR FISA metadata was disabled, preventing [REDACTED] from providing automated
+correlation results to BR FISA-authorized analysts. In addition, the implementation of the
+EAR on 20 February ended the practice of treating [REDACTED] correlations as RAS-
+approved in manual queries conducted within [REDACTED] since the EAR requires each
+selector to be individually RAS-approved prior to it being used to query the BR FISA
+data. NSA ceased the practice of treating [REDACTED] correlations as RAS-approved
+within the [REDACTED] in conjunction with the March 2009 Court
+Order.
+
+4. (TS//SI//NF) Handling BR FISA Metadata
+
+(U) Description
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The results of the Homeland Security Analysis Center (HSAC) analysts' BR
+FISA metadata contact chaining queries have been routinely made available to the
+broader population of NSA analysts working [REDACTED]
+This sharing helps ensure that analysts with specific foreign target expertise can
+apply the full scope of their knowledge to the BR FISA-generated information to identify
+all possible terrorist connections quickly and characterize them within the context of the
+target's known activities. With only 20 HSAC analysts approved to query the bulk BR
+FISA metadata and more than one thousand analysts working various aspects of the
+counterterrorism mission enterprise-wide, fewer than two percent of counterterrorism
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+12
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+analysts currently have the authority to access the BR FISA metadata. Thus, the
+collective experience of the BR FISA-authorized analysts represents a small fraction of
+NSA's overall expertise on counterterrorism targets. CT target analysts beyond the small
+number currently authorized to query the BR FISA metadata are responsible for
+analyzing the data in the context of SIGINT information and writing reports; this practice
+continued under the structure imposed by the March Court Orders. NSA believed such
+internal sharing of the results of its analysis (as distinct from the bulk metadata itself) was
+consistent with the Court's Orders, but had not included a description of it to the Court in
+its periodic reports prior to May 2009 [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NP) In addition, the Court Orders prior to 2 March 2009 state that "any
+processing by technical personnel of the BR metadata acquired pursuant to this Order
+shall be conducted through the NSA's private network, which shall be accessible only via
+select machines and only to cleared technical personnel, using secured encrypted
+communications." The end-to-end review revealed that the way in which NSA protects
+the data is not precisely as stated in the Court Order; however we believe NSA's
+implementation is consistent with the intent of preventing unauthorized users from
+accessing the data. For example, there are not specifically designated or "select"
+machines from which technical personnel access and process the data on NSA's private,
+secure network. The internal NSA communications paths on its classified networks are
+not encrypted, but are subject to strong physical and security access controls's which
+provide the necessary protections.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The end-to-end review also revealed that data integrity analysts, in order to
+conduct their authorized duties, pull samples of raw BR metadata into their private
+directories on the NSA network, which they access via username and password, to
+analyze the metadata in order to develop new parsing rules or prepare samples for spot
+checks. The private directories offered them a workspace to analyze the metadata using
+tools and applications that they could not invoke in the [REDACTED]
+While these private directories could be interpreted to be an additional data
+repository to the two [REDACTED] already
+described to the Court, the BR FISA data is not accumulated as in a true database
+repository. The data integrity analysts are authorized to access the data, and any
+importation to their own systems was deleted when no longer needed.
+
+(TS/ASIAANE) Additionally, the review uncovered that data integrity analysts, in
+conducting their authorized duties, copied data into two shared directories created for
+[REDACTED]
+
+15(15/SI//NE) The NSA complex is a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) that is an
+accredited installation, incorporating strong physical and security access control measures (barriers, locks,
+alarm systems, armed guards), to which only authorized personnel are granted access. Within NSA, only
+approved users of NSANET can gain access to the network through login and password. Once on the
+network, the user can only access the BR FISA metadata if additional access controls specifically allow
+such access. Access to particular data sets is granted based on need-to-know and is verified via Public Key
+Infrastructure (PKI).
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN 13
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+restricted information with a controlled user set. These shared directories also offered
+access to similar tools and applications as mentioned above. NSA learned that roughly
+170 personnel who at one time had been cleared for sensitive metadata programs had
+access to files on this server. Approximately 15% of these personnel were system
+administrators or data integrity analysts; the remainder included intelligence analysts,
+managers and engineers. While it was possible for the files to be accessed by any of these
+personnel, it is unlikely that anyone other than data integrity analysts would have done so
+since it would have been outside the scope of their duties.
+
+(U) Remedial Steps
+
+(TS//SI//NF) A notice was filed with the FISC on the matter of sharing results of queries
+within NSA as it relates to the BR FISA Order on 12 June 2009. While NSA believes the
+ability of BR FISA-authorized analysts to share unminimized query results with the
+broader population of NSA analysts working [REDACTED]
+is critical to the success of its counterterrorism efforts, effective 18 June 2009 NSA began
+the process of limiting access to unminimized BR FISA metadata query results to only
+authorized analysts. [REDACTED]
+The Court explicitly authorized the continuation of internal sharing of the results of
+authorized queries with NSA analysts other than the limited number authorized to access
+the bulk metadata, provided all analysts receiving such results receive appropriate and
+adequate training. The government anticipates seeking [REDACTED] in
+the BR FISA context.
+
+111
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Regarding the handling of metadata by technical personnel, NSA
+implemented additional access controls using UNIX group access control which assured
+that only the data integrity analysts were in the "group" which could access this data, and
+is providing appropriate protected storage areas for the data integrity analysts' work files.
+With regard to the manner in which NSA secures the BR FISA metadata, NSA will work
+with DoJ to more accurately reflect in any future application to the Court the current
+method of providing protection. Instead of accessing the data via select machines using
+secured encrypted communications, NSA provides protection through the use of the
+secure network; use of NSA's identity and authorization access control service; and other
+NSA corporate standard data protection services.
+
+5. (TS//SI//NF) System Developer Access to BR FISA Metadata while Testing
+New Tools
+
+(U) Description
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In its review of all tools and interfaces that allowed access to BR FISA
+metadata, NSA determined that developers assigned to work [REDACTED]
+a next generation metadata analysis graphical user interface (GUI) which is
+the replacement for [REDACTED] had queried BR FISA metadata
+chaining summaries 20 times during the course of their testing between 26 September
+2008 and 11 February 2009. This access occurred due to the dual responsibilities of the
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+14
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+individuals involved. The developers on [REDACTED] also have maintenance
+responsibilities for the operational system, [REDACTED] where their access to BR FISA
+is warranted on a continual basis. While the actions were in keeping with the Court
+Orders that were in place at the time of the queries, access to the BR metadata was
+unintentional and unknown to the developers at the time.
+
+(U) Remedial Steps
+
+(TS//SI//NF) When this issue surfaced, NSA implemented a software change on 19
+March 2009 to prevent the [REDACTED] GUI from accessing BR FISA
+metadata regardless of the user's access level or the RAS status of the selector. NSA also
+implemented an oversight process whereby all BR FISA-authorized technical personnel
+who have both maintenance and development responsibilities have their accesses to BR
+FISA metadata revoked when involved in new systems development. This process will
+ensure no inadvertent access to the data until such time as these technical personnel
+receive OGC authorization to access BR FISA metadata to test technological measures
+designed to enable compliance with the Court Order. The NSA O&C is notified each
+time anyone's permission to access the BR FISA metadata is changed and tracks these
+changes for compliance purposes.
+
+6. (TS/SI//NE) Provider Asserts That Foreign-to- Foreign Metadata Was
+Provided Pursuant to Business Records Court Order
+
+(U) Description
+
+(TS//SI//NP) [REDACTED] NSA's mission element which obtains
+the BR FISA metadata from the providers, reported during the end-to-end review tha
+[REDACTED] raised a question concerning whether certain foreign-to-foreign
+metadata it provides to NSA is subject to the terms of the BR FISA Order [REDACTED]
+This foreign-to-foreign
+metadata started coming into NSA in January 2007.
+
+(U) Remedial Steps
+
+(TS//SI//NF) When the provider began providing NSA with foreign-to-foreign metadata
+in January 2007 [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+The Court is now
+aware of this issue, and the Court's 29 May Order specifically excludes from its scope the
+aforementioned foreign-to-foreign metadata. The provider ceased providing this metadata
+on the same day as the Order was signed. NSA is coordinating with the provider and the
+NSD/DoJ to resolve this matter.
+
+7. (TS/SI//NE) Unintentional Omission of OGC Review of U.S. Identifiers
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+15
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+**(U) Description**
+
+**(TS//SI//NF)** It was recently discovered that during the June through October 2006 timeframe, in the process of implementing the initial BR FISA Orders, a few domestic numbers were designated as RAS approved and chained without OGC approval due to compound analyst errors. These errors occurred when analysts inadvertently selected the incorrect option in a GUI. The correct option would have designated the domestic identifier as needing OGC approval. The incorrect option set the domestic selector into a large list of foreign selectors which did not need OGC approval as part of the RAS approval process. In those cases where the Homeland Mission Coordinator (HMC) failed to notice the domestic number in the large list of foreign selectors and the RAS justification was approved, the number was chained. NSA continues to investigate this matter, but, based on available records, NSA's initial estimate is this occurred fewer than ten times. NSA will provide additional information as appropriate. A notice was filed with the FISC on this issue on 29 June 2009.
+
+**(U) Remedial Steps**
+
+**(TS//SI//NF)** Each time an error was identified through quality control, senior HMCs provided additional guidance and training, as appropriate. Continued training and management oversight, in particular when new analysts arrived, helped ensure such errors were not repeated.
+
+**8. (TS//SI//NF) External Access to Unminimized BR FISA Metadata Query Results**
+
+**(U) Description**
+
+**(TS//SI//NF)** In examining NSA's practice of sharing BR FISA metadata query results internally with other NSA analysts working authorized [REDACTED] NSA learned of CIA, FBI, and NCTC [REDACTED] unminimized BR FISA metadata-derived query results and target knowledge information via an NSA counterterrorism database, this matter, just recently identified, was a collaboration practice that was in place prior to the inception of the BR FISA Court Order. Over time, approximately 200 analysts at CIA, FBI, and NCTC had been granted access to this target knowledge base. When the BR program was brought under the jurisdiction of the FISA Court, this practice was not modified to conform with the Order's requirements for the dissemination of BR FISA metadata-derived query results outside of NSA. A notice was filed with the FISC on this matter on 16 June 2009.
+
+**(U) Remedial Steps**
+
+**(TS//SI//NF)** While NSA disabled the hyperlink button used by the external analysts to access this target knowledge database in the Summer 2008 timeframe, NSA learned that the external analysts could have still accessed the data if they retained the URL address.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+16
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+Upon identifying this as an area of concern on 11 June 2009, NSA began terminating external customer account access to the target knowledge database, completing the action by 12 June 2009. NSA is continuing to investigate this matter; audits are now underway to determine the extent to which the query results may have been accessed. Once completed, NSA will provide a full explanation of this practice.
+
+**9. (TS//SI//NF) Dissemination of BR FISA Information**
+
+**(U) Description**
+
+**(TS//SI//NF)** When an NSA analyst determines that information identifying a U.S. person is critical to include in a metadata report, he or she is required to obtain dissemination authorization from the designated NSA approving office in accordance with the Court's Order. Specifically, the order requires that prior to disseminating any U.S. person information outside of the NSA, the Chief of Information Sharing Services must determine that the information is related to counterterrorism information and is necessary to understand the information or to assess its importance. In fact, the Chief of Information Sharing Services, when unavailable, has in the past delegated this authority, typically to the Deputy Chief. Additionally, after hours or in an emergency situation, this authority has also been delegated to NSA's Senior Operations Officer (SOO) in its National Security Operations Center (NSOC).
+
+**(TS//SI//NF)** The practice of sharing BR FISA metadata analytic results also applied to [REDACTED] process which was established to facilitate sharing of sensitive metadata among NSA's [REDACTED] Queries, called Requests for Information (RFIs), submitted to the [REDACTED] were disseminated to all the partners for response. Only those RFIs that the [REDACTED] determined were answerable by NSA were forwarded to the HSAC. HSAC queries in response to the RFIs were only performed against valid RAS-approved selectors. The [REDACTED] standard operating procedure was to minimize HSAC's results and then merge them with the results of [REDACTED] with any sourcing information sanitized. Of the 12 RFIs sent to HSAC from the [REDACTED] etween 2007 and 2008, HSAC affirmatively responded to only four. The [REDACTED] in turn, provided the results of one of these RFIs, in a sanitized format, back to the [REDACTED] requestor. While the query results were sanitized to remove information regarding the collection source, it was recently discovered that two U.S. telephony identifiers derived from BR FISA metadata analysis results were inadvertently shared, without being minimized by NSA, with the [REDACTED] As it was not [REDACTED] practice to disseminate unminimized U.S. person information, obtaining dissemination authorization from the designated NSA approving office was not part of their process.
+
+**(U) Remedial Steps**
+
+16. (U//FOUO) The RFI response is not a subset of the 277 reports discussed earlier in Section II.A.4. [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+17
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+**(TS//SI//NF)** NSA is currently conducting a review of any BR FISA metadata-derived reports that contained U.S. person identifying information to determine consistency with the Court's Order. Once this is completed, the results will be provided.
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+**III. (U//FOUO) NSA's End-to-end BR FISA Review**
+
+**A. (U) Scope**
+
+**(TS//SI//NF)** NSA established a team of experts to conduct a thorough end-to-end systems engineering and process review of the BR FISA metadata workflow. The team reviewed 93 requirements extracted from the March 2009 BR FISA Court Order, Application and Declaration; dataflow diagrams; and system documentation (to include systems engineering and security plans) to ensure a complete understanding of how the requirements were being met prior to 2 March 2009, how well they are currently being met, and what changes may be needed to ensure compliance. The team then used these requirements as a basis to examine six key aspects (systems architecture, analyst workflow, management control, compliance auditing, oversight, and training) of NSA's handling of BR FISA metadata, and to establish a comprehensive plan to ensure that all requirements are addressed and properly implemented.
+
+**(TS//SI//NF)** Another critical step in preparing to conduct the end-to-end review was to identify and map how all the system components fit together. Lack of such end-to-end awareness contributed to the problems initially reported to the FISC.17 The systems/processes reviewed were:
+
+1. [REDACTED]
+2. [REDACTED], NSA's corporate file transfer/distribution system
+3. [REDACTED], NSA's corporate contact chaining system
+4. [REDACTED] repository for individual BR FISA metadata one-hop chains
+5. the Telephony Activity Detection (Alerting) Process
+6. the Reasonable Articulable Suspicion (RAS) Approval Process
+7. the BR FISA Analytic Tools and Processes
+8. the BR FISA Analyst Decision and Reporting Process.
+
+17. (U//FOUO) See Declaration of the Director of the National Security Agency (DIRNSA) dated 13 February 2009.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+18
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+**(TS//SI//NF)** The interaction of these systems and processes can be summarized as follows (see Figures 1 and 2): [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Both of these databases are accessible to BR FISA-authorized intelligence analysts. These analysts also use the following processes: the _Activity Detection (Alerting) Process_, the _RAS Approval Process_, the _BR FISA Analytic Tools/Processes_, and the _BR FISA Analyst Decision/Reporting Process_ to identify, query, analyze and ultimately disseminate information derived from the metadata. These eight components, part of a large and complex system, are further described in Section III.C. and pictured in Figures 1-10. Figure 1 provides a top-level view of the overall architectural system, Figure 2 highlights the eight components, while Figures 3-10 highlight each of the individual components in greater detail. Each component is reflected with corresponding colors in the diagrams.
+
+**(TS//SI//NF)** In concert with this systems engineering end-to-end review, NSA conducted a thorough review of its analytic processes, management controls, auditing mechanisms, oversight and training for the BR FISA metadata handling. This included a thorough examination of each activity, tool and analytic process to assure that it operated in compliance with the Court Order. The review led to several additional audits to ensure that no compliance incidents had occurred and to examine whether or not the individuals who worked with the BR FISA metadata fully understood the applicable authority and limitations. Documentation and training were also updated. Each part of the review compared the component or process being reviewed with the relevant requirement from the list extracted from the Court documents.
+
+**(TS//SI//NF)** NSA's systems engineering and workflow reviews surveyed the processes and tools as they existed before any remedies were implemented. This retrospective evaluation enabled NSA to develop the near-term corrective measures necessary for current Court-approved operations and potential resumption of regular access to the BR FISA metadata should it be authorized by the Court. It also informed plans for incorporating the BR FISA flow into the NSA future architecture more effectively.
+
+**B. (U) Methodology**
+
+**(TS//SI//NF)** NSA employed a repeatable and well-documented process in conducting its end-to-end review. NSA derived technical requirements from the legal requirements governing BR FISA metadata handling. As noted, NSA simultaneously began to develop an end-to-end systems engineering diagram of the systems and databases that support BR processing and storage. NSA also developed and conducted Initial Privacy Assessments (IPAs) which include a standard set of questions used to determine, among other things, whether the system or process under review interacts with data that could contain information about U.S. persons. The outcome of the IPA determines whether a more in-
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+19
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+depth Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA)18 is required to fully explore the extent of interaction and whether any privacy compliance concerns exist. An IPA was conducted for any system or process identified as potentially part of the BR FISA metadata end-to-end data flow. For those systems confirmed to be in contact with BR FISA metadata via the IPA, a PIA was performed. The results of the IPAs and PIAs were then compared against the Court-derived requirements to determine the level to which each requirement was satisfied. For any system or process for which there was concern, NSA is developing well-documented, fully-tested corrective solutions should the Court decide to allow NSA to resume its regular access.
+
+**C. (U) Results:**
+
+**1. (U//FOUO)** [REDACTED]
+
+**(TS//SI//NF)** [REDACTED] receives BR FISA metadata from [REDACTED] in bulk. Upon receipt, [REDACTED] sorts and labels the data according to data source and type, and determines the necessary routing path that is to be used for the different data types. [REDACTED] does not derive, process or create new data from this data set.
+
+**(TS//SI//NF)** Except for the provider issue identified in Section II.B.6, NSA identified no other significant issues in [REDACTED] receipt or handling of the BR FISA metadata. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+**2. (U//FOUO)** [REDACTED]
+
+**(TS//SI//NF)** [REDACTED] NSA's corporate file forwarding service, provides for distribution of the BR FISA metadata from the collection source to the analytic repositories. It accepts files from sources and transports those files to the end destinations identified in the filename given to the file by the source system.
+
+18. (C//REL TO USA, FVEY) The IPA/PIA framework provided a way for the Agency to assess compliance risk. This framework was not used to supersede any Court-derived requirements. Both the IPA and PIA templates were based on Department of Defense (DoD), DoI or Homeland Security Privacy Assessment frameworks and then adjusted for the SIGINT environment. While IPAs and PIAs are not required for the Intelligence Community, they provided a sound methodology for the systems engineering end-to-end review.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+20
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED] is configured to allow dataflows and system accesses by
+technical personnel to be monitored and logged. The [REDACTED] system has security
+controls that are documented across multiple SSPs. [REDACTED] employs security
+access controls, such as PKI, to verify users and their system level access and likewise
+employs file transfer controls to verify file transfer access, file source and file
+destination. The [REDACTED] system also employs a stringent configuration
+management methodology such that software changes cannot be implemented without the
+required testing and approval.
+
+3. (U/FOUO)
+
+(TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED] NSA's corporate contact chaining system, accepts metadata
+from multiple sources. It accepts the BR FISA metadata files from [REDACTED] stores
+the raw metadata in a separate realm, performs data quality, preparation and sorting
+functions; and then summarizes contacts represented in the processed data. [REDACTED] stores the resulting contact chains and provides analysts with access to these contact
+chains.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The [REDACTED] portion of the end-to-end review demonstrated that the
+system is now providing the necessary protection of the BR FISA metadata while it is in
+the [REDACTED] domain given the added protection provided by the implementation of
+the EAR and the removal of the system level certificates. [REDACTED] has always
+employed other access controls, system security and configuration management practices
+for ensuring appropriate protection of the BR FISA metadata residing in its database and
+accessed by authorized analysts. They include, but are not limited to, a fully certified and
+accredited system under a System Security Plan and effective use of corporate
+authentication and authorization service.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) As stated earlier, NSA installed the EAR on 20 February 2009 in response
+to a compliance issue previously reported to the Court.21 Prior to the EAR, NSA was
+relying on analytic due diligence to query [REDACTED] with only RAS-approved
+selectors. The EAR, via internal software system controls, now ensures that manual
+contact chaining is restricted to only those seeds that have been RAS-approved by the
+Court by preventing a non-RAS-approved selector from being used as a seed for
+conducting call chaining [REDACTED] of the BR FISA metadata in the [REDACTED]
+repository. In addition, NSA removed the system level certificate that had been used by
+automated tools to access the BR FISA metadata. In so doing, NSA disabled all
+automated querying of the BR FISA metadata. Access to the BR FISA metadata chaining
+information in [REDACTED] is strictly controlled via individual user access
+authentication/permission and this access is logged in accordance with the current BR
+FISA Court Order.
+
+21 (UFOUO) See DIRNSA Supplemental Declaration dated 25 February 2009.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+21
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The implementation of the EAR had an unintentional adverse impact on the
+technical support mission of NSA's BR FISA-authorized data integrity analysts. Prior to
+the addition of the EAR, these analysts frequently queried [REDACTED] Contact
+Chaining Database for the limited purpose of verifying their parsing rules (a method for
+separating data into standardized data fields). Analysts composed these rules for
+[REDACTED] BR FISA metadata to determine whether the system output represented
+accurate connections between communicants. In so doing, the data integrity analysts
+queried [REDACTED] using both RAS and non-RAS-approved selectors, as they were
+authorized to do. This type of querying is especially important when a new data format is
+received from one of the providers. Once the EAR was put in place, these analysts could
+only query the database using a RAS-approved selector. This diminishes their ability to
+test and evaluate their parsing rules. NSA is finalizing testing of a technical solution to
+create an EAR-bypass capability solely for the data integrity team. The existing impaired
+ability of the data integrity analysts is assessed as a system performance vulnerability, as
+it could result in improperly formatted data.
+
+(TS/SI//NF) While the EAR restricts the ability to query the [REDACTED] Contact
+Chaining Database to only RAS-approved seeds, there is no similar technical restriction
+to prevent a BR FISA-authorized analyst from chaining beyond the Court-mandated three
+hops from a RAS-approved selector. NSA is finalizing testing of a software modification
+to provide this contact-chaining hop restriction. In the meantime, training and
+management oversight ensure that contact chaining is executed in accordance with the
+Court Order.
+
+(TS//SI/NF) The end-to-end review also identified the fact tha [REDACTED] incorporated
+a defeat list including BR FISA-derived selectors to manage data ingest volumes more
+effectively. The inclusion of BR FISA-derived selectors on this list is described more
+fully in Section II.B.2.
+
+4. (U/FOUO)
+
+(TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED] is used by authorized BR FISA
+analysts to view detailed data about specific calling events. As the [REDACTED] Contact
+Chaining Database only contains summaries of one-hop chains (i.e., selector 1 was in
+contact with selector 2 - N times within a specific timeframe), [REDACTED][REDACTED][REDACTED][REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The end-to-end review revealed an area of concern resulting from the fact
+that queries within the [REDACTED] had not been audited, as
+described in Section II.B.1. As previously noted, subsequent audits showed no indication
+of unauthorized access to the [REDACTED] metadata or of any improper querying of the [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+22
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The review also identified other system weaknesses. First, insufficient
+documentation and configuration management (the ability to track versions) exist to
+ensure that no unauthorized or unintended changes can be made that would make the
+system non-compliant. Second, although it is attached to the [REDACTED] network, the
+[REDACTED] is not afforded the additional protection of [REDACTED] although access to the database is strictly controlled. Third, the [REDACTED] is not protected by the EAR, thus there are no
+technical measures in place to prevent a BR FISA-approved analyst from querying the
+metadata using a non-RAS-approved selector or one that is not within two hops of a
+RAS-approved selector. To prevent improper manual queries of metadata [REDACTED]
+using non-Court-approved selectors, NSA has provided
+enhanced training to authorized analysts and is conducting regular audits of queries.
+Additionally, analysts using [REDACTED] see a pop-up
+window reminding them to use only RAS-approved selectors for queries and limit their
+chaining to the Court-approved number of hops.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) NSA is preparing to incorporate the [REDACTED] into the NSA corporate architecture. This transition to the corporate engineering
+framework will maximize use of the latest technologies and proven configuration
+management to minimize any security and compliance risks. In the interim, NSA is
+addressing these vulnerabilities through improved training, competency testing
+and increased management oversight.
+
+5. (U/FOUO) Telephony Activity Detection (Alerting) Process
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The Activity Detection (Alerting) Process identified when a selector on the
+Activity Detection List was in contact with an incoming number in a given day's BR
+metadata when that contact originated or terminated in the U.S. This notification, in turn,
+allowed analysts to prioritize their follow-on analysis. If the RAS standard was met on
+the selector, the system performed automated contact chaining in the BR FISA metadata
+archive to identify and track terrorist operatives and their support networks both in the
+U.S. and abroad. If not, a notification was made to NSA personnel so that they could
+determine whether to attempt to satisfy the RAS standard, which would then allow such
+contact chaining to take place manually.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) As noted in Section II.A.1., the Activity Detection List consisted of
+telephony selectors [REDACTED] that had been RAS evaluated as
+well as selectors that had never been RAS evaluated. The original Activity Detection List
+was built from two sources; one was called the "Address Database," which was a master
+target database of foreign and domestic telephone identifiers that were of current foreign
+intelligence interest to counterterrorism personnel. The second source was [REDACTED]
+which was and continues to be a database NSA uses as a selection management system to
+manage and task identifiers for SIGINT collection. One of the features of [REDACTED] is
+that it is enriched with correlations of telephony identifiers associated with numbers
+tasked to the SIGINT system. This enrichment is enabled by [REDACTED] which is a
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+23
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+database used to store correlations between selectors [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The Telephony Activity Detection Process is not currently operational as
+the result of the compliance issue previously reported to the FISC 22 and as described in
+Section II.A.1 of this report. NSA shut down the Activity Detection Process entirely on
+24 January 2009 as a corrective measure. (Of note, under the prior implementation
+before contact chaining could take place in the complete body of archived metadata and
+before any results of such analysis were disseminated, the alerting selector had to satisfy
+the RAS standard and be approved explicitly as having done so.) This process was
+thoroughly examined in the course of the end-to-end review and consequently a revised
+implementation, as described in Section V.A., has been proposed should the Court
+approve resumption of regular access.
+
+6. (TS/SI//NF) RAS Approval Process
+
+(TS//SI//NE) The RAS Approval Process is the mechanism by which an analyst must be
+able to articulate some fact or set of facts that causes him or her to suspect in light of the
+totality of the circumstances that a particular number is associated with [REDACTED]
+before he or she may use a telephone number or
+electronic identifier as a seed to query the BR FISA metadata.
+
+(TS///SI//NF) The RAS Approval Process in place until 2 March 2009 (the date of the
+FISC Order) incorporated a combination of documented guidance and well-understood
+procedures as outlined in the OGC RAS Memo and the analytic office's RAS Working
+Aid. During the three years that DoJ has reviewed NSA RAS approvals, no spot check
+has revealed a faulty RAS approval decision.
+
+7. (TS//SI//NED BR FISA Analytic Tools and Processes
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The BR FISA Tools were designed to analyze the raw BR FISA metadata as
+well as the output of analytics such as [REDACTED] contact chaining. Analysts used these
+tools against the BR FISA metadata and chaining results to identify possible terrorist
+communications into, from and within the US.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Two instances of concern related to the analytic tools and processes used by
+the BR FISA-authorized intelligence analysts were identified through the end-to-end
+review and are described in Sections II.A.2. and II.B.3. These tools and processes, which
+were designed to function against both the BR FISA metadata and other categories of
+telephony metadata that NSA acquires through SIGINT operations authorized under the
+general provisions of EO 12333, were used primarily by analysts within NSA's Office of
+Counterterrorism to identify possible terrorist connections into, from, and within the U.S.,
+as well as foreign-to-foreign communications. Twelve of the 19 analytic tools examined
+
+22 (U/FOUO) See DIRNSA Declaration dated 13 February 2009
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+24
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED] systems architecture and are well-documented,
+configuration-controlled and audited. The other seven BR FISA analytic tools examined
+were developed in whole or in part by engineers working in the Counterterrorism
+Organization to meet constantly changing mission requirements, resulting in limited
+configuration and change management control. All seven of these tools were either
+monitored through existing O&C audits or were subjected to new audits and/or reviews
+as part of the end-to-end review. With the exception of [REDACTED] and GUI, none of these tools are currently able to access the BR FISA
+metadata.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) To mitigate risk in the future, NSA will transition the BR FISA analytic
+tools and processes to the corporate NSA enterprise architecture and will no longer
+develop tools within the Office of Counterterrorism. Complete end-to-end testing will be
+conducted for all tools against a standard set of BR FISA requirements to ensure they are
+fully compliant prior to resumption of automated operations if authorized by the Court.
+
+8. (U//FOLO) Analyst Decision and Reporting Process
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The Analyst Decision and Reporting Process encompasses the target
+knowledge, guidelines and procedures that enable intelligence analysts to determine what
+information meets customer requirements. It also involves the evaluation and
+minimization procedures intelligence analysts employ when analyzing data and drafting
+and disseminating reports.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Prior to the alert list shutdown on 24 January 2009, the BR FISA analyst
+decision and reporting work flow began when an HSAC analyst was notified of a match
+between a known selector of counterterrorism interest and an identifier in the ingested
+BR FISA metadata, when an analyst received an RFI from a customer, or when an
+analyst was continuing analysis on an existing target set. Aside from the activity
+detection list, the process remains the same today on selectors that are specifically
+approved in accordance with the Court's Orders. If NSA has reason to believe the
+information constitutes valid threat-related activity, NSA applies USSID 18 to minimize
+information concerning U.S. persons and then reports the information to the FBI, CIA,
+NCTC and ODNI, and other customers, as appropriate.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) NSA reviewed its analytic workflow to ensure the BR FISA metadata was
+appropriately handled, analyzed and disseminated. Three new areas of concern, discussed
+in Section II.B, were identified with the BR FISA Analysis Decision and Reporting
+Process in addition to that which was previously described to the Court and discussed in
+Section II.A.
+
+25 (U//FOUO) See Supplemental DIRNSA Declaration dated 25 February 2009, at 8, Section 2
+(Inappropriate analyst querying).
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+25
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(TS/SI//NF) As a by-product of the end-to-end review, NSA has updated the interim analytic BR FISA Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) to ensure compliance with the current Court Orders and is coordinating this document with DoJ as required by the Court. This SOP outlines step-by-step instructions for the authorized intelligence analysts in handling the BR FISA metadata; describes the procedures used to control access to the BR FISA metadata; provides the steps used to conduct weekly audits of the analysts' queries and tools; and details the methodology used to query the BR FISA metadata under newly established Imminent Threat Concept of Operations guidelines. NSA will continue to maintain the SOP and CONOP as "living documents" and update them as needed.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) NSA also continues to maintain and regularly update an 11-step comprehensive checklist that outlines both the Homeland Mission Coordinator and analyst responsibilities in the BR FISA metadata analysis and reporting process. The checklist is comprised of over 30 components that require analysts to answer a variety of questions, including whether the proposed report falls within the scope of BR FISA authorities and express OGC guidelines; whether NSA attempted to get additional information about the selector from the FBI and CIA integrees at NSA; and whether cellular identifiers were checked to determine if the user had roamed into another country. The checklist also reminds analysts to detail the information/intelligence source(s) that prompted the report's production.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In addition, NSA has in place a combination of web pages and on-line aids dedicated to end-product reporting and dissemination guidance. These detailed working aids, together with required USSID 18 training for all BR FISA-approved intelligence analysts, require that any NSA BR FISA-based reporting that contains U.S. person information follow NSA's standard minimization procedures found in USSID 18 and the Court Order.
+
+IV. (U//FOUO) NSA's Minimization and Oversight Procedures
+
+(TS//SI//NF) NSA has well-documented and long-standing minimization procedures for ensuring protection of U.S. persons' information in SIGINT analysis and reporting under all SIGINT authorities, to include the FISA Order. NSA's normal regime of compliance oversight for handling the BR FISA is a comprehensive, multi-pronged approach involving DoJ and NSA's OGC, O&C, Office of the Inspector General and SID. Currently, NSA is required to consult with DoJ on all significant legal opinions involving BR FISA metadata handling. DoJ meets with the appropriate NSA representatives at least once every renewal period to review the program. Prior to the 2 March Court Order that the FISC make all RAS determinations, DoJ also conducted "spot checks" to review a sampling of justifications (RAS determinations) for querying the metadata. NSA, in turn, provides internal oversight to the BR FISA program by a variety of oversight controls and compliance mechanisms to prevent, detect, correct and report incidents and violations of the procedures, to include technical, physical and managerial safeguards such as: examining samples of call-detail records to ensure NSA is receiving only compliant data; ensuring analysts are trained in the querying, dissemination and storage
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+26
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+restrictions for the metadata; monitoring analytic access to the metadata; auditing queries on a weekly basis by O&C; monitoring audit functionality; reviewing the BR FISA raw database repositories; and examining the list of RAS-approved selectors.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In light of the compliance issues that surfaced specific to the handling of the BR FISA metadata, NSA reviewed its minimization procedures as well as its oversight procedures, to include auditing, documentation, and training, to identify areas for potential improvement. All were identified as areas for enhancement to ensure that personnel handling the BR FISA metadata are aware of and compliant with the Court Orders governing its use and dissemination.
+
+A. (U) Minimization
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Every NSA intelligence analyst is required to complete training and pass a test on USSID 18 minimization procedures every two years as a pre-requisite for access to unminimized/unevaluated SIGINT data. Additionally, intelligence analysts must receive an OGC compliance briefing and on-the-job training (OJT) regarding their responsibilities for handling metadata containing U.S. person information prior to being granted access to the BR FISA metadata. They also have on-line access to detailed working aids including required minimization procedures. NSA will continue to emphasize the critical importance of applying USSID 18 and the Court Order requirements as they relate to the handling and dissemination of BR FISA.
+
+B. (U) Oversight
+
+1. (U//FOUO) Oversight Auditing Mechanisms
+
+(TS//SI//NF) NSA assessed requirements for auditing of systems, tools, processes and analyst queries to ensure the proper compliance procedures were in place. A total of 13 audits related to BR FISA metadata access and querying were conducted either as the result of standing requirements or in response to issues identified through the end-to-end review. Descriptions of resultant anomalies are captured in Section II.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) NSA audits samples of queries conducted by BR FISA-authorized intelligence analysts and data integrity analysts in the [REDACTED] on a weekly basis. As a result of a review of its oversight processes, O&C created a dedicated senior intelligence analyst position to enhance auditing of BR FISA metadata queries.
+
+2. (U//FOUO) Oversight Documentation and Procedures
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Oversight documentation and procedures governing BR FISA metadata handling consists of a set of SOPs that have been reviewed and revalidated. They are as follows:
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+27
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+* "Access": This SOP outlines the procedures for gaining and maintaining access to the BR FISA metadata in a way that is compliant with the BR FISA Court Order.
+* "BR FISA Audit Procedures": This document outlines the procedures used to audit BR FISA analyst queries [REDACTED]
+* "Compliance Notification": This document addresses the procedures to be followed when compliance issues are noted.
+* "DoJ and OGC Spot Checks": This SOP addresses the procedures to be followed for the required, regular DoJ and/or OGC spot checks.
+* "Oversight": This document outlines the roles and responsibilities of the DoJ, the NSA Director, the OGC, O&C, the Inspector General, [REDACTED] and those Counterterrorism Organization analysts approved for BR FISA metadata access.
+
+3. (U) Oversight Training
+
+(TS//SI/NF) NSA's Associate Directorate of Education and Training (ADET) had already been working with O&C and OGC to redesign the required training for accessing BR FISA metadata to better enforce appropriate handling of this data and to introduce competency testing as part of the O&C curriculum. The curriculum will be administered on-line to allow students 24/7 access to the course material.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The redesigned BR FISA portion of the training package addresses the knowledge and procedural components of handling BR FISA data, and now requires the analyst to read the most current Court Order and the OGC instructions, and in the future will require them to view an OGC video briefing about the BR FISA program and complete the following six lesson tutorials:
+
+1. "Overview of the Reasonable Articulable Suspicion standard," as covered in OGC instructions
+2. "Summary of the RAS standard," to aid NSA analysts in preparing RAS justifications
+3. "Association with [REDACTED] to identify how associations are established in order to qualify a target for RAS justification
+4. "First Amendment Considerations," to identify limitations and considerations when targeting U.S. persons within BR FISA data
+5. "Sources of information," to identify the supporting information used to justify the RAS determination
+6. "The BR FISC Order," which explains the content of the BR FISA Orders
+
+(TS//SI//NF) A computer-based competency examination will be administered upon completion of this training and remediation will be provided for missed questions. Once an analyst has demonstrated the necessary knowledge by successfully passing the exam, he or she will complete formalized OJT before O&C grants access to the data.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+28
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The OJT component has always been administered by an experienced HMC or senior analyst experienced in conducting OJT. This training specifically addresses how analysts are permitted to use the BR FISA metadata, reinforces the unique privacy concerns and handling requirements of this data, and demonstrates the various tools that can be used to query the BR FISA metadata. In addition, each HMC and authorized intelligence analyst is required to sign a user agreement, documenting that he or she has read and understands the obligations associated with handling the BR metadata.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) NSA has also begun to provide tailored briefings to all technical personnel that have been granted access to the BR FISA metadata. The tailored briefings outline the categories of data obtained under the BR FISA Court Order and the restrictions associated with the technical personnel's duties. For example, the briefings make it clear that the Collection Managers and System Administrators are not authorized to query the BR FISA metadata for foreign intelligence purposes. The briefing also outlines the correct offices to contact if the technical personnel see possible compliance issues in the course of their duties.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) As part of the BR FISA training redesign, complete training records will be maintained by ADET for each individual. The documentation will include the test score, answers to individual test questions, and performance feedback from the OJT component. This documentation will allow for tracking of access to the BR data on an individual basis.
+
+V. (U//FOUO) NSA's Future Architecture
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Using principles of system engineering, configuration management and access control, NSA has considered the future implementation of the BR FISA program including the automated activity detection process to be used should the Court authorize NSA to resume regular access to the BR FISA metadata.
+
+A. (U//FOUO) Future BR FISA Activity Detection (Alerting) Process
+
+(TS//SI//NF) NSA could resume automated activity detection in a fully compliant manner should the Court approve. NSA would maintain an Activity Detection (alert) List containing only RAS-approved selectors. Only the RAS-approved selectors on this "BR Identifier List" would be compared to the BR FISA metadata. With Court approval to resume automated querying, NSA will work with NSD/DoJ to ensure the BR Identifier List will be populated with only those selectors that the Court has authorized. Should the Court grant NSA RAS decision authority, NSA would begin to augment the BR Identifier List with additional identifiers that NSA approves as having satisfied the RAS standard, using the improved processes and training identified in this document.
+
+B. (U) Future of Overarching Architecture
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+29
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In the future, should the Court authorize NSA to resume regular access to the BR FISA metadata, NSA will migrate the dataflow and life cycle management of the BR FISA metadata to its next generation system architecture which offers more effective and efficient management and control. This architecture is designed to be flexible enough to adapt to changes in the legal and oversight requirements, while conforming to applicable governing authorizations such as EO 12333 and BR FISA.
+
+(U//FOUO) In the future architecture, the end-to-end BR FISA dataflow will be referred to as a system "thread." As such, NSA would manage the entire capability via a "Thread Engineering Team" to guide the requirements development, systems integration, use-case development, testing/validation and planning for current and future enhancements. Thread engineers would meet with representatives from the OGC and O&C to define and validate requirements prior to development. System-wide configuration management would be implemented to log the expected software builds and patches. Such practices exist now, but there is no thread focused on the Business Records process.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The proposed systems supporting BR FISA dataflow and life cycle within the next generation architecture encompass both technical- and personnel-based strategies to ensure that data is accessed, retained and purged in full compliance with authorities granted to NSA by the FISC. Moreover, the implementation of centralized processes and databases will ensure that all aspects of the dataflow will continue to be tracked and audited to further ensure that any non-compliance issues can be promptly identified and addressed. Plans for addressing key requirements for BR FISA metadata are as follows:
+
+1. (U//FOUO) Security / Access Control
+
+(TS//SI//NF) A new access control application will be applied to all databases and systems supporting the BR FISA workflow. This application will validate the credentials of users to govern what systems they are approved to access, and validate that their required training is current. PKI, which offers security measures for identification and authentication, as well as for access control, and audit capability will be used to manage users with access to the raw data or query results.
+
+2. (U//FOUO) Data Standardization
+
+(TS//SI//NF) A data standardization platform will date-stamp the incoming BR metadata and ensure its consistent and accurate structure. This will allow quick and accurate date-based purging once the Court-ordered time frame has been reached.
+
+3. (U//FOUO) Databasing RAS Selectors
+
+(TS//SI//NF) An updated and improved centralized target knowledge database for storing telephony and email selectors has been under development since October 2008. This database will enable more efficient storage and retrieval of key information about each BR FISA telephony identifier such as its RAS status and the justification and OGC
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+30
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+approval as appropriate, for those that have been RAS-approved. These features are scheduled for completion during the fourth quarter of FY09.
+
+4. (TS/SI) Analytical Processing and Call Chaining
+
+(TS/SI//NE) An enhanced call chaining function and data processing capability will support large volumes of automated algorithms, handle growing ingest rates and deliver faster query responses. Additionally, the metadata will be stored using security tags, a measure which can be used to restrict the visibility of individual entries in the database to personnel with the appropriate access credentials.
+
+5. (U/FOUO) Auditing and Monitoring
+
+(UFOUO) Enhanced auditing will provide a means to track a data user's activity patterns, the state of a user's operations, and the frequency and composition of queries. A formal metrics and monitoring system will also be used to monitor the status of the end-to-end processing and will alert management and operations personnel when processing anomalies are detected.
+
+VI. (U) Conclusion
+
+(TS//SF/NF) As discussed above, NSA has thoroughly reviewed the technological systems, analytic workflows and processes associated with its implementation of the BR FISA Court Order, and has introduced corrective measures to address specific concerns and vulnerabilities. These new measures will ensure a balanced focus on technological solutions and management controls. The end-to-end review also revealed areas for improvement which have been documented and will continue to be addressed. Where changes were made impacting current manual operations, a combination of system evaluations, demonstrations and audits provided confidence that the technical fixes are actually configured and operating as intended.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The remedial actions described in this report are subject to ongoing improvement and will support strict adherence to the Court Order. Although no corrective measure is infallible, NSA has taken significant steps designed to eliminate the possibility of any future compliance issues and to ensure that the mechanisms are in place to detect and respond quickly if one were to occur.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+31
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+Figure 1: Overall BR FISA Process
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+Business Record FISA (BRF) PROCESS
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+Figure 2: Components of BR FISA Process addressed in End-to-End Review
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+33
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+Figure 3: Component of BR FISA Process addressed in End-to-End Review
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+34
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+Figure 4: Component of BR FISA Process addressed in End-to-End Review
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+35
+[REDACTED]
+
+Figure 5: Component of BR FISA Process addressed in End-to-End Review
+
+[REDACTED]
+36
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+Figure 6: Component of BR FISA Process addressed in End-to-End Review
+
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+37
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+Figure 7: Component of BR FISA Process addressed in End-to-End Review
+"Telephony Activity Detection Process"
+
+STATION Table
+- RAS Approved Addresses
+ - All selectors set to Non-RAS: Approved
+ - Foreign & Domestic
+ - Met RAS
+- All terrorist related addresses liation may not be Known
+
+RAS Evaluation
+- HMC - 20 max
+- Yes - add to Approved Address
+- No - add to STATION Table
+
+Selector Exist as RAS Decision?
+- No. Selector TAG NOT RAS Approved
+- Yes, Selector TAG RAS Approved
+
+Analysis to Develop Alert RAS
+- Query Result
+
+Automated Chaining Analysis Tool (ACAT)
+- BRF broken by removal of System Level Certificates
+
+Selector which Met Reporting Criteria
+
+Selective Zip Codes Assigned by Technical Director
+
+BR FISA Analyst Decision & Reporting Process
+
+Chain Databases
+
+HSAC Special Alert Process
+- List
+- List Comparison & Extraction
+
+SIGINT
+
+BRF FISA-B
+
+Send to HMC Queue?
+- No leads to:
+ - Non-RAS BRF Alert
+ - Non-RAS SIGINT Alert
+- Also connected to:
+ - RAS BRF Alert
+ - RAS SIGINT Alert
+
+Disabled (associated with alert boxes)
+
+Alerts
+- Domestic
+- Foreign
+- STOP
+
+Reviewing Reports
+
+Telephony Activity Detection Process
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+38
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+Figure 8: Component of BR FISA Process addressed in End-to-End Review "RAS Approval Process"
+
+**Inputs/Sources:**
+* Published Reports
+* Full Field investigation Summaries
+* Information Used in Approved FISAs
+* SIGINT Development Work based on metadata and content collection
+* Forensic Analysis of seized data
+* Facts reliably in Public Record
+* (Unlabeled box, possibly for documentation)
+
+---
+
+**RAS Approval Process Flow:**
+
+1. **Weekly Updates** (Circle)
+ * Connects to FISA Process Future Process
+
+2. **FISA Process Future Process** (Rectangle)
+ * Connects to FISA RAS Approval
+ * **FISA RAS Approval** (Decision - Diamond)
+ * *in court order Future Process*
+ * Path "Yes": Add to Approved Address
+ * Path "No": No - add to STATION Table
+
+3. **Reviewing Reports** (Rectangle)
+ * Connects to RAS Evaluation
+
+4. **RFI Customers** (Rectangle)
+ * Connects to US Address 1st Amendment Approval (step)
+ * **US Address 1st Amendment Approval** (Step - Rectangle on left)
+ * Connects to RAS Evaluation and US Address 1st Amendment Approval (decision)
+
+5. **US Address 1st Amendment Approval** (Decision - Diamond)
+ * Path "Yes": Mark as RAS Approved
+ * Path "No": Mark as NOTRAS Approved
+
+6. **RAS Evaluation** (Decision - Diamond)
+ * Path "Yes": Add to Approved Address (which then flows into US Address 1st Amendment Approval decision point)
+ * Path "No": Add to Non-RAS Approved STATION Table
+
+7. **Corporate Storage Services** (Data Store - Cylinder)
+ * Receives data from RAS Evaluation (Yes path) and US Address 1st Amendment Approval (Yes path)
+
+8. **Automated Chaining Analysis Tools (ACATS)** (Process - Rectangle)
+ * Receives data from Corporate Storage Services
+
+9. **GUI** (Interface - Rectangle)
+ * Displays:
+ * Chain - DNI &
+ * Transact - DNI &
+ * Receives data from Corporate Storage Services
+
+10. **STATION Table** (Data Store - Container)
+ * Contents:
+ * RAS Non-Approved
+ * RAS Approved Addresses
+ * All selectors not to Non-RAS Approved
+ * (Foreign & Domestic)
+ * Met RAS
+ * Receives data from FISA RAS Approval (No path) and RAS Evaluation (No path)
+
+11. **Text related to STATION Table:** All terrorist related addresses [REDACTED] may not be known
+
+12. **IDENT DB** (Data Store - Cylinder)
+ * Receives:
+ * dump of Entire Station Table to IDENT DB
+ * dump of Entire Station Table to IDENT DB, so all queries were matched against the "latest" list of approved selectors
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN//20320108
+39
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+Figure 9: Component of BR FISA Process addressed in End-to-End Review
+"BR FISA Analytic Tools and Processes"
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+40
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+Figure 10: Component of BR FISA Process addressed in End-to-End Review
+"BR FISA Analyst Decision and Reporting Process"
+
+**BR FISA Analyst Decision & Reporting Process**
+
+**1. Telephony Activity Detection (Alerting) Process**
+ -> Analyst Decision to Draft Report
+
+**2. RFI & Target Knowledge Portal**
+ * **Portal**
+ * Reports
+ * Other Finished Intel
+ -> Queries / Responses (NSA Personnel)
+ * **Addresses DB**
+ * RFI's (Unminimized)
+ * Telephony Target Knowledge Forms
+ -> Queries / Responses (FBI, CIA, NCTC Personnel)
+
+ * **Queries / Responses (NSA Personnel)** -> Analyst Decision to Draft Report
+ * **Queries / Responses (FBI, CIA, NCTC Personnel)** -> Analyst Decision to Draft Report
+
+**3. Main Process Flow**
+
+* **Analyst Decision to Draft Report**
+ * **If Yes:**
+ -> Report Process (Analytic Checklist Used)
+ -> QC & Edits Request for one-time dissem. of US IDENT
+ -> Dissemination Approved
+ * **If No:**
+ -> STOP
+
+* **Dissemination Approved**
+ * **If Yes:**
+ -> Coordinate, Edit & Release
+ -> Report to FBI / CIA / ODNI / NCTC
+ * **If No:**
+ -> (Loops back to QC & Edits Request for one-time dissem. of US IDENT)
+
+* **Report to FBI / CIA / ODNI / NCTC** -> System GUI
+
+**4. Data Systems**
+
+* (Unlabeled System - oval) -> System (box)
+* **System (box)** -> BR FISA Transaction Database
+* **BR FISA Transaction Database** -> System (box)
+* **System (box)** -> GUI
+* **Report to FBI / CIA / ODNI / NCTC** -> (connects to general system flow towards GUI)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+41
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+Appendix: Glossary of Terms
+
+| | |
+|---|---|
+| ACAT | See *Automated Chaining and Analysis Tool and GUI* |
+| Activity Detection List | A list of foreign and domestic telephone selectors believed to be associated with terrorist targets. The Activity Detection List is independent of the Station Table. Formerly called the Alert List, this list is now more commonly referred to as the Activity Detection List in order to be more descriptive. |
+| Alert List | See *Activity Detection List* |
+| [REDACTED] | A database used to store correlations between selectors [REDACTED] It is one of the databases accessed by the [REDACTED] database. |
+| Automated Chaining and Analysis Tool and GUI (ACAT) | ACAT provides automated chaining requests to [REDACTED] based on the occurrence of alerts [REDACTED] ad hoc query requests from BR FISA-authorized analysts [REDACTED] |
+| Components | The core systems and processes identified as part of the BR FISA metadata workflow against which IPAs and PIAs were conducted. |
+| Configuration Management | The process of tracking, controlling and documenting changes in software applications, including revision control and establishing baselines. |
+| [REDACTED] | A database containing list of identifiers which, based on an analytic judgment, should not be tasked by the SIGINT system. |
+| Defeat List | A list of selectors that are deemed of little analytic value for metadata analysis. |
+| EAR | See *Emphatic Access Restriction* |
+| Emphatic Access Restriction (EAR) | A software restrictive measure written into the [REDACTED] middleware on 20 |
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+42
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+| | |
+|---|---|
+| [REDACTED] | February 2009 to prevent a non-RAS approved selector from being used for a chain query of the BR FISA metadata. |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| Initial Privacy Assessment (IPA) | A review of a system or process which includes a standard set of questions used to determine, among other things, whether the system or process under review interacts with data that could contain information about U.S. persons. |
+| IPA | See Initial Privacy Assessment |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | NSA's corporate file transfer/distribution system |
+| [REDACTED] | NSA's corporate contact chaining system. |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| Metadata | "Data about the data"; for example, information about a telephone call, to include the calling and called numbers, time of call, etc. Metadata does not include content. |
+| [REDACTED] | The repository for individual BR FISA metadata call records for access by authorized Homeland Security Analysis Center (HSAC) and data integrity analysts |
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+43
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+| | |
+|---|---|
+| [REDACTED] | to view detailed information about specific telephony calling events. |
+| [REDACTED] | A selection management system used to manage and task selectors, such as telephone numbers, IMEIs, and IMSIs, to many different information collection systems worldwide. |
+| Parsing Rules | A method for separating data into standardized data fields. |
+| PIA | See Privacy Impact Assessment |
+| PKI | See Public Key Infrastructure |
+| Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) | An information assurance service that supports digital signatures and other public-key based security mechanisms, and offers security measures such as identification and authentication, access control and audit capability. |
+| Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) | An in-depth, standardized review of privacy concerns for a particular system or process |
+| Requirements | The terms contained in the governing BR FISA metadata documents that must be satisfied as part the end-to-end workflow. |
+| Sanitize | The process of disguising intelligence to protect sensitive collection sources, methods, capabilities or analytic procedures in order to disseminate to customers at a classification level they can use. |
+| Seed | An initial selector used to generate a chain query. |
+| Selector | An identifier, in BR FISA realm could be an IMEI, IMSI, or MSISDN, as well as a telephone number. |
+| [REDACTED] | This tool is used by HMCs to conduct contact chaining against BR FISA metadata |
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+44
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+| [REDACTED] | and provide the results to the [REDACTED] team. HMCs only used RAS-approved selectors when using this tool. The [REDACTED] team ultimately provided the results to NSA's [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | The primary desktop graphical user interface (GUI) for access to [REDACTED] data and services. |
+| SOP | See Standard Operating Procedure |
+| [REDACTED] | NSA's mission element for access and exploitation o[REDACTED] |
+| SSP | See System Security Plan |
+| Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) | Institutionalized documentation describing official processes and procedures. |
+| Station Table | Historic reference of all telephony selectors that have been assessed for RAS - and their associated RAS determination (RAS Approved or Not RAS Approved) - since the BR FISA Order was first signed on 24 May 2006. |
+| Sub-components | The logical and physical breakdowns of the BR FISA metadata workflow components that performed specific activities and/or functions. |
+| [REDACTED] | An analytic query tool used to seek out additional information on telephony selectors from [REDACTED] and other knowledge bases and reporting repositories. |
+| [REDACTED] | A next generation metadata analysis graphical user interface (GUI) which is the replacement for [REDACTED] |
+| System Security Plan (SSP) | Formal document describing the implemented protection measures for the secure operation of a computer system. |
+| Telephony Activity Detection (Alerting) Process | The process used to notify NSA analysts if there was a contact between a foreign telephone identifier associated with |
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+45
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+| | domestic telephone identifier.
+| [REDACTED] | The query tool which indicates whether a telephony selector is present in NSA data repositories, the total number of unique contacts, total number of calls, and "first heard" and "last heard" information for the selector. |
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+46
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_NSA_Business_Records_FISA_Review_20130909/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_NSA_Business_Records_FISA_Review_20130909/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9e149c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_NSA_Business_Records_FISA_Review_20130909/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+{
+ "title": "Implementation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Authorized Business Records FISA",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "NSA's end-to-end review of it's implementation of the FISC's authorization under Section 215. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2009-06-25",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "ORCON, NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [
+ "TKB"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-09-10",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/june-25-2009-business-records-fisa-nsa-review",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "c8f9eb9a91840b1d5891972788342e530d76c6e9c0585ef0b050ee456f444816",
+ "pages": 46
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Nov_5_2009_Supplemental_Opinion_and_Order/ACLU_-_pub_Nov_5_2009_Supplemental_Opinion_and_Order.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Nov_5_2009_Supplemental_Opinion_and_Order/ACLU_-_pub_Nov_5_2009_Supplemental_Opinion_and_Order.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..900c2ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Nov_5_2009_Supplemental_Opinion_and_Order/ACLU_-_pub_Nov_5_2009_Supplemental_Opinion_and_Order.md
@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, DC
+
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
+BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
+ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
+OF TANGIBLE THINGS F[REDACTED]
+
+Docket Number: BR 09-15
+
+SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION AND ORDER
+
+On October 30, 2009, the Court authorized the acquisition by the National Security
+Agency ("NSA") of the tangible things sought in the government's application in the above-
+captioned docket ("BR metadata"). This supplemental opinion and order reiterates the manner in
+which query results may be shared within the NSA, as informed by the testimony provided by
+government, and elaborates on the reporting requirement imposed in the Court's order of
+October 30.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Sharing of BR Metadata Query Results Within the NSA
+
+The Court's order permits NSA analysts who are authorized to query the BR metadata to
+share the results of authorized queries among themselves and with other NSA personnel,
+"provided that all NSA personnel receiving such query results in any form (except for
+information properly disseminated outside NSA) shall first receive appropriate and adequate
+training and guidance regarding the rules and restrictions governing the use, storage, and
+dissemination of such information." Primary Order at 15, Docket No. BR 09-15 (October 30,
+2009) ("October 30 Order"). The order further provides: "[a]ll persons authorized for access to
+the BR metadata and other NSA personnel who are authorized to receive query results shall
+receive appropriate and adequate training by NSA's [Office of General Counsel] concerning the
+authorization granted by this Order, the limited circumstances in which the BR metadata may be
+accessed, and/or other procedures and restrictions regarding the retrieval, storage, and
+dissemination of the metadata." Id. at 13. The Court's prior order in this matter contained
+identical provisions. Primary Order at 12, 14-15, Docket No. BR 09-13 (September 3, 2009)
+("September 3 Order").
+
+In September, 2009, the Court received oral notification that NSA analysts had, on two
+occasions, shared the results of queries of the BR metadata with NSA analysts involved in the
+[REDACTED] investigation who had not received "appropriate and adequate training and
+guidance" as required under the September 3 Order. Order Regarding Further Compliance
+Incidents at 2-3, Docket No. BR 09-13 (September 25, 2009). On September 25, 2009, the Court
+ordered representatives of the NSA and the National Security Division ("NSD") of the
+
+2
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Department of Justice to appear for a hearing in order to inform the Court more fully of the scope
+and circumstances of the incidents, and to allow the Court to assess whether the Court's order
+should be modified or rescinded and whether other remedial steps should be imposed. Id at 4.
+
+At the hearing, which was conducted on September 28, 2009, the government confirmed
+that NSA analysts authorized to query the BR metadata had sent query results to NSA personnel
+who had not received the training and guidance required by the Court's September 3 Order.
+Transcript at 6-7, Docket No. BR 09-13. Specifically, the government reported that the NSA had
+created an e-mail distribution list (the NSA representative referred to this list as an "alias") for
+the 189 NSA analysts who were working on the "[REDACTED]" threat, only 53 of whom had
+received the required training and guidance. Id. at 6-7, 12-13. On September 17th, an NSA
+analyst authorized to query the BR metadata sent an e-mail to the [REDACTED] alias that
+included a "general analytic summary" of the results of a query of the BR metadata. Id. at 7.
+After a recipient brought the e-mail to the attention of the NSA's Oversight and Compliance
+Office and Office of General Counsel, the Oversight and Compliance Office issued guidance on
+September 21st, "reemphasizing the point, no dissemination of query results in any form." Id. at
+14. The NSA's Counter-terrorism organization sent a similar reminder on the morning of
+September 22nd, however, that afternoon, a second NSA analyst who was authorized to query the
+BR metadata sent a situation report to the [REDACTED] alias that contained information
+derived from a query of the BR metadata. Id. at 15.
+
+The government testified at the hearing that the NSA has taken steps to ensure that any
+sharing of the results of queries of the BR metadata within the NSA is fully consistent with the
+
+3
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Court's orders. First, the NSA has issued guidance interpreting "query results in any form," to
+mean any information of any kind derived from the BR metadata. Id. at 16. Second, NSA aliases
+for sharing information that could include BR metadata query results, will be limited to NSA
+personnel who have received the necessary training and guidance to receive those query results.
+Id. at 21-22. The Court hereby affirms that the NSA may share BR metadata query results in this
+manner consistent with the Court's October 30 Order. The only exception to this practice is
+under circumstances in which the Court has expressly authorized a deviation.¹
+
+Report on Queries Described in Footnote 6 of the Court's October 30 Order
+
+According to the government, one advantage of the BR metadata repository is that it is
+historical in nature, reflecting contact activity from the past that cannot be captured in the present
+or prospectively. Declaration of [REDACTED] at 7, Docket No. BR 09-15. At the
+government's request, the Court's September 3 Order and October 30 Order both acknowledge
+that the government may query the BR metadata for historical purposes, using a telephone
+identifier that is not currently associated with one of the targeted foreign powers, but that was for
+a period of time in the past.²
+
+¹ For example, pursuant to paragraph (3)J of the Court's order, NSA personnel authorized to query the BR metadata
+may use and share the identity of high-volume telephone identifiers and other types of identifiers not associated with
+specific users for purposes of metadata reduction and management, without regard to whether the recipient has
+received the training and guidance required for access to BR metadata query results.
+
+² Both orders contain the following footnote: "The Court understands that from time to time the information
+available to designated approving officials will indicate that a telephone identifier was, but may not presently be, or
+is, but was not formerly, associated with [REDACTED]. In such a circumstance, so long as the designated approving official can
+determine that the reasonable, articulable suspicion standard can be met for a particular period of time with respect
+to the telephone identifier, NSA may query the BR metadata using that telephone identifier. However, analysts
+conducting queries using such telephone identifiers must be made aware of the time period for (continued...)
+
+4
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Nevertheless, the NSA's querying of the BR metadata using telephone identifiers that do
+not currently satisfy the "reasonable articulable suspicion" standard has been a source of concern
+for the Court. Given that telephone providers regularly re-assign telephone identifiers, and in
+light of the fact that the NSA acquires approximately [REDACTED] call detail records per day, the
+vast majority of which are irrelevant to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's ("FBI")
+investigations and concern communications of United States persons in the United States, it
+would appear likely that such a query could produce results that include metadata from United
+States persons not under investigation by the FBI. In order to allay these concerns, the Court's
+September 3 Order mandated that any application to renew or reinstate the authority granted
+therein must include a report describing, among other things, how the NSA has conducted [these
+types of queries] and minimized any information obtained or derived therefrom. September
+3Order at 18.
+
+The government's report submitted as Exhibit B to its Application in Docket Number 09-
+15, stated:
+
+From time to time, NSA may have information indicating that a particular
+identifier was used by an individual associated w[REDACTED] only for a
+particular timeframe. In these circumstances, NSA would seek and grant as
+appropriate, RAS approval, with the understanding that contact chaining would be
+conducted in a manner that covered a limited timeframe that has been identified.
+
+(...continued) which the telephone identifier has been associated with [REDACTED] in order that the analysis and minimization of the
+information retrieved from their queries may be informed by that fact." September 3 Order at 9, n. 5; October 30
+Order at 9, n. 6.
+
+5
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+The report then provided one example of how the NSA had conducted such a query. NSA Report
+to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (BR 09-13) at 15-16.
+
+This report was not sufficiently detailed to allay the Court's concerns, and the Court
+therefore continues to be concerned about the likelihood that these queries could reveal
+communications of United States person users of the telephone identifier who are not the subject
+of FBI investigations. As a result, the Court's October 30 Order contains the same reporting
+requirements as the September 3 Order. October 30 Order at 18-19. However, to assist the
+government in providing a report that satisfies its needs, the Court HEREBY ORDERS that any
+report submitted by the government pursuant to paragraph (3)S of the Court's October 30 Order
+shall include the following information with regard to how the NSA has conducted queries of the
+BR metadata using telephone identifiers determined to satisfy the reasonable articulable
+suspicion standard at some time in the past, but that do not currently meet the standard, and how
+the NSA minimized any information obtained or derived therefrom:
+
+1. The total number of such queries run during the reporting period and what percentage
+those queries constitute of the total number of queries run.
+2. Would the status of a telephone identifier that was approved for querying under these
+circumstances be changed on the Station Table to non-RAS approved once a single query
+using that identifier has been run? If not, does the NSA have an automated process to
+limit queries of that telephone identifier to the specified time frame? If not, how will an
+NSA analyst know that any query of that telephone identifier must be limited to the time
+period for which the reasonable articulable suspicion existed?
+
+6
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+3. Are NSA analysts permitted to conduct more than one query using any telephone
+identifier determined to have met the reasonable articulable suspicion standard under
+circumstances described above, and if so, for what purpose? If query results from the
+first query indicated that the telephone identifier's association with the foreign power
+terminated earlier than the date the NSA believed the identifier no longer met the
+reasonable articulable suspicion, would the timeframe restriction be adjusted for any
+subsequent query?
+4. If this type of query is run, and the NSA analyst who ran the query determines that the
+query results include records of communications that were made after the telephone
+identifier was re-assigned to a United States person who is not associated with the foreign
+power, must the analyst delete or otherwise mask such records prior to sharing the query
+results with NSA analysts authorized to receive query results pursuant to paragraph (3)I
+of the Court's order?
+
+ENTERED this 5th day of November, 2009.
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+7
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Nov_5_2009_Supplemental_Opinion_and_Order/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Nov_5_2009_Supplemental_Opinion_and_Order/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..26b8b0e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Nov_5_2009_Supplemental_Opinion_and_Order/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+{
+ "title": "Supplemental Opinion and Order from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Supplemental Opinion and Order of the FISC reiterating Court ordered restrictions on NSA’s handling of query results of the telephony metadata program, and directing the Government to provide the court with additional information regarding queries of the telephony metadata. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2009-11-05",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Walton, Reggie B."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-09-10",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/november-11-2009-supplemental-opinion-and-order-fisc",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "b8054f92d270884f58bbedf8be9af8689626e9f04721a37fdfc60a52f48a1ae3",
+ "pages": 7
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Sep_3_2009_Cover_letter_to_Chairman_of_the_Intelligence_and_Judiciary_Committees/ACLU_-_pub_Sep_3_2009_Cover_letter_to_Chairman_of_the_Intelligence_and_Judiciary_Committees.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Sep_3_2009_Cover_letter_to_Chairman_of_the_Intelligence_and_Judiciary_Committees/ACLU_-_pub_Sep_3_2009_Cover_letter_to_Chairman_of_the_Intelligence_and_Judiciary_Committees.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bfa1982
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Sep_3_2009_Cover_letter_to_Chairman_of_the_Intelligence_and_Judiciary_Committees/ACLU_-_pub_Sep_3_2009_Cover_letter_to_Chairman_of_the_Intelligence_and_Judiciary_Committees.md
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+U.S. Department of Justice
+Office of Legislative Affairs
+
+Washington, DC
+
+Office of the Assistant Attorney General
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE-
+
+September 3, 2009
+
+The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
+Chairman
+Committee on the Judiciary
+United States Senate
+Washington, D.C. 20510
+
+The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
+Chairman
+Committee on the Judiciary
+U.S. House of Representatives
+Washington, D.C. 20515
+
+The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
+Chairman
+Select Committee on Intelligence
+United States Senate
+Washington, D.C. 2010
+
+The Honorable Silvestre Reyes
+Chairman
+Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
+U.S. House of Representatives
+Washington, D.C. 20515
+
+Dear Madam and Messrs. Chairmen:
+
+To keep your committees fully informed of matters pertaining to your oversight
+responsibilities pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended
+("FISA"), 50 U.S.C. 1801, et. seq., we are submitting herewith several documents for your
+information. The content of these documents were described, in pertinent part, in briefings
+provided to the House and Senate Intelligence and Judiciary Committees in March, April, and
+August 2009. The enclosed documents contain redactions necessary to protect the national
+security of the United States, including the protection of sensitive sources and methods.
+
+The enclosed documents are highly classified. Accordingly, while four copies are being
+provided for review by Members and appropriately-cleared staff from each of the four
+Committees, the copy for the Senate Committee on the Judiciary is being delivered to the Senate
+Select Committee on Intelligence for appropriate storage. The House Committee on the
+Judiciary's documents will be delivered to the House Security Office for appropriate storage.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE
+
+The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
+The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
+The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
+The Honorable Silvestre Reyes
+Page Two
+
+We hope that this information is helpful. Please do not hesitate to contact this office if
+you would like additional assistance regarding this or any other matter.
+
+Sincerely,
+
+Ronald Weich
+Assistant Attorney General
+
+Enclosures
+
+cc:
+The Honorable Jeff Sessions
+Ranking Minority Member
+Senate Committee on the Judiciary
+
+The Honorable Christopher S. Bond
+Vice Chairman
+Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
+
+The Honorable Lamar S. Smith
+Ranking Minority Member
+House Committee on the Judiciary
+
+The Honorable Peter Hoekstra
+Ranking Minority Member
+House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
+
+The Honorable John D. Bates
+Presiding Judge
+United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Sep_3_2009_Cover_letter_to_Chairman_of_the_Intelligence_and_Judiciary_Committees/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Sep_3_2009_Cover_letter_to_Chairman_of_the_Intelligence_and_Judiciary_Committees/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..589d249
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Sep_3_2009_Cover_letter_to_Chairman_of_the_Intelligence_and_Judiciary_Committees/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+{
+ "title": "Cover Letter to Chairman of the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Cover letter submitting several FISC opinions and Government filings relating to the Government’s discovery and remediation of compliance incidents in its handling of bulk telephony metadata. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "DOJ",
+ "date_created": "2009-09-03",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Leahy, Patrick J.",
+ "Conyers, John Jr.",
+ "Feinstein, Dianne",
+ "Reyes, Silvestre",
+ "Weich, Ronald",
+ "Sessions, Jeff",
+ "Bond, Christopher S.",
+ "Smith, Lamar S.",
+ "Hoekstra, Peter",
+ "Bates, John D."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-03-05",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/cover-letter-chairman-intelligence-and-judiciary-committees-0",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "eb5f0648cd9e8812f1b328cdf5f2c676030bf06346c5f41c6272919f40d0fabc",
+ "pages": 2
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Sep_3_2009_Primary_Order_from_FISC/ACLU_-_pub_Sep_3_2009_Primary_Order_from_FISC.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Sep_3_2009_Primary_Order_from_FISC/ACLU_-_pub_Sep_3_2009_Primary_Order_from_FISC.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4b4612c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Sep_3_2009_Primary_Order_from_FISC/ACLU_-_pub_Sep_3_2009_Primary_Order_from_FISC.md
@@ -0,0 +1,475 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
+BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
+ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
+OF TANGIBLE THINGS FROM
+[REDACTED]
+(TS)
+
+Docket Number: BR:
+09-13
+
+PRIMARY ORDER
+A verified application having been made by the Director of
+the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for an order pursuant
+to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the Act),
+Title 50, United States Code (U.S.C.), § 1861, as amended,
+requiring the production to the National Security Agency (NSA)
+of the tangible things described below, and full consideration
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Derived from: Pleadings in the above-captioned docket
+Declassify on: 1 September 2034
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+having been given to the matters set forth therein, the Court
+finds as follows:
+1. There are reasonable grounds to believe that the
+tangible things sought are relevant to authorized investigations
+(other than threat assessments) being conducted by the FBI under
+guidelines approved by the Attorney General under Executive
+Order 12333 to protect against international terrorism, which
+investigations are not being conducted solely upon the basis of
+activities protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution
+of the United States. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)]
+2. The tangible things sought could be obtained with a
+subpoena duces tecum issued by a court of the United States in
+aid of a grand jury investigation or with any other order issued
+by a court of the United States directing the production of
+records or tangible things. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)(D)]
+3. The application includes an enumeration of the
+minimization procedures the government proposes to follow with
+regard to the tangible things sought. Such procedures are
+similar to the minimization procedures approved and adopted as
+binding by the order of this Court in Docket Number BR 09-09 and
+its predecessors. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)]
+Accordingly, the Court finds that the application of the
+United States to obtain the tangible things, as described below,
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+2
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+satisfies the requirements of the Act and, therefore,
+IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to the authority conferred
+on this Court by the Act, that the application is GRANTED, and
+it is
+FURTHER ORDERED, as follows:
+(1)Α. [REDACTED] shall
+produce to NSA upon service of the appropriate secondary order,
+and continue production on an ongoing daily basis thereafter for
+the duration of this order, unless otherwise ordered by the
+Court, an electronic copy of the following tangible things: all
+call detail records or "telephony metadata"¹ created by
+[REDACTED]
+In addition, the Custodian of Records of [REDACTED] shall
+produce to NSA upon service of the appropriate Secondary Order
+an electronic copy of the same tangible things created by [REDACTED]
+for the period from 5:11 p.m. on July 9, 2009, to the date of
+this Order, to the extent those records still exist.
+1 For purposes of this Order "telephony metadata" includes
+comprehensive communications routing information (e.g.,
+originating and terminating telephone number, International
+Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) number, International Mobile
+station Equipment Identity (IMEI) number, etc.), trunk
+identifier, telephone calling card numbers, and time and
+duration of call. Telephony metadata does not include the
+substantive content of any communication, as defined by 18
+U.S.C. § 2510(8), or the name, address, or financial information
+of a subscriber or customer.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+3
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+B. The Custodian of Records of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+shall produce to NSA upon service of the appropriate
+secondary order, and continue production on an ongoing daily
+basis thereafter for the duration of this order, unless
+otherwise ordered by the Court, an electronic copy of the
+following tangible things: all call detail records or
+"telephony metadata" created by [REDACTED] for communications (i)
+between the United States and abroad; or (ii) wholly within the
+United States, including local telephone calls.
+[REDACTED]
+(2) With respect to any information the FBI receives as a
+result of this Order (information that is passed or "tipped" to
+it by NSA), the FBI shall follow as minimization procedures the
+procedures set forth in The Attorney General's Guidelines for
+Domestic FBI Operations (September 29, 2008).
+(3) With respect to the information that NSA receives as a
+result of this Order, NSA shall strictly adhere to the following
+minimization procedures:
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+4
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+A. The government is hereby prohibited from accessing
+business record metadata acquired pursuant to this Court's
+orders in the above-captioned docket and its predecessors ("BR
+metadata") for any purpose except as described herein.
+Notwithstanding the requirements set forth below, Executive
+Branch personnel may be permitted access to the BR metadata and
+information derived therefrom in order to facilitate their
+lawful oversight functions, which include, but are not limited
+to, those set forth below.
+B. The BR metadata may be accessed for the purposes of
+ensuring data integrity and developing and testing any
+technological measures designed to enable the NSA to comply with
+the Court's orders. Access to the BR metadata for such purposes
+shall be limited to the NSA Collection Managers, Data Integrity
+Analysts, and System Administrators described in paragraph 16 of
+the Declaration of [REDACTED] Chief, Special FISA Oversight
+and Processing, Oversight and Compliance, Signals Intelligence
+Directorate, the National Security Agency, filed as Exhibit A to
+the Application in the above-captioned docket [REDACTED]
+Declaration"). Additional individuals directly involved in
+developing and testing technologies to be used with the BR
+metadata may be granted access to the BR metadata, provided such
+access is approved by NSA's Office of General Counsel (OGC) on a
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+5
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+case-by-case basis. Except as provided in paragraph (3)J,
+persons who query the BR metadata pursuant to this paragraph may
+only share the results of any such query with other specially-
+cleared NSA technical personnel. Queries performed by the
+persons described in this paragraph shall not be subject to the
+approval process and standard set forth in paragraph (3) C below.
+To the extent NSA personnel make copies of the BR metadata for
+purposes of ensuring data integrity or developing and testing
+technological measures, such copies shall be destroyed upon the
+completion of their work.
+C. Subject to the restrictions and procedures below,
+the BR metadata may be accessed for purposes of obtaining
+foreign intelligence information through contact chaining
+[REDACTED] ("queries") using telephone
+identifiers, ² as described in the [REDACTED] Declaration at
+paragraphs 8-13.
+(i) Except as provided in subparagraph (ii) below,
+all telephone identifiers to be used for queries shall be
+approved by one of the following designated approving
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+6
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+officials: the Chief, Special FISA Oversight and
+Processing, Oversight and Compliance, Signals Intelligence
+Directorate; the Chief or Deputy Chief, Homeland Security
+Analysis Center; or one of the twenty specially-authorized
+Homeland Mission Coordinators in the Analysis and
+Production Directorate of the Signals Intelligence
+Directorate. Such approval shall be given only after the
+designated approving official has determined that based on
+the factual and practical considerations of everyday life
+on which reasonable and prudent persons act, there are
+facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion
+that the telephone identifier to be queried is associated
+with [REDACTED]
+³ For purposes of this Order, the term [REDACTED] includes the following
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+7
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+provided, however, that NSA'S OGC shall first determine
+that any telephone identifier reasonably believed to be
+used by a United States (U.S.) person is not regarded as
+associated with [REDACTED]
+solely on the basis of activities
+that are protected by the First Amendment to the
+[REDACTED]
+⁴ For purposes of this Order, the term [REDACTED] refers to those
+(namely [REDACTED] organizations involved in international terrorism
+[REDACTED]
+If
+intelligence reveals the existence of other terrorist
+organizations associated with the [REDACTED] the
+Government shall seek the Court's approval before regarding them
+as falling within [REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+8
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Constitution.⁵
+(ii) Telephone identifiers that are currently
+the subject of electronic surveillance authorized by
+the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC)
+based on the FISC's finding of probable cause to
+believe that they are used by agents of [REDACTED]
+including those used by U.S. persons, may be deemed
+approved for querying for the period of FISC-
+authorized electronic surveillance without review and
+approval by a designated approving official. The
+preceding sentence shall not apply to telephone
+identifiers under surveillance pursuant to any
+⁵ The Court understands that from time to time the information
+available to designated approving officials will indicate that a
+telephone identifier was, but may not presently be, or is, but
+was not formerly, associated with [REDACTED]
+In such a circumstance, so long as the
+designated approving official can determine that the reasonable,
+articulable suspicion standard can be met for a particular
+period of time with respect the telephone identifier, NSA may
+query the BR metadata using that telephone identifier. However,
+analysts conducting queries using such telephone identifiers
+must be made aware of the time period for which the telephone
+identifier has been associated with [REDACTED]
+in order that the analysis and
+minimization of the information retrieved from their queries may
+be informed by that fact.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+9
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+certification of the Director of National Intelligence
+and the Attorney General pursuant to Section 702 of
+FISA, as added by the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, or
+pursuant to an Order of the FISC issued under Section
+703 or Section 704 of FISA, as added by the FISA
+Amendments Act of 2008.
+(iii) A determination by a designated approving
+official that a telephone identifier is associated
+with [REDACTED] shall be effective for: one hundred
+eighty days for U.S. telephone identifiers and for any
+identifiers believed to be used by a U.S. person; one
+year for all other telephone identifiers.⁶
+⁶ [REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+10
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+D. The Director of the NSA shall continue to maintain
+mandatory procedures to strictly control access to and use of
+the BR metadata, in accordance with this Court's orders. NSA's
+OGC shall continue to promptly provide NSD with copies of these
+mandatory procedures (and all replacements, supplements or
+revisions thereto in effect now or adopted in the future). The
+Chief, Special FISA Oversight and Processing, Oversight and
+Compliance, Signals Intelligence Directorate; Chief and Deputy
+Chief, Homeland Security Analysis Center; and the Homeland
+Mission Coordinators shall maintain appropriate management
+controls (e.g., records of all tasking decisions, audit and
+review procedures) for access to the metadata.
+E. The NSA shall obtain the BR metadata from [REDACTED]
+via [REDACTED] and shall store and
+process the BR metadata on a secure internal network that NSA
+exclusively will operate.
+F. Any processing by technical personnel of the BR metadata
+acquired pursuant to this order shall be conducted through the
+NSA's secure internal network, which shall be accessible only to
+authorized personnel, using accounts authorized by a user
+authentication service, based on user login and password.
+G. Access to the metadata shall be controlled by user name
+and password. NSA's Oversight and Compliance Office shall
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+11
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+monitor the designation of individuals with access to the BR
+metadata. When the BR metadata is accessed through queries
+under paragraphs (3) B or (3) C above, a software interface shall
+limit access to the BR metadata to authorized personnel, and the
+user's login, Internet Protocol (IP) address, date and time, and
+retrieval request shall be automatically logged for auditing
+capability.⁷ When the BR metadata is accessed through any other
+means under paragraph (3) B above, the user's login, date and
+time shall be automatically logged for auditing capability.
+NSA's Office of Oversight and Compliance shall monitor the
+functioning of this automatic logging capability. All persons
+authorized for access to the BR metadata and other NSA personnel
+who are authorized to receive query results shall receive
+appropriate and adequate briefings by NSA'S OGC concerning the
+authorization granted by this Order, the limited circumstances
+in which the BR metadata may be accessed, and/or other
+procedures and restrictions regarding the retrieval, storage,
+and dissemination of the metadata.
+⁷ In addition, the Court understands from the Declaration of
+Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander, Director of NSA (Ex. A to
+the Report of the United States filed in docket number BR 09-09
+on August 17, 2009) that NSA has made a number of technical
+modifications that will prohibit analysts: a) from inadvertently
+accessing the BR metadata in [REDACTED] b) from querying the BR
+metadata in [REDACTED] with non-RAS-approved identifiers; and c)
+from going beyond three "hops" from an identifier used to query
+the BR metadata in [REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+12
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+H. NSA shall treat information from queries of the BR
+metadata in accordance with USSID 18 and shall apply USSID 18 to
+minimize information concerning U.S. persons obtained from the
+records produced pursuant to the authorities granted herein.
+Additionally, before the NSA disseminates any U.S. person
+identifying information, the Chief of Information Sharing
+Services in the Signals Intelligence Directorate, the Senior
+Operations Officer at NSA's National Security Operations Center,
+the Signals Intelligence Directorate Director, the Deputy
+Director of the NSA, or the Director of the NSA must determine
+that the information identifying the U.S. person is in fact
+related to counterterrorism information and that it is necessary
+to understand the counterterrorism information or assess its
+importance. Notwithstanding the above requirements, NSA may share
+information derived from the BR metadata, including U.S. person
+identifying information, with Executive Branch personnel in
+order to enable them to determine whether the information
+contains exculpatory or impeachment information or is otherwise
+discoverable in legal proceedings. By 5:00p.m. each Friday
+following the authorization requested herein, the government
+shall file a report listing each instance during the seven-day
+period ending the previous Friday in which NSA has shared, in
+any form, information obtained or derived from the BR metadata
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+13
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+with anyone outside NSA. For each such instance, the government
+shall specify the date on which the information was shared, the
+recipient of the information, and the form in which the
+information was communicated (e.g., written report, e-mail, oral
+communication, etc.). For each such instance in which U.S.
+person information has been shared, except those involving
+Executive Branch personnel seeking to identify discoverable
+information, the Chief of Information Sharing Services in the
+Signals Intelligence Directorate shall certify that one of the
+authorized officials identified above determined, prior to
+dissemination, that the information was related to
+counterterrorism information and necessary to understand the
+counterterrorism information or to assess its importance. This
+paragraph's reporting requirement is not intended to apply to
+instances in which BR metadata and information derived therefrom
+is shared with Executive Branch personnel in order to facilitate
+their lawful oversight functions.
+I. Personnel authorized to query the BR metadata in
+paragraph (3) C above may use and share the results of authorized
+queries of the BR metadata among themselves and with NSA
+personnel, including those who are not authorized to access the
+BR metadata pursuant to paragraph (3)C, provided that all NSA
+personnel receiving such query results in any form (except for
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+14
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+information properly disseminated outside NSA) shall first
+receive appropriate and adequate training and guidance regarding
+the rules and restrictions governing the use, storage, and
+dissemination of such information. NSA's Oversight and
+Compliance Office shall monitor the designation of individuals
+who have received the training and guidance necessary to receive
+the results of queries of the BR metadata.
+J. Authorized personnel also may use and share the identity
+of high-volume telephone identifiers and other types of
+identifiers not associated with specific users
+[REDACTED] that they discover or have
+discovered as a result of access authorized under paragraphs
+(3)B and (3) C or as a result of technical personnel access under
+prior docket numbers in this matter, among themselves and with
+other NSA personnel, including those who are not authorized to
+access the BR metadata, for purposes of metadata reduction and
+management. The training requirements set forth in paragraph
+(3) I above for NSA personnel receiving query results shall not
+apply to personnel receiving such identifiers, which may have
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+15
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+been identified through queries, so long as they are received
+solely for purposes of metadata reduction and management.
+K. The BR metadata collected under this Court's Orders may
+be kept online (that is, accessible for queries) for five years
+from the date of acquisition, at which time it shall be
+destroyed.
+L. At least twice before the expiration of the authorities
+granted herein, NSA's OGC shall conduct a random spot check,
+consisting of an examination of a sample of call detail records
+obtained, to ensure that NSA is receiving only data as
+authorized by the Court and not receiving the substantive
+content of communications.
+M. At least twice before the expiration of the authorities
+granted herein, the Department of Justice's National Security
+Division (NSD) will review NSA's access to the BR metadata under
+paragraph (3) C above. Such reviews shall include a sample of
+the justifications designated approving officials relied upon to
+approve telephone identifiers for querying the BR metadata, and
+a review of the queries conducted.
+N. NSA'S OGC shall consult with NSD on all significant
+legal opinions that relate to the interpretation, scope, and/or
+implementation of the authorizations granted by the Court in
+this matter. When operationally practicable, such consultation
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+16
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+shall occur in advance; otherwise, NSD shall be notified as soon
+as practicable.
+O. NSA'S OGC shall promptly provide NSD with copies of all
+formal briefing and/or training materials (including all
+revisions thereto) currently in use or prepared and used in the
+future to brief/train NSA personnel concerning the
+authorizations granted by this Order.
+P. At least once before the expiration of the authorities
+granted herein, a meeting for the purpose of assessing
+compliance with this Court's orders in this matter shall be held
+with representatives from NSA'S OGC, NSD, and appropriate
+individuals from NSA's Signals Intelligence Directorate. The
+results of this meeting shall be reduced to writing and
+submitted to the Court as part of any application to renew or
+reinstate the authorities granted herein.
+Q. At least once before the expiration of the authorities
+granted herein, NSD shall meet with NSA's Office of Inspector
+General (OIG) to discuss their respective oversight
+responsibilities and assess NSA's compliance with the Court's
+orders in this matter.
+R. Prior to implementation, all proposed automated query
+processes shall be reviewed and approved by NSA'S OGC, NSD, and
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+17
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+the Court.⁸
+S. Any application to renew or reinstate the authority
+granted herein shall include a report describing: (i) the
+queries made since the end of the reporting period of the last
+report filed with the Court; (ii) the manner in which NSA
+applied the procedures set forth in paragraph (3) C above; and
+(iii) any proposed changes in the way in which the call detail
+records would be received from the carriers and any significant
+changes to the systems NSA uses to receive, store, process, and
+disseminate BR metadata. In particular, the report shall describe
+how NSA has conducted queries described in footnote 5 of this
+order and minimized any information obtained or derived
+therefrom.
+//
+//
+//
+⁸ The Court understands that NSA may begin testing of certain
+automated processes (or capabilities associated with such
+processes) within the next sixty days.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+18
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+This authorization regarding [REDACTED]
+and unknown persons in the United States
+and abroad affiliated with [REDACTED]
+and unknown persons in the United States
+and abroad affiliated with [REDACTED]
+expires on 30th day of October 2009,
+at 5:00 p.m., Eastern Time.
+
+Signed 09-03-2009 P03:33 Eastern Time
+Date Time
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+19
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Sep_3_2009_Primary_Order_from_FISC/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Sep_3_2009_Primary_Order_from_FISC/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0e676ce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Sep_3_2009_Primary_Order_from_FISC/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+{
+ "title": "Primary Order from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Statement by intelligence officials before Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on FAA reauthorization. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2009-09-03",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Walton, Reggie B."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-09-10",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/primary-order-foreign-intelligence-surveillance-court",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "pdf_sha256": "0f2aa321f9faad5a5318e2b8d7de0018ce088e604b8366fc47cd18cb62d2ad23",
+ "pages": 19
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Sept_25_2009_Order_Regarding_Further_Compliance_Incidents/ACLU_-_pub_Sept_25_2009_Order_Regarding_Further_Compliance_Incidents.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Sept_25_2009_Order_Regarding_Further_Compliance_Incidents/ACLU_-_pub_Sept_25_2009_Order_Regarding_Further_Compliance_Incidents.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a10006c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Sept_25_2009_Order_Regarding_Further_Compliance_Incidents/ACLU_-_pub_Sept_25_2009_Order_Regarding_Further_Compliance_Incidents.md
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D. D.C.
+
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
+BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
+ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
+OF TANGIBLE THINGS FROM
+[REDACTED]
+
+Docket Number: BR 09-13
+
+ORDER REGARDING FURTHER COMPLIANCE INCIDENTS
+
+On September 3, 2009, the Court authorized the acquisition by the National
+Security Agency ("NSA") of the tangible things sought in the government's application
+in the above-captioned docket ("BR metadata"). Like prior orders in this matter, the
+Court's September 3 Order adopted strict procedures to control the NSA's access to, use
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+and dissemination of the BR metadata. Among other things, the Court ordered the
+following:
+
+The Director of the NSA shall continue to maintain mandatory procedures
+to strictly control access to and use of the BR metadata, in accordance with
+this Court's orders. NSA's [Office of General Counsel] shall continue to
+promptly provide NSD with copies of these mandatory procedures (and
+all replacements, supplements or revisions thereto in effect now or
+adopted in the future). The Chief, Special FISA Oversight and Processing,
+Oversight and Compliance, Signals Intelligence Directorate; Chief and
+Deputy Chief, Homeland Security Analysis Center; and the Homeland
+Mission Coordinators shall maintain appropriate management controls
+(e.g., records of all tasking decisions, audit and review procedures) for
+access to the metadata.
+
+9/3/09 Order at 11. The Court further ordered that:
+
+All persons authorized for access to the BR metadata and other NSA
+personnel who are authorized to receive query results shall receive
+appropriate and adequate briefings by NSA's [Office of General Counsel]
+concerning the authorization granted by this Order, the limited
+circumstances in which the BR metadata may be accessed, and/or other
+procedures and restrictions regarding the retrieval, storage, and
+dissemination of the metadata.
+
+Id. at 12. These provisions of the Court's order adopted requirements that the
+government proposed in its application as minimization procedures. Docket BR 09-13,
+Application at 21, 25.
+
+On September 21, 2009, at approximately 5:10 p.m., an attorney with the National
+Security Division of the Department of Justice ("NSD") orally informed a member of the
+Court staff of a likely violation by the NSA of the foregoing provisions of the Court's
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Page 2
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+September 3, 2009 Order. The NSD attorney advised that an NSA analyst properly in
+possession of the results of a query of the BR metadata had forwarded such results by
+email to other NSA analysts involved in the [REDACTED]" investigation.
+
+According to the NSD attorney, at least some of those other analysts had not received
+"appropriate and adequate briefings by NSA's OGC" concerning the strict controls
+imposed by the Court on NSA's access to, use and dissemination of the BR metadata.
+The NSD attorney further advised that it did not appear that the query results in
+question had been shared outside NSA.
+
+On September 23, 2009, at approximately 3:35 p.m., the same NSD attorney orally
+informed a member of the Court staff of another similar incident in which query results
+were shared by email with NSA employees who had not been trained on the handling
+of BR metadata in accordance with the Court's Order. The ensuing discussion between
+the NSD attorney and the Court staff suggested that NSA may have created a
+[REDACTED] distribution list comprised of the email addresses of some 189 NSA
+analysts, only 53 of whom have been so trained. The NSD attorney explained that he
+was not then in a position to assure the Court that the distribution list would be altered
+to include only properly trained NSA analysts.
+
+The NSD attorney advised that NSD and NSA were investigating the foregoing
+incidents and expected to be in a position to submit a preliminary written notice to the
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Page 3
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Court in short order. As of the entry of this Order, the Court has not yet received such a
+notice.
+
+The Court is deeply troubled by the incidents described above, which have
+occurred only a few weeks following the completion of an "end to end review" by the
+government of NSA's procedures and processes for handling the BR metadata, and its
+submission of a report intended to assure the Court that NSA had addressed and
+corrected the issues giving rise to the history of serious and widespread compliance
+problems in this matter and had taken the necessary steps to ensure compliance with
+the Court's orders going forward. Accordingly, the Court
+
+HEREBY ORDERS that representatives of the NSA and NSD appear for a hearing
+on Monday, September 28, 2009, at 3:30 p.m., the purpose of which will be to inform the
+Court more fully of the scope and circumstances of the incidents discussed above, and
+to allow the Court assess whether the Orders issued in this docket should be modified
+or rescinded and whether other remedial steps should be imposed. The Court expects
+that the representatives of the NSA and NSD who appear at the hearing will include
+persons with detailed knowledge of the facts and circumstances surrounding the above-
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+Page 4
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+described incidents and why remedial measures had not been implemented to ensure
+compliance with the Court's Orders that have been issued in this docket, as well as
+officials of stature sufficient to speak authoritatively on behalf of the Executive Branch.
+
+IT IS SO ORDERED, this 25th day of September 2009.
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Page 5
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Sept_25_2009_Order_Regarding_Further_Compliance_Incidents/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Sept_25_2009_Order_Regarding_Further_Compliance_Incidents/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eb50380
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_pub_Sept_25_2009_Order_Regarding_Further_Compliance_Incidents/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+{
+ "title": "Order Regarding Further Compliance Incidents from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "In response to the Government’s identification and notice to the FISC regarding improper dissemination of information related to an ongoing threat, the FISC ordered a hearing to inform the FISC of the scope and circumstances of the compliance incident. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2009-09-25",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Walton, Reggie B."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-09-10",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/september-25-2009-order-regarding-further-compliance-incidents-fisc",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "bd3bebbaf1ba59f6629325ea89044eaec9e04df023065f32e6e67c942d98f168",
+ "pages": 5
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_september_2012_fisc_opinion_and_order/ACLU_-_september_2012_fisc_opinion_and_order.md b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_september_2012_fisc_opinion_and_order/ACLU_-_september_2012_fisc_opinion_and_order.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d8218d6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_september_2012_fisc_opinion_and_order/ACLU_-_september_2012_fisc_opinion_and_order.md
@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+MEMORANDUM OPINION
+
+This matter is before the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC" or "Court") on
+the "Government's Ex Parte Submission of Reauthorization Certification and Related
+Procedures, Ex Parte Submission of Amended Certifications, and Request for an Order
+Approving Such Certification and Amended Certifications," which was filed on August 24, 2012
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON,NOFORN
+a. The Scope of NSA's Upstream Collection.
+Last year, following the submission of Certifications [REDACTED] for
+renewal, the government made a series of submissions to the Court disclosing that it had
+materially misrepresented the scope of NSA's "upstream collection" under Section 702 (and
+prior authorities including the Protect America Act). The term "upstream collection" refers to
+the acquisition of Internet communications as they transit the "internet backbone" facilities of
+[REDACTED] as opposed to the collection of communications directly
+from Internet service providers like [REDACTED]. See Docket Nos. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Oct. 3, 2011 Memorandum Opinion ("Oct. 3 Op.") at 5 n.3.
+Since 2006, the government had represented that NSA's upstream collection only acquired
+discrete communications to or from a facility tasked for acquisition and communications that
+referenced the tasked facility (so-called "about" communications). See id. at 15-16. With regard
+to the latter category, the government had repeatedly assured the Court that NSA only acquired
+[REDACTED] specific categories of "about" communications. Id.
+The government's 2011 submissions made clear, however, that NSA's upstream
+collection was much broader than the government had previously represented. For the first time,
+the government explained that NSA's upstream collection results in the acquisition of "Internet
+transactions" instead of discrete communications to, from or about a tasked selector. See id. at
+15. Internet transactions, the government would ultimately acknowledge, could and often do
+contain multiple discrete communications, including wholly domestic non-target
+communications and other non-target communications to, from, or concerning U.S. persons. Id.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON, NOFORN
+Page 26
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON, NOFORN
+While the government was able to show that the percentage of wholly domestic non-target
+communications and other non-target communications to, from, or concerning U.S. persons
+being acquired was small relative to the total volume of Internet communications acquired by the
+NSA pursuant to section 702, the acquisition of such communications nonetheless presented a
+significant issue for the Court in reviewing the procedures. In fact, it appeared that NSA was
+annually acquiring tens of thousands of Internet transactions containing at least one wholly
+domestic communication; that many of these wholly domestic communications were not to,
+from, or about a targeted facility; and that NSA was also likely annually acquiring tens of
+thousands of additional Internet transactions containing one or more non-target communications
+to or from U.S. persons or persons in the United States. Id. at 33, 37.
+In the October 3 Opinion, the Court approved in large part Certifications [REDACTED]
+and the accompanying targeting and minimization procedures. The Court
+concluded, however, that one aspect of the proposed collection - NSA's upstream collection of
+Internet transactions containing multiple communications, or "MCTs” – was, in some respects,
+deficient on statutory and constitutional grounds. The Court concluded that although NSA's
+targeting procedures met the statutory requirements, the NSA minimization procedures, as the
+government proposed to apply them to MCTs, did not satisfy the statutory definition of
+"minimization procedures" with respect to retention. Oct. 3 Op. at 59-63. As applied to the
+upstream collection of Internet transactions, the Court found that the procedures were not
+reasonably designed to minimize the retention of U.S. person information consistent with the
+government's national security needs. Id. at 62-63. The Court explained that the net effect of the
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 27
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON,NOFORN
+procedures would have been that thousands of wholly domestic communications, and thousands
+of other discrete communications that are not to or from a targeted selector but that are to, from,
+or concerning United States persons, would be retained by NSA for at least five years, despite the
+fact that they have no direct connection to a targeted selector and, therefore, were unlikely to
+contain foreign intelligence information. Id. at 60-61. For the same reason, the Court concluded
+that NSA's procedures, as the government proposed to apply then to MCTs, failed to satisfy the
+requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 78-79. The Court noted that the government
+might be able to remedy the deficiencies that it had identified, either by tailoring its upstream
+acquisition or by adopting more stringent post-acquisition safeguards. Id. at 61-62, 79.
+By operation of the statute, the government was permitted to continue the problematic
+portion of its collection for 30 days while taking steps to remedy the deficiencies identified in the
+October 3 order and opinion. See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3)(B). In late October of 2011, the
+government timely submitted amended NSA minimization procedures that included additional
+provisions regarding NSA's upstream collection. The amended procedures, which took effect on
+October 31, 2011 ("Oct. 31, 2011 NSA Minimization Procedures"), require NSA to restrict
+access to the portions of its ongoing upstream collection that are most likely to contain wholly
+domestic communications and non-target information that is subject to statutory or Fourth
+Amendment protection. See Nov. 30 Op. at 7-9. Segregated Internet transactions can be moved
+to NSA's general repositories only after having been determined by a specially trained analyst
+not to contain a wholly domestic communication. Id. at 8. Any transaction containing a wholly
+domestic communication (whether segregated or not) would be purged upon recognition. Id. at
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 28
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON,NOFORN
+8, 9. Any transaction moved from segregation to NSA's general repositories would be
+permanently marked as having previously been segregated. Id. at 8. On the non-segregated side,
+any discrete communication within an Internet transaction that an analyst wishes to use is subject
+to additional checks. Id. at 8-10. NSA is not permitted to use any discrete, non-target
+communication that is determined to be to or from a U.S. person or a person who appears to be in
+the United States, other than to protect against an immediate threat to human life. Id. at 9.
+Finally, all upstream acquisitions are retained for a default maximum period of two, rather than
+five, years. Id. at 10-11.
+The Court concluded in the November 30 Opinion that the October 31, 2011 NSA
+Minimization Procedures adequately remedied the deficiencies that had been identified in the
+October 3 opinion. Id. at 14-15. Accordingly, NSA was able to continue its upstream collection
+of Internet transactions (including MCTs) without interruption, but pursuant to amended
+procedures that are consistent with statutory and constitutional requirements.
+However, issues remained with respect to the past upstream collection residing in NSA's
+databases. Because NSA's upstream collection almost certainly included at least some
+acquisitions constituting "electronic surveillance" within the meaning of 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f),
+any overcollection resulting from the government's misrepresentation of the scope of that
+collection implicates 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a)(2). Section 1809(a)(2) makes it a crime to "disclose[]
+or use[] information obtained under color of law by electronic surveillance, knowing or having
+reason to know that the information was obtained through electronic surveillance not authorized"
+by statute. The Court therefore directed the government to make a written submission addressing
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 29
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON,NOFORN
+the applicability of Section 1809(a), which the government did on November 22, 2011. See
+[REDACTED] Oct. 13, 2011 Briefing Order, and
+Government's Response to the Court's Briefing Order of Oct. 13, 2011 (arguing that Section
+1809(a)(2) does not apply).
+Beginning late in 2011, the government began taking steps that had the effect of
+mitigating any Section 1809(a)(2) problem, including the risk that information subject to the
+statutory criminal prohibition might be used or disclosed in an application filed before this Court.
+The government informed the Court in October 2011 that although the amended NSA procedures
+do not by their terms apply to information acquired before October 31, NSA would apply
+portions of the procedures to the past upstream collection, including certain limitations on the use
+or disclosure of such information. See Nov. 30 Opinion at 20-21. Although it was not
+technically feasible for NSA to segregate the past upstream collection in the same way it is now
+segregating the incoming upstream acquisitions, the government explained that it would apply
+the remaining components of the amended procedures approved by the Court to the previously-
+collected data, including (1) the prohibition on using discrete, non-target communications
+determined to be to or from a U.S. person or a person in the United States, and (2) the two-year
+age-off requirement. See id. at 21.
+Thereafter, in April 2012, the government orally informed the Court that NSA had made
+a "corporate decision" to purge all data in its repositories that can be identified as having been
+acquired through upstream collection before the October 31, 2011 effective date of the amended
+NSA minimization procedures approved by the Court in the November 30 Opinion. NSA's
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 30
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON,NOFORN
+effort to purge that information, to the extent it is reasonably feasible to do so, is now complete.
+See Aug. 24 Submission at 9-10.17
+Finally, NSA has adopted measures to deal with the possibility that it has issued reports
+based on upstream collection that was unauthorized. NSA has identified [REDACTED] reports that were
+issued from the inception of its collection under Section 702 to October 31, 2011, that rely at
+least in part on information derived from NSA's upstream acquisitions from that period. See
+Sept. 12, 2012 Supplement to the Government's Ex Parte Submission of Reauthorization
+Certifications at 2 ("Sept. 12 Submission"). The government advises that, of the [REDACTED] reports,
+[REDACTED] have been confirmed to be based entirely upon communications that are to, from or about
+persons properly targeted under Section 702 and therefore present no issue under Section
+1809(a)(2). See id. The government is unable to make similar assurances, however, regarding
+the remaining [REDACTED] reports. Accordingly, NSA will direct the recipients of those [REDACTED] reports
+(both within NSA and outside the agency) not to further use or disseminate information
+contained therein without first obtaining NSA's express approval. Id. at 3-4. Upon receipt of
+such a request, NSA will review the relevant report to determine whether continued use thereof is
+
+17 The government has informed the Court that NSA stores some of the past upstream
+collection in repositories in which it may no longer be identifiable as such. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] See Aug. 24 Submission at 14-16. Assuming that NSA
+cannot with reasonable effort identify information in its repositories as the fruit of an
+unauthorized electronic surveillance, such information falls outside the scope of Section
+1809(a)(2), which by its terms applies only when there is knowledge or "reason to know that the
+information was obtained through electronic surveillance not authorized" by statute.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 31
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON,NOFORN
+appropriate. Id. at 4.18 Finally, the government has informed the Court that it will not use any
+report that cites to upstream collection acquired prior to October 31, 2011 in an application to
+this Court absent express notice to, and approval of, the Court. Aug. 24 Submission at 24.
+Taken together, the remedial steps taken by the government since October 2011 greatly
+reduce the risk that NSA will run afoul of Section 1809(a)(2) in its handling of the past upstream
+acquisitions made under color of Section 702. NSA's self-imposed prohibition on using non-
+target communications to or from a U.S. person or a person in the United States helped to ensure
+that the fruits of unauthorized electronic surveillance were not used or disclosed while it was
+working to purge the pre-October 31, 2011 upstream collection. And NSA's subsequent purge of
+that collection from its repositories and the above-described measures it has taken with respect to
+derivative reports further reduce the risk of a problem under Section 1809(a)(2). Finally, the
+amended NSA minimization procedures provide that in the event, despite NSA's effort to purge
+the prior upstream collection, the agency discovers an Internet transaction acquired before
+October 31, 2011, such transaction must be purged upon recognition. See Amended NSA
+Minimization Procedures at 8 § 3(c)(3). In light of the foregoing, it appears to the Court that the
+outstanding issues raised by NSA's upstream collection of Internet transactions have been
+resolved, subject to the discussion of changes to the minimization procedures that appears
+
+18 For instance, NSA may determine that the report is fully supported by cited
+communications other than the ones obtained through upstream communication. Sept. 12
+Submission at 4. In other instances, NSA may revise the report so that it no longer relies upon
+upstream communications and reissue it. Id. If such steps are not feasible because the report
+cannot be supported without the upstream communication, NSA will cancel the report. Id.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 32
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON,NOFORN
+below. 19
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+19 Under the circumstances, the Court finds it unnecessary to further address the
+arguments advanced by the government in its November 22, 2011 response to the Court's
+October 13, 2011 briefing order regarding Section 1809(a), particularly those regarding the scope
+of prior Section 702 authorizations.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON,NOFORN
+Page 33
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_september_2012_fisc_opinion_and_order/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_september_2012_fisc_opinion_and_order/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8656a25
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ACLU_-_september_2012_fisc_opinion_and_order/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+{
+ "title": "Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Opinion and Order – September 2012",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "A FISC opinion concluding the government has resolved the deficiencies identified in the FISC’s ruling from October 3, 2011. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2012-09-25",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "SI"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "ORCON, NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-08-21",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/foreign-intelligence-surveillance-opinion-and-order-september-2012",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "f6d32e1a67a123f79a49809cfcb4a7a6f357fffdd7c47835077050cb1e3781cd",
+ "pages": 9
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/EFF_-_20131119-odni-nsa_core_intelligence_oversight_training/EFF_-_20131119-odni-nsa_core_intelligence_oversight_training.md b/data/FOIA/EFF_-_20131119-odni-nsa_core_intelligence_oversight_training/EFF_-_20131119-odni-nsa_core_intelligence_oversight_training.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ba0bb80
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/EFF_-_20131119-odni-nsa_core_intelligence_oversight_training/EFF_-_20131119-odni-nsa_core_intelligence_oversight_training.md
@@ -0,0 +1,4933 @@
+SECRET//COMINT/[REDACTED]
+
+NSA Core Intelligence Oversight Training:
+
+1. (U) Executive Order (E.O.) 12333, as amended United States Intelligence
+Activities
+2. (U//FOUO) Procedures 1-4, 14, and 15 of DoD 5240.1-R, “Procedures for
+Department of Defense Intelligence Components That Affect US Persons"
+3. (U//FOUO) Directive Type Memorandum (DTM-08-052), "DoD Guidance for
+Reporting Questionable Intelligence Activities and Significant or Highly Sensitive
+Matters"
+4. (S//SI) NSA/CSS Policy 1-23, Procedures governing activities of NSA/CSS that
+affect US Persons
+
+SECRET//COMINT/[REDACTED]
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20070108
+Declassify On: 20350901
+
+SECRET//COMINT/[REDACTED]
+
+NSA Core Intelligence Oversight Training:
+
+1. (U) Executive Order (E.O.) 12333, as amended United States Intelligence
+Activities
+2. (U//FOUO) Procedures 1-4, 14, and 15 of DoD 5240.1-R, "Procedures for
+Department of Defense Intelligence Components That Affect US Persons"
+3. (U//FOUO) Directive Type Memorandum (DTM-08-052), "DoD Guidance for
+Reporting Questionable Intelligence Activities and Significant or Highly Sensitive
+Matters"
+4. (S//SI) NSA/CSS Policy 1-23, Procedures governing activities of NSA/CSS that
+affect US Persons
+
+SECRET//COMINT/[REDACTED]
+
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20070108
+Declassify On: 20350901
+
+EXECUTIVE ORDER
+12333
+- - - - -
+UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
+DECEMBER 4, 1981
+(AS AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDERS 13284 (2003), 13355 (2004)
+AND 13470 (2008))
+
+PREAMBLE
+Timely, accurate, and insightful information about the
+activities, capabilities, plans, and intentions of foreign
+powers, organizations, and persons, and their agents, is
+essential to the national security of the United States. All
+reasonable and lawful means must be used to ensure that the
+United States will receive the best intelligence possible. For
+that purpose, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the
+Constitution and the laws of the United States of America,
+including the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, (Act)
+and as President of the United States of America, in order to
+provide for the effective conduct of United States intelligence
+activities and the protection of constitutional rights, it is
+hereby ordered as follows:
+PART 1 Goals, Directions, Duties, and Responsibilities with
+Respect to United States Intelligence Efforts
+1.1 Goals. The United States intelligence effort shall provide
+the President, the National Security Council, and the Homeland
+Security Council with the necessary information on which to base
+decisions concerning the development and conduct of foreign,
+defense, and economic policies, and the protection of
+United States national interests from foreign security threats.
+All departments and agencies shall cooperate fully to fulfill
+this goal.
+(a) All means, consistent with applicable Federal law and
+this order, and with full consideration of the rights of
+United States persons, shall be used to obtain reliable
+intelligence information to protect the United States and its
+1
+
+interests.
+(b) The United States Government has a solemn obligation,
+and shall continue in the conduct of intelligence activities
+under this order, to protect fully the legal rights of all
+United States persons, including freedoms, civil liberties, and
+privacy rights guaranteed by Federal law.
+(c) Intelligence collection under this order should be
+guided by the need for information to respond to intelligence
+priorities set by the President.
+(d) Special emphasis should be given to detecting and
+countering:
+(1) Espionage and other threats and activities
+directed by foreign powers or their intelligence
+services against the United States and its interests;
+(2) Threats to the United States and its interests
+from terrorism; and
+(3) Threats to the United States and its interests
+from the development, possession, proliferation, or
+use of weapons of mass destruction.
+(e) Special emphasis shall be given to the production
+of timely, accurate, and insightful reports, responsive to
+decisionmakers in the executive branch, that draw on all
+appropriate sources of information, including open source
+information, meet rigorous analytic standards, consider
+diverse analytic viewpoints, and accurately represent
+appropriate alternative views.
+(f) State, local, and tribal governments are critical
+partners in securing and defending the United States from
+terrorism and other threats to the United States and its
+interests. Our national intelligence effort should take into
+account the responsibilities and requirements of State, local,
+and tribal governments and, as appropriate, private sector
+2
+entities, when undertaking the collection and dissemination of
+information and intelligence to protect the United States.
+(g) All departments and agencies have a responsibility
+to prepare and to provide intelligence in a manner that allows
+the full and free exchange of information, consistent with
+applicable law and presidential guidance.
+1.2 The National Security Council.
+(a) Purpose. The National Security Council (NSC)
+shall act as the highest ranking executive branch entity that
+provides support to the President for review of, guidance
+for, and direction to the conduct of all foreign intelligence,
+counterintelligence, and covert action, and attendant policies
+and programs.
+(b) Covert Action and Other Sensitive Intelligence
+Operations. The NSC shall consider and submit to the President
+a policy recommendation, including all dissents, on each
+proposed covert action and conduct a periodic review of ongoing
+covert action activities, including an evaluation of the
+effectiveness and consistency with current national policy
+of such activities and consistency with applicable legal
+requirements. The NSC shall perform such other functions
+related to covert action as the President may direct, but shall
+not undertake the conduct of covert actions. The NSC shall also
+review proposals for other sensitive intelligence operations.
+1.3 Director of National Intelligence. Subject to the
+authority, direction, and control of the President, the Director
+of National Intelligence (Director) shall serve as the head of
+the Intelligence Community, act as the principal adviser to the
+President, to the NSC, and to the Homeland Security Council
+for intelligence matters related to national security, and
+shall oversee and direct the implementation of the National
+Intelligence Program and execution of the National Intelligence
+
+3
+Program budget. The Director will lead a unified, coordinated,
+and effective intelligence effort. In addition, the Director
+shall, in carrying out the duties and responsibilities under
+this section, take into account the views of the heads of
+departments containing an element of the Intelligence Community
+and of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
+(a) Except as otherwise directed by the President or
+prohibited by law, the Director shall have access to all
+information and intelligence described in section 1.5(a) of this
+order. For the purpose of access to and sharing of information
+and intelligence, the Director:
+(1) Is hereby assigned the function under
+section 3(5) of the Act, to determine that intelligence,
+regardless of the source from which derived and including
+information gathered within or outside the United States,
+pertains to more than one United States Government agency; and
+(2) Shall develop guidelines for how information
+or intelligence is provided to or accessed by the Intelligence
+Community in accordance with section 1.5(a) of this order, and
+for how the information or intelligence may be used and shared
+by the Intelligence Community. All guidelines developed in
+accordance with this section shall be approved by the Attorney
+General and, where applicable, shall be consistent with
+guidelines issued pursuant to section 1016 of the Intelligence
+Reform and Terrorism Protection Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458)
+(IRTPA).
+(b) In addition to fulfilling the obligations and
+responsibilities prescribed by the Act, the Director:
+(1) Shall establish objectives, priorities, and
+guidance for the Intelligence Community to ensure timely and
+effective collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of
+intelligence, of whatever nature and from whatever source
+
+4
+derived;
+(2) May designate, in consultation with affected
+heads of departments or Intelligence Community elements, one or
+more Intelligence Community elements to develop and to maintain
+services of common concern on behalf of the Intelligence
+Community if the Director determines such services can be more
+efficiently or effectively accomplished in a consolidated
+manner;
+(3) Shall oversee and provide advice to the
+President and the NSC with respect to all ongoing and proposed
+covert action programs;
+(4) In regard to the establishment and conduct of
+intelligence arrangements and agreements with foreign
+governments and international organizations:
+(A) May enter into intelligence and
+counterintelligence arrangements and agreements with foreign
+governments and international organizations;
+(B) Shall formulate policies concerning
+intelligence and counterintelligence arrangements and agreements
+with foreign governments and international organizations; and
+(C) Shall align and synchronize intelligence and
+counterintelligence foreign relationships among the elements of
+the Intelligence Community to further United States national
+security, policy, and intelligence objectives;
+(5) Shall participate in the development of
+procedures approved by the Attorney General governing criminal
+drug intelligence activities abroad to ensure that these
+activities are consistent with foreign intelligence programs;
+(6) Shall establish common security and access
+standards for managing and handling intelligence systems,
+information, and products, with special emphasis on
+facilitating:
+
+5
+(A) The fullest and most prompt access to and
+dissemination of information and intelligence practicable,
+assigning the highest priority to detecting, preventing,
+preempting, and disrupting terrorist threats and activities
+against the United States, its interests, and allies; and
+(B) The establishment of standards for an
+interoperable information sharing enterprise that facilitates
+the sharing of intelligence information among elements of the
+Intelligence Community;
+(7) Shall ensure that appropriate departments and
+agencies have access to intelligence and receive the support
+needed to perform independent analysis;
+(8) Shall protect, and ensure that programs are
+developed to protect, intelligence sources, methods, and
+activities from unauthorized disclosure;
+(9) Shall, after consultation with the heads of
+affected departments and agencies, establish guidelines for
+Intelligence Community elements for:
+(A) Classification and declassification of all
+intelligence and intelligence-related information classified
+under the authority of the Director or the authority of the head
+of a department or Intelligence Community element; and
+(B) Access to and dissemination of all
+intelligence and intelligence-related information, both in its
+final form and in the form when initially gathered, to include
+intelligence originally classified by the head of a department
+or Intelligence Community element, except that access to and
+dissemination of information concerning United States persons
+shall be governed by procedures developed in accordance with
+Part 2 of this order;
+(10) May, only with respect to Intelligence
+Community elements, and after consultation with the head of the
+
+6
+originating Intelligence Community element or the head of the
+originating department, declassify, or direct the
+declassification of, information or intelligence relating to
+intelligence sources, methods, and activities. The Director may
+only delegate this authority to the Principal Deputy Director of
+National Intelligence;
+(11) May establish, operate, and direct one or more
+national intelligence centers to address intelligence
+priorities;
+(12) May establish Functional Managers and Mission
+Managers, and designate officers or employees of the
+United States to serve in these positions.
+(A) Functional Managers shall report to the
+Director concerning the execution of their duties as Functional
+Managers, and may be charged with developing and implementing
+strategic guidance, policies, and procedures for activities
+related to a specific intelligence discipline or set of
+intelligence activities; set training and tradecraft standards;
+and ensure coordination within and across intelligence
+disciplines and Intelligence Community elements and with related
+non-intelligence activities. Functional Managers may also
+advise the Director on: the management of resources; policies
+and procedures; collection capabilities and gaps; processing and
+dissemination of intelligence; technical architectures; and
+other issues or activities determined by the Director.
+(i) The Director of the National
+Security Agency is designated the Functional Manager for signals
+intelligence;
+(ii) The Director of the Central
+Intelligence Agency is designated the Functional Manager for
+human intelligence; and
+(iii) The Director of the National
+7
+Geospatial-Intelligence Agency is designated the Functional
+Manager for geospatial intelligence.
+(B) Mission Managers shall serve as principal
+substantive advisors on all or specified aspects of intelligence
+related to designated countries, regions, topics, or functional
+issues;
+(13) Shall establish uniform criteria for the
+determination of relative priorities for the transmission of
+critical foreign intelligence, and advise the Secretary of
+Defense concerning the communications requirements of the
+Intelligence Community for the transmission of such
+communications;
+(14) Shall have ultimate responsibility for
+production and dissemination of intelligence produced by the
+Intelligence Community and authority to levy analytic tasks on
+intelligence production organizations within the Intelligence
+Community, in consultation with the heads of the Intelligence
+Community elements concerned;
+(15) May establish advisory groups for the purpose
+of obtaining advice from within the Intelligence Community to
+carry out the Director's responsibilities, to include
+Intelligence Community executive management committees composed
+of senior Intelligence Community leaders. Advisory groups shall
+consist of representatives from elements of the Intelligence
+Community, as designated by the Director, or other executive
+branch departments, agencies, and offices, as appropriate;
+(16) Shall ensure the timely exploitation and
+dissemination of data gathered by national intelligence
+collection means, and ensure that the resulting intelligence is
+disseminated immediately to appropriate government elements,
+including military commands;
+(17) Shall determine requirements and priorities
+8
+
+for, and manage and direct the tasking, collection, analysis,
+production, and dissemination of, national intelligence by
+elements of the Intelligence Community, including approving
+requirements for collection and analysis and resolving conflicts
+in collection requirements and in the tasking of national
+collection assets of Intelligence Community elements (except
+when otherwise directed by the President or when the Secretary
+of Defense exercises collection tasking authority under plans
+and arrangements approved by the Secretary of Defense and the
+Director);
+(18) May provide advisory tasking concerning
+collection and analysis of information or intelligence relevant
+to national intelligence or national security to departments,
+agencies, and establishments of the United States Government
+that are not elements of the Intelligence Community; and shall
+establish
+procedures, in consultation with affected heads of
+departments or agencies and subject to approval by the Attorney
+General, to implement this authority and to monitor or evaluate
+the responsiveness of United States Government departments,
+agencies, and other establishments;
+(19) Shall fulfill the responsibilities in
+section 1.3(b) (17) and (18) of this order, consistent with
+applicable law and with full consideration of the rights of
+United States persons, whether information is to be collected
+inside or outside the United States;
+(20) Shall ensure, through appropriate policies and
+procedures, the deconfliction, coordination, and integration of
+all intelligence activities conducted by an Intelligence
+Community element or funded by the National Intelligence
+Program. In accordance with these policies and procedures:
+(A) The Director of the Federal Bureau of
+9
+
+Investigation shall coordinate the clandestine collection of
+foreign intelligence collected through human sources or through
+human-enabled means and counterintelligence activities inside
+the United States;
+(B) The Director of the Central Intelligence
+Agency shall coordinate the clandestine collection of foreign
+intelligence collected through human sources or through human-
+enabled means and counterintelligence activities outside the
+United States;
+(C) All policies and procedures for the
+coordination of counterintelligence activities and the
+clandestine collection of foreign intelligence inside the
+United States shall be subject to the approval of the Attorney
+General; and
+(D) All policies and procedures developed under
+this section shall be coordinated with the heads of affected
+departments and Intelligence Community elements;
+(21) Shall, with the concurrence of the heads of
+affected departments and agencies, establish joint procedures to
+deconflict, coordinate, and synchronize intelligence activities
+conducted by an Intelligence Community element or funded by the
+National Intelligence Program, with intelligence activities,
+activities that involve foreign intelligence and security
+services, or activities that involve the use of clandestine
+methods, conducted by other United States Government
+departments, agencies, and establishments;
+(22) Shall, in coordination with the heads of
+departments containing elements of the Intelligence Community,
+develop procedures to govern major system acquisitions funded in
+whole or in majority part by the National Intelligence Program;
+(23) Shall seek advice from the Secretary of State
+to ensure that the foreign policy implications of proposed
+10
+
+intelligence activities are considered, and shall ensure,
+through appropriate policies and procedures, that intelligence
+activities are conducted in a manner consistent with the
+responsibilities pursuant to law and presidential direction of
+Chiefs of United States Missions; and
+(24) Shall facilitate the use of Intelligence
+Community products by the Congress in a secure manner.
+(c) The Director's exercise of authorities in the
+Act and this order shall not abrogate the statutory or
+other responsibilities of the heads of departments of the
+United States Government or the Director of the Central
+Intelligence Agency. Directives issued and actions taken by
+the Director in the exercise of the Director's authorities
+and responsibilities to integrate, coordinate, and make the
+Intelligence Community more effective in providing intelligence
+related to national security shall be implemented by the
+elements of the Intelligence Community, provided that any
+department head whose department contains an element of the
+Intelligence Community and who believes that a directive or
+action of the Director violates the requirements of section 1018
+of the IRTPA or this subsection shall bring the issue to the
+attention of the Director, the NSC, or the President for
+resolution in a manner that respects and does not abrogate the
+statutory responsibilities of the heads of the departments.
+(d) Appointments to certain positions.
+(1) The relevant department or bureau head shall
+provide recommendations and obtain the concurrence of the
+Director for the selection of: the Director of the National
+Security Agency, the Director of the National Reconnaissance
+Office, the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence
+Agency, the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for
+Intelligence and Analysis, the Assistant Secretary of State for
+11
+
+Intelligence and Research, the Director of the Office of
+Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department of
+Energy, the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis of
+the Department of the Treasury, and the Executive Assistant
+Director for the National Security Branch of the Federal Bureau
+of Investigation. If the Director does not concur in the
+recommendation, the department head may not fill the vacancy or
+make the recommendation to the President, as the case may be.
+If the department head and the Director do not reach an
+agreement on the selection or recommendation, the Director and
+the department head concerned may advise the President directly
+of the Director's intention to withhold concurrence.
+(2) The relevant department head shall consult with
+the Director before appointing an individual to fill a vacancy
+or recommending to the President an individual be nominated to
+fill a vacancy in any of the following positions: the Under
+Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; the Director of the
+Defense Intelligence Agency; uniformed heads of the intelligence
+elements of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine
+Corps above the rank of Major General or Rear Admiral; the
+Assistant Commandant of the Coast Guard for Intelligence; and
+the Assistant Attorney General for National Security.
+(e) Removal from certain positions.
+(1) Except for the Director of the Central
+Intelligence Agency, whose removal the Director may recommend to
+the President, the Director and the relevant department head
+shall consult on the removal, or recommendation to the President
+for removal, as the case may be, of: the Director of the
+National Security Agency, the Director of the National
+Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Director of the Defense
+Intelligence Agency, the Under Secretary of Homeland Security
+for Intelligence and Analysis, the Assistant Secretary of State
+12
+for Intelligence and Research, and the Assistant Secretary for
+Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury. If
+the Director and the department head do not agree on removal, or
+recommendation for removal, either may make a recommendation to
+the President for the removal of the individual.
+(2) The Director and the relevant department or
+bureau head shall consult on the removal of: the Executive
+Assistant Director for the National Security Branch of the
+Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of the Office of
+Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department of
+Energy, the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office,
+the Assistant Commandant of the Coast Guard for Intelligence,
+and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. With
+respect to an individual appointed by a department head, the
+department head may remove the individual upon the request of
+the Director; if the department head chooses not to remove the
+individual, either the Director or the department head may
+advise the President of the department head's intention to
+retain the individual. In the case of the Under Secretary of
+Defense for Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense may recommend
+to the President either the removal or the retention of the
+individual. For uniformed heads of the intelligence elements of
+the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps, the
+Director may make a recommendation for removal to the Secretary
+of Defense.
+(3) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed
+to limit or otherwise affect the authority of the President to
+nominate, appoint, assign, or terminate the appointment or
+assignment of any individual, with or without a consultation,
+recommendation, or concurrence.
+1.4 The Intelligence Community. Consistent with applicable
+Federal law and with the other provisions of this order, and
+
+13
+under the leadership of the Director, as specified in such law
+and this order, the Intelligence Community shall:
+(a) Collect and provide information needed by the
+President and, in the performance of executive functions, the
+Vice President, the NSC, the Homeland Security Council, the
+Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, senior military
+commanders, and other executive branch officials and, as
+appropriate, the Congress of the United States;
+(b) In accordance with priorities set by the President,
+collect information concerning, and conduct activities to
+protect against, international terrorism, proliferation of
+weapons of mass destruction, intelligence activities directed
+against the United States, international criminal drug
+activities, and other hostile activities directed against the
+United States by foreign powers, organizations, persons, and
+their agents;
+(c) Analyze, produce, and disseminate intelligence;
+(d) Conduct administrative, technical, and other support
+activities within the United States and abroad necessary for
+the performance of authorized activities, to include providing
+services of common concern for the Intelligence Community as
+designated by the Director in accordance with this order;
+(e) Conduct research, development, and procurement of
+technical systems and devices relating to authorized functions
+and missions or the provision of services of common concern for
+the Intelligence Community;
+(f) Protect the security of intelligence related
+activities, information, installations, property, and employees
+by appropriate means, including such investigations of
+applicants, employees, contractors, and other persons with
+similar associations with the Intelligence Community elements as
+are necessary;
+
+14
+(g) Take into account State, local, and tribal
+governments' and, as appropriate, private sector entities'
+information needs relating to national and homeland security;
+(h) Deconflict, coordinate, and integrate all intelligence
+activities and other information gathering in accordance with
+section 1.3(b) (20) of this order; and
+(i) Perform such other functions and duties related to
+intelligence activities as the President may direct.
+1.5 Duties and Responsibilities of the Heads of Executive
+Branch Departments and Agencies. The heads of all departments
+and agencies shall:
+(a) Provide the Director access to all information and
+intelligence relevant to the national security or that otherwise
+is required for the performance of the Director's duties,
+to include administrative and other appropriate management
+information, except such information excluded by law, by the
+President, or by the Attorney General acting under this order
+at the direction of the President;
+(b) Provide all programmatic and budgetary information
+necessary to support the Director in developing the National
+Intelligence Program;
+(c) Coordinate development and implementation of
+intelligence systems and architectures and, as appropriate,
+operational systems and architectures of their departments,
+agencies, and other elements with the Director to respond
+to national intelligence requirements and all applicable
+information sharing and security guidelines, information
+privacy, and other legal requirements;
+(d) Provide, to the maximum extent permitted by
+law, subject to the availability of appropriations and not
+inconsistent with the mission of the department or agency, such
+further support to the Director as the Director may request,
+
+15
+after consultation with the head of the department or agency,
+for the performance of the Director's functions;
+(e) Respond to advisory tasking from the Director
+under section 1.3 (b) (18) of this order to the greatest extent
+possible, in accordance with applicable policies established
+by the head of the responding department or agency;
+(f) Ensure that all elements within the department
+or agency comply with the provisions of Part 2 of this order,
+regardless of Intelligence Community affiliation, when
+performing foreign intelligence and counterintelligence
+functions;
+(g) Deconflict, coordinate, and integrate all
+intelligence activities in accordance with section 1.3 (b) (20),
+and intelligence and other activities in accordance with
+section 1.3 (b) (21) of this order;
+(h) Inform the Attorney General, either directly or
+through the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Director
+of clandestine collection of foreign intelligence and
+counterintelligence activities inside the United States not
+coordinated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
+(i) Pursuant to arrangements developed by the head of
+the department or agency and the Director of the Central
+Intelligence Agency and approved by the Director, inform the
+Director and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,
+either directly or through his designee serving outside the
+United States, as appropriate, of clandestine collection of
+foreign intelligence collected through human sources or through
+human-enabled means outside the United States that has not been
+coordinated with the Central Intelligence Agency; and
+(j) Inform the Secretary of Defense, either directly or
+through his designee, as appropriate, of clandestine collection
+of foreign intelligence outside the United States in a region of
+
+16
+combat or contingency military operations designated by the
+Secretary of Defense, for purposes of this paragraph, after
+consultation with the Director of National Intelligence.
+1.6 Heads of Elements of the Intelligence Community. The heads
+of elements of the Intelligence Community shall:
+(a) Provide the Director access to all information and
+intelligence relevant to the national security or that otherwise
+is required for the performance of the Director's duties,
+to include administrative and other appropriate management
+information, except such information excluded by law, by the
+President, or by the Attorney General acting under this order
+at the direction of the President;
+(b) Report to the Attorney General possible violations
+of Federal criminal laws by employees and of specified Federal
+criminal laws by any other person as provided in procedures
+agreed upon by the Attorney General and the head of the
+department, agency, or establishment concerned, in a manner
+consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and
+methods, as specified in those procedures;
+(c) Report to the Intelligence Oversight Board, consistent
+with Executive Order 13462 of February 29, 2008, and provide
+copies of all such reports to the Director, concerning any
+intelligence activities of their elements that they have reason
+to believe may be unlawful or contrary to executive order or
+presidential directive;
+(d) Protect intelligence and intelligence sources,
+methods, and activities from unauthorized disclosure in
+accordance with guidance from the Director;
+(e) Facilitate, as appropriate, the sharing of information
+or intelligence, as directed by law or the President, to State,
+local, tribal, and private sector entities;
+(f) Disseminate information or intelligence to foreign
+
+17
+governments and international organizations under intelligence
+or counterintelligence arrangements or agreements established in
+accordance with section 1.3(b) (4) of this order;
+(g) Participate in the development of procedures approved
+by the Attorney General governing production and dissemination
+of information or intelligence resulting from criminal drug
+intelligence activities abroad if they have intelligence
+responsibilities for foreign or domestic criminal drug
+production and trafficking; and
+(h) Ensure that the inspectors general, general counsels,
+and agency officials responsible for privacy or civil liberties
+protection for their respective organizations have access to any
+information or intelligence necessary to perform their official
+duties.
+1.7 Intelligence Community Elements. Each element of
+the Intelligence Community shall have the duties and
+responsibilities specified below, in addition to those
+specified by law or elsewhere in this order. Intelligence
+Community elements within executive departments shall serve the
+information and intelligence needs of their respective heads
+of departments and also shall operate as part of an integrated
+Intelligence Community, as provided in law or this order.
+(a) THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. The Director of the
+Central Intelligence Agency shall:
+(1) Collect (including through clandestine means),
+analyze, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence and
+counterintelligence;
+(2) Conduct counterintelligence activities without
+assuming or performing any internal security functions within
+the United States;
+(3) Conduct administrative and technical support
+activities within and outside the United States as necessary for
+
+cover and proprietary arrangements;
+(4) Conduct covert action activities approved by the
+President. No agency except the Central Intelligence Agency (or
+the Armed Forces of the United States in time of war declared by
+the Congress or during any period covered by a report from the
+President to the Congress consistent with the War Powers
+Resolution, Public Law 93-148) may conduct any covert action
+activity unless the President determines that another agency is
+more likely to achieve a particular objective;
+(5) Conduct foreign intelligence liaison
+relationships with intelligence or security services of foreign
+governments or international organizations consistent with
+section 1.3(b) (4) of this order;
+(6) Under the direction and guidance of the Director,
+and in accordance with section 1.3(b) (4) of this order,
+coordinate the implementation of intelligence and
+counterintelligence relationships between elements of the
+Intelligence Community and the intelligence or security services
+of foreign governments or international organizations; and
+(7) Perform such other functions and duties related
+to intelligence as the Director may direct.
+(b) THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. The Director of the
+Defense Intelligence Agency shall:
+(1) Collect (including through clandestine means),
+analyze, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence and
+counterintelligence to support national and departmental
+missions;
+(2) Collect, analyze, produce, or, through tasking
+and coordination, provide defense and defense-related
+intelligence for the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the
+Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders, other Defense
+components, and non-Defense agencies;
+
+(3) Conduct counterintelligence activities;
+(4) Conduct administrative and technical support
+activities within and outside the United States as necessary for
+cover and proprietary arrangements;
+(5) Conduct foreign defense intelligence liaison
+'relationships and defense intelligence exchange programs with
+foreign defense establishments, intelligence or security
+services of foreign governments, and international organizations
+in accordance with sections 1.3(b) (4), 1.7(a) (6), and 1.10(i) of
+this order;
+(6) Manage and coordinate all matters related to the
+Defense Attaché system; and
+(7) Provide foreign intelligence and
+counterintelligence staff support as directed by the Secretary
+of Defense.
+(c) THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY. The Director of the
+National Security Agency shall:
+(1) Collect (including through clandestine means),
+process, analyze, produce, and disseminate signals intelligence
+information and data for foreign intelligence and
+counterintelligence purposes to support national and
+departmental missions;
+(2) Establish and operate an effective unified
+organization for signals intelligence activities, except for the
+delegation of operational control over certain operations that
+are conducted through other elements of the Intelligence
+Community. No other department or agency may engage in signals
+intelligence activities except pursuant to a delegation by the
+Secretary of Defense, after coordination with the Director;
+(3) Control signals intelligence collection and
+processing activities, including assignment of resources to an
+appropriate agent for such periods and tasks as required for the
+
+direct support of military commanders;
+(4) Conduct administrative and technical support
+activities within and outside the United States as necessary for
+cover arrangements;
+(5) Provide signals intelligence support for national
+and departmental requirements and for the conduct of military
+operations;
+(6) Act as the National Manager for National Security
+Systems as established in law and policy, and in this capacity
+be responsible to the Secretary of Defense and to the Director;
+(7) Prescribe, consistent with section 102A(g) of
+the Act, within its field of authorized operations, security
+regulations covering operating practices, including the
+transmission, handling, and distribution of signals intelligence
+and communications security material within and among the
+elements under control of the Director of the National Security
+Agency, and exercise the necessary supervisory control to ensure
+compliance with the regulations; and
+(8) Conduct foreign cryptologic liaison relationships
+in accordance with sections 1.3 (b) (4), 1.7(a) (6), and 1.10(i) of
+this order.
+(d) THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE. The Director of
+the National Reconnaissance Office shall:
+(1) Be responsible for research and development,
+acquisition, launch, deployment, and operation of overhead
+systems and related data processing facilities to collect
+intelligence and information to support national and
+departmental missions and other United States Government needs;
+and
+(2) Conduct foreign liaison relationships relating
+to the above missions, in accordance with sections 1.3(b) (4),
+1.7(a) (6), and 1.10(i) of this order.
+
+(e) THE NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. The
+Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency shall:
+(1) Collect, process, analyze, produce, and
+disseminate geospatial intelligence information and data for
+foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes to support
+national and departmental missions;
+(2) Provide geospatial intelligence support for
+national and departmental requirements and for the conduct of
+military operations;
+(3) Conduct administrative and technical support
+activities within and outside the United States as necessary for
+cover arrangements; and
+(4) Conduct foreign geospatial intelligence liaison
+relationships, in accordance with sections 1.3(b) (4), 1.7(a) (6),
+and 1.10 (i) of this order.
+(f) THE INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS OF
+THE ARMY, NAVY, AIR FORCE, AND MARINE CORPS. The Commanders and
+heads of the intelligence and counterintelligence elements of
+the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps shall:
+(1) Collect (including through clandestine means),
+produce, analyze, and disseminate defense and defense-related
+intelligence and counterintelligence to support departmental
+requirements, and, as appropriate, national requirements;
+(2) Conduct counterintelligence activities;
+(3) Monitor the development, procurement, and
+management of tactical intelligence systems and equipment and
+conduct related research, development, and test and evaluation
+activities; and
+(4) Conduct military intelligence liaison
+relationships and military intelligence exchange programs with
+selected cooperative foreign defense establishments and
+international organizations in accordance with
+sections 1.3 (b) (4), 1.7(a) (6), and 1.10(i) of this order.
+(g) INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
+INVESTIGATION. Under the supervision of the Attorney General
+and pursuant to such regulations as the Attorney General may
+establish, the intelligence elements of the Federal Bureau of
+Investigation shall:
+(1) Collect (including through clandestine means),
+analyze, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence and
+counterintelligence to support national and departmental
+missions, in accordance with procedural guidelines approved by
+the Attorney General, after consultation with the Director;
+(2) Conduct counterintelligence activities; and
+(3) Conduct foreign intelligence and
+counterintelligence liaison relationships with intelligence,
+security, and law enforcement services of foreign governments or
+international organizations in accordance with
+sections 1.3(b) (4) and 1.7(a) (6) of this order.
+(h) THE INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS OF
+THE COAST GUARD. The Commandant of the Coast Guard shall:
+(1) Collect (including through clandestine means),
+analyze, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence and
+counterintelligence including defense and defense-related
+information and intelligence to support national and
+departmental missions;
+(2) Conduct counterintelligence activities;
+(3) Monitor the development, procurement, and
+management of tactical intelligence systems and equipment and
+conduct related research, development, and test and evaluation
+activities; and
+(4) Conduct foreign intelligence liaison
+relationships and intelligence exchange programs with foreign
+intelligence services, security services or international
+23
+
+organizations in accordance with sections 1.3(b) (4), 1.7(a)(6),
+and, when operating as part of the Department of Defense,
+1.10 (i) of this order.
+(i) THE BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, DEPARTMENT OF
+STATE; THE OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, DEPARTMENT OF
+THE TREASURY; THE OFFICE OF NATIONAL SECURITY INTELLIGENCE, DRUG
+ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION; THE OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND
+ANALYSIS, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; AND THE OFFICE OF
+INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY.
+The heads of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department
+of State; the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Department
+of the Treasury; the Office of National Security Intelligence,
+Drug Enforcement Administration; the Office of Intelligence and
+Analysis, Department of Homeland Security; and the Office of
+Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Department of Energy
+shall:
+(1) Collect (overtly or through publicly available
+sources), analyze, produce, and disseminate information,
+intelligence, and counterintelligence to support national and
+departmental missions; and
+(2) Conduct and participate in analytic or
+information exchanges with foreign partners and international
+organizations in accordance with sections 1.3 (b) (4) and
+1.7 (a) (6) of this order.
+(j) THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
+The Director shall collect (overtly or through publicly
+available sources), analyze, produce, and disseminate
+information, intelligence, and counterintelligence to support
+the missions of the Office of the Director of National
+Intelligence, including the National Counterterrorism Center,
+and to support other national missions.
+1.8 The Department of State. In addition to the authorities
+24
+
+exercised by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research under
+sections 1.4 and 1.7(i) of this order, the Secretary of State
+shall:
+(a) Collect (overtly or through publicly available
+sources) information relevant to United States foreign policy
+and national security concerns;
+(b) Disseminate, to the maximum extent possible, reports
+received from United States diplomatic and consular posts;
+(c) Transmit reporting requirements and advisory taskings
+of the Intelligence Community to the Chiefs of United States
+Missions abroad; and
+(d) Support Chiefs of United States Missions in
+discharging their responsibilities pursuant to law and
+presidential direction.
+1.9 The Department of the Treasury. In addition to the
+authorities exercised by the Office of Intelligence and Analysis
+of the Department of the Treasury under sections 1.4 and 1.7(i)
+of this order the Secretary of the Treasury shall collect
+(overtly or through publicly available sources) foreign
+financial information and, in consultation with the Department
+of State, foreign economic information.
+1.10 The Department of Defense. The Secretary of Defense
+shall:
+(a) Collect (including through clandestine means),
+analyze, produce, and disseminate information and intelligence
+and be responsive to collection tasking and advisory tasking by
+the Director;
+(b) Collect (including through clandestine means),
+analyze, produce, and disseminate defense and defense-related
+intelligence and counterintelligence, as required for execution
+of the Secretary's responsibilities;
+(c) Conduct programs and missions necessary to fulfill
+25
+
+national, departmental, and tactical intelligence requirements;
+(d) Conduct counterintelligence activities in support
+of Department of Defense components and coordinate
+counterintelligence activities in accordance with
+section 1.3 (b) (20) and (21) of this order;
+(e) Act, in coordination with the Director, as the
+executive agent of the United States Government for signals
+intelligence activities;
+(f) Provide for the timely transmission of critical
+intelligence, as defined by the Director, within the
+United States Government;
+(g) Carry out or contract for research, development,
+and procurement of technical systems and devices relating to
+authorized intelligence functions;
+(h) Protect the security of Department of Defense
+installations, activities, information, property, and
+employees by appropriate means, including such investigations
+of applicants, employees, contractors, and other persons with
+similar associations with the Department of Defense as are
+necessary;
+(i) Establish and maintain defense intelligence
+relationships and defense intelligence exchange programs
+with selected cooperative foreign defense establishments,
+intelligence or security services of foreign governments, and
+international organizations, and ensure that such relationships
+and programs are in accordance with sections 1.3(b) (4),
+1.3 (b) (21) and 1.7(a) (6) of this order;
+(j) Conduct such administrative and technical support
+activities within and outside the United States as are necessary
+to provide for cover and proprietary arrangements, to perform
+the functions described in sections (a) though (i) above, and to
+support the Intelligence Community elements of the Department of
+26
+
+Defense; and
+(k) Use the Intelligence Community elements within the
+Department of Defense identified in section 1.7(b) through (f)
+and, when the Coast Guard is operating as part of the Department
+of Defense,
+(h) above to carry out the Secretary of Defense's
+responsibilities assigned in this section or other departments,
+agencies, or offices within the Department of Defense, as
+appropriate, to conduct the intelligence missions and
+responsibilities assigned to the Secretary of Defense.
+1.11 The Department of Homeland Security. In addition to the
+authorities exercised by the Office of Intelligence and Analysis
+of the Department of Homeland Security under sections 1.4 and
+1.7(i) of this order, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall
+conduct, through the United States Secret Service, activities to
+determine the existence and capability of surveillance equipment
+being used against the President or the Vice President of the
+United States, the Executive Office of the President, and,
+as authorized by the Secretary of Homeland Security or the
+President, other Secret Service protectees and United States
+officials. No information shall be acquired intentionally
+through such activities except to protect against use of such
+surveillance equipment, and those activities shall be conducted
+pursuant to procedures agreed upon by the Secretary of Homeland
+Security and the Attorney General.
+1.12 The Department of Energy. In addition to the authorities
+exercised by the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence
+of the Department of Energy under sections 1.4 and 1.7(i) of
+this order, the Secretary of Energy shall:
+(a) Provide expert scientific, technical, analytic, and
+research capabilities to other agencies within the Intelligence
+Community, as appropriate;
+27
+(b) Participate in formulating intelligence collection and
+analysis requirements where the special expert capability of the
+Department can contribute; and
+(c) Participate with the Department of State in overtly
+collecting information with respect to foreign energy matters.
+1.13 The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
+In addition to the
+authorities exercised by the intelligence elements of the
+Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice
+under sections 1.4 and 1.7(g) of this order and under the
+supervision of the Attorney General and pursuant to such
+regulations as the Attorney General may establish, the Director
+of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall provide technical
+assistance, within or outside the United States, to foreign
+intelligence and law enforcement services, consistent with
+section 1.3 (b) (20) and (21) of this order, as may be necessary
+to support national or departmental missions.
+PART 2 Conduct of Intelligence Activities
+2.1 Need.
+Timely, accurate, and insightful information about
+the activities, capabilities, plans, and intentions of foreign
+powers, organizations, and persons, and their agents, is
+essential to informed decisionmaking in the areas of national
+security, national defense, and foreign relations.
+Collection
+of such information is a priority objective and will be pursued
+in a vigorous, innovative, and responsible manner that is
+consistent with the Constitution and applicable law and
+respectful of the principles upon which the United States was
+founded.
+2.2 Purpose. This Order is intended to enhance human and
+technical collection techniques, especially those undertaken
+abroad, and the acquisition of significant foreign intelligence,
+as well as the detection and countering of international
+terrorist activities, the spread of weapons of mass destruction,
+28
+and espionage conducted by foreign powers. Set forth below are
+certain general principles that, in addition to and consistent
+with applicable laws, are intended to achieve the proper balance
+between the acquisition of essential information and protection
+of individual interests. Nothing in this Order shall be
+construed to apply to or interfere with any authorized civil or
+criminal law enforcement responsibility of any department or
+agency.
+2.3 Collection of information.
+Elements of the Intelligence
+Community are authorized to collect, retain, or disseminate
+information concerning United States persons only in accordance
+with procedures established by the head of the Intelligence
+Community element concerned or by the head of a department
+containing such element and approved by the Attorney General,
+consistent with the authorities provided by Part 1 of this
+Order, after consultation with the Director.
+Those procedures
+shall permit collection, retention, and dissemination of the
+following types of information:
+(a) Information that is publicly available or collected
+with the consent of the person concerned;
+(b) Information constituting foreign intelligence or
+counterintelligence, including such information concerning
+corporations or other commercial organizations.
+Collection
+within the United States of foreign intelligence not otherwise
+obtainable shall be undertaken by the Federal Bureau of
+Investigation (FBI) or, when significant foreign intelligence is
+sought, by other authorized elements of the Intelligence
+Community, provided that no foreign intelligence collection by
+such elements may be undertaken for the purpose of acquiring
+information concerning the domestic activities of United States
+persons;
+(c) Information obtained in the course of a lawful foreign
+29
+intelligence, counterintelligence, international drug or
+international terrorism investigation;
+(d) Information needed to protect the safety of any persons
+or organizations, including those who are targets, victims, or
+hostages of international terrorist organizations;
+(e) Information needed to protect foreign intelligence or
+counterintelligence sources, methods, and activities from
+unauthorized disclosure. Collection within the United States
+shall be undertaken by the FBI except that other elements of the
+Intelligence Community may also collect such information
+concerning present or former employees, present or former
+intelligence element contractors or their present or former
+employees, or applicants for such employment or contracting;
+(f) Information concerning persons who are reasonably
+believed to be potential sources or contacts for the purpose of
+determining their suitability or credibility;
+(g) Information arising out of a lawful personnel,
+physical, or communications security investigation;
+(h) Information acquired by overhead reconnaissance not
+directed at specific United States persons;
+(i) Incidentally obtained information that may indicate
+involvement in activities that may violate Federal, state,
+local, or foreign laws; and
+(j) Information necessary for administrative purposes.
+In addition, elements of the Intelligence Community may
+disseminate information to each appropriate element within the
+Intelligence Community for purposes of allowing the recipient
+element to determine whether the information is relevant to its
+responsibilities and can be retained by it, except that
+information derived from signals intelligence may only be
+disseminated or made available to Intelligence Community
+elements in accordance with procedures established by the
+30
+Director in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and
+approved by the Attorney General.
+2.4 Collection Techniques. Elements of the Intelligence
+Community shall use the least intrusive collection techniques
+feasible within the United States or directed against
+United States persons abroad. Elements of the Intelligence
+Community are not authorized to use such techniques as
+electronic surveillance, unconsented physical searches, mail-
+surveillance, physical surveillance, or monitoring devices
+unless they are in accordance with procedures established by the
+head of the Intelligence Community element concerned or the head
+of a department containing such element and approved by the
+Attorney General, after consultation with the Director.
+procedures shall protect constitutional and other legal rights
+and limit use of such information to lawful governmental
+purposes.
+These procedures shall not authorize:
+Such
+(a) The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to engage in
+electronic surveillance within the United States except for the
+purpose of training, testing, or conducting countermeasures to
+hostile electronic surveillance;
+(b) Unconsented physical searches in the United States by
+elements of the Intelligence Community other than the FBI,
+except for:
+(1) Searches by counterintelligence elements of the
+military services directed against military personnel within the
+United States or abroad for intelligence purposes, when
+authorized by a military commander empowered to approve physical
+searches for law enforcement purposes, based upon a finding of
+probable cause to believe that such persons are acting as agents
+of foreign powers; and
+(2) Searches by CIA of personal property of non-
+United States persons lawfully in its possession;
+31
+(c) Physical surveillance of a United States person in the
+United States by elements of the Intelligence Community other
+than the FBI, except for:
+(1) Physical surveillance of present or former
+employees, present or former intelligence element contractors or
+their present or former employees, or applicants for any such
+employment or contracting; and
+(2) Physical surveillance of a military person
+employed by a non-intelligence element of a military service;
+and
+(d) Physical surveillance of a United States person abroad
+to collect foreign intelligence, except to obtain significant
+information that cannot reasonably be acquired by other means.
+2.5 Attorney General Approval. The Attorney General hereby is
+delegated the power to approve the use for intelligence
+purposes, within the United States or against a United States
+person abroad, of any technique for which a warrant would be
+required if undertaken for law enforcement purposes, provided
+that such techniques shall not be undertaken unless the Attorney
+General has determined in each case that there is probable cause
+to believe that the technique is directed against a foreign
+power or an agent of a foreign power. The authority delegated
+pursuant to this paragraph, including the authority to approve
+the use of electronic surveillance as defined in the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, shall be
+exercised in accordance with that Act.
+2.6 Assistance to Law Enforcement and other Civil Authorities.
+Elements of the Intelligence Community are authorized to:
+(a) Cooperate with appropriate law enforcement agencies for
+the purpose of protecting the employees, information, property,
+and facilities of any element of the Intelligence Community;
+(b) Unless otherwise precluded by law or this Order,
+32
+participate in law enforcement activities to investigate or
+prevent clandestine intelligence activities by foreign powers,
+or international terrorist or narcotics activities;
+(c) Provide specialized equipment, technical knowledge, or
+assistance of expert personnel for use by any department or
+agency, or when lives are endangered, to support local law
+enforcement agencies. Provision of assistance by expert
+personnel shall be approved in each case by the general counsel
+of the providing element or department; and
+(d) Render any other assistance and cooperation to law
+enforcement or other civil authorities not precluded by
+applicable law.
+2.7 Contracting.
+Elements of the Intelligence Community are
+authorized to enter into contracts or arrangements for the
+provision of goods or services with private companies or
+institutions in the United States and need not reveal the
+sponsorship of such contracts or arrangements for authorized
+intelligence purposes. Contracts or arrangements with academic
+institutions may be undertaken only with the consent of
+appropriate officials of the institution.
+2.8 Consistency With Other Laws. Nothing in this Order shall be
+construed to authorize any activity in violation of the
+Constitution or statutes of the United States.
+2.9 Undisclosed Participation in Organizations Within the
+United States. No one acting on behalf of elements of the
+Intelligence Community may join or otherwise participate in any
+organization in the United States on behalf of any element of
+the Intelligence Community without disclosing such person's
+intelligence affiliation to appropriate officials of the
+organization, except in accordance with procedures established
+by the head of the Intelligence Community element concerned or
+the head of a department containing such element and approved by
+33
+the Attorney General, after consultation with the Director.
+Such participation shall be authorized only if it is essential
+to achieving lawful purposes as determined by the Intelligence
+Community element head or designee. No such participation may
+be undertaken for the purpose of influencing the activity of the
+organization or its members except in cases where:
+(a) The participation is undertaken on behalf of the FBI in
+the course of a lawful investigation; or
+(b) The organization concerned is composed primarily of
+individuals who are not United States persons and is reasonably
+believed to be acting on behalf of a foreign power.
+2.10 Human Experimentation.
+No element of the Intelligence
+Community shall sponsor, contract for, or conduct research on
+human subjects except in accordance with guidelines issued by
+the Department of Health and Human Services. The subject's
+informed consent shall be documented as required by those
+guidelines.
+2.11 Prohibition on Assassination.
+No person employed by or
+acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in
+or conspire to engage in assassination.
+2.12 Indirect Participation. No element of the Intelligence
+Community shall participate in or request any person to
+undertake activities forbidden by this Order.
+2.13 Limitation on Covert Action. No covert action may be
+conducted which is intended to influence United States political
+processes, public opinion, policies, or media.
+PART 3
+General Provisions
+3.1 Congressional Oversight. The duties and responsibilities of
+the Director and the heads of other departments, agencies,
+elements, and entities engaged in intelligence activities to
+cooperate with the Congress in the conduct of its
+responsibilities for oversight of intelligence activities shall
+34
+be implemented in accordance with applicable law, including
+title V of the Act. The requirements of applicable law,
+including title V of the Act, shall apply to all covert action
+activities as defined in this Order.
+3.2 Implementation.
+The President, supported by the NSC,
+and the Director shall issue such appropriate directives,
+procedures, and guidance as are necessary to implement this
+order. Heads of elements within the Intelligence Community
+shall issue appropriate procedures and supplementary directives
+consistent with this order. No procedures to implement Part 2
+of this order shall be issued without the Attorney General's
+approval, after consultation with the Director. The Attorney
+General shall provide a statement of reasons for not approving
+any procedures established by the head of an element in the
+Intelligence Community (or the head of the department containing
+such element) other than the FBI. In instances where the
+element head or department head and the Attorney General are
+unable to reach agreements on other than constitutional or other
+legal grounds, the Attorney General, the head of department
+concerned, or the Director shall refer the matter to the NSC.
+3.3 Procedures. The activities herein authorized that
+require procedures shall be conducted in accordance with
+existing procedures or requirements established under Executive
+Order 12333. New procedures, as required by Executive
+Order 12333, as further amended, shall be established as
+expeditiously as possible. All new procedures promulgated
+pursuant to Executive Order 12333, as amended, shall be made
+available to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate
+and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House
+of Representatives.
+3.4 References and Transition.
+References to "Senior Officials
+of the Intelligence Community" or "SOICS" in executive orders or
+35
+other Presidential guidance, shall be deemed references to the
+heads of elements in the Intelligence Community, unless the
+President otherwise directs; references in Intelligence
+Community or Intelligence Community element policies or
+guidance, shall be deemed to be references to the heads of
+elements of the Intelligence Community, unless the President or
+the Director otherwise directs.
+3.5 Definitions. For the purposes of this Order, the following
+terms shall have these meanings:
+(a) Counterintelligence means information gathered and
+activities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or
+protect against espionage, other intelligence activities,
+sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of
+foreign powers, organizations, or persons, or their agents, or
+international terrorist organizations or activities.
+(b) Covert action means an activity or activities of the
+United States Government to influence political, economic, or
+military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role
+of the United States Government will not be apparent or
+acknowledged publicly, but does not include:
+(1) Activities the primary purpose of which is to
+acquire intelligence, traditional counterintelligence
+activities, traditional activities to improve or maintain the
+operational security of United States Government programs, or
+administrative activities;
+(2)
+Traditional diplomatic or military activities or
+routine support to such activities;
+(3)
+Traditional law enforcement activities conducted
+by United States Government law enforcement agencies or routine
+support to such activities; or
+(4)
+Activities to provide routine support to the
+overt activities (other than activities described in
+36
+paragraph (1), (2), or (3)) of other United States Government
+agencies abroad.
+(c)
+Electronic surveillance means acquisition of a
+nonpublic communication by electronic means without the consent
+of a person who is a party to an electronic communication or, in
+the case of a nonelectronic communication, without the consent
+of a person who is visibly present at the place of
+communication, but not including the use of radio direction-
+finding equipment solely to determine the location of a
+transmitter.
+(d) Employee means a person employed by, assigned
+or detailed to, or acting for an element within the Intelligence
+Community.
+(e)
+Foreign intelligence means information relating to the
+capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign governments
+or elements thereof, foreign organizations, foreign persons, or
+international terrorists.
+(f) Intelligence includes foreign intelligence and
+counterintelligence.
+(g) Intelligence activities means all activities that
+elements of the Intelligence Community are authorized to conduct
+pursuant to this order.
+(h) Intelligence Community and elements of the
+Intelligence Community refers to:
+(1)
+The Office of the Director of National
+Intelligence;
+(2)
+The Central Intelligence Agency;
+(3) The National Security Agency;
+(4)
+The Defense Intelligence Agency;
+(5) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency;
+(6)
+The National Reconnaissance Office;
+(7)
+The other offices within the Department
+37
+of Defense for the collection of specialized national foreign
+intelligence through reconnaissance programs;
+(8) The intelligence and counterintelligence
+elements of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine
+Corps;
+(9) The intelligence elements of the Federal Bureau
+of Investigation;
+(10) The Office of National Security Intelligence of
+the Drug Enforcement Administration;
+(11) The Office of Intelligence and
+Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy;
+(12) The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the
+Department of State;
+(13) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the
+Department of the Treasury;
+(14) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the
+Department of Homeland Security;
+(15) The intelligence and counterintelligence
+elements of the Coast Guard; and
+(16) Such other elements of any department or agency
+as may be designated by the President, or designated jointly by
+the Director and the head of the department or agency concerned,
+as an element of the Intelligence Community.
+(i) National Intelligence and Intelligence Related to
+National Security means all intelligence, regardless of the
+source from which derived and including information gathered
+within or outside the United States, that pertains, as
+determined consistent with any guidance issued by the President,
+or that is determined for the purpose of access to information
+by the Director in accordance with section 1.3(a) (1) of this
+order, to pertain to more than one United States Government
+agency; and that involves threats to the United States, its
+
+38
+
+people, property, or interests; the development, proliferation,
+or use of weapons of mass destruction; or any other matter
+bearing on United States national or homeland security.
+(j) The National Intelligence Program means all programs,
+projects, and activities of the Intelligence Community, as well
+as any other programs of the Intelligence Community designated
+jointly by the Director and the head of a United States
+department or agency or by the President. Such term does not
+include programs, projects, or activities of the military
+departments to acquire intelligence solely for the planning and
+conduct of tactical military operations by United States Armed
+Forces.
+(k) United States person means a United States citizen, an
+alien known by the intelligence element concerned to be a
+permanent resident alien, an unincorporated association
+substantially composed of United States citizens or permanent
+resident aliens, or a corporation incorporated in the
+United States, except for a corporation directed and controlled
+by a foreign government or governments.
+3.6 Revocation. Executive Orders 13354 and 13355 of August 27,
+2004, are revoked; and paragraphs 1.3(b) (9) and (10) of Part 1
+supersede provisions within Executive Order 12958, as amended,
+to the extent such provisions in Executive Order 12958, as
+amended, are inconsistent with this Order.
+3.7 General Provisions.
+(a) Consistent with section 1.3(c) of this order, nothing
+in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
+(1) Authority granted by law to a department or
+agency, or the head thereof, or
+(2) Functions of the Director of the Office of
+Management and Budget relating to budget,
+administrative, or legislative proposals.
+
+39
+
+(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with
+applicable law and subject to the availability of
+appropriations.
+(c) This order is intended only to improve the internal
+management of the executive branch and is not intended to,
+and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or
+procedural, enforceable at law or in equity, by any party
+against the United States, its departments, agencies or
+entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other
+person.
+
+/s/ Ronald Reagan
+
+THE WHITE HOUSE
+December 4, 1981
+
+40
+
+DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
+Publicly available -
+this doc ends on
+page 108
+DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
+DoD 5240 1-R
+
+PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE
+ACTIVITIES OF
+DOD INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS
+THAT AFFECT UNITED STATES PERSONS
+
+DECEMBER 1982
+
+UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
+
+1
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+FOREWORD
+
+This DoD regulation sets forth procedures governing the activities of DoD
+intelligence components that affect United States persons. It implements DoD
+Directive 5240.1, and replaces the November 30, 1979 version of DoD Regulation
+5240.1-R. It is applicable to all DoD intelligence components.
+
+Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," stipulates
+that certain activities of intelligence components that affect U.S. persons be
+governed by procedures issued by the agency head and approved by the Attorney
+General. Specifically, procedures 1 through 10, as well as Appendix A, herein,
+require approval by the Attorney General. Procedures 11 through 15, while not
+requiring approval by the Attorney General, contain further guidance to DoD
+Components in implementing Executive Order 12333 as well as Executive Order
+12334, "President's Intelligence Oversight Board".
+
+Accordingly, by this memorandum, these procedures are approved for use
+within the Department of Defense. Heads of DoD components shall issue such
+implementing instructions as may be necessary for the conduct of authorized
+functions in a manner consistent with the procedures set forth herein.
+
+This regulation is effective immediately.
+
+Attorney General of the
+United States
+10/4/82
+Secretary of Defense
+12/7/82
+
+2
+FOREWORD
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+TABLE OF CONTENTS
+
+Page
+FOREWORD
+TABLE OF CONTENTS
+REFERENCES
+DEFINITIONS
+
+CHAPTER 1 - PROCEDURE 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
+C1.1. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE
+CI.2. SCOPE
+C1.3. INTERPRETATION
+CI.4. EXCEPTIONS TO POLICY
+CI.5. AMENDMENT
+
+CHAPTER 2 - PROCEDURE 2. COLLECTION OF INFORMATION ABOUT
+UNITED STATES PERSONS
+C2.1. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE
+C2.2. EXPLANATION OF UNDEFINED TERMS
+C2.3. TYPES OF INFORMATION THAT MAY BE COLLECTED ABOUT
+UNITED STATES PERSONS
+C2.4. GENERAL CRITERIA GOVERNING THE MEANS USED TO COLLECT
+INFORMATION ABOUT UNITED STATES PERSONS
+C2.5. SPECIAL LIMITATION ON THE COLLECTION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
+WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
+
+CHAPTER 3 - PROCEDURE 3. RETENTION OF INFORMATION ABOUT
+UNITED STATES PERSONS
+C3.1. APPLICABILITY
+C3.2. EXPLANATION OF UNDEFINED TERMS
+C3.3. CRITERIA FOR RETENTION
+C3.4. ACCESS AND RETENTION
+
+CHAPTER 4 - PROCEDURE 4. DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION ABOUT
+UNITED STATES PERSONS
+C4.1. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE
+C4.2. CRITERIA FOR DISSEMINATION
+C4.3. OTHER DISSEMINATION
+
+2
+3
+6
+7
+
+13
+13
+13
+14
+14
+14
+
+15
+
+15
+15
+16
+
+18
+18
+
+20
+
+20
+20
+20
+21
+
+22
+
+22
+22
+23
+
+3
+TABLE OF CONTENTS
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+TABLE OF CONTENTS, continued
+
+CHAPTER 5 - PROCEDURE 5. ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
+C5.1. PART 1. ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE IN THE UNITED STATES
+FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES
+C5.2. PART 2. ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES
+FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES
+C5.3. PART 3. SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
+C5.4. PART 4. TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASUSRES
+C5.5. PART 5. DEVELOPING, TESTING AND CALIBRATION OF
+ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT
+C5.6. PART 6. TRAINING OF PERSONNEL IN THE OPERATION AND USE
+OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS AND SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT
+C5.7. PART 7. CONDUCT OF VULNERABILITY AND HEARABILITY SURVEYS
+
+CHAPTER 6 - PROCEDURE 6. CONCEALED MONITORING
+C6.1. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE
+C6.2. EXPLANATION OF UNDEFINED TERMS
+C6.3. PROCEDURES
+
+CHAPTER 7 - PROCEDURE 7. PHYSICAL SEARCHES
+C7.1. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE
+C7.2. EXPLANATION OF UNDEFINED TERMS
+C7.3. PROCEDURES
+
+CHAPTER-8 - PROCEDURE 8. SEARCHES AND EXAMINATION OF MAIL
+C8.1. APPLICABILITY
+C8.2. EXPLANATION OF UNDEFINED TERMS
+C8.3. PROCEDURES
+
+CHAPTER 9 - PROCEDURE 9. PHYSICAL SURVEILLANCE
+C9.1. APPLICABILITY
+C9.2. EXPLANATION OF UNDEFINED TERMS
+C9.3. PROCEDURES
+
+Page
+24
+
+24
+25
+
+28
+31
+32
+
+34
+36
+
+38
+38
+38
+39
+
+41
+41
+41
+41
+
+45
+45
+45
+46
+
+47
+47
+47
+47
+
+4
+TABLE OF CONTENTS
+DoD 5240 1-R, December 1982
+
+TABLE OF CONTENTS, continued
+
+CHAPTER 10 - PROCEDURE 10, UNDISCLOSED PARTICIPATION IN ORGANIZATIONS
+C10.1. APPLICABILITY
+C10.2. EXPLANATION OF UNDEFINED TERMS
+C10.3. PROCEDURES FOR UNDISCLOSED PARTICIPATION
+C10.4. DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT
+
+CHAPTER 11 - PROCEDURE 11, CONTRACTING FOR GOODS AND SERVICES
+C11.1. APPLICABILITY
+C11.2. PROCEDURES
+C11.3. EFFECT OF NONCOMPLIANCE
+
+CHAPTER 12 - PROCEDURE 12. PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE TO LAW
+ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES
+C12.1. APPLICABILITY
+C12.2. PROCEDURES
+
+CHAPTER 13 - PROCEDURE 13. EXPERIMENTATION ON HUMAN SUBJECTS
+FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES
+C13.1. APPLICABILITY
+C13.2. EXPLANATION OF UNDEFINED TERMS
+C13.3. PROCEDURES
+
+CHAPTER 14 - PROCEDURE 14. EMPLOYEE CONDUCT
+C14.1. APPLICABILITY
+C14.2. PROCEDURES
+
+CHAPTER 15 - PROCEDURE 15, IDENTIFYING, INVESTIGATING, AND
+REPORTING QUESTIONABLE ACTIVITIES
+C15.1, APPLICABILITY
+C15.2. EXPLANATION OF UNDEFINED TERMS
+C15.3. PROCEDURES
+
+Page
+49
+49
+49
+50
+53
+
+54
+54
+54
+55
+
+56
+56
+56
+
+58
+58
+58
+58
+
+60
+60
+60
+
+62
+62
+62
+62
+
+5
+TABLE OF CONTENTS
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+REFERENCES
+
+(a) Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities,"December 4, 1981
+(b) Public Law 95-511, "Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978"
+(c) DoD Directive 5200.29, "DoD Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM)
+Survey Program," February 12, 1975
+(d) Chapters 105 and 119 of title 18, United States Code
+(e) Public Law 73-416, "Communications Act of 1934," Section 605
+(f) Sections 801-840 of title 10, United States Code, "Uniform Code of Military
+Justice"
+(g) Agreement Between the Deputy Secretary of Defense and Attorney General, April 5,
+1979
+(h) Executive Order 12198, "Prescribing Amendments to the Manual for
+Courts-Martial, United States, 1969," March 12, 1980
+(i) DoD Directive 5525.5, "DoD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials,"
+March 22, 1982
+(j) DoD Directive 5000.11, "Data Elements and Data Codes Standardization Program,"
+December 7, 1964
+(k) DoD Directive 5000.19, "Policies for the Management and Control of Information
+Requirements," March 12, 1976
+
+6
+REFERENCES
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+DL1. DEFINITIONS
+
+DL1.1.1. Administrative Purposes. Information is collected for "administrative
+purposes" when it is necessary for the administration of the component concerned, but
+is not collected directly in performance of the intelligence activities assigned such
+component. Examples include information relating to the past performance of
+potential contractors; information to enable such components to discharge their public
+affairs and legislative duties, including the maintenance of correspondence files; the
+maintenance of employee personnel and training records; and training materials or
+documents produced at training facilities.
+
+DL1.1.2. Available Publicly. Information that has been published or broadcast for
+general public consumption, is available on request to a member of the general public,
+could lawfully be seen or heard by any casual observer, or is made available at a meeting
+open to the general public. In this context, the "general public" also means general
+availability to persons in a military community even though the military community is
+not open to the civilian general public.
+
+DL1.1.3. Communications Security. Protective measures taken to deny
+unauthorized persons information derived from telecommunications of the U.S.
+Government related to national security and to ensure the authenticity of such
+telecommunications.
+
+DL1.1.4. Consent. The agreement by a person or organization to permit DoD
+intelligence components to take particular actions that affect the person or
+organization. Consent may be oral or written unless a specific form of consent is
+required by a particular procedure. Consent may be implied if adequate notice is
+provided that a particular action (such as entering a building) carries with it the
+presumption of consent to an accompanying action (such as search of briefcases).
+(Questions regarding what is adequate notice in particular circumstances should be
+referred to the legal office responsible for advising the DoD intelligence component
+concerned.)
+
+DL1.1.5. Counterintelligence. Information gathered and activities conducted to
+protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations
+conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons, or international
+terrorist activities, but not including personnel, physical, document, or communications
+security programs.
+
+7
+DEFINITIONS
+
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+DL1.1.6. Counterintelligence Investigation. Includes inquiries and other activities
+undertaken to determine whether a particular United States person is acting for, or on
+behalf of, a foreign power for purposes of conducting espionage and other intelligence
+activities, sabotage, assassinations, international terrorist activities, and actions to
+neutralize such acts.
+
+DL1.1.7. DoD Component. Includes the Office of the Secretary of Defense, each
+of the Military Departments, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified
+and Specified Commands, and the Defense Agencies.
+
+DL1.1.8. DoD Intelligence Components. Include the following organizations:
+
+DL1.1.8.1. The National Security Agency/Central Security Service.
+
+DL1.1.8.2. The Defense Intelligence Agency.
+
+DL1.1.8.3. The offices within the Department of Defense for the collection
+of specialized national foreign intelligence through reconnaissance programs.
+
+DL1.1.8.4. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Army General Staff.
+
+DL1.1.8.5. The Office of Naval Intelligence.
+
+DL1.1.8.6. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, U. S. Air Force.
+
+DL1.1.8.7. The Army Intelligence and Security Command.
+
+DL1.1.8.8. The Naval Intelligence Command.
+
+DL1.1.8.9. The Naval Security Group Command.
+
+DL1.1.8.10. The Director of Intelligence, U.S. Marine Corps.
+
+DL1.1.8.11. The Air Force Intelligence Service.
+
+DL1.1.8.12. The Electronic Security Command, U.S. Air Force.
+
+DL1.1.8.13. The counterintelligence elements of the Naval Investigative
+Service.
+
+DL1.1.8.14. The counterintelligence elements of the Air Force Office of
+Special Investigations.
+
+8
+DEFINITIONS
+
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+DL1.1.8.15. The 650th Military Intelligence Group, SHAPE.
+
+DL1.1.8.16. Other organizations, staffs, and offices, when used for foreign
+intelligence or counterintelligence activities to which part 2 of E.O. 12333 (reference
+(a)), applies, provided that the heads of such organizations, staffs, and offices shall not
+be considered as heads of DoD intelligence components for purposes of this
+Regulation.
+
+DL1.1.9. Electronic Surveillance. Acquisition of a nonpublic communication by
+electronic means without the consent of a person who is a party to an electronic
+communication or, in the case of a non-electronic communication, without the consent
+of a person who is visibly present at the place of communication, but not including the
+use of radio direction finding equipment solely to determine the location of a
+transmitter. (Electronic surveillance within the United States is subject to the
+definitions in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (reference (b)).)
+
+DL1.1.10. Employee. A person employed by, assigned to, or acting for an agency
+within the intelligence community, including contractors and persons otherwise acting at
+the direction of such an agency.
+
+DL1.1.11. Foreign Intelligence. Information relating to the capabilities, intentions,
+and activities of foreign powers, organizations, or persons, but not including
+counterintelligence except for information on international terrorist activities.
+
+DL1.1.12. Foreign Power. Any foreign government (regardless of whether
+recognized by the United States), foreign-based political party (or faction thereof),
+foreign military force, foreign-based terrorist group, or any organization composed, in
+major part, of any such entity or entities.
+
+DL1.1.13. Intelligence Activities. Refers to all activities that DoD intelligence
+components are authorized to undertake pursuant to Executive Order 12333 (reference
+(a)).
+
+DL1.1.14. Intelligence Community and an Agency of Or Within the Intelligence
+Community. Refers to the following organizations:
+
+DL1.1.14.1. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
+
+DL1.1.14.2. The National Security Agency (NSA).
+
+DL1.1.14.3. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).
+
+9
+DEFINITIONS
+
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+DL1.1.14.4. The Offices within the Department of Defense for the collection
+of specialized national foreign intelligence through reconnaissance programs.
+
+DL1.1.14.5. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of
+State.
+
+DL1.1.14.6. The intelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force
+and the Marine Corps, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of the
+Treasury, and the Department of Energy.
+
+DL1.1.14.7. The staff elements of the Office of the Director of Central
+Intelligence.
+
+DL1.1.15. International Narcotics Activities. Refers to activities outside the
+United States to produce, transfer or sell narcotics or other substances controlled in
+accordance with Sections 811 and 812 of title 21, United States Code.
+
+DL1.1.16. International Terrorist Activities. Activities undertaken by or in support
+of terrorists or terrorist organizations that occur totally outside the United States, or
+that transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are
+accomplished, the persons they appear intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in
+which the perpetrators operate or seek asylum.
+
+DL1.1.17. Lawful Investigation. An investigation qualifies as a lawful investigation
+if the subject of the investigation is within DoD investigative jurisdiction; if it is
+conducted by a DoD Component that has authorization to conduct the particular type of
+investigation concerned (for example, counterintelligence, personnel security, physical
+security, communications security); and if the investigation is conducted in accordance
+with applicable law and policy, including E.O. 12333 and this Regulation.
+
+DL1.1.18. Personnel Security. Measures designed to insure that persons
+employed, or being considered for employment, in sensitive positions of trust are
+suitable for such employment with respect to loyalty, character, emotional stability, and
+reliability and that such employment is clearly consistent with the interests of the
+national security. It includes measures designed to ensure that persons granted access
+to classified information remain suitable for such access and that access is consistent
+with the interests of national security.
+
+DL1.1.19. Personnel Security Investigation:
+
+10
+DEFINITIONS
+
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+DL1.1.19.1. An inquiry into the activities of a person granted access to
+intelligence or other classified information; or a person who is being considered for
+access to intelligence or other classified information, including persons who are
+granted or may be granted access to facilities of DoD intelligence components; or a
+person to be assigned or retained in a position with sensitive duties.emsp; The
+investigation is designed to develop information pertaining to the suitability, eligibility,
+and trustworthiness of the individual with respect to loyalty, character, emotional
+stability and reliability.
+
+DL1.1.19.2. Inquiries and other activities directed against DoD employees or
+members of a Military Service to determine the facts of possible voluntary or
+involuntary compromise of classified information by them.
+
+DL1.1.19.3. The collection of information about or from military personnel in
+the course of tactical training exercises for security training purposes.
+
+DL1.1.20. Physical Security. The physical measures taken to prevent unauthorized
+access to, and prevent the damage or loss of, equipment, facilities, materiel and
+documents; and measures undertaken to protect DoD personnel from physical threats to
+their safety.
+
+DL1.1.21. Physical Security Investigation. All inquiries, inspections, or surveys
+of the effectiveness of controls and procedures designed to provide physical security;
+and all inquiries and other actions undertaken to obtain information pertaining to
+physical threats to DoD personnel or property.
+
+DL1.1.22. Reasonable Belief. A reasonable belief arises when the facts and
+circumstances are such that a reasonable person would hold the belief. Reasonable
+belief must rest on facts and circumstances that can be articulated; "hunches" or
+intuitions are not sufficient. Reasonable belief can be based on experience, training,
+and knowledge in foreign intelligence or counterintelligence work applied to facts and
+circumstances at hand, so that a trained and experienced "reasonable person" might hold a
+reasonable belief sufficient to satisfy this criterion when someone unfamiliar with
+foreign intelligence or counterintelligence work might not.
+
+DL1.1.23. Signals Intelligence. A category of intelligence including
+communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation
+signals intelligence, either individually or in combination.
+
+DL1.1.24. United States. When used to describe a place, the term shall include
+the territories under the sovereignty of the United States.
+
+11
+DEFINITIONS
+DoD 5240 1-R, December 1982
+
+DL1.1.25. United States Person
+
+DL1.1.25.1. The term "United States person" means:
+
+DL1.1.25.1.1. A United States citizen;
+
+DL1.1.25.1.2. An alien known by the DoD intelligence component concerned to be a permanent resident alien;
+
+DL1.1.25.1.3. An unincorporated association substantially composed of United States citizens or permanent resident aliens;
+
+DL1.1.25.1.4. A corporation incorporated in the United States, except for a corporation directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments. A corporation or corporate subsidiary incorporated abroad, even if partially or wholly owned by a corporation incorporated in the United States, is not a United States person.
+
+DL1.1.25.2. A person or organization outside the United States shall be presumed not to be a United States person unless specific information to the contrary is obtained. An alien in the United States shall be presumed not to be a United States person unless specific information to the contrary is obtained.
+
+DL1.1.25.3. A permanent resident alien is a foreign national lawfully admitted into the United States for permanent residence.
+
+12
+DEFINITIONS
+C1. CHAPTER 1
+PROCEDURE 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
+
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+C1.1. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE
+
+C1.1.1. These procedures apply only to "DoD intelligence components," as defined in the Definitions Section. Procedures 2 through 4 provide the sole authority by which such components may collect, retain and disseminate information concerning United States persons. Procedures 5 through 10 set forth applicable guidance with respect to the use of certain collection techniques to obtain information for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes. Authority to employ such techniques shall be limited to that necessary to perform functions assigned the DoD intelligence component concerned. Procedures 11 through 15 govern other aspects of DoD intelligence activities, including the oversight of such activities.
+
+C1.1.2. The functions of DoD intelligence components not specifically addressed herein shall be carried out in accordance with applicable policy and procedure.
+
+C1.1.3. These procedures do not apply to law enforcement activities, including civil disturbance activities, that may be undertaken by DoD intelligence components. When an investigation or inquiry undertaken pursuant to these procedures establishes reasonable belief that a crime has been committed, the DoD intelligence component concerned shall refer the matter to the appropriate law enforcement agency in accordance with procedures 12 and 15 or, if the DoD intelligence component is otherwise authorized to conduct law enforcement activities, shall continue such investigation under appropriate law enforcement procedures.
+
+C1.1.4. DoD intelligence components shall not request any person or entity to undertake any activity forbidden by Executive Order 12333 (reference (a)).
+
+C1.2. PURPOSE
+
+The purpose of these procedures is to enable DoD intelligence components to carry out effectively their authorized functions while ensuring their activities that affect U.S. persons are carried out in a manner that protects the constitutional rights and privacy of such persons.
+
+13
+CHAPTER 1
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+C1.3. INTERPRETATION
+
+C1.3.1. These procedures shall be interpreted in accordance with their stated purpose.
+
+C1.3.2. All defined terms appear in the Definitions Section. Additional terms, not otherwise defined, are explained in the text of each procedure, as appropriate.
+
+C1.3.3. All questions of interpretation shall be referred to the legal office responsible for advising the DoD intelligence component concerned. Questions that cannot be resolved in this manner shall be referred to the General Counsel of the Military Department concerned, or, as appropriate, the General Counsel of the Department of Defense for resolution.
+
+C1.4. EXCEPTIONS TO POLICY
+
+Requests for exception to the policies and procedures established herein shall be made in writing to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), who shall obtain the written approval of the Secretary of Defense and, if required, the Attorney General for any such exception.
+
+C1.5. AMENDMENT
+
+Requests for amendment of these procedures shall be made to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), who shall obtain the written approval of the Secretary of Defense, and, if required, the Attorney General, for any such amendment.
+
+14
+CHAPTER 1
+C2. CHAPTER 2
+PROCEDURE 2. COLLECTION OF
+INFORMATION ABOUT UNITED STATES PERSONS
+
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+C2.1. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE
+
+This procedure specifies the kinds of information about United States persons that may be collected by DoD intelligence components and sets forth general criteria governing the means used to collect such information. Additional limitations are imposed in Procedures 5 through 10 on the use of specific collection techniques.
+
+C2.2. EXPLANATION OF UNDEFINED TERMS
+
+C2.2.1. Collection. Information shall be considered as "collected" only when it has been received for use by an employee of a DoD intelligence component in the course of his official duties. Thus, information volunteered to a DoD intelligence component by a cooperating source would be "collected" under this procedure when an employee of such component officially accepts, in some manner, such information for use within that component. Data acquired by electronic means is "collected" only when it has been processed into intelligible form.
+
+C2.2.2. Cooperating sources means persons or organizations that knowingly and voluntarily provide information to DoD intelligence components, or access to information, at the request of such components or on their own initiative. These include Government Agencies, law enforcement authorities, credit agencies, academic institutions, employers, and foreign governments.
+
+C2.2.3. Domestic activities refers to activities that take place within the United States that do not involve a significant connection with a foreign power, organization, or person.
+
+C2.2.4. Overt means refers to methods of collection whereby the source of the information being collected is advised, or is otherwise aware, that he is providing such information to the Department of Defense or a component thereof.
+
+15
+CHAPTER 2
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+C2.3. TYPES OF INFORMATION THAT MAY BE COLLECTED ABOUT UNITED STATES PERSONS
+
+Information that identifies a United States person may be collected by a DoD intelligence component only if it is necessary to the conduct of a function assigned the collecting component, and only if it falls within one of the following categories:
+
+C2.3.1. Information Obtained With Consent. Information may be collected about a United States person who consents to such collection.
+
+C2.3.2. Publicly Available Information. Information may be collected about a United States person if it is publicly available.
+
+C2.3.3. Foreign Intelligence. Subject to the special limitation contained in section C2.5., below, information may be collected about a United States person if the information constitutes foreign intelligence, provided the intentional collection of foreign intelligence about United States persons shall be limited to persons who are:
+
+C2.3.3.1. Individuals reasonably believed to be officers or employees, or otherwise acting for or on behalf, of a foreign power;
+
+C2.3.3.2. An organization reasonably believed to be owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a foreign power;
+
+C2.3.3.3. Persons or organizations reasonably believed to be engaged or about to engage, in international terrorist or international narcotics activities;
+
+C2.3.3.4. Persons who are reasonably believed to be prisoners of war; missing in action; or are the targets, the hostages, or victims of international terrorist organizations; or
+
+C2.3.3.5. Corporations or other commercial organizations believed to have some relationship with foreign powers, organizations, or persons.
+
+C2.3.4. Counterintelligence. Information may be collected about a United States person if the information constitutes counterintelligence, provided the intentional collection of counterintelligence about United States persons must be limited to:
+
+C2.3.4.1. Persons who are reasonably believed to be engaged in, or about to engage in, intelligence activities on behalf of a foreign power, or international terrorist activities.
+
+16
+CHAPTER 2
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+C2.3.4.2. Persons in contact with persons described in subparagraph C2.3.4.1.,
+above, for the purpose of identifying such person and assessing their relationship with
+persons described in subparagraph C2.3.4.1., above.
+
+C2.3.5. Potential Sources of Assistance to Intelligence Activities. Information
+may be collected about United States persons reasonably believed to be potential
+sources of intelligence, or potential sources of assistance to intelligence activities, for
+the purpose of assessing their suitability or credibility. This category does not include
+investigations undertaken for personnel security purposes.
+
+C2.3.6. Protection of Intelligence Sources and Methods. Information may be
+collected about a United States person who has access to, had access to, or is otherwise
+in possession of, information that reveals foreign intelligence and counterintelligence
+sources or methods, when collection is reasonably believed necessary to protect against
+the unauthorized disclosure of such information; provided that within the United States,
+intentional collection of such information shall be limited to persons who are:
+
+C2.3.6.1. Present and former DoD employees;
+
+C2.3.6.2. Present or former employees of a present or former DoD
+contractor; and
+
+C2.3.6.3. Applicants for employment at the Department of Defense or at a
+contractor of the Department of Defense.
+
+C2.3.7. Physical Security. Information may be collected about a United States
+person who is reasonably believed to threaten the physical security of DoD employees,
+installations, operations, or official visitors. Information may also be collected in the
+course of a lawful physical security investigation.
+
+C2.3.8. Personnel Security. Information may be collected about a United States
+person that arises out of a lawful personnel security investigation.
+
+C2.3.9. Communications Security. Information may be collected about a United
+States person that arises out of a lawful communications security investigation.
+
+C2.3.10. Narcotics. Information may be collected about a United States person
+who is reasonably believed to be engaged in international narcotics activities.
+
+C2.3.11. Threats to Safety. Information may be collected about a United States
+person when the information is needed to protect the safety of any person or
+
+17
+CHAPTER 2
+DoD 5240 1-R, December 1982
+
+organization, including those who are targets, victims, or hostages of international
+terrorist organizations.
+
+C2.3.12. Overhead Reconnaissance. Information may be collected from overhead
+reconnaissance not directed at specific United States persons.
+
+C2.3.13. Administrative Purposes. Information may be collected about a United
+States person that is necessary for administrative purposes.
+
+C2.4. GENERAL CRITERIA GOVERNING THE MEANS USED TO COLLECT
+INFORMATION ABOUT UNITED STATES PERSONS
+
+C2.4.1. Means of Collection. DoD intelligence components are authorized to
+collect information about United States persons by any lawful means, provided that all
+such collection activities shall be carried out in accordance with E.O. 12333 (reference
+(a)), and this Regulation, as appropriate.
+
+C2.4.2. Least Intrusive Means. The collection of information about United States
+persons shall be accomplished by the least intrusive means. In general, this means the
+following:
+
+C2.4.2.1. To the extent feasible, such information shall be collected from
+publicly available information or with the consent of the person concerned;
+
+C2.4.2.2. If collection from these sources is not feasible or sufficient, such
+information may be collected from cooperating sources;
+
+C2.4.2.3. If collection from cooperating sources is not feasible or sufficient,
+such information may be collected, as appropriate, using other lawful investigative
+techniques that do not require a judicial warrant or the approval of the Attorney
+General; then
+
+C2.4.2.4. If collection through use of these techniques is not feasible or
+sufficient, approval for use of investigative techniques that do require a judicial warrant
+or the approval of the Attorney General may be sought.
+
+C2.5. SPECIAL LIMITATION ON THE COLLECTION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
+WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
+
+Within the United States, foreign intelligence concerning United States persons may be
+collected only by overt means unless all the following conditions are met:
+
+18
+CHAPTER 2
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+C2.5.1. The foreign intelligence sought is significant and collection is not
+undertaken for the purpose of acquiring information concerning the domestic activities
+of any United States person;
+
+C2.5.2. Such foreign intelligence cannot be reasonably obtained by overt means;
+
+C2.5.3. The collection of such foreign intelligence has been coordinated with the
+Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); and
+
+C2.5.4. The use of other than overt means has been approved in writing by the head
+of the DoD intelligence component concerned, or his single designee, as being
+consistent with these procedures. A copy of any approval made pursuant to this section
+shall be provided the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy).
+
+19
+CHAPTER 2
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+C3. CHAPTER 3
+PROCEDURE 3. RETENTION OF INFORMATION
+ABOUT UNITED STATES PERSONS
+
+C3.1. APPLICABILITY
+
+This procedure governs the kinds of information about United States persons that may
+knowingly be retained by a DoD intelligence component without the consent of the
+person whom the information concerns. It does not apply when the information in
+question is retained solely for administrative purposes or is required by law to be
+maintained.
+
+C3.2. EXPLANATION OF UNDEFINED TERMS
+
+The term "retention," as used in this procedure, refers only to the maintenance of
+information about United States persons that can be retrieved by reference to the
+person's name or other identifying data.
+
+C3.3. CRITERIA FOR RETENTION
+
+C3.3.1. Retention of Information Collected Under Procedure 2. Information about
+United States persons may be retained if it was collected pursuant to Procedure 2.
+
+C3.3.2. Retention of Information Acquired Incidentally. Information about United
+States persons collected incidentally to authorized collection may be retained if:
+
+C3.3.2.1. Such information could have been collected intentionally under
+Procedure 2;
+
+C3.3.2.2. Such information is necessary to understand or assess foreign
+intelligence or counterintelligence;
+
+C3.3.2.3. The information is foreign intelligence or counterintelligence
+collected from electronic surveillance conducted in compliance with this Regulation; or
+
+C3.3.2.4. Such information is incidental to authorized collection and may
+indicate involvement in activities that may violate Federal, State, local, or foreign law.
+
+20
+CHAPTER 3
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+C3.3.3. Retention of Information Relating to Functions of Other DoD Components
+or non-DoD Agencies. Information about United States persons that pertains solely to
+the functions of other DoD Components or Agencies outside the Department of
+Defense shall be retained only as necessary to transmit or deliver such information to
+the appropriate recipients.
+
+C3.3.4. Temporary Retention. Information about United States persons may be
+retained temporarily, for a period not to exceed 90 days, solely for the purpose of
+determining whether that information may be permanently retained under these
+procedures.
+
+C3.3.5. Retention of Other Information. Information about United States persons
+other than that covered by paragraphs C3.3.1. through C3.3.4., above, shall be retained
+only for purposes of reporting such collection for oversight purposes and for any
+subsequent proceedings that may be necessary.
+
+C3.4. ACCESS AND RETENTION
+
+C3.4.1. Controls On Access to Retained Information. Access within a DoD
+intelligence component to information about United States persons retained pursuant to
+this procedure shall be limited to those with a need to know.
+
+C3.4.2. Duration of Retention. Disposition of information about United States
+Persons retained in the files of DoD intelligence components will comply with the
+disposition schedules approved by the Archivist of the United States for the files or
+records in which the information is retained.
+
+C3.4.3. Information Acquired Prior to Effective Date. Information acquired prior
+to the effective date of this procedure may be retained by DoD intelligence components
+without being screened for compliance with this procedure or Executive Order 12333
+(reference (a)), so long as retention was in compliance with applicable law and previous
+Executive orders.
+
+21
+CHAPTER 3
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+C4. CHAPTER 4
+PROCEDURE 4. DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION
+ABOUT UNITED STATES PERSONS
+
+C4.1. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE
+This procedure governs the kinds of information about United States persons that may
+be disseminated, without their consent, outside the DoD intelligence component that
+collected and retained the information. It does not apply to information collected
+solely for administrative purposes; or disseminated pursuant to law; or pursuant to a
+court order that otherwise imposes controls upon such dissemination.
+
+C4.2. CRITERIA FOR DISSEMINATION
+Except as provided in section C4.3., below, information about United States persons that
+identifies those persons may be disseminated without the consent of those persons only
+under the following conditions:
+
+C4.2.1. The information was collected or retained or both under Procedures 2 and
+3;
+
+C4.2.2. The recipient is reasonably believed to have a need to receive such
+information for the performance of a lawful governmental function, and is one of the
+following:
+
+C4.2.2.1. An employee of the Department of Defense, or an employee of a
+contractor of the Department of Defense, and has a need for such information in the
+course of his or her official duties;
+
+C4.2.2.2. A law enforcement entity of Federal, State, or local government, and
+the information may indicate involvement in activities that may violate laws that the
+recipient is responsible to enforce;
+
+C4.2.2.3. An Agency within the intelligence community; provided that within
+the intelligence community, information other than information derived from signals
+intelligence, may be disseminated to each appropriate Agency for the purpose of
+allowing the recipient Agency to determine whether the information is relevant to its
+responsibilities without such a determination being required of the disseminating DoD
+intelligence component;
+22
+CHAPTER 4
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+C4.2.2.4. An Agency of the Federal Government authorized to receive such
+information in the performance of a lawful governmental function; or
+
+C4.2.2.5. A foreign government, and dissemination is undertaken pursuant to an
+agreement or other understanding with such government.
+
+C4.3. OTHER DISSEMINATION
+Any dissemination that does not conform to the conditions set forth in section C4.2.,
+above, must be approved by the legal office responsible for advising the DoD
+Component concerned after consultation with the Department of Justice and General
+Counsel of the Department of Defense. Such approval shall be based on determination
+that the proposed dissemination complies with applicable laws, Executive orders, and
+regulations.
+23
+CHAPTER 1
+C5. CHAPTER 5
+PROCEDURE 5. ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
+
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+C5.1. PART1: ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE IN THE UNITED STATES FOR
+INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES
+
+C5.1.1. Applicability. This part of Procedure 5 implements the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1979 (reference (b)), and applies to electronic
+surveillance, as defined in that Act, conducted by DoD intelligence components within
+the United States to collect "foreign intelligence information," as defined in that Act.
+
+C5.1.2. General Rules
+
+C5.1.2.1. Electronic Surveillance Pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Act. A DoD intelligence component may conduct electronic surveillance
+within the United States for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes only
+pursuant to an order issued by a judge of the court appointed pursuant to the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (reference (b)), or pursuant to a certification of
+the Attorney General issued under the authority of Section 102(a) of the Act.
+
+C5.1.2.2. Authority to Request Electronic Surveillance. Authority to approve
+the submission of applications or requests for electronic surveillance under the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (reference (b)) shall be limited to the Secretary
+of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Secretary or Under Secretary of a
+Military Department, and the Director of the National Security Agency. Applications
+for court orders will be made through the Attorney General after prior clearance by the
+General Counsel, DoD. Requests for Attorney General certification shall be made only
+after prior clearance by the General Counsel, DoD.
+
+C5.1.2.3. Electronic Surveillance In Emergency Situations
+
+C5.1.2.3.1. ADoD intelligence component may conduct electronic
+surveillance within the United States in emergency situations under an approval from the
+Attorney General in accordance with Section 105(e) of reference (b).
+
+C5.1.2.3.2. The head of a DoD intelligence component may request that
+the DoD General Counsel seek such authority directly from the Attorney General in an
+emergency, if it is not feasible to submit such request through an official designated in
+subparagraph C5.1.2.2., above, provided the appropriate official concerned shall be
+advised of such requests as soon as possible thereafter.
+24
+CHAPTER 5
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+C5.2. PART2: ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES FOR
+INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES
+
+C5.2.1. Applicability. This part of Procedure 5 applies to electronic surveillance,
+as defined in the Definitions Section, for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence
+purposes directed against United States persons who are outside the United States, and
+who, under the circumstances, have a reasonable expectation of privacy. It is intended
+to be applied in conjunction with the regulation of electronic surveillance "within the
+United States" under Part 1 and the regulation of "signals intelligence activities" under
+Part 3 so that the intentional interception for foreign intelligence and
+counterintelligence purposes of all wire or radio communications of persons within the
+United States and against United States persons abroad where such persons enjoy a
+reasonable expectation of privacy is covered by one of the three parts. In addition, this
+part governs the use of electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance devices for foreign
+intelligence and counterintelligence purposes against a United States person abroad in
+circumstances where such person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. This part
+does not apply to the electronic surveillance of communications of other than United
+States persons abroad or the interception of the communications of United States
+persons abroad that do not constitute electronic surveillance.
+
+C5.2.2. Explanation of Undefined Terms
+
+C5.2.2.1. Electronic surveillance is "directed against a United States person"
+when the surveillance is intentionally targeted against or designed to intercept the
+communications of that person. Electronic surveillance directed against persons who
+are not United States persons that results in the incidental acquisition of the
+communications of a United States person does not thereby become electronic
+surveillance directed against a United States person.
+
+C5.2.2.2. Electronic surveillance is "outside the United States" if the person
+against whom the electronic surveillance is directed is physically outside the United
+States, regardless of the location at which surveillance is conducted. For example, the
+interception of communications that originate and terminate outside the United States
+can be conducted from within the United States and still fall under this part rather than
+Part 1.
+
+C5.2.3. Procedures. Except as provided in paragraph C5.2.5., below, DoD
+intelligence components may conduct electronic surveillance against a United States
+person who is outside the United States for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence
+purposes only if the surveillance is approved by the Attorney General. Requests for
+25
+CHAPTER 5
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+approval will be forwarded to the Attorney General by an official designated in
+subparagraph C5.2.5.1., below. Each request shall include:
+
+C5.2.3.1. An identification or description of the target.
+
+C5.2.3.2. A statement of the facts supporting a finding that:
+
+C5.2.3.2.1. There is probable cause to believe the target of the electronic
+surveillance is one of the following:
+
+C5.2.3.2.1.1. Aperson who, for or on behalf of a foreign power is
+engaged in clandestine intelligence activities (including covert activities intended to
+affect the political or governmental process), sabotage, or international terrorist
+activities, or activities in preparation for international terrorist activities; or who
+conspires with, or knowingly aids and abets a person engaging in such activities;
+
+C5.2.3.2.1.2. Aperson who is an officer or employee of a foreign
+power;
+
+C5.2.3.2.1.3. Aperson unlawfully acting for, or pursuant to the
+direction of, a foreign power. The mere fact that a person's activities may benefit or
+further the aims of a foreign power is not enough to bring that person under this
+paragraph, absent evidence that the person is taking direction from, or acting in knowing
+concert with, the foreign power;
+
+C5.2.3.2.1.4. Acorporation or other entity that is owned or
+controlled directly or indirectly by a foreign power; or
+
+C5.2.3.2.1.5. Aperson in contact with, or acting in collaboration with,
+an intelligence or security service of a foreign power for the purpose of providing
+access to information or material classified by the United States to which such person
+has access.
+
+C5.2.3.2.2. The electronic surveillance is necessary to obtain significant
+foreign intelligence or counterintelligence.
+
+C5.2.3.2.3. The significant foreign intelligence or counterintelligence
+expected to be obtained from the electronic surveillance could not reasonably be
+obtained by other less intrusive collection techniques.
+
+C5.2.3.3. Adescription of the significant foreign intelligence or
+counterintelligence expected to be obtained from the electronic surveillance.
+26
+CHAPTER 5
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+C5.2.3.4. A description of the means by which the electronic surveillance will be effected.
+
+C5.2.3.5. If physical trespass is required to effect the surveillance, a statement of facts supporting a finding that the means involve the least amount of intrusion that will accomplish the objective.
+
+C5.2.3.6. A statement of period of time, not to exceed 90 days, for which the electronic surveillance is required.
+
+C5.2.3.7. A description of the expected dissemination of the product of the surveillance, including a description of the procedures that will govern the retention and dissemination of communications of or concerning United States persons other than those targeted, acquired incidental to such surveillance.
+
+C5.2.4. Electronic Surveillance in Emergency Situations. Notwithstanding paragraph C5.2.3., above, a DoD intelligence component may conduct surveillance directed at a United States person who is outside the United States in emergency situations under the following limitations:
+
+C5.2.4.1. Officials designated in paragraph C5.2.5., below, may authorize electronic surveillance directed at a United States person outside the United States in emergency situations, when securing the prior approval of the Attorney General is not practical because:
+
+C5.2.4.1.1. The time required would cause failure or delay in obtaining significant foreign intelligence or counterintelligence and such failure or delay would result in substantial harm to the national security;
+
+C5.2.4.1.2. A person's life or physical safety is reasonably believed to be in immediate danger; or
+
+C5.2.4.1.3. The physical security of a defense installation or Government property is reasonably believed to be in immediate danger.
+
+C5.2.4.2. Except for actions taken under subparagraph C5.2.4.1.2., above, any official authorizing such emergency surveillance shall find that one of the criteria contained in subparagraph C5.2.3.2.1., above, is met. Such officials shall notify the DoD General Counsel promptly of any such surveillance, the reason for authorizing such surveillance on an emergency basis, and the expected results.
+
+27
+CHAPTER 5
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+C5.2.4.3. The Attorney General shall be notified by the General Counsel, DoD, as soon as possible of the surveillance, the circumstances surrounding its authorization, and the results thereof, and such other information as may be required to authorize continuation of such surveillance.
+
+C5.2.4.4. Electronic surveillance authorized pursuant to this section may not continue longer than the time required for a decision by the Attorney General and in no event longer than 72 hours.
+
+C5.2.5. Officials Authorized to Request and Approve Electronic Surveillance Outside the United States
+
+C5.2.5.1. The following officials may request approval of electronic surveillance outside the United States under paragraph C5.2.3., above, and approve emergency surveillance under paragraph C5.2.4., above:
+
+C5.2.5.1.1. The Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense.
+
+C5.2.5.1.2. The Secretaries and Under Secretaries of the Military Departments.
+
+C5.2.5.1.3. The Director and Deputy Director of the National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service.
+
+C5.2.5.2. Authorization for emergency electronic surveillance under paragraph C5.2.4., may also be granted by:
+
+C5.2.5.2.1. Any general or flag officer at the overseas location in question, having responsibility for either the subject of the surveillance, or responsibility for the protection of the persons, installations, or property that is endangered, or
+
+C5.2.5.2.2. The Deputy Director for Operations, National Security Agency.
+
+C5.3. PART 3: SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
+
+C5.3.1. Applicability and Scope
+
+C5.3.1.1. This procedure governs the conduct by the United States Signals Intelligence System of signals intelligence activities that involve the collection,
+
+28
+CHAPTER 5
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+retention, and dissemination of foreign communications and military tactical communications. Such activities may incidentally involve the collection of information concerning United States persons without their consent, or may involve communications originated or intended for receipt in the United States, without the consent of a party thereto.
+
+C5.3.1.2. This part of Procedure 5 shall be supplemented by a classified Annex promulgated by the Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service, which shall also be approved by the Attorney General. That regulation shall provide that signals intelligence activities that constitute electronic surveillance, as defined in Parts 1, and 2 of this procedure, will be authorized in accordance with those parts. Any information collected incidentally about United States persons shall be subjected to minimization procedures approved by the Attorney General.
+
+C5.3.2. Explanation of Undefined Terms
+
+C5.3.2.1. Communications concerning a United States person are those in which the United States person is identified in the communication. A United States person is identified when the person's name, unique title, address or other personal identifier is revealed in the communication in the context of activities conducted by that person or activities conducted by others and related to that person. A reference to a product by brand name or manufacturer's name or the use of a name in a descriptive sense, as, for example, "Monroe Doctrine," is not an identification of a United States person.
+
+C5.3.2.2. Interception means the acquisition by the United States Signals Intelligence system through electronic means of a nonpublic communication to which it is not an intended party, and the processing of the contents of that communication into an intelligible form, but not including the display of signals on visual display devices intended to permit the examination of the technical characteristics of the signals without reference to the information content carried by the signals.
+
+C5.3.2.3. Military tactical communications means United States and allied military exercise communications within the United States and abroad necessary for the production of simulated foreign intelligence and counterintelligence or to permit an analysis of communications security.
+
+C5.3.2.4. United States Person. For purposes of signals intelligence activities only, the following guidelines will apply in determining whether a person is a United States person:
+
+29
+CHAPTER 5
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+C5.3.2.4.1. A person known to be currently in the United States will be treated as a United States person unless the nature of the person's communications or other available information concerning the person gives rise to a reasonable belief that such person is not a United States citizen or permanent resident alien.
+
+C5.3.2.4.2. A person known to be currently outside the United States, or whose location is not known, will not be treated as a United States person unless the nature of the person's communications or other available information concerning the person give rise to a reasonable belief that such person is a United States citizen or permanent resident alien.
+
+C5.3.2.4.3. A person known to be an alien admitted for permanent residence may be assumed to have lost status as a United States person if the person leaves the United States and it is known that the person is not in compliance with the administrative formalities provided by law that enable such persons to reenter the United States without regard to the provisions of law that would otherwise restrict an alien's entry into the United States. The failure to follow the statutory procedures provides a reasonable basis to conclude that such alien has abandoned any intention of maintaining status as a permanent resident alien.
+
+C5.3.2.4.4. An unincorporated association whose headquarters are located outside the United States may be presumed not to be a United States person unless the collecting agency has information indicating that a substantial number of members are citizens of the United States or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence.
+
+C5.3.2.5. United States Signals Intelligence System means the unified organization for signals intelligence activities under the direction of the Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service, comprised of the National Security Agency, the Central Security Service, the components of the Military Services authorized to conduct signals intelligence and such other entities (other than the Federal Bureau of Investigation) as are authorized by the National Security Council or the Secretary of Defense to conduct signals intelligence. FBI activities are governed by procedures promulgated by the Attorney General.
+
+C5.3.3. Procedures
+
+C5.3.3.1. Foreign Communications. The United States Signals Intelligence System may collect, process, retain, and disseminate foreign communications that are also communications of or concerning United States persons, but only in accordance with the classified annex to this procedure.
+
+30
+CHAPTER
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+C5.3.3.2. Military Tactical Communications. The United States Signals Intelligence System may collect, process, retain, and disseminate military tactical communications that are also communications of or concerning United States persons but only in accordance with the classified annex to this procedure.
+
+C5.3.3.2.1. Collection. Collection efforts will be conducted in the same manner as in the case of signals intelligence for foreign intelligence purposes and must be designed in such a manner as to avoid to the extent feasible the intercept of communications not related to military exercises.
+
+C5.3.3.2.2. Retention and Processing. Military tactical communications may be retained and processed without deletion of references to United States persons who are participants in, or are otherwise mentioned in exercise-related communications, provided that the communications of United States persons not participating in the exercise that are inadvertently intercepted during the exercise shall be destroyed as soon as feasible.
+
+C5.3.3.2.3. Dissemination. Dissemination of military tactical communications and exercise reports or information files derived from such communications shall be limited to those authorities and persons participating in or conducting reviews and critiques of such exercise.
+
+C5.4. PART 4: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES
+
+C5.4.1. Applicability and Scope. This part of Procedure 5 applies to the use of electronic equipment to determine the existence and capability of electronic surveillance equipment being used by persons not authorized to conduct electronic surveillance. It implements Section 105(f)(2) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (reference (b)).
+
+C5.4.2. Explanation of Undefined Terms. The term technical surveillance countermeasures refers to activities authorized pursuant to DoD Directive 5200.29 (reference (c)), and, as used in this procedure, refers to the use of electronic surveillance equipment, or electronic or mechanical devices, solely for determining the existence and capability of electronic surveillance equipment being used by persons not authorized to conduct electronic surveillance, or for determining the susceptibility of electronic equipment to unlawful electronic surveillance.
+
+31
+CHAPTER 5
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+C5.4.3. **Procedures** A DoD intelligence component may use technical surveillance
+countermeasures that involve the incidental acquisition of the nonpublic
+communications of United States persons without their consent, provided:
+
+C5.4.3.1. The use of such countermeasures has been authorized or consented
+to by the official in charge of the facility, organization, or installation where the
+countermeasures are to be undertaken;
+
+C5.4.3.2. The use of such countermeasures is limited in that necessary to
+determine the existence and capability of such equipment; and
+
+C5.4.3.3. Access to the content of communications acquired during the use of
+countermeasures is limited to persons involved directly in conducting such measures,
+and any content acquired is destroyed as soon as practical or upon completion of the
+particular use. However, if the content is acquired within the United States, only
+information that is necessary to protect against unauthorized electronic surveillance, or
+to enforce Chapter 119 of title 18, United States Code (reference (d)) and Section 605
+of the Communication Act of 1934 (reference (e)), may be retained and disseminated
+only for these purposes. If acquired outside the United States, information that
+indicates a violation of Federal law, including the Uniform Code of Military Justice
+(reference (f)), or a clear and imminent threat to life or property, may also be
+disseminated to appropriate law enforcement authorities. A record of the types of
+communications and information subject to acquisition by the illegal electronic
+surveillance equipment may be retained.
+
+C5.5. PART 5: DEVELOPING, TESTING, AND CALIBRATION OF ELECTRONIC
+EQUIPMENT
+
+C5.5.1. **Applicability** This part of Procedure 5 applies to developing, testing, or
+calibrating electronic equipment that can intercept or process communications and
+non-communications signals. It also includes research and development that needs
+electronic communications as a signal source.
+
+C5.5.2. **Procedures**
+
+C5.5.2.1. **Signals Authorized for Use**
+
+C5.5.2.1.1. The following may be used without restriction:
+
+C5.5.2.1.1.1. Laboratory-generated signals.
+
+32
+CHAPTER 5
+
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+C5.5.2.1.1.2. Communications signals with the consent of the
+communicator.
+
+C5.5.2.1.1.3. Communications in the commercial or public service
+broadcast bands.
+
+C5.5.2.1.1.4. Communications transmitted between terminals located
+outside of the United States not used by any known United States person.
+
+C5.5.2.1.1.5. Non-communications signals (including telemetry, and
+radar).
+
+C5.5.2.1.2. Communications subject to lawful electronic surveillance
+under the provisions of Parts 1, 2, or 3, of this procedure may be used subject to the
+minimization procedures applicable to such surveillance.
+
+C5.5.2.1.3. Any of the following may be used subject to the restrictions
+of subparagraph C5.5.2.2., below.
+
+C5.5.2.1.3.1. Communications over official Government
+communications circuits with consent from an appropriate official of the controlling
+agency.
+
+bands.
+
+C5.5.2.1.3.2. Communications in the citizens and amateur-radio
+
+C5.5.2.1.4. Other signals may be used only when it is determined that it is
+not practical to use the signals described above and it is not reasonable to obtain the
+consent of persons incidentally subjected to the surveillance. The restrictions of
+subparagraph C5.5.2.2., below, will apply in such cases. The Attorney General must
+approve use of signals pursuant to this subsection for the purpose of development,
+testing, or calibration when the period of use exceeds 90 days. When Attorney General
+approval is required, the DoD intelligence component shall submit a test proposal to the
+General Counsel, DoD, or the NSA General Counsel for transmission to the Attorney
+General for approval. The test proposal shall state the requirement for a period beyond
+90 days, the nature of the activity, the organization that will conduct the activity, and the
+proposed disposition of any signals or communications acquired during the activity.
+
+C5.5.2.2. **Restrictions**. For signals described in subparagraphs C5.5.2.1.3. and
+C5.5.2.1.4., above, the following restrictions apply:
+
+33
+CHAPTER 5
+
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+C5.5.2.2.1. The surveillance shall be limited in scope and duration to that
+necessary for the purposes referred to in paragraph C5.5.1., above.
+
+C5.5.2.2.2. No particular United States person shall be targeted
+intentionally without consent.
+
+C5.5.2.2.3. The content of any communication shall:
+
+C5.5.2.2.3.1. Be retained only when actually needed for the purposes
+referred to in paragraph C5.5.1., above;
+
+C5.5.2.2.3.2. Be disseminated only to persons conducting the
+activity; and
+
+C5.5.2.2.3.3. Be destroyed immediately upon completion of the
+activity.
+
+C5.5.2.2.4. The technical parameters of a communication (such as
+frequency, modulation, bearing, signal strength, and time of activity) may be retained and
+used for the purposes outlined in paragraph C5.5.1., above, or for collection avoidance
+purposes. Such parameters may be disseminated to other DoD intelligence components
+and other entities authorized to conduct electronic surveillance or related development,
+testing, and calibration of electronic equipment provided such dissemination and use are
+limited to the purposes outlined in paragraph C5.5.1., or collection avoidance purposes.
+No content of any communication may be retained or used other than as provided in
+subparagraph C5.5.2.2.3., above.
+
+C5.6. PART 6: TRAINING OF PERSONNEL IN THE OPERATION AND USE OF
+ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS AND SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT
+
+C5.6.1. **Applicability**. This part of Procedure 5 applies to the training of
+personnel by DoD intelligence components in the operation and use of electronic
+communications and surveillance equipment. It does not apply to the interception of
+communications with the consent of one of the parties to the communication or to the
+training of intelligence personnel by non-intelligence components.
+
+C5.6.2. **Procedures**
+
+C5.6.2.1. **Training Guidance**. The training of personnel by DoD intelligence
+components in the operation and use of electronic communications and surveillance
+
+34
+CHAPTER 5
+
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+equipment shall include guidance concerning the requirements and restrictions of the
+Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (reference (b)), and E.O. 12333
+(reference (a)), with respect to the unauthorized acquisition and use of the content of
+communications of United States persons.
+
+C5.6.2.2. **Training Limitations**
+
+C5.6.2.2.1. Except as permitted by paragraph C5.6.2.2.2. and C5.6.2.2.3.,
+below, the use of electronic communications and surveillance equipment for training
+purposes is permitted, subject to the following limitations:
+
+C5.6.2.2.1.1. To the maximum extent practical, use of such
+equipment for training purposes shall be directed against communications that are
+subject to lawful electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence and
+counterintelligence purposes under Parts 1, 2, and 3 of this procedure.
+
+C5.6.2.2.1.2. The contents of private communications of
+non-consenting United States persons may not be acquired aurally unless the person is
+an authorized target of electronic surveillance.
+
+C5.6.2.2.1.3. The electronic surveillance will be limited in extent
+and duration to that necessary to train personnel in the use of the equipment.
+
+C5.6.2.2.2. Public broadcasts, distress signals, or official U.S.
+Government communications may be monitored, provided that when Government
+Agency communications are monitored, the consent of an appropriate official is
+obtained.
+
+C5.6.2.2.3. Minimal acquisition of information is permitted as required
+for calibration purposes.
+
+C5.6.2.3. **Retention and Dissemination**. Information collected during training
+that involves communications described in subparagraph C5.6.2.2.1.1., above, shall be
+retained and disseminated in accordance with minimization procedures applicable to that
+electronic surveillance. Information collected during training that does not involve
+communications described in subparagraph C5.6.2.2.1.1., above, or that is acquired
+inadvertently, shall be destroyed as soon as practical or upon completion of the training
+and may not be disseminated for any purpose. This limitation does not apply to distress
+signals.
+
+35
+CHAPTER 5
+
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+C5.7. PART 7: CONDUCT OF VULNERABILITY AND HEARABILITY SURVEYS
+
+C5.7.1. **Applicability and Scope** This part of Procedure 5 applies to the conduct
+of vulnerability surveys and hearability surveys by DoD intelligence components.
+
+C5.7.2. **Explanation of Undefined Terms**
+
+C5.7.2.1. The term **vulnerability survey** refers to the acquisition of radio
+frequency propagation and its subsequent analysis to determine empirically the
+vulnerability of the transmission media to interception by foreign intelligence services.
+
+C5.7.2.2. The term **hearability survey** refers to monitoring radio
+communications to determine whether a particular radio signal can be received at one
+or more locations and, if reception is possible, to determine the hearability of reception
+over time.
+
+C5.7.3. **Procedures**
+
+C5.7.3.1. **Conduct of Vulnerability Surveys**. Nonconsensual surveys may be
+conducted to determine the potential vulnerability to intelligence services of a foreign
+power of transmission facilities of communications common carriers, other private
+commercial entities, and entities of the federal government, subject of the following
+limitations:
+
+C5.7.3.1.1. No vulnerability survey may be conducted without the prior
+written approval of the Director, National Security Agency, or his designee.
+
+C5.7.3.1.2. No transmission may be acquired aurally.
+
+C5.7.3.1.3. No content of any transmission may be acquired by any means.
+
+C5.7.3.1.4. No transmissions may be recorded.
+
+C5.7.3.1.5. No report or log may identify any United States person or
+entity except to the extent of identifying transmission facilities that are vulnerable to
+surveillance by foreign powers. If the identities of the users of such facilities are not
+identical with the identities of the owners of the facilities, the identity of such users
+may be obtained but not from the content of the transmissions themselves, and may be
+included in such report or log. Reports may be disseminated. Logs may be
+disseminated only if required to verify results contained in reports.
+
+36
+CHAPTER 5
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+C5.7.3.2. Conduct of Hearability Surveys. The Director, National Security
+Agency, may conduct, or may authorize the conduct by other Agencies, of hearability
+surveys of telecommunications that are transmitted in the United States.
+
+C5.7.3.2.1. Collection. When practicable, consent will be secured from
+the owner or user of the facility against which the hearability survey is to be conducted
+prior to the commencement of the survey.
+
+C5.7.3.2.2. Processing and Storage. Information collected during a
+hearability survey must processed and stored as follows:
+
+C5.7.3.2.2.1. The content of communications may not be recorded
+or included in any report.
+
+C5.7.3.2.2.2. No microwave transmission may be de-multiplexed or
+demodulated for any purpose.
+
+C5.7.3.2.2.3. No report or log may identify any person or entity
+except to the extent of identifying the transmission facility that can be intercepted from
+the intercept site. If the identities of the users of such facilities are not identical with
+the identities of the owners of the facilities, and their identities are relevant to the
+purpose for which the hearability survey has been conducted, the identity of such users
+may be obtained provided such identities may not be obtained from the contents of the
+transmissions themselves.
+
+C5.7.3.2.3. Dissemination. Reports may be disseminated only within the
+U.S. Government. Logs may not be disseminated unless required to verify results
+contained in reports.
+
+37
+CHAPTER 5
+C6. CHAPTER 6
+PROCEDURE 6. CONCEALED MONITORING
+DoD 5240,1-R, December 1982
+
+C6.1. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE
+
+C6.1.1. This procedure applies to concealed monitoring only for foreign
+intelligence and counterintelligence purposes conducted by a DoD intelligence
+component within the United States or directed against a United States person who is
+outside the United States where the subject of such monitoring does not have a
+reasonable expectation of privacy, as explained in section 6.2., below, and no warrant
+would be required if undertaken for law enforcement purposes.
+
+C6.1.2. Concealed monitoring in the United States for foreign intelligence and
+counterintelligence purposes where the subject of such monitoring has a reasonable
+expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes
+shall be treated as "electronic surveillance within the United States" under Part 1 of
+Procedure 5, and processed pursuant to that procedure.
+
+C6.1.3. Concealed monitoring for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence
+purposes of a United States person abroad where the subject of such monitoring has a
+reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement
+purposes shall be treated as "electronic surveillance outside the United States" under
+Part 2 of Procedure 5, and processed pursuant to that procedure.
+
+C6.1.4. Concealed monitoring for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence
+purposes when the monitoring is a signals intelligence activity shall be conducted
+pursuant to Part 3 of Procedure 5.
+
+C6.2. EXPLANATION OF UNDEFINED TERMS
+
+C6.2.1. Concealed monitoring means targeting by electronic, optical, or
+mechanical devices a particular person or a group of persons without their consent in a
+surreptitious and continuous manner. Monitoring is surreptitious when it is targeted in
+a manner designed to keep the subject of the monitoring unaware of it. Monitoring is
+continuous if it is conducted without interruption for a substantial period of time.
+
+C6.2.2. Monitoring is within the United States if the monitoring device, or the
+target of the monitoring, is located within the United States.
+
+38
+CHAPTER 5
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+C6.2.3. Whether concealed monitoring is to occur where the subject has a
+reasonable expectation of privacy is a determination that depends upon the
+circumstances of a particular case, and shall be made only after consultation with the
+legal office responsible for advising the DoD intelligence component concerned.
+Reasonable expectation of privacy is the extent to which a reasonable person in the
+particular circumstances involved is entitled to believe his or her actions are not
+subject to monitoring by electronic, optical, or mechanical devices. For example, there
+are ordinarily reasonable expectations of privacy in work spaces if a person's actions
+and papers are not subject to ready observation by others under normal working
+conditions. Conversely, a person walking out of his or her residence into a public
+street ordinarily would not have a reasonable expectation that he or she is not being
+observed or even photographed; however, such a person ordinarily would have an
+expectation of privacy within his or her residence.
+
+C6.3. PROCEDURES
+
+C6.3.1. Limitations On Use of Concealed Monitoring. Use of concealed
+monitoring under circumstances when the subject of such monitoring has no reasonable
+expectation of privacy is subject to the following limitations:
+
+C6.3.1.1. Within the United States, a DoD intelligence component may
+conduct concealed monitoring only on an installation or facility owned or leased by the
+Department of Defense or otherwise in the course of an investigation conducted
+pursuant to the Agreement Between the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General
+(reference (g)).
+
+C6.3.1.2. Outside the United States, such monitoring may be conducted on
+installations and facilities owned or leased by the Department of Defense. Monitoring
+outside such facilities shall be conducted after coordination with appropriate host
+country officials, if such coordination is required by the governing Status of Forces
+Agreement, and with the Central Intelligence Agency.
+
+C6.3.2. Required Determination. Concealed monitoring conducted under
+paragraph C6.3.1., requires approval by an official designated in paragraph C6.3.3.,
+below, based on a determination that such monitoring is necessary to the conduct of
+assigned foreign intelligence or counterintelligence functions, and does not constitute
+electronic surveillance under Parts 1 or 2 of Procedure 5.
+
+C6.3.3. Officials Authorized to Approve Concealed Monitoring. Officials
+authorized to approve concealed monitoring under this procedure include the Deputy
+
+39
+CHAPTER 5
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+Under Secretary of Defense (Policy); the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; the
+Director, National Security Agency; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
+Department of Army; the Director, Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, U.S.
+Marine Corps; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, U.S. Air Force; the
+Commanding General, Army Intelligence and Security Command; the Director, Naval
+Investigative Service; and the Commanding Officer, Air Force Office of Special
+Investigations.
+
+40
+CHAPTER 5
+C7. CHAPTER 7
+PROCEDURE 7. PHYSICAL SEARCHES
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+C7.1. APPLICABILITY
+
+This procedure applies to nonconsensual physical searches of any person or property
+within the United States and to physical searches of the person or property of a United
+States person outside the United States by DoD intelligence components for foreign
+intelligence or counterintelligence purposes. DoD intelligence components may
+provide assistance to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other law enforcement
+authorities in accordance with Procedure 12.
+
+C7.2. EXPLANATION OF UNDEFINED TERMS
+
+Physical search means any intrusion upon a person or a person's property or possessions
+to obtain items of property or information. The term does not include examination of
+areas that are in plain view and visible to the unaided eye if no physical trespass is
+undertaken, and does not include examinations of abandoned property left in a public
+place. The term also does not include any intrusion authorized as necessary to
+accomplish lawful electronic surveillance conducted pursuant to Parts 1 and 2 of
+Procedure 5.
+
+C7.3. PROCEDURES
+
+C7.3.1. Nonconsensual Physical Searches Within the United States
+
+C7.3.1.1. Searches of Active Duty Military Personnel for Counterintelligence
+Purposes. The counterintelligence elements of the Military Departments are
+authorized to conduct nonconsensual physical searches in the United States for
+counterintelligence purposes of the person or property of active duty military
+personnel, when authorized by a military commander empowered to approve physical
+searches for law enforcement purposes pursuant to rule 315(d) of the Manual for
+Courts Martial, Executive Order 12198 (reference (h)), based upon a finding of
+probable cause to believe such persons are acting as agents of foreign powers. For
+purposes of this section, the term "agent of a foreign power" refers to an individual who
+meets the criteria set forth in subparagraph C7.3.1.2., below.
+
+41
+CHAPTER 7
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+C7.3.1.2. **Other Nonconsensual Physical Searches.** Except as permitted by
+section C7.1., above, DoD intelligence components may not conduct nonconsensual
+physical searches of persons and property within the United States for foreign
+intelligence or counterintelligence purposes. DoD intelligence components may,
+however, request the FBI to conduct such searches. All such requests, shall be in
+writing; shall contain the information required in subparagraphs C7.3.2.2.1., through
+C7.3.2.2.2.6., below; and be approved by an official designated in subparagraph
+C7.3.2.2.2.3., below. A copy of each such request shall be furnished the General
+Counsel, DoD.
+
+C7.3.2. Nonconsensual Physical Searches Outside the United States
+
+C7.3.2.1. **Searches of Active Duty Military Personnel for Counterintelligence**
+**Purposes.** The counterintelligence elements of the Military Departments may conduct
+nonconsensual physical searches of the person or property of active duty military
+personnel outside the United States for counterintelligence purposes when authorized
+by a military commander empowered to approve physical searches for law enforcement
+purposes pursuant to rule 315(d) of the Manual for Courts Martial, Executive Order
+12198 (reference (h)), based upon a finding of probable cause to believe such persons
+are acting as agents of foreign powers. For purposes of this section, the term "agent of
+a foreign power" refers to an individual who meets the criteria set forth in subparagraph
+C7.3.2.2.2., below.
+
+C7.3.2.2. **Other Nonconsensual Physical Searches.** DoD intelligence
+components may conduct other nonconsensual physical searches for foreign
+intelligence and counterintelligence purposes of the person or property of United States
+persons outside the United States only pursuant to the approval of the Attorney
+General. Requests for such approval will be forwarded by a senior official designated
+in subparagraph C7.3.2.3., below, to the Attorney General and shall include:
+
+C7.3.2.2.1. An identification of the person or description of the property
+to be searched.
+
+C7.3.2.2.2. A statement of facts supporting a finding that there is
+probable cause to believe the subject of the search is:
+
+42
+CHAPTER 7
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+C7.3.2.2.2.1. A person who, for or on behalf of a foreign power, is
+engaged in clandestine intelligence activities (including covert activities intended to
+affect the political or governmental process), sabotage, or international terrorist
+activities, activities in preparation for international terrorist activities, or who conspires
+with, or knowingly aids and abets a person engaging in such activities;
+
+C7.3.2.2.2.2. A person who is an officer or employee of a foreign
+power;
+
+C7.3.2.2.2.3. A person unlawfully acting for, or pursuant to the
+direction of, a foreign power. The mere fact that a person's activities may benefit or
+further the aims of a foreign power does not justify a nonconsensual physical search
+without evidence that the person is taking direction from, or acting in knowing concert
+with, the foreign power;
+
+C7.3.2.2.2.4. A corporation or other entity that is owned or
+controlled directly or indirectly by a foreign power; or
+
+C7.3.2.2.2.5. A person in contact with, or acting in collaboration with,
+an intelligence or security service of a foreign power for the purpose of providing
+access to information or material classified by the United States to which such person
+has access.
+
+C7.3.2.2.3. A statement of facts supporting a finding that the search is
+necessary to obtain significant foreign intelligence or counterintelligence.
+
+C7.3.2.2.4. A statement of facts supporting a finding that the significant
+foreign intelligence or counterintelligence expected to be obtained could not be
+obtained by less intrusive means.
+
+C7.3.2.2.5. A description of the significant foreign intelligence or
+counterintelligence expected to be obtained from the search.
+
+C7.3.2.2.6. A description of the extent of the search and a statement of
+facts supporting a finding that the search will involve the least amount of physical
+intrusion that will accomplish the objective sought.
+
+C7.3.2.2.7. A description of the expected dissemination of the product of
+the search, including a description of the procedures that will govern the retention and
+dissemination of information about United States persons acquired incidental to the
+search.
+
+43
+CHAPTER 7
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+C7.3.2.3. Requests for approval of nonconsensual physical searches under
+subparagraph C7.3.2.2., must be made by:
+
+C7.3.2.3.1. The Secretary or the Deputy Secretary of Defense;
+
+C7.3.2.3.2. The Secretary or the Under Secretary of a Military
+Department;
+
+C7.3.2.3.3. The Director, National Security Agency; or
+
+C7.3.2.3.4. The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency.
+
+44
+CHAPTER 7
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+C8. CHAPTER 8
+PROCEDURE 8. SEARCHES AND EXAMINATION OF MAIL
+
+C8.1. **APPLICABILITY**
+
+This procedure applies to the opening of mail in United States postal channels, and the
+use of mail covers with respect to such mail, for foreign intelligence and
+counterintelligence purposes. It also applies to the opening of mail to or from United
+States persons where such activity is conducted outside the United States and such mail
+is not in United States postal channels.
+
+C8.2. **EXPLANATION OF UNDEFINED TERMS**
+
+C8.2.1. **Mail Within United States Postal Channels** includes:
+
+C8.2.1.1. Mail while in transit within, among, and between the United States,
+its territories and possessions (including mail of foreign origin that is passed by a
+foreign postal administration, to the United States Postal Service for forwarding to a
+foreign postal administration under a postal treaty or convention, and mail temporarily in
+the hands of the United States Customs Service or the Department of Agriculture),
+Army-Air Force (APO) and Navy (FPO) post offices, and mail for delivery to the United
+Nations, NY; and
+
+C8.2.1.2. International mail enroute to an addressee in the United States or its
+possessions after passage to United States Postal Service from a foreign postal
+administration or enroute to an addressee abroad before passage to a foreign postal
+administration. As a rule, mail shall be considered in such postal channels until the
+moment it is delivered manually in the United States to the specific addressee named on
+the envelope, or his authorized agent.
+
+C8.2.2. **To examine mail** means to employ a mail cover with respect to such mail.
+
+C8.2.3. **Mail cover** means the process by which a record is made of any data
+appearing on the outside cover of any class of mail matter as permitted by law, other
+than that necessary for the delivery of mail or administration of the Postal Service.
+
+45
+CHAPTER 3
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+C8.3. **PROCEDURES**
+
+C8.3.1. **Searches of Mail Within United States Postal Channels**
+
+C8.3.1.1. Applicable postal regulations do not permit DoD intelligence
+components to detain or open first-class mail within United States postal channels for
+foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes, or to request such action by the
+U.S. Postal Service.
+
+C8.3.1.2. DoD intelligence components may request appropriate U.S. postal
+authorities to inspect, or authorize the inspection, of the contents of second-, third-, or
+fourth-class mail in United States postal channels, for such purposes, in accordance with
+applicable postal regulations. Such components may also request appropriate U.S.
+postal authorities to detain, or permit the detention of, mail that may become subject to
+search under this section, in accordance with applicable postal regulations.
+
+C8.3.2. **Searches of Mail Outside United States Postal Channels**
+
+C8.3.2.1. DoD intelligence components are authorized to open mail to or
+from a United States person that is found outside United States postal channels only
+pursuant to the approval of the Attorney General. Requests for such approval shall be
+treated as a request for a nonconsensual physical search under subparagraph C7.3.2.2.,
+of Procedure 7.
+
+C8.3.2.2. Heads of DoD intelligence components may authorize the opening
+of mail outside U.S. postal channels when both the sender and intended recipient are
+other than United States persons if such searches are otherwise lawful and consistent
+with any Status of Forces Agreement that may be in effect.
+
+C8.3.3. **Mail Covers**
+
+C8.3.3.1. DoD intelligence components may request U.S. postal authorities to
+examine mail in U.S. postal channels, for counterintelligence purposes, in accordance
+with applicable postal regulations.
+
+C8.3.3.2. DoD intelligence components may also request mail covers with
+respect to mail to or from a United States person that is outside U.S. postal channels, in
+accordance with appropriate law and procedure of the host government, and any Status of
+Forces Agreement that may be effect.
+
+46
+CHAPTER 3
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+C9. CHAPTER 9
+PROCEDURE 9. PHYSICAL SURVEILLANCE
+
+C9.1. APPLICABILITY
+
+This procedure applies only to the physical surveillance of United States persons by DoD intelligence components for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes. This procedure does not apply to physical surveillance conducted as part of a training exercise when the subjects are participants in the exercise.
+
+C9.2. EXPLANATION OF UNDEFINED TERMS
+
+The term physical surveillance means a systematic and deliberate observation of a person by any means on a continuing basis, or the acquisition of a nonpublic communication by a person not a party thereto or visibly present thereat through any means not involving electronic surveillance.
+
+C9.3. PROCEDURES
+
+C9.3.1. Criteria for Physical Surveillance In the United States. Within the United States, DoD Intelligence components may conduct nonconsensual physical surveillances for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes against United States persons who are present or former employees of the intelligence component concerned; present or former contractors of such components or their present or former employees; applicants for such employment or contracting; or military persons employed by a non-intelligence element of a Military Service. Any physical surveillance within the United States that occurs outside a DoD installation shall be coordinated with the FBI and other law enforcement agencies, as may be appropriate.
+
+C9.3.2. Criteria for Physical Surveillance Outside the United States. Outside the United States, DoD Intelligence components may conduct nonconsensual physical surveillance of United States persons in one of the categories identified in paragraph C9.3.1., above. In addition, such components may conduct physical surveillance of other United States persons in the course of a lawful foreign intelligence or counterintelligence investigation, provided:
+
+C9.3.2.1. Such surveillance is consistent with the laws and policy of the host government and does not violate any Status of Forces Agreement that may be in effect;
+
+47
+CHAPTER
+
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+C9.3.2.2. That physical surveillance of a United States person abroad to collect foreign intelligence may be authorized only to obtain significant information that cannot be obtained by other means.
+
+C9.3.3. Required Approvals for Physical Surveillance
+
+C9.3.3.1. Persons Within DoD Investigative Jurisdiction. Physical surveillances within the United States or that involve United States persons within DoD investigative jurisdiction overseas may be approved by the head of the DoD intelligence component concerned or by designated senior officials of such components in accordance with this procedure.
+
+C9.3.3.2. Persons Outside DoD Investigative Jurisdiction. Outside the United States, physical surveillances of United States persons who are not within the investigative jurisdiction of the DoD intelligence component concerned will be forwarded through appropriate channels to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) for approval. Such requests shall indicate coordination with the Central Intelligence Agency.
+
+48
+CHAPTER
+
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+C10. CHAPTER 10
+PROCEDURE 10. UNDISCLOSED PARTICIPATION IN ORGANIZATIONS
+
+C10.1. APPLICABILITY
+
+This procedure applies to participation by employees of DoD intelligence components in any organization within the United States, or any organization outside the United States that constitutes a United States person, when such participation is on behalf of any entity of the intelligence community. These procedures do not apply to participation in organizations for solely personal purposes.
+
+C10.2. EXPLANATION OF UNDEFINED TERMS
+
+C10.2.1. Domestic activities refers to activities that take place within the United States that do not involve a significant connection with a foreign power, organization or person.
+
+C10.2.2. The term organization includes corporations and other commercial organizations, academic institutions, clubs, professional societies, associations, and any other group whose existence is formalized in some manner or otherwise functions on a continuing basis.
+
+C10.2.3. An organization within the United States means all organizations physically located within the geographical boundaries of the United States whether or not they constitute a United States persons. Thus, a branch, subsidiary, or office of an organization within the United States, which is physically located outside the United States, is not considered as an organization within the United States.
+
+C10.2.4. Participation refers to any action undertaken within the structure or framework of the organization involved. Such actions include serving as a representative or agent of the organization; acquiring membership; attending meetings not open to the public, including social functions for the organization as a whole; carrying out the work or functions of the organization; and contributing funds to the organization other than in payment for goods or services. Actions taken outside the organizational framework, however, do not constitute participation. Thus, attendance at meetings or social gatherings that involve organization members, but are not functions or activities of the organization itself does not constitute participation.
+
+49
+CHAPTER 10
+
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+C10.2.5. Participation is on behalf of an agency within the intelligence community when an employee is tasked or requested to take action within an organization for the benefit of such agency. Such employee may already be a member of the organization or may be asked to join. Actions undertaken for the benefit of an intelligence agency include collecting information, identifying potential sources or contacts, or establishing and maintaining cover. If a cooperating source furnishes information to an intelligence agency that he or she obtained by participation within an organization, but was not given prior direction or tasking by the intelligence agency to collect such information, then such participation was not on behalf of such agency.
+
+C10.2.6. Participation is solely for personal purposes, if undertaken at the initiative and expense of the employee for the employee's benefit.
+
+C10.3. PROCEDURES FOR UNDISCLOSED PARTICIPATION
+
+Except as permitted herein, employees of DoD intelligence components may participate on behalf of such components in organizations within the United States, or in organizations outside the United States that constitute United States persons, only if their affiliation with the intelligence component concerned is disclosed to an appropriate official of the organization in accordance with section C10.4., below. Participation without such disclosure is permitted only if it is consistent with the limitations set forth in paragraph C10.3.1., below, and has been approved in accordance with paragraph C10.3.2., below.
+
+C10.3.1. Limitations On Undisclosed Participation
+
+C10.3.1.1. Lawful Purpose. No undisclosed participation shall be permitted under this procedure unless it is essential to achieving a lawful foreign intelligence or counterintelligence purpose within the assigned mission of the collecting DoD intelligence component.
+
+C10.3.1.2. Limitations On Use of Undisclosed Participation for Foreign Intelligence Purposes Within the United States. Undisclosed participation may not be authorized within the United States for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence from or about a United States person, nor to collect information necessary to assess United States persons as potential sources of assistance to foreign intelligence activities. This does not preclude the collection of information about such persons, volunteered by cooperating sources participating in organizations to which such persons belong, however, if otherwise permitted by Procedure 2.
+
+50
+CHAPTER 10
+
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+C10.3.1.3. Duration of Participation. Authorization to participate under subparagraphs C10.3.2.1., and C10.3.2.2., shall be limited to the period covered by such participation, which shall be no longer than 12 months. Participation that lasts longer than 12 months shall be re-approved by the appropriate official on an annual basis in accordance with this procedure.
+
+C10.3.1.4. Participation for the Purpose of Influencing the Activities of the Organization or Its Members. No participation under this procedure shall be authorized for the purpose of influencing the activities of the organization in question, or its members, unless such participation is undertaken on behalf of the FBI in the course of a lawful investigation, or the organization concerned is composed primarily of individuals who are not United States persons and is reasonably believed to be acting on behalf of a foreign power. Any DoD intelligence component that desires to undertake participation for such purpose shall forward its request to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) setting forth the relevant facts justifying such participation and explaining the nature of its contemplated activity. Such participation may be approved by the DUSD(P) with the concurrence of the General Counsel, DoD.
+
+C10.3.2. Required Approvals
+
+C10.3.2.1. Undisclosed Participation That May Be Approved Within the DoD Intelligence Component. Undisclosed participation on behalf of a DoD intelligence component may be authorized with such component under the following circumstances:
+
+C10.3.2.1.1. Participation in meetings open to the public. For purposes of this section, a seminar or conference sponsored by a professional organization that is open to persons of a particular profession, whether or not they are members of the organization itself or have received a special invitation, shall be considered a meeting open to the public.
+
+C10.3.2.1.2. Participation in organizations that permit other persons acknowledged to the organization to be employees of the U.S. Government to participate.
+
+C10.3.2.1.3. Participation in educational or professional organizations for the purpose of enhancing the professional skills, knowledge, or capabilities of employees.
+
+C10.3.2.1.4. Participation in seminars, forums, conferences, exhibitions, trade fairs, workshops, symposiums, and similar types of meetings, sponsored by organizations in which the employee is a member, has been invited to participate, or
+
+51
+CHAPTER 10
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+when the sponsoring organization does not require disclosure of the participants'
+employment affiliations, for the purpose of collecting significant foreign intelligence
+that is generally made available to participants at such meetings, and does not involve
+the domestic activities of the organization or its members.
+
+C10.3.2.2. Participation That May Be Approved By Senior Intelligence
+Officials. Undisclosed participation may be authorized by the Deputy Under Secretary
+of Defense (Policy); the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Assistant Chief of
+Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army; the Commanding General, U.S. Army
+Intelligence and Security Command; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of
+Intelligence, U.S. Marine Corps; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, United States
+Air Force; the Director, Naval Investigative Service; the Commanding Officer, Air Force
+Office of Special Investigations; or their single designees, for the following purposes:
+
+C10.3.2.2.1. To collect significant foreign intelligence outside the
+United States, or from or about other than United States persons within the United
+States, provided no information involving the domestic activities of the organization or
+its members may be collected.
+
+C10.3.2.2.2. For counterintelligence purposes, at the written request of
+the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
+
+C10.3.2.2.3. To collect significant counterintelligence about other than
+United States persons, or about United States persons who are within the investigative
+jurisdiction of the Department of Defense, provided any such participation that occurs
+within the United States shall be coordinated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
+
+C10.3.2.2.4. To collect information necessary to identify and assess
+other than United States persons as potential sources of assistance for foreign
+intelligence and counterintelligence activities.
+
+C10.3.2.2.5. To collect information necessary to identify United States
+persons as potential sources of assistance to foreign intelligence and
+counterintelligence activities.
+
+C10.3.2.2.6. To develop or maintain cover necessary for the security of
+foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities.
+
+CI0.3.2.2.7. Outside the United States, to assess United States persons as
+potential sources of assistance to foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities.
+
+52
+CHAPTER 10
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+C10.4. DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT
+
+C10.4.1. Disclosure of the intelligence affiliation of an employee of a DoD
+intelligence component shall be made to an executive officer of the organization in
+question, or to an official in charge of membership, attendance, or the records of the
+organization concerned.
+
+C10.4.2. Disclosure may be made by the DoD intelligence component involved, an
+authorized DoD official, or by another component of the Intelligence Community that is
+otherwise authorized to take such action on behalf of the DoD intelligence component
+concerned.
+
+53
+CHAPTER 10
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+C11. CHAPTER 11
+PROCEDURE 11. CONTRACTING FOR GOODS AND SERVICES
+
+C11.1. APPLICABILITY
+
+This procedure applies to contracting or other arrangements with United States persons
+for the procurement of goods and services by DoD intelligence components within the
+United States. This procedure does not apply to contracting with government entities,
+or to the enrollment of individual students in academic institutions. The latter situation
+is governed by Procedure 10.
+
+C11.2. PROCEDURES
+
+C11.2.1. Contracts with Academic Institutions. DoD intelligence components may
+enter into a contract for goods or services with an academic institution only if prior to
+the making of the contract, the intelligence component has disclosed to appropriate
+officials of the academic institution the fact of sponsorship by a DoD intelligence
+component.
+
+C11.2.2. Contracts with Commercial Organizations, Private Institutions, and
+Individuals. Contracting by or for a DoD intelligence component with commercial
+organizations, private institutions, or private individuals within the United States may be
+done without revealing the sponsorship of the intelligence component if:
+
+CI1.2.2.1. The contract is for published material available to the general
+public or for routine goods or services necessary for the support of approved activities,
+such as credit cards, car rentals, travel, lodging, meals, rental of office space or
+apartments, and other items incident to approved activities; or
+
+C11.2.2.2. There is a written determination by the Secretary or the Under
+Secretary of a Military Department, the Director of the National Security Agency, the
+Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, or the Deputy Under Secretary of
+Defense (Policy) that the sponsorship of a DoD intelligence component must be
+concealed to protect the activities of the DoD intelligence component concerned.
+
+54
+CHAPTER 11
+DoD 5240 1-R, December 1982
+
+C11.3. EFFECT OF NONCOMPLIANCE
+
+No contract shall be void or voidable for failure to comply with this procedure.
+
+55
+CHAPTER 11
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+C12. CHAPTER 12
+PROCEDURE 12. PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT
+AUTHORITIES
+
+C12.1. APPLICABILITY
+
+This procedure applies to the provision of assistance by DoD intelligence components
+to law enforcement authorities. It incorporates the specific limitations on such
+assistance contained in E.O. 12333 (reference (a)), together with the general limitations
+and approval requirements of DoD Directive 5525.5 (reference (i)).
+
+C12.2. PROCEDURES
+
+C12.2.1. Cooperation with Law Enforcement Authorities. Consistent with the
+limitations contained in DoD Directive 5525.5 (reference (i)), and paragraph C12.2.2.,
+below, DoD intelligence components are authorized to cooperate with law enforcement
+authorities for the purpose of:
+
+C12.2.1.1. Investigating or preventing clandestine intelligence activities by
+foreign powers, international narcotics activities, or international terrorist activities;
+
+and
+C12.2.1.2. Protecting DoD employees, information, property, and facilities;
+
+C12.2.1.3. Preventing, detecting, or investigating other violations of law.
+
+C12.2.2. Types of Permissible Assistance. DoD intelligence components may
+provide the following types of assistance to law enforcement authorities:
+
+C12.2.2.1. Incidentally acquired information reasonably believed to indicate a
+violation of Federal law shall be provided in accordance with the procedures adopted
+pursuant to section 1.7(a) of E.O. 12333 (reference (a));
+
+C12.2.2.2. Incidentially acquired information reasonably believed to indicate a
+violation of State, local, or foreign law may be provided in accordance with procedures
+adopted by the Heads of DoD Components;
+
+C12.2.2.3. Specialized equipment and facilities may be provided to Federal law
+enforcement authorities, and, when lives are endangered, to State and local law
+
+56
+CHAPTER 12
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+enforcement authorities, provided such assistance is consistent with, and has been
+approved by an official authorized pursuant to, Enclosure 3 of DoD Directive 5525.5
+(reference (i)); and
+
+C12.2.2.4. Personnel who are employees of DoD intelligence components
+may be assigned to assist Federal law enforcement authorities, and, when lives are
+endangered, State and local law enforcement authorities, provided such use is consistent
+with, and has been approved by an official authorized pursuant to, Enclosure 4 of DoD
+Directive 5525.5 (reference (i)). Such official shall ensure that the General Counsel
+of the providing DoD Component concurs in such use.
+
+C12.2.2.5. Assistance may be rendered to law enforcement agencies and
+security services of foreign governments or international organizations in accordance
+with established policy and applicable Status of Forces Agreements; provided, that DoD
+intelligence components may not request or participate in activities of such agencies
+undertaken against United States persons that would not be permitted such components
+under these procedures.
+
+57
+CHAPTER 12
+DoD 5240 1-R, December 1982
+
+C13. CHAPTER 13
+PROCEDURE 13. EXPERIMENTATION ON HUMAN SUBJECTS FOR
+INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES
+
+C13.1. APPLICABILITY
+
+This procedure applies to experimentation on human subjects if such experimentation is
+conducted by or on behalf of a DoD intelligence component. This procedure does not
+apply to experimentation on animal subjects.
+
+C13.2. EXPLANATION OF UNDEFINED TERMS
+
+C13.2.1. Experimentation in this context means any research or testing activity
+involving human subjects that may expose such subjects to the possibility of permanent
+or temporary injury (including physical or psychological damage and damage to the
+reputation of such persons) beyond the risks of injury to which such subjects are
+ordinarily exposed in their daily lives.
+
+C13.2.2. Experimentation is conducted on behalf of a DoD intelligence component
+if it is conducted under contract to that component or to another DoD Component for
+the benefit of the intelligence component or at the request of such a component
+regardless of the existence of a contractual relationship.
+
+C13.2.3. Human subjects in this context includes any person whether or not such
+person is a United States person.
+
+C13.3. PROCEDURES
+
+C13.3.1. Experimentation on human subjects conducted by or on behalf of a DoD
+intelligence component may be undertaken only with the informed consent of the
+subject, in accordance with guidelines issued by the Department of Health and Human
+Services, setting out conditions that safeguard the welfare of such subjects.
+
+58
+CHAPTER 13
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+C13.3.2. DoD intelligence components may not engage in or contract for
+experimentation on human subjects without approval of the Secretary or Deputy
+Secretary of Defense, or the Secretary or Under Secretary of a Military Department, as
+appropriate.
+
+59
+CHAPTER 13
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+C14. CHAPTER 14
+PROCEDURE 14. EMPLOYEE CONDUCT
+
+C14.1. APPLICABILITY
+
+This procedure sets forth the responsibilities of employees of DoD intelligence
+components to conduct themselves in accordance with this Regulation and other
+applicable policy. It also provides that DoD intelligence components shall ensure, as
+appropriate, that these policies and guidelines are made known to their employees.
+
+C14.2. PROCEDURES
+
+C14.2.1. Employee Responsibilities. Employees shall conduct intelligence
+activities only pursuant to, and in accordance with, Executive Order 12333 (reference
+(a)) and this Regulation. In conducting such activities, employees shall not exceed the
+authorities granted the employing DoD intelligence component by law; Executive order,
+including E.O. 12333 (reference (a)), and applicable DoD Directives.
+
+C14.2.2. Familiarity With Restrictions
+
+C14.2.2.1. Each DoD intelligence component shall familiarize its personnel
+with the provisions of E.O. 12333 (reference (a)), this Regulation, and any instructions
+implementing this Regulation that apply to the operations and activities of such
+component. At a minimum, such familiarization shall contain:
+
+C14.2.2.1.1. Applicable portions of Procedures 1 through 4;
+
+C14.2.2.1.2. A summary of other procedures that pertains to collection
+techniques that are, or may be, employed by the DoD intelligence component
+concerned; and
+
+C14.2.2.1.3. A statement of individual employee reporting responsibility
+under Procedure 15.
+
+C14.2.2.2. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)
+(ATSD(IQ)) and each Inspector General responsible for a DoD intelligence component
+shall ensure, as part of their inspections, that procedures are in effect that will achieve
+the objectives set forth in subparagraph C14.2.2.1., above.
+
+60
+CHAPTER 14
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+C14.2.3. Responsibilities of the Heads of DoD Components. The Heads of DoD
+Components that constitute, or contain, DoD intelligence components shall:
+
+C14.2.3.1. Ensure that all proposals for intelligence activities that may be
+unlawful, in whole or in part, or may be contrary to applicable Executive Branch or DoD
+policy are referred to the General Counsel responsible for such component.
+
+C14.2.3.2. Ensure that no adverse action is taken against any employee
+because the employee reports activities pursuant to Procedure 15.
+
+CI4.2.3.3. Impose such sanctions as may be appropriate upon any employee
+who violates the provisions of this Regulation or any instruction promulgated
+thereunder.
+
+C14.2.3.4. In any case involving serious or continuing breaches of security by
+either DoD or non-DoD employees, recommend to the Secretary of Defense
+appropriate investigative actions.
+
+C14.2.3.5. Ensure that the General Counsel and Inspector General with
+responsibility for the component, as well as the General Counsel, DoD, and the
+ATSD(IO), have access to all information concerning the intelligence activities of that
+component necessary to perform their oversight responsibilities.
+
+C14.2.3.6. Ensure that employees cooperate fully with the Intelligence
+Oversight Board and its representatives.
+
+61
+CHAPTER 14
+DoD 5240 1-R, December 1982
+
+C15. CHAPTER 15
+
+PROCEDURE 15. IDENTIFYING, INVESTIGATING, AND REPORTING
+OUSTIONABLE ACTIVITIES
+
+C15.1. APPLICABILITY
+
+This procedure provides for the identification, investigation, and reporting of
+questionable intelligence activities.
+
+C15.2. EXPLANATION OF UNDEFINED TERMS
+
+C15.2.1. The term "questionable activity," as used herein, refers to any conduct
+that constitutes, or is related to, an intelligence activity that may violate the law, any
+Executive order or Presidential directive, including E.O. 12333 (reference (a)), or
+applicable DoD policy, including this Regulation.
+
+C15.2.2. The terms "General Counsel"and "Inspector General," as used herein,
+refer, unless otherwise specified, to any General Counsel or Inspector General with
+responsibility for one or more DoD intelligence components. Unless otherwise
+indicated, the term "Inspector General" shall also include the ATSD(IO).
+
+C15.3. PROCEDURES
+
+C15.3.1. Identification
+
+C15.3.1.1. Each employee shall report any questionable activity to the
+General Counsel or Inspector General for the DoD intelligence component concerned,
+or to the General Counsel, DoD, or ATSD(IO).
+
+C15.3.1.2. Inspectors General, as part of their inspection of DoD intelligence
+components, and General Counsels, as part of their oversight responsibilities shall seek
+to determine if such components are involved in any questionable activities. If such
+activities have been or are being undertaken, the matter shall be investigated under
+paragraph C15.3.2., below. If such activities have been undertaken, but were not
+reported, the Inspector General shall also ascertain the reason for such failure and
+recommend appropriate corrective action.
+
+62
+CHAPTER 15
+
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+C15.3.1.3. Inspectors General, as part of their oversight responsibilities, shall,
+as appropriate, ascertain whether any organizations, staffs, or offices within their
+respective jurisdictions, but not otherwise specifically identified as DoD intelligence
+components, are being used for foreign intelligence or counterintelligence purposes to
+which Part 2 of E.O. 12333 (reference (a)), applies, and, if so, shall ensure the
+activities of such components are in compliance with this Regulation and applicable
+DoD policy.
+
+C15.3.1.4. Inspectors General, as part of their inspection of DoD intelligence
+components, shall ensure that procedures exist within such components for the
+reporting of questionable activities, and that employees of such components are aware
+of their responsibilities to report such activities.
+
+C15.3.2. Investigation
+
+C15.3.2.1. Each report of a questionable activity shall be investigated to the
+extent necessary to determine the facts and assess whether the activity is legal and is
+consistent with applicable policy.
+
+C15.3.2.2. When appropriate, questionable activities reported to a General
+Counsel shall be referred to the corresponding Inspector General for investigation, and
+if reported to an Inspector General, shall be referred to the corresponding General
+Counsel to determine whether the activity is legal and consistent with applicable
+policy. Reports made to the DoD General Counsel or the ATSD(IO) may be referred,
+after consultation between these officials, to the appropriate Inspector General and
+General Counsel for investigation and evaluation.
+
+C15.3.2.3. Investigations shall be conducted expeditiously. The officials
+responsible for these investigations may, in accordance with established procedures,
+obtain assistance from within the component concerned, or from other DoD
+Components, when necessary, to complete such investigations in a timely manner.
+
+C15.3.2.4. To complete such investigations, General Counsels and Inspectors
+General shall have access to all relevant information regardless of classification or
+compartmentation.
+
+C15.3.3. Reports
+
+C15.3.3.1. Each General Counsel and Inspector General shall report
+immediately to the General Counsel, DoD, and the ATSD(IO) questionable activities of
+a serious nature.
+
+63
+CHAPTER 15
+
+DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982
+
+C15.3.3.2. Each General Counsel and Inspector General shall submit to the
+ATSD(IO) a quarterly report describing those activities that come to their attention
+during the quarter reasonably believed to be illegal or contrary to Executive order or
+Presidential directive, or applicable DoD policy; and actions taken with respect to such
+activities. The reports shall also include significant oversight activities undertaken
+during the quarter and any suggestions for improvements in the oversight system.
+Separate, joint, or consolidated reports may be submitted. These reports should be
+prepared in accordance with DoD Directive 5000.11 (reference (j)).
+
+C15.3.3.3. All reports made pursuant to subparagraphs C15.3.3.1., and
+C15.3.3.2., above, which involve a possible violation of Federal criminal law shall be
+considered by the General Counsel concerned in accordance with the procedures
+adopted pursuant to section 1.7(a) of E.O. 12333 (reference (a)).
+
+C15.3.3.4. The General Counsel, DoD, and the ATSD(IO) may review the
+findings of other General Counsels and Inspectors General with respect to questionable
+activities.
+
+C15.3.3.5. The ATSD(IO) and the General Counsel, DoD, shall report in a
+timely manner to the White House Intelligence Oversight Board all activities that come
+to their attention that are reasonably believed to be illegal or contrary to Executive
+order or Presidential directive. They will also advise appropriate officials of the
+Office of the Secretary of Defense of such activities.
+
+C15.3.3.6. These reporting requirements are exempt from format approval and
+licensing in accordance with paragraph VII.G. of Enclosure 3 to DoD Directive 5000.19
+(reference (k)).
+
+64
+CHAPTER 15
+
+SECRET//COMINT//
+
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
+NSA/CSS POLICY 1-23
+
+Issue Date: 11 March 2004
+Revised: 27 December 2007,
+29 May 2009
+
+(U) PROCEDURES GOVERNING NSA/CSS ACTIVITIES
+THAT AFFECT U.S. PERSONS
+
+(U) PURPOSE AND SCOPE
+
+(U) This Policy is issued to comply with DoD Directive 5240.01 (Reference a), which
+implements 50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq (the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as
+amended (Reference b)); Executive Order 12333, as amended (Reference c); and Executive
+Order 12863 (Reference d). It establishes procedures and assigns responsibilities to ensure that
+the signals intelligence and information assurance missions of NSA/CSS are conducted in a
+manner consistent with the privacy rights of U.S. persons and as required by law, executive
+orders, Department of Defense policies and instructions, and internal NSA/CSS policy.
+
+(U) This Policy applies to all NSA/CSS elements.
+
+//s//
+MICHAEL V. HAYDEN
+Lieutenant General, USAF
+Director, NSA/Chief, CSS
+
+Endorsed by
+Associate Director for Policy
+
+Encl:
+(U) Annex - Classified Annex to DoD Procedures under Executive Order 12333
+
+DISTRIBUTION:
+DJP1
+DJP2 (VR)
+DJP2 (Archives)
+
+SECRET//COMINT//
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20070108
+Declassify Ont 20291123
+---SECRET//COMINT//
+Policy 1-23
+Dated: 11 March 2004
+
+(U) This Policy 1-23 supersedes Directive 10-30, dated 20 September 1990, and Change One
+thereto, dated June 1998. The Associate Director for Policy endorsed an administrative update,
+effective 27 December 2007 to make minor adjustments to the policy. This 29 May 2009
+administrative update includes changes due to the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 and in core
+training requirements.
+(U) OPI: Office of General Counsel (OGC), 963-3121s
+(U) No section of this document, regardless of classification, shall be released without approval
+from the Office of Policy and Records, DJP1.
+
+(U) POLICY
+
+1. (U) NSA/CSS shall collect, process, retain, and disseminate information about U.S.
+persons only as prescribed in DoD Directive 5240.1 (Reference a), DoD Regulation 5240.1-R
+(Reference e), orders issued by the Foreign intelligence Surveillance Court pursuant to reference
+b, and the Classified Annex to DoD Procedures under Executive Order 12333 (hereafter referred
+to as the Classified Annex; Reference f).
+
+(U) PROCEDURES
+
+2. (U) Signals Intelligence. The signals intelligence (SIGINT) mission of the NSA/CSS
+is to collect, process, analyze, produce, and disseminate SIGINT information and data for foreign
+intelligence and counterintelligence purposes to support national and departmental missions.
+NSA/CSS shall intentionally collect only foreign communications. NSA/CSS shall not
+intentionally collect U.S. person communications without proper legal authorization. The
+Director, NSA/Chief, CSS (DIRNSA/CHCSS) may authorize exceptions only pursuant to the
+procedures contained in DoD Regulation 5240.1-R (Reference e) and the Classified Annex
+thereto (Reference f).
+
+a. (U) Electronic surveillance, as defined in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
+Act of 1978, as amended (Reference b), requires a court order issued by a judge
+appointed pursuant to the Act or a certification of the Attorney General of the United
+States and the Director of National Intelligence issued pursuant to Section 105(b) of the
+Act. The DIRNSA/CHCSS or Deputy Director, NSA (D/DIR) must approve applications
+for a court order, which must be submitted through the DoD General Counsel to the
+Attorney General. The DIRNSA/CHCSS or D/DIR may contact the Attorney General in
+an emergency and the Attorney General may approve the surveillance pending
+subsequent court proceedings.
+
+b. (U) Electronic surveillance, as defined in Appendix A to DoD Regulation
+5240.1-R (Reference e), directed against U.S. persons who are outside the U.S. requires
+an order by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court. In emergency situations
+(e.g., U.S. hostages overseas), as described in Procedure 5, Part 2., of Reference e, the
+DIRNSA/CHCSS, D/DIR or Senior Operations Officer at the National Security
+Operations Center may authorize electronic surveillance, after consulting with the Office
+SECRET//COMINT//
+2
+SECRET//COMINT//
+Policy 1-23
+Dated: 11 March 2004
+
+of General Counsel (OGC). The Attorney General shall be notified promptly of any such
+surveillance.
+
+3. (U) Information Assurance. National Security Directive (NSD) 42 (Reference g) and
+Executive Order 12333 (Reference c) designated DIRNSA as the National Manager for National
+Security Systems (e.g. NSA's Information Assurance (IA) mission) as that term is defined by 44
+U.S. C. 3542(b)(2) (Reference h). In that capacity, and pursuant to those authorities as well as
+other applicable laws and policies, DIRNSA's responsibilities include examining national
+security systems and evaluating their vulnerability to foreign interception and exploitation. NSA,
+as an element of the Intelligence Community and pursuant to section 2.6(c) of Executive Order
+12333, as amended, may provide specialized equipment, technical knowledge, or assistance of
+expert personnel for use by any U.S. Government department or agency having a national
+security system or a non-national security system. The Executive Order directs that provision of
+assistance by expert personnel shall be approved in each case by the general counsel of the
+providing element or department. The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002
+(Reference i) and implementing procedures agreed to by NSA/CSS and the National Institute of
+Standards and Technology also authorizes NSA/CSS to provide IA support for US government
+non-national security systems.
+
+a. (U) Any IA activities undertaken by NSA/CSS, including those involving
+monitoring of official communications, shall be conducted in strict compliance with law,
+Executive Order and implementing procedures, and applicable Presidential directive.
+Any monitoring undertaken for communications security purposes ("COMSEC
+monitoring") shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of National
+Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Directive (NTISSD) No. 600
+(Reference j) or other special procedures approved by the Attorney General.
+
+b. (U) In addition to the responsibility to conduct COMSEC monitoring and to
+examine national security systems for vulnerabilities to foreign exploitation, NSD 42
+(Reference g) also requires NSA/CSS to disseminate information on threats to national
+security systems, regardless of the source of the threat. Title II of the Homeland Security
+Act of 2002 (Reference k) imposes similar requirements with respect to the protection of
+the United States' critical infrastructure.
+
+c. (U) Pursuant to NSA/CSS Policy 1-2, "(U) Mission and Functions Statements
+with Service Level Agreements," (Reference 1) and IAD's Mission and Functions
+Statement (Reference m), IAD performs all functions on behalf of the DIRNSA in
+fulfilling his role as National Manager for National Security Systems. Accordingly, the
+Information Assurance Director acts for DIRNSA/CHCSS in the issuance of written
+approval to conduct the information assurance activities assigned to NSA/CSS, including
+the conduct of activities that may result in the collection of U.S. person information as
+defined in DoD Regulation 5240.1-R (Reference e) and other applicable guidance.
+-SECRET//COMINT//
+3
+SECRET//COMINT//
+Policy 1-23
+Dated: 11 March 2004
+
+(U) RESPONSIBILITIES
+
+4. (U) The NSA General Counsel (GC) and Inspector General (IG) shall:
+
+a. (U) Conduct appropriate oversight to identify and prevent violations of
+Executive Order (E.O.) 12333, DoD Directive 5240.1 (References c and a), this Policy,
+and any laws, orders, directives and regulations; and
+
+b. (U) Forward to the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) of the President's
+Intelligence Advisory Board (PIAB), through the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
+for Intelligence Oversight (ATSD(IO)), reports of activities that they have reason to
+believe may be unlawful or contrary to Executive Order or Presidential Directive, and
+other questionable intelligence activities or significant or highly sensitive matters, as well
+as provide other reports or information that the IOB or ATSD(IO) requires.
+
+5. (U) The NSA Inspector General shall:
+
+a. (U) Conduct regular inspections of NSA/CSS activities for compliance with
+the law, executive orders, and related directives;
+
+b. (S//REL) Perform general oversight of the SIGINT activities of the [REDACTED]
+for compliance with E.O. 12333 (Reference c) and related laws and
+directives;
+
+c. (U) Establish reporting procedures to be followed by the Directors, Associate
+Directors and Principal Directors, Chiefs of NSA/CSS Field Activities, and NSA/CSS
+Representatives regarding their activities and practices;
+
+d. (U) Consult with the NSA General Counsel on matters involving
+interpretation or possible violations of law, executive orders, or directives;
+
+e. (U) Submit, semiannually, a comprehensive report to the DIRNSA/CHCSS
+and D/DIR on the results of the IG's oversight activities; and
+
+f. (U) Report, as required by E.O. 12333, E.O. 12863 (References c and d) and
+other authorities, to the ATSD(IO) and the IOB.
+
+6. (U) The NSA General Counsel shall:
+
+a. (U) Provide legal advice and assistance to all NSA/CSS elements regarding
+the activities covered by this Policy;
+
+b. (U) Assist NSA/CSS activities as requested in developing such guidelines and
+working aids as are necessary to ensure compliance with this Policy;
+4
+SECRET//COMINT/[REDACTED]
+SECRET//COMINT//
+Policy 1-23
+Dated: 11 March 2004
+
+c. (U) Assist the NSA Inspector General in inspections and oversight of
+NSA/CSS activities, as required;
+
+d. (U) Review and assess for legal implications, as requested by any NSA
+organization, all new major requirements and internally generated NSA/CSS activities;
+
+e. (U) Advise appropriate NSA organizations of new legislation and case law
+which may have an impact on NSA/CSS missions, functions, operations, activities, or
+practices;
+
+f. (U) Prepare and forward through DoD to the Attorney General any proposed
+changes to existing procedures or new procedures required by E.O. 12333 (Reference c)
+or FISA, as amended (Reference b);
+
+g. (U) In conjunction with the OIG, report as required by E.O. 12333 and E.O.
+12863 (References c and d) to the ATSD(IO) and the PIOB, and provide copies of such
+reports to DIRNSA/CHCSS and affected NSA/CSS elements;
+
+h. (U) Prepare and process applications for authority to conduct electronic
+surveillance pursuant to law, Executive Order and policy; and
+
+i. (U) Process requests from any DoD intelligence component, including
+NSA/CSS, for authority to use signals as described in Procedure 5, Part 5, of DoD
+Regulation 5240.1-R (Reference e), for periods in excess of 90 days in the development,
+test, or calibration of electronic equipment that can intercept communications and other
+electronic surveillance equipment. Forward processed requests to the Attorney General
+for approval when required.
+
+7. (U) The Directors, Associate Directors, the NSA/CSS Chief of Staff, and Extended
+Enterprise Commanders/Chiefs shall:
+
+a. (U) Appoint an intelligence oversight coordinator or senior level official to
+oversee intelligence oversight within each major element;
+
+b. (U) Provide training to all employees (including contractors and integrees),
+except contractor personnel excluded from core training requirements, in order to
+maintain a high degree of sensitivity to, and understanding of, the laws and authorities
+referenced in this Policy. Such training shall include both core and advanced intelligence
+oversight training and refresher training with appropriate testing. All employees, except
+contractor personnel excluded from core training requirements, shall receive core
+training, and those with exposure to U.S. person information shall receive appropriate
+advanced training. Training shall be required at least annually (or more often
+commensurate with the level of exposure to U.S. person information by the employee).
+Newly hired employees and reassignees, including contractor personnel not excluded
+from core training requirements and integrees, must be trained upon assignment.
+SECRET//COMINT//
+5
+-SECRET//COMINT//
+Policy 1-23
+Dated: 11 March 2004
+
+Managers shall keep records of training for all employees. The training must cover: E.O.
+12333 (Reference c); Procedures 1-4, 14 and 15 of DoD Regulation 5240.1-R (Reference
+e); other Procedures of the Regulation that apply to the assigned mission; and this Policy.
+Employees involved in the SIGINT process must be familiar with U.S. Signals
+Intelligence Directive SP0018 (USSID SP0018) (Reference n), and employees involved
+in COMSEC monitoring must be familiar with NTISSD 600 (Reference j).
+
+c. (U) Apply the provisions of this Policy to all activities under their cognizance
+and ensure that all publications (U.S. Signals Intelligence Directives, National COMSEC
+Instructions, NSA/CSS Management and Administrative Publications, etc.) and
+instructions for which they are responsible are in compliance with this Policy;
+
+d. (U) Conduct a periodic review of the activities and practices conducted in or
+under the cognizance of their respective organizations to ensure consistency with the laws
+and authorities listed in the References section of this Policy;
+
+e. (U) Ensure that all new major requirements levied on NSA/CSS and the U.S.
+Cryptologic System or internally generated NSA/CSS activities are considered for review
+and approval by the General Counsel. All activities that may raise a question of law or
+regulation must be reviewed by the General Counsel prior to acceptance or execution;
+
+f. (U) Ensure that necessary special security clearances and access authorizations
+are provided to the General Counsel and Inspector General to enable them to meet their
+assigned responsibilities;
+
+g. (U) Report as required and otherwise assist the Inspector General and General
+Counsel in carrying out their responsibilities, to include providing input to the Inspector
+General for preparing the joint Inspector General/General Counsel/Director, NSA/CSS
+quarterly report to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight) and
+the IOB; and
+
+h. (U) Develop, in coordination with the General Counsel and Inspector General
+as required, such specific guidelines and working aids as are necessary to ensure
+compliance with this Policy. These guidelines and working aids should be available to
+employees at all times and must be reviewed by management with employees at least
+annually.
+
+(U) REFERENCES
+
+8. (U) References:
+
+a. DoD Directive 5240.01, “DoD Intelligence Activities," dated August 27,
+2007.
+SECRET//COMINT/[REDACTED]
+6
+SECRET//COMINT/[REDACTED]
+Policy 1-23
+Dated: 11 March 2004
+
+b. (U) "Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978," as amended, 50 U.S.C.
+1801 et seq.
+
+c. (U) Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," as
+amended.
+
+d. (U) Executive Order 12863, "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
+Board," dated 13 September 1993.
+
+e. (U) DoD Regulation 5240. 1-R, "Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD
+Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons," dated 7 December 1982.
+
+f. (U) Classified Annex to Department of Defense Procedures Under Executive
+Order 12333.
+
+g. (U) National Security Directive (NSD) 42, "National Policy for the Security
+of National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems," dated 5 July 1990.
+
+h. (U) "Information Technology Reform Act of 1996," Division E of Public Law
+104-106, as codified at 40 U.S.C. 1401 et seq. [Intelink]
+
+i. (U) "Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002,” Public Law
+107-347, date 17 December 2002.
+
+j. (U) National Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Directive
+No. 600, “Communications Security (COMSEC) Monitoring," dated 10 April 1990.
+
+k. (U) "Homeland Security Act of 2002, Title II," Public Law 107-296.
+
+1. (U) NSA/CSS Policy 1-2, “(U) Mission and Functions Statements with
+Service Level Agreements," dated 12 May 2003.
+
+m. (U) NSA/CSS Mission and Functions Statement for Information Assurance
+Directorate, dated 23 April 2003.
+
+n. (U) United States Signals Intelligence Directive (USSID) SP0018, “Legal
+Compliance and Minimization Procedures," dated 27 July 1993.
+
+0. (U//FOUO) Memorandum from the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense to
+the Director, National Security Agency, "Exemption from Specified Training
+Requirements Required by Department of Defense (DoD) Regulation 5240.1-R,”
+dated 3 December 2008.
+
+p. (U) National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) No. 6, “Signals
+Intelligence," dated 17 February 1972.
+
+7
+SECRET//COMINT/[REDACTED]
+SECRET//COMINT/[REDACTED]
+Policy 1-23
+Dated: 11 March 2004
+
+(U) DEFINITIONS
+
+9. (U//FOUO) Contractor Personnel Excluded from Core Training Requirements
+Refer to the Secret//Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals memorandum from the Assistant to the
+Secretary of Defense, dated 3 December 2008 (Reference o), for contractor personnel in this
+category.
+
+10. (U) Employee - A person employed by, assigned to, or acting for an agency within
+the intelligence community, including contractors and persons otherwise acting at the direction
+of such an agency. DoD Regulation 5240.1-R (Reference e), Appendix A, Definitions.
+
+11. (U) SIGINT – SIGINT comprises communications intelligence, electronics
+intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, either individually or in
+combination. Communications intelligence (COMINT) is defined as “technical and
+intelligence information derived from foreign communications of other than the intended
+recipients..." and "... the collection and processing of foreign communications passed
+by radio, wire, or other electromagnetic means." NSCID 6 (Reference p), Sec. 4(b). Electronics
+intelligence (ELINT) consists of foreign electromagnetic radiations such as emissions from a
+radar system. Foreign instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT) includes signals from
+telemetry, beaconry, etc.
+
+12. (C//REL) U.S. Person
+a. (U) A citizen of the United States;
+b. (U) An alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States;
+c. (U) Unincorporated groups and associations a substantial number of the
+members of which constitute a or b above, or
+d. (U) Corporations incorporated in the United States, including U.S. flag non-
+governmental aircraft or vessels, but not including those entities which are openly
+acknowledged by a foreign government or governments to be directed and controlled
+by them. USSID SP0018 (Reference n), Section 9.18.
+
+8
+SECRET//COMINT/[REDACTED]
+SECRET//COMINT/[REDACTED]
+
+(U) ANNEX
+
+(U) CLASSIFIED ANNEX TO DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
+PROCEDURES UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333
+
+Sec. 1: Applicability and Scope (U)
+
+(S//SI) These procedures implement sections 2.3, 2.4, and 2.6 (c) of Executive Order
+12333 and supplement Procedure 5 of DoD Regulation 5240.1-R, previously approved by the
+Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General. They govern the conduct by the United States
+Signals Intelligence System of signals intelligence activities that involve the collection, retention
+and dissemination of communications originated or intended for receipt in the United States, and
+signals intelligence activities that are directed intentionally against the communications of a
+United States person who is outside the United States. These procedures also govern the
+collection, retention and dissemination of information concerning United States persons that is
+collected by the United States Signals Intelligence System including such activities undertaken
+by the [REDACTED]. These procedures do not apply to signals intelligence
+activities that are not required under Executive Order 12333 to be conducted pursuant to
+procedures approved by the Attorney General. Further, these procedures do not apply to signals
+intelligence activities directed against the radio communications of air and sea vessels for the
+purpose of collecting foreign intelligence regarding international narcotics trafficking or in
+support of federal law enforcement efforts to interdict such trafficking. Such signals intelligence
+activities are subject to a separate classified annex approved earlier by the Attorney General (See
+Annex J to United States Signals Intelligence Directive 18). Except for matters expressly
+authorized herein, the limitations contained in Department of Defense Regulation 5240.1-R also
+apply to the United States Signals Intelligence System. Reference should be made to those
+procedures with respect to matters of applicability and scope, definitions, policy and operational
+procedures not covered herein.
+
+Sec. 2: Definitions (U)
+
+(U) The following additional definitions or supplements to definitions in DoD Regulation
+5240.1-R apply solely to this Classified Annex:
+
+(S//SI) Agent of a Foreign Power. For purposes of signals intelligence activities which
+are not regulated by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), the term "agent
+of a foreign power" means:
+
+(a) a person who, for or on behalf of a foreign power, is engaged in clandestine
+intelligence activities, sabotage, or international terrorist activities, or activities in
+preparation for international terrorist activities, or who conspires with, or knowingly
+
+A-1
+Annex to Policy 1-23
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20070108
+Declassify On: 20291123-
+SECRET//COMINT/[REDACTED]
+SECRET//COMINT/[REDACTED]
+
+aids and abets such a person engaging in such activities;
+
+(b) a person who is an officer or employee of a foreign power;
+
+(c) a person unlawfully acting for, or pursuant to the direction of, a foreign power.
+The mere fact that a person's activities may benefit or further the aims of a foreign power
+is not enough to bring that person under this subsection, absent evidence that the person
+is taking direction from, or acting in knowing concert with, the foreign power;
+
+(d) a person in contact with or acting in collaboration with an intelligence or
+security service of a foreign power for the purpose of providing access to information or
+material classified by the United States to which such person has or has had access; or
+
+(e) a corporation or other entity that is owned or controlled directly or indirectly
+by a foreign power.
+
+(U) Communicant. The term "communicant" means a sender or intended recipient of a
+communication.
+
+(U) Consent. For the purposes of signals intelligence activities, an agreement by an
+organization with the National Security Agency to permit collection of information shall be
+deemed valid consent if given on behalf of such organization by an official or governing body
+determined by the General Counsel, National Security Agency, to have actual or apparent
+authority to make such an agreement.
+
+(S//SI) Foreign Communication. The term "foreign communication" means a
+communication that involves a sender or an intended recipient who is outside the United States
+or that is entirely among foreign powers or between a foreign power and officials of a foreign
+power. Electronic surveillance within the United States targeted against communications
+entirely among foreign powers or between a foreign power and officials of a foreign power will
+be coordinated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, including surveillances targeted against
+telephone communications or telecommunications that serve residential or non-official premises
+of a foreign power or foreign officials within the United States. This coordination is intended to
+satisfy the National Security Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation intelligence
+requirements, preclude duplication of effort, and ensure that appropriate minimization practices
+are developed and applied.
+
+(U) Foreign Intelligence. The term "foreign intelligence" includes both positive foreign
+intelligence and counterintelligence.
+
+(C) Illicit Communication. The term "illicit communication" means a communication
+transmitted in violation of the Communications Act of 1934 and regulations thereunder or of
+international agreements which because of its explicit content, message characteristics, or
+
+A-2
+Annex to Policy 1-23
+Dated: 11 March 2004
+SECRET//COMINT/[REDACTED]
+SECRET//COMINT/[REDACTED]
+
+method of transmission is reasonably believed to be a communication to or from an agent or
+agents of foreign powers, whether or not United States persons.
+
+(U) Interception. The term "interception" means the acquisition by the United States
+Signals Intelligence System through electronic means of a nonpublic communication to which it
+is not an intended party, and the processing of the contents of that communication into an
+intelligence form but not including the display of signals on visual display devices intended to
+permit the examination of the technical characteristics of the signal without reference to the
+information content carried by the signal.
+
+(C)International Commercial Communications. The term "international commercial
+Communications" means foreign communications transmitted internationally in whole or in part
+by one or more commercial or foreign government communications carriers, and includes, but is
+not limited to, [REDACTED]. International commercial communications may be
+wire, telephone or radio communications transmitted by high frequency, microwave, satellite or
+other mode of transmission.
+
+(C)National Diplomatic Communications. The term "national diplomatic
+communications" includes all communications, regardless of the mode of transmission,
+transmitted by or to a foreign power and to which no United States person is a communicant.
+The official communications of an international organization composed of foreign governments
+are included in the meaning of this term, provided, however that the communications of official
+representatives of the United States are not included.
+
+(C)Selection. The term "selection," as applied to manual and mechanical processing
+activities, means the intentional insertion of a name, cable, TELEX, or other address and answer
+back or other alpha-numeric device into a computer scan dictionary or manual scan guide for the
+purpose of identifying messages of interest and isolating them for further processing.
+
+(C)Selection Term. The term "selection term" means the composite of individual terms
+used to effect or defeat selection of particular communications for the purpose of interception. It
+comprises the entire term or series of terms so used, but not any segregable term contained
+herein. It applies to both mechanical and manual processing.
+
+(U) Technical Data Base. The term "technical data base" means information retained
+for cryptanalytic or traffic analytic purposes.
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+(C)United States Person. For purposes of intentionally collecting the communications
+of a particular person, the term "United States person," in addition to the meaning in the
+Appendix to DoD Regulation 5240.1-R, includes any alien known to be presently in the United
+States; any unincorporated association of such aliens or American citizens; the United States
+
+A-3
+Annex to Policy 1-23
+Dated: 11 March 2004
+SECRET//COMINT/[REDACTED]
+SECRET//COMINT/[REDACTED]
+operations, office, branch, or representative of a corporation incorporated abroad; any
+corporation or corporate subsidiary incorporated in the United States; and any U.S. flag non-
+governmental aircraft or vessel: Provided, however, that the term "U.S. person" shall not include
+(i) non-permanent resident aliens and entities in the United States that have diplomatic immunity
+as determined in accordance with Subsection 4.B; or (ii) a foreign power or powers as defined in
+Section 101 (a)(1)-(3) of FISA.
+Sec. 3: Policy (U)
+
+(U) The Director, National Security Agency, is assigned responsibility for signals
+intelligence collection and processing activities and communications security activities. In order
+to assure that these activities are conducted in accordance with the provisions of Executive Order
+12333, the Director, or his designee, will issue appropriate directives and instructions
+implementing these procedures and governing the conduct of the United States Signals
+Intelligence System and the activities of communications security entities.
+
+(C)It is the policy of the United States Signals Intelligence System to collect, retain, and
+disseminate foreign communications and military tactical communications. It is recognized,
+however, that the United States Signals Intelligence System may incidentally intercept non-
+foreign communications, including those of or concerning United States persons, in the course of
+authorized collection of foreign communications. The United States Signals Intelligence System
+makes every reasonable effort, through surveys and technical means, to reduce to the maximum
+extent possible the number of such incidental intercepts acquired in the conduct of its operations.
+Information derived from these incidentally intercepted non-foreign communications may be
+disseminated to the Federal Bureau of Investigation when the information is foreign intelligence
+or counterintelligence or indicates a threat to the physical safety of any person. Dissemination
+of such information is also governed by these procedures and applicable minimization
+procedures approved in accordance with FISA. Specific communications sent from or intended
+for receipt by the United States persons are not intercepted deliberately by the United States
+Signals Intelligence System unless specific authorization for such interception has been obtained
+in accordance with these procedures.
+
+(S//SI) The President has authorized, and the Attorney General hereby specifically
+approves, interception by the United States Signals Intelligence System of:
+
+* National Diplomatic Communications;
+* International Commercial Communications;
+* Illicit Communications;
+* United States and Allied Military exercise communications;
+
+A-4
+Annex to Policy 1-23
+Dated: 11 March 2004
+SECRET//COMINT//[REDACTED]
+
+SECRET//COMINT//[REDACTED]
+* Signals collected during the search of the signals environment for foreign communications
+that may be developed into sources of signals intelligence;
+
+* Signals collected during the monitoring of foreign electronic surveillance activities directed
+at United States communications consistent with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
+1978; and
+
+* Signals collected during the testing and training of personnel in the use of signals
+intelligence collection equipment in the United States consistent with the Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Act of 1978.
+Sec. 4: Procedures (U)
+
+A.(C) Signals Intelligence: Communications of, or concerning, United States persons.
+The United States Signals Intelligence System may collect, process, retain and disseminate
+foreign communications that are also communications of, or concerning, United States persons.
+Communications of, or concerning, United States will be treated in the following manner.
+
+1. Collection
+
+(a) (S//SI) Communications of or concerning a United States person may be
+intercepted intentionally or selected deliberately through use of a selection term or otherwise
+only:
+
+(1) with the consent of such United States person. Where a United States
+person has consented, by completion of the appropriate Consent Agreement appended hereto, to
+the use of a selection term intended to intercept communications originating by or referencing
+that person, the National Security Agency may use such selection term to select foreign
+communications; or
+
+(2) with specific prior court order pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence
+Suryeillance Act of 1978 where applicable. All United States Signals Intelligence System
+requests for such court orders or approvals shall be forwarded by the Director, National Security
+Agency for certification by the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense (in case
+of the unavailability of both of these officials and in emergency situations, certification may be
+granted by another official authorized by executive order to certify such requests), and thence to
+the Attorney General; or
+
+(3) with the specific prior approval of the Director, National Security Agency,
+in any case in which the United States person is reasonably believed to be held captive by a
+foreign power or by a group engaged in international terrorist activities. The Attorney General
+will be notified when the Director authorizes selection of communications concerning a United
+States person pursuant to this provision; or
+
+Annex to Policy 1-23
+Dated: 11 March 2004
+-SECRET//COMINT//[REDACTED]
+A-5
+
+SECRET//COMINT/[REDACTED]
+(4) with specific prior approval by the Attorney General based on a finding by
+the Attorney General that there is probable cause to believe the United States person is an agent
+of a foreign power and that the purpose of the interception or selection is to collect significant
+foreign intelligence. Such approvals shall be limited to a period of time not to exceed ninety
+days for individuals and one year for entities.
+
+(b) (S//SI) Communications of, or concerning (1)[REDACTED]
+of a foreign power, or powers, as defined in Section 101 (a) (1) - (3) of
+FISA. or (2) [REDACTED] may be intercepted intentionally, or
+selected deliberately (through the use of a selection term or otherwise), upon certification in
+writing by the Director, NSA to the Attorney General. Such certification shall take the form of
+the Certification Notice appended hereto. An information copy shall be forwarded to the Deputy
+Secretary of Defense. Collection may commence upon the Director, NSA's certification. In
+addition, the Director, NSA shall advise the Attorney General and the Deputy Secretary of
+Defense on an annual basis of all such collection.
+
+(c) [REDACTED] For purposes of the application of Parts 1, 2 and 3 of Procedure 5 (and
+subsection 4.A.1 (a) of this annex) to the activities of the United States Signals Intelligence
+System, any deliberate interception, selection or use of a selection term shall be deemed to
+constitute electronic surveillance; and "significant foreign intelligence" shall mean not only those
+items of information that are in themselves significant, but also items that are reasonably
+believed, based on the experience of the United States Signals Intelligence System, when
+analyzed together with other items, to make a contribution to the discovery of "significant
+foreign intelligence.",
+
+(d) (S//SI) Emergencies:
+
+(1) The emergency provision in Section D of Part 2, Procedure 5, of DoD
+5240.1-R, may be employed to authorize deliberate selection of communications of, or
+concerning, a United States persons defined in the Appendix to DoD Regulation 5240.1-R, when
+that person is outside the United States.
+
+(2) If the United States Signals Intelligence System is intentionally collecting
+the communications of or concerning a non-resident alien abroad who enters the United States in
+circumstances that suggest that the alien is an agent of a foreign power, collection of the
+communications of that alien may continue for a period not to exceed seventy-two hours after it
+is learned that the alien is in the United States while the United States Signals Intelligence
+system seeks authority to continue the surveillance from the Attorney General pursuant to these
+procedures.
+
+A-6
+Annex to Policy 1-23
+Dated: 11 March 2004
+SECRET//COMINT//[REDACTED]
+
+SECRET//COMINT//[REDACTED]
+Communications acquired after the target is
+known to be in the United States, and that are not solely of, or concerning, U.S. citizens or
+permanent resident aliens, may be disseminated for foreign intelligence purposes until such time
+as diplomatic status is established or Attorney General approval is obtained. In those instances
+in which the diplomatic status of the alien is established, or Attorney General approval for
+continued surveillance is obtained, communications of, or concerning, the alien may be
+disseminated in accordance with subsection 4.A.4 of these procedures.
+
+(3) If the United States Signals Intelligence System is intentionally collecting
+communications of, or concerning, a United States citizen or permanent resident alien abroad, it
+must terminate the surveillance promptly upon learning that person is in the United States.
+Electronic surveillance may be reinstituted only in accordance with FISA. In the event
+communications of, or concerning, the target continue to be collected before termination can be
+effected, processing and use of information derived from such communications shall be
+restricted to the greatest extent possible and special care shall be taken to ensure that such
+information is not disseminated for any purpose unless authorized in accordance with the
+provisions of FISA.
+
+(e) (S//SI)-Communications transmitted on [REDACTED] with a
+terminal in the United States that services a U.S. person may be targeted for interception upon
+certification in writing by the Director, NSA to the Attorney General that the target of the
+collection is a foreign entity and that the purpose of the collection is to obtain foreign
+intelligence. The certification shall take the form of the Certification Notice appended hereto.
+Collection may commence upon the Director, NSA's certification. In addition, the Director, NSA
+will advise the Attorney General on an annual basis of all such [REDACTED] collection.
+The Deputy Secretary of Defense will be provided information copies of all certifications sent to
+the Attorney General.
+
+(f) (S//SI) Provided the proposed monitoring is not otherwise regulated by Section
+4.A.1 (a)-(e), voice and facsimile communications with one communicant in the United States
+may be targeted for intercept only with the prior approval of the Attorney General or the
+Director, National Security Agency, as set forth below, unless those communications occur over
+channels used exclusively by a foreign power. The Director, National Security Agency, may
+approve the targeting of such communications if technical devices [REDACTED]
+are employed that limit acquisition by the National Security Agency to [REDACTED]
+communications where the target is a non-U.S. person located outside the United States.
+[REDACTED] or to specific forms of
+communications used by those targets, [REDACTED] communications. In those cases in which it is not possible to use such technical devices, the
+Attorney General must approve the targeting. Approvals granted by the Director, NSA under
+this provision shall be available for review by the Attorney General.
+
+(g) (C) [REDACTED] may be intercepted in accordance with Section
+3 of this Annex.
+
+Annex to Policy 1-23
+Dated: 11 March 2004
+A-7
+SECRET//COMINT/[REDACTED]
+
+SECRET//COMINT//[REDACTED]
+(h) (S//SI) Use of direction finding solely to determine the location of a
+transmitter does not constitute electronic surveillance or collection even if directed at
+transmitters believed to be used by United States persons. Unless collection of the
+communications is otherwise authorized pursuant to this annex, the contents of communications
+to which a United States person is a party monitored in the course of direction finding shall be
+used solely to identify the transmitter.
+
+2. Retention (U)
+
+(S//SI) Foreign communications of, or concerning, United States persons that are
+intercepted by the United States Signals Intelligence System may be retained in their original
+form or as transcribed only:
+
+(a) if processed so as to eliminate any reference to United States persons;
+
+(b) if necessary to the maintenance of technical data bases. Retention for this
+purpose is permitted for a period sufficient to allow a thorough exploitation and to permit access
+to data that are, or are reasonably believed likely to become, relevant to a current or future
+intelligent requirement. Sufficient duration may vary with the nature of the exploitation. In the
+context of a cryptanalytic effort, sufficient duration may consist of a period of time during which
+encrypted material is subject to, or of use in, cryptanalysis. In the case of international
+commercial communications that may contain the identity of United States persons and that are
+not enciphered or otherwise thought to contain secret meaning, sufficient duration is one year
+unless the Deputy Director for Operations, National Security Agency, determines in writing that
+retention for a longer period is required to respond to authorized foreign intelligence or
+counterintelligence requirements; or
+
+(c) if dissemination of such communications without elimination of references to
+such United States persons would be permitted under section 4.A.4 below.
+
+3. Processing (U)
+
+(a) (S//SI) Foreign communications of, or concerning, United States persons must
+be processed in accordance with the following limitations:
+
+(1) When a selection term is intended to intercept a communication on the
+basis of encipherment or some other aspect of the content of the communication, rather than the
+identity of a communicant or the fact that the communication mentions a particular individual:
+
+(a) No selection term may be used that is based on content and that is
+reasonably likely to result in the interception of communications to or from a United States
+person, or which has in the past resulted in the interception of a significant number of such
+
+SECRET//COMINT/[REDACTED]
+A-8
+Annex to Policy 1-23
+Dated: 11 March 2004
+SECRET//COMINT//[REDACTED]
+communications, unless there is reasonable cause to believe that foreign intelligence or
+counterintelligence will be obtained by use of such a selection term.
+
+(b) All such selection terms shall be reviewed annually by the Deputy
+Director for Operations, National Security Agency, or his designee to determine whether there is
+reasonable cause to believe that foreign intelligence or counterintelligence will be obtained by
+the use of these selection terms. The review of such selection terms shall include an examination
+of whether such selection terms have in the past resulted in the acquisition of foreign
+intelligence.
+
+(c) Selection terms based on content that have resulted or that are
+reasonably likely to result in the interception of communications to or from a United States
+person shall be designed to defeat, to the extent practicable under the circumstances, the
+interception of such communications not containing foreign intelligence.
+
+(2) Foreign communications collected by the United States Signals
+Intelligence System or other authorized entities may be forwarded to the National Security
+Agency as intercepted. This applies to forwarding to intermediate processing facilities, including
+those of authorized collaborating centers pursuant to written agreements, provided such
+forwarding does not result in the production by the United States Signals Intelligence System of
+information in violation of these procedures.
+
+(b) [REDACTED] Except as provided in (b)(1), radio communications that pass over
+channels with a terminal within the United States must be processed by use of selection terms,
+unless these communications occur over channels used exclusively by a foreign power.
+
+(1) Radio communications that pass over channels with a terminal in the
+United States may be processed without the use of selection terms only when necessary to
+determine whether a channel contains communications of foreign intelligence interest which the
+National Security Agency wishes to collect. Processing under this section may not exceed two
+hours without approval of the Deputy Director for Operations, National Security Agency, and
+shall in any event be limited to the minimum amount of time necessary to determine the nature
+of communications on the channel and the amount of such communications that include foreign
+intelligence. Once it is determined that the channel contains a sufficient amount of
+communications of foreign intelligence interest to warrant collection and exploitation to produce
+foreign intelligence, additional processing of the channel must utilize selection terms.
+
+4. Dissemination (U)
+
+[REDACTED] Dissemination of signals intelligence derived from foreign communications of, or
+concerning, United States persons is governed by Procedure 4 of DoD Regulation 5240.1-R.
+Dissemination of signals intelligence shall be limited to authorized signals intelligence
+consumers in accordance with requirements and tasking established pursuant to Executive Order
+12333. Dissemination of information that is not pursuant to such requirements or tasking that
+SECRET//COMINT//[REDACTED]
+A-9
+Annex to Policy 1-23
+Dated: 11 March 2004
+
+SECRET//COMINT//[REDACTED]
+constitutes foreign intelligence or counterintelligence or that is otherwise authorized under
+Procedure 4 shall be limited to those departments or agencies that have subject matter
+responsibility. Dissemination of the identity of a United Stated person is authorized if it meets
+one of the following criteria, each of which is also deemed to meet the standard of "necessary to
+understand or assess" the importance of foreign intelligence information (otherwise, the identity
+of the United States person must be replaced by a generic term, e.g., United States citizen or
+United States corporation):
+
+(a) The United States person has consented to the use of communications of or
+concerning him or her and has executed the applicable consent form;
+
+(b) the information is available publicly;
+
+(c) the identity of the United States person is that of a senior official in the Executive
+Branch. When this exemption is applied, the Deputy Director for Operations, National Security
+Agency, will ensure that domestic political or personal information is not retained or
+disseminated;
+
+(d) the communication or information indicates that the United States person may be
+an agent of a foreign power;
+
+(e) the communication or information indicates that the United States person may be:
+
+(1) a foreign power as defined in Section 101 (a)(4) or (6) of FISA;
+
+(2) residing outside the United States and holding an official position in the
+government or military forces of a foreign power such that information about his or her activities
+would constitute foreign intelligence;
+
+(3) a corporation or other entity that is owned or controlled directly or indirectly
+by a foreign power; or
+
+(4) acting in collaboration with an intelligence or security service of a foreign
+power and the United States person has, or has had, access to information or material classified
+by the United States;
+
+(f) the communication or information indicates that the United States person may be
+the target of intelligence activities of a foreign power;
+
+(g) the communication or information indicates that the United States person is
+engaged in the unauthorized disclosure of classified national security information;
+
+(h) the communication or information indicates that the United States person may be
+engaging in international terrorist activities;
+Annex to Policy 1-23
+Dated: 11 March 2004
+SECRET//COMINT//[REDACTED]
+A-10
+
+SECRET//COMINT//[REDACTED]
+(i) the interception of the United States person's communications was authorized by a
+court order issued pursuant to Section 105 of FISA or by Attorney General approval issued
+pursuant to Section 4.A.1 of this annex and the communication may relate to the foreign
+intelligence or counterintelligence purpose of the surveillance;
+
+(j) the communication or information indicates a possible threat to the safety of a
+person or organization, including those who are targets, victims, or hostages of international
+terrorist organizations;
+
+(k) the communication or information indicates that the United States person may be
+engaged in international narcotics trafficking activities;
+
+(l) the communication or information is evidence that a crime has been, is being, or is
+about to be committed, provided that dissemination is for law enforcement purposes; or
+
+(m) the identity of the United States person is otherwise necessary to understand
+foreign intelligence or counterintelligence or assess its importance. Access to technical data
+bases will be restricted to signals intelligence collection and analytic personnel. Requests for
+access from other personnel or entities shall be referred to the Deputy Director for Operations,
+National Security Agency. Domestic communications in which all communicants are United
+States persons shall be disposed of upon recognition, provided that technical data concerning
+frequency and channel usage may be retained for collection avoidance purposes.
+
+B. [REDACTED] Signals Intelligence: Communications of, or Concerning, Aliens and Entities
+The United States Signals Intelligence System may intentionally intercept
+the international communications of non-permanent resident aliens and entities in the United
+States
+[REDACTED]
+
+C. [REDACTED] Signals Intelligence: Illicit Communications. The United States Signals
+Intelligence System may collect, retain, process, and disseminate illicit communications without
+reference to the requirements concerning United States persons.
+
+D. [REDACTED] Signals Intelligence: Search and Development. The United States Signals
+Intelligence System may conduct search and development activities with respect to signals
+throughout the radio spectrum under the following limitations:
+
+1. Collection. Signals may be collected only for the purpose of identifying those
+signals that:
+
+(a) may contain information related to the production of foreign intelligence or
+counterintelligence;
+A-11
+SECRET//COMINT//[REDACTED]
+Annex to Policy 1-23
+Dated: 11 March 2004
+
+SECRET//COMINT//[REDACTED]
+(b) are enciphered or appear to contain secret meaning;
+
+(c) are necessary to ensure efficient signals intelligence collection or to avoid the
+collection of unwanted signals; or
+
+(d) reveal vulnerability of United States communications security.
+
+2. Retention and Processing. Communications originating or intended for receipt in
+the United States, or originated or intended for receipt by United States persons, shall be
+processed in accordance with Section 4.A.3, provided that information necessary for cataloging
+the constituent elements of the signal environment may be produced and retained if such
+information does not identify a United States person. Information revealing a United States
+communications security vulnerability may be retained.
+
+3. Dissemination. Information necessary for cataloging the constituent elements of
+the signal environment may be disseminated to the extent such information does not identify
+United States persons, except that communication equipment nomenclature may be
+disseminated. Information that reveals a vulnerability of United States communications security
+may be dissemination to the appropriate security authorities.
+
+E. [REDACTED] Foreign Electronic Surveillance Activities. The United States Signals
+Intelligence System may collect information related to the conduct of electronic surveillance
+activities by foreign powers conducted within the United States against communications
+originated or intended for receipt in the United States. Collection efforts must be reasonably
+designed to intercept, or otherwise obtain only the results of such foreign surveillance efforts,
+and to avoid, to the extent feasible, the intercept of other communications. Such activities shall
+be conducted pursuant to orders of the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.
+
+F. [REDACTED] Assistance to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
+
+1. In accordance with the provisions of Section 2.6 (c) of E.O. 12333, the National
+Security Agency may provide specialized equipment and technical knowledge to the Federal
+Bureau of Investigation to assist the Bureau in the conduct of its lawful functions. When
+requesting such assistance, The Federal Bureau of Investigation shall certify to the General
+Counsel, National Security Agency, that such equipment or technical knowledge is necessary to
+accomplishment of one or more of the Bureau's lawful functions.
+
+2. The National Security Agency may also provide expert personnel to assist Bureau
+personnel in the operation or installation of specialized equipment when that equipment is to be
+employed to collect foreign intelligence or counterintelligence. When requesting the assistance
+of expert personnel the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall certify to the General Counsel,
+National Security Agency, that such assistance is necessary to collect foreign intelligence or
+Annex to Policy 1-23
+Dated: 11 March 2004
+SECRET//COMINT//[REDACTED]
+A-12
+
+SECRET//COMINT/[REDACTED]
+counterintelligence and that the approval of the Attorney General (and when necessary an order
+from a court of competent jurisdiction) has been obtained.
+
+//s//
+William R. Taft
+DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
+26 April 1988
+
+//s//
+Edwin Meese III
+ATTORNEY GENERAL
+27 May 1988
+
+Annex to Policy 1-23
+Dated: 11 March 2004
+A-13
+SECRET//COMINT/[REDACTED]
+SECRET//COMINT//[REDACTED]
+
+Executive Order 12333
+Consent Agreement
+Signals Intelligence Coverage
+
+I.
+(full name)
+title
+hereby
+consent to the National Security Agency undertaking to seek and disseminate communications to
+or from or referencing me in foreign communications for the purpose of
+
+This consent applies to administrative messages alerting elements of the United States
+Signals intelligence System to this consent as well as to any signals intelligence reports which
+may relate to the purpose stated above.
+
+Except as otherwise provided by Executive Order 12333 procedures, this consent covers
+only information which relates to the purpose stated above and is effective for the period:
+
+Signals intelligence reports containing information derived from communication to
+or from me may only be disseminated to me and to
+Signals intelligence
+reports containing information derived from communication referencing me may only be
+disseminated to me and to [names of departments and agencies, e.g., DoD, CIA. etc] except as
+otherwise permitted by procedures under Executive Order 12333.
+
+(SIGNATURE)
+(TITLE)
+
+(UNCLASSIFIED until completed. Classify
+completed form based on information added,
+but not lower than CONFIDENTIAL.)
+
+A-14
+SECRET//COMINT//
+Annex to Policy 1-23
+Dated: 11 March 2004
+SECRET//COMINT/[REDACTED]
+
+Executive Order 12333
+Consent Agreement
+Signals Intelligence Coverage
+
+I.
+(full name)
+title
+herby
+consent to the National Security Agency undertaking to seek and disseminate references to me in
+foreign communications for the purpose of
+
+This consent applies to administrative messages alerting elements of the United States
+Signals Intelligence System to this consent as well as to any signals intelligence reports which
+may relate to the purpose stated above.
+
+Except as otherwise provided by Executive Order 12333 procedures, this consent covers
+only references to me in foreign communications and information derived therefrom which
+relates to the purpose stated above. This consent is effective for the period:
+
+Signals intelligence reports containing information derived from communications
+referencing me and related to the purpose stated above may only be disseminated to me and to
+[names of departments and agencies, e.g., DoD, CIA. etc] except as otherwise permitted by
+procedures under Executive Order 12333.
+
+(SIGNATURE)
+(TITLE)
+
+(UNCLASSIFIED until completed. Classify
+completed form based on information added,
+but not lower than CONFIDENTIAL.)
+
+A-15
+SECRET//COMINT//
+Annex to Policy 1-23
+Dated: 11 March 2004
+SECRET//COMINT//[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Annex to Policy 1-23
+Dated: 11 March 2004
+
+A-16
+-SECRET//COMINT//[REDACTED]
+DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
+1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
+WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010
+
+Publicly available -
+goes to end of this
+doc
+
+JUN 17 2009
+
+MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
+CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
+UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
+DEPUTY CHIEF MANAGEMENT OFFICER
+ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
+GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
+DEFENSE
+DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
+INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
+DEFENSE
+ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
+DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
+DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
+DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT
+DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES
+DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES
+
+SUBJECT: Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 08-052 – DoD Guidance for
+Reporting Questionable Intelligence Activities and Significant or Highly
+Sensitive Matters
+
+References: See Attachment 1
+
+Purpose. This DTM implements recent Executive Branch guidance in Director of
+National Intelligence and Chairman, Intelligence Oversight Board Memorandum
+(Reference (a)) concerning the criteria and requirements for reporting intelligence
+oversight matters and directs compliance with the guidance contained in Attachment 2. It
+establishes the procedures to ensure complete and standardized reporting by the DoD
+Intelligence Components and other entities involved in intelligence activities, which
+include both foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities. This DTM is
+effective immediately; it shall be incorporated into DoD 5240.1-R (Reference (b)) within
+180 days. Nothing in this DTM is intended to alter reporting requirements established by
+statute or departmental policy.
+
+Applicability. This DTM applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of
+the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands,
+the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies,
+
+OSD 05447-09
+DTM 08-052, June 17, 2009
+
+the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities in the Department of
+Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as the "DoD Components").
+
+Policy. Questionable intelligence activities and significant or highly sensitive
+matters involving intelligence activities may have serious implications for the execution
+of DoD missions. It is DoD policy that senior leaders and policymakers within the
+Government be made aware of events that may erode the public trust in the conduct of
+DoD intelligence operations. Reference (b), DoD Directive 5148.11 (Reference (c)), and
+Executive Order (E.O.) 13462 (Reference (d)) require that such matters be reported to the
+Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB), a component of the President's Intelligence
+Advisory Board, and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) as appropriate. The
+Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight (ATSD(IO)) is the
+principal staff assistant for intelligence oversight matters and shall serve as the conduit
+for all reporting to the IOB.
+
+Reporting Requirements and Procedures. Reporting guidance is contained in
+Attachment 2. The quarterly report to the ATSD(IO) is exempt from licensing in
+accordance with Chapter 4, subparagraphs C4.4.1 and C4.4.8, of DoD 8910.1-M
+(Reference (e)).
+
+Releasability. UNLIMITED. This DTM is approved for public release and is
+available on the Internet from the DoD Issuances Web Site at
+http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives.
+
+WlBlque
+
+Attachments:
+As stated
+
+2
+DTM 08-052, June 17, 2009
+
+ATTACHMENT 1
+REFERENCES
+
+(a) Director of National Intelligence and Chairman, Intelligence Oversight Board
+Memorandum, "Intelligence Oversight Reporting Criteria," July 17, 2008¹
+(b) DoD 5240.1-R, "Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence
+Components That Affect United States Persons," December 1982
+(c) DoD Directive 5148.11, "Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for
+Intelligence Oversight (ATSD(IO))," May 21, 2004
+(d) Executive Order 13462, "President's Intelligence Advisory Board and
+Intelligence Oversight Board," February 29, 2008
+(e) DoD 8910.1-M, "Department of Defense Procedures for Management of
+Information Requirements," June 30, 1998
+(f) Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," as amended
+(g) Department of Justice-DoD Memorandum of Understanding: "Reporting of
+Information Concerning Federal Crimes," August 1995²
+
+¹Available at: http://www.defenselink.mil/atsdio
+²Contact ATSD(IO), 703-275-6550
+
+3
+Attachment 1
+DTM 08-052, June 17, 2009
+
+ATTACHMENT 2
+PROCEDURES FOR REPORTING QUESTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
+AND SIGNIFICANT OR HIGHLY SENSITIVE MATTERS
+
+1. REPORTING PARAMETERS
+
+a. The DoD Components shall report the following matters to the ATSD(IO) in
+accordance with References (a) and (d).
+
+(1) Questionable Intelligence Activity. An intelligence activity, as defined
+in E.O. 12333 (Reference (f)), that may be unlawful or contrary to executive order,
+Presidential directive, or applicable DoD policy governing that activity.
+
+(2) Significant or Highly Sensitive Matters. A development or
+circumstance involving an intelligence activity or intelligence personnel that could
+impugn the reputation or integrity of the DoD Intelligence Community or otherwise call
+into question the propriety of an intelligence activity. Such matters might be manifested
+in or by an activity:
+
+(a) Involving congressional inquiries or investigations.
+
+(b) That may result in adverse media coverage.
+
+(c) That may impact on foreign relations or foreign partners.
+
+(d) Related to the unauthorized disclosure of classified or protected
+information, such as information identifying a sensitive source and method. Reporting
+under this paragraph does not include reporting of routine security violations.
+
+(3) Crimes Reported to the Attorney General. Any intelligence activity
+that has been or will be reported to the Attorney General, or that must be reported to the
+Attorney General as required by law or other directive, including crimes reported to the
+Attorney General as required by Department of Justice-DoD Memorandum of
+Understanding (Reference (g)).
+
+b. Unless extenuating circumstances exist, the ATSD(IO) will be notified prior to
+briefings of any congressional committee or member of Congress concerning intelligence
+matters identified in paragraphs 1.a.(1), 1.a.(2), and 1.a.(3) of this attachment. Should
+extenuating circumstances, in fact, delay notification to the ATSD(IO) until after the
+briefing, then the ATSD(IO) will be notified of the outcome of the briefing at the first
+opportunity thereafter.
+
+4
+Attachment 2
+DTM 08-052, June 17, 2009
+
+c. The DoD Component assigned to or conducting intelligence activities may
+establish internal organizational reporting responsibilities pursuant to that Component's
+internal policies and regulations.
+
+2. SUBMISSION OF REPORTS. DoD Components assigned to conduct intelligence
+and counterintelligence activities shall submit reports to the ATSD(IO) in accordance
+with the following guidance.
+
+a. Report questionable intelligence activities of a serious nature and all significant
+or highly sensitive matters immediately. Such reports may be made by any secure means.
+Oral reports should be documented with a written report as soon as possible thereafter.
+
+b. Report questionable intelligence activities not of a serious nature quarterly.
+Reporting periods shall be based on the calendar year. The first report for each calendar
+year shall cover January 1 through March 31. Succeeding reports shall follow at 3-month
+intervals. Quarterly reports are due to the ATSD(IO) by the 15th day of the month
+following the end of the quarter. Quarterly reports will describe all questionable
+intelligence activities as well as significant or highly sensitive matters identified during
+the quarter. Quarterly reports are routinely submitted to the ATSD(IO) through normal
+modes of routing and transmission (e.g., chain of command, hard or soft copy).
+Quarterly reports are required even if no reportable matters occurred during the reporting
+period.
+
+c. Reporting DoD Components will format all reports as follows:
+
+(1) Assignment of a Case Number for Each Incident. Except where the
+volume of incident investigations that have been reported and closed within the same
+reporting quarter makes the assigning of a case number to each case impracticable, a case
+number that runs consecutively and identifies the reported incident by reporting agency,
+Military Department, or Combatant Command and calendar year shall be assigned to
+each incident. For example: "DIA 2009 - 04" would indicate the fourth incident reported
+by DIA in calendar year 2009. Use this number each time the incident is mentioned in
+initial reports, and in update and close-out reports. A case number will be assigned to all
+reported incidents that, at a minimum, are the subject of an ongoing investigation.
+
+(2) Information to be Included in Each Report. For each incident reported,
+include the following information as it becomes available.
+
+(a) A narrative describing each incident reported.
+
+5
+Attachment 2
+DTM 08-052, June 17, 2009
+
+(b) An explanation of why the incident is being reported either as a
+potential violation of law, potentially contrary to executive order or Presidential directive,
+or a potential violation of Reference (b) and/or agency or Military Department procedures
+implementing Reference (f). Cite the portions of relevant law, order, policy, or
+regulation as it is determined.
+
+(c) An explanation of why the incident is considered a significant or
+highly sensitive matter, if so reported.
+
+(d) An analysis of how or why the incident occurred.
+
+(e) An assessment of the anticipated impact of the reported incident
+on national security or international relations, as well as any mitigation efforts, including
+success and failures of such efforts. If there has been no impact or no impact is
+anticipated, the report should so state.
+
+(f) Remedial action taken or planned to prevent recurrence of the
+incident.
+
+(g) An assessment of any impact the reported incident may have on
+civil liberties or protected privacy rights.
+
+(h) A description of actions taken if the incident concerns
+information improperly acquired, handled, used, or destroyed.
+
+(i) Any additional information considered relevant for purposes of
+fully informing the Secretary and/or Deputy Secretary of Defense, the IOB, and the DNI
+and providing context about the incident.
+
+d. Each quarterly report should be organized under the major headings of "New
+Incidents" and "Updates on Previously Reported Incidents." The latter heading includes
+incidents still under inquiry as well as those resolved and closed during the quarter.
+
+e. Additionally, each quarterly report will contain a summary of gravity,
+frequency, trends and patterns of the questionable intelligence activities, and/or
+significant or highly sensitive incidents reported during that quarter, to the extent that
+they can be determined. Otherwise, the summary should be provided, as the information
+becomes available, in a subsequent quarterly report.
+
+f. The quarterly report shall include a description of any inspection findings or
+intelligence oversight program developments, such as publication of a revised
+intelligence oversight regulation, that the reporting DoD Component believes is
+significant. Neither training reports nor inspection schedules shall be included in the
+
+6
+Attachment 2
+DTM 08-052, June 17, 2009
+quarterly report to ATSD(IO). DoD Components shall monitor compliance with training
+requirements and inspection schedules.
+g. Reporting shall not be delayed or postponed pending an investigation,
+command inquiry, or legal proceeding.
+3. PROHIBITED USE OF THIS ATTACHMENT. This attachment shall not be used to
+prepare the Annual Intelligence Oversight Report to Congress, which is signed by the
+Secretary of Defense. Instructions for preparing the Annual Intelligence Oversight
+Report to Congress will be issued by the ATSD(IO) in November of each year; the
+Annual Report will be due to the ATSD(IO) January 31 of each year.
+7
+Attachment 2
diff --git a/data/FOIA/EFF_-_20131119-odni-nsa_core_intelligence_oversight_training/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/EFF_-_20131119-odni-nsa_core_intelligence_oversight_training/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..10cccb5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/EFF_-_20131119-odni-nsa_core_intelligence_oversight_training/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+{
+ "title": "NSA Core Intelligence Oversight Training Materials",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "NSA training materials relating to signals intelligence collection activities involving Executive Order 12333, 1892 DOD Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components affecting US persons, and NSA/Central Security Service (CSS) Policy 1-23. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "This document is a collection of NSA Core Intelligence Oversight Training Materials released through FOIA litigation by the ACLU and EFF in 2013. At its foundation is Executive Order 12333, originally signed by President Reagan in 1981 and amended several times through 2008, which establishes the overall framework for how the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) is organized and what it is authorized to do. The order defines the roles of key bodies like the National Security Council, the Director of National Intelligence, and individual agencies including the CIA, NSA, DIA, FBI, and others. It emphasizes that intelligence activities must balance national security needs against the constitutional rights and civil liberties of U.S. persons.\n\nThe DoD Regulation 5240.1-R (1982) forms the procedural backbone of the collection, laying out 15 specific procedures governing how DoD intelligence components may collect, retain, and disseminate information about U.S. persons. It establishes a \"least intrusive means\" standard, meaning agencies must use the least privacy-invasive method feasible before escalating to more intrusive techniques. Specific procedures cover electronic surveillance, physical searches, mail examination, physical surveillance, and concealed monitoring — all requiring varying levels of approval from officials ranging from component heads up to the Attorney General, depending on the sensitivity of the activity.\n\nNSA/CSS Policy 1-23, signed by Director Michael Hayden, translates these broader DoD rules specifically into NSA operations. It makes clear that NSA shall only intentionally collect foreign communications and must not target U.S. person communications without proper legal authorization — either a FISA court order or Attorney General approval. The policy assigns specific oversight responsibilities to the NSA General Counsel and Inspector General, and mandates annual training for all employees on legal compliance. A heavily redacted Classified Annex details the specific technical and procedural rules governing signals intelligence collection, including rules around retention, processing, and dissemination of communications that incidentally involve U.S. persons.\n\nFinally, DTM 08-052 (2009) addresses the reporting of questionable intelligence activities and sensitive matters up the chain of oversight. It requires DoD components to report to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight (ATSD(IO)), who serves as the conduit to the Intelligence Oversight Board. The memo distinguishes between matters serious enough to require immediate reporting and lesser issues that can be included in quarterly reports. Taken together, these four documents paint a picture of a multi-layered oversight system designed to ensure intelligence activities remain lawful, with checks at the agency, DoD, Attorney General, and Presidential advisory board levels.",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2011-01-01",
+ "classification": [
+ "SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Reagan, Ronald",
+ "Hayden, Michael",
+ "Taft, William R.",
+ "Meese, Edwin III"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-18",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/nsa-core-intelligence-oversight-training-materials",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [
+ {
+ "id": "NSA_Core_Intelligence_Oversight_Training_Materials"
+ },
+ {
+ "id": "ACLU_-_NSA_Core_Intelligence_Oversight_Training_Materials"
+ },
+ {
+ "id": "ODNI_-_CLEANED022-_NSA_Core_Intelligence_Oversight_Training"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "dbdc766f1957cb678f71669c6f0ed1a9940eb490fa353f058d19abab812983af",
+ "pages": 141
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105Bg-07-01-motion-stay-proceedings-131004/FISC_-_105Bg-07-01-motion-stay-proceedings-131004.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105Bg-07-01-motion-stay-proceedings-131004/FISC_-_105Bg-07-01-motion-stay-proceedings-131004.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..465dd8b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105Bg-07-01-motion-stay-proceedings-131004/FISC_-_105Bg-07-01-motion-stay-proceedings-131004.md
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+2013 OCT -4 PM 5:03
+
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+UNITED STATES
+
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE: DIRECTIVES PURSUANT TO SECTION )
+105B OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE )
+SURVEILLANCE ACT )
+Docket No. 105B(g) 07-01
+
+MOTION FOR STAY OF PROCEEDINGS DUE TO LAPSE OF APPROPRIATIONS
+
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+
+J. BRADFORD WIEGMANN
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+TASHINA GAUHAR
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+JEFFREY M. SMITH
+NICHOLAS J. PATTERSON
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+Phone: (202) 514-5600
+Fax: (202) 514-8053
+
+Attorneys for the United States of America
+1
+The United States hereby moves for a stay of proceedings in this matter including, in
+particular, a stay of one upcoming deadline, due to a lapse in Government appropriations. In
+support thereof, the Government states as follows:
+
+1. At the end of the day on September 30, 2013, the appropriations act that had been
+funding the Department of Justice ("Department") expired and annual appropriations to the
+Department lapsed. The Department does not know when funding will be restored by Congress.
+
+2. Absent an appropriation, Department of Justice attorneys and employees are
+prohibited from working, even on a voluntary basis, except in very limited circumstances,
+including "emergencies involving the safety of human life or the protection of property,"
+31 U.S.C. § 1342.
+
+3. There is one deadline during the month of October that the Government proposed
+in this case: a status report on the Government's review of documents on October 25, 2013. In
+light of the lapse of appropriations, the Government requests a stay of this deadline and all other
+proceedings until Congress has restored appropriations to the Department.
+
+4. If this motion for a stay is granted, undersigned counsel proposes to notify the
+Court within five days after Congress has appropriated funds for the Department. The
+Government proposes that, at that point in time, this deadline can be re-set as appropriate under
+the circumstances. The Government believes that the October deadline identified above should
+be extended by a time period at least equal to the duration of the lapse in appropriations, or
+perhaps by longer if future circumstances warrant. While the Government cannot predict the
+ultimate impact the lapse in appropriations will have, at this point the Government does not
+anticipate that any other present deadlines would need to be extended.
+1
+5. On October 4, undersigned counsel for the Government contacted the Provider's
+counsel in order to ascertain the Provider's position regarding this motion. The Provider takes
+no position on this issue.
+
+Therefore, although we greatly regret any disruption caused to the Court and the
+other party, the Government hereby moves for a stay of proceedings in this case including, in
+particular, the October deadline outlined above, until Department of Justice attorneys are
+permitted to resume their usual civil litigation functions.
+2
+October 4, 2013
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+
+J. BRADFORD WIEGMANN
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+TASHINA GAUHAR
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+/s/ Nicholas J. Patterson
+JEFFREY M. SMITH
+NICHOLAS J. PATTERSON
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+Phone: (202) 514-5600
+Fax: (202) 514-8053
+
+Attorneys for the United States of America
+3
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I hereby certify that a true copy of the United States' Motion for Stay of Proceedings Due
+to Lapse in Appropriations was served by the Government via Federal Express overnight
+delivery on this 4th day of October, 2013,
+
+addressed to:
+
+Marc J. Zwillinger
+Jacob A. Sommer
+ZwillGen PLLC
+1705 N Street, NW
+Washington, DC 20036
+
+/s/ Nicholas J. Patterson
+Nicholas J. Patterson
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105Bg-07-01-motion-stay-proceedings-131004/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105Bg-07-01-motion-stay-proceedings-131004/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b22238b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105Bg-07-01-motion-stay-proceedings-131004/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Motion For Stay Of Proceedings Due To Lapse Of Appropriations",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "",
+ "date_created": "2013-10-04",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-10-04",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34409",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "356ff8e81a454f0613240319a161aeefc44ab07ff3423325410eb17f6ee44ab0",
+ "pages": 5
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-motion-130614/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-motion-130614.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-motion-130614/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-motion-130614.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3f6ea51
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-motion-130614/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-motion-130614.md
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+IN THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT FILED
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL, CLERK
+
+No. 105B(g07-01)
+
+JUN 1 4 2013
+
+In re Directives to [Provider]¹ Pursuant
+to Section 105B of the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act
+
+U.S. Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Court OF REVIEW
+
+PROVIDER'S UNCLASSIFIED MOTION UNDER FISC RULE 62 FOR
+PUBLICATION OF THIS COURT'S DECISION AND OTHER RECORDS
+
+Provider moves under FISC Rule 62(a) to request this Court to order
+publication of the Court's decision in the above-captioned case, which was
+appealed to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review ("FISCR") and
+ultimately resulted in the publication of the redacted decision in In re Directives
+[redacted] Pursuant to Section 105b of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,
+551 F.3d 1004 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2008). Although the FISCR decision
+was published in redacted form, this Court's decision has never been published nor
+have the parties have previously sought publication. The FISCR disclosed the fact
+of this Court's decision and a general description of the decision, but a more
+fulsome release of the decision is now warranted in light of: (a) recent
+declassification decisions by the Director of National Intelligence ("DNI"); (b) the
+current controversy surrounding the use of directives issued under Section 702 of
+the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 ("FAA") and under Section 105B of its
+
+---
+¹ This motion is being filed on behalf of the Provider that was a party to this case.
+Provider's name is being redacted so that this motion may be released publicly.
+The undersigned counsel represents that Provider is in fact the same Provider that
+was a party to this case, and that this filing is made with its authorization.
+
+predecessor, the Protect America Act of 2007 ("PAA"), and (c) recently-filed
+litigation regarding the constitutionality of Section 702. Accordingly, release of
+this Court's decision upholding the constitutionality of those directives, as well as
+the legal arguments contained in the briefs, is now in the public interest.
+
+## Argument
+
+FISC Rule 62(a) allows this court to publish its decisions and direct the
+Executive Branch to review and redact those decisions for release to the public.
+FISC Rule 62(b) allows for the publication of other records upon Court Order, in
+accordance with Rule 3. More specifically, FISC Rule 62(a) provides that "[t]he
+Judge who authored an order, opinion, or other decision may sua sponte or on
+motion by a party request that it be published. Upon such request, the Presiding
+Judge, after consulting with other Judges of the Court, may direct that an order,
+opinion or other decision be published. Before publication, the Court may as
+appropriate, direct the Executive Branch to review the order, opinion, or other
+decision and redact it as necessary to ensure that properly classified information is
+appropriately protected pursuant to Executive Order 13526 (or its successor)."
+Provider, as a party to this case, respectfully requests under Rule 62 that this Court
+publish its decision and allow public release of the briefs filed by Provider and the
+Government.
+
+Here, release of the decision of the court and the legal arguments raised in
+the briefs is in the public interest. Recent developments, including (a) recent
+declassification decisions by the Director of National Intelligence ("DNI"); (b)
+public controversy surrounding the use of directives issued under Section 702 of
+the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 ("FAA") and under Section 105B of its
+predecessor, the Protect America Act of 2007 ("PAA"), and (c) recently-filed
+litigation regarding the constitutionality of Section 702,² has brought attention to
+the use of the directive process and its legality. Accordingly, release of this
+Court's decision upholding the constitutionality of those directives, as well as the
+legal arguments contained in the briefs, is now in the public interest.
+
+Provider expects that prior to release, as directed by Rule 62(a), the Court
+will consult with the Executive Branch to ensure that the opinion is appropriately
+redacted for public release. As part of that process, Provider requests that the
+identity of the Provider and its counsel be made public along with the decision.³
+Although Provider's name was redacted from the FISCR's decision nearly five
+years ago, intervening developments, including the recent declassification and
+release of certain information by the DNI, no longer justifies the continued
+redaction and creates prejudice to the rights of Provider.
+
+---
+² Klayman et al. v. Holder, No. 13-cv-00881 (D.D.C. June 12, 2013).
+³ Provider has filed a similar request seeking disclosure of its name and its
+counsel's name in the FISCR.
+
+## Conclusion
+
+Provider respectfully requests that this Court: (1) enter an order designating
+this decision for publication; (2) direct the Executive Branch to review the opinion
+and redact as appropriate for publication; (3) direct the Executive Branch to revisit
+the classification of Provider and its counsel's identity, and (4) publish this instant
+motion in the Court's public docket.
+
+Date: June 14, 2013
+
+Marc J. Zwillinger
+Jacob A. Sommer
+ZwillGen PLLC
+1705 N St NW
+Washington, DC 20036
+marc@zwillgen.com
+jake@zwillgen.com
+
+Attorneys for Provider
+
+## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I, Marc J. Zwillinger, hereby certify that on June 14, 2013 I hand delivered
+"Provider's Unclassified Motion Under FISC Rule 62 for Publication of This
+Court's Decision and Other Records" on:
+
+Christine Gunning
+Department of Justice
+145 N St NW
+Washington, DC
+
+Pursuant to procedures established by the Security and Emergency Planning Staff,
+United States Department of Justice under FISC Rule 8.
+
+Date: June 14, 2013
+
+Marc J. Zwillinger
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-motion-130614/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-motion-130614/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8a96875
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-motion-130614/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Provider'S Unclassified Motion Under Fisc Rule 62 For Publication Of This Court'S Decision And Other Records",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "",
+ "date_created": "2013-06-14",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-06-14",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34402",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "587b33491c6302228ecb2ea431c3b38e08ba17686048dcdbb5973c33e7559381",
+ "pages": 6
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-motion-130625/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-motion-130625.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-motion-130625/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-motion-130625.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b267bb3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-motion-130625/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-motion-130625.md
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+UNITED STATES
+2013 JUN 25 PM 5:00
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+In Re: Directives [redacted text]
+Pursuant to Section 105B of the
+Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
+
+)
+)
+)
+No. 105B(g) 07-01
+
+THE UNITED STATES' REPONSE TO PROVIDER'S
+MOTION UNDER FISC RULE 62 FOR PUBLICATION
+OF THIS COURT'S DECISION AND OTHER RECORDS
+
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+
+J. BRADFORD WIEGMANN
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+TASHINA GAUHAR
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+JEFFREY M. SMITH
+NICHOLAS J. PATTERSON
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+Phone: (202) 514-5600
+Fax: (202) 514-8053
+
+Attorneys for the United States of America
+
+Pursuant to FISC Rule 62(a), Movant asks this Court to order publication of its opinion in
+this case. See Motion at 1.¹ Movant correctly notes that any such publication would be subject
+to FISC Rules 3 and 62(b), and would require a review by the Government to allow for properly
+classified information to be redacted before publication. See id. at 2.²
+
+The United States takes no position on this request, and submits that it is within the
+discretion of this Court to determine, acting pursuant to the procedure set forth in Rule 62(a),
+whether to publish the Court opinion at issue. Additionally, because Movant is a party to that
+underlying decision, it has standing pursuant to Rule 62(a) to make this Motion. Rule 62(a) also
+authorizes the Court, if it decides to order publication of the opinion, to direct the Government to
+undertake a classification review of the opinion as is "necessary to ensure that properly classified
+information is appropriately protected pursuant to Executive Order 13526." FISC Rule 62(a).
+Of course, the Government would conduct such a review upon the Court's request.
+
+The Government has already determined that, pursuant to EO 13526 section 3.1(d) and
+the public interest in disclosure of the information in the Motion and due to specific facts related
+to Movant and to statements that the Government has made in response to recent unauthorized
+
+¹ Pursuant to Rule 62(a), if the judge who authored the opinion at issue determines that it should be
+published, then that judge may make a request to the Presiding Judge who would then consult with the
+other judges of the Court and decide whether or not to direct the publication of the opinion at issue. See
+FISC Rule 62(a).
+
+² Rule 62(b) provides that releases of court records, including opinions, can only be released pursuant to
+Rule 3. Rule 3 provides that "[i]n all matters, the Court and its staff shall comply with the security
+measures established pursuant to [Congressional mandate], as well as Executive Order 13526." FISC
+Rule 3. Executive Order No. 13,526 "prescribes a uniform system for classifying, safeguarding, and
+declassifying national security information" and prohibits the release of any material that is properly
+classified. E.O. 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29, 2009); see also In re Mot. for Release of Ct. Records,
+526 F. Supp. 2d 484, 491 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. 2007) ("[I]f the FISC were to assume the role of
+independently making declassification and release decisions . . . there would be a real risk of harm to
+national security interests and ultimately to the FISA process itself.").
+
+disclosures, the identity of Movant and its association with this case can now be declassified.
+The Government thus has no objection to the Court making the Motion and this Response
+publicly available.³
+
+June 25, 2013
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+
+J. BRADFORD WIEGMANN
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+TASHINA GAUHAR
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+JEFFREY M. SMITH
+NICHOLAS J. PATTERSON
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+Phone: (202) 514-5600
+Fax: (202) 514-8053
+
+Attorneys for the United States of America
+
+³ The Motion does not explicitly identify Movant. It does, however, contain information that could allow
+someone familiar with certain publicly available information to determine the identity of Movant.
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I hereby certify that a true copy of the United States' Response to Provider's
+Motion under FISC Rule 62 for Publication of this Court's Decision and Other
+Records was served via Federal Express overnight delivery on this 25th day of
+June, 2013, addressed to:
+
+Marc J. Zwillinger
+Jacob A. Sommer
+ZwillGen PLLC
+1705 N Street, NW
+Washington, DC 20036
+
+Jeffrey M. Smith
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-motion-130625/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-motion-130625/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..729d16b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-motion-130625/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "The United States' Reponse To Provider's Motion Under Fisc Rule 62 For Publication Of This Court's Decision And Other Records",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-06-25",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-06-25",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34403",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "99b1a802e79131e39dcdf3afdb20a1816d35be5a592cfd1d9e1c25d06f0c15ba",
+ "pages": 4
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-motion-131021/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-motion-131021.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-motion-131021/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-motion-131021.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bdcf0aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-motion-131021/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-motion-131021.md
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+2013 OCT 21 PM 4:39
+
+UNITED STATES
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURERK OF COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE: DIRECTIVES PURSUANT TO
+SECTION 105B OF THE FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+Docket No. 105B(g) 07-01
+
+JOINT MOTION TO PROVIDE YAHOO WITH LIMITED
+PRE-PUBLICATION ACCESS TO COURT DOCUMENTS
+
+1. In its July 15, 2013 Order, this Court directed the Government to "conduct a
+declassification review" of the Court's April 25, 2008 Memorandum Opinion in this case and the
+"legal briefs submitted by the parties to this Court in this matter." Order at 3. That classification
+review is ongoing, and the Government has provided proposed redacted versions of documents
+for potential release by the Court and is reviewing other documents to release as much
+information as possible consistent with national security. The Government expects that a
+significant amount of information in the documents will be declassified and released.
+
+2. On September 30, 2013, Yahoo filed a motion under FISC Rule 62 requesting
+access to some of the documents the Government provided to this Court for review before they
+are made publicly available.
+
+3. On October 4, 2013, the Government filed a Motion for Stay of Proceedings Due
+to Lapse of Appropriations and on October 11, 2013, this Court granted the motion and stated
+that the Government shall notify the Court within five days after Congress has appropriated
+funds for the Department of Justice. The Government hereby notifies the Court that funding was
+restored for the Department of Justice on October 17, 2013. The Government estimates that it
+
+will be able to provide a further status report on its declassification review on
+November 12, 2013.
+
+4. The parties have engaged in negotiations regarding Yahoo's proposed access to
+documents the Government has provided to the Court.
+
+5. The Government partially opposes and partially concurs in Yahoo's request. The
+Government's position is that Yahoo may not view the documents until after the declassification
+process is complete, but may be allowed time to review the documents prior to public release.
+The Government has informed Yahoo that the declassification process will be complete after the
+Court finishes its initial review of the documents and the Government then provides the Court
+with formally declassified versions of the documents.
+
+6. The Government does not oppose allowing Yahoo to view the documents prior to
+publication by this Court after the declassification process is complete and redactions have been
+applied. That review would allow Yahoo the opportunity to bring any issues regarding the
+materials to be released to the Court's attention.
+
+7. The parties thus respectfully request that the Court enter an order:
+ a. Allowing Yahoo's counsel to access the documents upon the Court's
+ receipt of formally declassified versions from the Government.
+ b. Providing Yahoo seven days to file any motions regarding the public
+ release of the documents.
+ c. Providing the Government seven days to respond to Yahoo's motion, if
+ any, and Yahoo three business days to file a reply.
+
+October 21, 2013
+
+/s/ Marc J. Zwillinger
+MARC J. ZWILLINGER
+JACOB A. SOMMER
+ZwillGen PLLC
+1705 N St. NW
+Washington, DC 20036
+marc@zwillgen.com
+jake@zwillgen.com
+
+Attorneys for Yahoo! Inc.
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General for
+National Security
+
+J. BRADFORD WIEGMANN
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+TASHINA GAUHAR
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+/s/ Nicholas J. Patterson
+JEFFREY M. SMITH
+NICHOLAS J. PATTERSON
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+Phone: (202) 514-5600
+Fax: (202) 514-8053
+
+Attorneys for the United States of America
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE: DIRECTIVES PURSUANT TO
+SECTION 105B OF THE FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+Docket No. 105B(g) 07-01
+
+[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING JOINT MOTION TO PROVIDE YAHOO WITH
+LIMITED PRE-PUBLICATION ACCESS TO COURT DOCUMENTS
+
+On October 21, 2013, the parties in the above-captioned case filed a joint motion to allow
+Yahoo pre-publication access to court documents the Government has declassified and submitted
+to the Court for review. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that:
+
+Yahoo's counsel may review the redacted, formally declassified versions of documents
+the Government originally provided to this Court on September 12th and 27th, 2013 upon receipt
+of notice from the Government that it has provided the Court with formally declassified versions
+of those documents.
+
+Yahoo must file any motions regarding the release of those documents within seven days
+of receiving notice from the Government.
+
+The Government shall have seven days to respond to Yahoo's motion, if any.
+
+Yahoo shall then have three business days to file a reply, if any.
+
+SO ORDERED, this _____ day of October, 2013.
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-motion-131021/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-motion-131021/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bb39a7b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-motion-131021/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Joint Motion To Provide Yahoo With Limited Pre-Publication Access To Court Documents",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-10-21",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-10-21",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34410",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "57dd17e3ff603a14862fbb8aadfe53fee3671495893be420f0bb3655c6741e5e",
+ "pages": 4
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-order-130617/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-order-130617.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-order-130617/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-order-130617.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7a79f10
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-order-130617/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-order-130617.md
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE DIRECTIVES PURSUANT TO SECTION )
+105B OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE )
+SURVEILLANCE ACT. )
+)
+) Docket No. 105B(g) 07-01
+
+ORDER
+
+This matter is before the Court on the Provider's "Motion Under FISC Rule 62 for
+Publication of this Court's Decision and Other Records," which was submitted on June 14, 2013.
+Any response by the U.S. Department of Justice to the motion must be submitted no later than
+5:00 p.m. on July 2, 2013.
+If the government responds, Provider may file a reply brief no later than 5:00 p.m. on
+July 9, 2013, through the Security and Emergency Planning Staff, U.S. Department of Justice.
+Furthermore, the parties are reminded of this Court's Order Establishing Procedures for
+Handling Classified Information, issued in the above-captioned matter on December 28, 2007.
+SO ORDERED, this 17 day of June, 2013.
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-order-130617/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-order-130617/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e56635d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-order-130617/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Order, In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 2013 July 2",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-06-17",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-06-17",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34232",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "d31bb8b34d99cdd366ee96c01261a98bdeab1c08e1e4ae4b0bd19738e62d8a23",
+ "pages": 1
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-order-130626/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-order-130626.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-order-130626/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-order-130626.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8978eb4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-order-130626/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-order-130626.md
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE DIRECTIVES PURSUANT TO SECTION
+105B OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE ACT.
+Docket No. 105B(g) 07-01
+
+ORDER
+
+This matter is before the Court on the "Provider's Unclassified Motion Under FISC Rule
+62 for Publication of this Court's Decision and Other Records," which was submitted on June 14,
+2013. The U.S. Department of Justice filed a response to the motion on June 25, 2013. Upon
+review of the government's response, the Court rules that the Motion, Response, this Court's
+Order of June 17, 2013, and this instant Order, are not under seal pursuant to the applicable
+Order of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, see In re Directives Pursuant to
+Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1016-18 (For. Intel.
+Surv. Ct. Rev. 2008), and that the parties are permitted to make public disclosure of these
+pleadings and orders. Any further order from this Court will be issued upon receipt of the
+Provider's reply or waiver of the Provider's right to reply.
+
+SO ORDERED, this 26th day of June, 2013.
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-order-130626/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-order-130626/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1332335
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-order-130626/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": " Order, In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 2013 June 26",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-06-26",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-06-26",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34233",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "28a8c90dd1a8dd30f84ff67bf6270a9059a7b1fa63c2b63a630d01036af6a879",
+ "pages": 1
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-order-131011/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-order-131011.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-order-131011/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-order-131011.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c2d6e92
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-order-131011/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-order-131011.md
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+)
+IN RE DIRECTIVES PURSUANT TO SECTION )
+105B OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE ACT.
+)
+Docket No. 105B(g) 07-01
+)
+ORDER
+On October 4, 2013, the Government filed with this Court in the above-captioned matter
+a "Motion for Stay of Proceedings Due to Lapse of Appropriations." In that Motion, the
+Government represents that Yahoo! Inc. (“Yahoo”) takes no position regarding the Government's
+request.
+In view of the circumstances described in that Motion, it is **HEREBY ORDERED** as
+follows:
+1. The Government's Motion for a Stay of Proceedings Due to Lapse of Appropriations
+is **GRANTED**.
+2. The Government shall notify the Court within five days after Congress has
+appropriated funds for the Department of Justice. When appropriations are restored, the Court
+intends to revisit the schedule in this matter, taking into account the status of the declassification
+process before the Court of Review in Docket Number 08-01, which has not been stayed, and
+how the results of that process could inform declassification of materials on the same subject
+matter before this Court.
+SO ORDERED, this 17th day of October, 2013.
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-order-131011/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-order-131011/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..943f733
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-order-131011/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": " Order, In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 2013 October 11",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-10-11",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-10-11",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34235",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "71162ee9755a37686298947751fcaf9ad19f1fedb7caaeabd0612f72724d6593",
+ "pages": 1
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-order-131022/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-order-131022.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-order-131022/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-order-131022.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f37f92e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-order-131022/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-order-131022.md
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE DIRECTIVES PURSUANT TO SECTION
+105B OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE ACT.
+
+Docket No. 105B(g) 07-01
+
+ORDER
+
+On October 21, 2013, the parties in the above-captioned docket filed a joint motion to
+allow Yahoo! Inc. pre-publication access to Court documents after declassification by the
+Government and submission to the Court for review. The joint motion is hereby GRANTED and
+it is hereby ORDERED that:
+
+1) Counsel for Yahoo! Inc. may review the redacted, formally declassified versions of
+documents submitted to this Court upon receipt of notice from the Government that it has
+provided the Court with formally declassified versions of those documents.
+
+2) Yahoo! Inc. must file any motions regarding the release of those documents within
+seven days of receiving notice from the Government.
+
+3) The Government shall have seven days to respond to any motion by Yahoo! Inc.
+
+4) Yahoo! Inc. shall then have three days to file any reply.
+
+The Court intends to suspend its review of the proposed redactions submitted by the
+Government in order to permit the results of the declassification process before the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review in Docket Number 08-01 to inform its examination of
+declassified materials on the same subject matter.
+
+SO ORDERED, this 22 day of October, 2013.
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-order-131022/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-order-131022/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9a2181e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-order-131022/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": " Order, In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 2013 October 22",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-10-22",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-10-22",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34236",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "dd4132d6d654b54a0700c983173b95c04a47ce9a9d245a7b16b109c4878ccab9",
+ "pages": 2
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-rbw-signed-order-130715/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-rbw-signed-order-130715.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-rbw-signed-order-130715/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-rbw-signed-order-130715.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e95b4ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-rbw-signed-order-130715/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-rbw-signed-order-130715.md
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE DIRECTIVES PURSUANT TO SECTION
+105B OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE ACT.
+
+Docket No. 105B(g) 07-01
+
+ORDER
+
+This matter is before the Court on the "Provider's Unclassified Motion Under FISC Rule
+62 for Publication of this Court's Decision and Other Records," submitted by Yahoo!, Inc.
+("Yahoo!" or "Provider") on June 14, 2013. The U.S. Department of Justice filed a response to
+the motion on June 25, 2013, and the Provider filed a reply on July 9, 2013.
+
+The Provider seeks to make public additional information about this case
+
+in light of: (a) recent declassification decisions by the Director of National
+Intelligence ("DNI"); (b) the current controversy surrounding the use of directives
+issued under Section 702 of the [Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"),
+as amended] and under Section 105B of . . . the Protect America Act of 2007
+("PAA"), and (c) recently-filed litigation regarding the constitutionality of Section
+702.
+
+Motion at 1-2. Specifically, Provider requests that the Court "publish its decision and allow
+public release of the briefs filed by Provider and the Government." Id. at 2. To that end,
+Provider seeks an order "designating this decision for publication" and "direct[ing] the Executive
+Branch to review the opinion and redact as appropriate for publication." Motion at 4. Although
+the Motion does not, in so many words, request that the Court order the Government to conduct a
+
+declassification review of the parties' legal briefs,' such request is fairly implied in the
+circumstances of this case by Yahoo's request that the Court "allow public release" of those
+briefs. See In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
+Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1017 (FISA Ct. of Rev. 2008) (under sealing order applicable to this case,
+"[n]o party or counsel shall disclose publicly any classified information pertaining to this
+case"); FISC Rule 3 ("In all matters, the Court... shall comply with... Executive Order 13526,
+'Classified National Security Information' (or its successor)."2
+
+In its Response, the Government took "no position" on whether the opinion should be
+published, with the understanding that there would be "a review by the Government to allow for
+properly classified information to be redacted before publication." Response at 1. The
+Government undertook to “conduct such a review upon the Court's request." Id.
+
+Upon consideration of the parties' submissions and the June 28, 2013 Court of Review
+Order, and after consultation among the judges of this Court pursuant to FISC Rule 62(a), it is
+HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
+
+1 Yahoo!'s Reply did explicitly ask the Court to order the Government to conduct a
+declassification review of the parties' legal briefs. Reply at 1, 6.
+
+2 The Motion also asked the Court to "direct the Executive Branch to revisit the
+classification of Provider and its counsel's identity" and "publish this instant motion in the
+Court's public docket." Motion at 4 (emphasis in original). The Government has since advised
+the Court that it has declassified Yahoo!'s identity as the Provider in this case, see Response at 1-
+2, and the Court has published the Motion, which identifies Yahoo!'s counsel, on its public
+docket at . See also In re Directives
+Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Docket No. 08-01, Order
+issued on June 28 2013, at 2 (FISA Ct. Rev.) ("June 28, 2013 Court of Review Order") (in light
+of Government's statement that Yahoo!'s involvement in this litigation "can now be
+declassified," the Court "no longer considers the identities of the Provider or its counsel to be
+covered by this Court's sealing order"), attached as exhibit to Yahoo!'s Reply.
+2
+
+1. The Government shall conduct a declassification review of (a) this Court's
+Memorandum Opinion of April 25, 2008, and (2) the legal briefs submitted by the parties to this
+Court in this matter. After such review, the Court anticipates publishing that Memorandum
+Opinion in a form that redacts any properly classified information.
+
+2. The Government shall report to the Court by July 29, 2013, with estimated dates by
+which it will be able to complete its review of the two categories of documents identified above.
+Priority should be given to the review of this Court's Memorandum Opinion.
+
+SO ORDERED, this 15th day of July, 2013.
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+3
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-rbw-signed-order-130715/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-rbw-signed-order-130715/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3d91d53
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+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-rbw-signed-order-130715/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Order, In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 2013 July 2013",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-07-15",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-07-15",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34234",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "c299b674deb95e5981c74ddf7a038dca3ba1fb4c61133257fc7c8555e08febc2",
+ "pages": 3
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-reply-in-support/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-reply-in-support.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-reply-in-support/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-reply-in-support.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..89ef485
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-reply-in-support/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-reply-in-support.md
@@ -0,0 +1,621 @@
+IN THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURTS PH 3:33
+In re: Directives Pursuant to Section
+105B of the Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Act
+
+No. 105B(g) 07-01
+C. COURT
+
+REPLY IN SUPPORT OF YAHOO! INC.'S
+MOTION UNDER FISC RULE 62
+
+The Government has informed Yahoo! Inc. ("Yahoo!"), through its
+pleadings and otherwise, that Yahoo!'s name and its counsels' identities are no
+longer classified and may be released immediately. The Government has not
+objected to Yahoo!'s request for a new classification review and release of this
+Court's order and the parties' briefs. Yahoo! therefore asks this Court to enter an
+order:
+
+A. Stating the Court does not object to release of all of its orders or the parties'
+briefing; and
+
+B. Directing the government to conduct a classification review of this Court's
+orders and briefing this matter for public release.
+
+See Ex. A, In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Act, No. 08-01, Order (For. Intel. Surv. Ct. of Rev. June 28, 2013).
+
+1
+
+ARGUMENT
+
+Release of this Court's decision and the parties' briefing is necessary to
+inform the growing public debate about how this Court considers and examines the
+Government's use of directives. Courts have long recognized the public has a right
+to access court records. _United States v. Mitchell_, 551 F.2d 1252, 1258 (D.C. Cir.
+1976), _rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc._, 435 U.S.
+589 (1978) (The common law access right "is not some arcane relic of ancient
+English law," but rather "is fundamental to a democratic state.") "There is a
+'strong presumption in favor of public access to judicial proceedings." _In re
+Sealed Case_, 237 F.3d 657, 666 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing _Johnson v. Greater
+Southeast Cmty. Hosp. Corp._, 951 F.2d 1268, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). Executive
+Order 13,526 also recognizes that "the need to protect [classified] information may
+be outweighed by the public interest in disclosure of the information, and in these
+cases the information should be declassified."
+
+Following these principles, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of
+Review ("FISCR") accepted the need for additional public access to court records
+in this case. See Ex. A, In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act, No. 08-01, Order (For. Intel. Surv. Ct. of Rev. June
+28, 2013). The FISCR recognized that since it decided this case, "more than four
+years have passed, and recent events suggest that there may have been a change in
+
+2
+
+the government's position as to what it considers classified in this matter." _Id._ at
+2-3. The FISCR thus held that "it is appropriate for this Court to order the
+requested relief and not to require the Provider to initiate a separate proceeding
+under the Freedom of Information Act." _Id._ at 3. It ordered the Government, by
+July 12th, to provide a timeline for declassifying additional portions of its decision
+and the parties' legal briefs for this case on appeal. _Id._ This Court should do the
+same with regard to the previously unreleased record in this case, including the
+decision compelling Yahoo! to comply, the Court's denial of Yahoo!'s request for
+a stay, and the parties' briefing.
+
+The directives at issue in this case are at the center of a robust national
+debate represented by countless news articles, a statement from the Director of
+National Intelligence,¹ and congressional hearings.² Providing more information
+about the methods the government uses, the arguments this Court considers, and
+the Court's reasoning would inform this debate and prevent misunderstandings
+
+¹ Ex. B., James Clapper, DNI Statement on the Collection of Intelligence Pursuant to Section 702 of the
+Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (June 8, 2013) available at
+http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/191-press-releases-2013/872-dni-statement-on-
+the-collection-of-intelligence-pursuant-to-section-702-of-the-foreign-intelligence-surveillance-act.
+² U.S House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, How Disclosed NSA
+Programs Protect Americans, and Why Disclosure Aids our Adversaries (June 18, 2013), recording
+available at http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/34527763. Ex. C, U.S House of Representatives Permanent
+Select Committee on Intelligence, How Disclosed NSA Programs Protect Americans, and Why
+Disclosure Aids our Adversaries, Opening Statement of Chairman Rogers' (June 18, 2013) available at
+http://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/ChairOpening06182013.pdf
+
+3
+
+based on incomplete information.³ As Representative Rogers, Chairman of the U.S
+House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence stated,
+"One of the more damaging aspects of selectively leaking incomplete information
+is that it paints an inaccurate picture and fosters distrust in our government." Ex. D
+at 1. This Court's thorough analysis of Yahoo!'s objections, and arguments in the
+parties' briefs, would allow the public to observe the process by which this Court
+oversees directives, and offer more complete information about that process, while
+still protecting classified information. See, e.g., _Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
+Virginia_, 448 U.S. 555, 572 (1980) (noting that in criminal cases "the appearance
+of justice can best be provided by allowing people to observe it.")
+
+Other parties are also demanding information from Yahoo! (and other
+providers) about their responses to directives. Plaintiffs have already filed lawsuits
+against providers, including Yahoo!, that news reports have characterized as
+having responded to directives and/or taken part in the PRISM program. See, e.g.,
+_Klayman v. Obama_, No. 13-cv-00881-RJL (D.D.C. filed June 11, 2013). Yahoo!,
+like other electronic communications providers, is under public pressure to provide
+more information about its responses to United States Government demands for
+user data. Disclosure of the directives and the briefs in this case would also allow
+
+³ See, e.g., Ex. D, Eric Lichtblau, _In Secret, Court Vastly Broadens Powers of N.S.A._, The New York
+Times (July 6, 2013) http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/07/us/in-secret-court-vastly-broadens-powers-of-
+nsa.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (revealing a lack of clarity arising from incomplete release of court
+opinions).
+
+4
+
+Yahoo! to demonstrate that it objected strenuously to the directives that are now
+the subject of debate, and objected at every stage of the proceeding, but that these
+objections were overruled and its request for a stay was denied. Most importantly,
+making this Court's thorough analysis available to the public will provide the
+public with valuable information about how the parties and the Court vetted the
+Government's arguments supporting the use of directives. That information will
+give the public a more complete understanding of the directive process, allowing
+U.S. citizens to inform their legislative representatives as to their views on the
+continued use of the directive process, especially as the statutes authorizing
+directives are up for reauthorization. Pub. L. 112-238, § 2(a)(1) (reauthorizing
+directives until December 31, 2017). In short, additional disclosures will advance
+the proper functioning of our representative democracy with regard to the statute
+that authorizes the use of directives. See, e.g., _Richmond Newspapers_, 448 U.S. at
+572; _Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue_, 460 U.S.
+575, 585 (1983) ("an informed public is the essence of working democracy.").
+
+5
+
+CONCLUSION
+
+Given the Government's decision not to object to the relief Yahoo! has
+requested, and its declassification of Yahoo!'s identity, Yahoo! asks this Court to
+enter an order:
+
+1. Stating that the Court does not object to release of all of its orders in this
+case or the parties' briefing; and
+
+2. Directing the government to conduct a classification review of the orders
+and briefing in this matter for public release.
+
+Dated: July 9, 2013
+
+Signature:
+Marc J. Zwillinger
+Jacob A. Sommer
+ZwillGen PLLC
+1705 N St. NW
+Washington, DC 20036
+marc@zwillgen.com
+jake@zwillgen.com
+Attorneys for Yahoo! Inc.
+
+6
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+on:
+
+I hereby certify that on July 9, 2013, I served copies of the foregoing motion
+
+Carli Rodriguez-Feo
+United States Department of Justice
+Litigation Security Group
+2 Constitution Square
+145 N St NE
+Suite 2W-115
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+(202) 514-9016
+Carli.Rodriguez-Feo@usdoj.gov
+
+pursuant to FISC Rule 8 and procedures established by the Security and
+Emergency Planning Staff, United States Department of Justice.
+
+Sean T. Moran
+
+7
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE
+COURT OF REVIEW
+WASHINGTON, D. D.C.
+
+IN RE DIRECTIVES PURSUANT TO SECTION
+105B OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE ACT.
+
+Docket No. 08-01
+
+ORDER
+
+This matter is before the Court on the Motion of the Provider to "Publish Additional
+Portions of the Court's Decision" in _In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act_, 551 F.3d 1004 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. of Rev. 2008), which was
+submitted on June 14, 2013.¹ The U.S. Department of Justice filed a response to the motion on
+June 25, 2013, and the Provider waived its right to reply on June 26, 2013.
+
+The Provider moves this Court to issue an order stating: "(1) that it does not object to the
+Government's release of additional portions of its opinion in this case and (2) directing the
+Government to revisit its classification decisions under Executive Order 13,526 to determine if
+classification remains appropriate in light of recent disclosures." Mot. at 8 (footnote omitted).
+Earlier in its filing, the Provider requested that this Court "publish additional information
+including, but not limited to, the identity of the Provider and its counsel and the arguments made
+
+¹ Provider styles its pleading as request for relief under Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
+Court (FISC) Rule 62. As a matter of clarification, Rule 62 applies to the FISC only, and not this
+Court.
+
+in the briefs." _Id._ at 1. The government, in its response, does not oppose the relief sought or
+object to the Provider's requests. Resp. at 1-2. With respect to the Provider's request that this
+Court state that it does not object to the government's release of additional portions of its August
+22, 2008, opinion in this case, the government takes no position. With respect to the identity of
+the Provider and the contents of the present motion and response, the government states that "the
+identity of the petitioner in the 2008 litigation can now be declassified" and that it had no
+objection to the Motion being made publicly available. _Id._ at 2-3. With respect to the request for
+a new classification review, the government states that it does not object to the request, although
+it contends that it is not necessary for the Court to direct that relief, which could be triggered by a
+request under the Freedom of Information Act.
+
+This Court's January 12, 2009, Order places under seal all classified information in this
+matter. 551 F.3d at 1017. That Order defines "classified information" as "any information,
+document, or portion of a document, not included in the published, redacted opinion, that has
+been and remains classified by an Executive Branch agency or official pursuant to applicable
+Executive Orders...." _Id._ In light of the government's Response, this Court no longer considers
+the identities of the Provider or its counsel to be covered by this Court's sealing order.
+
+This Court stated in its January 12, 2009, Order that "[i]t would serve the public interest
+and the orderly administration of justice to publish" the August 22, 2008, Opinion, but that "an
+unredacted opinion would disclose materials that have been properly classified by the Executive
+Branch." 551 F.3d at 1016. As a result, redactions were made to the Court's opinion in
+consultation with the Executive Branch prior to publication. Since that time, more than four
+years have passed, and recent events suggest that there may have been a change in the
+
+2
+
+government's position as to what it considers classified in this matter. In recognition of this
+Court's authority over its own records and files, the Court concludes that it is appropriate for this
+Court to order the requested relief and not to require the Provider to initiate a separate proceeding
+under the Freedom of Information Act.
+
+For the reasons discussed above, this Court rules that it does not object to the
+government's release of additional portions of the Court's August 22, 2008, Opinion in this case
+to the extent that the government concludes that those matters may be declassified. In addition,
+IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the government is to conduct a new classification review of the
+following:
+
+1. This Court's August 22, 2008, Opinion in this matter.
+
+2. The Parties' Legal Briefs in this matter.
+
+The government is to report back to the Court by July 12, 2013, with estimated dates by which it
+will be able to complete its review of the two categories of information indicated above.
+
+SO ORDERED, this 28th day of June, 2013.
+
+WILLIAM C. BRYSON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance
+Court of Review
+
+3
+
+OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+LEADING INTELLIGENCE INTEGRATION
+
+DNI Statement on the Collection of Intelligence Pursuant to Section 702
+of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
+
+DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+WASHINGTON, DC 20511
+
+June 8, 2013
+
+DNI Statement on the Collection of Intelligence Pursuant to Section 702
+of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
+Over the last week we have seen reckless disclosures of intelligence community measures
+used to keep Americans safe. In a rush to publish, media outlets have not given the full
+context-including the extent to which these programs are overseen by all three branches of
+government-to these effective tools.
+
+In particular, the surveillance activities published in The Guardian and The Washington Post are
+lawful and conducted under authorities widely known and discussed, and fully debated and
+authorized by Congress. Their purpose is to obtain foreign intelligence information, including
+information necessary to thwart terrorist and cyber attacks against the United States and its
+allies.
+
+Our ability to discuss these activities is limited by our need to protect intelligence sources and
+methods. Disclosing information about the specific methods the government uses to collect
+communications can obviously give our enemies a "playbook" of how to avoid detection.
+Nonetheless, Section 702 has proven vital to keeping the nation and our allies safe. It continues
+to be one of our most important tools for the protection of the nation's security.
+
+However, there are significant misimpressions that have resulted from the recent articles. Not all
+the inaccuracies can be corrected without further revealing classified information. I have,
+however, declassified for release the attached details about the recent unauthorized disclosures
+in hope that it will help dispel some of the myths and add necessary context to what has been
+published.
+
+James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence
+
+1/1
+
+DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+WASHINGTON, DC 20511
+
+June 8, 2013
+
+Facts on the Collection of Intelligence Pursuant to Section 702
+of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
+
+* PRISM is not an undisclosed collection or data mining program. It is an internal government
+computer system used to facilitate the government's statutorily authorized collection of
+foreign intelligence information from electronic communication service providers under
+court supervision, as authorized by Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
+(FISA) (50 U.S.C. § 1881a). This authority was created by the Congress and has been widely
+known and publicly discussed since its inception in 2008.
+
+* Under Section 702 of FISA, the United States Government does not unilaterally obtain
+information from the servers of U.S. electronic communication service providers. All such
+information is obtained with FISA Court approval and with the knowledge of the provider
+based upon a written directive from the Attorney General and the Director of National
+Intelligence. In short, Section 702 facilitates the targeted acquisition of foreign intelligence
+information concerning foreign targets located outside the United States under court
+oversight. Service providers supply information to the Government when they are lawfully
+required to do so.
+
+* The Government cannot target anyone under the court-approved procedures for Section 702
+collection unless there is an appropriate, and documented, foreign intelligence purpose for the
+acquisition (such as for the prevention of terrorism, hostile cyber activities, or nuclear
+proliferation) and the foreign target is reasonably believed to be outside the United States.
+We cannot target even foreign persons overseas without a valid foreign intelligence purpose.
+
+* In addition, Section 702 cannot be used to intentionally target any U.S. citizen, or any other
+U.S. person, or to intentionally target any person known to be in the United States. Likewise,
+Section 702 cannot be used to target a person outside the United States if the purpose is to
+acquire information from a person inside the United States.
+
+* Finally, the notion that Section 702 activities are not subject to internal and external oversight
+is similarly incorrect. Collection of intelligence information under Section 702 is subject to
+an extensive oversight regime, incorporating reviews by the Executive, Legislative and
+Judicial branches.
+
+1
+
+* The Courts. All FISA collection, including collection under Section 702, is overseen and
+monitored by the FISA Court, a specially established Federal court comprised of 11 Federal
+judges appointed by the Chief Justice of the United States.
+ * The FISC must approve targeting and minimization procedures under Section 702
+ prior to the acquisition of any surveillance information.
+ * Targeting procedures are designed to ensure that an acquisition targets non-
+ U.S. persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States for specific
+ purposes, and also that it does not intentionally acquire a communication
+ when all the parties are known to be inside the US.
+ * Minimization procedures govern how the Intelligence Community (IC) treats
+ the information concerning any U.S. persons whose communications might
+ be incidentally intercepted and regulate the handling of any nonpublic
+ information concerning U.S. persons that is acquired, including whether
+ information concerning a U.S. person can be disseminated. Significantly, the
+ dissemination of information about U.S. persons is expressly prohibited
+ unless it is necessary to understand foreign intelligence or assess its
+ importance, is evidence of a crime, or indicates a threat of death or serious
+ bodily harm.
+
+* The Congress. After extensive public debate, the Congress reauthorized Section 702 in
+ December 2012.
+ * The law specifically requires a variety of reports about Section 702 to the Congress.
+ * The DNI and AG provide exhaustive semiannual reports assessing
+ compliance with the targeting and minimization procedures.
+ * These reports, along with FISA Court opinions, and a semi-annual report by
+ the Attorney General are provided to Congress. In short, the information
+ provided to Congress by the Executive Branch with respect to these activities
+ provides an unprecedented degree of accountability and transparency.
+ * In addition, the Congressional Intelligence and Judiciary Committees are regularly
+ briefed on the operation of Section 702.
+
+* The Executive. The Executive Branch, including through its independent Inspectors General,
+ carries out extensive oversight of the use of Section 702 authorities, which includes regular
+ on-site reviews of how Section 702 authorities are being implemented. These regular
+ reviews are documented in reports produced to Congress. Targeting decisions are reviewed
+ by ODNI and DOJ.
+ * Communications collected under Section 702 have provided the Intelligence
+ Community insight into terrorist networks and plans. For example, the Intelligence
+
+2
+
+* Community acquired information on a terrorist organization's strategic planning
+ efforts.
+* Communications collected under Section 702 have yielded intelligence regarding
+ proliferation networks and have directly and significantly contributed to successful
+ operations to impede the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related
+ technologies.
+* Communications collected under Section 702 have provided significant and unique
+ intelligence regarding potential cyber threats to the United States including specific
+ potential computer network attacks. This insight has led to successful efforts to
+ mitigate these threats.
+
+3
+
+The Committee will come to order.
+
+General Alexander, Deputy Attorney General Cole, Deputy Director Joyce and Mr. Litt, thank you for
+appearing before us today-especially on short notice.
+
+The Ranking Member and I believed it was important to hold an open hearing today to provide this
+House and the public with an opportunity to hear directly from you how the Government is using the
+legal authorities that Congress has provided to the Executive Branch since the terrorist attacks of
+September 11, 2001.
+
+I also would like to recognize the hard work of the men and women of the NSA and the rest of the
+IC who work day in and day out to disrupt threats to our national security. The people at NSA, in
+particular, have heard a constant public drumbeat about a laundry list of nefarious things they are
+alleged to be doing to spy on Americans. Yet, they keep their heads down and keep working every day
+to keep us safe. General Alexander, please convey our thanks to your team.
+
+This Committee has been extensively briefed on these efforts on a regular basis as part of our
+ongoing oversight responsibility over the 16 elements of the Intelligence Community and the National
+Intelligence Program.
+
+In order to fully understand intelligence collection programs, most of these briefings and hearings
+have taken place in classified settings. Nonetheless, the collection efforts under the business records
+provision and Section 702 of FISA are legal, court-approved and are subject to an extensive oversight
+regime.
+
+I look forward to hearing from all of the witnesses about the extensive protections and oversight in
+place for these programs. General Alexander, we look forward to hearing what you're able to discuss in
+an open forum about how the data that you obtain from providers under the Business Records provision
+is used; and Deputy Attorney General Cole, we look forward to hearing more about the legal authorities
+themselves, and the state of the law on what privacy protections Americans' have in business records.
+
+One of the frustrating parts about being a member of this Committee is sitting at the intersection of
+classified intelligence programs and transparent democracy as representatives of the American
+people. The public trusts the government to protect the country from another 9/11 type attack, but
+that trust can start to wane when they are faced with inaccuracies, half truths and outright lies about
+the way intelligence programs are being run.
+
+One of the more damaging aspects of selectively leaking incomplete information is that it paints an
+inaccurate picture and fosters distrust in our government. This is particularly so when those of us who
+have taken an oath to protect information that can damage the national security if released, cannot
+publicly provide clarifying information because it remains classified. It is at times like these where our
+enemies within become almost as damaging as our enemies on the outside.
+
+It is critically important to protect sources and methods so we aren't giving the enemy our
+playbook. It is also important, however, to be able to talk about how these programs help protect us so
+that they continue to be reauthorized.
+
+General Alexander, you and I have talked over the past week about the need to be able to publicly
+elaborate on the success stories these authorities have contributed to without jeopardizing ongoing
+operations. I place the utmost value in protecting sources and methods, but I also recognize that when
+we are forced into the position of having to publicly discuss intelligence programs due to irresponsible,
+criminal behavior that we also have to carefully balance the need for secrecy with educating the public.
+
+I think you have struck the right balance between protecting sources and methods, and maintaining
+the public's trust-by providing more examples of how these authorities have helped disrupt terrorist
+plots and connections. And I appreciate your efforts in this regard.
+
+For these authorities to continue to work they must continue to be available. Without them, I fear
+we will return to the position we were in prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001. And that should be
+unacceptable to all of us.
+
+I hope today's hearing will help answer the questions that have arisen as a result of the fragmentary
+and distorted illegal disclosures over the past several days.
+
+Before recognizing General Alexander for his opening statement, I turn the floor over to the Ranking
+Member for any opening statement he would like to make.
+
+The New York Times
+July 6, 2013
+
+In Secret, Court Vastly Broadens Powers
+of N.S.A.
+
+By ERIC LICHTBLAU
+WASHINGTON - In more than a dozen classified rulings, the nation's surveillance court has
+created a secret body of law giving the National Security Agency the power to amass vast
+collections of data on Americans while pursuing not only terrorism suspects, but also people
+possibly involved in nuclear proliferation, espionage and cyberattacks, officials say.
+
+The rulings, some nearly 100 pages long, reveal that the court has taken on a much more
+expansive role by regularly assessing broad constitutional questions and establishing important
+judicial precedents, with almost no public scrutiny, according to current and former officials
+familiar with the court's classified decisions.
+
+The 11-member Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, known as the FISA court, was once
+mostly focused on approving case-by-case wiretapping orders. But since major changes in
+legislation and greater judicial oversight of intelligence operations were instituted six years ago,
+it has quietly become almost a parallel Supreme Court, serving as the ultimate arbiter on
+surveillance issues and delivering opinions that will most likely shape intelligence practices for
+years to come, the officials said.
+
+Last month, a former National Security Agency contractor, Edward J. Snowden, leaked a
+classified order from the FISA court, which authorized the collection of all phone-tracing data
+from Verizon business customers. But the court's still-secret decisions go far beyond any single
+surveillance order, the officials said.
+
+"We've seen a growing body of law from the court," a former intelligence official said. "What you
+have is a common law that develops where the court is issuing orders involving particular types
+of surveillance, particular types of targets."
+
+In one of the court's most important decisions, the judges have expanded the use in terrorism
+cases of a legal principle known as the "special needs" doctrine and carved out an exception to
+the Fourth Amendment's requirement of a warrant for searches and seizures, the officials said.
+
+The special needs doctrine was originally established in 1989 by the Supreme Court in a ruling
+allowing the drug testing of railway workers, finding that a minimal intrusion on privacy was
+
+"justified by the government's need to combat an overriding public danger. Applying that
+concept more broadly, the FISA judges have ruled that the N.S.A.'s collection and examination
+of Americans' communications data to track possible terrorists does not run afoul of the Fourth
+Amendment, the officials said.
+
+That legal interpretation is significant, several outside legal experts said, because it uses a
+relatively narrow area of the law - used to justify airport screenings, for instance, or drunken-
+driving checkpoints - and applies it much more broadly, in secret, to the wholesale collection of
+communications in pursuit of terrorism suspects. "It seems like a legal stretch," William C.
+Banks, a national security law expert at Syracuse University, said in response to a description of
+the decision. "It's another way of tilting the scales toward the government in its access to all this
+data."
+
+While President Obama and his intelligence advisers have spoken of the surveillance programs
+leaked by Mr. Snowden mainly in terms of combating terrorism, the court has also interpreted
+the law in ways that extend into other national security concerns. In one recent case, for
+instance, intelligence officials were able to get access to an e-mail attachment sent within the
+United States because they said they were worried that the e-mail contained a schematic
+drawing or a diagram possibly connected to Iran's nuclear program.
+
+In the past, that probably would have required a court warrant because the suspicious e-mail
+involved American communications. In this case, however, a little-noticed provision in a 2008
+law, expanding the definition of "foreign intelligence" to include "weapons of mass destruction,"
+was used to justify access to the message.
+
+The court's use of that language has allowed intelligence officials to get wider access to data and
+communications that they believe may be linked to nuclear proliferation, the officials said. They
+added that other secret findings had eased access to data on espionage, cyberattacks and other
+possible threats connected to foreign intelligence.
+
+"The definition of 'foreign intelligence' is very broad," another former intelligence official said in
+an interview. "An espionage target, a nuclear proliferation target, that all falls within FISA, and
+the court has signed off on that.”
+
+The official, like a half-dozen other current and former national security officials, discussed the
+court's rulings and the general trends they have established on the condition of anonymity
+because they are classified. Judges on the FISA court refused to comment on the scope and
+volume of their decisions.
+
+Unlike the Supreme Court, the FISA court hears from only one side in the case — the
+
+government - and its findings are almost never made public. A Court of Review is empaneled
+to hear appeals, but that is known to have happened only a handful of times in the court's
+history, and no case has ever been taken to the Supreme Court. In fact, it is not clear in all
+circumstances whether Internet and phone companies that are turning over the reams of data
+even have the right to appear before the FISA court.
+
+Created by Congress in 1978 as a check against wiretapping abuses by the government, the
+court meets in a secure, nondescript room in the federal courthouse in Washington. All of the
+current 11 judges, who serve seven-year terms, were appointed to the special court by Chief
+Justice John G. Roberts Jr., and 10 of them were nominated to the bench by Republican
+presidents. Most hail from districts outside the capital and come in rotating shifts to hear
+surveillance applications; a single judge signs most surveillance orders, which totaled nearly
+1,800 last year. None of the requests from the intelligence agencies was denied, according to the
+court.
+
+Beyond broader legal rulings, the judges have had to resolve questions about newer types of
+technology, like video conferencing, and how and when the government can get access to them,
+the officials said.
+
+The judges have also had to intervene repeatedly when private Internet and phone companies,
+which provide much of the data to the N.S.A., have raised concerns that the government is
+overreaching in its demands for records or when the government itself reports that it has
+inadvertently collected more data than was authorized, the officials said. In such cases, the
+court has repeatedly ordered the N.S.A. to destroy the Internet or phone data that was
+improperly collected, the officials said.
+
+The officials said one central concept connects a number of the court's opinions. The judges
+have concluded that the mere collection of enormous volumes of "metadata" - facts like the
+time of phone calls and the numbers dialed, but not the content of conversations - does not
+violate the Fourth Amendment, as long as the government establishes a valid reason under
+national security regulations before taking the next step of actually examining the contents of
+an American's communications.
+
+This concept is rooted partly in the "special needs" provision the court has embraced. "The
+basic idea is that it's O.K. to create this huge pond of data," a third official said, "but you have to
+establish a reason to stick your pole in the water and start fishing.”
+
+Under the new procedures passed by Congress in 2008 in the FISA Amendments Act, even the
+collection of metadata must be considered "relevant" to a terrorism investigation or other
+intelligence activities.
+
+The court has indicated that while individual pieces of data may not appear "relevant" to a
+terrorism investigation, the total picture that the bits of data create may in fact be relevant,
+according to the officials with knowledge of the decisions.
+
+Geoffrey R. Stone, a professor of constitutional law at the University of Chicago, said he was
+troubled by the idea that the court is creating a significant body of law without hearing from
+anyone outside the government, forgoing the adversarial system that is a staple of the
+American justice system. "That whole notion is missing in this process," he said.
+
+The FISA judges have bristled at criticism that they are a rubber stamp for the government,
+occasionally speaking out to say they apply rigor in their scrutiny of government requests. Most
+of the surveillance operations involve the N.S.A., an eavesdropping behemoth that has listening
+posts around the world. Its role in gathering intelligence within the United States has grown
+enormously since the Sept. 11 attacks.
+
+Soon after, President George W. Bush, under a secret wiretapping program that circumvented
+the FISA court, authorized the N.S.A. to collect metadata and in some cases listen in on foreign
+calls to or from the United States. After a heated debate, the essential elements of the Bush
+program were put into law by Congress in 2007, but with greater involvement by the FISA
+court.
+
+Even before the leaks by Mr. Snowden, members of Congress and civil liberties advocates had
+been pressing for declassifying and publicly releasing court decisions, perhaps in summary
+form.
+
+Reggie B. Walton, the FISA court's presiding judge, wrote in March that he recognized the
+"potential benefit of better informing the public" about the court's decisions. But, he said, there
+are "serious obstacles" to doing so because of the potential for misunderstanding caused by
+omitting classified details.
+
+Gen. Keith B. Alexander, the N.S.A. director, was noncommittal when he was pressed at a
+Senate hearing in June to put out some version of the court's decisions.
+
+While he pledged to try to make more decisions public, he said, "I don't want to jeopardize the
+security of Americans by making a mistake in saying, 'Yes, we're going to do all that.' "
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-reply-in-support/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-reply-in-support/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3cdfd99
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-reply-in-support/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+{
+ "title": "Reply in Support of Yahoo! Inc.'s Motion Under FISC Rule 62, In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 2013 June 28",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-06-28",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [
+ "PRISM"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-06-28",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/sites/default/files/assets/105B%2528g%2529%252007-01%2520Reply-1.pdf",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "96ab6b92b5c3fa4d4f55cbbfb9d8f661775a82c74fd2f3742009ea565e39410f",
+ "pages": 20
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-response-130715/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-response-130715.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-response-130715/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-response-130715.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..99d596a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-response-130715/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-response-130715.md
@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
+UNITED STATES
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+2013 JUL 29 PM 4:47
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+IN RE: DIRECTIVES PURSUANT TO SECTION )
+105B OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE ACT
+)
+)
+Docket No. 105B(g) 07-01
+
+THE UNITED STATES' RESPONSE TO THIS COURT'S JULY 15, 2013 ORDER
+
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+
+J. BRADFORD WIEGMANN
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+TASHINA GAUHAR
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+JEFFREY M. SMITH
+NICHOLAS J. PATTERSON
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+Phone: (202) 514-5600
+Fax: (202) 514-8053
+
+Attorneys for the United States of America
+
+E
+
+In its Order of July 15, 2013, this Court directed the Government to "conduct a
+declassification review" of the Court's April 25, 2008 Memorandum Opinion in this case and the
+"legal briefs submitted by the parties to this Court in this matter." Order at 3. The Court further
+directed the Government to "report to the Court by July 29, 2013, with estimated dates by which
+it will be able to complete its review of the two categories of documents." Id. In the interest of
+providing a more complete picture of the litigation in this matter, the Government also proposes
+to undertake a declassification review of certain additional materials in this litigation. The
+Government estimates that it will be able to complete its review as follows: (a) the April 25,
+Memorandum Opinion by Thursday, September 12, 2013, 45 days from today; (b) the briefs and
+materials cited by the Court in the Memorandum Opinion (see Appendix A) by Friday,
+September 27, 2013, 60 days from today; and (c) the other briefs and materials that the
+Government has identified as potentially relevant to the Court's Memorandum Opinion (see
+Appendix A) on a rolling basis thereafter.
+
+These estimates are based on an assessment of the volume of materials at issue, the type
+of information contained in those materials, and the necessity of inter-agency coordination in the
+declassification process. Moreover, given the nature of the materials at issue, the review of these
+documents will need to be conducted in conjunction with reviews of other materials.
+Specifically, the review needs to be coordinated with the ongoing review of the U.S. Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review opinion in this case and the associated materials; the
+overarching Executive Branch declassification effort; and multiple Freedom of Information Act
+cases and other cases involving related issues. The declassification decisions being made in the
+instant case are intertwined with these other declassification reviews.
+
+1
+
+July 29, 2013
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+
+J. BRADFORD WIEGMANN
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+TASHINA GAUHAR
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+Nicholas J. Patterson
+JEFFREY M. SMITH
+NICHOLAS J. PATTERSON
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+Phone: (202) 514-5600
+Fax: (202) 514-8053
+
+Attorneys for the United States of America
+
+2
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I hereby certify that a true copy of the United States' Response to this Court's July 15,
+2013 Order was served via Federal Express overnight delivery on this 29th day of July, 2013,
+addressed to:
+
+Marc J. Zwillinger
+Jacob A. Sommer
+ZwillGen PLLC
+1705 N Street, NW.
+Washington, DC 20036
+
+Nichdas J. Patterson
+Nicholas J. Patterson
+
+APPENDIX A
+
+List of documents for declassification review:
+
+Group (a): Memorandum Opinion and Order
+
+Memorandum Opinion dated 04/25/08 and Order to Compel Compliance dated 04/25/08
+
+Group (b): Briefs and materials cited in the Memorandum Opinion
+
+Government brief dated 11/21/07
+Yahoo brief dated 11/30/07
+Government brief dated 12/11/07
+Government brief dated 01/04/08
+Government declaration dated 01/16/08
+Yahoo declarations dated 01/23/08
+Government brief dated 02/15/08
+Government brief dated 02/20/08
+Government document dated 02/20/08
+Yahoo brief dated 02/20/08
+Order dated 02/28/08
+Government brief dated 03/07/08
+Government brief dated 03/19/08
+Yahoo brief dated 03/19/08
+
+1
+
+Group (c): Relevant briefs and materials not cited in the Memorandum Opinion
+
+Government brief dated 12/11/07
+Order dated 12/14/07
+Government brief dated 12/18/07
+Yahoo brief dated 12/18/07
+Yahoo brief dated 12/21/07
+Government brief dated 12/27/07
+Order dated 12/28/07
+Other Order dated 12/28/07
+Order dated 01/04/08
+Yahoo brief dated 01/09/08
+Order dated 01/10/08
+Government brief dated 01/14/08
+Order dated 01/17/08
+Order dated 01/31/08
+Order dated 02/06/08
+Yahoo brief dated 02/07/08
+Government brief dated 02/08/08
+Order dated 02/12/08
+Order dated 02/15/08
+Yahoo brief dated 02/15/08
+Government brief dated 02/26/08
+Order dated 02/29/08
+
+2
+
+Government brief dated 03/03/08
+Order dated 03/05/08
+Government brief dated 03/14/08
+Order dated 03/17/08
+Government brief dated 04/16/08
+Order dated 04/22/08
+Government brief dated 04/30/08
+Government brief dated 05/01/08
+Order dated 05/02/08
+Yahoo brief dated 05/06/08
+Government brief dated 05/09/08
+Second Government brief dated 05/09/08
+Third Government brief and declaration dated 05/09/08
+Fourth Government brief dated 05/09/08
+Government brief dated 05/13/08
+Yahoo brief dated 05/14/08
+Second Yahoo brief dated 05/14/08
+Order dated 05/14/08
+Second Order dated 05/14/08
+Order dated 05/15/08
+
+3
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-response-130715/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-response-130715/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d71d0ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-response-130715/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": " The United States' Response to this Court's July 15, 2013 Order, In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-07-29",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-07-29",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34405",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "b355fae7941bb3421a2cfc2863b5703c5f553961c8dd883f655640d7b7778555",
+ "pages": 8
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-response-130913/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-response-130913.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-response-130913/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-response-130913.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5d457bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-response-130913/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-response-130913.md
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE: DIRECTIVES PURSUANT TO SECTION )
+105B OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE ACT
+)
+)
+
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+2013 SEP 12 PM 4:43
+
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+Docket No. 105B(g) 07-01
+
+THE UNITED STATES' SECOND RESPONSE
+TO THIS COURT'S JULY 15, 2013 ORDER
+
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+
+J. BRADFORD WIEGMANN
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+TASHINA GAUHAR
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+JEFFREY M. SMITH
+NICHOLAS J. PATTERSON
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+Phone: (202) 514-5600
+Fax: (202) 514-8053
+
+Attorneys for the United States of America
+
+In its Order of July 15, 2013, this Court directed the Government to "conduct a
+declassification review" of the Court's April 25, 2008 Memorandum Opinion in this case and the
+"legal briefs submitted by the parties to this Court in this matter." Order at 3. The Court further
+directed the Government to "report to the Court by July 29, 2013, with estimated dates by which
+it will be able to complete its review of the two categories of documents." Id. As background,
+the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review issued an Order on January 12, 2009,
+in this case which placed under seal all classified information in this matter and defined
+"classified information" as "any information, document, or portion of a document, not included
+in the published, redacted opinion, that has been and remains classified by an Executive Branch
+agency or official pursuant to applicable Executive Orders." In re Directives Pursuant to Section
+105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1017 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct.
+of Rev. 2008)).
+
+On July 29, 2013, the Government estimated that it would be able to complete its review
+of the April 25, Memorandum Opinion by Thursday, September 12, 2013. After careful review
+of the Court's opinion and an accompanying order by senior intelligence officials and the U.S.
+Department of Justice, the Executive Branch has decided that it would be appropriate to
+declassify certain information in these documents—making possible the publication of much of
+the Court's opinion and order. The opinion and order, however, still contain information that
+remains classified. Thus, the public versions of the opinion and order must remain redacted
+in part.
+1
+
+---
+1 In addition, the Government has redacted the names of certain government employees
+appearing in these documents.
+
+1
+
+All of the text that the Government has determined remains classified in these documents
+is contained in text boxes. Upon completion of the Court's review, the Director of National
+Intelligence will formally declassify the redacted versions provided to the Court. The
+Government then will provide the Court with redacted versions of the opinion and order,
+appropriate for publication, that black out the information currently contained in the text boxes
+and strike through any classification markings that are no longer valid.
+
+2
+
+September 12, 2013
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+
+J. BRADFORD WIEGMANN
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+TASHINA GAUHAR
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+Nichdas J. Patterson
+JEFFREY M. SMITH
+NICHOLAS J. PATTERSON
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+Phone: (202) 514-5600
+Fax: (202) 514-8053
+
+Attorneys for the United States of America
+
+3
+
+**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**
+
+I hereby certify that a true copy of the United States' Second Response to this Court's
+July 15, 2013 Order and classified attachments were served by hand-delivery on this 12th day of
+September, 2013, to the Litigation Security Officer, Christine Gunning, or her delegate, for
+forwarding to the Court. Additionally, a copy of the response, without attachments, was served
+by the Government via Federal Express overnight delivery on this 12th day of September, 2013,
+addressed to:
+
+Marc J. Zwillinger
+Jacob A. Sommer
+ZwillGen PLLC
+1705 N Street, NW
+Washington, DC 20036
+
+Nichdas J. Patterson
+Nicholas J. Patterson
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-response-130913/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-response-130913/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..811b401
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-response-130913/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "The United States' Second Response to this Court's July 15, 2013 Order, In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-09-12",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-09-12",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34406",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "764c16f5e3ddc21af37b47e34f9b4ce3b0de56018d2674fefe9784ad4b841284",
+ "pages": 5
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-response-130930/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-response-130930.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-response-130930/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-response-130930.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b564a58
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-response-130930/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-response-130930.md
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+UNITED STATES
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+2013 SEP 27 PM 4:46
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+IN RE: DIRECTIVES PURSUANT TO SECTION )
+105B OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE ACT
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+)
+)
+Docket No. 105B(g) 07-01
+
+THE UNITED STATES' THIRD RESPONSE
+TO THIS COURT'S JULY 15, 2013 ORDER
+
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+
+J. BRADFORD WIEGMANN
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+TASHINA GAUHAR
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+JEFFREY M. SMITH
+NICHOLAS J. PATTERSON
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+Phone: (202) 514-5600
+Fax: (202) 514-8053
+
+Attorneys for the United States of America
+
+In its Order of July 15, 2013, this Court directed the Government to "conduct a
+declassification review" of the Court's April 25, 2008 Memorandum Opinion in this case and the
+"legal briefs submitted by the parties to this Court in this matter." Order at 3. The Court further
+directed the Government to "report to the Court by July 29, 2013, with estimated dates by which
+it will be able to complete its review of the two categories of documents." Id. As background,
+the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review issued an Order on January 12, 2009,
+in this case which placed under seal all classified information in this matter and defined
+"classified information" as "any information, document, or portion of a document, not included
+in the published, redacted opinion, that has been and remains classified by an Executive Branch
+agency or official pursuant to applicable Executive Orders." In re Directives Pursuant to Section
+105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1017 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct.
+of Rev. 2008)).
+
+On July 29, 2013, the Government estimated that it would be able to complete its review
+of the April 25, 2008 Memorandum Opinion by Thursday, September 12, 2013, and the briefs
+and materials cited by the Court in the opinion by Friday, September 27, 2013. On Thursday,
+September 12, 2013, the Government submitted the Court's opinion and an accompanying order
+to the Court for review. After careful review of the briefs and materials cited by the Court in the
+opinion by senior intelligence officials and the U.S. Department of Justice, the Executive Branch
+has decided that it would be appropriate to declassify certain information in these documents—
+making possible the publication of much of these briefs and materials. The briefs and materials,
+
+1
+
+however, still contain information that remains classified. Thus, the public versions of the briefs
+and materials must remain redacted in part.¹
+
+All of the text that the Government has determined remains classified in these documents
+is contained in text boxes.² Upon completion of the Court's review, the Director of National
+Intelligence will formally declassify the redacted versions provided to the Court. The
+Government then will provide the Court with redacted versions of the briefs and materials,
+appropriate for publication, that black out the information currently contained in the text boxes
+and strike through any classification markings that are no longer valid.
+
+¹ In addition, the Government has redacted the names of certain government employees and non-
+government individuals appearing in these documents.
+² The Government is not producing herein one document initially identified in the Government's
+July 29, 2013 submission's Appendix A as "Government brief dated 03/19/08" because that
+document is a previously redacted version of another document separately listed in Appendix A,
+which is included in the instant production to the Court. Additionally, the Government is still in
+the process of reviewing the document identified in Appendix A as "Government document
+dated 02/20/08." The Government will continue its review of this document as part of its
+ongoing review of other materials in this matter identified in Appendix A as "Group (c)." The
+Government will provide a status report on the review of the Group (c) documents within thirty
+days of this filing.
+2
+
+September 27, 2013
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+
+J. BRADFORD WIEGMANN
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+TASHINA GAUHAR
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+Nicholas J. Patterson
+JEFFREY M. SMITH
+NICHOLAS J. PATTERSON
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+Phone: (202) 514-5600
+Fax: (202) 514-8053
+
+Attorneys for the United States of America
+
+3
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I hereby certify that a true copy of the United States' Third Response to this Court's July
+15, 2013 Order and classified attachments were served by hand-delivery on this 27th day of
+September, 2013, to the Litigation Security Officer, Christine Gunning, or her delegate, for
+forwarding to the Court. Additionally, a copy of the response, without attachments, was served
+by the Government via Federal Express overnight delivery on this 27th day of September, 2013,
+addressed to:
+
+Marc J. Zwillinger
+Jacob A. Sommer
+ZwillGen PLLC
+1705 N Street, NW
+Washington, DC 20036
+
+Nicholas J. Patterson
+Nicholas J. Patterson
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-response-130930/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-response-130930/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..392c39b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-response-130930/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "The United States' Third Response to this Court's July 15, 2013 Order, In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-09-27",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-09-27",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34407",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "9fb39a507fdf707bf0d80e9db57d0c88977328c7859a1e7bac361f51cb7a0773",
+ "pages": 5
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-yahoo-motion-131001/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-yahoo-motion-131001.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-yahoo-motion-131001/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-yahoo-motion-131001.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4e945c0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-yahoo-motion-131001/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-yahoo-motion-131001.md
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+FILED
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL, CLERK
+SEP 30 2013 5:05 PM.
+U.S. Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Court
+IN THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+In re: Directives Pursuant to Section
+105B of the Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Act
+
+No. 105B(g) 07-01
+
+YAHOO! INC.'S UNCLASSIFIED MOTION UNDER FISC RULE 62 TO
+ALLOW PRE-PUBLICATION REVIEW OF DOCUMENTS PRODUCED
+IN RESPONSE TO THIS COURT'S JULY 15, 2013 ORDER
+
+Pursuant to this Court's order of July 15, 2013, the Government has begun
+conducting a declassification review of the Court records associated with this case.
+It provided the first portion of those records to the Court on September 12, 2013,
+provided the second portion on September 27, 2013, and intends to make further
+submissions on a rolling basis. Counsel for Yahoo has previously had access to
+classified versions of these documents—many of which Yahoo itself filed. While
+the Executive Branch retains some discretion over declassification decisions,
+Yahoo respectfully requests permission to review the Government's submissions to
+ensure that its redactions are well-founded and do not unintentionally create a risk
+that the documents will be misunderstood. Likewise, because this Court ultimately
+retains control over its own records, Yahoo seeks permission to review the
+documents in order to state any objections to further redactions the Court may
+make. Yahoo asks this Court to enter an order permitting Yahoo, through its
+counsel holding an appropriate security clearance, to review all documents already
+
+1
+
+provided and to be provided by the Government in response to this Court's July 15,
+2013 Order prior to ordering publication of such documents in redacted form.
+
+Facts
+
+In response to this Court's July 15, 2013 Order, the Government conducted a
+declassification review of the Court's Memorandum Opinion of April 25, 2008 and
+an accompanying order. Gov't's Second Response at 1-2. At the conclusion of
+that review, it provided proposed redactions to the Court for the Court's own
+review on September 12, 2013. The Government completed its declassification
+review of briefs and materials cited in the Memorandum Opinion on September 27,
+2013, and submitted those documents to the Court with proposed redactions. The
+Government has stated that going forward it will complete its declassification
+reviews on a rolling basis. Gov't's First Response at 1. Among the briefs and
+materials the Government has submitted or will submit to the Court are eleven
+briefs and one set of declarations filed by Yahoo. Id. app. at 1-3. Yet, the
+government's proposed course of action—awaiting Court review on the
+declassification by the DNI—avoids any review or input by Yahoo. Id. at 2.
+
+Argument
+
+Yahoo respectfully requests that the Court permit Yahoo, through its counsel
+holding appropriate security clearance as required by FISC Rule 63, to review all
+documents already provided and to be provided by the Government in response to
+
+2
+
+this Court's July 15, 2013 Order prior to the publication of such documents in
+redacted form. Counsel for Yahoo in this case presently has access to "classified
+information pertaining to this case in accordance with applicable security
+requirements and regulations and applicable orders issued by [FISCR] or the
+FISC." In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1017 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2008). In
+addition, twelve of the documents the Government has or expects to provide to the
+Court will be Yahoo's own motions and declarations. As such, permitting counsel
+for Yahoo to review the documents provided by the Government will not result in
+any additional disclosure of classified information.¹
+
+Furthermore, this Court retains control over its own records, and thus the
+Government has argued that publication of court records requires additional action
+by this Court after the Government has concluded its classification review. Rule
+62(a); See Gov't Response to Provider's Motion at 1, 1 n. 1; In re Motion for
+Release of Court Records, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, 486 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. 2007)
+(FISC "has supervisory power over its own records and files") (citations omitted).
+
+Permitting Yahoo, by its counsel, to review the documents provided by the
+Government in response to this Court's July 15, 2013 Order will assist the Court in
+determining whether the documents are suitable for publication. In determining
+
+¹ Through this motion, Yahoo does not request access to any documents or portions of documents that were
+previously filed with this court ex parte.
+
+3
+
+whether an order is suitable for publication, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
+Court of Review has considered whether redactions "distort[ ] the content of the
+discussion of the statutory and constitutional issues." In re Directives, 551 F.3d at
+1016. As a party to this litigation—and as the author of twelve of the documents
+concerned—Yahoo has a unique understanding of "the content of the discussion of
+the statutory and constitutional issues" involved in this case. In addition, as
+discussed in Yahoo's Reply, Yahoo is currently facing litigation alleging statutory
+and constitutional violations in connection with United States Government
+demands for user data, which give Yahoo a unique interest in ensuring that the
+orders, as redacted, are suitable for publication and accurately reflect the
+discussion of statutory and constitutional issues. Yahoo Reply at 4-5. Therefore,
+the Court should permit Yahoo to review the documents as redacted before the
+Court orders publication.
+
+Conclusion
+
+For the foregoing reasons, Yahoo asks this Court to enter an order permitting
+Yahoo, by its counsel holding appropriate security clearance, to review all
+documents already provided and to be provided by the Government in response to
+this Court's July 15, 2013 Order prior to ordering publication of such documents in
+redacted form.
+
+4
+
+Dated: September 30, 2013
+
+Signature: /s/ Marc J. Zwillinger
+Marc J. Zwillinger
+Jacob A. Sommer
+ZwillGen PLLC
+1705 N St. NW
+Washington, DC 20036
+marc@zwillgen.com
+jake@zwillgen.com
+Attorneys for Yahoo! Inc.
+
+5
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I hereby certify that on September 30, 2013, I served copies of the foregoing
+motion on:
+
+Christine E. Gunning
+United States Department of Justice
+Litigation Security Group
+2 Constitution Square
+145 N St NE
+Suite 2W-115
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+(202) 514-9016
+Christine.E.Gunning@usdoj.gov
+
+pursuant to FISC Rule 8 and procedures established by the Security and
+Emergency Planning Staff, United States Department of Justice.
+
+/s/Jacob A. Sommer
+Jacob A. Sommer
+
+6
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-yahoo-motion-131001/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-yahoo-motion-131001/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b630fae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_105b-g-07-01-yahoo-motion-131001/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Yahoo! Inc's Unclassified Motion Under FISC Rule 62 to Allow Pre-Publication Review of Documents Produced in Response to this Court's July 15, 2013 Order, In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-09-30",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-09-30",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34408",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "efd3b77548db9a61005d0131296b1bcc7701476cb45147c18bbdf79166dbb7f6",
+ "pages": 6
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_13-03-04-05-06-motion-dropbox-leave-130923/FISC_-_13-03-04-05-06-motion-dropbox-leave-130923.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_13-03-04-05-06-motion-dropbox-leave-130923/FISC_-_13-03-04-05-06-motion-dropbox-leave-130923.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c501ac9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_13-03-04-05-06-motion-dropbox-leave-130923/FISC_-_13-03-04-05-06-motion-dropbox-leave-130923.md
@@ -0,0 +1,422 @@
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+UNITED STATES FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+2013 SEP 23 PM 3:44
+
+In re Motions To Disclose Aggregate Data
+Regarding FISA Orders and Directives
+
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+Case Nos. Misc. 13-03, 13-04,
+13-05, 13-06
+
+Motion of Dropbox, Inc. For Leave To File Amicus Curiae Brief
+
+Dropbox, Inc. (“Dropbox”) moves for leave to file the accompanying amicus curiae
+brief in support of the motions for declaratory judgment filed in the above-captioned
+cases by Google Inc., Microsoft Corporation, Facebook, Inc., and Yahoo! Inc.
+
+Counsel for the government and for each of the parties has consented to the
+filing of Dropbox's amicus brief. No party or counsel for a party participated in the
+drafting of this brief or made any monetary contribution to it. For these reasons, and
+those set out in the attached brief, Dropbox respectfully asks the Court to allow its
+amicus brief to be filed.
+
+***
+
+Pursuant to Rule 7(i) of the Rules of this Court, Dropbox states that none of its
+undersigned counsel holds security clearances. Dropbox's counsel of record in this
+matter, Brian Willen, is a member in good standing of the bars of The District of
+Columbia (SBN 490471) and the State of New York (SBN 4191730). David H. Kramer
+is a member in good standing of the bar of California (SBN 168452). Dropbox's in-
+house counsel, Bart Volkmer, is a member in good standing of the bar of California
+(SBN 223732).
+
+Dated: September 23, 2013
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI
+Professional Corporation
+
+Brian M. Willen
+
+Bart Volkmer
+Dropbox, Inc.
+185 Berry Street, Suite 400
+San Francisco, CA 94107
+(415) 857-6875
+bart@dropbox.com
+
+1301 Avenue of the Americas
+New York, NY 10019
+Tel: (650) 849-3340
+Fax: (212) 999-5899
+bwillen@wsgr.com
+
+David H. Kramer
+650 Page Mill Road
+Palo Alto, CA 94304
+(650) 493-9300
+dkramer@wsgr.com
+
+Counsel for Dropbox, Inc.
+
+-2-
+
+UNITED STATES FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+In re Motions To Disclose Aggregate Data
+Regarding FISA Orders and Directives
+
+Case Nos. Misc. 13-03, 13-04,
+13-05, 13-06
+
+[Proposed] Order on Motion of Dropbox, Inc. For Leave To File Amicus
+Curiae Brief
+
+Now before the Court is the motion of Dropbox, Inc. to file an amicus curiae
+brief in the above-captioned cases. Dropbox has an interest in these cases, and all the
+parties have consented to the filing of Dropbox's proposed brief. Accordingly, it is
+hereby ordered that Dropbox's motion for leave to file an amicus curiae brief is
+GRANTED.
+
+SO ORDERED, this ___ day of _____, 2013.
+
+United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+Washington, D.C.
+
+-3-
+
+Certificate of Service
+
+I hereby certify this 23rd day of September, 2013, that at or before the time of
+filing this submission, the Government (care of the Security and Emergency Planning
+Staff, United States Department of Justice) has been served by hand delivery and
+electronic mail with a copy of this motion pursuant to Rule 8(a) of the FISC Rules of
+Procedure, on the following:
+
+Christine E. Gunning
+Litigation Security Group
+United States Department of Justice
+2 Constitution Square
+145 N Street, N.E.
+Suite 2W-115
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+Email: Christine.E.Gunning@usdoj.gov
+
+I further certify that I caused to be served a copy of the foregoing motion,
+together with the accompanying brief amicus curiae, on the following persons by
+electronic mail:
+
+James Garland
+Covington & Burlington LLP
+1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
+Washington, DC 20004
+jgarland@cov.com
+Counsel for Microsoft Corporation
+
+Carl Nichols
+Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP
+1875 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20006
+Carl.nichols@wilmerhale.com
+Counsel for Facebook, Inc.
+
+Albert Gidari
+Perkins Coie LLP
+1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900
+Seattle, WA 98101
+agidari@perkinscoie.com
+Counsel for Google Inc.
+
+Marc Zwillinger
+ZwillGen PLLC
+1705 N. St. NW
+Washington, D.C. 20036
+marc@zwillgen.com
+Counsel for Yahoo! Inc.
+
+Brian M. Willen
+Counsel for Dropbox, Inc.
+
+-4-
+
+UNITED STATES FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+In re Motions To Disclose Aggregate
+Data Regarding FISA Orders and
+Directives
+
+Case Nos. Misc. 13-03, 13-04, 13-
+05, 13-06
+
+Amicus Curiae Brief of Dropbox, Inc. In Support of Service
+Providers' Motions to Publish Information About National-Security
+Requests
+
+"Secrecy in government is fundamentally anti-democratic. . . .
+Open debate and discussion of public issues are vital to our
+national health."
+
+— New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 724
+(1971) (Douglas, J., concurring)
+
+Dropbox, Inc. ("Dropbox") respectfully submits this amicus curiae brief to
+support the motions filed by Google, Microsoft, Yahoo, and Facebook (the "Service
+Providers") seeking the Court's permission to publish the number of national-
+security requests they have received and the number of users affected by those
+requests. Dropbox has an interest in these motions because the government has told
+Dropbox that it isn't allowed to publish exactly how many national-security
+requests, if any, it receives. Instead, the government will permit Dropbox to provide
+information about national-security requests only if those requests are lumped
+together with regular law-enforcement requests and, even then, only in bands of
+1,000. Because Dropbox received fewer than 100 regular law-enforcement requests
+last year, reporting in the government's format would decrease Dropbox's ongoing
+transparency efforts.
+
+There is no statute, nor any other law, supporting the government's
+demands. To the contrary, the proposed gag order violates the First Amendment, as
+it interferes with both the public's right to obtain truthful information about a
+matter of substantial public debate and service providers' rights to publish such
+
+1
+
+information. For these reasons, Dropbox supports the Service Providers' motions
+and asks the Court to confirm that all online services may publish accurate
+information about the number of national-security requests received within a
+reporting period, along with the number of accounts affected by those requests.
+
+1. Dropbox And Its Interest In These Proceedings
+
+Dropbox is a service that empowers people to store their documents, photos,
+videos, and other materials online and to access and share them from anywhere.
+Dropbox is committed to protecting the privacy of the hundreds of millions of people
+who use its service, and to disclosing data about any law-enforcement requests that
+seek user information.
+
+Since May 2012, Dropbox has published a Transparency Report (available at
+https://www.dropbox.com/transparency) that includes the total number of requests
+for user information that Dropbox receives each year and the number of accounts
+affected by those requests. Dropbox's Transparency Report does not currently
+include national-security requests. That's because the government demands that
+services like Dropbox disclose only the aggregate number of all law-enforcement and
+national-security requests they receive. Even if presented that way, the government
+insists that the disclosures must be reported in bands of 1,000.
+
+The government's approach harms public debate and discussion, without any
+societal benefit. To see why, consider Dropbox's most recent Transparency Report,
+which discloses the following information about the law-enforcement requests
+Dropbox received in 2012:
+
+| Reporting Period | Country | Requests for user information | Accounts specified |
+| :--------------- | :------ | :---------------------------- | :----------------- |
+| January to December 2012 | United States | 87 | 164 |
+
+Had Dropbox received just one national-security request during that period, and had
+it wished to include that single request in its report, the government's approach
+would require Dropbox's Report to look like this:
+
+2
+
+| Reporting Period | Country | Requests for user information | Accounts specified |
+| :--------------- | :------ | :---------------------------- | :----------------- |
+| January to December 2012 | United States | 1-1000 | 1-1000 |
+
+Reporting in that way decreases transparency. It would shed almost no light
+on the data requests Dropbox receives, and could foster the impression that Dropbox
+received many more national-security requests than it did. It would also obfuscate
+the number of law-enforcement requests Dropbox received in 2012, many of which
+were not sealed and are in the public record. Because Dropbox is unwilling to
+distort its reporting this way, it instead must omit information about the number of
+national-security requests. That result is bad for the public. Dropbox would prefer
+to report any national-security requests in the same way it reports law-enforcement
+requests: by publishing the total number of requests received over a given period
+along with the number of affected accounts.
+
+Dropbox's desire to disclose this information is consistent with the
+government's own transparency initiatives. On August 29, 2013, the Director of
+National Intelligence (DNI) announced that for five different kinds of national-
+security authorities, the Intelligence Community "will release the total number of
+orders issued during the prior twelve-month period, and the number of targets
+affected by these orders." Press Release, Director of National Intelligence James R.
+Clapper, DNI Clapper Directs Annual Release of Information Related to Orders
+Issued to Telecom Providers Under National Security Authorities (Aug. 29, 2013),
+available at http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/191-press-
+releases-2013/922-dni-clapper-directs-annual-release-of-information-related-to-
+orders-issued-under-national-security-authorities.
+
+Unfortunately, the government has prohibited online services that wish to
+report on these requests from providing the same level of transparency. That is a
+harsh result for services that receive few government requests, or none at all. The
+government's position leaves these services unable to respond to concerns that such
+
+3
+
+requests are routine and widespread.1 For that reason, the Court's ruling on these
+motions will impact Dropbox and similarly situated services.
+
+2. Barring Service Providers From Truthfully Reporting The Number
+of National Security Requests Made By The Government Violates
+The First Amendment
+
+Recent events have ignited a heated debate about the government's use of its
+powers under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and similar laws. Online
+services like Dropbox, and the people who use them, have a right to participate fully
+in this debate because they are directly affected by the government's activities.
+Service providers may be asked to provide information in response to government
+demands, and those providers often face questions about whether they are doing
+enough to protect users' privacy. At a minimum, people want to know how often
+information housed on those services is handed over to the government. That is a
+legitimate request, and providers should be allowed to respond to it by disclosing the
+number of national-security requests they receive.
+
+The government has no authority supporting its claim that the law prevents
+services from disclosing this information. Even if it did, allowing the government to
+silence this speech would violate the First Amendment rights of online services and
+people who use them. The First Amendment provides "special protection against
+orders that prohibit the publication or broadcast of particular information or
+commentary." *Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart*, 427 U.S. 539, 556 (1976). And the
+Supreme Court has made clear "that First Amendment protection extends equally to
+right to receive information." *Allentown Mack Sales and Serv., Inc. v. NLRB*, 522
+U.S. 359, 386-87 (1998).
+
+The government is violating these rights by ordering private parties to keep
+quiet on an important matter involving the government's conduct. In doing so, it is
+preventing the public from learning basic facts about how the government is using
+its national-security powers. A prior restraint on speech like that is "the most
+
+---
+1 Many people have written to Dropbox over the past few months asking about
+Dropbox's involvement with national-security requests from the government.
+
+4
+
+serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights," *Stuart*,
+427 U.S. at 559, and faces a "heavy presumption against its constitutional validity,"
+*Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan*, 372 U.S. 570, 70 (1963).
+
+The only way the government can prevail on these motions would be to show
+that its proposed gag order is "narrowly tailored" to protecting national security and
+that there are no "less restrictive alternatives" that would be equally effective. See
+*United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.*, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000);
+*Freedman v. Maryland*, 380 U.S. 51, (1965). *Accord In re National Security Letter, —
+F. Supp. 2d —, 2013 WL 1095417 (N.D. Cal. 2013)* (applying these standards in
+holding that prohibitions on disclosing information about National Security Letters
+violated the First Amendment). The government cannot come close to showing that.
+
+The government's effort to silence online services and thereby keep the public
+in the dark is not at all tailored to protecting national security. No harm to national
+security can be expected from the Service Providers releasing accurate information
+about the number of national-security requests that have been made. The
+government is planning on releasing similar information itself. The proposed
+disclosures would not reveal the substance of any request nor identify any
+subscriber who was the target of such a request. We are talking here simply about
+aggregate numbers that should have been made public months ago.
+
+The Court should not permit the government to invoke the mere label of
+"national security" to justify the speech restraints it seeks—especially not here,
+where the speech will inform the public about the government's use of its national-
+security powers. As Justice Black observed when the Supreme Court rejected the
+government's effort to block publication of the Pentagon Papers: "The word 'security'
+is a broad, vague generality whose contours should not be invoked to abrogate the
+fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment. The guarding of military and
+diplomatic secrets at the expense of informed representative government provides no
+real security for our Republic." *New York Times v. United States*, 403 U.S. at 719
+(Black, J., concurring).
+
+5
+
+Conclusion
+
+For these reasons, Dropbox asks the Court to grant the Service Providers'
+motions and, in doing so, to make clear that online services have a First Amendment
+right to publish accurate information about how many national-security requests
+they receive and how many user accounts are implicated.
+
+Dated: September 23, 2013
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI
+Professional Corporation
+
+Brian M. Willen
+
+Bart Volkmer
+Dropbox, Inc.
+185 Berry Street, Suite 400
+San Francisco, CA 94107
+(415) 857-6875
+bart@dropbox.com
+
+1301 Avenue of the Americas
+New York, NY 10019
+Tel: (650) 849-3340
+Fax: (212) 999-5899
+bwillen@wsgr.com
+
+David H. Kramer
+650 Page Mill Road
+Palo Alto, CA 94304
+(650) 493-9300
+dkramer@wsgr.com
+
+Counsel for Dropbox, Inc.
+
+6
+
+Certificate of Service
+
+I hereby certify this 23rd day of September, 2013, that at or before the time of
+filing this submission, the Government (care of the Security and Emergency
+Planning Staff, United States Department of Justice) has been served by hand
+delivery and electronic mail with a copy of this Amicus Curiae brief pursuant to Rule
+8(a) of the FISC Rules of Procedure, on the following:
+
+Christine E. Gunning
+Litigation Security Group
+United States Department of Justice
+2 Constitution Square
+145 N Street, N.E.
+Suite 2W-115
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+Email: Christine.E.Gunning@usdoj.gov
+
+I further certify that I caused to be served a copy of the foregoing motion,
+together with the accompanying brief amicus curiae, on the following persons by
+electronic mail:
+
+James Garland
+Covington & Burlington LLP
+1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
+Washington, DC 20004
+jgarland@cov.com
+Counsel for Microsoft Corporation
+
+Carl Nichols
+Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP
+1875 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20006
+Carl.nichols@wilmerhale.com
+Counsel for Facebook, Inc.
+
+Albert Gidari
+Perkins Coie LLP
+1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900
+Seattle, WA 98101
+agidari@perkinscoie.com
+Counsel for Google Inc.
+
+Marc Zwillinger
+ZwillGen PLLC
+1705 N. St. NW
+Washington, D.C. 20036
+marc@zwillgen.com
+Counsel for Yahoo! Inc.
+
+Brian M. Willen
+Counsel for Dropbox, Inc.
+
+7
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_13-03-04-05-06-motion-dropbox-leave-130923/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_13-03-04-05-06-motion-dropbox-leave-130923/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1b3ac4d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_13-03-04-05-06-motion-dropbox-leave-130923/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Motion of Dropbox, Inc. for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief, In re Motions to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders and Directives",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-09-23",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-09-23",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34469",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "d7bfd5038d1001bc617716ef0505951c5a4fc91e971d235e5fbfe56ccd181a87",
+ "pages": 11
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_Misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-131105/FISC_-_Misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-131105.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_Misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-131105/FISC_-_Misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-131105.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9c04b29
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_Misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-131105/FISC_-_Misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-131105.md
@@ -0,0 +1,924 @@
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+UNITED STATES FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+In re Motions for Declaratory
+Judgment to Disclose Aggregate
+Data Regarding FISA Orders
+and Directives
+)
+)
+)
+)
+)
+2013 NOV-5 PM 4:42
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+Case Nos. Misc. 13-03, 13-04, 13-05, 13-06,
+and 13-07
+AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF APPLE INC. IN SUPPORT OF PROVIDERS' MOTIONS
+FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
+
+Apple Inc. ("Apple") submits this _amicus_ brief in support of motions for declaratory
+judgment filed by Google Inc., Microsoft Corporation, Yahoo! Inc., Facebook, Inc., and
+LinkedIn Corporation seeking permission to publish the aggregate numbers of national security
+demands made on them and the number of users or accounts affected by those requests. As with
+these providers, and fellow _amicus curiae_ Dropbox, Inc., the Government has told Apple that it
+may not publish the aggregate number of national security demands, if any, it may receive.
+Apple concurs with the previously submitted filings of movants and _amici_ and describes herein
+the interest of Apple and its customers in the motions that have been filed. In addition, Apple
+provides additional analysis as to why the Government's position both (i) lacks any statutory
+basis and (ii) violates the First Amendment right of Apple and others to provide the public and
+its customers with important information on an issue that has been the subject of intense political
+debate and public concern.¹
+
+STATEMENT OF INTEREST AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
+
+Amicus Apple is one of the world's largest designers, manufacturers, and sellers of
+mobile communication and media devices, personal computers, and portable digital music
+players and also sells a variety of related software and services. Its notable products and services
+
+¹ Nothing in this filing is intended to confirm or deny that Apple has received any order or orders issued
+by this Court under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act or the FISA Amendments Act.
+
+include the iPhone, iPad, Mac, iPod, Apple TV, iOS and OS X operating systems, iCloud, and a
+variety of accessory, service, and support offerings. In the first nine months of its 2013 fiscal
+year, it sold 173.5 million iPads and iPhones and has sold over 700 million such devices in its
+lifetime.² These Apple devices are increasingly linked to its cloud service, iCloud. iCloud stores
+email, music, photos, applications, contacts, calendars, and documents which can be accessed by
+Apple mobile devices and Mac and Windows-based personal computers. Access to iCloud (with
+storage limitations) is free for all Apple customers that purchase devices using its iOS operating
+system for mobile devices, or Mac computers that use OS X. Apple now has 350 million iCloud
+customers worldwide. As stated in its November 5, 2013 Report on Government Information
+Requests (attached as Exhibit 1), Apple believes that its "customers have a right to understand
+how their personal information is handled" and considers it to be Apple's "responsibility to
+provide them with the best privacy protections available." Ex. 1 at 1.
+
+In June of 2013, articles in major newspapers reported erroneously that Apple and other
+technology companies had enabled an alleged National Security Agency program known as
+"PRISM" to tap into providers' central servers. _E.g._, Glenn Greenwald and Ewen MacAskill,
+_The NSA Prism Program Taps in to User Data of Apple, Google and Others_, The Guardian (June
+6, 2013), available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data;
+Barton Gellman and Laura Poitras, _U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data from Nine U.S.
+Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program_, The Washington Post (June 6, 2013), available at
+http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-
+internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-
+
+² Apple Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 27 (July 24, 2013), available at
+http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/320193/000119312513300670/d552802d10q.htm; Press Release,
+Apple Inc., iOS 7 with Completely Redesigned User Interface & Great New Features Available
+September 18 (Sept. 10, 2013), available at http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2013/09/10iOS-7-With-
+Completely-Redesigned-User-Interface-Great-New-Features-Available-September-18.html.
+2
+
+d970ccb04497_story.html. To correct the misinformation in these reports and address customer
+concerns, on June 16, 2013 Apple issued its _Commitment to Customer Privacy_. See _Apple's
+Commitment to Customer Privacy_, Apple (June 16, 2013), available at www.apple.com/apples-
+commitment-to-customer-privacy. In that statement, Apple explained that it does "not provide
+any government agency with direct access to our servers, and any government agency requesting
+customer content must get a court order." _Id_.
+
+Apple additionally sought permission from the FBI to disclose the aggregate number of
+national security requests that it received and the number of accounts affected by each applicable
+national security authority (_e.g._, NSL, FISA, and Section 702 of FISA). In a phone conversation
+on June 15, 2013, and then by letter of June 17, 2013, the General Counsel of the FBI refused the
+request. Instead, Apple was informed that it could only provide data that aggregated
+
+all the legal process it received for intervals of six months, beginning with the
+period ending May 31, 2013, from any and all government entities in the United
+States (including local, state, and federal, and including criminal and national
+security-related requests) into bands of 1000, starting at zero, and which you may
+break down into one or both of the following two categories: the number of
+requests and the number of user accounts for which data was requested.
+
+Exhibit 2, Letter from Andrew Weissmann, Gen. Counsel, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, to Jane
+Horvath, Dir. of Global Privacy, Apple Inc. (June 17, 2013) (emphasis added). Thus, the FBI
+required Apple to group the receipt of national security requests with requests from police
+investigating robberies and other crimes, searching for missing children, or hoping to prevent a
+suicide. And even aggregated in this way, Apple must use ranges of 1,000 rather than disclose a
+precise number.
+
+The FBI did not designate its letter or any of its contents as classified at any level. The
+FBI also did not assert that the information Apple sought to disclose was classified. The FBI did
+not even mention any issue of classified information as pertinent to the issues here.
+3
+
+In its letter, the FBI instead discussed the FISA statute as the relevant issue. Even on that
+issue, the FBI did not identify anything in the law that authorizes the Government to prohibit
+disclosure of the aggregate number of national security requests received by Apple. Instead, the
+Bureau's letter portrayed its decision as an exercise of its discretion not to enforce the statute
+against Apple specifically. _Id_. at 1 ("[W]e do not intend to seek enforcement of the non-
+disclosure provisions associated with any legal process, including FISA orders, in connection
+with the aggregate data described below . . . [and this] position is an exercise of FBI discretion in
+light of current circumstances and the precise contours of this letter."). It further reserved the
+right to reach a different conclusion as to other companies and/or to restrict further Apple's
+ability to disclose even this limited information upon notice to Apple.
+
+As a result of these restrictions, in its most recent report Apple was able to disclose to the
+public and its customers only that it has received 1,000-2,000 requests for user account
+information affecting 2,000-3,000 user accounts from all federal, state, and local law-
+enforcement agencies combined. Ex. 1 at 3. The report further states that actual data were
+disclosed in 0-1,000 instances. _Id_. From Apple's perspective, as well as the perspective of its
+customers and the public as a whole, this limited disclosure does not contribute effectively to the
+debate over the Government's national security systems and (as discussed _infra_) is unnecessary
+to protect national security. By design, it combines the aggregate data that are of the greatest and
+most timely public concern, and the greatest concern to Apple and its customers, with other
+unrelated aggregate data in a deliberate attempt to reduce public knowledge as to the activities of
+the Government.
+4
+
+ARGUMENT
+I. THE GOVERNMENT HAS NO LEGAL AUTHORITY TO PROHIBIT THE
+DISCLOSURE OF THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF NATIONAL SECURITY
+REQUESTS.
+
+Apple concurs with movants that nothing in FISA or any other law prohibits providers
+from disclosing aggregate information about the number of demands they receive by individual
+national security authority (_e.g._, NSL, FISA, and Section 702 of FISA). Under FISA, a
+particular order may direct the recipient to furnish necessary assistance for the particular
+surveillance "in such a manner as will protect its secrecy." 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(B) (2013);
+_see also id._ § 1824(c)(2)(B) (same requirement for a physical search where the target is a foreign
+power or the agent of a foreign power); _id._ § 1881a(h)(1)(A) (same requirement for a request to
+an electronic communications service provider for persons located outside the United States); _id._
+§ 1881b(c)(5)(B) (same requirement where the target is a United States person located outside
+the United States). These provisions are designed to protect the secrecy of particular orders in
+order to preserve the integrity of ongoing investigations. They are not designed to preclude
+companies from reporting aggregate data. Nothing in FISA's text or legislative history suggests
+that the Act prohibits a recipient of a FISA order from confirming (or denying) the basic fact that
+it has (or has not) received nondescript legal process under FISA, or from disclosing the
+aggregate number of requests it has received.
+
+FISA generally requires providers to maintain any records they generate as a result of
+these requests "under security procedures approved by the Attorney General and the Director of
+National Intelligence." _Id._ § 1805(c)(2)(C); _see also id._ § 1881a(h)(1)(B). These provisions
+have the same purpose - _i.e._, protecting target-specific data – and do not impose a ban on the
+disclosure of aggregate numbers of requests a provider receives. 50 U.S.C. § 1807 even requires
+the Attorney General to publish aggregate data across providers, and the Attorney General has
+5
+
+previously released such reports to the public.³ _Id._ § 1807. FISA thus supports the disclosure of
+aggregate data.
+
+The Government's response to Apple's request confirms the absence of any legal support
+for its position. As discussed above, the letter from the FBI's General Counsel at no point claims
+that Apple's proposed disclosures would cover classified information. Nor does the letter
+identify any legal authority supporting its position. Instead, it asserts that the FBI will not
+"enforce" the nondisclosure provisions against Apple as an exercise of its "discretion," if
+Apple's disclosure is limited in the manner prescribed by the FBI. _See_ Ex. 2. It is thus fair to
+assume that the FBI is well aware that there is no legal authority for its position but is using its
+non-enforcement discretion as a way of creating a de facto licensing system for aggregate data
+disclosure that has no foundation in law.
+
+The Government's recent filing does not point to anything in FISA that prohibits
+disclosure of the relevant material. It relies only on provisions allowing it to "protect the secrecy
+of the acquisition" and "records concerning the acquisition or aid furnished." Response of the
+United States to Motions for Declaratory Judgment by Google Inc., Microsoft Corporation,
+Yahoo Inc.!, Facebook, Inc., and LinkedIn Corporation ("Gov't Resp.") at 13 (internal citations
+and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Disclosure of the aggregate number of requests
+received, however, would not reveal anything or provide any "records" about any particular
+"acquisition" or "the acquisition or aid furnished."
+
+³ See Letter from Peter J. Kadzik, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
+Harry Reid, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate (Apr. 30, 2013), available at
+http://www.justice.gov/nsd/foia/foia_library/2012fisa-ltr.pdf (noting that (1) during 2012, the
+Government made 1,856 applications to the FISC for authority to conduct electronic surveillance and/or
+physical searches for foreign intelligence purposes; and (2) the FISC did not deny any applications in
+whole or in part).
+6
+
+The Government asserts that there would be a "wide range of damaging disclosures" from
+the proposed disclosure here. _Id._ at 14. Notably, however, the Government fails to identify a
+single one other than a vague reference to topics "from the nature of surveillance targets to their
+general locations." _Id._ at 4. These examples are not at all clear, and the Government notably
+fails to provide any elaboration to its public filing on this point as to how aggregate data could,
+for example, disclose anything about surveillance targets much less their "nature" or "location."
+
+To the extent, however, that the Government is suggesting that the proffered
+interpretation would allow damaging disclosures about particular requests, that is not the case.
+FISA permits the Government to prevent the disclosure of information about particular requests
+even if the disclosure does not identify a target by name. It does not, however, prohibit the
+release of the aggregate number of requests received and accounts affected by individual national
+security authority (_e.g._, NSL, FISA, or Section 702 of FISA) where no details are provided about
+any individual request.
+
+The Government's filing also claims, for the first time, that all of the data the providers
+seek to disclose are classified. _See id._ at 5-6. This argument does nothing to alter the fact that
+the Government has failed to identify anything in FISA (the subject of the Court's jurisdiction)
+that prohibits the disclosure of the aggregate number of FISA process received and accounts
+affected by individual national security authority (_e.g._, NSL, FISA, or Section 702 of FISA).
+Further, as described above, at no point in the FBI's initial response to the providers did the
+Bureau suggest that a disclosure aggregating received national security legal process by
+individual national security authority (_e.g._, NSL, FISA, or Section 702 of FISA) would be
+classified. It is thus implausible for the Government now to claim that the aggregate number of
+7
+
+legal contacts providers may receive under each individual national security authority and
+accounts affected thereby is itself classified.
+
+Further, Apple, along with certain other providers, has sought to report only the total
+number of national security legal process received and accounts affected in the aggregate by
+individual national security authority (_e.g._, NSL, FISA, or Section 702 of FISA). That basic
+information cannot be considered "properly classified" – given the wide variety of tools
+available to the Government under FISA and other factors discussed in the next section, such an
+aggregate disclosure of legal process under the Act would not offer would-be adversaries any
+useful information regarding the Government's intelligence sources or methods.
+
+II. THE BLANKET BAN ON DISCLOSING THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF
+NATIONAL SECURITY REQUESTS VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT
+BECAUSE IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO PROTECT NATIONAL SECURITY.
+
+The legal standard that governs this dispute is straightforward, and the Government does
+not deny it. Under the First Amendment, content-based restrictions such as the restrictions at
+issue here are subject to strict scrutiny and are thus "presumptively invalid." _United States v._
+_Stevens_, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010) (content-based restrictions are "presumptively invalid,' and
+the Government bears the burden to rebut that presumption") (quoting _United States v. Playboy_
+_Ent. Grp., Inc._, 529 U.S. 803, 817 (2000)). Further, because the Government has prohibited
+providers from speaking about aggregate data without first obtaining the Government's
+permission, the restriction is a prior restraint and presumptively invalid for that reason as well.
+_Am. Freedom Defense Initiative v. WMATA_, 898 F. Supp. 2d 73, 79 (D.D.C. 2012) (a prior
+restraint bears "a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity”) (quoting _Bantam Books,_
+_Inc. v. Sullivan_, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)); _see Neb. Press Ass 'n v. Stuart_, 427 U.S. 539, 559
+(1976) ("[P]rior restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and the least tolerable
+infringement on First Amendment rights."). Moreover, "speech on public issues" such as the
+8
+
+Government's surveillance program "occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First
+Amendment values, and is entitled to special protection." _See Snyder v. Phelps_, 131 S. Ct. 1207,
+1215 (2011) (quoting _Connick v. Myers_, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983)); _Mills v. Alabama_, 384 U.S.
+214, 218 (1966) ("[T]here is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of [the First]
+Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.").
+
+To survive strict scrutiny, a restriction must, at a minimum, be "necessary to serve a
+compelling state interest" and "narrowly drawn to achieve that end." _Am. Freedom Defense_
+_Initiative_, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 80 (quoting _Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n,_
+460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)); _see also United States v. Alvarez_, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2549, 2551 (2012)
+(the "First Amendment requires that the Government's chosen restriction on the speech at issue
+be 'actually necessary' to achieve its interest" and that such a “restriction must be the 'least
+restrictive means among available, effective alternatives'") (quoting _Ashcroft v. Am. Civil_
+_Liberties Union_, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004)).
+
+As various courts have recognized, this is a "demanding standard" that few restrictions
+survive. _See Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass'n_, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011) (quoting _Playboy Ent._
+_Grp., Inc._, 529 U.S. at 818); _Am. Freedom Defense Initiative_, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 80-81 (there "is
+no doubt that content-based restrictions can rarely pass constitutional review" and neither party
+"points to a case concerning a content-based restriction where the Supreme Court concluded that
+the government had a compelling interest and the restriction could be approved because it was
+sufficiently narrowly tailored").
+
+Courts vigorously enforce the narrow tailoring requirement in both the national security
+and non-national security contexts. _See Al Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of the_
+_Treasury_, 686 F.3d 965, 997-1001 (9th Cir. 2012) (restrictions on providing aid to terrorists
+9
+
+violated the First Amendment based on the failure of the Government to establish that the
+restrictions were "narrowly tailored to advance the concededly compelling government interest
+of preventing terrorism"); _Doe v. Mukasey_, 549 F.3d 861, 878-81 (2d Cir. 2009) (restrictions on
+disclosure of receipt of national security letters were not narrowly tailored to fulfill the
+compelling interest of ensuring no harm to national security); _In re Nat'l Sec. Letter_, 930 F.
+Supp. 2d 1064, 1075-77 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (restrictions on disclosure of national security letters
+were not narrowly tailored); _Am. Freedom Defense Initiative_, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 83 (granting a
+preliminary injunction against a prohibition on a pro-Israel and anti-Muslim subway
+advertisement because it was unnecessary to serve the concededly compelling interest of
+protecting passenger safety).⁴
+
+The need for such vigilance is if anything even more compelling where, as here, the
+decision to suppress speech rests entirely in the hands of administrative officials operating purely
+based on a promise of non-enforcement with no discernible standards governing the exercise of
+their discretion and no legal framework governing the de facto licensing system they have
+created. _See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co._, 486 U.S. 750, 757 (1988) (referring
+to the "time-tested knowledge that in the area of free expression a licensing statute placing
+
+⁴ The seriousness with which the courts take this requirement is reflected in the strict application of the
+least restrictive alternative test even to content-based restrictions that impact non-political speech, which
+occupies a lower "rung on the hierarchy of First Amendment values." _Alvarez_, 132 S. Ct. at 2551 (the
+Government failed to show why additional speech or creating a database of Congressional Medal of
+Honor recipients would not have been viable less restrictive alternatives to a criminal prohibition on false
+claims to have received the medal); _Am. Civil Liberties Union_, 542 U.S. at 670 (a prohibition on posting
+material harmful to minors without imposing age-verification procedures violated the First Amendment
+because it was not narrowly tailored due to the Government's failure to show that alternatives such as
+encouraging the use of blocking and filtering software would not be equally as effective); _Playboy Ent._
+_Grp., Inc._, 529 U.S. at 827 (striking down restrictions designed to prevent "signal bleed" from sexually
+explicit stations because the Government had failed to show that individual blocking requests were not a
+viable less restrictive alternative); _Fabulous Assocs., Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Utils. Comm'n_, 896 F.2d 780, 785-
+88 (3d Cir. 1990) (restrictions on access to providers of sexually explicit telephone messaging services
+struck down because of availability of other alternatives).
+10
+
+unbridled discretion in the hands of a government official or agency constitutes a prior restraint
+and may result in censorship"); _see also ACLU v. Reno_, 929 F. Supp. 824, 857 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
+("[T]he bottom line is that the First Amendment should not be interpreted to require us to entrust
+the protection it affords to the judgment of prosecutors.").
+
+As with virtually all such restrictions, the restrictions at issue here – specifically (1) the
+required reporting of aggregate request data in bands of 1,000 and (2) the prohibition on
+disclosure of aggregate national security requests received and accounts affected by individual
+national security authority (_e.g._, NSL, FISA, or Section 702 of FISA) – fail to meet this
+demanding standard. Beginning with the former, the Government's restriction irrationally
+prohibits a provider's disclosure that the provider has received 6,500 requests while permitting
+the disclosure that the provider has received 6,000-7,000 requests.⁶ There could be no basis for
+asserting that the first disclosure harms national security while the second does not, and the
+Government's brief tellingly makes no effort to defend its restriction. Thus, the Government has
+not even purported to satisfy its constitutional obligation to determine the least restrictive
+alternative or impose only those restrictions that are necessary to protect a compelling
+government interest.
+
+The ban on the providers' ability to disclose the aggregate number of national security
+requests that they receive also is unnecessary to protect national security. As indicated above,
+
+⁵ Apple addresses in this brief only the ban on disclosure of the aggregate number of national requests
+received and the requirement that the aggregate number of law-enforcement requests be grouped in bands
+of 1,000. It does not address the prohibition on providers' disclosure of the total number of process
+received in each FISA category, although it endorses the other providers' assertion that these prohibitions
+also are not narrowly tailored.
+
+⁶ To avoid any suggestion that it has disclosed the actual number of requests it has received, Apple is
+using Microsoft's reported 6,000-7,000 range to illustrate the point. See Microsoft Corporation's First
+Amended Motion for Declaratory Judgment or Other Appropriate Relief Authorizing Disclosure of
+Aggregate Data Regarding Any FISA Orders It Has Received at 4.
+11
+
+Apple has 350 million iCloud customers worldwide and has sold nearly 700 million iPad and
+iPhone devices in the company's history. There were only 1,000-2,000 combined law-
+enforcement and national security requests for user account information to Apple in the first half
+of 2013. _See_ Ex. 1 at 3. Whatever percentage of this number is accounted for by national
+security requests would necessarily represent an infinitesimal fraction of Apple's overall
+subscriber base. It is therefore simply not possible that disclosure of the aggregate figure could
+compromise an investigation or reveal to a user that the user has been targeted under FISA or the
+FISA Amendments Act. _See In re Nat'l Sec. Letter_, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 1076 (observing that the
+interest in prohibiting disclosure diminishes as a provider's subscriber base increases).
+
+The Government does not appear to argue that disclosing the total number of nondescript
+FISA process the providers have received would reveal any target-specific data, but asserts
+nonetheless that this focus is too narrow because the proposed disclosure could enable
+adversaries to avoid surveillance. Gov't Resp. at 19. This assertion, however, does not
+withstand scrutiny. It simply is not a secret that the user accounts of some of the largest
+electronic communications service providers in the world can be and are subject to FISA
+surveillance. The NSA has publicly admitted that it regularly compels information from service
+providers. National Security Agency, _The National Security Agency: Missions, Authorities,_
+_Oversight and Partnerships_, Lawfare, 6 (Aug. 9, 2013), available at
+http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/NSA-August-9-2013-Memorandum-
+on-Missions-Authorities-Oversight-and-Partnerships.pdf ("Under all FISA and FAA programs,
+the government compels one or more providers to assist NSA with the collection of information
+responsive to the foreign intelligence need."). And the very fact that the providers are filing
+these motions shows that they receive such process because if they received no such process,
+12
+
+there would be no legal bar to saying so. _See also Chenda Ngak, Apple, Microsoft, Facebook_
+_Release New Details on National Security Requests_, CBSNews (June 17, 2013), available at
+http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-205_162-57589619/apple-microsoft-facebook-release-new-
+details-on-national-security-requests/ ("Facebook and Microsoft say they were granted
+permission from the U.S. government to disclose more information about FISA requests and
+national security letters, but only if aggregated with criminal requests from local, state and
+federal law enforcement.").
+
+Moreover, by the logic of the Government, the "safest" platforms would be those who
+receive no FISA requests, but there is no bar to those platforms saying that they have received no
+FISA requests. Thus, if the Government's predictions were sound, our adversaries would
+already know "which platforms the Government does not surveil." Gov't Resp. at 11. For
+example, Apple's November 5 Report on Government Information Requests discloses that
+"Apple has never received an order under Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act." Ex. 1 at 5.
+
+There also is no basis for believing that release of the aggregate number of requests
+received by major providers would reveal anything about the ability to conduct surveillance of
+those who use these platforms that is not already known. The type of data that these services
+have and do not have on their servers (whether email, Facebook account information, or
+something else) is not classified information. It is rather a core element of the services that they
+provide. For example, Apple's November 5 report explains that it protects "personal
+conversations by providing end-to-end encryption over iMessage and FaceTime." Ex. 1 at 1.
+The Report further explains that Apple does not "store location data, Maps searches, or Siri
+requests in any identifiable form." _Id._ At the same time, Apple users know that they use
+Apple's services to store content online, including emails, music, and photographs through such
+13
+
+services as iTunes and iCloud, and that such content may accordingly be the subject of FISA
+requests as well as requests from state and local law-enforcement agencies.
+
+Further, the basic methods of intelligence gathering that would be the subject of the
+disclosures also are not classified. Instead, they appear in the pages of the still unclassified
+United States Code. Given this publicly available information, an adversary who uses Yahoo!
+(particularly one sophisticated enough to monitor provider disclosures) could not be using
+Yahoo! because he believes it is immune from surveillance or because he believes Yahoo! is
+safer than other platforms. Instead, he is using that service because it provides the functionality
+he needs and because he believes that he has not been targeted for surveillance. The disclosures
+sought, if allowed, would not disabuse him of either notion.
+
+The foregoing is why it is fundamentally misleading (and perpetuating of the very
+misconceptions that the providers have filed these motions to correct) for the Government to
+assert throughout its brief that the Government is subjecting "providers" to surveillance when it,
+for example, issues a FISA request related to an individual user account. A search of a particular
+user's Facebook account is no more surveillance of Facebook than a search warrant executed on
+a single house is surveillance of the United States. The Government also has imposed the same
+restrictions on all providers. This one-size-fits-all approach further demonstrates the absence of
+any basis for the suggestion that the prohibitions are designed to prevent the release of
+information that would demonstrate that the users of one provider are exceedingly vulnerable to,
+or uniquely immune from, the reach of the Government.
+
+With respect to particular FISA categories, the Government itself has agreed to report the
+aggregate numbers of both FISA orders, and the targets those orders affect, on an annual basis.
+Office of the Director of National Intelligence, _DNI Clapper Directs Annual Release of_
+14
+
+_Information Related to Orders Issued Under National Security Authorities_, IC on the Record
+(Aug. 29, 2013), available at icontherecord.tumblr.com. Those reports will quantify the number
+of times the Government has invoked each surveillance "method" authorized by FISA, including
+the number of FISA orders issued on the basis of probable cause under Sections 703 and 704,
+Section 702 orders, FISA Pen Register and Trap and Trace Orders under Title IV, business
+records requests pursuant to Title V, and more. _Id_. These disclosures further demonstrate that
+disclosure of the relative number of aggregate requests in each category does not harm national
+security, particularly when, as is the case with the providers that have filed motions as well as
+Apple, any given request could be targeting any one of hundreds of millions of potential targets.
+
+The Government has also placed on providers the burden of moving for judicial review to
+lift the speech restrictions rather than imposing a burden on itself to seek judicial review to
+impose such a requirement. _See Doe_, 549 F.3d at 881 (holding that "in the absence of
+Government-initiated judicial review," a statutory restriction on disclosure of the receipt of a
+national security letter "is not narrowly tailored to conform to First Amendment procedural
+standards").
+
+As a final note, Apple notes the Government's unintentionally revealing statement on
+page 1 of its brief that "the Government has taken a number of significant steps – above and
+beyond what the law requires – in order to promote transparency." It should go without saying
+that the First Amendment is law. Thus, any disclosures the Government has authorized as
+unnecessary to protect national security are, by definition, not "above and beyond what the law
+requires." They are what the law requires. The Government's suggestion that permitting speech
+is a function of grace and dispensation, rather than a constitutional requirement, further
+15
+
+demonstrates that it has not narrowly tailored the restrictions it has placed on the disclosure of
+aggregate data by providers.
+
+CONCLUSION
+For the foregoing reasons, the providers' motions should be granted, and the Court
+should declare that the providers have a right to disclose accurate information about the number
+of national security requests received and the number of user accounts affected.
+
+***
+
+Pursuant to FISC Rule of Procedure 7(h)(1), Attorneys for Amicus Apple Inc. certify that
+the undersigned attorneys are members in good standing of the Bar of the District of Columbia.
+Attorneys further certify that they do not currently hold a security clearance.
+
+Dated: November 5, 2013
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+William Isaacson, D.C. Bar No. 414788
+Samuel C. Kaplan, D.C. Bar No. 463350
+Michael J. Gottlieb, D.C. Bar No. 974960
+BOIES, SCHILLER & FLEXNER, LLP
+5301 Wisconsin Ave. NW
+Washington, DC 20015
+(t) (202) 237-2727
+(f) (202) 237-6131
+wisaacson@bsfllp.com
+
+Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Apple Inc.
+16
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+I hereby certify this 5th day of November, 2013, that I caused the foregoing document to
+be served by hand delivery on the following:
+
+Christine Gunning
+Litigation Security Group
+United States Department of Justice
+2 Constitution Square
+145 N St., NE, Suite 2W-115
+Washington, DC 20530
+
+In addition, I caused the foregoing document to be served by electronic mail on:
+
+Albert Gidari
+Perkins Coie LLP
+1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900
+Seattle, WA 98101
+agidari@perkinscoie.com
+Counsel for Google Inc.
+
+Carl Nichols
+Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP
+1875 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
+Washington, DC 20006
+Carl.nichols@wilmerhale.com
+Counsel for Facebook, Inc.
+
+Jerome C. Roth
+Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP
+560 Mission Street, 27th Floor
+San Francisco, CA 94105
+Jermone.Roth@mto.com
+Counsel for LinkedIn Corporation
+
+James Garland
+Covington & Burling LLP
+1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
+Washington, DC 20004
+jgarland@cov.com
+Counsel for Microsoft Corporation
+
+Marc Zwillinger
+ZwillGen PLLC
+1705 N St. NW
+Washington, DC 20036
+marc@zwillgen.com
+Counsel for Yahoo! Inc.
+
+Samuel C. Kaplan
+
+Exhibit 1
+
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+2013 NOV-5 PM 4:42
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+Report on Government
+Information Requests
+
+November 5, 2013
+
+Protecting Personal Data
+We believe that our customers have a right to understand how their personal
+information is handled, and we consider it our responsibility to provide them
+with the best privacy protections available. Apple has prepared this report on
+the requests we receive from governments seeking information about individual
+users or devices in the interest of transparency for our customers around
+the world.
+
+This report provides statistics on requests related to customer accounts as well
+as those related to specific devices. We have reported all the information we
+are legally allowed to share, and Apple will continue to advocate for greater
+transparency about the requests we receive.
+
+Apple offers customers a single, straightforward privacy policy that covers every
+Apple product. Customer privacy is a consideration from the earliest stages of
+design for all our products and services. We work hard to deliver the most secure
+hardware and software in the world, including such innovative security solutions
+as Find My iPhone and Touch ID, which have made the iPhone both more secure
+and more convenient.
+
+Perhaps most important, our business does not depend on collecting personal
+data. We have no interest in amassing personal information about our customers.
+We protect personal conversations by providing end-to-end encryption over
+iMessage and FaceTime. We do not store location data, Maps searches, or Siri
+requests in any identifiable form.
+
+Advocating for
+Greater Transparency
+At the time of this report, the U.S. government does not allow Apple to
+disclose, except in broad ranges, the number of national security orders, the
+number of accounts affected by the orders, or whether content, such as emails,
+was disclosed. We strongly oppose this gag order, and Apple has made the case
+for relief from these restrictions in meetings and discussions with the White
+House, the U.S. Attorney General, congressional leaders, and the courts. Despite
+our extensive efforts in this area, we do not yet have an agreement that we feel
+adequately addresses our customers' right to know how often and under what
+circumstances we provide data to law enforcement agencies.
+
+We believe that dialogue and advocacy are the most productive way to bring
+about a change in these policies, rather than filing a lawsuit against the U.S.
+government. Concurrent with the release of this report, we have filed an Amicus
+brief at the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA Court) in support of
+a group of cases requesting greater transparency. Later this year, we will file a
+second Amicus brief at the Ninth Circuit in support of a case seeking greater
+transparency with respect to National Security Letters. We feel strongly that the
+government should lift the gag order and permit companies to disclose complete
+and accurate numbers regarding FISA requests and National Security Letters. We
+will continue to aggressively pursue our ability to be more transparent.
+
+Requests from
+Law Enforcement
+Like many companies, Apple receives requests from law enforcement agencies
+to provide customer information. As we have explained, any government agency
+demanding customer content from Apple must get a court order. When we receive
+such a demand, our legal team carefully reviews the order. If there is any question
+about the legitimacy or scope of the court order, we challenge it. Only when we are
+satisfied that the court order is valid and appropriate do we deliver the narrowest
+possible set of information responsive to the request.
+
+Unlike many other companies dealing with requests for customer data from
+government agencies, Apple's main business is not about collecting information.
+As a result, the vast majority of the requests we receive from law enforcement seek
+information about lost or stolen devices, and are logged as device requests. These
+types of requests frequently arise when our customers ask the police to assist them
+with a lost or stolen iPhone, or when law enforcement has recovered a shipment of
+stolen devices.
+
+Only a small fraction of the requests that Apple receives seek personal information
+related to an iTunes, iCloud, or Game Center account. Account-based requests
+generally involve account holders' personal data and their use of an online service in
+which they have an expectation of privacy, such as government requests for customer
+identifying information, email, stored photographs, or other user content stored
+online. Apple logs these as account requests.
+
+We believe it is important to differentiate these categories and report them
+individually. Device requests and account requests involve very different types of
+data. Many of the device requests we receive are initiated by our own customers
+working together with law enforcement. Device requests never include national
+security-related requests.
+
+Reporting the Number of
+Requests for Information
+About Customer Accounts
+The following tables detail the account requests and device requests Apple received
+from law enforcement agencies between January 1, 2013, and June 30, 2013.
+
+Table 1 shows account requests. The U.S. government has given us permission to
+share only a limited amount of information about these orders, with the requirement
+that we combine national security orders with account-based law enforcement
+requests and report only a consolidated range in increments of 1000.
+
+The most common account requests involve robberies and other crimes or requests
+from law enforcement officers searching for missing persons or children, finding a
+kidnapping victim, or hoping to prevent a suicide. Responding to an account request
+usually involves providing information about an account holder's iTunes or iCloud
+account, such as a name and an address. In very rare cases, we are asked to provide
+stored photos or email. We consider these requests very carefully and only provide
+account content in extremely limited circumstances.
+
+Table 2 shows device requests. Even though device requests have not been the focus
+of public debate, we are disclosing them to make our report as comprehensive as
+possible. These may include requests for the customer contact information provided
+to register a device with Apple or the date the device first used Apple services. We
+count devices based on the individual serial numbers related to an investigation.
+
+For further information about data in these tables, please see the glossary below.
+
+¹National Security Letters (NSLs), which are often the first step in an investigation, do not carry a court order but by law
+they may not be used to obtain customer content. NSL orders are limited to transactional data such as a customer's contact
+information. Apple is required by law to comply with these requests if we have the information being sought. Apple assesses
+the legitimacy of each NSL as if it were a regular court order.
+
+Table 1: Account Information Requests
+
+| Country ² | Total Number of Law Enforcement Account Requests Received | Number of Accounts Specified in the Requests | Number of Accounts for Which Data Was Disclosed | Number of Account Requests Where Apple Objected | Number of Account Requests Where Non-Content Data Was Disclosed | Number of Account Requests Where No Data Was Disclosed | Number of Account Requests Where Some Content Was Disclosed | Percentage of Account Requests Where Some Data Was Disclosed |
+| :------------- | :------------------------------------------------------ | :--------------------------------------- | :-------------------------------------------- | :---------------------------------------------- | :-------------------------------------------------------- | :----------------------------------------------------- | :---------------------------------------------------- | :--------------------------------------------------- |
+| Australia | 74 | 75 | 41 | 22 | 34 | 40 | 0 | 54% |
+| Austria | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 50% |
+| Bahamas | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 100% |
+| Belarus | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0% |
+| Belgium | 13 | 20 | 4 | 8 | 8 | 5 | 0 | 38% |
+| Brazil | 8 | 8 | 0 | 8 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0% |
+| Canada | 6 | 6 | 4 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 0 | 67% |
+| China | 6 | 6 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 33% |
+| Czech Republic | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 50% |
+| Denmark | 11 | 11 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 0 | 55% |
+| France | 71 | 72 | 14 | 49 | 54 | 17 | 0 | 24% |
+| Germany | 93 | 93 | 5 | 86 | 87 | 6 | 0 | 6% |
+| Hong Kong | 32 | 33 | 25 | 4 | 8 | 24 | 0 | 75% |
+| Ireland | 5 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 60% |
+| Italy | 60 | 76 | 18 | 34 | 38 | 22 | 0 | 37% |
+| Japan | 42 | 42 | 3 | 21 | 32 | 10 | 0 | 24% |
+| Netherlands | 4 | 4 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 25% |
+| New Zealand | 3 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 33% |
+| Norway | 6 | 6 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 33% |
+| Poland | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0% |
+| Portugal | 2 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 100% |
+| Russia | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 100% |
+| San Marino | 2 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0% |
+| Singapore | 23 | 23 | 13 | 9 | 10 | 13 | 0 | 57% |
+| South Korea | 4 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 50% |
+| Spain | 102 | 104 | 19 | 77 | 80 | 22 | 0 | 22% |
+| Sweden | 7 | 7 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 0 | 43% |
+| Switzerland | 6 | 6 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 17% |
+| Taiwan | 4 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 75% |
+| United Kingdom | 127 | 141 | 51 | 79 | 80 | 46 | 1 | 37% |
+| United States | 1000-2000 | 2000-3000 | 0-1000 | 0-1000 | 0-1000 | 0-1000 | 0-1000 | |
+
+² Personal information regarding individuals who reside in a member state of the European Economic
+Area (EEA) is controlled by Apple Distribution International in Cork, Ireland, and processed on its behalf
+by Apple Inc. Personal information collected in the EEA when using iTunes is controlled by iTunes SARL
+in Luxembourg and processed on its behalf by Apple Inc. All personally identifiable content is hosted
+on servers within the United States. Accordingly, law enforcement agencies outside the United States
+seeking such content must obtain legal process through U.S. authorities. Where the foreign country has
+signed a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) with the United States, then appropriate legal process can
+be obtained through the process specified in the treaty or through other cooperative efforts with the U.S.
+Department of Justice.
+
+Table 2: Device Information Requests
+
+| Country ² | Total Number of Law Enforcement Device Requests Received | Number of Devices Specified in the Requests | Number of Device Requests Where Some Data Was Provided | Percentage of Device Requests Where Some Data Was Provided |
+| :----------------- | :------------------------------------------------------- | :------------------------------------------ | :----------------------------------------------------- | :--------------------------------------------------- |
+| Australia | 1178 | 1929 | 695 | 59% |
+| Austria | 49 | 104 | 39 | 80% |
+| Bahamas | 1 | 1 | 1 | 100% |
+| Belgium | 64 | 175 | 41 | 64% |
+| Brazil³ | 34 | 5057 | 2 | 5% |
+| Canada | 38 | 224 | 35 | 92% |
+| Chile | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0% |
+| China | 585 | 1268 | 429 | 73% |
+| Cyprus | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0% |
+| Czech Republic | 12 | 99 | 7 | 58% |
+| Denmark | 55 | 132 | 41 | 75% |
+| Estonia | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0% |
+| Finland | 3 | 4 | 2 | 67% |
+| France | 530 | 2679 | 334 | 63% |
+| Germany | 2156 | 4928 | 1856 | 86% |
+| Greece | 2 | 8 | 2 | 100% |
+| Hong Kong | 92 | 267 | 64 | 70% |
+| Hungary | 12 | 13 | 3 | 25% |
+| India | 27 | 65 | 11 | 41% |
+| Ireland | 102 | 379 | 79 | 77% |
+| Italy | 409 | 4034 | 331 | 81% |
+| Japan | 106 | 182 | 12 | 11% |
+| Luxembourg | 67 | 92 | 29 | 43% |
+| Malaysia | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0% |
+| Netherlands | 61 | 229 | 40 | 66% |
+| New Zealand | 71 | 116 | 42 | 59% |
+| Norway | 33 | 101 | 27 | 82% |
+| Poland | 2 | 53 | 1 | 50% |
+| Portugal | 17 | 300 | 14 | 82% |
+| Russia | 13 | 15 | 12 | 92% |
+| Singapore | 1498 | 1681 | 853 | 57% |
+| Slovenia | 4 | 5 | 2 | 50% |
+| South Korea | 88 | 419 | 46 | 52% |
+| Spain | 308 | 463 | 244 | 79% |
+| Swaziland | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0% |
+| Sweden | 61 | 102 | 54 | 89% |
+| Switzerland | 107 | 139 | 91 | 85% |
+| Taiwan | 81 | 115 | 10 | 12% |
+| United Arab Emirates | 1 | 1 | 1 | 100% |
+| United Kingdom | 1028 | 2474 | 689 | 67% |
+| United States | 3542 | 8605 | 3110 | 88% |
+
+² Personal information regarding individuals who reside in a member state of the European Economic
+Area (EEA) is controlled by Apple Distribution International in Cork, Ireland, and processed on its behalf
+by Apple Inc. Personal information collected in the EEA when using iTunes is controlled by iTunes SARL
+in Luxembourg and processed on its behalf by Apple Inc. All personally identifiable content is hosted on
+servers within the United States. Accordingly, law enforcement agencies outside the United States seeking
+such content must obtain legal process through U.S. authorities. Where the foreign country has signed
+a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) with the United States, then appropriate legal process can be
+obtained through the process specified in the treaty or through other cooperative efforts with the U.S.
+Department of Justice.
+
+³ Five requests are related to the recovery of stolen cargoes of devices.
+
+Notes
+
+Apple keeps track of every request we receive. Some countries are not listed
+in this report because Apple has not received any information requests from
+the government there.
+
+The number of affected accounts and devices is often larger than the number
+of requests because law enforcement may seek information related to multiple
+accounts or devices. For example, some device requests related to the theft
+of a shipment may involve hundreds of serial numbers.
+
+In cases where no data was disclosed, Apple may have objected to a government
+request for legal reasons or searched our records and discovered that we have
+no relevant information. This category includes multiple scenarios in which no
+data was disclosed.
+
+Apple has never received an order under Section 215 of the USA
+Patriot Act. We would expect to challenge such an order if served on us.
+
+Glossary of Terms
+Table 1 Definitions
+
+Total Number of Law Enforcement Account Requests Received
+The total number of account-based requests issued by a government agency
+and/or a court that are received by Apple and seek customer data related
+to specific Apple IDs, email addresses, telephone numbers, credit card numbers,
+or other personal identifiers. Account-based law enforcement requests come in
+various forms such as subpoenas, court orders, and warrants.
+
+Number of Accounts Specified in the Requests
+The number of discernible accounts, based on specific Apple IDs, email
+addresses, telephone numbers, credit card numbers, or other personal identifiers
+in each law enforcement request. A single request may involve multiple accounts
+where, for example, multiple accounts are associated with the same credit card.
+
+Number of Accounts for Which Data Was Disclosed
+The number of discernible accounts, based on specific Apple IDs, email
+addresses, telephone numbers, credit card numbers, or other personal identifiers,
+for which Apple provided some iCloud, iTunes, or Game Center data.
+
+Number of Account Requests Where Apple Objected
+The number of law enforcement requests that resulted in Apple refusing to
+provide some data based on various grounds, such as jurisdiction, improper
+process, insufficient process, invalid process, or where the scope of the request
+was excessively broad. For example, Apple may object to a law enforcement
+request as "invalid" if it was not signed.
+
+Number of Account Requests Where Non-Content Data
+Was Disclosed
+The number of law enforcement requests that resulted in Apple providing only
+subscriber or transactional information, but not content. For example, Apple may
+provide subscriber information and a limited purchase history in response to
+valid legal process.
+
+Number of Account Requests Where No Data Was Disclosed
+The number of law enforcement requests that resulted in Apple providing no
+customer information whatsoever.
+
+Number of Account Requests Where Some Content
+Was Disclosed
+The number of law enforcement requests where Apple determined that an
+account request was lawful and provided content such as iCloud email, contacts,
+calendar, or Photo Stream content. Apple only provides user account content in
+extremely limited circumstances.
+
+Percentage of Account Requests Where Some Data
+Was Disclosed
+The percentage of law enforcement requests that resulted in Apple
+providing some iCloud, iTunes, or Game Center data.
+
+Table 2 Definitions
+
+Total Number of Law Enforcement Device Requests Received
+The number of device-based requests issued by a government agency and/or
+a court that are received by Apple and seek customer data related to specific
+device identifiers such as serial or IMEI numbers. Law enforcement device
+requests come in various forms such as subpoenas, court orders, and warrants. A
+single request may involve multiple devices. For example, in the case of a
+recovered shipment of stolen devices, law enforcement may seek information
+related to several devices in a single request.
+
+Number of Devices Specified in the Requests
+The total number of iPhone, iPad, iPod, Mac, or other devices identified in
+each law enforcement request, based on the number of device identifiers. For
+example, law enforcement agencies investigating theft cases often send requests
+seeking information based on serial numbers. Each serial number is counted
+as a single device. A request may involve multiple devices as in the case of a
+recovered shipment of stolen devices.
+
+Number of Device Requests Where Some Data Was Provided
+The number of law enforcement requests that resulted in Apple providing
+relevant device information, such as registration, subscriber, service, repair, and
+purchase information in response to valid legal process.
+
+Percentage of Device Requests Where Some Data
+Was Provided
+The percentage of law enforcement requests that resulted in Apple
+providing some relevant device information in response to valid legal process.
+
+Exhibit 2
+
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+2013 NOV-5 PM 4:42
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+U.S. Department of Justice
+Federal Bureau of Investigation
+
+Washington, D. C. 20535-0001
+June 17, 2013
+
+Jane C. Horvath
+Director of Global Privacy
+1 Infinite Loop
+Cupertino, CA 90514
+
+Dear Ms. Horvath:
+
+We appreciate your discussion with us about your proposal to disclose certain
+information about the volume of legal process Apple receives.
+
+As we discussed during our phone call on June 15, 2013, we do not intend to seek
+enforcement¹ of the non-disclosure provisions associated with any legal process, including FISA
+orders, in connection with the aggregate data described below, so long as Apple aggregates data
+for all of the legal process it received for intervals of six months, beginning with the period
+ending May 31, 2013, from any and all government entities in the United States (including local,
+state, and federal, and including criminal and national security-related requests) into bands of
+1000, starting at zero, and which you may break down into one or both of the following two
+categories: the number of requests and the number of user accounts for which data was
+requested.
+
+This position is an exercise of FBI discretion in light of current circumstances and
+the precise contours of this letter. Accordingly, our decision does not reflect the FBI's position
+with respect to potential disclosures by Apple that differ in any respect from the disclosures
+outlined in this letter. Nor is our decision a precedent for disclosures by any other company that
+is in receipt of such process, even if the disclosures were made in the manner that is proposed in
+this letter. The national security implications of disclosures related to the receipt of such process
+may vary depending on the identity of the company that is making the disclosure and the overall
+number of disclosures by different companies. For this reason, if other companies also seek to
+disclose information about the volume of such process that they receive, that may alter our
+calculus about the implications of disclosures by Apple. In addition, our current determination is
+based on our prediction about the potential national security consequences of the disclosures and
+as such we may in the future revise our position as circumstances change or as we evaluate the
+actual impact of your disclosures on national security.
+
+¹ The FBI does not have the authority to negate a court order, nor can we bind state or local authorities.
+
+Jane C. Horvath
+Page 2
+
+This letter further commits Apple to coordinate with us before making any additional
+public disclosures about the volume of legal process you receive, beyond the contours outlined in
+this letter. If we revise our position, we will notify you. We would retain the right to bring an
+appropriate enforcement action with respect to any future disclosures you make after you receive
+a notification of our change in position.
+
+Thank you again for coordinating your proposal with us. We appreciate your efforts to
+reach an agreement that promotes transparency without jeopardizing our national security
+responsibilities to the public.
+
+Sincerely,
+
+Andrew Weissmann
+General Counsel
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_Misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-131105/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_Misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-131105/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7e035dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_Misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-131105/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+{
+ "title": "Amicus Curiae Brief of Apple Inc. in Support of Providers' Motions for Declaratory Judgment, In re Motions for Declaratory Judgment to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders and Directives",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-11-05",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [
+ "PRISM"
+ ],
+ "countries": [
+ "Australia",
+ "Austria",
+ "Bahamas",
+ "Belarus",
+ "Belgium",
+ "Brazil",
+ "Canada",
+ "China",
+ "Czech Republic",
+ "Denmark",
+ "France",
+ "Germany",
+ "Hong Kong",
+ "Ireland",
+ "Italy",
+ "Japan",
+ "Netherlands",
+ "New Zealand",
+ "Norway",
+ "Poland",
+ "Portugal",
+ "Russia",
+ "San Marino",
+ "Singapore",
+ "South Korea",
+ "Spain",
+ "Sweden",
+ "Switzerland",
+ "Taiwan",
+ "United Kingdom",
+ "United States",
+ "Chile",
+ "Cyprus",
+ "Estonia",
+ "Finland",
+ "Greece",
+ "Hungary",
+ "India",
+ "Luxembourg",
+ "Malaysia",
+ "Slovenia",
+ "United Arab Emirates"
+ ],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-05",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34475",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "pdf_sha256": "7a187bebafb193566097834b949dc7597677a77f96d4608e1144f91f257b2251",
+ "pages": 28
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_Misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-131112/FISC_-_Misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-131112.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_Misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-131112/FISC_-_Misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-131112.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ca9dc84
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_Misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-131112/FISC_-_Misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-131112.md
@@ -0,0 +1,362 @@
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+United States
+Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+Washington, D.C.
+
+2013 NOV 12 PM 3:42
+
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+)
+In re Motion to Disclose Aggregate Data
+Regarding FISA Orders
+)
+Docket Nos. Misc. 13-03, 13-04, 13-05,
+)
+13-06, 13-07
+)
+)
+ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
+
+Motion to Strike the Government's Ex Parte Response to
+Motions to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders
+
+Google Inc., Microsoft Corporation, Yahoo! Inc., Facebook, Inc., and LinkedIn Corporation
+(collectively, "the providers") have moved for declaratory relief to remove an unlawful prior
+restraint on their right to speak about an issue of substantial public importance: whether, and in
+what numbers, the providers receive orders or directives from the government under the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") or the FISA Amendments Act ("FAA"). The government
+has submitted a response and supporting declaration for _ex parte, in camera_ review. It has given the
+providers only a heavily redacted version of its submissions, and it has rejected all requests for
+greater access.
+
+Unless the government reconsiders its refusal to accommodate the providers' legitimate need
+to understand the basis for the government's response, the providers respectfully request that this
+Court strike the redacted portions of the government's brief and supporting declaration. The
+redacted version of the government's submissions does not comply with Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Court Rule 7(j) because it does not "clearly articulate the government's legal
+arguments," as the rule requires. If the government's interpretation of the rule were correct, the rule
+would violate both the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause. To avoid that result, the
+Court should construe the rule to require fuller disclosure to the providers.
+
+Allowing the government to file an _ex parte_ brief in this case will cripple the providers' ability
+to reply to the government's arguments and is likely to result in a disposition of the providers' First
+Amendment claims based on information that the providers will never see. The providers do not
+dispute that in some cases it may be appropriate for this Court to consider _ex parte_ filings. In this
+case, however, such a course is neither justified nor constitutional. The providers already know the
+core information that the government seeks to protect in this litigation—the number of FISC orders
+or FAA directives to which they have been subject, if any. At issue here is only the secondary
+question whether the providers may be told the reasons why the government seeks to keep that
+information a secret. The government has not argued that sharing those reasons with the providers
+or their counsel would endanger national security. Accordingly, unless the government allows the
+providers' counsel to access its response, the Court should strike the redacted portions of that
+response.
+
+BACKGROUND
+
+The providers have sought a declaratory judgment permitting them to publish aggregate data
+about any orders or directives they may have received under FISA or the FAA. As the providers
+have explained, there is no statutory basis for the government's refusal to permit them to publish
+such data. And to the extent there is any basis for the government's restraint, it constitutes a
+content-based restriction on speech that violates the First Amendment because it is not narrowly
+tailored to promote a compelling governmental interest.
+
+On September 30, 2013, the government responded to the providers' motions. Invoking
+FISC Rule 7(j), the government filed its response and a supporting declaration _ex parte_ for _in camera_
+review by the Court. The government also served the providers with a heavily redacted version of
+its response and declaration.
+
+2
+
+The providers have attempted to accommodate the government's concerns. In advance of
+the government's filing, on September 20, 2013, the providers requested notice if the government
+intended to submit classified information. The government did not respond to that letter. Since
+receiving the government's redacted response, the providers have repeatedly conferred with the
+government in an effort to obtain access to the unredacted version of the government's filings and
+accompanying declaration under appropriate security procedures. The providers have suggested a
+range of alternatives to the government, including the following:
+
+* Allowing counsel for providers who already hold Top Secret clearances to review the
+ unredacted response.
+* Granting uncleared counsel interim clearances (or entering into nondisclosure agreements)
+ that would permit them to review some or all of the unredacted response.
+* Withdrawing the current version of the response and filing an unclassified response, or at
+ least a response at a lower level of classification.
+* Agreeing to the appointment of a neutral third-party advisor or special master who would
+ review the government's submission in unredacted form and make arguments on the
+ providers' behalf relating to materials that providers' counsel are not permitted to see.
+* Permitting counsel for the respective providers to review at least those aspects of the
+ redacted submissions that pertain to those specific providers.
+
+Those alternatives would not fully satisfy all of the providers' First Amendment and due process
+interests in understanding the factual bases of the government's position, but some of the
+alternatives could help to address at least some of the providers' interests. Nevertheless, the
+government has categorically refused any and all access by any of the providers' counsel—regardless
+of level of clearance—and has made clear that it is unwilling to entertain any of the foregoing
+
+3
+
+alternatives. In the government's view, the providers must litigate this case solely on the basis of the
+redacted filings that the government has already provided.
+
+ARGUMENT
+
+I. The government's response does not comply with Rule 7(j)
+
+Rule 7(j) requires the Court to "review _ex parte_ and _in camera_ any submissions by the
+government, or portions thereof, which may include classified information," but it also requires the
+government to provide the adverse party with a redacted version, which, "at a minimum, must
+clearly articulate the government's legal arguments." The redacted version of the government's
+submissions fails to satisfy that requirement because it does not explain how the relief sought by the
+providers would harm national security. While the government suggests (Gov't Br. 6) that "[t]he
+FBI's assessment of harm" that would result from the disclosure sought by the providers "is entitled
+to deference," it does not argue that such deference is absolute, and rightly so. See _McGehee v. Casey_,
+718 F.2d 1137, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("Considering that speech concerning public affairs is more
+than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government, and that the line between information
+threatening to foreign policy and matters of legitimate public concern is often very fine, courts must
+assure themselves that the reasons for classification are rational and plausible ones." (internal
+quotation marks and citation omitted)). To the contrary, the government devotes five pages of its
+brief to arguing the correctness of the FBI's assessment, thereby implicitly conceding that it is
+appropriate for the Court to evaluate, at least to some degree, the FBI's reasoning. In other words,
+establishing the reasonableness of the FBI's assessment of harm is a critical part of the government's
+legal argument. But the pages devoted to that part of the government's argument are almost entirely
+redacted; on that critical issue, the providers have no way to respond to the government's
+
+4
+
+contentions. The government has therefore failed to "clearly articulate [its] legal arguments," as
+Rule 7(j) requires.¹
+
+II. If Rule 7(j) were construed to permit the government's filing of heavily redacted
+submissions in this case, it would violate the First and Fifth Amendments
+
+To the extent there is any doubt whether Rule 7(j) permits the government's _ex parte_ filing,
+the Court should construe the rule so as not to permit the filing because a contrary interpretation
+would make the rule unconstitutional.² While _ex parte_ filings might be permissible in some contexts,
+accepting the government's _ex parte_ filing of September 30 would pose two constitutional problems.
+First, it would prevent the providers from participating fully in the resolution of their First
+Amendment claim, which would further chill the providers' (and others') speech, magnifying the
+harm that forced the providers to seek relief from this Court in the first place. Second, it would
+violate the providers' procedural due process rights by depriving the providers of adequate
+safeguards to protect their substantive First Amendment rights.
+
+First Amendment. In preventing the providers from reviewing and analyzing the core
+evidence supporting its restraint on their speech, the government has prevented them from fully and
+
+¹ Additionally, in the section of the government's brief arguing that FISA itself prohibits disclosure,
+the redacted version omits the entirety of footnote 4. That footnote follows a citation to the FISA
+statute, and it comes in the middle of a paragraph that is otherwise entirely devoted to legal
+argument and that contains no factual discussion. It is therefore reasonable to infer that footnote 4
+is part of the government's legal argument. The footnote's contribution to the argument, however,
+is impossible to discern from the redacted version. The government's failure to explain what
+argument it is making in the footnote is a further violation of Rule 7(j).
+² At a minimum, a contrary interpretation would require the Court to resolve serious constitutional
+questions, and it should be avoided for that reason. See _Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast
+Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council_, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) ("[W]here an otherwise acceptable
+construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the
+statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of
+Congress."); see also, e.g., _United States v. Wecht_, 484 F.3d 194, 204–05 (3d Cir. 2007) (invoking court's
+supervisory authority over local rules and narrowing contested rule to avoid First Amendment
+issue); _Gordon v. Idaho_, 778 F.2d 1397, 1400 (9th Cir. 1985) ("The First Amendment's guarantee of
+the free exercise of religion requires that our procedural rules be interpreted flexibly to protect
+sincerely-held religious beliefs and practices.").
+
+5
+
+meaningfully responding to its position. This substantially undermines the adversarial system, which
+is particularly critical in the context of First Amendment litigation. The government's prohibition
+on the disclosure of the aggregate data is a prior restraint on speech—that is, it "forbid[s] certain
+communications . . . in advance of the time that such communications are to occur." _Alexander v.
+United States_, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under these
+circumstances, "the First Amendment generally requires procedural protections to guard against
+impermissible censorship." _John Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey_, 549 F.3d 861, 871 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing
+_Freedman v. Maryland_, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965)). Central to those procedural protections is the right to
+judicial review of any restraint in an adversarial proceeding. See _Freedman_, 380 U.S. at 58 ("[O]nly a
+judicial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of
+expression...."). The Supreme Court has recognized that the "value of a judicial proceeding is
+substantially diluted where the process is _ex parte_, because the Court does not have available the
+fundamental instrument for judicial judgment: an adversary proceeding in which both parties may
+participate." _Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne_, 393 U.S. 175, 183 (1968); see _id_. (“In the
+absence of evidence and argument offered by both sides and of their participation in the formulation
+of value judgments, there is insufficient assurance of the balanced analysis and careful conclusions
+which are essential in the area of First Amendment adjudication.").
+
+While this case is not an _ex parte_ proceeding, the concerns that animated the Supreme
+Court's decision in _Carroll_ apply equally here. The government is restraining the providers from
+speech using evidence that the providers will never see, based on its categorical interpretation of a
+procedural rule that, in the government's view, applies irrespective of the liberty interest at issue.
+Foreclosing the providers' ability to view, analyze, or reply to the government's unredacted
+submissions would preclude the meaningful "participation of the party seeking to exercise First
+
+6
+
+Amendment rights" and thereby "substantially imperil[] the protection which the Amendment seeks
+to assure." _Id_. at 184.
+
+Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. Where the government seeks to rely on classified
+information in a proceeding that implicates a protected liberty interest of a private party (here, the
+providers' right to engage in core First Amendment protected speech about the government and
+themselves), "the Constitution . . . require[s] that the government take reasonable measures to ensure
+basic fairness to the private party and that the government follow procedures reasonably designed to
+protect against erroneous deprivation of the private party's interests." _Al Haramain Islamic Found.,
+Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury_, 686 F.3d 965, 980 (9th Cir. 2012).
+
+To analyze whether Rule 7(j), as the government seeks to apply it in this case, comports with
+the Fifth Amendment, this Court should apply the balancing test set forth in _Mathews v. Eldridge_, 424
+U.S. 319 (1976). See _Hamdi v. Rumsfeld_, 542 U.S. 507, 528–29 (2004) (plurality opinion) (recognizing
+that _Mathews_ is the appropriate framework for determining the requirements of the Due Process
+Clause, even when national-security interests are at stake). Under _Mathews_, courts weigh three
+factors: "First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an
+erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any,
+of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including
+the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
+procedural requirement would entail." 424 U.S. at 334–35. All three factors support the conclusion
+that the Court should not resolve this case on the basis of the government's unredacted filings if the
+providers are not given an opportunity to review and respond to them.
+
+First, the liberty interest at issue in the providers' motion is substantial. "Freedom of speech
+and the other freedoms encompassed by the First Amendment always have been viewed as
+fundamental components of the liberty safeguarded by the Due Process Clause." _First Nat'l Bank of_
+
+7
+
+_Boston v. Bellotti_, 435 U.S. 765, 779-80 (1978) (internal citations omitted). As previously explained,
+the providers are currently being restrained from correcting the misimpression, furthered by
+inaccurate media reporting, that they indiscriminately disclose their users' information to the
+government. In other words, on a subject at the core of the First Amendment—speech about the
+government—the providers cannot fully answer the media's inaccuracies with their own truthful
+speech. See _Mills v. Alabama_, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (“Whatever differences may exist about
+interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major
+purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.").
+
+Second, there is a considerable risk that deciding this case on the basis of factual assertions
+and arguments that the providers are not permitted to see could erroneously deprive the providers
+of their First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "[t]he core of due
+process is the right to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard." _LaChance v. Erickson_, 522
+U.S. 262, 266 (1998); see also Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing'', 123 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1267,
+1280-1281 (1975). That basic feature of due process is lacking here because the providers lack
+notice of critical aspects of the government's argument, and without such notice, they cannot
+meaningfully respond to the government's brief. The premise of our adversarial system is that fair
+decision-making requires that the decision maker hear from both sides of the controversy. As
+courts have observed, "[o]ne will be hard pressed to design a procedure more likely to result in
+erroneous deprivations" than the "use of classified information without disclosure" to the opposing
+party. _Al Haramain_, 686 F.3d at 980 (internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]he very foundation of
+the adversary process assumes that use of undisclosed information will violate due process because
+of the risk of error." _Id_. (internal quotation marks omitted). We have no doubt that the Court will
+carefully scrutinize the arguments and factual assertions in the redacted portions of the
+
+8
+
+government's submissions. But even the most searching judicial scrutiny of an _ex parte_ filing is no
+substitute for the rigors of testing in an adversarial process.
+
+With respect to the third factor, there is no dispute that the government has a compelling
+interest in maintaining national security. See _Haig v. Agee_, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) ("[N]o
+governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation."). There is also no
+dispute that the government has a compelling interest in preventing the dissemination of classified
+information to unauthorized persons. See _Dep't of Navy v. Egan_, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988) ("This
+Court has recognized the Government's 'compelling interest' in withholding national security
+information from unauthorized persons."). But the providers have already been entrusted with the
+core information that the government seeks to protect in this litigation—the number of FISC orders
+or FAA directives to which they have been subject, if any—as well as with even more sensitive
+information, such as the names and identifiers of the targets of those orders. At issue in this motion
+is only the secondary question whether the providers may be told the reasons why the government
+seeks to keep that information a secret. The government has made no effort to explain how sharing
+those reasons with the providers or their counsel would endanger national security.
+
+9
+
+CONCLUSION
+
+The Court should order that, unless the government agrees to take appropriate steps to
+permit counsel for the providers to access the unredacted version of its September 30 filing, the
+redacted portions of that filing will be stricken. Pursuant to Rule 1 of Rules of the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court and Rule 7 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the providers
+request oral argument on this motion.
+
+Dated: November 12, 2013
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+GOOGLE INC.
+
+Albert Gidari / by JKR
+Albert Gidari
+Perkins Coie LLP
+1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900
+Seattle, WA 98101
+Tel: 206.359.8688
+Fax: 206.359.9688
+agidari@perkinscoie.com
+
+MICROSOFT CORPORATION
+
+James M. Garland / by JKR
+James M. Garland, D.C. Bar # 475509
+David N. Fagan, D.C. Bar # 474518
+Alexander A. Berengaut, D.C. Bar # 989222
+COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
+1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
+Washington, DC 20004-2401
+Tel: 202.662.6000
+Fax: 202.662.6291
+
+10
+
+YAHOO! INC.
+
+Marc J. Zwillinger / by JRR
+Marc J. Zwillinger
+Jacob A. Sommer
+ZwillGen PLLC
+1705 N St. NW
+Washington, DC 20036
+marc@zwillgen.com
+jake@zwillgen.com
+
+FACEBOOK, INC.
+
+Carl Nichols / by JRR
+Carl Nichols
+Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP
+1875 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20006
+Tel: 202.663.6226
+Fax: 202-663.6363
+carl.nichols@wilmerhale.com
+
+LINKEDIN CORPORATION
+
+Jerome C. Roth /by JKR
+Jerome C. Roth
+Jonathan H. Blavin
+Justin P. Raphael
+Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP
+560 Mission Street, 27th Floor
+San Francisco, CA 94015
+Tel: 415.683.9100
+Fax: 415.512.4077
+Jerome.Roth@mto.com
+Jonathan.Blavin@mto.com
+Justin.Raphael@mto.com
+
+11
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I hereby certify that at or before the time of filing this submission, the government (care of
+the Security and Emergency Planning Staff, United States Department of Justice) has been served
+with a copy of this motion pursuant to Rule 8(a) of the FISC Rules of Procedure.
+
+Dated: November 12, 2013
+
+John Roche
+Perkins Coie LLP
+700 13th St. NW
+Washington, DC 20005
+Tel: 202.434.1627
+jroche@perkinscoie.com
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_Misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-131112/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_Misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-131112/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5bf7223
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_Misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-131112/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Motion to Strike the Government's Ex Parte Response to Motions to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders, In re Motion to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-11-12",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-12",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34476",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "dc2de3e4a85c4b04681608d28512efdefc9ba682e7e2d0e0f5b9977d3630d895",
+ "pages": 12
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_aclu-briefing-order/FISC_-_aclu-briefing-order.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_aclu-briefing-order/FISC_-_aclu-briefing-order.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9917596
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_aclu-briefing-order/FISC_-_aclu-briefing-order.md
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+UNITED STATES FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+)
+IN RE ORDERS ISSUED BY THIS COURT )
+INTERPRETING SECTION 215 OF THE )
+PATRIOT ACT )
+)
+Docket No.: Misc. 13-02
+
+ORDER
+
+This matter is before the Court on the Motion of the American Civil Liberties Union, the
+American Civil Liberties Union of the Nation's Capital, and the Media Freedom and Information
+Access Clinic ("Movants") for the Release of Court Records, which was submitted on June 12,
+2013. Any response by the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ") to the motion shall be
+submitted no later than 5:00 p.m. on July 5, 2013. Any reply by the Movants to DOJ's response
+shall be submitted no later than 5:00 p.m. on July 12, 2013.¹
+
+In addition, counsel for the Movants are directed to provide the additional information
+required under rules 7(h)(1) (bar membership information) and 7(i) (security clearance
+information) of the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court's Rules of Procedure
+("FISC Rules"). See also FISC Rule 63 ("Practice Before the Court"). Such information must be
+
+¹ This reply date has been set based on the Movants' request for expedited consideration
+of the motion. The Movants may waive the reply time, or request additional time, if needed.
+
+submitted, in writing, no later than 5:00 p.m. on July 12, 2013.
+
+SO ORDERED, this 14th day of June, 2013.
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_aclu-briefing-order/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_aclu-briefing-order/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3bf503d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_aclu-briefing-order/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Order, In re Orders of this Court Interpreting Section 215 of the Patriot Act",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-06-14",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-06-14",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34229",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "7f773507d1e009aff849fdd477cd820e8ae4fd28181c9698edc765e9b9cbf8e0",
+ "pages": 2
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_aclu-misc-13-02/FISC_-_aclu-misc-13-02.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_aclu-misc-13-02/FISC_-_aclu-misc-13-02.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..32d243f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_aclu-misc-13-02/FISC_-_aclu-misc-13-02.md
@@ -0,0 +1,674 @@
+2013 JU 12 AM 9:43
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, DC
+
+[REDACTED]
+IN RE ORDERS ISSUED BY THIS COURT
+INTERPRETING SECTION 215 OF THE
+PATRIOT ACT
+Docket No. MISC. 13-02
+
+MOTION OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
+THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF THE NATION'S CAPITAL, AND
+THE MEDIA FREEDOM AND INFORMATION ACCESS CLINIC
+FOR THE RELEASE OF COURT RECORDS
+
+David A. Schulz
+Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic
+Yale Law School
+40 Ashmun Street, 4th Floor
+New Haven, CT 06511
+Phone: (203) 436-5892
+Fax: (203) 436-0851
+david.schulz@yale.edu
+
+Alex Abdo
+Brett Max Kaufman
+Patrick Toomey
+Jameel Jaffer
+American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
+125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
+New York, NY 10004
+Phone: (212) 549-2500
+Fax: (212) 549-2654
+aabdo@aclu.org
+
+Arthur B. Spitzer
+American Civil Liberties Union of the
+Nation's Capital
+4301 Connecticut Avenue, N. W., Suite 434
+Washington, DC 20008
+Phone: (202) 457-0800
+Fax: (202) 457-0805
+artspitzer@aclu-nca.org
+
+PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
+
+Pursuant to the First Amendment and to Rule 62 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
+Court's Rules of Procedure ("FISC Rules"), the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU") and
+the Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic at Yale Law School respectfully move for the
+publication of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC") opinions evaluating the
+meaning, scope, and constitutionality of Section 215 of the Patriot Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1861.¹ On
+June 6, 2013, the Director of National Intelligence officially acknowledged and declassified
+details regarding a surveillance program approved by this Court pursuant to that provision.
+President Obama and members of the congressional intelligence committees have publicly
+discussed the program and expressly invited a public debate about the legitimacy of the
+government's surveillance activities. This Court's legal opinions approving the program are of
+critical importance to that debate. The movants respectfully request that the Court publish the
+opinions as quickly as possible, with only those redactions that satisfy the stringent First
+Amendment standard that applies in public-access cases. Alternatively, the Court should exercise
+its discretion to do so in the public interest.²
+
+1 "The Patriot Act" is the common name for the Uniting and Strengthening America by
+Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L.
+No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 2001).
+2 In 2007, the ACLU filed a motion for public access to certain FISC records, which the Court
+denied in an opinion signed by Judge John D. Bates. See In re Motion for Release of Court
+Records, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484 (FISA Ct. 2007). The present motion seeks access to a different set
+of FISC opinions and presents a new factual and legal record in support of disclosure. As such, it
+merits consideration by the Court on its own terms. If the earlier decision controls the resolution
+of this motion, however, the movants respectfully request an order permitting them to seek en
+banc FISC review or to appeal directly to the Court of Review.
+
+1
+
+FACTUAL BACKGROUND
+
+Section 215, which amended the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (“FISA”),
+50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq., empowers the Director of the FBI to obtain secret court orders from the
+FISC compelling third parties to produce "any tangible things" relevant to authorized foreign-
+intelligence or terrorism investigations. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1), (b)(2)(A). The orders are
+accompanied by a gag order forbidding recipients from disclosing having received the order. 50
+U.S.C. § 1861(c)-(d).
+
+Since its enactment, Section 215 has generated considerable public debate. Many have
+raised concerns about the apparent breadth of the statute (allowing the government to obtain "any
+tangible things"), its standard for compelled disclosure (relevance to a foreign-intelligence or
+terrorism investigation), and the indefinite restraints it imposes upon the speech of recipients of
+disclosure orders. See, e.g., Editorial, Revising the Patriot Act, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 2005,
+http://nyti.ms/fQd8sJ (“Section 215 is written far too broadly. It lets the government seize an
+entire database... when it is investigating a single person.... If the gag rule remains, it should
+be limited, so record holders can speak about the search after a suitable period of time, or talk
+about it right away without revealing who the target was.").
+
+In more recent years, a handful of Senators have said that the government has adopted a
+secret interpretation of its authority under Section 215, and they have argued forcefully for its
+disclosure to allow an informed public debate of its necessity and legality. See, e.g., Charlie
+Savage, Senators Say Patriot Act is Being Misinterpreted, N.Y. Times, May 26, 2011,
+http://nyti.ms/qMTGVx (quoting Sen. Ron Wyden as warning that "[w]hen the American people
+find out how their government has secretly interpreted the Patriot Act, they will be stunned and
+
+2
+
+they will be angry," and quoting Sen. Mark Udall as stating that "Americans would be alarmed if
+they knew how this law was being carried out").
+
+A few days ago, The Guardian disclosed a previously secret order from this Court
+apparently implementing the secret interpretation of Section 215 of which those Senators
+warned. Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers
+Daily, Guardian, June 5, 2013, http://bit.ly/13jsdlb. The order which was issued on April 25,
+2013 and expires on July 19, 2013-directs Verizon Business Network Services, Inc. to produce
+to the National Security Agency "on an ongoing daily basis... all call detail records or
+'telephony metadata" of its customers' calls, including those "wholly within the United States."
+Secondary Order (“Verizon 215 Order”), In Re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring
+the Production of Tangible Things from Verizon Bus. Network Servs., Inc. on Behalf of MCI
+Commc'n Servs., Inc. d/b/a Verizon Bus. Servs., No. BR 13-80 at 2 (FISC Apr. 25, 2013),
+available at http://bit.ly/11FY393.
+
+In the few days since The Guardian disclosed the order directed at Verizon, federal
+officials have revealed even greater detail about the government's surveillance under Section
+215. On June 6, James Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence (“DNI"), officially
+acknowledged the authenticity of the order sent to Verizon along with key details about the
+larger program supported by this Court's orders under Section 215. See James R. Clapper, DNI
+Statement on Recent Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information, Office of the Director
+of National Intelligence (June 6, 2013), http://1.usa.gov/13jwuFc. He stated that: "[t]he judicial
+order that was disclosed in the press is used to support a sensitive intelligence collection
+operation"; "[t]he only type of information acquired under the Court's order is telephony
+metadata, such as telephone numbers dialed and length of calls”; “[t]he [FISC] only allows the
+
+3
+
+data to be queried when there is a reasonable suspicion, based on specific facts, that the
+particular basis for the query is associated with a foreign terrorist organization"; and "[t]he
+[FISC] reviews the program approximately every 90 days." Id.
+
+The following day, President Obama also commented publicly on the Section 215 order.
+Like the DNI, the President stated that "what the intelligence community is doing is looking at
+phone numbers and durations of calls. They are not looking at people's names, and they're not
+looking at content.” Statement by the President, Office of the Press Secretary (June 7, 2013),
+http://1.usa.gov/12xerjF. The President also stated that "This program, by the way, is fully
+overseen not just by Congress, but by the FISA Court-a court specially put together to evaluate
+classified programs to make sure that the executive branch, or government generally, is not
+abusing them, and that it's being carried out consistent with the Constitution and rule of law." Id.
+
+The President also encouraged the public debate that the revelation of the Section 215
+order had provoked:
+
+I welcome this debate. And I think it's healthy for our democracy. I think it's a
+sign of maturity, because probably five years ago, six years ago, we might not
+have been having this debate. And I think it's interesting that there are some folks
+on the left but also some folks on the right who are now worried about it who
+weren't very worried about it when there was a Republican President. I think
+that's good that we're having this discussion.
+
+Id.; see also Press Gaggle by Deputy Principal Press Secretary Josh Earnest and Secretary of
+Education Arne Duncan, Office of the Press Secretary (June 6, 2013), http://1.usa.gov/12xf251
+(similar comments).
+
+Finally, members of the congressional intelligence committees have elaborated upon the
+DNI's statement by confirming that the order issued to Verizon was but a single, three-month
+order in a much broader, seven-year program that allows the government to collect the telephone
+records of essentially all Americans. See, e.g., Dan Roberts & Spencer Ackerman, Senator
+
+4
+
+Feinstein: NSA Phone Call Data Collection in Place 'Since 2006, 'Guardian, June 6, 2013,
+http://bit.ly/13rfxdu ("As far as I know, this is the exact three-month renewal of what has been
+the case for the past seven years. This renewal is carried out by the [foreign intelligence
+surveillance] court under the business records section of the Patriot Act."); id. (Senator Saxby
+Chambliss: "This has been going on for seven years.").
+
+Like President Obama, Senator Dianne Feinstein-Chairman of the Senate Select
+Committee on Intelligence and a vocal proponent of the Section 215 program authorized by this
+Court-has encouraged public debate about the program and any proposed changes to it.
+Matthew DeLuca & Kasie Hunt, NSA Snooping Has Foiled Multiple Terror Plots: Feinstein,
+NBC News, June 6, 2013, http://nbcnews.to/13rgO10 ("We are always open to changes. But that
+doesn't mean there will be any. It does mean that we will look at any ideas, any thoughts, and we
+do this on everything.").
+
+Despite the extraordinary and increasing public interest in the surveillance program
+authorized by the Court, the Court's legal opinions evaluating the meaning, scope, and
+constitutionality of Section 215 and that program in particular remain secret.
+
+JURISDICTION
+
+As an inferior federal court established by Congress under Article III, this Court is vested
+with inherent powers, including "supervisory power over its own records and files.” Nixon v.
+Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978); accord Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S.
+32, 43 (1991) ("It has long been understood that [c]ertain implied powers must necessarily result
+to our Courts of justice from the nature of their institution." (quotation marks omitted)). As this
+Court has previously determined, the FISC therefore has "jurisdiction in the first instance to
+
+5
+
+adjudicate a claim of right to the court's very own records and files." In re Motion for Release of
+Court Records, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 487.
+
+ARGUMENT
+I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT COMPELS THE RELEASE OF THE COURT'S
+LEGAL OPINIONS RELATED TO SECTION 215 OF THE PATRIOT ACT.
+
+A. The First Amendment Right of Access Attaches to Judicial Opinions, Including
+the Opinions of this Court Interpreting Section 215.
+
+That the judicial process should be as open to the public as possible is a principle
+enshrined in both the Constitution and the common law. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
+Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564–73 (1980); Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110,
+119 (2d Cir. 2006) ("The common law right of public access to judicial documents is firmly
+rooted in our nation's history."); cf. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in
+9 Writings of James Madison at 103 (G. Hunt ed. 1910) (“A popular Government, without
+popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or,
+perhaps both."). The public's right of access to judicial proceedings and records under the First
+Amendment is not absolute; while some exclusions may pass constitutional muster, "[w]hat
+offends the First Amendment" is judicial secrecy imposed "without sufficient justification.” N.Y.
+Civil Liberties Union v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 684 F.3d 286, 296 (2d Cir. 2012). Under the
+Supreme Court's prevailing "experience and logic" test, the public's qualified First Amendment
+right of access to judicial proceedings and records attaches where (a) the types of judicial
+processes or records sought have historically been available to the public, and (b) public access
+plays a "significant positive role" in the functioning of those proceedings. Press-Enter. Co. v.
+Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 9, 11 (1986) (“Press-Enter. II"); see Globe Newspaper v. Superior
+Court, 457 U.S. 596, 605–07 (1982); Wash. Post v. Robinson, 935 F.2d 282, 287–92 (D.C. Cir.
+1991). Here, there is a nearly unbroken tradition of public access to judicial rulings and opinions
+
+6
+
+interpreting the laws governing the American people and their government. Moreover,
+publishing judicial opinions interpreting limits on government power-particularly when those
+opinions construe the scope of domestic surveillance authority-crucially enhances the public's
+ability to evaluate its representatives and function as an essential check on its government.
+
+In concluding otherwise upon consideration of the ACLU's previous public-access
+motion to this Court, the Court erred. By limiting the Court's analysis to whether the two
+published opinions of this Court "establish a tradition of public access" and concluding that "the
+FISC is not a court whose place or process has historically been open to the public," In re Motion
+for Release of Court Records, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, 493 (FISA Ct. 2007) (emphasis omitted), the
+Court failed to identify the proper focus of the “experience" prong of the Supreme Court's test.
+As that Court has made clear, "the 'experience' test of Globe Newspaper does not look to the
+particular practice of any one jurisdiction, but instead to the experience in that type or kind of
+hearing throughout the United States." El Vocero de P.R. v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147, 150
+(1993) (per curiam) (quotation marks omitted). And far from "result[ing] in a diminished flow of
+information[] to the detriment of the process in question," disclosure of the requested opinions
+would serve weighty democratic interests by informing the governed about the meaning of
+public laws enacted on their behalf.
+
+1. “Experience”
+
+When evaluating the First Amendment interests at stake in public-access cases, the
+proper focus is the type of judicial records or process to which a petitioner seeks access, not the
+past practice of the specific forum. See, e.g., El Vocero de P.R., 508 U.S. at 150; N.Y. Civil
+Liberties Union, 684 F.3d at 301 (rejecting the view that "[t]he Richmond Newspapers test
+looks... to the formal description of the forum"); Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d
+
+7
+
+83, 94 (2d Cir. 2004) (examining First Amendment right of access to district court "docket sheets
+and their historical counterparts," beginning with early English courts); In re Boston Herald,
+Inc., 321 F.3d 174, 184 (1st Cir. 2003) (concluding that the experience test includes examining
+"analogous proceedings and documents"). Here, the types of records at issue are judicial
+opinions interpreting the meaning of public statutes. And no type of judicial record enjoys as
+uninterrupted a history of presumptive openness as a judicial opinion. See Lowenschuss v. W.
+Pub. Co., 542 F.2d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 1976) ("As ours is a common-law system based on the
+'directive force' of precedents, its effective and efficient functioning demands wide
+dissemination of judicial decisions.... Even that part of the law which consists of codified
+statutes is incomplete without the accompanying body of judicial decisions construing the
+statutes. Accordingly, under our system of jurisprudence the judiciary has the duty of publishing
+and disseminating its decisions." (quoting Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial
+Process 20, 22 (1963))); see also Scheiner v. Wallace, 93 Civ. 62, 1996 WL 633226, at *1
+(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 1996) (“The public interest in an accountable judiciary generally demands
+that the reasons for a judgment be exposed to public scrutiny.... Therefore, the presumption of
+public access to" judicial opinions "is particularly high." (citing United States v. Amodeo, 71
+F.3d 1044, 1048-49 (2d Cir. 1995)). As part of this history, courts have found a qualified First
+Amendment right of access to judicial opinions construing the government's search and seizure
+powers. See In re Application of N.Y. Times Co. for Access to Certain Sealed Court Records, 585
+F. Supp. 2d 83, 88 (D.D.C. 2008) (stating that "routine historical practice countenances in favor
+of a qualified First Amendment right of access to warrant materials").
+
+3 This Court therefore erred in previously considering the "experience" test to address only
+"FISC orders" or "a narrow subset of FISC decisions of broad legal significance," In re Motion
+for Release of Court Records, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 492-93.
+
+8
+
+2. "Logic"
+
+Just as fundamentally, the "significant positive role" of public judicial decisionmaking in
+a democracy is so firmly established that it is hardly ever questioned. Public access to judicial
+opinions promotes confidence in the judicial system by allowing the public to evaluate for itself
+the operation and decisions of the courts. As the Supreme Court has explained, "[p]eople in an
+open society do not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to
+accept what they are prohibited from observing." Press-Enter. II, 478 U.S. at 13; see Richmond
+Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569 (discussing the value of an open justice system and noting that
+""[w]ithout publicity, all other checks are insufficient: in comparison of publicity, all other
+checks are of small account" (alteration in original) (quoting Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of
+Judicial Evidence 524 (1827))); United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d 72, 83 (2d Cir. 2008)
+("Transparency is pivotal to public perception of the judiciary's legitimacy and independence.");
+Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53, 81 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[I]n these cases... the law itself is on
+trial, quite as much as the cause which is to be decided. Holding court in public thus assumes a
+unique significance in a society that commits itself to the rule of law." (quotation marks
+omitted)); In re Orion Pictures Corp., 21 F.3d 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1994) ("This preference for public
+access is rooted in the public's first amendment right to know about the administration of justice.
+It helps safeguard the integrity, quality, and respect in our judicial system, and permits the public
+to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies." (quotation marks and citations
+omitted)); United States v. Ressam, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1263 (W.D. Wash. 2002) (explaining
+that "the general practice of disclosing court orders to the public not only plays a significant role
+in the judicial process, but is also a fundamental aspect of our country's open administration of
+justice").
+
+9
+
+The value in making judicial opinions available to the public only increases where, as
+here, the subject of such opinions concerns both the power of the Executive Branch and the
+constitutional rights of citizens.⁴ See F.T.C. v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 410
+(1st Cir. 1987) ("The appropriateness of making court files accessible is accentuated in cases
+where the government is a party: in such circumstances, the public's right to know what the
+executive branch is about coalesces with the concomitant right of the citizenry to appraise the
+judicial branch."); In re Application for Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site
+Location Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 748–49 (S.D. Tex. 2005) ("The underlying order and
+application have been sealed at the government's request, in order not to jeopardize the ongoing
+criminal investigation. This opinion will not be sealed, because it concerns a matter of statutory
+interpretation which does not hinge on the particulars of the underlying investigation. The issue
+explored here has serious implications for the balance between privacy and law enforcement, and
+is a matter of first impression in this circuit as well as most others.").
+
+This principle is no less true in the context of national security, where the courts have
+routinely recognized and given effect to the public's right of access to judicial orders and
+opinions. Indeed, where matters of national security are at stake, the role of public evaluation of
+judicial decisions takes on an even weightier role. See Ressam, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1262 (in
+discussing a protective order in a terrorism prosecution, explaining that “there is a venerable
+tradition of public access to court orders").
+
+4 The Second Circuit has explained that “the weight to be given the presumption of access
+must be governed by the role of the material at issue in the exercise of Article III judicial power
+and the resultant value of such information to those monitoring the federal courts." Amodeo, 71
+F.3d at 1049.
+
+10
+
+Moreover, public release of this Court's legal interpretations of Section 215 would
+benefit the public interest immensely.⁵ As discussed above, the recent disclosures about the
+Executive Branch's use of its surveillance authority under Section 215 have prompted a renewed
+debate about that authority-a debate welcomed by both President Obama and members of
+Congress. Because the Verizon 215 Order merely implements, rather than explains, the
+government's surveillance authority under Section 215, the release of opinions issued by this
+Court interpreting that authority would permit the public to more fully understand the order's
+meaning and to contribute to the ongoing debate, as well as to hold its representatives
+accountable for their support of or opposition to such authority.
+
+For example, release of Section 215 opinions would allow the public to understand the
+reach of the statutory term "tangible things," which is not defined in FISA but apparently has
+been interpreted to include even electronic items. Compare 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1) (stating that
+"tangible things” “include[e] books, records, papers, documents, and other items"), with Verizon
+215 Order at 2 (stating that "tangible things" include "all call detail records or 'telephony
+metadata' created by Verizon for communications (i) between the United States and abroad; or
+(ii) wholly within the United States, including local telephone calls"). Likewise, disclosure of the
+Court's opinions would inform ongoing debate about the statutory phrase "relevant to an
+authorized investigation," 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A), and address confusion as to how the call
+records of all Americans or all Verizon customers could be "relevant to" an investigation. See,
+e.g., Amy Davidson, The N.S.A.-Verizon Scandal, Close Read, New Yorker (June 6, 2013),
+http://nyr.kr/ZvnXzM (“Does the government believe that the possibility that someone,
+
+5 The relief sought by this motion does not, as this Court interpreted the ACLU's 2007
+motion, seek "broad public access to FISC proceedings or records," In re Motion for Release of
+Court Records, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 494, but only those opinions that evaluate the meaning, scope,
+and constitutionality of Section 215.
+
+11
+
+somewhere, is calling a terrorist makes the entire body of phone calls relevant? If the answer is
+yes-and I don't think it is then there is something very wrong with the law."); Benjamin
+Wittes, A Correction and a Reiteration, Lawfare (June 6, 2013, 7:53 PM), http://bit.ly/1baFxv8
+("But here's the problem: if that constitutes relevance for purposes of Section 215 then isn't all
+data relevant to all investigations?").
+
+The Verizon 215 Order raises other questions about how this Court has interpreted the
+government's authority under the statute as well:
+
+* Whether a statute authorizing the compelled disclosure of "tangible things"
+permits essentially real-time surveillance “on an ongoing daily basis"? See
+Verizon 215 Order at 1-2.
+* Whether this Court has been asked to, or endeavored to, revisit its legal
+interpretation of Section 215 in light of the conclusion of five members of the
+Supreme Court in United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012), that "longer
+term" collection of location data or information not ordinarily protected by the
+Fourth Amendment constitutes a search? See id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in
+the judgment for four members of the Court); id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J.).
+* Whether this Court has examined the application of Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
+735 (1979), to the mass acquisition of phone records by the government under
+Section 215?
+* Whether this Court has considered the constitutionality of the "gag order"
+provision of Section 215, 50 U.S.C. § 1861(d), in light of the holding of the
+Second Circuit that a similar nondisclosure provision in another statute was
+unconstitutional? See, e.g., John Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir.
+2008).
+
+Because there is a longstanding American tradition of public access to judicial opinions;
+because such access positively contributes to the integrity of the judicial process, the democratic
+legitimacy of this Court, and the public understanding of laws passed in its name; and because
+the release of opinions interpreting Section 215 would illuminate crucial gaps in the public
+knowledge about the breadth of its government's surveillance activities under the statute, this
+
+12
+
+Court should conclude that the public's First Amendment right of access attaches to the Court's
+legal opinions relating to Section 215.⁶
+
+B. The First Amendment Requires Disclosure of the Court's Opinions Relating to
+Section 215.
+
+When the First Amendment right of access attaches to judicial documents, strict scrutiny
+applies to any restriction of that right. See Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 606–07; accord
+Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581. A court may restrict access only on the basis of a
+"compelling governmental interest," and only if the denial is “narrowly tailored to serve that
+interest." Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 606–07. Moreover, the burden to overcome a First
+Amendment right of access rests on the party seeking to restrict access, and that party must
+present specific reasons in support of its position. See Press-Enter. II, 478 U.S. at 15 ("The First
+Amendment right of access cannot be overcome by [a] conclusory assertion.").
+
+The government cannot meet the strict-scrutiny test here. With the revelation of the
+Verizon 215 Order, the President's defense of the government's Section 215 surveillance, and
+the explanations given by DNI Clapper and members of Congress, the proposition that the
+
+6 In dismissing the ACLU's prior motion for public access, Judge Bates found it relevant that
+the Court's opinions could be obtained under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”). On
+May 31, 2011, the ACLU filed a FOIA request seeking records related to the government's legal
+interpretation of Section 215, including the legal opinions sought here. Compl. ¶¶ 23-24, Am.
+Civil Liberties Union v. FBI, No. 11 Civ. 7562 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2011), ECF No. 1. In
+subsequent litigation, the government has argued that it may not release "FISC records" under
+FOIA, because only this Court may do so. Second Supplemental Decl. of Mark A. Bradley at ¶
+12, Am. Civil Liberties Union v. FBI, No. 11 Civ. 7562 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2013), ECF No. 55.
+That position contradicts representations made by the government before this Court, in which it
+insisted that FOIA was “the [o]nly [a]ppropriate [a]venue" for obtaining FISC opinions. Br. for
+Gov't at 5-7, In re Motion for Release of Court Records, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484 (FISA Ct. 2007).
+The Court credited that argument in rejecting the ACLU's previous motion for access to specific
+FISC records. See In re Motion for Release of Court Records, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 491 n.18, 497.
+For the reasons explained in this motion, the public's First Amendment right of access attaches
+to this Court's legal opinions interpreting public laws, irrespective of the government's statutory
+obligation under FOIA to disclose records in its possession.
+
+13
+
+government has an interest-let alone a "compelling" one-in preventing the release of this
+Court's opinions interpreting Section 215 is insupportable.⁷ In fact, a fuller accounting of the
+legal basis for the Verizon 215 Order would serve governmental interests by giving context and
+substance to the content of the order. Cf. James R. Clapper, DNI Statement on Recent
+Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information, Office of the Director of National
+Intelligence (June 6, 2013), http://1.usa.gov/13jwuFc ("DNI Statement") ("The article omits key
+information regarding how a classified intelligence collection program is used to prevent terrorist
+attacks and the numerous safeguards that protect privacy and civil liberties. I believe it is
+important for the American people to understand the limits of this targeted counterterrorism
+program and the principles that govern its use.").
+
+Of course, portions of the Court's opinions may be sealed to serve compelling
+governmental interests--for example, to protect intelligence sources and methods that have not
+been previously disclosed-but the First Amendment requires the Court to ensure that any
+redactions be narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Cf. Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond, 46 F.3d 29,
+
+7 That portions of the opinions sought might be classified is no obstacle to this Court's
+granting of the relief requested by this motion. The question whether and to what extent-
+judicial records must be disclosed is one for the Court to decide, applying the constitutional
+standard mandated by the First Amendment. See, e.g., Washington Post Co. v. Soussoudis, 807
+F.2d 383, 391-92 (4th Cir. 1986) ("[T]roubled as we are by the risk that disclosure of classified
+information could endanger the lives of both Americans and their foreign informants, we are
+equally troubled by the notion that the judiciary should abdicate its decisionmaking
+responsibility to the executive branch whenever national security concerns are present."); United
+States v. Rosen, 487 F. Supp. 2d 703, 716 (E.D. Va. 2007) (“While it is true, as an abstract
+proposition, that the government's interest in protecting classified information can be a
+qualifying compelling and overriding interest, it is also true that the government must make a
+specific showing of harm to national security in specific cases to carry its burden [under the
+Press-Enterprise standard]."). The government does not dispute that federal courts may order the
+release of classified information where justified. See Final Reply Br. of Appellants at 8 n.1, Ctr.
+for Int'l Envtl. Law v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, No. 12-5136 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 27,
+2012) (stating that the government has not "suggested that the Executive's determination that a
+document is classified should be conclusive or unreviewable").
+
+14
+
+31 (7th Cir. 1995) (Easterbrook, J.) ("The judge must make his own decision about what should
+be confidential (and thus be the subject of oblique reference) and what may be spoken of openly.
+I regret that this means extra work for the judge, but preserving the principle that judicial
+opinions are available to the public is worth at least that much sacrifice."). Critical to that
+analysis will be the numerous disclosures made to date regarding the government's surveillance
+activities under Section 215: that the government relies upon Section 215 to collect all
+Americans' call records, that it has been doing so for seven years, that this Court reauthorizes
+that collection program approximately every ninety days, and that this Court "only allows the
+data to be queried when there is a reasonable suspicion, based on specific facts, that the
+particular basis for the query is associated with a foreign terrorist organization.” DNI Statement.
+
+II. ALTERNATIVELY, THE COURT SHOULD EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION TO
+RELEASE ITS LEGAL OPINIONS CONCERNING SECTION 215.
+
+Even if the Court determines that the First Amendment does not require the release of
+these judicial decisions, the Court's supervisory powers over its own records, as reflected in the
+FISC Rules, permit the Court to publish its orders and opinions. The movants respectfully
+request that the Court exercise this authority.
+
+The FISC Rules expressly permit the Court to publish its own orders, opinions, or other
+decisions "sua sponte or on motion by a party request that [they] be published." FISC R.P. 62(a)
+(2010).⁸ Indeed, in 2010, the Court revised its procedural rules to clarify that the Court may
+
+8 Rule 62 of the FISC Rules, effective November 1, 2010, states:
+(a) Publication of Opinions. The Judge who authored an order, opinion, or other
+decision may sua sponte or on motion by a party request that it be published.
+Upon such request, the Presiding Judge, after consulting with other Judges of the
+Court, may direct that an order, opinion or other decision be published. Before
+publication, the Court may, as appropriate, direct the Executive Branch to review
+the order, opinion or other decision and redact it as necessary to ensure that
+
+15
+
+release its orders and opinions without prior Executive Branch approval or review.⁹ Moreover,
+the Court would have authority to grant this motion even in the absence of these rules, because it
+is fundamental that "every court has supervisory power over its own records and files." In re
+Motion for Release of Court Records, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 486–87 (quoting Nixon v. Warner
+Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978)); see also Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d
+133, 140 (2d Cir. 2004).
+
+The movants recognize that this Court's docket encompasses a great deal of material that
+is properly classified. This motion does not seek the disclosure of intelligence targets or, for that
+matter, any properly classified information. But some matters that come before the FISC raise
+novel and complex legal issues and, as a consequence, generate legal interpretations of broad
+significance. The FISC Rules contemplate instances in which the Court can and should provide
+public access to these decisions and the Court has, in the past, exercised this power in precisely
+the manner urged by the movants. On at least three occasions, this Court or the FISA Court of
+Review ("FISCR") has recognized the public interest in the Court's resolution of such issues and
+has, accordingly, published its rulings. In the early 1980s, Presiding Judge George Hart
+published an opinion concerning the Court's authority to issue warrants for physical searches.
+Letter from Presiding Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly to Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, et al. (Aug. 20,
+2002) ("Kollar-Kotelly Letter"), available at http://bit.ly/114e6SM; see James Bamford, The
+Puzzle Palace: A Report on America's Most Secret Agency (Penguin Books 1983). In 2002, the
+
+properly classified information is appropriately protected pursuant to Executive
+Order 13526 (or its successor).
+9 Compare FISC R.P. 62(a) (2010) (stating that before publication of an opinion the Court
+"may, as appropriate, direct the Executive Branch to review the order, opinion, or other decision
+and redact it as necessary to ensure that properly classified information is appropriately
+protected"), with FISC R.P. 5(c) (2006) (stating that before publication of an opinion it "must be
+reviewed by the Executive Branch and redacted, as necessary, to ensure that properly classified
+information is appropriately protected").
+
+16
+
+Court published an en banc decision addressing the government's motion to vacate certain
+procedures that the Court had previously enforced as "minimization procedures" under 50 U.S.C.
+§ 1801(h). See Hon. Kollar-Kotelly Letter. ¹⁰
+
+Most recently, in 2009, the FISCR released a formerly classified opinion because it
+"addresses and resolves issues of statutory and constitutional significance," because "it would
+serve the public interest and the orderly administration of justice to publish" the opinion, and
+because the Court could redact classified material from the opinion without "distorting the
+content of the discussion of the statutory and constitutional issues." Order, In re Directives
+[Redacted] Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, No. 08-01 at
+1 (FISA Ct. Rev. Jan. 12, 2009), available at http://bit.ly/r32r2W. All of those factors apply with
+equal force to this motion. At a minimum, the Court's previous disclosures show that the type of
+tailored, limited publication of the Court's legal reasoning requested here can be accomplished
+without harm to national security.
+
+The Court's opinions concerning Section 215 plainly address legal issues of similarly
+broad significance. The broad surveillance power conferred by Section 215 and the unknown
+reach of several of the statute's terms make any controlling judicial interpretation of the law a
+matter of acute public concern. The materials sought by this motion are not simply routine FISC
+orders that granted run-of-the-mill surveillance applications; they are, instead, decisional law
+fixing the limits of the government's surveillance authority. The opinions are surely, in practice,
+a clearer statement of what Section 215 does and does not allow than the words in the U.S. Code.
+
+10 This Court's decision was later appealed by the government, requiring the FISCR to
+convene for the first time ever. The FISCR published its subsequent order and opinion. See In re
+Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 742 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002). The briefs submitted by the government
+were also made public. See Br. for the United States, In re Sealed Case, No. 02-001 (Aug. 21,
+2002); Supp. Br. for the United States, In re Sealed Case, No. 02-001 (Sep. 25, 2002). The briefs
+are available at http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/.
+
+17
+
+That the release of the Verizon 215 Order came as such a shock to the nation indicates just how
+uninformed the public has been to date about the scope of the provision.
+
+Access to these legal opinions is thus crucial: the public cannot assess the country's laws,
+the work of their legislators, or the powers conferred upon their executive officials unless they
+know what the courts take those laws to mean. In this way, the sealed opinions at issue have far-
+reaching implications. In "address[ing] and resolv[ing] issues of statutory and constitutional
+significance," they affect far more than the executive's authority to conduct surveillance in
+individual foreign intelligence or terrorism investigations. Order, In re Directives [Redacted]
+Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, No. 08-01 at 1 (FISA Ct/
+Rev. Jan. 12, 2009). Disclosure of these opinions, with redactions to protect information that
+warrants continued sealing, is consistent with the Court's past practice and procedural rules.
+
+Moreover, the recent disclosures relating to the government's surveillance activities
+under Section 215 eliminate any interest in continued sealing of the Court's legal opinions. As
+explained above, the President, the Director of National Intelligence, and members of the
+congressional intelligence committees have revealed the essential details of the program. This
+Court's rules permit it to publish its legal opinions in precisely these circumstances. At the same
+time, the Court's previous disclosures exemplify the Court's ability to properly balance the need
+for disclosure with the government's interest in secrecy in this context. There is no obstacle-
+either procedural or practical-to releasing FISC opinions that have been carefully redacted to
+protect specific intelligence interests, so that the public knows the meaning of its laws.
+
+18
+
+CONCLUSION
+
+For the foregoing reasons, the movants respectfully request that this Court unseal its
+opinions evaluating the meaning, scope, and constitutionality of Section 215 of the Patriot Act.
+The movants request that these materials be released as quickly as possible and with only those
+redactions essential to protect information that the Court determines, after independent review, to
+warrant continued sealing. Given the relevance of the opinions to an ongoing debate of immense
+public interest, the movants also request expedited consideration of this motion, as well as oral
+argument before the Court.
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+David A. Schulz
+Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic
+Yale Law School
+40 Ashmun Street, 4th Floor
+New Haven, CT 06511
+Phone: (203) 436-5892
+Fax: (203) 436-0851
+david.schulz@yale.edu
+
+/s/ Alex Abdo
+Alex Abdo
+Brett Max Kaufman
+Patrick Toomey
+Jameel Jaffer
+American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
+125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
+New York, NY 10004
+Phone: (212) 549-2500
+Fax: (212) 549-2654
+aabdo@aclu.org
+
+Arthur B. Spitzer
+American Civil Liberties Union of the
+Nation's Capital
+4301 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 434
+Washington, DC 20008
+Phone: (202) 457-0800
+Fax: (202) 457-0805
+artspitzer@aclu-nca.org
+
+June 10, 2013
+
+19
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I, Alex Abdo, certify that on this day, June 10, 2013, a copy of the foregoing brief was
+served by UPS on the following persons:
+
+Eric H. Holder
+Attorney General
+Office of the Attorney General
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
+Washington, DC 20530
+
+John P. Carlin
+Acting Assistant Attorney General for National Security
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
+Washington, DC 20530
+
+Christine Gunning
+Litigation Security Group
+U.S. Department of Justice
+2 Constitution Square
+145 N Street, N.E.
+Suite 2W-115
+Washington, DC 20530
+
+/s/ Alex Abdo
+Alex Abdo
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_aclu-misc-13-02/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_aclu-misc-13-02/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..15cdffd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_aclu-misc-13-02/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Motion of the American Civil Liberties Union, the American Civil Liberties Union of the Nation's Capital, and the Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic for the Release of Court Records, In re Orders of this Court Interpreting Section 215 of the Patriot Act",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-06-10",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-06-10",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/sites/default/files/assets/Misc%252013-02%2520Motion-1.pdf",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "076600e103ee1700015d8c4439983bae8fbe07096b44d25e7c711e90ad9b66c3",
+ "pages": 21
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-02-08-09-order-131205/FISC_-_br13-02-08-09-order-131205.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-02-08-09-order-131205/FISC_-_br13-02-08-09-order-131205.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f2d0130
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-02-08-09-order-131205/FISC_-_br13-02-08-09-order-131205.md
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+In re Orders of this Court
+Interpreting Section 215 of
+the Patriot Act
+)
+)
+)
+)
+)
+)
+Docket No. Misc. 13-02
+
+In re Opinions and Orders of this
+Court Addressing Bulk Collection
+of Data Under the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act
+)
+)
+)
+)
+)
+)
+Docket No. Misc. 13-08
+
+In re Motion of Propublica, Inc.
+for the Release of Court Records
+)
+)
+)
+)
+)
+Docket No. Misc. 13-09
+
+ORDER ON MOTION OF THE REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR
+FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND 25 MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS
+FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF
+CERTAIN MOTIONS IN THE ABOVE-REFERENCED CASES
+
+Now before the Court is the motion of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press
+and a group of 25 media organizations (collectively "Movants") to file a brief as amici curiae in
+the above-captioned cases. The Movants represent that counsel for all parties have consented to
+the filing of the brief that accompanies their motion. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that
+the motion is granted.
+
+SO ORDERED, this 5th day of December, 2013.
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-02-08-09-order-131205/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-02-08-09-order-131205/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ae044d3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-02-08-09-order-131205/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Order on Motion of The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and 25 Media Organizations for Leave to File Brief as Amici Curiae in Support of Certain Motions in the Above-Referenced Cases, In re Orders of this Court Interpreting Section 215 of the Patriot Act",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-12-05",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-12-05",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34266",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "97b2f15ae5ea220731f09b5e0eaf3eca92be95bb9d0ea1d99c25c16620adc303",
+ "pages": 1
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-02-order-131230/FISC_-_br13-02-order-131230.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-02-order-131230/FISC_-_br13-02-order-131230.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b54d4b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-02-order-131230/FISC_-_br13-02-order-131230.md
@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+UNITED STATES
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+2013 DEC 20 PM 4:50
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+CLERK OF COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+IN RE ORDERS OF THIS COURT
+INTERPRETING SECTION 215
+OF THE PATRIOT ACT
+)
+)
+)
+Docket No.: Misc. 13-02
+
+SUBMISSION OF THE UNITED STATES IN RESPONSE TO
+THE COURT'S NOVEMBER 20, 2013 ORDER
+
+In its September 13, 2013 Opinion and Order, the Court directed the United States to
+identify those opinions of this Court that evaluate the meaning, scope, and constitutionality of
+Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1861, that are at issue in ongoing Freedom
+of Information Act ("FOIA") litigation in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
+New York. Opinion and Order at 1, 18. The Court also directed the United States to identify
+any such opinions that are not at issue in the FOIA litigation or already subject to the Court's
+publication process pursuant to Rule 62(a) of the Court's Rules of Procedure, and to propose a
+timetable to complete declassification review of any such opinions. Opinion and Order at 18.
+
+On October 4, 2013, the Government filed a submission in response to the Court's
+September 13, 2013 Opinion and Order, and moved for a stay of further proceedings due to
+lapsed appropriations. The Government identified, inter alia, the Opinion issued in Docket
+Number BR 13-25 on February 19, 2013, as one that contains "analysis by this Court evaluating
+the meaning, scope, and/or constitutionality" of Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act,
+
+50 U.S.C. § 1861, and that is not at issue in the FOIA litigation in the Southern District of New
+York. Submission at 2.
+
+On October 8, 2013, the Court granted the Government's motion for a stay of further
+proceedings. The Court also directed the Government to submit to the Court, within seven days
+of the restoration of appropriations, a proposed timetable for completing the declassification
+review of the Opinion issued in Docket Number BR 13-25 on February 19, 2013, and submitting
+to the Court any proposed redactions for the Opinion. On October 24, 2013, the Government
+estimated that it would complete the declassification review of the Opinion and submit to the
+Court any proposed redactions by November 18, 2013.
+
+On November 18, 2013, the Government filed a submission stating that "the Executive
+Branch ha[d] determined that the Opinion should be withheld in full and a public version of the
+Opinion cannot be provided." Second Submission of the United States in Response to the
+Court's October 8, 2013 Order at 2. On November 20, 2013, this Court ordered that, no later
+than December 20, 2013, the Government should submit a detailed explanation of its
+determination that a public version could not be provided. Order at 2.
+
+The reason the Government advised the Court that the Opinion should be withheld in full
+is that the Opinion is not only classified but also pertains to an ongoing law enforcement
+investigation, and therefore is protected by the law enforcement investigatory privilege.
+Specifically, the Opinion relates to an application for records relevant to an ongoing
+investigation of a particular individual who is the subject of a Federal Bureau of Investigation
+counterterrorism investigation. The Opinion includes this Court's analysis of particular
+information relating to this subject and discusses in detail the activities of the subject and certain
+2
+
+of the subject's associates. The investigation of this individual remains open. Disclosure of
+information within the Opinion could tip off the subject and/or the subject's associates, which
+would impair the ongoing counterterrorism investigation in various ways.
+
+For these reasons, the Opinion falls within the law enforcement investigatory privilege,
+which protects law enforcement information from disclosure where "disclosure of the
+information would jeopardize on-going investigations by prematurely revealing facts and
+investigatory materials to potential subjects of those investigations." In re Sealed Case, 856 F.2d
+268, 272 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see also In re Dep't of Investigation of City of New York, 856 F.2d
+481, 483-84 (2d Cir. 1988). Such information would also be protected from disclosure under the
+Freedom of Information Act, which codified the privilege. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A); see also
+Juarez v. Department of Justice, 518 F.3d 54, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (FOIA Exemption 7(A)
+protects from mandatory disclosure law enforcement records, the disclosure of which "could
+reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings") (quoting 5 U.S.C. §
+552(b)(7)(A)). Significantly, the law enforcement investigatory privilege is applied categorically
+to documents and classes of documents and generally does not require the Government to show
+that disclosure of each paragraph of the document would cause harm to the investigation. See
+NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 236 (1978); Maydak v. United States Dep't
+of Justice, 218 F.3d 760, 763 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
+
+However, upon review and as a discretionary matter, the Government has now
+determined that it does not object if this Court determines, pursuant to Rule 62(a), that those
+portions of the Opinion that are not classified and the release of which would not jeopardize the
+ongoing investigation should be published. In that regard, the Government has identified for this
+Court in the attached declaration and proposed redacted opinion those portions of the Opinion
+3
+
+that are classified and/or the release of which would harm the ongoing investigation. See
+Declaration of Richard McNally, Acting Deputy General Counsel, Federal Bureau of
+Investigation. Any publication of the Opinion by this Court should not include these portions.
+See FISC Rules of Procedure 3, 62.¹
+
+All of the text that the Government has determined should not be released in the Opinion
+is contained in text boxes. Should the Court elect, pursuant to Rule 62(a), to publish the
+Opinion, the Director of National Intelligence will formally declassify the proposed redacted
+version of the Opinion provided to the Court. The Government will then provide the Court with
+a redacted version of the Opinion, appropriate for publication, blacking out the information
+currently contained in the text boxes and striking through any classification markings that are no
+longer valid.
+
+¹ In addition, the Government has identified the names of certain government employees and
+non-government individuals that should be redacted if the Opinion is published.
+4
+
+December 20, 2013
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+
+J. BRADFORD WIEGMANN
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+TASHINA GAUHAR
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+/s/ Nicholas J. Patterson
+JEFFREY M. SMITH
+NICHOLAS J. PATTERSON
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+Phone: (202) 514-5600
+Fax: (202) 514-8053
+
+Attorneys for the United States of America
+5
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+I hereby certify that a true copy of the Submission of the United States in Response to the
+Court's November 20, 2013 Order was served by the Government via Federal Express overnight
+delivery on this 20th day of December, 2013, addressed to:
+
+Alex Abdo
+Brett Max Kaufman
+Patrick Toomey
+Jameel Jaffer
+American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
+125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
+New York, NY 10004
+aabdo@aclu.org
+
+Arthur B. Spitzer
+American Civil Liberties Union of the
+Nation's Capital
+4301 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 434
+Washington, DC 20008
+artspitzer@aclu-nca.org
+
+David A. Schulz
+Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic
+Yale Law School
+40 Ashmun Street, 4th Floor
+New Haven, CT 06511
+david.schulz@yale.edu
+
+Gregory L. Diskant
+Benjamin S. Litman
+Richard I. Kim
+Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP
+1133 Avenue of the Americas
+New York, NY 10036
+blitman@pbwt.com
+
+/s/ Nicholas J. Patterson
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-02-order-131230/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-02-order-131230/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ef532b6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-02-order-131230/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Submission of the United States in Response to the Court's November 20, 2013 Order, In re Orders of this Court Interpreting Section 215 of the Patriot Act",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-12-20",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-12-20",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34449",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "6378feb6501d46065a85ce61e6f6a492a68aaaaa1aeb8076c0fd14f1e421ce65",
+ "pages": 6
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-02-order-140107/FISC_-_br13-02-order-140107.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-02-order-140107/FISC_-_br13-02-order-140107.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6c57e9f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-02-order-140107/FISC_-_br13-02-order-140107.md
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+UNITED STATES
+U.S. FOREIGN
+SURVEILLANCE
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+2014 FEB-6 Pii 4:42
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+SEANK FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+IN RE ORDERS OF THIS COURT
+INTERPRETING SECTION 215
+OF THE PATRIOT ACT
+)
+)
+Docket No.: Misc. 13-02
+)
+)
+
+SECOND SUBMISSION OF THE UNITED STATES
+IN RESPONSE TO THE COURT'S NOVEMBER 20, 2013 ORDER
+
+In its September 13, 2013 Opinion and Order, the Court directed the United States to
+identify those opinions of this Court that evaluate the meaning, scope, and constitutionality of
+Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1861, that are at issue in ongoing Freedom
+of Information Act ("FOIA") litigation in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
+New York. Opinion and Order at 1, 18. The Court also directed the United States to identify
+any such opinions that are not at issue in the FOIA litigation or already subject to the Court's
+publication process pursuant to Rule 62(a) of the Court's Rules of Procedure, and to propose a
+timetable to complete declassification review of any such opinions. Id. at 18.
+
+On October 4, 2013, the Government filed a submission in response to the Court's
+September 13, 2013 Opinion and Order, and moved for a stay of further proceedings due to
+lapsed appropriations. The Government identified, *inter alia*, the Opinion issued in Docket
+Number BR 13-25 on February 19, 2013, as one that contains "analysis by this Court evaluating
+the meaning, scope, and/or constitutionality" of Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act,
+50 U.S.C. § 1861, and that is not at issue in the FOIA litigation in the Southern District of New
+York. Submission at 2.
+
+2
+
+On October 8, 2013, the Court granted the Government's motion for a stay of further
+proceedings. The Court also directed the Government to submit to the Court, within seven days
+of the restoration of appropriations, a proposed timetable for completing the declassification
+review of the Opinion issued in Docket Number BR 13-25 on February 19, 2013, and submitting
+to the Court any proposed redactions for the Opinion. On October 24, 2013, the Government
+estimated that it would complete the declassification review of the Opinion and submit to the
+Court any proposed redactions by November 18, 2013.
+
+On November 18, 2013, the Government filed a submission stating that "the Executive
+Branch ha[d] determined that the Opinion should be withheld in full and a public version of the
+Opinion cannot be provided." Second Submission of the United States in Response to the
+Court's October 8, 2013 Order at 2. On November 20, 2013, this Court ordered that, no later
+than December 20, 2013, the Government should submit a detailed explanation of its
+determination that a public version could not be provided. Id. at 2.
+
+On December 20, 2013, the Government filed a submission stating that the Opinion could
+be withheld in full because the Opinion is not only classified but also pertains to an ongoing law
+enforcement investigation, and therefore is protected by the law enforcement investigatory
+privilege. However, the Government noted that, upon review and as a discretionary matter, the
+Government does not object if this Court determines, pursuant to Rule 62(a), that those portions
+of the Opinion that are not classified and the release of which would not jeopardize the ongoing
+investigation should be published. The Government identified for the Court, in a proposed
+redacted opinion and the Declaration of Richard McNally, Acting Deputy General Counsel,
+Federal Bureau of Investigation, those portions of the Opinion that are classified and/or the
+release of which would harm the ongoing investigation.
+
+3
+
+On January 23, 2014, at the Court's request, the Government met with Court staff
+regarding the Government's proposed redactions to the Opinion. In response to questions from
+the Court's staff, and upon further review of the Opinion, the Government has determined that
+certain additional information in the Opinion is not classified and the release of that additional
+information would not jeopardize the ongoing investigation. The Government has identified for
+this Court, in the attached revised copy of the Opinion, the portions of the Opinion that are
+classified and/or the release of which would harm the ongoing investigation.1 All of the text that
+the Government has determined should not be released in the Opinion is contained in text boxes.
+Any publication of the Opinion by this Court should not include these portions. See FISC Rules
+of Procedure 3, 62. Should the Court elect to publish the Opinion, pursuant to Rule 62(a), the
+Government will provide the Court with a redacted version of the Opinion, appropriate for
+publication, blacking out the information currently contained in the text boxes and striking
+through any classification markings that are no longer valid.
+
+1 In addition, the Government has identified the name of one government employee that should
+be redacted if the Opinion is published.
+
+4
+
+February 6, 2014
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+
+TASHINA GAUHAR
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+National Security Division
+
+J. BRADFORD WIEGMANN
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+National Security Division
+
+/s/ Alex Iftimie
+JEFFREY M. SMITH
+ALEX IFTIMIE
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+Phone: (202) 514-5600
+Fax: (202) 514-8053
+
+Attorneys for the United States of America
+
+5
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I hereby certify that a true copy of the Second Submission of the United States in
+Response to the Court's November 20, 2013 Order was served by the Government via Federal
+Express overnight delivery on this 6th day of February, 2014, addressed to:
+
+Alex Abdo
+Brett Max Kaufman
+Patrick Toomey
+Jameel Jaffer
+American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
+125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
+New York, NY 10004
+aabdo@aclu.org
+
+Arthur B. Spitzer
+American Civil Liberties Union of the
+Nation's Capital
+4301 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 434
+Washington, DC 20008
+artspitzer@aclu-nca.org
+
+David A. Schulz
+Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic
+Yale Law School
+40 Ashmun Street, 4th Floor
+New Haven, CT 06511
+david.schulz@yale.edu
+
+Gregory L. Diskant
+Benjamin S. Litman
+Richard I. Kim
+Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP
+1133 Avenue of the Americas
+New York, NY 10036
+blitman@pbwt.com
+
+/s/
+Alex Iftimie
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-02-order-140107/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-02-order-140107/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eac4f0f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-02-order-140107/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Second Submission of the United States in Response to the Court's November 20, 2013 Order, In re Orders of this Court Interpreting Section 215 of the Patriot Act",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2014-02-06",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2014-02-06",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34450",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "9a8829a02e0348b5c25c0a12e31235c9cdc677001d5fc95f4d6eb34e2ca3e45e",
+ "pages": 5
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-02-order-140219/FISC_-_br13-02-order-140219.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-02-order-140219/FISC_-_br13-02-order-140219.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..81811f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-02-order-140219/FISC_-_br13-02-order-140219.md
@@ -0,0 +1,296 @@
+U.S. FOREIGN
+SURVEIL
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+FEDERAL 19 AM 10:43
+HALL
+
+IN RE ORDERS OF THIS COURT
+INTERPRETING SECTION 215
+OF THE PATRIOT ACT
+Docket No. Misc. 13-02
+
+MOVANTS' RESPONSE TO THE SECOND SUBMISSION OF THE UNITED STATES
+IN RESPONSE TO THE COURT'S ORDER OF NOVEMBER 20, 2013
+
+PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
+
+The government has submitted proposed redactions before the public release of an
+Opinion of this Court subject to the motion for access previously filed by the ACLU and the
+Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic. While Movants have not seen the proposed
+redactions, they respectfully submit this Response to the government's assertion that material
+may be withheld from the public under a law enforcement exception or because it is classified.
+Because the Opinion is subject to the First Amendment right of access, information may only be
+redacted if the Court independently determines that the government has made the showings
+required by *Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press Enterprise II)*, 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
+
+PROCEDURAL HISTORY
+
+On September 13, 2013, this Court directed the government to identify any opinions of
+the FISC that evaluate the meaning, scope, and constitutionality of Section 215 of the Patriot
+Act, and that are not at issue in ongoing Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA") litigation in the
+
+[^1] This Court previously found that the Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic
+("MFIAC") lacked standing to assert a constitutional right of access to the Section 215 opinions.
+*In re Section 215 Orders*, No. Misc. 13-02, 2013 WL 5460064, at *4 (FISA Ct. Sept. 13, 2013).
+MFIAC has filed a motion for reconsideration, which is pending. *See MFIAC Mot. for Recons.,
+In re Section 215 Orders*, No. Misc 13-02 (FISA Ct. Oct. 11, 2013), http://l.usa.gov/1aTGGa4.
+
+U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York or already subject to the Court's
+publication process pursuant to FISC Rule 62(a). The Court further directed the government to
+propose a timetable to complete declassification review of any such opinions. On October 4,
+2013, the government identified one opinion of this Court ("the Opinion") fitting these criteria,
+and on November 18, 2013, the government informed the Court that "the Opinion should be
+withheld in full and a public version of the Opinion cannot be provided." On November 20,
+2013, the Court ordered the government to submit "a detailed explanation" of how it had reached
+that conclusion.
+
+On December 20, 2013, the government explained to the Court that "the Opinion is not
+only classified but also pertains to an ongoing law enforcement investigation, and therefore is
+protected by the law enforcement investigatory privilege." At the same time, the government
+"upon review and as a discretionary matter" determined that it would "not object" if the Court
+were to publish the Opinion in redacted form; the government also provided the Court with
+proposed redactions. On February 6, 2014, the government disclosed that it had subsequently
+"met with Court staff regarding the Government's proposed redactions to the Opinion" and
+"upon further review" determined that "certain additional information in the Opinion is not
+classified and the release of that additional information would not jeopardize the ongoing
+investigation." The government again provided the Court with a set of proposed redactions.
+
+[^2] The February 6 filing provided the first public notice that Court staff has held at least one *ex
+parte* meeting with the government on issues relating to Movants' motion for access. Movants
+recognize that the FISC generally operates in a non-adversarial manner and appreciate that if
+classified information was discussed, Movants' counsel may not have been permitted to
+participate in this meeting. But Movants urge that "any *ex parte* oral communications made to
+the court should be recorded and made available for appellate review." *Pollard v. FBI*, 705 F.2d
+1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 1983). Movants further request that reasonably segregable portions of such
+transcripts—including any record of the January 23, 2014 meeting—be placed on the Court's
+
+2
+
+ARGUMENT
+
+I. The First Amendment Right of Access Has No Law Enforcement Exception.
+
+In asserting that the Opinion "is protected by the law enforcement investigatory
+privilege" and therefore must be withheld or released only in redacted form, the government
+misapprehends both the law enforcement privilege and the First Amendment right of access. As
+the very cases cited by the government make clear, the law enforcement privilege is a limited-
+purpose shield that can be used by parties responding to discovery demands, orders to produce
+documents, and other analogous requests. In other words, it is a common law evidentiary
+privilege. *See In re Sealed Case*, 856 F.2d 268 (D.C. Cir. 1988); *In re Dep't of Investigation of
+City of New York*, 856 F.2d 481 (2d Cir. 1988). This privilege is a qualified one, under which the
+"public interest in nondisclosure must be balanced against the need of a particular litigant for
+access to the privileged information." *In re Sealed Case*, 856 F.2d at 272.
+
+It is true, as the government notes, that Congress "codified the privilege” as the basis of
+FOIA Exemption 7(A), *Submission of the U.S. in Resp. to the Court's Nov. 20, 2013 Order*
+("Gov. Br.") at 3, but Movants' right of access to the Opinion arises from the First Amendment,
+not FOIA. The government's assertion that the law enforcement privilege “applie[s]
+categorically to documents and classes of documents" likewise rests solely on FOIA doctrine and
+is inapposite here. *See Gov. Br. at 3 (citing NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co.*, 437 U.S. 214
+(1978) (FOIA request for witness statements); *Maydak v. Dep't of Justice*, 218 F.3d 760 (D.C.
+Cir. 2000) (FOIA request for criminal records)).
+
+The government offers no caselaw to support the notion that an asserted law enforcement
+
+public docket, as is consistent with the First Amendment right of access. *See, e.g., Transcript of
+Ex Parte Session, ACLU v. Dep't of Defense*, 10-4290 (Dkt. No. 140) (2d Cir. Apr. 17, 2012).
+
+3
+
+privilege can exempt entire documents—let alone entire classes of documents—from the
+public's First Amendment right of access. Nor could they do so: in a variety of contexts, courts
+have found that the First Amendment provides a right of access to government records, or
+portions thereof, even where the concerns that motivate the law enforcement privilege are
+present. In *Vasquez v. City of New York*, 10-cv-6277 (LBS), 2012 WL 4377774 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
+24, 2012), for example, the court considered a request for access to the transcript of the *ex parte*,
+*in camera* testimony of a witness in a state court murder trial. The court balanced the
+presumption of access under the First Amendment against the city's concerns over witness safety
+and found that, in the absence of "specific, on-the-record findings to justify sealing the entire
+document[]," the First Amendment access right prevailed. Id. at *3; *see also In re Application of
+N.Y. Times Co. for Access to Certain Sealed Court Records*, 585 F. Supp. 2d 83, 91 (D.D.C.
+2008) (finding a qualified First Amendment right of access to redacted search warrant records
+even though "the government has demonstrated a compelling interest—promoting effective law
+enforcement—in keeping the identity of informants secret"); *Va. Dep't of State Police v. Wash.
+Post*, 386 F.3d 567, 579 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that, to overcome a qualified First Amendment
+right of access claim, "it is not enough simply to assert th[e] general principle" that "a
+compelling governmental interest exists in protecting the integrity of an ongoing law
+enforcement investigation").
+
+In sum, the government cannot short-circuit the findings required under the First
+Amendment right of access simply by asserting that the requested materials fall under a law
+enforcement privilege.
+
+II. The Government's Proposed Withholdings Must Survive Strict Scrutiny.
+
+Instead, the government must satisfy the constitutional standards articulated in *Press-
+Enterprise II*. In that case, the Supreme Court held that "[s]ince a qualified First Amendment
+
+4
+
+right of access attaches to preliminary hearings [in a California state criminal trial] . . . the
+proceedings cannot be closed unless specific, on the record findings are made demonstrating that
+closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest." 478
+U.S. 1, 13–14 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). In *Press-Enterprise II*, the interest in
+secrecy asserted was the defendant's right to a fair trial free from prejudice by publicity. Though
+it found the government's interest legitimate, the Court held that "this risk of prejudice does not
+automatically justify refusing public access to hearings." Id. at 15. Instead, the government was
+required to demonstrate on the basis of specific facts, first, a "substantial probability" that the
+defendant's right to a fair trial would be prejudiced by publicity that secrecy would prevent,
+second, that "reasonable alternatives to closure cannot adequately protect the defendant's fair
+trial rights," and third, that any restriction on access is narrowly tailored. Id. at 14 (citing
+*Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia*, 448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980)).
+
+This is a heavy burden: in *Press-Enterprise II*, the Supreme Court rejected sealing
+founded only on a "reasonable likelihood" of harm, insisting that strict scrutiny was required to
+overcome the First Amendment right of access and that such scrutiny is satisfied only by a
+substantial probability of harm. Id.; *see also Presley v. Georgia*, 558 U.S. 209, 214 (2010).
+
+Here, the government has made no attempt to demonstrate on the basis of specific facts
+that the withholding of the requested Opinion survives the strict scrutiny required by *Press-
+Enterprise II*. The government suggests only that "[d]isclosure of information within the Opinion
+could tip off the subject and/or the subject's associates" and that such a tip-off "would impair the
+ongoing counterterrorism investigation in various ways." Gov. Br. at 3 (emphasis added). Under
+*Press-Enterprise II*, the government must demonstrate a substantial likelihood that disclosure of
+the Opinion would tip off the subject or his associates. The "conclusory assertion" offered here is
+
+5
+
+not sufficient to meet even the first prong of the *Press-Enterprise II* test. *See Presley v. Georgia*,
+558 U.S. at 215 (holding that government's assertion of a "generic risk" of prejudice through
+disclosure to the public is not enough to justify excluding the public from trial, for "[i]f broad
+concerns were sufficient to override a defendant's constitutional right to a public trial, a court
+could exclude the public . . . almost as a matter of course").
+
+The government must also show that there are no reasonable alternatives to withholding
+the redacted sections of the Opinion that would adequately protect its investigation, and that the
+redactions it has proposed, Gov. Br. at 3, are narrowly tailored.[^3] More narrow options may well
+exist. For example, the Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1–16
+("CIPA"), permits the government in litigation to provide "a summary of the specific classified
+information" when classified information itself is found to be properly withheld. Id. at
+§ 6(c)(1)(B). In a similar fashion, meaningful non-classified summaries of redacted material may
+be available, or the nature of the redactions could be noted, e.g., "[redacted name of target of
+investigation]" or "[redacted investigatory method]." In failing to consider any such alternative
+measures, and in failing to show that its proposed redactions are narrowly tailored, the
+government has made no apparent effort to carry its burdens.
+
+III. This Court Has Final Say Over Any Redactions In Its Opinion.
+
+Should the government claim a compelling interest in redacting portions of the Opinion,
+this Court must still independently assess the appropriateness of each of those proposed
+redactions. Declassification review by the Executive fails to satisfy public's First Amendment
+right "to be heard on the question of their exclusion." *Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court*
+
+[^3] Again, the subsequent Second Submission in Response to the Court's November 20, 2013
+Order offers the most recent of three different positions that the government has taken on the
+extent to which the Opinion may be released: not at all (as of November 18, 2013), only if
+redacted (as of December 20, 2013), and only if less redacted (as of February 6, 2014).
+
+6
+
+for *Norfolk Cnty.*, 457 U.S. 596, 609 n.25 (1982) (quoting *Gannett Co. v. DePasquale*, 443 U.S.
+368, 401 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring)). Instead, the Court must "independently examine the
+Government's redactions" to make sure that they "are no greater than necessary." *United States
+v. Moussaoui*, 65 F. App'x 881, 888 (4th Cir. 2003). Thus, when the government asserts that the
+Court should publish only those portions of the Opinion that the Executive deems appropriate,
+Gov. Br. at 3–4, the government improperly attempts to restrict public access to court records. *In
+re Wash. Post Co.*, 807 F.2d 383, 392 (4th Cir. 1986) (“A blind acceptance by the courts of the
+government's insistence on the need for secrecy, without notice to others, without argument, and
+without a statement of reasons, would impermissibly compromise the independence of the
+judiciary and open the door to possible abuse.").
+
+Although some measure of deference to the government may be appropriate in this
+context, the judiciary's "independent judgment concerning redactions" must also be exercised.
+*Moussaoui*, 65 F. App'x at 888. Indeed, even if the government's interest in protecting portions
+of the Opinion is "a qualifying compelling and overriding" one, the First Amendment "require[s]
+a judicial inquiry into the legitimacy of the asserted . . . interest, and specific findings, sealed if
+necessary, about the harm . . . that would ensue” if the redactions were not upheld. *United States
+v. Rosen*, 487 F. Supp. 2d 703, 717 (E.D. Va. 2007) (emphasis added). The overwhelming public
+interest in understanding this Court's analysis and application of the nation's surveillance laws
+underscores this requirement. Movants therefore urge the Court to “make its own redactions [if
+any], supported by specific findings, after a careful review of all claims for and against access."
+*United States v. Amodeo*, 44 F.3d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 1995).
+
+7
+
+CONCLUSION
+
+For the foregoing reasons and the reasons given in Movants' previous filings, Movants
+respectfully request that this Court unseal the Opinion. Movants request that the Opinion be
+released as soon as possible and with only those redactions essential to protect information that
+the Court determines, after independent review, to warrant continued sealing. Movants also urge
+the Court to memorialize its conclusions with specific findings on the record.
+
+Dated: February 18, 2014
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+David A. Schulz
+Jonathan Manes
+Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic
+Yale Law School[^4]
+P.O. Box 208215
+New Haven, CT 06520
+Phone: (212) 850-6103
+Fax: (212) 850-6299
+dschulz@lskslaw.com
+
+/s/ Alex Abdo
+Alex Abdo
+Brett Max Kaufman
+Patrick Toomey
+Jameel Jaffer
+American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
+125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
+New York, NY 10004
+Phone: (212) 549-2500
+Fax: (212) 549-2654
+aabdo@aclu.org
+
+Arthur B. Spitzer
+American Civil Liberties Union of the
+Nation's Capital
+4301 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 434
+Washington, DC 20008
+Phone: (202) 457-0800
+Fax: (202) 457-0805
+artspitzer@aclu-nca.org
+
+[^4] This Response has been prepared with the assistance of Yale Law School students Patrick
+Hayden '14, Anjali Motgi '14, Max Mishkin '14, and Brianna van Kan '15. This Response does
+not purport to present the institutional views of Yale Law School, if any.
+
+8
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I, Alex Abdo, certify that on this day, February 18, 2014, a copy of the foregoing brief
+was served on the following persons by the methods indicated:
+
+By email and UPS overnight delivery
+
+Christine Gunning
+Litigation Security Group
+U.S. Department of Justice
+2 Constitution Square
+145 N Street, N.E.
+Suite 2W-115
+Washington, DC 20530
+Email: Christine.E.Gunning@usdoj.gov
+
+By UPS overnight delivery
+
+John P. Carlin
+J. Bradford Wiegmann
+Tashina Gauhar
+Jeffrey M. Smith
+Nicholas J. Patterson
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, DC 20530
+Phone: (202) 514-5600
+
+/s/ Alex Abdo
+Alex Abdo
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-02-order-140219/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-02-order-140219/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fc93e4c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-02-order-140219/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Movant's Response to the Second Submission of the United States in Response to the Court's Order of November 20, 2013, In re Orders of this Court Interpreting Section 215 of the Patriot Act",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2014-02-19",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2014-02-19",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34451",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "2c7c538a1361cebf237416b3efabf0fa84fce22f7bd774c66387bbcd9549e2d1",
+ "pages": 9
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-130823/FISC_-_br13-09-130823.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-130823/FISC_-_br13-09-130823.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..57edb12
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-130823/FISC_-_br13-09-130823.md
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D. C.
+
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
+BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
+ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
+OF TANGIBLE THINGS FROM
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Docket Number: BR 13-109
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+ORDER
+
+The Judge who authored the Memorandum Opinion and Primary Order in this matter has
+made a sua sponte request, pursuant to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) Rule
+62(a), for the publication of those documents. See Mem. Op. at 29. Rule 62(a) provides in
+pertinent part:
+
+The Judge who authored an order, opinion, or other decision may sua sponte ...
+request that it be published. Upon such request, the Presiding Judge, after
+consulting with other Judges of the Court, may direct that an order, opinion or
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+other decision be published. Before publication, the Court may, as appropriate,
+direct the Executive Branch to review the order, opinion, or other decision and
+redact as necessary to ensure that properly classified information is appropriately
+protected pursuant to Executive Order 13526 (or its successor).
+
+Upon consideration of the Judge's request, and after consultation among the judges of
+this Court pursuant to FISC Rules 62(a), it is HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
+
+1. The Government shall conduct a declassification review of (a) this Court's
+Memorandum Opinion of August 22, 2013, in this docket, and (b) this Court's
+Primary Order of July 19, 2013, in this docket.
+
+2. The Government shall report to the Court by August 30, 2013, with estimated dates
+by which it will be able to complete its review of the two documents identified above.
+
+SO ORDERED, this 23rd day of August, 2013.
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+2
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-130823/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-130823/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5073ac6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-130823/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Order, In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring Production of Tangible Things from REDACTED",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-08-23",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-08-23",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34253",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "efb137ae02a76810ae7094e33cc72d249563185cdb0695786432efe7a3a1af54",
+ "pages": 2
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-130829/FISC_-_br13-09-130829.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-130829/FISC_-_br13-09-130829.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2a05e8d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-130829/FISC_-_br13-09-130829.md
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D. C.
+
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
+BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
+ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
+OF TANGIBLE THINGS FROM
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Docket Number: BR 13-109
+
+ORDER
+
+On August 22, 2013, this Court issued a Memorandum Opinion in the above-
+captioned docket. Since that time, it has come to the Court's attention that, due to a
+technical printing error, the footnotes in that opinion were not numbered properly
+resulting in two numbers being skipped. As a result, the Court has corrected the
+numbering of the footnotes, and it is HEREBY ORDERED that an Amended
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+Memorandum Opinion shall issue solely for the purpose of correcting the numbering of
+the footnotes. No other changes have been made to the Memorandum Opinion.
+
+SO ORDERED, this 29^th^ day of August, 2013.
+
+CLAIRE V. EAGAN
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+2
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-130829/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-130829/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5764f5b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-130829/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Order, In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring Production of Tangible Things from REDACTED",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-08-29",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-08-29",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34254",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "9413b242058ef00860fc4f068365577b03c8d1205de1cf36246abf767c640e07",
+ "pages": 2
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-130917/FISC_-_br13-09-130917.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-130917/FISC_-_br13-09-130917.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2c73d13
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-130917/FISC_-_br13-09-130917.md
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
+BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
+ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
+OF TANGIBLE THINGS
+
+Docket Number: BR 13-109
+
+## ORDER
+
+On August 23, 2013, the Court directed the Government to conduct a declassification
+review of the Memorandum Opinion and Primary Order that were issued in this docket on
+August 22, 2013 and July 19, 2013, respectively.¹ That review is now complete, and the Court
+has determined that the attached Amended Memorandum Opinion and related orders, as
+redacted, are suitable for publication. Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that, pursuant to
+F.I.S.C. Rule 62(a), the Court's Amended Memorandum Opinion of August 29, 2013, as
+redacted, the Primary Order of July 19, 2013, as redacted, the Order of August 23, 2013, as
+redacted, the Order of August 29, 2013, and this Order shall be published.
+
+SO ORDERED, this 17th day of September, 2013.
+
+/s/ Reggie B. Walton
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+---
+¹ The Court issued an Amended Memorandum Opinion on August 29, 2013, solely for the purpose of correcting the
+numbering of the footnotes.
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-130917/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-130917/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e5d2df2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-130917/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Order, In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring Production of Tangible Things",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-09-17",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-09-17",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34255",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "373072113854dc84411a7cb5d0e11930287082fa099c8a43913aa888bb23e26a",
+ "pages": 1
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-letter-131009/FISC_-_br13-09-letter-131009.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-letter-131009/FISC_-_br13-09-letter-131009.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a623398
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-letter-131009/FISC_-_br13-09-letter-131009.md
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+Center for National Security Studies
+U.S. FOREIGN
+protecting civil liberties and human rights INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+2013 SEP 26 PM 4:56
+
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+September 25, 2013
+
+The Honorable Reggie B. Walton
+Presiding Judge
+United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+Washington, D.C. 20001
+
+Dear Judge Walton,
+
+Owing to the considerable importance of legal issues concerning bulk telephone metadata
+collection under section 501 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, we are writing concerning
+the procedures the Court may use to ensure plenary consideration on a public record of these
+issues in the event that the Government seeks reauthorization of that collection.
+
+First, we request that the Court direct the Government, if it seeks reauthorization, to file
+on the public record an application and supporting brief that sets forth its argument on the
+legality of bulk telephony metadata collection. While the Government may have supplemental
+classified information that is submitted to the Court under seal, it is important that there be a
+public record that describes the full legal basis for the Government's application.
+
+We note that the Court has now published an opinion on telephony metadata collection
+under section 501 (per Judge Eagan). That decision, like earlier decisions of the Court, was
+reached after ex parte proceedings. Moreover, the Court notes (opinion fn. 4) that it explicitly
+did not consider the Administration White Paper on Bulk Collection of Telephony Metadata
+Under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act (August 9, 2013) which was released after the
+Court's ex parte hearing with the Government. It is therefore important that in the briefing now
+being proposed the Government go first so that it is clear what legal analysis it is now relying
+on.
+
+Second, we request that the Court establish a briefing schedule that enables interested
+persons or organizations to submit briefs amicus curiae responding to the Government's
+submission. This would be in accord with procedures utilized by the Court of Review in In re
+Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002) and in In re: Directives Pursuant
+to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004 (Foreign Intel. Surv.
+Ct. Rev. 2008). My organization, the Center for National Security Studies, participated as
+amicus curiae in the 2002 In re Sealed Case, and filed a Legal Memorandum In re Warrantless
+Electronic Surveillance before the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court in 2006.
+
+1730 Pennsylvania Ave NW, 7th Floor, Washington, D.C. 2006
+tel: (202) 721-5650 fax: (202) 530-0128 kmartin@cnss.org
+
+Third, we believe that pursuant to section 103(a)(2), 50 USC 1803(a)(2) of the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act and implementing rules of this Court, this is an appropriate matter
+for the Court to consider en banc. Under the Act and the rules, a majority of the judges of the
+Court may order en banc consideration when "the proceeding involves a question of exceptional
+importance." Any request by the Government to reauthorize bulk collection of telephony
+metadata would meet that standard.
+
+We believe that the Court's favorable action in response to these requests will promote
+the public interest in assuring that there is plenary consideration of the significant legal issues in
+this matter and help fulfill the Government's commitment to greater transparency on these
+issues.
+
+We are sending copies of this letter to John P. Carlin, Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security, and Robert S. Litt, General Counsel, Office of Director of National
+Intelligence. We hope that they will join in these requests.
+
+We are submitting these requests by letter. If a formal motion is required, we ask you to
+treat this letter as a motion or advise us that it should be refiled as such.
+
+Thank you for your consideration of this matter.
+
+Sincerely,
+Kate Martin
+
+cc:
+
+John P. Carlin
+Acting Assistant Attorney General for National Security
+U.S. Department of Justice
+950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+
+Robert S. Litt
+General Counsel
+Office of the Director of National Intelligence
+1500 Tysons McLean Dr.
+McLean, Virginia 22102
+
+2
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-letter-131009/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-letter-131009/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b437dfc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-letter-131009/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Center for National Security Studies Letter, September 25, 2013",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-09-26",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-09-26",
+ "link": "https://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/BR%2013-109%20Letter-1.pdf",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "e7877a81fa0a7521c966b371fc8964c457187dc7af74a7955800df9426729cb1",
+ "pages": 2
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-motion-131017/FISC_-_br13-09-motion-131017.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-motion-131017/FISC_-_br13-09-motion-131017.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a8f9552
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-motion-131017/FISC_-_br13-09-motion-131017.md
@@ -0,0 +1,244 @@
+UNITED STATES FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+U.S. FOREIGN
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT,
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+2013 OCT 17 PM 2:29
+
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
+BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
+ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
+OF TANGIBLE THINGS
+
+Docket No. BR 13-109
+(or successor docket)
+
+MOTION TO ESTABLISH A PUBLIC BRIEFING SCHEDULE INCLUDING
+THE FILINGS OF BRIEFS BY AMICI CURIAE, FOR LEAVE FOR THE
+CENTER FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES TO FILE AN
+AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF, AND A SUGGESTION FOR HEARING EN BANC
+
+Pursuant to Rule 6(d) of the Rules of the United States Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Court, the Center for National Security Studies moves this Court to establish
+procedures to ensure that the most recent or next reauthorization of the bulk telephone
+metadata collection previously authorized in Docket No. BR 13-109 is given plenary
+consideration by the full Court that includes an opportunity for amici curiae to submit a
+brief or briefs setting forth reasons why section 501 of the Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Act, 50 USC § 1861, does not authorize that bulk collection.
+
+1. The Center for National Security Studies is a project of the National Security
+Archive Fund, Inc., a tax-exempt organization under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal
+Revenue Code. The Center is dedicated to the defense of civil liberties, human rights and
+constitutional limits on government power. Since being founded in 1974, one of the
+Center's principal concerns has been the prevention of illegal government surveillance.
+
+To that end, the Center participated as amicus curiae in In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717
+(Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002).
+
+2. On September 25, 2013, the Center submitted a letter to the Presiding Judge of
+this Court concerning the procedures the Court may use to ensure plenary consideration
+on a public record of the significant legal issues concerning the legality of bulk telephony
+metadata collection. Specifically, the letter requested that the procedures include three
+elements. First, if the Government seeks reauthorization of the collection, the
+Government should file on the public record a supporting brief that sets forth its
+argument on the legality of the collection. The letter recognized the Government might
+have supplemental classified information that has been or would be submitted to the
+Court under seal. Second, the letter sought a briefing schedule that enables interested
+persons or organizations to submit briefs amicus curiae responding to the Government's
+submission. Third, the letter expressed the belief that this is an appropriate case for the
+Court to hear en banc. The letter asked that if a formal motion should be made that the
+letter be treated as a motion or that the Center be advised that a motion should be filed.
+Copies of the letter were sent to the Acting Assistant Attorney General for National
+Security and the General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
+with the hope expressed that they would join in these requests.
+
+3. On October 9, 2013, this Court entered an order that a formal motion is
+required and that the Center may resubmit its requests in that form. The order directed
+that any such submission address whether the Center's requests are foreclosed in whole
+or in part by the language and structure of Section 1861, the section of Title 50 of the
+
+2
+
+U.S. Code that sets forth the provisions of section 501 of FISA and is commonly referred
+to as section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act.
+
+4. On October 11, 2013, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
+announced that this Court has approved the Government's application to renew the court
+authorization for the telephony metadata program that expired on October 11, 2013.
+
+5. Pursuant to the Court's invitation, the Center hereby moves for entry of an
+order granting the requests set forth in its letter of September 25, 2013. Since then,
+authority for bulk telephony metadata collection expired on October 11 and has been
+renewed at the Government's request, presumably for another 90 days. We accordingly
+ask the Court to establish the recommended procedures for plenary briefing by providing
+for reconsideration and briefing on reconsideration of the ex parte order that has been
+entered reauthorizing the collection as of October 11, 2013. In the alternative, we ask
+that the Court now establish a docket for the next application for a successor 90-day bulk
+telephony metadata order and provide for the procedures requested in this motion for the
+consideration of that application. If the Court chooses that alternative, we request that the
+Court begin the schedule for that briefing as soon as possible in order to assure over the
+next three months that there is sufficient time for briefing and consideration.
+
+a) The Government should file on the public record, or declassify if it has
+submitted on the closed record, its current argument on the legality of the bulk telephony
+collection. On September 19, 2013, the Court published an opinion by Judge Claire
+Eagan on this collection that had been entered on August 22, 2013 (amended on August
+29, 2013) and declassified in substantial part by the Executive Branch. In that opinion,
+the Court noted in footnote 4 that it explicitly did not consider the Administration White
+
+3
+
+Paper on Bulk Collection of Telephony Metadata under Section 215 of the USA
+PATRIOT Act (August 9, 2013) which was released after the Court's ex parte hearing
+with the Government. There are differences, both in the ground covered and the manner
+in which points are stated, among the Court's opinion and the Government's publicly
+released arguments in the White Paper, the merits portion of the Department of Justice's
+memoranda of law in the Southern District of New York (American Civil Liberties Union
+v. Clapper, Case No. 13 Civ. 3994), and the merits portion of the Solicitor General's brief
+for the United States in response to the petition for mandamus pending in the Supreme
+Court (In re Electronic Privacy Information Center, Petitioner, No. 13-58). It is
+important, therefore, that the Government state clearly, in one public brief, the arguments
+it is now asking this Court to consider and to which amici can now respond.
+
+b) The Court should establish a briefing schedule that enables interested
+persons or organizations to submit briefs amicus curiae responding to the Government's
+submission. This would be in accord with the procedures used by the Court of Review in
+In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002). There are
+substantial questions whether Congress intended in 2001 or in the amendments enacted in
+2006 to authorize bulk collection of the telephony metadata of U.S. citizens. There are
+substantial questions whether, notwithstanding its lack of intent to do so, the language
+enacted may fairly be construed to allow for that bulk collection. And there are
+substantial questions whether the sunset extension in 2011, which occurred prior to the
+Administration's 2013 White Paper and this Court's 2013 opinion, may properly be read
+to authorize that previously unauthorized collection. Now that the fact of the collection
+has been publicly disclosed there is no reason for this Court to delay what any court of
+
+4
+
+the United States should do in a case that no longer involves a national secret: decide
+after hearing both points of view. The Administration should agree. At page 9 of his
+testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee on October 2, 2013, Director of
+National Intelligence James Clapper stated the Administration's openness to discussing
+legislation to authorize this Court to appoint an amicus in cases "that present novel and
+significant questions of law and that involve the acquisition and retention of information
+concerning a substantial number of U.S. persons." If the Court presently has the
+authority to receive amicus briefs, as we believe it does and as the Court of Review has
+done, there is no need to wait for legislation before hearing competing legal arguments on
+bulk telephony collection. Movant requests that it be granted leave to file a brief amicus
+curiae and that the schedule permit other proposed amici to seek leave to file in
+accordance with that schedule.
+
+c) The Court should consider hearing this matter en banc. Pursuant to
+section 103(a)(2) of FISA (50 USC § 1803(a)(2)) and this Court's implementing rules a
+majority of the judges of the Court may order en banc consideration when "the
+proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance," as this matter does. The
+Government reiterates the point that fourteen judges of this Court have approved bulk
+telephony orders. Perhaps the impression sought to be conveyed is that the full Court has
+weighed the legal issues and unanimously reached the same conclusion. But as far as the
+public record is concerned, this Court, as a full Court, has never considered the matter in
+the manner that the Congress has authorized, by hearing it en banc in a proceeding in
+which all the judges of the Court hear the same arguments and then deliberate together.
+While en banc proceedings might understandably be rare, the difficulty and significance
+
+5
+
+of the legal issues and their practical and potential import for the surveillance authorities
+of the Government warrant the judges of the Court coming together for the first time
+pursuant to the en banc authority granted by Congress in 2008.
+
+6. The Court directed the Center to address whether its requests are foreclosed in
+whole or in part by the language and structure of the Act. The answer is that these
+requests are not foreclosed by either the language or structure of the Act, even if some
+details of process should be adjusted in harmonizing the requests with particular features
+of the statute. As a starting point, section 103(g)(1) of FISA (50 USC § 1803(g)(1))
+provides that this Court and the Court of Review “may establish such rules and
+procedures, and take such actions, as are reasonably necessary to administer their
+responsibilities under this Act." An invitation to amici to address legal arguments that
+have been declassified by the Executive Branch, and published by this Court, in order to
+inform the Court about competing arguments may certainly be deemed to be "reasonably
+necessary" to enable the Court to carry out its function of determining whether proposed
+collection is lawful. Under section 103(g)(1), the Court does not need a formal rule on
+amicus briefs - it may "take such actions" without a rule, although, of course, the Court
+may wish to adopt a rule on amicus briefs for future matters. Not only does the Court
+have this affirmative authority to take such actions, there is also no conflict between the
+receipt of amicus briefs on unclassified matters and the provisions in section 501 of FISA
+(50 USC § 1861) on the potential party status of the recipients of business record orders.
+The amici will not be parties. For example, they will not have the right to seek review in
+the Court of Review. Their only role would be to provide arguments to the Court in
+response to arguments that have been declassified by the Executive Branch. The other
+
+6
+
+provisions identified in the Court's October 9 order pose no problem. If there is a
+concern about whether documents need to be filed under seal, there is a ready
+accommodation for that. Briefs can be filed under seal, subject to a prompt review for
+declassification. This Court's order and opinion can also be filed under seal, subject
+likewise to prompt review for declassification. And, of course, any order issued by this
+Court would remain an ex parte order even if amici are permitted to present competing
+viewpoints. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 719 ("Since the government is the only party
+to FISA proceedings, we have accepted briefs filed by [listing] as amici curiae.")
+
+7. The Court's order drew attention to the rules of this Court on security
+clearances for counsel. Undersigned counsel for the movant Center for National Security
+Studies do not hold a security clearance. The briefing proposed by this motion will not
+require counsel for amici obtaining access to or using any classified information.
+
+8. Undersigned counsel certifies that they are licensed to practice law by the Bar
+in the District of Columbia, that Kate A. Martin and Joseph Onek are members in good
+standing of the bar of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
+Circuit, and that Kate A. Martin is a member in good standing of the bar of the United
+States District Court for the District of Columbia.
+
+7
+
+Conclusion
+For the foregoing reasons, the Center for National Security Studies requests that
+the Court establish the procedures requested in this motion.
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+Kate A. Martin, D.C. Bar No. 949115
+Center for National Security Studies
+1730 Pennsylvania Ave., NW S. 700
+Washington, D.C. 20006
+(202) 721-5650 (telephone)
+(202) 530-0128 (fax)
+kmartin@cnss.org
+
+Joseph Onek, D.C. Bar No. 43611
+The Raben Group
+1640 Rhode Island Ave., NW S.600
+Washington, D.C. 20036
+(202) 587-4942 (telephone)
+(202) 463-4803 (fax)
+jonek@rabengroup.com
+
+Date: October 17, 2013
+
+Counsel for Movant Center for National
+Security Studies
+
+8
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+I, Kate A. Martin, hereby certify that on October 17, 2013, pursuant to procedures
+established by the Security and Emergency Planning Staff, United States Department of
+Justice under FISC Rule 8, I caused copies of the Motion To Establish a Public Briefing
+Schedule Including the Filings of Briefs by Amici Curiae, for Leave for the Center for
+National Security Studies to File an Amicus Curiae Brief, and a Suggestion for Hearing
+En Banc to be hand-delivered to:
+
+Christine Gunning
+United States Department of Justice
+Litigation Security Group
+145 N Street, NE
+Suite 2W-115
+Washington, DC 20530
+
+Kate A. Martin
+
+9
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-motion-131017/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-motion-131017/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..14e2a8a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-motion-131017/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Motion to Establish a Public Briefing Schedule Including the Filings of Briefs by Amici Curiae, for Leave for the Center for National Security Studies to File an Amicus Brief, and a Suggestion for Hearing En Banc, In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 13-109 (FISA Ct. Oct. 17, 2013)",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-10-17",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-10-17",
+ "link": "https://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/BR%2013-109%20Schedule-1.pdf",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "a82f7a494085ba45e304f7186b78bb98fc1322454ce160cbd6533581c26ff11a",
+ "pages": 9
+}
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+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+UNITED STATES FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT2013 NOV 12 PM 3:41
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+IN RE MOTION OF PROPUBLICA, INC.
+FOR THE RELEASE OF COURT RECORDS
+)
+)
+Docket No.: 13-09
+
+MOTION OF PROPUBLICA, INC. FOR THE RELEASE OF COURT RECORDS
+
+David Greene
+ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION
+815 Eddy Street
+San Francisco, CA 94109
+(415) 436-9333
+davidg@eff.org
+
+Counsel for Movant ProPublica, Inc.
+
+TABLE OF CONTENTS
+
+PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.................................................................................................... 1
+
+FACTUAL BACKGROUND....................................................................................................... 3
+
+JURISDICTION.......................................................................................................................... 5
+
+ARGUMENT................................................................................................................................ 6
+
+I. MOVANT HAS STANDING UNDER ARTICLE III TO SEEK THE RELIEF
+REQUESTED .............................................................................................................. 6
+
+II. THERE ARE NO KNOWN COMITY CONCERNS THAT SERVE AS A
+BAR TO THE CONSIDERATION OF THIS MOTION ........................................ 7
+
+III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT COMPELS THE RELEASE OF THE COURT'S
+OPINIONS................................................................................................................... 8
+
+A. There is a First Amendment Right of Access to Judicial Opinions.........................8
+1. Experience.......................................................................................................11
+2. Logic...............................................................................................................11
+
+B. The First Amendment Permits the Withholding of Only Those Portions
+of the Opinion Found Necessary to Protect National Security.............................13
+
+IV. ALTERNATIVELY, THE COURT SHOULD EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION
+TO RELEASE THE OPINIONS SOUGHT..............................................................15
+
+CONCLUSION........................................................................................................................... 16
+
+i
+
+TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
+Federal Cases
+
+Applications of Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc. v. Presser,
+828 F.2d 340 (6th Cir. 1987) ................................................................................10
+
+Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC,
+710 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1983) ........................................................................8, 9, 13
+
+Cal-Almond, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric.,
+960 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1992)................................................................................10
+
+Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA,
+133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013)............................................................................................6
+
+Del. Coal. for Open Gov't v. Strine,
+No. 1-11-cv-01015 (3d Cir. Oct. 23, 2013).....................................................10, 11
+
+Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft,
+303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2004) ..........................................................................10, 12
+
+El Vocero de P.R. v. Puerto Rico,
+508 U.S. 147 (1993) ..............................................................................................10
+
+Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins,
+524 U.S. 11 (1998) ..................................................................................................7
+
+Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,
+457 US 596 (1982) ..................................................................................................8
+
+Grove Fresh Distributors, Inc. v. Everfresh Juice Co.,
+24 F.3d 893 (7th Cir. 1994) ..................................................................................14
+
+Hicklin Engineering, LC v. Bartell,
+439 F. 3d 346 (7th Cir. 2006) ..............................................................................13
+
+In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things
+From [Redacted], No. BR 13-109 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013)...............................passim
+
+In Re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things
+from [Redacted], No. BR 13-158 (FISA Ct. Oct. 11, 2013) ...................................2
+
+In re Directives [Redacted] Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Act, No. 08-01 (FISA Ct. Rev. Jan. 12, 2009)..................................16
+
+ii
+
+In re Dow Jones & Co., Inc.,
+842 F.2d 603 (2nd Cir. 1988) ................................................................................7
+
+In re Motion for Release of Court Records,
+526 F. Supp. 2d 484 (FISA Ct. 2007)..........................................................6, 9, 13, 15
+
+In re Oliver,
+333 U.S. 257 (1948) ..............................................................................................12
+
+In re Orders of this Court Interpreting Section 215 of the Patriot Act at 16-17,
+No. Misc. 13-02 (FISA Ct. Sep. 13, 2013)..........................................................passim
+
+Lowenschuss v. West Pub. Co.,
+542 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1976) ..............................................................................9, 10
+
+Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
+504 U.S. 555 (1992) ................................................................................................6
+
+N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth.,
+684 F.3d 286 (2d Cir. 2012) ....................................................................................7
+
+Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns Inc.,
+435 U.S. 589 (1978) ..........................................................................................5, 15
+
+Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court,
+464 U.S. 501 (1984) ..............................................................................................14
+
+Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court,
+478 U.S. 1 (1986) ................................................................................................passim
+
+Raines v. Byrd,
+529 U.S. 811 (1997) ................................................................................................6
+
+Redacted,
+2011 WL 10945618 (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011)......................................................11
+
+Redacted,
+2012 WL 9189263 (FISA Ct. Aug. 24, 2012)......................................................11
+
+Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia,
+448 U.S. 555 (1980) ..........................................................................................8, 12
+
+Smith v. Maryland,
+442 U.S. 735 (1979) ..........................................................................................3, 5
+
+iii
+
+United States v Rosen,
+487 F. Supp. 2d 703 (E.D. Va. 2007)..................................................................14
+
+United States v. Jones,
+132 S. Ct. 945 (2012)................................................................................................2
+
+United States v. Simone,
+14 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994) ..................................................................................10
+
+Federal Statutes
+
+50 U.S.C. § 1861 ....................................................................................................passim
+
+Federal Rules
+
+Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court's Rule of Procedure 62........................1, 15, 16
+
+Constitutional Provisions
+
+First Amendment....................................................................................................passim
+Fourth Amendment................................................................................................passim
+
+Other Authorities
+
+Charlie Savage, Extended Ruling by Secret Court Backs Collection of Phone Data,
+N.Y. Times, Sep. 17, 2013 ........................................................................................5
+
+Jennifer Valentino DeVries & Siobhan Gorman, Secret Court's Redefinition of 'Relevant'
+Empowered Vast NSA Data-Gathering, Wall St. J. (July 8, 2013, 3:13 AM)............12
+
+Jim Sensenbrenner, Op-Ed., How Obama Has Abused the Patriot Act, L.A. Times,
+Aug. 19, 2013 ............................................................................................................4
+
+John Locke, Treatise of Civil Government §§ 124, 136-37 (1690)............................13
+
+Julian Sanchez, Are Internet Backbone Pen Registers Constitutional?, Just Security
+(Sep. 23, 2013, 7:55 PM)..........................................................................................5
+
+Office of the Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence, IC on the Record, DNI Clapper Declassifies
+Intelligence Community Documents Regarding Collection Under Section 501 of the
+Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) (Sep. 10, 2013)................................11
+
+Office of the Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence, IC on the Record, Release of Previously Classified
+August 29, 2013 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Opinion (Sep. 17, 2013, 4:58
+PM)..........................................................................................................................14
+
+iv
+
+Orin Kerr, Hints and Questions About the Secret Fourth Amendment Rulings of the FISA
+Court, Volokh Conspiracy (July 7, 2013, 1:37 AM)................................................12
+
+Orin Kerr, My (Mostly Critical) Thoughts on the August 2013 FISC Opinion on Section 215,
+The Volokh Conspiracy (Sep. 17, 2013, 7:39 PM)....................................................5
+
+Statement by the President, Office of the Press Secretary (June 7, 2013) ................4
+
+Status Report, Elec. Frontier Found. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice,
+No. 4:11-cv-05221 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 04, 2013), ECF No. 63....................................8
+
+U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Public Filings (last visited October 8, 2013).........11
+
+Zoë Carpenter, Congress Renews Efforts to Curb NSA Surveillance,
+The Nation (Sep. 24, 2013, 4:52 PM)........................................................................5
+
+v
+
+PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
+
+Pursuant to the First Amendment and to Rule 62 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
+Court's Rules of Procedure ("FISC Rules"), ProPublica, Inc. (“ProPublica") respectfully moves
+for the publication of a certain Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC") opinion or
+opinions that appear to underlie the government's collection of telephone metadata. The specific
+opinion or opinions sought are those referenced on, but redacted from, pages 8, 9, and 19-20 of
+In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things From
+[Redacted], No. BR 13-109 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013) (“BR 13-109").
+
+The opinion or opinions sought are cited in BR 13-109 as stating "[s]o long as no
+individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in meta[]data, the large number of persons
+whose communications will be subjected to the . . . surveillance is irrelevant to the issue of
+whether a Fourth Amendment search or seizure will occur." BR 13-109 at 8-9 (quoting
+[Redacted], at 63). The Court further cited to the opinion or opinions sought, stating, "This Court
+has previously examined the issue of relevance." Id. at 19-20. Lastly, movant seeks the opinion
+or opinions quoted on page 20 of BR 13-109 as follows:
+
+* The "finding of relevance most crucially depended on the conclusion that bulk
+collection is necessary for NSA to employ tools that are likely to generate useful
+investigative leads to help identify and track terrorist operatives."
+* Bulk collections are "necessary to identify the much smaller number of
+[international terrorist] communications."
+* "[T]he entire mass of collected metadata is relevant to investigating [international
+terrorist groups] and affiliated persons."
+
+1
+
+These records should be unsealed because the public has a First Amendment right of
+access to them.
+
+In the alternative, this Court, recognizing the considerable public interest in the opinions
+sought, should exercise its discretion to publish its own opinions. The opinions to which access
+is sought appear to set forth the FISC's ultimate legal authority supporting bulk collection of
+telephone call records pursuant to Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act. As this Court recently
+noted in the context of a request to unseal different FISC records, there is such a "considerable
+public interest" in the FISC opinions interpreting "the meaning, scope, and constitutionality of
+Section 215" because the publication of such opinions will “contribute to an informed debate...
+[and] assure citizens of the integrity of this Court's proceedings." In re Orders of this Court
+Interpreting Section 215 of the Patriot Act at 16-17, No. Misc. 13-02 (FISA Ct. Sep. 13, 2013)
+("Misc. 13-02"). Although numerous FISC opinions regarding Section 215 have now been made
+public, the FISC's ultimate authority for the bulk collection of records remains secret.¹ Like
+nesting dolls, the opinions that have been released thus far merely cite to redacted opinions, and
+when those opinions are released, they too cite to and rely on other redacted opinions. For the
+same reasons supporting the conclusion that the public interest would be served by the disclosure
+of opinions interpreting Section 215, the Court should provide the full legal rationale by
+publishing its opinions relied on in the now-public BR 13-109.
+
+¹ The FISC's most recent published Section 215 order discusses bulk collection of metadata and
+the Fourth Amendment in the context of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Jones,
+132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). In Re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Production of
+Tangible Things from [Redacted], No. BR 13-158 (FISA Ct. Oct. 11, 2013). However, the Court
+reaffirmed the analysis from BR 13-109, underscoring the importance of the still-secret opinions
+sought here. Id. at 4-5.
+
+2
+
+FACTUAL BACKGROUND
+
+On September 17, 2013, the FISC released a partially redacted version of a previously
+classified August 29, 2013 memorandum opinion requiring a telephone service provider to
+produce bulk "telephony metadata" on an ongoing basis to the National Security Agency
+("NSA"), pursuant to Section 215. See BR 13-109 at 1-2. Relying on the Supreme Court's 1979
+opinion in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), for the proposition "that a person does not
+have a legitimate expectation of privacy in telephone numbers dialed," the Court held that bulk
+collection of telephony metadata under Section 215 does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id.
+at 8-9. The Court noted the significant distinction that in Smith "the government was obtaining
+the telephone company's metadata of one person suspected of a crime... [but] [h]ere the
+government is requesting daily production of certain telephony metadata in bulk... without
+specifying the particular number of an individual." Id. at 8. However, the Court concluded that
+this was a distinction without a difference because "where one individual does not have a Fourth
+Amendment interest, grouping together a large number of similarly situated individuals cannot
+result in a Fourth Amendment interest springing into existence ex nihilo." Id. at 9. The Court's
+authority for this conclusion was a redacted citation to an earlier FISC opinion "analyz[ing] this
+distinction in a similar context." Id. at 8. Similarly, in its statutory analysis of whether bulk
+collection of telephony metadata meets Section 215's relevance standard, the Court again
+provided a redacted citation to an earlier FISC opinion. Id. at 19 ("This Court has previously
+examined the issue of relevance for bulk collections. See [redacted].") Relying on this redacted
+
+3
+
+opinion,² the Court concluded that the bulk collection fit within Section 215's statutory language.
+Id. at 20-21.
+
+The release of this redacted BR 13-109 opinion interpreting Section 215 occurred against
+the backdrop of the FISC's public ruling four days earlier on a motion by the American Civil
+Liberties Union (“ACLU"), the American Civil Liberties Union of the Nation's Capital
+(“ACLU-NC”), and the Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic (“MFIAC”) (hereinafter
+collectively "the ACLU") requesting that the Court release FISC opinions interpreting
+Section 215. See Misc. 13-02. As an exercise of its discretion, the FISC held that any opinions
+not already at issue in the ACLU's ongoing FOIA litigation should be reviewed for
+declassification and published subject to the approval of the authoring judge. Id. at 16, 18.
+Although it did not reach the merits of the ACLU's asserted First Amendment right of access,
+the Court agreed that release of these opinions would serve the public interest and inform the
+ongoing debate. Id. at 16-17.
+
+In addition to these public releases by the FISC, there has been a significant public debate
+regarding the legality of the telephone call records collection since the disclosure of the existence
+of the program in June 2013. In June, after The Guardian and the Washington Post disclosed a
+FISC order allowing bulk collection of telephony metadata under Section 215, public debate
+intensified. President Obama as well as other members of the executive and legislative branch
+spoke publicly about the program and "welcome[d] this debate." Statement by the President,
+Office of the Press Secretary (June 7, 2013), http://1.usa.gov/12xerjF; see also Jim
+Sensenbrenner, Op-Ed., How Obama Has Abused the Patriot Act, L.A. Times, Aug. 19, 2013,
+
+² Because of the redactions, it is unclear whether the Court was citing to a single opinion or to
+two or more. See BR 13-109 at 20 (several redacted citations on the subject bulk collections and
+relevance).
+
+4
+
+http://www.latimes.com/opinion/commentary/la-oe-sensenbrenner-data-patriot-act-obama-
+20130819,0,1387481.story (criticizing executive branch's interpretation of Section 215); Zoë
+Carpenter, Congress Renews Efforts to Curb NSA Surveillance, The Nation (Sep. 24, 2013, 4:52
+PM),
+http://www.thenation.com/blog/176328/congress-renews-efforts-curb-nsa-surveillance
+(discussing congressional proposals to revise Section 215 to end bulk collection).
+
+The FISC's release of the BR 13-109 opinion on September 17 has amplified public
+discussion of the Court's interpretation of the statute. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Extended Ruling
+by Secret Court Backs Collection of Phone Data, N.Y. Times, Sep. 17, 2013,
+http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/18/us/opinion-by-secret-court-calls-collection-of-phone-data-
+legal.html. Yet despite the FISC's release of this opinion, commentators have noted that the
+Court's legal analysis remains skeletal because of its reliance on earlier, still-secret opinions. See
+Julian Sanchez, Are Internet Backbone Pen Registers Constitutional?, Just Security (Sep. 23,
+2013, 7:55 PM), http://justsecurity.org/2013/09/23/internet-backbone-pen-registers-constitutional
+(referencing citation of secret Fourth Amendment opinions and these opinions' possible
+misreading of Smith v. Maryland); Orin Kerr, My (Mostly Critical) Thoughts on the August 2013
+FISC Opinion on Section 215, The Volokh Conspiracy (Sep. 17, 2013, 7:39 PM),
+http://www.volokh.com/2013/09/17/thoughts-august-2013-fisc-opinion-section-215 (explaining
+that on question of relevance, the Court "refers to an earlier [secret] decision. . . then just
+concludes[.]").
+
+JURISDICTION
+
+The FISC is an Article III court established by Congress, Misc. 13-02 at 4, with
+"supervisory power over its own records and files." Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns Inc., 435 U.S.
+589, 598 (1978). In particular, this Court has held that that it has "jurisdiction in the first instance
+
+5
+
+to adjudicate a claim of right to the court's very own records and files." In re Motion for Release
+of Court Records, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, 487 (FISA Ct. 2007); accord Misc. 13-02 at 11-12 (FISC
+not precluded by FISC Rules from adjudicating "claim of right' to access 'its very own records
+and files" or "requests for discretionary publication," at least where “non-parties . . . have
+sufficient information to make reasonably concrete, rather than abstract arguments in favor of
+publication"). As detailed below, movant has concrete arguments for publication under both a
+claim of right and as a discretionary request. Accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction.
+
+ARGUMENT
+I. MOVANT HAS STANDING UNDER ARTICLE III TO SEEK THE RELIEF
+REQUESTED
+
+Standing is "[o]ne element of the case or controversy requirement." Clapper v. Amnesty
+Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013) (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 529 U.S. 811, 818 (1997)). To
+establish standing under Article III, a party invoking federal jurisdiction must demonstrate an
+injury that is "concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged
+action; and redressable by a favorable ruling." Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147; accord Lujan v.
+Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (three "irreducible" elements of standing are
+"injury-in-fact," "causal connection . . . [to] conduct complained of," and likelihood of
+redressability).
+
+Movant has standing to seek the publication of the FISC records. Movant's First
+Amendment right of access is violated by the continued withholding of these records from the
+public, which is an “actual, rather than imminent" injury. Misc. 13-02 at 4-5. "Nor is there any
+real question that this claimed injury is fairly traceable to the government's decision" to withhold
+them or "that it would be redressed by this Court's directing that those opinions be published."
+Id. Federal courts have found that news media entities have standing to challenge the closure of
+
+6
+
+court records and proceedings. See, e.g., In re Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 842 F.2d 603, 607-08 (2nd
+Cir. 1988) (news agencies have standing because they are "potential recipients of speech" of
+underlying closed court proceeding); see also N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth.,
+684 F.3d 286, 294-95 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[O]nly a perceptible impairment of an organization's
+activities is necessary for there to be an injury in fact.").
+
+Moreover, as this Court found in Misc. 13-02, an entity suffers a sufficiently concrete
+injury so as to confer standing if it demonstrates "active participation" in the public debate over
+the matters at issue. Misc. 13-02 at 8-9 (finding that the ACLU had standing to move to unseal a
+FISC opinion). In such a situation, a movant asserts an injury-in-fact, not simply a "generalized
+grievance[]," which would be insufficient to confer standing. Id. at 6 (quoting Fed. Election
+Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23-24 (1998)).
+
+As a Pulitzer-Prize-winning press organization that routinely cover matters of privacy
+and Internet policy, movant has reported extensively on the government's surveillance efforts.
+See Declaration of Richard Tofel ("Tofel Decl.”) ¶¶ 4-7. This reporting includes a discussion of
+the asserted justification for the bulk collection of metadata. See id. ¶ 8. The withholding of FISC
+opinions that pass on these justifications hinders movant's abilities to fully explain the
+government's actions to the public. Id. ¶ 9. This is a concrete injury that goes to the heart of
+movant's organizational activities. Such a showing is more than sufficient to confer standing.
+
+II. THERE ARE NO KNOWN COMITY CONCERNS THAT SERVE AS A BAR TO
+THE CONSIDERATION OF THIS MOTION
+
+This Court also has no prudential barriers to ruling on its motion. In Misc. 13-02, the
+Court, citing comity concerns and the first-to-file rule, declined to consider the motions to unseal
+that pertained to FISC opinions that were the subject of ongoing FOIA litigation to which the
+
+7
+
+movant was a party. Misc. 13-02 at 12-16. Movant here is not a party to any existing related
+FOIA litigation.³
+
+III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT COMPELS THE RELEASE OF THE COURT'S
+OPINIONS
+
+A. There is a First Amendment Right of Access to Judicial Opinions
+
+The Supreme Court has recognized that the public has a First Amendment right of access
+to many judicial proceedings. See Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564-73
+(1980); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 US 596, 603-05 (1982); see also Brown &
+Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1177 (6th Cir. 1983) (explaining that the
+public nature of legal principles and decisions is a "fundamental feature of the American judicial
+system," with roots in "the English common law, the American constitutional system, and the
+notion of 'the consent of the governed'").
+
+Following the Richmond Newspapers line of cases, courts employ the two-step
+"experience and logic" test to determine whether there is a right of public access to a category of
+judicial proceedings: "First, because a tradition of accessibility implies the favorable judgment of
+experiences, we have considered whether the place and process have historically been open to
+the press and general public." Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (Press-
+Enter. II) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "Second, in this setting the Court has
+traditionally considered whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning
+of the particular process in question." Id.
+
+³ Movant's counsel, Electronic Frontier Foundation, is a party to FOIA litigation pertaining to
+legal authority upon which the Department of Justice and National Security Agency base their
+interpretation of Section 215. See Status Report, Elec. Frontier Found. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice,
+No. 4:11-cv-05221 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 04, 2013), ECF No. 63. It does not appear that the FISC
+opinion sought by this motion would be responsive to that FOIA request or otherwise subject to
+that FOIA litigation. Id. at 2.
+
+8
+
+This Court has at least twice been faced with a claimed First Amendment right of access
+to its opinions. See In re Motion for Release of Court Records, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 484; Misc. 13-
+02. In the first case, the Court held that whatever the general American legal tradition of
+openness in judicial proceedings, the FISC itself had no such tradition that could meet the
+experience test. In re Motion for Release of Court Records, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 492-93 ("[T]he
+FISC has never held a public hearing in its history, and a total of two opinions have been
+released to the public in nearly three decades of operation. During that period, the FISC has
+issued literally thousands of classified orders to which the public has had no access."). In the
+second, the Court was asked to reconsider this holding but instead granted the movant's request
+without reaching the merits of the First Amendment argument. Misc. 13-02 at 17.
+
+However, it is now clear both that experience favors finding a right of access, and that the
+FISC's position with regard to the general tradition of openness has changed. What is more,
+these changes emphasize the logic in finding a right of access.
+
+1. Experience
+
+The experience prong is satisfied here because there is an unbroken history of Article III
+court opinions being public. Lowenschuss v. West Pub. Co., 542 F.2d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 1976)
+("[U]nder our system of jurisprudence the judiciary has the duty of publishing and disseminating
+its decisions."); Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1177 (opinions and records are presumptively
+public because "court records often provide important, sometimes the only, bases or explanations
+for a court's decision").
+
+⁴ The Court also rejected the argument that a narrower subset of its opinions, those of "broad
+legal significance," should qualify for the experience test. In re Motion for Release, 526 F. Supp.
+2d at 493.
+
+9
+
+The experience prong does not require a tradition of openness dating back to the
+ratification of the Constitution. See Press-Enter. II, 478 U.S. at 10-12 (relying on post-Bill of
+Rights history); Applications of Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc. v. Presser, 828 F.2d 340, 344 (6th Cir.
+1987) (finding First Amendment right of access while reviewing history from 1924-1984).
+Indeed, even a very recent tradition of openness may be sufficient. See Detroit Free Press v.
+Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 703 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding that a "brisk evolution" in pattern of
+openness of deportation proceedings satisfied the experience test). This is especially the case
+where "the beneficial effects of access to that process are overwhelming and uncontradicted." Id.
+at 701; see also United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833, 842 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding First
+Amendment right of access despite no history on point); Cal-Almond, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of
+Agric., 960 F.2d 105, 109 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding tradition of public access is reflected in
+current statutes).
+
+The FISC is an Article III court issuing judicial opinions based on the "directive force of
+precedents," and is therefore part of the long tradition of public dissemination of judicial
+opinions. Lowenschuss, 542 F.2d at 185. That the FISC is a different type of Article III court
+than, for example, the federal district courts, is not relevant. The experience test looks not "to the
+particular practice of any one jurisdiction, but instead to the experience in that type or kind of
+hearing throughout the United States." El Vocero de P.R. v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147, 150
+(1993) (per curiam) (quotation marks omitted). As the Third Circuit recently found, even the
+government's description of a proceeding as a type that has been traditionally closed to the
+public, such as an arbitration, is not dispositive of the experience test. Del. Coal. for Open Gov't
+v. Strine, No. 1-11-cv-01015, slip op. at 18 (3d Cir. Oct. 23, 2013). Thus, the right of access
+applies to a government-sponsored arbitration because it bears important hallmarks of a court
+
+10
+
+proceeding and is "deeply rooted in the way the judiciary functions in a democratic society." Id.
+at 18.
+
+Even if this Court were correct in stating that the court should look to the FISC's
+particular tradition rather than the tradition of Article III courts in general, recent experience
+shows a "brisk evolution" in the openness of FISC opinions. Indeed, the tradition of openness of
+the FISC opinions is much different than that encountered in 2007, when the FISC rejected the
+existence of a First Amendment right of access. The number of opinions available to the public
+since 2007 has multiplied many times over.⁵
+
+In sum, the experience test favors finding a right of access both with regard to the general
+tradition of openness of judicial opinions and in regard to the FISC's recent moves to release far
+more material publicly than ever before.
+
+2. Logic
+
+Similarly, the release of the FISC opinions sought by movant will serve a "significant
+positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question." Press-Enter. II, 478 U.S. at
+8-9. The Supreme Court has explained that the logic test looks to the benefits that public access
+to the proceeding or materials would confer, such as "enhanc[ing] both the basic fairness of the
+
+⁵ At least eight FISC opinions have been made available to the public since 2007, including four
+in 2013 alone. Many other orders and filings to the court are also now publicly available. See,
+e.g., U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Public Filings,
+http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/index.html (last visited October 8, 2013) (featuring
+memorandum opinions in case numbers BR 13-158, 13-109, Misc. 13-02, and Misc. 13-01 as
+well as additional orders and filings); Redacted, 2012 WL 9189263 (FISA Ct. Aug. 24, 2012)
+(memorandum opinion); Redacted, 2011 WL 10945618 (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011) (memorandum
+opinion); Office of the Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence, IC on the Record, DNI Clapper Declassifies
+Intelligence Community Documents Regarding Collection Under Section 501 of the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) (Sep. 10, 2013),
+http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/60867560465/dni-clapper-declassifies-intelligence-
+community (featuring orders and filings from 2006-2009 and supplemental opinions in case
+numbers 08-13 and 09-15).
+
+11
+
+criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the system." Id.
+In the criminal context, a public trial can have "therapeutic value,” serving as an outlet for
+"community concern, hostility, and emotion.” Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569; Detroit
+Free Press, 303 F.3d at 704. Perhaps even more important, public access to judicial proceedings
+ensures accuracy and fairness in the process. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 592 (citing In
+re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948)).
+
+This Court has already recognized the benefits of public release of its opinions construing
+Section 215 in language that closely parallels the purposes of the logic test:
+
+"Publication of FISC opinions relating to this provision would contribute to an
+informed public debate. Congressional amici emphasize the value of public
+information and debate in representing their constituents and discharging their
+legislative responsibilities. Publication would also assure citizens of the integrity
+of this Court's proceedings."
+
+Misc. 13-02 at 16-17. Publication has especially clear benefits where, as here, the opinions at
+issue contain foundational legal analysis, including interpretation of public statutes and the
+Constitution itself. As public debate over FISA and Section 215 has grown, commentators have
+suggested that the FISC's classified opinions are leading to a de facto "secret body of case law"
+interpreting the Fourth Amendment. Orin Kerr, Hints and Questions About the Secret Fourth
+Amendment Rulings of the FISA Court, Volokh Conspiracy (July 7, 2013, 1:37 AM),
+http://www.volokh.com/2013/07/07/hints-and-questions-about-the-secret-fourth-amendment-
+rulings-of-the-fisa-court. Similar questions exist about the FISC's "circuit"-specific
+interpretation of relevance. Jennifer Valentino DeVries & Siobhan Gorman, Secret Court's
+Redefinition of 'Relevant' Empowered Vast NSA Data-Gathering, Wall St. J. (July 8, 2013, 3:13
+AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323873904578571893758853344.html.
+In this regard, the previous release of the Section 215 opinion can only be seen as a half-
+
+12
+
+measure, since an informed public cannot yet read these foundational interpretations for itself.
+See Hicklin Engineering, LC v. Bartell, 439 F. 3d 346 (7th Cir. 2006) (“The political branches of
+government claim legitimacy by election, judges by reason. Any step that withdraws an element
+of the judicial process from public view makes the ensuing decision look more like fiat and
+requires rigorous justification."); Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1177 n.6 ("Long ago Locke
+emphasized the need for 'promulgated standing laws'—'established, settled, known laws
+received and allowed by common consent'.... They would not 'put a force into the magistrate's
+hands to execute his unlimited will arbitrarily upon them.") (quoting Locke, Treatise of Civil
+Government §§ 124, 136-37 (1690)).
+
+Finally, at this point, it can hardly be contended that the benefits of disclosure are
+outweighed by the harm of a decreased flow of information and an avoidance of judicial review.
+Cf. In re Motion for Release, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 496 ("The greater risk of declassification and
+disclosure over Executive branch objections would chill the government's interactions with the
+Court.... [G]overnment officials might choose to conduct a search or surveillance without
+FISC approval where the need for such approval is unclear.") After widespread reporting of
+unauthorized disclosures and repeated discussion by public officials of the government's legal
+authority for bulk collection of metadata, the cat is out of the bag. Because release of the
+opinions sought is in keeping with the tradition of Article III courts in general and the FISC's
+evolving practice in specific, and because release would enhance public debate and increase this
+Court's legitimacy, the Court should find that a First Amendment right of access exists.
+
+B. The First Amendment Permits the Withholding of Only Those Portions of
+the Opinion Found Necessary to Protect National Security
+
+Although the right is not unbounded, "[t]he First Amendment presumes that there is a
+right of access to proceedings and documents" that meet the experience and logic test. Grove
+
+13
+
+Fresh Distributors, Inc. v. Everfresh Juice Co., 24 F.3d 893, 897 (7th Cir. 1994). Once the right
+applies, the documents sought are presumptively open unless the court finds that four criteria
+support their retention: (1) There is an "overriding interest" supporting the retention of the
+records, (2) that this retention is no broader than necessary to protect that interest, (3) that no
+reasonable alternatives to the retention exist, and (4) this finding is supported by sufficiently
+specific findings. Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984) (Press-Enter. I).
+Thus, the burden is on the government to demonstrate that retention "is essential to preserve
+higher values," based on a non-conclusory showing of a "substantial probability" of harm to the
+interest asserted. Press-Enter. II, 478 U.S. at 13-14, 15.
+
+With the growing record of now-public FISC opinions, the government cannot contend
+that it has an overriding interest in withholding the opinions sought. The government has pointed
+to the recently publicized Section 215 opinion as proof of its commitment to increasing
+transparency and assuring citizens that it is working within the law. Office of the Dir. of Nat'l
+Intelligence, IC on the Record, Release of Previously Classified August 29, 2013 Foreign
+Intelligence
+Surveillance
+Court Opinion (Sep. 17, 2013, 4:58 PM),
+http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/61526105674/release-of-previously-classified-august-29-
+2013 ("The opinion affirms that the bulk telephony metadata collection is both lawful and
+constitutional.") It would therefore be incongruous to maintain that the Section 215 opinion can
+be released but that the very legal authorities relied on to reach this conclusion are somehow
+subject to a more compelling need for secrecy. Of course, the Court can redact those portions of
+an opinion for which the government can meet its burden of showing a compelling interest.
+Press-Enter. II, 478 U.S. at 13 (specific showing required); United States v Rosen, 487 F. Supp.
+2d 703, 716 (E.D. Va. 2007) (redacting classified information requires specific showing even in
+
+14
+
+national security context). The Court has already ordered such a review in the context of
+opinions interpreting Section 215, Misc. 13-02 at 18 (requiring government to submit “proposed
+redactions”), and the finding of a First Amendment right of access to the opinions in this case
+should only strengthen the necessity of such a review here.
+
+IV. ALTERNATIVELY, THE COURT SHOULD EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION
+TO RELEASE THE OPINIONS SOUGHT
+
+Even if a First Amendment right of access does not exist, this Court instead may rely on
+its supervisory powers over its own records to publish the opinions sought by movant. Nixon,
+435 U.S. at 598; In re Motion for Release, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 487. In addition, FISC Rule 62(a)
+gives the Court "discretion to direct publication sua sponte." Misc. 13-02 at 11; FISC Rule 62(a).
+Given the Court's previous decision to invoke Rule 62(a) to allow publication of those Section
+215 opinions not at issue in other litigation, Misc. 13-02 at 17, movant respectfully request that
+the Court similarly use its discretion to allow publication of the opinions that form the legal
+authority for the now-public Section 215 opinion.
+
+Movant's argument for publication is specific to the circumstances and aimed at
+furthering an already lively public debate. See Misc. 13-02 at 12 (where non-party to FISC
+proceeding can make "reasonably concrete, rather than abstract, arguments in favor of
+publication,” FISC may consider publication under Rule 62(a)). Movant does not seek release of
+unspecified or random FISC opinions, but only those cited and centrally relied on for
+fundamental legal principles in the already public FISC opinion on Section 215. Nor does
+movant seek disclosure of any properly classified information. Rule 62(a) provides a mechanism
+for publication of an opinion with “[r]edactions after consultation with the Executive Branch,
+[that] can be made to exclude such classified materials without distorting the content of the
+discussion of the statutory and constitutional issues." Order, In re Directives [Redacted]
+
+15
+
+Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, No. 08-01 at 1 (FISA Ct.
+Rev. Jan. 12, 2009), available at http://bit.ly/r32r2W; FISC Rule 62(a); see also Misc. 13-02 at
+17-18 (invoking Rule 62(a) to request that the government "submit proposed redactions" for
+Section 215 opinions subject to release).
+
+CONCLUSION
+
+For the foregoing reasons, movant respectfully requests that this Court unseal the
+opinions relied on in its recently released Section 215 opinion which provide support for the
+legality of bulk metadata collection under the Fourth Amendment and under a relevance
+standard.
+
+Dated: November 8, 2013
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+DAVID GREENE
+ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION
+815 Eddy Street
+San Francisco, CA 94109
+(415) 436-9333
+davidg@eff.org
+
+Counsel for Movant ProPublica, Inc.
+
+16
+
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+UNITED STATES FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+2013 NOV 12 PM 3:41.
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+IN RE MOTION OF PROPUBLICA, INC.
+FOR THE RELEASE OF COURT RECORDS
+)
+Docket No.: 13-09
+
+DECLARATION OF RICHARD TOFEL
+
+David Greene
+ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION
+815 Eddy Street
+San Francisco, CA 94109
+(415) 436-9333
+davidg@eff.org
+
+Counsel for ProPublica, Inc.
+
+DECLARATION OF RICHARD TOFEL
+
+I, Richard Tofel, hereby declare:
+
+1. I am the president of ProPublica, Inc. Prior to becoming president of
+ProPublica on January 1, 2013, I was ProPublica's founding general manager, from
+September 2007 through December 2012. The facts contained in the following affidavit are
+known to me based on my own personal knowledge.
+
+2. ProPublica, Inc. is a Delaware non-profit corporation and does business as
+ProPublica.
+
+3. ProPublica is an independent, non-profit newsroom that produces investigative
+journalism in the public interest. Our mission is: "To expose abuses of power and betrayals of
+the public trust by government, business, and other institutions, using the moral force of
+investigative journalism to spur reform through the sustained spotlighting of wrongdoing."
+
+4. ProPublica was founded in 2007 and started publishing in 2008. In its five
+years of publishing, it has been awarded the Pulitzer Prize twice—including the first Pulitzer
+ever given to an online news organization, in 2010, and the first-ever awarded for material not
+published in print, in 2011, as well as a host of other journalism prizes, most notably a
+Peabody Award in 2013.
+
+1
+
+5. ProPublica's reporting has included coverage of privacy, surveillance and
+Internet policy nearly since its beginning. ProPublica started increasing the resources
+dedicated to these topics in the middle of 2012.
+
+6. ProPublica has published dozens of investigative pieces on corporate and
+government surveillance, including:
+
+* NIST to Review Standards After Cryptographers Cry Foul Over NSA Meddling,
+Nov. 4, 2013, [REDACTED]
+
+* Revealed: The NSA's Secret Campaign to Crack, Undermine Internet Security,
+Sept. 5, 2013, [REDACTED] (in partnership with the Guardian and the
+New York Times)
+
+* Claim on "Attacks Thwarted" by NSA Spreads Despite Lack of Evidence, Oct. 23,
+2013, [REDACTED]
+
+* How a Telecom Helped the Government Spy on Me, Oct. 3, 2013, [REDACTED]
+
+* Mass Surveillance in America: A Timeline of Loosening Laws and Practices, June
+7, 2013, [REDACTED]
+
+* No Warrant, No Problem: How the Government Can Get Your Digital Data, July
+31, 2013, [REDACTED]
+
+2
+
+government-can-still-get-your-digital-data (originally published December 4,
+2012)
+
+7. ProPublica has been collaborating with the Guardian since June of this year
+(and more recently also with the New York Times), on stories based on documents provided
+to the Guardian by Edward Snowden, including the story from September 5 above about the
+National Security Agency weakening national encryption standards. That story led the body
+that sets encryption standards to announce a total technical review (discussed in the November
+4 story above).
+
+8. ProPublica has also reported specifically on the government's justifications for
+its surveillance programs, including, in the October 23 story referenced above, claims that the
+collection of telephone "metadata" has helped thwart terror attacks.
+
+9. The release of the opinions sought by ProPublica in this motion would aid it in
+its efforts to inform the public about government surveillance by allowing ProPublica to
+report on and distill the government's stated legal justifications for its readership.
+
+I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed
+on November 8, 2013, at New York, New York.
+
+Richard Tofel
+
+3
+
+U.S. FOREIGH
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+UNITED STATES FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+2013 NOV 12 PM 3:42
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+IN RE MOTION OF PROPUBLICA, INC.
+FOR THE RELEASE OF COURT RECORDS
+)
+Docket No.: 13-09
+
+CERTIFICATION OF BAR MEMBERSHIP AND SECURITY CLEARANCE STATUS
+
+David Greene
+ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION
+815 Eddy Street
+San Francisco, CA 94109
+(415) 436-9333
+davidg@eff.org
+
+Counsel for Movant ProPublica, Inc.
+
+CERTIFICATION OF BAR MEMBERSHIP AND SECURITY CLEARANCE STATUS
+
+Pursuant to the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Rules of
+Procedure 7(h)(1), 7(i), and 63, ProPublica, Inc. ("Movant") respectfully submits the following
+information:
+
+(1) Bar Membership Information
+
+Undersigned counsel for Movant is a licensed attorney, and a member in good standing
+of the bars of United States district and circuit courts. See FISC Rule 7(h)(1); FISC Rule 63.
+
+David Greene is a member, in good standing, of the State Bar of California (Bar
+No. 160107), and is a member in good standing of the bars of the United States District Courts
+for the Northern District of California, Southern District of California, and Central District of
+California, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
+
+(2) Security Clearance Information
+
+Neither Movant's officers or employees or Movant's counsel hold security clearances.
+See FISC Rule 7(i). Because Movant's motion does not seek the release of legitimately classified
+information, and because the motion itself does not contain classified information, Movant
+respectfully submits that Movant and its counsel may participate in proceedings on the motion
+without access to classified information or security clearances. See FISC Rule 63 (requiring
+counsel only to have "appropriate security clearances").
+
+Dated: November 8, 2013
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+DAVID GREENE
+Electronic Frontier Foundation
+815 Eddy Street
+San Francisco, CA 94110
+(415) 436-9333
+davidg@eff.org
+Counsel for Movant ProPublica, Inc.
+
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+UNITED STATES FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+2013 NOV 12 PM 3:42
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+IN RE MOTION OF PROPUBLICA, INC.
+FOR THE RELEASE OF COURT RECORDS
+)
+Docket No.: 13-09
+
+CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE
+
+David Greene
+ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION
+815 Eddy Street
+San Francisco, CA 94109
+(415) 436-9333
+davidg@eff.org
+
+Counsel for ProPublica, Inc.
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I HEREBY CERTIFY that true and correct copies of the following:
+
+* MOTION OF PROPUBLICA, INC. FOR THE RELEASE OF COURT
+RECORDS
+
+* DECLARATION OF RICHARD TOFEL
+
+* CERTIFICATION OF BAR MEMBERSHIP AND SECURITY CLEARANCE
+STATUS
+
+have been served this day on the following counsel by Federal Express 2nd Day Air for
+delivery on Tuesday November 12, 2013:
+
+Christine Gunning
+United States Department of Justice
+Litigation Security Group
+2 Constitution Square
+145 N Street NE
+Suite 2W-115
+Washington, DC 20530
+(202) 514-9016
+
+I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the
+foregoing is true and correct.
+
+Dated this 8th day of November, 2013.
+
+David Greene
+Counsel for Movant ProPublica, Inc.
+
+1
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-motion-131112/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-motion-131112/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..48a0fca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-motion-131112/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Motion of ProPublica, Inc. for the Release of Court Records, In re Motion of ProPublica, Inc. for the Release of Court Records, No. Misc. 13-09 (FISA Ct. Nov. 12, 2013).",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-11-12",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-12",
+ "link": "https://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/Misc%2013-09%20Motion-2.pdf",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "ad13eacc9afae27ae7d6ebc87624244f0a7c3cf0d6b854a091412267e50d1d19",
+ "pages": 30
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-motion-131211/FISC_-_br13-09-motion-131211.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-motion-131211/FISC_-_br13-09-motion-131211.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b94a83b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-motion-131211/FISC_-_br13-09-motion-131211.md
@@ -0,0 +1,253 @@
+# UNITED STATES
+
+# FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+# WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+U.S. FORSION
+2013 DEC 11 PM 4:20
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+IN RE MOTION OF PROPUBLICA, INC.
+FOR THE RELEASE OF COURT RECORDS
+)
+)
+)
+)
+Docket No.: Misc. 13-09
+
+# THE UNITED STATES' OPPOSITION TO THE
+# MOTION OF PROPUBLICA, INC.
+# FOR THE RELEASE OF COURT RECORDS
+
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+
+J. BRADFORD WIEGMANN
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+TASHINA GAUHAR
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+NICHOLAS J. PATTERSON
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+Phone: (202) 514-5600
+Fax: (202) 514-8053
+
+Attorneys for the United States of America
+
+ProPublica, Inc. (“ProPublica”) seeks the publication of “a certain Foreign Intelligence
+Suryeillance Court (‘FISC’) opinion or opinions that appear to underlie the government’s
+collection of telephone metadata. The specific opinion or opinions sought are those referenced
+on, but redacted from, pages 8, 9, and 19-20 of _In re Application of the FBI for an Order
+Requiring the Production of Tangible Things From [Redacted], No. BR 13-109 (FISA Ct. Aug.
+29, 2013) (‘BR 13-109’)._” Mot. at 1. ProPublica’s motion should be dismissed because the
+relevant opinion has been subjected to classification review and the unclassified portions
+released, and there is no basis for the Court to order a new classification review.
+
+# ARGUMENT
+
+I. ProPublica's Motion Should Be Dismissed Because a Declassified Version of the Requested Opinion Has Already Been Released.
+
+ProPublica’s motion should be dismissed because the Government has already released a
+declassified version of the opinion that is referenced on, but redacted from, pages 8, 9, and 19-20
+of _In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things From
+[Redacted], No. BR 13-109, Order (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. Aug. 29, 2013)._ After a
+classification review conducted by the Executive Branch consistent with Executive Order 13,526
+(Dec. 29, 2009), all unclassified portions of this opinion were released by the Executive Branch.
+This opinion is:
+
+> The Court’s Opinion (J. Kollar-Kotelly) granting the Government’s application
+> seeking the collection of bulk electronic communications metadata pursuant to
+> Section 402 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the Pen Register and Trap
+> and Trace provision. (Released by the Executive Branch on November 18, 2013),
+> available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/1118/CLEANEDPRTT%201.pdf.
+
+Because the Government has already conducted a thorough classification review of this opinion,
+there is no basis to require the Government to review it again.
+
+1
+
+II. The Court Should Not Order the Government to Conduct a New Classification Review of the Opinion.
+
+A. ProPublica does not have standing to seek declassification.
+
+Although this Court has inherent authority to require a classification review of its own
+opinions as a matter of discretion, and can order such a review _sua sponte_, that authority should
+be exercised in a manner that is consistent with FISA and this Court’s rules. FISA does not
+provide third parties with the right to seek disclosure of classified records of this Court. _In re
+Mot. for Release of Ct. Records_, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, 491 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. 2007). Under
+United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”) Rule of Procedure 62(a) (“FISC
+Rule”), only a “party” may move the Court for publication of an opinion. This Court recently
+concluded that “the term ‘party’ in Rule 62(a) refers to a party to the proceeding that resulted in
+the ‘opinion, order, or other decision’ being considered for publication.” _In re Orders of this Ct.
+Interpreting Section 215 of the Patriot Act, Docket No. Misc. 13-02, Opinion and Order, at 11
+(Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. Sept. 13, 2013)_, available at
+http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/misc-13-02-order-130813.pdf. ProPublica is not a
+
+[^1] Rule 62. Release of Court Records
+(a) Publication of Opinions. The judge who authored an order, opinion, or
+other decision may sua sponte or on motion by a party request that it be
+published. Upon such request, the Presiding Judge, after consulting with
+other Judges of the Court, may direct that an order, opinion or other
+decision be published. Before publication, the Court may, as appropriate,
+direct the Executive Branch to review the order, opinion, or other decision
+and redact it as necessary to ensure that properly classified information is
+appropriately protected pursuant to Executive Order 13526 (or
+its successor).
+
+FISC Rule of Procedure 62(a).
+
+2
+
+party to the proceedings that generated the relevant opinion and, therefore, does not have
+standing to move for publication of the opinion.
+
+FISC Rule 62(a)’s limitation on who can move for publication of an order, opinion, or
+other decision is in accord with the fact that a comprehensive statutory regime—the Freedom of
+Information Act (“FOIA”)—governs requests for documents classified by and in the possession
+of the Executive Branch. _See In re Release, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 491 n.18, 496 n.32._ As this
+Court has recognized, although this Court has supervisory power over its own records and could
+conduct a review “under the same standards as a district court would in FOIA litigation,” “there
+would be no point in this Court’s merely duplicating the judicial review that the ACLU, and
+anyone else, can obtain by submitting a FOIA request to the Department of Justice for these
+same records.” _Id. at 496 n.32._
+
+The Court should insist that ProPublica respect, and not through its motion attempt to
+circumvent, the FOIA process enacted by Congress. Accordingly, the Government submits that
+the Court should not exercise its inherent discretion to determine whether to order a
+declassification review in this case. FOIA carefully prescribes a process whereby parties must
+first seek administrative review of FOIA requests before bringing litigation, and FOIA includes
+additional exemptions beyond the classification exemptions that would overlap with a
+declassification review ordered by the FISC. Such duplicative processes therefore raise
+administrative concerns, and the FISC should resist invitations to serve as an alternative forum
+for FISC-related matters that can and should be resolved through the FOIA process established
+by Congress.
+
+3
+
+B. This Court traditionally does not involve itself with the Executive Branch's classification decisions.
+
+ProPublica seeks an order giving it full access to the opinion or, in the alternative,
+requiring the Government to justify any redactions to the Court as necessary to prevent a
+substantial probability of harm to a compelling interest. ProPublica invokes the First
+Amendment, but the First Amendment does not justify judicial (or ProPublica’s) involvement in
+Executive Branch classification decisions.
+
+Putting aside the fact that this Court has repeatedly rejected arguments that litigants such
+as ProPublica have a First Amendment right to access classified FISC records,[^2] the Court does
+not interfere with the Government’s classification process and classification decisions. Under
+FISC Rule 62(a), the Court is empowered only to “direct the Executive Branch to review the
+[opinion] and redact it as necessary to ensure that properly classified information is appropriately
+protected.” This limitation on the Court’s discretion is consistent with the requirement that, “[i]n
+all matters, the Court and its staff shall comply with the security measures established pursuant
+to [Congressional mandate], as well as Executive Order 13526.” FISC Rule 3; _see also_ FISC
+Rule 62(b) (mandating that a release of FISC records must be conducted “in conformance with
+the security measures referenced in Rule 3”). Executive Order 13,526 “prescribes a uniform
+
+[^2] _See In re Mot. for Release of Ct. Records_, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. 2007);
+_In re Mot. for Release of Ct. Records, Docket No. Misc. 07-01, Memorandum Opinion (Foreign
+Intel. Surv. Ct. Feb. 8, 2008)_, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/misc-13-
+02-us-opposition-130705.pdf (Appendix A to _In re Orders Issued by This Ct. Interpreting
+Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, Docket No. Misc. 13-02, The United States’ Opposition to the
+Motion of the American Civil Liberties Union, et al., for the Release of Court Records (Foreign
+Intel. Surv. Ct. July 5, 2013)_). Additionally, this Court recently chose not to “reach[] the merits
+of the [ACLU’s] asserted right of public access under the First Amendment.” _See In re Orders
+of this Ct. Interpreting Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, Docket No. Misc. 13-02, Opinion and
+Order, at 17 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. Sept. 13, 2013)_.
+
+4
+
+system for classifying, safeguarding, and declassifying national security information,” and under
+that system only certain designated Executive Branch officials can classify or declassify national
+security information. _See Exec. Order 13,526._
+
+Consistent with the Court’s Rules of Procedure, the Court’s decisions also make clear
+that the Court does not involve itself with the Executive Branch’s declassification decisions.
+Indeed, “if the FISC were to assume the role of independently making declassification and
+release decisions . . . there would be a real risk of harm to national security interests and
+ultimately to the FISA process itself.” _In re Release, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 491._ “FISC judges do
+not make classification decisions and are not intended to become national security experts.” _Id._
+_at 495 n.31 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 25-26 (1978))._ And, while FISC judges may
+have “more expertise in national security matters than a typical district court judge, that expertise
+[does] not equal that of the Executive Branch, which is constitutionally entrusted with protecting
+the national security.” _Id. Thus,_ this Court has recognized that “there is no role for this Court
+independently to review, and potentially override, Executive Branch classification decisions.”
+_Id. at 491._[^3] This Court recently reiterated that “[i]t is fundamentally the Executive Branch’s
+responsibility to safeguard sensitive national security information.” _In re Mot. for Consent to
+Disclosure of Ct. Records, Docket No. Misc. 13-01, Opinion and Order, at 6 (Foreign Intel. Surv.
+Ct. June 12, 2013) (citing Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527-29 (1988))_, available
+at www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/misc-13-01-opinion-order.pdf. Thus, this Court should
+deny ProPublica’s First Amendment classification review request.
+
+[^3] This is not to say that Executive Branch classifications are never judicially reviewable. The
+proper means to obtain such review is through a FOIA request and subsequent action in district
+court. _See In re Release, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 491 n.18, 496 n.32._
+
+5
+
+For these reasons, the Court should deny ProPublica’s request for a new classification
+review of the relevant opinion. There is no need for this Court to order a new classification
+review of the relevant opinion because the Government recently conducted a thorough
+classification review of the opinion and made “public as much information as possible about
+certain sensitive intelligence collection programs undertaken under the authority of the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) while being mindful of the need to protect national
+security.”[^4] Release of this document reflected the Executive Branch’s continued commitment to
+making information about intelligence collection publicly available when appropriate and
+consistent with the national security of the United States.
+
+# CONCLUSION
+
+For the reasons stated above, ProPublica’s Motion should be denied.
+
+[^4] DNI Clapper Declassifies Intelligence Community Documents Regarding Collection Under
+Section 501 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), available at
+http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/60867560465/dni-clapper-declassifies-intelligence-
+community.
+
+6
+
+December 11, 2013
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+
+J. BRADFORD WIEGMANN
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+TASHINA GAUHAR
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+/s/ Nicholas J. Patterson
+NICHOLAS J. PATTERSON
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+Phone: (202) 514-5600
+Fax: (202) 514-8053
+
+Attorneys for the United States of America
+
+7
+
+# CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I hereby certify that a true copy of the United States’ Opposition to the Motion of
+ProPublica, Inc. for the Release of Court Records was served by the Government via Federal
+Express overnight delivery on this 11th day of December, 2013, addressed to:
+
+David Greene
+ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION
+815 Eddy Street
+San Francisco, CA 94109
+
+/s/ Nicholas J. Patterson
+Nicholas J. Patterson
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-motion-131211/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-motion-131211/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3a620ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-motion-131211/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "The United States’ Opposition to the Motion of ProPublica, Inc. for the Release of Court Records, In re Motion of ProPublica, Inc. for the Release of Court Records, No. Misc. 13-09 (FISA Ct. Dec. 11, 2013).",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-12-11",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-12-11",
+ "link": "https://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/Misc%2013-09%20Motion-4.pdf",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "1ca60661decf8ac99003bb6ec63efebda54e62484aebc4af707d6bc7dcbcaf3f",
+ "pages": 9
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-motion-131223/FISC_-_br13-09-motion-131223.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-motion-131223/FISC_-_br13-09-motion-131223.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cc490cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-motion-131223/FISC_-_br13-09-motion-131223.md
@@ -0,0 +1,601 @@
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+UNITED STATES FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+2013 DEC 23 AM 11:39
+
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+IN RE MOTION OF PROPUBLICA, INC
+FOR THE RELEASE OF COURT RECORDS
+
+)
+) Docket No.: Misc. 13-09
+
+**REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION OF PROPUBLICA, INC. FOR THE**
+**RELEASE OF COURT RECORDS**
+
+David Greene
+Andrew Crocker
+ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION
+815 Eddy Street
+San Francisco, CA 94109
+(415) 436-9333
+davidg@eff.org
+andrew@eff.org
+
+Counsel for ProPublica, Inc.
+
+---
+
+TABLE OF CONTENTS
+
+INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................1
+ARGUMENT..........................................................................................................2
+I. THIS COURT HAS THE ABILITY AND THE DUTY TO SCRUTINIZE
+THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH'S CLASSIFICATION DECISIONS...............2
+A. The Court's Power to Publish Its Opinions and Review
+Classification Decisions Is Not Limited By Its Own Rules....................2
+B. FOIA Does Not Preempt This Court's Ability to Publish Its Own
+Opinions..................................................................................................4
+C. The Court Should Review and Scrutinize the Government's
+Classification Decisions Here..................................................................5
+II. THE GOVERNMENT'S VOLUNTARY RELEASE OF DECLASSIFIED
+OPINIONS SUBSEQUENT TO THE FILING OF PROPUBLICA'S
+MOTION DOES NOT SUPPORT DISMISSAL.........................................8
+III. THE COURT SHOULD PUBLISH THE OPINIONS PURSUANT TO
+PROPUBLICA'S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF ACCESS OR THE
+COURT'S INHERENT AUTHORITY........................................................8
+A. ProPublica Has Standing to Seek the Records Sought.........................8
+B. ProPublica Has Established a First Amendment Right of Access to
+the Opinions...........................................................................................9
+C. Alternatively, This Court Should Exercise Its Inherent Authority to
+Publish Its Decisions............................................................................10
+CONCLUSION......................................................................................................10
+
+i
+
+---
+
+TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
+
+Federal Cases
+
+Alvarez v. Longboy,
+697 F. 2d 1333 (9th Cir. 1983)..........................................................................................3
+Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C.,
+710 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1983)..........................................................................................5
+Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.,
+501 U.S. 32 (1991)............................................................................................................4
+Elec. Frontier Found. v. DOJ,
+No. 12-cv-1441 (D.D.C. Dec. 6, 2013)..............................................................................7
+In re Motion for Release of Court Records,
+526 F. Supp. 2d 484 (FISA Ct. 2007)............................................................................passim
+In re Nat'l Sec. Letter,
+930 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (N.D. Cal. 2013)..............................................................................5
+In re Orders of this Court Interpreting Section 215 of the Patriot Act,
+No. Misc 13-02 (FISA Ct. Nov. 20, 2013)...........................................................................2
+In re Orders of this Court Interpreting Section 215 of the Patriot Act,
+No. Misc. 13-02, 2013 WL 5460064, (FISA Ct. Sep. 13, 2013)...................................2, 9
+In re Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED],
+BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Mar. 2, 2009)...................................................................................6, 7
+In re Wash. Post Co.,
+807 F.2d 383 (4th Cir. 1986)...............................................................................................5
+Klayman v. Obama,
+No. 13-0851, 2013 WL 6571596, (D.D.C. Dec 16, 2013)..................................................4
+Mem. Op., [REDACTED],
+[REDACTED], (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011)........................................................................6, 7
+Mem. Op., [REDACTED],
+PR/TT [REDACTED], ([REDACTED])...........................................................................1
+Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc.,
+435 U.S. 589 (1978)............................................................................................................4
+
+ii
+
+---
+
+Opinion and Order [REDACTED],
+No. PR/TT [REDACTED], ([REDACTED])....................................................................8
+Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court,
+478 U.S. 1 (1986)...............................................................................................................9
+United States v. Cook,
+432 F. 2d 1093 (7th Cir. 1970)..........................................................................................3
+United States v. Rosen,
+487 F. Supp. 2d 703 (E.D. Va. 2007)................................................................................9
+United States v. Smith,
+899 F.2d 564 (6th Cir. 1990).............................................................................................6
+Webster v. Doe,
+486 U.S. 592 (1988)...........................................................................................................4
+
+Federal Statutes
+
+18 U.S.C. App III § 6..........................................................................................................6
+5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(1)........................................................................................................4, 5
+50 U.S.C. § 1806(f)...........................................................................................................6
+
+Rules
+
+FISC Rule 3........................................................................................................................3
+FISC Rule 62(a)............................................................................................................2, 3, 8
+
+Other Authorities
+
+Leonard Downie, Jr., The Obama Administration and the Press, Comm. to Protect
+Journalists (Oct. 10, 2013)................................................................................................7
+Office of the Dir. Of Nat'l Intelligence, IC on the Record, DNI Clapper Declassifies
+Additional Intelligence Community Documents Regarding Collection Under Section 501
+of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (Nov. 18, 2013)............................................8
+
+iii
+
+---
+
+**INTRODUCTION**
+
+This Court, like all Article III courts, has control over its files, including the ability to
+publish its own opinions. That ability is not preempted by the Freedom of the Information Act
+(“FOIA”). Nor has this Court ceded its Article III power to publish its opinions to the Executive
+Branch's classification decisions. This Court should exercise its powers here.
+
+ProPublica, Inc. (“ProPublica") has moved this Court to publish its opinions pursuant to a
+First Amendment right of access, or in the alternative, pursuant to this Court's discretion and its
+inherent supervisory control over its own records. The opinions sought by ProPublica have,
+since the filing of the motion, been partially released by the Executive Branch. ¹ However, each
+opinion is heavily redacted because the Executive continues to classify the information withheld.
+But the Executive's claims of classification have yet to be subject to judicial scrutiny, and
+therefore they do not moot ProPublica's motion. Before finally withholding any part of its
+opinions, the Court must make specific findings on the record, even where the information
+withheld is classified.
+
+Thus, pursuant to the First Amendment or its own discretion, the Court should scrutinize
+
+1 The Government states that its voluntary release of a redacted, declassified version of an
+opinion sought by ProPublica, the "PR/TT Order" by former FISC Judge Kollar-Kotelly,
+necessitates dismissal of the instant motion. Opp'n at 1. As a preliminary matter, ProPublica
+believes its motion encompasses, at the least, not only the Kollar-Kotelly opinion but an
+additional opinion by Judge Bates released for the first time on that same day. ProPublica moved
+for publication of the opinions that contained specific quotations and were cited in a published
+FISC opinion. Mot. at 1. Several of these quotations appear in the redacted Judge Kollar-Kotelly
+opinion released on November 18, but at least one does not: "As this Court noted in 2010, the
+'finding of relevance most crucially depended on the conclusion that bulk collection is necessary
+for NSA to employ tools that are likely to generate useful investigative leads to help identify and
+track terrorists'." Motion at 1. This quotation appears to be contained in the PR/TT order by
+Judge Bates, which was also released in redacted, classified form on November 18, see Mem.
+Op. at 9, [REDACTED], PR/TT [REDACTED], ([REDACTED])
+(containing quote), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/1118/CLEANEDPRTT%20
+2.pdf.
+
+1
+
+---
+
+the redacted material and independently determine whether to publish it.
+
+**ARGUMENT**
+
+**I. THIS COURT HAS THE ABILITY AND THE DUTY TO SCRUTINIZE THE**
+**EXECUTIVE BRANCH'S CLASSIFICATION DECISIONS**
+
+**A. The Court's Power to Publish Its Opinions and Review Classification**
+**Decisions Is Not Limited By Its Own Rules.**
+
+It is settled law that this Court has the power to publish its opinions and, should it see fit,
+to review the Executive Branch's classification decisions. _In re Motion for Release of Court_
+_Records_, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, 486-87 (FISA Ct. 2007); _In re Orders of this Court Interpreting_
+_Section 215 of the Patriot Act_, No. Misc. 13-02, 2013 WL 5460064, at *7-8 (FISA Ct. Sep. 13,
+2013) ("Misc 13-02"). And this Court has not hesitated to subject classification claims to
+scrutiny when it determines that an opinion should be published. Just last month, after being
+directed by Judge Saylor of this Court to conduct a declassification review of a classified FISC
+opinion, the government responded, without any explanation at all, that it could not declassify
+the opinion. Order at 1, _In re Orders of this Court Interpreting Section 215 of the Patriot Act_,
+No. Misc 13-02 (FISA Ct. Nov. 20, 2013) (“Misc 13-02 November Order").² In response, Judge
+Saylor ordered that the government submit "a detailed explanation of its conclusion," which
+could be reviewed in camera if necessary to protect classified information, pursuant to FISC
+Rule 7(j). Id. at 2.
+
+The government's arguments that the Court is limited by its own Rules or by prudential
+concerns should be rejected. The government first claims that FISC Rule 62(a) is a "limitation on
+the Court's discretion" that empowers the Court "only" to direct a classification review. Opp'n
+at 4. It further suggests that this limitation is consistent with Rule 3's requirement that Court
+
+² Available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/misc-13-02-order-131120.pdf.
+
+2
+
+---
+
+staff "comply with security measures." Id.
+
+By their plain meaning, these rules do not limit the Court's power to publish its own
+decisions. Rule 62(a) states:
+The Judge who authored an order, opinion, or other decisions may _sua sponte_
+request that it be published.... [T]he Presiding Judge, after consulting with other
+Judges of the Court, may direct that an order, opinion, or other decision be
+published. Before publication, the Court may, as appropriate, direct the Executive
+Branch to review the order, opinion or other decision and redact it as necessary to
+ensure that properly classified information is appropriately protected pursuant to
+Executive Order 13526.³
+FISC Rule 62(a) (emphasis added). Nor does FISC Rule 3, dealing with how Court judges and
+staff handle classified information, suggest otherwise. See FISC Rule 3 (Court and stuff must
+possess requisite security clearances and "shall comply" with statutory security measures). It
+would be odd, to say the least, for the Court, in its own Rules, to subtract from the authority that
+it ordinarily possesses under Article III. See _In re Motion for Release_, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 486-87
+(discussing Court's Article III powers and jurisdiction to entertain a motion for release of court
+records).
+
+This Court's previous statement that "[u]nder FISA and the applicable Security
+Procedures, there is no role for this Court independently to review, and potentially override,
+Executive Branch classification decisions," Opp'n at 5 (quoting _In re Motion for Release_, 526 F.
+Supp. 2d at 491), should not be read as a blanket prohibition on scrutinizing classification
+decisions. Rather, that statement was made in the context of defeating a proposed common law
+
+³ The ordinary meaning of the word "may" as well as the larger context of the Rule indicates an
+additional power in the Court's discretion, not, as the government suggests, a constraint. See
+_Alvarez v. Longboy_, 697 F. 2d 1333, 1341 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing _United States v. Cook_, 432 F.
+2d 1093, 1098 (7th Cir. 1970)) ("That word [may] has been interpreted, depending on its context,
+to vest discretionary power in the court"). The government's brief omits the words "may, as
+appropriate" from its recitation of the rule. Opp'n at 4.
+
+3
+
+---
+
+right of access. _In re Motion for Release_, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 491. Although a statutory scheme
+like FISA may preempt a common law right of access, it cannot divest an Article III court of its
+power to publish its own opinions pursuant to the First Amendment or its own constitutional
+authority, and if necessary, to scrutinize classification decisions in the process. See _In re Motion_
+_for Release_, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 486-87 (FISA does not displace Court's supervisory powers)
+(citing _Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc._, 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978)); _Chambers v. NASCO, Inc._,
+501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (“certain implied powers must necessarily result to our [c]ourts of justice
+from the nature of their institution") (internal quotations and citations omitted). Moreover,
+construing FISA to preclude the Court's ability to exercise its Article III duties, particularly
+pursuant to a First Amendment claim, would raise a “serious constitutional question." _Klayman_
+_v. Obama_, No. 13-0851, 2013 WL 6571596, at *13 (D.D.C. Dec 16, 2013) (finding that FISA
+does not foreclose judicial review of constitutional claims) (quoting _Webster v. Doe_, 486 U.S.
+592, 603 (1988)).
+
+Above all, the Court cannot lack the ability to independently examine the Executive
+Branch's classification decisions in all cases and simultaneously retain the inherent authority to
+publish its own decisions.
+
+**B. FOIA Does Not Preempt This Court's Ability to Publish Its Own**
+**Opinions.**
+
+Nor, as the government claims, is ProPublica's only recourse for publication of the
+opinions through FOIA. See Opp'n at 5 n. 3. As this Court has made clear, "Nothing in FOIA
+divests federal courts of supervisory power over their own records, nor would an agency record's
+exemption from disclosure under FOIA necessarily displace a right of access to a copy of the
+
+⁴ FOIA requests are directed to the Executive Branch, see 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(1), whereas
+ProPublica seeks opinions from the Court itself.
+
+4
+
+---
+
+same document in a court's files, especially if that right is grounded in the First Amendment." _In_
+_re Motion for Release_, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 491 n. 19 (emphasis added). More generally, "[i]t is
+clear that [FOIA] was not intended to restrict the federal courts either by mandating disclosure
+or by requiring non-disclosure under the [FOIA] § 552 exemptions." _Brown & Williamson_
+_Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C._, 710 F.2d 1165, 1177 (6th Cir. 1983) (finding court is not bound by
+FOIA in sealing decisions but it is bound by the First Amendment).
+
+**C. The Court Should Review and Scrutinize the Government's**
+**Classification Decisions Here.**
+
+This Court should thus scrutinize the government's classification decisions and
+redactions and make its own independent determination as to whether that material should
+remain unpublished. To date, the government has made no showing at all as to why the redacted
+information in the released opinions is properly classified, and the Executive Branch's voluntary
+classification review in releasing the redacted opinions to the public has not been reviewed by
+this or any other Court.
+
+Even in the area of national security, courts do not give unquestioned deference to the
+Executive Branch. “A blind acceptance by the courts of the government's insistence on the need
+for secrecy, without notice to others, without argument, and without a statement of reasons,
+would impermissibly compromise the independence of the judiciary and open the door to
+possible abuse." _In re Wash. Post Co._, 807 F.2d 383, 392 (4th Cir. 1986). Where deference is
+due, "that deference must be based on a reasoned explanation from an official that directly
+supports the assertion of national security interests." _In re Nat'l Sec. Letter_, 930 F. Supp. 2d
+1064, 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2013). To take the government up on its invitation and avoid review
+entirely would risk violating the separation of powers and allow the “the Judiciary [to] become
+
+5
+
+---
+
+the handmaiden of the Executive." _United States v. Smith_, 899 F.2d 564, 569 (6th Cir. 1990).⁵
+
+In this specific context, the government has not earned deference. As this Court has now
+repeatedly been at pains to document, past pleas for deference in surveillance oversight have
+resulted in the Court being misled:
+
+* "The Court is troubled that the government's revelations regarding NSA's
+ acquisition of Internet transactions mark the third instance in less than three years
+ in which the government has disclosed a substantial misrepresentation regarding
+ the scope of a major collection program."⁶
+
+* "[I]t has come to light that the FISC's authorizations of this vast collection
+ program have been premised on a flawed depiction of how the NSA uses BR
+ metadata. . . buttressed by repeated inaccurate statements made in the
+ government's submissions, and despite a government-devised and Court-
+ mandated oversight regime."⁷
+
+⁵ Indeed, there are many contexts in which Article III courts scrutinize information that is
+classified or otherwise withheld from the public or litigants for reasons of national security. See,
+e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f) (upon application of an "aggrieved person" subject to surveillance,
+court shall review “materials relating to the surveillance as may be necessary to determine
+whether the surveillance of the aggrieved person was lawful[]" and may disclose such materials
+to the aggrieved person under appropriate security procedures where "necessary to make an
+accurate determination of the legality of the surveillance"); 18 U.S.C. App III §§ 6(a), (f) (upon
+motion by the United States, after hearing, court may make determination “concerning the use,
+relevance, or admissibility of classified information," and may determine that classified
+information "be disclosed in connection with a trial").
+⁶ Mem. Op. at 16 n. 14, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011), available at
+http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/October%202011%20Bates%20Opinion%20and%20Order
+%20Part%202.pdf.
+⁷ Order at 10-11, In re Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], BR 08-13 (FISA Ct.
+Mar. 2, 2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_March%202%2020
+09%20Order%20from%20FISC.pdf.
+
+6
+
+---
+
+* "To approve such a program [of bulk collection], the Court must have every
+ confidence that the government is doing its utmost to ensure that those
+ responsible for implementation fully comply with the Court's orders. The Court
+ no longer has such confidence."⁸
+
+Additionally, there is a growing recognition that the classification system itself is in
+drastic need of oversight. Former head of the Office Of Legal Counsel Jack Goldsmith has
+pointed to the problem of "massive, massive overclassification." Leonard Downie, Jr., The
+_Obama Administration and the Press_, Comm. to Protect Journalists (Oct. 10, 2013).⁹ A recent
+report to Congress noted that in 2011 alone, 4 million people had access to classified
+information, and there were 92 million decisions to declassify information. Id. In fact, the very
+sentence describing the government's ongoing misrepresentations about its collection programs,
+quoted supra from a footnote in a 2011 FISC opinion, was itself originally classified then
+subsequently released pursuant to the Executive Branch's voluntary November 18
+declassification review. ¹⁰ The problems with this system are broad and are usually a matter best
+suited for the Legislative Branch. However, where this Court's own decisions are subject to
+unilateral, unexplained classification decisions, the Court should at a minimum conduct its own
+independent review.
+
+⁸ Id. at 12.
+⁹ Available at https://cpj.org/reports/2013/10/obama-and-the-press-us-leaks-surveillance-post-
+911.php.
+¹⁰ See Reply Mem. in Supp. of Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 1-2, Elec. Frontier Found. v. DOJ,
+No. 12-cv-1441 (D.D.C. Dec. 6, 2013) (describing government's classification claims regarding
+footnote and subsequent release of opinion with unredacted footnote).
+
+7
+
+---
+
+**II. THE GOVERNMENT'S VOLUNTARY RELEASE OF DECLASSIFIED**
+**OPINIONS SUBSEQUENT TO THE FILING OF PROPUBLICA'S**
+**MOTION DOES NOT SUPPORT DISMISSAL**
+
+This motion is not moot because each opinion ProPublica sought for publication has been
+only partially published: each contains extensive redactions, including the types of Internet
+metadata the FISC authorized the government to collect under the FISA PR/TT provisions.¹¹ See,
+e.g., Opinion and Order at 7-11, [REDACTED], No. PR/TT [REDACTED], ([REDACTED]) ¹² (FISC
+authorizes collection of certain redacted categories of Internet metadata from an over three-page
+list of categories metadata that is itself almost completely redacted). Thus ProPublica's request
+that this Court fully publish its own opinions to the extent it, not the Executive Branch, deems
+appropriate, has not been fulfilled.
+
+**III. THE COURT SHOULD PUBLISH THE OPINIONS PURSUANT TO**
+**PROPUBLICA'S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF ACCESS OR THE**
+**COURT'S INHERENT AUTHORITY**
+
+**A. ProPublica Has Standing to Seek the Records Sought.**
+
+Here, movants have undisputed constitutional standing and seek publication pursuant to a
+First Amendment right of access. The government argues that because ProPublica was not a
+"party" to the proceedings that produced the opinions sought, it is precluded by FISA and FISC
+Rule 62(a) from moving for their publication. But that is incorrect. As stated in a recent opinion
+of this Court:
+
+¹¹ Even the date of the opinions is redacted despite website description accompanying the public
+release of these opinions noting that the PR/TT program discussed by the opinions was
+discontinued in 2011. See Office of the Dir. Of Nat'l Intelligence, IC on the Record, DNI
+Clapper Declassifies Additional Intelligence Community Documents Regarding Collection
+Under Section 501 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (Nov. 18, 2013),
+http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/67419963949/dni-clapper-declassifies-additional-
+intelligence.
+¹² Available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/1118/CLEANEDPRTT%201.pdf.
+
+8
+
+---
+
+As the government acknowledges and Rule 62(a) explicitly states, the Court has
+the discretion to direct publication _sua sponte_. Given this discretion to act, it
+would serve no discernible purpose for the Court, by rule, to be precluded from
+considering reasoned arguments in favor of publication of certain opinions made
+by claimants with Article III standing to seek their publication."
+Misc. 13-02 at 11. The Court further noted that this argument would also bar non-parties' claims
+of right (such as First Amendment claims), which it has the indisputable authority to adjudicate.
+Id. at 11-12 (citing _In re Motion for Release_, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 487).
+
+**B. ProPublica Has Established a First Amendment Right of Access to the**
+**Opinions.**
+
+ProPublica's motion demonstrates that it has a First Amendment right of access to the
+opinions sought. Mot. at 8-15. The government makes no argument in opposition, save the
+assertion that this Court has "repeatedly" rejected First Amendment claims to its records. Opp'n
+at 4. But this assertion is incorrect. The Court has only reached the merits of the First
+Amendment right of access argument in one case. _In re Motion for Release_, 526 F. Supp. 2d at
+496-97, petition for reh'g en banc denied, No. Misc 07-01 (FISA Ct. Feb. 8, 2008). In its motion,
+ProPublica noted several reasons why that decision was not controlling. Mot. at 9-11. The
+government fails to refute any of these arguments.
+
+As set forth in Pro Publica's opening memorandum, the Court should find that a First
+Amendment right of access applies. As a result, the opinions are presumptively open, and the
+burden is on the government to demonstrate that retention "is essential to preserve higher
+values," based on a non-conclusory showing of a "substantial probability" of harm to the
+interests asserted. _Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court_, 478 U.S. 1, 13-14, 15 (1986). Before
+withholding any part of the opinions, even where the information withheld is classified, the
+Court must make specific findings on the record supporting its decision to not publish in full. Id.
+at 13-14; _United States v. Rosen_, 487 F. Supp. 2d 703, 716 (E.D. Va. 2007).
+
+9
+
+---
+
+**C. Alternatively, This Court Should Exercise Its Inherent Authority to**
+**Publish Its Decisions.**
+
+Even if the Court does not reach ProPublica's asserted First Amendment right of access,
+it should exercise its discretion to publish the records based on an independent decision about the
+redacted information.
+
+**CONCLUSION**
+
+For the forgoing reasons, ProPublica respectfully requests that this Court review the
+government's classification decisions and then, absent specific findings to the contrary, publish
+the opinions sought in full.
+
+Dated: December 20, 2013
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+Andrew Crocker
+David Greene
+ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION
+815 Eddy Street
+San Francisco, CA 94109
+(415) 436-9333
+andrew@eff.org
+davidg@eff.org
+
+Counsel for ProPublica, Inc.
+
+10
+
+---
+
+**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**
+
+I HEREBY CERTIFY that copies of the foregoing Reply Brief in Support of Motion of
+Propublica, Inc. for the Release of Court Records have been served on the following counsel this
+20th day of December, 2013, in the manner indicated:
+
+By Overnight Delivery:
+
+CHRISTINE GUNNING
+United States Department of Justice
+Litigation Security Group
+2 Constitution Square
+145 N Street NE
+Suite 2W-115
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+(202) 514-9016
+
+Via Email:
+
+Bruce D. Brown
+The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press
+1101 Wilson Blvd., Suite 1100
+Arlington, VA 22209
+703-807-2100
+bbrown@rcfp.org
+
+Counsel for Amici Curiae
+
+Andrew Crocker
+
+11
+
+---
+
+UNITED STATES FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE MOTION OF PROPUBLICA, INC.
+FOR THE RELEASE OF COURT RECORDS
+
+)
+) Docket No.: Misc. 13-09
+
+**NOTICE OF APPEARANCE**
+
+TO THE CLERK AND ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
+
+PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the following counsel has been added to the case and will be
+appearing as additional counsel of record for ProPublica, Inc.:
+
+Andrew Crocker
+ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION
+815 Eddy Street
+San Francisco, CA 94109
+Tel: (415) 436-9333
+Fax: (415) 436-9993
+Email: andrew@eff.org
+
+**CERTIFICATION OF BAR MEMBERSHIP AND SECURITY CLEARANCE STATUS**
+
+Pursuant to the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Rules of
+Procedure 7(h)(1), 7(i), and 63, ProPublica, Inc. (“Movant”) respectfully submits the following
+information:
+
+**(1) Bar Membership Information**
+
+Undersigned counsel for Movant is a licensed attorney, and a member in good standing of the
+bar of a United States district court. See FISC Rule 7(h)(1); FISC Rule 63.
+
+Andrew Crocker is a member, in good standing, of the State Bar of California (Bar
+No. 291596), and is a member, in good standing, of the bar of the United States District Court for
+the Northern District of California.
+
+---
+
+**(2) Security Clearance Information**
+
+Neither Movant's officers or employees or Movant's counsel hold security clearances. See
+FISC Rule 7(i). Because Movant's motion does not seek the release of legitimately classified
+information, and because the motion itself does not contain classified information, Movant
+respectfully submits that Movant and its counsel may participate in proceedings on the motion
+without access to classified information or security clearances. See FISC Rule 63 (requiring
+counsel only to have "appropriate security clearances").
+
+Dated: December 20, 2013
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+Andrew Crocker
+ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION
+815 Eddy Street
+San Francisco, CA 94109
+(415) 436-9333
+andrew@eff.org
+
+Counsel for Movant ProPublica, Inc.
+
+---
+
+**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**
+
+I HEREBY CERTIFY that copies of the foregoing Notice of Appearance and
+Certification of Bar Membership and Security Clearance Status have been served on the
+following counsel this 20th day of December, 2013, in the manner indicated:
+
+By Overnight Delivery:
+
+CHRISTINE GUNNING
+United States Department of Justice
+Litigation Security Group
+2 Constitution Square
+145 N Street NE
+Suite 2W-115
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+(202) 514-9016
+
+Andrew Crocker
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-motion-131223/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-motion-131223/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fb41a56
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-motion-131223/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Reply Brief in Support of Motion of ProPublica, Inc. for the Release of Court Records, In re Motion of ProPublica, Inc. for the Release of Court Records, No. Misc. 13-09 (FISA Ct. Dec. 23, 2013).",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-12-23",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-12-23",
+ "link": "https://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/Misc%2013-09%20Motion-3.pdf",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "9b6ec18fd4d7ef40cd76f5ef6803ba244f277a120750cbeb30e8a2c493f87c7a",
+ "pages": 18
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-order-131009/FISC_-_br13-09-order-131009.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-order-131009/FISC_-_br13-09-order-131009.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ac857ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-order-131009/FISC_-_br13-09-order-131009.md
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+UNITED STATES FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
+BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
+ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
+OF TANGIBLE THINGS
+
+Docket No. BR 13-109
+
+ORDER
+
+The Clerk of the Court received a letter from the Center for National Security Studies
+("Center") on September 26, 2013. In the letter, the Center makes several requests in connection
+with the possible renewal of authorities granted by the Court on July 19, 2013. On that date in
+the above-captioned docket, the Court entered an order pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1861 requiring
+the ongoing daily production to the National Security Agency of certain telephone call detail
+records in bulk. The order and the Court's supporting amended memorandum opinion were
+declassified in substantial part by the Executive Branch and published by the Court on September
+17, 2013. See http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/br13-09-primary-order.pdf. The
+order in Docket Number BR 13-109 is set to expire on October 11, 2013, at 5:00 p.m. Eastern
+Time.
+
+In the event the government applies for an order requiring the continuing bulk production
+of call detail records beyond October 11, the Center asks the Court to: (1) "direct the
+Government ... to file on the public record an application and supporting brief that sets forth its
+argument on the legality of bulk telephony metadata collection;" (2) "establish a briefing
+schedule that enables interested persons or organizations to submit briefs [of] amicus curiae
+responding to the Government's submission;" and (3) consider entertaining the matter en banc
+pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(2). See Center Letter at 1-2.
+
+FISC Rule 6 describes the means by which relief may be requested from this Court.
+Under Rule 6(d), the Center must make its requests by motion. The Center asks that "[i]f a
+formal motion is required," the Court "treat [its] letter as a motion or advise [it] that it should be
+refiled as such." Center Letter at 2. Because the Center's letter fails to comply with the FISC
+Rules in several respects, the Court declines to treat it as a motion. See FISC Rule 7(c)(2) (form
+of submissions); Rule 7(h)(1) (bar information); Rule 7(i) (security clearance information); Rule
+63 (practice before the Court).
+
+The Center may re-submit its requests in the form of a motion that complies with all
+applicable requirements of the FISC Rules. Any such submission, however, should address the
+
+question whether the Center's requests are foreclosed in whole or in part by the language and
+structure of Section 1861. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1) (directing the Court to "enter an ex
+parte order"), (d) (restricting disclosures relating to orders issued under § 1861), and (f)
+(providing detailed procedures for challenges to production orders pursuant to which only the
+recipient of a production order may contest the legality of that order, and requiring that such
+challenges be filed "under seal").
+
+The FISC Rules are available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/rules/FISC2010.pdf.
+
+SO ORDERED, this 9^th day of October, 2013, in Docket No. BR 13-109.
+
+MARY A. MCLAUGHLIN
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+Page 2
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-order-131009/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-order-131009/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..635afdd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-order-131009/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Order, In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring Production of Tangible Things",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-10-09",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-10-09",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34256",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "d9b7d8ab29a44eed76d6df551fc4e49dae578f8106bd49fec36def0c0513fdce",
+ "pages": 2
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-order-131113/FISC_-_br13-09-order-131113.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-order-131113/FISC_-_br13-09-order-131113.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ba8f9bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-order-131113/FISC_-_br13-09-order-131113.md
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+UNITED STATES
+
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE MOTION OF PROPUBLICA, INC.
+FOR THE RELEASE OF COURT RECORDS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-09
+
+BRIEFING ORDER
+
+This matter is before the Court on the Motion of ProPublica, Inc. for the Release of Court
+Records, which was submitted on November 12, 2013. Any response by the United States
+Department of Justice ("DOJ") to the motion shall be submitted no later than 5:00 p.m. on
+December 10, 2013. Any reply by ProPublica, Inc. to DOJ's Response shall be submitted no
+later than 5:00 p.m. on December 23, 2013.
+
+SO ORDERED, this 13th day of November, 2013.
+
+/s/ Reggie B. Walton
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-order-131113/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-order-131113/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..336c0e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-order-131113/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Briefing Order, In re Motion of ProPublica, Inc. for the Release of Court Records",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-11-13",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-13",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34252",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "68e2a6fef3d794de370319cbd86cee733def6a4a496d0896c74c940f8ef0ab31",
+ "pages": 1
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-primary-order/FISC_-_br13-09-primary-order.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-primary-order/FISC_-_br13-09-primary-order.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..64aa30f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-primary-order/FISC_-_br13-09-primary-order.md
@@ -0,0 +1,1235 @@
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D. C.
+
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
+BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
+ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
+OF TANGIBLE THINGS FROM
+
+[REDACTED]
+Docket Number: BR 13-109
+[REDACTED]
+
+AMENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION
+
+I. Background.
+
+On July 18, 2013, a verified Final "Application for Certain Tangible Things for
+Investigations to Protect Against International Terrorism" (Application) was submitted
+to the Court by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for an order pursuant to the
+Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA or the Act), Title 50, United States
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+
+Code (U.S.C.), § 1861, as amended (also known as Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT
+Act),¹ requiring the ongoing daily production to the National Security Agency (NSA) of
+certain call detail records or "telephony metadata" in bulk.² The Court, after having
+fully considered the United States Government's (government) earlier-filed Proposed
+Application pursuant to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) Rule of
+Procedure 9(a), and having held an extensive hearing to receive testimony and
+
+¹ "Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
+Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001," Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 2001) ("PATRIOT Act"),
+amended by, "USA PATRIOT Improvement Reauthorization Act of 2005," Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat.
+192 (Mar. 9, 2006); "USA PATRIOT Act Additional Reauthorizing Amendments Act of 2006," Pub. L. No.
+109-178, 120 Stat. 278 (Mar. 9, 2006); and Section 215 expiration extended by "Department of Defense
+Appropriations Act, 2010," Pub. L. No. 111-118 (Dec. 19, 2009); "USA PATRIOT-Extension of Sunsets,"
+Pub. L. No. 111-141 (Feb. 27, 2010); "FISA Sunsets Extension Act of 2011," Pub. L. No. 112-3 (Feb. 25,
+2011); and, "PATRIOT Sunsets Extension Act of 2011," Pub. L. No. 112-14, 125 Stat. 216 (May 26, 2011).
+² For purposes of this matter, ""telephony metadata' includes comprehensive communications routing
+information, including but not limited to session identifying information (e.g., originating and
+terminating telephone number, International Mobile station Equipment Identity (IMEI) number,
+International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) number, etc.), trunk identifier, telephone calling card
+numbers, and time and duration of call. Telephony metadata does not include the substantive content of
+any communication, as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8), or the name, address, or financial information of a
+subscriber or customer." App. at 4. In addition, the Court has explicitly directed that its authorization
+does not include "the production of cell site location information (CSLI)." Primary Ord. at 3.
+³ Prior to scheduling a hearing in this matter, the Court reviewed the Proposed Application and its filed
+Exhibits pursuant to its standard procedure. Exhibit A consists of a Declaration from the NSA in support
+of the government's Application. As Ordered by this Court in Docket No. BR 13-80, Exhibit B is a
+Renewal Report to describe any significant changes proposed in the way in which records would be
+received, and any significant changes to controls NSA has in place to receive, store, process, and
+disseminate the information. [REDACTED]. It also provides the final segment of
+information normally contained in the 30-day reports discussed below. As Ordered by this Court in
+Docket No. BR 13-80, Exhibit C is a summary of a meeting held by Executive Branch representatives to
+assess compliance with this Court's Orders. Furthermore, the Court reviewed the previously filed 30-day
+reports that were Ordered by this Court in Docket No. 13-80, discussing NSA's application of the
+reasonable, articulable suspicion (RAS) standard for approving selection terms and implementation of the
+automated query process. In addition, the 30-day reports describe disseminations of U.S.-person
+information obtained under this program.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+2
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+evidence on this matter on July 18, 2013,⁴ GRANTED the application for the reasons
+stated in this Memorandum Opinion and in a Primary Order issued on July 19, 2013,
+which is appended hereto.
+
+In conducting its review of the government's application, the Court considered
+whether the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution imposed any impediment to
+the government's proposed collection. Having found none in accord with U.S. Supreme
+Court precedent, the Court turned to Section 215 to determine if the proposed collection
+was lawful and that Orders requested from this Court should issue. The Court found
+that under the terms of Section 215 and under operation of the canons of statutory
+construction such Orders were lawful and required, and the requested Orders were
+therefore issued.
+
+⁴ The proceedings were conducted ex parte under security procedures as mandated by 50 U.S.C. §§
+1803(c), 1861(c)(1), and FISC Rules 3, 17(a)-(b). See Letter from Presiding Judge Walton, U.S. FISC to
+Chairman Leahy, Senate Judiciary Committee (Jul. 29, 2013), at 7 (noting that initial proceedings before
+the FISC are handled ex parte as is the universal practice in courts that handle government requests for
+orders for the production of business records, pen register/trap and trace implementation, wiretaps, and
+search warrants), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/fisc/honorable-patrick-leahy.pdf. Pursuant to FISC
+Rules 17(b)-(d), this Court heard oral argument by attorneys from the U.S. Department of Justice, and
+received sworn testimony from personnel from the FBI and NSA. The Court also entered into evidence
+Exhibits 1-7 during the hearing. Except as cited in this Memorandum Opinion, at the request of the
+government, the transcript of the hearing has been placed under seal by Order of this Court for security
+reasons. Draft Tr. at 3-4. At the hearing, the government notified the Court that it was developing an
+updated legal analysis expounding on its legal position with regard to the application of Section 215 to
+bulk telephony metadata collection. Draft Tr. at 25. The government was not prepared to present such a
+document to the Court. The Court is aware that on August 9, 2013, the government released to the public
+an "Administration White Paper: Bulk Collection of Telephony Metadata Under Section 215 of the USA
+PATRIOT Act" (Aug. 9, 2013). The Court, however, has not reviewed the government's "White Paper"
+and the "White Paper", has played no part in the Court's consideration of the government's Application
+or this Memorandum Opinion.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+3
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+
+Specifically, the government requested Orders from this Court to obtain certain
+business records of specified telephone service providers. Those telephone company
+business records consist of a very large volume of each company's call detail records or
+telephony metadata, but expressly exclude the contents of any communication; the
+name, address, or financial information of any subscriber or customer; or any cell site
+location information (CSLI). Primary Ord. at 3 n.1.⁵ The government requested
+production of this data on a daily basis for a period of 90 days. The sole purpose of this
+production is to obtain foreign intelligence information in support of [REDACTED]
+individual authorized investigations to protect against international terrorism and
+concerning various international terrorist organizations. See Primary Ord. at 2, 6; App.
+at 8; and, Ex. A. at 2-3. In granting the government's request, the Court has prohibited
+the government from accessing the data for any other intelligence or investigative
+purpose.⁶ Primary Ord. at 4.
+
+⁵ In the event that the government seeks the production of CSLI as part of the bulk production of call
+detail records in the future, the government would be required to provide notice and briefing to this
+Court pursuant to FISC Rule 11. The production of all call detail records of all persons in the United
+States has never occurred under this program. For example, the government [REDACTED] App. at 13 n.4.
+⁶ The government may, however, permit access to "trained and authorized technical personnel ... to
+perform those processes needed to make [the data] usable for intelligence analysis," Primary Ord. at 5,
+and may share query results "[1] to determine whether the information contains exculpatory or
+impeachment information or is otherwise discoverable in legal proceedings or (2) to facilitate lawful
+oversight functions." Id. at 14.
+
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+
+By the terms of this Court's Primary Order, access to the data is restricted
+through technical means, through limits on trained personnel with authorized access,
+and through a query process that requires a reasonable, articulable suspicion (RAS), as
+determined by a limited set of personnel, that the selection term (e.g., a telephone
+number) that will be used to search the data is associated with one of the identified
+international terrorist organizations.⁷ Primary Ord. at 4-9. Moreover, the government
+may not make the RAS determination for selection terms reasonably believed to be used
+by U.S. persons solely based on activities protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 9;
+and see 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1). To ensure adherence to its Orders, this Court has the
+authority to oversee compliance, see 50 U.S.C. § 1803(h), and requires the government
+to notify the Court in writing immediately concerning any instance of non-compliance,
+see FISC Rule 13(b). According to the government, in the prior authorization period
+there have been no compliance incidents.⁸
+
+Finally, although not required by statute, the government has demonstrated
+through its written submissions and oral testimony that this production has been and
+remains valuable for obtaining foreign intelligence information regarding international
+
+⁷ A selection term that meets specific legal standards has always been required. This Court has not
+authorized government personnel to access the data for the purpose of wholesale "data mining" or
+browsing.
+⁸ The Court is aware that in prior years there have been incidents of non-compliance with respect to
+NSA's handling of produced information. Through oversight by this Court over a period of months,
+those issues were resolved.
+
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+
+terrorist organizations, see App. Ex. B at 3-4; Thirty-Day Report for Filing in Docket
+Number BR 13-80 (Jun. 25, 2013) at 3-4; Thirty-Day Report for Filing in Docket Number
+BR 13-80 (May 24, 2013) a 3-4.
+
+II. Fourth Amendment.⁹
+
+The production of telephone service provider metadata is squarely controlled by
+the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). The Smith
+decision and its progeny have governed Fourth Amendment jurisprudence with regard
+to telephony and communications metadata for more than 30 years. Specifically, the
+Smith case involved a Fourth Amendment challenge to the use of a pen register on
+telephone company equipment to capture information concerning telephone calls,¹⁰ but
+not the content or the identities of the parties to a conversation. Id. at 737, 741 (citing
+Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434
+U.S. 159 (1977)). The same type of information is at issue here.¹¹
+
+⁹ "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
+searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
+supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
+or things to be seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV.
+¹⁰ Because the metadata was obtained from telephone company equipment, the Court found that
+"petitioner obviously cannot claim that his 'property' was invaded or that police intruded into a
+'constitutionally protected area." Id. at 741.
+¹¹ The Court is aware that additional call detail data is obtained via this production than was acquired
+through the pen register acquisition at issue in Smith. Other courts have had the opportunity to review
+whether there is a Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy in call detail records similar to the data
+sought in this matter and have found that there is none. See United States v. Reed, 575 F.3d 900, 914 (9th
+Cir. 2009) (finding that because "data about the 'call origination, length, and time of call' is nothing
+more than pen register and trap and trace data, there is no Fourth Amendment 'expectation of privacy."
+
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+
+The Supreme Court in Smith recognized that telephone companies maintain call
+detail records in the normal course of business for a variety of purposes. Id. at 742 (“All
+subscribers realize ... that the phone company has facilities for making permanent
+records of the number they dial...."). This appreciation is directly applicable to a
+business records request. "Telephone users typically know that they must convey
+numerical information to the phone company; that the phone company has facilities for
+recording this information; and that the phone company does in fact record this
+information for a variety of legitimate business purposes." Id. at 743. Furthermore, the
+Supreme Court found that once a person has transmitted this information to a third
+party (in this case, a telephone company), the person "has no legitimate expectation of
+privacy in [the] information...."¹² Id. The telephone user, having conveyed this
+information to a telephone company that retains the information in the ordinary course
+of business, assumes the risk that the company will provide that information to the
+
+(citing Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44)) cert. denied 559 U.S. 987, 988 (2010); United States Telecom Ass'n, 227
+F.3d 450, 454 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (noting pen registers record telephone numbers of outgoing calls and trap
+and trace devices are like caller ID systems, and that such information is not protected by the Fourth
+Amendment); United States v. Hallmark, 911 F.2d 399, 402 (10th Cir. 1990) (recognizing that "[t]he
+installation and use of a pen register and trap and trace device is not a 'search' requiring a warrant
+pursuant to the Fourth Amendment," and noting that there is no ""legitimate expectation of privacy' at
+stake." (citing Smith, 442 U.S. at 739-46)).
+¹² The Supreme Court has applied this principle – that there is no Fourth Amendment search when the
+government obtains information that has been conveyed to third parties – in cases involving other types
+of business records. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (bank records); see also S.E.C. v. Jerry
+T. O'Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 743 (1984) ("It is established that, when a person communicates information
+to a third party even on the understanding that the communication is confidential, he cannot object if the
+third party conveys that information or records thereof to law enforcement authorities.") (citing Miller,
+425 U.S. at 443).
+
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+
+government. See id. at 744. Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that a person does not
+have a legitimate expectation of privacy in telephone numbers dialed and, therefore,
+when the government obtained that dialing information, it "was not a 'search,' and no
+warrant was required" under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 746.¹³
+
+In Smith, the government was obtaining the telephone company's metadata of
+one person suspected of a crime. See id. at 737. Here, the government is requesting
+daily production of certain telephony metadata in bulk belonging to companies without
+specifying the particular number of an individual. This Court had reason to analyze
+this distinction in a similar context in [REDACTED]
+
+In that case, this Court found that "regarding the breadth of the proposed
+surveillance, it is noteworthy that the application of the Fourth Amendment depends on
+the government's intruding into some individual's reasonable expectation of privacy."
+Id. at 62. The Court noted that Fourth Amendment rights are personal and individual,
+see id. (citing Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 219 (1981); accord, e.g., Rakas v.
+Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133 (1978) (""Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which
+.. may not be vicariously asserted.") (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165,
+174 (1969))), and that "[s]o long as no individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy
+
+¹³ If a service provider believed that a business records order infringed on its own Fourth Amendment
+rights, it could raise such a challenge pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f).
+
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+
+in meta data, the large number of persons whose communications will be subjected to
+the ... surveillance is irrelevant to the issue of whether a Fourth Amendment search or
+seizure will occur." Id. at 63. Put another way, where one individual does not have a
+Fourth Amendment interest, grouping together a large number of similarly-situated
+individuals cannot result in a Fourth Amendment interest springing into existence ex
+nihilo.
+
+In sum, because the Application at issue here concerns only the production of
+call detail records or "telephony metadata" belonging to a telephone company, and not
+the contents of communications, Smith v. Maryland compels the conclusion that there is
+no Fourth Amendment impediment to the collection. Furthermore, for the reasons
+stated in [REDACTED] and discussed above, this Court finds that the volume
+of records being acquired does not alter this conclusion. Indeed, there is no legal basis
+for this Court to find otherwise.
+
+III. Section 215.
+
+Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act created a statutory framework, the various
+parts of which are designed to ensure not only that the government has access to the
+information it needs for authorized investigations, but also that there are protections
+and prohibitions in place to safeguard U.S. person information. It requires the
+government to demonstrate, among other things, that there is "an investigation to
+
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+
+obtain foreign intelligence information ... to [in this case] protect against international
+terrorism," 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1); that investigations of U.S. persons are "not conducted
+solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution,"
+id.; that the investigation is "conducted under guidelines approved by the Attorney
+General under Executive Order 12333," id. § 1861(a)(2); that there is "a statement of
+facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things
+sought are relevant" to the investigation, id. § 1861(b)(2)(A);¹⁴ that there are adequate
+minimization procedures "applicable to the retention and dissemination" of the
+information requested, id. § 1861(b)(2)(B); and, that only the production of such things
+that could be "obtained with a subpoena duces tecum" or "any other order issued by a
+court of the United States directing the production of records" may be ordered, id.
+§ 1861(c)(2)(D), see infra Part III.a. (discussing Section 2703(d) of the Stored
+Communications Act). If the Court determines that the government has met the
+requirements of Section 215, it shall enter an ex parte order compelling production.¹⁵
+
+¹⁴ This section also provides that the records sought are "presumptively relevant to an authorized
+investigation if the applicant shows in the statement of facts that they pertain to -(i) a foreign power or
+an agent of a foreign power; (ii) the activities of a suspected agent of a foreign power who is the subject of
+such authorized investigation; or (iii) an individual in contact with, or known, to, a suspected agent of a
+foreign power who is the subject of such authorized investigation." 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A)(i)-(iii). The
+government has not invoked this presumption and, therefore, the Court need not address it.
+¹⁵ "Upon an application made pursuant to this section, if the judge finds that the application meets the
+requirements of [Section 215], the judge shall enter an ex parte order as requested, or as modified,
+approving the release of tangible things." Id. § 1861(c)(1) (emphasis added). As indicated, the Court may
+modify the Orders as necessary, and compliance issues could present situations requiring modification.
+
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+
+This Court must verify that each statutory provision is satisfied before issuing
+the requested Orders. For example, even if the Court finds that the records requested
+are relevant to an investigation, it may not authorize the production if the minimization
+procedures are insufficient. Under Section 215, minimization procedures are "specific
+procedures that are reasonably designed in light of the purpose and technique of an
+order for the production of tangible things, to minimize the retention, and prohibit the
+dissemination, of nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting United
+States persons consistent with the need of the United States to obtain, produce, and
+disseminate foreign intelligence information." Id. § 1861(g)(2)(A). Congress recognized
+in this provision that information concerning U.S. persons that is not directly responsive
+to foreign intelligence needs will be produced under these orders and established post-
+production protections for such information. As the Primary Order issued in this
+matter demonstrates, this Court's authorization includes detailed restrictions on the
+government through minimization procedures. See Primary Ord. at 4-17. Without
+those restrictions, this Court could not, nor would it, have approved the proposed
+production. This Court's Primary Order also sets forth the requisite findings under
+Section 215 for issuing the Orders requested by the government in its Application. Id.
+at 2, 4-17.
+
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+
+The Court now turns to its interpretation of Section 215 with regard to how it
+compares to 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (Stored Communications Act); its determination that
+"there are reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are relevant to
+an authorized investigation," 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A); and, the doctrine of legislative
+re-enactment as it pertains to the business records provision.
+
+a. Section 215 of FISA and Section 2703(d) of the Stored Communications
+Act.
+
+It is instructive to compare Section 215, which is used for foreign intelligence
+purposes and is codified as part of FISA, with 18 U.S.C. § 2703 ("Required disclosure of
+customer communications or records"), which is used in criminal investigations and is
+part of the Stored Communications Act (SCA). See In Re Production of Tangible Things
+From [REDACTED] Docket No. BR 08-13, Supp. Op.
+(Dec. 12, 2008) (discussing Section 215 and Section 2703). Section 2703 establishes a
+process by which the government can obtain information from electronic
+communications service providers, such as telephone companies. As with FISA, this
+section of the SCA provides the mechanism for obtaining either the contents of
+communications, or non-content records of communications. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(a)-
+(c).
+
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+
+For non-content records production requests, such as the type sought here,
+Section 2703(c) provides a variety of mechanisms, including acquisition through a court
+order under Section 2703(d). Under this section, which is comparable to Section 215, the
+government must offer to the court "specific and articulable facts showing that there are
+reasonable grounds to believe that ... the records or other information sought, are
+relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation." Id. § 2703(d) (emphasis
+added). Section 215, the comparable provision for foreign intelligence purposes,
+requires neither "specific and articulable facts" nor does it require that the information
+be "material." Rather, it merely requires a statement of facts showing that there are
+reasonable grounds to believe that the records sought are relevant to the investigation.
+See 50 U.S.C. §1861(b)(2)(A). That these two provisions apply to the production of the
+same type of records from the same type of providers is an indication that Congress
+intended this Court to apply a different, and in specific respects lower, standard to the
+government's Application under Section 215 than a court reviewing a request under
+Section 2703(d). Indeed, the pre-PATRIOT Act version of FISA's business records
+provision required "specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that the
+person to whom the records pertain is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power."
+50 U.S.C. §1862(b)(2)(B) as it read on October 25, 2001.¹⁶ In enacting Section 215,
+
+¹⁶ Prior to enactment of the PATRIOT Act, the business records provision was in Section 1862 vice 1861.
+
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+
+Congress removed the requirements for "specific and articulable facts" and that the
+records pertain to "a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power." Accordingly, now
+the government need not provide specific and articulable facts, demonstrate any
+connection to a particular suspect, nor show materiality when requesting business
+records under Section 215. To find otherwise would be to impose a higher burden – one
+that Congress knew how to include in Section 215, but chose to dispense with.
+
+Furthermore, Congress provided different measures to ensure that the
+government obtains and uses information properly, depending on the purpose for
+which it sought the information. First, Section 2703 has no provision for minimization
+procedures. However, such procedures are mandated under Section 215 and must be
+designed to restrict the retention and dissemination of information, as imposed by this
+Court's Primary Order. Primary Ord. at 4-17; see 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861(c)(1), (g).
+
+Second, Section 2703(d) permits the service provider to file a motion with a court
+to "quash or modify such order, if the information or records requested are unusually
+voluminous in nature or compliance with such order otherwise would cause undue
+burden on such provider." Id. Congress recognized that, even with the higher
+statutory standard for a production order under Section 2703(d), some requests
+authorized by a court would be "voluminous" and provided a means by which the
+provider could seek relief using a motion. Id. Under Section 215, however, Congress
+
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+14
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+
+provided a specific and complex statutory scheme for judicial review of an Order from
+this Court to ensure that providers could challenge both the legality of the required
+production and the nondisclosure provisions of that Order. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f). This
+adversarial process includes the selection of a judge from a pool of FISC judges to
+review the challenge to determine if it is frivolous and to rule on the merits, id. §
+1861(f)(2)(A)(ii), provides standards that the judge is to apply during such review, id. §§
+1861(1)(2)(B)-(C), and provides for appeal to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+of Review and, ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court, id. § 1861(f)(3).¹⁷ This procedure, as
+opposed to the motion process available under Section 2703(d) to challenge a
+production as unduly voluminous or burdensome, contemplates a substantial and
+engaging adversarial process to test the legality of this Court's Orders under Section
+215.¹⁸ This enhanced process appears designed to ensure that there are additional
+safeguards in light of the lower threshold that the government is required to meet for
+production under Section 215 as opposed to Section 2703(d). To date, no holder of
+
+¹⁷ For further discussion on the various means by which adversarial proceedings before the FISC may
+occur, see Letter from Presiding Judge Walton, U.S. FISC to Chairman Leahy, Senate Judiciary Committee
+(Jul. 29, 2013), at 7-10, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/fisc/honorable-patrick-leahy.pdf.
+¹⁸ In In re Application of the United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), 830 F.Supp.2d
+114, 128-29 (E.D. Va. 2011), the court found that only the service provider, as opposed to a customer or
+subscriber, could challenge the execution of a § 2703(d) non-content records order. The court reasoned
+that "[b]ecause Congress clearly provided ... protections for one type of § 2703 order [content] but not for
+others, the Court must infer that Congress deliberately declined to permit challenges for the omitted
+orders." Id. The court also noted that the distinction between content and non-content demonstrates an
+incorporation of Smith v. Maryland into the SCA. Id. at 128 n.11. As discussed above, the operation of
+Section 215 within FISA represents that same distinction.
+
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+
+records who has received an Order to produce bulk telephony metadata has challenged
+the legality of such an Order. Indeed, no recipient of any Section 215 Order has
+challenged the legality of such an Order, despite the explicit statutory mechanism for
+doing so.
+
+When analyzing a statute or a provision thereof, a court considers the statutory
+schemes as a whole. See Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974) (noting that when
+a court interprets a statute, it looks not merely to a particular clause but will examine it
+within the whole statute or statutes on the same subject) (internal quotation and citation
+omitted); Jones v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 728 F.2d 257, 262 (6th Cir. 1984)
+("[W]here two or more statutes deal with the same subject, they are to be read in pari
+materia and harmonized, if possible. This rule of statutory construction is based upon
+the premise that when Congress enacts a new statute, it is aware of all previously
+enacted statutes on the same subject.") (citations omitted). Here, the Court finds that
+Section 215 and Section 2703(d) operate in a complementary manner and are designed
+for their specific purposes. In the criminal investigation context, Section 2703(d)
+includes front-end protections by imposing a higher burden on the government to
+obtain the information in the first instance. On the other hand, when the government
+seeks to obtain the same type of information, but for a foreign intelligence purpose,
+Congress provided the government with more latitude at the production stage under
+
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+16
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+
+Section 215 by not requiring specific and articulable facts or meeting a materiality
+standard. Instead, it imposed post-production checks in the form of mandated
+minimization procedures and a structured adversarial process. This is a logical
+framework and it comports well with the Fourth Amendment concept that the required
+factual predicate for obtaining information in a case of special needs, such as national
+security, can be lower than for use of the same investigative measures for an ordinary
+criminal investigation. See United States v. United States District Court (Keith), 407
+U.S. 297, 308-09, 322-23 (1972); and, In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 745-46 (FISA Ct.
+Rev. 2002) (differentiating requirements for the government to obtain information
+obtained for national security reasons as opposed to a criminal investigation).¹⁹
+
+Moreover, the government's interest is significantly greater when it is attempting to
+thwart attacks and disrupt activities that could harm national security, as opposed to
+gathering evidence on domestic crimes. See In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of
+the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1012 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008)
+("[T]he relevant government interest - the interest in national security-is of the highest
+order of magnitude.") (citing Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981)); and, In re Sealed
+Case, 310 F.3d at 745-46.
+
+¹⁹ As discussed above, there is no Fourth Amendment interest here, as per Smith v. Maryland.
+
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+17
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+
+b. Relevance.
+
+Because known and unknown international terrorist operatives are using
+telephone communications, and because it is necessary to obtain the bulk collection of a
+telephone company's metadata to determine those connections between known and
+unknown international terrorist operatives as part of authorized investigations, the
+production of the information sought meets the standard for relevance under Section
+215.
+
+As an initial matter and as a point of clarification, the government's burden
+under Section 215 is not to prove that the records sought are, in fact, relevant to an
+authorized investigation. The explicit terms of the statute require "a statement of facts
+showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are
+relevant...." 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). In establishing this standard,
+Congress chose to leave the term "relevant" undefined. It is axiomatic that when
+Congress declines to define a term a court must give the term its ordinary meaning.
+See, e.g., Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., U.S. 132 S.Ct. 1997, 2002 (2012).
+Accompanying the government's first application for the bulk production of telephone
+company metadata was a Memorandum of Law which argued that "[i]nformation is
+'relevant' to an authorized international terrorism investigation if it bears upon, or is
+pertinent to, that investigation." Mem. of Law in Support of App. for Certain Tangible
+
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+18
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+Things for Investigations to Protect Against International Terrorism, Docket No. BR 06-
+05 (filed May 23, 2006), at 13-14 (quoting dictionary definitions, Oppenheimer Fund,
+Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978), and Fed. R. Evid. 401²⁰). This Court recognizes
+that the concept of relevance here is in fact broad and amounts to a relatively low
+standard.²¹ Where there is no requirement for specific and articulable facts or
+materiality, the government may meet the standard under Section 215 if it can
+demonstrate reasonable grounds to believe that the information sought to be produced
+has some bearing on its investigations of the identified international terrorist
+organizations.
+
+This Court has previously examined the issue of relevance for bulk collections.
+See [REDACTED]
+
+²⁰ At the time of the government's submission in Docket No. BR 06-05, a different version of Fed. R. Evid.
+401 was in place. While not directly applicable in this context, the current version reads: "Evidence is
+relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the
+evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action." (Emphasis added.)
+²¹ Even under the higher "relevant and material" standard for 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), discussed above, "[t]he
+government need not show actual relevance, such as would be required at trial." In re Application of the
+United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), 830 F.Supp.2d 114, 130 (E.D. Va. 2011). The
+petitioners had argued in that case that most of their activity for which records were sought was
+"unrelated" and that "the government cannot be permitted to blindly request everything that 'might' be
+useful...." Id. (internal quotation omitted). The court rejected this argument, noting that "[t]he
+probability that some gathered information will not be material is not a substantial objection," and that
+where no constitutional right is implicated, as is the case here, "there is no need for ... narrow tailoring." Id.
+
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+19
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+
+While those matters involved different collections from the one at issue here, the
+relevance standard was similar. See 50 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2) ("[R]elevant to an ongoing
+investigation to protect against international terrorism...."). In both cases, there were
+facts demonstrating that information concerning known and unknown affiliates of
+international terrorist organizations was contained within the non-content metadata the
+government sought to obtain. As this Court noted in 2010, the "finding of relevance
+most crucially depended on the conclusion that bulk collection is necessary for NSA to
+employ tools that are likely to generate useful investigative leads to help identify and
+track terrorist operatives." [REDACTED]
+
+Indeed, in [REDACTED] this Court noted that bulk collections such as these are
+"necessary to identify the much smaller number of [international terrorist]
+communications. [REDACTED]
+
+As a result, it is this showing of necessity that led the Court to find that "the entire mass
+of collected metadata is relevant to investigating [international terrorist groups] and
+affiliated persons." [REDACTED]
+
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+
+This case is no different. The government stated, and this Court is well aware,
+that individuals associated with international terrorist organizations use telephonic
+systems to communicate with one another around the world, including within the
+United States. Ex. A. at 4. The government argues that the broad collection of
+telephone company metadata "is necessary to create a historical repository of metadata
+that enables NSA to find or identify known and unknown operatives ..., some of whom
+may be in the United States or in communication with U.S. persons." App. at 6
+(emphasis added). The government would use such information, in part, "to detect and
+prevent terrorist acts against the United States and U.S. interests." Ex. A. at 3. The
+government posits that bulk telephonic metadata is necessary to its investigations
+because it is impossible to know where in the data the connections to international
+terrorist organizations will be found. Id. at 8-9. The government notes also that
+"[a]nalysts know that the terrorists' communications are located somewhere" in the
+metadata produced under this authority, but cannot know where until the data is
+aggregated and then accessed by their analytic tools under limited and controlled
+queries. Id. As the government stated in its 2006 Memorandum of Law, "[a]ll of the
+metadata collected is thus relevant, because the success of this investigative tool
+depends on bulk collection." Mem. of Law at 15, Docket No. BR 06-05.
+
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+
+The government depends on this bulk collection because if production of the
+information were to wait until the specific identifier connected to an international
+terrorist group were determined, most of the historical connections (the entire purpose
+of this authorization) would be lost. See Ex. A. at 7-12. The analysis of past connections
+is only possible "if the Government has collected and archived a broad set of metadata
+that contains within it the subset of communications that can later be identified as
+terrorist-related." Mem. of Law at 2, Docket No. BR 06-05. Because the subset of
+terrorist communications is ultimately contained within the whole of the metadata
+produced, but can only be found after the production is aggregated and then queried
+using identifiers determined to be associated with identified international terrorist
+organizations, the whole production is relevant to the ongoing investigation out of
+necessity.
+
+The government must demonstrate "facts showing that there are reasonable
+grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are relevant to an authorized
+investigation." 50 U.S.C. 1861(b)(2)(A). The fact that international terrorist operatives
+are using telephone communications, and that it is necessary to obtain the bulk
+collection of a telephone company's metadata to determine those connections between
+known and unknown international terrorist operatives as part of authorized
+investigations, is sufficient to meet the low statutory hurdle set out in Section 215 to
+
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+22
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+obtain a production of records. Furthermore, it is important to remember that the
+relevance finding is only one part of a whole protective statutory scheme. Within the
+whole of this particular statutory scheme, the low relevance standard is counter-
+balanced by significant post-production minimization procedures that must accompany
+such an authorization and an available mechanism for an adversarial challenge in this
+Court by the record holder. See supra Part III.a. Without the minimization procedures
+set out in detail in this Court's Primary Order, for example, no Orders for production
+would issue from this Court. See Primary Ord. at 4-17. Taken together, the Section 215
+provisions are designed to permit the government wide latitude to seek the information
+it needs to meet its national security responsibilities, but only in combination with
+specific procedures for the protection of U.S. person information that are tailored to the
+production and with an opportunity for the authorization to be challenged. The
+Application before this Court fits comfortably within this statutory framework.
+
+c. Legislative Re-enactment or Ratification.
+
+As the U.S. Supreme Court has stated, "Congress is presumed to be aware of an
+administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation
+when it re-enacts a statute without change." Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978)
+(citing cases and authorities); see also Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. Τ.Α., 557 U.S. 230, 239-
+40 (2009) (quoting Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 580). This doctrine of legislative re-enactment,
+
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+23
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+
+also known as the doctrine of ratification, is applicable here because Congress re-
+authorized Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act without change in 2011. "PATRIOT
+Sunsets Extension Act of 2011," Pub. L. No. 112-14, 125 Stat. 216 (May 26, 2011).²² This
+doctrine applies as a presumption that guides a court in interpreting a re-enacted
+statute. See Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 580-81 (citing cases); NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S.
+361, 365-66 (1951) ("[I]t is a fair assumption that by reenacting without pertinent
+modification [REDACTED] Congress accepted the construction [REDACTED] approved by the courts."); 2B
+Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 49:8 and cases cited (7th ed. 2009). Admittedly,
+in the national security context where legal decisions are classified by the Executive
+Branch and, therefore, normally not widely available to Members of Congress for
+scrutiny, one could imagine that such a presumption would be easily overcome.
+However, despite the highly-classified nature of the program and this Court's orders,
+that is not the case here.
+
+Prior to the May 2011 congressional votes on Section 215 re-authorization, the
+Executive Branch provided the Intelligence Committees of both houses of Congress
+with letters which contained a "Report on the National Security Agency's Bulk
+
+²² The Senate and House of Representatives voted to re-authorize Section 215 for another four years by
+overwhelming majorities. See
+http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=112&session=1&vot
+e-00084 (indicating a 72-23 vote in the Senate); and, http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll376.xml
+(indicating a 250-153 vote in the House). President Obama signed the re-authorization into law on
+May 26, 2011.
+
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+24
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+Collection Programs for USA PATRIOT Act Reauthorization" (Report). Ex. 3 (Letter to
+Hon. Mike Rogers, Chairman, and Hon. C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger, Ranking Minority
+Member, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives
+(HPSCI), from Ronald Weich, Asst. Attorney General (Feb. 2, 2011) (HPSCI Letter); and,
+Letter to Hon. Dianne Feinstein, Chairman, and Hon. Saxby Chambliss, Vice Chairman,
+Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate (SSCI), from Ronald Weich, Asst.
+Attorney General (Feb. 2, 2011) (SSCI Letter)). The Report provided extensive and
+detailed information to the Committees regarding the nature and scope of this Court's
+approval of the implementation of Section 215 concerning bulk telephone metadata, ²³
+
+The Report noted that "[a]lthough these programs have been briefed to the Intelligence
+and Judiciary Committees, it is important that other Members of Congress have access
+to information about th[is] ... program[] when considering reauthorization of the
+
+²³ Specifically, the Report provided the following information: 1) the Section 215 production is a program
+"authorized to collect in bulk certain dialing, routing, addressing and signaling information about
+telephone calls ... but not the content of the calls ...." Ex. 3, Report at 1 (emphasis in original); 2) this
+Court's "orders generally require production of the business records (as described above) relating to
+substantially all of the telephone calls handled by the companies, including both calls made between the
+United States and a foreign country and calls made entirely within the United States," id. at 3 (emphasis
+added); 3) "Although the program[] collect[s] a large amount of information, the vast majority of that
+information is never reviewed by any person, because the information is not responsive to the limited
+queries that are authorized for intelligence purposes," id. at 1; 4) "The programs are subject to an
+extensive regime of internal checks, particularly for U.S. persons, and are monitored by the FISA Court
+and Congress," id.; 5) "Although there have been compliance problems in recent years, the Executive
+Branch has worked to resolve them, subject to oversight by the FISA Court," id.; 6) "Today, under FISA
+Court authorization pursuant to the 'business records' authority of the FISA (commonly referred to as
+'Section 215'), the government has developed a program to close the gap" regarding a terrorist plot, id. at
+2; 7) "NSA collects and analyzes large amounts of transactional data obtained from certain
+telecommunications service providers in the United States," id.; and, 8) that the program operates "on a
+very large scale." Id.
+
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+25
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+
+expiring PATRIOT Act provisions." Id. Report at 3. Furthermore, the government
+stated the following in the HPSCI and SSCI Letters: "We believe that making this
+document available to all Members of Congress is an effective way to inform the
+legislative debate about reauthorization of Section 215...." Id. HPSCI Letter at 1; SSCI
+Letter at 1. It is clear from the letters that the Report would be made available to all
+Members of Congress and that HPSCI, SSCI, and Executive Branch staff would also be
+made available to answer any questions from Members of Congress. ²⁴ Id. HPSCI Letter
+at 2; SSCI Letter at 2.
+
+In light of the importance of the national security programs that were set to
+expire, the Executive Branch and relevant congressional committees worked together to
+ensure that each Member of Congress knew or had the opportunity to know how
+
+²⁴ It is unnecessary for the Court to inquire how many of the 535 individual Members of Congress took
+advantage of the opportunity to learn the facts about how the Executive Branch was implementing
+Section 215 under this Court's Orders. Rather, the Court looks to congressional action on the whole, not
+the preparatory work of individual Members in anticipation of legislation. In fact, the Court is bound to
+presume regularity on the part of Congress. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500
+(1989) ("The factfinding process of legislative bodies is generally entitled to a presumption of regularity
+and deferential review by the judiciary." (citing cases)). The ratification presumption applies here where
+each Member was presented with an opportunity to learn about a highly-sensitive classified program
+important to national security in preparation for upcoming legislative action. Furthermore, Congress as a
+whole may debate such legislation in secret session. Sec U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 5. ("Each House may
+determine the Rules of its Proceedings, Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from
+time to time publish the same excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; ....") (emphasis
+added.). In fact, according to a Congressional Research Service Report, both Houses have implemented
+rules for such sessions pursuant to the Constitution. See "Secret Sessions of the House and Senate:
+Authority, Confidentiality, and Frequency" Congressional Research Service (Mar. 15, 2013), at 1-2 (citing
+House Rules XVII, cl. 9; X, cl. 11; and, Senate Rules XXI; XXIX; and, XXXI). Indeed, both Houses have
+entered into secret session in the past decade to discuss intelligence matters. See id. at 5 (Table 1. Senate
+"Iraq war intelligence" (Nov. 1, 2005); Table 2. House of Representatives "Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Act and electronic surveillance" (Mar. 13, 2008)).
+
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+26
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+
+Section 215 was being implemented under this Court's Orders.²⁵ Documentation and
+personnel were also made available to afford each Member full knowledge of the scope
+of the implementation of Section 215 and of the underlying legal interpretation.
+
+The record before this Court thus demonstrates that the factual basis for
+applying the re-enactment doctrine and presuming that in 2011 Congress intended to
+ratify Section 215 as applied by this Court is well supported. Members were informed
+that this Court's "orders generally require production of the business records (as
+described above) relating to substantially all of the telephone calls handled by the
+companies, including both calls made between the United States and a foreign country
+and calls made entirely within the United States." Ex. 3, Report at 3 (emphasis added).
+When Congress subsequently re-authorized Section 215 without change, except as to
+expiration date, that re-authorization carried with it this Court's interpretation of the
+statute, which permits the bulk collection of telephony metadata under the restrictions
+that are in place. Therefore, the passage of the PATRIOT Sunsets Extension Act
+
+²⁵ Indeed, one year earlier when Section 215 was previously set to expire, SSCI Chairman Feinstein and
+Vice Chairman Bond sent a letter to every Senator inviting "each Member of the Senate" to read a very
+similar Report to the one provided in the 2011 Letters, and pointing out that this would "permit each
+Member of Congress access to information on the nature and significance of intelligence authority on
+which they are asked to vote." Ex. 7 ("Dear Colleague" Letter from SSCI Chairman Dianne Feinstein and
+Vice Chairman Christopher Bond (Feb. 23, 2010)). The next day, HPSCI Chairman Reyes sent a similar
+notice to each Member of the House that this information would be made available "on important
+intelligence collection programs made possible by these expiring authorities." Ex. 2 ("Dear Colleague"
+Notice from HPSCI Chairman Silvestre Reyes (Feb. 24, 2010)). This notice also indicated that the HPSCI
+Chairman and Chairman Conyers of the House Judiciary Committee would "make staff available to meet
+with any member who has questions" along with Executive Branch personnel. Id.
+
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+27
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+provides a persuasive reason for this Court to adhere to its prior interpretations of
+Section 215.
+
+IV. Conclusion.
+
+This Court is mindful that this matter comes before it at a time when
+unprecedented disclosures have been made about this and other highly-sensitive
+programs designed to obtain foreign intelligence information and carry out counter-
+terrorism investigations. According to NSA Director Gen. Keith Alexander, the
+disclosures have caused "significant and irreversible damage to our nation." Remarks
+at "Clear and Present Danger: Cyber-Crime; Cyber-Espionage; Cyber-Terror; and
+Cyber-War," Aspen, Colo. (Jul. 18, 2013). In the wake of these disclosures, whether and
+to what extent the government seeks to continue the program discussed in this
+Memorandum Opinion is a matter for the political branches of government to decide.
+
+As discussed above, because there is no cognizable Fourth Amendment interest
+in a telephone company's metadata that it holds in the course of its business, the Court
+finds that there is no Constitutional impediment to the requested production. Finding
+no Constitutional issue, the Court directs its attention to the statute. The Court
+concludes that there are facts showing reasonable grounds to believe that the records
+sought are relevant to authorized investigations. This conclusion is supported not only
+by the plain text and structure of Section 215, but also by the statutory modifications
+
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+28
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+and framework instituted by Congress. Furthermore, the Court finds that this result is
+strongly supported, if not required, by the doctrine of legislative re-enactment or
+ratification.
+
+For these reasons, for the reasons stated in the Primary Order appended hereto,
+and pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1), the Court has GRANTED the Orders requested
+by the government.
+
+Because of the public interest in this matter, pursuant to FISC Rule 62(a), the
+undersigned FISC Judge requests that this Memorandum Opinion and the Primary
+Order of July 19, 2013, appended herein, be published, and directs such request to the
+Presiding Judge as required by the Rule.
+
+ENTERED this 24th day of August, 2013.
+
+Claire V. Eagan
+CLAIRE V. EAGAN
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+[REDACTED]
+
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+29
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+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D. C.
+
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
+BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
+ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
+OF TANGIBLE THINGS FROM
+[REDACTED]
+
+Docket Number: BR 13-109
+[REDACTED]
+
+PRIMARY ORDER
+
+A verified application having been made by the Director of the Federal Bureau of
+Investigation (FBI) for an order pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
+1978 (the Act), Title 50, United States Code (U.S.C.); § 1861, as amended, requiring the
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Derived from: Pleadings in the above-captioned docket
+Declassify on: [REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+production to the National Security Agency (NSA) of the tangible things described
+below, and full consideration having been given to the matters set forth therein, the
+Court finds as follows:
+
+1. There are reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are
+relevant to authorized investigations (other than threat assessments) being conducted
+by the FBI under guidelines approved by the Attorney General under Executive Order
+12333 to protect against international terrorism, which investigations are not being
+conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment to the
+Constitution of the United States. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)]
+
+2. The tangible things sought could be obtained with a subpoena duces tecum
+issued by a court of the United States in aid of a grand jury investigation or with any
+other order issued by a court of the United States directing the production of records or
+tangible things. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)(D)]
+
+3. The application includes an enumeration of the minimization procedures the
+government proposes to follow with regard to the tangible things sought. Such
+procedures are similar to the minimization procedures approved and adopted as
+binding by the order of this Court in Docket Number BR 13-80 and its predecessors. [50
+U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)]
+
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+2
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+Accordingly, and as further explained in a Memorandum Opinion to follow, the
+Court finds that the application of the United States to obtain the tangible things, as
+described below, satisfies the requirements of the Act and, therefore,
+
+IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to the authority conferred on this Court by
+the Act, that the application is GRANTED, and it is
+
+FURTHER ORDERED, as follows:
+
+(1)A. The Custodians of Records of [REDACTED] shall produce to NSA
+upon service of the appropriate secondary order, and continue production on an
+ongoing daily basis thereafter for the duration of this order, unless otherwise ordered
+by the Court, an electronic copy of the following tangible things: all call detail records
+or "telephony metadata"¹ created by [REDACTED]
+
+B. The Custodian of Records of [REDACTED] shall produce to NSA upon service of the
+appropriate secondary order, and continue production on an ongoing daily basis
+
+¹ For purposes of this Order "telephony metadata" includes comprehensive communications
+routing information, including but not limited to session identifying information (e.g.,
+originating and terminating telephone number, International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI)
+number, International Mobile station Equipment Identity (IMEI) number, etc.), trunk identifier,
+telephone calling card numbers, and time and duration of call. Telephony metadata does not
+include the substantive content of any communication, as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8), or the
+name, address, or financial information of a subscriber or customer. Furthermore, this Order
+does not authorize the production of cell site location information (CSLI).
+
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+3
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+
+thereafter for the duration of this order, unless otherwise ordered by the Court, an
+electronic copy of the following tangible things: all call detail records or "telephony
+metadata" created by [REDACTED] for communications (i) between the United States and
+abroad; or (ii) wholly within the United States, including local telephone calls.
+[REDACTED]
+
+(2) With respect to any information the FBI receives as a result of this Order
+(information that is disseminated to it by NSA), the FBI shall follow as minimization
+procedures the procedures set forth in The Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic FBI
+Operations (September 29, 2008).
+
+(3) With respect to the information that NSA receives as a result of this Order,
+NSA shall strictly adhere to the following minimization procedures:
+
+A. The government is hereby prohibited from accessing business record
+metadata acquired pursuant to this Court's orders in the above-captioned docket and its
+predecessors ("BR metadata") for any purpose except as described herein.
+
+B. NSA shall store and process the BR metadata in repositories within secure
+networks under NSA's control.² The BR metadata shall carry unique markings such
+
+² The Court understands that NSA will maintain the BR metadata in recovery back-up systems
+for mission assurance and continuity of operations purposes. NSA shall ensure that any access
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+4
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+that software and other controls (including user authentication services) can restrict
+access to it to authorized personnel who have received appropriate and adequate
+training with regard to this authority. NSA shall restrict access to the BR metadata to
+authorized personnel who have received appropriate and adequate training.³
+Appropriately trained and authorized technical personnel may access the BR metadata
+to perform those processes needed to make it usable for intelligence analysis. Technical
+personnel may query the BR metadata using selection terms that have not been RAS-
+approved (described below) for those purposes described above, and may share the
+results of those queries with other authorized personnel responsible for these purposes,
+or use of the BR metadata in the event of any natural disaster, man-made emergency, attack, or
+other unforeseen event is in compliance with the Court's Order.
+
+³ The Court understands that the technical personnel responsible for NSA's underlying
+corporate infrastructure and the transmission of the BR metadata from the specified persons to
+NSA, will not receive special training regarding the authority granted herein.
+[REDACTED]
+
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+5
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+but the results of any such queries will not be used for intelligence analysis purposes.
+
+An authorized technician may access the BR metadata to ascertain those identifiers that
+may be high volume identifiers. The technician may share the results of any such
+access, i.e., the identifiers and the fact that they are high volume identifiers, with
+authorized personnel (including those responsible for the identification and defeat of
+high volume and other unwanted BR metadata from any of NSA's various metadata
+repositories), but may not share any other information from the results of that access for
+intelligence analysis purposes. In addition, authorized technical personnel may access
+the BR metadata for purposes of obtaining foreign intelligence information pursuant to
+the requirements of subparagraph (3)C below.
+
+C. NSA shall access the BR metadata for purposes of obtaining foreign
+intelligence information only through queries of the BR metadata to obtain contact
+chaining information as described in paragraph 17 of the Declaration of [REDACTED]
+attached to the application as Exhibit A, using selection terms approved as "seeds"
+pursuant to the RAS approval process described below.⁵ NSA shall ensure, through
+
+⁵ For purposes of this Order, "National Security Agency" and "NSA personnel" are defined as
+any employees of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service ("NSA/CSS" or
+"NSA") and any other personnel engaged in Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) operations
+authorized pursuant to FISA if such operations are executed under the direction, authority, or
+control of the Director, NSA/Chief, CSS (DIRNSA). NSA personnel shall not disseminate BR
+metadata outside the NSA unless the dissemination is permitted by, and in accordance with, the
+requirements of this Order that are applicable to the NSA.
+
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+6
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+adequate and appropriate technical and management controls, that queries of the BR
+metadata for intelligence analysis purposes will be initiated using only a selection term
+that has been RAS-approved. Whenever the BR metadata is accessed for foreign
+intelligence analysis purposes or using foreign intelligence analysis query tools, an
+auditable record of the activity shall be generated.⁶
+
+(i) Except as provided in subparagraph (ii) below, all selection terms to be
+used as "seeds" with which to query the BR metadata shall be approved by any
+of the following designated approving officials: the Chief or Deputy Chief,
+Homeland Security Analysis Center; or one of the twenty specially-authorized
+Homeland Mission Coordinators in the Analysis and Production Directorate of
+the Signals Intelligence Directorate. Such approval shall be given only after the
+designated approving official has determined that based on the factual and
+practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent
+persons act, there are facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion (RAS)
+that the selection term to be queried is associated with [REDACTED]
+
+⁶ This auditable record requirement shall not apply to accesses of the results of RAS-approved
+queries.
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+7
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+provided, however, that NSA's Office of General Counsel (OGC)
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+8
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+shall first determine that any selection term reasonably believed to be used by a
+United States (U.S.) person is not regarded as associated with [REDACTED]
+solely on the basis of activities that are protected by the
+First Amendment to the Constitution.
+
+(ii) Selection terms that are currently the subject of electronic surveillance
+authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) based on the
+FISC's finding of probable cause to believe that they are used by [REDACTED]
+including those used by U.S. persons, may be
+deemed approved for querying for the period of FISC-authorized electronic
+surveillance without review and approval by a designated approving official.
+
+The preceding sentence shall not apply to selection terms under surveillance
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+9
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+pursuant to any certification of the Director of National Intelligence and the
+Attorney General pursuant to Section 702 of FISA, as added by the FISA
+Amendments Act of 2008, or pursuant to an Order of the FISC issued under
+Section 703 or Section 704 of FISA, as added by the FISA Amendments Act of
+2008.
+
+(iii) A determination by a designated approving official that a selection
+term is associated [REDACTED] shall be effective for:
+one hundred eighty days for any selection term reasonably believed to be used
+by a U.S. person; and one year for all other selection terms.⁹,¹⁰
+
+⁹ The Court understands that from time to time the information available to designated
+approving officials will indicate that a selection term is or was associated with a Foreign Power
+only for a specific and limited time frame. In such cases, a designated approving official may
+determine that the reasonable, articulable suspicion standard is met, but the time frame for
+which the selection term is or was associated with a Foreign Power shall be specified. The
+automated query process described in the [REDACTED] Declaration limits the first hop query
+results to the specified time frame. Analysts conducting manual queries using that selection
+term shall continue to properly minimize information that may be returned within query results
+that fall outside of that timeframe.
+¹⁰ The Court understands that NSA receives certain call detail records pursuant to other
+authority, in addition to the call detail records produced in response to this Court's Orders.
+NSA shall store, handle, and disseminate call detail records produced in response to this
+Court's Orders pursuant to this Order [REDACTED]
+
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+10
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+(iv) Queries of the BR metadata using RAS-approved selection terms may
+occur either by manual analyst query or through the automated query process
+described below.¹¹ This automated query process queries the collected BR
+metadata (in a "collection store") with RAS-approved selection terms and returns
+the hop-limited results from those queries to a "corporate store." The corporate
+store may then be searched by appropriately and adequately trained personnel
+for valid foreign intelligence purposes, without the requirement that those
+searches use only RAS-approved selection terms. The specifics of the automated
+query process, as described in the [REDACTED] Declaration, are as follows:
+[REDACTED]
+
+¹¹ This automated query process was initially approved by this Court in its November 8, 2012
+Order amending docket number BR 12-178.
+¹² As an added protection in case technical issues prevent the process from verifying that the
+most up-to-date list of RAS-approved selection terms is being used, this step of the automated
+process checks the expiration dates of RAS-approved selection terms to confirm that the
+approvals for those terms have not expired. This step does not use expired RAS-approved
+selection terms to create the list of "authorized query terms" (described below) regardless of
+whether the list of RAS-approved selection terms is up-to-date.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+11
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+D. Results of any intelligence analysis queries of the BR metadata may be shared,
+prior to minimization, for intelligence analysis purposes among NSA analysts, subject
+to the requirement that all NSA personnel who receive query results in any form first
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+12
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+receive appropriate and adequate training and guidance regarding the procedures and
+restrictions for the handling and dissemination of such information.¹⁵ NSA shall apply
+the minimization and dissemination requirements and procedures of Section 7 of
+United States Signals Intelligence Directive SP0018 (USSID 18) issued on January 25,
+2011, to any results from queries of the BR metadata, in any form, before the
+information is disseminated outside of NSA in any form. Additionally, prior to
+disseminating any U.S. person information outside NSA, the Director of NSA, the
+Deputy Director of NSA, or one of the officials listed in Section 7.3(c) of USSID 18 (i.e.,
+the Director of the Signals Intelligence Directorate (SID), the Deputy Director of the SID,
+the Chief of the Information Sharing Services (ISS) office, the Deputy Chief of the ISS
+office, and the Senior Operations Officer of the National Security Operations Center)
+must determine that the information identifying the U.S. person is in fact related to
+counterterrorism information and that it is necessary to understand the
+counterterrorism information or assess its importance.¹⁶ Notwithstanding the above
+requirements, NSA may share results from intelligence analysis queries of the BR
+metadata, including U.S. person identifying information, with Executive Branch
+
+¹⁵ In addition, the Court understands that NSA may apply the full range of SIGINT analytic
+tradecraft to the results of intelligence analysis queries of the collected BR metadata.
+¹⁶ In the event the Government encounters circumstances that it believes necessitate the
+alteration of these dissemination procedures, it may obtain prospectively-applicable
+modifications to the procedures upon a determination by the Court that such modifications are
+appropriate under the circumstances and in light of the size and nature of this bulk collection.
+
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+13
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+personnel (1) in order to enable them to determine whether the information contains
+exculpatory or impeachment information or is otherwise discoverable in legal
+proceedings or (2) to facilitate their lawful oversight functions.
+
+E. BR metadata shall be destroyed no later than five years (60 months) after its
+initial collection.
+
+F. NSA and the National Security Division of the Department of Justice
+(NSD/DoJ) shall conduct oversight of NSA's activities under this authority as outlined
+below.
+
+(i) NSA's OGC and Office of the Director of Compliance (ODOC) shall
+ensure that personnel with access to the BR metadata receive appropriate and
+adequate training and guidance regarding the procedures and restrictions for
+collection, storage, analysis, dissemination, and retention of the BR metadata and
+the results of queries of the BR metadata. NSA's OGC and ODOC shall further
+ensure that all NSA personnel who receive query results in any form first receive
+appropriate and adequate training and guidance regarding the procedures and
+restrictions for the handling and dissemination of such information. NSA shall
+maintain records of all such training.¹⁷ OGC shall provide NSD/DoJ with copies
+
+¹⁷ The nature of the training that is appropriate and adequate for a particular person will
+depend on the person's responsibilities and the circumstances of his access to the BR metadata
+or the results from any queries of the metadata.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+14
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+of all formal briefing and/or training materials (including all revisions thereto)
+used to brief/train NSA personnel concerning this authority.
+
+(ii) NSA's ODOC shall monitor the implementation and use of the
+software and other controls (including user authentication services) and the
+logging of auditable information referenced above.
+
+(iii) NSA's OGC shall consult with NSD/DoJ on all significant legal
+opinions that relate to the interpretation, scope, and/or implementation of this
+authority. When operationally practicable, such consultation shall occur in
+advance; otherwise NSD shall be notified as soon as practicable.
+
+(iv) At least once during the authorization period, NSA's OGC, ODOC,
+NSD/DoJ, and any other appropriate NSA representatives shall meet for the
+purpose of assessing compliance with this Court's orders. Included in this
+meeting will be a review of NSA's monitoring and assessment to ensure that
+only approved metadata is being acquired. The results of this meeting shall be
+reduced to writing and submitted to the Court as part of any application to
+renew or reinstate the authority requested herein.
+
+(v) At least once during the authorization period, NSD/DoJ shall meet
+with NSA's Office of the Inspector General to discuss their respective oversight
+responsibilities and assess NSA's compliance with the Court's orders.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+15
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+(vi) At least once during the authorization period, NSA's OGC and
+NSD/DoJ shall review a sample of the justifications for RAS approvals for
+selection terms used to query the BR metadata.
+
+(vii) Other than the automated query process described in the [REDACTED]
+Declaration and this Order, prior to implementation of any new or modified
+automated query processes, such new or modified processes shall be reviewed
+and approved by NSA's OGC, NSD/DoJ, and the Court.
+
+G. Approximately every thirty days, NSA shall file with the Court a report that
+includes a discussion of NSA's application of the RAS standard, as well as NSA's
+implementation and operation of the automated query process. In addition, should the
+United States seek renewal of the requested authority, NSA shall also include in its
+report a description of any significant changes proposed in the way in which the call
+detail records would be received from the Providers and any significant changes to the
+controls NSA has in place to receive, store, process, and disseminate the BR metadata.
+
+Each report shall include a statement of the number of instances since the
+preceding report in which NSA has shared, in any form, results from queries of the BR
+metadata that contain United States person information, in any form, with anyone
+outside NSA. For each such instance in which United States person information has
+been shared, the report shall include NSA's attestation that one of the officials
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+16
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+authorized to approve such disseminations determined, prior to dissemination, that the
+information was related to counterterrorism information and necessary to understand
+counterterrorism information or to assess its importance.
+
+This authorization regarding [REDACTED] expires on the 19th day
+of October, 2013, at 5:00 p.m., Eastern Time.
+
+Signed [BLANK] Eastern Time
+Date [BLANK] Time [BLANK]
+
+Claire V. Eagan
+CLAIRE V. EAGAN
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+17
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-primary-order/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-primary-order/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..73da7a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-09-primary-order/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+{
+ "title": "Amended Memorandum Opinion and Primary Order, In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED]",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-08-29",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-08-29",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34000",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [
+ {
+ "id": "ODNI_-_br13-09-primary-order"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "3b19efa1c8a81c7fbeff8ca4a236536e82bd979f307171f844441a410ea6f5e8",
+ "pages": 46
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-158-Memorandum-131218/FISC_-_br13-158-Memorandum-131218.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-158-Memorandum-131218/FISC_-_br13-158-Memorandum-131218.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9971201
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-158-Memorandum-131218/FISC_-_br13-158-Memorandum-131218.md
@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+Washington, D.C.
+
+IN RE: APPLICATION OF THE
+FEDERAL BUREAU OF
+INVESTIGATION FOR AN ORDER
+REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION OF
+TANGIBLE THINGS
+
+Docket No. BR 13-158
+
+ORDER
+
+For the reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, it hereby is
+ORDERED that the Motion to Establish a Public Briefing Schedule Including the Filings of
+Briefs by Amici Curiae, for Leave for the Center for National Security Studies to File an Amicus
+Curiae Brief, and a Suggestion for Hearing En Banc is GRANTED IN PART. The Center for
+National Security Studies may file an amicus curiae brief on why Section 501 of the FISA, 50
+U.S.C. § 1861, does not authorize the collection of telephony metadata records in bulk. All other
+relief requested by the Center for National Security Studies is DENIED.
+
+Signed 12/18/13 3:08 PM. Eastern Time
+Date Time
+
+MARY A. MCLAUGHLIN
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+Washington, D.C.
+
+IN RE: APPLICATION OF THE
+FEDERAL BUREAU OF
+INVESTIGATION FOR AN ORDER
+REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION OF
+TANGIBLE THINGS
+
+Docket No. BR 13-158
+
+MEMORANDUM OPINION
+
+The Center for National Security Studies ("the Center") has filed a Motion to Establish a
+Public Briefing Schedule Including the Filings of Briefs by Amici Curiae, for Leave for the
+Center for National Security Studies to File an Amicus Curiae Brief, and a Suggestion for
+Hearing En Banc, in connection with the government's collection of telephony metadata records
+in bulk. The motion requests entry of an order permitting the Center to file an amicus curiae
+brief and also requests that the Court: (1) reconsider the ex parte order that authorized the
+collection of bulk telephony metadata as of October 11, 2013, and establish procedures for the
+submission of legal briefs addressing the request for reconsideration; (2) establish a docket for
+the United States' next application for an order authorizing the collection of bulk telephony
+metadata; (3) require the United States to file a public legal brief or declassify the current
+arguments setting forth the legality of bulk telephony metadata collection and establish a briefing
+schedule for the submission of amicus curiae briefs responding to the United States' legal brief
+or declassified arguments; and (4) order a hearing en banc to consider the United States' request
+for authorization of bulk telephony metadata collection. Mot. ¶ 5.
+
+Pursuant to the Court's October 18, 2013 order, the United States filed a response to the
+Center's motion. Although the United States does not contest the proposition that the Court has
+the inherent authority to grant requests to file amicus curiae briefs, the United States takes no
+position on whether the Court should exercise that authority with respect to the Center's request.
+The United States opposes, however, the filing and docketing of amicus curiae briefs in ex parte
+proceedings pursuant to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") § 501(f), 50 U.S.C.
+§ 1861(f) and argues that an "amicus brief should be accepted in a miscellaneous docket rather
+than the docket of a classified application." United States' Opp'n Br. at 8-9, 10 n.4. The United
+States opposes the Center's request for all other relief.
+
+The Court will grant the motion only to the extent that the Court will allow the movant to
+file an amicus curiae brief on "why Section 501 of the FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1861, does not
+authorize" the collection of telephony metadata records in bulk. Mot. ¶ 1. The Court will deny
+all other relief requested by the movant.
+
+Although there is no statute or rule applicable to this Court that specifically addresses
+whether an amicus curiae may be permitted to file a legal brief,¹ federal district courts possess
+the inherent authority to appoint amici curiae and permit the filing of briefs by them.² See, e.g.,
+Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445, 447 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Jin v. Ministry
+of State Sec., 557 F. Supp. 2d 131, 136-37 (D.D.C. 2008); Martinez v. Capital Cities/ABC-
+
+---
+¹ Neither the Rules of Procedure for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC")
+nor the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 ("FISA”), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1885c, as
+amended, provide for the filing of legal briefs by an amicus curiae. Although the FISC may
+refer to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
+resolve issues not addressed by the FISC Rules, see FISC Rule P. 1, those rules also do not
+address the filing of amicus curiae briefs.
+
+² Although this Court is not a district court, it possesses similar inherent authority, except
+to the extent it is limited by FISA. See In re Motion for Release of Court Records, 526 F. Supp.
+2d 484, 486-87 (FISA Ct. 2007); cf. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(g).
+-2-
+
+WPVI, 909 F. Supp. 283, 286 (E.D. Pa. 1995). The decision to allow participation of an amicus
+curiae, and the extent of that participation, is within the sound discretion of the district court.
+See Liberty Res., Inc. v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., 395 F. Supp. 2d 206, 210 (E.D. Pa. 2009);
+Jin, 557 F. Supp. 2d at 136-37; Cmty. Ass’n for Restoration of Env’t (CARE) v. DeRuyter Bros.
+Dairy, 54 F. Supp. 2d 974, 975 (E.D. Wash. 1999); 4 Am. Jur. 2d Amicus Curiae § 1 (2013).
+
+The traditional role of an amicus curiae is to act as a "friend of the court," whose purpose
+is to provide impartial information to the court on a question of law about which there is doubt,
+particularly in matters of public interest. Neonatology Assoc., P.A. v. C.I.R., 293 F.3d 128, 131
+(3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Michigan, 940 F.2d 143, 164 (6th Cir. 1991); Miller-Wohl Co.,
+Inc. v. Comm’r of Labor and Indus., 694 F.2d 203, 204 (9th Cir. 1982). An amicus curiae
+traditionally presents a perspective different from that of the litigants or provides information to
+the court that might otherwise escape its attention. Miller-Wohl Co., Inc., 694 F.2d at 204; 4
+Am. Jur. 2d Amicus Curiae §§ 1, 6 (2013).
+
+Some courts have expanded the role of the amicus curiae from a purely impartial advisor
+to more of an adversarial or partisan participant. See Neonatology Assoc., P.A., 293 F.3d at 131
+(holding that an amicus curiae need not be disinterested or impartial); Ryan v. Commodity
+Futures Trading Comm'n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, C.J., in chambers)
+(noting that the "vast majority of amicus curiae briefs are filed by allies of litigants" and that "an
+adversary role of an amicus curiae has become accepted," but finding that this practice is "an
+abuse"); Funbus Sys., Inc. v. California Pub. Util. Comm'n, 801 F.2d 1120, 1124-25 (9th Cir.
+1986) (holding that an amicus curiae need not be disinterested); Samuel Krislov, The Amicus
+Curiae Brief: from Friendship to Advocacy, 72 Yale L.J. 694 (1963).
+-3-
+
+Regardless of whether the role of an amicus curiae is to act as an impartial advisor or as
+an advocate, most courts have recognized that the role of an amicus curiae is limited, and does
+not rise to the level of a party to the litigation. See, e.g., Upper Blackstone Water Pollution
+Abatement Dist. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 690 F.3d 9, 29 n.25 (1st Cir. 2012); In re
+Bayshore Ford Trucks Sales, Inc., 471 F.3d 1233, 1249 n.34 (11th Cir. 2006); Cohen v. Empire
+Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 176 F.3d 35, 41 (2d Cir. 1999); Miller-Wohl Co., Inc., 694 F.2d at
+204; City of Winter Haven v. Gillespie, 84 F.2d 285, 287 (5th Cir. 1936).
+
+For example, in United States v. Michigan, the United States Court of Appeals for the
+Sixth Circuit concluded that an amicus curiae lacks standing "to exercise any litigating rights
+equal to a named party/real party in interest...." 940 F.2d 143, 166 (6th Cir. 1991). In that
+case, the district court had granted the amicus curiae rights of a litigating party, such as the right
+to file pleadings, conduct discovery, initiate contempt proceedings, and file motions. Id. at 163.
+On review, the Sixth Circuit found that the district court had allowed a nonparty to circumvent
+the traditional processes for becoming a named party by giving it "litigating amicus curiae"
+status. Id. at 164. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's expansion of the role of the
+amicus curiae, finding that giving an amicus curiae the powers of a named party would "convert
+the trial court into a free-wheeling forum of competing special interest groups capable" of
+interfering with the interests of the parties and the administration of justice. Id. at 165.
+
+A nonparty cannot circumvent Article III standing requirements, and gain control over a
+case equal to that of a real party of interest, by filing an amicus curiae brief. Rio Grande
+Pipeline Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 178 F.3d 533, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1999). A court
+has discretion to set limits on an amicus curiae consistent with that principle. See, e.g., Briggs v.
+-4-
+
+United States, 597 A.2d 370, 374-75 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Cobell v. Norton, 246 F. Supp. 2d 59, 62
+(D.D.C. 2003); 4 Am. Jur. 2d Amicus Curiae § 6 (2013).
+
+The Court will apply these principles relating to the filing of amicus curiae briefs within
+the context of the statutory provisions that set out the ex parte and classified nature of
+proceedings under the FISA. Section 501 of FISA, as amended by Section 215 of the USA
+PATRIOT Act in 2001, permits the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") to apply to this
+Court "for an order requiring the production of any tangible things (including books, records,
+papers, documents, and other items) for an investigation... to protect against international
+terrorism." FISA § 501(a)(1), 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1). If the application meets the statutory
+requirements, FISA requires that the Court "shall enter an ex parte order as requested, or as
+modified, approving the release of tangible things." FISA § 501(c)(1), 50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1).
+As in all matters, FISA directs that proceedings be "conducted as expeditiously as possible,"
+with records "maintained under [appropriate] security measures." FISA § 103(c), 50 U.S.C. §
+1803(c).
+
+The Court will exercise its discretion to allow the Center to file an amicus curiae brief on
+the issue requested by the Center -- whether Section 1861 authorizes the collection of telephony
+metadata records in bulk. The brief will be filed in a miscellaneous docket that can be accessed
+by any judge of the Court when considering an application for such collection under Section
+1861 in the future. The brief shall contain a table of contents with page references and a table of
+authorities with references to the pages of the brief where the authorities are cited, be no more
+than 15 pages in length excluding signature pages and any certificates of service, and shall
+otherwise comply with any relevant provisions contained in FISC Rule P. 7 with respect to form
+and filing.
+-5-
+
+Although the Court could require the Center to file a motion to file an amicus brief in
+accordance with the strictures of Fed. R. App. P. 29,³ the Court in this particular case will allow
+the Center to file the requested brief without filing an additional motion. According to Fed. R.
+App. P. 29, a court may grant leave for a nonparty to file an amicus curiae brief upon motion by
+the amicus curiae. Such a motion must include a copy of the proposed amicus brief and must
+state "the movant's interest," and "the reason why an amicus brief is desirable and why the
+matters asserted are relevant to the disposition of the case." Fed. R. App. P. 29(b). Such a
+motion would be repetitive of the briefing currently before the court, and is therefore
+unnecessary under these particular circumstances.
+
+In its reply memorandum, the Center has described the issues that will be addressed by
+the Center's amicus brief. The Center's amicus brief will argue that (1) the collection of bulk
+telephony metadata does not fit within the structure and limitations of Section 1861 and FISA as
+a whole; (2) the collection of bulk telephony metadata does not meet the "relevance” standard of
+Section 1861, as adopted in the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005;
+and (3) Congress's extension of the sunset of Section 1861 from May 2011 to June 2015 did not
+enact the FISC's interpretation of Section 1861. The Court therefore finds that, in light of the
+information provided in the Center's reply brief, the Center has demonstrated the Center's
+interest and the contents of and reasons for its amicus curiae brief.
+
+The other relief requested by the Center goes well beyond the appropriate limits of an
+amicus curiae, especially in an ex parte proceeding such as the one here. An amicus curiae has
+no standing to move for reconsideration of a decision nor does the Center have standing to seek
+
+---
+³ Federal district courts often refer to Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
+Procedure for guidance as to the filing of amicus curiae briefs. See, e.g. United States v.
+Alkaabi, 223 F. Supp. 2d 583, 592 (D.N.J. 2002); United States v. Gotti, 755 F. Supp. 1157,
+1158 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
+-6-
+
+en banc review by the Court. See FISC Rule P. 46. Congress has mandated that the Court's
+review of a Section 1861 application be ex parte. In view of that mandate, the Center will not
+have access to the government's application or other docket proceedings. As evidenced by the
+preview of the Center's intended arguments in its reply brief, information already made available
+to the public, including opinions of this Court, provides sufficient context for the Center to brief
+the issue specified herein.
+
+Signed 12/18/13 3:08 P.M. Eastern Time
+Date Time
+
+MARY A. MCLAUGHLIN
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+-7-
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-158-Memorandum-131218/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-158-Memorandum-131218/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eb1eab8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-158-Memorandum-131218/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Order and Memorandum Opinion, In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring Production of Tangible Things",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-12-18",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-12-18",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/33995",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "0cf0c3699244853e849ab91c4315b23b3b353026206d46e0ae0336b3d31c410c",
+ "pages": 8
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-158-briefing-131018/FISC_-_br13-158-briefing-131018.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-158-briefing-131018/FISC_-_br13-158-briefing-131018.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..46c33af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-158-briefing-131018/FISC_-_br13-158-briefing-131018.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
+BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
+ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
+OF TANGIBLE THINGS
+
+Docket Number: BR 13-158
+
+**ORDER**
+
+This matter is before the Court on the "Motion to Establish a Public Briefing Schedule Including the Filings of Briefs by Amicus Curiae, for Leave for the Center for National Security Studies to File an Amicus Brief, and a Suggestion for Hearing En Banc," which was submitted on October 17, 2013 ("Motion").¹ The government is hereby directed to file a response to the Motion by 5:00 p.m. on November 8, 2013. Any reply by the Center for National Security Studies shall be filed no later than 5:00 p.m. on November 22, 2013, through the Security and Emergency Planning Staff, United States Department of Justice.
+
+SO ORDERED, this 18th day of October, 2013.
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+¹ The caption of the Motion identifies the pertinent proceeding as "Docket No. BR 13-109 (or successor docket)." The Motion is deemed to have been filed in Docket No. BR 13-158, which is the "successor docket" to Docket Number BR 13-109.
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-158-briefing-131018/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-158-briefing-131018/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e4da635
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-158-briefing-131018/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Order, In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-10-18",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-10-18",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34065",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "71f93e744e33ce3883078ba4f73a6d702d35af223be2d84a913bdb09649abfe9",
+ "pages": 1
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-158-memo-131018/FISC_-_br13-158-memo-131018.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-158-memo-131018/FISC_-_br13-158-memo-131018.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..43d363b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-158-memo-131018/FISC_-_br13-158-memo-131018.md
@@ -0,0 +1,538 @@
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
+BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
+ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION OF
+TANGIBLE THINGS FROM [REDACTED]
+
+Docket Number: BR 13-158
+
+MEMORANDUM
+
+The Court has today issued the Primary Order appended hereto granting the
+"Application for Certain Tangible Things for Investigations to Protect Against
+International Terrorism" ("Application"), which was submitted to the Court on October
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+10, 2013, by the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"). The Application requested the
+issuance of orders pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1861, as amended (also known as Section 215
+of the USA PATRIOT Act), requiring the ongoing daily production to the National
+Security Agency ("NSA") of certain telephone call detail records in bulk.
+
+The Primary Order appended hereto renews the production of records made
+pursuant to the similar Primary Order issued by the Honorable Claire V. Eagan of this
+Court on July 19, 2013 in Docket Number BR 13-109 ("July 19 Primary Order"). On
+August 29, 2013, Judge Eagan issued an Amended Memorandum Opinion setting forth
+her reasons for issuing the July 19 Primary Order ("August 29 Opinion"). Following a
+declassification review by the Executive Branch, the Court published the July 19
+Primary Order and August 29 Opinion in redacted form on September 17, 2013.
+
+The call detail records to be produced pursuant to the orders issued today in the
+above-captioned docket are identical in scope and nature to the records produced in
+response to the orders issued by Judge Eagan in Docket Number BR 13-109. The
+records will be produced on terms identical to those set out in Judge Eagan's July 19
+Primary Order and for the same purpose, and the information acquired by NSA
+through the production will be subject to the same provisions for oversight and
+identical restrictions on access, retention, and dissemination.
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+Page 2
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+This is the first time that the undersigned has entertained an application
+requesting the bulk production of call detail records. The Court has conducted an
+independent review of the issues presented by the application and agrees with and
+adopts Judge Eagan's analysis as the basis for granting the Application. The Court
+writes separately to discuss briefly the issues of "relevance" and the inapplicability of
+the Fourth Amendment to the production.
+
+Although the definition of relevance set forth in Judge Eagan's decision is broad,
+the Court is persuaded that that definition is supported by the statutory analysis set out
+in the August 29 Opinion. That analysis is reinforced by Congress's re-enactment of
+Section 215 after receiving information about the government's and the FISA Court's
+interpretation of the statute. Although the existence of this program was classified until
+several months ago, the record is clear that before the 2011 re-enactment of Section 215,
+many Members of Congress were aware of, and each Member had the opportunity to
+learn about, the scope of the metadata collection and this Court's interpretation of
+Section 215. Accordingly, the re-enactment of Section 215 without change in 2011
+triggered the doctrine of ratification through re-enactment, which provides a strong
+reason for this Court to continue to adhere to its prior interpretation of Section 215. See
+Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978); see also EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 69
+(1984); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 297-98 (1981).
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 3
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+The undersigned also agrees with Judge Eagan that, under Smith v. Maryland,
+442 U.S. 735 (1979), the production of call detail records in this matter does not
+constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. In Smith, the Supreme Court held
+that the use of a pen register to record the numbers dialed from the defendant's home
+telephone did not constitute a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. In so
+holding, the Court stressed that the information acquired did not include the contents of
+any communication and that the information was acquired by the government from the
+telephone company, to which the defendant had voluntarily disclosed it for the purpose
+of completing his calls.
+
+The Supreme Court's more recent decision in United States v. Jones, - U.S. -,
+132 S. Ct. 945 (2012), does not point to a different result here. Jones involved the
+acquisition of a different type of information through different means. There, law
+enforcement officers surreptitiously attached a Global Positioning System (GPS) device
+to the defendant's vehicle and used it to track his location for 28 days. The Court held
+in Justice Scalia's majority opinion that the officers' conduct constituted a search under
+the Fourth Amendment because the information at issue was obtained by means of a
+physical intrusion on the defendant's vehicle, a constitutionally-protected area. The
+majority declined to decide whether use of the GPS device, without the physical
+intrusion, impinged upon a reasonable expectation of privacy.
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 4
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Five Justices in Jones signed or joined concurring opinions suggesting that the
+precise, pervasive monitoring by the government of a person's location could trigger
+Fourth Amendment protection even without any physical intrusion. This matter,
+however, involves no such monitoring. Like Smith, this case concerns the acquisition of
+non-content metadata other than location information. See Aug. 29 Op. at 29 at 4 n.5;
+id. at 6 & n.10.
+
+Justice Sotomayor stated in her concurring opinion in Jones that it "may be
+necessary" for the Supreme Court to "reconsider the premise that an individual has no
+reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties,"
+which she described as "ill suited to the digital age." See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957
+(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citing Smith and United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443
+(1976), as examples of decisions relying upon that premise). But Justice Sotomayor also
+made clear that the Court undertook no such reconsideration in Jones. See id.
+("Resolution of these difficult questions in this case is unnecessary, however, because
+the Government's physical intrusion on Jones' Jeep supplies a narrower basis for
+decision."). The Supreme Court may some day revisit the third-party disclosure
+principle in the context of twenty-first century communications technology, but that
+day has not arrived. Accordingly, Smith remains controlling with respect to the
+acquisition by the government from service providers of non-content telephony
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+Page 5
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+metadata such as the information to be produced in this matter.
+
+In light of the public interest in this matter and the government's declassification
+of related materials, including substantial portions of Judge Eagan's August 29 Opinion
+and July 19 Primary Order, the undersigned requests pursuant to FISC Rule 62 that this
+Memorandum and the accompanying Primary Order also be published and directs such
+request to the Presiding Judge as required by the Rule.
+
+ENTERED this 11th day of October, 2013.
+
+Mary A. McLaughlin
+MARY A. MCLAUGHLIN
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 6
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D. C.
+
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
+BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
+ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
+OF TANGIBLE THINGS FROM [REDACTED]
+
+Docket Number: BR
+13-158
+
+PRIMARY ORDER
+
+A verified application having been made by the Director of the Federal Bureau of
+Investigation (FBI) for an order pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
+1978 (the Act), Title 50, United States Code (U.S.C.), § 1861, as amended, requiring the
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+
+Derived from: Pleadings in the above-captioned docket
+Declassify on: [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+production to the National Security Agency (NSA) of the tangible things described
+below, and full consideration having been given to the matters set forth therein, the
+Court finds as follows:
+
+1. There are reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are
+relevant to authorized investigations (other than threat assessments) being conducted
+by the FBI under guidelines approved by the Attorney General under Executive Order
+12333 to protect against international terrorism, which investigations are not being
+conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment to the
+Constitution of the United States. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)]
+
+2. The tangible things sought could be obtained with a subpoena duces tecum
+issued by a court of the United States in aid of a grand jury investigation or with any
+other order issued by a court of the United States directing the production of records or
+tangible things. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)(D)]
+
+3. The application includes an enumeration of the minimization procedures the
+government proposes to follow with regard to the tangible things sought. Such
+procedures are similar to the minimization procedures approved and adopted as
+binding by the order of this Court in Docket Number BR 13-109 and its predecessors.
+[50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)]
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+2
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Accordingly, and as further explained in the accompanying Memorandum, the
+Court finds that the application of the United States to obtain the tangible things, as
+described below, satisfies the requirements of the Act and, therefore,
+
+IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to the authority conferred on this Court by
+the Act, that the application is GRANTED, and it is
+
+FURTHER ORDERED, as follows:
+
+(1)A. The Custodians of Records of [REDACTED] shall produce to NSA
+upon service of the appropriate secondary order, and continue production on an
+ongoing daily basis thereafter for the duration of this order, unless otherwise ordered
+by the Court, an electronic copy of the following tangible things: all call detail records
+or "telephony metadata"¹ created by [REDACTED]
+
+B. The Custodian of Records of [REDACTED] shall produce to NSA upon service of the
+appropriate secondary order, and continue production on an ongoing daily basis
+
+1 For purposes of this Order "telephony metadata" includes comprehensive communications
+routing information, including but not limited to session identifying information (e.g.,
+originating and terminating telephone number, International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI)
+number, International Mobile station Equipment Identity (IMEI) number, etc.), trunk identifier,
+telephone calling card numbers, and time and duration of call. Telephony metadata does not
+include the substantive content of any communication, as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8), or the
+name, address, or financial information of a subscriber or customer. Furthermore, this Order
+does not authorize the production of cell site location information (CSLI).
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+3
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+thereafter for the duration of this order, unless otherwise ordered by the Court, an
+electronic copy of the following tangible things: all call detail records or "telephony
+metadata" created by [REDACTED] for communications (i) between the United States and
+abroad; or (ii) wholly within the United States, including local telephone calls.
+[REDACTED]
+
+(2) With respect to any information the FBI receives as a result of this Order
+(information that is disseminated to it by NSA), the FBI shall follow as minimization
+procedures the procedures set forth in The Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic FBI
+Operations (September 29, 2008).
+
+(3) With respect to the information that NSA receives as a result of this Order,
+NSA shall strictly adhere to the following minimization procedures:
+
+A. The government is hereby prohibited from accessing business record
+metadata acquired pursuant to this Court's orders in the above-captioned docket and its
+predecessors ("BR metadata") for any purpose except as described herein.
+
+B. NSA shall store and process the BR metadata in repositories within secure
+networks under NSA's control.2 The BR metadata shall carry unique markings such
+
+2 The Court understands that NSA will maintain the BR metadata in recovery back-up systems
+for mission assurance and continuity of operations purposes. NSA shall ensure that any access
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+4
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+that software and other controls (including user authentication services) can restrict
+access to it to authorized personnel who have received appropriate and adequate
+training with regard to this authority. NSA shall restrict access to the BR metadata to
+authorized personnel who have received appropriate and adequate training.3
+
+Appropriately trained and authorized technical personnel may access the BR metadata
+to perform those processes needed to make it usable for intelligence analysis. Technical
+personnel may query the BR metadata using selection terms that have not been RAS-
+approved (described below) for those purposes described above, and may share the
+results of those queries with other authorized personnel responsible for these purposes,
+
+or use of the BR metadata in the event of any natural disaster, man-made emergency, attack, or
+other unforeseen event is in compliance with the Court's Order.
+3 The Court understands that the technical personnel responsible for NSA's underlying
+corporate infrastructure and the transmission of the BR metadata from the specified persons to
+NSA, will not receive special training regarding the authority granted herein.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+5
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+but the results of any such queries will not be used for intelligence analysis purposes.
+
+An authorized technician may access the BR metadata to ascertain those identifiers that
+may be high volume identifiers. The technician may share the results of any such
+access, i.e., the identifiers and the fact that they are high volume identifiers, with
+authorized personnel (including those responsible for the identification and defeat of
+high volume and other unwanted BR metadata from any of NSA's various metadata
+repositories), but may not share any other information from the results of that access for
+intelligence analysis purposes. In addition, authorized technical personnel may access
+the BR metadata for purposes of obtaining foreign intelligence information pursuant to
+the requirements of subparagraph (3)C below.
+
+C. NSA shall access the BR metadata for purposes of obtaining foreign
+intelligence information only through queries of the BR metadata to obtain contact
+chaining information as described in paragraph 17 of the Declaration of [REDACTED]
+attached to the application as Exhibit A, using selection terms approved as
+"seeds" pursuant to the RAS approval process described below.5 NSA shall ensure,
+
+5 For purposes of this Order, "National Security Agency" and "NSA personnel" are defined as
+any employees of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service (“NSA/CSS" or
+"NSA") and any other personnel engaged in Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) operations
+authorized pursuant to FISA if such operations are executed under the direction, authority, or
+control of the Director, NSA/Chief, CSS (DIRNSA). NSA personnel shall not disseminate BR
+metadata outside the NSA unless the dissemination is permitted by, and in accordance with, the
+requirements of this Order that are applicable to the NSA.
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+6
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+through adequate and appropriate technical and management controls, that queries of
+the BR metadata for intelligence analysis purposes will be initiated using only a
+selection term that has been RAS-approved. Whenever the BR metadata is accessed for
+foreign intelligence analysis purposes or using foreign intelligence analysis query tools,
+an auditable record of the activity shall be generated.6
+
+(i) Except as provided in subparagraph (ii) below, all selection terms to be
+used as "seeds" with which to query the BR metadata shall be approved by any
+of the following designated approving officials: the Chief or Deputy Chief,
+Homeland Security Analysis Center; or one of the twenty specially-authorized
+Homeland Mission Coordinators in the Analysis and Production Directorate of
+the Signals Intelligence Directorate. Such approval shall be given only after the
+designated approving official has determined that based on the factual and
+practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent
+persons act, there are facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion (RAS)
+that the selection term to be queried is associated with [REDACTED]
+
+6 This auditable record requirement shall not apply to accesses of the results of RAS-approved
+queries.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+7
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+[REDACTED] provided, however, that NSA's Office of General Counsel (OGC)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+8
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+shall first determine that any selection term reasonably believed to be used by a
+United States (U.S.) person is not regarded as associated with [REDACTED]
+solely on the basis of activities that are protected by the
+First Amendment to the Constitution.
+
+(ii) Selection terms that are currently the subject of electronic surveillance
+authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) based on the
+FISC's finding of probable cause to believe that they are used by [REDACTED]
+including those used by U.S. persons, may be
+deemed approved for querying for the period of FISC-authorized electronic
+surveillance without review and approval by a designated approving official.
+The preceding sentence shall not apply to selection terms under surveillance
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+9
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+pursuant to any certification of the Director of National Intelligence and the
+Attorney General pursuant to Section 702 of FISA, as added by the FISA
+Amendments Act of 2008, or pursuant to an Order of the FISC issued under
+Section 703 or Section 704 of FISA, as added by the FISA Amendments Act of
+2008.
+
+(iii) A determination by a designated approving official that a selection
+term is associated with [REDACTED] shall be effective for:
+one hundred eighty days for any selection term reasonably believed to be used
+by a U.S. person; and one year for all other selection terms. 9,10
+
+9 The Court understands that from time to time the information available to designated
+approving officials will indicate that a selection term is or was associated with a Foreign Power
+only for a specific and limited time frame. In such cases, a designated approving official may
+determine that the reasonable, articulable suspicion standard is met, but the time frame for
+which the selection term is or was associated with a Foreign Power shall be specified. The
+automated query process described in the [REDACTED] Declaration limits the first hop query results
+to the specified time frame. Analysts conducting manual queries using that selection term shall
+continue to properly minimize information that may be returned within query results that fall
+outside of that timeframe.
+10 The Court understands that NSA receives certain call detail records pursuant to other
+authority, in addition to the call detail records produced in response to this Court's Orders.
+NSA shall store, handle, and disseminate call detail records produced in response to this
+Court's Orders pursuant to this Order [REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+10
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+(iv) Queries of the BR metadata using RAS-approved selection terms may
+occur either by manual analyst query or through the automated query process
+described below. 11 This automated query process queries the collected BR
+metadata (in a "collection store") with RAS-approved selection terms and returns
+the hop-limited results from those queries to a "corporate store." The corporate
+store may then be searched by appropriately and adequately trained personnel
+for valid foreign intelligence purposes, without the requirement that those
+searches use only RAS-approved selection terms. The specifics of the automated
+query process, as described in the [REDACTED] Declaration, are as follows:
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+11 This automated query process was initially approved by this Court in its November 8, 2012
+Order amending docket number BR 12-178.
+12 As an added protection in case technical issues prevent the process from verifying that the
+most up-to-date list of RAS-approved selection terms is being used, this step of the automated
+process checks the expiration dates of RAS-approved selection terms to confirm that the
+approvals for those terms have not expired. This step does not use expired RAS-approved
+selection terms to create the list of "authorized query terms" (described below) regardless of
+whether the list of RAS-approved selection terms is up-to-date.
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+11
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+D. Results of any intelligence analysis queries of the BR metadata may be shared,
+prior to minimization, for intelligence analysis purposes among NSA analysts, subject
+to the requirement that all NSA personnel who receive query results in any form first
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+12
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+receive appropriate and adequate training and guidance regarding the procedures and
+restrictions for the handling and dissemination of such information. 15 NSA shall apply
+the minimization and dissemination requirements and procedures of Section 7 of
+United States Signals Intelligence Directive SP0018 (USSID 18) issued on January 25,
+2011, to any results from queries of the BR metadata, in any form, before the
+information is disseminated outside of NSA in any form. Additionally, prior to
+disseminating any U.S. person information outside NSA, the Director of NSA, the
+Deputy Director of NSA, or one of the officials listed in Section 7.3(c) of USSID 18 (i.e.,
+the Director of the Signals Intelligence Directorate (SID), the Deputy Director of the SID,
+the Chief of the Information Sharing Services (ISS) office, the Deputy Chief of the ISS
+office, and the Senior Operations Officer of the National Security Operations Center)
+must determine that the information identifying the U.S. person is in fact related to
+counterterrorism information and that it is necessary to understand the
+counterterrorism information or assess its importance. 16 Notwithstanding the above
+requirements, NSA may share results from intelligence analysis queries of the BR
+metadata, including U.S. person identifying information, with Executive Branch
+
+15 In addition, the Court understands that NSA may apply the full range of SIGINT analytic
+tradecraft to the results of intelligence analysis queries of the collected BR metadata.
+16 In the event the Government encounters circumstances that it believes necessitate the
+alteration of these dissemination procedures, it may obtain prospectively-applicable
+modifications to the procedures upon a determination by the Court that such modifications are
+appropriate under the circumstances and in light of the size and nature of this bulk collection.
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+13
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+personnel (1) in order to enable them to determine whether the information contains
+exculpatory or impeachment information or is otherwise discoverable in legal
+proceedings or (2) to facilitate their lawful oversight functions.
+
+E. BR metadata shall be destroyed no later than five years (60 months) after its
+initial collection.
+
+F. NSA and the National Security Division of the Department of Justice
+(NSD/DoJ) shall conduct oversight of NSA's activities under this authority as outlined
+below.
+
+(i) NSA's OGC and Office of the Director of Compliance (ODOC) shall
+ensure that personnel with access to the BR metadata receive appropriate and
+adequate training and guidance regarding the procedures and restrictions for
+collection, storage, analysis, dissemination, and retention of the BR metadata and
+the results of queries of the BR metadata. NSA's OGC and ODOC shall further
+ensure that all NSA personnel who receive query results in any form first receive
+appropriate and adequate training and guidance regarding the procedures and
+restrictions for the handling and dissemination of such information. NSA shall
+maintain records of all such training. 17 OGC shall provide NSD/DoJ with copies
+
+17 The nature of the training that is appropriate and adequate for a particular person will
+depend on the person's responsibilities and the circumstances of his access to the BR metadata
+or the results from any queries of the metadata.
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+14
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+of all formal briefing and/or training materials (including all revisions thereto)
+used to brief/train NSA personnel concerning this authority.
+
+(ii) NSA's ODOC shall monitor the implementation and use of the
+software and other controls (including user authentication services) and the
+logging of auditable information referenced above.
+
+(iii) NSA's OGC shall consult with NSD/DoJ on all significant legal
+opinions that relate to the interpretation, scope, and/or implementation of this
+authority. When operationally practicable, such consultation shall occur in
+advance; otherwise NSD shall be notified as soon as practicable.
+
+(iv) At least once during the authorization period, NSA's OGC, ODOC,
+NSD/DoJ, and any other appropriate NSA representatives shall meet for the
+purpose of assessing compliance with this Court's orders. Included in this
+meeting will be a review of NSA's monitoring and assessment to ensure that
+only approved metadata is being acquired. The results of this meeting shall be
+reduced to writing and submitted to the Court as part of any application to
+renew or reinstate the authority requested herein.
+
+(v) At least once during the authorization period, NSD/DoJ shall meet
+with NSA's Office of the Inspector General to discuss their respective oversight
+responsibilities and assess NSA's compliance with the Court's orders.
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+15
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+(vi) At least once during the authorization period, NSA's OGC and
+NSD/DoJ shall review a sample of the justifications for RAS approvals for
+selection terms used to query the BR metadata.
+
+(vii) Other than the automated query process described in the [REDACTED]
+Declaration and this Order, prior to implementation of any new or modified
+automated query processes, such new or modified processes shall be reviewed
+and approved by NSA's OGC, NSD/DoJ, and the Court.
+
+G. Approximately every thirty days, NSA shall file with the Court a report that
+includes a discussion of NSA's application of the RAS standard, as well as NSA's
+implementation and operation of the automated query process. In addition, should the
+United States seek renewal of the requested authority, NSA shall also include in its
+report a description of any significant changes proposed in the way in which the call
+detail records would be received from the Providers and any significant changes to the
+controls NSA has in place to receive, store, process, and disseminate the BR metadata.
+
+Each report shall include a statement of the number of instances since the
+preceding report in which NSA has shared, in any form, results from queries of the BR
+metadata that contain United States person information, in any form, with anyone
+outside NSA. For each such instance in which United States person information has
+been shared, the report shall include NSA's attestation that one of the officials
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+16
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+authorized to approve such disseminations determined, prior to dissemination, that the
+information was related to counterterrorism information and necessary to understand
+counterterrorism information or to assess its importance.
+
+This authorization regarding [REDACTED] expires on the 3RD day
+of January, 2014, at 5:00 p.m., Eastern Time.
+
+Signed 10-11-2013 P12:05 Eastern Time
+Date Time
+
+Mary A. McLaughlin
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+17
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-158-memo-131018/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-158-memo-131018/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..00f6fb6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-158-memo-131018/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+{
+ "title": "Memorandum and Primary Order, In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED]",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-10-11",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-10-11",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/33997",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [
+ {
+ "id": "ODNI_-_br13-158-memo-131018"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "9e07fce60dbe0fd2636f5fa3d01460f3ec956ec8bee4e1eb197a95441ec91fbe",
+ "pages": 23
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-158-order-131015/FISC_-_br13-158-order-131015.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-158-order-131015/FISC_-_br13-158-order-131015.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2f2dd27
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-158-order-131015/FISC_-_br13-158-order-131015.md
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D. C.
+
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
+BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
+ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
+OF TANGIBLE THINGS FROM
+[REDACTED]
+Docket Number: BR 13-158
+
+ORDER
+
+The Judge who authored the Primary Order and accompanying Memorandum in this
+matter has made a sua sponte request, pursuant to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC)
+Rule 62(a), for the publication of those documents. Rule 62(a) provides in pertinent part:
+
+The Judge who authored an order, opinion, or other decision may sua sponte ...
+request that it be published. Upon such request, the Presiding Judge, after
+consulting with other Judges of the Court, may direct that an order, opinion or
+other decision be published. Before publication, the Court may, as appropriate,
+direct the Executive Branch to review the order, opinion, or other decision and
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+redact as necessary to ensure that properly classified information is appropriately
+protected pursuant to Executive Order 13526 (or its successor).
+
+Upon consideration of the Judge's request, and after consultation among the judges of
+this Court pursuant to FISC Rules 62(a), it is HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
+
+1. The Government shall conduct a declassification review of the Primary Order and
+accompanying Memorandum issued on October 11, 2013, in this docket.
+
+2. The Government shall report to the Court by October 18, 2013, with estimated dates
+by which it will be able to complete its review of the two documents identified above.
+
+SO ORDERED, this 15 day of October, 2013.
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+2
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-158-order-131015/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-158-order-131015/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ae6d1aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-158-order-131015/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+{
+ "title": "Order, In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things From [REDACTED]",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-10-15",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-10-15",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34066",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [
+ {
+ "id": "ODNI_-_br13-158-order-131015"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "d1ae9664a2dc97ca8af0de4f169b0d7b5e5ccc696f035ef11ee4c4d2254acc38",
+ "pages": 2
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-158-order-131018/FISC_-_br13-158-order-131018.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-158-order-131018/FISC_-_br13-158-order-131018.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1d6cc78
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-158-order-131018/FISC_-_br13-158-order-131018.md
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
+BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
+ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
+OF TANGIBLE THINGS
+
+Docket Number: BR 13-158
+
+**ORDER**
+
+On October 15, 2013, the Court directed the Government to conduct a declassification review of the Memorandum and accompanying Primary Order that were issued in this docket on October 11, 2013. That review is now complete, and the Court has determined that the attached Memorandum and related Orders, as redacted, are suitable for publication. Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED pursuant to FISC Rule 62(a) that the Memorandum and Primary Order of October 11, 2013, and the declassification Order of October 15, 2013, shall be published as redacted.
+
+SO ORDERED, this 18th day of October, 2013.
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-158-order-131018/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-158-order-131018/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3e03be2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-158-order-131018/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+{
+ "title": "Order, In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-10-18",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-10-18",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34065",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [
+ {
+ "id": "ODNI_-_br13-158-order-131018"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "6e2cc4c9c3a450b02923714b3c1ffb3b5b3f2baa792a55c6123ffd38dae687b6",
+ "pages": 1
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-158-response-131108/FISC_-_br13-158-response-131108.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-158-response-131108/FISC_-_br13-158-response-131108.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5fb61bb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-158-response-131108/FISC_-_br13-158-response-131108.md
@@ -0,0 +1,408 @@
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+2013 NOV -8 PM 1:26
+
+UNITED STATES
+
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT ANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE: APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
+BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
+ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
+OF TANGIBLE THINGS
+
+Docket No. BR 13-158¹
+
+THE UNITED STATES' RESPONSE TO THE MOTION TO ESTABLISH A PUBLIC
+BRIEFING SCHEDULE INCLUDING THE FILINGS OF BRIEFS BY AMICI CURIAE,
+FOR LEAVE FOR THE CENTER FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES TO FILE AN
+AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF, AND A SUGGESTION FOR HEARING EN BANC
+
+This Court has the inherent power to authorize an amicus curiae to submit a brief on an
+issue of law, if the Court determines that this would assist the Court. Thus, the Court has
+discretion to accept an amicus brief from the Center for National Security Studies setting forth
+the Center's arguments as to "why [it believes that] section 501 of the Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Act [FISA], 50 U.S.C. § 1861, does not authorize" bulk telephone metadata
+collection, Mot. 1.
+
+The Center's motion should be denied, however, to the extent the motion goes beyond
+seeking participation as amicus curiae and seeks relief that would undermine the carefully
+structured statutory provisions setting out the ex parte and classified nature of FISA proceedings.
+First, the Court should not consider the Center's request for "reconsideration" of this Court's
+
+¹ The Center for National Security Studies filed its motion in “Docket No. BR 13-109 (or
+successor docket)." In its briefing Order, the Court ruled that "[t]he Motion is deemed to have
+been filed in Docket No. BR 13-158, which is the 'successor docket' to Docket No. BR 13-109."
+The Government respectfully submits that this matter belongs in neither of these business
+records dockets, but rather in a separate miscellaneous docket. See infra note 4. Such a docket
+could then be made publicly available on the Court's public website.
+
+previously entered ex parte order. See Mot. 3. An amicus (or putative amicus) has no standing
+to move for reconsideration of a decision. Second, the Court should not open or disclose to the
+Center or the public any past or future business records dockets, as this would be inconsistent
+with FISA, nor should it permit the Center or other outside entities to participate in these
+proceedings as parties. Finally, there is no reason for the Court to sit en banc at this time.
+
+BACKGROUND
+
+I. Statutory Background
+
+Section 501 of FISA, as amended by Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act in 2001,
+permits the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to apply to this Court "for an order requiring
+the production of any tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other
+items) for an investigation . . . to protect against international terrorism." 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a).
+Such an application must comply with certain enumerated requirements, including that it contain
+"a statement of facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things
+sought are relevant to an authorized investigation.” 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A). If the
+application meets the statutory requirements, FISA requires that the Court "shall enter an ex
+parte order as requested, or as modified, approving the release of tangible things." 50 U.S.C.
+§ 1861(c)(1). As in all matters before this Court, FISA directs that proceedings be "conducted as
+expeditiously as possible," with records "maintained under [appropriate] security measures." 50
+U.S.C. § 1803(c).
+
+Both FBI applications and Court orders pursuant to Section 1861 are subject to a broad
+non-disclosure obligation. Specifically, FISA provides that "[n]o person shall disclose to any
+other person that the [FBI] has sought or obtained tangible things pursuant to an order under this
+
+2
+
+section, other than to" (1) persons to whom disclosure is necessary for compliance, (2) an
+attorney consulted for legal advice or assistance with respect to the production orders, or
+(3) other persons as permitted by the FBI. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(d)(1). FISA permits the recipient of
+an order to challenge the legality of the order in this Court. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f). FISA does not
+provide for any other person to challenge a Section 1861 order, and unlike several other FISA
+provisions, Congress did not provide a suppression remedy for business records obtained under
+section 1861. Compare 50 U.S.C. § 1861 with 50 U.S.C. §§ 1806(e), 1825(f), 1845(e), 1881e.
+
+II. Previous Third-Party Requests To File Briefs in Ex Parte FISA Proceedings
+
+There have been at least two previous instances in which third parties have sought to file
+amicus briefs in ex parte FISA proceedings. In In re: Sealed Case, the Government appealed an
+adverse ruling from this Court in a proceeding brought by the Government pursuant to Title I of
+FISA, which, like Section 1861, requires proceedings to be ex parte. 50 U.S.C. § 1805
+(containing an ex parte requirement similar to that of Section 1861). The Government's appeal
+raised an issue of statutory interpretation that had broad legal significance to the Government's
+foreign intelligence programs. At the ex parte hearing before the Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Court of Review, the Government did not object to the Court receiving amicus
+briefs.²
+
+² JUDGE SILBERMAN: [W]e expect to get some amicus briefs. Do you have a
+view [as to] what we should do with amicus briefs?
+
+SOLICITOR GENERAL OLSON: Our position is we have no objection to the
+Court receiving amicus briefs. In fact, I think it's probably good that the Court
+receive amicus briefs.
+
+JUDGE SILBERMAN: That sets a precedent for this process which worries me a
+little bit.
+
+3
+
+Ultimately, the Court of Review agreed, accepting two amicus briefs and giving the
+Government an opportunity to reply. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 719 (For. Intel.
+Surveillance Ct. Rev. 2002) ("Since the government is the only party to FISA proceedings, we
+have accepted briefs filed by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the National
+Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) as amici curiae.") (footnote omitted).
+
+In contrast, in 2008, the ACLU sought not merely to file an amicus brief, but also to
+participate broadly in proceedings brought by the Government pursuant to the FISA
+Amendments Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1881a, et seq. Specifically, the ACLU requested:
+
+(i) that it be notified of the caption and briefing schedule for any proceedings under
+section 702(i) in which this Court will consider legal questions relating to the scope,
+meaning, and constitutionality of the FISA Amendments Act;
+
+(ii) that, in connection with such proceedings, the Court require the government to
+file public versions of its legal briefs, with only those redactions necessary to protect
+information that is properly classified;
+
+(iii) that, in connection with such proceedings, the ACLU be granted leave to file a
+legal brief addressing the constitutionality of the Act and to participate in oral
+argument before the Court; [and]
+
+SOLICITOR GENERAL OLSON: I understand that. I think that this is an
+unusual situation because it would not typically have occurred that this opinion
+would become public or that this appeal would have been taken or that it was
+going to be scheduled on a schedule-I don't think a Court deciding in a
+particular case to accept or not accept an amicus brief has ever been done as
+requiring the Court to always do that or invariably do that, but because this is a
+special issue and it is important and for the very reasons that you imply when you
+say that it might be good to address and resolve the constitutional questions, I
+think it's good for the process.
+
+JUDGE SILBERMAN: [T]hen you would want time to respond if you
+thought there was something of importance [in an amicus brief].
+
+Tr. 67-69, available at www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/hrng090902.htm.
+
+4
+
+(iv) that any legal opinions issued by this Court at the conclusion of such proceedings
+be made available to the public, with only those redactions necessary to protect
+information that is properly classified.
+ACLU Mot. 2, available at www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/aclu071008.pdf.
+
+This Court, in an opinion by Judge McLaughlin, denied the ACLU's motion. See In re
+Proceedings Required by § 702(i) of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Dkt. No. Misc. 08-01
+(Aug. 27, 2008), available at www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/fisc082708.pdf. The Court
+observed that the ACLU's broad requests fell into two categories: (1) a request for the release of
+records, and (2) "a more general request to participate in the Court's review under § 702(i)." Id.
+at 4. The Court rejected the request for records for essentially the same reasons that this Court
+had previously found a similar ACLU request for access to this Court's records to be without
+merit. See id. at 5-8 (citing In re Motion for Release of Court Records, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484,
+490-97 (Foreign Intel. Surveillance Ct. 2007)). The Court then rejected the request to participate
+in the proceedings for two reasons. First, the Court found that the FISA Amendments Act (FAA)
+did not contemplate participation by a third party. See id. at 9 (finding that "Congress did not
+contemplate the Court's review of the [FAA] certification and procedures to be anything other
+than an ex parte proceeding"). And, second, the Court determined that, given the circumstances,
+"the ACLU's participation [was] unlikely to provide meaningful assistance to the Court." Id.
+at 8.
+
+III. Procedural Background
+
+The Center's motion relates to the Government's collection of telephony metadata
+records in bulk. In response to unauthorized disclosures earlier this year, the Government has
+declassified and made available to the public certain facts about this collection. See, e.g.,
+
+5
+
+Administration White Paper: Bulk Collection of Telephony Metadata under Section 215 of the
+USA PATRIOT Act (Aug. 9, 2013), available at http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/politics/
+obama-administration-white-paper-on-nsa-surveillance-oversight/388/. Pursuant to the program,
+the Government has obtained FISC orders under Section 1861 directing certain
+telecommunications companies to produce certain telephony metadata records that the
+companies create and maintain as part of their business. Fifteen different judges of the FISC
+have issued these orders over the past seven years.
+
+In connection with the two most recent instances in which the Court has approved the
+program, the Court issued opinions explaining its conclusion that the collection of bulk
+telephony metadata is consistent with Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1861.
+See In re Application of the F.B.I. for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things,
+Dkt. No. BR 13-109, 2013 WL 5741573, at *3-*9 (For. Intel. Surveillance Ct. Aug. 29, 2013)
+(Eagan, J.); In re Application of the F.B.I. for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible
+Things, Dkt. No. BR 13-158, at 3 (For. Intel. Surveillance Ct. Oct. 11, 2013) (McLaughlin, J.),
+available at www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/br13-158-memo-131018.pdf.
+
+On September 25, 2013, the Center sent a letter to Presiding Judge Walton asking the
+Court to alter its procedures "to ensure plenary consideration on a public record" of "legal issues
+concerning bulk telephone metadata collection under section 501 of [FISA]" "in the event that
+the Government seeks reauthorization of that collection." Letter from Kate Martin to Hon.
+Reggie B. Walton, at 1 (Sept. 25, 2013). In an Order dated October 9, 2013, the Court rejected
+the Center's request because it failed to comply with the Court's Rules of Procedure, and ruled
+that "[t]he Center may re-submit its requests in the form of a motion that complies with all
+applicable requirements of the FISC Rules." Order, Dkt. No. BR 13-109, at 1 (Oct. 9, 2013),
+
+6
+
+available at www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/fisc/index.html. The Court directed that any such
+motion "should address the question whether the Center's requests are foreclosed in whole or in
+part by the language and structure of Section 1861." Id. at 1-2 (citing 50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1),
+(d), and (f)).
+
+On October 17, 2013, the Center filed the instant motion which asks the Court to set a
+public briefing schedule for "the most recent or next authorization of the bulk telephone
+metadata collection," seeks leave to file an amicus brief "setting forth reasons why [the Center
+believes] section . . . 1861[] does not authorize that bulk collection," and requests that the Court
+sit en banc. See Mot. 1. In response to the Court's direction to address whether this relief is
+foreclosed by the language and structure of Section 1861, the Center provided only the
+following:
+
+[T]here is also no conflict between the receipt of amicus briefs on unclassified
+matters and the provisions in [Section 1861] on the potential party status of the
+recipients of business record orders. The amici will not be parties. For example,
+they will not have the right to seek review in the Court of Review. Their only role
+would be to provide arguments to the Court in response to arguments that have
+been declassified by the Executive Branch. . . And, of course, any order issued
+by this Court would remain an ex parte order even if amici are permitted to
+present competing viewpoints.
+
+Mot. 6-7. The Center also noted that "[t]he briefing proposed by this motion will not require
+counsel for amici obtaining access to or using any classified information." Id. at 7.
+
+ARGUMENT
+
+If the Court wishes to grant leave to file an amicus brief, it has the authority to do so.
+However, if the Court elects to do so, any proceedings must still be conducted in a manner
+consistent with FISA. As such, any application by the Government pursuant to Section 1861
+must remain non-public, see 50 U.S.C. § 1861(d)(1), and the proceedings before the Court must
+
+7
+
+be ex parte, see 50 U.S.C. § 1861(c). An amicus brief on the legal question of whether Section
+1861 permits an order for bulk telephony metadata collection could be used by the Court in
+adjudicating any future application that raises this legal question. Any resulting opinion could be
+published pursuant to the procedures set forth in Rule 62(a) of the Court's Rules of Procedure.
+
+I. The Court Has the Authority To Accept a Brief of an Amicus Curiae
+
+A. Appointment of Amicus is an Exercise of Inherent Authority
+
+Numerous district courts have recognized broad inherent authority to appoint an amicus
+curiae when doing so would assist the court. This Court is not a district court, but it possesses
+similar inherent authority except to the extent inconsistent with provisions of FISA. See In re
+Mot. for Release of Ct. Records, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 486-87; cf. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(g) (FISC may
+"take such actions[] as are reasonably necessary to administer [its] responsibilities under
+[FISA]"). While some of the relief sought by the Center would squarely conflict with FISA,
+accepting a brief of an amicus curiae to provide argument as to whether Section 1861 authorizes
+the Court to issue an order requiring the production of bulk telephony metadata would not, by
+itself, be inconsistent with FISA.
+
+In the ordinary course, as Solicitor General Olson observed before the Court of Review,
+see supra note 2, the Court would not receive requests to file amicus briefs because the issues
+pending before the Court are almost invariably classified and not known to the public. And the
+Court should not solicit amicus briefs in a manner that would reveal the existence or contents of
+
+³ See, e.g., Mobile County Water, Sewer & Fire Prot. Auth., Inc. v. Mobile Area Water & Sewer
+Sys., Inc., 567 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1344 n.1 (N.D. Ala. 2008); Jin v. Ministry of State Sec., 557 F.
+Supp. 2d 131, 136 (D.D.C. 2008); Verizon New England v. Maine Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 229
+F.R.D. 335, 338 (D. Me. 2005); United States v. Davis, 180 F. Supp. 2d 797, 799-800 (E.D. La.
+2001); Sciotto v. Marple Newtown Sch. Dist., 70 F. Supp. 2d 553, 554 (E.D. Pa. 1999); Resort
+Timeshare Resales, Inc. v. Stuart, 764 F. Supp. 1495, 1500-01 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
+
+8
+
+an application or any classified information associated therewith. However, where, as here, a
+legal issue that has arisen before the Court has become public, it is possible for the Court to
+accept an amicus filing provided that the Court complies with the strictures of FISA requiring ex
+parte proceedings and nondisclosure of applications and orders.
+
+As the Court of Review's decision in In re Sealed Case demonstrates, the fact that the
+proceedings concerning the Government's application for an order pursuant to Section 1861 are
+ex parte does not preclude the appointment of an amicus. See 310 F.3d at 719. The amicus
+would not be a party to the proceeding, and would not have access to the Government's
+application or other docket proceedings. Rather, an amicus would, if the Court determined it to
+be appropriate, simply be permitted to file a brief on a specific legal question that has been at
+issue in a series of matters before the Court, where both the Court and the public have reason to
+believe that there may be future applications from the Government raising the same issue.
+
+Similarly, although the non-disclosure provision of Section 1861(c)(1) indicates that an
+application from the Government and an order issued by the Court pursuant to Section 1861
+must not be disclosed to an amicus or the public, it does not necessarily prevent the Court from
+permitting an amicus to submit a public brief on an abstract legal issue where the relevance of
+that legal issue to the Court's work is already publicly known. Finally, Section 1861(f) does not
+preclude appointment of an amicus. That subsection authorizes a challenge to an issued order by
+a recipient of that order, which is a different proceeding from a proceeding under Section
+
+9
+
+1861(c) in which the Court issues an ex parte order. The amicus brief posited here would relate
+to a hypothetical future Section 1861(c) proceeding and not to a Section 1861(f) proceeding.⁴
+
+The Court thus has the authority to appoint the Center as amicus curiae and to invite it to
+submit a brief on an identified legal question, if the Court, in its discretion, elects to do so.
+
+B. Appointment of Amicus Is an Exercise of Judicial Discretion
+
+The decision to appoint an amicus is within the broad discretion of the Court. The
+"classic role of amicus curiae" involves "assisting in a case of general public interest,
+supplementing the efforts of counsel, and drawing the court's attention to law that escaped
+consideration." Miller-Wohl Co. v. Comm'r of Labor & Indus., 694 F.2d 203, 204 (9th Cir.
+1982). Of course, “[a]n amicus is not a party and does not represent the parties but participates
+only for the benefit of the court." Alliance of Auto. Mfrs. v. Gwadowsky, 297 F. Supp. 2d 305,
+306-07 (D. Me. 2003) (citation omitted); accord Jin v. Ministry of State Sec., 557 F. Supp. 2d
+131, 136 (D.D.C. 2008). Thus, "[t]he privilege of being heard amicus rests solely within the
+discretion of the court." United States v. State of Louisiana, 751 F. Supp. 608, 620 (E.D. La.
+1990); accord Jin, 557 F. Supp. 2d at 137 n.5.
+
+II. The Court Should Not Alter the Statutorily Required FISA Procedures
+
+Regardless of whether the Court decides to accept an amicus brief, the Court should not
+allow amicus participation in a manner that would conflict with the procedures required by
+FISA. Thus, any applications for business record orders should continue to be handled ex parte,
+see 50 U.S.C. § 1861(c), and both the applications and any orders issued to telecommunications
+
+⁴ Because any future application for bulk telephony records will be classified, any amicus brief
+should be accepted in a miscellaneous docket rather than the docket of a classified application.
+
+10
+
+companies or any other recipient should remain confidential and non-public, see 50 U.S.C.
+§ 1861(d)(1). This necessarily means that the "public docket" envisioned by the Center is not
+legally possible.
+
+Indeed, when directed by the Court to address the applicability of the language and
+structure of Section 1861 to the relief it seeks, the Center responded only that an amicus brief
+would not conflict with Section 1861, a position with which the Government agrees. See Mot. 6-
+7. The Center's motion does not address, however, how the other relief sought particularly the
+request that the Court create a public docket for the Government's application for a Section 1861
+business records order could be consistent with either the language or the structure of Section
+1861. The Center's request for a public docket is squarely inconsistent both with the structure of
+Section 1861 and with its specific language, which requires both that the proceedings be ex parte
+and that the Government's applications (as well as any orders) remain secret. See 50 U.S.C.
+§§ 1861(c), 1861(d)(1).
+
+Additionally, to the extent that the Center seeks reconsideration of this Court's previous
+decision, this too is unwarranted. The Center, by its own admission, is not a party and does not
+seek to become a party. Mot. 6. An amicus (or, in this case, putative amicus) cannot move for
+"substantive relief," see Newark Branch, NAACP v. Town of Harrison, 940 F.2d 792, 808 (3d
+Cir. 1991), and the Center has provided no legal basis for a motion to reconsider here.
+
+Similarly, the Center has no standing to seek en banc review by this Court. See FISC
+R.P. 46 (delineating who may seek en banc review). And while the Court has the power to
+initiate en banc proceedings sua sponte, see FISC R.P. 49, the Government sees no reason to do
+so now. Rule 46, which is instructive although not strictly applicable here, provides that "initial
+hearings en banc are extraordinary and will be ordered only when a majority of the Judges
+
+11
+
+determines that a matter is of such immediate and extraordinary importance that initial
+consideration by the en banc Court is necessary, and en banc review is feasible in light of
+applicable time constraints on Court action." FISC R.P. 46. Here, the legal question on which
+the Center seeks to opine has been ruled upon by fifteen different judges of this Court, and each
+has ruled the same way. Such uniformity suggests that it is not necessary for the next case
+presenting this same legal issue to be heard en banc.
+
+CONCLUSION
+
+Whether to accept a brief of an amicus curiae to provide argument on the issue of
+whether Section 1861 authorizes bulk telephony metadata collection is an issue committed to the
+sound discretion of the Court. Such an appointment, however, does not alter the statutory
+requirement for ex parte proceedings or the statutory requirement that the Government's
+applications shall be nonpublic.
+
+November 8, 2013
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+
+J. BRADFORD WIEGMANN
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+TASHINA GAUHAR
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+/s/ Jeffrey M. Smith
+JEFFREY M. SMITH
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+Phone: (202) 514-5600
+Fax: (202) 514-8053
+
+Attorneys for the United States of America
+
+12
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I hereby certify that a true copy of the United States' Response to the Motion To
+Establish a Public Briefing Schedule Including the Filings of Briefs by Amici Curiae, for Leave
+for the Center for National Security Studies To File an Amicus Curiae Brief, and a Suggestion
+for Hearing En Banc was served via Federal Express overnight delivery on this 8th day of
+November, 2013, addressed to:
+
+Kate A. Martin
+Center for National Security Studies
+1730 Pennsylvania Ave., NW S. 700
+Washington, DC 20006
+
+/s/ Jeffrey M. Smith
+Jeffrey M. Smith
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-158-response-131108/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-158-response-131108/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..039063c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-158-response-131108/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "The United States' Response to the Motion to Establish a Public Briefing Schedule Including the Filings of Briefs by Amici Curiae, for Leave for the Center for National Security Studies to File an Amicus Curiae Brief, and a Suggestion for Hearing En Banc",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-11-08",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-08",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34521",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "d1430adaffc01f1b36921198c7607b3888dba8a8c5862404e465f81e18f32939",
+ "pages": 13
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-158-response-131125/FISC_-_br13-158-response-131125.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-158-response-131125/FISC_-_br13-158-response-131125.md
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@@ -0,0 +1,660 @@
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILANCE COURN13 NOV 22 PM4:01
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
+BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
+ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
+OF TANGIBLE THINGS
+
+Docket No. BR 13-158
+
+REPLY OF THE CENTER FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES IN
+SUPPORT OF MOTION TO ESTABLISH A PUBLIC BRIEFING SCHEDULE
+INCLUDING THE FILING OF BRIEFS BY AMICI CURIAE,
+FOR LEAVE TO FILE AN AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF, AND A SUGGESTION
+FOR HEARING EN BANC
+
+The Telephony Records Program ("Program"), the name used by the Solicitor
+General in the Supreme Court, is a program, periodically reauthorized by this Court for
+the last seven years, of compelled production to the National Security Agency of "all"
+call detail records not only for calls between the United States and abroad but for those
+"wholly within the United States, including local telephone calls" (Order in BR 13-158,
+October 11, 2013, at p. 4). That Program is without precedent in American history. And
+it is very questionable whether it is within the scope of what Congress intended to
+authorize in passing Section 501 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”),
+50 U.S.C. § 1861. Yet in the seven years the Program has operated, this Court has heard
+only from the Government, in secret, on that exceptionally important legal question.¹
+
+¹ On October 17, 2013, the Center for National Security Studies ("Center") moved this
+Court to establish procedures to ensure that the current or next reauthorization of bulk
+telephony metadata collection is given plenary consideration by the full Court that
+includes an opportunity for amici curiae to submit a brief or briefs detailing why that bulk
+collection is unlawful. This is the Center's Reply to the Government's Response.
+
+75451.5
+
+At the heart of the Center's Motion is the principle that the Court needs to hear
+from more than one side. Accordingly, the Center has moved this Court to direct the
+Government to file its legal justifications for the Program publicly, and to set a briefing
+schedule to allow amici curiae to respond to those justifications. That is the best way to
+bring about a meaningful and comprehensive airing of the issues. It would also be
+consistent with Section 501, because proceedings will remain ex parte and any sensitive
+information in the Government's application or Court's order may remain protected.
+Moreover, the Court should follow the Center's suggestion and consider this case en
+banc. This case presents foundational issues concerning whether Congress has
+authorized the Executive Branch to engage in massive collection of personal data that
+seemingly has no end point.
+
+I. The Court Should Receive on the Public Record Competing Legal
+Arguments from the Government and Amici on the Lawfulness of Bulk
+Metadata Collection.
+
+The Government concedes in its Response that this Court has inherent power to
+receive a public brief from amici curiae on whether Section 501 authorizes the bulk
+collection at issue. See Resp. at 1, 8-10. Yet the Government contends that Section 501
+prohibits it from publicly filing its own legal argument in support of the bulk collection,
+thus preventing any amicus from grappling directly with the Government's actual legal
+justifications. Resp. at 10-12. The Government's position misinterprets Section 501, and
+would deny this Court the chief benefit of amicus participation—a full and informed
+briefing on both sides of the relevant issues. This Court both can and should require the
+Government to publicly file its legal justifications.
+
+75451.5
+2
+
+The ability of the Court to receive an amicus brief that comprehensively addresses
+the legal arguments of the Government will be greatly enhanced if the Government is
+directed to file its own public memorandum of law defending the program. The
+Government's legal arguments are scattered across various sources that have been
+declassified in piecemeal fashion. For example, this Court's Amended Memorandum
+Opinion of August 29, 2013 cites a Government 2006 Memorandum of Law in No. BR
+06-05, the docket for the first telephony metadata order. That memorandum of law was
+made public only this week. Beginning in August 2013, the Government has addressed
+publicly the legality of bulk telephony metadata collection in a White Paper, briefs and
+legal memoranda in the Supreme Court, see In re Electronic Privacy Information Center,
+(No. 13-58), at least two district courts, see Government Defendants' Opposition to
+Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunctions at 31-44, Klayman v. Obama, No. 13-cv-
+00851 (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 2013); Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion
+to Dismiss the Complaint, at 19-29, ACLU v. Clapper, 13 Civ. 3994 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26,
+2013), congressional testimony, and a speech before the Brookings Institution. These
+briefs, statements, and speeches do not, however, address elements of the reasoning in the
+August opinion, such as the Court's reliance on earlier opinions construing the term
+"relevance" in Title IV of FISA on governing the use of of pen registers for metadata.
+
+The Government appears to argue that Section 501 precludes it from filing a
+public legal memorandum in this Court because that section requires that the proceedings
+be ex parte and that the application and orders remain secret. Id. at 11. But requiring the
+Government to publicly file its legal memorandum would not violate either of those
+requirements. The Government's argument appears to conflate "ex parte" with “in
+
+75451.5
+3
+
+camera." To say that a proceeding must be held ex parte does not necessarily mean that it
+must be held in secret; rather, it simply means that it must be held without providing
+notice to the other party. See Mission Eng'g Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 883 F. Supp.
+488, 489 (C.D. Cal. 1995). The proceedings will still be “ex parte" because appearance
+of amici will not alter the fact that the Government is the only party present. Nor does
+"ex parte" always require consideration “in camera," as can be seen by the inclusion in
+Section 501(f)(5), 50 USC § 1861(f)(5), of authority to proceed “in camera" as well as
+"ex parte" in proceedings involving recipients of Section 501 orders. See Section 802(d),
+50 USC § 1885a(d) (the court shall review classified information “in camera and ex
+parte"). The inclusion of both terms in that section is in contrast to Section 501(c), which
+requires only that the proceedings be ex parte, and thus as a statutory matter does not
+preclude an open part of a proceeding when no classified matter would be disclosed.
+
+Additionally, directing the Government to file its legal memorandum publicly
+would not require the Government or the Court to divulge anything that must be kept
+secret. Indeed, much if not all of the information that would be contained in such a
+memorandum has already been made public. The Government has declassified the fact
+of the collection and the Government or this Court has made public various opinions,
+orders, and legal arguments related to the Program. In fact, the Government publicly
+filed a detailed legal defense of its bulk metadata collection just last week in the District
+Court for the District of Columbia. See Government Defendants' Opposition to
+Plaintiffs' Motion for Prelimary Injunctions at 31-44, Klayman v. Obama, No. 13-cv-
+00851 (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 2013). No reasonable reading of Section 501's non-disclosure
+
+75451.5
+4
+
+requirements compels the Court to simply ignore what has already been made public.²
+And Rule 7(j) of this Court provides a model for the Government's service of a redacted
+submission provided that it “must clearly articulate the government's legal arguments."
+That some or all of the Government's brief is made public does not mean that sensitive
+information in the application or order must also be revealed.
+
+In testimony before the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board on July 9,
+2013, Tr. at 34, a former member of this Court, James Robertson, described the
+importance of hearing competing views:
+
+Now judges are learned in the law and all that, but anybody who has been a judge
+will tell you that a judge needs to hear both sides of a case before deciding.
+It's quite common, in fact it's the norm to read one side's brief or hear one side's
+argument and think, hmm, that sounds right, until we read the other side.
+
+Now that the fact of the Program is declassified, this Court has released its recent
+opinions, and the Government is making public arguments before other courts and
+
+² The Government submits that an amicus brief does not belong in a business
+records docket and should be accepted only as a brief on "an abstract legal issue, Resp. at
+9, and placed in a separate public miscellaneous docket, Resp. at 1, n.1, where the Court
+could use it in adjudicating a “future" application, id at 8. The Court's miscellaneous
+public dockets appear to be used for ancillary matters, each under a case number, in
+which final relief is sought on a question of public release of information. The question
+whether bulk metadata collection is authorized by Section 501 is not a comparably
+ancillary issue.
+The Court has discretion to provide for docketing in a manner that best enables it
+to achieve fully informed adjudication of competing legal views. One way is to establish
+procedures for reconsideration of the present order. That would address the stated
+concern of the Government about a classified docket because the fact of the present
+docket and collection order is declassified. Another way is to establish procedures for the
+next authorization (the present order expires on January 3, 2014) and to begin them in
+time for action on it. Or the Court could begin the procedures under the present docket
+and transfer them to the next when it is established. Whichever path the Court takes in its
+discretion, the objective should be to connect consideration of the competing briefs to an
+actual decision on authorization of bulk telephony metadata collection.
+
+75451.5
+5
+
+elsewhere, it is time for argument to be joined in public before this Court, which has the
+unavoidable responsibility of adjudicating the lawfulness of this collection.
+
+II. Bulk Telephony Metadata Collection Presents Questions of Exceptional
+Importance that Merit En Banc Review.
+
+A. The Standard
+
+The Government states that the Center has no standing to seek en banc review.
+Resp. at 11. But we have not sought to file, and under the rules of this Court could not
+file, a petition for hearing or rehearing en banc that is required to be submitted to the
+members of the Court for a vote. We have made a suggestion to the Court. Under Rule
+49 of this Court, a Judge to whom a matter has been presented may request that all Judges
+be polled with respect to whether the matter should be considered or reheard en banc. It
+would serve the public interest to make that request and for the members of the Court to
+act favorably on it.
+
+The Government offers one reason why en banc review is "not necessary"—
+namely, that fifteen judges of this Court have ruled the same way on bulk telephony
+metadata orders. Resp at 12. The standard the Government addresses – "to secure or
+maintain uniformity of the court's decisions" – is one of two alternative standards for en
+banc review. The other standard, which is the basis for the Center's suggestion (Motion
+at 5), is that "the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance." Section
+103(a)(2)(A)(ii), 50 USC §1803(a)(2)(A)(ii); see also FISC Rule 45. The Government's
+Response makes no effort to refute the undeniable exceptional importance of the question
+whether Section 501 authorizes the bulk metadata collection at issue.
+
+75451.5
+6
+
+B. The Center's Amicus Brief Would Address Numerous Questions of
+Exceptional Importance.
+
+At issue in the Center's amicus brief would be the Government's authority to
+collect massive amounts of data on the activities of its citizens in secret. The scope of the
+Program is unprecedented, both because of its incredible breadth and because it targets
+purely domestic telephony data. Yet this massive program was undertaken without clear
+congressional authorization or public knowledge and approved by secret court orders
+until the existence of the Program was publicly revealed. The Government has developed
+powerful tools to search the mass of collected information to identify connections of
+interest. The conjunction of the collection of mass information with the very power of
+these search tools makes it exceptionally important to consider whether the Congress has
+authorized the collection.
+
+Yet the statutory provision the Government invokes to justify the Program does
+not, on its face, appear to support any kind of data collection "program" at all. Rather,
+Section 501 provides for access to business records relevant to "an investigation,"
+suggesting that Congress intended that section to apply on a case-by-case basis for
+specific investigatory purposes, and not as the foundation for a program to collect data
+pertaining to virtually all Americans in perpetuity.
+
+The extraordinary importance of these issues is magnified by the legal predicate
+the Program establishes for other bulk collection. Neither the Government nor this Court
+has articulated any limiting principle for the expansive interpretation of Section 501
+advanced by the Government and accepted by this Court. Without such a limit, that
+interpretation coud be applied to justify the collection of virtually any kind of data that
+can be classified as a "business record," such as data relating to electronic
+
+75451.5
+7
+
+communications and credit card and other financial transactions within the United States.
+On this view, Congress has handed the Executive Branch virtual carte blanche to
+determine the limits of its own data collection programs.
+
+Among the specific issues that should be addressed in briefs by the Government
+and an amicus are the following:
+
+1. Does the collection fit within the overall structure and limitations of
+Section 501 or FISA as a whole?
+
+The Telephony Records Program is in tension with the structure of Section 501 in
+at least two respects: first, Section 501 is directed on its face to the Federal Bureau of
+Investigation; and second, Section 501 lacks key safeguards present in other sections of
+FISA, such as a set duration authority for orders issued under those sections, indicating
+that Congress intended Section 501 to provide for the FBI's discrete collections of
+business records in connection with an investigation, not to serve as the foundation for a
+massive, perpetual data collection program by the National Security Agency.
+
+In contrast to other FISA authorities, Section 501 explicitly applies to one
+Government entity, the FBI. For electronic surveillance orders under Title I or search
+orders under Title III, a “Federal officer" may make the application. In Title V regarding
+business records, authority is given the FBI Director or, depending on the sensitivity of
+the application, to subordinate levels within the FBI. Section 501(a)(1) and (3), 50 USC
+§1861(a)(1) and (3). Both the minimization and use provisions of Section 501 apply to
+records "received" by the FBI. Section 501(g) and (h), 50 USC § 1861(g) and (h).
+Nothing in the statutory text authorizes or contemplates the wholesale contracting out to
+the NSA of authority that Congress vested in the FBI.
+
+75451.5
+8
+
+Section 501 differs from other collection authorities under FISA in another
+fundamental respect: it lacks a key limitation like those Congress enacted in other
+sections that contemplate significant data collection for an extended period of time – an
+expiration date for data collection orders issued thereunder. The absence of such a
+limitation indicates that Congress intended Section 501 to provide for discrete data
+collections in the limited circumstances its plain language suggests - in connection with
+authorized investigations – and not as part of a perpetual data collection "program."
+
+Title I on electronic surveillance, Title IV on pen registers for metadata, and Title
+VII on overseas collection from within the United States, each authorize collection for
+periods of time ranging from 90 days to one year. See Section 105(d)(1), 50 USC §
+1805(d)(1); Section 402(e)(1), 50 USC § 1842(e)(1); Section 702(a), 50 USC § 1881a(a).
+Title III provides that a physical search order may be for a limited number of days.
+Section 304(d)(1), 50 USC § 1824(d)(1). But while Congress provided for collection
+over a period of time in these other provisions, it did not do that in Section 501. The
+reason is that, unlike Sections 105, 402 and 702, which are aimed at the collection of
+ongoing communications and data created on a continual basis, Section 501 contemplates
+specific and discrete orders to produce “tangible things (including books, records, papers,
+documents, and other items)," not a continuous collection program. The Government
+elsewhere suggests it could overcome this by burdening the Court with daily applications,
+but that would make distortion of the statute only more obvious.
+
+This leads to a broader point about the lack of fit between the Program and FISA
+as a whole. In Title VII, 50 U.S.C. § 1881 et seq., when Congress addressed large-scale,
+programmatic collection from within the United States targeted against persons
+
+75451.5
+9
+
+reasonably believed to be outside the United States, it worked with the Executive Branch
+to enact legislation that specifically allocates responsibilities among the branches of
+Government, including the specific legislative determination of standards to be applied
+by this Court in reviewing and approving the Government's certifications for that broad
+collection. Section 501 has no such legislative standards. While Court-devised
+limitations on the Program, such as the Reasonable Articulable Standard or the number of
+hops permitted for searches, may be salutary, the fact remains the Court has had to create
+key features of the governance of the Program. That Congress omitted such key features
+from Section 501 while including similar standards in other provisions indicates that
+Congress did not intend for Section 501 to authorize large-scale programmatic data
+collection.
+
+2. Does Section 501's “relevance” standard, as adopted in the USA
+PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, authorize the bulk
+telephony metadata program?
+
+It is equally hard to see how the Telephony Records Program can be squared with
+the statutory relevance standard Congress established when it revised Section 501 in the
+USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-77 (March
+9, 2006). Section 501 authorizes mandatory prodution of things "relevant to an
+authorized investigation” involving international terrorism. That is not a mandate for
+indiscriminate and continuous collection of all telephony metadata. After all, it is
+obvious (and uncontested by the Government) that nearly all of the metadata has no
+relevance whatever to any investigation.
+
+The legislative history further undercuts the argument that Congress intended
+Section 501's relevance standard to authorize something like the current Program.
+
+75451.5
+10
+
+Although there was debate about the exact reach of that standard, even the broader
+interpretations offered during that debate would be far too limited to justify the current
+Program. At the outset of the Senate's consideration of the report of the Conference
+Committee for the Improvement and Reauthorization Act, which sought to reconcile very
+different Senate and House bills concerning the laguage of Section 501, Senator Arlen
+Specter, who as Judiciary Committee Chairman was leader of the Senate conferees and
+the Senate floor manager, placed in the Record a detailed explanation of the conference
+report. 151 Cong. Rec. S13442-43 (Dec. 12, 2005).³ He noted the Senate's preference
+to tie business record collection to limited categories of persons, explaining that the more
+general relevance standard accepted by the conference “will apply only in extraordinary
+circumstances." Id. at S13443. He characterized the burden law enforcement would face
+in going beyond the categories of the Senate bill as "an uphill battle." Id. From that
+description to the Senate, there is no reason to believe Section 501 was an effort to enact
+a predicate for bulk collection.
+
+The Government has pointed to a statement made by Senator Kyl that "[t]he
+relevance standard is exactly the standard employed for the issuance of discovery orders
+in civil litigation, grand jury subpoenas in a criminal investigation, and for each and
+every one of the 335 different administrative subpoenas currently authorized by the
+United States Code." Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to
+Dismiss the Complaint, ACLU v. Clapper, 13 Civ. 3994 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2013), at 23
+
+³ The Conference Committee issued its report on December 9, 2005. When cloture failed
+in the Senate, Congress enacted short-term extensions until March 10, 2006. The
+Improvement and Reauthorization Act finally cleared the Senate and was signed into law,
+together, with the USA PATRIOT Act Additional Authorizing Amendments Act of 2006,
+Pub. L. 109-178 (March 9, 2006).
+
+75451.5
+11
+
+n.12 (quoting 152 Cong. Rec. S1379, 1395 (Feb. 16, 2006)). While Senator Kyl's
+understanding of "relevance" may have differed from that of Senator Specter, it too does
+not justify the unprecedent scope of the Program. To the contrary, even under Senator
+Kyl's view, as well as similar views expressed by other Senators, the scope of any
+collection under Section 501 should resemble what is permissible under civil discovery
+orders, grand jury subpoenas, and numerous adminstrative subpoena authorities. None of
+these vehicles allows data collection of the scope and duration undertaken here.
+
+Yet, despite the plain language of Section 501 and the legislative history
+underlying its relevance standard, it is apparent that several individual opinions of this
+Court have adopted an exceptionally broad definition of “relevance." That definition is
+focused not, as the text of Section 501 would have it, on whether the specific records are
+relevant to a specific authorized investigation, but rather on whether the NSA's analytical
+methods for uncovering investigative leads require bulk data collection. In considering
+the meaning of “relevance" in Section 501, Judge Eagan's Amended Memorandum
+Opinion of August 29, 2013 in BR 13-109 quotes approvingly a 2010 opinion
+interpreting 50 USC § 1842(c)(2) (which provides for a relevance standard in
+applications for authorization for installation of pen registers and trap and trace devices).
+The 2010 opinion states that the "finding of relevance most crucially depended on the
+conclusion that bulk collection is necessary for NSA to employ tools that are likely to
+generate useful investigative leads to help identify and track terrorist operatives." See
+Mem. Op. at 20. On this view, the relevance standard does not work to limit the
+permissible scope of data collection to what the Government actually needs for a specific
+investigation, but rather functions as an elastic statutory term whose meaning expands, by
+
+75451.5
+12
+
+virtue of a kind of blank check from Congress, as information technology provides even
+more powerful tools for agencies of the Executive Branch to identify matters of interest
+in masses of information about ordinary conduct, such as the local calls of all Americans.
+It is a matter of extraordinary importance whether that view of Section 501 is correct,
+both now and as data analytical tools become increasingly powerful.
+
+A final consideration arises from the fact that interpreting Section 501 to
+authorize the Program raises serious constitutional questions. Courts have a duty, where
+possible, to interpret statutes so as to avoid serious constitutional issues. See, e.g., Boos
+v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 331 (1988). Here, although it can be argued that the public has
+no expectation of privacy in telephone records in the hands of third-party telephone
+companies, see Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), members of the Supreme Court
+have recently suggested that the Fourth Amendment may be read to provide protection in
+this context. As Justice Sotomayor put it: "[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the
+premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information
+voluntarily disclosed to third parties.... This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in
+which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parites in the
+course of carrying out mundane tasks." United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957
+(2012) (Sotomayor, J. concurring); see also id. at 963-64 (Alito, J. concurring joined by
+Justices Ginsburg, Breyer and Kagan) (concluding that government use of a GPS device
+to track a person's location for a month violated an expectation of privacy, even after
+noting that "cell phones and other wireless devices now permit wireless carriers to track
+and record the location of users"). Recognizing the seriousness of these constitutional
+
+75451.5
+13
+
+issues, Congress should not be deemed to authorize such an expansive Program absent
+clear statutory language that does so expressly.
+
+3. Did the extension until June 2015 of the sunset of Section 501 enact this
+Court's interpretation of Section 501?
+
+Both Judge Eagan's Amended Memorandum Opinion of August 29, 2013 and
+Judge McLaughlin's Opinion of October 11, 2013 (BR 13-158) invoke the "doctrine of
+ratification through reenactment" to hold that Congress essentially adopted this expansive
+view of relevance under Section 501 when it extended provisions of the USA PATRIOT
+Act in 2011. The theory advanced is that when Congress extended the sunset of Section
+501 from May 2011 to June 2015, all members of Congress were either aware or had an
+opportunity to be aware that Section 501 was being used by the Executive Branch to
+justify its bulk collection of telephony metadata. But even assuming that amending a
+sunset date is properly treated the same as a reenactment of a statute (itself a dubious
+proposition), application of the doctrine to the circumstances surrounding the 2011
+reauthorization is both unprecedented and inappropriate.
+
+At the outset, it must be noted that the “ratification through reenactment” doctrine
+is not a stand-alone rule for determining the meaning of a statutory provision; rather it is
+one of numerous available canons for interpreting the meaning of a statute beyond its
+text. Like all such canons, this doctrine cannot override the clear meaning of the law.
+See Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 121 (1994) (stating that the government's
+reenactment argument could not overcome the fact that the existing interpretation was
+contrary to the statute). As argued above, the plain language, statutory structure and
+legislative history do not support this Court's interpretation of Section 501, and the
+ratification doctrine alone cannot trump Congress's originally intended meaning.
+
+75451.5
+14
+
+Even leaving aside for the moment the secret nature of the FISA Court's
+proceedings and orders, the ratification doctrine should not be applied here. First, the
+opinions of this Court—the court that is charged with considering the Government's
+applications in the first instance—do not constitute a “settled judicial interpretation." See
+Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 567 (1988); see also Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S.
+624, 645 (1998). This Court's interpretation of Section 501 has never been subject to
+appellate review by the FISA Court of Review, let alone by the Supreme Court. See
+United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 55 n.13 (1964) (declining to hold that Congress
+adopted the interpretation of four judicial opinions, as those opinions did not constitute
+settled law); Micron Tech., Inc. v. United States, 243 F.3d 1301, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
+(the decision by the Court of International Trade "was hardly the last word regarding the
+interpretation" of the statutory provision at issue); In re Coastal Grp., 13 F.3d 81, 85 (3d
+Cir. 1994) (two decisions of the bankruptcy court did not constitute “settled judicial
+interpretation" under Pierce). Second, the doctrine is generally applied where there is
+some indication that Congress intended to ratify the existing interpretation; mere silence
+in reenacting the provision is not enough. Such an indication could be found in
+affirmative statements of approval from Congress, see Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575,
+582 (1978) (noting that the legislative history expressly stated approval of the existing
+interpretation); McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 132 n.8 (1988)
+(declining to apply the doctrine where the legislative history merely made a passing
+reference to a prior judicial decision); Micron, 243 F.3d at 1311 (holding that there was
+no indication that Congress was aware of the decision by the Court of International
+Trade), or in the fact that the prior judicial interpretation comports with the statutory
+
+75451.5
+15
+
+structure and Congress's purpose for reenactment, see Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A.,
+557 U.S. 230, 239-240 (2009) (finding that the existing interpretation furthered
+Congress's purpose in reenacting that provision); Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 580-81 (holding
+that Congress evidenced an intent to adopt the existing interpretation, in part because it
+exhibited detailed knowledge of the existing law and selectively departed from that law
+in certain respects). No such indication from Congress is present here. As the
+Government would have it, Congress should be assumed to have adopted this Court's
+interpretation simply because this Court had issued orders prior to the reauthorization.
+
+The secretive nature of these proceedings makes application of the ratification
+doctrine even more problematic. The doctrine is based on the legal assumption that
+Congress is aware of well-settled interpretations when it reenacts a statute—an
+assumption that be must be employed cautiously given the significant consequences of its
+use. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. E.P.A., 824 F.2d 1146, 1162 n.10
+(D.C. Cir. 1987). Such an assumption may be justified where the source of the
+interpretation is the Supreme Court or unanimous courts of appeal. That was the case in
+the two Supreme Court decisions, Forest Grove and Lorillard, cited by the opinions of
+Judges Eagan and McLaughlin in support of applying the ratification doctrine to Section
+501. In Forest Grove School District, the doctrine was applied to an enactment that
+followed two Supreme Court opinions affirming the Court's interpretation of the
+statutory language. 557 U.S. at 239-40. In Lorillard, the doctrine was invoked when
+"every court to consider the issue" had interpreted the language in question in the same
+way. 434 U.S. at 580. But employing that legal assumption here, where no opinion by
+this Court justifying its interpretation of Section 501 had even been authored, let alone
+
+75451.5
+16
+
+made public, at the time of the reauthorization is far more precarious. It requires the
+Court essentially to engage in detailed fact-finding, including the examination of what
+materials were made available to Congress, when those materials were made available,
+what portions of any such materials were redacted, whether members of Congress in fact
+had a meaningful opportunity to scrutinize those materials, and whether those materials
+fairly and adequately informed Congress about the Court's underlying legal reasoning.
+
+Judge Eagan's opinion illustrates the dangers of this exercise, as well as the need
+for argument by parties other than the Government. The opinion argues that applying the
+ratification doctrine is appropriate here because Congress was made aware of this Court's
+approval of Program by way of a five-page secret "Report on the National Security
+Agency's Bulk Collection Programs for USA PATRIOT Act Reauthorization"
+(hereinafter "the February 2011 Report"). Id. at 24-26.⁴ But that is simply incorrect. As
+stated above, no opinion of this Court had yet been authored that provided a full
+substantive justification for its interpretation of Section 501. The Report itself, which is
+not a neutral analysis of the Program's legality but rather the Government's effort to
+justify the Program to Congress, contains only a cursory description of this Court's orders
+authorizing the Program and provides no legal reasoning. And it is uncertain whether the
+Report was even made available to all members of Congress. See Peter Wallsten, House
+Panel Withheld Document on NSA Survellience Program From Members, Wash. Post.,
+Aug. 16, 2013. While the Government has stated in its motion to dismiss in the Clapper
+case that the Senate Intelligence Committee made the report available to all Senators, it
+has made no similar representation concerning the House of Representatives. See
+
+⁴ The opinion cites to Ex. 3, which appears to include the probably unredacted "Report."
+
+75451.5
+17
+
+Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss the Complaint,
+ACLU v. Clapper, 13-cv-03994, at 27 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2013). The Report might
+have been a useful first step in informing Congress about the Program, but it was far
+from affording, as Judge Eagan asserts, "each Member" with "full knowledge" of the
+"underlying legal interpretation" of Section 501. Mem. Op. at 26-27.
+
+Judge McLaughlin also cites, Mem. Op. at 3, the Supreme Court's decision in
+Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981). The Government previously cited that opinion for
+the proposition that where Congress ratifies statutory language that has been subject to a
+"longstanding administrative construction," it is presumed to have adopted that
+construction. See Administration White Paper, Bulk Collection of Telephony Metadata
+Under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, at 19 (Aug. 9, 2013). But that decision
+concerned a longstanding administrative interpretation that had been publicly available
+for congressional scrutiny for 70 years. 453 U.S. at 296-298. And courts have held that
+application of the doctrine typically requires an indication that Congress was aware of the
+existing administrative interpretation and intended to adopt it. See Brown, 513 U.S. at
+121 (ratification inappropriate without an indication that Congress considered the
+interpretation).
+
+The publicly released version of the February 2011 Report illustrates another
+problem with applying the ratification doctrine to Section 501—the secretive nature of
+the Government's Program prevented debate by the members or the public, and no one
+from outside Congress was there to question the Government's and this Court's legal
+interpretation. This meant that the legislative process did not operate in normal fashion.
+For example, the secrecy greatly restricted any members of Congress inclined to vote
+
+75451.5
+18
+
+against extending Section 501 because they believed it had been misused in the
+authorization of the Program. They would have known they could not fully explain a
+"no" vote to their constituents because they could not reveal the Program's existence.
+
+III. Given the Government's View, this Court Sitting En Banc May be the Only
+Opportunity for Collegial Judicial Decision Making Regarding Bulk
+Telephony Metadata Collection
+
+This Court, sitting en banc, may be the only Court on which Judges can come
+together to provide collective judgment to the legal questions presented by the Telephony
+Records Program. The Government has argued at every turn that private litigants in other
+forums cannot challege the orders of this Court under Section 501. For example, it
+successfully opposed the Supreme Court petition for mandamus of the Electronic Privacy
+Information Center on the ground that only the Government or a telecommunication
+company, as recipient of an order for the records of its customers, may seek appellate
+review of an order of this Court approving continuation of the Program. The Solicitor
+General argued that if the petitioner can bring its claim in any court the proper course
+would be an action in a federal district court. At the same time, the government also has
+sought dismissal of any lawsuit raising a challenge to the Program in federal district
+court. It has argued that the plaintiffs lack standing and that Section 501 impliedly
+precludes judicial review of the statutory claim that bulk collection pursuant to an order
+of this Court violates Section 501. If successful, these arguments would foreclose any
+avenue to federal appellate consideration through a district court.
+
+Additionally, if the Government continues to prevail in this Court on all
+applications to individual judges to extend the Telephony Records Program, and no
+telecommunication provider asserts an interest of its customers, no appeal can be taken to
+
+75451.5
+19
+
+the FISA Court of Review or thereafter to the Supreme Court. For seven years already,
+the Telephony Records Program has not been the subject of either en banc consideration
+or appellate review—the kind of collegial judicial examination that our system of law
+relies on to correct error in individual judgments. En banc review by this Court, under
+the authority provided by Congress, would provide that opportunity.
+
+CONCLUSION
+
+For the foregoing reasons, the Center for National Security Studies requests that
+the Court establish the procedures requested in its motion.
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+Michael Davidson, D.C. Bar No.
+449007
+3753 McKinley Street, NW
+Washington, DC 20015
+(202) 362-4885
+mdavid2368@aol.com
+
+Paul M. Smith, D.C. Bar No. 358870
+Michael T. Borgia*
+Jenner & Block, LLP
+1099 New York Avenue, N.W.,
+Suite 900
+Washington, DC 20001
+(202) 639-6000 (telephone)
+(202) 639-6066 (fax)
+
+Of Counsel
+
+*Admitted in New York. Admission
+pending in the District of Columbia.
+Practicing under the supervision of the
+partnership of Jenner & Block LLP.
+
+Date: November 22, 2013
+
+Kate A. Martin
+Kate A. Martin, D.C. Bar No. 949115
+Center for National Security Studies
+1730 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., S. 700
+Washington, D.C. 20006
+(202) 721-5650 (telephone)
+(202) 530-0128 (fax)
+kmartin@cnss.org
+
+Joseph Onek, D.C. Bar No. 43611
+The Raben Group
+1640 Rhode Island Ave., N.W., S. 600
+Washington, D.C. 20036
+(202) 587-4942 (telephone)
+(202) 463-4803 (fax)
+jonek@rabengroup.com
+
+Counsel for Movant Center for National
+Security Studies
+
+75451.5
+20
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I, Kate A. Martin, hereby certify that on November 22, 2013, pursuant to
+procedures established by the Security and Emergency Planning Staff, United States
+Department of Justice under FISC Rule 8, I caused copies of the Reply of the Center for
+National Security Studies in Support of Motion to Establish a Public Briefing Schedule
+Including the Filing of Briefs by Amici Curiae, for Leave to File an Amicus Curiae Brief,
+and a Suggestion for Hearing En Banc to be hand-delivered to:
+
+Christine Gunning
+United States Department of Justice
+Litigation Security Group
+145 N Street, NE
+Suite 2W-115
+Washington, DC 20530
+
+Kate A. Martin
+
+75451.5
+21
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-158-response-131125/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-158-response-131125/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6c28d88
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-158-response-131125/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Reply of the Center for National Security Studies in Support of Motion to Establish a Public Briefing Schedule Including the Filings of Briefs by Amici Curiae, for Leave to File an Amicus Curiae Brief, and a Suggestion for Hearing En Banc, In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED]",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-11-22",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-22",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34522",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "a568eb4261f6cb6d31379aafff01f7a93eadaeed0ff30387bf32d023a50b59bb",
+ "pages": 21
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br14-01-motion/FISC_-_br14-01-motion.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br14-01-motion/FISC_-_br14-01-motion.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3f5dedf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br14-01-motion/FISC_-_br14-01-motion.md
@@ -0,0 +1,399 @@
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+UNITED STATES
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+2011 FEB -5 AM 11:50
+WASHINGTON, D. C.
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+(TS//NF) IN RE APPLICATION OF THE
+FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR
+AN ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
+OF TANGIBLE THINGS
+Docket Number: BR 14-01
+
+(U) MOTION FOR AMENDMENT TO PRIMARY ORDER
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The United States of America, hereby moves this Court, pursuant to
+the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the "Act"), Title 50, United States Code
+(U.S.C.), § 1861, as amended, for an amendment to the Primary Order issued in the
+above-captioned docket number. Specifically, the Government requests that the Primary
+Order be amended to require the Government to obtain the Court's permission, by
+motion, to use specific selection terms (or "seeds") to query the BR metadata for
+purposes of obtaining foreign intelligence information, except in cases of emergency. In
+addition, going forward, authorized queries of the BR metadata to obtain foreign
+intelligence information will return only that metadata within two "hops" of the seed.
+____
+1 (U//FOUO) The first "hop" from a seed returns results including all identifiers (and their
+associated metadata) with a contact and/or connection with the seed. The second "hop" returns
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+Classified by: John P. Carlin, Acting Assistant
+Attorney General, NSD, DOJ
+Reason: 1.4(c)
+Declassify on: [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+1. (TS//SI//NF) Upon consideration of the Application by the United States, on
+January 3, 2014, the Honorable Thomas F. Hogan of this Court issued orders in the
+above-captioned docket number requiring the production to the National Security
+Agency (NSA) of certain call detail records or "telephony metadata" created by certain
+specified telecommunications providers. That authority expires on March 28, 2014, at
+5:00 p.m. Eastern Time. The application, including all exhibits and the resulting orders,
+is incorporated herein by reference.
+
+2. (TS//SI//NF) The Primary Order in the above-captioned docket number
+requires NSA to strictly adhere to the enumerated minimization procedures. Among the
+minimization procedures is subparagraph (3)C, which, in summary, authorizes NSA to
+access the BR metadata for purposes of obtaining foreign intelligence information only
+through queries of the BR metadata to obtain contact chaining information (as described)
+using selection terms approved as "seeds" pursuant to the RAS approval process
+described in subparagraph (3)C.
+
+3. (TS//SI//NF) The Government moves this Court for an amendment to the
+Primary Order in docket number BR 14-01 that will require the Government to first
+obtain the Court's approval, by motion, to use specific selection terms to the query the
+results that include all identifiers (and their associated metadata) with a contact and/or
+connection with an identifier revealed by the first "hop."
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+2
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+BR metadata for purposes of obtaining foreign intelligence information, except in cases
+determined to be an emergency. The Government further moves this Court for an
+amendment to the Primary Order restricting queries of the BR metadata to obtain foreign
+intelligence information to return only that metadata within two "hops" of an approved
+seed. The Government is seeking these amendments to the Primary Order based on
+direction from the President of the United States of America concerning the manner in
+which the Government will implement this program going forward.
+
+4. (TS//SI//NP) Specifically, the Government requests that the Court strike
+subparagraph (3)C from the Primary Order in docket number BR 14-01 and replace it
+with the following new subparagraph (3)C:
+
+C. The government may request, by motion and on a case-by-case
+basis, permission from the Court for NSA[FN1] to use specific
+selection terms that satisfy the reasonable articulable suspicion (RAS)
+standard[FN2] as "seeds" to query the BR metadata to obtain contact
+chaining information, within two hops of an approved "seed", for
+purposes of obtaining foreign intelligence information. In addition,
+the Director or Acting Director of NSA may authorize the
+emergency querying of the BR metadata with a selection term for
+purposes of obtaining foreign intelligence information, within two
+hops of a "seed", if: (1) the Director or Acting Director of NSA
+reasonably determines that an emergency situation exists with
+respect to the conduct of such querying before an order authorizing
+such use of a selection term can with due diligence be obtained; and
+(2) the Director or Acting Director of NSA reasonably determines
+that the RAS standard has been met with respect to the selection
+term. In any case in which this emergency authority is exercised,
+the government shall make a motion in accordance with this
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+3
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+
+amendment to Primary Order to the Court as soon as practicable,
+but not later than 7 days after the Director or Acting Director of
+NSA authorizes such query.[FN3]
+
+(i) Any submission to the Court under this paragraph shall, at a
+minimum, specify the selection term for which query authorization
+is sought or was granted, provide the factual basis for the NSA's
+belief that the reasonable articulable suspicion standard has been
+met with regard to that selection term and, if such query has already
+taken place, a statement of the emergency necessitating such
+query.[FN4]
+
+(ii) NSA shall ensure, through adequate and appropriate
+technical and management controls, that queries of the BR metadata
+for intelligence analysis purposes will be initiated using only a
+selection term that has been RAS-approved. Whenever the BR
+metadata is accessed for foreign intelligence analysis purposes or
+using foreign intelligence analysis query tools, an auditable record
+of the activity shall be generated. [FN5]
+
+(iii) The Court's finding that a selection term is associated with
+[REDACTED] shall be effective for:
+one hundred eighty days for any selection term reasonably believed
+to be used by a U.S. person; and one year for all other selection
+terms.[FN6) (FN7)
+
+(iv) Queries of the BR metadata using RAS-approved selection
+terms may occur either by manual analyst query or through the
+automated query process described below. In either case, queries of
+the BR metadata to obtain foreign intelligence information shall
+return only that metadata within two "hops" of an approved
+seed.[FN8) This automated query process queries the collected BR
+metadata (in a "collection store") with RAS-approved selection
+terms and returns the hop-limited results from those queries to a
+"corporate store." The corporate store may then be searched by
+appropriately and adequately trained personnel for valid foreign
+intelligence purposes, without the requirement that those searches
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+4
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+use only RAS-approved selection terms. The specifics of the
+automated query process, as described in the [REDACTED] Declaration
+and modified by this Order, are as follows:
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[FN1] For purposes of this Order, "National Security Agency" and
+"NSA personnel" are defined as any employees of the National
+Security Agency/Central Security Service ("NSA/CSS" or "NSA")
+and any other personnel engaged in Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+5
+
+TOP SECRET//SI/NOFORN
+
+operations authorized pursuant to FISA if such operations are
+executed under the direction, authority, or control of the Director,
+NSA/Chief, CSS (DIRNSA). NSA personnel shall not disseminate
+BR metadata outside the NSA unless the dissemination is permitted
+by, and in accordance with, the requirements of this Order that are
+applicable to the NSA.
+
+(FN2) The reasonable articulable suspicion standard is met when,
+based on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on
+which reasonable and prudent persons act, there are facts giving rise
+to a reasonable, articulable suspicion (RAS) that the selection term to
+be queried is associated with [REDACTED]
+provided, however, that any selection term
+reasonably believed to be used by a United States (U.S.) person shall
+not be regarded as associated with [REDACTED]
+solely on the basis of activities that are protected by
+the First Amendment to the Constitution. In the event the
+emergency provisions of any amendment to the Court's Primary
+Order are invoked by the Director or Acting Director, NSA's Office
+of General Counsel (OGC), in consultation with the Director or
+Acting Director will first confirm that any selection term reasonably
+believed to be used by a United States (U.S.) person is not regarded
+as associated with [REDACTED] solely
+on the basis of activities that are protected by the First Amendment
+to the Constitution.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+6
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+7
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[FN3] In the event the Court denies such motion, the government shall
+take appropriate remedial steps, including any steps the Court
+may direct.
+
+[FN4] For any selection term that is subject to ongoing Court-
+authorized electronic surveillance, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1805,
+based on this Court's finding of probable cause to believe that the
+selection term is being used or is about to be used by [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+8
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+including those used by
+U.S. persons, the government may use such selection terms as
+"seeds" during any period of ongoing Court-authorized electronic
+surveillance without first seeking authorization from this Court as
+described herein. Except in the case of an emergency, NSA will first
+notify the Department of Justice, National Security Division of its
+proposed use as a seed any selection term subject to ongoing
+Court-authorized electronic surveillance.
+
+[FNS] This auditable record requirement shall not apply to accesses of
+the results of RAS-approved queries.
+
+[FN6] The Court understands that from time to time the information
+available to NSA will indicate that a selection term is or was
+associated with a Foreign Power only for a specific and limited time
+frame. In such cases, the government's submission shall specify the
+time frame for which the selection term is or was associated with
+[REDACTED] In the event the Court
+finds that the RAS standard is met, the automated query process
+described herein shall limit the first hop query results to the
+specified time frame, and analysts conducting manual queries using
+that selection term shall continue to properly minimize information
+that may be returned within query results that fall outside of that
+timeframe.
+
+[FN7] The Court understands that NSA receives certain call detail
+records pursuant to other authority, in addition to the call detail
+records produced in response to this Court's Orders. NSA shall
+store, handle, and disseminate call detail records produced in
+response to this Court's Orders pursuant to this Order,
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET/SI//NOFORN
+9
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+[FN8] The first "hop" from a seed returns results including all
+identifiers (and their associated metadata) with a contact and/or
+connection with the seed. The second "hop" returns results that
+include all identifiers (and their associated metadata) with a contact
+and/or connection with an identifier revealed by the first "hop."
+
+[FN9]
+[REDACTED]
+
+[FN10]
+[REDACTED]
+
+[FN11]
+[REDACTED]
+
+(FN12) The Court understands that to date NSA has not implemented,
+and for the duration of this authorization will not as a technical matter
+be in a position to implement, the automated query process authorized
+by prior orders of this Court for analytical purposes. Accordingly, this
+amendment to the Primary Order authorizes the use of this automated
+query process for development and testing purposes only. No query
+results from such testing shall be made available for analytic purposes.
+Use of this automated query process for analytical purposes requires
+further order of this Court.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+10
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+
+5. (TS//SI//NF) The Government respectfully submits that the procedures set
+forth in the Court's Primary Order, as amended by this motion, would meet the
+statutory definition of minimization procedures. Section 1861(c)(1) requires that upon
+approval of an application the Court direct that minimization procedures adopted
+pursuant to subsection (g) be followed. Subsection (g) requires the adoption of
+minimization procedures which are reasonably designed in light of the purpose and
+technique of a tangible things order to minimize the retention, and prohibit the
+dissemination, of nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting United
+States persons, consistent with the need of the Government to obtain, produce and
+disseminate foreign intelligence information. To further enhance privacy and civil
+liberty protections concerning the information produced to and retained by the
+Government pursuant to the Court's orders issued in this matter, the Government seeks
+an amendment to the Court's Primary Order requiring prior judicial review and
+approval, except in an emergency, to use specific selection terms to query the BR
+metadata for purposes of obtaining foreign intelligence information, and to restrict
+queries of the BR metadata to return only that metadata within two "hops" of an
+approved seed. As the Government has acknowledged, the applications seeking the
+bulk production of call detail records are not routine due to the nature and scope of the
+production. In light of the bulk nature of the production for which authority has been
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+11
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+granted, the Government is proposing amendments which, if approved, will require
+prior judicial review and approval of the Government's RAS determinations and a
+further limitation on hops. The Government respectfully submits that these proposed
+additional limitations on the minimization procedures previously approved by this
+Court are consistent with Section 1861(g)'s definition of minimization procedures
+because they seek to further ensure (1) that the Government's access to and analysis of
+the BR metadata is for appropriate counterterrorism purposes consistent with the
+Court's authorization; (2) that query results containing nonpublicly available
+information concerning unconsenting United States persons are limited, consistent with
+the needs of the counterterrorism purpose of the production; and (3) that NSA's
+disseminations of such United States person information be as limited as possible
+consistent with the needs of the Government to disseminate counterterrorism
+information. The proposed minimization procedures are similar to those approved and
+adopted as binding by order of this Court in docket numbers BR 09-01, BR 09-06, and BR
+09-09.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) For the reasons set out above, the Government respectfully submits
+that consistent with section 1861(g) the proposed amendments are reasonably designed
+in light of the nature and purpose of the bulk telephony metadata production to further
+protect United States person information, and to further ensure that the information
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+12
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+
+produced is used and disseminated in furtherance of the counterterrorism purpose of the
+production.
+
+6. (TS//SI//NP) By this motion, the Government does not seek to modify any
+other provisions of the Primary Order in docket number BR 14-01.2 The Government
+will continue to comply with all of the other restrictions and procedures described in the
+Court's Primary Order.
+
+- Remainder of page intentionally left blank -
+
+____
+2 (TS//SI//NF) In particular, this motion does not seek to modify the provisions of subparagraph
+(3)B of the Primary Order. Consistent with that subparagraph, appropriately trained and
+authorized technical personnel will access the BR metadata (including via queries using
+non-RAS-approved selection terms) to perform those processes needed to make the BR metadata
+usable for intelligence analysis
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+13
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+
+(TS//SI//NF) WHEREFORE, the United States of America, through the
+undersigned attorney, moves for an amendment to the Primary Order in docket number
+BR 14-01 striking paragraph (3)C of the Primary Order and replacing it with a new
+subparagraph (3)C set forth above.
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+John P. Carlin
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+National Security Division
+U.S. Department of Justice
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+14
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+(U) APPROVAL
+
+(S) I find that the foregoing Motion for Amendment to Primary Order satisfies the
+criteria and requirements set forth in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as
+amended, and hereby approve its filing with the United States Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Court.
+
+Date
+
+Eric H. Holder, Jr.
+Attorney General of the United States
+
+2/5/14
+Date
+
+James M. Cole
+Deputy Attorney General of the United States
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+15
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br14-01-motion/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br14-01-motion/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..480a8db
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br14-01-motion/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Motion for Amendment to Primary Order, In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2014-02-05",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2014-02-05",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34526",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "7376c3f0a6424b53a283c4e019d2bf268d219cf9f28f45f3cbfe68a33e0c8259",
+ "pages": 15
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br14-01-order/FISC_-_br14-01-order.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br14-01-order/FISC_-_br14-01-order.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f380375
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br14-01-order/FISC_-_br14-01-order.md
@@ -0,0 +1,353 @@
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
+BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
+ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION OF
+TANGIBLE THINGS
+Docket No. BR 14-01
+ORDER GRANTING THE GOVERNMENT'S MOTION TO AMEND
+THE COURT'S PRIMARY ORDER DATED JANUARY 3, 2014
+
+This matter is before the Court on the motion of the government to amend the
+Primary Order issued on January 3, 2014, in the above-captioned docket ("January 3
+Primary Order" or "Jan. 3 Primary Order"), which was submitted on February 5, 2014
+("Motion"). In the January 3 Primary Order, the Court approved the government's
+application pursuant to Section 501 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
+("FISA" or "the Act"), codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861, as amended (also known as Section
+215 of the USA PATRIOT Act),¹ for orders requiring the production to the National
+Security Agency ("NSA"), in bulk and on an ongoing basis, of call detail records or
+
+1 "Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
+to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001," Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (Oct.
+26, 2001) ("PATRIOT Act"), amended by, "USA PATRIOT Improvement
+Reauthorization Act of 2005," Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (Mar. 9, 2006); "USA
+PATRIOT Act Additional Reauthorizing Amendments Act of 2006," Pub. L. No. 109-
+178, 120 Stat. 278 (Mar. 9, 2006); and Section 215 expiration extended by "Department of
+Defense Appropriations Act, 2010," Pub. L. No. 111-118 (Dec. 19, 2009); "USA
+PATRIOT-Extension of Sunsets," Pub. L. No. 111-141 (Feb. 27, 2010); “FISA Sunsets
+Extension Act of 2011," Pub. L. No. 112-3 (Feb. 25, 2011); and, "PATRIOT Sunsets
+Extension Act of 2011," Pub. L. No. 112-14, 125 Stat. 216 (May 26, 2011).
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+"telephony metadata" created by certain telecommunications carriers. The January 3
+Primary Order approved and adopted a detailed set of minimization procedures
+restricting NSA's access to and use of the telephony metadata produced in response to
+the Court's orders. The purpose of the Motion is to modify the applicable minimization
+procedures. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is granted.
+
+Before discussing the changes proposed by the government in the Motion, some
+background discussion is warranted. An application by the government for a
+production order under Section 215 must include, among other things, "an enumeration
+of the minimization procedures adopted by the Attorney General under subsection (g)
+of this section that are applicable to the retention and dissemination" of the tangible
+things that are received as part of the production. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(B). Subsection
+(g) defines the term "minimization procedures" as follows:
+
+(A) specific procedures that are reasonably designed in light of the
+purpose and technique of an order for the production of tangible things,
+to minimize the retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly
+available information concerning unconsenting United States persons
+consistent with the need of the United States to obtain, produce, and
+disseminate foreign intelligence information;
+
+(B) procedures that require that nonpublicly available information, which
+is not foreign intelligence information, as defined in section 1803(e)(1) of
+this title, shall not be disseminated in a manner that identifies any United
+States person, without such person's consent, unless such person's
+identity is necessary to understand foreign intelligence information or
+assess its importance; and
+
+(C) notwithstanding subparagraphs (A) and (B), procedures that allow for
+the retention and dissemination of information that is evidence of a crime
+which has been, is being, or is about to be committed and that is to be
+retained or disseminated for law enforcement purposes.
+
+Id. § 1861(g)(2).
+
+To approve an application under Section 215, this Court must find that the
+application "meets the requirements of subsections (a) and (b)," including the
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+Page 2
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+requirement that the application provide an enumeration of minimization procedures
+that have been adopted by the Attorney General and that meet the definition set forth in
+subsection (g). See id. § 1861(c)(1). Upon approval, the Court must, among other
+things, "direct that minimization procedures adopted pursuant to subsection (g) of this
+section be followed." Id.
+
+As required by FISA, the application filed by the government in this docket
+enumerated detailed minimization procedures for proposed use in connection with
+telephony metadata received in response to the requested production orders. See
+Application for Certain Tangible Things for Investigations to Protect Against
+International Terrorism (filed Jan. 3, 2014) at 15-25. The Court concluded that those
+procedures, which were adopted by the Attorney General, satisfied the above-described
+requirements of subsection (g), and directed that the government "strictly adhere" to
+them. See Jan. 3 Primary Order at 4. Among other things, the minimization
+procedures proposed by the government and approved by the Court in the January 3
+Primary Order authorize NSA analysts to access the telephony metadata only through a
+query process that requires a reasonable, articulable suspicion (RAS), as determined by
+a limited set of NSA personnel, that each selection term or "seed" (e.g., a telephone
+number) that will be used to search the data is associated with an international terrorist
+organization listed in the order. See id, at 4-12. The minimization procedures proposed
+by the government and adopted by the Court also effectively limit the results of queries
+to identifiers (e.g., telephone numbers) within three "hops" of the identifier used to
+conduct the query. See id, at 11-12.²
+
+In the Motion, the government proposes two changes to the previously-
+
+² The first "hop" from a seed returns results including all identifiers (and their
+associated metadata) that have been in contact or are connected with the seed. See
+Application for Certain Tangible Things for Investigations to Protect Against
+International Terrorism (filed Jan, 3, 2014), Tab A ([REDACTED]) n.5. The second hop returns results that include all identifiers (and their associated
+metadata) that have been in contact or are connected with an identifier revealed by the
+first hop. See id. The third hop returns results that included all identifiers (and their
+associated metadata) that have been in contact or are connected to an identifier at the
+second hop. See id.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+Page 3
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+approved minimization procedures. The first change would generally preclude the
+government from querying the telephony metadata without first having obtained, by
+motion, a determination by this Court that each selection term to be used satisfies the
+RAS standard. See Motion at 2-3.³ The second change would limit the results of each
+query to metadata associated with identifiers that are within two, rather than three,
+"hops" of the approved seed used to conduct the query. See id, at 3.⁴ To effectuate
+these changes, the government proposes striking subparagraph (3)C from the January 3
+Primary Order and replacing it with a new subparagraph (3)C that is set forth in the
+Motion. See id, at 3-10.
+
+³ The proposal includes a provision that would allow the Director or Acting
+Director of NSA to authorize the "emergency querying" of a seed upon determining
+that (1) "an emergency exists with respect to the conduct of such querying before an
+order authorizing such use of a selection term can with due diligence be obtained" and
+(2) "the RAS standard has been met with respect to the selection term." Motion at 3.
+As soon as practicable, but not later than seven days following any use of this
+emergency provision, the government would be required to make a motion to the Court
+for approval of the query based on a determination that the RAS standard was satisfied.
+See id, at 3-4. In the event the Court were to determine that RAS was lacking, the
+government would be required to take appropriate remedial measures, including any
+steps the Court might direct (e.g., destroying the results of the emergency query and
+recalling any reports or other disseminations based on those results). See id. at 8.
+
+⁴ Other important aspects of the process would remain largely the same. For
+example, NSA would still be required to ensure through "adequate and appropriate
+technical and management controls" that queries of the telephony metadata are
+conducted only using RAS-approved selection terms. See Motion at 4. RAS approvals
+made by the Court (like RAS approvals made by NSA under the current process) would
+be effective for 180 days for any selection term reasonably believed to be used by a
+United States person; other RAS approvals would be effective for one year. See id.
+NSA would be permitted to use as a querying seed any selection term that is the subject
+of ongoing Court-authorized electronic surveillance pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1805, based
+on the Court's finding of probable cause to believe that the selection term is being used
+or is about to be used by an agent or agents of one of the terrorist groups enumerated in
+the Primary Order in this docket. See id. at 8-9.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+Page 4
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+
+Both proposed changes have been adopted by the Attorney General, as required
+by subsection (b)(2)(B). See Motion at 15.⁵ Furthermore, both bear directly on the
+balancing of privacy and national security interests that is required by the first
+component of the definition of "minimization procedures" set forth in subsection (g).
+That portion of the definition requires:
+
+specific procedures that are reasonably designed in light of the purpose and
+technique of an order for the production of tangible things, to minimize the
+retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly available information
+concerning unconsenting United States persons consistent with the need of the
+United States to obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence
+information....
+
+50 U.S.C. § 1861(g)(2)(A).
+
+Limiting query results to two, rather than three, "hops" will have the effect of
+enhancing the protection of "nonpublicly available information concerning
+unconsenting United States persons." Id. Eliminating the third hop will reduce the
+amount of metadata - including metadata of or concerning United States persons – that
+is accessed by NSA analysts. Of course, metadata that is never accessed cannot be used
+or disseminated by the government.⁶
+
+Regarding the requirement that the proposed procedures be "consistent with the
+need of the United States to obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence
+information," id., the Court observes that metadata returned at the third hop is less
+likely to have foreign intelligence value than the metadata returned at the first and
+second hops. That is because identifiers that are three steps removed from a RAS-
+
+⁵ The Deputy Attorney General approved the proposed amendments. See
+Motion at 15. FISA defines "Attorney General" to include the Deputy Attorney
+General. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(g).
+
+⁶ For this reason, limiting query results to two hops also will help to limit the
+dissemination of United States-person identifying information in accordance with the
+second component of the definition of "minimization procedures" that is set forth on
+page 2 above. See 50 U.S.C. 1861(g)(2)(B).
+
+TOP-SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+Page 5
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+
+approved selection term are less likely to have a connection to international terrorism
+than those that are more closely connected to the seed identifier. For these reasons, the
+Court has no difficulty concluding that the proposed reduction in the number of hops
+from three to two is consistent with the applicable definition of "minimization
+procedures."
+
+The government's proposal to require RAS determinations by the FISC is less
+straightforward. To be sure, this change would enhance the protection of "nonpublicly
+available information concerning unconsenting United States persons," id, that is
+included in the telephony metadata received by NSA. In applying the warrant
+requirement of the Fourth Amendment in the context of more intrusive investigative
+measures used in criminal investigations, the Supreme Court has recognized the value
+of having a "neutral and detached magistrate" determine whether the circumstances
+justify the intrusion:
+
+The point of the Fourth Amendment... is not that it denies law
+enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men
+draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those
+inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
+judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
+ferreting out crime.
+
+Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
+
+Although the protection of the Fourth Amendment does not extend to the
+government's acquisition or use of the telephony metadata at issue here, see Smith v.
+Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1978), the Supreme Court's reasoning in Johnson can plausibly
+be extended to the RAS determinations that are required to query the data. Having a
+disinterested judicial officer determine whether each selection term has the requisite
+connection to international terrorism can reasonably be expected to minimize the risk of
+erroneous queries and the attendant risk that United States-person information will be
+accessed or disseminated without adequate justification.
+
+The proposed judicial approval requirement is also "consistent with the need of
+the United States to obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information."
+50 U.S.C. § 1861(g)(2)(A). The substantive standard for querying the metadata – the
+RAS standard - will remain the same. Although requiring that RAS determinations be
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Page 6
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+
+made by an entity outside NSA will burden the approval process to some degree, the
+Executive Branch, which has primary responsibility for safeguarding our national
+security, proposed this change and thus presumably believes it to be workable. Further,
+the emergency exception described in footnote 3 above will give the government
+reasonable flexibility in appropriate situations to act expeditiously when obtaining prior
+judicial approval for particular queries is not feasible.
+
+Although the Court is satisfied that the effect of the government's proposal to
+require RAS approvals by the FISC would be consistent with Section 215's definition of
+"minimization procedures," that is not the end of the discussion. FISA contemplates
+that the Executive Branch, which formulates the minimization procedures and receives
+the tangible things from the recipient of the production order, will apply those
+procedures, with appropriate oversight by the FISC. See 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(B); see
+also 50 U.S.C. § 1803(h). Historically, the minimization procedures proposed by the
+government and approved by the Court under FISA have reflected this allocation of
+responsibilities, which also recognizes the distinct roles of the Executive Branch and the
+Judiciary in our system of government. The government's proposal to require RAS
+determinations by the FISC as a prerequisite to NSA queries of the database would
+deviate from this framework by giving the Court a more prominent role not just in
+overseeing Executive Branch compliance with FISC-approved procedures, but in the
+actual application of those procedures. It could also impose substantial new burdens on
+the FISC that are not contemplated by FISA.
+
+The Executive Branch, of course, cannot unilaterally compel the FISC, an Article
+III court, to assume the RAS-approval function, and the Court would be within its
+discretion under FISA to reject this aspect of the Motion. See 50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)
+(permitting the Court to grant the government's application "as modified").
+The Court is cognizant of the fact that this program is under review by the other
+branches of government and that changes may result from the review. While this
+policymaking assessment is ongoing, the Executive Branch is asking the Court for
+additional assistance in reassuring the public that adequate protection is afforded to
+information concerning United States persons that is being acquired pursuant to a FISC
+order.
+
+The Court sees nothing in the language of the Act that would preclude it from
+accepting the Executive Branch's invitation to assume responsibility for making RAS
+determinations. This role in fact parallels the FISC's core judicial function of
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+Page 7
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+
+determining whether applications for authority to conduct electronic surveillance or
+physical search are supported by probable cause. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1805, 1824.⁷ Indeed,
+the Court has previously approved query requests in this matter, albeit under distinct
+circumstances and pursuant to different authority.⁸ Provided that the number of
+
+⁷ This matter is distinguishable from In Re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct.
+Rev. 2002), in which the FISC, under the rubric of "minimization procedures" and over
+the government's objection, prohibited law enforcement officials from directing or
+controlling the use of FISA proceedings to enhance criminal investigations or
+prosecutions. Id. at 720. To effectuate that prohibition, the FISC required that certain
+Executive Branch officials participate, effectively as "chaperones," in meetings and
+consultations between other Executive Branch officials. Id. The Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Court of Review held that the prohibition imposed by the FISC was
+inconsistent with language of FISA, and that by asserting authority to govern the
+internal organization and investigative procedures of the Executive Branch, the FISC
+"may well have exceeded the constitutional bounds that restrict an Article III court."
+Id. at 731. Here, the Executive Branch is asking the Court to undertake what is
+essentially a core judicial function, and one which, as discussed in the text above, is not
+inconsistent with the language of the Act.
+
+⁸ In 2009, after the Executive Branch reported widespread noncompliance by
+NSA with the RAS-approval provisions of the FISC's orders in this matter, the Court, on
+its own motion, mandated that all queries of the telephony metadata be approved by
+the Court pending investigation of the incident and restoration of the Court's
+confidence that NSA was prepared to comply with its orders. See Docket No. BR 08-13,
+Order dated March 2, 2009, at 18-19. In taking this unusual step, the Court expressly
+invoked its "authority and responsibility to 'determine [and] enforce compliance' with
+Court orders and Court-approved procedures [under] 50 U.S.C. § 1803(i)," which has
+since been renumbered as 50 U.S.C. § 1803(h). See id. at 14. Once adequate remedial
+measures had been implemented by the Executive Branch, NSA was permitted to
+resume making RAS determinations on its own, with oversight by the FISC and other
+elements of the Executive Branch. See Docket No. BR 09-13, Primary Order (Sept. 3,
+2009) at 6-18. Insofar as the Court is aware, there is at present no similar pattern of
+pervasive noncompliance.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+Page 8
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+selectors used to query the metadata remains relatively close to the present level, the
+Court is satisfied that it will be able to undertake the additional work that will be
+required, at least until the expiration of the January 3 Primary Order. In consideration
+of the unique facts and circumstances that are now presented, the Court will approve
+the Executive Branch's proposal to require RAS approvals by the FISC as a prerequisite
+to queries of the telephony metadata acquired pursuant to the Court's orders in this
+matter.
+
+For the foregoing reasons, the Motion to amend the January 3 Primary Order is
+granted. Subsection (3)C of that Primary Order shall be stricken and replaced with the
+revised subsection (3)C that is set forth in the Motion.
+
+In light of the ongoing public interest in this matter and the President's recent
+public remarks regarding the proposed changes that are the subject of the Motion, the
+government is directed to review this Order for declassification in anticipation of likely
+publication by the Court pursuant to FISC Rule 62(a). The Court understands that a
+declassification review of the January 3 Primary Order is already underway. Because
+the revised subsection (3)C of the Primary Order is set forth in the Motion, the
+government is also directed to conduct a declassification review of the Motion. The
+government shall complete its declassification reviews of this Order, the January 3
+Primary Order, and the Motion as promptly as is practicable and report to the Court
+with the results of such review no later than February 17, 2014.
+
+SO ORDERED, this 5th day of February, 2014, in Docket Number BR 14-01.
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Presiding Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
+Page 9
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br14-01-order/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br14-01-order/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..43004d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br14-01-order/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Order Granting the Government's Motion to Amend the Court's Primary Order Dated January 3, 2014 (Feb. 5, 2014)",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2014-02-05",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2014-02-05",
+ "link": "https://clearinghouse.net/doc/76768/",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "7ad281439251bf90c85ae3004383defaae800eecbc9c1585cc0d0b952e03acbc",
+ "pages": 9
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br14-01-primary-order/FISC_-_br14-01-primary-order.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br14-01-primary-order/FISC_-_br14-01-primary-order.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aea2b8e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br14-01-primary-order/FISC_-_br14-01-primary-order.md
@@ -0,0 +1,483 @@
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D. C.
+
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
+BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
+ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
+OF TANGIBLE THINGS FROM
+[REDACTED]
+
+Docket Number: BR
+
+14-01
+
+PRIMARY ORDER
+
+A verified application having been made by the Director of the Federal Bureau of
+Investigation (FBI) for an order pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
+1978 (the Act), Title 50, United States Code (U.S.C.), § 1861, as amended, requiring the
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+Derived from: Pleadings in the above-captioned docket
+Declassify on:
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+production to the National Security Agency (NSA) of the tangible things described
+below, and full consideration having been given to the matters set forth therein,¹ the
+Court finds as follows:
+
+1. There are reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are
+relevant to authorized investigations (other than threat assessments) being conducted
+by the FBI under guidelines approved by the Attorney General under Executive Order
+12333 to protect against international terrorism, which investigations are not being
+conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment to the
+Constitution of the United States. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)]
+
+2. The tangible things sought could be obtained with a subpoena duces tecum
+issued by a court of the United States in aid of a grand jury investigation or with any
+other order issued by a court of the United States directing the production of records or
+tangible things. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)(D)]
+
+3. The application includes an enumeration of the minimization procedures the
+government proposes to follow with regard to the tangible things sought. Such
+procedures are similar to the minimization procedures approved and adopted as
+
+¹ The Court has also carefully considered the opinions entered by Judges Eagan and
+McLaughlin in Docket Numbers BR 13-109 and BR 13-158, respectively, as well as the recent
+decisions issued in related district court litigation. See American Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, -
+F. Supp.2d-, 2013WL6819708 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2013); Klayman v. Obama, - F. Supp.2d -,
+2013WL6571596 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2013).
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+2
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+binding by the order of this Court in Docket Number BR 13-158 and its predecessors.
+[50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)]
+
+Accordingly, the Court finds that the application of the United States to obtain
+the tangible things, as described below, satisfies the requirements of the Act and,
+therefore,
+
+IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to the authority conferred on this Court by
+the Act, that the application is GRANTED, and it is
+
+FURTHER ORDERED, as follows:
+
+(1)A. The Custodians of Records of [REDACTED] shall produce to NSA
+upon service of the appropriate secondary order, and continue production on an
+ongoing daily basis thereafter for the duration of this order, unless otherwise ordered
+by the Court, an electronic copy of the following tangible things: all call detail records
+or "telephony metadata"2 created by [REDACTED]
+
+B. The Custodian of Records of [REDACTED]
+
+2 For purposes of this Order "telephony metadata" includes comprehensive communications
+routing information, including but not limited to session identifying information (e.g.,
+originating and terminating telephone number, International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI)
+number, International Mobile station Equipment Identity (IMEI) number, etc.), trunk identifier,
+telephone calling card numbers, and time and duration of call. Telephony metadata does not
+include the substantive content of any communication, as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8), or the
+name, address, or financial information of a subscriber or customer. Furthermore, this Order
+does not authorize the production of cell site location information (CSLI).
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+3
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED] shall produce to NSA upon service of the
+appropriate secondary order, and continue production on an ongoing daily basis
+thereafter for the duration of this order, unless otherwise ordered by the Court, an
+electronic copy of the following tangible things: all call detail records or "telephony
+metadata" created by [REDACTED] for communications (i) between the United States and
+abroad; or (ii) wholly within the United States, including local telephone calls.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(2) With respect to any information the FBI receives as a result of this Order
+(information that is disseminated to it by NSA), the FBI shall follow as minimization
+procedures the procedures set forth in The Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic FBI
+Operations (September 29, 2008).
+
+(3) With respect to the information that NSA receives as a result of this Order,
+NSA shall strictly adhere to the following minimization procedures:
+
+A. The government is hereby prohibited from accessing business record
+metadata acquired pursuant to this Court's orders in the above-captioned docket and its
+predecessors ("BR metadata") for any purpose except as described herein.
+
+B. NSA shall store and process the BR metadata in repositories within secure
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+4
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+networks under NSA's control.3 The BR metadata shall carry unique markings such
+that software and other controls (including user authentication services) can restrict
+access to it to authorized personnel who have received appropriate and adequate
+training with regard to this authority. NSA shall restrict access to the BR metadata to
+authorized personnel who have received appropriate and adequate training.4
+
+Appropriately trained and authorized technical personnel may access the BR metadata
+to perform those processes needed to make it usable for intelligence analysis. Technical
+personnel may query the BR metadata using selection terms that have not been RAS-
+
+3 The Court understands that NSA will maintain the BR metadata in recovery back-up systems
+for mission assurance and continuity of operations purposes. NSA shall ensure that any access
+or use of the BR metadata in the event of any natural disaster, man-made emergency, attack, or
+other unforeseen event is in compliance with the Court's Order.
+4 The Court understands that the technical personnel responsible for NSA's underlying
+corporate infrastructure and the transmission of the BR metadata from the specified persons to
+NSA, will not receive special training regarding the authority granted herein.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+5
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+approved (described below) for those purposes described above, and may share the
+results of those queries with other authorized personnel responsible for these purposes,
+but the results of any such queries will not be used for intelligence analysis purposes.
+
+An authorized technician may access the BR metadata to ascertain those identifiers that
+may be high volume identifiers. The technician may share the results of any such
+access, i.e., the identifiers and the fact that they are high volume identifiers, with
+authorized personnel (including those responsible for the identification and defeat of
+high volume and other unwanted BR metadata from any of NSA's various metadata
+repositories), but may not share any other information from the results of that access for
+intelligence analysis purposes. In addition, authorized technical personnel may access
+the BR metadata for purposes of obtaining foreign intelligence information pursuant to
+the requirements of subparagraph (3)C below.
+
+C. NSA shall access the BR metadata for purposes of obtaining foreign
+intelligence information only through queries of the BR metadata to obtain contact
+chaining information as described in paragraph 17 of the Declaration of [REDACTED]
+attached to the application as Exhibit A, using selection terms approved as
+"seeds" pursuant to the RAS approval process described below.6 NSA shall ensure,
+
+6 For purposes of this Order, "National Security Agency" and "NSA personnel" are defined as
+any employees of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service ("NSA/CSS" or
+"NSA") and any other personnel engaged in Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) operations
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+6
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+through adequate and appropriate technical and management controls, that queries of
+the BR metadata for intelligence analysis purposes will be initiated using only a
+selection term that has been RAS-approved. Whenever the BR metadata is accessed for
+foreign intelligence analysis purposes or using foreign intelligence analysis query tools,
+an auditable record of the activity shall be generated.7
+
+(i) Except as provided in subparagraph (ii) below, all selection terms to be
+used as "seeds" with which to query the BR metadata shall be approved by any
+of the following designated approving officials: the Chief or Deputy Chief,
+Homeland Security Analysis Center; or one of the twenty specially-authorized
+Homeland Mission Coordinators in the Analysis and Production Directorate of
+the Signals Intelligence Directorate. Such approval shall be given only after the
+designated approving official has determined that based on the factual and
+practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent
+persons act, there are facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion (RAS)
+that the selection term to be queried is associated with [REDACTED]
+
+authorized pursuant to FISA if such operations are executed under the direction, authority, or
+control of the Director, NSA/Chief, CSS (DIRNSA). NSA personnel shall not disseminate BR
+metadata outside the NSA unless the dissemination is permitted by, and in accordance with, the
+requirements of this Order that are applicable to the NSA.
+7 This auditable record requirement shall not apply to accesses of the results of RAS-approved
+queries.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+7
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+8
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+provided, however, that NSA's Office of General Counsel (OGC)
+shall first determine that any selection term reasonably believed to be used by a
+United States (U.S.) person is not regarded as associated with [REDACTED]
+solely on the basis of activities that are protected by the
+First Amendment to the Constitution.
+
+(ii) Selection terms that are currently the subject of electronic surveillance
+authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) based on the
+FISC's finding of probable cause to believe that they are used by [REDACTED]
+including those used by U.S. persons, may be
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+9
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+deemed approved for querying for the period of FISC-authorized electronic
+surveillance without review and approval by a designated approving official.
+
+The preceding sentence shall not apply to selection terms under surveillance
+pursuant to any certification of the Director of National Intelligence and the
+Attorney General pursuant to Section 702 of FISA, as added by the FISA
+Amendments Act of 2008, or pursuant to an Order of the FISC issued under
+Section 703 or Section 704 of FISA, as added by the FISA Amendments Act of
+2008.
+
+(iii) A determination by a designated approving official that a selection
+term is associated with [REDACTED] shall be effective for:
+one hundred eighty days for any selection term reasonably believed to be used
+by a U.S. person; and one year for all other selection terms. 10,11
+
+10 The Court understands that from time to time the information available to designated
+approving officials will indicate that a selection term is or was associated with a Foreign Power
+only for a specific and limited time frame. In such cases, a designated approving official may
+determine that the reasonable, articulable suspicion standard is met, but the time frame for
+which the selection term is or was associated with a Foreign Power shall be specified. The
+automated query process described in the [REDACTED] Declaration limits the first hop query results
+to the specified time frame. Analysts conducting manual queries using that selection term shall
+continue to properly minimize information that may be returned within query results that fall
+outside of that timeframe.
+11 The Court understands that NSA receives certain call detail records pursuant to other
+authority, in addition to the call detail records produced in response to this Court's Orders.
+NSA shall store, handle, and disseminate call detail records produced in response to this
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+10
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+(iv) Queries of the BR metadata using RAS-approved selection terms may
+occur either by manual analyst query or through the automated query process
+described below.12 This automated query process queries the collected BR
+metadata (in a "collection store") with RAS-approved selection terms and returns
+the hop-limited results from those queries to a "corporate store." The corporate
+store may then be searched by appropriately and adequately trained personnel
+for valid foreign intelligence purposes, without the requirement that those
+searches use only RAS-approved selection terms. The specifics of the automated
+query process, as described in the [REDACTED] Declaration, are as follows:
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Court's Orders pursuant to this Order,
+[REDACTED]
+
+12 This automated query process was initially approved by this Court in its November 8, 2012
+Order amending docket number BR 12-178.
+13 As an added protection in case technical issues prevent the process from verifying that the
+most up-to-date list of RAS-approved selection terms is being used, this step of the automated
+process checks the expiration dates of RAS-approved selection terms to confirm that the
+approvals for those terms have not expired. This step does not use expired RAS-approved
+selection terms to create the list of "authorized query terms" (described below) regardless of
+whether the list of RAS-approved selection terms is up-to-date.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+11
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+12
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+D. Results of any intelligence analysis queries of the BR metadata may be shared,
+prior to minimization, for intelligence analysis purposes among NSA analysts, subject
+to the requirement that all NSA personnel who receive query results in any form first
+receive appropriate and adequate training and guidance regarding the procedures and
+restrictions for the handling and dissemination of such information.16 NSA shall apply
+the minimization and dissemination requirements and procedures of Section 7 of
+United States Signals Intelligence Directive SP0018 (USSID 18) issued on January 25,
+2011, to any results from queries of the BR metadata, in any form, before the
+information is disseminated outside of NSA in any form. Additionally, prior to
+disseminating any U.S. person information outside NSA, the Director of NSA, the
+Deputy Director of NSA, or one of the officials listed in Section 7.3(c) of USSID 18 (i.e.,
+the Director of the Signals Intelligence Directorate (SID), the Deputy Director of the SID,
+the Chief of the Information Sharing Services (ISS) office, the Deputy Chief of the ISS
+office, and the Senior Operations Officer of the National Security Operations Center)
+must determine that the information identifying the U.S. person is in fact related to
+counterterrorism information and that it is necessary to understand the
+
+16 In addition, the Court understands that NSA may apply the full range of SIGINT analytic
+tradecraft to the results of intelligence analysis queries of the collected BR metadata.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+13
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+counterterrorism information or assess its importance.17 Notwithstanding the above
+requirements, NSA may share results from intelligence analysis queries of the BR
+metadata, including U.S. person identifying information, with Executive Branch
+personnel (1) in order to enable them to determine whether the information contains
+exculpatory or impeachment information or is otherwise discoverable in legal
+proceedings or (2) to facilitate their lawful oversight functions. Notwithstanding the
+above requirements, NSA may share the results from intelligence analysis queries of the
+BR metadata, including United States person information, with Legislative Branch
+personnel to facilitate lawful oversight functions.
+
+E. BR metadata shall be destroyed no later than five years (60 months) after its
+initial collection.
+
+F. NSA and the National Security Division of the Department of Justice
+(NSD/DoJ) shall conduct oversight of NSA's activities under this authority as outlined
+below.
+
+(i) NSA's OGC and Office of the Director of Compliance (ODOC) shall
+ensure that personnel with access to the BR metadata receive appropriate and
+adequate training and guidance regarding the procedures and restrictions for
+
+17 In the event the Government encounters circumstances that it believes necessitate the
+alteration of these dissemination procedures, it may obtain prospectively-applicable
+modifications to the procedures upon a determination by the Court that such modifications are
+appropriate under the circumstances and in light of the size and nature of this bulk collection,
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+14
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+collection, storage, analysis, dissemination, and retention of the BR metadata and
+the results of queries of the BR metadata. NSA's OGC and ODOC shall further
+ensure that all NSA personnel who receive query results in any form first receive
+appropriate and adequate training and guidance regarding the procedures and
+restrictions for the handling and dissemination of such information. NSA shall
+maintain records of all such training.18 OGC shall provide NSD/DoJ with copies
+of all formal briefing and/or training materials (including all revisions thereto)
+used to brief/train NSA personnel concerning this authority.
+
+(ii) NSA's ODOC shall monitor the implementation and use of the
+software and other controls (including user authentication services) and the
+logging of auditable information referenced above.
+
+(iii) NSA's OGC shall consult with NSD/DoJ on all significant legal
+opinions that relate to the interpretation, scope, and/or implementation of this
+authority. When operationally practicable, such consultation shall occur in
+advance; otherwise NSD shall be notified as soon as practicable.
+
+(iv) At least once during the authorization period, NSA's OGC, ODOC,
+NSD/DoJ, and any other appropriate NSA representatives shall meet for the
+
+18 The nature of the training that is appropriate and adequate for a particular person will
+depend on the person's responsibilities and the circumstances of his access to the BR metadata
+or the results from any queries of the metadata.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+15
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+purpose of assessing compliance with this Court's orders. Included in this
+meeting will be a review of NSA's monitoring and assessment to ensure that
+only approved metadata is being acquired. The results of this meeting shall be
+reduced to writing and submitted to the Court as part of any application to
+renew or reinstate the authority requested herein.
+
+(v) At least once during the authorization period, NSD/DoJ shall meet
+with NSA's Office of the Inspector General to discuss their respective oversight
+responsibilities and assess NSA's compliance with the Court's orders.
+
+(vi) At least once during the authorization period, NSA's OGC and
+NSD/DoJ shall review a sample of the justifications for RAS approvals for
+selection terms used to query the BR metadata.
+
+(vii) Other than the automated query process described in the [REDACTED]
+Declaration and this Order, prior to implementation of any new or modified
+automated query processes, such new or modified processes shall be reviewed
+and approved by NSA's OGC, NSD/DoJ, and the Court.
+
+G. Approximately every thirty days, NSA shall file with the Court a report that
+includes a discussion of NSA's application of the RAS standard, as well as NSA's
+implementation and operation of the automated query process. In addition, should the
+United States seek renewal of the requested authority, NSA shall also include in its
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+16
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+report a description of any significant changes proposed in the way in which the call
+detail records would be received from the Providers and any significant changes to the
+controls NSA has in place to receive, store, process, and disseminate the BR metadata.
+
+Each report shall include a statement of the number of instances since the
+preceding report in which NSA has shared, in any form, results from queries of the BR
+metadata that contain United States person information, in any form, with anyone
+outside NSA, other than Executive Branch or Legislative Branch personnel receiving
+such results for their purposes that are exempted from the dissemination requirements
+of paragraph (3)D above. For each such instance in which United States person
+information has been shared, the report shall include NSA's attestation that one of the
+officials authorized to approve such disseminations determined, prior to dissemination,
+that the information was related to counterterrorism information and necessary to
+understand counterterrorism information or to assess its importance.
+
+- Remainder of this page intentionally left blank -
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+17
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+This authorization regarding [REDACTED] expires on the 28th day
+of March, 2014, at 5:00 p.m., Eastern Time.
+
+Signed 01-03-2014 P12:41
+Date Time Eastern Time
+
+THOMAS F. HOGAN
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+18
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br14-01-primary-order/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br14-01-primary-order/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d94fad9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_br14-01-primary-order/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Primary Order, In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED]",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2014-01-03",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2014-01-03",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34064",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "b811c3d2a8604b89f2ddb83c9fb690ffe395a7d13f967db0881059d3493cfabd",
+ "pages": 18
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_declaration-of-andrew-mccabe-131002/FISC_-_declaration-of-andrew-mccabe-131002.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_declaration-of-andrew-mccabe-131002/FISC_-_declaration-of-andrew-mccabe-131002.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e0e743b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_declaration-of-andrew-mccabe-131002/FISC_-_declaration-of-andrew-mccabe-131002.md
@@ -0,0 +1,1136 @@
+UNITED STATES
+FILED
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL, CLERK
+
+SEP 30 2013
+5:0
+U.S. Foreign Intelligence
+060
+Surveillance Court
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLATORY
+)
+JUDGMENT OF A FIRST AMENDMENT
+)
+Docket No. Misc. 13-03
+RIGHT TO PUBLISH AGGREGATE
+INFORMATION ABOUT FISA ORDERS
+)
+
+IN RE MOTION TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+)
+Docket No. Misc. 13-04
+)
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+AND DIRECTIVES
+)
+)
+Docket No. Misc. 13-05
+)
+)
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+AND DIRECTIVES
+)
+)
+Docket No. Misc. 13-06
+)
+)
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT TO REPORT AGGREGATED
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+)
+)
+Docket No. Misc. 13-07
+)
+
+DECLARATION OF ANDREW G. MCCABE
+
+I, Andrew G. McCabe, hereby declare as follows, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746:
+
+1
+[REDACTED]
+
+1. (U) I am the Acting Executive Assistant Director of the National Security Branch
+of the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), United States Department of Justice. This
+declaration is submitted in connection with the United States' opposition to the motions for
+declaratory judgment filed by Google Inc. ("Google"), Microsoft Corporation ("Microsoft"),
+Yahoo! Inc. ("Yahoo"), Facebook, Inc. ("Facebook"), and LinkedIn Corporation ("LinkedIn")
+(collectively, the "Movants" or the "providers") in the above-captioned proceedings.¹
+
+2. (U) I entered on duty with the FBI, as a Special Agent, in 1996. Following several
+assignments, I served as the assistant section chief of the International Terrorist Operations
+Section One of the FBI's Counterterrorism Division, where I was responsible for the FBI's
+counterterrorism investigations in the continental United States. In 2008, I was promoted to
+Assistant Special Agent in Charge of the Washington Field Office's Counterterrorism Division,
+which included the division's National Capital Response Squad, Rapid Deployment Team,
+Domestic Terrorism Squad, Cyber-CT Targeting Squad, and the Extraterritorial Investigations
+Squads. In September 2009, I was named the first director of the FBI's High-Value Interrogation
+Group. In May 2011, I became the FBI Counterterrorism Division's Deputy Assistant Director
+overseeing the international terrorism investigation program. In May 2012, I was named
+Assistant Director of the FBI's Counterterrorism Division. I served as Assistant Director of the
+
+¹ (U) The motions for declaratory judgment filed by each of the Movants are referred to
+herein individually as the "Google Amended Motion", the "Microsoft Amended Motion", the
+"Yahoo Motion", the "Facebook Motion", and the "LinkedIn Motion", respectively, and
+collectively as the "Motions." Dropbox, Inc. ("Dropbox") has filed an amicus curiae brief in
+support of the Movants.
+
+2
+[REDACTED]
+FBI's Counterterrorism Division until July 2013, when I was named Acting Executive Assistant
+Director of the FBI's National Security Branch.
+
+3. (U) As the Acting Executive Assistant Director of the FBI's National Security
+Branch, I am responsible for, among other things, overseeing the national security operations of
+the FBI's Counterintelligence Division, Counterterrorism Division, Directorate of Intelligence,
+High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group, Terrorist Screening Center, and Weapons of Mass
+Destruction Directorate. The FBI's National Security Branch is also accountable for the
+functions carried out by other FBI divisions that support the FBI's national security mission, such
+as training, technology, human resources, and security countermeasures. In this role, I have
+official supervision over all of the FBI's investigations to deter, detect, and disrupt national
+security threats to the United States and its interests as well as to protect against foreign
+clandestine intelligence activities.
+
+4. (U) As the Acting Executive Assistant Director of the National Security Branch, I
+also have been delegated original classification authority by the Director of the FBI. See
+Executive Order 12958, as amended by Executive Order 13292, as amended by Executive Order
+13526, Section 1.3(c). As a result, I am responsible for the protection of classified national
+security information within the National Security Branch of the FBI, including the sources and
+methods used by the FBI in the collection of national security and criminal information for
+national security investigations. To that end, I have been authorized by the Director of the FBI to
+execute declarations and affidavits in order to protect such information.
+
+3
+[REDACTED]
+5. (U) I base the statements contained in this declaration upon my personal
+knowledge, my review and consideration of documents and information available to me in my
+official capacity, and information obtained from Special Agents and other FBI employees. I have
+reached my stated conclusions in accordance with this information.
+
+(U) Background
+
+6. (U) Prior to the events leading to this litigation, a limited number of electronic
+communication service providers, including Google and Microsoft, publicly disclosed the precise
+number of unclassified criminal information requests that they receive from all sources. These
+numbers have included, for example, grand jury subpoenas and criminal search warrants, but do
+not include Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") orders or National Security Letters
+("NSLs").
+
+7. (U) In early 2013, pursuant to an agreement with the FBI, Google and Microsoft
+began publicly disclosing, separate and apart from their disclosures about criminal process
+received, annual aggregate figures regarding the number of NSLs that each company received and
+the number of accounts affected by the NSLs. Specifically, Google and Microsoft were permitted
+to disclose, and have now disclosed, the following figures: (a) the number of NSLs that they
+receive annually, in ranges of one thousand (i.e., 0-999, 1000-1999, etc.); and (b) the number of
+accounts affected by those NSLs, also in ranges of 1000. See
+http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/userdatarequests/;
+www.microsoft.com/about/corporatecitizenship/en-us.reporting/transparency (last visited
+September 27, 2013); see also Attachment A (letters from the FBI to Google and Microsoft
+
+4
+[REDACTED]
+regarding the NSL disclosures). In connection with their discussions with the FBI about the NSL
+disclosures, both providers indicated that they did not intend to make comparable disclosures
+about any FISA orders that they receive. At that time, Yahoo and Facebook did not request
+authority to make these public NSL disclosures nor were they known to be publicly disclosing
+through any formal company report the extent to which they received criminal process.
+
+8. (U) In June 2013, Edward Snowden, a former National Security Agency contractor,
+made well-publicized and self-acknowledged leaks regarding government surveillance programs.
+Following the Snowden leaks, multiple providers, including Google, Microsoft, Yahoo, and
+Facebook, sought relief from the FBI in order to correct inaccuracies in press reports and to
+alleviate public speculation about the nature and scope of the providers' cooperation with the U.S.
+Government. To address this concern, the FBI agreed among other things to allow the providers
+to report the number of FISA orders received and accounts affected by these orders, on a
+semiannual basis, but only as part of a single, aggregate number of criminal and national
+security-related orders that they received from all U.S. governmental entities, including local,
+state, and federal entities. This agreement was made in consultation with the United States
+Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC"). The agreement was subject to the following
+parameters: (i) the numbers of requests received and the number of user accounts for which data
+was requested would be stated in ranges of 1000 (i.e., 0-999, 1000-1099, etc.); and (ii) the
+disclosures would not specify or differentiate between the types of process – e.g., a FISA order,
+
+5
+[REDACTED]
+account tasked under Section 702 of FISA, NSL, or criminal subpoena – received. See
+Attachment B (letters from the FBI to Microsoft, Yahoo, and Facebook regarding this agreement).
+The FBI agreed to these unprecedented disclosures to enable the providers to demonstrate to their
+customers that only a tiny fraction of their customers' accounts were subject to legal process of any
+kind. It was the view of the FBI that the combined disclosure of all legal process received –
+criminal and national security – would sufficiently mitigate the harm to national security that
+would follow from a more disaggregated disclosure of national security process. By aggregating
+all legal process from all levels of government into "one bucket," neither the receipt of FISA
+orders, nor any significant increase in the number of FISA orders received or accounts affected,
+would be discernible due to the large volume of criminal legal process that would also be reported.
+
+9. (U) It was part of the "one aggregate bucket" agreement that a provider could not
+make the disclosures discussed in paragraph eight while also making either the separate NSL
+disclosures (discussed in paragraph seven) or the separate criminal process disclosures (discussed
+in paragraph six). Microsoft, Facebook, Apple, Yahoo, and AOL opted for the arrangement
+permitting them to make the disclosures discussed in paragraph eight: i.e., disclosure, on a
+semiannual basis, of aggregate numbers, in bands of 1000, of all process from all governmental
+entities, without specifying or differentiating between the type of process received.3
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+6
+[REDACTED]
+10. (U) As the providers have recognized in their various transparency reports, publicly
+reporting a combined number of (a) legal process received and (b) potentially affected accounts
+has allowed and will continue to allow them to explain that only a very small fraction of their users
+and accounts are affected by legal process of any kind, much less national security process.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+12. (U) Microsoft's numbers are to the same effect. Microsoft's 2012 Law
+Enforcement Requests Report, which was published before the Snowden leaks, stated the
+
+7
+[REDACTED]
+following: "[I]n 2012, Microsoft and Skype received a total of 75,378 law enforcement requests.
+Those requests potentially impacted 137,424 accounts. While it is not possible to directly
+compare the number of requests to the number of users affected, it is likely that less than 0.02% of
+active users were affected." See
+www.microsoft.com/about/corporatecitizenship/en-us.reporting/transparency (last visited
+September 27, 2013). That report goes on to say the following: "We know that law enforcement
+requests impacted approximately 135,000 Microsoft and Skype accounts in 2012. We have many
+hundreds of millions of accounts for our online and cloud services. To give you a sense of
+proportion we estimate that less than two one-hundredths of one percent (or 0.02%, to put it
+another way) were potentially affected by law enforcement requests." Id. Similarly, following
+the Snowden leaks and after obtaining permission from the FBI, Microsoft publicly released the
+total number of law enforcement requests (including national security process) it had received for
+the last six months of 2012 with this statement: "For the six months ended December 31, 2012,
+Microsoft received between 6,000 and 7,000 criminal and national security warrants, subpoenas
+and orders affecting between 31,000 and 32,000 consumer accounts from U.S. governmental
+entities (including local, state and federal). This only impacts a tiny fraction of Microsoft's
+global customer base." See
+http://blogs.technet.com/b/microsoft_on_the_issues/archive/2013/06/14/microsoft-s-u-s-law-enfo
+rcement-and-national-security-requests-for-last-half-of-2012.aspx (June 14, 2013) (last visited
+September 27, 2013).4
+
+4 (U) On September 27, 2013, Microsoft published a law enforcement requests report for
+
+8
+[REDACTED]
+13. (U) Facebook made a similar statement after publishing data showing that, for the
+six months ending December 31, 2012, the total number of user-data requests Facebook received
+from all U.S. governmental entities was between 9,000 and 10,000 and affected between 18,000
+and 19,000 accounts: "With more than 1.1 billion monthly active users worldwide, this means
+that a tiny fraction of one percent of our user accounts were the subject of any kind of U.S. state,
+local, or federal U.S. government request (including criminal and national security-related
+requests) in the past six months. We hope this helps put into perspective the numbers involved,
+and lays to rest some of the hyperbolic and false assertions in some recent press accounts about the
+frequency and scope of the data requests that we receive." See Press Release, Facebook Releases
+Data Including All National Security Requests,
+http://newsroom.fb.com/News/636/Facebook-Releases-Data-Including-All-National-Security-Re
+quests (June 14, 2013) (last visited September 27, 2013).
+
+14. (U) Likewise for Yahoo: In its motion before this Court, Yahoo states that it
+"provides electronic communications services to hundreds of millions of people and businesses
+worldwide, including through electronic mail and instant messaging services." Yahoo Motion at
+2. Indeed, Yahoo recently stated that it has more than 800 million monthly active users. See
+http//news.yahoo.com/yahoo-ceo-says-monthly-traffic-surpasses-800-million-220034655-sector.
+
+the first six months of 2013. See
+www.microsoft.com/about/corporatecitizenship/en-us.reporting/transparency (last visited
+September 27, 2013). This most recent report, which was filed after this litigation was initiated,
+does not include "any national security orders [Microsoft] might have received." Id.
+Nevertheless, as Microsoft was able to say in its 2012 report and its June 2013 statement, "this new
+data shows that across our services only a tiny fraction of accounts, less than 0.01 percent are ever
+affected by law enforcement requests for customer data."
+
+9
+[REDACTED]
+html (September 11, 2013) (last visited September 27, 2013). In its September 2013 transparency
+report, Yahoo publicly reported receiving criminal and national security legal process (to the
+extent any national security legal process was received) from all U.S. governmental entities for
+only 40,322 accounts. Yahoo thus concluded: "The total number of accounts specified in these
+government data requests during the reporting period comprised less than one one-hundredth of
+one percent of Yahoo users worldwide." See Yahoo Transparency Report Overview,
+http://info.yahoo.com/transparency-report (last visited September 27, 2013).
+
+15. (U) Finally, LinkedIn presents the same statistical point. LinkedIn represents that it
+has "over 238 million members," and that, as compared to other providers, it receives "relatively
+low numbers of requests for member data." LinkedIn Motion at 1;
+http://press.linkedin.com/Content/Detail.aspx?ReleaseID=313&NewsAreaID=2&ClientID=1
+(September 17, 2013) (last visited September 27, 2013). If it accepted the Government's offer to
+report its total number of criminal and national security orders, LinkedIn could thus presumably
+advise its users that only a very small fraction of its accounts is affected by legal requests,
+including national security requests.5
+
+5 (U) Amicus Dropbox has approximately 175 million users. Like the Movants, if it
+accepted the Government's "one bucket" approach, it would similarly report that only a tiny
+fraction of its users are affected by any legal process. See Dropbox Amicus Brief, at 2-3;
+http://techcrunch.com/2013/07/09/dropbox-dbx-conference (July 9, 2013) (last visited September
+27, 2013).
+
+10
+[REDACTED]
+(U) The Pending Motions and the Purpose Of This Declaration
+
+16. (U) In their initial Motions filed on June 19, 2013, Google and Microsoft asked the
+FISC to authorize them to disclose aggregate statistics about orders and/or directives that they
+have received under FISA, including the provisions of the FISA Amendments Act. Specifically,
+in their initial Motions, Google and Microsoft sought authorization to disclose two categories of
+aggregate figures: (a) the total number of FISA orders, if any, that they have received; and (b) the
+total number of users or accounts encompassed within, or affected by, any such FISA orders. In
+Google's initial Motion, Google asserted that it would report the numbers in items (a) and (b) in
+ranges of 1000, starting with zero: i.e., 0-999, 1000-1999, and so on. In its initial Motion,
+Microsoft did not state how it would disclose the information in categories (a) and (b), i.e., it was
+not clear whether Microsoft was seeking to disclose FISA information using precise numbers or in
+ranges.
+
+17. (U) Subsequent to Google and Microsoft filing the Motions described in the
+preceding paragraph, on August 29, 2013, Director of National Intelligence (DNI) James R.
+Clapper announced in a public statement on behalf of the Intelligence Community, including the
+FBI, that he was directing the annual disclosure of national aggregate FISA data, but, critically, not
+broken down by company receiving such process. Under the DNI's announcement, the
+Government will release "the total number of orders issued during the prior twelve-month period,
+and the number of targets affected by these orders." See http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/ (last
+visited September 27, 2013). As noted, the Government's reporting will not be broken down by
+company. The disclosed numbers will be reported for each of the following categories of national
+
+11
+[REDACTED]
+security authorities: (i) FISA orders based on probable cause (Titles I and III of FISA, and
+sections 703 and 704); (ii) Section 702 of FISA; (iii) FISA Business Records (Title V of FISA);
+(iv) FISA Pen Register/Trap and Trace (Title IV of FISA); and (v) National Security Letters
+issued pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681u(a) and (b), 15 U.S.C. § 1681v, and
+18 U.S.C. § 2709. In announcing the release of this information, the DNI emphasized that this
+initiative was consistent with the President's directive to "make public as much information as
+possible about certain sensitive U.S. Government surveillance programs while being mindful of
+the need to protect sensitive classified intelligence and national security." See
+http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/page/2 (August 29, 2013) (last visited September 27, 2013).
+
+18. (U) Thus, combined with the "one aggregate bucket" disclosures that are broken
+out by company, the public will have full visibility into the numbers and types of process utilized
+per year (and accounts affected), and companies and their customers will know the full scope, on
+an aggregate basis, every 6 months as to the percentage of accounts affected at a company.
+Notwithstanding the U.S. Government's plans to make public an unprecedented amount of
+national aggregate information concerning U.S. Government surveillance programs, Google and
+Microsoft amended their initial motions and now seek significantly broader relief than what they
+had first requested. Whereas Google's initial motion sought declaratory relief that would permit
+it to publish two data points within ranges of 1000, Google's amended motion seeks declaratory
+relief that would permit it to disclose eight data points regarding classified FISA process, and to do
+so in precise numbers rather than bands of one thousand. See Amended Google Motion at 7.
+Microsoft's amended motion seeks permission to make even more granular disclosures. See
+
+12
+[REDACTED]
+Amended Microsoft Motion at 5. Microsoft seeks permission to release separate statistics "for
+each provision of FISA and/or the [FISA Amendments Act] pursuant to which Microsoft may
+receive process,"⁶ including both the precise number of orders or directives (if any) and the
+number of accounts affected for each statutory provision. Microsoft also seeks permission to split
+those numbers further into separate categories for "non-content" requests and "content and
+non-content" requests. Id. (emphasis in original).
+
+19. (U) Yahoo, Facebook, and LinkedIn's requests "involve similar, but not identical,
+requests for relief [as those] filed by Google and Microsoft." Yahoo Motion at 9 n.6; Facebook
+Motion at 7 n.3. Like Google and Microsoft, these companies also seek declaratory judgments
+that would permit them to disclose data regarding both the specific number of classified FISA
+process that they receive, and the particular FISA authorities under which they receive that
+process. See Yahoo Motion at 4; Facebook Motion at 3; LinkedIn Motion at 6.
+
+20. (U) As explained below, the FISA data that Google and Microsoft sought to publish
+in their initial Motions constitutes information classified at the Secret level because its disclosure
+could reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to the national security of the United States.
+See Executive Order 13526 § 1.2(a)(2). The harm to the national security is even greater with
+respect to the significantly more expansive disclosures now sought by the five companies here.
+This declaration addresses: (1) factors considered by the FBI when classifying information, (2)
+specific policies that govern the FBI's classification of information, (3) a discussion of how the
+
+⁶ (U) If "provision" is interpreted to mean "title" then there would be five "provisions," as
+five titles of FISA contain information collection authority (Titles I, III, IV, V, and VII).
+However, if the term "provision" is interpreted to mean "section," the number would be higher.
+
+13
+[REDACTED]
+information sought to be disclosed by the providers would harm national security, and (4) a
+discussion of how the more detailed and more disaggregated disclosures now proposed by the
+Movants are even more detrimental to national security than the disclosures initially sought by
+Google and Microsoft as part of their initial Motions.
+
+21. (U) Each paragraph in this declaration is marked immediately after the number of
+the paragraph with letters in parentheses, indicating the level of classification and restrictions on
+dissemination applicable to that particular paragraph. Paragraphs marked with a "U" are
+unclassified. Paragraphs marked with a "TS" are classified Top Secret. Paragraphs marked with
+an "S" are classified as Secret. A designation of SI reflects "Special Intelligence" protected as
+Sensitive Compartmented Information. Designations of "NF" or "NOFORN" reflect information
+that may not be disseminated to foreign countries or nationals. The "FISA" dissemination control
+marking denotes that information was obtained or derived from surveillance authorized pursuant
+to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended. The designation "FOUO"
+refers to information that is for official use only. Because this declaration is itself a classified
+document, it is being made available to the Court ex parte, in camera.
+
+(U) Classification of Information
+
+22. (U) The conduct of national security investigations, and the collection, production,
+and dissemination of intelligence to support counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and other U.S.
+national security objectives, requires the FBI to collect, analyze, and disseminate information
+eligible for classification under Executive Order 13526.
+
+14
+[REDACTED]
+
+23. (U) The decision whether to classify or declassify information, including but not
+limited to whether the FBI has conducted or is conducting an investigation, the amount and nature
+of intelligence that the FBI may have collected during an investigation, and how that intelligence
+was collected, is based on a variety of factors and considerations that are weighed by officials,
+such as myself, who have been delegated original classification authority. In weighing these
+factors, some of which are subtle and complex, I assess whether the disclosure of information, at
+any given time, may lead to an unacceptable risk of compromising the FBI's past or ongoing
+intelligence gathering efforts with respect to a particular investigation or investigations, and
+whether disclosure may lead to an unacceptable risk of compromising investigative sources,
+methods, or techniques. Among other things, my assessment and judgment as to the harm to the
+national security that reasonably could be expected from disclosure in any given case at any
+particular time is affected by whether a mosaic of information can be pieced together by our
+adversaries, both individuals and groups, which would allow them to better evade ongoing
+investigations and more easily formulate or revise their counter-surveillance efforts.
+
+(U) The FBI National Security Information Classification Guide
+
+24. (U) The Federal Bureau of Investigation National Security Information
+Classification Guide ("NSICG") provides guidance concerning the classification and level of
+protection afforded to FBI-originated national security information. The NSICG is issued under
+authority of Executive Order 13526; Information Security Oversight Office Directive Number 1
+(32 CFR Section 2001.10); Department of Justice Security Program Operating Manual; the FBI
+
+15
+[REDACTED]
+Security Policy Manual; and the designated Original Classification Authority of the Executive
+Assistant Director, National Security Branch.
+
+25. (U) The NSICG identifies categories of information frequently obtained in the
+course of national security investigations and intelligence analysis and provides guidance on
+whether information in these categories should be designated Unclassified (U), Confidential (C),
+Secret (S), or Top Secret (TS).
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+27. (U) The FISA order information sought to be disclosed implicates the NSICG
+categories referenced in the preceding paragraph, and accordingly is classified as Secret. The
+FISA information at issue would provide international terrorists, terrorist organizations, foreign
+intelligence services, cyber intruders, and other persons or entities who pose a threat to the national
+
+16
+[REDACTED]
+security (collectively, "adversaries") with significant insight into, and information about, the U.S.
+Government's counterterrorism and counterintelligence efforts and capabilities including, among
+other things, the Government's collection capabilities under FISA. Armed with this information,
+adversaries can take action to conceal their activities, alter their methods of operation, or otherwise
+counter, thwart, or frustrate the ability of the FBI to pursue them. This would undermine both
+current and future efforts by the FBI to collect foreign intelligence and to detect, obtain
+information about, or prevent or protect against threats to the national security.
+
+28. (U) National security investigations present evolving challenges, and the FBI's
+efforts to combat threats to the national security are fluid. The kinds of disclosures requested
+even in the initial Google and Microsoft Motions have never previously been made. This is all the
+more true with respect to the more detailed and more disaggregated disclosures now proposed in
+the current motions by five companies. It would be impossible to specifically identify each and
+every harm that could arise from the disclosures that the Movants seek to make. However, I note
+here some of the harms to the national security interests of the United States that would logically
+flow from the proposed disclosures.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+17
+[REDACTED]
+
+18
+[REDACTED]
+
+19
+[REDACTED]
+
+20
+[REDACTED]
+
+21
+[REDACTED]
+
+22
+[REDACTED]
+
+23
+[REDACTED]
+
+24
+[REDACTED]
+
+25
+[REDACTED]
+39. (U) Armed with information about the Government's collection capabilities,
+adversaries will take actions detrimental to the national security. Adversaries may alter their
+behavior by switching to services that the Government is not intercepting. Should an adversary
+switch to such services, then the Government would not have an interception or monitoring
+capability with regard to communications made on these services. This significantly and
+irreparably undermines current and future counterterrorism and counterintelligence efforts.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+26
+[REDACTED]
+
+27
+[REDACTED]
+
+28
+[REDACTED]
+
+29
+[REDACTED]
+(U) The Harms to the National Security Will be Compounded By Other
+Companies Likely Seeking the Same Relief
+
+48. (U) If Google, Microsoft, Yahoo, Facebook, and LinkedIn are permitted to disclose
+the FISA information that is the subject of their Motions, it is likely that other companies will seek
+the same relief. Indeed, initially only Google and Microsoft sought authority from the FISC to
+disclose publicly the FISA information, and the relief they sought did not include publishing
+specific numbers or distinguishing among the type of statutory authority used. Barely one month
+later, Yahoo, Facebook, and LinkedIn have petitioned this Court for authority to disclose their own
+receipt of FISA orders, and Google and Microsoft have since amended their Motions to publicly
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+30
+[REDACTED]
+disclose information that is substantially more granular in nature – and thus more revealing of
+USIC intelligence collection capabilities.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+31
+[REDACTED]
+
+32
+[REDACTED]
+
+33
+[REDACTED]
+
+34
+[REDACTED]
+
+35
+[REDACTED]
+(U) Prior Disclosures Regarding Receipt of Criminal Process and NSLs Do
+Not Lead To The Same Harms
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+36
+[REDACTED]
+
+37
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+65. (U) Another important distinction is that NSLs are unclassified legal process,
+whereas FISA orders are classified, generally at the Secret level. The FBI has confirmed that
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+38
+[REDACTED]
+employees from each of the Movants who work with the FBI on FISA matters have signed binding
+"Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement(s)" (SF-312) reflecting their obligation to
+protect classified information. The current version of the SF-312 nondisclosure agreement went
+into effect in July 2013. Both the current and prior versions of the SF-312 nondisclosure
+agreement include the following language: "I hereby agree that I will never divulge classified
+information to anyone unless: (a) I have officially verified that the recipient has been properly
+authorized by the United States Government to receive it; or (b) I have been given prior written
+notice of authorization from the United States Government Department or Agency..." See
+SF-312 Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement (effective July 2013), available at:
+http://www.gsa.gov/portal/forms/download/116218; SF-312 Classified Information
+Nondisclosure Agreement (pre-July 2013), available at:
+http://armypubs.army.mil/eforms/pdf/S312.PDF.¹⁶ The protection of classified information
+surrounding FISA orders is of a paramount concern to the United States government. NSLs,
+which are not classified, present different concerns.
+
+(U) Disclosure of National Aggregate Figures Does Not Give Rise to the
+Same Concerns
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+39
+[REDACTED]
+(U) Conclusion
+
+67. (U) Protecting the national security of the United States requires that intelligence
+sources, methods, and techniques be protected from disclosure. In keeping with the
+above-referenced authorities and after a considered assessment of all of the facts and
+circumstances concerning this matter, I have concluded that the disclosure of the FISA
+information at issue in this litigation reasonably could be expected to harm the national security of
+the United States.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+40
+[REDACTED]
+(U) I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
+Dated: September 30, 2013
+
+Andrew G. McCabe
+Acting Executive Assistant Director
+National Security Branch
+Federal Bureau of Investigation
+Washington, D.C.
+
+41
+(U) ATTACHMENT “A”
+U.S. Department of Justice
+Federal Bureau of Investigation
+
+Washington, D. C. 20535-0001
+
+January 29, 2013
+
+Richard Salgado
+Director, Law Enforcement and Information Security
+Google Inc..
+1600 Amphitheatre Parkway
+Mountain View, CA 94043
+
+Re: Disclosure of Limited Information About National Security Letters
+
+Dear Mr. Salgado:
+
+We appreciate your discussions with us over the past few months about your proposal to
+disclose certain information about the volume of national security letters Google receives from
+the FBI.
+
+We do not intend to seek to enforce the non-disclosure provisions of the national security
+letter statute with respect to the proposed disclosures outlined in your letter dated January 15,
+2013 (the "Letter"). This position is an exercise of FBI discretion in light of current
+circumstances and the precise contours of your Letter. Accordingly, our decision does not reflect
+the FBI's position with respect to potential disclosures by Google that differ in any respect from
+the disclosures outlined in your Letter. Nor is our decision a precedent for disclosures by any
+other company that is in receipt of national security letters from the FBI, even if the disclosures
+were made in the manner that you have proposed in your Letter. The national security
+implications of disclosures related to the receipt of national security letters may vary depending
+on the identity of the company that is making the disclosure and the overall number of
+disclosures by different companies. For this reason, if other companies also seek to disclose
+information about the volume of national security letters that they receive, that may alter our
+calculus about the implications of disclosures by Google. In addition, our current determination
+is based on our prediction about the potential national security consequences of the disclosures
+outlined in your letter. We may in the future revise our position as circumstances change or as
+we evaluate the actual impact of your disclosures on national security.
+
+If we revise our position, we will notify you. We would retain the right to bring an
+appropriate enforcement action with respect to any future disclosures you make after you receive
+a notification of our change in position.
+Thank you again for discussing your proposals with us in an effort to reach an agreement
+that promotes transparency without jeopardizing our national security responsibilities to the
+public.
+
+Sincerely,
+
+Andrew Weissmann
+General Counsel
+U.S. Department of Justice
+Federal Bureau of Investigation
+
+Washington, D. C. 20535-0001
+
+March 19. 2013
+
+Bryan Schilling
+Attorney
+Microsoft Corporation
+One Microsoft Way
+Redmond. WA 98052
+
+Re: Microsoft's Pending Transparency Report
+
+Dear Mr. Schilling:
+
+Thank you for your proposal to publish certain limited information about the number of
+national security letters that Microsoft receives.
+
+We do not intend to seek to enforce the non-disclosure provisions of the national security
+letter statute with respect to the proposed disclosures outlined in your letter dated March 14,
+2013 (the "Letter"). This position is an exercise of FBI discretion in light of current
+circumstances and the precise contours of your Letter. Accordingly, our decision does not reflect
+the FBI's position with respect to potential disclosures by Microsoft that differ in any respect
+from the disclosures outlined in your Letter. Nor is our decision a precedent for disclosures by
+any other company that is in receipt of national security letters from the FBI, even if the
+disclosures were made in the manner that you have proposed in your Letter. The national
+security implications of disclosures related to the receipt of national security letters may vary
+depending on the identity of the company that is making the disclosure and the overall number of
+disclosures by different companies. For this reason, if other companies also seek to disclose
+information about the volume of national security letters that they receive, that may alter our
+calculus about the implications of disclosures by Microsoft. In addition, our current
+determination is based on our prediction about the potential national security consequences of
+the disclosures outlined in your letter. We may in the future revise our position as circumstances
+change or as we evaluate the actual impact of your disclosures on national security.
+
+We understand from your Letter that you will coordinate with us before making any
+additional public disclosures about the volume of national security letters you receive, beyond
+disclosures for the years and in the manner outlined in your Letter.
+Thank you again for coordinating your proposal with us. We appreciate your efforts to
+reach an agreement that promotes transparency without jeopardizing our national security
+responsibilities to the public.
+
+Sincerely.
+
+Andrew Weissmann
+General Counsel
+(U) ATTACHMENT "B"
+U.S. Department of Justice
+Federal Bureau of Investigation
+
+Office of the General Counsel
+Washington, D.C. 20535
+
+June 14, 2013
+
+Mr. John Frank
+Vice President/Deputy General Counsel
+Office of the General Counsel
+Microsoft Corporation
+1 Microsoft Way
+Redmond, WA 98052
+
+Re: Microsoft's Pending Transparency Report
+
+Dear Mr. Frank:
+
+We appreciate your discussions with us about your proposal to disclose certain
+information about the volume of legal process Microsoft receives.
+
+As we discussed during our phone call on June 14, 2013, we do not intend to seek
+enforcement¹ of the non-disclosure provisions associated with any legal process, including FISA
+orders, so long as Microsoft agrees to aggregate data for all of the legal process it received in
+intervals of six months, beginning with the period ending December 31, 2012, from any and all
+government entities in the United States (including local, state, and federal, and including
+criminal and national security-related requests) into bands of 1000, starting at zero, and broken
+down into two categories: the number of requests and the number of user accounts for which
+data was requested.
+
+This position is an exercise of FBI discretion in light of current circumstances and the
+precise contours of this letter. Accordingly, our decision does not reflect the FBI's position with
+respect to potential disclosures by Microsoft that differ in any respect from the disclosures
+outlined in this letter. Nor is our decision a precedent for disclosures by any other company that
+is in receipt of such process, even if the disclosures were made in the manner that is proposed in
+this letter. The national security implications of disclosures related to the receipt of such process
+may vary depending on the identity of the company that is making the disclosure and the overall
+number of disclosures by different companies. For this reason, if other companies also seek to
+disclose information about the volume of such process that they receive, that may alter our
+calculus about the implications of disclosures by Microsoft. In addition, our current
+determination is based on our prediction about the potential national security consequences of
+
+¹ The FBI does not have the authority to negate a court order, nor can we bind state or local authorities.
+the disclosures and as such we may in the future revise our position as circumstances change or
+as we evaluate the actual impact of your disclosures on national security.
+
+This letter further commits Microsoft to coordinate with us before making any additional
+public disclosures about the volume of legal process you receive, beyond the contours outlined in
+this letter. If we revise our position, we will notify you. We would retain the right to bring an
+appropriate enforcement action with respect to any future disclosures you make after you receive
+a notification of our change in position.
+
+Thank you again for coordinating your proposal with us. We appreciate your efforts to
+reach an agreement that promotes transparency without jeopardizing our national security
+responsibilities to the public.
+
+Sincerely,
+
+Andrew Weissmann
+General Counsel
+U.S. Department of Justice
+Federal Bureau of Investigation
+
+Office of the General Counsel
+Washington, D.C. 20535
+
+June 17, 2013
+
+Mr. Aaron Altschuler
+Vice President/Associate General Counsel
+Yahoo, Inc.
+701 First Avenue
+Sunnyvale, CA 94089
+
+Re: Yahoo Inc.'s Transparency Report
+
+Dear Mr. Altschuler:
+
+We appreciate your discussion with us about your proposal to disclose certain
+information about the volume of legal process Yahoo, Inc. (Yahoo) receives.
+
+As we discussed during our phone call on June 17, 2013, we do not intend to seek
+enforcement¹ of the non-disclosure provisions associated with any legal process, including FISA
+orders, in connection with the aggregate data described below, so long as Yahoo aggregates data
+for all of the legal process it received for intervals of six months, with the first period covering
+December 1, 2012, through May 31, 2013, from any and all government entities in the United
+States (including local, state, and federal, and including criminal and national security-related
+requests) into bands of 1000, starting at zero, and which you may break down into one or both of
+the following two categories: the number of requests and the number of user accounts for which
+data was requested.
+
+This position is an exercise of FBI discretion in light of current circumstances and the
+precise contours of this letter. Accordingly, our decision does not reflect the FBI's position with
+respect to potential disclosures by Yahoo that differ in any respect from the disclosures outlined
+in this letter. Nor is our decision a precedent for disclosures by any other company that is in
+receipt of such process, even if the disclosures were made in the manner that is proposed in this
+letter. The national security implications of disclosures related to the receipt of such process
+may vary depending on the identity of the company that is making the disclosure and the overall
+number of disclosures by different companies. For this reason, if other companies also seek to
+disclose information about the volume of such process that they receive, that may alter our
+calculus about the implications of disclosures by Yahoo. In addition, our current
+determination is based on our prediction about the potential national security consequences of
+
+¹ The FBI does not have the authority to negate a court order, nor can we bind state or local authorities.
+calculus about the implications of disclosures by Yahoo. In addition, our current determination
+is based on our prediction about the potential national security consequences of the disclosures
+and as such we may in the future revise our position as circumstances change or as we evaluate
+the actual impact of your disclosures on national security.
+
+This letter further commits Yahoo to coordinate with us before making any additional
+public disclosures about the volume of legal process you receive, beyond the contours outlined in
+this letter. If we revise our position, we will notify you. We would retain the right to bring an
+appropriate enforcement action with respect to any future disclosures you make after you receive
+a notification of our change in position.
+
+Thank you again for coordinating your proposal with us. We appreciate your efforts to
+reach an agreement that promotes transparency without jeopardizing our national security
+responsibilities to the public.
+
+Sincerely,
+
+Andrew Weissmann
+General Counsel
+U.S. Department of Justice
+Federal Bureau of Investigation
+
+Office of the General Counsel
+Washington, D.C. 20535
+
+June 14, 2013
+
+Ted Ullyot
+General Counsel
+Facebook
+1601 Willow Road
+Menlo Park, CA 94025
+
+Re: Facebook's Pending Transparency Report
+
+Dear Mr. Ullyot:
+
+We appreciate your discussions with us about your proposal to disclose certain
+information about the volume of legal process Facebook receives.
+
+As we discussed during our phone call on June 14, 2013, we do not intend to seek
+enforcement¹ of the non-disclosure provisions associated with any legal process, including FISA
+orders, so long as Facebook agrees to aggregate data for all of the legal process it received for
+intervals of six months, beginning with the period ending December 31, 2012, from any and all
+government entities in the United States (including local, state, and federal, and including
+criminal and national security-related requests) into bands of 1000, starting at zero, and broken
+down into two categories: the number of requests and the number of user accounts for which
+data was requested.
+
+This position is an exercise of FBI discretion in light of current circumstances and the
+precise contours of this letter. Accordingly, our decision does not reflect the FBI's position with
+respect to potential disclosures by Facebook that differ in any respect from the disclosures
+outlined in this letter. Nor is our decision a precedent for disclosures by any other company that
+is in receipt of such process, even if the disclosures were made in the manner that is proposed in
+this letter. The national security implications of disclosures related to the receipt of such process
+may vary depending on the identity of the company that is making the disclosure and the overall
+number of disclosures by different companies. For this reason, if other companies also seek to
+disclose information about the volume of such process that they receive, that may alter our
+calculus about the implications of disclosures by Facebook. In addition, our current
+determination is based on our prediction about the potential national security consequences of
+
+¹ The FBI does not have the authority to negate a court order, nor can we bind state or local authorities.
+the disclosures and as such we may in the future revise our position as circumstances change or
+as we evaluate the actual impact of your disclosures on national security.
+
+This letter further commits Facebook to coordinate with us before making any additional
+public disclosures about the volume of legal process you receive, beyond the contours outlined in
+this letter. If we revise our position, we will notify you. We would retain the right to bring an
+appropriate enforcement action with respect to any future disclosures you make after you receive
+a notification of our change in position.
+
+Thank you again for coordinating your proposal with us. We appreciate your efforts to
+reach an agreement that promotes transparency without jeopardizing our national security
+responsibilities to the public.
+
+Sincerely,
+
+Andrew Weissmann
+General Counsel
+(U) ATTACHMENT “C”
+CLASSIFIED INFORMATION NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENT
+AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN
+AND THE UNITED STATES
+(Name of Individual - Printed or typed)
+1. Intending to be legally bound, I hereby accept the obligations contained in this Agreement in consideration of my being granted
+access to classified information. As used in this Agreement, classified information is marked or unmarked classified information,
+including oral communications, that is classified under the standards of Executive Order 13526, or under any other Executive order or
+statute that prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of information in the interest of national security; and unclassified information that
+meets the standards for classification and is in the process of a classification determination as provided in sections 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and
+1.4(e) of Executive Order 13526, or under any other Executive order or statute that requires protection for such information in the
+interest of national security. I understand and accept that by being granted access to classified information, special confidence and
+trust shall be placed in me by the United States Government.
+
+2. I hereby acknowledge that I have received a security indoctrination concerning the nature and protection of classified information,
+including the procedures to be followed in ascertaining whether other persons to whom I contemplate disclosing this information have
+been approved for access to it, and that I understand these procedures.
+
+3. I have been advised that the unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized retention, or negligent handling of classified information by me
+could cause damage or irreparable injury to the United States or could be used to advantage by a foreign nation. I hereby agree that I
+will never divulge classified information to anyone unless: (a) I have officially verified that the recipient has been properly authorized by
+the United States Government to receive it; or (b) I have been given prior written notice of authorization from the United States
+Government Department or Agency (hereinafter Department or Agency) responsible for the classification of information or last granting
+me a security clearance that such disclosure is permitted. I understand that if I am uncertain about the classification status of
+information, I am required to confirm from an authorized official that the information is unclassified before I may disclose it, except to a
+person as provided in (a) or (b), above. I further understand that I am obligated to comply with laws and regulations that prohibit the
+unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
+
+4. I have been advised that any breach of this Agreement may result in the termination of any security clearances I hold; removal from
+any position of special confidence and trust requiring such clearances; or termination of my employment or other relationships with the
+Departments or Agencies that granted my security clearance or clearances. In addition, I have been advised that any unauthorized
+disclosure of classified information by me may constitute a violation, or violations, of United States criminal laws, including the
+provisions of sections 641, 793, 794, 798, *952 and 1924, title 18, United States Code; *the provisions of section 783(b), title 50,
+United States Code; and the provisions of the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982. I recognize that nothing in this Agreement
+constitutes a waiver by the United States of the right to prosecute me for any statutory violation.
+
+5. I hereby assign to the United States Government all royalties, remunerations, and emoluments that have resulted, will result or may
+result from any disclosure, publication, or revelation of classified information not consistent with the terms of this Agreement.
+
+6. I understand that the United States Government may seek any remedy available to it to enforce this Agreement including, but not
+limited to, application for a court order prohibiting disclosure of information in breach of this Agreement.
+
+7. I understand that all classified information to which I have access or may obtain access by signing this Agreement is now and will
+remain the property of, or under the control of the United States Government unless and until otherwise determined by an authorized
+official or final ruling of a court of law. I agree that I shall return all classified materials which have, or may come into my possession or
+for which I am responsible because of such access: (a) upon demand by an authorized representative of the United States
+Government; (b) upon the conclusion of my employment or other relationship with the Department or Agency that last granted me a
+security clearance or that provided me access to classified information; or (c) upon the conclusion of my employment or other
+relationship that requires access to classified information. If I do not return such materials upon request, I understand that this may be
+a violation of sections 793 and/or 1924, title 18, United States Code, a United States criminal law.
+
+8. Unless and until I am released in writing by an authorized representative of the United States Government, I understand that all
+conditions and obligations imposed upon me by this Agreement apply during the time I am granted access to classified information,
+and at all times thereafter.
+
+9. Each provision of this Agreement is severable. If a court should find any provision of this Agreement to be unenforceable, all other
+provisions of this Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.
+
+10. These provisions are consistent with and do not supersede, conflict with, or otherwise alter the employee obligations, rights, or
+liabilities created by existing statute or Executive order relating to (1) classified information, (2) communications to Congress, (3) the
+reporting to an Inspector General of a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of
+authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety, or (4) any other whistleblower protection. The definitions,
+requirements, obligations, rights, sanctions, and liabilities created by controlling Executive orders and statutory provisions are
+incorporated into this agreement and are controlling.
+
+(Continue on reverse.)
+NSN 7540-01-280-5499
+Previous edition not usable.
+STANDARD FORM 312 (Rev. 7-2013)
+Prescribed by ODNI
+32 CFR PART 2001.80 E.O. 13526
+11. These restrictions are consistent with and do not supersede, conflict with, or otherwise alter the employee obligations, rights, or
+liabilities created by Executive Order No. 13526 (75 Fed. Reg. 707), or any successor thereto section 7211 of title 5, United States
+Code (governing disclosures to Congress); section 1034 of title 10, United States Code, as amended by the Military Whistleblower
+Protection Act (governing disclosure to Congress by members of the military); section 2302(b) (8) of title 5, United States Code, as
+amended by the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 (governing disclosures of illegality, waste, fraud, abuse or public health or
+safety threats); the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 (50 U.S.C. 421 et seq.) (governing disclosures that could expose
+confidential Government agents); sections 7(c) and 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) (relating to disclosures to
+an inspector general; the inspectors general of the Intelligence Community, and Congress); section 103H(g) (3) of the National Security
+Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3h(g) (3) (relating to disclosures to the inspector general of the Intelligence Community); sections 17(d)(5)
+and 17(e)(3) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403g(d) (5) and 403q(e) (3)) (relating to disclosures to the
+Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency and Congress); and the statutes which protect against disclosure that may
+compromise the national security, including sections 641, 793, 794, 798, *952 and 1924 of title 18, United States Code, and *section 4
+(b) of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. section 783(b)). The definitions, requirements, obligations, rights,
+sanctions, and liabilities created by said Executive Order and listed statutes are incorporated into this agreement and are controlling.
+
+12. I have read this Agreement carefully and my questions, if any, have been answered. I acknowledge that the briefing officer has
+made available to me the Executive Order and statutes referenced in this agreement and its implementing regulation (32 CFR Part
+2001, section 2001.80(d)(2)) so that I may read them at this time, if I so choose.
+
+* NOT APPLICABLE TO NON-GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT.
+SIGNATURE
+DATE
+SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER (See Notice below)
+
+ORGANIZATION (IF CONTRACTOR, LICENSEE, GRANTEE OR AGENT, PROVIDE: NAME, ADDRESS, AND, IF APPLICABLE, FEDERAL SUPPLY CODE
+NUMBER) (Type or print)
+
+WITNESS
+ACCEPTANCE
+
+THE EXECUTION OF THIS AGREEMENT WAS WITNESSED
+BY THE UNDERSIGNED.
+THE UNDERSIGNED ACCEPTED THIS AGREEMENT ON
+BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.
+
+SIGNATURE
+NAME AND ADDRESS (Type or print)
+DATE
+SIGNATURE
+NAME AND ADDRESS (Type or print)
+DATE
+
+SECURITY DEBRIEFING ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
+I reaffirm that the provisions of the espionage laws, other federal criminal laws and executive orders applicable to the safeguarding of classified
+information have been made available to me; that I have returned all classified information in my custody; that I will not communicate or
+transmit classified information to any unauthorized person or organization; that I will promptly report to the Federal Bureau of Investigation any
+attempt by an unauthorized person to solicit classified information, and that 1.(have) (have not) (strike out inappropriate word or words)
+received a security debriefing.
+SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
+DATE
+
+NAME OF WITNESS (Type or print)
+SIGNATURE OF WITNESS
+
+NOTICE: The Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a, requires that federal agencies inform individuals, at the time information is solicited from them, whether the
+disclosure is mandatory or voluntary, by what authority such information is solicited, and what uses will be made of the information. You are hereby
+advised that authority for soliciting your Social Security Account Number (SSN) is Executive Order 9397. Your SSN will be used to identify you
+precisely when it is necessary to 1) certify that you have access to the information indicated above or 2) determine that your access to the information
+indicated has been terminated. Although disclosure of your SSN is not mandatory, your failure to do so may impede the processing of such certifications or determinations, or possibly result in the dental of your being granted access to classified
+information.
+
+* NOT APPLICABLE TO NON-GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT.
+STANDARD FORM 312 BACK (REV. 1.00)
+APD V1.00
+CLASSIFIED INFORMATION NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENT
+AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN
+AND THE UNITED STATES
+(Name of Individual - Printed or typed)
+
+1. Intending to be legally bound, I hereby accept the obligations contained in this Agreement in consideration of my being
+granted access to classified information. As used in this Agreement, classified information is marked or unmarked classified
+information, including oral communications, that is classified under the standards of Executive Order 12958, or under any
+other Executive order or statute that prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of information in the interest of national security;
+and unclassified information that meets the standards for classification and is in the process of a classification determination
+as provided in Sections 1.2, 1.3, and 14(e) of Executive Order 12958, or under any other Executive order or statute that
+requires protection for such information in the interest of national security. I understand and accept that by being granted
+access to classified information, special confidence and trust shall be placed in me by the United States Government.
+
+2. I hereby acknowledge that I have received a security indoctrination concerning the nature and protection of classified
+information, including the procedures to be followed in ascertaining whether other persons to whom I contemplate disclosing
+this information have been approved for access to it, and that I understand these procedures.
+
+3. I have been advised that the unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized retention, or negligent handling of classified information
+by me could cause damage or irreparable injury to the United States or could be used to advantage by a foreign nation. I
+hereby agree that I will never divulge classified information to anyone unless: (a) I have officially verified that the recipient
+has been properly authorized by the United States Government to receive it; or (b) I have been given prior written notice of
+authorization from the United States Government Department or Agency (hereinafter Department or Agency) responsible for
+the classification of the information or last granting me a security clearance that such disclosure is permitted. I understand
+that if I am uncertain about the classification status of information, I am required to confirm from an authorized official that
+the information is unclassified before I may disclose it, except to a person as provided in (a) or (b), above. I further
+understand that I am obligated to comply with laws and regulations that prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of classified
+information.
+
+4. I have been advised that any breach of this Agreement may result in the termination of any security clearances I hold;
+removal from any position of special confidence and trust requiring such clearances; or the termination of my employment or
+other relationships with the Departments or Agencies that granted my security clearance or clearances. In addition, I have
+been advised that any unauthorized disclosure of classified information by me may constitute a violation, or violations, of
+United States criminal laws, including the provisions of Sections 641, 793, 794, 798, *952 and 1924, Title 18, United
+States Code, the provisions of Section 783(b), Title 50, United States Code, and the provisions of the Intelligence Identities
+Protection Act of 1982. I recognize that nothing in this Agreement constitutes a waiver by the United States of the right to
+prosecute me for any statutory violation.
+
+5. I hereby assign to the United States Government all royalties, remunerations, and emoluments that have resulted, will
+result or may result from any disclosure, publication, or revelation of classified information not consistent with the terms of
+this Agreement.
+
+6. I understand that the United States Government may seek any remedy available to it to enforce this Agreement including,
+but not limited to, application for a court order prohibiting disclosure of information in breach of this Agreement.
+
+7. I understand that all classified information to which I have access or may obtain access by signing this Agreement is now
+and will remain the property of, or under the control of the United States Government unless and until otherwise determined
+by an authorized official or final ruling of a court of law. I agree that I shall return all classified materials which have, or may
+come into my possession or for which I am responsible because of such access: (a) upon demand by an authorized
+representative of the United States Government; (b) upon the conclusion of my employment or other relationship with the
+Department or Agency that last granted me a security clearance or that provided me access to classified information; or (c)
+upon the conclusion of my employment or other relationship that requires access to classified information. If I do not return
+such materials upon request, I understand that this may be a violation of Section 793 and/or 1924, Title 18, United States
+Code, a United States criminal law.
+
+8. Unless and until I am released in writing by an authorized representative of the United States Government, I understand
+that all conditions and obligations imposed upon me by this Agreement apply during the time I am granted access to classified
+information, and at all times thereafter.
+
+9. Each provision of this Agreement is severable. If a court should find any provision of this Agreement to be unenforceable,
+all other provisions of this Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.
+
+(Continue on reverse.)
+NSN 7540-01-280-5499
+Previous edition not usable.
+STANDARD FORM 312 (REV. 1-00)
+Prescribed by NARA/ISOO
+32 CFR 2003, E.O. 12958
+APD V1.00
+10. These restrictions are consistent with and do not supersede, conflict with or otherwise alter the employee obligations,
+rights or liabilities created by Executive Order 12356; Section 7211 of Title 5, United States Code (governing disclosures to
+Congress); Section 1034 of Title 10, United States Code, as amended by the Military Whistleblower Protection Act (governing
+disclosure to Congress by members of the military); Section 2302(b)(8) of Title 5, United States Code, as amended by the
+Whistleblower Protection Act (governing disclosures of illegality, waste, fraud, abuse or public health or safety threats); the
+Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 (50 U.S.C. 421 et seq.) (governing disclosures that could expose confidential
+Government agents), and the statutes which protect against disclosure that may compromise the national security, including
+Sections 641, 793, 794, 798, 952 and 1924 of Title 18, United States Code, and Section 4(b) of the Subversive Activities
+Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. Section 783(b)). The definitions, requirements, obligations, rights, sanctions and liabilities created by
+said Executive Order and listed statutes are incorporated into this Agreement and are controlling.
+
+11. I have read this Agreement carefully and my questions, if any, have been answered. I acknowledge that the briefing
+officer has made available to me the Executive Order and statutes referenced in this Agreement and its implementing regulation
+(32 CFR Section 2003.20) so that I may read them at this time, if I so choose.
+
+* NOT APPLICABLE TO NON-GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT.
+SIGNATURE
+DATE
+SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER (See Notice below)
+
+ORGANIZATION (IF CONTRACTOR, LICENSEE, GRANTEE OR AGENT, PROVIDE: NAME, ADDRESS, AND, IF APPLICABLE, FEDERAL SUPPLY CODE NUMBER)
+(Type or Print)
+
+WITNESS
+ACCEPTANCE
+
+THE EXECUTION OF THIS AGREEMENT WAS WITNESSED BY THE UNDERSIGNED ACCEPTED THIS AGREEMENT ON
+THE UNDERSIGNED.
+BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.
+
+SIGNATURE
+NAME AND ADDRESS (Type or print)
+DATE
+SIGNATURE
+NAME AND ADDRESS (Type or print)
+DATE
+
+SECURITY DEBRIEFING ACKNOWLEDGMENT
+I reaffirm that the provisions of the espionage laws, other federal criminal laws and executive orders applicable to the safeguarding of classified
+information have been made available to me; that I have returned all classified information in my custody; that I will not communicate or
+transmit classified information to any unauthorized person or organization; that I will promptly report to the Federal Bureau of Investigation any
+attempt by an unauthorized person to solicit classified information, and that 1.(have) (have not) (strike out inappropriate word or words)
+received a security debriefing.
+SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
+DATE
+
+NAME OF WITNESS (Type or print)
+SIGNATURE OF WITNESS
+
+NOTICE: The Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a, requires that federal agencies inform individuals, at the time information is solicited from them,
+whether the 'disclosure is mandatory or voluntary, by what authority such information is solicited, and what uses will be made of the
+information. You are hereby advised that authority for soliciting your Social Security Account Number (SSN) is Executive Order 9397. Your
+SSN will be used to identify you precisely when it is necessary to 1) certify that you have access to the information indicated above or 2)
+determine that your access to the information indicated has been terminated. Although disclosure of your SSN is not mandatory, your failure to do
+so may impede the processing of such certifications or determinations, or possibly result in the dental of your being granted access to classified
+information.
+
+* NOT APPLICABLE TO NON-GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT.
+STANDARD FORM 312 BACK (REV. 1.00)
+APD V1.00
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_declaration-of-andrew-mccabe-131002/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_declaration-of-andrew-mccabe-131002/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9582b8c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_declaration-of-andrew-mccabe-131002/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": " Declaration of Andrew G. McCabe",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-09-30",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-09-30",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34470",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "71eb867e53cdffb194e0459ccf96ed7c9270fa4e68497e5ce23659697ba2011c",
+ "pages": 58
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_doj-opposition-motion/FISC_-_doj-opposition-motion.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_doj-opposition-motion/FISC_-_doj-opposition-motion.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f4f79e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_doj-opposition-motion/FISC_-_doj-opposition-motion.md
@@ -0,0 +1,406 @@
+UNITED STATES
+2013 2013.01-7 JUH-7 P11 2:06
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+CLERMO
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR CONSENT TO DISCLOSURE )
+OF COURT RECORDS OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, )
+A DETERMINATION OF THE EFFECT OF THE )
+COURT'S RULES ON STATUTORY ACCESS RIGHTS )
+Docket No.: Misc. 13-01
+
+THE UNITED STATES' OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION
+OF THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION
+
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+
+J. BRADFORD WIEGMANN
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+TASHINA GAUHAR
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+JEFFREY M. SMITH
+NICHOLAS J. PATTERSON
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+Phone: (202) 514-5600
+Fax: (202) 514-8053
+
+Attorneys for the United States of America
+
+Movant seeks to obtain from the Government copies of an opinion of this Court which is
+currently subject to seal pursuant to this Court's rules. This Court should deny the instant
+Motion both because it is outside this Court's jurisdiction and because there is good reason not to
+vacate the seal on the opinion.
+
+BACKGROUND
+
+Movant Electronic Frontier Foundation brings the instant Motion seeking this Court's
+intervention in support of Movant's ongoing Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") lawsuit
+currently pending before Judge Amy Berman Jackson of the U.S. District Court for the District
+of Columbia in which Movant contends that the U.S. Department of Justice has unlawfully
+withheld records responsive to its FOIA request. See *Electronic Frontier Found. v. Dep't of
+Justice*, No. 12-CV-1441-ABJ (D.D.C. filed Aug. 30, 2012). In response to Movant's FOIA
+request, the Department of Justice located five documents. Only two of these documents are
+relevant here, and they are two copies of the same document. One is an unredacted version of an
+opinion of this Court, and the other is a partially redacted version of the same opinion. See
+*Electronic Frontier Found*., No. 12-CV-1441, Doc. No. 11-2.
+
+The Department of Justice moved for summary judgment in the FOIA case. See
+*Electronic Frontier Found*., No. 12-CV-1441, Doc. No. 11-1. With regard to the two versions of
+the responsive opinion of this Court, the Government contended that the Department had no
+discretion to release the opinion under the FISC's Rules of Procedure. See *id*. at 11-15. The
+Department also argued that this opinion, as well as the other material withheld in that case, is
+properly classified and therefore exempt from release pursuant to Exemptions 1 and 3 of FOIA.
+*Id*. at 15-25.
+
+1
+
+Rather than respond to the Department's motion for summary judgment, Movant sought
+and received a stay of that litigation and came to this Court. Movant styles its request as one "for
+entry of an order consenting to the disclosure of certain Court records." Motion at 2. In fact, the
+"certain Court records" consist of a single opinion of this Court, the relevant copies of which are
+in the possession of the Department of Justice. And, "consenting to the disclosure" would
+require issuance of an order vacating this Court's seal over its opinion, which would not result in
+the release of the Court's opinion in its entirety but might ultimately lead to disclosure of
+portions of the Court's opinion at a later stage in the FOIA case.
+
+ARGUMENT
+
+The Motion at issue is outside the jurisdiction of this Court. This is not, as Movant
+suggests, a case about whether Movant has a legal right to this Court's files; it is an action in aid
+of Movant's FOIA suit against the Department of Justice seeking records from the Department's
+files. This action is outside the inherent jurisdiction previously recognized by this Court with
+respect to its supervisory power over its own records and files. Moreover, even if this Court had
+jurisdiction over this Motion, it should deny it, rather than allow another court to determine
+whether any portions of its opinion should be released under FOIA. Any such release would be
+incomplete and quite possibly misleading to the public about the role of this Court and the issues
+discussed in the opinion.
+
+I. This Court Does Not Have Jurisdiction Over This Motion
+
+The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC"), like other Article III courts, is a
+"court[] of limited jurisdiction marked out by Congress." *Int'l Custom Prods., Inc. v. United
+States*, 467 F.3d 1324, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting *Aldinger v. Howard*, 427 U.S. 1, 15
+(1976)). Thus, this Court's jurisdiction is limited to that which Congress explicitly conferred on
+
+2
+
+it plus those limited areas in which a court possesses inherent jurisdiction. See *Chambers v.
+NASCO, Inc*., 501 U.S. 32, 43-44 (1991) ("It has long been understood that '[c]ertain implied
+powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature of their institution.'").
+Neither this Court's statutory jurisdiction nor its inherent jurisdiction extends to this Motion.
+
+This Court's statutory jurisdiction is limited to certain applications and certifications that
+may be filed by the Government, see 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804, 1823, 1842, 1861, 1881(b), 1881(c),
+and 1881(d), and two types of petitions that a private party may file, neither of which is
+applicable here. See 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f) (permitting a person receiving a production order to file
+a petition to challenge that order); 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a) (permitting an electronic service provider
+that receives a Section 1881(a) directive to file a petition to challenge that directive). Indeed,
+Movant does not claim that this Court's statutory jurisdiction encompasses the instant Motion.
+See Motion at 4-5.
+
+Instead, Movant relies entirely on this Court's earlier holding that it has inherent
+jurisdiction "to adjudicate a claim of right to the court's very own records and files." *Id*. at 5
+(quoting *In re Release of Court Records*, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, 487 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct.
+2007)). But, unlike the movant in *In re Release* who claimed that the First Amendment and the
+common law required this Court to open its files and make documents available to the public,
+Movant here does not claim a right "to the court's very own records and files." Movant is not
+asking this Court to release any documents, nor to open up its files. Indeed, Movant does not
+cite any "claim of right" against this Court at all. Rather, Movant is functionally asking this
+Court to vacate in part the seal on a FISC proceeding to which it is not a party so that another
+court can order the Government to release an opinion of this Court from the Government's files.
+Movant provides no authority to support the contention that this Court has inherent jurisdiction
+
+3
+
+over such an action or that the Court's inherent jurisdiction may extend to cases where the "claim
+of right" is not against this Court, but rather is a FOIA claim against the Government being
+adjudicated by another court.
+
+Because this Motion does not fall within the Court's statutory or inherent jurisdiction, it
+should be dismissed.¹
+
+II. The Opinion at Issue Is Sealed Pursuant to This Court's Rules
+
+The opinion Movant seeks cannot be released by the Government not only because it is
+classified but also because it is under this Court's seal. As Judge Bates has explained, "[t]he
+FISC is a unique court," whereas "[o]ther courts operate primarily in public, with secrecy the
+exception; the FISC operates primarily in secret, with public access the exception." In re
+Release, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 487-88. The FISC maintains this operational secrecy because, unlike
+any other court, its "entire docket relates to the collection of foreign intelligence by the federal
+government." Id. at 487.
+
+The FISC's operations are governed "by FISA, by Court rule, and by statutorily
+mandated security procedures issued by the Chief Justice of the United States [which] [t]ogether
+represent a comprehensive scheme for the safeguarding and handling of FISC proceedings and
+records." Id. at 488. In this scheme, the first line of defense for the protection of the FISC's
+records, including opinions, is the FISC's Rules of Procedure.
+_______
+¹ This does not mean, however, that the Court is without the power to unseal its opinions. As discussed
+below, Rule 62(a) of this Court's rules provides that a judge of this Court may, on motion by a party or
+sua sponte, after consultation with the other judges of the Court and with review and redaction by the
+Executive Branch for classification, direct that an opinion that he or she authored be published. See U.S.
+Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, Rule of Procedure 62(a) (2010). This procedure, which allows
+for input from all judges on the Court and the Executive Branch, and which is not required in response to
+a motion from a non-party otherwise not involved in the case, is the proper mechanism by which this
+Court considers whether or not its opinions should be unsealed and made available to the public.
+
+4
+
+A plain reading of the FISC's Rules of Procedure, as well as the longstanding practice of
+the FISC and the Government implementing these rules, makes clear that FISC opinions,
+including the instant opinion, are sealed and, with one exception that is not applicable here, the
+Government cannot release copies of FISC opinions in its possession without permission from
+the FISC. Under FISC Rule 62(a), FISC opinions can only be made public if the "Judge who
+authored an order, opinion, or other decision ... *sua sponte* or on motion by a party request[s]
+that it be published." See U.S. Foreign Intelligence Court, Rule of Procedure 62(a) (2010).
+When such a request is made, "the Presiding Judge, after consulting with other Judges of the
+Court, may direct that an order, opinion or other decision be published." Id.
+
+The FISC Rule provides a critical role for the Executive Branch before publication but
+makes clear that the FISC is the decisionmaker regarding unsealing: "Before publication, the
+Court may, as appropriate, direct the Executive Branch to review the order, opinion, or other
+decision and redact it as necessary to ensure that properly classified information is appropriately
+protected pursuant to Executive Order 13526 (or its successor)." Id.
+
+Furthermore, FISC Rule 62's next subsection reinforces the FISC's limits on the
+unsealing of orders. In what is essentially a catchall clause, FISC Rule 62(b) states that "[e]xcept
+when an order, opinion, or other decision is published or provided to a party upon issuance, the
+Clerk may not release it, or other related record, without a Court order." See U.S. Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court, Rule of Procedure 62(b) (2010).
+
+The Rule provides one exception under which the Government may release a FISC order
+without Court approval, but even then, places a tight constraint on such action. Under FISC Rule
+62(c)(1), the Government "may provide copies of Court orders, opinions, decisions, or other
+Court records, to Congress, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §§ 1871(a)(5), 1871(c), or 1881f(b)(1)(D), or
+
+5
+
+any other statutory requirement, without prior motion to and order by the Court." See U.S.
+Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, Rule of Procedure 62(e)(1) (2010). The Government,
+however, "must contemporaneously notify the Court in writing whenever it provides copies of
+Court records to Congress and must include in the notice a list of the documents provided."
+See id.
+
+This language makes clear that the Government's right to provide copies of opinions to
+Congress (albeit with contemporaneous notice to this Court) is an explicit exception to the
+otherwise applicable rule that the Government may not disclose copies of FISC opinions without
+an order from the Court. Indeed, it would make little sense for FISC Rule 62 explicitly to
+articulate this limited exception for disclosures to Congress if the Government had the ability to
+unseal and publish FISC opinions without Court approval in other circumstances.
+
+Longstanding practice also supports this reading of the FISC Rules of Procedure. As this
+Court is aware, prior to the 2010 FISC Rules of Procedure, the Government had, when it needed
+to disclose an order, opinion, decision, or other record of this Court to Congress, filed an *in
+camera* motion asking this Court to unseal the records for that purpose, a step that was necessary
+only because this Court's orders, opinions, and other records are viewed as being under seal.
+That practice would have been unnecessary, and the Court's prior orders in this regard would be
+of no operative consequence, if the rules did not serve as a seal barring the release of FISC
+opinions and orders without Court approval. The 2010 revisions to the FISC Rules of Procedure,
+while relaxing the procedure to allow provision of materials to Congress with notice rather than
+Court approval, did not purport to alter the underlying principle that FISC orders and opinions
+are under seal. Since that time, under the current FISC Rules of Procedure, when the
+Government has needed to provide FISC orders and related records to other courts in connection
+
+6
+
+with criminal cases in which FISA information is to be used against a criminal defendant, the
+Government has filed motions with this Court to unseal the records for this purpose, and the
+Court has granted such motions. Again, these unsealing orders would be unnecessary were there
+no seal in effect. This consistent practice demonstrates that FISC orders, opinions, and related
+records are under seal, that both the Government and this Court have treated them as such, and
+that the Government does not have discretion to disclose such records without the approval of
+this Court.
+
+Thus, when read together and in light of longstanding practice, the different sections of
+FISC Rule 62 reveal that the Court places tight controls on the unsealing of orders, retaining
+authority to determine whether opinions should be disclosed in almost all instances. The instant
+opinion, because it has not been unsealed by this Court, is still under seal, and the Government
+cannot release it to Movant.
+
+III. This Court Should Not Vacate the Seal on the Opinion
+
+Even assuming this Court has jurisdiction over this Motion, it should deny the Motion. If
+this Court grants Movant the relief sought, the consequence would be that the Government could
+release the opinion or any portion of it in its discretion, and that another court, not as familiar as
+this Court with the equities at issue, could order the release of the opinion or some portion of it.
+If this Court were to find that its Rules of Procedure do not operate to seal its opinions at all, the
+consequences would be even more dramatic: the Government would be free to release any
+opinion or portion thereof without Court approval, and other courts could likewise order the
+release of any FISC opinion.
+
+Of course, the Government could continue to assert classification of FISC opinions as
+grounds for non-disclosure under FOIA. As a practical matter, if any release were to occur, it is
+
+7
+
+likely that it would be only unclassified portions of an opinion not intertwined with or tending to
+reveal classified information. This Court has no way to judge *ex ante* whether such a selective
+release of material would provide a misleading view of this Court's opinion or otherwise
+undermine important interests in the Court's oversight of the Government's activities.
+Moreover, whatever the outcome of this particular case, granting the relief sought by Movant
+here will set a precedent that could lead to many more requests for releases of this Court's
+opinions.
+
+A release involving the disclosure of some parts of a FISC opinion while concealing
+other parts creates a substantial risk of public misunderstanding or confusion regarding this
+Court's decision or reasoning. Because the facts presented in applications to the FISC typically
+involve classified intelligence activities, the disclosure of which could be harmful to the nation's
+security, and the facts and the legal analysis of FISC opinions are so inextricably intertwined,
+exercising the classified information from the FISC's analysis would result in a remnant void of
+much or any useful meaning.²
+
+While classification decisions regarding national security information are within the
+exclusive purview of the Executive Branch, this Court has an independent equity in ensuring that
+its opinions are not presented to the public in a highly incomplete or misleading manner. The
+Court's sealing rules protect this equity, as well as protecting classified information. Granting
+Movant's request at a time when the Court does not know what portions of its opinion might
+ultimately be released would vitiate that equity in this case and set a precedent for future cases in
+which third parties will seek releases of this Court's sealed opinions.
+_______
+² The Court, of course, has a means of providing public access to its opinions in those cases where it
+determines that meaningful access to the opinion is possible and desirable. See U.S. Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Court, Rule of Procedure 62(a) (2010). That the Court did not consider the opinion at issue
+here a good candidate for public release is unsurprising given the fact-intensive nature of FISC opinions.
+
+8
+
+IV. The Fact That Movant May Be Unsuccessful in the District Court in Compelling the
+Department of Justice to Release a Classified, Sealed FISC Opinion Does Not Mean
+That Plaintiff Faces a "Catch-22"
+
+Movant misinterprets FISC Rule 62(a) and its relation to FOIA, positing a "Catch-22"
+where none exists. In fact, it is well-established that requesters cannot receive records either
+from a district court or the Executive Branch when the records are under seal. The fact that there
+are two separate reasons why Movant cannot obtain the FISC opinion it seeks—because it is
+properly classified by the Executive Branch and because it is under this Court's seal—does not
+imply a "Catch-22."
+
+Indeed, the D.C. Circuit has held that the Government may withhold materials in a FOIA
+case if the materials are under seal and the sealing court intended to prevent the Government
+from disclosing the materials. In *Morgan v. U.S. Dep't of Justice*, 923 F.2d 195 (D.C. Cir.
+1991), which involved a FOIA request where the requestor sought documents in the
+Government's possession that had been sealed by a district court, the D.C. Circuit held that "the
+proper test for determining whether an agency improperly withholds records under seal is
+whether the seal, like an injunction, prohibits the agency from disclosing the records." *Id*. at 197
+(citing *GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc*., 445 U.S. 375, 386-87
+(1980) (holding that (1) an agency does not abuse its discretion under the FOIA by honoring a
+court order enjoining the agency from releasing records because in such a case there "simply [is]
+no discretion for the agency to exercise," and (2) respect for the judicial process requires the
+agency to honor the injunction)). The D.C. Circuit held that if the seal prohibits disclosure, "the
+FOIA does not compel the agency to release the information." *Id*. Morgan's logic has particular
+force in the context of an opinion of this "uniquely nonpublic" court, *In re Release*, 526 F. Supp.
+
+9
+
+2d at 491 n.18, which "operates primarily in secret, with public access the exception," *id*. at 488.³
+See also *Gerstein v. U.S. Dep't of Justice*, No. C-03-04893 RMW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
+41276, at *17-*21 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2005) (finding that the Department of Justice properly
+withheld under FOIA sealed search warrants where disclosure to third parties would eliminate
+the courts' ability to keep the warrants confidential); *Nguyen v. FBI*, No. 04-0018 RWR, 2006
+U.S.Dist. LEXIS 75943, at *1-*2 (Oct. 19, 2006) (finding that the Federal Bureau of
+Investigation properly withheld under FOIA a sealed court order concerning third party
+informant).
+
+But in any event, the United States has not asked this Court to hold that the Government
+may withhold the opinion pursuant to FOIA. That is a decision for Judge Jackson to make in the
+FOIA litigation pending before her. The United States is arguing here that this Court should,
+absent a dismissal on jurisdictional grounds, recognize that its opinion is under seal and decline
+to vacate the seal for the reasons stated above. In this regard, Movant appears to misconstrue
+this Court's opinion regarding FISC records and FOIA in *In re Motion for Release of Court
+Records*. In that case, the movant had not filed a FOIA request but had instead requested that the
+FISC release orders and other materials. *In re Release*, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 485. In rejecting the
+movant's request, the FISC stated that a party could "submit[] a FOIA request," *id*. at 496 n.32,
+_______
+³ In *Morgan*, the D.C. Circuit gave the D.C. district court handling the FOIA case leave to stay
+proceedings pending a clarification from the Maryland district court that had issued the seal that
+prohibited the Department of Justice from releasing the materials. *Morgan*, 923 F.2d at 198. (The
+Government has not sought such a clarification in this case because there has never been any doubt that
+under the FISC rules—based on the language of the rules and the longstanding practice thereunder—the
+Government cannot release a FISC opinion without Court approval.) In subsequent litigation, the
+Maryland district court that had sealed the materials issued a Memorandum and Order granting a motion
+of the United States for clarification and denying Morgan's motion to remove the seal. *United States v.
+Morgan*, No. H-83-00351 (D. Md. July 3, 1991). Specifically, the court clarified the issue of its intent by
+holding that the "sealing Order, which was affirmed when the Fourth Circuit declined to unseal the notes,
+was intended to operate as the functional equivalent of an injunction prohibiting disclosure of the matters
+under seal." *Id*. at 5. The Fourth Circuit then affirmed the district court's decision clarifying the intent of
+the order sealing the documents and denying the motion to remove the seal. *U.S. v. Morgan*, 962 F.2d 8
+(4th Cir. 1992) (Table).
+
+10
+
+for such records and pursue "whatever remedies may be available to it in a district court." *Id*. at
+497. In so doing, the FISC did not state that such records would necessarily be released or could
+be released in the absence of a FISC order unsealing the materials. *Id*.
+
+The United States agrees that a FOIA request and subsequent suit in the district court is
+the proper method for Movant to test whether it has a legal right to obtain the opinion. The
+Government has argued in the district court that Movant has no such right to obtain a classified,
+sealed FISC opinion. The fact that Movant lacks a legal right to obtain the document it seeks
+does not imply a "Catch-22." Rather, as in *Morgan* and the other cases cited above, it indicates
+that neither this Court nor the Executive Branch is obliged under FOIA to release the opinion.
+
+11
+
+CONCLUSION
+
+For the reasons stated above, the Court should deny the Motion.⁴
+
+June 7, 2013
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+
+J. BRADFORD WIEGMANN
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+TASHINA GAUHAR
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+Nicholas J. Patterson
+
+JEFFREY M. SMITH
+NICHOLAS J. PATTERSON
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+Phone: (202) 514-5600
+Fax: (202) 514-8053
+
+Attorneys for the United States of America
+_______
+⁴ Even if this Court were to grant the relief sought in the Motion, the opinion at issue would remain
+classified and could not be given to Movant absent a decision to declassify it, in whole or in part, by the
+Executive Branch, whether on its own initiative or by Order of a court reviewing a FOIA request.
+
+12
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I hereby certify that a true copy of the United States of America's Opposition to the
+Motion of the Electronic Frontier Foundation was served via Federal Express and email on this
+7th day of June, 2013, addressed to:
+
+David L. Sobel
+Electronic Frontier Foundation
+1818 N Street, N. W., Suite 410
+Washington, DC 20036
+
+Mark Rumold
+Electronic Frontier Foundation
+454 Shotwell Street
+San Francisco, CA 94110
+
+Nicholas J. Patterson
+Nicholas J. Patterson
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_doj-opposition-motion/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_doj-opposition-motion/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..84be63a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_doj-opposition-motion/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "The United States' Opposition to the Motion of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, In re Motion for Consent to Disclosure of Court Records or, in the Alternative, A Determination of the Effect of the Courts Rules on Statutory Access Rights",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-06-07",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-06-07",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34432",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "28b7ea44b82cec602e4b25c3afbc67cb641013472123e194b773ffbfcab40817",
+ "pages": 14
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_eff-bar-membership/FISC_-_eff-bar-membership.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_eff-bar-membership/FISC_-_eff-bar-membership.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..46c9fd0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_eff-bar-membership/FISC_-_eff-bar-membership.md
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+IN THE UNITED STATES FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+2012 JUL -5 PM 2:00
+FILED
+CLERKS OFFICE
+IN RE MOTION FOR CONSENT TO DISCLOSURE
+OF COURT RECORDS OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,
+A DETERMINATION OF THE EFFECT OF THE
+COURT'S RULES ON STATUTORY ACCESS RIGHTS
+)
+)
+) Docket No.: Misc. 13-01
+)
+)
+
+RESPONSE OF THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION
+TO THE COURT'S ORDER OF MAY 24, 2013
+
+Pursuant to the Court's Order of May 24, 2013, the Electronic Frontier Foundation
+("EFF") respectfully submits the following information:
+
+(1) Bar Membership Information:
+
+Undersigned counsel for EFF are licensed attorneys and members, in good standing, of
+the bars of United States district and circuit courts. See FISC Rule 7(h)(1); FISC Rule 63.
+
+David L. Sobel is a member, in good standing, of the District of Columbia Bar (Bar
+No. 360418), and is a member, in good standing, of the bars of the United States District Court
+for the District of Columbia, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
+Circuit, and the United States Supreme Court.
+
+Mark Rumold is a member, in good standing, of the State Bar of California (Bar
+No. 279060), and is a member, in good standing, of the bars of the United States District Court
+for the Northern District of California, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
+and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
+
+(2) Security Clearance Information:
+
+No member of EFF's staff, including counsel for EFF, possesses a security clearance
+issued by a federal agency. Because EFF's motion does not seek the release of legitimately
+classified information, and because the motion, itself, does not contain classified information,
+EFF respectfully submits that counsel may participate in proceedings on the motion without
+access to classified information or security clearances. See FISC Rule 63 (requiring counsel only
+to have "appropriate security clearances").
+
+Finally, the Court's Order directed the Department of Justice to respond to EFF's motion
+by June 7, 2013. Should the Court deem it appropriate, EFF would welcome the opportunity to
+offer a response to the Department's filings.
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+David Sobel /ss/
+
+DAVID L. SOBEL
+Electronic Frontier Foundation
+1818 N Street, N.W., Suite 410
+Washington, DC 20036
+(202) 797-9009
+sobel@eff.org
+
+MARK RUMOLD
+Electronic Frontier Foundation
+815 Eddy Street
+San Francisco, CA 94110
+(415) 436-9333
+mark@eff.org
+
+Counsel for Electronic Frontier Foundation
+
+2
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I HEREBY CERTIFY that copies of the foregoing motion have been served on the
+following counsel this 4th day of June, 2013, in the manner indicated:
+
+By E-mail:
+
+JACQUELINE COLEMAN SNEAD
+Senior Counsel
+United States Department of Justice
+Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch
+20 Massachusetts Ave, NW
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+
+E-mail: Jacqueline.Snead@usdoj.gov
+
+By Overnight Delivery:
+
+CHRISTINE GUNNING
+United States Department of Justice
+Litigation Security Group
+2 Constitution Square
+145 N Street NE
+Suite 2W-115
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+(202) 514-9016
+
+Mark Rumold
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_eff-bar-membership/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_eff-bar-membership/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ffa21d3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_eff-bar-membership/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Response of the Electronic Frontier Foundation to this Court's Order of May 24, 2013, In re Motion for Consent to Disclosure of Court Records or, in the Alternative, A Determination of the Effect of the Court's Rules on Statutory Access Rights",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-06-05",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-06-05",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34431",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "f45191b36f96286d4838b8d0349231a342b5ac8d3068163a57a225cdba518e85",
+ "pages": 3
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_eff-motion/FISC_-_eff-motion.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_eff-motion/FISC_-_eff-motion.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..441bd51
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_eff-motion/FISC_-_eff-motion.md
@@ -0,0 +1,271 @@
+UNITED STATES FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR CONSENT TO DISCLOSURE
+OF COURT RECORDS OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,
+A DETERMINATION OF THE EFFECT OF THE
+COURT'S RULES ON STATUTORY ACCESS RIGHTS
+
+Docket No. MISC.
+13-01
+
+MOTION OF THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION
+FOR CONSENT TO DISCLOSURE OF COURT RECORDS OR, IN
+THE ALTERNATIVE, A DETERMINATION OF THE EFFECT OF
+THE COURT'S RULES ON STATUTORY ACCESS RIGHTS
+
+DAVID L. SOBEL
+Electronic Frontier Foundation
+1818 N Street, N. W., Suite 410
+Washington, DC 20036
+(202) 797-9009
+sobel@eff.org
+
+MARK RUMOLD
+Electronic Frontier Foundation
+454 Shotwell Street
+San Francisco, CA 94110
+(415) 436-9333
+mark@efl.org
+
+Counsel for Electronic Frontier Foundation
+Introduction
+Pursuant to Rule 6(d) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court's Rules of
+Procedure ("FISC Rules"), the Electronic Frontier Foundation ("EFF") respectfully
+moves this Court for entry of an order consenting to the disclosure of certain Court
+records, subject to appropriate security procedures or, in the alternative, a determination
+that the FISC Rules do not constitute a bar to disclosure of records otherwise subject to
+release under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552. While EFF
+recognizes that such a request to this Court is unusual, EFF's need for the requested relief
+results from a position the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") has advanced in pending
+FOIA litigation in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The
+circumstances giving rise to this motion are set forth below.
+
+Background
+In July 2012, EFF filed a FOIA request with DOJ requesting, among other
+records, any "written opinion or order" of this Court in which the Court held government
+surveillance conducted under the FISA Amendments Act, Pub. L. 110-261, 122 Stat.
+2436 (2008), "was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment" or had "circumvented the
+spirit of the law." Complaint ¶ 12 (Dkt. No. 1). After DOJ failed to release the
+requested records within the statutorily-mandated timeframe, EFF filed suit in the United
+States District Court for the District of Columbia on August 30, 2012.
+
+By letter dated January 3, 2013, DOJ initially informed EFF that it had located
+records, including a FISC opinion, responsive to EFF's request. Memorandum of Points
+
+In this motion, all citations to docket entries are to EFF v. Dep't of Justice, No. 12-
+1441-ABJ (D.D.C. filed Aug. 30, 2012).
+
+2
+and Authorities in Support of the Dep't of Justice's Motion for Summary Judgment
+("DOJ Mem.") (Dkt. No. 11-1) (attached hereto as Exhibit 1) at 8-9. The agency
+indicated that the records were being withheld in full under Exemptions 1 and 3 of the
+FOIA. Id.
+
+On April 1, 2013, DOJ moved for summary judgment in the district court. The
+agency again acknowledged that it was withholding a FISC opinion responsive to EFF's
+request -- an 86-page opinion issued on October 3, 2011.2 Declaration of Mark Bradley
+("Bradley Decl."), ¶ 5 (Dkt. No. 11-3) (attached hereto as Exhibit 2). DOJ claimed in its
+motion that, independent of any exemption to FOIA, the FISC Rules bar the agency from
+disclosing any part of the responsive opinion in response to a FOIA request. See DOJ
+Mem. at 11-15. Specifically, DOJ asserted that
+
+FISC opinions and orders are subject to strict security procedures set forth
+in the FISC Rules of Procedure. See 50 U.S.C. § 1803(c) (providing that
+"record[s] of proceedings under this chapter, including applications made
+and orders granted, shall be maintained under security measures
+established by the Chief Justice in consultation with the Attorney General
+and the Director of National Intelligence"). Notwithstanding that, by
+statute, the Attorney General as part of his reporting obligations to
+Congress is authorized to provide copies of FISC opinions to Congress,
+(see 50 U.S.C. § 1871(c)(1)), the FISC Rules of Procedure require that the
+government "contemporaneously notify the Court in writing whenever it
+provides copies of Court records to Congress and must include in the
+notice a list of the documents provided." FISC R. P. 62(c)(1). Otherwise,
+the FISC Rules of Procedure do not authorize the release of court
+opinions by the Department. See FISC R. P. 62. Rather, opinions may be
+released publicly only if ordered published sua sponte by the authoring
+judge or upon motion by a party requesting publication[.]
+
+Id. at 14 (citations omitted; emphasis added). DOJ flatly asserted that "[p]ursuant to the
+FISC Rules of Procedure, the Department is prohibited from disclosing [the requested
+
+2 A second, redacted version of the FISC Opinion, which was produced for Congress,
+was also determined to be responsive to EFF's request.
+
+3
+material] publicly," and that "the Department has no discretion over the release of FISC
+orders and accordingly is not 'improperly withholding [them]." Id. at 15 (citations and
+footnote omitted). The agency's declarant stated unequivocally that "FISC rules do not
+permit the Government to release FISC opinions to a FOIA requester or any other
+member of the public without a FISC order." Bradley Decl. ¶ 8, n.2.
+
+On April 24, 2013, EFF filed a motion in the district court to stay proceedings in
+the pending FOIA matter on the ground that such a stay was warranted "to definitively
+resolve the interplay between the FISC's procedural rules, FOIA, and the release of the
+FISC opinions at issue in [the district court] case," Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion to Stay
+Proceedings (Dkt. No. 12) at 1-2, and noted that "[t]he FISC is uniquely able to opine on
+the application of its own rules, and should clearly be afforded an opportunity to do so
+before this [the district court] proceeds," id. at 3. DOJ indicated that it did not oppose
+EFF's motion, and the district court granted the motion in a minute order issued later that
+day.
+
+Argument
+1. The Court has jurisdiction to entertain this motion. On one previous occasion,
+this Court was called upon to consider its authority to render a determination concerning
+the potential disclosure of its orders and opinions. In 2007, the American Civil Liberties
+Union ("ACLU") filed a motion with the Court seeking release of certain FISC records,
+including orders issued by the Court. In re Release of Court Records, 526 F. Supp. 2d
+484 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. 2007). The government opposed the ACLU's motion,
+asserting, inter alia, that "the Court lacks jurisdiction over the motion." Id. at 485. The
+Court disagreed, noting that "it would be quite odd if the FISC did not have jurisdiction
+
+4
+in the first instance to adjudicate a claim of right to the court's very own records and
+files." Id. at 487 (footnote omitted). The Court held that "the FISC rules do not preclude
+the filing of [the] motion by the ACLU," and that "[f]urthermore, this Court's inherent
+power over its records supplies the authority to consider a claim of legal right to release
+of those records . . . ." Id.
+
+2. The FISC Rules do not bar disclosure under FOIA. Contrary to DOJ's
+assertion in the district court, the FISC Rules, in and of themselves, in no way prohibit
+disclosure of the records EFF seeks through its FOIA request. As an initial matter, the
+circumstances present here are clearly distinguishable from those the Court confronted
+when it considered the ACLU's motion in 2007. The ACLU asserted that "under the
+First Amendment and the common law, the public has a qualified right of access to the
+records in question," and sought entry of an order releasing the material on those
+grounds. In re Release of Court Records, 526 F. Supp, at 485. The Court rejected that
+argument for reasons not pertinent here, but noted that, "[o]f course, nothing in this
+decision forecloses the ACLU from pursuing whatever remedies may be available to it in
+a district court through a FOIA request addressed to the Executive Branch." Id. at 497.
+While the Court acknowledged the option of "making its own release decisions about
+classified documents . . . [by] conduct[ing] a review under the same standards as a district
+court would in FOIA litigation," it concluded "there would be no point in this Court's
+merely duplicating the judicial review that the ACLU, and anyone else, can obtain by
+
+5
+submitting a FOIA request to the Department of Justice for these same records." Id. at
+496 n.32.3
+
+Here, EFF simply seeks to pursue its statutory right of access under FOIA in the
+manner this Court previously described. Rather than ask the Court to "mak[e] its own
+release decisions about classified documents," EFF requested access to copies of the
+Court's opinions in the possession of the Executive Branch. In response, DOJ has
+represented to the district court that "[p]ursuant to the FISC Rules of Procedure, the
+Department is prohibited from disclosing [the requested material] publicly," and that "the
+Department has no discretion over the release of FISC orders and accordingly is not
+'improperly withholding [them]." Def. Mem. at 15 (citations and footnote omitted).
+DOJ specifically cites FISC Rule 62(a), which provides:
+
+Publication of Opinions. The Judge who authored an order, opinion, or
+other decision may sua sponte or on motion by a party request that it be
+published. Upon such request, the Presiding Judge, after consulting with
+other Judges of the Court, may direct that an order, opinion or other
+
+3 In its opposition to the ACLU's motion, the government agreed that FOIA provided the
+appropriate vehicle through which to seek disclosure of this Court's records:
+
+Under FOIA, the ACLU cannot ask this Court for its orders because FOIA
+applies only to Executive Branch agency records. The ACLU can use
+FOIA, however, to seek access to FISC orders and Government briefs in
+the Executive Branch's possession. The FOIA process, which combines
+an initial review and decision by the Executive Branch on the release and
+withholding of information with Judicial Branch review in an adversary
+and public proceeding, is the proper means for the ACLU to seek records
+of this Court's proceedings from the Executive Branch. Moreover, FOIA's
+judicial remedies must be sought only in district court, not in this Court.
+Instead of following the FOIA process that Congress carefully laid out, the
+ACLU has improperly attempted an end run around FOIA by filing this
+motion.
+
+Opposition to the American Civil Liberties Union's Motion for Release of Court
+Records, In re Motion for Release of Court Records (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. Misc. 07-
+01), at 5 (citation omitted).
+
+6
+decision be published. Before publication, the Court may, as appropriate,
+direct the Executive Branch to review the order, opinion, or other decision
+and redact it as necessary to ensure that properly classified information is
+appropriately protected pursuant to Executive Order 13526 (or its
+successor).
+
+EFF respectfully submits that while FISC Rule 62(a) provides one means of seeking
+disclosure of FISC records, it in no way purports to be the exclusive means of doing so.
+Indeed, this Court has explicitly recognized that "anyone" can obtain judicial review of a
+government decision to withhold copies of this Court's records "by submitting a FOIA
+request to the Department of Justice for these same records." In re Release of Court
+Records, 526 F. Supp. at 496 n.32.
+
+When the ACLU sought an order from this Court seeking the release of FISC
+records, the government complained that the request amounted to an attempted "end run
+around FOIA." Now, in the face of EFF's effort to seek disclosure of FISC material in
+the government's possession under FOIA (following this Court's explicit guidance), DOJ
+asserts that this Court's rules somehow bar release and, in effect, divest the district court
+of its jurisdiction to consider the matter. EFF submits that the government cannot have it
+both ways. The argument DOJ seeks to advance in the district court would, if accepted,
+impose a "Catch-22" preventing any judicial review of access rights to this Court's
+materials. To avoid that result. EFF respectfully requests entry of an order in which this
+Court notes its consent (or lack of opposition) to the disclosure of the material EFF seeks
+should such material be found to be non-exempt under the provisions of FOIA, subject to
+any security procedures the Court deems appropriate. In the alternative, EFF requests a
+determination that the FISC rules do not prohibit disclosure of the requested material in a
+
+7
+manner that would supersede a judicial determination that such material is subject to
+disclosure under FOIA.
+
+Conclusion
+For the foregoing reasons, EFF's motion should be granted.
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+David Sobel /s/
+
+DAVID L. SOBEL
+Electronic Frontier Foundation
+1818 N Street, N.W., Suite 410
+Washington, DC 20036
+(202) 797-9009
+sobel@eff.org
+
+Mark Rumold /s/
+
+MARK RUMOLD
+Electronic Frontier Foundation
+454 Shotwell Street
+San Francisco, CA 94110
+(415) 436-9333
+mark@eff.org
+
+Counsel for Electronic Frontier Foundation
+
+8
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I HEREBY CERTIFY that copies of the foregoing motion have been served on
+the following counsel this 21st day of May, 2013, in the manner indicated:
+
+By e-mail:
+
+JACQUELINE COLEMAN SNEAD
+Senior Counsel
+United States Department of Justice
+Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch
+20 Massachusetts Ave, NW
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+
+E-mail: Jacqueline.Snead@usdoj.gov
+
+By overnight delivery:
+
+CHRISTINE GUNNING
+United States Department of Justice
+Litigation Security Group
+2 Constitution Square
+145 N Street NE
+Suite 2W-115
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+(202) 514-9016
+
+9
+Mark Rumold
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_eff-motion/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_eff-motion/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ea411f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_eff-motion/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Motion of the Electronic Frontier Foundation for Consent to Disclosure of Court Records or, in the Alternative, a Determination of the Effect of the Court's Rules of Statutory Access Rights, In re Motion for Consent to Disclosure of Court Records or, in the Alternative, A Determination of the Effect of the Court's Rules on Statutory Access Rights",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-05-21",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-05-21",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34430",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "36725aa3366920d1b01b66260db868ed7f544b2493ef0f599c4c7e4b68ed80ab",
+ "pages": 9
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_eff-order/FISC_-_eff-order.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_eff-order/FISC_-_eff-order.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..455a180
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_eff-order/FISC_-_eff-order.md
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+UNITED STATES FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR CONSENT TO DISCLOSURE
+OF COURT RECORDS, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE,
+A DETERMINATION OF THE EFFECT OF THE
+COURT'S RULES ON STATUTORY ACCESS RIGHTS
+
+Docket No.: Misc. 13-01
+
+ORDER
+
+This matter is before the Court on the Motion of the Electronic Frontier Foundation for
+Consent to Diselosure of Court Records or, in the Alternative, a Determination of the Effect of
+the Court's Rules on Statutory Access Rights, which was submitted on May 23, 2013. Any
+response by the Department of Justice to the motion must be submitted no later than 5:00 p.m. on
+June 7, 2013.
+
+In addition, counsel for the Electronic Frontier Foundation are direeted to provide the
+additional information required under FISC Rule 7(h)(1) (bar membership information) and Rule
+7(i) (security clearance information). See also FISC Rule 63 ("Practice Before the Court"). Such
+information must be submitted, in writing, no later than 5:00 p.m. on June 7, 2013.
+
+SO ORDERED, this 240 day of May, 2013.
+
+Reggi B.
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Forcign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_eff-order/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_eff-order/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..99b35d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_eff-order/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Order, In re Motion for Consent to Disclosure of Court Records, or, in the Alternative, A Determination of the Effect of the Court’s Rules on Statutory Access Rights",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-05-24",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-05-24",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34228",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "a74a72ddeeb02f9cfc1badca2cf8d87fcae8daa6180b35f2b3bb0314a3f8f7b2",
+ "pages": 1
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_exhibit-1/FISC_-_exhibit-1.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_exhibit-1/FISC_-_exhibit-1.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eba8214
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_exhibit-1/FISC_-_exhibit-1.md
@@ -0,0 +1,1036 @@
+# EXHIBIT 1
+
+Motion of the Electronic Frontier Foundation for Consent to Disclosure of Court
+Records or, in the Alternative, a Determination of the Effect of the Court's
+Rules on Statutory Access Rights
+
+# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
+# FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
+
+ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
+FOUNDATION,
+
+Plaintiff,
+
+V.
+
+DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
+
+Defendant.
+
+Civil Action No. 12-1441-ABJ
+
+# MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF THE
+# DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
+
+STUART F. DELERY
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+
+JOHN R. TYLER
+Assistant Branch Director
+Civil Division
+
+JACQUELINE COLEMAN SNEAD (D.C. Bar
+459548)
+Senior Counsel
+United States Department of Justice
+Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch
+20 Massachusetts Ave, NW
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+Telephone: (202) 514-3418
+Fax: (202) 616-8470
+E-mail: Jacqueline.Snead@usdoj.gov
+
+Counsel for the Department of Justice
+
+# TABLE OF CONTENTS
+
+INTRODUCTION 1
+
+STATUTORY BACKGROUND 3
+
+STATEMENT OF FACTS 7
+
+ARGUMENT 9
+
+I. THE DEPARTMENT IS NOT "IMPROPERLY" WITHHOLDING
+ORDERS OF THE FISC. 11
+
+II. THE COURT SHOULD UPHOLD THE DEPARTMENT'S
+WITHHOLDINGS UNDER EXEMPTION (B)(1). 15
+
+A. An Original Classification Authority Has Properly Classified
+the Information Withheld From Plaintiff as Exempt Under (b)(1). 17
+
+B. All of the Information Withheld Pursuant to Exemption (b)(1) is
+Government Information. 18
+
+C. All of the Information Withheld Pursuant to Exemption (b)(1) Is
+Within a Category Identified in Section 1.4 of Executive
+Order No. 13526. 18
+
+D. The Unauthorized Disclosure of the Information Withheld Under
+Exemption (b)(1) Reasonably Could Be Expected to Damage
+National Security. 20
+
+III. THE COURT SHOULD UPHOLD THE DEPARTMENT'S
+WITHHOLDINGS UNDER EXEMPTION (13)(3). 22
+
+IV. THE DEPARTMENT SATISFIED FOIA'S SEGREGABILITY
+REQUIREMENT. 25
+
+A. Documents A and B Cannot Be "Reasonably" Segregated Because
+the FISC Controls the Publication of Its Orders. 26
+
+B. The Department Has Complied with FOIA's Segregability
+Requirement as to the Congressional Brielings Responsive to
+Plaintiff's FOIA Request. 27
+
+CONCLUSION 27
+
+i
+
+# TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
+
+**Cases**
+
+Abbotts v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n,
+766 F.2d 604 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 16
+
+ACLU v. CIA,
+2012 WL 4356338 (D.D.C., Sept. 25, 2012) 20, 26
+
+ACLU v. U.S. Dep't of Justice,
+681 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2012). 11,20
+
+ACLU v. U.S. Dep't of Defense,
+628 F.3d 612 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 11
+
+Center for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. Dep't of Justice,
+331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 11,21
+
+CIA v. Sims,
+471 U.S. 159 (1985). 23
+
+Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA,
+133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). 3
+
+Darui v. U.S. Dep't of State,
+798 F. Supp. 2d 32 (D.D.C. 2011) 10
+
+Essential Info., Inc. v. USIA,
+134 F.3d 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 23
+
+FBI v. Abramson,
+456 U.S. 615 (1982). 9
+
+Ferranti v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms,
+177 F. Supp. 2d 41 (D.D.C. 2001). 10
+
+Fitzgibbon v. CIA,
+911 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1990) 23
+
+Goland v. CIA,
+607 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1978) 23
+
+Grove v. Dep't of Justice,
+802 F. Supp. 506 (D.D.C. 1992). 10
+
+ii
+
+GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of U.S.,
+445 U.S. 375 (1980). 2, 11, 12
+
+Halperin v. CIA,
+629 F.2d 144 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 21,23
+
+Hayden v. NSA,,
+608 F.2d 1381 (D.C. Cir. 1979) 24
+
+In re Mot. for Rel. of Court Records,,
+526 F. Supp. 2d 484 (FISC Dec. 11, 2007). 13, 14
+
+John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp.,
+493 U.S. 146 (1989). 9
+
+Juarez v. Department of Justice,
+518 F.3d 54 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 25
+
+Kissinger v. Reporters Comin. for Freedom of the Press,
+445 U.S. 136 (1980). 15, 26
+
+Krikorian v. Dep't of State,
+984 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 11
+
+Larson v. Dep't of State,
+565 F.3d 857 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 20
+
+Linder v. NSA,
+94 F.3d 693 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 24
+
+Mack v. Dep't of the Navy,
+259 F. Supp. 2d. 99 (D.D.C. 2003). 10
+
+Military Audit Project v. Casey,
+656 F.24 724 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 16
+
+Morgan v. United States Dep't of Justice,
+923 F.2d 195 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 13
+
+Reporters Comin. for Freedom of the Press v. Dep't of Justice,
+816 F.2d 730 (D.C. Cir.) modified on other grounds,
+831 F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd on other
+grounds, 489 U.S. 749 (1989), 23
+
+iii
+
+Salisbury v. United States,
+690 F.2d 966 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 16
+
+Senate of Commonwealth of P.R. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice,
+1993 WL 364696 (D.D.C., Aug. 24, 1993) 12
+
+Soghoian v. United States Dep't of Justice,
+885 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D.D.C. 2012). 25
+
+U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Tax Analysts,
+492 U.S. 136 (1989). 10, 12, 26
+
+Weissman v. CIA,
+565 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1977).. 21
+
+Wheeler v. CIA,
+271 F. Supp. 2d 132 (D.D.C. 2003). 10
+
+Wilbur v. CIA,
+273 F. Supp. 2d 119 (D.D.C. 2003). 10
+
+Wolf v. CIA,
+473 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 11
+
+**Statutes**
+
+5 U.S.C. § 552. passim
+
+18 U.S.C. § 798 25
+
+50 U.S.C. § 402. 24
+
+50 U.S.C. § 403-1 24
+
+50 U.S.C. § 1801 4
+
+50 U.S.C. § 1803 6, 14, 26
+
+50 U.S.C. § 1821 4
+
+50 U.S.C. § 1871 14
+
+50 U.S.C. § 1881a. passim
+
+Pub. L. No. 95-511, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (Oct. 25, 1978). 3
+
+jv
+
+Pub. L. No. 110-261, 110th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 10, 2008). .3
+
+Pub. L. No. 112-238, 112th Cong., 2d Sess. (Dee. 30, 2012). 6
+
+**Other Authorities**
+
+75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29, 2009). 16, 17, 18, 19, 20
+
+FISC R. P. 62 6, 14, 26
+
+V
+
+# INTRODUCTION
+
+Last summer, in an effort to strike the right balance between government
+transparency and the protection of critical intelligence activities, the government
+declassified four statements concerning its activities pursuant to Section 702 of the
+Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") Amendments Act of 2008. Not content
+with that disclosure, Electronic Frontier Foundation ("EFF" or "Plaintiff") submitted a
+Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") request seeking additional information related to
+two of the declassified statements, specifically, that on at least one occasion the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC") "held that some collection carried out pursuant
+to the Section 702 minimization procedures used by the government was unreasonable
+under the Fourth Amendment" and that "on at least one occasion the FISA Court has
+reached th[e] conclusion" that "the government's implementation of Section 702 of
+FISA has sometimes circumvented the spirit of the law." Notwithstanding that the
+"government has remedied these concerns and the FISC has continued to approve []
+collection [pursuant to Section 702] as consistent with the statute and reasonable under
+the Fourth Amendment," EFF complains that further information about those statements
+has not been disclosed. Thus, EFF invoked FOIA and now this Court's jurisdiction to
+obtain previously, undisclosed and classified information about the government's
+intelligence activities under Section 702. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks any FISC opinions
+or orders described in the two declassified statements as well as any briefing on such
+opinions or orders to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence or the House
+Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. FOIA, however, exempts that information
+from disclosure and thus is unavailing.
+
+1
+
+Although Plaintiff was advised that two copies of a responsive FISC order were
+identified, neither could be produced to Plaintiff because the FISC Rules of Procedure
+prohibit their public disclosure. That the Department is withholding those copies thus is
+not "improper" under FOIA because the Department has no discretion in regard to their
+publication. As the Supreme Court concluded long ago, "[t]here is nothing in the
+legislative history to suggest that in adopting the Freedom of Information Act to curb
+agency discretion to conceal information, Congress intended to require an agency to
+commit contempt of court in order to release documents." *GTE Sylvania, Inc. v.
+Consumers Union of U.S.*, 445 U.S. 375, 387 (1980). Thus, the Department's compliance
+with the rules of the FISC is not improper under FOJA, and the disclosure of the
+responsive FISC orders accordingly cannot be compelled.
+
+Alternatively and independently, their withholding as well as that of the other
+three responsive records (two in part and one in its entirety) should be upheld pursuant to
+exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3). Plaintiff's request for information related to Section 702
+activities necessarily implicates classified intelligence sources and methods that these
+exemptions shield from public disclosure. The government has determined that
+disclosure of the information withheld from Plaintiff could result in exceptionally grave
+and serious damage to the national security. Plaintiff obviously cannot contend
+otherwise. The Court accordingly should defer to the government's determination in this
+case, uphold the Department's withholdings, and grant this motion.
+
+2
+
+# STATUTORY BACKGROUND
+
+Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") of 1978 to
+authorize and establish procedures for "electronic surveillance to obtain foreign
+intelligence information." Pub. L. 95-511, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (Oct. 25, 1978). In 2008,
+the Act was amended to include "a new and independent source of intelligence collection
+authority, beyond that granted in traditional FISA." *Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA*, 133
+S. Ct. 1138, 1144 (2013); Pub. L. 110-261, 110th Cong, 2d Sess. (July 10, 2008) ("FISA
+Amendments Act of 2008"). That authority, which is set forth in Section 702, empowers
+the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence to authorize jointly "for a
+period of up to 1 year from the effective date of the authorization, the targeting of persons
+reasonably believed to be located outside the United States to acquire foreign intelligence
+information." 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a). Such acquisitions of foreign intelligenee
+information are limited and must not "intentionally target any person known at the time
+of acquisition to be located in the United States;" "intentionally target a person
+reasonably believed to be located outside the United States if the purpose of such
+acquisition is to target a particular, known person reasonably believed to be in the United
+States;" "intentionally target a United States person reasonably believed to be located
+outside the United States;" or "intentionally acquire any communication as to which the
+sender and all intended recipients are known at the time of the acquisition to be located in
+the United States." Id. § 1881a(b). In addition, the acquisitions of foreign intelligence
+authorized by Section 702 "shall be conducted in a manner consistent with the fourth
+amendment to the Constitution of the United States." Id.
+
+3
+
+Section 702 acquisitions additionally are subject to minimization procedures,
+targeting procedures, and compliance guidelines adopted by the Attorney General in
+consultation with the Director of National Intelligence. See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(d)-(f).
+The minimization procedures are specific measures that, among other things, are
+"designed in light of the purpose and technique of the particular surveillance, to minimize
+the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly available
+information concerning unconsenting United States persons consistent with the need of
+the United States to obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information."¹
+50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(1). The targeting procedures "ensure that any acquisition authorized
+under [Section 702] is limited to targeting persons reasonably believed to be located
+outside the United States" and "prevent the intentional acquisition of any communication
+as to which the sender and all intended recipients are known at the time of the acquisition
+to be located in the United Stales." 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(d)(1)(A), (B). Finally, the
+required compliance guidelines must ensure "compliance with the limitations (set out in
+Section 1881a(b)]," and ensure "that an application for a court order is filed as required
+by this Act." 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(1)(1)(A), (B).
+
+---
+¹ The minimization procedures also should:
+(1) "require that nonpublicly available information, which is not foreign intelligence information...not
+be disseminated in a manner that identifies any United States person, without such person's consent.
+unless such person's identity is necessary to understand foreign intelligence information or assess its
+importance;"
+(2) "allow for the retention and dissemination of information that is evidence of a crime which has been.
+is being, or is about to be committed and that is to be retained or disseminated for law enforcement
+purposes;" and
+(3) "require that no contents of any communication to which a United States person is a party shall be
+disclosed, disseminated, or used for any purpose or retained for longer than 72 hours" except upon
+court order or determination by the Attorney General that the information indicates a threat of death
+or serious bodily harm to any person.
+
+50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(2)-(4); see also 50 U.S.C. § 1821(4)(A)-(D).
+---
+
+4
+
+Thus, in general, before Section 702 authorization can be implemented, the
+Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence "shall provide to the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court" ("FISC") a written certification and any supporting
+affidavit attesting that all necessary procedures are in place and the required guidelines
+adopted "consistent with the requirements of the fourth amendment." 50 U.S.C.
+§ 1881a(g)(1)(A), (g)(2)(A)(iv). The certification additionally must attest that "a
+significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain foreign intelligence information" and
+that "the acquisition involves obtaining foreign intelligence information from or with the
+assistance of an electronic communication service provider." Id. § 1881a(g)(2)(A)(v)-
+(vi).
+
+The FISC has jurisdiction to review certifications and targeting and minimization
+procedures. That court reviews targeting and minimization procedures to ensure that they
+comply with all statutory requirements and are consistent with the Fourth Amendment.
+The FISC reviews Section 702 certifications to ensure that they contain all required
+elements. Id. § 1881a(i). If the FISC concludes that a certification "contains all the
+required elements" and that "the targeting and minimization procedures adopted" satisfy
+their statutory requirements and are consistent with the Fourth Amendment, that court
+"shall enter an order approving the certification and the use... of the procedures for the
+acquisition." Id. § 1881a(i)(2)(A). However, if the FISC determines that the certification
+is deficient in any respect, the Court "shall issue an order directing the Government to..
+(i) correct any deficiency identified by the Court's order not later than 30 days alter the
+date on which the Court issues the order; or (ii) cease, or not begin, the implementation of
+the authorization for which [the] certification was submitted." Id. § 1881a(i)(3)(B)(i)-(ii).
+
+5
+
+A written statement explaining the reasons for the FISC's determination shall issue
+simultaneously with the order. Neither the statement nor the order can be released
+publicly except upon the order of the FISC. See FISC Rules of Procedure ("FISC R. P.")
+62(b); see also 50 U.S.C. § 1803(c).
+
+No targeting pursuant to Section 702 can commence except upon an order of the
+FISC or a determination by the Attorney General and the Director of the National
+Intelligence that "exigent circumstances exist" that do not permit "the issuance of an
+order" and that "without immediate implementation of [the Section 702] authorization...
+intelligence important to the national security of the United States may be lost or not
+timely acquired." Id. § 1881a(c)(2). In the event Section 702 authorization is based on
+such a determination, the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence
+"shall submit to the [FISC] a certification for authorization as soon as practicable but in
+no event later than 7 days after such determination is made." 50 U.S.C.
+§ 1881a(g)(1)(B).
+
+Although Section 702 was scheduled to sunset at the end of 2012, Congress
+extended the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 for another live years or until December 31,
+2017. See Pub. L. No. 112-238, 112th Cong., 2d Sess. (Dec. 30, 2012). In advance of
+Congress's reauthorization decision and at the request of Senator Ron Wyden, the Office
+of the Director of National Intelligence declassified the following statements concerning
+the government's surveillance activities pursuant to Section 702:
+
+(1) A recent unclassified report noted that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
+Court has repeatedly held that collection carried out pursuant to the FISA
+Section 702 minimization procedures used by the government is reasonable
+under the Fourth Amendment.
+
+(2) It is also true that on at least one occasion the Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Court held that some collection carried ont pursuant to the
+
+6
+
+Section 702 minimization procedures used by the government was
+unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
+
+(3) [According to Senator Wyden,] the government's implementation of Section
+702 of FISA has sometimes circumvented the spirit of the law, and on at least
+one occasion the FISA Court has reached this same conclusion.
+
+(4) The government has remedied these concerns and the FISC has continued to
+approve the collection as consistent with the statute and reasonable under the
+Fourth Amendment.
+
+See Declaration of Mark A. Bradley ("Bradley Decl.") Ex. A (Letter Dated July 20, 2012
+to Hon. Ron Wyden), filed herewith. Other details concerning the government's
+intelligence activities pursuant to Section 702 remain classified. See generally Bradley
+Decl. and Declaration of Diane M. Janosek ("Janosek Decl."), filed herewith.
+
+# STATEMENT OF FACTS
+
+By letter dated July 26, 2012, Plaintiff submitted a FOIA request to the
+Department of Justice National Security Division ("NSD") seeking records related to
+certain of the declassified statements concerning the government's surveillance activities
+pursuant to Section 702. See Bradley Deel. Ex. A (EFF's FOIA Request). Specifically,
+EFF requested the following records:
+
+(1) Any written opinion or order, as described in the statement quoted above, in
+which "the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court held that some collection
+carried out pursuant to the Section 702 minimization procedures used by the
+government was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment";
+
+(2) Any written opinion or order, as described in the statement quoted above,
+reflecting or concerning a FISC determination that "the government's
+implementation of Section 702 of FISA has sometimes circumvented the spirit
+of the law"; and
+
+(3) Any briefing provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence or the
+House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence concerning the FISC
+opinions or orders, described in items (1) and (2) above.
+
+7
+
+Id. EFF additionally requested expedited processing of its request and a waiver of the
+associated processing fees. See id. NSD acknowledged receipt of EFF's FOIA request
+by email dated August 13, 2012. Therein, NSD explained that its policy is to process
+FOIA requests on a first-in, first-out basis and that, consistent with that policy, NSD
+would make every effort to respond as quickly as possible. Nevertheless, EFF filed this
+action on August 30, 2012 challenging the Department's failure to process its FOIA
+request within the twenty-day, statutory time period. See Compl. for Inj. Relief at 5,
+Aug. 30, 2012, ECF No. 1.
+
+The Department continued to process EFF's request. By email dated September
+5, 2012, the Department advised EFF that its request for a fee waiver had been granted
+but that its request for expedited processing had been denied. After answering the
+Complaint in this action, the Department advised the Court that it anticipated needing
+until December 5, 2012 to complete processing Plaintiff's request. See Def.'s Status
+Rpt., Oct. 31, 2012, ECF No. 6. The Department subsequently revised that date and
+advised the Court that processing would not be completed until January 2013 because of
+NSD's need to consult with additional government offices. See Def.'s Status Rpt., Dec.
+5, 2012, ECF No. 7. By letter dated January 3, 2013, NSD informed Plaintiff that five
+documents responsive to its request had been located, (Bradley Decl. Ex. B):
+
+(1) a FISC order responsive to Item 1 of Plaintiff's FOIA request
+("Document A");
+
+(2) the redacted copy of the same FISC order that was provided to
+Congress pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1871 ("Document B");
+
+(3) a classified white paper prepared for Congress, only one paragraph of
+which is responsive to Plaintiff's FOIA request ("Document C");
+
+8
+
+(4) a Joint Statement Before the Permanent Select Committee on
+Intelligence, United States House of Representatives ("Document D"), one
+section of which is responsive to Plaintiff's FOIA request; and
+
+(5) a Joint Statement Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
+one section of which is responsive to Plaintiff's FOIA request ("Document
+E").
+
+See Bradley Decl. ¶ 5 & Ex. B; see also Def.'s Statement of Material Facts ("Def.
+SOMF") ¶ 3, filed herewith. The Department is withholding Document C in full
+pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3), and Documents A and B in full pursuant
+to the FISC Rules of Procedure as well as those exemptions. See Bradley Decl. ¶¶ 11 &
+12. Documents D and E were segregable and accordingly redacted and produced to
+Plaintiff. See Bradley Decl. ¶ 5 & Ex. B. The information the Department continues to
+withhold from those documents is exempt under (b)(1) and (b)(3).
+
+The Department now moves for summary judgment and an order upholding the
+government's withholdings.
+
+# ARGUMENT
+
+FOIA represents a balance struck by Congress "between the right of the public to
+know and the need of the Government to keep information in confidence." *John Doe
+Agency v. John Doe Corp.*, 493 U.S. 146, 152 (1989) (citation omitted). While FOIA
+generally requires agency disclosure, Congress recognized "that legitimate governmental
+and private interests could be harmed by release of certain types of information and
+provided nine specific exemptions under which disclosure could be relused." *FBI v.
+Abramson*, 456 U.S. 615, 621 (1982); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). Although these
+exemptions should be "narrowly construed," (*Abramson*, 456 U.S. at 630), they should be
+given "meaningful reach and application," (*John Doe*, 493 U.S. at 152). The Act
+"confers jurisdiction on the district courts 'to enjoin the agency from withholding agency
+
+9
+
+records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld.'" *United
+States Dep't of Justice v. Tax Analysts*, 492 U.S. 136, 142 (1989); see also 5 U.S.C.
+§ 552(a)(4)(B).
+
+An agency is entitled to summary judgment when, as here, "the agency
+demonstrates that it has fully discharged its obligations under FOIA." *Wilbur v. CIA*, 273
+F. Supp. 2d 119, 124 (D.D.C. 2003). "In determining whether the agency has satisfied
+this burden, the Court may rely solely on agency affidavits," (*Grove v. Department of
+Justice*, 802 F. Supp. 506, 509 (D.D.C. 1992) (internal citations omitted)), and should
+award summary judgment "solely on the basis of information provided by the agency in
+declarations," (*Darui v. United States Dep't of State*, 798 F. Supp. 2d 32, 37 (D.D.C.
+2011)). Such declarations should "describe 'the [responsive] documents and the
+justifications for nondisclosure with reasonably specific detail, demonstrate that the
+information withheld logically falls within the claimed exemption, and are not
+controverted by either contrary evidence in the record nor by evidence of agency bad
+faith.'" *Mack v. Department of Navy*, 259 F. Supp. 2d. 99, 104 (D.D.C. 2003); see also
+*Wheeler v. CIA*, 271 F. Supp. 2d 132, 136 (D.D.C. 2003).
+
+Unless the declarations are "deficient, the court need not conduct further inquiry
+into their veracity." *Ferranti v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms*, 177 F. Supp.
+2d 41, 45 (D.D.C. 2001). Rather, they "enjoy a presumption of good faith, which may
+not be rebutted by purely speculative claims." *Mack v. Department of Navy*, 259 F. Supp.
+2d. 99, 105 (D.D.C. 200.3) (internal quotations omitted). That is especially true in cases
+implicating, as here, national security concerns. Courts in such cases "have consistently
+deferred to executive affidavits predicting harm to the national security, and have found it
+
+10
+
+unwise to undertake searching judicial review." *Center for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. United
+States Dep't of Justice*, 331 F.3d 918, 927 (D.C. Cir. 2003); *ACLU v. United States Dep't
+of Defense*, 628 F.3d 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (noting that courts must accord
+substantial weight to an agency's affidavit concerning the details of the classified status
+of [a] disputed record" because they "lack the expertise necessary to second-guess such
+agency opinions in the typical national security FOIA case"); see also *Wolf v. CIA*, 473
+F.3d 370, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2007); *Krikorian v. Department of State*, 984 F.2d 461, 464
+(D.C. Cir. 1993). Affording such deference to the Declarations of Mark A. Bradley and
+Diane M. Janosck, the Court should uphold the Department's actions in this case and
+enter judgment in favor of the government.² See Bradley Deel. ¶¶ 2-12; Janosek Deel.
+¶¶ 2-26; see also generally Def. SOMF.
+
+**I. THE DEPARTMENT IS NOT "IMPROPERLY" WITHHOLDING
+ORDERS OF THE FISC.**
+
+This Court does not have jurisdiction to enjoin the Department's withholding of
+opinions and orders of the FISC. FOIA confers jurisdiction only "to order the production
+of any agency records improperly withheld." *GTE Sylvania*, 445 U.S. at 384 (internal
+quotations omitted; emphasis added); 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). Although the Act does
+not define "improperly," the term's meaning is well understood from FOIA's legislative
+history. That history makes elear that "Congress was largely concerned with the
+unjustified suppression of information by agency officials. Federal employees were
+denying requests for documents without an adequate basis for nondisclosure, and
+
+---
+² As evident from their titles, Documents C, D, and E. go well beyond the scope of the particular, discrete
+information Plaintiff requested and thus their non-responsive sections were withheld as such from Plaintiff.
+Although the arguments herein are equally applicable to the non-responsive sections, (sce Janosek Deel. ¶ 3
+n.1), any further discussion of that information would necessitate the filing of a classified, *ex parte*, *in
+camera* declaration.
+---
+
+11
+
+Congress wanted to curb this apparently unbridled discretion." *GTE Sylvania*, 445 U.S.
+at 385 (internal citations omitted). Congress thus decided to give federal district courts
+jurisdiction to order the production of "improperly" withheld records. That jurisdiction
+assumes "the typical FOIA case, where the agency decides for itself whether to comply
+with a request for agency records." *Tax Analysts*, 492 U.S. at 155 (internal citation
+omitted). When, as here, there is "no discretion [in that regard] for the agency to
+exercise," the withholding of requested documents is not "improper" and therefore cannot
+be compelled under FOIA. See *GTE Sylvania*, 445 U.S. at 386. Thus, in *GTE Sylvania*,
+the Supreme Court held that an agency had not "improperly" withheld records whose
+disclosure was prohibited by a court injunction. The Supreme Court explained that "[t]o
+construe the [agency's] lawful obedience of an injunction issued by a federal district
+court with jurisdiction to enter such a decrce as 'improperly' withholding documents
+under the Freedom of Information Act would do violence to the common understanding
+of the term 'improperly' and would extend the Act well beyond the intent of Congress."
+Id. at 387.
+
+The rationale of *GTE Sylvania* has been extended outside its particular, factual
+context to other types of court-imposed prohibitions (e.g. sealing orders). See *Tax
+Analysts*, 492 U.S. at 155 (suggesting that *GTE Sylvania's* reasoning is implicated in
+cases where the agency has "no discretion... to exercise"); see also *Senate of
+Commonwealth of P.R. v. United States Dep't of Justice*, 1993 WL 364696, at *6 (D.D.C.
+Aug. 24, 1993) ("The Supreme Court has held that records covered by an injunction,
+protective order, or held under court seal are not subject to disclosure under FOIA."
+(internal citation omitted)). The proper test for determining whether an agency
+
+12
+
+improperly withholds records subject to such a restriction is whether, like an injunction, it
+"prohibits the agency from disclosing the records." *Morgan v. United States Dep't of
+Justice*, 923 F.2d 195, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (emphasis in original). An agency can make
+that showing by reference to (1) the court order itself; (2) extrinsic evidence, such as
+transcripts and papers filed with the order; (3) orders of the same court in similar cases
+that explain the purpose for the imposition of the order; or (4) the court's general rules or
+procedures. Id. at 198. If the order prohibits the agency from releasing the information,
+the agency is entitled to summary judgment in the FOIA case seeking that information.
+See, e.g., *Morgan*, 923 F.2d at 198 ("If the district court finds that the sealing order does
+prohibit the DOJ from releasing the notes, the DOJ is entitled to summary judgment; and,
+as long as the seal remains in effect, neither [plaintiff] nor any other member of the
+public may obtain the notes").
+
+These same considerations compel the determination that the Department is not
+"improperly" withholding Documents A and B, the FISC orders responsive to Plaintiff's
+FOIA request. Indeed, that determination necessarily follows from the unique nature and
+history of the FISC:
+
+Its entire docket relates to the collection of foreign intelligence by the
+federal government. The applications submitted to it by the government
+are elassified, as are the overwhelming majority of the FISC's orders.
+Court sessions are held behind closed doors in a secure facility, and
+[virtually) every proceeding in its history has been ex parte, with the
+government the only party. In the entire history of the FISC [only a few]
+opinions have been publicly released. ... [T]he FISC operates primarily
+in secret, with public access the exception.
+
+*In re Mot. for Rel. of Court Records*, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, 487-88 (FISC Dec. 11, 2007).
+Thus a "comprehensive scheme" consisting of statutorily mandated security procedures,
+court rules, and provisions of the FISA (as amended) govern the "safeguarding and
+
+13
+
+handling of FISC proceedings and records." Id. at 488. FISC opinions and orders are
+subject to strict security procedures set forth in the FISC Rules of Procedure. See 50
+U.S.C. § 1803(c) (providing that "record[s] of proceedings under this chapter, including
+applications made and orders granted, shall be maintained under security measures
+established by the Chief Justice in consultation with the Attorncy General and the
+Director of National Intelligence"); see also Bradley Deel. ¶¶ 7, 11. Notwithstanding
+that, by statute, the Attorney General as part of his reporting obligations to Congress is
+authorized to provide copies of FISC opinions to Congress, (see 50 U.S.C. § 1871(c)(1)),
+the FISC Rules of Procedure require that the government "contemporaneously notify the
+Court in writing whenever it provides copies of Court records to Congress and must
+include in the notice a list of the documents provided." FISC R. P. 62(c)(1). Otherwise,
+the FISC Rules of Procedure do not authorize the relcase of court opinions by the
+Department. See FISC R. P. 62. Rather, opinions may be released publicly only if
+ordered published *sua sponte* by the authoring judge or upon motion by a party
+requesting publication:
+
+The Judge who authored an order, opinion, or other decision may *sua sponte*
+or on motion by a party request that it be published. Upon such a request, the
+Presiding Judge, after consulting with other Judges of the Court, may direct
+that an order, opinion or other decision be published. Before publication, the
+Court may, as appropriate, direct the Executive Branch to review the order,
+opinion, or other decision and redact it as necessary to ensure that the
+properly classified information is appropriately protected pursuant to
+Executive Order 13526 (or its successor).
+
+FISC R. P. 62(a); see also *In re Mot.*, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 487 (noting that "it would be
+quite odd if the FISC did not have jurisdiction in the first instance to adjudicate a claim of
+right to the court's very own records and files").
+
+14
+
+The Department has identified two copies of the same FISC order - Documents A
+and B as responsive to Plaintiff's request for "[a]ny written opinion or order... in
+which 'the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court held that some collection carried out
+pursuant to Section 702 minimization procedures used by the government was
+unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment" or that "reflect[cd] or concern[ed] a FISC
+determination that 'the government's implementation of Section 702 of FISA has
+sometimes circumvented the spirit of the law." Bradley Decl. Ex. A at 2; Bradley Deel.
+¶ 5 (describing Documents A and B as "FISC order[s]"). Pursuant to the FISC Rules of
+Procedure, the Department is prohibited from disclosing cither publicly. See FISC R. P.
+62; see also Bradley Decl. ¶ 7. Moreover, neither Document A nor Document B has been
+ordered published by the issning judge. See Bradley Decl. ¶ 7. Thus, the circumstances
+here are clearly as in *GTE Sylvania*: the Department has no discretion over the release of
+FISC orders and accordingly is not "improperly" withholding Documents A and B. The
+Department therefore is entitled to summary judgment as to that withholding.
+
+**II. THE COURT SHOULD UPHOLD THE DEPARTMENT'S
+WITHHOLDINGS UNDER EXEMPTION (B)(1).**
+
+Alternatively, and independently, the Court should uphold the Department's
+withholding of Documents A and B, as well as the three other withheld documents,
+pursuant to exemption (b)(1). The Department has invoked exemption (b)(1) to protect
+information properly classified pursuant to Executive Order 13526. This exemption.
+protects records that are: "(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an
+
+---
+³ The Department, moreover, is not obligated under FOIA to commence proceedings in the FISC to
+request the publication of orders responsive to FOIA requests. The Supreme Court has long recognized
+that, in enacting FOIA, Congress "was operating under the assumption that agencies would not be obligated
+to file lawsuits in order to comply with FOIA requests." *Kissinger v. Reporters Comun. for Freedom of the
+Press*, 445 U.S. 136, 153 (1980).
+---
+
+15
+
+Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy, and
+(B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order." See 5 U.S.C. § 552
+(b)(1). Exemption (b)(1) thus "establishes a specific exemption for defense and foreign
+policy secrets, and delegates to the President the power to establish the scope of that
+exemption by executive order." *Military Audit Project v. Casey*, 656 F.2d 724, 737 (D.C.
+Cir. 1981). An agency can demonstrate that it has properly withheld information under
+exemption (b)(1) if it establishes that it has met the requirements of the applicable
+Executive Order, Substantively, the agency must show that the records at issue logically
+fall within the exemption, i.e., the Executive Order authorizes the classification of the
+information at issue. Procedurally, the agency must demonstrate that it followed the
+proper procedures in classifying the information. See *Salisbury v. United States*, 690
+F.2d 966, 970-73 (D.C. Cir. 1982); *Military Audit Project*, 656 F.2d at 737-38. An
+agency that demonstrates substantive and procedural compliance with an applicable
+Executive Order is entitled to summary judgment. See *Abbotts v. Nuclear Regulatory
+Comm'n*, 766 F.2d 604, 606-08 (D.C. Cir, 1985). Here that order is Executive Order No.
+13526, "Classified National Security Information." Under Section 1.1(a) of that order,
+information may be classified if;
+
+(1) an original classification anthority is classifying the information;
+
+(2) the information is owned by, produced by or for, or is under the control of the
+United States Government;
+
+(3) the information falls within one or more of the categories of information listed
+in section 1.4 of this order; and
+
+(4) the original classification authority determines that the unauthorized
+disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to result in damage to
+the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism, and
+the original classification authority is able to identify or describe the damage.
+
+16
+
+75 Fed. Reg. 707, 707 (Dec. 29, 2009) ("Executive Order No. 13526"). As demonstrated
+by the Declarations Mark A. Bradley and Diane M. Janosek, these conditions are met by
+the information over which exemption (b)(1) was asserted. See Bradley Decl. ¶¶ 6, 8-9;
+Janosek Decl. ¶¶ 3, 13-18; Def. SOMF ¶¶ 7, 8, 11.
+
+**A. An Original Classilication Authority Has Properly Classified the
+Information Withheld From Plaintiff as Exempt Under (b)(1).**
+
+Mr. Bradley and Ms. Janosek have original elassification authority and have
+determined that the information withheld pursuant to exemption (b)(1) from the five
+documents at issue is properly classified. See Bradley Decl. ¶¶ 1, 6, 8-11; Janosek Deel.
+¶¶ 2, 3, 13-18. Section 1.3(a) of Executive Order 13526 provides that the authority to
+classify information "may be exercised... [by] United States Government officials
+delegated this authority pursuant to [section 1.3(c)]." 75 Fed. Reg. at 708. Section
+1.3(c)(2) provides that "Top Secret' original classification authority may be delegated
+only by the President, the Vice President, or an agency head or official designated
+pursuant to [section 1.3(a)(2)]." 75 Fed. Reg. at 708. Pursuant to a written delegation
+authority, Mr. Bradley "hold[s] original classification authority at the TOP SECRET
+level" and thus is "authorized [] to conduct classification reviews and to make original
+classification and deelassilication decisions." Bradley Decl. ¶ 2. Likewise, Ms. Janosek
+has TOP SECRET classification authority pursuant to Section 1.3 of Executive Order of
+13526. See Janosek Decl. ¶ 2.
+
+Morcover, as to all information over which the Department asserted exemption
+(b)(1), Mr. Bradley and Ms. Janosek have examined the information and determined that
+the information is currently and properly classified under Executive Order 13526. See
+Bradley Deel. ¶ 8 ("I have examined documents A and B, and I have determined that both
+
+17
+
+documents are currently and properly classified under Executive Order 13526"); id. ¶ 9
+(noting that "the withheld material in documents A and B is classified at the TOP
+SECRET level"); Janosek Decl. ¶ 9 (noting that "[a]ll responsive information withheld in
+the two Joint Statements (the 'Recent FISC Opinion' sections)... is currently and
+properly classified TOP SECRET//SI/NOFORN"); id. ¶ 9 (noting that "the one
+responsive paragraph in the white paper withheld... is classified TOP
+SECRET//SI//NOFORN"); see also Janosek Decl. ¶ 3. Thus, condition (1) of Executive
+Order 13526 is satisfied by the information withheld from Plaintiff.
+
+**B. All of the Information Withheld Pursuant to Exemption (b)(1) is
+Government Information.**
+
+The second condition of Executive Order 13526 is also met by the information
+over which the Department has asserted exemption (b)(1). See 75 Fed. Reg. at 707
+(requiring that information originally classified under Executive Order 13526 be "owned
+by, produced by or for, or [be] under the control of the United States Government").
+That information is owned by, was produced by, and is under the control of the United
+States Government. See Bradley Decl. ¶ 8 (declaring that the classified information in
+Documents A and B is owned by, produced by or for, or under the control of the United
+States government,' as required by E.O. 13526"); Janosek Deel. ¶ 15 (declaring that the
+two Joint Statements and white paper "originated with NSA and/or contain[] NSA
+equities").
+
+**C. All of the Information Withheld Pursuant to Exemption (b)(1) ls
+Within a Category Identified in Section 1.4 of Executive Order
+No. 13526.**
+
+The information over which the Department has asserted exemption (b)(1)
+satisfies the third condition of Executive Order 13526. See 75 Fed. Reg. at 707 (requiring
+
+18
+
+that information originally classified under this order be within a category identified in
+section 1.4). Section 1.4's categories include information concerning "intelligence
+activities (including covert action), intelligence sources or methods or cryptology" and
+"vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or
+protection services relating to national security." Id. at 709. The information over which
+the Department has asserted exemption (b)(1) concerns these subjects. See Bradley Decl.
+¶ 8 (declaring that "the withheld information contained in [Documents A and B) meets
+the criteria for classification as set forth in subparagraphs (c) and (g) of Section 1.4 of
+Executive Order 13526"); see also id. ¶ 9. As to Documents A and B, the "withheld
+material contains specific descriptions of the manner and means by which the United
+States Government targets non-United States persons located overseas to acquire foreign
+intelligence information under Section 702." Bradley Decl. ¶ 9; see also lanosek Decl. ¶
+14.
+
+Documents C, D, and E, to the extent they are responsive to Plaintiff's request,
+likewise concern categories "found in Section 1.4(c), which includes intelligence
+activities (including covert action), intelligence sources and methods, or cryptology" and
+in "Section 1.4(g), which include vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations,
+infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to the national security."
+See id. Specifically, "[t]he information withheld in the two Joint Statements and white
+paper pertains to operational details of NSA's collection activities under Section 702,"
+Id. ¶ 16. Such information clearly satisfies the substantive requirements of Executive
+Order 13526.
+
+19
+
+**D. The Unauthorized Disclosure of the Information Withheld Under
+Exemption (b)(1) Reasonably Could Be Expected to Damage National
+Security.**
+
+Notwithstanding that the government has declassified certain information related
+to the government's surveillance activities pursuant to Section 702, (see Bradley Deel.
+¶ 8), other information continues to be classified at the TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE
+COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION and SECRET levels, including the information
+in the five documents withheld from Plaintiff. See Bradley Decl. ¶ 9; Janosck Deel. ¶ 5.
+That information consists of previously undisclosed and classified information that if
+disclosed could be expected to cause exceptionally grave and serious damage to the
+national security of the United States. See Bradley Decl. ¶¶ 8 & 9; Janosek Deel. ¶ 5.
+The D.C. Circuit has recognized that "[m]inor details of intelligence information may
+reveal more information than their apparent insignificance suggests because much like a
+piece of jigsaw puzzle, each detail may aid in piecing together other bits of information
+even when the individual piece is not of obvious importance itself." *Larson v.
+Department of State*, 565 F.3d 857, 864 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (internal quotations and
+citations omitted); *ACLU v. Department of Justice*, 681 F.3d 61, 71 (2d Cir. 2012)
+(same); see also *ACLU v. CIA*, 2012 WL 4356338, at *11 (D.D.C., Sept. 25, 2012).
+Thus, the government's declassilication of four statements concerning activities pursuant
+to Section 702 does not suggest anything about the harm that could result from the
+disclosure of the previously undisclosed information at issue in this case.
+
+The fourth condition of information classified pursuant to Executive Order 13526
+requires, as here, that "the original classification authority determine[] that the
+unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to result in
+damage to the national security." 75 Fed. Reg. at 707. Recognizing that national security
+
+20
+
+is a uniquely executive purview, courts typically defer to such an agency determination.
+*Center for Nat'l Sec. Studies*, 331 F.3d at 927 ("[1]n the FOIA context, we have
+consistently deferred to exeentive affidavits predieting harm to the national security, and
+have found it unwise to undertake scarching judicial review."); *Weissman v. CIA*, 565
+F.2d 692, 697 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("Few judges have the skill or experience to weigh the
+repercussions of disclosure of intelligence information."); see also *Halperin v. CIA*, 629
+F.2d 144, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("Judges... lack the expertise necessary to second-guess
+[] agency opinions in the typical national security FOIA case"). Thus, the Court should
+defer here to Mr. Bradley's and Ms. Janosek's assessments of the likely repercussions to
+the national security from disclosure of the information withheld pursuant to exemption
+(b)(1).
+
+In his declaration, Mr. Bradley explains that Documents A and B "contain[]
+specific descriptions of the manner and means by which the United States Government
+targets non-United States persons located overseas to acquire intelligence information
+under Section 702." Bradley Deel. ¶ 9. As such, "the withheld information describes
+highly sensitive intelligence activities, sourees and methods. Id. According to Mr.
+Bradley, "exceptionally grave damage" to the national security could attend the
+disclosure of this information. Id. Specifically, such disclosure would provide "our
+adversaries and foreign intelligence targets with insight into the United States
+Government's foreign intelligence collection capabilities, which in turn could be used to
+develop the means to degrade and evade those collection capabilities." Id.; see also
+Janosek Deel. ¶ 11 (coneurring that exemption (b)(1) applies to Documents A and B).
+
+21
+
+Similar harms reasonably could attend the public disclosure of the withheld
+information from Documents C, D, and E. According to Ms. Janosek, "[t]he disclosure
+of NSA's ability or lack of ability to collect intelligence under the [FISA Amendments
+Act] would reveal information about the U.S. Intelligence Community's capabilities,
+priorities, and activities." Janosek Decl. ¶ 16. Such information "could reasonably be
+expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security because it would
+provide our nation's adversaries information about the nature and frequency of the
+Government's use of specific techniques that could assist them in undermining the NSA's
+and the Intelligence Community's national security mission." Id. Targeted individuals
+and foreign nationals moreover could frustrate the government's collection of
+information "by using different communications techniques" or "utilizing a different
+communications link or facility" thereby "result[ing] in a loss of access to information
+crucial to the national security and defense of the United States." Janosek Decl. ¶ 17; see
+also id. ¶ 18 (noting that targets "if they learn or suspect that their signals are or may be
+targeted by the NSA for collection, can take steps to evade detections, to manipulate the
+information that NSA receives, or to implement countermeasures aimed at undermining
+NSA's operations"). The last condition for classification under Executive Order 13526
+therefore clearly is satisfied by each withheld document. Because the information
+withheld here satisfies all four conditions of that order, it is exempt under (b)(1).
+
+**III. THE COURT SHOULD UPHOLD THE DEPARTMENT'S
+WITHHOLDINGS UNDER EXEMPTION (B)(3).**
+
+Although the Court need not reach the Department's exemption (b)(3) argument,
+that exemption too is dispositive of this casc. Excmption (b)(3) cxcmpts from FOIA
+information whose disclosure is prohibited by another statute, if that statute either: (A)
+
+22
+
+"requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no
+discretion on the issue;" or (B) "establishes a particular criteria for withholding or refers
+to particular types of matters to be withheld." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)(A)(i)-(ii). This other
+statute "must, on its face, exempt matters from disclosure." *Reporters Comm. for
+Freedom of Press v. Department of Justice*, 816 F.2d 730, 735 (D.C. Cir.), modified on
+other grounds, 831 F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 489 U.S. 749
+(1989); see also *Essential Info., Inc. v. USIA*, 134 F.3d 1165, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
+(noting that a statute that prohibits "dissemination" and "distribution" of certain
+information within the United States qualifies as an exemption (b)(3) "nondisclosure"
+statute). Unlike the requirements for exemption (b)(1), exemption (b)(3) does not require
+the government to demonstrate harm to the national security. Exemption (b)(3)'s
+"applicability depends less on the detailed factual contents of specific documents; the
+sole issue for decision is the existence of a relevant statute and the inclusion of withheld
+material within that statute's coverage." *Goland v. CIA*, 607 F.2d 339, 350 (D.C. Cir.
+1978); see also *Fitzgibbon v. CIA*, 911 F.2d 755, 761-62 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (same). Here
+again, deference to the agency's determination that withheld material is within the
+coverage of an exemption (b)(3) statute is appropriate. See *Reporters Comm.*, 816 F.2d at
+735 n.5 (noting that "it may be proper to give deference to an agency's interpretation of
+what matters are covered by a statute, once the court is satisfied that the statute is in fact
+an Exemption 3 withholding statute"); see also *CIA v. Sims*, 471 U.S. 159, 179 (1985)
+(noting that "decisions of the Director [of the CIA], who must of course be familiar with
+'the whole picture,' as judges are not, are worthy of great deference given the magnitude
+of the national security interests and potential risks at stake"); *Halperin*, 629 F.2d at 148.
+
+23
+
+Three such statutes clearly are implicated by the information withheld from
+Plaintiff. First, Section 102A(i)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 "protect[s]
+intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure," (50 U.S.C. § 403-
+1(i)(1)), and thus "requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner
+as to leave no discretion on the issue." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)(A)(i). As such, the National
+Security Act of 1947 is an exemption (b)(3) statute. Because Documents A and B
+"contain[] intelligence sources and method[s]," both are within the scope of that Act's
+coverage and thus "protected from release by the National Security Act." Bradley Decl.
+¶ 10; see also Janosek Decl. ¶ 11. Documents C, D, and E also concern intelligence
+sources and methods and therefore are within that same protection. See Janosek Deel.
+¶ 19.
+
+Second, the National Security Agency Act of 1959, which contains a statutory
+privilege unique to NSA, provides that "[n]othing in this Act or any other law... shall be
+construed to require the disclosure of the organization or any function of the National
+Security Agency, [or] of any information with respect to the activities thereof." 50
+U.S.C. § 402 note; see also Janosek Deel. ¶ 20. This language thus provides absolute
+protection from disclosure of any information concerning NSA activities. *Linder v. NSA*,
+94 F.3d 693, 696 (D.C. Cir. 1996); *Hayden v. NSA*, 608 F.2d 1381, 1389 (D.C. Cir.
+1979); see also Janosek Decl. ¶ 20. Accordingly, because the responsive information
+from Documents C, D, and E "pertains to operational details of the NSA's collection
+activities under Section 702," (Janosek Decl. ¶ 16), it is within that protection and cannot
+be compelled here. Documents A and B, which also contain NSA equities, likewise are
+subject to that absolute protection. See Janosek Decl. ¶ 11.
+
+24
+
+Dated: April 1, 2013
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+STUART F. DELERY
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+
+JOHN R. TYLER
+Assistant Branch Director
+Civil Division
+
+/s/ Jacqueline Coleman Snead
+JACQUELINE COLEMAN SNEAD (D.C. Bar
+459548)
+Senior Counsel
+United States Department of Justice
+Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch
+20 Massachusetts Ave, NW
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+Telephone: (202) 514-3418
+Fax: (202) 616-8470
+E-mail: Jacqueline.Snead@usdoj.gov
+
+Counsel for the Department of Justice
+
+28
+
+# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
+# FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
+
+ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
+FOUNDATION,
+
+Plaintiff,
+
+V.
+
+DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
+Defendant.
+
+)
+)
+)
+)
+)
+)
+) Civil Action No. 12-1441-ABJ
+)
+)
+)
+
+# PROPOSED ORDER
+
+Upon consideration of the Department of Justice's Motion for Summary
+Judgment, the opposition thereto, and the complete record in the case, it is hereby
+
+ORDERED that the Department's motion is GRANTED. Judgment is entered in
+favor of the Department of Justice.
+
+SO ORDERED.
+
+Date:
+
+United States District Court Judge
+
+29
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_exhibit-1/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_exhibit-1/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e0e06c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_exhibit-1/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Motion of the Electronic Frontier Foundation for Consent to Disclosure of Court Records or, in the Alternative, a Determination of the Effect of the Court's Rules of Statutory Access Rights, In re Motion for Consent to Disclosure of Court Records or, in the Alternative, A Determination of the Effect of the Court's Rules on Statutory Access Rights, Exhibit 1",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-05-21",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-05-21",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34430",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "fcee9e01dd10bc073732a048800a3642f4a9ca0f4ba700b28fb848cf896f03fb",
+ "pages": 33
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_exhibit-2/FISC_-_exhibit-2.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_exhibit-2/FISC_-_exhibit-2.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..452b187
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_exhibit-2/FISC_-_exhibit-2.md
@@ -0,0 +1,219 @@
+EXHIBIT 2
+
+Motion of the Electronic Frontier Foundation for Consent to Disclosure of Court
+Records or, in the Alternative, a Determination of the Effect of the Court's
+Rules on Statutory Access Rights
+UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
+FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
+
+Civil Action No. 12-1441-ABJ
+
+ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
+FOUNDATION,
+
+Plaintiff,
+
+V.
+
+DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
+
+Defendant.
+
+ECLARATION OF MARK A. BRADLEY
+
+I, Mark A. Bradley, do hereby state and declare as follows:
+
+1. I am the Director of the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") and
+Declassification Unit of the Office of Law and Policy in the National Security Division ("NSD)
+of the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ" or "Department"). NSD is a component of
+the Department.
+
+2. In addition, under a written delegation of authority pursuant to section 1.3.(c) of
+Executive Order 13526, I hold original classification authority at the TOP SECRET level. I am
+authorized, therefore, to conduct classification reviews and to make original classification and
+declassification decisions.
+
+3. I submit this declaration in support of DOF's Motion for Summary Judgment in
+the above-captioned case. I make the statements herein on the basis of personal knowledge, as
+well as on information acquired by me in the course of performing my official duties.
+
+PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST
+
+4. By letter dated July 26, 2012, plaintiff, the Electronic Frontier Foundation
+("EFF"), requested the following:
+
+1. Any written opinion or order, in which "the Foreign Intelligence
+Suryeillance Court held that some collection carried out pursuant to the
+Section 702 minimization procedures used by the government was
+unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment";
+
+2. Any written opinion or order,... reflecting or concerning a FISC
+determination that "the government's implementation of Section 702 of
+FISA has sometimes circumvented the spirit of the law"; and,
+
+3. Any briefing provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence or
+the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence concerning the
+FISC opinions or orders, described in items (1) and (2) above.
+
+The NSD FOIA unit assigned this request number 12-219. This request is attached as Exhibit A.
+
+NSD'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST
+
+5. In a letter dated January 3, 2013, NSD FOIA informed EFF that it had searched
+the files of the Office of the Assistant Attorney General ("OAAG") for NSD and the files of
+NSD's OI and located five responsive records. The five responsive records are:
+
+(A) FISC order dated October 3, 2011, totaling 86 pages', and responsive to items 1
+and 2 of plaintiff's request. This document was withheld in full pursuant to FOIA
+Exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3).
+
+(B) Redacted version of document A which was produced to Congress pursuant to the
+Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"). Highly sensitive information
+was redacted from this version of the order, but this version still contains
+information classified at the TOP SECRET level. This document was withheld in
+
+¹ Based on the particular circumstances presented in this case, I have determined that revealing the date and
+length of the FISC opinion identified above and at issue in this case would not compromise national security.
+However, similar information may be classified as to other FISC opinions where disclosure of the date or length of
+an opinion, either in isolation or in conjunction with other information that might be available to the public or to
+persons subject to intelligence collection, might tend to reveal classified national security information, including
+information concerning the timing or nature of intelligence activities. For example, in certain settings, the date or
+length of a FISC opinion might assist a sophisticated adversary in deducing particular intelligence activities or
+sources and methods, and possibly lead to the use of countermeasures that may deprive the United States of critical
+intelligence. Accordingly, my decision to release information as to this particular opinion does not indicate that
+similar information about other FISC opinions will also be released.
+
+2
+
+(C) full pursuant to FOIA Exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3).
+
+An undated, classified white paper prepared by DOJ for Congress, totaling nine
+pages, only one paragraph of which is responsive to item 3 of the request. The
+responsive paragraph was withheld in full pursuant to FOIA Exemptions (b)(1)
+and (b)(3).
+
+(D) Joint Statement of Lisa Monaco, Assistant Attorney General for the National
+Security Division, U.S. Department of Justice; John C. (Chris) Inglis, Deputy
+Director for the National Security Agency, Robert Litt, General Counsel, Office
+of the Director of National Intelligence before the Permanent Select Committee
+on Intelligence, United States House of Representatives at a Hearing Concerning
+"FISA Amendments Act Reauthorization" presented on December 8, 2011.
+Portions of this statement are responsive to item 3 of the request.
+
+(E) Joint Statement of Lisa Monaco, Assistant Attorney General for the National
+Security Division, U.S. Department of Justice, John C. (Chris) Inglis, Deputy
+Director for the National Security Agency, Robert Litt, General Counsel, Office
+of the Director of National Intelligence before the Senate Select Committee on
+Intelligence, United States Senate at a Hearing Concerning "FISA Amendments
+Act Reauthorization" presented on February 9, 2012. Portions of this statement
+are responsive to item 3 of the request.
+
+Enclosed with the January 3, 2013 letter, attached as Exhibit B, were redacted versions of
+documents D and E for partial release.
+
+6. 1 examined documents C, D, and E and determined all three contain National
+Security Agency ("NSA") equity. As a result, NSD sent documents C, D, and E to the NSA.
+NSA asked NSD to withhold the responsive paragraph in document C in full pursuant to FOIA
+Exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3), NSA also asked NSD to withhold documents D and E in part
+pursuant to FOIA Exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3). As noted above, NSD released documents D
+and E in part on January 3, 2013. Documents C, D, and E are discussed in the declaration of
+Diane Janosek.
+
+DOCUMENTS A AND B
+
+7. Document A is an opinion issued by the FISC and is subject to section 1803(c) of
+FISA which states, "[r]ecords of proceedings under this Act, including applications made and
+
+3
+
+orders granted, shall be maintained under security measures established by the Chief Justice in
+consultation with the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence." And under
+Rule 62(b) of the FISC Rules of Procedure, a FISC order or opinion may not be released by the
+Clerk "without a Court order." To date, the FISC has not issued any orders releasing this
+opinion, and FISC rules prohibit the release of any portion of the opinion without a FISC order.
+A copy of the FISC Rules of Procedure is attached as Exhibit C.
+
+EXEMPTION ONE
+
+8. In addition, I have determined that documents A and B are exempt under FOIA
+Exemption One. I have examined documents A and B, and I have determined that both
+documents are currently and properly classified under Executive Order 13526. Specifically, I
+have determined that the withheld information contained in these records meets the criteria for
+classification as set forth in subparagraphs (c) and (g) of Section 1.4 of Executive Order 13526,
+which respectively authorize the classification of information concerning "intelligence activities
+(including covert action), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology," and "vulnerabilities or
+capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services
+relating to national security," which includes defense against transnational terrorism. I have also
+determined that the classified information in the responsive documents is "owned by, produced
+by or for, or under the control of the United States Government," as required by E.O. 13526.
+Further, the withheld information in NSD's responsive records is not the same as the information
+that was declassified by ODNI in the July 20, 2012 letter from Kathleen Turner, ODNI's
+
+² As noted above, document B is a redacted version of this opinion which was provided to Congress
+pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1871. The redacted version still contains information classified at the TOP SECRET level.
+FISC rule 62(c) permits the Government to provide copies of FISC "opinions, decisions, or other Court records, to
+Congress, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §§ 1871(a)(5), 1871(c), or 18811(b)(1)(D), or any other statutory requirement,
+without prior motion to and order by the Court." FISC rules do not permit the Government to release FISC opinions
+10 a FOIA requester or any other member of the public without a FISC order.
+
+4
+
+Director of Legislative Affairs, to Senator Ron Wyden.
+
+9. Because the withheld material in documents A and B is classified at the TOP
+SECRET level, its disclosure could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the
+national security of the United States. I have examined documents A and B, and I have
+determined that the withheld material contains specific descriptions of the manner and means by
+which the United States Government targets non-United States persons located overseas to
+acquire foreign intelligence information under Section 702. As such, I have determined that the
+withheld information describes highly sensitive intelligence activities, sources and methods, and
+disclosure of this information would provide our adversaries and foreign intelligence targets with
+insight into the United States Government's foreign intelligence collection capabilities, which in
+turn could be used to develop the means to degrade and evade those collection capabilities.
+
+EXEMPTION THREE
+
+10. I have also determined that the information in documents A and B is also exempt
+from disclosure pursuant to FOIA Exemption 3. Exemption 3 states that FOIA's disclosure
+provisions do not apply to matters that are specifically exempted from disclosure by statute. In
+this case, I examined the withheld information and determined that it is protected by the National
+Security Act of 1947, as amended by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
+("IRTPA") of 2004, which protects intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
+disclosure. 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i)(1). I determined the information in documents A and B
+contains intelligence sources and method and is therefore protected from release by the National
+Security Act and FOIA Exemption 3.
+
+SEGREGABILITY
+
+11. I reviewed documents A, B, C, D, and E for purposes of complying with FOIA's
+
+5
+
+segregability provision which requires the Government to release "any reasonably segregable
+portion of a record" after proper application of the FOIA exemptions. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). For
+documents A and B, I determined that no portion of them could be properly segregated and
+released due to the FISC's rules pertaining to the release of its orders.
+
+12. After careful examination, I have also determined that the one responsive
+paragraph in document C contains no unclassified portions that can be segregated and released.
+The unclassified, non-exempt material in the one responsive paragraph in document C is so
+inextricably intertwined with the classified material that the release of any non-exempt
+information would produce only incomplete, fragmented, unintelligible sentences and phrases
+that are devoid of any meaning.
+
+13. For documents D and E, the non-exempt, responsive information was segregated
+and provided in NSD's response, dated January 3, 2013. The exempt and non-responsive
+portions of the document were redacted.
+
+6
+
+CONCLUSION
+
+I certify. pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true
+and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
+
+Executed this 1st day of April 2013
+
+Mark A. Bradley
+
+7
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_exhibit-2/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_exhibit-2/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7b1be91
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_exhibit-2/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Motion of the Electronic Frontier Foundation for Consent to Disclosure of Court Records or, in the Alternative, a Determination of the Effect of the Court's Rules of Statutory Access Rights, In re Motion for Consent to Disclosure of Court Records or, in the Alternative, A Determination of the Effect of the Court's Rules on Statutory Access Rights, Exhibit 2",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-05-21",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-05-21",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34430",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "ed5da447190c6830353d372fc39cd61bfbbf78420ae92fca72597f15ed670b65",
+ "pages": 8
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_honorable-charles-grassley/FISC_-_honorable-charles-grassley.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_honorable-charles-grassley/FISC_-_honorable-charles-grassley.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b3ae769
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_honorable-charles-grassley/FISC_-_honorable-charles-grassley.md
@@ -0,0 +1,619 @@
+Honorable Reggie B. Walton
+Presiding Judge
+
+UNITED STATES FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+Washington, D.C.
+
+July 29, 2013
+
+Honorable Charles E. Grassley
+Ranking Member
+Committee on the Judiciary
+United States Senate
+Washington, DC 20510
+
+Dear Senator Grassley:
+
+I am writing in response to your letter of July 18, 2013, in which you posed several questions about the operations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (the Court). As you requested, we are providing unclassified responses. We would note that, as a general matter, the Court's practices have evolved over time. Various developments in the last several years – including statutory changes, changes in the size of the Court and its staff, the adoption of new Rules of Procedure in 2010, and the relocation of the Court's facilities from the Department of Justice headquarters to a secure space in the federal courthouse in 2009 – have affected some of these practices. The responses below reflect the current practices of the Court.
+
+1. Describe the typical process that the Court follows when it considers the following: (1) an application for an order for electronic surveillance under Title I of FISA; (2) an application for an order for access to business records under Title V of FISA; and (3) submissions from the government under Section 702 of FISA. As to applications for orders for access to business records under Title V of FISA, please describe whether the process for the Court's consideration of such applications is different when considering requests for bulk collection of phone call metadata records, as recently declassified by the Director of National Intelligence.
+
+Each week, one of the eleven district court judges who comprise the Court is on duty in Washington. As discussed below, most of the Court's work is handled by the duty judge with the assistance of attorneys and clerk's office personnel who staff the Court. Some of the Court's more complex or time-consuming matters are handled by judges outside of the duty-week system, at the discretion of the Presiding Judge. In either case, matters before the Court are thoroughly reviewed and analyzed by the Court.
+
+Rule 9(a) of the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Rules of Procedure
+
+Honorable Charles E. Grassley
+July 29, 2013
+Page 2
+
+(FISC Rules of Procedure)¹ requires that except in certain circumstances (i.e., a submission pursuant to an emergency authorization under the statute or as otherwise permitted by the Court), a proposed application must be submitted by the government no later than seven days before the government seeks to have the matter entertained.² Upon the Court's receipt of a proposed application for an order under FISA, a member of the Court's legal staff reviews the application and evaluates whether it meets the legal requirements under the statute. As part of this evaluation, a Court attorney will often have one or more telephone conversations with the government³ to seek additional information and/or raise concerns about the application. A Court attorney then prepares a written analysis of the application for the duty judge, which includes an identification of any weaknesses, flaws, or other concerns. For example, the attorney may recommend that the judge consider requiring the addition of information to the application; imposing special reporting requirements;⁴ or shortening the requested duration of an authorization.
+
+The judge then reviews the proposed application, as well as the attorney's written analysis. The judge typically makes a preliminary determination at that time about what course
+
+¹ A copy of the FISC Rules of Procedure is appended hereto as Attachment A. The rules are also available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/rules/FISC2010.pdf.
+
+² A proposed application is also sometimes referred to as a "read copy" and has been referred to in this manner in at least one recent congressional hearing. A proposed application or "read copy" is a near-final version of the government's application, which does not include the signatures of executive branch officials required by statutory provisions such as 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(6) and 1823(a)(6). As described below, in most circumstances, the government will subsequently file a final copy of an application pursuant to Rule 9(b) of the FISC Rules of Procedure. Both the proposed and final applications include proposed orders.
+
+The process of using proposed applications and final applications is altogether similar to the process employed by other federal courts in considering applications for wiretap orders under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended ("Title III"), which is codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522.
+
+³ In discussing Court interactions with "the government" throughout this document, I am referring to interactions with attorneys in the Office of Intelligence of the National Security Division of the United States Department of Justice.
+
+⁴ Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §§ 1805(d)(3) and 1824(d)(3), the Court is authorized to assess compliance with the statutorily-required minimization procedures by reviewing the circumstances under which information concerning United States persons was acquired, retained, or disseminated.
+
+For each application, the Court retains the attorney's written analysis and the notes made by the judge, so that if the government later seeks to renew the authorization, the judge who considers the next
+
+Honorable Charles E. Grassley
+July 29, 2013
+Page 3
+
+of action to take. These courses of action might include indicating to Court staff that he or she is prepared to approve the application without a hearing; indicating an inclination to impose conditions on the approval of the application; determining that additional information is needed about the application; or determining that a hearing would be appropriate before deciding whether to grant the application. A staff attorney will then relay the judge's inclination to the government, and the government will typically proceed by providing additional information, or by submitting a final application (sometimes with amendments, at the government's election) for the Court's ruling pursuant to Rule 9(b) of the FISC Rules of Procedure. In conjunction with its submission of a final application, the government has an opportunity to request a hearing, even if the judge did not otherwise intend to require one. The government might request a hearing, for example, to challenge conditions that the judge has indicated he or she would impose on the approval of an application. If the judge schedules a hearing, the judge decides whether to approve the application thereafter. Otherwise, the judge makes a determination based on the final written application submitted by the government. In approving an application, a judge will sometimes issue a Supplemental Order in addition to signing the government's proposed orders. Often, a Supplemental Order imposes some form of reporting requirement on the government.
+
+If after receiving a final application, the judge is inclined to deny it, the Court will prepare a statement of reason(s) pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(1). In some cases, the government may decide not to submit a final application, or to withdraw one that has been submitted, after learning that the judge does not intend to approve it. The annual statistics provided to Congress by the Attorney General pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §§ 1807 and 1862(b) – frequently cited to in press reports as a suggestion that the Court's approval rate of applications is over 99% – reflect only the number of final applications submitted to and acted on by the Court. These statistics do not reflect the fact that many applications are altered prior to final submission or even withheld from final submission entirely, often after an indication that a judge would not approve them.⁵
+
+Most applications under Title V of FISA are handled pursuant to the process described above. However, applications under Title V of FISA for bulk collection of phone call metadata records are normally handled by the weekly duty judge using a process that is similar to the one described above, albeit more exacting. The government typically submits a proposed application of this type more than one week in advance. The attorney who reviews the application spends a
+
+application has the benefit of the prior thoughts of the judge(s) and staff, and a written record of any problems with the case.
+
+⁵ Notably, the approval rate for Title III wiretap applications (see note 2 above) is higher than the approval rate for FISA applications, even using the Attorney General's FISA statistics as the baseline for comparison, as recent statistics show that from 2008 through 2012, only five of 13,593 Title III wiretap applications were requested but not authorized. See Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Wiretap Report 2012, Table 7 (available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/statistics/wiretapreports/2012/Table7.pdf).
+
+Honorable Charles E. Grassley
+July 29, 2013
+Page 4
+
+greater amount of time reviewing and preparing a written analysis of such an application, in part because the Court has always required detailed information about the government's implementation of this authority. The judge likewise typically spends a greater amount of time than he or she normally spends on an individual application, carefully considering the extensive information provided by the government and determining whether to seek more information or hold a hearing before ruling on the application.
+
+As described above, the majority of applications submitted to the Court are handled on a seven-day cycle, by a judge sitting on a weekly duty schedule. Applications that are novel or more complex are sometimes handled on a longer time-line, usually require additional briefing, and are assigned by the Presiding Judge based on judges' availability. Section 702 (i.e., 50 U.S.C. § 1881a) applications⁷ would typically fall into this category.
+
+Where the Court's process for handling Section 702 applications differs from the process described above, it is largely based on the statutory requirements of that section, which was enacted as part of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA). Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881a(g)(1)(A) & (g)(2)(D)(i), prior to the implementation of an authorization under Section 702, the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence must provide the Court with a written certification containing certain statutorily required elements, and that certification must include an effective date for the authorization that is at least 30 days after the submission of the written certification to the Court.⁸ Under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(B), the Court must review the certification, as well as the targeting and minimization procedures adopted in accordance with 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881a(d) & (e), not later than 30 days after the date on which the certification and procedures are submitted. The statutorily-imposed deadline for the Court's review typically coincides with the effective date identified in the final certification filed with the Court.
+
+The government's submission of a Section 702 application typically includes a cover filing that highlights any special issues and identifies any changes that have been made relative to the prior application. The government has typically filed proposed (read copy) Section 702 applications approximately one month before filing a final application. Proposed Section 702 applications are reviewed by multiple members of the Court's legal staff. At the direction of the Presiding Judge or a judge who has been assigned to handle the Section 702 application, the
+
+⁷ "Section 702 application” is used here to refer collectively to a Section 702 certification and supporting affidavit, as well as to the statutorily-required targeting and minimization procedures.
+
+⁸ If the acquisition has already begun (e.g., pursuant to a determination of exigent circumstances under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(c)(2)) or the effective date is less than 30 days after the submission of the written certification to the Court (e.g., because of an amendment to a certification while judicial review is pending, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(1)(C)), 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g)(2)(D)(ii) requires the certification to include the date the acquisition began or the effective date of the authorization.
+
+Honorable Charles E. Grassley
+July 29, 2013
+Page 5
+
+Court's legal staff may request a meeting with the government to discuss a proposed application. Also at the direction of the Presiding Judge or a judge who has been assigned to handle the Section 702 application, the Court legal staff may request additional information from the government or convey a judge's concerns about the legal sufficiency of a proposed Section 702 application. Following these interactions, the government files a final Section 702 application, which the government may have elected to amend based on any concerns raised by the judge.
+
+The judge reviews the final Section 702 application and may set a hearing if he or she has additional questions about it. If the judge finds (based on the written submission alone or the written submission in combination with a hearing) that the certification contains all of the required elements, and that the targeting and minimization procedures adopted in accordance with 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881a(d) & (e) are consistent with the requirements of those subsections and with the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, the judge enters an order approving the certification in accordance with 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3)(A). As required by 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3)(C), the judge also issues an opinion in support of the order. If the judge finds that the certification does not contain the required elements or the targeting and minimization procedures are inconsistent with the requirements of 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881a(d) & (e), or the Fourth Amendment, the judge will, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3)(B), issue an order directing the government to, at the government's election and to the extent required by the Court's order, either correct any deficiency identified by the Court's order not later than 30 days after the date on which the Court issues the order, or cease, or not begin, the implementation of the authorization for which the certification was submitted. Subsequent review of any remedial measures taken by the government may then be required and may result in another order and opinion pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i).
+
+2. When considering such applications and submissions, please describe the interaction between the government and the Court (including both judges and court staff), including any hearings, meetings, or other means through which the Court has the opportunity to ask questions or seek additional information from the government. Please describe how frequently such exchanges occur, and generally what types of additional information that the Court might request of the government, if any. Please also describe how frequently the Court asks the government to make changes to its applications and submissions before ruling.
+
+The process through which the Court interacts with the government in reviewing proposed applications, seeking additional information, conveying Court concerns, and adjudicating final applications, is very similar to the process employed by other federal courts in considering applications for wiretap orders under Title III (discussed in notes 2 and 6 above).
+
+Under FISA practice, the first set of interactions often take place at the staff level. The Court's legal staff frequently interacts with the government in various ways in the context of
+
+Honorable Charles E. Grassley
+July 29, 2013
+Page 6
+
+examining the legal sufficiency of applications before they are presented in final form to a judge. Indeed, in the process of reviewing the government's applications and submissions in order to provide advice to the judge, the legal staff interact with the government on a daily basis. These daily interactions typically consist of secure telephone conversations in which legal staff ask the government questions about the legal and factual elements of applications or submissions. These questions may originate with legal staff after an initial review of an application or submission, or they may come from a judge.
+
+At the direction of the Presiding Judge or the judge assigned to a matter, Court legal staff sometimes meet with the government in connection with applications and submissions. The Court typically requests such meetings when a proposed application or submission presents a special legal or factual concern about which the Court would like additional information (e.g., a novel use of technology or a request to use a new surveillance or search technique). The frequency of such meetings varies depending on the Court's assessment of its need for additional information in matters before it and the most conducive means to obtain that information. Court legal staff may meet with the government as often as 2-3 times a week, or as few as 1-2 times a month, in connection with the various matters pending before the Court.
+
+Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(2)(A) and Rule 17(a) of the FISC Rules of Procedure, the Court also holds hearings in cases in which a judge assesses that he or she needs additional information in order to rule on a matter. The frequency of hearings varies depending on the nature and complexity of matters pending before the Court at a given time, and also, to some extent, based on the individual preferences of different judges. Hearings are attended, at a minimum, by the Department of Justice attorney who prepared the application and a fact witness from the agency seeking the Court's authorization.
+
+The types of additional information sought from the government - through telephone conversations, meetings, or hearings - include, but are not limited to, the following: additional facts to justify the government's belief that its application meets the legal requirements for the type of authority it is seeking (e.g., in the case of electronic surveillance, that might include additional information to justify the government's belief that a target of surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, as required by 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(3)(A), or that the target is using or about to use a particular facility, as required by 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(3)(B)); additional facts about how the government intends to implement statutorily required minimization procedures (see, e.g., 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h); 1805(a)(3); 1824(a)(3); 1861(c)(1); 1881a(i)(3)(A); and 1881c(c)(1)(c)); additional information about the government's prior implementation of a Court order, particularly if the government has previously failed to comply fully with a Court order; or additional information about novel issues of technology or law (see Rule 11 of FISC Rules of Procedure).
+
+In a typical week, the Court seeks additional information or modifies the terms proposed
+
+Honorable Charles E. Grassley
+July 29, 2013
+Page 7
+
+by the government in a significant percentage of cases.⁹ (The Court has recently initiated the process of tracking more precisely how frequently this occurs.) The judge may determine, for example, that he or she cannot make the necessary findings under the statute without the addition of information to the application, or that he or she can approve only some of the authorities sought through the application. The government then has the choice to alter its final application or proposed orders in response to the judge's concerns; request a hearing to address those concerns; submit a final application without changes; or elect not to proceed at all with a final application. If the government files a final application, the Court may, on its own, make changes to the government's proposed orders (or issue totally redrafted orders) to address the judge's concern about a given application. The judge may choose, for example, to make an authorization of a shorter duration than what was requested by the government, or the judge may issue a Supplemental Order imposing special reporting or minimization requirements on the government's implementation of an authorization.
+
+3. Public FISA Court opinions and orders make clear that the Court has considered the views of non-governmental parties in certain cases, including a provider challenge to the Protect America Act of 2007. Describe instances where non-governmental parties have appeared before the Court. Has the Court invited or heard views from a nongovernmental party regarding applications or submissions under Title I, Title V, or Title VII of FISA? If so, how did this come about, and what was the process or mechanism that the Court used to enable such views to be considered?
+
+FISA does not provide a mechanism for the Court to invite the views of nongovernmental parties. In fact, the Court's proceedings are ex parte as required by the statute (see, e.g., 50 U.S.C. §§ 1805(a), 1824(a), 1842(d)(1) & 1861(c)(1)), and in keeping with the procedures followed by other courts in applications for search warrants and wiretap orders. Nevertheless, the statute and the FISC Rules of Procedure provide multiple opportunities for recipients of Court orders or government directives to challenge those orders or directives, either directly or through refusal to comply with orders or directives. Additionally, as detailed below, there have been several instances – particularly in the past several months - in which nongovernmental parties have appeared before the Court outside of the context of a challenge to an individual Court order or government directive.
+
+There has been one instance in which the Court heard arguments from a nongovernmental party that sought to substantively contest a directive from the government. Specifically, in 2007, the government issued directives to Yahoo!, Inc. (Yahoo) pursuant to Section 105B of the Protect America Act of 2007 (PAA). Yahoo refused to comply with the directives, and the government
+
+⁹ This assessment does not include minor technical or typographical changes, which occur more frequently.
+
+Honorable Charles E. Grassley
+July 29, 2013
+Page 8
+
+filed a motion with this Court to compel compliance. The Court ordered and received briefing from both parties, and rendered a decision in April 2008.¹⁰
+
+As noted above, the FISC Rules of Procedure and the FISA statute provide opportunities for the appearance of nongovernmental parties before the Court in matters pending pursuant to Titles I, V and VII of the statute. For example, Rule 19(a) of the FISC Rules of Procedure provides that if a person or entity served with a Court order fails to comply with that order, the government may file a motion for an order to show cause why the recipient should not be held in contempt and sanctioned accordingly. Thus, a nongovernmental party served with an order may invite an opportunity to be heard by the Court through refusal to comply with an order.
+
+With respect to applications filed under Title V of FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)(2)(A)(i) provides that a person receiving a production order may challenge the legality of that order by filing a petition with the Court. The same section of the statute provides that the recipient of a production order may challenge the non-disclosure order imposed in connection with a production order by filing a petition to modify or set aside the nondisclosure order. Rules 33-36 of the FISC Rules of Procedure delineate the procedures and requirements for filing such petitions, including the time limits on such challenges. To date, no recipient of a production order has opted to invoke this section of the statute.
+
+With respect to applications filed under Title VII of FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(4)(A) provides that an electronic communication service provider who receives a directive pursuant to Section 702 may file a petition to modify or set aside the directive with the Court. Sections 1881a(h)(4)(A)-(G) of the statute, as well as Rule 28 of the FISC Rules of Procedure, delineate
+
+¹⁰ Yahoo thereafter appealed the Court's decision to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISCR). See In re Directives [REDACTED] Pursuant to Section 105b of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008). This is not the only instance in which a nongovernmental entity has appeared before the FISCR. In 2002, the FISCR accepted briefs filed by the ACLU and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amici curiae in In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
+
+While Yahoo's identity as the provider that challenged these directives was previously under seal pursuant to the FISCR's decision in In re Directives, 551 F.3d 1004, 1016-18, the FISCR issued an Order on June 26, 2013, indicating that it does not object to the release of Yahoo's identity, and ordering, among other things, a new declassification review of the FISCR's opinion in In re Directives. The FISCR issued this order in response to a motion by Yahoo's counsel, and after receiving briefing by Yahoo and the government. Yahoo also recently filed a motion for publication of the Court's decision that was appealed to the FISCR, resulting in the published opinion in In re Directives. The Court granted the motion. Documents related to Yahoo's recent motion to this Court are available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/index.html under Docket No. 105B(g) 07-01.
+
+Honorable Charles E. Grassley
+July 29, 2013
+Page 9
+
+the procedures and requirements for such challenges. Relatedly, 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(5)(A) provides that if an electronic communication service provider fails to comply with a directive issued under Section 702, the Attorney General may file a petition with the Court for an order to compel compliance, which would likely result in the service provider's appearance before the Court through its legal representatives. (Section 1881a(h)(5), as well as Rule 29 of the FISC Rules of Procedure, provide further detail on the procedures and requirements for the enforcement of Section 702 directives.) Finally, 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(6) and Rule 31 of the FISC Rules of Procedure allow for the government or an electronic communication service provider to appeal an order of this Court under §§ 1881a(h)(4) or (5) to the FISCR. To date, no electronic communication service provider has opted to challenge a directive issued pursuant to Section 702, although, as noted above, Yahoo refused to comply with government directives issued under the PAA, which resulted in the government invoking a provision under that statute to compel compliance.
+
+As noted above, there have been a number of other instances in which nongovernmental parties have appeared before the Court outside of the context of a direct challenge to a court order or a government directive, particularly recently. Those instances are as follows:
+
+In August 2007, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed a motion with the Court for the release of certain records. The Court ordered and received briefing on the matter from the ACLU and the government, and rendered a decision in December 2007. See In re Motion for Release of Court Records, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484 (FISA Ct. 2007).
+
+On May 23, 2013, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) filed a motion with this Court for consent to disclosure of court records, or in the alternative, a determination of the effect of the Court's rules on access rights under the Freedom of Information Act. Following briefing by EFF and the government, the Court issued an Opinion and Order on June 12, 2013. All documents filed in this docket are available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/index.html under Case No. Misc. 13-01.
+
+On June 12, 2013, the ACLU, the American Civil Liberties Union of the Nation's Capital, and the Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic (Movants) filed a motion with this Court for the release of Court records. The Court ordered and has received briefing on the matter from the Movants and the government. On July 18, 2013, the Court granted the motions of (1) sixteen members of the House of Representatives and (2) a coalition of news media organizations for leave to file amicus curiae briefs in this case. The matter is pending before the Court. All documents filed in this docket are available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/index.html under Case No. Misc. 13-02.
+
+On June 18, 2013, Google, Inc. filed a motion with this Court for declaratory judgment of the company's first amendment right to publish aggregate information about FISA orders. The
+
+Honorable Charles E. Grassley
+July 29, 2013
+Page 10
+
+court ordered briefing on the matter. On July 18, 2013, the Court granted the motions of (1) a coalition of news media organizations and (2) the First Amendment Coalition, the ACLU, the Center for Democracy and Technology, the EFF, and Techfreedom for leave to file amicus curiae briefs in this case. The matter is pending before the Court. All documents filed in this docket are available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/index.html under Case No. Misc. 13-03.
+
+On June 19, 2013, Microsoft Corporation filed a motion in this Court for declaratory judgment or other appropriate relief authorizing disclosure of aggregate data regarding any FISA orders it has received. The court ordered briefing on the matter. On July 18, 2013, the Court granted the motions of (1) a coalition of news media organizations and (2) the First Amendment Coalition, the ACLU, the Center for Democracy and Technology, the EFF, and Techfreedom for leave to file amicus curiae briefs in this case. The matter is pending before the Court. All documents filed in this docket are available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/index.html under Case No. Misc. 13-04.
+
+4. Please describe the process used by the Court to consider and resolve any instances where the government notifies the Court of compliance concerns with any of the FISA authorities.
+
+Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1803(h), the Court is empowered to ensure compliance with its orders. Additionally, Rule 13(a) of the FISC Rules of Procedure requires the government to file a written notice with the Court immediately upon discovering that any authority or approval granted by the Court has been implemented (either by government officials or others operating pursuant to Court order) in a manner that did not comply with the Court's authorization or approval or with applicable law. Rule 13(a) also requires the government to notify the Court in writing of the facts and circumstances relevant to the non-compliance; any modifications the government has made or proposes to make in how it will implement any authority or approval granted by the Court; and how the government proposes to dispose of or treat any information obtained as a result of the non-compliance.
+
+When the government discovers instances of non-compliance, it files notices with the Court as required by Rule 13(a). Because the rule requires the government to "immediately inform the Judge" of a compliance incident, the government typically files a preliminary notice that provides whatever facts are available at the time an incident is discovered. The legal staff review these notices as they are received and call significant matters to the attention of the appropriate judge. In instances in which the non-compliance has not been fully addressed by the time the preliminary Rule 13(a) notice is filed, the Court may seek additional information through telephone calls, meetings, or hearings. Typically, the government will file a final Rule 13(a) notice once the relevant facts are known and any unauthorized collection has been destroyed. However, judges sometimes issue orders directing the government to take specific
+
+Honorable Charles E. Grassley
+July 29, 2013
+Page 11
+
+actions to address instances of non-compliance either before or after a final notice is filed, and, less frequently, to cease a course of action that the Court considers non-compliant. This process is followed for compliance issues in all matters, including matters handled under Title V and Section 702.
+
+I hope these responses are helpful to the Senate Judiciary Committee in its deliberations.
+
+Sincerely,
+Reggie B. Walton
+Presiding Judge
+
+Identical letter sent to: Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
+
+TO THE BENCH, BAR AND PUBLIC:
+
+The attached Rules of Procedure for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court supersede both the February 17, 2006 Rules of Procedure and the May 5, 2006 Procedures for Review of Petitions Filed Pursuant to Section 501(f) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, As Amended. These revised Rules of Procedure are effective immediately.
+
+John D. Bates
+Presiding Judge
+Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+November 1, 2010
+
+UNITED STATES FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+Washington, D.C.
+
+RULES OF PROCEDURE
+Effective November 1, 2010
+
+Rule | Page
+--- | ---
+**Title I. Scope of Rules; Amendment** |
+1. Scope of Rules | 1
+2. Amendment | 1
+**Title II. National Security Information** |
+3. National Security Information | 1
+**Title III. Structure and Powers of the Court** |
+4. Structure | 1
+5. Authority of the Judges | 1
+**Title IV. Matters Presented to the Court** |
+6. Means of Requesting Relief from the Court | 2
+7. Filing Applications, Certifications, Petitions, Motions, or Other Papers ("Submissions") | 2
+8. Service | 3
+9. Time and Manner of Submission of Applications | 3
+10. Computation of Time | 4
+11. Notice and Briefing of Novel Issues | 4
+12. Submission of Targeting and Minimization Procedures | 5
+13. Correction of Misstatement or Omission; Disclosure of Non-Compliance | 5
+14. Motions to Amend Court Orders | 5
+15. Sequestration | 5
+16. Returns | 6
+**Title V. Hearings, Orders, and Enforcement** |
+17. Hearings | 6
+18. Court Orders | 6
+19. Enforcement of Orders | 7
+
+-ii-
+
+**Title VI. Supplemental Procedures for Proceedings Under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)** |
+20. Scope | 7
+21. Petition to Modify or Set Aside a Directive | 7
+22. Petition to Compel Compliance With a Directive | 7
+23. Contents of Petition | 8
+24. Response | 8
+25. Length of Petition and Response; Other Papers | 8
+26. Notification of Presiding Judge | 8
+27. Assignment | 8
+28. Review of Petition to Modify or Set Aside a Directive | 9
+29. Review of Petition to Compel Compliance Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(5)(C) | 9
+30. In Camera Review | 9
+31. Appeal | 9
+**Title VII. Supplemental Procedures for Proceedings Under 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)** |
+32. Scope | 10
+33. Petition Challenging Production or Nondisclosure Order | 10
+34. Contents of Petition | 10
+35. Length of Petition | 10
+36. Request to Stay Production | 10
+37. Notification of Presiding Judge | 10
+38. Assignment | 11
+39. Initial Review | 11
+40. Response to Petition; Other Papers | 11
+41. Rulings on Non-frivolous Petitions | 11
+42. Failure to Comply | 12
+43. In Camera Review | 12
+44. Appeal | 12
+**Title VIII. En Banc Proceedings** |
+45. Standard for Hearing or Rehearing En Banc | 12
+46. Initial Hearing En Banc on Request of a Party | 12
+47. Rehearing En Banc on Petition by a Party | 12
+48. Circulation of En Banc Petitions and Responses | 13
+49. Court-Initiated En Banc Proceedings | 13
+50. Polling | 13
+51. Stay Pending En Banc Review | 13
+52. Supplemental Briefing | 13
+53. Order Granting or Denying En Banc Review | 13
+
+-iii-
+
+**Title IX. Appeals** |
+54. How Taken | 14
+55. When Taken | 14
+56. Stay Pending Appeal | 14
+57. Motion to Transmit the Record | 14
+58. Transmitting the Record | 14
+59. Oral Notification to the Court of Review | 14
+**Title X. Administrative Provisions** |
+60. Duties of the Clerk | 14
+61. Office Hours | 15
+62. Release of Court Records | 15
+63. Practice Before Court | 15
+
+-iii-
+
+**Title I. Scope of Rules; Amendment**
+
+**Rule 1. Scope of Rules.** These rules, which are promulgated pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1803(g), govern all proceedings in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("the Court"). Issues not addressed in these rules or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, as amended ("the Act"), may be resolved under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
+
+**Rule 2. Amendment.** Any amendment to these rules must be promulgated in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2071.
+
+**Title II. National Security Information**
+
+**Rule 3. National Security Information.** In all matters, the Court and its staff shall comply with the security measures established pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §§ 1803(c), 1822(e), 1861(f)(4), and 1881a(k)(1), as well as Executive Order 13526, "Classified National Security Information" (or its successor). Each member of the Court's staff must possess security clearances at a level commensurate to the individual's responsibilities.
+
+**Title III. Structure and Powers of the Court**
+
+**Rule 4. Structure.**
+(a) **Composition.** In accordance with 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a), the Court consists of United States District Court Judges appointed by the Chief Justice of the United States.
+(b) **Presiding Judge.** The Chief Justice designates the "Presiding Judge."
+
+**Rule 5. Authority of the Judges.**
+(a) **Scope of Authority.** Each Judge may exercise the authority vested by the Act and such other authority as is consistent with Article III of the Constitution and other statutes and laws of the United States, to the extent not inconsistent with the Act.
+(b) **Referring Matters to Other Judges.** Except for matters involving a denial of an application for an order, a Judge may refer any matter to another Judge of the Court with that Judge's consent. If a Judge directs the government to supplement an application, the Judge may direct the government to present the renewal of that application to the same Judge. If a matter is presented to a Judge who is unavailable or whose tenure on the Court expires while the matter is pending, the Presiding Judge may re-assign the matter.
+(c) **Supplementation.** The Judge before whom a matter is pending may order a party to furnish any information that the Judge deems necessary.
+
+-1-
+
+**Title IV. Matters Presented to the Court**
+
+**Rule 6. Means of Requesting Relief from the Court.**
+(a) **Application.** The government may, in accordance with 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804, 1823, 1842, 1861, 1881b(b), 1881c(b), or 1881d(a), file an application for a Court order ("application").
+(b) **Certification.** The government may, in accordance with 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g), file a certification concerning the targeting of non-United States persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States ("certification").
+(c) **Petition.** A party may, in accordance with 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861(f) and 1881a(h) and the Supplemental Procedures in Titles VI and VII of these Rules, file a petition for review of a production or nondisclosure order issued under 50 U.S.C. § 1861 or for review or enforcement of a directive issued under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (“petition”).
+(d) **Motion.** A party seeking relief, other than pursuant to an application, certification, or petition permitted under the Act and these Rules, must do so by motion (“motion”).
+
+**Rule 7. Filing Applications, Certifications, Petitions, Motions, or Other Papers ("Submissions").**
+(a) **Filing.** A submission is filed by delivering it to the Clerk or as otherwise directed by the Clerk in accordance with Rule 7(k).
+(b) **Original and One Copy.** Except as otherwise provided, a signed original and one copy must be filed with the Clerk.
+(c) **Form.** Unless otherwise ordered, all submissions must be:
+(1) on 8½-by-11-inch opaque white paper; and
+(2) typed (double-spaced) or reproduced in a manner that produces a clear black image.
+(d) **Electronic Filing.** The Clerk, when authorized by the Court, may accept and file submissions by any reliable, and appropriately secure, electronic means.
+(e) **Facsimile or Scanned Signature.** The Clerk may accept for filing a submission bearing a facsimile or scanned signature in lieu of the original signature. Upon acceptance, a submission bearing a facsimile or scanned signature is the original Court record.
+(f) **Citations.** Each submission must contain citations to pertinent provisions of the Act.
+(g) **Contents.** Each application and certification filed by the government must be approved and certified in accordance with the Act, and must contain the statements and other information required by the Act.
+(h) **Contact Information in Adversarial Proceedings.**
+(1) **Filing by a Party Other Than the Government.** A party other than the government must include in the initial submission the party's full name, address, and telephone number, or, if the party is represented by counsel, the full name of the party and the party's counsel, as well as counsel's address, telephone number, facsimile number, and bar membership information.
+(2) **Filing by the Government.** In an adversarial proceeding, the initial
+
+-2-
+
+submission filed by the government must include the full names of the attorneys representing the United States and their mailing addresses, telephone numbers, and facsimile numbers.
+(i) **Information Concerning Security Clearances in Adversarial Proceedings.** A party other than the government must:
+(1) state in the initial submission whether the party (or the party's responsible officers or employees) and counsel for the party hold security clearances;
+(2) describe the circumstances in which such clearances were granted; and
+(3) identify the federal agencies granting the clearances and the classification levels and compartments involved.
+(j) **Ex Parte Review.** At the request of the government in an adversarial proceeding, the Judge must review *ex parte* and *in camera* any submissions by the government, or portions thereof, which may include classified information. Except as otherwise ordered, if the government files *ex parte* a submission that contains classified information, the government must file and serve on the non-governmental party an unclassified or redacted version. The unclassified or redacted version, at a minimum, must clearly articulate the government's legal arguments.
+(k) **Instructions for Delivery to the Court.** A party may obtain instructions for making submissions permitted under the Act and these Rules by contacting the Clerk at (202) 357-6250.
+
+**Rule 8. Service.**
+(a) **By a Party Other than the Government.** A party other than the government must, at or before the time of filing a submission permitted under the Act and these Rules, serve a copy on the government. Instructions for effecting service must be obtained by contacting the Security and Emergency Planning Staff, United States Department of Justice, by telephone at (202) 514-2094.
+(b) **By the Government.** At or before the time of filing a submission in an adversarial proceeding, the government must, subject to Rule 7(j), serve a copy by hand delivery or by overnight delivery on counsel for the other party, or, if the party is not represented by counsel, on the party directly.
+(c) **Certificate of Service.** A party must include a certificate of service specifying the time and manner of service.
+
+**Rule 9. Time and Manner of Submission of Applications.**
+(a) **Proposed Applications.** Except when an application is being submitted following an emergency authorization pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §§ 1805(e), 1824(e), 1843, 1881b(d), or 1881c(d) ("emergency authorization"), or as otherwise permitted by the Court, proposed applications must be submitted by the government no later than seven days before the government seeks to have the matter entertained by the Court. Proposed applications submitted following an emergency authorization must be submitted as soon after such authorization as is reasonably practicable.
+(b) **Final Applications.** Unless the Court permits otherwise, the final application,
+
+-3-
+
+including all signatures, approvals, and certifications required by the Act, must be filed no later than 10:00 a.m. Eastern Time on the day the government seeks to have the matter entertained by the Court.
+(c) **Proposed Orders.** Each proposed application and final application submitted to the Court must include any pertinent proposed orders.
+(d) **Number of Copies.** Notwithstanding Rule 7(b), unless the Court directs otherwise, only one copy of a proposed application must be submitted and only the original final application must be filed.
+(e) **Notice of Changes.** No later than the time the final application is filed, the government must identify any differences between the final application and the proposed application.
+
+**Rule 10. Computation of Time.** The following rules apply in computing a time period specified by these Rules or by Court order:
+(a) **Day of the Event Excluded.** Exclude the day of the event that triggers the period.
+(b) **Compute Time Using Calendar Days.** Compute time using calendar days, not business days.
+(c) **Include the Last Day.** Include the last day of the period; but if the last day is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the period continues to run until the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.
+
+**Rule 11. Notice and Briefing of Novel Issues.**
+(a) **Notice to the Court.** If a submission by the government for Court action involves an issue not previously presented to the Court — including, but not limited to, a novel issue of technology or law — the government must inform the Court in writing of the nature and significance of that issue.
+(b) **Submission Relating to New Techniques.** Prior to requesting authorization to use a new surveillance or search technique, the government must submit a memorandum to the Court that:
+(1) explains the technique;
+(2) describes the circumstances of the likely implementation of the technique;
+(3) discusses any legal issues apparently raised; and
+(4) describes the proposed minimization procedures to be applied.
+At the latest, the memorandum must be submitted as part of the first proposed application or other submission that seeks to employ the new technique.
+(c) **Novel Implementation.** When requesting authorization to use an existing surveillance or search technique in a novel context, the government must identify and address any new minimization or other issues in a written submission made, at the latest, as part of the application or other filing seeking such authorization.
+(d) **Legal Memorandum.** If an application or other request for action raises an issue of law not previously considered by the Court, the government must file a memorandum of law in support of its position on each new issue. At the latest, the memorandum must be
+
+-4-
+
+submitted as part of the first proposed application or other submission that raises the issue.
+
+**Rule 12. Submission of Targeting and Minimization Procedures.** In a matter involving Court review of targeting or minimization procedures, such procedures may be set out in full in the government's submission or may be incorporated by reference to procedures approved in a prior docket. Procedures that are incorporated by reference to a prior docket may be supplemented, but not otherwise modified, in the government's submission. Otherwise, proposed procedures must be set forth in a clear and self-contained manner, without resort to cross-referencing.
+
+**Rule 13. Correction of Misstatement or Omission; Disclosure of Non-Compliance.**
+(a) **Correction of Material Facts.** If the government discovers that a submission to the Court contained a misstatement or omission of material fact, the government, in writing, must immediately inform the Judge to whom the submission was made of:
+(1) the misstatement or omission;
+(2) any necessary correction;
+(3) the facts and circumstances relevant to the misstatement or omission;
+(4) any modifications the government has made or proposes to make in how it will implement any authority or approval granted by the Court; and
+(5) how the government proposes to dispose of or treat any information obtained as a result of the misstatement or omission.
+(b) **Disclosure of Non-Compliance.** If the government discovers that any authority or approval granted by the Court has been implemented in a manner that did not comply with the Court's authorization or approval or with applicable law, the government, in writing, must immediately inform the Judge to whom the submission was made of:
+(1) the non-compliance;
+(2) the facts and circumstances relevant to the non-compliance;
+(3) any modifications the government has made or proposes to make in how it will implement any authority or approval granted by the Court; and
+(4) how the government proposes to dispose of or treat any information obtained as a result of the non-compliance.
+
+**Rule 14. Motions to Amend Court Orders.** Unless the Judge who issued the order granting an application directs otherwise, a motion to amend the order may be presented to any other Judge.
+
+**Rule 15. Sequestration.** Except as required by Court-approved minimization procedures, the government must not submit material for sequestration with the Court without the prior approval of the Presiding Judge. To obtain such approval, the government must, prior to tendering the material to the Court for sequestration, file a motion stating the circumstances of the material's acquisition and explaining why it is necessary for such material to be retained in the custody of the Court.
+
+-5-
+
+**Rule 16. Returns.**
+(a) **Time for Filing.**
+(1) **Search Orders.** Unless the Court directs otherwise, a return must be made and filed either at the time of submission of a proposed renewal application or within 90 days of the execution of a search order, whichever is sooner.
+(2) **Other Orders.** The Court may direct the filing of other returns at a time and in a manner that it deems appropriate.
+(b) **Contents.** The return must:
+(1) notify the Court of the execution of the order;
+(2) describe the circumstances and results of the search or other activity including, where appropriate, an inventory;
+(3) certify that the execution was in conformity with the order or describe and explain any deviation from the order; and
+(4) include any other information as the Court may direct.
+
+**Title V. Hearings, Orders, and Enforcement**
+
+**Rule 17. Hearings.**
+(a) **Scheduling.** The Judge to whom a matter is presented or assigned must determine whether a hearing is necessary and, if so, set the time and place of the hearing.
+(b) **Ex Parte.** Except as the Court otherwise directs or the Rules otherwise provide, a hearing in a non-adversarial matter must be *ex parte* and conducted within the Court's secure facility.
+(c) **Appearances.** Unless excused, the government official providing the factual information in an application or certification and an attorney for the applicant must attend the hearing, along with other representatives of the government, and any other party, as the Court may direct or permit.
+(d) **Testimony; Oath; Recording of Proceedings.** A Judge may take testimony under oath and receive other evidence. The testimony may be recorded electronically or as the Judge may otherwise direct, consistent with the security measures referenced in Rule 3.
+
+**Rule 18. Court Orders.**
+(a) **Citations.** All orders must contain citations to pertinent provisions of the Act.
+(b) **Denying Applications.**
+(1) **Written Statement of Reasons.** If a Judge denies the government's application, the Judge must immediately provide a written statement of each reason for the decision and cause a copy of the statement to be served on the government.
+(2) **Previously Denied Application.** If a Judge denies an application or other request for relief by the government, any subsequent submission on the matter must be referred to that Judge.
+
+-6-
+
+(c) **Expiration Dates.** An expiration date in an order must be stated using Eastern Time and must be computed from the date and time of the Court's issuance of the order, or, if applicable, of an emergency authorization.
+(d) **Electronic Signatures.** The Judge may sign an order by any reliable, appropriately secure electronic means, including facsimile.
+
+**Rule 19. Enforcement of Orders.**
+(a) **Show Cause Motions.** If a person or entity served with a Court order (the "recipient") fails to comply with that order, the government may file a motion for an order to show cause why the recipient should not be held in contempt and sanctioned accordingly. The motion must be presented to the Judge who entered the underlying order.
+(b) **Proceedings.**
+(1) An order to show cause must:
+(i) confirm that the underlying order was issued;
+(ii) schedule further proceedings; and
+(iii) afford the recipient an opportunity to show cause why the recipient should not be held in contempt.
+(2) A Judge must conduct any proceeding on a motion to show cause *in camera*. The Clerk must maintain all records of the proceedings in conformance with 50 U.S.C. § 1803(c).
+(3) If the recipient fails to show cause for noncompliance with the underlying order, the Court may find the recipient in contempt and enter any order it deems necessary and appropriate to compel compliance and to sanction the recipient for noncompliance with the underlying order.
+(4) If the recipient shows cause for noncompliance or if the Court concludes that the order should not be enforced as issued, the Court may enter any order it deems appropriate.
+
+**Title VI. Supplemental Procedures for Proceedings Under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)**
+
+**Rule 20. Scope.** Together with the generally-applicable provisions of these Rules concerning filing, service, and other matters, these supplemental procedures apply in proceedings under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h).
+
+**Rule 21. Petition to Modify or Set Aside a Directive.** An electronic communication service provider ("provider"), who receives a directive issued under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(1), may file a petition to modify or set aside such directive under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(4). A petition may be filed by the provider's counsel.
+
+-7-
+
+**Rule 22. Petition to Compel Compliance With a Directive.** In the event a provider fails to comply with a directive issued under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(1), the government may, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(5), file a petition to compel compliance with the directive.
+
+**Rule 23. Contents of Petition.** The petition must:
+(a) state clearly the relief being sought;
+(b) state concisely the factual and legal grounds for modifying, setting aside, or compelling compliance with the directive at issue;
+(c) include a copy of the directive and state the date on which the directive was served on the provider; and
+(d) state whether a hearing is requested.
+
+**Rule 24. Response.**
+(a) **By Government.** The government may, within seven days following notification under Rule 28(b) that plenary review is necessary, file a response to a provider's petition.
+(b) **By Provider.** The provider may, within seven days after service of a petition by the government to compel compliance, file a response to the petition.
+
+**Rule 25. Length of Petition and Response; Other Papers.**
+(a) **Length.** Unless the Court directs otherwise, a petition and response each must not exceed 20 pages in length, including any attachments (other than a copy of the directive at issue).
+(b) **Other papers.** No supplements, replies, or sur-replies may be filed without leave of the Court.
+
+**Rule 26. Notification of Presiding Judge.** Upon receipt, the Clerk must notify the Presiding Judge that a petition to modify, set aside, or compel compliance with a directive issued under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(1) has been filed. If the Presiding Judge is not reasonably available when the Clerk receives a petition, the Clerk must notify each of the local Judges, in order of seniority on the Court, and, if necessary, each of the other Judges, in order of seniority on the Court, until a Judge who is reasonably available has received notification. The reasonably available Judge who receives notification will be the acting Presiding Judge ("Presiding Judge") for the case.
+
+**Rule 27. Assignment.**
+(a) **Presiding Judge.** As soon as possible after receiving notification from the Clerk that a petition has been filed, and no later than 24 hours after the filing of the petition, the Presiding Judge must assign the matter to a Judge in the petition review pool established by 50 U.S.C. § 1803(e)(1). The Clerk must record the date and time of the assignment.
+(b) **Transmitting Petition.** The Clerk must transmit the petition to the assigned Judge as soon as possible but no later than 24 hours after being notified of the assignment by the Presiding Judge.
+
+-8-
+
+**Rule 28. Review of Petition to Modify or Set Aside a Directive.**
+(a) **Initial Review Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(4)(D).**
+(1) A Judge must conduct an initial review of a petition to modify or set aside a directive within five days after being assigned such petition.
+(2) If the Judge determines that the provider's claims, defenses, or other legal contentions are not warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law, the Judge must promptly deny such petition, affirm the directive, and order the provider to comply with the directive. Upon making such determination or promptly thereafter, the Judge must provide a written statement of reasons. The Clerk must transmit the ruling and statement of reasons to the provider and the government.
+(b) **Plenary Review Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(4)(E).**
+(1) If the Judge determines that the petition requires plenary review, the Court must promptly notify the parties. The Judge must provide a written statement of reasons for the determination.
+(2) The Judge must affirm, modify, or set aside the directive that is the subject of the petition within the time permitted under 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881a(h)(4)(E) and 1881a(j)(2).
+(3) The Judge may hold a hearing or conduct proceedings solely on the papers filed by the provider and the government.
+(c) **Burden.** Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(4)(C), a Judge may grant the petition only if the Judge finds that the challenged directive does not meet the requirements of 50 U.S.C. § 1881a or is otherwise unlawful.
+(d) **Continued Effect.** Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(4)(F), any directive not explicitly modified or set aside by the Judge remains in full effect.
+
+**Rule 29. Review of Petition to Compel Compliance Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(5)(C).**
+(a) The Judge reviewing the government's petition to compel compliance with a directive must, within the time permitted under 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881a(h)(5)(C) and 1881a(j)(2), issue an order requiring the provider to comply with the directive or any part of it, as issued or as modified, if the Judge finds that the directive meets the requirements of 50 U.S.C. § 1881a and is otherwise lawful.
+(b) The Judge must provide a written statement of reasons for the determination. The Clerk must transmit the ruling and statement of reasons to the provider and the government.
+
+**Rule 30. In Camera Review.** Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1803(e)(2), the Court must review a petition under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h) and conduct related proceedings *in camera*.
+
+**Rule 31. Appeal.** Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(6) and subject to Rules 54 through 59 of these Rules, the government or the provider may petition the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review ("Court of Review") to review the Judge's ruling.
+
+-9-
+
+**Title VII. Supplemental Procedures for Proceedings Under 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)**
+
+**Rule 32. Scope.** Together with the generally-applicable provisions of these Rules regarding filing, service, and other matters, these supplemental procedures apply in proceedings under 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f).
+
+**Rule 33. Petition Challenging Production or Nondisclosure Order.**
+(a) **Who May File.** The recipient of a production order or nondisclosure order under 50 U.S.C. § 1861 ("petitioner") may file a petition challenging the order pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f). A petition may be filed by the petitioner's counsel.
+(b) **Time to File Petition.**
+(1) **Challenging a Production Order.** The petitioner must file a petition challenging a production order within 20 days after the order has been served.
+(2) **Challenging a Nondisclosure Order.** A petitioner may not file a petition challenging a nondisclosure order issued under 50 U.S.C. § 1861(d) earlier than one year after the order was entered.
+(3) **Subsequent Petition Challenging a Nondisclosure Order.** If a Judge denies a petition to modify or set aside a nondisclosure order, the petitioner may not file a subsequent petition challenging the same nondisclosure order earlier than one year after the date of the denial.
+
+**Rule 34. Contents of Petition.** A petition must:
+(a) state clearly the relief being sought;
+(b) state concisely the factual and legal grounds for modifying or setting aside the challenged order;
+(c) include a copy of the challenged order and state the date on which it was served on the petitioner; and
+(d) state whether a hearing is requested.
+
+**Rule 35. Length of Petition.** Unless the Court directs otherwise, a petition may not exceed 20 pages in length, including any attachments (other than a copy of the challenged order).
+
+**Rule 36. Request to Stay Production.**
+(a) **Petition Does Not Automatically Effect a Stay.** A petition does not automatically stay the underlying order. A production order will be stayed only if the petitioner requests a stay and the Judge grants such relief.
+(b) **Stay May Be Requested Prior to Filing of a Petition.** A petitioner may request the Court to stay the production order before filing a petition challenging the order.
+
+**Rule 37. Notification of Presiding Judge.** Upon receipt, the Clerk must notify the Presiding Judge that a petition challenging a production or nondisclosure order has been filed. If the Presiding Judge is not reasonably available when the Clerk receives the petition, the Clerk must
+
+-10-
+
+notify each of the local Judges, in order of seniority on the Court, and, if necessary, each of the other Judges, in order of seniority on the Court, until a Judge who is reasonably available has received notification. The reasonably available Judge who receives notification will be the acting Presiding Judge ("Presiding Judge") for the case.
+
+**Rule 38. Assignment.**
+(a) **Presiding Judge.** Immediately after receiving notification from the Clerk that a petition has been filed, the Presiding Judge must assign the matter to a Judge in the petition pool established by 50 U.S.C. § 1803(e)(1). The Clerk must record the date and time of the assignment.
+(b) **Transmitting Petition.** The Clerk must transmit the petition to the assigned Judge as soon as possible but no later than 24 hours after being notified of the assignment by the Presiding Judge.
+
+**Rule 39. Initial Review.**
+(a) **When.** The Judge must review the petition within 72 hours after being assigned the petition.
+(b) **Frivolous Petition.** If the Judge determines that the petition is frivolous, the Judge must:
+(1) immediately deny the petition and affirm the challenged order;
+(2) promptly provide a written statement of the reasons for the denial; and
+(3) provide a written ruling, together with the statement of reasons, to the Clerk, who must transmit the ruling and statement of reasons to the petitioner and the government.
+(c) **Non-Frivolous Petition.**
+(1) **Scheduling.** If the Judge determines that the petition is not frivolous, the Judge must promptly issue an order that sets a schedule for its consideration. The Clerk must transmit the order to the petitioner and the government.
+(2) **Manner of Proceeding.** The judge may hold a hearing or conduct the proceedings solely on the papers filed by the petitioner and the government.
+
+**Rule 40. Response to Petition; Other Papers.**
+(a) **Government's Response.** Unless the Judge orders otherwise, the government must file a response within 20 days after the issuance of the initial scheduling order pursuant to Rule 39(c). The response must not exceed 20 pages in length, including any attachments (other than a copy of the challenged order).
+(b) **Other Papers.** No supplements, replies, or sur-replies may be filed without leave of the Court.
+
+**Rule 41. Rulings on Non-frivolous Petitions.**
+(a) **Written Statement of Reasons.** If the Judge determines that the petition is not frivolous, the Judge must promptly provide a written statement of the reasons for modifying, setting aside, or affirming the production or nondisclosure order.
+
+-11-
+
+(b) **Affirming the Order.** If the Judge does not modify or set aside the production or nondisclosure order, the Judge must affirm it and order the recipient promptly to comply with it.
+(c) **Transmitting the Judge's Ruling.** The Clerk must transmit the Judge's ruling and written statement of reasons to the petitioner and the government.
+
+**Rule 42. Failure to Comply.** If a recipient fails to comply with an order affirmed under 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f), the government may file a motion seeking immediate enforcement of the affirmed order. The Court may consider the government's motion without receiving additional submissions or convening further proceedings on the matter.
+
+**Rule 43. In Camera Review.** Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1803(e)(2), the Court must review a petition under 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f) and conduct related proceedings *in camera*.
+
+**Rule 44. Appeal.** Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)(3) and subject to Rules 54 through 59 of these Rules, the government or the petitioner may petition the Court of Review to review the Judge's ruling.
+
+**Title VIII. En Banc Proceedings**
+
+**Rule 45. Standard for Hearing or Rehearing En Banc.** Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(2)(A), the Court may order a hearing or rehearing en banc only if it is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the Court's decisions, or the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance.
+
+**Rule 46. Initial Hearing En Banc on Request of a Party.** The government in any proceeding, or a party in a proceeding under 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f) or 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(4)-(5), may request that the matter be entertained from the outset by the full Court. However, initial hearings en banc are extraordinary and will be ordered only when a majority of the Judges determines that a matter is of such immediate and extraordinary importance that initial consideration by the en banc Court is necessary, and en banc review is feasible in light of applicable time constraints on Court action.
+
+**Rule 47. Rehearing En Banc on Petition by a Party.**
+(a) **Timing of Petition and Response.** A party may file a petition for rehearing en banc permitted under 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(2) no later than 30 days after the challenged order or decision is entered. In an adversarial proceeding in which a petition for rehearing en banc is permitted under § 1803(a)(2), a party must file a response to the petition within 14 days after filing and service of the petition.
+(b) **Length of Petition and Response.** Unless the Court directs otherwise, a petition for rehearing en banc and a response to a petition for rehearing en banc each must not exceed 15 pages, including any attachments (other than the challenged order or decision).
+
+-12-
+
+**Rule 48. Circulation of En Banc Petitions and Responses.** The Clerk must, after consulting with the Presiding Judge and in a manner consistent with applicable security requirements, promptly provide a copy of any timely-filed en banc petition permitted under 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(2), and any timely-filed response thereto, to each Judge.
+
+**Rule 49. Court-Initiated En Banc Proceedings.** A Judge to whom a matter has been presented may request that all Judges be polled with respect to whether the matter should be considered or reconsidered en banc. On a Judge's request, the Clerk must, after consulting with the Presiding Judge and in a manner consistent with applicable security requirements, promptly provide notice of the request, along with a copy of pertinent materials, to every Judge.
+
+**Rule 50. Polling.**
+(a) **Deadline for Vote.** The Presiding Judge must set a deadline for the Judges to submit their vote to the Clerk on whether to grant a hearing or rehearing en banc. The deadline must be communicated to all Judges at the time the petition or polling request is circulated.
+(b) **Vote on Stay.** In the case of rehearing en banc, the Presiding Judge may request that all Judges also vote on whether and to what extent the challenged order or ruling should be stayed or remain in effect if rehearing en banc is granted, pending a decision by the en banc Court on the merits.
+
+**Rule 51. Stay Pending En Banc Review.**
+(a) **Stay or Modifying Order.** In accordance with 50 U.S.C. §§ 1803(a)(2)(B) and 1803(f), the Court en banc may enter a stay or modifying order while en banc proceedings are pending.
+(b) **Statement of Position Regarding Continued Effect of Challenged Order.** A petition for rehearing en banc and any response to the petition each must include a statement of the party's position as to whether and to what extent the challenged order should remain in effect if rehearing en banc is granted, pending a decision by the en banc Court on the merits.
+
+**Rule 52. Supplemental Briefing.** Upon ordering hearing or rehearing en banc, the Court may require the submission of supplemental briefs.
+
+**Rule 53. Order Granting or Denying En Banc Review.**
+(a) **Entry of Order.** If a majority of the Judges votes within the time allotted for polling that a matter be considered en banc, the Presiding Judge must direct the Clerk to enter an order granting en banc review. If a majority of the Judges does not vote to grant hearing or rehearing en banc within the time allotted for polling, the Presiding Judge must direct the Clerk to enter an order denying en banc review.
+(b) **Other Issues.** The Presiding Judge may set the time of an en banc hearing and the time and scope of any supplemental hearing in the order granting en banc review. The
+
+-13-
+
+order may also address whether and to what extent the challenged order or ruling will be stayed or remain in effect pending a decision by the en banc Court on the merits.
+
+**Title IX. Appeals**
+
+**Rule 54. How Taken.** An appeal to the Court of Review, as permitted by law, may be taken by filing a petition for review with the Clerk.
+
+**Rule 55. When Taken.**
+(a) **Generally.** Except as the Act provides otherwise, a party must file a petition for review no later than 30 days after entry of the decision or order as to which review is sought.
+(b) **Effect of En Banc Proceedings.** Following the timely submission of a petition for rehearing en banc permitted under 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(2) or the grant of rehearing en banc on the Court's own initiative, the time otherwise allowed for taking an appeal runs from the date on which such petition is denied or dismissed or, if en banc review is granted, from the date of the decision of the en banc Court on the merits.
+
+**Rule 56. Stay Pending Appeal.** In accordance with 50 U.S.C. § 1803(f), the Court may enter a stay of an order or an order modifying an order while an appeal is pending.
+
+**Rule 57. Motion to Transmit the Record.** Together with the petition for review, the party filing the appeal must also file a motion to transmit the record to the Court of Review.
+
+**Rule 58. Transmitting the Record.** The Clerk must arrange to transmit the record under seal to the Court of Review as expeditiously as possible, no later than 30 days after an appeal has been filed. The Clerk must include a copy of the Court's statement of reasons for the decision or order appealed from as part of the record on appeal.
+
+**Rule 59. Oral Notification to the Court of Review.** The Clerk must orally notify the Presiding Judge of the Court of Review promptly upon the filing of a petition for review.
+
+**Title X. Administrative Provisions**
+
+**Rule 60. Duties of the Clerk.**
+(a) **General Duties.** The Clerk supports the work of the Court consistent with the directives of the Presiding Judge. The Presiding Judge may authorize the Clerk to delegate duties to staff in the Clerk's office or other designated individuals.
+(b) **Maintenance of Court Records.** The Clerk:
+(1) maintains the Court's docket and records — including records and recordings of proceedings before the Court — and the seal of the Court;
+
+-14-
+
+(2) accepts papers for filing;
+(3) keeps all records, pleadings, and files in a secure location, making those materials available only to persons authorized to have access to them; and
+(4) performs any other duties, consistent with the usual powers of a Clerk of Court, as the Presiding Judge may authorize.
+
+**Rule 61. Office Hours.** Although the Court is always open, the regular business hours of the Clerk's Office are 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. daily except Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. Except when the government submits an application following an emergency authorization, or when the Court otherwise directs, any filing outside these hours will be recorded as received at the start of the next business day.
+
+**Rule 62. Release of Court Records.**
+(a) **Publication of Opinions.** The Judge who authored an order, opinion, or other decision may *sua sponte* or on motion by a party request that it be published. Upon such request, the Presiding Judge, after consulting with other Judges of the Court, may direct that an order, opinion or other decision be published. Before publication, the Court may, as appropriate, direct the Executive Branch to review the order, opinion, or other decision and redact it as necessary to ensure that properly classified information is appropriately protected pursuant to Executive Order 13526 (or its successor).
+(b) **Other Records.** Except when an order, opinion, or other decision is published or provided to a party upon issuance, the Clerk may not release it, or other related record, without a Court order. Such records must be released in conformance with the security measures referenced in Rule 3.
+(c) **Provision of Court Records to Congress.**
+(1) **By the Government.** The government may provide copies of Court orders, opinions, decisions, or other Court records, to Congress, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §§ 1871(a)(5), 1871(c), or 1881f(b)(1)(D), or any other statutory requirement, without prior motion to and order by the Court. The government, however, must contemporaneously notify the Court in writing whenever it provides copies of Court records to Congress and must include in the notice a list of the documents provided.
+(2) **By the Court.** The Presiding Judge may provide copies of Court orders, opinions, decisions, or other Court records to Congress. Such disclosures must be made in conformance with the security measures referenced in Rule 3.
+
+**Rule 63. Practice Before Court.** An attorney may appear on a matter with the permission of the Judge before whom the matter is pending. An attorney who appears before the Court must be a licensed attorney and a member, in good standing, of the bar of a United States district or circuit court, except that an attorney who is employed by and represents the United States or any of its agencies in a matter before the Court may appear before the Court regardless of federal bar membership. All attorneys appearing before the Court must have the appropriate security clearance.
+
+-15-
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_honorable-charles-grassley/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_honorable-charles-grassley/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a60eb93
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_honorable-charles-grassley/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Letter to Charles E. Grassley, Ranking Member, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-07-29",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-07-29",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34195",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "02f5dd3640965182e696ba672268c8f8edde6ecb61c4d9b3ff2443bca14963d9",
+ "pages": 30
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_honorable-patrick-leahy/FISC_-_honorable-patrick-leahy.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_honorable-patrick-leahy/FISC_-_honorable-patrick-leahy.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6c23fa2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_honorable-patrick-leahy/FISC_-_honorable-patrick-leahy.md
@@ -0,0 +1,630 @@
+Honorable Reggie B. Walton
+Presiding Judge
+
+UNITED STATES FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+Washington, D.C.
+
+July 29, 2013
+
+Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
+Chairman
+Committee on the Judiciary
+United States Senate
+Washington, DC 20510
+
+Dear Mr. Chairman:
+
+I am writing in response to your letter of July 18, 2013, in which you posed several questions about the operations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (the Court). As you requested, we are providing unclassified responses. We would note that, as a general matter, the Court's practices have evolved over time. Various developments in the last several years including statutory changes, changes in the size of the Court and its staff, the adoption of new Rules of Procedure in 2010, and the relocation of the Court's facilities from the Department of Justice headquarters to a secure space in the federal courthouse in 2009 – have affected some of these practices. The responses below reflect the current practices of the Court.
+
+1. Describe the typical process that the Court follows when it considers the following: (1) an application for an order for electronic surveillance under Title I of FISA; (2) an application for an order for access to business records under Title V of FISA; and (3) submissions from the government under Section 702 of FISA. As to applications for orders for access to business records under Title V of FISA, please describe whether the process for the Court's consideration of such applications is different when considering requests for bulk collection of phone call metadata records, as recently declassified by the Director of National Intelligence.
+
+Each week, one of the eleven district court judges who comprise the Court is on duty in Washington. As discussed below, most of the Court's work is handled by the duty judge with the assistance of attorneys and clerk's office personnel who staff the Court. Some of the Court's more complex or time-consuming matters are handled by judges outside of the duty-week system, at the discretion of the Presiding Judge. In either case, matters before the Court are thoroughly reviewed and analyzed by the Court.
+
+Rule 9(a) of the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Rules of Procedure
+
+Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
+July 29, 2013
+Page 2
+
+(FISC Rules of Procedure) [1] requires that except in certain circumstances (i.e., a submission pursuant to an emergency authorization under the statute or as otherwise permitted by the Court), a proposed application must be submitted by the government no later than seven days before the government seeks to have the matter entertained. [2] Upon the Court's receipt of a proposed application for an order under FISA, a member of the Court's legal staff reviews the application and evaluates whether it meets the legal requirements under the statute. As part of this evaluation, a Court attorney will often have one or more telephone conversations with the government [3] to seek additional information and/or raise concerns about the application. A Court attorney then prepares a written analysis of the application for the duty judge, which includes an identification of any weaknesses, flaws, or other concerns. For example, the attorney may recommend that the judge consider requiring the addition of information to the application; imposing special reporting requirements; [4] or shortening the requested duration of an authorization.
+
+The judge then reviews the proposed application, as well as the attorney's written analysis. [5] The judge typically makes a preliminary determination at that time about what course
+
+[1] A copy of the FISC Rules of Procedure is appended hereto as Attachment A. The rules are also available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/rules/FISC2010.pdf.
+[2] A proposed application is also sometimes referred to as a “read copy” and has been referred to in this manner in at least one recent congressional hearing. A proposed application or "read copy" is a near-final version of the government's application, which does not include the signatures of executive branch officials required by statutory provisions such as 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(6) and 1823(a)(6). As described below, in most circumstances, the government will subsequently file a final copy of an application pursuant to Rule 9(b) of the FISC Rules of Procedure. Both the proposed and final applications include proposed orders.
+The process of using proposed applications and final applications is altogether similar to the process employed by other federal courts in considering applications for wiretap orders under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended ("Title 111"), which is codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522.
+[3] In discussing Court interactions with “the government" throughout this document, I am referring to interactions with attorneys in the Office of Intelligence of the National Security Division of the United States Department of Justice.
+[4] Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §§ 1805(d)(3) and 1824(d)(3), the Court is authorized to assess compliance with the statutorily-required minimization procedures by reviewing the circumstances under which information concerning United States persons was acquired, retained, or disseminated.
+[5] For each application, the Court retains the attorney's written analysis and the notes made by the judge, so that if the government later seeks to renew the authorization, the judge who considers the next
+
+Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
+July 29, 2013
+Page 3
+
+of action to take. These courses of action might include indicating to Court staff that he or she is prepared to approve the application without a hearing; indicating an inclination to impose conditions on the approval of the application; determining that additional information is needed about the application; or determining that a hearing would be appropriate before deciding whether to grant the application. A staff attorney will then relay the judge's inclination to the government, and the government will typically proceed by providing additional information, or by submitting a final application (sometimes with amendments, at the government's election) for the Court's ruling pursuant to Rule 9(b) of the FISC Rules of Procedure. In conjunction with its submission of a final application, the government has an opportunity to request a hearing, even if the judge did not otherwise intend to require one. The government might request a hearing, for example, to challenge conditions that the judge has indicated he or she would impose on the approval of an application. If the judge schedules a hearing, the judge decides whether to approve the application thereafter. Otherwise, the judge makes a determination based on the final written application submitted by the government. In approving an application, a judge will sometimes issue a Supplemental Order in addition to signing the government's proposed orders. Often, a Supplemental Order imposes some form of reporting requirement on the government.
+
+If after receiving a final application, the judge is inclined to deny it, the Court will prepare a statement of reason(s) pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(1). In some cases, the government may decide not to submit a final application, or to withdraw one that has been submitted, after learning that the judge does not intend to approve it. The annual statistics provided to Congress by the Attorney General pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §§ 1807 and 1862(b) – frequently cited to in press reports as a suggestion that the Court's approval rate of applications is over 99% – reflect only the number of final applications submitted to and acted on by the Court. These statistics do not reflect the fact that many applications are altered prior to final submission or even withheld from final submission entirely, often after an indication that a judge would not approve them.
+
+Most applications under Title V of FISA are handled pursuant to the process described above. However, applications under Title V of FISA for bulk collection of phone call metadata records are normally handled by the weekly duty judge using a process that is similar to the one described above, albeit more exacting. The government typically submits a proposed application of this type more than one week in advance. The attorney who reviews the application spends a
+
+application has the benefit of the prior thoughts of the judge(s) and staff, and a written record of any problems with the case.
+
+[6] Notably, the approval rate for Title III wiretap applications (see note 2 above) is higher than the approval rate for FISA applications, even using the Attorney General's FISA statistics as the baseline for comparison, as recent statistics show that from 2008 through 2012, only five of 13,593 Title III wiretap applications were requested but not authorized. See Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Wiretap Report 2012, Table 7 (available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/statistics/wiretapreports/2012/Table7.pdf).
+
+Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
+July 29, 2013
+Page 4
+
+greater amount of time reviewing and preparing a written analysis of such an application, in part because the Court has always required detailed information about the government's implementation of this authority. The judge likewise typically spends a greater amount of time than he or she normally spends on an individual application, carefully considering the extensive information provided by the government and determining whether to seek more information or hold a hearing before ruling on the application.
+
+As described above, the majority of applications submitted to the Court are handled on a seven-day cycle, by a judge sitting on a weekly duty schedule. Applications that are novel or more complex are sometimes handled on a longer time-line, usually require additional briefing, and are assigned by the Presiding Judge based on judges' availability. Section 702 (i.e., 50 U.S.C. § 1881a) applications [7] would typically fall into this category.
+
+Where the Court's process for handling Section 702 applications differs from the process described above, it is largely based on the statutory requirements of that section, which was enacted as part of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA). Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881a(g)(1)(A) & (g)(2)(D)(i), prior to the implementation of an authorization under Section 702, the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence must provide the Court with a written certification containing certain statutorily required elements, and that certification must include an effective date for the authorization that is at least 30 days after the submission of the written certification to the Court. Under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(B), the Court must review the certification, as well as the targeting and minimization procedures adopted in accordance with 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881a(d) & (e), not later than 30 days after the date on which the certification and procedures are submitted. The statutorily-imposed deadline for the Court's review typically coincides with the effective date identified in the final certification filed with the Court.
+
+The government's submission of a Section 702 application typically includes a cover filing that highlights any special issues and identifies any changes that have been made relative to the prior application. The government has typically filed proposed (read copy) Section 702 applications approximately one month before filing a final application. Proposed Section 702 applications are reviewed by multiple members of the Court's legal staff. At the direction of the Presiding Judge or a judge who has been assigned to handle the Section 702 application, the
+
+[7] "Section 702 application" is used here to refer collectively to a Section 702 certification and supporting affidavit, as well as to the statutorily-required targeting and minimization procedures.
+[8] If the acquisition has already begun (e.g., pursuant to a determination of exigent circumstances under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(c)(2)) or the effective date is less than 30 days after the submission of the written certification to the Court (e.g., because of an amendment to a certification while judicial review is pending, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(1)(C)), 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g)(2)(D)(ii) requires the certification to include the date the acquisition began or the effective date of the authorization.
+
+Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
+July 29, 2013
+Page 5
+
+Court's legal staff may request a meeting with the government to discuss a proposed application. Also at the direction of the Presiding Judge or a judge who has been assigned to handle the Section 702 application, the Court legal staff may request additional information from the government or convey a judge's concerns about the legal sufficiency of a proposed Section 702 application. Following these interactions, the government files a final Section 702 application, which the government may have elected to amend based on any concerns raised by the judge.
+
+The judge reviews the final Section 702 application and may set a hearing if he or she has additional questions about it. If the judge finds (based on the written submission alone or the written submission in combination with a hearing) that the certification contains all of the required elements, and that the targeting and minimization procedures adopted in accordance with 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881a(d) & (e) are consistent with the requirements of those subsections and with the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, the judge enters an order approving the certification in accordance with 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3)(A). As required by 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3)(C), the judge also issues an opinion in support of the order. If the judge finds that the certification does not contain the required elements or the targeting and minimization procedures are inconsistent with the requirements of 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881a(d) & (e), or the Fourth Amendment, the judge will, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3)(B), issue an order directing the government to, at the government's election and to the extent required by the Court's order, either correct any deficiency identified by the Court's order not later than 30 days after the date on which the Court issues the order, or cease, or not begin, the implementation of the authorization for which the certification was submitted. Subsequent review of any remedial measures taken by the government may then be required and may result in another order and opinion pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i).
+
+2. When considering such applications and submissions, please describe the interaction between the government and the Court (including both judges and court staff), including any hearings, meetings, or other means through which the Court has the opportunity to ask questions or seek additional information from the government. Please describe how frequently such exchanges occur, and generally what types of additional information that the Court might request of the government, if any. Please also describe how frequently the Court asks the government to make changes to its applications and submissions before ruling.
+
+The process through which the Court interacts with the government in reviewing proposed applications, seeking additional information, conveying Court concerns, and adjudicating final applications, is very similar to the process employed by other federal courts in considering applications for wiretap orders under Title III (discussed in notes 2 and 6 above).
+
+Under FISA practice, the first set of interactions often take place at the staff level. The Court's legal staff frequently interacts with the government in various ways in the context of
+
+Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
+July 29, 2013
+Page 6
+
+examining the legal sufficiency of applications before they are presented in final form to a judge. Indeed, in the process of reviewing the government's applications and submissions in order to provide advice to the judge, the legal staff interact with the government on a daily basis. These daily interactions typically consist of secure telephone conversations in which legal staff ask the government questions about the legal and factual elements of applications or submissions. These questions may originate with legal staff after an initial review of an application or submission, or they may come from a judge.
+
+At the direction of the Presiding Judge or the judge assigned to a matter, Court legal staff sometimes meet with the government in connection with applications and submissions. The Court typically requests such meetings when a proposed application or submission presents a special legal or factual concern about which the Court would like additional information (e.g., a novel use of technology or a request to use a new surveillance or search technique). The frequency of such meetings varies depending on the Court's assessment of its need for additional information in matters before it and the most conducive means to obtain that information. Court legal staff may meet with the government as often as 2-3 times a week, or as few as 1-2 times a month, in connection with the various matters pending before the Court.
+
+Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(2)(A) and Rule 17(a) of the FISC Rules of Procedure, the Court also holds hearings in cases in which a judge assesses that he or she needs additional information in order to rule on a matter. The frequency of hearings varies depending on the nature and complexity of matters pending before the Court at a given time, and also, to some extent, based on the individual preferences of different judges. Hearings are attended, at a minimum, by the Department of Justice attorney who prepared the application and a fact witness from the agency seeking the Court's authorization.
+
+The types of additional information sought from the government - through telephone conversations, meetings, or hearings – include, but are not limited to, the following: additional facts to justify the government's belief that its application meets the legal requirements for the type of authority it is seeking (e.g., in the case of electronic surveillance, that might include additional information to justify the government's belief that a target of surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, as required by 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(3)(A), or that the target is using or about to use a particular facility, as required by 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(3)(B)); additional facts about how the government intends to implement statutorily required minimization procedures (see, e.g., 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h); 1805(a)(3); 1824(a)(3); 1861(c)(1); 1881a(i)(3)(A); and 1881c(c)(1)(c)); additional information about the government's prior implementation of a Court order, particularly if the government has previously failed to comply fully with a Court order; or additional information about novel issues of technology or law (see Rule 11 of FISC Rules of Procedure).
+
+In a typical week, the Court seeks additional information or modifies the terms proposed
+
+Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
+July 29, 2013
+Page 7
+
+by the government in a significant percentage of cases. [9] (The Court has recently initiated the process of tracking more precisely how frequently this occurs.) The judge may determine, for example, that he or she cannot make the necessary findings under the statute without the addition of information to the application, or that he or she can approve only some of the authorities sought through the application. The government then has the choice to alter its final application or proposed orders in response to the judge's concerns; request a hearing to address those concerns; submit a final application without changes; or elect not to proceed at all with a final application. If the government files a final application, the Court may, on its own, make changes to the government's proposed orders (or issue totally redrafted orders) to address the judge's concern about a given application. The judge may choose, for example, to make an authorization of a shorter duration than what was requested by the government, or the judge may issue a Supplemental Order imposing special reporting or minimization requirements on the government's implementation of an authorization.
+
+3. Public FISA Court opinions and orders make clear that the Court has considered the views of non-governmental parties in certain cases, including a provider challenge to the Protect America Act of 2007. Describe instances where non-governmental parties have appeared before the Court. Has the Court invited or heard views from a nongovernmental party regarding applications or submissions under Title I, Title V, or Title VII of FISA? If so, how did this come about, and what was the process or mechanism that the Court used to enable such views to be considered?
+
+FISA does not provide a mechanism for the Court to invite the views of nongovernmental parties. In fact, the Court's proceedings are *ex parte* as required by the statute (see, e.g., 50 U.S.C. §§ 1805(a), 1824(a), 1842(d)(1) & 1861(c)(1)), and in keeping with the procedures followed by other courts in applications for search warrants and wiretap orders. Nevertheless, the statute and the FISC Rules of Procedure provide multiple opportunities for recipients of Court orders or government directives to challenge those orders or directives, either directly or through refusal to comply with orders or directives. Additionally, as detailed below, there have been several instances – particularly in the past several months – in which nongovernmental parties have appeared before the Court outside of the context of a challenge to an individual Court order or government directive.
+
+There has been one instance in which the Court heard arguments from a nongovernmental party that sought to substantively contest a directive from the government. Specifically, in 2007, the government issued directives to Yahoo!, Inc. (Yahoo) pursuant to Section 105B of the Protect America Act of 2007 (PAA). Yahoo refused to comply with the directives, and the government
+
+[9] This assessment does not include minor technical or typographical changes, which occur more frequently.
+
+Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
+July 29, 2013
+Page 8
+
+filed a motion with this Court to compel compliance. The Court ordered and received briefing from both parties, and rendered a decision in April 2008. [10]
+
+As noted above, the FISC Rules of Procedure and the FISA statute provide opportunities for the appearance of nongovernmental parties before the Court in matters pending pursuant to Titles I, V and VII of the statute. For example, Rule 19(a) of the FISC Rules of Procedure provides that if a person or entity served with a Court order fails to comply with that order, the government may file a motion for an order to show cause why the recipient should not be held in contempt and sanctioned accordingly. Thus, a nongovernmental party served with an order may invite an opportunity to be heard by the Court through refusal to comply with an order.
+
+With respect to applications filed under Title V of FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)(2)(A)(i) provides that a person receiving a production order may challenge the legality of that order by filing a petition with the Court. The same section of the statute provides that the recipient of a production order may challenge the non-disclosure order imposed in connection with a production order by filing a petition to modify or set aside the nondisclosure order. Rules 33-36 of the FISC Rules of Procedure delineate the procedures and requirements for filing such petitions, including the time limits on such challenges. To date, no recipient of a production order has opted to invoke this section of the statute.
+
+With respect to applications filed under Title VII of FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(4)(A) provides that an electronic communication service provider who receives a directive pursuant to Section 702 may file a petition to modify or set aside the directive with the Court. Sections 1881a(h)(4)(A)-(G) of the statute, as well as Rule 28 of the FISC Rules of Procedure, delineate
+
+[10] Yahoo thereafter appealed the Court's decision to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISCR). See In re Directives [REDACTED] Pursuant to Section 105b of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008). This is not the only instance in which a nongovernmental entity has appeared before the FISCR. In 2002, the FISCR accepted briefs filed by the ACLU and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amici curiae in In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
+
+While Yahoo's identity as the provider that challenged these directives was previously under seal pursuant to the FISCR's decision in In re Directives, 551 F.3d 1004, 1016-18, the FISCR issued an Order on June 26, 2013, indicating that it does not object to the release of Yahoo's identity, and ordering, among other things, a new declassification review of the FISCR's opinion in In re Directives. The FISCR issued this order in response to a motion by Yahoo's counsel, and after receiving briefing by Yahoo and the government. Yahoo also recently filed a motion for publication of the Court's decision that was appealed to the FISCR, resulting in the published opinion in In re Directives. The Court granted the motion. Documents related to Yahoo's recent motion to this Court are available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/index.html under Docket No. 105B(g) 07-01.
+
+Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
+July 29, 2013
+Page 9
+
+the procedures and requirements for such challenges. Relatedly, 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(5)(A) provides that if an electronic communication service provider fails to comply with a directive issued under Section 702, the Attorney General may file a petition with the Court for an order to compel compliance, which would likely result in the service provider's appearance before the Court through its legal representatives. (Section 1881a(h)(5), as well as Rule 29 of the FISC Rules of Procedure, provide further detail on the procedures and requirements for the enforcement of Section 702 directives.) Finally, 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(6) and Rule 31 of the FISC Rules of Procedure allow for the government or an electronic communication service provider to appeal an order of this Court under §§ 1881a(h)(4) or (5) to the FISCR. To date, no electronic communication service provider has opted to challenge a directive issued pursuant to Section 702, although, as noted above, Yahoo refused to comply with government directives issued under the PAA, which resulted in the government invoking a provision under that statute to compel compliance.
+
+As noted above, there have been a number of other instances in which nongovernmental parties have appeared before the Court outside of the context of a direct challenge to a court order or a government directive, particularly recently. Those instances are as follows:
+
+In August 2007, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed a motion with the Court for the release of certain records. The Court ordered and received briefing on the matter from the ACLU and the government, and rendered a decision in December 2007. See *In re Motion for Release of Court Records*, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484 (FISA Ct. 2007).
+
+On May 23, 2013, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) filed a motion with this Court for consent to disclosure of court records, or in the alternative, a determination of the effect of the Court's rules on access rights under the Freedom of Information Act. Following briefing by EFF and the government, the Court issued an Opinion and Order on June 12, 2013. All documents filed in this docket are available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/index.html under Case No. Misc. 13-01.
+
+On June 12, 2013, the ACLU, the American Civil Liberties Union of the Nation's Capital, and the Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic (Movants) filed a motion with this Court for the release of Court records. The Court ordered and has received briefing on the matter from the Movants and the government. On July 18, 2013, the Court granted the motions of (1) sixteen members of the House of Representatives and (2) a coalition of news media organizations for leave to file *amicus curiae* briefs in this case. The matter is pending before the Court. All documents filed in this docket are available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/index.html under Case No. Misc. 13-02.
+
+On June 18, 2013, Google, Inc. filed a motion with this Court for declaratory judgment of the company's first amendment right to publish aggregate information about FISA orders. The
+
+Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
+July 29, 2013
+Page 10
+
+court ordered briefing on the matter. On July 18, 2013, the Court granted the motions of (1) a coalition of news media organizations and (2) the First Amendment Coalition, the ACLU, the Center for Democracy and Technology, the EFF, and Techfreedom for leave to file *amicus curiae* briefs in this case. The matter is pending before the Court. All documents filed in this docket are available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/index.html under Case No. Misc. 13-03.
+
+On June 19, 2013, Microsoft Corporation filed a motion in this Court for declaratory judgment or other appropriate relief authorizing disclosure of aggregate data regarding any FISA orders it has received. The court ordered briefing on the matter. On July 18, 2013, the Court granted the motions of (1) a coalition of news media organizations and (2) the First Amendment Coalition, the ACLU, the Center for Democracy and Technology, the EFF, and Techfreedom for leave to file *amicus curiae* briefs in this case. The matter is pending before the Court. All documents filed in this docket are available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/index.html under Case No. Misc. 13-04.
+
+4. Please describe the process used by the Court to consider and resolve any instances where the government notifies the Court of compliance concerns with any of the FISA authorities.
+
+Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1803(h), the Court is empowered to ensure compliance with its orders. Additionally, Rule 13(a) of the FISC Rules of Procedure requires the government to file a written notice with the Court immediately upon discovering that any authority or approval granted by the Court has been implemented (either by government officials or others operating pursuant to Court order) in a manner that did not comply with the Court's authorization or approval or with applicable law. Rule 13(a) also requires the government to notify the Court in writing of the facts and circumstances relevant to the non-compliance; any modifications the government has made or proposes to make in how it will implement any authority or approval granted by the Court; and how the government proposes to dispose of or treat any information obtained as a result of the non-compliance.
+
+When the government discovers instances of non-compliance, it files notices with the Court as required by Rule 13(a). Because the rule requires the government to "immediately inform the Judge" of a compliance incident, the government typically files a preliminary notice that provides whatever facts are available at the time an incident is discovered. The legal staff review these notices as they are received and call significant matters to the attention of the appropriate judge. In instances in which the non-compliance has not been fully addressed by the time the preliminary Rule 13(a) notice is filed, the Court may seek additional information through telephone calls, meetings, or hearings. Typically, the government will file a final Rule 13(a) notice once the relevant facts are known and any unauthorized collection has been destroyed. However, judges sometimes issue orders directing the government to take specific
+
+Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
+July 29, 2013
+Page 11
+
+actions to address instances of non-compliance either before or after a final notice is filed, and, less frequently, to cease a course of action that the Court considers non-compliant. This process is followed for compliance issues in all matters, including matters handled under Title V and Section 702.
+
+I hope these responses are helpful to the Senate Judiciary Committee in its deliberations.
+
+Sincerely,
+Reggie B. Walton
+Presiding Judge
+
+Identical letter sent to:
+Honorable Charles E. Grassley
+
+TO THE BENCH, BAR AND PUBLIC:
+
+The attached Rules of Procedure for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court supersede both the February 17, 2006 Rules of Procedure and the May 5, 2006 Procedures for Review of Petitions Filed Pursuant to Section 501(f) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, As Amended. These revised Rules of Procedure are effective immediately.
+
+John D. Bates
+Presiding Judge
+Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+November 1, 2010
+
+UNITED STATES FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+Washington, D.C.
+
+RULES OF PROCEDURE
+Effective November 1, 2010
+
+Rule Page
+
+**Title I. Scope of Rules; Amendment**
+
+1. Scope of Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
+2. Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
+
+**Title II. National Security Information**
+
+3. National Security Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
+
+**Title III. Structure and Powers of the Court**
+
+4. Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
+5. Authority of the Judges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
+
+**Title IV. Matters Presented to the Court**
+
+6. Means of Requesting Relief from the Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
+7. Filing Applications, Certifications, Petitions,
+ Motions, or Other Papers ("Submissions") . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
+8. Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
+9. Time and Manner of Submission of Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
+10. Computation of Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
+11. Notice and Briefing of Novel Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
+12. Submission of Targeting and Minimization Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
+13. Correction of Misstatement or Omission; Disclosure of Non-Compliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
+14. Motions to Amend Court Orders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
+15. Sequestration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
+16. Returns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
+
+**Title V. Hearings, Orders, and Enforcement**
+
+17. Hearings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
+18. Court Orders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
+19. Enforcement of Orders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
+
+**Title VI. Supplemental Procedures for Proceedings Under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)**
+
+20. Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
+21. Petition to Modify or Set Aside a Directive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
+22. Petition to Compel Compliance With a Directive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
+23. Contents of Petition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
+24. Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
+25. Length of Petition and Response; Other Papers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
+26. Notification of Presiding Judge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
+27. Assignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
+28. Review of Petition to Modify or Set Aside a Directive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
+29. Review of Petition to Compel Compliance Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(5)(C) . . . . . . . 9
+30. In Camera Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
+31. Appeal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
+
+**Title VII. Supplemental Procedures for Proceedings Under 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)**
+
+32. Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
+33. Petition Challenging Production or Nondisclosure Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
+34. Contents of Petition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
+35. Length of Petition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
+36. Request to Stay Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
+37. Notification of Presiding Judge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
+38. Assignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
+39. Initial Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
+40. Response to Petition; Other Papers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
+41. Rulings on Non-frivolous Petitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
+42. Failure to Comply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
+43. In Camera Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
+44. Appeal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
+
+**Title VIII. En Banc Proceedings**
+
+45. Standard for Hearing or Rehearing En Banc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
+46. Initial Hearing En Banc on Request of a Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
+47. Rehearing En Banc on Petition by a Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
+48. Circulation of En Banc Petitions and Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
+49. Court-Initiated En Banc Proceedings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
+50. Polling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
+51. Stay Pending En Banc Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
+52. Supplemental Briefing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
+53. Order Granting or Denying En Banc Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
+
+-ii-
+
+**Title IX. Appeals**
+
+54. How Taken . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
+55. When Taken . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
+56. Stay Pending Appeal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
+57. Motion to Transmit the Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
+58. Transmitting the Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
+59. Oral Notification to the Court of Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
+
+**Title X. Administrative Provisions**
+
+60. Duties of the Clerk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
+61. Office Hours . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
+62. Release of Court Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
+63. Practice Before Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
+
+-iii-
+
+**Title I. Scope of Rules; Amendment**
+
+**Rule 1. Scope of Rules.** These rules, which are promulgated pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1803(g), govern all proceedings in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("the Court"). Issues not addressed in these rules or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, as amended ("the Act"), may be resolved under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
+
+**Rule 2. Amendment.** Any amendment to these rules must be promulgated in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2071.
+
+**Title II. National Security Information**
+
+**Rule 3. National Security Information.** In all matters, the Court and its staff shall comply with the security measures established pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §§ 1803(c), 1822(e), 1861(f)(4), and 1881a(k)(1), as well as Executive Order 13526, "Classified National Security Information" (or its successor). Each member of the Court's staff must possess security clearances at a level commensurate to the individual's responsibilities.
+
+**Title III. Structure and Powers of the Court**
+
+**Rule 4. Structure.**
+(a) **Composition.** In accordance with 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a), the Court consists of United States District Court Judges appointed by the Chief Justice of the United States.
+(b) **Presiding Judge.** The Chief Justice designates the "Presiding Judge."
+
+**Rule 5. Authority of the Judges.**
+(a) **Scope of Authority.** Each Judge may exercise the authority vested by the Act and such other authority as is consistent with Article III of the Constitution and other statutes and laws of the United States, to the extent not inconsistent with the Act.
+(b) **Referring Matters to Other Judges.** Except for matters involving a denial of an application for an order, a Judge may refer any matter to another Judge of the Court with that Judge's consent. If a Judge directs the government to supplement an application, the Judge may direct the government to present the renewal of that application to the same Judge. If a matter is presented to a Judge who is unavailable or whose tenure on the Court expires while the matter is pending, the Presiding Judge may re-assign the matter.
+(c) **Supplementation.** The Judge before whom a matter is pending may order a party to furnish any information that the Judge deems necessary.
+
+-1-
+
+**Title IV. Matters Presented to the Court**
+
+**Rule 6. Means of Requesting Relief from the Court.**
+(a) **Application.** The government may, in accordance with 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804, 1823, 1842, 1861, 1881b(b), 1881c(b), or 1881d(a), file an application for a Court order ("application").
+(b) **Certification.** The government may, in accordance with 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g), file a certification concerning the targeting of non-United States persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States ("certification").
+(c) **Petition.** A party may, in accordance with 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861(f) and 1881a(h) and the Supplemental Procedures in Titles VI and VII of these Rules, file a petition for review of a production or nondisclosure order issued under 50 U.S.C. § 1861 or for review or enforcement of a directive issued under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (“petition”).
+(d) **Motion.** A party seeking relief, other than pursuant to an application, certification, or petition permitted under the Act and these Rules, must do so by motion (“motion”).
+
+**Rule 7. Filing Applications, Certifications, Petitions, Motions, or Other Papers ("Submissions").**
+(a) **Filing.** A submission is filed by delivering it to the Clerk or as otherwise directed by the Clerk in accordance with Rule 7(k).
+(b) **Original and One Copy.** Except as otherwise provided, a signed original and one copy must be filed with the Clerk.
+(c) **Form.** Unless otherwise ordered, all submissions must be:
+ (1) on 8½-by-11-inch opaque white paper; and
+ (2) typed (double-spaced) or reproduced in a manner that produces a clear black image.
+(d) **Electronic Filing.** The Clerk, when authorized by the Court, may accept and file submissions by any reliable, and appropriately secure, electronic means.
+(e) **Facsimile or Scanned Signature.** The Clerk may accept for filing a submission bearing a facsimile or scanned signature in lieu of the original signature. Upon acceptance, a submission bearing a facsimile or scanned signature is the original Court record.
+(f) **Citations.** Each submission must contain citations to pertinent provisions of the Act.
+(g) **Contents.** Each application and certification filed by the government must be approved and certified in accordance with the Act, and must contain the statements and other information required by the Act.
+(h) **Contact Information in Adversarial Proceedings.**
+ (1) **Filing by a Party Other Than the Government.** A party other than the government must include in the initial submission the party's full name, address, and telephone number, or, if the party is represented by counsel, the full name of the party and the party's counsel, as well as counsel's address, telephone number, facsimile number, and bar membership information.
+ (2) **Filing by the Government.** In an adversarial proceeding, the initial
+
+-2-
+
+submission filed by the government must include the full names of the attorneys representing the United States and their mailing addresses, telephone numbers, and facsimile numbers.
+(i) **Information Concerning Security Clearances in Adversarial Proceedings.** A party other than the government must:
+ (1) state in the initial submission whether the party (or the party's responsible officers or employees) and counsel for the party hold security clearances;
+ (2) describe the circumstances in which such clearances were granted; and
+ (3) identify the federal agencies granting the clearances and the classification levels and compartments involved.
+(j) **Ex Parte Review.** At the request of the government in an adversarial proceeding, the Judge must review *ex parte* and *in camera* any submissions by the government, or portions thereof, which may include classified information. Except as otherwise ordered, if the government files *ex parte* a submission that contains classified information, the government must file and serve on the non-governmental party an unclassified or redacted version. The unclassified or redacted version, at a minimum, must clearly articulate the government's legal arguments.
+(k) **Instructions for Delivery to the Court.** A party may obtain instructions for making submissions permitted under the Act and these Rules by contacting the Clerk at (202) 357-6250.
+
+**Rule 8. Service.**
+(a) **By a Party Other than the Government.** A party other than the government must, at or before the time of filing a submission permitted under the Act and these Rules, serve a copy on the government. Instructions for effecting service must be obtained by contacting the Security and Emergency Planning Staff, United States Department of Justice, by telephone at (202) 514-2094.
+(b) **By the Government.** At or before the time of filing a submission in an adversarial proceeding, the government must, subject to Rule 7(j), serve a copy by hand delivery or by overnight delivery on counsel for the other party, or, if the party is not represented by counsel, on the party directly.
+(c) **Certificate of Service.** A party must include a certificate of service specifying the time and manner of service.
+
+**Rule 9. Time and Manner of Submission of Applications.**
+(a) **Proposed Applications.** Except when an application is being submitted following an emergency authorization pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §§ 1805(e), 1824(e), 1843, 1881b(d), or 1881c(d) ("emergency authorization"), or as otherwise permitted by the Court, proposed applications must be submitted by the government no later than seven days before the government seeks to have the matter entertained by the Court. Proposed applications submitted following an emergency authorization must be submitted as soon after such authorization as is reasonably practicable.
+(b) **Final Applications.** Unless the Court permits otherwise, the final application,
+
+-3-
+
+including all signatures, approvals, and certifications required by the Act, must be filed no later than 10:00 a.m. Eastern Time on the day the government seeks to have the matter entertained by the Court.
+(c) **Proposed Orders.** Each proposed application and final application submitted to the Court must include any pertinent proposed orders.
+(d) **Number of Copies.** Notwithstanding Rule 7(b), unless the Court directs otherwise, only one copy of a proposed application must be submitted and only the original final application must be filed.
+(e) **Notice of Changes.** No later than the time the final application is filed, the government must identify any differences between the final application and the proposed application.
+
+**Rule 10. Computation of Time.** The following rules apply in computing a time period specified by these Rules or by Court order:
+(a) **Day of the Event Excluded.** Exclude the day of the event that triggers the period.
+(b) **Compute Time Using Calendar Days.** Compute time using calendar days, not business days.
+(c) **Include the Last Day.** Include the last day of the period; but if the last day is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the period continues to run until the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.
+
+**Rule 11. Notice and Briefing of Novel Issues.**
+(a) **Notice to the Court.** If a submission by the government for Court action involves an issue not previously presented to the Court — including, but not limited to, a novel issue of technology or law — the government must inform the Court in writing of the nature and significance of that issue.
+(b) **Submission Relating to New Techniques.** Prior to requesting authorization to use a new surveillance or search technique, the government must submit a memorandum to the Court that:
+ (1) explains the technique;
+ (2) describes the circumstances of the likely implementation of the technique;
+ (3) discusses any legal issues apparently raised; and
+ (4) describes the proposed minimization procedures to be applied.
+At the latest, the memorandum must be submitted as part of the first proposed application or other submission that seeks to employ the new technique.
+(c) **Novel Implementation.** When requesting authorization to use an existing surveillance or search technique in a novel context, the government must identify and address any new minimization or other issues in a written submission made, at the latest, as part of the application or other filing seeking such authorization.
+(d) **Legal Memorandum.** If an application or other request for action raises an issue of law not previously considered by the Court, the government must file a memorandum of law in support of its position on each new issue. At the latest, the memorandum must be
+
+-4-
+
+submitted as part of the first proposed application or other submission that raises the issue.
+
+**Rule 12. Submission of Targeting and Minimization Procedures.** In a matter involving Court review of targeting or minimization procedures, such procedures may be set out in full in the government's submission or may be incorporated by reference to procedures approved in a prior docket. Procedures that are incorporated by reference to a prior docket may be supplemented, but not otherwise modified, in the government's submission. Otherwise, proposed procedures must be set forth in a clear and self-contained manner, without resort to cross-referencing.
+
+**Rule 13. Correction of Misstatement or Omission; Disclosure of Non-Compliance.**
+(a) **Correction of Material Facts.** If the government discovers that a submission to the Court contained a misstatement or omission of material fact, the government, in writing, must immediately inform the Judge to whom the submission was made of:
+ (1) the misstatement or omission;
+ (2) any necessary correction;
+ (3) the facts and circumstances relevant to the misstatement or omission;
+ (4) any modifications the government has made or proposes to make in how it will implement any authority or approval granted by the Court; and
+ (5) how the government proposes to dispose of or treat any information obtained as a result of the misstatement or omission.
+(b) **Disclosure of Non-Compliance.** If the government discovers that any authority or approval granted by the Court has been implemented in a manner that did not comply with the Court's authorization or approval or with applicable law, the government, in writing, must immediately inform the Judge to whom the submission was made of:
+ (1) the non-compliance;
+ (2) the facts and circumstances relevant to the non-compliance;
+ (3) any modifications the government has made or proposes to make in how it will implement any authority or approval granted by the Court; and
+ (4) how the government proposes to dispose of or treat any information obtained as a result of the non-compliance.
+
+**Rule 14. Motions to Amend Court Orders.** Unless the Judge who issued the order granting an application directs otherwise, a motion to amend the order may be presented to any other Judge.
+
+**Rule 15. Sequestration.** Except as required by Court-approved minimization procedures, the government must not submit material for sequestration with the Court without the prior approval of the Presiding Judge. To obtain such approval, the government must, prior to tendering the material to the Court for sequestration, file a motion stating the circumstances of the material's acquisition and explaining why it is necessary for such material to be retained in the custody of the Court.
+
+-5-
+
+**Rule 16. Returns.**
+(a) **Time for Filing.**
+ (1) **Search Orders.** Unless the Court directs otherwise, a return must be made and filed either at the time of submission of a proposed renewal application or within 90 days of the execution of a search order, whichever is sooner.
+ (2) **Other Orders.** The Court may direct the filing of other returns at a time and in a manner that it deems appropriate.
+(b) **Contents.** The return must:
+ (1) notify the Court of the execution of the order;
+ (2) describe the circumstances and results of the search or other activity including, where appropriate, an inventory;
+ (3) certify that the execution was in conformity with the order or describe and explain any deviation from the order; and
+ (4) include any other information as the Court may direct.
+
+**Title V. Hearings, Orders, and Enforcement**
+
+**Rule 17. Hearings.**
+(a) **Scheduling.** The Judge to whom a matter is presented or assigned must determine whether a hearing is necessary and, if so, set the time and place of the hearing.
+(b) **Ex Parte.** Except as the Court otherwise directs or the Rules otherwise provide, a hearing in a non-adversarial matter must be *ex parte* and conducted within the Court's secure facility.
+(c) **Appearances.** Unless excused, the government official providing the factual information in an application or certification and an attorney for the applicant must attend the hearing, along with other representatives of the government, and any other party, as the Court may direct or permit.
+(d) **Testimony; Oath; Recording of Proceedings.** A Judge may take testimony under oath and receive other evidence. The testimony may be recorded electronically or as the Judge may otherwise direct, consistent with the security measures referenced in Rule 3.
+
+**Rule 18. Court Orders.**
+(a) **Citations.** All orders must contain citations to pertinent provisions of the Act.
+(b) **Denying Applications.**
+ (1) **Written Statement of Reasons.** If a Judge denies the government's application, the Judge must immediately provide a written statement of each reason for the decision and cause a copy of the statement to be served on the government.
+ (2) **Previously Denied Application.** If a Judge denies an application or other request for relief by the government, any subsequent submission on the matter must be referred to that Judge.
+
+-6-
+
+(c) **Expiration Dates.** An expiration date in an order must be stated using Eastern Time and must be computed from the date and time of the Court's issuance of the order, or, if applicable, of an emergency authorization.
+(d) **Electronic Signatures.** The Judge may sign an order by any reliable, appropriately secure electronic means, including facsimile.
+
+**Rule 19. Enforcement of Orders.**
+(a) **Show Cause Motions.** If a person or entity served with a Court order (the "recipient") fails to comply with that order, the government may file a motion for an order to show cause why the recipient should not be held in contempt and sanctioned accordingly. The motion must be presented to the Judge who entered the underlying order.
+(b) **Proceedings.**
+ (1) An order to show cause must:
+ (i) confirm that the underlying order was issued;
+ (ii) schedule further proceedings; and
+ (iii) afford the recipient an opportunity to show cause why the recipient should not be held in contempt.
+ (2) A Judge must conduct any proceeding on a motion to show cause *in camera*. The Clerk must maintain all records of the proceedings in conformance with 50 U.S.C. § 1803(c).
+ (3) If the recipient fails to show cause for noncompliance with the underlying order, the Court may find the recipient in contempt and enter any order it deems necessary and appropriate to compel compliance and to sanction the recipient for noncompliance with the underlying order.
+ (4) If the recipient shows cause for noncompliance or if the Court concludes that the order should not be enforced as issued, the Court may enter any order it deems appropriate.
+
+**Title VI. Supplemental Procedures for Proceedings Under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)**
+
+**Rule 20. Scope.** Together with the generally-applicable provisions of these Rules concerning filing, service, and other matters, these supplemental procedures apply in proceedings under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h).
+
+**Rule 21. Petition to Modify or Set Aside a Directive.** An electronic communication service provider ("provider"), who receives a directive issued under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(1), may file a petition to modify or set aside such directive under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(4). A petition may be filed by the provider's counsel.
+
+-7-
+
+**Rule 22. Petition to Compel Compliance With a Directive.** In the event a provider fails to comply with a directive issued under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(1), the government may, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(5), file a petition to compel compliance with the directive.
+
+**Rule 23. Contents of Petition.** The petition must:
+(a) state clearly the relief being sought;
+(b) state concisely the factual and legal grounds for modifying, setting aside, or compelling compliance with the directive at issue;
+(c) include a copy of the directive and state the date on which the directive was served on the provider; and
+(d) state whether a hearing is requested.
+
+**Rule 24. Response.**
+(a) **By Government.** The government may, within seven days following notification under Rule 28(b) that plenary review is necessary, file a response to a provider's petition.
+(b) **By Provider.** The provider may, within seven days after service of a petition by the government to compel compliance, file a response to the petition.
+
+**Rule 25. Length of Petition and Response; Other Papers.**
+(a) **Length.** Unless the Court directs otherwise, a petition and response each must not exceed 20 pages in length, including any attachments (other than a copy of the directive at issue).
+(b) **Other papers.** No supplements, replies, or sur-replies may be filed without leave of the Court.
+
+**Rule 26. Notification of Presiding Judge.** Upon receipt, the Clerk must notify the Presiding Judge that a petition to modify, set aside, or compel compliance with a directive issued under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(1) has been filed. If the Presiding Judge is not reasonably available when the Clerk receives a petition, the Clerk must notify each of the local Judges, in order of seniority on the Court, and, if necessary, each of the other Judges, in order of seniority on the Court, until a Judge who is reasonably available has received notification. The reasonably available Judge who receives notification will be the acting Presiding Judge ("Presiding Judge") for the case.
+
+**Rule 27. Assignment.**
+(a) **Presiding Judge.** As soon as possible after receiving notification from the Clerk that a petition has been filed, and no later than 24 hours after the filing of the petition, the Presiding Judge must assign the matter to a Judge in the petition review pool established by 50 U.S.C. § 1803(e)(1). The Clerk must record the date and time of the assignment.
+(b) **Transmitting Petition.** The Clerk must transmit the petition to the assigned Judge as soon as possible but no later than 24 hours after being notified of the assignment by the Presiding Judge.
+
+-8-
+
+**Rule 28. Review of Petition to Modify or Set Aside a Directive.**
+(a) **Initial Review Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(4)(D).**
+ (1) A Judge must conduct an initial review of a petition to modify or set aside a directive within five days after being assigned such petition.
+ (2) If the Judge determines that the provider's claims, defenses, or other legal contentions are not warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law, the Judge must promptly deny such petition, affirm the directive, and order the provider to comply with the directive. Upon making such determination or promptly thereafter, the Judge must provide a written statement of reasons. The Clerk must transmit the ruling and statement of reasons to the provider and the government.
+(b) **Plenary Review Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(4)(E).**
+ (1) If the Judge determines that the petition requires plenary review, the Court must promptly notify the parties. The Judge must provide a written statement of reasons for the determination.
+ (2) The Judge must affirm, modify, or set aside the directive that is the subject of the petition within the time permitted under 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881a(h)(4)(E) and 1881a(j)(2).
+ (3) The Judge may hold a hearing or conduct proceedings solely on the papers filed by the provider and the government.
+(c) **Burden.** Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(4)(C), a Judge may grant the petition only if the Judge finds that the challenged directive does not meet the requirements of 50 U.S.C. § 1881a or is otherwise unlawful.
+(d) **Continued Effect.** Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(4)(F), any directive not explicitly modified or set aside by the Judge remains in full effect.
+
+**Rule 29. Review of Petition to Compel Compliance Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(5)(C).**
+(a) The Judge reviewing the government's petition to compel compliance with a directive must, within the time permitted under 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881a(h)(5)(C) and 1881a(j)(2), issue an order requiring the provider to comply with the directive or any part of it, as issued or as modified, if the Judge finds that the directive meets the requirements of 50 U.S.C. § 1881a and is otherwise lawful.
+(b) The Judge must provide a written statement of reasons for the determination. The Clerk must transmit the ruling and statement of reasons to the provider and the government.
+
+**Rule 30. In Camera Review.** Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1803(e)(2), the Court must review a petition under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h) and conduct related proceedings *in camera*.
+
+**Rule 31. Appeal.** Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(6) and subject to Rules 54 through 59 of these Rules, the government or the provider may petition the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review ("Court of Review") to review the Judge's ruling.
+
+-9-
+
+**Title VII. Supplemental Procedures for Proceedings Under 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)**
+
+**Rule 32. Scope.** Together with the generally-applicable provisions of these Rules regarding filing, service, and other matters, these supplemental procedures apply in proceedings under 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f).
+
+**Rule 33. Petition Challenging Production or Nondisclosure Order.**
+(a) **Who May File.** The recipient of a production order or nondisclosure order under 50 U.S.C. § 1861 ("petitioner") may file a petition challenging the order pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f). A petition may be filed by the petitioner's counsel.
+(b) **Time to File Petition.**
+ (1) **Challenging a Production Order.** The petitioner must file a petition challenging a production order within 20 days after the order has been served.
+ (2) **Challenging a Nondisclosure Order.** A petitioner may not file a petition challenging a nondisclosure order issued under 50 U.S.C. § 1861(d) earlier than one year after the order was entered.
+ (3) **Subsequent Petition Challenging a Nondisclosure Order.** If a Judge denies a petition to modify or set aside a nondisclosure order, the petitioner may not file a subsequent petition challenging the same nondisclosure order earlier than one year after the date of the denial.
+
+**Rule 34. Contents of Petition.** A petition must:
+(a) state clearly the relief being sought;
+(b) state concisely the factual and legal grounds for modifying or setting aside the challenged order;
+(c) include a copy of the challenged order and state the date on which it was served on the petitioner; and
+(d) state whether a hearing is requested.
+
+**Rule 35. Length of Petition.** Unless the Court directs otherwise, a petition may not exceed 20 pages in length, including any attachments (other than a copy of the challenged order).
+
+**Rule 36. Request to Stay Production.**
+(a) **Petition Does Not Automatically Effect a Stay.** A petition does not automatically stay the underlying order. A production order will be stayed only if the petitioner requests a stay and the Judge grants such relief.
+(b) **Stay May Be Requested Prior to Filing of a Petition.** A petitioner may request the Court to stay the production order before filing a petition challenging the order.
+
+**Rule 37. Notification of Presiding Judge.** Upon receipt, the Clerk must notify the Presiding Judge that a petition challenging a production or nondisclosure order has been filed. If the Presiding Judge is not reasonably available when the Clerk receives the petition, the Clerk must
+
+-10-
+
+notify each of the local Judges, in order of seniority on the Court, and, if necessary, each of the other Judges, in order of seniority on the Court, until a Judge who is reasonably available has received notification. The reasonably available Judge who receives notification will be the acting Presiding Judge ("Presiding Judge") for the case.
+
+**Rule 38. Assignment.**
+(a) **Presiding Judge.** Immediately after receiving notification from the Clerk that a petition has been filed, the Presiding Judge must assign the matter to a Judge in the petition pool established by 50 U.S.C. § 1803(e)(1). The Clerk must record the date and time of the assignment.
+(b) **Transmitting Petition.** The Clerk must transmit the petition to the assigned Judge as soon as possible but no later than 24 hours after being notified of the assignment by the Presiding Judge.
+
+**Rule 39. Initial Review.**
+(a) **When.** The Judge must review the petition within 72 hours after being assigned the petition.
+(b) **Frivolous Petition.** If the Judge determines that the petition is frivolous, the Judge must:
+ (1) immediately deny the petition and affirm the challenged order;
+ (2) promptly provide a written statement of the reasons for the denial; and
+ (3) provide a written ruling, together with the statement of reasons, to the Clerk, who must transmit the ruling and statement of reasons to the petitioner and the government.
+(c) **Non-Frivolous Petition.**
+ (1) **Scheduling.** If the Judge determines that the petition is not frivolous, the Judge must promptly issue an order that sets a schedule for its consideration. The Clerk must transmit the order to the petitioner and the government.
+ (2) **Manner of Proceeding.** The judge may hold a hearing or conduct the proceedings solely on the papers filed by the petitioner and the government.
+
+**Rule 40. Response to Petition; Other Papers.**
+(a) **Government's Response.** Unless the Judge orders otherwise, the government must file a response within 20 days after the issuance of the initial scheduling order pursuant to Rule 39(c). The response must not exceed 20 pages in length, including any attachments (other than a copy of the challenged order).
+(b) **Other Papers.** No supplements, replies, or sur-replies may be filed without leave of the Court.
+
+**Rule 41. Rulings on Non-frivolous Petitions.**
+(a) **Written Statement of Reasons.** If the Judge determines that the petition is not frivolous, the Judge must promptly provide a written statement of the reasons for modifying, setting aside, or affirming the production or nondisclosure order.
+
+-11-
+
+(b) **Affirming the Order.** If the Judge does not modify or set aside the production or nondisclosure order, the Judge must affirm it and order the recipient promptly to comply with it.
+(c) **Transmitting the Judge's Ruling.** The Clerk must transmit the Judge's ruling and written statement of reasons to the petitioner and the government.
+
+**Rule 42. Failure to Comply.** If a recipient fails to comply with an order affirmed under 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f), the government may file a motion seeking immediate enforcement of the affirmed order. The Court may consider the government's motion without receiving additional submissions or convening further proceedings on the matter.
+
+**Rule 43. In Camera Review.** Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1803(e)(2), the Court must review a petition under 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f) and conduct related proceedings *in camera*.
+
+**Rule 44. Appeal.** Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)(3) and subject to Rules 54 through 59 of these Rules, the government or the petitioner may petition the Court of Review to review the Judge's ruling.
+
+**Title VIII. En Banc Proceedings**
+
+**Rule 45. Standard for Hearing or Rehearing En Banc.** Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(2)(A), the Court may order a hearing or rehearing *en banc* only if it is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the Court's decisions, or the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance.
+
+**Rule 46. Initial Hearing En Banc on Request of a Party.** The government in any proceeding, or a party in a proceeding under 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f) or 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(4)-(5), may request that the matter be entertained from the outset by the full Court. However, initial hearings *en banc* are extraordinary and will be ordered only when a majority of the Judges determines that a matter is of such immediate and extraordinary importance that initial consideration by the *en banc* Court is necessary, and *en banc* review is feasible in light of applicable time constraints on Court action.
+
+**Rule 47. Rehearing En Banc on Petition by a Party.**
+(a) **Timing of Petition and Response.** A party may file a petition for rehearing *en banc* permitted under 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(2) no later than 30 days after the challenged order or decision is entered. In an adversarial proceeding in which a petition for rehearing *en banc* is permitted under § 1803(a)(2), a party must file a response to the petition within 14 days after filing and service of the petition.
+(b) **Length of Petition and Response.** Unless the Court directs otherwise, a petition for rehearing *en banc* and a response to a petition for rehearing *en banc* each must not exceed 15 pages, including any attachments (other than the challenged order or decision).
+
+-12-
+
+**Rule 48. Circulation of En Banc Petitions and Responses.** The Clerk must, after consulting with the Presiding Judge and in a manner consistent with applicable security requirements, promptly provide a copy of any timely-filed *en banc* petition permitted under 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(2), and any timely-filed response thereto, to each Judge.
+
+**Rule 49. Court-Initiated En Banc Proceedings.** A Judge to whom a matter has been presented may request that all Judges be polled with respect to whether the matter should be considered or reconsidered *en banc*. On a Judge's request, the Clerk must, after consulting with the Presiding Judge and in a manner consistent with applicable security requirements, promptly provide notice of the request, along with a copy of pertinent materials, to every Judge.
+
+**Rule 50. Polling.**
+(a) **Deadline for Vote.** The Presiding Judge must set a deadline for the Judges to submit their vote to the Clerk on whether to grant a hearing or rehearing *en banc*. The deadline must be communicated to all Judges at the time the petition or polling request is circulated.
+(b) **Vote on Stay.** In the case of rehearing *en banc*, the Presiding Judge may request that all Judges also vote on whether and to what extent the challenged order or ruling should be stayed or remain in effect if rehearing *en banc* is granted, pending a decision by the *en banc* Court on the merits.
+
+**Rule 51. Stay Pending En Banc Review.**
+(a) **Stay or Modifying Order.** In accordance with 50 U.S.C. §§ 1803(a)(2)(B) and 1803(f), the Court *en banc* may enter a stay or modifying order while *en banc* proceedings are pending.
+(b) **Statement of Position Regarding Continued Effect of Challenged Order.** A petition for rehearing *en banc* and any response to the petition each must include a statement of the party's position as to whether and to what extent the challenged order should remain in effect if rehearing *en banc* is granted, pending a decision by the *en banc* Court on the merits.
+
+**Rule 52. Supplemental Briefing.** Upon ordering hearing or rehearing *en banc*, the Court may require the submission of supplemental briefs.
+
+**Rule 53. Order Granting or Denying En Banc Review.**
+(a) **Entry of Order.** If a majority of the Judges votes within the time allotted for polling that a matter be considered *en banc*, the Presiding Judge must direct the Clerk to enter an order granting *en banc* review. If a majority of the Judges does not vote to grant hearing or rehearing *en banc* within the time allotted for polling, the Presiding Judge must direct the Clerk to enter an order denying *en banc* review.
+(b) **Other Issues.** The Presiding Judge may set the time of an *en banc* hearing and the time and scope of any supplemental hearing in the order granting *en banc* review. The
+
+-13-
+
+order may also address whether and to what extent the challenged order or ruling will be stayed or remain in effect pending a decision by the *en banc* Court on the merits.
+
+**Title IX. Appeals**
+
+**Rule 54. How Taken.** An appeal to the Court of Review, as permitted by law, may be taken by filing a petition for review with the Clerk.
+
+**Rule 55. When Taken.**
+(a) **Generally.** Except as the Act provides otherwise, a party must file a petition for review no later than 30 days after entry of the decision or order as to which review is sought.
+(b) **Effect of En Banc Proceedings.** Following the timely submission of a petition for rehearing *en banc* permitted under 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(2) or the grant of rehearing *en banc* on the Court's own initiative, the time otherwise allowed for taking an appeal runs from the date on which such petition is denied or dismissed or, if *en banc* review is granted, from the date of the decision of the *en banc* Court on the merits.
+
+**Rule 56. Stay Pending Appeal.** In accordance with 50 U.S.C. § 1803(f), the Court may enter a stay of an order or an order modifying an order while an appeal is pending.
+
+**Rule 57. Motion to Transmit the Record.** Together with the petition for review, the party filing the appeal must also file a motion to transmit the record to the Court of Review.
+
+**Rule 58. Transmitting the Record.** The Clerk must arrange to transmit the record under seal to the Court of Review as expeditiously as possible, no later than 30 days after an appeal has been filed. The Clerk must include a copy of the Court's statement of reasons for the decision or order appealed from as part of the record on appeal.
+
+**Rule 59. Oral Notification to the Court of Review.** The Clerk must orally notify the Presiding Judge of the Court of Review promptly upon the filing of a petition for review.
+
+**Title X. Administrative Provisions**
+
+**Rule 60. Duties of the Clerk.**
+(a) **General Duties.** The Clerk supports the work of the Court consistent with the directives of the Presiding Judge. The Presiding Judge may authorize the Clerk to delegate duties to staff in the Clerk's office or other designated individuals.
+(b) **Maintenance of Court Records.** The Clerk:
+ (1) maintains the Court's docket and records — including records and recordings of proceedings before the Court — and the seal of the Court;
+
+-14-
+
+(2) accepts papers for filing;
+(3) keeps all records, pleadings, and files in a secure location, making those materials available only to persons authorized to have access to them; and
+(4) performs any other duties, consistent with the usual powers of a Clerk of Court, as the Presiding Judge may authorize.
+
+**Rule 61. Office Hours.** Although the Court is always open, the regular business hours of the Clerk's Office are 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. daily except Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. Except when the government submits an application following an emergency authorization, or when the Court otherwise directs, any filing outside these hours will be recorded as received at the start of the next business day.
+
+**Rule 62. Release of Court Records.**
+(a) **Publication of Opinions.** The Judge who authored an order, opinion, or other decision may *sua sponte* or on motion by a party request that it be published. Upon such request, the Presiding Judge, after consulting with other Judges of the Court, may direct that an order, opinion or other decision be published. Before publication, the Court may, as appropriate, direct the Executive Branch to review the order, opinion, or other decision and redact it as necessary to ensure that properly classified information is appropriately protected pursuant to Executive Order 13526 (or its successor).
+(b) **Other Records.** Except when an order, opinion, or other decision is published or provided to a party upon issuance, the Clerk may not release it, or other related record, without a Court order. Such records must be released in conformance with the security measures referenced in Rule 3.
+(c) **Provision of Court Records to Congress.**
+ (1) **By the Government.** The government may provide copies of Court orders, opinions, decisions, or other Court records, to Congress, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §§ 1871(a)(5), 1871(c), or 1881f(b)(1)(D), or any other statutory requirement, without prior motion to and order by the Court. The government, however, must contemporaneously notify the Court in writing whenever it provides copies of Court records to Congress and must include in the notice a list of the documents provided.
+ (2) **By the Court.** The Presiding Judge may provide copies of Court orders, opinions, decisions, or other Court records to Congress. Such disclosures must be made in conformance with the security measures referenced in Rule 3.
+
+**Rule 63. Practice Before Court.** An attorney may appear on a matter with the permission of the Judge before whom the matter is pending. An attorney who appears before the Court must be a licensed attorney and a member, in good standing, of the bar of a United States district or circuit court, except that an attorney who is employed by and represents the United States or any of its agencies in a matter before the Court may appear before the Court regardless of federal bar membership. All attorneys appearing before the Court must have the appropriate security clearance.
+
+-15-
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_honorable-patrick-leahy/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_honorable-patrick-leahy/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3a93d30
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_honorable-patrick-leahy/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Letter to Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-07-29",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-07-29",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34194",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "bdc4a0aa59031a82b9c50ff98b1ff9a70cf4568c5a28976992132f177bece154",
+ "pages": 30
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-01-opinion-order/FISC_-_misc-13-01-opinion-order.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-01-opinion-order/FISC_-_misc-13-01-opinion-order.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3e0e031
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-01-opinion-order/FISC_-_misc-13-01-opinion-order.md
@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+UNITED STATES FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR CONSENT TO DISCLOSURE
+OF COURT RECORDS OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,
+A DETERMINATION OF THE EFFECT OF THE
+COURT'S RULES ON STATUTORY ACCESS RIGHTS
+
+Docket No.: Misc. 13-01
+
+OPINION AND ORDER
+
+This matter is before the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC" or "Court") on
+the Motion of the Electronic Frontier Foundation for Consent to Disclosure of Court Records or,
+in the Alternative, a Determination of the Effect of the Court's Rules on Statutory Access Rights,
+which was submitted on May 23, 2013 ("EFF Motion"), and the Opposition of the United States
+thereto, which was submitted on June 7, 2013 ("Gov't Opp.").
+
+EFF and the Government are engaged in litigation in the United States District Court for
+the District of Columbia regarding EFF's request pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act
+("FOIA") for disclosure of particular FISC records in the Government's possession – two
+versions of the same Court opinion (hereinafter referred to collectively as the "Opinion"). See
+Gov't Opp at 1. The Government has argued in the District Court that the Rules of this Court
+prohibit disclosure of the Opinion to EFF pursuant to FOIA. See id. The District Court has
+granted EFF's unopposed motion to stay the proceedings in the FOIA litigation, apparently for
+the purpose of allowing EFF to request relief from this Court regarding the claimed prohibition.
+
+See EFF Motion at 4; Gov't Opp. at 2.
+In its Motion to this Court, EFF requests either: (1) "entry of an order in which this Court
+notes its consent (or lack of opposition) to the disclosure of the material EFF seeks should such
+material be found to be non-exempt under the provisions of FOIA, subject to any security
+procedures the Court deems appropriate"; or (2) "a determination that the FISC rules do not
+prohibit disclosure of the requested material in a manner that would supersede a judicial
+determination that such material is subject to disclosure under FOIA." EFF Motion at 7-8. The
+Government responds that the Court should deny the EFF Motion "both because it is outside this
+Court's jurisdiction and because there is good reason not to vacate the seal on the opinion."
+Gov't Opp. at 1.
+
+The Court concludes that it has jurisdiction to adjudicate the EFF Motion and that the
+FISC Rules do not prohibit the Government's disclosure of the Opinion in the event it is
+ultimately determined by the District Court to be subject to disclosure under FOIA.
+I. The EFF Motion is Within the Jurisdiction of this Court.
+"[T]he FISC is an inferior federal court established by Congress under Article III," and
+like all other such courts, "has supervisory power over its own records and files." _In re Motion
+for Release of Court Records_, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, 486 (FISA Ct. 2007) (quoting _Nixon v.
+Warner Commc'ns, Inc._, 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978)). In a prior matter involving a motion by the
+American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU") for access to certain FISC records, this Court held
+that it had jurisdiction to entertain the motion, explaining that "it would be quite odd if the FISC
+did not have jurisdiction in the first instance to adjudicate a claim of right to the Court's very
+own records and files." Id. at 487. The Government asserts that the same reasoning is
+
+Page 2
+
+inapplicable here because, unlike the records sought by the ACLU, which were identified as
+being in the Court's possession, the copies of the Opinion that are sought by EFF are in the
+possession of the Government. Gov't Opp at 3-4. The Government also observes that in the
+ACLU matter, the movant's claim of right was directed at the Court itself, while EFF is asserting
+a statutory right of access against the Executive Branch. Id. at 3.
+
+These differences are immaterial to the question of jurisdiction. The very reason the
+parties are now before this Court is the Government's contention (disputed by EFF) that this
+Court, by operation of FISC Rule 62, continues to exert authority and control over copies of the
+Opinion in the Government's possession in a manner that prohibits the disclosure sought by EFF
+pursuant to FOIA. The Court has little difficulty concluding that it has jurisdiction to adjudicate
+this dispute between the parties over whether the Court has in fact prohibited such disclosure
+and, if so, whether the prohibition should be modified or lifted.
+II. FISC Rule 62 Does Not Prohibit the Government from Disclosing Copies of the Opinion
+to EFF Pursuant to FOIA.
+The Court disagrees with the Government that FISC Rule 62 prohibits the disclosure of
+the copies of the FISC Opinion to EFF under FOIA. Rule 62 provides as follows:
+
+Rule 62. Release of Court Records.
+(a) Publication of Opinions. The Judge who authored an order, opinion, or other
+decision may sua sponte or on motion by a party request that it be published. Upon such
+request, the Presiding Judge, after consulting with other Judges of the Court, may direct
+that an order, opinion or other decision be published. Before publication, the Court may,
+as appropriate, direct the Executive Branch to review the order, opinion, or other decision
+and redact it as necessary to ensure that properly classified information is appropriately
+protected pursuant to Executive Order 13526 (or its successor).
+(b) Other Records. Except when an order, opinion, or other decision is published or
+provided to a party upon issuance, the Clerk may not release it, or other related record,
+without a Court order. Such records must be released in conformance with the security
+measures referenced in Rule 3.
+
+Page 3
+
+(c) Provision of Court Records to Congress.
+(1) By the Government. The government may provide copies of Court orders,
+opinions, decisions, or other Court records, to Congress, pursuant to 50 U.S.C.
+§§ 1871(a)(5), 1871(c), or 1881f(b)(1)(D), or any other statutory requirement,
+without prior motion to and order by the Court. The government, however, must
+contemporaneously notify the Court in writing whenever it provides copies of
+Court records to Congress and must include in the notice a list of the documents
+provided.
+(2) By the Court. The Presiding Judge may provide copies of Court orders,
+opinions, decisions, or other Court records to Congress. Such disclosures must be
+made in conformance with the security measures referenced in Rule 3.
+
+The Government contends that Rule 62 has the effect of placing copies of the Opinion in
+its possession "under this Court's seal." Gov't Opp. at 4. The term "seal," however, does not
+appear in Rule 62, and contrary to the Government's contention, Rule 62 neither explicitly nor
+implicitly places the Government's copies of the Opinion "under seal."
+
+Rule 62 contains four subsections, all of which generally concern the "Release of Court
+Records," but each addresses a distinct situation. Three of the four subsections address different
+forms of release by the Court or its staff: subsection (a) sets out the Court's process for
+publishing Court opinions; subsection (b) governs the release of Court records by the Clerk; and
+subsection (c)(2) provides for the provision of Court records to Congress by the Presiding Judge.
+None of these provisions is applicable here.
+
+The only portion of Rule 62 that applies to the disclosure of Court records by the
+Executive Branch is subsection (c)(1), which states that the Government may, when required by
+law, provide FISC records to the Congress without prior motion to and order from the Court.
+Subsection (c)(1), which was first adopted in November 2010, was intended to stop the
+Government's practice of filing what the Court viewed as unnecessary motions for unsealing
+before fulfilling its statutory obligation to submit certain FISC records to Congress. See Rule
+
+Page 4
+
+62(c)(1) (citing pertinent statutory provisions). Rule 62(c)(1) does not address other disclosures
+by the Government of FISC orders or opinions in its possession. By contrast, Rule 62(b)
+explicitly prohibits the Clerk of the Court from disclosing FISC records except in two narrow
+circumstances. The lack of similar preclusive language in subsection (c)(1) militates against
+reading it as barring other, unspecified disclosures by the Government of FISC records in its
+possession, and the Court concludes that it should not be construed in such a manner.
+
+As the Government notes (Gov't Opp. at 6-7), this Court routinely grants motions by the
+Government to unseal and release certified copies of FISC records for District Court review in
+connection with a decision by the Government to use in litigation information derived from
+electronic surveillance or physical search conducted under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
+Act ("FISA"). See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1806(f), 1825(g). That practice, however, does not support the
+Government's interpretation of Rule 62 in this matter. To begin with, the Government's motions
+to unseal and release frequently encompass FISC orders that are, by their own terms, explicitly
+sealed. Moreover, such motions always include a request for the release by the Court of
+certified copies of FISC records. As discussed above, FISC Rule 62(b) provides that "[e]xcept
+when an order, opinion, or other decision is published or provided to a party upon issuance, the
+
+1
+Some orders of this Court are, by their own terms, sealed or otherwise subject to
+restrictions on disclosure. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)(C) (requiring that certain Court
+orders contain language restricting disclosure). The Government does not assert that the Opinion
+at issue here contains, or is otherwise subject to, an express sealing provision. Moreover, FISA
+requires that certain submissions to the FISC be made "under seal," see id. §§ 1802(a)(3),
+1822(a)(3), 1861(f)(5), 1881a(g)(1)(A), 1881(a)(k)(2), and that certain Court records be
+transmitted "under seal" to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review or the Supreme
+Court, see id. §§ 1803(a)(1), 1803(b), 1822(a)(3), 1822(c), 1822(d), 1861(f)(3), 1881a(h)(6)(B),
+1881a(i)(4)(D). None of these provisions is applicable here, and the Government does not argue
+otherwise.
+
+Page 5
+
+Clerk may not release it, or other related record, without a Court order." Because the
+Government's motions to unseal and release are seldom, if ever, filed contemporaneously with
+the issuance or publication of an order or opinion, Rule 62(b) expressly requires a Court order to
+effectuate the requested release of records by the Clerk. Rule 62 imposes no such requirement
+for disclosures made by the Government pursuant to FOIA.
+
+There is nothing anomalous in the conclusion that the Rules of this Court do not prohibit
+the Government from disclosing the copies of the Opinion sought by EFF. It is fundamentally
+the Executive Branch's responsibility to safeguard sensitive national security information. See
+_Dep't of Navy v. Egan_, 484 U.S. 518, 527-29 (1988). As a general matter, it would be redundant
+for this Court to impose on the Executive Branch additional restrictions on the disclosure of
+information about sensitive foreign intelligence activities contained in FISC records beyond
+those imposed by Executive Order and statute.² As the Court has previously noted, security
+measures required by FISA govern surveillance orders and opinions "in the possession of the
+FISC, the [Foreign Intelligence Surveillance] Court of Review, the Supreme Court, a person
+rendering assistance [in conducting surveillance], or a district court for review [in litigation], or
+even when submitted to Congress." In re Motion for Release of Court Records, 526 F. Supp. 2d
+at 490. They do not generally regulate copies of those records in the possession of the Executive
+Branch.
+
+² See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,968, 60 Fed. Reg. 40, 245 (Aug. 2, 1995), as amended by
+Exec. Order No. 13,467, 73 Fed. Reg. 38,103 (June 30, 2008), set out as note to 50 U.S.C.A.
+§ 435; Exec. Order 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29, 2009), set out as note to 50 U.S.C.A.
+§ 435; see also 18 U.S.C. § 798.
+
+Page 6
+
+III. Conclusion.
+
+For the foregoing reasons, EFF's motion is granted in part. The Court holds that FISC
+Rule 62 does not have the effect of sealing copies of the Opinion in the Government's possession
+and that the Court has not otherwise prohibited the Government's disclosure of such copies in
+response to EFF's FOIA request. This Court expresses no opinion on the other issues presented
+in the FOIA litigation, including whether the Opinion is ultimately subject to disclosure under
+FOIA. Such questions are appropriately addressed by the District Court in the FOIA litigation.
+
+SO ORDERED, this _17_ day of June, 2013, in Docket No. Misc. 13-01.
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+Page 7
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-01-opinion-order/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-01-opinion-order/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b0432fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-01-opinion-order/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Opinion and Order, In re Motion for Consent to Disclosure of Court Records or, in the Alternative, A Determination of the Effect of the Court’s Rules on Statutory Access Rights",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-06-12",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-06-12",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34001",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "fa3c48572dfca2bf5ce2abe3150d6579fa5efcec48723bee165f71b820ccb0b2",
+ "pages": 7
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-04-brief-of-amici-curiae-130715/FISC_-_misc-13-02-04-brief-of-amici-curiae-130715.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-04-brief-of-amici-curiae-130715/FISC_-_misc-13-02-04-brief-of-amici-curiae-130715.md
new file mode 100644
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-04-brief-of-amici-curiae-130715/FISC_-_misc-13-02-04-brief-of-amici-curiae-130715.md
@@ -0,0 +1,642 @@
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+U.S. FOREIC
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+2013 JUL 15 PM 4:50
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+In re Orders Issued by This Court
+Interpreting Section 215 of the Patriot Act
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-02
+
+In re Motion for Declaratory Judgment
+of A First Amendment Right
+to Publish Aggregate Information
+About FISA Orders
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-03
+
+In re Motion to Disclose
+Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-04
+
+BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE THE REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE
+PRESS, ABC, INC., THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, BLOOMBERG L.P., DOW JONES &
+COMPANY, INC., GANNETT CO., INC., LOS ANGELES TIMES, THE MCCLATCHY
+COMPANY, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, INC., THE NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY,
+THE NEW YORKER, THE NEWSWEEK/DAILY BEAST COMPANY LLC, REUTERS
+AMERICA LLC, TRIBUNE COMPANY, AND THE WASHINGTON POST IN SUPPORT OF
+THE MOTION FOR THE RELEASE OF COURT RECORDS AND THE MOTIONS FOR
+DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
+
+Bruce D. Brown
+Gregg P. Leslie
+Robert J. Tricchinelli
+The Reporters Committee
+for Freedom of the Press
+1101 Wilson Blvd., Suite 1100
+Arlington, VA 22209
+Counsel for Amici Curiae
+
+July 15, 2013
+
+TABLE OF CONTENTS
+
+IDENTITY OF AMICI CURIAE
+SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
+I. The First Amendment interests of the public in hearing a "willing speaker" are
+particularly strong when the government itself is speaking about secretive national security
+programs and the disclosure of the data at issue is not forbidden by law.
+II. A profound and growing public interest exists in access to the precedential opinions of
+this Court the disclosure of which will strengthen this tribunal's legitimacy.
+CONCLUSION.
+
+3
+6
+
+9
+
+13
+18
+
+2
+
+IDENTITY OF AMICI CURIAE
+
+The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press is a voluntary, unincorporated
+association of reporters and editors that works to defend the First Amendment rights and freedom
+of information interests of the news media. The Reporters Committee has provided
+representation, guidance and research in First Amendment and Freedom of Information Act
+litigation since 1970.
+
+ABC, Inc., alone and through its subsidiaries, owns and operates, inter alia, ABC News,
+abcnews.com and local broadcast television stations, including WABC-TV in New York City,
+which regularly gather and report news to the public. Programs produced and disseminated by
+ABC News include "World News with Diane Sawyer," "20/20,” “Nightline,” “Good Morning
+America" and "This Week."
+
+The Associated Press (“AP”) is a news cooperative organized under the Not-for-Profit
+Corporation Law of New York, and owned by its 1,500 U.S. newspaper members. The AP's
+members and subscribers include the nation's newspapers, magazines, broadcasters, cable news
+services and Internet content providers. The AP operates from 300 locations in more than 100
+countries. On any given day, AP's content can reach more than half of the world's population.
+
+Bloomberg L.P., based in New York City, operates Bloomberg News, which is
+comprised of more than 1,500 professionals in 145 bureaus around the world. Bloomberg News
+publishes more than 6,000 news stories each day, and The Bloomberg Professional Service
+maintains an archive of more than 15 million stories and multimedia reports and a photo library
+comprised of more than 290,000 images. Bloomberg News also operates as a wire service,
+syndicating news and data to over 450 newspapers worldwide with a combined circulation of 80
+million people in more than 160 countries. Bloomberg News operates the following: cable and
+
+3
+
+satellite television news channels broadcasting worldwide; WBBR, a 24-hour business news
+radio station that syndicates reports to more than 840 radio stations worldwide;Bloomberg
+Markets and Bloomberg Businessweek magazines; and Bloomberg.com, which receives 3.5
+million individual user visits each month.
+
+Dow Jones & Company, Inc., a global provider of news and business information, is the
+publisher of *The Wall Street Journal, Barron's, MarketWatch, Dow Jones Newswires*, and other
+publications. Dow Jones maintains one of the world's largest newsgathering operations, with
+2,000 journalists in more than fifty countries publishing news in several different languages.
+Dow Jones also provides information services, including Dow Jones Factiva, Dow Jones Risk &
+Compliance, and Dow Jones VentureSource. Dow Jones is a News Corporation company.
+
+Gannett Co., Inc. is an international news and information company that publishes 82
+daily newspapers in the United States, including *USA TODAY*, as well as hundreds of non-daily
+publications. In broadcasting, the company operates 23 television stations in the U.S. with a
+market reach of more than 21 million households. Each of Gannett's daily newspapers and TV
+stations operates Internet sites offering news and advertising that is customized for the market
+served and integrated with its publishing or broadcasting operations.
+
+The McClatchy Company, through its affiliates, is the third-largest newspaper publisher
+in the United States with 30 daily newspapers and related websites as well as numerous
+community newspapers and niche publications.
+
+National Public Radio, Inc. is an award-winning producer and distributor of
+noncommercial news programming. A privately supported, not-for-profit membership
+organization, NPR serves a growing audience of more than 26 million listeners each week by
+providing news programming to 285 member stations that are independently operated,
+
+4
+
+noncommercial public radio stations. In addition, NPR provides original online content and
+audio streaming of its news programming. NPR.org offers hourly newscasts, special features
+and 10 years of archived audio and information.
+
+The New York Times Company is the publisher of *The New York Times, The Boston
+Globe*, and *International Herald Tribune* and operates such leading news websites as
+nytimes.com and bostonglobe.com.
+
+The New Yorker is an award-winning magazine, published weekly in print, digital, and
+online.
+
+The Newsweek/Daily Beast Company LLC publishes *Newsweek* magazine and operates
+the website TheDailyBeast.com. The 80-year-old *Newsweek* magazine became an industry
+leader by going all-digital in 2013. It is now one of the largest tablet magazines in the world.
+Available weekly across digital platforms, *Newsweek* is written with a global perspective for a
+global audience. The Daily Beast, founded by Newsweek/Daily Beast Editor in Chief Tina
+Brown in 2008, offers award-winning journalism spanning every major news vertical, from
+politics and world news to fashion, film, and art. Winner of the 2012 Webby Award for Best
+News Website, The Daily Beast attracts over 16 million unique visitors per month and is among
+the fastest-growing news destinations on the web.
+
+Reuters, the world's largest international news agency, is a leading provider of real-time
+multi-media news and information services to newspapers, television and cable networks, radio
+stations and websites around the world. Through Reuters.com, affiliated websites and multiple
+online and mobile platforms, more than a billion professionals, news organizations and
+consumers rely on Reuters every day. Its text newswires provide newsrooms with source
+material and ready-to-publish news stories in twenty languages and, through Reuters Pictures
+
+5
+
+and Video, global video content and up to 1,600 photographs a day covering international news,
+sports, entertainment, and business. In addition, Reuters publishes authoritative and unbiased
+market data and intelligence to business and finance consumers, including investment banking
+and private equity professionals.
+
+Tribune Company operates broadcasting, publishing and interactive businesses, engaging
+in the coverage and dissemination of news and entertainment programming. On the broadcasting
+side, it owns 23 television stations, a radio station, a 24-hour regional cable news network and
+"Superstation" WGN America. On the publishing side, Tribune publishes eight daily
+newspapers — *Chicago Tribune, Hartford (Conn.) Courant, Los Angeles Times, Orlando
+Sentinel* (Central Florida), *The (Baltimore) Sun, The (Allentown, Pa.) Morning Call, (Hampton
+Roads, Va.) Daily Press* and *Sun-Sentinel* (South Florida).
+
+WP Company LLC (d/b/a The Washington Post) publishes one of the nation's most
+prominent daily newspapers, as well as a website, www.washingtonpost.com, that is read by an
+average of more than 20 million unique visitors per month.
+
+SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
+
+In these three cases, two leading communications carriers subject to the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") advance their rights under the First Amendment to
+discuss, in a broad and abstract way, the extent of the government surveillance in which they are
+compelled to participate by statute and through orders of this Court, while the ACLU and the
+Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic at Yale Law School seek access to precedential
+opinions of this Court interpreting those statutes both in their own right and in light of all
+relevant constitutional safeguards. Civil liberties groups, including the ACLU, have filed a brief
+
+6
+
+in the Google and Microsoft cases supporting the companies' positions and emphasizing their
+First Amendment interests as speakers. *See Brief of First Amendment Coalition et al. as Amici
+Curiae in Support of the Motions for Declaratory Judgment, In re Motion for Declaratory
+Judgment of Google Inc.'s First Amendment Right to Publish Aggregate Information About FISA
+Orders, In re Motion To Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders*, Docket Nos. Misc.
+13-03, 13-04 (FISA Ct. July 8, 2013).
+
+This coalition of news media organizations writes separately in support of the
+communications carriers to emphasize a related point that complements the arguments of the
+carriers and their civil liberties amici. In addition to implicating their rights as speakers, the
+Google and Microsoft cases raise important concerns relating to the interests of the public in
+receiving information, an interest that the Supreme Court has long recognized as a separate
+component of the speech and press freedoms under the First Amendment. Where the
+communications providers are willing speakers, the public has a heightened interest in hearing
+their speech. That interest is heightened even more when the government is itself choosing to
+provide information to the public regarding issues central to the Google and Microsoft cases.
+
+The public also has a formidable First Amendment interest in hearing directly from this
+Court about its core judicial activities in interpreting the statutes that give rise to its jurisdiction.
+The way the public learns about any tribunal's activities is chiefly through its opinions, and thus
+the news media coalition also files in support of the request for public access to this Court's
+interpretations of Section 215 of the Patriot Act that address the meaning, scope, and
+constitutionality of this law. *See In re Orders Issued by This Court Interpreting Section 215 of
+the Patriot Act*, Docket No. Misc. 13-02 (FISA Ct.). The mandate to this Court to keep secret
+the particular government applications filed before it does not require secrecy beyond that
+
+7
+
+statutory duty, and the interest of the public in understanding how this Court is construing these
+key congressional enactments is paramount, particularly regarding information in which the
+interest of the government justifying secrecy is not present.
+
+Excessive secrecy limits truthful reporting on matters of public concern, implicating the
+highest First Amendment values. These three cases, which share a common purpose of seeking
+disclosure of truthful information to the public about the FISA warrant application and approval
+process, come to this Court against the backdrop of an urgent and in many ways delayed debate
+regarding balancing the nation's commitment to transparency in its public institutions with the
+demands placed upon those traditions by the professed needs of the national security state. The
+communications carriers and this Court have both expressed commitment to correcting any
+misinformation in the public domain about the FISA process and the providers' cooperation with
+the National Security Agency. Concerns about the impressions created in the public media
+underscore the real point: The issues here are vitally important to both national security and civil
+liberties, they inevitably and rightfully are going to be the subject of public reporting and debate,
+and secrecy is preventing the public and the press from having even the rudimentary information
+needed for the kind of informed discussion that the country deserves.
+
+The President concluded his remarks during a recent press conference by noting that
+some people, including members of Congress, will disagree with the FISA surveillance programs
+and saying, "We're happy to have that debate." *See The White House, Statement by the
+President*, June 7, 2013, available at http://1.usa.gov/12xerjF. Disclosure of the aggregate data
+and the judicial opinions interpreting the surveillance statutes requested in these cases would be a
+modest yet important part of that public debate and a step toward more accountability of the
+FISA programs passed by Congress and overseen by this Court.
+
+8
+
+I. The First Amendment interests of the public in hearing a "willing speaker" are
+particularly strong when the government itself is speaking about secretive national
+security programs and the disclosure of the data at issue is not forbidden by law.
+
+The Supreme Court has long recognized that the public has a First Amendment right to
+receive speech where there is a willing speaker. “[W]here a speaker exists, as is the case here,
+the protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both." *Va.
+State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.*, 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976). The
+*Virginia Pharmacy* Court explained that this precept was "clear from the decided cases," *id.*,
+including *Klendienst v. Mandel*, 408 U.S. 753, 762–63 (1972), where again the Court referred to
+a broadly accepted right to "receive information and ideas," and it cited its decision in *Martin v.
+City of Struthers*, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) that holds:
+
+> The authors of the First Amendment knew that novel and
+> unconventional ideas might disturb the complacent, but they chose
+> to encourage a freedom which they believed essential if vigorous
+> enlightenment was ever to triumph over slothful ignorance. This
+> freedom embraces the right to distribute literature, and necessarily
+> protects the right to receive it.
+
+*Id.* at 143 (internal citations omitted). The Court has further explained that the "right to receive
+ideas is a necessary predicate to the recipient's meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech,
+press, and political freedom." *Bd. of Ed. v. Pico*, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (Brennan, J.,
+plurality opinion) (emphasis in original). Justice Brennan rooted this concept of the listener's
+pursuit of his own constitutional liberties in the writings of the author of the First Amendment,
+James Madison, citing this passage from Madison's letters:
+
+> A popular Government, without popular information, or the means
+> of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or,
+> perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a
+> people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves
+> with the power which knowledge gives.
+
+*Id.*
+
+9
+
+In addressing the various rationales for free speech protections – from the search for truth
+to a check on government power to personal self-realization and liberty – modern scholars of the
+First Amendment have concluded that these individual models and others all serve to reinforce
+each other. According to University of Texas Professor Lucas A. Powe, Jr., referring to Yale
+Professor Thomas Emerson's influential treatise *The System of Free Expression*, "[L]ooking for
+a single explanation for the importance of freedom of speech is a futile search. Each of the
+theories has explanatory power.... [Thomas] Emerson's great insight, implicit in [Justice]
+Brandeis's *Whitney* concurrence, was that the whole is stronger than the sum of its parts." Lucas
+A. Powe, Jr., *The Fourth Estate and the Constitution: Freedom of the Press in America* 240
+(University of California Press 1992). The power of the listeners' rights concept is thus derived
+from the power of speakers wishing to communicate information – and vice versa.
+
+Courts often employ concepts relating to the "right to receive" information from a
+"willing speaker" when news media parties challenge gag orders and base their standing to
+intervene on the public's interest in hearing the information. *See Application of Dow Jones &
+Co., Inc.*, 842 F.2d 603, 607 (2d Cir. 1988) (“But the rights of potential recipients of speech, like
+the news agencies, to challenge the abridgment of that speech has already been decided.")
+(citing *Virginia Pharmacy*); *FOCUS v. Allegheny County Court*, 75 F.3d 834, 839 (3d Cir. 1996)
+(affirming that third parties have standing to challenge gag orders when the subjects of those
+orders might fear reprisal by speaking out); *Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg*, 23 F.3d 772, 777
+(3d Cir. 1994) ("The Newspapers may have standing notwithstanding the fact that they assert
+rights that may belong to a broad portion of the public at large.") (citations omitted); *Davis v.
+East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd.*, 78 F.3d 920, 927 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that because the
+subject of the gag order was newsworthy and of great public interest in the community, the order
+
+10
+
+severely impeded efforts "to discover newsworthy information from potential speakers"). These
+cases illuminate that the media's interest in receiving information about court proceedings in the
+name of the public's interest is substantial.
+
+Amici draw upon these doctrines to support the applications of Google and Microsoft.
+They are speakers with significant First Amendment interests who wish to convey to the public
+generalized data about government surveillance programs in which they are required to play a
+role based on statute and judicial orders. They have submitted to this Court that disclosure of the
+information they seek to share with the public is not barred by law and will better explain the
+nature of their participation in these programs and correct popular misperceptions about the
+operation of key anti-terrorism initiatives undertaken by the government. Where Google and
+Microsoft have an interest of constitutional dimension in communicating with the public, the
+public has a corresponding constitutional interest in receiving the communications in order to
+fully realize its own speech and political freedoms. *See Motion for Declaratory Judgment of
+Google Inc.'s First Amendment Right to Publish Aggregate Information About FISA Orders at
+3, In re Motion for Declaratory Judgment of A First Amendment Right to Publish Aggregate
+Information About FISA Orders*, Docket No. Misc. 13-03 (FISA Ct. June 18, 2013) (“[T]hese are
+matters of significant weight and importance, and transparency is critical to advancing public
+debate in a thoughtful and democratic manner.").
+
+The public interest in disclosure is even more compelling when the government has
+acknowledged the existence of these surveillance programs and is itself speaking about them.
+*See ACLU v. CIA*, 710 F.3d 422, 426–27 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (reversing dismissal of a FOIA action
+against the CIA because the government's public acknowledgement of a drone strike program
+vitiated the CIA's claim that it could not disclose its interest or involvement in the program).
+
+11
+
+The government's own speech amplifies the First Amendment interests of affected speakers
+seeking to communicate a message flowing directly from an official acknowledgement of a
+government program. If the public is hearing from the government, it should be hearing from the
+providers. Google and Microsoft should not be barred from confirming through the release of
+aggregate data the extent to which they have been subject to the demands of these programs
+when their communications will not implicate the confidentiality of any particular case.
+
+Statements by President Obama and the Director of National Intelligence, James R.
+Clapper, among others, acknowledge continuing government programs to retrieve both telephone
+toll and email envelope information. *See The White House, Statement by the President*, June 7,
+2013, available at http://1.usa.gov/12xerjF; Director of National Intelligence, *Facts on the
+Collection of Intelligence Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act*,
+June 8, 2013, available at http://1.usa.gov/1bhNPkX; *see also*
+http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases (“DNI Statement on the Collection of
+Intelligence Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act," June 8, 2013;
+"DNI Statement on Activities Authorized Under Section 702 of FISA," June 6, 2013; "DNI
+Statement on Recent Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information," June 6, 2013). Of
+course, the administration has not acknowledged any particular FISA warrant. But it has
+discussed the various surveillance programs with enough detail to argue that the programs are
+not invading the privacy of American citizens.
+
+Disclosure of the aggregate data is necessary to understanding the administration's
+position - as well as the positions of Google and Microsoft. When two of the most
+knowledgeable officials possessing intelligence information declare that the surveillance
+programs do not violate the privacy of members of the public, two of the most ostensibly
+
+12
+
+affected companies which must comply with the surveillance orders should be free to talk about
+them at least in the most general ways. *See Microsoft Corporation's Motion for Declaratory
+Judgment or Other Appropriate Relief Authorizing Disclosure of Aggregate Data Regarding Any
+FISA Orders It Has Received at 7, In re Motion to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA
+Orders*, Docket No. Misc. 13-04 (FISA Ct. June 19, 2013) ("The First Amendment does not
+permit the Government to bar Microsoft from speaking about an issue of great importance to its
+customers, shareholders, and the public while, simultaneously, senior Government officials are
+speaking publicly about the very same subject."). Google and Microsoft have First Amendment
+interests in speaking to these issues through the release of aggregate data, and the interests of the
+public in hearing about all sides of these issues strongly supports their petitions.
+
+II. A profound and growing public interest exists in access to the precedential opinions
+of this Court the disclosure of which will strengthen this tribunal's legitimacy.
+
+Amici support the efforts of the ACLU and the Media Freedom and Information Access
+Clinic at Yale Law School for public access to opinions of this Court under *Press-Enterprise Co.
+v. Superior Court*, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (“*Press-Enterprise II*") as well as through the Court's own
+rules. *See FISC R.P. 62* (establishing procedure for publication of court opinions *sua sponte* or
+through the motion of a party). While the constitutional grounds for access are persuasively
+argued in the ACLU's brief, the news media amici file to highlight additional factors relating to
+the Court's institutional interests and the interplay between the public, the Court, and the press
+that makes reliance on Rule 62's practices compelling in this case.
+
+A "watershed" moment for the interests of the public in receiving information, in Justice
+Stevens' words, arrived when the Supreme Court applied the listeners' rights model to the
+question of access to court proceedings. *See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia*, 448 U.S.
+555, 582 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring). In *Richmond Newspapers*, the Court recognized a
+
+13
+
+right based in the First Amendment that created a presumption of open criminal trials. *See id.* at
+573. While Justice Stevens wrote to emphasize that the holding was significant in part because it
+found that the "acquisition of newsworthy matter" was entitled to its own basis for constitutional
+protection, *id.* at 582, other Justices stressed the role that openness plays in legitimizing the
+criminal justice system itself. *See id.* at 572 (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion) ("[T]he appearance
+of justice can best be provided by allowing people to observe it."); *id.* at 600 (Stewart, J.,
+concurring) ("[A] trial courtroom is a place where representatives of the press and of the public
+are not only free to be, but where their presence serves to assure the integrity of what goes on.").
+
+The news media of course plays its own democratic role by ensuring that newsworthy
+information reaches the public about each of the three branches of government. *See United
+States v. Morison*, 844 F.2d 1057, 1081 (4th Cir. 1988) (Wilkinson, J., concurring) ("We have
+placed our faith in knowledge, not in ignorance, and for most, this means reliance on the press.").
+The Supreme Court has signaled the special significance of the news media's role in the area of
+access to judicial proceedings:
+
+> Great responsibility is accordingly placed upon the news media to
+> report fully and accurately the proceedings of government....
+> Without the information provided by the press most of us and
+> many of our representatives would be unable to vote intelligently
+> or to register opinions on the administration of government
+> generally. With respect to judicial proceedings in particular, the
+> function of the press serves to... bring to bear the beneficial
+> effects of public scrutiny upon the administration of justice.
+
+*Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn*, 420 U.S. 469, 491–92 (1975).
+
+As the ACLU and the Yale clinic explain, the judiciary, as a separate and co-equal branch
+of government, is invested in the recognition of public access rights to judicial proceedings for
+its own institutional reasons as well. *See Reply Brief In Support Of Motion of the American
+Civil Liberties Union, et al., For The Release Of Court Records at 11, In re Orders Issued by*
+
+14
+
+*This Court Interpreting Section 215 of the Patriot Act*, Docket No. Misc. 13-02 (FISA Ct. July
+12, 2013) ("In particular, access 'enhances the quality and safeguards the integrity' of courts,
+while at the same time 'foster[ing] an appearance of fairness, thereby heightening public respect
+for the judicial process.") (citing *Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court*, 457 U.S. 596, 606
+(1982)). While these institutional interests are prevalent throughout the judiciary, from trial
+courts all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court, they may be even more pronounced in the FISA
+Court "than in other tribunals" for reasons ranging from the secretive nature of its adjudications
+to the lack of any adversarial process. *Id*. Thus, for this Court in particular, a connection exists
+between transparency into its development of a controlling body of law and public confidence in
+its expanding (and secretive) judicial functions. As the Second Circuit articulated:
+
+> Because the Constitution grants the judiciary “neither force nor
+> will, but merely judgment," *The Federalist* No. 78 (Alexander
+> Hamilton), courts must impede scrutiny of the exercise of that
+> judgment only in the rarest of circumstances. This is especially so
+> when a judicial decision accedes to the requests of a coordinate
+> branch, lest ignorance of the basis for the decision cause the public
+> to doubt that "complete independence of the courts of justice
+> [which] is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution." *Id*.
+
+*United States v. Aref*, 533 F.3d 72, 83 (2d Cir. 2008).
+
+There is another nexus here as well – the nexus between the judiciary's promotion of
+freedom of the press and judicial independence itself. In *Images of A Free Press*, Lee Bollinger
+writes of the "special bond" between the Supreme Court and the press in years since the Court
+constitutionalized the law of libel in *New York Times v. Sullivan*, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). For
+Bollinger, now president of Columbia University, the *Sullivan* decision showed the Court "eager
+to take on the role of constitutional advocate for, as well as protector of, the press" not just to
+advance the public's constitutional interests in a free press but for the judiciary's own sake as
+well. Lee Bollinger, *Images of A Free Press* 52 (University of Chicago Press 1994). In
+
+15
+
+elaborating on the "sense of solidarity" between the courts and the news media, Bollinger states:
+
+> Something in the identities of both institutions may lead naturally
+> to such a bond. They share the condition of standing, as it were,
+> on the margin of society. Both function as social critics. Neither
+> possesses the powers of enforcement held by the legislative and
+> executive branches. ... They exist in the ever-awkward position
+> of having a grand role to perform being electorally
+> authorized, democratically legitimated, to perform that role.
+
+*Id.*
+
+As the public's legitimate demands grow for more information about the judiciary's role
+in administering the country's surveillance programs, the institutional needs of this Court to
+explain its functions and the interests of the news media in keeping the public informed will
+inevitably be linked in the way Bollinger envisioned. Several former members of this Court
+have spoken out recently to defend their independence as FISA judges and to advance the cause
+of greater understanding of FISA proceedings. *See Carol D. Leonnig et al., Secret-Court Judges
+Upset at Portrayal of “Collaboration” with Government, Wash. Post*, June 30, 2013 at A1,
+available at http://wapo.st/17KTAeS; Stephen Braun, *Former FISA Judge Says Secret Court Is
+Flawed, Associated Press*, July 9, 2013, available at http://bigstory.ap.org/article/oversight-
+board-hears-testimony-nsa-spying. This Court itself last month issued a statement to the news
+media to defend the integrity of FISA procedures. *See John Shiffman & Kristina Cooke, The
+Judges Who Preside Over America's Secret Court, Reuters*, June 21, 2013, available at
+http://reut.rs/19mopUi.
+
+When this Court's opinions become available, it can be sure that the media will be there
+to explain its work to the public. *See Philip Shenon, Secret Court Says F.B.I. Aides Misled
+Judges in 75 Cases, N.Y. Times*, Aug. 23, 2002, available at http://nyti.ms/13KNMR5 (reporting
+on a publicly released FISA Court opinion in which the Court criticized the FBI for making
+
+16
+
+misleading statements in numerous applications for wiretaps). In the meantime, the news media
+is doing its part to shed more light on the FISA process and the expansion of this Court's docket
+and jurisprudential responsibilities. *See Eric Lichtblau, In Secret, Court Vastly Broadens Powers
+of N.S.A., N.Y. Times*, July 6, 2013, at A1, available at http://nyti.ms/12beiA3; Jennifer
+Valentino-Devries & Siobhan Gorman, *Secret Court's Redefinition of 'Relevant' Empowered
+Vast NSA Data-Gathering, Wall St. J.*, July 8, 2013, available at http://on.wsj.com/13x8QKU.
+
+The best language promoting the values of transparency and the benefits to judicial
+autonomy of openness comes from judges themselves. *See Hon. T.S. Ellis III, Sealing, Judicial
+Transparency and Judicial Independence*, 53 Vill. L. Rev. 939, 948 (2008) (“[S]ecrecy
+encourages a perception of abuse, which in turn erodes public confidence in judicial institutions
+and ultimately will lead to attacks on, and erosion of, judicial independence."); *Hicklin Eng'g,
+L.C. v. Bartell*, 439 F.3d 346, 348 (7th Cir. 2006) (Easterbrook, J.) (“The political branches of
+government claim legitimacy by election, judges by reason. Any step that withdraws an element
+of the judicial process from public view makes the ensuing decision look more like fiat and
+requires rigorous justification.... The Supreme Court issues public opinions in all cases, even
+those said to involve state secrets."). Publication of leading authoritative opinions under *FISC
+R.P. 62* would both educate the public about the business of this Court and in the process protect
+its independence as an Article III tribunal.
+
+17
+
+CONCLUSION
+
+For the reasons stated above, the petitions in Case Nos. Misc. 13-02, Misc. 13-03, and
+Misc. 13-04 should be granted.
+
+***
+
+Pursuant to FISC R.P. 7(h)(1), attorneys for *amici curiae* certify that Bruce D. Brown is a
+member in good standing of the bar of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (#629541) and the
+District of Columbia (#457317); that Gregg P. Leslie is a member in good standing of the bar of
+the District of Columbia (#426092); and that Robert J. Tricchinelli is a member in good standing
+of the bar of the State of Maryland. Pursuant to FISC R.P. 7(i), attorneys for *amici* further
+certify that the undersigned do not currently hold a security clearance.
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+Bruce D. Brown
+Gregg P. Leslie
+Robert J. Tricchinelli
+The Reporters Committee
+for Freedom of the Press
+1101 Wilson Blvd., Suite 1100
+Arlington, VA 22209
+Phone: 703-807-2100
+bbrown@rcfp.org
+Counsel for Amici Curiae
+
+*Additional amici counsel listed below
+
+18
+
+Of Counsel:
+
+John Zucker
+Indira Satyendra
+ABC, Inc.
+77 W. 66th Street
+New York, NY 10023
+
+Karen Kaiser
+Associate General Counsel
+The Associated Press
+450 W. 33rd Street
+New York, NY 10001
+
+Tom Golden
+Willkie Farr & Gallagher
+787 Seventh Avenue
+New York, N.Y. 10019-6099
+Counsel for Bloomberg L.P.
+
+Mark H. Jackson
+Jason P. Conti
+Dow Jones & Company, Inc.
+1211 Avenue of the Americas
+7th Floor
+New York, NY 10036
+
+Barbara W. Wall
+Vice President/Senior
+Associate General Counsel
+Gannett Co., Inc.
+7950 Jones Branch Drive
+McLean, VA 22107
+
+Karlene Goller
+Los Angeles Times
+202 West First Street
+Los Angeles, CA 90012
+
+Karole Morgan-Prager
+Juan Cornejo
+The McClatchy Company
+2100 Q Street
+Sacramento, CA 95816
+
+Denise Leary
+Ashley Messenger
+National Public Radio, Inc.
+1111 North Capitol St. NE
+Washington, D.C. 20002
+
+David McCraw
+V.P./Assistant General Counsel
+The New York Times Company
+620 Eighth Avenue
+New York, NY 10018
+
+Lynn Oberlander
+General Counsel
+The New Yorker
+4 Times Square
+New York, NY 10036
+
+Randy L. Shapiro
+The Newsweek/
+Daily Beast Company LLC
+555 W. 18th St., 2nd Floor
+New York, NY 10011
+
+Gail C. Gove
+Chief Counsel, News
+Reuters America LLC
+3 Times Square, 20th Floor
+New York, NY 10036
+
+19
+
+David S. Bralow
+Assistant General Counsel/
+East Coast Media
+Karen H. Flax
+Assistant General Counsel/
+Publishing & Litigation
+Tribune Company
+220 E. 42nd St., Suite 400
+New York, NY 10017
+
+John B. Kennedy
+James A. McLaughlin
+Kalea S. Clark
+The Washington Post
+1150 15th Street, N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20071
+
+20
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-04-brief-of-amici-curiae-130715/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-04-brief-of-amici-curiae-130715/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..00d4483
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-04-brief-of-amici-curiae-130715/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Brief of Amici Curiae The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, ABC, Inc., The Associated Press, Bloomberg, L.P., Dow Jones & Company, Inc., Gannett Co., Inc., Los Angeles Times, The McClatchy Company, National Public Radio, Inc., The New York Times Company, The New Yorker, The Newsweek/Daily Beast Company LLC, Reuters America LLC, Tribune Company, and The Washington Post in Support of the Motion for the Release of Court Records and the Motions for Declaratory Judgment,...",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-07-15",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-07-15",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34440",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "6ff58582854a9a697ba8de5b2aeace4c7eb89afe27a330e507791c3cea18c63c",
+ "pages": 20
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-04-motion-for-leave-file-amici-curiae-130715/FISC_-_misc-13-02-04-motion-for-leave-file-amici-curiae-130715.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-04-motion-for-leave-file-amici-curiae-130715/FISC_-_misc-13-02-04-motion-for-leave-file-amici-curiae-130715.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5e863ec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-04-motion-for-leave-file-amici-curiae-130715/FISC_-_misc-13-02-04-motion-for-leave-file-amici-curiae-130715.md
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+UNITED STATES
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+3 JUL 15 PM 4:51
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+In re Orders Issued by This Court
+Interpreting Section 215 of the Patriot Act
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-02
+
+In re Motion for Declaratory Judgment
+of A First Amendment Right
+to Publish Aggregate Information
+About FISA Orders
+Docket No. Misc. 13-03
+
+In re Motion to Disclose
+Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-04
+
+MOTION OF THE REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, ABC,
+INC., THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, BLOOMBERG L.P., DOW JONES & COMPANY, INC.,
+GANNETT CO., INC., LOS ANGELES TIMES, THE MCCLATCHY COMPANY,
+NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, INC., THE NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY, THE NEW
+YORKER, THE NEWSWEEK/DAILY BEAST COMPANY LLC, REUTERS AMERICA LLC,
+TRIBUNE COMPANY, AND THE WASHINGTON POST FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AS
+AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION FOR THE RELEASE OF COURT
+RECORDS AND THE MOTIONS FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
+
+July 15, 2013
+
+Bruce D. Brown
+Gregg P. Leslie
+Robert J. Tricchinelli
+The Reporters Committee
+for Freedom of the Press
+1101 Wilson Blvd., Suite 1100
+Arlington, VA 22209
+Counsel for Amici Curiae
+
+The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, ABC, Inc., The Associated Press,
+Bloomberg L.P., Dow Jones & Company, Inc., Gannett Co., Inc., Los Angeles Times, The
+McClatchy Company, National Public Radio, Inc., The New York Times Company, The New
+Yorker, The Newsweek/Daily Beast Company LLC, Reuters America LLC, Tribune Company,
+and The Washington Post move for leave to file the accompanying brief amici curiae in support
+of (1) the motion of the American Civil Liberties Union, et al., for the release of court records;
+(2) the motion for declaratory judgment of Google Inc.'s first amendment right to publish
+aggregate information about FISA orders; and (3) Microsoft Corporation's motion for
+declaratory judgment or other appropriate relief authorizing disclosure of aggregate data
+regarding any FISA orders it has received.
+
+This coalition of news media organizations writes separately in support of the
+communications carriers to emphasize a related point that complements the arguments of the
+carriers and their civil liberties amici. In addition to implicating their rights as speakers, the
+Google and Microsoft cases raise important concerns relating to the interests of the public in
+receiving information, an interest that the Supreme Court has long recognized as a separate
+component of the speech and press freedoms under the First Amendment. Where the
+communications providers are willing speakers, the public has a heightened interest in hearing
+their speech. That interest is heightened even more when the government is itself choosing to
+provide information to the public regarding issues central to the Google and Microsoft cases.
+
+The public also has a formidable First Amendment interest in hearing directly from this
+Court about its core judicial activities in interpreting the statutes that give rise to its jurisdiction.
+The way the public learns about any tribunal's activities is chiefly through its opinions, and thus
+the news media coalition also files in support of the request for public access to this Court's
+
+interpretations of Section 215 of the Patriot Act that address the meaning, scope, and
+constitutionality of this law.
+
+Counsel for all parties have consented to the filing of the accompanying brief.
+
+Dated: July 15, 2013
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+Bruce D. Brown
+Gregg P. Leslie
+Robert J. Tricchinelli
+The Reporters Committee
+for Freedom of the Press
+1101 Wilson Blvd., Suite 1100
+Arlington, VA 22209
+Phone: 703-807-2100
+bbrown@rcfp.org
+
+Counsel for Amici Curiae
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+I, Bruce D. Brown, certify that on July 15, 2013, a copy of this motion, together with the
+accompanying brief of amici curiae, were served on the following by in-person delivery:
+
+Christine Gunning
+Litigation Security Group
+U.S. Department of Justice
+2 Constitution Square
+145 N ST NE, Suite 2W-115
+Washington, DC 20530
+christine.e.gunning@usdoj.gov
+
+I further certify that this motion and the accompanying brief were served on the following
+by electronic mail:
+
+Alex Abdo
+American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
+125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
+New York, NY 10004
+aabdo@aclu.org
+Counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union
+
+Albert Gidari
+Perkins Coie LLP
+1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900
+Seattle, WA 98101
+agidari@perkinscoie.com
+Counsel for Google Inc.
+
+James M. Garland
+Covington & Burling LLP
+1201 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
+Washington, DC 20004
+jgarland@cov.com
+Counsel for Microsoft Corporation
+
+Bruce D. Brown
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-04-motion-for-leave-file-amici-curiae-130715/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-04-motion-for-leave-file-amici-curiae-130715/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6e8228e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-04-motion-for-leave-file-amici-curiae-130715/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Motion of The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, ABC, Inc., The Associated Press, Bloomberg, L.P., Dow Jones & Company, Inc., Gannett Co., Inc., Los Angeles Times, The McClatchy Company, National Public Radio, Inc., The New York Times Company, The New Yorker, The Newsweek/Daily Beast Company LLC, Reuters America LLC, Tribune Company, and The Washington Post for Leave to File Brief as Amici Curiae in Support of the Motion for the Release of Court Records and the Motions for Declaratory Judgment,...",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-07-15",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-07-15",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34439",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "1686bd4ef47976bfdfbaf05735e04fac9de413e71670b73e5650922619d77f6a",
+ "pages": 4
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-US-response-order-motion-stay-lapsed-appropriations-131004/FISC_-_misc-13-02-US-response-order-motion-stay-lapsed-appropriations-131004.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-US-response-order-motion-stay-lapsed-appropriations-131004/FISC_-_misc-13-02-US-response-order-motion-stay-lapsed-appropriations-131004.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..597247b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-US-response-order-motion-stay-lapsed-appropriations-131004/FISC_-_misc-13-02-US-response-order-motion-stay-lapsed-appropriations-131004.md
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+UNITED STATES
+2013 OCT -4 PM 5:03
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE ORDERS ISSUED BY THIS COURT
+INTERPRETING SECTION 215 OF THE
+PATRIOT ACT
+
+Docket No.: Misc. 13-02
+
+SUBMISSION OF THE UNITED STATES IN RESPONSE TO THE
+COURT'S SEPTEMBER 13, 2013 OPINION AND ORDER AND MOTION FOR
+STAY OF FURTHER PROCEEDINGS DUE TO LAPSED APPROPRIATIONS
+
+In its September 13, 2013 Opinion and Order, the Court directed the United States to
+identify those opinions of this Court that evaluate the meaning, scope, and constitutionality of
+Section 215 of the Patriot Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1861, that are at issue in ongoing Freedom of
+Information Act ("FOIA") litigation in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
+York. Opinion and Order, at 1, 18. The Court also directed the United States to identify any
+such opinions that are not at issue in the FOIA litigation or already subject to the Court's
+publication process pursuant to Rule 62(a) of the Court's Rules of Procedure, and to propose a
+timetable to complete declassification review of any such opinions. Opinion and Order, at 18.
+
+After a review of this Court's opinions and orders, the Government has determined that
+eight of these documents contain analysis by the Court evaluating the meaning, scope, and/or
+constitutionality of Section 215. Six of these documents are currently at issue in the FOIA
+litigation in the Southern District of New York. They are:
+
+(1) the Court's February 24, 2006 Opinion, PR-BR 06-24 and PR-BR 06-26;¹
+(2) the Court's August 20, 2008 Supplemental Opinion, BR 08-07;
+(3) the Court's December 12, 2008 Supplemental Opinion, BR 08-13;
+(4) the Court's March 2, 2009 Order, BR 08-13;
+(5) the Court's November 5, 2009 Supplemental Opinion and Order, BR 09-15; and
+(6) the Court's November 23, 2010 Supplemental Order, BR 10-82.
+
+One additional Section 215 opinion of the Court (dated August 29, 2013) was, at the time
+of this Court's Opinion and Order of September 13, 2013, subject to the Rule 62(a) process, and
+it was publicly released by the Court (with redactions) on September 17, 2013. See BR 13-109.
+
+There is one remaining document that contains analysis by this Court evaluating the
+meaning, scope, and/or constitutionality of Section 215: this Court's Opinion of February 19,
+2013 in case BR 13-25. Because of the current lapse of appropriations authority, the
+Government cannot presently estimate the date by which it will be able to complete a
+declassification review of this opinion. The Government anticipates, however, that it will
+complete its review within approximately 21 days of the resumption of appropriations at the
+relevant agencies.
+
+In light of the aforementioned lapse in appropriations, the Government respectfully
+requests that the Court stay any further proceedings in this case until after appropriations are
+restored. In support of its motion for a stay, the Government states the following:
+
+1. At the end of the day on September 30, 2013, the appropriations act that had been
+funding the Department of Justice expired and annual appropriations to the Department of
+
+¹ Although the February 24, 2006 Opinion is not within the timeframe of the American Civil
+Liberties Union's ("ACLU") FOIA request, the Government has previously notified the ACLU
+that it is reviewing and processing this Opinion as part of that litigation and that the ACLU will
+be provided with copies of any non-exempt portions.
+
+2
+
+Justice lapsed. The Department of Justice does not know when funding will be restored by
+Congress.
+
+2. Absent an appropriation, Department of Justice attorneys and employees are
+prohibited from working, even on a voluntary basis, except in very limited circumstances,
+including "emergencies involving the safety of human life or the protection of property,"
+31 U.S.C. § 1342.
+
+3. There are no pending deadlines in this matter. The Government intends to notify
+the Court once appropriation authority has been restored.
+
+October 4, 2013
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+
+J. BRADFORD WIEGMANN
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+TASHINA GAUHAR
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+/s/ Jeffrey M. Smith
+JEFFREY M. SMITH
+NICHOLAS J. PATTERSON
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+Phone: (202) 514-5600
+Fax: (202) 514-8053
+
+Attorneys for the United States of America
+
+3
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I hereby certify that a true copy of the Submission of the United States in Response to the
+Court's September 13, 2013 Opinion and Order and Motion for Stay of Further Proceedings Due
+to Lapsed Appropriations was served by the Government via Federal Express overnight delivery
+addressed to:
+
+Alex Abdo
+Brett Max Kaufman
+Patrick Toomey
+Jameel Jaffer
+American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
+125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
+New York, NY 10004
+aabdo@aclu.org
+
+/s/ Nicholas J. Patterson
+Nicholas J. Patterson
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-US-response-order-motion-stay-lapsed-appropriations-131004/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-US-response-order-motion-stay-lapsed-appropriations-131004/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..29f4e4f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-US-response-order-motion-stay-lapsed-appropriations-131004/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Submission of the United States in Response to the Court's September 13, 2013 Opinion and Order and Motion for Stay of Further Proceedings Due to Lapsed Appropriations, In re Orders of this Court Interpreting Section 215 of the Patriot Act",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-10-04",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-10-04",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34443",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "b2ebfb77eba8b33de682d61249c36ff3c79489062e67b33c2137763df3f7f187",
+ "pages": 4
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-brief-131127/FISC_-_misc-13-02-brief-131127.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-brief-131127/FISC_-_misc-13-02-brief-131127.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0463493
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-brief-131127/FISC_-_misc-13-02-brief-131127.md
@@ -0,0 +1,875 @@
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+2013 NOV 26 PM 3:58
+CLEON FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+IN RE OPINIONS & ORDERS OF THIS COURT
+ADDRESSING BULK COLLECTION OF DATA
+UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-02
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR THE RELEASE OF
+COURT RECORDS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-08
+
+IN RE MOTION OF PROPUBLICA, INC. FOR
+THE RELEASE OF COURT RECORDS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-09
+
+BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE THE REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF
+THE PRESS AND 25 MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS, IN SUPPORT OF THE NOVEMBER
+6, 2013 MOTION BY THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, ET AL., FOR THE
+RELEASE OF COURT RECORDS; THE OCTOBER 11, 2013 MOTION BY THE
+MEDIA FREEDOM AND INFORMATION ACCESS CLINIC FOR
+RECONSIDERATION OF THIS COURT'S SEPTEMBER 13, 2013 OPINION ON THE
+ISSUE OF ARTICLE III STANDING; AND THE NOVEMBER 12, 2013 MOTION OF
+PROPUBLICA, INC. FOR RELEASE OF COURT RECORDS
+
+November 26, 2013
+
+Bruce D. Brown
+The Reporters Committee for
+Freedom of the Press
+1101 Wilson Blvd., Suite 1100
+Arlington, VA 22209
+Counsel for Amici Curiae
+
+ii
+TABLE OF CONTENTS
+
+TABLE OF CONTENTS...................................................................................................... ii
+TABLE OF AUTHORITIES...............................................................................................iii
+IDENTITY OF AMICI CURIAE......................................................................................... 1
+SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT.................................................................................... 2
+ARGUMENT...................................................................................................................... 3
+I. The right of access to court proceedings and documents belongs to the general public
+and can be vindicated by any member of the public............................................... 3
+A. All members of the public share an equal right of access to the courts................ 4
+B. The standard applied by this Court undermines the right of even the news media
+to seek access to court records and proceedings............................................. 6
+C. The changing dynamics of the news industry have increased the importance of
+a broad public right to challenge court closure............................................... 7
+II. The documents sought in these cases are critically important to improving public
+understanding of this Court and the federal government's national security
+operations............................................................................................................. 10
+A. These opinions are needed to promote robust debate about important public
+issues and to instill faith in the judicial system........................................... 10
+B. Recent revelations about programs that this Court has sanctioned underscore
+the need for information about its decision-making process....................... 12
+CONCLUSION................................................................................................................. 14
+APPENDIX A.................................................................................................................. A-1
+APPENDIX B.................................................................................................................. A-3
+
+iii
+TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
+
+Cases
+Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973)................................................................... 5
+Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979)............................................. 3, 5, 11
+In re Access to Jury Questionnaires, 37 A.3d 879 (D.C. 2012)........................................ 5
+In Re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from
+Verizon Bus. Network Servs., Inc., on Behalf of MCI Commc'n Servs., Inc. d/b/a/ Verizon
+Bus. Servs., No. BR 13-80 (FISC Apr. 25, 2013), available at http://bit.ly/11FY393........... 13
+New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)......................................................... 8
+New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).................................................. 8
+Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978)..................................... 3, 4, 7
+Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974)........................................................................ 6, 7
+Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, Riverside (“Press-Enterprise I"),
+464 U.S. 501 (1984).......................................................................................... 3, 5, 8, 11
+Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, Riverside (“Press-Enterprise II”),
+478 U.S. 1 (1986).................................................................................................... 3
+Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980)..................................... passim
+
+Other Authorities
+Charlie Savage & Scott Shane, Secret Court Rebuked N.S.A. on Surveillance, N.Y. Times,
+Aug. 21, 2013, available at http://nyti.ms/15aSPIr.................................................... 12
+Growth in Foundation Support for Media in the United States, Knight Foundation (Nov. 2013),
+available at http://bit.ly/1a0zL22.............................................................................. 9
+Jamie Schuman, The Shadows of the Spooks, The News Media and the Law, Fall 2013....... 11
+Joseph Menn, Secret U.S. Court Approved Wider NSA Spying Even After Finding Excesses,
+Reuters, Nov. 19, 2013, available at http://reut.rs/I1AmGn......................................... 12
+Kimberly Dozier & Stephen Braun, NSA Reveals More Secrets After Court Order, Associated
+Press, Aug. 22, 2013, available at http://bit.ly/14llee7................................................ 12
+Leonard Downie Jr., The Obama Administration and the Press: Leak Investigations and
+Surveillance in Post-9/11 America, Comm. to Protect Journalists, Oct. 10, 2013, available
+at http://bit.ly/1c3Cnfg........................................................................................... 11
+Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The Fourth Estate and the Constitution (1992).................................. 6
+
+iv
+Media, Freedom and Information Access Clinic, http://www.law.yale.edu/academics/MFIA.htm
+(last visited Nov. 22, 2013)......................................................................................... 8
+Memorandum Opinion by Judge John Bates, pp. 21-22, available at http://1.usa.gov/1gZwy7b 12
+Misc. 13-02 (Opinion and Order of Sept. 13, 2013.................................................... 3, 6
+Misc. 13-09 (Motion of Nov. 12, 2013)......................................................................... 3
+Nicolas Cornell, Note, Overbreadth and Listeners' Rights, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1749 (2010)........ 5
+RonNell Andersen Jones, Litigation, Legislation and Democracy in a Post-Newspaper America,
+68 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 557 (2011)................................................................... 6, 8, 9, 10
+
+1
+IDENTITY OF AMICI CURIAE
+
+Amici, who are described more fully in Appendix B, are The Reporters Committee for
+Freedom of the Press, American Society of News Editors, Atlantic Media, Inc., Bay Area News
+Group, Belo Corp., Bloomberg L.P., Courthouse News Service, The E.W. Scripps Company,
+First Amendment Coalition, Gannett Co., Inc., Hearst Corporation, Investigative Reporters and
+Editors, Investigative Reporting Workshop at American University, The McClatchy Company,
+Media Consortium, The National Press Club, National Press Photographers Association,
+National Public Radio, Inc., The New York Times Company, The New Yorker, North Jersey
+Media Group Inc., Online News Association, POLITICO LLC, Radio Television Digital News
+Association, The Seattle Times Company, and The Washington Post.
+
+2
+SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
+
+Public access to court proceedings is the linchpin of public acceptance of the legitimacy
+and credibility of judicial institutions. This right has long been understood as one held by the
+public at large under the First Amendment and at common law, with the news media often acting
+as a proxy - but never a substitute – for the general public. This Court's decision on September
+13, 2013 to exclude the Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic at Yale Law School
+(MFIAC) from that right by concluding that the group lacked standing, and to adopt a narrow
+test under which it found that the ACLU had standing, interferes with the most basic
+constitutional commandments and common-law traditions underlying the laws of access to
+courts, and is particularly problematic in a court already so closed off from public view.
+
+Amici, as news media organizations, often represent the public interest before courts in
+pressing for access and also by educating the public about how the judicial system operates. The
+MFIAC performs the same service. The public and the press have always been understood to
+have equal access to court records and court proceedings, much as both the public and the media
+are understood to have co-extensive First Amendment rights generally. The fact that, in practice,
+it is often traditional news media outlets litigating for access or records does not mean that public
+interest organizations lack standing to vindicate the public's access rights as well. That MFIAC
+sought access to court records and was denied them constitutes an injury-in-fact under the
+Richmond Newspapers line of cases. There is no question of the cause of the injury, nor is there
+any doubt that this Court has the power to redress that injury.
+
+Furthermore, the public has an important interest in learning the justification behind the
+decision to allow the NSA to conduct its surveillance programs. The recently declassified
+disclosures about how some of those decisions have been made support the idea that the public
+needs to know more about how the FISA Court has set this important precedent.
+
+3
+ARGUMENT
+
+I. The right of access to court proceedings and documents belongs to the general
+public and can be vindicated by any member of the public.
+
+The effort to have this Court release the precedential opinions that underlie the National
+Security Agency's surveillance programs is still active, as this Court has ordered the government
+to conduct a declassification review after finding that the ACLU had standing to pursue a claim
+for public access to the decisions. Misc. 13-02 (Opinion and Order of Sept. 13, 2013. However,
+some of the focus has now turned to the issue of what parties must show to have standing to
+prosecute that right of access. The ACLU and its Nation's Capital chapter were only allowed to
+proceed because they could demonstrate that lack of access “impedes their own activities in a
+concrete, particular way,” id. at 5, while the MFIAC was denied standing in the same order, id. at
+9. In addition, ProPublica has joined this cause and stressed that it has standing as a member of
+the media. Misc. 13-09 (Motion of Nov. 12, 2013).
+
+While the news media have a long tradition of fighting for public access to court
+proceedings and records, it is important for this Court to recognize that this right is possessed by
+the public at large, and the interests at stake can be vindicated by anyone. In fact, the key
+Supreme Court access cases Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978),
+Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,
+448 U.S. 555 (1980), Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, Riverside (“Press-
+Enterprise I"), 464 U.S. 501 (1984), and Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California,
+Riverside (“Press-Enterprise II”), 478 U.S. 1 (1986) – do not examine the question of standing to
+bring an action for access. These cases establish a presumption of a right of access based on the
+
+4
+important public interests at stake and do not even pause to consider whether the parties have
+demonstrated any particular harm. Instead, the public interest in access, by itself, is enough.
+
+A. All members of the public share an equal right of access to the courts.
+
+Although it is news organizations that have traditionally brought suit to obtain access to
+records and proceedings, courts have firmly based this right of access in a right of the general
+public to know how its courts operate. Moreover, courts have found that all members of the
+public equally share the right to enforce these long-established understandings.
+
+Nixon v. Warner Communications, the seminal Supreme Court case recognizing the
+common-law right of access to judicial documents, noted a presumptive right of access based on
+nothing more than a citizen's desire to hold the government accountable:
+
+It is clear that the courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy
+public records and documents, including judicial records and documents. In contrast to
+the English practice, American decisions generally do not condition enforcement of this
+right on a proprietary interest in the document or upon a need for it as evidence in a
+lawsuit. The interest necessary to support the issuance of a writ compelling access has
+been found, for example, in the citizen's desire to keep a watchful eye on the workings of
+public agencies, and in a newspaper publisher's intention to publish information
+concerning the operation of government.
+
+Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598 (citations and footnotes omitted). At issue in Nixon was access to
+presidential tapes during a trial of Watergate conspirators. The Court did not presume that
+Warner Communications had standing only because it had thrust itself into coverage of the
+Watergate investigation; the Court clearly would have entertained an action for access by any
+citizen with a "watchful eye." Id.
+
+In Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. at 564-75, applying the First Amendment,
+the Court examined at great length the history of openness in trials and its importance to the
+public. As the Court concluded,
+
+5
+People in an open society do not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is
+difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from observing. When a criminal
+trial is conducted in the open, there is at least an opportunity both for understanding the
+system in general and its workings in a particular case.
+
+Id. at 572. These substantial public interests were not based on anything other than the
+generalized interest in having an open justice system, and standing to intervene was not
+addressed. Id. See also In re Access to Jury Questionnaires, 37 A.3d 879, 885 (D.C. 2012)
+("The right of public access is 'a right that any member of the public can assert[.]") (citation
+omitted). When media organizations have sued for access, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
+framed the right of access as a right of the public generally, not a right unique to the press. See
+Gannett, 443 U.S. at 370 (framing issue as whether “members of the public" can attend pre-trial
+proceedings); Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 508 (finding that "everyone in the community" can
+attend voir dire). As access is a public right, any member of the public who has been excluded
+from a courtroom can intervene.
+
+Although the Supreme Court has not demanded a showing of standing before allowing an
+access action, it is nonetheless clear that denial of information at the heart of democratic process
+would suffice as a harm that establishes standing. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,
+611-12 (1973) (explaining that because the First Amendment requires "breathing space,"
+standing rules are relaxed in constitutional challenges of state action and litigants can sue for
+violations of others' rights). See also Nicolas Cornell, Note, Overbreadth and Listeners' Rights,
+123 Harv. L. Rev. 1749 (2010) ("Insofar as the First Amendment protects a general right of the
+citizenry to open and undistorted discourse, such a right is an appropriate basis for standing.").
+
+To contextualize this presumption of openness, the Supreme Court has explained that a
+public right of access dates back to England and colonial America. See Richmond Newspapers,
+448 U.S. at 564 ("[T]hroughout its evolution, the trial has been open to all who care to
+
+6
+observe."). New Jersey's colonial charter, for instance, allowed "any person or persons" to
+"freely come" to civil or criminal trials. Id. at 567 (citation omitted). Consequently, the
+holdings of Richmond Newspapers and other access cases are not about "media-specific rights."
+RonNell Andersen Jones, Litigation, Legislation and Democracy in a Post-Newspaper America,
+68 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 557, 627 (2011). Instead, the cases are a "bold statement on the needs
+of 'people in an open society' and the value of public observation in government proceedings."
+Id. Indeed, in oral argument in Richmond Newspapers, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger asked the
+news outlet's attorney whether there is a difference between "a person who wants to attend [a
+trial] to write something or just make a speech about it." Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The Fourth Estate
+and the Constitution 244 (1992). The lawyer, Lawrence Tribe, replied "None, nor if he just
+wanted to inform himself as a citizen." Id. (emphasis added).
+
+Cases outside of the court-access area also show that the press and public's rights of
+access are generally co-extensive in other ways. When news outlets have challenged statutes
+that prohibit the general public from interviewing prison inmates, courts have declined to find
+that journalists have special access rights under the Constitution. Instead, they have said that
+reporters have no First Amendment newsgathering rights "not available to the public generally."
+Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974). Such a determination reiterates that members of the
+public and reporters share the same rights to watch a trial or read judicial opinions; neither's
+interest is greater than the other, but both are sufficient to advance an action for public access.
+
+B. The standard applied by this Court undermines the right of even the news
+media to seek access to court records and proceedings.
+
+This Court ignored Supreme Court precedent when it denied MFIAC standing because it
+found that the clinic had not "participated in public debate about Section 215." Misc. 13-02
+(Opinion and Order of Sept. 13, 2013) at 9 n.13. The Richmond Newspapers line of cases and
+
+7
+Broadrick show that because access to court information is a public right, anyone who wants
+access has standing to pursue it. Requiring groups to show that access would be of "concrete,
+particular assistance to them in their own activities," as this Court held, would be akin to
+requiring an individual who is barred from the courtroom to prove that his past actions show that
+he has a specific stake in attending a hearing. Id. at 5. But, as Richmond Newspapers explains,
+"what transpires in the courtroom is public property." 448 U.S. at 593 (citation omitted).
+Potential harm to the public debate and erosion in confidence to the judicial system is an injury
+that everyone shares when access rights are denied.
+
+Moreover, this Court's standard would directly threaten the traditional ability of the news
+media to fight for access. While it seems that a news organization that intends to report on a
+public controversy would be able to satisfy this standard, a court could use it to deny standing to
+a media party that could not show a prior track record of covering a particular issue. Such a rule,
+however, ignores the constitutionally compelled mandate of Richmond Newspapers: that access
+is a right that everyone has and that an abridgement of that right harms the public's right to hold
+its government accountable.
+
+C. The changing dynamics of the news industry have increased the importance
+of a broad public right to challenge court closure.
+
+Although the access right to court records and proceedings is one that all people hold,
+courts have recognized that reporters serve as "surrogates" for members of the public who are
+unable to attend hearings or obtain documents themselves. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at
+573; see also Nixon, 435 U.S. at 609 ("[T]he press serves as the information-gathering agent of
+the public."). As such, although it is not constitutionally required, journalists sometimes receive
+special seating and priority of entry to courtrooms so that they can fulfill their role of informing
+the public. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 573; see also Pell, 417 U.S. at 830-31
+
+8
+(acknowledging that reporters, by virtue of their profession, receive permission to observe prison
+programs and interview participants).
+
+Given that journalists help ensure public access by serving as the "information-gathering
+agent" of people who cannot go to courtrooms themselves, it is especially important that this
+Court recognize the interests of new groups, like MFIAC, that are forming to take on these same
+responsibilities for the benefit of the public. MFIAC's mission is "to support a robust
+investigative role for news organizations and to preserve the public's right of access to
+information, thereby ensuring a well-informed public sphere." Media, Freedom and Information
+Access Clinic, http://www.law.yale.edu/academics/MFIA.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2013).
+
+Although the media and the public generally have co-extensive First Amendment rights
+and equal rights of access to court records, the news media have often played a special role in the
+judicial system. Traditional news media have historically led the effort to increase public access
+to the courts. See Jones, supra, at 559. These companies have spent the past century advocating
+on behalf of the public in all areas of First Amendment law, thereby reducing the need for
+members of the public to take up the fight themselves. Among the major constitutional victories
+the media have won for the public are the right to publish without prior restraint (New York
+Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), protection from defamation lawsuits for good-faith
+mistakes (New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), access to the voir dire portion of a
+trial (Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., Riverside, 464 U.S. 501 (1984), and the right
+of access to criminal trials (Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980)). See
+Jones, supra, at 573-575. As Jones explains, “In this role, these entities claim credit for the
+establishment and implementation of some of the nation's most important statutory and
+constitutional mandates. Their death threatens the preservation, enforcement, and further
+
+9
+development of these mandates." Id. at 559. While amici feel that news of their "death" has
+been greatly exaggerated, shrinking budgets at large media companies have inevitably meant a
+drop-off in First Amendment litigation from those outlets. When the news organizations that
+have historically had the financial resources to vindicate the right of access are less able to
+pursue every access case, it becomes critical that lower courts follow the concept so clearly
+established in Nixon and Richmond Newspapers – that court access is truly a public right that
+may be defended by anyone to whom it is denied.
+
+More and more often now, those defenders are organizations like MFIAC. Private
+foundations are increasingly funding the pursuit of access litigation. See Growth in Foundation
+Support for Media in the United States, Knight Foundation, 4 (Nov. 2013), available at
+http://bit.ly/1a0zL22. Between 2009 and 2011, media access and access policy efforts received
+$134.7 million from private foundations. Id. at 12-13. This figure demonstrates that outside
+groups that traditionally have not been involved in access debates are becoming participants in
+this crucial area of First Amendment jurisprudence. New entrants should not be excluded, as
+MFIAC was, for attempting to join this critical field. Additionally, the primacy foundations have
+put recently on open government and access efforts highlights the vital role MFIAC and other
+clinical and public interest programs play in public discourse and in vindicating and protecting
+the public's constitutional rights. As these types of organizations assume a greater role in
+helping represent the public's interests, it is essential that this Court and others recognize the
+importance of these actors in the constitutional debate.
+
+While the litigation leadership from the traditional news media that this country has seen
+over the past century will surely continue, university programs like MFIAC are particularly well-
+positioned to represent the public interest in access cases they choose to pursue. A need for a
+
+10
+proxy representative of the general public in First Amendment cases undoubtedly remains.
+"Given the complexity, expense, and time involved in making even simple requests, [newsroom
+lawyers] are skeptical that members of the public will be able or willing to take up the effort
+alone." Jones, supra, at 597. Just as an individual member of the public who is turned away
+from the courthouse can seek redress for that harm, an individual public interest group that is
+litigating to increase public knowledge and understanding of the court system has standing to
+protest its own exclusion. Law school clinics, like MFIAC, are serving the public interest in new
+and creative ways for the benefit of all of our legal and judicial institutions. Id. at 628. This
+Court must recognize the role such groups are playing in representing the public, much in the
+way the judiciary has always trusted the traditional media to do.
+
+II. The documents sought in these cases are critically important to improving public
+understanding of this Court and the federal government's national security
+operations.
+
+The scope, legality, and administration of NSA surveillance programs – including bulk
+call tracking and collection of internet metadata and cell-site location information – have
+generated great public controversy in recent months. While many of the amici here have already
+weighed in on the issue of the important public interest at stake in access to the precedential
+opinions of this Court, see Brief of Amicus Curiae of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of
+the Press et al., filed July 15, 2013, further disclosures in recent months about these decisions
+amplify the need for access and merits attention here.
+
+A. These opinions are needed to promote robust debate about important public
+issues and to instill faith in the judicial system.
+
+Chief among the justifications for the presumption of court openness is that “uninhibited,
+robust, and wide-open debate" about public issues strengthens democracy by giving voters better
+understanding about government programs put in place by their elected officials. Richmond
+
+11
+Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citation omitted). For amici, opinions on
+the legal basis of NSA programs are especially important because uncertainty about the scope of
+surveillance efforts has deterred confidential sources from speaking with reporters. Discussing
+the NSA surveillance programs, New York Times investigative reporter and three-time Pulitzer
+Prize winner David Barstow said, “I have absolutely no doubt whatsoever that stories have not
+gotten done because of this." Jamie Schuman, The Shadows of the Spooks, The News Media and
+the Law, Fall 2013, at 9; see also Leonard Downie Jr., The Obama Administration and the Press:
+Leak Investigations and Surveillance in Post-9/11 America, Comm. to Protect Journalists, Oct.
+10, 2013, available at http://bit.ly/1c3Cnfg. Major works of journalism, from stories about the
+Watergate break-in to pieces on harsh CIA investigation tactics, have relied on confidential
+interviews. When potential sources refuse to speak to reporters out of fear of surveillance,
+quality reporting is diminished and the public is less informed.
+
+Another benefit of court openness is that secrecy weakens the credibility of the justice
+system and government affairs in general. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 508. In Gannett Co.,
+Inc. v. DePasquale, the Supreme Court explained, “Public confidence cannot long be maintained
+where important judicial decisions are made behind closed doors and then announced in
+conclusive terms to the public, with the record supporting the court's decision sealed from public
+view." 443 U.S. at 429 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting United
+States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 851 (3rd Cir. 1978)).
+
+In addition to closing its proceedings and sealing its records, the FISA Court has only one
+side - the government – arguing before it. Disclosing precedential opinions would be a major
+step towards fostering trust in the Court and public understanding of surveillance programs.
+
+12
+These changes would especially benefit journalists, whose work requires the willingness of
+sources to speak with them.
+
+B. Recent revelations about programs that this Court has sanctioned
+underscore the need for information about its decision-making process.
+
+The need for openness is especially important in light of the recent revelations about the
+programs this Court has sanctioned and the government's expansion of surveillance beyond what
+this Court has indicated it intended. In the past six months, Americans have learned that this
+Court approved the collection of the "to" and "from" fields in e-mail messages, as well as the
+date and time the messages were sent. Joseph Menn, Secret U.S. Court Approved Wider NSA
+Spying Even After Finding Excesses, Reuters, Nov. 19, 2013, available at http://reut.rs/I1AmGn.
+It has also become public that this Court criticized the government for exceeding the surveillance
+authority this Court had granted it in earlier cases. In an opinion released just this month, Judge
+John Bates referred to systematic overcollection and concluded that:
+
+given the duration of this problem, the oversight measures ostensibly taken since
+[REDACTED] to detect overcollection, and the extraordinary fact that NSA's end-to-
+end review overlooked unauthorized acquisitions that were documented in
+virtually every record of what was acquired, it must be added that those
+responsible for conducting oversight at NSA failed to do so effectively.
+
+Memorandum Opinion by Judge John Bates, pp. 21-22, available at http://1.usa.gov/1gZwy7b;
+see also Menn, supra; Kimberly Dozier & Stephen Braun, NSA Reveals More Secrets After
+Court Order, Associated Press, Aug. 22, 2013, available at http://bit.ly/141Iee7; Charlie Savage
+& Scott Shane, Secret Court Rebuked N.S.A. on Surveillance, N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 2013,
+available at http://nyti.ms/15aSPIr. Judge Bates' concerns over NSA's overreaching emphasizes
+why it is so important that Americans, through organizations like MFIAC, have access to this
+Court's decisions.
+
+13
+By way of further example of the impact this Court has on everyday citizens, the recently
+declassified opinion from this Court requiring Verizon to turn over phone records of every call
+placed on its network involving a U.S. phone was styled as a warrant request but actually served
+as precedent allowing for the massive and indiscriminate collection of Americans'
+communications data. See In Re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Production
+of Tangible Things from Verizon Bus. Network Servs., Inc., on Behalf of MCI Commc'n Servs.,
+Inc. d/b/a/ Verizon Bus. Servs., No. BR 13-80 (FISC Apr. 25, 2013), available at
+http://bit.ly/11FY393. Unlike a traditional warrant application and grant, which is typically
+withheld from public view until after the warrant is executed because it names the targeted
+individual and the information sought, the Verizon decision did not name a particular suspect nor
+did it point to any particular investigation. Weighing the serious constitutional concerns at issue
+against the government's desire for secrecy, the balance should have favored earlier disclosure of
+this Court's ruling. The history of the Verizon order demonstrates the need to continually release
+the types of decisions MFIAC, the ACLU, and ProPublica seek here.
+
+14
+CONCLUSION
+
+For the reasons stated above, this Court should grant the ACLU and MFIAC's November
+6, 2013 motion for the release of court records; the MFIAC's October 11, 2013 motion for
+reconsideration; and ProPublica's November 12, 2013 motion for release of court records.
+
+***
+Pursuant to this Court's order, dated July 18, 2013, and United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court R.P. 7(h)(1) and 63, the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
+Press respectfully submits the following information:
+
+Bruce D. Brown is a member in good standing of the United States District Court for the
+District of Columbia (#457317), admitted September 12, 2011. Additionally, Brown is a
+member of good standing of the bar of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (#629541) and the
+District of Columbia (#426092). Amici further certify that the undersigned does not currently
+hold a security clearance.
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+Bruce D. Brown
+The Reporters Committee for
+Freedom of the Press
+1101 Wilson Blvd., Suite 1100
+Arlington, VA 22209
+Phone: 703-807-2100
+Fax: 703-807-2109
+bbrown@rcfp.org
+Counsel for Amici Curiae
+
+\*Additional amici counsel listed below
+
+A-1
+APPENDIX A
+
+Of counsel to amici curiae:
+
+Gregg P. Leslie
+Emily R. Grannis
+Jamie T. Schuman (Admission pending, Pa.)
+The Reporters Committee for
+Freedom of the Press
+1101 Wilson Blvd., Suite 1100
+Arlington, VA 22209
+
+Kevin M. Goldberg
+Fletcher, Heald & Hildreth, PLC
+1300 N. 17th St., 11th Floor
+Arlington, VA 22209
+Counsel for American Society of
+News Editors
+
+Bruce L. Gottlieb
+Aretae Wyler
+Atlantic Media, Inc.
+600 New Hampshire Ave., NW
+Washington, DC 20037
+
+Marshall Anstandig
+Senior VP/General Counsel
+Andrew Huntington
+General Counsel/Director of Labor
+Relations
+Bay Area News Group
+750 Ridder Park Drive
+San Jose, CA 95190
+
+James Chadwick
+Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP
+390 Lytton Avenue
+Palo Alto, CA 94301
+Additional Counsel for Bay Area News
+Group
+
+Russell F. Coleman
+Belo Corp.
+400 S. Record Street
+Dallas, TX 75202
+
+Randy L. Shapiro
+Global Media Counsel
+Bloomberg LP
+731 Lexington Avenue
+New York, NY 10022
+
+Rachel Matteo-Boehm
+Bryan Cave LLP
+560 Mission Street, Suite 2500
+San Francisco, CA 94105
+Counsel for Courthouse News Service
+
+David M. Giles
+Vice President/Deputy General Counsel
+The E.W. Scripps Company
+312 Walnut St., Suite 2800
+Cincinnati, OH 45202
+
+Peter Scheer
+First Amendment Coalition
+534 Fourth St., Suite B
+San Rafael, CA 94901
+
+Barbara W. Wall
+Vice President/Senior
+Associate General Counsel
+Gannett Co., Inc.
+7950 Jones Branch Drive
+McLean, VA 22107
+
+Jonathan Donnellan
+Kristina Findikyan
+Hearst Corporation
+Office of General Counsel
+300 W. 57th St., 40th Floor
+New York, NY 10019
+
+Karole Morgan-Prager
+Juan Cornejo
+The McClatchy Company
+2100 Q Street
+Sacramento, CA 95816
+
+A-2
+Charles D. Tobin
+Holland & Knight LLP
+800 17th Street, NW
+Suite 1100
+Washington, DC 20006
+Counsel for The National Press Club
+
+Mickey H. Osterreicher
+1100 M&T Center, 3 Fountain Plaza,
+Buffalo, NY 14203
+Counsel for National Press Photographers
+Association
+
+Denise Leary
+Ashley Messenger
+National Public Radio, Inc.
+1111 North Capitol St. NE
+Washington, D.C. 20002
+
+David McCraw
+V.P./Assistant General Counsel
+The New York Times Company
+620 Eighth Avenue
+New York, NY 10018
+
+Lynn Oberlander
+General Counsel
+The New Yorker
+4 Times Square
+New York, NY 10036
+
+Jennifer A. Borg
+General Counsel
+North Jersey Media Group Inc.
+1 Garret Mountain Plaza
+Woodland Park, NJ 07424
+
+Jonathan D. Hart
+Dow Lohnes PLLC
+1200 New Hampshire Ave., NW
+Washington, DC 20036
+Counsel for Online News Association
+
+Jerald N. Fritz
+Vice President and General Counsel
+POLITICO LLC
+1000 Wilson Blvd., Suite 2700
+Arlington, VA 22209
+
+Kathleen A. Kirby
+Wiley Rein LLP
+1776 K St., NW
+Washington, DC 20006
+Counsel for Radio Television Digital News
+Association
+
+Bruce E. H. Johnson
+Davis Wright Tremaine LLP
+1201 Third Ave., Suite 2200
+Seattle, WA 98101
+Counsel for The Seattle Times Co.
+
+John B. Kennedy
+James A. McLaughlin
+Kalea S. Clark
+The Washington Post
+1150 15th Street, N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20071
+
+A-3
+APPENDIX B
+
+The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press is a voluntary, unincorporated
+association of reporters and editors that works to defend the First Amendment rights and freedom
+of information interests of the news media. The Reporters Committee has provided
+representation, guidance and research in First Amendment and Freedom of Information Act
+litigation since 1970.
+
+With some 500 members, American Society of News Editors ("ASNE”) is an
+organization that includes directing editors of daily newspapers throughout the Americas. ASNE
+changed its name in April 2009 to American Society of News Editors and approved broadening
+its membership to editors of online news providers and academic leaders. Founded in 1922 as
+American Society of Newspaper Editors, ASNE is active in a number of areas of interest to top
+editors with priorities on improving freedom of information, diversity, readership and the
+credibility of newspapers.
+
+Atlantic Media, Inc. is a privately held, integrated media company that publishes The
+Atlantic, National Journal, Quartz and Government Executive. These award-winning titles
+address topics in national and international affairs, business, culture, technology and related
+areas, as well as cover political and public policy issues at federal, state and local levels. The
+Atlantic was founded in 1857 by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry
+Wadsworth Longfellow and others.
+
+Bay Area News Group is operated by MediaNews Group, one of the largest newspaper
+companies in the United States with newspapers throughout California and the nation. The Bay
+Area News Group includes The Oakland Tribune, The Daily Review, The Argus, San Jose
+Mercury News, Contra Costa Times, Marin Independent Journal, West County Times, Valley
+Times, East County Times, Tri-Valley Herald, Santa Cruz Sentinel, San Mateo County
+Times, Vallejo Times-Herald and Vacaville Reporter, all in California.
+
+Belo Corp. owns 20 television stations that reach more than 14% of U.S. television
+households.
+
+Bloomberg L.P., based in New York City, operates Bloomberg News, which is
+comprised of more than 1,500 professionals in 145 bureaus around the world. Bloomberg News
+publishes more than 6,000 news stories each day, and The Bloomberg Professional Service
+maintains an archive of more than 15 million stories and multimedia reports and a photo library
+comprised of more than 290,000 images. Bloomberg News also operates as a wire service,
+syndicating news and data to over 450 newspapers worldwide with a combined circulation of 80
+million people in more than 160 countries. Bloomberg News operates the following: cable and
+satellite television news channels broadcasting worldwide; WBBR, a 24-hour business news
+radio station that syndicates reports to more than 840 radio stations worldwide; Bloomberg
+Markets and Bloomberg Businessweek magazines; and Bloomberg.com, which receives 3.5
+million individual user visits each month.
+
+Courthouse News Service is a California-based legal news service for lawyers and the
+news media that focuses on court coverage throughout the nation, reporting on matters raised in
+trial courts and courts of appeal up to and including the U.S. Supreme Court.
+
+A-4
+The E.W. Scripps Company is a diverse, 131-year-old media enterprise with interests in
+television stations, newspapers, local news and information websites and licensing and
+syndication. The company's portfolio of locally focused media properties includes: 19 TV
+stations (ten ABC affiliates, three NBC affiliates, one independent and five Spanish-language
+stations); daily and community newspapers in 13 markets; and the Washington-based Scripps
+Media Center, home of the Scripps Howard News Service.
+
+First Amendment Coalition is a nonprofit public interest organization dedicated to
+defending free speech, free press and open government rights in order to make government, at all
+levels, more accountable to the people. The Coalition's mission assumes that government
+transparency and an informed electorate are essential to a self-governing democracy. To that end,
+we resist excessive government secrecy (while recognizing the need to protect legitimate state
+secrets) and censorship of all kinds.
+
+Gannett Co., Inc. is an international news and information company that publishes 82
+daily newspapers in the United States, including USA TODAY, as well as hundreds of non-daily
+publications. In broadcasting, the company operates 23 television stations in the U.S. with a
+market reach of more than 21 million households. Each of Gannett's daily newspapers and TV
+stations operates Internet sites offering news and advertising that is customized for the market
+served and integrated with its publishing or broadcasting operations.
+
+Hearst Corporation is one of the nation's largest diversified media companies. Its major
+interests include the following: ownership of 15 daily and 38 weekly newspapers, including
+the Houston Chronicle, San Francisco Chronicle and Albany (N.Y.) Times Union; nearly 300
+magazines around the world, includingGood Housekeeping, Cosmopolitan and O, The Oprah
+Magazine; 29 television stations, which reach a combined 18% of U.S. viewers; ownership in
+leading cable networks, including Lifetime, A&E and ESPN; business publishing, including a
+joint venture interest in Fitch Ratings; and Internet businesses, television production, newspaper
+features distribution and real estate.
+
+Investigative Reporters and Editors, Inc. is a grassroots nonprofit organization dedicated
+to improving the quality of investigative reporting. IRE was formed in 1975 to create a forum in
+which journalists throughout the world could help each other by sharing story ideas,
+newsgathering techniques and news sources.
+
+The Investigative Reporting Workshop, a project of the School of Communication (SOC)
+at American University, is a nonprofit, professional newsroom. The Workshop publishes in-
+depth stories at investigativereportingworkshop.org about government and corporate
+accountability, ranging widely from the environment and health to national security and the
+economy.
+
+The McClatchy Company, through its affiliates, is the third-largest newspaper publisher
+in the United States with 30 daily newspapers and related websites as well as numerous
+community newspapers and niche publications.
+
+A-5
+The Media Consortium is a network of the country's leading, progressive, independent
+media outlets. Our mission is to amplify independent media's voice, increase our collective
+clout, leverage our current audience and reach new ones.
+
+The National Press Club is the world's leading professional organization for journalists.
+Founded in 1908, the Club has 3,100 members representing most major news organizations. The
+Club defends a free press worldwide. Each year, the Club holds over 2,000 events, including
+news conferences, luncheons and panels, and more than 250,000 guests come through its doors.
+
+The National Press Photographers Association ("NPPA”) is a 501(c)(6) non-profit
+organization dedicated to the advancement of visual journalism in its creation, editing and
+distribution. NPPA's approximately 7,000 members include television and still photographers,
+editors, students and representatives of businesses that serve the visual journalism industry. Since
+its founding in 1946, the NPPA has vigorously promoted the constitutional rights of journalists
+as well as freedom of the press in all its forms, especially as it relates to visual journalism. The
+submission of this brief was duly authorized by Mickey H. Osterreicher, its General Counsel.
+
+National Public Radio, Inc. is an award-winning producer and distributor of
+noncommercial news programming. A privately supported, not-for-profit membership
+organization, NPR serves a growing audience of more than 26 million listeners each week by
+providing news programming to 285 member stations that are independently operated,
+noncommercial public radio stations. In addition, NPR provides original online content and
+audio streaming of its news programming. NPR.org offers hourly newscasts, special features and
+10 years of archived audio and information.
+
+The New York Times Company is the publisher of The New York Times, The Boston
+Globe, and International Herald Tribune and operates such leading news websites as
+nytimes.com and bostonglobe.com.
+
+The New Yorker is an award-winning magazine, published weekly in print, digital, and
+online. Its writers, including Jane Mayer, David Grann, and Raffi Khatchadourian, regularly use
+information gained from federal and state freedom of information laws to report on matters of
+state, national, and international importance.
+
+North Jersey Media Group Inc. (“NJMG”) is an independent, family-owned printing and
+publishing company, parent of two daily newspapers serving the residents of northern New
+Jersey: The Record (Bergen County), the state's second-largest newspaper, and the Herald
+News (Passaic County). NJMG also publishes more than 40 community newspapers serving
+towns across five counties and a family of glossy magazines, including (201) Magazine, Bergen
+County's premiere magazine. All of the newspapers contribute breaking news, features, columns
+and local information to NorthJersey.com. The company also owns and publishes Bergen.com
+showcasing the people, places and events of Bergen County.
+
+Online News Association ("ONA") is the world's largest association of online journalists.
+ONA's mission is to inspire innovation and excellence among journalists to better serve the
+public. ONA's more than 2,000 members include news writers, producers, designers, editors,
+bloggers, technologists, photographers, academics, students and others who produce news for the
+
+A-6
+Internet or other digital delivery systems. ONA hosts the annual Online News Association
+conference and administers the Online Journalism Awards. ONA is dedicated to advancing the
+interests of digital journalists and the public generally by encouraging editorial integrity and
+independence, journalistic excellence and freedom of expression and access.
+
+POLITICO LLC is a nonpartisan, Washington-based political journalism organization
+that produces a series of websites, video programming and a newspaper covering politics and
+public policy.
+
+Radio Television Digital News Association (“RTDNA”) is the world's largest and only
+professional organization devoted exclusively to electronic journalism. RTDNA is made up of
+news directors, news associates, educators and students in radio, television, cable and electronic
+media in more than 30 countries. RTDNA is committed to encouraging excellence in the
+electronic journalism industry and upholding First Amendment freedoms.
+
+The Seattle Times Company, locally owned since 1896, publishes the daily
+newspaper The Seattle Times, together with The Issaquah Press, Yakima Herald-Republic, Walla
+Walla Union-Bulletin, Sammamish Review and Newcastle-News, all in Washington state.
+
+WP Company LLC (d/b/a The Washington Post) publishes one of the nation's most
+prominent daily newspapers, as well as a website, www.washingtonpost.com, that is read by an
+average of more than 20 million unique visitors per month.
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I, Bruce D. Brown, certify that on November 26, 2013, a copy of this motion, together
+with the accompanying brief of amici curiae, were served on the following by in-person
+delivery.
+
+Christine Gunning
+Litigation Security Group
+U.S. Department of Justice
+2 Constitution Square
+145 N ST NE, Suite 2W-115
+Washington, DC 20530
+Christine.e.gunning@usdoj.gov
+
+I further certify that this motion and the accompanying brief were served on the following
+by electronic mail:
+
+Alex Abdo
+American Civil Liberties Union
+Foundation
+125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
+New York, NY 10004
+aabdo@aclu.org
+
+David A. Schulz
+Media Freedom and Information
+Access Clinic
+Yale Law School
+P.O. Box 208215
+New Haven, CT 06520
+dschulz@lskslaw.com
+
+Arthur B. Spitzer
+American Civil Liberties Union of
+the Nation's Capital
+4301 Connecticut Avenue, NW,
+Suite 434
+Washington, DC 20008
+artspitzer@aclu-nca.org
+
+David Greene
+Electronic Frontier Foundation
+815 Eddy Street
+San Francisco, CA 94109
+davidg@eff.org
+Counsel for ProPublica, Inc.
+
+Bruce D. Brown
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-brief-131127/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-brief-131127/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..07c974a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-brief-131127/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Motion of The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and 25 Media Organizations for Leave to File Brief as Amicus Curiae in Support of the November 6, 2013 Motion by the American Civil Liberties Union, et al., for the Release of Court Records; the October 11, 2013 Motion by the Media Freedom and Information Clinic for Reconsideration of this Court's September 13, 2013 Opinion on the Issue of Article III Standing; and the November 12, 2013 Motion of ProPublica, Inc. for Release of Court Records,...",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-11-26",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-26",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34447",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "dae94f390a1ad0c5fcc750dbb64891a579d580eff995cd71a34e6c4ee235f821",
+ "pages": 25
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-brief-of-amici-curiae/FISC_-_misc-13-02-brief-of-amici-curiae.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-brief-of-amici-curiae/FISC_-_misc-13-02-brief-of-amici-curiae.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ee5c0ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-brief-of-amici-curiae/FISC_-_misc-13-02-brief-of-amici-curiae.md
@@ -0,0 +1,529 @@
+UNITED STATES
+2013 JUN 28 PM 4:54
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURTEANG FULL
+WASHINGTON, DC
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+IN RE ORDERS ISSUED BY THIS COURT
+INTERPRETING SECTION 215 OF THE
+PATRIOT ACT
+Docket No. Misc. 13-02
+
+BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE U.S. REPRESENTATIVES AMASH, BROUN, GABBARD,
+GRIFFITH, HOLT, JONES, LEE, LOFGREN, MASSIE, MCCLINTOCK, NORTON,
+O'ROURKE, PEARCE, SALMON, SANFORD, AND YOHO IN SUPPORT OF THE
+MOTION OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE AMERICAN CIVIL
+LIBERTIES UNION OF THE NATION'S CAPITAL, AND THE MEDIA FREEDOM
+AND INFORMATION ACCESS CLINIC FOR THE RELEASE OF COURT RECORDS
+
+Gregory L. Diskant
+Benjamin S. Litman
+Richard I. Kim
+PATTERSON BELKNAP WEBB & TYLER LLP
+1133 Avenue of the Americas
+New York, NY 10036
+Phone: (212) 336-2000
+Fax: (212) 336-2222
+Counsel for Amici Curiae
+
+INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE¹
+U.S. Representatives Justin Amash, Paul Broun, Tulsi Gabbard, Morgan Griffith,
+Rush Holt, Walter Jones, Barbara Lee, Zoe Lofgren, Thomas Massie, Tom McClintock, Eleanor
+Holmes Norton, Beto O'Rourke, Steve Pearce, Matt Salmon, Mark Sanford, and Ted Yoho²
+respectfully submit this brief in support of the Motion of the American Civil Liberties Union, the
+American Civil Liberties Union of the Nation's Capital, and the Media Freedom and Information
+Access Clinic for the Release of Court Records (the "Motion"), which was filed with this Court
+on June 10, 2013. This brief is addressed to the same subject as the Motion: to urge the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC") to publish opinions-with classified information
+redacted-evaluating the meaning, scope, and constitutionality of Section 215 of the Patriot Act,
+50 U.S.C. § 1861. Amici curiae have worked extensively on issues surrounding government
+oversight and transparency. Rep. Amash has succinctly captured the interest of amici as follows:
+"We accept that free countries must engage in secret operations from time to time to protect their
+citizens. Free countries must not, however, operate under secret laws. Secret court opinions
+obscure the law. They prevent public debate on critical policy issues and they stop Congress
+from fulfilling its duty to enact sound laws and fix broken ones."
+
+The opinions sought in the Motion are essential to the proper functioning of the
+legislative branch of government and an informed public debate. They provide a critical gloss-
+namely, judicial interpretation and construction on the laws governing the nation's surveillance
+practices. Without access to this information, Congress and the public cannot have a meaningful
+debate about how these laws operate in practice. The need for informed discussion in Congress
+
+¹ This brief is filed with the consent of the parties. Amici curiae certify that this brief was not written in
+whole or in part by counsel for any party, and no person or entity other than amici curiae and its counsel
+has made a monetary contribution to the preparation and submission of this brief.
+² Brief biographies for each amicus appear in Appendix A to this brief.
+
+1
+
+regarding the implementation of surveillance laws is especially great now, as Congress is
+evaluating ways to ensure government operations are more effective, to streamline the
+government's budget, and to protect Americans' civil liberties in an age of rapid technological
+expansion. As Congress considers whether to reauthorize one of the government's principal
+surveillance tools-Section 215 of the Patriot Act-in two years, it is crucial for Congress to
+fully understand how the law is being utilized and where it can be clarified or improved.
+Moreover, the importance of meaningful debate on this issue has grown as the American people
+have become increasingly suspicious of their government's surveillance activities. To enable an
+open dialogue on these issues between and within Congress and the public, amici curiae urge
+this Court to disclose the secret opinions sought in the Motion.
+
+STATEMENT OF FACTS
+Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-
+1885c, the proceedings of the FISC and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review
+("FISA Review Court") are generally secret. FISA mandates that the "record of proceedings" of
+the Courts, including "applications made and orders granted," is subject to "security measures
+established by the Chief Justice in consultation with the Attorney General and the Director of
+National Intelligence." 50 U.S.C. § 1803(c). As a practical matter, these security measures have
+resulted in virtually all of the FISC's and the FISA Review Court's opinions being kept secret,
+including from most Members of Congress.
+
+Under FISA, the decisions of this Court are disclosed to Congress only to a
+limited extent. FISC Rule of Procedure 62(c) permits either the government or the Court to
+provide "copies of Court orders, opinions, decisions, or other Court records" to Congress. In
+particular, FISA requires that the Attorney General make semiannual reports only to several
+
+2
+
+Congressional committees³ and not to Congress as a whole. These reports must contain, among
+other things, (1) "copies of all decisions, orders, or opinions" of this Court or the FISA Review
+Court that contain "significant construction or interpretation" of FISA, and (2) “a summary of
+significant legal interpretations" under FISA involving matters before this Court or the FISA
+Review Court, including "interpretations presented in applications or pleadings" filed by the
+Department of Justice in either court. 50 U.S.C. § 1871(a)(4), (5). The statute further requires
+that the Attorney General submit to the same committees (1) "a copy of any decision, order, or
+opinion" issued by either court that contains "significant construction or interpretation" and any
+associated "pleadings, applications, or memoranda of law" not later than 45 days after the
+decision, order, or opinion issues, and (2) a copy of each such decision, order, or opinion issued
+during the five years prior to July 10, 2008, not previously submitted. 50 U.S.C. § 1871(c).
+FISA allows the Attorney General to redact the materials as necessary to protect national
+security. 50 U.S.C. § 1871(d).
+
+As a consequence of the secrecy of FISA decisions and the limited disclosure of
+those decisions only to a few Members of Congress, most Members of Congress are not privy to
+the substance of FISC proceedings. Members of Congress who do not serve on the enumerated
+committees do not routinely receive information disseminated to committee members. See, e.g.,
+Molly K. Hooper & Jordy Yager, Lawmakers can ask for intel info, but they still might not get it,
+The Hill (June 12, 2013, 5:00 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/house/304937-lawmakers-can-
+ask-for-intel-info-but-they-still-might-not-get-it; Reid J. Epstein, Lawmakers rebut President
+Obama's data defense, POLITICO (June 7, 2013, 9:40 PM),
+
+³ The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, the Select Committee
+on Intelligence of the Senate, and the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and
+the Senate. 50 U.S.C. § 1871(a).
+
+3
+
+http://www.politico.com/story/2013/06/congress-nsa-prism-intelligence-briefing-92438.html. In
+some cases, only four or eight Members of Congress, the top-ranking Intelligence Members and
+sometimes the House and Senate leadership, are fully briefed on the government's programs.⁴
+See, e.g., Hooper & Yager, supra (detailing a "closed" process); Epstein, supra ("This 'fully
+briefed' is something that drives us up the wall, because often 'fully briefed' means a group of
+eight leadership; it does not necessarily mean relevant committees,' [Sen. Barbara] Mikulski
+said.").
+
+As important, whatever information Members of Congress learn about secret
+FISC opinions and orders, they are unable publicly to discuss or debate them because any
+disclosure is still subject to secrecy requirements. See, e.g., Hooper & Yager, supra
+("Lawmakers learn a little more than what has been reported in the news, [Former Chairman of
+the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Pete] Hoekstra said. But those members
+are barred from discussing the matter because technically they received the information at a
+classified briefing."); Jonathan Weisman, Sounding the Alarm, but With a Muted Bell, N.Y.
+Times (June 6, 2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/07/us/politics/senators-
+wyden-and-udall-warned-about-surveillance.html ("Yet shackled by strict rules on the discussion
+of classified information, Mr. Wyden and Mr. Udall, members of the Senate Select Committee
+on Intelligence[,] could not-and still cannot-offer more than an intimation about their
+concerns. They had to be content to sit in a special sealed room, soak in information that they
+said appalled and frightened them, then offer veiled messages that were largely ignored.").
+
+⁴ When four Members of Congress are briefed, this group is only the highest-ranking Republican and
+Democrat in both the House and Senate Intelligence Committees. Hooper & Yager, supra. When eight
+Members of Congress are briefed, this group also includes the Speaker of the House, the House minority
+leader, and the Senate majority and minority leaders. Id.
+
+4
+
+In light of recent disclosures regarding the existence of a "classified intelligence
+program," related to the "business records" section of FISA,⁵ the Director of National
+Intelligence has acknowledged that "it is important for the American people to understand" the
+limits of the program and the principles behind it. Press Release, Office of the Dir. of Nat'l
+Intelligence, DNI Statement on Recent Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information (June
+6, 2013), available at http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/191-press-
+releases-2013/868-dni-statement-on-recent-unauthorized-disclosures-of-classified-information.
+Notwithstanding the compelling public interest in an open debate about the scope and propriety
+of government surveillance programs authorized under FISA, even the amici-Members of the
+U.S. Congress-cannot meaningfully participate in that public debate so long as this Court's
+relevant decisions and interpretations of law remain secret. They cannot engage in public
+discussion on the floor of the Senate and the House about the government's surveillance
+programs. And they cannot engage in a dialogue with their constituents on these pressing
+matters of public importance.
+
+SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
+The U.S. Constitution protects robust, open debate in Congress, and Congress
+must in turn be able to communicate freely and openly with its constituents, the American
+people. The Constitution also explicitly provides Congress with the power to make rules for the
+government and pass all laws necessary and proper to execute this power. To fulfill these
+responsibilities, Congress depends on accurate information regarding the implementation of
+laws, the activities of the government itself, and the will of the public. The very democratic
+process on which the United States was founded suffers in the absence of this information.
+
+⁵ 50 U.S.C. § 1861, amended by Section 215 of the Patriot Act.
+
+5
+
+Congress's "informing function" is especially critical when the public suffers from a crisis of
+confidence in its government. Recent disclosures about the nature and scope of the
+government's surveillance practices have given many citizens cause for concern about their
+privacy and the infringement of civil liberties generally.
+
+Congress's ability to legislate effectively depends on an open judiciary. Congress
+and the public cannot know how their laws operate in practice unless they have access to relevant
+information, such as court opinions, that interpret and construe those laws. Americans' need to
+know about this Court's actions has grown in tandem with the significance of the operations this
+Court approves. That is especially true now, as we approach the sunset of Section 215 of the
+Patriot Act. The text of U.S. surveillance statutes alone cannot provide necessary insight into the
+FISC's significant interpretations of the statutes.
+
+Disclosure of this Court's opinions interpreting Section 215 is imperative to a
+meaningful debate in Congress and in the public about how the government conducts
+surveillance. That disclosure and debate will enhance, not diminish, national security. Amici
+respectfully ask this Court to release its relevant decisions to the maximum extent practicable so
+that this critical debate can occur in public, where it belongs.
+
+ARGUMENT
+I. TO FULFILL ITS CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE, CONGRESS MUST BE
+ABLE TO HAVE INFORMED, PUBLIC DEBATE
+
+Informed, public debate is central to Congress's role as a coequal branch of the
+federal government. The Constitution acknowledges the unique importance of open debate to
+Congress's role in the Speech or Debate Clause. Debate in Congress serves not only the
+institution's internal goal of creating sound public policy. Courts have recognized a second
+
+6
+
+crucial purpose of informed, public debate in Congress: to inform the American people about
+the issues affecting their government.
+
+A. The Speech or Debate Clause Underscores the Unique Importance of
+Open Debate to Congress's Legislative Function
+
+In the Speech or Debate Clause, the Constitution privileges Congress's open
+exchange of ideas. U.S. Const. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 ("[F]or any Speech or Debate in either House,
+[Congressmen] shall not be questioned in any other Place."). The Speech or Debate Clause
+provides extraordinary protection for Congressmen's statements. The Clause offers in some
+respects more generous protection than is found in the First Amendment alone so that Congress
+can engage in robust debate. See, e.g., II Works of James Wilson 38 (Andrews ed. 1896) (“In
+order to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with
+firmness and success, it is indispensably necessary, that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of
+speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to
+whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offence."), quoted in Tenney v. Branhove, 341
+U.S. 367, 373 (1951). This constitutional protection of debate is meant to insulate the legislative
+branch from "possible prosecution by an unfriendly executive and conviction by a hostile
+judiciary." United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 179 (1966) (quoting Kilbourn v. Thompson,
+103 U.S. 168, 204 (1881)).
+
+The inclusion of the Clause in the Constitution demonstrates that an essential
+function of Congress is robust legislative debate. There is no doubt that public debate among
+executive-branch officials or members of the judiciary is important to the execution of their
+constitutional roles. However, the Speech and Debate Clause applies only to Congress; there
+exists no analog to protect the other two branches. The unique protection of debate in Congress
+underscores the importance of that debate to fulfilling the institution's constitutional role.
+
+7
+
+B. Congress Must Be Able to Perform its "Informing Function"
+
+Informed, public debate serves not only Congress's role in enacting sound public
+policy, but also the important role of Congress as a source of information to the public about the
+government's operations. Congress's "informing function" was recognized from the earliest
+days of the Republic. In a 1787 letter to James Madison, Thomas Jefferson posed the question
+"whether peace is best preserved by giving energy to the government, or information to the
+people," and then answered, "[t]his last is the most certain, and the most legitimate engine of
+government." 6 Writings of Thomas Jefferson 392 (Memorial ed. 1903) (emphasis added),
+quoted in Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 641 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The
+Supreme Court has similarly recognized that "from the earliest times in its history, Congress has
+assiduously performed an 'informing function' of this nature.". Watkins v. United States, 354
+U.S. 178, 199 n.33 (1957). Indeed, a legislator's duty to inform the public about matters
+affecting their government lies "at the heart of our democratic system." Gravel, 408 U.S. at 649
+(Brennan, J., dissenting).
+
+In times of political controversy, it is crucial that Congress be able to carry out its
+informing function freely and without restriction. When the public experiences a "crisis in
+confidence" in its government, "[c]ommunication between Congress and the electorate tends to
+alleviate that doubt by exposing and clarifying the workings of the political system, the politics
+underlying new laws and the role of the Executive in their administration." Gravel, 408 U.S. at
+651-52 (Brennan, J., dissenting). By making information available to its constituents, Congress
+has great power to inform debate and shape public discussion. See, e.g., Samuel Dash,
+Congress' Spotlight on the Oval Office: The Senate Watergate Hearings, 18 Nova L. Rev. 1719,
+1723 (1994) (discussing the "tremendous impact" the Senate Watergate hearings had on public
+opinion). This ability is clearly diminished, however, if Congress is prevented from making as
+
+8
+
+much information as possible publicly available. Cf. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 656 (Brennan, J.,
+dissenting) ("[S]elf-government can succeed only when the people are informed by their
+representatives, without interference by the Executive or Judiciary, concerning the conduct of
+their agents in government."); Ramsey Clark, Attorney General's Memorandum on the Public
+Information Section of the Administrative Procedure Act, June 1967, available at
+http://www.justice.gov/oip/67agmemo.htm ("If government is to be truly of, by, and for the
+people, the people must know in detail the activities of government. Nothing so diminishes
+democracy as secrecy.").
+
+II. RELEASING THIS COURT'S OPINIONS WOULD ALLOW CONGRESS
+TO PROPERLY PERFORM ITS LEGISLATIVE AND INFORMING
+FUNCTIONS
+
+A. Information on How Courts Interpret the Law Is Critical to
+Congress's Legislative Function
+
+Courts and commentators have long recognized the value of the dialogue between
+the judiciary and the legislature, rooted in the free exchange of information between the two
+institutions. The Supreme Court has recognized an "ongoing dialogue between and among the
+branches of Government" in the context of detention policy post-September 11, 2001.
+Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 738 (2008). The Supreme Court acknowledged the effect of
+judicial opinions on informing and shaping legislation when it observed that its statutory
+interpretations allowed Congress to "make an informed legislative choice either to amend the
+statute or to retain its existing test." Id. Federal courts have repeatedly acknowledged similar
+dialogues and their importance. See, e.g., Leibovitch v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 697 F.3d 561,
+563 (7th Cir. 2012) (Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act); Dotson v. Griesa, 398 F.3d 156, 176
+(2d Cir. 2005) (Civil Service Reform Act); United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1262
+(D. Utah 2004) ("Presumably Congress no less than the President desires feedback on how its
+
+9
+
+statutes are operating."), aff'd, 433 F.3d 738 (10th Cir. 2006); Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey
+Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 955 F. Supp. 598, 601 n.8 (E.D. Va. 1997)
+(dialogue between court and legislature "is central to our legal system").
+
+Such a dialogue has already occurred between this Court and Congress. In the
+1980s, Presiding Judge George Hart issued an opinion, publicly disclosed by Congress, in which
+he concluded that the FISC did not have jurisdiction to review and issue warrants for physical
+searches. S. Rep. No. 97-280, at 4, 16–19 (1981). In response, Congress subsequently enacted
+legislation granting such jurisdiction. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub.
+L. No. 103-359, § 807(a), 108 Stat. 3423, 3443-52 (1994) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1821-1829).
+
+To restart the dialogue between this Court and Congress, Congress and the public
+must have a greater understanding of the Court's rulings. Congress as a whole is unable to make
+a considered judgment about the law governing surveillance without knowledge of what the law
+is-both the Executive's litigation position and how the Court is interpreting the law. And the
+American people cannot evaluate the judgments of either this Court or Congress unless the
+debate occurs in public. Meanwhile, the Court's work in interpreting Congress's intent is made
+all the more difficult when the statute is not subject to vigorous and public debate.
+
+B. The Expansion of FISA Makes Significant FISC Opinions
+Particularly Important and Weighs in Favor of Their Release
+
+1. The Scope of Surveillance Under FISA Has Been Expanded
+Materially Over the Last Thirty Years
+
+FISA began as a response to "the problem of unchecked domestic surveillance by
+the executive branch," and was intended to "displace entirely the various warrantless wiretapping
+and surveillance programs undertaken by the executive branch" and "leave no room for...
+warrantless surveillance in the domestic sphere in the future." In re NSA Telecomms. Records
+Litig., 564 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1115-16 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (citing Senate Select Committee to
+
+10
+
+Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities Book II: Intelligence
+Activities and the Rights of Americans, S. Rep. No. 94-755, 290 (1976)).
+
+In 1994, Congress expanded FISA to allow for physical searches, and expanded
+the jurisdiction of the FISC to grant orders approving a "physical search for the purpose of
+obtaining foreign intelligence information anywhere within the United States." Intelligence
+Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-359, § 807(a), 108 Stat. 3423, 3443
+(1994) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1821-1829). In 1998, FISA was expanded again to
+empower the FISC to rule on applications for pen registers or trap-and-trace devices, as well as
+certain business records. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-
+272, §§ 601-602, 112 Stat. 2396, 2404–12 (1998).
+
+FISA was rewritten and expanded with the enactment of the Uniting and
+Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
+Terrorism Act of 2001, commonly known as the "Patriot Act." Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
+272 (2001). Among the Patriot Act's changes to FISA were: (1) Section 206 allowed the FISC
+to approve "roving" or multipoint wiretaps; (2) Section 214 modified several requirements
+relating to pen-register and trap-and-trace authority, including modifying the types of eligible
+investigative purposes, allowing for tracing of electronic communications, such as e-mail, and
+altering the certification requirement to apply for such authority; and (3) Section 218 changed the
+certification requirement for electronic surveillance and physical searches with respect to the
+"purpose" of the information gathering. Id.
+
+Central to the Motion at issue here, Section 215 of the Patriot Act replaced the
+existing sections of FISA regarding business records. The new section allowed the Director of
+the Federal Bureau of Investigation or his designee to apply for an order requiring the
+
+11
+
+"production of any tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other
+items) for an investigation to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United
+States person or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities,
+provided that such investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely upon the basis
+of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution." 50 U.S.C. § 1861. Section
+215 was again modified extensively in 2006.
+
+2. FISC Opinions Appear to Have Broken Significant New Legal
+Ground
+
+From various public disclosures concerning FISC opinions, it appears that the
+FISC has broken significant new legal ground, which suggests that the nation's surveillance laws
+may be operating in ways that are not obvious to Congress or the public. Examples of significant
+FISC opinions about which information has been disclosed to the public are:
+* A released opinion dated May 17, 2002, in which the FISC found that new
+ minimization procedures proposed by the Department of Justice were not
+ "reasonably designed" consistent with FISA, and which modified the
+ minimization procedures. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign
+ Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611 (FISA Ct. 2002),
+ available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/fisc051702.html, rev'd
+ sub nom. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
+* An unreleased "meticulous opinion" from 2007 or 2008 following
+ "amplitudinous briefing" in which the FISC compelled a communications
+ service provider to assist the United States in gathering foreign
+ intelligence notwithstanding the service provider's legal challenges. See
+ In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105b of the Foreign Intelligence
+ Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1008 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008) (reviewing
+ and upholding the unreleased FISC opinion).
+* An unreleased 86-page opinion dated October 3, 2011, in which the FISC
+ held "that some collection carried out pursuant to the Section 702
+ minimization procedures used by the government was unreasonable under
+ the Fourth Amendment" and which reflected or concerned a FISC
+ determination that the "government's implementation of Section 702 of
+ FISA has sometimes circumvented the spirit of the law." Decl. of Mark
+ A. Bradley 4-5, Elec. Frontier Found. v. Dep't of Justice, Civ. Action
+ No. 12-1441-ABJ (D.D.C. Apr. 1, 2013), available at
+
+12
+
+http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/exhibit-2.pdf. The opinion is
+currently the subject of a lawsuit brought by the Electronic Frontier
+Foundation against the Department of Justice.
+
+This publicly disclosed information suggests that the FISC has issued increasingly
+complex and significant opinions over time. As the FISC accumulates a growing and
+increasingly complex body of decisional law, it becomes more urgent for Congress and the
+public to understand how the Court is interpreting and shaping the law.
+
+C. Releasing this Court's Opinions Is Crucial to Enabling Congress to
+Resolve the Controversy Surrounding Section 215
+
+The principles discussed in this brief-that Congress performs both legislative
+and informing functions and that open courts enable Congress to fulfill its duties have timely
+application here. Recent disclosures concerning the government's surveillance programs have
+raised profound questions about Americans' security and liberty. Section 215 of the Patriot Act,
+which authorizes at least one of the programs, is set to expire on June 1, 2015. Whether and to
+what extent Congress will reauthorize Section 215 depends directly on Congress's-and its
+constituents'-knowledge about how Section 215 currently operates. Reading the law itself is
+not enough. The statutory text does not provide adequate clarity-to the public or to many in
+government on the breadth of authority that intelligence and law-enforcement agencies
+evidently claim under those statutes, or how those claims of authority are consistent with other
+laws and constitutional restraints. Without full access to this Court's opinions interpreting and
+construing the law, Congress and the public cannot have a meaningful reauthorization debate,
+frustrating Congress's constitutional responsibility to make rules for the Executive Branch of
+government.
+
+The disclosure sought by the Motion, moreover, will have no harmful effects on
+national security. The Motion explicitly does not ask for the disclosure of classified information.
+
+13
+
+Rather, it requests that the Court redact that information. The Motion seeks solely the Court's
+opinions interpreting and construing laws that govern the nation's surveillance practices.
+Disclosure of laws, and their interpretation and construction, is not the same as disclosure of
+government secrets. Americans can tolerate the continued existence of government secrets, but
+"[t]he idea of secret laws is repugnant." Torres v. INS, 144 F.3d 472, 474 (7th Cir. 1998).
+
+CONCLUSION
+For all of the reasons set forth above, amici curiae respectfully request that the
+Court grant the Motion.
+
+Dated: June 28, 2013
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+Gregory L. Diskant, NYS OCA #1047240
+Benjamin S. Litman, NYS OCA #4508404
+Richard I. Kim, NYS OCA #4939799
+PATTERSON BELKNAP WEBB & TYLER LLP
+1133 Avenue of the Americas
+New York, NY 10036
+Phone: (212) 336-2000
+Fax: (212) 336-2222
+Counsel for Amici Curiae
+
+14
+
+APPENDIX A
+
+Rep. Justin Amash represents Michigan's Third District in the 113th U.S.
+Congress. He was elected to his first term in 2010. He serves on the Joint Economic Committee
+and the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.
+
+Rep. Paul Broun represents Georgia's Tenth District in the 113th U.S. Congress.
+He was elected to his first term in 2007. He serves on the Committee on Homeland Security and
+the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology.
+
+Rep. Tulsi Gabbard represents Hawaii's Second District in the 113th U.S.
+Congress. She was elected to her first term in 2012. She serves on the Committee on Homeland
+Security and the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
+
+Rep. Morgan Griffith represents Virginia's Ninth District in the 113th U.S.
+Congress. He was elected to his first term in 2010. He serves on the Committee on Energy and
+Commerce.
+
+Rep. Rush Holt represents New Jersey's Twelfth District in the 113th U.S.
+Congress. He was elected to his first term in 1998. He serves on the Committee on Education
+and the Workforce and the Committee on Natural Resources.
+
+Rep. Walter Jones represents North Carolina's Third District in the 113th U.S.
+Congress. He was elected to his first term in 1994. He serves on the Committee on Armed
+Services.
+
+Rep. Barbara Lee represents California's Thirteenth District in the 113th U.S.
+Congress. She was elected to her first term in 1998. She serves on the Committee on
+Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Democratic Steering and Policy
+Committee.
+
+15
+
+Rep. Zoe Lofgren represents California's Nineteenth District in the 113th U.S.
+Congress. She was elected to her first term in 1994. She serves on the Committee on the
+Judiciary, the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, and the Committee on House
+Administration.
+
+Rep. Thomas Massie represents Kentucky's Fourth District in the 113th U.S.
+Congress. He was elected to his first term in 2012. He serves on the Committee on
+Transportation and Infrastructure, the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and the
+Committee on Science, Space, and Technology.
+
+Rep. Tom McClintock represents California's Fourth District in the 113th U.S.
+Congress. He was elected to his first term in 2008. He serves on the Committee on Natural
+Resources and the Committee on the Budget.
+
+Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton represents the District of Columbia in
+the 113th U.S. Congress. She was elected to her first term in 1990. She serves on the
+Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and the Committee on Transportation and
+Infrastructure.
+
+Rep. Beto O'Rourke represents Texas's Sixteenth District in the 113th U.S.
+Congress. He was elected to his first term in 2012. He serves on the Committee on Homeland
+Security and the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.
+
+Rep. Steve Pearce represents New Mexico's Second District in the 113th U.S.
+Congress. He was elected to his first term in 2002, served until 2009, and was elected again in
+2010. He serves on the Committee on Financial Services.
+
+Rep. Matt Salmon represents Arizona's Fifth District in the 113th United States
+Congress. He was elected to his first term in 1994, served until 2001, and was elected again in
+
+16
+
+2012. He serves on the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Education and the
+Workforce.
+
+Rep. Mark Sanford represents South Carolina's First District in the 113th U.S.
+Congress. He was elected to his first term in 1994, served until 2001, and was elected again in
+2013. He serves on the Committee on Homeland Security and the Committee on Transportation
+and Infrastructure.
+
+Rep. Ted Yoho represents Florida's Third District in the 113th U.S. Congress. He
+was elected to his first term in 2012. He serves on the Committee on Agriculture and the
+Committee on Foreign Affairs.
+
+17
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-brief-of-amici-curiae/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-brief-of-amici-curiae/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fb4b0aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-brief-of-amici-curiae/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+{
+ "title": "Brief of Amici Curiae U.S. Representatives Amash, Broun, Gabbard, Griffith, Holt, Jones, Lee, Lofgren, Massie, McClintock, Norton, O'Rourke, Pearce, Salmon, Sanford, and Yoho in Support of the Motion of the American Civil Liberties Union, the American Civil Liberties Union of the Nation's Capital, and the Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic for the Release of Court Records, In re Orders of this Court Interpreting Section 215 of the Patriot Act",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-06-28",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [
+ "PRISM"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-06-28",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34435",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "16fe6843a2307895e2c856b620c5693f8f3843bb4bbf4dfc6e79502da659d5e4",
+ "pages": 18
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-certification-bar-membership-130712/FISC_-_misc-13-02-certification-bar-membership-130712.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-certification-bar-membership-130712/FISC_-_misc-13-02-certification-bar-membership-130712.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d9e0ca8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-certification-bar-membership-130712/FISC_-_misc-13-02-certification-bar-membership-130712.md
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+UNITED STATES
+U.S. FO. FICH
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE CLUAT
+2013 JUL 12 PM 4:22
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+IN RE ORDERS ISSUED BY THIS COURT
+INTERPRETING SECTION 215 OF THE
+PATRIOT ACT
+
+Case No. Misc. 13-02
+
+CERTIFICATION OF BAR MEMBERSHIP AND
+SECURITY CLEARANCE STATUS
+
+Pursuant to the Court's Order of June 14, 2013, and United States Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Court Rules of Procedure 7(h)(1), 7(i), and 63, the American Civil Liberties Union
+("ACLU") and the Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic at Yale Law School (together,
+"Movants") respectfully submit the following information:
+
+Bar Membership Information
+
+Undersigned counsel for Movants are licensed attorneys and members, in good standing,
+of the bars of United States district and circuit courts. See FISA Ct. R.P. 7(h)(1), 63.
+
+Alex Abdo is a member, in good standing, of the following federal courts: the Supreme
+Court of the United States; the United States Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Fourth, and
+District of Columbia Circuits; and the United States District Court for the Southern District of
+New York. He is licensed to practice law by the bar of the State of New York.
+
+Brett Max Kaufman is a member, in good standing, of the following federal courts: the
+United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; and the United States District Court for
+the Southern District of New York. He is licensed to practice law by the bar of the State of New
+York.
+
+1
+Patrick Toomey is a member, in good standing, of the following federal courts: the
+United States District Courts for the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York. He is licensed
+to practice law by the bars of the States of Massachusetts and New York.
+
+Jameel Jaffer is a member, in good standing, of the following federal courts: the Supreme
+Court of the United States; the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fourth, Sixth,
+Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits; and the United States District Courts for the Eastern
+and Southern Districts of New York, and the Eastern District of Michigan. He is licensed to
+practice law by the bar of the State of New York.
+
+Arthur Spitzer is a member, in good standing, of the following federal courts: the
+Supreme Court of the United States; the United States Courts of Appeals for the Armed Forces
+and the Fourth, District of Columbia, and Federal Circuits; and the United States District Courts
+for the District of Columbia, District of Maryland, and the Eastern and Southern Districts of New
+York. He is licensed to practice law by the bars of the District of Columbia and the State of New
+York.
+
+David Schulz is a member, in good standing, of the following federal courts: the Supreme
+Court of the United States; the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Fourth,
+Ninth, Tenth and District of Columbia Circuits; and the United States District Courts for the
+District of Columbia, and for all Districts of the State of New York. He is licensed to practice
+law by the bars of the District of Columbia and the State of New York.
+
+Security Clearance Information
+
+Pursuant to FISA Ct. R.P. 7(i), Movants certify that Arthur Spitzer holds a "Secret"
+security clearance issued by the Department of Justice.
+
+2
+Because Movants' motion does not seek the release of properly classified information,
+and because the motion and the related briefing does not contain classified information, Movants
+respectfully submit that all undersigned counsel may participate in proceedings on the motion
+without access to classified information or security clearances. See FISA Ct. R.P. 63 (requiring
+counsel only to have "appropriate security clearances").
+
+Dated: July 12, 2013
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+/s/ Alex Abdo
+Alex Abdo
+Brett Max Kaufman
+Patrick Toomey
+Jameel Jaffer
+American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
+125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
+New York, NY 10004
+Phone: (212) 549-2500
+Fax: (212) 549-2654
+aabdo@aclu.org
+
+David A. Schulz
+Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic
+Yale Law School
+40 Ashmun Street, 4th Floor
+New Haven, CT 06511
+Phone: (203) 436-5892
+Fax: (203) 436-0851
+david.schulz@yale.edu
+
+Arthur B. Spitzer
+American Civil Liberties Union of the
+Nation's Capital
+4301 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 434
+Washington, DC 20008
+Phone: (202) 457-0800
+Fax: (202) 457-0805
+artspitzer@aclu-nca.org
+
+3
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I, Alex Abdo, certify that on this day, July 12, 2013, a copy of the foregoing certification
+was served on the following persons by the methods indicated:
+
+By email and UPS overnight delivery
+
+Christine Gunning
+Litigation Security Group
+U.S. Department of Justice
+2 Constitution Square
+145 N Street, N.E.
+Suite 2W-115
+Washington, DC 20530
+Email: Christine.E.Gunning@usdoj.gov
+
+By UPS overnight delivery
+
+John P. Carlin
+J. Bradford Wiegmann
+Tashina Gauhar
+Jeffrey M. Smith
+Nicholas J. Patterson
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, DC 20530
+Phone: (202) 514-5600
+
+l. babh
+Alex Abdo
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-certification-bar-membership-130712/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-certification-bar-membership-130712/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ee783b6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-certification-bar-membership-130712/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Certification of Bar Membership and Security Clearance Status, In re Orders of this Court Interpreting Section 215 of the Patriot Act",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-07-12",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-07-12",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34437",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "7242e18c145d7081eb50d04a87087b560409ee63d3b1b2e5409c2ca7b031e32d",
+ "pages": 4
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-motion-131011/FISC_-_misc-13-02-motion-131011.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-motion-131011/FISC_-_misc-13-02-motion-131011.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9a21b6a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-motion-131011/FISC_-_misc-13-02-motion-131011.md
@@ -0,0 +1,767 @@
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+2013 OCT 11 PM 4:26
+
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+IN RE ORDERS OF THIS COURT
+INTERPRETING SECTION 215
+OF THE PATRIOT ACT
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-02
+
+NOTICE OF MOTION
+
+PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, upon the accompanying memorandum of law
+and the declaration of Maxwell S. Mishkin, both dated October 11, 2013, the undersigned
+hereby moves this Court for reconsideration of the ruling in its Opinion and Order issued
+September 13, 2013 holding that the Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic lacks
+Article III standing to assert a constitutional right to inspect opinions of the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court.
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+David A. Schulz
+Jonathan M. Manes
+Media Freedom and Information Access
+Clinic
+Yale Law School
+P.O. Box 208215
+New Haven, CT 06520
+Phone: (212) 850-6103
+Fax: (203) 433-30334
+dschulz@lskslaw.com
+jonathan.manes@yale.edu
+
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COUR
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+2013 OCT 11 PM 4:2
+
+LEEANN FLYNN HA
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+IN RE ORDERS OF THIS COURT
+INTERPRETING SECTION 215
+OF THE PATRIOT ACT
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-02
+
+MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION BY MEDIA FREEDOM AND
+INFORMATION ACCESS CLINIC FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THIS COURT'S
+SEPTEMBER 13, 2013 OPINION ON THE ISSUE OF ARTICLE III STANDING
+
+David A. Schulz
+Jonathan M. Manes
+Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic
+Yale Law School
+P.O. Box 208215
+New Haven, CT 06520
+Phone: (212) 850-6103
+Fax: (203) 433-30334
+dschulz@lskslaw.com
+jonathan.manes@yale.cdu
+
+PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
+
+The Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic ("MFIAC") respectfully seeks
+reconsideration of the Court's ruling on standing in its September 13, 2013 Opinion and Order
+(the "Opinion" or "Op.") dismissing MFIAC's motion for access to judicial opinions construing
+Section 215 of the Patriot Act.¹
+
+The issue of standing warrants reconsideration because it was neither raised nor briefed
+by the parties, and in the absence of information and legal arguments on the issue, this Court
+applied an overly stringent standard in evaluating MFIAC's standing to assert a First
+Amendment right to inspect judicial records. Just as any individual who is refused entrance to a
+public trial would have standing to challenge that denial of the constitutional access right without
+demonstrating a particularized need to observe the specific proceeding, MFIAC has standing to
+challenge the denial of its constitutional right of access to the requested opinions of this Court
+without first establishing a particularized need for the information. In any event, the Court
+misperceived MFIAC's organizational purpose and its specific interest in asserting the access
+right here, which amply satisfy even the more stringent standing standard applied by the Court.²
+
+¹ Because the FISC Rules do not address motions to reconsider, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may
+apply. FISC Rule 1. And while "the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not explicitly provide for
+motions for reconsideration, these motions are accepted as the offspring of Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)," Gregg
+v. Am. Quasar Petroleum Co., 840 F. Supp. 1394, 1401 (D. Colo. 1991), and are a routine part of federal
+civil practice. In accordance with Rule 59(e), this motion is filed within 28 days of the order in question.
+
+² MFIAC seeks reconsideration of that portion of the Court's opinion denying standing. In light of the
+declassification process already underway pursuant to FISC Rule 62 and the ACLU's parallel FOIA
+litigation, MFIAC does not ask this Court to reach the merits of its First Amendment claim at this time
+and does not oppose a stay of its original access motion pending the outcome of those other proceedings.
+
+1
+
+ARGUMENT
+I.
+RECONSIDERATION IS APPROPRIATE BECAUSE STANDING
+WAS NOT RAISED OR BRIEFED BEFORE MFIAC'S DISMISSAL
+
+The Court's order dismissing MFIAC for lack of standing was issued without any
+briefing from the parties addressing the issue. The Government did not challenge the standing of
+either party, and neither the ACLU nor MFIAC anticipated that their standing would be
+questioned. Nor did the Court indicate that standing was a concern before issuing its Opinion
+finding that MFIAC lacked standing. Accordingly, this motion for reconsideration will be
+MFIAC's first opportunity to address the legal requirements for standing and to provide
+information about its organizational activities, both of which support MFIAC's standing to assert
+a violation of its First Amendment right to inspect the judicial opinions of this Court.
+
+Reconsideration is appropriate where, as here, a court "has made a decision outside the
+adversarial issues presented to the Court by the parties." *Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannan
+Roofing, Inc.*, 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D. Va. 1983); see also *DirecTV, Inc. v. Hart*, 366 F. Supp. 2d
+315, 318 (E.D.N.C. 2004) (granting reconsideration where "the parties were not able to brief and
+argue the issues upon which the order... ultimately was decided"); *Neal v. Honeywell, Inc.*, 958
+F. Supp. 345, 347 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (reconsidering ruling where parties "had not raised the issue
+and hence... had not briefed it on the motion for summary judgment"). As recognized in
+*Yacobo v. Achim*, No. 06-C-1425, 2008 WL 907444 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2008), “[b]asing a ruling
+on issues not raised through the adversarial process... would most likely qualify as a manifest
+error of law." *Id.* at *1.
+
+MFIAC does not seek reconsideration to present "theories previously advanced and
+rejected." *Palmer v. Champion Mortgage*, 465 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2006). Rather, MFIAC
+seeks to explain for the first time the legal and factual bases for its standing. As detailed below,
+
+2
+
+MFIAC respectfully submits that the Court applied an incorrect legal standard in evaluating the
+injury-in-fact requirement of constitutional standing to allege a violation of First Amendment
+access rights. See *Walker v. McCaughtry*, 72 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (granting
+motion to reconsider denial of habeas corpus relief where the court applied an incorrect standard
+to a claim of denial of assistance). Furthermore, as set forth in the accompanying Declaration of
+Maxwell S. Mishkin, dated October 11, 2013 ("Mishkin Decl."), facts about MFIAC's activities
+and objectives that were not available to the Court in its *sua sponte* review of the public record
+establish MFIAC's standing under even the more stringent test applied in the Opinion. See
+*Tokar v. City of Chicago*, No. 96-CV-5331, 2000 WL 1230489, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2000)
+(granting reconsideration of retaliation claim where court "misapprehended a critical fact" that
+"satisfactorily demonstrated a causal nexus"); see also *Edward H. Bohlin Co. v. Banning Co.*, 6
+F.3d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 1993) ("the need to render just decisions on the basis of all the facts" can
+outweigh the imperative of finality).
+
+Under these circumstances, basic fairness requires reconsideration. The standing inquiry
+enunciated by the Court could inappropriately impede the ability of future litigants to exercise
+their First Amendment right of access to judicial proceedings and records, and the particular
+ruling with respect to MFIAC's standing could hamper its ability to carry out its organizational
+mission to support robust investigative journalism and to preserve the public's right of access to
+information about the actions of government. See Mishkin Decl. ¶5.
+
+II.
+THE COURT APPLIED AN INCORRECT STANDARD IN DENYING
+MFIAC'S STANDING TO ENFORCE THE FIRST AMENDMENT ACCESS RIGHT
+
+To demonstrate Article III standing, a party seeking judicial review must show "(1) that it
+has suffered an 'injury in fact'; (2) that the injury is caused by or fairly traceable to the
+
+3
+
+challenged actions of the defendant; and (3) that it is likely that the injury will be redressed by a
+favorable decision." *Ethyl Corp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency*, 306 F.3d 1144, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
+(citing *Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). Here, only MFIAC's
+"injury-in-fact" is in dispute. That injury--the denial of access to the requested FISC
+opinions--is more than sufficient to meet the requirements for Article III standing.
+
+The Court erred, we respectfully submit, by suggesting that parties seeking access to
+court records must allege not only that they have been denied access to court records—and are
+thereby deprived of the very constitutional right they assert—but further demonstrate that this
+denial "impedes their own activities in a concrete and particular way," or that access "would be
+of concrete, particular assistance to them in their own activities." Op. at 5. Demonstrating
+"concrete, particular assistance" or harm to one's "activities" is not necessary to satisfy Article
+III standing requirements. To the contrary, the denial of access itself is an Article III injury. See
+*N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth.*, 684 F.3d 286 (2d Cir. 2011).
+
+A party who asserts a constitutional right of access to review court records, and is denied
+that access, has suffered an injury that is both concrete and particular: it has been deprived of
+information to which it has asserted a personal right of access. Of course, the injury when court
+records are improperly sealed is shared by all those who are denied access to the sealed
+information, but that does not render it insufficient under Article III, so long as the party seeking
+to invoke the court's jurisdiction itself seeks disclosure and has been denied access. See Fed.
+
+³ MFIAC unquestionably satisfies the other two prongs of standing analysis: causation and redressability.
+There can be no doubt that MFIAC's inability to inspect this Court's opinions "fairly can be traced to"
+this Court's decision to deny public access to them. *Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for
+Separation of Church & State, Inc.*, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). It is likewise clear that there is a
+""substantial probability' that a favorable outcome would redress [MFIAC's] injuries." *Town of
+Barnstable v. Fed. Aviation Admin.*, 659 F.3d 28, 31 (D.C. Cir. 2011). By releasing the requested
+portions of its opinions, this Court would enforce the access right MFIAC asserts.
+
+4
+
+*Election Comm'n v. Akins*, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998) ("[W]here a harm is concrete, though widely
+shared, the Court has found 'injury in fact."); *Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice*, 491 U.S.
+440, 449-50 (1989) ("The fact that other citizens or groups of citizens might make the same
+complaint after unsuccessfully demanding disclosure under FACA does not lessen appellants'
+asserted injury."). See *infra* § II.B.
+
+To be sure, the few courts that have explicitly considered whether a party has standing to
+assert a right of access have, on occasion, commented upon the party's reasons for seeking
+access. But in doing so, these courts have never imposed a requirement that "concrete and
+particular" harm to the party's specific objective be demonstrated as a prerequisite to standing, as
+this Court has done. Instead, courts look to the "activities" of a party only to determine that the
+party in fact has some cognizable interest in the information sought. So courts properly assure
+themselves that, for example, a party is not seeking judicial relief with respect to court records or
+proceedings they in fact have no interest in using or attending, see *Ernst v. Child & Youth Servs.
+of Chester Cnty.*, 108 F.3d 486 (3d Cir. 1997), or to ensure that a party has at least some interest
+in the records it seeks and is not asserting the rights of third parties not before the court, see *N.Y.
+Civil Liberties Union*, 684 F.3d 286, or a bare desire to have the government act in accordance
+with the law, see *Akins*, 524 U.S. 11. See *infra* § II.B.
+
+Here, the basic activity that MFIAC seeks to promote by bringing this motion is apparent
+on the face of the pleadings, as the Court acknowledged. Specifically, in seeking to obtain the
+Section 215 opinions, MFIAC is pursuing its particular interest in "inform[ing] and enhanc[ing]
+public debate about Section 215." Op. at 8.; see also Mot. of ACLU & MFIAC for Release of
+Ct. Records at 1; Reply Br. in Supp. of Mot. at 1-3. Under the applicable law, this is a
+cognizable interest sufficient to establish standing. Indeed, this interest must be cognizable, for
+
+5
+
+the quality of public debate on major national issues and the importance of holding the
+government accountable is at the core of the First Amendment's protections for the freedoms of
+speech, press, and petition. The Article III injury that MFIAC suffered—denial of access—is
+plainly an injury to a cognizable interest and suffices to establish standing. See *infra* § II.B-C.
+
+Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the Court's standing analysis is that the Court
+reached its conclusion on MFIAC's standing even while acknowledging MFIAC's effort "to
+inform and enhance public debate about Section 215." Op. at 8. Put differently, the Court's
+opinion suggests that organizations whose "activity" is to disseminate information of public
+interest do not suffer an injury sufficient even to invoke the court's jurisdiction when they are
+denied their constitutional right of access to court records in service of that activity. If that
+standard were correct, then standing could become a significant obstacle to the enforcement of
+the public's right of access precisely by those who endeavor to vindicate that right in service of
+the public interest. We doubt that this result, so clearly in tension with the objectives of the First
+Amendment, is what the Court intended, and so we respectfully request the Court to reconsider,
+or at least to clarify, its reasoning. See *infra* § I.C.
+
+A. A Denial of Access to Court Records Alone
+Inflicts Actual Injury Sufficient for Standing
+
+As a general matter, standing "often turns on the nature and source of the claim asserted"
+and, in particular, on "whether the constitutional . . . provision on which the claim rests properly
+can be understood as granting persons in the plaintiff's position a right to judicial relief." *Warth
+v. Seldin*, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975). The right in question here—the First Amendment right of
+access to judicial proceedings and records—is, of course, a general right afforded to all members
+of the public, each of whom has the same claim of access. As recognized in *Globe Newspaper
+Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk Cnty.*, 457 U.S. 596 (1982), the First Amendment access right
+
+6
+
+"serves to ensure that the individual citizen can effectively participate in and contribute to our
+republican system of self-government." *Id.* at 604 (emphasis added); see also *Richmond
+Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia*, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980) (First Amendment prohibits "the
+government from limiting the stock of information from which members of the public may
+draw") (emphasis added). There is also no question that organizations have this right just as
+individuals do. See, e.g., *N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth.*, 684 F.3d 286 (2d
+Cir. 2011).
+
+Accordingly, when a court improperly closes its proceedings or seals records subject to
+the First Amendment right, any citizen—or any collection of citizens—denied access to the
+proceeding or record suffers a concrete and particularized injury. In other words, the injury is
+"concrete" because the party seeking access is in fact being deprived of information, and it is
+"particular" because the party specifically sought and was denied the material. On this view,
+whether the injury is "concrete and particular" does not depend at all on how the denial of access
+in turn affects the party's further activities or interests, except in the minimal sense that the party
+must actually have an interest in disclosure that is frustrated by the denial of access.
+
+This view finds support in the principal cases upon which this Court relied. For instance,
+in *New York Civil Liberties Union v. New York City Transit Authority*, the Second Circuit
+reiterated that "in order to have standing to challenge the [impugned policy restricting access],
+the NYCLU must establish that it (through its agents) suffered a concrete injury as a result of the
+policy." 684 F.3d at 295. The two-paragraph discussion that followed focused solely on
+whether the policy did in fact result in the denial of access, without regard to how it affected
+NYCLU's activities. The court concluded the discussion, after finding that the policy did
+actually result in NYCLU's agents being denied access, by holding that “NYCLU has
+
+7
+
+established that it suffered an actual injury—exclusion from at least some TAB hearings—as a
+result of the NYCTA's access policy." *Id.* (emphasis added).
+
+The only discussion of how this injury affected NYCLU's "activities" came after the
+court had held that NYCLU suffered a concrete injury. Specifically, once the court found that
+NYCLU suffered an "actual injury," the court only then asked whether "this injury, in turn, is to
+a cognizable interest." *Id.* It is only at this later stage of the analysis—determining whether
+NYCLU's interest is "cognizable"—that the court discussed how the challenged access policy
+would "impede" the organization's activities. *Id.* at 295-96. And nowhere in that discussion
+does the Second Circuit suggest, as this Court held, that standing depends on a finding that the
+denial of access "impeded [NYCLU's] own interests in a concrete, particular way," or that
+access "would be of concrete, particular assistance to them in their own activities." Op. at 5.
+Instead, the court's discussion of "cognizable interests" responded to a strand of the standing
+jurisprudence that categorically excludes certain interests from serving as a basis for standing;
+for example, a plaintiff lacks a "cognizable interest" where his or her only interest is an "alleged
+right to have the Government act in accordance with the law," *Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*,
+504 U.S. 555, 575 (1992), or asserts an "interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of
+another," *Linda R.S. v. Richard D.*, 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). Here, however, it was clear—on
+the face of the original motion itself—that MFIAC's interest was not to enforce abstract
+compliance with the law, but rather to compel the Court to disclose a specifically limited set of
+opinions to which it asserted a personal constitutional right of access.
+
+Moreover, even if NYCLU may be read to require some inquiry into whether an access
+injury is "cognizable," nothing in NYCLU suggests that MFIAC's acknowledged interests in the
+requested opinions—gathering information for the purpose of disseminating it to the public and
+
+8
+
+enhancing public debate—are somehow insufficient to support standing, as this Court found.
+Indeed, the NYCLU's interests in accessing the proceedings at issue there—to gather
+information about certain administrative proceedings to better serve future clients—are
+analogous to MFIAC's interest here, which is to gather information about FISC proceedings in
+furtherance of MFIAC's mission and for the benefit of the broader public.
+
+The principle that a finding of "injury" in the access context does not depend on the
+purpose for which records are sought is further demonstrated by *Huminski v. Corsones*, 396 F.3d
+53 (2d Cir. 2005), a case in which the plaintiff was denied access to courtroom proceedings that
+were open to the public. The Second Circuit first observed that the First Amendment access
+right provides "quintessential protection for the individual" and that the Supreme Court has
+permitted the right to be "asserted by an identified excluded individual." *Id.* at 83. It then
+emphasized that "any member of the public—not only members of the public selected by the
+courts themselves—may come and bear witness to what happens beyond the courtroom door."
+*Id.* at 84. Accordingly, the court did not question Mr. Huminski's standing to sue over his denial
+of access, and found that the First Amendment access right had been violated, irrespective of the
+purposes for which he sought access. See *id.*
+
+Other courts, too, have routinely accepted that denial of access to information subject to
+the First Amendment access right inflicts a manifest injury on any party seeking access to it. For
+instance, this past summer, when advocacy organizations including the Center for Constitutional
+Rights, journalists, and media organizations including Democracy Now! asserted a First
+Amendment right of access to documents related to the court martial of Private Manning, there
+was no question that these groups had standing. See *Ctr. for Constitutional Rights v. Lind*, No.
+13-1504, 2013 WL 3167910, at *4 n.8 (D. Md. June 19, 2013); see also, e.g., *Rosenfeld v.*
+
+9
+
+*Montgomery Cnty. Pub. Sch.*, 25 F. App'x 123, 131-32 (4th Cir. 2001) (non-press plaintiffs have
+standing to assert First Amendment claims to inspect court documents); *Fisher v. King*, 232 F.3d
+391, 396 & n.4 (4th Cir. 2000) (non-press plaintiff has standing to assert "a right of physical
+access to an audio tape that was played in open court").
+
+The case law is quite clear that where a party is denied access to judicial records, it
+suffers an injury in fact that is concrete and particular without need for any significant scrutiny of
+the uses to which the information is to be put, nor how those uses will be impaired or aided.
+Certainly none of these cases suggest, as this Court decided, that where an organization seeks to
+gather information in order to disseminate it and improve the public discussion, denial of access
+does not inflict a "concrete" or "particular" injury sufficient to establish standing and invoke the
+court's jurisdiction.
+
+B. MFIAC Does Not Merely Assert a "Generalized Grievance"
+But Rather a Concrete Injury to Its Constitutional Right of Access
+
+Another strand in this Court's reasoning begins with the contention that "movants assert a
+right that is indistinguishable from those of any other interested member of the public." Op. at 5.
+The Court's subsequent discussion is concerned that MFIAC's claim is simply a "generalized
+injury" of the type that is insufficient to support standing. And, indeed, in *Federal Election
+Commission v. Akins*, the Court cautions that standing may not exist where a party asserts only
+"generalized grievances" that are "widely shared." 524 U.S. 11, 23-24. But in the same case,
+the Court also made clear that "where a harm is concrete" as opposed to "abstract," then even
+"though widely shared, the Court has found 'injury in fact." *Id.*
+
+At issue in *Akins* was a demand by a group of voters to force the FEC to subject a
+particular lobbying organization, AIPAC, to follow certain recordkeeping and disclosure
+requirements. *Id.* at 21. The statute under which the voters sued permitted any member of the
+
+10
+
+public to file such a lawsuit, thereby raising the concern that the injury was too "widely shared"
+and the lawsuit was merely a generalized plea from members of the public for the FEC to follow
+the law. The plaintiffs contended that their injury consisted of being deprived of the specific
+information they sought, which they hoped to use themselves and share with others in order to
+evaluate candidates by determining who may have received contributions from the lobbying
+organization in question. *Id.* at 21. In other words, the voters sought the information for their
+own purposes and to disseminate it to others who had similar concerns. The Court held that this
+"informational injury, directly related to voting, the most basic of political rights, is sufficiently
+concrete and specific such that the fact that it is widely shared does not" mean that the
+respondents lacked an Article III injury. *Id.* at 24-25. This same reasoning holds in the present
+case. As the Court acknowledged, MFIAC sought access to these opinions of unusual public
+importance for the purpose of informing the public debate, in very much the same way that the
+group of voters in *Akins* sought to educate its fellow citizens. It is difficult to see why the injury
+was sufficiently concrete in *Akins*, but too abstract here. Like the groups of voters in *Akins*,
+MFIAC has distinguished itself from the rest of the public (save for the ACLU) by actually
+coming to the FISC to seek access to the opinions in question.
+
+Other courts, both before and after *Akins*, have affirmed that informational injuries of the
+type that MFIAC suffers simply by being denied access to the Court's opinions are sufficiently
+concrete and particular to establish standing, without reference to the intended use of the
+information. See *Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice*, 491 U.S. 440, 449-50 (1989) ("The fact
+that other citizens or groups of citizens might make the same complaint after unsuccessfully
+demanding disclosure... does not lessen appellants' asserted injury"); *Havens Realty Corp. v.
+Coleman*, 455 U.S. 363, 373-74 (1982) (failure to disclose information about housing availability
+
+11
+
+under the Fair Housing Act); *Ethyl Corp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency*, 306 F.3d 1144, 1148 (D.C. Cir.
+2002) (denial of access to information is injury in fact for standing purposes where a statute
+allegedly "requires that the information be publicly disclosed"); *Ernst v. Child & Youth Servs. Of
+Chester Cnty.*, 108 F.3d 486, 500 (3d Cir. 1997) (denying standing to challenge a juvenile court
+closure law because plaintiff "ha[d] not alleged that she ha[d] ever been excluded under the
+closure provision from a proceeding to which she sought access," and therefore had suffered no
+particular injury, but suggesting that if the plaintiff had "complain[ed] about her exclusion from
+a particular hearing" rather than challenging the closure law writ large, she would have had
+standing); *U.S. House of Representatives v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce*, 11 F. Supp. 2d 76, 85
+(D.D.C. 1998) ("The inability to receive information which a person is entitled to by law is
+sufficiently concrete and particular to satisfy constitutional standing requirements."). In each of
+these cases, the court's standing inquiry focused squarely on the plaintiff's assertion of a right to
+receive information and the defendant's failure to provide it. Here, the denial of MFIAC's
+asserted constitutional right of access produces the same type of informational injury that was
+found to be sufficient under Article III in these other contexts—indeed, the denial of access is
+precisely the injury the right of access was designed to prevent.
+
+C. The Standing Requirements Applied by this Court Threaten
+To Significantly and Needlessly Undermine the Right of Access
+
+The Court's standing analysis erred not only by scrutinizing the purposes for which
+MFIAC sought the records, but also by drawing a distinction between the objectives MFIAC and
+ACLU jointly described in their motion—seeking to obtain and disseminate information critical
+to an informed public debate about Section 215—and the activities the Court ascribed only to the
+ACLU: actually engaging in the public debate about Section 215. The Court found that denial of
+access sufficiently impaired the ACLU's advocacy to confer standing upon it, but did not find
+
+12
+
+that the inability to fulfill the parties' jointly stated objective of merely informing public debate
+was a sufficient injury. This distinction is very troubling from the perspective of the First
+Amendment right of access. The Supreme Court consistently has described this right as one that
+belongs to the general public, not just persons or organizations that disseminate information
+professionally, let alone only those that actually enter the fray on one side or another of public
+debates on certain topics. See *Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Riverside Cnty.* (*Press-
+Enterprise I*), 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984) ("[T]he sure knowledge that anyone is free to attend [a
+trial] gives assurance that established procedures are being followed and that deviations will
+become known."); *Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk Cnty.*, 457 U.S. 596, 603
+(1983) ("[T]he press and general public have a constitutional right of access to criminal trials.");
+*Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia*, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980) (noting that, while members of
+the media may be provided "special seating and priority of entry" at the court house, "media
+representatives enjoy the same right of access as the public" as a whole). This Court's opinion,
+which distinguished between a requester that has "participated in public debate" (the ACLU) and
+a requester that it believed had not (MFIAC), contravenes this constitutional tradition. As a
+consequence, under this Court's approach, members of the public—who may wish only to learn
+about the operation of government—could be turned away at the threshold of the courthouse,
+without any legal recourse, for lack of standing.
+
+This error is compounded by the fact that members of the public may seek access to
+judicial proceedings or records because they wish eventually to participate in public debate—but
+only in a well-informed manner. As explained in *Globe Newspaper Co.*:
+
+Underlying the First Amendment right of access to criminal trials is the
+common understanding that "a major purpose of that Amendment was to
+protect the free discussion of governmental affairs." By offering such
+protection, the First Amendment serves to ensure that the individual
+
+13
+
+citizen can effectively participate in and contribute to our republican
+system of self-government.
+
+457 U.S. at 596 (citation omitted) (quoting *Mills v. Alabama*, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)). The
+Court's approach, requiring a requestor to have participated in public debate on a given issue
+before it can establish standing, threatens to cede the enforcement of the First Amendment right
+of access to partisans in any given debate. It would leave out in the cold those members of the
+public and civil society who advocate for transparency without necessarily taking a substantive
+position on each issue. There is nothing in the First Amendment nor the law of standing that
+justifies this result, which cannot be squared with *Mills*, common sense, or the basic purposes of
+the First Amendment.⁴
+
+Finally, it is important to note that one of the key motivations for strictly policing the
+requirements of standing is not present here in its usual form: the separation of powers.
+MFIAC's motion, by its very nature, does not ask this Court to meddle in the affairs of the
+executive or legislative branches; instead, the dispute here concerns the practices of this Court
+and the judicial records that this Court controls. "Every court has supervisory power over its
+own records and files," *Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc.*, 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978), and it is this
+Court's exercise of that fundamentally judicial power that forms the heart of MFIAC's action.
+MFIAC does not ask this Court to become engaged in a tangled "policy dispute[] that [is]
+appropriately addressed by the elected branches," *Coalition for Mercury-Free Drugs v. Sebelius*,
+671 F.3d 1275, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 2012), but rather asks this Court's to assess the constitutionality
+
+⁴ In recognition of the essential values at stake in the First Amendment context, courts have rightly
+construed standing requirements for asserting First Amendment claims more liberally than in other
+contexts, "lest free speech be chilled." *Harrell v. Florida Bar*, 608 F.3d 1241, 1254 (11th Cir. 2010); see
+also 16 Moore's Federal Practice - Civil §101.61 (Matthew Bender ed., 3d ed. 2013) ("Within the First
+Amendment context, courts properly apply an expanded notion of standing to determine who may
+institute the asserted claim for relief....").
+
+14
+
+of its own practices. Little purpose would be served were the Court to strictly construe the injury
+requirement in right of access cases, except to make it more difficult for members of the public
+even to ask the Court to consider their constitutional right to step inside.
+
+III.
+MFIAC HAS STANDING TO PURSUE THIS FIRST AMENDMENT
+CLAIM EVEN UNDER THE STANDARD APPLIED BY THIS COURT
+
+Because standing was not raised by the Government, the facts concerning MFIAC's
+mission and activities were not developed for the Court. MFIAC's activities are described in the
+accompanying Mishkin Declaration, and they plainly establish MFIAC's standing even under the
+more stringent standard applied by the Court.
+
+This Court identified *sua sponte* one cognizable interest of MFIAC: the ability to
+meaningfully continue taking part in "the legislative and public debates" about the very subject
+of the access request. Op. at 8. Because the issue was not previously briefed by either party, the
+Court did not have the opportunity to examine the record of MFIAC's activities, and mistakenly
+believed that MFIAC has not "participated in public debate about Section 215." *Id.* at 9 n.13. A
+full showing of the facts reveals that MFIAC—through a variety of activities—has engaged in
+the public debate over many of the core policy issues implicated by Section 215: balancing
+privacy interests with national security concerns, preserving the First Amendment right to
+communicate anonymously, and ensuring meaningful oversight of law enforcement activities,
+including domestic surveillance programs. See Mishkin Decl. ¶¶ 11-15. Indeed, access to the
+Section 215 opinions would benefit MFIAC precisely because it would allow MFIAC to better
+inform this debate going forward.
+
+The Court also may have failed to perceive the extent to which MFIAC publicly
+disseminates information obtained through its litigation activities, as it intends to do here. See *id.*
+¶¶ 10, 12. Because cognizable interests of MFIAC have been harmed by the denial of access to
+
+15
+
+Section 215 opinions, and because gaining such access will significantly aid its litigation,
+advocacy, and educational activities, MFIAC has satisfied the injury-in-fact element of Article
+III standing even under the standard applied by the Court.
+
+CONCLUSION
+
+For the foregoing reasons, movant respectfully requests this Court to reconsider and
+amend its Opinion of September 13, 2013, to hold that MFIAC has Article III standing to assert a
+right of access to the opinions of this Court interpreting Section 215 of the Patriot Act.
+
+Given the weighty legal questions at issue, as well as the relevance of the opinions to an
+ongoing debate of immense public interest, movant also requests oral argument before the Court.
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+David A. Schulz
+Jonathan M. Manes
+Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic
+Yale Law School⁵
+P.O. Box 208215
+New Haven, CT 06520
+Phone: (212) 850-6103
+Fax: (203) 433-30334
+dschulz@lskslaw.com
+jonathan.manes@yale.edu
+
+⁵ This memorandum has been prepared by a clinic operated by Yale Law School, but does not purport to
+present the school's institutional views, if any. Yale Law School students assisting on the papers: Pat
+Hayden '14, Max Mishkin '14, Anjali Motgi '14, and Brianna van Kan '15.
+
+16
+
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+2013 OCT 11 PM 4:26
+
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+IN RE ORDERS OF THIS COURT
+INTERPRETING SECTION 215
+OF THE PATRIOT ACT
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-02
+
+DECLARATION OF MAXWELL S. MISHKIN
+
+I, Maxwell S. Mishkin, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, declare as follows:
+
+1. I am a third-year law student at Yale Law School and a student co-director of the
+Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic ("MFIAC"). I make this declaration in support
+of MFIAC's motion for reconsideration of this Court's Opinion of September 13, 2013, on the
+issue of standing. I base the statements contained herein on personal knowledge and my review
+of both publicly available documents and records accessible to me in my capacity as a student
+director of MFIAC.
+
+2. As discussed below, MFIAC's mission and activities are dedicated to protecting
+the public's right of access to information about government activities. MFIAC regularly
+litigates the scope and application of the First Amendment access right, on behalf of journalists
+and in its own name. MFIAC endeavors to make all information obtained through its efforts
+publicly available, to further public understanding, and to enable public oversight of government
+institutions. MFIAC has an interest in ensuring a proper legal standard is applied in weighing
+the public access right in this case and in facilitating the dissemination of this Court's opinions
+concerning the scope of authority granted by Section 215 of the Patriot Act.
+
+1
+
+MFIAC'S HISTORY AND MISSION
+
+3. MFIAC was founded by a group of four law students and was officially launched
+in February 2010 as an initiative of the Information Society Project and the Knight Law & Media
+Program at Yale Law School, with the goal of increasing government transparency and
+supporting both traditional and emerging forms of newsgathering through impact litigation and
+policy work. When the Floyd Abrams Institute for Freedom of Expression was established at the
+Yale Law School in October 2011, MFIAC became a component of the Abrams Institute.
+
+4. Yale Law School Professor Jack Balkin, Knight Professor of Constitutional Law
+and the First Amendment, and visiting Lecturer in Law David A. Schulz, partner at Levine
+Sullivan Koch & Schulz, LLP, are Co-Directors of MFIAC. Jonathan Manes, Abrams Clinical
+Fellow of the Information Society Project, supervises students in the clinic on a day-to-day basis.
+
+5. MFIAC's mission is two-fold: to support robust investigative journalism and to
+promote the public's right of access to information in defense of democracy. MFIAC carries out
+this mission by providing free legal services to journalists seeking to exercise public access
+rights but lacking access to legal support, and through impact litigation brought in its own name.
+
+6. MFIAC functions not only as a legal clinic, but also as a legal and policy
+organization, pursuing initiatives in its own name and in aid of other organizations at Yale Law
+School. MFIAC initiates litigation and files amicus briefs on issues related to national security,
+government transparency, law enforcement oversight, personal privacy, and online anonymity,
+among other topics. MFIAC educates journalists, law students, and other interested members of
+the public on how to seek access to public records or proceedings at the state and federal level.
+MFIAC is frequently involved in activities that inform the public on topics such as how to
+balance personal privacy with national security and how to increase government transparency.
+
+2
+
+MFIAC'S REPRESENTATION OF CLIENTS
+
+7. MFIAC provides free legal services to clients who otherwise lack the resources to
+retain counsel and who are seeking to compel access to information from government agencies at
+the federal, state, or local level. Its clients have included journalists, scholars, freelance writers,
+bloggers, and others. In deciding whether to take on a representation, MFIAC determines
+whether the clients' objectives in the representation are consistent with MFIAC's mission to
+promote government transparency.
+
+8. Among the representations handled by MFIAC in its brief history, the clinic has:
+* assisted a journalist in compelling the Department of Defense to release the
+identities of Guantanamo Bay detainees considered unfit for either release or trial.
+*Rosenberg v. Dep't of Defense*, No. 1:13-cv-00342 (GK) (D.D.C. July 3, 2013).
+* represented an online journalist in gaining access to pre-sentencing "letters of
+support" in a criminal prosecution, in a precedent-setting victory defining the
+common law right of access to court documents in the First Circuit. *United States
+v. Kravetz*, 706 F.3d 47 (1st. Cir. 2013).
+* succeeded on behalf of another journalist in defeating a "Glomar" response by the
+Department of Defense to a request for information about an investigation into an
+allegedly abusive work environment at the U.S. Strategic Command, the agency
+responsible for global missile defense. *McMichael v. Dep't of Defense*, 910 F.
+Supp. 2d 47 (D.D.C. 2012).
+* worked with the ACLU to seek from various government agencies their
+interpretation of the surveillance authority granted by Executive Order 12333,
+which authorizes federal agencies to collect intelligence, particularly abroad, and
+sets forth certain limits on intelligence-gathering activities relevant to civil
+liberties. This effort is ongoing at the administrative level today.
+
+9. As these sample cases reflect, one of the factors that MFIAC weighs in deciding
+whether to take a case is whether its adjudication may serve to clarify ambiguity in the law—
+such as the scope of the common law and First Amendment access rights, or the scope of a FOIA
+exemption—so that outcomes will assist others seeking information from government actors.
+
+3
+
+10. MFIAC also furthers its mission by requiring prospective clients to agree that any
+information obtained through litigation handled by MFIAC will be made available to the general
+public. MFIAC generally retains the right to post information obtained on its own website
+within a few days after its public release. MFIAC thus has a direct stake not only in developing
+legal principles, but also in ensuring the dissemination of information to the public.
+
+MFIAC'S EDUCATION AND ADVOCACY EFFORTS
+
+11. MFIAC engages in litigation and other advocacy efforts in its own name and as
+counsel to amici. These efforts to date have focused largely on surveillance, law enforcement,
+and national security issues, such as the issues raised in MFIAC's motion before this Court.
+
+12. From its inception, MFIAC has addressed the privacy implications of data
+monitoring and other domestic surveillance activities carried out in the name of national security.
+For example, MFIAC has engaged in independent research and advocacy into use by the
+Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") of so-called “fusion centers." MFIAC filed multiple
+Freedom of Information Act requests in its own name seeking records disclosing the relationship
+of Connecticut state law enforcement agencies to the Fusion Center Initiative of DHS, and all the
+voluminous documents obtained have been catalogued by the Yale Law School library for online
+reference and research. MFIAC also filed a comment with DHS expressing "concern about the
+expense, mission creep, and privacy effects" of a proposed "Fusion System" database. See
+Comment of MFIAC on DHS Dkt. No. DHS-2010-0052, 75 Fed. Reg. 69689-93 (Nov. 15,
+2010), available at http://epic.org/privacy/fusion/MFIA_FusionCenters_CommentFinal.pdf.
+
+13. MFIAC has advocated for effective oversight of other law enforcement activities
+as well. On behalf of a group of local, state, and national media, journalist, open government,
+and civil liberties organizations, MFIAC filed an amicus brief in *Commissioner of Public Safety*
+
+4
+
+*v. Freedom of Information Commission, et al.*, a case currently pending before the Connecticut
+Supreme Court addressing the scope of an exemption for law enforcement records under the
+state's Freedom of Information law.
+
+14. MFIAC also carries out educational activities designed to increase public
+knowledge and awareness of open government issues, including the difficulty of reporting on
+certain topics related to national security and the challenges that requestors may face in using the
+Freedom of Information Act. For example, each year, MFIAC hosts a "FOIA Boot Camp" at
+Yale Law School for journalists, students, and other members of the public. Speakers walk
+through the process of filing requests for records under the federal FOIA and state FOI laws,
+explain the importance of access to government information, and address many of the challenges
+that requestors often face.
+
+15. Each year MFIAC is also involved in numerous conferences, presentations, and
+other events aimed at fostering public awareness of and debate over topics including balancing
+online privacy and national security, and understanding the scope and scale of federal law
+enforcement surveillance programs. Such events have included conferences or presentations on
+such topics as "NSA Surveillance and Foreign Affairs," "Protecting Journalism: Anonymous and
+Secure Communications for Reporters and Sources," "Open Government and the First
+Amendment: Strengthening our Democracy through Transparency, Participation, and
+Collaboration," "The Espionage Act and The Press: From The Pentagon Papers to Wikileaks,"
+"Is Big Brother Tracking You: Location Data and Fourth Amendment Privacy," "Nothing to
+Hide: The False Tradeoff Between Privacy and Security," "Privacy and Prior Consent," and
+"Surveillance." These presentations are, with rare exception, free and open to the public.
+Videos of many of these talks and others can likewise be viewed online.
+
+5
+
+CONCLUSION
+
+16. As the overview demonstrates, MFIAC's legal, policy, and educational activities
+stand to benefit in a number of ways from the disclosure and dissemination of information
+critical to effective oversight of government, including specifically information concerning
+surveillance and the protection of privacy.
+
+I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on
+October 11, 2013, at New Haven, Connecticut.
+
+MAXWELL S. MISHKIN
+
+6
+
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+2013 OCT 11 PM 4:27
+
+I, Patrick J. Hayden, certify that on this day, October 11, 2013, a copy of the foregoing
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+motion was served on the following persons by email and FedEx overnight delivery.CLERK OF COURT
+
+Christine Gunning
+Litigation Security Group
+U.S. Department of Justice
+2 Constitution Square
+145 N Street, N.E.
+Suite 2W-115
+Washington, DC 20530
+Email: Christine.E.Gunning@usdoj.gov
+
+John P. Carlin
+J. Bradford Wiegmann
+Tashina Gauhar
+Jeffrey M. Smith
+Nicholas J. Patterson
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, DC 20530
+Phone: (202) 514-5600
+Email: Jeffrey.Smith5@usdoj.gov
+
+Patrick J. Hayden
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-motion-131011/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-motion-131011/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c54d15e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-motion-131011/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+{
+ "title": "Notice of Motion, Memorandum in Support of Motion by Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic for Reconsideration of This Court's September 13, 2013 Opinion on the Issue of Article III Standing, and Declaration of Maxwell S. Mishkin, In re Orders of this Court Interpreting Section 215 of the Patriot Act",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-10-11",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Manning, Bradley"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-10-11",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34444",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "ca25e50e5114d72e879f414b9aaeed1a56431fbcb10c41604d7f20a6f13dfedc",
+ "pages": 25
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-motion-131127/FISC_-_misc-13-02-motion-131127.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-motion-131127/FISC_-_misc-13-02-motion-131127.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c9a7070
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-motion-131127/FISC_-_misc-13-02-motion-131127.md
@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+2013 NOV 26 PM 3:58
+
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+IN RE OPINIONS & ORDERS OF THIS COURT
+ADDRESSING BULK COLLECTION OF DATA
+UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-02
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR THE RELEASE OF
+COURT RECORDS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-08
+
+IN RE MOTION OF PROPUBLICA, INC. FOR
+THE RELEASE OF COURT RECORDS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-09
+
+MOTION OF THE REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND
+25 MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AS *AMICI CURIAE* IN
+SUPPORT OF THE NOVEMBER 6, 2013 MOTION BY THE AMERICAN CIVIL
+LIBERTIES UNION, *ET AL*., FOR THE RELEASE OF COURT RECORDS; THE
+OCTOBER 11, 2013 MOTION BY THE MEDIA FREEDOM AND INFORMATION
+ACCESS CLINIC FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THIS COURT'S SEPTEMBER 13,
+2013 OPINION ON THE ISSUE OF ARTICLE III STANDING; AND THE NOVEMBER
+12, 2013 MOTION BY PROPUBLICA, INC. FOR RELEASE OF COURT RECORDS
+
+November 26, 2013
+
+Bruce D. Brown
+The Reporters Committee for
+Freedom of the Press
+1101 Wilson Blvd., Suite 1100
+Arlington, VA 22209
+Counsel for Amici Curiae
+
+The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, American Society of News Editors,
+Atlantic Media, Inc., Bay Area News Group, Belo Corp., Bloomberg L.P., Courthouse News
+Service, The E.W. Scripps Company, First Amendment Coalition, Gannett Co., Inc., Hearst
+Corporation, Investigative Reporters and Editors, Investigative Reporting Workshop at American
+University, The McClatchy Company, Media Consortium, The National Press Club, National
+Press Photographers Association, National Public Radio, Inc., The New York Times Company,
+The New Yorker, North Jersey Media Group Inc., Online News Association, POLITICO LLC,
+Radio Television Digital News Association, The Seattle Times Company, and The Washington
+Post move for leave to file the accompanying brief *amici curiae* in support of (1) the November
+6, 2013 motion of the American Civil Liberties Union, *et al*., for the release of court records; (2)
+the October 11, 2013 motion of the Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic (MFIAC) for
+reconsideration of this Court's September 13, 2013 opinion on the issue of Article III standing;
+and (3) the November 12, 2013 motion of ProPublica, Inc. for release of court records.
+
+This coalition of news media organizations writes separately to emphasize that MFIAC,
+like all members of the public, has standing to seek access to this Court's records. While the
+news media have a long tradition of fighting for public access to court proceedings and records,
+it is important for this Court to recognize that the public at large possesses this right, and that the
+interests at stake can be vindicated by anyone. As the Supreme Court has found, potential harm
+to the public debate and erosion in confidence to the judicial system is an injury that everyone
+shares when access rights are denied.
+
+*Amici* are further concerned that the standard that this Court applied in denying standing
+to MFIAC undermines the right of the news media to seek access to court records and
+proceedings. While it seems that a news organization that intends to report on a public
+
+2
+
+controversy would be able to satisfy the rule, a court could use it to deny standing to a media
+party that could not show a prior track record of covering a particular issue.
+
+*Amici* additionally emphasize that the documents sought are critically important to
+improving public understanding of this Court and the federal government's national security
+operations. The public has a formidable First Amendment interest in hearing directly from this
+Court about its core judicial activities in interpreting the statutes that give rise to its jurisdiction.
+Disclosures in recent months about the scope, legality and administration of NSA surveillance
+programs amplify the need for access and merits attention here.
+
+Counsel for all parties have consented to the filing of the accompanying brief.
+
+***
+
+Pursuant to this Court's order, dated July 18, 2013, and United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court R.P. 7(h)(1) and 63, the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
+Press respectfully submits the following information: Bruce D. Brown is a member in good
+standing of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (#457317), admitted
+September 12, 2011. Additionally, Brown is a member of good standing of the bar of the
+Commonwealth of Massachusetts (#629541) and the District of Columbia (#426092). *Amici*
+further certify that the undersigned does not currently hold a security clearance.
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+Bur D. Bru
+Bruce D. Brown, Counsel for Amici Curiae
+The Reporters Committee for
+Freedom of the Press
+1101 Wilson Blvd., Suite 1100
+Arlington, VA 22209
+Phone: 703-807-2100
+Fax: 703-807-2109
+bbrown@rcfp.org
+
+Dated: November 26, 2013
+
+3
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I, Bruce D. Brown, certify that on November 26, 2013, a copy of this motion, together
+with the accompanying brief of *amici curiae*, were served on the following by in-person
+delivery:
+
+Christine Gunning
+Litigation Security Group
+U.S. Department of Justice
+2 Constitution Square
+145 N ST NE, Suite 2W-115
+Washington, DC 20530
+Christine.e.gunning@usdoj.gov
+
+I further certify that this motion and the accompanying brief were served on the following
+by electronic mail:
+
+Alex Abdo
+American Civil Liberties Union
+Foundation
+125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
+New York, NY 10004
+aabdo@aclu.org
+Counsel for American Civil Liberties
+Union
+
+David A. Schulz
+Media Freedom and Information Access
+Clinic
+Yale Law School
+P.O. Box 208215
+New Haven, CT 06520
+dschulz@lskslaw.com
+Counsel for Media Freedom and
+Information Access Clinic
+
+Arthur B. Spitzer
+American Civil Liberties Union of the
+Nation's Capital
+4301 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 434
+Washington, DC 20008
+artspitzer@aclu-nca.org
+Counsel for the American Civil Liberties
+Union of the Nation's Capital
+
+David Greene
+Electronic Frontier Foundation
+815 Eddy Street
+San Francisco, CA 94109
+davidg@eff.org
+Counsel for ProPublica, Inc.
+
+Bur D. Brow
+Bruce D. Brown
+
+4
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-motion-131127/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-motion-131127/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6e093d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-motion-131127/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Motion of The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and 25 Media Organizations for Leave to File Brief as Amicus Curiae in Support of the November 6, 2013 Motion by the American Civil Liberties Union, et al., for the Release of Court Records; the October 11, 2013 Motion by the Media Freedom and Information Clinic for Reconsideration of this Court's September 13, 2013 Opinion on the Issue of Article III Standing; and the November 12, 2013 Motion of ProPublica, Inc. for Release of Court Records,...",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-11-26",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-26",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34447",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "131bba8e787d78460ba1154d37dadb7ae1a28beaad5af4ad95c10e78718a37df",
+ "pages": 4
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-motion-for-leave/FISC_-_misc-13-02-motion-for-leave.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-motion-for-leave/FISC_-_misc-13-02-motion-for-leave.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..414ee83
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-motion-for-leave/FISC_-_misc-13-02-motion-for-leave.md
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, DC
+
+2013 JUN 28 PM 14:54
+LECARTOON RALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+IN RE ORDERS ISSUED BY THIS COURT
+INTERPRETING SECTION 215 OF THE
+PATRIOT ACT
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-02
+
+MOTION OF U.S. REPRESENTATIVES AMASH, BROUN, GABBARD, GRIFFITH,
+HOLT, JONES, LEE, LOFGREN, MASSIE, MCCLINTOCK, NORTON, O'ROURKE,
+PEARCE, SALMON, SANFORD, AND YOHO FOR LEAVE TO FILE A BRIEF AS
+AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL
+LIBERTIES UNION, THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF THE NATION'S
+CAPITAL, AND THE MEDIA FREEDOM AND INFORMATION ACCESS CLINIC
+FOR THE RELEASE OF COURT RECORDS
+
+Gregory L. Diskant
+Benjamin S. Litman
+Richard I. Kim
+PATTERSON BELKNAP WEBB & TYLER LLP
+1133 Avenue of the Americas
+New York, NY 10036
+Phone: (212) 336-2000
+Fax: (212) 336-2222
+
+Counsel for Amici Curiae
+
+U.S. Representatives Justin Amash, Paul Broun, Tulsi Gabbard, Morgan Griffith,
+Rush Holt, Walter Jones, Barbara Lee, Zoe Lofgren, Thomas Massie, Tom McClintock, Eleanor
+Holmes Norton, Beto O'Rourke, Steve Pearce, Matt Salmon, Mark Sanford, and Ted Yoho¹
+respectfully move for leave to file the accompanying brief as amici curiae in support of the
+Motion of the American Civil Liberties Union, the American Civil Liberties Union of the
+Nation's Capital, and the Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic for the Release of Court
+Records (the "Motion"), which was filed with this Court on June 10, 2013. The accompanying
+brief is addressed to the same subject as the Motion: to urge the Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Court ("FISC") to publish opinions--with classified information redacted—
+evaluating the meaning, scope, and constitutionality of Section 215 of the Patriot Act, 50 U.S.C.
+§ 1861. Amici curiae have worked extensively on issues surrounding government oversight and
+transparency. Rep. Amash has succinctly captured the interest of amici as follows: "We accept
+that free countries must engage in secret operations from time to time to protect their citizens.
+Free countries must not, however, operate under secret laws. Secret court opinions obscure the
+law. They prevent public debate on critical policy issues and they stop Congress from fulfilling
+its duty to enact sound laws and fix broken ones."
+The opinions sought in the Motion are essential to the proper functioning of the
+legislative branch of government and an informed public debate. They provide a critical gloss—
+namely, judicial interpretation and construction—on the laws governing the nation's surveillance
+practices. Without access to this information, Congress and the public cannot have a meaningful
+debate about how these laws operate in practice. The need for informed discussion in Congress
+regarding the implementation of surveillance laws is especially great now, as Congress is
+
+¹ Brief biographies for each amicus appear in Appendix A to the accompanying brief.
+
+evaluating ways to ensure government operations are more effective, to streamline the
+government's budget, and to protect Americans' civil liberties in an age of rapid technological
+expansion. As Congress considers whether to reauthorize one of the government's principal
+surveillance tools—Section 215 of the Patriot Act in two years, it is crucial for Congress to
+fully understand how the law is being utilized and where it can be clarified or improved.
+Moreover, the importance of meaningful debate on this issue has grown as the American people
+have become increasingly suspicious of their government's surveillance activities. To enable an
+open dialogue on these issues between and within Congress and the public, amici curiae urge
+this Court to disclose the secret opinions sought in the Motion.
+Counsel for both parties have consented to the filing of the accompanying brief.
+Dated: June 28, 2013
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+Gregory L. Diskant, NYS OCA #1047240
+Benjamin S. Litman, NYS OCA #4508404
+Richard I. Kim, NYS OCA #4939799
+PATTERSON BELKNAP WEBB & TYLER, LLP
+1133 Avenue of the Americas
+New York, NY 10036
+Phone: (212) 336-2000
+Fax: (212) 336-2222
+
+Counsel for Amici Curiae
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+I, Benjamin S. Litman, certify that on this day, June 28, 2013, a copy of the
+foregoing motion, together with the accompanying brief of amici curiae, was served on the
+following person via electronic mail:
+
+Christine Gunning
+Litigation Security Group
+U.S. Department of Justice
+2 Constitution Square
+145 N Street, N.E.
+Suite 2W-115
+Washington, DC 20530
+christine.e.gunning@usdoj.gov
+
+Benjamin S. Litman
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-motion-for-leave/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-motion-for-leave/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..53121bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-motion-for-leave/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Motion of U.S. Representatives Amash, Broun, Gabbard, Griffith, Holt, Jones, Lee, Lofgren, Massie, McClintock, Norton, O'Rourke, Pearce, Salmon, Sanford, and Yoho for Leave to File a Brief as Amici Curiae in Support of the Motion of the American Civil Liberties Union, the American Civil Liberties Union of the Nation's Capital, and the Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic for the Release of Court Records, In re Orders of this Court Interpreting Section 215 of the Patriot Act",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-06-28",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-06-28",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34434",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "1cfcebfaedd5bbc9a0c13a0eabb8536930219d6de392db17f7df6acbe96f4572",
+ "pages": 4
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-order-130813/FISC_-_misc-13-02-order-130813.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-order-130813/FISC_-_misc-13-02-order-130813.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..331c271
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-order-130813/FISC_-_misc-13-02-order-130813.md
@@ -0,0 +1,542 @@
+[REDACTED]
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE ORDERS OF THIS COURT
+INTERPRETING SECTION 215
+OF THE PATRIOT ACT
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-02
+
+OPINION AND ORDER
+
+This matter involves a motion by the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU"), the
+American Civil Liberties Union of the Nation's Capital (“ACLU-NC"), and the Media Freedom
+and Information Access Clinic (“MFIAC") for release of certain opinions of the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court. In particular, movants seek release of opinions on Section 215
+of the Patriot Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1861¹---that is, the business records provision of the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA"), codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1885c.
+
+For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that the ACLU and ACLU-NC have
+standing to seek this relief, as required by Article III of the Constitution, and that the Rules of the
+FISC do not preclude the Court from considering this request.² The Court concludes, however,
+that principles of comity---specifically, the "first-to-file" rule---require that the motion be denied
+to the extent that it concerns FISC opinions that are at issue in a separate suit brought by the
+ACLU in October 2011 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
+
+¹ See Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 287 (2001), codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
+§ 1861.
+
+² The Rules of the FISC may be found at www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/rules/FISC2010.pdf.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552.³
+As a matter of discretion and for the reasons set forth below, the Court will order the government
+to conduct a declassification review of any opinions responsive to the present motion that are not
+subject to that FOIA litigation and to report the results of that review to the Court.
+
+I. Procedural History
+
+On June 12, 2013, the ACLU, the ACLU-NC, and the MFIAC filed a motion with the
+FISC for release of certain court records. Specifically, the movants seek "publication of [FISC]
+opinions evaluating the meaning, scope, and constitutionality of Section 215 of the Patriot Act,
+50 U.S.C. § 1861" ("Section 215 Opinions"), "with only those redactions that satisfy the
+stringent First Amendment standard that applies in public-access cases." Motion at 1.
+Alternatively, the motion requests that the Court "exercise its discretion" to order such
+publication "in the public interest." Id.
+
+In support of that request, movants assert a qualified First Amendment right of access to
+the opinions in question. They contend that a prior opinion of the FISC denying a claim of right
+to obtain access to a FISC opinion, In re Motion for Release of Court Records, 526 F. Supp.2d
+484 (FISA Ct. 2007), was erroneous. In particular, they contend that the FISC erred in its
+application of the two-part "experience and logic" test for determining whether a First
+Amendment right of access to court proceedings or records attaches.⁴ Movants further contend
+
+³ ACLU v. FBI, No. 11 Civ. 7562 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2011). For the sake of convenience,
+the Court will refer to it as the “FOIA litigation."
+
+⁴ In assessing whether there is a First Amendment right of access to a criminal
+2
+(continued...)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+that, because of this constitutional right, any restriction on access must serve a compelling
+governmental interest and be narrowly tailored to serve that interest. They acknowledge that
+narrow redactions to protect sensitive information, such as "intelligence sources and methods
+that have not been previously disclosed," would satisfy this standard. Id. at 14; see also id. at 16
+("This motion does not seek the disclosure of ... any properly classified information").
+
+The government, in response, contends that In re Motion for Release of Court Records
+was correctly decided and that movants have not established a First Amendment right of access
+to the opinions at issue. The government also contends that because movants were not parties to
+the Section 215 proceedings that resulted in the opinions they seek, they lack "standing" under
+the FISC Rules to request the Court to publish the opinions as a matter of discretion. On the
+government's interpretation, the judge who authored an opinion could still request publication
+sua sponte, and after consultation the Presiding Judge could direct publication, provided that the
+Executive Branch redacts from the public version any classified information.
+
+In their reply memorandum, movants further contend that the FISC has the authority to
+make classification decisions independent of the Executive Branch and to publish the opinions
+without an Executive Branch declassification review.
+
+⁴(...continued)
+proceeding, the Supreme Court has looked to "whether the place and process have historically
+been open to the press and the general public" and "whether public access plays a significant
+positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question." Press-Enter. Co. v.
+Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986). "If the particular proceeding in question passes these tests
+of experience and logic, a qualified First Amendment right of public access attaches." Id. at 9.
+
+⁵ The Court has also received, accompanied by motions for leave to file, two amici curiae
+(continued...)
+3
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+II. The ACLU and ACLU-NC Have Standing Under Article III to Seek the
+Relief Requested.
+
+The FISC is an Article III court.⁶ In order for the federal judicial power to be exercised
+under Article III, there must be an actual case or controversy before the court. See, e.g., Clapper
+v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S.
+332, 341 (2006). "One element of the case-or-controversy requirement' is that plaintiffs 'must
+establish that they have standing to sue." Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1146 (quoting Raines v. Byrd,
+521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997)). Although the parties have not addressed whether movants have
+standing under Article III, the Court is nonetheless obliged to verify that standing exists. See
+e.g., Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 331 (1977).
+
+"To establish Article III standing, an injury must be concrete, particularized, and actual or
+imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling."
+
+⁵(...continued)
+briefs in support of the Motion. See Brief of Amici Curiae U.S. Representatives Amash, Broun,
+Gabbard, Griffith, Holt, Jones, Lee, Lofgren, Massie, McClintock, Norton, O'Rourke, Pearce,
+Salmon, Sanford, and Yoho (hereinafter “Congressional Amici") in Support of the Motion, filed
+on June 28, 2013; Brief of Amici Curiae the Reporters Committee for the Freedom of the Press;
+ABC, Inc.; the Associated Press; Bloomberg, L.P.; Dow Jones & Company, Inc.; Gannet Co.,
+Inc.; Los Angeles Times; the McClatchy Company; National Public Radio, Inc.; the New York
+Times Company; the New Yorker; the Newsweek/Daily Beast Company LLC; Reuters America
+LLC; Tribune Company; and the Washington Post (hereinafter “Media Amici") in Support of the
+Motion, filed on July 15, 2013. The Court granted the motions for leave to file these two briefs
+on July 18, 2013, and has reviewed and benefited from them.
+
+⁶ See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 731 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (applying to the FISC
+"the constitutional bounds that restrict an Article III court") (per curiam); In re Motion, 526 F.
+Supp. 2d at 486 ("the FISC is an inferior federal court established by Congress under Article
+III"); In re Kevork, 634 F. Supp. 1002, 1014 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (district court judges retain
+"Article III status" when acting as members of the FISC), aff'd, 788 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1986).
+4
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147 (internal quotations omitted); accord, e.g., Davis v. Federal Election
+Comm'n, 554 U.S. 724, 733 (2008). Here, movants complain that withholding the Section 215
+Opinions from the public violates their First Amendment right of access. The claimed injury is
+actual, rather than imminent: the Section 215 Opinions are not now available to the public. Nor
+is there any real question that this claimed injury is fairly traceable to the government's decision
+not to make the Section 215 Opinions public and to the grounds for such withholding---that is,
+the government's determination that the opinions are classified---and that it would be redressed
+by this Court's directing that those opinions be published.
+
+There is a more substantial question whether movants have an injury that is sufficiently
+concrete and particularized to confer Article III standing. The injury-in-fact prerequisite for
+Article III standing "helps assure that courts will not pass upon... abstract, intellectual
+problems, but adjudicate concrete, living contest[s] between adversaries." Federal Election
+Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20 (1998) (internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, an injury
+is particularized for standing purposes if it affects a claimant "in a personal and individual way."
+Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 n.1 (1992). Here, movants assert a right of
+access that is indistinguishable from those of any other interested member of the public.
+Nevertheless, for the reasons explained below, movants could have a concrete and particularized
+injury in fact if the lack of public access to the Section 215 Opinions impedes their own activities
+in a concrete, particular way---or to put the point differently, if public access to the Section 215
+Opinions would be of concrete, particular assistance to them in their own activities.
+
+5
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+The Supreme Court has held that claimants asserting a widely-shared right to receive
+information can establish an injury that is sufficiently concrete and particular for purposes of
+Article III standing. The respondents in Akins asserted a right to obtain "lists of [American Israel
+Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC)] donors ... and campaign-related contributions and
+expenditures... that, on respondents' view of the law, the [Federal Election Campaign Act]
+require[d] that AIPAC make public." 524 U.S. at 21. The Court found that the respondents'
+inability to obtain this information constituted a sufficient injury in fact under Article III because
+there was "no reason to doubt their claim that the information would help them (and others to
+whom they would communicate it) to evaluate candidates for public office, especially candidates
+who received assistance from AIPAC, and to evaluate the role that AIPAC's financial assistance
+might play in a specific election." Id. On that basis, the Court found that the respondents' injury
+was "concrete and particular." Id.
+
+The Court reached that conclusion in Akins notwithstanding the fact that the respondents'
+"asserted harm (their failure to obtain information) is one which is shared in substantially equal
+measure by all or a large class of citizens." Id. at 23 (internal quotations omitted). While
+acknowledging that some of its prior decisions contained statements suggesting that such
+"generalized grievances" do not confer standing, id. (citing, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74
+(internal quotations omitted)), the Court explained that such "judicial language ... invariably
+appears in cases where the harm at issue is not only widely shared, but is also of an abstract and
+indefinite nature -- for example, harm to the common concern for obedience to law." Akins, 524
+U.S. at 23 (emphasis added; internal quotations omitted). "The abstract nature of the harm" in
+
+6
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+those cases "deprives the case of the concrete specificity" necessary for a plaintiff to have
+standing. Id. at 24. "[W]here a harm is concrete, though widely shared, the Court has found
+'injury in fact." Id.⁷
+
+Courts have applied the same principles in evaluating Article III standing to assert a right
+of access to judicial or administrative proceedings. A party who had not herself been excluded
+from any juvenile court proceeding, and who had been permitted to attend the only proceedings
+she had sought to attend, had not suffered a particularized injury in fact and consequently lacked
+standing to bring a First Amendment challenge to a statute restricting public access to such
+proceedings. See Ernst v. Child & Youth Servs. of Chester Cnty., 108 F.3d 486, 499-500 (3d
+Cir. 1997). On the other hand, when an organization had been excluded from certain
+proceedings and that exclusion had been detrimental to its activities, the organization suffered a
+concrete and particularized injury in fact. See New York Civil Liberties Union v. New York City
+Transit Auth., 684 F.3d 286, 295 (2d Cir. 2012).⁸ In that case, agents of the plaintiff organization
+had sought to attend certain hearings and had been denied access as a result of the challenged
+policy of the agency conducting the hearings. The court found that the organization had
+"suffered a concrete injury as a result of the policy." Id. This injury was to a particularized
+interest of the organization because it represented clients before that agency and sought to
+
+⁷ As to the other two elements of Article III standing, the Court found in Akins that the
+claimants' injury was fairly traceable to a decision of the Federal Election Commission and
+would be redressed by the Court's setting aside that decision. Id. at 25.
+
+⁸ An organization will have Article III standing if it meets the same requirements that
+apply to individuals. E.g., New York Civil Liberties Union v. New York City Transit Auth., 684
+F.3d 286, 294 (2d Cir. 2012).
+7
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+observe hearings in order to prepare for those appearances. Id. at 293, 295. Actual exclusion of
+the organization (through its agents), to the detriment of the organization's own activities,
+constituted a sufficient injury in fact for there to be standing under Article III. Id. at 295.⁹
+
+In this case, movants contend that release of the Section 215 Opinions would inform and
+enhance public debate about Section 215, but they do not explain how release would aid their
+own activities or how continued withholding of the opinions is detrimental to them particularly.
+A sufficient injury in fact may not require great harm to movants' own activities, see New York
+Civil Liberties Union, 684 F.3d at 294 ("only a perceptible impairment of an organization's
+activities is necessary for there to be an injury in fact") (citation and internal quotations omitted),
+but some harm is necessary.¹⁰
+
+The Court ordinarily would not look beyond information presented by the parties to find
+that a claimant has Article III standing. In this case, however, the ACLU's active participation in
+the legislative and public debates about the proper scope of Section 215 and the advisability of
+amending that provision is obvious from the public record and not reasonably in dispute.¹¹ Nor is
+
+⁹ The causation and redressability requirements for Article III standing were also met, as
+the exclusion was a result of an agency policy that the organization sought to invalidate on First
+Amendment grounds. Id.
+
+¹⁰ But see Fisher v. King, 232 F.3d 391, 396 n.5 (4th Cir. 2000) (including a brief
+discussion of standing that could be read to state that mere lack of access to a requested record
+constituted a sufficient injury in fact).
+
+¹¹ See, e.g., Michelle Richardson, Legislative Counsel, ACLU Washington Legislative
+Office, Misdirection: The House Intelligence Committee's Misleading Patriot Act Talking Points
+(June 20, 2013) (https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/misdirection-house-intelligence-
+committees-misleading-patriot-act-talking); Testimony of Jameel Jaffer, Deputy Legal Director
+(continued...)
+8
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+it disputed that access to the Section 215 Opinions would assist the ACLU in that debate. The
+Court therefore concludes that the ACLU has satisfied that requirement. See, e.g., Ohio Citizen
+Action v. City of Englewood, 671 F.3d 564, 579 (6th Cir. 2012).
+
+Accordingly, the Court finds that the withholding from the ACLU of the Section 215
+Opinions constitutes a concrete and particularized injury in fact to the ACLU for purposes of
+Article III standing. Because of the ACLU-NC's shared mission and interlocking membership
+with the ACLU (also a matter of public record not in dispute),¹² the Court makes the same
+finding regarding the ACLU-NC. The Court cannot, however, make such a finding as to
+MFIAC.¹³
+
+¹¹(...continued)
+of the ACLU Foundation, and Laura W. Murphy, Director, Washington Legislative Office,
+ACLU, before the Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on Strengthening Privacy Rights and
+National Security: Oversight of FISA Surveillance Programs (July 31, 2013)
+(http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/7-31-13JafferTestimony.pdf); Testimony of Mr. Jaffer and
+Ms. Murphy before the House Committee on the Judiciary, Oversight Hearing on the
+Administration's Use of FISA Authorities (July 17, 2013) (at
+http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/113th/07172013/Jaffer%2007172913.pdf).
+
+¹² Persons who join the ACLU-NC thereby become members of the ACLU also. See
+http://ACLU-NCA.org/about.
+
+¹³ MFIAC has submitted no information as to how the release of the opinions would aid
+its activities, or how the failure to release them would be detrimental. Moreover, a review of the
+public record has not revealed any indication that the MFIAC has participated in public debate
+about Section 215. Therefore, the Court is unable to find that MFIAC has suffered an injury in
+fact from lack of access to the Section 215 Opinions. MFIAC's lack of standing under Article III
+has no practical effect, however, because the other movants do have standing and they seek the
+same relief on identical grounds as MFIAC.
+9
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+III. FISC Rule 62(a) Does Not Preclude the Court From Entertaining the Motion.
+
+The government contends that movants lack "standing" of a different sort than the Article
+III requirement. In the government's view, FISC Rule 62(a) precludes movants from requesting
+the Court to publish the Section 215 Opinions as an exercise of the Court's discretion.¹⁴ That
+Rule states as follows:
+
+Publication of Opinions. The judge who authored an order, opinion, or other
+decision may sua sponte or on motion by a party request that it be published.
+Upon such request, the Presiding Judge, after consulting with other Judges of the
+Court, may direct that an order, opinion or other decision be published. Before
+publication, the Court may, as appropriate, direct the Executive Branch to review
+the order, opinion, or other decision and redact it as necessary to ensure that
+properly classified information is appropriately protected....
+
+FISC Rule 62(a). The government argues that because movants were not parties to any of the
+Section 215 proceedings in which the opinions were issued, Rule 62(a) forecloses them from
+seeking publication. Under the government's interpretation, the judge who authored an opinion
+could nevertheless sua sponte request publication, and after consultation the Presiding Judge
+could direct publication, provided that the Executive Branch redacts from the public version any
+classified information. The government also states that a declassification review process for
+these opinions is underway.
+
+¹⁴ The government does not assert that movants lack this form of "standing" insofar as
+they assert a First Amendment right of access, perhaps in view of the determination of the FISC
+in 2007 that "it would be quite odd if the FISC did not have jurisdiction in the first instance to
+adjudicate a claim of right to the court's very own records and files.” In re Motion, 526 F. Supp.
+2d at 487 (emphasis added). Of course, the government vigorously disputes that the claim of a
+First Amendment right of access is meritorious.
+10
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Movants submit that Rule 62(a) does not preclude the Court from entertaining their
+motion for two reasons: first, because a "party" who, as described in that Rule, may move for
+publication of an opinion does not have to have been a party to the proceeding that resulted in the
+opinion; and second, because Rule 62(a) should not be understood to extinguish the FISC's
+inherent power to consider movants' request. Movants further contend that the FISC has the
+authority to make classification decisions independent of the Executive Branch and to publish the
+opinions without an Executive Branch declassification review.
+
+The Court concludes that the term "party" in Rule 62(a) refers to a party to the proceeding
+that resulted in the "opinion, order, or other decision" being considered for publication.
+Otherwise, the phrase "by a party" would be superfluous. Nevertheless, for reasons explained
+below, the Court is persuaded that Rule 62(a) does not preclude it from considering the present
+motion.
+
+As the government acknowledges and Rule 62(a) explicitly states, the Court has the
+discretion to direct publication sua sponte. Given this discretion to act, it would serve no
+discernible purpose for the Court, by rule, to be precluded from considering reasoned arguments
+in favor of publication of certain opinions made by claimants with Article III standing to seek
+their publication. Indeed, although the Court does not reach the merits of the First Amendment
+claim, it is noteworthy that the government's reading of Rule 62(a), which would preclude non-
+parties from requesting publication, would logically extend to non-parties who claim a right to
+public access. Certainly, at least, nothing in the language of the Rule provides a basis for
+distinguishing assertions of right from requests for discretionary publication. Accordingly, the
+11
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+government's interpretation of Rule 62(a) would lead to the same "odd" result that the FISC
+rejected in 2007: that the FISC could not "adjudicate a claim of right" to access "its very own
+records and files." In re Motion, 526 F. Supp.2d at 487.
+
+Moreover, in referring to a "motion by a party" seeking publication, Rule 62(a) appears to
+contemplate the ordinary case where publication of an opinion is being considered shortly after
+its issuance, when non-parties are unlikely to know about a classified opinion and would not be
+able to present cogent arguments for publication. This case involves the extraordinary
+circumstances of (1) a particular FISC order (apparently) being unlawfully misappropriated,
+leaked to the press, and widely publicized; (2) the government's subsequent declassification and
+release of significant information about the context and legal underpinnings of that order; and (3)
+a high level of public and legislative interest in how the relevant statutory provision has been
+interpreted and applied and whether legislative changes should be made. This unusual
+combination of events, among other things, means that non-parties to the Section 215
+proceedings have sufficient information to make reasonably concrete, rather than abstract,
+arguments in favor of publication. Under the circumstances, there is no persuasive reason to
+interpret Rule 62(a) to preclude the Court from even considering their request.
+
+IV. Principles of Comity Require Dismissal of the Motion With Regard to
+Opinions That Are the Subject of the Previously Commenced FOIA
+Litigation.
+
+Movants acknowledge that there is ongoing FOIA litigation in the District Court for the
+Southern District of New York concerning disclosure of a set of FISC opinions. The subject of
+that litigation overlaps, if not entirely coincides, with the Section 215 Opinions subject to the
+12
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+present motion. Other than movants' assertion that “the public's First Amendment right of
+access attaches to this Court's legal opinions interpreting public laws, irrespective of the
+government's statutory obligation under FOIA to disclose records in its possession,” Motion at
+13 n.6, the parties have not briefed the significance of the ongoing FOIA litigation. It is apparent
+to the Court, however, that it should examine sua sponte whether principles of comity—and
+specifically, the "first-to-file" rule—counsel against proceeding in this matter with regard to
+FISC opinions that are already part of the FOIA litigation.¹⁵
+
+As a matter of comity, and in order to conserve judicial resources and avoid inconsistent
+judgments, federal courts do not engage in parallel adjudications involving the same parties and
+issues. See, e.g., UtahAmerican Energy, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor, 685 F.3d 1118, 1124 (D.C. Cir.
+2012) (per curiam); Church of Scientology of California v. Dep't of Army, 611 F.2d 738, 749-50
+(9th Cir. 1979). The general rule is that when two such actions are pending, the district court in
+which the second action is filed will decline to consider the matter in deference to the district
+court in which the first matter was filed. See UtahAmerican Energy, 685 F.3d at 1124; EEOC v.
+University of Pennsylvania, 850 F.2d 969, 976 (3d Cir. 1988), aff'd, 493 U.S. 182 (1990);
+Church of Scientology, 611 F.2d at 749-50. Under exceptional circumstances, the court with the
+earlier-filed action may defer to the court with the later-filed action, but in either case
+duplicative, parallel proceedings are avoided.¹⁶
+
+¹⁵ Courts have discretion to examine matters of comity sua sponte. United States v. AMC
+Entertainment, Inc., 549 F.3d 760, 771 n.5 (9th Cir. 2008).
+
+¹⁶ See, e.g., University of Pennsylvania, 850 F.2d at 978 (party filing first action sought
+(continued...)
+13
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+The application of these principles to the FOIA context results in courts avoiding
+duplicative adjudication over the same documents between the same parties. Under the general
+first-to-file rule, the court with the later-filed action generally should defer to the court with the
+earlier-filed action, to the extent the matters involve the same party requesting the same
+documents. See UtahAmerican Energy, 685 F.3d at 1123-25 (abuse of discretion for judge with
+later-filed action to order release of document also at issue in earlier-filed action).
+
+The FISC, of course, is not a district court, but rather an Article III court composed of
+district judges. The concerns underlying the first-to-file rule—avoiding duplicative effort and the
+possibility of inconsistent results—fully apply here. The opinions at issue in both cases are
+overlapping, if not coextensive. The FOIA litigation in New York commenced in October 2011,
+long before the motion was filed in this Court in June 2013. The parties in the two cases are
+substantially identical.¹⁷ The movants properly before this Court are the ACLU and a closely
+related entity, the ACLU-NC; the ACLU is a plaintiff in the FOIA litigation.¹⁸ Of course, the
+United States Government or its agencies are parties to both proceedings. Insofar as they involve
+
+¹⁶(...continued)
+"to circumvent local law and preempt an imminent subpoena enforcement action"); Church of
+Scientology, 611 F.2d at 749-50 (proceedings in second court advanced to point where judicial
+economy was better served by that court's adjudicating the matter).
+
+¹⁷ Application of the first-to-file rule does not require "exact identity" of parties, as long
+as some "parties in one matter are also in the other matter." Intersearch Worldwide, Ltd. v.
+Intersearch Group, Inc., 544 F. Supp.2d 949, 959 n.6 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
+
+¹⁸ In addition, two of the attorneys for the movants before the FISC also represent the
+ACLU in the separate FOIA litigation.
+14
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+the same documents, presumably the same officials are involved in declassification and release
+determinations in each case.
+
+Finally, there is sufficient overlap between the issues in the two cases for the first-to-file
+rule to apply. Although the legal theories advanced by the ACLU in the two proceedings are
+different (statutory right-to-disclosure under FOIA rather than constitutional right-of-access
+under the First Amendment), substantially the same relief is sought in both cases: disclosure of
+the opinions with only such redactions as are necessary to protect intelligence sources and
+methods and other properly classified information. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (exempting from
+disclosure under FOIA matters that are "specifically authorized under criteria established by an
+Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and... are
+in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order"); Motion at 14, 16 (the motion does
+not seek disclosure of “intelligence sources and methods that have not been previously disclosed"
+or other "properly classified information"). The present motion thus asks the FISC to do the
+same thing that the ACLU is asking the District Court in New York to do in the FOIA litigation:
+ensure that the opinions are disclosed, with only properly classified information withheld.
+Having both courts proceed poses the risks of duplication of effort and inconsistent outcomes
+that the first-to-file rule is intended to avoid.
+
+Under the first-to-file rule, dismissal by the court of second filing "is proper where the
+court of first filing provides adequate remedies.” Intersearch Worldwide, 544 F. Supp.2d at 963.
+The Court sees no reason to presume that the remedies available in the FOIA litigation in the
+Southern District of New York are inadequate. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the present
+15
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+motion to the extent that it concerns the opinions that are at issue in the FOIA litigation. Such
+dismissal is without prejudice to reinstatement of a motion for publication with the FISC after
+resolution of the FOIA litigation in the Southern District of New York and any appeal
+therefrom.¹⁹
+
+V. As an Exercise of Discretion, the Court Directs the Government to Perform
+and Report on the Results of Declassification Reviews of Any Section 215
+Opinions That Are Not Subject to the FOIA Litigation.
+
+There may be FISC opinions that "evaluat[e] the meaning, scope, and constitutionality of
+Section 215," Motion at 1, but are not subject to the FOIA litigation (for example, because they
+were issued after the government had conducted its search for responsive records in response to
+the underlying FOIA request). The Court, however, is not in a position to identify any such
+Section 215 Opinions, because the record does not specify exactly what opinions are at issue in
+the FOIA litigation.
+
+Assuming that there are such Section 215 Opinions that are not at issue in the FOIA
+litigation, movants and amici have presented several substantial reasons why the public interest
+might be served by their publication. The unauthorized disclosure in June 2013 of a Section 215
+order, and government statements in response to that disclosure, have engendered considerable
+public interest and debate about Section 215. Publication of FISC opinions relating to this
+provision would contribute to an informed debate. Congressional amici emphasize the value of
+public information and debate in representing their constituents and discharging their legislative
+
+¹⁹ Upon such reinstatement, the FISC would presumably examine what, if any, preclusive
+effect the outcome of the FOIA litigation should be afforded.
+16
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+responsibilities. Publication would also assure citizens of the integrity of this Court's
+proceedings.
+
+In addition, publication with only limited redactions may now be feasible, given the
+extent of the government's recent public disclosures about how Section 215 is implemented.
+Indeed, the government advises that a declassification review process is already underway.
+
+In view of these circumstances, and as an exercise of discretion, the Court has determined
+that it is appropriate to take steps toward publication of any Section 215 Opinions that are not
+subject to the ongoing FOIA litigation, without reaching the merits of the asserted right of public
+access under the First Amendment. Because the record in this matter does not specify exactly
+which (if any) Section 215 Opinions are not subject to the FOIA litigation, the Court is not in a
+position at this time to initiate the publication procedure described in Rule 62(a), whereby the
+judge who issued the opinion in question may request its publication. Instead, the Court will take
+the steps described below in order to facilitate consideration of publication pursuant to Rule
+62(a).
+
+***
+
+For the reasons stated above, it is HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
+
+(1) The Court dismisses the Motion of the ACLU and the ACLU-NC to the extent that it
+requests publication of opinions that are at issue in the pending FOIA litigation in the District
+Court for the Southern District of New York. Such dismissal is without prejudice to
+reinstatement of a motion for publication with the FISC after resolution of that FOIA litigation,
+including any appeal therefrom.
+
+17
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(2) The Court dismisses the claim of MFIAC for lack of standing.
+
+(3) By October 4, 2013, the government (and, to the extent particularly identifying
+information is available to it as plaintiff in the FOIA litigation, the ACLU) shall make a written
+submission identifying which Section 215 Opinions are subject to the FOIA litigation. By that
+same date, the government shall identify which Section 215 Opinions, if any, are not subject to
+the FOIA litigation (or a separate order under Rule 62(a)) and propose a timetable to complete a
+declassification review and submit to the Court its proposed redactions, if any, for each such
+Section 215 Opinion. After that review and submission, the author of each such opinion, with
+the benefit of any proposed redactions, may decide whether to propose publication pursuant to
+Rule 62(a).
+
+So ORDERED this 13th day of September, 2013, in Docket No. Misc. 13-02.
+
+/s/ F. Dennis Saylor
+F. DENNIS SAYLOR IV
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+18
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-order-130813/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-order-130813/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6dabc7c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-order-130813/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Opinion and Order, In re Orders of this Court Interpreting Section 215 of the Patriot Act",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-09-13",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-09-13",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/33998",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "30670820d2d2151096b28a033344b457cf8997cb6a92d8a39fe2d939a2283568",
+ "pages": 18
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-order-131008/FISC_-_misc-13-02-order-131008.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-order-131008/FISC_-_misc-13-02-order-131008.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5140ff1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-order-131008/FISC_-_misc-13-02-order-131008.md
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+UNITED STATES
+
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE ORDERS OF THIS COURT
+INTERPRETING SECTION 215
+OF THE PATRIOT ACT
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-02
+
+ORDER
+
+The Court having reviewed and considered the Submission of the United States in
+Response to the Court's September 13, 2013 Opinion and Order and Motion for Stay of Further
+Proceedings Due to Lapsed Appropriations, filed on October 4, 2013 (“Submission”), it is
+HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
+
+(1) In view of the lack of appropriations noted in the Submission, the government's
+motion for stay of further proceedings is GRANTED.
+
+(2) The government has identified the Opinion issued in Docket Number BR 13-25 on
+February 19, 2013, as one that "contain[s] analysis by this Court evaluating the meaning, scope,
+and/or constitutionality" of Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, codified as amended at 50
+U.S.C. § 1861, and that is not at issue in a previously commenced suit (ACLU v. FBI, No. 11
+Civ. 7562 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2011)) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C.
+§ 552. Submission at 2. The government shall promptly conduct a declassification review of that
+opinion when the necessary appropriations are restored to the agencies involved in such a review.
+
+(3) Within seven days of such restoration of appropriations, the government shall submit
+to the Court a proposed timetable for completing the declassification review of the opinion
+identified in paragraph (2) above and submitting to the Court any proposed redactions for that
+opinion.
+
+So ORDERED this 8th day of October, 2013, in Docket No. Misc. 13-02.
+
+/s/ F. Dennis Saylor
+F. DENNIS SAYLOR IV
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-order-131008/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-order-131008/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3b6d07a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-order-131008/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Order, In re Orders of this Court Interpreting Section 215 of the Patriot Act",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-10-08",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-10-08",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34230",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "8e17c41052b7fb888e367b831ccd7fd6fb07c8704a5f14c387405f26d32645c1",
+ "pages": 1
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-order-131120/FISC_-_misc-13-02-order-131120.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-order-131120/FISC_-_misc-13-02-order-131120.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d999163
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-order-131120/FISC_-_misc-13-02-order-131120.md
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE ORDERS OF THIS COURT
+INTERPRETING SECTION 215
+OF THE PATRIOT ACT
+Docket No. Misc. 13-02
+
+ORDER
+
+This matter involves a motion by the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) and the American Civil Liberties Union of the Nation's Capital (“ACLU-NC”) for release of certain opinions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. In particular, movants seek release of opinions on Section 215 of the Patriot Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1861[^1]—that is, the business records provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”), codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1885c.
+
+Under orders of the Court issued on September 13 and October 8, 2013, the government was required to conduct a declassification review of a FISC opinion issued on February 19, 2013, in Docket No. BR 13-25 (“Opinion”) and to submit to the Court its proposed redactions of that Opinion, if any, in order to inform the Court's decision whether to publish it under FISC Rule 62(a). On November 18, 2013, the government advised that, “[a]fter careful review of the Opinion by senior intelligence officials and the U.S. Department of Justice, the Executive Branch has determined that the Opinion should be withheld in full and a public version of the Opinion
+
+1: See Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 287 (2001), codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861.
+
+cannot be provided.” Second Submission of the United States in Response to the Court's October 8, 2013 Order at 2. The government has provided no explanation of this conclusion.
+
+Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that, no later than December 20, 2013, the government shall submit a detailed explanation of its conclusion that the Opinion is classified in full and cannot be made public, even in a redacted form. To the extent that this submission may contain classified information, it shall conform with FISC Rule 7(j), which provides:
+
+At the request of the government in an adversarial proceeding, the Judge must review *ex parte* and *in camera* any submissions by the government, or portions thereof, which may include classified information. Except as otherwise ordered, if the government files *ex parte* a submission that contains classified information, the government must file and serve on the non-governmental party an unclassified or redacted version. The unclassified or redacted version, at a minimum, must clearly articulate the government's legal arguments.
+
+So ORDERED this 20th day of November, 2013, in Docket No. Misc. 13-02.
+
+/s/ F. Dennis Saylor
+F. DENNIS SAYLOR IV
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+2
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-order-131120/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-order-131120/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..879b60e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-order-131120/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Order, In re Orders of this Court Interpreting Section 215 of the Patriot Act",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-11-20",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-20",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34231",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "48f594c2c1cdb5dc030daed9c96d6863a873363aec3ec3720ce5eb9c3e8422b5",
+ "pages": 2
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-order-response-131008/FISC_-_misc-13-02-order-response-131008.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-order-response-131008/FISC_-_misc-13-02-order-response-131008.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..88e4223
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-order-response-131008/FISC_-_misc-13-02-order-response-131008.md
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+2013 NOV 18 Pi1 5:01
+
+UNITED STATES
+
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT CLERK OF COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE ORDERS OF THIS COURT
+INTERPRETING SECTION 215
+OF THE PATRIOT ACT
+
+Docket No.: Misc. 13-02
+
+SECOND SUBMISSION OF THE UNITED STATES IN RESPONSE TO
+THE COURT'S OCTOBER 8, 2013 ORDER
+
+In its September 13, 2013 Opinion and Order, the Court directed the United States to
+identify those opinions of this Court that evaluate the meaning, scope, and constitutionality of
+Section 215 of the Patriot Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1861, that are at issue in ongoing Freedom of
+Information Act ("FOIA") litigation in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
+York. Opinion and Order, at 1, 18. The Court also directed the United States to identify any
+such opinions that are not at issue in the FOIA litigation or already subject to the Court's
+publication process pursuant to Rule 62(a) of the Court's Rules of Procedure, and to propose a
+timetable to complete declassification review of any such opinions. Opinion and Order, at 18.
+
+On October 4, 2013, the Government filed a submission in response to the Court's
+September 13, 2013 Opinion and Order, and moved for a stay of further proceedings due to
+lapsed appropriations. The Government identified, inter alia, the Opinion issued in Docket
+Number BR 13-25 on February 19, 2013, as one that contains "analysis by this Court evaluating
+the meaning, scope, and/or constitutionality" of Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act,
+50 U.S.C. § 1861, and that is not at issue in the FOIA litigation in the Southern District of New
+York. Submission, at 2.
+
+On October 8, 2013, the Court granted the Government's motion for a stay of further
+proceedings. The Court also directed the Government to submit to the Court, within seven days
+of the restoration of appropriations, a proposed timetable for completing the declassification
+review of the Opinion issued in Docket Number BR 13-25 on February 19, 2013, and submitting
+to the Court any proposed redactions for the Opinion. On October 24, 2013, the Government
+estimated that it would complete the declassification review of the Opinion and submit to the
+Court any proposed redactions by November 18, 2013.
+
+After careful review of the Opinion by senior intelligence officials and the U.S.
+Department of Justice, the Executive Branch has determined that the Opinion should be withheld
+in full and a public version of the Opinion cannot be provided.
+
+2
+
+November 18, 2013
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+
+J. BRADFORD WIEGMANN
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+TASHINA GAUHAR
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+/s/ Nicholas J. Patterson
+JEFFREY M. SMITH
+NICHOLAS J. PATTERSON
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+Phone: (202) 514-5600
+Fax: (202) 514-8053
+
+Attorneys for the United States of America
+
+3
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+I hereby certify that a true copy of the Second Submission of the United States in
+Response to the Court's October 8, 2013 Order was served by the Government via Federal
+Express overnight delivery on this 18th day of November, 2013, addressed to:
+Alex Abdo
+Brett Max Kaufman
+Patrick Toomey
+Jameel Jaffer
+American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
+125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
+New York, NY 10004
+aabdo@aclu.org
+Arthur B. Spitzer
+American Civil Liberties Union of the
+Nation's Capital
+4301 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 434
+Washington, DC 20008
+artspitzer@aclu-nca.org
+David A. Schulz
+Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic
+Yale Law School
+40 Ashmun Street, 4th Floor
+New Haven, CT 06511
+david.schulz@yale.edu
+Gregory L. Diskant
+Benjamin S. Litman
+Richard I. Kim
+Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP
+1133 Avenue of the Americas
+New York, NY 10036
+blitman@pbwt.com
+
+/s/ Nicholas J. Patterson
+Nicholas J. Patterson
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-order-response-131008/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-order-response-131008/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ad0e866
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-order-response-131008/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Second Submission of the United States in Response to the Court's October 8, 2013 Order, In re Orders of this Court Interpreting Section 215 of the Patriot Act",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-11-18",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-18",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34446",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "113952660ac958f829c504fb6085ed0e331c0aa053136914b197b1ecd4fb97a4",
+ "pages": 4
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-reply-brief-in-support-130712/FISC_-_misc-13-02-reply-brief-in-support-130712.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-reply-brief-in-support-130712/FISC_-_misc-13-02-reply-brief-in-support-130712.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ca26ee7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-reply-brief-in-support-130712/FISC_-_misc-13-02-reply-brief-in-support-130712.md
@@ -0,0 +1,672 @@
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, DC
+
+Case No. Misc. 13-02
+
+IN RE ORDERS ISSUED BY THIS COURT
+INTERPRETING SECTION 215 OF THE
+PATRIOT ACT
+
+REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL
+LIBERTIES UNION, THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF THE NATION'S
+CAPITAL, AND THE MEDIA FREEDOM AND INFORMATION ACCESS CLINIC
+FOR THE RELEASE OF COURT RECORDS
+
+David A. Schulz
+Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic
+Yale Law School
+40 Ashmun Street, 4th Floor
+New Haven, CT 06511
+Phone: (203) 436-5892
+Fax: (203) 436-0851
+david.schulz@yale.edu
+
+Alex Abdo
+Brett Max Kaufman
+Patrick Toomey
+Jameel Jaffer
+American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
+125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
+New York, NY 10004
+Phone: (212) 549-2500
+Fax: (212) 549-2654
+aabdo@aclu.org
+
+Arthur B. Spitzer
+American Civil Liberties Union of the
+Nation's Capital
+4301 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 434
+Washington, DC 20008
+Phone: (202) 457-0800
+Fax: (202) 457-0805
+artspitzer@aclu-nca.org
+
+PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
+Movants' request for access to the legal opinions of this Court evaluating the meaning,
+scope, and constitutionality of Section 215 of the Patriot Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1861, seeks to
+vindicate the public's overriding interest in understanding a far-reaching federal statute. The
+First Amendment guarantees the public a qualified right of access to those opinions, because
+judicial opinions interpreting constitutional and statutory limits on governmental authorities—
+including those relevant to foreign-intelligence surveillance—have always been available for
+inspection by the public and because their release is so manifestly fundamental in a democracy
+committed to the rule of law.
+
+The government's contrary view—that legal opinions of an Article III court controlling
+the constitutional rights of millions of Americans may forever be denied to the public, even if
+any legitimate interest in secrecy has expired or can be accommodated—is wrong. Indeed, if the
+government succeeds in depriving the public of the tools necessary to understand the laws passed
+by its elected officials, it will have eroded the foundations of our democracy. The government's
+theory affects more than the public's right to this Court's opinions; its reasoning would likewise
+deny the public a right of access to the opinions of courts sitting in review of those opinions,
+whether issued by the Court of Review or even the Supreme Court of the United States. That
+result would defeat democratic oversight and undermine public confidence in our legal
+institutions.
+
+The government arrives at its radical position through a sleight of hand: because this
+Court has operated in secrecy since it was created in 1978, the government claims the
+constitutional right of access does not attach to the Court's legal opinions. In other words, the
+government insists that the Court's opinions should remain secret because they have been secret.
+1
+
+This reasoning is dizzyingly circular. The question is not whether the FISC has, to date,
+published its opinions, but whether court rulings on the scope of the government's surveillance
+authorities are immune from the constitutional right of access. Plainly, they are not. And, as
+explained below, the undeniable value to our nation of public access to this Court's
+pronouncements on the meaning and scope of surveillance laws is sufficient, on its own, to
+confirm the existence of a First Amendment right to inspect them. As sixteen U.S.
+representatives explained as amici curiae, the opinions sought "are essential to the proper
+functioning of the legislative branch of government and an informed public debate.... Without
+access to this information, Congress and the public cannot have a meaningful debate about how
+these laws operate in practice." Br. of Rep. Amash et al. 1.
+
+The government's claimed need for blanket secrecy surrounding this Court's
+interpretation of Section 215 is in significant tension with its own public statements describing
+how that provision is being applied. Since Movants filed their motion, the government has
+continued to publicly defend the program of surveillance it is operating under Section 215 with
+the selective disclosure of additional details. This Court need not and should not sit idly by while
+administration officials continue to publicly characterize its opinions. Depriving the public of
+access to those opinions, which clearly should not be sealed in their entirety, undermines faith in
+government and ultimately jeopardizes the relatively limited information that truly should be
+kept secret. As Justice Stewart warned in New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713,
+729 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring):
+
+[W]hen everything is classified, then nothing is classified, and the system
+becomes one to be disregarded by the cynical or the careless, and to be
+manipulated by those intent on self-protection or self-promotion.... [T]he
+hallmark of a truly effective internal security system would be the maximum
+possible disclosure, recognizing that secrecy can best be preserved only when
+credibility is truly maintained.
+2
+
+The Court should recognize a public right of access to its legal opinions concerning
+Section 215 and publish them as quickly as possible, with only those redactions strictly
+necessary to preserve a compelling governmental interest. Alternatively, it should exercise its
+discretion to do so in recognition of the significant importance of public access to this
+information.
+1
+ARGUMENT
+I. The Public Has a Constitutional Right of Access to the Legal Opinions of this Court
+Construing the Constitution and the Scope of the Government's Surveillance
+Authorities.
+A. Judicial Opinions, Including Those Interpreting the Scope of the Government's
+Surveillance Authorities, Have Historically Been Public.
+
+The Constitution guarantees the public a qualified right of access to the legal opinions of
+this Court, because opinions interpreting the constitutionality and scope of congressional
+enactments, including surveillance laws, have always been available for public inspection and
+because disclosure is of obvious and overwhelming public importance. See Movants' Br. 6-15.
+The core of the government's response is the argument that the secrecy of this Court's opinions
+justifies the secrecy of this Court's opinions. See Gov't Br. 6–7. But that begs the question. The
+question is not whether the forum has, to date, published its orders and opinions, but whether the
+rulings it issues on the scope of the government's surveillance authorities are immune from the
+constitutional commitment to judicial transparency. They are not, because the types of opinions
+
+1 The government repeatedly characterizes this motion as an attempt to relitigate a motion
+filed by the American Civil Liberties Union in 2007. But the facts have changed, as the
+government itself acknowledges. See Gov't Br. 12. As explained below, this Court's role in
+overseeing the government's surveillance has shifted, requiring it to issue opinions adjudicating
+more than merely the validity of the government's selection of particular surveillance targets.
+See, e.g., FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436. Movants now
+argue for a constitutional right of access tethered to the Court's expanded role in construing the
+Constitution and the nation's surveillance laws.
+3
+
+sought by Movants—Article III legal opinions interpreting the country's surveillance laws and
+the Constitution's application to those laws—have historically been public.
+
+This is true even of opinions about FISA and the government's other foreign-intelligence
+surveillance powers. In United States v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972), for example,
+the Supreme Court publicly considered the constitutionality of a warrantless-wiretapping
+program conducted by the government "to protect the national security." Id. at 301. And in
+dozens of other cases, the lower courts have publicly heard suits related to other national-security
+surveillance activities—whether conducted pursuant to FISA,2 the government's claimed
+inherent authority,3 or more recent enactments4—all while protecting properly sealed
+information about intelligence sources and methods. Public handling of these cases has been the
+norm, and indeed, outside of this Court's decision in 2007, Movants are not aware of a single
+case in which a court has rejected the public's qualified right of access to legal opinions
+interpreting public surveillance laws. Indeed, even more generally, the legal opinions of Article
+
+2 See, e.g., United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 72–74, 77 (2d Cir. 1984) (analyzing FISA's
+original "purpose" requirement, and holding that "FISA does not violate the probable cause
+requirement of the Fourth Amendment"); United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d 102, 118–29 (2d
+Cir. 2010) (analyzing FISA's "significant purpose" requirement in light of Patriot Act
+amendments and Fourth Amendment requirements, and collecting other cases); Mayfield v.
+United States, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1039-40 (D. Or. 2007) (same), rev'd and remanded, 599
+F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Belfield, 692 F.2d 141, 148-49 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
+(considering the constitutionality of FISA's discovery and suppression procedures).
+
+3 See, e.g., Jewel v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 673 F.3d 902, 905 (9th Cir. 2011) (reversing dismissal
+of lawsuit challenging "widespread warrantless eavesdropping in the United States"); Order,
+Jewel v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, No. C 08-0437, 2013 WL 3388503 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2013)
+(rejecting government's assertion of state-secrets defense after remand); Am. Civil Liberties
+Union v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (adjudicating the
+constitutionality of the National Security Agency's warrantless wiretapping of Americans under
+the President's Terrorist Surveillance Program), rev'd on other grounds, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir.
+2007).
+
+4 See, e.g., Defs.' Mem. in Opp. at 32-59, Amnesty Int'l USA v. McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d
+633 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (defending the constitutionality of the FISA Amendments Act on Fourth
+Amendment and Article III grounds).
+4
+
+III courts interpreting public laws and the Constitution's application to those laws have always
+been public. See, e.g., Movants' Br. 7–8. The contrary proposition has no historical foundation
+and is anathema to our democracy.
+
+Nonetheless, the government embraces the view that the public is not entitled to know
+how this Court has interpreted the law and construed the Constitution. Its arguments in support
+of that proposition all hinge on its characterization of the FISC as a unique court that oversees
+classified matters. See Gov't Br. 6 ("Indeed, proceedings before the FISC involve highly
+sensitive and classified matters involving national security, relating, for example, to efforts by
+the United States to foil acts of international terrorism. By their very nature, such proceedings
+need to be conducted in secrecy.").
+
+There are two fundamental flaws with this view.
+
+First, by focusing on the FISC as a unique forum, the government begins from an
+improper premise. The relevant question is whether the type of records at issue—legal
+interpretations of public laws, including the government's surveillance authorities—have
+historically been public. In emphasizing instead the practice of this Court, the government
+advances the same logic rejected in El Vocero de P.R. v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147, 150 (1993)
+("The Puerto Rico Supreme Court's reliance on Puerto Rican tradition is also misplaced.").
+Moreover, in assessing the "experience" of access, it is inappropriate to analyze the history of a
+new forum whose secrecy is being challenged. Because there will never be a tradition of public
+access in new forums, the government's logic would permit Congress to circumvent the
+constitutional right of access—even as to, say, criminal trials—by providing that such trials
+henceforth be heard in some new forum.
+5
+
+The government argues that the FISC has no historical analogues. See Gov't Br. 6
+(characterizing this Court's proceedings as "unlike the operations of any other court"). The FISC
+is unusual in that all of its cases concern foreign intelligence, but this fact, to which the
+government returns repeatedly, is neither here nor there. While this Court may be unique in the
+composition of its caseload, it has no monopoly on cases concerning foreign intelligence. In any
+event, to determine whether the right of access attaches, the important question is not the general
+nature of the FISC's docket but whether there is a history of openness with respect to the
+particular type of judicial records sought. Were the government's contrary argument correct, U.S.
+District Court and the dozens of public opinions concerning FISA and other foreign-intelligence
+collection would not just be secret—they would not be subject to a constitutional right of access.
+
+The government's focus on the bulk of the Court's early history, as evidence of its
+tradition of secrecy, is similarly misplaced. Thirty years ago, one could have argued that the
+nature of the Court's primary task—determining whether the government had demonstrated
+probable cause to believe a specific surveillance target was an agent of a foreign power, 50
+U.S.C. § 1805(a)(2)—was analogous to proceedings not always subject to a right of access. In
+recent years, however, the FISC's responsibilities have changed dramatically. No longer is this
+Court confined to making individualized assessments of probable cause. Today, the FISC
+oversees broad surveillance programs, makes programmatic determinations regarding the
+implementation of these programs, and apparently decides the extent to which such programs are
+constitutional. See, e.g., Secondary Order, In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring
+the Production of Tangible Things from Verizon Bus. Network Servs., Inc., No. BR 13-80 (FISA
+Ct. Apr. 25, 2013), available at http://bit.ly/11FY393; 50 U.S.C. § 1881a.
+6
+
+In carrying out those new responsibilities, the Court reportedly issues broad legal
+opinions essential to the public's understanding of the laws that regulate government surveillance
+and that define the limits of their privacy. That is not the kind of role the FISC has traditionally
+played. As Judge James Robertson, a former judge of this Court, explained:
+
+The FISA approval process works just fine when it deals with individual
+applications for surveillance warrants, because approving search warrants and
+wiretap orders and trap and trace orders and foreign intelligence surveillance
+warrants one at a time is familiar ground for judges.... But what happened after
+the revelations in late 2005 about NSA circumventing the FISA process was that
+Congress passed the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 and introduced a new role
+for the FISC, which was to approve surveillance programs. That change, in my
+view, turned the FISA court into something like an administrative agency, which
+makes and approves rules for others to follow.
+Hearing of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board on Legal Perspectives at 31:27–
+32:28 (July 9, 2013), http://cs.pn/177IpII.
+
+Second, the government's implicit suggestion that courts must reject the right of access
+for all cases about "highly sensitive and classified matters involving national security" is simply
+wrong. Gov't Br. 6. Courts regularly entertain such suits in public, sealing only those portions
+that must be sealed to preserve higher values. See, e.g., supra notes 2–4; In re Guantanamo Bay
+Detainee Litig., 630 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2009) (recognizing right of public access to
+Guantanamo Bay habeas corpus proceedings); Gov't Response 1-2, Am. Civil Liberties Union v.
+United States, No. 13-003 (U.S.C.M.C.R. Mar. 7, 2013) (acknowledging that Article II military-
+commission proceedings are subject to the First Amendment right of public access and its strict-
+scrutiny test), available at http://bit.ly/10Rw3DL; Al Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. U.S.
+Dep't of the Treasury, 686 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2012) (publicly addressing constitutionality of the
+
+5 See, e.g., Jennifer Valentino-Devries & Siobhan Gorman, Secret Court's Redefinition of
+'Relevant' Empowered Vast NSA Data-Gathering, Wall St. J., July 8, 2013,
+http://on.wsj.com/13x8QKU; Eric Lichtblau, In Secret, Court Vastly Broadens Powers of N.S.A.,
+N.Y. Times, July 6, 2013, http://nyti.ms/12beiA3.
+7
+
+freezing of the assets of an alleged "specially designated global terrorist," based in part on
+classified evidence); KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner, 647 F.
+Supp. 2d 857 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (similar).
+
+For these reasons, there is a tradition of public access to Article III opinions generally
+and, specifically, to those interpreting the scope and constitutionality of the nation's surveillance
+laws.
+
+Even if there were no history of openness, however, that would not defeat the existence
+of the First Amendment right where the policy reasons supporting access are clear. Courts have
+often found the First Amendment right of access to attach even where there is no tradition of
+openness. In New York Civil Liberties Union v. New York City Transit Authority, 684 F.3d 286,
+298 (2d Cir. 2012), for example, the Second Circuit found a First Amendment right of access to
+administrative hearings conducted by New York City's Transit Authority Bureau, which was
+created in 1986. Looking to "the reasoning of the public access cases," the court found that a
+proper application of the experience and logic test should "focus not on formalistic descriptions
+of the government proceeding but on the kind of work the proceeding actually does and on the
+First Amendment principles at stake." Id. at 299. As a result, the Bureau's scant history was not
+dispositive—a point that the court made clear:
+
+If... government institutions that did not exist at the time of the Framers were
+insulated from the principles of accountability and public participation that the
+Framers inscribed in the First Amendment, legislatures could easily avoid
+constitutional strictures by moving an old governmental function to a new
+institutional location. Immunizing government proceedings from public scrutiny
+by placing them in institutions the Framers could not have imagined... would
+make avoidance of constitutional protections all too easy.
+Id.; see also In re Copley Press, Inc., 518 F.3d 1022, 1027 (9th Cir. 2008) ("Even without
+historical experience, logic requires that at least part of these [plea-related] hearings be open to
+8
+
+the public" despite the lack of "historical experience of public access to these hearings...
+because the hearings didn't exist until quite recently.")."
+
+B. "Logic" Supports the Release of the Judicial Opinions Sought.
+
+The public's First Amendment interest and the logic supporting access is at its zenith
+when it comes to judicial opinions that interpret our laws. The long history and practice set forth
+in the motion is an expression of that logic, and it speaks to the special importance of this
+category of judicial records. See Movants' Br. 7-8. The government is badly mistaken when it
+argues that Movants assert nothing more than a generic interest in more information. Gov't Br. 9.
+That claim is belied both by the limited subset of FISC records that Movants seek and by the
+particular value of those records to the proper functioning of our democracy. As courts have
+repeatedly recognized, public access to judicial opinions serves an exceptionally vital function:
+
+The decisions and opinions of the justices are the authorized expositions and
+interpretations of the laws, which are binding upon all the citizens. They declare
+the unwritten law, and construe and declare the meaning of the statutes. Every
+citizen is presumed to know the law thus declared, and it needs no argument to
+show that justice requires that all should have free access to the opinions, and that
+it is against sound public policy to prevent this, or to suppress and keep from the
+earliest knowledge of the public the statutes, or the decisions and opinions of the
+justices. Such opinions stand, upon principle, on substantially the same footing as
+the statutes enacted by the legislature. It can hardly be contended that it would be
+within the constitutional power of the legislature to enact that the statutes and
+
+6 See also Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 701 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding that even
+brief historical tradition can be "sufficient to establish a First Amendment right of access where
+the beneficial effects of access to that process are overwhelming and uncontradicted"); United
+States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833, 840, 838 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding right of access to post-trial
+hearings on juror misconduct because "logic counsels" that openness will "have a positive
+effect" and the "experience' prong. provides little guidance"); United States v. Suarez, 880
+F.2d 626, 631 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding First Amendment right of access to Criminal Justice Act
+forms despite a "lack of tradition' with respect to the CJA forms" because of the "public's
+strong interest in how its funds are being spent"); Seattle Times Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 845 F.2d
+1513, 1516-17 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding First Amendment right because "public scrutiny" would
+"benefit" the proceedings, despite lack of an "unbroken history of public access"); United States
+v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 363 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting that "lack of an historic tradition of open
+bail reduction hearings does not bar our recognizing a right of access to such hearings").
+9
+
+opinions should not be made known to the public.... The policy of the state
+always has been that the opinions of the justices, after they are delivered, belong
+to the public.
+Nash v. Lathrop, 142 Mass. 29, 35-36 (1886) (emphasis added) (cited by Banks v. Manchester,
+128 U.S. 244, 253–54 (1888) (Blatchford, J.)); see also Lowenschuss v. W. Pub. Co., 542 F.2d
+180, 185 (3d Cir. 1976). The public's right to judicial opinions is, in reality, the sum of two
+bedrock principles: (1) the public's right to know what the law is, as a condition of democratic
+governance; and (2) the founding recognition that, in our political system, it is "emphatically the
+province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
+(1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
+
+Because courts determine what the law means and therefore what the law is—the public
+interest in access to judicial opinions could not run deeper. As amici emphasize, these opinions
+enable the public to engage their elected representatives on matters of grave importance. See Br.
+of Rep. Amash et al. 9–10. The FISC's interpretations of our surveillance laws are part and
+parcel of this dialogue, but without open access to those interpretations, the conversation cannot
+move forward. The ongoing public debate is one about the lawful limits of government power,
+and those limits can and should be made known without revealing the targets of the underlying
+investigations. This is the specific and compelling logic for allowing the public access to the
+
+7 That conversation should also include the courts themselves, to allow our tradition of
+common-law decisionmaking to function. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 400-01 (1985)
+(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The only true rules governing search and seizure have been formulated
+and refined in the painstaking scrutiny of case-by-case adjudication. Consideration of this matter
+by the lower courts in a series of litigated cases would surely have facilitated a reasoned
+accommodation of the conflicting interests. To identify rules that will endure, we must rely on
+the state and lower federal courts to debate and evaluate the different approaches to difficult and
+unresolved questions of constitutional law. Deliberation on the question over time winnows out
+the unnecessary and discordant elements of doctrine and preserves 'whatever is pure and sound
+and fine." (quoting Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 179 (1921))).
+10
+
+FISC's significant legal opinions—which is all Movants seek—even while the Court's day-to-
+day review of individual surveillance applications remains protected from disclosure.
+
+Access to the FISC's significant legal interpretations will also serve other public virtues,
+which the government neglects but which may be of great institutional importance to the Court.
+In particular, access "enhances the quality and safeguards the integrity" of courts, while at the
+same time "foster[ing] an appearance of fairness, thereby heightening public respect for the
+judicial process." Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982). Release of
+significant FISC opinions will have these salutary effects, potentially even more here than in
+other tribunals. Precisely because adjudications before the FISC are generally not adversarial,
+public access to the resulting legal opinions will promote the performance of all involved and
+facilitate an important form of accountability after the fact. See United States v. Ressam, 221 F.
+Supp. 2d 1252, 1263 (W.D. Wash. 2002) ("The benefits of access to court orders do not accrue
+merely in those members of the public that read or hear of them. The court itself, knowing that
+its determinations will be scrutinized by others, is further encouraged to coherently explain the
+reasoning behind its decision."); Littlejohn v. Bic Corp., 851 F.2d 673, 683 (3d Cir. 1988). This
+transparency, in turn, promises to ground the FISC's reputation for fairness, heightening public
+confidence in the Court's otherwise secret legal processes. See, e.g., United States v. Amodeo, 71
+F.3d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1995). Finally, release of these FISC opinions would allow the Court to
+speak for itself, with the weight of its considered legal reasoning, at a time when those opinions
+are being characterized in leaks by current and former executive officials. See supra note 5.
+
+In its effort to keep the FISC's opinions officially hidden from view, the government
+mischaracterizes Movants' request to conjure a threat of harm where none exists. The
+government writes as if Movants seek access to individual surveillance applications—something
+11
+
+Movants have repeatedly made clear they do not seek. Movants' Br. 1, 5, 14. Likewise, the cases
+marshaled by the government concern records that are, in close inspection, different in kind
+from the opinions sought here. Gov't Br. 10 n.2; see, e.g., In re Bos. Herald, Inc., 321 F.3d 174,
+188 (1st Cir. 2003) (weighing privacy interest in personal financial details). All these cases
+involve categories of court records that would necessarily expose ongoing investigations,
+confidential sources, or personal information—in contexts in which there was no way of
+protecting this material short of sealing the records themselves. See, e.g., In re Balt. Sun Co., 886
+F.2d 60, 64 (4th Cir. 1989) (access to search-warrant affidavits related to ongoing investigation);
+Times Mirror Co. v. United States, 873 F.2d 1210, 1215–16 (9th Cir. 1989) (same); United
+States v. Smith, 123 F.3d 140, 148 (3d Cir. 1997) (grand-jury proceedings related to ongoing
+investigation); United States v. Corbitt, 879 F.2d 224, 229–35 (7th Cir. 1989) (access to
+presentence reports). The same is not true of FISC opinions, where such information can and
+should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis and protected as appropriate. Unlike search-warrant
+affidavits, grand-jury proceedings, and presentence reports, the FISC's judicial opinions contain
+legal reasoning that, in many instances, can be segregated from sensitive information.8 Cf. In re
+Application for Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth., 396 F. Supp.
+2d 747, 748-49 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
+
+In short, judicial opinions—as a category—present a different logic: the public's First
+Amendment interest can be vindicated without automatically jeopardizing the underlying
+investigations. See, e.g., In re United States, 872 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (redacting portion of
+
+8 The FISC's own rules acknowledge the feasibility of segregating sensitive information. In particular,
+FISC Rule 7(j) provides, in part:
+Except as otherwise ordered, if the government files ex parte a submission that contains
+classified information, the government must file and serve on the non-governmental party
+an unclassified or redacted version. The unclassified or redacted version, at a minimum,
+must clearly articulate the government's legal arguments.
+12
+
+judicial opinion to protect national-security interests). Recent disclosures by executive and
+congressional officials speak directly to this capacity. For instance, officials have publicly
+discussed the legal standard that the Court has imposed on the government's searches of
+telephony metadata, the Court's development of the special-needs doctrine, its interpretation of
+"relevance" within Section 215, and the extension of the third-party doctrine to bulk metadata.
+See James R. Clapper, DNI Statement on Recent Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified
+Information (June 6, 2013), http://1.usa.gov/13jwuFc; How Disclosed NSA Programs Protect
+Americans, and Why Disclosure Aids Our Adversaries: Hearing Before the H. Permanent Select
+Intelligence Comm. (June 18, 2013), http://1.usa.gov/128XsNp (testimony of Deputy Attorney
+General James Cole) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment does not apply to these records."); see also
+supra note 5. All of these public explanations suggest the FISC's opinions contain
+consequential legal holdings and interpretations and that they can be disclosed without risk to
+specific targets or methods.
+
+In this way, the factors identified by the government belong to the case-by-case sealing
+analysis—they do not determine whether a qualified First Amendment right attaches to FISC
+opinions in the first place. See, e.g., United States v. Rosen, 487 F. Supp. 2d 703, 715–16 (E.D.
+Va. 2007); United States v. Pelton, 696 F. Supp. 156, 159 (D. Md. 1986). Pressing for blanket
+secrecy, the government conflates these separate issues. The existence of the right flows from the
+combined history and logic of publishing judicial opinions, including those interpreting our
+national-security and surveillance laws. Accord Union Oil Co. v. Leavell, 220 F.3d 562, 567 (7th
+Cir. 2000) (citing cases) ("[D]isputes about claims of national security are litigated in the
+open."). Yet because the right is qualified, it may be overcome in specific instances—in
+particular, where the government demonstrates a "compelling governmental interest" and where
+13
+
+the restriction is "narrowly tailored to serve that interest.” Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at
+607. Thus, in Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, the Sixth Circuit rejected the argument that
+national-security concerns precluded recognition of a constitutional right of access to "special
+interest" deportation proceedings, but acknowledged that those same concerns could justify
+abridging the constitutional right in specific cases. 303 F.3d 681, 692-93 (6th Cir. 2002). In
+other words, national-security concerns may demonstrate a "compelling interest" sufficient to
+overcome the qualified right of access on a case-by-case basis, but they do not defeat the right's
+attachment in the first instance. Much the same, in this case, the Court would evaluate whether a
+particular opinion discusses intelligence sources or methods that have not been previously
+disclosed, and whether targeted redactions could protect the government's interests while
+providing public access to the FISC's legal reasoning. Cf. supra note 8 (discussing FISA Ct. R.P.
+7(j)). It is possible, too, that over time the FISC's opinions would evolve to anticipate this
+process and the interest in disclosure, by adopting a format or structure that readily separates
+sensitive, investigation-specific information from the Court's broader legal conclusions.
+
+The government's suggestion that recognizing a qualified right of access would chill its
+relationship with the FISC is implausible. Gov't Br. 10–11. Movants do not seek access to all the
+FISC's operations, and they do not contend that the right of access attaches to all FISC
+opinions—only to those that interpret the Constitution and the scope of the government's
+surveillance authorities. Nor does the existence of the right imply blanket disclosure of FISC
+opinions. The Court would continue to evaluate publication requests individually, with direct
+input from the government in every case and the opportunity to redact sensitive information or to
+maintain specific opinions under seal. If the government's interests are as compelling as it
+claims, this test should not be a daunting one. Indeed, there is some irony in the government's
+14
+
+effort to recast the familiar First Amendment standard as a chilling device. Most importantly,
+recognizing a qualified right of access would not dramatically remake the government's
+relationship to the Court: as the government acknowledges, the current Rules permit the Court to
+publish its opinions while redacting "properly classified information." FISA Ct. R.P. 62(a); see
+Gov't Br. 1, 12–16. Thus, the logic of disclosure is already suggested by the FISC's own
+procedures, as well as the prior publication of FISC and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+of Review ("FISCR") opinions in the public interest. See, e.g., Order, In re Directives
+[REDACTED] Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, No. 08-01 at
+1 (FISA Ct. Rev. Jan. 12, 2009), http://bit.ly/r32r2W (observing that "[i]t would serve the public
+interest and the orderly administration of justice to publish" the FISCR opinion).
+
+II. This Court Has the Discretion to Release Its Own Opinions and Need Not Defer
+Exclusively to the Executive Branch with Respect to Classification.
+
+Movants also properly seek the release of this Court's opinions interpreting Section 215
+pursuant to the Court's Rules of Procedure. The crux of the government's argument is that Rule
+62(a) forecloses a member of the public who is "not a party to any opinions at issue,” Gov't Br.
+13, from filing a motion for release of FISC records. To reject that strained reading of Rule
+62(a), the Court need look no further than its own dismissal of that same contention six years ago
+in In re Motion for Release of Court Records, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, 486-87 (FISA Ct. 2007) ("In
+re Release"). Rule 62(a)'s authorization of motions for publication by "a party" permits, rather
+than prohibits, Movants' request. Nowhere in the text of the Rules is the word "party" cabined to
+mean solely "a party to any opinions at issue,” as the government would have it. Moreover, that
+
+9 Where the Rules insist on qualifying the term "party," they are clear in doing so. See, e.g.,
+FISA Ct. R.P. 7(h) ("party other than the government"), 46 ("party in a proceeding under" the
+FISA); see also FISA Ct. R.P. 33 (using "petitioner" to refer to "[t]he recipient of a production
+order").
+15
+
+"[e]very court has supervisory power over its own records and files" is by now axiomatic. Nixon
+v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978). Thus, even if the applicable Rule were
+unclear, the Court would undoubtedly have the "inherent power" to consider Movants' request.
+In re Release, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 487.
+
+Moreover, the government's unduly narrow focus on the FISC Rules' executive-branch
+declassification procedures substantially understates the Court's capacity—indeed, its judicial
+duty—to independently review government claims of classification. The government correctly
+acknowledges that, even absent a First Amendment right of access, publication of FISC opinions
+is within the "sound discretion of the judges of this Court." Gov't Br. 13.10 But it wrongly argues
+that the FISC "cannot release an opinion that contains (or may contain) classified information
+without first ordering the Executive Branch to conduct a classification review." Gov't Br. 14. In
+so arguing, the government attempts to convert a permissive rule into a mandatory one. See FISA
+Ct. R. P. 62(a) ("Before publication, the Court may, as appropriate, direct the Executive Branch
+to review the order, opinion, or other decision" as to classification questions. (emphasis added)).
+That the FISC "may" enlist the executive branch to assist it in preparing its own opinions for
+public release merely underscores the Court's authority to prepare them for publication itself.
+
+Furthermore, the government misreads the FISC's deference to the executive branch on
+particular classification matters in the past. See Gov't Br. 14–15 (citing In re Release, 526 F.
+Supp. 2d at 491, 495); see also Movants' Br. 16-17 (discussing publicly released FISC and
+FISCR opinions). What the government elides is that the supervisory power of the FISC over its
+own records grants it the discretion—like any other Article III court—to determine whether one
+
+10 The Court exercised that discretion just last month. See In re Motion for Consent to
+Disclosure of Court Records or, in the Alternative, a Determination of the Effect of the Court's
+Rules on Statutory Access Rights, Misc. 13-01 (FISA Ct. June 12, 2013).
+16
+
+of its own judicial opinions or a portion thereof warrants public disclosure notwithstanding a
+claim of classification by the executive branch.
+
+The FISC's inherent authority to publish redacted versions of its own opinions stands
+independently of its obligation to do so when First Amendment interests are at stake. That
+authority compels the same result when the Court finds that the public's interest in release
+outweighs the government's interest in continued secrecy. Cf. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 602 (describing
+the "task of weighing the interests advanced by the parties in light of the public interest and the
+duty of the courts"). No matter the context, "[a] blind acceptance by the courts of the
+government's insistence" as to its interest's decisive weight “would impermissibly compromise
+the independence of the judiciary and open the door to possible abuse." In re Wash. Post Co.,
+807 F.2d 383, 391 (4th Cir. 1986); accord United States v. Smith, 899 F.2d 564, 569 (6th Cir.
+1990). As a result, courts routinely scrutinize executive-branch classifications, which are never
+determinative of claims to public access. See, e.g., John Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861,
+882-83 (2d Cir. 2009) (applying strict scrutiny to classification decisions in challenge to
+national-security-letter gag orders) ("The fiat of a governmental official, though senior in rank
+and doubtless honorable in the execution of official duties, cannot displace the judicial obligation
+to enforce constitutional requirements."); Campbell v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 30
+(D.C. Cir. 1998) ("[D]eference is not equivalent to acquiescence" when evaluating national-
+security assertions as to FOIA exemptions.); Goldberg v. U.S. Dep't of State, 818 F.2d 71, 76
+(D.C. Cir. 1987) (same). This principle is not controversial, and in other forums, the government
+has expressly accepted it. See, e.g., Final Reply Br. 8 n.1, Ctr. for Int'l Envtl. Law v. Office of the
+U.S. Trade Representative, No. 12-5136 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 27, 2012), 2012 WL 5940305
+(clarifying that the government has not "suggested that the Executive's determination that a
+17
+
+document is classified should be conclusive or unreviewable"). Far from an "abuse of
+discretion," Gov't Br. 15, applying scrutiny to executive-branch claims about the national-
+security consequences of release of information is a fundamental task of Article III courts,
+including—indeed, especially—the FISC.11
+
+The FISC's fitness to determine that the public interest compels the release of classified
+information in certain circumstances is not at all preempted by the existence of FOIA. See Gov't
+Br. 15 n.4. If this Court properly determines that the First Amendment right of access applies,
+strict scrutiny requires the government to present specific and articulable reasons supporting a
+"compelling governmental interest," and the Court must "narrowly tailor[]" any restriction of
+access to the Section 215 opinions. Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 607. Even if the Court
+acts upon its own discretion to grant the requested relief, FOIA's availability has no bearing on
+the Court's ultimate and autonomous assessment of whether a legitimate national-security need
+merits the opinions' continued secrecy, in total or in part. The FISC has recognized that its
+judges often have "more expertise in national security matters than a typical district court judge."
+In re Release, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 495 n.31. It would be incongruous, to say the least, to accept
+the government's assertion that district courts may review classification in cases under FOIA
+seeking executive-branch documents, but that the FISC may not do the same upon motions for
+public access to its own legal opinions.
+
+11 The government's suggestion that Rule 3 of the FISC Rules of Procedure counsels to the
+contrary is mistaken. See Gov't Br. 15. That the judges and staff of this Court must obtain
+security clearances, and that they "shall comply" with certain statutory security procedures when
+handling classified information, FISA Ct. R.P. 3, does not speak to the Court's institutional
+authority as an independent branch of government to publicly release its own opinions
+interpreting the nation's public laws, or any other of its records, see In re Release, 526 F. Supp.
+2d at 486-87.
+18
+
+Finally, a considered balancing of the relevant interests plainly warrants the relief sought.
+See Movants' Br. 17-18. The Section 215 opinions of this Court interpret a public law. As that
+law's democratic source, the public is entitled to understand Section 215's legal contours,
+particularly in light of the government's public acknowledgments of the broad powers the
+provision sanctions. And this Court's unique role in monitoring the government's surveillance
+activities entitles it, as well, to ensure that the public has the necessary information to assess the
+truth and logic of what is now publicly known about Section 215, rather than only piecemeal
+disclosures made to the press. See, e.g., supra note 5.
+
+Movants do not take lightly the responsibility of both the executive branch and the FISC
+to prevent the public disclosure of certain information. But as the Court of Review has
+recognized in the recent past, see Order, In re Directives [REDACTED] Pursuant to Section 105B of
+the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, No. 08-01 (FISA Ct. Rev. Jan. 12, 2009), the release
+of its legal interpretations of broad significance would not call that responsibility into question,
+while advancing vital public values and furthering ongoing democratic debates.
+
+CONCLUSION
+For the foregoing reasons, Movants respectfully request that this Court unseal its
+opinions evaluating the meaning, scope, and constitutionality of Section 215 of the Patriot Act.
+Movants request that these materials be released as quickly as possible and with only those
+redactions essential to protect information that the Court determines, after independent review, to
+warrant continued sealing.
+19
+
+Dated: July 12, 2013
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+Alex Abdo
+
+David A. Schulz
+Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic
+Yale Law School
+40 Ashmun Street, 4th Floor
+New Haven, CT 06511
+Phone: (203) 436-5892
+Fax: (203) 436-0851
+david.schulz@yale.edu
+
+Brett Max Kaufman
+Patrick Toomey
+Jameel Jaffer
+American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
+125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
+New York, NY 10004
+Phone: (212) 549-2500
+Fax: (212) 549-2654
+aabdo@aclu.org
+
+Arthur B. Spitzer
+American Civil Liberties Union of the
+Nation's Capital
+4301 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 434
+Washington, DC 20008
+Phone: (202) 457-0800
+Fax: (202) 457-0805
+artspitzer@aclu-nca.org
+
+20
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+I, Alex Abdo, certify that on this day, July 12, 2013, a copy of the foregoing certification
+was served on the following persons by the methods indicated:
+
+By email and UPS overnight delivery
+
+Christine Gunning
+Litigation Security Group
+U.S. Department of Justice
+2 Constitution Square
+145 N Street, N.E.
+Suite 2W-115
+Washington, DC 20530
+Email: Christine.E.Gunning@usdoj.gov
+
+By UPS overnight delivery
+
+John P. Carlin
+J. Bradford Wiegmann
+Tashina Gauhar
+Jeffrey M. Smith
+Nicholas J. Patterson
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, DC 20530
+Phone: (202) 514-5600
+
+Alex Abdo
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-reply-brief-in-support-130712/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-reply-brief-in-support-130712/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..afbc1e4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-reply-brief-in-support-130712/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Reply Brief in Support of Motion of the American Civil Liberties Union, the American Civil Liberties Union of the Nation's Capital, and the Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic for the Release of Court Records, In re Orders of this Court Interpreting Section 215 of the Patriot Act",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-07-12",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-07-12",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34438",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "0f92d800f38e5a896249318876d4d60b3e7e36684147820d8d3b236fc58481d6",
+ "pages": 22
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-submission-of-us-response-to-courts-oct-8-order/FISC_-_misc-13-02-submission-of-us-response-to-courts-oct-8-order.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-submission-of-us-response-to-courts-oct-8-order/FISC_-_misc-13-02-submission-of-us-response-to-courts-oct-8-order.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dfbcc66
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-submission-of-us-response-to-courts-oct-8-order/FISC_-_misc-13-02-submission-of-us-response-to-courts-oct-8-order.md
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+UNITED STATES
+
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+2013 OCT 24 PM 4:27
+
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+IN RE ORDERS OF THIS COURT
+INTERPRETING SECTION 215
+OF THE PATRIOT ACT
+)
+)
+)
+Docket No.: Misc. 13-02
+
+Submission of the United States in Response to
+the Court's October 8, 2013 Order
+
+In its September 13, 2013 Opinion and Order, the Court directed the United States to
+identify those opinions of this Court that evaluate the meaning, scope, and constitutionality of
+Section 215 of the Patriot Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1861, that are at issue in ongoing Freedom of
+Information Act ("FOIA") litigation in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
+York. Opinion and Order, at 1, 18. The Court also directed the United States to identify any
+such opinions that are not at issue in the FOIA litigation or already subject to the Court's
+publication process pursuant to Rule 62(a) of the Court's Rules of Procedure, and to propose a
+timetable to complete declassification review of any such opinions. Opinion and Order, at 18.
+
+On October 4, 2013, the Government filed a submission in response to the Court's
+September 13, 2013 Opinion and Order, and moved for a stay of further proceedings due to
+lapsed appropriations. The Government identified, *inter alia*, the Opinion issued in Docket
+Number BR 13-25 on February 19, 2013, as one that contains "analysis by this Court evaluating
+the meaning, scope, and/or constitutionality" of Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, 50
+U.S.C. § 1861, and that is not at issue in the FOIA litigation in the Southern District of New
+York. Submission at 2.
+
+On October 8, 2013, the Court granted the Government's motion for a stay of further
+proceedings. The Court also directed the Government to submit to the Court, within seven days
+of the restoration of appropriations, a proposed timetable for completing the declassification
+review of the Opinion issued in Docket Number BR 13-25 on February 19, 2013, and submitting
+to the Court any proposed redactions for the Opinion. The Government estimates that it will
+complete the declassification review of the Opinion and submit to the Court any proposed
+redactions by November 18, 2013.
+
+October 24, 2013
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+
+J. BRADFORD WIEGMANN
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+TASHINA GAUHAR
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+/s/ Nicholas J. Patterson
+JEFFREY M. SMITH
+NICHOLAS J. PATTERSON
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+Phone: (202) 514-5600
+Fax: (202) 514-8053
+
+Attorneys for the United States of America
+
+2
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I hereby certify that a true copy of the Submission of the United States in Response to
+the Court's October 8, 2013 Order was served by the Government via Federal Express overnight
+delivery on this 24th day of October, 2013, addressed to:
+
+Alex Abdo
+Brett Max Kaufman
+Patrick Toomey
+Jameel Jaffer
+American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
+125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
+New York, NY 10004
+aabdo@aclu.org
+
+Arthur B. Spitzer
+American Civil Liberties Union of the
+Nation's Capital
+4301 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 434
+Washington, DC 20008
+artspitzer@aclu-nca.org
+
+David A. Schulz
+Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic
+Yale Law School
+40 Ashmun Street, 4th Floor
+New Haven, CT 06511
+david.schulz@yale.edu
+
+Gregory L. Diskant
+Benjamin S. Litman
+Richard I. Kim
+Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP
+1133 Avenue of the Americas
+New York, NY 10036
+blitman@pbwt.com
+
+/s/ Nicholas J. Patterson
+Nicholas J. Patterson
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-submission-of-us-response-to-courts-oct-8-order/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-submission-of-us-response-to-courts-oct-8-order/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2a518d6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-submission-of-us-response-to-courts-oct-8-order/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Submission of the United States in Response to the Court's October 8, 2013 Order, In re Orders of this Court Interpreting Section 215 of the Patriot Act",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-10-24",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-10-24",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34445",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "4b19115c462052fef69f5dfb3eeeffdf2b5b5e7f4aff04a85459e9bbc3140447",
+ "pages": 3
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-us-opposition-130705/FISC_-_misc-13-02-us-opposition-130705.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-us-opposition-130705/FISC_-_misc-13-02-us-opposition-130705.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cd7f61d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-us-opposition-130705/FISC_-_misc-13-02-us-opposition-130705.md
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+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE ORDERS ISSUED BY THIS COURT
+INTERPRETING SECTION 215 OF THE
+PATRIOT ACT
+
+Docket No.: Misc. 13-02
+
+THE UNITED STATES' OPPOSITION TO THE
+MOTION OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
+UNION, ET AL., FOR THE RELEASE OF COURT RECORDS
+
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+
+J. BRADFORD WIEGMANN
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+TASHINA GAUHAR
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+JEFFREY M. SMITH
+NICHOLAS J. PATTERSON
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+Phone: (202) 514-5600
+Fax: (202) 514-8053
+
+Attorneys for the United States of America
+
+---
+
+The American Civil Liberties Union and two other entities (hereinafter “ACLU") seek
+the publication of opinions of this Court that "evaluat[e] the meaning, scope, and
+constitutionality of Section 215 of the Patriot Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1861." Motion at 1. The
+ACLU's primary argument is that such publication is compelled by the First Amendment of the
+U.S. Constitution, an argument that repeats contentions that this Court twice rejected when the
+ACLU raised them six years ago. See id. at 6-15. This Court's ruling in *In re Motion for
+Release of Court Records*, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. 2007) ("In re Release"),
+was correct at the time this Court issued it, as was this Court's ruling denying the ACLU's
+motion for reconsideration, see *In re Motion for Release of Court Records, Memorandum
+Opinion, Docket No. Misc. 07-01* (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. Feb. 8, 2008) (“In re Release II")
+(attached as Appendix A). The ACLU decided not to appeal those decisions, and both remain
+correct today.
+
+The ACLU's secondary argument is that this Court should exercise its discretion to
+publish its opinions “evaluating the meaning, scope, and constitutionality of Section 215." See
+Motion at 15-18. The ACLU has no standing to bring such a motion because it was not a party
+to any relevant opinion. See U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC"), Rule of
+Procedure 62(a) (2010) (providing that the process for deciding whether to publish a FISC
+opinion begins “sua sponte or on motion by a party"). The Court should thus deny the Motion.
+Of course, a judge of this Court who has issued an opinion may, if he or she elects, sua sponte
+begin the process for considering whether that opinion should be published. See id. If the Court,
+in its discretion, chooses to undertake this process, it should, as explained below, simply follow
+its clear rules, including FISC Rules of Procedure 3 and 62.
+
+1
+
+---
+
+In any event, the Government is mindful of the delicate balance between the need for
+secrecy in conducting intelligence activities to protect national security and the interest in
+transparency and public accountability. For this reason, the Government continues to review
+material, including opinions of this Court, for potential declassification and release to the public,
+where national security will allow. Thus, a declassification review process is already occurring.
+
+BACKGROUND
+
+The ACLU previously came before this Court on the "Motion of the American Civil
+Liberties Union for Release of Court Records," filed on August 9, 2007 (“ACLU 2007 Motion").
+In that motion, the ACLU sought the release of what it identified as court orders and government
+pleadings regarding a program of surveillance of suspected international terrorists by the
+National Security Agency ("NSA") that had previously been conducted without court
+authorization. See ACLU 2007 Motion at 2 n.2, 3-9. This Court after considering the ACLU's
+motion, an opposition by the Government, and the ACLU's reply—issued a Memorandum
+Opinion and Order denying the ACLU Motion on December 11, 2007. See *In re Motion for
+Release of Court Records*, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484.
+
+This Court held that the First Amendment does not provide a right of public access to
+such records, in whole or in part, under the test establishing such a right in *Press-Enterprise Co.
+v. Superior Court*, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (“Press-Enterprise II"). See *In re Release*, 526 F. Supp. 2d
+at 491-97. Additionally, the Court declined to exercise any residual discretion it might possess
+"to undertake the searching review of the Executive Branch's classification decisions requested
+by the ACLU," without prejudice to the ACLU's “pursuing whatever remedies may be available
+to it in a district court through a... request addressed to the Executive Branch" under the
+
+2
+
+---
+
+Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 ("FOIA"). See *In re Release*, 526 F. Supp. 2d
+at 497.
+
+On December 20, 2007, the ACLU filed a "Motion for Reconsideration or
+Reconsideration En Banc," the Government responded on January 8, 2008, and this Court denied
+the ACLU's request for reconsideration on February 8, 2008. In denying the ACLU's
+reconsideration motion, this Court held that the ACLU's motion "presents nothing that can be
+regarded as an intervening change in controlling law or newly available evidence. Furthermore,
+the ACLU fails to demonstrate clear error or manifest injustice in the prior opinion." See *In re
+Release II*, at 3-4. Specifically, this Court held that “the ACLU has failed to demonstrate any
+error, let alone clear error or manifest injustice, in the Court's prior holding that the ACLU has
+no First Amendment right of access to the documents it seeks." Id. at 9. This Court also
+reaffirmed that it would not release the requested records as a matter of discretion because the
+"unacceptable risks to the national security and to the proper functioning of the FISA process...
+simply outweigh the potential benefits from discretionary release." Id. at 10.
+
+The ACLU did not subsequently appeal this Court's opinion in *In re Release* or its denial
+of reconsideration in *In re Release II* to the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+of Review.
+
+In the instant Motion, the ACLU requests that this Court publish FISC opinions
+evaluating the meaning, scope, and constitutionality of Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act,
+50 U.S.C. § 1861. Motion at 1. The ACLU relies on the same legal arguments it twice
+submitted to this Court in 2007 and which, as described above, this Court previously denied.
+
+3
+
+---
+
+The ACLU, for a third time, argues for disclosure of this Court's records pursuant to a First
+Amendment right of access or for this Court to release the records as a matter of discretion.
+
+ARGUMENT
+
+I. There Is No First Amendment Right of Access to Judicial Opinions of the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court.
+
+The ACLU seeks to re-litigate an issue this Court has correctly decided against it. See *In
+re Release*, 526 F. Supp, 2d 484; *In re Release II*, Docket No. Misc. 07-01. The current Motion
+should be denied for the same reasons. In rejecting the ACLU's earlier challenge, this Court
+applied the "experience and logic" test that the Supreme Court established in *Press-Enterprise
+Co. v. Superior Court*, 478 U.S. 1, 9, and held that "[e]lectronic surveillance proceedings under
+50 U.S.C. §§ 1804-1805 do not ... meet th[e]se tests." *In re Release*, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 492;
+see also *id.* at 497 (holding that the First Amendment provides no public right of access to FISC
+documents); *In re Release II*, at 9 (holding that the ACLU "failed to demonstrate any error, let
+alone clear error or manifest injustice, in the Court's prior holding that the ACLU has no First
+Amendment right of access to the documents it seeks"). This Court should follow its well-
+reasoned earlier opinions in evaluating the ACLU's current motion—which essentially repeats
+the ACLU's prior arguments and deny the ACLU's Motion.
+
+A. The ACLU Fails the “Experience" Prong of Press-Enterprise II.
+
+In *In re Release* and *In re Release II*, this Court correctly applied the "experience" prong
+of the *Press-Enterprise II* test, which asks whether "the place and the process have historically
+been open to the press and general public," 478 U.S. at 8 (citations and internal quotation marks
+omitted), and held that the ACLU did not satisfy this prong. 526 F. Supp. 2d at 492-93. This
+same analysis applies here.
+
+4
+
+---
+
+In arguing that this Court "erred," Motion at 7, in applying the "experience" test to its
+prior right of access motion, the ACLU misunderstands this Court's analysis. The ACLU claims
+that the Court "failed to identify the proper focus of the 'experience' prong" by focusing on "the
+past practice of the specific forum [the FISC]" rather than "the type of judicial records or process
+to which" the movant sought access. Motion at 6-7. However, this Court's "experience"
+analysis was clearly consistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation: "the 'experience' test of
+*Globe Newspaper* does not look to the particular practice of any one jurisdiction, but instead to
+the experience in that type or kind of hearing throughout the United States." *El Vocero de P.R.
+(Caribbean Intern. News Corp.) v. Puerto Rico*, 508 U.S. 147, 150 (1993) (per curiam)
+(quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). In *In re Release*, this Court looked to the
+FISC's experience in handling its unique type of proceedings and in handling its unique kinds
+of records.[^1]
+
+Indeed, this Court rejected a similar challenge to its application of the *Press-Enterprise II*
+test raised by the ACLU in its 2007 motion for reconsideration. This Court held that the ACLU,
+in arguing that the "experience" test should analyze the tradition of public access to decisions of
+Article III courts generally, was presenting "an incorrect framing of the question." *In re Release*
+
+[^1]: The ACLU's comparison of *In re Release* to the case in *El Vocero* is inapposite. In *El
+Vocero*, the Supreme Court analyzed a particular type of hearing—a preliminary hearing—which
+is common to many jurisdictions throughout the United States, unlike the FISC's unique type of
+proceedings. *El Vocero*, 508 U.S. at 150-51. The Supreme Court found that although the Puerto
+Rican Supreme Court had relied on a Puerto Rican tradition of closed preliminary hearings, the
+"established and widespread tradition of open preliminary hearings among the States was
+canvassed in *Press-Enterprise* and is controlling here." *Id.* (citations omitted). In other words,
+the Supreme Court held that the traditions of a particular jurisdiction in handling a particular type
+or kind of hearing were overcome by the general experience of how all U.S. jurisdictions
+handled such hearings.
+
+5
+
+---
+
+II, at 6. Instead, this Court found *Press-Enterprise II* "requires that the tests of experience and
+logic be applied to the 'particular proceeding in question.'" *Id.* (quoting *Press-Enterprise II*,
+478 U.S. at 9 (emphasis added by this Court)). Thus, this Court found that the tests of
+"experience" and "logic" have not been applied to categories as sweeping as all decisions of
+Article III courts, but "rather to narrower classes that permit a meaningful assessment of the
+effects of public access on a particular type of judicial process—for example, district court
+proceedings (and related records) that are ancillary to grand jury operations." *In re Release II*, at
+6 (citing *In re Motions of Dow Jones & Co.*, 142 F.3d 496, 502-03 (D.C. Cir. 1998); *United
+States v. Smith*, 123 F.3d 140, 148-50 (3d Cir. 1997)).
+
+As this Court explained, "[t]he FISC is a unique court." *In re Release*, 526 F. Supp. 2d at
+487. Whereas "[o]ther courts operate primarily in public, with secrecy the exception; the FISC
+operates primarily in secret, with public access the exception." *Id.* at 488. The FISC maintains
+this operational secrecy because, unlike any other court, its "entire docket relates to the
+collection of foreign intelligence by the federal government." *Id.* at 487. Indeed, proceedings
+before the FISC involve highly sensitive and classified matters involving national security,
+relating, for example, to efforts by the United States to foil acts of international terrorism. By
+their very nature, such proceedings need to be conducted in secrecy. Additionally, unlike the
+operations of any other court, the FISC's operations are governed "by FISA, by Court rule, and
+by statutorily mandated security procedures issued by the Chief Justice of the United States
+[which] [t]ogether . . . represent a comprehensive scheme for the safeguarding and handling of
+FISC proceedings and records." *Id.* at 488. Thus, the FISC's proceedings and the handling of its
+records are different in type or kind from the proceedings and handling of records in any other
+
+6
+
+---
+
+U.S. court, and it is appropriate "to apply the *Press-Enterprise II* tests to the proceedings and
+records of the FISC, rather than to the decisions of all Article III courts." *In re Release II*, at 6.
+
+Having established the uniqueness of the type of proceedings and handling of records, the
+Court applied the "experience" test of *Press-Enterprise II*, which asks whether "the place and
+the process have historically been open to the press and general public." *In re Release*, 526 F.
+Supp. 2d at 492 (quoting *Press-Enterprise II*, 478 U.S. at 8). The Court explained that "the
+FISC has never held a public hearing in its history, and [only a few] opinions have been released
+to the public in nearly three decades of operation." *Id.*
+
+The ACLU is incorrect in asserting that this Court limited its "analysis to whether the two
+published opinions of this Court 'establish a tradition of public access...'" Motion at 7. Rather,
+the Court employed an expansive analysis “the FISC has issued literally thousands of classified
+orders to which the public has had no access," *In re Release*, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 492—in support
+of its holding that "there is no tradition of public access to government briefing materials filed
+with the FISC." *Id.* This is because, again, proceedings before the FISC involve highly sensitive
+and classified matters related to the nation's security, such as efforts to thwart acts of
+international terrorism.
+
+While this Court did examine its two published opinions, it did so in the context of
+refuting the ACLU's argument that the Court had a tradition of releasing "FISC decisions of
+broad legal significance." 526 F. Supp. 2d at 493. The ACLU attempts to reintroduce
+essentially the same disclosure argument it previously made, and this Court rejected. Just as in
+*In re Release*, where the ACLU argued for release of certain FISC records based on their
+"broader significance" and "legal analysis and legal rulings concerning the meaning of FISA,"
+
+7
+
+---
+
+*id.* at 493 (citing ACLU Reply at 13), the ACLU argues here for the release of specific FISC
+records because of their "critical importance" to public debate, Motion at 1, and because the
+records "interpret[] the meaning of public statutes." *Id.* at 8. However, as the Court noted in *In
+re Release*, although it has released a very limited number of opinions of broad legal
+significance, the FISC does not have a tradition of releasing opinions based on these criteria.
+Indeed, "the FISC has in fact issued other legally significant decisions that remain classified and
+have not been released to the public." *In re Release*, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 493; see also *In re
+Release II*, at 6-7 n.9 ("reject[ing] the [ACLU's] suggestion . . . that the amorphous and ill-
+defined category of 'decisions of broad legal significance' constitutes the proper frame of
+reference under *Press-Enterprise II*").
+
+For these reasons, this Court was correct in holding that “the FISC is not a court whose
+place or process has historically been open to the public," and the Court should reaffirm that the
+ACLU's motion "does not satisfy the experience test for a First Amendment right of access." *In
+re Release*, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 493; see also *In re Release II*, at 6 (finding that "the 'experience'
+test is clearly not satisfied, for the reasons stated in the Court's prior opinion"); cf. *Am. Lib.
+Ass'n v. Faurer*, 631 F. Supp. 416, 421 (D.D.C. 1986) (holding that “no First Amendment right
+exists where disclosure of classified information would possibly endanger national security, even
+though the information had been previously in the public domain"), aff'd sub nom. *Am. Lib.
+Ass'n v. Odom*, 818 F.2d 81 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (affirmed on other grounds).
+
+B. The ACLU Also Cannot Establish the "Logic" Prong of Press-Enterprise II.
+
+Under *Press-Enterprise II*, both the "experience and logic" tests must be satisfied. 478
+U.S. at 9 (emphasis added). Accordingly, as a threshold issue, because the ACLU's First
+Amendment claim fails the "experience" test—like its claim in *In re Release*, it "runs counter to
+
+8
+
+---
+
+a long-established and virtually unbroken practice of excluding the public from FISA
+applications and orders"—the claim "fails" regardless of whether it passes the "logic" test. *In re
+Release*, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 493 (citing *Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz*, 886 F.2d 60, 64 (4th Cir.
+1989) (failure to establish right of access because first prong is not satisfied); *United States v. El-
+Sayegh*, 131 F.3d 158, 161 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (same)).
+
+In *In re Release*, this Court also found that the benefits the ACLU claimed would result
+in that case (which are quite similar to those posited by the ACLU here, see Motion at 9-13),
+"fall short of satisfying the 'logic' test under *Press-Enterprise II*." *In re Release*, 526 F. Supp.
+2d at 494; see also *In re Release II*, at 7 (holding that the "ACLU has failed to demonstrate any
+error in the Court's application of the 'logic' test"). This Court observed that, "to a considerable
+degree, comparable benefits could be ascribed to public access to any type of proceeding," 526
+F. Supp. 2d at 494, and therefore the argument "proves too much,' since it provides a rationale
+under which 'even grand jury proceedings would be public.'" *Id.* (quoting *In re Boston Herald,
+Inc.*, 321 F.3d 174, 187 (1st Cir. 2003)); see also *North Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft*, 308
+F.3d 198, 217 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding that were the "logic" prong only to determine whether
+openness serves some good, "it is difficult to conceive of a government proceeding to which the
+public would not have a First Amendment right of access").
+
+This Court also observed that "the detrimental consequences of broad public access to
+FISC proceedings or records would greatly outweigh any such benefits" resulting from a finding
+of a First Amendment right of access to FISC records and proceedings. *In re Release*, 526 F.
+Supp. 2d at 494. In this vein, the Court found that the possible harms from a finding of a First
+Amendment-based right of access "are real and significant, and, quite frankly, beyond debate."
+*Id.* This observation is highly relevant here where the ACLU again seeks "broad public access to
+
+9
+
+---
+
+FISC proceedings or records." *Id.* Compare *id.* at 485 (noting that the ACLU "seeks the release
+of what it identifies as court orders and government pleadings regarding a program of
+surveillance of suspected international terrorists by the National Security Agency (NSA) that had
+previously been conducted without court authorization") with Motion at 11 n.5 (seeking
+"opinions that evaluate the meaning, scope, and constitutionality of Section 215"). These
+concerns are similar to the concerns highlighted by other courts in decisions finding that the
+"logic" requirement was not met in the context of other types of proceedings and records.[^2] Other
+concerns unique to FISA's national security context "are equally supportive of the conclusion
+that public access to FISA surveillance records does not and would not play 'a significant
+positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question.'" *Id.* at 494-95 (quoting
+*Press-Enterprise II*, 478 U.S. at 8).
+
+An additional consideration recognized by this Court is that a finding of a First
+Amendment right of access "would result in a diminished flow of information [from the
+Government to the Court], to the detriment of . . . the FISA process." 526 F. Supp. 2d at 496-
+
+[^2]: See *In re Release*, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 494 n.26 (citing *In re Boston Herald, Inc.*, 321
+F.3d at 188 (discussing privacy concerns and the chilling of sources of information regarding
+public access to records regarding eligibility for assistance under Criminal Justice Act (CJA));
+*Smith*, 123 F.3d at 148 (making grand jury proceedings public could result in flight of those
+about to be indicted and expose the "accused but exonerated . . . to public ridicule") (internal
+quotation marks omitted); *Baltimore Sun Co.*, 886 F.2d at 64 (access to search warrant affidavit
+may disclose wiretaps not yet terminated or reveal identities of, and thereby endanger,
+informants); *United States v. Corbitt*, 879 F.2d 224, 229-35 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting privacy
+concerns of defendants and third parties, and the risks of impeding flow of information from
+confidential sources and of compromising ongoing investigations, regarding claim of public
+access to presentence report); *Times Mirror Co.*, 873 F.2d at 1215-16 (access to search warrant
+proceedings, or to supporting affidavits while investigation is ongoing, would risk destruction of
+evidence, coordination of false testimony, and flight of suspects, and result in public
+embarrassment of persons named). But see *In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside
+Office of Gunn*, 855 F.2d 569, 573 (8th Cir. 1988) ("logic" prong satisfied for access to search
+warrant affidavits).
+
+10
+
+---
+
+97.[^3] Specifically, if the Court were to find a First Amendment-based right of access to FISC
+opinions, the "greater risk of declassification and disclosure over Executive Branch objections"
+would have the potential to "chill the government's interactions with the Court." *Id.* at 496.
+This Court observed that such a "chilling effect could damage national security interests, if, for
+example, the government opted to forgo surveillance or search of legitimate targets in order to
+retain control of sensitive information that a FISA application would contain." *Id.* In addition,
+this Court found that in cases that are presented to the Court, "the free flow of information to the
+FISC that is needed for an ex parte proceeding to result in sound decisionmaking and effective
+oversight could also be threatened." *Id.*; see also *In re Release II*, at 7-8 (reiterating the harms
+the Court described in *In re Release*).
+
+Of course, recent unauthorized disclosures of classified information concerning
+intelligence activities authorized by this Court pursuant to Section 215 have necessarily affected
+the Government's assessment of the need for continued classification of certain information, but
+they should not affect the constitutional analysis grounded in the unique nature of this Court. In
+light of the recent unauthorized disclosures, the Government declassified some information,
+including information concerning intelligence collection under Section 215, so as to provide the
+
+[^3]: This Court's interpretation of the "logic" test was firmly grounded in the decisions of
+other courts that had encountered similar situations. See *In re Release*, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 496
+n.33 (citing *In re Boston Herald*, 321 F.3d at 188 (in CJA context, the "specter of disclosure . . .
+might lead defendants (or other sources called upon by the court) to withhold information");
+*Gonzales*, 150 F.3d at 1259 (analogizing to grand juries, which "function best in secret . . .
+because secrecy 'encourage[s] free and untrammeled disclosures,'" and finding that "[w]ithout
+an assurance that the information revealed at CJA hearings and in documents submitted to the
+court will not be disclosed, a defendant and his or her counsel would be discouraged from fully
+disclosing information") (quoting *Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Nw.*, 441 U.S. 211, 219 n.10
+(1979)); *Corbitt*, 879 F.2d at 232-35 (relying on need to preserve "free flow of information" to
+sentencing judge, and "untoward effects" disclosure could have "on the gathering of information
+in future presentence investigations," in rejecting claimed First Amendment right of access to
+presentence report)).
+
+11
+
+---
+
+public with appropriate context and to inform the ongoing public discussions of the activities in
+question. To ensure that the exercise of those authorities and the need for secrecy is balanced
+with the interest in transparency and public accountability, the Government continues to review
+relevant material, including opinions of this Court, to determine whether, in light of present
+circumstances, there is additional information that should be declassified and released to the
+public, consistent with the need to protect sources and methods and national security. That it is
+appropriate for the Government to conduct such a review at this time does not suggest that this
+Court should recognize a broad-based constitutional right whose implications would stretch far
+beyond the current circumstances, threatening the serious negative consequences that this Court
+identified in *In re Release*.
+
+***
+
+Just as in *In re Release*, "with both the 'experience' and 'logic' tests unsatisfied," this
+Court should conclude that "there is no First Amendment right of access to the requested
+materials." *In re Release*, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 497; see also *In re Release II*, at 9 (holding that
+"the ACLU has failed to demonstrate any error . . . in the Court's prior holding that the ACLU
+has no First Amendment right of access to the documents it seeks").
+
+II. The Court Has Discretion To Publish Any of Its Opinions, and if It Chooses to Do
+So, It Should Follow the Process Set Forth in the Court's Rules.
+
+To the extent that the ACLU moves this Court to publish certain of its opinions, the
+Motion should be denied because only a party to an underlying opinion may move the Court for
+publication. The ACLU correctly identifies the rule that governs the release of FISC opinions—
+FISC Rule of Procedure 62(a). That Rule provides in its entirety:
+
+12
+
+---
+
+Rule 62. Release of Court Records
+
+(a) Publication of Opinions. The judge who authored an order, opinion, or
+other decision may sua sponte or on motion by a party request that it be
+published. Upon such request, the Presiding Judge, after consulting with
+other Judges of the Court, may direct that an order, opinion or other
+decision be published. Before publication, the Court may, as appropriate,
+direct the Executive Branch to review the order, opinion, or other decision
+and redact it as necessary to ensure that properly classified information is
+appropriately protected pursuant to Executive Order 13526 (or its
+successor).
+
+FISC Rule of Procedure 62(a).
+
+Because the ACLU is not a party to any opinions at issue, its Motion should be denied.
+Apart from this Motion, a *sua sponte* request from a judge who authored a particular opinion
+could trigger this process. If a judge of this Court determines, *sua sponte*, that an opinion that he
+or she authored should be published, then that judge may make a request to the Presiding Judge.
+The Presiding Judge would then consult with the other judges of the Court and decide whether or
+not to direct the publication of the opinion at issue. Because "[i]ts entire docket relates to the
+collection of foreign intelligence by the federal government," the publication of this Court's
+opinions is the exception rather than the rule. *In re Release*, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 487-88; see also
+*id.* at 495 (observing that "release [of FISC materials] with redactions may confuse or obscure,
+rather than illuminate, the decisions in question"). Nevertheless, publication is within the
+Court's discretion, and the process for determining which opinions should be published is within
+the sound discretion of the judges of this Court.
+
+Once the Presiding Judge has decided to direct publication of an opinion, the Court is
+empowered to "direct the Executive Branch to review the [opinion] and redact it as necessary to
+ensure that properly classified information is appropriately protected." FISC Rule of Procedure
+62(a). This power is necessary because "[i]n all matters, the Court and its staff shall comply
+
+13
+
+---
+
+with the security measures established pursuant to [congressional mandate], as well as Executive
+Order 13526." FISC Rule of Procedure 3; see also FISC Rule of Procedure 62(b) (mandating
+that a release of FISC records must be conducted "in conformance with the security measures
+referenced in Rule 3"). Executive Order 13,526 "prescribes a uniform system for classifying,
+safeguarding, and declassifying national security information," and under that system only
+certain designated Executive Branch officials can classify or declassify national security
+information. See E.O. 13,526 (Dec. 29, 2009). Thus, pursuant to this Court's Rules of
+Procedure, the Court cannot release an opinion that contains (or may contain) classified
+information without first ordering the Executive Branch to conduct a classification review of the
+opinion and "redact it as necessary to ensure that properly classified information is appropriately
+protected." FISC Rule of Procedure 62(a).
+
+Indeed, as this Court has recognized, “if the FISC were to assume the role of
+independently making declassification and release decisions . . . there would be a real risk of
+harm to national security interests and ultimately to the FISA process itself." *In re Release*, 526
+F. Supp. 2d at 491. "FISC judges do not make classification decisions and are not intended to
+become national security experts." *Id.* at 495 n.31 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 25-26
+(1978)). And, while they may have "more expertise in national security matters than a typical
+district court judge, that expertise [does] not equal that of the Executive Branch, which is
+constitutionally entrusted with protecting the national security." *Id.* Thus, this Court has
+recognized that classification and declassification decisions are the province of the Executive
+
+14
+
+---
+
+Branch, and "there is no role for this Court independently to review, and potentially override,
+Executive Branch classification decisions."[^4] 526 F. Supp. 2d at 491.
+
+In its motion, the ACLU "recognize[s] that this Court's docket encompasses a great deal
+of material that is properly classified," and states that it does not seek disclosure of "any properly
+classified information." Motion at 16. Nevertheless, the ACLU suggests that the FISC could
+release opinions "without prior Executive Branch review." *Id.* However, where an opinion
+contains (or may contain) classified information, FISC Rule of Procedure 3, which incorporates
+Executive Order 13,526, constrains the Court from releasing the opinion until classified
+information has been redacted and recognizes that such redaction can only be done by authorized
+officials within the Executive Branch. Indeed, this Court recently reiterated that "[i]t is
+fundamentally the Executive Branch's responsibility to safeguard sensitive national security
+information." *In re Motion for Consent to Disclosure of Court Records, Docket No. Misc. 13-
+01*, at 6 (June 12, 2013) (citing *Department of Navy v. Egan*, 484 U.S. 518, 527-29 (1988))
+(available at: www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/misc-13-01-opinion-order.pdf). This
+Court's rules provide the way for the Executive Branch to do so.
+
+Because this Court cannot release properly classified information, and only certain
+designated officials within the Executive Branch can determine whether information remains
+properly classified, it would be an abuse of discretion for the Court to release any opinion that
+
+[^4]: This is not to say that Executive Branch classifications are never judicially reviewable.
+The proper means to obtain such review is through a Freedom of Information Act request and
+subsequent action in district court. See *In re Release*, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 491 n.18, 496 n.32.
+
+15
+
+---
+
+may contain classified information without first providing the Executive Branch an opportunity
+to review the opinion and redact all properly classified information.[^5]
+
+CONCLUSION
+
+For the reasons stated above, the ACLU's Motion should be denied.
+
+July 5, 2013
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+
+J. BRADFORD WIEGMANN
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+TASHINA GAUHAR
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+Jeffrey Suits
+JEFFREY M. SMITH
+NICHOLAS J. PATTERSON
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+Phone: (202) 514-5600
+Fax: (202) 514-8053
+
+Attorneys for the United States of America
+
+[^5]: Sixteen members of the House of Representatives as *amici curiae* raise two concerns
+regarding information sharing between the Executive Branch and Congress: (1) that because
+much of the information they receive is classified, they cannot discuss it in congressional debate
+or with their constituents, and (2) that some of the information is so sensitive that it is shared
+only with congressional and/or committee leaders and not with all members of Congress. See
+*Brief of Rep. Amash, et al.* (filed June 28, 2013). The relief sought by the ACLU could not
+alleviate either of these concerns. As *amici* recognize, the ACLU "explicitly does not ask for the
+disclosure of classified information,” *Amici Brief* at 13-14, and thus its Motion would not affect
+the information that members cannot discuss publicly or that is so sensitive that only certain
+leaders receive it.
+
+16
+
+---
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I hereby certify that a true copy of the United States' Opposition to the Motion of the
+American Civil Liberties Union, *et al.*, for the Release of Court Records was served via Federal
+Express overnight delivery on this 5th day of July, 2013, addressed to:
+
+David A. Schulz
+Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic
+Yale Law School
+40 Ashmun Street, 4th Floor
+New Haven, CT 06511
+david.schulz@yale.edu
+
+Alex Abdo
+Brett Max Kaufman
+Patrick Toomey
+Jameel Jaffer
+American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
+125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
+New York, NY 10004
+aabdo@aclu.org
+
+Arthur B. Spitzer
+American Civil Liberties Union of the
+Nation's Capital
+4301 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 434
+Washington, DC 20008
+artspitzer@aclu-nca.org
+
+Gregory L. Diskant
+Benjamin S. Litman
+Richard I. Kim
+Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP
+1133 Avenue of the Americas
+New York, NY 10036
+blitman@pbwt.com
+
+Nichdas J. Pattren
+Nicholas J. Patterson
+
+18
+
+---
+
+APPENDIX A
+
+---
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR RELEASE
+OF COURT RECORDS
+
+Docket No.: MISC. 07-01
+
+MEMORANDUM OPINION[^1A]
+
+This matter first came before the Court on the "Motion of the American Civil Liberties
+Union for Release of Court Records," filed on August 9, 2007 ("ACLU Motion"). In its motion,
+the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) sought the release of what it identifies as court
+orders and government pleadings regarding a program of surveillance of suspected international
+terrorists by the National Security Agency (NSA) that had previously been conducted without
+court authorization. See ACLU Motion at 2 n.2, 3-9. After consideration of the motion; the
+government's opposition to the motion, filed on August 31, 2007 ("Gov't Opp."); and the
+ACLU's reply, filed on September 14, 2007 (“ACLU Reply"), the Court issued a Memorandum
+Opinion and Order denying the ACLU Motion on December 11, 2007. See *In re Motion for
+Release of Court Records, No. MISC. 07-01* (FISC Dec. 11, 2007) (*In re Motion*).
+
+The ACLU sought public release of these documents "with only those redactions essential
+to protect information that the Court determines . . . to be properly classified" after "independent
+review," ACLU Motion at 2-3, under a standard less deferential than "ordinary district courts
+accord" classification decisions of the Executive Branch, ACLU Reply at 8. Addressing the
+three arguments presented by the ACLU, the Court held, first, that there was no common law
+
+[^1A]: The FISC Security Officer has compared this opinion and the accompanying order to the
+unclassified filings by the government in this case, and determined that the opinion and order do
+not contain any classified information.
+
+---
+
+right of public access to the records as a whole, or to such portions of the records that the Court
+might release after conducting such a review. *In re Motion*, slip op. at 10-12. The Court next
+held that the First Amendment does not provide a right of public access to these records, in
+whole or in part, under the criteria for establishing such a right in *Press-Enterprise Co. v.
+Superior Court*, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (*Press-Enterprise II*). *In re Motion*, slip op. at 13-22. Finally,
+the Court declined to exercise any residual discretion it may have "to undertake the searching
+review of the Executive Branch's classification decisions requested by the ACLU," without
+prejudice to the ACLU's "pursuing whatever remedies may be available to it in a district court
+through a . . . request addressed to the Executive Branch" under the Freedom of Information Act,
+5 U.S.C. § 552 (FOIA). *Id.* at 22.
+
+On December 21, 2007, the ACLU filed a "Motion for Reconsideration or
+Reconsideration En Banc” (“Recon. Motion"), and the government subsequently submitted a
+response on January 8, 2008. For the reasons stated herein, the ACLU's request for
+reconsideration will be denied.[^2A]
+
+[^2A]: The ACLU's request for reconsideration en banc will also be denied. As authority for
+this Court to sit en banc, the ACLU cites this Court's decision in *In re All Matters Submitted to
+the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court*, 218 F. Supp.2d 611 (FISC), rev'd sub nom. *In re
+Sealed Case*, 310 F.3d 717 (FISC Rev. 2002). But the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of
+Review specifically stated that FISA does not contemplate an en banc proceeding before this
+Court. In re *Sealed Case*, 310 F.3d at 721 n.5. That statement by the Court of Review would
+appear to put an end to the ACLU's motion for en banc reconsideration. But even assuming,
+arguendo, that this Court does have authority to sit en banc in this case, the decision in this
+matter simply does not warrant reconsideration en banc. This footnote has been circulated to all
+the other judges of this Court, and they are in agreement with it.
+
+2
+
+---
+
+I. The Standards for Reconsideration.
+
+The rules of the FISC do not directly provide for motions for reconsideration. However,
+FISC Rule of Procedure 1 states that "[i]ssues not addressed in these rules may be resolved under
+the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." FISC Rule 1.
+In this case, it is logical to apply the standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to the
+ACLU's request for reconsideration.[^3A] A district court "properly invokes its discretion to grant a
+Rule 59(e) motion if it finds there is: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the
+availability of new evidence; or (3) the need to correct clear error or manifest injustice." *Lance
+v. United Mine Workers of Am. 1974 Pension Trust*, 400 F. Supp.2d 29, 31 (D.D.C. 2005);
+accord, *Ciralsky v. CIA*, 355 F.3d 661, 671 (D.C. Cir. 2004); *Firestone v. Firestone*, 76 F.3d
+1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996). A motion for reconsideration is not an opportunity for a party
+merely to reassert factual or legal arguments that were already presented,[^4A] or to rely on theories it
+could have put forward earlier.[^5A]
+
+The ACLU's motion for reconsideration presents nothing that can be regarded as an
+intervening change in controlling law or newly available evidence. Furthermore, the ACLU fails
+
+[^3A]: "Courts have routinely construed papers captioned 'motion to reconsider' as a motion
+to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e)." *Emory v. Sec'y of the Navy*, 819 F.2d 291,
+293 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
+[^4A]: *Fresh Kist Produce, LLC v. Choi Corp.*, 251 F. Supp.2d 138, 140 (D.D.C. 2003);
+*Consol. Edison Co. of New York v. O'Leary*, 184 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1998); *New York v.
+United States*, 880 F. Supp. 37, 38 (D.D.C. 1995) (per curiam).
+[^5A]: *Howard v. Gutierrez*, 503 F. Supp.2d 392, 394 (D.D.C. 2007); *Fresh Kist Produce*, 251
+F. Supp.2d at 140.
+
+3
+
+---
+
+to demonstrate clear error or manifest injustice in the prior opinion. The motion for
+reconsideration is accordingly denied.
+
+II. There Is No Common Law Right of Public Access.
+
+In its prior opinion, the Court concluded that any common law right of public access that
+might otherwise exist has been pre-empted by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978,
+codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1871 (FISA), and the Security Procedures adopted
+thereunder.[^6A] *In re Motion*, slip op. at 11-12. This is because FISA and the Security Procedures
+strictly limit access to FISC records and proceedings, see *id.* at 6-10, and these limitations are
+inconsistent with a common law right of public access.
+
+The ACLU now asserts that this Court "erred in holding that it must treat the executive's
+classification decisions as conclusive." Recon. Motion at 11. But the Court did not so hold.
+Rather, the Court held that FISA and the Security Procedures promulgated thereunder were
+inconsistent with the claim that the ACLU or other members of the public had a common law
+right to require the Court independently to review Executive Branch classification decisions and
+release documents found to be improperly classified. It was only in this context—that is, in the
+course of holding that any common law right of access had been pre-empted – that the Court
+noted that, "[u]nder FISA and the applicable Security Procedures, there is no role for this Court
+independently to review, and potentially override, Executive Branch classification decisions." *In
+re Motion*, slip op. at 11. Hence, the Court simply did not decide whether the FISC, in an
+
+[^6A]: See Security Procedures Established Pursuant to Public L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783,
+by the Chief Justice of the United States for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the
+Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (May 18, 1979) ("Security Procedures"),
+reprinted in H.R. Rep. No. 96-558, at 7-10 (1979).
+
+4
+
+---
+
+appropriate case, would have the authority to override Executive Branch classification decisions
+as a matter of discretion. The ACLU's claim of error therefore misses the mark, because it is
+aimed at a holding that this Court did not in fact make. And the ACLU has failed to demonstrate
+clear error or manifest injustice in the Court's actual holding, which was that any common law
+right of public access that might otherwise exist has been pre-empted by FISA and the Security
+Procedures.
+
+As an independent ground for holding that there is no applicable common law right, the
+Court also found that, “if the FISC were to assume the role of independently making
+declassification and release decisions in the probing manner requested by the ACLU, there would
+be a real risk of harm to national security interests and ultimately to the FISA process itself." *In
+re Motion*, slip op. at 12. As noted below in the context of the "logic" test under *Press-Enterprise
+II*, the ACLU fails to refute this rationale as well.
+
+III. There Is No First Amendment Right of Access.
+
+Contrary to the suggestion of the ACLU, the Court's prior opinion did not hold that "First
+Amendment interests are not implicated by the sealing of judicial opinions concerning the scope
+and meaning of FISA." Recon. Motion at 13. Rather, it applied the governing "experience and
+logic" tests specified in *Press-Enterprise II*, 478 U.S. at 8-9, which is the controlling Supreme
+Court precedent, to determine whether the ACLU had a First Amendment right to access the
+opinions and records in question. See *In re Motion*, slip op. at 13-22.[^7A]
+
+[^7A]: The ACLU does not challenge the holding, see *id.*, at 16, that both the experience and
+logic tests must be satisfied to establish a First Amendment right of public access.
+
+5
+
+---
+
+Under the "experience" test, the ACLU argues that the appropriate inquiry is whether
+there is a tradition of public access to decisions of Article III courts. Recon. Motion at 13. That
+is an incorrect framing of the question. *Press-Enterprise II* requires that the tests of experience
+and logic be applied to the "particular proceeding in question" 478 U.S. at 9 (emphasis added).
+Thus, the tests of experience and logic have not been applied to categories as sweeping as all
+decisions of Article III courts, but rather to narrower classes that permit a meaningful assessment
+of the effects of public access on a particular type of judicial process – for example, district court
+proceedings (and related records) that are ancillary to grand jury operations. See *In re Motions of
+Dow Jones & Co.*, 142 F.3d 496, 502-03 (D.C. Cir. 1998); *United States v. Smith*, 123 F.3d 140,
+148-50 (3d Cir. 1997).[^8A] Moreover, as explained in the Court's earlier opinion, see *In re Motion*,
+slip op. at 6-10, the FISC is a unique court created to deal with classified foreign intelligence
+matters in a secure and non-public fashion. It is therefore appropriate in this case to apply the
+*Press-Enterprise II* tests to the proceedings and records of the FISC, rather than to the decisions
+of all Article III courts. And once FISC records and proceedings are accepted as the appropriate
+category for analysis under *Press-Enterprise II*, the "experience" test is clearly not satisfied, for
+the reasons stated in the Court's prior opinion. See *In re Motion*, slip op. at 14-16.[^9A]
+
+[^8A]: Contrary to the ACLU's contention, see Recon. Motion at 13 n.13, the decision in
+*Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court*, 457 U.S. 596 (1982), does not support the broad
+analysis that the ACLU advocates. In that case, the tests of experience and logic were applied to
+the category of criminal trials, not to all court proceedings or even to all trials.
+[^9A]: The ACLU argues in its motion for reconsideration (Recon. Motion at 13) that the FISC
+simply has no tradition of issuing decisions of broad legal significance, either publicly or
+nonpublicly. But the fact remains that some "legally significant [FISC] decisions . . . remain
+classified and have not been released to the public." *In re Motion*, slip op. at 15. More
+fundamentally, the Court rejects the suggestion (see ACLU Reply at 13) that the amorphous and
+(continued...)
+
+6
+
+---
+
+With regard to the "logic" test, the Court did not hold, as the ACLU suggests, that
+judicial decisions about the meaning of a federal statute should be "kept secret from the public
+simply because the executive has demanded that they be kept secret." Recon. Motion at 15.
+Rather, under the "logic" test, the relief requested by the ACLU – application by the FISC of a
+more probing standard of judicial review of Executive Branch classification decisions than a
+federal district court would apply -- would result in harmful consequences that outweigh any
+likely public benefits. *In re Motion*, slip op. at 18-21.[^10A]
+
+The ACLU has failed to demonstrate any error in the Court's application of the "logic"
+test. In its prior opinion, the Court reasoned that the benefits to the public of the process
+requested by the ACLU would be diminished, “insofar as release with redactions may confuse or
+obscure, rather than illuminate, the decisions in question." *In re Motion*, slip op. at 19. The
+Court also noted the harmful consequences of granting the relief requested. First, if the Court
+were to engage in the heightened form of judicial review requested by the ACLU, the Court
+might err in its declassification decisions and release properly classified information, thus
+damaging the national security. *Id.* Second, the proper functioning of the FISA process would
+be adversely affected if submitting sensitive information to the FISC could subject the Executive
+Branch's classification decisions to a heightened form of judicial review. In particular, the
+government might opt to forgo surveillance and search of legitimate targets in order to retain
+
+(...continued)
+ill-defined category of "decisions of broad legal significance" constitutes the proper frame of
+reference under *Press-Enterprise II*.
+[^10A]: Of course, nothing in the Court's prior opinion or in this opinion prevents release of
+any part of a FISC decision under FOIA, should such release be appropriate pursuant to that
+statute.
+
+7
+
+---
+
+control of sensitive information; government officials might choose to conduct a search or
+surveillance without FISC approval where the need for such approval is unclear; and in cases that
+are submitted, the free flow of information to the FISC could be threatened. *Id.* at 20.
+
+The ACLU contends that the Court erred in noting the diminished benefits of a redacted
+or partial release of the documents in question, because "it is not appropriate for this Court (or
+any other) to keep information secret on the grounds that its disclosure could confuse the public."
+Recon. Motion at 16. But the Court did not keep information secret on the grounds that its
+disclosure could confuse the public. Instead, the Court conducted the balancing of benefits and
+harms required under the logic test. And in conducting that analysis, it was appropriate to
+consider the quantum of benefit that inhered in the heightened review requested by the ACLU so
+that the Court could make a correct judgment as to whether that benefit outweighed the
+(considerable) costs. Here, the benefit was diminished because of the potential for confusion
+from a redacted release.
+
+The ACLU also argues against this Court's concern that, if the ACLU's motion were
+granted, the Court might err by releasing information that in fact should remain classified, and
+thereby damage the national security. Recon. Motion at 15. First, the ACLU asserts that these
+risks are equally present in FOIA litigation. But as the prior opinion noted, the issue before the
+Court was the cost of applying "the less deferential standard sought by the ACLU.” *In re
+Motion*, slip op. 19 (emphasis added); see also *id.* at 21 n.32. Applying that less deferential
+standard would increase the risk of erroneous release beyond that incurred in a FOIA action.
+Second, the ACLU suggests that a heightened standard of review is appropriate because
+constitutional rights are at stake. But that puts the cart before the horse. The purpose of the
+
+8
+
+---
+
+experience and logic tests is to determine whether a constitutional right is in fact at stake.
+
+The ACLU does not address the Court's concern that the government might opt to forgo
+surveillance and search of legitimate targets in order to retain control of sensitive information.
+Nor does the ACLU address the Court's concern about ensuring the free flow of information
+from the government to the FISC in cases that are submitted. The ACLU does, however, suggest
+that it is inappropriate for the Court to consider the possibility that government officials might
+choose to conduct a search or surveillance without FISC approval where the need for such
+approval is unclear. Recon. Motion at 16. But there is no basis for the ACLU's suggestion that
+the Court's concern about government officials avoiding the FISC where the need for FISC
+approval is unclear constitutes a "capitulation to lawlessness" or an acceptance of
+"unconstitutional behavior" (Recon. Motion at 16).
+
+For all of these reasons, the ACLU has failed to demonstrate any error, let alone clear
+error or manifest injustice, in the Court's prior holding that the ACLU has no First Amendment
+right of access to the documents it seeks.
+
+IV. The Court Will Not Release the Records as a Matter of Discretion.
+
+Finally, the ACLU's request that the Court exercise its discretion to review the sealed
+materials "in the unusual circumstances presented here" (Recon. Motion at 17) does not warrant
+reconsideration. The Court is aware of the ongoing congressional and public debate over
+extending or replacing the Protect America Act of 2007, and it acknowledges that release of the
+requested materials (at least in their unredacted form) could inform the public in that debate.
+
+Nevertheless, the Court properly rejected the ACLU's request for release, and now denies
+the ACLU's motion for reconsideration. As noted above and in the Court's original opinion,
+
+9
+
+---
+
+even assuming that this Court has the discretion independently to declassify materials over the
+Executive's objections, the searching review requested by the ACLU of the Executive Branch's
+classification decisions—over and above that conducted by a district court under FOIA -- poses
+unacceptable risks to the national security and to the proper functioning of the FISA process. As
+already explained, these risks include the heightened possibility of erroneous judicial release of
+properly classified materials; the forgoing of search or surveillance against legitimate targets;
+avoidance of the FISC in cases where the need for FISC approval is unclear; and impediments to
+the free flow of information in cases that are submitted. *In re Motion*, slip op. at 19-20. These
+risks simply outweigh the potential benefits from discretionary release.
+
+V. Conclusion.
+
+The Court will therefore deny the ACLU's motion for reconsideration or reconsideration
+en banc.
+
+JOHN D. BATES
+Judge, Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Court
+
+February 8, 2008
+Date
+
+I, Karen E. Sutton, Clerk,
+FISC, certify that this document
+is a true and correct copy
+of the original.
+
+10
+
+---
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR RELEASE
+OF COURT RECORDS
+
+Docket No.: MISC. 07-01
+
+ORDER
+
+IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion of the American Civil Liberties Union for
+Reconsideration or Reconsideration en Banc is DENIED.
+
+JOHN D. BATES
+Judge, Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Court
+
+February 8, 2008
+DATE
+
+I, Karen E. Sutton, Clerk,
+FISC, certify that this document
+is a true and correct copy
+of the original.
+
+---
+[^1]: The ACLU's comparison of *In re Release* to the case in *El Vocero* is inapposite. In *El Vocero*, the Supreme Court analyzed a particular type of hearing—a preliminary hearing—which is common to many jurisdictions throughout the United States, unlike the FISC's unique type of proceedings. *El Vocero*, 508 U.S. at 150-51. The Supreme Court found that although the Puerto Rican Supreme Court had relied on a Puerto Rican tradition of closed preliminary hearings, the "established and widespread tradition of open preliminary hearings among the States was canvassed in *Press-Enterprise* and is controlling here." *Id.* (citations omitted). In other words, the Supreme Court held that the traditions of a particular jurisdiction in handling a particular type or kind of hearing were overcome by the general experience of how all U.S. jurisdictions handled such hearings.
+[^2]: See *In re Release*, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 494 n.26 (citing *In re Boston Herald, Inc.*, 321 F.3d at 188 (discussing privacy concerns and the chilling of sources of information regarding public access to records regarding eligibility for assistance under Criminal Justice Act (CJA)); *Smith*, 123 F.3d at 148 (making grand jury proceedings public could result in flight of those about to be indicted and expose the "accused but exonerated . . . to public ridicule") (internal quotation marks omitted); *Baltimore Sun Co.*, 886 F.2d at 64 (access to search warrant affidavit may disclose wiretaps not yet terminated or reveal identities of, and thereby endanger, informants); *United States v. Corbitt*, 879 F.2d 224, 229-35 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting privacy concerns of defendants and third parties, and the risks of impeding flow of information from confidential sources and of compromising ongoing investigations, regarding claim of public access to presentence report); *Times Mirror Co.*, 873 F.2d at 1215-16 (access to search warrant proceedings, or to supporting affidavits while investigation is ongoing, would risk destruction of evidence, coordination of false testimony, and flight of suspects, and result in public embarrassment of persons named). But see *In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside Office of Gunn*, 855 F.2d 569, 573 (8th Cir. 1988) ("logic" prong satisfied for access to search warrant affidavits).
+[^3]: This Court's interpretation of the "logic" test was firmly grounded in the decisions of other courts that had encountered similar situations. See *In re Release*, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 496 n.33 (citing *In re Boston Herald*, 321 F.3d at 188 (in CJA context, the "specter of disclosure . . . might lead defendants (or other sources called upon by the court) to withhold information"); *Gonzales*, 150 F.3d at 1259 (analogizing to grand juries, which "function best in secret . . . because secrecy 'encourage[s] free and untrammeled disclosures,'" and finding that "[w]ithout an assurance that the information revealed at CJA hearings and in documents submitted to the court will not be disclosed, a defendant and his or her counsel would be discouraged from fully disclosing information") (quoting *Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Nw.*, 441 U.S. 211, 219 n.10 (1979)); *Corbitt*, 879 F.2d at 232-35 (relying on need to preserve "free flow of information" to sentencing judge, and "untoward effects" disclosure could have "on the gathering of information in future presentence investigations," in rejecting claimed First Amendment right of access to presentence report)).
+[^4]: This is not to say that Executive Branch classifications are never judicially reviewable. The proper means to obtain such review is through a Freedom of Information Act request and subsequent action in district court. See *In re Release*, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 491 n.18, 496 n.32.
+[^5]: Sixteen members of the House of Representatives as *amici curiae* raise two concerns regarding information sharing between the Executive Branch and Congress: (1) that because much of the information they receive is classified, they cannot discuss it in congressional debate or with their constituents, and (2) that some of the information is so sensitive that it is shared only with congressional and/or committee leaders and not with all members of Congress. See *Brief of Rep. Amash, et al.* (filed June 28, 2013). The relief sought by the ACLU could not alleviate either of these concerns. As *amici* recognize, the ACLU "explicitly does not ask for the disclosure of classified information,” *Amici Brief* at 13-14, and thus its Motion would not affect the information that members cannot discuss publicly or that is so sensitive that only certain leaders receive it.
+[^1A]: The FISC Security Officer has compared this opinion and the accompanying order to the unclassified filings by the government in this case, and determined that the opinion and order do not contain any classified information.
+[^2A]: The ACLU's request for reconsideration en banc will also be denied. As authority for this Court to sit en banc, the ACLU cites this Court's decision in *In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court*, 218 F. Supp.2d 611 (FISC), rev'd sub nom. *In re Sealed Case*, 310 F.3d 717 (FISC Rev. 2002). But the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review specifically stated that FISA does not contemplate an en banc proceeding before this Court. In re *Sealed Case*, 310 F.3d at 721 n.5. That statement by the Court of Review would appear to put an end to the ACLU's motion for en banc reconsideration. But even assuming, arguendo, that this Court does have authority to sit en banc in this case, the decision in this matter simply does not warrant reconsideration en banc. This footnote has been circulated to all the other judges of this Court, and they are in agreement with it.
+[^3A]: "Courts have routinely construed papers captioned 'motion to reconsider' as a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e)." *Emory v. Sec'y of the Navy*, 819 F.2d 291, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
+[^4A]: *Fresh Kist Produce, LLC v. Choi Corp.*, 251 F. Supp.2d 138, 140 (D.D.C. 2003); *Consol. Edison Co. of New York v. O'Leary*, 184 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1998); *New York v. United States*, 880 F. Supp. 37, 38 (D.D.C. 1995) (per curiam).
+[^5A]: *Howard v. Gutierrez*, 503 F. Supp.2d 392, 394 (D.D.C. 2007); *Fresh Kist Produce*, 251 F. Supp.2d at 140.
+[^6A]: See Security Procedures Established Pursuant to Public L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783, by the Chief Justice of the United States for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (May 18, 1979) ("Security Procedures"), reprinted in H.R. Rep. No. 96-558, at 7-10 (1979).
+[^7A]: The ACLU does not challenge the holding, see *id.*, at 16, that both the experience and logic tests must be satisfied to establish a First Amendment right of public access.
+[^8A]: Contrary to the ACLU's contention, see Recon. Motion at 13 n.13, the decision in *Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court*, 457 U.S. 596 (1982), does not support the broad analysis that the ACLU advocates. In that case, the tests of experience and logic were applied to the category of criminal trials, not to all court proceedings or even to all trials.
+[^9A]: The ACLU argues in its motion for reconsideration (Recon. Motion at 13) that the FISC simply has no tradition of issuing decisions of broad legal significance, either publicly or nonpublicly. But the fact remains that some "legally significant [FISC] decisions . . . remain classified and have not been released to the public." *In re Motion*, slip op. at 15. More fundamentally, the Court rejects the suggestion (see ACLU Reply at 13) that the amorphous and (continued...) ill-defined category of "decisions of broad legal significance" constitutes the proper frame of reference under *Press-Enterprise II*.
+[^10A]: Of course, nothing in the Court's prior opinion or in this opinion prevents release of any part of a FISC decision under FOIA, should such release be appropriate pursuant to that statute.
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-us-opposition-130705/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-us-opposition-130705/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f597ab7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-us-opposition-130705/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "The United States' Opposition to the Motion of the American Civil Liberties Union, et. al., for the Release of Court Records, In re Orders of this Court Interpreting Section 215 of the Patriot Act",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-07-05",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-07-05",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34436",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "6edce354113e167caf3939b74a539cda1b1d70362db4a795f716ea5633097ede",
+ "pages": 30
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-action-140127/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-action-140127.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-action-140127/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-action-140127.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ae56787
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-action-140127/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-action-140127.md
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+2014 JAN 27 PM 3:48
+
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE AMENDED MOTION FOR
+DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF A FIRST
+AMENDMENT RIGHT TO PUBLISH
+AGGREGATE INFORMATION ABOUT
+FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-03
+
+IN RE MOTION TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-04
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+AND DIRECTIVES
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-05
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS AND
+DIRECTIVES
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-06
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT TO REPORT AGGREGATED
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-07
+
+STIPULATION FOR VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF ACTION
+
+The parties, being the only parties who have appeared in this action, stipulate and agree,
+pursuant to Rule 1 of this Court's Rules of Procedure, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
+41(a)(1)(A)(ii), that the above-entitled actions shall be dismissed without prejudice.
+
+Dated: January 27, 2014
+
+ALBERT GIDARI
+Perkins Coie LLP
+1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900
+Seattle, WA 98101
+Attorneys for Google Inc.
+
+JAMES M. GARLAND
+DAVID N. FAGAN
+ALEXANDER A. BERENGAUT
+Covington & Burling LLP
+1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
+Washington, DC 20004-2401
+Attorneys for Microsoft Corporation
+
+MARC J. ZWILLINGER
+JACOB A. SOMMER
+ZwillGen PLLC
+1705 N St. N.W.
+Washington, DC 20036
+Attorneys for Yahoo! Inc.
+
+CARL J. NICHOLS
+Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP
+1875 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
+Washington, DC 20006
+Attorney for Facebook, Inc.
+
+JEROME C. ROTH
+JONATHAN H. BLAVIN
+JUSTIN P. RAPHAEL
+Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP
+560 Mission Street,
+27th Floor
+San Francisco, CA 94105
+Attorneys for LinkedIn Corporation
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+
+TASHINA GAUHAR
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+J. BRADFORD WIEGMANN
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+CHRISTOPHER HARDEE
+Chief Counsel for Policy
+
+/s/ Alex Iftimie
+ALEX IFTIMIE
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, DC 20530
+Attorneys for the United States of America
+
+2
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I hereby certify that a true copy of this Stipulation of Dismissal was served by the
+Government via email on this 27th day of January, 2014, addressed to:
+
+Albert Gidari
+Perkins Coie LLP
+1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900
+Seattle, WA 98101
+Attorney for Google Inc.
+
+James Garland
+David N. Fagan
+Alexander A. Berengaut
+Covington & Burling LLP
+1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
+Washington, DC 20004-2401
+Attorneys for Microsoft Corporation
+
+Marc J. Zwillinger
+Jacob A. Sommer
+ZwillGen PLLC
+1705 N Street, N.W.
+Washington, DC 20036
+Attorneys for Yahoo! Inc.
+
+Carl J. Nichols
+Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP
+1875 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
+Washington, DC 20006
+Attorney for Facebook, Inc.
+
+Jerome C. Roth
+Jonathan H. Blavin
+Justin P. Raphael
+Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP
+560 Mission Street, 27th Floor
+San Francisco, CA 94105
+Attorneys for LinkedIn Corporation
+
+/s/
+Alex Iftimie
+
+3
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-action-140127/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-action-140127/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..77be3b8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-action-140127/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Stipulation for Voluntary Dismissal of Action",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2014-01-27",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2014-01-27",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34483",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "d49258c1321dd72e5a38cc06887c5829c16e32dec1703201d69076f752f9ebe8",
+ "pages": 3
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-motion-131105/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-motion-131105.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-motion-131105/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-motion-131105.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..82da181
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-motion-131105/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-motion-131105.md
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+U.S. FOREIGN
+UNITED STATES FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE, COURT
+
+In re Motions for Declaratory
+Judgment to Disclose Aggregate
+Data Regarding FISA Orders
+and Directives
+
+Case Nos. Misc. 13-03, 13-04, 13-05, 13-06
+and 13-07
+
+MOTION OF APPLE INC. FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF
+
+Apple Inc. ("Apple") moves for leave to file the accompanying amicus curiae brief in
+support of the motions for declaratory judgment filed in the above-captioned cases by Google
+Inc., Microsoft Corporation, Yahoo! Inc., Facebook, Inc., and LinkedIn Corporation ("the
+providers"). As set forth in greater detail in its filing, Apple submits this filing to describe the
+interest of Apple and its customers in the motions that have been filed and to provide additional
+analysis as to why the Government's position both (i) lacks any statutory basis and (ii) violates
+the First Amendment right of Apple and others to provide the public and Apple's customers with
+important information on an issue that has been the subject of intense political debate and public
+concern.
+
+The providers consent to Apple's filing. The Government consents to Apple's filing on
+the condition that it have the opportunity to file a reply due on or before November 26, 2013, if it
+chooses to do so. Both the providers and Apple consent to this condition.
+
+No party or counsel for a party participated in the drafting of this brief or made any
+monetary contributions to it. For these reasons, and those set out in the attached brief, Apple
+respectfully requests that the Court grant it leave to file its amicus curiae brief.
+
+***
+
+Pursuant to FISC Rule of Procedure 7(i), Apple states that none of its undersigned
+counsel holds security clearances. Pursuant to FISC Rule of Procedure 7(h)(1), Attorneys for
+Amicus Apple certify that the undersigned attorneys are members in good standing of the Bar of
+the District of Columbia.
+
+Dated: November 5, 2013
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+C.
+
+William Isaacson, D.C. Bar No. 414788
+Samuel C. Kaplan, D.C. Bar No. 463350
+Michael J. Gottlieb, D.C. Bar No. 974960
+BOIES, SCHILLER & FLEXNER, LLP
+5301 Wisconsin Ave. NW
+Washington, DC 20015
+(t) (202) 237-2727
+(f) (202) 237-6131
+wisaacson@bsfllp.com
+
+Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Apple, Inc.
+
+2
+
+UNITED STATES FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+In re Motions for Declaratory
+Judgment to Disclose Aggregate
+Data Regarding FISA Orders
+and Directives
+
+Case Nos. Misc. 13-03, 13-04, 13-05, 13-06,
+and 13-07
+
+[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING MOTION OF APPLE INC. FOR LEAVE TO FILE
+AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF
+
+Now before the Court is the motion of Apple Inc. to file an amicus curiae brief in the
+above-captioned cases. Apple has an interest in these cases, and the parties have consented. If
+the Government chooses to file a response to Apple's filing, it shall do so on or before November
+26, 2013. Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that Apple's motion for leave to file an amicus
+curiae brief is GRANTED.
+
+SO ORDERED, this ___ day of _______________, 2013.
+
+United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+Washington, D.C.
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I hereby certify this 5th day of November, 2013, that I caused the foregoing document to
+be served by hand delivery on the following:
+
+Christine Gunning
+Litigation Security Group
+United States Department of Justice
+2 Constitution Square
+145 N St., NE, Suite 2W-115
+Washington, DC 20530
+
+In addition, I caused the foregoing document to be served by electronic mail on:
+
+Albert Gidari
+Perkins Coie LLP
+1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900
+Seattle, WA 98101
+agidari@perkinscoie.com
+Counsel for Google Inc.
+
+Carl Nichols
+Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP
+1875 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
+Washington, DC 20006
+Carl.nichols@wilmerhale.com
+Counsel for Facebook, Inc.
+
+Jerome C. Roth
+Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP
+560 Mission Street, 27th Floor
+San Francisco, CA 94105
+Jermone.Roth@mto.com
+Counsel for LinkedIn Corporation
+
+James Garland
+Covington & Burling LLP
+1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
+Washington, DC 20004
+jgarland@cov.com
+Counsel for Microsoft Corporation
+
+Marc Zwillinger
+ZwillGen PLLC
+1705 N St. NW
+Washington, DC 20036
+marc@zwillgen.com
+Counsel for Yahoo! Inc.
+
+Samuel C. Kaplan
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-motion-131105/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-motion-131105/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..89bed21
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-motion-131105/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Motion of Apple Inc. for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief, In re Motions for Declaratory Judgment to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders and Directives",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-11-05",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-05",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34474",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "396bbdaa5b8a4039d285864113606f8d462b2cd83d09dd4cd59cfe1b1248e6f8",
+ "pages": 4
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-motion-131113/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-motion-131113.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-motion-131113/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-motion-131113.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..39ef66f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-motion-131113/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-motion-131113.md
@@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+2013 NOV 13 AM 10:12
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+UNITED STATES
+
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT OF A FIRST AMENDMENT
+RIGHT TO PUBLISH AGGREGATE
+INFORMATION ABOUT FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-03
+
+IN RE MOTION TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-04
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+AND DIRECTIVES
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-05
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+AND DIRECTIVES
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-06
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT TO REPORT AGGREGATED
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-07
+
+JOINT MOTION FOR PARTIAL STAY OF PROCEEDINGS
+
+In accordance with the Court's Order of October 11, 2013, the parties have met and
+conferred regarding the Movants' request for access to unredacted versions of the Government's
+response and declaration. The parties have been unable to reach agreement on this issue, and
+after informing the Government that they intended to seek relief from the Court in regard to the
+
+Government's redacted submissions, on November 12, 2013, Movants filed their Motion to
+Strike the Government's Ex Parte Response to Motions to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding
+FISA Orders.
+
+Accordingly, the parties hereby jointly move for a stay of the deadline for the Movants'
+reply to the Government's response to the Movants' motions for declaratory relief. The parties
+request that the Court stay the deadline for the Movants' reply until the Court resolves the
+Movants' pending motion for relief in regard to the Government's redacted submissions. At that
+point in time, the deadline for the Movants' reply can be re-set as appropriate under the
+circumstances. The parties propose that the Government's opposition to Movants' motion for
+relief in regard to the Government's redacted submissions be filed on or before December 6,
+2013, and that the Movants' reply with respect to that motion be filed on or before December 20,
+2013. A proposed Order is attached.
+
+November 13, 2013
+
+/s/ Albert Gidari
+ALBERT GIDARI
+TODD M. HINNEN
+Perkins Coie LLP
+1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900
+Seattle, WA
+
+Attorney for Google Inc.
+
+/s/ James M. Garland
+JAMES M. GARLAND
+DAVID N. FAGAN
+ALEXANDER A. BERENGAUT
+Covington & Burling LLP
+1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
+Washington, DC 20004-2401
+
+Attorneys for Microsoft Corporation
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+
+TASHINA GAUHAR
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+/s/ Nicholas J. Patterson
+JEFFREY M. SMITH
+NICHOLAS J. PATTERSON
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+
+Attorneys for the United States of America
+2
+
+/s/ Marc J. Zwillinger
+MARC J. ZWILLINGER
+JACOB A. SOMMER
+ZwillGen PLLC
+1705 N St. NW
+Washington, DC 20036
+
+Attorneys for Yahoo! Inc.
+
+/s/ Carl J. Nicholas
+CARL J. NICHOLS
+Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP
+1875 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
+Washington, DC 20006
+
+Attorney for Facebook, Inc.
+
+/s/ Jerome C. Roth
+JEROME C. ROTH
+JONATHAN H. BLAVIN
+JUSTIN P. RAPHAEL
+Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP
+560 Mission Street, 27th Floor
+San Francisco, CA 94105
+
+Attorney for LinkedIn Corporation
+
+3
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT OF A FIRST AMENDMENT
+RIGHT TO PUBLISH AGGREGATE
+INFORMATION ABOUT FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-03
+
+IN RE MOTION TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-04
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+AND DIRECTIVES
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-05
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+AND DIRECTIVES
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-06
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT TO REPORT AGGREGATED
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-07
+
+[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING JOINT MOTION
+FOR PARTIAL STAY OF PROCEEDINGS
+
+On November 13, 2013, the parties in the above-captioned cases filed a joint motion for a
+partial stay of proceedings. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the joint motion is
+GRANTED and (1) the deadline for the Movants' reply is stayed pending the Court's resolution
+
+of the Movants' motion for relief in regard to the Government's redacted submissions, (2) the
+Government's opposition to Movants' motion for relief in regard to the Government's redacted
+submissions shall be filed on or before December 6, 2013, and (3) the Movants' reply with
+respect to that motion shall be filed on or before December 20, 2013.
+
+SO ORDERED, this _______ day of November, 2013.
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+2
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-motion-131113/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-motion-131113/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b2e8b1c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-motion-131113/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Joint Motion for Partial Stay of Proceedings",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-11-13",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-13",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34477",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "9acb927cdd72cb9380b62b9bf03eeec2bc9df40dfa43b2788ee6f04a582f5654",
+ "pages": 5
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-motion-131206/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-motion-131206.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-motion-131206/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-motion-131206.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d19014d
--- /dev/null
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+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEI COURT
+
+Filed with Classified
+Information Security Officer
+CISO
+Date: 2/16/13
+
+20FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+LEEANN FLYNN
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT OF A FIRST AMENDMENT
+RIGHT TO PUBLISH AGGREGATE
+INFORMATION ABOUT FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-03
+
+
+IN RE MOTION TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-04
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+AND DIRECTIVES
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-05
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+AND DIRECTIVES
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-06
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT TO REPORT AGGREGATED
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-07
+
+THE UNITED STATES' OPPOSITION TO THE COMPANIES' MOTION
+TO STRIKE THE GOVERNMENT'S EX PARTE RESPONSE TO MOTIONS
+TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+
+J. BRADFORD WIEGMANN
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+INTRODUCTION
+
+The companies seek to strike the classified redacted information in the Government's
+response to their motions for declaratory judgment unless the Government discloses the
+information to their counsel. But the Government's response is consistent with Rule 7(j) of this
+Court's Rules of Procedure, which expressly authorizes the Government to file classified
+submissions *ex parte* in adversarial proceedings. The rule only requires that "[t]he unclassified
+or redacted version, at a minimum, must clearly articulate the government's legal arguments."
+None of the legal arguments in the Government's public brief have been redacted. The brief was
+carefully reviewed to provide as much information as possible to the companies and to the
+public, consistent with national security. The redacted information supports the Government's
+decision to classify the data the companies seek to disclose. That classification decision is within
+the discretion of the Executive Branch, and in any event does not interfere with the legal
+arguments the companies can offer.
+
+Indeed, the classified information is irrelevant to the companies' argument about the
+scope of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act's nondisclosure provisions, which is an issue
+of statutory construction. The companies argue that FISA only bars the disclosure of
+information that would reveal a particular target of surveillance, and does not bar disclosure of
+information (even classified information) that would compromise surveillance generally. If the
+companies' narrow interpretation of FISA were correct, then the Government's classified
+submission – which does not relate to disclosures of particular surveillance targets, but rather
+explains how an adversary could use the companies' proposed disclosures to determine the
+capabilities and limits of the Government's surveillance – would be irrelevant.
+
+1
+
+As to the companies' First Amendment challenge, the Government has disclosed the
+basis for its classification decision, a judgment that is constitutionally committed to the
+Executive. Because the basis for the decision is provided, the companies can challenge whether
+the disclosure prohibitions are narrowly tailored to protect the information classified by the
+Executive Branch.¹
+
+In any event, even where classified evidence is central to a civil case, unlike here, it is
+well-settled that a Court can review classified information *ex parte* and *in camera*. That rule
+applies irrespective of whether counsel could qualify for security clearances. Accordingly, the
+companies' motion to strike should be denied.
+
+ARGUMENT
+
+I. The Government Has Met and Exceeded the Requirements of Rule 7(j).
+
+The Government's public brief meets and exceeds the requirements of Rule 7(j). The
+rule clearly provides that submissions to the Court "which may include classified information"
+will be reviewed by the Court "*ex parte* and *in camera*" and that adversarial parties will receive
+only "an unclassified or redacted version" which "clearly articulate[s] the government's legal
+arguments." Rule of Procedure 7(j). Not only does the Government's public brief "clearly
+articulate the government's legal arguments," the legal arguments are fully disclosed. The
+redacted information contains no additional legal arguments, no case citations, and no discussion
+of statutory or other law.
+
+¹ When the Government initially filed its responsive memorandum, footnote 4 of that brief was classified
+and redacted. The Government has since decided to release footnote 4. A public version of the
+Government's responsive memorandum is attached as Exhibit A.
+
+2
+
+The overwhelming majority of the Government's brief is available to the public and the
+companies. See Response of the United States to Motions for Declaratory Judgment (Govt.
+Response).² There are approximately 50 paragraphs in the brief, and only two are fully redacted
+and only four are partly redacted. There are no redactions in any section of the argument aside
+from the section entitled "The Information that the Companies Seek to Disclose is Classified."
+That argument is primarily factual, and the unredacted portions of the section "clearly articulate"
+the only legal arguments it contains, including: (1) that the information that the companies wish
+to disclose has been classified at the Secret level, *id.* at 5-6; (2) that this Court does not
+independently review Executive Branch classification decisions, *id.* at 6 (quoting *In re Mot. for
+Release of Ct. Records*, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, 491 (For. Intel. Sur. Ct. 2007)); (3) that Executive
+Branch classification decisions are entitled to "the utmost deference," *id.* (quoting *Dep't of the
+Navy v. Egan*, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988)); and (4) that such deference is especially appropriate
+where the Executive Branch bases its classification decision, as here, on a review of all pertinent
+information, including whether disclosure of the data in the manner proposed by the companies
+would risk filling out the mosaic of information available to our adversaries in their efforts to
+assess and avoid our surveillance capabilities, *id.* at 6-7 (citing cases).
+
+The redactions appear solely in the Government's description of the factual basis for the
+FBI's classification, but even this portion of the Government's response is substantially
+unredacted and provides the essential reasons supporting the classification decision, as follows:
+
+² The companies complain about redactions in the supporting declaration filed by the Government. But
+Rule 7(j) only requires the provision of "the government's legal arguments," and these are contained in
+the Government's brief.
+
+3
+
+The detailed disclosures the companies propose would reveal the nature and
+extent of FISA-authorized process served on the major providers in this country.
+The potential harm from such disclosures is easy to illustrate.
+
+First, the disclosure of FISA data in specific numbers and by specific FISA
+provisions, as the companies seek, would provide adversaries significant
+information about the Government's collection capabilities with respect to
+particular providers. Disclosures of FISA information in a manner that would
+permit our adversaries to identify those collection capabilities would harm
+national security by allowing them to switch providers to avoid surveillance.
+
+Second, for similar reasons, the companies' proposed unilateral disclosures would
+allow our adversaries to infer when the Government has acquired a collection
+capability on new services....
+
+Third, the proposed disclosures would also enable our adversaries to gain
+significant information about which platforms and services are not subject to
+surveillance, or are subject to only limited surveillance.... Disclosing precise
+numbers associated with each provision or title of FISA, as the companies
+propose, would provide our adversaries with even more specific information,
+which they could use to track the Government's sources and methods of FISA-
+authorized intelligence collection.
+
+If these leading Internet companies are permitted to make these disclosures, the
+harms to national security would be compounded by the fact that other companies
+would surely seek to make similar disclosures. As a result, our adversaries could
+soon be able to obtain a comprehensive picture of FISA-related surveillance
+activities.
+
+In addition, the disclosure of precise numbers of FISA orders reasonably could be
+expected to cause other serious harms to national security....
+
+There is little doubt that foreign adversaries can and will glean important national
+security information from publicly available data. Indeed, the Intelligence
+Community knows that our adversaries actively gather information to assess such
+capabilities and react to avoid surveillance. If our adversaries know which
+platforms the Government does not surveil, they can communicate over those
+platforms when, for example, planning a terrorist attack or the theft of state
+secrets. Such disclosures could significantly and irreparably harm
+counterterrorism and counterintelligence efforts. Other types of harm can also
+result from adversaries learning which platforms the Government does surveil.
+Most obviously, they can avoid them. But as this Court has recognized, they can
+also use that information to engage in deceptive tactics or disinformation
+campaigns that could undermine intelligence operations and that could even
+expose Government personnel to the risk of physical harm.
+
+*Id.* at 7, 9-11 (citations omitted).
+
+4
+
+Accordingly, the companies have received considerably more than the "clear
+articulation" of the Government's legal arguments required by Rule 7(j). Although the
+companies are entitled to an adequate description of the Government's legal arguments, they are
+not entitled to "knowledge of the specific evidence on which [FBI] relied" in classifying the
+information that the companies seek to disclose, where that evidence is itself classified. *Jifry v.
+FAA*, 370 F.3d 1174, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
+
+II. It Is Well-Established That Courts May Review Classified Information Ex
+Parte and In Camera, Including in Constitutional Challenges.
+
+The companies argue that if Rule 7(j) permits the Government's *ex parte* filing (as it
+does), such an interpretation "would make the rule unconstitutional." Mot. to Strike at 5.
+Contrary to their argument, it is well-established that Courts can review classified national
+security information *ex parte* and *in camera*.
+
+A. Rule 7(j) Appropriately Accommodates the Executive Branch's
+Constitutional Responsibility to Protect National Security.
+
+By expressly providing that the Government need not disclose classified information in
+adversarial proceedings, Rule 7(j) recognizes that the Executive Branch is constitutionally
+charged with the responsibility to protect national security information. See, e.g., *Dep't of
+Navy v. Egan*, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988). The Government has a compelling interest in the
+protection of such information, *id.*, and "the protection of classified information must be
+committed to the broad discretion of the agency responsible, and this must include broad
+discretion to determine who may have access to it," *id.* at 529; see also, e.g., *Holy Land Found.*
+
+³ The companies suggest that the Court should apply the canon of constitutional avoidance. See Mot. to
+Strike at 5 n.2. That cannon is inapplicable because Rule 7(j) is unambiguous. See, e.g., *HUD v. Rucker*,
+535 U.S. 125, 134-35 (2002). The Rule unambiguously authorizes the Government to file classified
+submissions *ex parte* and *in camera*, and the rule raises no serious constitutional issues.
+
+5
+
+*for Relief & Devel. v. Ashcroft*, 333 F.3d 156, 164 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (recognizing the "primacy of
+the Executive in controlling and exercising responsibility" over national security information).
+
+In furtherance of the Executive Branch's responsibility to protect sensitive national
+security information, the President has issued an Executive Order governing the use and
+protection of classified information. See Exec. Order 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29, 2009);
+see also FISC Rule of Procedure 3 (providing that the Court will "[i]n all matters . . . comply
+with the security measures established pursuant to . . . Executive Order 13526"). Pursuant to this
+order, access to classified information is permitted only where the recipient has a requisite
+security clearance and there has been a determination that the recipient has a "need-to-know" the
+information. Exec. Order 13,526 § 4.1(a). A "need-to-know" is "a determination within the
+executive branch in accordance with directives issued pursuant to this order that a prospective
+recipient requires access to specific classified information in order to perform or assist in a
+lawful and authorized governmental function." *Id.* § 6.1(dd).
+
+In this case, some of the redacted information is classified at the Secret level, which
+means that disclosure "reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national
+security," while other redacted information is classified at the Top Secret level (and is designated
+as sensitive compartmented information, see 50 U.S.C. § 3024(j)), which means that disclosure
+"reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security."
+See Exec. Order 13,526 § 1.2(a). Although counsel for some of the companies may have
+security clearances, none may lawfully access sensitive compartmented information, and none
+has been found to have a "need-to-know" any of the classified information in order to perform a
+governmental function.
+
+6
+
+A private party or counsel in non-criminal litigation does not have a "need-to-know"
+classified information even where, unlike here, the information is central to the case. See, e.g.,
+*Sterling v. Tenet*, 416 F.3d 338, 348 (4th Cir. 2005); *Holy Land Found.*, 333 F.3d at 164;
+*Ellsberg v. Mitchell*, 709 F.2d 51, 61 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (explaining that the rule denying counsel
+access to classified information is "well settled"). And although even classified information that
+is "central" to a civil case can be withheld, the classified information at issue here is not even
+central to the companies' arguments.
+
+The companies' first argument, that FISA's nondisclosure provisions preclude only
+disclosure of information concerning the targets of FISA surveillance, is a pure legal
+interpretation of the statute. Although the Government's brief establishes that the data the
+companies seek to disclose is classified, under the companies' narrow interpretation it is
+irrelevant that the data is classified. Under their argument, it is also irrelevant that the
+disclosures would undermine the secrecy of surveillance in significant ways that do not implicate
+a particular target. The companies' interpretation – that FISA would prohibit only disclosures
+concerning discrete targets and would permit damaging disclosures about the surveillance more
+generally – is simply implausible and nowhere apparent from the text and structure of FISA, as
+the Government explains in non-redacted portions of its brief. Govt. Response at 12-16.
+
+In the alternative, the companies argue in their declaratory judgment motions that
+prohibiting them from disclosing classified data about any FISA process they receive is not
+narrowly tailored under the First Amendment. But they cannot premise their First Amendment
+claim on challenging the Government's decision to classify the data they seek to disclose. This
+Court does not independently review Executive Branch classification decisions. See *In re Mot.
+for Release of Ct. Records*, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, 491 (For. Intel. Sur. Ct. 2007). Because the
+
+7
+
+Government has fully disclosed the key reasons for that classification decision, the companies
+can argue that the disclosure restrictions are not narrowly tailored to protect those national
+security concerns. The companies do not need specific classified examples or details supporting
+these harms to argue that the nondisclosure prohibitions are not narrowly tailored to address
+them.
+
+Finally, there is no reason to risk the disclosure of any of the information redacted from
+the Government's public brief, given its sensitivity and limited value to the companies'
+arguments. While the Government does not doubt the good faith of the companies and their
+counsel, "any such disclosure [of classified information] carries with it serious risk that highly
+sensitive information may be compromised." *Halkin v. Helms*, 598 F.2d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
+(citation omitted); accord *Sterling*, 416 F.3d at 348. The companies' assertion that counsel for
+some of the companies already know "the core information that the government seeks to protect
+in this [underlying] litigation . . . as well as with even more sensitive information, such as the
+names and identifiers of the targets of [FISA] orders," is of no moment. Mot. to Strike at 9. Past
+access to classified information for one purpose does not establish a need to know classified
+information for a different purpose. See *Doe v. CIA*, 576 F.3d 95, 105-06 (2d Cir. 2009)
+(rejecting argument that government's refusal to allow plaintiffs or their counsel access to
+classified information to oppose invocation of state secrets privilege unconstitutionally interfered
+with their ability to prosecute a discrimination lawsuit, where "[t]hey do not ask the CIA for
+access to classified information that [wa]s new to them"); see also *Pfeiffer v. CIA*, 60 F.3d 861,
+864 (D.C. Cir. 1995). And, in any event, the classified information that has been redacted from
+
+8
+
+the public version of the Government's brief is qualitatively different from any sensitive
+information that may have been provided to certain companies as part of the FISA process.⁴
+
+B. Rule 7(j) Does Not Raise Any Constitutional Issues.
+
+Contrary to the companies' argument, Rule 7(j) raises no constitutional issues because, as
+discussed above, it is well-established that courts can review classified national security
+information *ex parte* and *in camera*. Numerous courts have rejected the same constitutional
+arguments the companies assert here.
+
+1. Due Process Does Not Require the Government to Disclose Classified
+Information in Civil Litigation.
+
+The companies invoke the Due Process Clause, but due process does not require the
+Government to disclose classified information in civil litigation. Rather, due process is "flexible
+and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." *Morrissey v.
+Brewer*, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). Where the Government has a legitimate interest in protecting
+the secrecy of information, as it inarguably does with classified national security information, the
+opposing party's "interests as a litigant are satisfied by the *ex parte*/*in camera* decision of an
+impartial district judge." *Meridian Int'l Logistics, Inc. v. United States*, 939 F.2d 740, 745 (9th
+Cir. 1991); accord *Hayden v. National Sec. Agency*, 608 F.2d 1381, 1385 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (in
+the national security context, "this court has accepted the idea of *In camera* review
+of . . . documents without the presence of [plaintiff's] counsel").
+
+⁴ The companies' focus on "the names and identifiers of targets" mirrors the narrow focus of their
+underlying merits motions. See, e.g., LinkedIn Mot. at 8-9 (contending that the non-disclosure obligation
+imposed by FISA extends only to the "identity" of subscribers and the "substance of communications").
+While it is important to protect the secrecy of the identity of foreign intelligence targets, that is not the
+only type of national security information that is protected from disclosure. See Govt. Response at 14-16.
+
+9
+
+In *Holy Land Foundation for Relief & Development v. Ashcroft*, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir.
+2003), the court held that "due process require[s] the disclosure of only the unclassified portions
+of the administrative record" to the plaintiff. *Id.* at 164 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
+The case raised First Amendment challenges to the Government's decision to block the
+foundation's assets, and the Government relied on both classified and unclassified evidence in
+taking that action. *Id.* at 164. The court based its conclusion, in part, on "the primacy of the
+Executive in controlling and exercising responsibility over access to classified information, and
+the Executive's compelling interest in withholding national security information from
+unauthorized persons in the course of executive business." *Id.* (internal quotation marks and
+citation omitted). Other cases have consistently rejected such due process challenges to
+submitting classified information *ex parte* and *in camera*.⁵
+
+The companies rely heavily on *Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. United States
+Department of Treasury*, 686 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2012), but that case further supports the
+Government's position. In *Al Haramain*, the court held that due process did not require the
+
+⁵ See, e.g., *Jifry*, 370 F.3d at 1184 (holding that due process was satisfied although the plaintiffs
+were not given "knowledge of the specific [classified] evidence on which [the Government]
+relied" in making the challenged decision); *People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep't of State*,
+327 F.3d 1238, 1242-43 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ("The Due Process Clause requires only that process
+which is due under the circumstances of the case" and this does not include disclosure to the
+opposing party of classified intelligence relied on by the Government); *Global Relief Found.,
+Inc. v. O'Neill*, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir. 2003) (rejecting a challenge to a statute that, like
+Rule 7(j), "authorize[d] the use of classified evidence that may be considered *ex parte* by the
+district court"); *National Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep't of State*, 251 F.3d 192, 208 (D.C.
+Cir. 2001) (holding that due process required notice but that the Government "need not disclose
+the classified information to be presented in camera and ex parte to the court"); *id.* at 207
+(reasoning "that [the] strong interest of the government [in protecting against the disclosure of
+classified information] clearly affects the nature of the due process which must be afforded
+petitioners"); *Patterson v. FBI*, 893 F.2d 595, 600 n.9 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing cases); see also
+*Weberman v. National Sec. Agency*, 668 F.2d 676, 678 (2d Cir. 1982) (“The risk presented by
+participation of counsel outweighs the utility of counsel, or adversary process, in construing a
+[classified document].").
+
+10
+
+disclosure to the plaintiff's counsel of classified information relied on by the Government to
+support subjecting the foundation to terrorism-related sanctions. *Id.* at 980-81. Despite the fact
+that the Government action would render a purported religious charitable organization
+"financially defunct," *id.* at 980, the court held that the Government's national security interests
+justified the use of classified information without disclosure to plaintiff or its counsel, *id.* at 982.
+See also *id.* at 981 ("Not surprisingly, all federal courts to have considered [plaintiff's] argument
+have rejected it."). In light of the significant interests asserted by the foundation in that case, it
+follows that the use of *in camera, ex parte* information is permitted here.
+
+2. The First Amendment Does Not Force the Government to Disclose Classified
+Information to Justify a Nondisclosure Requirement.
+
+The companies also invoke the First Amendment, but as *Holy Land* demonstrates, the
+Government's right to file classified information *ex parte* and *in camera* also applies in cases
+involving First Amendment challenges. The companies' position that they are entitled to see all
+of the classified information in the Government's brief, on First Amendment grounds, would
+give plaintiffs a right to see classified information any time they challenge a nondisclosure
+obligation regarding other sensitive information. But it cannot be that the Government's only
+option for safeguarding classified information is to expose to private parties additional sensitive
+classified information. See *Bassiouni v. FBI*, 436 F.3d 712, 722 n.7 (7th Cir. 2006) ("We do not
+believe that Congress meant to place law enforcement agencies in the catch-22 of either
+divulging current investigatory activities or not asserting the law enforcement [interest].").
+
+In an analogous case, *Stillman v. Central Intelligence Agency*, 319 F.3d 546 (D.C. Cir.
+2003), the court denied counsel access to classified information where the plaintiff challenged on
+First Amendment grounds the Government's determination that information he sought to publish
+
+11
+
+was classified. *Id.* at 547-48. Although the Government determined that plaintiff's counsel
+could qualify for a security clearance, *id.*, the Government denied counsel access to the classified
+information based on his lack of a need to know, *id.* at 547. The district court determined that
+the First Amendment required that plaintiff's counsel be given access to the materials to
+challenge the classification decision, and the Government appealed. *Id.* at 547-48. In reversing
+the district court, the court of appeals observed that in cases involving classified information, "in
+camera review of affidavits, followed if necessary by further judicial inquiry, will be the norm."
+*Id.* at 548 (citation omitted). On remand, the district court upheld the Government's
+classification decision on the basis of *ex parte, in camera* submissions, giving "substantial
+deference" to the Government. *Stillman v. CIA*, 517 F. Supp. 2d 32, 39 (D.D.C. 2007).
+Likewise, in *Tabbaa v. Chertoff*, 509 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2007), the plaintiff raised First and Fourth
+Amendment challenges, but the court "viewed, *ex parte* and *in camera*, the classified intelligence
+at issue in order to ensure independently that there was a sufficient basis for" the Government
+declaration. See *id.* at 93 n.1.
+
+The companies rely on *John Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey*, 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2008), to argue
+that their First Amendment challenge gives them a special right of access to classified
+information. Mot. to Strike at 6. But that reliance is puzzling, because the statute governing
+nondisclosure of National Security Letters (NSLs) at issue in *Doe* expressly authorizes the
+Government to submit materials *ex parte* and *in camera*, and the court of appeals accepted a
+classified submission *ex parte* that provided a supplemental justification for the nondisclosure
+requirement at issue in that case. See 549 F.3d at 881-82 & n.15. The court determined that it
+should largely defer to the Government's arguments regarding the need to maintain secrecy, even
+
+12
+
+though NSLs are unclassified. *Id.* at 882 ("Such a judgment is not to be second-guessed, but a
+court must receive some indication that the judgment has been soundly reached.").
+
+Importantly, even though this Court is constitutionally entitled to review classified
+information *ex parte* and *in camera*, the Government has provided to the companies and to the
+public significant information regarding the nature of the harms underlying its decision to
+classify the data the companies seek to disclose. And as argued above, the redactions in the
+Government's brief do not materially affect any of the arguments the companies can offer in
+favour of disclosing the classified data. Accordingly, the Government's compliance with Rule
+7(j) raises no First Amendment issues.
+
+13
+
+CONCLUSION
+
+For the reasons discussed above, the companies' Motion to Strike should be denied.
+
+December 6, 2013
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+
+J. BRADFORD WIEGMANN
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+National Security Division
+
+N. CHRISTOPHER HARDEE
+Chief Counsel for Policy
+National Security Division
+
+/s/ Jeffrey M. Smith
+JEFFREY M. SMITH
+NICHOLAS J. PATTERSON
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+Phone: (202) 514-5600
+Fax: (202) 514-8053
+
+Attorneys for the United States of America
+
+14
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I hereby certify that a true copy of the United States' Opposition to the Companies'
+Motion to Strike the Government's *Ex Parte* Response to Motions to Disclose Aggregate Data
+Regarding FISA Orders was served by the Government via Federal Express overnight delivery
+on this 6th day of December, 2013, addressed to:
+
+Albert Gidari
+Perkins Coie LLP
+1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900
+Seattle, WA 98101
+
+Attorney for Google Inc.
+
+James Garland
+Covington & Burling LLP
+1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
+Washington, DC 20004-2401
+
+Attorney for Microsoft Corporation
+
+Marc J. Zwillinger
+ZwillGen PLLC
+1705 N Street, NW
+Washington, DC 20036
+
+Attorney for Yahoo! Inc.
+
+Carl J. Nichols
+Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP
+1875 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
+Washington, DC 20006
+
+Attorney for Facebook, Inc.
+
+Jerome C. Roth
+Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP
+560 Mission Street, 27th Floor
+San Francisco, CA 94105
+
+Attorney for Linkedin Corporation
+
+/s/ Jeffrey M. Smith
+
+Exhibit A
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE AMENDED MOTION FOR
+DECLATORY JUDGMENT OF A FIRST
+AMENDMENT RIGHT TO PUBLISH
+AGGREGATE INFORMATION ABOUT
+FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-03
+
+IN RE MOTION TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-04
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+AND DIRECTIVES
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-05
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+AND DIRECTIVES
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-06
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT TO REPORT AGGREGATED
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-07
+
+(U) RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES TO MOTIONS FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT BY GOOGLE INC., MICROSOFT CORPORATION, YAHOO! INC.,
+FACEBOOK, INC., AND LINKEDIN CORPORATION
+
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+
+TASHINA GAUHAR
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+for Intelligence
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TABLE OF CONTENTS
+
+TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................................ ii
+INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1
+ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................... 5
+
+I. (U) The Court-Ordered Nondisclosure Obligations Imposed Pursuant
+to FISA Prevent the Companies from Unilaterally Publishing Classified
+FISA Data. ....................................................................................................... 5
+
+A. (U) The Information that the Companies Seek to Disclose
+is Classified. ........................................................................................... 5
+
+B. (U) The Court-Ordered Nondisclosure Obligations Required Under
+FISA Prohibit the Companies from Publishing Classified Sources and
+Methods of FISA Surveillance. ............................................................ 12
+
+II. (U) The Prohibitions on Disclosure Satisfy the First Amendment
+Because They Are Narrowly Tailored to Promote Compelling National
+Security Interests. ......................................................................................... 16
+
+III. (U) As a Court of Limited Jurisdiction, This Court Cannot Provide
+Declaratory Relief Regarding Legal Prohibitions on Disclosure
+Outside of FISA. ........................................................................................... 21
+
+CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 26
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+i
+
+TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
+
+CASES:
+*Aldinger v. Howard*, 427 U.S. 1 (1976).......................................................................23
+*C&E Servs., Inc. v. District of Columbia Water & Sewer Auth.*,
+310 F.3d 197, 201 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ................................................................24
+*Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.*, 501 U.S. 32 (1991)..........................................................24
+*Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo*, 667 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2012) .............................................24
+*CIA v. Sims*, 471 U.S. 159 (1985).........................................................................7, 19
+*Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain*, 503 U.S. 249 (1992) ............................................13
+*Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treas.*, 489 U.S. 803 (1989) ..............................................14
+*Department of the Navy v. Egan*, 484 U.S. 518 (1988) ..........................................6, 16, 20
+*Doe v. Mukasey*, 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2008).....................................................17, 18
+*Dow Jones & Co. v. Harrods Ltd.*, 346 F.3d 357 (2d Cir. 2003) ....................................24
+*Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc.*, 757 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1985).........................................24
+*Haig v. Agee*, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) .............................................................................14
+*Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project*, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010) .................................17, 18
+*International Custom Prods., Inc. v. United States*, 467 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ..............23
+*McQuiggen v. Perkins*, 133 S. Ct. 1924 (2013) ............................................................25
+*In re Mot. for Release of Ct. Records*, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484 (Foreign Intel. Sur. Ct. 2007) .. passim
+*Reno v. ACLU*, 521 U.S. 844 (1997)..........................................................................18
+*In re Sealed Case*, 310 F.3d 717 (For. Intelligence Surv. Ct. of Rev. 2002)........................23
+*Schilling v. Rogers*, 363 U.S. 666 (1960) ....................................................................24
+*Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.*, 339 U.S. 667 (1950).....................................24
+*Snepp v. United States*, 444 U.S. 507 (1980)....................................................16, 20, 22
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+ii
+
+*Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't*, 523 U.S. 83 (1998).............................................23
+*United States v. Boyce*, 594 F.2d 1246 (9th Cir. 1979) .................................................22
+*United States v. King*, 395 U.S. 1 (1969)......................................................................25
+*United States v. Marchetti*, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1972) ..........................................7, 19
+*United States v. Nixon*, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) ................................................................6
+*United States v. Pappas*, 94 F.3d 795 (2d Cir. 1996) ....................................................22
+*United States v. Sterling*, 724 F.3d 482 (4th Cir. 2013).............................................16, 17
+*United States v. Yunis*, 867 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1989).................................................7, 19
+*Whitman v. American Trucking Ass 'ns*, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) ........................................15
+*Wilson v. CIA*, 586 F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2009) ................................................................22
+
+CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES:
+U.S. Const. Amend. I. ............................................................................................... passim
+All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 .....................................................................................25
+Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201.................................................................24
+Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1801 *et seq.*:
+50 U.S.C. § 1803(b) ................................................................................................25
+50 U.S.C. § 1804. .....................................................................................................23
+50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(B) ........................................................................................13
+50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(C) ........................................................................................13
+50 U.S.C. § 1822(d) ................................................................................................25
+50 U.S.C. § 1823 .....................................................................................................23
+50 U.S.C. § 1824(c)(2)(B)-(C) ..................................................................................13
+50 U.S.C. § 1842. .....................................................................................................23
+50 U.S.C. § 1842(d)(2)(B) ........................................................................................13
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+iii
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+50 U.S.C. § 1861 .....................................................................................................23
+50 U.S.C. § 1861(d)(1) ............................................................................................14
+50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)(3) ............................................................................................25
+50 U.S.C. § 1881 .....................................................................................................23
+50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(1)(A) ......................................................................................13
+50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(1)(B) ......................................................................................13
+50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(6)(A) ......................................................................................25
+50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(4)(A) ......................................................................................25
+50 U.S.C. § 1881b(f)(1) ............................................................................................25
+50 U.S.C. § 1881c(e)(1) ............................................................................................25
+12 U.S.C. § 3414 ...................................................................................................1, 2
+15 U.S.C. § 1681u ....................................................................................................2
+15 U.S.C. § 1681v ....................................................................................................2
+18 U.S.C. § 798(a)(3) ..............................................................................................22
+18 U.S.C. § 798(b) .............................................................................................22, 23
+18 U.S.C. § 2709 ......................................................................................................2
+28 U.S.C. § 1291 .....................................................................................................25
+50 U.S.C. § 3162 ......................................................................................................2
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+iv
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(U) INTRODUCTION
+
+(U) The United States Government firmly supports a policy of appropriate transparency
+with respect to its intelligence activities. As the President has emphasized, such a policy furthers
+accountability and increases public trust in the Government's activities. Consistent with this
+approach, the Government is actively engaged in a careful review of classified information
+related to the foreign intelligence surveillance activities authorized by this Court. The purpose of
+this review is to make public as much information about these activities as is consistent with the
+national security interests of the United States. In conducting this review, the Government must
+balance the need to inform the public about these activities with the need to protect classified
+sources and methods of intelligence collection, including the Government's ability (or inability)
+to conduct surveillance on particular electronic communication service providers or platforms.
+Releasing information that could induce adversaries to shift communications platforms in order
+to avoid surveillance would cause serious harm to the national security interests of the United
+States. See Declaration of Andrew G. McCabe, Acting Executive Assistant Director, Federal
+Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (attached).
+
+(U) Balancing the competing interests at stake, the Government has taken a number of
+significant steps—above and beyond what the law requires—in order to promote transparency
+and to accommodate the legitimate interests of companies, including those that have filed
+motions before this Court and others that have not. For example, for the first time, in the winter
+of 2013, the Government agreed that companies may report the aggregate number of National
+Security Letters (NSLs) they receive, in numerical ranges and on a periodic basis.¹ More
+
+¹ (U) NSLs are a type of administrative subpoena issued by U.S. Government agencies, particularly the
+Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), when investigating matters related to national security. See 12
+
+1
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+recently, the Government, in consultation with the Court, agreed to permit companies to make a
+wider set of disclosures by opting instead to report, in certain bands, the aggregate number of
+criminal and national security related orders they receive from federal, state, and local
+government entities combined, and the number of user accounts affected by such orders. A
+number of companies have agreed to exercise that option, which allows them to demonstrate to
+their customers that the sum total of all such process affects only a tiny fraction of the
+companies' user accounts.²
+
+(U) In addition, on August 29, 2013, the Government announced that it will report
+annually the total number of orders issued nationwide and the total number of targets the orders
+affect. The report will include (a) the number of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)
+orders or warrants issued based on probable cause (i.e., pursuant to Title I, Title III, Section 703,
+or Section 704 of FISA) and the number of targets affected by those orders or warrants; (b) the
+number of directives issued pursuant to Section 702 of FISA and the number of targets affected
+by those directives; (c) the number of orders issued pursuant to FISA's pen register provision
+(Title IV of FISA) and the number of targets affected by those orders; (d) the number of orders
+issued pursuant to FISA's business records provision (Title V of FISA) and the number of targets
+affected by those orders; and (e) the number of NSLs issued by the Government nationwide and
+the number of targets affected by the NSLs.
+
+U.S.C. § 3414; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681u, 1681v; 18 U.S.C. § 2709; 50 U.S.C. § 3162 (NSL statutory
+authorities).
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+2
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(U) The Government's annual report of the use of various FISA authorities will provide
+the public significant information about how often the Government uses its foreign intelligence
+investigative authorities. The companies' ability to disclose how often they have responded to
+Government process will allow them to inform their customers about the likelihood that their
+information will be disclosed. On the other hand, because the Government's reporting will not
+be broken down by company, and the companies' reporting will aggregate criminal and non-
+criminal, content and non-content, and federal, state and local process, these reports will not
+provide our adversaries with a roadmap to the existence or extent of Government surveillance of
+any particular provider or communications platform.
+
+(U) Dissatisfied with the Government's efforts to strike the appropriate balance between
+the public interest in transparency and the protection of national security, the petitioners seek
+declaratory relief that would effectively give every communications provider in the United States
+the right to reveal the nature and scope of any FISA surveillance of their communications
+platforms. Such information would be invaluable to our adversaries, who could thereby derive a
+clear picture of where the Government's surveillance efforts are directed and how its
+surveillance activities change over time, including when the Government initiates or expands
+surveillance efforts involving providers or services that adversaries previously considered "safe."
+
+(U) In their original motions, Google and Microsoft sought to publish one aggregate
+number for all the FISA process they receive. After failing to reach a settlement with the
+Government, however, they amended their motions to seek relief that would present an even
+greater risk to national security: the right to disclose the precise number of FISA process they
+may receive under each separate provision of FISA. See Amended Google Mot. at 7; Microsoft
+
+3
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Mot. at 5. Microsoft goes still further, seeking to disclose separate categories for "non-content"
+requests and "content and non-content" requests. Id. (emphasis in original). After Google and
+Microsoft filed their amended motions, Yahoo! Inc., Facebook, Inc., and LinkedIn filed motions
+seeking essentially the same scope of relief.
+
+(U) Because revealing FISA data on a company-by-company basis would cause serious
+harm to national security, such data has been classified by the FBI. That classification decision
+establishes that unilaterally disclosing the information would undermine the secrecy of the
+surveillance, in violation of this Court's orders, which require any company that has received a
+FISA order to protect the secrecy of the intelligence acquisitions. The companies assert that the
+secrecy requirements apply only to particular surveillance targets. But that implausible reading
+ignores the forest for the trees. It would permit damaging disclosures that would reveal sources
+and methods of surveillance potentially nationwide. The secrecy provisions in the orders flow
+from statutory requirements that, according to their plain language, protect such sources and
+methods, not just particular collection efforts. Indeed, limiting the secrecy protections only to
+information revealing a particular surveillance target would authorize a wide range of other
+damaging disclosures, from the nature of surveillance targets to their general locations, among
+others.
+
+(U) Contrary to the companies' argument that they have a First Amendment right to
+disclose this sensitive national security information, it is well-settled that prohibitions on the
+disclosure of classified information, such as the ones contained in this Court's orders, satisfy the
+First Amendment. The Government has a compelling interest in protecting such national
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+4
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+security information from disclosure, and the prohibitions on disclosure are narrowly tailored to
+protect that interest.
+
+(U) Finally, insofar as the companies argue that no other laws or regulations prohibit the
+disclosures they seek, the Court lacks jurisdiction to issue declaratory relief unrelated to
+prohibitions imposed pursuant to FISA. Because the data the companies seek to disclose is
+classified, the disclosures are prohibited by other sources of law, such as nondisclosure
+agreements between the Government and company employees. The interpretation and
+application of such non-FISA prohibitions are outside the specialized jurisdiction of this Court.
+
+(U) Accordingly, the Court should deny the companies' motions for declaratory relief.
+
+(U) ARGUMENT
+
+I. (U) The Court-Ordered Nondisclosure Obligations Imposed Pursuant to FISA
+Prevent the Companies from Unilaterally Publishing Classified FISA Data.
+
+(U) The companies assert that the information they seek to disclose is not classified,
+disregarding the harms to national security the proposed disclosures would likely cause. But
+classification judgments belong to the Executive Branch, not the companies, and the Executive
+Branch has classified the information. The companies' flawed premise undermines their entire
+argument: the only plausible reading of FISA, and the Court's orders, is that FISA orders and
+directives bar recipients from disclosing properly classified information about the nature and
+scope of the authorized surveillance activities.
+
+A. (U) The Information that the Companies Seek to Disclose is Classified.
+
+(U) The companies fail to address the harm their disclosures would cause to national
+security, beyond pointing out that they do not seek to disclose individual surveillance targets.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+5
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+The companies' narrow focus on individual targets ignores that the disclosures would risk
+revealing the Government's collection capabilities as they presently exist and as they develop in
+the future. McCabe Decl. ¶ 30. Such disclosures could therefore cause significant harm to
+national security. As a result, the FBI has classified the data the companies seek to publish at the
+Secret level. Id. ¶ 27; see also id. ¶¶ 22-26.
+
+(U) The FBI's assessment of harm is entitled to deference. This Court has previously
+held that "there is no role for this Court independently to review, and potentially override,
+Executive Branch classification decisions." *In re Mot. for Release of Ct. Records*, 526 F. Supp.
+2d 484, 491 (Foreign Intel. Sur. Ct. 2007). As the Court recognized, if the U.S. Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) "were to assume the role of independently making
+declassification and release decisions . . . there would be a real risk of harm to national security
+interests and ultimately to the FISA process itself." Id. Moreover, "even if a typical FISC judge
+ha[s] more expertise in national security matters than a typical district court judge, that expertise
+would still not equal that of the Executive Branch, which is constitutionally entrusted with
+protecting the national security." Id. at 495 n.31. This Court's holding is consistent with the fact
+that "courts have traditionally shown the utmost deference" to the Executive Branch's authority
+to classify and control access to national security information. *Department of the Navy v. Egan*,
+484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988) (emphasis added) (quoting *United States v. Nixon*, 418 U.S. 683, 710
+(1974)).
+
+(U) The FBI based its classification decision on a review of all pertinent information,
+including whether disclosure of the data in the manner proposed by the companies would risk
+filling out the mosaic of information available to our adversaries in their efforts to assess and
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+6
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+avoid our surveillance capabilities. McCabe Decl. ¶ 23. Deference to the Executive Branch is
+especially appropriate in such circumstances, where assessing the likely harm requires
+knowledge of many other pieces of information and intelligence expertise regarding how
+additional disclosures would help adversaries form a more complete mosaic to guide their
+efforts. See *CIA v. Sims*, 471 U.S. 159, 178-79 (1985); *United States v. Marchetti*, 466 F.2d
+1309, 1318 (4th Cir. 1972); accord *United States v. Yunis*, 867 F.2d 617, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
+("Things that did not make sense to the District Judge would make all too much sense to a
+foreign counter-intelligence specialist who could learn much about this nation's intelligence-
+gathering capabilities from what these documents revealed about sources and methods.").
+
+(U) The detailed disclosures the companies propose would reveal the nature and extent
+of FISA-authorized process served on the major providers in this country. The potential harm
+from such disclosures is easy to illustrate.
+
+(U) First, the disclosure of FISA data in specific numbers and by specific FISA
+provisions, as the companies seek, would provide adversaries significant information about the
+Government's collection capabilities with respect to particular providers. Disclosures of FISA
+information in a manner that would permit our adversaries to identify those collection
+capabilities would harm national security by allowing them to switch providers to avoid
+surveillance.
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
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+7
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+Second, for similar reasons, the companies' proposed unilateral disclosures
+would allow our adversaries to infer when the Government has acquired a collection capability
+on new services.
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Third, the proposed disclosures would also enable our adversaries to gain
+significant information about which platforms and services are not subject to surveillance, or are
+subject to only limited surveillance.
+
+[REDACTED]
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+
+Disclosing precise numbers associated with each provision or title of
+FISA, as the companies propose, would provide our adversaries with even more specific
+information, which they could use to track the Government's sources and methods of FISA-
+authorized intelligence collection.
+
+(U) If these leading Internet companies are permitted to make these disclosures, the
+harms to national security would be compounded by the fact that other companies would surely
+seek to make similar disclosures. See *id.* ¶ 48. As a result, our adversaries could soon be able to
+obtain a comprehensive picture of FISA-related surveillance activities.
+
+In addition, the disclosure of precise numbers of FISA orders reasonably
+could be expected to cause other serious harms to national security.
+
+[REDACTED]
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+
+There is little doubt that foreign adversaries can and will glean important
+national security information from publicly available data. Indeed, the Intelligence Community
+knows that our adversaries actively gather information to assess such capabilities and react to
+avoid surveillance. Id. ¶ 30;
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+If our adversaries
+know which platforms the Government does not surveil, they can communicate over those
+platforms when, for example, planning a terrorist attack or the theft of state secrets. *Id.* ¶ 39.
+Such disclosures could significantly and irreparably harm counterterrorism and
+counterintelligence efforts. *Id.* ¶ 39. Other types of harm can also result from adversaries
+learning which platforms the Government does surveil. Most obviously, they can avoid them.
+But as this Court has recognized, they can also use that information to engage in deceptive
+tactics or disinformation campaigns that could undermine intelligence operations and that could
+even expose Government personnel to the risk of physical harm. See *In re Mot. for Release of
+Ct. Records*, 526 F. Supp.2d at 494;
+
+[REDACTED]
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+
+(U) In contrast, reporting an aggregate number of both national security and criminal
+process – which the Government has told the companies they can release – would not tend to
+disclose the Government's classified surveillance capabilities. The aggregate number would
+combine both content and non-content requests, so that our adversaries would not know, for
+example, whether a particular provider was responding to requests for subscriber identity
+information via an NSL, or was providing the full content of communications pursuant to a FISA
+
+11
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+or Title III wiretap order. Thus, the extent of the Government's actual capabilities would be
+masked from our adversaries.
+
+(U) It is quintessentially an Executive Branch responsibility to assess these risks to
+national security and to determine what information can be disclosed consistent with both
+transparency and national security interests. The Government cannot agree to the disclosures the
+companies seek because the disclosures will harm national security by risking the disclosure of
+the Government's capabilities to conduct surveillance with respect to particular providers and
+Internet platforms. In assessing whether the companies' proposed disclosures will undermine the
+secrecy of the Government's intelligence collection activities under FISA, the Court should defer
+to the judgment of the Executive Branch.
+
+B. (U) The Court-Ordered Nondisclosure Obligations Required Under FISA
+Prohibit the Companies from Publishing Classified Sources and Methods of
+FISA Surveillance.
+
+(U) As explained below, the nondisclosure provisions in FISA orders are prescribed by
+statute and require companies to protect the secrecy of authorized surveillance. Because the
+information the companies seek to disclose has been properly classified, it follows that protecting
+the secrecy of the acquisitions underlying that information requires keeping the information
+secret. The companies would interpret this Court's orders as protecting only information about
+specific targets, therefore permitting the broad disclosure of damaging information about the
+Government's sources and methods of surveillance overall. But such a result is contrary to the
+text and purpose of the secrecy provisions in FISA on which the orders are based.
+
+(U) As an initial matter, the provisions of FISA should be enforced as written,
+*Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain*, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992), and neither provision at issue
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+12
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+here contains the "particular target" limitation on secrecy that the companies advance. Titles I
+and VII of FISA provide that FISA orders "shall direct," and FISA directives "may direct,"
+recipients to provide the Government with "all information, facilities, or assistance necessary to
+accomplish the acquisition in a manner that will protect the secrecy of the acquisition," without
+limitation. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(1)(A) (Title VII); see also 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(B) (similar
+language for Title I).⁴ Additionally, the orders "shall direct" and the directives "may direct" that
+recipients "maintain under security procedures approved by the Attorney General and the
+Director of National Intelligence any records concerning the acquisition or the aid furnished"
+that such electronic communication service provider maintains. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(1)(B)
+(Title VII); see also 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(C) (similar language for Title I).⁵ Consistent with
+the Executive Branch's authority to control classified information, that provision explicitly
+
+⁴ (S/NF) To the extent that the moving companies receive process pursuant to Titles I and VII, the Title
+VII directives contain the statutorily permitted nondisclosure provisions, while the Title I orders contain
+nondisclosure requirements that track the statutory provision, although not identically. Title I orders
+typically contain language such as: "This order and warrant is sealed and the specified person and its
+agents and employees shall not disclose to the targets or to any other person the existence of the order and
+warrant or this investigation or the fact of any of the activities authorized herein or the means used to
+accomplish them, except as otherwise may be required by legal process and then only after prior
+notification to the Attorney General." Of course, disclosing the number of Title I orders received would
+violate such a provision as it would "disclose... the existence" of each of the orders.
+
+⁵ (U) The other FISA titles that provide search or surveillance authorities also contain nondisclosure
+provisions. See 50 U.S.C. § 1824(c)(2)(B)-(C) (requiring Title III orders to require the recipient to assist
+in the physical search "in such a manner as will protect its secrecy" and provide that "any records
+concerning the search or the aid furnished" that the recipient retains be maintained under appropriate
+security procedures); 50 U.S.C. § 1842(d)(2)(B) (requiring Title IV orders to direct that recipients
+"furnish any information, facilities, or technical assistance necessary to accomplish the installation and
+operation of the pen register or trap and trace device in such a manner as will protect its secrecy," and
+provide that "any records concerning the pen register or trap and trace device or the aid furnished" that
+the recipient retains shall be maintained under appropriate security procedures); 50 U.S.C. § 1861(d)(1)
+(providing that "[n]o person shall disclose to any other person that the [FBI] has sought or obtained
+tangible things pursuant to an order under" Title V of FISA). Because the potential national security
+harm at issue is the disclosure of information that could provide adversaries with information about the
+Government's electronic surveillance capacities, the nondisclosure provisions in Titles I and VII – the
+titles that concern electronic surveillance – are most relevant here.
+
+13
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+provides for Executive Branch approval of the companies' procedures for maintaining all records
+associated with surveillance. The provision is not limited to protecting only specific targeting
+information that such records would reveal, and on its face does not give companies the right to
+disclose classified information so long as records are disclosed in large groups.
+
+(U) Moreover, "[i]t is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a
+statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory
+scheme." *Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treas.*, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989). Reading a "particular
+target" limitation into FISA's secrecy provisions would be inconsistent with FISA's strong
+protections for the secrecy of the intelligence collection activities subject to the Court's review.
+Although the Government is seeking to make public as much information about these activities
+as the national security interests of the United States will permit, "[i]n the FISA context, there is
+an unquestioned tradition of secrecy, based on the vitally important need to protect national
+security." *In re Mot. for Release of Ct. Records*, 526 F. Supp.2d at 490-91 (citing *Haig v. Agee*,
+453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981)). Such protections extend not just to targets but also to surveillance
+sources and methods generally, because "[t]he identification of targets and methods of
+surveillance would permit adversaries to evade surveillance, conceal their activities, and possibly
+mislead investigators through false information." *Id.* at 494.
+
+(U) The implausibility of interpreting the "secrecy of the acquisition" to reach only the
+identification of targets is illustrated not only by the FBI's declaration but by the wide range of
+other damaging disclosures that interpretation would permit. There are numerous types of
+damaging disclosures that could be made without revealing the identity of a particular target,
+including general information concerning the type of target and their locations. The same is true
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+14
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+of the companies' narrow interpretation that the "records" they must protect extend only to the
+"identity" of subscribers or the "substance of communications," see LinkedIn Mot. at 8-9.
+
+(U) It would be illogical to conclude that Congress enacted a "comprehensive statutory
+scheme designed to protect FISC records from routine public disclosure," *In re Mot. for Release
+of Ct. Records*, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 491, while allowing every public company to reveal damaging
+information about the nature and scope of surveillance under each separate title or provision of
+FISA. Cf. *Whitman v. American Trucking Ass 'ns*, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (Congress "does
+not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes."). And although the companies invoke FISA's
+congressional reporting requirements to support their contemplated disclosures, those reporting
+requirements are another example of the careful protections provided for FISA information.
+Unlike the classified reports submitted to Congress, the information publicly reported pursuant to
+FISA provides aggregated data at a level of detail far less than even what the Government
+recently committed to provide voluntarily, and certainly not comparable to what the companies
+now seek. None of the Government's disclosures report company-by-company data.
+
+(U) Accordingly, most reasonably construed, FISA's secrecy provisions prohibit the
+disclosure of FISA-related data in a manner that would provide insights into the Government's
+intelligence activities and risk harm to national security. The companies' proposed disclosures
+reasonably could be expected to cause serious harm to national security by revealing the
+Government's electronic surveillance capabilities and targeting actions on a company-by-
+company basis, potentially nationwide. See Part I.A *supra*. Relatedly, the disclosure of the
+classified data would reveal FISA-related sources and methods, and thus would be plainly
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+15
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+inconsistent with maintaining "records concerning the acquisition" in a manner that will protect
+its secrecy as determined by the Executive Branch.
+
+(U) For these reasons, the Court should reject the companies' contention that any orders
+and directives they have received only prevent disclosures that concern particular surveillance
+targets. Their motions should be denied because their proposed disclosures would risk harm to
+national security by revealing the nature and scope of intelligence collection activities conducted
+by the Government pursuant to FISA.
+
+II. (U) The Prohibitions on Disclosure Satisfy the First Amendment Because They Are
+Narrowly Tailored to Promote Compelling National Security Interests.
+
+(U) The companies' First Amendment challenge turns on the same flawed premise that
+undermines their statutory argument. They argue that prohibiting their proposed disclosures
+would violate the First Amendment because the disclosures would not reveal particular
+surveillance targets, and therefore would not cause harm to national security. But as detailed
+above, the disclosures risk causing serious harm to national security. The Court's orders barring
+such disclosure satisfy any level of First Amendment scrutiny because they are narrowly tailored
+to serve a compelling governmental interest.
+
+(U) As the companies acknowledge, "[t]he Government has a compelling interest in
+protecting . . . the secrecy of information important to our national security." *Snepp v. United
+States*, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980); *Department of the Navy v. Egan*, 484 U.S. at 527; *United
+States v. Sterling*, 724 F.3d 482, 509 (4th Cir. 2013). The companies' contemplated disclosures
+risk significant harm to national security by revealing the nature and scope of the Government's
+intelligence collection on a company-by-company basis throughout the country. See Part I.A,
+supra. This "evaluation of the facts by the Executive . . . is entitled to deference" even in
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+16
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+assessing First Amendment interests because, "when it comes to collecting evidence and drawing
+factual inferences in this area, the lack of competence on the part of the courts is marked, and
+respect for the Government's conclusions is appropriate." *Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project*,
+130 S. Ct. 2705, 2727 (2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
+
+(U) The Government's interest in preventing harm to national security is more than
+sufficient to outweigh the companies' interests in speaking about the particular FISA process
+they may receive. The principal case on which the companies rely, *Doe v. Mukasey*, 549 F.3d
+861 (2d Cir. 2008), supports the Government's position. In *Doe*, the court concluded that the
+nondisclosure requirement applicable to unclassified NSLs "is not a typical prior restraint or a
+typical content-based restriction warranting the most rigorous First Amendment scrutiny." Id.
+877. The court reached that conclusion after rejecting analogies to government processes in
+which the limited public interest in disclosure justifies lower First Amendment scrutiny, such as
+grand juries, civil discovery, or pre-publication review. Id. at 876-77. The court distinguished
+grand jury secrecy as "inher[ent] in the nature of the proceeding," whereas NSLs "might or
+might not" justify secrecy. Id. But FISA proceedings and foreign intelligence collection are
+subject to even stronger secrecy protections than grand juries and necessarily involve classified
+information. See, e.g., *In re Mot. for Release of Ct. Records*, 526 F. Supp.2d at 490 ("It is this
+highly classified, and fundamentally secret, nature of FISC records that distinguishes them from
+the records of other courts."). Accordingly, the companies' First Amendment interests should be
+evaluated against the "comprehensive statutory scheme designed to protect FISC records from
+routine public disclosure" and the absence of any long-standing practice of releasing the kind of
+information they seek to disclose. Id. at 491.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+17
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(U) Even outside the unique FISA context, *Doe* concluded that, while a "conclusory
+assertion" of harm would be insufficient to justify a prohibition, courts should defer to the
+"Government's considered assessment of why disclosure in a particular case may result in an
+enumerated harm related to such great matters as international terrorism or clandestine
+intelligence activities." 549 F.3d at 881 (emphasis in original). Even as to unclassified NSLs,
+nondisclosure can be justified where the Government "indicate[s] the nature of the apprehended
+harm and provide[s] a court with some basis to assure itself (based on *in camera* presentations
+where appropriate) that the link between disclosure and risk of harm is substantial." Id. at 881-
+82 (a "demonstration of a reasonable likelihood of potential harm, related to international
+terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, will virtually always outweigh the First
+Amendment interest in speaking about such a limited and particularized occurrence as the receipt
+of an NSL and will suffice to maintain the secrecy of the fact of such receipt"). Here, the
+Government has explained in detail the serious harm to national security that the companies'
+proposed disclosures reasonably could be expected to cause.
+
+(U) Recognizing that the Government has a compelling interest in protecting national
+security, the companies argue that the prohibitions on disclosure are not narrowly tailored. But
+the restrictions are narrowly tailored because there are no "less restrictive alternatives [that]
+would be at least as effective in achieving" the Government's compelling interest. *Reno v.
+ACLU*, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997); see also *Humanitarian Law Project*, 130 S. Ct. at 2723-30
+(upholding a statute that restricted plaintiffs from "communicating a message" because the
+Government had "adequately substantiated" its determination that the statutory restriction served
+"the Government's interest in combating terrorism [which] is an urgent objective of the highest
+order"). The Government has demonstrated why vital national security considerations preclude
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+18
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+disclosure of information about FISA-authorized surveillance that will reveal the Government's
+surveillance activities by provider and platform. See Part I.A supra.
+
+(U) Relying on authority involving the disclosure of individual NSLs, the companies
+argue that the disclosure prohibitions are not narrowly tailored because aggregate disclosures of
+FISA data by large providers, such as themselves, will not reveal a particular surveillance target.
+But this is another example of their flawed premise. The harm to national security that led the
+FBI to classify the information concerns the disclosure of intelligence sources and methods of
+electronic surveillance, not the identification of a particular individual recipient of process.
+Irrespective of whether disclosures would tend to reveal a particular surveillance target, they
+would allow adversaries to derive a clear picture of the nature and extent of the Government's
+FISA surveillance activities with respect to every major provider in the country. Such harm to
+national security would result from disclosure of the data by any type of provider, large or small,
+and from the totality of information that would be disclosed. The Government is entitled to
+significant deference in assessing the harms to national security, and its judgment – not that of
+the providers – is critical to determining the scope of the prohibitions on disclosure that are
+necessary to protect national security interests. See, e.g., *Sims*, 471 U.S. at 178-79; *Marchetti*,
+466 F.2d at 1318; *Yunis*, 867 F.2d at 623.
+
+(U) The companies also argue that the Government's public disclosures of aggregated
+FISA data somehow demonstrate that the prohibitions on the companies' proposed disclosures
+are not narrowly tailored. On the contrary, the Government's voluntary disclosures of FISA data
+demonstrate that the Government seeks to protect such information in a narrowly tailored
+manner and has carefully stopped short of permitting disclosures that would cause harm. None
+of the Government's public disclosures reveal any information that would allow our adversaries
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+19
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+to determine the Government's surveillance capabilities of specific companies or specific
+platforms, or the timing of when the Government acquires certain surveillance capabilities. See
+McCabe Decl. ¶ 66. Rather, the Government has provided as much data as reasonably possible,
+consistent with national security, to inform the public about the nature of its intelligence
+activities.
+
+(U) Finally, the companies argue that the public debate about the Government's
+surveillance activities justifies disclosure. Although the Government has attempted to release as
+much information as possible about the intelligence collection activities overseen by this Court,
+the public debate about surveillance does not give the companies the First Amendment right to
+disclose information that the Government has determined must remain classified. The
+companies are "correct in asserting that certain benefits could be expected" from public
+disclosure, but the argument "proves too much." *In re Mot. for Release of Ct. Records*, 526 F.
+Supp. 2d at 494 (citation omitted). It fails to account for the "detrimental consequences of broad
+public access" to such information. *Id.* at 494-95; see also *Snepp*, 444 U.S. at 509 n.3; *Egan*,
+484 U.S. at 527.⁶
+
+⁶ (U) Moreover, it is unclear whether the companies need to disclosure such data to serve their interests
+in responding to erroneous reporting about their role in Government surveillance. The companies
+contend that they need to disclose FISA data to respond to "inaccurate media reporting" that suggests that
+the companies "provide[] the United States Government with direct access to [their] servers and network
+infrastructure." Am. Microsoft Mot. at 3; accord Am. Google Mot. at 2; Yahoo! Mot. at 2; Facebook
+Mot. at 2. But the companies fail to explain why disclosing precise numbers of various types of FISA
+orders that they have received is necessary or even relevant to refuting mistaken reports that the
+Government has unlimited "direct access" to the companies' servers. Indeed, the companies make clear
+that, without the need to disclose any classified information, they have been able to clearly and forcefully
+respond to the inaccurate or misleading reporting. See Am. Google Mot. at 2-3 (referencing statement of
+Larry Page and David Drummond); Facebook Mot. at 2 (referencing statement of Mark Zuckerberg).
+And the Government itself has responded forcefully to such erroneous reports. See, e.g., Office of the
+Director of National Intelligence, IC on the Record, available at http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/
+topics/section-702. There is reason to believe that these efforts have been successful. See Joseph Menn,
+Analysis: Despite fears, NSA revelations helping U.S. tech industry, Reuters, 9/15/13 RTRSUSTOP
+
+20
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(U) Accordingly, there is no constitutional impediment to protecting from disclosure
+properly classified information about the Government's sources and methods of intelligence
+collection. Such disclosures reasonably could be expected to cause serious harm to national
+security. The prohibitions on disclosure at issue here are narrowly tailored to prevent such harm.
+
+III. (U) As a Court of Limited Jurisdiction, This Court Cannot Provide Declaratory
+Relief Regarding Legal Prohibitions on Disclosure Outside of FISA.
+
+(U) The companies seek relief that goes well beyond restraints imposed pursuant to
+FISA. They also seek a declaration that "no applicable law or regulation" prohibits their
+proposed disclosures. See Am. Google Mot. at 7; see also LinkedIn Mot. at 1; Am. Microsoft
+Mot. at 5. But the interpretation and application of these other potential prohibitions on
+disclosure is not within this Court's specialized jurisdiction.
+
+(U) Because the information that the companies seek permission to disclose is properly
+classified, it is subject to prohibitions on the disclosure of classified information. For example,
+employees of the companies have signed nondisclosure agreements that prohibit disclosure of
+classified information, whether publicly, to another employee or agent, or to any other person.
+
+13:09:19 ("Google Inc. and Facebook Inc. [] say privately that they have felt little if any impact on their
+business [from the disclosures]. Insiders at . . . Microsoft Corp.[] also say they are seeing no fallout.").
+
+(U) Additionally, as described above, the Government has permitted the companies to release the
+aggregate number of governmental requests for information (combining criminal and national security
+requests), which would demonstrate that only an exceptionally small percentage of their customers'
+accounts are subject to any governmental process at all. See, e.g., Ted Ullyot, General Counsel,
+Facebook, Facebook Releases Data Including All National Security Requests (June 14, 2013),
+http://newsroom.fb.com/News/636/Facebook-Releases-Data-Including-All-National-Security-Requests
+("With more than 1.1 billion monthly active users worldwide, this means that a tiny fraction of one
+percent of our user accounts were the subject of any kind of U.S. state, local, or federal U.S. government
+request (including criminal and national security-related requests) in the past six months.").
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+21
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+See McCabe Decl. ¶ 65.⁷ Where relevant employees have entered into nondisclosure agreements
+that prohibit them from disclosing classified information, "[t]he Government is entitled to
+enforce its agreements to maintain the confidentiality of classified information." *United States v.
+Pappas*, 94 F.3d 795, 801 (2d Cir. 1996); see also *Wilson v. CIA*, 586 F.3d 171, 183-84 (2d Cir.
+2009). Nondisclosure agreements are "a reasonable means for protecting this vital interest" that
+are consistent with the First Amendment. *Snepp*, 444 U.S. at 509 n.3. Other laws and
+regulations might also prohibit the companies' proposed disclosures. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
+§ 798(a)(3).
+
+(U) This Court would not have jurisdiction to assess the potential applicability of such
+prohibitions, even if it could otherwise do so. Like any other Article III court, this Court has an
+obligation to assure itself of its jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits of a dispute. *Steel
+Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't*, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998); see also *In re Sealed Case*, 310 F.3d
+717, 731-32 (For. Intelligence Surv. Ct. of Rev. 2002) (FISC operates within "the constitutional
+bounds that restrict an Article III court"). As the Supreme Court has held, "[f]or a court to
+pronounce upon the meaning or the constitutionality of a state or federal law when it has no
+jurisdiction to do so is, by very definition, for a court to act ultra vires." *Steel Co.*, 523 U.S. at
+101-02.
+
+⁷ (U) Both the current standard nondisclosure agreement, which went into effect in July 2013, and the
+previous version contained the following language: "I hereby agree that I will never divulge classified
+information to anyone unless: (a) I have officially verified that the recipient has been properly authorized
+by the United States Government to receive it; or (b) I have been given prior written notice of
+authorization from the United States Government Department or Agency . . . responsible for the
+classification of . . . information or last granting me a security clearance that such disclosure is
+permitted.") See Standard Form 312: Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement (effective July
+2013), available at: http://www.gsa.gov/portal/forms/download/116218; Standard Form 312: Classified
+Information Nondisclosure Agreement (effective prior to July 2013), available at:
+http://armypubs.army.mil/eforms/pdf/s312.PDF.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+22
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(U) This Court, like all Article III courts, is a "court[] of limited jurisdiction marked out
+by Congress." *International Custom Prods., Inc. v. United States*, 467 F.3d 1324, 1326 (Fed.
+Cir. 2006) (quoting *Aldinger v. Howard*, 427 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)). This Court has been granted a
+narrow and specialized (but vital) jurisdiction limited to certain specified applications and
+certifications that may be filed by the Government and two types of petitions that a private party
+may file. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804, 1823, 1842, 1861, 1881. Thus, FISA does not provide this
+Court with jurisdiction to provide declaratory relief regarding the applicability or enforceability
+of non-FISA prohibitions on disclosure.
+
+(U) Nor could such relief fall within this Court's inherent jurisdiction. Beyond those
+powers necessary for the exercise of its statutory jurisdiction or useful to adjudicate such cases,
+such as the power to construe the Court's own orders and procedures, "inherent power, which
+might be termed irreducible inherent authority, encompasses an extremely narrow range of
+authority involving activity so fundamental to the essence of a court as a constitutional tribunal
+that to divest the court of absolute command within this sphere is really to render practically
+meaningless the terms 'court' and 'judicial power.'" *Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc.*, 757 F.2d
+557, 562 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc). The review and construction of nondisclosure agreements
+and other prohibitions on disclosure unrelated to FISA or the Court's rules and orders fall far
+outside the powers that "necessarily result to [this Court] from the nature of [the] institution,"
+and therefore fall outside the Court's inherent jurisdiction. *Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.*, 501 U.S.
+32, 43 (1991) (citation omitted).
+
+(U) The companies rely on the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2201, but
+the DJA cannot create jurisdiction where jurisdiction is lacking. The DJA provides that "[i]n a
+case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, . . . any court of the United States, upon the
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+23
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any
+interested party seeking such declaration." However, the DJA is "procedural only." *Chevron
+Corp. v. Naranjo*, 667 F.3d 232, 244 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting *Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum
+Co.*, 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950)). It "does not create an independent cause of action," *id.*, and it
+"is not an independent source of federal jurisdiction." *C&E Servs., Inc. v. District of Columbia
+Water & Sewer Auth.*, 310 F.3d 197, 201 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting *Schilling v. Rogers*, 363 U.S.
+666, 677 (1960)).⁸
+
+(U) While the DJA refers to "any court of the United States," the Supreme Court has
+held that it does not necessarily confer the power to grant declaratory relief on a specialized
+tribunal of limited, statutorily specified jurisdiction. See *United States v. King*, 395 U.S. 1, 3-4
+(1969). In *King*, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the DJA did not confer the power to
+grant declaratory relief on the United States Court of Claims, an Article III court of specialized
+jurisdiction. See *id.* at 4. The Court reasoned that the type of relief contemplated by the DJA
+"ha[d] never been 'within [the Court of Claims'] jurisdiction'" given that, unlike a court that
+exercises general federal question and diversity jurisdiction, the Court of Claims had, since its
+creation in 1855, a specialized and narrow jurisdiction. *Id.* (quoting the DJA).
+
+(U) Given the limited jurisdiction of the FISC, the level of specificity with which
+Congress described it, and its "esoteric nature," *In re Mot. for Release of Ct. Records*, 526 F.
+Supp. at 486, it is unlikely that Congress intended to provide "expanded jurisdiction," *King*, 395
+U.S. at 4, to broadly grant declaratory relief, pursuant to the DJA, about companies' rights to
+
+⁸ (U) Additionally, the DJA provides a court with "discretion to determine whether it will exert
+jurisdiction over a proposed declaratory action or not," and this has been "consistently interpreted . . . as a
+broad grant of discretion to district courts to refuse to exercise jurisdiction over a declaratory action that
+they would otherwise be empowered to hear." *Dow Jones & Co. v. Harrods Ltd.*, 346 F.3d 357, 359 (2d
+Cir. 2003).
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+24
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+make public disclosures. This is particularly so given that Congress created this Court and
+imbued it with specialized jurisdiction after *King* was decided. See, e.g., *McQuiggen v. Perkins*,
+133 S. Ct. 1924, 1934 n.3 (2013) (“Congress legislates against the backdrop of existing law.").⁹
+
+(U) Because this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the applicability of the nondisclosure
+agreements or any other laws or regulations beyond FISA that restrict the disclosure of classified
+information, this Court should reject the companies' request for broad declaratory relief
+concerning such prohibitions.
+
+⁹ (U) An additional feature of FISA that counsels against a finding that the Court can exercise general
+declaratory powers pursuant to the DJA is the limited statutory appellate jurisdiction of the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review. Unlike federal circuit courts of appeals, which have a general
+statutory grant of jurisdiction over all final judgments by district courts within their respective circuits,
+see 28 U.S.C. § 1291, FISA contains specific appellate provisions that vest the Court of Review with
+appellate jurisdiction over particular types of rulings from this Court. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. §§ 1803(b),
+1822(d), 1861(f)(3), 1881a(h)(6)(A), 1881a(i)(4)(A), 1881b(f)(1), 1881c(e)(1). In an appropriate case,
+the Court of Review (like this Court) could issue an extraordinary writ pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28
+U.S.C. § 1651.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+25
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(U) CONCLUSION
+
+(U) For the reasons stated above, the Motions should be denied.
+
+September 30, 2013
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+
+TASHINA GAUHAR
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+for Intelligence
+
+CHRISTOPHER HARDEE
+Chief Counsel for Policy
+National Security Division
+
+/s/ Nicholas J. Patterson
+JEFFREY M. SMITH
+NICHOLAS J. PATTERSON
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+Phone: (202) 514-5600
+Fax: (202) 514-8053
+
+Attorneys for the United States of America
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+26
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(U) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+(U) I hereby certify that a true copy of the Response of the United States to Motions for
+Declaratory Judgment by Google Inc., Microsoft Corporation, Yahoo! Inc., Facebook, Inc., and
+Linkedin Corporation was served by hand-delivery on this 30th day of September, 2013, to
+Christine Gunning, Chief of Operations, Litigation Security Group, or her delegate, for
+forwarding to the Court. Additionally, redacted copies of the brief and accompanying
+declaration were served by the Government via Federal Express overnight delivery on this 30th
+day of September, 2013, addressed to:
+
+Albert Gidari
+Perkins Coie LLP
+1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900
+Seattle, WA 98101
+
+Attorney for Google Inc.
+
+James Garland
+David N. Fagan
+Alexander A. Berengaut
+Covington & Burling LLP
+1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
+Washington, DC 20004-2401
+
+Attorneys for Microsoft Corporation
+
+Marc J. Zwillinger
+Jacob A. Sommer
+ZwillGen PLLC
+1705 N Street, NW
+Washington, DC 20036
+
+Attorneys for Yahoo! Inc.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Carl J. Nichols
+Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP
+1875 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
+Washington, DC 20006
+
+Attorney for Facebook, Inc.
+
+Jerome C. Roth
+Jonathan H. Blavin
+Justin P. Raphael
+Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP
+560 Mission Street, 27th Floor
+San Francisco, CA 94105
+
+Attorneys for LinkedIn Corporation
+
+/s/ Nicholas J. Patterson
+Nicholas J. Patterson
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-motion-131206/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-motion-131206/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f17d818
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-motion-131206/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "The United States' Opposition to the Companies' Motion to Strike the Government's Ex Parte Response to Motions to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-12-06",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-12-06",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34480",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "56d00272c774ba48df1cda72891ba9971f653fb7b9e2d9e631d19cd03d4f9bf8",
+ "pages": 50
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-motion-131223/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-motion-131223.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-motion-131223/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-motion-131223.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..79f4256
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-motion-131223/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-motion-131223.md
@@ -0,0 +1,376 @@
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+United States
+Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+Washington, D.C.
+
+2013 DEC 20 PM 4:49
+
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+In re Motion to Disclose Aggregate Data
+Regarding FISA Orders
+
+Docket Nos. Misc. 13-03, 13-04, 13-05,
+13-06, 13-07
+
+ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
+
+**Reply in Support of Motion to Strike the Government's _Ex Parte_ Response to**
+**Motions to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders**
+
+According to the government, the constitutional issue at the heart of this case should be
+decided in a factual vacuum. The government defends its partially _ex parte, in camera_ opposition to
+the providers' motion for declaratory relief by claiming that it complies with this Court's Rule 7(j)
+and that the providers have no need to know the underlying rationale for the government's prior
+restraint on their speech. But the legal conclusions in the government's redacted submission are not
+enough to satisfy Rule 7(j). The rule requires a clear articulation of "the government's legal
+arguments"—that is, the reasoning supporting those conclusions. The government's redacted filing,
+however, obscures from the providers critical steps in its legal argument.
+
+The government offers no explanation of how national security would be harmed by
+allowing the providers—each of whom would have been or could be entrusted with the individual
+orders issued by the court—to access the government's response. It fails to grapple with the
+specifics of this case, resting its response to the providers' constitutional arguments on generalities
+about the protection of classified information. Refusing even to address the proposed alternatives
+to allow the providers access to the government's filing, the government simply asserts that the
+providers should litigate this case in the dark. But the government does not cite a single case in
+which any court has ever permitted it to justify a prior restraint on private speech without submitting
+
+its evidence to the rigors of the adversarial process. Permitting such a course here would violate not
+only Rule 7(j) but also the providers' constitutional rights. Unless the government allows the
+providers the access they seek, the Court should strike the redacted portions of its response.
+
+ARGUMENT
+
+I. The government's response does not comply with Rule 7(j)
+
+Rule 7(j) requires that, if the government submits an _ex parte_ filing containing classified
+information, it must provide the adverse parties with a redacted version, which, "at a minimum,
+must clearly articulate the government's legal arguments." The redacted version of the government's
+submissions does not satisfy that requirement.
+
+The government's efforts to defend its redacted submissions are unavailing because the
+government fails to appreciate the distinction between its legal argument and its legal conclusions.
+Rule 7(j) requires the government to disclose not only its conclusions but also the underlying
+reasoning. That reasoning is what is missing from the redacted argument on page 4 of the
+opposition: although the government has asserted various conclusions about how the disclosure
+sought in this case could harm national security, it has not articulated the basis for those
+conclusions. And it is no answer to say, as the government does (Opp. 3), that "[t]he redactions
+appear solely in the Government's descriptions of the _factual basis_" for its classification decision.
+Such an argument might have merit if, like most proceedings before this Court, this case turned on
+the validity or invalidity of a specific order or directive. But this case involves a programmatic
+challenge to the government's prohibition on speech about the aggregate numbers of orders that the
+providers may receive. The question whether such disclosure poses any risk to national security
+does not turn on the facts of any particular order or directive. Rather, it requires a legal conclusion
+based on legislative facts, that is, evidence supporting a general opinion or predictive judgment
+about a sociological phenomenon—here, whether and how national security targets would react to
+
+2
+
+the disclosure in question—rather than evidence related to a specific and individualized factual
+finding. _See Lockhart v. McCree_, 476 U.S. 162, 168 n.3 (1986) (noting the difference between the
+determination of legislative facts and ordinary factual findings). As such, the "facts" the government
+omits are a critical element of the legal arguments before the Court.¹
+
+The government devotes much of its opposition to arguing that the redacted information is
+"irrelevant to the companies' argument about the scope of [FISA]'s nondisclosure provisions, which
+is an issue of statutory construction." Opp. 1; see id. at 7-8. The government does not say, however,
+that the information is irrelevant to the government's argument—perhaps because, if the information
+were irrelevant to both sides' arguments, it should be stricken as immaterial. _See Fed. R. Civ. P._
+12(f). Indeed, the government contends that the text of FISA must be construed to prohibit
+disclosure of the aggregate data precisely because revealing that data would damage national security.
+_See Opp. Exh. A at 14_ ("The implausibility of interpreting the 'secrecy of the acquisition' to reach
+only the identification of targets is illustrated not only by the FBI's declaration but by the wide range
+of other damaging disclosures that interpretation would permit."). The core reasoning of the
+government's argument—that the disclosures sought here would damage national security—is
+explained in the redacted portions of its submission. The government's assessment of harm is
+therefore an essential part of its argument. But the government has redacted the critical steps in its
+
+¹ Facts are often intertwined with legal arguments and necessary to understanding legal conclusions.
+See, e.g., _Williams v. Taylor_, 529 U.S. 362, 408 (2000) (noting that "it is sometimes difficult to
+distinguish a mixed question of law and fact from a question of fact"); _Miller v. Fenton_, 474 U.S. 104,
+113-114 (1985) (noting that "the appropriate methodology for distinguishing questions of fact from
+questions of law has been, to say the least, elusive" and that "much of the difficulty in this area
+stems from the practical truth that the decision to label an issue a 'question of law,' a 'question of
+fact,' or a 'mixed question of law and fact' is sometimes as much a matter of allocation as it is of
+analysis"). Here, it is critical to know whether there are facts, and what those facts may be, that
+justify the prohibition on truthful speech by providers about aggregate numbers of legal demands
+they may have received.
+
+3
+
+reasoning and refused to give the providers' counsel access to them, making the filing insufficient
+under Rule 7(j).
+
+If the Court has any doubt whether the redacted brief "clearly articulate[s] the government's
+legal arguments" within the meaning of Rule 7(j), it still should strike the government's brief, for two
+reasons. First, the rule provides that a clear articulation of a brief's legal arguments is only a
+minimum requirement. If the rule required nothing more, then the words "at a minimum" would be
+superfluous, contrary to the "cardinal principle of statutory construction that a statute ought, upon
+the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be
+superfluous, void, or insignificant." _TRW, Inc. v. Andrews_, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (internal quotation
+marks omitted). The rule therefore gives the Court discretion to order disclosure that goes beyond
+what is required "at a minimum." Because the redacted information is central to the issues in this
+case, such disclosure is appropriate here. Second, if Rule 7(j) were construed to permit the
+government's redacted filing, it would be unconstitutional for the reasons set forth below.
+
+II. If Rule 7(j) were construed to permit the government's filing of heavily redacted
+submissions in this case, it would violate the First and Fifth Amendments
+
+While _ex parte_ filings may be permissible in some contexts, accepting the government's _ex
+parte_ filing in this case would pose two constitutional problems: it would prevent the providers from
+participating fully in the resolution of their First Amendment claim, and it would violate the
+providers' procedural due process rights by depriving them of adequate safeguards to protect their
+substantive First Amendment rights. The government's response to both points is essentially the
+same: it asserts (Opp. 9) the general proposition that "courts can review classified national security
+information _ex parte_ and _in camera_." That may be true, but it is not relevant here. The providers do
+not suggest that the government can never rely on _ex parte_ filings to be reviewed _in camera_. Rather,
+they argue that the government cannot rely on _ex parte_ filings to justify a prior restraint on speech in
+this case. The government is therefore wrong when it suggests (Opp. 9) that "[n]umerous courts
+
+4
+
+have rejected the same constitutional arguments the companies assert here." The government does
+not cite—and providers are not aware of—any case in which a court permitted the government to
+justify a prior restraint without explaining the reasons for the restraint so that they could be
+challenged by the party restrained.
+
+_First Amendment_. In arguing that the providers should be prohibited from reviewing the core
+reasoning supporting its prior restraint, the government relies heavily on _Stillman v. CIA_, 319 F.3d
+546 (D.C. Cir. 2003), in which, it says (Opp. 11-12), the court denied counsel access to classified
+information. In fact, the D.C. Circuit held only that the district court should not have ordered
+access to classified information without first determining "whether it can, consistent with the
+protection of Stillman's first amendment rights to speak and to publish, and with the appropriate
+degree of deference owed to the Executive Branch concerning classification decisions, resolve the
+classification issue without the assistance of plaintiff's counsel." 319 F.3d at 549. The D.C. Circuit
+went on to explain that, if the district court determined that the "need for such assistance outweighs
+the concomitant intrusion upon the Government's interest in national security," it could consider
+ordering disclosure. _Id_. Stillman thus supports the argument that, in a case like this one, the
+resolution of First Amendment claims may require that counsel be granted access to the classified
+information that forms a critical part of the government's legal argument.
+
+Significantly, the court in Stillman emphasized the plaintiff's status as a government employee
+whose speech the government has a greater ability to control than that of a private citizen. As the
+court observed, "[i]f the Government classified the information properly, then Stillman simply ha[d]
+no first amendment right to publish it" because as part of his employment he "voluntarily signed the
+agreement that expressly obligated him to submit any proposed publication for prior review" and
+because the CIA may "impos[e] reasonable restrictions on employee activities that in other contexts
+might be protected by the First Amendment." 319 F.3d at 548 (quoting _Snepp v. United States_, 444
+
+5
+
+U.S. 507, 510 n.3 (1980)) (emphasis added). That reasoning does not apply here because the
+providers are not government employees who voluntarily agreed to restrictions on their
+speech. They are private companies who wish to speak to their users and the public about whether,
+and if so how often, the government has ordered them to produce information. For that reason,
+this is just the kind of "other context" contemplated by the court in _Stillman_ in which access to
+classified information is necessary to allow First Amendment claims to be fully litigated.²
+
+_Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause_. The government cites (Opp. 9-11) various cases denying
+due process claims for access to classified information, but none of the cases establishes the broad
+proposition that such access is never appropriate. Instead, many of the cited cases held only that
+plaintiffs suing the government to force the disclosure of classified information do not have a right
+to see the very classified information they seek. _See Bassiouni v. FBI_, 436 F.3d 712 (7th Cir. 2006)
+(plaintiff seeking to amend FBI records regarding his contacts with the Middle East); _Patterson ex rel_.
+_Patterson v. FBI_, 893 F.2d 595 (3d Cir. 1990) (plaintiff seeking access to FBI records about himself);
+_Weberman v. NSA_, 668 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1982) (suit seeking disclosure of records under FOIA);
+_Hayden v. NSA_, 608 F.2d 1381 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (plaintiffs seeking all NSA records about
+themselves). _Cf. Meridian Int'l Logistics, Inc. v. United States_, 939 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1991) (libel suit
+
+² The government also relies (Opp. 12-13) on _John Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey_, 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2008),
+but that case, too, did not involve the question whether the Constitution permits the government to
+justify a prior restraint on the basis of _ex parte_ submissions. Although the plaintiffs initially
+challenged the statute providing for _ex parte_ submissions, 18 U.S.C. § 3511(e), they declined to appeal
+that issue, and neither the district court nor the Court of Appeals held that it would be permissible
+for the government to reply on an _ex parte_ submission in any particular case. Rather, both courts
+merely stated that the question would depend on the circumstances. _See 549 F.3d at 881_ (referring
+to "_in camera_ presentations where appropriate") (emphasis added); _Doe v. Gonzales_, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379,
+423-24 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding it "sufficient to simply reiterate that the Court's authority to assess
+what process is due on a case-by-case basis is undisturbed by the language of § 3511(e)" because it
+"neither restricts the ability of a district court to take all necessary measures required to safeguard
+the due process rights of a party in instances where evidence may be submitted _in camera_ or _ex
+parte_, nor constrains the role of the district court in appropriately balancing those needs against a
+potentially compelling interest").
+
+6
+
+against FBI agent). That rule makes perfect sense: where the issue in the lawsuit is whether the
+government should be ordered to disclose classified information, requiring the government to
+disclose that information in its brief would moot the proceeding. But here, the providers have not
+filed a lawsuit to compel the government to disclose classified information they have never seen.
+Instead, they are challenging a prior restraint on their First Amendment rights to disclose
+information already in their possession and, within the specific context of this motion, are
+challenging the withholding of the information at issue only because the government has relied upon
+it to justify the restraint. Granting the providers access to that information would not give the
+providers the relief they seek in the underlying litigation; it would merely give them the ability to test
+the reasoning behind the government's prior restraint on speech about facts already known to them.
+
+As the government concedes (Opp. 9), the due process clause does not prescribe a
+categorical rule either requiring or prohibiting disclosure in all cases; instead, it "calls for such
+procedural protections as the particular situation demands." _Morrissey v. Brewer_, 408 U.S. 471, 481
+(1972). The government does not dispute that the test for determining what procedural protections
+are required is set out in _Mathews v. Eldridge_, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Here, the _Mathews_ balancing test
+weighs heavily in favor of granting the providers' motion.
+
+First, as explained in the motion to strike (at 7-8), the liberty interest at issue is vital: it is the
+right to engage in speech about the government. The government makes no effort to dispute the
+importance of that interest.
+
+Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of First Amendment rights in _ex parte_
+proceedings is substantial. Indeed, that risk is illustrated by the government's opposition itself,
+which releases a footnote that, as the providers observed in the motion to strike (at 5 n.1), "comes in
+the middle of a paragraph that is otherwise entirely devoted to legal argument and that contains no
+factual discussion," making it difficult to see how it could be anything other than part of the legal
+
+7
+
+argument. In its opposition (Opp. 2 n.1), the government says that it "has since decided to release
+footnote 4," which was originally classified at the "Secret" level. While the government does not
+explain why it has decided to release the footnote now, it would appear that the government has
+concluded that its release will not, in fact, damage national security, and that it should not have been
+classified in the first place. That the government would classify an innocuous portion of its brief in
+this case—where the very issue to be decided is whether the government has acted appropriately in
+restricting the disclosure of information—demonstrates both the value of the adversarial process in
+testing the government's submissions and the substantial risk of an erroneous deprivation of the
+providers' First Amendment rights in an _ex parte_ proceeding.
+
+The apparent overclassification of footnote 4 is representative of a broader problem of
+overclassification that the government itself has acknowledged. _See, e.g., Reducing Over-_
+_Classification Act_, § 2(3), Pub. L. No. 118-258, 124 Stat. 2648 (2010) (finding that "security
+requirements nurture over-classification," which "causes considerable confusion regarding what
+information may be shared with whom"); _Intelligence Oversight and the Joint Inquiry: Hearing Before the_
+_Nat'l Comm'n on Terrorist Attacks Upon the U.S._ (2003), available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/
+archive/hearing2/9-11Commission_Hearing_2003-05-22.pdf (testimony of Rep. Porter Goss)
+("[W]e overclassify very badly. There's a lot of gratuitous classification going on."). The practice of
+overclassification—the precise opposite of the narrow tailoring that the First Amendment
+requires—makes it essential that the Court have the assistance of an adversarial process in
+scrutinizing the government's assertion that the information at issue in this litigation cannot be
+disclosed without harming national security.
+
+Third, while the government certainly has a compelling interest in protecting national
+security, it has made no effort to explain how disclosing the information at issue to the providers would
+
+8
+
+harm that interest.³ Instead, the government relies on generalized assertions about the potential
+harm of disclosure (Opp. 8) and the question-begging claim that none of the providers, or their
+counsel, "has been found to have a 'need-to-know' any of the classified information" (Opp. 6). But
+the premise of the government's argument, both on this motion and on the merits, is that the
+assistance of electronic communications service providers is essential to national security and that
+any such assistance would involve information that implicates national security. For that reason, if
+any provider has, in fact, received a FISC order, the government already would have determined that
+the providers and their counsel have a need to know sensitive classified information. After all, each
+provider obviously knows the total number of orders it has received (if any), as well as the total
+number of affected accounts. Only now, in this lawsuit, does the government suggest that the
+providers cannot be trusted with sensitive information. The government should not be permitted to
+use selective need-to-know determinations to permit the providers and their counsel to access such
+information only when they are receiving FISC orders and not when they are seeking to challenge
+the government.
+
+³ Several cases cited by the government (Opp. 9-11) are distinguishable because they involved
+requests for disclosure made by parties who were alleged to pose a threat to national security. _See_
+_Tabbaa v. Chertoff_, 509 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2007) (suit by plaintiffs detained on return to United States
+from conference in Canada where intelligence officials believed persons connected to terrorists were
+in attendance); _Jifry v. FAA_, 370 F.3d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Saudi pilots challenging post-9/11
+regulations that prevented them from flying commercial aircraft into the United States); _Holy Land_
+_Found. for Relief and Dev. v. Ashcroft_, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (plaintiffs challenging classification
+as foreign terrorist organization); _People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep't of State_, 327 F.3d 1238 (D.C.
+Cir. 2003) (same); _Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill_, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002) (plaintiff
+challenging Treasury department order blocking its assets that allegedly were used to support
+terrorism); _Nat'l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep't of State_, 251 F.3d 192, 209 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
+(plaintiffs challenging classification as foreign terrorist organization). Here, of course, the
+government does not contend that the providers are a threat to national security.
+
+9
+
+CONCLUSION
+The Court should order that, unless the government agrees to take appropriate steps to
+permit counsel for the providers to access the unredacted version of its September 30 filing, the
+redacted portions of that filing will be stricken.
+
+Dated: December 20, 2013
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+GOOGLE INC.
+
+Albert Gidari / by JKR
+Albert Gidari
+Perkins Coie LLP
+1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900
+Seattle, WA 98101
+Tel: 206.359.8688
+Fax: 206.359.9688
+agidari@perkinscoie.com
+
+MICROSOFT CORPORATION
+
+James M. Garland / by JKR
+James M. Garland, D.C. Bar # 475509
+David N. Fagan, D.C. Bar # 474518
+Alexander A. Berengaut, D.C. Bar # 989222
+COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
+1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
+Washington, DC 20004-2401
+Tel: 202.662.6000
+Fax: 202.662.6291
+
+10
+
+YAHOO! INC.
+
+Marc J. Zwillinger / by JKR
+Marc J. Zwillinger
+Jacob A. Sommer
+ZwillGen PLLC
+1705 N St. NW
+Washington, DC 20036
+marc@zwillgen.com
+jake@zwillgen.com
+
+FACEBOOK, INC.
+
+Carl Nichols / by JKR
+Carl Nichols
+Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP
+1875 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20006
+Tel: 202.663.6226
+Fax: 202-663.6363
+carl.nichols@wilmerhale.com
+
+LINKEDIN CORPORATION
+
+Jerome C. Roth / by JRR
+Jerome C. Roth
+Jonathan H. Blavin
+Justin P. Raphael
+Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP
+560 Mission Street, 27th Floor
+San Francisco, CA 94015
+Tel: 415.683.9100
+Fax: 415.512.4077
+Jerome.Roth@mto.com
+Jonathan.Blavin@mto.com
+Justin.Raphael@mto.com
+
+11
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I hereby certify that at or before the time of filing this submission, the government (care of
+the Security and Emergency Planning Staff, United States Department of Justice) has been served
+with a copy of this motion pursuant to Rule 8(a) of the FISC Rules of Procedure.
+
+Dated: December 20, 2013
+
+John Roche
+Perkins Coie LLP
+700 13th St. NW
+Washington, DC 20005
+Tel: 202.434.1627
+jroche@perkinscoie.com
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-motion-131223/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-motion-131223/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9842589
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-motion-131223/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Reply in Support of Motion to Strike the Government's Ex Parte Response to Motions to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders, In re Motion to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders, Nos. Misc. 13-03, 13-04, 13-05, 13-06, 13-07",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-12-20",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-12-20",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34481",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "405543f740f6be977970b6b2d72c688d1c016516f929f9164d7bed7e641f50cc",
+ "pages": 12
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-notice-140127/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-notice-140127.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-notice-140127/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-notice-140127.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..64158bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-notice-140127/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-notice-140127.md
@@ -0,0 +1,290 @@
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+2014 JAN 27 PM 3:48
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT OF A FIRST AMENDMENT
+RIGHT TO PUBLISH AGGREGATE
+INFORMATION ABOUT FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-03
+
+IN RE MOTION TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-04
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+AND DIRECTIVES
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-05
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+AND DIRECTIVES
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-06
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT TO REPORT AGGREGATED
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-07
+
+**NOTICE**
+
+The Government hereby informs the Court that, pursuant to the terms of the attached
+letter from the Deputy Attorney General, the Government will permit the petitioners to publish
+the aggregate data at issue in the above-captioned actions relating to any orders issued pursuant
+to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The parties are separately stipulating to the
+
+2
+dismissal of these actions without prejudice. The Director of National Intelligence has
+declassified the aggregate data consistent with the terms of the attached letter from the Deputy
+Attorney General, in the exercise of the Director of National Intelligence's discretion pursuant to
+Executive Order 13526, § 3.1(c). The Government will therefore treat such disclosures as no
+longer prohibited under any legal provision that would otherwise prohibit the disclosure of
+classified data, including data relating to FISA surveillance. It is the Government's position that
+the terms outlined in the Deputy Attorney General's letter define the limits of permissible
+reporting for the parties and other similarly situated companies.
+
+Dated: January 27, 2014
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+
+TASHINA GAUHAR
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+National Security Division
+
+J. BRADFORD WIEGMANN
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+National Security Division
+
+CHRISTOPHER HARDEE
+Chief Counsel for Policy
+National Security Division
+
+/s/ Alex Iftimie
+ALEX IFTIMIE
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, DC 20530
+Phone: (202) 514-5600
+Fax: (202) 514-8053
+
+Attorneys for the United States of America
+
+3
+**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**
+
+I hereby certify that a true copy of this Notice was served by the Government via email
+on this 27th day of January, 2014, addressed to:
+
+Albert Gidari
+Perkins Coie LLP
+1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900
+Seattle, WA 98101
+Attorney for Google Inc.
+
+James Garland
+David N. Fagan
+Alexander A. Berengaut
+Covington & Burling LLP
+1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
+Washington, DC 20004-2401
+Attorneys for Microsoft Corporation
+
+Marc J. Zwillinger
+Jacob A. Sommer
+ZwillGen PLLC
+1705 N Street, N.W.
+Washington, DC 20036
+Attorneys for Yahoo! Inc.
+
+Carl J. Nichols
+Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP
+1875 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
+Washington, DC 20006
+Attorney for Facebook, Inc.
+
+Jerome C. Roth
+Jonathan H. Blavin
+Justin P. Raphael
+Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP
+560 Mission Street, 27th Floor
+San Francisco, CA 94105
+Attorneys for LinkedIn Corporation
+
+/s/
+Alex Iftimie
+
+Office of the Deputy Attorney General
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+
+January 27, 2014
+
+Sent via Email
+
+Colin Stretch, Esquire
+Vice President and General Counsel
+Facebook Corporate Office
+1601 Willow Road
+Menlo Park, CA 94025
+
+Kent Walker, Esquire
+Senior Vice President and General Counsel
+Google Corporate Office Headquarters
+1600 Amphitheater Parkway
+Mountain View, CA 94043
+
+Erika Rottenberg, Esquire
+Vice President, General Counsel/Secretary
+LinkedIn Corporation
+2029 Stierlin Court
+Mountain View, CA 94043
+
+Brad Smith, Esquire
+Executive Vice President and General Counsel
+Microsoft Corporate Office Headquarters
+One Microsoft Way
+Redmond, WA 98052-7329
+
+Ronald Bell, Esquire
+General Counsel
+Yahoo Inc. Corporate Office and Headquarters
+701 First Avenue
+Sunnyvale, CA 94089
+
+Dear General Counsels:
+
+Pursuant to my discussions with you over the last month, this letter memorializes the new
+and additional ways in which the government, will permit your company to report data
+concerning requests for customer information. We are sending this in connection with the
+Notice we filed with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court today.
+
+In the summer of 2013, the government agreed that providers could report in aggregate
+the total number of all requests received for customer data, including all criminal process, NSLs,
+
+Letter to Colin Stretch, Kent Walker, Erika Rottenberg, Brad Smith and Ronald Bell
+Page 2
+
+and FISA orders, and the total number of accounts targeted by those requests, in bands of 1000.
+In the alternative, the provider could separately report precise numbers of criminal process
+received and number of accounts affected thereby, as well as the number of NSLs received and
+the number of accounts affected thereby in bands of 1000. Under this latter option, however, a
+provider could not include in its reporting any data about FISA process received.
+
+The government is now providing two alternative ways in which companies may inform
+their customers about requests for data. Consistent with the President's direction in his speech
+on January 17, 2014, these new reporting methods enable communications providers to make
+public more information than ever before about the orders that they have received to provide data
+to the government.
+
+**Option One.**
+
+A provider may report aggregate data in the following separate categories:
+
+1. Criminal process, subject to no restrictions.
+
+2. The number of NSLs received, reported in bands of 1000 starting with 0-999.
+
+3. The number of customer accounts affected by NSLs, reported in bands of 1000 starting
+with 0-999.
+
+4. The number of FISA orders for content, reported in bands of 1000 starting with 0-999.
+
+5. The number of customer selectors targeted under FISA content orders, in bands of 1000
+starting with 0-999.
+
+6. The number of FISA orders for non-content, reported in bands of 1000 starting with
+0-999.¹
+
+7. The number of customer selectors targeted under FISA non-content orders, in bands of
+1000 starting with 0-999.
+
+A provider may publish the FISA and NSL numbers every six months. For FISA
+information, there will be a six-month delay between the publication date and the period covered
+
+¹ As the Director of National Intelligence stated on November 18, 2013, the Government several
+years ago discontinued a program under which it collected bulk internet metadata, and no longer
+issues FISA orders for such information in bulk. See
+http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/67419963949/dni-clapper-declassifies-additional-
+intelligence. With regard to the bulk collection of telephone metadata, the President has ordered
+a transition that will end the Section 215 bulk metadata program as it currently exists and has
+requested recommendations about how the program should be restructured. The result of that
+transition will determine the manner in which data about any continued collection of that kind is
+most appropriately reported.
+
+Letter to Colin Stretch, Kent Walker, Erika Rottenberg, Brad Smith and Ronald Bell
+Page 3
+
+by the report. For example, a report published on July 1, 2015, will reflect the FISA data for the
+period ending December 31, 2014.
+
+In addition, there will be a delay of two years for data relating to the first order that is
+served on a company for a platform, product, or service (whether developed or acquired) for
+which the company has not previously received such an order, and that is designated by the
+government as a "New Capability Order" because disclosing it would reveal that the platform,
+product, or service is subject to previously undisclosed collection through FISA orders. For
+example, a report published on July 1, 2015, will not reflect data relating to any New Capability
+Order received during the period ending December 31, 2014. Such data will be reflected in a
+report published on January 1, 2017. After data about a New Capability Order has been
+published, that type of order will no longer be considered a New Capability Order, and the
+ordinary six-month delay will apply.
+
+The two-year delay described above does not apply to a FISA order directed at an
+enhancement to or iteration of an existing, already publicly available platform, product, or
+service when the company has received previously disclosed FISA orders of the same type for
+that platform, product, or service.
+
+A provider may include in its transparency report general qualifying language regarding
+the existence of this additional delay mechanism to ensure the accuracy of its reported data, to
+the effect that the transparency report may or may not include orders subject to such additional
+delay (but without specifically confirming or denying that it has received such new capability
+orders).
+
+**Option Two.**
+
+In the alternative, a provider may report aggregate data in the following separate categories:
+
+1. Criminal process, subject to no restrictions.
+
+2. The total number of all national security process received, including all NSLs and FISA
+orders, reported as a single number in the following bands: 0-249 and thereafter in bands
+of 250.
+
+3. The total number of customer selectors targeted under all national security process,
+including all NSLs and FISA orders, reported as a single number in the following bands,
+0-249, and thereafter in bands of 250.
+
+* * *
+
+I have appreciated the opportunity to discuss these issues with you, and I am grateful for
+the time, effort, and input of your companies in reaching a result that we believe strikes an
+appropriate balance between the competing interests of protecting national security and
+furthering transparency. We look forward to continuing to discuss with you ways in which the
+
+Letter to Colin Stretch, Kent Walker, Erika Rottenberg, Brad Smith and Ronald Bell
+Page 4
+
+government and industry can similarly find common ground on other issues raised by the
+surveillance debates of recent months.
+
+Sincerely,
+
+James M. Cole
+Deputy Attorney General
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-notice-140127/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-notice-140127/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..326da88
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-notice-140127/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Notice, In re Motion for Declaratory Judgment of a First Amendment Right to Publish Aggregate Info. About FISA Orders, No. Misc. 13-03 (FISA Ct. Jan. 27, 2014).",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2014-01-27",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2014-01-27",
+ "link": "",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "4ccfe513abb08a5c7ced0cadac7edad43652647d8ce3e1a5e48bbf484e462a68",
+ "pages": 7
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-rbw-granting-131113/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-rbw-granting-131113.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-rbw-granting-131113/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-rbw-granting-131113.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0e9e49f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-rbw-granting-131113/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-rbw-granting-131113.md
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE AMENDED MOTION FOR
+DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF A FIRST
+AMENDMENT RIGHT TO PUBLISH
+AGGREGATE INFORMATION ABOUT
+FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-03
+
+IN RE MOTION TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-04
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+AND DIRECTIVES
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-05
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS AND
+DIRECTIVES
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-06
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGEMENT TO REPORT AGGREGATED
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-07
+
+ORDER GRANTING JOINT MOTION
+FOR PARTIAL STAY OF PROCEEDINGS
+
+On November 13, 2013, the parties in the above-captioned dockets filed a joint motion
+for a partial stay of proceedings. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the joint motion is
+GRANTED, and that the deadline for the Movants' reply to the Government's September 30,
+2013, Response is stayed pending the Court's resolution of the Movants' November 12, 2013,
+Motion to Strike the Government's _Ex Parte_ Response to Motions to Disclose Aggregate Data
+Regarding FISA Orders.
+
+It is further ORDERED that the Government's response to the Movants' Motion to Strike
+the Government's _Ex Parte_ Response to Motions to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA
+Orders shall be filed on or before 5 p.m. on December 6, 2013, and Movants' reply with respect
+to that motion shall be filed on or before 5 p.m. on December 20, 2013.
+
+SO ORDERED, this 13 day of November, 2013.
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+2
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-rbw-granting-131113/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-rbw-granting-131113/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f2ec219
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-rbw-granting-131113/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Order Granting Joint Motion for Partial Stay of Proceedings, In re Amended Motion for Declaratory Judgment of a First Amendment Right to Publish Aggregate Info. About FISA Orders",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-11-13",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-13",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34264",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "df7ee8d6269f3c82389127b83122a56221e69e8022f05231c387ab9f99c3dfa6",
+ "pages": 2
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-rbw-motion-131113/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-rbw-motion-131113.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-rbw-motion-131113/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-rbw-motion-131113.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..85e4fcf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-rbw-motion-131113/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-rbw-motion-131113.md
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+In re Motions for Declaratory
+Judgement to Disclose Aggregate
+Data Regarding FISA Orders
+and Directives
+
+Case Nos. Misc. 13-03; 13-04;
+13-05; 13-06; 13-07
+
+ORDER ON MOTION OF APPLE, INC. FOR LEAVE
+TO FILE AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF
+
+Now before the Court is the motion of Apple, Inc. (Apple) to file an amicus curiae brief
+in Case Nos. Misc. 13-03, 13-04, 13-05, 13-06, and 13-07. Apple represents that Movants have
+consented to its filing, and that the Government has also consented on the condition that it have
+the opportunity to file a reply brief on or before November 26, 2013. Accordingly, it is hereby
+ORDERED that Apple's motion for leave to file an amicus curiae brief is granted, and that the
+Government may file a reply brief on or before 5 p.m. on November 26, 2013.
+
+SO ORDERED, this 13 day of November, 2013.
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-rbw-motion-131113/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-rbw-motion-131113/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..70dd8cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-rbw-motion-131113/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Order on Motion of Apple, Inc. for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief, In re Motions for Declaratory Judgment to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders and Directives",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-11-13",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-13",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34265",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "6afa6d60c8ef35bb676555441e51751f00014568196e41137904b895f7ea6d16",
+ "pages": 1
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-certification/FISC_-_misc-13-03-certification.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-certification/FISC_-_misc-13-03-certification.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cffe58f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-certification/FISC_-_misc-13-03-certification.md
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
+OF A FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
+PUBLISH AGGREGATE INFORMATION ABOUT
+FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-03
+
+**CERTIFICATION OF BAR MEMBERSHIP**
+
+Pursuant to the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court's Rules of
+Procedure 7(h)(1) and 63, undersigned counsel for Movant Google Inc. certifies he is a member
+in good standing of the bars of the following federal courts: United States District Court for the
+Western District of Washington (admitted in 1989), United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
+Circuit (admitted in 1990), and United States Supreme Court (admitted in 1995). Undersigned
+counsel further certifies he is licensed to practice law by the bar of the District of Columbia
+(admitted in 1988), and the bar of the State of Washington (admitted in 1989).
+
+DATED: June 21, 2013
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+Albert Gidari /by JKR
+Albert Gidari
+Perkins Coie LLP
+1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900
+Seattle, WA 98101
+206-359-8688
+Fax: 206-359-9688
+agidari@perkinscoie.com
+
+Attorneys for Google Inc.
+
+---
+
+**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**
+
+I hereby certify this 21st day of June, 2013, that the foregoing document was served via hand-
+delivery on the following:
+
+Christine E. Gunning
+Carli Rodriguez-Feo
+Litigation Security Group
+United States Department of Justice
+2 Constitution Square
+145 N St., NE, Suite 2W-115
+Washington, DC 20530
+
+Albert Gidari / by JKR
+Albert Gidari
+Perkins Coie LLP
+1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900
+Seattle, WA 98101
+206-359-8688
+Fax: 206-359-9688
+agidari@perkinscoie.com
+
+Attorneys for Google Inc.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-certification/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-certification/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c22aec7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-certification/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Certification of Bar Membership, In re Motion for Declaratory Judgment of a First Amendment Right to Publish Aggregate Info. About FISA Orders",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-06-21",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-06-21",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34456",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "dca7b3eff9685ef32c37637fa0653190487cc2b760673a4ff06781c1ba3068c7",
+ "pages": 2
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-misc-13-04-brief-130708/FISC_-_misc-13-03-misc-13-04-brief-130708.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-misc-13-04-brief-130708/FISC_-_misc-13-03-misc-13-04-brief-130708.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fec85ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-misc-13-04-brief-130708/FISC_-_misc-13-03-misc-13-04-brief-130708.md
@@ -0,0 +1,575 @@
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT AND FLYER HALL
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF GOOGLE
+INC.'S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO PUBLISH AGGREGATE
+INFORMATION ABOUT FISA ORDERS.
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-03
+
+IN RE MOTION TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE DATA REGARDING
+FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-04
+
+BRIEF OF FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION, AMERICAN CIVIL
+LIBERTIES UNION, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY,
+ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, AND TECHFREEDOM AS
+AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTIONS FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT
+
+July 8, 2013
+
+Floyd Abrams
+Dean Ringel
+Philip V. Tisne
+CAHILL GORDON & REINDEL LLP
+80 Pine Street
+New York, New York 10005-1772
+(212) 701-3000
+Attorneys for Amici Curiae
+
+TABLE OF CONTENTS
+
+page(s)
+
+TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.....................................ii
+STATEMENT OF AMICI.......................................1
+DESCRIPTION OF THE AMICI.................................1
+ARGUMENT.................................................2
+A. The First Amendment Imposes a Heavy Burden on Any Effort To
+Bar Disclosure Here.......................................2
+B. First Amendment Principles Have Barred Overbroad Non-
+disclosure Rules in the Context of National Security .....11
+
+-ii-
+TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
+
+page(s)
+Cases
+Alexander v. United States,
+509 U.S. 544 (1993).
+.9
+Bartnicki v. Vopper,
+532 U.S. 514 (2001).
+.7
+Butterworth v. Smith,
+494 U.S. 624 (1990).
+...8
+Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,
+558 U.S. 310 (2010).
+.5
+Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. Public Service Commission
+of New York, 447 U.S. 530 (1980)
+.6
+First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
+435 U.S. 765 (1978).
+.6
+The Florida Star v. B.J.F.,
+491 U.S. 524 (1989).
+.7
+Garrison v. State of Louisiana,
+379 U.S. 64 (1964).
+.6
+In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
+814 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1987)
+8
+In re Grand Jury Subpoena,
+574 F. Supp. 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
+...8
+Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
+542 U.S. 507 (2004).
+10
+Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,
+130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
+10
+Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,
+290 U.S. 398 (1934).
+10
+John Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey,
+549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2008)..
+11
+
+-iii-
+Ex parte Milligan,
+71 U.S. 2 (1803).
+10
+Mills v. Alabama,
+384 U.S. 214 (1971).....
+.6
+In re National Security Letter,
+No. C 11-02173 (SI), 2013 WL 1095417 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2013).
+11
+Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart,
+427 U.S. 539 (1976)...
+9
+New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
+376 U.S. 254 (1964).
+.....5
+New York Times Co. v. United States,
+403 U.S. 713 (1971).
+...9
+Police Department of City of Chicago v. Mosley,
+408 U.S. 92 (1972).
+.7
+Procunier v. Martinez,
+416 U.S. 396 (1974).
+.7
+Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,
+448 U.S. 555 (1980).
+.9, 10
+Roth v. United States,
+354 U.S. 476 (1957).
+...5, 6
+Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart,
+467 U.S. 20 (1984).
+.7
+Snepp v. United States,
+444 U.S. 507 (1980).
+.7
+Snyder v. Phelps,
+131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
+.6
+United States v. Aguilar,
+515 U.S. 593 (1995).
+.7
+United States v. Morison,
+844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1988)
+...5
+
+-iv-
+United States v. New York Times Co.,
+328 F. Supp. 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
+.5
+United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.,
+529 U.S. 803 (2000).
+.9
+Statutes
+Electronic Communications Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
+(1986).
+11
+U.S.A. PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001)
+11
+Other Authorities
+Caleb Garling, Firms Seek to Explain to Users; Tech Surveillance; Some
+Companies Urge Government Agencies to Allow Transparency, SAN
+FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, June 18, 2013
+.7
+Clarence Page, Secrecy Scandal? Not So Much, Really, CHICAGO
+TRIBUNE, June 12, 2013..
+.2
+Editorial, President Obama's Dragnet, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2013
+2
+Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI): Hearing Before
+the H. Judiciary Comm., 113th Cong. 47 (June 13, 2013)
+3
+Jessica Guynn, Tech Firms Try to Regain Trust; Apple is the Latest to Try
+to Reassure Public That It Didn't Give U.S. Direct Access to Data,
+LOS ANGELES TIMES, June 18, 2013
+7
+Matthew DeLuca & Kasie Hunt, NSA Snooping Has Foiled Multiple
+Terror Plots: Feinstein, NBC NEWS, June 6, 2013
+.3
+Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation: Hearing Before the S.
+Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (June 19, 2013)
+.3
+Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,
+47 IND. L.J. 1, 27-28 (1971).....
+.6
+Statement by the President, Office of the Press Secretary (June 7, 2013)...
+.3
+Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72
+YALE L.J. 877, 879 (1963)
+.7
+Zechariah Chafee Jr., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1967)
+7
+
+STATEMENT OF AMICI
+
+Amici are public interest organizations dedicated to the preservation of civil liberties.
+They respectfully submit this brief to set forth their views as to the special impact of the First
+Amendment's protection of free expression on the resolution of the motions filed by Google, Inc.
+("Google") and Microsoft Corporation ("Microsoft") seeking declaratory judgments confirming
+their ability to disclose limited numerical information in aggregate form as to requests that each
+may have received from the government pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
+("FISA").
+
+DESCRIPTION OF THE AMICI
+
+Amicus First Amendment Coalition ("FAC") is a section 501(C)(3) nonprofit organi-
+zation dedicated to First Amendment freedoms—primarily freedom of speech and the press—
+and government transparency. Founded in 1988, FAC works to enhance and protect these rights
+through a free legal consultation service, educational and information services, public advocacy
+of various kinds, and litigation, including the initiation of litigation in its own name and the filing
+of briefs *amicus curiae*. FAC receives support from foundations and from its members, who in-
+clude individuals and corporations.
+
+Amicus American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU”) is a nationwide, nonprofit, non-
+partisan organization with more than 500,000 members dedicated to the principles of liberty and
+equality embodied in the Constitution and this nation's civil-rights laws. Since its founding in
+1920, the ACLU has appeared before the federal courts as direct counsel and as *amicus curiae* in
+numerous cases involving the First Amendment. It has also appeared before this Court on sever-
+al occasions.
+
+Amicus Center for Democracy & Technology (“CDT”) is a non-profit public interest
+organization focused on privacy and other civil liberties issues affecting the Internet, other com-
+
+-2-
+munications networks, and associated technologies. CDT represents the public's interest in an
+open Internet and promotes the constitutional and democratic values of free expression, privacy,
+and individual liberty.
+
+Amicus Electronic Frontier Foundation ("EFF") is a member-supported organization
+dedicated to protecting civil liberties in the digital world. Founded in 1990, EFF fights to ensure
+that the rights and freedoms we enjoy are enhanced as our use of technology grows. EFF has
+filed actions and has appeared before this Court and also advocates for greater transparency
+about government requests for user information.
+
+Amicus TechFreedom is a nonprofit, nonpartisan public policy think tank. Its work
+on a wide range of information technology policy issues rests on a belief that technology en-
+hances freedom and freedom enhances technology. TechFreedom has been involved in debates
+over both free speech and privacy and believes that restrictions on the flow of information,
+whether to protect national security or to achieve some other state interest, must be reconciled
+with the speech interests burdened by regulation.
+
+All parties have consented to the filing of this brief *amici curiae*.¹
+
+ARGUMENT
+
+A. THE FIRST AMENDMENT IMPOSES A
+HEAVY BURDEN ON ANY EFFORT TO BAR
+DISCLOSURE HERE
+
+The Google and Microsoft motions arise in the context of an ongoing national debate
+about the nature and extent of government surveillance intended to protect national security.
+There is widespread national interest in the topic, compare, e.g., Editorial, *President Obama's
+Dragnet*, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2013, with Clarence Page, *Secrecy Scandal? Not So Much, Really*,
+
+¹ *Amici* certify that no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person or entity
+other than *amici curiae* or their counsel made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission.
+
+-3-
+CHICAGO TRIBUNE, June 12, 2013, which is reflected in acknowledgment by the highest officials
+of the Executive branch and Congressional leaders of both parties that a robust national debate
+about that subject is appropriate.² The President has emphasized the need for such a debate: “I
+welcome this debate. And I think it's healthy for our democracy. I think it's a sign of maturity,
+because probably five years ago, six years ago, we might not have been having this debate."
+Statement by the President, Office of the Press Secretary (June 7, 2013), available at http://www.
+whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/07/statement-president. Similarly Republican Senator
+Charles E. Grassley has observed that "open and transparent discussion of these programs is the
+only way that the American people will have confidence in what their government's doing."
+*Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judici-
+ary*, 113th Cong. (June 19, 2013) (stmt. of Sen. Charles E. Grassley).
+
+Yet even basic facts of central relevance in this debate are unknown and currently
+unknowable to the public, facts ranging from how extensive the government surveillance pro-
+grams are to how many users or accounts they affect. It is against this backdrop that Google and
+Microsoft now seek to disclose (1) the number of FISA requests that each may have received and
+(2) the number of users or accounts encompassed within any such requests. Google and Mi-
+crosoft have each filed motions seeking a declaration from this Court that they are not prohibited
+
+² *Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary*,
+113th Cong. (June 19, 2013) (stmt. of Sen. Leahy) ("We have to have an open debate about the efficacy
+of these tools, particularly, in light of the Boston marathon bombing in April, not only [] how we collect
+them, but what we do with it once it's [collected]."); *Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
+(FBI): Hearing Before the H. Judiciary Comm.*, 113th Cong. 47 (June 13, 2013) (stmt. of Rep. Jeffries)
+("But it is clear that he has become a lightning rod that has sparked what I think is a very important de-
+bate in this country that we in the Congress should have as to the proper balance between legitimately
+held security concerns and concerns for privacy and liberty, which are essential to the preservation of our
+democracy."); Matthew DeLuca & Kasie Hunt, *NSA Snooping Has Foiled Multiple Terror Plots: Fein-
+stein*, NBC NEWS, June 6, 2013, available at http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/06/06/18796204-
+nsa-snooping-has-foiled-multiple-terror-plots-feinstein?lite ("We are always open to changes. But that
+doesn't mean there will be any. It does mean that we will look at any ideas, any thoughts, and we do this
+on everything." (quoting Sen. Feinstein)).
+
+-4-
+from doing so. See Br. at 4, *In re Motion for Declaratory Judgment of Google Inc.'s First
+Amendment Right to Publish Aggregate Information About FISA Orders*, No. Misc. 13-03 (June
+18, 2013) ("Google Br."); Br. at 4, *In re Motion to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA
+Orders*, No. Misc. 13-04 (June 19, 2013) (“Microsoft Br."). Both companies state that they
+would publish this data in a way that would not allow "any particular individual user to infer that
+he or she had been targeted." Microsoft Br. at 5; see also Google Br. at 4.
+
+*Amici* submit this brief in support of those motions. Google asserts that "no applica-
+ble law or regulation" bars it from making the disclosures it seeks to make. See Google Br. at 4;
+see also Microsoft Br. at 4. *Amici* also are not aware of any such bar but recognize that they
+have more limited information as to the procedures and rules applicable to the applications of the
+government and the rules of this Court and so do not address that issue as such. Instead, we aim
+(1) to highlight the fundamental First Amendment interests implicated by any rule, whatever its
+origin, that prohibits the disclosures that Google and Microsoft seek to make here; and (2) to
+emphasize the very heavy burden that the proponent of any such rule would have to sustain in
+light of the First Amendment's requirements.
+
+Any rule precluding disclosure as to what a party itself is asked to do bears an ex-
+tremely high burden of justification under broad principles protecting free expression even where
+the non-disclosure might be sought in service of national security. And those principles have, in
+fact, been applied in the closely related "National Security Letter" context to determine that even
+an explicit statutory prohibition on far more specific disclosures than those at issue here was un-
+constitutional. We write to put both these general principles and their specific application in this
+context before this Court. *Amici* believe that these First Amendment principles, when applied to
+the limited proposed disclosures—disclosures central to an ongoing national debate—argue
+strongly for the grant of the declaratory relief being sought.
+
+-5-
+In making this argument, we are not insensitive to concerns for national security.
+But even those important concerns do not easily, let alone routinely, trump the First Amendment.
+See, e.g., *United States v. Morison*, 844 F.2d 1057, 1081 (4th Cir. 1988) (Wilkinson, J., concur-
+ring) ("The First Amendment interest in informed popular debate does not simply vanish at the
+invocation of the words 'national security"). As Judge Gurfein recognized many years ago in
+his ruling in the Pentagon Papers case, "[t]he security of the Nation is not at the ramparts alone
+[but] also lies in the value of our free institutions." *United States v. New York Times Co.*, 328 F.
+Supp. 324, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
+
+The "free institution" at risk here is nothing less than the guarantee of free expres-
+sion contained in the First Amendment. The expression at issue on the present motions—speech
+by Google and Microsoft about their own conduct in responding to any government requests—is
+central to a significant political debate at the heart of self-government. It implicates the most
+fundamental First Amendment values and should yield only to a government interest of the high-
+est order subjected to the most searching judicial inquiry. The government's burden is a heavy
+one, as both broad principles of First Amendment law and narrower decisions issued in strikingly
+similar national security contexts make clear.
+
+The First Amendment embodies "a profound national commitment" to the principle
+that "debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open," *New York Times Co.
+v. Sullivan*, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964), and that Amendment was "fashioned to assure unfettered
+interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes," *Roth v. United
+States*, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). Nowhere is this commitment more pronounced than in the
+context of a national public debate on pressing political issues:
+Speech is an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold offi-
+cials accountable to the people. The right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak,
+and to use information to reach consensus is a precondition to enlightened self-
+government and a necessary means to protect it.
+
+-6-
+*Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission*, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010) (citation omitted);
+see also *Garrison v. State of Louisiana*, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964) (“For speech concerning pub-
+lic affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.").
+
+Even scholars who have advanced the most restrictive view of the scope of the First
+Amendment by questioning whether it should protect artistic speech, have strongly affirmed that
+speech about governmental interaction with the citizenry is at the heart of what the Amendment
+protects. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, *Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems*, 47
+IND. L.J. 1, 27-28 (1971) (“The category of protected speech should consist of speech concerned
+with governmental behavior, policy or personnel, whether the governmental unit involved is ex-
+ecutive, legislative, judicial or administrative."). And, as the Supreme Court has recognized,
+there is "practically universal agreement" that the First Amendment's protections are at their
+zenith when applied to "the free discussion of governmental affairs." *Mills v. Alabama*, 384 U.S.
+214, 218 (1971). Here, in seeking to provide the public with information about the number of
+government requests received and the number of affected subscriber accounts, Google and Mi-
+crosoft each seeks to engage in speech that addresses governmental affairs in the most profound
+way that any citizen can: by describing their own interaction with the government process that is
+the subject of the national debate. Such speech, relating to the "structures and forms of govern-
+ment" and "the manner in which government is operated or should be operated," is at the very
+core of the First Amendment, e.g., *Mills*, 384 U.S. at 218; see also *Roth*, 354 U.S. at 484, and
+thus occupies "the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and is entitled to
+special protection," *Snyder v. Phelps*, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011) (quoting *Connick v. Myers*,
+461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983)).
+
+This speech also implicates another fundamental aspect of the First Amendment, the
+protection for self-expression. E.g., *Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. Public Service
+Commission of New York*, 447 U.S. 530, 534 n.2 (1980); *First National Bank of Boston v. Bellot*-
+
+-7-
+*ti*, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978). That interest reflects the principle at the very foundation of the
+First Amendment that freedom of expression is tied to freedom of thought and to a speaker's
+very identity. E.g., *Procunier v. Martinez*, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring)
+(self-expression "is an integral part of the development of ideas and a sense of identity"); *Police
+Department of City of Chicago v. Mosley*, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972) (First Amendment "as-
+sure[s] self-fulfillment for each individual" by guaranteeing the "right to express any thought,
+free from government censorship"); see also Zechariah Chafee Jr., *FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED
+STATES* 33 (1967); Thomas I. Emerson, *Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment*, 72
+YALE L.J. 877, 879 (1963). The speech at issue here is expression about the speakers' own ac-
+tions, actions taken under government compulsion for which the speakers have been publicly
+criticized³ and that they now seek to explain and to defend.⁴ Banning such speech strikes at the
+heart of the First Amendment's preservation of speech. It is antithetical to the First Amendment
+to restrict the ability of a person to mount a defense against public accusations by responding
+with speech setting forth the truth about one's own actions.⁵
+
+³ See, e.g., Caleb Garling, *Firms Seek to Explain to Users; Tech Surveillance; Some Companies Urge
+Government Agencies to Allow Transparency*, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, June 18, 2013, at D1 ("But it
+is clear that some Internet users have come to view these tech giants as proxy spies as a result of their as-
+sumed compliance."); Jessica Guynn, *Tech Firms Try to Regain Trust; Apple is the Latest to Try to Reas-
+sure Public That It Didn't Give U.S. Direct Access to Data*, LOS ANGELES TIMES, June 18, 2013, at B2
+("Scrutiny of the role technology companies played in a clandestine government surveillance program is
+intensifying, and nowhere have the revelations that companies turned over users' personal information
+been more unsettling than in Silicon Valley.").
+
+⁴ The element of government compulsion here distinguishes this situation from that in *Seattle Times Co.
+v. Rhinehart*, 467 U.S. 20, 32-34 (1984), and *Snepp v. United States*, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980) (per
+curiam), where the speaker's voluntary participation in a government process that restricted his ability to
+disseminate materials obtained through that process resulted in diminished First Amendment concerns,
+see *United States v. Aguilar*, 515 U.S. 593, 606 (1995) (distinguishing such cases from those involving
+"efforts to impose [speech] restrictions on unwilling members of the public" (emphasis added)).
+
+⁵ Any prohibition on the proposed numerical disclosure would bar truthful speech about a matter of pro-
+found national significance and is therefore particularly pernicious given our commitment to protect truth-
+ful speech against government restrictions. See, e.g., *Bartnicki v. Vopper*, 532 U.S. 514, 533-34 (2001)
+(noting that challenged measure "implicates the core purposes of the First Amendment because it imposes
+sanctions on the publication of truthful information of public concern"); cf. *The Florida Star v. B.J.F.*,
+Footnote continued on next page.
+
+-8-
+The Supreme Court has recognized the special concern that attends prohibitions on
+speaking about one's own experiences. See, e.g., *Butterworth v. Smith*, 494 U.S. 624 (1990)
+(First Amendment violated by rule prohibiting witness publicly disclosing his own prior grand
+jury testimony). Indeed Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure makes a pointed
+distinction between the general secrecy imposed on participants in the grand jury process and the
+witnesses before such grand jury, who are not subject to the general secrecy rule. In *Butter-
+worth*, the Supreme Court recognized the importance of a witness' "ability to make a truthful
+public statement" notwithstanding the longstanding recognition of societal interest in grand jury
+secrecy. Id at 635. Lower courts have frequently struck down orders precluding banks and other
+institutions from disclosing that the institution had received a subpoena for a customer's records.
+See, e.g., *In re Grand Jury Proceedings*, 814 F.2d 61 (1st Cir. 1987); *In re Grand Jury Subpoe-
+na*, 574 F. Supp. 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). The point is not that a non-disclosure rule as to govern-
+mental inquiries is precluded in all circumstances, but rather that courts have recognized that
+First Amendment interests must be weighed very heavily when the government seeks to ban
+truthful disclosure of information concerning a person's own actions even where other signifi-
+cant societal concerns are at stake. At the least, the government must make a substantial and par-
+ticularized showing to justify any such ban. See *In re Grand Jury Proceedings*, 574 F. Supp. at
+86 (recognizing "the important freedoms, including speech and association" at issue and reject-
+ing request that bank be barred from disclosing to its customer fact of subpoena because of gov-
+ernment's failure to make "particularized showing of need for secrecy").
+
+Any attempt to overcome First Amendment concerns implicated by the speech at is-
+sue here would have to be subjected to the most searching scrutiny. First, the nature of the re-
+Footnote continued from previous page.
+491 U.S. 524, 533-34 (1989) (discussing constitutional protection afforded for dissemination of lawfully
+obtained truthful information concerning matters of public significance).
+
+-9-
+strictions is that of a prior restraint.⁶ Such restraint is “the most serious and the least tolerable
+infringement on First Amendment rights," *Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart*, 427 U.S. 539, 559
+(1976), and would carry a "heavy presumption against its constitutional validity," *New York
+Times Co. v. United States*, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (quotation omitted). Second,
+even if not a prior restriction, any bar focused on disclosure would be based on the speech's con-
+tent and, therefore, subject to strict scrutiny, which it could survive only if it were narrowly tai-
+lored to promote a compelling government interest in the least restrictive means available. See,
+e.g., *United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.*, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).
+
+The institutional role of the judiciary also argues strongly for the most rigorous vet-
+ting of any proposed bar to disclosure here. That role is relevant in two distinct ways: first, in
+the interest of the citizenry in observing the workings of the judicial system; and second, in the
+crucial role that the judiciary has historically played in weighing the claims of the other branches
+of government against each other and against the interests of the citizenry at large.
+
+As the Supreme Court has recognized in setting out the constitutional concerns sup-
+porting open trials, the public's interest in seeing the government process at work, including the
+judicial process, is a fundamental element of our heritage. “People in an open society do not
+demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are
+prohibited from observing." *Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia*, 448 U.S. 555, 572 (1980).
+*Amici* recognize that this Court routinely deals with sensitive information. But when, as with the
+current applications, disclosure is sought that can bring some transparency to the process and in-
+form the national debate, it is imperative for reasons relating to process as well as the ultimate
+
+⁶ "The term prior restraint is used to describe administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain com-
+munications when issued in advance of the time that such communications are to occur." *Alexander v.
+United States*, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) (quotations omitted).
+
+-10-
+substantive decision, that any effort to bar disclosure require the most extraordinary showing of
+potential harm if it is even to be entertained.⁷
+
+And this Court's role in assessing any such effort is crucial. The judiciary's role is
+that of the "great bulwark of public liberty" in our system of separated powers. See 3 The Mis-
+cellaneous Writings of Justice Story 209 (ed. William M. Story 1852). That role is undiminished
+even when those "public liberties" are set against interests of such undeniable exigence as na-
+tional security. See *Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project*, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2727 (2010)
+("[C]oncerns of national security and foreign relations do not warrant abdication of the judicial
+role" and courts must "not defer to the Government's reading of the First Amendment, even
+when such interests are at stake."); *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) ("We have
+long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank check... when it comes to the rights of
+the Nation's citizens.").⁸ Indeed, the judiciary's role as bulwark is all the more significant in a
+context such as this, where proceedings are essentially *ex parte* and where information about
+those proceedings is of particular value to the public. The broad scope of First Amendment ju-
+risprudence makes clear the rigorous standard that must be required of any claim that would pre-
+clude disclosure here. And, as discussed below, these principles have been applied in a specific
+context closely akin to the present one and held to impose just such a requirement of specific fac-
+tual proof.
+
+⁷ As the *Richmond Newspapers* decision also recognized, "[t]he First Amendment goes beyond protec-
+tion of the press and self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of in-
+formation from which members of the public may draw." 448 U.S. at 575-76 (citation omitted). This
+public interest in "the stock of information" provides a separate First Amendment interest at issue here.
+
+⁸ Indeed, the role as arbiter assumes still greater significance when fundamental constitutional guarantees
+are tested in times of even the gravest insecurity. E.g., *Ex parte Milligan*, 71 U.S. 2, 120-21 (1866) ("The
+Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers
+with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances."); *Home
+Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell*, 290 U.S. 398, 425-26 (1934) (constitutional rights "were determined
+in the light of emergency and they are not altered by emergency[;] even the war power does not remove
+constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties").
+
+-11-
+B. FIRST AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES HAVE
+BARRED OVERBROAD NON-DISCLOSURE
+RULES IN THE CONTEXT OF NATIONAL
+SECURITY
+
+The broad principles described in the preceding section animated the decision in
+*John Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey*, 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2008), which sustained a First Amendment
+challenge to portions of the Electronic Communication Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100
+Stat. 1848 (1986), as amended by the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
+(2001). The decision held unconstitutional a blanket prohibition on the recipient of a National
+Security Letter disclosing information about that letter. The Second Circuit held that a perceived
+threat to national security could justify restraining the speech there at issue only if the govern-
+ment articulated a sound basis for its judgment to that effect. See id. at 881-82. To do otherwise
+would "cast Article III judges in the role of petty functionaries,... stripped of capacity to evalu-
+ate independently whether the executive's decision is correct." Id. at 881 (quoting *Gutierrez de
+Martinez v. Lamagno*, 515 U.S. 417, 426 (1995)). As that court explained:
+The fiat of a governmental official, though senior in rank and doubtless honorable
+in the execution of official duties, cannot displace the judicial obligation to en-
+force constitutional requirements. “Under no circumstances should the Judiciary
+become the handmaiden of the Executive."
+Id. at 882-83 (quoting *United States v. Smith*, 899 F.2d 564, 569 (6th Cir.1990)). A similar ap-
+preciation of First Amendment concerns informed the recent decision in *In re National Security
+Letter*, No. C 11-02173 (SI), 2013 WL 1095417 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2013), where the court per-
+ceived no justification for a general prohibition on disclosure of the mere fact of receiving a Na-
+tional Security Letter, see id. at *10-11, and concluded that the same statutes as were at issue in
+*Mukasey* violated the First Amendment. Each of those cases involved challenges to disclosures
+as to the letters themselves, surely a potentially more revealing disclosure than revelation of nu-
+merical totals.
+
+-12-
+The same core First Amendment principles reflected in those decisions apply with at
+least equal force to the disclosures at issue here and counsel that any restriction of that speech
+can be sustained only if such restriction survives the most searching judicial review of a detailed
+presentation of facts supporting such non-disclosure. *Amici* find it difficult to comprehend how
+national security could be threatened by the disclosures that Google and Microsoft seek to make
+here. *Amici* have no doubt, however, that any restriction premised on the suggestion of such al-
+leged threat must be subjected to the strictest of scrutiny and the proponents of any such re-
+striction must overcome the very highest level of First Amendment protection.
+
+***
+
+Pursuant to FISC Rule of Procedure 7(h)(1), Attorneys for the *Amici* certify that each
+of the undersigned Attorneys for *Amici* is a licensed attorney and a member, in good standing, of
+the bar of United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Pursuant to FISC
+Rule of Procedure 7(i), Attorneys for the *Amici* further certify that the undersigned do not cur-
+rently hold a security clearance.
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+OF COUNSEL:
+PETER SCHEER
+First Amendment Coalition
+ALEXANDER ABDO
+American Civil Liberties Union
+KEVIN BANKSTON
+Center for Democracy and Technology
+MATT ZIMMERMAN
+MARK RUMOLD
+Electronic Frontier Foundation
+BERIN SZOKA
+TechFreedom
+
+FLOYD ABRAMS
+DEAN RINGEL
+PHILIP TISNE
+CAHILL GORDON & REINDEL LLP
+80 Pine Street
+New York, New York 10005
+(212) 701-3000
+fabrams@cahill.com
+
+Attorneys for Amici Curiae
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-misc-13-04-brief-130708/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-misc-13-04-brief-130708/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-misc-13-04-brief-130708/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Brief of First Amendment Coalition, American Civil Liberties Union, Center for Democracy and Technology, Electronic Frontier Foundation, and TechFreedom as Amici Curiae in Support of the Motions for Declaratory Judgment, In re Motion for Declaratory Judgment of Google Inc.'s First Amendment Right to Publish Aggregate Info. About FISA Orders",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-07-08",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-07-08",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34460",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "184d2001dac48b6dc11cf8d144ec625004f272f78ff8aafed7baaa1fbec6bac5",
+ "pages": 18
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-misc-13-04-motion-130708/FISC_-_misc-13-03-misc-13-04-motion-130708.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-misc-13-04-motion-130708/FISC_-_misc-13-03-misc-13-04-motion-130708.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b9a45bb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-misc-13-04-motion-130708/FISC_-_misc-13-03-misc-13-04-motion-130708.md
@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF GOOGLE
+INC.'S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO PUBLISH AGGREGATE
+INFORMATION ABOUT FISA ORDERS.
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-03
+
+IN RE MOTION TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE DATA REGARDING
+FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-04
+
+MOTION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION, AMERICAN CIVIL
+LIBERTIES UNION, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY,
+ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, AND TECHFREEDOM FOR
+LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF THE
+MOTIONS FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
+
+July 8, 2013
+
+Floyd Abrams
+Dean Ringel
+Philip V. Tisne
+CAHILL GORDON & REINDEL LLP
+80 Pine Street
+New York, New York 10005-1772
+(212) 701-3000
+Counsel for Amici Curiae
+
+-2-
+
+The First Amendment Coalition, American Civil Liberties Union, Center for Democ-
+racy and Technology, Electronic Frontier Foundation, and TechFreedom (together, "Movants")
+are public interest organizations dedicated to the preservation of civil liberties. They respectfully
+submit this motion for leave to file a brief as amici curiae in support of the motions filed by
+Google, Inc. ("Google") and Microsoft Corporation ("Microsoft") seeking declaratory judgments
+confirming the ability of those parties to disclose limited aggregate numerical information relat-
+ing to requests that each may have received from the government pursuant to the Foreign Intelli-
+gence Surveillance Act ("FISA"). See In re Motion for Declaratory Judgment of Google Inc.'s
+First Amendment Right to Publish Aggregate Information About FISA Orders, No. Misc. 13-03
+(June 18, 2013); In re Motion to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders, No. Misc.
+13-04 (June 19, 2013).
+
+Amici are not aware of any specific prohibition on such disclosure, but the thrust of
+the proposed brief amici curiae is to emphasize that any effort to restrict the disclosure in ques-
+tion must overcome an extraordinarily strong First Amendment interest flowing from the nature
+of the speech here, speech which lies at the core of the constitutional protection for free expres-
+sion.
+
+Counsel for the United States and for Google and Microsoft have consented to the
+filing of the brief amici curiae.
+
+-3-
+July 8, 2013
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+OF COUNSEL:
+
+PETER SCHEER
+First Amendment Coalition
+ALEXANDER ABDO
+American Civil Liberties Union
+KEVIN BANKSTON
+Center for Democracy and Technology
+MATT ZIMMERMAN
+MARK RUMOLD
+Electronic Frontier Foundation
+BERIN SZOKA
+TechFreedom
+
+FLOYD ABRAMS
+DEAN RINGEL
+PHILIP TISNE
+CAHILL GORDON & REINDEL LLP
+80 Pine Street
+New York, New York 10005
+(212) 701-3000
+fabrams@cahill.com
+
+Attorneys for Amici Curiae
+
+-4-
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I, Dean Ringel, hereby certify that on this day, July 8, 2013, pursuant to Rule 8(a) of the
+Rules of Procedure for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, I caused to be served two
+copies of the foregoing motion, together with three copies of the accompanying brief amici curi-
+ae, on the following person by hand delivery:
+
+Christine Gunning
+Litigation Security Group
+U.S. Department of Justice
+Two Constitution Square
+145 N Street, N.E.
+Suite 2W-115
+Washington, DC 20530
+Christine.E.Gunning@usdoj.gov
+
+I further certify that I caused to be served a copy of the foregoing motion, together with the
+accompanying brief amici curiae, on the following persons by electronic mail:
+
+Albert Gidari
+Perkins Coie LLP
+1201 Third Avenue
+Suite 4900
+Seattle, WA 98101
+agidari@perkinscoie.com
+
+Attorneys for Google Inc.
+
+James Garland
+Covington & Burlington LLP
+1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
+Washington, DC 20004
+jgarland@cov.com
+
+Attorneys for Microsoft Corporation
+
+-5-
+
+Nicholas J. Patterson
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Avenue
+Washington, DC 20530
+Nicholas.Patterson@usdoj.gov
+
+Attorneys for the United States of America
+
+By:
+
+Dean Ringel
+CAHILL GORDON & REINDEL LLP
+80 Pine Street
+New York, New York 10005
+(212) 701-3000
+dringel@cahill.com
+
+Attorneys for Amici Curiae
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-misc-13-04-motion-130708/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-misc-13-04-motion-130708/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5c6294e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-misc-13-04-motion-130708/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Motion of the First Amendment Coalition, American Civil Liberties Union, Center for Democracy and Technology, Electronic Frontier Foundation, and TechFreedom for Leave to File Brief as Amici Curiae in Support of the Motions for Declaratory Judgment, In re Motion for Declaratory Judgment of Google Inc.'s First Amendment Right to Publish Aggregate Info. About FISA Orders, No. Misc. 13-03 (FISA Ct. July 8, 2013).",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-07-08",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-07-08",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34459",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "472af1aaf162e652e187b01925bc8be1ff8fb677ae0e920a76073bb79c3e5520",
+ "pages": 5
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-motion-130702/FISC_-_misc-13-03-motion-130702.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-motion-130702/FISC_-_misc-13-03-motion-130702.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d7f6795
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-motion-130702/FISC_-_misc-13-03-motion-130702.md
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT OF A FIRST AMENDMENT
+RIGHT TO PUBLISH AGGREGATE
+INFORMATION ABOUT FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-03
+
+CONSENT MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME
+TO RESPOND TO GOOGLE, INC.'S MOTION
+
+Pursuant to U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Rule of Procedure 6(d) and
+Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b), the United States respectfully requests that the deadline for
+responding to Google, Inc.'s Motion in this matter be extended by fourteen days from July 9,
+2013, up to and including July 23, 2013. This is the first request for an extension of this
+deadline.
+
+This matter concerns Google, Inc.'s request to publish aggregate information about
+Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act orders. The United States respectfully requests that the
+Court grant this brief extension in order to further evaluate the substantial issues raised by
+Google, Inc. in its motion.
+
+Counsel for the United States conferred with counsel for Google, Inc., who indicated that
+Google, Inc. consents to the relief sought in this motion.
+
+July 2, 2013
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+
+TASHINA GAUHAR
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+Nicholas J. Patterso
+JEFFREY M. SMITH
+NICHOLAS J. PATTERSON
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+Phone: (202) 514-5600
+Fax: (202) 514-8053
+
+Attorneys for the United States of America
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+I hereby certify that a true copy of the Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to
+Google Inc.'s Motion was served via Federal Express and email on this 2d day of July, 2013,
+addressed to:
+
+Albert Gidari
+Perkins Coie LLP
+1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900
+Seattle, WA 98101
+
+Nicholas J. Patterson
+Nicholas J. Patterson
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY )
+JUDGMENT OF A FIRST AMENDMENT)
+RIGHT TO PUBLISH AGGREGATE )
+INFORMATION ABOUT FISA ORDERS )
+Docket No. Misc. 13-03
+
+[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING CONSENT MOTION
+FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO RESPOND TO GOOGLE, INC.’S MOTION
+
+Having read and considered the United States' Motion for Extension of Time to Respond
+to Google, Inc.'s Motion, the Motion for Extension of Time is hereby GRANTED. The United
+States' time to respond to Google, Inc.'s Motion is extended up to and including July 23, 2013.
+
+SO ORDERED, this ____ day of July, 2013.
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-motion-130702/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-motion-130702/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5df3761
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-motion-130702/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Consent Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Microsoft Corporation's Motion, In re Motion to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-07-02",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-07-02",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34486",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "071fc6fc7b70d65484f4455abf4b737840bdb86f62e1101caa493d8b329289a2",
+ "pages": 4
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-motion-131010/FISC_-_misc-13-03-motion-131010.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-motion-131010/FISC_-_misc-13-03-motion-131010.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..402d9c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-motion-131010/FISC_-_misc-13-03-motion-131010.md
@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+2013 OCT 10 PM 2:14
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF GOOGLE
+INC.'S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO PUBLISH AGGREGATE
+INFORMATION ABOUT FISA ORDERS.
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-03
+
+IN RE MOTION TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE DATA REGARDING
+FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-04
+
+MOTION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION, AMERICAN CIVIL
+LIBERTIES UNION, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY,
+ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, AND TECHFREEDOM AS
+AMICI CURIAE FOR LEAVE TO PARTICIPATE IN ORAL ARGUMENT
+
+October 10, 2013
+
+Floyd Abrams
+Dean Ringel
+CAHILL GORDON & REINDEL LLP
+80 Pine Street
+New York, New York 10005-1772
+(212) 701-3000
+Counsel for Amici Curiae
+
+-2-
+
+The First Amendment Coalition, American Civil Liberties Union, Center for Democ-
+racy and Technology, Electronic Frontier Foundation, and TechFreedom (together, "Amici") are
+public interest organizations dedicated to the preservation of civil liberties. They have previous-
+ly submitted a brief Amici Curiae in support of motions filed by Google, Inc. ("Google") and
+Microsoft Corporation ("Microsoft") seeking declaratory judgments confirming the ability of
+those parties to disclose limited aggregate numerical information relating to requests that each
+may have received from the government pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
+("FISA"). See _In re Motion for Declaratory Judgment of Google Inc.'s First Amendment Right
+to Publish Aggregate Information About FISA Orders_, Docket No. Misc. 13-03 (June 18, 2013);
+_In re Motion to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders_, Docket No. Misc. 13-04 (June
+19, 2013). Google has since filed amended motions for declaratory judgment seeking, inter alia,
+"public oral argument." _Amended Motion for Declaratory Judgment of Google Inc.'s First
+Amendment Right to Publish Aggregate Information About FISA Orders_, Docket No. Misc. 13-
+03 (Sept. 9, 2013), at 1; see also _Microsoft's First Amended Motion to Disclose Aggregate Data
+Regarding FISA Orders_, Docket No. Misc. 13-04 (Sept. 9, 2013), at 1.
+
+Amici now respectfully submit this motion for leave for their counsel, Floyd Abrams,
+to participate in oral argument on those motions.
+
+The argument (and ultimately the resolution) of the Google and Microsoft motions
+will deal with the fundamental question of how the public is to be informed about a surveillance
+system undertaken to protect that public. It will explore the restrictions on disclosure imposed
+by statute and this Court's orders and the limitations on such compelled non-disclosure imposed
+by those same statutes and the Constitution. Amici and their counsel, while mindful of con-
+straints imposed by considerations of national security in this area, have substantial experience in
+advancing arguments rooted in the public interest in open judicial proceedings. Our participation
+in oral argument would, we submit, assist the Court in its deliberations, facilitate the public's un-
+derstanding and evaluation of government surveillance programs, and provide transparency to a
+
+-3-
+
+judicial oversight process that has been the subject of considerable discussion, some accurate,
+some not.
+
+Transparency is especially important in "light of the active, continuing public de-
+bate" surrounding the government's investigatory powers, "which has spawned a series of Con-
+gressional hearings, academic commentary, and press coverage." _In re National Security Letter_,
+930 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1076 (N.D. Cal. 2013). The ability of Amici to address these issues in a
+public setting in this matter will "further inform the ongoing public debate." Id. This Court it-
+self has recognized "the public interest" in the general subject of surveillance and oversight. See
+_In Re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production
+of Tangible Things_, Docket No. BR 13-109, Amended Memorandum Opinion (Aug. 29, 2013),
+at 29.
+
+***
+
+Pursuant to FISC Rule of Procedure 7(h)(1), Attorneys for the Amici certify that each
+of the undersigned Attorneys for Amici is a licensed attorney and a member, in good standing, of
+the bar of Untied District Court for the Southern District of New York. Pursuant to FISC Rule of
+Procedure 7(i), Attorneys for the Amici further certify that the undersigned do not currently hold
+a security clearance.
+
+October 10, 2013
+
+OF COUNSEL:
+
+PETER SCHEER
+First Amendment Coalition
+ALEXANDER ABDO
+American Civil Liberties Union
+KEVIN BANKSTON
+Center for Democracy and Technology
+MATT ZIMMERMAN
+MARK RUMOLD
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+FLOYD ABRAMS
+DEAN RINGEL
+CAHILL GORDON & REINDEL LLP
+80 Pine Street
+New York, New York 10005
+(212) 701-3000
+fabrams@cahill.com
+
+Attorneys for Amici Curiae
+
+-4-
+
+Electronic Frontier Foundation
+BERIN SZOKA
+TechFreedom
+
+-5-
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I, Dean Ringel, hereby certify that on this day, October 10, 2013, pursuant to Rule 8(a) of
+the Rules of Procedure for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, I caused to be served two
+copies of the foregoing motion, on the following person by hand delivery:
+
+Michael Macisso
+Litigation Security Group
+U.S. Department of Justice
+Two Constitution Square
+145 N Street, N.E.
+Suite 2W-115
+Washington, DC 20530
+
+I further certify that I caused to be served a copy of the foregoing motion on the following
+persons by electronic mail:
+
+Albert Gidari
+Perkins Coie LLP
+1201 Third Avenue
+Suite 4900
+Seattle, WA 98101
+agidari@perkinscoie.com
+
+Attorneys for Google Inc.
+
+James Garland
+Covington & Burlington LLP
+1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
+Washington, DC 20004
+jgarland@cov.com
+
+Attorneys for Microsoft Corporation
+
+-6-
+
+Nicholas J. Patterson
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Avenue
+Washington, DC 20530
+Nicholas.Patterson@usdoj.gov
+
+Attorneys for the United States of America
+
+By
+Dean Ringel
+CAHILL GORDON & REINDEL LLP
+80 Pine Street
+New York, New York 10005
+(212) 701-3000
+dringel@cahill.com
+
+Attorneys for Amici Curiae
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-motion-131010/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-motion-131010/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8a1ea67
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-motion-131010/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Motion of the First Amendment Coalition, American Civil Liberties Union, Center for Democracy and Technology, Electronic Frontier Foundation, and TechFreedom as Amici Curiae for Leave to Participate in Oral Argument, In re Motion for Declaratory Judgment of Google Inc.'s First Amendment Right to Publish Aggregate Information About FISA Orders, No. Misc. 13-03 (FISA Ct. Oct. 10, 2013).",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-10-10",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-10-10",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34473",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "ebbd2cf4ac1341fd4c759a883db365d98152e92124781949a0225b95fd4a8bc2",
+ "pages": 6
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-motion/FISC_-_misc-13-03-motion.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-motion/FISC_-_misc-13-03-motion.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1590860
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-motion/FISC_-_misc-13-03-motion.md
@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+UNITED STATES FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+2013 JUN 18 PH 4:49
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
+OF GOOGLE INC.'S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
+PUBLISH AGGREGATE INFORMATION ABOUT
+FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. NISC. 13-03
+
+MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF
+GOOGLE INC.'S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
+PUBLISH AGGREGATE INFORMATION ABOUT FISA ORDERS
+
+COMES NOW Movant Google Inc. ("Google") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and
+Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC") Rule of Procedure 6(d) and respectfully moves
+this Court for declaratory judgment, or such other relief as appropriate, that Google may disclose
+limited, aggregate statistics regarding Google's receipt of orders issued by this Court, if any,
+without violating the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") or the FISC Rules of
+Procedure.¹
+
+I. FACTS
+
+Google is an electronic services provider that offers a wide variety of products, services,
+and online tools such as Gmail and Search to millions of users around the globe. Transparency is
+a core value at Google and the company is committed to informing its users and the public about
+requests it receives from government agencies around the world for the production of users'
+information and/or communications. Google publishes a Transparency Report conveying this
+
+¹ Nothing in this Motion is intended to confirm or deny that Google has received any order or orders issued by this Court.
+
+1
+information in aggregate form, available at
+http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/userdatarequests/. In 2013, for the first time, Google
+included in its Transparency Report the number of National Security Letters ("NSLs") it receives
+and the number of users/accounts specified, within a range and on an annual basis. The Federal
+Bureau of Investigation confirmed in writing that Google could so, and to Google's knowledge,
+no declassification of any such information was necessary.
+
+On June 6, 2013, The Guardian newspaper published a story mischaracterizing the scope
+and nature of Google's receipt of and compliance with foreign intelligence surveillance requests.
+In particular, the story falsely alleged that Google provides the U.S. government with "direct
+access" to its systems, allowing the government unfettered access to the records and
+communications of millions of user. The story is available at
+http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data. The Washington Post
+also published a misleading story that day, alleging that the U.S. government is "tapping directly
+into" Google's central servers in order to surreptitiously obtain user records and
+communications. The story is available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-
+intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-
+program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_story.html.
+
+On June 7, 2013, Google Chief Executive Officer Larry Page and Chief Legal Officer
+David Drummond posted a blog entry that responded to these allegations as best it could given
+the constraints imposed by the government's position that even general information regarding
+Google's receipt of and response to foreign intelligence surveillance orders, if any, cannot be
+disclosed. Google clarified that the government does not have direct access to Google's servers,
+that Google provides information to the U.S. and other governments only in accordance with the
+
+2
+law, and that Google carefully reviews each government request and complies only if the
+requests appear proper and lawful. The blog post is available at
+googleblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/what.html.
+
+In light of the intense public interest generated by The Guardian's and Post's erroneous
+articles, and others that have followed them, Google seeks to increase its transparency with users
+and the public regarding its receipt of national security requests, if any. On June 11, 2013,
+Google requested that the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation permit
+Google to publish the aggregate numbers regarding the receipt of national security requests, as
+further described below. The Department of Justice and the FBI have not classified the
+aggregate numbers regarding the receipt of national security requests described above.
+Nonetheless, the Department of Justice and FBI maintain their position that publication of such
+aggregate numbers is unlawful.
+
+Google's reputation and business has been harmed by the false or misleading reports in
+the media, and Google's users are concerned by the allegations. Google must respond to such
+claims with more than generalities. Moreover, these are matters of significant weight and
+importance, and transparency is critical to advancing public debate in a thoughtful and
+democratic manner.
+
+II. ENTITLEMENT TO RELIEF
+
+Google is a "communications carrier . . . or other specified person" subject to orders by
+this Court to assist the government in conducting electronic surveillance or other foreign
+intelligence collection activities pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C.
+§§ 1801-1881g ("FISA"). Google seeks to be transparent regarding FISA requests that may be
+
+3
+or have been served upon it, if any, and to respond to false or misleading statements about the
+scope of its compelled disclosure under national security authorities.
+
+In particular, Google seeks a declaratory judgment that Google has a right under the First
+Amendment to publish, and that no applicable law or regulation prohibits Google from
+publishing, two aggregate unclassified numbers: (1) the total number of FISA requests it
+receives, if any; and (2) the total number of users or accounts encompassed within such requests.
+
+Google's publication would disclose numbers as part of the regular Transparency Report
+publication cycle for National Security Letters, which covers data over calendar year time
+periods. There would be two new categories to cover requests made under FISA (50 U.S.C. §§
+1801-1881g): (a) total requests received and (b) total users/accounts at issue. Each of these
+entries will be reported as a range, rather than an actual number. That range would be the same
+as used by Google in its reporting of NSLs currently, in increments of one thousand, starting
+with zero. As with the NSL reporting, Google would have a Frequently Asked Questions
+("FAQ") section that would describe the statutory FISA authorities themselves.
+
+To be clear, Google would not state, either in the published statistics or the FAQ, which
+FISA authorities the government has actually invoked to compel production of data from
+Google.
+
+This Court has the power to declare that aggregate data about such orders for all
+providers is protected by the First Amendment and is not classified or subject to any other legal
+limitation on disclosure. The Court may, pursuant to a rule or inherent in its own authority,
+make clear that providers can publish aggregate numbers of orders received and the aggregate
+number of affected users under such orders.
+
+4
+Accordingly, Google respectfully requests that this Court issue a declaratory judgment
+indicating that Google may lawfully disclose such information.
+
+Pursuant to FISC Rule of Procedure 7(i), Google certifies that the following responsible
+employees for relevant matters hold security clearances: John Kent Walker Jr., General Counsel
+(FBI-Secret), and Richard Paul Salgado, Legal Director (FBI-Top Secret). These clearances
+were granted for the purpose of handling classified legal process. Google's undersigned counsel
+does not hold a security clearance.
+
+DATED: June 18, 2013
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+Albert Gidari / by JKR
+Albert Gidari
+Perkins Coie LLP
+1201 Third Avenue
+Suite 4900
+Seattle, WA 98101
+206-359-8688
+Fax: (206) 359-9688
+agidari@perkinscoie.com
+
+Attorneys for Google Inc.
+
+5
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I hereby certify this 18th day of June, 2013, that the foregoing document was served via hand
+delivery on the following:
+
+Christine Gunning
+Litigation Security Group
+United States Department of Justice
+2 Constitution Square
+145 N St., NE, Suite 2W-115
+Washington, DC 20530
+
+Albert Gidari / by JKR
+Albert Gidari
+Perkins Coie LLP
+1201 Third Avenue
+Suite 4900
+Seattle, WA 98101
+206-359-8688
+Fax: (206) 359-9688
+agidari@perkinscoie.com
+
+Attorneys for Google Inc.
+
+6
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-motion/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-motion/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eb3a69f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-motion/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Motion for Declaratory Judgment of Google Inc.'s First Amendment Right to Publish Aggregate Information About FISA Orders, In re Motion for Declaratory Judgment of a First Amendment Right to Publish Aggregate Info. About FISA Orders",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-06-18",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-06-18",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34455",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "66ef4ac974c875b4f1a4653a92768ea734f5313723a3de50d604b5729037676c",
+ "pages": 6
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-order-130703/FISC_-_misc-13-03-order-130703.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-order-130703/FISC_-_misc-13-03-order-130703.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..518eb3e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-order-130703/FISC_-_misc-13-03-order-130703.md
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT OF A FIRST AMENDMENT
+RIGHT TO PUBLISH AGGREGATE
+INFORMATION ABOUT FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-03
+
+ORDER
+
+The Court has reviewed the Government's Consent Motion for Extension of Time to
+Respond to Google, Inc.'s Motion and notes that the Government represents therein that Google,
+Inc., through counsel, "consents to the relief sought in this motion."
+
+Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that this Court's order dated June 20, 2013, is
+amended to provide as follows: Any response by the Government to Google, Inc.'s Motion for
+Declaratory Judgment of a First Amendment Right to Publish Aggregate Information About
+FISA Orders must be submitted no later than 5:00 p.m. on July 23, 2013. If the government
+responds, Google, Inc., may file a reply brief no later than 5:00 p.m. on July 30, 2013, through
+the Security and Emergency Planning Staff, U.S. Department of Justice.
+
+SO ORDERED, this 3rd day of July, 2013.
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-order-130703/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-order-130703/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f632770
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-order-130703/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Order, In re Motion to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-07-03",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-07-03",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34245",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "c32d22421611b7c0a5631b22bf9c3d75d4e467af18e0719967c5a5e9009e10a8",
+ "pages": 1
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-order/FISC_-_misc-13-03-order.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-order/FISC_-_misc-13-03-order.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7dd8097
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-order/FISC_-_misc-13-03-order.md
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT OF A FIRST AMENDMENT
+RIGHT TO PUBLISH AGGREGATE
+INFORMATION ABOUT FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-03
+
+**ORDER**
+
+This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Declaratory Judgment of a First
+Amendment Right to Publish Aggregate Information About FISA Orders, which was submitted
+on June 18, 2013. Any response by the U.S. Department of Justice to the motion must be
+submitted no later than 5:00 p.m. on July 9, 2013. If the government responds, the Movant may
+file a reply brief no later than 5:00 p.m. on July 16, 2013, through the Security and Emergency
+Planning Staff, U.S. Department of Justice.
+
+The Court is aware that the Movant has made its Motion publicly available. Unless the
+government advises in a written submission made no later than 5:00 p.m. on June 25, 2013, that,
+in its assessment, the Motion contains classified information, information that is potentially
+classified and currently subject to a classification review, or information that is or should be
+sealed, the Court intends to post copies of the Motion and this Order to a publicly accessible
+Uniform Resource Locator. If the government advises that potentially classified information is
+currently subject to a classification review, the government shall state when it expects that review
+to be concluded.
+
+In addition, counsel for the Movant shall provide the bar membership information
+required under rule 7(h)(1) of the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court's Rules
+of Procedure ("FISC Rules"). See also FISC Rule 63 ("Practice Before the Court"). Such
+information must be submitted, in writing, no later than 5:00 pm on June 25, 2013.
+
+SO ORDERED, this 20th day of June, 2013.
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+i, Beverly C. Queen, Chief Deputy
+Clerk, FISC, certify that this document
+is a true and correct copy of the
+original.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-order/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-order/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b4ae4f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-order/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Order, In re Motion for Declaratory Judgment of a First Amendment Right to Publish Aggregate Info. About FISA Orders",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-06-20",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-06-20",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34237",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "09b706f29227328af944c5cae52b725f708fd7adca1ea23ed0ac6fa9e0a4406a",
+ "pages": 1
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-response/FISC_-_misc-13-03-response.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-response/FISC_-_misc-13-03-response.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bf10cb1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-response/FISC_-_misc-13-03-response.md
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+2013 JUN 25 PM 4:39
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLATORY
+JUDGMENT OF A FIRST AMENDMENT
+RIGHT TO PUBLISH AGGREGATE
+INFORMATION ABOUT FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-03
+
+RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES TO
+THE COURT'S ORDER DATED JUNE 20, 2013
+
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+
+TASHINA GAUHAR
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+JEFFREY M. SMITH
+NICHOLAS J. PATTERSON
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+Phone: (202) 514-5600
+Fax: (202) 514-8053
+
+Attorneys for the United States of America
+
+On June 18, 2013, Google filed a Motion for Declaratory Judgment in the above-
+captioned matter. By order dated June 20, 2013, this Court provided the Government until June
+25, 2013, to respond in writing with an assessment as to whether said motion contains classified
+information, potentially classified information, or information that is or should be sealed.
+
+The motion does not contain information that is now classified, nor information that
+should be held under seal, and the Government thus has no objection to its public posting. This
+determination has been made on the basis of the contents of this particular motion and the facts
+as they relate specifically to Google, including public statements the Government has made in
+response to the unauthorized disclosure of previously classified information.
+
+The Government will submit its substantive response to the motion no later than
+July 9, 2013.
+
+June 25, 2013
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+
+TASHINA GAUHAR
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+Nicholas J. Patterson
+JEFFREY M. SMITH
+NICHOLAS J. PATTERSON
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+Phone: (202) 514-5600
+Fax: (202) 514-8053
+
+Attorneys for the United States of America
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I hereby certify that a true copy of the Response of the United States to the Court's Order
+Dated June 20, 2013 was served via Federal Express and email on this 25th day of June, 2013,
+addressed to:
+
+Albert Gidari
+Perkins Coie LLP
+1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900
+Seattle, WA 98101
+
+Nicholas J. Patterson
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-response/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-response/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9531716
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-03-response/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Response of the United States to the Court's Order Dated June 20, 2013, In re Motion for Declaratory Judgment of a First Amendment Right to Publish Aggregate Info. About FISA Orders",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-06-25",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-06-25",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34457",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "f8a8671150f97233829510a2eb47d81bcabe832cbc96bac90d6d71dd90c0f585",
+ "pages": 3
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-briefing-scheudule-130909/FISC_-_misc-13-04-briefing-scheudule-130909.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-briefing-scheudule-130909/FISC_-_misc-13-04-briefing-scheudule-130909.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..60b303e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-briefing-scheudule-130909/FISC_-_misc-13-04-briefing-scheudule-130909.md
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+2013 SEP -9 PM 4:39
+
+LEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT OF A FIRST AMENDMENT
+RIGHT TO PUBLISH AGGREGATE
+INFORMATION ABOUT FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-03
+
+IN RE MOTION TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-04
+
+JOINT MOTION FOR PARTIES' PROPOSED BRIEFING SCHEDULE
+
+Pursuant to the Court's September 4, 2013 Orders in the above-captioned cases, the
+parties have agreed to the following proposed briefing schedule. The Government's response to
+Microsoft Corporation and Google Inc.'s amended motions for declaratory relief would be due
+by 5:00 p.m. on September 30, 2013. Any replies by Microsoft Corporation and Google Inc.
+would be due by 5:00 p.m. on October 21, 2013. A proposed Order is attached.
+September 9, 2013
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+/s/ Albert Gidari
+ALBERT GIDARI
+Perkins Coie LLP
+1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900
+Seattle, WA
+
+Attorney for Google Inc.
+
+/s/ James M. Garland
+JAMES M. GARLAND
+DAVID N. FAGAN
+ALEXANDER A. BERENGAUT
+Covington & Burling LLP
+1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
+Washington, DC 20004-2401
+
+Attorneys for Microsoft Corporation
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+
+TASHINA GAUHAR
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+/s/ Nicholas J. Patterson
+JEFFREY M. SMITH
+NICHOLAS J. PATTERSON
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+
+Attorneys for the United States of America
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT OF A FIRST AMENDMENT
+RIGHT TO PUBLISH AGGREGATE
+INFORMATION ABOUT FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-03
+
+IN RE MOTION TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-04
+
+[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING JOINT MOTION
+FOR PARTIES' PROPOSED BRIEFING SCHEDULE
+
+On September 9, 2013, the parties in the above-captioned case filed a joint motion for a
+proposed briefing schedule. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the joint motion is
+GRANTED and the briefing schedule in this matter is revised as follows: the Government's
+response to Microsoft Corporation and Google Inc.'s amended motions for declaratory relief
+shall be submitted no later than 5:00 p.m. on September 30, 2013. Microsoft Corporation and
+Google Inc. may file reply briefs no later than 5:00 p.m. on October 21, 2013, through the
+Security and Emergency Planning Staff, U.S. Department of Justice.
+
+SO ORDERED, this ___ day of September, 2013.
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-briefing-scheudule-130909/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-briefing-scheudule-130909/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bc24481
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-briefing-scheudule-130909/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Joint Motion for Parties' Proposed Briefing Schedule, In re Motion for Declaratory Judgment of a First Amendment Right to Publish Aggregate Info. About FISA Orders, No. Misc. 13-03 (FISA Ct. Sept. 9, 2013).",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-09-09",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-09-09",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34467",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "10248e1ba678072d319d659ad414d554d03a58de1b7e9aa41e1db11b68e76b22",
+ "pages": 3
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-consent-motion-for-second-extension-of-time/FISC_-_misc-13-04-consent-motion-for-second-extension-of-time.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-consent-motion-for-second-extension-of-time/FISC_-_misc-13-04-consent-motion-for-second-extension-of-time.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a4943a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-consent-motion-for-second-extension-of-time/FISC_-_misc-13-04-consent-motion-for-second-extension-of-time.md
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+UNITED STATES
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+2013 JUL 22 PM 4:13
+
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE MOTION TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-04
+
+CONSENT MOTION FOR SECOND EXTENSION OF TIME
+TO RESPOND TO MICROSOFT CORPORATION'S MOTION
+
+Pursuant to U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Rule of Procedure 6(d) and
+Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b), the United States respectfully requests that the deadline for
+responding to Microsoft Corporation's Motion in this matter be extended by seven days from
+July 23, 2013, up to and including July 30, 2013. This is the second request for an extension of
+this deadline.
+
+This matter concerns Microsoft Corporation's request to disclose aggregate information
+about Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act orders. The United States respectfully requests that
+the Court grant this brief extension in order to provide additional time to negotiate with
+Microsoft Corporation regarding the substantial issues raised by Microsoft Corporation in
+its motion.
+
+Counsel for the United States conferred with counsel for Microsoft Corporation, who
+indicated that Microsoft Corporation consents to the relief sought in this motion.
+
+July 22, 2013
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+
+TASHINA GAUHAR
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+Nicholas J. Patterson
+JEFFREY M. SMITH
+NICHOLAS J. PATTERSON
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+Phone: (202) 514-5600
+Fax: (202) 514-8053
+
+Attorneys for the United States of America
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I hereby certify that a true copy of the Consent Motion for Second Extension of Time to
+Respond to Microsoft Corporation's Motion was served via Federal Express and email on this
+22nd day of July, 2013,
+
+addressed to:
+James M. Garland
+David N. Fagan
+Alexander A. Berengaut
+Covington & Burling LLP
+1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
+Washington, DC 20004-2401
+
+Nicholas J. Patterson
+Nicholas J. Patterson
+
+UNITED STATES
+
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE MOTION TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-04
+
+[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING CONSENT MOTION
+FOR SECOND EXTENSION OF TIME TO RESPOND TO
+MICROSOFT CORPORATION'S MOTION
+
+Having read and considered the United States' Motion for Second Extension of Time to
+Respond to Microsoft Corporation's Motion, the Motion for Second Extension of Time is hereby
+GRANTED. The United States' time to respond to Microsoft Corporation's Motion is extended
+up to and including July 30, 2013.
+
+SO ORDERED, this _____ day of July, 2013.
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-consent-motion-for-second-extension-of-time/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-consent-motion-for-second-extension-of-time/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9c6a3cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-consent-motion-for-second-extension-of-time/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Consent Motion for Second Extension of Time to Respond to Microsoft Corporation's Motion, In re Motion to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-07-22",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-07-22",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34487",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "3241ee44278bd6720f0bb3b9e0bba43ec56feb8ef2967b89df0d03b60548d16e",
+ "pages": 4
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-fifth-extension/FISC_-_misc-13-04-fifth-extension.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-fifth-extension/FISC_-_misc-13-04-fifth-extension.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a727b01
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-fifth-extension/FISC_-_misc-13-04-fifth-extension.md
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+UNITED STATES
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+2013 AUG 12 PM 4:55
+
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE MOTION TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-04
+
+**CONSENT MOTION FOR FIFTH EXTENSION OF TIME**
+**TO RESPOND TO MICROSOFT CORPORATION'S MOTION**
+
+Pursuant to U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Rule of Procedure 6(d) and
+Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b), the United States respectfully requests that the deadline for
+responding to Microsoft Corporation's Motion in this matter be extended by seven days from
+August 13, 2013, up to and including August 20, 2013. This is the fifth request for an extension
+of this deadline.
+
+This matter concerns Microsoft Corporation's request to disclose aggregate information
+about Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act orders. The United States respectfully requests that
+the Court grant this additional extension in order to provide time for further negotiations with
+Microsoft Corporation regarding the substantial issues raised by Microsoft Corporation in
+its motion.
+
+Counsel for the United States conferred with counsel for Microsoft Corporation, who
+indicated that Microsoft Corporation consents to the relief sought in this motion.
+August 12, 2013
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+
+TASHINA GAUHAR
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+Nicholas J. Patterson
+JEFFREY M. SMITH
+NICHOLAS J. PATTERSON
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+Phone: (202) 514-5600
+Fax: (202) 514-8053
+
+Attorneys for the United States of America
+**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**
+
+I hereby certify that a true copy of the Consent Motion for Fifth Extension of Time to
+Respond to Microsoft Corporation's Motion was served via Federal Express and email on this
+12th day of August, 2013,
+
+addressed to:
+James M. Garland
+David N. Fagan
+Alexander A. Berengaut
+Covington & Burling LLP
+1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
+Washington, DC 20004-2401
+
+Nicholas J. Patterson
+Nicholas J. Patterson
+UNITED STATES
+
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE MOTION TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-04
+
+**[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING CONSENT MOTION**
+**FOR FIFTH EXTENSION OF TIME TO RESPOND TO**
+**MICROSOFT CORPORATION'S MOTION**
+
+Having read and considered the United States' Motion for Fifth Extension of Time to
+Respond to Microsoft Corporation's Motion, the Motion for Fifth Extension of Time is hereby
+GRANTED. The United States' time to respond to Microsoft Corporation's Motion is extended
+up to and including August 20, 2013.
+
+SO ORDERED, this ____ day of August, 2013.
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-fifth-extension/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-fifth-extension/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cfed9c0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-fifth-extension/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Consent Motion for Fifth Extension of Time to Respond to Microsoft Corporation's Motion, In re Motion to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-08-12",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-08-12",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34490",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "f0b3ce43155ea7859a9d70d46cd1ec4392fc23f3425bbb86373959340bb8336e",
+ "pages": 4
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-microsoft-corporation-130909/FISC_-_misc-13-04-microsoft-corporation-130909.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-microsoft-corporation-130909/FISC_-_misc-13-04-microsoft-corporation-130909.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f93299e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-microsoft-corporation-130909/FISC_-_misc-13-04-microsoft-corporation-130909.md
@@ -0,0 +1,460 @@
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+2013 SEP -9 PM 4:39
+
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+United States
+Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+Washington, D.C.
+
+In re Motion to Disclose Aggregate Data
+Regarding FISA Orders
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-04
+
+Microsoft Corporation's First Amended Motion for Declaratory Judgment or Other
+Appropriate Relief Authorizing Disclosure of Aggregate Data
+Regarding Any FISA Orders It Has Received
+
+Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and Rule 6(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the United States
+Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”), Microsoft Corporation ("Microsoft") respectfully
+moves this Court for an order, judgment, or such other relief as the Court may deem appropriate
+declaring that Microsoft may lawfully disclose aggregate statistics concerning any orders and/or
+directives that Microsoft may have received under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
+("FISA") and/or FISA Amendments Act ("FAA").¹ Microsoft further respectfully requests that the
+Court hear oral argument on this Motion.²
+
+I. Background
+
+Microsoft, a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Washington with its
+principal place of business in Redmond, Washington, is a provider of electronic communication
+services and remote computing storage services to individual users, enterprises, educational
+institutions and governments worldwide. It is accordingly subject to orders and directives under
+FISA and the FAA seeking data hosted in the United States. See 50 U.S.C. SS 1805(c)(2)(B);
+
+¹ Nothing in this First Amended Motion is intended to confirm or deny that Microsoft has
+received any orders or directives issued pursuant to FISA or the FAA.
+² The parties are today filing a motion for a proposed briefing order separate from this First
+Amended Motion.
+
+1881a(h). As set forth in Microsoft's 2012 Law Enforcement Requests Report ("LERR"), available
+at: http://www.microsoft.com/about/corporatecitizenship/en-us/reporting/transparency/,
+Microsoft receives a variety of lawful, compulsory process from U.S. federal, state, and local law
+enforcement authorities seeking user content and records. The LERR includes information about
+the number, within ranges, of National Security Letters (“NSLs") issued to Microsoft pursuant to 18
+U.S.C. § 2709. Microsoft consulted the FBI before including NSL-related data in the LERR, and the
+FBI agreed that this information could be disclosed (in ranges) consistent with the NSL statute's
+non-disclosure obligations.
+
+Since early June 2013, Microsoft and other electronic communication service providers have
+been the subject of intensive media coverage concerning an alleged U.S. Government surveillance
+program called “PRISM." See The Guardian, *NSA Prism Program Taps In To User Data of Apple, Google
+and Others* (June 6, 2013), available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-
+giants-nsa-data; The Washington Post, *U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data From Nine U.S. Internet
+Companies in Broad Secret Program* (June 6, 2013), available at:
+http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-
+companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-
+d970ccb04497_story.html. The media has erroneously reported that the alleged PRISM program
+enables the U.S. Government to "tap directly into the central servers" of electronic communication
+service providers, including Microsoft, to collect information about their users.
+
+In the months following the initial disclosure of the alleged PRISM program, the media has
+continued to report extensively on U.S. national security-related surveillance programs and the
+supposed role of technology and communications companies, including Microsoft, in such
+programs. See, e.g., The Guardian, *NSA Paid Millions to Cover Prism Compliance Costs for Tech Companies*
+(Aug. 22, 2013), available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/23/nsa-prism-costs-
+
+2
+
+tech-companies-paid; The Washington Post, *NSA Gathered Thousands of Americans' E-mails Before Court
+Ordered It to Revise Its Tactics* (Aug. 21, 2013), available at:
+http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-gathered-thousands-of-americans-e-
+mails-before-court-struck-down-program/2013/08/21/146ba4b6-0a90-11e3-b87c-
+476db8ac34cd_story.html; The Guardian, *XKeyscore: NSA Tool Collects Nearly Everything a User Does on
+the Internet'* (July 31, 2013), available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-
+secret-program-online-data.
+
+Microsoft has sought—and continues to seek—to correct the misimpression, furthered by
+inaccurate media reporting, that it provides the United States Government with direct access to its
+servers and network infrastructure and, thereby, indiscriminately discloses Microsoft users'
+information to the Government. As it had done in connection with its earlier disclosure of NSL-
+related statistics in the LERR, following the initial disclosures about the alleged PRISM program,
+Microsoft entered into discussions with the FBI concerning what information it could disclose
+relating to FISA orders and/or FAA directives that may have been served on Microsoft, if any. The
+FBI partially approved Microsoft's request to disclose information relating to FISA orders and/or
+FAA directives, subject to defined parameters. Specifically, the FBI informed Microsoft that it
+would not
+seek enforcement of the non-disclosure provisions associated with any legal
+process, including FISA orders, so long as Microsoft agrees to aggregate data for all
+of the legal process it received in intervals of six months, beginning with the period
+ending December 31, 2012, from any and all government entities in the United
+States (including local, state, and federal, and including criminal and national security-
+related requests) into bands of 1000, starting at zero, and broken down into two
+categories: the number of requests and the number of user accounts for which data
+was requested.
+(Letter from Andrew Weissmann, General Counsel, FBI, to John Frank, Vice President & Deputy
+General Counsel, Microsoft Corporation, June 14, 2013 (footnote omitted) (attached hereto as
+Exhibit A).)
+
+3
+
+Accordingly, on June 14, 2013, John Frank, Vice President & Deputy General Counsel for
+Microsoft, published the following statement on Microsoft's blog:
+This afternoon we are publishing additional information about the volume of law
+enforcement and national security orders served on Microsoft. For the first time, we
+are permitted to include the total volume of national security orders, which may
+include FISA orders, in this reporting. We are still not permitted to confirm whether
+we have received any FISA orders, but if we were to have received any they would
+now be included in our aggregate volumes.
+
+Earlier this week, along with others in the industry, we called for greater transparency
+about the volume and scope of the national security orders, including FISA orders,
+which require the disclosure of some customer content. We believe this would help
+the community understand and debate these important issues. Since then, we have
+worked with the FBI and U.S. Department of Justice to try and secure permission to
+do this.
+
+This afternoon, the FBI and DOJ have given us permission to publish some
+additional data, and we are publishing it straight away. However, we continue to
+believe that what we are permitted to publish continues to fall short of what is
+needed to help the community understand and debate these issues.
+
+Here is what the data shows: For the six months ended December 31,2012,
+Microsoft received between 6,000 and 7,000 criminal and national security warrants,
+subpoenas and orders affecting between 31,000 and 32,000 consumer accounts from
+U.S. governmental entities (including local, state and federal). This only impacts a
+tiny fraction of Microsoft's global customer base.
+
+We are permitted to publish data on national security orders received (including, if
+any, FISA Orders and FISA Directives), but only if aggregated with law enforcement
+requests from all other U.S. local, state and federal law enforcement agencies; only
+for the six-month period of July 1, 2012 thru December 31, 2012; only if the totals
+are presented in bands of 1,000; and all Microsoft consumer services had to be
+reported together. [...]
+Available at: http://blogs.technet.com/b/microsoft_on_the_issues/archive/2013/06/14/
+microsoft-s-u-s-law-enforcement-and-national-security-requests-for-last-half-of-2012.aspx.
+
+To promote additional transparency concerning the Government's lawful access to
+Microsoft's customer data, Microsoft sought permission to report more specific aggregate
+information about FISA orders and FAA directives, separate and apart from all other local, state,
+and federal law enforcement demands. The FBI and the Department of Justice denied Microsoft's
+
+4
+
+request. Accordingly, on June 19, 2013, Microsoft filed in this Court a Motion for Declaratory
+Judgment or Other Appropriate Relief seeking a judicial declaration authorizing the publication of
+the total number of orders and/or directives (if any) received under FISA and/or the FAA, as well
+as the total number of accounts affected by any such orders and/or directives.
+
+Thereafter, the Court established a briefing schedule (see Order of June 20, 2013) and
+subsequently extended the Government's deadline to respond to Microsoft's motion six times so
+that the parties could engage in settlement discussions. (See Orders of July 3, 2013; July 23, 2013;
+August 1, 2013; August 7, 2013; August 13, 2013; and August 19, 2013.) Those discussions were
+unsuccessful. Microsoft now files this First Amended Motion and respectfully requests that the
+Court issue an order declaring that Microsoft may disclose, for each provision of FISA and/or the
+FAA pursuant to which Microsoft may receive process,³ the following aggregate figures: (1) the
+number of orders and/or directives (if any) received that require the production of only non-content
+data, and the number of accounts affected by any such orders and/or directives; and (2) the total
+number of orders and/or directives (if any) received that require the production of content and non-
+content data, and the number of accounts affected by any such orders and/or directives (together,
+the "Aggregate Data").
+
+Microsoft respectfully submits that there is no statutory basis under FISA or the FAA for
+precluding Microsoft from disclosing the Aggregate Data. Further, to the extent FISA, the FAA, or
+any other law or rule could be construed to bar such disclosure, such a construction would
+constitute a content-based restriction on speech and thus would impose a heavy burden on the
+Government to demonstrate that the restraint satisfies strict scrutiny—i.e., that it is narrowly tailored
+
+³ These authorities could include electronic surveillance orders, see 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1812;
+physical search orders, see 50 U.S.C. §§ 1821-1829; pen register and trap and trace orders, see 50
+U.S.C. SS 1841-1846; business records orders, see 50 U.S.C. SS 1861-1862; and orders and directives
+targeting certain persons outside the United States, see 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881-1881g.
+
+5
+
+to serve a compelling state interest. While the preservation of national security is undoubtedly a
+compelling interest, the Government has not demonstrated—and on the facts of this case, cannot
+establish—that restraining Microsoft from disclosing the Aggregate Data is narrowly tailored to
+serve that compelling interest. Without such a showing, a restraint on Microsoft's disclosure of the
+Aggregate Data violates the First Amendment.
+
+II. FISA and the FAA Do Not Prohibit Microsoft From Disclosing the Aggregate Data.
+
+FISA and the FAA do not prohibit providers from disclosing aggregated information about
+the number of FISA orders and/or FAA directives they receive. To the extent FISA or the FAA
+imposes on providers an obligation of secrecy with respect to individual FISA orders or FAA
+directives—and, in turn, to the extent such an obligation is incorporated into the language of any
+particular order or directive—the clear purpose of such an obligation is to prevent the specific
+targets of such orders or directives from becoming aware of the required search or surveillance. See
+50 U.S.C. § 1805(c) (2) (B) (providers can be ordered to "furnish the applicant forthwith all
+information, facilities, or technical assistance necessary to accomplish the electronic surveillance in
+such a manner as will protect its secrecy and produce a minimum of interference with the services
+that such carrier... is providing that target of electronic surveillance."); see also 50 U.S.C. §
+1824(c)(2)(B) (imposing the same obligation in the context of a FISA physical search order); 50
+U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(1)(A) (same with respect to a directive issued under Section 702 of the FAA).⁴ As
+the statutory language makes clear, FISA's non-disclosure obligations are target-specific. The statute
+does not purport to impose on providers the obligation to remain silent about the fact that they
+
+⁴ The provisions of FISA and the FAA that require providers to maintain "records concerning
+the surveillance" under "security procedures approved by the Attorney General and Director of
+National Intelligence" have the same purpose—protecting the secrecy of particular FISA orders and
+FAA directives—and do not bar Microsoft from disclosing the Aggregate Data. 50 U.S.C. §
+1805(c)(2)(C); see also 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(1)(B).
+
+6
+
+receive FISA orders generally, nor does it purport to limit providers' ability to disclose the aggregate
+number of any such orders they may receive and the accounts that are affected.
+
+Disclosure of the Aggregate Data would not plausibly jeopardize the secrecy of any
+particular FISA order or FAA directive that Microsoft may have received. Microsoft is a large
+provider of electronic communication services with millions of customers. Given the size of
+Microsoft's user base, and the tiny fraction of user accounts that are affected by any type of
+compulsory legal process served on Microsoft (whether issued pursuant to traditional law
+enforcement or national security authorities), the Government cannot reasonably contend that
+disclosure of the Aggregate Data could lead any particular individual user to infer that he or she had
+been targeted.
+
+III. To the Extent FISA or the FAA Bars Microsoft's Disclosure of the Aggregate Data,
+Such a Restraint on Speech Violates the First Amendment.
+
+As set forth above, FISA and the FAA do not prohibit providers such as Microsoft from
+disclosing the Aggregate Data. If, however, FISA, the FAA, or any other statute or rule were
+construed to prohibit such a disclosure, such a restraint would be unconstitutional as applied to
+Microsoft. See *Boddie v. Connecticut*, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971) ("Our cases further establish that a
+statute or a rule may be held constitutionally invalid as applied when it operates to deprive an
+individual of a protected right although its general validity as a measure enacted in the legitimate
+exercise of state power is beyond question.").
+
+Any law prohibiting Microsoft from disclosing the Aggregate Data would be a content-based
+restriction on speech—i.e., a rule forbidding speech about the fact that Microsoft has received
+process under FISA or the FAA—and thus subject to strict scrutiny. See *Doe v. Mukasey*, 549 F.3d
+861, 878 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting, in the context of an analogous challenge to the non-disclosure
+provisions of the NSL statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2709, that “the Government has conceded that strict
+scrutiny is the applicable standard"). "Under strict scrutiny review, the Government must
+
+7
+
+demonstrate that the nondisclosure requirement is 'narrowly tailored to promote a compelling
+Government interest.'” Id. (quoting *United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc.*, 529 U.S. 803, 813
+(2000)).
+
+The Government has not, and cannot, establish that a prohibition against the disclosure of
+the Aggregate Data is "narrowly tailored" to promote the admittedly compelling Government
+interests in enforcing FISA orders and FAA directives, for three reasons.
+
+First, as noted above, a bar to disclosing the Aggregate Data is not narrowly tailored because
+it does not promote the Government's interest in maintaining the secrecy of national security
+investigations or foreign intelligence collection. As one court explained when analyzing the non-
+disclosure provision of the NSL statute, "[i]t is not hard to surmise situations where recipients would
+appropriately be precluded from disclosing their receipt of an NSL. For example, if a[] [provider]
+has only a handful of subscribers, disclosure could compromise a national security investigation." *In
+re Nat'l Sec. Letter*, --- F. Supp. 2d. ---, 2013 WL 1095417, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2013).
+Microsoft, however, offers electronic communications services to many millions of users, none of
+whom could plausibly infer from the disclosure of the Aggregate Data that he or she has been
+targeted by a FISA order or FAA directive. That the First Amendment might permit a different
+result for a small provider with few customers does not justify the blanket imposition of a non-
+disclosure rule on Microsoft. See *Members of City Council of City of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent*, 466
+U.S. 789, 803 n.22 (1984) ("The fact that the ordinance is capable of valid applications does not
+necessarily mean that it is valid as applied to these litigants."); *United States v. Nat'l Treasury Emps.
+Union*, 513 U.S. 454, 478 (1995) ("In this case, granting full relief [under the First Amendment] to
+respondents—who include all Executive Branch employees below grade GS-16—does not require
+passing on the applicability of [the challenged honoraria ban] to Executive Branch employees above
+grade GS-15....").
+
+8
+
+Second, a prohibition against disclosure of the Aggregate Data is not narrowly tailored
+because the Government already discloses detailed aggregate data regarding surveillance activities
+undertaken pursuant to FISA. Under 50 U.S.C. § 1807, for example, the Attorney General is
+directed to transmit to Congress "a report setting forth with respect to the preceding calendar
+year... [1] the total number of applications made for orders and extensions of orders approving
+electronic surveillance under this subchapter; and [2] the total number of such orders and extensions
+either granted, modified, or denied." These reports are released to the public. See Letter to Majority
+Leader Harry Reid, United States Senate from Peter J. Kadzik, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
+General (Apr. 30, 2013), available at: http://www.justice.gov/nsd/foia/foia_library/2012fisa-ltr.pdf
+(noting, for example, that during calendar year 2012, (1) the Government made 1,856 applications to
+the FISC for authority to conduct electronic surveillance and/or physical searches for foreign
+intelligence purposes; and (2) the FISC did not deny any applications in whole or in part.)
+
+The Government also has recently undertaken to release voluntarily even more detailed
+aggregate data about its use of FISA and the FAA. On August 29, 2013, the Director of National
+Intelligence ("DNI”) announced that the Intelligence Community (“IC") would release annually the
+total number of orders issued during the prior year and the number of targets affected by those
+orders for each of the following categories of national security authorities: (i) FISA orders based on
+probable cause (Titles I and III of FISA, and sections 703 and 704); (ii) Section 702 of FISA; (iii)
+FISA Business Records (Title V of FISA); (iv) FISA Pen Register/Trap and Trace (Title IV of
+FISA); and (v) NSLs. See Office of the DNI, *DNI Clapper Directs Annual Release of Information Related
+to Orders Issued Under National Security Authorities, IC on the Record* (Aug. 29, 2013), available at
+http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/59719173750/dni-clapper-directs-annual-release-of-
+information. The fact that the Government already releases aggregate data about the number of
+FISA orders issued annually—and plans to release even more detailed aggregate information in
+
+9
+
+voluntary annual reports—refutes any notion that a prohibition on Microsoft's disclosure of its
+Aggregate Data is necessary to protect the secrecy of national security investigations or foreign
+intelligence collection. To the contrary, the Government's own speech on these issues supports
+Microsoft's claim that it should be permitted to disclose the fact that it has or has not received
+national security-related orders under specific statutory authorities, and how often.
+
+Third, a rule barring Microsoft from disclosing the Aggregate Data fails strict scrutiny
+because of the significant public debate and interest over the use of FISA and the FAA to collect
+information from electronic communication services providers. The fact that the Government uses
+FISA and the FAA to collect information from electronic communication service providers is
+already a matter of public record as a result of statements made by the President, the DNI, and
+other high-ranking Government officials, as well as from documents that the Government recently
+has declassified. See, e.g., Office of the DNI, *DNI Statement on Activities Authorized Under Section 702 of
+FISA* (June 6, 2013), available at: http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/191-
+press-releases-2013/869-dni-statement-on-activities-authorized-under-section-702-of-fisa ("The
+Guardian and The Washington Post articles refer to collection of communications pursuant to Section
+702 of [FISA] ... Information collected under this program is among the most important and
+valuable foreign intelligence information we collect, and is used to protect our nation from a wide
+variety of threats."); U.S. Dep't of Justice & Office of the DNI, *The Intelligence Community's Collection
+Programs Under Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act*, at 3 (marked "Top Secret" and
+transmitted to Congress on May 4, 2012; declassified on August 21, 2013), available at:
+http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Ltr%20to%20HPSCI%20Chairman%20Rogers%20and%20
+Ranking%20Member%20Ruppersberger_Scan.pdf ("Once a target has been approved, NSA uses
+two means to acquire [REDACTED] electronic communications. First, [REDACTED], it acquires such
+communications directly from U.S.-based ISPs. This is known as PRISM collection.... Second, in
+
+10
+
+addition to collection directly from ISPs, NSA collects telephone and electronic communications as
+they transit the Internet 'backbone' within the United States. This is known as 'upstream'
+collection.").
+
+In light of these statements, and the extensive public reporting on this subject, a prohibition
+against Microsoft's disclosure of the Aggregate Data cannot be narrowly tailored to promote the
+Government's national security interests. As amici point out, disclosure of the Aggregate Data
+constitutes truthful speech about Microsoft's actions taken under government compulsion, a subject
+at the core of what the First Amendment is intended to protect. See Br. of First Amendment
+Coalition et al., at 6-8 & n.5 (citing *Mills v. Alabama*, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1971) (“Whatever differences
+may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that
+a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs."),
+and *Bartnicki v. Vopper*, 532 U.S. 514, 533-34 (2001) (“The enforcement of [the challenged measure]
+in these cases ... implicates the core purposes of the First Amendment because it imposes sanctions
+on the publication of truthful information of public concern.")). Particularly where, as here, the
+Government itself has decided to engage actively in an ongoing public debate on an issue of great
+importance to Microsoft's customers, shareholders, and the public, the First Amendment does not
+permit the Government to bar Microsoft from speaking about the very same subject.
+
+* * *
+
+For the foregoing reasons, Microsoft respectfully requests that the Court issue an order
+declaring that Microsoft may disclose the Aggregate Data.
+
+Pursuant to Rule 7(i) of the FISC Rules of Procedure, Microsoft states that the following
+responsible employee of Microsoft holds a security clearance: John Frank, Vice President and
+Deputy General Counsel (DOD-Top Secret). This clearance was granted for the purpose of
+facilitating Microsoft's interaction with the Government concerning classified matters. Microsoft
+
+11
+
+further states that its undersigned counsel have security clearances as follows: James M. Garland
+(FBI-Top Secret), David N. Fagan (FBI-Top Secret), and Alexander A. Berengaut (FBI-Top Secret).
+These clearances were granted so as to permit counsel to advise their clients concerning any
+classified legal process they might receive.
+
+Dated: September 9, 2013
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+MICROSOFT CORPORATION
+James M. Garland, D.C. Bar # 475509
+David N. Fagan, D.C. Bar # 474518
+Alexander A. Berengaut, D.C. Bar # 989222
+COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
+1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
+Washington, DC 20004-2401
+Tel: (202) 662-5337
+Fax: (202) 778-5337
+
+12
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I hereby certify that at or before the time of filing this submission, the Government (care of
+the Security and Emergency Planning Staff, United States Department of Justice) has been served
+with a copy of this motion pursuant to Rule 8(a) of the FISC Rules of Procedure.
+
+Dated: September 9, 2013
+
+James M. Garland, D.C. Bar # 475509
+David N. Fagan, D.C. Bar # 474518
+Alexander A. Berengaut, D.C. Bar # 989222
+COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
+1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
+Washington, DC 20004-2401
+Tel: (202) 662-5337
+Fax: (202) 778-5337
+
+EXHIBIT A
+
+U.S. Department of Justice
+
+Federal Bureau of Investigation
+
+Office of the General Counsel
+Washington, D.C. 20535
+
+June 14, 2013
+
+Mr. John Frank
+Vice President/Deputy General Counsel
+Office of the General Counsel
+Microsoft Corporation
+1 Microsoft Way
+Redmond, WA 98052
+
+Re: Microsoft's Pending Transparency Report
+
+Dear Mr. Frank:
+
+We appreciate your discussions with us about your proposal to disclose certain
+information about the volume of legal process Microsoft receives.
+
+As we discussed during our phone call on June 14, 2013, we do not intend to seek
+enforcement¹ of the non-disclosure provisions associated with any legal process, including FISA
+orders, so long as Microsoft agrees to aggregate data for all of the legal process it received in
+intervals of six months, beginning with the period ending December 31, 2012, from any and all
+government entities in the United States (including local, state, and federal, and including
+criminal and national security-related requests) into bands of 1000, starting at zero, and broken
+down into two categories: the number of requests and the number of user accounts for which
+data was requested.
+
+This position is an exercise of FBI discretion in light of current circumstances and the
+precise contours of this letter. Accordingly, our decision does not reflect the FBI's position with
+respect to potential disclosures by Microsoft that differ in any respect from the disclosures
+outlined in this letter. Nor is our decision a precedent for disclosures by any other company that
+is in receipt of such process, even if the disclosures were made in the manner that is proposed in
+this letter. The national security implications of disclosures related to the receipt of such process
+may vary depending on the identity of the company that is making the disclosure and the overall
+number of disclosures by different companies. For this reason, if other companies also seek to
+disclose information about the volume of such process that they receive, that may alter our
+
+¹ The FBI does not have the authority to negate a court order, nor can we bind state or local authorities.
+
+calculus about the implications of disclosures by Microsoft. In addition, our current
+determination is based on our prediction about the potential national security consequences of
+the disclosures and as such we may in the future revise our position as circumstances change or
+as we evaluate the actual impact of your disclosures on national security.
+
+This letter further commits Microsoft to coordinate with us before making any additional
+public disclosures about the volume of legal process you receive, beyond the contours outlined in
+this letter. If we revise our position, we will notify you. We would retain the right to bring an
+appropriate enforcement action with respect to any future disclosures you make after you receive
+a notification of our change in position.
+
+Thank you again for coordinating your proposal with us. We appreciate your efforts to
+reach an agreement that promotes transparency without jeopardizing our national security
+responsibilities to the public.
+
+Sincerely,
+
+Andrew Weissmann
+General Counsel
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-microsoft-corporation-130909/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-microsoft-corporation-130909/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fb18fd4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-microsoft-corporation-130909/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+{
+ "title": "Microsoft Corporation's First Amended Motion for Declaratory Judgment or Other Appropriate Relief Authorizing Disclosure of Aggregate Data Regarding Any FISA Orders It Has Received, In re Motion to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-09-09",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [
+ "PRISM",
+ "XKEYSCORE"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-09-09",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34492",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "4fa63666ce64439720eb875e53f0c0684698cd7cd4b4240f896900c3c004cc4a",
+ "pages": 16
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-motion-130702/FISC_-_misc-13-04-motion-130702.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-motion-130702/FISC_-_misc-13-04-motion-130702.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..753cdfc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-motion-130702/FISC_-_misc-13-04-motion-130702.md
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+2013 JUL -2 PM 4:07
+
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE MOTION TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-04
+
+CONSENT MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME
+TO RESPOND TO MICROSOFT CORPORATION'S MOTION
+
+Pursuant to U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Rule of Procedure 6(d) and
+Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b), the United States respectfully requests that the deadline for
+responding to Microsoft Corporation's Motion in this matter be extended by fourteen days from
+July 9, 2013, up to and including July 23, 2013. This is the first request for an extension of this
+deadline.
+
+This matter concerns Microsoft Corporation's request to disclose aggregate information
+about Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act orders. The United States respectfully requests that
+the Court grant this brief extension in order to further evaluate the substantial issues raised by
+Microsoft Corporation in its motion.
+
+Counsel for the United States conferred with counsel for Microsoft Corporation, who
+indicated that Microsoft Corporation consents to the relief sought in this motion.
+
+July 2, 2013
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+
+TASHINA GAUHAR
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+Nicholas J. Patterson
+
+JEFFREY M. SMITH
+NICHOLAS J. PATTERSON
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+Phone: (202) 514-5600
+Fax: (202) 514-8053
+
+Attorneys for the United States of America
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I hereby certify that a true copy of the Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to
+Microsoft Corporation's Motion was served via Federal Express and email on this 2d day of
+July, 2013,
+
+addressed to:
+
+James M. Garland
+David N. Fagan
+Alexander A. Berengaut
+Covington & Burling LLP
+1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
+Washington, DC 20004-2401
+
+Nicholas J. Patterson
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE MOTION TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-04
+
+[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING CONSENT MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF
+TIME TO RESPOND TO MICROSOFT CORPORATION'S MOTION
+
+Having read and considered the United States' Motion for Extension of Time to Respond
+to Microsoft Corporation's Motion, the Motion for Extension of Time is hereby GRANTED.
+The United States' time to respond to Microsoft Corporation's Motion is extended up to and
+including July 23, 2013.
+
+SO ORDERED, this _____ day of July, 2013.
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-motion-130702/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-motion-130702/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aab3e55
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-motion-130702/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Consent Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Microsoft Corporation's Motion, In re Motion to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-07-02",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-07-02",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34486",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "f788bee3707f33d1c6cbe5807a7bcb3b81101db1b8cb2ad441f83e9c393845f1",
+ "pages": 4
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-motion-130729/FISC_-_misc-13-04-motion-130729.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-motion-130729/FISC_-_misc-13-04-motion-130729.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7fb6997
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-motion-130729/FISC_-_misc-13-04-motion-130729.md
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+2013 JUL 29 PM 4:48
+
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE MOTION TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-04
+
+CONSENT MOTION FOR THIRD EXTENSION OF TIME
+TO RESPOND TO MICROSOFT CORPORATION'S MOTION
+
+Pursuant to U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Rule of Procedure 6(d) and
+Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b), the United States respectfully requests that the deadline for
+responding to Microsoft Corporation's Motion in this matter be extended by seven days from
+July 30, 2013, up to and including August 6, 2013. This is the third request for an extension of
+this deadline.
+
+This matter concerns Microsoft Corporation's request to disclose aggregate information
+about Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act orders. The United States respectfully requests that
+the Court grant this brief extension in order to provide time for further negotiations with
+Microsoft Corporation regarding the substantial issues raised by Microsoft Corporation in
+its motion.
+
+Counsel for the United States conferred with counsel for Microsoft Corporation, who
+indicated that Microsoft Corporation consents to the relief sought in this motion.
+
+July 29, 2013
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+
+TASHINA GAUHAR
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+Nichdas J. Patterson
+JEFFREY M. SMITH
+NICHOLAS J. PATTERSON
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+Phone: (202) 514-5600
+Fax: (202) 514-8053
+
+Attorneys for the United States of America
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I hereby certify that a true copy of the Consent Motion for Third Extension of Time to
+Respond to Microsoft Corporation's Motion was served via Federal Express and email on this
+29th day of July, 2013,
+
+addressed to:
+James M. Garland
+David N. Fagan
+Alexander A. Berengaut
+Covington & Burling LLP
+1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
+Washington, DC 20004-2401
+
+Nichds J. Patterson
+Nicholas J. Patterson
+
+UNITED STATES
+
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE MOTION TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-04
+
+[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING CONSENT MOTION
+FOR THIRD EXTENSION OF TIME TO RESPOND TO
+MICROSOFT CORPORATION'S MOTION
+
+Having read and considered the United States' Motion for Third Extension of Time to
+Respond to Microsoft Corporation's Motion, the Motion for Third Extension of Time is hereby
+GRANTED. The United States' time to respond to Microsoft Corporation's Motion is extended
+up to and including August 6, 2013.
+
+SO ORDERED, this
+day of July, 2013.
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-motion-130729/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-motion-130729/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..db1276e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-motion-130729/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Consent Motion for Third Extension of Time to Respond to Microsoft Corporation's Motion, In re Motion to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-07-29",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-07-29",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34488",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "7bc361dc7bf566cfa09419cf1941157eedafe9bef43304b5b2e138223bc0bb74",
+ "pages": 4
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-motion-130807/FISC_-_misc-13-04-motion-130807.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-motion-130807/FISC_-_misc-13-04-motion-130807.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..314ea11
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-motion-130807/FISC_-_misc-13-04-motion-130807.md
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+UNITED STATES
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+2013 AUG -6 PM 1:21
+LEE ANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE MOTION TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-04
+
+**CONSENT MOTION FOR FOURTH EXTENSION OF TIME**
+**TO RESPOND TO MICROSOFT CORPORATION'S MOTION**
+
+Pursuant to U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Rule of Procedure 6(d) and
+Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b), the United States respectfully requests that the deadline for
+responding to Microsoft Corporation's Motion in this matter be extended by seven days from
+August 6, 2013, up to and including August 13, 2013. This is the fourth request for an extension
+of this deadline.
+
+This matter concerns Microsoft Corporation's request to disclose aggregate information
+about Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act orders. The United States respectfully requests that
+the Court grant this brief extension in order to provide time for further negotiations with
+Microsoft Corporation regarding the substantial issues raised by Microsoft Corporation in
+its motion.
+
+Counsel for the United States conferred with counsel for Microsoft Corporation, who
+indicated that Microsoft Corporation consents to the relief sought in this motion.
+August 6, 2013
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+
+TASHINA GAUHAR
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+_________________________
+Nicholas J. Patterson
+JEFFREY M. SMITH
+NICHOLAS J. PATTERSON
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+Phone: (202) 514-5600
+Fax: (202) 514-8053
+
+Attorneys for the United States of America
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I hereby certify that a true copy of the Consent Motion for Fourth Extension of Time to
+Respond to Microsoft Corporation's Motion was served via Federal Express and email on this
+6th day of August, 2013,
+
+addressed to:
+James M. Garland
+David N. Fagan
+Alexander A. Berengaut
+Covington & Burling LLP
+1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
+Washington, DC 20004-2401
+
+_________________________
+Nicholas J. Patterson
+Nicholas J. Patterson
+
+UNITED STATES
+
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE MOTION TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-04
+
+**[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING CONSENT MOTION**
+**FOR FOURTH EXTENSION OF TIME TO RESPOND TO**
+**MICROSOFT CORPORATION'S MOTION**
+
+Having read and considered the United States' Motion for Fourth Extension of Time to
+Respond to Microsoft Corporation's Motion, the Motion for Fourth Extension of Time is hereby
+GRANTED. The United States' time to respond to Microsoft Corporation's Motion is extended
+up to and including August 13, 2013.
+
+SO ORDERED, this _____ day of August, 2013.
+
+_________________________
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-motion-130807/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-motion-130807/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..866b2c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-motion-130807/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Consent Motion for Fourth Extension of Time to Respond to Microsoft Corporation's Motion, In re Motion to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-08-06",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-08-06",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34489",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "57d96f11be0adc28902802933e18db2cafc5913ab15999a67b3557862b5b744b",
+ "pages": 4
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-motion-130820/FISC_-_misc-13-04-motion-130820.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-motion-130820/FISC_-_misc-13-04-motion-130820.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d16789d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-motion-130820/FISC_-_misc-13-04-motion-130820.md
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+UNITED STATES
+
+2013 AUG 19 PM 3:29
+
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE MOTION TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-04
+
+**CONSENT MOTION FOR SIXTH EXTENSION OF TIME**
+**TO RESPOND TO MICROSOFT CORPORATION'S MOTION**
+
+Pursuant to U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Rule of Procedure 6(d) and
+Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b), the United States respectfully requests that the deadline for
+responding to Microsoft Corporation's Motion in this matter be extended by ten days from
+August 20, 2013, up to and including August 30, 2013. This is the sixth request for an extension
+of this deadline.
+
+This matter concerns Microsoft Corporation's request to disclose aggregate information
+about Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act orders. The United States respectfully requests that
+the Court grant this additional extension in order to provide time for further negotiations with
+Microsoft Corporation regarding the substantial issues raised by Microsoft Corporation in
+its motion.
+
+Counsel for the United States conferred with counsel for Microsoft Corporation, who
+indicated that Microsoft Corporation consents to the relief sought in this motion.
+
+August 19, 2013
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+
+TASHINA GAUHAR
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+Nichdas J. Patterson
+JEFFREY M. SMITH
+NICHOLAS J. PATTERSON
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+Phone: (202) 514-5600
+Fax: (202) 514-8053
+
+Attorneys for the United States of America
+
+**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**
+
+I hereby certify that a true copy of the Consent Motion for Sixth Extension of Time to
+Respond to Microsoft Corporation's Motion was served via Federal Express and email on this
+19th day of August, 2013,
+
+addressed to:
+
+James M. Garland
+David N. Fagan
+Alexander A. Berengaut
+Covington & Burling LLP
+1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
+Washington, DC 20004-2401
+
+Nicholas J. Patterson
+Nicholas J. Patterson
+
+UNITED STATES
+
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE MOTION TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE )
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+)
+Docket No. Misc. 13-04
+
+**[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING CONSENT MOTION**
+**FOR SIXTH EXTENSION OF TIME TO RESPOND TO**
+**MICROSOFT CORPORATION'S MOTION**
+
+Having read and considered the United States' Motion for Sixth Extension of Time to
+Respond to Microsoft Corporation's Motion, the Motion for Sixth Extension of Time is hereby
+GRANTED. The United States' time to respond to Microsoft Corporation's Motion is extended
+up to and including August 30, 2013.
+
+SO ORDERED, this _____ day of August, 2013.
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-motion-130820/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-motion-130820/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..08d75d8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-motion-130820/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Consent Motion for Sixth Extension of Time to Respond to Microsoft Corporation's Motion, In re Motion to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-08-19",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-08-19",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34491",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "07dc092fe5a9dd41182670334cb341a6e4c29a6b502f8720db43f27d67dcba16",
+ "pages": 4
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-motion/FISC_-_misc-13-04-motion.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-motion/FISC_-_misc-13-04-motion.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a0f2b0a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-motion/FISC_-_misc-13-04-motion.md
@@ -0,0 +1,269 @@
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+2013 JUN 19 PM 2:09
+
+Case No. MISC. 13-08
+
+In re Motion to Disclose Aggregate Data
+Regarding FISA Orders
+
+Microsoft Corporation's Motion for Declaratory Judgment or Other Appropriate Relief
+Authorizing Disclosure of Aggregate Data Regarding Any FISA Orders It Has Received
+
+Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and Rule 6(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the United States
+Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC"), Microsoft Corporation ("Microsoft") respectfully
+moves this Court for an order, judgment, or such other relief as the Court may deem appropriate
+declaring that Microsoft may lawfully disclose aggregate statistics concerning any orders and/or
+directives that Microsoft may have received under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
+("FISA") and/or FISA Amendments Act ("FAA").¹
+
+I. Background
+
+Microsoft, a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Washington with its
+principal place of business in Redmond, Washington, is a provider of electronic communication
+services and remote computing storage services to individual users, enterprises, educational
+institutions and governments worldwide. It is accordingly subject to orders and directives under
+FISA and the FAA seeking data hosted in the United States. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1805(c)(2)(B);
+1881a(h). As set forth in Microsoft's 2012 Law Enforcement Requests Report (“LERR”), available
+at: http://www.microsoft.com/about/corporatecitizenship/en-us/reporting/transparency/,
+
+___
+¹ Nothing in this Motion is intended to confirm or deny that Microsoft has received any
+orders or directives issued pursuant to FISA or the FAA.
+
+Microsoft receives a variety of lawful, compulsory process from U.S. federal, state, and local law
+enforcement authorities seeking user content and records. The LERR includes information about
+the number, within ranges, of National Security Letters ("NSLs") issued to Microsoft pursuant to 18
+U.S.C. § 2709. Microsoft consulted the FBI before including NSL-related data in the LERR, and the
+FBI agreed that this information could be disclosed (in ranges) consistent with the NSL statute's
+non-disclosure obligations.
+
+In recent weeks, Microsoft and other electronic communication service providers have been
+the subject of intensive media coverage concerning an alleged U.S. Government surveillance
+program called "PRISM." See The Guardian, *NSA Prism Program Taps In To User Data of Apple, Google
+and Others* (June 6, 2013), available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-
+giants-nsa-data; The Washington Post, *U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data From Nine U.S. Internet
+Companies in Broad Secret Program* (June 6, 2013), available at.
+http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-
+companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-
+d970ccb04497_story.html. The media has erroneously reported that the alleged PRISM program
+enables the U.S. Government to "tap[] directly into the central servers" of Microsoft and other
+electronic communication service providers to collect information about their users.
+
+Microsoft has sought—and continues to seek—to correct the misimpression, furthered by
+such inaccurate media reporting, that it provides the United States Government with direct access to
+its servers and network infrastructure and, thereby, indiscriminately discloses Microsoft users'
+information to the Government. As it had done in connection with its earlier disclosure of NSL-
+related statistics in the LERR, Microsoft entered into discussions with the FBI concerning what
+information it could disclose relating to FISA orders and/or FAA directives that may have been
+served on Microsoft, if any. The FBI approved Microsoft's request subject to specific parameters
+
+2
+
+under which Microsoft could make a public disclosure. Accordingly, on June 14, 2013, John Frank,
+Vice President & Deputy General Counsel for Microsoft, published the following statement on
+Microsoft's blog:
+
+> This afternoon we are publishing additional information about the volume of law
+> enforcement and national security orders served on Microsoft. For the first time, we
+> are permitted to include the total volume of national security orders, which may
+> include FISA orders, in this reporting. We are still not permitted to confirm whether
+> we have received any FISA orders, but if we were to have received any they would
+> now be included in our aggregate volumes.
+>
+> Earlier this week, along with others in the industry, we called for greater transparency
+> about the volume and scope of the national security orders, including FISA orders,
+> which require the disclosure of some customer content. We believe this would help
+> the community understand and debate these important issues. Since then, we have
+> worked with the FBI and U.S. Department of Justice to try and secure permission to
+> do this.
+>
+> This afternoon, the FBI and DOJ have given us permission to publish some
+> additional data, and we are publishing it straight away. However, we continue to
+> believe that what we are permitted to publish continues to fall short of what is
+> needed to help the community understand and debate these issues.
+>
+> Here is what the data shows: For the six months ended December 31, 2012,
+> Microsoft received between 6,000 and 7,000 criminal and national security warrants,
+> subpoenas and orders affecting between 31,000 and 32,000 consumer accounts from
+> U.S. governmental entities (including local, state and federal). This only impacts a
+> tiny fraction of Microsoft's global customer base.
+>
+> We are permitted to publish data on national security orders received (including, if
+> any, FISA Orders and FISA Directives), but only if aggregated with law enforcement
+> requests from all other U.S. local, state and federal law enforcement agencies; only
+> for the six-month period of July 1, 2012 thru December 31, 2012; only if the totals
+> are presented in bands of 1,000; and all Microsoft consumer services had to be
+> reported together. [...]
+
+Available at: http://blogs.technet.com/b/microsoft_on_the_issues/archive/2013/06/14/
+microsoft-s-u-s-law-enforcement-and-national-security-requests-for-last-half-of-2012.aspx.
+
+To promote additional transparency concerning the Government's lawful access to
+Microsoft's customer data, Microsoft seeks to report aggregate information about FISA orders and
+FAA directives separately from all other local, state, and federal law enforcement demands. Despite
+
+3
+
+further efforts, however, Microsoft has not received permission from the FBI and the Department
+of Justice to disclose additional aggregate figures relating to any orders and/or directives it may have
+received under FISA or the FAA, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1881g. Specifically, the Government has
+denied Microsoft's request to disclose the following two aggregate figures: (1) the total number of
+orders and/or directives (if any) received under FISA and/or the FAA; and (2) the total number of
+accounts affected by any such orders and/or directives (together, the "Aggregate Data").
+
+As set forth below in greater detail, Microsoft respectfully submits that there is no statutory
+basis under FISA or the FAA for precluding Microsoft from disclosing the Aggregate Data.
+Further, to the extent FISA or the FAA could be construed to bar such disclosure, such a
+construction would constitute a content-based restriction on speech that fails to satisfy strict
+scrutiny, in violation of the First Amendment.
+
+II. FISA and the FAA Do Not Prohibit Microsoft From Disclosing the Aggregate Data.
+
+FISA and the FAA do not prohibit providers from disclosing aggregated information about
+the number of FISA orders and/or FAA directives they receive. To the extent FISA or the FAA
+imposes on providers an obligation of secrecy with respect to individual FISA orders or FAA
+directives—and, in turn, to the extent such an obligation is incorporated into the language of any
+particular order or directive—the clear purpose of such an obligation is to prevent the targets of
+such orders or directives from becoming aware of the required search or surveillance. See 50 U.S.C.
+§ 1805(c)(2)(B) (providers may be ordered to "furnish the applicant forthwith all information,
+facilities, or technical assistance necessary to accomplish the electronic surveillance in such a manner
+as will protect its secrecy and produce a minimum of interference with the services that such carrier
+is providing that target of electronic surveillance."); see also 50 U.S.C. § 1824(c)(2)(B) (imposing
+the same obligation in the context of a FISA physical search order); 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(1)(A)
+(same with respect to a directive issued under Section 702 of the FAA).
+
+4
+
+Disclosure of the Aggregate Data would not plausibly jeopardize the secrecy of any
+particular FISA order or FAA directive that Microsoft may have received. Microsoft is a large
+provider of electronic communication services with millions of customers. Given the size of
+Microsoft's user base, the Government cannot reasonably contend that disclosure of the Aggregate
+Data could lead any particular individual user to infer that he or she had been targeted.
+
+III. To the Extent FISA or the FAA Bars Microsoft's Disclosure of the Aggregate Data,
+Such a Restraint on Speech Violates the First Amendment.
+
+As set forth above, FISA and the FAA do not prohibit providers such as Microsoft from
+disclosing the Aggregate Data. If FISA or the FAA were to prohibit such a disclosure, however, the
+statutes would be unconstitutional.
+
+Any law prohibiting Microsoft from disclosing the Aggregate Data would be a content-based
+restriction on speech—i.e., a rule forbidding speech about the fact that Microsoft has received
+process under FISA or the FAA—and thus subject to strict scrutiny. See Doe v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d
+861, 878 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting, in the context of an analogous challenge to the non-disclosure
+provisions of the NSL statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2709, that “the Government has conceded that strict
+scrutiny is the applicable standard"). "Under strict scrutiny review, the Government must
+demonstrate that the nondisclosure requirement is 'narrowly tailored to promote a compelling
+Government interest."" Id. (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm't, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000)).
+
+The Government has not, and cannot, establish that a prohibition against the disclosure of
+the Aggregate Data is "narrowly tailored" to promote the admittedly compelling Government
+interests in enforcing FISA orders and FAA directives, for three reasons.
+
+First, as noted above, a bar to disclosing the Aggregate Data is not narrowly tailored because
+it does not promote the Government's interest in maintaining the secrecy of national security
+investigations. As one court explained when analyzing the non-disclosure provision of the NSL
+statute, "[i]t is not hard to surmise situations where recipients would appropriately be precluded
+
+5
+
+from disclosing their receipt of an NSL. For example, if a[] [provider] has only a handful of
+subscribers, disclosure could compromise a national security investigation." In re Nat'l Sec. Letter,
+2013 WL 1095417, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2013). Microsoft, however, offers electronic
+communications services to many millions of users, none of whom could plausibly infer from the
+disclosure of the Aggregate Data that he or she has been targeted by a FISA order or FAA directive.
+
+Second, a prohibition against disclosure of the Aggregate Data is not narrowly tailored
+because FISA already provides for public disclosure of the aggregate number of applications made
+and orders issued under the law. Under 50 U.S.C. § 1807, the Attorney General is directed to
+transmit to Congress "a report setting forth with respect to the preceding calendar year ... [1] the
+total number of applications made for orders and extensions of orders approving electronic
+surveillance under this subchapter; and [2] the total number of such orders and extensions either
+granted, modified, or denied." These reports are released to the public. See Letter to Majority
+Leader Harry Reid, United States Senate from Peter J. Kadzik, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
+General (Apr. 30, 2013) available at. http://www.justice.gov/nsd/foia/foia_library/2012fisa-ltr.pdf
+(noting, for example, that during calendar year 2012, (1) the Government made 1,856 applications to
+the FISC for authority to conduct electronic surveillance and/or physical searches for foreign
+intelligence purposes; and (2) the FISC did not deny any applications in whole or in part.) The fact
+that the Government already releases aggregate data about the number of FISA orders issued
+annually refutes any notion that a prohibition against Microsoft's disclosure of the Aggregate Data is
+necessary to promote the Government's interest in protecting the secrecy of national security
+investigations.
+
+Third, a construction of FISA and the FAA that would bar Microsoft from disclosing the
+Aggregate Data fails strict scrutiny because of the significant public debate and interest over the use
+of FISA and the FAA to collect information from electronic communication services providers.
+
+6
+
+The fact that the Government uses FISA and the FAA to collect information from electronic
+communication service providers is already a matter of public record as a result of statements made
+by the Director of National Intelligence, among others. See, e.g., Director of National Intelligence
+Statement on Activities Authorized Under Section 702 of FISA (June 6, 2013) (“The Guardian and
+The Washington Post articles refer to collection of communications pursuant to Section 702 of [FISA]
+... Information collected under this program is among the most important and valuable foreign
+intelligence information we collect, and is used to protect our nation from a wide variety of
+threats."), available at: http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/191-press-
+releases-2013/869-dni-statement-on-activities-authorized-under-section-702-of-fisa.
+
+In light of these statements, and the extensive public reporting on this subject, a statutory
+prohibition against Microsoft's disclosure of the Aggregate Data cannot be narrowly tailored to
+promote the Government's national security interests. The First Amendment does not permit the
+Government to bar Microsoft from speaking about an issue of great importance to its customers,
+shareholders, and the public while, simultaneously, senior Government officials are speaking
+publicly about the very same subject.
+
+* * *
+
+For the foregoing reasons, Microsoft respectfully requests that the Court issue an order
+declaring that Microsoft may disclose the Aggregate Data.
+
+Pursuant to Rule 7(i) of the FISC Rules of Procedure, Microsoft states that the following
+responsible employee of Microsoft holds a security clearance: John Frank, Vice President and
+Deputy General Counsel (DOD-Top Secret). This clearance was granted for the purpose of
+facilitating Microsoft's interaction with the Government concerning classified matters. Microsoft
+further states that its undersigned counsel have security clearances as follows: James M. Garland
+(FBI-Top Secret), David N. Fagan (FBI-Top Secret), and Alexander A. Berengaut (FBI-Top Secret).
+
+7
+
+These clearances were granted so as to permit counsel to advise their clients concerning any
+classified legal process they might receive.
+
+Dated: June 19, 2013
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+MICROSOFT CORPORATION
+
+James M. Garland, D.C. Bar # 475509
+David N. Fagan, D.C. Bar # 474518
+Alexander A. Berengaut, D.C. Bar # 989222
+COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
+1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
+Washington, DC 20004-2401
+Tel: 202.662.6000
+Fax: 202.662.6291
+
+8
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I hereby certify that at or before the time of filing this submission, the Government (care of
+the Security and Emergency Planning Staff, United States Department of Justice) has been served by
+hand delivery with a copy of this motion pursuant to Rule 8(a) of the FISC Rules of Procedure.
+
+Dated: June 19, 2013
+
+James M. Garland, D.C. Bar # 475509
+David N. Fagan, D.C. Bar # 474518
+Alexander A. Berengaut, D.C. Bar # 989222
+COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
+1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
+Washington, DC 20004-2401
+Tel: 202.662.6000
+Fax: 202.662.6291
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-motion/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-motion/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f66e052
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-motion/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+{
+ "title": "Microsoft Corporation's Motion for Declaratory Judgment or Other Appropriate Relief Authorizing Disclosure of Aggregate Data Regarding Any FISA Orders It Has Received, In re Motion to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-06-19",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [
+ "PRISM"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-06-19",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34484",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "2d077eddca2055b6a362fda9560a1297685c5e8cd07c4fd70f759e22c49d426e",
+ "pages": 9
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130703/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130703.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130703/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130703.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8a775d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130703/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130703.md
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE MOTION TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-04
+
+ORDER
+
+The Court has reviewed the Government's Consent Motion for Extension of Time to
+Respond to Microsoft Corporation's Motion and notes that the Government represents therein
+that Microsoft Corporation, through counsel, "consents to the relief sought in this motion."
+
+Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that this Court's order dated June 20, 2013, is
+amended to provide as follows: Any response by the Government to Microsoft Corporation's
+Motion for Declaratory Judgment or Other Appropriate Relief Authorizing Disclosure of
+Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders must be submitted no later than 5:00 p.m. on July 23,
+2013. If the government responds, Microsoft Corporation may file a reply brief no later than
+5:00 p.m. on July 30, 2013, through the Security and Emergency Planning Staff, U.S. Department
+of Justice.
+
+SO ORDERED, this 3rd day of July, 2013.
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130703/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130703/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..47d20aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130703/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": " Order, In re Motion to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders, No. Misc. 13-04, GID.C.00195 (FISA Ct. July 3, 2013) (Walton, J.)",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-07-03",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-07-03",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34245",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "1ed9388aa67fac7b4d01052b21a30768aa089ef40930115aa979008e55b8ae53",
+ "pages": 1
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130723/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130723.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130723/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130723.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6d724cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130723/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130723.md
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE MOTION TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-04
+
+[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING CONSENT MOTION
+FOR SECOND EXTENSION OF TIME TO RESPOND TO
+MICROSOFT CORPORATION'S MOTION
+
+Having read and considered the United States' Motion for Second Extension of Time to
+Respond to Microsoft Corporation's Motion, the Motion for Second Extension of Time is hereby
+GRANTED. The United States' time to respond to Microsoft Corporation's Motion is extended
+up to and including July 30, 2013.
+
+SO ORDERED, this 23rd day of July, 2013.
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130723/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130723/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2d5c524
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130723/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "[Proposed] Order Granting Consent Motion for Second Extension of Time to Respond to Microsoft Corporation’s Motion, In re Motion to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-07-23",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-07-23",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34246",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "4997a71af67aec185dba3fc5befb708cf9a31c06c57fb40dfb3f0928e69ddcc1",
+ "pages": 1
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130801/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130801.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130801/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130801.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c378927
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130801/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130801.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE MOTION TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+Docket No. Misc. 13-04
+
+**[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING CONSENT MOTION**
+**FOR THIRD EXTENSION OF TIME TO RESPOND TO**
+**MICROSOFT CORPORATION'S MOTION**
+
+Having read and considered the United States' Motion for Third Extension of Time to
+Respond to Microsoft Corporation's Motion, the Motion for Third Extension of Time is hereby
+GRANTED. The United States' time to respond to Microsoft Corporation's Motion is extended
+up to and including August 6, 2013.
+SO ORDERED, this 1st day of August, 2013.
+
+/s/ Reggie B. Walton
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130801/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130801/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..13902a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130801/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "[Proposed] Order Granting Consent Motion for Third Extension of Time to Respond to Microsoft Corporation’s Motion, In re Motion to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-08-01",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-08-01",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34247",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "50107a8dfe70901d088700311df19b5e4b5d43ed6985b4e9131155e45cda166c",
+ "pages": 1
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130807/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130807.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130807/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130807.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9373e6d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130807/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130807.md
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE MOTION TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-04
+
+ORDER
+
+On August 6, 2013, the Government filed a consent motion for an extension of time to
+respond to Microsoft Corporation's motion. The Government represents therein that Microsoft
+Corporation, through counsel, "consents to the relief sought in this motion."
+
+Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the briefing schedule in this matter is revised as
+follows: any response by the Government to Microsoft Corporation's Motion for Declaratory
+Judgment or Other Appropriate Relief Authorizing Disclosure of Aggregate Data Regarding
+FISA Orders must be submitted no later than 5:00 p.m. on August 13, 2013. If the Government
+responds, Microsoft Corporation may file a reply brief no later than 5:00 p.m. on August 20,
+2013, through the Security and Emergency Planning Staff, U.S. Department of Justice.
+
+SO ORDERED, this 7th day of August, 2013.
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130807/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130807/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c09931a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130807/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Order, In re Motion to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders, No. Misc. 13-04, GID.C.00198 (FISA Ct. Aug. 7, 2013) (Walton, J.)",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-08-07",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-08-07",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34248",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "4a88f83faf430f5eedd400c0360ca7a5736f58de6869d31f6dfccf323f123353",
+ "pages": 1
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130814/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130814.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130814/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130814.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5a76283
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130814/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130814.md
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE MOTION TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-04
+
+ORDER
+
+On August 12, 2013, the Government filed a consent motion for an extension of time to
+respond to Microsoft Corporation's motion. The Government represents therein that Microsoft
+Corporation, through counsel, "consents to the relief sought in this motion."
+
+Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the briefing schedule in this matter is revised as
+follows: any response by the Government to Microsoft Corporation's Motion for Declaratory
+Judgment or Other Appropriate Relief Authorizing Disclosure of Aggregate Data Regarding
+FISA Orders must be submitted no later than 5:00 p.m. on August 20, 2013. If the Government
+responds, Microsoft Corporation may file a reply brief no later than 5:00 p.m. on August 27,
+2013, through the Security and Emergency Planning Staff, U.S. Department of Justice.
+
+SO ORDERED, this 13ᵗʰ day of August, 2013.
+
+F. DENNIS SAYLOR IV
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130814/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130814/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4673ddf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130814/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Order, In re Motion to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders, No. Misc. 13-04, GID.C.00199 (FISA Ct. Aug. 13, 2013) (Saylor IV, J.)",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-08-13",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-08-13",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34249",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "f6e7eb0cd04a85ef76b6fc2faf05a25af77ee9488f1ed626a7dbcc286fb419ca",
+ "pages": 1
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130820/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130820.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130820/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130820.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..06f44f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130820/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130820.md
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE MOTION TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-04
+
+ORDER
+
+On August 19, 2013, the Government filed a consent motion for an extension of time to
+respond to Microsoft Corporation's motion. The Government represents therein that Microsoft
+Corporation, through counsel, "consents to the relief sought in this motion."
+
+Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the briefing schedule in this matter is revised as
+follows: any response by the Government to Microsoft Corporation's Motion for Declaratory
+Judgment or Other Appropriate Relief Authorizing Disclosure of Aggregate Data Regarding
+FISA Orders must be submitted no later than 5:00 p.m. on August 30, 2013. If the Government
+responds, Microsoft Corporation may file a reply brief no later than 5:00 p.m. on September 9,
+2013, through the Security and Emergency Planning Staff, U.S. Department of Justice.
+
+SO ORDERED, this 19 day of August, 2013.
+
+Reppe B. Vatt
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130820/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130820/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1360807
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130820/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Order, In re Motion to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders, No. Misc. 13-04, GID.C.00200 (FISA Ct. Aug. 19, 2013) (Walton, J.)",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-08-19",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-08-19",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34250",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "a2c48bfe0653870b16c29d67c0915e650a19d540a023191f808742e1a015250c",
+ "pages": 1
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130904/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130904.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130904/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130904.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..192382f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130904/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130904.md
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT OF A FIRST AMENDMENT
+RIGHT TO PUBLISH AGGREGATE
+INFORMATION ABOUT FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-03
+
+IN RE MOTION TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-04
+
+ORDER
+
+On August 30, 2013, Microsoft Corporation and Google Inc. (together, "the Providers") filed a consent motion for "a 10-day stay of the proceedings so as to permit the Providers to file ... amended motions" for declaratory relief "and to avoid the Government having to respond more than once to the Providers' requests for declaratory relief." That motion further requested "that the Court vacate its scheduling orders of August 19, 2013" and stated that the "parties will file a proposed briefing schedule in conjunction with the filing of the Providers' amended motions for declaratory relief." The motion further represented that "the Government consents to the proposed stay requested herein."
+
+Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:
+
+(1) Microsoft Corporation and Google Inc. shall file any amended motions for declaratory relief no later than 5:00 pm on September 9, 2013, through the Security and Emergency Planning Staff, U.S. Department of Justice. Such filing shall also include the parties' proposed briefing schedule.
+
+(2) The scheduling orders issued in the above-captioned dockets on August 19, 2013, are rescinded.
+
+SO ORDERED, this 4th of September, 2013
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130904/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130904/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1ffe1f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130904/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Order, In re Motion for Declaratory Judgment of a First Amendment Right to Publish Aggregate Info. About FISA Orders, No. Misc. 13-03, GID.C.00209 (FISA Ct. Sept. 4, 2013) (Walton, J.)",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-09-04",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-09-04",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34259",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "73b0b246a43491f9bcbc0abf02a6be80e6903d479fbab297d4015575cceac39b",
+ "pages": 1
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130913/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130913.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130913/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130913.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f34e090
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130913/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130913.md
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE AMENDED MOTION FOR
+DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF A FIRST
+AMENDMENT RIGHT TO PUBLISH
+AGGREGATE INFORMATION ABOUT
+FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-03
+
+IN RE MOTION TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-04
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+AND DIRECTIVES
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-05
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS AND
+DIRECTIVES
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-06
+
+ORDER
+
+On September 9, 2013, Google, Inc. and Microsoft Corporation filed amended motions for declaratory judgment regarding their right to publish aggregate information about Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) orders in Docket Nos. Misc 13-03 and 13-04, respectively. On the same date, those providers, along with the Government, filed a joint motion for a proposed briefing schedule. Additionally, on September 9, 2013, Yahoo! Inc., and Facebook, Inc. filed motions for declaratory judgment to disclose aggregate data regarding FISA orders and directives in Docket Nos. Misc. 13-05 and 13-06, respectively. In their motions, Yahoo! Inc. and Facebook, Inc. requested that the Court set a briefing schedule and indicated a willingness to coordinate such schedules with the schedule entered in Docket Nos. Misc 13-03 and 13-04. Given the overlap in issues presented in these cases, the Court has decided to consolidate the briefing schedules.
+
+Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the Government's response to Microsoft Corporation's and Google Inc.'s amended motions for declaratory relief, and Yahoo! Inc.'s and Facebook, Inc.'s motions for declaratory relief, shall be submitted no later than 5:00 p.m. on September 30, 2013. The Government shall file a single response to the motions in all four of the above-captioned cases. Microsoft Corporation, Google, Inc., Yahoo! Inc., and Facebook, Inc. may file a reply brief no later than 5:00 p.m. on October 21, 2013, through the Security and Emergency Planning Staff, U.S. Department of Justice. Given the substantial similarity in the relief sought and legal arguments presented in these cases, Microsoft Corporation, Google, Inc., Yahoo! Inc., and Facebook, Inc. shall coordinate their efforts and jointly file a single reply brief.
+
+SO ORDERED, this 13^th^ day of September, 2013.
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+2
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130913/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130913/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2350b19
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130913/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Order, In re Amended Motion for Declaratory Judgment of a First Amendment Right to Publish Aggregate Info. About FISA Orders, No. Misc. 13-03, GID.C.00210 (FISA Ct. Sept. 13, 2013) (Walton, J.)",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-09-13",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-09-13",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34260",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "d3fc4472598dc701160244cea7d6f8780bac69b28db62f49889c21d28f8e05bf",
+ "pages": 2
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130919/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130919.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130919/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130919.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f380db0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130919/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130919.md
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE AMENDED MOTION FOR
+DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF A FIRST
+AMENDMENT RIGHT TO PUBLISH
+AGGREGATE INFORMATION ABOUT
+FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-03
+
+IN RE MOTION TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-04
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+AND DIRECTIVES
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-05
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS AND
+DIRECTIVES
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-06
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGEMENT TO REPORT AGGREGATED
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-07
+
+ORDER
+
+On September 13, 2013, this Court entered an Order setting a briefing schedule in connection with motions filed by Google, Inc. (Docket No. Misc. 13-03), Microsoft Corporation (Docket No. Misc. 13-04), Yahoo! Inc. (Docket No. Misc. 13-05), and Facebook, Inc. (Docket No. Misc. 13-06) for declaratory judgment regarding their ability to disclose aggregate information about Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) orders received. On September 17, 2013, LinkIn Corporation filed a Motion for Declaratory Judgment That LinkedIn Corporation May Report Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders (Docket No. Misc. 13-07). Given the overlap in issues presented in these cases, the Court has decided to consolidate the briefing schedules in all five dockets.
+
+Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the Government shall file a single response to the motions in all five of the above-captioned dockets no later than 5:00 p.m. on September 30, 2013. Google, Inc., Microsoft Corporation, Yahoo! Inc., Facebook, Inc., and LinkIn Corporation may file a reply brief no later than 5:00 p.m. on October 21, 2013, through the Security and Emergency Planning Staff, U.S. Department of Justice. Given the substantial similarity in the relief sought and legal arguments presented in these cases, Google, Inc., Microsoft Corporation, Yahoo! Inc., Facebook, Inc., and LinkIn Corporation shall coordinate their efforts and jointly file a single reply brief.
+
+SO ORDERED, this 18 day of September, 2013.
+
+CLAIRE V. EAGAN
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+2
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130919/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130919/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4258bdf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-130919/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Order, In re Amended Motion for Declaratory Judgment of a First Amendment Right to Publish Aggregate Info. About FISA Orders, No. Misc. 13-03, GID.C.00211 (FISA Ct. Sept. 18, 2013) (Eagan, J.)",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-09-18",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-09-18",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34261",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "998ac1bf7434526ff3be7d8e920cb13848140d06211f99bd4e82e26744288f8b",
+ "pages": 2
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-131002/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-131002.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-131002/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-131002.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..05ef92b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-131002/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-131002.md
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+In re Motions to Disclose Aggregate Data
+Regarding FISA Orders and Directives
+
+Case Nos. Misc. 13-03; 13-04;
+13-05; 13-06; 13-07
+
+ORDER ON MOTION OF DROPBOX, INC. FOR LEAVE
+TO FILE AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF
+
+Now before the Court is the motion of Dropbox, Inc. to file an amicus curiae brief in
+Case Nos. Misc. 13-03, 13-04, 13-05, and 13-06, to which all parties have consented. Given the
+substantial similarity in the relief sought and legal arguments presented in these cases and Case
+No. Misc. 13-07, the Court has consolidated the briefing schedules in all five cases.
+Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that Dropbox's motion for leave to file an amicus curiae brief is
+GRANTED.
+
+SO ORDERED, this 1st day of October, 2013.
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-131002/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-131002/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ee46682
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order-131002/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Order, In re Motions to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders and Directives, Nos. Misc. 13-03, 13-04, 13-05, 13-06, 13-07, GID.C.00212 (FISA Ct. Oct. 1, 2013) (Walton, J.)",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-10-01",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-10-01",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34262",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "31c4d4eff6a07249d6a05145a970e7c5ad0dda8c0f91bca47bffbb3f67358de5",
+ "pages": 1
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f5d313c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order.md
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE MOTION TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+Docket No. Misc. 13-04
+
+ORDER
+
+This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Declaratory Judgment or Other
+Appropriate Relief Authorizing Disclosure of Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders, which
+was submitted on June 19, 2013. Any response by the U.S. Department of Justice to the motion
+must be submitted no later than 5:00 p.m. on July 9, 2013. If the government responds, the
+Movant may file a reply brief no later than 5:00 p.m. on July 16, 2013, through the Security and
+Emergency Planning Staff, U.S. Department of Justice.
+
+Unless the government advises in a written submission made no later than 5:00 p.m. on
+June 25, 2013, that, in its assessment, the Motion contains classified information, information
+that is potentially classified and currently subject to a classification review, or information that is
+or should be sealed, the Court intends to post copies of the Motion and this Order to a publicly
+accessible Uniform Resource Locator. If the government advises that potentially classified
+information is currently subject to a classification review, the government shall state when it
+expects that review to be concluded.
+
+SO ORDERED, this 20th day of June, 2013.
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..adf40e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-order/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": " Order, In re Motion to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders, No. Misc. 13-04, GID.C.00194 (FISA Ct. June 20, 2013) (Walton, J.)",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-06-20",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-06-20",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34244",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "a5273e97fcfb1fcf8feae781a30c922cefb2b34cd27f140d82afb5fa19a7c4c5",
+ "pages": 1
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-providers-consent-motion-for-stay-130830/FISC_-_misc-13-04-providers-consent-motion-for-stay-130830.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-providers-consent-motion-for-stay-130830/FISC_-_misc-13-04-providers-consent-motion-for-stay-130830.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cde7791
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-providers-consent-motion-for-stay-130830/FISC_-_misc-13-04-providers-consent-motion-for-stay-130830.md
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+2013 AUG 30 PM 4:44
+
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+United States
+Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+Washington, D.C.
+
+In re Motion for Declaratory Judgment of a
+First Amendment Right to Publish Aggregate)
+Information About FISA Orders
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-03
+
+In re Motion to Disclose Aggregate
+Numbers Regarding FISA Orders
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-04
+
+PROVIDERS' CONSENT MOTION FOR STAY
+
+Microsoft Corporation (Microsoft) and Google Inc. (Google) (together, "the Providers")
+have informed the Government of their intent to file amended motions for declaratory relief in the
+above-captioned matters. Because the Government's response to the Providers' initial motions is
+due today, the Providers respectfully request, pursuant to Rule 6(d) of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Court Rules of Procedure and Rule 6(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a 10-
+day stay of the proceedings so as to permit the Providers to file their amended motions, and to avoid
+the Government having to respond more than once to the Providers' requests for declaratory relief.
+The Providers respectfully submit that such a stay will promote judicial efficiency.
+
+The Providers further respectfully request that the Court vacate its scheduling orders of
+August 19, 2013 (thereby relieving the United States of its obligation to respond today to the
+
+Providers' original motions). The parties will file a proposed briefing schedule in conjunction with
+the filing of the Providers' amended motions for declaratory relief.
+
+Counsel for the Providers have conferred with counsel for the Government and the
+Government consents to the Providers' filing of amended motions and further consents to the
+proposed stay requested herein.
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+August 30, 2013
+
+Albert Gidari
+Perkins Coie LLP
+1201 Third Avenue
+Suite 4900
+Seattle, WA 98101
+Tel.: (206) 359-8688
+Fax: (206) 359-9688
+agidari@perkinscoie.com
+
+Attorneys for Google Inc.
+
+James M. Garland, D.C. Bar # 475509
+David N. Fagan, D.C. Bar # 474518
+Alexander A. Berengaut, D.C. Bar # 989222
+COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
+1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
+Washington, DC 20004-2401
+Tel.: (202) 662-6000
+Fax: (202) 662-6291
+jgarland@cov.com
+
+Attorneys for Microsoft Corporation
+
+2
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I hereby certify that at or before the time of filing this submission, the Government (care of
+the Security and Emergency Planning Staff, United States Department of Justice) has been served by
+electronic mail with a copy of this motion pursuant to Rule 8(a) of the FISC Rules of Procedure.
+
+Dated: August 30, 2013
+
+James M. Garland, D.C. Bar # 475509
+COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
+1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
+Washington, DC 20004-2401
+Tel.: (202) 662-6000
+Fax: (202) 662-6291
+
+Attorneys for Microsoft Corporation
+
+3
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-providers-consent-motion-for-stay-130830/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-providers-consent-motion-for-stay-130830/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5cd3ee9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-providers-consent-motion-for-stay-130830/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Providers' Consent Motion for Stay, In re Motion for Declaratory Judgment of a First Amendment Right to Publish Aggregate Info. About FISA Orders, No. Misc. 13-03 (FISA Ct. Aug. 19, 2013).",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-08-30",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-08-30",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34466",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "5139936b88c499c7b701c7369334ff1c63744d0f5b963501b7ab7009a90307e4",
+ "pages": 3
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-response/FISC_-_misc-13-04-response.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-response/FISC_-_misc-13-04-response.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..42ca1a4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-response/FISC_-_misc-13-04-response.md
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+UNITED STATES
+20130225 PM 1:30
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE MOTION TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-04
+
+RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES TO
+THE COURT'S ORDER DATED JUNE 20, 2013
+
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+
+TASHINA GAUHAR
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+JEFFREY M. SMITH
+NICHOLAS J. PATTERSON
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+Phone: (202) 514-5600
+Fax: (202) 514-8053
+
+Attorneys for the United States of America
+
+On June 19, 2013, Microsoft filed a Motion for Declaratory Judgment in the above-
+captioned matter. By order dated June 20, 2013, this Court provided the Government until June
+25, 2013, to respond in writing with an assessment as to whether said motion contains classified
+information, potentially classified information, or information that is or should be sealed.
+
+The motion does not contain information that is now classified, nor information that
+should be held under seal, and the Government thus has no objection to its public posting. This
+determination has been made on the basis of the contents of this particular motion and the facts
+as they relate specifically to Microsoft, including public statements the Government has made in
+response to the unauthorized disclosure of previously classified information.
+
+The Government will submit its substantive response to the motion no later than
+July 9, 2013.
+
+June 25, 2013
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+
+TASHINA GAUHAR
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+Nicholas J. Patterson
+JEFFREY M. SMITH
+NICHOLAS J. PATTERSON
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+Phone: (202) 514-5600
+Fax: (202) 514-8053
+
+Attorneys for the United States of America
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I hereby certify that a true copy of the Response of the United States to the Court's Order
+Dated June 20, 2013 was served via Federal Express and email on this 25th day of June, 2013,
+addressed to:
+
+James M. Garland
+David N. Fagan
+Alexander A. Berengaut
+Covington & Burling LLP
+1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
+Washington, DC 20004-2401
+
+Nicholas J. Patterson
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-response/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-response/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bc1e41b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-04-response/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Order, In re Motion to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders, No. Misc. 13-04, GID.C.00194 (FISA Ct. June 20, 2013) (Walton, J.)",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-06-20",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-06-20",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34244",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "e25f9f1f806cc2b5e5dee76749efd9d3e45dde1eb48aa0fb5f9591596bceb6f7",
+ "pages": 3
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-05-motion-130909/FISC_-_misc-13-05-motion-130909.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-05-motion-130909/FISC_-_misc-13-05-motion-130909.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ae57d68
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-05-motion-130909/FISC_-_misc-13-05-motion-130909.md
@@ -0,0 +1,318 @@
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+2013 SEP -9 PM 12: 22
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+In re Motion for Declaratory
+Judgment to Disclose Aggregate
+Data Regarding FISA Orders
+and Directives
+
+Case No. 13-05
+
+YAHOO!'S MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGEMENT TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE DATA
+REGARDING FISA ORDERS AND DIRECTIVES
+
+Yahoo! Inc. ("Yahoo!") and other electronic communications providers have been
+intensely and publicly scrutinized for their alleged "participation" in surveillance that the
+Government has conducted under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") and
+other national security authorities. Yahoo! has been unable to engage fully in the debate
+about whether the Government has properly used its powers because the Government has
+placed a prior restraint on Yahoo!'s speech by forbidding Yahoo! and other providers from
+disclosing aggregate numbers of demands for surveillance they receive (if any) under FISA.
+At the same time, the Government has released volumes of previously-classified documents
+confirming the use of FISA surveillance and has promised to report its own aggregate
+numbers shortly. See generally Office of the Director of National Intelligence, IC on the
+Record, available at icontherecord.tumblr.com. Preventing Yahoo! from disclosing similar
+data is a content-based restriction on Yahoo!'s First Amendment rights that is not narrowly
+tailored to further national security.
+
+Yahoo! thus moves this Court, under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Court Rule of Procedure 6(d), for a declaratory judgment or for other
+appropriate relief, confirming its legal authority to disclose specific statistics that pertain to
+its receipt of orders of this Court and directives under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a, if any, in six month
+reporting cycles without violating FISA, the FISC rules of procedure or any court orders.
+1
+
+I. Facts
+
+Yahoo! provides electronic communications services to hundreds of millions of
+people and businesses worldwide, including through electronic mail and instant messaging
+services. It is thus subject to orders and directives under FISA and the FAA, which seek
+data hosted by Yahoo! in the United States. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1805(c)(2)(B); 1881a(h). The
+public knows that Yahoo! has received directives and orders from this Court. In re
+Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intel. Surv. Act, 551 F.3d 1004 (For. Intel.
+Surv. Ct. Rev. 2008); FISC Case No. 105B(g) 07-01, Order, July 15, 2013. Yahoo! also
+regularly receives legal process seeking user data from U.S. federal, state, and local law
+enforcement authorities and some authorities in countries in which it has a presence.
+
+In June of this year, Yahoo! was named in intensive media coverage regarding an
+alleged "PRISM" surveillance program conducted by the National Security Agency. See, e.g.,
+The Guardian, The NSA Prism Program Taps in to User Data of Apple, Google, and Others
+(June 6, 2013),¹ The Washington Post, U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data from Nine U.S.
+Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program (June 6, 2013).² The media has mistakenly—
+and repeatedly—reported that this "program" allows the U.S. Government to "tap
+directly into the central servers" of providers to collect information.
+
+Yahoo! tried to correct this false claim and the misimpressions created by such false
+reports by, among other actions, increasing transparency around the receipt and handling
+of national security demands. For example, Yahoo! has filed motions in this Court and the
+Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review ("FISCR") seeking to declassify its
+
+¹ Available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data.
+² Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-
+nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11c2-8845-
+d970ccb04497_story.html
+2
+
+previous challenge to directives issued under 105B of the Protect America Act, the
+precursor to Section 702. This Court and the FISCR essentially granted both motions and
+the Government has stated that it will release more declassified documents from both cases
+soon. FISC Case No. 105B(g) 07-01, United States Response to July 15, 2013 Order.
+
+In addition, with the FBI's consent, Yahoo! released the aggregate number of law
+enforcement and national security requests that it received between December 1, 2012 and
+May 31, 2013. On September 6, 2013, Yahoo! also released a more detailed transparency
+report regarding law enforcement process for the period from Jan. 1, 2013 to June 30,
+2013. See Yahoo! Transparency Report, available at http://info.yahoo.com/transparency-
+report. This report did not—and because of the government's prior restraint could not—
+include individual numbers for national security-related demands.
+
+Despite Yahoo!'s desire not to commingle other law enforcement data with national
+security demands, the government prohibited Yahoo! from disclosing the number of
+national security demands that it has received (if any) and the numbers of accounts
+affected by such demands.³ In addition, based on the government's response to similar
+requests made by both Google and Microsoft, it appears that the government maintains
+that publishing aggregate numbers of national security demands received is unlawful.
+
+Yahoo!'s inability to respond to news reports has harmed its reputation and has
+undermined its business not only in the United States but worldwide. Yahoo! cannot
+respond to such reports with mere generalities. Specific data about the number of
+
+³ Moreover, the Government refused to allow Yahoo! to disclose the aggregate number of NSLs it
+had received in bands of 1,000 despite previously allowing Google to disclose that same data. See
+FISC Case No. Misc. 13-02, Motion for Declaratory Judgment of Google Inc.'s First Amendment Right
+to Publish Aggregate Information about FISA Orders, June 18, 2013 at 2.
+3
+
+demands that Yahoo! receives is important to answer the intense, continuing debate about
+the Government's use of FISA process to obtain information from providers.
+
+II. Right to Relief
+
+Yahoo! is a "communications carrier ... or other specified person" that the
+Government, through this Court, may compel to provide data under the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1801-1881g (“FISA"). Indeed, Yahoo! has, in the
+past, received compulsory process from this Court. In re Directives, 551 F.3d at 1004.
+Yahoo! requests relief to allow it to publish accurate information about how many
+disclosures the Government has compelled it to make (if any) under FISA or other national
+security-related authorities.
+
+Specifically, Yahoo! moves this court to declare that Yahoo! has a First Amendment
+right to publish, and/or no applicable law or order prohibits the publication, in six-month
+reporting cycles, of the sum of active requests it received (and the number of accounts
+specified) under each of the FISA authorities, including:
+
+(1) FISA orders based on probable cause (Titles I and III of FISA, and sections 703
+and 704);
+(2) Section 702 of FISA;
+(3) FISA Section 12 Business Records (Title V of FISA); and
+(4) FISA Pen Register/Trap and Trace (Title IV of FISA).
+
+If the Court finds that disclosure of any single set of specific statistics described here would
+compromise national security interests, Yahoo! moves for other appropriate relief
+permitting the publication of the described data in aggregate form.
+
+This Court may enter this declaratory relief because the aggregate data Yahoo! seeks
+to disclose is not classified or subject to any other limitation on disclosure. FISA and the
+4
+
+FAA do not prohibit providers from disclosing aggregate data. While FISA orders may
+prohibit disclosure of the orders themselves, those prohibitions exist to prevent targets
+from becoming aware of surveillance and to protect U.S. assets involved with particular
+surveillance—not to obscure the government's use of FISA process from the American
+public. 50 U.S.C. 1805(c)(2)(B) (providers may be ordered to "furnish the applicant
+forthwith all information, facilities, or technical assistance necessary to accomplish the
+electronic surveillance in such a manner as will protect its secrecy and produce a minimum
+of interference with the services that such carrier ... is providing that target of electronic
+surveillance"); see also 50 U.S.C. § 1824(c)(2)(B) (imposing the same obligation in the
+contest of a FISA physical search); § 1881b(h)(1)(A) (same in the context of a § 702
+directive).
+
+Similarly, although 50 U.S.C. §§ 1805(c)(2)(C) and 1881a(h)(1)(B) require providers
+to "maintain under security procedures approved by the Attorney General and the Director
+of National Intelligence any records concerning the acquisition or the aid furnished that
+such electronic communication service provider wishes to maintain," nothing in these
+provisions expressly prohibits disclosure of aggregate numbers. And any security
+procedures that act to prohibit Yahoo!'s release of aggregate disclosure under all
+circumstances must be evaluated in light of the First Amendment. Otherwise, the
+Government could use these provisions to prevent providers from disclosing anything
+about the Government's use of FISA process. This would prohibit speech about matters of
+significant public concern even where no specific justification exists for such secrecy. See
+In re Nat'l Sec. Letter, 2013 WL 1095417 at *10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2013) ("here, the concern
+is the government's unilateral ability to prevent individuals from speaking out about the
+5
+
+government's use of NSLs, a subject that has engendered extensive public and academic
+debate.")
+
+A. Disclosing Aggregate Data will Not Harm National Security Interests
+
+Disclosing aggregate data, without identifying the targets of that surveillance, does
+not imperil the secrecy of any particular FISA order or FAA directive. Yahoo! provides
+electronic communications services to hundreds of millions of users across the world.
+Given the number of Yahoo! users and the wide variety of uses for Yahoo!'s services, it is
+difficult to see how disclosing aggregate numbers of demands could possibly harm the
+secrecy of any particular FISA or FAA surveillance. See Id. 2013 WL 1095417 at *11 (N.D.
+Cal. Mar. 14, 2013) (noting that security concerns related to disclosing NSL data could exist
+where the provider was a small provider with few users). The risk that disclosure of
+aggregate numbers will tip off a particular user that or she is under surveillance is
+minuscule.
+
+B. The First Amendment Prohibits the Government from Placing Such Content-Based
+Restrictions on Yahoo!'s Speech
+
+The First Amendment protects Yahoo!'s right to report this data and to respond to
+public criticism. Forbidding Yahoo! from disclosing aggregate numbers would be a
+content-based restriction on speech that is subject to strict scrutiny. Doe v. Mukasey, 549
+F.3d 861, 878 (2d Cir. 2008) (government conceded in a challenge to non-disclosure
+provisions of NSLs that strict scrutiny is the applicable standard). To survive strict
+scrutiny, "the Government must demonstrate that the nondisclosure requirement is
+'narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government interest'." Id. (quoting United
+States v. Playboy Entertainment, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000)). Though national security
+interests are compelling and Courts give some degree of deference to the executive branch,
+6
+
+that deference is not absolute. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524 (1985) (no absolute
+immunity for executive branch officials for decisions made for national security reasons);
+Doe v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d at 882-84 (giving the executive branch total deference in national
+security matters would be no scrutiny at all). The Government's content-based
+prohibition on Yahoo!'s speech cannot survive strict scrutiny.
+
+Forbidding all disclosure of aggregate data does not promote the Government's
+interest in the secrecy of particular surveillance efforts. And even if it did, prohibiting the
+disclosure of accurate information about the volume of such process on a per provider
+basis is not narrowly tailored to further that interest. Indeed, FISA already provides that
+the Attorney General may publish aggregate data. 50 U.S.C. § 1807. The Attorney General
+has previously released such reports to the public.⁴ More importantly, the government has
+committed to publish aggregate numbers of orders issued during a 12-month period and
+the aggregate number of targets affected by these orders across all providers. The Director
+of National Intelligence (DNI) recently agreed to report each of the following categories of
+surveillance that the intelligence community has demanded:
+
+* FISA orders based on probable cause (Titles I and III of FISA, and sections 703 and
+ 704).
+* Orders under Section 702 of FISA
+* FISA Business Records (Title V of FISA).
+* FISA Pen Register/Trap and Trace (Title IV of FISA)
+* National Security Letters issued under 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. §§
+ 1681u(a) and (b), 15 U.S.C. § 1681v, and 18 U.S.C. § 2709.
+
+⁴ See Letter to Majority Leader Harry Reid, United States Senate from Peter J. Kadzik, Principal
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General (Apr. 30, 2013) available at
+http://www.justice.gov/nsd/foia/foia_library/2012fisa-ltr.pdf (noting that during 2012, the
+Government made 1,856 applications to the FISC for authority to conduct electronic surveillance
+and/or physical searches for foreign intelligence purposes; and (2) the FISC did not deny any
+applications in whole or in part.)
+7
+
+See generally DNOI Clapper Directs Annual Release of Information Related to Orders Issued
+Under National Security Authorities (August 29, 2013) available at
+http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/59719173750/dni-clapper-directs-annual-release-
+of-information. The government's release will aggregate this information across all
+providers. Id. However, Yahoo! seeks the ability to disclose the portion of these requests it
+receives. The Government's public release of similar data—which was likely motivated by
+a desire to inform the public and to correct the misimpressions caused by inaccurate
+reporting—undermines any argument that prohibiting Yahoo! from publicly disclosing the
+same data would harm national security.
+
+Finally, any FISA provisions that would allow the Government to prohibit Yahoo!
+from making the requested disclosures would not survive strict scrutiny because of the
+strong public interest in this information as part of the national, ongoing debate over the
+Government's use of surveillance powers under FISA and the Government's own
+participation in that debate. That the Government engages in such surveillance is now part
+of the public record—and the government has released and plans to release more data
+about its programs. To that end, the Director of National Intelligence has also
+acknowledged that President Obama directed him to "declassify and make public as much
+information as possible about certain sensitive NSA programs while being mindful of the
+need to protect sensitive classified intelligence and national security."⁵ The information
+that Yahoo! seeks to disclose furthers the Government's avowed interest in transparency,
+without compromising national security, especially in light of the public knowledge that
+
+⁵ DNI Declassifies Intelligence Community Documents Regarding Collection Under Section 702 of
+the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), Aug. 21, 2013, available at
+http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/191-press-releases-2013/915-dni-
+declassifies-intelligence-community-documents-regarding-collection-under-section-702-of-the-
+foreign-intelligence-surveillance-act-fisa
+8
+
+Yahoo! has received intelligence process. Given these statements and extensive public
+reporting on the issue, completely prohibiting Yahoo!'s speech regarding these issues is not
+narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. The First Amendment does not allow the
+Government to suppress private speech, while the Government itself speaks extensively
+about the same subject.
+
+III. Conclusion
+
+Yahoo! requests that this Court issue a declaratory judgment declaring that Yahoo!
+may lawfully disclose the requested information. Yahoo! also requests that the Court set a
+briefing schedule for this motion that would allow it an opportunity to respond to any
+opposition the Government files in response to this petition.⁶
+
+IV. Rule 7 Statement
+
+Pursuant to FISC Rules of Procedure 7(h) & (i), Yahoo! states that its undersigned
+counsel, Marc J. Zwillinger holds a top secret security clearance, which was granted by the
+FBI to permit him to advise his clients about classified legal process. He is also a member in
+good standing of the bars of Illinois and the District of Columbia. He has previously
+appeared before this Court. Jacob Sommer held a secret security clearance, which is
+currently being renewed. The FBI originally granted the clearance to allow him to advise
+his clients concerning classified legal process. He is a member in good standing of the bars
+of the District of Columbia and South Carolina. He has also previously appeared before this
+Court.
+
+⁶ Yahoo! would be willing to coordinate such schedule with the schedule to be entered in Case Nos.
+Misc. 13-03 and 13-04, which cases involve similar, but not identical, requests for relief filed by
+Google and Microsoft.
+9
+
+Dated: September 9, 2013
+
+Signature:
+Marc J. Zwillinger
+Jacob A. Sommer
+ZwillGen PLLC
+1705 N St. NW
+Washington, DC 20036
+marc@zwillgen.com
+jake@zwillgen.com
+Attorneys for Yahoo! Inc.
+
+10
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I hereby certify that on September 9, 2013, I caused copies of the foregoing motion
+to be served on:
+
+Christine Gunning
+United States Department of Justice
+Litigation Security Group
+2 Constitution Square
+145 N St NE
+Suite 2W-115
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+(202) 514-9016
+Carli.Rodriguez-Feo@usdoj.gov
+
+pursuant to FISC Rule 8 and procedures established by the Security and Emergency
+Planning Staff, United States Department of Justice.
+
+Marc J. Zwillinger
+
+11
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-05-motion-130909/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-05-motion-130909/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..99f0e71
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-05-motion-130909/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+{
+ "title": "Yahoo's Motion for Declaratory Judgement to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders and Directives, In re Motion for Declaratory Judgment to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders and Directives, No. Misc. 13-05 (FISA Ct. Sept. 9, 2013).",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-09-09",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [
+ "PRISM"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-09-09",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34493",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "a69b577e327e764d56acce0e416cc88b2db3b5cf9997aabffd3feaf16952857c",
+ "pages": 11
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-05-motion-130913/FISC_-_misc-13-05-motion-130913.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-05-motion-130913/FISC_-_misc-13-05-motion-130913.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b6151d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-05-motion-130913/FISC_-_misc-13-05-motion-130913.md
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+2013 SEP 12 PM 4:41
+
+In re Motion for Declaratory
+Judgment to Disclose Aggregate
+Data Regarding FISA Orders
+and Directives
+
+Case No. 13-05
+
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+JOINT MOTION FOR PARTIES' PROPOSED BRIEFING SCHEDULE
+
+The parties have agreed to the following proposed briefing schedule on Yahoo! Inc.'s
+declaratory judgment motion. The Government's response to Yahoo! Inc.'s motion for
+declaratory judgment would be due by 5:00 p.m. on September 30, 2013. Any reply by
+Yahoo! Inc. would be due by 5:00 p.m. on October 21, 2013. A proposed Order is attached.
+
+Dated: September 12, 2013
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+/s/ Marc J. Zwillinger
+Marc J. Zwillinger
+Jacob A. Sommer
+ZwillGen PLLC
+1705 N St. NW
+Washington, DC 20036
+marc@zwillgen.com
+jake@zwillgen.com
+Attorneys for Yahoo! Inc.
+
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+
+TASHINA GAUHAR
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+/s/ Nicholas J. Patterson
+JEFFREY M. SMITH
+NICHOLAS J. PATTERSON
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+
+Attorneys for the United States of America
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I hereby certify that on September 12, 2013, I caused copies of the foregoing motion
+to be served on:
+
+Christine Gunning
+Carli Rodriguez-Feo
+United States Department of Justice
+Litigation Security Group
+2 Constitution Square
+145 N St NE
+Suite 2W-115
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+(202) 514-9016
+Carli.Rodriguez-Feo@usdoj.gov
+
+pursuant to FISC Rule 8 and procedures established by the Security and Emergency
+Planning Staff, United States Department of Justice.
+
+/s/Jacob A. Sommer
+Jacob A. Sommer
+
+2
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+2013 SEP 12 PM 4:42
+
+In re Motion for Declaratory
+Judgment to Disclose Aggregate
+Data Regarding FISA Orders
+and Directives
+
+Case No. 13-05
+
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING JOINT MOTION FOR PARTIES'
+PROPOSED BRIEFING SCHEDULE
+
+On September 12, 2013, the parties in the above-captioned case filed a joint motion
+for a proposed briefing schedule. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the joint motion
+is GRANTED and the briefing schedule in this matter is revised as follows: the
+Government's response to Yahoo! Inc.'s declaratory judgment motion shall be submitted no
+later than 5:00 p.m. on September 30, 2013. Yahoo Inc. may file a reply brief no later than
+5:00 p.m. on October 21, 2013, through the Securities and Emergency Planning Staff, U.S.
+Department of Justice.
+
+SO ORDERED, this ____ day of September, 2013.
+
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+1
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-05-motion-130913/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-05-motion-130913/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c0a68de
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-05-motion-130913/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Joint Motion for Parties' Proposed Briefing Schedule, In re Motion for Declaratory Judgment to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders and Directives, No. Misc. 13-05 (FISA Ct. Sept. 12, 2013).",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-09-12",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-09-12",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34494",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "bfb0bc6b6a945cdfe7f52e7ecff1e4464d28be0871c1d4a983ca76e44b8f9de2",
+ "pages": 3
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-06-motion-130909/FISC_-_misc-13-06-motion-130909.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-06-motion-130909/FISC_-_misc-13-06-motion-130909.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c864088
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-06-motion-130909/FISC_-_misc-13-06-motion-130909.md
@@ -0,0 +1,269 @@
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+2013 SEP -9 PM 12:24
+
+LEE ANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+In re Motion for Declaratory Judgment to Disclose
+Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders and Directives
+
+Case No. 13-06
+
+Facebook, Inc. ("Facebook") hereby moves this Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and
+Rule 6(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+("FISC"), for a declaratory judgment, or such other relief as the Court may deem appropriate,
+confirming that Facebook may lawfully disclose aggregate data regarding any orders and/or
+directives that Facebook may have received under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
+("FISA") and/or FISA Amendments Act ("FAA"), 50 U.S.C. § 1801-1881g.1
+
+I. Background
+
+Facebook, a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Delaware with its
+principal place of business in Menlo Park, California, is an online social networking service that
+enables people to connect and share information with their friends, family, and coworkers.
+Facebook is a global company with more than one billion active monthly users throughout the
+world. The company's technologies facilitate the sharing of information through the social graph
+– the digital mapping of people's real world social connections.
+
+Over the past several months, Facebook and other entities have been the subject of
+intense media coverage concerning an alleged surveillance program operated by the United
+States government called "PRISM." See The Guardian, NSA Prism Program Taps In To User
+1
+Nothing in this Motion is intended to confirm or deny that Facebook has received any orders or directives
+pursuant to FISA or the FAA.
+
+1
+
+Data of Apple, Google, and Others (June 6, 2013), available at
+http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data; The Washington Post,
+U.S. British Intelligence Mining Data From Nine U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret
+Program (June 6, 2013) available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-
+intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-
+program/2013/06/06/3a0e0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970eeb04497_story.html. These news reports
+have raised serious concerns among the people around the world who use Facebook and the
+public at large about the Internet surveillance activities of the U.S. government and the responses
+of providers who may receive orders issued by this Court.
+
+Within the constraints imposed by the position of the U.S. government, Facebook has
+taken substantial steps to respond to these concerns. On June 7, 2013, Facebook Chief Executive
+Officer Mark Zuckerberg posted a public message on Facebook that clarified that Facebook
+carefully reviews all government requests for legal sufficiency, has never received a bulk order
+for metadata, and "is not and has never been part of any program to give the US or any other
+government direct access to our servers." See http://newsroom.fb.com/News/709/Personal-
+Response-From-Mark-Zuckerberg-About-PRISM. The following week, on June 14, 2013,
+Facebook released information covering the second half of 2012, which showed, for the first
+time, the aggregate number of law enforcement and national security requests it received from
+government authorities in the United States, as well as the aggregate number of accounts
+specified in those requests, within ranges of 1,000. See
+http://newsroom.fb.com/News/636/Facebook-Releases-Data-Including-All-National-Security-
+Requests. And on August 27, 2013, Facebook published a global report of government requests
+for the first half of 2013 which again included the aggregate number of all U.S. law enforcement
+2
+
+and national security requests, and accounts specified in those requests, within ranges of 1,000.
+See https://www.facebook.com/about/government_requests.
+
+Despite Facebook's efforts to push for more transparency, which have included extensive
+discussions with government officials, the U.S. government has taken the position that Facebook
+is prohibited from disclosing the specific number and type of any such requests as well as even
+aggregate numbers of any national security requests within ranges. Based on the government's
+response to similar requests made by both Google, Inc. and Microsoft Corporation, Facebook
+understands that the government believes that publishing such information would be unlawful.
+
+To appropriately and effectively respond to these inaccurate news reports and the related
+public concerns, Facebook seeks to be as transparent as possible regarding its receipt of orders
+under FISA and the FAA, if any. To that end, Facebook moves this Court to declare that it may
+lawfully disclose the following aggregate unclassified numbers covering a 6-month period
+(collectively, "the Aggregate Data"): (1) the total number of FISA court orders it has received
+during the period, if any, under specific FISA authorities, such as Physical Search Orders,
+Business Record Orders, and Wiretap and Pen Register/Trap and Trace Orders; (2) the total
+number of user accounts specified in such FISA orders; (3) the total number of Directives it has
+received during the period under 18 U.S.C. § 1881a, if any; and (4) the total number of user
+accounts specified under such directives. Facebook further requests the ability to release, in
+aggregate numbers, the number of requests that called for content of communications versus
+those that called for transaction or subscriber information.
+
+II. Facebook May Lawfully Disclose the Aggregate Data.
+
+Neither FISA nor the FAA prohibit Facebook from disclosing the Aggregate Data. The
+First Amendment also ensures Facebook's right to report these data and to respond to public
+3
+
+criticism.
+
+A. FISA and the FAA Do Not Prohibit Facebook From Disclosing the Aggregate
+Data.
+
+FISA and the FAA contain two confidentiality provisions. The first provides that orders
+and directives require the recipient to provide assistance to the government “necessary to
+accomplish the electronic surveillance in such a manner as will protect its secrecy.” 50 U.S.C. §
+1805(c)(2)(B); see also id. § 1881a(h)(1)(A) (providing the same for acquisition of foreign
+intelligence information). The second requires that the recipient “maintain under security
+procedures approved by the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence any
+records concerning the surveillance or the aid furnished that such person wishes to retain.” Id. §
+1805(c)(2)(C); see also id. § 1881a(h)(1)(B) (providing the same for acquisition of foreign
+intelligence information). Neither provision precludes Facebook from disclosing the Aggregate
+Data.
+
+With respect to the first confidentiality provision, the recipient’s obligation to provide
+assistance to the government “necessary to accomplish” the intelligence-gathering “in such a
+manner as will protect its secrecy” imposes upon the recipient an obligation to assist the
+government in a way that preserves the secrecy of the particular surveillance or acquisition.
+This provision, however, does not prohibit disclosure of the Aggregate Data because disclosure
+of such data would not compromise the “secrecy” of any particular electronic surveillance or
+acquisition. In light of Facebook’s over one billion active users and the generalized information
+included in the Aggregate Data, disclosure could not lead any user to infer that he or she is or has
+been the target of an order or directive. Moreover, disclosure of the Aggregate Data would not
+diminish Facebook’s obligation under FISA and the FAA to provide any assistance required of it
+
+4
+
+under any order or directive in a manner protective of the secrecy of that surveillance or
+acquisition.
+Similarly, although 50 U.S.C. §§ 1805(c)(2)(C) and 1881a(h)(1)(B) require providers to
+"maintain under security procedures approved by the Attorney General and the Director of
+National Intelligence any records concerning" the acquisition "or the aid furnished that such"
+recipient "wishes to" retain, those provisions on their face do not prohibit disclosure of aggregate
+numbers. Disclosing aggregate data, without indicating the specific process the government has
+invoked, does not put the secrecy of any particular FISA order or FAA directive in jeopardy.
+
+B. Facebook has a First Amendment Right to Disclose the Aggregate Data and
+Respond to Public Criticism.
+
+A restriction on the disclosure of the Aggregate Data would be a content-based restriction
+on speech and thus subject to strict scrutiny. See Doe v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861, 878 (2d Cir.
+2008) (noting, in the context of an analogous challenge to the non-disclosure provisions of the
+National Security Letter statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2709, that "the Government has conceded that strict
+scrutiny is the applicable standard"). To survive strict scrutiny review, “the Government must
+demonstrate that the nondisclosure requirement is 'narrowly tailored to promote a compelling
+Government interest." Id. (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm '1, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000)).
+"If a less restrictive alternative would serve the Government's purpose, the legislature must use
+that alternative." Playboy Entm 't, 529 U.S. at 813 (citation omitted).
+
+Undoubtedly, the security of the nation is a compelling government interest. See Haig v.
+Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981). However, Facebook's disclosure of Aggregate Data would not
+compromise the secrecy of the government's surveillance or acquisition efforts. Facebook
+provides services to more than one billion subscribers; it is difficult to see how the disclosure of
+5
+
+the Aggregate Data could make any individual user suspicious, much less aware, that he or she
+was the target of government intelligence-gathering. As one court has recognized in the context
+of analyzing the prohibition on disclosure of National Security Letters, the plausibility of the
+notion that disclosure of the receipt of government-issued national security orders may
+compromise a national security investigation diminishes as the size of the recipient's customer
+base grows. See In re Nat'l Sec. Letter, 2013 WL 1095417, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2013).
+
+Moreover, the government's own public release of similar data demonstrates that a
+prohibition on Facebook's disclosure is not narrowly tailored to the government's interest.
+Indeed, FISA already provides for the publication of aggregate data by the Attorney General. 50
+U.S.C. § 1807, and such reports have previously been released to the public. More importantly,
+the government itself has committed to the publication of the aggregate numbers of orders issued
+during a 12-month period and the aggregate number of targets affected by these orders across all
+providers.2 And the Director of National Intelligence ("DNI") recently has agreed to report each
+of the following categories of surveillance that the intelligence community has demanded:
+
+* FISA orders based on probable cause (Titles I and III of FISA, and Sections 703 and
+ 704)
+* Orders under Section 702 of FISA
+* FISA Business Records (Title V of FISA)
+* FISA Pen Register/Trap and Trace (Title IV of FISA)
+* National Security Letters issued pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. §§
+ 1681u(a) and (b), 15 U.S.C. § 1681v, and 18 U.S.C. § 2709.
+
+See generally Office of the Director of National Intelligence, IC On the Record,
+icontherecord.tumblr.com, posted dated August 29, 2013.
+
+2
+See Letter to Majority Leader Harry Reid, United States Senate from Peter J. Kadzik, Principal
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General (Aug. 30, 2013) available at
+http://www.justice.gov/oip/foia/foia_library/2013fisa-ltr.pdf (noting that during 2012, the government
+made 1,856 applications to the FISC for authority to conduct electronic surveillance and/or physical
+searches for foreign intelligence purposes, and (2) the FISC did not deny any applications in whole or in
+part.)
+
+6
+
+Finally, construing FISA and the FAA to bar disclosure fails strict scrutiny review
+because of the significant public interest in this information. As evidenced by the intense media
+coverage of PRISM and Facebook's alleged involvement therein, there is an ongoing debate over
+the government's use of its surveillance powers under FISA and the FAA. The government has
+confirmed that it uses its powers under FISA and the FAA and has weighed in on the public
+debate about the value of such programs. See Director of National Intelligence Statement on
+Activities Authorized Under Section 702 of FISA (June 6, 2013), available at
+http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/191-press-releases-2013/869-dni-
+statement-on-activities-authorized-under-section-702-of-fisa ("Information collected under this
+program is among the most important and valuable foreign intelligence information we collect,
+and is used to protect our nation from a wide variety of threats."). By this motion, Facebook
+seeks to contribute to this important debate in a responsible way that is commensurate with the
+information that the government has released or intends to release regarding the very same
+surveillance and acquisition activity.
+
+III. Conclusion
+
+For the foregoing reasons, Facebook requests that this Court issue a judgment declaring
+that it may disclose the Aggregate Data. Facebook also requests that the Court set a briefing
+schedule for this motion that would allow it an opportunity to respond to any opposition the
+government files in response to this petition.3
+
+3
+Facebook is amenable to coordinating the schedule in this matter with the schedule to be entered
+in Case Nos. Misc. 13-03 and 13-04, which involve similar, but not identical, requests for relief filed by
+Google and Microsoft.
+
+7
+
+IV. Rule 7 Statement
+
+Pursuant to FISC Rule of Procedure 7(1), Facebook states that its undersigned counsel,
+Chris Sonderby, holds a Top Secret security clearance, which was granted by the Federal Bureau
+of Investigation to permit him to advise Facebook concerning classified legal process. He is also
+a member in good standing of the State Bar of California. He has not previously appeared before
+this Court. Carl Nichols is a member in good standing of the bars of the District of Columbia
+and Commonwealth of Virginia. He does not presently hold a security clearance and has not
+previously appeared before this Court.
+
+Dated: September 9, 2013
+
+Chris Sonderby
+Facebook, Inc.
+Tel: (202) 663-6226
+Fax: (650) 472-8007
+1601 Willow Road
+Menlo Park, CA 94025
+
+Carl J. Nichols
+Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and
+Dorr LLP
+1875 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20006
+Tel: (202) 663-6226
+Fax: (202) 663-6363
+Carl.nichols@wilmerhale.com
+Attorneys for Facebook
+
+8
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+I hereby certify that at or before the time of filing this submission, the Government (care
+of the Security and Emergency Planning Staff, United States Department of Justice) has been
+served by hand delivery with a copy of this motion pursuant to Rule 8(a) of the FISC Rules of
+Procedure.
+
+Dated: September 9, 2013
+
+Carl J. Nichols
+Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and
+Dorr LLP
+1875 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20006
+Tel: (202) 663-6226
+Fax: (202) 663-6363
+Carl.nichols@wilmerhale.com
+Attorney for Facebook
+
+9
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-06-motion-130909/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-06-motion-130909/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..62a0548
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-06-motion-130909/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+{
+ "title": "Motion, In re Motion for Declaratory Judgment to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders and Directives, No. Misc. 13-06 (FISA Ct. Sept. 9, 2013)",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-09-09",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [
+ "PRISM"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-09-09",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34495",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "4fcbbf1339300f326cda5222f68c24f05bb6586269d399f1c0191aed6076937c",
+ "pages": 9
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-07-motion-for-declaratory-judgement-LinkedIn-130917/FISC_-_misc-13-07-motion-for-declaratory-judgement-LinkedIn-130917.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-07-motion-for-declaratory-judgement-LinkedIn-130917/FISC_-_misc-13-07-motion-for-declaratory-judgement-LinkedIn-130917.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f36b35c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-07-motion-for-declaratory-judgement-LinkedIn-130917/FISC_-_misc-13-07-motion-for-declaratory-judgement-LinkedIn-130917.md
@@ -0,0 +1,496 @@
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+2013 SEP 17 PM 4:44
+
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+UNITED STATES FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
+THAT LINKEDIN CORPORATION MAY REPORT
+AGGREGATE DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. 13-07
+
+MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
+THAT LINKEDIN CORPORATION MAY REPORT
+AGGREGATE DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and Rule 6(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court, LinkedIn Corporation ("LinkedIn") hereby respectfully moves
+this Court for an order, judgment, or such other relief as this Court may deem appropriate,
+declaring that, for each provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"), 50
+U.S.C. § 1801 et seq. and the FISA Amendments Act (the "FAA") pursuant to which LinkedIn
+may receive process, LinkedIn may, without violating any provision of law, publicly report the
+total number of compulsory requests it receives from the United States government and the total
+number of users or accounts encompassed within such requests. Further, pursuant to Rule 17 of
+the Rules of Procedure, LinkedIn respectfully requests a public oral argument on this Motion.
+
+BACKGROUND
+
+LinkedIn is the world's largest professional network, with over 238 million members.
+Among other things, through its website and mobile applications, LinkedIn provides its members
+with electronic communications services. Thus, LinkedIn's business involves providing
+
+[^1] Nothing in this Motion is intended to, or does, confirm or deny that LinkedIn has received any
+requests under FISA or the FAA.
+
+1
+
+electronic communications services that, for certain purposes, are subject to FISA and the FAA.
+See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(B); 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h).[^2]
+
+LinkedIn's mission is to connect the world's professionals to make them more productive
+and successful. As it represents to its members, one of LinkedIn's core values is "Members
+First." Critical to this mission and core value is LinkedIn's commitment to earning and retaining
+its members' trust. It earns this trust by being open and transparent with its members, and by
+providing members with the Three C's, as it relates to members' data: Clarity, Consistency and
+Control. LinkedIn is clear about what it will and will not do with member data. It is consistent
+with how it treats member data (e.g., no retroactive default settings). And, finally, LinkedIn
+provides members control over their data. This applies to all data on LinkedIn, including
+communications. LinkedIn's members entrust LinkedIn with their data, upon which they have
+built their professional reputation. LinkedIn's success is based upon the trust its members have
+placed in the company; although that trust takes a long time to build, it can be broken with a snap
+of the fingers.
+
+[^2] Under the FAA, for example, the term "electronic communications service provider" is defined
+by reference to how that term is defined by the Stored Communications Act ("SCA"), 18 U.S.C.
+§§ 2701 et seq. See 50 U.S.C. 1881(b)(4)(C). However, the SCA regulates only the disclosure
+of stored electronic communications held by providers of electronic communication service
+("ECS") and providers of remote computing service ("RCS"). Whether an entity acts as an ECS
+or an RCS is entirely context dependent; a determination of whether the SCA's ECS rules or
+RCS rules apply must occur based on the particular service or particular piece of an electronic
+communication at issue at a specific time. See In re United States, 665 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1214
+(D. Or. 2009); Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a
+Legislator's Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO.WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1215-16 & n.48 (2004)
+("Kerr"). In other words, a provider such as LinkedIn can act as an ECS with respect to some
+communications, an RCS with respect to other communications, and neither an ECS nor an RCS
+with respect to other communications. Kerr at 1215-16 & n.48. Thus, nothing in this Motion is
+intended as an acknowledgement that LinkedIn is subject to the SCA for any and all purposes.
+
+2
+
+LinkedIn understands, supports and has the greatest respect for the critical work
+performed by the government to protect our national security. At the same time, recent news
+reports about government surveillance have given rise to significant concerns among both the
+American people and the global community about the privacy of individuals' communications,
+activities, and personal data on the Internet. For example, both The Guardian and The
+Washington Post newspapers have published extensive reports alleging that the government has
+far-reaching access to electronic communications of American citizens, particularly via providers
+of Internet communications services similar to those provided by LinkedIn.[^3] As President
+Obama has noted, these are "revelations that have depleted public trust" in the privacy of
+electronic communications.[^4] Indeed, the President has acknowledged that when those "outside
+of the intelligence community" read these news stories, "understandably, people would be
+concerned" and that he, "too," would be concerned if he "wasn't inside the government."[^5] Other
+articles have falsely suggested that LinkedIn itself is the subject of extensive government
+surveillance and information gathering.[^6] All of these reports clearly have the potential to cause
+significant harm to LinkedIn's reputation and to its business.
+
+Under these circumstances, and in light of LinkedIn's mission and core value, LinkedIn
+is committed to disclosing to its members clear and accurate information about government
+
+[^3] See, e.g., http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data;
+http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-
+internet-companies-in-broad-secret -program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-
+d970ccb04497_story.html.
+[^4] Remarks by the President in a Press Conference, Aug. 9, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
+press-office/2013/08/09/remarks-president-press-conference.
+[^5] Id.
+[^6] See, e.g., http://www.wnd.com/2013/06/prism-targets-worldwide-communications/ (stating that
+"LinkedIn and Twitter also are included in this information gathering" under government
+"PRISM" program).
+
+3
+
+requests for their data and communications, including the frequency and nature of government
+requests and the number of members affected. LinkedIn seeks to report this data in order to
+address its members' concerns about the privacy and security of their data, activities, and
+communications on the LinkedIn site; to correct any misimpressions members might have about
+the nature and frequency of government requests; and to inform the important and ongoing
+public debate regarding government surveillance.
+
+To these ends, over the past several months, LinkedIn has engaged with the Federal
+Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") to try to reach an agreement regarding LinkedIn's reporting of
+information regarding the number and the type of government requests for information it has
+received, including national security-related requests under FISA and/or the FAA and National
+Security Letters (“NSLs”). LinkedIn understands and supports the government's increasingly
+difficult job of protecting our national security, but those national security interests must be
+balanced against the need for transparency. LinkedIn has never sought, and does not now seek,
+to disclose the substance of any such requests, the identity of the affected members, or the
+substance of any of LinkedIn's responses to the requests. Against the backdrop of these
+negotiations, on July 18, 2013, LinkedIn and dozens of other companies and nonprofit
+organizations and trade associations sent a letter to President Obama and congressional
+leadership urging greater transparency around national security-related requests by the United
+States government to Internet, telephone, and web-based service providers for information about
+their users and subscribers.
+
+Unfortunately, despite extensive negotiations, LinkedIn and the FBI have recently
+reached an impasse and have been unable to agree on a reporting framework that would permit
+LinkedIn to provide its members and the public with an accurate and more transparent
+
+4
+
+understanding of the government's national security-related requests for its members' data and
+communications. Among other things, the FBI has taken the position that LinkedIn cannot
+report aggregate data regarding the number of FISA requests, NSLs, or other kinds of national
+security-related requests or the aggregate number of member accounts affected by such requests.
+The FBI has informed LinkedIn that it has two choices: (1) it may disclose the total number of
+government requests for information, excluding all national security-related requests, with the
+number of NSLs only in "buckets of 0 to 1,000" on an annual basis and without any information
+regarding the number of FISA requests; or (2) it may disclose the total number of all government
+requests, including national security-related requests, on a six-month basis but only in "buckets
+of 0 to 1,000" and without any breakdown or indication of the number of national security-
+related requests.
+
+On September 17, 2013, LinkedIn published a global transparency report of government
+requests for members' data, covering the period January 1, 2013 – June 30, 2013. The report
+lists total U.S. government requests for member data, including subpoenas, search warrants,
+court orders, and other requests. As a result of the FBI's restrictions, however, the report does
+not include any data regarding national security-related requests, including requests issued under
+FISA and/or the FAA or NSLs.
+
+The FBI continues to maintain that disclosing this information would harm unspecified
+national security interests despite the fact that, on August 29, 2013, at the direction of President
+Obama, the Director of National Intelligence ("DNI") instructed the intelligence community to
+report data regarding various requests for information related to national security, including:
+(1) orders under FISA based on probable cause; (2) orders under Section 702 of FISA; (3)
+orders to produce business records pursuant to Title V of FISA; (4) orders for Pen Registers
+
+5
+
+pursuant to Title IV of FISA; and (5) NSLs issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2709, among other
+statutes.[^7] The DNI stated that, in each category, the intelligence community would release the
+"total number of orders" and the "number of targets affected by these orders."[^8]
+
+The government's restrictions on the information that LinkedIn can provide to its
+members and to the public lacks any support in the law and is inconsistent with the Constitution.
+Moreover, LinkedIn's reputation and business have been and continue to be affected by the
+limitations on the information LinkedIn can disclose, particularly in light of the recent news
+reports of government surveillance activity and the false and misleading news reports suggesting
+that LinkedIn may itself be the subject of extensive government surveillance. Under these
+circumstances, LinkedIn hereby moves this Court for an order declaring that, for each provision
+of FISA and/or the FAA pursuant to which it may receive process, LinkedIn may disclose, on a
+semi-annual basis, the total number of compulsory requests it received from the United States
+government issued during the prior six months and the total number of members or accounts
+encompassed within or affected by such requests (collectively, "the Aggregate Data"), without
+violating any provision of law. At a minimum, LinkedIn respectfully submits that it is entitled to
+report the total number of compulsory requests it has received pursuant to FISA and/or the FAA
+and the total number of members or accounts encompassed within or affected by such requests.[^9]
+
+[^7] See http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/191-press-releases-2013/922-dni-
+clapper-directs-annual-release-of-information-related-to-orders-issued-under-national-security-
+authorities.
+[^8] Id.
+[^9] These authorities include the provisions of FISA and the FAA authorizing (1) electronic
+surveillance orders, see 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1812; (2) physical search orders, see 50 U.S.C.
+§§ 1821-1829; (3) pen register and trap and trace orders, see 50 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1846; (4)
+business records orders, see 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1862; and (5) orders and directives targeting
+certain persons outside the United States, see 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881-1881g.
+
+6
+
+ARGUMENT
+
+At the President's direction, the government is "creating a website that will serve as a hub
+for further transparency" in order to "give Americans and the world the ability to learn more
+about what our intelligence community does and what it doesn't do, how it carries out its
+mission, and why it does so."[^10] That is all LinkedIn seeks for itself, its members, and the public,
+and it is all that reporting the Aggregate Data would do. The government's limitations on the
+information that LinkedIn may disclose is unsupported by FISA, the FAA, or any other rule of
+law. It also violates the First Amendment by restricting LinkedIn's ability to communicate with
+its members and the broader public regarding the number of requests for member data it has
+received.
+
+I. NO RULE OF LAW PROHIBITS LINKEDIN FROM REPORTING THE
+AGGREGATE DATA
+
+No provision of FISA or the FAA grants the government the authority it has arrogated to
+itself to limit LinkedIn's ability to report publicly the Aggregate Data. Among other things,
+neither statutory framework contains any provision authorizing the government to prevent the
+recipient of an order issued by this Court authorizing electronic surveillance from disclosing the
+existence of such an order. Nor does any provision of FISA or the FAA prohibit the recipient of
+an electronic surveillance order from disclosing the fact that the order has been received.
+Further, the plain text of the provisions of FISA and the FAA that refer to disclosure of this
+Court's orders makes clear that neither provision prohibits disclosure of the Aggregate Data.
+
+The first such provision provides that this Court may order electronic communications
+providers to furnish "all information, facilities, or technical assistance necessary to accomplish
+
+[^10] Remarks by the President in a Press Conference, Aug. 9, 2013, supra note 4.
+
+7
+
+the electronic surveillance in such a manner as will protect its secrecy and produce a minimum of
+interference with the services" the provider is "providing that target of electronic surveillance."
+50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(B); see also 50 U.S.C. § 1824(c)(2)(B); § 1881b(h)(1)(A). Far from a
+perpetual gag order prohibiting the disclosure of the existence of surveillance the government
+already has undertaken, this provision simply ensures that communications providers will take
+steps to avoid alerting targets as to surveillance activities the government is carrying out or will
+carry out with respect to their communications. The provision requires a communications
+provider to minimize interference with the target's service precisely because a significant
+disruption of service could alert the target. Likewise, because FISA defines "electronic
+surveillance" as "the acquisition" of data or communications, see 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f) (emphasis
+added), the phrase "accomplish the electronic surveillance in such manner as will protect its
+secrecy" simply means that a communications provider must not compromise the secrecy of
+planned surveillance of a particular target before the government can carry it out. That language
+does not prevent a communications provider from disclosing the number of requests for
+surveillance it already has received without disclosing the targets of that surveillance. Nothing
+in such a disclosure undermines the secrecy of the surveillance conducted against a particular
+target or alerts a target that is going to be the subject of surveillance.
+
+Nor does the provision of FISA that requires electronic communications providers to
+"maintain under security procedures approved by the Attorney General and the Director of
+National Intelligence any records concerning the acquisition or the aid furnished that such
+electronic communication service provider wishes to maintain" prohibit the reporting of the
+Aggregate Data. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(C); see also 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(1)(B) (same). The
+provision is directed only at "records" that an electronic communications provider may maintain.
+
+8
+
+Here, LinkedIn is not seeking to disclose any records, i.e., the identity of members or the
+substance of communications. LinkedIn merely seeks to report the Aggregate Data, which
+consists only of the number and type of requests without disclosing any information regarding
+the content of those requests.
+
+In light of these statutory provisions, and the absence of any other provision that
+authorizes the government to impose limitations on the disclosure of the Aggregate Data, the
+restrictions imposed by the government are without legal basis, exceed the government's
+authority, and should be stricken down.
+
+II. LINKEDIN HAS A FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO REPORT THE
+AGGREGATE DATA
+
+For the reasons set forth above, no rule of law prevents LinkedIn from reporting the
+Aggregate Data. Any rule of law that could be interpreted to authorize the government to
+prevent LinkedIn from reporting the Aggregate Data would be unconstitutional under the First
+Amendment because LinkedIn has a free speech right to report such information to its members
+and to the public.
+
+Judge Illston in the Northern District of California recently held that an explicit statutory
+provision prohibiting the disclosure of requests for national security-related information violated
+the First Amendment. See In re Nat'l Sec. Letter, No. C 11-02173 SI, 2013 WL 1095417 (N.D.
+Cal. Mar. 14, 2013), appeal pending, Nos. 13-15957, 13-16731 and 13-16732 (9th Cir.). The
+petitioner in that case was an electronic communications provider that received an NSL pursuant
+to 18 U.S.C. § 2709. In the letter, the FBI certified that disclosing the existence of the NSL
+could result in "a danger to the national security of the United States, interference with a
+criminal, counterterrorism, or counterintelligence investigation, interference with diplomatic
+relations, or danger to the life or physical safety of any person." Id. at *2. Under the NSL
+
+9
+
+statute, the FBI's certification prohibited the petitioner from disclosing the NSL's existence. See
+18 U.S.C. § 2709(c). The petitioner filed an action alleging that the nondisclosure provision
+violated the First Amendment. Judge Illston held that the government's "pervasive use of
+nondisclosure orders, coupled with the government's failure to demonstrate that a blanket
+prohibition on recipients' ability to disclose the mere fact of receipt of an NSL is necessary to
+serve the compelling need of national security, creates too large a danger that speech is being
+unnecessarily restricted." In re Nat'l Sec. Letter, 2013 WL 1095417, at *10.
+
+The same is true here where the government claims authority to prevent LinkedIn from
+reporting factual information regarding FISA orders. Like the NSL nondisclosure provision, a
+prohibition on reporting the Aggregate Data, whether or not statutory, "clearly restrains speech
+of a particular content—significantly, speech about government conduct." In re Nat'l Sec.
+Letter, 2013 WL 1095417, at *6 (citing John Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861, 876, 878 (2d
+Cir. 2008)). The government's position, as in the NSL litigation, is that LinkedIn may be
+"prevented from speaking about [its] receipt" of any national security-related requests "and from
+disclosing, as part of the public debate on the appropriate use of" such requests its "own
+experiences." Id.
+
+As a content-based restraint on speech, it is subject to strict scrutiny. See, e.g., id.;
+Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass'n, 555 U.S. 353, 358 (2009) (“Restrictions on speech based on its
+content are presumptively invalid and subject to strict scrutiny.") (quotation marks omitted).
+Indeed, the government previously has conceded that strict scrutiny would apply to a statute
+preventing the very kind of disclosure that the government has claimed the power to prevent
+here. See Mukasey, 549 F.3d at 877-78. Under strict scrutiny review, the government must
+demonstrate that the nondisclosure requirement is "narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
+
+10
+
+governmental interest." In re Nat'l Sec. Letter, 2013 WL 1095417, at *6; compare United States
+v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (same).
+
+Further, the government's position is that it "has been given the unilateral power to
+determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether to allow [the] recipients" of national security-related
+requests "to speak about the" requests. In re Nat'l Sec. Letter, 2013 WL 1095417, at *6. Judge
+Illston held that the First Amendment prohibited the government from exercising such power as
+to NSLs, even where Congress had granted it. See id. If no statute prohibits disclosure of the
+Aggregate Data, the government's claimed authority would be even more constitutionally
+problematic. While this may not be a "typical" prior restraint, the government cannot exercise
+this kind of authority unless it can show the same "heightened justifications for sustaining prior-
+restraints" that apply to traditional prior restraints. Id.; cf. New York Times Co. v. United States,
+403 U.S. 713, 723 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("The Government says that it has inherent
+powers to go into court and obtain an injunction to protect the national interest, which in this
+case is alleged to be national security. [We have] repudiated that expansive doctrine in no
+uncertain terms.").
+
+To be sure, the government's interest in national security is vitally important as a general
+matter. See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 510 (1980) (per curiam) ("The Government
+has a compelling interest in protecting both the secrecy of information important to our national
+security and the appearance of confidentiality so essential to the effective operation of our
+foreign intelligence service"). However, a restraint on reporting that applies, "without
+distinction," to "both the content of" a request for national security-related information "and to
+the very fact of having received one" is "not narrowly tailored" to the government's interest in
+national security. In re Nat'l Sec. Letter, 2013 WL 1095417, at *10.
+
+11
+
+That is because reporting only an aggregate number of requests (and the aggregate
+number of members affected) does not reveal anything about the substantive content of those
+requests. Disclosure of the number of requests does not reveal what information or threats the
+government is investigating, nor does it reveal who the information relates to or the member or
+members at issue. An aggregate number does not give anyone warning that he or she is under
+suspicion or the target of surveillance. And an aggregate number does not reveal whether this
+Court has issued any particular order or granted any particular government application. In short,
+unless a recipient has "only a handful of subscribers," reporting whether a recipient has received
+a request for information related to national security does not reveal anything about the
+government's strategy or tactics in protecting national security. Id. at *11.
+
+Nor can the government claim otherwise where it already has publicly reported aggregate
+data on requests under FISA.[^11] Further, as set forth above, the DNI has directed the intelligence
+community to report data regarding various requests for information related to national security,
+including FISA orders and NSLs.[^12] The DNI stated that, in each category, the intelligence
+community would release the "total number of orders" and the "number of targets affected by
+these orders."[^13]
+
+Thus, LinkedIn's reporting of the aggregate number of each such request it has received
+(and the aggregate number of members affected) —without disclosing the contents of any of
+these requests—would simply report a subset of information that the government itself has
+
+[^11] See Letter from Peter J. Kadzik, Principal Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
+Hon. Senator Harry Reid, Majority Leader, Apr. 30, 2013, available at:
+http://www.justice.gov/nsd/foia/foia_library/2012fisa-ltr.pdf.
+[^12] See supra note 7.
+[^13] Id.
+
+12
+
+reported and will continue reporting. The First Amendment simply does not permit the
+government to restrain LinkedIn from reporting a portion of information that the government
+itself already has disclosed.
+
+On the contrary, a prior restraint on reporting the Aggregate Data would be "especially
+problematic in light of the active, continuing public debate" regarding government surveillance.
+In re Nat'l Sec. Letter, 2013 WL 1095417, at *11. Indeed, the government has publicly stated on
+repeated occasions that it uses its powers under FISA and the FAA to collect information
+regarding Internet users' activities and communications, and has weighed in on this public debate
+about the value of such programs.[^14] The President has called for "a thoughtful fact-based
+debate" that is "guided by our Constitution, with reverence for our history as a nation of laws,
+and with respect for the facts."[^15] Reporting the Aggregate Data would provide LinkedIn
+members and the public with basic facts about the government's requests to LinkedIn for
+information about its members. As such, it "occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First
+Amendment values, and is entitled to special protection." Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207,
+
+[^14] See, e.g., Director of National Intelligence Statement on Activities Authorized Under Section
+702 of FISA (June 6, 2013), available at http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-
+releases/191-press-releases-2013/869-dni-statement-on-activities-authorized-under-section-702-
+of-fisa ("Information collected under this program is among the most important and valuable
+foreign intelligence information we collect, and is used to protect our nation from a wide variety
+of threats."); U.S. Dep't of Justice & Office of the DNI, The Intelligence Community's
+Collection Programs Under Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, at 3-4 (marked
+"Top Secret" and transmitted to Congress on May 4, 2012; declassified on August 21, 2013),
+available at:
+http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Ltr%20to%20HPSCI%20Chairman%20Rogers%20and%20
+Ranking%20Member%20Ruppersberger_Scan.pdf ("Once a target has been approved, NSA
+uses two means to acquire [redacted] electronic communications. First, [redacted], it acquires
+such communications directly from U.S.-based ISPs. This is known as PRISM collection...
+Second, in addition to collection directly from ISPs, NSA collects telephone and electronic
+communications as they transit the Internet 'backbone' within the United States. This is known
+as 'upstream' collection.").
+[^15] See Remarks by the President in a Press Conference, Aug. 9, 2013, supra note 4.
+
+13
+
+1215 (2011) (quotation marks omitted); see also Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)
+("Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is
+practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free
+discussion of governmental affairs."); Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533-34 (2001) ("The
+enforcement of [the challenged measure] in these cases . . . implicates the core purposes of the
+First Amendment because it imposes sanctions on the publication of truthful information of
+public concern.").
+
+There is no justification for depriving LinkedIn of the protections provided by the First
+Amendment here. Reporting the Aggregate Data would not jeopardize national security and the
+government itself already has reported similar data. Accordingly, LinkedIn has a First
+Amendment right to report the Aggregate Data and any provision of law preventing such
+reporting is constitutionally infirm.
+
+III. CONCLUSION
+
+For the foregoing reasons, LinkedIn respectfully requests that this Court issue an order,
+judgment, or such other relief as this Court may deem appropriate, declaring that LinkedIn may
+disclose the Aggregate Data without violating any provision of law.
+
+Further, pursuant to Rule 17 of the Rules of Procedure, LinkedIn respectfully requests a
+public oral argument on this Motion. Given that the issues of transparency raised by this Motion
+are the subject of intense concern by and vigorous debate among the American people and their
+elected representatives, it is appropriate that those issues be adjudicated as transparently as
+possible.
+
+* * * *
+
+14
+
+The undersigned counsel do not hold a security clearance.
+
+Pursuant to Rule 7(h) and Rule 63, the undersigned counsel for LinkedIn hereby certify
+that Jerome C. Roth is licensed to practice law by the bar of California and the bar of New York,
+and is a member in good standing of the bars of the United States Courts of Appeals for the
+Second and Ninth Circuits and the United States District Courts for the Eastern, Central and
+Northern Districts of California and the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York.
+Undersigned counsel further certify that Jonathan H. Blavin is licensed to practice law by the bar
+of California, and is a member in good standing of the bars of the United States Court of Appeals
+for the Ninth Circuit and the United States District Courts for the Eastern, Central and Northern
+Districts of California. Undersigned counsel certify that Justin P. Raphael is licensed to practice
+law by the bar of New York, and is a member in good standing of the bar of the United States
+District Court for the Southern District of New York.
+
+Dated: September 17, 2013
+
+Jerome C. Roth
+Jonathan H. Blavin
+Justin P. Raphael
+Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP
+560 Mission Street, 27th Floor
+San Francisco, CA 94105
+(415) 683-9100 (telephone)
+(415) 512-4077 (facsimile)
+Jerome.Roth@mto.com
+Jonathan.Blavin@mto.com
+Justin.Raphael@mto.com
+
+Attorneys for Movant LinkedIn Corporation
+
+15
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I hereby certify this 17th of September, 2013, that the foregoing document was
+served via hand delivery on the following:
+
+Christine Gunning
+Litigation Security Group
+United States Department of Justice
+2 Constitution Square
+145 N. St., NE, Suite 2W-115
+Washington, DC 20530
+
+Jerome C. Roth
+Jonathan H. Blavin
+Justin P. Raphael
+Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP
+560 Mission Street, 27th Floor
+San Francisco, CA 94105
+(415) 512-4000 (telephone)
+(415) 512-4077 (facsimile)
+Jerome.Roth@mto.com
+Jonathan.Blavin@mto.com
+Justin.Raphael@mto.com
+
+Attorneys for Movant LinkedIn Corporation
+
+16
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-07-motion-for-declaratory-judgement-LinkedIn-130917/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-07-motion-for-declaratory-judgement-LinkedIn-130917/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6207476
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-07-motion-for-declaratory-judgement-LinkedIn-130917/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+{
+ "title": "Motion for Declaratory Judgment that LinkedIn Corporation May Report Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders, In re Motion for Declaratory Judgment that LinkedIn May Report Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders, No. Misc. 13-07 (FISA Ct. Sept. 17, 2013).",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-09-17",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [
+ "PRISM"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-09-17",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34496",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "dab3141b8b4924b31d6b3bfd10424b7907cb0fab87a0c3444052dfa3757beb89",
+ "pages": 16
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-08-motion-131107/FISC_-_misc-13-08-motion-131107.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-08-motion-131107/FISC_-_misc-13-08-motion-131107.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6d96f42
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-08-motion-131107/FISC_-_misc-13-08-motion-131107.md
@@ -0,0 +1,1185 @@
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+2013 NOV -7 PM 2:42
+
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE OPINIONS & ORDERS OF THIS COURT
+ADDRESSING BULK COLLECTION OF DATA
+UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE ACT
+No. Misc. 13-8
+
+MOTION OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
+THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF THE NATION'S CAPITAL, AND
+THE MEDIA FREEDOM AND INFORMATION ACCESS CLINIC
+FOR THE RELEASE OF COURT RECORDS
+
+David A. Schulz
+Jonathan Manes
+Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic
+Yale Law School
+P.O. Box 208215
+New Haven, CT 06520
+Phone: (212) 850-6103
+Fax: (212) 850-6299
+dschulz@lskslaw.com
+
+Alex Abdo
+Brett Max Kaufman
+Patrick Toomey
+Jameel Jaffer
+American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
+125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
+New York, NY 10004
+Phone: (212) 549-2500
+Fax: (212) 549-2654
+aabdo@aclu.org
+
+Arthur B. Spitzer
+American Civil Liberties Union of the
+Nation's Capital
+4301 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 434
+Washington, DC 20008
+Phone: (202) 457-0800
+Fax: (202) 457-0805
+artspitzer@aclu-nca.org
+
+TABLE OF CONTENTS
+
+PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.................................................................................... 1
+FACTUAL BACKGROUND....................................................................................... 3
+JURISDICTION........................................................................................................... 9
+ARGUMENT............................................................................................................... 10
+
+I. MOVANTS HAVE STANDING TO BRING THIS PUBLIC-ACCESS MOTION. 10
+
+II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT REQUIRES THE RELEASE OF THIS COURT'S OPINIONS CONCERNING THE LEGALITY OF THE GOVERNMENT'S BULK COLLECTION OF AMERICANS' DATA. 12
+
+A. The First Amendment right of access attaches to judicial opinions, including the opinions of this Court concerning the bulk collection of Americans' data. 12
+
+1. "Experience".......................................................................................... 13
+2. "Logic"................................................................................................... 16
+
+B. The First Amendment requires disclosure of the Court's opinions relating to bulk collection. 21
+
+III. THE COURT SHOULD ORDER DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW UNDER RULE 62 AND THEN APPLY THE FIRST AMENDMENT STANDARD TO ANY PROPOSED SEALING BY THE GOVERNMENT. 24
+
+CONCLUSION............................................................................................................ 28
+
+i
+
+PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
+
+Pursuant to the First Amendment and Rule 62 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
+Court's Rules of Procedure, the American Civil Liberties Union and the American Civil
+Liberties Union of the Nation's Capital (together, the "ACLU") and the Media Freedom and
+Information Access Clinic at Yale Law School (“MFIAC") (collectively, "Movants")
+respectfully move the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC") to unseal its opinions
+addressing the legal basis for the "bulk collection" of data by the United States government
+under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”), 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq., including
+but not limited to 50 U.S.C. § 1842. These opinions are subject to the public's First Amendment
+right of access, and no proper basis exists to keep the legal discussion in these opinions secret.¹
+
+In June 2013, government officials acknowledged the existence of an ongoing, seven-
+year program of bulk collection of the call-detail records of nearly every telephonic
+communication in the country. The program was approved by this Court pursuant to a provision
+of FISA amended by Section 215 of the Patriot Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1861.² Days after this call-
+tracking program was first revealed, Movants asked this Court to disclose its opinions addressing
+the meaning, scope, and constitutionality of Section 215 and the legality of the call-tracking
+
+¹ Movants use the term “bulk collection" in this motion in the same way this Court used it in
+In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from
+[REDACTED], No. BR 13-109, 2013 WL 5741573 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013).
+² "The Patriot Act" is the common name for the Uniting and Strengthening America by
+Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L.
+No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 2001). Section 215 amended FISA in part and empowers the
+Director of the FBI to obtain secret orders from this Court compelling third parties to produce
+"any tangible things" upon a showing that there are "reasonable grounds to believe that the
+tangible things sought are relevant" to an authorized foreign-intelligence or terrorism
+investigation. Id. § 1861(a)(1), (b)(2)(A). The orders are accompanied by a gag order forbidding
+recipients from disclosing having received the order. See id. § 1861(c)-(d).
+
+1
+
+program. .³ This Court granted that motion in part, and the government is now undertaking a
+declassification review of one of the Court's opinions in response.⁴
+
+Since Movants filed that motion, however, it has become clear that other critical opinions
+of this Court approving the bulk collection of Americans' information remain secret. Movants
+seek access to those opinions for two reasons. First, some of those opinions pertain to other
+forms of bulk collection that the government has now acknowledged, such as the bulk collection
+of internet metadata and cell-site location information. The public is entitled to know the legal
+bases for those programs, but those bases have not yet been disclosed. Second, some of those
+opinions predate the call-tracking program and apparently supply the original legal analysis
+necessary to understand this Court's later authorization of the call-tracking program. For
+example, it appears that one of the earlier bulk-collection opinions provides the Court's most
+comprehensive discussion both of the constitutionality of bulk collection under the Fourth
+Amendment and of the meaning of the term "relevant" as it appears in various FISA provisions.
+
+Movants' current request for access to opinions of this Court evaluating the legality of
+bulk collection seeks to vindicate the public's overriding interest in understanding how a far-
+reaching federal statute is being construed and implemented, and how constitutional privacy
+protections are being enforced. The First Amendment guarantees the public a qualified right of
+access to those opinions because judicial opinions interpreting constitutional and statutory limits
+on governmental authorities including those relevant to foreign-intelligence surveillance-have
+
+³ See Motion of ACLU & MFIAC for the Release of Court Records, In re Orders of this
+Court Interpreting Section 215 of the Patriot Act, No. Misc. 13-02 (FISA Ct. June 12, 2013),
+http://1.usa.gov/15dJTjx.
+⁴ See In re Orders of this Court Interpreting Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act (In re Section
+215 Orders), No. Misc. 13-02, 2013 WL 5460064, at *7 (FISA Ct. Sept. 13, 2013); see also
+Order, In re Section 215 Orders, No. Misc. 13-02 (FISA Ct. Oct. 8, 2013),
+http://1.usa.gov/18MXSQg (ordering declassification review of February 19, 2013 FISC
+opinion).
+
+2
+
+always been available for inspection by the public, and because their release is so manifestly
+fundamental in a democracy committed to the rule of law. Public disclosure serves to improve
+the functioning of the Court itself, to enhance its perceived fairness and independence, and to
+educate citizens about the Court's role in ensuring the integrity of the FISA system. This First
+Amendment guarantee of public access may be overcome only if the government is able to
+demonstrate a substantial probability of harm to a compelling interest and the absence of any
+alternative means to protect that interest. Any limits on the public's right of access must then be
+narrowly tailored and demonstrably effective in avoiding that harm.
+
+The Court should acknowledge the public's First Amendment right of access to these
+opinions and order their prompt publication. Because the opinions are of critical importance to
+the ongoing public debate about the legitimacy of the government's surveillance activities,
+Movants respectfully request that the Court publish the opinions as quickly as possible, with only
+those redactions justified under the stringent First Amendment standard. Alternatively, the Court
+should exercise its discretion to publish the opinions expeditiously in the public interest.
+
+FACTUAL BACKGROUND
+
+In June 2013, The Guardian disclosed a previously secret order issued by this Court
+compelling Verizon Business Network Services, a major U.S. telecommunications provider, to
+produce to the National Security Agency ("NSA”) “all call detail records or 'telephony
+metadata" of its customers over a ninety-day period. Soon thereafter, the government disclosed
+that the Secondary Order belongs to a broader NSA program that has been in place for seven
+
+⁵ Secondary Order at 2, In Re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Production
+of Tangible Things from Verizon Bus. Network Servs., Inc. on Behalf of MCI Commc'n Servs.,
+Inc., No. BR 13-80 (FISA Ct. Apr. 25, 2013) ("Secondary Order"),
+https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/709012/verizon.pdf; see Glenn
+Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily, Guardian,
+June 5, 2013, http://gu.com/p/3gc62.
+
+3
+
+years involving the bulk collection of metadata-including the times and durations of calls-
+concerning virtually every phone call, domestic and international, made or received in the United
+States.⁶
+
+In the months following the government's acknowledgment of the NSA's call-tracking
+program, the public learned that the government's bulk collection of records has not been limited
+to call records. In late June 2013, an administration official acknowledged a now-discontinued
+government surveillance program that involved the collection of Americans' internet metadata in
+bulk.⁷ The Director of National Intelligence (“DNI"), James R. Clapper, later reiterated that
+acknowledgment.⁸ Additional releases of documents by the government have provided more
+details, specifying the apparent legal basis for the internet-metadata program.⁹
+
+Indeed, several recent disclosures suggest that the government's bulk-collection activities
+go beyond even telephony and internet metadata. During a hearing before the Senate Judiciary
+Committee in early October, DNI Clapper disclosed that the NSA "conducted a secret pilot
+project in 2010 and 2011 to test the collection of bulk data about the location of Americans'
+
+⁶ See Administration White Paper: Bulk Collection of Telephony Metadata Under Section 215
+of the USA PATRIOT Act at 1 (Aug. 9, 2013),
+http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/Section215.pdf; Dep't of Justice, Report on the National
+Security Agency's Bulk Collection Programs for USA PATRIOT Act Reauthorization at 3 (Feb.
+2, 2011), http://l.usa.gov/1cdFJ1G.
+⁷ See Glenn Greenwald & Spencer Ackerman, How the NSA Is Still Harvesting Your Online
+Data, Guardian, June 27, 2013, http://gu.com/p/3gqmz.
+⁸ See James R. Clapper, DNI, Cover Letter Announcing Document Release (Aug. 21, 2013),
+http://1.usa.gov/1bU8Cgt.
+⁹ See, e.g., Memorandum from Vito T. Potenza, General Counsel, NSA, to Staff Director,
+House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Feb. 25, 2009), http://1.usa.gov/1cplAa9
+(stating that bulk collection of internet metadata was based on FISA's pen-register provision, 50
+U.S.C. § 1841); see also, e.g., Letter from Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney General, to Rep.
+Bobby Scott, House Committee on the Judiciary, at 1 (Dec. 17. 2009), http://1.usa.gov/1dk3hQO
+(referring to "bulk collection of telephony metadata" under Section 215 and a "similar collection
+program conducted under the pen register/trap and trace authority of FISA").
+
+4
+
+cellphones."¹⁰ Though DNI Clapper told Congress that the government is no longer engaged in
+the bulk collection of location information under Section 215, officials have elsewhere stated that
+the government is authorized to obtain location information in bulk under the Secondary Order.¹¹
+On April 1, 2011, the NSA's Office of General Counsel informed the Senate Select Committee
+on Intelligence that the Department of Justice ("DOJ") had advised the NSA in February 2010
+that obtaining cell-site location information for "testing purposes was permissible based upon the
+current language of the [FISC's] BR FISA order requiring the production of 'all call detail
+records," and that the DOJ had "orally advised the FISC" only after the acquisition of this
+information.¹² Under questioning from lawmakers, various government officials have declined to
+deny that the government is currently collecting Americans' location information in bulk, stating
+only that such information is not being collected "under this program"-i.e., the call-tracking
+program already acknowledged under Section 215.¹³
+
+There are reasons to believe that the government is engaged in the bulk collection of
+other records as well. In a statement issued this summer, Senators Ron Wyden and Mark Udall----
+both members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence-warned that:
+
+> [T]he Patriot Act's surveillance authorities are not limited to phone records. In
+> fact, section 215 of the Patriot Act can be used to collect any type of records
+> whatsoever. The fact that Patriot Act authorities were used for the bulk collection
+> of email records as well as phone records underscores our concern that this
+
+¹⁰ Charlie Savage, In Test Project, N.S.A. Tracked Cellphone Locations, N.Y. Times, Oct. 2,
+2013, http://nyti.ms/18OAlz2.
+¹¹ See Siobhan Gorman & Julian E. Barnes, Officials: NSA Doesn't Collect Cellphone-
+Location Records, Wall St. J., June 16, 2013, http://on.wsj.com/16RpQNF.
+¹² See Letter from [REDACTED], Attorney, Office of General Counsel, NSA, to Senate Select
+Committee on Intelligence at 1 (Apr. 1, 2011), http://1.usa.gov/1gWqiy0.
+¹³ See, e.g., Letter from James R. Clapper, DNI, to Senator Ron Wyden, at 1 (July 26, 2013),
+http://1.usa.gov/1acgiHi; Oversight of the Administration's Use of FISA Authorities: Hearing
+Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. at 29:33–36:00 (July 17, 2013),
+http://cs.pn/1bpUHRJ (statement of John C. Inglis, Deputy Director, NSA).
+
+5
+
+> authority could be used to collect other types of records in bulk as well, including
+> information on credit card purchases, medical records, library records, firearm
+> sales records, financial information and a range of other sensitive subjects. These
+> other types of collection could clearly have a significant impact on Americans'
+> constitutional rights.¹⁴
+
+Senator Wyden expanded on this warning in a speech given later in July 2013, suggesting
+that the government's view of its bulk-collection authority is "essentially limitless":
+
+> Especially troubling is the fact that there is nothing in the Patriot Act that limits
+> this sweeping bulk collection to phone records. The government can use the
+> Patriot Act's business records authority to collect, collate and retain all sorts of
+> sensitive information, including medical records, financial records, or credit card
+> purchases. They could use this authority to develop a database of gun owners or
+> readers of books and magazines deemed subversive. This means that the
+> government's authority to collect information on law-abiding American citizens is
+> essentially limitless. If it is a record held by a business, membership organization,
+> doctor, or school, or any other third party, it could be subject to bulk collection
+> under the Patriot Act.¹⁵
+
+Additionally, this Court has confirmed that it has addressed the legality of bulk collection
+of Americans' data outside the context of the call-tracking program. On September 17, 2013, the
+Court published a partially redacted opinion issued on August 29, 2013 ("August 2013 FISC
+Opinion") explaining its renewal of the NSA's call-tracking program.¹⁶ In its opinion, the Court
+relied upon earlier unpublished FISC opinions that apparently addressed the "issue of relevance
+for bulk collections" under another provision of FISA and, presumably, the constitutionality of
+
+¹⁴ Sen. R. Wyden & Sen. M. Udall, Wyden, Udall Statement on the Disclosure of Bulk Email
+Records Collection Program (July 2, 2013), http://1.usa.gov/121Flua (emphasis added).
+¹⁵ Sen. R. Wyden, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery for the Center for American
+Progress Event on NSA Surveillance (July 23, 2013),
+http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-
+content/uploads/2013/07/7232013WydenCAPspeech.pdf (emphasis added).
+¹⁶ In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things
+from [REDACTED], No. BR 13-109, 2013 WL 5741573, at *1 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013).
+
+6
+
+the bulk collection of metadata under the Fourth Amendment.¹⁷ The Court did not summarize or
+otherwise expand upon the previous, still-secret FISC opinions addressing the government's bulk
+collection of Americans' data.
+
+Thus, despite the government's and this Court's publication of some information
+concerning the legal basis for the call-tracking program and other government surveillance
+activities, crucial aspects of that legal basis remain secret-in particular, this Court's original
+analysis of the constitutionality of bulk data collection under the Fourth Amendment and the
+Court's interpretation of the term “relevant" under 50 U.S.C. § 1842.¹⁸
+
+Last month, _The Washington Post_ reported that various current and former government
+officials have called for the declassification and release of "the original—and still classified-
+judicial interpretation that held that the bulk collection of Americans' data was lawful."¹⁹ The
+officials expressed concern that despite the disclosures made by the government and this Court
+over the past three months, the public has still not been provided with the original, complete
+
+¹⁷ Id. at *6 ("This Court has previously examined the issue of relevance for bulk collections.
+See [REDACTED]. While those matters involved different collections from the one at issue here, the
+relevance standard was similar." (citing 50 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2))); see id. at *2 ("This Court had
+reason to analyze this distinction [between individual and bulk collection] in a similar context in
+[REDACTED].").
+¹⁸ In addressing the Fourth Amendment implications of the call-tracking program, the August
+2013 FISC Opinion concludes that "[t]he production of telephone service provider metadata is
+squarely controlled by the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735
+(1979)." 2013 WL 5741573, at *2. A more recent FISC opinion renewing the call-tracking
+program concurs and also considers the program's constitutionality in light of the Supreme
+Court's decision in _United States v. Jones_, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). See Memorandum at 4-6, In re
+Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from
+[REDACTED], No. BR 13-158 (FISA Ct. Oct. 11, 2013), http://1.usa.gov/19QvFam. However, no
+published FISC opinion to date has addressed the compatibility of the Fourth Amendment with
+the bulk collection of other kinds of metadata, and the Court's original discussion of Smith and
+related authorities with respect to bulk collection remains secret.
+¹⁹ Ellen Nakashima & Carol D. Leonnig, _Effort Underway to Declassify Document that Is
+Legal Foundation for NSA Phone Program_, Wash. Post, Oct. 12, 2013, http://wapo.st/17reSyy
+(revealing the existence of a FISC opinion authored by then-Presiding Judge Kollar-Kotelly).
+
+7
+
+legal basis for the FISC's approval of the call-tracking program. As one former administration
+official put it:
+
+> If the question is, "How was this program authorized and what type of legal
+> analysis first took place?" the [August 2013 FISC Opinion] is just not
+> responsive.... It's hard for me to imagine, with all that's already out there, that
+> highly classified intelligence material would be so deeply entwined in the legal
+> analysis in that original interpretation that they couldn't somehow release it.²⁰
+
+And Senators Patrick Leahy and Ron Wyden both issued statements to the _Post_ expressing their
+firm support for the release of the FISC's original legal analysis of the call-tracking program.²¹
+
+The sum of the disclosures and releases of information over the past several months have
+generated a sustained and profound debate about the use of the government's surveillance
+authorities and, in particular, the NSA's collection of Americans' data in bulk. Since early June
+2013, Congress has held more than ten hearings to question government officials about NSA
+surveillance. Lawmakers have introduced legislation to end such bulk collection.²² And the
+government itself has initiated various reviews of its collection activities and authorities.²³
+
+This Court, too, has recognized the immense public interest in the ongoing debate. In _In
+re Section 215 Orders_, the Court acknowledged the important values served by the disclosure of
+these opinions. It noted that previous public disclosures had "engendered considerable public
+interest and debate" and that further "[p]ublication of FISC opinions... would contribute to that
+debate."²⁴ The Court also underscored the assertions by legislators of the "value of public
+
+²⁰ Id.
+²¹ See id.
+²² See, e.g., Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ending
+Eavesdropping, Dragnet-collection, and On-line Monitoring Act (“USA FREEDOM Act”), H.R.
+3361, 113th Cong. (2013), http://1.usa.gov/1dnrXb3.
+²³ See Paul Lewis, _NSA Review Panel to Present Obama with Dossier on Surveillance
+Reforms_, Guardian, Oct. 28, 2013, http://gu.com/p/3kv3p.
+²⁴ _In re Section 215 Orders_, 2013 WL 5460064, at *7.
+
+8
+
+information and debate in representing their constituents and discharging their legislative
+responsibilities," and affirmed that "[p]ublication would also assure citizens of the integrity of
+this Court's proceedings."²⁵ Likely for the same reason, the Court's Presiding Judge published
+his correspondence with Congress explaining the FISC's operating procedures and detailing
+certain statistics concerning the Court's approval of government applications, including under
+Section 215.²⁶
+
+Despite the extraordinary public interest in the surveillance programs authorized by the
+Court, an unknown number of legal opinions evaluating the constitutionality of and statutory
+basis for the bulk collection of Americans' data remain secret.
+
+JURISDICTION
+
+As an inferior federal court established by Congress under Article III, this Court
+possesses inherent powers, including "supervisory power over its own records and files....”
+_Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc._, 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978); accord _Chambers v. NASCO, Inc._,
+501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (“It has long been understood that [c]ertain implied powers must
+necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature of their institution." (quotation marks
+omitted)). As this Court has previously determined, the FISC therefore has "jurisdiction in the
+first instance to adjudicate a claim of right to the court's very own records and files." _In re
+Motion for Release of Court Records_, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, 487 (FISA Ct. 2007).
+
+²⁵ Id.; see Memorandum, In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Production
+of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 13-158 (FISA Ct. Oct. 11, 2013),
+http://1.usa.gov/19QvFam; In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Production
+of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], 2013 WL 5741573.
+²⁶ See Letter from Hon. Reggie B. Walton, Presiding Judge, FISC, to Hon. Patrick J. Leahy,
+Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary (Oct. 11, 2013), http://1.usa.gov/19FoYrJ; Letter from Hon.
+Reggie B. Walton, Presiding Judge, FISC, to Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Comm. on the
+Judiciary (July 29, 2013), http://1.usa.gov/laloM6n.
+
+9
+
+ARGUMENT
+
+I. MOVANTS HAVE STANDING TO BRING THIS PUBLIC-ACCESS MOTION.
+
+To demonstrate Article III standing, a party seeking judicial action must show “(1) that it
+has suffered an 'injury in fact'; (2) that the injury is caused by or fairly traceable to the
+challenged actions of the defendant; and (3) that it is likely that the injury will be redressed by a
+favorable decision." _Ethyl Corp. v. EPA_, 306 F.3d 1144, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing _Lujan v.
+Defenders of Wildlife_, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). Each element is met here.
+
+Denial of access to court opinions alone constitutes an injury sufficient to satisfy Article
+III. As the Supreme Court recognized in _Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for County of
+Norfolk_, 457 U.S. 596 (1982), the First Amendment right of access "serves to ensure that the
+individual citizen can effectively participate in and contribute to our republican system of self-
+government." Id. at 604; see _Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia_, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980)
+(The First Amendment prohibits "the government from limiting the stock of information from
+which members of the public may draw." (quotation marks omitted)). The right extends to
+organizations, and not just individuals. See _N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth._,
+684 F.3d 286, 294–95 (2d Cir. 2011).
+
+Accordingly, when a court closes its proceedings or seals records that are subject to the
+First Amendment right, any person denied access to the proceeding or record suffers a concrete
+and particularized injury. The injury is concrete because the party seeking access is in fact being
+deprived of information, and it is particular because the party specifically sought and was denied
+the material. Thus, in a case challenging a district court's exclusion of the press and public from
+plea and sentencing hearings and from access to court documents, the Fourth Circuit had no
+trouble summarily holding that a newspaper whose reporter was denied access "meets the
+standing requirement because it has suffered 'an injury that is likely to be redressed by a
+
+10
+
+favorable decision.'" _In re Wash. Post_, 807 F.2d 383, 388 n.4 (4th Cir. 1986) (alteration omitted)
+(quoting _Cent. S.C. Chapter, Soc'y of Prof'l Journalists v. Martin_, 556 F.2d 706, 707–08 (4th
+Cir. 1977)); see also, e.g., _N.Y.C. Transit Auth._, 684 F.3d at 295 (concluding that "exclusion
+from at least some... hearings" sufficed to "establish[] ... an actual injury”); _Huminski v.
+Corsones_, 396 F.3d 53, 83–84 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that the right of access can be "asserted by
+an identified excluded individual" and that "any member of the public not only members of the
+public selected by the courts themselves-may come and bear witness to what happens beyond
+the courtroom door").²⁷
+
+Movants also satisfy the second and third prongs of the standing analysis: causation and
+redressability. There can be no doubt that Movants' inability to inspect this Court's opinions
+"fairly can be traced to" this Court's denial of public access to them. See _Valley Forge Christian
+Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State_, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). It is likewise
+clear that there is a ""substantial probability' that a favorable outcome would redress [Movants']
+injuries." _Town of Barnstable v. FAA_, 659 F.3d 28, 31 (D.C. Cir. 2011). By releasing the
+
+²⁷ In the recent request by Movants for access to the opinions of this Court interpreting
+Section 215, Judge Saylor imposed a heightened burden upon parties seeking to assert a right of
+access, requiring a showing that the denial of access to this Court's opinions "impedes [access-
+seekers'] own activities in a concrete, particular way" or that gaining access "would be of
+concrete, particular assistance to them in their own activities." _In re Section 215 Orders_, 2013
+WL 5460064, at *2. MFIAC has moved for reconsideration of the Court's holding in that
+proceeding that it did not have standing to assert the right of access, see id. at *4, and contends
+that these additional showings are not properly part of the standing analysis. See Mem. of Law in
+Supp. of Mot. by MFIAC for Recons. of this Court's Sep. 13, 2013 Op. on the Issue of Article III
+Standing, In Re Section 215 Orders, No. Misc. 13-02 (FISA Ct. Oct. 11, 2013),
+http://1.usa.gov/1aTGGa4 (“MFIAC Recons. Br."). But even if those showings are necessary to
+establish standing, both the ACLU and MFIAC satisfy the additional requirements. See _In re
+Section 215 Orders_, 2013 WL 5460064, at *4 (holding that the ACLU has standing to assert a
+right of access to FISC records); MFIAC Recons. Br. at 15-16; Decl. of Maxwell S. Mishkin in
+Supp. of MFIAC Recons. Br., Ex. to MFIAC Recons. Br. (describing the litigation, advocacy,
+and educational activities of MFIAC).
+
+11
+
+requested portions of its opinions on bulk data collection, this Court would enforce the right of
+access that Movants assert.
+
+II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT REQUIRES THE RELEASE OF THIS COURT'S
+OPINIONS CONCERNING THE LEGALITY OF THE GOVERNMENT'S BULK
+COLLECTION OF AMERICANS' DATA.
+
+A. The First Amendment right of access attaches to judicial opinions,
+including the opinions of this Court concerning the bulk collection of
+Americans' data.
+
+That the judicial process should be as open to the public as possible is a principle
+enshrined in both the Constitution and the common law. See _Richmond Newspapers_, 448 U.S. at
+564-73; _Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga_, 435 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2006) ("The common
+law right of public access to judicial documents is firmly rooted in our nation's history."); cf.
+Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 Writings of James Madison at 103
+(G. Hunt ed. 1910) ("A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of
+acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both."). Under the Supreme
+Court's "experience and logic" test, the First Amendment right of public access attaches to
+judicial proceedings and records where (a) the type of judicial process or record sought has
+historically been available to the public, and (b) public access plays a "significant positive role"
+in the functioning of the process itself. _Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise
+II)_, 478 U.S. 1, 9, 11 (1986); see _Globe Newspaper_, 457 U.S. at 605-07; _Wash. Post v. Robinson_,
+935 F.2d 282, 287-92 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Proceedings and records to which the right of access
+attaches are presumptively open to the public and may be closed only where there is a substantial
+probability of harm to a compelling government interest, and where no alternative to a narrow
+limitation of access can effectively protect against that harm. _N.Y.C. Transit Auth._, 684 F.3d at
+296. In other words, the right of access is qualified but may not be denied "without sufficient
+justification." Id.
+
+12
+
+Here, there is a nearly unbroken tradition of public access to judicial rulings and opinions
+interpreting the Constitution and the laws governing the American people. Moreover, public
+access to such rulings and opinions allows the public to function as an essential check on its
+government and improves judicial decisionmaking. Those interests are particularly acute in the
+context of this Court's opinions interpreting the reach and constitutionality of the government's
+surveillance authorities. Access would enhance the functioning of this Court and the FISA
+system by: facilitating effective public oversight, increasing the legitimacy and independence of
+this Court, subjecting this Court's legal opinions to scrutiny within our common-law system, and
+permitting Congress, subject-matter experts, and the broader public to evaluate this Court's legal
+interpretations as they consider changes to the law. For these reasons, and as explained more
+fully below, the constitutional right of access extends to the opinions of this Court concerning the
+legality of the bulk collection of Americans' data.
+
+1. "Experience"
+
+The Supreme Court has instructed that the experience prong of its two-part test "does not
+look to the particular practice of any one jurisdiction, but instead 'to the experience in that type
+or kind of hearing throughout the United States . . . ." _El Vocero de P.R. v. Puerto Rico_, 508
+U.S. 147, 150 (1993) (per curiam) (quoting _Rivera-Puig v. Garcia-Rosario_, 983 F.2d 311, 323
+(1st Cir. 1992)). In other words, the proper focus of the "experience" analysis is the type of
+governmental process or record to which a petitioner seeks access, not the past practice of the
+specific forum. See, e.g., _N.Y.C. Transit Auth._, 684 F.3d at 301 (rejecting view that "Richmond
+Newspapers test looks... to the formal description of the forum"); _Hartford Courant Co. v.
+Pellegrino_, 380 F.3d 83, 94 (2d Cir. 2004) (examining First Amendment right of access to court
+"docket sheets and their historical counterparts," beginning with early English courts); _In re Bos._
+
+13
+
+_Herald, Inc._, 321 F.3d 174, 184 (1st Cir. 2003) (experience test includes examination of
+"analogous proceedings and documents").
+
+Under this approach, in assessing the past experience of access to a new forum whose
+secrecy is being challenged, it is inappropriate to analyze only the history of that forum itself.
+Because there will never be a tradition of public access in new forums, this approach would
+permit Congress to circumvent the constitutional right of access altogether-even as to, say,
+criminal trials-simply by providing that such trials henceforth be heard in a newly created
+forum. See, e.g., _N.Y.C. Transit Auth._, 684 F.3d at 296 (“Immunizing government proceedings
+from public scrutiny by placing them in institutions the Framers could not have imagined...
+would make avoidance of constitutional protections all too easy."); _In re Copley Press, Inc._, 518
+F.3d 1022, 1027 (9th Cir. 2008). The proper approach, therefore, is to examine whether the type
+of proceeding or record at issue-here judicial opinions interpreting the meaning and
+constitutionality of public statutes-has historically been available to the public. See, e.g., _N.Y.C.
+Transit Auth._, 684 F.3d at 299.
+
+No type of judicial record enjoys a more uninterrupted history of openness than judicial
+opinions. As explained by the Third Circuit:
+
+> As ours is a common-law system based on the "directive force" of precedents, its
+> effective and efficient functioning demands wide dissemination of judicial
+> decisions.... Even that part of the law which consists of codified statutes is
+> incomplete without the accompanying body of judicial decisions construing the
+> statutes. Accordingly, under our system of jurisprudence the judiciary has the
+> duty of publishing and disseminating its decisions.
+
+_Lowenschuss v. W. Pub. Co._, 542 F.2d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 1976) (quoting Benjamin N. Cardozo,
+_The Nature of the Judicial Process_ 20, 21–22 (1963)); see _Scheiner v. Wallace_, No. 93 Civ.
+0062, 1996 WL 633226, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 1996) (“The public interest in an accountable
+
+14
+
+judiciary generally demands that the reasons for a judgment be exposed to public scrutiny."
+(citing _United States v. Amodeo_, 71 F.3d 1044, 1048-49 (2d Cir. 1995))).
+
+Given this history, courts have customarily disclosed opinions dealing with the
+government's authority to conduct investigations and gather information about U.S. citizens. For
+example, the First Amendment right of access has been held to apply to judicial opinions
+construing the government's search and seizure powers. See _In re Application of N.Y. Times Co.
+for Access to Certain Sealed Court Records_, 585 F. Supp. 2d 83, 88 (D.D.C. 2008). And federal
+courts have routinely published their opinions interpreting the scope and constitutionality of
+intelligence collection permitted under FISA and related authorities-the very type of opinions
+Movants seek here. See, e.g., _United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Mich._, 407 U.S.
+297 (1972) (considering constitutionality of warrantless-wiretapping program conducted by the
+government to "protect the national security"); _United States v. Duggan_, 743 F.2d 59, 72-74, 77
+(2d Cir. 1984) (analyzing FISA's original "purpose" requirement, and holding that "FISA does
+not violate the probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment"); _Jewel v. Nat'l Sec.
+Agency_, 673 F.3d 902, 905 (9th Cir. 2011) (reversing dismissal of lawsuit challenging
+"widespread warrantless eavesdropping in the United States"); _In re Application for Pen Register
+& Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth. (In re PR/TT with CSLI)_, 396 F. Supp. 2d
+747, 748-49 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (refusing government request to seal opinion "because it concerns
+a matter of statutory interpretation" and the issue explored "has serious implications for the
+balance between privacy and law enforcement, and is a matter of first impression"); see also,
+e.g., Defs.' Mem. in Opp. at 32–59, _Amnesty Int'l USA v. McConnell_, 646 F. Supp. 2d 633
+(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (ECF No. 10) (public, unredacted arguments of the government defending the
+constitutionality of the FISA Amendments Act).
+
+15
+
+2. "Logic"
+
+Just as fundamentally, the "significant positive role" of public judicial decisionmaking in
+a democracy is so essential that it is hardly ever questioned. Courts have repeatedly recognized
+that public access to judicial opinions serves a vital function:
+
+> The decisions and opinions of the justices are the authorized expositions and
+> interpretations of the laws, which are binding upon all the citizens. They declare
+> the unwritten law, and construe and declare the meaning of the statutes. Every
+> citizen is presumed to know the law thus declared, and it needs no argument to
+> show that justice requires that all should have free access to the opinions, and that
+> it is against sound public policy to prevent this, or to suppress and keep from the
+> earliest knowledge of the public the statutes, or the decisions and opinions of the
+> justices. Such opinions stand, upon principle, on substantially the same footing as
+> the statutes enacted by the legislature. It can hardly be contended that it would be
+> within the constitutional power of the legislature to enact that the statutes and
+> opinions should not be made known to the public.... The policy of the state
+> always has been that the opinions of the justices, after they are delivered, belong
+> to the public.
+
+_Nash v. Lathrop_, 142 Mass. 29, 35-36 (1886) (emphasis added) (cited by _Banks v. Manchester_,
+128 U.S. 244, 253–54 (1888) (Blatchford, J.)); see also _Lowenschuss_, 542 F.2d at 185. The
+importance of public access to judicial opinions flows from two bedrock principles: (1) the
+public's right to know what the law is, as a condition of democratic governance; and (2) the
+founding recognition that, in our political system, it is "emphatically the province and duty of the
+judicial department to say what the law is." _Marbury v. Madison_, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
+(1803). Because courts determine what the law means and therefore what the law is the
+societal need for access to judicial opinions is paramount.
+
+The value in making judicial opinions available to the public only increases where, as
+here, the opinions concern both the power of the executive branch and the constitutional rights of
+citizens. See _FTC v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp._, 830 F.2d 404, 410 (1st Cir. 1987) (access to
+court files "accentuated" where "the public's right to know what the executive branch is about
+coalesces with the concomitant right of the citizenry to appraise the judicial branch"); _In re_
+
+16
+
+_PR/TT with CSLI_, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 748-49 (refusing government request to seal order that "has
+serious implications for the balance between privacy and law enforcement").
+
+This principle applies with equal force in the context of national security, where the
+courts routinely recognize and give effect to the public's right of access to judicial orders and
+opinions. See, e.g., _United States v. Aref_, 533 F.3d 72, 82–83 (2d Cir. 2008); _In re Wash. Post_,
+807 F.2d at 393; _United States v. Rosen_, 487 F. Supp. 2d 703, 710, 716–17 (E.D. Va. 2007). In
+fact, where matters of national security are at stake, the role of public evaluation of judicial
+decisions takes on an even weightier role. See, e.g., _In re Wash. Post_, 807 F.2d at 393; _United
+States v. Ressam_, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1262 (W.D. Wash. 2002). Moreover, public access to
+the opinions of this Court is important to the functioning of the FISA system in several respects.
+
+First, public access to the opinions of this Court will promote public confidence in the
+integrity, reliability, and independence of the FISC and the FISA system. Access to the reasoning
+and actions of this Court will allow the public to evaluate for itself the operation of the FISA
+system and the legal bases for the government's actions. As the Supreme Court has explained,
+"[p]eople in an open society do not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult
+for them to accept what they are prohibited from observing." _Press-Enterprise II_, 478 U.S. at 13
+(quotation marks omitted). See, e.g., _Globe Newspaper_, 457 U.S. at 606 (public access to court
+documents and proceedings "fosters an appearance of fairness, thereby heightening public
+respect for the judicial process"); _Aref_, 533 F.3d at 83 ("Transparency is pivotal to public
+perception of the judiciary's legitimacy and independence."); _In re Orion Pictures Corp._, 21
+F.3d 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1994) (public access "helps safeguard the integrity, quality, and respect in
+our judicial system, and permits the public to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public
+agencies" (quotation marks and citations omitted)); _Ressam_, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1263 (explaining
+
+17
+
+that "the general practice of disclosing court orders to the public not only plays a significant role
+in the judicial process, but is also a fundamental aspect of our country's open administration of
+justice").
+
+Second, allowing the public to review and assess the reasoning of the opinions of this
+Court will support more refined decisionmaking in future cases. For example, since the recent
+release of some of the Court's orders construing Section 215, there has already been a
+proliferation of highly sophisticated legal debate over the foundations of the program. See, e.g.,
+David S. Kris, _On the Bulk Collection of Tangible Things_, Lawfare Res. Paper Series (Sep. 29,
+2013), http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Lawfare-Research-Paper-
+Series-No.-4-2.pdf; Marty Lederman, _The Kris Paper, and the Problematic FISC Opinion on the
+Section 215 "Metadata" Collection Program_, Just Security (Oct. 1, 2013 5:25 PM),
+http://justsecurity.org/2013/10/01/kris-paper-legality-section-215-metadata-collection; Laura K.
+Donohue, _Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional Considerations_, 37 Harv. J. L.
+& Pub. Pol'y (forthcoming 2014), http://justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Just-
+Security-Donohue-PDF.pdf. This kind of detailed public discussion, which can only benefit the
+FISA system, was impossible prior to the release of this Court's opinions.
+
+Third, publishing this Court's opinions of broad legal significance will contribute to the
+body of decisional law essential to the functioning of our common-law system. Article III courts
+have always built upon the work of their predecessors by refining, reworking, or even, at times,
+abandoning decisions issued in the past. See, e.g., _Penny v. Little_, 4 Ill. (3 Scam.) 301, 304
+(1841) (Douglass, J.) ("The common law is a beautiful system; containing the wisdom and
+experience of ages."). This iterative process lies at the foundation of our legal system but has
+been stunted by the continued secrecy of this Court's significant legal opinions. Other courts
+
+18
+
+should have access to this Court's determinations relating to bulk collection so that they may rely
+on, respond to, or distinguish this Court's reasoning.²⁸
+
+Fourth, access to this Court's opinions will educate citizens about the functioning of the
+FISA system and improve democratic oversight. Because the information released to date does
+not adequately explain the constitutional and statutory bases for bulk collection, the release of
+the requested opinions would permit the public and Congress itself to more fully understand
+these programs and to contribute to the ongoing debate. See generally Br. of Amici Curiae U.S.
+Representatives Amash et al. in Support of the Motion of the ACLU and MFIAC for the Release
+of Court Records, _In re Section 215 Orders_ (June 28, 2013), http://1.usa.gov/13mI1HL.
+Members of Congress have acknowledged the importance of proper oversight, but that oversight
+has been impeded by the secrecy surrounding the authority this Court has construed the
+government to possess. See, e.g., Letter from Sens. Dianne Feinstein, Jeff Merkley, Ron Wyden,
+& Mark Udall to Hon. John Bates, Presiding Judge, FISC (Feb. 13, 2013),
+http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/fisc-021313.pdf; Rep. Jim Sensenbrenner, _How Obama
+Has Abused the Patriot Act_, L.A. Times, Aug. 19, 2013, http://lat.ms/17AIdiU. Indeed, members
+of this Court have recognized the value of public disclosure of its opinions construing the
+government's surveillance authority. See, e.g., _In re Section 215 Orders_, 2013 WL 5460064, at
+*7; cf. Nakashima & Leonnig, _supra_ (Judge “Kollar-Kotelly told associates this summer that she
+
+²⁸ See also, e.g., _California v. Carney_, 471 U.S. 386, 400–01 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
+("The only true rules governing search and seizure have been formulated and refined in the
+painstaking scrutiny of case-by-case adjudication. Consideration of this matter by the lower
+courts in a series of litigated cases would surely have facilitated a reasoned accommodation of
+the conflicting interests. To identify rules that will endure, we must rely on the state and lower
+federal courts to debate and evaluate the different approaches to difficult and unresolved
+questions of constitutional law. Deliberation on the question over time winnows out the
+unnecessary and discordant elements of doctrine and preserves ‘whatever is pure and sound and
+fine." (quoting Benjamin Cardozo, _The Nature of the Judicial Process_ 179 (1921))).
+
+19
+
+wanted her legal argument out, according to two people familiar with what she said. Several
+members of the intelligence court want more transparency about the court's role to dispel what
+they consider a misperception that the court acted as a rubber stamp for the administration's top-
+secret spying programs."). As the Supreme Court noted in _Richmond Newspapers_, "[w]ithout
+publicity, all other checks are insufficient: in comparison of publicity, all other checks are of
+small account." 448 U.S. at 569 (quoting Jeremy Bentham, _Rationale of Judicial Evidence_ 524
+(1827)).
+
+For these reasons, public disclosure of this Court's opinions addressing the
+constitutionality of the government's bulk collection of data and construing the meaning of
+"relevance" in FISA would contribute to the functioning of the FISA system and benefit the
+public interest. Cf. _In re Section 215 Orders_, 2013 WL 5460064, at *7 (“[M]ovants
+and _amici_ have presented several substantial reasons why the public interest might be served by
+the[] publication" of FISC opinions interpreting Section 215.). In particular, release of the
+opinions requested in this proceeding would shed further light on the Court's interpretation of the
+statutory term "relevant," and it would provide the public with the Court's original Fourth
+Amendment analysis of whether and under what conditions the bulk collection of Americans'
+data complies with the Constitution. As Senator Wyden has urged,
+
+> The original legal interpretation that said that the Patriot Act could be used to
+> collect Americans' records in bulk should never have been kept secret and should
+> be declassified and released. This collection has been ongoing for years and
+> the public should be able to compare the legal interpretation under which it was
+> originally authorized with more recent documents.
+
+Nakashima & Leonnig, _supra_; see also id. (Sen. Leahy: The release of "any additional legal
+analysis' related to the phone records program... 'is exactly the sort of transparency we need in
+order to have a full and open debate about whether this program is legal and appropriate or
+needed.").
+
+20
+
+* * *
+
+In sum, because there is a longstanding American tradition of public access to judicial
+opinions; because such access positively contributes to the integrity of the judicial process, the
+democratic legitimacy of this Court, and the public understanding of laws passed in its name; and
+because the release of opinions addressing bulk collection would illuminate crucial gaps in the
+public knowledge about the breadth of its government's surveillance activities under the statute,
+the public's First Amendment right of access attaches to the Court's legal opinions relating to the
+bulk collection of Americans' data.
+
+This Court erred in concluding otherwise in denying a 2007 public-access motion brought
+by the ACLU. First, by limiting its analysis to whether two previously published opinions of this
+Court "establish a tradition of public access," the Court took too narrow a view of the
+"experience" prong of the Supreme Court's test. See _In re Motion for Release of Court Records_,
+526 F. Supp. 2d at 493 (emphasis omitted). Again, "the 'experience' test of _Globe Newspaper_
+does not look to the particular practice of any one jurisdiction, but instead 'to the experience in
+that type or kind of hearing throughout the United States.” _El Vocero_, 508 U.S. at 150 (quotation
+marks omitted). Second, the Court erred in concluding that public access would "result in a
+diminished flow of information, to the detriment of the process in question." See _In re Motion for
+Release of Court Records_, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 496. Instead, disclosure of the requested opinions
+would serve weighty democratic interests by informing the governed about the meaning of
+public laws enacted on their behalf.
+
+B. The First Amendment requires disclosure of the Court's opinions relating
+to bulk collection.
+
+Although the First Amendment right of access is a qualified one, judicial records that are
+subject to the right may be kept from the public only upon a rigorous showing. Different
+
+21
+
+formulations have been used by various courts to define the showing that must be made, but the
+governing standard applied by the Supreme Court encompasses four distinct factors:
+
+1. There must be a "substantial probability" of prejudice to a compelling
+interest. Anyone seeking to restrict the right of access must demonstrate a
+substantial probability that openness will cause harm to a compelling
+governmental interest. See, e.g., _Press-Enterprise II_, 478 U.S. at 13-14; _Press-
+Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court_, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1983); _Richmond
+Newspapers_, 448 U.S. at 580–81. In _Press-Enterprise II_, the Court specifically
+held that a "reasonable likelihood" standard is not sufficiently protective of the
+right and that a “substantial probability” standard must be applied. 478 U.S. at
+14-15. This standard applies equally in the context of national security. See _In re
+Wash. Post_, 807 F.2d at 392.
+
+2. There must be no alternative to adequately protect the threatened interest.
+Anyone seeking to defeat access must further demonstrate that nothing short of a
+limitation on the constitutional right of access can adequately protect the
+threatened interest. See _Press-Enterprise II_, 478 U.S. at 13–14; see also _Presley v.
+Georgia_, 558 U.S. 209, 214–15 (2010) (per curiam) ("[T]rial courts are required
+to consider alternatives to closure even when they are not offered by the parties"
+and "are obligated to take every reasonable measure to accommodate public
+attendance at criminal trials."); _In re Herald Co._, 734 F.2d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 1984)
+(A "trial judge must consider alternatives and reach a reasoned conclusion that
+closure is a preferable course to follow to safeguard the interests at issue.");
+_Robinson_, 935 F.2d at 290.
+
+3. Any restriction on access must be narrowly tailored. Even "legitimate and
+substantial" governmental interests “cannot be pursued by means that broadly
+stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
+achieved." _Shelton v. Tucker_, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). Any limitation imposed
+on public access thus must be no broader than necessary to protect the threatened
+interest. See, e.g., _Press-Enterprise II_, 478 U.S. at 13–14; _Lugosch_, 435 F.3d at
+124; _Robinson_, 935 F.2d at 287.
+
+4. Any restriction on access must be effective. Any order limiting access must be
+effective in protecting the threatened interest for which the limitation is imposed.
+As articulated in _Press-Enterprise II_, the party seeking secrecy must demonstrate
+"that closure would prevent the harm sought to be avoided. 478 U.S. at 14; see
+_Robinson_, 935 F.2d at 291-92 (disclosure could not pose any additional threat in
+light of already publicized information); _In re Herald Co._, 734 F.2d at 101
+(closure order cannot stand if "the information sought to be kept confidential has
+already been given sufficient public exposure"); _United States v. Hubbard_, 650
+F.2d 293, 322 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("One possible reason for unsealing is that the
+documents were already made public through other means.").
+
+22
+
+The party seeking to restrict access bears the burden of presenting specific facts that satisfy this
+four-part test. See _Press-Enterprise II_, 478 U.S. at 15 ("The First Amendment right of access
+cannot be overcome by [a] conclusory assertion.").
+
+The government cannot satisfy these strict standards in this case. The proposition that the
+government has an interest-let alone a "compelling" one-in preventing disclosure of this
+Court's opinions on the legality of bulk collection is insupportable. In fact, a public accounting
+of the legal review by this Court of bulk collections would serve governmental interests by
+clarifying the government's actions and the legal rationale supporting them. See Nakashima &
+Leonnig, _supra_ (quoting current and former government officials advocating for release of
+original FISC bulk-collection opinion). Even the Director of National Intelligence has
+complained of the absence from the public debate of "key information regarding how a classified
+intelligence collection program is used to prevent terrorist attacks and the numerous safeguards
+that protect privacy and civil liberties," and underscored the importance of the public
+"understand[ing] the limits of this targeted counterterrorism program and the principles that
+govern its use." Press Release, DNI Statement on Recent Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified
+Information, Office of the Director of National Intelligence (June 6, 2013),
+http://1.usa.gov/13jwuFc.
+
+Of course, portions of the Court's opinions may be sealed to serve compelling
+governmental interests--for example, to protect intelligence sources and methods that have not
+been previously disclosed--but the First Amendment requires the Court itself to ensure that any
+redactions are narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Cf. _Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond_, 46 F.3d 29,
+31 (7th Cir. 1995) (Easterbrook, J.) ("The judge must make his own decision about what should
+be confidential [REDACTED] and what may be spoken of openly. I regret that this means extra work for the
+
+23
+
+judge, but preserving the principle that judicial opinions are available to the public is worth at
+least that much sacrifice."); Nakashima & Leonnig, _supra_ (quoting former senior DOJ attorney
+Kenneth Wainstein as arguing that "[e]specially when it comes to legal decisions about big
+programs,... we can talk about them in a sanitized way without disclosing sources and
+methods"). Critical to that analysis will be the numerous disclosures made to date regarding the
+government's bulk-collection surveillance activities. See, e.g., _Doe v. Gonzales_, 386 F. Supp. 2d
+66, 78 (D. Conn. 2005) (in First Amendment challenge to gag of recipient of national-security
+letter, relying in part on "the nature and extent of information about the [national-security letter]
+that has already been disclosed by the defendants" in determining that "the government has not
+demonstrated a compelling interest in preventing disclosure of the recipient's identity").
+
+III. THE COURT SHOULD ORDER DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW UNDER RULE
+62 AND THEN APPLY THE FIRST AMENDMENT STANDARD TO ANY
+PROPOSED SEALING BY THE GOVERNMENT.
+
+In implementing the constitutional right of access to opinions concerning the bulk
+collection of Americans' information, the Court should first order the government to conduct a
+declassification review of the opinions pursuant to FISC Rule 62(a). See, e.g., _In re Section 215
+Orders_, 2013 WL 5460064, at *7; Order, _In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the
+Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED]_, No. BR 13-109 (Aug. 23, 2013),
+http://1.usa.gov/16miTkR (discussing sua sponte request by FISC judge to publish memorandum
+opinion under FISC R.P. 62(a)); _In re Directives [REDACTED] Pursuant to Section 105B of the
+Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act_, 551 F.3d 1004, 1016 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008).
+
+If, after the completion of that review, the government proposes to redact any information
+in the Court's opinions, the Court should set a briefing schedule, requiring the government to
+justify how its sealing request meets the constitutional standard set out above, and allowing
+Movants to contest any sealing they believe to be unjustified. Although the Court should give
+
+24
+
+due consideration to the government's predictive judgments of harm to national security, it
+should not simply defer to those judgments or to the results of the government's declassification
+review. See, e.g., _In re Wash. Post_, 807 F.2d at 392. The First Amendment right of access is a
+constitutional right that belongs to the public, and that right can be overcome only upon specific
+findings by a court, including a finding that disclosure would risk a substantial probability of
+harm to a compelling interest. See _supra_ Part II.B.²⁹
+
+Independent judicial review of any proposed redactions from this Court's opinions is
+necessary because the standards that justify classification do not always satisfy the strict
+constitutional standard and because executive-branch decisions cannot substitute for the judicial
+determination required by the First Amendment. Specifically, information may be classified on a
+simple determination by the executive branch that "the unauthorized disclosure of [the
+information] reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security." Exec.
+Order No. 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707, § 1.2(a) (Dec. 29, 2009) (emphasis added). The First
+Amendment, however, can be overcome only upon a showing of a "substantial probability" of
+harm, a standard that the Supreme Court has specifically held to be more stringent than a
+"reasonable likelihood" test. _Press-Enterprise II_, 478 U.S. at 14. Moreover, under the
+classification regime, the executive branch alone decides whether to consider the public's
+interest in disclosure, and it does so only in "exceptional cases." Exec. Order No. 13,526 §
+3.1(d). Applying that standard to judicial records would flatly contradict the First Amendment
+right of access, which presumes that the public's interest is in disclosure, and permits sealing
+
+²⁹ Cf. _Doe_, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 78 ("However, the plaintiffs' desire here is to exercise their
+First Amendment rights, which distinguishes this case from those in which an individual seeks
+disclosure of information in the course of discovery or pursuant to FOIA. Here, plaintiffs seek to
+vindicate a constitutionally guaranteed right; they do not seek to vindicate a right created, and
+limited, by statute.").
+
+25
+
+only if there are no less-restrictive alternatives and if the limitation on access is narrowly
+tailored.
+
+Furthermore, whether the public's constitutional right of access has been overcome is a
+question for the courts, not one that rests with the executive. See _Press-Enterprise II_, 478 U.S.
+13-14. As the Fourth Circuit has forcefully explained,
+
+> [T]roubled as we are by the risk that disclosure of classified information could
+> endanger the lives of both Americans and their foreign informants, we are equally
+> troubled by the notion that the judiciary should abdicate its decisionmaking
+> responsibility to the executive branch whenever national security concerns are
+> present. History teaches us how easily the spectre of a threat to "national security"
+> may be used to justify a wide variety of repressive government actions. A blind
+> acceptance by the courts of the government's insistence on the need for secrecy,
+> without notice to others, without argument, and without a statement of reasons,
+> would impermissibly compromise the independence of the judiciary and open the
+> door to possible abuse.
+
+_In re Wash. Post_, 807 F.2d at 391-92; see _United States v. Hershey_, 20 M.J. 433, 436 (C.M.A.
+1985) ("[E]ven when the interest sought to be protected is national security, the Government
+must demonstrate a compelling need to exclude the public...." (emphasis omitted)); _United
+States v. Grunden_, 2 M.J. 116, 122 (C.M.A. 1977) (although classification and the policy
+determinations it involves "are not normal judicial functions, immunization from judicial review
+cannot be countenanced in situations where strong countervailing constitutional interests exist").
+
+Case law under the Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C., App. 3 (2000)
+("CIPA"), confirms that the fact of classification does not automatically trump the constitutional
+right of access. To seal classified information where CIPA is involved, the government must
+make "a sufficient showing that disclosure of the information sought would impair identified
+national interests in substantial ways," and the court must conduct an "independent review" to
+determine that closure is "narrowly tailored to protect national security." _Aref_, 533 F.3d at 82-
+83; see _In re Wash. Post_, 807 F.2d at 393 (district court not excused under CIPA "from making
+
+26
+
+the appropriate constitutional inquiry"); _Rosen_, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 710, 716-17 (a statute cannot
+defeat a constitutional right and "government's ipse dixit that information is damaging to
+national security is not sufficient to close the courtroom doors"); see also _United States v.
+Moussaoui_, 65 F. App'x 881, 887 (4th Cir. 2003) (under CIPA procedures, courts "must
+independently determine whether, and to what extent, the proceedings and documents must be
+kept under seal"); _United States v. Poindexter_, 732 F. Supp. 165, 167 n.9 (D.D.C. 1990) (“CIPA
+obviously cannot override a constitutional right of access"); _United States v. Pelton_, 696 F. Supp.
+156, 159 (D. Md. 1986) (same).
+
+In other contexts, too, courts routinely scrutinize executive-branch classifications. See,
+e.g., _Campbell v. U.S. Dep't of Justice_, 164 F.3d 20, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1999); _Goldberg v. U.S. Dep't
+of State_, 818 F.2d 71, 76 (D.C. Cir. 1987). This principle is not controversial, and in other
+forums, the government has expressly accepted it. See, e.g., Final Reply Br. for Appellants at 8
+n.1, _Ctr. for Int'l Envtl. Law v. Office of the U.S. Trade Rep._, No. 12-5136 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 27,
+2012), 2012 WL 5940305 (clarifying that the government has not "suggested that the
+Executive's determination that a document is classified should be conclusive or unreviewable").
+
+For these reasons, merely ordering discretionary release under Rule 62(a) after executive
+declassification review would not satisfy the constitutional right of access. The Court should thus
+order declassification review as a first step and then test any sealing proposed by the government
+against the standard required by the First Amendment. Of course, even if the Court holds that the
+First Amendment right of access does not attach to the legal opinions requested by Movants, it
+should nonetheless exercise its discretion as it has in the past and in the public interest-to
+order the government to conduct a declassification review of its opinions pursuant to Rule 62.
+See, e.g., _In re Section 215 Orders_, 2013 WL 5460064, at *7.
+
+27
+
+CONCLUSION
+
+For the foregoing reasons, the movants respectfully request that this Court unseal its
+opinions addressing the constitutional and statutory bases for the "bulk collection" of records
+under various authorities within FISA, including but not limited to 50 U.S.C. § 1842, with only
+those limited redactions that satisfy the strict test to overcome the constitutional right of access.
+Given the relevance of the opinions to an ongoing debate of immense public interest, Movants
+request expedited consideration of this motion, as well as oral argument.
+
+Dated: November 6, 2013
+
+David A. Schulz
+Jonathan Manes
+Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic
+Yale Law School
+P.O. Box 208215
+New Haven, CT 06520
+Phone: (212) 850-6103
+Fax: (212) 850-6299
+dschulz@lskslaw.com
+
+/s/ Alex Abdo
+Alex Abdo
+Brett Max Kaufman
+Patrick Toomey
+Jameel Jaffer
+American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
+125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
+New York, NY 10004
+Phone: (212) 549-2500
+Fax: (212) 549-2654
+aabdo@aclu.org
+
+Arthur B. Spitzer
+American Civil Liberties Union of the
+Nation's Capital
+4301 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 434
+Washington, DC 20008
+Phone: (202) 457-0800
+Fax: (202) 457-0805
+artspitzer@aclu-nca.org
+
+\* This motion has been prepared in part by a clinic operated by Yale Law School, but does not
+purport to present the school's institutional views, if any. Yale Law School students assisting on
+the papers: Patrick Hayden '14, John Langford '14, Max Mishkin '14, and Brianna van Kan '15.
+
+28
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I, Alex Abdo, certify that on this day, November 6, 2013, a copy of the foregoing brief
+was served by UPS on the following persons:
+
+Eric H. Holder
+Attorney General
+Office of the Attorney General
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
+Washington, DC 20530
+
+John P. Carlin
+Acting Assistant Attorney General for National Security
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
+Washington, DC 20530
+
+Christine Gunning
+Litigation Security Group
+U.S. Department of Justice
+2 Constitution Square
+145 N Street, N.E.
+Suite 2W-115
+Washington, DC 20530
+
+/s/ Alex Abdo
+Alex Abdo
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+2013 NOV -7 PM 2:42
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+IN RE OPINIONS & ORDERS OF THIS COURT
+ADDRESSING BULK COLLECTION OF DATA
+UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE ACT
+No. Misc. 13-8
+
+CERTIFICATION OF BAR MEMBERSHIP AND
+SECURITY-CLEARANCE STATUS
+
+Pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court's Rules of Procedure 7(h)(1),
+7(i), and 63, the American Civil Liberties Union, the American Civil Liberties Union of the
+Nation's Capital, and the Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic at Yale Law School
+(collectively, "Movants") respectfully submit the following information:
+
+Bar Membership Information
+
+Undersigned counsel for Movants are licensed attorneys and members, in good standing,
+of the bars of United States district and circuit courts. See FISC R.P. 7(h)(1), 63.
+
+Alex Abdo is a member, in good standing, of the following federal courts: the Supreme
+Court of the United States; the United States Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Fourth, and
+District of Columbia Circuits; and the United States District Court for the Southern District of
+New York. He is licensed to practice law by the bar of the State of New York.
+
+Brett Max Kaufman is a member, in good standing, of the following federal courts: the
+United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; and the United States District Court for
+the Southern District of New York. He is licensed to practice law by the bar of the State of New
+York.
+
+1
+
+Patrick Toomey is a member, in good standing, of the following federal courts: the
+United States District Courts for the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York. He is licensed
+to practice law by the bars of the States of Massachusetts and New York.
+
+Jameel Jaffer is a member, in good standing, of the following federal courts: the Supreme
+Court of the United States; the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fourth, Sixth,
+Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits; and the United States District Courts for the Eastern
+and Southern Districts of New York, and the Eastern District of Michigan. He is licensed to
+practice law by the bar of the State of New York.
+
+Arthur Spitzer is a member, in good standing, of the following federal courts: the
+Supreme Court of the United States; the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, District
+of Columbia, Federal, and Armed Forces Circuits; and the United States District Courts for the
+Districts of Columbia and Maryland, and the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York. He is
+licensed to practice law by the bars of the District of Columbia and the State of New York.
+
+David Schulz is a member, in good standing, of the following federal courts: the Supreme
+Court of the United States; the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Fourth,
+Ninth, Tenth and District of Columbia Circuits; and the United States District Courts for the
+District of Columbia, and for all Districts of the State of New York. He is licensed to practice
+law by the bars of the District of Columbia and the State of New York.
+
+Jonathan Manes is a member, in good standing, of the following federal courts: the
+United States Courts of Appeals for the Third and Tenth Circuits; and the United States District
+Courts for District of New Jersey, and the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York. He is
+licensed to practice law by the bars of the State of New York and the State of New Jersey.
+
+2
+
+Security-Clearance Information
+
+Pursuant to FISC R.P. 7(i), Movants certify that Arthur Spitzer holds a "Secret" security
+clearance issued by the Department of Justice.
+
+Because Movants' motion and the related briefing do not contain classified information,
+Movants respectfully submit that all undersigned counsel may participate in proceedings on the
+motion without access to classified information or security clearances. See FISC R.P. 63
+(requiring counsel only to have "appropriate security clearances").
+
+Dated: November 6, 2013
+
+David A. Schulz
+Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic
+Yale Law School
+P.O. Box 208215
+New Haven, CT 06520
+Phone: (212) 850-6103
+Fax: (212) 850-6299
+dschulz@lskslaw.com
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+/s/ Alex Abdo
+Alex Abdo
+Brett Max Kaufman
+Patrick Toomey
+Jameel Jaffer
+American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
+125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
+New York, NY 10004
+Phone: (212) 549-2500
+Fax: (212) 549-2654
+aabdo@aclu.org
+
+Arthur B. Spitzer
+American Civil Liberties Union of the
+Nation's Capital
+4301 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 434
+Washington, DC 20008
+Phone: (202) 457-0800
+Fax: (202) 457-0805
+artspitzer@aclu-nca.org
+
+3
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I, Alex Abdo, certify that on this day, November 6, 2013, a copy of the foregoing
+certification was served by UPS on the following persons by the methods indicated:
+
+Christine Gunning
+Litigation Security Group
+U.S. Department of Justice
+2 Constitution Square
+145 N Street, N.E.
+Suite 2W-115
+Washington, DC 20530
+
+John P. Carlin
+J. Bradford Wiegmann
+Tashina Gauhar
+Jeffrey M. Smith
+Nicholas J. Patterson
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, DC 20530
+
+/s/ Alex Abdo
+Alex Abdo
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-08-motion-131107/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-08-motion-131107/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7e80fef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-08-motion-131107/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Motion of the American Civil Liberties Union, the American Civil Liberties Union of the Nation's Capital, and the Media Freedom and Information Clinic for the Release of Court Records, In re Opinions & Orders of this Court Addressing Bulk Collection of Data Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, No. Misc. 13-08 (FISA Ct. Nov. 7, 2013).",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-11-07",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-07",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34497",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "dbc5ea4dc85cd45e83d652c9cd5efb62461a209cb16742b5e585b44bb6793ea7",
+ "pages": 35
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-08-motion-131206/FISC_-_misc-13-08-motion-131206.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-08-motion-131206/FISC_-_misc-13-08-motion-131206.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..70380b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-08-motion-131206/FISC_-_misc-13-08-motion-131206.md
@@ -0,0 +1,314 @@
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+2013 DEC -6 PM 4:50
+
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+Filed with Classified
+Information Security Officer
+CISO
+Date 12/6/2013
+
+IN RE OPINIONS AND ORDERS OF THIS
+COURT ADDRESSING BULK COLLECTION OF
+Docket No.: Misc. 13-08
+DATA UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+THE UNITED STATES’ OPPOSITION TO THE
+MOTION OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
+UNION, ET AL., FOR THE RELEASE OF COURT RECORDS
+
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+
+J. BRADFORD WIEGMANN
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+TASHINA GAUHAR
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+NICHOLAS J. PATTERSON
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+Phone: (202) 514-5600
+Fax: (202) 514-8053
+
+Attorneys for the United States of America
+
+The American Civil Liberties Union and two other entities (hereinafter, “ACLU”) seek
+the publication of opinions of this Court addressing “the legal basis for the ‘bulk collection’ of
+data by the United States government under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (‘FISA’),
+50 U.S.C. § 1861 *et seq.*, including but not limited to 50 U.S.C. § 1842.” Mot. at 1. The
+ACLU's motion should be dismissed because the relevant opinions have been subjected to
+classification review and the unclassified portions released, and there is no basis for the Court to
+order a new classification review.
+
+**ARGUMENT**
+
+I. **The ACLU’s Motion Should Be Dismissed Because Declassified Versions of the**
+**Requested Opinions Have Already Been Released.**
+
+The ACLU's motion should be dismissed because this Court and the Government have
+already released declassified versions of the opinions that the Government has determined are
+responsive to the ACLU’s motion after the Government conducted a classification review with
+the objective to release as much information in the opinions as possible consistent with national
+security. A new classification review would duplicate the result of the thorough review the
+Government already conducted.
+
+After a review of this Court’s opinions, the Government has identified four responsive
+opinions that address the legal basis for the “bulk collection” of data by the United States
+Government under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1801 *et seq.*, including
+but not limited to 50 U.S.C. § 1842. After a classification review conducted by the Executive
+Branch consistent with Executive Order 13,526 (Dec. 29, 2009), two of the opinions were
+released by the Executive Branch and two others were published by this Court. They are:
+
+(1) the Court's Opinion (J. Kollar-Kotelly) granting the Government's application
+seeking the collection of bulk electronic communications metadata pursuant to
+Section 402 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the Pen Register and Trap
+and Trace provision. (Released by the Executive Branch on November 18, 2013),
+available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/1118/CLEANEDPRTT%201.pdf.
+(2) the Court's Opinion (J. Bates) granting the Government's application seeking to re-
+instate the National Security Agency's bulk electronic communications metadata
+program following the Government's suspension of the program for several months
+to address compliance issues identified by the Government and brought to the Court's
+attention. (Released by the Executive Branch on November 18, 2013), available at
+http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/1118/CLEANEDPRTT%202.pdf.
+(3) the Court's Opinion (J. McLaughlin) reauthorizing the collection of bulk telephony
+metadata under the "business records" provision of the Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Act and re-affirming that the bulk telephony metadata collection is both
+lawful and constitutional. (Published by this Court on October 18, 2013), available at
+http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/br13-158-memo-131018.pdf.
+(4) the Court's Opinion (J. Eagan) reauthorizing the collection of bulk telephony
+metadata under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and affirming that the bulk
+telephony metadata collection is both lawful and constitutional. (Published by this
+Court on September 17, 2013), available at
+http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/br13-09-primary-order.pdf.
+Because the Government has already conducted a thorough classification review of these
+opinions, there is no basis to require the Government to review them again.
+
+II. **The Court Should Not Order the Government to Conduct New Classification**
+**Reviews of the Opinions.**
+
+A. **The ACLU does not have standing to seek declassification.**
+
+Although this Court has inherent authority to require a classification review of its own
+opinions as a matter of discretion, and can order such a review *sua sponte*, that authority should
+be exercised in a manner that is consistent with FISA and this Court's rules. FISA does not
+provide third parties with the right to seek disclosure of classified FISC records. *In re Mot. for*
+
+2
+
+Release of Ct. Records, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, 491 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. 2007). Under United
+States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC") Rule of Procedure 62(a) ("FISC Rule"),
+only a "party" may move the Court for publication of an opinion.¹ This Court recently
+concluded that "the term 'party' in Rule 62(a) refers to a party to the proceeding that resulted in
+the 'opinion, order, or other decision' being considered for publication." *In re Orders of this Ct.*
+*Interpreting Section 215 of the Patriot Act*, Docket No. Misc. 13-02, Opinion and Order, at 11
+(Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. Sept. 13, 2013), available at
+http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/misc-13-02-order-130813.pdf. The ACLU is not a
+party to any of the proceedings that generated the relevant opinions and, therefore, does not have
+standing to move for publication of the opinions.
+
+FISC Rule 62(a)'s limitation on who can move for publication of an order, opinion, or
+other decision is in accord with the fact that a comprehensive statutory regime—the Freedom of
+Information Act (“FOIA”)—governs requests for documents classified by and in the possession
+of the Executive Branch. *See In re Release*, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 491 n.18, 496 n.32. As this
+Court has recognized, although this Court has supervisory power over its own records and could
+
+¹ Rule 62. **Release of Court Records**
+(a) **Publication of Opinions.** The judge who authored an order, opinion, or
+other decision may *sua sponte* or on motion by a party request that it be
+published. Upon such request, the Presiding Judge, after consulting with
+other Judges of the Court, may direct that an order, opinion or other
+decision be published. Before publication, the Court may, as appropriate,
+direct the Executive Branch to review the order, opinion, or other decision
+and redact it as necessary to ensure that properly classified information is
+appropriately protected pursuant to Executive Order 13526 (or
+its successor).
+
+FISC Rule of Procedure 62(a).
+
+3
+
+conduct a review "under the same standards as a district court would in FOIA litigation," "there
+would be no point in this Court's merely duplicating the judicial review that the ACLU, and
+anyone else, can obtain by submitting a FOIA request to the Department of Justice for these
+same records." *Id.* at 496 n.32.
+
+The Court should insist that the ACLU respect, and not through its motion attempt to
+circumvent, the FOIA process enacted by Congress. Accordingly, the Government submits that
+the Court should not exercise its inherent discretion to determine whether to order a
+declassification review in this case. FOIA carefully prescribes a process whereby parties must
+first seek administrative review of FOIA requests before bringing litigation, and FOIA includes
+additional exemptions beyond the classification exemptions that would overlap with a
+declassification review ordered by the FISC. Such duplicative processes therefore raise
+administrative concerns, and the FISC should resist invitations to serve as an alternative forum
+for FISC-related matters that can and should be resolved through the FOIA process established
+by Congress.
+
+B. **This Court traditionally does not involve itself with the Executive Branch’s**
+**classification decisions.**
+
+The ACLU seeks an order giving it full access to the opinions or, in the alternative,
+requiring the Government to justify any redactions to the Court as necessary to prevent a
+substantial probability of harm to a compelling interest. The ACLU also seeks the right to
+contest redactions. The ACLU invokes the First Amendment, but the First Amendment does not
+justify judicial (or ACLU) involvement in Executive Branch classification decisions.
+
+4
+
+Putting aside the fact that this Court has repeatedly rejected arguments that litigants such
+as the ACLU have a First Amendment right to access classified FISA court records,² the Court
+does not interfere with the Government’s classification process and classification decisions.
+Under FISC Rule 62(a), the Court is empowered only to “direct the Executive Branch to review
+the [opinion] and redact it as necessary to ensure that properly classified information is
+appropriately protected.” This limitation on the Court's discretion is consistent with the
+requirement that, “[i]n all matters, the Court and its staff shall comply with the security measures
+established pursuant to [Congressional mandate], as well as Executive Order 13526.” FISC Rule
+3; *see also* FISC Rule 62(b) (mandating that a release of FISC records must be conducted “in
+conformance with the security measures referenced in Rule 3”). Executive Order 13,526
+“prescribes a uniform system for classifying, safeguarding, and declassifying national security
+information,” and under that system only certain designated Executive Branch officials can
+classify or declassify national security information. *See Executive Order* 13,526.
+
+Consistent with the Court’s Rules of Procedure, the Court’s decisions also make clear
+that the Court does not involve itself with the Executive Branch’s declassification decisions.
+Indeed, “if the FISC were to assume the role of independently making declassification and
+
+² *See In re Mot. for Release of Ct. Records*, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. 2007);
+*In re Mot. for Release of Ct. Records*, Memorandum Opinion, Docket No. Misc. 07-01 (Foreign
+Intel. Surv. Ct. Feb. 8, 2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/misc-13-
+02-us-opposition-130705.pdf (Appendix A to *In re Orders Issued by This Ct. Interpreting*
+*Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act*, Docket No. Misc. 13-02, The United States' Opposition to the
+Motion of the American Civil Liberties Union, *et al.*, for the Release of Court Records (Foreign
+Intel. Surv. Ct. July 5, 2013)). In this Court's most recent Opinion and Order involving the
+ACLU, the Court chose not to “reach[] the merits of the [ACLU’s] asserted right of public access
+under the First Amendment.” *See In re Orders of this Ct. Interpreting Section 215 of the*
+*PATRIOT Act*, Docket No. Misc. 13-02, Opinion and Order, at 17 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct.
+Sept. 13, 2013).
+
+5
+
+release decisions . . . there would be a real risk of harm to national security interests and
+ultimately to the FISA process itself.” *In re Release*, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 491. “FISC judges do
+not make classification decisions and are not intended to become national security experts.” *Id.*
+at 495 n.31 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 25-26 (1978)). And, while FISC judges may
+have “more expertise in national security matters than a typical district court judge, that expertise
+[does] not equal that of the Executive Branch, which is constitutionally entrusted with protecting
+the national security.” *Id.* Thus, this Court has recognized that “there is no role for this Court
+independently to review, and potentially override, Executive Branch classification decisions.”
+*Id.* at 491.³ This Court recently reiterated that “[i]t is fundamentally the Executive Branch's
+responsibility to safeguard sensitive national security information.” *In re Mot. for Consent to*
+*Disclosure of Ct. Records*, Docket No. Misc. 13-01, Opinion and Order, at 6 (Foreign Intel. Surv.
+Ct. June 12, 2013) (citing *Department of Navy v. Egan*, 484 U.S. 518, 527-29 (1988)), available
+at www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/misc-13-01-opinion-order.pdf. Thus, this Court should
+deny the ACLU's First Amendment classification review request and the ACLU's request to
+contest any redactions.
+
+For these reasons, the Court should deny the ACLU's request for new classification
+reviews of the relevant opinions. There is no need for this Court to order new classification
+reviews of the relevant opinions because the Government recently conducted thorough
+classification reviews of these opinions and made "public as much information as possible about
+certain sensitive intelligence collection programs undertaken under the authority of the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) while being mindful of the need to protect national
+
+³ This is not to say that Executive Branch classifications are never judicially reviewable. The
+proper means to obtain such review is through a FOIA request and subsequent action in district
+court. *See In re Release*, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 491 n.18, 496 n.32.
+
+6
+
+security.”⁴ Release of these documents reflected the Executive Branch's continued commitment
+to making information about intelligence collection publicly available when appropriate and
+consistent with the national security of the United States.
+
+**CONCLUSION**
+
+For the reasons stated above, the ACLU’s Motion should be denied.
+
+December 6, 2013
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+
+J. BRADFORD WIEGMANN
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+TASHINA GAUHAR
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+/s/ Nicholas J. Patterson
+NICHOLAS J. PATTERSON
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+Phone: (202) 514-5600
+Fax: (202) 514-8053
+
+Attorneys for the United States of America
+
+⁴ DNI Clapper Declassifies Intelligence Community Documents Regarding Collection Under
+Section 501 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), available at
+http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/60867560465/dni-clapper-declassifies-intelligence-
+community. Although this statement was made in reference to the two opinions the Government
+released, the Government also applied the same standard when conducting the classification
+review of the two opinions published by this Court.
+
+7
+
+**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**
+
+I hereby certify that a true copy of the United States’ Opposition to the Motion of the
+American Civil Liberties Union, *et al.*, for the Release of Court Records was served by the
+Government via Federal Express overnight delivery on this 6th day of December, 2013,
+
+addressed to:
+
+Alex Abdo
+Brett Max Kaufman
+Patrick Toomey
+Jameel Jaffer
+American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
+125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
+New York, NY 10004
+abdo@aclu.org
+
+Arthur B. Spitzer
+American Civil Liberties Union of the
+Nation’s Capital
+9151 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 434
+Washington, DC 20008
+artspitzer@aclu-nca.org
+
+David A. Schulz
+Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic
+Yale Law School
+40 Ashmun Street, 4th Floor
+New Haven, CT 06511
+david.schulz@yale.edu
+
+Gregory L. Diskant
+Benjamin S. Litman
+Richard I. Kim
+Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP
+1133 Avenue of the Americas
+New York, NY 10036
+blitman@pbwt.com
+
+/s/ Nicholas J. Patterson
+Nicholas J. Patterson
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-08-motion-131206/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-08-motion-131206/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2cf7e09
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-08-motion-131206/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "The United States' Opposition to the Motion of the American Civil Liberties Union, et al., for the Release of Court Records, In re Opinions & Orders of this Court Addressing Bulk Collection of Data Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, No. Misc. 13-08 (FISA Ct. Dec. 6, 2013).",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-12-06",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-12-06",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34498",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "66799395e2cdf65c2afd1a2fa700846c4ce95f04e0458be0a40d75985f940cf6",
+ "pages": 9
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-08-order-131107/FISC_-_misc-13-08-order-131107.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-08-order-131107/FISC_-_misc-13-08-order-131107.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3813975
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-08-order-131107/FISC_-_misc-13-08-order-131107.md
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE OPINIONS AND ORDERS OF THIS
+COURT ADDRESSING BULK COLLECTION OF
+DATA UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-08
+
+BRIEFING ORDER
+
+This matter is before the Court on the Motion of the American Civil Liberties Union, the
+American Civil Liberties Union of the Nation's Capital, and the Media Freedom and Information
+Access Clinic ("Movants") for the Release of Court Records, which was submitted on November
+7, 2013. Any response by the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ") to the motion shall
+be submitted no later than 5:00 p.m. on December 6, 2013. Any reply by the Movants to DOJ's
+Response shall be submitted no later than 5:00 p.m. on December 20, 2013.
+
+SO ORDERED, this 8th day of November, 2013,
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-08-order-131107/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-08-order-131107/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8ee813a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-08-order-131107/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Briefing Order, In re Opinions & Orders of this Court Addressing Bulk Collection of Data Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, No. Misc. 13-08, GID.C.00201 (FISA Ct. Nov. 8, 2013) (Walton, J.)",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-11-08",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-11-08",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34251",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "36fb8a093ad70f7eb8b8f5fc3eb2a0dd5cbf2db32b4b9330f83a77343f1c0fbe",
+ "pages": 1
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-08-reply-131223/FISC_-_misc-13-08-reply-131223.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-08-reply-131223/FISC_-_misc-13-08-reply-131223.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2126ddd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-08-reply-131223/FISC_-_misc-13-08-reply-131223.md
@@ -0,0 +1,648 @@
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE OPINIONS & ORDERS ISSUED BY
+THIS COURT ADDRESSING BULK
+COLLECTION OF DATA UNDER VARIOUS
+PROVISIONS OF THE FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+2013 DEC 20 PM 4:49
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-08
+
+MOVANTS' REPLY IN SUPPORT OF THEIR
+MOTION FOR THE RELEASE OF COURT RECORDS
+
+David A. Schulz
+Jonathan Manes
+Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic
+Yale Law School
+P.O. Box 208215
+New Haven, CT 06520
+Phone: (212) 850-6103
+Fax: (212) 850-6299
+dschulz@lskslaw.com
+
+Alex Abdo
+Patrick Toomey
+Brett Max Kaufman
+Jameel Jaffer
+American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
+125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
+New York, NY 10004
+Phone: (212) 549-2500
+Fax: (212) 549-2654
+aabdo@aclu.org
+
+Arthur B. Spitzer
+American Civil Liberties Union of the
+Nation's Capital
+4301 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 434
+Washington, DC 20008
+Phone: (202) 457-0800
+Fax: (202) 457-0805
+artspitzer@aclu-nca.org
+
+TABLE OF CONTENTS
+
+PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.................................................................................... 1
+
+ARGUMENT............................................................................................................. 2
+
+I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT REQUIRES THIS COURT TO DETERMINE
+INDEPENDENTLY WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT HAS
+DEMONSTRATED A COMPELLING REASON TO REDACT ITS OPINIONS.................... 2
+A. Rule 62(a) does not relieve this Court of its obligation under the First
+Amendment to evaluate the government's justification for the
+proposed redactions. ......................................................................................... 3
+B. To satisfy the First Amendment right of access, the government should
+be required to justify its proposed redactions in light of the publicly
+known facts. .................................................................................................... 3
+C. Strict application of the First Amendment standard is particularly
+important here given the extraordinary public interest in disclosure of
+these opinions. ................................................................................................. 5
+
+II. AN EXECUTIVE BRANCH DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW DOES NOT
+SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT
+FOR KEEPING JUDICIAL OPINIONS SECRET.......................................................... 8
+A. The government ignores the essential role of the judiciary in
+independently assessing the public's right of access to judicial
+opinions. ......................................................................................................... 8
+B. Many of the government's proposed redactions are facially suspect
+and warrant careful judicial review. ............................................................... 10
+
+III. FOIA IS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF
+ACCESS. ............................................................................................................... 13
+A. FOIA's statutory standards for withholding differ significantly from
+the First Amendment's standard for sealing judicial opinions. ........................ 13
+B. The government's proposal to substitute FOIA review for First
+Amendment analysis would eviscerate the constitutional right of
+access. .......................................................................................................... 15
+
+CONCLUSION. .................................................................................................... 16
+
+PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
+
+The government's opposition fails to grapple with the key issues raised by this motion.
+At issue is the public's right to access opinions of an Article III court that interpret the
+Constitution and the nation's surveillance laws and that affect the privacy rights of millions of
+Americans. The government has declassified portions of the four opinions that it represents are
+responsive to this motion for public access, but it wrongly contends that its unilateral
+declassification review resolves this motion that the Court, in other words, has no role to play
+in determining which portions of its opinions are released and whether the government's
+extensive redactions satisfy the strict First Amendment standard that governs the sealing of
+judicial opinions. That is emphatically not the case.
+
+While much of this Court's work may not be subject to a constitutional right of access,
+this motion concerns opinions containing significant legal interpretation of the Constitution and
+statutory law. For those sorts of opinions, at least, the First Amendment has always required
+courts to operate openly to allow the public to assure itself that judicial proceedings are fair and
+just, to improve the quality of proceedings and the performance of participants, and to educate
+the public. It obligates the courts to determine-independently, even in cases concerning national
+security-whether any proposed sealing of their opinions is narrowly tailored to serve
+compelling interests. Adherence to the Constitution's command is especially vital in this case,
+given the importance of the opinions sought to the ongoing public, judicial, and legislative
+debates about the legality and wisdom of permitting the government to acquire Americans'
+sensitive data in bulk.
+
+An independent judicial determination is also important here because many of the
+redactions proposed by the government are inexplicable. As but one particularly egregious
+example, the government has redacted the dates of dozens of seemingly innocuous events,
+
+1
+
+including the dates that it notified this Court of instances in which it "exceeded the scope of
+authorized collection" under the Court's bulk-collection orders. The availability of statutory
+review under the Freedom of Information Act to challenge these redactions is no substitute for
+the constitutional review required by the First Amendment.
+
+To give effect to the constitutional right of access, this Court should require the
+government to justify its proposed redactions, permit Movants an opportunity to respond, and
+then make findings on the record about whether the proposed redactions are narrowly tailored to
+avert a substantial risk of harm to a compelling governmental interest.
+
+ARGUMENT
+
+I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT REQUIRES THIS COURT TO DETERMINE
+INDEPENDENTLY WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT HAS DEMONSTRATED
+A COMPELLING REASON TO REDACT ITS OPINIONS.
+
+Movants' initial papers demonstrated that the opinions of this Court addressing the
+statutory and constitutional authority for the government's bulk collection of data are subject to
+the public's First Amendment right of access. *See Mot. of ACLU and MFIA for Release of Ct.
+Records* ("Mot.") at 12-21. The government's opposition does not dispute or deny this
+controlling fact. Instead, it argues that no relief is required because declassified versions of the
+requested opinions have been released by the executive branch, and because this Court should
+defer to the executive's decision to redact classified information from its opinions. This is wrong.
+
+Where the constitutional right of access applies, a court must determine whether the party
+seeking to deny public access has established a substantial probability of harm to a compelling
+interest before the constitutional right may be abridged. *See Mot.* at 22–23; *Press-Enterprise Co.
+v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II)*, 478 U.S. 1, 9–11 (1986). The government does not even
+attempt to carry this burden.
+
+2
+
+A. Rule 62(a) does not relieve this Court of its obligation under the First Amendment
+to evaluate the government's justification for the proposed redactions.
+
+Rather than address its constitutional burden, the government simply "[p]ut[s] aside" the
+First Amendment and argues for dismissal on the basis of FISC Rule 62(a). *See Gov't Opp'n to
+Mot. for Release of Court Records* ("Opp'n") at 5-7. The government asserts that "the Court is
+empowered only to 'direct the Executive Branch to review the [opinion] and redact it as
+necessary to ensure that properly classified information is appropriately protected.'" Opp'n at 5.
+But a court rule cannot displace a constitutional right. *See Boumediene v. Bush*, 553 U.S. 723,
+733 (2008) (statutory procedures cannot displace constitutional privileges where those
+procedures do not represent an "adequate and effective substitute"); *In re New York Times Co.*,
+828 F.2d 110, 115 (2d Cir. 1987) ("Obviously, a statute cannot override a constitutional right.").
+While Rule 62(a) permits the Court to publish opinions *sua sponte* or on motion by a party, it
+cannot limit the scope of the First Amendment right of access.
+
+Neither the discretion of this Court under Rule 62(a) to request that the executive
+undertake a declassification review, nor the potential for the public to request copies of the
+opinions directly from the executive under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), are
+adequate substitutes for the constitutional inquiry required under *Press-Enterprise II*. Before
+access may be denied to a judicial opinion of an Article III court construing the Constitution and
+the law, that court must determine whether a denial of access is permitted under the strict
+standards required by the First Amendment. *See Mot.* at 21–24; *Press-Enterprise II*, 478 U.S. at
+13-15.
+
+B. To satisfy the First Amendment right of access, the government should be
+required to justify its proposed redactions in light of the publicly known facts.
+
+Because the public has a First Amendment right to inspect the opinions at issue, the
+government must demonstrate to this Court that the *Press-Enterprise II* standards have been
+
+3
+
+satisfied with respect to each item of information it asks this Court to withhold from the public.
+As Judge Saylor did in addressing an earlier request for access, the Court should require the
+government to explain the need for each of its proposed redactions. *See In re Orders of this
+Court Interpreting Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act (In re Section 215 Orders)*, No. Misc. 13-02,
+2013 WL 5460064, at *8 (FISA Ct. Sept. 13, 2013); *In re Section 215 Orders*, No. Misc. 13-02
+(FISA Ct. Nov. 20, 2013). As discussed below, see *infra* Part II, the government must do more
+than simply assert that the information is classified. Rather, it must provide an explanation of the
+compelling interest that requires continued secrecy of the fact at issue, and a showing that each
+redaction is both necessary and narrowly tailored to protect that interest. The government's
+explanation should not be conclusory and should support each of its proposed redactions. *Cf. In
+re Section 215 Orders*, No. Misc. 13-02 (FISA Ct. Nov. 20, 2013) ("[T]he government shall
+submit a detailed explanation of its conclusion that the Opinion is classified in full and cannot be
+made public, even in redacted form.").
+
+The Court should allow Movants an opportunity to respond to the government's
+explanation and should then independently assess whether the First Amendment access right may
+be overcome. The First Amendment mandates such a process. *See Globe Newspaper Co. v.
+Superior Court for Norfolk Cnty.*, 457 U.S. 596, 609 n.25 (1982) ("[R]epresentatives of the press
+and general public 'must be given an opportunity to be heard on the question of their
+
+1 Movants have already fully addressed the government's meritless argument that they lack
+standing to assert this constitutional right of access. *See Opp'n* at 2-4; *Mot.* at 10–12; see also
+Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. by MFIAC for Recons. of this Court's Sep. 13, 2013 Op. on the
+Issue of Article III Standing, *In re Section 215 Orders*, No. Misc. 13-02 (FISA Ct. Oct. 11,
+2013), http://1.usa.gov/1sTGrg4 (arguing that MFIAC satisfies the requirements for
+constitutional standing to seek access to this court's opinions interpreting Section 215 of the
+PATRIOT Act).
+
+4
+
+exclusion."" (quoting *Gannett Co. v. DePasquale*, 443 U.S. 368, 401 (1979) (Powell, J.,
+concurring)).
+
+C. Strict application of the First Amendment standard is particularly
+important here given the extraordinary public interest in disclosure of these opinions.
+
+The overwhelming public interest in understanding this Court's analysis of the legality of
+bulk collection demands a rigorous application of the First Amendment. Courts have long
+recognized that "access is particularly appropriate when the subject matter of the litigation is of
+especial public interest." *In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig.*, 821 F.2d 139, 146 (2d Cir.
+1987). This Court's opinions regarding bulk collection involve some of the most contested and
+important issues in the public arena today. A public debate regarding the legality of bulk
+collection by the NSA-often marked by confusion and outrage-has continued unabated since
+June, when Edward Snowden first revealed the practice of bulk collection.
+
+The President, congressional leaders, and the heads of the intelligence agencies have
+acknowledged that the Snowden leaks triggered an important public debate about national
+security and surveillance. President Obama welcomed the debate as "healthy for our democracy"
+and as a sign of the "maturity" of our nation. *See Transcript: What Obama Said on NSA
+Controversy*, Wall St. J., June 7, 2013, http://on.wsj.com/19CrIgI. National Intelligence Director
+James Clapper agreed: "As loathe as I am to give any credit for what's happened here ... I think
+it's clear that some of the conversations that this has generated, some of the debate ... actually
+probably needed to happen." *Agence France-Presse, NSA Chief Clapper Praise Snowden: Data
+Spying Debate 'Probably Needed to Happen', Raw Story*, Sep. 12, 2013,
+http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2013/09/12/nsa-chief-clapper-praises-snowden-data-spying-debate-
+probably-needed-to-happen/ (second alteration in original). Even Senator Dianne Feinstein, who
+had once insisted that "through four years of oversight, the [Senate Select Committee on
+
+5
+
+Intelligence] has not identified a single case in which a government official engaged in a willful
+effort to circumvent or violate the law," S. Rep. No. 122-172, at 6 (2012), called for greater
+transparency and oversight of the programs following the Snowden leaks. *See Dianne Feinstein,
+Op-Ed., Make NSA Programs More Transparent, Wash. Post*, July 30, 2013,
+http://wapo.st/18v002j.
+
+At the center of this debate is the scope of the NSA's authority and the role of this Court
+in approving programs of bulk collection. While some members of Congress have insisted that
+"[t]he FISA Court is taking [its] mandate seriously," Tom Risen, *FISA Judge Denies
+Surveillance Court Offers 'Rubber Stamp, 'U.S. News & World Report*, Oct. 16, 2013,
+http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/10/16/fisa-judge-denies-surveillance-court-offers-
+rubber-stamp (quoting Sen. Feinstein), other commentators have called for reform of the Court
+that would make it “as much like other courts as possible,” Editorial, *Privacy and the FISA
+Court, L.A. Times*, July 10, 2013, http://lat.ms/19CrTEi; *see id.* (“These legal issues—the reach
+of the Patriot Act and application of the 'special needs' doctrine—have enormous implications
+for the privacy of Americans. They would be debated by judges in public and ultimately resolved
+by the Supreme Court."); Editorial, *NSA Oversight Should Be Tough, Clear, and Fair, Wash.
+Post*, Nov. 2, 2013, wapo.st/JrUGRI. And in recent months, current and former members of the
+Court have taken the unorthodox step of defending their institution to the public. *See Letter from
+Hon. Reggie B. Walton, Presiding Judge, FISC, to Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Senate
+Comm. on the Judiciary* (Oct. 11, 2013), http://1.usa.gov/19Csvdo (detailing FISC procedures
+
+6
+
+and practices); Frederic Frommer, *Federal Judge: FISA Court Not a Rubber Stamp, Huffington
+Post*, July 11, 2013, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/federal-judge-fisa-court-not-rubber-stamp.²
+
+Finally, the District Court for the District of Columbia's December 16 ruling that the
+NSA's bulk collection and querying of phone record metadata is most likely unconstitutional
+highlights the significant and positive role that judicial transparency can play in enhancing this
+public debate. *See Klayman v. Obama*, No. 13-cv-0851, 2013 WL 6571596 (D.D.C. Dec. 16,
+2013). The overwhelming public response to the opinion, both positive³ and negative,⁵
+illustrates the productive dialogue that judicial decisions can and should generate—precisely the
+dialogue hindered by the government's redaction of the opinions requested here. Indeed, even a
+leading academic defender of the NSA's surveillance activities argued that Judge Leon's
+opinion, though “unpersuasive in its reasoning," nevertheless “starts a conversation that might
+lead to some very interesting places.”⁶ Just days ago, the President's own review group joined
+
+² Other former members of the FISC, meanwhile, have publicly criticized elements of the
+Court's procedures. *See, e.g., Hon. James G. Carr, Op-Ed., A Better Secret Court, N.Y. Times*,
+July 22, 2013, http://nyti.ms/19CsG81; Stephen Braun, *Former Judge Admits Flaws with Secret
+FISA Court, Associated Press*, July 9, 2013, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/oversight-board-hears-
+testimony-nsa-spying (quoting Hon. James Robertson).
+
+³ For general coverage of Judge Leon's opinion, *see Ellen Nakashima & Ann E. Marimow,
+Judge: NSA's Collecting of Phone Records Is Probably Unconstitutional, Wash. Post*, Dec. 16,
+2013, http://wapo.st/19CsNAD; and Charlie Savage, *Judge Questions Legality of N.S.A. Phone
+Records, N.Y. Times*, Dec. 16, 2013, http://nyti.ms/19CsRAB.
+
+⁴ *See, e.g., Editorial, NSA's Phone Record Sweep-Up Harder To Defend: Our View, USA
+Today*, Dec. 17, 2013, http://usat.ly/19CsVQT.
+
+⁵ *See, e.g., Robert F. Turner, Op-Ed., Why Judge Leon's NSA Ruling Is Wrong, Wall St. J.*,
+Dec. 17, 2013, http://on.wsj.com/19CsXZ0.
+
+⁶ Orin Kerr, *Preliminary Thoughts On Judge Leon's Opinions, Volokh Conspiracy* (Dec. 16,
+2013, 6:54 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/12/16/preliminary-thoughts-judge-leons-opinion/.
+
+7
+
+that conversation with a three-hundred-page report that recommends, in part, greater
+transparency in this Court's operation.⁷
+
+Whatever one thinks of the various viewpoints on this issue, the extraordinary—and
+inadequately informed—public debate surrounding this Court's activities requires a careful and
+rigorous application of the First Amendment standards governing public access to the Court's
+decisions.
+
+II. AN EXECUTIVE BRANCH DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW DOES NOT
+SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT
+FOR KEEPING JUDICIAL OPINIONS SECRET.
+
+The government urges the Court to accept its declassification review and respectfully step
+aside. This declassification review, however, fails to satisfy the government's constitutional
+burden to justify censoring portions of a judicial opinion. Moreover, the fruits of its
+declassification review in this case—four opinions redacted to shreds—amply illustrate the need
+for independent judicial review of the proposed redactions in light of the overwhelming public
+interest in understanding the Court's analysis and application of the nation's surveillance laws.
+
+A. The government ignores the essential role of the judiciary in independently
+assessing the public's right of access to judicial opinions.
+
+The government's misguided approach focuses on the wrong issue. It stresses that “the
+First Amendment does not justify judicial . . . involvement in Executive Branch classification
+decisions.” Opp'n at 4. But the issue is not what the executive branch can classify, but whether
+the executive branch can unilaterally restrict public access to a judicial decision. "While it is
+true, as an abstract proposition, that the government's interest in protecting classified information
+can be a qualifying compelling and overriding interest," the First Amendment “require[s] a
+
+⁷ *President's Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies, Liberty and
+Security in a Changing World* 200–07 (Dec. 12, 2013), http://1.usa.gov/19Cu8aL.
+
+8
+
+judicial inquiry into the legitimacy of the asserted national security interest, and specific
+findings, sealed if necessary, about the harm to national security that would ensue if the request"
+is not granted. *United States v. Rosen*, 487 F. Supp. 2d 703, 717 (E.D. Va. 2007) (emphasis
+added). Indeed, "[a] blind acceptance by the courts of the government's insistence on the need
+for secrecy, without notice to others, without argument, and without a statement of reasons,
+would impermissibly compromise the independence of the judiciary and open the door to
+possible abuse." *In re Washington Post Co.*, 807 F.2d 383, 391–92 (4th Cir. 1986).
+
+Accordingly, where First Amendment rights apply, courts routinely subject claims that
+information must remain secret to the heightened level of scrutiny the Constitution demands. *See
+Mot.* at 25–27; *see also, e.g., McGehee v. Casey*, 718 F.2d 1137, 1148–49 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
+(explaining, in the context of First Amendment challenge to censorship of article written by
+former government employee, that since “the judiciary's tasks include the protection of
+individual rights[,] . . . courts must assure themselves that the reasons for classification" are
+acceptable); *Doe v. Gonzales*, 386 F. Supp. 2d 66, 76 (D. Conn. 2005) ("While the court
+recognizes the [government's] expertise in the area of counter-terrorism and is inclined to afford
+their judgments in that area deference, those judgments remain subject to judicial review.");
+*United States v. Grunden*, 2 M.J. 116, 122 (C.M.A. 1977) (explaining that the trial judge "must
+be satisfied from all the evidence and circumstances" that classification warrants the closure of
+proceedings).
+
+Courts must independently evaluate whether the executive's proposed sealing overcomes
+the public's right of access because the First Amendment requires it, but also because the
+standard for classification differs significantly from the First Amendment standard for sealing
+judicial opinions. Under Executive Order 13,526, information may be classified if an executive
+
+9
+
+official determines that “unauthorized disclosure . . . reasonably could be expected to result in
+damage to the national security." Exec. Order. 13,526 at § 1.1(4). But the First Amendment
+permits sealing only after a judicial determination that the sealing is narrowly tailored to avoid a
+"substantial probability” of harm. *Press-Enterprise II*, 478 U.S. at 14. Thus, in evaluating the
+withholding of records under these two different standards, courts might uphold classification
+even while finding the justifications for secrecy wanting under the First Amendment. *Compare,
+e.g., ACLU v. Dep't of State*, 878 F. Supp. 2d 215, 223–24 (D.D.C. 2012) (concluding that
+documents publicly disclosed by Wikileaks but not “officially acknowledged" remain properly
+classified), *with Bank Julius Baer & Co. v. Wikileaks*, 535 F. Supp. 2d 980, 985 (N.D. Cal. 2008)
+(*The First Amendment bars preliminary injunction against Wikileaks to prevent further
+dissemination of confidential bank records once “the cat is out of the bag.").
+
+B. Many of the government's proposed redactions are facially suspect and warrant
+careful judicial review.
+
+Here, the heavy redactions to the Court's opinions proposed by the government only
+underscore the need for independent judicial assessment of the sealing. While "release of
+redacted material is clearly a less restrictive means" of protecting a party's interest than blanket
+sealing, *Globe Newspaper Co. v. Pokaski*, 684 F. Supp. 1132, 1136 n.4 (D. Mass. 1988), aff'd in
+part, rev'd in part, 868 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1989), the judiciary must “independently examine the
+Government's redactions . . . to ensure that the redactions . . . are no greater than necessary,"
+*United States v. Moussaoui*, 65 F. App'x 881, 888 (4th Cir. 2003).
+
+Despite the obligation to minimize redactions to those essential to protect a compelling
+interest, the government proposes extensive, and often questionable, redactions that seriously
+impair the public's ability to understand and evaluate the Court's reasoning and holdings. By
+way of example, the government seeks to shield from public view such items as:
+
+10
+
+* The definition of the "metadata" for which bulk collection is authorized;⁸
+* The duration of the bulk collection authorized;⁹
+* The manner in which internet metadata was used, beyond contact chaining;¹⁰
+* The nature and duration of the government's non-compliance with past orders;¹¹ and
+* Dozens of seemingly innocuous dates, such as the dates of FISC opinions and
+applications to the Court, and even the dates the government notified this Court of its
+violations of court-imposed limitations on its bulk collection programs.¹²
+
+These redactions appear unjustified on their face and warrant the Court's attention.
+
+Of these, perhaps the most troubling is the government's attempt to keep secret the
+categories of metadata it was authorized to collect—the very subject, in other words, of its
+applications. *See, e.g., Kollar-Kotelly Opinion* at 7–11; *Bates Opinion* at 2. Without this
+information, the opinions merely recite the Fourth Amendment's third-party doctrine, but they
+omit the information necessary to make sense of the Court's application of this doctrine to the
+government do so, and since FOIA does not permit a requester to seek records directly from a
+
+⁸ *See Opinion and Order Authorizing Collection of Bulk Electronic Communications
+Metadata* at 7–11, 19 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (released Nov. 18, 2013), http://1.usa.gov/19Ct5rI
+("Kollar-Kotelly Opinion") ("[Redacted] like other forms of metadata, is not protected by the
+Fourth Amendment . . ."); *Opinion and Order Authorizing Reinstatement of Bulk Collection of
+Internet Metadata* at 2, 35, 71 (Bates, J.) (released Nov. 18, 2013), http://1.usa.gov/19CtjQ3
+("Bates Opinion") ("The government requests authority to [redacted] categories of [sixteen pages
+of redacted material].").
+
+⁹ *See, e.g., Bates Opinion* at 4.
+
+¹⁰ *See, e.g., Kollar-Kotelly Opinion* at 42–43 ("NSA proposes to employ two analytic methods
+on the body of archived meta data it seeks to collect. . . The two methods are: (1) Contact
+chaining – [ (21)] [Redacted].").
+
+¹¹ *See, e.g., Bates Opinion* at 2–3 ("[T]he government acknowledges that NSA exceeded the
+scope of authorized acquisition continuously during the more than [redacted] years of acquisition
+under these orders."); *id.* at 105 ("[T]he unauthorized collection included: [redacted].").
+
+¹² *See, e.g., Kollar-Kotelly Opinion* at 2, 3, 70; *Bates Opinion* at 4, 10, 13, 14; *Amended
+Memorandum Opinion Reauthorizing Bulk Collection of Telephony Metadata* at 20 (Eagan, J.)
+(published Sept. 17, 2013), http://1.usa.gov/19CtcHA ("Eagan Opinion"). As but one of many
+examples, Judge Bates's discussion of the government's violations goes as follows: “[O]n
+[redacted] the government provided written notice to the FISC that it had exceeded the scope of
+authorized collection [redacted]." Bates Opinion at 10.
+
+11
+
+government's requests. *See Ellen Nakashima & Greg Miller, Official Releasing What Appears
+To Be Original Court File Authorizing NSA To Conduct Sweeps, Wash. Post*, Nov. 18, 2013,
+http://www.wapo.st/IGqxNK (because "[t]hree pages [of the Kollar-Kotelly Opinion] describing
+the 'metadata' . . . were redacted," its "true scope" remains "unclear"). Judge Bates describes this
+application of doctrine to categories of metadata as "difficult line-drawing," *Bates Opinion* at
+71—precisely the type of "line-drawing" that the public must see to understand how the law is
+being construed and how the Constitution is being applied in this contested area. *See Mosaid
+Technologies Inc. v. LSI Corp.*, 878 F. Supp. 2d 503, 513 (D. Del. 2012) (rejecting proposal to
+redact discussion of how precedent “should (or should not) apply to the present facts").
+
+Beyond the nature of the material the government seeks to redact, the sheer volume of its
+redactions in some cases "would have the practical effect of sealing the entire case" and leave an
+interested citizen with "no idea what to make" of the redacted opinions. *In re Platinum &
+Palladium Commodities Litig.*, 828 F. Supp. 2d 602, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); *see CRAssociates,
+Inc. v. United States*, 102 Fed. Cl. 698 (Fed. Cl. 2011), aff'd, 475 F. App'x 341 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
+(rejecting proposed redactions since "the public version of th[e] document would scarcely be
+comprehensible"). For example, with approximately twenty-five pages redacted, Judge Kollar-
+Kotelly's opinion is full of impenetrable—but likely critical—passages that are void of the
+meaning they ought to have. Likewise, in redacting Judge Bates's opinion, the government seeks
+to shield dozens of consecutive pages wholesale, *see Bates Opinion* at 35–52, 57–70, while also
+excising the individual words or phrases that give meaning to his discussion, *see Bates Opinion*
+at 3, 5. Such extensive redactions “obscure any discussion of the actual nature" of the opinions
+and defeat the core oversight purpose of the access right. *In re Mosaid Technologies Inc.*, 878 F.
+
+12
+
+Supp. 2d at 507-08 (rejecting the parties' proposal to redact 40 percent of one transcript and 60
+percent of another).
+
+Whether these redactions could be justified—and it is difficult to see how all of them
+could be—their nature and scope call for independent evaluation. Contrary to the government's
+position, a court cannot "delegate its authority" to edit and redact a judicial document and must
+instead "make its own redactions, supported by specific findings, after a careful review of all
+claims for and against access." *United States v. Amodeo*, 44 F.3d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 1995); *see
+also United States v. Moussaoui*, 65 F. App'x 881, 888 (4th Cir. 2003) (“The interest of the
+public in the flow of information is protected by our exercising independent judgment
+concerning redactions." (emphasis added)).
+
+Given the extent of the government's proposed redactions and the tremendous public
+interest in the contents of these opinions, this Court's "independent judgment" is essential.
+
+III. FOIA IS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF ACCESS.
+
+In light of the judiciary's constitutional mandate to independently police access to its own
+proceedings and records, the government's reliance on FOIA—a statute governing access to
+executive materials—is wholly misplaced. The government's error not only demonstrates a
+disturbing insensitivity to core separation-of-powers principles, but it would also have the
+practical effect of narrowing or eliminating the public's First Amendment right of access.
+
+A. FOIA's statutory standards for withholding differ significantly from the First
+Amendment's standard for sealing judicial opinions.
+
+FOIA's statutory standards for determining when information may be withheld from the
+public cannot satisfy the constitutional right of access that applies to the opinions of this Court.
+The government is thus wrong in asserting that “there would be no point in this Court's merely
+duplicating the judicial review that the ACLU, and anyone else, can obtain by submitting a FOIA
+
+13
+
+request to the Department of Justice for these same records."¹³ Opp'n at 3–4 (quoting *In re
+Release*, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 496 n.32). The review this Court undertakes in applying First
+Amendment standards are not “the same standards as a district court would [apply] in the FOIA
+litigation," *id.* at 4, particularly where classified information is involved. Whereas *Press-
+Enterprise II* requires courts to exercise their independent judgment as to whether a compelling
+need requires some secrecy for information in a court opinion, FOIA directs courts to determine
+only whether the executive has shown that it appears 'logical' or 'plausible'" that the records
+sought are properly classified. *Wolf v. CIA*, 473 F.3d 370, 374–75 (D.C. Cir. 2007). In both cases
+appropriate deference is given to the “expertise of agencies engaged in national security and
+foreign policy," *id.* at 374, but the ultimate issue for the court to decide is very different where
+the constitutional right of access attaches.¹³
+
+This difference may well be dispositive here: the government's proposed redactions to
+the four opinions at issue might satisfy FOIA's inquiry into whether the information is properly
+classified, but still fail to pass *Press-Enterprise II*'s exacting standard requiring a “substantial
+probability" of harm and “narrow[] tailoring." *Compare ACLU v. Dep't of State*, 878 F. Supp. 2d
+at 223–24, *with Bank Julius Baer*, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 985. The government thus fails to
+appreciate that these distinct standards of review—and the necessary possibility of divergent
+outcomes—prevent a court from supplanting the First Amendment right of access with FOIA.
+
+¹³ *Cf. Wright v. FBI*, 613 F. Supp. 2d 24, 24–25 (D.D.C. 2009) (“Plaintiffs have relied upon
+the First Amendment, not FOIA, and the Government has cited to no case holding that FOIA is
+coterminous with the First Amendment. . . . Consequently, censorship is prohibited, even if the
+material falls within a FOIA Exemption, where the Government fails to show with reasonable
+specificity that its interest in censorship . . . outweighs the interest of prospective speakers in free
+dissemination of those speakers' views.").
+
+14
+
+B. The government's proposal to substitute FOIA review for First Amendment
+analysis would eviscerate the constitutional right of access.
+
+The government's demand that Movants "respect, and not through [their] motion attempt
+to circumvent, the FOIA process enacted by Congress,” Opp'n at 4, if accepted by this Court,
+would upend the public's qualified constitutional right to inspect court records and attend court
+proceedings. Under this theory, the government could defeat public access by “classifying" court
+records or evidence to be submitted in court—even the Supreme Court—and demanding that
+members of the public rely solely on FOIA to seek access.¹⁴ Access as a constitutional right
+protected by the judicial branch would become, by this sleight of hand, a solely statutory matter.
+
+Alternatively, the government could entirely defeat the public's right of access to this
+Court's opinions—wholly insulating them from public review—by refusing to take the opinions
+into its possession or to maintain copies over time. Since there is no affirmative requirement that
+the government do so, and since FOIA does not permit a requester to seek records directly from a
+court, *Mayo v. U.S. Gov't Printing Office*, 9 F.3d 1450, 1451 (9th Cir. 1993), public access to
+this Court's opinions would rise or fall on the vagaries of the Justice Department's document-
+retention policy. FOIA is thus no substitute for review required under the First Amendment and
+provides no proper basis to dismiss this motion.
+
+¹⁴ In enacting the Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1–16 ("CIPA")
+Congress recognized that the need to use "classified" information in a criminal prosecution does
+not automatically justify an abridgment of the public's right of access. Where classified
+information is deemed by a judge to be relevant and admissible in a criminal prosecution, CIPA
+requires the government either to declassify it, find an acceptable non-classified alternative, or
+face consequences up to and including dismissal of the indictment; it does not authorize the
+prosecution to proceed in a closed courtroom or on a sealed record. *See generally Edward C. Liu
+& Todd Garvey, Cong. Research Serv., R41742, Protecting Classified Information and the
+Rights of Criminal Defendants: The Classified Information Procedures Act* 6–11 (2012).
+
+15
+
+CONCLUSION
+
+For the foregoing reasons, Movants respectfully request that this Court deny the
+government's request to dismiss their motion and instead unseal its opinions addressing the
+constitutional and statutory bases for the "bulk collection" of records under various authorities
+within FISA, including but not limited to 50 U.S.C. § 1842. Movants request that these materials
+be released as quickly as possible and with only those redactions essential to protect information
+that the Court determines, after independent review, to warrant continued sealing. Given the
+relevance of the opinions to an ongoing debate of immense public interest, Movants also request
+expedited consideration of this motion, as well as oral argument before the Court.
+
+Dated: December 20, 2013
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+/s/ David A. Shulz
+David A. Schulz
+Jonathan Manes
+Media Freedom and Information Access
+Clinic
+Yale Law School¹⁵
+P.O. Box 208215
+New Haven, CT 06520
+Phone: (212) 850-6103
+Fax: (212) 850-6299
+dschulz@lskslaw.com
+
+Alex Abdo
+Brett Max Kaufman
+Patrick Toomey
+Jameel Jaffer
+American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
+125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
+New York, NY 10004
+Phone: (212) 549-2500
+Fax: (212) 549-2654
+
+¹⁵ This memorandum has been prepared with the assistance of Yale Law School students,
+Patrick Hayden '14, John Langford '14, Anjali Motgi '14, Max Mishkin '14, and Brianna van
+Kan '15. This brief does not purport to present the institutional views of Yale Law School, if
+any.
+
+16
+
+aabdo@aclu.org
+
+Arthur B. Spitzer
+American Civil Liberties Union of the
+Nation's Capital
+4301 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 434
+Washington, DC 20008
+Phone: (202) 457-0800
+Fax: (202) 457-0805
+artspitzer@aclu-nca.org
+
+17
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I, Alex Abdo, certify that on this day, December 20, 2013, a copy of the foregoing brief
+was served by UPS on the following persons:
+
+Eric H. Holder
+Attorney General
+Office of the Attorney General
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
+Washington, DC 20530
+
+John P. Carlin
+Acting Assistant Attorney General for National Security
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
+Washington, DC 20530
+
+Christine Gunning
+Litigation Security Group
+U.S. Department of Justice
+2 Constitution Square
+145 N Street, N.E.
+Suite 2W-115
+Washington, DC 20530
+
+/s/ Alex Abdo
+Alex Abdo
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-08-reply-131223/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-08-reply-131223/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b79e454
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-08-reply-131223/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Movants' Reply in Support of Their Motion for Release of Court Records, In re Opinions & Orders Issued by this Court Addressing Bulk Collection of Data Under Various Provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, No. Misc. 13-08 (FISA Ct. Dec. 20, 2013).",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-12-20",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-12-20",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34499",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "663aa29edb8fa4295ce5bbf6af6b879de5113a26f650a9c6b10b0987ea4fd59e",
+ "pages": 20
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-order-130718/FISC_-_misc-13-order-130718.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-order-130718/FISC_-_misc-13-order-130718.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7f35186
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-order-130718/FISC_-_misc-13-order-130718.md
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE ORDERS ISSUED BY THIS COURT
+INTERPRETING SECTION 215 OF THE
+PATRIOT ACT
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-02
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT OF A FIRST AMENDMENT
+RIGHT TO PUBLISH AGGREGATE
+INFORMATION ABOUT FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-03
+
+IN RE MOTION TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+NUMBERS REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+Docket No. Misc. 13-04
+
+**ORDER**
+
+These matters are before the Court on the following motions:
+
+(1) Motion of U.S. Representatives Amash, Broun, Gabbard, Griffith, Holt, Jones, Lee, Lofgren, Massie, McClintock, Norton, O'Rourke, Pearce, Salmon, Sanford, and Yoho for Leave to File a Brief as *Amici Curiae* in Support of the Motion of the American Civil Liberties Union, the American Civil Liberties Union of the Nation's Capital, and the Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic for the Release of Court Records, filed on June 28, 2013, in Docket Number Misc. 13-02;
+
+(2) Motion of the First Amendment Coalition, American Civil Liberties Union, Center for Democracy and Technology, Electronic Frontier Foundation, and TechFreedom for Leave to File Brief as *Amici Curiae* in Support of the Motions for Declaratory Judgment, filed on July 8, 2013,
+in Docket Numbers Misc. 13-03 and Misc. 13-04; and,
+
+(3) Motion of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, ABC, Inc., The Associated Press, Bloomberg L.P., Dow Jones & Company, Inc., Gannett Co. Inc., Los Angeles Times, The McClatchey Company, National Public Radio, Inc., The New York Times Company, The New Yorker, The Newsweek/Daily Beast Company LLC, Reuters America LLC, Tribune Company, and The Washington Post for Leave to File Brief as *Amici Curiae* in Support of the Motion for the Release of Court Records and the Motions for Declaratory Judgment, filed on July 15, 2013, in Docket Numbers Misc. 13-02, Misc. 13-03, and Misc. 13-04.
+
+The parties have consented to the filing of the briefs accompanying these motions.
+
+Accordingly, the motions are granted. Counsel for *amici* The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and the U.S. Representatives are directed to submit the federal bar information required by FISC Rules 7(h)(1) and 63 no later than August 9, 2013. See FISC Rule 63 (a non-government attorney appearing before the FISC "must be a licensed attorney and a member, in good standing, of a bar of a United States district court or circuit court").
+
+SO ORDERED this 18th day of July 2013.
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+Page 2
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-order-130718/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-order-130718/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7f26a0e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-order-130718/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Order, In re Orders Issued by this Court Interpreting Section 215 of the Patriot Act, No. Misc. 13-02, GID.C.00208 (FISA Ct. July 18, 2013) (Walton, J.)",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-07-18",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-07-18",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34258",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "10fe3911bffbea5f711fe1fa06b4b134ebafdd18b35cf39fe415577b013e1b0d",
+ "pages": 2
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-order-131011/FISC_-_misc-13-order-131011.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-order-131011/FISC_-_misc-13-order-131011.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9a0cd42
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-order-131011/FISC_-_misc-13-order-131011.md
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE AMENDED MOTION FOR
+DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF A FIRST
+AMENDMENT RIGHT TO PUBLISH
+AGGREGATE INFORMATION ABOUT
+FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-03
+
+IN RE MOTION TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-04
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+AND DIRECTIVES
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-05
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS AND
+DIRECTIVES
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-06
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGEMENT TO REPORT AGGREGATED
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-07
+
+ORDER GRANTING JOINT MOTION
+FOR STAY OF PROCEEDINGS
+
+On October 7, 2013, the parties in the above-captioned cases filed a joint motion for a
+stay of proceedings. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the joint motion is GRANTED,
+and the proceedings, including the October 21, 2013, deadline for the Movants' reply, are stayed
+
+until Department of Justice attorneys are permitted to resume their usual civil litigation functions
+and consult with Movants regarding the issues they have raised regarding access to classified
+information in the Government's response and declaration.
+
+SO ORDERED, this 11th day of October, 2013.
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+2
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-order-131011/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-order-131011/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5111cc0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-order-131011/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Order Granting Joint Motion for Stay of Proceedings, In re Amended Motion for Declaratory Judgment of a First Amendment Right to Publish Aggregate Info. About FISA Orders, No. Misc. 13-03, GID.C.00213 (FISA Ct. Oct. 11, 2013) (Walton, J.)",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-10-11",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-10-11",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34263",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "af2246ad7f8565e8d0ffc98e6c87d7cbd8fb3f20a926c591718a2eec7c4bf151",
+ "pages": 2
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-bar-membership-130730/FISC_-_misc-bar-membership-130730.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-bar-membership-130730/FISC_-_misc-bar-membership-130730.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bdc5975
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-bar-membership-130730/FISC_-_misc-bar-membership-130730.md
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+2013 JUL 30 PM 4:26
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+In re Orders Issued by This Court
+Interpreting Section 215 of the Patriot Act
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-02
+
+In re Motion for Declaratory Judgment
+of A First Amendment Right
+to Publish Aggregate Information
+About FISA Orders
+Docket No. Misc. 13-03
+
+In re Motion to Disclose
+Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-04
+
+CERTIFICATION OF BAR MEMBERSHIP
+
+Pursuant to this Court's order, dated July 18, 2013, and United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court R.P. 7(h)(1) and 63, The Reporters Committee for Freedom of
+the Press respectfully submits the following information:
+
+Bruce D. Brown is a member in good standing of the United States District Court for the
+District of Columbia, #457317, admitted September 12, 2011. Gregg P. Leslie, Robert J.
+Tricchinelli, and all listed counsel for other *amici* are "of counsel" and not formally entering an
+appearance.
+
+Dated: July 24, 2013
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+Bruce D. Brown
+The Reporters Committee
+for Freedom of the Press
+1101 Wilson Blvd., Suite 1100
+Arlington, VA 22209
+Phone: 703-807-2100
+bbrown@rcfp.org
+Counsel for Amici Curiae
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-bar-membership-130730/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-bar-membership-130730/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f3c5973
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-bar-membership-130730/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Certification of Bar Membership, In re Orders of This Court Interpreting Section 215 of the Patriot Act, No. Misc. 13-02 (FISA Ct. July 30, 2013).",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-07-30",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-07-30",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34441",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "d7ee0a4ebd3834b14b7bcb0bc348980e43d44e965d629dd74fbd4f386adb3b0a",
+ "pages": 1
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-bar-membership-130809/FISC_-_misc-bar-membership-130809.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-bar-membership-130809/FISC_-_misc-bar-membership-130809.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5ab871e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-bar-membership-130809/FISC_-_misc-bar-membership-130809.md
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+2013 AUG -9 PM 3:04
+
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, DC
+
+IN RE ORDERS ISSUED BY THIS COURT
+INTERPRETING SECTION 215 OF THE
+PATRIOT ACT
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-02
+
+CERTIFICATION OF BAR MEMBERSHIP
+
+Pursuant to this Court's order dated July 18, 2013, and U.S. Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Court Rules of Procedure 7(b)(1) and 63, *amici curiae* U.S. Representatives Justin
+Amash, Paul Broun, Tulsi Gabbard, Morgan Griffith, Rush Holt, Walter Jones, Barbara Lee, Zoe
+Lofgren, Thomas Massie, Tom McClintock, Eleanor Holmes Norton, Beto O'Rourke, Steve
+Pearce, Matt Salmon, Mark Sanford, and Ted Yoho submit the following information:
+
+Gregory L. Diskant is a member in good standing of the United States District
+Court for the Southern District of New York, admitted December 24, 1975. He is licensed to
+practice law by the bar of the State of New York.
+
+Benjamin S. Litman is a member in good standing of the United States District
+Court for the Southern District of New York, admitted October 21, 2008. He is licensed to
+practice law by the bar of the State of New York.
+
+Richard I. Kim is "of counsel" in this matter and is not formally entering an
+appearance.
+
+Dated: August 9, 2013
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+Gregory L. Diskant, NYS OCA #1047240
+Benjamin S. Litman, NYS OCA #4508404
+Richard I. Kim, NYS OCA #4939799
+PATTERSON BELKNAP WEBB & TYLER LLP
+1133 Avenue of the Americas
+New York, NY 10036
+Phone: (212) 336-2000
+Fax: (212) 336-2222
+Counsel for Amici Curiae
+
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+I, Benjamin S. Litman, certify that on this day, August 9, 2013, a copy of the
+foregoing certification of bar membership was served on the following person via electronic
+mail:
+Carli Rodriguez-Feo
+Litigation Security Group
+U.S. Department of Justice
+2 Constitution Square
+145 N Street, N.E.
+Suite 2W-115
+Washington, DC 20530
+Carli.Rodriguez-Feo@usdoj.gov
+
+Benjamin S. Litman
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-bar-membership-130809/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-bar-membership-130809/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5647680
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-bar-membership-130809/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Certification of Bar Membership, In re Orders of this Court Interpreting Section 215 of the Patriot Act, No. Misc. 13-02 (FISA Ct. Aug. 9, 2013).",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-08-09",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-08-09",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34442",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "66ae27ece1f9299cd815e2ab1f3cf01e2f0796d4e7a6e294c20f3e64c68035de",
+ "pages": 3
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-joint-motion-for-stay-of-proceedings-131008/FISC_-_misc-joint-motion-for-stay-of-proceedings-131008.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-joint-motion-for-stay-of-proceedings-131008/FISC_-_misc-joint-motion-for-stay-of-proceedings-131008.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..88d17fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-joint-motion-for-stay-of-proceedings-131008/FISC_-_misc-joint-motion-for-stay-of-proceedings-131008.md
@@ -0,0 +1,222 @@
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+
+2013 OCT -7 PM 3:39
+
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE AMENDED MOTION FOR
+DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF A FIRST
+AMENDMENT RIGHT TO PUBLISH
+AGGREGATE INFORMATION ABOUT
+FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-03
+
+IN RE MOTION TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-04
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+AND DIRECTIVES
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-05
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS AND
+DIRECTIVES
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-06
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT TO REPORT AGGREGATED
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-07
+
+JOINT MOTION FOR STAY OF PROCEEDINGS
+
+The parties hereby jointly move for a stay of proceedings in this matter including, in
+particular, a stay of the upcoming deadline of October 21, 2013 for Movants' reply to the
+Government's response to the Movants' motions for declaratory relief. In support thereof, the
+parties state as follows:
+
+1. At the end of the day on September 30, 2013, the appropriations act that had been
+funding the U.S. Department of Justice ("Department") expired and annual appropriations to the
+Department lapsed. The Department does not know when funding will be restored by Congress.
+
+2. Absent an appropriation, Department of Justice attorneys and employees are
+prohibited from continuing to work, even on a voluntary basis, except in very limited
+circumstances, including "emergencies involving the safety of human life or the protection of
+property," 31 U.S.C. § 1342.
+
+3. On October 2, 2013, Movants approached counsel for the Government to seek a
+stay of the deadline for Movants' reply in order to discuss with counsel for the Government
+whether cleared counsel for Movants can be permitted to access classified information contained
+in the response and declaration filed by the Government. Absent an appropriation, Department
+of Justice attorneys cannot continue to work on this matter, including engaging in discussions
+with Movants' counsel regarding such issues.
+
+4. In light of the lapse of appropriations, the parties request a stay of the deadline for
+Movants' reply at least until Congress has restored appropriations to the Department and these
+access-related issues have been resolved. The Government makes no representation regarding
+whether, after consulting with relevant agencies and the parties, the Government will ultimately
+agree to the disclosure of any additional information contained in the response and declaration
+filed by the Government.
+
+5. If this motion for a stay is granted, undersigned counsel proposes to notify the
+Court within five days after Congress has appropriated funds for the Department. The parties
+propose that, at that point in time, deadlines can be re-set as appropriate under the circumstances,
+
+2
+
+accounting for a time period at least equal to the duration of the lapse in appropriations and any
+additional time that may be provided by the Court in response to Movants' requests to access
+classified information. While the Government cannot predict the ultimate impact the lapse in
+appropriations will have, at this point the parties do not anticipate that any other present
+deadlines would need to be extended.
+
+Therefore, the parties hereby move for a stay of proceedings in this case including, in
+particular, the October 21, 2013, deadline outlined above, until Department of Justice attorneys
+are permitted to resume their usual civil litigation functions and consult with Movants regarding
+the issues they have raised regarding access to classified information in the Government's
+response and declaration. A proposed Order is attached.
+
+3
+
+October 7, 2013
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+/s/ Albert Gidari
+ALBERT GIDARI
+TODD M. HINNEN
+Perkins Coie LLP
+1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900
+Seattle, WA 98101
+
+Attorneys for Google Inc.
+
+/s/ James M. Garland
+JAMES M. GARLAND
+DAVID N. FAGAN
+ALEXANDER A. BERENGAUT
+Covington & Burling LLP
+1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
+Washington, DC 20004-2401
+
+Attorneys for Microsoft Corporation
+
+/s/ Marc J. Zwillinger
+MARC J. ZWILLINGER
+JACOB A. SOMMER
+ZwillGen PLLC
+1705 N St. N.W.
+Washington, DC 20036
+
+Attorneys for Yahoo! Inc.
+
+/s/ Carl J. Nichols
+CARL J. NICHOLS
+Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP
+1875 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
+Washington, DC 20006
+
+Attorney for Facebook, Inc.
+
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+
+TASHINA GAUHAR
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
+/s/ Nicholas J. Patterson
+JEFFREY M. SMITH
+NICHOLAS J. PATTERSON
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+
+Attorneys for the United States of America
+
+4
+
+/s/ Jerome C. Roth
+JEROME C. ROTH
+JONATHAN H. BLAVIN
+JUSTIN P. RAPHAEL:
+Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP
+560 Mission Street, 27th Floor
+San Francisco, CA 94105
+
+Attorneys for LinkedIn Corporation
+
+5
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE AMENDED MOTION FOR
+DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF A FIRST
+AMENDMENT RIGHT TO PUBLISH
+AGGREGATE INFORMATION ABOUT
+FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-03
+
+IN RE MOTION TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-04
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+AND DIRECTIVES
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-05
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS AND
+DIRECTIVES
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-06
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT TO REPORT AGGREGATED
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-07
+
+[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING JOINT MOTION
+FOR STAY OF PROCEEDINGS
+
+On October 7, 2013, the parties in the above-captioned cases filed a joint motion for a
+stay of proceedings. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the joint motion is GRANTED
+and the proceedings including, in particular, the October 21, 2013, deadline for the Movants'
+
+reply, are stayed until Department of Justice attorneys are permitted to resume their usual civil
+litigation functions and consult with Movants regarding the issues they have raised regarding
+access to classified information in the Government's response and declaration.
+
+SO ORDERED, this _____ day of October, 2013.
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+2
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-joint-motion-for-stay-of-proceedings-131008/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-joint-motion-for-stay-of-proceedings-131008/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0475a54
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-joint-motion-for-stay-of-proceedings-131008/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Joint Motion for Stay of Proceedings, In re Motion for Declaratory Judgment of a First Amendment Right to Publish Aggregate Info. About FISA Orders, No. Misc. 13-03 (FISA Ct. Oct. 7, 2013).",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-10-07",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-10-07",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34472",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "4d4cc9c06e3fed9e7a67232c9deb44ab4f80306577f9e4aea8c6a2f342c7eadd",
+ "pages": 7
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_motion-declaratory-judgement-131002/FISC_-_motion-declaratory-judgement-131002.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_motion-declaratory-judgement-131002/FISC_-_motion-declaratory-judgement-131002.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b57979d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_motion-declaratory-judgement-131002/FISC_-_motion-declaratory-judgement-131002.md
@@ -0,0 +1,966 @@
+U.S. FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE COURT
+2013 SEP 30 PM 5:06
+
+LEEANN FLYNN HALL
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+IN RE AMENDED MOTION FOR
+DECLATORY JUDGMENT OF A FIRST
+AMENDMENT RIGHT TO PUBLISH
+AGGREGATE INFORMATION ABOUT
+FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-03
+
+IN RE MOTION TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-04
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+AND DIRECTIVES
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-05
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT TO DISCLOSE AGGREGATE
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+AND DIRECTIVES
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-06
+
+IN RE MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT TO REPORT AGGREGATED
+DATA REGARDING FISA ORDERS
+
+Docket No. Misc. 13-07
+
+(U) RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES TO MOTIONS FOR DECLARATORY
+JUDGMENT BY GOOGLE INC., MICROSOFT CORPORATION, YAHOO! INC.,
+FACEBOOK, INC., AND LINKEDIN CORPORATION
+
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+
+TASHINA GAUHAR
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+for Intelligence
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TABLE OF CONTENTS
+
+TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................................ ii
+INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................ 1
+ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................... 5
+
+I. (U) The Court-Ordered Nondisclosure Obligations Imposed Pursuant
+to FISA Prevent the Companies from Unilaterally Publishing Classified
+FISA Data. ............................................................................................... 5
+
+A. (U) The Information that the Companies Seek to Disclose
+is Classified. ................................................................................... 5
+
+B. (U) The Court-Ordered Nondisclosure Obligations Required Under
+FISA Prohibit the Companies from Publishing Classified Sources and
+Methods of FISA Surveillance. .................................................... 12
+
+II. (U) The Prohibitions on Disclosure Satisfy the First Amendment
+Because They Are Narrowly Tailored to Promote Compelling National
+Security Interests. ................................................................................. 16
+
+III. (U) As a Court of Limited Jurisdiction, This Court Cannot Provide
+Declaratory Relief Regarding Legal Prohibitions on Disclosure
+Outside of FISA. .................................................................................. 21
+CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 26
+
+i
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
+
+CASES:
+
+Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976)...............................................................................23
+C&E Servs., Inc. v. District of Columbia Water & Sewer Auth.,
+310 F.3d 197, 201 (D.C. Cir. 2002).........................................................................24
+Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991)...................................................................24
+Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2012).....................................................24
+CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985)..................................................................................7, 19
+Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (1992).................................................13
+Davis v. Michigan Dep’t of Treas., 489 U.S. 803 (1989)...................................................14
+Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988)...............................................6, 16, 20
+Doe v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2008)............................................................17, 18
+Dow Jones & Co. v. Harrods Ltd., 346 F.3d 357 (2d Cir. 2003)........................................24
+Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1985)..............................................24
+Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981).....................................................................................14
+Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).....................................17, 18
+International Custom Prods., Inc. v. United States, 467 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2006)..........23
+McQuiggen v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924 (2013)...................................................................23
+In re Mot. for Release of Ct. Records, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484 (Foreign Intel. Sur. Ct. 2007) .passim
+Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997)...................................................................................18
+In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (For. Intelligence Surv. Ct. of Rev. 2002)........................23
+Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.S. 666 (1960)............................................................................24
+Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950)..........................................24
+Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).............................................................16, 20, 22
+
+ii
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998)............................................23
+United States v. Boyce, 594 F.2d 1246 (9th Cir. 1979)...................................................22
+United States v. King, 395 U.S. I (1969)........................................................................25
+United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1972)...........................................7, 19
+United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)...................................................................6
+United States v. Pappas, 94 F.3d 795 (2d Cir. 1996).....................................................22
+United States v. Sterling, 724 F.3d 482 (4th Cir. 2013)............................................16, 17
+United States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1989)................................................7, 19
+Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001)........................................15
+Wilson v. CIA, 586 F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2009)...................................................................22
+
+CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES:
+
+U.S. Const. Amend. I................................................................................................passim
+All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.....................................................................................25
+Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201................................................................24
+Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq.:
+50 U.S.C. § 1803(b)...................................................................................................25
+50 U.S.C. § 1804.........................................................................................................23
+50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(B)...........................................................................................13
+50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(C)...........................................................................................13
+50 U.S.C. § 1822(d)......................................................................................................25
+50 U.S.C. § 1823.........................................................................................................23
+50 U.S.C. § 1824(c)(2)(B)-(C).....................................................................................13
+50 U.S.C. § 1842.........................................................................................................23
+50 U.S.C. § 1842(d)(2)(B)...........................................................................................13
+
+iii
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+50 U.S.C. § 1861 ........................................................................................................23
+50 U.S.C. § 1861(d)(1) ................................................................................................14
+50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)(3) ................................................................................................25
+50 U.S.C. § 1881 ........................................................................................................23
+50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(1)(A) ........................................................................................13
+50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(1)(B) ........................................................................................13
+50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(6)(A) ........................................................................................25
+50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(4)(A) ........................................................................................25
+50 U.S.C. § 1881b(f)(1) ..............................................................................................25
+50 U.S.C. § 1881c(e)(1) ..............................................................................................25
+12 U.S.C. § 3414 ........................................................................................................1, 2
+15 U.S.C. § 1681u ......................................................................................................2
+15 U.S.C. § 1681v ......................................................................................................2
+18 U.S.C. § 798(a)(3) ..................................................................................................22
+18 U.S.C. § 798(b) ..................................................................................................22, 23
+18 U.S.C. § 2709 ........................................................................................................2
+28 U.S.C. § 1291 ........................................................................................................25
+50 U.S.C. § 3162 ........................................................................................................2
+
+iv
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(U) INTRODUCTION
+
+(U) The United States Government firmly supports a policy of appropriate transparency
+with respect to its intelligence activities. As the President has emphasized, such a policy furthers
+accountability and increases public trust in the Government's activities. Consistent with this
+approach, the Government is actively engaged in a careful review of classified information
+related to the foreign intelligence surveillance activities authorized by this Court. The purpose of
+this review is to make public as much information about these activities as is consistent with the
+national security interests of the United States. In conducting this review, the Government must
+balance the need to inform the public about these activities with the need to protect classified
+sources and methods of intelligence collection, including the Government's ability (or inability)
+to conduct surveillance on particular electronic communication service providers or platforms.
+Releasing information that could induce adversaries to shift communications platforms in order
+to avoid surveillance would cause serious harm to the national security interests of the United
+States. See Declaration of Andrew G. McCabe, Acting Executive Assistant Director, Federal
+Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (attached).
+
+(U) Balancing the competing interests at stake, the Government has taken a number of
+significant steps—above and beyond what the law requires—in order to promote transparency
+and to accommodate the legitimate interests of companies, including those that have filed
+motions before this Court and others that have not. For example, for the first time, in the winter
+of 2013, the Government agreed that companies may report the aggregate number of National
+Security Letters (NSLs) they receive, in numerical ranges and on a periodic basis.¹ More
+
+¹ (U) NSLs are a type of administrative subpoena issued by U.S. Government agencies, particularly the
+Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), when investigating matters related to national security. See 12
+
+1
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+recently, the Government, in consultation with the Court, agreed to permit companies to make a
+wider set of disclosures by opting instead to report, in certain bands, the aggregate number of
+criminal and national security related orders they receive from federal, state, and local
+government entities combined, and the number of user accounts affected by such orders. A
+number of companies have agreed to exercise that option, which allows them to demonstrate to
+their customers that the sum total of all such process affects only a tiny fraction of the
+companies' user accounts.²
+
+(U) In addition, on August 29, 2013, the Government announced that it will report
+annually the total number of orders issued nationwide and the total number of targets the orders
+affect. The report will include (a) the number of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)
+orders or warrants issued based on probable cause (i.e., pursuant to Title I, Title III, Section 703,
+or Section 704 of FISA) and the number of targets affected by those orders or warrants; (b) the
+number of directives issued pursuant to Section 702 of FISA and the number of targets affected
+by those directives; (c) the number of orders issued pursuant to FISA's pen register provision
+(Title IV of FISA) and the number of targets affected by those orders; (d) the number of orders
+issued pursuant to FISA's business records provision (Title V of FISA) and the number of targets
+affected by those orders; and (e) the number of NSLs issued by the Government nationwide and
+the number of targets affected by the NSLs.
+
+U.S.C. § 3414; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681u, 1681v; 18 U.S.C. § 2709; 50 U.S.C. § 3162 (NSL statutory
+authorities).
+[REDACTED]
+
+2
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(U) The Government's annual report of the use of various FISA authorities will provide
+the public significant information about how often the Government uses its foreign intelligence
+investigative authorities. The companies' ability to disclose how often they have responded to
+Government process will allow them to inform their customers about the likelihood that their
+information will be disclosed. On the other hand, because the Government's reporting will not
+be broken down by company, and the companies' reporting will aggregate criminal and non-
+criminal, content and non-content, and federal, state and local process, these reports will not
+provide our adversaries with a roadmap to the existence or extent of Government surveillance of
+any particular provider or communications platform.
+
+(U) Dissatisfied with the Government's efforts to strike the appropriate balance between
+the public interest in transparency and the protection of national security, the petitioners seek
+declaratory relief that would effectively give every communications provider in the United States
+the right to reveal the nature and scope of any FISA surveillance of their communications
+platforms. Such information would be invaluable to our adversaries, who could thereby derive a
+clear picture of where the Government's surveillance efforts are directed and how its
+surveillance activities change over time, including when the Government initiates or expands
+surveillance efforts involving providers or services that adversaries previously considered "safe."
+
+(U) In their original motions, Google and Microsoft sought to publish one aggregate
+number for all the FISA process they receive. After failing to reach a settlement with the
+Government, however, they amended their motions to seek relief that would present an even
+greater risk to national security: the right to disclose the precise number of FISA process they
+may receive under each separate provision of FISA. See Amended Google Mot. at 7; Microsoft
+
+3
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Mot. at 5. Microsoft goes still further, seeking to disclose separate categories for "non-content"
+requests and "content and non-content" requests. Id. (emphasis in original). After Google and
+Microsoft filed their amended motions, Yahoo! Inc., Facebook, Inc., and LinkedIn filed motions
+seeking essentially the same scope of relief.
+
+(U) Because revealing FISA data on a company-by-company basis would cause serious
+harm to national security, such data has been classified by the FBI. That classification decision
+establishes that unilaterally disclosing the information would undermine the secrecy of the
+surveillance, in violation of this Court's orders, which require any company that has received a
+FISA order to protect the secrecy of the intelligence acquisitions. The companies assert that the
+secrecy requirements apply only to particular surveillance targets. But that implausible reading
+ignores the forest for the trees. It would permit damaging disclosures that would reveal sources
+and methods of surveillance potentially nationwide. The secrecy provisions in the orders flow
+from statutory requirements that, according to their plain language, protect such sources and
+methods, not just particular collection efforts. Indeed, limiting the secrecy protections only to
+information revealing a particular surveillance target would authorize a wide range of other
+damaging disclosures, from the nature of surveillance targets to their general locations, among
+others.
+
+(U) Contrary to the companies' argument that they have a First Amendment right to
+disclose this sensitive national security information, it is well-settled that prohibitions on the
+disclosure of classified information, such as the ones contained in this Court's orders, satisfy the
+First Amendment. The Government has a compelling interest in protecting such national
+
+4
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+security information from disclosure, and the prohibitions on disclosure are narrowly tailored to
+protect that interest.
+
+(U) Finally, insofar as the companies argue that no other laws or regulations prohibit the
+disclosures they seek, the Court lacks jurisdiction to issue declaratory relief unrelated to
+prohibitions imposed pursuant to FISA. Because the data the companies seek to disclose is
+classified, the disclosures are prohibited by other sources of law, such as nondisclosure
+agreements between the Government and company employees. The interpretation and
+application of such non-FISA prohibitions are outside the specialized jurisdiction of this Court.
+
+(U) Accordingly, the Court should deny the companies' motions for declaratory relief.
+
+(U) ARGUMENT
+
+I. (U) The Court-Ordered Nondisclosure Obligations Imposed Pursuant to FISA
+Prevent the Companies from Unilaterally Publishing Classified FISA Data.
+
+(U) The companies assert that the information they seek to disclose is not classified,
+disregarding the harms to national security the proposed disclosures would likely cause. But
+classification judgments belong to the Executive Branch, not the companies, and the Executive
+Branch has classified the information. The companies' flawed premise undermines their entire
+argument: the only plausible reading of FISA, and the Court's orders, is that FISA orders and
+directives bar recipients from disclosing properly classified information about the nature and
+scope of the authorized surveillance activities.
+
+A. (U) The Information that the Companies Seek to Disclose is Classified.
+
+(U) The companies fail to address the harm their disclosures would cause to national
+security, beyond pointing out that they do not seek to disclose individual surveillance targets.
+
+5
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+The companies' narrow focus on individual targets ignores that the disclosures would risk
+revealing the Government's collection capabilities as they presently exist and as they develop in
+the future. McCabe Decl. ¶ 30. Such disclosures could therefore cause significant harm to
+national security. As a result, the FBI has classified the data the companies seek to publish at the
+Secret level. Id. ¶ 27; see also id. ¶¶ 22-26.
+
+(U) The FBI's assessment of harm is entitled to deference. This Court has previously
+held that "there is no role for this Court independently to review, and potentially override,
+Executive Branch classification decisions." In re Mot. for Release of Ct. Records, 526 F. Supp.
+2d 484, 491 (Foreign Intel. Sur. Ct. 2007). As the Court recognized, if the U.S. Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) "were to assume the role of independently making
+declassification and release decisions... there would be a real risk of harm to national security
+interests and ultimately to the FISA process itself." Id. Moreover, "even if a typical FISC judge
+ha[s] more expertise in national security matters than a typical district court judge, that expertise
+would still not equal that of the Executive Branch, which is constitutionally entrusted with
+protecting the national security." Id. at 495 n.31. This Court's holding is consistent with the fact
+that "courts have traditionally shown the utmost deference" to the Executive Branch's authority
+to classify and control access to national security information. Department of the Navy v. Egan,
+484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710
+(1974)).
+
+(U) The FBI based its classification decision on a review of all pertinent information,
+including whether disclosure of the data in the manner proposed by the companies would risk
+filling out the mosaic of information available to our adversaries in their efforts to assess and
+
+6
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+avoid our surveillance capabilities. McCabe Decl. ¶ 23. Deference to the Executive Branch is
+especially appropriate in such circumstances, where assessing the likely harm requires
+knowledge of many other pieces of information and intelligence expertise regarding how
+additional disclosures would help adversaries form a more complete mosaic to guide their
+efforts. See CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 178-79 (1985); United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d
+1309, 1318 (4th Cir. 1972); accord United States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
+("Things that did not make sense to the District Judge would make all too much sense to a
+foreign counter-intelligence specialist who could learn much about this nation's intelligence-
+gathering capabilities from what these documents revealed about sources and methods.").
+
+(U) The detailed disclosures the companies propose would reveal the nature and extent
+of FISA-authorized process served on the major providers in this country. The potential harm
+from such disclosures is easy to illustrate.
+
+(U) First, the disclosure of FISA data in specific numbers and by specific FISA
+provisions, as the companies seek, would provide adversaries significant information about the
+Government's collection capabilities with respect to particular providers. Disclosures of FISA
+information in a manner that would permit our adversaries to identify those collection
+capabilities would harm national security by allowing them to switch providers to avoid
+surveillance.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+7
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+8
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Second, for similar reasons, the companies' proposed unilateral disclosures
+would allow our adversaries to infer when the Government has acquired a collection capability
+on new services.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Third, the proposed disclosures would also enable our adversaries to gain
+significant information about which platforms and services are not subject to surveillance, or are
+subject to only limited surveillance.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+9
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Disclosing precise numbers associated with each provision or title of
+FISA, as the companies propose, would provide our adversaries with even more specific
+information, which they could use to track the Government's sources and methods of FISA-
+authorized intelligence collection.
+
+(U) If these leading Internet companies are permitted to make these disclosures, the
+harms to national security would be compounded by the fact that other companies would surely
+seek to make similar disclosures. See id. ¶ 48. As a result, our adversaries could soon be able to
+obtain a comprehensive picture of FISA-related surveillance activities.
+
+[REDACTED] In addition, the disclosure of precise numbers of FISA orders reasonably
+could be expected to cause other serious harms to national security.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+10
+
+[REDACTED] There is little doubt that foreign adversaries can and will glean important
+national security information from publicly available data. Indeed, the Intelligence Community
+knows that our adversaries actively gather information to assess such capabilities and react to
+avoid surveillance. Id. ¶ 30.
+[REDACTED] If our adversaries
+know which platforms the Government does not surveil, they can communicate over those
+platforms when, for example, planning a terrorist attack or the theft of state secrets. Id. ¶¶ 39,
+[REDACTED] Such disclosures could significantly and irreparably harm counterterrorism and
+counterintelligence efforts. Id. ¶ 39. Other types of harm can also result from adversaries
+learning which platforms the Government does surveil. Most obviously, they can avoid them.
+But as this Court has recognized, they can also use that information to engage in deceptive
+tactics or disinformation campaigns that could undermine intelligence operations and that could
+even expose Government personnel to the risk of physical harm. See In re Mot. for Release of
+Ct. Records, 526 F. Supp.2d at 494; [REDACTED]
+
+(U) In contrast, reporting an aggregate number of both national security and criminal
+process—which the Government has told the companies they can release—would not tend to
+disclose the Government's classified surveillance capabilities. The aggregate number would
+combine both content and non-content requests, so that our adversaries would not know, for
+example, whether a particular provider was responding to requests for subscriber identity
+information via an NSL, or was providing the full content of communications pursuant to a FISA
+
+11
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+or Title III wiretap order. Thus, the extent of the Government's actual capabilities would be
+masked from our adversaries.
+
+(U) It is quintessentially an Executive Branch responsibility to assess these risks to
+national security and to determine what information can be disclosed consistent with both
+transparency and national security interests. The Government cannot agree to the disclosures the
+companies seek because the disclosures will harm national security by risking the disclosure of
+the Government's capabilities to conduct surveillance with respect to particular providers and
+Internet platforms. In assessing whether the companies' proposed disclosures will undermine the
+secrecy of the Government's intelligence collection activities under FISA, the Court should defer
+to the judgment of the Executive Branch.
+
+B. (U) The Court-Ordered Nondisclosure Obligations Required Under FISA
+Prohibit the Companies from Publishing Classified Sources and Methods of
+FISA Surveillance.
+
+(U) As explained below, the nondisclosure provisions in FISA orders are prescribed by
+statute and require companies to protect the secrecy of authorized surveillance. Because the
+information the companies seek to disclose has been properly classified, it follows that protecting
+the secrecy of the acquisitions underlying that information requires keeping the information
+secret. The companies would interpret this Court's orders as protecting only information about
+specific targets, therefore permitting the broad disclosure of damaging information about the
+Government's sources and methods of surveillance overall. But such a result is contrary to the
+text and purpose of the secrecy provisions in FISA on which the orders are based.
+
+(U) As an initial matter, the provisions of FISA should be enforced as written,
+Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992), and neither provision at issue
+
+12
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+here contains the "particular target" limitation on secrecy that the companies advance. Titles I
+and VII of FISA provide that FISA orders "shall direct," and FISA directives "may direct,"
+recipients to provide the Government with "all information, facilities, or assistance necessary to
+accomplish the acquisition in a manner that will protect the secrecy of the acquisition," without
+limitation. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(1)(A) (Title VII); see also 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(B) (similar
+language for Title I).⁴ Additionally, the orders "shall direct" and the directives "may direct" that
+recipients "maintain under security procedures approved by the Attorney General and the
+Director of National Intelligence any records concerning the acquisition or the aid furnished"
+that such electronic communication service provider maintains. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(1)(B)
+(Title VII); see also 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(C) (similar language for Title I).⁵ Consistent with
+the Executive Branch's authority to control classified information, that provision explicitly
+
+⁴ (S/NF) To the extent that the moving companies receive process pursuant to Titles I and VII, the Title VII directives contain the statutorily permitted nondisclosure provisions, while the Title I orders contain nondisclosure requirements that track the statutory provision, although not identically. Title I orders typically contain language such as: “This order and warrant is sealed and the specified person and its agents and employees shall not disclose to the targets or to any other person the existence of the order and warrant or this investigation or the fact of any of the activities authorized herein or the means used to accomplish them, except as otherwise may be required by legal process and then only after prior notification to the Attorney General.” Of course, disclosing the number of Title I orders received would violate such a provision as it would “disclose . . . the existence” of each of the orders.
+
+⁵ (U) The other FISA titles that provide search or surveillance authorities also contain nondisclosure
+provisions. See 50 U.S.C. § 1824(c)(2)(B)-(C) (requiring Title III orders to require the recipient to assist
+in the physical search "in such a manner as will protect its secrecy" and provide that "any records
+concerning the search or the aid furnished" that the recipient retains be maintained under appropriate
+security procedures); 50 U.S.C. § 1842(d)(2)(B) (requiring Title IV orders to direct that recipients
+"furnish any information, facilities, or technical assistance necessary to accomplish the installation and
+operation of the pen register or trap and trace device in such a manner as will protect its secrecy," and
+provide that "any records concerning the pen register or trap and trace device or the aid furnished" that
+the recipient retains shall be maintained under appropriate security procedures); 50 U.S.C. § 1861(d)(1)
+(providing that "[n]o person shall disclose to any other person that the [FBI] has sought or obtained
+tangible things pursuant to an order under" Title V of FISA). Because the potential national security
+harm at issue is the disclosure of information that could provide adversaries with information about the
+Government's electronic surveillance capacities, the nondisclosure provisions in Titles I and VII – the
+titles that concern electronic surveillance are most relevant here.
+
+13
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+provides for Executive Branch approval of the companies' procedures for maintaining all records
+associated with surveillance. The provision is not limited to protecting only specific targeting
+information that such records would reveal, and on its face does not give companies the right to
+disclose classified information so long as records are disclosed in large groups.
+
+(U) Moreover, "[i]t is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a
+statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory
+scheme." Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treas., 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989). Reading a "particular
+target" limitation into FISA's secrecy provisions would be inconsistent with FISA's strong
+protections for the secrecy of the intelligence collection activities subject to the Court's review.
+Although the Government is seeking to make public as much information about these activities
+as the national security interests of the United States will permit, "[i]n the FISA context, there is
+an unquestioned tradition of secrecy, based on the vitally important need to protect national
+security." In re Mot. for Release of Ct. Records, 526 F. Supp.2d at 490-91 (citing Haig v. Agee,
+453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981)). Such protections extend not just to targets but also to surveillance
+sources and methods generally, because "[t]he identification of targets and methods of
+surveillance would permit adversaries to evade surveillance, conceal their activities, and possibly
+mislead investigators through false information." Id. at 494.
+
+(U) The implausibility of interpreting the "secrecy of the acquisition" to reach only the
+identification of targets is illustrated not only by the FBI's declaration but by the wide range of
+other damaging disclosures that interpretation would permit. There are numerous types of
+damaging disclosures that could be made without revealing the identity of a particular target,
+including general information concerning the type of target and their locations. The same is true
+
+14
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+of the companies' narrow interpretation that the "records" they must protect extend only to the
+"identity" of subscribers or the "substance of communications," see LinkedIn Mot. at 8-9.
+
+(U) It would be illogical to conclude that Congress enacted a "comprehensive statutory
+scheme designed to protect FISC records from routine public disclosure," In re Mot. for Release
+of Ct. Records, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 491, while allowing every public company to reveal damaging
+information about the nature and scope of surveillance under each separate title or provision of
+FISA. Cf. Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (Congress "does
+not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes."). And although the companies invoke FISA's
+congressional reporting requirements to support their contemplated disclosures, those reporting
+requirements are another example of the careful protections provided for FISA information.
+Unlike the classified reports submitted to Congress, the information publicly reported pursuant to
+FISA provides aggregated data at a level of detail far less than even what the Government
+recently committed to provide voluntarily, and certainly not comparable to what the companies
+now seek. None of the Government's disclosures report company-by-company data.
+
+(U) Accordingly, most reasonably construed, FISA's secrecy provisions prohibit the
+disclosure of FISA-related data in a manner that would provide insights into the Government's
+intelligence activities and risk harm to national security. The companies' proposed disclosures
+reasonably could be expected to cause serious harm to national security by revealing the
+Government's electronic surveillance capabilities and targeting actions on a company-by-
+company basis, potentially nationwide. See Part I.A supra. Relatedly, the disclosure of the
+classified data would reveal FISA-related sources and methods, and thus would be plainly
+
+15
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+inconsistent with maintaining "records concerning the acquisition" in a manner that will protect
+its secrecy as determined by the Executive Branch.
+
+(U) For these reasons, the Court should reject the companies' contention that any orders
+and directives they have received only prevent disclosures that concern particular surveillance
+targets. Their motions should be denied because their proposed disclosures would risk harm to
+national security by revealing the nature and scope of intelligence collection activities conducted
+by the Government pursuant to FISA.
+
+II. (U) The Prohibitions on Disclosure Satisfy the First Amendment Because They Are
+Narrowly Tailored to Promote Compelling National Security Interests.
+
+(U) The companies' First Amendment challenge turns on the same flawed premise that
+undermines their statutory argument. They argue that prohibiting their proposed disclosures
+would violate the First Amendment because the disclosures would not reveal particular
+surveillance targets, and therefore would not cause harm to national security. But as detailed
+above, the disclosures risk causing serious harm to national security. The Court's orders barring
+such disclosure satisfy any level of First Amendment scrutiny because they are narrowly tailored
+to serve a compelling governmental interest.
+
+(U) As the companies acknowledge, "[t]he Government has a compelling interest in
+protecting . . . the secrecy of information important to our national security." Snepp v. United
+States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980); Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. at 527; United
+States v. Sterling, 724 F.3d 482, 509 (4th Cir. 2013). The companies' contemplated disclosures
+risk significant harm to national security by revealing the nature and scope of the Government's
+intelligence collection on a company-by-company basis throughout the country. See Part I.A,
+supra. This "evaluation of the facts by the Executive is entitled to deference" even in
+
+16
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+assessing First Amendment interests because, "when it comes to collecting evidence and drawing
+factual inferences in this area, the lack of competence on the part of the courts is marked, and
+respect for the Government's conclusions is appropriate." Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,
+130 S. Ct. 2705, 2727 (2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
+
+(U) The Government's interest in preventing harm to national security is more than
+sufficient to outweigh the companies' interests in speaking about the particular FISA process
+they may receive. The principal case on which the companies rely, Doe v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d
+861 (2d Cir. 2008), supports the Government's position. In Doe, the court concluded that the
+nondisclosure requirement applicable to unclassified NSLs “is not a typical prior restraint or a
+typical content-based restriction warranting the most rigorous First Amendment scrutiny." Id.
+877. The court reached that conclusion after rejecting analogies to government processes in
+which the limited public interest in disclosure justifies lower First Amendment scrutiny, such as
+grand juries, civil discovery, or pre-publication review. Id. at 876-77. The court distinguished
+grand jury secrecy as "inher[ent] in the nature of the proceeding," whereas NSLs "might or
+might not" justify secrecy. Id. But FISA proceedings and foreign intelligence collection are
+subject to even stronger secrecy protections than grand juries and necessarily involve classified
+information. See, e.g., In re Mot. for Release of Ct. Records, 526 F. Supp.2d at 490 ("It is this
+highly classified, and fundamentally secret, nature of FISC records that distinguishes them from
+the records of other courts."). Accordingly, the companies' First Amendment interests should be
+evaluated against the "comprehensive statutory scheme designed to protect FISC records from
+routine public disclosure" and the absence of any long-standing practice of releasing the kind of
+information they seek to disclose. Id. at 491.
+
+17
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(U) Even outside the unique FISA context, Doe concluded that, while a "conclusory
+assertion" of harm would be insufficient to justify a prohibition, courts should defer to the
+"Government's considered assessment of why disclosure in a particular case may result in an
+enumerated harm related to such great matters as international terrorism or clandestine
+intelligence activities." 549 F.3d at 881 (emphasis in original). Even as to unclassified NSLs,
+nondisclosure can be justified where the Government "indicate[s] the nature of the apprehended
+harm and provide[s] a court with some basis to assure itself (based on in camera presentations
+where appropriate) that the link between disclosure and risk of harm is substantial." Id. at 881-
+82 (a "demonstration of a reasonable likelihood of potential harm, related to international
+terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, will virtually always outweigh the First
+Amendment interest in speaking about such a limited and particularized occurrence as the receipt
+of an NSL and will suffice to maintain the secrecy of the fact of such receipt"). Here, the
+Government has explained in detail the serious harm to national security that the companies'
+proposed disclosures reasonably could be expected to cause.
+
+(U) Recognizing that the Government has a compelling interest in protecting national
+security, the companies argue that the prohibitions on disclosure are not narrowly tailored. But
+the restrictions are narrowly tailored because there are no "less restrictive alternatives [that]
+would be at least as effective in achieving" the Government's compelling interest. Reno v.
+ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997); see also Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2723-30
+(upholding a statute that restricted plaintiffs from "communicating a message" because the
+Government had "adequately substantiated" its determination that the statutory restriction served
+"the Government's interest in combating terrorism [which] is an urgent objective of the highest
+order"). The Government has demonstrated why vital national security considerations preclude
+
+18
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+disclosure of information about FISA-authorized surveillance that will reveal the Government's
+surveillance activities by provider and platform. See Part I.A supra.
+
+(U) Relying on authority involving the disclosure of individual NSLs, the companies
+argue that the disclosure prohibitions are not narrowly tailored because aggregate disclosures of
+FISA data by large providers, such as themselves, will not reveal a particular surveillance target.
+But this is another example of their flawed premise. The harm to national security that led the
+FBI to classify the information concerns the disclosure of intelligence sources and methods of
+electronic surveillance, not the identification of a particular individual recipient of process.
+Irrespective of whether disclosures would tend to reveal a particular surveillance target, they
+would allow adversaries to derive a clear picture of the nature and extent of the Government's
+FISA surveillance activities with respect to every major provider in the country. Such harm to
+national security would result from disclosure of the data by any type of provider, large or small,
+and from the totality of information that would be disclosed. The Government is entitled to
+significant deference in assessing the harms to national security, and its judgment—not that of
+the providers—is critical to determining the scope of the prohibitions on disclosure that are
+necessary to protect national security interests. See, e.g., Sims, 471 U.S. at 178-79; Marchetti,
+466 F.2d at 1318; Yunis, 867 F.2d at 623.
+
+(U) The companies also argue that the Government's public disclosures of aggregated
+FISA data somehow demonstrate that the prohibitions on the companies' proposed disclosures
+are not narrowly tailored. On the contrary, the Government's voluntary disclosures of FISA data
+demonstrate that the Government seeks to protect such information in a narrowly tailored
+manner and has carefully stopped short of permitting disclosures that would cause harm. None
+of the Government's public disclosures reveal any information that would allow our adversaries
+
+19
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+to determine the Government's surveillance capabilities of specific companies or specific
+platforms, or the timing of when the Government acquires certain surveillance capabilities. See
+McCabe Decl. ¶ 66. Rather, the Government has provided as much data as reasonably possible,
+consistent with national security, to inform the public about the nature of its intelligence
+activities.
+
+(U) Finally, the companies argue that the public debate about the Government's
+surveillance activities justifies disclosure. Although the Government has attempted to release as
+much information as possible about the intelligence collection activities overseen by this Court,
+the public debate about surveillance does not give the companies the First Amendment right to
+disclose information that the Government has determined must remain classified. The
+companies are "correct in asserting that certain benefits could be expected" from public
+disclosure, but the argument "proves too much." In re Mot. for Release of Ct. Records, 526 F.
+Supp. 2d at 494 (citation omitted). It fails to account for the "detrimental consequences of broad
+public access" to such information. Id. at 494-95; see also Snepp, 444 U.S. at 509 n.3; Egan,
+484 U.S. at 527.⁶
+
+⁶ (U) Moreover, it is unclear whether the companies need to disclosure such data to serve their interests
+in responding to erroneous reporting about their role in Government surveillance. The companies
+contend that they need to disclose FISA data to respond to "inaccurate media reporting" that suggests that
+the companies "provide[] the United States Government with direct access to [their] servers and network
+infrastructure." Am. Microsoft Mot. at 3; accord Am. Google Mot. at 2; Yahoo! Mot. at 2; Facebook
+Mot. at 2. But the companies fail to explain why disclosing precise numbers of various types of FISA
+orders that they may have received is necessary or even relevant to refuting mistaken reports that the
+Government has unlimited "direct access" to the companies' servers. Indeed, the companies make clear
+that, without the need to disclose any classified information, they have been able to clearly and forcefully
+respond to the inaccurate or misleading reporting. See Am. Google Mot. at 2-3 (referencing statement of
+Larry Page and David Drummond); Facebook Mot. at 2 (referencing statement of Mark Zuckerberg).
+And the Government itself has responded forcefully to such erroneous reports. See, e.g., Office of the
+Director of National Intelligence, IC on the Record, available at http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/
+topics/section-702. There is reason to believe that these efforts have been successful. See Joseph Menn,
+Analysis: Despite fears, NSA revelations helping U.S. tech industry, Reuters, 9/15/13 RTRSUSTOP
+
+20
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(U) Accordingly, there is no constitutional impediment to protecting from disclosure
+properly classified information about the Government's sources and methods of intelligence
+collection. Such disclosures reasonably could be expected to cause serious harm to national
+security. The prohibitions on disclosure at issue here are narrowly tailored to prevent such harm.
+
+III. (U) As a Court of Limited Jurisdiction, This Court Cannot Provide Declaratory
+Relief Regarding Legal Prohibitions on Disclosure Outside of FISA.
+
+(U) The companies seek relief that goes well beyond restraints imposed pursuant to
+FISA. They also seek a declaration that "no applicable law or regulation" prohibits their
+proposed disclosures. See Am. Google Mot. at 7; see also LinkedIn Mot. at 1; Am. Microsoft
+Mot. at 5. But the interpretation and application of these other potential prohibitions on
+disclosure is not within this Court's specialized jurisdiction.
+
+(U) Because the information that the companies seek permission to disclose is properly
+classified, it is subject to prohibitions on the disclosure of classified information. For example,
+employees of the companies have signed nondisclosure agreements that prohibit disclosure of
+classified information, whether publicly, to another employee or agent, or to any other person.
+
+13:09:19 ("Google Inc. and Facebook Inc. [] say privately that they have felt little if any impact on their
+business [from the disclosures]. Insiders at... Microsoft Corp.[] also say they are seeing no fallout.").
+² (U) Additionally, as described above, the Government has permitted the companies to release the
+aggregate number of governmental requests for information (combining criminal and national security
+requests), which would demonstrate that only an exceptionally small percentage of their customers'
+accounts are subject to any governmental process at all. See, e.g., Ted Ullyot, General Counsel,
+Facebook, Facebook Releases Data Including All National Security Requests (June 14, 2013),
+http://newsroom.fb.com/News/636/Facebook-Releases-Data-Including-All-National-Security-Requests
+("With more than 1.1 billion monthly active users worldwide, this means that a tiny fraction of one
+percent of our user accounts were the subject of any kind of U.S. state, local, or federal U.S. government
+request (including criminal and national security-related requests) in the past six months.").
+
+21
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+See McCabe Decl. ¶ 65.⁷ Where relevant employees have entered into nondisclosure agreements
+that prohibit them from disclosing classified information, "[t]he Government is entitled to
+enforce its agreements to maintain the confidentiality of classified information." United States v.
+Pappas, 94 F.3d 795, 801 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Wilson v. CIA, 586 F.3d 171, 183-84 (2d Cir.
+2009). Nondisclosure agreements are "a reasonable means for protecting this vital interest" that
+are consistent with the First Amendment. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 509 n.3. Other laws and
+regulations might also prohibit the companies' proposed disclosures. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
+§ 798(a)(3).
+
+(U) This Court would not have jurisdiction to assess the potential applicability of such
+prohibitions, even if it could otherwise do so. Like any other Article III court, this Court has an
+obligation to assure itself of its jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits of a dispute. Steel
+Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998); see also In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d
+717, 731-32 (For. Intelligence Surv. Ct. of Rev. 2002) (FISC operates within "the constitutional
+bounds that restrict an Article III court"). As the Supreme Court has held, "[f]or a court to
+pronounce upon the meaning or the constitutionality of a state or federal law when it has no
+jurisdiction to do so is, by very definition, for a court to act ultra vires." Steel Co., 523 U.S. at
+101-02.
+
+⁷ (U) Both the current standard nondisclosure agreement, which went into effect in July 2013, and the
+previous version contained the following language: "I hereby agree that I will never divulge classified
+information to anyone unless: (a) I have officially verified that the recipient has been properly authorized
+by the United States Government to receive it; or (b) I have been given prior written notice of
+authorization from the United States Government Department or Agency... responsible for the
+classification of... information of last granting me a security clearance that such disclosure is
+permitted.") See Standard Form 312: Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement (effective July
+2013), available at: http://www.gsa.gov/portal/forms/ download/116218; Standard Form 312: Classified
+Information Nondisclosure Agreement (effective prior to July 2013), available at:
+http://armypubs.army.mil/forms/pdf/sf312.pdf.
+
+22
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(U) This Court, like all Article III courts, is a "court[] of limited jurisdiction marked out
+by Congress." International Custom Prods., Inc. v. United States, 467 F.3d 1324, 1326 (Fed.
+Cir. 2006) (quoting Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)). This Court has been granted a
+narrow and specialized (but vital) jurisdiction limited to certain specified applications and
+certifications that may be filed by the Government and two types of petitions that a private party
+may file. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804, 1823, 1842, 1861, 1881. Thus, FISA does not provide this
+Court with jurisdiction to provide declaratory relief regarding the applicability or enforceability
+of non-FISA prohibitions on disclosure.
+
+(U) Nor could such relief fall within this Court's inherent jurisdiction. Beyond those
+powers necessary for the exercise of its statutory jurisdiction or useful to adjudicate such cases,
+such as the power to construe the Court's own orders and procedures, "inherent power, which
+might be termed irreducible inherent authority, encompasses an extremely narrow range of
+authority involving activity so fundamental to the essence of a court as a constitutional tribunal
+that to divest the court of absolute command within this sphere is really to render practically
+meaningless the terms 'court' and 'judicial power." Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d
+557, 562 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc). The review and construction of nondisclosure agreements
+and other prohibitions on disclosure unrelated to FISA or the Court's rules and orders fall far
+outside the powers that "necessarily result to [this Court] from the nature of [the] institution,"
+and therefore fall outside the Court's inherent jurisdiction. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S.
+32, 43 (1991) (citation omitted).
+
+(U) The companies rely on the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2201, but
+the DJA cannot create jurisdiction where jurisdiction is lacking. The DJA provides that "[i]n a
+case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction,.. any court of the United States, upon the
+
+23
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any
+interested party seeking such declaration." However, the DJA is "procedural only." Chevron
+Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 244 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum
+Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950)). It "does not create an independent cause of action," id., and it
+"is not an independent source of federal jurisdiction." C&E Servs., Inc. v. District of Columbia
+Water & Sewer Auth., 310 F.3d 197, 201 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.S.
+666, 677 (1960)).⁸
+
+(U) While the DJA refers to "any court of the United States," the Supreme Court has
+held that it does not necessarily confer the power to grant declaratory relief on a specialized
+tribunal of limited, statutorily specified jurisdiction. See United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 3-4
+(1969). In King, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the DJA did not confer the power to
+grant declaratory relief on the United States Court of Claims, an Article III court of specialized
+jurisdiction. See id. at 4. The Court reasoned that the type of relief contemplated by the DJA
+"ha[d] never been 'within [the Court of Claims'] jurisdiction" given that, unlike a court that
+exercises general federal question and diversity jurisdiction, the Court of Claims had, since its
+creation in 1855, a specialized and narrow jurisdiction. Id. (quoting the DJA).
+
+(U) Given the limited jurisdiction of the FISC, the level of specificity with which
+Congress described it, and its "esoteric nature," In re Mot. for Release of Ct. Records, 526 F.
+Supp. at 486, it is unlikely that Congress intended to provide “expanded jurisdiction,” King, 395
+U.S. at 4, to broadly grant declaratory relief, pursuant to the DJA, about companies' rights to
+
+⁸ (U) Additionally, the DJA provides a court with "discretion to determine whether it will exert
+jurisdiction over a proposed declaratory action or not," and this has been "consistently interpreted... as a
+broad grant of discretion to district courts to refuse to exercise jurisdiction over a declaratory action that
+they would otherwise be empowered to hear." Dow Jones & Co. v. Harrods Ltd., 346 F.3d 357, 359 (2d
+Cir. 2003).
+
+24
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+make public disclosures. This is particularly so given that Congress created this Court and
+imbued it with specialized jurisdiction after King was decided. See, e.g., McQuiggen v. Perkins,
+133 S. Ct. 1924, 1934 n.3 (2013) ("Congress legislates against the backdrop of existing law.").⁹
+
+(U) Because this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the applicability of the nondisclosure
+agreements or any other laws or regulations beyond FISA that restrict the disclosure of classified
+information, this Court should reject the companies' request for broad declaratory relief
+concerning such prohibitions.
+
+⁹ (U) An additional feature of FISA that counsels against a finding that the Court can exercise general
+declaratory powers pursuant to the DJA is the limited statutory appellate jurisdiction of the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review. Unlike federal circuit courts of appeals, which have a general
+statutory grant of jurisdiction over all final judgments by district courts within their respective circuits,
+see 28 U.S.C. § 1291, FISA contains specific appellate provisions that vest the Court of Review with
+appellate jurisdiction over particular types of rulings from this Court. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. §§ 1803(b),
+1822(d), 1861(f)(3), 1881a(h)(6)(A), 1881a(i)(4)(A), 1881b(f)(1), 1881c(e)(1). In an appropriate case,
+the Court of Review (like this Court) could issue an extraordinary writ pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28
+U.S.C. § 1651.
+
+25
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(U) CONCLUSION
+
+(U) For the reasons stated above, the Motions should be denied.
+
+September 30, 2013
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+JOHN P. CARLIN
+Acting Assistant Attorney General
+for National Security
+
+TASHINA GAUHAR
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+for Intelligence
+
+CHRISTOPHER HARDEE
+Chief Counsel for Policy
+National Security Division
+
+/s/ Nicholas J. Patterson
+JEFFREY M. SMITH
+NICHOLAS J. PATTERSON
+U.S. Department of Justice
+National Security Division
+950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
+Washington, D.C. 20530
+Phone: (202) 514-5600
+Fax: (202) 514-8053
+
+Attorneys for the United States of America
+
+26
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(U) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+(U) I hereby certify that a true copy of the Response of the United States to Motions for
+Declaratory Judgment by Google Inc., Microsoft Corporation, Yahoo! Inc., Facebook, Inc., and
+Linkedin Corporation was served by hand-delivery on this 30th day of September, 2013, to
+Christine Gunning, Chief of Operations, Litigation Security Group, or her delegate, for
+forwarding to the Court. Additionally, redacted copies of the brief and accompanying
+declaration were served by the Government via Federal Express overnight delivery on this 30th
+day of September, 2013, addressed to:
+
+Albert Gidari
+Perkins Coie LLP
+1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900
+Seattle, WA 98101
+
+Attorney for Google Inc.
+
+James Garland
+David N. Fagan
+Alexander A. Berengaut
+Covington & Burling LLP
+1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
+Washington, DC 20004-2401
+
+Attorneys for Microsoft Corporation
+
+Marc J. Zwillinger
+Jacob A. Sommer
+ZwillGen PLLC
+1705 N Street, NW
+Washington, DC 20036
+
+Attorneys for Yahoo! Inc.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Carl J. Nichols
+Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP
+1875 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
+Washington, DC 20006
+
+Attorney for Facebook, Inc.
+
+Jerome C. Roth
+Jonathan H. Blavin
+Justin P. Raphael
+Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP
+560 Mission Street, 27th Floor
+San Francisco, CA 94105
+
+Attorneys for LinkedIn Corporation
+
+/s/ Nicholas J. Patterson
+Nicholas J. Patterson
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_motion-declaratory-judgement-131002/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_motion-declaratory-judgement-131002/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c838ed3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_motion-declaratory-judgement-131002/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+{
+ "title": "Response of the United States to Motions for Declaratory Judgment by Google Inc., Microsoft Corporation, Yahoo! Inc., Facebook, Inc., and LinkedIn Corporation, In re Motion for Declaratory Judgment of a First Amendment Right to Publish Aggregate Info. About FISA Orders, No. Misc. 13-03 (FISA Ct. Sept. 30, 2013).",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-09-30",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-09-30",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34471",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "archive_comment": "On PDF page 18, the redacted footnote is visible on FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-motion-131206 PDF page 35 (https://archive.org/download/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-motion-131206/FISC_-_misc-13-03-04-05-06-07-motion-131206.pdf).",
+ "pdf_sha256": "8f2ab3caf34df8390f3ec45db6c835bf1e36ff0ad98dc06a4532e98921597eec",
+ "pages": 33
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_ranking-member-grassley-letter-131011/FISC_-_ranking-member-grassley-letter-131011.md b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_ranking-member-grassley-letter-131011/FISC_-_ranking-member-grassley-letter-131011.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..33db71e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_ranking-member-grassley-letter-131011/FISC_-_ranking-member-grassley-letter-131011.md
@@ -0,0 +1,1294 @@
+UNITED STATES FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+Washington, D.C.
+
+Honorable Reggie B. Walton
+Presiding Judge
+
+October 11, 2013
+
+Honorable Charles E. Grassley
+Ranking Member
+Committee on the Judiciary
+United States Senate
+Washington, D.C. 20510
+
+Dear Senator Grassley:
+
+On July 29, 2013, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) corresponded with
+the Senate Judiciary Committee in a response to questions about the Court's practices (copy
+enclosed). In our response, we explained in greater detail the process by which the Court
+interacts with the executive branch. Among other things, we noted:
+
+The annual statistics provided to Congress by the Attorney General pursuant to 50
+U.S.C. §§ 1807 and 1862(b) – frequently cited to in press reports as a suggestion
+that the Court's approval rate of applications is over 99% – reflect only the
+number of *final* applications submitted to and acted on by the Court. These
+statistics do not reflect the fact that many applications are altered prior to final
+submission or even withheld from final submission entirely, often after an
+indication that a judge would not approve them.
+
+Our letter also stated, "In a typical week, the Court seeks additional information or modifies the
+terms proposed by the government in a significant percentage of cases." We further indicated that
+the FISC was then just beginning a practice of collecting statistics on the rate at which such
+modifications occur. We are now ready to provide some initial statistics in this regard.
+
+During the three month period from July 1, 2013 through September 30, 2013, we have
+observed that 24.4% of matters submitted ultimately involved substantive changes to the
+information provided by the government or to the authorities granted as a result of Court inquiry
+or action. This does not include, for example, mere typographical corrections. Although we
+have every reason to believe that this three month period is typical in terms of the historic rate of
+modifications, we will continue to collect these statistics for an additional period of time and we
+will inform you if those data suggest that the recent three months were anomalous. It should be
+noted, however, that these statistics are an attempt to measure the results of what are, typically,
+informal communications between the branches. Therefore, the determination of exactly when a
+Honorable Charles E. Grassley
+October 11, 2013
+Page 2
+
+modification is "substantial," and whether it was caused solely by the FISC's intervention, can be
+a judgment call.
+
+We hope this information is helpful to Congress and the public in better understanding
+the role and operations of the FISC.
+
+Sincerely,
+Reggie B. Walton
+Presiding Judge
+
+Enclosure
+
+Identical letters sent to:
+
+Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
+Honorable Bob Goodlatte
+Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
+Honorable Dianne Feinstein
+Honorable Saxby Chambliss
+Honorable Mike Rogers
+Honorable C. A. Dutch Ruppersberger
+Honorable Reggie B. Walton
+Presiding Judge
+
+UNITED STATES FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+Washington, D.C.
+
+July 29, 2013
+
+Honorable Charles E. Grassley
+Ranking Member
+Committee on the Judiciary
+United States Senate
+Washington, DC 20510
+
+Dear Senator Grassley:
+
+I am writing in response to your letter of July 18, 2013, in which you posed several
+questions about the operations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (the Court). As you
+requested, we are providing unclassified responses. We would note that, as a general matter, the
+Court's practices have evolved over time. Various developments in the last several years
+including statutory changes, changes in the size of the Court and its staff, the adoption of new
+Rules of Procedure in 2010, and the relocation of the Court's facilities from the Department of
+Justice headquarters to a secure space in the federal courthouse in 2009 - have affected some of
+these practices. The responses below reflect the current practices of the Court.
+
+1. Describe the typical process that the Court follows when it considers the following: (1)
+an application for an order for electronic surveillance under Title I of FISA; (2) an
+application for an order for access to business records under Title V of FISA; and (3)
+submissions from the government under Section 702 of FISA. As to applications for
+orders for access to business records under Title V of FISA, please describe whether the
+process for the Court's consideration of such applications is different when considering
+requests for bulk collection of phone call metadata records, as recently declassified by
+the Director of National Intelligence.
+
+Each week, one of the eleven district court judges who comprise the Court is on duty in
+Washington. As discussed below, most of the Court's work is handled by the duty judge with the
+assistance of attorneys and clerk's office personnel who staff the Court. Some of the Court's
+more complex or time-consuming matters are handled by judges outside of the duty-week
+system, at the discretion of the Presiding Judge. In either case, matters before the Court are
+thoroughly reviewed and analyzed by the Court.
+
+Rule 9(a) of the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Rules of Procedure
+Honorable Charles E. Grassley
+July 29, 2013
+Page 2
+
+(FISC Rules of Procedure)^1 requires that except in certain circumstances (i.e., a submission
+pursuant to an emergency authorization under the statute or as otherwise permitted by the Court),
+a proposed application must be submitted by the government no later than seven days before the
+government seeks to have the matter entertained.^2 Upon the Court's receipt of a proposed
+application for an order under FISA, a member of the Court's legal staff reviews the application
+and evaluates whether it meets the legal requirements under the statute. As part of this
+evaluation, a Court attorney will often have one or more telephone conversations with the
+government^3 to seek additional information and/or raise concerns about the application. A Court
+attorney then prepares a written analysis of the application for the duty judge, which includes an
+identification of any weaknesses, flaws, or other concerns. For example, the attorney may
+recommend that the judge consider requiring the addition of information to the application;
+imposing special reporting requirements; or shortening the requested duration of an
+authorization.
+
+The judge then reviews the proposed application, as well as the attorney's written
+analysis. The judge typically makes a preliminary determination at that time about what course
+
+^1 A copy of the FISC Rules of Procedure is appended hereto as Attachment A. The rules are also
+available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/rules/FISC2010.pdf.
+
+^2 A proposed application is also sometimes referred to as a "read copy" and has been referred to
+in this manner in at least one recent congressional hearing. A proposed application or "read copy" is a
+near-final version of the government's application, which does not include the signatures of executive
+branch officials required by statutory provisions such as 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(6) and 1823(a)(6). As
+described below, in most circumstances, the government will subsequently file a final copy of an
+application pursuant to Rule 9(b) of the FISC Rules of Procedure. Both the proposed and final
+applications include proposed orders.
+
+The process of using proposed applications and final applications is altogether similar to the
+process employed by other federal courts in considering applications for wiretap orders under Title III of
+the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended ("Title III"), which is codified at
+18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522.
+
+^3 In discussing Court interactions with "the government" throughout this document, I am
+referring to interactions with attorneys in the Office of Intelligence of the National Security Division of
+the United States Department of Justice.
+
+^4 Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §§ 1805(d)(3) and 1824(d)(3), the Court is authorized to assess
+compliance with the statutorily-required minimization procedures by reviewing the circumstances under
+which information concerning United States persons was acquired, retained, or disseminated.
+
+^5 For each application, the Court retains the attorney's written analysis and the notes made by the
+judge, so that if the government later seeks to renew the authorization, the judge who considers the next
+Honorable Charles E. Grassley
+July 29, 2013
+Page 3
+
+of action to take. These courses of action might include indicating to Court staff that he or she is
+prepared to approve the application without a hearing; indicating an inclination to impose
+conditions on the approval of the application; determining that additional information is needed
+about the application; or determining that a hearing would be appropriate before deciding
+whether to grant the application. A staff attorney will then relay the judge's inclination to the
+government, and the government will typically proceed by providing additional information, or
+by submitting a final application, sometimes with an amendment, to the government's election, for
+the Court's ruling pursuant to Rule 9(b) of the FISC Rules of Procedure. In conjunction with its
+submission of a final application, the government has an opportunity to request a hearing, even if
+the judge did not otherwise intend to require one. The government might request a hearing, for
+example, to challenge conditions that the judge has indicated he or she would impose on the
+approval of an application. If the judge schedules a hearing, the judge determines whether to
+approve the application thereafter. Often, if a judge makes a determination that the
+written application must be amended by the government. In approving an application, a judge will
+sometimes issue a Supplemental Order in addition to signing the government's proposed orders.
+Often, a Supplemental Order imposes some form of reporting requirement on the government.
+
+If after receiving a final application, the judge is inclined to deny it, the Court will prepare
+a statement of reason(s) pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 11803(b)(1). In some cases, the government may
+decide not to submit a final application, or to withdraw one that has been submitted, after
+learning that the judge does not intend to approve it. The annual statistics provided to Congress
+by the Attorney General pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §§ 1807 and 1862(b) - frequently cited in press
+reports as a suggestion that the Court's approval rate of applications is over 99% - reflect only
+the number of *final* applications submitted to and acted on by the Court. These statistics do not
+reflect the fact that many applications are altered prior to final submission or even withheld from
+final submission entirely, often after an indication that a judge would not approve them.^6
+
+Most applications under Title V of FISA are handled pursuant to the process described
+above. However, applications under Title V of FISA for bulk collection of phone call metadata
+records are normally handled by the duty judge using a process that is similar to the one
+described above, albeit more exacting. The government typically submits a proposed application
+of this type more than one week in advance. The attorney who reviews the application spends a
+application has the benefit of the prior thoughts of the judge(s) and staff, and a written record of any
+problems with the authorization.
+
+^6 Notably, the approval rate for Title III wiretap applications (see note 2 above) is higher than
+the approval rate for FISA applications, even using the Attorney General's FISA statistics as the baseline
+for comparison. Recent statistics show that from 2008 through 2012, only five of 13,593 Title III
+wiretap applications were requested but not authorized. See Administrative Office of the United States
+Courts, Wiretap Report 2012, Table 7 (available at
+http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/statistic/wiretapreports/2012/Table7.pdf).
+Honorable Charles E. Grassley
+July 29, 2013
+Page 4
+
+greater amount of time reviewing and preparing a written analysis of such an application, in part
+because the Court has always required detailed information about the government's
+implementation of the authority. The Judge likewise typically spends a greater amount of time
+than he or she normally spends on an individual application carefully considering the extensive
+information provided by the government and determining whether to seek more information or
+hold a hearing before ruling on the application.
+
+As described above, the majority of applications submitted to the Court are handled on a
+seven-day cycle, by a judge sitting on a weekly duty schedule. Applications that are novel or
+more complex are sometimes handled on a longer time-line or actually require additional briefing,
+and are assigned by the Presiding Judge based on judges' availability. Section 702 (i.e., 50
+U.S.C. § 1881a) applications^7 would typically fall into this category.
+
+Where the Court's process for handling Section 702 applications differs from the process
+described above is that, based on the statutory requirements of that section, which was
+enacted as part of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA), Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §§
+1881a(g)(1)(A) & (g)(2)(D)(i), prior to the implementation of an authorization under Section
+702, the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence must provide the Court with
+a written certification containing certain statutorily required elements, and that certification must
+include an effective date for the authorization that is at least 30 days after the submission of the
+written certification to the Court.^8 Under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(3), the Court must review the
+certification, as well as the targeting and minimization procedures adopted in accordance with 50
+U.S.C. §§ 1881a(d) & (e), not later than 30 days after the date on which the certification and
+procedures are submitted. The statutorily-imposed deadline for the Court's review typically
+coincides with the effective date identified in the final certification filed with the Court.
+
+The government's submission of a Section 702 application typically includes a cover
+filing that highlights any special issues and identifies any changes that have been made relative to
+the prior application. The government has typically filed proposed (read copy) Section 702
+applications approximately one month before filing a final application. Proposed Section 702
+applications are reviewed by multiple members of the Court's legal staff, at the discretion of the
+Presiding Judge or a judge who has been assigned to handle the Section 702 application, the
+
+^7 "Section 702 application" is used here to refer collectively to a Section 702 certification and
+supporting affidavit, as well as to the statutorily-required targeting and minimization procedures.
+
+^8 If the acquisition has already begun (e.g., pursuant to a determination of exigent circumstances
+under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(c)(2)) or the effective date is less than 30 days after the submission of the
+written certification to the Court (e.g., because of an amendment to a certification while Court review is
+pending, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3)(C)), 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g)(2)(D)(ii) requires the
+certification to include the date the acquisition began or the effective date of the authorization.
+Honorable Charles E. Grassley
+July 29, 2013
+Page 5
+
+Court's legal staff may request a meeting with the government to discuss a proposed application.
+Also at the direction of the Presiding Judge or a judge who has been assigned to handle the
+Section 702 application, the Court legal staff may request additional information from the
+government or convey a judge's concerns about the legal sufficiency of a proposed Section 702
+application. Following these interactions, the government files a final Section 702 application,
+which the government may have elected to amend based on any concerns raised by the judge.
+
+The judge reviews the final Section 702 application and may set a hearing if he or she has
+additional questions about it. If the judge finds (based on the written submission alone or the
+written submission in combination with a hearing) that the certification contains all of the
+required elements, and that the targeting and minimization procedures adopted in accordance
+with 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881a(d) & (e) are consistent with the requirements of those subsections and
+with the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, the judge enters an order
+approving the certification in accordance with 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3)(A). As required by 50
+U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3)(C), the judge also issues an opinion in support of the order. If the judge
+finds that the certification does not contain the required elements or the targeting and
+minimization procedures are inconsistent with the requirements of 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881a(d) & (e),
+or the Fourth Amendment, the judge will, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3)(B), issue an order
+directing the government to, at the government's election and to the extent required by the
+Court's order, either correct any deficiency identified by the Court's order not later than 30 days
+after the date on which the Court issues the order, or cease, or not begin, the implementation of
+the authorization for which the certification was submitted. Subsequent review of any remedial
+measures taken by the government may then be required and may result in another order and
+opinion pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i).
+
+2. When considering such applications and submissions, please describe the interaction
+between the government and the Court (including both judges and court staff), including
+any hearings, meetings, or other means through which the Court has the opportunity to
+ask questions or seek additional information from the government. Please describe how
+frequently such exchanges occur, and generally what types of additional information that
+the Court might request of the government, if any. Please also describe how frequently
+the Court asks the government to make changes to its applications and submissions
+before ruling.
+
+The process through which the Court interacts with the government in reviewing
+proposed applications, seeking additional information, conveying Court concerns, and
+adjudicating final applications, is very similar to the process employed by other federal courts in
+considering applications for wiretap orders under Title Ill (discussed in notes 2 and 6 above).
+
+Under FISA practice, the first set of interactions often take place at the staff level. The
+Court's legal staff frequently interacts with the government in various ways in the context of
+Honorable Charles E. Grassley
+July 29, 2013
+Page 6
+
+examining the legal sufficiency of applications before they are presented in final form to a judge.
+Indeed, in the process of reviewing the government's applications and submissions in order to
+provide advice to the judge, the legal staff interact with the government on a daily basis. These
+daily interactions typically consist of informal telephone conversations in which legal staff ask the
+government questions about the legal and factual elements of applications or submissions. These
+questions may originate with legal staff after an initial review of an application or submission, or
+they may come from a judge.
+
+At the direction of the Presiding Judge or the judge assigned to a matter, Court legal staff
+sometimes meet with the government in connection with applications and submissions. The
+Court typically requests such meetings when a proposed application or submission presents a
+novel legal or factual concern or when the Court would like additional information (e.g., a
+novel use of technology or a request for a new surveillance or search technique). The
+frequency of such meetings varies depending on the Court's assessment of its need for additional
+information. In matters before it and the most conducive means to obtain that information. Court
+legal staff may meet with the government as often as 2-3 times a week, or as few as 1-2 times a
+month, in connection with the various matters pending before the Court.
+
+Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(2) and Rule 17(a) of the FISC Rules of Procedure,
+the Court also holds hearings in cases in which a judge assesses that he or she needs additional
+information in order to rule on a matter. The frequency of hearings varies depending on the
+nature and complexity of matters pending before the Court at a given time, and, to some
+extent, based on the individual preferences of different judges. Hearings are attended, at a
+minimum, by the Department of Justice attorney who prepared the application and a fact witness
+from the agency seeking the Court's authorization.
+
+The types of additional information sought from the government - through telephone
+conversations, meetings, or hearings - include, but are not limited to, the following: additional
+facts to justify the government's belief that its application meets the legal requirements for the
+type of authority it is seeking (e.g., in the case of electronic surveillance, that might include
+additional information to justify the government's belief that a target of electronic surveillance is a
+foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, as required by 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(3)(A), or that the target
+is an agent about to use a particular facility as required by 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(3)(B)); additional
+facts about how the government intends to implement statutorily required minimization
+procedures (see, e.g., 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h); 1805(a)(3); 1824(a)(3); 1861(c)(1); 1881a(i)(3)(A);
+and 1881a(i)(3)(J)); additional information about the government's prior implementation of a
+Court order, particularly if the prior Court order has not been fully complied with or if
+information about novel issues of technology or law (see Rule 11 of FISC
+Rules of Procedure).
+
+In this period, the Court seeks additional information or modifies the terms proposed
+Honorable Charles E. Grassley
+July 29, 2013
+Page 7
+
+by the government in a significant percentage of cases.^9 (The Court has recently initiated the
+process of tracking more precisely how frequently this occurs.) The judge may determine, for
+example, that he or she cannot make the necessary findings under the statute without the addition
+of information to the application or that he or she cannot approve only some of the authorities
+sought through the application. The government then has the choice to alter its final application
+or proposed orders in response to the judge's concerns; request a hearing to address those
+concerns; submit a final application without changes; or elect not to proceed at all with a final
+application. If the government files a final application, the Court may, on its own, make changes
+to the government's proposed orders (or issue totally redrafted orders) to address the judge's
+concern about a given application. The judge may choose, for example, to make an authorization
+of a shorter duration than what was requested by the government, or the judge may issue a
+Supplemental Order imposing special reporting or minimization requirements on the
+government's implementation of an authorization.
+
+3. Please explain what mechanisms the Court has to invite the views of nongovernmental
+parties that appear before the Court in certain cases, including a provider
+challenge to the Protect America Act of 2007. Describe instances where non-
+governmental parties have appeared before the Court. Has the Court granted or
+heard arguments from a nongovernmental party regarding applications or submissions
+under Title I, Title V, or Title VII of FISA? If so, how did this come about, and
+what was the process or mechanism that the Court used to enable such views to
+be considered?
+
+FISA does not include a mechanism for the Court to invite the views of nongovernmental
+parties. In fact, the Court's proceedings are ex parte as required by the statute (see, e.g., 50
+U.S.C. §§ 1805(a), 1824(a), 1842(d)(1) & 1861(e)(1)), and in keeping with the procedures
+followed by other courts for applications for search warrants and wiretap orders. Nevertheless,
+the statute and the FISC Rules of Procedure provide multiple opportunities for recipients of
+Court orders or government directives to challenge those orders or directives, either directly or
+through virtual non-compliance, with orders or directives. Additionally, as detailed below, there have
+been several instances - particularly in the past several months - in which nongovernmental
+parties have appeared before the Court outside of the context of a challenge to an individual
+Court order or government directive.
+
+There has been one instance in which the Court heard arguments from a nongovernmental
+party that sought to substantively challenge a directive from the government. Specifically, in 2007,
+the government issued directives to Yahoo! Inc. (Yahoo) pursuant to Section 105B of the Protect
+America Act of 2007 (PAA). Yahoo refused to comply with the directives, and the government
+^9 This assessment does not include minor technical or typographical changes, which occur more
+frequently.
+Honorable Charles E. Grassley
+July 29, 2013
+Page 8
+
+filed a motion with this Court to compel compliance. The Court ordered and received briefing
+from both parties, and rendered a decision in April 2008.^10
+
+As noted above, the FISC Rules of Procedure and the FISA statute provide opportunities
+for the appearance of nongovernmental parties before the Court in matters pending pursuant to
+Titles I, V and VII of the statute. For example, Rule 19(a) of the FISC Rules of Procedure
+provides that if a person or entity served with a Court order fails to comply with that order, the
+government may file a motion for an order to show cause why the recipient should not be held in
+contempt and sanctioned accordingly. Thus, a nongovernmental party served with an order may
+invite an opportunity to be heard by the Court through refusal to comply with an order.
+
+With respect to applications filed under Title I of FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1803(e)(2)(A)(i)
+provides that a person receiving a production order may challenge the legality of that order by
+filing a petition with the Court. The same section of the statute provides that the recipient of a
+production order may challenge the non-disclosure order imposed in connection with a
+production order by filing a petition to modify or set aside the nondisclosure order. Rules 33-36
+of the FISC Rules of Procedure delineate the procedures and requirements for filing such
+petitions, including the time limits on such challenges. To date, no recipient of a production
+order has opted to invoke this section of the statute.
+
+With respect to applications filed under Title VII of FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(4)(A)
+provides that an electronic communication service provider who receives a directive pursuant to
+Section 702 may file a motion to modify or set aside the directive with the Court. Sections
+1881a(h)(4)(A)-(G) of the statute, as well as Rule 28 of the FISC Rules of Procedure, delineate
+
+^10 Yahoo thereafter appealed the Court's decision to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+of Review ("FISC-R"), which issued a declassified, redacted opinion in *In re Procedures for Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act*, 551 F.3d 1004 (FISC-R. 2008). This is not the only instance in
+which a nongovernmental entity has appeared before the FISC-R. In 2002, the FISC-R accepted briefs
+filed by the ACLU and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as *amici curiae* in *In re
+Sealed Case*, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
+
+While Yahoo's identity as the provider that challenged these directives was previously under seal
+pursuant to the FISC-R decision in *In re Directives*, 551 F.3d 1004, 1016-18, the FISCR issued an Order
+on June 26, 2013, indicating that it does not object to the release of Yahoo's identity, and ordering,
+among other things, a new declassification review of the FISC-R's opinion in *In re Directives*. The
+FISC issued this Order in response to a motion by Yahoo!'s counsel, and after receiving briefing by
+Yahoo and the government. Yahoo has since filed a motion for publication of the Court's decision that
+was appealed to the FISC-R, in the published opinion on *In re Directives*. The Court granted
+the motion and the motion is pending. The original opinion in this case is available at
+http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/index.html under Docket No. 1058(g) 07-01.
+Honorable Charles E. Grassley
+July 29, 2013
+Page 9
+
+the procedures and requirements for such challenges. Relatedly, 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(5)(A)
+provides that if an electronic communication service provider fails to comply with a directive
+issued under Section 702, the Attorney General may file a petition with the Court for an order to
+compel compliance, which would likely result in the service provider's appearance before the
+Court through its legal representatives. (Section 1881a(h)(5), as well as Rule 29 of the FISC
+Rules of Procedure, provide further detail on the procedures and requirements for the
+enforcement of Section 702 directives.) Finally, 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(6) and Rule 31 of the
+FISC Rules of Procedure allow for the government or an electronic communication service
+provider to appeal an order of this Court under §§ 1881a(h)(4) or (5) to the FISC-R. To date, no
+electronic communication service provider has opted to challenge a directive issued pursuant to
+Section 702, although, as noted above, Yahoo refused to comply with government directives
+issued under the PAA, which resulted in the government invoking a provision under that statute
+to compel compliance.
+
+As noted above, there have been a number of other instances in which nongovernmental
+parties have appeared before the Court outside of the context of a direct challenge to a court
+order or a government directive, particularly recently. Those instances are as follows:
+
+On August 2007, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed a motion with the
+Court for the release of certain records. The Court ordered and received briefing on the matter
+from the ACLU and the government, and rendered a decision in December 2007. *S/gn In re
+Motions for Release of Court Records, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484 (FISA Ct. 2007)*.
+
+On May 23, 2013, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) filed a motion with this
+Court for consent to disclosure of court records, or for the alternative, a determination of the effect
+of the Court's rules on access rights under the Freedom of Information Act. Following briefing
+by EFF and the government, the Court issued an Opinion and Order on June 12, 2013. All
+documents filed in this docket are available at:
+http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/index.html under Case No. Misc. 13-01.
+
+On June 12, 2013, the ACLU, the American Civil Liberties Union of the Nation's
+Capital, and the Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic (Movants) filed a motion with
+this Court for the release of Court records. The Court ordered and received briefing on the
+matter from the movants and the government. On July 18, 2013, the Court granted motions of
+(1) sixteen members of the House of Representatives and (2) a coalition of news media
+organizations for leave to file *amicus curiae* briefs in this case. The matter is pending before the
+Court. All documents filed in this docket are available at
+http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/index.html under Case No. Misc. 13-02.
+
+On June 18, 2013, Google, Inc. filed a motion in this Court for declaratory judgment of
+the company's first amendment right to publish aggregate information about FISA orders. The
+Honorable Charles E. Grassley
+July 29, 2013
+Page 10
+
+court ordered briefing on the matter. On July 18, 2013, the Court granted the motions of (1) a
+coalition of news media organizations and (2) the First Amendment Coalition, the ACLU, the
+Center for Democracy and Technology, the EFF, and Techfreedom for leave to file *amicus curiae*
+briefs in this case. The matter is pending before the Court. All documents filed in this docket
+are available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/index.html under Case No. Misc.
+13-03.
+
+On June 19, 2013, Microsoft Corporation filed a motion in this Court for declaratory
+judgment or other appropriate relief authorizing disclosure of aggregate data regarding any FISA
+orders it has received. The court ordered briefing on the matter. On July 18, 2013, the Court
+granted the motions of (1) a coalition of news media organizations and (2) the First Amendment
+Coalition, the ACLU, the Center for Democracy and Technology, the EFF, and Techfreedom for
+leave to file *amicus curiae* briefs in this case. The matter is pending before the Court. All
+documents filed in this docket are available at
+http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/index.html under Case No. Misc. 13-04.
+
+4. Please describe the process used by the Court to consider and resolve any instances
+where the government notifies the Court of compliance concerns with any of the FISA
+authorities.
+
+Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1803(h), the Court is empowered to ensure compliance with its
+orders. Additionally, Rule 13(a) of the FISC Rules of Procedure requires the government to file
+a written notice with the Court immediately upon discovering that any authority or approval
+granted by the Court has been implemented (either by government officials or others operating
+pursuant to Court order) in a manner that did not comply with the Court's authorization or
+approval or with applicable law. Rule 13(a) also requires the government to notify the Court in
+writing of the facts and circumstances relevant to the non-compliance; any modifications the
+government has made or proposes to make in how it will implement any authority or approval
+granted by the Court; and how the government proposes to dispose of or treat any information
+obtained as a result of the non-compliance.
+
+When the government discovers instances of non-compliance, it files notices with the
+Court as required by Rule 13(a). Because the rule requires the government to "immediately
+inform the Judge" of a compliance incident, the government typically files a preliminary notice
+that provides whatever facts are available at the time an incident is discovered. The legal staff
+review these notices as they are received and call significant matters to the attention of the
+appropriate judge. In instances in which the non-compliance has not been fully addressed by the
+time the preliminary Rule 13(a) notice is filed, the Court may seek additional information
+through telephone calls, meetings, or hearings. Typically, the government will file a final Rule
+13(a) notice once the relevant facts are known and any unauthorized collection has been
+destroyed. However, judges sometimes issue orders directing the government to take specific
+Honorable Charles E. Grassley
+July 29, 2013
+Page 11
+
+actions to address instances of non-compliance either before or after a final notice is
+filed, and, less frequently, to cease a course of action that the Court considers non-compliant.
+This process is followed for compliance issues in all matters, including matters handled under
+Title V and Section 702.
+
+I hope these responses are helpful to the Senate Judiciary Committee in its deliberations.
+
+Sincerely,
+Reggie B. Walton
+Presiding Judge
+
+Identical letter sent to:
+Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
+TO THE BENCH, BAR AND PUBLIC:
+
+The attached Rules of Procedure for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court supersede both
+the February 17, 2006 Rules of Procedure and the May 5, 2006 Procedures for Review of
+Petitions Filed Pursuant to Section 501(f) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978,
+As Amended. These revised Rules of Procedure are effective immediately.
+
+John D. Bates
+Presiding Judge
+Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+November 1, 2010
+UNITED STATES FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+Washington, D.C.
+
+**RULES OF PROCEDURE**
+Effective November 1, 2010
+
+| Rule | Page |
+| :--- | :--- |
+| **Title I. Scope of Rules; Amendment** | |
+| 1. Scope of Rules | 1 |
+| 2. Amendment | 1 |
+| **Title II. National Security Information** | |
+| 3. National Security Information | 1 |
+| **Title III. Structure and Powers of the Court** | |
+| 4. Structure | 1 |
+| 5. Authority of the Judges | 1 |
+| **Title IV. Matters Presented to the Court** | |
+| 6. Means of Requesting Relief from the Court | 2 |
+| 7. Filing Applications, Certifications, Petitions, Motions, or Other Papers ("Submissions") | 2 |
+| 8. Service | 3 |
+| 9. Time and Manner of Submission of Applications | 3 |
+| 10. Computation of Time | 4 |
+| 11. Notice and Briefing of Novel Issues | 4 |
+| 12. Submission of Targeting and Minimization Procedures | 5 |
+| 13. Correction of Misstatement or Omission; Disclosure of Non-Compliance | 5 |
+| 14. Motions to Amend Court Orders | 5 |
+| 15. Sequestration | 5 |
+| 16. Returns | 6 |
+| **Title V. Hearings, Orders, and Enforcement** | |
+| 17. Hearings | 6 |
+| 18. Court Orders | 6 |
+| 19. Enforcement of Orders | 7 |
+**Title VI. Supplemental Procedures for Proceedings Under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)**
+
+| | |
+| :--- | :--- |
+| 20. Scope | 7 |
+| 21. Petition to Modify or Set Aside a Directive | 7 |
+| 22. Petition to Compel Compliance With a Directive | 7 |
+| 23. Contents of Petition | 8 |
+| 24. Response | 8 |
+| 25. Length of Petition and Response; Other Papers | 8 |
+| 26. Notification of Presiding Judge | 8 |
+| 27. Assignment | 8 |
+| 28. Review of Petition to Modify or Set Aside a Directive | 9 |
+| 29. Review of Petition to Compel Compliance Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(5)(C) | 9 |
+| 30. In Camera Review | 9 |
+| 31. Appeal | 9 |
+| **Title VII. Supplemental Procedures for Proceedings Under 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)** | |
+| 32. Scope | 10 |
+| 33. Petition Challenging Production or Nondisclosure Order | 10 |
+| 34. Contents of Petition | 10 |
+| 35. Length of Petition | 10 |
+| 36. Request to Stay Production | 10 |
+| 37. Notification of Presiding Judge | 10 |
+| 38. Assignment | 11 |
+| 39. Initial Review | 11 |
+| 40. Response to Petition; Other Papers | 11 |
+| 41. Rulings on Non-frivolous Petitions | 11 |
+| 42. Failure to Comply | 12 |
+| 43. In Camera Review | 12 |
+| 44. Appeal | 12 |
+| **Title VIII. En Banc Proceedings** | |
+| 45. Standard for Hearing or Rehearing En Banc | 12 |
+| 46. Initial Hearing En Banc on Request of a Party | 12 |
+| 47. Rehearing En Banc on Petition by a Party | 12 |
+| 48. Circulation of En Banc Petitions and Responses | 13 |
+| 49. Court-Initiated En Banc Proceedings | 13 |
+| 50. Polling | 13 |
+| 51. Stay Pending En Banc Review | 13 |
+| 52. Supplemental Briefing | 13 |
+| 53. Order Granting or Denying En Banc Review | 13 |
+
+-ii-
+**Title IX. Appeals**
+
+| | |
+| :--- | :--- |
+| 54. How Taken | 14 |
+| 55. When Taken | 14 |
+| 56. Stay Pending Appeal | 14 |
+| 57. Motion to Transmit the Record | 14 |
+| 58. Transmitting the Record | 14 |
+| 59. Oral Notification to the Court of Review | 14 |
+| **Title X. Administrative Provisions** | |
+| 60. Duties of the Clerk | 14 |
+| 61. Office Hours | 15 |
+| 62. Release of Court Records | 15 |
+| 63. Practice Before Court | 15 |
+
+-iii-
+**Title I. Scope of Rules; Amendment**
+
+**Rule 1. Scope of Rules.** These rules, which are promulgated pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1803(g),
+govern all proceedings in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("the Court"). Issues not
+addressed in these rules or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, as amended ("the Act"),
+may be resolved under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Federal Rules of Civil
+Procedure.
+
+**Rule 2. Amendment.** Any amendment to these rules must be promulgated in accordance with
+28 U.S.C. § 2071.
+
+**Title II. National Security Information**
+
+**Rule 3. National Security Information.** In all matters, the Court and its staff shall comply with
+the security measures established pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §§ 1803(c), 1822(e), 1861(f)(4), and
+1881a(k)(1), as well as Executive Order 13526, "Classified National Security Information" (or its
+successor). Each member of the Court's staff must possess security clearances at a level
+commensurate to the individual's responsibilities.
+
+**Title III. Structure and Powers of the Court**
+
+**Rule 4. Structure.**
+(a) **Composition.** In accordance with 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a), the Court consists of United
+States District Court Judges appointed by the Chief Justice of the United States.
+(b) **Presiding Judge.** The Chief Justice designates the "Presiding Judge."
+
+**Rule 5. Authority of the Judges.**
+(a) **Scope of Authority.** Each Judge may exercise the authority vested by the Act and
+such other authority as is consistent with Article III of the Constitution and other statutes
+and laws of the United States, to the extent not inconsistent with the Act.
+(b) **Referring Matters to Other Judges.** Except for matters involving a denial of an
+application for an order, a Judge may refer any matter to another Judge of the Court with
+that Judge's consent. If a Judge directs the government to supplement an application, the
+Judge may direct the government to present the renewal of that application to the same
+Judge. If a matter is presented to a Judge who is unavailable or whose tenure on the
+Court expires while the matter is pending, the Presiding Judge may re-assign the matter.
+(c) **Supplementation.** The Judge before whom a matter is pending may order a party to
+furnish any information that the Judge deems necessary.
+
+-1-
+**Title IV. Matters Presented to the Court**
+
+**Rule 6. Means of Requesting Relief from the Court**
+(a) **Application.** The government may, in accordance with 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804, 1823,
+1842, 1861, 1881b(b), 1881c(b), or 1881d(a), file an application for a Court order
+("application").
+(b) **Certification.** The government may, in accordance with 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g), file a
+government certification confirming the targeting of non-United States persons reasonably believed to
+be located outside the United States ("certification").
+(c) **Petition.** A party may, in accordance with 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861(f) and 1881a(h) and
+the Supplemental Procedures in Titles VI and VII of these Rules, file a petition for review
+of a production or nondisclosure order issued under 50 U.S.C. § 1861 or for review or
+enforcement of a directive issued under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a ("petition").
+(d) **Motion.** A party seeking relief, other than pursuant to an application, certification, or
+petition permitted under the Act and these Rules, must do so by motion ("motion").
+
+**Rule 7. Filing Applications, Certifications, Petitions, Motions, or Other Papers**
+**(“Submissions”).**
+(a) **Filing.** A submission is filed by delivering it to the Clerk or as otherwise directed by
+the Clerk in accordance with Rule 7(k).
+(b) **Original and One Copy.** Except as otherwise provided, a signed original and one
+copy must be filed with the Clerk.
+(c) **Form.** Unless otherwise ordered, all submissions must be:
+(1) on 8½-by-11-inch opaque white paper; and
+(2) typed (double-spaced) or reproduced in a manner that produces a clear black
+image.
+(d) **Electronic Filing.** The Clerk, when authorized by the Court, may accept and file
+submissions by reliable, and appropriately secure, electronic means.
+(e) **Facsimile or Scanned Signature.** The Clerk may accept for filing a submission
+bearing a facsimile or scanned signature in lieu of the original signature. Upon
+acceptance, a submission bearing a facsimile or scanned signature is the original Court
+record.
+(f) **Citations.** Each submission must contain citations to pertinent provisions of the Act.
+(g) **Contents.** Each application and certification filed by the government must be
+approved and certified in accordance with the Act, and must contain the statements and
+other information required by the Act.
+(h) **Content; Filings in Adversarial Proceedings.**
+(1) **Filing by a Party Other Than the Government.** A party other than the
+government must include in the initial submission the party's full name, address,
+and telephone number, or, if the party is represented by Counsel, the full name of
+the party and the party's Counsel, as well as Counsel's address, telephone number,
+facsimile number, and bar membership information.
+(2) **Filing by the Government.** In an adversarial proceeding, the initial
+
+-2-
+submission filed by the government must include the full names of the attorneys
+representing the United States and their mailing addresses, telephone numbers,
+and facsimile numbers.
+(i) **Information Concerning Security Clearances in Adversarial Proceedings.** A party
+other than the government must:
+(1) state in the initial submission whether the party (or the party's responsible
+officers or employees) and counsel for the party hold security clearances;
+(2) describe the circumstances in which such clearances were granted; and
+(3) identify the federal agencies granting the clearances and the classification
+levels and compartments involved.
+(j) **Ex Parte Review.** At the request of the government in an adversarial proceeding, the
+Judge must review *ex parte* and *in camera* any submissions by the government, or
+portions thereof, which may include classified information. Except as otherwise ordered,
+if the government files *ex parte* a submission that contains classified information, the
+government must file and serve on the non-governmental party an unclassified or
+redacted version. The unclassified or redacted version, at a minimum, must clearly
+articulate the government's legal arguments.
+(k) **Instructions for Delivery to the Court.** A party may obtain instructions for making
+submissions permitted under the Act and these Rules by contacting the Clerk at (202)
+357-6250.
+
+**Rule 8. Service.**
+(a) **By a Party Other than the Government.** A party other than the government must,
+at or before the time of filing a submission permitted under the Act and these Rules, serve
+a copy on the government. Instructions for effecting service must be obtained by
+contacting the Security and Emergency Planning Staff, United States Department of
+Justice, by telephone at (202) 514-2094.
+(b) **By the Government.** At or before the time of filing a submission in an adversarial
+proceeding, the government must, subject to Rule 7(j), serve a copy by hand delivery or
+by overnight delivery on counsel for the other party, or, if the party is not represented by
+counsel, on the party directly.
+(c) **Certificate of Service.** A party must include a certificate of service specifying the
+time and manner of service.
+
+**Rule 9. Time and Manner of Submission of Applications.**
+(a) **Proposed Applications.** Except when an application is being submitted following
+an emergency authorization pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §§ 1805(e), 1824(e), 1843, 1881b(d),
+or 1881c(d) ("emergency authorization"), or as otherwise permitted by the Court,
+proposed applications must be submitted by the government no later than seven days
+before the government seeks to have the matter entertained by the Court. Proposed
+applications submitted following an emergency authorization must be submitted as soon
+after such authorization as is reasonably practicable.
+(b) **Final Applications.** Unless the Court permits otherwise, the final application,
+
+-3-
+including all signatures, approvals, and certifications required by the Act, must be filed
+no later than 10:00 a.m. Eastern Time on the day the government seeks to have the matter
+entertained by the Court.
+(c) **Proposed Orders.** Each proposed application and final application submitted to the
+Court must include any pertinent proposed orders.
+(d) **Number of Copies.** Notwithstanding Rule 7(b), unless the Court directs otherwise,
+only one copy of a proposed application must be submitted and only the original final
+application must be filed.
+(e) **Notice of Changes.** No later than the time the final application is filed, the
+government must identify any differences between the final application and the proposed
+application. The motion must be presented to the Judge who entered the underlying
+order.
+
+**Rule 10. Computation of Time.** The following rules apply in computing a time period
+specified in these Rules or by Court order:
+(a) **Day of the Event Excluded.** Exclude the day of the event that triggers the period.
+(b) **Compute Time Using Calendar Days.** Compute time using calendar days, not
+business days.
+(c) **Include the Last Day.** Include the last day of the period, but if the last day is a
+Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the period continues to run until the next day that is
+not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.
+
+**Rule 11. Notice and Briefing of Novel Issues.**
+(a) **Notice to the Court.** If a submission by the government for Court action involves an
+issue not previously presented to the Court — including, but not limited to, a novel issue
+of technology or law — the government must inform the Court in writing of the nature
+and significance of that issue.
+(b) **Submission Relating to New Techniques.** Prior to requesting authorization to use a
+new surveillance or search technique, the government must submit a memorandum to the
+Court that:
+(1) explains the technique;
+(2) describes the circumstances of the likely implementation of the technique;
+(3) identifies any legal issues, apparent or anticipated; and
+(4) describes the proposed minimization procedures to be applied.
+At the latest, the memorandum must be submitted as part of the first proposed application
+or other submission that seeks to employ the new technique.
+(c) **Novel Implementation.** When requesting authorization to use an existing surveillance
+or search technique in a novel context, the government must identify and address any new
+minimization or other legal or factual issues in writing, made, at the latest, as part of the
+application or other filing seeking such authorization.
+(d) **Legal Memorandum.** If an application or other request for action raises an issue of
+law that is intensely contested by the Court, the government must file a memorandum of
+law in support of its position on each new issue. At the latest, the memorandum must be
+submitted with the first proposed application or other submission that raises the
+issue.
+
+-4-
+submitted as part of the first proposed application or other submission that raises the
+issue.
+
+**Rule 12. Submission of Targeting and Minimization Procedures.** In a matter involving
+Court review of targeting or minimization procedures, such procedures may be set out in full in
+the government's submission or may be incorporated by reference to procedures approved in a
+prior docket. Procedures that are incorporated by reference to a prior docket may be
+supplemented, but not otherwise modified, in the government's submission. Otherwise,
+proposed procedures must be set forth in a clear and self-contained manner, without resort to
+cross-referencing.
+
+**Rule 13. Correction of Misstatement or Omission; Disclosure of Non-Compliance.**
+(a) **Correction of Material Facts.** If the government discovers that a submission to the
+Court contained a misstatement or omission of material fact, the government, in writing,
+must immediately inform the Judge to whom the submission was made of:
+(1) the misstatement or omission;
+(2) any necessary correction;
+(3) the facts and circumstances relevant to the misstatement or omission;
+(4) any modifications the government has made or proposes to make in how it will
+implement any authority or approval granted by the Court; and
+(5) how the government proposes to dispose of or treat any information obtained
+as a result of the misstatement or omission.
+(b) **Disclosure of Non-Compliances.** If the government discovers that any authority or
+approval granted by the Court has been implemented in a manner that did not comply with
+the Court's authorization or approval or with applicable law, the government, in
+writing, must immediately inform the Judge to whom the submission was made of:
+(1) the non-compliance;
+(2) the facts and circumstances relevant to the non-compliance;
+(3) any modifications the government has made or proposes to make in how it will
+implement any authority or approval granted by the Court; and
+(4) how the government proposes to dispose of or treat any information obtained
+as a result of the non-compliance.
+
+**Rule 14. Motions to Amend Court Orders.** Unless the Judge who issued the order granting an
+application directs otherwise, a motion to amend the order may be presented to any other Judge.
+
+**Rule 15. Sequestration.** Except as required by Court-approved minimization procedures, the
+government must submit material for sequestration to the Court, without the prior approval
+of the Presiding Judge. To obtain such approval, the government must, prior to tendering the
+material to the Court for sequestration, file a motion stating the circumstances of the material's
+acquisition and explaining why it is necessary for such material to be retained in the custody of
+the Court.
+
+-5-
+**Rule 16. Returns.**
+(a) **Time for Filing.**
+(1) **Search Orders.** Unless the Court directs otherwise, a return must be made
+and filed either at the time of submission of a proposed renewal application or
+within 90 days of the execution of a search order, whichever is sooner.
+(2) **Other Orders.** The Court may direct the filing of other returns at a time and
+in a manner that it deems appropriate.
+(b) **Contents.** The return must:
+(1) notify the Court of the execution of the order;
+(2) describe the circumstances and results of the search or other activity including,
+where appropriate, an inventory;
+(3) certify that the execution was in conformity with the order or describe and
+explain any deviation from the order; and
+(4) include any other information as the Court may direct.
+
+**Title V. Hearings, Orders, and Enforcement**
+
+**Rule 17. Hearings.**
+(a) **Scheduling.** The Judge to whom a matter is presented or assigned must determine
+whether a hearing is necessary and, if so, set the time and place of the hearing.
+(b) **Ex Parte.** Except as the Court otherwise directs or the Rules otherwise provide, a
+hearing in a non-adversarial matter must be *ex parte* and conducted within the Court's
+secure facility.
+(c) **Appearances.** Unless excused, the government official providing the factual
+information in an application or certification and an attorney for the applicant must attend
+the hearing, along with other representatives of the government, and any other party, as
+the Court may direct or permit.
+(d) **Testimony; Oath; Recording of Proceedings.** A Judge may take testimony under
+oath and receive other evidence. The testimony may be recorded electronically or as the
+Judge may otherwise direct, consistent with the security measures referenced in Rule 3.
+
+**Rule 18. Court Orders.**
+(a) **Citations.** All orders must contain citations to pertinent provisions of the Act.
+(b) **Denying Applications.**
+(1) **Written Statement of Reasons.** If a Judge denies the government's
+application, the Judge must immediately provide a written statement of each
+reason for the decision and cause a copy of the statement to be served on the
+government.
+(2) **Previously Denied Application.** If a Judge denies an application or other
+request for relief by the government, any subsequent submission on the matter
+must be referred to that Judge.
+
+-6-
+**Rule 19. Enforcement of Orders.**
+(a) **Show Cause Motions.** If a person or entity served with a Court order (the
+"recipient") fails to comply with that order, the government may file a motion for an
+order to show cause why the recipient should not be held in contempt and sanctioned
+accordingly. The motion must be presented to the Judge who entered the underlying
+order.
+(b) **Proceedings.**
+(1) An order to show cause must:
+(i) confirm that the underlying order was issued;
+(ii) schedule further proceedings; and
+(iii) afford the recipient an opportunity to show cause why the recipient
+should not be held in contempt.
+(2) A Judge must conduct any proceeding on a motion to show cause *in camera*.
+The Clerk must maintain all records of the proceedings in conformance with 50
+U.S.C. § 1803(c).
+(3) If the recipient fails to show cause for noncompliance with the underlying
+order, the Court may find the recipient in contempt and enter any order it deems
+necessary and appropriate to compel compliance and to sanction the recipient for
+noncompliance with the underlying order.
+(4) If the government shows cause for noncompliance or if the Court concludes that
+the order should not be enforced as issued, the Court may enter any order it deems
+appropriate.
+
+**Title VI. Supplemental Procedures For Proceedings Under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)**
+
+**Rule 20. Scope.** Together with the generally-applicable provisions of these Rules concerning
+filing, service, and other matters, these supplemental procedures apply in proceedings under 50
+U.S.C. § 1881a(h).
+
+**Rule 21. Petition to Modify or Set Aside a Directive.** An electronic communication service
+provider ("provider"), who receives a directive issued under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(1), may file a
+petition to modify or set aside such directive under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(4). A petition may be
+filed by the provider's counsel.
+
+-7-
+**Rule 22. Petition to Compel Compliance With a Directive.** In the event a provider fails to
+comply with a directive issued under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(1), the government may, pursuant to
+50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(5), file a petition to compel compliance with the directive.
+
+**Rule 23. Contents of Petition.** The petition must:
+(a) state clearly the relief being sought;
+(b) state concisely the factual and legal grounds for modifying, setting aside, or
+compelling compliance with the directive at issue;
+(c) include a copy of the directive and state the date on which the directive was served on
+the provider; and
+(d) state whether a hearing is requested.
+
+**Rule 24. Response.**
+(a) **By Government.** The government may, within seven days following notification
+under Rule 28(b) that plenary review is necessary, file a response to a provider's petition.
+(b) **By Provider.** The provider may, within seven days after service of a petition by the
+government to compel compliance, file a response to the petition.
+
+**Rule 25. Length of Petition and Response; Other Papers.**
+(a) **Length.** Unless the Court directs otherwise, a petition and response each must not
+exceed 20 pages in length, including any attachments (other than a copy of the directive at
+issue).
+(b) **Other papers.** No supplements, replies, or sur-replies may be filed without leave of
+the Court.
+
+**Rule 26. Notification of Presiding Judge.** Upon receipt, the Clerk must notify the Presiding
+Judge that a petition to modify, set aside, or compel compliance with a directive issued under 50
+U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(1) has been filed. If the Presiding Judge is not reasonably available when the
+Clerk receives a petition, the Clerk must notify each of the local Judges, in order of seniority on
+the Court, and, if necessary, each of the other Judges, in order of seniority on the Court, until a
+Judge who is reasonably available has received notification. The reasonably available Judge who
+receives notification will be the acting Presiding Judge ("Presiding Judge") for the case.
+
+**Rule 27. Assignment.**
+(a) **Presiding Judge.** As soon as possible after receiving notification from the Clerk that
+a petition has been filed, and no later than 24 hours after the filing of the petition, the
+Presiding Judge must assign the matter to a Judge in the petition review pool established
+by 50 U.S.C. § 1803(c)(1). The Clerk must record the date and time of the assignment.
+(b) **Transmitting Petition.** The Clerk must transmit the petition to the assigned Judge
+as soon as possible but no later than 24 hours after being notified of the assignment by the
+Presiding Judge.
+
+-8-
+**Rule 28. Review of Petition to Modify or Set Aside a Directive.**
+(a) **Initial Review Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(4)(D).**
+(1) A Judge must conduct an initial review of a petition to modify or set aside a
+directive within five days after being assigned such petition.
+(2) If the Judge determines that the provider's claims, defenses, or other legal
+contentions are not warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for
+extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law, the
+Judge must promptly deny such petition, affirm the directive, and order the
+provider to comply with the directive. Upon making such determination or
+promptly thereafter, the Judge must provide a written statement of reasons. The
+Clerk must transmit the ruling and statement of reasons to the provider and the
+government.
+(b) **Plenary Review Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(4)(E).**
+(1) If the Judge determines that the petition requires plenary review, the Court
+must promptly notify the parties. The Judge must provide a written statement of
+reasons for the determination.
+(2) The Judge must affirm, modify, or set aside the directive that is the subject of
+the petition within the time permitted under 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881a(h)(4)(E) and
+1881a(j)(2).
+(3) The Judge may hold a hearing or conduct proceedings solely on the papers
+filed by the provider and the government.
+(c) **Burden.** Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(4)(C), a Judge may grant the petition only
+if the Judge finds that the challenged directive does not meet the requirements of 50
+U.S.C. § 1881a or is otherwise unlawful.
+(d) **Continued Effect.** Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(4)(F), any directive not
+explicitly modified or set aside by the Judge remains in full effect.
+
+**Rule 29. Review of Petition to Compel Compliance Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(5)(C).**
+(a) The Judge reviewing the government's petition to compel compliance with a directive
+must, within the time permitted under 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881a(h)(5)(C) and 1881a(j)(2), issue
+an order requiring the provider to comply with the directive or any part of it, as issued or
+as modified, if the Judge finds that the directive meets the requirements of 50 U.S.C.
+§ 1881a and is otherwise lawful.
+(b) The Judge must provide a written statement of reasons for the determination. The
+Clerk must transmit the ruling and statement of reasons to the provider and the
+government.
+
+**Rule 30. In Camera Review.** Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1803(e)(2), the Court must review a
+petition under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h) and conduct related proceedings *in camera*.
+
+**Rule 31. Appeal.** Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(6) and subject to Rules 54 through 59 of
+these Rules, the government or the provider may petition the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
+Court of Review ("Court of Review") to review the Judge's ruling.
+
+-9-
+**Title VII. Supplemental Procedures for Proceedings Under 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)**
+
+**Rule 32. Scope.** Together with the generally-applicable provisions of these Rules regarding
+filing, service, and other matters, these supplemental procedures apply in proceedings under 50
+U.S.C. § 1861(f).
+
+**Rule 33. Petition Challenging Production or Nondisclosure Order.**
+(a) **Who May File.** The recipient of a production order or nondisclosure order under 50
+U.S.C. § 1861 ("petitioner") may file a petition challenging the order pursuant to 50
+U.S.C. § 1861(f). A petition may be filed by the petitioner's counsel.
+(b) **Time to File Petition.**
+(1) **Challenging a Production Order.** The petitioner must file a petition
+challenging a production order within 20 days after the order has been served.
+(2) **Challenging a Nondisclosure Order.** A petitioner may not file a petition
+challenging a nondisclosure order issued under 50 U.S.C. § 1861(d) earlier than
+one year after the order was entered.
+(3) **Subsequent Petition Challenging a Nondisclosure Order.** If a Judge
+denies a petition to modify or set aside a nondisclosure order, the petitioner may
+not file a subsequent petition challenging the same nondisclosure order earlier
+than one year after the date of the denial.
+
+**Rule 34. Contents of Petition.** A petition must:
+(a) state clearly the relief being sought;
+(b) state concisely the factual and legal grounds for modifying or setting aside the
+challenged order;
+(c) include a copy of the challenged order and state the date on which it was served on the
+petitioner; and
+(d) state whether a hearing is requested.
+
+**Rule 35. Length of Petition.** Unless the Court directs otherwise, a petition may not exceed 20
+pages in length, including any attachments (other than a copy of the challenged order).
+
+**Rule 36. Request to Stay Production.**
+(a) **Petition Does Not Automatically Effect a Stay.** A petition does not automatically
+stay the underlying order. A production order will be stayed only if the petitioner
+requests a stay and the Judge grants such relief.
+(b) **Stay May Be Requested Prior to Filing of a Petition.** A petitioner may request the
+Court to stay the production order before filing a petition challenging the order.
+
+**Rule 37. Notification of Presiding Judge.** Upon receipt, the Clerk must notify the Presiding
+Judge that a petition challenging a production or nondisclosure order has been filed. If the
+Presiding Judge is not reasonably available when the Clerk receives the petition, the Clerk must
+
+-10-
+notify each of the local Judges, in order of seniority on the Court, and, if necessary, each of the
+other Judges, in order of seniority on the Court, until a Judge who is reasonably available has
+received notification. The reasonably available Judge who receives notification will be the acting
+Presiding Judge ("Presiding Judge") for the case.
+
+**Rule 38. Assignment.**
+(a) **Presiding Judge.** Immediately after receiving notification from the Clerk that a
+petition has been filed, the Presiding Judge must assign the matter to a Judge in the
+petition review pool established by 50 U.S.C. § 1803(c)(1). The Clerk must record the date and
+time of the assignment.
+(b) **Transmitting Petition.** The Clerk must transmit the petition to the assigned Judge
+as soon as possible but no later than 24 hours after being notified of the assignment by the
+Presiding Judge.
+
+**Rule 39. Initial Review.**
+(a) **When.** The Judge must review the petition within 72 hours after being assigned the
+petition.
+(b) **Frivolous Petition.** If the Judge determines that the petition is frivolous, the Judge
+must:
+(1) immediately deny the petition and affirm the challenged order;
+(2) promptly provide a written statement of the reasons for the denial; and
+(3) provide a written ruling, together with the statement of reasons, to the Clerk,
+who must transmit the ruling and statement of reasons to the petitioner and the
+government.
+(c) **Non-Frivolous Petitions.**
+(1) **Scheduling.** If the Judge determines that the petition is not frivolous, the
+Judge must promptly issue an order that sets a schedule for its consideration. The
+Clerk must transmit the order to the petitioner and the government.
+(2) **Conduct of Proceeding.** The Judge may hold a hearing or conduct the
+proceedings solely on the papers filed by the petitioner and the government.
+
+**Rule 40. Response to Petition; Other Papers.**
+(a) **Government's Response.** Unless the Judge orders otherwise, the government must
+file a response within 20 days after the issuance of the initial scheduling order pursuant to
+Rule 39(c). The response must not exceed 20 pages in length, including any attachments
+(other than a copy of the challenged order).
+(b) **Other Papers.** No supplements, replies, or sur-replies may be filed without leave of
+the Court.
+
+**Rule 41. Rulings on Non-Frivolous Petitions.**
+(a) **Written Statement of Reasons.** If a Judge determines that the petition is not
+frivolous, the Judge must promptly provide a written statement of the reasons for
+modifying, setting aside, or affirming the production or nondisclosure order.
+
+-11-
+(b) **Affirming the Order.** If the Judge does not modify or set aside the production or
+nondisclosure order, the Judge must affirm it and order the recipient promptly to comply
+with it.
+(c) **Transmitting the Judge's Ruling.** The Clerk must transmit the Judge's ruling and
+written statement of reasons to the petitioner and the government.
+
+**Rule 42. Failure to Comply.** If a recipient fails to comply with an order affirmed under 50
+U.S.C. § 1861(f), the government may file a motion seeking immediate enforcement of the
+affirmed order. The Court may require the government to petition without receiving additional
+submissions or convening further proceedings on the matter.
+
+**Rule 43. In Camera Review.** Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1803(e)(2), the Court must review a
+petition under 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f) and conduct related proceedings *in camera*.
+
+**Rule 44. Appeal.** Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)(3) and subject to Rules 54 through 59 of
+these Rules, the government or the petitioner may petition the Court of Review to review the
+Judge's ruling.
+
+**Title VIII. En Banc Proceedings**
+
+**Rule 45. Standard for Hearing or Rehearing En Banc.** Pursuant to 50 U.S.C.
+§ 1803(a)(2)(A), the Court may order a hearing or rehearing en banc only if it is necessary to
+secure or maintain uniformity of the Court's decisions, or the proceeding involves a question of
+exceptional importance.
+
+**Rule 46. Initial Hearing En Banc on Request of a Party.** The government in any proceeding,
+or a party in a proceeding under 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f) or 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(4), may request
+that hearings be entertained from the outset by the full Court. However, initial hearings en banc
+are extraordinary and will be ordered only when a majority of the Judges determines that a matter
+is of such immediate and extraordinary importance that initial consideration by the en banc Court
+is necessary, and en banc review is feasible in light of applicable time constraints on Court
+action.
+
+**Rule 47. Rehearing En Banc on Petition by a Party.**
+(a) **Timing of Petition and Response.** A party may file a petition for rehearing en banc
+permitted under 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(2) no later than 30 days after the challenged order or
+decision is entered. In an adversarial proceeding, the Judge must direct the Clerk to enter a
+rehearing en banc petition no later than 24 hours after being notified of the assignment by the
+Presiding Judge.
+(b) **Length of Petition and Response.** Unless the Court directs otherwise, a petition for
+rehearing en banc and a response to a petition for rehearing en banc each must not exceed
+15 pages, including any attachments (other than the challenged order or decision).
+
+-12-
+order may also address whether and to what extent the challenged order or ruling will be
+stayed or remain in effect pending a decision by the en banc Court on the merits.
+
+**Rule 48. Circulation of En Banc Petitions and Responses.** The Clerk must, after consulting
+with the Presiding Judge and in a manner consistent with applicable security requirements,
+promptly provide a copy of any timely-filed en banc petition permitted under 50 U.S.C.
+§ 1803(a)(2), and any timely-filed response thereto, to each Judge.
+
+**Rule 49. Court-Initiated En Banc Proceedings.** A Judge to whom a matter has been presented
+may request that all Judges be polled with respect to whether the matter should be considered or
+reconsidered en banc. If a Judge's request, the Clerk must, after consulting with the Presiding
+Judge and in a manner consistent with applicable security requirements, promptly provide notice
+of the request, along with a copy of pertinent materials, to every Judge.
+
+**Rule 50. Polling.**
+(a) **Deadline for Vote.** The Presiding Judge must set a deadline for the Judges to submit
+their vote to the Clerk on whether to grant a hearing or rehearing en banc. The deadline
+must be communicated to all Judges at the time the petition or polling request is
+circulated.
+(b) **Vote on Stay.** In the case of rehearing en banc, the Presiding Judge may request that
+all Judges also vote on whether and to what extent the challenged order or ruling should
+be stayed or remain in effect if rehearing en banc is granted, pending a decision by the en
+banc Court on the merits.
+
+**Rule 51. Stay Pending En Banc Review.**
+(a) **Stay or Modifying Order.** In accordance with 50 U.S.C. §§ 1803(a)(2)(B) and
+1803(f), the Court en banc may enter a stay or modifying order while en banc
+proceedings are pending.
+(b) **Statement of Position Regarding Continued Effect of Challenged Order.** A
+petition for rehearing en banc and any response to the petition each must include a
+statement of the party's position as to whether and to what extent the challenged order
+should remain in effect if rehearing en banc is granted, pending a decision by the en banc
+Court on the merits.
+
+**Rule 52. Supplemental Briefing.** Upon ordering hearing or rehearing en banc, the Court may
+require the submission of supplemental briefs.
+
+**Rule 53. Order Granting or Denying En Banc Review.**
+(a) **Entry of Order.** If a majority of the Judges votes within the time allotted for polling
+that a matter be considered en banc, the Presiding Judge must direct the Clerk to enter an
+order granting en banc review. If a majority of the Judges does not vote to grant hearing
+or rehearing en banc within the time allotted for polling, the Presiding Judge must direct
+the Clerk to enter an order denying en banc review.
+(b) **Other Issues.** The Presiding Judge may set the time of an en banc hearing and the
+time and scope of any supplemental hearing in the order granting en banc review. The
+
+-13-
+order may also address whether and to what extent the challenged order or ruling will be
+stayed or remain in effect pending a decision by the en banc Court on the merits.
+
+**Title IX. Appeals**
+
+**Rule 54. How Taken.** An appeal to the Court of Review, as permitted by law, may be taken by
+filing a petition for review with the Clerk.
+
+**Rule 55. When Taken.**
+(a) **Generally.** Except as the Act provides otherwise, a party must file a petition for
+review no later than 30 days after entry of the decision or order as to which review is
+sought.
+(b) **Effect of En Banc Proceedings.** Following the timely submission of a petition for
+rehearing en banc permitted under 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(2) or the grant of rehearing en
+banc on the Court's own initiative, the time otherwise allowed for taking an appeal runs
+from the date on which such petition is denied or dismissed or, if en banc review is
+granted, from the date of the decision of the en banc Court on the merits.
+
+**Rule 56. Stay Pending Appeal.** In accordance with 50 U.S.C. § 1803(f), the Court may enter a
+stay of an order or an order modifying an order while an appeal is pending.
+
+**Rule 57. Motion to Transmit the Record.** Together with the petition for review, the party
+filing the appeal must also file a motion to transmit the record to the Court of Review.
+
+**Rule 58. Transmitting the Record.** The Clerk must arrange to transmit the record under seal to
+the Court of Review as expeditiously as possible, no later than 30 days after an appeal has been
+filed. The Clerk must include a copy of the Court's statement of reasons for the decision or order
+appealed from as part of the record on appeal.
+
+**Rule 59. Oral Notification to the Court of Review.** The Clerk must orally notify the Presiding
+Judge of the Court of Review promptly upon the filing of a petition for review.
+
+**Title X. Administrative Provisions**
+
+**Rule 60. Duties of the Clerk.**
+(a) **General Duties.** The Clerk supports the work of the Court consistent with the
+directives of the Presiding Judge. The Presiding Judge may authorize the Clerk to
+delegate duties to staff in the Clerk's office or other designated individuals.
+(b) **Maintenance of Court Records.** The Clerk:
+(1) maintains the Court's docket and records – including records and recordings
+of proceedings before the Court – and the seal of the Court;
+
+-14-
+(2) accepts papers for filing;
+(3) keeps all records, pleadings, and files in a secure location, making those
+materials available only to persons authorized to have access to them; and
+(4) performs any other duties, consistent with the usual powers of a Clerk of
+Court, as the Presiding Judge may authorize.
+
+**Rule 61. Office Hours.** Although the Court is always open, the regular business hours of the
+Clerk's Office are 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. daily except Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays.
+Except when the government submits an application following an emergency authorization, or
+when the Court otherwise directs, any filing outside these hours will be recorded as received at
+the start of the next business day.
+
+**Rule 62. Release of Court Records.**
+(a) **Publication of Opinions.** The Judge who authored an order, opinion, or other
+decision may *sua sponte* or on motion by a party request that it be published. Upon such
+request, the Presiding Judge, after consulting with other Judges of the Court, may direct
+that an order, opinion or other decision be published. Before publication, the Court may,
+as appropriate, direct the Executive Branch to review the order, opinion, or other decision
+and redact it as necessary to ensure that properly classified information is appropriately
+protected pursuant to Executive Order 13526 (or its successor).
+(b) **Other Records.** Except when an order, opinion, or other decision is published or
+provided to a party upon issuance, the Clerk may not release it, or other related record,
+without a Court order. Such records must be released in conformance with the security
+measures referenced in Rule 3.
+(c) **Provision of Court Records to Congress.**
+(1) **By the Government.** The government may provide copies of Court orders,
+opinions, decisions, or other Court records, to Congress, pursuant to 50 U.S.C.
+§§ 1871(a)(5), 1871(c), or 1881f(b)(1)(D), or any other statutory requirement,
+without prior motion to and order by the Court. The government, however, must
+contemporaneously notify the Court in writing whenever it provides copies of
+Court records to Congress and must include in the notice a list of the documents
+provided.
+(2) **By the Court.** The Presiding Judge may provide copies of Court orders,
+opinions, decisions, or other Court records to Congress. Such disclosures must be
+made in conformance with the security measures referenced in Rule 3.
+
+**Rule 63. Practice Before Court.** An attorney may appear on a matter with the permission of
+the Judge before whom the matter is pending. An attorney who appears before the Court must be
+a licensed attorney and a member, in good standing, of the bar of a United States district or
+circuit court, except that an attorney who is employed by and represents the United States or any
+of its agencies in a matter before the Court may appear before the Court regardless of federal bar
+membership. All attorneys appearing before the Court must have the appropriate security
+clearance.
+
+-15-
diff --git a/data/FOIA/FISC_-_ranking-member-grassley-letter-131011/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_ranking-member-grassley-letter-131011/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9078daa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/FISC_-_ranking-member-grassley-letter-131011/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+ "title": "Letter from Reggie B. Walton, Presiding Judge, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, to Charles E. Grassley, Ranking Member, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (Oct. 11, 2013)",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2013-10-11",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-10-11",
+ "link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34197",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "c155a09ff19679694559f947d6e8bcafa40a4a9ab529a01decd3ce0719521629",
+ "pages": 32
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ODNI_-_2013-06-21_DNI_Ltr_to_Sen-_Feinstein/ODNI_-_2013-06-21_DNI_Ltr_to_Sen-_Feinstein.md b/data/FOIA/ODNI_-_2013-06-21_DNI_Ltr_to_Sen-_Feinstein/ODNI_-_2013-06-21_DNI_Ltr_to_Sen-_Feinstein.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..faf0892
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ODNI_-_2013-06-21_DNI_Ltr_to_Sen-_Feinstein/ODNI_-_2013-06-21_DNI_Ltr_to_Sen-_Feinstein.md
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+WASHINGTON, D.C. 20511
+
+JUN 21 2013
+
+The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
+Chairman
+Select Committee on Intelligence
+United States Senate
+Washington, D.C. 20510
+
+Dear Madam Chairman:
+
+Because of the charged rhetoric and heated controversy prompted by my response to a question Senator Ron Wyden asked me last March 12th during an unclassified threat assessment hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I am using this direct means of communication with you to set the record straight.
+
+Near the end of the hearing, Senator Wyden asked the following question:
+
+And this is for you. Director Clapper, again on the surveillance front. And I hope
+we can do this in just a yes or no answer because I know Senator Feinstein wants
+to move on.
+
+Last summer, the NSA director was at a conference, and he was asked a question
+about the NSA surveillance of Americans. He replied, and I quote here, "The
+story that we have millions or hundreds of millions of dossiers on people is
+completely false."
+
+The reason I'm asking the question is, having served on the committee now for a
+dozen years, I don't really know what a dossier is in this context. So what I
+wanted to see is if you could give me a yes or no answer to the question, does the
+NSA collect any type of data at all on millions or hundreds of millions of
+Americans?
+
+I have thought long and hard to re-create what went through my mind at the time. In light of Senator Wyden's reference to "dossiers" and faced with the challenge of trying to give an unclassified answer about our intelligence collection activities, many of which are classified, I simply didn't think of Section 215 of the Patriot Act. Instead, my answer addressed collection of the content of communications. I focused in particular on Section 702 of FISA, because we had just been through a year-long campaign to seek reauthorization of this provision and had had
+many classified discussions about it, including with Senator Wyden. That is why I added a comment about "inadvertent" collection of U.S. person information, because that is what happens under Section 702 even though it is targeted at foreigners.
+
+That said, I realized later that Senator Wyden was asking about Section 215 metadata collection, rather than content collection. Thus, my response was clearly erroneous--for which I apologize. While my staff acknowledged the error to Senator Wyden's staff soon after the hearing, I can now openly correct it because the existence of the metadata collection program has been declassified.
+
+Next month will mark for me 50 years of service to this country, virtually all of it in intelligence. In the last 20 of those years, I have appeared before Congressional hearings and briefings dozens of times, and have answered thousands of questions, either orally or in writing. I take all such appearances seriously and prepare rigorously for them. But mistakes will happen, and when I make one, I correct it.
+
+I am sending originals of this letter to the other leaders of the intelligence oversight committees. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me.
+
+Respectfully-
+Jim
+James R. Clapper
+
+2
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ODNI_-_2013-06-21_DNI_Ltr_to_Sen-_Feinstein/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ODNI_-_2013-06-21_DNI_Ltr_to_Sen-_Feinstein/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c636af7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ODNI_-_2013-06-21_DNI_Ltr_to_Sen-_Feinstein/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+{
+ "title": "ODNI - 2013-06-21 DNI Ltr to Sen. Feinstein",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "description": "",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "DNI",
+ "date_created": "2013-06-21",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Feinstein, Dianne",
+ "Wyden, Ron",
+ "Clapper, James R."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [],
+ "pdf_sha256": "764f017353bcbe15bc27deaaeee647d0cec552dd7c920f5f43465a031da1e224",
+ "pages": 2
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ODNI_-_CLEANED101-_Order_and_Supplemental_Order_6-22-09-sealed/ODNI_-_CLEANED101-_Order_and_Supplemental_Order_6-22-09-sealed.md b/data/FOIA/ODNI_-_CLEANED101-_Order_and_Supplemental_Order_6-22-09-sealed/ODNI_-_CLEANED101-_Order_and_Supplemental_Order_6-22-09-sealed.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3c69b95
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ODNI_-_CLEANED101-_Order_and_Supplemental_Order_6-22-09-sealed/ODNI_-_CLEANED101-_Order_and_Supplemental_Order_6-22-09-sealed.md
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+UNITED STATES
+All redacted information exempt
+under b(1) and b(3) except as
+otherwise noted.
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+DOCKET NO. PR/TT [REDACTED]
+
+IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
+BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN ORDER
+REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION OF TANGIBLE
+THINGS FROM
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+DOCKET NO. BR 09-06
+
+ORDER
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+On May 29, 2009, this Court issued a Supplemental Order in Docket No. PR/TT [REDACTED] that addressed several issues. Among other things, the May 29 Supplemental Order noted the government's recent disclosure that the unminimized results of authorized queries of PR/TT metadata collected by the National Security Agency (NSA) pursuant to the Court's order in Docket No. PR/TT [REDACTED] and prior FISC orders [REDACTED] had been shared with NSA analysts other than the limited number of analysts authorized to access such metadata. May 29 Supplemental Order at 1-2. Such sharing had not previously been disclosed to the Court. Id. at 2. The May 29 Supplemental Order also noted the government's disclosure of an inaccuracy regarding the number of PR/TT-derived reports described in paragraph 14 of the declaration attached as Exhibit A to the application in Docket No. PR/TT [REDACTED] Id. at 3.
+The Court directed the government to submit, within 20 days, a declaration correcting the inaccuracy regarding the number of reports and to provide a complete and "updated description of NSA's dissemination practices." May 29 Supplemental Order at 3-4. The Court further ordered that it would allow NSA, for a period of 20 days, to continue to share the unminimized results of authorized queries of the PR/TT metadata with NSA analysts other than the limited number of analysts authorized to access such metadata, but that such sharing was not to continue beyond the 20-day period unless the government first satisfied the Court, by written submission, that such sharing is necessary and appropriate on an ongoing basis. Id. at 4.
+On [REDACTED] the United States filed the Government's Response to the Court's Supplemental Order Entered On [REDACTED] in Docket No. PR/TT [REDACTED] Response"), and the supporting Declaration of [REDACTED] Chief, Special Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Oversight and Processing, Oversight and Compliance, Signals Intelligence Directorate, NSA ("[REDACTED] Declaration"). The government asserted in its
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Page 2
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN-
+filings that “the ability of PR/TT-cleared analysts to share unminimized query results with non-PR/TT-cleared analysts is critical to the success of the NSA's counterterrorism mission.” [REDACTED] Declaration at 8. The government explained that while “[l]ess than ten percent of NSA's analysts responsible for tracking and reporting foreign intelligence on counterterrorism matters generally may query the PR/TT metadata,” NSA's “collective expertise” in the targeted foreign powers “resides in more than [REDACTED] intelligence analysts” assigned not only to “NSA's Counterterrorism Analytic Enterprise,” but also to “other NSA organizations and product lines.” Id. at 7-8. Further, the government asserted that “[e]ach of the NSA's [REDACTED] product lines has some role in protecting the homeland from terrorists.” Id, at 8. Accordingly, the government has asked the Court to allow NSA to continue to share the results of authorized queries of the PR/TT metadata with analysts other than the limited number who are permitted to perform queries. See [REDACTED] Response at 9.
+On June 18, 2009, the United States submitted the Government's Response to the Court's Supplemental Order Entered on May 29, 2009, in Docket No. PR/TT [REDACTED] Requesting a Corrective Declaration (“[REDACTED] Response”), and the supporting Declaration of [REDACTED] Chief, Special Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Oversight and Processing, Oversight and Compliance, Signals Intelligence Directorate, NSA (“[REDACTED] Declaration”). In those filings, the government explained that the [REDACTED] reports described in the declaration filed in support of the government's application in Docket No. PR/TT [REDACTED] included only reports prepared by PR/TT-cleared analysts; however, that description did not include one additional report that was prepared by a non-PR/TT analyst. [REDACTED] Declaration at 2-3.
+Accordingly, the government asserted that “[REDACTED] reports were produced and disseminated from inception of the PR/TT to [REDACTED]” Id. at 3.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Page 3
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Unfortunately, the government's responses to the Court's May 29 Supplemental Order also raise two additional compliance issues, one which implicates not only the Court's orders authorizing the collection of PR/TT metadata, but also its orders in the related bulk business records collection, which was last renewed by the Court in Docket No. BR 09-06. First, the government disclosed in its [REDACTED] filings in Docket No. PR/TT [REDACTED] that NSA has generally failed to adhere to the special dissemination restrictions originally proposed by the government, repeatedly relied upon by the Court in authorizing the collection of the PR/TT metadata, and incorporated into the Court's orders [REDACTED] as binding on NSA. See [REDACTED] Response at 2. The Court's current order, which is in pertinent part substantively identical to prior orders, provides that:
+> The NSA shall treat information derived from queries of the metadata in accordance with United States Signals Intelligence Directive 18 (USSID 18) (Attachment D to the application in docket number PR/TT [REDACTED]), and shall apply USSID 18 to minimize information concerning U.S. persons obtained from the pen registers and trap and trace [REDACTED] Additionally, prior to disseminating any U.S. person information outside of the NSA, the Chief of Information Sharing Services in NSA's Signals Intelligence Directorate shall determine that the information is related to counterterrorism information and is necessary to understand the counterterrorism information or to assess its importance.
+Docket No. PR/TT No. [REDACTED] Primary Order at 12. In its [REDACTED] submissions, however, the government disclosed that “the NSA has generally permitted the dissemination of U.S. person identities derived from the metadata acquired pursuant to the Court's orders in this matter... in accordance with [USSID 18] rather than specifically requiring that the narrower dissemination
+---
+¹ Before September [REDACTED] the Court's orders designated the "Chief of Customer Response" in the NSA's Signals Intelligence Directorate as the official responsible for determining whether information proposed for dissemination had the necessary connection to counterterrorism. See, e.g., Docket No. PR/TT [REDACTED] Order at 16; Docket No. PR/TT [REDACTED] at 10.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Page 4
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+provision set forth in the Court's orders in this matter be strictly adhered to.”[REDACTED] Response at 2; see also [REDACTED] Declaration at 3-5.
+The Court understands the government's disclosure to mean that NSA likely has disseminated U.S. person information derived from the PR/TT metadata outside NSA without a prior determination by the NSA official designated in the Court's orders that the information is related to counterterrorism information and is necessary to understand the counterterrorism information or to assess its importance. See [REDACTED] Response at 2. According to the government, on [REDACTED] the Department of Justice instructed NSA only to disseminate U.S. person information derived from the PR/TT metadata outside NSA after the designated official has made the required determination. Id. The government further stated that it is investigating the matter. Id. at 2-3.
+Second, the government referred in its June 18 submissions to a dissemination-related problem that was first brought to the Court's attention in a “preliminary notice of compliance incident filed with the Court on June 16, 2009.” June 18 [REDACTED] Declaration at 3 n.1. In the June 16 notice – and in a separate notice filed contemporaneously in Docket No. BR 09-06 – the government informed the Court that the unminimized results of some queries of metadata collected in both matters had been “uploaded [by NSA] into a database to which other intelligence agencies... had access.” Preliminary Notice of Compliance Incident filed [REDACTED] in Docket No. PR/TT [REDACTED] at 2; Preliminary Notice of Compliance Incident filed June 16, 2009, in Docket No. BR 09-06 at 2. Providing such access, the government explained, may have resulted in the dissemination of U.S. person information in violation of USSID 18 and the more restrictive restrictions on dissemination proposed by the government and adopted by the Court in its current and prior orders in both of the above-captioned matters. Preliminary Notice of
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Page 5
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN-
+Compliance Incident filed [REDACTED] in Docket No. PR/TT [REDACTED] at 2; Preliminary Notice of Compliance Incident filed June 16, 2009, in Docket No. BR 09-06 at 2. The government explained that, in the PR/TT matter, any such disseminations would have been in addition to the [REDACTED] reports that are described by the government in the [REDACTED] submissions. Declaration at 3 n.1. The government asserts that NSA terminated access by outside agencies to the database at issue on June 12, 2009, and that it is still investigating the matter. Preliminary Notice of Compliance Incident filed June 16, 2009, in Docket No. BR 09-06 at 2; Preliminary. Notice of Compliance Incident filed [REDACTED] in Docket No. PR/TT [REDACTED] at 2.
+Based upon the information provided by the government in its recent submissions, the Court has concluded that NSA's sharing of authorized queries of the PR/TT metadata with analysts other than the limited number authorized to access the metadata is not the principal concern presented. Indeed, according to the government, only one of the [REDACTED] reports containing PR/TT metadata and disseminated outside NSA was prepared by a non-cleared analyst. The Court is gravely concerned, however, that NSA analysts, cleared and otherwise, have generally not adhered to the dissemination restrictions proposed by the government, repeatedly relied upon by the Court in authorizing the collection of the PR/TT metadata, and incorporated into the Court's orders in this matter [REDACTED] as binding on NSA. Given the apparent widespread disregard of these restrictions, it seems clear that NSA's Office of General Counsel has failed to satisfy its obligation to ensure that all analysts with access to information derived from the PR/TT metadata “receive appropriate training and guidance regarding the querying standard set out in paragraph c. above, as well as other procedures and restrictions regarding the retrieval, storage, and dissemination of such information.” Docket No. PR/TT [REDACTED] Order at 11 (emphasis added). The Court is also seriously concerned regarding NSA's placement of
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Page 6
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+unminimized metadata from both the above-captioned matters into databases accessible by outside agencies, which, as the government has acknowledged, violates not only the Court's orders, but also NSA's minimization and dissemination procedures set forth in USSID 18.
+Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that:
+1. With regard to Docket No. PR/TT [REDACTED] NSA may share the results of authorized queries of the PR/TT metadata with NSA analysts other than the limited number of analysts who are authorized to access the metadata, provided, however, that any NSA analyst receiving such query results in any form has first received appropriate and adequate training and guidance regarding all rules and restrictions governing the use, storage, and dissemination of such information;
+2. With regard to Docket Nos. PR/TT [REDACTED] and BR 09-06, the government shall, by 5:00 p.m. each Friday, commencing on July 3, 2009, file with the Court a report listing each instance during the seven-day period ending the previous Friday in which NSA has shared, in any form, information obtained or derived from the PR/TT or BR metadata collections with anyone outside NSA. For each such instance, the government shall specify the date on which the information was shared, the recipient of the information, and the form in which the information was communicated (e.g., written report, email, oral communication, etc.). For each such instance in which U.S. person information has been shared, the Chief of Information Sharing of NSA's Signals Intelligence Directorate shall certify that such official determined, prior to dissemination, the information to be related to counterterrorism information and necessary to understand the counterterrorism information or to assess its importance;
+3. With regard to Docket Nos. PR/TT [REDACTED] and BR 09-06, the government shall
+---
+² If Friday is a holiday, the report shall be submitted on the next business day.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Page 7
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+include, in its submissions regarding the results of the end-to-end reviews, a full explanation of why the government has permitted the dissemination outside NSA of U.S. person information without regard to whether such dissemination complied with the clear and acknowledged requirements for sharing U.S. person information derived from the metadata collected pursuant to the Court's orders.
+
+IT IS SO ORDERED this 22nd day of June, 2009.
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+b(6)
+Deputy Clerk
+FISC, certify that this document,
+is a true and correct copy of
+the original. [REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+Page 8
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+DOCKET NO. PR/TT [REDACTED]
+
+SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER
+On [REDACTED] in the above-captioned docket, the Court ordered the National Security Agency (“NSA”) to cease using the “master list of [REDACTED] described in the government's Preliminary Notice of Compliance Incident filed on [REDACTED] within 20 days unless the government showed cause, in writing, why it is necessary and appropriate for the NSA to continue to use the list. [REDACTED] Supplemental Order at 4. In addition, the Court ordered the government to explain, in writing, why any ongoing use of PR/TT metadata collected under the authority of orders in this matter (“PR/TT metadata”) in connection with deleting information associated with [REDACTED] is consistent with this Court's orders and otherwise appropriate. Id.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+The Court has reviewed the Government's Response to the Court's Supplemental Order, filed on [REDACTED]'), and the Declaration of [REDACTED] Chief, Special Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Oversight and Processing, Oversight and Compliance, Signals Intelligence Directorate, The National Security Agency, filed on the same date (“[REDACTED] Declaration”).
+As the government has acknowledged, its practices with regard to the creation and use of defeat lists for [REDACTED] selectors deviated, at least in part, from the procedures governing the handling of PR/TT metadata. It is important to note that the procedures at issue were devised by the government and incorporated into the Court's orders as binding upon the NSA at the government's suggestion. Had the government initially proposed procedures permitting defeat list practices such as those described in the [REDACTED] Response and the [REDACTED] Declaration, the Court likely would have found them reasonable and would have incorporated such procedures in its orders.
+In any event, the Court finds that the continuation of the defeat list practices is reasonable and appropriate. Therefore, subject to further consideration following the submission of the government's report on its end-to-end review, it is
+**HEREBY ORDERED that the restrictions imposed by the Court in paragraph 3 of its [REDACTED] Supplemental Order, are hereby lifted and, as the government requests, NSA is authorized to:**
+* Continue to use the existing “master defeat list” for metadata reduction and management in its [REDACTED] contact-chaining repositories, including those repositories containing
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+-2-
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+* PR/TT metadata and those containing non-PR/TT metadata;
+* Add to the “master defeat list” [REDACTED] identifiers discovered by NSA technical personnel through chain summary building and management processes, as described in paragraphs 6-8 of the [REDACTED] Declaration; and
+* Add to the “master defeat list” [REDACTED] identifiers discovered by NSA analysts reviewing the results of authorized queries of the PR/TT metadata.
+This authorization was orally conveyed to the government on [REDACTED]
+IT IS SO ORDERED this [REDACTED]
+
+REGGIE B. WALTON
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+b(6)
+FISC, certify that this document
+is a true and correct copy of
+the original [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+-3-
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ODNI_-_CLEANED101-_Order_and_Supplemental_Order_6-22-09-sealed/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ODNI_-_CLEANED101-_Order_and_Supplemental_Order_6-22-09-sealed/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5e01338
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ODNI_-_CLEANED101-_Order_and_Supplemental_Order_6-22-09-sealed/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+{
+ "title": "FISC Order BR 09-06 ",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "Order of the FISC requiring the government to report on a weekly basis regarding a compliance incident relating to NSA dissemination of query results. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "2009-06-22",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Walton, Reggie B."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2014-08-12",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/docket-no-br-09-06-order",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "pdf_sha256": "fdd96cc564a0ea8c91458775a2335ff6f5e9dff14978dece244811eea287ae54",
+ "pages": 11
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ODNI_-_CLEANEDPRTT_2/ODNI_-_CLEANEDPRTT_2.md b/data/FOIA/ODNI_-_CLEANEDPRTT_2/ODNI_-_CLEANEDPRTT_2.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c050010
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ODNI_-_CLEANEDPRTT_2/ODNI_-_CLEANEDPRTT_2.md
@@ -0,0 +1,2160 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+UNITED STATES
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
+WASHINGTON, D.C.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Docket Number: PR/TT [REDACTED]
+
+MEMORANDUM OPINION
+
+This matter is before the Court upon the government's application to re-initiate in
+expanded form a pen register/trap and trace (PR/TT) authorization for the National Security
+Agency (NSA) to engage in bulk acquisition of metadata¹ about Internet communications. The
+government's application also seeks Court authorization to query and use information previously
+obtained by NSA, regardless of whether the information was authorized to be acquired under
+
+---
+¹ When used in reference to a communication, "metadata" is information “about the
+communication, not the actual communication itself," including "numbers dialed, the length of a
+call, internet protocol addresses, e-mail addresses, and similar information concerning the
+delivery of the communication rather than the message between two parties." ² Wayne R.
+LaFave, Jerold H. Israel, Nancy J. King & Orin S. Kerr, Criminal Procedure § 4.6(b) at 476 (3d
+ed. 2007).
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+prior bulk PR/TT orders of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC or "Court") or
+exceeded the scope of previously authorized acquisition. For the reasons explained herein, the
+government's application will be granted in part and denied in part.
+I.
+History of Bulk PR/TT Acquisitions Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
+From [REDACTED], NSA was authorized, under a series of FISC
+orders under the PR/TT provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50
+U.S.C. §§ 1841-1846, to engage in the bulk acquisition of specified categories of metadata about
+Internet communications. Although the specific terms of authorization under those orders varied
+over time, there were important constants. Notably, each order limited the authorized acquisition
+to [REDACTED] categories of metadata.² As detailed herein, the government acknowledges that
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+2
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+NSA exceeded the scope of authorized acquisition continuously during the more than [REDACTED] years
+of acquisition under these orders.
+
+In addition, each order authorized NSA analysts to access the acquired metadata only
+through queries based on validated "seed" accounts, i.e., Internet accounts for which there was a
+reasonable articulable suspicion ("RAS") that they were associated with a targeted international
+terrorist group; for accounts used by U.S. persons, RAS could not be based solely on activities
+protected by the First Amendment.3 The results of such queries provided analysts with
+information about the [REDACTED] of contacts and usage for a seed account, as reflected in the
+collected metadata, which in turn could help analysts identify previously unknown accounts or
+persons affiliated with a targeted terrorist group. See [REDACTED] Opinion at 41-45. Finally,
+each bulk PR/TT order included a requirement that NSA could disseminate U.S. person
+information to other agencies only upon a determination by a designated NSA official that it is
+related to counterterrorism information and is necessary to understand the counterterrorism
+information or to assess its importance.4
+
+2( continued)
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+3
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+The current application relies on this prior framework, but also seeks to expand
+authorization in ways that test the limits of what the applicable FISA provisions will bear. It also
+raises issues that are closely related to serious compliance problems that have characterized the
+government's implementation of prior FISC orders. It is therefore helpful at the outset to
+summarize both the underlying rationale of the prior authorizations and the government's
+frequent failures to comply with their terms.
+A. Initial Approval
+The first application for a bulk PR/TT authorization was granted by the Honorable
+Colleen Kollar-Kotelly in [REDACTED] Judge Kollar-Kotelly authorized PR/TT surveillance [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+See [REDACTED] Opinion at 72-80.5 When known, the particular customers [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] were identified in the Court's order pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1842(d)(2)(A)(ii). See [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Opinion at 22-23.
+The [REDACTED] Opinion authorized the acquisition of [REDACTED] categories of metadata:
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+4
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+The government proposed to collect these categories of metadata from [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+5
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Judge Kollar-Kotelly found that the proposed collection of information within Categories
+[REDACTED] comported with the applicable statutory definitions of "pen register" and "trap
+and trace device,” id. at 13-17, and with the Fourth Amendment, id. at 58-61.[REDACTED]
+The [REDACTED] Opinion stated the Court's understanding that the application sought
+authority to obtain only [REDACTED] categories of information and specified that it authorized “only
+the collection of information in Categories [REDACTED] Id. at 11 (emphasis in
+original). Each subsequent bulk PR/TT order adopted as its rationale the analysis and
+conclusions set out in the [REDACTED] Opinion.
+8
+7 See 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3), (4). These definitions are more fully discussed at pages 25-
+26, infra.
+8 See e.g., Docket No. PR/TT [REDACTED] Primary Order issued on [REDACTED] at 5; Docket
+(continued...)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+6
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+It was anticipated that the authorized PR/TT surveillance would "encompass [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+Opinion at 39-40 (internal quotations omitted).
+Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2), the initial application included a certification that the
+information likely to be obtained was relevant to an ongoing investigation to protect against
+international terrorism, which was not being conducted solely upon the basis of activities
+protected by the First Amendment. Docket No. PR/TT [REDACTED] Application filed [REDACTED]
+---
+[REDACTED]
+⁹ Bulk PR/TT surveillance was first approved in support of investigations of [REDACTED] and the collected
+metadata could only be accessed through queries based on seed accounts for which there was
+RAS that the account was associated with [REDACTED] July
+Opinion at 72, 83. The range of terrorist organizations for which a RAS determination
+could support querying the metadata was [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+The present description of these Foreign Powers is contained in
+the Declaration of Michael E. Leiter, Director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC),
+filed in docket number [REDACTED] which is incorporated by reference in the current application. See
+Docket No. PR/TT [REDACTED] Application filed [REDACTED] at 2.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+7
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+[REDACTED] Application”), at 26.¹⁰ Judge Kollar-Kotelly found that the sweeping and non-
+targeted scope of the proposed acquisition was consistent with this certification of relevance.
+[REDACTED] Opinion at 49. In making this finding, the Court relied on several factors,
+including NSA’s efforts “to build a meta data archive that will be, in relative terms, richly
+populated with [REDACTED] communications,” at least as compared with the entire universe
+of Internet communications, [REDACTED] Opinion at 47,¹¹ and the presence of “safeguards”
+proposed by the government “to ensure that the information collected will not be used for
+unrelated purposes,” *id.* at 27, thereby protecting “the continued validity of the certification of
+relevance,” *id.* at 70. These safeguards importantly included both the limitation that NSA
+
+¹⁰ The government argued that “FISA prohibits the Court from engaging in any
+substantive review of this certification,” and that “the Court’s exclusive function” was “to verify
+that it contains the words required” by the statute. [REDACTED] Opinion at 26. The Court did
+not find such arguments persuasive. *Id.* However, because the government had in fact provided
+a detailed explanation of the basis for the certification, the Court did not “decide whether it
+would be obliged to accept the applicant’s certification without any explanation of its basis” and
+instead “assume[d] for purposes of this case that it may and should consider the basis” of the
+certification of relevance. *Id.* at 27-28.
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+8
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+analysts could access the bulk metadata only on the basis of RAS-approved queries, id. at 42-43,
+56-58, and the rule governing dissemination of U.S. person information outside of NSA, id. at
+85.
+
+However, the finding of relevance most crucially depended on the conclusion that "the
+proposed bulk collection . . . is necessary for NSA to employ . . . analytic tools [that] are likely to
+generate useful investigative leads for ongoing efforts by the [Federal Bureau of Investigation
+(FBI)] (and other agencies) to identify and track [REDACTED] Id. at 48.
+Consequently, "the collection of both a huge volume and high percentage of unrelated
+communications . . . is necessary to identify the much smaller number of [REDACTED]
+such that the entire mass of collected metadata is relevant to investigating [REDACTED]
+affiliated persons. Id. at 48-49; see also id. at 53-54 (relying on government's
+explanation why bulk collection is "necessary to identify and monitor [REDACTED] operatives
+whose Internet communications would otherwise go undetected in the huge streams of [REDACTED]
+communications").
+
+B. First Disclosure of Overcollection
+
+During the initial period of authorization, the government disclosed that NSA's
+acquisitions had exceeded the scope of what the government had requested and the FISC had
+approved. Insofar as it is instructive regarding the separate form of overcollection that has led
+directly to the current application, this prior episode is summarized here.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+9
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+On [REDACTED] the government provided written notice to the FISC that it had
+exceeded the scope of authorized collection [REDACTED] Docket No. PR/TT [REDACTED] Notice
+of Compliance Incidents, filed on [REDACTED]. On the same day, Judge Kollar-Kotelly ordered
+the government to provide additional information about this non-compliance, including a "full
+description of the scope, nature, and circumstances of any unauthorized collection" [REDACTED]
+Docket No. PR/TT [REDACTED] Order Regarding Disclosed Violations Involving [REDACTED]
+issued on [REDACTED] Order"), at 6. The government made an
+interim response to the [REDACTED] Order in the form of a Declaration of [REDACTED]
+filed in Docket No. PR/TT [REDACTED] on [REDACTED]
+Decl."), and a fuller response in the form of a Declaration of [REDACTED]
+filed in Docket No. PR/TT [REDACTED] on [REDACTED]
+Decl.").
+As described by the government, the unauthorized collection resulted from failures to
+[REDACTED] in the manner required. [REDACTED] Decl. at 8-11.12 By the
+government's account, the lack of required [REDACTED] did not result from technical difficulty or
+malfunction, but rather from a failure of "those NSA officials who understood in detail the
+requirements of the [REDACTED] Opinion] . . . to communicate those requirements effectively
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+10
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+to the [REDACTED] who were directly responsible" for implementation.
+Id. at 5. The government assessed the violations to have been caused by "poor management, lack
+of involvement by compliance officials, and lack of internal verification procedures - not by bad
+faith." Id. at 7.
+The Court had specifically directed the government to explain whether this unauthorized
+collection involved the acquisition of information other than the approved Categories [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Order at 7. In response, the Deputy Secretary of Defense stated that the
+"Director of NSA has informed me that at no time did NSA collect any category of information
+. . . other than the [REDACTED] categories of meta data" approved in the [REDACTED] Opinion, but also
+noted that the NSA's Inspector General had not completed his assessment of this issue. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Decl. at 21.13 As discussed below, this assurance turned out to be untrue.
+Regarding the information obtained through unauthorized collection, the Court ordered
+the government to describe whether it "has been, or can be, segregated from information that
+NSA was authorized to collect," "how the government proposes to dispose of" it, and "how the
+government proposes to ensure that [it] is not included . . . in applications presented to this
+Court." [REDACTED] Order at 7-8. In response, the government stated that, while it was not
+13 At a hearing on [REDACTED] Judge Kollar-Kotelly referred to this portion of the
+Deputy Secretary's declaration and asked: "[Clan we conclude that there wasn't content here?"
+[REDACTED] of NSA, replied: "There is not the physical
+possibility of our having [REDACTED]
+Docket Nos. [REDACTED] Transcript of Hearing Conducted [REDACTED] at 16-17.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+11
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+feasible to segregate authorized collection from unauthorized collection on an item-by-item
+basis, NSA had eliminated access to the database that contained the entire set of metadata, and
+repopulated the databases used by analysts to run queries so that they only contained information
+[REDACTED] that had not been involved in the unauthorized collection.
+[REDACTED] Decl. at 25-26. The government asserted that, after taking these actions, NSA was
+“making queries against a database that contain[ed] only meta data that NSA was authorized to
+collect.” Id. at 26. As to information disseminated outside of NSA, the government reported that
+it had reviewed disseminated NSA reports and concluded that just one report was potentially
+based on improperly collected information. [REDACTED] Decl. at 9-10. NSA cancelled
+this report and confirmed that the recipient agencies had purged it from their records. Id. at 11.
+The initial bulk PR/TT authorization granted by the [REDACTED] Opinion was set to
+expire on [REDACTED] shortly after the government had disclosed this unauthorized
+collection. On that date, Judge Kollar-Kotelly granted an application for continued bulk PR/TT
+acquisition; however, in that application, the government only requested authorization for
+acquisition [REDACTED] that had not been subject to the [REDACTED] See
+Docket No. PR/TT [REDACTED] Application filed on [REDACTED] Application”), at 9-
+15; Primary Order issued on [REDACTED] at 2-5.14 The government represented that the PR/TT
+[REDACTED] had “fully complied with the orders of the Court.”
+14
+Subsequent applications and orders followed the same approach. See, e.g., Docket No.
+PR/TT [REDACTED] Application filed on [REDACTED] at 9-13; Primary Order issued on [REDACTED] at
+2-5.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+12
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Declaration of [REDACTED] at 2-3 (Exhibit C to [REDACTED] Application). The government
+also described in that application new oversight mechanisms to ensure against future
+overcollection. [REDACTED] Application at 8-9. These included a requirement that, "at least
+twice during the 90-day authorized period of surveillance," NSA's Office of General Counsel
+(NSA OGC) "will conduct random spot checks [REDACTED] to ensure that [REDACTED]
+functioning as authorized by the Court. Such spot checks will require an examination of a
+sample of data." Id. at 9. The Court adopted this requirement in its orders granting the
+application, as well as in subsequent orders for bulk PR/TT surveillance. 15
+C. Overcollection Disclosed in [REDACTED]
+In December [REDACTED] the government reported to the FISC a separate case of unauthorized
+collection, which it attributed to a typographical error in how a prior application and resulting
+orders had described communications [REDACTED] See Docket No.
+PR/TT [REDACTED] Verified Motion for an Amended Order filed on [REDACTED] at 4-6. The
+government sought a _nunc pro tunc_ correction of the typographical error in the prior orders,
+which would have effectively approved two months of unauthorized collection. _Id._ at 7. The
+government represented that, with regard to prior collection [REDACTED] it could not
+
+15 See
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+13
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+"accurately segregate" information that fell within the scope of the prior orders from those that
+did not. Id.
+The FISC approved prospective collection [REDACTED] on the terms requested by the
+government when it granted a renewal application [REDACTED] See Docket No. PR/TT
+[REDACTED] Primary Order issued on [REDACTED] at 5-6. However, the FISC withheld nunc pro
+tunc relief for the previously collected information, and NSA removed from its systems all data
+collected [REDACTED] under the prior order. See Docket [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] at 18.
+D. Non-Compliance Disclosed
+The next relevant compliance problems surfaced in [REDACTED] and involved three general
+subjects: (1) accessing of metadata; (2) disclosure of query results and information derived
+therefrom; and (3) overcollection. These compliance disclosures generally coincided with
+revelations about similar problems under a separate line of FISC orders providing for NSA's
+bulk acquisition of metadata for telephone communications pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1861.16
+1. Accessing Metadata
+On January [REDACTED] the government disclosed that NSA had regularly accessed the bulk
+telephone metadata using a form of automated querying based on telephone numbers that had not
+been approved under the RAS standard. See Docket No. BR 08-13, Order Regarding
+
+16 The Section 1861 orders, like the bulk PR/TT orders, permit NSA analysts to access
+the bulk telephone metadata only through queries based on RAS-approved telephone numbers.
+See, e.g., Docket No. [REDACTED] , at 7-10.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+14
+TOP SECRET//[REDACTED]//ORCON,NOFORN
+Preliminary Notice of Compliance Incident Dated [REDACTED] issued on [REDACTED] at 2-3.
+The Honorable Reggie B. Walton of this Court ordered the government to verify that access to
+the bulk PR/TT metadata complied with comparable restrictions, noting "the similarity between
+the querying practices and requirements employed" in both contexts. See Docket No. PR/TT [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Order issued on [REDACTED] at 1.
+In response, the government reported that it had identified, and discontinued, a non-
+automated querying practice for PR/TT metadata that it had concluded was non-compliant with
+the required RAS approval process. See Docket No. PR/TT [REDACTED] Government's Response to
+the Court's Order Dated [REDACTED] filed on [REDACTED] at 2-6 ([REDACTED]
+Response").¹⁷ The government's [REDACTED] Response also described additional oversight and
+
+¹⁷ This practice involved an analyst running a query using as a seed "a U.S.-based e-mail
+account" that had been in direct contact with a properly validated seed account, but had not itself
+been properly validated under the RAS approval process. [REDACTED] Response at 2-3. When
+he granted renewed authorization for bulk PR/TT surveillance on [REDACTED] , Judge Walton
+ordered the government not to resume this practice without prior Court approval. See Docket
+No. PR/TT [REDACTED] Primary Order issued [REDACTED] at 10.
+
+In its response, the government also described an automated means of querying, which it
+regarded as consistent with the applicable PR/TT orders. This form of querying involved the
+determination that an e-mail address satisfied the RAS standard, but for the lack of a connection
+to one of the Foreign Powers (e.g, there were sufficient indicia that the user of the e-mail address
+was involved in terrorist activities, but the user's affiliation with a particular group was
+unknown). See Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director of NSA, at 8 (attached at
+Tab 1 to [REDACTED] Response) ([REDACTED] Alexander Decl."). In the event that such an
+e-mail address was in contact with a RAS-approved seed account on an NSA “Alert List," that e-
+mail address would itself be used as a seed for automatic querying, on the theory that the
+requisite nexus to one of the Foreign Powers had been established. Id. at 8-9. The government
+later reported that it had discontinued this practice, see Docket No. PR/TT [REDACTED] NSA 90-Day
+(continued...)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+15
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+compliance measures being taken with regard to the bulk PR/TT program, see
+Response at 6-7, which Judge Walton adopted as requirements in his order authorizing continued
+bulk PR/TT surveillance on [REDACTED] See Docket No. PR/TT [REDACTED] Primary Order issued
+[REDACTED] at 13-14. Finally, the government's response noted the commencement by NSA
+of a "complete ongoing end-to-end system engineering and process review (technical and
+operational) of NSA's handling of PR/TT metadata to ensure that the material is handled in strict
+compliance with the terms of the PR/TT Orders and the NSA's descriptions to the Court."[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Alexander Decl. at 16.18
+***
+17(...continued)
+Report filed [REDACTED] at 8 (Exhibit B to Application), and the Court ordered the
+government not to resume it without prior Court approval. See Docket No. PR/TT
+Primary Order issued [REDACTED] at 10.
+18 On [REDACTED] the government provided written notice of a separate form of
+unauthorized access relating to the use by NSA technical personnel of bulk PR/TT metadata to
+identify [REDACTED] which they then employed for “metadata reduction and management activities” in
+other data repositories. See Docket No. PR/TT [REDACTED] Preliminary Notice of Compliance
+Incident filed on [REDACTED] at 2-3. The government assessed this practice to be inconsistent
+with restrictions on accessing and using bulk PR/TT metadata. Id. at 3. On [REDACTED] Judge
+Walton issued a supplemental order which, inter alia, directed the government to discontinue
+such use or show cause why continued use was necessary and appropriate. See Docket No.
+PR/TT [REDACTED] Supplemental Order issued on [REDACTED] Order”), at 4. In
+response, the government described the deleterious effects that would likely result from
+discontinuing the use of [REDACTED] derived from the bulk PR/TT metadata. See
+Docket No. PR/TT [REDACTED] Declaration of [REDACTED] NSA, filed on [REDACTED] at 1-3, 6
+Decl.”). On [REDACTED] Judge Walton approved the continuation of
+NSA's use of [REDACTED] Docket No. PR/TT [REDACTED] Supplemental Order issued on
+[REDACTED] at 2-3. In addition, with regard to a then-recent misstatement by the government
+concerning when NSA had terminated automatic querying of the bulk PR/TT metadata, see [REDACTED]
+(continued...)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+16
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+2. Disclosure of Query Results and Information Derived Therefrom
+Also in the [REDACTED] Order, the Court noted recent disclosure of the extent to which
+NSA analysts who were not authorized to access the PR/TT metadata directly nonetheless
+received unminimized query results. [REDACTED] Order at 2. The Court permitted the
+continuance of this practice for a 20-day period, but provided that such sharing shall not continue
+thereafter "unless the government has satisfied the Court, by written submission, that [it] is
+necessary and appropriate." _Id._ at 4. In response, the government stated that “NSA's collective
+expertise in [the targeted] Foreign Powers resides in more than one thousand intelligence
+analysts,” less than ten percent of whom were authorized to query the PR/TT metadata. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Declaration at 7-8. Therefore, the government posited that sharing “unminimized
+query results with non-PR/TT-cleared analysts is critical to the success of NSA's
+counterterrorism mission.” _Id._ at 8. Judge Walton authorized the continued sharing of such
+information within NSA, subject to the training requirement discussed at pages 18-19, _infra._
+_See_ Docket Nos. PR/TT [REDACTED] & BR 09-06, Order issued on [REDACTED]
+Order”), at 7.
+On [REDACTED] the government submitted a notice of non-compliance regarding
+dissemination of information outside of NSA that resulted from NSA's placing of query results
+into a database accessible by other agencies’ personnel without the determination, required for
+^(18)(...continued)
+[REDACTED] Order at 2, the Court ordered NSA not to “resume automated querying of the PR/TT
+metadata without the prior approval of the Court.” _Id._ at 3.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+17
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+any U.S. person information, that it related to counterterrorism information and was necessary to
+understand the counterterrorism information or assess its importance. See Docket No. PR/TT
+[REDACTED] Preliminary Notice of Compliance Incident filed on [REDACTED] Between [REDACTED]
+and [REDACTED] approximately 47 analysts from the FBI, the Central Intelligence Agency
+(CIA), and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) queried this database in the course of
+their responsibilities and accessed unminimized U.S. person information. See Docket No.
+PR/TT [REDACTED] Report of the United States filed on [REDACTED] Report"),
+Exhibit A, Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, NSA, at 11-13. NSA
+terminated access to this database for other agencies' personnel by [REDACTED] Id. at 12.
+Based on its end-to-end review, NSA concluded that NSA personnel "failed to make the
+connection between continued use of the database and the new dissemination procedures
+required by the Court's Orders." Id. at 15.
+The government further disclosed that, apart from this shared database, NSA analysts
+made it a general practice to disseminate to other agencies NSA intelligence reports containing
+U.S. person information extracted from the PR/TT metadata without obtaining the required
+determination. See Docket No. PR/TT [REDACTED] Government's Response to the Court's
+Supplemental Order Entered on [REDACTED] filed on [REDACTED] at 2. The large majority
+of disseminated reports had been written by analysts cleared to directly query the PR/TT
+metadata. See Docket No. PR/TT [REDACTED] Declaration of [REDACTED] NSA, filed on [REDACTED]
+at 2. In response to these disclosures, Judge Walton ordered that, prior to receiving query
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+18
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+results, any NSA analyst must first have received “appropriate and adequate training and
+guidance regarding all rules and restrictions governing the use, storage, and dissemination of
+such information.” [REDACTED] Order at 7. He also required the government to submit weekly
+reports on dissemination, including a certification that the required determination had been made
+for any dissemination of U.S. person information, and to include “in its submissions regarding
+the results of the end-to-end review[] a full explanation” of why this dissemination rule had been
+disregarded. Id. at 7-8.
+
+Subsequently, in response to the latter requirement, the government merely stated:
+“Although NSA now understands the fact that only a limited set of individuals were authorized
+to approve these releases under the Court’s authorization, it seemed appropriate at the time” to
+delegate approval authority to others. [REDACTED] Report, Exhibit A, at 17. The government’s
+explanation speaks only to the identity of the approving official, but a substantive determination
+regarding the counterterrorism nature of the information and the necessity of including U.S.
+person information was also required under the Court’s orders. See page 3, supra. It appears
+that, for the period preceding the adoption of the weekly reporting requirement, there is no record
+of the required determination being made by any NSA official for any dissemination. As far as
+can be ascertained, the requirement was simply ignored. See [REDACTED] Report, Exhibit A, at
+18-19.
+
+NSA completed its “end-to-end review” of the PR/TT metadata program on [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]. See [REDACTED] Report, Exhibit B. On [REDACTED] Judge Walton granted an
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+19
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+application for continued bulk PR/TT authorization. In that application, the government
+represented that “all the technologies used by NSA to implement the authorizations granted
+by docket number PR/TT [REDACTED] and previous docket numbers only collect, or collected,
+authorized metadata." Docket No. PR/TT [REDACTED] Application filed on [REDACTED]
+Application"), at 11 n.6 (emphasis in original).
+3. **Overcollection**
+Notwithstanding this and many similar prior representations, there in fact had been
+systemic overcollection since [REDACTED] On [REDACTED] the government provided written
+notice of yet another form of substantial non-compliance discovered by NSA OGC on [REDACTED]
+19 this time involving the acquisition of information beyond the [REDACTED] authorized categories.
+See Docket No. PR/TT [REDACTED] Preliminary Notice of Compliance Incident filed on [REDACTED]
+at 2. This overcollection, which had occurred continuously since the initial authorization in [REDACTED]
+id. at 3, included the acquisition of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] id. at 2. The
+government reported that NSA had ceased querying PR/TT metadata and suspended receipt of
+metadata [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Id. The government later advised that this continuous overcollection acquired
+[REDACTED]
+19 Since [REDACTED] NSA OGC had been obligated to conduct periodic checks of the
+metadata obtained at [REDACTED] to ensure that [REDACTED] were functioning in an
+authorized manner. See page 13, supra.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+20
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+many other types of data²⁰ and that “[v]irtually every PR/TT record” generated by this program
+included some data that had not been authorized for collection. [REDACTED] Application,
+Exhibit D, NSA Response to FISA Court Questions dated [REDACTED] (“[REDACTED]
+Response”), at 18.
+
+The government has provided no comprehensive explanation of how so substantial an
+overcollection occurred, only the conclusion that, [REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED] there was a failure to translate the
+technical requirements” [REDACTED] “into accurate and precise technical
+descriptions for the Court.” [REDACTED] Report, Exhibit A, at 31. The government has said
+nothing about how the systemic overcollection was permitted to continue, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] On the record before the Court, the most charitable
+interpretation possible is that the same factors identified by the government [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] remained unabated and in full effect:
+non-communication with the technical personnel directly responsible [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] resulting from poor management. However, given the duration of this problem, the
+oversight measures ostensibly taken since [REDACTED] to detect overcollection, and the extraordinary
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+21
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+fact that NSA's end-to-end review overlooked unauthorized acquisitions that were documented
+in virtually every record of what was acquired, it must be added that those responsible for
+conducting oversight at NSA failed to do so effectively. The government has expressed a belief
+that "the stand-up of NSA's Office of the Director of Compliance in July 2009" will help avoid
+similar failures in the future, both with respect to explaining to the FISC what NSA actually
+intends to do and in conforming NSA's actions to the terms of FISC authorizations. Id. at 31-32.
+E. Expiration of Bulk PR/TT Authorities
+The PR/TT authorization granted in Docket No. PR/TT [REDACTED] was set to expire on
+[REDACTED] On [REDACTED] the government submitted a proposed renewal
+application, which acknowledged [REDACTED] information that
+may not have been contemplated under prior orders. See Docket No. PR/TT [REDACTED]
+Supplemental Order issued on [REDACTED] Order"), at 2. The proposed
+application sought approval [REDACTED] subject to the
+restrictions that NSA analysts would not query the PR/TT metadata previously received by
+NSA²¹ and that information prospectively obtained [REDACTED] would be stored
+[REDACTED] and not [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] o access or use. Id. at 2. After Judge Walton expressed concern about the merits of the
+
+²¹ The government requested in its proposed application that, if "immediate access to the
+metadata repository is necessary in order to protect against an imminent threat to human life," the
+government would "first notify the Court." [REDACTED] Order at 3. Instead, Judge Walton
+permitted access to protect against an imminent threat as long as the government provided a
+report.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+22
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+proposed application,22 the government elected not to submit a final application. Id. at 3. As a
+result, the authorization for bulk PR/TT surveillance expired on [REDACTED] judge
+Walton directed that the government “shall not access the information [previously] obtained . . .
+for any analytic or investigative purpose” and shall not “transfer to any other NSA facility
+information . . . currently stored [REDACTED] Id.
+at 4-5. He also provided that, “[i]n the extraordinary event that the government determines
+immediate access to the [PR/TT metadata] is necessary in order to protect against an imminent
+threat to human life, the government may access the information,” and shall thereafter “provide a
+written report to the Court describing the circumstances and results of the access.” Id. at 5.23
+
+F. The Current Application
+
+On [REDACTED] the government submitted another proposed application, which
+in most substantive respects is very similar to the final application now before the Court.
+Thereafter, on [REDACTED] the undersigned judge met with
+representatives of the executive branch to explore a number of factual and legal questions
+presented. The government responded to the Court’s questions in three written submissions,
+
+---
+22 The proposed application did not purport to specify the types of data acquired [REDACTED] or, importantly, to provide a legal justification for such acquisition under a
+PR/TT order.
+
+23 In compliance with this requirement, the government has reported that, under this
+emergency exception, NSA has run queries of the bulk metadata in response to threats stemming
+from (i) [REDACTED]
+See, e.g., Docket No. PR/TT [REDACTED] Reports filed on [REDACTED]
+and various reports filed from [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+23
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+filed on [REDACTED] the government then submitted its
+revised, final application on [REDACTED], with those prior written responses attached as Exhibit
+D.
+
+To enter the PR/TT order requested in the current application, or a modified PR/TT order,
+the Court must find that the application meets all of the requirements of Section 1842. See 50
+U.S.C. § 1842(d)(1). Some of these requirements are plainly met: the government has submitted
+to a judge of the FISC a written application that has been approved by the Attorney General (who
+is also the applicant). See [REDACTED] Application at 1, 20; 50 U.S.C. § 1842(a)(1), (b)(1), (c).
+The application identifies the Federal officer seeking to use the PR/TT devices covered by it as
+General Keith B. Alexander, the Director of NSA, who has also verified the application pursuant
+to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 in lieu of an oath or affirmation. See [REDACTED] pplication at 5, 18; 50
+U.S.C. § 1842(b), (c)(1).
+
+In other respects, however, the Court's review of this application is not nearly so
+straightforward. As a crucial threshold matter, there are substantial questions about whether
+some aspects of the proposed collection are properly regarded as involving the use of PR/TT
+devices. There are also noteworthy issues regarding the certification of relevance pursuant to
+Section 1842(c)(2) and the specifications that the order must include under Section
+1842(d)(2)(A), as well as post-acquisition concerns regarding the procedures for handling the
+metadata. The Court's resolution of these issues is set out below.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+24
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+In the remainder of this Opinion, the Court will first consider whether the proposed
+collection involves the use of a PR/TT device within the meaning of the applicable statutory
+definitions, and whether the data that the government seeks to collect consists of information that
+may properly be acquired by such a device. Next, the Court will consider whether the
+application satisfies the statutory relevance standard and contains all the necessary elements. The
+Court will then address the procedures and restrictions proposed by the government for the
+retention, use, and dissemination of the information that is collected. Finally, the Court will
+consider the government's request for permission to use all previously-collected data, including
+information falling outside the scope of the Court's prior authorizations.
+II. **The Proposed Collection, as Modified Herein, Involves the Installation and Use of PR/TT
+Devices**
+A. **The Applicable Statutory Definitions**
+For purposes of 50 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1846, FISA adopts the definitions of "pen register"
+and "trap and trace device" set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3127. See 50 U.S.C. § 1841(2). Section 3127
+provides the following definitions:
+> (3) the term "pen register" means a device or process which records or decodes
+> dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument
+> or facility from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted,
+> provided, however, that such information shall not include the contents of any
+> communication . . .;[24]
+
+24 The definition excludes any device or process used by communications providers or
+customers for certain billing-related purposes or “for cost accounting or other like purposes in the
+ordinary course of business." § 3127(3). These exclusions are not pertinent to this case.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+25
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+(4) the term "trap and trace device" means a device or process which captures the
+incoming electronic or other impulses which identify the originating number or
+other dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information reasonably likely to
+identify the source of a wire or electronic communication, provided, however, that
+such information shall not include the contents of any communication.
+
+These definitions employ three other terms - "electronic communication," "wire
+communication," and "contents" - that are themselves governed by statutory definitions "set
+forth for such terms in section 2510" of title 18. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(1). Section 2510 defines
+these terms as follows:
+
+(1) "Electronic communication" is defined as:
+
+any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any
+nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic,
+photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce,
+but does not include - (A) any wire or oral communication.[25]
+
+18 U.S.C. § 2510(12).
+
+(2) "Wire communication" is defined as:
+
+any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the
+transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection
+between the point of origin and the point of reception . . . furnished or operated by
+any person engaged in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission
+of interstate or foreign communications or communications affecting interstate or
+foreign commerce.
+
+18 U.S.C. § 2510(1).
+
+---
+
+25 The other exclusions to this definition at Section 2510(12)(B)-(D) are not relevant to
+this case.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+26
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+(3) "Contents" is defined to "include[] any information concerning the substance, purport,
+or meaning" of a "wire, oral, or electronic communication." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8).26
+Together, these definitions set bounds on the Court's authority to issue the requested
+order because the devices or processes to be employed must meet the definition of "pen register"
+or "trap and trace device."
+As explained by the government, the proposed collection [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Declaration of Gen. Keith B. Alexander,
+Director of NSA, at 23-24 (attached as Exhibit A to [REDACTED] Application) ([REDACTED]
+Alexander Decl.").
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+26 Different definitions of "wire communication" and "contents" are set forth at 50
+U.S.C. § 1801(1) & (n). The definitions in Section 1801, however, apply to terms “[a]s used in
+this subchapter” – i.e., in 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1812 (FISA subchapter on electronic surveillance) –
+and thus are not applicable to the terms "wire communication” and “contents" as used in the
+definition of "pen register" and "trap and trace device" applicable to Sections 1841-1846 (FISA
+subchapter on pen registers and trap and trace devices).
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+27
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON.NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+See id., Tab 2, at 1-2 n.2.27
+Subject to the following discussion of what types of information may properly be
+regarded as non-content addressing, routing or signaling information, the Court concludes that
+this [REDACTED] is consistent with the statutory definitions of "pen register" and, insofar
+as information about the source of a communication is obtained, "trap and trace device." Each
+communication subject to collection is either a wire communication or an electronic
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+28
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+communication under the definitions set forth above. 28 The end-result of the collection process29
+is that only metadata authorized by the Court for collection is forwarded to NSA for retention and
+use.
+[REDACTED]
+Finally, and again subject to the
+discussion below regarding what types of information may properly be acquired, the Court
+concludes that the automated processes resulting in the transmission to NSA of information
+28 Many of the communications for which information will be acquired will fall within
+the broad definition of "electronic communication" at 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12). If, however, a
+covered communication consists of an “aural transfer," i.e., "a transfer containing the human
+voice at any point between and including the point of origin and the point of reception," id. §
+2510(18), then it could constitute a “wire communication" under the meaning of Section
+2510(1). In either case, the communications subject to collection are “wire or electronic
+communication[s]," as required in Sections 3127(3) & (4).
+29 The term "process," as used in the definitions of "pen register" and "trap and trace
+device", has its "generally understood" meaning of "a series of actions or operations conducing
+to an end" and "covers software and hardware operations used to collect information." In re
+Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Installation and Use of a PR/TT
+Device on E-Mail Account, 416 F. Supp.2d 13, 16 n.5 (D.D.C. 2006) (Hogan, District Judge)
+(internal quotations and citations omitted).
+30 Accord [REDACTED] Opinion at 12-13; In re Application of the United States for an
+Order Authorizing the Use of Two PR/TT Devices, 2008 WL 5082506 at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 26,
+2008) (Garaufis, District Judge) (recording and transmitting contents permissible under PR/TT
+order where government computers were configured to immediately delete all contents). But see
+In re Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Use of a PR/TT Device On
+Wireless Telephone, 2008 WL 5255815 at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2008) (Orenstein, Magistrate
+Judge) (any recording of contents impermissible under PR/TT order, even if deleted before
+information is provided to investigators).
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+29
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+resulting from [REDACTED] about communications is a form of "record[ing]" or "decod[ing]"
+permissible under the definition of "pen register."
+C. The Requested Information
+The application seeks to expand considerably the types of information authorized for
+acquisition. Although the government provides new descriptions for the categories of
+information sought, see [REDACTED] Alexander Decl., Tab 2, they encompass all the types of
+information that were actually collected (to include unauthorized collection) under color of the
+prior orders. Memorandum of Law and Fact in Support of Application for Pen Registers and
+Trap and Trace Devices for Foreign Intelligence Purposes ("Memorandum of Law") at 3,
+submitted as Exhibit B to the [REDACTED] Application.
+1. The Proper Understanding of DRAS Information and Contents
+The government contends that all of the data requested in this application may properly
+be collected by a PR/TT device because all of it is dialing, routing, addressing or signaling
+("DRAS") information, and none constitutes contents. Id. at 22. In support of that contention,
+the government advances several propositions concerning the meaning of "dialing, routing,
+addressing, or signaling information" and "contents," as those terms are used in the definitions of
+"pen register" and "trap and trace device." While it is not necessary to address all of the
+government's assertions, a brief discussion of the government's proposed statutory construction
+will be useful in explaining the Court's decision to approve most, but not all, of the proposed
+collection.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+30
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+The government argues that DRAS information and contents are "mutually exclusive
+categories," and that Congress intended for DRAS information "to be synonymous with 'non-
+content." Id. at 23, 51. The Court is not persuaded that the government's proposed construction
+can be squared with the statutory text. The definition of pen register covers “a device or process
+which records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an
+instrument or facility . . ., provided, however, that such information shall not include the contents
+of any communication." § 3127(3). The structure of the sentence – an affirmative description of
+the information to be recorded or decoded, followed by a proviso that “such information shall not
+include the contents of any communication" – does not suggest an intention by Congress to
+create two mutually exclusive categories of information. Instead, the sentence is more naturally
+read as conveying two independent requirements – the information to be recorded or decoded
+must be DRAS information and, whether or not it is DRAS, it must not be contents. The same
+observations apply to the similarly-structured definition of “trap and trace device." See 18
+U.S.C. § 3127(4) (“a device or process which captures the incoming electronic or other impulses
+which identify the originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling
+information reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic communication,
+provided, however, that such information shall not include the contents of any communication").
+The breadth of the terms used by Congress to identify the categories of information
+subject to collection and to define "contents" reinforces the conclusion that DRAS and contents
+are not mutually exclusive categories. As the government observes, see Memorandum of Law at
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+31
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+37, the ordinary meanings of the terms “dialing,” “routing,” addressing,” and “signaling” – which
+are not defined by the statute – are relatively broad. Moreover, as noted above, the term
+“contents” is broadly defined to include “any information concerning the substance, purport, or
+meaning of [an electronic] communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (emphasis added). And
+“electronic communication,” too, is defined broadly to mean “any transfer of signs, signals,
+writing, images, sounds, data or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a
+wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic, or photooptical system . . . .” 18 U.S.C. §
+2510(12) (emphasis added).
+
+Given the breadth of the terms used in the statute, it is not surprising that courts have
+identified forms of information that constitute both DRAS and contents. In the context of
+Internet communications, a Uniform Resource Locator (URL) – “an address that can lead you to
+a file on any computer connected to the Internet”31 – constitutes a form of “addressing
+information” under the ordinary meaning of that term. Yet, in some circumstances a URL can
+also include “contents” as defined in Section 2510(8). In particular, if a user runs a search using
+an Internet search engine, the “search phrase would appear in the URL after the first forward
+slash” as part of the addressing information, but would also reveal contents, i.e., the “substance’
+and ‘meaning’ of the communication . . . that the user is conducting a search for information on a
+particular topic.” In re Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Use of a
+Pen Register and Trap, 396 F. Supp.2d 45, 49 (D. Mass. 2005) (Collins, Magistrate Judge); see
+
+31 See Newton’s Telecom Dictionary 971 (24th ed. 2008).
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+32
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+also In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 9, 16, 18 (1st Cir. 2003) (URLs including search terms are
+"contents" under Section 2510(8)).32 In the context of telephone communications, the term
+"dialing information” can naturally be understood to encompass all digits dialed by a caller.
+However, some digits dialed after a call has been connected, or "cut through," can constitute
+"contents" – for example, if the caller is inputting digits in response to prompts from an
+automated prescription refill system, the digits may convey substantive instructions such as the
+prescription number and desired pickup time for a refill. Courts accordingly have described post-
+cut-through digits as dialing information, some of which also constitutes contents. See In re
+Application of the United States for an Order (1) Authorizing the Installation and Use of a PR/TT
+Device and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber and Other Information, 622 F. Supp.2d 411,
+412 n.1, 413 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (Rosenthal, District Judge); In re Application, 396 F. Supp.2d at
+48.
+In light of the foregoing, the Court rejects the government's contention that DRAS
+information and contents are mutually exclusive categories. Instead, the Court will, in
+accordance with the language and structure of Section 3127(3) and (4), apply a two-part test to
+32 But see H.R. Rep. No. 107-236(I), at 53 (2001) (stating that the portion of a URL
+"specifying Web search terms or the name of a requested file or article" is not DRAS information
+and therefore could not be collected by a PR/TT device).
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+33
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+the information that the government seeks to acquire and use in this case: (1) is the information
+DRAS information?; and (2) is it contents?33
+In determining whether or not the types of information sought by the government
+constitute DRAS information, the Court is guided by the ordinary meanings of the terms
+"addressing," "routing," and "signaling," and by the context in which the terms are used.34 As
+the government asserts, “addressing information" may generally be understood to be
+"information that identifies recipients of communications or participants in a communication"
+and "may refer to people [or] devices." Memorandum of Law at 37.35 The Court also agrees
+with the government that “routing information" can generally be understood to include
+information regarding "the path or means by which information travels." Memorandum of Law
+at 37. As will be explained more fully in the discussion of "communications actions" below, the
+Court adopts a somewhat narrower definition of "signaling information" than the government. In
+summary, the Court concludes that signaling information includes information that is utilized in
+
+33
+To decide the issues presented by the application, the Court need not reach the
+government's contention that Congress intended DRAS information to include all information
+that is not contents, or its alternative argument that, if there is a third category consisting of non-
+DRAS, non-content information, a PR/TT device may properly collect such information. See
+Memorandum of Law at 49-51.
+
+34 The government does not contend that any of the information sought constitutes only
+"dialing information," which it asserts "presumptively relates to telephones." Memorandum of
+Law at 37 n.19.
+
+35 See Newton's Telecom Dictionary at 89 ("An address comprises the characters
+identifying the recipient or originator of transmitted data.").
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+34
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+or pertains to (1) logging into or out of an account or (2) processing or transmitting an e-mail or
+IM communication. See pages 50-56, infra. 36
+With regard to "contents,” the Court is, of course, bound by the definition set forth in
+Section 2510(8), which, as noted, covers "any information concerning the substance, purport, or
+meaning" of the wire or electronic communication to which the information relates. When the
+communication at issue is between or among end users, application of the definition of
+"contents" can be relatively straightforward. For an e-mail communication, for example, the
+contents would most obviously include the text of the message, the attachments, and the subject-
+line information. In the context of person-to-computer communications like the interactions
+between a user and a web-mail service provider, however, determining what constitutes contents
+can become "hazy." See 2 LaFave, et al. Criminal Procedure § 4.6(b) at 476 ("[W]hen a person
+sends a message to a machine, the meaning of 'contents' is unclear."). Particularly in the user-
+to-provider context, the broad statutory definition of contents includes some information beyond
+what might, in ordinary parlance, be considered the contents of a communication.
+2. The Categories of Metadata Sought for Acquisition
+The government requests authority to [REDACTED] categories of
+[REDACTED]
+36 For purposes of this Opinion, the term “e-mail communications" refers to e-mail
+messages sent between e-mail users [REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+35
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+36
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+37
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+38
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+39
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+40
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+41
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+42
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+43
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+44
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+45
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+46
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON.NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+47
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+48
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+49
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+50
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+51
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+Within the definitions of "pen register" and "trap and trace device,” “signaling
+information" appears as the fourth and final item in a list of undefined terms that all modify
+"information": "dialing, routing, addressing, [and/or] signaling information." 18 U.S.C.
+§ 3127(3), (4). It is well-established in statutory interpretation that one term appearing within a
+list may take its meaning from the character of the other listed terms.47 Here, the other three
+terms modifying “information" are not merely "associated with" a communication. Rather,
+dialing, routing, and addressing information are all types of information that, in the context of a
+[REDACTED]
+47 See, e.g., Dolan v. United States Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486-87 (2006) ("[A]
+word is known by the company it keeps' -- a rule that 'is often wisely applied where a word is
+capable of many meanings in order to avoid the giving of unintended breadth to the Acts of
+Congress."") (quoting Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961)); Schreiber v.
+Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (recognizing the “familiar principle of statutory
+construction that words grouped in a list should be given related meaning") (quoting Securities
+Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 468 U.S. 207, 218 (1984)).
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+52
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+communication, particularly relate to the transmission of the communication to its intended
+party. By placing “signaling” within the same list of types of communication-related
+information, Congress presumably intended “signaling information” likewise to relate to the
+transmission of a communication.
+The wording of a related provision lends further support to this interpretation:
+A government agency authorized to install and use a pen register or trap and trace
+device . . . shall use technology reasonably available to it that restricts the
+recording or decoding of electronic or other impulses to the dialing, routing,
+addressing, and signaling information utilized in the processing and transmitting
+of wire or electronic communications so as not to include the contents of any wire
+or electronic communications.
+18 U.S.C. § 3121(c) (emphasis added). Questions of available technology aside, there is no
+reason to think Congress intended to compel an agency deploying a PR/TT device to try to avoid
+acquiring data that would constitute DRAS information under the definitions of “pen register”
+and “trap and trace device.” For this reason, Section 3121(c) strongly suggests that the intended
+scope of acquisition under a PR/TT device is DRAS information utilized in the processing and
+transmitting of a communication. 48
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+53
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+The legislative history relied on by the government, _see_ Memorandum of Law at 52, actually points to a similar conclusion about the intended scope of signaling information to be acquired by a PR/TT device. It states that "orders for the installation of [PR/TT] devices may obtain any non-content information – 'dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information' – utilized in the processing or transmitting of wire and electronic communications." H.R. Rep. No. 107-236(I), at 53 (emphasis added; footnote omitted). Moreover, the particular types of information mentioned in the legislative history as DRAS information that may be collected by a PR/TT device all pertain to the processing or transmitting of a communication. _See, e.g._, _id._ (referencing "attempted connections," including "busy signals” and “packets that merely request a telnet connection in the Internet context"). The House report states that "non-content information contained in the 'options field' of a network packet header constitutes 'signaling' information and is properly obtained by an authorized pen register or trap and trace device." _Id._ at 53 n.1.
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+54
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+55
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+b. Contents
+As noted above, "contents,” “when used with respect to any . . . electronic
+communication, includes any information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that
+communication." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (emphasis added). "Electronic communication” is also
+defined broadly, so that it encompasses the exchanges of information between account user and
+provider that are described by communications actions. And of course, the definitions of "pen
+register" and "trap and trace device" provide that the information acquired "shall not include the
+contents of any communication," Section 3127(3) & (4) (emphasis added) – unqualified language
+that certainly seems to include electronic communications between account users and providers.
+The combined literal effect of these provisions appears to be that PR/TT devices may not obtain
+any information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of any communication, including
+those between account users and providers, and that communications actions that divulge any
+such information would be impermissible “contents" for purposes of a PR/TT authorization.
+The government does not directly confront the statutory text on this point. It does argue,
+however, that an expansive, literal understanding of the prohibition on acquiring "contents”
+would lead to an absurd and unintended restriction on what PR/TT devices can do. Specifically,
+the government notes that the electronic impulses transmitted by dialing digits on a telephone
+49 The Court's understanding of "processing" and "transmitting" e-mail [REDACTED]
+is set forth below. See pages 63-64, infra.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+56
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+literally qualify as an “electronic communication" under Section 2510(12), but the "import" of
+that communication – i.e., "place a call from this telephone to the one whose number has been
+dialed" - has never been understood to be impermissible “contents" under the PR/TT statute.
+See [REDACTED] Response at 7.
+
+⁵⁰ While Congress sought, in the relevant statutory definitions, to reinforce "a line
+identical to the constitutional distinction" between contents and non-contents "drawn by the . . .
+Supreme Court in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741-43 (1979)," H.R. Rep. No. 107-236(I),
+at 53, it also expanded the "pen register" and "trap and trace" definitions to a broad range of
+Internet communications for which the scope of Fourth Amendment protections is unclear, see,
+e.g., 2 LaFave, et al. Criminal Procedure § 4.4(a) at 456-57 (the law is "highly unsettled," with "a
+range of different ways that courts plausibly could apply the Fourth Amendment to Internet
+communications").
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+57
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+58
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON.NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+59
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+60
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+61
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+53
+See, e.g., TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 US. 19, 31 (2001) (“It is our duty to give effect, if
+possible, to every clause and word of a statute.") (citation and internal quotations omitted);
+accord Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001).
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+62
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+63
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+64
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+65
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+66
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+67
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+68
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+69
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+70
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+The foregoing analysis has involved difficult line-drawing. But the end-results
+correspond well with the evident legislative purpose of permitting the acquisition of DRAS
+information for e-mail[REDACTED] while avoiding the acquisition of the contents of
+electronic communications,[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The Court believes that this approach is necessary to ensure that the authority
+sought by the government[REDACTED] is limited to non-
+content signaling information properly subject to collection by a PR/TT device. Given the
+challenges presented by this category of metadata, the Court's authorization will be limited to the
+[REDACTED] approved above.[REDACTED]
+III. The Application Satisfies the Applicable Statutory Requirements
+A. Request to Re-Initiate and Expand Collection
+The current application, in comparison with prior dockets, seeks authority to acquire a
+much larger volume of metadata at a greatly expanded range of facilities, while also modifying
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+71
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+– and in some ways relaxing – the rules governing the handling of metadata. In the foreseeable
+future, NSA does not expect to implement the full scope of the requested authorization because
+of processing limitations. [REDACTED] Response at 1. Even so, NSA projects the creation of
+[REDACTED] metadata records per day during the period of the requested order,
+compared with the norm under prior orders of approximately [REDACTED] records per day. Id.
+That is roughly an 11- to 24-fold increase in volume.
+
+The history of material misstatements in prior applications and non-compliance with prior
+orders gives the Court pause before approving such an expanded collection. The government's
+poor track record with bulk PR/TT acquisition, see pages 9-22, supra, presents threshold
+concerns about whether implementation will conform with, or exceed, what the government
+represents and the Court may approve. However, after reviewing the government's submissions
+and engaging in thorough discussions with knowledgeable representatives, the Court believes
+that the government has now provided an accurate description of the functioning of the [REDACTED]
+and the types of information they obtain. In addition, the Court is approving proposed
+modifications of the rules for NSA's handling of acquired information only insofar as they do not
+detract from effective implementation of protections regarding U.S. person information.
+
+B. Relevance
+
+The current application includes a certification by the Attorney General "that the
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+72
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+information likely to be obtained from the pen registers and trap and trace devices requested in
+this Application . . . is relevant to ongoing investigations to protect against international terrorism
+that are not being conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment
+to the Constitution." [REDACTED] Application at 19. In its wording, this certification complies
+with the statute's requirement of a certification of relevance.57 As explained below, the Court
+also finds that there is an adequate basis for regarding the information to be acquired as relevant
+to the terrorist-affiliated Foreign Powers that are the subject of the investigations underlying the
+application. See note 9, supra.58
+
+As summarized above, the [REDACTED] Opinion's finding of relevance most crucially
+depended on the conclusion that bulk collection is necessary for NSA to employ analytic tools
+that are likely to generate useful investigative leads to help identify and track terrorist operatives.
+See page 9, supra. However, in finding relevance, the [REDACTED] Opinion also relied on
+[REDACTED]
+57 Under FISA, a PR/TT application requires
+a certification by the applicant that the information likely to be obtained is foreign
+intelligence information not concerning a United States person or is relevant to an
+ongoing investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine
+intelligence activities, provided that such investigation of a United States person
+is not conducted solely on the basis of activities protected by the first amendment
+to the Constitution.
+50 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2).
+
+58 The government again argues that the Court should conduct no substantive review of
+the certification of relevance. See Memorandum of Law at 29. This opinion follows Judge
+Kollar-Kotelly's [REDACTED] Opinion in assuming, without conclusively deciding, that
+substantive review is warranted. See note 10, supra.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+73
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+NSA's efforts to acquire metadata that [REDACTED]
+See page 8, supra. 59 For purposes of
+assessing relevance, the primary difference between the current application and prior bulk PR/TT
+authorizations is that the current application encompasses a much larger volume of
+communications, without limiting the requested authorization to streams of data with a relatively
+high concentration of Foreign Power communications.60
+There is precedent, however, for concluding that a wholly non-targeted bulk production
+of metadata under Section 1861 can be relevant to international terrorism investigations. In those
+cases, the FISC has found that the ongoing production by major telephone service providers of
+call detail records for all domestic, United States-to-foreign, and foreign-to-United States calls, in
+order to facilitate comparable forms of NSA analysis and with similar restrictions on handling
+and dissemination, is relevant to investigations of the Foreign Powers. See, e.g., Docket No. [REDACTED]
+
+59 As part of the relevance analysis, the [REDACTED] Opinion also relied on the presence
+of "safeguards" governing the handling and dissemination of the bulk metadata and information
+derived from it. The safeguards proposed in the current application are discussed below, and, as
+modified, the Court finds them to be adequate. See Part IV, infra.
+60 The current application also seeks to expand the categories of metadata to be acquired
+for each communication. The Court is satisfied that the categories of metadata described in the
+current application constitute directly relevant information, insofar as they relate to
+communications of a Foreign Power. See, e.g., [REDACTED] Alexander Decl. at 19-22. The
+metadata for other communications is relevant to the investigations of the Foreign Powers for the
+reasons discussed herein.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+74
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+[REDACTED] Primary Order issued on [REDACTED] at 2-19.61
+The current application similarly supports a finding of relevance for this non-targeted
+form of bulk acquisition of Internet metadata because it “will substantially increase NSA’s ability
+to detect and identify the Foreign Powers and those individuals affiliated with them.” [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Alexander Decl. at 18. There is credible testimony that terrorists affiliated with the Foreign
+Powers attempt to conceal operational communications by [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] See id. at 9, 11. Terrorist efforts to evade surveillance, in
+combination with the inability to know the full range of ongoing terrorist activity at a given time,
+make it “impossible to determine in advance what metadata will turn out to be valuable in
+tracking, identifying, characterizing and exploiting a terrorist.” Id. at 17-18. Analysts know that
+terrorists’ communications are traversing Internet facilities within the United States, but “they
+cannot know ahead of time . . . exactly where.” Id. at 18. And, if not captured at the time of
+transmission, Internet metadata may be “lost forever.” Id. For these reasons, bulk collection of
+metadata is necessary to enable retrospective analysis, which can uncover new terrorists, as well
+61
+The current application further resembles the bulk productions of metadata under
+Section 1861 in that it proposes to capture metadata for a larger volume of U.S. person
+communications. See [REDACTED] Response at 3. The Court is satisfied that the increase in
+U.S. person communications does not undermine the basis for relevance, particularly in view of
+the specific safeguards for accessing and disseminating U.S. person information.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+75
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+as e-mail accounts used by known terrorists that otherwise would be missed. Id. at 21-22.62
+As the [REDACTED] Opinion recognizes, the relevance standard does not require “a
+statistical 'tight fit' between the volume of proposed collection and the much smaller proportion
+of information” that pertains directly to a Foreign Power. [REDACTED] Opinion at 49-50. Nor,
+in the Court's view, does the relevance standard necessarily require a PR/TT authorization to
+limit collection to [REDACTED] of Foreign Power communications. The circumstances that make bulk metadata relevant include
+[REDACTED] Alexander Decl. at 18. It follows
+that some Foreign Power communications
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+76
+---
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+
+C. Specifications of the Order
+Section 1842(d)(2)(A) requires a PR/TT order to
+specify—
+(i) the identity, if known, of the person who is the subject of the
+investigation;
+(ii) the identity, if known, of the person to whom is leased or in
+whose name is listed the telephone line or other facility to which
+the pen register or trap and trace device is to be attached or applied;
+and
+(iii) the attributes of the communications to which the order
+applies, such as the number or other identifier, and, if known, the
+location of the telephone line or other facility to which the pen
+register or trap and trace device is to be attached or applied.[65]
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+77
+---
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+In this case, the subjects of the relevant investigations are sufficiently identified, to the extent
+known, as the enumerated Foreign Powers "and unknown persons in the United States and
+abroad affiliated with the Foreign Powers."[REDACTED] Primary Order at 2-3.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+78
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+67 See, e.g., Docket No. PR/TT [REDACTED] Application at 26 n.15, Primary Order issued on [REDACTED] at 3
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+79
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+At this pre-collection stage, it is uncertain to which facilities PR/TT devices will be
+attached or applied during the pendency of the initial order. See pages 76-77, supra; [REDACTED]
+Response at 1-2. For this reason, and because the Court is satisfied that other specifications
+in the order will adequately demarcate the scope of authorized collection, the Court will issue an
+order that does not identify persons pursuant to Section 1842(d)(2)(A)(ii). However, once this
+surveillance is implemented, the government's state of knowledge may well change.
+Accordingly, the Court expects the government in any future application to identify persons (as
+described in Section 1842(d)(2)(A)(ii)) who are known to the government for any facility that the
+government knows will be subjected to PR/TT surveillance during the period covered by the
+requested order.
+Section 1842(d)(2)(A)(iii) requires the order to specify “the attributes of the
+communications to which the order applies, such as the number or other identifier, and, if known,
+the location of the telephone line or other facility to which the pen register or trap and trace
+device is to be attached or applied.” The order specifies the location of each facility. The Court
+is also satisfied that “the attributes of the communications to which the order applies” are
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+80
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+appropriately specified. Acquisition of particular forms of metadata (described in Part II, supra)
+is authorized for all e-mail [REDACTED] communications traversing any of the
+communications facilities at the specified locations. This form of specification is consistent with
+the language of Section 1842(d)(2)(A)(iii) and is sufficient to delineate the scope of authorized
+acquisition from that which is not authorized. 68
+IV. The Court Approves, Subject to Modifications, the Restrictions and Procedures Proposed
+by the Government For the Retention, Use, and Dissemination of the PR/TTMetadata
+Unlike other provisions of FISA, the PR/TT provisions of the statute do not expressly
+require the adoption and use of minimization procedures. Compare 50 U.S.C. §§ 1805(c)(2)(A)
+& 1824(c)(2)(A) (providing that orders authorizing electronic surveillance or physical search
+must direct that minimization procedures be followed). Accordingly, routine FISA PR/TT orders
+do not require that minimization procedures be followed. The government acknowledges,
+however, that the application now before the Court is not routine. As discussed above, the
+government seeks to acquire information concerning [REDACTED] electronic communications, the
+vast majority of which, viewed individually, are not relevant to the counterterrorism purpose of
+the collection, and many of which involve United States persons. In light of the sweeping and
+non-targeted nature of the collection for which authority is sought, the government proposes a
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+81
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+number of restrictions on retention, use, and dissemination, some of which the government refers
+to as “minimization” procedures. See, e.g., Memorandum of Law at 4, 17. The restrictions now
+proposed by the government are similar, but not identical, to the rules that were adopted by the
+Court in its [REDACTED] Order in Docket Number PR/TT [REDACTED]
+Order”), the most recent order authorizing bulk PR/TT collection by NSA.
+Absent any suggestion by the government that a different standard should apply, the
+Court is guided in assessing the proposed restrictions by the definition of minimization
+procedures in 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h).69 Because procedures satisfying that definition are sufficient
+
+69 Section 1801(h) defines “minimization procedures” in pertinent part as follows:
+(1) specific procedures, which shall be adopted by the Attorney General, that are
+reasonably designed in light of the purpose and technique of the particular
+surveillance, to minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the
+dissemination, of nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting
+United States persons consistent with the need of the United States to obtain,
+produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information;
+(2) procedures that require that nonpublicly available information, which is not
+foreign intelligence information, as defined in [50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(1)], shall not
+be disseminated in a manner that identifies any United States person, without such
+person’s consent, unless such person’s identity is necessary to understand foreign
+intelligence information or assess its importance; [and]
+(3) notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), procedures that allow for the retention
+and dissemination of information that is evidence of a crime which has been, is
+being, or is about to be committed and that is to be retained or disseminated for
+law enforcement purposes[.]
+. . .
+50 U.S.C. § 1801(h).
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+82
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+under FISA to protect the privacy interests of United States persons with respect to the
+acquisition, use, and dissemination of the contents of communications, restrictions meeting the
+same standard are also at least adequate in the context of the collection and use of non-content
+metadata. Guided by the Section 1801(h) standard, the Court concludes, for the reasons stated
+below, that the procedures proposed by the government, subject to the modifications described
+below, are reasonably designed in light of the nature and purpose of the bulk PR/TT collection to
+protect United States person information, and to ensure that the information acquired is used and
+disseminated in furtherance of the counterterrorism purpose of the collection.
+A. Storage and Traceability
+NSA will continue to store the PR/TT data that it retains in repositories within secure
+networks under NSA's control. [REDACTED] Alexander Decl. at 24. As was the case under the
+[REDACTED] Order, the data collected pursuant to the authority now sought by the
+government will carry unique markings that render it distinguishable from information collected
+by NSA pursuant to other authorities. [REDACTED] Response at 15; see also Declaration of
+[REDACTED] NSA, filed on [REDACTED] in Docket No. PR/TT [REDACTED]
+Decl.") at 14 n.8. The markings, which are applied to the data before it is made available
+for analytic querying and remain attached to the information as it is stored in metadata
+repositories, see [REDACTED] Response at 15, are designed to ensure that software and other
+controls (such as user authentication tools) can restrict access to the PR/TT data solely to
+authorized personnel who have received appropriate training regarding the special rules for using
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+83
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+and disseminating such information. See [REDACTED] Alexander Decl. at 24-25;
+[REDACTED] Decl. at 14 n.8. After PR/TT metadata is queried in accordance with the procedures
+described below, the query results (including analytic output based on query results) will remain
+identifiable as bulk PR/TT-derived information. See [REDACTED] Response at 15. Such
+traceability enables NSA personnel to adhere to the special rules for disseminating PR/TT-
+derived information that are described below.
+B. Access to the Metadata by Technical Personnel for Non-Analytic Purposes
+Under the approach proposed by the government, "[t]rained and authorized technical
+personnel" will be permitted to access the metadata to ensure that it is “usable for intelligence
+analysis." Id. at 25. For example, such personnel may access the metadata to perform processes
+designed to prevent the collection, processing, or analysis of metadata associated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] to create and
+maintain records necessary to demonstrate compliance with the terms of authority granted; or to
+develop and test technologies for possible use with the metadata. Id.¹ Similar non-analytic
+70 The government has explained that "[q]uery results could include information
+provided orally or in writing, and could include a tip or a lead (e.g., 'A query on RAS-approved
+identifier A revealed a direct contact with identifier Z'), a written or electronic depiction of a
+chain or pattern, a compilation or summary of direct or indirect contacts of a RAS-approved
+seed, a draft or finished report, or any other information that would be returned following a
+properly predicated PR/TT query." [REDACTED] Response at 15 n.6.
+71 An authorized NSA technician may query the metadata with a non-RAS-approved
+identifier for the limited purpose of determining whether such identifier is an unwanted [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Alexander Decl. at 25. After recognizing a [REDACTED]
+(continued...)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+84
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+access by appropriately trained and authorized technical personnel was permitted under the [REDACTED] Order. See [REDACTED] Order at 10.
+C. Access by Analysts
+NSA analysts will query the metadata that is collected only with RAS-approved “seed” identifiers, in accordance with the same basic framework that was approved by the Court in the [REDACTED] Order. See [REDACTED] Alexander Decl. at 26-27; [REDACTED] Order at 7-9.
+An identifier may be approved for use as a querying seed in one of two ways. First, an identifier may be used as a seed after a designated “approving official” (i.e., the Chief or Deputy Chief of NSA's Homeland Analysis Center, or one of 20 authorized Homeland Mission Coordinators72) determines that the available facts give rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion that the identifier is associated with one of the targeted Foreign Powers. [REDACTED] Alexander Decl. at 26-27. Before querying can be performed using an identifier that is reasonably believed to be used by a United States person, NSA's Office of General Counsel (OGC) must determine that the identifier is not regarded as associated with a Foreign Power solely based on activities that are
+
+71(...continued)
+[REDACTED] through such a query, the NSA technician could share the query results - i.e., the identifier and the fact that it is a [REDACTED] with other NSA personnel responsible for the removal of unwanted metadata from NSA's repositories, but would not be permitted to share any other information from the query. Id. at 25-26.
+
+72 The [REDACTED] Order identified one approving official in addition to the 22 officials listed here. See [REDACTED] Order at 8 (listing the Chief, Special FISA Oversight and Processing, Oversight and Compliance, Signals Intelligence Directorate as one of the 23 approving officials).
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+85
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 27. Second, an identifier that is the subject of
+electronic surveillance or physical search pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1805 or § 1824 based on this
+Court's finding of probable cause that such identifier is used by an agent of a Foreign Power may
+be deemed RAS-approved without review by an NSA designated approving official. Id.
+As was the case under the Court's [REDACTED] Order and prior orders in this matter,
+RAS-approved queries of the collected data will take the form of “contact chaining." Id. at 18.
+Such queries yield data for all communications within two "hops" of the RAS-approved seed. Id.
+The first hop acquires data regarding all identifiers that have been in contact with the seed, and
+the second hop yields data for all identifiers in contact with identifiers that were revealed by the
+first hop. Id. at 18 n.12. The government asserts, and the Court has previously accepted, that
+"[g]oing out to the second 'hop' enhances NSA's ability to find, detect and identify the Foreign
+Powers and those affiliated with them by greatly increasing the chances that previously unknown
+Foreign Power-associated identifiers may be uncovered." Id. at 18-19 n.12; [REDACTED]
+Opinion and Order at 48.73
+
+73 NSA also intends to perform [REDACTED]
+
+The government has clarified in connection with this
+application, however, that [REDACTED] is not used as a means for querying the metadata, but
+instead is applied only to the results of RAS-approved contact-chaining queries. See [REDACTED]
+Response at 16.
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+86
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+The government's proposed RAS-approval and querying process differs in two
+noteworthy respects from the approach previously approved by the Court. First, unlike RAS
+approvals made pursuant to the [REDACTED] Order and prior orders in this matter, 74 RAS
+approvals made under the approach now proposed by the government will expire after a specified
+time. A determination by a designated approving official for an identifier reasonably believed to
+be used by a United States person would be effective for 180 days, while such a determination
+for any other identifier would last for one year. [REDACTED] Alexander Decl. at 27. An
+identifier deemed approved based on FISC-authorized electronic surveillance or physical search
+will be subject to use as a seed for the duration of the FISC authorization. Id. The adoption of
+fixed durations for RAS approvals will require the government at regular intervals to renew its
+RAS assessments for identifiers that it wishes to continue to use as querying "seeds." The re-
+evaluations that will be required under the proposed approach can be expected to increase the
+likelihood that query results are relevant to the counterterrorism purpose of the bulk metadata
+collection and to reduce the amount of irrelevant query results (including information regarding
+
+74 Previously, approved identifiers remained eligible for querying until they were
+affirmatively removed from the list of approved "seed" accounts. The government's practice was
+to remove identifiers from the list only "[w]hen NSA receive[d] information that suggest[ed] that
+a RAS-approved e-mail address [was] no longer associated with one of the Foreign Powers";
+implicitly, the mere passage of time without new information did not obligate the government to
+revoke a RAS approval. See Docket No. PR/TT [REDACTED] NSA 90-Day Report to the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court filed on [REDACTED] at 6. The government had informed the
+Court on [REDACTED] that it was "developing a framework within which to revalidate, and
+when appropriate, reverse . . . RAS approvals," id. at 6, but it does not appear that the new
+framework had been implemented before the expiration of the Court's [REDACTED] Order on [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+87
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+United States persons) that is yielded.
+The second proposed change to the process involves the number of NSA personnel
+permitted to perform RAS-approved queries. Unlike the [REDACTED] Order and prior orders
+in this matter, which limited the number of analysts permitted to run such queries, the re-
+initiation proposed by the government has no such limitation. See Id. at 26 n.18; [REDACTED]
+Order at 7. The government instead proposes the use of "technical controls" to "block any
+analytic query of the metadata with a non-RAS-approved seed." [REDACTED] Alexander Decl. at
+26 n.18. The government further notes that all analytic queries will continue to be logged, and
+that the creation and maintenance of auditable records will "continue to serve as a compliance
+measure." Id.; see also [REDACTED] Order at 7. In light of the safeguards noted by the
+government, and the additional fact that no identifier will be eligible for use as a querying seed
+without having first been approved for querying by a designated approving official (or deemed
+approved by virtue of a FISC order), the Court is satisfied that it is unnecessary to limit the
+number of NSA analysts eligible to conduct RAS-approved queries.
+
+D. Sharing of Query Results Within NSA
+
+The government's proposal for sharing query results within NSA is similar to the
+approach approved by the Court last year. The [REDACTED] Order provided, subject to a
+proviso that is discussed below, that the unminimized results of RAS-approved queries could be
+"shared with other NSA personnel, including those who are not authorized to access the PR/TT
+metadata." [REDACTED] Order at 11. The basis for such widespread sharing of query results
+
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+within NSA was the government's assertion that analysts throughout the agency address
+counterterrorism issues as part of their missions and, therefore, have a need for the information. 75
+Presumably for the same reason, the government proposes in the application now before the
+Court that the results of RAS-approved queries be available to all NSA analysts for intelligence
+purposes, and that such analysts be allowed to apply "the full range of SIGINT analytical
+tradecraft" to the query results. [REDACTED] Alexander Decl. at 28 n.19.76 The Court is satisfied
+
+75
+In a declaration filed in Docket Number PR/TT [REDACTED] late last year, the Director of
+NSA explained that:
+
+NSA's collective expertise in the[] Foreign Powers resides in more than [REDACTED]
+intelligence analysts, who sit, not only in the NSA's Counterterrorism Analytic
+Enterprise, but also in other NSA organizations or product lines. Analysts from other
+product lines also address counterterrorism issues specific to their analytic missions and
+expertise. For example, the International Security Issues product line pursues foreign
+intelligence information on [REDACTED] including [REDACTED]
+The mission of the Combating Proliferation product line includes
+identifying connections between proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and
+terrorists, including those associated with the Foreign Powers. The International Crime
+and Narcotics product line identifies connections between terrorism and human or nuclear
+smuggling or other forms of international crime. . . . Each of the NSA's ten product lines
+has some role in protecting the Homeland from terrorists, including the Foreign Powers.
+Because so many analysts touch upon terrorism information, it is impossible to estimate
+how many analysts might be served by access to the PR/TT results.
+[REDACTED] Report, Exhibit A at 5-6.
+
+76 The [REDACTED] Order did not explicitly authorize NSA analysts to apply the "full
+range of SIGINT tools” to PR/TT query results, but, at the same time it placed no limit on the
+analytical tools or techniques that could be applied by the trained analysts who were entitled to
+have access to query results. Accordingly, the Court views the express reference to "the full
+range of analytic tools" in the government's proposal as a clarification of prior practice that the
+Court, in any event, approves.
+
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+that such internal sharing remains appropriate, subject to the training requirement that is
+discussed below.
+E. Dissemination Outside NSA
+
+The government's proposed rules for disseminating PR/TT-derived information outside
+of NSA are slightly different from the procedures that were previously in place. Under the
+[REDACTED] Order, NSA was required to "treat information from queries of the PR/TT
+metadata in accordance with United States Signals Intelligence Directive 18 (USSID 18)" –
+NSA's standard procedures for handling Signals Intelligence collection – and to "apply USSID
+18 to minimize information concerning U.S. persons obtained from the pen registers and trap and
+trace devices authorized herein." [REDACTED] Order at 12. In addition,
+
+> before NSA disseminate[d] any U.S. person identifying information outside of NSA, the
+> Chief of Information Sharing Services in the Signals Intelligence Directorate, the Senior
+> Operations Officer at NSA's National Security Operations Center, the Signals
+> Intelligence Directorate Director, the Deputy Director of NSA, or the Director of NSA
+> [was required to] determine that the information identifying the U.S. person [was] in fact
+> related to counterterrorism information and that it [was] necessary to understand the
+> counterterrorism information or assess its importance.
+
+Id.
+
+The government's proposal has the same two basic elements, although they are worded
+slightly differently. First, NSA “will apply the minimization and dissemination procedures of
+Section 7 of [USSID 18] to any results from queries of the metadata disseminated outside of
+NSA in any form." [REDACTED] Alexander Decl. at 28. Second,
+
+prior to disseminating any U.S. person information outside NSA, one of the officials
+listed in Section 7.3(c) of USSID 18 (i.e., the Director of NSA, the Deputy Director of
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+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+NSA, the Director of the Signals Intelligence Directorate (SID), the Deputy Director of
+the SID, the Chief of the Information Services (ISS) office, the Deputy Chief of the ISS
+office, and the Senior Operation Officer of the National Security Operations Center) must
+determine that the information identifying the U.S. person is in fact related to
+counterterrorism information and that it is necessary to understand the counterterrorism
+information or assess its importance.
+
+Id.
+
+The differences are not material. Although the proposal refers specifically to "the
+minimization and dissemination procedures of Section 7 of [USSID 18]" rather than to USSID
+18 generally, the Court does not understand any difference in meaning to be intended; indeed,
+Section 7 is the portion of USSID 18 that specifically covers disseminations outside NSA. See
+[REDACTED] Application, Tab C (USSID 18), at 8-10. With regard to the application of the
+counterterrorism purpose requirement, the proposal adds two high-ranking NSA officials (the
+Deputy Director of the SID and the Deputy Chief of the ISS office) to the list of five officials
+who were previously designated to make the required determination. The Court is aware of no
+reason to think that the two additional officials are less suited than the other five to make the
+required determination, or that their designation as approving officials will undermine the
+internal check that is provided by having high-ranking NSA officials approve disseminations that
+include United States person identifying information.77
+
+77 Like the [REDACTED] Order, the government's proposal would also permit NSA to
+"share results derived from intelligence analysis queries of the metadata, including U.S. person
+identifying information, with Executive Branch personnel . . . in order to enable them to
+determine whether the information contains exculpatory or impeachment information or is
+otherwise discoverable in legal proceedings." [REDACTED] Alexander Decl. 28-29; see also
+[REDACTED] (continued...)
+
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+The government's proposal contains one additional element that was not part of the
+framework approved by the Court in the [REDACTED] Order. Specifically, the government
+proposes that "[i]n the extraordinary event that NSA determines that there is a need to
+disseminate information identifying a U.S. person that is related to foreign intelligence
+information, as defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e), other than counterterrorism information and that
+is necessary to understand the foreign intelligence information or assess its importance, the
+Government will seek prior approval from the Court." [REDACTED] Alexander Decl. at 28 n.20.
+Insofar as the government's proposal invites the Court to review and pre-approve individual
+disseminations of information based upon the Court's own assessments of foreign intelligence
+value, the Court declines the invitation. The judiciary is ill-equipped to make such assessments,
+which involve matters on which the courts generally defer to the Executive Branch.78 In the
+7"(...continued)
+[REDACTED] Order at 12-13. The government's current proposal also permits such sharing with
+Executive Branch personnel "to facilitate their lawful oversight functions." [REDACTED] Alexander Decl. at 29. Although the [REDACTED] order did not contain an explicit provision
+to this effect, sharing for such purposes was plainly contemplated. See, e.g., [REDACTED] Order at 16 (providing for NSD review of RAS querying justifications).
+78
+See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, — U.S. —, 2010 WL 2471055, *22
+(June 21, 2010) ("[W]hen it comes to collecting evidence and drawing factual inferences in [the
+national security] area, the lack of competence on the part of the courts is marked.") (citation and
+internal quotation marks omitted); Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525
+U.S. 471, 491 (1999) ("a court would be ill-equipped to determine [the] authenticity and utterly
+unable to assess [the] adequacy" of the executive's security or foreign policy reasons for treating
+certain foreign nationals as a "special threat"); Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 243 (1984) (giving
+the "traditional deference to executive judgment" in foreign affairs in sustaining President's
+decision to restrict travel to Cuba against a due process challenge).
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+event, however, that NSA encounters circumstances that it believes necessitate alteration of the
+dissemination procedures that have been approved by the Court, the government may obtain
+prospectively-applicable modifications to those requirements upon a determination by the Court
+that such modifications are appropriate under the circumstances and in light of the sweeping and
+non-targeted nature of the PR/TT collection. Cf. Standard Minimization Procedures for FBI
+Electronic Surveillance and Physical Search § I.D (on file with the Court in Docket No. 08-
+1833).
+F. Retention
+Under the [REDACTED] Order, the PR/TT metadata was available for querying for
+four and one-half years, after which it had to be destroyed. [REDACTED] Order at 13. The four-
+and-one-half-year retention period was originally set based upon NSA's assessment of how long
+collected metadata is likely to have operational value. See [REDACTED] Opinion at 70-71.
+Pursuant to the government's proposal, the retention period would be extended to five years.
+[REDACTED] Application at 13. The government asserts that the purpose of the change is to
+"develop and maintain consistency" with the retention period for NSA's bulk telephony metadata
+collection, which is authorized by this Court under the FISA business records provision, 50
+U.S.C. § 1861. [REDACTED] Response at 24. The Court is satisfied that the relatively small
+extension of the retention period that is sought by the government is justified by the
+administrative benefits that would result.
+
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+
+G. Oversight
+
+The government proposes to employ an internal oversight regime that closely tracks the
+oversight provisions adopted by the Court in the [REDACTED] Order, requiring, among other
+things, that NSA OGC and NSD take various steps to ensure that the data is collected and
+handled in accordance with the scope of the authorization. Compare [REDACTED] Order at 13-
+16, with [REDACTED] Alexander Decl. at 29-30. There is, however, one significant difference.
+The [REDACTED] Order required NSA OGC to ensure that all NSA personnel permitted to
+access the metadata or receive query results were first “provided the appropriate and adequate
+training and guidance regarding the procedures and restrictions for storage, access, and
+dissemination of the PR/TT metadata and/or PR/TT metadata-derived information, i.e., query
+results.” [REDACTED] Order at 13-14. The analogous oversight provision in the government's
+current proposal, by contrast, directs NSA OGC and the Office of the Director of Oversight and
+Compliance (ODOC) to ensure that adequate training and guidance is provided to NSA personnel
+having access to the metadata, but not to those receiving query results. See [REDACTED]
+Alexander Decl. at 29. As discussed above, the government has proposed special rules and
+restrictions on the handling and dissemination of query results. Most notably, PR/TT query
+results must remain identifiable as bulk PR/TT-derived information, see [REDACTED] Response
+at 15, and may not be disseminated outside NSA without the prior determination by a designated
+official that any United States person information relates to counterterrorism information and that
+it is necessary to understand the counterterrorism information or to assess its importance. [REDACTED]
+
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+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+[REDACTED] Alexander Decl. at 28. To follow those rules, NSA personnel must know and understand
+them.
+As noted above, NSA's record of compliance with these rules has been poor. Most
+notably, NSA generally disregarded the special rules for disseminating United States person
+information outside of NSA until it was ordered to report such disseminations and certify to the
+FISC that the required approval had been obtained. See pages 18-19, supra. The government has
+provided no meaningful explanation why these violations occurred, but it seems likely that
+widespread ignorance of the rules was a contributing factor.
+Accordingly, the Court will order NSA OGC and ODOC to ensure that all NSA personnel
+who receive PR/TT query results in any form first receive appropriate and adequate training and
+guidance regarding the procedures and restrictions for the handling and dissemination of such
+information.
+H. Reporting
+The reporting requirements proposed by the government are similar to the reporting
+requirements adopted by the Court in the [REDACTED] Order. Compare
+Alexander Decl. at 31, with [REDACTED] Order at 16-18. As was previously the case, the
+government will submit reports to the Court approximately every 30 days and upon requesting
+any renewal of the authority sought. Se[REDACTED] Alexander Dec. at 31. The 30-day reports
+will include "a discussion of the queries made since the last report and NSA's application of the
+RAS standard." Id. Because NSA will not apply the requested authority to particular
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+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+[REDACTED] however, the 30-day reports will no longer include a discussion of "changes in the
+description of the [REDACTED] , or in the nature of the communications carried thereon.” See
+[REDACTED] Order at 16. Like the [REDACTED] Order, the government's proposal will also
+require it, upon seeking renewal of the requested authority, to file a report describing "any new
+facility proposed to be added" and "any changes proposed in the collection methods." [REDACTED]
+Alexander Decl. at 31.
+The [REDACTED] Order also directed the government to submit weekly reports listing
+each instance in which “NSA has shared, in any form, information obtained or derived from the
+PR/TT metadata with anyone outside NSA,” including a certification that the requirements for
+disseminating United States person information (i.e., that a designated official had determined
+that any such information related to counterterrorism information and was necessary to
+understand counterterrorism information or to assess its importance) had been followed. See
+[REDACTED] Order at 17. The government’s proposal does not include such a requirement.
+In light of NSA’s historical problems complying with the requirements for disseminating PR/TT-
+derived information, the Court is not prepared to eliminate this reporting requirement altogether.
+At the same time, the Court does not believe that weekly reports are still necessary to ensure
+compliance. Accordingly, the Court will order that the 30-day reports described in the preceding
+paragraph include a statement of the number of instances since the preceding report in which
+NSA has shared, in any form, information obtained or derived from the PR/TT metadata with
+anyone outside NSA. For each such instance in which United States person information has been
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+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+shared, the report must also include NSA's attestation that one of the officials authorized to
+approve such disseminations determined, prior to dissemination, that the information was related
+to counterterrorism information and necessary to understand the counterterrorism information or
+to assess its importance.
+V. The Government's Request for Authority to Access and Use All
+Previously Collected Data
+The government seeks authority to access and use all previously acquired bulk PR/TT
+data, including information not authorized for collection under the Court's prior orders, subject
+to the same restrictions and procedures that will apply to newly-acquired PR/TT collection. See
+[REDACTED] Application at 16. For the following reasons, the Court will grant the government's
+request in part and deny it in part.
+A. The [REDACTED] Order
+As discussed above, after the government disclosed the continuous and widespread
+collection of data exceeding the scope of the Court's prior orders dating back to [REDACTED] it elected
+not to seek renewal of the authority granted in the [REDACTED] Order. The government was
+unable, before the expiration of that authority on [REDACTED] to determine the extent to
+which the previously-acquired information exceeded the scope of the Court's orders or to rule
+out the possibility that some of the information fell outside the scope of the pen register statute.
+See [REDACTED] Order at 2-4. Accordingly, as an interim measure, Judge Walton entered an
+order on [REDACTED] directing the government not to access the information previously
+
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+obtained “for any analytic or investigative purpose,” except when such access is “necessary to
+protect against an imminent threat to human life.” See [REDACTED] Order at 4-5; see also page
+23, supra.
+The application now before the Court includes a request to lift the [REDACTED] Order.
+See [REDACTED] Application at 16. Since [REDACTED], both the Court and the
+government have had the opportunity to make a thorough assessment of the scope and
+circumstances of the overcollection and to consider the pertinent legal issues. Based on that
+assessment, the Court believes that it is now appropriate to rescind the [REDACTED]
+Order, which, as noted, was intended to be an interim measure, and to refine the rules for
+handling the prior bulk PR/TT collection.
+B. The Court Lacks Authority to Grant the Government's Request in its Entirety
+The Court concludes that it has only limited authority to grant the government’s request
+for permission to resume accessing and using previously-collected information. As discussed in
+more detail below, the Court concludes that it possesses authority to permit the government to
+query data collected within the scope of the Court’s prior orders, and that it is appropriate under
+the circumstances to grant such approval. But for information falling outside the scope of the
+prior orders, the Court lacks authority to approve any use or disclosure that would be prohibited
+under 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a)(2). Accordingly, the Court will deny the government’s request with
+respect to those portions of the unauthorized collection that are covered by Section 1809(a)(2).
+To the extent that other portions of the unauthorized prior collection may fall outside the reach of
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
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+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+Section 1809(a)(2), the Court concludes that it has authority to grant the government's request
+and that it is appropriate under the circumstances to do so.
+1. Information Authorized for Acquisition Under the Court's Prior Orders
+The government argues that the FISA PR/TT statute, 50 U.S.C. § 1842, empowers the
+Court to authorize NSA to resume querying the prior collection in its entirety. See Memorandum
+of Law at 72-73. As discussed above, the Court continues to be satisfied that it may, pursuant to
+Section 1842 and subject to appropriate restrictions, authorize NSA to acquire, in bulk, the
+metadata associated with Internet communications transiting the United States. Further, although
+Section 1842 does not explicitly require the application of minimization procedures to PR/TT-
+acquired information, the Court also agrees that in light of the sweeping and non-targeted nature
+of this bulk collection, it has authority to impose limitations on access to and use of the metadata
+that NSA has accumulated.
+The Court is satisfied that it may invoke the same authority to permit NSA to resume
+querying the PR/TT information that was collected in accordance with the Court's prior orders.
+The Court is further persuaded that, in light of the government's assertion of national security
+need, it is appropriate to exercise that authority. Accordingly, the Court hereby orders that the
+government may access, use, and disseminate bulk PR/TT information that was collected in
+79 See [REDACTED] Alexander Decl. at 10 n.6 ("The ability of NSA to access the
+information collected under docket number PR/TT [REDACTED] and previous dockets is vital to NSA's
+ability to carry out its counterterrorism intelligence mission. If NSA is not able to combine the
+information it collects prospectively with the information it collected [previously], there will be a
+substantial gap in the information available to NSA.").
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
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+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+accordance with the terms of the Court's prior orders, subject to the procedures and restrictions
+discussed herein that will apply to newly-acquired metadata.
+2. Information Not Authorized for Acquisition Under the Court's Prior
+Orders
+
+By contrast, the Court is not persuaded that it has authority to grant the government's
+request with respect to all information collected outside the scope of its prior orders. FISA itself
+precludes the Court from granting that request in full.
+a. 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a)(2) Precludes the Court from Granting the
+Government's Request with Respect to Some of the Prior
+Unauthorized Collection
+
+The crucial provision of FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1809, provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
+(a) Prohibited Activities
+
+A person is guilty of an offense if he intentionally –
+
+(2) discloses or uses information obtained under color of law by electronic surveillance,
+knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through electronic
+surveillance not authorized by this chapter, chapter 119, 121, or 206 of Title 18 or any
+express statutory authorization that is an additional exclusive means for conducting
+electronic surveillance under section 1812 of this title.
+
+50 U.S.C. § 1809(a)(2).
+
+Section 1809(a)(2) has three essential elements: (1) the intentional disclosure or use of
+information (2) obtained under color of law through electronic surveillance (3) by a person
+knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through electronic
+surveillance not authorized by one of the enumerated (or similar) statutory provisions. The
+
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+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+government’s request to access, use, and disseminate the fruits of the prior unauthorized
+collection implicates all three elements of Section 1809(a)(2)’s criminal prohibition.
+Application of the first two elements is straightforward. Plainly, conducting contact
+chaining inquiries of stored data and sharing the query results both within and outside NSA
+would constitute the intentional use and disclosure of information.⁸⁰ It is also clear that the data
+previously collected by the government – which was acquired through the use of orders issued by
+this Court pursuant to FISA – was obtained “under color of law.” See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
+42, 49-50 (1988) (explaining that the misuse of authority possessed by virtue of law is action
+“under color of law”).⁸¹
+The third element requires lengthier discussion, but, in summary, the Court concludes
+that some of the prior bulk PR/TT collection is information that the responsible government
+officials know or have reason to know was obtained through electronic surveillance not
+authorized by one of the statutory provisions referred to in Section 1809(a)(2). To begin with,
+___
+⁸⁰ Insofar as the government contends that Section 1809(a)(2) reaches only “intentional
+violations of the Court’s orders,” or “willful” as opposed to intentional conduct, see
+Memorandum of Law at 74 n. 37, the Court disagrees. The plain language of the statute requires
+proof that the person in question “intentionally” disclosed or used information “knowing or with
+reason to know” the information was obtained in the manner described.
+
+⁸¹ The phrase “a person” in Section 1809 is certainly intended to cover government
+officials. In addition to requiring conduct “under color of law,” the statute provides an
+affirmative defense to prosecution for a “law enforcement or investigative officer engaged in the
+course of his official duties” in connection with electronic surveillance “authorized by and
+conducted pursuant to a search warrant or court order of a court of competent jurisdiction.” See
+50 U.S.C. § 1809(b).
+___
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+the language of Section 1809(a)(2) demonstrates that Congress intended at least some
+unauthorized PR/TT acquisitions to be covered by the criminal prohibition. The statute expressly
+reaches, among other things, information obtained through "electronic surveillance not
+authorized by this chapter, [or] chapter 119, 121, or 206 of Title 18." Section 1809 is part of
+Chapter 36 of Title 50 of the U.S. Code. Chapter 36, in turn, encompasses all of FISA, as
+codified in Title 50, including FISA's PR/TT provisions found at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1846.
+Accordingly, "this chapter" in Section 1809(a)(2) refers in part to the FISA PR/TT provisions.
+Moreover, Chapter 206 of Title 18, which is also referenced in Section 1809(a)(2), consists
+exclusively of the PR/TT provisions of the criminal code, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127, key portions
+of which are incorporated by reference into FISA. See 50 U.S.C. § 1841(2) (incorporating the
+definitions of "pen register" and "trap and trace device" found at 18 U.S.C. § 3127). Because
+Chapter 206 of Title 18 authorizes no means of acquiring information other than through the use
+of PR/TT devices, Section 1809(a)(2)'s reference to "electronic surveillance" must be understood
+to include at least some information acquired through the use of PR/TT authority.
+That conclusion is reinforced by examination of FISA's definition of "electronic
+surveillance," which applies to Section 1809, see 50 U.S.C. § 1801 ("As used in this
+subchapter:..."), and which is broad enough to include some (but not necessarily all)
+information acquired through the use of PR/TT devices.82 "Electronic surveillance" is defined, in
+82 See also H.R. Rep. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 51 (1978) ("The surveillance covered by [Section
+1801(f)(2)] is not limited to the acquisition of the oral or verbal contents of a communication . . .
+(continued...)
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+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+pertinent part, as "the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the
+contents of any wire communication to or from a person in the United States, without the consent
+of any party thereto, if such acquisition occurs in the United States." 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(2).83
+For purposes of this definition of "electronic surveillance," "contents" is defined in Section
+1801(n) to include, among other things, “any information concerning the identity of the parties"
+to a communication "or the existence . . . of that communication."84 "Wire communication" is
+defined as "any communication while it is being carried by a wire, cable, or other like connection
+82(...continued)
+[and] includes any form of 'pen register' or 'touch-tone decoder' device which is used to acquire,
+from the contents of a voice communication, the identities or locations of the parties to the
+communication.").
+
+83
+Section 1801(f) includes three additional definitions of "electronic surveillance," only
+one of which appears to have any possible application with regard to the prior bulk PR/TT
+collection. Subsections (f)(1) ("the acquisition . . . of any wire or radio communication sent by
+or intended to be received by a particular, known United States person who is in the United
+States, if the contents are acquired by intentionally targeting that United States person") and
+(f)(3) ("the intentional acquisition . . . of any radio communication") are flatly inapplicable.
+Subsection (f)(4) could apply to the extent the prior collection included non-wire
+communications acquired under "circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation
+of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes." The Court's analysis
+of Section 1809(a)(2) would, of course, apply identically to prior unauthorized collection
+constituting "electronic surveillance" under any of the definitions set forth in Section 1801(f).
+
+84 As noted above, the definition of "contents" in Section 1801(n) is different than the
+definition of "contents" in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) – the latter definition does not include
+information concerning the identity of the parties to or the existence of the communication. See
+page 27, supra; [REDACTED] Opinion at 6 n.6. Accordingly, information constituting "contents"
+as used in Section 1801(f) can be acquired through the use of a PR/TT device, provided that it
+does not also constitute "contents" under Section 2510(8) and that it otherwise satisfies the
+statutory requirements for acquisition by PR/TT collection.
+
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+furnished or operated by any person engaged as a common carrier in providing or operating such
+facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign commerce." 50 U.S.C. § 1801(1). Reading
+those definitions together, then, “electronic surveillance” includes, among other things, the
+acquisition (1) by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device (2) of information
+concerning the identity of the parties to or the existence of any communication to or from a
+person in the United States, (3) when such information is acquired in the United States (4) while
+the communication is being carried on a wire, cable, or other like connection furnished or
+operated by a common carrier.
+The unauthorized portion of the prior PR/TT collection includes some information that
+meets all four of these criteria. First, there is no question that the prior collection was acquired
+through the use of "electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance devices." See, e.g., [REDACTED]
+Decl. at 9 (describing the use of “NSA-controlled equipment or devices” to “extract
+metadata for subsequent forwarding to NSA's repositories").
+Second, the overcollection included information concerning the identity of the parties to
+and the existence of communications to or from persons in the United States. Persons in the
+United States were parties to some of the communications for which data was acquired. See,
+e.g., [REDACTED] Application at 5-6 (stating that the collection will include metadata pertaining
+to persons within the United States); id. at 9 (stating that the "collection activity . . . will collect
+metadata from electronic communications that are: (1) between the United States and abroad; (2)
+between overseas locations; and (3) wholly within the United States"). And, as discussed above,
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+104
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+the unauthorized collection included:
+[REDACTED]
+All of these
+forms of information concern the existence of an associated communication, and many of them
+could also concern the identities of the communicants.
+Third, the data previously collected, both authorized and unauthorized, was acquired in
+the United States. See, e.g., [REDACTED] Application at 9 ("All of the collection activity
+described above will occur in the United States...."); [REDACTED] Opinion at 72-80 [REDACTED]
+Fourth, it appears that much, and perhaps all, of the information previously collected was
+acquired while the associated communication was "being carried by a wire, cable, or other like
+connection furnished or operated by any person engaged as a common carrier in providing or
+operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign commerce." See 50 U.S.C. §
+1801(1).
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+105
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+106
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON.NOFORN
+[REDACTED]
+For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that at least some of the data previously
+collected, including portions of the data that was not authorized by the Court's prior orders,
+constitutes unauthorized "electronic surveillance" under Section 1809(a)(2). But that does not
+complete the analysis. Section 1809 does not prohibit all disclosures or uses of unauthorized
+electronic surveillance; rather, it reaches disclosure or use only by "a person knowing or having
+reason to know" that the information was obtained through unauthorized electronic surveillance.
+The Court concludes that the knowledge requirement is satisfied for some of the prior
+unauthorized collection constituting electronic surveillance. The government has acknowledged
+that particular portions of the prior collection fell outside the scope of the Court's prior
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+107
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+authorizations. See generally [REDACTED] Report. Further, some of that unauthorized
+collection is identifiable as electronic surveillance – i.e., as information concerning the identity
+of the parties to or the existence of any communication to or from a person in the United States
+that was acquired in the United States while the communication was being carried on a wire,
+cable, or other like connection furnished or operated by a common carrier. As demonstrated
+above, the government's filings dating back to [REDACTED] demonstrate that most, if not all, of the
+information previously collected was acquired in the United States [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The government's descriptions of the
+overcollected information make clear that the information concerns the identity of the parties, the
+existence of the communication, or both. Finally, the information available to the government –
+e.g., e-mail identifiers [REDACTED] — is likely to make some of the data collected identifiable
+as concerning communications to or from a person in the United States. Accordingly, the Court
+concludes that the government officials responsible for using and making disclosures of bulk
+PR/TT-derived information know or have reason to know that portions of the prior collection
+constitute unauthorized electronic surveillance.⁸⁶
+
+⁸⁶ In the law enforcement context, courts have held that there is no statutory prohibition
+on the use – specifically, the evidentiary use – of the results of unlawful PR/TT surveillance.
+See, e.g., Forrester, supra, 512 F.3d at 512-13 (citing cases). Those decisions, however, do not
+address the potential application of Section 1809(a)(2), and so provide no basis for departing
+from the clear terms of that statutory prohibition. Indeed, Forrester recognized that suppression
+would be warranted if it were "clearly contemplated by [a] relevant statute” and stressed that the
+party seeking suppression had failed to "point to any statutory language requiring suppression."
+(continued...)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+108
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+b.
+### Section 1809(a)(2) Applies to the Prior Collection
+
+The government does not contest that portions of the prior collection contain information that the responsible officials know or have reason to know constitutes “electronic surveillance" that was collected without the necessary authority. Instead, the government offers several reasons why it believes Section 1809(a)(2) presents no bar to Court approval of use of the prior collection. The Court finds the government's contentions unpersuasive.
+
+The government argues that the opening phrase of 50 U.S.C. § 1842(a) vests the Court with authority to enter an order rendering Section 1809(a)(2) inapplicable. See Memorandum of Law at 74 n. 37. The Court disagrees. Section 1842(a), which is entitled "Application for authorization or approval," provides in pertinent part as follows:
+
+> Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Attorney General or a designated attorney for the government may make an application for an order or an extension of an order authorizing or approving the installation or use of a pen register or trap and trace device for any investigation to obtain foreign intelligence information....
+
+As the context makes clear, the opening phrase "[n]othwithstanding any other provision of law" in Section 1842 relates to the circumstances in which the government may apply for an order permitting it to install and use a PR/TT device for foreign intelligence purposes. It does not speak to the Court's authority to grant a request for permission to use and disclose information
+---
+86(...continued)
+Id. at 512; see also Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 382-84 (1937) (statute prohibiting any person from divulging the substance of interstate wire communications precluded testimony by law enforcement agents about such communications).
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+109
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+obtained in violation of prior orders authorizing the installation of PR/TT devices. Indeed, the
+Court finds nothing in the text of Section 1842 or the other provisions of FISA that can be read to
+confer such authority, particularly in the face of the clear prohibition set forth in Section
+1809(a)(2).
+The government next contends that because the Court has, in its prior orders, regulated
+access to and use of previously accumulated metadata, it follows that the Court may now
+authorize NSA to access and use all previously collected information, including information that
+was acquired outside the scope of prior authorizations, so long as the information "is within the
+scope of the [PR/TT] statute and the Constitution." Memorandum of Law at 73. But the
+government overstates the precedential significance of the Court's past practice. The fact that the
+Court has, at the government's invitation, exercised authority to limit the use of properly-
+acquired bulk PR/TT data does not support the conclusion that it also has authority to permit the
+use of improperly-acquired PR/TT information, especially when such use is criminally prohibited
+by Section 1809(a)(2).
+The Court has limited the access to and use of information collected in accordance with
+prior authorizations, in view of the sweeping and non-targeted nature of that collection. The
+Court has done so within a statutory framework that generally permits the government to make
+comparatively liberal use, for foreign intelligence purposes, of information acquired pursuant to
+PR/TT orders, and in which the Court generally has a relatively small role beyond the acquisition
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+110
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+stage. 87 Thus, the Court's prior orders in this matter are notable not because they permitted the
+use of PR/TT-acquired data – again, the statute itself generally allows the use and dissemination
+of properly-acquired PR/TT information for foreign intelligence purposes – but because they
+imposed restrictions on such use to account for the bulk and non-targeted nature of the
+collection. 88 The Court has never authorized the government to access and use information
+collected outside the scope of its prior orders in this matter. Indeed, in the prior instances in
+which the Court learned of overcollections, it has carefully monitored the disposition of the
+improperly-acquired information to ensure that it was not used or disseminated by the
+government. See pages 11-12, 14, _supra_.
+
+The government further contends that Rule 10(c) of the Rules of this Court gives the
+Court discretion to authorize access to and use of the overcollected information. Memorandum
+of Law at 73. The Court disagrees. Rule 10(c) requires the government, upon discovering that
+
+---
+
+87 As discussed above, unlike the provisions for electronic surveillance and physical
+search, _see_ 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1812, 1821-1829, the FISA PR/TT provisions do not require the
+application of Court-approved minimization procedures. In the context of Court-authorized
+electronic surveillance and physical searches, such procedures govern not only the acquisition of
+information, but also its retention and dissemination. _See_ 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h), 1821(4). Like
+the electronic surveillance and physical search provisions, the FISA PR/TT provisions limit the
+use and disclosure of information acquired for law enforcement and other non-foreign
+intelligence-related purposes. _Compare_ 50 U.S.C. § 1845 _with_ 50 U.S.C. § 1806.
+
+88 Contrary to the government's assertion, the imposition of restrictions on the use and
+dissemination of the data collected is not “unique” to the bulk PR/TT. Indeed, the Court restricts
+the government's use of [REDACTED]
+_See_, _e.g._, Docket No. PR/TT [REDACTED] Primary Order at 4.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+111
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+"any authority granted by the Court has been implemented in a manner that did not comply with
+the Court's authorization," to notify the Court of the incident and to explain, among other things,
+"how the government proposes to dispose of or treat any information obtained as a result of the
+non-compliance." FISC Rule 10(c). Rule 10 does not explicitly give the Court the authority to
+do anything. To be sure, the rule implicitly recognizes the Court's authority, subject to FISA and
+other applicable law, to ensure compliance with its orders and with applicable Court-approved
+procedures. It does not, however, state or suggest that the Court is free in the event of an
+overcollection to dictate any disposition of the overcollected material that it wishes, without
+regard to other provisions of law, such as Section 1809(a)(2).89
+Finally, insofar as the government suggests that the Court has inherent authority to permit
+the use and disclosure of all unauthorized collection without regard to Section 1809, see
+Memorandum of Law at 73-74 & n.37, the Court again must disagree. To be sure, this Court,
+like all other Article III courts, was vested upon its creation with certain inherent powers. See In
+[REDACTED]
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+112
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+re Motion for Release of Court Records, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, 486 (FISA Ct. 2007); see also
+Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) ("It has long been understood that [c]ertain
+implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature of their
+institution. . . ."). It is well settled, however, that the exercise of such authority "is invalid if it
+conflicts with constitutional or statutory provisions." Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 148 (1985).
+And defining crimes is not among the inherent powers of the federal courts; rather, federal crimes
+are defined by Congress and are solely creatures of statute. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S.
+614, 620-21 (1998); United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812). Accordingly,
+when Congress has spoken clearly, a court assessing the reach of a criminal statute must heed
+Congress's intent as reflected in the statutory text. See, e.g., Huddleston v. United States, 415
+U.S. 814, 831 (1974). The plain language of Section 1809(a)(2) makes it a crime for any person,
+acting under color of law, intentionally to use or disclose information with knowledge or reason
+to know that the information was obtained through unauthorized electronic surveillance. The
+Court simply lacks the power, inherent or otherwise, to authorize the government to engage in
+conduct that Congress has unambiguously prohibited.90
+90 In its [REDACTED] Response at page 4 n.1, the government added an alternative
+request for the Court to amend all prior bulk PR/TT orders nunc pro tunc to permit acquisition of
+the overcollected information. The Court denies that request. Nunc pro tunc relief is appropriate
+to conform the record to a court's original intent but is not a means to alter what was originally
+intended or what actually transpired. See, e.g., U.S. Philips Corp. v. KBC Bank N.V., 590 F.3d
+1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing cases). Here, the prior bulk PR/TT orders make clear that the
+Court intended to authorize the government to acquire only information [REDACTED]
+(continued...)
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+113
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny the government's request for authority to
+access and use portions of the accumulated prior PR/TT collection constituting information that
+the government knows or has reason to know was obtained through electronic surveillance not
+authorized by the Court's prior orders.
+c. Portions of the Unauthorized Collection Falling Outside the Scope
+of Section 1809(a)(2)
+There is one additional category of information to consider – overcollected information
+that is not subject to Section 1809(a)(2). The Court is not well positioned to attempt a
+comprehensive description of the particular types of information that are subject (or not) to
+Section 1809(a)(2)'s prohibition, but it appears that some of the overcollected data is likely to
+fall outside its reach. For example, NSA may have no way to determine based on the available
+information whether a particular piece of data relates to a communication obtained from the
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Similarly, it may not be apparent from available
+information whether the communication to which a piece of data relates is to or from a person in
+the United States, such that acquisition constituted electronic surveillance as defined at Section
+1801(f)(2).
+90(...continued)
+[REDACTED] categories. Nunc pro tunc relief would thus be inappropriate here. See page 14,
+supra (discussing an instance in which the Court declined to grant a comparable request for nunc
+pro tunc relief).
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+114
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+When it is not known, and there is no reason to know, that a piece of information was
+acquired through electronic surveillance that was not authorized by the Court's prior orders, the
+information is not subject to the criminal prohibition in Section 1809(a)(2). Of course,
+government officials may not avoid the strictures of Section 1809(a)(2) by cultivating a state of
+deliberate ignorance when reasonable inquiry would likely establish that information was indeed
+obtained through unauthorized electronic surveillance. See, e.g., United States v. Whitehill, 532
+F.3d 746, 751 (8th Cir.) (where "failure to investigate is equivalent to 'burying one's head in the
+sand,'" willful blindness may constitute knowledge), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 610 (2008).
+However, when it is not known, and there is genuinely no reason to know, that a piece of
+information was acquired through electronic surveillance that was not authorized by the Court's
+prior orders, the information is not subject to the criminal prohibition in Section 1809(a)(2).
+The Court is satisfied that neither Section 1809(a)(2) nor any other provision of law
+precludes it from authorizing the government to access and use this category of information. The
+bigger question here is whether the Court should grant such authority. Given NSA's
+longstanding and pervasive violations of the prior orders in this matter, the Court believes that it
+would be acting well within its discretion in precluding the government from accessing or using
+such information. Barring any use of the information would provide a strong incentive for the
+exercise of greater care in this massive collection by the executive branch officials responsible
+for ensuring compliance with the Court's orders and other applicable requirements. On the other
+hand, the government has asserted that it has a strong national security interest in accessing and
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+115
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+using the overcollected information. The Court has no basis to question that assertion.
+Furthermore, high-level officials at the Department of Justice and NSA have personally assured
+the Court that they will closely monitor the acquisition and use of the bulk PR/TT collection to
+ensure that the law, as reflected in the Court's orders, is carefully followed by all responsible
+officials and employees. In light of the government's assertions of need, and in heavy reliance on
+the assurances of the responsible officials, the Court is prepared – albeit reluctantly – to grant the
+government's request with respect to information that is not subject to Section 1809(a)(2)'s
+prohibition. Hence, the government may access, use, and disseminate such information subject
+to the restrictions and procedures described above that will apply to future collection.
+The Court expects the responsible executive branch officials to act with care and in good
+faith in determining which portions of the prior collection are subject to Section 1809(a)(2)'s
+prohibition. The authorization to use overcollected information falling outside the scope of the
+criminal prohibition should not be understood as an invitation to disregard information that, if
+pursued, would create a reason to know that data was obtained by unauthorized electronic
+surveillance within the meaning of Section 1809(a)(2). The Court also expects the government
+to keep it reasonably apprised with regard to efforts to segregate those portions of the prior
+collection that it intends to use from the portions it is prohibited from using. Accordingly, the
+Court will order that each of the 30-day reports described above include a description of those
+efforts.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+116
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+
+VI. Conclusion
+
+For all the reasons set forth herein, the government's application will be granted in part
+and denied in part. Accompanying Primary and Secondary Orders are being issued
+contemporaneously with this Memorandum Opinion.
+
+Signed [REDACTED] P02:37 E.T.
+Date Time
+
+JOHN D. BATES
+Judge, United States Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN
+117
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ODNI_-_CLEANEDPRTT_2/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ODNI_-_CLEANEDPRTT_2/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f10145a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ODNI_-_CLEANEDPRTT_2/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+{
+ "title": "PR-TT Memorandum Opinion",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "FISC",
+ "date_created": "",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "ORCON, NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2014-08-12",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/pr-tt-memorandum-opinion",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "pdf_sha256": "e07b972b59a12c5fa19cb210e1190cae6dc23e22f3aeed22f0f0d31a47330e11",
+ "pages": 117
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ODNI_-_HJC_SJC_Mobility_Records_CN_1Sept11-Sealed-FINAL/ODNI_-_HJC_SJC_Mobility_Records_CN_1Sept11-Sealed-FINAL.md b/data/FOIA/ODNI_-_HJC_SJC_Mobility_Records_CN_1Sept11-Sealed-FINAL/ODNI_-_HJC_SJC_Mobility_Records_CN_1Sept11-Sealed-FINAL.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a077cb7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ODNI_-_HJC_SJC_Mobility_Records_CN_1Sept11-Sealed-FINAL/ODNI_-_HJC_SJC_Mobility_Records_CN_1Sept11-Sealed-FINAL.md
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+All redacted information exempt under (b)(1) and (b)(3) except as otherwise noted.
+
+DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
+UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
+
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000
+
+SEP 01 2011
+
+MEMORANDUM FOR:
+STAFF DIRECTOR AND MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
+
+SUBJECT: (TS//SI//NF) Congressional Notification - NSA Acquisition and Use of Telephony Metadata from Cellular Network Call Detail Records - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
+
+(TS//SI//NF) This is to inform the Committee that, in addition to the telephony metadata the National Security Agency (NSA) has been acquiring since 2006 under its counterterrorism Business Records (BR) Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Act (FISA) program, NSA has begun to acquire and analyze telephony metadata derived from cellular network or "mobility" call detail records (CDRs) [REDACTED] The cellular telephony metadata is being produced pursuant to an order issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) pursuant to Section 501 (50 U.S.C. § 1861) of FISA. As the Committee is aware, the orders issued by the FISC strictly control the circumstances under which NSA may access (query), use, and disseminate information obtained under this bulk collection program.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) NSA analyzes this metadata to discover and develop the networks and associations of known and suspected terrorists. Until this change, NSA had been acquiring approximately [REDACTED] CDRs per day for billed long distance telephone calls to or from landline telephones either (a) between the U.S. and abroad; or (b) wholly within the U.S., including local telephone calls. [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Before initiating the acquisition of mobility data, NSA undertook extensive testing to ensure strict compliance with the terms of the FISC Orders. The Court's Orders are designed to protect the civil liberties and privacy interests of Americans. Following completion of the testing, on 29 August 2011, NSA began to receive approximately [REDACTED] CDRs per day and enter these records into our BR FISA bulk metadata architecture.
+
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20070108
+Declassify On: 20320108
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+(TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED] NSA requested that the [REDACTED] remove the cell location information [REDACTED] before providing the CDRs to NSA. Consequently, NSA is not currently receiving this field as part of the data
+being acquired. [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The collection and processing of [REDACTED] is critical to the success of NSA's BR FISA program. We will continue to keep you informed of our progress in this area. Should you have questions or want additional information, please contact me at [REDACTED]
+
+ETHAN L. BAUMAN
+Director, Legislative Affairs Office
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
+UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
+
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000
+
+SEP 01 2011
+
+MEMORANDUM FOR:
+STAFF DIRECTOR AND MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR, SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
+
+SUBJECT: (TS//SI//NF) Congressional Notification - NSA Acquisition and Use of Telephony Metadata from Cellular Network Call Detail Records - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
+
+(TS//SI//NF) This is to inform the Committee that, in addition to the telephony metadata the National Security Agency (NSA) has been acquiring since 2006 under its counterterrorism Business Records (BR) Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Act (FISA) program, NSA has begun to acquire and analyze telephony metadata derived from cellular network or "mobility" call detail records (CDRs) [REDACTED] The cellular telephony metadata is being produced pursuant to an order issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) pursuant to Section 501 (50 U.S.C. § 1861) of FISA. As the Committee is aware, the orders issued by the FISC strictly control the circumstances under which NSA may access (query), use, and disseminate information obtained under this bulk collection program.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) NSA analyzes this metadata to discover and develop the networks and associations of known and suspected terrorists. Until this change, NSA had been acquiring approximately [REDACTED] CDRs per day for billed long distance telephone calls to or from landline telephones either (a) between the U.S. and abroad; or (b) wholly within the U.S., including local telephone calls. [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Before initiating the acquisition of mobility data, NSA undertook extensive testing to ensure strict compliance with the terms of the FISC Orders. The Court's Orders are designed to protect the civil liberties and privacy interests of Americans. Following completion of the testing, on 29 August 2011, NSA began to receive approximately [REDACTED] CDRs per day and enter these records into our BR FISA bulk metadata architecture.
+
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20070108
+Declassify On: 20320108
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+(TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED] NSA requested that the [REDACTED] remove the cell location information [REDACTED] before providing the CDRs to NSA. Consequently, NSA is not currently receiving this field as part of the data being acquired.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The collection and processing of [REDACTED] is critical to the success of NSA's BR FISA program. We will continue to keep you informed of our progress in this area. Should you have questions or want additional information, please contact me at [REDACTED]
+
+ETHAN L. BAUMAN
+Director, Legislative Affairs Office
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOIA/ODNI_-_HJC_SJC_Mobility_Records_CN_1Sept11-Sealed-FINAL/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/ODNI_-_HJC_SJC_Mobility_Records_CN_1Sept11-Sealed-FINAL/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f61b5bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/ODNI_-_HJC_SJC_Mobility_Records_CN_1Sept11-Sealed-FINAL/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+{
+ "title": "NSA Memo: Congressional Notification & NSA Acquisition and Use of Telephony Metadata",
+ "type": "foia",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "An NSA memo to notify the House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary of the collection of telephony metadata under Section 501 of FISA. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2011-09-01",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Bauman, Ethan L."
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "2013-10-28",
+ "link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/nsa-memo-congressional-notification-nsa-acquisition-and-use-telephony-metadata",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "ade7b583601004eddf226aa44a94449f4e5182fb0645f4aa5b3680d6e92f796d",
+ "pages": 4
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/doj-14-0228/doj-14-0228.md b/data/FOIA/doj-14-0228/doj-14-0228.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4a421b2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/doj-14-0228/doj-14-0228.md
@@ -0,0 +1,820 @@
+MAB
+USDOUNG
+2/28/14
+SECRET
+
+THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT ON THE USE
+OF PEN REGISTERS AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES
+UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+April 2001
+
+This report is submitted pursuant to the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the "Act"), 50 U.S.C.
+§§ 1801-1811, 1841-1846, as amended, by Pub. L. No. 105-272, 112
+Stat. 2404-2413 (1998), and covers all applications to use pen
+registers and trap and trace devices conducted under the Act
+during the period July 1, 2000 through December 31, 2000. (U)
+
+The Government filed five applications with the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) seeking authorization to
+use pen registers and/or trap and trace devices during this
+period. The Court authorized the use of the pen registers and/or
+trap and trace devices as requested in all five applications.
+(S)
+
+SECRET
+
+Classified by: James A. Baker, Deputy Counsel
+ for Intelligence Operations, Office of
+ Intelligence Policy and Review, U.S.
+ Department of Justice
+Reason: 1.5(c)
+Declassify on: X1, X6
+
+MAB
+2/28/14
+SECRET
+
+THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT ON THE USE
+OF PEN REGISTERS AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES
+UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+December 2001
+
+This report is submitted pursuant to the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the "Act"), 50 U.S.C.
+§§ 1801-1811, 1841-1846, as amended, by Pub. L. No. 105-272, 112
+Stat. 2404-2413 (1998), and covers all applications to use pen
+registers and trap and trace devices conducted under the Act
+during the period January 1, 2001 through June 30, 2001. (U)
+
+The Government filed two applications with the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) seeking authorization to
+use pen registers and/or trap and trace devices during this
+period. The Court authorized the use of the pen registers and/or
+trap and trace devices as requested in the two applications.
+(S)
+
+SECRET
+
+Classified by: James A. Baker, Acting Counsel
+ for Intelligence Policy, Office of
+ Intelligence Policy and Review, U.S.
+ Department of Justice
+Reason: 1.5(e)
+Declassify on: X1, X6
+
+MAB
+2/28/14
+SECRET
+
+THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT ON THE USE
+OF PEN REGISTERS AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES
+UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+April 2002
+
+This report is submitted pursuant to the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the "Act"), 50 U.S.C.
+§§ 1801-1811, 1841-1846, as amended, and covers all applications
+to use pen registers and trap and trace devices conducted under
+the Act during the period July 1, 2001 through December 31, 2001.
+(U)
+
+The Government filed twelve applications with the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) seeking authorization to
+use pen registers and/or trap and trace devices during this
+period. The Court authorized the use of the pen registers and/or
+trap and trace devices as requested in all twelve applications.
+(S)
+
+SECRET
+
+Classified by: James A. Baker, Counsel
+ for Intelligence Policy, Office of
+ Intelligence Policy and Review, U.S.
+ Department of Justice
+Reason: 1.5(e)
+Declassify on: X1, X6
+
+MAB
+2/28/14
+SECRET
+
+THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT ON THE USE
+OF PEN REGISTERS AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES
+UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+December 2002
+
+This report is submitted pursuant to the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the "Act"), 50 U.S.C.
+§§ 1801-1811, 1841-1846, as amended, and covers all applications
+to use pen registers and trap and trace devices conducted under
+the Act during the period January 1, 2002 through June 30, 2002.
+(U)
+
+The Government filed 29 applications with the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) seeking authorization to
+use pen registers and/or trap and trace devices during this
+period. The Court authorized the use of the pen registers and/or
+trap and trace devices as requested in all 29 applications.
+(S)
+
+SECRET
+
+Classified by: James A. Baker, Counsel
+ for Intelligence Policy, Office of
+ Intelligence Policy and Review, U.S.
+ Department of Justice
+Reason: 1.5(c)
+Declassify on: X1, X6
+
+MAB
+2/28/14
+SECRET
+
+THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT ON THE USE
+OF PEN REGISTERS AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES
+UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+September 2003
+
+This report is submitted pursuant to the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the "Act"), 50 U.S.C.
+§§ 1801-1811, 1841-1846, as amended, and covers all applications
+to use pen registers and trap and trace devices conducted under
+the Act during the period July 1, 2002 through December 31, 2002.
+(U)
+
+The Government filed 42 applications with the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) seeking authorization to
+use pen registers and/or trap and trace devices during this
+period. The Court authorized the use of the pen registers and/or
+trap and trace devices as requested in all 42 applications.
+(S)
+
+SECRET
+
+Classified by: James A. Baker, Counsel
+ for Intelligence Policy, Office of
+ Intelligence Policy and Review, U.S.
+ Department of Justice
+Reason: 1.5(e)
+Declassify on: X1, X6
+
+MAB
+2/28/14
+SECRET
+
+THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT ON THE USE
+OF PEN REGISTERS AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES
+UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+December 2003
+
+This report is submitted pursuant to the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the "Act"), 50 U.S.C.
+§§ 1801-1811, 1841-1846, as amended, and covers all applications
+to use pen registers and trap and trace devices conducted under
+the Act during the period January 1, 2003 through June 30, 2003.
+(U)
+
+The Government filed 80 applications with the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) seeking authorization to
+use pen registers and/or trap and trace devices during this
+period. The Court authorized the use of the pen registers and/or
+trap and trace devices as requested in all 80 applications. (S)
+
+SECRET
+
+Classified by: James A. Baker, Counsel
+ for Intelligence Policy, Office of
+ Intelligence Policy and Review, U.S.
+ Department of Justice
+Reason: 1.4(e)
+Declassify on: X1, X6
+
+MAB
+SECRET
+2/28/14
+
+THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT ON THE USE
+OF PEN REGISTERS AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES
+UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+December 2004
+
+This report is submitted pursuant to the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the "Act"), 50 U.S.C.
+§§ 1841-1846, as amended, and covers all applications to use pen
+registers and trap and trace devices conducted under the Act
+during the period January 1, 2004 through June 30, 2004. (U)
+
+The Government filed 119 applications with the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) seeking authorization to
+use pen registers and/or trap and trace devices during this
+period. The Court authorized the use of the pen registers and/or
+trap and trace devices in all 119 applications. The Court made
+modifications to five proposed orders submitted with these
+applications.
+(S)
+
+SECRET
+
+Classified by: James A. Baker, Counsel
+ for Intelligence Policy, Office of
+ Intelligence Policy and Review, U.S.
+ Department of Justice
+Reason: 1.4(c)
+Declassify on: X1, X6
+
+MAB
+2/28/14
+SECRET
+
+THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT ON THE USE
+OF PEN REGISTERS AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES
+UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+June 2005
+
+This report is submitted pursuant to the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the "Act"), 50 U.S.C.
+§§ 1841-1846, as amended, and covers all applications to use pen
+registers and trap and trace devices conducted under the Act
+during the period July 1, 2004 through December 31, 2004. (U)
+
+The Government filed 184 applications with the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) seeking authorization to
+use pen registers and/or trap and trace devices during this
+period. The FISC authorized the use of the pen registers and/or
+trap and trace devices in all 184 applications. The Court made
+modifications to six proposed orders submitted with these
+applications.
+(S)
+
+SECRET
+
+Classified by: James A. Baker, Counsel
+ for Intelligence Policy, Office of
+ Intelligence Policy and Review, U.S.
+ Department of Justice
+Reason: 1.4(c)
+Declassify on: X1, X6
+
+MAB
+2/28/14
+SECRET
+
+THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT ON THE USE OF PEN
+REGISTERS AND/OR TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES
+UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+December 2005
+
+This report is submitted pursuant to the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the "Act"), 50 U.S.C.
+§§ 1841-1846, as amended, and covers all applications to use pen
+register and/or trap and trace devices conducted under the Act
+during the period January 1, 2005, through June 30, 2005.
+(U)
+
+The Government filed 157 applications with the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) seeking authorization to
+use pen register and/or trap and trace devices during this
+period. Of these 157 applications,
+[REDACTED]
+in conjunction with the Court-authorized installation
+and use of pen register and/or trap and trace devices. The FISC
+authorized the use of the pen register and/or trap and trace
+devices in all 157 applications. The Court made modifications to
+two proposed orders submitted with these applications. (S)
+
+SECRET
+
+Classified by: James A. Baker, Counsel for
+ Intelligence Policy, Office of
+ Intelligence Policy and Review,
+ U.S. Department of Justice
+Reason: 1.4(c)
+Declassify on: X1, X6
+
+MAB
+2/28/14
+SECRET
+
+THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT ON THE USE OF PEN
+REGISTERS AND/OR TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES
+UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+June 2006
+
+This report is submitted pursuant to the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the "Act"), 50 U.S.C.
+§§ 1841-1846, as amended, and covers all applications to use pen
+register and/or trap and trace devices conducted under the Act
+during the period July 1, 2005, through December 31, 2005. (U)
+
+During this reporting period, the Government filed 161
+applications with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+(FISC) seeking authorization to use pen register and/or trap and
+trace devices during this period. The FISC approved all 161
+applications filed by the Government during this reporting
+period. The FISC modified the proposed order(s) submitted with
+two of the 161 applications that it approved during this
+reporting period. (S)
+
+During this reporting period, the Attorney General did not
+approve the installation and use of any pen register and/or trap
+and trace devices on an emergency basis pursuant to 50 U.S.C.
+§ 1843.
+(S)
+
+SECRET
+
+Classified by: James A. Baker, Counsel for
+ Intelligence Policy, Office of
+ Intelligence Policy and Review,
+ U.S. Department of Justice
+Reason: 1.4(c)
+Declassify on: X1, X6
+
+MAB
+2/28/14
+SECRET
+
+THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT ON THE USE OF
+PEN REGISTERS AND/OR TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES
+UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+December 2006
+
+This report is submitted pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Act of 1978 (the "Act"), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1846, as
+amended, and covers all applications to use pen register and/or trap
+and trace devices conducted under the Act during the period January
+1. 2006, through June 30, 2006. (U)
+
+During this reporting period, the government filed 120
+applications with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC)
+seeking authorization to use pen register and/or trap and trace
+devices during this period. The FISC approved all 120 applications
+filed by the government during this reporting period. The FISC
+modified the proposed order(s) submitted with five of the 120
+applications that it approved during this reporting period.
+(S)
+
+During this reporting period, the Attorney General did not
+approve the installation and use of any pen register and/or trap
+and trace devices on an emergency basis pursuant to
+50 U.S.C. § 1843.
+(S)
+
+SECRET
+
+Classified by: James A. Baker, Counsel for
+ Intelligence Policy, Office of
+ Intelligence Policy and Review,
+ U.S. Department of Justice
+Reason: 1.4(c)
+Declassify on: X1, X6
+
+MAB
+SECRET
+2/28/14
+
+THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT ON THE USE OF PEN
+REGISTERS AND/OR TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES
+UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+June 2007
+
+This report is submitted pursuant to the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the "Act"), 50 U.S.C.
+§§ 1841-1846, as amended, and covers all applications to use pen
+register and/or trap and trace devices conducted under the Act
+during the period July 1, 2006, through December 31, 2006. (U)
+
+During this reporting period, the Government filed 98
+applications with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+(FISC) seeking authorization to use pen register and/or trap and
+trace devices during this period. The FISC approved all 98
+applications filed by the Government during this reporting
+period. The FISC modified the proposed order(s) submitted with
+18 of the 98 applications that it approved during this reporting
+period.
+(S)
+
+During this reporting period, the Attorney General
+approved the installation and use on [REDACTED] occasions of pen
+register and/or trap and trace devices on an emergency basis
+pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1843.
+(S)
+
+SECRET
+
+Classified by: Margaret A. Skelly-Nolen
+ Acting Counsel for Intelligence Policy
+ National Security Division
+ U.S. Department of Justice
+Reason: 1.4(e)
+Declassify on: June 30, 2032
+
+MAB
+SECRET
+2/14/20
+
+THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT ON THE USE OF PEN
+REGISTERS AND/OR TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES
+UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+December 2007
+
+This report is submitted pursuant to the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the "Act"), 50 U.S.C.
+§§ 1841-1846, as amended, and covers all applications to use pen
+register and/or trap and trace devices conducted under the Act
+during the period January 1, 2007, through June 30, 2007.
+(U)
+
+During this reporting period, the Government filed 117
+applications with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+(FISC) seeking authorization to use pen register and/or trap and
+trace devices during this period. The FISC modified the
+proposed order(s) submitted with 10 of the 117 applications that
+it approved during this reporting period.
+(S)
+
+The Attorney General did not approve the installation and
+use of any pen register and/or trap and trace devices on an
+emergency basis pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1843 during this
+reporting period.
+(S)
+
+SECRET
+
+Classified by: Margaret A. Skelly-Nolen
+ Acting Counsel for Intelligence Policy
+ National Security Division
+ U.S. Department of Justice
+Reason: 1.4(e)
+Declassify on: December 14, 2032
+
+MAB
+2/28/14
+SECRET
+
+THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT ON THE USE OF PEN
+REGISTERS AND/OR TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES
+UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+June 2008
+
+This report is submitted pursuant to the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the "Act"), 50 U.S.C.
+§§ 1841-1846, as amended, and covers all applications to use pen
+register and/or trap and trace devices conducted under the Act
+during the period July 1, 2007, through December 31, 2007. (U)
+
+During this reporting period, the Government filed 129
+applications with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+(FISC) seeking authorization to use pen register and/or trap and
+trace devices during this period. The FISC modified the
+proposed order(s) submitted with seven of the 129 applications
+that it approved during this reporting period.
+(S)
+
+The Attorney General approved the installation and use of
+pen register and/or trap and trace devices on an
+emergency basis pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1843 during this
+reporting period.
+(S)
+
+SECRET
+
+Classified by: Matthew G. Olsen
+ Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+ National Security Division
+ U.S. Department of Justice
+Reason: 1.4(c)
+Declassify on: June 15, 2033
+
+MAB
+2/28/14
+SECRET
+
+REPORT OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ON
+THE USE OF PEN REGISTERS AND/OR TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES
+UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+December 2008 Report
+
+This report is submitted pursuant to the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the "Act"), 50 U.S.C.
+§§ 1841-1846, as amended, and covers all applications to use pen
+register and/or trap and trace devices conducted under the Act
+during the period January 1, 2008, through June 30, 2008. (U)
+
+During this reporting period, the Government filed 110
+applications with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+(FISC) seeking authorization to use pen register and/or trap and
+trace devices during this period. The FISC modified the
+proposed order(s) submitted with four of the 110 applications
+that it approved during this reporting period.
+(S)
+
+(S)
+The Attorney General approved the installation and use of
+pen register and/or trap and trace devices on an emergency
+[REDACTED] is pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1843 during this reporting period.
+
+SECRET
+
+Classified by: Matthew G. Olsen, Deputy Assistant
+ Attorney General, National Security
+ Division, U.S. Department of Justice
+Reason: 1.4(c)
+Declassify on: December 30, 2033
+
+MAB
+2/28/14
+SECRET
+
+REPORT OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ON
+THE USE OF PEN REGISTERS AND/OR TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES
+UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+Report for the Period from July 1, 2008 through December 31, 2008
+
+This report is submitted pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
+(the Act), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1846, as amended, and covers all applications to use pen register
+and/or trap and trace devices conducted under the Act during the period July 1, 2008, through
+December 31, 2008. (U)
+
+During this reporting period, the Government filed 58 applications with the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) seeking authorization to use pen register and/or trap and
+trace devices during this period. The FISC modified the proposed order(s) submitted with one of
+the 58 applications that it approved during this reporting period. (S)
+
+The Attorney General approved the installation and use of [REDACTED] pen register and/or trap
+and trace devices on an emergency basis pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1843 during this reporting
+period. (S)
+
+SECRET
+
+Classified by: David S. Kris, Assistant Attorney
+ General, NSD, DOJ
+Reason: 1.4(e)
+Declassify on: 29 December 2034
+
+MAB
+2/28/14
+SECRET
+
+REPORT OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ON
+THE USE OF PEN REGISTERS AND/OR TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES
+UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+December 2009 Report
+
+This report is submitted pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
+(the Act), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1846, as amended, and covers all applications to use pen register
+and/or trap and trace devices conducted under the Act during the period January 1, 2009
+through June 30, 2009. (U)
+
+During this reporting period, the Government filed 39 applications with the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) seeking authorization to use pen register and/or trap and
+trace devices during this period. The FISC issued a supplemental order with one of the 39
+applications that it approved during this reporting period. (S)
+
+The Attorney General approved the installation and use of [REDACTED] pen register and/or
+trap and trace devices on an emergency basis pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1843 during this
+reporting period. (S)
+
+SECRET
+
+Classified by: David S. Kris, Assistant Attorney
+ General, NSD, DOJ
+Reason: 1.4(e)
+Declassify on: 28 December 2034
+
+MAB
+2/28/14
+SECRET
+
+REPORT OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ON
+THE USE OF PEN REGISTERS AND/OR TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES
+UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+June 2010
+
+This report is submitted pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
+(the Act), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1846, as amended, and covers all applications to use pen register
+and/or trap and trace devices conducted under the Act during the period July 1, 2009 through
+December 31, 2009. (U)
+
+During this reporting period, the Government filed 53 applications with the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) seeking authorization to use pen register and/or trap and
+trace devices during this period. (S)
+
+The Attorney General approved the installation and use of [REDACTED] pen register and/or trap
+and trace devices on an emergency basis pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1843 during this reporting
+period. (S)
+
+SECRET
+
+Classified by: David S. Kris, Assistant Attorney
+ General, NSD, DOJ
+Reason: 1.4(e)
+Declassify on: 30-June-2035
+
+MAB
+2/20/14
+SECRET
+
+REPORT OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ON
+THE USE OF PEN REGISTERS AND/OR TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES
+UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+December 2010 Report
+
+This report is submitted pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
+(the Act), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1846, as amended, and covers all applications to use pen register
+and/or trap and trace devices conducted under the Act during the period from January 1, 2010
+through June 30, 2010. (U)
+
+During this reporting period, the Government filed 78 applications with the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) seeking authorization to use pen register and/or trap and
+trace devices during this period. (S)
+
+The Attorney General approved the installation and use of [REDACTED] pen register and/or
+trap and trace devices on an emergency basis pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1843 during this
+reporting period. (S)
+
+SECRET
+
+Classified by: David S. Kris, Assistant Attorney
+ General, NSD, DOJ
+Reason: 1.4(e)
+Declassify on: 30 December 2035
+
+MAB
+2/28/14
+SECRET
+
+REPORT OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ON
+THE USE OF PEN REGISTERS AND/OR TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES
+UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+June 2011 Report
+
+This report is submitted pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
+(the Act), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1846, as amended, and covers all applications to use pen register
+and/or trap and trace devices conducted under the Act during the period from July 1, 2010
+through December 31, 2010. (U)
+
+During this reporting period, the Government filed 49 applications with the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) seeking authorization to use pen register and/or trap and
+trace devices during this period; [REDACTED]
+(S)
+
+The Attorney General approved the installation and use of [REDACTED] pen register and/or
+trap and trace devices on an emergency basis pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1843 during this
+reporting period. (S)
+
+SECRET
+
+Classified by: Tashina Gauhar, Deputy Assistant Attorney
+ General, NSD, DOJ
+Reason: 1.4(c)
+Declassify on: 30 June 2036
+
+MAB
+2/28/14
+SECRET
+
+REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON
+THE USE OF PEN REGISTERS AND/OR TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES
+UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+December 2011 Report
+
+This report is submitted pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
+(the Act), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1846, as amended, and covers all applications to use pen register
+and/or trap and trace devices conducted under the Act during the period from January 1, 2011
+through June 30, 2011. (U)
+
+During this reporting period, the Government filed 55 applications with the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) seeking authorization to use pen register and/or trap and
+trace devices during this period. Four of these applications were filed during the reporting
+period, but approved outside the reporting period. Thus, the FISC approved 51 pen register/trap
+and trace applications during the reporting period. [REDACTED]
+(S)
+
+The Attorney General approved the installation and use of [REDACTED] pen register and/or trap
+and trace devices on an emergency basis pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1843 during the reporting
+period. (S)
+
+SECRET
+
+Classified by: Lisa O. Monaco, Assistant Attorney
+ General, NSD, DOJ
+Reason: 1.4(e)
+Declassify on: 31-December 2036
+
+MAB
+2/20/2014
+SECRET
+
+REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON
+THE USE OF PEN REGISTERS AND/OR TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES
+UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+June 2012
+
+This report is submitted pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
+(the Act), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1846, as amended, and covers all applications to use pen register
+and/or trap and trace devices conducted under the Act during the period from July 1, 2011
+through December 31, 2011. (U)
+
+During this reporting period, the Government filed 53 applications with the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) seeking authorization to use pen register and/or trap and
+trace devices during this period. Four applications were filed before the reporting period, but
+were approved during the reporting period. Thus, the FISC approved 56 pen register/trap and
+trace applications during the reporting period. The FISC did not deny in whole, or in part, any
+pen register/trap and trace applications during the reporting period. Two pen register/trap and
+trace applications were substantively modified by the FISC. (S)
+
+The Attorney General approved the installation and use of [REDACTED] pen register and/or trap
+and trace device on an emergency basis pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1843 during the reporting
+period. (S)
+
+SECRET
+
+Classified by: Lisa O. Monaco, Assistant Attorney
+ General, NSD, DOJ
+Reason: 1.4(e)
+Declassify on: 30 June-2037
+
+MAB
+2/20/14
+SECRET
+
+REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON
+THE USE OF PEN REGISTERS AND/OR TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES
+UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+December 2012
+
+This report is submitted pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
+(the Act), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1846, as amended, and covers all applications to use pen register
+and/or trap and trace devices (PR/TT) conducted pursuant to the Act during the period from
+January 1, 2012 through June 30, 2012. (U)
+
+During this reporting period, the Government filed 64 applications with the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) seeking authorization to use PR/TT devices. The FISC
+approved all 64 PR/TT applications filed during the reporting period. The FISC did not deny in
+whole, or in part, any PR/TT applications during the reporting period. No PR/TT applications
+were substantively modified by the FISC. (S)
+
+The Attorney General approved the installation and use of [REDACTED] PR/TT devices on an
+emergency basis pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1843 during the reporting period. (S)
+
+SECRET
+
+Classified by: Lisa O. Monaco, Assistant Attorney
+ General, NSD, DOJ
+Reason: 1.4(c)
+Declassify on: 31 December 2037
+
+MAB
+SECRET
+2/28/14
+
+REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON
+THE USE OF PEN REGISTERS AND/OR TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES
+UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
+
+June 2013
+
+(U) This report is submitted pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
+1978 (the Act), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1846, as amended, and covers all applications to use pen
+register and/or trap and trace devices (PR/TT) conducted pursuant to the Act during the period
+from July 1, 2012 through December 31, 2012.
+
+(S) During this reporting period, the Government filed 69 applications with the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) seeking authorization to use PR/TT devices. The FISC
+approved all 69 PR/TT applications filed during the reporting period. The FISC did not deny in
+whole, or in part, any PR/TT applications during the reporting period. No PR/TT applications
+were substantively modified by the FISC.
+
+(S) The Attorney General approved the installation and use of [REDACTED] PR/TT devices on an
+emergency basis pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1843 during the reporting period.
+
+SECRET
+
+Classified by: The Attorney General
+Reason: 1.4(e)
+Declassify on: 30-June 2038
diff --git a/data/FOIA/doj-14-0228/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/doj-14-0228/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dd7ffa2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/doj-14-0228/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+{
+ "title": "THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT ON THE USE OF PEN REGISTERS AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "DOJ",
+ "date_created": "",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
+ "date_published": "",
+ "link": "https://web.archive.org/web/20140303162110/https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/03/us/politics/documents-released-on-us-wiretapping-since-sept-11-terrorist-attacks.html",
+ "reporters": [],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "pdf_sha256": "4fc3aca22b60e6a651ca2463c8c85bc21b17489eed14c7bea05052fc7d2ad7dd",
+ "pages": 24
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/savage_foia_stellarwind_ig_report/metadata.json b/data/FOIA/savage_foia_stellarwind_ig_report/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dd66057
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/savage_foia_stellarwind_ig_report/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+{
+ "title": "Savage-FOIA-Stellarwind IG Report",
+ "type": "FOIA",
+ "collection": "foia",
+ "description": "In response to a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit by The New York Times, the government has declassified a 2009 report by five agencies’ inspectors general about the Stellarwind program, the group of N.S.A. warrantless wiretapping and bulk phone and e-mail records collection activities initiated by President George W. Bush after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. In 2009, the government released a 43-page unclassified version which omitted discussion of many key facts that then remained secret. After the 2013 leaks by the former intelligence contractor Edward J. Snowden, which included a draft version of the N.S.A. inspector general’s contribution to this larger joint I.G. report, the government declassified many facts about surveillance, leading to The Times’ lawsuit seeking release of the full and final report.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "USG",
+ "date_created": "2009-07-10",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "STLW",
+ "HCS",
+ "COMINT",
+ "ORCON"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "programs": [
+ "STELLARWIND",
+ "PSP"
+ ],
+ "countries": [
+ "Afghanistan"
+ ],
+ "people": [
+ "McCraw, David",
+ "Kutner, Jeremy",
+ "Bharara, Preet",
+ "Clopper, John D.",
+ "Daughtry, Emily",
+ "Fine, Glenn A.",
+ "Heddell, Gordon S.",
+ "Lewis, Patricia A.",
+ "Ellard, George",
+ "Mazer, Roslyn A.",
+ "Bush, George W.",
+ "Gonzales, Alberto R.",
+ "Comey, James B.",
+ "Mueller, Robert S.",
+ "Rumsfeld, Donald H.",
+ "Hayden, Michael",
+ "Goss, Porter",
+ "Alexander, Keith B.",
+ "Negroponte, John D.",
+ "McConnell, J. M.",
+ "Brennan, John O.",
+ "Wolfowitz, Paul D.",
+ "Card, Andrew H.",
+ "Addington, David S.",
+ "Cheney, Dick",
+ "Ashcroft, John D.",
+ "Yoo, John",
+ "Tenet, George J.",
+ "Philbin, Patrick F.",
+ "Bradbury, Steven G.",
+ "bin Laden, Osama",
+ "Rizzo, John A.",
+ "Bybee, Jay S.",
+ "Pelosi, Nancy",
+ "Goss, Porter J.",
+ "Graham, Robert D.",
+ "Shelby, Richard C.",
+ "Lamberth, Royce",
+ "Baker, James A.",
+ "Kollar-Kotelly, Colleen",
+ "Philbin, Patrick",
+ "Wainstein, Kenneth",
+ "Rowan, Patrick",
+ "Levin, Mark",
+ "Rosenberg, Chuck",
+ "McLaughlin, John E.",
+ "Frist, Bill",
+ "Daschle, Thomas A.",
+ "Roberts, Pat",
+ "Rockefeller, John D. IV",
+ "Hastert, Dennis",
+ "Harman, Jane",
+ "Ayres, David",
+ "Olson, Theodore B.",
+ "Howard, Malcolm J.",
+ "Almihdhar, Khalid",
+ "Alhazmi, Nawaf",
+ "Pistole, John",
+ "Gates, Robert",
+ "Rumsfeld, Donald",
+ "Wolfowitz, Paul",
+ "Cambone, Stephen",
+ "Dell'Orto, Daniel",
+ "Moseman, John H.",
+ "McNamara, Robert M. Jr.",
+ "Goldsmith, Jack L.",
+ "Taubman, Philip",
+ "Hung, Truong Dinh",
+ "Buck, Marilyn Jean",
+ "Zweibon, Bertram",
+ "Mitchell, John N.",
+ "Brown, Hubert Geroid",
+ "Butenko, John William",
+ "Smith, Michael Lee",
+ "Negroponte, John",
+ "Burgess, Ronald",
+ "Shedd, David R.",
+ "Joel, Alexander W.",
+ "Maguire, Edward",
+ "Powell, Benjamin",
+ "Stone, Corin",
+ "Brenner, Joel",
+ "Redd, John Scott",
+ "Leiter, Michael",
+ "Haseltine, Eric",
+ "Cleave, Michelle Van",
+ "Burgess, Ronald L. Jr.",
+ "Fingar, Thomas",
+ "Graham, Mary Margaret",
+ "Kennedy, Patrick F.",
+ "Brill, Kenneth",
+ "Bradbury, Steven",
+ "Agee, Philip",
+ "Truman, Harry S.",
+ "Jackson, Robert H.",
+ "Skelly-Nolen, Peggy",
+ "Levin, Daniel",
+ "Koffsky, Daniel",
+ "Whelan, Edward",
+ "Leitch, David",
+ "Hagin, Joe",
+ "Montgomery, Brian",
+ "Eggen, Dan",
+ "Kane, Paul",
+ "Rowley, James",
+ "Muller, Scott",
+ "Caproni, Valerie",
+ "Fedarcyk, Michael",
+ "Clement, Paul",
+ "Bergman, Lowell",
+ "Goldsmith, Jack",
+ "Risen, James",
+ "Lichtblau, Eric",
+ "Boxer, Barbara",
+ "Comey, Jim",
+ "Lee, Jackson"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The New York Times",
+ "date_published": "2015-04-24",
+ "title": "Declassified Report Shows Doubts About Value of N.S.A.’s Warrantless Spying",
+ "link": "https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/25/us/politics/value-of-nsa-warrantless-spying-is-doubted-in-declassified-reports.html",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Savage, Charlie"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_source": "https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/04/25/us/25stellarwind-ig-report.html",
+ "doc_url": "https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/savage-foia-stellarwind-ig-report/fd1368590db24fe1/full.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "pdf_sha256": "c1509c820aa914077cf91ac35f1ee6dec9c4b81996aae8c40aaf54689ff9b9ca",
+ "pages": 747
+}
diff --git a/data/FOIA/savage_foia_stellarwind_ig_report/savage_foia_stellarwind_ig_report.md b/data/FOIA/savage_foia_stellarwind_ig_report/savage_foia_stellarwind_ig_report.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1dee2f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOIA/savage_foia_stellarwind_ig_report/savage_foia_stellarwind_ig_report.md
@@ -0,0 +1,28638 @@
+U.S. Department of Justice
+United States Attorney
+Southern District of New York
+
+86 Chambers Street
+New York, New York 10007
+
+April 24, 2015
+
+BY E-MAIL
+David McCraw
+Jeremy Kutner
+Legal Department
+The New York Times Company
+620 8th Avenue, 18th Floor
+New York, NY 10018
+
+Re: New York Times Company v. U.S. Department of Justice,
+14 Civ. 3776 (AT)
+
+Dear Mr. McCraw and Mr. Kutner:
+
+On behalf of the United States Department of Justice (the “Government”), we enclose
+one three-volume document pursuant to the schedule so-ordered by the Court on August 28,
+2014, as finally modified by the Court's Order on April 17, 2015, in the above-referenced FOIA
+case. Information in this document has been redacted pursuant to certain FOIA exemptions,
+including 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and (b)(7)(E).
+
+The Government reserves its right to modify or supplement the exemptions listed for
+information that has been redacted from this document. If you have any questions, please let us
+know.
+
+Sincerely,
+
+PREET BHARARA
+United States Attorney
+Southern District of New York
+
+By: s/ John Clopper
+JOHN D. CLOPPER
+EMILY DAUGHTRY
+Assistant United States Attorneys
+Tel.: (212) 637-2716/2777
+Fax: (212) 637-2702
+john.clopper@usdoj.gov
+emily.daughtry@usdoj.gov
+
+Encls.
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN 37.3
+
+(U) REPORT ON THE
+PRESIDENT'S SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM
+
+VOLUME I
+10 JULY 2009
+
+PREPARED BY THE
+OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GENERAL
+OF THE
+DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
+DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
+CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+
+Special Warning
+The report contains compartmented, classified material and no
+secondary distribution may be made without prior consent of the
+participating Inspectors General. Improper disclosure of this
+report may result in criminal, civil, or administrative penalties.
+
+REPORT NO. 2009-0013-A
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+1
+
+APPROVED PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(U) Preface
+10 July 2009
+
+(U) Title III of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
+Act Amendments Act of 2008 required the Inspectors General
+(IGs) of the elements of the Intelligence Community that
+participated in the President's Surveillance Program (PSP) to
+conduct a comprehensive review of the Program. The IGs of
+the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Department of Defense
+(DOD), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National
+Security Agency (NSA), and the Office of the Director of
+National Intelligence (ODNI) participated in the review
+required under the Act. The Act required the IGs to submit a
+comprehensive report on the review to the Senate Select
+Committee on Intelligence, the Senate Committee on the
+Judiciary, the House Permanent Select Committee on
+Intelligence, and the House Committee on the Judiciary.
+
+(U) Because many aspects of the PSP remain classified,
+and in order to provide the Congressional committees the
+complete results of our review, we have prepared this
+classified report on the PSP. The report is in three
+volumes:
+
+* Volume I summarizes the collective results of the
+IGs' review.
+* Volume II contains the individual reports prepared
+and issued by the DoD, CIA, NSA, and ODNI IGs.
+* Volume III contains the report prepared and issued
+by the DoJ IG.
+
+(U) The unclassified report on the PSP required by
+Title III has been provided to the Congressional committees
+in a separately bound volume.
+
+Unclassified When Separated
+From Attachment
+
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52, 2-400,
+NSA/CSS M1-52, 12-48
+Dated: 20070100
+Declassify On: 20340713
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+Glenn A. Fine
+Inspector General
+Department of Justice
+
+Gordon S. Heddell
+Acting Inspector General
+Department of Defense
+
+Patricia A. Lewis
+Acting Inspector General
+Central Intelligence Agency
+
+George Ellard
+Inspector General
+National Security Agency
+
+Roslyn A. Mazer
+Inspector General
+Office of the Director of
+National Intelligence
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(U) Table of Contents
+
+(U) INTRODUCTION...................................................................................1
+(U) Scope of the Review...........................................................................1
+(U) Methodology ......................................................................................2
+(U) INCEPTION OF THE PRESIDENT'S SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM ...................4
+(U) National Security Agency Counterterrorism Efforts Prior to
+11 September 2001.................................................................................4
+(U) NSA Initially Used Existing Authorities to Enhance Signals
+Intelligence (SIGINT) Collection After the September 2001
+Terrorist Attacks.....................................................................................5
+(U) NSA Explored Options to Improve SIGINT Collection and
+Address Intelligence Gaps on Terrorist Targets......................................6
+(U) Impediments to SIGINT Collection Against Terrorist Targets
+Were Discussed With the White House...................................................7
+(U) Authorization of the President's Surveillance Program ......................7
+(U) SIGINT Activities Authorized Under the Program ............................7
+(U) Content of the Presidential Authorizations and
+Department of Justice Certification as to Form and Legality.................9
+(U) The Threat Assessment Memorandums Supporting
+Presidential Authorization of the Program ...........................................10
+(U) Early Revisions to the Presidential Authorizations..........................11
+(U) DoJ Office of Legal Counsel Memorandums Supporting
+Legality of the Program .........................................................................12
+(U) IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S SURVEILLANCE
+PROGRAM ................................................................................................16
+(U) NSA Implementation.........................................................................16
+[REDACTED]....................................................................................................17
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Telephone and Internet Communications
+Content Collection and Analysis ..............................................................18
+(TS//SI//NF) Telephony and Internet Metadata Collection and
+Analysis ....................................................................................................20
+(U) NSA Reporting From the President's Surveillance
+Program ....................................................................................................21
+(U) NSA Managerial Structure and Oversight of the President's
+Surveillance Program................................................................................22
+(U) NSA Management Controls to Ensure Compliance With
+Presidential Authorizations.......................................................................23
+(U) NSA Inspector General Oversight of the Program ..............................24
+(U) Access to the President's Surveillance Program ..................................25
+(U) Congressional Briefings on the Program .............................................26
+(U) Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Briefings on the
+Program ....................................................................................................27
+(U) FBI Participation in the President's Surveillance Program...................28
+(U) CIA Participation in the President's Surveillance Program ..................30
+(U) NCTC Participation in the President's Surveillance Program...............32
+(U) The President's Surveillance Program and the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court ................................................................33
+(U) Discovery Issues Associated With the President's
+Surveillance Program................................................................................35
+(U) LEGAL REASSESSMENT OF THE PRESIDENT'S SURVEILLANCE
+PROGRAM (2003 – 2004) ..........................................................................35
+(TS//SI/NF) Concern Over the [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Collection..............................36
+(U) A New Legal Basis for the Program Is Adopted...................................37
+(U) Department of Justice Officials Convey Concerns About the
+Program to the White House ...................................................................39
+(U) Conflict Between the Department of Justice and the White
+House Over the Program ..........................................................................40
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(S//NF) White House Counsel Certifies Presidential
+Authorization Without Department of Justice Concurrence......................44
+(TS//SI//NF) White House Agrees to [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]..................................48
+(U) Restrictions on Access to the President's Surveillance
+Program Impeded Department of Justice Legal Review...........................50
+(U) TRANSITION OF PRESIDENT'S SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM
+ACTIVITIES TO FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
+AUTHORITY...............................................................................................50
+(TS//SI//NF) Internet Metadata Collection Transition to
+Operation Under FISA Authority ..............................................................50
+(U) Department of Justice Notices of Compliance Incidents......................53
+(TS//SI//NF) Telephony Metadata Collection Transition to
+Operation Under FISA Authority ..............................................................54
+(TS//SI//NF) Content Collection Transition to Operation Under
+FISA Authority..........................................................................................57
+(U) IMPACT OF THE PRESIDENT'S SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM ON
+INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS.....................60
+(U) Senior Intelligence Community Officials Believe That the
+President's Surveillance Program Filled an Intelligence Gap...................60
+(U) Difficulty in Assessing the Impact of the President's
+Surveillance Program................................................................................61
+(U) Impact of the President's Surveillance Program on FBI
+Counterterrorism Efforts...........................................................................61
+(U) FBI Efforts to Assess the Value of the Program ..................................62
+(U) FBI Judgmental Assessments of the Program .....................................62
+(U) Impact of the President's Surveillance Program on CIA
+Counterterrorism Operations ...................................................................63
+(U) The CIA Did Not Systematically Assess the
+Effectiveness of the Program.....................................................................63
+(U) Several Factors Hindered CIA Utilization of the Program .................64
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(U) Impact of the President's Surveillance Program on NCTC
+Counterterrorism Efforts..........................................................................................65
+
+(U) Counterterrorism Operations Supported by the President's
+Surveillance Program...............................................................................................65
+
+(U) ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES'S TESTIMONY ON THE
+PRESIDENT'S SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM..........................................................68
+
+(U) CONCLUSIONS.....................................................................................................69
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(U) The President's Surveillance Program
+
+(U) INTRODUCTION
+
+(TS//SI//OC/NF). In response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, on
+4 October 2001, President George W. Bush issued a Top Secret authorization to the
+Secretary of Defense directing that the signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities of the
+National Security Agency (NSA) be used to detect and prevent further attacks in the
+United States. The Presidential Authorization stated that an extraordinary emergency
+existed permitting the use of electronic surveillance within the United States for
+counterterrorism purposes, without a court order, under certain circumstances. For more
+than five years, the Presidential Authorization was renewed at 30- to 60-day intervals to
+authorize the highly classified NSA surveillance program, which is referred to throughout
+this report as the President's Surveillance Program (PSP).¹
+
+(TS//SI//OC/NF) Under the Presidential Authorizations, the NSA intercepted the
+content of international telephone and Internet communications of both U.S. and non-U.S.
+persons. In addition, the NSA collected telephone and Internet metadata—
+communications signaling information showing contacts between and among telephone
+numbers and Internet communications addresses, but not including the contents of the
+communications. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The content and metadata information was
+analyzed by the NSA, working with other members of the Intelligence Community (IC), to
+generate intelligence reports. These reports were sent to the Federal Bureau of
+Investigation (FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and other intelligence
+organizations.
+
+(U) The scope of collection permitted under the Presidential Authorizations varied
+over time. In stages between July 2004 and January 2007, NSA ceased PSP collection
+activities under Presidential authorization and resumed them under four separate court
+orders issued in accordance with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 as
+amended (FISA).²
+
+(U) Scope of the Review
+
+(U) Title III of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Amendments Act of 2008
+(FISA Amendments Act)—signed into law on 10 July 2008—required the inspectors
+
+¹ (S//NF) The cover term NSA uses to protect the President's Surveillance Program is STELLARWIND.
+² (U) Unless otherwise indicated, references to FISA in this report are to the statute as it existed prior to being
+amended in 2008.
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+1
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+general of the elements of the IC that participated in the PSP to conduct a comprehensive
+review of the program.³ The Act required that the review examine:
+
+(A) all of the facts necessary to describe the establishment,
+implementation, product, and use of the product of the Program;
+
+(B) access to legal reviews of the Program and access to information
+about the Program;
+
+(C) communications with, and participation of, individuals and entities
+in the private sector related to the Program;
+
+(D) interaction with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and
+transition to court orders related to the Program; and
+
+(E) any other matters identified by any such Inspector General that
+would enable that Inspector General to complete a review of the
+Program, with respect to such Department or element.
+
+(U) The Inspectors General (IGs) of the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department
+of Justice (DoJ), the CIA, the NSA, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
+(ODNI) conducted the review required under the Act. This report summarizes the collective
+results of the IGs' review. Conclusions and recommendations in this report that are attributed
+to a particular IG should be understood to represent that IG's opinion. Individual reports
+detail the results of each IG's review and are annexes to this report. All of the reports have
+been classified in accordance with the program's classification guide, which was revised
+during our review and re-issued on 21 January 2009.
+
+(U) Title III of the FISA Amendments Act also required that the report of any
+investigation of matters relating to the PSP conducted by the DoJ, Office of Professional
+Responsibility (OPR) be provided to the DoJ IG, and that the findings and conclusions of
+such investigation be included in the DoJ IG's review. OPR intends to review whether any
+standards of professional conduct were violated in the preparation of the first series of legal
+memorandums supporting the PSP. OPR has not yet completed its review or provided its
+findings and conclusions to the DoJ IG.
+
+(U) Methodology
+
+(U) During the course of this review, the participating IGs conducted approximately
+200 interviews. Among the individuals we interviewed were: former White House Counsel
+and Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales; former Deputy Attorney General
+James B. Comey; FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, III; former Secretary of Defense
+
+³ (U) The President's Surveillance Program is defined in the Act as the intelligence activity involving
+communications that was authorized by the President during the period beginning on 11 September 2001 and
+ending on 17 January 2007, including the program referred to by the President in a radio address on
+17 December 2005 (commonly known as the Terrorist Surveillance Program).
+
+2
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+Donald H. Rumsfeld; former NSA Director, Principal Deputy Director of National
+Intelligence, and CIA Director Michael V. Hayden; former Director of Central Intelligence
+(DCI) and CIA Director Porter J. Goss; NSA Director Lieutenant General
+Keith B. Alexander; former Directors of National Intelligence John D. Negroponte and
+J. M. McConnell; and former National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) Director
+John O. Brennan. Certain other persons who had significant involvement in the PSP either
+declined or did not respond to our requests for an interview, including former Deputy
+Secretary of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz; former Chief of Staff to President Bush
+Andrew H. Card; David S. Addington, former Counsel to Vice President Richard B. Cheney;
+former Attorney General John D. Ashcroft; former Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+John Yoo; and former DCI George J. Tenet.
+
+(S//NF) We interviewed former NSA [REDACTED] as well as leadership [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] within the NSA Signals Intelligence Directorate (SID). We
+interviewed personnel from the CIA [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]; senior FBI Counterterrorism Division officials; FBI special agents
+and intelligence analysts; senior officials from DoJ's Criminal and National Security
+Divisions; and current and former senior NCTC officials. We also interviewed DoJ officials
+and office of general counsel officials from the participating organizations who were
+involved in legal reviews of the PSP and/or had access to the memorandums supporting the
+legality of the PSP.
+
+(S//NF) We examined thousands of electronic and hardcopy documents, including the
+Presidential Authorizations, terrorist threat assessments, legal memorandums, applicable
+regulations and policies, briefings, reports, correspondence, and notes. We obtained access
+to an FBI database of PSP-derived leads that had been disseminated to FBI field offices.
+We used the database to confirm information obtained through interviews and to assist in our
+analysis of FBI investigations that utilized PSP information. We evaluated the justifications
+included in the requests for information (RFIs) submitted by the CIA to the NSA to
+determine whether they were in accordance with program guidelines. Reports of prior
+reviews and investigations of the PSP conducted by the NSA IG were also utilized in our
+review.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+3
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(U) INCEPTION OF THE PRESIDENT'S
+SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM
+
+(U) National Security Agency Counterterrorism
+Efforts Prior to 11 September 2001
+
+(C/NF) For more than a decade before the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001,
+NSA was applying its SIGINT capabilities against terrorist targets in response to IC
+requirements. The NSA, SID, Counterterrorism (CT) Product Line led these efforts. NSA
+was authorized by Executive Order (E.O.) 12333, *United States Intelligence Activities*,
+4 December 1981, as amended, to collect, process, and disseminate SIGINT information
+for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes in accordance with DCI guidance
+and to support the conduct of military operations under the guidance of the Secretary of
+Defense. It is the policy of U.S. Government entities that conduct SIGINT activities that
+they will collect, retain, and disseminate only foreign communications. In September
+2001, NSA's compliance procedures defined foreign communications as communications
+having at least one communicant outside the United States, communications entirely
+among foreign powers, or communications between a foreign power and officers or
+employees of a foreign power. All other communications were considered domestic
+communications. NSA was not authorized under E.O. 12333 to collect communications
+from a wire in the United States without a court order unless the communications
+originated and terminated outside the United States or met applicable exceptions to the
+requirement of a court order under FISA.
+
+(U) FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1801, et seq., was enacted in 1978 to "provide legislative
+authorization and regulation for all electronic surveillance conducted within the United
+States for foreign intelligence purposes." FISA authorizes the Federal Government to
+engage in electronic surveillance and physical searches, to use pen register and trap and
+trace devices, and to obtain business records to acquire foreign intelligence information by
+targeting foreign powers and agents of foreign powers inside the United States. As a
+general rule, the FISC must first approve an application for a warrant before the
+government may initiate electronic surveillance.
+
+(S//SI//NF) Prior to the PSP, NSA authority to intercept foreign communications
+included the Director, NSA's authority to approve the targeting of communications with
+one communicant within the United States if technical devices could be employed to limit
+collection to communications where the target is a non-U.S. person located outside the
+United States, [REDACTED]
+
+⁴ (U) The term "pen register" is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 3127 as a device or process which records or decodes
+dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or
+electronic communication is transmitted, provided, however, that such information shall not include the contents
+of any communication. The term "trap and trace device" is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 3127 as a device or process
+which captures the incoming electronic or other impulses which identify the originating number or other dialing,
+routing, addressing, and signaling information reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic
+communication, provided, however, that such information shall not include the contents of any communication.
+
+4
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] If technical devices could not be used to limit
+collection, the collection required approval by the Attorney General. The Director, NSA
+could exercise this authority, except when the collection was otherwise regulated, for
+example, under FISA for communications collected from a wire in the United States.
+
+(U) NSA Initially Used Existing Authorities to
+Enhance Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Collection
+After the September 2001 Terrorist Attacks
+
+(TS//SI//NF) On 14 September 2001, NSA Director Hayden used his E.O. 12333
+authority to approve a SID CT Product Line request to target [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] foreign telephone numbers [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] He approved the tasking of the specified numbers, or
+selectors [REDACTED] This was an aggressive use of authority because of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+Hayden's 14 September 2001 approval memorandum stated that the purpose of the
+targeting was to facilitate "dialing analysis/contact chaining."⁵ NSA Office of General
+Counsel (OGC) personnel concurred with the proposed activity, but provided a
+handwritten note to Hayden stating that chaining was permitted only on foreign numbers,
+and no U.S. number could be chained without a court order. Collection of the content [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] was not addressed in the memorandum. However, other
+documentation indicates that NSA OGC and SID personnel understood that Hayden also
+had approved content collection and analysis. NSA OGC personnel told us that Hayden's
+action was a lawful exercise of his authority under E.O. 12333. In addition, according to
+NSA's Deputy General Counsel, Hayden had decided by 26 September 2001 that [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] would be presumed to be of foreign intelligence value and could be provided
+to the FBI. Hayden told us that his actions were a “tactical decision" and that he was
+operating in a unique environment because it was widely believed that more terrorist
+attacks on U.S. soil were imminent.
+
+(S//NF) In late September, Hayden informed Tenet that he had expanded SIGINT
+operations under E.O. 12333 authority. According to Hayden, Tenet later said that he had
+explained the NSA's expanded SIGINT operations to Vice President Cheney during a
+meeting at the White House. On 2 October 2001, Hayden briefed the House Permanent
+Select Committee on Intelligence on his decision to expand operations under E.O. 12333
+and informed members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by telephone.
+
+⁵ (S//SI//NF) Dialing analysis/contact chaining is the process of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] from the communications sent or received by
+targeted entities.
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+5
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(U) NSA Explored Options to Improve
+SIGINT Collection and Address
+Intelligence Gaps on Terrorist Targets
+
+(S//NF) Hayden did not attend the meeting at the White House at which Tenet
+explained the NSA's expanded SIGINT operations to the Vice President. According to
+Hayden, Tenet told him that during the meeting the Vice President asked if the IC was
+doing everything possible to prevent another attack. The Vice President specifically asked
+Tenet if NSA could do more. Tenet then discussed the matter with Hayden. Hayden told
+Tenet that nothing more could be done within existing authorities. In a follow-up
+telephone conversation, Tenet asked Hayden what the NSA could do if it was provided
+additional authorities. To formulate a response, Hayden met with NSA personnel, who
+were already working to fill intelligence gaps, to identify additional authorities to support
+SIGINT collection activities that would be operationally useful and technically feasible. In
+particular, discussions focused on how NSA might bridge the "international gap," i.e.,
+collection of international communications in which one communicant was within the
+United States.
+
+(U) In the days immediately after 11 September 2001, the House Permanent Select
+Committee on Intelligence asked NSA for technical assistance in drafting a proposal to
+amend FISA to give the President authority to conduct electronic surveillance without a
+court order to obtain foreign intelligence information. On 20 September 2001, the NSA
+General Counsel wrote to White House Counsel Gonzales asking if the proposed
+amendment to FISA had merit. We found no record of a response to the NSA General
+Counsel's writing and could not determine why the proposal to amend FISA was not
+pursued at that time.
+
+(U) Hayden said that, in his professional judgment, NSA could not address the
+intelligence gap using FISA. The process for obtaining FISC orders was slow; it involved
+extensive coordination and separate legal and policy reviews by several agencies.
+Although FISA's emergency authorization provision permitted 72 hours of surveillance
+before obtaining a court order, it did not allow the government to undertake surveillance
+immediately. Rather, the Attorney General had to ensure that emergency surveillance
+would satisfy the standards articulated in FISA and be acceptable to the FISC.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+6
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(U) Impediments to SIGINT Collection
+Against Terrorist Targets Were Discussed
+With the White House
+
+(S//NF) Hayden recalled that, after consulting with NSA personnel, he discussed with
+the White House how FISA constrained NSA collection of communications carried on a
+wire in the United States. Hayden explained that NSA could not collect from a wire in the
+United States, without a court order, content or metadata from communications that
+originated and/or terminated in the United States. Hayden also said that communications
+metadata do not have the same level of constitutional protection as the content of
+communications and that access to metadata concerning communications having one end
+in the United States would significantly enhance NSA's analytic capabilities. Hayden
+suggested that the ability to collect communications that originated or terminated in the
+United States without a court order would increase NSA's speed and agility. After two
+additional meetings with Vice President Cheney to discuss further how NSA collection
+capabilities could be expanded along the lines described at the White House meeting, the
+Vice President told Hayden to work out a solution with Counsel to the Vice President
+David Addington.
+
+(U) Authorization of the
+President's Surveillance Program
+
+(TS//SI//NF) According to Hayden, Addington drafted the first Presidential
+Authorization of the PSP. Hayden characterized himself as the "subject matter expert,"
+and he said that no other NSA personnel, including the General Counsel, participated in
+drafting the authorization. Hayden also said that DoJ personnel had not been involved in
+his discussions with Addington concerning Presidential authorization of the PSP. The PSP
+came into existence on 4 October 2001, when President Bush signed the Presidential
+Authorization drafted by Addington. The authorization was entitled: *Presidential
+Authorization for Specified Electronic Surveillance Activities during a Limited Period to
+Detect and Prevent Acts of Terrorism within the United States*. Between 4 October 2001
+and 8 December 2006, President Bush signed 43 authorizations, exclusive of modifications
+and other program-related memoranda to the Secretary of Defense.
+
+(U) SIGINT Activities Authorized Under the Program
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) The 4 October 2001 Presidential Authorization directed the
+Secretary of Defense to [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+7
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) The first Presidential Authorization allowed NSA to
+intercept the content of [REDACTED]
+any communication, including those to, from, or exclusively within the United States,
+where probable cause existed to believe one of the communicants was engaged in
+international terrorism. The authorization also allowed the NSA to acquire telephony and
+Internet metadata where one end of the communication was outside the United States or
+neither communicant was known to be a U.S. citizen. For telephone calls, metadata
+generally referred to "dialing-type information" (the originating and terminating telephone
+numbers, and the date, time, and duration of the call), but not the content of the call. For
+Internet communications, metadata generally referred to the "to," "from," "cc," "bcc," and
+"sent" lines of a message, but not the "subject" line or content. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) The Secretary of Defense directed NSA, in writing, on
+8 October 2001 to execute the authorization to conduct specified electronic surveillance on
+targets related to [REDACTED] international terrorism.⁶ Because the surveillance was
+conducted in the United States, included [REDACTED] communications into or out of the
+United States, and a subset of these communications was to or from persons in the United
+States, the surveillance otherwise would have required a FISC order. NSA was also
+allowed to retain, process, analyze, and disseminate intelligence from communications
+acquired under the Presidential Authorization.
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) In addition to allowing the interception of the content of
+communications into or out of the United States, paragraph (a)(ii) of the first Presidential
+Authorization allowed NSA to intercept the content of purely domestic communications.
+Hayden told us he did not realize this until Addington specifically raised the subject during
+
+⁶ [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+8
+TOP SECRET//STLW/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+a meeting to discuss renewing the authorization. According to Hayden, he told Addington
+that NSA would not collect domestic communications because NSA is a foreign
+intelligence agency, its infrastructure did not support domestic collection, and he would
+require such a high evidentiary standard to justify intercepting purely domestic
+communication that such cases might just as well go to the FISC.
+
+(U) Content of the Presidential Authorizations
+and Department of Justice Certification
+as to Form and Legality
+
+(S//NF) Each of the Presidential Authorizations included a finding to the effect that
+terrorist groups of global reach possessed the intent and capability to attack the United
+States, that an extraordinary emergency continued to exist, and that these circumstances
+constituted an urgent and compelling governmental interest permitting electronic
+surveillance within the United States for counterterrorism purposes, without judicial
+warrants or court orders. The primary authorities cited for the legality of the electronic
+surveillance and related activities were Article II of the Constitution and the
+18 September 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution (AUMF).
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The President also
+noted his intention to inform appropriate members of the Senate and the House of
+Representatives of the program "as soon as I judge that it can be done consistently with
+national defense needs."
+
+(S//NF) Ashcroft certified the first Presidential Authorization as to "form and
+legality" on 4 October 2001. According to NSA records, this was the same day that
+Ashcroft was read into the PSP. There was no legal requirement that the Presidential
+Authorizations of the PSP be certified by the Attorney General or other DoJ officials.
+Former senior DoJ official Patrick F. Philbin told us he thought one purpose of the
+certification was to give the program a sense of legitimacy so that it not "look like a rogue
+operation." [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+Principal Deputy and Acting Assistant Attorney General Steven G. Bradbury told us that
+the DoJ certifications served as official confirmation that DoJ had determined that the
+activities carried out under the program were lawful.
+
+(S//NF) Gonzales told us that approval of the program as to form and legality was not
+required as a matter of law, but he believed that it "added value" to the Presidential
+Authorization for three reasons. First, NSA was being asked to do something it had not
+done before, and it was important to assure the NSA that the Attorney General had
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+9
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+approved the legality of the program
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Third, for "purely political considerations," the Attorney General's approval of
+the program would have value "prospectively" in the event of Congressional or inspector
+general reviews of the program.
+
+(U) The Presidential Authorizations were issued at intervals of approximately 30 to
+60 days. Bradbury said that the main reason for periodically reauthorizing the program
+was to ensure that the Presidential Authorizations were reviewed frequently to assess the
+program's value and effectiveness. As the period for each Presidential Authorization drew
+to a close, the DCI prepared a threat assessment memorandum for the President describing
+the current state of potential terrorist threats to the United States.
+
+(U) The Threat Assessment Memorandums
+Supporting Presidential Authorization of the Program
+
+(S/NF) From October 2001 to May 2003, the CIA prepared the threat assessment
+memorandums that supported Presidential authorization and periodic reauthorization of the
+PSP. The memorandums documented the current threat to the U.S. homeland and to U.S.
+interests abroad from al-Qa'ida and affiliated terrorist organizations. The first threat
+assessment memorandum—The Continuing Near-Term Threat from Usama Bin Ladin—
+was signed by the DCI on 4 October 2001.7 Subsequent threat assessment memorandums
+were prepared every 30 to 60 days to correspond with the President's reauthorizations.
+
+(S/NF) The DCI Chief of Staff, John H. Moseman, was the CIA focal point for
+preparing the threat assessment memorandums. According to Moseman, he directed the
+CIA, [REDACTED] to prepare objective appraisals of the
+current terrorist threat, focusing primarily on threats to the homeland, and to document
+those appraisals in a memorandum. [REDACTED] analysts drew upon all sources of intelligence in
+preparing their threat assessments. Each of the memorandums focused primarily on the
+current threat situation and did not routinely provide information concerning previously
+reported threats or an assessment of the PSP's utility in addressing previously reported
+threats.
+
+(S/NF) After [REDACTED] completed its portion of the memorandums, Moseman added a
+paragraph at the end of the memorandums stating that the individuals and organizations
+involved in global terrorism (and discussed in the memorandums) possessed the capability
+and intention to undertake further terrorist attacks within the United States. Moseman
+recalled that the paragraph was provided to him initially by either Gonzales or Addington.
+The paragraph recommended that the President authorize the Secretary of Defense to
+employ within the United States the capabilities of DoD, including but not limited to
+NSA's SIGINT capabilities, to collect foreign intelligence by electronic surveillance. The
+paragraph described the types of communication and data that would be collected and the
+
+⁷ (U) The title of the threat assessment memorandums was changed to The Global War Against Terrorism in
+June 2002.
+
+10
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+circumstances under which they could be collected. The draft threat assessment
+memorandums were reviewed by CIA Office of General Counsel attorneys assigned to
+[REDACTED] and CIA Acting General Counsel (Principal Deputy General Counsel), John A. Rizzo.
+Rizzo told us that the draft memorandums were generally sufficient, but there were
+occasions when, based on his experience with previous memorandums, he thought that
+draft memorandums contained insufficient threat information or did not present a
+compelling case for reauthorization of the PSP. In such instances, Rizzo would request
+that [REDACTED] provide additional available threat information or make revisions to the draft
+memorandums.
+
+(S//NF) The threat assessment memorandums were then signed by the DCI and
+forwarded to the Secretary of Defense to be co-signed. Tenet signed most of the threat
+memorandums prepared during his tenure as DCI. There were no occasions when the DCI
+or Acting DCI withheld their signature from the threat assessment memorandums. The
+threat assessment memorandums were reviewed by DoJ's OLC to assess whether there was
+"a sufficient factual basis demonstrating a threat of terrorist attacks in the United States for
+it to continue to be reasonable under the standards of the Fourth Amendment for the
+President to [continue] to authorize the warrantless searches involved" in the program.
+OLC then advised the Attorney General whether the constitutional standards for
+reasonableness had been met and whether the Presidential Authorization could be certified
+as to form and legality. After review and approval as to form and legality by the Attorney
+General, the threat assessment memorandums were delivered to the White House to be
+attached to the PSP reauthorization memorandums signed by the President.
+
+(S//NF) Responsibility for drafting the threat assessment memorandums was
+transferred from [REDACTED] to the newly-established Terrorist Threat Integration Center in May
+2003. This responsibility was retained by TTIC's successor organization, NCTC. The
+DCI continued to sign the threat assessment memorandums through 15 April 2005.
+Subsequent memorandums were signed by the Director of National Intelligence or his
+designee.
+
+(U) Early Revisions to the Presidential Authorizations
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) On 2 November 2001, with the first authorization set to
+expire, President Bush signed a second Presidential Authorization of the PSP. The second
+authorization cited the same authorities in support of the President's actions, principally the
+Article II Commander-in-Chief powers and the AUMF. The second authorization also
+cited the same findings of a threat assessment concerning the magnitude of potential
+terrorist threats and the likelihood of their occurrence in the future. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+11
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) On 30 November 2001, the President signed a third
+authorization for the PSP. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+(U) DoJ Office of Legal Counsel Memorandums
+Supporting Legality of the Program
+
+(S/NF) OLC Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo was responsible for
+drafting the first series of legal memorandums supporting the PSP. Yoo was the only OLC
+official read into the PSP from the program's inception until he left DoJ in May 2003.
+
+12
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+During Yoo's tenure at DoJ, he was one of only three DoJ officials read into the PSP. The
+other two were Ashcroft and Baker. OLC Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee, Yoo's
+direct supervisor, was never read into the program.
+
+(S/NF) Before the President authorized the PSP on 4 October 2001, Yoo had
+prepared a memorandum evaluating the legality of a hypothetical electronic surveillance
+program within the United States to monitor communications of potential terrorists. His
+memorandum, dated 17 September 2001, was addressed to Deputy White House Counsel
+Timothy E. Flanigan and was entitled Constitutional Standards on Random Electronic |
+Surveillance for Counter-Terrorism Purposes. Yoo drafted a more extensive version of the
+memorandum, dated 4 October 2001, for Gonzales. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+13
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(S/NF) The first OLC memorandum explicitly addressing the legality of PSP was
+not drafted until after the program had been formally authorized by the President and after
+Ashcroft had certified the program as to form and legality. The first OLC opinion directly
+supporting the legality of the PSP was dated 2 November 2001, and was drafted by Yoo.
+Yoo acknowledged at the outset of his 2 November memorandum that "[b]ecause of the
+highly sensitive nature of this subject and the time pressures involved, this memorandurn
+has not undergone the usual editing and review process for opinions that issue from our
+Office OLCL"
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(S/NF) Yoo acknowledged in his 2 November 2001 memorandum that the first
+Presidential Authorization was "in tension with FISA." Yoo stated that FISA "purports to
+be the exclusive statutory means for conducting electronic surveillance for foreign
+intelligence." But Yoo then opined that "[s]uch a reading of FISA would be an
+unconstitutional infringement on the President's Article II authorities." Citing advice of
+OLC and DoJ's position as presented to Congress during passage of the USA PATRIOT
+Act several weeks earlier, Yoo characterized FISA as merely providing a "safe harbor for
+electronic surveillance," adding that it "cannot restrict the President's ability to engage in
+warrantless searches that protect the national security."
+
+(S//NF) Regarding whether the activities conducted under the PSP could be
+conducted under FISA, Yoo described the same potential impediments that he had cited in
+his 4 October memorandum. Noting that the Presidential Authorization could be viewed as
+a violation of FISA's civil and criminal sanctions in 50 U.S.C. §§ 1809-10, Yoo opined that
+in this regard FISA represented an unconstitutional infringement on the President's
+Article II powers. According to Yoo, the ultimate test of whether the government may
+engage in warrantless electronic surveillance activities is whether such conduct is
+consistent with the Fourth Amendment, not whether it meets the standards of FISA.
+
+14
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(S//NF) Yoo wrote that reading FISA to restrict the President's inherent authority to
+conduct foreign intelligence surveillance would raise grave constitutional questions which,
+under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, would require resolving the issue in a
+manner that preserves the President's [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] "[U]nless Congress made a clear statement in FISA
+that it sought to restrict presidential authority to conduct warrantless searches in the
+national security area—which it has not—then the statute must be construed to avoid such
+a reading."
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Yoo's 2 November 2001 memorandum dismissed Fourth Amendment
+concerns to the extent that the authorized collection involved non-U.S. persons outside the
+United States. Regarding those aspects of the program that involved interception of the
+international communications of U.S. persons within the United States, Yoo asserted that
+Fourth Amendment jurisprudence allowed for searches of persons crossing U.S.
+international borders and that interceptions of communications into or out of the United
+States fell within the "border crossing exception." Yoo further opined that electronic
+surveillance in "direct support of military operations" did not trigger constitutional
+protection against illegal searches and seizures, in part because the Fourth Amendment is
+primarily aimed at curbing law enforcement abuses. Finally, Yoo wrote that the electronic
+surveillance described in the Presidential Authorizations was "reasonable" under the
+Fourth Amendment and therefore did not require a warrant, i.e., in this situation the
+government's national security interest outweighed the individual's privacy interest.
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+15
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In October 2002, at Ashcroft's request, Yoo drafted another opinion
+concerning the PSP. The memorandum, dated 11 October 2002, reiterated the same basic
+analysis as Yoo's 2 November 2001 memorandum in support of the legality of the PSP.
+[REDACTED]
+
+(U) IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
+PRESIDENT'S SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM
+
+(U) NSA Implementation
+
+(S/NF) On 4 October 2001, Hayden received the initial Presidential Authorization of
+the PSP and briefed the NSA SIGINT Director and other key NSA personnel on the
+authorization. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] He also said that the NSA General Counsel
+had reviewed the authorization and concluded that the authorized activities were legal.
+[REDACTED]
+
+16
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] NSA began to collect the
+content of telephone calls under PSP authority in October 2001. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+17
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Telephone and Internet
+Communications Content Collection and Analysis
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Content collection and analysis under the PSP was conducted in the
+same manner as collection and analysis conducted previously by the NSA under
+E.O. 12333 authority. NSA management applied standard minimization and specially
+designed procedures to task domestic selectors such as telephone numbers and e-mail
+addresses. Selectors had to meet two criteria before being tasked under the PSP: the
+purpose of the collection had to be to prevent and detect terrorist attacks in the United
+States; and the selector had to be linked to al-Qa'ida, an associate, or international
+terrorism. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) NSA collection managers were responsible for ensuring that telephony
+and Internet communications selectors were appropriately added or removed from
+collection. Content collection for domestic selectors was sometimes approved for specific
+
+18
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+time periods. Data collected under the PSP were stored in compartmented NSA databases,
+and access to the databases was strictly controlled.
+
+(TS//SI//OC/NF) The majority of targets for content collection under the PSP were
+foreign telephone numbers and Internet communications addresses. In 2008, NSA reported
+that [REDACTED] foreign telephone numbers and in excess of [REDACTED] foreign Internet
+communications addresses had been targeted from October 2001 through December 2006.
+NSA reported in 2008 that [REDACTED] domestic telephone numbers and [REDACTED] domestic Internet
+communications addresses were targeted for PSP content collection from October 2001 to
+January 2007. Although targeted domestic telephone numbers and Internet
+communications addresses were located in the United States, they were not necessarily
+used by U.S. citizens.
+
+PSP program officials told us that the NSA did not seek to collect domestic
+communications under the PSP. However, NSA managers said that there are no readily
+available technical means within the [REDACTED] to guarantee that no
+domestic calls will be collected. Issues of this kind inevitably arise from time to time in
+other SIGINT operations, and are not unique to the PSP. Over the life of the program, the
+NSA reported [REDACTED] incidents of unintentional collection of domestic communications or
+non-targeted communications. In such cases, the NSA IG determined that personnel
+followed established procedures in reporting the incidents, adjusting collection, and
+purging unauthorized collection records from NSA databases.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) NSA analysis of content collected under the PSP involved the same
+practices and techniques used in analyzing information from other SIGINT operations.
+Telephone content was made available to NSA analysts through a voice processing system;
+Internet communications content was available from the database in which it was stored.
+Analysis involved more than listening to, or reading the content of, a communication and
+transcribing and disseminating a transcript. Analysis also involved coordinating and
+collaborating with other IC analysts, applying previous knowledge of the target, and
+integrating other relevant intelligence.
+
+19
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Telephony and Internet
+Metadata Collection and Analysis
+
+(TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] NSA personnel used PSP metadata to perform contact chaining.
+Although the NSA had the capability to collect bulk telephony and Internet metadata
+before the PSP, collection was limited because the NSA was not authorized to collect
+metadata from a wire inside the United States without a court order when one end of the
+communication was in the United States. NSA could "chain" to, but not through, domestic
+selectors. Access to large amounts of metadata is required for effective contact chaining,
+and the PSP increased the data available to NSA analysts and allowed them to perform
+more thorough contact chaining.
+
+(TS//SI//OC/NF) Although NSA analysts could search bulk-collected metadata under
+the PSP, the analysts' searches were limited to targets that were approved under the
+standards set forth in the Presidential Authorizations. As such, only a small fraction of the
+metadata collected under the PSP was ever accessed. In August 2006, the NSA estimated
+that 0.000025 percent of the telephone records in the PSP database (or one of every
+four million records) could be expected to be seen by NSA analysts through chaining
+analysis.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) NSA analysts conduct contact chaining by entering a target selector—a
+telephone number or Internet communication address—in a specialized metadata analysis
+tool, which searches the metadata and identifies contacts between the selector and other
+telephone numbers or Internet communications addresses. The resulting contact graph is
+analyzed for intelligence and to develop investigative leads. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Although the Presidential Authorizations did not prohibit chaining more
+than two degrees of separation from the target, NSA analysts determined that it was not
+analytically useful to do so.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) An automated process was created to alert and automatically chain new
+and potentially reportable telephone numbers using what was called an "alert list."
+Telephone numbers on the alert list were automatically run against incoming metadata to
+look for contacts. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+20
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) When NSA personnel identified erroneous metadata collection—usually
+caused by technical problems or inappropriate application of the authorization—they were
+directed to report the violation or incident through appropriate channels and to delete the
+collection from all NSA databases. NSA reported three such violations early in the
+program and took measures to correct them.
+
+(U) NSA Reporting From the
+President's Surveillance Program
+
+(TS//SI//OC/NF) PSP information was disseminated in [REDACTED] types of reports:
+"tippers," which provided metadata analysis; content reports, which provided NSA analysis
+of content collection; [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Tippers were sent to the FBI and the CIA by e-mail on a
+secure communications network. Some tippers contained "tear line" information that
+allowed for wider distribution of a sanitized version of the information. From October
+2001 through January 2007, the NSA issued [REDACTED] tippers to the FBI and the CIA.⁸
+[REDACTED]
+
+⁸ [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+21
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(U) NSA Managerial Structure and Oversight
+of the President's Surveillance Program
+
+(S/NF) Analysis and reporting associated with the PSP was conducted within SID at
+NSA's Fort Meade, Maryland headquarters. PSP activities were not conducted at NSA
+field sites. The Director and Deputy Director of NSA exercised senior operational control
+and authority over the program. The individual who was SIGINT Director in 2001 told us
+that, aside from ensuring that the PSP had appropriate checks and balances, she left direct
+management of the program to the NSA Director, the Deputy Director, and the Office of
+General Counsel. She noted that Hayden took personal responsibility for the program and
+managed it carefully.
+
+(S//NF) By 2004, specific managerial authorities concerning PSP collection, analysis,
+and reporting activities had been delegated to the SIGINT Director. The SIGINT Director
+further delegated managerial authority to the PSP program manager and mission execution
+responsibilities to the Chief of the CT Product Line. The PSP program manager position
+was restructured to provide the incumbent authority and responsibility for oversight of PSP
+
+22
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+activity across SID, and the PSP program manager was provided additional staff. Over the
+life of the program, there were five PSP program managers, who reported directly to the
+SIGINT Director or the Chief of the CT Product Line.
+
+(TS//STLW//SI/OC/NF) The NSA supported the operation of the PSP with
+approximately [REDACTED] from fiscal years
+(FYs) 2002 through 2006. Funds were used for the acquisition of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+(U) NSA PSP Costs From FY 2002 through FY 2006
+(dollars in thousands, personnel costs not included)
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+[REDACTED]
+
+(U) NSA Management Controls to Ensure
+Compliance With Presidential Authorizations
+
+(S//NF) NSA management took steps to protect U.S. person information and ensure
+compliance with the Presidential Authorizations. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+23
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(S//NF) The NSA General Counsel was read into the PSP on 4 October 2001, the day
+the first Presidential Authorization was signed. On 6 October 2001, the General Counsel
+provided Hayden and his deputy talking points for use in briefing NSA personnel on the
+new program's authorities. The talking points included the fact that Hayden had directed
+the NSA General Counsel and the NSA Associate General Counsel for Operations to
+review and oversee PSP activities. The NSA Associate General Counsel for Operations
+provided most of the program oversight before the NSA IG was read into the PSP in
+August 2002. The Associate General Counsel for Operations oversaw program
+implementation, reviewed proposed target packages for compliance with the
+authorizations, and coordinated program-related issues with DoJ.
+
+(U) NSA Inspector General Oversight
+of the Program
+
+(S//NF) The NSA IG and other NSA Office of Inspector General personnel were read
+into the PSP beginning in August 2002. Over the life of the program, the NSA IG
+conducted:
+* Three investigations in response to specific incidents and violations of the
+ Presidential Authorizations to determine the cause, effect, and remedy.
+* Ten reviews to determine the adequacy of management controls to ensure
+ compliance with the authorization and related authorities, assess the
+ mitigation of risk associated with program activities, and identify
+ impediments to meeting the requirements of the authorizations.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Ten of the NSA IG reports included a total of [REDACTED] recommendations to
+NSA management to strengthen internal controls and procedures over the PSP. The NSA
+IG identified no intentional misuse of the PSP. Significant findings from NSA IG reviews
+of the PSP include the following:
+* In 2005, the NSA IG found [REDACTED] errors when comparing records of domestic
+ telephone and communications selectors approved for PSP content
+ collection with selectors actually on collection. The errors included
+ selectors that were not removed from collection after being detasked,
+ selectors that were not put on collection when approved, and selectors that
+ were mistakenly put on collection due to typographical errors. NSA
+ management took steps to correct the errors and establish procedures to
+ reconcile approved selectors with selectors actually on collection.
+* During a 2006 review, the NSA IG found that all items in a randomly
+ selected sample of domestic selectors met Presidential Authorization
+ criteria. Using a statistically valid sampling methodology, the IG
+ concluded with 95 percent confidence that 95 percent or more of domestic
+
+24
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+selectors tasked for PSP content collection were linked to al-Qa'ida, its
+associates, or international terrorist threats inside the United States.
+
+(S//NF) In addition to NSA IG report recommendations, in March 2003, the NSA IG
+recommended to Hayden that he report violations of the Presidential Authorizations to the
+President. The NSA IG prepared [REDACTED] Presidential notifications for the NSA Director
+concerning violations of the authorizations.
+
+(S//NF) Beginning in January 2007, violations involving collection activities
+conducted under PSP authority as well as violations related to former PSP activities that
+were operating under FISA authority were reported quarterly to the President's Intelligence
+Oversight Board, through the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
+Oversight.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The NSA IG learned in late 2008, that from approximately [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] collection of [REDACTED] All related collection records were purged from NSA databases in
+2004; therefore, it was not possible to determine the exact nature and extent of the
+collection. NSA OIG will close out this incident in its upcoming report to the President's
+Intelligence Oversight Board.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) On 15 January 2009, the DoJ reported to the FISC that the NSA had
+been using an "alert list" to compare FISA-authorized metadata against telephone numbers
+associated with counterterrorism targets tasked by the NSA for SIGINT collection. The
+NSA had reported to the FISC that the alert list consisted of telephone numbers for which
+NSA had determined the existence of a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the numbers
+were related to a terrorist organization associated with [REDACTED]
+In fact, such a determination had not been made for the majority of the selectors on the
+alert list. The NSA IG reported this incident to the President's Intelligence Oversight
+Board, and has provided updates as required. The alert list and a detailed NSA 60-day
+review of processes related to the business records FISC order were the subject of several
+recent submissions to the FISC and of NSA briefings to the Congressional oversight
+committees.
+
+(U) Access to the President's Surveillance Program
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+25
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(U) PSP Cumulative Clearance Totals
+(as of 17 January 2007)
+
+(TS//SI/OC/NF)
+[REDACTED]
+
+(S//NF) Knowledge of the PSP was strictly controlled and limited at the express
+direction of the White House. Hayden eventually delegated his PSP clearance approval
+authority for NSA, FBI, and CIA operational personnel to the NSA PSP program manager.
+Hayden was required to obtain approval from the White House to clear members of
+Congress, FISC Judges, the NSA IG, and others.
+
+(S//NF) The NSA IG was not read into the PSP until August 2002. According to
+the NSA General Counsel at the time, the President would not allow the IG to be briefed
+prior to that date. Although Hayden did not recall why the IG had not been cleared
+earlier, he thought that it would have been inappropriate to clear him when the length of
+the program was unknown and before operations had stabilized. By August 2002,
+Hayden and the NSA General Counsel wanted to institutionalize PSP oversight with the
+involvement of the NSA IG. Hayden recalled having to "make a case" to the White
+House to have the NSA IG read in. The ODNI IG found that ODNI oversight of the PSP
+was limited by ODNI oversight personnel not being provided timely access to the
+program.
+
+(U) Congressional Briefings on the Program
+
+(TS//SI//NF) On 25 October 2001, Hayden conducted a briefing on the PSP for the
+Chairman and the Ranking Member of the House Permanent Select Committee on
+Intelligence, Nancy P. Pelosi and Porter J. Goss; and the Chairman and the Vice Chairman
+of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), D. Robert Graham and
+Richard C. Shelby. Between 25 October 2001 and 17 January 2007, Hayden and current
+NSA Director Alexander, sometimes supported by other NSA personnel, conducted
+
+26
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+49 briefings to members of Congress and their staff. Hayden told us that during the many
+PSP briefings to members of Congress, no one ever suggested that the NSA should stop the
+program. Hayden emphasized that he did more than just "flip through slides" during the
+briefings, which lasted as long as attendees had questions.
+
+(U) Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+Briefings on the Program
+
+(TS//SI//OC/NF) On 31 January 2002, the FISC Presiding Judge Royce Lamberth
+became the first member of the court to be read into the PSP. He was briefed on the
+program after James Baker, the head of DoJ's Office of Intelligence Policy and Review
+(OIPR). [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Lamberth's briefing was conducted at the DoJ and was
+attended by Ashcroft, Hayden, Mueller, Yoo, and Baker.
+
+(TS//SI//OC/NF) Ashcroft provided Lamberth a brief summary of the President's
+decision to create the PSP, and Ashcroft stated that he had determined, based upon the
+advice of John Yoo, an attorney in DoJ's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), that the
+President's actions were lawful under the Constitution. Ashcroft also emphasized to
+Lamberth that the FISC was not being asked to approve the program. Following
+Ashcroft's summary, Hayden described for Lamberth how the program functioned
+operationally, Yoo discussed legal aspects of the program, and Baker proposed procedures
+for handling international terrorism FISA applications that contained PSP-derived
+information. For the next four months, until the end of his term in May 2002, Lamberth
+was the only FISC judge read into the PSP.
+
+(TS//SI//OC/NF) Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly succeeded Lamberth as the FISC
+Presiding Judge and was briefed on the PSP on 17 May 2002. The briefing was similar in
+form and substance to that provided to Lamberth. In response to several questions from
+Kollar-Kotelly about the scope of the President's authority to conduct warrantless
+surveillance, DoJ prepared a letter to Kollar-Kotelly, signed by Yoo, that, according to
+Kollar-Kotelly, "set out a broad overview of the legal authority for conducting [the PSP],
+but did not analyze the specifics of the [PSP] program." The letter, which Kollar-Kotelly
+reviewed at the White House but was not permitted to retain, essentially replicated Yoo's
+2 November 2001 memorandum regarding the legality of the PSP. Kollar-Kotelly was the
+only sitting FISC judge read into the PSP until January 2006, when the other FISC judges
+were read in.
+
+(TS//SI//OC/NF) Baker was read into the PSP only after he came upon "strange,
+unattributed" language in a FISA application that suggested the existence of a
+compartmented program. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] As noted, eventually Lamberth, and later
+his successor, Kollar-Kotelly, were read in. The DoJ IG believes that not having OIPR
+officials and members of the FISC read into the PSP, while program-derived information
+was being disseminated as investigative leads to the FBI and finding its way into FISA
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+27
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+applications, put at risk the DoJ's important relationship with the FISC. The DoJ IG agrees
+with Baker's assessment that, as the government's representative before the FISC, good
+relations between the DoJ and the FISC depend on candor and transparency.
+
+(U) FBI Participation in the
+President's Surveillance Program
+
+(TS//SI//NF) As a user of PSP-derived information, the FBI disseminated leads—
+tippers—to FBI field offices. Tippers primarily consisted of domestic telephone numbers
+and Internet communications addresses that NSA analysts had determined through
+metadata analysis were connected to individuals involved with al-Qa'ida or its affiliates.
+Domestic telephone numbers represented the overwhelming majority of PSP-derived
+information contained in tippers. Tippers also provided information derived from content
+collection under the PSP.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The FBI's principal objective during the earliest months of the PSP was
+to disseminate program information to FBI field offices for investigation while protecting
+the source of the information and the methods used to collect it. The FBI initially assigned
+responsibility for this to its Telephone Analysis Unit (TAU), which developed procedures
+to disseminate information from NSA's PSP reports in a non-compartmented, Secret-level
+format. The resulting [REDACTED] Electronic Communications (ECs) included
+restrictions on how the information could be used, i.e., FBI field offices were to use the
+information "for lead purposes only" and not use the information in legal or judicial
+proceedings.
+
+(S//NF) The FBI's participation in the PSP evolved over time as the program became
+less a temporary response to the September 11 attacks and more a permanent surveillance
+capability. To improve the effectiveness of its participation in the program, the FBI
+initiated the [REDACTED] project in [REDACTED] to manage its involvement in the
+PSP. In February 2003, the FBI assigned a team of FBI personnel—"Team 10"—to work
+full-time at the NSA to manage the FBI's participation in the program.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Team 10's primary responsibility was to disseminate PSP information
+through [REDACTED] ECs to FBI field offices for investigation or other purposes. However,
+over time, Team 10 began to participate in the PSP in other ways. For example, Team 10
+occasionally submitted telephone numbers and Internet communications addresses to the
+NSA to be searched against the bulk metadata collected under the PSP. The NSA
+conducted independent analysis to determine whether telephone numbers or Internet
+communications addresses submitted by Team 10 met the standards established by the
+Presidential Authorizations. Team 10 also regularly contributed to NSA's PSP process by
+reviewing draft reports and providing relevant information from FBI databases.
+
+(S//NF) FBI field offices were not required to investigate every tipper disseminated
+by Team 10 under the [REDACTED] project. Rather, the type of lead that the [REDACTED]
+EC assigned "action," "discretionary," or "for information"—drove the field office's
+
+28
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+response to a tipper.⁹ The vast majority of FBI investigative activity related to PSP
+information involved responding to [REDACTED] telephone number tippers that assigned
+action leads. Team 10 generally assigned action leads for telephone numbers that were not
+already known to the FBI or telephone numbers that Team 10 otherwise deemed a high
+priority, such as a number that had a relationship to a major FBI investigation. From
+approximately [REDACTED] when [REDACTED] was established, to [REDACTED] action
+leads instructed field offices to obtain subscriber information for the telephone numbers
+within its jurisdiction and to conduct any "logical investigation to determine terrorist
+connections." Some agents complained that action leads lacked guidance about how to
+make use of the tippers, which was of particular concern because agents were not confident
+that [REDACTED] communications provided sufficient predication to open national security
+investigations.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Two changes to FBI procedures in 2003 addressed some FBI agents'
+concerns. [REDACTED] FBI Headquarters assumed responsibility from field offices
+for issuing national security letters (NSLs) to obtain subscriber information about PSP-
+tipped telephone numbers and Internet communications addresses. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] the Attorney General issued new guidelines for FBI national security investigations
+that created a new category of investigative activity called a "threat assessment." Under a
+threat assessment, FBI agents are authorized to investigate or collect information on
+individuals, groups, and organizations of possible investigative interest without opening a
+preliminary or full national security investigation. Beginning [REDACTED] action leads
+assigned by [REDACTED] metadata tippers instructed field offices to conduct threat
+assessments and advised that FBI headquarters would issue NSLs to obtain subscriber
+information.
+
+(S//NF) In general, an FBI threat assessment involved searching several FBI, public,
+and commercial databases for information about the tipped telephone number, and
+requesting that various state and local government entities conduct similar searches.
+Sometimes these searches identified the subscriber to the telephone number before FBI
+Headquarters obtained the information with an NSL. In other cases, the threat assessments
+continued after the field office received the NSL results.
+
+(S//NF) The [REDACTED] leads frequently were closed after conducting a threat
+assessment interview with the subscriber and determining that there was no nexus to
+terrorism or threat to national security. In other cases, the leads were closed based solely
+on the results of database checks.
+
+(S//NF) Beginning [REDACTED] FBI field offices were required to report the
+results of their threat assessments to FBI headquarters. FBI field offices typically reported
+all of the information that was obtained about the tipped telephone numbers, including the
+details of any subscriber interviews, and then stated that the office had determined that the
+
+⁹ (S//NF) An action lead instructs an FBI field office to take a particular action in response. A discretionary lead
+allows the field office to make a determination whether the information provided warrants investigative action. A
+field office is not expected to take any specific action on a for information lead.
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+29
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+telephone number did not have a nexus to terrorism and considered the lead closed. Much
+less frequently, field offices reported that a preliminary investigation was opened.
+Regardless of whether any links to international terrorism were identified in a threat
+assessment, the results of the threat assessments and the information that was collected
+about subscribers generally were reported to FBI headquarters and uploaded to FBI
+databases.
+
+(U) CIA Participation in the
+President's Surveillance Program
+
+(S//NF) CIA analysts and targeters, as PSP consumers, requested information from
+the program and utilized program reporting in their analyses. [REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+30
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+31
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(U) NCTC Participation in the
+President's Surveillance Program
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The ODNI IG found that the ODNI's primary role in the PSP was the
+preparation of the threat assessments that summarized the al-Qa'ida threat to the United
+States and were used to support periodic reauthorization of the program. The ODNI IG
+found that the threat assessments were drafted by experienced NCTC personnel who
+prepared the documents in a memorandum style following an established DoJ format. The
+ODNI IG also determined that the ODNI threat assessments were prepared using
+evaluated intelligence information chosen from a wide variety of IC sources. ODNI
+personnel said that during the period when the ODNI prepared the threat assessments, the
+IC had access to fully evaluated intelligence that readily supported an assessment that
+al-Qa'ida remained a significant threat to the United States.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The NCTC
+analysts told us that PSP information was subject to stringent security protections [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+(S//NF) The NCTC analysts said that they handle NSA surveillance information,
+including PSP information, consistent with the standard rules and procedures for handling
+NSA intelligence information including minimization of U.S. person identities. On those
+occasions when the NCTC analysts knew that a particular NSA intelligence product was
+derived from the PSP, the analysts told us they reviewed program information in the same
+manner as other incoming NSA intelligence products. If appropriate, NCTC analysts then
+incorporated the PSP information into analytical products being prepared for the Director
+of National Intelligence (DNI) and other senior intelligence officials. They identified the
+President's Terrorism Threat Report and the Senior Executive Terrorism Report as
+examples of the types of finished intelligence products that would, at times, contain PSP
+information.
+
+32
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(U) The President's Surveillance Program
+and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+(TS//SI//NF) DoJ, initially with the FISC's concurrence and later at the court's
+direction, developed and implemented procedures-referred to as "scrubbing"
+procedures-to account for and make the court aware of instances when PSP-derived
+information was included in FISA applications. Lamberth required that all FISA
+applications that contained PSP-derived information or that would result in simultaneous
+collection against particular targets under both the PSP and a FISC order, be filed with him
+only. Baker told us that Lamberth wanted to be informed of applications that contained
+PSP information and of dual coverage situations. According to Baker, the scrubbing
+procedures were a means of meeting his ethical duty of candor to the FISC without
+disclosing the existence of the PSP to uncleared judges.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) DoJ effectuated the scrubbing procedures by compiling lists of
+information contained in initial and renewal FISA applications that was attributed to the
+NSA and of all facilities targeted for electronic surveillance in the applications. These lists
+were sent to the NSA to determine whether any of the NSA-attributed information was
+PSP-derived and whether any of the facilities also were targeted under the PSP. The NSA
+communicated the results back to DoJ, which then filed the applications with the FISC
+consistent with the scrubbing procedures.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Kollar-Kotelly continued the procedures that had been developed by
+Baker and agreed to by Lamberth for handling FISA applications that contained PSP-
+derived information. However, Kollar-Kotelly required DoJ to excise from FISA
+applications any information obtained or derived from the PSP. But Kollar-Kotelly also
+instructed Baker to alert her to any instances where an application's basis for the requisite
+probable cause showing under FISA was weakened by excising PSP information. In such
+cases, Kollar-Kotelly would then assess the application with the knowledge that additional
+relevant information had been excised.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Kollar-Kotelly also instructed DoJ to discontinue the practice
+employed under Lamberth of including in applications a descriptive phrase associated with
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] as a means of indicating that incentives targeted by the applications were
+also targeted under the PSP. Baker told us that while Kollar-Kotelly understood that
+instances of dual coverage would occur, she did not want to appear to judicially sanction
+PSP coverage.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In March 2004, Kollar-Kotelly was informed of operational changes
+made to the PSP following a dispute between DoJ and the White House about the legal
+basis for certain aspects of the program. Kollar-Kotelly responded by imposing an
+additional scrubbing requirement to further ensure, to the extent possible, that PSP-derived
+information was not included in FISA applications. The FBI, in coordination with DoJ and
+NSA, was to determine whether a facility included in a FISA application-not just a
+targeted telephone number or Internet communication address-also appeared in a PSP
+report. Kollar-Kotelly permitted any such facility to remain in the application if it could be
+
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+
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+
+demonstrated that the FBI had developed, independent of the PSP, an investigative interest
+in the facility, or that the FBI inevitably would have identified the facility in question
+through normal investigative steps. An OIPR official who was responsible for discussing
+such cases with Kollar-Kotelly told us that the judge generally accepted DoJ's assessment
+that there was a non-PSP investigative basis for a facility in question, or that the facility
+inevitably would have been discovered even in the absence of PSP-derived leads to the
+FBI.
+
+(S//NF) Implementing the scrubbing procedures, both under Lamberth and Kollar-
+Kotelly, was a complicated and time-consuming endeavor for OIPR staff. Baker, who
+until March 2004 was the only individual in OIPR read into the PSP, found himself having
+to ask OIPR attorneys to compile information about their cases, and sometimes to make
+changes to their FISA applications, without being able to provide an explanation other than
+that he had spoken to the Attorney General and the FISC about the situation. Baker
+regularly told attorneys that they did not have to sign applications that they were not
+comfortable with, and, in some instances, international terrorism cases had to be reassigned
+for this reason.
+
+(S//NF) The situation was further complicated by the fact that, until August 2003,
+only one of the two DoJ officials authorized by statute to approve FISA applications-
+Attorney General Ashcroft and Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson-was read into
+the PSP. Thompson, who served as Deputy Attorney General from May 2001 to August
+2003, was never read into the PSP, despite Ashcroft's request to the White House.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Similarly, Kollar-Kotelly, who by November 2004 was handling
+approximately [REDACTED] percent of all FISA applications as a result of her requirement that
+scrubbed applications be filed with her only, made unsuccessful requests for additional
+FISC judges to be cleared for the program. Kollar-Kotelly decided in November 2004 that
+in view of the scrubbing procedures that were in operation, international terrorism FISA
+applications could be decided by other judges based on the information contained in the
+applications.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) DoJ, together with the FBI and the NSA, continue to apply the
+scrubbing procedures to international terrorism FISA applications. Since January 2006,
+all members of the FISC have been briefed on the PSP and all of the judges handle
+applications that involve the issue of PSP-derived information. Although compliance with
+the scrubbing procedures has been burdensome, we did not find instances when the
+government was unable to obtain FISA surveillance coverage on a target because of the
+requirement. However, the DoJ IG concluded that once the PSP began to affect the
+functioning of the FISA process, OIPR and the FISC effectively became part of the PSP's
+operations, and more OIPR staff and FISC judges should have been read into the PSP to
+address the impact. Instead, access to the PSP was limited for years to a single OIPR
+official and one FISC judge.
+
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+
+(U) Discovery Issues Associated With
+the President's Surveillance Program
+
+(TS//SI//NF) DOJ was aware as early as [REDACTED] that information collected
+under the PSP could have implications for DoJ's litigation responsibilities under Rule 16 of
+the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and *Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)*.
+Analysis of the discovery issue was first assigned to Yoo in [REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(S//NF) No DoJ attorneys with terrorism prosecution responsibilities were read into
+the PSP until mid-2004, and as a result, DoJ did not have access to the advice of attorneys
+who were best equipped to identify and examine discovery issues associated with the PSP.
+The DoJ IG believes that since then, DoJ has taken steps to respond [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] to [REDACTED] discovery motions [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] DoJ's
+responses to the discovery motions involve the use of the Classified Information
+Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. App. 3, to file ex parte in camera pleadings with federal courts
+to describe potentially responsive PSP-derived information. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+(S//NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] the DoJ IG recommends that DoJ assess its discovery obligations regarding PSP-
+derived information in international terrorism prosecutions currently considering whether it
+must re-examine past cases to see whether potentially discoverable but undisclosed
+Rule 16 or Brady material was collected by the NSA, and take appropriate steps to ensure
+that it has complied with its discovery obligations in such cases. The DoJ IG also
+recommends that DoJ, in coordination with the NSA, implement a procedure to identify
+PSP-derived information that may be associated with international terrorism cases
+
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+
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+
+currently pending or likely to be brought in the future and evaluate whether such
+information should be disclosed in light of the government's discovery obligations under
+Rule 16 and Brady.
+
+(U) LEGAL REASSESSMENT OF THE
+PRESIDENT'S SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM (2003 – 2004)
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Concern Over the [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Collection
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Yoo was the sole OLC attorney who advised Ashcroft and White House
+officials on the PSP from the program's inception in October 2001 through Yoo's
+resignation from DoJ in May 2003. Upon Yoo's departure, Patrick Philbin was selected by
+the White House to be read into the PSP to assume Yoo's role as advisor to the Attorney
+General concerning the program.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Philbin told us that when he reviewed Yoo's legal memorandums about
+the PSP, he realized that Yoo had omitted from his analysis any reference to the FISA
+provision allowing the interception of electronic communications without a warrant for a
+period of 15 days following a Congressional declaration of war. (See 50 U.S.C. § 1811.)
+Philbin stated that Yoo's OLC opinions were premised on the assumption that FISA did
+not expressly apply to wartime operations, an assumption that from Philbin's perspective
+made the opinions "problematic."
+
+[REDACTED]
+
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
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+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(S//NF) In August 2003, Philbin told Ashcroft that there were problems with the legal
+analysis supporting the PSP but probably not with the conclusions reached, and he
+therefore advised Ashcroft to continue to certify the program "as to form and legality."
+Philbin also recommended that a new OLC memorandum assessing the legality of the PSP
+be drafted, and with Ashcroft's concurrence he began drafting the memorandum.
+
+(U) A New Legal Basis for the Program Is Adopted
+
+(S//NF) Goldsmith was sworn in as the Assistant Attorney General for OLC on
+6 October 2003, replacing Bybee, who had left that position several months earlier to serve
+as a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Philbin told us that he
+pressed hard to have Goldsmith read into the PSP, and when Addington told Philbin he
+would have to justify the request before Addington would take it to the President for a
+decision, Addington subsequently read Goldsmith into the program on
+17 November 2003.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) After reviewing Yoo's memorandums and Philbin's new draft analysis
+of the PSP, Goldsmith agreed with Philbin's concerns about the existing legal analysis
+supporting the program, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+(S//SI//NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
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+
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+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Goldsmith concluded that the NSA's interception of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] did not comply with FISA's requirement to obtain
+judicial authorization, and did not fall within any of the exceptions to this requirement.
+Goldsmith later wrote in a May 2004 legal memorandum reassessing the legality of the
+program that a proper analysis of the PSP "must not consider FISA in isolation" but rather
+must "consider whether Congress, by authorizing the use of military force against al-Qa'ida,
+also "effectively exempts" such surveillance from FISA. Goldsmith believed that this
+reading of the AUMF was correct because the AUMF authorized the President to use "all
+necessary and appropriate force" "against the enemy that attacked the United States on
+11 September 2001, and to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the
+United States" by such enemy-authority that has long been recognized to include the use
+of SIGINT as a military tool. Alternatively, Goldsmith reasoned that even if the AUMF
+did not exempt surveillance under the program from the restrictions imposed by FISA, the
+question was sufficiently ambiguous to warrant the application of the doctrine of
+constitutional avoidance, and therefore should be construed not to prohibit the activity.¹¹
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+¹¹ (TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+38
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+
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+
+(TS//SI//NF) In late 2003, Philbin and Goldsmith were the only two DoJ officials in a
+position to brief the Attorney General and White House officials on the status of their legal
+reassessment and its potential ramifications for the operation of the program. Goldsmith
+advised Ashcroft that, despite concerns about the program, Ashcroft should certify the
+9 December 2003 Presidential Authorization. Goldsmith later advised Ashcroft to certify
+the 14 January 2004 authorization as well. Goldsmith told us that he made these
+recommendations to Ashcroft with the caveat that although he believed Yoo's
+memorandums to be flawed, Goldsmith had not yet concluded that the program itself was
+illegal.
+
+(U) Department of Justice Officials Convey
+Concerns About the Program to the White House
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In December 2003, Goldsmith and Philbin met with Addington and
+Gonzales at the White House to express their growing concerns about the legal
+underpinnings for the program. Goldsmith told us he told them that OLC was not sure the
+program could survive in its current form. According to Goldsmith's contemporaneous
+notes of these events, these discussions did not contemplate an interruption of the program,
+although the White House officials represented that they would "agree to pull the plug" if
+the problems with the program were found to be sufficiently serious. Goldsmith told us
+that the White House "typically through Addington" told him "several times" that it
+would halt the program if DoJ found that it could not be legally supported.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) On 18 December 2003, Goldsmith met again with Addington and
+Gonzales and wrote in his notes that during this meeting he conveyed with "more force"
+his "serious doubts and the need to get more help to resolve the issue [as soon as
+possible]." Goldsmith told us that during this meeting he also asked to have Deputy
+Attorney General Comey read into the program. According to Goldsmith's notes,
+Addington and Gonzales "bristle[d]" at that suggestion. Goldsmith told us that he
+requested that Comey be read in because he believed he would need Comey's assistance to
+help "make the case" to the White House that the program was legally flawed. In addition,
+he said he wanted Comey read in because, as the Deputy Attorney General, Comey was
+Philbin's direct supervisor.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Goldsmith's efforts to gain the White House's permission to have
+additional attorneys, and especially Comey, read into the program continued through
+January 2004. According to Goldsmith's notes, both Addington and Gonzales pressed
+Goldsmith on his reasons for the request and continued to express doubt that additional DoJ
+personnel were needed. However, in late January 2004 the White House agreed to allow
+Comey to be read in, and Comey was briefed into the PSP on 12 March 2004 by Hayden.
+
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+39
+
+(S/NF) After his briefing, Comey discussed the program with Goldsmith, Philbin,
+and other DoJ officials, and agreed that the concerns with Yoo's legal analysis were well-
+founded.12 Comey told us that of particular concern to him and Goldsmith was the notion
+that Yoo's legal analysis entailed ignoring an act of Congress, and doing so without full
+Congressional notification.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Comey told us that in early March 2004 the sense at DoJ was that “we
+can get there" with regard to [REDACTED] albeit by using an aggressive
+legal analysis. However, he agreed with Goldsmith's conclusion that [REDACTED]
+would require [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+(U) Conflict Between the Department of Justice
+and the White House Over the Program
+
+(U) Comey told us that he met with Ashcroft for lunch on 4 March 2004 to discuss
+the PSP, and that Ashcroft agreed with Comey and the other DoJ officials' assessment of
+the potential legal problems with the program. Three hours after their lunch meeting,
+Ashcroft became ill and was admitted to the George Washington University Hospital.¹³ On
+5 March 2004, Goldsmith advised Comey by memorandum that under the circumstances of
+Ashcroft's medical condition and hospitalization, a "clear basis" existed for Comey to
+exercise the authorities of the Attorney General allowed by law as Deputy Attorney
+General or Acting Attorney General. The "cc" line of Goldsmith's memorandum to
+Comey indicated that a copy of the memorandum was sent to Gonzales.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) On 5 March 2004—six days before the Presidential Authorization then
+in effect was set to expire—Goldsmith and Philbin met with Addington and Gonzales at
+the White House to again convey their concerns about the PSP. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Later that day, Gonzales called Goldsmith to
+request a letter from OLC stating that Yoo's prior OLC opinions "covered the program.”
+Philbin told us that Gonzales was not requesting a new opinion that the program itself was
+legal, but only a letter stating that the prior opinions had concluded that it was.
+
+¹² (TS//SI//OC/NF) The other officials included Counsel for Intelligence Policy Baker, Counselor to the Attorney
+General Levin, and Comey's Chief of Staff Chuck Rosenberg. Both Levin and Rosenberg had been read into the
+PSP while at the FBI. Comey also discussed DoJ's concerns about the legality of the program with FBI Director
+Mueller on 1 March 2004. Mueller told us that this was the first time he had been made aware of DoJ's concerns.
+¹³ (U) Ashcroft's doctors did not clear Ashcroft to resume his duties as Attorney General until 31 March 2004.
+
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+
+(TS//SI//NF) As a result of Gonzales's request, Goldsmith, Philbin, and Comey re-
+examined Yoo's memorandums with a view toward determining whether they adequately
+described the actual collection activities of the NSA under the Presidential Authorizations.
+They concluded that the memorandums did not. According to Goldsmith, the conclusion
+that Yoo's memorandums failed to accurately describe, let alone provide a legal analysis
+of [REDACTED] meant that OLC could not tell the White House that the
+program could continue under the authority of those legal memorandums.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) On 6 March 2004, Goldsmith and Philbin, with Comey's concurrence,
+went to the White House to meet with Addington and Gonzales to convey their conclusions
+that [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] According to Goldsmith's notes,
+Addington and Gonzales "reacted calmly and said they would get back with us." On
+Sunday, 7 March 2004, Goldsmith and Philbin met again with Addington and Gonzales at
+the White House. According to Goldsmith, the White House officials informed Goldsmith
+and Philbin that they disagreed with their interpretation of Yoo's memorandums and on the
+need to change the scope of the NSA's collection under the PSP.
+
+(S/NF) On 9 March 2004, Gonzales called Goldsmith to the White House in an effort
+to persuade him that his criticisms of Yoo's memorandums were incorrect and that Yoo's
+analysis provided sufficient legal support for the program. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+After Goldsmith stated that he disagreed, Gonzales next argued for a "30-day bridge to
+get past the expiration of the current Presidential Authorization on 11 March 2004.
+Gonzales reasoned that Ashcroft, who was still hospitalized, was not in any condition to
+sign a renewal of the authorization, and that a "30-day bridge” would move the situation to
+a point where Ashcroft would be well enough to approve the program. Goldsmith told
+Gonzales he could not agree to recommend an extension because aspects of the program
+lacked legal support.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) At noon on 9 March, another meeting was held at the White House in
+Card's office. According to Mueller's notes, Mueller, Card, Vice President Cheney,
+Deputy Director of Central Intelligence John E. McLaughlin, Hayden, Gonzales, and other
+unspecified officials were present. Comey, Goldsmith, and Philbin were not invited to this
+meeting. After a presentation on the value of the PSP by NSA and CIA officials, it was
+then explained to the group that Comey "has problems" with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Mueller's notes state that the Vice President suggested that "the President may
+have to reauthorize without [the] blessing of DoJ,” to which Mueller responded, "I could
+have a problem with that,” and that the FBI would "have to review legality of continued
+participation in the program."
+
+(TS//SI//NF) A third meeting at the White House was held on 9 March, this time with
+Comey, Goldsmith, and Philbin present. Gonzales told us that the meeting was held to
+make sure that Comey understood what was at stake with the program and to demonstrate
+its value. Comey said the Vice President stressed that the program was "critically
+
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+
+important" and warned that Comey would risk "thousands" of lives if he did not agree to
+recertify it. Comey said he stated at the meeting that he, as Acting Attorney General, could
+support reauthorizing [REDACTED] provided the collection was [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] However, he told the group "we can't
+get there" on [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+According to Comey, the White House officials said they could not agree to that
+modification.
+
+(S/NF) Gonzales told us after President Bush was advised of the results of the
+9 March meetings, he instructed the Vice President on the morning of 10 March to call a
+meeting with Congressional leaders to advise them of the impasse with DoJ. That
+afternoon, Gonzales and other White House and IC officials, including Vice President
+Cheney, Card, Hayden, McLaughlin, and Tenet, convened an "emergency meeting" with
+Congressional leaders in the White House Situation Room. The Congressional leaders in
+attendance were Senate Majority and Minority Leaders William H. "Bill" Frist and
+Thomas A. Daschle; Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman Pat Roberts and
+Vice Chairman John D. Rockefeller, IV; Speaker of the House J. Dennis Hastert and House
+Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi; and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
+Chair Porter Goss and Ranking Member Jane Harman. No DoJ officials were asked to be
+present at the meeting.
+
+(S/NF) According to Gonzales's notes of the meeting, individual Congressional
+leaders expressed thoughts and concerns related to the program. Gonzales told us that the
+consensus was that the program should continue. Gonzales also said that following the
+meeting with Congressional leaders, President Bush instructed him and Card to go to the
+George Washington University Hospital to speak to Ashcroft, who was in the intensive
+care unit recovering from surgery.
+
+(U) According to notes from Ashcroft's FBI security detail, at 18:20 on
+10 March 2004, Card called the hospital and spoke with an agent in the security detail,
+advising the agent that President Bush would be calling shortly to speak with Ashcroft.
+Ashcroft's wife told the agent that Ashcroft would not accept the call. Ten minutes later,
+the agent called Ashcroft's Chief of Staff David Ayres at DoJ to request that Ayres speak
+with Card about the President's intention to call Ashcroft. The agent conveyed to Ayres
+Mrs. Ashcroft's desire that no calls be made to Ashcroft for another day or two. However,
+at 18:45, Card and the President called the hospital and, according to the agent's notes,
+"insisted on speaking [with Attorney General Ashcroft]." According to the agent's notes,
+Mrs. Ashcroft took the call from Card and the President and was informed that Gonzales
+and Card were coming to the hospital to see Ashcroft regarding a matter involving national
+security.
+
+(U) At approximately 19:00, Ayres was advised that Gonzales and Card were on their
+way to the hospital. Ayres then called Comey, who at the time was being driven home by
+his security detail, and told Comey that Gonzales and Card were on their way to the
+
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+
+hospital. Comey told his driver to take him to the hospital. According to his May 2007
+testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Comey then called his Chief of Staff,
+Chuck Rosenberg, and directed him to "get as many of my people as possible to the
+hospital immediately." Comey next called Mueller and told him that Gonzales and Card
+were on their way to the hospital to see Ashcroft, and that Ashcroft was in no condition to
+receive visitors, much less make a decision about whether to recertify the PSP. According
+to Mueller's notes, Comey asked Mueller to come to the hospital to "witness [the]
+condition of AG." Mueller told Comey he would go to the hospital right away.
+
+(U) Comey arrived at the hospital between 19:10 and 19:30. Comey said he began
+speaking to Ashcroft, and that it was not clear that Ashcroft could focus and that he
+"seemed pretty bad off." Goldsmith and Philbin also had been summoned to the hospital
+and arrived within a few minutes of each other. Comey, Goldsmith, and Philbin met
+briefly in an FBI "command post" that had been set up in a room adjacent to Ashcroft's
+room. Moments later, the command post was notified that Card and Gonzales had arrived
+at the hospital and were on their way upstairs to see Ashcroft. Comey, Goldsmith, and
+Philbin entered Ashcroft's room and, according to Goldsmith's notes, Comey and the
+others advised Ashcroft "not to sign anything."
+
+(U) Gonzales and Card entered Ashcroft's hospital room at 19:35. Gonzales told us
+that he had with him in a manila envelope the 11 March 2004, Presidential Authorization
+for Ashcroft to sign. According to Philbin, Gonzales first asked Ashcroft how he was
+feeling. Ashcroft replied, "not well." Gonzales then said words to the effect, "You know,
+there's a reauthorization that has to be renewed...." Gonzales told us that he may also
+have told Ashcroft that White House officials had met with Congressional leaders "to
+pursue a legislative fix."
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Comey testified to the Senate Judiciary Committee that at this point
+Ashcroft told Gonzales and Card "in very strong terms" his objections to the PSP, which
+Comey testified Ashcroft drew from his meeting with Comey about the program a week
+earlier. Goldsmith's notes indicate that Ashcroft complained in particular that NSA's
+collection activities exceeded the scope of the authorizations and the OLC memorandums.
+Comey testified that Ashcroft next stated:
+
+"But that doesn't matter, because I'm not the Attorney
+General. There is the Attorney General," and he pointed to
+me—I was just to his left. The two men [Gonzales and Card]
+did not acknowledge me; they turned and walked from the
+room.
+
+(U) Moments after Gonzales and Card departed, Mueller arrived at the hospital.
+Mueller met briefly with Ashcroft and later wrote in his notes, "AG in chair; is feeble,
+barely articulate, clearly stressed."
+
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+
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+
+(U) Before leaving the hospital, Comey received a call from Card. Comey testified
+that Card was very upset and demanded that Comey come to the White House
+immediately. Comey told Card that he would meet with him, but not without a witness,
+and that he intended that witness to be Solicitor General Theodore B. Olson.
+
+(U) Comey and the other DoJ officials left the hospital at 20:10 and met at DoJ. They
+were joined there by Olson. During this meeting, a call came from the Vice President for
+Olson, which Olson took on a secure line in Comey's office while Comey waited outside.
+Comey told us he believes the Vice President effectively read Olson into the program
+during that conversation. Comey and Olson then went to the White House at about 23:00
+that evening and met with Gonzales and Card. Gonzales told us that little more was
+achieved at this meeting than a general acknowledgement that a "situation" continued to
+exist because of the disagreement between DoJ and the White House regarding the
+program.
+
+(S/NF) White House Counsel Certifies
+Presidential Authorization Without
+Department of Justice Concurrence
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) On the morning of 11 March 2004, with the Presidential
+Authorization set to expire, President Bush signed a new authorization for the PSP. In a
+departure from the past practice of having the Attorney General certify the authorization as
+to form and legality, the 11 March authorization was certified by White House Counsel
+Gonzales. The 11 March authorization also differed markedly from prior authorizations in
+three other respects.
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) The first significant difference between the 11 March 2004
+Presidential Authorization and prior authorizations was the President's explicit assertion
+that the exercise of his Article II Commander-in-Chief authority [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) Second, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+44
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+
+[REDACTED]
+
+45
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+
+(TS//SI//NF) The third departure from prior authorizations was the inclusion of a
+statement that [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (Id. at para. 10.)¹⁴
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Card informed Comey by telephone on the morning of 11 March 2004
+that the President had signed the new authorization that morning. At approximately 12:00,
+Gonzales called Goldsmith to inform him that the President, in issuing the authorization,
+had made an interpretation of law concerning his authorities and that DoJ should not act in
+contradiction of the President's determinations.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Also at 12:00 on 11 March, Mueller met with Card at the White House.
+According to Mueller's notes, Card summoned Mueller to his office to bring Mueller up-
+to-date on the events of the preceding 24 hours, including the briefing of the Congressional
+leaders the prior afternoon and the President's issuance of the new authorization without
+DoJ's certification as to legality. In addition, Card told Mueller that if no "legislative fix"
+could be found by 6 May 2004, when the 11 March authorization was set to expire, the
+program would be discontinued.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) According to Mueller's notes, Card acknowledged to Mueller that
+President Bush had sent him and Gonzales to the hospital to seek Ashcroft's certification
+for the 11 March 2004 authorization, but that Ashcroft had said he was too ill to make the
+determination and that Comey was the Acting Attorney General. Mueller wrote that he
+told Card that the failure to have DoJ representation at the Congressional briefing and the
+attempt to have Ashcroft certify the authorization without going through Comey "gave the
+strong perception that the [White House] was trying to do an end run around the Acting
+[Attorney General] whom they knew to have serious concerns as to the legality of portions
+of the program." Card responded that he and Gonzales were unaware at the time of the
+hospital visit that Comey was the Acting Attorney General, and that they had only been
+following the directions of the President.
+
+(S/NF) Several senior DoJ and FBI officials, including Comey, Goldsmith, and
+Mueller considered resigning after the 11 March 2004 Presidential Authorization was
+signed without DoJ's concurrence. These officials cited as reasons for considering
+resignation the manner in which the White House had handled its dispute with DoJ and the
+treatment of Ashcroft, among other reasons.
+
+(S/NF) On 12 March 2004, Mueller drafted by hand a letter stating, in part: "[A]fter
+reviewing the plain language of the FISA statute, and the order issued yesterday by the
+President... and in the absence of further clarification of the legality of the program from
+the Attorney General, I am forced to withdraw the FBI from participation in the program.
+
+¹⁴ [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+46
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+Further, should the President order the continuation of the FBI's participation in the
+program, and in the absence of further legal advice from the AG, I would be constrained to
+resign as Director of the FBI." Mueller told us he planned on having the letter typed and
+then tendering it, but that based on subsequent events his resignation was not necessary.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Mueller sent Comey a memorandum seeking guidance on how the FBI
+should proceed in light of developments related to the Presidential Authorizations. The
+memorandum asked whether FBI agents detailed to the NSA to work on the PSP should be
+recalled: whether the FBI should continue to receive and investigate tips based on [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] and whether [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+(U) On the morning of 12 March, Comey and Mueller attended the regular daily
+threat briefing with the President in the Oval Office. Comey said that, following the
+briefing, President Bush called him into the President's private study for an "unscheduled
+meeting." Comey told the President of DoJ's legal concerns regarding the PSP.
+According to Comey, the President's response indicated that he had not been fully
+informed of these concerns. Comey told the President that the President's staff had been
+advised of these issues "for weeks." According to Comey, the President said that he just
+needed until May 6 (the date of the next authorization), and that if he could not get
+Congress to fix FISA by then he would shut down the program. The President emphasized
+the importance of the program and that it "saves lives."
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The President next met with Mueller. According to Mueller's notes,
+Mueller told the President of his concerns regarding the FBI's continued participation in
+the program without an opinion from the Attorney General as to its legality, and that he
+was considering resigning if the FBI were directed to continue to participate without the
+concurrence of the Attorney General. The President directed Mueller to meet with Comey
+and other PSP principals to address the legal concerns so that the FBI could continue
+participating in the program "as appropriate under the law." Comey decided not to direct
+the FBI to cease cooperating with the NSA in conjunction with the PSP. Comey's decision
+is documented in a one-page memorandum from Goldsmith to Comey in which Goldsmith
+explained that the President, as Commander-in-Chief and Chief Executive with the
+constitutional duty to "take care that the laws are faithfully executed," made a
+determination that the PSP, as practiced, was lawful. Goldsmith concluded that this
+determination is binding on the entire Executive Branch, including Comey in his
+exercise of the powers of the Attorney General.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The same day, an interagency working group was convened to continue
+reanalyzing the legality of the PSP. In accordance with the President's directive to
+Mueller, officials from the FBI, NSA, and CIA were brought into the process, although the
+OLC maintained the lead role. On 16 March 2004, Comey drafted a memorandum to
+Gonzales setting out Comey's advice to the President regarding the PSP. Comey advised
+that the President may lawfully continue [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Comey further
+
+47
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+wrote that DoJ remained unable to find a legal basis to support [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] and he advised that such [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Finally, Comey cautioned that he believed the
+ongoing collection of [REDACTED] raised "serious issues" about
+Congressional notification, "particularly where the legal basis for the program is the
+President's decision to assert his authority to override an otherwise applicable Act of
+Congress."
+
+(U) Gonzales replied by letter on the evening of 16 March. The letter stated, in part:
+
+ Your memorandum appears to have been based on a
+ misunderstanding of the President's expectations regarding
+ the conduct of the Department of Justice. While the President
+ was, and remains, interested in any thoughts the Department
+ of Justice may have on alternative ways to achieve effectively
+ the goals of the activities authorized by the Presidential
+ Authorization of March 11, 2004, the President has addressed
+ definitively for the Executive Branch in the Presidential
+ Authorization the interpretation of the law.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) White House Agrees to
+REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Notwithstanding Gonzales's letter, on 17 March 2004 the President
+decided to [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+The President's directive was expressed in two modifications to the 11 March 2004
+Presidential Authorization.
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) On 19 March 2004, the President signed, and Gonzales
+certified as to form and legality, a modification of the 11 March 2004 Presidential
+Authorization. The modification made two significant changes to the current authorization
+and a third important change affecting all subsequent authorizations. First, the
+modification [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Second, the modification [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+48
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED] Third the modification authorized [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF). On 2 April 2004, President Bush signed, and Gonzales
+certified as to form and legality, a second modification of the 11 March 2004, Presidential
+Authorization. This modification addressed only [REDACTED] of the
+PSP.[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+(S/NF) On 6 May 2004, Goldsmith and Philbin completed an OLC legal
+memorandum assessing the legality of the PSP as it was then operating. The memorandum
+stated that the AUMF passed by Congress shortly after the attacks of 11 September 2001
+gave the President authority to use both domestically and abroad “all necessary and
+appropriate force,” including SIGINT capabilities, to prevent future acts of international
+terrorism against the United States. According to the memorandum, the AUMF was
+properly read as an express authorization to conduct targeted electronic surveillance
+against al-Qa'ida and its affiliates, the entities responsible for attacking the United States,
+thereby supporting the President's directives to conduct these activities under the PSP.
+Much of the legal reasoning in the 6 May 2004 OLC memorandum was publicly released
+by DoJ in a "White Paper”—“Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National
+Security Agency Described by the President"—issued on 19 January 2006 after the content
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+49
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+collection portion of the program was revealed in The New York Times and publicly
+confirmed by the President in December 2005.
+
+(U) Restrictions on Access to the
+President's Surveillance Program
+Impeded Department of Justice Legal Review
+
+(TS//SI//OC/NF) The DoJ IG found it extraordinary and inappropriate that a single
+DoJ attorney, John Yoo, was relied upon to conduct the initial legal assessment of the PSP,
+and that the lack of oversight and review of Yoo's work, which was contrary to the
+customary practice of OLC, contributed to a legal analysis of the PSP that, at a minimum,
+was factually flawed. Deficiencies in the legal memorandums became apparent once
+additional Doj attorneys were read into the program in 2003 and those attorneys sought a
+greater understanding of the PSP's operation. The White House's strict controls over
+access to the PSP undermined DoJ's ability to provide the President the best available
+advice about the program. The DoJ IG also concluded that the circumstances plainly
+called for additional DoJ resources to be applied to the legal review of the program, and
+that it was the Attorney General's responsibility to be aware of this need and to take steps
+to address it. However, the DoJ OIG could not determine whether Ashcroft aggressively
+sought additional read-ins to assist with DoJ's legal review of the program prior to 2003
+because Ashcroft did not agree to be interviewed.
+
+(U) TRANSITION OF PRESIDENT'S SURVEILLANCE
+PROGRAM ACTIVITIES TO FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE ACT AUTHORITY
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Internet Metadata Collection
+Transition to Operation Under FISA Authority
+
+(TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The government's FISA application, entitled "Application for Pen
+Registers and Trap and Trace Devices for Foreign Intelligence Purposes," was filed [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The application package included:
+* A proposed order authorizing the collection activity and secondary orders
+ mandating carriers to cooperate.
+* A declaration by Hayden explaining the technical aspects of the proposed
+ Internet metadata collection and identifying the government official
+
+50
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+ seeking to use the pen register and trap and trace (PR/TT) devices covered
+ by the application for purposes of 50 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(1).
+* A declaration by Tenet describing the threat posed by [REDACTED]
+ [REDACTED] to the United States.
+* A certification from Ashcroft stating that the information likely to be
+ obtained from the PR/TT devices was relevant to an ongoing investigation
+ to protect against international terrorism, as required by 50 U.S.C. § 1842(c).
+* A memorandum of law and fact in support of the application.
+
+(TS//SI//OC/NF) The objective of the application was to secure authority under FISA
+to collect [REDACTED] bulk Internet metadata. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] DoJ constructed its legal argument for
+this novel use of PR/TT devices around traditional authorities provided under FISA. (See
+50 U.S.C. § 1842(a)(1).) The government argued that the NSA's proposed collection of
+metadata met the requirements of FISA by noting that the metadata sought comported with
+the "dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information" type of data described in
+FISA's definitions of PR/TT devices. (See 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) and (4).) The government
+next argued that the information likely to be obtained from the PR/TT devices was relevant
+to an ongoing investigation to protect against international terrorism, as certified by the
+Attorney General under 50 U.S.C. § 1842(c). In support of this “certification of relevance"
+the government stated that the FBI [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The government also stated that
+the NSA needed to collect metadata in bulk to effectively perform contact chaining [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] that would enable the NSA to discover enemy communications.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The application requested that the NSA be authorized to collect
+metadata [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The application represented that for most of the proposed collection on [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] it was "overwhelmingly likely" that at least one end of the transmitted
+communication either originated in or was destined for locations outside the United States,
+and that in some cases both ends of the communication were entirely foreign. However,
+the government acknowledged that [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The application proposed allowing 10 NSA analysts access to the
+database. The NSA analysts were to be briefed by NSA OGC personnel concerning the
+circumstances under which the database could be queried, and all queries would have to be
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+51
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+approved by one of seven senior NSA officials. The application proposed that queries of
+the Internet metadata archive would be performed when the Internet communication
+address met the following standard:
+
+ [B]ased on the factual and practical considerations of
+ everyday life on which reasonable and prudent persons act,
+ there are facts giving rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion
+ that a particular known e-mail address is associated with
+ [REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//OC/NF) The application and supporting documents explained that the NSA
+intended to use the Internet metadata to develop contact chaining [REDACTED]
+The NSA estimated that its queries of the database would generate approximately 400
+tips to the FBI and CIA each year. Of these tips, the NSA projected that 25 percent would
+include U.S. person information, amounting to leads including information on about "four
+to five U.S. persons each month."
+
+(TS//SI//NF) On 14 July 2004, Kollar-Kotelly signed a Pen Register and Trap and Trace
+Opinion and Order (PR/TT Order) based on her findings that the proposed collection
+of Internet metadata and the government's proposed controls over and dissemination of
+this information satisfied the requirements of FISA. The PR/TT Order, which granted the
+government's application in all key respects, approved for a period of 90 days the
+collection within the United States of Internet metadata [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The PR/TT Order also required the government to comply with certain
+additional restrictions and procedures either adapted from or not originally proposed in the
+application. The FISC amended the government's proposed querying standard, consistent
+with 50 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2), to include the proviso that the NSA may query the database
+based on its reasonable articulable suspicion that a particular known Internet
+communication address is associated with [REDACTED]
+"provided, however, that an [REDACTED] believed to be used by a U.S. person shall
+not be regarded as associated with [REDACTED] solely on
+the basis of activities that are protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution."
+Regarding the storing, accessing, and disseminating of the Internet metadata obtained by
+the NSA, the FISC ordered that the NSA store the information in a manner that ensures it
+is not commingled with other data, and "generate a log of auditing information for each
+occasion when the information is accessed, to include the ... retrieval request." The FISC
+also issued separate orders to [REDACTED] service providers [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] to assist the NSA with the installation and use of the PR/TT devices and to maintain
+the secrecy of the NSA's activities.
+
+52
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Several officials told us that obtaining the PR/TT Order was seen as a
+great success, and that there was general agreement that the government had secured all the
+authority it sought to conduct the bulk Internet metadata collection.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The FISC first renewed the PR/TT Order on [REDACTED] and then
+renewed it by subsequent orders at approximately 90-day intervals. In these renewals, the
+FISC [REDACTED] that it approved with the
+14 July 2004 PR/TT Order. Under the PR/TT renewal applications, the scope of
+authorized queries, against the PR/TT database remained limited to queries that concerned
+[REDACTED]
+
+(U) Department of Justice Notices
+of Compliance Incidents
+
+(TS//SI//NF) On [REDACTED] DoJ OIPR filed a Notice of Compliance Incidents
+with the FISC describing certain "unauthorized collection" that had taken place following
+issuance of the PR/TT Order. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) On [REDACTED] the FISC issued a Compliance Order stating that
+the "NSA violated its own proposed limitations." The FISC stated that it was troubled by
+the duration of the violations, which extended from 14 July through [REDACTED]
+and that the Court was reluctant to issue a renewal of the PR/TT Order as to [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] However, Kollar-Kotelly signed a Renewal Order on [REDACTED] allowing
+the NSA to continue collecting Internet metadata under FISA on terms similar to the
+original PR/TT Order.
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+53
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Telephony Metadata Collection
+Transition to Operation Under FISA Authority
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Another part of the PSP, bulk collection of telephony metadata, was
+brought under FISA authority in May 2006. As with Internet metadata, the bulk nature of
+the telephony metadata collection provided the NSA the ability to conduct contact chaining
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The transition of bulk telephony metadata collection from Presidential
+authority to FISA authority relied on a provision in FISA that authorized the FBI to seek an
+order from the FISC compelling the production of "any tangible things" from any business,
+organization, or entity, provided the items are for an authorized investigation to protect
+against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities. (See
+50 U.S.C. § 1861.) Orders under this provision are commonly referred to as "Section 215"
+orders in reference to Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, which amended the
+"business records" provision in Title V of FISA.¹⁸ The "tangible things" sought in this
+Section 215 application were the telephone call detail records of certain
+telecommunications service providers.
+
+(TS//SI/NF) The timing of the decision in May 2006 to seek a FISC order for the
+bulk collection of telephony metadata was driven primarily by external events. A
+16 December 2005 article in The New York Times entitled, "Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers
+Without Courts." described in broad terms the content collection aspect of the PSP. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] On 17 December 2005, in response to the article, President
+Bush publicly confirmed that he had authorized the NSA to intercept the international
+communications of people with known links to al-Qa'ida and related terrorist
+organizations. On 19 January 2006, DoJ issued its White Paper–"Legal Authorities
+Supporting the Activities of the National Security Agency Described by the President"–
+that addressed in an unclassified form the legal basis for the collection activities described
+in The New York Times article and confirmed by the President.
+
+¹⁸ (U) Prior to the enactment of Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, the FISA "business records" provisions
+were limited to obtaining information about a specific person or entity under investigation and only from common
+carriers, public accommodation facilities, physical storage facilities, and vehicle rental facilities.
+
+54
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(TS//SI//NF) According to Bradbury, the head of OLC at that time, the legal analysis
+contained in the White Paper [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Although The New York Times article did not describe this aspect of the PSP,
+reporters at USA Today asked about this aspect of the program in early 2006. Bradbury
+[REDACTED] anticipated that a USA Today article would attract
+significant public attention when published. As anticipated, on 11 May 2006, the USA
+Today published the results of its investigation in an article entitled, "NSA Has Massive
+Database of American Phone Calls."
+
+(TS//SI//NF) On 23 May 2006, the FBI filed with the FISC a Section 215 application
+seeking authority to collect telephony metadata to assist the NSA in finding and identifying
+members or agents of [REDACTED] in support of the [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] FBI investigations then pending and other IC operations. The application requested
+an order compelling certain telecommunications companies to produce (for the duration of
+the 90-day order) call detail records relating to all telephone communications maintained
+by the carriers. According to the application, the majority of the telephony metadata
+provided to the NSA was expected to involve communications that were (1) between
+domestic and foreign locations, or (2) wholly within the United States, including local
+telephone calls. The application estimated that the collection would involve the NSA
+receiving approximately [REDACTED] call detail records per day.¹⁹
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The application acknowledged that the vast collection would include
+communications records of U.S. persons located within the United States who were not the
+subject of any FBI investigation. However, relying on the precedent established by the
+PR/TT Order, the application asserted that the collection was needed for the NSA to find
+[REDACTED] and to identify unknown operatives, some of whom may be in
+the United States or in communication with U.S. persons, by using contact chaining [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] As was done under the PSP, the call detail records would be entered in an
+NSA database and analysts would query the data with particular telephone numbers to
+identify connections with other numbers [REDACTED] The proposed
+query standard in the Section 215 application essentially was the same standard applied
+under the PSP in connection with telephony metadata, and the same standard the FISC
+authorized in the PR/TT Order for Internet metadata. The Section 215 application also
+included in the proposed query standard the First Amendment proviso that the FISC added
+to the PR/TT query standard.
+
+¹⁹ (TS//SI//NF) The actual average amount of telephony metadata collected per day is [REDACTED] call detail records rather than [REDACTED] estimated in the application.
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+55
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(TS//SI//NF) On 24 May 2006, the FISC approved the Section 215 application,
+finding that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the telephony metadata records
+sought were relevant to authorized investigations the FBI was conducting to protect against
+international terrorism. The FISC Section 215 order incorporated each of the procedures
+proposed in the government's application relating to access to and use of the metadata,
+which were nearly identical to those included in the Internet metadata PR/TT Order.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Through March 2009, the FISC renewed the authorities granted in the
+24 May 2006 order at approximately 90-day intervals, with some modifications sought by
+the U.S. government. For example, the FISC granted an August 2006 motion requesting
+[REDACTED] Except for these and other minor modifications, the terms of the FISC's grant of
+Section 215 authority for the bulk collection of telephony metadata remained essentially
+unchanged from the first approval in May 2006 until March 2009. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Further, the FISC's Section 215 Orders
+did not require the NSA to modify its use of the telephony metadata from an analytical
+perspective. NSA analysts were authorized to query the data as they had under the PSP,
+conduct metadata analysis, and disseminate the results to the FBI, the CIA, and other
+customers.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) However, the FISC drastically changed the authority contained in its
+March 2009 Section 215 Order after it was notified in January 2009 that the NSA had
+been querying the metadata in a manner that was not authorized by the court's Section 215
+Orders. Specifically, the NSA, on a daily basis, was automatically querying the metadata
+with [REDACTED] telephone numbers from an alert list that had not been determined to
+satisfy the reasonable articulable suspicion standard required by the FISC to access the
+telephony metadata for search or analysis purposes.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) On 2 March 2009, the FISC issued an order that addressed the
+compliance incidents that had been reported in January 2009, the government's
+explanation for their occurrence, and the remedial and prospective measures being taken in
+response. The FISC stated its concerns with the telephony metadata program and its lack
+of confidence "that the government is doing its utmost to ensure that those responsible for
+implementation fully comply with the Court's orders." Nonetheless, the FISC authorized
+the government to continue collecting telephony metadata under the Section 215 Orders.
+The FISC explained that in light of the government's repeated representations that the
+collection of the telephony metadata is vital to national security, taken together with the
+court's prior determination that the collection properly administered conforms with the
+FISA statute, that "it would not be prudent" to order the government to cease the bulk
+collection.
+
+56
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(TS//SI//NF) However, believing that "more is needed to protect the privacy of U.S.
+person information acquired and retained" pursuant to the Section 215 Orders, the FISC
+prohibited the government from accessing the metadata collected "until such time as the
+government is able to restore the Court's confidence that the government can and will
+comply with previously approved procedures for accessing such data." The government
+may, on a case-by-case basis, request authority from the FISC to query the metadata with a
+specific telephone number to obtain foreign intelligence. The FISC also authorized the
+government to query the metadata without court approval to protect against an imminent
+threat to human life, provided the government notifies the court within the next business
+day.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Content Collection Transition
+to Operation Under FISA Authority
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The last part of the PSP brought under FISA authority was telephone
+and Internet communications content collection. As explained below, the effort to
+accomplish this transition was legally and operationally complex and required an enormous
+effort on the part of the government and the FISC. The FISC judge who ruled on the initial
+application approved the unconventional legal approach the government proposed to fit
+PSP's content collection activities within FISA. However, the FISC judge responsible for
+considering the government's renewal application rejected the legal approach. This
+ in significant diminution in authorized surveillance activity involving content
+collection and hastened the enactment of legislation that significantly amended FISA and
+provided the government surveillance authorities broader than those authorized under the
+PSP.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI/NF) The government filed the content collection application with the FISC
+on 13 December 2006. The application sought authority to intercept the content of
+telephone and electronic communications of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The
+application sought to replace the conventional practice under FISA of filing individual
+applications each time the government had probable cause to believe that a particular
+telephone number or Internet communication address was being used or about to be used
+by members or agents of a foreign power. In the place of the individualized process, the
+application proposed that the FISC establish broad parameters for the interception of
+communications—the groups that can be targeted and the locations where the surveillance
+can be conducted—and that NSA officials, rather than FISC judges, determine within these
+parameters the particular selectors to be collected against. [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN
+57
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN
+
+[REDACED]
+[REDACED] albeit with FISC review and supervision. The government's approach in the
+FISA application rested on a broad interpretation of the statutory term "facility" and the
+use of minimization procedures by NSA officials to make probable cause determinations
+about individual selectors, rather than have a FISC judge make such determinations.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In short, the government's content application asked the FISC to find
+probable cause to believe that [REDACTED]
+[REDACED] engaged in international terrorism, and that [REDACTED]
+[REDACED] Then, within these parameters, NSA officials would make probable
+cause findings (subsequently reviewed by the FISC) about whether individual telephone
+numbers or Internet communications addresses are used by members or agents of
+[REDACTED] and whether the
+communications of those numbers and addresses are to or from a foreign country. When
+probable cause findings were made, the NSA could direct the telecommunications
+companies to provide the content of communications associated with those telephone
+numbers and Internet communications addresses.
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) On 10 January 2007, Judge Malcolm J. Howard approved
+the government's 13 December 2006 content application as it pertained to foreign
+selectors—telephone numbers and Internet communications addresses reasonably believed
+to be used by individuals outside the United States. The effort to implement the order was
+a massive undertaking for DoJ and NSA. At the time of the order, the NSA was actively
+tasking for content collection approximately [REDACTED] foreign selectors—Internet
+communications addresses or telephone numbers—under authority of the PSP.
+Approximately [REDACTED] of these were filed with Howard on an approved schedule of rolling
+submissions over the 90-day duration of the order.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) However, Howard did not approve the government's 13 December 2006
+content application as it pertained to domestic selectors—telephone numbers and Internet
+communications addresses reasonably believed to be used by individuals in the United
+States. Howard advised DoJ to file a separate application for the international calls of
+domestic selectors that took a more traditional approach to FISA. A more traditional
+approach meant that the facilities targeted by the FISA application should be particular
+telephone numbers and Internet communication addresses and that the probable cause
+determination for a particular selector would reside with the FISC. DoJ did this in an
+application filed on 9 January 2007, which Howard approved the following day. The FISC
+renewed the domestic selectors order approved by Howard for the final time in
+[REDACTED] and it has since expired.
+
+58
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(TS//SI/NF) DoJ's first renewal application to extend the foreign selectors authorities
+was filed on 20 March 2007 with Judge Roger Vinson, the FISC duty judge that week. On
+29 March 2007, Vinson orally advised DoJ that he could not approve the application and,
+on 3 April 2007, he issued an order and Memorandum Opinion explaining the reasoning
+for his conclusion. Vinson wrote that DoJ's foreign selectors renewal application concerns
+an "extremely important issue" regarding who may make probable cause findings that
+determine the individuals and the communications that can be subjected to electronic
+surveillance under FISA. In Vinson's view, the question was whether probable cause
+determinations are required to be made by the FISC through procedures established by
+statute, or whether the NSA may make such determinations under an alternative
+mechanism cast as "minimization procedures." Vinson concluded, based on past practice
+under FISA and the Congressional intent underlying the statute, that probable cause
+determinations must be made by the FISC.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Vinson also wrote that he was mindful of the government's argument
+that the government's proposed approach to foreign selectors was necessary to provide or
+enhance the "speed and flexibility" with which the NSA responds to threats, and that
+foreign intelligence information may be lost in the time it takes to obtain Attorney General
+emergency authorizations. However, in Vinson's view, FISA's requirements reflected a
+balance struck by Congress between privacy interests and the need to obtain foreign
+intelligence information, and until Congress took legislative action on FISA to respond to
+the government's concerns, the FISC must apply the statute's procedures. He concluded
+that the government's application sought to strike a different balance for the surveillance of
+foreign telephone numbers and Internet communications addresses. Vinson rejected this
+position, stating, "the [FISA] statute applies the same requirements to surveillance of
+facilities used overseas as it does to surveillance of facilities used in the United States."
+Vinson suggested that, "Congress should also consider clarifying or modifying the scope of
+FISA and of this Court's jurisdiction with regard to such facilities...." Vinson's
+suggestion was a spur to Congress to consider FISA modernization legislation in the summer of 2007.
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) In May 2007, DoJ filed, and Vinson approved, a revised
+foreign selectors application that took a more traditional approach to FISA. Although the
+revised approach sought to preserve some of the "speed and agility" the government had
+under Howard's order, the comparatively laborious process for targeting foreign selectors
+under Vinson's order caused the government to place only a fraction of the desired foreign
+selectors under coverage. The number of foreign selectors on collection dropped from
+about [REDACTED] under the January 2007 order to about [REDACTED] under the May 2007 order. The
+situation accelerated the government's efforts to obtain legislation that would amend FISA
+to address the government's surveillance capabilities within the United States directed at
+persons located outside the United States. The Protect America Act, signed into law on
+5 August 2007, accomplished this objective by authorizing the NSA to intercept inside the
+United States any communications of non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be located
+outside the United States, provided a significant purpose of the acquisition pertains to
+foreign intelligence. The Protect America Act effectively superseded Vinson's foreign
+
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+59
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+selectors order and the government therefore did not seek to renew the order when it
+expired on 24 August 2007.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The DOJ IG concluded that several considerations favored initiating
+PSP's transition from Presidential authority to FISA authority earlier than March 2004,
+especially as the program became less a temporary response to the September 11 terrorist
+attacks and more a permanent surveillance tool. These considerations included PSP's
+substantial effect on privacy interests of U.S. persons, the instability of the legal reasoning
+on which the program rested for several years, and the substantial restrictions placed on
+FBI agents' and analysts' access to and use of program-derived information due to the
+highly classified status of the PSP. The DOJ IG also recommended that DoJ carefully
+monitor the collection, use, and retention of the information that is now collected under
+FISA authority and, together with other agencies, continue to examine its value to the
+government's ongoing counterterrorism efforts.
+
+(U) IMPACT OF THE PRESIDENT'S SURVEILLANCE
+PROGRAM ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
+COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS
+
+(U) Senior Intelligence Community Officials
+Believe That the President's Surveillance Program
+Filled an Intelligence Gap
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Hayden, Goss, McLaughlin, and other senior IC officials we
+interviewed told us that the PSP addressed a gap in intelligence collection. The IC needed
+increased access to international communications that transited domestic U.S.
+communication wires, particularly international communications that originated or
+terminated within the United States. However, collection of such communications required
+authorization under FISA, and there was widespread belief among senior IC officials that
+the process for obtaining FISA authorization was too cumbersome and time consuming to
+address the current threat. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] During the May 2006 Senate hearing on
+his nomination to be Director of the CIA, Hayden said that, had PSP been in place before
+the September 2001 attacks, hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi almost
+certainly would have been identified and located.
+
+(TS//SI//OC/NF) According to senior NSA officials, the PSP gave NSA the
+capability to exploit a key terrorist vulnerability. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] With PSP authority, NSA could collect communications between terrorists
+in the United States and members of al-Qa'ida [REDACTED] located in
+foreign countries. The PSP provided SIGINT coverage at the seam between foreign and
+
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+
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+
+domestic intelligence collection. Havden cited as an important consequence of the PSP the
+NSA's ability to collect more [REDACTED]
+
+(S//NF) Hayden told us that he always felt the PSP was worthwhile and successful.
+His expectation was that the CIA and the FBI would be customers of program-derived
+information and integrate it into their respective operations. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Hayden
+told us that the program helped to determine that terrorist cells were not embeaded within
+the United States to the extent that had been feared.
+
+(U) Difficulty in Assessing the Impact of
+the President's Surveillance Program
+
+(S//SI//NF) It was difficult to assess the overall impact of PSP on IC counterterrorism
+efforts. Except for the FBI, IC organizations that participated in the PSP did not have
+systematic processes for tracking how PSP reporting was used. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] We
+were repeatedly told that the PSP was one of a number of intelligence sources and analytic
+tools that were available to IC personnel, and that, because PSP reporting was used in
+conjunction with reporting from other intelligence sources, it was difficult to attribute the
+success of particular counterterrorism operations exclusively to the PSP.
+
+(U) Impact of the President's Surveillance
+Program on FBI Counterterrorism Efforts
+
+(S/NF) The DoJ IG found it difficult to assess or quantify the impact of the PSP on
+FBI counterterrorism efforts. However, based on our interviews of FBI managers and
+agents and our review of documents, we concluded that, although PSP information had
+value in some counterterrorism investigations, the program generally played a limited role
+in the FBI's overall counterterrorism efforts. Several officials we interviewed suggested
+that the program provided an “early warning system" to allow the IC to detect potential
+
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+
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+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
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+
+terrorist attacks, even if the program had not specifically uncovered evidence of
+preparations for such attacks.
+
+(U) FBI Efforts to Assess the
+Value of the Program
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The FBI made several attempts to assess the value of the PSP to FBI
+counterterrorism efforts. In 2004 and again in 2006, FBI's Office of General Counsel
+(OGC) attempted to assess the value to the FBI of PSP information. This first assessment
+relied on anecdotal information and informal feedback from FBI field offices. The 2006
+assessment was limited to the aspect of the PSP disclosed in The New York Times article
+and subsequently confirmed by the President, i.e., content collection.
+
+(S/NF) The FBI undertook two more efforts to study PSP's impact on FBI
+operations in early 2006. In both of these statistical studies, the FBI sought to determine
+what percentage of PSP tippers resulted in "significant contribution[s] to the identification
+of terrorist subjects or activity on U.S. soil." The FBI considered a tipper significant if it
+led to any of three investigative results: the identification of a terrorist, the deportation
+from the United States of a suspected terrorist, or the development of an asset that can
+report about the activities of terrorists.
+
+(TS//SI//OC/NF) The first study examined a sample of leads selected from the
+[REDACTED] tippers the NSA provided the FBI from approximately October
+2001 to December 2005. The study found that 1.2 percent of the leads made significant
+contributions, as defined above. The study extrapolated this figure to the entire population
+of leads and determined that one could expect to find that [REDACTED] leads
+made significant contributions to FBI counterterrorism efforts. The second study, which
+reviewed all of the [REDACTED] leads the NSA provided the FBI from
+August 2004 through January 2006, identified no instances of significant contributions to
+FBI counterterrorism efforts. The studies did not include explicit conclusions on the
+program's usefulness. However, based in part on the results of the first study, FBI
+executive management, including Mueller and Deputy Director John Pistole, concluded
+that the PSP was "of value."
+
+(U) FBI Judgmental Assessments
+of the Program
+
+(S/NF) We interviewed FBI headquarters and field office personnel who regularly
+handled PSP information for their assessments of the impact of program information on
+FBI counterterrorism efforts. The FBI personnel we interviewed were generally supportive
+of the PSP as "one tool of many" in the FBI's anti-terrorism efforts that "could help move
+cases forward". Even though most leads were determined not to have any connection to
+terrorism, many of the FBI officials believed the mere possibility of a terrorist connection
+made investigating the tips worthwhile.
+
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+
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+
+(S/NF) However, the exceptionally compartmented nature of the program created
+some frustration for FBI personnel. Some agents criticized PSP reports for providing
+insufficient details about the foreign individuals allegedly involved in terrorism. Others
+occasionally were frustrated by the prohibition on using [REDACTED] information in judicial
+processes, such as in FISA applications, although none of the FBI field office agents we
+interviewed could identify an investigation in which the restrictions adversely affected the
+case. Agents who managed counterterrorism programs at the FBI offices we visited
+were critical of the [REDACTED] project for failing to adequately prioritize threat
+information and, because of the program's special status, for limiting the managers' ability
+to prioritize the leads in the manner they felt was warranted by the information.
+
+(S/NF) Mueller told us that the PSP was useful. He said the FBI must follow every
+lead it receives in order to prevent future terrorist attacks and that to the extent such
+information can be gathered and used legally it must be exploited. He stated that he
+"would not dismiss the potency of a program based on the percentage of hits." Mueller
+added that, as a general matter, it is very difficult to quantify the effectiveness of an
+intelligence program without “tagging" the leads that are produced in order to evaluate the
+role the program information played in any investigation.
+
+(U) Impact of the President's Surveillance Program
+on CIA Counterterrorism Operations
+
+(U) The CIA Did Not Systematically
+Assess the Effectiveness of the Program
+
+(S/NF) The CIA did not implement procedures to systematically assess the
+usefulness of the product of the PSP and did not routinely document whether particular
+PSP reporting had contributed to successful counterterrorism operations. CIA officials,
+including Hayden, told us that PSP reporting was used in conjunction with reporting from
+other intelligence sources; consequently, it is difficult to attribute the success of particular
+counterterrorism operations exclusively to the PSP. In a May 2006 briefing to the SSCI,
+the Deputy Director, [REDACTED] said that PSP reporting was rarely the sole basis for an
+intelligence success, but that it frequently played a supporting role. He went on to state
+that the program was an additional resource to enhance the CIA's understanding of terrorist
+networks and to help identify potential threats to the homeland. Other [REDACTED] officials we
+interviewed said that the PSP was one of many tools available to them, and that the tools
+were often used in combination.
+
+(S//NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] However, because there is no means to
+comprehensively track now PSP information was used, CIA officials were able to provide
+
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+only limited information on how program reporting contributed to successful operations,
+and the CIA IG was unable to independently draw any conclusion on the overall usefulness
+of the program to CIA.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(U) Several Factors Hindered CIA
+Utilization of the Program
+
+(S/NF) The CIA IG concluded that several factors hindered the CIA in making full
+use of the capabilities of the PSP. Many CIA officials told us that too few CIA personnel
+at the working level were read into the PSP. At the program's inception, a disproportionate
+number of the CIA personnel who were read into the PSP were senior CIA managers. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] the disparity between the number of senior CIA managers
+read into PSP and the number of working-level CIA personnel read into the program
+resulted in too few CIA personnel to fully utilize PSP information for targeting and
+analysis.
+
+(S/NF) [REDACTED] working-level CIA analysts and targeting
+officers who were read into the PSP had too many competing priorities, and too many
+other information sources and analytic tools available to them, to fully utilize PSP [REDACTED]
+officials also told us that much of the PSP reporting was vague or without context, which
+led analysts and targeting officers to rely more heavily on other information sources and
+analytic tools, which were more easily accessed and timely than the PSP.
+
+(S//NF) CIA officers said that the PSP would have been more fully utilized if
+analysts and targeting officers had obtained a better understanding of the program's
+capabilities. There was no formal training on the use of the PSP beyond the initial read in
+to the program. Many CIA officers we interviewed said that the instruction provided in the
+read-in briefing was not sufficient and that they were surprised and frustrated by the lack of
+additional guidance. Some officers told us that there was insufficient legal guidance on the
+use of PSP-derived information.
+
+(S/NF) The factors that hindered the CIA in making full use of the PSP might have
+been mitigated if the CIA had designated an individual at an appropriate level of
+managerial authority, who possessed knowledge of both the PSP and CIA counterterrorism
+activities, to be responsible and accountable for overseeing CIA participation in the
+
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+
+65
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+program. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+(U) Impact of the President's Surveillance
+Program on NCTC Counterterrorism Efforts
+
+(S//NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] NCTC analysts characterized the PSP as a useful
+tool, but they also noted that the program was only one of several valuable sources of
+information available to them. In their view, PSP-derived information was not of greater
+value than other sources of intelligence. Although NCTC analysts we interviewed could
+not recall specific examples where PSP information provided what they considered
+actionable intelligence, they told us they remember attending meetings where the benefits
+of the PSP were regularly discussed.
+
+(U) Counterterrorism Operations Supported by
+the President's Surveillance Program
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) Our efforts to independently identify how PSP information
+impacted terrorism investigations and counterterrorism operations were hampered by the
+nature of these activities, which as previously stated, frequently are predicated on multiple
+sources of information. Many IC officials we interviewed had difficulty citing specific
+instances where PSP reporting contributed to a counterterrorism success. The same
+handful of cases tended to be cited as PSP successes by personnel we interviewed from
+each of the participating IC organizations and in reports, briefing charts, and other
+documents we reviewed. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] These cases, and others identified
+to us as PSP successes, are discussed below.
+
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+
+65
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(TS//STLW/SI//OC/NF) Among the more significant PSP successes was
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) In [REDACTED] the FBI arrested [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] later pled
+guilty to [REDACTED]. After [REDACTED] arrest, [REDACTED]
+provided valuable information to the law enforcement and intelligence communities. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] NSA Director Alexander cited reporting on [REDACTED] as the most significant
+success of the PSP. Alexander said that PSP reporting on [REDACTED]
+"probably saved more lives" than any other PSP information produced by NSA.
+
+(TS//STIW/SI//OC/NF) An [REDACTED] tipper dated [REDACTED] reported that
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Additional [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] reporting, in [REDACTED] provided telephone contacts between and
+among [REDACTED] and several individuals with suspected terrorist ties located in [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The FBI learned more about [REDACTED] ties
+to terrorist groups from evidence seized [REDACTED]
+evidence gathered through several interviews [REDACTED]. The
+FBI arrested [REDACTED] on [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] was indicted on [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] was
+convicted on [REDACTED] on [REDACTED] and was sentenced to [REDACTED] prison term.
+[REDACTED]
+
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+66
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW/SI//OC/NF) In an undated summary of PSP successes, the NSA
+characterized [REDACTED] as:
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//STLW/SI/OC/NF) Other examples of PSP successes cited in IC records and
+briefings include the [REDACTED] cases.
+[REDACTED] PSP analysis and reporting helped to identify and
+locate [REDACTED] who was arrested in [REDACTED]. Subsequent PSP analysis of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] identified [REDACTED].
+[REDACTED] This information generated
+several leads for the FBI.
+
+(S//STLW/SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED] According to
+internal FBI briefing materials PSP reporting was "instrumental in [REDACTED] becoming the
+subject of a Full Investigation [REDACTED]." However, the FBI's Counterterrorism
+Division told the DoJ OIG that "no [REDACTED] reporting factored into [REDACTED]
+investigation." [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] PSP reporting assisted in locating his network's
+worldwide associates [REDACTED]
+
+67
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(U) ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES'S TESTIMONY
+ON THE PRESIDENT'S SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM
+
+(U) As part of this review, the DoJ IG examined whether Attorney General Gonzales
+made false, inaccurate, or misleading statements to Congress related to the PSP. Aspects
+of the PSP were first disclosed publicly in a series of articles in The New York Times in
+December 2005. In response, the President publicly confirmed a portion of the PSP-
+which he called the terrorist surveillance program-describing it as the interception of the
+content of international communications of people reasonably believed to have links to
+al-Qaeda and related organizations. Subsequently, Gonzales was questioned about NSA
+surveillance activities in two hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee in
+February 2006 and July 2007.
+
+(S/NF) Through media accounts and Comey's Senate Judiciary Committee
+testimony in May 2007, it was publicly revealed that DoJ and the White House had a major
+disagreement related to the PSP, which brought several senior DoJ and FBI officials to the
+brink of resignation in March 2004. In his testimony before the Senate Judiciary
+Committee, Gonzales stated that the dispute at issue between DoJ and the White House did
+not relate to the “Terrorist Surveillance Program" that the President had confirmed, but
+rather pertained to other intelligence activities. We believe this testimony created the
+misimpression that the dispute concerned activities entirely unrelated to the terrorist
+surveillance program, which was not accurate. In addition, we believe Gonzales's
+testimony that DoJ attorneys did not have "reservations" or "concerns" about the program
+the "President has confirmed" was incomplete and confusing [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] and that
+these concerns had been conveyed to the White House over a period of months before the
+issue was resolved.
+
+(S/NF) The DoJ IG recognizes that Gonzales was in the difficult position of
+testifying about a highly classified program in an open forum. However, Gonzales, as a
+participant in the March 2004 dispute between DoJ and the White House and, more
+importantly, as the nation's chief law enforcement officer, had a duty to balance his
+obligation not to disclose classified information with the need not to be misleading in his
+testimony. Although we believe that Gonzales did not intend to mislead Congress, we
+believe his testimony was confusing, inaccurate, and had the effect of misleading those
+
+who were not knowledgeable about the program.
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+68
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(U) CONCLUSIONS
+
+(U) Pursuant to Title III of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, the Inspectors General
+of the DoD, the DoJ, the CIA, the NSA, and the ODNI conducted reviews of the PSP. In this
+report and the accompanying individual reports of the participating IGs, we describe how,
+following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the President enhanced the NSA's
+SIGINT collection authorities in an effort to "detect and prevent acts of terrorism against the
+United States."
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Pursuant to this authority, the NSA, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] collected significant new information, such as the
+content of communications into and out of the United States, where one party to the
+communication was reasonably believed to be a member of al-Qa'ida, or its affiliates, or a
+group the President determined was in armed conflict with the United States. In addition,
+the President authorized the collection of significant amounts of telephony and Internet
+metadata. The NSA analyzed this information for dissemination as leads to the IC,
+principally the CIA and the FBI. As described in the IG reports, the scope of this
+collection authority changed over the course of the PSP.
+
+(U//FOUO) The IG reports describe the role of each of the participating agencies in
+the PSP, including the NSA's management and oversight of the collection, analysis, and
+reporting process; the CIA's and FBI's use of the PSP-derived intelligence in their
+counterterrorism efforts; the ODNI's support of the program by providing periodic threat
+assessments; and the DoJ's role in analyzing and certifying the legality of the PSP and
+managing use of PSP information in the judicial process.
+
+(U) The IG reports also describe the conflicting views surrounding the legality of
+aspects of the PSP during 2003 and 2004, the confrontation between officials from DoJ and
+the White House about the legal basis for parts of the program and the resolution of that
+conflict. The ensuing transition of the PSP, in stages, from presidential authority to
+statutory authority under FISA, is also described in the IG reports.
+
+(U) The IGs also examined the impact of PSP information on counterterrorism
+efforts. Many senior IC officials believe that the PSP filled a gap in intelligence collection
+thought to exist under FISA by increasing access to international communications that
+transited domestic U.S. communication wires, particularly international communications
+that originated or terminated within the United States. Others within the IC Community,
+including FBI agents, CIA analysts and managers, and other officials had difficulty
+evaluating the precise contribution of the PSP to counterterrorism efforts because it was
+most often viewed as one source among many available analytic and intelligence-gathering
+tools in these efforts. The IG reports describe several examples of how PSP-derived
+information factored into specific investigations and operations.
+
+(U) The collection activities pursued under the PSP, and under FISA following the
+activities' transition to operation under that authority, as described in this report, resulted in
+unprecedented collection of communications content and metadata. We believe the retention
+and use by IC organizations of information collected under the PSP and FISA, particularly
+information on U.S. persons, should be carefully monitored.
+
+69
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN
+
+This page intentionally left blank.
+
+70
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN
+
+PREPARED BY THE
+OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GENERAL
+OF THE
+DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
+DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
+CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+
+(U) REPORT ON THE
+PRESIDENT'S SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM
+
+REPORT NO. 2009-0013-AS
+VOLUME I
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN 37. 3
+
+(U) ANNEX TO THE REPORT ON THE
+PRESIDENT'S SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM
+
+VOLUME II
+10 JULY 2009
+
+PREPARED BY THE
+OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GENERAL
+OF THE
+DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
+DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
+CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+
+Special Warning
+The report contains compartmented, classified material and no
+secondary distribution may be made without prior consent of the
+participating Inspectors General. Improper disclosure of this
+report may result in criminal, civil, or administrative penalties.
+
+REPORT NO. 2009-0013-A
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+(U) Table of Contents
+
+(U) The Department of Defense Inspector General's Review
+of the President's Surveillance Program...........................................1
+
+(S//NF) The Central Intelligence Agency Inspector
+General's Review of CIA Participation in the President's
+Surveillance Program.........................................................................11
+
+(U) The National Security Agency, Central Security Service
+Inspector General's Review of the President's Surveillance
+Program...............................................................................................45
+
+(S//NF) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence
+Inspector General's Review of the Participation of the ODNI
+in the President's Surveillance Program...........................................213
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+This page intentionally left blank.
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//SI//ORCON//NOFORN
+SPECIAL ACCESS REQUIRED
+
+Report No. 09-INTEL-08
+June 26, 2009
+Review
+
+Inspector General
+United States
+Department of Defense
+
+DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR INTELLIGENCE
+
+Review of the President's Surveillance Program (U)
+
+"Derived From: Multiple Sources"
+"Declassify On: 20390515."
+Copy of
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//SI//ORCON//NOFORN
+SPECIAL ACCESS REQUIRED
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN
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+
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+
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+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//SI//ORCON//NOFORN
+
+INSPECTOR GENERAL
+DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
+400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
+ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704
+
+June 26, 2009
+
+MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
+
+SUBJECT: (U) Report on Review of the President's Surveillance Program
+Report No.: 09-INTEL-08 (U)
+
+(U) We are providing this report for your information. This report fulfills the
+DOD Inspector General's requirement pursuant to Section 301 of Public Law 110-
+261, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act of 2008
+(the Act). This report, along with reports prepared by the Inspectors General of
+the Department of Justice (DoJ), the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
+(DNI), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA),
+will be summarized in a comprehensive report as required by the Act.
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC//NF) Results. The OSD role in the establishment and
+implementation of the PSP was limited, with the burden of program execution
+residing with the NSA. We determined that there had been six OSD officials with
+access to the PSP. These individuals had limited involvement, and did not make
+any additional tasking decisions beyond those directed for NSA implementation.
+We are aware of no other OSD involvement in the PSP.
+
+(U) Background. The Act requires the IGs of the DoJ, DNI, NSA, the DoD, and
+any other element of the intelligence community that participated in the
+President's Surveillance Program (PSP), to complete a comprehensive review of,
+with respect to the oversight authority and responsibility of each such IG:
+* All facts necessary to describe establishment, implementation, product
+and use of the product in the program
+* Access to legal reviews and access to information about the Program
+* Communications and participation of individuals/entities related to the
+Program
+
+(U) The President's Surveillance Program is defined in the Act as the intelligence activity involving
+communications that was authorized by the President during the period beginning on September 11, 2001,
+and ending on January 17, 2007, including the program referred to by the President in a radio address on
+December 17, 2005 (commonly known as the Terrorist Surveillance Program).
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//SI//ORCON//NOFORN
+
+Derived From: Multiple Sources
+Declassify On: 20390515.
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN
+3
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
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+
+
+* Interaction with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and
+* Any other matters identified by the IGs
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC//NF) Scope and Methodology. We conducted this review
+to examine the involvement of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD),
+Department of Defense (DoD), in the establishment and implementation of the
+President's Surveillance Program (PSP). We interviewed current and former
+officials within OSD that had access to the PSP. We withdrew our request to
+interview Secretary of Defense Gates because he was provided access to the PSP
+after the program ended. The former Deputy Secretary of Defense Dr. Wolfowitz
+declined our request for an interview. We reviewed all relevant documentation
+within OSD and NSA related to OSD's involvement in the PSP. We also
+reviewed documentation at DoJ related to the PSP.
+
+(U) The IGs of the DoJ, DoD, DNI, NSA, and CIA issued an interim report on
+September 10, 2008. In the interim report, the DoD IG stated that he would
+examine the involvement of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in the
+establishment and implementation of the PSP. The NSA, as an agency within
+DoD performed the requirements of the PSP. As such, the NSA IG is conducting
+a review of NSA involvement with the PSP separate from this memorandum
+report.
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC//NF) Implementation and Establishment of the PSP.
+The OSD access to the PSP was limited to six individuals.² Those individuals are
+Secretary of Defense Robert Gates; former Secretary of Defense Donald
+Rumsfeld; former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz; Under Secretary
+of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) James Clapper³; former USD(I) Stephen
+Cambone; and Principal Deputy General Counsel Daniel Dell 'Orto.
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC//NF) The PSP was an extremely sensitive counterterrorism
+program focused on detecting and preventing terrorist attacks within the United
+States. The PSP was authorized by the President every 30 to 45 days and was
+initially directed against international terrorism; after March 2004, the PSP
+focused specifically against al-Qaeda and its affiliates. The Director of Central
+Intelligence (DCI), and later the DNI, would prepare a Threat Assessment
+
+[REDACTED]
+² (TS//STLW//SI//OC//NF) [REDACTED]
+³ (TS//STLW//SI//OC//NF) Secretary Gates and Under Secretary Clapper were provided access to the PSP
+after the PSP was transferred to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court supervision.
+
+2
+
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+APPROVED PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+-TOP SECRET//STLW//SI//ORCON//NOFORN
+
+Memorandum, which validated the current threat to the United States. The
+Secretary of Defense would review and sign the Threat Assessment Memorandum.
+On three occasions, Dr. Wolfowitz, the former Deputy Secretary of Defense,
+signed the Threat Assessment Memoranda in the Secretary's absence. On two
+occasions, Dr. Cambone, the former USD(I), signed the Threat Assessment
+Memoranda when Secretary Rumsfeld and Dr. Wolfowitz were unavailable.
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC//NF) Once the Threat Assessment Memorandum was signed,
+the President would then sign a Presidential Authorization with the Threat
+Memorandum attached. The President would task the Secretary of Defense to
+employ DoD resources to execute the requirements set forth in the Presidential
+Authorization. The Attorney General, or his designee, would certify the
+Presidential Authorization for form and legality. The Secretary of Defense would
+then direct the actions authorized by the Presidential Authorization to the NSA for
+implementation. On one occasion, Dr. Wolfowitz, the former Deputy Secretary of
+Defense, directed the Director of NSA to implement the Presidential
+Authorization, in the Secretary's absence. On a separate occasion, Dr. Cambone,
+the former USD(I), directed the Director of NSA to implement the Presidential
+Authorization.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Interaction with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. Dr.
+Wolfowitz also executed two declarations to the U.S. Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Court. The first, executed on [REDACTED] was in support of the
+Government's Application seeking renewal, in part, of the authority to install and
+use pen register and trap and trace devices, in order to obtain information [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] pursuant to the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), 50 U.S.C. sections 1801-1811,
+1841-1846, as amended. The initial authority under FISA to install and use pen
+register and trap and trace devices for that purpose was granted by the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Court on July 14, 2004,[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Dr. Wolfowitz's second declaration was executed on [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] That declaration was made in response to the Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Court's [REDACTED] Order requiring the Government to submit a
+declaration from the Deputy Secretary of Defense discussing NSA' violations of
+the Court's July 14 Order authorizing NSA to install and use pen register and trap
+and trace devices in order to obtain information about [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] In that declaration, Dr. Wolfowitz stated the
+circumstances surrounding unauthorized collection that occurred, the disposition
+of information collected without authorization, steps NSA took to remedy the
+violation, and measures NSA implemented to prevent recurrence of such
+violations.
+3
+
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+
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+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
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+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//SI//ORCON//NOFORN
+
+APPENDIX (U)
+REPORT DISTRIBUTION LIST (U)
+(U)
+
+OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
+Secretary of Defense
+Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
+Deputy General Counsel, Intelligence
+
+OTHER DEFENSE ORGANIZATION
+Inspector General, National Security Agency
+
+NON-DEFENSE FEDERAL ORGANIZATIONS
+Inspector General, Director of National Intelligence
+Inspector General, Department of Justice
+Inspector General, Central Intelligence Agency
+
+CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
+Senate Judiciary Committee
+Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
+House Judiciary Committee
+House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
+5
+
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+
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+
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+SPECIAL ACCESS REQUIRED
+
+DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
+UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
+
+Inspector General
+Department of Defense
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//SI//ORCON//NOFORN
+SPECIAL ACCESS REQUIRED
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+
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+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
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+
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+
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+
+CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
+
+Office of Inspector General
+
+(U) FINAL REPORT
+(S//NF) CIA Participation in the
+President's Surveillance Program
+Report No. 2008-0016-AS
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+30 June 2009
+Issue Date
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
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+
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+
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+
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+
+(U) Table of Contents
+
+(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY....................................................................................... 1
+(U) BACKGROUND ...................................................................................................... 3
+(U) Origin and Scope of the Review ....................................................................... 4
+(U) The President's Surveillance Program ............................................................ 5
+(U) REVIEW RESULTS................................................................................................ 6
+
+(S//NF) CIA Participation in the President's Surveillance
+Program ................................................................................................................. 6
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) CIA Prepared the Threat Assessment
+Memorandums Supporting Authorization of the President's
+Surveillance Program........................................................................................... 7
+
+(U//FOUO) CIA Tasked and Received Reporting From the
+President's Surveillance Program ........................................................................ 9
+
+(U//FOUE) Procedures and Standards for
+Requesting Information ....................................................................................... 9
+
+(U//FOUO) Reporting Provided in Response to Requests for
+Information........................................................................................................... 10
+
+(U//FOUO) Primary CIA Users of the President's Surveillance
+Program................................................................................................................ 11
+
+(U//FOUO) CIA Requests for Information Were Adequately
+Justified .............................................................................................................. 13
+
+(U//FOUO) Senior CIA Officials Believe That the President's
+Surveillance Program Filled an Intelligence Gap............................................ 13
+
+(U//FOUO) The CIA Did Not Assess the Effectiveness of the
+President's Surveillance Program...................................................................... 15
+
+(U) Counterterrorism Successes Supported by the President's
+Surveillance Program ........................................................................................ 16
+
+(S//NF) Several Factors Hindered CIA Utilization of the
+President's Surveillance Program...................................................................... 17
+
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+1
+
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+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(U) CIA Had Limited Access to Legal Reviews of the President's
+Surveillance Program............................................19
+(S//NF) CIA Officials Sought to Delay Exposure of the
+President's Surveillance Program by the New York Times..........20
+(U) Methodology.................................................Exhibit A
+(U) Threat Assessment Memorandum Concluding Paragraph ..........Exhibit B
+(U) Example of Link Diagram From August 2002....................Exhibit C
+(U) Review Team.................................................Exhibit D
+
+14
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
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+
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+
+(S/NF) CIA Participation in the
+President's Surveillance Program
+
+(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
+
+(S/NF) Title III of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments
+Act of 2008 requires the Inspectors General (IGs) of the elements of the Intelligence
+Community (IC) that participated in the President's Surveillance Program (PSP) to
+conduct a comprehensive review of the program. The results of our review of CIA
+participation in the PSP are presented in this report, and will be included in the
+comprehensive report required to be provided to the appropriate committees of Congress
+by 10 July 2009.
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) The CIA prepared the threat assessment memorandums
+that were used to support Presidential authorization and periodic reauthorizations of the
+PSP. The threat assessment memorandums were prepared by personnel from the CIA
+[REDACTED] Each of the
+memorandums focused on the current threat situation and did not provide an
+assessment of the PSP's utility in addressing previously reported threats. The threat
+assessment memorandums were signed by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)
+and forwarded to the Secretary of Defense to be co-signed. Responsibility for drafting
+the threat assessment memorandums was transferred to the newly-established Terrorist
+Threat Integration Center in May 2003 and retained by TTIC's successor organization,
+NCTC (the National Counterterrorism Center). The DCI continued to sign the threat
+assessment memorandums through 15 April 2005. Subsequent memorandums were
+signed by the Director of National Intelligence.
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OCANF) CIA analysts and targeters, as PSP consumers, tasked
+the program and utilized the product from the program in their analyses.
+[REDACTED]
+
+1
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+15
+
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+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) Two former Directors, a former Acting Director, and
+other senior CIA officials we interviewed told us that the PSP addressed a gap in
+intelligence collection. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] However, collection of
+such communications required authorization under FISA, and there was widespread
+belief among senior IC and CIA officials that the process for obtaining FISA
+authorization was too cumbersome and time consuming to address the current threat.
+Current and former CIA officials emphasized the increased timeliness, flexibility, and
+access provided by the PSP as compared to the process for obtaining a warrant under
+FISA.
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) The CIA did not implement procedures to assess the
+usefulness of the product of the PSP and did not routinely document whether particular
+PSP reporting had contributed to successful counterterrorism operations. CIA officials
+told us that PSP reporting was used in conjunction with reporting from other
+intelligence sources and was rarely the sole basis for a counterterrorism success [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] CIA
+officers, even those read into the program, would have been unaware of the full extent of
+PSP reporting. Consequently, there is no means to comprehensively track how PSP
+information was used. CIA officials were able to provide only limited information on
+how program reporting contributed to successful operations, and therefore, we were
+unable to independently draw any conclusion on the overall usefulness of the program
+to CIA.
+
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+
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+
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+
+(S/NF) Several factors hindered the CIA in making full use of the capabilities of
+the PSP. Many CIA officials told us that too few CIA personnel at the working level
+were read into the PSP. [REDACTED] officials told us that CIA analysts and targeting officers
+who were read in had too many competing priorities and too many other available
+information sources and analytic tools-many of which were more easily accessed and
+timely to fully utilize the PSP. CIA officers also told us that the PSP would have
+been more fully utilized if analysts and targeting officers had obtained a better
+understanding of the program's capabilities. Many CIA officers noted that there was
+insufficient training and legal guidance concerning the program's capabilities and the
+use of PSP-derived information. The factors that hindered the CIA in making full use
+of the PSP might have been mitigated if the CIA had designated an individual at an
+appropriate level of managerial authority, who possessed knowledge of both the PSP
+and CIA counterterrorism activities, to be responsible and accountable for overseeing
+CIA participation in the program.
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) There is no indication that personnel from the CIA
+Office of General Counsel or other CIA components were involved in preparing the
+legal memorandums supporting the PSP that were produced by the Department of
+Justice, Office of Legal Counsel (OLC). CIA OGC personnel had very limited access
+to these memorandums.
+
+(S/NF) Senior CIA officials participated in meetings with a New York Times
+editor and reporter and senior Administration officials concerning an article the
+newspaper was preparing concerning the PSP.
+
+[REDACTED]
+Assistant Inspector General for Audit
+
+3
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+
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+
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+
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+
+(U) BACKGROUND
+
+(U) Origin and Scope of the Review
+
+(U) Title III of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Amendments Act of
+2008, which was signed into law on 10 July 2008, requires the IGs of the elements of
+the Intelligence Community that participated in the PSP to conduct a comprehensive
+review of the program.¹ The review required to be conducted under the Act is to
+examine:
+ (A) all of the facts necessary to describe the establishment,
+ implementation, product, and use of the product of the Program;
+ (B) access to legal reviews of the program and access to information
+ about the Program;
+ (C) communications with, and participation of, individuals and
+ entities in the private sector related to the Program;
+ (D) interaction with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and
+ transition to court orders related to the Program; and
+ (E) any other matters identified by any such Inspector General that
+ would enable that Inspector General to complete a review of the
+ Program, with respect to such Department or element.
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) The interim report required under the Act was submitted
+to the committees of Congress prescribed in the Act on 10 September 2008. That
+report described the scope of the work to be conducted by each of the participating IGs,
+which include the Inspectors General of the Department of Justice, the Office of the
+Director of National Intelligence, the National Security Agency, the Department of
+Defense, and the CIA. Our review of CIA participation in the PSP examined CIA's :
+
+* Role in preparing the threat assessments and legal certifications
+supporting periodic reauthorization of the PSP.
+* Role in identifying targets for the PSP.
+
+¹ (S/NF) The President's Surveillance Program is defined in the Act as the intelligence activity involving
+communications that was authorized by the President during the period beginning on 11 September 2001, and
+ending on 17 January 2007, including the program referred to by the President in a radio address on
+17 December 2005 (commonly known as the Terrorist Surveillance Program). The classified name for the
+President's Surveillance Program is "STELLARWIND."
+
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+4
+19
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+The results of our review of CIA participation in the PSP are presented in this
+report, and will be included in the comprehensive final report required to be provided
+to the appropriate committees of Congress by 10 July 2009.
+
+(U) The President's Surveillance Program
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) According to former Director of the NSA and former
+Director of the CIA (DCIA) Michael V. Hayden, initial discussions concerning the
+activities that would become the PSP occurred less than two weeks after
+the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in a meeting between DCI George J. Tenet and
+Vice President Richard B. Cheney. Although Hayden did not attend the meeting, he
+was told by Tenet that Cheney asked if the Intelligence Community was doing
+everything possible to prevent another terrorist attack. In response, Tenet described [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Cheney then asked if there was more that NSA could do.
+This led to discussions between Cheney, Hayden, Cheney's legal counsel
+David S. Addington, and senior NSA officials. It was determined that the NSA had the
+capability to collect additional wire communications that could enhance the IC's
+counterterrorism efforts, but that new authority was needed to employ the capability.
+The determination led to the authorization of the PSP by President George W. Bush on
+4 October 2001.
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) The PSP was intended to help prevent additional
+terrorist attacks against the US Homeland. Although the authorized collection
+activities changed over the life of the program, in general, the program authorized the
+NSA to acquire content and/or metadata concerning telephone and e-mail
+communications for which there were reasonable grounds to believe that at least one of
+the participants in the communication was located outside the US and that a party to
+
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+5
+20
+
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+
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+
+the communication was affiliated with a group engaged in international terrorism. The
+collection activities conducted under the PSP were brought under Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Court oversight in stages between July 2004 and January 2007.²
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) Under the PSP, the NSA collected three sets of data.
+The first set included the content of individually targeted telephone and e-mail
+communications. The second set consisted of telephone dialing information-the date,
+time, and duration of calls; the telephone number of the caller; and the number
+receiving the call–collected in bulk [REDACTED] The third data
+set consisted of e-mail transactional data–[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+collected in bulk [REDACTED]
+
+(U) REVIEW RESULTS
+
+(S/NF) CIA Participation in the
+President's Surveillance Program
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+² (U) The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 established the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+to oversee requests for surveillance warrants by federal agencies against suspected foreign intelligence agents
+inside the US.
+
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+
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+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+FS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) CIA personnel prepared the threat assessment memorandums
+that were used to support the initial Presidential authorization and subsequent
+reauthorizations of the PSP. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) CIA Prepared
+the Threat Assessment Memorandums
+Supporting Authorization of the
+President's Surveillance Program
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) The CIA initially prepared the threat assessment
+memorandums that were used to support Presidential authorization and periodic
+reauthorizations of the PSP. The memorandums documented the current threat to the
+US homeland and to US interests abroad from al-Qa'ida and affiliated terrorist
+organizations. The first threat assessment memorandum-The Continuing Near-Term
+Threat from Usama Bin Ladin-was signed by DCI Tenet on 4 October 2001.³
+Subsequent threat assessment memorandums were prepared every 30 to 60 days to
+correspond with the President's reauthorizations of the PSP.
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) The DCI Chief of Staff, John H. Moseman, was the CIA
+focal point for preparing the threat assessment memorandums. According to
+Moseman, he directed the [REDACTED] to prepare objective
+appraisals of the current terrorist threat, focusing primarily on threats to the homeland,
+and to document those appraisals in a memorandum. Initially, the [REDACTED] analysts who
+prepared the threat assessments were not read into the PSP and did not know how the
+threat assessments would be used. [REDACTED] analysts drew upon all sources of intelligence
+in preparing their threat assessments. Each of the memorandums focused on the
+current threat situation and did not provide an assessment of the PSP's utility in
+addressing previously reported threats.
+
+³ (S/NF) The title of the threat assessment memorandums was changed to The Global War Against Terrorism in
+June 2002.
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+7
+22
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) After [REDACTED] completed its portion of the memorandums,
+the DCI's Chief of Staff added a paragraph at the end of the memorandums stating that
+the individuals and organizations involved in global terrorism (and discussed in the
+memorandums) possessed the capability and intention to undertake further terrorist
+attacks within the US. Moseman recalled that the paragraph was provided to him
+initially by either White House Counsel Alberto R. Gonzales or Addington. The
+paragraph recommended that the President authorize the Secretary of Defense to
+employ within the US the capabilities of the Department of Defense, including but not
+limited to NSA's signals intelligence capabilities, to collect foreign intelligence by
+electronic surveillance. The paragraph also described the types of communication and
+data that would be collected and the circumstances under which they could be
+collected.⁴ The draft threat assessment memorandums were then reviewed by Office of
+General Counsel attorneys assigned to [REDACTED] and Acting General Counsel (Senior
+Deputy General Counsel) John A. Rizzo. Rizzo told us that the draft memorandums
+were generally sufficient, but that there were occasions when, based on his experience
+with previous memorandums, he thought that draft memorandums contained
+insufficient threat information or did not present a compelling case for reauthorization
+of the PSP. In such instances, Rizzo would request tha[REDACTED] provide additional
+available threat information or make revisions to the draft memorandums.
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) The threat assessment memorandums were then signed
+by DCI Tenet and forwarded to the Secretary of Defense to be co-signed. Tenet signed
+most of the threat memorandums prepared during his tenure as DCI. On the few
+occasions when he was unavailable, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
+(DDCI), John E. McLaughlin, signed the memorandums on behalf of Tenet.
+McLaughlin also signed the memorandums in the capacity of Acting DCI in August
+and September 2004. In November 2004, Porter J. Goss became DCI and assumed
+responsibility for signing the memorandums. There were no occasions when the DCI
+or Acting DCI withheld his signature from the threat assessment memorandum. After
+they were signed by the Secretary of Defense, the memorandums were reviewed by the
+Attorney General and delivered to the White House to be attached to the PSP
+reauthorization memorandums signed by the President.
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) Responsibility for drafting the threat assessment
+memorandums was transferred from [REDACTED] to the newly established Terrorist Threat
+Integration Center in May 2003. This responsibility was retained by TTIC's successor
+organization, NCTC. The DCI continued to sign the threat assessment memorandums
+
+⁴ (U) Exhibit B presents the conclusion and recommendation paragraph included in the threat assessment
+memorandum dated 10 January 2005. Similar language was included in each of the memorandums.
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+8
+23
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+through 15 April 2005. Subsequent memorandums were signed by the Director of
+National Intelligence.⁵
+
+(U//FOUO) CIA Tasked and Received Reporting
+From the President's Surveillance Program
+
+(U//FOUO) Procedures and Standards
+for Requesting Information
+
+[REDACTED]
+9
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+24
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORGON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(U//FOUO) Reporting Provided in
+Response to Requests for Information
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+10
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORGON/NOFORN
+TOP SECRETI/STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+25
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+(U//FOUO) Primary CIA Users of the
+President's Surveillance Program
+
+[REDACTED]
+11
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+26
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+12
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+27
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(U//FOUO) Senior CIA Officials Believe
+That the President's Surveillance Program
+Filled an Intelligence Gap
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) Former Directors Hayden and Goss, former Acting
+Director McLaughlin, and other senior CIA officials we interviewed told us that the
+PSP addressed a gap in intelligence collection. Following the terrorist attacks on
+11 September 2001, there was concern that additional acts of terrorism would be
+perpetrated by terrorist cells already inside the US. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] However, collection of such communications required
+authorization under FISA, and there was widespread belief among senior IC and CIA
+officials that the process for obtaining FISA authorization was too cumbersome and
+time consuming to address the current threat.
+13
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+28
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) Other senior CIA officials told us that the PSP provided
+CIA access to information that was previously unavailable. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+14
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+29
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORGON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(U//FOUO) The CIA Did Not Assess
+the Effectiveness of the
+President's Surveillance Program
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) The CIA did not implement procedures to assess the
+usefulness of the product of the PSP and did not routinely document whether particular
+PSP reporting had contributed to successful counterterrorism operations. CIA officials,
+including DCIA Hayden, told us that PSP reporting was used in conjunction with
+reporting from other intelligence sources; consequently, it is difficult to attribute the
+success of particular counterterrorism operations exclusively to the PSP. In a May
+2006 briefing to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), the Deputy
+Director [REDACTED] said that PSP reporting was rarely the sole basis for an intelligence
+success, but that it frequently played a supporting role. He went on to state that the
+program was an additional resource to enhance the CIA's understanding of terrorist
+networks and to help identify potential threats to the homeland. Other [REDACTED] officials
+we interviewed said that the PSP was one of many tools available to them, and that the
+tools were often used in combination.
+[REDACTED]
+
+15
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+30
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(U) Counterterrorism Successes Supported
+by the President's Surveillance Program
+
+(S//NF) Despite the fact that CIA officials we interviewed did not provide much
+specific information on PSP-derived counterterrorism successes, some key
+counterterrorism operations supported by the PSP were cited in briefings presented by
+CIA officials. In March 2004, the CIA provided a series of three briefings at the White
+House to senior Administration officials and Congressional leaders. These briefings
+included operational details concerning the PSP as well as examples of program
+successes. In May 2006, the Deputy Director, [REDACTED] briefed SSCI members and staff on
+the usefulness to [REDACTED] of the PSP.
+[REDACTED]
+
+16
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+3
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(S/NF) Several Factors Hindered CIA
+Utilization of the President's Surveillance Program
+
+(S/ANE) Several factors hindered the CIA in making full use of the capabilities of
+the PSP. Many CIA officials told us that too few CIA personnel at the working level
+were read into the PSP. At the program's inception, a disproportionate number of the
+
+17
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+32
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+CIA personnel who were read into the PSP were senior CIA managers. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+(S//NF) [REDACTED] officials also told us that working-level CIA analysts and targeting
+officers who were read into the PSP had too many competing priorities, and too many
+other information sources and analytic tools available to them, to fully utilize PSP. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] officials also told us that much of the PSP reporting was vague or
+without context, which led analysts and targeting officers to rely more heavily on other
+information sources and analytic tools, which were more easily accessed and timely
+than the PSP.
+
+(S//NE) CIA officers also told us that the PSP would have been more fully
+utilized if analysts and targeting officers had obtained a better understanding of the
+program's capabilities. There was no formal training on the use of the PSP beyond the
+initial read in to the program. Many CIA officers we interviewed said that the
+instruction provided in the read-in briefing was not sufficient and that they were
+surprised and frustrated by the lack of additional guidance. Some officers told us that
+there was insufficient legal guidance on the use of PSP-derived information.
+[REDACTED]
+
+(S//NF) The factors that hindered the CIA in making full use of the PSP might
+have been mitigated if the CIA had designated an individual at an appropriate level of
+managerial authority, who possessed knowledge of both the PSP and CIA
+counterterrorism activities, to be responsible and accountable for overseeing CIA
+participation in the program. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+18
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+33
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(U) CIA Had Limited Access
+to Legal Reviews of the
+President's Surveillance Program
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) There is no indication that personnel from the CIA
+Office of General Counsel or other CIA components were involved in preparing the
+legal memorandums supporting the PSP that were produced by the Department of
+Justice, Office of Legal Counsel (OLC). At the time of the initial authorization of the
+PSP (4 October 2001), Robert M. McNamara, Jr. was the CIA General Counsel. There
+is no record that McNamara was ever read into PSP, and he retired from the CIA on
+15 November 2001. Acting General Counsel John Rizzo was read into the program on
+21 December 2001, but, at that time, he was not provided access to the OLC legal
+opinions. Rizzo told us that by working through Addington, with whom Rizzo was
+acquainted, he eventually was allowed to read the OLC legal memorandums at
+Addington's office in July 2004.
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) Scott W. Muller became the CIA General Counsel on
+24 October 2002. Although NSA records do not indicate that Muller was read into
+PSP, during our interview with Muller, he acknowledged having been read into the
+program and having read the OLC legal memorandums supporting the program. After
+Jack L. Goldsmith became the Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal
+Counsel in October 2003, the OLC undertook a reassessment of the legal rationale for
+the PSP. Muller recounted discussions with Deputy Attorney General James B. Comey
+around March 2004 concerning the legal basis for certain aspects of the program.
+Muller told us that he shared Comey's concern [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Several of the senior CIA
+managers we interviewed said that, although they were concerned that the PSP operate
+within legal authorities, they believed that it was important to continue CIA
+19
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+participation in the program because CIA analysts and targeters had told them that the
+program was a useful counterterrorism tool.
+
+(S//NF) CIA Officials Sought to
+Delay Exposure of the President's
+Surveillance Program by the New York Times
+
+(S//NF) In October 2004, James Risen, a reporter for The New York Times,
+contacted the CIA Office of Public Affairs seeking an interview with DCI Goss
+concerning an article the newspaper was planning on the PSP. Senior officials from
+the CIA, NSA, Office of the Vice President, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense
+met to discuss a response. On 20 October 2004, DDCI McLaughlin and DCI Chief of
+Staff Moseman met with the Washington, DC editor of The New York Times, Philip
+Taubman, and Risen. According to a memorandum for the record prepared by
+Moseman, McLaughlin did not provide any details regarding the PSP or comment on
+the legal basis for the program, but he stressed that publication of the article would
+expose, and potentially compromise, effective counterterrorism tools.
+
+(S//NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Ultimately, based on assurances from Hayden that he would advise
+them of inquiries from other news organizations concerning the PSP, Taubman and
+Risen agreed to hold the article and publish it only when it became apparent that other
+news organizations were preparing their own stories on the PSP. On 16 December
+2005, The New York Times published its first article on the PSP: "Bush Lets U.S. Spy
+on Callers Without Courts." On 17 December 2005, President Bush publicly
+confirmed in a radio address the existence of the disclosed portion of the PSP.
+20
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+35
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+This page intentionally left blank.
+
+36
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+Exhibit A
+
+(U) Methodology
+
+(U//FOUO) During our review, we conducted 50 interviews of current and former
+CIA personnel who had been involved with the President's Surveillance Program
+(PSP). Among the senior CIA officials we interviewed were former Director of the
+National Security Agency (NSA) and former Director of the CIA (DCIA)
+Michael V. Hayden, former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and former DCIA
+Porter J. Goss, and former Acting DCI John E. McLaughlin. We contacted former DCI
+George J. Tenet for an interview. Tenet suggested that we first interview his former
+Chief of Staff, John H. Moseman, and then contact him if we still had a need to
+interview him. Following our interview with Moseman, we contacted Tenet's office
+several times to request an interview, but he did not return our telephone calls.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+37
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(U//FOUO) Management comments were received from Michael V. Havden:
+[REDACTED] Scott W. Muller; John H. Moseman; the Director, [REDACTED] and the Chief [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Their comments were considered in preparation of the final report.
+
+2
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+38
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+Exhibit B
+
+(U) Threat Assessment Memorandum Concluding Paragraph
+[Excerpt from the Global War Against Terrorism memorandum dated 10 January 2005.]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+39
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+This page intentionally left blank.
+
+40
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED OR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+Exhibit C
+
+(U) Example of a Link Diagram From August 2002
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+41
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+This page intentionally left blank.
+
+42
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+Exhibit D
+
+(U) Review Team
+
+(U//FOUO) This report was prepared by the Operations Division, Audit Staff,
+Office of Inspector General.
+
+[REDACTED] Division Chief
+[REDACTED] Project Manager
+[REDACTED] Auditor
+[REDACTED] Auditor
+[REDACTED] Auditor
+
+This Exhibit is UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+43
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+This page intentionally left blank.
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+44
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
+
+Further dissemination of this report outside the
+addressee organizations is PROHIBITED without the
+approval of the Inspector General.
+
+THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OFFICE
+
+INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT
+(U) Review of the President's Surveillance Program
+
+ST-09-0002
+29 June 2009
+
+Derived From: STLW Classification Guide
+Dated: 22 January 2009
+Declassify On: MR
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+45
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(U) OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
+(U) Chartered by the Director, NSA/Chief, CSS, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG)
+conducts inspections, audits, and investigations. Its mission is to ensure the integrity, efficiency,
+and effectiveness of NSA/CSS operations; to provide intelligence oversight; to protect against
+fraud, waste, and mismanagement of resources; and to ensure that NSA/CSS activities are
+conducted in compliance with the Constitution, laws, executive orders, regulations, and
+directives. The OIG also serves as ombudsman, assisting all NSA/CSS employees and affiliates,
+civilian and military.
+
+(U) INSPECTIONS
+(U) The inspection function conducts management and program evaluations in the form of
+organizational and functional reviews, undertaken either as part of the OIG's annual plan or by
+management request. The inspection team's findings are designed to yield accurate and up-to-
+date information on the effectiveness and efficiency of entities and programs, along with an
+assessment of compliance with laws and regulations; the recommendations for corrections or
+improvements are subject to followup. The inspection office also partners with the Inspectors
+General of the Service Cryptologic Elements to conduct joint inspections of the consolidated
+cryptologic facilities.
+
+(U) AUDITS
+(U) The internal audit function is designed to provide an independent assessment of programs
+and organizations. Performance audits evaluate the economy and efficiency of an entity or
+program, as well as whether program objectives are being met and operations are in compliance
+with regulations. Financial audits determine the accuracy of an entity's financial statements. All
+audits are conducted in accordance with standards established by the Comptroller General of the
+United States.
+
+(U) INVESTIGATIONS AND SPECIAL INQUIRIES
+(U) THE OIG administers a system for receiving and acting upon requests for assistance or
+complaints (including anonymous tips) about fraud, waste and mismanagement. Investigations
+and Special Inquiries may be undertaken as a result or irregularities that surface during an
+inspection or audit; or at the initiative of the Inspector General.
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+46
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+ST-09-0002
+
+OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
+
+29 June 2009
+[G-11051-09
+
+TO: DISTRIBUTION
+SUBJECT: (U) Review of President's Surveillance Program (ST-09-0002) —
+INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
+
+1. (U//FOUO) This report summarizes our review of the President's
+Surveillance Program, as mandated by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
+Act Amendments Act of 2008.
+
+2. (U//FOUO) For additional information, please contact my office on
+301-688-6666. We appreciate the courtesy and cooperation extended to our
+staff throughout the review.
+
+GEORGE ELLARD
+Inspector General
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+47
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002 TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+DISTRIBUTION:
+SID
+OGC
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+48
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+ST-09-0002
+
+(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
+
+(U) OVERVIEW
+(TS//SI//NF) For over a decade before the terrorist
+attacks on 11 September 2001, NSA used its SIGINT authorities to
+provide information in response to Intelligence Community
+requirements on terrorism targets. In late September 2001,
+when the Vice President asked the Director of Central
+Intelligence what more NSA could do with additional
+authority, NSA's Director identified impediments to
+enhancing SIGINT collection under existing authorities. He
+said that in most instances NSA could not collect
+communications on a wire in the United States without a
+court order. As a result, NSA's ability to quickly collect and
+report on a large volume of communications from foreign
+countries to the United States was impeded by the time-
+consuming court order approval process. Attempting to
+obtain court orders for [REDACTED] foreign telephone
+numbers and Internet addresses was impractical for
+collecting terrorist communications with speed and agility.
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) Counsel to the Vice President
+drafted the 4 October 2001 Authorization that established
+the President's Surveillance Program (PSP), under which NSA
+could routinely collect on a wire, for counterterrorism
+purposes, foreign communications originating or terminating
+in the United States. Under the PSP, NSA did not target
+communications with both ends in the United States,
+although some of these communications were incidentally
+collected.
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) The PSP gave NSA a capability to
+exploit a key vulnerability in terrorist communications.
+[REDACTED]
+According to senior NSA leaders, the value of the program
+was that this SIGINT coverage provided confidence that
+someone was looking at the seam between foreign and
+domestic intelligence domains to detect and prevent attacks
+in the United States.
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+i
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+49
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002 TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) NSA's Director said that SIGINT
+reporting on an extremist linked [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] "probably saved more lives" than any other PSP information and is, therefore,
+the most important SIGINT success of the PSP, NSA analysis
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC//NF) Knowledge of the Program was
+strictly limited at the express direction of the White House,
+and NSA's Director needed White House approval to inform
+members of Congress about Program activity. Between
+25 October 2001 and 17 January 2007, General Michael V.
+Hayden and Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander
+conducted [REDACTED] PSP briefings for members of Congress and
+staff.
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) NSA activity conducted under the
+PSP was authorized by Doreign Intelligence Surveillance
+Court (FISC) orders by 17 January 2007, when NSA stopped
+operating under PSP authority. The NSA Office of the
+Inspector General (OIG) detected no intentional misuse of
+Program authority.
+
+(U) HIGHLIGHTS
+
+* (U) PSP establishment, implementation, and product
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) NSA began PSP operations on
+6 October 2001. Although the Director of NSA was
+"comfortable" exercising the new authority and believed that
+it was lawful, he realized that it would be controversial.
+Under the PSP, NSA issued over [REDACTED] reports. This included
+[REDACTED] reports based on collected metadata, which was
+defined in the Authorization as [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+included [REDACTED] reports [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) NSA's PSP products, all of which
+were sent to CIA and FBI, were intended for intelligence
+purposes to develop investigative leads and were not to be
+used for jucidial purposes. [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+ii
+50
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002 TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED] and NSA had no mechanism to track and assess the effectiveness of PSP reporting.
+
+* (U) Access to legal reviews and program information
+
+(C//NF) NSA's General Counsel and Inspector General were
+not permitted to read the 2001 DoJ, Office of Legal Counsel
+opinion on the PSP, but they were given access to draft 2004
+Office of Legal Counsel opinions. Knowledge of the PSP was
+strictly controlled by the White House. Between 4 October
+2001 and 17 January 2007, [REDACTED] people were cleared for
+access to PSP information.
+
+* [REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+* (U) NSA-FISC interaction and transition to court orders
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) NSA's PSP-related interaction with
+the FISC was primarily briefings to presiding judges,
+beginning in January 2002. Interaction increased when NSA
+and the DoJ began to transition PSP activities to FISC orders.
+After parts of the program had been publicly revealed in
+December 2005, all members of the FISC were briefed. NSA's
+PSP authorized collection of bulk Internet metadata,
+telephony business records, and the content of
+communications transitioned to FISC orders on 14 July
+2004, 24 May 2006, and 10 January 2007, respectively.
+
+* (U) Program oversight at NSA
+
+(C//NF) NSA's Office of General Counsel and Signals
+Intelligence Directorate provided oversight of NSA PSP
+activities from October 2001 to January 2007. NSA OIG
+oversight began after the IG was cleared for PSP information
+in August 2002.
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+iii
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+51
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002 TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+This page intentionally left blank.
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+iv
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+52
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN ST-09-0002
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+v
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+53
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCOWNOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+This page intentionally left blank.
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+54
+vi
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+ST-09-0002
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+55
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORGON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+This page intentionally left blank.
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+56
+2
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN ST-09-0002
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(S/NF) For years before the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the
+United States, NSA had been using its authorities to focus the United
+States Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) System on foreign intelligence
+targets, including terrorism, in response to Intelligence Community
+requirements. After the attacks, NSA adjusted SIGINT collection, in
+accordance with its authorities, to counter the terrorist threat within the
+United States. In late September, the Vice President asked the Director of
+Central Intelligence (DCI) if NSA could do more to prevent another attack.
+NSA's Director responded by describing impediments to SIGINT collection
+of terrorist-related communications to the Vice President. Counsel to the
+Vice President used the information about impediments to draft the
+Presidential Authorization that established the PSP.
+
+(U) SIGINT Efforts against Terrorists before 11 September 2001
+
+(C//NF) For over a decade before terrorists attacked the
+United States in September 2001, NSA was applying SIGINT
+assets against terrorist targets in response to Intelligence
+Community requirements. The Signals Intelligence
+Directorate (SID) Counterterrorism (CT) Product Line led
+these efforts in accordance with SIGINT authorities, which
+defined what NSA could and could not do against SIGINT
+targets.
+
+(U) Authorized SIGINT activity in September 2001
+
+(U) NSA was authorized by Executive Order (E.O.) 12333,
+United States Intelligence Activities, 4 December 1981, as
+amended, to collect, process, and disseminate SIGINT
+information for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence
+purposes in accordance with DCI guidance and to support
+the conduct of military operations under the guidance of the
+Secretary of Defense. NSA and other Intelligence Community
+agencies were required by E.O. 12333 to conduct intelligence
+activities in accordance with U.S. law and other E.O. 12333
+provisions.
+
+(U) Both DoD regulation and NSA/Central Security Service
+(CSS) policy implemented NSA's authorities under E.O.
+12333 and specified procedures governing activities that
+affect U. S. persons (DoD Regulation 5240.1-R, December
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+3
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+57
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+1982, Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence
+Components that Affect United States Persons and NSA/CSS
+Policy 1-23, 11 March 2004, Procedures Governing NSA/CSS
+Activities that Affect U. S. Persons).
+
+(S//SI//NF) The policy of the U.S. SIGINT System is to
+collect, retain, and disseminate only foreign communications,
+which, in September 2001, were defined in NSA's legal
+compliance procedures (described below) as communications
+having at least one communicant outside the United States
+or entirely among foreign powers or between a foreign power
+and officers or employees of a foreign power. All other
+communications were considered domestic communications.
+NSA could not collect communications from a wire in the
+United States without a court order unless they originated
+and terminated outside the United States.
+
+(S//SI//NF) In 2001, NSA's authority to collect foreign
+communications included the Director of NSA's authority to
+approve targeting communications with one communicant in
+the United States, if technical devices (such as [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] could be employed to limit acquisition of
+communications to those in which the target is a non-U.S.
+person located outside of the United States, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] or
+[REDACTED]
+
+(S//SI//NF) NSA's Director could exercise this authority,
+except when the collection was otherwise regulated, for
+example, under FISA for communications collected from a
+wire in the United States.
+
+(U) NSA safeguards to protect U.S. persons' Constitutional
+rights
+
+(U) The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects
+all U.S. persons anywhere in the world and all persons within
+the United States from unreasonable searches and seizures
+by any person or agency acting on behalf of the U.S.
+Government.¹ United States Signals Intelligence Directive
+(USSID) SP0018, Legal Compliance and Minimization
+
+1 (C//NF) USSID SP0018 defines a U.S. person as a citizen of the United States, an alien lawfully admitted for
+permanent residence in the United States, unincorporated groups or associations a substantial number of the
+members of which constitute either of the first two groups, or corporations incorporated in the United States,
+including U.S. flag non-governmental aircraft or vessels, but not including those entities openly acknowledged
+by a foreign government to be directed and controlled by them.
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+58
+4
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+ST-09-0002
+
+Procedures, 27 July 1993, prescribes policies and
+minimization procedures and assigns responsibilities to
+ensure that United States SIGINT System missions and
+activities are conducted in a manner that safeguards U.S.
+persons' Constitutional rights. (See Appendix G.)
+
+(S//SI//NF) During the course of normal operations, NSA
+personnel sometimes inadvertently encounter information to,
+from, or about U.S. persons. When that happens, they must
+apply standard minimization procedures approved by the
+Attorney General in accordance with E.O. 12333 and defined
+in USSID SP0018. These procedures implement the
+constitutional principle of reasonableness by giving different
+categories of individuals and entities different levels of
+protection. They ensure that U.S. person information is
+minimized during collection, processing, dissemination, and
+retention of SIGINT by, for example, strictly controlling
+collection with a high risk of encountering U.S. person
+information and focusing all reporting solely on the activities
+of foreign entities and persons and their agents.
+
+(U) NSA Director Used Existing Authorities to Enhance SIGINT
+Collection after Terrorist Attacks
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+59
+5
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+ST-09-0002
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+60
+6
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+ST-09-0002
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(S//NF) In Oval Office Meeting, DCI Explained NSA Director's
+Decision to Expand Operations under Existing SIGINT Authorities
+
+(U//FOUO) General Hayden recalled that in late September
+2001, he told Mr. Tenet about NSA actions under E.O. 12333
+to counter the terrorist threat. Mr. Tenet shared that
+information with the White House in an Oval Office meeting.
+
+(U//FOUO) We did not interview Mr. Tenet or White House
+personnel during this review. We asked the White House to
+provide documentation of meetings at which General Hayden
+or NSA employees discussed the PSP or the Terrorist
+Surveillance Program with the President, Vice President, or
+White House personnel, but we did not receive a response
+before this report was published. Therefore, information
+about the sequence of events leading up to the establishment
+of the PSP comes from interviews of NSA personnel.
+
+(U) Vice President Asked What Other Authorities NSA Needed
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+61
+7
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002 -TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(S//NF) NSA Options to Improve SIGINT Collection Could Not Fill
+Intelligence Gaps on Terrorist Targets
+
+(U) FISA Amendments Considered
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(S//NF) General Hayden said that, in his professional
+judgment, NSA could not get the needed collection using the
+FISA. The process for obtaining court orders was slow, and it
+involved extensive coordination and separate legal and policy
+reviews by several agencies. Although an emergency
+authorization provision permitted 72 hours of surveillance
+without a court order, it did not allow the government to
+undertake surveillance immediately. Rather, the Attorney
+General had to ensure that emergency surveillance would
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+62
+8
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+ST-09-0002
+
+satisfy the standards articulated in the FISA and be
+acceptable to the FISC.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(S//SI//NF) Under its authorities, NSA had no other options
+for the timely collection of communications of suspected
+terrorists when one end of those communications was in the
+United States and the communications could only be
+collected from a wire or cable in the United States.
+
+(U//FOUO) NSA Director Described to the Vice President the Impediments
+to Improved SIGINT Collection against Terrorist Targets
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) According to NSA OGC, DoJ has since agreed with NSA that simply processing
+communications metadata in this manner does not constitute electronic surveillance under the FISA.
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+63
+9
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002 TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(U//FOUO) After two additional meetings, the Vice President
+asked General Hayden to work with his Counsel, David
+Addington. Because early discussions about expanding NSA
+authority were not documented, we do not have records of
+attendees or specific topics discussed at General Hayden's
+meetings with White House representatives.
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+10
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+64
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN ST-09-0002
+
+III. (U) THE PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORIZATIONS
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)Between 4 October 2001 and
+8 December 2006, President George W. Bush signed
+43 Authorizations, two modifications, and one document
+described as [REDACTED]. The authorizations were
+based on the President's determination that after the
+11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, an
+extraordinary emergency existed for national defense
+purposes. The Authorization documents contained the terms
+under which NSA executed special Presidential authority and
+were titled Presidential Authorization for Specified Electronic
+Surveillance Activities during a Limited Period to Detect and
+Prevent Acts of Terrorism within the United States. They were
+addressed to the Secretary of Defense.
+
+(U) SIGINT Activity Permitted under the PSP
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+11
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+65
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORGON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002 TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) The authorizations changed over
+time, first eliminating the possibility that the Authority could
+be interpreted to permit collection of communications with
+both ends in the United States and adding an additional
+qualification that metadata could be collected for
+communications related to international terrorism or
+activities in preparation for international terrorism.⁷ [REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) Starting in March 2004, the
+authorizations underwent several adjustments related to
+DoJ's Office of Legal Counsel's review of the Authority. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] When these two
+clarifications were added to the 11 March 2004 and
+subsequent authorizations, an accompanying statement
+added that these clarifications had been previously
+understood and implemented by NSA and that they applied
+to past and future activities. Al-Qaida (also spelled al-Qaeda)
+was specified as a target for content collection [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] and NSA's authority to
+acquire [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Finally, as a result of a subsequent change, NSA's
+authority to collect [REDACTED] but only
+for [REDACTED] with [REDACTED] thus [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) The definition of "terrorist groups"
+within the authorities was also refined, and, for a limited
+
+⁵ (TS//SI//NF) Metadata, as defined by the Authorization, is [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+⁷ (U) See Appendix B for information about the types of collection permitted.
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+12
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+66
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN ST-09-0002
+
+period in 2004, NSA analysts were permitted to query
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//OC/NF) According to General Hayden, the
+Authorization, for the most part, did not change the
+communications that NSA could collect, but did change the
+location from which the Agency could collect them by
+permitting collection [REDACTED] in the United
+States. Without that authorization, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+(U) NSA Discussions about the Lawfulness of the Authorization
+
+(TS//SI//NF) NSA leaders believed that they could lawfully
+carry out the President's authorizations. However, they also
+recognized that the Program would be controversial and
+politically sensitive. This section describes how key NSA
+leaders-the Director, the NSA General Counsel, Deputy
+General Counsel, and Associate General Counsel for
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+13
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+67
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002 TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+Operations-concluded that the Program was legally
+defensible.
+
+(U) Director of NSA
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Generals Hayden and Alexander stated that
+they believed the Authorization was lawful.
+
+(U) General Hayden
+
+(TS//SI//NF) When asked how he had decided to execute an
+Authorization that some would consider legally and politically
+controversial, General Hayden said that NSA's highest
+ranking lawyers had advised him, collectively and
+individually, that the Program was lawful under the
+President's Article II powers. He said that three factors
+influenced his decision to implement the Authority. First,
+NSA would do exactly what the Authorization stated and "not
+one electron or photon more." Second, the Program was
+simply an expansion of existing NSA collection activities.
+Third, the periodic renewal of the Authorization would ensure
+that the threat continued to justify the Program.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) General Hayden said that as time passed, he
+determined that the Program was still needed. Specifically,
+he and NSA's Deputy Director reviewed the DCI threat
+memorandum for each reauthorization and judged that the
+threats continued to justify the Program.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) General Hayden said that no one at NSA
+expressed concerns to him or the NSA IG that the
+Authorization was not lawful. Most importantly, General
+Hayden said that no one outside NSA asserted that he should
+stop the Program. He occasionally heard concerns from
+members of Congress, but he sensed general support for the
+Program from those he briefed outside NSA. He emphasized
+that he did not just "flip through slides" during briefings. He
+wanted to ensure that attendees understood the Program;
+consequently, briefings lasted as long as the attendees
+wanted.
+
+(U) General Alexander
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) When Lieutenant General Keith B.
+Alexander became NSA/CSS Director in mid-2005, some of
+the more controversial legal questions surrounding the
+Authorization had been settled. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] the Office of Legal Counsel had
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+14
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+68
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN ST-09-0002
+
+reviewed its initial opinion and determined that the
+remaining three types of collection were legally supportable.
+
+(U) NSA Office of General Counsel
+
+(TS//SI//NF) After the Authorization was signed on
+4 October 2001, NSA's highest ranking attorneys, the NSA
+General Counsel and Deputy General Counsel, as well as the
+Associate General Counsel for Operations, orally advised
+General Hayden that the Authorization was legal
+
+(U) General Counsel
+
+(TS//SI//NF) After having received the Authorization on
+4 October 2001, General Hayden asked NSA General Counsel
+Robert Deitz if it was lawful. Mr. Deitz said that General
+Hayden understood that the Attorney General had already
+certified its legality by signing the Authorization, but General
+Hayden wanted Mr. Deitz's view. Mr. Deitz said that on
+5 October he told General Hayden that he believed the
+Authorization to be lawful. He added that he emphasized to
+General Hayden that if this issue were before the Supreme
+Court, it would likely rule, although not unanimously, that
+the Authorization was legal.
+
+(U) Associate General Counsel for Operations
+
+(TS//SI//NF) On 5 October 2001, the General Counsel
+consulted the Associate General Counsel for Operations at
+his home via secure telephone. The Associate General
+Counsel for Operations was responsible for all legal matters
+related to NSA SIGINT activities. According to the General
+Counsel, he had not yet been authorized to tell the Associate
+General Counsel about the PSP, so he "talked around" it and
+did not divulge details. The Associate General Counsel was
+given enough information to assess the lawfulness of the
+concept described, but records show that he was not officially
+cleared for the PSP until 11 October 2001. On Tuesday,
+9 October, he told Mr. Deitz that he believed the
+Authorization was lawful, and he began planning for its
+implementation.
+
+(U) Deputy General Counsel
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The Deputy General Counsel was cleared for
+the PSP on 11 October 2001. He reviewed the Authorization
+with Mr. Deitz and the Associate General Counsel for
+Operations and also concluded that it was lawful.
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+15
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+69
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002 TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(U) Discussions on Legality
+
+(TS//SI//NF) OGC attorneys said that their discussions
+about the Program's lawfulness took into account the severity
+of the 11 September attacks and the fear that foreign persons
+were in the United States planning attacks. The NSA
+attorneys concluded that the Authorization was lawful.
+Given the following factors, the General Counsel said the
+Authorization was constitutional and did not violate FISA.
+[REDACTED]
+
+* (S//NF) FISA was not a realistic means of addressing
+the terrorist threat inside the United States because
+the process lacked speed and agility.
+* (U//FOUO) The Authorization was a temporary 30-day
+grant of authority.
+* (U//FOUO) The statute allowed such an exception, or,
+to the extent that it did not, it was unconstitutional.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The NSA attorneys determined that the
+President could issue the Authorization through his authority
+under Article II of the Constitution to perform warrantless
+electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes
+outside and inside the United States. This conclusion, they
+said, was supported by the concurring opinion in
+Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
+(1952), and appellate cases.⁸
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The Congressional Authorization of Use of
+Military Force and the canon of constitutional avoidance,
+which requires a court to attempt to interpret issues so as to
+avoid constitutional questions, cemented OGC's belief that
+the President's interpretation of Article II authority had legal
+merit.
+
+⁸ (U) United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v Buck, 548 F.2d 871 (9th
+Cir. 1977); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (DC Cir. 1975); United States v. Brown 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir.
+1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3rd Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
+419 U.S. 881 (1974).
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+16
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+70
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002 TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The Associate General Counsel for Operations
+described his position:
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Does Congress have the authority to
+limit Presidential Article II authority in foreign
+intelligence collection? Given the threat, this was a
+perfect storm of events-3,000 people killed,
+airplanes and buildings destroyed by foreign
+terrorists, an attack in the United States by a
+foreign terrorist organization. No one knew where
+the terrorists were or if there were more terrorists,
+and NSA had a collection capability unable to
+function because with the FISA, you cannot get
+[REDACTED] FISA orders needed to cover what you
+needed covered at that time to look for the
+terrorists. You go to the President and tell him
+that there is a statute that prevents him from doing
+something from a collection standpoint that may
+protect the United States from a future attack and
+that while the country is in danger, I have to
+adhere with a statute and can't get the amount of
+warrants I need. Any president is going to say
+there has got to be a way to do this a federal law
+can't let me stand here and watch the country go
+down the tubes. Does the President have to abide
+by a statute depriving him of his authority and
+watch the country go down the tubes? Given the
+case law of five different circuits with the Supreme
+Court denying certiorari in two cases, there was
+good basis for deciding this.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) NSA OGC attorneys said that they did not
+prepare a formal written legal opinion because it was not
+necessary. The Attorney General had already certified the
+legality of the Program, and General Hayden had not asked
+for a written legal opinion. The attorneys also said that they
+did not have time to prepare a written legal opinion given the
+pace of operations.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) After having concluded that the Authorization
+was lawful, NSA attorneys believed it was important to
+ensure that NSA's implementation of the Program complied
+with the Authorization, that processes were well documented,
+and that strict controls and due diligence were embedded
+into the execution of the Program. Recognizing that the legal
+basis of the Program might become controversial, they said
+that they wanted to ensure that NSA's execution of the
+Authority would withstand scrutiny.
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+17
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+71
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002 TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+This page intentionally left blank.
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+18
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+72
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN ST-09-0002
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) NSA PSP operations began on 6 October 2001
+and ended on 17 January 2007 and involved the collection, analysis, and
+reporting of two types of information: metadata and content. NSA
+assumed that the PSP was temporary and did not immediately formalize
+processes and procedures for operations, which were quickly set up to
+provide SIGINT on terrorist targets. As the Authorization continued to be
+renewed, NSA implemented special procedures to ensure that selectors
+used for metadata analysis and domestic selectors tasked for content
+collection were linked to al-Qa'ida, its associates, or international terrorism
+and that related decisions were documented. NSA did not target
+communications with both ends in the United States under PSP authority,
+although some of these communications were incidentally collected, and
+the OIG found no intentional violations of the Authorization. Over the life
+of the Program, NSA issued more than [REDACTED] products based on PSP
+data. According to senior NSA leaders, the value of the PSP was that
+SIGINT coverage provided confidence that someone was looking at the
+seam between the foreign and domestic intelligence domains to detect
+and prevent attacks in the United States.
+
+(U) NSA Begins PSP Operations
+
+(S//NF) On 4 October 2001, General Hayden received the
+initial Authorization and informed the SIGINT Director and
+other key personnel.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+19
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+73
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002 TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(S/NF) A permanent cover term, STELLARWIND, was assigned to Program information on
+31 October 2001
+¹⁰ (S//NF) [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+20
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+74
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN ST-09-0002
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Authorization Renewed
+
+(S//NF) NSA leaders assumed the PSP would be temporary,
+so they did not establish processes and procedures for a
+long-term program, and they had plans to cease operations if
+the Authorization was not renewed. However, the President
+continued to renew the Authorization, and General Hayden
+stated that the DCI threat memoranda accompanying each
+renewal continued to justify the Program.
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+21
+TOP SECRETI/STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+75
+
+TOP SECRETI/STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002 TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(U) FISA Authority Still not an Option in 2002
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In January 2002, senior NSA leaders still
+thought that neither the FISA court order process nor the
+infrastructure associated with FISA collection was suited to
+large numbers of targets [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) NSA's First Attempt to Obtain FISA Authority on [REDACTED] Failed.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In September 2002, NSA attempted to obtain
+FISA authority to collect Internet and electronic wire
+communications of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] using the standard process for
+seeking authority on foreign powers and foreign agents.
+Before preparing an application, NSA submitted a
+"Memorandum of Justification" to the [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]¹¹
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+22
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+76
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+ST-09-0002
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The request was prompted by a CT Product
+Line staff member, who explained that technical problems
+delayed NSA's receipt of e-mail collected through FISC orders
+that the FBI had obtained. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] In one case, an
+FBI order listed only [REDACTED] terrorist agents of interest to
+NSA.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(U) NSA Structure for PSP Operations
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+23
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+77
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(U//FOUO) NSA Organizational Structure for PSP Activity
+November 2004
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+Director Deputy Director
+Inspector General
+General Counsel
+Signals Intelligence Directorate (SID)
+SID Oversight & Compliance
+Customer Relationships
+Analysis & Production
+Data Acquisition
+PSP Operations
+STLW Program Manager (SID Program Manager for CT Special Projects)
+CT Product Line
+Approvals for targeting domestic selectors
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+Analysts and reporting
+Collection of content and metadata
+PSP Operations
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+(U) Chain of Command
+
+(S//NF) NSA's Director and Deputy Director exercised senior
+operational control and authority over the Program.
+According to NSA's Deputy Director, General Hayden handled
+"downtown" and the Deputy Director managed everything
+within NSA. The SIGINT Director at the start of the Program
+stated that once she was confident that the Program had
+appropriate checks and balances, she left direct management
+to the Director, Deputy Director, and the OGC. She noted
+that General Hayden took personal responsibility for the
+Program and managed it carefully. By 2004, specific roles
+related to collection, analysis, and reporting had been
+delegated to the SIGINT Director, who delegated management
+responsibilities to the Program Manager and mission
+execution responsibilities to the Chief of the CT Product Line
+and subordinate leaders.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+24
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+78
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+ST-09-0002
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(U) Coordination with FBI
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) On 24 January 2003, NSA, SID,
+and the FBI agreed to detail FBI personnel working under
+NSA SIGINT authorities to SID's [REDACTED]
+Under the agreement, detailees assisted with terrorism-
+related SIGINT metadata analysis, identified and
+disseminated terrorism-related SIGINT information meeting
+FBI foreign intelligence information needs, and facilitated
+NSA analyst access to FBI terrorism-related information.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//CO[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
+25
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+79
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Minimization Procedures and Additional Controls on PSP
+Operations¹²
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) Management emphasized that the
+minimization rules required under non-PSP authorities also
+applied to PSP. The Authorization specifically directed NSA
+[REDACTED]
+
+¹²(U) Internal control, or management control, comprises the plans, methods, and procedures used to meet
+missions, goals, and objectives. It provides reasonable assurance that an entity is effective and efficient in its
+operations, reliable in its reporting, and compliant with applicable laws and regulations.
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+26
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN
+80
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+ST-09-0002
+
+[REDACTED] NSA complied by
+applying USSID SP0018 minimization procedures. For
+example, and as described in the following sections:
+
+* The collection of U.S. person information was
+minimized by [REDACTED]
+* When analysts encountered U.S. person information,
+they handled it in accordance with minimization
+guidance, which included reporting violations or
+incidents.
+* Dissemination of U.S. person information was
+minimized by requiring pre-release verification that the
+information was related to counterterrorism and
+necessary to understand the foreign intelligence or
+assess its importance.
+
+(e//NE) In addition, as PSP operations stabilized and the
+Authorization continued to be renewed, NSA management
+designed processes and procedures to implement the
+Program effectively while ensuring compliance with the
+Authorization and protecting U.S. person information. By
+April 2004, formal procedures were in place, many of which
+were more stringent than those used for non-PSP SIGINT
+operations. One analyst commented that the PSP "had more
+documentation than anything else [she] had ever been
+involved with." Examples of controls, some of which will be
+explained in more detail in the following sections of this
+report, include:
+
+* (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) Approvals-Shift
+Coordinators approved foreign and domestic target
+selectors for metadata analysis. The Chief or Deputy
+of CT Product Line Chief or the Program Manager
+approved domestic selectors for content collection
+under the PSP.
+* (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) Documentation-RFIs,
+leads, tasked domestic selectors, and tippers were
+tracked in the [REDACTED] Justifications for
+contact chaining were recorded, and justification
+packages and approvals for tasking domestic selectors
+for content collection were formally documented.
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HSC//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+27
+TOP SECRET//STLW///HSC//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+81
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW///HSC//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+* (TS//SI//NF) Monitoring-Statistics on content
+tasking and reports were maintained and reviewed by
+SID, Oversight and Compliance by 2003. A CT
+Product Line employee stated: "... [N]owhere else did
+NSA have to report on selectors and how many
+selectors were rolled off [detasked) and why."
+* (U//FOUO) OGC involvement-Personnel working
+under PSP authority noted that they had a continuous
+dialogue with the OGC on what was permissible under
+the Authorization. The Associate General Counsel for
+Operations confirmed that the OGC "was involved with
+the operations people day in and day out."
+* (U//FOUO) Due Diligence Meetings-The PSP Program
+Manager chaired due-diligence meetings attended by
+operational, OIG, and OGC personnel. They discussed
+OIG and OGC reviews and Program challenges,
+processes, procedures, and documentation.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) PSP Operations: Metadata
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) The Authorization defines
+"metadata" as [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] For example, e-mail
+message metadata includes the sender and recipient e-mail
+addresses. It does not include the subject line or the text of
+the e-mail, which are considered content. Telephony
+metadata includes such information as the calling and called
+telephone numbers, but not spoken words.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+28
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+82
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+ST-09-0002
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRETI/STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+29
+TOP SECRETI/STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+83
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002 TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(TS//SI//NE) Process to Conduct Metadata Analysis
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Standards for Conducting Metadata Analysis
+
+(TS//SI//NF) During an OIG review in 2006, the Associate
+General Counsel for Operations described OGC's standards
+for complying with the terms of the Authorization when
+conducting metadata analysis and contact chaining.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) To conduct contact chaining under the PSP,
+the Authorization required that NSA meet one of the following
+conditions: 1) at least one party to the communication had
+to be outside the United States, 2) no party to the
+communication could be known to be a U.S. citizen, or 3)
+based on the factual and practical considerations of everyday
+life on which reasonable and prudent persons act, there were
+specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that the
+communication relates to international terrorism or activities
+in preparation therefor. The Associate General Counsel for
+Operations said that OGC's guidance was more stringent
+than the Authorization in that the OGC always required that
+the third condition be met before contact chaining began.
+Analysts were required to establish a link with designated
+groups related to international terrorism, al-Qa'ida, or al
+-Qa'ida affiliates.¹⁴
+
+(S//NF) The Associate General Counsel for Operations said
+that establishing a link to international terrorist groups or al-
+Qa'ida and its affiliates met the Authorization's requirement
+that all activities conducted under the PSP be for the purpose
+of detecting and preventing terrorist acts within the United
+States. He explained that because the President had
+determined that [REDACTED] international terrorist groups
+al-Qa'ida presented a threat within the United States,
+regardless of where members were located, linking a target
+selector to such groups established that the collection was for
+
+¹³ (U) Smith v. Maryland 442 U.S. 735 742 (1979)
+¹⁴ (TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+30
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+84
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN ST-09-0002
+
+the purpose of detection and prevention of terrorist acts
+within the United States.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In a 2005 Program memorandum, NSA OGC
+defined the NSA standard for establishing a link to al-Qa'ida
+under the PSP, NSA could target selectors when "based on
+the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on
+which reasonable and prudent persons act, there are
+reasonable grounds to believe a party to such communication
+is an agent of al-Qa'ida, or a group affiliated with al-Qa'ida."
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) Facts giving rise to
+"reasonable grounds for belief" means reliable facts
+in NSA's possession, either derived from its signals
+intelligence activity, or facts provided to NSA by
+another government department or agency, or facts
+reliably in the public record (e.g., a newspaper
+article). Whatever the source of information, the
+key is that NSA is basing its determination on
+articulable facts, not on bare assertions made by
+someone else. We need evidence, rather than
+conclusions. Thus a mere statement that person X
+is a member of al Qaeda, without more
+information, will not suffice as a justification for
+chaining or for content tasking. Instead we need to
+know what facts have led NSA, or another agency,
+or the press, etc., to that conclusion. Focus on the
+facts and determine whether they lead to a
+conclusion, rather than accepting someone else's
+conclusion. If you don't have enough facts to make
+a determination, ask for them.
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) In addition, the
+standard does not require certain knowledge, or
+even necessarily a better than 50/50 chance that
+the user of a phone or e-mail is a member of al
+Qaeda or an affiliated organization. It requires
+only that a reasonable and prudent person
+exercising good judgment would conclude that
+there are grounds for believing the thing to be
+proved. It is not mere hunch or mere suspicion,
+nor is it proof beyond a reasonable doubt or even a
+preponderance of the evidence; rather, the
+standard requires some degree of concrete and
+articulable evidence or information on which to
+base a conclusion.
+
+(U) Approvals for Metadata Analysis
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+31
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+85
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002 TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) If the standard for establishing a link to al-
+Qa'ida could not be met based solely on the information
+provided in the RFI or lead, analysts could search NSA and
+Intelligence Community databases and chain under non-PSP
+authorities to find additional facts to substantiate the link.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Shift coordinators were not required to approve
+all alert-list selectors that might have generated [REDACTED]
+chaining. One individual, the equivalent of a shift
+coordinator, managed and monitored the alert process.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) When NSA personnel identified erroneous
+metadata collection, usually caused by technical collection
+system problems or inappropriate application of the
+Authorization, minimization procedures required them to
+report the violation or incident through appropriate channels
+and to delete the collection from all NSA databases. Early in
+the Program, NSA reported three violations in which the
+Authorization was not properly applied and took measures to
+correct them.
+
+* (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) In [REDACTED] NSA
+chained on numbers associated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+In this case, the target was foreign, but there was no link to terrorism.
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+32
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+86
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN ST-09-0002
+
+* (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) In [REDACTED] NSA
+chained on a domestic telephone number provided by
+the FBI that was related to a [REDACTED]
+investigation. In this case, the target posed a terrorist
+threat inside the United States, but there was no
+known link to international terrorism.
+
+* (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) In [REDACTED] NSA chained
+on metadata based on two telephone numbers
+provided by FBI related [REDACTED]
+While the selectors were associated with international
+terrorism, [REDACTED] did not pose a threat of terrorist
+attacks inside the United States.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Bulk Metadata Needed for Effective Contact
+Chaining
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) Effective contact chaining requires
+large amounts of metadata, sometimes called bulk metadata,
+because more data yields more complete chains.
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) Under PSP authority, NSA
+obtained a daily average of approximately [REDACTED]
+telephony metadata records and an estimated [REDACTED]
+Internet metadata records. Metadata obtained under PSP
+authorities was stored in a protected database, to which only
+cleared and trained personnel were given access. NSA
+analysts were able to access and chain through metadata
+records, but they could view only records associated with an
+approved foreign intelligence target. This was a small
+fraction of the metadata available. For example, in August
+2006, NSA estimated that only 0.000025 percent or one in
+every four million archived bulk telephony records was
+expected to be viewed by trained SIGINT analysts.¹⁵
+
+¹⁵ (TS//SI//NE) This estimate was presented in the August 2006 application for the Business Records Order, the
+FISC Order that permitted NSA's collection of call detail records. Although this estimate applies to collection
+and analysis of telephony metadata conducted under the Business Records Order, the same processes and
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+33
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+87
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002 TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(TS//SI//NF) PSP Operations: Content
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] PSP content
+operations involved three separate activities: tasking selectors
+for content collection, collecting the content of
+communications associated with tasked selectors, and
+analyzing the content collected. To comply with the
+Authorization, NSA management combined standard
+minimization procedures and specially designed procedures
+to task domestic selectors, collect the resulting
+communications, and analyze and report the foreign
+intelligence they contained. Over the life of the Program, NSA
+tasked approximately [REDACTED] foreign and domestic selectors
+for content collection.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Tasking Selectors for Content Collection
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) "Tasking" is the direct levying of
+SIGINT collection requirements on designated collectors.
+Analysts must task selectors to obtain a target's
+communications.
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) Under the PSP. [REDACTED]
+Before NSA personnel tasked target selectors for PSP content
+collection, the Authorization required that target selectors
+comply with two criteria. First, they had to determine that
+[REDACTED] as described in guidance issued by OGC in
+2005. Second, the purpose of the collection had to be
+the prevention and detection of terrorist attacks in the United
+States. The OGC provided the same guidance for tasking
+selectors for content collection as it had for contact chaining.
+Specifically, because the President had determined that al-
+Qa'ida presented a threat within the United States, regardless
+of where its members were located, linking a target selector to
+designated international terrorist groups or al-Qaida and its
+affiliates, established that the collection was for the purpose
+of detection and prevention of terrorist acts within the United
+States.
+
+techniques were used under the PSP, making this a reasonable comparison. This estimate was based on data
+available in August 2006 and cannot be replicated.
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+34
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+88
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN ST-09-0002
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Approvals to Task Domestic Selectors for Content
+Collection
+
+(TS//SI//NF) NSA analysts determined whether foreign
+selectors met the Authorization criteria and tasked them
+without further approval. However, because NSA leadership
+considered selectors located in the United States to be
+extremely sensitive, the associated tasking process required
+extra documentation, reviews, and approvals than foreign
+selector tasking under the PSP.
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+¹⁶(U) From 2005 to 2007, SID, Analysis and Production leadership titles changed. The Primary Production
+Center Manager became the primary approval authority for tasking packages.
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+35
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+89
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002 TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Most Selectors Tasked for Content Collection Were Foreign.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) In 2008, NSA reported to a
+member of Congress that [REDACTED] domestic telephone numbers
+and [REDACTED] domestic Internet addresses were tasked for PSP
+content collection from October 2001 to January 2007.
+Domestic selectors were located in the United States and
+associated with al-Qa'ida or international terrorism and were
+not necessarily used by U.S. citizens. In a 2008 Attorney
+General Certification, NSA reported that [REDACTED] foreign
+telephone numbers and in excess of [REDACTED] foreign Internet
+addresses had been targeted from October 2001 through
+December 2006, which spans all but one month of the
+Program. NSA could not precisely estimate the number of
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+36
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+90
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN ST-09-0002
+
+foreign Internet addresses targeted because the tools used by
+analysts before September 2005 did not accurately account
+for the number of individual addresses targeted.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In 2006, the OIG Found that Justifications for
+Tasking Domestic Selectors Met Authorization Criteria.
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) During a 2006 review, the OIG
+found that all items in a randomly selected sample of tasked
+domestic selectors met Authorization criteria. Based on a
+statistically valid sampling methodology, the OIG was able to
+conclude with 95 percent confidence that 95 percent or more
+of domestic selectors tasked for PSP content collection could
+be linked to al-Qa'ida, its associates, or international terrorist
+threats inside the United States. Justification packages for
+all sample items tested were supported by one or more of the
+following types of information:
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+* Information associated with or obtained through FBI investigations.
+
+(U) Process to Task Selectors
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+37
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+91
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002 TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In 2005, the OIG found that the largely manual
+process to task and detask selectors for content collection
+was unreliable. Specifically, the OIG found [REDACTED] errors when
+comparing records of domestic telephone numbers and
+Internet identifiers approved for PSP content collection as of
+November 2004 with those actually on collection. The errors
+consisted of selectors that had not been removed
+from collection after being detasked, had not been put on
+collection after having been approved, had been put on
+collection because of a typographical error, or had not been
+accurately recorded in the [REDACTED] In response
+to the OIG finding, management took immediate steps to
+correct the errors and set up a process to reconcile approved
+tasked selectors with selectors actually on collection.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Collecting the Content of Communications
+
+(U//FOUO) Collection refers to the process of obtaining
+communications after selectors associated with intelligence
+targets are tasked for collection at designated sites. Data
+collected under the PSP was stored in protected partitions in
+NSA databases. Access to the partitions was restricted to
+PSP-cleared personnel.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The Authorization required that a collected
+communication originate or terminate outside the United
+States. NSA did not intentionally collect domestic
+communications under the PSP. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] and the CT Product Line to
+ensure that collected data was as intended and authorized.
+According to PSP program officials, NSA's [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+Its purpose was to collect international communications.
+However, management stated that:
+
+ There are no readily available technical solutions
+ within the [REDACTED] to
+ guarantee that no (domestic) calls will be collected.
+ Issues of this kind inevitably arise from time to
+ time in other SIGINT operations, as foreseen by
+ Executive Order 12333, and are thus not peculiar
+ to [the PSP].
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+38
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+92
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN ST-09-0002
+
+(S//NF) The Program Management Office identified four ways
+that NSA might have unintentionally collected non-target data:
+
+* A target could have been correctly tasked using valid
+selectors, but, in addition to collecting the desired
+ communications, non-target communications were inadvertently
+collected.
+
+* A valid target selector could have generated target-
+specific collection that ultimately proved the target not
+to be related to al-Qa'ida.
+
+* A technical, human, or procedural error in the target
+identification or tasking process could have resulted in
+unintentional collection of communications not related
+to al-Qa'ida.
+
+* Technical collection system problems could have
+resulted in unintentional collection of non-al-Qa'ida
+related targets, even when all steps in the target
+identification and tasking process had been properly
+executed.
+
+(S//NF) Over the life of the Program, NSA reported
+[REDACTED]ncidents of unintentional collection of domestic
+communications and [REDACTED] incidents in which the wrong
+selector had been tasked. (See Appendix F for details.) In
+those cases, personnel followed USSID SP0018 procedures
+and were given detailed instructions to report the violations
+or incidents, adjust tasking, and delete collection records
+from NSA and other databases.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Analyzing the Content of Collected Communications
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Analysis of content collected under the PSP
+involved the same practices and techniques used in non-PSP
+operations. One NSA manager described the PSP as "just one
+more tool in the analysts' tool kit." [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Collected
+communications were then transcribed, if necessary, and
+processed to make them useful for intelligence analysis and
+reporting. Analysis included not only listening to or reading
+the contents of a communication, but drawing on target
+knowledge, coordinating and collaborating with other
+analysts, and integrating collateral information, metadata,
+and information from databases and published intelligence
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+39
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+93
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+reports to determine whether the communications included
+foreign intelligence that was timely, unique, actionable, and
+reportable.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+¹⁷ (U//FOUO) A serialized report is a formatted intelligence product produced pursuant to USSID CR1400 that
+has a reference serial number, contains foreign intelligence information derived from SIGINT, and goes to
+approved users of intelligence.
+¹⁸ (TS///STLW//SI//OC/NF) NSA issued [REDACTED] additional reports between 17 January 2007 and December 2008
+that were based on analysis of data previously collected under PSP authority.
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+40
+94
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+ST-09-0002
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Metadata Analysis Reports (Tippers)
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) Reports based on metadata
+analysis were referred to as "tippers." [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) NSA retained documentation of
+the analysis, supporting customer request or lead
+information, and a description of the link to terrorism for
+tippers based on PSP collection. Documentation of analysis
+was not retained unless a tipper was written.
+Counterterrorism personnel updated information in a
+computer tracking system to reflect the disposition of all
+metadata analysis requests. From October 2001 through
+January 2007, NSA issued [REDACTED] tippers to FBI and CIA:
+
+* [REDACTED] tippers were based on Internet metadata analysis.
+* [REDACTED] tippers were based on telephony metadata
+ analysis when telephone numbers had only direct
+ contact (one degree of separation) with a known
+ terrorist as defined by the Authorization.
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+41
+95
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+* [REDACTED] tippers were based on more detailed telephony
+ metadata analysis that included contacts with two
+ degrees of separation from known terrorists.
+* [REDACTED] tippers were based on telephony and Internet
+ metadata analysis.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Content Reports
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) PSP content reports contained
+NSA's analysis of communications [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+(U//FOUO) Protection of U.S. Person Information in Reporting
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Before sending PSP reports to customers, NSA
+removed unnecessary U.S. person information, as required
+by minimization procedures in USSID SP0018. The CT
+Product Line reviewed PSP reports to ensure that they had
+been written in accordance with these procedures. SID's
+Oversight and Compliance office then reviewed PSP reports
+containing U.S. person information. Oversight and
+Compliance personnel reviewed U.S. person information in
+reports, determined if it was necessary to understand the
+foreign intelligence in the reports, and submitted
+recommendations for the inclusion of U.S. person
+information to SID, Chief of Information Sharing Services for
+final approval. For example, if an individual's name was not
+necessary to understand the foreign intelligence in the report,
+the name was deleted or changed to "a U.S. person."
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+42
+96
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+ST-09-0002
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Oversight and Compliance did not review
+tippers based on metadata analysis. When NSA began to
+issue tippers based on the content of communications, SID
+adapted its procedures for the dissemination of U.S. person
+information. Additional Oversight and Compliance personnel
+were cleared for the Program to assist with reviews. They
+gave PSP and other terrorism reporting priority for review
+over other Agency reporting.
+
+(U) Use of SIGINT Product
+
+(TS//SI//NF)As NSA's primary customers for PSP
+information, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] All products included this statement:
+
+ This information is provided only for intelligence
+ purposes in an effort to develop potential
+ investigative leads. It cannot be used in court
+ proceedings, subpoenas, or for other legal or
+ judicial purposes.
+
+(U//FOUO) Value of the PSP
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Referring to portions of the PSP in 2005,
+General Hayden said there were probably no communications
+more important to NSA efforts to defend the nation than
+those involving al-Qaida. NSA collected communications
+when one end was inside the United States and one end was
+associated with al-Qa'ida or international terrorism in order
+to detect and prevent attacks inside the United States.
+General Hayden stated that "the program in this regard has
+been successful." During the May 2006 Senate hearing on
+his nomination to be CIA Director, General Hayden said that,
+had the PSP been in place before the September 2001
+attacks, hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi
+almost certainly would have been identified and located.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) In May 2009, General Hayden told us that the
+value of the Program was in knowing that NSA SIGINT
+activities under the PSP covered an important "quadrant"
+(terrorist communications between foreign countries and the
+United States). This coverage provided confidence that there
+were "not additional terrorist cells in the United States."
+NSA's Deputy Director, who was the SID Deputy Director for
+Analysis and Production on 11 September 2001, echoed
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+43
+97
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+General Hayden's comment: "The value of the PSP was in the
+confidence it provided that someone was looking at the seam
+between the foreign and domestic intelligence domains."
+
+(TS//SI//NF) The former SID Deputy Director for Data
+Acquisition said that the possibility of a large terrorist
+presence in the United States [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The PSP gave NSA a capability to
+exploit a key vulnerability in terrorists' communications: [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] With PSP
+authority, NSA could collect communications between
+[REDACTED] al-Qa'ida
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) Current NSA Director General
+Alexander cited SIGINT reporting on [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] as the most important SIGINT success of the PSP.
+NSA analysis of PSP metadata and content collection placed
+[REDACTED] General
+Alexander said, "probably saved more lives" than any other
+PSP information produced by NSA because the information
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) From an operational standpoint, the PSP
+enabled NSA to:
+* Support customers
+* Provide SIGINT that contributed to customers'
+ investigative work
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(U//FOUO) Support to Customers
+
+(TS//SI//NF) From April 2002 to January 2007 NSA
+responded to [REDACTED] and more than [REDACTED] from FBI. These
+numbers do not account for requests submitted before NSA
+began to use an automated tracking system in April 2002.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Based on information obtained under PSP
+authority, NSA sent [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+44
+98
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+ST-09-0002
+
+and FBI. In the early days of the Program, the FBI said that
+the large number of tippers from NSA was causing them
+unnecessary work because agents treated each tipper as a
+lead requiring action. General Hayden said that NSA's
+intention was that SIGINT information be added to FBI's
+knowledge base, not that the FBI act on each piece of
+information. When NSA realized that it was sending too
+much data to the FBI, the Agency made appropriate
+adjustments.
+
+(U//FOUO) PSP Reporting Contributed to Customers' Investigative Work.
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] For example, an
+FBI briefing dated 4 May 2006 stated that “STELLARWIND
+continues to provide timely and carefully vetted intelligence
+to support FBI's investigations in connection with [REDACTED]
+operations]."
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED] FBI did not routinely
+provide feedback on NSA reporting under the PSP, and NSA
+had no mechanism to track and assess the effectiveness of
+SIGINT reporting in general or PSP reporting in particular.¹⁹
+Tracking PSP contributions was also difficult because
+customers did not know that [REDACTED] General Hayden
+noted that success stories decreased over time as intelligence
+became more integrated and it became more difficult to
+attribute success to any one activity.
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) The Program Management Office
+provided the following examples of PSP reporting that helped
+redirect FBI resources [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] viewed as vulnerable to terrorism targeting. The
+examples also include cases in which NSA provided reporting
+that contributed to FBI investigations, FBI confidential
+human sources, FISA warrants, arrests, and convictions.
+
+¹⁹ (C//NF) In July 2007, SID initiated a formal effort to assess the effectiveness of its CT efforts. By the fall of
+2007, that effort was struggling.
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+45
+99
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HGS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(U) Case Name (U) PSP Contribution
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+46
+100
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+ST-09-0002
+
+(U) Case Name (U) PSP Contribution
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+47
+10
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(U) Case Name (U) PSP Contribution
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+48
+102
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+ST-09-0002
+
+(U) Case Name (U) PSP Contribution
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+49
+10:
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+U
+104
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(U) PSP information (U) Description of SIGINT Reporting
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+50
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN ST-09-0002
+
+(U) Case Name (U) PSP Contribution
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+51
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+105
+
+106
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(U) PSP Information (U) Description of SIGINT Reporting
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+52
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN ST-09-0002
+
+(U) PSP information (U) Description of SIGINT Reporting
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+53
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+107
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+54
+108
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN ST-09-0002
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+55
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+109
+
+110
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+56
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN ST-09-0002
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+111
+
+112
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+58
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN ST-09-0002
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+59
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+113
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002 TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+60
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+114
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN ST-09-0002
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+61
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+115
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002 TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+62
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+116
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORGONINOFORN
+APPROVED PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+ST-09-0002
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+63
+TOP SECRETI/STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+117
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//ST OMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+64
+TOP SECRETI/STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+118
+
+TOP SECRETI/STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+ST-09-0002
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+65
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+119
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002 TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+66
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+120
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+ST-09-0002
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+67
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+121
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002 TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+68
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+122
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+ST-09-0002
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) On 12 March, the President directed DoJ to
+continue working on the legal issues, and on 15 March OLC
+issued a three page memorandum to the Deputy Attorney
+General stating that, while it had only begun to analyze the
+issues and was not yet prepared to issue a final opinion, it
+believed that [REDACTED] types of collection authorized
+under the PSP were legally supportable. OLC had not yet
+developed a supportable argument to justify [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+²⁵ (TS//SI//NF) The Assistant Attorney General for OLC issued a memorandum on 6 May 2004 concluding that
+operation of the PSP as described in the opinion was lawful. A 16 July memorandum upheld the 6 May
+opinion [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+69
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+123
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002 TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+70
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN ST-09-0002
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN
+71
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+125
+
+126
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002 TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+²⁷ (TS//SI//NF) The minimization probable cause standard states that the Agency may target for collection, communications for which there is probable cause to believe that one of the communicants is a member or
+agent of [REDACTED] and the communication is to or from a foreign country.
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+72
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN ST-09-0002
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+73
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN 127
+127
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002 TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+This page intentionally left blank.
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+74
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+128
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN ST-09-0002
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+75
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+129
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002 TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(U//FOUO) The OIG issued a report for each of the
+13 investigations and reviews described above. Ten
+reports on PSP activity resulted in 11 recommendations to
+management; 10 have been closed, and one remains open.
+Three reports on FISC-approved activity previously
+authorized by the PSP contained nine recommendations to
+management; three have been closed and six remain open.
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) Beginning in January 2007,
+violations that had occurred under the Authorization and
+violations related to PSP activity transitioned to court orders
+were reported quarterly to the President's Intelligence
+Oversight Board (through the Assistant to the Secretary of
+Defense for Intelligence Oversight).
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+76
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+130
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+ST-09-0002
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(U) Recently Reported Incidents
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF NSA OIG learned in late 2008
+that, from approximately [REDACTED]
+collection of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] All related records
+were purged from NSA databases in 2004; therefore, it was
+not possible to determine the exact nature and extent of that
+collection. The NSA OIG will close out this incident in an
+upcoming report to the President's Intelligence Oversight
+Board.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) On 15 January 2009, the Department of
+Justice reported to the FISC that NSA had been using an
+"alert list" to compare incoming business records FISA
+metadata against telephone numbers associated with
+counterterrorism targets tasked by NSA for SIGINT collection.
+NSA had reported to the Court that the alert list consisted of
+numbers for which NSA had determined that a reasonable
+articulable suspicion existed that the numbers were related
+to a terrorist organization associated [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] However, the majority of selectors on the
+alert list had not been subjected to a reasonable articulable
+suspicion determination. The NSA OIG has reported this
+incident to the President's Intelligence Oversight Board and
+has filed updates as required. The alert list and a detailed
+NSA 60-day review of processes related to the Business
+Records FISC order were the subject of several recent
+submissions to the FISC and of NSA briefings to
+Congressional oversight committees.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+77
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+131
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002 TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(U//FOUO) Other IG Program concerns were documented in
+the 2003-2008 reports. Presidential Notifications are listed
+and described in Appendix F. The 2008 report described the
+adequacy of Program decompartmentation plans.
+
+132
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+78
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN ST-09-0002
+
+(U) ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
+
+(TS//SI//NF)
+Bps Bits per Second
+BR Business Records
+CDR Call Detail Records
+[REDACTED]
+CIA Central Intelligence Agency
+COMINT Communications Intelligence
+CT Counterterrorism
+DCI Director of Central Intelligence
+DNI Director of National Intelligence
+DoD Department of Defense
+DoJ Department of Justice
+EO Executive Order
+FAA FISA Amendments Act
+FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
+FISA Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
+FISC Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+GC General Counsel
+Gbps Gigabits per Second
+HPSCI House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
+IG Inspector General
+LAN Local Area Network
+[REDACTED]
+NSA National Security Agency
+NSA/CSS National Security Agency/Central Security Service
+O&C Oversight and Compliance
+ODNI Office of the Director of National Intelligence
+OGC Office of the General Counsel
+OIG Office of the Inspector General
+OIPR Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (now the Office of
+Intelligence, National Security Division)
+OLC Office of Legal Counsel
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+79
+TOP SECRETI/STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+133
+
+TOP SECRETI/STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002 TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+PM Program Manager
+PR/TT Pen Register/Trap & Trace
+PSP President's Surveillance Program
+RFI Request for Information
+SID Signals Intelligence Directorate
+SIGINT Signals Intelligence
+SSCI Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
+[REDACTED]
+TS/SCI Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+80
+134
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NΟFORN ST-09-0002
+
+(U) GLOSSARY OF TERMS
+
+(U) COMINT (U) Communications Intelligence - technical
+and intelligence information derived from
+foreign communications by someone other
+than the intended recipients
+
+(U) Ε.Ο. 12333 (U) Executive Order 12333 - United States
+Intelligence Activities - provides goals, duties,
+and responsibilities with respect to the
+national intelligence effort. It mandates that
+certain activities of U.S. intelligence
+components are to be governed by
+procedures issued by agency heads and
+approved by the Attorney General.
+
+(U) FISA (U) The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
+of 1978, as amended, governs the conduct of
+certain electronic surveillance activities
+within the United States to collect foreign
+intelligence information.
+
+(U) [REDACTED] (S//SI//NF) Analytic tool for contact
+chaining used by analysts to do target
+discovery by quickly and easily navigating
+global communications metadata
+
+(TS//SI//NF) METADATA (TS//SI//NE) Header, router, and
+addressing-type information, including
+telecommunications dialing-type data, but
+not the contents of the communication
+
+(U) [REDACTED]
+
+(U) [REDACTED] (S//NF) NSA's primary storage, search, and
+retrieval mechanism for SIGINT text
+
+(U) SANITIZATION (U) The process of disguising COMINT to
+protect sensitive intelligence sources,
+methods, capabilities, and analytical
+procedures in order to disseminate the
+information outside COMINT channels.
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+81
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+135
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002 TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(U) SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE (U) A category of intelligence comprising
+individually or in combination all
+communications intelligence (COMINT),
+electronic intelligence (ELINT) and foreign
+instrumentation intelligence (FISINT),
+however transmitted.
+
+(U) TEAR LINE REPORTS (U) Reports used to disseminate SIGINT-
+derived information and sanitized
+information in the same record. The
+sanitized tear line conveys the same facts as
+the COMINT-controlled information, while
+hiding COMINT as the source.
+
+(U) TELEPHONY (U) The technology associated with the
+electronic transmission of voice, fax, and
+other information between parties using
+systems historically associated with the
+telephone
+
+(U) TIPPERS [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+82
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+136
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN ST-09-0002
+
+APPENDIX A
+
+(U) About the Review
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+137
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002 TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+This page intentionally left blank.
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+138
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN ST-09-0002
+
+(U) About the Review
+
+(U) Objectives
+
+(U) The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)
+Amendments Act of 2008, which was signed into law on
+10 July 2008, requires that the Inspectors General of
+Intelligence Community elements that participated in the
+President's Surveillance Program (PSP) conduct a
+comprehensive review of the Program. The NSA Office of the
+Inspector General (OIG) reviewed NSA's participation in the
+PSP. The specific review objectives were to examine:
+
+* (U) The establishment and evolution of the PSP as it
+affected NSA
+
+* (U) NSA implementation of the PSP, including
+preparation and dissemination of product under the
+PSP
+
+* (U) NSA access to legal reviews of the PSP and access
+to information about the Program
+
+* (U) NSA communications with and representations
+made to private sector entities and private sector
+participation
+
+* (U) NSA interaction with the Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Court (FISC) and transition of PSP-
+authorized collection to court orders
+
+* (U) Oversight of PSP activities at NSA.
+
+(U) Scope and Methodology
+
+(U) This review was conducted in accordance with generally
+accepted government auditing standards, as set forth by the
+Comptroller General of the United States and implemented by
+the audit manuals of the DoD and NSA/CSS Inspectors
+General.
+
+(U) The review was conducted from 10 July 2008 to 15 May
+2009 in coordination with the Inspectors General of the
+Department of Defense, Office of the Director of National
+Intelligence, CIA, and DoJ.
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+139
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002 TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(U//FOUO) The scope of this review was limited to NSA's
+participation in the PSP from 4 October 2001 to 17 January
+2007. The review included NSA activities before and after
+the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 that led to the
+Presidential Authorization on 4 October 2001. It also
+included the transition of PSP-authorized activity to FISC
+orders.
+
+(TS//NF) To satisfy review objectives, we interviewed
+[REDACTED] current and former NSA personnel who participated in the
+PSP including NSA Directors and Deputy Director, General
+Counsels, Deputy General Counsels, Associate General
+Counsels for Operations, and the Inspector General
+responsible for Program oversight from August 2002 until
+August 2006. We also interviewed former [REDACTED]
+as well as leadership [REDACTED] within the
+Signals Intelligence Directorate.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Interviews of the former Director of NSA,
+General Hayden, the former NSA Associate General Counsel
+for Operations, [REDACTED] were conducted
+with other IG offices involved in the joint PSP review.
+
+(U//FOUO) We requested White House documentation of
+meetings at which General Hayden or NSA employees
+discussed the PSP or the Terrorist Surveillance Program with
+the President, Vice President, or White House personnel, but
+did not receive a response before publication of this report.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED]
+
+(U//FOUO) We reviewed NSA records dated 27 July 1993 to
+10 July 2008 that pertained to review objectives. Records
+included NSA policies and regulations, correspondence,
+e-mail, briefings, notes, reports, calendars, and database
+reports.
+
+(S//NF) Numbers of selectors tasked and reports issued
+were based on information provided by the PSP Program
+Management Office and were not independently verified
+during this review.
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+140
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN ST-09-0002
+
+(U//FOUO) Information about individuals cleared for access
+to Program information was based on records provided by the
+PSP Project Security Officer and were not independently
+verified during this review.
+
+(U) Prior Coverage
+
+(U//FOUO) The OIG began oversight of the PSP and related
+activities in August 2002 and issued twelve reports dated
+21 February 2003 through 30 June 2008 (Appendix E.) The
+OIG also issued 14 Presidential notifications from
+March 2003 to October 2006 (Appendix F). Detailed
+discussion of the OIG's oversight of the PSP is included in
+Section VIII of this report.
+
+(TS//SI//NF). As portions of the Program were transitioned
+to FISC orders for the collection of internet metadata and
+telephony business records, the OIG reviewed the execution
+and adequacy of controls in ensuring compliance with the
+orders. The OIG did not test the efficacy of controls for
+metadata collected under the authority of the PSP or court
+orders. Three reports summarized OIG investigations into
+possible misuse of the Authority or violations of FISC orders.
+One report summarized the OIG's oversight of the PSP, and
+the last report reviewed the adequacy of Program
+decompartmentation plans.
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+141
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002 TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+This page intentionally left blank.
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+142
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN ST-09-0002
+
+APPENDIX B
+
+(U) The Presidential Authorizations
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+143
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002 TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+This page intentionally left blank.
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+144
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN ST-09-0002
+
+(U) The Presidential Authorizations
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) The Authorization documents that contained the terms
+under which NSA executed special Presidential authority were addressed to the
+Secretary of Defense and were titled "Presidential Authorization for Specified
+Electronic Surveillance Activities during a Limited Period to Detect and Prevent Acts
+of Terrorism within the United States." The first Authorization consisted of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] There
+were 43 Authorizations, two modifications, and one document described as
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+145
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002 -TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+146
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN ST-09-0002
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+147
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002 TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+148
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN ST-09-0002
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+149
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002 -TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(U//FOUO) Signature of President
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) The Authorizations were signed by
+the President, followed by a place and date of signature. All
+but one authorization was signed in Washington, D.C.
+
+(U) Other Signatures
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) Under the phrase "approved for
+form and legality," the Attorney General signed all but one of
+the Authorizations. The other authorization and the two
+modifications were signed by the Counsel to the President.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+150
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN ST-09-0002
+
+APPENDIX C
+
+(U) Timeline of Key Events
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+151
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002 TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+This page intentionally left blank.
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+152
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN ST-09-0002
+
+(U) Timeline of Key Events
+
+(U//FOUO) This timeline includes key events that occurred during NSA's
+implementation of the President's Surveillance Program (PSP). In addition to
+issuances of the Authorization, the timeline includes selected communications
+between NSA and Congress, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC),
+[REDACTED] Because the timeline is limited to documented
+events and communications, it is not all-inclusive.
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+2001
+
+| Date | Event |
+|------------|---------|
+| 4-Oct-01 | 1st Presidential Authorization signed |
+| 4-Oct-01 | General Hayden briefs White House (President, Vice President [VP], VP Counsel, VP Chief of Staff, White House Counsel) |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 25-Oct-01 | NSA briefs Chair and Ranking Member of House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), Chair and Vice Chair of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) |
+| 2-Nov-01 | 2nd Presidential Authorization signed |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 14-Nov-01 | NSA briefs Chair and Ranking Member, HPSCI, Chair and Vice Chair, SSCI |
+| 30-Nov-01 | 3rd Presidential Authorization signed |
+| 4-Dec-01 | NSA briefs Chair, Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, and Ranking Member, Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee |
+| 5 Dec 01 | NSA briefs FBI Director Mueller |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+
+2002
+
+| Date | Event |
+|------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 9-Jan-02 | 4th Presidential Authorization signed |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 11-Jan-02 | NSA briefs Department of Justice, Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (DoJ, OIPR), James Baker |
+| 31-Jan-02 | NSA briefs FISC Presiding Judge Lamberth |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 5-Mar-02 | NSA briefs Chair and Ranking Member, HPSCI, and Vice Chair, SSCI |
+| 14-Mar-02 | 5th Presidential Authorization signed |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+153
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+| Date | Event |
+|------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 10-Apr-02 | NSA briefs Chair SSCI |
+| 18-Apr-02 | 6th Presidential Authorization signed |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 17-May-02 | NSA briefs incumbent FISC Presiding Judge Kollar-Kotelly |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 22-May-02 | 7th Presidential Authorization signed |
+| 12-Jun-02 | NSA briefs Chair, HPSCI, and Ranking Member HPSCI |
+| 24-Jun-02 | 8th Presidential Authorization signed |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 8-Jul-02 | NSA briefs Chair and Ranking Member SSCI |
+| 30-Jul-02 | 9th Presidential Authorization signed |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 12-Aug-02 | NSA briefs FISC Presiding Judge Kollar-Kotelly at the White House |
+| 13-Aug-02 | NSA Inspector General (IG) cleared for the PSP |
+| 10-Sep-02 | 10th Presidential Authorization signed |
+| 11-Sep-02 | NSA GC, Deputy General Counsel (GC), Associate GC for Operations, and IG meet to discuss PSP oversight |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 18-Sep-02 | 1st NSA Due Diligence Meeting |
+| 30-Sep-02 | Chair HPSCI visits NSA for briefing |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 15-Oct-02 | 11th Presidential Authorization signed |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 18-Nov-02 | 12th Presidential Authorization signed |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 16-Dec-02 | NSA IG advises General Hayden to issue "Delegation of Authority Letters" to "units that administer the project" |
+
+2003
+
+| Date | Event |
+|------------|----------------------------------------|
+| 8-Jan-03 | 13th Presidential Authorization signed |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+
+154
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+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+| Date | Event |
+| :--------- | :-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| 13-Jan-03 | FBI Director visits NSA for briefing |
+| 29-Jan-03 | NSA briefs Chair and Ranking Member, HPSCI, Chair and Vice Chair, SSCI |
+| 7-Feb-03 | 14th Presidential Authorization signed |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 4-Mar-03 | General Hayden issues first Delegation of Authority letter to key Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Directorate operational personnel |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 17-Mar-03 | 15th Presidential Authorization signed |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 22-Apr-03 | 16th Presidential Authorization signed |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 11-Jun-03 | 17th Presidential Authorization signed |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 14-Jul-03 | 18th Presidential Authorization signed |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 17-Jul-03 | NSA briefs Chair and Ranking Member, HPSCI, Chair and Vice Chair, SSCI |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 10-Sep-03 | 19th Presidential Authorization signed |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
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+155
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+| Date | Event |
+| :--------- | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| 8-Oct-03 | NSA-FBI-CIA conference at NSA to discuss PSP operations and customer needs |
+| 15-Oct-03 | 20th Presidential Authorization signed |
+| [REDACTED] |
+| 1-Dec-03 | NSA IG announces a review of NSA PSP operations |
+| 8-Dec-03 | NSA IG asks VP Counsel for access to PSP legal opinions and is told that a request should come from General Hayden |
+| 9-Dec-03 | 21st Presidential Authorization signed |
+| 9-Dec-03 | IG memo asks General Hayden to ask VP Counsel's permission for NSA IG and GC to obtain copies of, or view, PSP legal justification |
+| [REDACTED] | |
+
+2004
+
+| Date | Event |
+| :--------- | :-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| 6-Jan-04 | NSA briefing to DoJ Mr. Philbin, Mr. Goldsmith for Mr. Goldsmith's orientation to the PSP and other NSA Signals Intelligence efforts against terrorism |
+| 8-Jan-04 | NSA and FBI [REDACTED] meet to discuss the PSP and recent changes at NSA |
+| 14-Jan-04 | 22nd Presidential Authorization signed |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 9-Mar-04 | General Hayden briefs Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) on value of the PSP |
+| 10-Mar-04 | General Hayden briefs White House Counsel and Chief of Staff, Deputy DCI, Deputy AG, and FBI Director on value of the PSP |
+| 10-Mar-04 | General Hayden briefs Speaker of the House, Senate Majority and Minority leaders, House Minority Leader, Chairman and Ranking Member, HPSCI, and Chair and Vice Chair, SSCI |
+| 10-Mar-04 | General Hayden briefs Secretary of Defense, DoD Principal Deputy GC |
+| 11-Mar-04 | 23rd Presidential Authorization signed |
+| 11-Mar-04 | NSA IG and Acting GC discuss new Authorization signed by President's Counsel rather than the AG |
+| 11-Mar-04 | NSA briefs House Majority Leader |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 12-Mar-04 | General Hayden briefs House Majority Leader |
+| 19-Mar-04 | Revision to 23rd Presidential Authorization signed |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | General Hayden sends letter to Assistant AG. Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) |
+
+156
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+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+| Date | Event |
+| :--------- | :------------------------------------------------------------------ |
+| 2-Apr-04 | 2nd Revision to 23rd Presidential Authorization signed |
+| 4-Apr-04 | General Hayden briefs DoD Principal Deputy GC |
+| 5-May-04 | 24th Presidential Authorization signed |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 20-May-04 | NSA briefs the Minority Leader of the Senate |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 23-Jun-04 | 25th Presidential Authorization signed |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 14-Jul-04 | Initial PR/TT Order approved by FISC |
+| 9-Aug-04 | 26th Presidential Authorization signed |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 23-Aug-04 | General Hayden briefs National Security Advisor and Homeland Security Advisor |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 17-Sep-04 | 27th Presidential Authorization signed |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 23-Sep-04 | Presidential "further direction" of 9 August 2004 expires |
+| 23-Sep-04 | NSA briefs Chair, HPSCI |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 17-Nov-04 | 28th Presidential Authorization signed |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+
+2005
+
+| Date | Event |
+| :-------- | :------------------------------------------------------------------ |
+| 5-Jan-05 | NSA briefs National Security Advisor and White House Counsel |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 11-Jan-05 | 29th Presidential Authorization signed |
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
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+157
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+| Date | Event |
+| :--------- | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 3-Feb-05 | NSA briefs Chair and Ranking Member, HPSCI, Chair and Vice Chair, SSCI |
+| 25-Feb-05 | General Hayden briefs White House Counsel and Counsel to Deputy AG |
+| 1-Mar-05 | 30th Presidential Authorization signed |
+| 2-Mar-05 | NSA briefs Senate Minority Leader |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 19-Apr-05 | 31st Presidential Authorization signed |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 22-Apr-05 | General Hayden briefs Director of National Intelligence (DNI) |
+| 23-May-05 | Two-level PSP clearance structure discontinued |
+| 1-Jun-05 | Discussions to seek FISC orders to authorize content collection begin with DoJ OLC |
+| 14-Jun-05 | 32nd Presidential Authorization signed |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 26-Jul-05 | 33rd Presidential Authorization signed |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 3-Aug-05 | Principal Deputy DNI Hayden briefs new NSA/CSS Director General Alexander on the PSP |
+| 10-Sep-05 | 34th Presidential Authorization signed |
+| 14-Sep-05 | NSA briefs Chair and Ranking Member, HPSCI, Chair and Vice Chair, SSCI |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 26-Oct-05 | 35th Presidential Authorization signed |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 13-Dec-05 | 36th Presidential Authorization signed |
+| 16-Dec-05 | New York Times says that President secretly authorized NSA eavesdropping on Americans |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 20-Dec-05 | DoD IG receives letter, signed by 39 Congressmen, requesting a review of the PSP. DoD IG faxes the letter to the NSA IG on 10 Jan 06 |
+| 21-Dec-05 | NSA briefs DNI |
+
+158
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+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+2006
+
+| Date | Event |
+| :--------- | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| 3-Jan-06 | NSA IG and DoD IG discuss letter from 39 Congressmen requesting DoD IG review of the PSP |
+| 9-Jan-06 | NSA briefs nine FISC judges and three FISC legal advisors |
+| 11-Jan-06 | NSA briefs Speaker of the House, Senate Majority Leader, Chair of HPSCI, Chair and Vice Chair, SSCI |
+| 20-Jan-06 | NSA briefs Senate Minority Leader, House Minority Leader, Chair SSCI, and Ranking Member HPSCI |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 27-Jan-06 | 37th Presidential Authorization signed |
+| 31-Jan-06 | NSA briefs FISC Judge Scullin |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 11-Feb-06 | NSA briefs Chair SSCI |
+| 16-Feb-06 | NSA briefs Speaker of the House and Chair, HPSCI |
+| 28-Feb-06 | NSA briefs Chair and Ranking Member, House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 3-Mar-06 | NSA briefs Vice Chair, SSCI |
+| 9-Mar-06 | NSA briefs Chair and Vice Chair, SSCI, and Members of SSCI Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP) Subcommittee (Roberts, Rockefeller, Hatch, DeWine, Feinstein, Levin, Bond) with SSCI Minority and Majority Staff Directors, Senior Director for Legislative Affairs, National Security Counsel, VP, AG, White House Counsel, and VP Chief of Staff |
+| 10-Mar-06 | NSA briefs Mr. Bond, Member, SSCI TSP Subcommittee |
+| 13-Mar-06 | NSA briefs Chair, SSCI TSP Subcommittee, Members SSCI TSP Subcommittee (Roberts, Feinstein, and Hatch), SSCI Majority and Minority Staff Directors, and SSCI Counsel at NSA |
+| 14-Mar-06 | NSA briefs Mr. DeWine, Member, SSCI TSP Subcommittee at NSA |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 21-Mar-06 | 38th Presidential Authorization signed |
+| 21-Mar-06 | NSA briefs FISC Judge Bates |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 27-Mar-06 | NSA briefs Mr. Levin, Member, SSCI TSP Subcommittee and Minority Staff Director at NSA |
+| 29-Mar-06 | NSA briefs Chairman and Ranking Member HPSCI TSP Subcommittee, TSP Subcommittee Members (Hoekstra, Harman, McHugh, Rogers, Thornberry, Wilson, Davis, Holt, Cramer, Eshoo, and Boswell), Majority General Counsel, Staff Member, and Minority General Counsel |
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
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+159
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+| Date | Event |
+| :--------- | :---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| 7-Apr-06 | NSA briefs Chairman of the HPSCI TSP Subcommittee, HPSCI TSP Subcommittee Members (Hoekstra, McHugh, Rogers, Thornberry, Wilson, and Holt), Majority General Counsel, Staff Member, and Minority General Counsel at NSA |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 28-Apr-06 | NSA briefs Ranking Member, HPSCI TSP Subcommittee, Members of HPSCI TSP Subcommittee (Harman, Wilson, and Eshoo), Majority General Counsel, Staff Member, and Minority General Counsel at NSA |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 11-May-06 | NSA briefs Chair and Ranking Member House Appropriations Committee Defense Subcommittee |
+| 16-May-06 | 39th Presidential Authorization signed |
+| 17-May-06 | Chair SSCI, Members, SSCI (Roberts, Hagel, Mikulski, Snowe, DeWine, Bayh, Chambliss, Lott, Bond, Levin, Feingold, Feinstein, Wyden, Warner), SSCI Staff Member, SSCI Majority Staff Director, and SSCI Counsel |
+| 17-May-06 | HPSCI Chair, HPSCI Members (Hoekstra, Harman, Wilson, Eshoo, Rogers, Thornberry, Holt, Boswell, Cramer, LaHood, Everett, Gallegly, Davis, Tiahrt, Reyes, Ruppersberger, and Tierney), Majority General Counsel, Staff Director, and Minority General Counsel |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 24-May-06 | First Business Records Order approved by the FISC |
+| 5-Jun-06 | NSA briefs Ms. Feingold, SSCI Member at NSA |
+| 7-Jun-06 | NSA briefs Ranking Member, Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, and SSCI Staff Director |
+| 7-Jun-06 | NSA briefs President's Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board |
+| 9-Jun-06 | NSA briefs Chair, SSCI, SSCI Members (Mikulski, Wyden, and Hagel), SSCI Minority Staff Director, SSCI Counsel, and SSCI Staff Director |
+| 15-Jun-06 | NSA briefs Chair, SSCI and SSCI Members (Roberts, Mikulski, Feingold, Bayh, Snowe, Hatch, Lott, and Bond), and Minority Staff Director |
+| 26-Jun-06 | NSA briefs Chair, Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, and House Minority Leader |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 30-Jun-06 | NSA briefs Mr. Bayh, SSCI Member at NSA |
+| 6-Jul-06 | 40th Presidential Authorization signed |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 10-Jul-06 | NSA briefs Ms. Snowe, SSCI Member and SSCI Counsel at NSA |
+| 18-Jul-06 | NSA briefs Mr. Chambliss, SSCI Member at NSA |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 6-Sep-06 | 41st Presidential Authorization signed |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+
+160
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+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+| Date | Event |
+| :--------- | :------------------------------------------------------------------ |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 24-Oct-06 | 42nd Presidential Authorization signed |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 20-Nov-06 | NSA briefs President's Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board |
+| 8-Dec-06 | 43rd and final Presidential Authorization signed |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+
+2007
+
+| Date | Event |
+| :-------- | :-------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| 10-Jan-07 | Content orders approved by the FISC |
+| 17-Jan-07 | AG letter to Congress: Presidential program brought under the FISC |
+| 1-Feb-07 | NSA briefs President's Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board |
+| 1-Feb-07 | Presidential Authorization expires |
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
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+161
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+This page intentionally left blank.
+
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+162
+
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+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPENDIX D
+(U) Cumulative Number of Clearances for the President's Surveillance Program
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
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+163
+
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+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
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+
+This page intentionally left blank.
+
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+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002 TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(U) Cumulative Number of Clearances for the
+President's Surveillance Program⁴
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
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+165
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+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
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+
+This page intentionally left blank.
+
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+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002 TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPENDIX E
+
+(U) NSA Office of the Inspector General Reports on the
+President's Surveillance Program and Related Activities
+
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+
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+
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+
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+
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+
+ST-09-0002 TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(U) NSA Office of the Inspector General Reports on the
+President's Surveillance Program and Related Activities
+
+(TS//SI//NF) This appendix lists and describes OIG investigation and review
+reports of activity conducted under the PSP, also referred to as the STELLARWIND
+Program, and related activities such as the Pen Register Trap and Trace (PR/TT)
+Order and the Business Records Order. These reports are limited to activity
+conducted between 4 October 2001 and 17 January 2007.
+
+(U) OIG Investigations
+
+(U) Report of Investigation of Two Violations
+
+(S//NF) On [REDACTED] the OIG issued a report on
+what it believed to be the first two violations of Authorization,
+both of which were unintentional.
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) The first incident occurred on
+[REDACTED] An
+NSA analyst misguidedly used PSP authority to collect
+communications between [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] These
+communications were foreign within the meaning of the
+Authorization, but they were not terrorist related. [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) The second incident occurred on
+[REDACTED] when NSA inappropriately performed
+contact chaining on [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] This query was requested by an
+FBI official during the investigation of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+(S//NF) NSA OIG found that in neither incident had NSA
+personnel acted with intent to disregard their authority.
+
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+
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+
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+
+Both incidents occurred, at least in part, because early in the
+Program the terms of the Authorization were so closely held
+that few, if any, operational personnel working under the
+Authority were permitted to see the Authorization or its
+operative provisions. It was unreasonable to hold persons
+accountable for violating an order that they had not seen,
+when the order was too complex to be easily committed to
+memory. Accordingly, the OIG did not recommend
+disciplinary action, but did recommend that the NSA Director
+issue formal written delegations of authority to the Signals
+Intelligence Director and specified subordinates so that
+personnel working the Program would know the precise
+terms of the Authorization. Management concurred with the
+recommendations and made appropriate notifications.
+
+(U//FOUO) This report was sent to SSCI on 31 May 2006
+and HPSCI on 2 January 2008.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Violations of Court Orders in [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) On 14 July 2004 [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The Order permitted NSA to
+collect internet metadata under the pen register/trap-and-
+trace provisions of the FISA (§§ 1841-1846). The authority to
+collect Internet metadata under the Order [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Material acquired under the Order
+continued to be protected in PSP channels.
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) On [REDACTED] NSA OIG
+issued a report on an investigation of a management
+breakdown that had resulted in unintentional filtering
+violations of the FISC Order. The Order permitted NSA to
+collect Internet metadata from communications involving
+[REDACTED] The violations occurred because NSA
+[REDACTED] However, no
+violations resulted from the collection of domestic
+communications. An NSA collection manager discovered the
+violations on [REDACTED] The following day, the
+questionable collection was stopped and reported to the OIG
+and the OGC. With the exception of [REDACTED] the OIG
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
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+
+ST-09-0002 TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+found no reason to believe that any violations resulted in the
+collection of U.S. person information. The OIG reserved
+judgment on [REDACTED] The OIG evaluation of responsibility for the incident
+led directly to the replacement of the Program Manager and
+to changes in Program management, leadership, and chain of command.
+
+(U//FOUO) This report was sent to SSCI on 31 May 2006
+and HPSCI on 2 January 2008 and was redacted at the
+request of the White House.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Supplemental Report on Violations of Court
+Orders in [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) A follow-up investigation of the
+questionable [REDACTED] revealed no additional
+violations. On [REDACTED] the NSA OIG issued a
+report detailing its examination of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] that the OIG suspected
+might not have originated or terminated outside the United
+States. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] All but [REDACTED] messages could have been associated
+with a foreign sender or recipient. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] None of the [REDACTED] messages had been intentionally
+collected, none had been analyzed, and none had been
+reported outside NSA.
+
+(U//FOUO) This report was sent to SSCI on 31 May 2006
+and HPSCI on 2 January 2008.
+
+(U) OIG Reviews
+
+14 May 2004 (U) Need for Documentation and Development of Key
+Processes (ST-04-0024)
+
+(TS//SI//NF) This OIG report concluded that a continuing
+deficiency in clear, written procedures governing the
+collection, processing, and dissemination of PSP material
+created undue risk of unintentional violations of the
+Authorization. The report noted that Program officials had
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+171
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002 TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+made progress in addressing some of these deficiencies, but
+found that processes had not been fully documented in the
+form of management directives, administrative policies, or
+operating manuals. The NSA OIG recommended that
+Program officials formally adopt rigorous, written operating
+procedures for the following key processes:
+
+* Approvals for content collection by the appropriate
+named officials
+* Reporting of violations of the Authority, similar to
+procedures for documenting violations of Legal
+Compliance and Minimization Procedures⁵
+* Evaluation of dual FISA and PSP content collection
+* Systematic identification and evaluation of telephone
+numbers and Internet identifiers for detasking.⁶
+
+(U//FOUO) Corrective action was taken in response to the
+four recommendations.
+
+(U//FOUO) This report was sent to SSCI on 31 May 06 and
+HPSCI on 2 January 2008.
+
+13 Sep 2004 (S//NF) Need for Increased Attention to Security-Related
+Aspects of the STELLARWIND Program (ST-04-0025)
+
+(U//FOUO) This OIG report disclosed weaknesses in Program
+security. The Program was particularly vulnerable to
+exposure because it involved numerous organizations inside
+and outside NSA.
+
+(U//FOUO) While the Program Manager placed a strong
+emphasis on personnel security, he did not take a proactive
+and strategic approach to physical and operational security.
+In particular, better use of the Program Security Officer
+would have helped to improve special security practices for
+handling Program material and strengthen operations
+security (OPSEC).
+
+(U//FOUO) The Program Manager and the Associate Director
+for Security and Counterintelligence concurred with the
+findings and implemented corrective measures. In particular,
+
+⁵(U) U.S. Signals Intelligence Directive 18 or "USSID SP0018" (as of 27 July 2003).
+⁶(TS//SI/NF) [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+172
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002 TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+the Staff Security Officer was freed from other responsibilities
+and took a more active and effective role in Program security.
+Management did not conduct a formal OPSEC survey as
+recommended; however, steps taken by management to
+implement OPSEC practices met the intent of the original
+recommendation.
+
+(U//FOUO) This report was sent to SSCI on 31 May 2006
+and HPSCI on 2 January 2008.
+
+21 Nov 2005 (TS//SI//NF) Review of the Tasking Process for
+STELLARWIND U.S. Content Collection (ST-04-0026)
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) This report identified material
+weaknesses in the tasking and detasking process under the
+PSP. The process to task and detask telephone numbers for
+content collection under the Program was inherently fragile
+because it was based on e-mail exchanges and was not
+automated or monitored.
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) The OIG examined [REDACTED] telephone
+numbers and Internet identifiers approved for content
+collection on the date in November 2004 when the audit
+began and identified the following types of errors:
+
+* [REDACTED] involved under-collection; identifiers were
+not put on collection quickly enough or were not put
+on collection until the OIG discovered the errors.
+* [REDACTED] involved unauthorized collection caused by a
+typographical error.
+* [REDACTED] involved over-collection; they were not
+removed from collection quickly enough.
+* [REDACTED] record-keeping errors in the Program's tracking
+database
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) In the [REDACTED] of
+unauthorized collection caused by a typographical error, NSA
+personnel did not review the collected information before
+destroying it, nor did NSA issue any report based on, or
+otherwise disseminate, any information from the
+[REDACTED] of untimely detasking. However, without a
+robust and reliable collection and tracking process, NSA
+increased its risk of unintentionally violating the
+Authorization. NSA also increased the risk of missing
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+173
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002 TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+valuable foreign intelligence by failing to task telephone
+numbers and Internet identifiers in a timely manner.
+
+(U//FOUO) NSA OIG recommended that all errors be swiftly
+resolved, that specific procedures be adopted to prevent
+recurrences, and that identifiers tasked for collection be
+promptly reconciled with identifiers approved for tasking, and
+repeated every 90 days. Management implemented the
+recommendations.
+
+(U//FOUO) This report was sent to SSCI on 31 May 2006
+and HPSCI on 2 January 2008 and was redacted at the
+request of the White House.
+
+31 May 2006 (TS//SI//NF) Review of Compliance with Authorization
+Requirements for STELLARWIND U.S. Content Collection
+(ST-04-0027)
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) This report determined that, based
+on a statistical sample, Program officials were adhering to the
+terms of the Authorization and the Director's delegation
+thereunder; that tasking was appropriately approved and
+duly recorded under the Authorization; and that tasking was
+justified as linked to al-Qa'ida or affiliates of al-Qa'ida. The
+report recommended improvements in record-keeping
+practices.
+
+(S//NF) Due to a lack of sufficient and reliable data, the NSA
+OIG could not reach a conclusion on the tasking approval
+process for two PSP-related collection programs. The OIG
+recommended that management responsible for the affected
+programs, design and implement a tasking and tracking
+process to allow managers to audit, assess timeliness, and
+validate the sequencing of tasking activities. Management
+agreed to install automated tracking of tasking and
+detasking.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Although the collection architecture was
+designed to produce one-end-foreign communications,
+inadvertent collection of domestic communications occurred
+and was addressed. The OIG recommended changes in
+management reporting to improve the tracking and resolution
+of inadvertent collection issues.
+
+(U//FOUO) Corrective action has been completed for one of
+the two recommendations.
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+174
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+ST-09-0002
+
+(U//FOUΘ) This report was sent to SSCI on 31 May 2006
+and HPSCI on 2 January 2008 and was redacted at the
+request of the White House.
+
+11 Jul 2006 (TS//SI//NF) Supplemental Report to Review of Compliance
+with Authorization Requirements for STELLARWIND U.S.
+Content Collection (ST-04-0027.01)
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) After issuing the original report,
+the NSA OIG conducted further research to determine
+whether Program officials were approving content tasking
+requests based solely on metadata analysis. Using the
+statistical sample in the original audit, the OIG found no
+instances of metadata analysis as the sole justification for
+content tasking. In all cases tested, there was corroborating
+evidence to support the tasking decision.
+
+(U//FOUO) This report was sent to SSCI on 13 February
+2007 and HPSCI on 2 January 2008.
+
+5 Sep 2006 (TS//SI//NF) Report on the Assessment of Management
+Controls for Implementing the Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Court Order: Telephony Business Records
+(ST-06-0018)
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) On 24 May 2006, the telephony
+metadata portion of the PSP was transferred to FISC Order
+BR-06-05, In re Application of the Federal Bureau of
+Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tanaible
+Things from [Telecommunications Providers] Relating to [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The Order authorized NSA to collect and
+retain telephony metadata to protect against international
+terrorism and to process and disseminate this data regarding
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS//SI//NF)On 10 July 2006, in a memorandum with the
+subject FISA Court Order: Telephony Business Records (ST-06-
+0018), the NSA OIG issued "a report to the Director of NSA
+45 days after the initiation of the activity (permitted by the
+Order] assessing the adequacy of the management controls
+for the processing and dissemination of U.S. person
+information." This report was issued with the Office of the
+General Counsel's concurrence as mandated by the Order.
+
+(TS//SI//NE) The "Report on the Assessment of Management
+Controls for Implementing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+175
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002 TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+Court Order: Telephony Business Records (ST-06-0018),"
+5 September 2006, provided the details of the findings of the
+10 July memorandum and made formal recommendations to
+management.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Management controls governing the
+processing, dissemination, data security, and oversight of
+telephony metadata and U.S. person information obtained
+under the Order were adequate and in several aspects
+exceeded the terms of the Order. However, due to the risk
+associated with the collection and processing of telephony
+metadata involving U.S. person information, the NSA OIG
+recommended three additional controls regarding collection
+procedures, reconciliation of audit logs, and segregation of
+duties.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Collection Procedures
+
+(TS//SI//NF) During an OIG review of collection procedures.
+Program management discovered that NSA was obtaining [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] data that might not have been in keeping with the
+Order: [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] OGC advised
+that [REDACTED] data should have been suppressed from
+the incoming data flow. Immediately, management blocked
+the data from analysts' view. Further, working with the
+providers, Program management completed suppression of
+the suspect data on 11 October 2006 and agreed to
+implement additional procedures to prevent the collection of
+unauthorized data.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Reconciliation of Audit Logs
+
+(TS//SI//NF) Management controls were not in place to
+verify that telephone numbers approved for querying were the
+only numbers queried. Although audit logs documented the
+queries of the archived metadata, the logs were not in a
+usable format, and Program management did not routinely
+use them to audit telephone numbers queried. Management
+concurred with the recommendation to conduct periodic
+reconciliations; however, action was contingent on the
+approval of a Program management request for two additional
+computer Programmers.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+176
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+ST-09-0002
+
+(C//NF) Lack of Segregation of Duties
+
+(C//NF) The seven individuals with the authority to approve
+queries also had the ability to conduct queries under the
+Order. Standard internal control practices require that key
+duties and responsibilities be divided among different people
+to reduce the risk of error and fraud. Although Program
+management concurred with the finding, it could not
+implement the recommendation due to staffing and
+operational needs. As an alternative, Program management
+agreed to develop a process to monitor independently the
+queries of the seven individuals. This action plan was
+contingent on the development of usable audit logs
+recommended above.
+
+(U//FOUO) Corrective action has been completed for one of
+the three recommendations.
+
+(U//FOUO) This report was sent to SSCI on 13 February
+2007 and HPSCI on 2 January 2008.
+
+20 Dec 2006 (S//NF) Summary of OIG Oversight 2001-2006
+STELLARWIND Program Activities (ST-07-0011)
+
+(S//NF) On 20 December 2006, the OIG issued a report
+summarizing OIG's oversight of the STELLARWIND Program
+after five years of implementation.
+
+(U//FOUO) This report was sent to SSCI on 13 February
+2007 and HPSCI on 2 January 2008 and was redacted at the
+request of the White House.
+
+[REDACTED] (TS//SI//NF) Assessment of Management Controls to
+Implement the FISC Order Authorizing NSA to Collect
+Information Using Pen Register and Trap and Trace
+Devices (ST-06-0020)
+
+(TS//SI//NF) On [REDACTED] the OIG reported that the
+management controls governing the collection,
+dissemination, and data security of electronic
+communications metadata and U.S. person information
+obtained under the FISC Order authorizing NSA to collect
+Internet metadata using PR/TT devices were adequate and in
+several aspects exceeded the terms of the Order. Due to the
+risk associated with the processing of electronic
+communications metadata involving U.S. person information,
+additional controls were needed for processing and
+monitoring queries made against PR/TT data, documenting [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+177
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002 TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+oversight activities, and providing annual refresher training
+on the terms of the Order.
+
+(U//FOUO) Corrective action has been completed for two of
+the six recommendations.
+
+(U//FOUO) This report was sent to SSCI on [REDACTED]
+and HPSCI on [REDACTED]
+
+5 Jul 2007 (TS//SI//NF) Domestic Selector Tasking Justification Review
+(ST-07-0017)
+
+(U//FOUO) The OIG conducted this review to determine
+whether tasking justification statements were supported with
+intelligence information consistent with sources cited in the
+justifications. The OIG identified some justifications
+containing errors, but there was no pattern of errors or
+exaggeration of facts or intentional misstatements.
+
+(U//FOUΘ) This report was sent to SSCI on 28 January 2008
+and HPSCI on 28 January 2008.
+
+30 June 2008 (TS//SI//NF) Advisory Report on the Adequacy of
+STELLARWIND Decompartmentation Plans (ST-08-0018)
+
+(TS//SI//NF) At the request of the SID Program Manager for
+CT Special Projects, the OIG assessed the adequacy of NSA's
+plans to remove data from the STELLARWIND compartment,
+as authorized by the Director of National Intelligence. On
+30 June 2008, the OIG reported that NSA management had a
+solid foundation of planning for decompartmentation. In
+particular, the content, communication, and assignment of
+supporting plans were adequate to provide reasonable
+assurance of successfully removing data from the
+STELLARWIND compartment, while complying with laws and
+authorities. Management also was diligent in assessing the
+scope and complexity of this undertaking. Although the OIG
+made no formal recommendations, it suggested
+improvements to develop more detailed plans, set firm
+milestones, and establish a feedback system to ensure that
+plans were successfully implemented.
+
+(U//FOUO) This report was not sent to SSCI or HPSCI.
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+178
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+ST-09-0002
+
+APPENDIX F
+
+(U) Presidential Notifications
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+179
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002 TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+This page intentionally left blank.
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+180
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002
+
+(U) Presidential Notifications
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) Executive Orders 12333 and 12863 require intelligence
+agencies to report to the President, through the President's Intelligence Oversight
+Board, activities they have reason to believe may be unlawful or contrary to
+executive order or presidential directive. Knowing that Board members were not
+cleared, however, the NSA Director or Deputy Director reported the following
+violations of the Presidential Authorization and related authorities to the President
+through his Counsel, rather than through the Board. Each notification was
+approved if not actually drafted by OIG. Some of the notifications were not the
+subject of the OIG reviews or investigations discussed in Appendix E.
+
+
+| (U) Date | (U) Summary of Notification |
+| ---------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| [REDACTED] | (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) Describes violations regarding (1) the [REDACTED] and (2) [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) Describes a delay of about 90 days in detasking a telephone number [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | (TS//SI//NF) Describes the investigation mentioned above regarding metadata collection violations that occurred under FISA Court Order In Re [REDACTED] FISA Court [REDACTED] The complete OIG report was issued [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | (TS//SI//NF) Describes [REDACTED] instances in which cleared NSA analysts mistakenly accessed data [REDACTED] In one instance, a report based on such data went out, but it was not cancelled because the same information was available elsewhere. In the other [REDACTED] instances, no reports were issued. [REDACTED] |
+
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+181
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002 TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+| (U) Date | (U) Summary of Notification |
+| ------------------------------------ | --------------------------- |
+| | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) Describes one instance of inadvertent collection of a call with both ends in the U.S. - a fact that could not have been known until it was listened to because [REDACTED] showed the call as having a foreign origin. [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | (TS//SI//NF) Describes three incidents: The first involved a one-digit typo resulting in one incorrectly tasked number. The second involved a number improperly tasked for metadata analysis. The operator discovered it almost immediately and promptly removed it from tasking. The third involved [REDACTED] numbers that were not detasked in a timely fashion. |
+| 2 Aug 2005 [REDACTED] | (TS//SI//NF) Describes the evolving [REDACTED] a practice that may have resulted in over-collection. The notification refers to NSA's work in developing more rigorous [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) Describes an incident in which bulk telephony metadata was actively collected in spite [REDACTED] At that time NSA limited collection of bulk telephone records to [REDACTED] as permitted by statute. The collection resulted when [REDACTED] The error was not discovered for 18 months. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) Although most of the metadata improperly collected was also properly acquired [REDACTED] pursuant to statute, the dataflow was terminated immediately upon discovery. Also, because the improperly collected metadata had been forwarded to non-STELLARWIND databases, the Agency removed non-compliant metadata from all affected databases, including those in which |
+| STELLARWIND data is normally stored. |
+
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+182
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+ST-09-0002
+
+| (U) Date | (U) Summary of Notification |
+| ---------- | ------------------------------------- |
+| [REDACTED] | (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) Describes [REDACTED] instances in which authorized targeting of properly tasked [REDACTED] telephone numbers resulted in inadvertent collection of U.S.-to-US calls In each case [REDACTED] No reporting was generated, and collection was deleted. |
+| [REDACTED] | (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) Describes an incident in which an [REDACTED] This resulted [REDACTED] of non-target data. The error was discovered within hours, when personnel responsible for monitoring [REDACTED] The error was corrected, and all inadvertently collected records were deleted. |
+| [REDACTED] | (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) Describes [REDACTED] instances in which authorized targeting of properly tasked [REDACTED] telephone numbers resulted in inadvertent collection of U.S.-to-U.S. calls. In each case, [REDACTED] No reporting was generated, and collection was deleted. |
+| [REDACTED] | (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) Describes [REDACTED] instances in which authorized targeting of properly tasked [REDACTED] telephone numbers resulted in inadvertent collection of U.S.-to-U.S. calls. In each case, [REDACTED] No reporting was generated, and collection was deleted. |
+| [REDACTED] | (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) Describes an instance where a [REDACTED] Although no reports were generated, and there was no evidence that U.S.-to-U.S. communications were collected, we could not certify that the files were all one-end foreign without reviewing [REDACTED] The [REDACTED] files were deleted, and procedures used by [REDACTED] were being reviewed. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NE) A second incident was reported in which a typographical error resulted in contact chaining on a U.S. telephone number with no [REDACTED] affiliation. The telephone number was rechecked, and the error was corrected. |
+
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+183
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+This page intentionally left blank.
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+184
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN ST-09-0002
+
+APPENDIX G
+
+(U) United States Signals Intelligence Directive
+SP0018, Legal Compliance and Minimization
+Procedures
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+185
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+ST-09-0002
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+This page intentionally left blank.
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+186
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+SECRET
+AUTHORIZED REPRODUCTION NUMBER R0043
+
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
+Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
+
+UNITED STATES
+SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE
+DIRECTIVE
+
+18
+
+27 July 1993
+
+INCLUDES CHANGES 1 and 2
+
+See Letter of Promulgation for instructions on reproduction or release of this document.
+
+OPC: D2
+CLASSIFIED BY NSA/CSSM 123-2
+DECLASSIFY ON: ORIGINATING AGENCY'S DETERMINATION REQUIRED
+
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+187
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+This page intentionally left blank.
+
+188
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+SECRET
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
+Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
+
+27 July 1993
+
+UNITED STATES SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE
+(USSID)
+18
+
+LEGAL COMPLIANCE AND MINIMIZATION
+PROCEDURES (FOUO)
+
+LETTER OF PROMULGATION
+
+(U) This USSID prescribes policies and procedures and assigns responsibilities to ensure that the
+missions and functions of the United States SIGINT System (USSS) are conducted in a manner that
+safeguards the constitutional rights of U.S. persons.
+
+(U) This USSID has been completely rewritten to make it shorter and easier to understand. It
+constitutes a summary of the laws and regulations directly affecting USSS operations. All USSS personnel
+who collect, process, retain, or disseminate information to, from, or about U.S. persons or persons in the
+United States must be familiar with its contents.
+
+(FOUO) This USSID supersedes USSID 18, and USSID 18, Annex A (distributed separately to
+selected recipients), both of which are dated 20 October 1980, and must now be destroyed. Notify
+DIRNSA/CHCSS (USSID Manager) if this edition of USSID 18 is destroyed because of an emergency action;
+otherwise, request approval from DIRNSA/CHCSS before destroying this USSID.
+
+(FOUO) Release or exposure of this document to contractors and consultants without approval from
+the USSID Manager is prohibited. Instructions applicable to release or exposure of USSID to contractors and
+consultants may be found in USSID 19.
+
+(FOUO) Questions and comments concerning this USSID should be addressed to the Office of the
+General Counsel, NSA/CSS, NSTS 963-3121 on [REDACTED]
+
+J.M.MCCONNELL
+Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
+Director
+
+CLASSIFIED BY NSA/CSSM 123-2
+DECLASSIFY ON: ORIGINATING AGENCY'S DETERMINATION REQUIRED
+
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+189
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+
+This page intentionally left blank.
+
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+
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+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+
+CHANGE REGISTER
+
+CHANGE ENTERED
+
+No | Date | Authority (Msg Cite/DTG, Hard Copy (HC)) | Date | By
+---|----------|----------------------------------------------------------------|----------|---
+1 | 28OCT97 | HARDCOPY CHANGE | 29OCT97 | RS
+2 | 11Dec98 | P0211-0307-98, 111800Z Dec 98 | 11Dec98 | WF
+2 | 11Dec98 | P0211-0309-98, 111840Z Dec 98 (correction to above) | 11Dec98 | WF
+
+FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+ii
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+191
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+This page intentionally left blank.
+
+192
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+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+SECRET
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+
+TABLE OF CONTENTS
+
+SECTION 1 – PREFACE ..................................................................... 1
+SECTION 2 – REFERENCES ................................................................. 1
+SECTION 3 – POLICY ..................................................................... 2
+SECTION 4 – COLLECTION ................................................................. 2
+ 4.1. Communications to, from or About U.S. Persons and [REDACTED] ................... 2
+ a. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Approval .......................... 2
+ b. Attorney General Approval ............................................. 2
+ c. DIRNSA/CHCSS Approval ................................................. 2
+ d. Emergency Situations .................................................. 3
+ e. Annual Reports ........................................................ 4
+ 4.2. [REDACTED] ....................................................................... 4
+ 4.3. Incidental Acquisition of U.S. Person Information ............................. 4
+ 4.4. Nonresident Alien Targets Entering the United States .......................... 5
+ 4.5. U.S. Person Targets Entering the United States ................................ 5
+ 4.6. Requests to Target U.S. Persons ............................................. 5
+ 4.7. Direction Finding ........................................................... 5
+ 4.8. Distress Signals ............................................................ 5
+ 4.9. COMSEC Monitoring and Security Testing of Automated Information Systems ..... 6
+SECTION 5 – PROCESSING ................................................................. 6
+ 5.1. Use of Selection Terms During Processing ...................................... 6
+ 5.2. Annual Review by DDO ........................................................ 6
+ 5.3. Forwarding of Intercepted Material .......................................... 6
+ 5.4. Nonforeign Communications ................................................... 7
+ a. Communications between Persons in the United States ..................... 7
+ b. Communications between U.S. Persons ................................... 7
+ c. Communications Involving an Officer or Employee
+ of the U.S. Government .............................................. 7
+ d. Exceptions ............................................................ 7
+
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+193
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORGON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+27 July 1993
+
+5.5. Radio Communications with a Terminal in the United States..........7
+SECTION 6 - RETENTION........................8
+6.1. Retention of Communications to, from, or About U.S. Persons.......8
+ a. Unenciphered Communications; and Communications Necessary
+ to Maintain Technical Data Bases for Cryptanalytic or
+ Traffic Analytic Purposes..........................8
+ b. Communications Which Could be Disseminated Under Section 7 .........8
+6.2. Access...................................................8
+SECTION 7 - DISSEMINATION..............................................8
+7.1. Focus of SIGINT Reports................................................8
+7.2. Dissemination of U.S. Person Identities..................................9
+ a. Consent......................................9
+ b. Publicly Available Information.................9
+ c. Information Necessary to Understand or Access.................9
+7.3. Approval Authorities..................................10
+ a. DIRNSA/CHCSS..................................10
+ b. Field Units..................................10
+ c. DDO and Designees..................................10
+7.4. Privileged Communications and Criminal Activity.................10
+7.5. Improper Dissemination..................................10
+SECTION 8 - RESPONSIBILITIES..................................11
+8.1. Inspector General..................................11
+8.2. General Counsel..................................11
+8.3. Deputy Director for Operations..................................12
+8.4. All Elements of the USSS..................................12
+SECTION 9 - DEFINITIONS.........................12
+ANNEX A - PROCEDURES IMPLEMENTING THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
+SURVEILLANCE ACT (U)...................................................A/1
+APPENDIX 1 - STANDARDIZED MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES FOR
+NSA ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES..................................A-1/1
+
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+iv
+
+194
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+SECRET
+
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+
+ANNEX B - OPERATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO THE FEDERAL BUREAU
+OF INVESTIGATION (U)..................................B/1
+ANNEX C - SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO U.S. AND ALLIED MILITARY
+EXERCISE COMMAND AUTHORITIES (U)..................................C/1
+ANNEX D - TESTING OF ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT (U)...................D/1
+ANNEX E - SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS (U).................E/1
+ANNEX F - ILLICIT COMMUNICATIONS (6).................F/1
+ANNEX G - TRAINING OF PERSONNEL IN THE OPERATION AND USE OF SIGINT
+COLLECTION AND OTHER SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT (U).................G/1
+ANNEX H - CONSENT FORMS (U).................H/1
+ANNEX I - FORM FOR CERTIFICATION OF OPENLY-ACKNOWLEDGED ENTITIES (S-CCO).................I/1
+ANNEX J - PROCEDURES FOR MONITORING RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF
+SUSPECTED INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS (S-CCO)
+(Issued separately to selected recipients).................J/1
+ANNEX K - [REDACTED].................K/1
+
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+
+SECRET
+
+194
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORGON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+
+SECRET
+
+This page intentionally left blank.
+
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+
+196
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORGON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+SECRET
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+
+LEGAL COMPLIANCE AND MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES (U)
+
+SECTION 1 - PREFACE
+
+1.1. (U) The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects all U.S. persons anywhere
+in the world and all persons within the United States from unreasonable searches and seizures by any person
+or agency acting on behalf of the U.S. Government. The Supreme Court has ruled that the interception of
+electronic communications is a search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. It is
+therefore mandatory that signals intelligence (SIGINT) operations be conducted pursuant to procedures
+which meet the reasonableness requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
+
+1.2. (U) In determining whether United States SIGINT System (USSS) operations are "reasonable,"
+it is necessary to balance the U.S. Government's need for foreign intelligence information and the privacy
+interests of persons protected by the Fourth Amendment. Striking that balance has consumed much time
+and effort by all branches of the United States Government. The results of that effort are reflected in the
+references listed in Section 2 below. Together, these references require the minimization of U.S. person
+information collected, processed, retained or disseminated by the USSS. The purpose of this document is
+to implement these minimization requirements.
+
+1.3. (U) Several themes run throughout this USSID. The most important is that intelligence operations
+and the protection of constitutional rights are not incompatible. It is not necessary to deny legitimate foreign
+intelligence collection or suppress legitimate foreign intelligence information to protect the Fourth Amendment
+rights of U.S. persons.
+
+1.4. (U) Finally, these minimization procedures implement the constitutional principle of
+"reasonableness" by giving different categories of individuals and entities different levels of protection. These
+levels range from the stringent protection accorded U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens in the United
+States to provisions relating to foreign diplomats in the U.S. These differences reflect yet another main theme
+of these procedures, that is, that the focus of all foreign intelligence operations is on foreign entities and
+persons.
+
+SECTION 2 - REFERENCES
+
+2.1. (U) References
+a. 50 U.S.C. 1801, et seq.. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, Public Law
+No. 95-511.
+b. Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," dated 4 December 1931.
+
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+1
+197
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+
+c. DoD Directive 5240.1, "Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect U.S. Persons,"
+dated 25 April 1988.
+
+d. NSA/CSS Directive No. 10-30, "Procedures Governing Activities of NSA/CSS that Affect
+U.S. Persons," dated 20 September 1990.
+
+## SECTION 3 - POLICY
+
+3.1. (U) The policy of the USSS is to TARGET or COLLECT only FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS.
+The USSS will not intentionally COLLECT communications to, from or about U.S. PERSONS or persons or
+entities in the U.S. except as set forth in this USSID. If the USSS Inadvertently COLLECTS such
+communications, it will process, retain and disseminate them only in accordance with this USSID.
+
+SECTION 4 - COLLECTION
+
+4.1. (S-CCO) Communications which are known to be to, from or about a U.S. PERSON [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] will not be intentionally intercepted, or selected through the use
+of a SELECTION TERM, except in the following instances:
+
+a. With the approval of the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court under the
+conditions outlined in Annex A of this USSID.
+
+b. With the approval of the Attorney General of the United States, if:
+
+(1) The COLLECTION is directed against the following:
+
+(a) Communications to or from U.S. PERSONS outside the UNITED STATES, or
+
+(b) International communications to, from, [REDACTED], or
+
+(c) Communications which are not to or from but merely about U.S. PERSONS
+(wherever located).
+
+(2) The person is an AGENT OF A FOREIGN POWER, and
+
+(3) The purpose of the COLLECTION is to acquire significant FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
+information.
+
+c. With the approval of the Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service
+(DIRNSA/CHCSS), so long as the COLLECTION need not be approved by the Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Court or the Attorney General, and
+
+(1) The person has CONSENTED to the COLLECTION by executing one of the
+CONSENT forms contained in Annex H, or
+
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+
+2
+198
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+SECRET
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+
+* Capitalized words in Sections 3 through 9 are defined terms in Section 9.
+
+(2) The person is reasonably believed to be held captive by a FOREIGN POWER or group
+engaged in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, or
+
+(3) The TARGETED [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] and the DIRNSA/CHCSS has approved the COLLECTION in accordance with Annex
+1, or
+
+(4) The COLLECTION is directed against [REDACTED] between a U.S.
+PERSON in the UNITED STATES and a foreign entity outside the UNITED STATES, the TARGET is the
+foreign entity, and the DIRNSA/CHCSS has approved the COLLECTION in accordance with Annex K, or
+
+(5) Technical devices (e.g. [REDACTED]) are employed to
+limit acquisition by the USSS to communications to or from the TARGET or to specific forms of
+communications used by the TARGET (e.g. [REDACTED]) and
+the COLLECTION is directed against [REDACTED] voice and facsimile
+communications with one COMMUNICANT in the UNITED STATES, and the TARGET of the COLLECTION
+is [REDACTED]:
+
+(a) A non-U.S. PERSON located outside the UNITED STATES [REDACTED]
+
+(b) [REDACTED]
+
+(6) Copies of approvals granted by the DIRNSA/CHCSS under these provisions will be
+retained in the Office of General Counsel for review by the Attorney General.
+
+d. Emergency Situations.
+
+(1) In emergency situations, DIRNSA/CHCSS may authorize the COLLECTION of
+information to, from, or about a U.S. PERSON who is outside the UNITED STATES when securing the prior
+approval of the Attorney General is not practical because:
+
+(a) The time required to obtain such approval would result in the loss of significant
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE and would cause substantial harm to the national security.
+
+(b) A person's life or physical safety is reasonably believed to be in immediate
+danger.
+
+(c) The physical security of a defense installation or government property is
+reasonably believed to be in immediate danger.
+
+(2) In those cases where the DIRNSA/CHCSS authorizes emergency COLLECTION,
+except for actions taken under paragraph d.(1)(b) above. DIRNSA/CHCSS shall find that there is probable
+cause that the TARGET meets one of the following criteria:
+
+(a) A person who, for or on behalf of a FOREIGN POWER, is engaged in clandestine
+intelligence activities (Including covert activities intended to affect the political or governmental process).
+
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+
+3
+199
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+
+sabotage, or INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST activities, or activities in preparation for INTERNATIONAL
+TERRORIST activities; or who conspires with, or knowingly aids and abets a person engaging in such
+activities.
+
+(b) A person who is an officer or employee of a FOREIGN POWER.
+
+(c) A person unlawfully acting for, or pursuant to the direction of, a FOREIGN
+POWER. The mere fact that a person's activities may benefit or further the aims of a FOREIGN POWER is
+not enough to bring that person under this subsection, absent evidence that the person is taking direction
+from, or acting in knowing concert with, the FOREIGN POWER.
+
+(d) A CORPORATION or other entity that is owned or controlled directly or indirectly
+by a FOREIGN POWER.
+
+(e) A person in contact with, or acting in collaboration with, an intelligence or security
+service of a foreign power for the purpose of providing access to information or material classified by the
+United States to which such person has access.
+
+(3) In all cases where emergency collection is authorized, the following steps shall be
+taken;
+
+(a) The General Counsel will be notified immediately that the COLLECTION has
+started.
+
+(b) The General Counsel will initiate Immediate efforts to obtain Attorney General
+approval to continue the collection If Attorney General approval is not obtained within seventy two hours, the
+COLLECTION will be terminated. If the Attorney General approves the COLLECTION, it may continue for
+the period specified in the approval.
+
+e. Annual reports to the Attorney General are required for COLLECTION conducted under
+paragraphs 4.1.c.(3) and (4). Responsible analytic offices will provide such reports through the Deputy
+Director for Operations (DDO) and the General Counsel to the DIRNSA/CHCSS for transmittal to the Attorney
+General by 31 January of each year.
+
+4.2. (S-CCO) [REDACTED]
+
+a. [REDACTED]
+
+b. [REDACTED]
+
+4.3. (U) Incidental Acquisition of U.S. PERSON Information. Information to, from or about U.S.
+PERSONS acquired incidentally as a result of COLLECTION directed against appropriate FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE TARGETS may be retained and processed in accordance with Section 5 and Section 3 of
+this USSID.
+
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+
+4
+200
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+SECRET
+
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+
+4.4. (S-CCO) Nonresident Alien TARGETS Entering the UNITED STATES.
+
+a. If the communications of a nonresident alien located abroad are being TARGETED and the
+USSS learns that the individual has entered the UNITED STATES, COLLECTION may continue for a period
+of 72 hours provided that the DIRNSA/CHCSS is advised immediately and:
+
+(1) Immediate efforts are initiated to obtain Attorney General approval, or
+
+(2) A determination is made within the 72 hour period that the [REDACTED]
+
+b. If Attorney General approval is obtained, the COLLECTION may continue for the length of
+time specified in the approval.
+
+c. If it is determined that [REDACTED] COLLECTION may continue
+at the discretion of the operational element.
+
+d. If [REDACTED] or if Attorney General approval is not obtained within 72
+hours, COLLECTION must be terminated [REDACTED] Attorney General approval is
+obtained, or the individual leaves the UNITED STATES.
+
+4.5. (C-CCO) U.S. PERSON TARGETS Entering the UNITED STATES.
+
+a. If communications to, from or about a U.S. PERSON located outside the UNITED STATES
+are being COLLECTED under Attorney General approval described in Section 4.1.b. above, the
+COLLECTION must stop when the USSS learns that the individual has entered the UNITED STATES.
+
+b. While the individual is in the UNITED STATES, COLLECTION may be resumed only with the
+approval of the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court as described in Annex A.
+
+4.6. (S-CCO) Requests to TARGET U.S. PERSONS. All proposals for COLLECTION against U.S.
+PERSONS, [REDACTED] must be submitted through
+the DDO and the General Counsel to the DIRNSA/CHCSS for review.
+
+4.7. (S-CCO) Direction Finding. Use of direction finding solely to determine the location of a
+transmitter located outside of the UNITED STATES does not constitute ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE or
+COLLECTION even if directed at transmitters believed to be used by U.S. PERSONS. Unless COLLECTION
+of the communications is otherwise authorized under these procedures, the contents of communications to
+which a U.S. PERSON is a party monitored in the course of direction finding may only be used to identify the
+transmitter.
+
+4.8. (U) Distress Signals. Distress signals may be intentionally collected, processed, retained, and
+disseminated without regard to the restrictions contained in this USSID.
+
+4.9. (U) COMSEC Monitoring and Security Testing of Automated Information Systems. Monitoring
+for communications security purposes must be conducted with the consent of the person being monitored
+and in accordance with the procedures established in National Telecommunications and Information Systems
+Security Directive 600, Communications Security (COMSEC) Monitoring, dated 10 April 1990. Monitoring for
+
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+5
+
+201
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+
+communications security purposes is not governed by this USSID. Intrusive security testing to assess
+security vulnerabilities in automated information systems likewise is not governed by this USSID.
+
+SECTION 5 - PROCESSING
+
+5.1. (S-CCO) Use of Selection Terms During Processing.
+When a SELECTION TERM is intended to INTERCEPT a communication on the basis of the content of the
+communication, or because a communication is enciphered, rather than on the basis of the Identity of the
+COMMUNICANT or the fact that the communication mentions a particular individual, the following rules apply:
+
+a. No SELECTION TERM that is reasonably likely to result in the INTERCEPTION of
+communications to or from a U.S. PERSON (wherever located) [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] may be used unless there is reason to believe that FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE will be obtained by use of such SELECTION TERM.
+
+b. No SELECTION TERM that has resulted in the INTERCEPTION of a significant number of
+communications to or from such persons or entities may be used unless there is reason to believe that
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE will be obtained.
+
+c. SELECTION TERMS that have resulted or are reasonably likely to result in the
+INTERCEPTION of communications to or from such persons or entities shall be designed to defeat to the
+greatest extent practicable under the circumstances, the INTERCEPTION of those communications which
+do not contain FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE.
+
+5.2. (S-CCO) Annual Review by DDO.
+
+a. All SELECTION TERMS that are reasonably likely to result in the INTERCEPTION of
+communications to or from a U.S. PERSON or terms that have resulted in the INTERCEPTION of a significant
+number of such communications shall be reviewed annually by the DDO or a designee.
+
+b. The purpose of the review shall be to determine whether there is reason to believe that
+FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE will be obtained, or will continue to be obtained, by the use of these SELECTION
+TERMS.
+
+c. A copy of the results of the review will be provided to the Inspector General and the General
+Counsel.
+
+5.3. (S-CCO) Forwarding of Intercepted Material. FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS collected by the
+USSS may be forwarded as intercepted to NSA, intermediate processing facilities, and collaborating centers.
+
+5.4. (S-CCO) Nonforeign Communications.
+
+a. Communications between persons in the UNITED STATES. Private radio communications
+solely between persons in the UNITED STATES inadvertently intercepted during the COLLECTION of
+FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS will be promptly destroyed unless the Attorney General determines that the
+contents indicate a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any person.
+
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+6
+
+202
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+SECRET
+
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+
+b. Communications between U.S. PERSONS. Communications solely between U.S.
+PERSONS will be treated as follows:
+
+(1) Communications solely between U.S. PERSONS inadvertently intercepted during the
+COLLECTION of FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS will be destroyed upon recognition, if technically possible,
+except as provided in paragraph 5.4.d. below.
+
+(2) Notwithstanding the preceding provision, cryptologic data (e.g., signal and
+encipherment information) and technical communications data (e.g., circuit usage) may be extracted and
+retained from those communications if necessary to:
+
+(a) Establish or maintain intercept, or
+
+(b) Minimize unwanted Intercept, or
+
+(c) Support cryptologic operations related to FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS.
+
+c. Communications Involving an Officer or Employee of the U.S. Government.
+Communications to or from any officer or employee of the U.S. Government, or any state or local government,
+will not be intentionally intercepted. Inadvertent INTERCEPTIONS of such communications (including those
+between foreign TARGETS and U.S. officials) will be treated as Indicated in paragraphs 5.4.a. and b., above.
+
+d. Exceptions: Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 5.4.b. and c., the
+DIRNSA/CHCSS may waive the destruction requirement for international communications containing, inter
+alia, the following types of information:
+
+(1) Significant FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE, or
+
+(2) Evidence of a crime or threat of death or serious bodily harm to any person, or
+
+(3) Anomalies that reveal a potential vulnerability to U.S. communications security.
+Communications for which the Attorney General or DIRNSA/CHCSS's waiver is sought should be forwarded
+to NSA/CSS, Attn: P02.
+
+5.5. (S-CCO) Radio Communications with a Terminal in the UNITED STATES.
+
+a. All radio communications that pass over channels with a terminal in the UNITED STATES
+must be processed through a computer scan dictionary or similar device unless those communications occur
+over channels used exclusively by a FOREIGN POWER.
+
+b. International communications that pass over channels with a terminal
+in the UNITED STATES [REDACTED] communications, may be processed
+without the use of a computer scan dictionary or similar device if necessary to determine whether a channel
+contains communications of FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE interest which NSA may wish to collect. Such
+processing may not exceed two hours without the specific prior written approval of the DDO and, in any event.
+shall be limited to the minimum amount of time necessary to determine the nature of communications on the
+channel and the amount of such communications that include FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE. Once it is
+determined that the channel contains sufficient communications of FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE interest to
+
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+7
+
+203
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORGON/NOFORN
+APPROVED PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+
+warrant COLLECTION and exploitation to produce FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE, a computer scan dictionary
+or similar device must be used for additional processing.
+
+c. Copies of all DDO written approvals made pursuant to 5.5.b. must be provided to the General
+Counsel and the Inspector General.
+
+SECTION 6 - RETENTION
+
+6.1. (S-GGO) Retention of Communications to, from or About U.S. PERSONS.
+
+a. Except as otherwise provided in Annex A, Appendix 1, Section 4, communications to, from
+or about U.S. PERSONS that are intercepted by the USSS may be retained in their original or transcribed
+form only as follows:
+
+(1) Unenciphered communications not thought to contain secret meaning may be retained
+for five years unless the DDO determines in writing that retention for a longer period is required to respond
+to authorized FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE requirements.
+
+(2) Communications necessary to maintain technical data bases for cryptanalytic or traffic
+analytic purposes may be retained for a period sufficient to allow a thorough exploitation and to permit access
+to data that are, or are reasonably believed likely to become, relevant to a current or future FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE requirement. Sufficient duration may vary with the nature of the exploitation and may consist
+of any period of time during which the technical data base is subject to, or of use in, cryptanalysis. If a U.S.
+PERSON'S identity is not necessary to maintaining technical data bases, it should be deleted or replaced by
+a generic term when practicable.
+
+b. Communications which could be disseminated under Section 7, below (i.e., without
+elimination of references to U.S. PERSONS) may be retained in their original or transcribed form,
+
+6.2. (5.000) Access. Access to raw traffic storage systems which contain Identities of U.S.
+PERSONS must be limited to SIGINT production personnel.
+
+SECTION 7 - DISSEMINATION
+
+7.1. (0-CCO) Focus of SIGINT Reports. All SIGINT reports will be written so as to focus solely on
+the activities of foreign entities and persons and their agents. Except as provided in Section 7.2., FOREIGN
+INTELLIGENCE information concerning U.S. PERSONS must be disseminated in a manner which does not
+identify the U.S. PERSON. Generic or general terms or phrases must be substituted for the identity (e.g.,
+"U.S. firm" for the specific name of a U.S. CORPORATION or "U.S. PERSON" for the specific name of a U.S.
+PERSON). Files containing the identities of U.S. persons deleted from SIGINT reports will be maintained for
+a maximum period of one year and any requests from SIGINT customers for such identities should be referred
+to P02.
+
+7.2. (G-GCO) Dissemination of U.S. PERSON Identities. SIGINT reports may include the
+identification of a U.S. PERSON only if one of the following conditions is met and a determination is made
+
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+9
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+SECRET
+
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+
+by the appropriate approval authority that the recipient has a need for the identity for the performance of his
+official duties:
+
+a. The U.S. PERSON has CONSENTED to the dissemination of communications of, or about,
+him or her and has executed the CONSENT form found in Annex H of this USSID, or
+
+b. The information is PUBLICLY AVAILABLE (i.e., the information is derived from unclassified
+> information available to the general public), or
+
+c. The identity of the U.S. PERSON is necessary to understand the FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
+information or assess its importance. The following nonexclusive list contains examples of the type of
+information that meet this standard:
+
+(1) FOREIGN POWER or AGENT OF A FOREIGN POWER. The information indicates
+that the U.S. PERSON is a FOREIGN POWER or an AGENT OF A FOREIGN POWER.
+
+(2) Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information. The Information indicates that the
+U.S. PERSON may be engaged in the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
+
+(3) International Narcotics Activity. The Information Indicates that the individual may be
+engaged in international narcotics trafficking activities. (See Annex J of this USSID for further Information
+concerning Individuals involved in international narcotics trafficking).
+
+(4) Criminal Activity. The information is evidence that the individual may be involved in a
+crime that has been, is being, or is about to be committed, provided that the dissemination is for law
+enforcement purposes.
+
+(5) Intelligence TARGET. The information indicates that the U.S. PERSON may be the
+TARGET of hostile intelligence activities of a FOREIGN POWER.
+
+(6) Threat to Safety. The information indicates that the identity of the U.S. PERSON is
+pertinent to a possible threat to the safety of any person or organization, including those who are TARGETS,
+victims or hostages of INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST organizations. Reporting units shall identify to P02
+any report containing the identity of a U.S. PERSON reported under this subsection (6). Field reporting to
+P02 should be in the form of a CRITICOMM message (DDI XAO) and include the report date-time-group
+(DTG), product serial number and the reason for inclusion of the U.S. PERSON'S identity.
+
+(7) Senior Executive Branch Officials. The identity is that of a senior official of the Executive
+Branch of the U.S. Government. In this case only the official's title will be disseminated. Domestic political
+or personal information on such individuals will be neither disseminated nor retained.
+
+7.3. (U-000) Approval Authorities. Approval authorities for the release of identities of U.S. persons
+under Section 7 are as follows:
+
+a. DIRNSA/CHCSS. DIRNSA/CHCSS must approve dissemination of:
+
+(1) The identities of any senator, congressman, officer, or employee of the Legislative
+Branch of the U.S. Government.
+
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+9
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+
+(2) The identity of any person for law enforcement purposes.
+
+b. Field Units and NSA Headquarters Elements. All SIGINT production organizations are
+authorized to disseminate the identities of U.S. PERSONS when:
+
+(1) The identity is pertinent to the safety of any person or organization.
+
+(2) The Identity is that of a senior official of the Executive Branch.
+
+(3) The U.S. PERSON has CONSENTED under paragraph 7.2.a. above.
+
+c. DDO and Designees.
+
+(1) In all other cases, U.S. PERSON identities may be released only with the prior approval
+of the Deputy Director for Operations, the Assistant Deputy Director for Operations, the Chief, P02, the
+Deputy Chief, P02, or, in their absence, the Senior Operations Officer of the National SIGINT Operations
+Center. The DDO or ADDO shall review all U.S. Identities released by these designees as soon as practicable
+after the release is made.
+
+(1) For law enforcement purposes involving narcotics related information, DIRNSA has
+granted to the DDO authority to disseminate U.S. identities. This authority may not be further delegated.
+
+7.4. (U) Privileged Communications and Criminal Activity. All proposed disseminations of
+information constituting U.S. PERSON privileged communications (e.g., attorney/client, doctor/patient) and
+all information concerning criminal activities or criminal or judicial proceedings in the UNITED STATES must
+be reviewed by the Office of General Counsel prior to dissemination.
+
+7.5. (U) Improper Dissemination. If the name of a U.S. PERSON is improperly disseminated, the
+Incident should be reported to P02 within 24 hours of discovery of the error.
+
+SECTION 8 - RESPONSIBILITIES
+
+8.1. (U) Inspector General.
+The Inspector General shall:
+
+a. Conduct regular inspections and perform general oversight of NSA/CSS activities to ensure
+compliance with this USSID.
+
+b. Establish procedures for reporting by Key Component and Field Chiefs of their activities and
+practices for oversight purposes.
+
+c. Report to the DIRNSA/CHCSS, annually by 31 October, concerning NSA/CSS compliance
+with this USSID.
+
+d. Report quarterly with the DIRNSA/CHCSS and General Counsel to the President's
+Intelligence Oversight Board through the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight).
+
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+10
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+SECRET
+
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+
+8.2. (U) General Counsel. The General Counsel shall:
+
+a. Provide legal advice and assistance to all elements of the USSS regarding SIGINT activities.
+Requests for legal advice on any aspect of these procedures should be sent by CRITICOMM to DDI XDI, or
+by NSA/CSS secure telephone 963-3121, or [REDACTED]
+
+b. Prepare and process all applications for Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court orders and
+requests for Attorney General approvals required by these procedures.
+
+c. Advise the Inspector General in inspections and oversight of USSS activities.
+
+d. Review and assess for legal implications as requested by the DIRNSA/CHCSS, Deputy
+Director, Inspector General or Key Components Chief, all new major requirements and internally generated
+USSS activities.
+
+e. Advise USSS personnel of new legislation and case law that may affect USSS missions,
+functions, operations, activities, or practices.
+
+f. Report as required to the Attorney General and the President's Intelligence Oversight Board
+and provide copies of such reports to the DIRNSA/CHCSS and affected agency elements.
+
+g. Process requests from any DDO intelligence component for authority to use signals as
+described in Procedure 5, Part 5, of DoD 5240.1-9, for periods in excess of 90 days in the development, test,
+or calibration of ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE equipment and other equipment that can intercept
+communications.
+
+8.3. (U) Deputy Director for Operations (DDO).
+The DDO shall:
+
+a. Ensure that all SIGINT production personnel understand and maintain a high degree of
+awareness and sensitivity to the requirements of this USSID.
+
+b. Apply the provisions of this USSID to all SIGINT production activities. The DDO staff focal
+point for USSID 18 matters is P02 (use CRITICOMM DDI XAO).
+
+c. Conduct necessary reviews of SIGINT production activities and practices to ensure
+consistency with this USSID.
+
+d. Ensure that all new major requirements levied on the USSS or internally generated activities
+are considered for review by the General Counsel. All activities that raise questions of law or the proper
+interpretation of this USSID must be reviewed by the General Counsel prior to acceptance or execution.
+
+8.4. (U) All Elements of the USSS. All elements of the USSS shall:
+
+a. Implement this directive upon receipt.
+
+b. Prepare new procedures or amend or supplement existing procedures as required to ensure
+adherence to this USSID. A copy of such procedures shall be forwarded to NSA/CSS, Attn: P02.
+
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+11
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+
+c. Immediately inform the DDO of any tasking or instructions that appear to require actions at
+variance with this USSID.
+
+d. Promptly report to the NSA Inspector General and consult with the NSA General Counsel
+on all activities that may raise a question of compliance with this USSID.
+
+SECTION 9 - DEFINITIONS
+
+9.1. (6-CGO) AGENT OF A FOREIGN POWER means:
+
+a. Any person, other than a U.S. PERSON, who:
+
+(1) Acts in the UNITED STATES as an officer or employee of a FOREIGN POWER, or as
+a member of a group engaged in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM or activities in preparation therefor; or
+
+(2) Acts for, or on behalf of, a FOREIGN POWER that engages in clandestine intelligence
+activities in the UNITED STATES contrary to the interests of the UNITED STATES, when the circumstances
+of such person's presence in the UNITED STATES indicate that such person may engage in such activities
+in the UNITED STATES, or when such person knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of such
+activities or knowingly conspires with any person to engage in such activities; or
+
+b. Any person, including a U.S. PERSON, who:
+
+(1) Knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence gathering activities for, or on behalf of,
+A FOREIGN POWER, which activities involve, or may involve, a violation of the criminal statutes of the
+UNITED STATES; or
+
+(2) Pursuant to the direction of an intelligence service or network of a FOREIGN POWER,
+knowingly engages in any other clandestine intelligence activities for, or on behalf of, such FOREIGN
+POWER, which activities involve or are about to Involve, a violation of the criminal statutes of the UNITED
+STATES; or
+
+(3) Knowingly engages in sabotage or INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, or activities that
+are in preparation therefor, for or on behalf of a FOREIGN POWER; or
+
+(4) Knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of activities described in paragraphs
+9.1.b.(1) through (3) or knowingly conspires with any person to engage in those activities.
+
+c. For all purposes other than the conduct of ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE as defined by
+The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (see Annex A), the phrase "AGENT OF A FOREIGN POWER" also
+means any person, including U.S. PERSONS outside the UNITED STATES, who are officers or employees
+of a FOREIGN POWER, or who act unlawfully for or pursuant to the direction of a FOREIGN POWER, or
+who are in contact with or acting in collaboration with an intelligence or security service of a FOREIGN
+POWER for the purpose of providing access to information or material classified by the UNITED STATES
+Government and to which the person has or has had access. The mere fact that a person's activities may
+benefit or further the aims of a FOREIGN POWER is not enough to bring that person under this provision,
+
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+12
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+SECRET
+
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+
+absent evidence that the person is taking direction from or acting in knowing concert with a FOREIGN
+POWER.
+
+9.2. (C) COLLECTION means intentional tasking or SELECTION of identified nonpublic
+communications for subsequent processing aimed at reporting or retention as a file record.
+
+9.3. (U) COMMUNICANT means a sender or intended recipient of a communication.
+
+9.4. (U) COMMUNICATIONS ABOUT A U.S. PERSON are those in which the U.S. PERSON is
+identified in the communication. A U.S. PERSON is identified when the person's name, unique title, address,
+or other personal identifier is revealed in the communication in the context of activities conducted by that
+person or activities conducted by others and related to that person. A mere reference to a product by brand
+name or manufacturer's name, e.g., "Boeing 707" is not an identification of a U.S. person.
+
+9.5. (U) CONSENT, for SIGINT purposes, means an agreement by a person or organization to permit
+the USSS to take particular actions that affect the person or organization. An agreement by an organization
+with the National Security Agency to permit COLLECTION of information shall be deemed valid CONSENT
+if given on behalf of such organization by an official or governing body determined by the General Counsel,
+National Security Agency, to have actual or apparent authority to make such an agreement.
+
+9.6. (U) CORPORATIONS, for purposes of this USSID, are entities legally recognized as separate
+from the persons who formed, own, or run them. CORPORATIONS have the nationality of the nation state
+under whose laws they were formed. Thus, CORPORATIONS incorporated under UNITED STATES federal
+or state law are U.S. PERSONS.
+
+9.7. (U) ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE means:
+
+a. In the case of an electronic communication, the acquisition of a nonpublic communication
+by electronic means without the CONSENT of a person who is a party to the communication.
+
+b. In the case of a nonelectronic communication, the acquisition of a nonpublic communication
+by electronic means without the CONSENT of a person who is visibly present at the place of communication.
+
+c. The term ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE does not include the use of radio direction finding
+equipment solely to determine the location of a transmitter.
+
+9.8. (S) FOREIGN COMMUNICATION means a communication that has at least one
+COMMUNICANT outside of the UNITED STATES, or that is entirely among FOREIGN POWERS or between
+a FOREIGN POWER and officials of a FOREIGN POWER, but does not include communications intercepted
+by ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE directed at premises in the UNITED STATES used predominantly for
+residential purposes.
+
+9.9. (U) FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE means information relating to the capabilities, Intentions, and
+activities of FOREIGN POWERS, organizations, or persons, and for purposes of this USSID Includes both
+positive FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE and counterintelligence.
+
+9.10. (U) FOREIGN POWER means:
+
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+13
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+
+STATES,
+
+a. A foreign government or any component thereof, whether or not recognized by the UNITED
+STATES,
+
+b. A faction of a foreign nation or nations, not substantially composed of UNITED STATES
+PERSONS,
+
+c. An entity that is openly acknowledged by a foreign government or governments to be
+directed and controlled by such foreign government or governments,
+
+d. A group engaged in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM or activities in preparation therefor,
+
+e. A foreign-based political organization, not substantially composed of UNITED STATES
+PERSONS, or
+
+f. An entity that is directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments.
+
+9.11. (U) INTERCEPTION means the acquisition by the USSS through electronic means of a
+nonpublic communication to which it is not an intended party, and the processing of the contents of that
+communication into an intelligible form, but does not include the display of signals on visual display devices
+Intended to permit the examination of the technical characteristics of the signals without reference to the
+information content carried by the signal.
+
+9.12. (U) INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM means activities that:
+
+a. Involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws
+of the UNITED STATES or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction
+of the UNITED STATES or any State, and
+
+b. Appear to be intended:
+
+(1) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population,
+
+(2) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or
+
+(3) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping, and
+
+c. Occur totally outside the UNITED STATES, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the
+means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to coerce or intimidate, or the
+locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.
+
+9.13. (U) PUBLICLY AVAILABLE INFORMATION means information that has been published or
+broadcast for general public consumption, is available on request to a member of the general public, has been
+seen or heard by a casual observer, or is made available at a meeting open to the general public.
+
+9.14. (S) SELECTION, as applied to manual and electronic processing activities, means the
+intentional insertion of a [REDACTED] telephone number, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] into a computer scan dictionary or manual scan guide for the purpose of identifying
+messages of interest and isolating them for further processing.
+
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+
+14
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+SECRET
+
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+
+9.15. (C) SELECTION TERM means the composite of individual terms used to effect or defeat
+SELECTION of particular communications for the purpose of INTERCEPTION. It comprises the entire term
+or series of terms so used, but not any segregable term contained therein. It applies to both electronic and
+manual processing.
+
+9.16. (U) TARGET, OR TARGETING: See COLLECTION.
+
+9.17. (U) UNITED STATES, when used geographically, includes the 50 states and the District of
+Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the U.S. Virgin Islands, the Northern Mariana Islands, and
+any other territory or possession over which the UNITED STATES exercises sovereignty.
+
+9.18. (C) UNITED STATES PERSON:
+
+a. A citizen of the UNITED STATES,
+
+b. An alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the UNITED STATES,
+
+c. Unincorporated groups and associations a substantial number of the members of which
+constitute a. or b. above, or
+
+d. CORPORATIONS incorporated in the UNITED STATES, including U.S. flag
+nongovernmental aircraft or vessels, but not including those entities which are openly acknowledged by a
+foreign government or governments to be directed and controlled by them.
+
+e. The following guidelines apply in determining whether a person is a U.S. PERSON:
+
+(1) A person known to be currently in the United States will be treated as a U.S. PERSON
+unless that person is reasonably Identified as an alien who has not been admitted for permanent residence
+or if the nature of the person's communications or other indicia in the contents or circumstances of such
+communications give rise to a reasonable belief that such person is not a U.S. PERSON.
+
+(2) A person known to be currently outside the UNITED STATES, or whose location is not
+known, will not be treated as a U.S. PERSON unless such person is reasonably identified as such or the
+nature of the person's communications or other indicia in the contents or circumstances of such
+communications give rise to a reasonable belief that such person is a U.S. PERSON.
+
+(3) A person known to be an alien admitted for permanent residence may be assumed to
+have lost status as a U.S. PERSON if the person leaves the UNITED STATES and it is known that the person
+is not in compliance with the administrative formalities provided by law (8 U.S.C. Section 1203) that enable
+such persons to reenter the UNITED STATES without regard to the provisions of law that would otherwise
+restrict an alien's entry into the UNITED STATES. The failure to follow the statutory procedures provides a
+reasonable basis to conclude that such alien has abandoned any intention of maintaining status as a
+permanent resident alien.
+
+(4) An unincorporated association whose headquarters are located outside the UNITED
+STATES may be presumed not to be a U.S. PERSON unless the USSS has information indicating that a
+substantial number of members are citizens of the UNITED STATES or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent
+residence.
+
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+15
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+USSID 18
+27 July 1993
+
+(5) CORPORATIONS have the nationality of the nation-state in which they are
+Incorporated. CORPORATIONS formed under U.S. federal or state law are thus U.S. persons, even if the
+corporate stock is foreign-owned. The only exception set forth above is CORPORATIONS which are openly
+acknowledged to be directed and controlled by foreign governments. Conversely, CORPORATIONS
+incorporated in foreign countries are not U.S. PERSONS even if that CORPORATION is a subsidiary of a
+U.S. CORPORATION.
+
+(6) Nongovernmental ships and aircraft are legal entities and have the nationality of the
+country in which they are registered. Ships and aircraft fly the flag and are subject to the law of their place
+of registration.
+
+HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
+SECRET
+16
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+No. OP 2008-0009
+
+OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
+
+OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
+
+(S/NF) REVIEW OF THE PARTICIPATION OF THE
+OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+IN THE PRESIDENT'S SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM
+
+July 2, 2009
+
+ROSLYN A. MAZER
+INSPECTOR GENERAL
+
+Copy No.
+
+CL BY: 2385885
+CL
+REASON 1.4(C), (G)
+DECL ON! 20340218
+DRV FROM: MISS-06,
+ODNI COM T-08
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+213
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+This page intentionally left blank.
+
+214
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+TOP SECRET//STLW//SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(U) TABLE OF CONTENTS
+
+PAGE
+
+I. (U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2
+II. (U) INTRODUCTION 3
+ΠΙ. (U) SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 3
+IV. (U) DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 4
+A. (U) Initial Response by the President and Congress to
+the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 (U) 4
+B. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) ODNI Role in Preparing Threat
+Assessments in Support of the Program 6
+C. (TS//STLW//SI//OC//NF) NCTC Use of the Program to
+Support Counterterrorism Analysis 10
+D. [REDACTED] 12
+E. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) NCTC Role in Identifying Program
+Targets or Tasking Collection 13
+F. (S/NF) ODNI Oversight of the Program 13
+V. (U) CONCLUSION 16
+VI. (U) APPENDIX – STRUCTURE OF THE ODNI - 2005 17
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+1
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+This page intentionally left blank.
+
+216
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(S//NF) REVIEW OF THE PARTICIPATION OF THE
+OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+IN THE PRESIDENT'S SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM
+
+I. (U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) The Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of the
+Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), was one of five Intelligence Community
+Inspectors General that conducted a review of their agency's participation in the
+President's Surveillance Program (hereafter "the Program"), a top secret National
+Security Agency (NSA) electronic surveillance activity undertaken at the direction of the
+President. The Program became operational on October 4, 2001, three weeks after the
+deadly terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The review examined the ODNI's
+involvement in the Program from the period beginning with the stand-up of the ODNI in
+April 2005 through the termination of the Program in January 2007.
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) The ODNI's primary role in the Program was the
+preparation of the threat assessments that summarized the al Qaeda terrorist threat to the
+United States and were used to support the periodic reauthorization of the Program. That
+role began in April 2005, shortly after the ODNI stand-up and contemporaneous with the
+arrival of General Michael Hayden as the first Principal Deputy Director of National
+Intelligence (PDDNI). Prior to his ODNI appointment, Hayden was Director of NSA.
+In April 2005, ODNI personnel in the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) began
+to prepare the first of 12 Program threat assessments. In coordination with the
+Department of Justice (DOJ), then Director of National Intelligence (DNI) John
+Negroponte or PDDNI Hayden approved 12 ODNI-prepared threat assessments over an
+18-month period. Once approved by the DNI or PDDNI, the Program threat assessments
+were reviewed and approved by the Secretary of Defense, and were subsequently used by
+DOJ, NSA, and White House personnel in support of the Program reauthorization. In
+addition to the preparation of the threat assessments, we found that NCTC used Program
+information in producing analytical products that were distributed to senior IC
+community officials and analysts. [REDACTED]
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) During the review, we made several related findings
+and observations. We learned that the ODNI usage of Program-derived information in
+ODNI intelligence products was consistent with the standard rules and procedures for
+handling NSA intelligence. We learned that ODNI personnel were not involved in
+nominating specific targets for collection through the Program. While ODNI personnel
+were identified as having contact [REDACTED] regarding the
+Program, we found that those communications were limited in frequency and scope. We
+also found that the ODNI intelligence oversight components -- the Civil Liberties
+Protection Officer (CLPO), Office of General Counsel (OGC), and the OIG -- had little
+involvement in oversight of the Program and had limited opportunity to participate in
+Program oversight due to delays in ODNI oversight personnel being granted access to the
+
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+Program and temporary resource limitations attendant to the stand-up of the ODNI.
+Finally, we found that the 2008 amendments to Executive Order 12333 and the current
+ODNI staffing levels provide the ODNI oversight components with sufficient resources
+and authority to fulfill their current oversight responsibilities, assuming timely
+notification.
+
+Π. (U) INTRODUCTION
+
+(TS//STLW//SI/OCANF) The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Amendments
+Act of 2008, Pub L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2438 (hereafter "FISA Amendments Act")
+required the IGs of the DOJ, ODNI, NSA, Department of Defenses (DOD), and any other
+element of the intelligence community that participated in the President's Surveillance
+Program to conduct a comprehensive review of the Program.¹ The FISA Amendments
+Act defined the "President's Surveillance Program" as the "intelligence activity involving
+communications authorized by the President during the period beginning on September
+11, 2001, and ending on January 17, 2007, including the program referred to by the
+President in a radio address on December 17, 2005." In response to this tasking, the IGs
+of the following five agencies were identified as having a role in Program review: DOJ,
+ODNI, NSA, DOD, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
+
+(S//NF) The participating IGs organized the review in a manner where each OIG
+conducted a review of its own agency's involvement in the Program. CIA IG John
+Helgerson was initially designated by the IGs to coordinate the review and oversee the
+preparation of an interim report due within 60 days after the enactment of the Act, and a
+later final report due not later than 1 year after the enactment of the Act. Because of IG
+Helgerson's recent retirement, DOJ IG Glenn Fine was selected to coordinate the
+preparation of the final report. This report contains the results of the ODNI OIG review.
+
+ΠΙ. (U) SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) We sought to identify the role of the ODNI in
+implementing the Program beginning with the stand-up of the ODNI in April 2005
+through the Program's termination in January 2007. This review examined the:
+
+A. Role of the ODNI and its component the National Counterterrorism Center
+(NCTC) in drafting and coordinating the threat assessments that supported the
+periodic reauthorization of the Program;
+
+¹ (S/ANT) The Program is also known within the Intelligence Community by the cover term STELLARWIND.
+The Program is a Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) program.
+
+² (U) The participating IGs submitted an interim report, dated September 10, 2008, to the Chairman and Ranking
+member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and a revised interim report, dated November 24, 2008,
+to the Chairman and Ranking member of the House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
+(HPSCI).
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+B. NCTC's use of Program information to support counterterrorism analysis;
+
+C. NCTC's role in identifying Program targets and tasking Program collection;
+
+D. [REDACTED] and
+
+F. Role of the ODNI in providing compliance oversight of the Program.
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OCANF) - During the review, we interviewed 23 current or
+former ODNI officials and employees involved in the Program. The ODNI personnel we
+interviewed were cooperative and helpful. Our interviews included the following ODNI
+senior officials:
+
+John Negroponte, former Director of National Intelligence
+Michael McConnell, former Director of National Intelligence
+Michael V. Hayden, former Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence
+Ronald Burgess, former Acting Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence
+David R. Shedd, Deputy Director of National Intelligence for
+Policy, Plans, and Requirements
+Alexander W. Joel, Civil Liberties Protection Officer
+Edward Maguire, former Inspector General
+Benjamin Powell, former General Counsel
+Corin Stone, Deputy General Counsel and Acting General Counsel
+Joel Brenner, former National Counterintelligence Executive³
+John Scott Redd, former NCTC Director
+Michael Leiter, NCTC Director
+
+(S//NF) In addition to the interviews noted above, we reviewed Program-related
+documents made available by the NSA OIG, the DOJ OIG, and the ODNI OGC.
+
+IV. (U) DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
+
+(TS//STLW//SI/OC/NF) The following discussion contains our findings
+regarding the topics identified above. First, we briefly describe the terrorist attacks of
+September 11, 2001, and the initial government response to the attacks, including the
+authorization of the President's Surveillance Program. Next, we discuss the ODNI and
+NCTC role in implementing the Program. Finally, we set forth our conclusions and
+observations.
+
+A. (U) Initial Response by the President and Congress
+to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001
+
+(U) The devastating al Qaeda terrorist attacks against the United States quickly
+triggered an unprecedented military and intelligence community response to protect the
+
+³ (U) Brenner was the NSA Inspector General before joining the ODNI.
+
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+country from additional attacks. The following quote describes the initial terrorist attacks
+and the intended al Qaeda goal to deliver a decapitating strike against our political
+institutions.
+
+(U) On September 11, 2001, the al Qaeda terrorist network launched a set of
+coordinated attacks along the East Coast of the United States. Four commercial
+airliners, each carefully selected to be fully loaded with jet fuel for a
+transcontinental flight, were hijacked by al Qaeda operatives. Two of the jetliners
+were targeted at the Nation's financial center in New York and were deliberately
+flown into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center. The third was targeted at
+the headquarters of the Nation's Armed Forces, the Pentagon. The fourth was
+apparently headed toward Washington, D.C., when passengers struggled with the
+hijackers and the plane crashed in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. The intended target
+of this fourth jetliner was evidently the White House or the Capitol, strongly
+suggesting that its intended mission was to strike a decapitating blow on the
+Government of the United States - to kill the President, the Vice President, or
+Members of Congress. The attacks of September 11th resulted in approximately
+3,000 deaths - the highest single-day death toll from hostile foreign attacks in the
+Nation's history.⁴
+
+(U) On September 14, 2001, in response to the attacks, the President issued a
+Declaration of National Emergency by Reason of Certain Terrorist Attacks stating that
+"(a) national emergency exists by reason of the terrorist attacks at the World Trade
+Center, New York, New York, and the Pentagon, and continuing immediate threat of
+further attacks on the United States."⁵
+
+(U) On September 18, 2001, by an overwhelming majority in both the Senate
+and House of Representatives, a joint resolution was passed that authorized the use of
+United States military force against those responsible for the terrorist attacks launched
+against the United States. The joint resolution, also known as the Authorization for Use
+of Military Force (AUMF), is often cited by White House and DOJ officials as one of the
+principal legal authorities upon which the Program is based. In relevant part, the AUMF
+provides:⁶
+
+(a) IN GENERAL - That the President is authorized to use all
+necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
+organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
+committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September
+11, 2001, or harbored such organization or persons, in order to
+
+⁴ (U) This summary of the events of September 11, 2001, was prepared by DOJ personnel and is set forth in the
+unclassified DOJ "White Paper" entitled Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National Security Agency
+Described by the President, dated January 19, 2006.
+
+⁵ (U) Proclamation 7463, 66 Fed. Reg. No. 181, September 14, 2001.
+
+⁶ (U) Authorization for Use of Military Force, Section 2(a), Pub, L. No. 170-40, 115 Stat. 224, September 18, 2001.
+
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+prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United
+States by such nations, organizations or persons.
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) On October 4, 2001, three days before the start of overt
+military action against the al Qaeda and Taliban terrorist camps, the President authorized
+the Secretary of Defense to implement the President's Surveillance Program. The
+Program, a closely held top-secret NSA electronic surveillance project, authorized the
+Secretary of Defense to employ within the United States the capabilities of the DOD,
+including but not limited to the signals intelligence capabilities of the NSA, to collect
+international terrorism-related foreign intelligence information under certain specified
+circumstances. Each Program reauthorization was supported by a written threat
+assessment, approved by a senior Intelligence Community official, that described the
+threat of a terrorist attack against the United States.
+
+(U) On October 7, 2001, in a national television broadcast, the President
+announced the start of military operations against al Qaeda and Taliban terrorist camps in
+Afghanistan.⁸
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OCANF) On April 22, 2005, the ODNI began operations as the
+newest member of the Intelligence Community. The ODNI was created, in part, in
+response to the findings of the Independent National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
+Upon the United States (hereafter 9/11 Commission) that recommended the creation of a
+national "Director of National Intelligence" to oversee and coordinate the planning,
+policy, and budgets of the Intelligence Community.⁹ In late April 2005, ODNI personnel
+began to prepare the threat assessments used in the periodic reauthorization of the
+Program. In June 2005, ODNI officials began to approve the threat assessments.
+
+B. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) ODNI Role in Preparing Threat Assessments
+in Support of the Program Reauthorizations
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) Prior to the ODNI's involvement in the Program, the
+Program was periodically reauthorized approximately every 30 to 45 days pursuant to a
+reauthorization process overseen by DOJ, NSA, and White House personnel. Each
+reauthorization relied, in part, on a written threat assessment approved by a senior
+Intelligence Community official that described the current threat of a terrorist attack
+against the United States and contained the approving official's recommendation
+regarding the need to reauthorize the Program. Before the ODNI's involvement in the
+
+⁷ (TS//STLW//SW/OGANF) The NSA materials we reviewed identified October 4, 2001, as the date of the first Program
+authorization.
+
+⁸ (U) The CNN.com webpage article entitled President announces opening of attack, dated, October 7, 2001, provides
+a summary of the President's announcement and describes the national television broadcast.
+
+⁹ (U) While the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) that created the ODNI was
+signed by the President on December 17, 2004, the actual ODNI stand-up occurred months later. The official ODNI
+history, A Brief History of the ODNI's Founding, sets April 22, 2005, as the date when the ODNI commenced
+operations.
+
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+Program, every threat assessment prepared by the Intelligence Community in support of
+the Program reauthorization identified the threat of a terrorist attack against the United
+States and recommended that the Program be reauthorized. Accordingly, the Program
+was regularly reauthorized during the approximately 3-year period prior to the
+involvement of the ODNI. During that period, the Director of Central Intelligence or his
+designee approved 31 threat assessments in support of the reauthorization of the Program.
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) In reviewing the circumstances that led to the decision
+to transfer responsibility for preparing the Program threat assessments to the ODNI, we
+found that the ODNI does not have identifiable records regarding that decision. Senior
+ODNI officials involved with the Program told us that after the merger of the Terrorist
+Threat Integration Center (TTIC) into the NCTC, and the later incorporation of NCTC
+into the ODNI, it made sense for the ODNI to take responsibility for preparing the
+Program threat assessments as both TTIC and NCTC previously handled that task.
+Former PDDNI Hayden told us that the primary reason that the ODNI become involved
+in the Program was the statutory creation of the new DNI position as the senior
+Intelligence Community advisor to the President. When Ambassador Negroponte was
+confirmed as the first DNI, Hayden and other senior intelligence officials believed that
+DNI Negroponte, as the President's new senior intelligence advisor, should make the
+Intelligence Community's recommendation to the President regarding the need to renew
+the Program. Hayden commented that the new DNI's involvement in this important
+intelligence program enhanced the DNI's role as the leader of the Intelligence
+Community and gave immediate credibility to the ODNI as a new intelligence agency.
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) Once the ODNI became involved in the Program, the
+preparation and approval of the threat assessments became the ODNI's primary Program
+role.¹⁰ Beginning in April 2005, and continuing at about 30 to 45 day intervals until the
+Program's termination in January 2007, ODNI personnel prepared and approved 12
+written threat assessments in support of the periodic reauthorization of the Program. We
+found that the ODNI threat assessments were drafted by experienced NCTC personnel
+who prepared the documents following an established DOJ format used in earlier
+Program reauthorizations. NCTC analysts prepared the threat assessments in a
+memorandum format, usually 12 to 14 pages in length. Senior ODNI and NCTC officials
+told us that each threat assessment was intended to set forth the ODNI's view regarding
+the current threat of an al Qaeda attack against the United States and to provide the DNI's
+recommendation whether to continue the Program. NCTC personnel involved in
+preparing the threat assessments told us that the danger of a terrorist attack described in
+the threat assessments was sobering and "scary," resulting in the threat assessments
+becoming known by ODNI and Intelligence Community personnel involved in the
+Program as the "scary memos."
+
+¹⁰ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) The joint interim report prepared by the participating IGs notified congressional
+oversight committees that the review would examine the ODNI's involvement in preparing "threat assessments and
+legal certifications" submitted in support of the Program. Because we did not identify any ODNI officials executing a
+legal certification, we treated our review of the legal certifications to be the same as the review of the threat
+assessments. The Attorney General made legal certifications in support of the Program that are addressed in the DOJ
+OIG report.
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+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) - During interviews, ODNI personnel said they were
+aware that the threat assessments were relied upon by DOJ and the White House as the
+basis for continuing the Program and further understood that if a threat assessment
+identified a threat against the United States, the Program was likely to be reauthorized.
+NCTC analysts also said that on a less frequent basis they prepared a related document
+that set forth a list of al Qaeda-affiliated groups that they understood were targets of the
+Program. Both the threat assessments and the less frequent list of al Qaeda-affiliated
+groups underwent the same ODNI approval process.
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) We examined the ODNI process for preparing the
+Program documents, particularly the threat assessments, and found that the documents
+were drafted by experienced NCTC analysts under the supervision of the NCTC Director
+and his management staff, who were ultimately responsible for the accuracy of the
+information in the documents. We determined that the ODNI threat assessments were
+prepared using evaluated intelligence information chosen from a wide-variety of
+Intelligence Community sources. ODNI personnel told us that during the period when
+the ODNI prepared the threat assessments, the Intelligence Community had access to
+fully evaluated intelligence that readily supported the ODNI assessments that al Qaeda
+terrorists remained a significant threat to the United States.
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) Once the ODNI threat assessments were approved
+within NCTC and by the NCTC Director, the documents were forwarded through an
+established approval chain to senior ODNI personnel who independently satisfied
+themselves that the documents were accurate, properly prepared, and in the appropriate
+format. Throughout the ODNI preparation and approval process, the threat assessments
+were also subject to varying degrees of review and comment by DOJ and OGC attorneys,
+including then General Counsel Benjamin Powell and Deputy General Counsel Corin
+Stone. Powell said his review of the threat assessments was not a legal review, but was
+focused on spotting issues that might merit further review or analysis. Powell said he
+relied on DOJ to conduct the legal review. Once the draft threat assessments were
+subjected to this systematic and multi-layered management and legal review, the
+documents were provided to the DNI or PDDNI for consideration and, if appropriate,
+approval. Overall, we found the process used by the ODNI to prepare and obtain
+approval of the threat assessments was straightforward, reasonable, and consistent with
+the preparation of other documents requiring DNI or PDDNI approval.
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) Negroponte told us that because of time-sensitive
+issues present in 2005 relating to the ongoing ODNI start-up as a new agency and other
+Intelligence Community matters requiring his attention, he tasked his deputy, then
+PDDNI Hayden, to oversee the ODNI approval of the threat assessments and related
+documents. Negroponte told us that when making this decision, he was aware of
+Hayden's prior experience with the Program during Hayden's earlier assignment as
+Director of NSA. In June 2005, shortly after his arrival at ODNI, Hayden received and
+approved the first ODNI threat assessment. Hayden later approved the next six ODNI
+threat assessments. After Hayden left the ODNI in May 2006 to become Director of
+CIA, Negroponte approved the next five ODNI threat assessments, including a December
+
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+2006 threat assessment used in the final reauthorization of the Program. In total,
+Negroponte and Hayden approved 12 ODNI threat assessments prepared in support of the
+Program reauthorizations.¹¹
+
+(TS/STLW/SI/OC/NF) In discussing the ODNI process used to prepare and
+approve the threat assessments, Negroponte told us he was “extremely satisfied” with the
+quality and content of the threat assessments provided for his approval. He did not recall
+any inaccuracies or problems relating to preparation of the ODNI threat assessments.
+Negroponte said the al Qaeda threat information described in the Program threat assessments
+was consistent with the terrorist threat information found in the President’s
+Daily Briefing and other senior-level Intelligence Community products he had read.
+Hayden had a similar view. Negroponte and Hayden separately told us that when they
+approved the threat assessments, credible intelligence was readily available to the
+Intelligence Community that demonstrated the ongoing and dangerous al Qaeda terrorist
+threat to the United States. Similarly, Negroponte and Hayden each told us that the
+nature and scope of the al Qaeda terrorist threat to the United States was well
+documented and easily supported the ODNI threat assessments used in the Program
+reauthorizations.
+
+(TS/STLW/SI/OC/NF) Because of questions raised in the media about the
+legal basis for the Program, we asked the ODNI personnel involved in the preparation or
+approval of the threat assessments about their concerns, if any, regarding the legal basis
+for the Program. We found that ODNI personnel involved in the Program generally
+understood that the Program had been in operation for several years and was approved
+by senior Intelligence Community and DOJ officials. During our interviews, ODNI officials
+told us they were satisfied with the legal basis for the Program, primarily because of their
+knowledge that the Attorney General and senior DOJ attorneys had personally approved
+the Program and remained directly involved in the Program reauthorization process. We
+did not identify any ODNI personnel who believed that the Program was unlawful.
+
+(TS/STLW/SI/OC/NF) Former ODNI General Counsel Powell told us that after
+his Program briefings in early 2006, he had questions regarding the DOJ description of
+the legal authority for the Program but lacked the time to conduct his own legal review of
+the issue given the many time-sensitive ODNI legal issues that required his attention.
+Powell said he understood the rationale of DOJ's legal opinion that the Program was
+lawfully based on the FISA optional "deeply complex issue" with "legal
+scholarship on both sides." Powell said he recognized that he was a newcomer to a
+complex legal issue that was previously and continuously approved by DOJ, personally
+supported by the Attorney General, and was being transacted in judicial oversight – an
+idea he strongly supported. Powell said he knew the DOJ legal opinion regarding the
+Program and directed his efforts to supporting the Program's transition to judicial
+oversight under traditional FISA, the 2007 Protect America Act, and the subsequent FISA
+Amendments Act of 2008.
+
+¹¹(TS/STLW/SI/OC/NF) The DNI and PDDNI together approved 12 of the 43 threat assessments used in support of the Program reauthorizations. CIA officials approved the other 31 threat assessments.
+
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+(TS/STLW/SI/OC/NF) Negroponte recalled having regular contact with senior
+NSA and DOJ officials who offered no legal concerns to him about the Program. He said
+he remembered attending a Program-related meeting that included members of the FISA
+Court who did not raise any legal concerns to him about the authority for the Program
+and seemed generally supportive of the Program. Negroponte also recalled attending
+meetings in which the Program was briefed to congressional leadership who did not raise
+legal concerns to him. Overall, his direct involvement of DOJ and other senior
+Intelligence Community officials in the Program resulted in Negroponte and other
+ODNI personnel having few, if any, concerns about the legal basis for the Program.
+
+C. (TS/STLW/SI/OC/NF) NCTC Use of Program Information to Support
+Counterterrorism Analysis
+
+(TS/STLW/SI/OC/NF) The Program information was closely held within the
+ODNI and was made available to no more than 15 NCTC analysts for review and, if
+appropriate, use in preparing NCTC analytical products.¹² Generally, the NCTC analysts
+approved for access received the Program information in the form of finished NSA
+intelligence products. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The NCTC analysts said the
+Program information was subject to stringent security protections [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The NCTC analysts told us they received training regarding proper
+handling of NSA intelligence. They said they handled the NSA intelligence, including
+Program information, consistent with the standard rules and procedures for handling NSA
+intelligence information, including the minimization of U.S. person identities.
+
+(TS/STLW/SI/OC/NF) Hayden told us that during his tenure as Director of
+NSA, he sought to disseminate as much Program information as possible to the
+Intelligence Community. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+(TS/STLW/SI/OC/NF) During our review, NCTC analysts told us they often
+did not know if the NSA intelligence available to them was derived from the Program.
+
+¹²(TS/STLW/SI/OC/NF) The number of NCTC analysts read into the Program ranged from 5 to 15 analysts.
+
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+[REDACTED] On those occasions when the NCTC analysts
+knew that a particular NSA intelligence product was derived from the Program, the
+analysts said they reviewed the Program information in the same manner as other NSA
+intelligence products and, if appropriate, incorporated Program information into
+analytical products being prepared for the DNI and other senior intelligence officials.
+They identified the President's Terrorism Threat Report and the Senior Executive
+Terrorism Report as examples of the types of finished intelligence products that would,
+at times, contain Program information.
+
+(TS/STLW/SI/OC/NF) NCTC analysts with Program access said they had
+broad access to a wide variety of high quality and fully evaluated terrorism related
+intelligence. In particular, NCTC analysts told us that by virtue of their NCTC
+assignments, they had access to some of the most sensitive and valuable
+terrorism intelligence available to the Intelligence Community. NCTC analysts characterized the
+Program information as being a useful tool, but also noted that the Program information
+was only one of several valuable sources of information available to them from numerous
+collection sources and methods. During interviews, NCTC analysts and other ODNI
+personnel described the Program information as “one tool in the tool box,” “one arrow in
+the quiver,” or in other similar phrases to connote that the Program information was not
+of greater value than other sources of intelligence. The NCTC analysts we interviewed
+said they could not identify specific examples where the Program information provided
+what they considered time-sensitive or actionable intelligence, but they generally recalled
+attending meetings in which the benefits of the Program were discussed. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The NCTC analysts uniformly told us that during
+the period when NCTC prepared the threat assessment memoranda, the intelligence
+demonstrating the al Qaeda threat to the United States was overwhelming and readily
+available to the Intelligence Community.
+
+(TS/STLW/SI/OC/NF) When asked about the value of the Program, Hayden
+said “without the Program as a skirmish line you wouldn't know what you don't know.”
+He explained that by using the Program to look at a “quadrant of communications” the
+Intelligence Community was able to assess the threat arising from those communications,
+which allowed Intelligence Community leaders to make valuable judgments regarding the
+allocation of national security resources. He said looking at the terrorist threat in this
+manner was similar to soldiers on a combat patrol who look in all directions for the threat
+and adjust resources based on what they learn. Hayden said that NSA General Counsel
+Vito Potenza often described the Program as an “early warning system” for terrorist
+threats, which Hayden thought was an accurate description of the Program. Hayden told
+us the Program was extremely valuable in protecting the United States from an al Qaeda
+terrorist attack. Hayden cited [REDACTED]
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+
+[REDACTED] as examples where
+the Program information was effectively used to disrupt al Qaeda operatives.¹³
+
+D. [REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
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+
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+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+E. (TS/STLW/SI/OC/NF) No NCTC Role in Identifying Program Targets
+and Tasking Collection
+
+(TS/STLW/SI/OC/NF) We did not identify any information that indicated that
+ODNI or NCTC personnel were involved in identifying or nominating targets for
+collection within the Program. ODNI personnel told us that ODNI and NCTC are non-
+operational elements of the Intelligence Community and were not involved in nominating
+targets for Program collection.
+
+F. (S/NF) ODNI Oversight of the Program
+
+(TS/STLW/SI/OC/NF) We examined the role of the ODNI oversight
+components -- CLPO, OIG, and OGC -- in providing compliance oversight for the
+Program. We found that while the Program was subject to oversight by the NSA OIG,
+the ODNI oversight components had a limited role in providing oversight for the
+Program. During the review, we learned that within the first year of the Program, then
+NSA Director Hayden obtained White House approval allowing the NSA IG and
+designated NSA OGC officials to be read into the Program to provide compliance
+oversight for the Program. In furtherance of its NSA oversight program, the NSA IG
+provided compliance reports and briefings to the NSA Director, NSA General Counsel,
+and cleared White House personnel, including the Counsel to the President.¹⁶
+
+(TS/STLW/SI/OC/NF) In reviewing the ODNI oversight role regarding the
+Program, we found that the ODNI oversight components had limited involvement in
+oversight of the Program. We found that the opportunity for the ODNI to participate in
+Program oversight was limited by the fact that ODNI oversight personnel were not
+[REDACTED]
+
+¹⁵(TS/STLW/SI/OC/NF) [REDACTED]
+
+¹⁶(S/NF) According to the General Counsel to the President's Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB), the IOB members
+and staff were not read into the Program and did not receive compliance reports from the NSA IG.
+
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+granted timely access to the Program by the White House personnel responsible for
+approving access. In addition, we found that the newly formed ODNI oversight offices
+were in varying stages of agency stand-up and lacked the necessary experienced staff and
+resources to effectively participate in oversight of the Program.
+
+(TS/STLW/SI/OC/NF) For example, General Counsel Powell received
+Program access after his arrival in January 2006, but his predecessor, then Acting
+General Counsel Corin Stone, was not read into the Program until a few days before
+Powell in January 2006, several months after the Program became operational within
+ODNI and only after she had read about the Program in a December 2005 newspaper
+article.¹⁶ Similarly, CLPO Alexander Joel, who is responsible for reviewing the privacy
+and civil liberties implications of intelligence activities, requested but did not receive
+Program access until October 2006, shortly before the Program terminated.¹⁸ Joel told us
+that Negroponte and Hayden supported his request for Program access, but White House
+staff delayed approval for several months. Joel said that while waiting for approval of his
+Program access, Hayden gave him some insight about the Program that did not require
+the disclosure of compartmented information. Joel found this information helpful in
+planning his later review. Finally, then ODNI Inspector General Edward Maguire and
+his oversight staff did not obtain Program access until 2008, long after the Program had
+terminated.¹⁹
+
+(TS/STLW/SI/OC/NF) Once read into the Program, Powell and Joel were
+provided with reasonable access to NSA compliance reports and briefings relating to the
+NSA OIG oversight program. Powell told us that he was satisfied that the NSA IG
+provided a reasonable degree of Program oversight. Similarly, Joel said he believed that
+he had received full disclosure regarding the NSA oversight program and found the NSA
+oversight effort to be reasonable.
+
+(TS/STLW/SI/OC/NF) We also learned that the members of the President's
+Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) reviewed the Program, in part,
+in association with Joel.²⁰ The PCLOB review was contemporaneous with Joel's review
+
+¹⁷ (S//NF) Powell was appointed General Counsel in January 2006 and served in that position as a recess
+appointment until Senate confirmation in April 2006. Prior to his appointment, Powell was an Associate Counsel to
+the President and Special Assistant to the President where he worked on initiatives related to the Intelligence
+Community. However, Powell was not read into the Program while serving at the White House.
+
+¹⁸ (U//FOUO) Joel is the Civil Liberties Protection Officer (CLPO) and has responsibility for ensuring that the
+protection of privacy and civil liberties is incorporated in the policies and procedures of the Intelligence Community.
+The CLPO responsibilities are set forth in the Section 1038 of Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
+2004.
+
+¹⁹ (S//NF) While OIG personnel were not read into the Program until 2008, OIG officials were alerted to the existence
+of the bulk collection program through a December 2005 newspaper report. Shortly after that report, the NSA IG told
+ODNI OIG officials that the NSA OIG was reviewing the program and NSA prog am. PDDNI Hayden that told IG
+Maguire that the NSA program was subject to NSA OIG oversight.
+
+²⁰ (U) The PCLOB was created by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), which
+requires the Board to ensure that concerns with respect to privacy and civil liberties are appropriately considered in the
+implementation of laws, regulations, and executive branch policies related to efforts to protect the Nation against
+terrorism (P.L. 108-458, 2004).
+
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+
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+
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+
+and resulted in an independent and generally favorable finding regarding the NSA
+implementation of the Program. After the PCLOB review, a PCLOB board member
+published an editorial article, in part, quoted below, that summarized his observations
+regarding the NSA effort in implementing the Program.
+
+There were times, including when the Board was "read into" and given
+complete access to the operation of the Terrorist Surveillance Program that
+I wondered whether the individuals doing this difficult job on behalf of all
+of us were not being too careful, too concerned, about going over the
+privacy and liberties lines -- so concerned, with so many internal checks
+and balances, that they could miss catching or preventing the bad guys
+from another attack. And I remember walking out of these briefing
+sessions in some dark and super secret agency with the thought: I wish the
+American people could meet these people and observe what they are doing.²¹
+
+(S//NF) In sum, the ODNI oversight components had limited and belated
+involvement in the oversight of the Program. However, once read into the Program,
+Powell and Joel determined that the Program was subject to reasonable oversight by the
+NSA OIG. Moreover, the initial White House delay in granting ODNI oversight
+personnel access to the Program occurred prior to the 2008 revision to Executive Order
+(EO) 12333, which expressly grants ODNI oversight components broad access to any
+information necessary for performing their oversight duties. In particular, EO 12333
+provides in relevant part that:
+
+Section 1.6 Heads of Elements of the Intelligence Community. The heads
+of elements of the Intelligence Community shall:
+
+(h) Ensure that the inspectors general, general counsels, and agency
+officials responsible for privacy and civil liberties protection for their
+respective organizations have access to any information or intelligence
+necessary to perform their duties.
+
+(TS/STLW/SI/OC/NF) EO 12333, as amended, clarifies and strengthens the
+ODNI's ability to provide compliance oversight. In light of the recent change to EO
+12333, and with our new finding, we believe that ODNI's oversight components have
+sufficient resources and authority to perform their responsibilities to conduct oversight of
+closely held intelligence activities, assuming timely notification.
+
+²¹(U) The quote is taken from a May 5, 2007, article by former PCLOB member Lanny Davis, entitled, "Why I
+Resigned From The President's Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board – And Where We Go From Here." The
+article was published on webpage of The Huffington Post, www.huffingtonpost.com.
+
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+
+230
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
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+
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+
+V. (U) CONCLUSION
+
+(TS/STLW/SI/OC/NF) We found that the ODNI's primary role in the Program
+was the preparation of 12 ODNI threat assessments approved by the DNI or PDDNI for
+use in the Program reauthorizations. The ODNI-prepared threat assessments set forth
+the ODNI's view regarding the existing threat of an al Qaeda terrorist attack against the
+United States and provided the DNI's recommendation regarding the need to reauthorize
+the Program. We found that the ODNI threat assessments were drafted by experienced
+NCTC personnel under the supervision of knowledgeable NCTC supervisors. We noted
+that the threat assessments were subject to review by OGC and DOJ attorneys before
+approval. Additionally, we found that the process used by the ODNI to prepare and
+obtain approval of the threat assessments was straightforward, reasonable, and consistent
+with the preparation of other documents requiring DNI approval. Overall, we found the
+ODNI process for the preparation and approval of the threat assessments was responsible
+and effective.
+
+(TS/STLW/SI/OC/NF) We also found that the ODNI oversight components
+played a limited role in oversight of the Program. The limited ODNI oversight role was
+due to delays in obtaining Program access for ODNI oversight personnel and
+to temporary resource limitations related to the stand-up of the agency. However, we
+believe that the 2008 amendments to EO 12333 and improved staffing levels provide the
+ODNI oversight components with sufficient resources and authority to fulfill their current
+oversight responsibilities, assuming timely notification.
+
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+
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+
+This page intentionally left blank.
+
+232
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+
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+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+VI. (U) APPENDIX – STRUCTURE OF THE ODNI – 2005
+
+DNI
+Ambassador John D. Negroponte
+
+PDDNI
+General Michael V. Hayden
+
+Inspector General
+Mr. Edward Maguire
+
+General Counsel
+Nominee pending Confirmation
+
+ADNI/Civil Liberties Protection
+Interim: Mr. Alex Joel
+
+ADNI & CoS
+Mr. David R. Shedd
+
+ADNI/S&T
+Dr. Eric C. Haseltine
+
+ADNI/CIO
+Nominee pending Confirmation
+
+NCIX
+Ms. Michelle Van Cleave
+
+EEO
+Vacant
+
+Ombudsman
+Vacant
+
+DDNI for Customer Outcomes
+"Want It"
+LTG Ronald L. Burgess, Jr.
+
+DDNI for Analysis
+"Know It"
+Dr. Charles Thomas Fingar
+
+DDNI for Collection
+"Get It"
+Mrs. Mary Margaret Graham
+
+DDNI for Management
+"Build It"
+Ambassador Patrick F. Kennedy
+
+NCTC
+Vice Admiral Radd, Ret.
+
+NCPC
+Ambassador Kenneth Brill
+
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+
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+PREPARED BY THE
+OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GENERAL
+OF THE
+DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
+DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
+CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+
+(U) ANNEX TO THE REPORT ON THE
+PRESIDENT'S SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM
+
+REPORT NO. 2009-0013-AS
+VOLUME II
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN 37.3
+
+(U) ANNEX TO THE REPORT ON THE
+PRESIDENT'S SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM
+
+VOLUME III
+
+10 JULY 2009
+
+PREPARED BY THE
+OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GENERAL
+OF THE
+DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
+DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
+CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+
+Special Warning
+The report contains compartmented, classified material and no
+secondary distribution may be made without prior consent of the
+participating Inspectors General. Improper disclosure of this
+report may result in criminal, civil, or administrative penalties.
+
+REPORT NO. 2009-0013-AS
+
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
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+
+U.S. Department of Justice
+Office of the Inspector General
+
+A Review of the Department of Justice's
+Involvement with the
+President's Surveillance Program (U)
+
+DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
+OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
+
+Department of Justice
+Office of the Inspector General
+Oversight and Review Division
+July 2009
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+Derived From. NSA/C99 M 1-52, 2-400
+NSA/CSS M-1-52, 12-18
+Dated: 20070108
+Declassify On: 20340713
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+TABLE OF CONTENTS
+
+CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION (U) .......................1
+I. Methodology of OIG Review (U) .......................3
+II. Organization of this Report (U) ....................5
+CHAPTER TWO: LEGAL AUTHORITIES (U) .......................7
+I. Constitutional, Statutory, and Executive Order Authorities (U) .......................7
+ A. Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution (U) .......................7
+ B. The Fourth Amendment (U) .......................7
+ C. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) (U) .......................8
+ 1. Overview of FISA (U) .......................8
+ 2. FISA Applications and Orders (U) .......................10
+ 3. FISA Court (U) .......................11
+ D. Authorization for Use of Military Force (U) .......................12
+ E. Executive Order 12333 (U) .......................13
+II. Presidential Authorizations (U) .......................14
+ A. Types of Collection Authorized (S//NF) .......................15
+ B. Findings and Primary Authorities (U) .......................16
+ C. The Reauthorization Process (U) .......................16
+ D. Approval "as to form and legality" (U) .......................17
+
+CHAPTER THREE: INCEPTION AND EARLY OPERATION OF STELLAR
+WIND (SEPTEMBER 2001 THROUGH APRIL 2003) (S//NF) .......................19
+I. Inception of the Stellar Wind Program (U//FOUO) .......................19
+ A. The National Security Agency (U) .......................19
+ B. Implementation of the Program (September 2001 through
+ November 2001) (S//NF) .......................20
+ 1. Pre-Stellar Wind Office of Legal Counsel Legal
+ Memoranda (U) .......................23
+ 2. Presidential Authorization of October 4, 2001
+ (TS//SI//NF) .......................28
+
+i
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+
+C. Presidential Authorization is Revised and the Office of Legal
+Counsel Issues Legal Memoranda in Support of the Program
+(November 2001 through January 2002)
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) .......................31
+ 1. Presidential Authorization of November 2, 2001
+ (TS//SI//NF) .......................31
+ 2. Yoo Drafts Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum
+ Addressing Legality of Stellar Wind
+ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) .......................33
+ 3. Additional Presidential Authorizations (U) .......................38
+ 4. Subsequent Yoo Opinions (U) .......................39
+ 5. Yoo's Communications with the White House (U) .......................40
+ 6. Gonzales's View of the Department's Role in
+ Authorizing the Stellar Wind Program (S//NF) .......................41
+
+II. NSA's Implementation of the Stellar Wind Program (U//FOUO) .......................42
+ A. Implementation of Stellar Wind (U//FOUO) .......................42
+ 1. Basket 1 - Telephone and E-Mail Content Collection
+ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) .......................44
+ 2. Basket 2 - Telephony Meta Data Collection
+ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) .......................48
+ 3. Basket 3 - E-Mail Meta Data Collection
+ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) .......................51
+ B. NSA Process for Analyzing Information Collected Under
+ Stellar Wind (S//NF) .......................52
+ 1. Basket 1: Content tasking, Analysis, and
+ Dissemination (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) .......................52
+ 2. Baskets 2 and 3: Telephony and E-Mail Meta Data
+ Queries, Analysis, and Dissemination
+ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) .......................54
+
+III. FBI's Early Participation in the Stellar Wind Program (S//NF) .......................58
+ A. FBI Director First Informed of Stellar Wind Program
+ (U//FOUO) .......................59
+ B. [REDACTED] .......................59
+ C. FBI Begins to Receive and Disseminate Stellar Wind
+ "Tippers" (S//NF) .......................63
+ 1. FBI Initiates [REDACTED] (S//NF) .......................63
+ 2. FBI Field Offices' Response to [REDACTED] Leads
+ (S//NF) .......................67
+
+ii
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+
+3. FBI's Efforts to Track Stellar Wind Tippers and
+ Undate Executive Management on Status of [REDACTED]
+ [REDACTED] Leads (S//NF) .......................69
+IV. Justice Department Office of Intelligence Policy and Review's (OIPR)
+and FISA Court's Early Role in Stellar Wind
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) .......................70
+ A. Overview of OIPR (U) .......................71
+ B. OIPR Counsel Learns of Stellar Wind Program (U//FOUO)..71
+ C. FISA Court is Informed of Stellar Wind (TS//SI//NF). .......................74
+ D. OIPR Implements "Scrubbing" Procedures for Stellar Wind
+ Information in International Terrorism FISA Applications
+ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) .......................78
+ 1. Initial Scrubbing Procedures (TS//SI//NF) .......................79
+ 2. Complications with Scrubbing Procedures
+ (TS//SI//NF) .......................81
+ E. Judge Kollar-Kotelly Succeeds Judge Lamberth as FISA
+ Court Presiding Judge (U) .......................83
+ 1. Judge Kollar-Kotelly Modifies OIPR Scrubbing
+ Procedures (TS//SI//NF) .......................83
+ 2. OIPR implements Judge Kollar-Kotelly's Scrubbing
+ Procedure (TS//SI//NF) .......................85
+
+V. FBI Initiates Measures to Improve the Management of
+Stellar Wind Information (S//NF) .......................88
+ A. CAU Acting Unit Chief Evaluates FBI Response to
+ Stellar Wind (S//NF) .......................89
+ B. FBI Increases Cooperation with NSA and Initiates
+ Project to Manage Stellar Wind Information
+ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) .......................90
+ C. FBI Assigns CAU Personnel to NSA on Full-Time Basis
+ (S//NF) .......................93
+
+VI. OIG Analysis (U) .......................94
+CHAPTER FOUR: LEGAL REASSESSMENT OF STELLAR WIND
+(MAY 2003 THROUGH MAY 2004) (TS//SI//NF) .......................99
+
+I. Justice Department Reassesses Legality of Stellar Wind Program
+(TS//SI//NF) .......................99
+ A. Overview of Office of Legal Counsel (U) .......................99
+
+iii
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+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+B. Personnel Changes within Office of Legal Counsel (U) .......................100
+ 1. Yoo's Role in the Program (October 2001 through
+ May 2003) (U) ................................................................ 100
+ 2. Philbin Replaces Yoo (U)............................................... 103
+ 3. Initial Concerns with Yoo's Analysis (U) ........................ 104
+ 4. Problems with [REDACTED]
+ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)................................................ 106
+ 5. Other Collection Concerns (S//NF)................................. 108
+ 6. Decision to Draft New OLC Memorandum (U) ................ 108
+
+C. Reassessment of Legal Rationale for the Program
+(TS//SI//NF) .......................................................................... 109
+ 1. Goldsmith Becomes OLC Assistant Attorney
+ General (U).................................................................... 109
+ 2. NSA Denied Access to OLC Memoranda (U//FOUO).. 111
+ 3. Goldsmith Joins Effort to Reassess Legal Basis for
+ the Program (TS//SI//NF)............................................ 112
+ 4. AUMF Becomes the Primary Legal Rationale
+ Supporting [REDACTED] of the Stellar Wind
+ Program (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)................................. 113
+ 5. Office of Legal Counsel Raises its Reassessment of
+ the Stellar Wind Program (December 2003 through
+ January 2004) (TS//SI//NF).......................................... 115
+ 6. Deputy Attorney General Comey is Read into the
+ Program (U).................................................................. 118
+
+D. Office of Legal Counsel Presents its Conclusions to the
+White House (U) ..................................................................... 119
+ 1. March 4, 2004: Comey Meets with Ashcroft to
+ Discuss Problems with the Program (U) ........................ 120
+ 2. March 5, 2004: Comey Determines Ashcroft is
+ "Absent or Disabled” (U) ............................................... 121
+ 3. March 5, 2004: Goldsmith and Philbin Seek
+ Clarification from White House on Presidential
+ Authorizations (U) ........................................................ 122
+ 4. March 6 to 8, 2004: The Department Concludes
+ That Yoo's Legal Memoranda Did Not Cover the
+ Program (U)................................................................... 124
+ 5. March 9, 2004: White House Seeks to Persuade
+ Department and FBI to Support Continuation of the
+ Program (S//NF)............................................................ 126
+ 6. Conflict Ensues between Department and White
+ House (U) ...................................................................... 129
+
+II. White House Continues Program without Justice Department's
+Certification (TS//SI//NF)......................................................... 130
+
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+
+A. White House Counsel Gonzales Certifies March 11, 2004,
+Presidential Authorization (TS//SI//NF)................................. 131
+ 1. March 10, 2004: Office of Legal Counsel Presses for
+ Solicitor General to be Read into Program (U) ............... 131
+ 2. March 10, 2004: Congressional Leaders Briefed on
+ Situation (U) ................................................................ 131
+ 3. March 10, 2004: Hospital Visit (U)............................... 134
+ 4. March 10, 2004: Olson is Read into the Program (U). 140
+ 5. March 11, 2004: Goldsmith Proposes Compromise
+ Solution (U) ................................................................. 141
+ 6. March 11, 2004: White House Asserts that Comey's
+ Status as Acting Attorney General was Unclear (U).... 142
+ 7. March 11, 2004: Gonzales Certifies Presidential
+ Authorization as to Form and Legality (TS//SI//NF):144
+
+B. Department and FBI Officials React to Issuance of
+March 11, 2004, Authorization (TS//SI//NF).......................... 148
+ 1. Initial Responses of Department and FBI Officials (U) 149
+ 2. Department and FBI Officials Consider Resigning (U) 152
+ 3. Comey and Mueller Meet with President Bush (U)...... 155
+ 4. Comey Directs Continued Cooperation with NSA (U).. 157
+ 5. Department Conducts Additional Legal Analysis (U)... 158
+ 6. Comey Determines that Ashcroft Remains "Absent or
+ Disabled" (U) ................................................................ 163
+ 7. Judge Kollar-Kotelly Briefed on Lack of Attorney
+ General Certification (U) ............................................. 164
+ 8. Comey and Gonzales Exchange Documents
+Asserting Conflicting Positions (U) .............................. 164
+
+C. White House Agrees to [REDACTED]
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) ........................................................ 168
+ 1. March 19, 2004, Modification (U)................................. 168
+ 2. [REDACTED] 172
+ 3. [REDACTED] 173
+ 4. [REDACTED] 175
+ 5. Judge Kollar-Kotelly is Presented with the OLC Legal
+ Analysis Regarding [REDACTED]
+ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)............................................ 175
+6. April 2, 2004, Modification (U) ..................................... 178
+
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+
+7. [REDACTED] Standard is Conveyed
+to the FBI (TS//SI//NF)................................................ 180
+8. Office of Legal Counsel Assesses NSA's Compliance
+with New Collection Standards (TS//SI//NF)............... 180
+9. May 5, 2004, Presidential Authorization
+(TS//SI//NF)................................................................. 181
+10. May 6, 2004, OLC Memorandum (TS//SI//NF)............ 182
+
+III. OIG Analysis (U) ................................................................. 186
+ A. Department's Access to and Legal Review of Stellar Wind
+ Program Through May 2004 (TS//SI//NF).............................. 186
+ B. The Hospital Visit (U)............................................................ 197
+ C. Recertification of the Presidential Authorization and
+ Modification of the Program (U)............................................ 199
+
+CHAPTER FIVE: STELLAR WIND PROGRAM'S TRANSITION TO FISA
+AUTHORITY (JUNE 2004 THROUGH AUGUST 2007) ................... 203
+
+I. E-Mail Meta Data Collection Under FISA (TS//SI//NF)................. 203
+ A. Application and FISA Court Order (U) ............................ 203
+ 1. Decision to Seek a Pen Register and Trap and Trace
+ (PR/TT) Order from the FISA Court (TS//SI//NF) .... 203
+ 2. Briefing for Judge Kollar-Kotelly (U) ........................ 205
+ 3. The PR/TT Application (TS//SI//NF) .......................... 205
+ 4. Judge Kollar-Kotelly Raises Questions about PR/TT
+ Application (TS//SI//NF)............................................. 212
+ 5. FISA Court Order (U)................................................. 213
+
+ B. President Orders Limited Use [REDACTED]
+ [REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)......................................................... 217
+ 1. The President's August 9, 2004, Memorandum to the
+ Secretary of Defense (TS//SI//NF)................................ 217
+ 2. Office of Legal Counsel Determines [REDACTED]
+ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)............................................ 218
+
+ C. Non-Compliance with PR/TT Order (TS//SI//NF)................. 219
+ 1. Filtering Violations (TS//SI//NF)................................ 219
+ 2. FISA Court Renews PR/TT Order (TS//SI//NF)........ 221
+ 3. [REDACTED] 222
+
+ D. Subsequent PR/TT Applications and Orders (TS//SI//NF). 224
+
+II. Telephony Meta Data Collection Under FISA (TS//SI//NF) .......... 225
+
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+A. Decision to Seek Order Compelling Production of Call
+detail records (TS//SI//NF).................................................... 226
+B. Summary of Department's Application and Related FISA
+Court Order (S/NF)................................................................ 228
+C. Non-Compliance with Section 215 Orders (TS//SI//NF) .... 232
+
+III. Content Collection under FISA (TS//SI//NF) ............................... 237
+ A. Decision to Seek Content Order (TS//SI//NF) ................... 237
+ B. Summary of Department's December 13, 2006, Content
+ Application (TS//SI//NF) .................................................... 239
+ C. Judge Howard Grants Application in Part (TS//SI//NF) .... 245
+ D. Domestic Selectors Application and Order (TS//SI//NF)..... 248
+ E. Last Stellar Wind Presidential Authorization Expires
+ (TS//SI//NF)............................................................................ 250
+ F. First Domestic and Foreign Selectors FISA Renewal
+ Applications (TS//SI//NF)..................................................... 251
+ G. Revised Renewal Application for Foreign Selectors and
+ Order (TS//SI//NF)................................................................. 255
+
+IV. The Protect America Act and the FISA Amendments Act of
+2008 (U)..................................................................................... 259
+ A. The Protect America Act (U) ............................................. 260
+ B. The FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (U)............................. 264
+
+V. OIG Analysis (U) ................................................................. 267
+
+CHAPTER SIX: [REDACTED] (S//NF).................................. 271
+
+I. [REDACTED] Process (S//NF).......................................... 272
+
+II. FBI's Decision to Issue National Security Letters under [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] to Obtain Telephone Subscriber Information (S//NF)............277
+
+III. [REDACTED] and Scrubbing Process (TS//SI//NF)...................... 284
+
+IV. Impact of Stellar Wind Information on FBI Counterterrorism
+Efforts (S//NF).......................................................................... 291
+ A. Stellar Wind [REDACTED] Statistics
+ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) ................................................... 291
+ B. FBI Field Office Investigations of [REDACTED] Tippers
+ (S//NF) [REDACTED] 296
+
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+C. FBI Statistical Surveys of [REDACTED] Meta Data Tippers
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) ........................................................ 300
+ 1. Early 2006 Survey of [REDACTED] Telephony and E-Mail
+ Meta Data Tippers (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)................. 301
+ 2. January 2006 Survey of E-Mail Meta Data
+Tippers (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)................................... 304
+
+D. FBI Judgmental Assessments of Stellar Wind Information
+(S//NF)..................................................................................... 305
+
+E. Examples of FBI Counterterrorism Cases Involving
+Stellar Wind Information (S//NF)............................................ 310
+1. [REDACTED] 311
+2. [REDACTED] 313
+3. [REDACTED] 315
+4. [REDACTED] 318
+5. [REDACTED] 322
+
+V. OIG Analysis (U) ................................................................. 325
+
+CHAPTER SEVEN: DISCOVERY ISSUES RELATED TO STELLAR WIND
+INFORMATION (TS//SI//NF)...................................................... 333
+
+I. Relevant Law (U) ................................................................. 333
+
+II. Cases Raise Questions about Government's Compliance with
+Discovery Obligations (U) ...................................................... 335
+A. [REDACTED] 335
+B. [REDACTED] 336
+
+III. Criminal Division Examines Discovery Issues (U) ...................... 340
+ A. The "Informal Process" for Treating Discovery Issues in
+ International Terrorism Cases (U)........................................ 341
+ B. [REDACTED] Memorandum Analyzing Discovery Issues Raised
+ by the Stellar Wind Program (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)...... 342
+ C. Office of Legal Counsel and Discovery Issue (U) ............... 346
+
+IV. Use of the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) to
+Respond to Discovery Requests (U) ........................................ 347
+ A. Overview of CIPA (U)........................................................ 348
+ B. Use of CIPA in International Terrorism Prosecutions
+ Alleged to Involve Stellar Wind-Derived Information
+ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF) .................................................... 348
+
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+C. Government Arguments in Specific Cases (U) ................... 351
+ [REDACTED] ....... 351
+ [REDACTED] ....... 353
+ [REDACTED] ....... 354
+ [REDACTED] ....... 355
+
+V. OIG ANALYSIS (U).............................................................. 357
+
+CHAPTER EIGHT: PUBLIC STATEMENTS ABOUT THE
+SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM (U) ............................................... 361
+
+I. Summary of the Dispute about the Program (U) ..................... 361
+
+II. The New York Times Articles and President Bush's Confirmation
+Regarding NSA Activities (U)................................................ 363
+
+III. Other Administration Statements (U)........................................ 365
+
+IV. Testimony and Other Statements (U) ....................................... 366
+ A. Gonzales's February 6, 2006, Senate Judiciary Committee
+ Testimony (U) ................................................................... 367
+ B. Comey's May 15, 2007, Senate Judiciary Committee Testimony
+ (U) .................................................................................... 370
+ C. Gonzales's June 5, 2007, Press Conference (U) ............... 371
+ D. Gonzales's July 24, 2007, Senate Judiciary Committee
+ Testimony (U) ................................................................... 371
+ E. FBI Director Mueller's July 26, 2007, House Committee
+ on the Judiciary Testimony (U) ........................................ 376
+ F. Gonzales's Follow-up Letter to the Senate Judiciary
+ Committee (U)................................................................... 377
+
+V. OIG Analysis (U).............................................................. 378
+
+CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSIONS (U)......................................... 387
+
+I. Operation of the Program (U//FOUO)................................... 388
+
+II. Office of Legal Counsel's Analysis of the Stellar Wind Program
+(TS//SI//NF).......................................................................... 389
+
+III. Hospital Visit and White House Recertification of the Program (U) 394
+
+IV. Transition of Program to FISA Authority
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF).......................................................... 396
+
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+V. Impact of Stellar Wind Information on FBI Counterterrorism
+Efforts (S//NF) ........................................................................ 397
+
+VI. Discovery and "Scrubbing" Issues (TS//SI//NF)..................... 402
+
+VII. Gonzales's Statements (U)...................................................... 404
+
+VIII. Conclusion (U) ...................................................................... 406
+
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+CHAPTER ONE
+INTRODUCTION (U)
+
+On October 4, 2001, three weeks after the terrorist attacks of
+September 11, 2001, the President issued a Top Secret Presidential
+Authorization to the Secretary of Defense directing that the signals
+intelligence capabilities of the National Security Agency (NSA) be used to
+detect and prevent further attacks in the United States. The Presidential
+Authorization stated that an extraordinary emergency existed permitting the
+use of electronic surveillance within the United States for counterterrorism
+purposes, without a court order, under certain circumstances. For over 6
+years, this Presidential Authorization was renewed at approximately 30 to
+45 day intervals to authorize the highly classified NSA surveillance program,
+which was given the cover term "Stellar Wind."¹ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Under these Presidential Authorizations and subsequently obtained
+Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA Court) orders, the NSA
+intercepted the content of international telephone and e-mail
+communications of both U.S. and non-U.S. persons when certain criteria
+were met. In addition, the NSA collected vast amounts of telephony and
+e-mail meta data – that is, communications signaling information showing
+contacts between and among telephone numbers and e-mail addresses, but
+not including the contents of the communications.
+[REDACTED]²
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Within the Department of Justice (Department or Justice Department)
+and the Intelligence Community, the different types of information collected
+under the NSA program came to be referred to as three different "baskets" of
+information. The collection of the content of telephone and e-mail
+
+¹ This program is also known as the President's Surveillance Program (PSP). In
+Title III of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Amendments Act of 2008 (FISA
+Amendments Act), the President's Surveillance Program is defined as
+
+ the intelligence activity involving communications that was authorized by the
+ President during the period beginning on September 11, 2001, and ending
+ on January 17, 2007, including the program referred to by the President in a
+ radio address on December 17, 2005 (commonly known as the Terrorist
+ Surveillance Program).
+FISA Amendments Act, Title III, Sec. 301(a)(3). (U)
+² [REDACTED]
+
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+communications was referred to as basket 1. The collection of telephone
+meta data - including information on the date, time, and duration of the
+telephone call, the telephone number of the caller, and the number receiving
+the call - was referred to as basket 2. The collection of e-mail meta data -
+including the "to,” “from,” “cc,” “bcc,” and “sent" lines of an e-mail, but not
+the "subject" line or content of the e-mail was referred to as basket 3.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The content and meta data information was used by the NSA, working
+with other members of the Intelligence Community, to generate intelligence
+reports. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] By March 2006, over [REDACTED] individual U.S. telephone numbers
+and [REDACTED] e-mail addresses had been "tipped" to the FBI as leads, the vast
+majority of which were disseminated to FBI field offices for investigation or
+other action. Some Stellar Wind-derived information also was disseminated
+to the larger Intelligence Community through traditional intelligence
+reporting channels.³ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+In addition to the FBI's receipt of information from the program, the
+Justice Department was involved in the program in other ways. Most
+significantly, the Department's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) provided advice
+to the White House and the Attorney General on the overall legality of the
+Stellar Wind program. In addition, the Department's Office of Intelligence
+Policy and Review (now called the Office of Intelligence in the Department's
+National Security Division) worked with the FBI and NSA to justify the
+inclusion of Stellar Wind-derived information in applications seeking orders
+under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), and when unable to
+do so, to exclude such information from the applications. The Department's
+National Security Division (NSD) also submitted classified ex parte legal
+filings in federal courts to address any Stellar Wind reporting concerning
+defendants during discovery in international terrorism prosecutions.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Beginning in December 2005, aspects of the Stellar Wind program
+were publicly disclosed in media reports, originally in a series of articles by
+The New York Times. After these articles disclosed the telephone and e-mail
+content collection (basket 1), the President, Attorney General Alberto
+Gonzales, and other Administration officials publicly confirmed the
+
+³ The larger Intelligence Community also includes components within other
+Departments, such as the Departments of Homeland Security, Treasury, Defense, and
+State. (U)
+
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+existence of this part of the program. However, the other aspects of the
+program - the collection of telephone and e-mail meta data – have not been
+publicly confirmed. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The President and other Administration officials labeled the NSA
+collection of information that was publicly disclosed as "the Terrorist
+Surveillance Program," although this name was sometimes used within the
+Intelligence Community to refer to the entire Stellar Wind program. The
+program was also referred to by other names, such as the "Warrantless
+Wiretapping Program" or the "NSA Surveillance Program." As discussed
+above, the technical name for the program, and the term we generally use
+throughout this report, is the Stellar Wind program.⁴ (S//NF)
+
+This report describes the Office of the Inspector General's (OIG) review
+of the Department's role in the Stellar Wind program. Our review discusses
+the evolution of the Stellar Wind program, including the changes in the
+Department's legal analyses of the program, the operational changes to the
+program, and the eventual transition of the program from presidential
+authority to statutory authority under FISA. The report also assesses the
+FBI's use of information derived from the Stellar Wind program, including
+the impact of the information in FBI counterterrorism investigations.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+I. Methodology of OIG Review (U)
+
+During the course of this review, the OIG conducted approximately 80
+interviews. Among the individuals we interviewed were former White House
+Counsel and Attorney General Gonzales; former Deputy Attorney General
+James Comey; former NSA Director Michael Hayden; FBI Director Robert
+Mueller, III; former Counsel for Intelligence Policy James Baker; former
+Assistant Attorneys General for OLC Jay Bybee and Jack Goldsmith; former
+Principal Deputy and Acting Assistant Attorney General for OLC Steven
+Bradbury; former Deputy Assistant Attorney General for OLC and Associate
+Deputy Attorney General Patrick Philbin; and former Assistant Attorneys
+General for the NSD Kenneth Wainstein and Patrick Rowan. We also
+interviewed senior FBI Counterterrorism Division officials, the FBI General
+Counsel and other FBI attorneys, FBI special agents and intelligence
+analysts, and senior officials in the Department's Criminal and National
+Security Divisions.⁵ (U)
+
+⁴ Stellar Wind is classified as a Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information
+program. (S/NF)
+
+⁵ Although the FBI is a component of the Department of Justice, references in this
+report to Department officials generally mean non-FBI Department officials. This
+(Cont'd.)
+
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+We attempted to interview former Attorney General John Ashcroft, but
+he declined our request for an interview. (U)
+
+In addition, we attempted to interview former Deputy Assistant
+Attorney General for OLC John Yoo, who drafted the early legal memoranda
+supporting the legality of the Stellar Wind program. Yoo, through his
+counsel, declined our request for an interview. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+We also attempted to interview White House officials regarding the
+program, including Andrew Card, former Chief of Staff to President George
+W. Bush. We made our request for an interview of Card both directly to
+Card and through the Office of the Counsel to the President (White House
+Counsel's Office). Card did not grant our request for an interview.
+Similarly, we attempted to interview David Addington, former Counsel to
+Vice President Richard B. Cheney. We contacted the Office of the Vice
+President, but that office did not respond to our request for an interview of
+Addington. (U)
+
+We believe that we were able to obtain a full picture of the evolution of
+the program and the theories supporting its legality. However, the refusal
+by White House officials, former Attorney General Ashcroft, and former
+Deputy Assistant Attorney General Yoo to be interviewed hampered our
+ability to fully investigate the process by which the White House and the
+Justice Department arrived at the initial legal rationale to support the
+program. In addition, because of our inability to interview Ashcroft, we
+could not fully determine what efforts the Department took to press the
+White House for additional Department attorneys to be read into Stellar
+Wind to work on the legal analysis of the program during its first two years
+of operation. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+In our review, we also examined thousands of electronic and hard
+copy documents, including the Presidential Authorizations and threat
+assessments, OLC legal memoranda supporting the program,
+contemporaneous notes and e-mails of various senior Department and FBI
+officials, and FISA Court pleadings and orders. We also reviewed NSA
+materials, including NSA OIG reports on the Stellar Wind program and
+correspondence between the NSA Office of General Counsel and the
+Department. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+In addition, we received from the FBI an electronic database of its
+collection of Electronic Communications (EC) that were used to disseminate
+
+distinction is especially relevant to our discussion of the number of Department personnel
+read into the Stellar Wind program, as distinguished from the number of FBI personnel
+read into the program. (U//FOUO)
+
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+Stellar Wind-derived leads to FBI field offices. This database contained
+approximately [REDACTED] ECs, including leads to the FBI's 56 field offices, and
+responses from those field offices, among other documents. The OIG used
+this database to confirm information it obtained through interviews and to
+assist in our analysis of FBI investigations that were based on Stellar Wind
+information. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+II. Organization of this Report (U)
+
+Chapter Two of this report provides an overview of the primary legal
+authorities that are relevant to the Stellar Wind program. This chapter also
+discusses the Presidential Authorizations that were issued to approve the
+program. (U//FOUO)
+
+Chapter Three describes the inception and early implementation of
+the Stellar Wind program from September 2001 through April 2003. This
+chapter includes a description of the early OLC legal memoranda on the
+legality of Stellar Wind, how the program was technically implemented, the
+FBI's early participation in the program, and the FISA Court's first
+awareness of the program. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Chapter Four covers the period from May 2003 through May 2004
+when the legal rationale for the program was substantially reconsidered by
+the Justice Department. This chapter details in particular the events of
+March 2004 when the White House decided to continue the program
+without the Department's certification of a Presidential Authorization.
+During this time, Attorney General Ashcroft was hospitalized and Deputy
+Attorney General Comey temporarily exercised the powers of the Attorney
+General in his capacity as Deputy Attorney General. Comey declined to
+recertify the Presidential Authorization approving the program based on
+legal advice he received from OLC Assistant Attorney General Jack
+Goldsmith, who questioned the adequacy of the legal support for aspects of
+the program. Comey's decision prompted a significant dispute between the
+White House and the Justice Department, which resulted in White House
+Counsel Gonzales and White House Chief of Staff Card visiting Ashcroft in
+his hospital room in an unsuccessful attempt to have Ashcroft recertify the
+program. This chapter also describes the background to the dispute, the
+events related to the hospital visit, the threat by Department officials to
+resign over the dispute, and the eventual resolution of the dispute.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+Chapter Five discusses the transition, in stages, from a program
+based on Presidential Authorizations to collection activities authorized
+under the FISA statute. This transition took place in stages between July
+2004 and January 2007. This chapter also summarizes legislation in 2007
+
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+and 2008 designed to modernize certain provisions of FISA.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Chapter Six discusses the use of Stellar Wind information by the FBI.
+It describes the process by which the FBI disseminated Stellar Wind-derived
+leads to FBI field offices under a program called [REDACTED] as well as the
+impact and effectiveness of the Stellar Wind program to the FBI's
+counterterrorism efforts. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Chapter Seven examines the Department's handling of discovery
+issues related to Stellar Wind-derived information in international terrorism
+prosecutions. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Chapter Eight analyzes testimony and public statements about
+aspects of the Stellar Wind program by Attorney General Gonzales. We
+assess whether the Attorney General's statements, particularly his
+testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee in February 2006 and July
+2007, were false, inaccurate, or misleading. (S//NF)
+
+Chapter Nine contains our conclusions and recommendations. (U)
+
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+CHAPTER TWO
+LEGAL AUTHORITIES (U)
+
+This chapter summarizes the primary legal authorities referred to
+throughout this report concerning the Stellar Wind program. These
+authorities include Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution; the Fourth
+Amendment to the Constitution; the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act;
+the Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution (AUMF) passed
+by Congress after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; Executive
+Order 12333; and the Presidential Authorizations specifically authorizing
+the Stellar Wind program. Other authorities, including relevant criminal
+statutes and judicial opinions, are discussed throughout the report.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+I. Constitutional, Statutory, and Executive Order Authorities (U)
+
+A. Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution (U)
+
+Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, which was one of the primary
+authorities cited in the Presidential Authorizations in support of the legality
+of the Stellar Wind program, provides in relevant part:
+
+ The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and
+ Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several
+ States, when called into the actual Service of the United States;
+ he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer
+ in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating
+ to the Duties of their respective Offices....(TS//SI//NF)
+
+B. The Fourth Amendment (U)
+
+The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, which also was raised as
+an important factor in the analysis of the legality of the Stellar Wind
+program, provides:
+
+ The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
+ papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
+ seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
+ upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
+ particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person
+ or things to be seized. (TS//SI//NF)
+
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+C. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)⁶ (U)
+
+The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. § 1801, et
+seq., was enacted in 1978 to "provide legislative authorization and
+regulation for all electronic surveillance conducted within the United States
+for foreign intelligence purposes." S. Rep. No. 95-701, at 9 (1978), reprinted
+in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3973, 3977. Three major FISA issues are covered in
+this report. First, as discussed in Chapter Four, FISA was central to a
+controversy that arose in late 2003 and early 2004 when officials in the
+Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) and others viewed FISA as potentially in
+conflict with the legal rationale for at least one aspect of the Stellar Wind
+program. OLC officials reasoned that if courts viewed FISA in isolation, they
+might conclude that Congress intended to regulate the President's power to
+conduct electronic surveillance during wartime, thereby raising questions
+about the legality of aspects of the program. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Second, after the FISA Court was informed about the Stellar Wind
+program in January 2002, it required the government to carefully scrutinize
+each FISA application to ensure that no Stellar Wind-derived information
+was relied upon in support of a FISA application without the Court's
+knowledge, and later without its consent. This process, known as
+"scrubbing,” is discussed in Chapters Three and Six.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Third, beginning in July 2004, the Stellar Wind program was brought
+under FISA authority in stages, with the entire program brought under FISA
+authority by January 2007. In August 2007 and again in July 2008, FISA
+was amended, and [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The migration of the Stellar Wind program
+from presidential authority to FISA authority, as well as legislation
+subsequently enacted to modernize FISA, is discussed in Chapter Five.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+In the following sections, we summarize relevant provisions of FISA as
+they related to the Stellar Wind program. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+1. Overview of FISA (U)
+
+FISA authorizes the federal government to engage in electronic
+surveillance and physical searches, to use pen register and trap and trace
+
+⁶ Unless otherwise indicated, all references to FISA are to the statute as it existed
+prior to the Protect America Act of 2007 and the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. (U)
+
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+devices, and to obtain business records to acquire inside the United States
+foreign intelligence information by, in some instances, targeting foreign
+powers and agents of foreign powers.⁷ FISA also permits the targeting of
+foreign powers and their agents who are located outside the United States.
+As a general rule, the FISA Court must first approve an application by the
+government before the government initiates electronic surveillance. FISA
+applications must identify or describe the "target" of the surveillance, and
+must establish probable cause to believe that the target is a "foreign power"
+or "agent of a foreign power" and that "each of the facilities or places at
+which the electronic surveillance is directed is being used, or is about to be
+used, by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power."⁸ 50 U.S.C.
+§ 1804(a)(4)(A) & (B). (TS//SI//NF)
+
+FISA provides four exceptions to the requirement of obtaining judicial
+approval prior to conducting electronic surveillance: (1) for electronic
+surveillance directed at certain facilities where the Attorney General certifies
+that the electronic surveillance is solely directed at communications
+transmitted by means used exclusively between or among foreign powers or
+from property under the open and exclusive control of a foreign power, 50
+U.S.C. § 1802; (2) where the Attorney General determines an emergency
+exists and authorizes emergency surveillance until the information sought is
+obtained, the after-filed application for an order is denied, or the expiration
+of 72 hours from the time of Attorney General authorization, 50 U.S.C.
+§ 1805(f); (3) for training and testing purposes, 50 U.S.C. § 1805(g); and (4)
+for 15 days following a congressional declaration of war, 50 U.S.C. § 1811.⁹
+(U)
+
+The 15-day war declaration exception to FISA's warrant requirement
+was particularly relevant to the events of 2004, when OLC reassessed its
+prior opinions concerning the legality of the Stellar Wind program.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+⁷ This report is primarily concerned with the provisions of FISA that authorize
+electronic surveillance, pen register and trap and trace devices, and access to certain
+business records. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+⁸ The terms "foreign power" and "agent of a foreign power" are defined in FISA at 50
+U.S.C. § 1801(a) & (b). "Foreign power" is defined, inter alia, as "a group engaged in
+international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor; ...." 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(4).
+An "agent of a foreign power" may be a U.S. person, defined at 50 U.S.C. § 1801(i) to mean,
+inter alia, a United States citizen or permanent resident alien. The term "facilities" is not
+defined in FISA. (U)
+
+⁹ The Attorney General's emergency surveillance authority under 50 U.S.C.
+§ 1805(f) was extended to 7 days under Section 105(a) of the FISA Amendments Act of
+2008. (U)
+
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+
+As discussed in Chapter Four [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+Another FISA provision prohibits persons from intentionally engaging
+in electronic surveillance "under color of law except as authorized by
+statute[.]" 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a)(1). As discussed in Chapter Eight, in 2006
+the Justice Department asserted in a publicly released legal analysis that
+this provision did not preclude certain warrantless electronic surveillance
+activities because such surveillance was "authorized by" subsequent
+legislative enactments – principally the AUMF. The Department also
+asserted that the AUMF "confirms and supplements the President's
+constitutional authority" to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance
+against the enemy during wartime. (U)
+
+2. FISA Applications and Orders (U)
+
+FISA applications were presented to the FISA Court by the
+Department's Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR).¹⁰ Department
+and FBI officials familiar with the preparation and presentation of FISA
+applications described this process as extremely time-consuming and labor
+intensive. (U)
+
+Each application must be approved and signed by the Attorney
+General (or Acting Attorney General) or Deputy Attorney General and must
+include the certification of a federal officer identifying or describing the
+target of the electronic surveillance; a "statement of the facts and
+circumstances relied upon by the applicant to justify his belief that the
+target is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power and that the electronic
+surveillance is directed at the facilities or places used or to be used by the
+target; a statement of proposed minimization procedures; and a detailed
+description of the nature of the information sought and the type of
+communication or activities to be subjected to the surveillance. 50 U.S.C.
+§ 1804(a)(1)-(6).11 The application must also include the certification of a
+
+¹⁰ The Office of Intelligence Policy and Review became a part of the Department's
+National Security Division, which was created in September 2006. As of April 2008, the
+Office of Intelligence Policy and Review was renamed the Office of Intelligence. This
+organizational change did not affect the FISA application process. (U)
+
+¹¹ FISA defines minimization procedures as
+
+ [s]pecific procedures, which shall be adopted by the Attorney General, that
+ are reasonably designed in light of the purpose and technique of the
+(Cont'd.)
+
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+
+high-ranking executive branch official or officials designated by the
+President from among those executive officers employed in the area of
+national security or defense that the information sought is deemed to be
+foreign intelligence information, that such information "cannot reasonably
+be obtained by normal investigative techniques," and that a "significant
+purpose" of the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information.¹²
+Id. at § 1804(a)(7). (U)
+
+FISA orders authorize electronic surveillance of U.S. persons for 90
+days. FISA orders may be renewed upon the same basis as the underlying
+order. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(e). As noted, FISA also provides for the emergency
+use of electronic surveillance. When the Attorney General reasonably
+determines that an emergency situation exists, the use of electronic
+surveillance may be approved for a period of up to 72 hours (and under the
+FISA Amendments Act of 2008, up to 7 days) without a FISA order. 50
+U.S.C. § 1805(f). (U)
+
+3. FISA Court (U)
+
+The FISA statute established the FISA Court to review applications
+and issue orders. The FISA Court initially was composed of seven U.S.
+District Court judges designated by the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme
+Court to serve staggered, non-renewable 7-year terms.¹³ 50 U.S.C.
+
+ particular surveillance, to minimize the acquisition and retention, and
+ prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly available information concerning
+ unconsenting United States persons consistent with the need of the United
+ States to obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence
+ information..
+ 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(1). (U)
+
+¹² As initially enacted, FISA required officials to certify that "the purpose" of the
+surveillance was to obtain "foreign intelligence information." However, the Uniting and
+Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
+Terrorism Act (the USA PATRIOT Act) was enacted in October 2001 and amended this
+language in FISA to require only that officials certify that "a significant purpose" of the
+surveillance was to obtain foreign intelligence information. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B). This
+amendment, along with post-September 11 changes to Attorney General guidelines on
+intelligence sharing procedures and a ruling by the FISA Court of Review, removed the
+so-called "wall" that had existed between intelligence-gathering activities and criminal
+investigations. See Memorandum from the Attorney General to Director of the FBI, et al.,
+entitled "Intelligence Sharing Procedures for Foreign Intelligence and Foreign
+Counterintelligence Investigations Conducted by the FBI" (March 6, 2002); In re Sealed
+Case, 310 F.3d 717, 727 (For. Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002)(FISA did not "preclude or limit the
+government's use or proposed use of foreign intelligence information, which included
+evidence of certain kinds of criminal activity, in a criminal prosecution."). (U)
+
+¹³ To achieve staggered terms, the initial appointments ranged from one to seven
+years. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(d). (U)
+
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+
+§ 1803(a) & (d). The number of judges serving on the FISA Court was
+increased to 11 by the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. (U)
+
+D. Authorization for Use of Military Force (U)
+
+On September 18, 2001, in response to the terrorist attacks of
+September 11, Congress approved an Authorization for Use of Military Force
+Joint Resolution (AUMF). In conjunction with the President's
+Commander-in-Chief authority under Article II of the Constitution, this
+legislation has been cited in support of the President's authority to conduct
+electronic surveillance without judicial approval. See, e.g., Legal Authorities
+Supporting the Activities of the National Security Agency Described by the
+President, January 19, 2006 (Justice Department White Paper), at 6-17.
+The AUMF states, in pertinent part:
+
+ To authorize the use of the United States Armed Forces against
+ those responsible for the recent attacks launched against the
+ United States.
+
+ Whereas, on September 11, 2001, acts of treacherous violence
+ were committed against the United States and its citizens; and
+
+ Whereas, such acts render it both necessary and appropriate
+ that the United States exercise its rights to self-defense and to
+ protect United States citizens both at home and abroad; and
+
+ Whereas, in light of the threat to the national security and
+ foreign policy of the United States posed by these grave acts of
+ violence; and
+
+ Whereas, such acts continue to pose an unusual and
+ extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy
+ of the United States; and
+
+ Whereas, the President has authority under the Constitution to
+ take action to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism
+ against the United States: Now, therefore, be it
+
+ Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
+ United States of America in Congress assembled,
+ ...
+ SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES
+ ARMED FORCES
+
+ (a) IN GENERAL – That the President is authorized to use all
+ necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
+ organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
+ committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
+ September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or
+
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+
+ persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international
+ terrorism against the United States by such nations,
+ organizations or persons. (U)
+
+Pursuant to this authority, the President ordered the U.S. armed
+forces to invade Afghanistan to combat al Qaeda terrorists and overthrow
+the Taliban government that had given them refuge. (U)
+
+In 2004, OLC took the position that the AUMF was "expressly
+designed to authorize whatever military actions the Executive deems
+appropriate to safeguard the United States[,]" including the use of electronic
+surveillance to detect and prevent further attacks. See Office of Legal
+Counsel Memorandum, May 6, 2004, at 31, citing 50 U.S.C. § 1811. In
+addition, the Justice Department asserted in the 2006 White Paper that in
+enacting FISA Congress contemplated that a later legislative enactment
+could authorize electronic surveillance outside the procedures set forth in
+FISA itself, and cited the AUMF as such a legislative enactment. See Justice
+Department White Paper at 20-28, citing 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a)(1).
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+E. Executive Order 12333 (U)
+
+On December 4, 1981, President Reagan signed Executive Order
+12333 as part of a series of legal reforms that followed abuses of
+intelligence-gathering authority documented by the Church Commission in
+the 1970s.¹⁴ Executive Order 12333 placed restrictions on intelligence
+collection activities engaged in by Executive Branch agencies, including the
+NSA, while also seeking to foster "full and free exchange of information"
+among these agencies.¹⁵ Executive Order 12333 at 1.1. (U)
+
+Executive Order 12333 provides that the Attorney General is
+authorized "to approve the use for intelligence purposes, within the United
+States or against a United States person abroad, of any technique for which
+a warrant would be required if undertaken for law enforcement purposes,
+provided that such techniques shall not be undertaken unless the Attorney
+General has determined in each case that there is probable cause to believe
+the technique is directed against a foreign power or an agent of a
+foreign power." Id. at 2.5. Executive Order 12333 also provides that
+
+¹⁴ See http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/church/reports/contents.htm. Volumes
+5 and 6 of the Church Commission report address abuses of intelligence-gathering
+authority by the NSA and the FBI. (U)
+
+¹⁵ Executive Order 12333 was amended on July 30, 2008, by Executive Order
+13470. This report refers to Executive Order 12333 as it existed prior to that amendment.
+(U)
+
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+
+electronic surveillance, as defined under FISA, must be conducted in
+accordance with FISA.¹⁶ (U)
+
+Executive Order 12333 prohibits the collection of foreign intelligence
+information by "authorized [agencies] of the Intelligence Community . . . for
+the purpose of acquiring information concerning the domestic activities of
+United States persons." Id. at 2.3(b). (U)
+
+However, in authorizing the Stellar Wind program, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] As discussed
+previously, the legal rationale advanced for this exemption was that the
+Authorization for Use of Military Force and the President's
+Commander-in-Chief powers gave the President the authority to collect such
+information, notwithstanding the FISA statute. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+II. Presidential Authorizations (U)
+
+The Stellar Wind program was first authorized by the President on
+October 4, 2001, and periodically reauthorized by the President through a
+series of documents issued to the Secretary of Defense entitled "Presidential
+Authorization for Specified Electronic Surveillance Activities During a
+Limited Period to Detect and Prevent Acts of Terrorism Within the United
+States" (Presidential Authorization or Authorization). A total of 43
+Presidential Authorizations, not including modifications and related
+presidential memoranda, were issued over the duration of the program from
+October 2001 through February 2007.¹⁷ Each Authorization directed the
+
+¹⁶ Prior to September 11, 2001, Executive Order 12333 and FISA were generally
+viewed as the principal governing authorities for conducting electronic surveillance. For
+example, in 2000 the NSA reported to Congress that
+
+ (U) The applicable legal standards for the collection, retention, or
+ dissemination of information concerning U.S. persons reflect a careful
+ balancing between the needs of the government for such intelligence and the
+ protection of the rights of U.S. persons, consistent with the reasonableness
+ standard of the Fourth Amendment, as determined by factual
+ circumstances.
+
+(U) In the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and Executive Order
+(E.O.) 12333, Congress and the Executive have codified this balancing.
+(Citations omitted.)
+
+NSA Report to Congress, Legal Standards for the Intelligence Community in Conducting
+Electronic Surveillance (2000). (U)
+
+¹⁷ The Presidential Authorizations were issued on the following dates: October 4,
+2001; November 2, 2001; November 30, 2001; January 9, 2002; March 14, 2002; April 18,
+2002; May 22, 2002; June 24, 2002; July 30, 2002; September 10, 2002; October 15,
+2002; November 18, 2002; January 8, 2003; February 7, 2003; March 17, 2003; April 22,
+(Cont'd.)
+
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+
+Secretary of Defense to [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] provided the surveillance met certain criteria. The specific
+criteria are described in detail in Chapters Three and Four of this report.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+A. Types of Collection Authorized (S//NF)
+
+The scope of collection permitted under the Presidential
+Authorizations varied over time, but generally involved intercepting the
+content of certain telephone calls and e-mails, and the collection of bulk
+telephone and e-mail meta data. The term "meta data" has been described
+as "information about information." As used in the Stellar Wind program,
+for telephone calls, meta data generally refers to "dialing-type information"
+(the originating and terminating telephone numbers, and the date, time, and
+duration of the call), but not the content of the call. For e-mails, meta data
+generally refers to the "to," "from," "cc," "bcc," and "sent" lines of an e-mail,
+but not the "subject" line or content. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The information collected through the Stellar Wind program fell into
+three categories, often referred to as "baskets":
+
+* Basket 1 (content of telephone and e-mail communications);
+* Basket 2 (telephony meta data); and
+* Basket 3 (e-mail meta data). (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+2003; June 11, 2003; July 14, 2003; September 10, 2003; October 15, 2003; December 9,
+2003; January 14, 2004; March 11, 2004; May 5, 2004; June 23, 2004; August 9, 2004;
+September 17, 2004; November 17, 2004; January 11, 2005; March 1, 2005; April 19,
+2005; June 14, 2005; July 26, 2005; September 10, 2005; October 26, 2005; December 13,
+2005; January 27, 2006; March 21, 2006; May 16, 2006; July 6, 2006; September 6, 2006;
+October 24, 2006; and December 8, 2006. The last Presidential Authorization expired
+February 1, 2007. There were also two modifications of a Presidential Authorization and
+one Presidential memorandum to the Secretary of Defense issued in connection with the
+Stellar Wind program. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
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+
+B. Findings and Primary Authorities (U)
+
+In this section, we describe certain features common to all the
+Presidential Authorizations. Each of the Presidential Authorizations
+included a finding to the effect that terrorist groups of global reach
+possessed the intent and capability to attack the United States, that an
+extraordinary emergency continued to exist, and that these circumstances
+"constitute an urgent and compelling governmental interest [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The primary authorities cited for the legality of these electronic
+surveillance and related activities were Article II of the Constitution and the
+Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution.[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED] The President also noted his
+intention to inform appropriate members of the Senate and the House of
+Representatives of the program "as soon as I judge that it can be done
+consistently with national defense needs." Some Presidential Authorizations
+described briefings given to members of Congress and FISA Court judges.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+C. The Reauthorization Process (U)
+
+The Presidential Authorizations were issued at intervals of
+approximately 30 to 45 days. Department officials told the OIG that the
+intervals were designed to be somewhat flexible to assure the availability of
+the principals that had to sign the Authorizations and to reassess the
+reasonableness of the collection.¹⁸ Steven Bradbury, former Principal
+Deputy and Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal
+Counsel (OLC), said that the main reason for periodically reauthorizing the
+program was to ensure that the Presidential Authorizations were reviewed
+frequently to assess the continued need for the program and the program's
+
+¹⁸ The officials who signed the Authorizations included the Attorney General, the
+President, and the Secretary of Defense (or other high-ranking Department of Defense
+official). (U//FOUO)
+
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+
+value. As the period for each Presidential Authorization drew to a close, the
+Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), and as of June 3, 2005, the Director of
+National Intelligence (DNI) prepared a threat assessment memorandum for
+the President describing potential terrorist threats to the United States and
+outlining intelligence gathered through the Stellar Wind program and other
+means during the previous Authorization period. The DCI (and later the
+DNI) and the Secretary of Defense reviewed these memoranda and signed a
+recommendation that the program be reauthorized.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Each recommendation was then reviewed by the OLC to assess
+whether, based on the threat assessment and information gathered from
+other sources, there was "a sufficient factual basis demonstrating a threat of
+terrorist attacks in the United States for it to continue to be reasonable
+under the standards of the Fourth Amendment for the President to
+[continue] to authorize the warrantless searches involved in the program.
+The OLC then advised the Attorney General whether the constitutional
+standard of reasonableness had been met and whether the Presidential
+Authorization could be certified "as to form and legality."
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+D. Approval "as to form and legality" (U)
+
+As noted above, the Presidential Authorizations were "[a]pproved as to
+form and legality" by the Attorney General or other senior Department
+official, typically after the review and concurrence of the OLC. The lone
+exception to this practice was the March 11, 2004, Authorization which we
+discuss in Chapter Four. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+However, there was no legal requirement that the Authorizations be
+certified by the Attorney General or other Department official. Former
+senior Department official Patrick Philbin told us he thought one purpose
+for the certification was to give the program a sense of legitimacy so that it
+not "look like a rogue operation." [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Bradbury told us that the Justice Department certifications
+served as official confirmation that the Department had determined that the
+activities carried out under the program were lawful.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Former Attorney General Gonzales told us that certification of the
+program as to form and legality was not required as a matter of law, but he
+believed that it "added value" to the Authorization for three reasons. First,
+
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+
+he said that the NSA was being asked to do something it had not done
+before, and it was important to assure the NSA that the Attorney General
+had approved the legality of the program. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Third, for "purely political considerations" the
+Attorney General's approval of the program would have value "prospectively"
+in the event of congressional or Inspector General reviews of the program.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
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+
+CHAPTER THREE
+INCEPTION AND EARLY OPERATION OF STELLAR WIND
+(SEPTEMBER 2001 THROUGH APRIL 2003) (S//NF)
+
+This chapter describes the early operation of the Stellar Wind
+program. The five sections of the chapter cover the time period from
+September 2001 to April 2003. (S//NF)
+
+In Section I, we provide a brief overview of the National Security
+Agency (NSA) and the inception of the Stellar Wind program, including a
+description of the legal authorities relied upon to support the program and
+the scope of collection authorized under the Presidential Authorizations. In
+Section II, we describe key aspects of the NSA's implementation of the
+Presidential Authorizations, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] the technical
+operation of the program, and the initial process for analyzing and
+disseminating the information collected. In Sections III and IV, we describe
+the FBI's and the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review's early knowledge
+of and involvement in Stellar Wind. In Section V, we describe measures the
+FBI implemented to improve its management of information derived from
+the program that the FBI disseminated to its field offices.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+I. Inception of the Stellar Wind Program (U//FOUO)
+
+A. The National Security Agency (U)
+
+The NSA was established on October 24, 1952, by President Truman
+as a separate agency within the Department of Defense under the direction,
+authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense. See Presidential
+Memorandum to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense,
+October 24, 1952. By Executive Order 12333 (December 4, 1981), the NSA
+was given responsibility within the U.S. Intelligence Community for all
+signals intelligence, including the "collection of signals intelligence for
+national foreign intelligence purposes" and the processing and
+dissemination of such intelligence for counterintelligence purposes.¹⁹ (U)
+
+¹⁹ Signals intelligence is defined as:
+
+ 1. A category of intelligence comprising either individually or in combination
+ all communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign
+ instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted. (U)
+
+ 2. Intelligence derived from communications, electronic, and foreign
+ instrumentation signals. (U)
+
+(Cont'd.)
+
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+
+The NSA's two primary missions are to protect U.S. government
+information systems and to collect, process, and disseminate foreign signals
+intelligence information. This twofold mission is reflected in the NSA's
+organizational structure, which consists of two operational directorates:
+The Information Assurance Directorate, which conducts defensive
+information operations to protect information infrastructures critical to the
+United States' national security interests, and the Signals Intelligence
+Directorate (SID), which controls foreign intelligence collection and
+processing activities for the United States. (U)
+
+The SID is divided into three major components, two of which -
+Analysis and Production [REDACTED] and Data Acquisition [REDACTED] are relevant to the
+Stellar Wind program. The work of these components with respect to the
+Stellar Wind program is discussed in more detail in Section II below.
+(S//NF)
+
+B. Implementation of the Program
+(September 2001 through November 2001) (S//NF)
+
+Immediately following the September 11 terrorist attacks, the NSA
+modified how it conducted some of its traditional signals collection
+activities. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//SI//NF)
+
+George Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence at the time,
+mentioned the modification of these NSA collection activities during a
+meeting with Vice President Cheney shortly after the September 11 attacks
+to discuss the intelligence community's response. According to Hayden,
+who did not attend the meeting but was told about it by Tenet, Cheney
+asked Tenet to inquire from the NSA whether there were additional steps
+that could be taken with respect to enhancing signals intelligence
+capabilities. Tenet related this message to Hayden, who responded that
+there was nothing further the NSA could do without additional authority.
+According to Hayden, Tenet asked him a short time later what the NSA
+could do if additional authority was provided. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02,
+484. (U)
+
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+
+Hayden consulted with experts from the NSA's SID and attorneys from
+the NSA's Office of General Counsel about how the NSA could enhance its
+collection capabilities consistent with considerations of operational
+usefulness, technical feasibility, and legality. Hayden said he then attended
+a meeting at the White House to discuss how NSA signals intelligence
+collection capabilities could be modified to respond to the September 11
+attacks. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Hayden told us he highlighted two issues at this meeting. First,
+Hayden stated at the meeting that the FISA statute's applicability to evolving
+telecommunications technology had the effect of constraining the NSA's
+ability to intercept communications [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] According to Hayden, the NSA was authorized under Executive
+Order 12333 to [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Thus, the NSA could not
+direct its traditional foreign intelligence collection activities [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] without having to first obtain FISA Court
+authorization.²¹ (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The second issue Hayden highlighted at the meeting concerned the
+meta data associated with telephonic and e-mail communications. Hayden
+said that obtaining access to the meta data of communications to and from
+[REDACTED]
+
+²⁰ The FISA statute defines "wire communication" as "any communication while it is
+being carried by a wire, cable, or other like connection furnished or operated by any person
+engaged as a common carrier in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission
+of interstate or foreign communications." 50 U.S.C. § 1801(1). By its terms, FISA governs
+the acquisition of wire communications to or from persons in the United States if such
+acquisition occurs in the United States. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(1)(2).
+[REDACTED] (U)
+²¹ [REDACTED]
+
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+
+the United States, as well as communications within the United States,
+would significantly enhance the NSA's analytical capabilities. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Hayden said he attended two additional meetings with Vice President
+Cheney to discuss further how NSA collection capabilities could be
+expanded along the lines described at the White House meeting. Vice
+President Cheney directed Hayden to meet with the Counsel to the Vice
+President, David Addington, to continue the discussion, which Hayden said
+he did. According to Hayden, Addington drafted the first Presidential
+Authorization for the Stellar Wind program based on these meetings.²²
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The Stellar Wind program officially came into existence on October 4,
+2001, when President Bush signed the Presidential Authorization drafted by
+Addington. The Authorization directed the Secretary of Defense to employ
+the signals intelligence capabilities of the NSA to collect certain foreign
+intelligence by electronic surveillance in order to prevent acts of terrorism
+within the United States.²³ The Presidential Authorization stated that an
+extraordinary emergency existed because of the September 11 attacks,
+constituting an urgent and compelling governmental interest permitting
+electronic surveillance within the United States for counterterrorism
+purposes without judicial warrants or court orders.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Access to the Stellar Wind program was very tightly restricted.
+Former White House Counsel and Attorney General Alberto Gonzales told
+the OIG that it was the President's decision to keep the program a "close
+hold." Gonzales stated that the President made the decision on all requests
+to read in non-operational persons, including Justice Department officials,
+and that as far as he was aware this decision-making authority had not
+been delegated either within the White House or to other agencies
+concerning read-in decisions for operational personnel, such as NSA and
+
+²² Hayden told us he could not recall the Justice Department having any
+involvement in or presence at meetings he attended to discuss enhancing NSA collection
+capabilities. Hayden said this mildly surprised him but that he assumed someone was
+keeping the Department briefed on these discussions. Gonzales, who was the White House
+Counsel at the time, also told the OIG that he would be "shocked" if the Department was
+not represented at the White House meetings, and further stated that in the immediate
+aftermath of September 11, he met often with lawyers from the NSA, CIA, DOD, and the
+Justice Department with the objective of "coordinating the legal thinking" concerning the
+United States' response to the attacks, Because we were unable to interview Addington,
+former Attorney General Ashcroft, and John Yoo, we do not know what role if any the
+Department played in drafting or reviewing the first Presidential Authorization.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+²³ The program was given the cover term [REDACTED] at
+which time the cover term was changed to "Stellar Wind." (S//NF)
+
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+FBI employees.²⁴ However, as indicated in the NSA Office of the Inspector
+General's report on the President's Surveillance Program (NSA OIG Report),
+decisions to read in NSA, CIA, and FBI operational personnel were made by
+the NSA. According to the NSA OIG Report, NSA Director Hayden needed
+White House approval to read in members of Congress, FISA Court judges,
+the NSA Inspector General, and others. See NSA OIG Report at V.
+(S//NF)
+
+1. Pre-Stellar Wind Office of Legal Counsel Legal
+Memoranda (U)
+
+In this section, we summarize the initial legal memoranda from the
+Justice Department supporting the legal basis for the Stellar Wind program,
+and we describe the key aspects of the first Presidential Authorization for
+the program. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+a. Hiring of John Yoo (U)
+
+OLC Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo was responsible for
+drafting the first series of legal memoranda supporting the program.²⁵ As
+noted above, Yoo was the only OLC official "read into" the Stellar Wind
+program from the program's inception until he left the Department in May
+2003.²⁶ The only other non-FBI Department officials read into the program
+until after Yoo's departure were Attorney General Ashcroft, who was read in
+on October 4, 2001, and Counsel for Intelligence Policy James Baker, who
+was read in on January 11, 2002.²⁷
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+²⁴ Gonzales testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee on July 18, 2006, that
+"[a]s with all decisions that are non-operational in terms of who has access to the program,
+the President of the United States makes the decisions, because this is such an important
+program[.]" (U)
+
+²⁵ The Office of Legal Counsel typically drafts memoranda for the Attorney General
+and the Counsel to the President, usually on matters involving significant legal issues or
+constitutional questions, and in response to legal questions raised by Executive Branch
+agencies. In addition, all Executive Orders proposed to be issued by the President are
+reviewed by the Office of Legal Counsel as to form and legality, as are other matters that
+require the President's formal approval. (U)
+
+²⁶ The process of being "read into" a compartmented program generally entails
+being approved for access to particularly sensitive and restricted information about a
+classified program, receiving a briefing about the program, and formally acknowledging the
+briefing, usually by signing a nondisclosure agreement describing restrictions on the
+handling and use of information concerning the program. (U)
+
+²⁷ Daniel Levin, who served as both Chief of Staff to FBI Director Robert Mueller
+and briefly as Ashcroft's national security counselor, also was read into the program along
+with Mueller in late September 2001 at the FBI. According to Levin, White House Counsel
+Gonzales controlled who was read into the program, but Gonzales told him that the
+President had to personally approve each request.
+[REDACTED]
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
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+
+Jay Bybee, the Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal
+Counsel from November 2001 through March 2003, provided the OIG with
+background information on how Yoo came to be involved in national
+security issues on behalf of the OLC. Bybee's nomination to be the OLC
+Assistant Attorney General was announced by the White House in July
+2001. Bybee was not confirmed by the Senate as the Assistant Attorney
+General until late October 2001.²⁸ For several weeks after the
+September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Bybee remained a law professor at
+the University of Nevada-Las Vegas, and was sworn in as OLC Assistant
+Attorney General in late November 2001. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Bybee told us that he traveled to Washington, D.C., sometime in July
+2001 to interview applicants for Deputy Assistant Attorney General slots in
+OLC. In early July 2001, Kyle Sampson, at the time a Special Assistant to
+the President and Associate Director for Presidential Personnel assigned to
+handle presidential appointments to the Department of Justice, told Bybee
+that John Yoo was already under consideration for one of the OLC Deputy
+Assistant Attorney General slots. Bybee said Sampson asked him whether
+he would agree to have Yoo be one of his deputies. Bybee said that he knew
+Yoo only by reputation but was "enthusiastic" about the prospect of having
+Yoo as a Deputy. Bybee told the OIG that he regarded Yoo as a
+"distinguished hire." Bybee said that after speaking with Sampson he called
+Yoo and asked him to work at OLC as a Deputy Assistant Attorney General.
+(U)
+
+In addition to speaking with Yoo, Bybee interviewed other prospective
+OLC Deputies, and hired several individuals, including Patrick Philbin and
+Ed Whelan, for those positions. ²⁹ The White House recommended, and
+Bybee agreed, that Whelan be designated Principal Deputy. Bybee stated
+that he knew Yoo would be disappointed because Yoo had wanted that
+position, and Bybee said that Yoo "didn't hide his disappointment." Bybee
+told us that Yoo asked him whether since he was not selected for the
+Principal Deputy slot he could be guaranteed the "national security
+portfolio." Bybee agreed to Yoo's request. Bybee told the OIG that this was
+an easy decision because Yoo had more national security experience than
+any of the other deputies. (U)
+
+²⁸ Bybee told us that Daniel Koffsky was the Acting Assistant Attorney General at
+this time. (U)
+
+²⁹ Bybee told us that all Deputy candidates were also interviewed by the White
+House. As described in Chapter Four of this report, Philbin played a central role in the
+Department's reassessment of the legal basis for the Stellar Wind program after John Yoo
+left the Department in May 2003. (TS//SI//NF)
+
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+Bybee said that Yoo began working in OLC in July 2001 and that all
+of the Deputies were in place before Bybee began serving as head of the OLC
+that November. (U)
+
+Bybee told us he was never read into the Stellar Wind program and
+could shed no further light on how Yoo came to draft the OLC opinions on
+the program. However, he said that Yoo had responsibility for supervising
+the drafting of opinions related to national security issues by the time the
+attacks of September 11 occurred.³⁰ Bybee described Yoo as "articulate and
+brilliant," and also said he had a "golden resume" and was "very well
+connected" with officials in the White House. He said that from these
+connections, in addition to Yoo's scholarship in the area of executive
+authority during wartime, it was not surprising that Yoo "became the White
+House's guy" on national security matters. (U)
+
+b. Yoo's Legal Analysis of a Warrantless Domestic
+Electronic Surveillance Program (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Before the start of the Stellar Wind program under the October 4,
+2001, Presidential Authorization, Yoo drafted a memorandum evaluating the
+legality of a "hypothetical" electronic surveillance program within the United
+States to monitor communications of potential terrorists. His
+memorandum, dated September 17, 2001, was addressed to Timothy
+Flanigan, Deputy White House Counsel, and was entitled "Constitutional
+Standards on Random Electronic Surveillance for Counter-Terrorism
+Purposes." (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Yoo drafted a more extensive version of this memorandum, dated
+October 4, 2001, for White House Counsel Gonzales. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//SI//NF)
+
+³⁰ As noted above, Yoo, Ashcroft, Card, and Addington declined or did not respond
+to our request for interviews, and we do not know how Yoo came to deal directly with the
+White House on legal issues surrounding the Stellar Wind program. In his book "War by
+Other Means," Yoo wrote that "[a]s a deputy to the assistant attorney general in charge of
+the office, I was a Bush Administration appointee who shared its general constitutional
+philosophy.. I had been hired specifically to supervise OLC's work on [foreign affairs
+and national security)." John Yoo, War by Other Means, (Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006),
+19-20. (TS//SI//NF)
+
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+
+[REDACTED]
+
+³¹ As discussed below, however, his description of how communications would be
+collected and used under the program differed in key respects from the actual operation of
+the Stellar Wind program. In fact, in a January 23, 2006, address to the National Press
+Club, former NSA Director Hayden stated: (TS//SI//NF)
+
+ Let me talk for a few minutes also about what this program is not. It is not a
+ drift net over Dearborn or Lackawanna or Freemont grabbing conversations
+ that we then sort out by these alleged keyword searches or data-mining tools
+ or other devices that so-called experts keep talking about. (U)
+ [REDACTED]
+
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+[REDACTED]
+
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+
+Yoo's September 17 and October 4 memoranda were not addressed
+specifically to the Stellar Wind program, but rather to a "hypothetical"
+randomized or broadly scoped domestic warrantless surveillance program.
+As discussed below, the first Office of Legal Counsel opinion explicitly
+addressing the legality of the Stellar Wind program was not drafted until
+after the program had been formally authorized by President Bush on
+October 4, 2001. (TS//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Gonzales told the OIG that he did not believe these first two
+memoranda fully addressed the White House's understanding of the Stellar
+Wind program. Rather, as described above, these memoranda addressed the
+legality of a "hypothetical" domestic surveillance program rather than the
+Stellar Wind program as authorized by the President and carried out by the
+NSA.³⁵ However, Gonzales also told us that he believed these first two
+memoranda described as lawful activities that were broader than those
+carried out under Stellar Wind, and that therefore these opinions "covered"
+the Stellar Wind program. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+2. Presidential Authorization of October 4, 2001
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+On October 4, 2001, President Bush issued the first of 43 Presidential
+Authorizations for the Stellar Wind program. The October 4 Authorization
+[REDACTED]
+
+³⁵ Gonzales noted that Deputy White House Counsel Timothy Flanigan, the
+recipient of the first Yoo memorandum, was not read into Stellar Wind. (U//FOBO)
+
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+In short, this first Authorization allowed NSA to intercept the content of any
+communication, including those to, from, or exclusively within the United
+States, where probable cause existed to believe one of the communicants
+was engaged in international terrorism, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The Authorization also allowed
+the NSA to "acquire" telephony and e-mail meta data where one end of the
+communication was foreign or neither communicant was known to be a U.S.
+citizen.³⁶ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The Authorization stated that it relied primarily on Article II of the
+Constitution and on the recently passed Authorization for the Use of
+Military Force (AUMF) to support the intelligence-gathering activities. The
+Authorization also stated that the President's directive was based on threat
+assessments indicating that terrorist groups remained determined to attack
+in the United States. The Authorization stated that it was to terminate [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] from the date of its execution.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+As several Office of Legal Counsel and other Department and NSA
+officials acknowledged, in addition to allowing the interception of the
+content of communications into or out of the United States, the literal terms
+of paragraph 4(a)(ii) of this first Authorization would have allowed NSA to
+intercept the content of purely domestic communications. NSA Director
+Hayden told us he did not realize this until Addington specifically raised the
+subject during a meeting the two had to discuss renewing the first
+Authorization. According to Hayden, he told Addington that he did not want
+the NSA conducting such domestic interceptions and cited three reasons for
+this. First, he said the NSA was a foreign intelligence agency. Second, the
+NSA's collection infrastructure would not support the collection of purely
+domestic communications. Third, Hayden said he would require such a
+high evidentiary standard to justify intercepting purely domestic
+communication that such cases might just as well go to the FISA Court. 37
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+³⁶ [REDACTED]
+
+³⁷ Hayden said Addington did not pressure him on the subject and simply modified
+the next Authorization to provide that the NSA may only intercept the content of
+communications that originated or terminated in the United States. We discuss the
+modifications to the Authorization in the next part of this chapter.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
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+As a result, Hayden said the NSA did not exercise the apparent
+authority in the first Authorization to intercept domestic-to-domestic
+communications. Goldsmith stated that Hayden's position that the NSA not
+involve itself in domestic spying related back to NSA's "getting in a lot of
+trouble" for its abuses during the 1970s. In addition, former Deputy
+Attorney General Comey told us that Hayden had said he was willing to
+"walk up to the line" but would be careful "not to get chalk on [his] shoes."
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+As discussed above, subsection (b) of paragraph 4 of the Authorization
+covered the acquisition of both e-mail and telephony meta data. The e-mail
+meta data included the "to," "from," "cc," "bcc," and "sent" lines of an e-mail
+but not the "subject" line or content of the e-mail. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Telephony meta data acquisition
+included the dialing information from telephone billing data, such as the
+originating and terminating telephone number and the date, time, and
+duration of the telephone calls, but not the content of telephone calls.
+Under the Presidential Authorization, collection of both e-mail and
+telephony meta data was limited to circumstances in which one party to the
+communication was outside the United States or no party to the
+communication was known to be a U.S. citizen. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Attorney General Ashcroft approved the first Presidential
+Authorization as to "form and legality" on October 4, 2001. According to
+NSA records, this was the same day that Ashcroft was verbally read into the
+Stellar Wind program. Daniel Levin, who in October 2001 was both a
+national security counselor to Attorney General Ashcroft and FBI Director
+Mueller's Chief of Staff, told us that, according to Ashcroft, the Presidential
+Authorization was "pushed in front of Ashcroft and he was told to sign it.³⁸
+Levin stated that he was not with Ashcroft when this occurred and therefore
+he did not have an opportunity to advise Ashcroft about the Authorization
+before Ashcroft signed it. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+James Baker, Counsel for Intelligence Policy, told us that Levin had
+given him the same account of how Ashcroft came to approve the October 4,
+2001, Presidential Authorization. According to Baker, Ashcroft was told
+that the program was "critically important" and that it must be approved as
+to form and legality. Baker said that Levin told him Ashcroft approved the
+
+³⁸ According to Hayden, Addington typed the Presidential Authorizations and
+personally couriered them around for signatures. However, the OIG was unable to
+determine whether Addington presented the first Authorization to Ashcroft for signature,
+because both Ashcroft and Addington declined or did not respond to our requests to
+interview them. (S//NF)
+
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+Authorization on the spot. According to Baker, Levin also told Baker that
+when he learned there was no memorandum from the Office of Legal
+Counsel concerning the program, Levin told Yoo to draft one.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Levin's account to us of the instruction that Yoo draft a memorandum
+concerning the legality of the program differed slightly from Baker's account.
+Levin told us that he said to Ashcroft that it "wasn't fair" that Ashcroft was
+the only Justice official read into the program, and that for Ashcroft's
+protection Levin advised Ashcroft to have another Department official read
+into the program for the purpose of providing advice on the legality of the
+program. Levin said he learned that Ashcroft was able to get permission
+from the White House to have one other person read into the program to
+advise Ashcroft, although Levin was not certain how Yoo came to be selected
+as that person.³⁹ As discussed below, Gonzales told us that it was the
+President's decision to read John Yoo into the program.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+C. Presidential Authorization is Revised and the Office of
+Legal Counsel Issues Legal Memoranda in Support of the
+Program (November 2001 through January 2002)
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+1. Presidential Authorization of November 2, 2001
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+On November 2, 2001, with the first Presidential Authorization set to
+expire, President Bush signed a second Presidential Authorization. The
+second Authorization relied upon the same authorities in support of the
+President's actions, chiefly the Article II Commander-in-Chief powers and
+the AUMF. The second Authorization cited the same findings in a threat
+assessment as to the magnitude of the potential threats and the likelihood
+of their occurrence in the future. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+³⁹ By October 4, 2001, Yoo had already drafted two legal analyses on a hypothetical
+warrantless surveillance program and therefore already had done some work related to the
+program prior to October 4 when Ashcroft was read in. (TS//SI//NF)
+
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+[REDACTED]
+
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+In addition, former OLC Principal Deputy and Acting Assistant
+Attorney General Steven Bradbury described this [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+2. Yoo Drafts Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum
+Addressing Legality of Stellar Wind
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The Stellar Wind program was first authorized by President Bush and
+certified as to form and legality by Attorney General Ashcroft on October 4,
+2001, without the support of any formal legal opinion from the Office of
+Legal Counsel expressly addressing Stellar Wind. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The first OLC opinion directly supporting the legality of the Stellar
+Wind program was dated November 2, 2001, and was drafted by Yoo. His
+opinion also analyzed the legality of the first Presidential Authorization and
+a draft version of the second Authorization.⁴⁰ (TS//SI//NF)
+
+In his November 2 memorandum to Attorney General Ashcroft, Yoo
+opined that the Stellar Wind program [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] As discussed in Chapter Four of this report,
+however, perceived deficiencies in Yoo's memorandum later became critical
+to the Office of Legal Counsel's decision to reassess the Stellar Wind
+program in 2003. We therefore describe Yoo's legal analysis in his
+November 2 memorandum. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Yoo acknowledged at the outset of his November 2 memorandum that
+"[b]ecause of the highly sensitive nature of this subject and the time
+pressures involved, this memorandum has not undergone the usual editing
+and review process for opinions that issue from our Office [OLC]." The
+memorandum then reviewed the changes to NSA's collection authority
+between the first and second Presidential Authorizations. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+⁴⁰ The second Authorization was issued on November 2, 2001. In developing his
+legal memorandum, Yoo analyzed a draft of the second Authorization dated October 31,
+2001. The OIG was not provided the October 31 draft Presidential Authorization, but based
+on Yoo's description in his November 2 memorandum, it appears that the draft that Yoo
+analyzed tracked the language of the final November 2, 2001, Authorization signed by the
+President. (TS//SI//NF)
+
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+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Yoo did acknowledge in his memorandum that the first Presidential
+Authorization was "in tension with FISA." Yoo stated that FISA "purports to
+be the exclusive statutory means for conducting electronic surveillance for
+foreign intelligence," but Yoo then opined that "[s]uch a reading of FISA
+would be an unconstitutional infringement on the President's Article II
+authorities."⁴¹ Citing advice of the OLC and the position of the Department
+as presented to Congress during passage of the USA PATRIOT Act several
+weeks earlier, Yoo characterized FISA as merely providing a "safe harbor for
+electronic surveillance,” adding that it "cannot restrict the President's ability
+to engage in warrantless searches that protect the national security."
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+⁴¹ As discussed in Chapter Four, Goldsmith criticized this statement as conclusory
+and unsupported by any separation of powers analysis. (U//FOUO)
+
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+Regarding whether the activities conducted under the Stellar Wind
+program could be conducted under FISA, Yoo wrote that it was problematic
+that FISA required an application to the FISA Court to describe the [REDACTED]
+or "facilities" to be used by the target of the surveillance. Yoo also stated
+that it was unlikely that a FISA Court would grant a warrant to cover [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] as contemplated in the Presidential
+Authorization. Noting that the Authorization could be viewed as a violation
+of FISA's civil and criminal sanctions in 50 U.S.C. §§ 1809-10, Yoo opined
+that in this regard FISA represented an unconstitutional infringement on
+the President's Article II powers. According to Yoo, the ultimate test of
+whether the government may engage in warrantless electronic surveillance
+activities is whether such conduct is consistent with the Fourth
+Amendment, not whether it meets the standards of FISA.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Citing cases applying the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, Yoo
+reasoned that reading FISA to restrict the President's inherent authority to
+conduct foreign intelligence surveillance would raise grave constitutional
+questions.⁴² Yoo wrote that "unless Congress made a clear statement in
+FISA that it sought to restrict presidential authority to conduct warrantless
+searches in the national security area – which it has not – then the statute
+must be construed to avoid such a reading."⁴³ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+⁴² Yoo's memorandum cited the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, which holds
+that "where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious
+constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless
+such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress." Edward J. DeBartolo Corp.
+v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988). Yoo
+cited cases supporting the application of this doctrine in a manner that preserves the
+President's "inherent constitutional power, so as to avoid potential constitutional
+problems." See, e.g., Public Citizen v, Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 466 (1989).
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+⁴³ On March 2, 2009, the Justice Department released nine opinions written by the
+OLC from 2001 through 2003 regarding "the allocation of authorities between the President
+and Congress in matters of war and national security" containing certain propositions that
+no longer reflect the views of the OLC and "should not be treated as authoritative for any
+purpose." Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
+Counsel, Department of Justice, Memorandum for the Files, "Re: Status of Certain OLC
+Opinions Issued in the Aftermath of the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001,"
+January 15, 2009, 1, 11. Among these opinions was a February 2002 classified
+memorandum written by Yoo which asserted that Congress had not included a clear
+statement in FISA that it sought to restrict presidential authority to conduct warrantless
+surveillance activities in the national security area and that the FISA statute therefore does
+not apply to the president's exercise of his Commander-in-Chief authority. In a
+January 15, 2009, memorandum (included among those released in March), Bradbury
+stated that this proposition "is problematic and questionable, given FISA's express
+references to the President's authority" and is "not supported by convincing reasoning."
+(TS/STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
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+
+Yoo's analysis of this point would later raise serious concerns for
+other officials in the Office of Legal Counsel and the Office of the Deputy
+Attorney General (ODAG) in late 2003 and early 2004.⁴⁴ Among other
+concerns, Yoo did not address the 15-day warrant requirement exception in
+FISA following a congressional declaration of war. See 50 U.S.C. § 1811.
+Yoo's successors in the Office of Legal Counsel criticized this omission in
+Yoo's memorandum because they believed that by including this provision
+in FISA, Congress arguably had demonstrated an intention to "occupy the
+field" on the matter of electronic surveillance during wartime.⁴⁵
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Yoo's memorandum next analyzed Fourth Amendment issues raised
+by the Presidential Authorizations. Yoo dismissed Fourth Amendment
+concerns regarding the NSA surveillance program to the extent that the
+Authorizations applied to non-U.S. persons outside the United States.
+Regarding those aspects of the program that involved interception of the
+international communications of U.S. persons in the United States, Yoo
+asserted that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence allowed for searches of
+persons crossing the border and that interceptions of communications in or
+out of the United States fell within the "border crossing exception." Yoo
+further opined that electronic surveillance in "direct support of military
+operations" did not trigger constitutional rights against illegal searches and
+seizures, in part because the Fourth Amendment is primarily aimed at
+curbing law enforcement abuses. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Finally, Yoo wrote that the electronic surveillance described in the
+Presidential Authorizations was "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment
+and therefore did not require a warrant. In support of this position, Yoo
+cited Supreme Court opinions upholding warrantless searches in a variety
+of contexts, such as drug testing of employees and sobriety checkpoints to
+detect drunk drivers, and in other circumstances "when special needs,
+beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and
+probable cause requirement impracticable," Veronia School Dist. 47J v.
+Acton, 515 U.S. 464, 652 (1995) (as quoted in November 2, 2001,
+Memorandum at 20). Yoo wrote that in these situations the government's
+interest was found to have outweighed the individual's privacy interest, and
+that in this regard "no governmental interest is more compelling than the
+security of the Nation." Haig v. Agee, 435 U.S. 280, 307 (1981). According
+
+⁴⁴ One of these officials was Patrick Philbin, who following Yoo's departure was
+"dual-hatted" as both an Associate Deputy Attorney General and a Deputy Assistant
+Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel. (U)
+
+⁴⁵ We discuss the OLC's reassessment and criticism of Yoo's analysis in Chapter
+Four. (U)
+
+36
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+
+to Yoo, the surveillance authorized by the Presidential Authorizations
+advanced this governmental security interest. [REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Yoo's memorandum focused almost exclusively on content
+interceptions. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Yoo also omitted from his November 2 memorandum as well as from
+his earlier September 17 and October 4, 2001, memoranda – any discussion
+of *Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer*, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), a leading
+case on the distribution of government powers between the Executive and
+
+⁴⁶ [REDACTED]
+
+37
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+
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+
+Legislative branches.⁴⁷ As discussed in Chapter Four, Justice Jackson's
+analysis of President Truman's Article II Commander-in-Chief authority
+during wartime in the Youngstown case was an important factor in the
+Office of Legal Counsel's reevaluation in 2004 of Yoo's opinion on the
+legality of the Stellar Wind program. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+3. Additional Presidential Authorizations (U)
+
+On November 30, 2001, the President signed a third Authorization
+authorizing the Stellar Wind program. The third Authorization was virtually
+identical to the second Authorization of November 2, 2001, in finding that
+the threat of terrorist attacks in the United States continued to exist, the
+legal authorities cited for continuing the electronic surveillance, and the
+scope of collection. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+OLC Principal Deputy and Acting Assistant Attorney General
+Bradbury told the OIG that [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Accordingly, the fourth
+Presidential Authorization, signed on January 9, 2002, modified the scope of
+collection to provide:
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+⁴⁷ In Youngstown, the Supreme Court held that President Truman's Executive
+Order directing the Secretary of Commerce to seize and operate steel plants during a labor
+dispute to produce steel needed for American troops during the Korean War was an
+unconstitutional exercise of the President's Article II Commander-in-Chief authority. In a
+concurring opinion, Justice Jackson listed three categories of Presidential actions against
+which to judge the Presidential powers. First, "[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an
+express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum[.]" Id. at
+635. Second, Justice Jackson described a category of concurrent authority between the
+President and Congress as a "zone of twilight" in which the distribution of power is
+uncertain and dependant on "the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables
+rather than on abstract theories of law." Id. at 637 (footnote omitted). Third, "[w]hen the
+President takes measures incompatible with the express or implied will of Congress, his
+power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers
+minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter." Id. Justice Jackson
+concluded that President Truman's actions fell within this third category, and thus "under
+circumstances which leave Presidential power most vulnerable to attack and in the least
+favorable of possible constitutional postures." Id. at 640. (U)
+
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+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Presidential Authorization, January 9, 2002. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED] The language of the Authorization as modified
+in January 2002 remained the collection standard in subsequent
+Presidential Authorizations extending the Stellar Wind Program, until the
+disputed Presidential Authorization in March 2004, which we discuss in
+Chapter Four. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+4. Subsequent Yoo Opinions (U)
+
+In a 2-page memorandum to Attorney General Ashcroft dated
+January 9, 2002, Yoo wrote that [REDACTED] did not affect the
+legality of the Authorization. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Several identical Presidential Authorizations recertifying the Stellar
+Wind program were signed in 2002. (U//FOUO)
+
+In October 2002, at Attorney General Ashcroft's request, Yoo drafted
+another opinion for Ashcroft concerning the Stellar Wind program. This
+memorandum, dated October 11, 2002, reiterated the same basic analysis
+in Yoo's November 2, 2001, memorandum in support of the legality of the
+Stellar Wind program.⁴⁸ [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+⁴⁸ As in the November 2, 2001, memorandum, Yoo's October 11, 2002,
+memorandum included the following caveat: "Because of the highly sensitive nature of this
+subject and its level of classification, this memorandum has not undergone the usual
+editing and review process for opinions that issue from our Office [OLC]."
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+39
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+5. Yoo's Communications with the White House (U)
+
+As the only Office of Legal Counsel official who had been read into the
+Stellar Wind program through early 2003, Yoo consulted directly with White
+House officials about the program during this period. Because we were
+unable to interview Yoo, we could not determine the exact nature and extent
+of these consultations. We were also unable to determine whether Ashcroft
+was fully aware of the advice Yoo was providing directly to the White House
+about the program. (S//NF)
+
+Gonzales told the OIG that Yoo was among those with whom the
+White House consulted to develop advice for the President on the program,
+but he asserted that Yoo was not sought out to provide approval of the
+program for the Department. However, Gonzales told us that he did not
+know how Yoo came to be the primary Justice Department official that the
+White House consulted during this period about the program. (S//NF)
+
+In fact, Jay Bybee, who served as the OLC Assistant Attorney General
+for most of this period and was Yoo's supervisor, was never read into the
+Stellar Wind program. Bybee told the OIG that during his tenure as
+Assistant Attorney General he did not know that Yoo was working alone on
+a sensitive compartmented program and he had no knowledge of how Yoo
+
+40
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+
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+
+came to be selected for this responsibility. Bybee told us that he was
+"surprised" and "a little disappointed" to learn in media accounts that he
+was not privy to Yoo's work on what Bybee had later learned to be a
+compartmented counterterrorism program involving warrantless electronic
+surveillance. Bybee said that it would not be unusual for a Deputy
+Assistant Attorney General such as Yoo to have direct contact with the
+White House for the purpose of rendering legal advice, but that the OLC
+Assistant Attorney General must be aware of all opinions that issue from
+the OLC. Bybee said that the Assistant Attorney General has an obligation
+to "see the whole picture" and is the person in the office who knows the full
+range of issues that are being addressed by the OLC and who can assure
+that OLC opinions remain consistent. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+6. Gonzales's View of the Department's Role in
+Authorizing the Stellar Wind Program (S//NF)
+
+The OIG asked Gonzales about how he, as White House Counsel,
+viewed the role of the Justice Department during the early phase of the
+Stellar Wind program. Gonzales stated that he and others at the White
+House tried to be very careful to understand what could be done legally, and
+they wanted to have "constant communications with the Department" in the
+first few months following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.
+Gonzales also stated that it was the President, and not the Attorney General
+or the White House Counsel, who authorized the warrantless surveillance
+activity under the Stellar Wind program. However, Gonzales acknowledged
+that the President's decision was based on advice from the Attorney General
+and White House Counsel, among others. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The OIG also asked whether Gonzales had a personal belief about the
+justification for having a single attorney - Yoo - speak on behalf of the
+Department regarding the legality of the program. Gonzales stated that it
+was up to the Attorney General to make that determination or calculation.
+Gonzales stated that he understood the Department's position was that the
+program was legal and that Yoo would sit down with Attorney General
+Ashcroft to answer any legal questions when the Presidential Authorizations
+were presented to Ashcroft for his signature. Gonzales said he understood
+that the Yoo opinions represented the legal opinion of the Department.
+However, as noted previously, for the first year and a half of the program the
+Department read-ins included only Yoo, Ashcroft, and Baker. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Gonzales also stated that it was Ashcroft's decision as to how to
+satisfy his legal obligations as Attorney General. However, when the OIG
+asked whether Gonzales was aware if Ashcroft ever requested to have
+additional people read into Stellar Wind, Gonzales stated that he recalled
+Ashcroft wanted Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson and his Chief of
+Staff, David Ayres, read in. Gonzales acknowledged that neither official was
+
+41
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+
+ever read into the program. Gonzales said that Ashcroft complained that it
+was "inconvenient" not to have Thompson and Ayres read in, but Gonzales
+also stated that he never got the sense from Ashcroft that it affected the
+quality of the legal advice the Department provided to the White House.
+Gonzales stated that other than Ashcroft's request that Thompson and
+Ayres be read in, he did not recall Ashcroft requesting to have additional
+Department officials read in.⁴⁹ (S//NF)
+
+II. NSA's Implementation of the Stellar Wind Program (U//FOUO)
+
+In this section, we describe the NSA's initial implementation of the
+Stellar Wind program. We first describe how the NSA acquired the
+communications data authorized for collection under the program. We also
+discuss the process the NSA used to analyze the information received from
+the Stellar Wind program and how this information was provided to the FBI.
+(U//FOVO)
+
+A. Implementation of Stellar Wind (U//FOUO)
+
+Our description of the implementation of the Stellar Wind program is
+based on NSA and Justice Department documents we obtained during our
+review, as well as interviews of NSA and Department personnel with
+knowledge of Stellar Wind's technical operation. This section provides a
+basic overview of how the NSA obtained [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] the information authorized for collection under Stellar Wind. This
+information is also important for later sections of this report that describe
+significant modifications to the Authorizations regarding the manner and
+scope of collection, the Department's re-assessment of the legal rationale
+supporting the Stellar Wind program during late 2003 and early 2004, and
+compliance issues that arose when the Department decided to seek
+collection of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+⁴⁹ Gonzales stated that Ashcroft, as the Attorney General, would be well-positioned
+to request the President to allow additional attorneys to be read into the program. Drawing
+on his own experience as Attorney General, Gonzales cited his request to the President in
+2006 that the then head of the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) and several
+attorneys within OPR be granted security clearances in order to conduct an inquiry into the
+professional conduct of Department lawyers with respect to the Stellar Wind program.
+Gonzales said he made his request both through White House Counsel Harriet Miers and
+directly to the President. However, the President initially declined the request, and the
+request was not granted until October 2007. (U//FOU)
+
+42
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+
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+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] As discussed
+previously, the NSA collected three categories of information under Stellar
+Wind that came to be commonly referred to as the three "baskets.” Basket 1
+referred to collection of the content of telephone and e-mail
+communications; basket 2 referred to collection of meta data associated
+with telephone communications; and basket 3 referred to collection of meta
+data associated with e-mail and other Internet communications. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]⁵² (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+⁵⁰ [REDACTED]
+⁵¹ We describe in Chapter Four changes made in March and [REDACTED] 2004 [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] under Presidential Authorization following a dispute between the White House
+and Justice Department concerning the legality of the Stellar Wind program. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//SI//NF)
+
+⁵² Title 18 of the United States Code generally prohibits the interception and
+disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications, and provides for criminal penalties
+for any person engaging in such activity. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+43
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+
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+
+The meta data collected [REDACTED]
+under Stellar Wind (baskets 2 and 3), as well as the meta data associated
+with communications targeted for content collection under the program,
+was placed into an NSA database system called [REDACTED] which according
+to NSA officials is a configuration of databases and analytical tools.
+[REDACTED] databases are segregated into "realms" organized by the specific
+authority allowing the particular data to be collected.⁵³ The content data
+collected under the Stellar Wind program was placed in a separate NSA
+repository.⁵⁴ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+1. Basket 1 - Telephone and E-Mail Content Collection
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+a. Telephone Communications (U)
+
+In this section we describe briefly the technical means used by the
+NSA to access the international telephone system to accomplish the
+collection of international calls under the Stellar Wind program.⁵⁵
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+(U)
+[REDACTED]
+
+⁵³ NSA officials said the realms also establish a system of access control to ensure
+that only authorized users access certain data. (S//NF)
+
+⁵⁴ As discussed in Chapter Five of this report, the NSA created an additional realm
+in July 2004 when the government obtained FISA authority to collect e-mail meta data, and
+another realm in May 2006 when it obtained authority under FISA to collect telephony
+meta data. These realms were separate from the realms that contained information
+collected under Stellar Wind. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+55 The NSA's interception of international telephone communications under Stellar
+Wind highlighted the dramatic change in telecommunications technology that had been
+taking place for nearly 20 years. In 1978, when FISA was enacted, telephone calls placed
+by and to individuals within the United States (domestic calls) were carried mostly on
+copper wires, while telephone calls placed to or from individuals outside the United States
+(international calls) generally were transmitted by satellites. FISA reflected the state of
+technology then by defining the term "electronic surveillance" to be the acquisition of the
+contents of certain wire and radio (satellite) communications. FISA stated that as to radio
+
+(Cont'd.)
+
+44
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+
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+
+[REDACTED]
+
+communications specifically, and thus as to most international communications, the
+interception of calls constituted "electronic surveillance" only if the acquisition intentionally
+targeted a particular known U.S. person in the United States, or if all participants to the
+communication were located in the United States. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(f)(1) and (3).
+Accordingly, government surveillance that targeted foreign persons outside the United
+States generally was not considered electronic surveillance under FISA, and the
+government was not required to obtain a FISA Court order authorizing the surveillance
+even if one of the parties to the communication was in the United States.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+⁵⁶ [REDACTED]
+
+45
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//OC/NF
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+b. E-Mail Communications (TS//SI//NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+46
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED] However, under [REDACTED]
+the October 4, 2001, Presidential Authorization, the NSA for the first time
+was authorized to intercept international e-mails originating or terminating
+inside the United States. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+⁵⁸ [REDACTED]
+⁵⁹ [REDACTED]
+
+47
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+2. Basket 2 - Telephony Meta Data Collection
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+⁶⁰ [REDACTED]
+The NSA informed the FISA Court of this issue in the government's December 2006
+FISA application that sought to bring Stellar Wind's content collection under FISA authority
+(discussed in Chapter Five of this report). [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+48
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] These records, also referred to as call detail records, consist of
+routing information that includes the originating and terminating telephone
+number of each call, and the date, time, and duration of each call. The call
+detail records do not include the substantive content of any communication
+or the name, address, or financial information of a subscriber or customer.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+As discussed above the initial Presidential Authorizations [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] that is, call detail records
+pertaining to communications where at least one party was outside the
+United States, where no party was known to be a United States citizen, or
+where there was reasonable articulable suspicion to believe the
+communication related to international terrorism. As noted in Chapter One,
+the NSA interpreted this authority to also permit it to collect telephony and
+e-mail meta data in bulk so that it would have a database from which to
+acquire the targeted meta data. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+(Cont'd.)
+
+49
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+
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+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The NSA personnel also organized the data
+into a format that could be used by NSA analysts responsible for analyzing
+the information under the Stellar Wind program. The data was archived
+into an NSA analytical database that contained exclusively Stellar Wind
+information and that was accessible only by specially authorized NSA
+personnel read into the program. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] ⁶³ While the magnitude of the bulk collection was enormous, the
+NSA did not retrieve or review most of this data because access was
+authorized only with respect to telephone communications that satisfied the
+Presidential Authorizations "acquisition" standard. In fact, the NSA
+reported that by the end of 2006, .001% of the data collected had actually
+been retrieved from its database for analysis. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+⁶³ We describe these techniques in part B of this section. (U)
+
+50
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+3. Basket 3 - E-Mail Meta Data Collection
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+The meta data the NSA obtained from e-mail communications
+included the information that appeared on the "to," "from," "cc," "bcc," and
+"sent" lines of a standard e-mail. Thus, the NSA collected the e-mail
+address of the sender, the e-mail addresses of any recipients, and the
+information concerning the date and time when the e-mail was sent.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The meta data collection did not include information
+from the "subject" or "re" lines of the e-mails or the body of the e-mails.64
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+⁶⁴ [REDACTED]
+
+51
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+B. NSA Process for Analyzing Information Collected Under
+Stellar Wind (S//NF)
+
+The NSA conducted two functionally distinct types of review of the
+massive amount of data it collected under the Stellar Wind program. First,
+the NSA conducted procedures intended to ensure that it only reviewed or
+"acquired" the information that was within the scope of the Presidential
+Authorizations. Second, the NSA conducted substantive analysis of the
+acquired information to determine whether it had intelligence value that
+should be disseminated to customer agencies such as the FBI and the CIA.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+The NSA procedures to ensure that the acquisition and dissemination
+standards were satisfied became more formalized over time. We describe
+below how the NSA handled the enormous volume of data it was collecting
+with the Stellar Wind program. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+1. Basket 1: Content tasking, Analysis, and
+Dissemination (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Stellar Wind's "basket 1" content database contains telephone and
+e-mail communications of individuals. The NSA refers to the telephone
+numbers and e-mail addresses tasked for interception as "selectors." To
+task a selector under the Presidential Authorizations, the NSA was required
+to establish probable cause to believe the intercepted communications
+originated or terminated outside the United States and probable cause to
+believe a party to the communications was a group engaged in international
+terrorism, or activities in preparation therefor, or any agent of such a
+group.⁶⁵ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The NSA had two processes for tasking selectors under Stellar Wind.
+One process applied to tasking foreign selectors, or selectors believed to be
+
+⁶⁵ [REDACTED]
+
+52
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+
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+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+used by non-U.S. persons outside the United States. The other process
+applied to tasking domestic selectors, or selectors believed to be used by
+persons inside the United States or by U.S. persons abroad. A foreign
+selector could be tasked for collection under Stellar Wind based upon an
+NSA analyst's determination, following some amount of documented
+research and analysis about the selector, that the terms of the
+Authorizations were satisfied. The NSA did not require any additional levels
+of approval before a foreign selector could be tasked.⁶⁶
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+A domestic selector could be tasked only after the NSA analyst
+obtained specific approvals. The rigor of the process to task a domestic
+selector evolved over time, but essentially it required an analyst to draft a
+formal tasking package that demonstrated, through analysis and
+documentation, that the selector satisfied the terms of the Authorizations.
+This package was reviewed by a designated senior official who could approve
+or reject the package, or request that additional information be provided.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+In emergency situations, the NSA could commence content
+interception on a selector within [REDACTED] of identifying a number or address
+that satisfied the criteria in the Presidential Authorizations. In other cases,
+interception commenced within [REDACTED] for urgent or priority taskings
+and within a week for routine taskings. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The NSA conducted 15-, 30-, and 90-day reviews of tasked foreign
+and domestic selectors to assess whether the interception should continue.
+The NSA stated that the selectors were "de-tasked" if the user was arrested,
+if probable cause could no longer be established, or if other targets took
+priority. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The content intercepted under taskings was sent to the NSA and
+placed in a database accessible by NSA analysts cleared into the Stellar
+Wind program. The analysts were responsible for reviewing the
+communications and assessing whether a Stellar Wind report should be
+generated for the FBI and the CIA. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+53
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+2. Baskets 2 and 3: Telephony and E-Mail Meta Data
+Queries, Analysis, and Dissemination
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The NSA received [REDACTED] a massive amount of telephony and
+e-mail meta data (basket 2 and 3 information) that was stored in a realm
+accessible only by NSA analysts assigned to the Stellar Wind program. The
+purpose of the collection was to facilitate the identification of connections
+[REDACTED] among particular telephone numbers and e-mail addresses by
+using [REDACTED] sophisticated analytical techniques called "contact chaining" [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+As described by the NSA in declarations filed with the FISA Court,
+contact chaining is used to determine the contacts made by a particular
+telephone number or e-mail address (tier one contacts), as well as contacts
+made by subsequent contacts (tier two and tier three contacts). The NSA
+uses computer algorithms to identify the first two tiers of contacts an e-mail
+address makes and the first three tiers of contacts a telephone number
+makes. According to the NSA, multi-tiered contact analysis is particularly
+useful with telephony meta data because a telephone does not lend itself to
+simultaneous contact with large numbers of individuals as e-mail does with
+spam. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+54
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+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+As previously noted, the NSA interpreted the Presidential
+Authorizations to permit it to collect telephony and e-mail meta data in
+bulk.⁶⁷ The NSA "queried” the databases that held this data to identify meta
+data for communications to or from a particular telephone or e-mail address
+(the "selector," also known as the "seed number" or "seed account"). NSA
+analysts queried the database using a selector for which there was a
+reasonable articulable suspicion to believe that the number or account had
+been used for communications related to international terrorism.⁶⁸ [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+As with proposals to task selectors, an NSA shift coordinator typically
+reviewed for approval proposals to query either the e-mail or telephony meta
+data bulk databases using particular selectors. If the shift coordinator
+agreed that the reasonable articulable suspicion standard was met, the
+selector was approved and the analyst was authorized to query the meta
+data bulk database to identify all of the other telephone numbers or e-mail
+addresses that had been in contact with the seed account. Each contact
+along the chain of contacts that originated with the selector was referred to
+as a "hop," meaning that a telephone call from the seed account to
+telephone number A was considered "one hop out," and a call from
+telephone number A to telephone number B was considered "two hops out"
+(relative to the seed account), and so on. NSA analysts used specialized
+software to chain and analyze the contacts identified by each query. The
+
+⁶⁷ [REDACTED]
+⁶⁸ [REDACTED]
+
+55
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+NSA told us that Stellar Wind analysts were permitted to chain the results
+of queries up to three hops out from the selector. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The results of each query were analyzed to determine whether any of
+the contacts should be reported, or "tipped," to Stellar Wind customers —
+primarily the FBI, CIA, and the National Counterterrorism Center. In the
+first months of the Stellar Wind program, the NSA reported to the FBI most
+contacts identified between a U.S. telephone number or e-mail address and
+the selector used to query the meta data realm, as well as domestic contacts
+that were two and three hops out from a selector. As discussed in Chapter
+Six of this report, over time the NSA and FBI worked to improve the
+reporting process and the quality of the intelligence being disseminated
+under Stellar Wind. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The domestic contacts from specified numbers or e-mail addresses,
+called "tippers," were provided to the FBI by the NSA. These tippers were
+included in reports that contained two sections separated by a dashed line,
+commonly referred to as a "tearline," made to appear as a perforation
+extending across the width of a page. The purpose of the tearline was to
+separate the compartmented information above the tearline, which could
+identify the specific sources and methods used to obtain the information,
+from the non-compartmented information that the FBI could further
+disseminate to its field offices. Only FBI personnel read into the Stellar
+Wind program could have access to the full Stellar Wind reports from NSA.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The information that appeared above the tearline typically was
+classified Top Secret/SCI and identified Stellar Wind as the source of the
+intelligence. The information included specific details [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] as well as any pertinent comments by NSA intelligence analysts.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The information that appeared below the tearline of a report generally
+was classified Secret or Confidential and did not identify Stellar Wind as the
+source of the intelligence. The text typically included some version of the
+following statement:
+ [REDACTED]
+The amount of information about the contacts that followed this
+ statement varied.
+
+56
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] and provided the date or dates of the contacts,
+or the period of time in which contact was made. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+During the first several months of the Stellar Wind program, nearly all
+reports based on telephone or e-mail meta data analysis designated each of
+the tippers as [REDACTED]
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+As examples, the following Stellar Wind reports were among those
+disseminated to the FBI in November 2001. We have excerpted only the
+information below the tearline, which is often referred to simply as "tearline
+information." In addition, we did not provide the actual telephone numbers
+provided by the NSA to the FBI. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+57
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+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+III. FBI's Early Participation in the Stellar Wind Program (S//NF)
+
+Stellar Wind was not an FBI program, nor was the FBI involved in the
+program's creation. However, as the lead agency for counterterrorism in the
+United States, the FBI received much intelligence produced under Stellar
+Wind. In the following sections, we describe how the FBI became involved in
+the Stellar Wind program, the personnel resources allocated to handle
+Stellar Wind information, and the initial procedures the FBI established to
+receive, control, and disseminate the program information.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+⁶⁹ In addition to the queries the NSA conducted on a case-by-case basis, the NSA
+also maintained a list of foreign and domestic telephone numbers and e-mail addresses for
+which, based on NSA analysts' assessments, there was a reasonable basis to believe were
+associated with international terrorism. These selectors, called "alerts," were queried
+against the incoming meta data automatically on a daily basis, and any contacts with a
+domestic telephone number or e-mail address were directed to NSA analysts for review and
+possible reporting to the FBI. The NSA regularly updated the alert list by adding or
+removing selectors, depending on the available intelligence. As we discuss in Chapter Five
+in connection with the transition of Stellar Wind's bulk meta data collection from
+presidential authority to FISA authority, the FISA Court found that the NSA's use of the
+alert list to query incoming telephone meta data did not comply with terms of the Court's
+Order. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+58
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+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+A. FBI Director First Informed of Stellar Wind Program
+(U//FOUO)
+
+Director Mueller told us that his earliest recollection of the Stellar
+Wind program was a meeting he attended at the White House with Attorney
+General Ashcroft, which occurred either after the decision had been made to
+move forward with the presidentially authorized program or shortly after the
+October 4, 2001, Authorization was issued. Mueller told us the meeting was
+"more than a formal read-in" and that Director Hayden may have attended.
+Mueller said that at or around this time he also briefly reviewed the
+October 4, 2001, Presidential Authorization, which he characterized as
+"relatively complex." (TS//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Director Mueller said his impression at the time was that the terms of
+the Presidential Authorization might allow for collecting purely domestic
+telephone and e-mail communications. Mueller said he discussed the
+matter with Ashcroft and asked whether OLC had issued an opinion on the
+program. Mueller said that he recalled being told that OLC might have
+opined orally on the program and Mueller said he suggested to Ashcroft that
+OLC issue a formal written opinion. Mueller told us that he did not think
+the NSA ever exercised authority under the Authorization to collect purely
+domestic communications. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Mueller stated that based on the meeting he attended at the White
+House and his brief review of the October 4, 2001, Presidential
+Authorization, he understood the FBI's role in the Stellar Wind program was
+to be a "recipient" of intelligence generated by the NSA, and to provide any
+technical support to the NSA as necessary to support the program.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+B. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+59
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+⁷⁰ Executive Order 12333 authorizes the FBI to provide operational support to the Intelligence Community. (U)
+⁷¹ [REDACTED]
+
+60
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED] Mueller said he therefore decided to request an order from the
+
+61
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+Attorney General formally directing the FBI to support the NSA program.
+Mueller said that he also requested the order because he wanted a "record
+as to our participation." (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+In response, on October 20, 2001, Attorney General Ashcroft sent a
+memorandum to Director Mueller stating:
+
+ As part of the Nation's self defense activities, the National
+ Security Agency (NSA) is engaged in certain additional collection
+ activities, the details of which you are aware. Those activities
+ are legal and have been appropriately authorized, and the
+ Federal Bureau of Investigation should cooperate with NSA as
+ necessary for it to conduct those activities. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+According to Mueller, the combination of this memorandum from the
+Attorney General and the November 2, 2001, memorandum prepared by the
+Department's Office of Legal Counsel regarding the legality of Stellar Wind
+gave him comfort at that time with the FBI's participation in the program.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Bowman also told us that the White House officials primarily
+responsible for Stellar Wind, who he identified as the Vice President and
+Addington, were "amateurs" when it came to intelligence work. Bowman
+stated that one of the potential consequences of severely limiting the
+number of individuals read into a program is that uncleared personnel who
+
+62
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+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+occupy positions placing them in close proximity to program-related
+activities might construe certain actions as questionable or illegal and
+report that activity, thereby potentially compromising the activities.
+Bowman said that this is what occurred with Stellar Wind. For this reason
+and others, Bowman did not agree with the decision to so severely limit
+access to the program. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+C. FBI Begins to Receive and Disseminate Stellar Wind
+"Tippers" (S//NF)
+
+In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the
+FBI had created a task force of agents and analysts to analyze the flood of
+telephone numbers it received from multiple sources, including agencies
+within the U.S. Intelligence Community, foreign intelligence services, and
+concerned citizens. The task force, called the Telephone Analysis Unit
+(TAU), was located at FBI Headquarters and consisted of approximately 50
+FBI employees working on shift rotations 24 hours per day, 6 days per
+week. The operation was supervised by FBI supervisors working out of the
+FBI's Strategic Information and Operations Center. As described below,
+personnel assigned to this task force were among the first at the FBI to
+handle Stellar Wind-derived information. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+1. FBI Initiates [REDACTED] (S//NF)
+
+In October or November 2001, several TAU analysts were assigned to
+what came to be called the [REDACTED] which was the FBI's effort
+to manage the Stellar Wind-derived information being received from the
+NSA. The information, referred to as Stellar Wind "tippers," consisted of
+telephone numbers and e-mail accounts derived from NSA meta data
+analysis, and sometimes content intercepted from particular telephone and
+e-mail communications. The essential purpose of the [REDACTED]
+was to receive Stellar Wind tippers from the NSA and disseminate the
+information to FBI field offices for investigation in a manner that did not
+reveal the source of the information or the methods by which it was
+collected. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Working alternating shifts in the FBI's Strategic Information and
+Operations Center, two FBI analysts were primarily responsible for
+managing Stellar Wind tippers in the initial months of the program. These
+analysts told the OIG that until December 2001, the Stellar Wind tippers
+
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
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+
+consisted nearly exclusively of telephone numbers. According to the
+analysts, the process for handling Stellar Wind tippers began when the NSA
+liaison co-located at FBI Headquarters provided one of the analysts the
+information below the tearline from a Stellar Wind report containing one or
+more tippers. The analyst then queried FBI databases for any information
+about each tipper, such as whether the tipper appeared in any pending or
+closed FBI investigations. The analyst also queried the tipper against the
+FBI's [REDACTED] database, which is the FBI's central repository
+for telephone subscriber data acquired during the course of investigations.
+In addition, the analyst checked each tipper against public source
+databases for relevant information, such as the identity of a telephone
+number subscriber. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+After completing these database checks, the analyst drafted an
+Electronic Communication, or EC, from FBI Headquarters to the
+appropriate FBI field office. The EC described the tearline information
+about the tipper contained in the Stellar Wind report together with any
+additional information the analyst was able to locate.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The [REDACTED] ECs disseminated to field offices included
+several features concerning the nature of the information and how it could
+be used. First, the ECs advised the field offices that the information being
+provided was "derived from an established and reliable source” and that it
+was "being addressed by the TAU as the [REDACTED]"⁷² (S//NF)
+
+Second, the ECs included a caveat about the use of the information
+being provided, stating that the information "is for lead purposes only and is
+intended solely for the background information of recipients in developing
+their own collateral leads. It cannot be used in affidavits, court proceedings,
+subpoenas, or for other legal or judicial purposes." The FBI said this
+language was included in each EC to protect the source of the information
+and the methods by which it was collected. (S//NF)
+
+Third, the ECs provided an explanation about the qualitative rankings
+assigned to the tippers. As described previously, the NSA assigned each
+tipper a [REDACTED] ranking.
+
+[REDACTED] (TS//SI//NF)
+
+⁷² [REDACTED] (S//NF)
+⁷³ [REDACTED]
+
+(Cont'd.)
+
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+Fourth, the ECs instructed the field offices how the tippers should be
+addressed. These instructions were provided as "leads," for which the FBI
+had three categories: Action, Discretionary, and For Information. An Action
+lead instructed a field office to take a particular action in response to the
+EC. An Action lead was "covered" when the field office took the specified
+action or conducted appropriate investigation to address the information in
+the EC. A Discretionary lead allowed the field office to take whatever action
+it deemed appropriate. A field office that receives a "For Information" lead
+was not expected to take any specific action in response to the EC other
+than possibly route the communication to the office personnel whose
+investigations or duties the information concerned. (S//NF)
+
+After the FBI analyst completed this process and drafted the EC, an
+FBI Supervisory Special Agent read into the Stellar Wind program reviewed
+the EC, in part to ensure that it did not reveal the source of the information
+or the method by which the information was obtained. Once approved, the
+analyst entered the EC into the FBI's Automated Case Management System
+and the receiving field offices were notified electronically to review the
+communication. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Each [REDACTED] EC typically contained multiple tippers and
+therefore was distributed to multiple field offices. The receiving field offices
+were responsible for handling the leads that concerned tippers falling in
+their respective geographic jurisdictions. (S//NF)
+
+Most of the [REDACTED] leads that disseminated Stellar Wind
+tippers were designated Action leads. As noted, during this period the
+tippers were almost exclusively telephone numbers. Accordingly, the typical
+lead instructed the field office to [REDACTED]
+
+The lead also instructed the field
+office to report the investigative results to the Telephone Analysis Unit.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+The two [REDACTED] analysts told us that the focus of their
+work in the first months after the September 11 attacks was to detect what
+many believed was an imminent second attack. During this period, nearly
+all of the Stellar Wind tippers the FBI received were disseminated to a field
+office for investigation as quickly as possible. (S//NF)
+
+In addition to tippers containing the content of intercepted telephone
+and e-mail communications (content tippers), in approximately December
+
+[REDACTED] (TS//SI//NF)
+
+65
+
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+2001 the NSA began providing the FBI tippers derived from the NSA's e-mail
+meta data analysis (e-mail tippers). These e-mail tippers initially were
+routed to the same two analysts who were managing the telephone tippers.
+The analysts told us that the e-mail tippers were processed and
+disseminated in the same manner as the telephone tippers. Content
+tippers, which according to the analysts were received very infrequently
+during this early period, generally were also disseminated by EC to the
+appropriate field offices, but little if any research regarding the information
+was conducted. The analysts said they considered the content tippers
+particularly time-sensitive and for that reason occasionally transmitted the
+ECs directly to the appropriate field offices or called the offices to advise that
+the information was being loaded into the FBI's Automated Case
+Management System. In 2002, responsibility for e-mail tippers was
+reassigned to the Electronic Communications Analysis Unit.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+In February 2002, one of the two FBI analysts left the [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] after being selected for a management position in a different
+analytical section within the FBI's Counterterrorism Division. The
+remaining analyst became solely responsible for managing the Stellar Wind
+tippers under the [REDACTED] a situation that continued for
+approximately the next 12 months. The analyst told us that while her work
+hours during this period were "ridiculous," she did not feel there was any
+pressure to add analysts to the project because "the process was working
+well." (TS//SI//NF)
+
+In early 2002, FBI management instructed the lone [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] analyst to conduct some of her work while physically located in the
+NSA Headquarters at Fort Meade, Maryland. This created an unusual
+arrangement for the analyst. The analyst continued to receive the NSA's
+daily Stellar Wind reports at FBI Headquarters, and she would then drive to
+the NSA with the reports to draft the ECs (the analyst had remote access to
+FBI databases from an NSA workstation). The analyst told us that
+interaction with NSA counterparts during these daily visits was minimal.
+After the ECs were drafted, the analyst returned to FBI Headquarters to
+obtain approval to disseminate the communications to the FBI's field offices.
+The analyst's impression was that FBI management created this unusual
+arrangement "for show" and that its purpose was to establish an FBI
+"presence" at the NSA in connection with Stellar Wind.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The analyst continued working on Stellar Wind matters until
+approximately February 2003, when a small team of FBI personnel were
+
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+
+assigned permanently to the NSA to manage the FBI's participation in the
+Stellar Wind program.⁷⁴ (S//NF)
+
+2. FBI Field Offices' Response to [REDACTED]
+Leads (S//NF)
+
+According to the two FBI analysts responsible for managing Stellar
+Wind information under the [REDACTED] from approximately
+October 2001 to February 2003, some agents in FBI field offices grew
+frustrated with the information they were receiving under the program.
+Because the [REDACTED] ECs that disseminated the tippers to the
+field offices assigned most of them as Action leads, this required that the
+leads be covered expeditiously. (S//NF
+
+Under ordinary operating procedures, investigative leads for
+international terrorism matters are set by FBI Headquarters' International
+Terrorism Operations Section. In addition, the ECs assigning international
+terrorism leads typically identified a Supervisory Special Agent within ITOS
+as the point-of-contact for any questions field offices might have. Because
+the Stellar Wind program was so tightly compartmented, the leads sent
+during this early period by the [REDACTED] were not coordinated
+with ITOS, and the FBI Headquarters point-of-contact identified in the ECs
+for any questions generally was one of the two [REDACTED] analysts.
+(S//NF)
+
+According to one of the [REDACTED] analysts, agents
+responsible for covering the Action leads complained that the lack of
+background information provided in the ECs about the tippers made it
+difficult to determine what investigative steps could or should be taken.
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]⁷⁵ Consequently, the analyst
+
+⁷⁴ This co-location of FBI personnel at the NSA is discussed below. (S//NF)
+⁷⁵ To open a full investigation, the FBI was required to [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] A preliminary inquiry required
+only a showing of [REDACTED] See Attorney General
+Guidelines for [REDACTED]
+The FBI's practice of issuing national security letters based on Stellar Wind-derived
+information is discussed in Chapter Six of this report. (S//NF)
+
+67
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+received calls from agents requesting additional information about the
+source of the intelligence provided in the ECs to help the agents decide
+whether there was sufficient predication to open an investigation on the
+telephone number or to issue a national security letter for subscriber
+information. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The analyst stated that in response to these calls he could only
+reiterate to the agents that the information was provided by a reliable,
+sensitive source. The analyst said this situation produced a "dichotomy"
+with the tippers. On the one hand, there was a demand in the International
+Terrorism Operations Section and field offices for the telephone numbers
+because of their priority [REDACTED] status and the prevailing concern
+that there would be a second terrorist attack; on the other hand, the limited
+and vague information contained in the [REDACTED] ECs caused
+some confusion and frustration among agents investigating the lead.
+(S//NF)
+
+Agents also complained that many tippers were already known to the
+FBI from past or pending investigations and that the [REDACTED]
+ECs were providing "circular reporting."⁷⁶ However, according to one [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] analyst, this generally did not occur. The analyst explained
+that an agent in the field assigned to cover a lead on a telephone number
+did not know the NSA was the source of the intelligence. Consequently,
+when the agent discovered that the number was identical to a number the
+agent was already investigating or was aware of, it appeared to the agent
+that the [REDACTED] simply had identified a previously known
+number, conducted some additional research that the field office likely had
+already done, and disseminated the information back to the field as new
+reporting. Because the analysts could not fully explain the source of the
+intelligence, the agent did not realize the [REDACTED] reporting in
+fact reflected a new foreign connection to the telephone number.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Another frustration voiced by agents to the [REDACTED]
+analysts was that leads disseminated under the project that were
+designated "Action leads" frequently did not yield significant investigative
+results, such as identifying new persons of interest or contributing to an
+active investigation. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+⁷⁶ For example, circular reporting might have occurred when the FBI passed a
+Stellar Wind-derived telephone number or e-mail address to another agency within the U.S.
+Intelligence Community, that agency in turn requested the NSA to analyze the information,
+and the NSA subsequently disseminated the results back to the FBI in a Stellar Wind
+report. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+68
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTEd]
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The NSA responded to this frustration by implementing the [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] rankings described earlier to provide the agents some
+guidance on prioritizing the tippers. In addition, the FBI analysts told us
+that they became more adept at telephone analysis and "got better at their
+game" by eliminating low value tippers [REDACTED] from being
+disseminated to field offices. According to FBI documents, the FBI also
+sought additional information from the NSA about tippers ranked [REDACTED]
+before the FBI disseminated these tippers to the field for investigation.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+3. FBI's Efforts to Track Stellar Wind Tippers and Update
+Executive Management on Status of [REDACTED]
+Leads (S//NF)
+
+Typically, FBI ECs originate from a specific investigative or
+administrative case file number. A file number is also required for an EC to
+be loaded into the FBI's Automated Case Management System and to enable
+the sending office to assign a lead to the receiving office. However, FBI
+Headquarters did not initially open an investigative file for the [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] ECs that disseminated Stellar Wind tippers to field offices. One of
+the original analysts assigned to the project told the OIG that he was
+familiar with a telephone analysis project in the FBI's drug program and
+that as a result he decided to issue the first Stellar Wind-related EC from
+that drug investigative file. This confused some field offices receiving the
+earliest ECs because counterterrorism leads were being disseminated under
+a drug investigation file number. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+In mid-October 2001, the FBI created a subfile under the FBI's
+investigation of the September 11 terrorist attacks to disseminate Stellar
+Wind information. The FBI used this subfile, referred to as the [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] until September 2002, when a more formal program for
+disseminating Stellar Wind information, called [REDACTED] was created.⁷⁷
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The [REDACTED] analysts also told us that they created a
+database to attempt to track the status of leads disseminated to the field
+offices. The database identified each tipper by field office and the status of
+the lead that was assigned. One analyst stated that the response rate from
+
+⁷⁷ We describe this more formal program in Chapter Six of this report. (U)
+
+69
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+field offices was uneven during these early months, and their supervisors
+instructed the analysts at one point to contact the head of each field office
+to determine the status of the [REDACTED] leads for which each office was
+responsible. (S//NF)
+
+The [REDACTED] analysts used the database they created to
+produce status reports for senior FBI officials who were read into the Stellar
+Wind program. These reports provided statistics regarding the quantity and
+rankings of disseminated tippers, as well as brief synopses of the status of
+the [REDACTED] leads. The Stellar Wind program was viewed as an
+emergency response to the September 11 attacks and these status reports
+were intended to provide FBI executives information about how the program
+was contributing to the FBI's counterterrorism efforts. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+IV. Justice Department Office of Intelligence Policy and Review's
+(OIPR) and FISA Court's Early Role in Stellar Wind
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+When the President signed the first Authorization for the program on
+October 4, 2001, only two Department officials outside the FBI were read
+into the Stellar Wind program: Attorney General John Ashcroft, who
+certified the Authorization as to form and legality; and John Yoo, the Deputy
+Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel responsible for
+advising the Attorney General on the matter and for drafting the
+Department's first memorandum on the legality of the program.⁷⁸ The
+Department's Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR), despite its
+expertise in FISA matters, was not asked to consider how FISA might affect
+the program's legality or implementation, nor was OIPR asked to consider
+how the program might affect the Department's FISA operations.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+In this section, we provide an overview of OIPR, how James Baker, the
+head of OIPR, inadvertently came to learn about Stellar Wind soon after it
+was initiated, and the subsequent role that OIPR played in the program's
+operation. We also describe the circumstances surrounding the decision to
+have the FISA Court Presiding Judge and his successor read into the Stellar
+Wind program, and the Court's response to the program.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+[REDACTED]
+
+⁷⁸ Levin told us that he did not believe Yoo was read into Stellar Wind before the
+October 4, 2001, Presidential Authorization was signed, and we were not able to determine
+precisely when Yoo's read-in occurred. However, Yoo's November 2, 2001, memorandum
+analyzes the legality of the October 4, 2001, Authorization and the draft of the November 2,
+2001, Authorization. Thus, it appears that Yoo was read into the program not later than
+November 2, 2001. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
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+A. Overview of OIPR (U)
+
+At the time of the implementation of the Stellar Wind program, OIPR
+was responsible for advising the Attorney General on matters relating to the
+national security activities of the United States.⁷⁹ Created shortly after
+enactment of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, OIPR
+reviewed executive orders, directives, and procedures relating to the
+intelligence community, and approved certain intelligence-gathering
+activities. OIPR also provided formal and informal legal advice to the
+Attorney General and U.S. intelligence agencies regarding questions of law
+and procedure relating to U.S. intelligence activities. In addition, OIPR
+advised the Attorney General and agencies such as the CIA, FBI, and
+Defense and State Departments concerning questions of law relating to U.S.
+national security activities and the legality of domestic and overseas
+intelligence operations. (U//FOVO)
+
+OIPR also represented the United States before the FISA Court. OIPR
+was responsible for preparing and presenting applications to the FISA Court
+for orders authorizing electronic surveillance and physical searches by U.S.
+intelligence agencies for foreign intelligence purposes in investigations
+involving espionage and international terrorism. When evidence obtained
+under FISA was proposed to be used in criminal proceedings, OIPR sought
+the necessary authorization from the Attorney General, and in coordination
+with the Criminal Division and U.S. Attorney's Office prepared the motions
+and briefs required by the federal court whenever surveillance under FISA
+was challenged. (U)
+
+The head of OIPR was referred to as the Counsel for Intelligence Policy
+and was supported by two Deputy Counsel and a staff of attorneys,
+paralegals, and administrative professionals. James Baker served as the
+Counsel for OIPR from May 2001 to January 2007.⁸⁰ (U)
+
+B. OIPR Counsel Learns of Stellar Wind Program (U//FOUO)
+
+Baker told us that while standing outside the Department one evening
+several weeks after the September 11 attacks, he was approached by an FBI
+colleague who said, "There is something spooky going on," that it appeared
+
+⁷⁹ In September 2006, the Justice Department moved OIPR into the newly created
+National Security Division (NSD). In April 2008, NSD modified OIPR's structure and name.
+The new organization is called the Office of Intelligence and includes operations, oversight,
+and litigation sections. For purposes of this report we use the term OIPR to reflect the time
+period our review encompasses. (U)
+
+⁸⁰ Baker served as Acting Counsel for OIPR from May 2001 to January 2002, and
+as Counsel from February 2002 until January 2007. Baker officially resigned from the
+Justice Department in October 2007. (U)
+
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+foreign-to-domestic collection was being conducted without a FISA order,
+and that some FBI personnel "were getting nervous." The FBI colleague
+asked Baker whether he knew anything about the activity, and Baker
+responded that he did not. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Baker said that while reviewing a FISA application several weeks after
+this conversation, a particular passage regarding international
+communications "leapt out at" him. According to Baker, the passage
+contained "strange, unattributed language" and information that was "not
+attributed in the usual way." Baker told the OIG that the information
+concerned connections between telephone numbers, but he could not recall
+if the information simply identified a link between individuals or also
+included the content of communications. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Baker asked the OIPR attorney responsible for the application about
+the information in the passage, and the attorney responded that nobody at
+the FBI would disclose where the information had come from, only that it
+was part of a "special collection." Baker therefore contacted the FBI about
+the application. Unable to obtain any answers to his questions, Baker
+informed the FBI that he would not allow the application to be filed with the
+FISA Court. Baker said that, to the best of his recollection, he did not
+believe the application was filed with the Court. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Soon thereafter, Baker spoke with Daniel Levin, who at that time was
+serving as both Counselor to the Attorney General and Chief of Staff to the
+FBI Director. Levin told Baker that approval from the White House was
+needed before he could tell Baker about the special collection. Levin told us
+that he successfully pressed the White House for Baker to be read into
+Stellar Wind. Baker stated that David Addington, counselor to Vice
+President Cheney, was the individual who approved his clearance into the
+program. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+According to NSA records, Baker was read into Stellar Wind in
+January 2002.⁸¹ He said his read in essentially consisted of Levin providing
+him a short briefing and a copy of Yoo's November 2, 2001, memorandum
+regarding the legality of the program. Baker told us that his initial reaction
+was that the program, and Yoo's memorandum, were flawed legally. Baker
+said he did not consider himself a constitutional law scholar, but was
+
+⁸¹ Baker told us that he initially was read into the program in December 2001 by
+Levin. Baker said he later received a more formal briefing on the program at the NSA,
+where he was allowed to read the Presidential Authorizations and discuss the program with
+NSA attorneys. This formal briefing appears to be the event that the NSA considers Baker's
+official read-in, which according to NSA records occurred on January 11, 2002. We used
+this date for purposes of calculating the number of Justice Department employees read into
+the program. (U//FOUO)
+
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+nevertheless surprised that while Stellar Wind was in his view "overriding a
+criminal statute" on the basis of the President's power as Commander in
+Chief, Yoo's memorandum did not even cite an important U.S. Supreme
+Court opinion on presidential authority during wartime, Youngstown Sheet
+& Tube Co. Baker said he believed that it is important to exercise some
+"humility" when dealing with national security matters because of the
+complexity and importance of the issues, and he therefore reserved final
+judgment on the memorandum until he researched the legal issues further.
+Yet, Baker said his initial opinion that the memorandum was flawed legally
+did not change over time. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+We asked Baker whether at the time he thought the collection
+authorized under Stellar Wind could have been accomplished under FISA.
+Baker said that his thinking on this issue has evolved over time, but that he
+staunchly believed that "FISA works in wartime." He stated that although it
+is difficult to do, FISA can be made to work under the circumstances that
+existed following the September 11 attacks, but that it also was easy to
+"make FISA not work" under these circumstances.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Baker cited a lack of resources as the primary impediment to using
+the FISA process, rather than Stellar Wind, to collect foreign intelligence
+following the September 11 attacks. Baker said that he did not believe
+OIPR, as staffed in October 2001, had sufficient resources to process the
+volume of telephone numbers the NSA was tasking for content collection
+under Stellar Wind at that time. However, Baker explained that in his view
+FISA is "scalable" and that to some degree the statute's utility is limited by
+the resources allocated to OIPR.⁸² (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Baker also observed that to bring Stellar Wind's content and meta
+data collections fully under FISA authority would have required a different
+approach to the statute. Baker said that developing such an approach
+would have been possible only by convening a working group to examine
+constitutional and practical issues. Baker, one of only three people in the
+Justice Department read into Stellar Wind as of January 2002, said he did
+not have the ability or the authority to do this himself.⁸³ Baker stated that
+his belief in this approach was informed by his own experience with and
+participation in a small, informal group composed of U.S. Intelligence
+Community officials that had worked periodically since shortly before the
+
+⁸² Baker also observed that OIPR could have been staffed with detailees from the
+Department of Defense and other components within the Justice Department. (U)
+
+⁸³ Baker also said that he did not have the legal resources within OIPR to
+"challenge" Yoo's November 2, 2001, legal analysis of the Stellar Wind program, although
+he believed it was flawed. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
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+September 11 terrorist attacks to develop solutions to various foreign
+intelligence collection issues.⁸⁴ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+C. FISA Court is Informed of Stellar Wind (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Baker told the OIG that sometime in the December 2001 to January
+2002 time period he concluded, based on his awareness that information
+derived from Stellar Wind had been used to support at least one request for
+a FISA application, that the FISA Court also needed to be made aware of the
+Stellar Wind program. Baker said that the Department's counterterrorism
+efforts rely on good relations with the FISA Court and that candor and
+transparency are critical components of that relationship. According to
+Baker, OIPR had a policy of full disclosure with the Court that he said
+served the Department well when problematic issues arose. Baker also
+attributed the Department's record of success with FISA applications and
+the improved coordination between intelligence agents and prosecutors to
+the strong relationship that the Department had built with the Court.
+Baker believed it would be detrimental to this relationship if the Court
+learned later that information from Stellar Wind was included in FISA
+applications without notice to the Court. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Baker said he raised the issue of the FISA Court not being informed
+about Stellar Wind with Levin, who first responded by suggesting that the
+Attorney General order Baker not to disclose the program to the Court while
+the issue was being considered. Baker initially agreed to this approach and
+drafted a memorandum from Ashcroft to Baker to this effect. He said that
+Levin edited the document and presented it to Ashcroft, who signed it. The
+memorandum, dated January 17, 2002, stated that Ashcroft understood
+FISA Court applications would include information obtained or derived from
+Stellar Wind, and that these applications would seek authorizations to
+conduct surveillance of targets already subject to surveillance under Stellar
+Wind. Ashcroft's memorandum also stated that he was considering Baker's
+recommendation that the Department brief the FISA Court on the program.
+The memorandum stated further:
+
+ In the interim, I am directing you to file applications with the
+ Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court without informing the
+ court of the existence of the Stellar Wind program or any aspect
+ thereof. I am also directing you not to brief any other
+
+⁸⁴ This type of collaborative effort ultimately developed the legal theories used to
+transition Stellar Wind's collection activities to FISA authority. However, as we discuss in
+Chapter Five, while the transition was successful with respect to bulk meta data collection,
+the legal theory to transition Stellar Wind's content collection, while initially approved by
+one FISA Court judge, subsequently was rejected by a second judge.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
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+
+individuals in the Department of Justice, including the FBI,
+regarding Stellar Wind without my prior authorization.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Levin told us that he, as well as Ashcroft, soon came to agree with
+Baker that the FISA Court should be made aware of the program. Levin
+said he told Ashcroft during this time that Baker had done a "remarkable
+job" building a relationship with the FISA Court that greatly benefited the
+Department's counterintelligence and counterterrorism efforts. Levin said
+he advised Ashcroft, "We should do what Baker thinks is right." According
+to Levin, Ashcroft agreed. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Levin said that he informed Gonzales and Addington at some point of
+Baker's position that the FISA Court should be made aware of Stellar Wind,
+but said they initially rejected the idea of reading any judges into the
+program. Levin stated that he continued to press the issue without success.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+However, the issue came to a head on a weekend in January 2002
+when Baker reviewed a second FISA application that contained the "strange,
+unattributed language" Baker understood to indicate that the information
+referenced was obtained from the Stellar Wind program. This second FISA
+application sought emergency approval from the FISA Court to conduct
+electronic surveillance of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Because this would
+be the first application seeking FISA authority to monitor this particular
+subject's telephone communications, Baker recognized that the NSA had
+already engaged in some level of electronic surveillance in the United States
+of a domestic telephone number without a FISA order.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Although Baker viewed the memorandum from Ashcroft directing him
+not to inform the FISA Court about Stellar Wind as "cover" for him not to
+inform the FISA Court about Stellar Wind, he remained uncomfortable
+about filing an application that contained Stellar Wind information without
+informing the FISA Court. Baker therefore approached the Chief of the
+Justice Department's Professional Responsibility Advisory Office (PRAO) to
+discuss his ethical responsibilities to the FISA Court under circumstances
+where a FISA application contains certain information that is material to the
+Court's decision, but Baker was not authorized to disclose the source of the
+
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+information.⁸⁵ Baker stated that the PRAO Chief told him that he had an
+affirmative duty of candor to the Court, and that this duty of candor was
+heightened due to the ex parte nature of the FISA proceedings.⁸⁶ Baker
+concurred with this guidance, which Baker felt also was compelled by his
+position as a federal officer and officer of the Court. Baker said he therefore
+concluded, and informed Levin, that he would not sign the pending
+application or present to it to the FISA Court, nor would he allow any OIPR
+attorney do so. According to Baker, Levin spoke to David Addington about
+the situation, but Addington nevertheless declared that the Court would not
+be read into the program. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+According to Baker, the White House, the Attorney General, and Levin
+then decided that Levin, rather than Baker, would sign the FISA application
+and present it to Judge Claude M. Hilton, the FISA Court judge responsible
+for hearing FISA matters that weekend.⁸⁷ Baker told us that he notified
+Judge Hilton in advance that the application was being handled in this
+manner. Levin said he brought the application to Judge Hilton's residence
+and explained that he, instead of the OIPR Counsel, was presenting the case
+because it involved a "special classified program." Levin told us that Judge
+Hilton approved the application without asking any questions. According to
+Levin, when he later told Addington how the matter was resolved, and that
+he agreed with Baker's position that the Court should be briefed into the
+program, Addington responded that Baker should be fired for
+insubordination for not signing the application. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+According to Baker, a consensus formed after this episode among the
+Attorney General, the FBI, and the White House that future FISA matters
+could not be handled in the same fashion, particularly in view of the
+anticipated increase in FISA applications resulting from the intelligence
+collected and disseminated under Stellar Wind.⁸⁸ Baker said that the
+
+⁸⁵ The Professional Responsibility Advisory Office provides advice to Department
+attorneys with respect to professional responsibility issues. (U)
+
+⁸⁶ Baker cited Rule 3.3 of the American Bar Association's Model Rules of
+Professional Conduct as the specific rule implicated by the situation. That rule provides, in
+relevant part, that "in an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all
+material facts known to the lawyer which will enable the tribunal to make an informed
+decision, whether or not the facts are adverse." Baker stated that he also consulted with
+two officials from the Office of the Deputy Attorney General on the matter and that they
+provided the same advice as PRAO. (U)
+
+⁸⁷ Director Mueller and Attorney General Ashcroft already had signed the
+application. (U)
+
+⁸⁸ We asked Baker whether he thought the FBI's restrictions on the use of Stellar
+Wind-derived leads disseminated to field offices, as described above, were sufficient to
+guard against including Stellar Wind information in FISA applications. Baker stated that
+his experience with FBI record-keeping practices did not give him a high degree of
+
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+
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+decision was therefore made to brief the FISA Court's Presiding Judge,
+Royce Lamberth.⁸⁹ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Judge Lamberth was read into Stellar Wind on January 31, 2002.
+The briefing was conducted in the Attorney General's office at the
+Department, and was attended by Ashcroft, Hayden, Mueller, Levin, Yoo,
+and Baker. According to a memorandum of talking points prepared for the
+briefing, Ashcroft provided Judge Lamberth a brief summary of the
+program's creation, explaining that the President had authorized a sensitive
+collection technique in response to the September 11 attacks in order to
+obtain foreign intelligence information necessary to protect the United
+States from future attacks and acts of international terrorism. Ashcroft said
+the NSA, at the instruction of the Secretary of Defense, implemented the
+collection, which was code named Stellar Wind. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+According to the talking points, Ashcroft also discussed the factors
+the President considered in determining that an "extraordinary emergency
+existed to support electronic surveillance without a warrant. The factors
+cited to Judge Lamberth paralleled those contained in the Presidential
+Authorizations, including "the magnitude and probability of death from
+terrorist attacks, the need to detect and prevent such attacks with secrecy,
+the possible intrusion into the privacy of American citizens, the absence of a
+more narrowly tailored means to obtain the information, and the
+reasonableness of such intrusion in light of the magnitude of the potential
+threat of such terrorist acts and the probability of their occurrence."
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+According to the talking points, Ashcroft stated that he determined,
+based upon the advice of the Office of Legal Counsel, that the President's
+actions were lawful under the Constitution. Levin told us that Ashcroft
+emphasized to Judge Lamberth that the FISA Court was not being asked to
+approve the program. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Following Ashcroft's summary, the briefing continued in three parts.
+First, Hayden described how the program worked operationally. Second,
+Yoo discussed legal aspects of the program. Third, Baker discussed a
+
+confidence that such separation could be consistently maintained. In addition, Baker
+believed that the nature of FBI international terrorism investigations would make it difficult
+to track Stellar Wind-derived information. According to the FBI OGC, Baker did not share
+with the FBI his concerns about whether its record-keeping practices would keep Stellar
+Wind information from being used in FISA applications. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+⁸⁹ The Presiding Judge for the FISA Court is appointed to a 7-year term by the Chief
+Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. Judge Lamberth did not appointe as
+Presiding Judge in 1995. (U)
+
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+proposal for handling FISA applications that contained program-derived
+information. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Levin told us that when the briefing concluded, Lamberth
+acknowledged he was not being asked to approve the program and
+expressed his appreciation for being read in. According to Baker, Lamberth
+also remarked, "Well, it all depends on whether you can get five votes on the
+Supreme Court, but I'm comfortable with it." For the next 4 months, until
+the end of his term in May 2002, Judge Lamberth was the only FISA Court
+judge read into Stellar Wind. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+D. OIPR Implements "Scrubbing" Procedures for Stellar Wind
+Information in International Terrorism FISA Applications
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Following Judge Lamberth's read-in to the Stellar Wind program,
+Baker implemented procedures in OIPR to address two scenarios in which
+Stellar Wind could affect international terrorism FISA applications.⁹⁰ First,
+information obtained or derived from Stellar Wind might be included in a
+FISA application to establish probable cause that the target of the
+application is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and that the
+target is using or is about to use a particular "facility” (a term used in FISA
+generally to refer to a specific telephone number or e-mail address) at which
+the electronic surveillance is directed. Second, a FISA application might
+target facilities that were also targeted by Stellar Wind, a situation referred
+to as "dual coverage" because the targeted communications were collected
+under two separate authorities. Baker's procedures, referred to as
+"scrubbing" procedures, applied to initial FISA applications as well as to
+renewal applications seeking to continue existing coverage of targets
+(electronic surveillance under FISA generally is authorized for 90-day
+periods). (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Judge Lamberth required that all applications that contained NSA
+information derived from Stellar Wind or that would produce dual coverage
+of a facility be filed with him only. Baker told the OIG that the scrubbing
+process was his idea, with Judge Lamberth's full concurrence, and that it
+had as its core principle OIPR's obligation to inform the Court of all material
+facts contained in a FISA application. According to Baker, the scrubbing
+
+⁹⁰ The procedures implemented by Baker only applied to international terrorism
+FISA applications, not to counterintelligence FISA applications. As Baker later explained in
+a letter to Judge Lamberth's successor as FISA Presiding Judge, this limitation was based
+on the understanding that the Stellar Wind program targeted only certain international
+terrorist communications "and there is no reason to believe that the fruits of Stellar Wind
+collection would appear in a counterintelligence FISA application."
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
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+procedures were a means of implementing his ethical duty of candor to the
+Court without disclosing the existence of the Stellar Wind program to
+uncleared attorneys and judges. Baker also said that Judge Lamberth
+wanted to be informed of applications that contained Stellar Wind
+information and of dual coverage situations, and that Judge Lamberth
+believed that the procedures devised by Baker were an appropriate and
+acceptable means of accomplishing this. According to Baker, the scrubbing
+process made him and Judge Lamberth "comfortable the Court being
+told what it needed to be told."⁹¹ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+We describe below the initial two scrubbing procedures implemented
+by Baker as well as the difficulties they created for the FISA application
+process. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+1. Initial Scrubbing Procedures (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Each international terrorism FISA application was "scrubbed" for
+Stellar Wind information and dual coverage before it was filed. However,
+Baker, as the only person in OIPR read into Stellar Wind, was unable to
+explain to his staff why the scrubbing was being conducted. With the NSA's
+cooperation, Baker initially scrubbed the applications without any
+assistance from OIPR staff. Baker said the time and effort he expended on
+this practice was not sustainable, and within weeks of beginning the
+scrubbing procedures Baker enlisted the assistance of OIPR's Acting Deputy
+Counsel for Intelligence Operations, Peggy Skelly-Nolen. Skelly-Nolen stated
+to the OIG that Baker told her at that time that he "needed to tell me
+something that he couldn't tell me," but was able to convey that he needed
+her and the office's assistance to process international terrorism FISA
+applications because the supporting declarations contained information that
+required special handling. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The scrubbing process, or "the program check" as it came to be
+known within OIPR, had two purposes. The first purpose was to identify
+draft applications that contained Stellar Wind-derived information in
+support of probable cause to believe that the target of the application was a
+foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and was using or was about to
+use a particular facility. The second purpose was to identify applications
+that targeted facilities that were already actively targeted under the Stellar
+Wind program. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+⁹¹ The FBI OGC told us that Baker never disclosed to it that the FISA Court was
+concerned about risks presented by the inclusion of Stellar Wind information in FISA
+applications, nor did Baker inform the FBI that OIPR implemented procedures to address
+these concerns. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
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+
+To accomplish the first purpose, OIPR attorneys were required to
+identify any information in applications attributed to the NSA, even if there
+was no suggestion the information was derived from a special program. The
+OIPR attorneys provided by e-mail the relevant excerpts from the
+applications to a designated OIPR legal assistant, who in turn compiled the
+information and transmitted it to the NSA by secure e-mail or facsimile.
+Upon receipt, the NSA conducted a check of the identified information
+against the Stellar Wind activity database, among others, to determine
+whether the information was derived or obtained from the program (as
+distinguished from being obtained by some other NSA signals collection
+activity). The NSA provided OIPR the results of its search by return e-mail
+or facsimile, writing next to each excerpt either "yes" or "no" to indicate
+whether the information was Stellar Wind-derived. Judge Lamberth did not
+require that Stellar Wind-derived information be removed from FISA
+applications, only that any such applications be filed with him exclusively
+and the Stellar Wind information identified to him orally.⁹²
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The second purpose of the scrub – to identify dual collection
+applications - followed similar steps. On approximately a weekly basis, an
+OIPR legal assistant requested that OIPR attorneys transmit to him all
+facilities targeted for electronic surveillance in applications scheduled to be
+filed with the FISA Court that week. The legal assistant created a single list
+of all targeted telephone numbers and e-mail accounts and e-mailed or
+faxed the information to the NSA. The NSA in turn checked the Stellar Wind
+database to determine whether any of the listed facilities were tasked for
+content collection under the program. The NSA provided OIPR the results of
+this check by return e-mail or facsimile, writing next to each facility either
+"yes" or "no" to indicate whether the facility was tasked under Stellar Wind.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Baker proposed to Judge Lamberth that OIPR notify him of dual
+coverage cases by including in the applications a [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+⁹² Baker said that only [REDACTED] international terrorism FISA applications
+presented to Judge Lamberth included Stellar Wind information to support the application.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+(Cont'd.)
+
+80
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED] Baker proposed to include this descriptive phrase
+in applications that, if approved, would result in dual coverage.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Beginning in early 2002, any FISA applications that included the
+descriptive phrase [REDACTED] were to be
+presented to Judge Lamberth, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] also would inform Judge Lamberth directly that it was a
+"Lamberth only" case to indicate it was connected to Stellar Wind.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+2. Complications with Scrubbing Procedures
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+Skelly-Nolen told us that no one in OIPR, including her at that time,
+was aware that the checks Baker was requiring the office to make concerned
+a specific compartmented program. However, the scrubbing procedures
+generated questions from OIPR attorneys and FBI agents, particularly when
+Skelly-Nolen instructed an OIPR attorney to add to an application the
+descriptive phrase [REDACTED]
+Skelly-Nolen told us that she was not able to provide a satisfactory response
+to the questions because she did not have the answers. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Skelly-Nolen also stated that it was stressful to comply with the
+procedures, due in large part to the fact that the attorneys and agents
+responsible for the contents of the international terrorism applications were
+asked to follow certain procedures for filings but were not being provided an
+explanation for these measures. She said this stress was compounded by
+the concurrent anthrax scare and the prevailing belief that there would be
+another terrorist attack. Skelly-Nolen stated that OIPR staff was acting
+based on Baker's representations alone, and while Baker sought to assuage
+any concerns the OIPR attorneys had over these new procedures by
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+81
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+
+explaining to the office that he had spoken to the Attorney General and the
+FISA Court on the issue, some OIPR attorneys simply were not comfortable
+under these circumstances and Skelly-Nolen had to reassign the
+international terrorism cases these attorneys were handling. Baker stated
+that he regularly told attorneys that they did not have to sign applications
+that they were not comfortable with. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The process for filing international terrorism FISA applications was
+further complicated by the fact that of the two Justice Department officials
+authorized to approve such applications – the Attorney General and the
+Deputy Attorney General – only Attorney General Ashcroft was read into
+Stellar Wind.⁹⁴ As mentioned previously, Larry Thompson, who served as
+Deputy Attorney General from May 2001 to August 2003, was never read
+into the Stellar Wind program. Alberto Gonzales, who served as White
+House Counsel from January 2000 to February 2005, stated to the OIG that
+he recalled that Ashcroft wanted Thompson, as well as Ashcroft's Chief of
+Staff, read into Stellar Wind, but that neither official ever was. Gonzales
+said Ashcroft complained that it was "inconvenient" not having these two
+officials read into the program.⁹⁵ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The situation with Thompson caused Associate Deputy Attorney
+General David Kris, who oversaw national security matters in the Office of
+the Deputy Attorney General during Thompson's tenure, to draft a
+memorandum on January 11, 2002, advising Baker that he should not send
+Kris any FISA applications that included information obtained or derived
+from the Stellar Wind program, and that Kris intended to advise Thompson
+not to review or approve any such applications.⁹⁶ The memorandum stated
+that Kris was aware of the existence of a "highly classified
+information-collection program that has the unclassified code name 'Stellar
+Wind'," but that he was "wholly unaware of the nature and scope of the
+
+⁹⁴ Each FISA application must be approved by the Attorney General, defined under
+§ 1801(g) to include the Deputy Attorney General or Acting Attorney General, based on the
+Attorney General's finding that the application "satisfies the criteria and requirements of
+such application as set forth in [subchapter I concerning electronic surveillance]." 50
+U.S.C. § 1804(a). (U)
+
+⁹⁵ As noted above, Gonzales also told the OIG that he never got the sense from
+Ashcroft that the situation affected the quality of the legal advice the Department provided
+to the White House. However, as described in Chapter Four, others had a decidedly
+different impression of Ashcroft's opinion of the legal advice he received on Stellar Wind
+during this period. We were unable to interview Ashcroft about this issue. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+⁹⁶ Baker told the OIG that he had informed Kris about the existence of a classified
+program that he could not discuss further, and that it impacted FISA applications. Baker
+said he and Kris agreed that, under the circumstances, it was not appropriate for
+Thompson to sign applications if he was not fully informed about all of the material facts
+related to them. (TS//SI//NF)
+
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+
+program." Kris also stated in the memorandum that his request for a
+briefing on the program had been denied and that he was aware Deputy
+Attorney General Thompson also had not been briefed on the program.⁹⁷
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+E. Judge Kollar-Kotelly Succeeds Judge Lamberth as FISA
+Court Presiding Judge (U)
+
+Judge Lamberth's 7-year term on the FISA Court ended in May 2002.
+On May 19, 2002, Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly was appointed to the Court
+to replace Lamberth as the Presiding Judge. In connection with this
+appointment, Judge Kollar-Kotelly was read into the Stellar Wind program
+and provided an opportunity to examine the Department's analysis of the
+program's legality. Judge Kollar-Kotelly also spoke with Baker on numerous
+occasions about the scrubbing procedures he implemented to account for
+Stellar Wind information in international terrorism FISA applications and to
+identify applications that would result in dual coverage.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+1. Judge Kollar-Kotelly Modifies OIPR Scrubbing
+Procedures (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Judge Kollar-Kotelly received her first briefing on the Stellar Wind
+program in the Attorney General's office on May 17, 2002, 2 days prior to
+being formally appointed Presiding Judge for the FISA Court. Baker, who
+attended the briefing, told us that the presentation was similar to the
+briefing initially provided to Judge Lamberth. Judge Kollar-Kotelly had
+several questions concerning the scope of the President's authority to
+conduct warrantless surveillance, and the Department responded that same
+day with a letter signed by OLC Deputy Assistant Attorney General Yoo that
+outlined the legal basis for the activity. The letter essentially replicated
+Yoo's November 2, 2001, memorandum regarding the legality of Stellar
+Wind. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+According to Baker, Judge Kollar-Kotelly met at the White House with
+Addington, Gonzales, and Yoo to read Yoo's letter, but she was not
+permitted to retain a copy or take any notes. Judge Kollar-Kotelly later
+wrote in a letter to Baker that Yoo's letter "set out a broad overview of the
+legal authority for conducting [Stellar Wind), but did not analyze the
+specifics of the [Stellar Wind] program." (TS//SI//NF)
+
+⁹⁷ [REDACTED]
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
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+
+Judge Kollar-Kotelly also requested an opportunity to review the
+Presidential Authorization initiating Stellar Wind. On August 12, 2002, she
+reviewed the October 4, 2001, Authorization. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Baker said that he met with Judge Kollar-Kotelly on several occasions
+after her initial Stellar Wind briefing to discuss how OIPR had been
+handling Stellar Wind's impact on FISA applications. Baker described for
+her the existing procedures to account for NSA information contained in
+FISA applications derived from Stellar Wind, and to identify applications
+that, if approved, would produce dual coverage of a facility.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Judge Kollar-Kotelly also was interested in identifying whether a
+facility targeted in a FISA application had been tipped to the FBI as
+Stellar-Wind derived information. Baker told the OIG that at this time he
+did not believe the FBI and NSA had the ability to track Stellar Wind tips on
+a timely basis. Baker said he mistakenly believed that as tips passed from
+the NSA to FBI Headquarters, and from there to FBI field offices for
+investigation, it would be exceedingly difficult to trace the specific source of
+the information in a sufficiently timely manner for inclusion in a FISA
+application. Baker provided his understanding to Judge Kollar-Kotelly,
+likening the Stellar Wind information in tips to the FBI as "salt in soup" that
+is impossible to extract once added. Based on Baker's representations,
+Judge Kollar-Kotelly did not require the Department to identify whether a
+facility targeted in a FISA application was ever provided to the FBI under
+Stellar Wind.⁹⁸ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Judge Kollar-Kotelly decided that the scrubbing procedures
+implemented under Judge Lamberth should continue, but she directed
+OIPR to discontinue including in applications the descriptive phrase
+[REDACTED] as a means of
+notifying her that facilities targeted by the applications were also targeted
+under Stellar Wind. Baker said that while Judge Kollar-Kotelly understood
+that instances of dual coverage would occur, she did not want to appear to
+judicially sanction Stellar Wind coverage. Baker told us his impression was
+that Judge Kollar-Kotelly "did not want to rule on the legality of the
+program" by appearing to "authorize" the NSA's technique for collecting the
+same information the government was seeking to collect under FISA.⁹⁹
+
+⁹⁸ Baker eventually learned that the FBI and the NSA in fact did have some ability
+to track Stellar Wind information. As discussed in Chapter Six, in March 2004 Judge
+Kollar-Kotelly added to the scrubbing process a check performed by the FBI to determine
+whether any telephone numbers or e-mail addresses contained in a FISA application had
+ever been provided to the FBI in a Stellar Wind report. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+⁹⁹ Judge Kollar-Kotelly later wrote about the dual coverage issue, in a January 12,
+2005, letter to Baker that discussed the "Stellar Wind Program and Practice Before the
+(Cont'd.)
+
+84
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+
+Baker said he believes Judge Kollar-Kotelly was trying to protect the FISA
+Court and did not want the legality of the Court's orders called into
+question. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Judge Kollar-Kotelly also directed OIPR to excise from FISA
+applications any information obtained or derived from Stellar Wind. Baker
+told Judge Kollar-Kotelly that OIPR could implement this requirement using
+the scrubbing procedures already in place, and that where the FBI included
+NSA information in an application determined to be Stellar Wind-derived,
+OIPR would excise it. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Judge Kollar-Kotelly also instructed Baker to alert her of any
+instances where an application's basis for the requisite probable cause
+showing under FISA was weakened by excising the Stellar Wind
+information. In such cases, Judge Kollar-Kotelly would then decide whether
+to approve the application with the knowledge that additional relevant
+information had been excised. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Even though Judge Kollar-Kotelly's scrubbing process was intended to
+eliminate all Stellar Wind information from international terrorism FISA
+applications, she still required that scrubbed applications be filed with her
+only. In time, Judge Kollar-Kotelly relaxed this requirement and permitted
+other judges on the Court to handle these applications, although only after
+first being filed with her. 100 (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+2. OIPR implements Judge Kollar-Kotelly's Scrubbing
+Procedure (TS//SI//NF)
+
+According to Baker and Skelly-Nolen, the mechanics within OIPR for
+determining whether an application contained Stellar Wind information or
+targeted a facility also targeted under Stellar Wind remained essentially
+unchanged after the transition from Judge Lamberth to Judge
+Kollar-Kotelly. However, the scrubbing process became more complex. For
+
+FISC." The letter memorialized the information Judge Kollar-Kotelly received from the
+government about the program and how she requested the government to proceed in
+preparing and presenting applications. On the subject of dual coverage, Judge
+Kollar-Kotelly wrote, "Without opining on [Stellar Wind]-related legal issues, I have sought
+to protect the proper functioning of the FISA process, under which separate court
+authorities are granted to conduct foreign intelligence collection against a set of targets that
+overlaps the set of [Stellar Wind] targets." We discuss this letter in Chapter Four of this
+report. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+100 [REDACTED]
+
+85
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+
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+
+example, because only the Attorney General could sign the applications and
+Judge Kollar-Kotelly required that only she receive the applications (even
+after being scrubbed), Skelly-Nolen had to regularly visit the Attorney
+General's and Presiding Judge's residences with stacks of what Skelly-Nolen
+came to refer to as "AG-KK only" FISA applications.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The situation was further complicated when Ashcroft was on overseas
+travel and his signature was needed for a scrubbed application ready to be
+filed. When this occurred, the classification of the application's signature
+page was "downgraded" and then sent to Ashcroft by secure fax. The actual
+application was not faxed; instead, Skelly-Nolen typically included a
+statement from her or Baker with the signature page indicating that the
+application was proper and complied with the requirements of the FISA
+statute. Skelly-Nolen observed that in these cases Ashcroft essentially
+relied on her and Baker's assessments of the applications – even though
+Skelly-Nolen was not read into Stellar Wind at this time. Scrubbed
+applications were handled similarly when Ashcroft was traveling
+domestically, although in those instances the applications could be provided
+along with the signature page if requested.¹⁰¹ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Judge Kollar-Kotelly also required that hearings for the "AG-KK only"
+FISA applications and renewals be scheduled for late in the day or on the
+weekend, either in her courtroom chambers at the District Court for the
+District of Columbia or at her residence. According to Skelly-Nolen, Judge
+Kollar-Kotelly insisted on this practice so that the "AG-KK only" docket did
+not interfere with her regular court docket. From Skelly-Nolen's perspective,
+this practice proved to be an "enormous burden," particularly in cases
+involving applications to continue FISA coverage on targets of emergency
+authorizations.¹⁰² Skelly-Nolen explained that these authorizations were,
+for "no good operations reason" that she was aware of, routinely approved
+by the Attorney General on Fridays, meaning that a FISA application had to
+be filed with the Court within 72 hours – by Monday - to continue the
+emergency surveillance coverage. However, because Judge Kollar-Kotelly
+had a regular court docket on Mondays, she required that any scrubbed
+FISA application seeking authority to continue surveillance initiated under
+
+¹⁰¹ Baker and Skelly-Nolen told the OIG that in their experience it was not unusual
+for an Attorney General or Deputy Attorney General to rely on OIPR's representations that
+the FISA applications presented for signature satisfied the statute's requirements, instead
+of reviewing the full contents of each application. (U//FOUO)
+
+¹⁰² As previously described, under FISA during this time period, when the Attorney
+General reasonably determines that an emergency situation exists prior to obtaining a FISA
+order, the Attorney General may approve the use of electronic surveillance for a period of
+up to 72 hours without an order. (U)
+
+86
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+
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+
+emergency authorization be scheduled with her for Sunday. Skelly-Nolen
+stated that these cases would be in addition to the renewal applications that
+also had to be heard on Sundays so the authority for the surveillance in
+those cases did not expire and the coverage lapse.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Baker identified another issue that stemmed from Judge
+Kollar-Kotelly's requirement that only she receive dual coverage
+applications. The problem arose when Judge Kollar-Kotelly was out of town
+and unavailable to hear a dual coverage application. Baker's solution was
+either to fly the application to the place Judge Kollar-Kotelly was located, or
+to contact the NSA and request that it "de-task" the facilities that the FISA
+application was targeting. In this way, the application could be presented to
+an alternative FISA Court judge because it no longer targeted facilities that
+were also targeted under Stellar Wind. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+For example, Baker described a situation where the FBI was urgently
+interested in a particular individual whose telephone was currently tasked
+by the NSA under Stellar Wind. In this case, Baker instructed the NSA to
+de-task the telephone number so the FBI's FISA application could be
+presented to a judge other than Judge Kollar-Kotelly. To prevent any gap in
+coverage between the time the NSA detasked the telephone number and the
+Court approved the FBI's application, surveillance was initiated under
+FISA's emergency authorization provision and then presented to a FISA
+Court judge within the requisite 72 hours. According to Baker, proceeding
+in this fashion "made everyone comfortable," including the NSA. Baker told
+us that this situation occurred a couple of times each year.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+According to Baker and Skelly-Nolen, these examples illustrate how
+having only the Attorney General and a single judge on the FISA Court read
+into Stellar Wind complicated the FISA process. Baker said that "fairly early
+on" after being read into the program, Judge Kollar-Kotelly made several
+requests for other FISA Court judges to be read into the program. Baker
+told the OIG that these requests were generally made through him, orally
+and in writing, but was aware that on at least one occasion Judge
+Kollar-Kotelly made the request directly to Attorney General Ashcroft.
+Baker said that sometime prior to March 2004 he personally advised
+Ashcroft of Judge Kollar-Kotelly's concerns, and that Ashcroft responded
+with words to the effect that the White House would not allow more judges
+to be read into Stellar Wind. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+In a January 12, 2005, letter to Baker, Judge Kollar-Kotelly
+summarized the situation, stating, "I have repeatedly asked that the other
+members of the FISC be given access to the same information that I have
+received regarding the [Stellar Wind] program. To date, the executive
+
+87
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+
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+
+branch has declined to do so, citing a need to maintain the strictest secrecy
+regarding [Stellar Wind]." (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+As a consequence of only Judge Kollar-Kotelly being read into Stellar
+Wind and her insistence that she alone handle applications scrubbed of
+Stellar Wind information or that involved tasking telephone numbers or
+e-mail addresses already tasked under Stellar Wind (dual coverage), by
+November 2004 she was handling approximately [REDACTED] percent of all FISA
+applications. Judge Kollar-Kotelly also tended to hear successive
+applications regarding the same targeted facilities. She discontinued this
+practice in November 2004 and permitted other judges to hear scrubbed
+applications. Judge Kollar-Kotelly later wrote that her decision was "based
+on the operational systems" OIPR had in place to scrub applications and
+that she assured her colleagues "that they could properly decide [the cases]
+based on the information in each application, without the additional
+information on which I have been briefed, but which, to date, the other
+judges have not received." (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+V. FBI Initiates Measures to Improve the Management of Stellar
+Wind Information (S//NF)
+
+Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, the FBI had
+reallocated personnel and resources to counterterrorism operations, and
+established the Telephone Analysis Unit (TAU) to exploit telephone
+communications data. We described above how a small team of agents and
+analysts from this unit was reassigned to the [REDACTED] which
+was responsible for handling the Stellar Wind reports provided by the NSA.
+(S//NF)
+
+In approximately May 2002, the TAU was renamed the
+Communications Analysis Unit (CAU) and became one of the units within
+the newly created Communications Exploitation Section (CXS). According to
+the first Acting CAU Unit Chief, the FBI's vision for the unit was that it
+would support FBI international terrorism investigations by [REDACTED]
+The Stellar Wind [REDACTED] program was one source for obtaining this [REDACTED]
+(S//NF)
+
+In this section, we describe changes the FBI implemented in late 2002
+and early 2003 to manage the intelligence it received under Stellar Wind.
+These changes included attempts to improve coordination with the NSA,
+implement a more formal program to receive intelligence from the NSA and
+disseminate it to FBI field offices, educate the FBI field offices about the
+value of the intelligence and FBI Headquarters' expectations concerning its
+use, and assign a small team of FBI personnel to work full-time at the NSA
+on Stellar Wind. (S//NF)
+
+88
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+
+A. CAU Acting Unit Chief Evaluates FBI Response to Stellar
+Wind (S//NF)
+
+When the first CAU Unit Chief arrived at FBI Headquarters in
+September 2002, CXS was newly established and most of the Section's
+15-20 staff was there on temporary duty assignments. The CAU was staffed
+similarly at this time, but also contained some professional support
+employees from other divisions at FBI Headquarters. (S//NF)
+
+The CAU Unit Chief said that the CAU's mission was to support FBI
+international terrorism investigations – al Qaeda investigations in particular
+by analyzing telephone calling activity and e-mail communications. He
+explained that prior to September 11, 2001, the FBI analyzed telephone
+numbers received by field offices or other sources by querying the numbers
+against the FBI's [REDACTED] database, the FBI's central
+repository for telephone subscriber data. However, he said the FBI's
+database at that time was relatively small and had limited analytical
+capability. In the wake of the September 11 attacks, the FBI gained access
+to additional tools and began to utilize more sophisticated analytical
+techniques. Stellar Wind was one of those new tools.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The CAU Unit Chief said that after he was read into Stellar Wind in
+late September 2002, it was clear to him based on conversations with the
+CXS Acting Section Chief that the FBI wanted to increase its participation in
+the Stellar Wind program. As a counterterrorism agent in the FBI's Chicago
+field office, the Unit Chief had some exposure to Stellar Wind in the form of
+[REDACTED] leads. He told us that he had recalled thinking the
+leads were "stupid" and "not sensible.” He also said that he had been
+critical of the leads because they did not provide any context to the
+information, such as how it was obtained. He stated that the leads did not
+adequately explain the [REDACTED] rankings associated with the
+telephone numbers, and the leads were not sufficiently specific as to what
+action the field office was expected to take. In his view, the intelligence
+disseminated by the [REDACTED] ECs was not "actionable." The Unit
+Chief told us that he could not figure out why FBI Headquarters was
+"pushing this stuff out" after September 11, and that other agents in the
+field shared his views. 103 (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+¹⁰³ As previously described, former NSA Director Hayden told us that immediately
+following the September 11 terrorist attacks the NSA modified the agency's collection [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] and that this resulted in a flood of telephone numbers to the FBI. Thus, it is possible that
+
+(Cont'd.)
+89
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+
+After becoming the acting Unit Chief for the CAU and reviewing how
+the FBI was handling the Stellar Wind information, he learned that there
+was no unit that oversaw the [REDACTED] and no guidance for how
+the NSA information should be processed by FBI analysts. He also said that
+the process in place - essentially re-typing into ECs the tearline information
+contained in Stellar Wind reports - merely "regurgitated" information that,
+by itself, was not actionable. He was not critical of the FBI analysts
+responsible for drafting the ECs, who simply performed this task as
+directed. Rather, he believed the process suffered from a lack of leadership.
+He described the FBI's involvement in Stellar Wind up to this point as
+"happenstance" and said the FBI did not have "a real good handle on it." He
+said that the deficiencies he identified were attributable in part to the
+significant resource challenges the FBI encountered after September 11, but
+he nevertheless considered the FBI's effort to respond to the Stellar Wind
+information as "half-baked." He said he therefore set about implementing
+changes within the CAU to better organize this effort, which he believed
+would improve the quality of the intelligence disseminated to FBI field
+offices. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+B. FBI Increases Cooperation with NSA and Initiates [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Project to Manage Stellar Wind Information
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF}
+
+The CAU Unit Chief said that the first step he took to improve the
+FBI's involvement in Stellar Wind was to detail to the NSA one of CAU's
+temporary duty special agents. He instructed the agent to form a working
+group at the NSA to identify any problems and evaluate the quality of the
+information provided in the NSA's Stellar Wind reports, as well as the
+information that the FBI reported back to the NSA about tips.¹⁰⁴ The CAU
+Unit Chief said he took this step so that the NSA gained a "case agent's
+perspective" on the type of information useful to FBI field offices, and also to
+explain to the NSA that the information that could be disseminated about
+the tippers should include "context" and "clarity" sufficient to justify the FBI
+conducting an inquiry under the FBI's investigative guidelines.¹⁰⁵ He said
+he did not believe that the NSA's interest in obscuring the “sources and
+methods" associated with the information had to compromise the quality of
+the information provided to the FBI. He also said that the NSA needed to
+
+FBI agents' early frustration with leads that provided telephone numbers was attributable
+in part to the leads generated under this NSA collection activity. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+¹⁰⁴ The CAU Unit Chief recalled that the NSA had expressed frustration that the FBI
+never provided the NSA any responses to the tipped information. (S//NF)
+
+¹⁰⁵ FBI international terrorism investigations at this time were governed by the
+Attorney General Guidelines for FBI Foreign Intelligence Collection and Foreign
+Counterintelligence Investigations. (U)
+
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+understand how the FBI investigated intelligence that it received, and that
+FBI agents did not have to know the specific sources and methods used to
+acquire information in order to effectively investigate the information.
+(S//NF)
+
+The CAU Unit Chief said that this liaison effort occurred over a couple
+of weeks, with the temporary duty agent driving to the NSA daily. According
+to the Unit Chief, the agent explained to NSA personnel what the FBI was
+permitted to do with certain types of information and that the NSA would
+receive more feedback from the FBI if the quality of the disseminable
+information about the tippers improved. The Unit Chief told us that
+following this exchange the NSA improved the Stellar Wind reports by
+providing better information in both the compartmented and tearline
+portions of the reports. (S//NF)
+
+In addition, the CAU Unit Chief told us that he took steps to increase
+cooperation within the FBI between CAU, which was part of an analytical
+section that supported counterterrorism investigations, and FBI
+Headquarters' International Terrorism Operations Section, which was
+responsible for overseeing FBI counterterrorism investigations. The Unit
+Chief said that based on his experience in the field working
+counterterrorism cases, he believed it was important that the CAU analysts
+consult with agents in the operational section about leads the CAU
+proposed to set in the ECs. While he was confident the CAU analysts could
+identify logical investigative steps, he thought they should nevertheless
+coordinate with the operational personnel to see if there was agreement and
+to determine whether a lead potentially could affect any ongoing operations
+that the CAU was not aware of. He also noted that his CAU Unit Chief
+successors discontinued this practice, a decision he disagreed with and
+complained about to the Section Chief for CXS because he believed the
+program risked losing a measure of effectiveness and efficiency as a
+consequence. (S//NF)
+
+Another step the CAU Unit Chief took relating to the FBI's
+management of Stellar Wind information was to open an administrative file,
+or "control file," to serve as the repository for all communications that the
+CAU sent to the field offices containing Stellar Wind information, as well as
+all communications the CAU received from field offices reporting the results
+of the investigative activity taken in response to assigned leads.¹⁰⁶ As
+explained previously, the [REDACTED] communications had been
+
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+disseminated from a subfile associated with the FBI's international
+terrorism investigation of the September 11 attacks. In the EC requesting
+that a control file be opened for Stellar Wind information, the CAU Unit
+Chief wrote that "a dedicated control file for this project will better serve the
+specific needs of the special project and will add an additional layer of
+security for the source." (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+A control file for Stellar Wind information was opened on
+September 30, 2002, and given the designation [REDACTED] From that
+point forward, all ECs that disseminated Stellar Wind tips were sent in
+connection with the [REDACTED] control file.¹⁰⁷ The ECs were classified at
+the Secret level and, similar to the [REDACTED] ECs, included a
+vague explanation about the source of the information and a caveat
+concerning its use. 108 (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+¹⁰⁷ The Unit Chief told us that Director Mueller held a telephone conference call in
+October 2002 with the heads of all FBI field offices and advised them that FBI
+Headquarters was working to improve the process for disseminating [REDACTED]
+information to the field offices by adding both context and clarity to the communications.
+Director Mueller expressed his expectation that the offices would act on the information.
+According to the Unit Chief, Director Mueller essentially was trying to sell the program and
+ensure the "tool" was being used. Director Mueller told the OIG that he did not recall
+having specific discussions with the heads of FBI field offices about Stellar Wind
+information. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
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+Several months later, in January 2003, the CAU Unit Chief sent an
+EC to all FBI field offices seeking "to clarify the mission of [CAU]... as well
+as to describe this unit's distinct role in the FBI's participation in the global
+war on terror." The EC emphasized CAU's capabilities in examining
+telephone calling activity and its liaison function with members of the U.S.
+Intelligence Community that are "in a unique position to provide potentially
+actionable intelligence to the FBI." The EC explained that many of the leads
+from the CAU were sent under the [REDACTED] file. On the subject of
+investigative responses to [REDACTED] leads, the EC stated:
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+C. FBI Assigns CAU Personnel to NSA on Full-Time Basis
+(S//NF)
+
+The CAU Unit Chief also assigned a team of FBI personnel to the NSA
+on a full-time basis to manage Stellar Wind information. The Unit Chief told
+us that shortly before his temporary duty assignment to FBI Headquarters
+was set to expire, he and the CXS Acting Section Chief briefed Director
+Mueller's assistant – and later Director Mueller – about the role they
+recommended that the FBI take in the Stellar Wind program. The CAU Unit
+Chief recommended co-locating at the NSA approximately four FBI agents
+and analysts with remote access to FBI information systems. He likened the
+suggestion to a "task force environment" that would introduce the FBI's
+investigative skills at the beginning of the NSA's analysis of Stellar Wind
+information. Director Mueller approved the recommendation and told the
+CAU Unit Chief to implement it. (S//NF)
+
+For the next 2 months the CAU Unit Chief worked with the NSA on
+the proposal. [REDACTED]
+
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+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The Memorandum of Understanding
+between the FBI and the NSA to facilitate the co-location was finalized in
+December 2002, and in February 2003 a CAU team began its co-location at
+the NSA to manage the FBI's involvement in Stellar Wind. This co-location
+continues today. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+VI. OIG Analysis (U)
+
+In analyzing the Department's and the FBI's involvement in the NSA's
+expanded signals intelligence collection activity after the September 11
+attacks, it is important to recognize the exceptional circumstances that
+existed at the time. Many Department and FBI officials emphasized to us
+the sense of crisis and alarm during this period, and noted the widely
+shared concern within the Intelligence Community that a second wave of
+attacks was imminent. The Stellar Wind program was conceived and
+implemented amid these challenging circumstances. (S//NF)
+
+This chapter described the role of Justice Department and FBI
+officials in the inception and early implementation of the Stellar Wind
+program, including the Department's initial reviews of the legality of the
+program. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+We believe that a significant problem during this early phase of the
+Stellar Wind program was the lack of a sufficient number of Justice
+Department attorneys read into the program to conduct an analysis of the
+program's legality. The White House – and according to Gonzales, the
+President - determined who within the Department was permitted access to
+the program. We believe that Attorney General Ashcroft, who met frequently
+with the President on national security matters, was in a position to
+personally advocate for the read-in of an adequate number of attorneys
+necessary for the Department to perform a thorough and factually accurate
+legal analysis of the program. We know that Ashcroft's request that his
+chief of staff David Ayres and Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson be
+read into the program was not granted. But because Ashcroft did not agree
+to be interviewed, we were unable to determine from him whether he sought
+additional Department read-ins to assist in the legal analysis of the
+program, how hard he may have pressed for these additional resources, or
+whether he believed he was receiving adequate legal advice about the
+program from Yoo alone. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+As described in this chapter, John Yoo was the only Department
+attorney read in to work on the legal analysis supporting the program from
+
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+September 2001 through May 2003.¹⁰⁹ As described in Chapter Four,
+Department officials who succeeded Yoo concluded that the analysis Yoo
+produced was significantly flawed and found the legal basis for aspects of
+the program to be lacking. We believe that reading in only one Department
+attorney to analyze the legality of the program impeded the Department's
+ability to conduct a thorough and factually accurate legal analysis, and
+undermined the Department's early role in the program. In Chapter Four
+we discuss the harm that resulted in late 2003 and early 2004 from the
+Department's highly restricted access to the program. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+We also described in this chapter how the harm attributable to the
+Justice Department's insufficient early involvement in the program extended
+beyond conducting an analysis of the program's legality. The Justice
+Department's relationship with the FISA Court was put at risk by not having
+officials from OIPR and members of the FISA Court read into Stellar Wind
+when program-derived information started being disseminated as
+investigative leads to FBI field offices. In our view, it was foreseeable that
+Stellar Wind-derived information would be included in FISA applications.¹¹⁰
+OIPR Counsel Baker told us that the Department's counterterrorism and
+counterintelligence efforts rely on good relations with the FISA Court and
+that candor and transparency are critical components of the relationship.
+Baker attributed the Department's record of success with FISA applications
+and the improved coordination between intelligence agents and prosecutors
+to the strong relationship that the Department built with the Court. Baker
+believed, and we agree, that it would have been detrimental to the
+relationship if the Court learned that information from Stellar Wind was
+
+¹⁰⁹ As was the case with Ashcroft, because Yoo did not agree to be interviewed we
+were unable to learn from him what if any efforts he made either within the Department or
+at the White House to advocate for additional attorneys - including his supervisor in OLC -
+to be read into the program to assist in his legal analysis. However, in his book "War by
+Other Means," Yoo wrote of his experience working on the Stellar Wind program:
+While meeting with Ashcroft alone reflected the importance of the issues, it
+also placed me in a difficult position. I could not discuss certain matters
+with my DOJ superiors, or rely on the collective resources of OLC, which
+usually assigned several attorneys to work on an opinion. Operational
+security demanded by the war on terrorism changed some of OLC's standard
+operating procedures.
+War by Other Means at 101. (S//NF)
+
+¹¹⁰ The restrictions the FBI imposed on the use of program-derived information -
+that it could be used for "lead purposes only and not for "legal or judicial purposes" (such
+as affidavits) - reflected a good faith and reasonable effort. However, such restrictions
+could not ensure that program-derived information would not appear in FISA applications.
+Indeed, this eventuality led to Baker's discovery of the program. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
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+included in FISA applications without the Court being told so in advance.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Yet we are not aware of any effort or consideration on the part of
+Attorney General Ashcroft or officials at the White House to account for
+Stellar Wind's impact on Justice Department FISA operations by reading in
+any OIPR officials or members of the FISA Court. In fact, as we described in
+this chapter, Baker was read into Stellar Wind only after hearing from an
+FBI colleague that "there is something spooky going on" with the collection
+of foreign-to-U.S. communications and subsequently reviewing a FISA
+application that contained "strange, unattributed" language that the FBI
+would not explain to him. Baker was read in when Daniel Levin, then
+Counselor to Ashcroft and Chief of Staff to Mueller, pressed White House
+officials for the clearance. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Moreover, White House officials initially rejected the idea of reading in
+members of the FISA Court, and then took no action even as Levin, who
+together with Ashcroft agreed with Baker that the Court needed to be
+informed about the program, continued to press the issue. It was not until
+Levin was required to sign and file a FISA application that Baker refused to
+handle because it contained Stellar Wind-derived information that the
+decision was made to read in a single judge (Presiding Judge Lamberth,
+followed by Presiding Judge Kollar-Kotelly). (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The decisions to read in Baker and a member of the FISA Court,
+which in our view were unnecessarily delayed, were important steps in
+preserving the relationship the Justice Department had built with the
+Court. However, we believe that once Stellar Wind's impact on the Justice
+Department's FISA operations became evident, limiting read-ins to a single
+OIPR official and a single FISA Court judge was unduly restrictive and
+short-sighted. This chapter described how the scrubbing procedures
+imposed by the FISA Court and implemented by OIPR to account for Stellar
+Wind-derived information created concerns among some OIPR attorneys
+about the unexplained changes being made to their FISA applications. The
+scrubbing procedures also substantially distorted the assignment of cases
+to FISA Court judges and by November 2004 resulted in Judge
+Kollar-Kotelly handling approximately [REDACTED] percent of all FISA applications.
+In our view, once Stellar Wind began to affect the functioning of the FISA
+process, OIPR and the FISA Court effectively became part of the program's
+operations and the number of OIPR staff and FISA Court judges read into
+Stellar Wind to manage the impact should have increased.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+This chapter also described the FBI's handling of Stellar Wind-derived
+information in the initial weeks and months of the program. The FBI's chief
+objective during this period was to expeditiously disseminate
+
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+program-derived information to FBI field offices for investigation while
+protecting the source of the information and the method by which it was
+obtained. We concluded that the FBI's procedures to meet this objective
+generally were reasonable. The FBI personnel assigned to the [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] developed a straightforward process for receiving Stellar Wind
+reports, reproducing the information in a non-compartmented, Secret-level
+format, and disseminating the information in Electronic Communications,
+or ECs, to the appropriate field offices for investigation. The [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] ECs disseminated to FBI field offices also placed appropriate
+restrictions on how the information could be used, instructing field offices
+that the information was "for lead purposes only" and could not be used for
+any legal or judicial purpose. FBI personnel at the field offices we visited as
+part of our review generally were familiar with the restrictions. (S//NF)
+
+However, we found that the exceptionally compartmented nature of
+Stellar Wind created deficiencies in the FBI's initial process for handling
+program-derived information and understandably frustrated agents
+assigned to handle [REDACTED] leads. The limited resources
+allocated to the [REDACTED] hampered the analysts' ability to
+enhance Stellar Wind information with relevant FBI or public source
+information before disseminating leads to field offices for investigation.
+More significantly, the [REDACTED] was prohibited from disclosing
+information that agents traditionally were accustomed to receiving with
+leads that required investigation. The [REDACTED] ECs
+consequently suffered from vagueness about the source of the information
+being provided and lacked factual details about the individuals allegedly
+involved with international terrorism and with whom the domestic numbers
+being disseminated possibly were in contact. (S//NF)
+
+We found that the FBI sought over time to address these deficiencies
+and improve the effectiveness of its participation in the Stellar Wind
+program. In April 2002, transmitting Stellar Wind-derived leads to FBI field
+offices became a priority of the Communications Exploitation Section, and
+within it, the Communications Analysis Unit (CAU). The first chief of the
+CAU assigned a team of FBI personnel to work full-time at the NSA on
+Stellar Wind and to initiate the [REDACTED] project to manage the FBI's
+participation in Stellar Wind. As we discuss in this chapter and in Chapter
+Six, these measures enhanced the FBI's knowledge about Stellar Wind
+operations and gave the NSA better insight about how FBI field offices
+investigated Stellar Wind information, which improved Stellar Wind reports
+and the leads that were disseminated to FBI field offices.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
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+CHAPTER FOUR
+LEGAL REASSESSMENT OF STELLAR WIND
+(MAY 2003 THROUGH MAY 2004) (TS//SI//NF)
+
+By early 2003, while the operation of the Stellar Wind program had
+evolved, particularly with respect to the means by which intelligence from
+the program was provided to the FBI, the program still remained legally
+premised on John Yoo's November 2001 and October 2002 Office of Legal
+Counsel memoranda. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+This chapter describes the pivotal period between May 2003 and May
+2004 during which Yoo's departure from the Office of Legal Counsel and the
+arrival of new officials at the Justice Department resulted in a
+comprehensive reassessment of the Stellar Wind program's legal basis. This
+legal reassessment led to a contentious dispute between the Justice
+Department and the White House on the legality of important aspects of the
+program. This dispute eventually resulted in modifications to the operation
+of the program, and also contributed to the decision to place at least one
+aspect of the program under FISA authority. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Section I of this chapter discusses how personnel changes within the
+Office of Legal Counsel led to a re-examination of Yoo's legal analysis,
+culminating in a Justice Department legal position against continuing to
+certify the program and the resulting dispute with the White House. Section
+II describes how, faced with the prospect that the Attorney General, Deputy
+Attorney General, FBI Director, and other senior Department officials would
+resign in March 2004 if the program continued unchanged, the White House
+agreed to modify the program to conform it to the Department's revised legal
+analysis. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+I. Justice Department Reassesses Legality of Stellar Wind Program
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+A. Overview of Office of Legal Counsel (U)
+
+One of the responsibilities of the Assistant Attorney General for the
+Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) is to assist the Attorney General in his
+function as legal advisor to the President and all Executive Branch agencies.
+OLC drafts legal opinions for the Attorney General and also provides its own
+opinions in response to requests from the Counsel to the President, various
+agencies of the Executive Branch, and offices within the Department of
+Justice. OLC often deals with complex legal issues on which two or more
+agencies are in disagreement, and provides legal advice to the Executive
+Branch on constitutional questions, including the review of pending
+
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+legislation for constitutionality. Executive Orders proposed to be issued by
+the President are reviewed by OLC as to form and legality, as are other
+matters that require the President's formal approval. OLC also reviews
+proposed orders by the Attorney General and all regulations requiring the
+Attorney General's approval. (U)
+
+B. Personnel Changes within Office of Legal Counsel (U)
+
+John Yoo advised Attorney General Ashcroft and White House officials
+on the Stellar Wind program from the program's inception in October 2001
+through Yoo's resignation from the Department in May 2003. Upon Yoo's
+departure, Patrick Philbin told the OIG that he was selected by the White
+House to assume Yoo's role as advisor to the Attorney General concerning
+the program.¹¹¹ With this personnel change came a fresh review of the legal
+underpinnings of the Stellar Wind program. We describe in the following
+sections the circumstances leading to what one official described as "the
+great rethink" of the program. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+1. Yoo's Role in the Program
+(October 2001 through May 2003) (U)
+
+On September 11, 2001, and through November 2001, Daniel Koffsky
+was the Acting Assistant Attorney General for OLC. Koffsky was not read
+into the Stellar Wind program. Jay Bybee served as Assistant Attorney
+General for OLC from November 2001 until March 2003, when he became a
+judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.¹¹² Bybee also was
+never read into the Stellar Wind program. As discussed in Chapter Three,
+John Yoo, a Deputy Assistant Attorney General in OLC, had sole
+responsibility within that office and within the Department of Justice for
+developing the legal analysis relating to the Stellar Wind program until May
+2003.¹¹³ Bybee told us he was not aware at the time that Yoo was drafting
+legal opinions in connection with a compartmented program. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Bybee told us that the OLC normally adheres to a tradition called the
+"two Deputy rule," so that OLC opinions are reviewed by two OLC Deputy
+Assistant Attorneys General before going to the OLC Assistant Attorney
+General for approval. Bybee said that the purpose of this rule is to ensure
+
+¹¹¹ On June 1, 2003, Philbin became an Associate Deputy Attorney General.
+However, he told us that he still technically remained a Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+in OLC and was thus "dual-hatted." (U)
+
+¹¹² Bybee was nominated by President Bush to serve on the Ninth Circuit in May
+2002 but was not confirmed by the Senate until March 2003. (U)
+
+¹¹³ Yoo's major opinions about electronic surveillance and Stellar Wind are
+summarized in Chapter Three. (TS//SI//NF)
+
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+the quality of the legal research and soundness of the legal analysis. In
+addition, Bybee stressed that the Assistant Attorney General must be aware
+of all opinions that issue from the OLC. Bybee said that the OLC Assistant
+Attorney General has an obligation to "see the whole picture" and is the only
+person in the office who knows the full range of issues that are being
+addressed by the OLC. Bybee also said the Assistant Attorney General is
+the only official in that office who can assure that OLC opinions remain
+consistent. Bybee stated that the Assistant Attorney General, as a
+Senate-confirmed official, has ultimate accountability for the work of the
+office. Bybee noted that, by contrast, the Deputy Assistant Attorney
+General position, though political, does not require Senate confirmation. (U)
+
+Bybee told the OIG that it would not be unusual for a Deputy
+Assistant Attorney General such as Yoo to have direct contact with the
+White House for the purpose of rendering legal advice. Bybee stated that it
+is "not clear" whether or to what extent the Attorney General needs to be
+kept informed of such contacts. However, Bybee said that the Attorney
+General may appropriately decide to ask a single OLC attorney to work on a
+particular project, but that it is "not the White House's call" to make such
+assignments because the White House may not be aware of what advice the
+OLC is providing to other Executive Branch agencies. Bybee told us that
+during his tenure as Assistant Attorney General he did not know that Yoo
+was working alone on a sensitive compartmented program, and he had no
+knowledge of how Yoo came to be selected for this responsibility. (U)
+
+Philbin said he believed that White House Counsel Gonzales and Vice
+President Cheney's Counsel David Addington had selected Yoo to draft the
+OLC's opinions on Stellar Wind and other national security programs, and
+that Yoo was the "obvious choice" to assume this role because of his
+expertise in war powers issues and the authority of the
+Commander-in-Chief.¹¹⁴ (S//NF)
+
+Gonzales told the OIG he understood that Yoo had asked others
+within OLC to help out with specific legal issues during this period without
+telling them what they were asked to assist with, and Yoo then
+aggregated that work into his memoranda concerning electronic surveillance
+and the Stellar Wind program. Gonzales also stated that Yoo did not
+consult with any experts outside the Department in drafting his
+memoranda.¹¹⁵ (TS//SI//NF)
+
+¹¹⁴ As discussed in Chapter Three, Yoo had been given responsibility for working on
+national security issues prior to the inception of the Stellar Wind program. (U)
+
+¹¹⁵ When Gonzales testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee on February 6,
+2006, he stated that although he was not at the Department when the program
+commenced, "I suspect - in fact I'm fairly sure that there were not discussions with
+(Cont'd.)
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+As noted above, neither Yoo nor Ashcroft agreed to be interviewed for
+the OIG's investigation. Other witnesses gave the OIG various accounts of
+Yoo's interactions with Attorney General Ashcroft and with the White House
+concerning the program. Gonzales told us that Yoo regularly advised
+Ashcroft on the legal aspects of the program so that Ashcroft could continue
+to certify it as to form and legality. Gonzales also said that it was
+incumbent on Ashcroft as Attorney General to satisfy the Department's legal
+obligations regarding the program. Gonzales told us he thus understood
+Yoo's opinions as representing the opinions of the Department. However,
+Gonzales acknowledged that White House officials consulted with Yoo and
+sought his advice without going through the Attorney General or Bybee -
+Yoo's supervisor - although Gonzales also said they did not seek
+Department approval from Yoo concerning the Stellar Wind program.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+Other witnesses described their concerns regarding Yoo's direct
+contacts with the White House, and with Addington and Gonzales in
+particular. Philbin said he told Addington that Yoo's direct access to
+Addington on legal matters was "not a good way to run things," referring to
+the lack of oversight of an OLC Deputy Assistant Attorney General by a
+supervisor. Philbin stated that there was nothing wrong with assigning a
+project to a subordinate, but not without the head of the office knowing
+what the subordinate was doing. (U)
+
+Jack Goldsmith told us that when he became the Assistant Attorney
+General for the Office of Legal Counsel in October 2003, he learned that
+Yoo's contacts with the White House had had the effect of cutting the
+Attorney General "out of the loop," a practice Goldsmith said he resolved not
+to continue with any OLC attorney. (U)
+
+Goldsmith also told us the White House had wanted Yoo to replace
+Bybee as the Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel
+following Bybee's confirmation as a judge on the Ninth Circuit, but that
+Ashcroft blocked the move. Yoo resigned from the Department in May
+2003.¹¹⁶ (U)
+
+outside expertise at the Department, although I don't know for sure." An NSA Associate
+General Counsel for Operations told the OIG that Yoo visited the NSA for a briefing about
+the program at some point after he had drafted his November 2, 2001, legal memorandum.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+¹¹⁶ In addition to working on the legal analysis for the Stellar Wind program while
+at the Justice Department, Yoo also worked on at least one other project involving a Top
+Secret compartmented detainee interrogation program. In contrast to the Stellar Wind
+program, the OIG determined that at least three OLC attorneys, including Bybee and
+Philbin, worked on the program's legal analysis with Yoo or participated by supervising his
+work. In addition, attorneys from the Department's Criminal Division and from other
+(Cont'd.)
+
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+2. Philbin Replaces Yoo (U)
+
+Patrick Philbin joined the Department as a Deputy Assistant Attorney
+General in the Office of Legal Counsel on September 4, 2001.¹¹⁷ He was
+read into the Stellar Wind program in late May 2003, just before Yoo left the
+Department. Philbin said that he, accompanied by Yoo, was read into the
+program by Addington in Addington's office in the Old Executive Office
+Building. Philbin told us that Addington provided an overview of the
+program, describing the two basic categories of collection as “content” and
+"meta data." Philbin said that later, based on his legal analysis of the
+Stellar Wind program, he developed the "three baskets" terminology to
+describe more specifically the three types of collections.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Philbin said he was told by Addington he was being read into the
+program because Yoo was leaving the Department and another attorney was
+needed to review the threat assessments that supported the Presidential
+Authorizations and to then advise the Attorney General on recertifying the
+program as to form and legality.¹¹⁸ Philbin said he also was told that he and
+the Attorney General were the only Justice Department officials who were
+supposed to be involved in this "review and recertification" process. Philbin
+told us he was aware that OIPR Counsel James Baker had also been read
+into the program; however, Philbin stated that Addington told him he should
+not discuss the program with Baker and should only advise the Attorney
+General on the program. Philbin said he believed Addington did not want
+Philbin speaking with Baker about the program because Addington had
+always taken the position that the program should be kept as
+compartmented as possible.¹¹⁹ (TS//SI//NF)
+
+agencies were regularly consulted by Yoo in his drafting of the legal memoranda on the
+legality of this program. Yoo told the Department's Office of Professional Responsibility that
+Attorney General Ashcroft determined who was allowed to work on the memoranda for the
+detainee interrogation program. Transcript of Interview of John Yoo by Office of
+Professional Responsibility, June 7, 2005, at 12. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+¹¹⁷ Prior to joining the Department Philbin had been at a private law firm and had
+specialized in telecommunications law. (U)
+
+¹¹⁸ When asked whether he had any knowledge of the program prior to being read
+in, Philbin said he did not, but he recalled that in the fall of 2001 he had a discussion with
+Yoo about some general electronic surveillance issues. Yoo told Philbin that Yoo was told to
+work alone on this particular matter. Yoo did not state who had given him this instruction.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+¹¹⁹ Baker told us he was not similarly advised to avoid discussions with Philbin
+about the program, nor was he aware that Addington had instructed Philbin not to discuss
+the program with him. In fact, according to Baker, Philbin initiated several conversations
+with Baker about the operational details of the program as Baker understood them at the
+time. (U)
+
+103
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+The day after being read into the program, Philbin moved from the
+Office of Legal Counsel to the Office of the Deputy Attorney General to
+become an Associate Deputy Attorney General, although technically he still
+retained his OLC Deputy Assistant Attorney General position and was thus
+"dual-hatted." Philbin took over the "national security portfolio" from David
+Kris, who had recently left the Department. Philbin stated he was
+"somewhat concerned" that he would be advising the Attorney General on
+the Stellar Wind program even though Deputy Attorney General Larry
+Thompson, Philbin's supervisor, was not read into the program. However,
+Philbin said he anticipated at the outset that his work on the program
+would not require a lot of his time. (3//NF)
+
+3. Initial Concerns with Yoo's Analysis (U)
+
+Philbin said that after he was read into the Stellar Wind program he
+believed he needed to do "due diligence" to learn about the program. He
+said he reviewed Yoo's legal opinions about the program and realized that
+Yoo had omitted from his analysis any reference to the FISA provision
+allowing the interception of electronic communications without a warrant
+for a period of 15 days following a congressional declaration of war. See 50
+U.S.C. § 1811. Philbin also stated that Yoo's OLC opinions were premised
+on the assumption that FISA did not expressly apply to wartime operations,
+an assumption that from Philbin's perspective rendered the opinions
+"problematic." Philbin said that this gap in Yoo's analysis was his first
+indication that the legal reasoning underpinning the Presidential
+Authorizations would have to be revisited. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Philbin said the second indication of problems with Yoo's analysis
+came when he read a summary document Yoo had prepared concerning the
+program. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+104
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Second, and more significantly, Philbin stated that [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] ¹²⁰ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+¹²⁰ See Presidential Authorization of April 22, 2003 at para. 4(b)(i) & (ii). The
+April 22, 2003, Authorization was the only Authorization personally approved as to form
+and legality by Yoo. He approved the Authorization on April 18, 2003, five days before the
+date of his talking points memorandum. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+¹²[REDACTED]
+
+105
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
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+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Philbin said the errors in the Yoo's talking points document
+represented "a significant step toward the realization that the whole legal
+analysis was screwed up." Philbin told us he felt he could not rely on the
+existing analysis and that he needed to "build from the ground up."
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+4. Problems with [REDACTED]
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+In addition to the flaws Philbin identified in Yoo's legal analysis,
+Philbin told us he grew increasingly concerned that [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+¹²² Philbin told us he visited the NSA three times during the summer of 2003 in an
+effort to learn how the program operated. Several officials we interviewed told us that
+Philbin understood the program well, in part due to his background in telecommunications
+law. (U//FOUO
+
+106
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
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+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Philbin said that he and later Goldsmith recognized that the existence
+of the Stellar Wind program would be disclosed at some point in the future.
+[REDACTED]
+
+107
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
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+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]¹²³ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+5. Other Collection Concerns (S//NF)
+
+Philbin told us that during the summer of 2003 he identified other
+concerns about the Stellar Wind program. First, Philbin said he began to
+believe that the existing OLC memoranda failed to describe the [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Philbin said he also had concerns over
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+6. Decision to Draft New OLC Memorandum (U)
+
+In August 2003, Philbin brought his concerns about the OLC legal
+opinions to Attorney General Ashcroft. Philbin told Ashcroft that there were
+problems with the legal analysis supporting the program but probably not
+with the conclusions reached. Philbin told us that he believed that since
+the conclusions would not change there would be no need to "pull the plug"
+on the analytically problematic aspects of the program. Philbin said he
+
+
+¹²³ [REDACTED]
+¹²⁴ [REDACTED]
+
+108
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
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+
+therefore advised that Ashcroft could continue to certify the program "as to
+form and legality." (TS//SI//NF)
+
+However, Philbin also recommended that a new OLC memorandum be
+drafted. According to Philbin, Ashcroft concurred, told him to continue
+working on his analysis, and asked to be kept updated on Philbin's
+progress. After meeting with Ashcroft to discuss the issue, Philbin said he
+began to write a new memorandum on the legality of the entire Stellar Wind
+program.¹²⁵ (TS//SI//NF)
+
+C. Reassessment of Legal Rationale for the Program
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+1. Goldsmith Becomes OLC Assistant Attorney
+General (U)
+
+Jack Goldsmith told the OIG that he was recommended for the
+Assistant Attorney General position by Yoo after Yoo was not selected for the
+position. Goldsmith stated that during his interview for the position,
+Attorney General Ashcroft and Ashcroft's Chief of Staff David Ayres
+emphasized that the OLC Assistant Attorney General must keep the
+Attorney General informed of matters the Office of Legal Counsel was
+working on and stressed the importance of keeping the Attorney General "in
+the loop." Goldsmith told the OIG that he believed Ashcroft and Ayres
+raised these issues as a result of their experience with Yoo. (U)
+
+Goldsmith was selected for the position, confirmed by the Senate, and
+on October 6, 2003, was sworn in as the OLC Assistant Attorney General.
+(U)
+
+According to Goldsmith, he was told by Department colleagues that
+the procedures OLC historically followed in drafting its opinions were
+changing and that the Attorney General was being circumvented in the new
+
+¹²⁵ Philbin said that he was not certain at the time that Ashcroft fully understood
+the [REDACTED] because the subject matter was "difficult." Philbin also stated
+that for "client management" purposes, he needed to first make sure that he too fully
+understood the issues before raising his concerns to others. He said he did not just want
+to be "a naysayer" identifying problems, but also wanted to propose solutions. He said that
+the program would be examined by Congress one day and that the legal analysis had to be
+"carefully done to protect the President." Philbin said he therefore believed that the OLC
+legal memoranda had to be rewritten to achieve that objective. Philbin told us he also was
+concerned that the program not appear like a "rogue operation," but rather as a responsible
+approach to collecting intelligence with adequate controls and oversight. In this regard,
+Philbin emphasized that it would be important to demonstrate that the program had
+appropriate restrictions based on the law, and that the restrictions guarded against abuses.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+109
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+
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+
+process. Goldsmith said that OLC Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
+General Ed Whelan also told him that OLC's procedures, built on custom
+and practice but still "hugely important," had "broken down" prior to
+Goldsmith's arrival as the Assistant Attorney General. (U)
+
+Goldsmith told us that he also became aware that Ashcroft sensed
+there was a White House-Office of Legal Counsel relationship over which
+Ashcroft did not have full control. Goldsmith said that when he became the
+OLC Assistant Attorney General he immediately moved to "bring things back
+to normalcy" by, for example, making sure all OLC memoranda were
+provided to client agencies for review and input and that all memoranda
+were reviewed by two OLC deputies, as was the traditional OLC practice.¹²⁶
+(U)
+
+With regard to the Stellar Wind program, Philbin told us he had
+always intended to request that Goldsmith be read into the program after
+Goldsmith was confirmed by the Senate. Philbin said that he went to the
+White House and asked Addington (and possibly Gonzales) to have
+Goldsmith read into the program. Philbin stated that Addington told him
+that he would have been "fine" with not allowing Goldsmith to be read in,
+and that Philbin would have to justify the request before Addington would
+convey the request to the President. Philbin told us he explained to
+Addington that he would need to have the head of OLC sign off on the new
+memorandum he was writing or the memorandum would lack credibility.
+(U//FOVO)
+
+On November 17, 2003, Goldsmith was read into the Stellar Wind
+program by Addington in Addington's office.¹²⁷ Philbin was also present.
+On the way to the read-in, Philbin told Goldsmith to "prepare for your mind
+to be blown." Goldsmith told us that the read-in took approximately 5
+minutes, and when it was over he remarked to Philbin, "That doesn't seem
+
+¹²⁶ Goldsmith's view of how the OLC should operate was later echoed by a
+subsequent head of the office, Steven Bradbury. In a May 16, 2005, internal OLC guidance
+memorandum entitled "Best Practices for OLC Opinions," Bradbury emphasized that OLC
+legal memoranda should reflect the positions and expertise of interested agencies, and he
+also stressed the importance of a rigorous peer review process within the office before
+finalizing OLC memoranda. (U)
+
+¹²⁷ After Ashcroft, Yoo, Baker, and Philbin, Goldsmith was only the fifth non-FBI
+Justice Department official to be read into the Stellar Wind program since the program's
+inception over 2 years earlier. Philbin stated that prior to Goldsmith's arrival at the
+Department and subsequent read-in to the program, he had no one to help him draft a new
+legal memorandum and no one other than Ashcroft with whom to discuss the legal issues.
+He told the OIG that it was extremely beneficial to have another attorney working with him
+on the project. Philbin also told us he did not press the White House to read in additional
+attorneys during the summer 2003 period before Goldsmith arrived at the Department.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+110
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+
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+
+so bad." Goldsmith said that 3 weeks later, after studying the matter, he
+would come to a "different conclusion." (U//FOVO)
+
+2. NSA Denied Access to OLC Memoranda (U//FOUO)
+
+One of the first Stellar Wind meetings Goldsmith and Philbin attended
+after Goldsmith's read-in was held in the DOJ Command Center with
+Addington, NSA Deputy General Counsel Vito Potenza, and NSA Inspector
+General Joel Brenner, Goldsmith stated that the NSA Inspector General
+requested a copy of the OLC legal memoranda regarding the program as
+part of an audit the NSA Office of the Inspector General wanted to conduct
+of the program. According to Goldsmith, Addington "bit [the Inspector
+General's] head off," and made it clear that the memoranda would not be
+provided to the NSA OIG. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Goldsmith said he learned either at that meeting or shortly thereafter
+that NSA's Office of General Counsel also had been denied access to the
+OLC memoranda. Bob Deitz, the NSA General Counsel during this period,
+told the NSA OIG that he was never permitted to see Yoo's legal memoranda.
+Dietz stated that he called Addington several weeks after the first
+Presidential Authorization was signed and asked if he could see a copy of
+Yoo's memorandum (likely the November 2, 2001, memorandum), and that
+Addington responded "no." Dietz said that Addington would only read "a
+paragraph or two" from the memorandum to him over a classified telephone
+line. Deitz stated that he never advised Yoo on his legal analysis, although
+he did advise NSA Director Hayden that he thought the program was legal
+and within the President's authority. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The OIG also interviewed [REDACTED] the NSA's Associate General
+Counsel for Operations during Yoo's and Goldsmith's tenure in OLC.
+[REDACTED] told us that he was not troubled by the fact that other senior NSA
+officials had been denied access to Yoo's legal memoranda, and that he felt
+no need to review them. [REDACTED] stated that his primary concern with
+respect to the legality of the program was whether "Justice was comfortable
+with it." [REDACTED] also stated that he assumed that the Justice Department
+would find the program legal by resolving the tension between FISA and the
+President's inherent Commander-in-Chief authority based upon the doctrine
+of constitutional avoidance. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Goldsmith told us he found it "shocking” that the NSA was not
+provided access to Yoo's legal memoranda. He stated that the decision to
+withhold the memoranda was one of the "most astonishing things" he
+learned about how the program was handled, and that he could not "draw a
+good inference" from that fact. Goldsmith emphasized that under the
+Stellar Wind program the NSA had been asked to do something contrary to
+its ordinary practices, and yet was not allowed to review the legal
+
+111
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
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+
+justifications for being permitted to do it. Goldsmith told us he believed
+that the NSA might have identified problems or mistakes in Yoo's analysis
+early in the program had it been given access to his memoranda.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+Goldsmith told us that upon becoming the Assistant Attorney General
+he intended to reverse the practice of keeping OLC memoranda closely held,
+and that he also decided he would seek client agency expertise in drafting
+these documents. (U)
+
+3. Goldsmith Joins Effort to Reassess Legal Basis for the
+Program (TS//SI//NF)
+
+In the two or three weeks following his read-in to the Stellar Wind
+program, Goldsmith reviewed several documents to educate himself about
+the program. These included the memorandum that Philbin had already
+begun to draft (which included a description of how the program worked
+operationally), Yoo's memoranda, and older OLC memoranda concerning
+surveillance activities. After Goldsmith familiarized himself with the
+program, Goldsmith provided Philbin with additional research and helped
+supplement Philbin's draft memorandum. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Goldsmith stated that Philbin had done an "amazingly heroic job" in
+reviewing the program. Goldsmith believed "ninety-nine out of a hundred"
+attorneys in Philbin's position, having been asked simply to opine as to form
+and legality, would have just relied on the previous Office of Legal Counsel
+memoranda. Goldsmith said that Philbin, however, was not convinced by
+those memoranda and therefore did not rely on them. In addition,
+Goldsmith noted that Philbin sought to understand the program as it was
+actually implemented at the NSA before advising the Attorney General on its
+legality. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+¹²⁸ [REDACTED]
+(Cont'd.)
+
+112
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+
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+
+[REDACTED]
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+4. AUMF Becomes the Primary Legal Rationale
+Supporting [REDACTED] of the Stellar Wind
+Program (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Goldsmith concluded the NSA's interception of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] did not comply with FISA's
+requirement to obtain judicial authorization, and did not fall within any of
+the exceptions to this requirement. Goldsmith later wrote in his legal
+memorandum reassessing the legality of the program that a proper analysis
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+¹²⁹ [REDACTED]
+¹³⁰ See Goldsmith's May 6, 2004, memorandum entitled "Review of the Legality of
+the Stellar Wind Program" (Goldsmith Memorandum, May 6, 2004). This memorandum is
+discussed in Section II C below. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+113
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+
+of Stellar Wind "must not consider FISA in isolation" but rather must
+consider whether Congress, by authorizing the use of military force against
+al Qaeda, also "effectively exempts" such surveillance from FISA. Goldsmith
+concluded that this reading of the AUMF was correct because the AUMF
+authorized the President to use "all necessary and appropriate force" against
+the enemy that attacked the United States on September 11, 2001, and to
+"prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United
+States" by such enemy - authority that has long been recognized to include
+the use of signals intelligence as a military tool. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Alternatively, Goldsmith reasoned that even if the AUMF did not
+exempt surveillance under the program from the restrictions imposed by
+FISA, the question was sufficiently ambiguous to warrant the application of
+the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, and therefore should be construed
+not to prohibit the activity.¹³¹ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+¹³¹ In his May 6, 2004, memorandum, Goldsmith concluded that if the [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] arguments under the AUMF did not create
+sufficient ambiguity as to trigger the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, FISA as applied
+would represent an unconstitutional infringement on the President's exclusive authority as
+Commander-in-Chief in wartime to protect the nation from attack.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+114
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+
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+
+[REDACTED]
+
+5. Office of Legal Counsel Raises its Reassessment of the
+Stellar Wind Program (December 2003 through
+January 2004)¹³³ (TS//SI//NF)
+
+During late 2003, Goldsmith and Philbin continued their analysis of
+the legal bases for the Stellar Wind program. During this time Philbin and
+Goldsmith were the only two Department officials in a position to brief the
+Attorney General and White House officials on the status of their legal
+reassessment and its potential ramifications for the operation of the
+program.¹³⁴ (TS//SI//NF)
+
+With the existing Presidential Authorization set to expire on
+December 11, 2003, Goldsmith and Philbin met with Ashcroft on
+December 8, 2003, to advise him on recertifying the program as to form and
+legality. Goldsmith wrote in notes that he maintained during this time
+period that at the meeting he and Philbin "note[d] problems gently" to
+Ashcroft. Goldsmith told us Ashcroft was "extraordinarily supportive" of his
+and Philbin's efforts to reassess the legality of the program and made clear
+his view that the program had to be on solid legal footing.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Goldsmith advised Ashcroft that, despite concerns about the program,
+Ashcroft should certify the December 9, 2003, Authorization. Goldsmith
+
+¹³² [REDACTED]
+¹³³ The narrative in this and the following sections is based on our interviews of
+Philbin, Goldsmith, Comey, Mueller, Gonzales, and others. We also relied on Philbin's and
+Goldsmith's contemporaneous notes, Goldsmith's chronology of events that he wrote during
+this period, Mueller's Program Log documenting events in March 2004, and Attorney
+General Ashcroft's FBI security detail log of events that occurred while Ashcroft was
+hospitalized from March 4 through March 14, 2004, among other documents. (U)
+¹³⁴ James Comey became the Deputy Attorney General on December 9, 2003, but
+was not read into the program until over 2 months later. (U)
+¹³⁴
+
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+
+later advised Ashcroft to certify the January 14, 2004, Authorization as well.
+Goldsmith told us he made these recommendations to Ashcroft with the
+caveat that although he believed Yoo's memoranda to be flawed, Goldsmith
+had not yet concluded that the program itself was illegal. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Based on Goldsmith's advice, Ashcroft certified the December 9, 2003,
+and January 14, 2004, Authorizations. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+In December 2003 Philbin and Goldsmith informed Ashcroft that they
+believed Comey, who was sworn in as the new Deputy Attorney General in
+December 2003, also needed to be read into the program. Philbin said he
+justified this request by noting that he would be traveling abroad for 2
+weeks later that month on an unrelated Justice Department matter.¹³⁵ (U)
+
+In December 2003, Goldsmith and Philbin met with Addington and
+Gonzales at the White House to express their growing concerns about the
+legal underpinnings for program. Goldsmith said he told them that OLC
+was not sure the program could survive in its current form. According to
+Goldsmith's notes, these discussions did not contemplate an interruption of
+the program, although the White House represented that it would "agree to
+pull the plug" if the problems with the program were found to be sufficiently
+serious. Goldsmith told us that the White House - typically through
+Addington - told him "several times" that it would halt the program if the
+Department found that it could not be legally supported. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Philbin told us he recalled that Addington in particular was "annoyed"
+with the OLC's preliminary conclusion that [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Philbin said that Addington nevertheless told him and
+Goldsmith to continue analyzing the program and that if serious problems
+were found, the program would be shut down. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+On December 18, 2003, while Philbin was abroad, Goldsmith met
+again with Addington and Gonzales. Goldsmith wrote in his chronology that
+this time he conveyed with "more force" his "serious doubts and the need to
+get more help to resolve the issue [as soon as possible]." Goldsmith also
+told Addington and Gonzales that he needed more resources to continue
+examining the legality of the program. They responded to this request by
+telling Goldsmith that Philbin should devote all of his time to the project.
+
+¹³⁵ As discussed in Chapter Three, Comey's predecessor as Deputy Attorney
+General, Larry Thompson, was never read into the Stellar Wind program despite Ashcroft's
+request to the White House on behalf of both Thompson and Ashcroft's chief of staff.
+(U//FOUO)
+
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+
+Goldsmith told us that he asked to have Comey read into the program.
+According to Goldsmith's notes, Addington and Gonzales "bristle[d]" at that
+suggestion. Goldsmith told us he made the request for Comey to be read in
+because he believed he would need the Deputy Attorney General's
+assistance to help "make the case" to the White House that the program was
+legally flawed. Goldsmith also stated that he wanted Comey read in
+because, as the Deputy Attorney General, Comey was Philbin's direct
+supervisor. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+We asked Gonzales when he first became aware that the Department
+had concerns about the legality of the Stellar Wind program. Gonzales
+stated that he remembered that sometime after Philbin and Goldsmith
+joined the Department, they decided to conduct a programmatic review of
+the legal basis for Stellar Wind. Gonzales said that he welcomed this review,
+and that it was always important to reassess the value of or need for the
+program, as well as its legality. Gonzales told us he thought that Goldsmith
+and Philbin's review arose out of concerns about Yoo's November 2, 2001,
+opinion and that their review was limited to that document. Gonzales said
+that Goldsmith periodically told him that Philbin was reviewing the program
+and that some questions had been raised or that some changes to the
+program might be needed as a result of their reassessment. Gonzales said
+that he told Goldsmith to let him know how the review was progressing.
+Gonzales also told us he did not recall getting into any specific discussions
+with Goldsmith about OLC's concerns until early March 2004.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+In contrast, Goldsmith told us he had been "crystal clear" with
+Gonzales and Addington that the Office of Legal Counsel had concerns
+about the legality of aspects of the program as early as December 2003,
+although Goldsmith also acknowledged that his discussions with Gonzales
+and Addington became more detailed in March 2004. Goldsmith told us
+that he gave the two White House officials the same caveats he gave
+Ashcroft when advising him on the legality of the program – that there were
+flaws in Yoo's analysis, but that OLC had not yet concluded that the
+program itself was illegal. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Goldsmith's efforts to gain the White House's permission to have
+others (including Comey) read into the program continued through January
+2004. According to Goldsmith's notes, both Addington and Gonzales
+pressed Goldsmith on his reason for the request and continued to express
+doubt that additional resources were needed. However, in late January the
+White House agreed to allow Comey to be read in, provided that Philbin
+devoted all of his time to his analysis of the program and, according to
+Goldsmith, that the Department's legal analysis be completed by March
+2004 when the Presidential Authorization was due to be renewed. (U)
+
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+6. Deputy Attorney General Comey is Read into the
+Program (U)
+
+Comey became the Deputy Attorney General on December 9, 2003,
+and was read into the Stellar Wind program on February 17, 2004. Comey
+told us that he had no awareness of the program prior to being read in. He
+said he learned after his read-in that Addington had resisted Goldsmith and
+Philbin's efforts to have him read in earlier. Comey said Addington was the
+"gatekeeper" for Stellar Wind and wanted to keep the program a "close hold."
+(U)
+
+Comey told us that NSA Director Hayden personally wanted to
+conduct Comey's read-in to the program. Hayden read in Comey at the
+Justice Command Center in a briefing that took approximately 20 to 30
+minutes. Comey said that, at the read in, Hayden explained the "three
+baskets" to him. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Comey told us that after Hayden left the Command Center, Comey
+and Philbin continued discussing the program. Philbin told Comey that
+there were problems with the legality of the program and that there were
+"operational issues" as well. Comey told us that his initial reaction to the
+program was "unprintable." He said he thought that the NSA could not
+collect the content of certain communications covered by the program
+outside of FISA authority. Hayden told the OIG that Comey raised no
+objections to him about the program upon being read in. (U)
+
+Within the first month after being read in, Comey discussed the
+program with Ashcroft, Goldsmith, Philbin, and other Department officials
+who had been read in by this time, including James Baker, Counsel for
+Intelligence Policy; Chuck Rosenberg, Comey's Chief of Staff, and Daniel
+Levin, Counsel to the Attorney General.¹³⁶ Comey said he did not recall
+having any discussions about the program with FBI Director Mueller during
+this period. (U)
+
+Comey also recalled meeting with Scott Muller, the CIA General
+Counsel, shortly after being read into the program. Comey said that he told
+Muller about the legal concerns Philbin and Goldsmith had raised regarding
+Yoo's analysis and that Muller agreed that the concerns were well founded.
+(U)
+
+Comey also told us that Goldsmith had identified for Comey as a
+particular concern the notion that Yoo's legal analysis entailed ignoring an
+
+¹³⁶ Levin had just returned to the Department after working in private practice and
+serving as a Bush Administration liaison to the September 11 Commission, Rosenberg was
+read into Stellar Wind in 2003 while serving as Counsel to FBI Director Mueller. (U)
+
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+act of Congress, and doing so in secret. Comey stated that Goldsmith
+described such action as "breathtaking." Comey agreed, describing the
+action as "unprecedented." (U)
+
+D. Office of Legal Counsel Presents its Conclusions to the
+White House (U)
+
+On March 1, 2004, Philbin completed a first draft of a revised OLC
+opinion on the Stellar Wind program. According to Goldsmith's notes, at
+this time Goldsmith and Philbin had not yet concluded "definitively" that
+there was "anything certainly wrong" with the program, with the possible
+exception of the scope of [REDACTED]
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+In explaining the rationale for the revised opinion, Comey described to
+the OIG his view of two approaches or standards that could be used to
+undertake legal analysis of government action. If the government is
+contemplating taking a particular action, OLC's legal analysis will be based
+on a "best view of the law" standard. However, if the government already is
+taking the action, the analysis should instead focus on whether reasonable
+legal arguments can be made to support the continuation of the conduct.¹³⁷
+Comey said that because Stellar Wind was an ongoing program, Goldsmith
+and Philbin's analysis proceeded under the second approach. Under this
+approach, at this point they concluded that there were reasonable legal
+arguments to be made to continue the collection of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] but they still had not identified a legal
+argument to support [REDACTED]
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Comey said that during early March 2004 the sense was that "we can
+get there" as to [REDACTED] albeit by using an aggressive legal analysis.
+However, he said that collection of [REDACTED] would require [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+¹³⁷ Goldsmith emphasized to us that this second situation almost never presents
+itself, and that OLC rarely is asked to furnish legal advice on an ongoing program because
+the pressure "to say 'yes' to the President" invariably would result in applying a lower
+standard of review. Goldsmith stated that OLC's involvement in Stellar Wind was
+"unprecedented" because OLC is always asked to review the facts and formulate its advice
+"up front." (S//NF)
+
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+On March 1, 2004, Comey met with FBI Director Mueller to inform
+him that the OLC had found problems with the legal authority for the Stellar
+Wind program, particularly with the [REDACTED]
+According to a log Mueller kept documenting events in March 2004
+concerning the program, Comey said he was trying to work out these
+problems with the OLC and "other interested parties."¹³⁸ Mueller told us
+that March 1, 2004, was when he first became aware of the Department's
+concerns about the legal support for the program. Mueller described the
+FBI as "recipients of information from the program," and that the dialogue
+as to the program's legality was between the Department and the White
+House. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+1. March 4, 2004: Comey Meets with Ashcroft to
+Discuss Problems with the Program (U)
+
+Comey told us he met with Attorney General Ashcroft for lunch on
+March 4, 2004, to discuss the Stellar Wind program. Comey reminded
+Ashcroft of the details of the program and said he used salt and pepper
+shakers and a knife to represent the three baskets during the discussion.
+According to Comey, Ashcroft agreed with Comey and OLC's assessment of
+the potential legal problems, and he instructed Comey to "just fix it" and
+"tell them to make the changes that need to be done."
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Comey said he assumed Ashcroft meant that Comey should reach out
+to the NSA and the White House for the necessary changes. The
+Presidential Authorization in effect at the time was due to expire on
+March 11, 2004. Comey said Ashcroft did not discuss with him whether he
+would recertify the program as it was currently being authorized by the
+President. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Comey also described Ashcroft as being frustrated, and said he was
+"beating himself up" because he was "in a box" with Yoo, yet was learning
+from Philbin, Goldsmith, and now Comey that parts of the program were not
+in their view legally supportable.¹³⁹ (TS//SI//NF)
+
+After the lunch meeting on March 4, Comey traveled to Phoenix,
+Arizona, to make a speech. Three hours after their lunch meeting, Ashcroft
+was struck with severe gallstone pancreatitis and was admitted to the
+
+¹³⁸ Mueller told us he maintained the program log because "[t]hese were
+extraordinary circumstances about which I would one day be questioned." Mueller said the
+program log was drafted "relatively contemporaneously" with the events described in it. (U)
+
+¹³⁹ By the time Ashcroft received OLC's preliminary findings concerning the legality
+of the program in December 2003, he had already certified the program as to form and
+legality approximately 20 times. (TS//SI//NF)
+
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+George Washington University Hospital. After being informed that Ashcroft
+was hospitalized, Comey returned to Washington the next morning on an
+FBI jet. (U)
+
+2. March 5, 2004: Comey Determines Ashcroft is
+"Absent or Disabled" (U)
+
+On March 5, 2004, Goldsmith advised Comey by memorandum that
+under the circumstances of Ashcroft's medical condition and
+hospitalization, a "clear basis" existed for Comey to determine that "this is a
+case of 'absence or disability' of the Attorney General" within the meaning of
+28 U.S.C. § 508(a). This statute provides:
+
+ In case of a vacancy in the office of Attorney General, or of his
+ absence or disability, the Deputy Attorney General may exercise
+ all the duties of that office, and for purposes of section 3345 of
+ title 5 the Deputy Attorney General is the first assistant to the
+ Attorney General. (U)
+
+Goldsmith's memorandum further advised Comey that he could serve
+as Acting Attorney General until Ashcroft's absence or disability no longer
+existed, and that Comey could exercise "all the power and authority of the
+Attorney General, unless such power or authority is required by law to be
+exercised by the Attorney General personally." See 28 C.F.R. § 0.15(a).
+Goldsmith noted in the memorandum that there are "very few duties" that
+can be exercised only by the Attorney General. Goldsmith wrote that,
+except for these duties, Comey could opt to exercise the duties of the
+Attorney General as Deputy Attorney General rather than as Acting Attorney
+General, noting, "Your office has informed us that this is your intention."¹⁴⁰ (U)
+
+Goldsmith's memorandum to Comey referenced an attached draft
+memorandum for Comey's review, which would memorialize Comey's
+decision to invoke 28 U.S.C. § 508(a) in writing, although Goldsmith advised
+that it was not necessary to do so. The "cc" line of Goldsmith's
+memorandum to Comey indicated that a copy of the memorandum was also
+[REDACTED]
+
+¹⁴⁰ According to an e-mail sent on March 5, 2004, at 9:15 a.m. from OLC Special
+Counsel Daniel Koffsky to OLC Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Edward
+Whelan and other Department officials, among the duties that can only be exercised by the
+Attorney General or his designee is the authority to approve FISA applications to engage in
+electronic surveillance of a specific type of agent of a foreign power based on requests of
+certain high level officials. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(e)(2)(A). This section represents an exception
+to FISA's general conferral of authority on the Attorney General, a term that is defined to
+include the Acting Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General. See 50 U.S.C.
+§ 1801(g). (U)
+
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+sent to White House Counsel Gonzales.¹⁴¹ As discussed below, a significant
+dispute between White House and Department officials later arose over
+whether the White House in fact received notice of Comey's decision to
+assume the powers of the Attorney General, whether as Deputy Attorney
+General or otherwise. (U)
+
+3. March 5, 2004: Goldsmith and Philbin Seek
+Clarification from White House on Presidential
+Authorizations (U)
+
+On the afternoon of Friday, March 5, 2004 – 6 days before the
+Presidential Authorization then in effect was set to expire - Goldsmith and
+Philbin met with Addington and Gonzales at the White House to seek
+clarification on two key issues related to the Authorizations. (U//FOUO)
+
+First Goldsmith expressed his belief that the [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Philbin said they explained to Addington and Gonzales the importance of
+briefing the President on this new legal approach to justifying the program.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Second [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+¹⁴¹ A March 12, 2004, e-mail from Ashcroft's Chief of Staff David Ayres to Deputy
+White House Counsel David Leitch detailing the Department's efforts to inform the White
+House Counsel's Office of Ashcroft's hospitalization and Comey's assumption of Ashcroft's
+duties shows that Ayres confirmed the White House's receipt of a facsimile from OLC
+advising the White House of Comey's decision to exercise "all the power and authority of the
+Attorney General... in [his] capacity as Deputy Attorney General." Ayres also wrote in the
+e-mail that a copy of OLC's "legal memorandum" was sent to White House Counsel
+Gonzales. Ayres also wrote in the e-mail that he personally called Harriet Miers, a White
+House Deputy Chief of Staff, and informed her that Comey "had assumed the Attorney
+General's responsibilities[.]" Ayres wrote in the e-mail that he also informed others at the
+White House of Comey's status, including another White House Deputy Chief of Staff [Joe
+Hagin] and the White House Cabinet Secretary (Brian Montgomery). (U)
+
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+[REDACTED]
+
+However according to Gonzales Goldsmith's conclusion [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] created a serious issue. Gonzales stated
+that Goldsmith's argument on this point was that Congress had spoken on
+the matter by enacting FISA, but Yoo previously had opined that FISA was
+unconstitutional to the extent it infringed on the President's
+Commander-in-Chief authority to conduct electronic surveillance without a
+judicial warrant.¹⁴² (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Gonzales also told us that the March 5, 2004, meeting with Goldsmith
+and Philbin represented the first substantively detailed discussion he had
+with the OLC officials regarding their concerns with the existing legal
+analysis and their reservations about continuing the program as it had been
+operating. As noted above, Goldsmith said that he had informed Gonzales
+and Addington about his general concerns with Yoo's legal analysis of the
+program as early as December 2003. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Later that day on March 5, Gonzales called Goldsmith to request a
+letter from the OLC stating that Yoo's prior OLC opinions "covered the
+program." Philbin told the OIG that Gonzales was not requesting a new
+
+¹⁴² [REDACTED]
+
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+opinion that the program itself was legal, but only that the prior opinions
+had concluded that it was. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+4. March 6 to 8, 2004: The Department Concludes That
+ Yoo's Legal Memoranda Did Not Cover the Program
+ (U)
+
+As a result of Gonzales's request on March 5, Goldsmith re-examined
+Yoo's memoranda with a view toward determining whether they adequately
+described the actual collection activities of the NSA under the
+Authorizations. Goldsmith told us that after a brief review, he called Philbin
+to tell him he agreed with Philbin's assessment that Yoo's memoranda were
+problematic from a factual standpoint. Philbin said that through this
+re-examination he and Goldsmith confirmed Philbin's initial sense that
+Yoo's memoranda did not describe the [REDACTED]¹⁴³
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Goldsmith's account of the response to Gonzales's request was
+similar. Goldsmith also stated that his and Philbin's conclusion that Yoo's
+memoranda failed to adequately describe the [REDACTED]
+meant that OLC could not tell the White House that the program could
+continue under the authority of those legal memoranda. Goldsmith stated
+that he and Philbin realized at this point that the program had been
+conducted for 2 years without a proper OLC review. Specifically, both
+Goldsmith and Philbin stated that they had always viewed Yoo's legal
+analysis as poorly reasoned; however, they were now realizing that Yoo's
+factual description of the program was inaccurate and incomplete as well,
+and thus did not "cover" aspects of the program. Goldsmith said Gonzales's
+request for ratification of Yoo's memoranda "forced [the Office of Legal
+
+¹⁴³ [REDACTED]
+
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+Counsel's] hand" and was the point at which the "presumption in favor of
+legality flipped."¹⁴⁵ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+On Saturday, March 6, 2004, Goldsmith and Philbin advised Comey
+that they believed the [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Goldsmith also told Comey that the White House would
+have to be notified of this development. Comey agreed with this
+recommendation. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Later on March 6, Goldsmith and Philbin went to the White House to
+meet with Addington and Gonzales to convey their conclusions that the
+[REDACTED]
+According to Goldsmith's chronology of these events, Addington and
+Gonzales "reacted calmly and said they would get back with us." Goldsmith
+told us that the White House was now worried that it was "out there,"
+meaning that it was implementing a program without legal support.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+On Sunday afternoon, March 7, 2004, Goldsmith and Philbin met
+again with Addington and Gonzales at the White House.¹⁴⁵ According to
+Goldsmith, the White House officials informed Goldsmith and Philbin that
+they disagreed with Goldsmith and Philbin's interpretation of Yoo's
+memoranda and on the need to change the scope of the NSA's collection,¹⁴⁶
+Gonzales told us he recalled the meetings of March 6 and 7, 2004, but did
+not recall the specifics of the discussions. He said he remembered that the
+overall tenor of the meetings with Goldsmith was one of trying to "find a way
+forward."147 (TS//SI//NF)
+
+¹⁴⁴ As noted in Chapter Three, Gonzales told us that he believed Yoo's memoranda
+described as lawful activities that were broader than those carried out under Stellar Wind,
+and that therefore these opinions "covered" the Stellar Wind program. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+¹⁴⁵ Gonzales told us that White House Chief of Staff Card may also have been
+present for this meeting. Goldsmith's chronology indicates that only Addington and
+Gonzales were present. (U)
+
+¹⁴⁶ In discussing these early March meetings with the OIG, Goldsmith told us that
+Addington had stated on more than one occasion that Goldsmith was the head of OLC and
+if he determined that the program needed to be shut down, it would be shut down.
+Goldsmith told us he believed that the White House officials' references to "shutting down
+the program" extended only to those aspects of the program for which no legal support
+could be found. Goldsmith also told us that he did not know whether Addington and
+Gonzales were keeping the President informed of OLC's concerns. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+147 As noted above, Gonzales was represented by counsel during his interview with
+the OIG. Also present during the interview because of the issue of executive privilege was a
+Special Counsel to the President, Emmitt Flood. We asked Gonzales whether the President
+had been informed by this point in time of the OLC position regarding the lack of legal
+
+(Cont'd.)
+
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+On the evening of Sunday, March 7, 2004, Goldsmith and Philbin met
+with Comey in Comey's office to again review Yoo's opinions and make sure
+all three agreed with the conclusion that the opinions failed to support the
+Stellar Wind program as it was being implemented. Philbin said that until
+Gonzales's March 5 request for a letter from the OLC stating that Yoo's prior
+OLC opinions "covered the program," he and Goldsmith had intended to
+recommend that the program be recertified on March 11.2004, while they
+continued to work on the new OLC opinion. [REDACTED]
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+According to Goldsmith's chronology, there was no interaction with
+the White House on the issue on the following day, Monday, March 8, 2004.
+Goldsmith wrote in his chronology of events for this day: "Monday,
+March 8: Silence." (U)
+
+5. March 9, 2004: White House Seeks to Persuade
+ Department and FBI to Support Continuation of the
+ Program (S//NF)
+
+On Tuesday, March 9, 2004, Gonzales called Goldsmith to attend an
+early morning meeting (at 6:00 or 6:30 a.m.) at the White House to discuss
+the issues regarding Yoo's memoranda and the Stellar Wind program.¹⁴⁹
+Goldsmith called Philbin and told him to meet Goldsmith at the White
+House. According to Goldsmith, Philbin was allowed into the White House,
+but Gonzales excluded Philbin from the meeting despite Goldsmith's
+requests that Philbin be allowed to participate. (S//NF)
+
+support for the program and [REDACTED] Flood
+objected to the question on relevancy grounds and advised Gonzales not to answer, and
+Gonzales did not provide us an answer. However, when Gonzales commented on a draft of
+this report, he stated that he would not have brought Goldsmith and Philbin's "concerns" to
+the attention of the President because there would have been nothing for the President to
+act upon at that point. Gonzales stated that this was especially true given that Ashcroft
+continued to certify the program as to legality during this period. Gonzales stated he
+generally would only bring matters to the President's attention if the President could make
+a decision about them. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+¹⁴⁸ [REDACTED]
+
+¹⁴⁹ Gonzales told the OIG that he did not recall this meeting. Both Goldsmith and
+Philbin told the OIG about the meeting. The meeting is also briefly described in
+Goldsmith's contemporaneous notes and chronology. (U)
+
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+Goldsmith said Gonzales tried first to persuade him that he and
+Philbin were wrong to conclude that Yoo's memoranda did not provide
+sufficient legal justification to cover the parts of the program that OLC had
+identified as problematic, but that Gonzales did not persuade him on this
+point. Gonzales next argued for a "30-day bridge" to get past the upcoming
+March 11, 2004, Authorization. Gonzales reasoned that Ashcroft, who was
+still hospitalized, was not in any condition to sign the upcoming
+Authorization, and that a "30-day bridge" would move the situation to a
+point where Ashcroft would be well enough to approve the program.
+Goldsmith told Gonzales he could not agree to recommend an extension.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+Goldsmith said Gonzales noted that Ashcroft had certified the
+program as to form and legality for the previous two and a half years, yet
+now Comey was the Acting Attorney General. Goldsmith said the
+implication of Gonzales's statement was that not approving the March 11,
+2004, Authorization would "undercut" Ashcroft. Goldsmith said he made
+clear to Gonzales that Ashcroft was "supportive" of his and Philbin's
+analysis. Goldsmith's notes from the meeting also indicate that Gonzales
+stated that he did not "want to face" Ashcroft in the hospital. Goldsmith
+told us he recommended to Gonzales that he not visit Ashcroft.¹⁵⁰
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+Goldsmith said his discussion with Gonzales lasted about 1 hour.
+Philbin was then brought into Gonzales's office and the issues were
+discussed again. According to Goldsmith's chronology, nothing was
+resolved during the meeting. (U)
+
+At noon that day, another meeting was held in Andrew Card's office at
+the White House. According to Director Mueller's program log, Mueller,
+Chief of Staff Card, Vice President Cheney, CIA Deputy Director John
+McLaughlin, Hayden, Gonzales, and other unspecified officials were present.
+Comey, Goldsmith, and Philbin were not invited to this meeting. Mueller
+described this gathering as a "pre-meeting" in anticipation of another
+meeting that was to be held later that afternoon in which the Justice
+Department officials (Comey, Goldsmith, and Philbin) would be
+participating.¹⁵¹ (U)
+
+¹⁵⁰ At noon on March 9, 2004, Attorney General Ashcroft underwent surgery at the
+George Washington University Hospital. The surgery was completed by 2:30 p.m. (U)
+
+¹⁵¹ Mueller prepared for this meeting by meeting earlier that morning with Michael
+Fedarcyk, the Chief of the FBI's Communications Exploitation Section; General Counsel
+Valerie Caproni; and possibly others. Mueller's program log indicates that Fedarcyk
+"appears unaware of details of how [REDACTED] is collected." (TS//SI//NF)
+
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+According to Mueller's notes, a presentation on the value of the Stellar
+Wind program was given by CIA and NSA representatives.¹⁵² It was then
+explained to the group that Comey "has problems" with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Mueller's notes state that Vice President Cheney suggested
+that "the President may have to reauthorize without [the] blessing of DOJ,"
+to which Mueller responded, "I could have a problem with that," and that
+the FBI would "have to review legality of continued participation in the
+program." (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+A third meeting was held at the White House that afternoon, at 4:00
+p.m. The meeting included Comey, Goldsmith, and Philbin, in addition to
+Vice President Cheney, Card, Addington, Gonzales, Hayden, Mueller, CIA
+General Counsel Muller, McLaughlin, and approximately 10 NSA analysts.
+Gonzales told us the meeting was held to make sure that Comey understood
+what was at stake with the program and to demonstrate its value. (S//NF)
+
+At the beginning of the meeting the NSA analysts made a presentation
+to Comey, Goldsmith, and Philbin Comey said the presentation consisted
+of charts showing the chaining [REDACTED] capabilities that could
+be generated from Stellar Wind-derived information, as well as a description
+of "success stories" resulting from the program. Comey told us that the
+cases the analysts highlighted were not in his view the Stellar Wind
+successes that the analysts claimed, and that he felt "the NSA had no good
+stories to tell about the program."¹⁵³ Comey also told us that the collection
+of content communications under Stellar Wind was somewhat duplicative of
+existing FISA coverage, and that only the meta data collection under baskets
+2 and 3 represented truly new capabilities. However, Comey said he did not
+challenge the analysts on the assertion that Stellar Wind was a critical
+anti-terrorism tool because the value of the program was not his primary
+concern. Rather, Comey said he was willing to concede the program's value,
+and that his concern was with its legality. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Goldsmith told us that he did not believe it was his place to judge the
+value of the program from an intelligence-gathering standpoint. Goldsmith
+told us he found persuasive a remark by Hayden that even though there
+may not have been major successes under the program to date, the program
+still could produce successes in the future. However, both Goldsmith and
+
+¹⁵² Mueller's notes indicate that [REDACTED] were cited as
+examples during the presentation. We discuss [REDACTED] briefly in this chapter and
+[REDACTED] in Chapter Six. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+¹⁵³ Comey specifically questioned whether the [REDACTED] case was a legitimate
+"success story" under the Stellar Wind program. The [REDACTED] case, as well as other cases
+cited as successes under Stellar Wind, is discussed in Chapter Six.
+
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
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+Philbin told us that they believed that identifiable successes under the
+program. [REDACTED]
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The NSA analysts were excused after their presentation and the
+meeting continued. Comey said Vice President Cheney stressed that the
+program was "critically important" and warned that Comey would risk
+"thousands" of lives if Comey did not agree to recertify it. Comey said he
+told those at the meeting that he, as the Deputy Attorney General exercising
+the powers of the Attorney General, could support reauthorizing [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]¹⁵⁴ However, he told the group "we can't
+get there" on [REDACTED]
+According to Comey, the White House said it could not agree to that
+modification. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Comey also told us he was certain the White House understood him to
+be the acting in Attorney General Ashcroft's stead during this meeting. (U)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Gonzales told us that he came away from the meeting with the
+understanding that Comey [REDACTED]
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+6. Conflict Ensues between Department and White
+ House (U)
+
+Each of the Department witnesses we interviewed concerning the
+Department's discussions with the White House during this time period
+
+¹⁵⁴ [REDACTED]
+
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+emphasized the sense of pressure and anxiety that pervaded the
+discussions in March 2004. For instance, Comey said discussions during
+the meeting at the White House on March 9 became heated as he sought to
+convey to everyone how difficult it was for the Department to take the
+position it was taking, and how hard the Department officials were working
+to find a solution. Comey also stated that Vice President Cheney was
+"understandably frustrated" because the Department was changing its
+advice to the White House about the program. (U)
+
+Goldsmith also recalled that at one point during these meetings with
+the White House, Addington told him that if he narrowed the Stellar Wind
+program Goldsmith "will have the blood of 100,000 American lives on his
+hands." (S//NF)
+
+Goldsmith observed to us that from the White House's point of view,
+due to the timing of the events, and in particular with Ashcroft in the
+hospital, it appeared to the White House that a "palace coup" was taking
+place at the Department of Justice. Goldsmith said that this perception was
+somewhat understandable under the circumstances. (U)
+
+Philbin also stated that tensions were high during this period and that
+the Department and White House "started to divide into camps." Philbin
+added that Department and White House officials were "starting to attribute
+motives" to each other. Philbin said he thought Addington came to believe
+that Comey was opposed to recertifying the program for "political reasons,"
+and that Comey wanted to be on the "politically right" side of the dispute.
+(U)
+
+Comey said that his dealings with Gonzales, Card, Addington, and
+others at the White House were generally civil. Comey acknowledged that
+there was tension between the Department and the White House during the
+March 2004 period, but believed that it resulted primarily from differences
+in legal perspectives. (U)
+
+II. White House Continues Program without Justice Department's
+ Certification (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The Presidential Authorization under which the program was
+operating during early 2004 was set to expire on March 11, 2004. As
+described in the preceding section, Comey concurred with the views of
+Goldsmith and Philbin, and as the Deputy Attorney General exercising the
+powers of the Attorney General Comey refused to certify the program as to
+form and legality. He conveyed this decision to the White House during the
+meeting on the afternoon of March 9, 2004. In response, as described
+below, the President decided to reauthorize the program without the Justice
+
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+Department's support, precipitating a serious confrontation between White
+House and Department officials. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+A. White House Counsel Gonzales Certifies March 11, 2004,
+ Presidential Authorization (TS//SI//NF)
+
+1. March 10, 2004: Office of Legal Counsel Presses for
+ Solicitor General to be Read into Program (U)
+
+Goldsmith, Philbin, and Comey met in the early afternoon of
+March 10, 2004, to discuss the meeting at the White House the day before
+and how the Department should proceed. Goldsmith and Philbin
+reconfirmed their position to Comey that collection under [REDACTED]
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Goldsmith and Philbin also recommended to Comey that Solicitor
+General Theodore Olson be read into the program. Goldsmith told us that
+Olson had been at the Department for a long time and had valuable
+experience and credibility. Goldsmith said that given the importance of the
+decisions being made at the Department concerning the program at this
+time, he believed it was imperative to have Olson read in. (U)
+
+Comey agreed with Goldsmith and Philbin, and he directed Goldsmith
+to call Gonzales to reaffirm the Department's position on the program and
+also to request that Olson be read in. (U)
+
+Goldsmith called Gonzales at 2:20 p.m. on March 10 to tell him that
+the Department could not support the legality of [REDACTED] as then being implemented under the program.
+Goldsmith also told Gonzales of the "urgent need" for approval to read Olson
+into the program. Goldsmith's notes indicate that he called Gonzales twice
+that day with the request to have Olson read in, but by early evening had
+not heard back from Gonzales. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+2. March 10, 2004: Congressional Leaders Briefed on
+ Situation (U)
+
+Gonzales told us that after President Bush was advised of the results
+of the March 9, 2004, meeting, the President instructed Vice President
+Cheney on the morning of Wednesday, March 10, to call a meeting with
+congressional leaders to advise them of the impasse with the Justice
+Department. On the afternoon of March 10, at approximately 4:00 or 5:00
+p.m., Gonzales and other White House and intelligence agency officials,
+including Vice President Cheney, Card, Hayden, McLaughlin, and Director
+of Central Intelligence George Tenet, convened an "emergency meeting" with
+Congressional leaders in the White House Situation Room. The
+
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+congressional leaders in attendance were Senate Majority and Minority
+Leaders Bill Frist and Tom Daschle; Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
+Chairman Pat Roberts and Vice Chairman Jay Rockefeller; Speaker of the
+House Dennis Hastert and House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi; and House
+Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Chair Porter Goss and Ranking
+Member Jane Harman. This congressional group was known informally as
+the "Gang of Eight." (U)
+
+No officials from the Department were present at the meeting. When
+we asked Gonzales whether the White House had given any consideration to
+inviting Department officials to attend, Gonzales declined to answer on the
+advice of the Special Counsel to the President, who was present during
+Gonzales's interview with the OIG.¹⁵⁵ (U)
+
+Gonzales told us that President Bush also directed him to
+"memorialize" the meeting, although Gonzales said he could not recall
+whether the President directed him to do so before or after the meeting.
+Gonzales did not take notes during the meeting. Rather, he said he wrote
+down his recollection of the meeting within a few days of Wednesday,
+March 10, probably, according to him, the following weekend.¹⁵⁶ Gonzales
+said that, with the exception of a single phrase discussed below, he wrote
+his notes in one sitting in his White House office. (U)
+
+The notes indicate that President Bush appeared briefly at the start of
+the meeting to explain how important the meeting was. Vice President
+Cheney, who chaired the meeting, gave a general explanation of the program
+and indicated that the purpose of the meeting was to "discuss potential
+legislation to continue the program." According to Gonzales's notes, Hayden
+then explained the collection of "telephone content and meda data [sic]"
+under the program. [REDACTED]
+
+¹⁵⁵ However, when Gonzales commented on a draft of this report, he stated that the
+Department was not invited to the meeting because the purpose of the meeting was to
+advise the congressional leaders that a legislative fix was necessary, not to describe or
+resolve the legal dispute between the Department and the White House. (U//FOUO)
+
+¹⁵⁶ Gonzales's handling of his notes from this meeting later became the subject of a
+separate OIG misconduct investigation. The OIG found that when Gonzales became the
+Attorney General in 2005, he took the notes, which contained TS/SCI information relating
+to the Stellar Wind program, from the White House and improperly stored these notes at
+his residence for an indeterminate period. When he brought the notes to the Justice
+Department, he kept them in a safe near his office that was not cleared for storage of
+TS/SCI material. The OIG also determined through this investigation that Gonzales
+improperly stored several other TS/SCI documents in the safe near his office, many of
+which concerned Stellar Wind. The OIG's report, entitled "Report of Investigation Regarding
+Allegations of Mishandling of Classified Documents by Attorney General Alberto Gonzales,"
+was released by the OIG on September 2, 2008, and can be found at
+http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0809/index.htm. (S//NF)
+
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+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] ¹⁵⁷ According to Gonzales's notes, the
+briefers then left the meeting and the remaining participants discussed the
+need for legislation so that the program's intelligence collection activities
+could continue. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Gonzales's notes indicate that when he was asked at the meeting why
+Comey was "reluctant" to sign the Authorization, Gonzales responded [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The notes do not indicate what else was discussed
+about the basis for the Department's concerns about the legal support for
+the program. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The notes indicate that Andrew Card stated that "it would be hard to
+explain if another attack occurred and we could have stopped it with this
+tool." Gonzales's notes then state:
+
+ - Andy asked if anyone had any reservation and no one spoke up
+ raising an objection
+
+ - The VP said that what I am hearing is that we should go forward with
+ the program for a period of 30-45 days and see if there was a
+ legislative fix. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The notes indicate that Vice President Cheney read aloud proposed
+language of new legislation. However, the notes do not describe the
+proposed legislation that was discussed. (U)
+
+According to Gonzales's notes, the reactions and comments of the
+congressional leaders were as follows: Both Hastert and Roberts "said they
+now felt an obligation to use the tool," although according to the notes
+Hastert "kept coming back to the [REDACTED] Roberts said that if Comey would not certify
+the Authorization "he should be fired." Harman suggested that another
+branch of government "should have some role, checks and balances on the
+program" and raised the possibility of involving the FISA Court. According
+to the notes, Gonzales responded to Harman's suggestion by volunteering
+that it would be possible to have the Presiding Judge of the FISA Court
+"approve or develop the guidelines to protect privacy rights." The notes
+state that Daschle felt it would be "impossible to get [new legislation] passed
+
+¹⁵⁷ Gonzales told us he was unable to recall [REDACTED] he was referring to in
+the notes, and said he did not recall whether it had to do with [REDACTED] (U)
+
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+without it becoming very public." Rockefeller was "concerned about privacy
+safeguards" and was advised of "the 39 steps followed [by the NSA] to make
+sure privacy concerns were addressed." According to the notes, Pelosi
+expressed concern about giving "total discretion" to the President and
+discussed the need for the proposed legislation to be periodically renewed by
+Congress and that it not be permanent. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Gonzales told us he initially left a gap in one section of the notes
+where he described Pelosi's comments. He stated that a day or so later,
+after recalling what she had said at the meeting, he filled in the gap with the
+following italicized language: "Pelosi said tell DAG that everyone is
+comfortable and the program should go forward."¹⁵⁸ (U)
+
+3. March 10, 2004: Hospital Visit (U)
+
+Gonzales told us that following the meeting with the congressional
+leaders during the afternoon of March 10, President Bush instructed him
+and Card to go to the George Washington University Hospital to speak to
+Ashcroft, who was recovering from surgery in the intensive care unit. The
+events that followed, which are recounted below, are based on notes from
+Ashcroft's FBI security detail, Goldsmith's notes, and Mueller's program log;
+the OIG's interviews of Gonzales, Comey, Goldsmith, Philbin, and Mueller;
+and Comey and Gonzales's congressional testimony.¹⁵⁹ (U)
+
+At 6:20 p.m. on March 10, Card called the hospital and spoke with an
+agent in Ashcroft's FBI security detail, advising the agent that President
+Bush would be calling shortly to speak with Ashcroft. Ashcroft's wife told
+
+¹⁵⁸ When Gonzales testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee on July 24,
+2007, he essentially described the congressional leaders' reactions to the March 10, 2004,
+Gang of Eight briefing as he did in his handwritten notes of the briefing, stating, "The
+consensus in the room from the congressional leadership is that we should continue the
+activities, at least for now." However, after Gonzales testified, Representative Pelosi,
+Senator Rockefeller, and Senator Daschle issued statements to the media sharply disputing
+Gonzales's characterization of their statements at the March 10, 2004, briefing, and stating
+that there was no consensus at the meeting that the program should proceed. See
+"Gonzales, Senators Spar on Credibility," by Dan Eggen and Paul Kane, The Washington
+Post (July 25, 2007). Pelosi's office also issued a statement that she "made clear my
+disagreement with what the White House was asking" concerning the program. See
+"Gonzales Comes Under New Bipartisan Attack in Senate," by James Rowley,
+Bloomberg.com (July 24, 2007). We did not attempt to interview the congressional leaders
+and obtain their recollections as to what was said at this meeting, because this was beyond
+the scope of our review. (U)
+
+¹⁵⁹ Comey described the events surrounding the hospital visit in testimony before
+the Senate Judiciary Committee on May 15, 2007. Gonzales testified about these issues
+before the Senate Judiciary Committee on July 24, 2007. As noted above, Attorney General
+Ashcroft and Card declined our request to be interviewed. Ayres, Ashcroft's Chief of Staff at
+the time, also declined our request for an interview. (U)
+
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+the agent that Ashcroft would not accept the call. Ten minutes later, the
+agent called Ashcroft's Chief of Staff David Ayres through the Justice
+Command Center to request that Ayres speak with Card about the
+President's intention to call Ashcroft. The agent conveyed to Ayres Mrs.
+Ashcroft's desire that no calls be made to Ashcroft for another day or two.¹⁶⁰
+Ayres told the agent he would relay this message to Card. (U)
+
+However, at 6:45 p.m., Card and the President called the hospital
+and, according to the agent's notes, "insisted on speaking [with Attorney
+General Ashcroft]." According to the agent's notes, Mrs. Ashcroft, rather
+than Attorney General Ashcroft, took the call from Card and the President.
+According to the agent's notes, she was informed that Gonzales and Card
+were coming to the hospital to see Ashcroft regarding a matter involving
+national security. (U)
+
+At approximately 7:00 p.m., Ayres was advised, either by Mrs.
+Ashcroft or a member of the Attorney General's security detail that Gonzales
+and Card were on their way to the hospital. Ayres then called Comey, who
+at the time was being driven home by his security detail, and told Comey
+that Gonzales and Card were on their way to the hospital. Comey told his
+driver to rush him to the hospital. According to Comey, his driver activated
+the emergency lights on the vehicle and headed to the hospital. (U)
+
+According to his congressional testimony, Comey then called his Chief
+of Staff, Chuck Rosenberg, and directed him to "get as many of my people as
+possible to the hospital immediately." Comey then called FBI Director
+Mueller, who was having dinner with his wife and daughter at a restaurant,
+and told him that Gonzales and Card were on their way to the hospital to
+see Ashcroft, and that Ashcroft was in no condition to receive guests, much
+less make a decision about whether to continue the program. According to
+Mueller's program log, Comey asked Mueller to come to the hospital to
+"witness [the] condition of AG." Mueller told Comey he would go to the
+hospital right away. (U)
+
+At 7:05 p.m., Ayres was notified by an agent on Ashcroft's security
+detail that Comey was en route to the hospital. Ayres called the agent back
+at approximately 7:20 p.m. and told the agent that "things may get 'a little
+weird'" when Gonzales and Card arrived. Ayres instructed Ashcroft's
+security detail, which was composed of FBI agents, to give its "full support"
+to Comey and to follow Comey's instructions. Ayres also told the agent that
+the security detail should not allow the U.S. Secret Service agents who
+
+¹⁶⁰ Ashcroft was recovering from his gallbladder surgery the prior day. He was
+described by those who saw him that night as being very weak and appearing heavily
+medicated. Philbin told us that Ashcroft was "on morphine" on the evening of March 10.
+(U)
+
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+would be accompanying Gonzales and Card to remove Comey from
+Ashcroft's room. The FBI agent told Ayres that the Attorney General's
+security detail would "fully back" Comey and that "this is 'our scene'." (U)
+
+Philbin said he was leaving work that evening when he received a call
+from Comey, who said that Philbin needed to get to the hospital right away
+because Gonzales and Card were on their way there "to get Ashcroft to sign
+something." Comey also directed Philbin to call Goldsmith and tell him
+what was happening at the hospital. Philbin called Goldsmith from a taxi
+on his way to the hospital. Goldsmith told us he was home having dinner
+when he received Philbin's call telling him to go immediately to the hospital.
+(U)
+
+Comey arrived at the hospital between 7:10 and 7:30 p.m.¹⁶¹ In his
+congressional testimony, Comey said he ran up the stairs with his security
+detail to Ashcroft's floor, and he entered Ashcroft's room, which he
+described as darkened, with Ashcroft lying in bed and his wife standing by
+the bed. Comey said he began speaking to Ashcroft, "trying to orient him as
+to time and place, and try to see if he could focus on what was happening."
+Comey said it was not clear that Ashcroft could focus and that he "seemed
+pretty bad off[.]" Comey stepped out of the room into the hallway and
+telephoned Mueller, who was on his way to the hospital. With Mueller still
+on the line, Comey gave his phone to an FBI agent on Ashcroft's security
+detail, and according to Comey Mueller instructed the agent not to allow
+Comey to be removed from Ashcroft's room "under any circumstances." (U)
+
+Goldsmith and Philbin arrived at the hospital within a few minutes of
+each other. Comey, Goldsmith, and Philbin met briefly in an FBI "command
+post" that had been set up in a room adjacent to Ashcroft's room. Moments
+later, word was received at the command post that Card and Gonzales had
+arrived at the hospital and were on their way upstairs to see Ashcroft.
+Philbin told us the FBI agents in the command post called down to the
+checkpoint at the hospital entrance to ask whether Card and Gonzales were
+accompanied by Secret Service agents, which Philbin said indicated concern
+that a "stand-off" between the FBI agents and the Secret Service agents
+might ensue. (U)
+
+Comey, Goldsmith, and Philbin entered Ashcroft's room. Goldsmith
+described Ashcroft's appearance as "weak" and "frail," and observed that his
+breathing was shallow. Philbin said he was shocked by Ashcroft's
+appearance and said he "looked terrible." Philbin said that Ashcroft
+
+¹⁶¹ There is a discrepancy in the Attorney General's security detail log on the time.
+One agent wrote that Comey arrived at 7:10. Another agent wrote that Comey arrived at
+7:30. (U)
+
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+appeared to have lost a lot of weight, was "gray in the face," and was "almost
+out of it" because he was on morphine. Comey stated that Ashcroft was
+"clearly medicated." (U)
+
+Comey testified that he sat in an armchair by the head of Ashcroft's
+bed, with Goldsmith and Philbin standing behind him; Mrs. Ashcroft stood
+on the other side of the bed holding Ashcroft's arm. No security or medical
+personnel were present. (U)
+
+Goldsmith's notes indicate that at this point Comey and the others
+advised Ashcroft "not to sign anything." (U)
+
+Gonzales and Card, unaccompanied by Secret Service agents, entered
+Ashcroft's hospital room at 7:35 p.m., according to the FBI agent's notes.¹⁶²
+The two stood across from Mrs. Ashcroft at the head of the bed, with Comey,
+Goldsmith, and Philbin behind them. (U)
+
+Gonzales stated that when he entered the hospital room, Ashcroft was
+in the bed and his wife was "at the 11:00 position." Gonzales said to us that
+he was unaware that Comey, Goldsmith, and Philbin were also present in
+the room until Card told him this later. Gonzales told us that he could
+"sense" that others were in the room, but that he was not sure who, because
+his focus was on Ashcroft. Gonzales said he carried with him in a manila
+envelope the March 11, 2004, Presidential Authorization for Ashcroft to
+sign. (U)
+
+According to Philbin, Gonzales first asked Ashcroft how he was
+feeling. Ashcroft replied, "Not well." Gonzales then said words to the effect,
+"You know, there's a reauthorization that has to be renewed....” (U)
+
+Goldsmith told the OIG that Gonzales next reminded Ashcroft that he
+had been certifying the program for the past 2 years. Comey told us that
+Gonzales told Ashcroft, "We have arranged for a legislative remediation;
+we're going to get Congress to fix it," and that more time was needed to
+accomplish this. Comey told us he did not know what Gonzales meant by
+"legislative remediation." (U)
+
+Gonzales told us that he did not recall telling Ashcroft that a
+legislative remediation had been arranged, but rather may have told
+Ashcroft that White House officials had met with congressional leaders "to
+pursue a legislative fix." (U)
+
+Comey testified to the Senate Judiciary Committee about what
+happened next:
+
+¹⁶² Gonzales told us he and Card arrived in Ashcroft's hospital room at 7:20. (U)
+
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+... Attorney General Ashcroft then stunned me. He lifted his
+head off the pillow and in very strong terms expressed his view
+of the matter, rich in both substance and fact, which stunned
+me, drawn from the hourlong meeting we'd had a week earlier,
+and in very strong terms expressed himself, and then laid his
+head back down on the pillow. He seemed spent. ... And as
+he laid back down, he said, "But that doesn't matter, because
+I'm not the Attorney General. There is the Attorney General,"
+and he pointed to me - I was just to his left. The two men
+[Gonzales and Card] did not acknowledge me; they turned and
+walked from the room. (U)
+
+Comey also testified that "I thought I had just witnessed an effort to
+take advantage of a very sick man, who did not have the powers of the
+Attorney General because they had been transferred to me." (U)
+
+Philbin described to us Ashcroft's statements to Gonzales and Card in
+the hospital room, stating that Ashcroft "rallied and held forth for two
+minutes" about problems with the program as had been explained to him by
+Comey, and that Ashcroft agreed with Comey. Gonzales told us that he did
+not recall Ashcroft stating that he agreed with Comey. Goldsmith's notes
+indicate that Ashcroft argued in particular that NSA's collection activities
+exceeded the scope of the Authorizations and the OLC memoranda, stating
+that he was troubled by [REDACTED]"¹⁶³ According to
+Goldsmith's notes Ashcroft also said that it was “very troubling that
+[REDACTED] people in other agencies" had been read into the program, but that
+Ashcroft's own Chief of Staff, and until recently the Deputy Attorney
+General, had not been allowed to be read in. Gonzales told us he responded
+to Ashcroft that this was the President's decision. (TS//SI//NF) -
+
+According to Goldsmith's notes, Ashcroft also complained that the
+White House had "not returned phone calls," and that the Department had
+been "treated badly and cut out of [the] whole affair." Ashcroft told
+Gonzales that he was "not prepared to sign anything.” (U)
+
+When we interviewed Gonzales about the hospital visit, he stated that
+these were "extraordinary circumstances," that the program had been
+reauthorized over the past two years, and that the sentiment of the
+
+¹⁶³ As discussed in Chapter Three, Ashcroft was present for the January 31, 2002,
+briefing of Presiding Judge of the FISA Court Royce Lamberth about the program.
+According to an outline of information to be covered during that briefing, NSA Director
+Hayden would have explained how the program functioned operationally. Because Ashcroft
+did not agree to be interviewed, we were unable to determine what Ashcroft understood
+about the [REDACTED] collection prior to Philbin and Goldsmith's explanation to
+him of this aspect of the program in late 2003. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
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+congressional leadership was that it should continue. Gonzales said he
+therefore felt it was very important that Ashcroft be told what was
+happening, adding "If I were the Attorney General I would damn sure want
+to know." (U)
+
+In his July 2007 congressional testimony, Gonzales also explained the
+visit to the hospital by stating that it was "important that the Attorney
+General knew about the views and recommendations of the congressional
+leadership; that as a former member of Congress and as someone who had
+authorized these activities for over two years, that it might be important for
+him to hear this information. That was the reason that Mr. Card and I went
+to the hospital." Gonzales further testified, "We didn't know whether or not
+he knew of Mr. Comey's position and, if he did know, whether or not he
+agreed with it." Gonzales also disputed Goldsmith's account that Ashcroft
+stated that he was "not prepared to sign anything," and referred us to his
+July 2007 testimony where he stated: (U)
+
+My recollection, Senator [Feinstein], is – and, of course, this
+happened some time ago and people's recollections are going to
+differ. My recollection is that Mr. Ashcroft did most of the
+talking. At the end, my recollection is, he said, "I've been told it
+would be improvident for me to sign. But that doesn't matter,
+because I'm no longer the Attorney General.” (U)
+
+Gonzales told us that he and Card would not have gone to the
+hospital if they believed Ashcroft did not have the authority to certify the
+Authorization and told us that as soon as Ashcroft stated he no longer
+retained authority to act, Gonzales decided not ask Ashcroft to sign the
+Authorization. In his congressional testimony Gonzales stated, "Obviously
+there was concern about General Ashcroft's condition ... [W]e knew, of
+course, that he was ill, that he'd had surgery." Gonzales also stated that
+"We would not have sought nor did we intend to get any approval from
+General Ashcroft if in fact he wasn't fully competent to make that decision."
+He also testified, "There's no governing legal principle that says that Mr.
+Ashcroft [...] If he decided he felt better, could decide, I'm feeling better
+and I can make this decision, and I'm going to make this decision."¹⁶⁴ (U)
+
+The Attorney General security detail's logs indicate that Gonzales and
+Card left Ashcroft's room at 7:40 p.m. (U)
+
+¹⁶⁴ Hearing before Senate Judiciary Committee, July 24, 2007. Gonzales also told
+us that he would not have gone to the hospital solely over the dispute concerning the scope
+[REDACTED] (TS//SI//NF)
+
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+Moments after Gonzales and Card departed, Mueller arrived at the
+hospital. According to Mueller's notes, outside the hospital room Comey
+informed him of the exchange that had occurred in Ashcroft's room, and in
+particular that Ashcroft had stated that Comey was the Acting Attorney
+General, that "all matters" were to be taken to Comey, but that Ashcroft
+supported Comey's position regarding the program. Mueller's notes also
+state: "The AG also told [Gonzales and Card] that he was barred from
+obtaining the advice he needed on the program by the strict
+compartmentalization rules of the [White House].” (U)
+
+Mueller's notes indicate that Comey asked Mueller to witness
+Ashcroft's condition, and requested Mueller to inform the FBI security detail
+that no visitors, other than family, be allowed to see Ashcroft without
+Mueller's consent. Both Mueller's notes and the security detail log indicate
+that Mueller instructed the detail that under no circumstances was anyone
+to be allowed into Ashcroft's room without express approval from either Mrs.
+Ashcroft or Mueller. (U)
+
+At approximately 8:00p.m. Mueller went into Ashcroft's room for 5 to
+10 minutes. Mueller wrote in his program log: "AG in chair; is feeble,
+barely articulate, clearly stressed." (U)
+
+4. March 10, 2004: Olson is Read into the Program (U)
+
+According to Comey's congressional testimony, while he was speaking
+with Mueller prior to Mueller's departure from the hospital, an FBI agent
+interrupted, stating that Comey had an urgent telephone call from Card.
+Comey testified that he then spoke with Card, who was very upset and
+demanded that Comey come to the White House immediately. Comey
+testified that he told Card that based on the conduct Comey had just
+witnessed at the hospital, he would not meet with Card without a witness
+present. Comey testified that Card replied, "What conduct? We were just
+there to wish him well." Comey reiterated his condition that he would only
+meet Card with a witness present, and that he intended the witness to be
+Solicitor General Olson. Comey testified that until he could "connect" with
+Olson, he was not going to meet with Card. Card asked if Comey was
+refusing to come to the White House, and Comey responded that he was not
+refusing and would be there, but that he had to go back to the Justice
+Department first. (U)
+
+Comey and the other Department officials left the hospital at 8:10
+p.m. Philbin stated that he returned to the Department with Comey in
+Comey's vehicle, and that the emergency lights were again activated.
+Goldsmith also left the hospital and went to the Department. At the
+Department Comey, Goldsmith, and Philbin were joined by Olson, who had
+come to the Justice Department after being contacted at a dinner party.
+
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+Comey told us that he believed there was an urgent need to have Olson read
+into the program because he was confident Olson would agree with Comey
+and the others that Yoo's legal analysis was flawed and that Olson would be
+a strong ally in the matter because of Olson's respected intellect and
+credibility. (U)
+
+During this meeting at the Justice Department, a call came from Vice
+President Cheney for Olson, which Olson took on a secure line in Comey's
+office while Comey waited outside. Comey told us he believes Vice President
+Cheney effectively read Olson into the program during that conversation.
+(U)
+
+Comey and Olson then went to the White House at about 11:00p.m.,
+and met with Gonzales and Card that evening. Comey testified that Card
+would not allow Olson to enter his office. Comey relented and spoke to Card
+alone for about 15 minutes. At that point, Gonzales arrived and brought
+Olson into the room. According to Comey, he communicated the
+Department's views on the dispute and that the dispute was not resolved in
+this discussion. Comey stated that Card was concerned that he had heard
+reports there was to be a large number of resignations at the
+Department. (U)
+
+Gonzales told us that he recalled that Comey met first with him and
+Card while Olson waited outside the office, and that Olson joined them
+shortly thereafter. Gonzales said that little more was achieved than a
+general acknowledgement that a "situation" continued to exist because of
+the disagreement between the Department and the White House regarding
+the program.¹⁶⁵ (U)
+
+5. March 11, 2004: Goldsmith Proposes Compromise Solution (U)
+
+According to a memorandum to the file drafted by Goldsmith, he met
+with Gonzales at 6:30 a.m. the next morning, March 11, 2004, at the White
+House to discuss a proposal under which the Department could support
+
+¹⁶⁵ Comey stated that Olson did not become deeply involved in analyzing the Stellar
+Wind program in the days that followed because he was preparing for a major argument
+before the Supreme Court. Comey told us that Deputy Solicitor General Paul Clement was
+read into the program on March 12, 2004, and reviewed all of the OLC memoranda that
+weekend. Comey said Clement agreed with Goldsmith and Philbin's analysis "one hundred
+percent" and later worked with the OLC on drafting a new memorandum on the legality of
+the program, which is discussed below. However, Bradbury told us that Comey's
+characterization of Clement's view of the analysis was exaggerated. Bradbury told us that
+Clement had remarked to him after these events transpired that Goldsmith and Philbin's
+analysis "sounded reasonable to me at the time," and that Clement's view of the analysis
+was based only on a limited review of it. (TS//SI//NF)
+
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+certification of the program. Goldsmith's proposal had three conditions.
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Goldsmith told us that he did not specifically recall this meeting.
+Gonzales told us that he recalled conveying to Goldsmith and Philbin at
+some point during this day that the President had decided he had the
+constitutional authority to continue the program. Gonzales said he also
+expressed to Department officials the sentiment that the Department should
+continue seeking a way to "get comfortable" with the President's decision.
+(U)
+
+6. March 11, 2004: White House Asserts that Comey's
+Status as Acting Attorney General was Unclear (U)
+
+Goldsmith told the OIG that later during the morning of March 11,
+2004, he received a call from Deputy White House Counsel David Leitch.
+Goldsmith said Leitch was "yelling and screaming" about the White House
+not being informed that Comey was the Acting Attorney General. Goldsmith
+told the OIG that Leitch made two specific complaints. First, Leitch claimed
+that the White House had never received a determination from OLC on
+Comey's assumption of Ashcroft's powers and duties. Goldsmith told us
+that to rebut this charge, OLC Deputy Assistant Attorney General Edward
+Whelan was sent to the Justice Command Center to retrieve from a waste
+basket the facsimile transmittal confirmation sheet from the March 5, 2004,
+memorandum Goldsmith had sent to Gonzales entitled "Determination that
+Attorney General is absent or disabled." This confirmation sheet
+subsequently was sent to Leitch.¹⁶⁶ (U)
+
+¹⁶⁶ In a March 12, 2004, e-mail to Ayres, Comey, Goldsmith, Philbin, and others
+(including a copy to Gonzales), Leitch offered a "clarification," asserting that the White
+House had in fact received the Goldsmith memoranda of March 5, as well as the
+
+(Cont'd.)
+
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+Leitch's second claim was that the OLC memorandum was ambiguous
+because it did not specify whether the Attorney General was determined to
+be "absent" or "disabled," a difference for purposes of the Attorney General's
+authority. According to Goldsmith, if the Attorney General was "absent,"
+the Deputy Attorney General could act as the Attorney General, although
+the Attorney General would retain his authority and technically could
+overrule the Deputy. If the Attorney General was "disabled," the Attorney
+General was divested of all authority. Goldsmith said he responded to
+Leitch by noting the inconsistency of the White House making this second
+claim because, according to Leitch, it had not received Goldsmith's
+memorandum in the first instance. (U)
+
+Goldsmith said he also told Leitch to "lay off" the complaints, but that
+Leitch did not. Goldsmith said he therefore reluctantly sent a detailed
+e-mail to Leitch on March 11 to support the Department's contention that it
+had properly informed the White House of Ashcroft's status. Goldsmith
+stated that in the e-mail he also made the point that his conversation with
+Gonzales on March 9, 2004 (discussed above) was premised on Gonzales's
+knowledge that Ashcroft was ill and that Comey needed to authorize a
+"30-day bridge" until Ashcroft was well enough to sign the Authorizations
+again.¹⁶⁷ (U)
+
+Gonzales told us that he had no recollection of having seen OLC's
+March 5, 2004, memorandum entitled "Determination that Attorney General
+is absent or disabled." As described above, Gonzales stated that he and
+Card would not have gone to the hospital if they believed Ashcroft did not
+have the authority to certify the Authorization as to form and legality.
+Gonzales also said that while he believed Comey would be making the
+decision to recertify the program, this did not mean that Ashcroft had
+relinquished his authority or had been "recused" from making the decision.
+Gonzales said he believed that Ashcroft retained the authority if he was
+competent to exercise it and was inclined to do so.¹⁶⁸ (TS//SI//NF)
+
+memorandum from Comey's Chief of Staff Chuck Rosenberg memorializing Comey's
+decision that the Attorney General was "absent or disabled" within the meaning of 28
+U.S.C. § 508(a). Leitch's clarification stated that the Rosenberg memorandum had been in
+draft form. (U)
+
+¹⁶⁷ The OIG searched for but was unable to find this e-mail from Goldsmith to
+Leitch. (U)
+
+¹⁶⁸ During his July 24, 2007, testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
+however, Gonzales stated that he thought there had been newspaper accounts of Comey's
+assumption of the Attorney General's duties and stated that "the fact that Mr. Comey was
+the acting Attorney General is probably something that I knew of." Gonzales testified that
+he was aware that Ashcroft was ill and had undergone surgery, but Gonzales stated that
+Ashcroft "could always reclaim" his authority. (U)
+
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+7. March 11, 2004: Gonzales Certifies Presidential
+Authorization as to Form and Legality (TS//SI//NF)
+
+On the morning of March 11, 2004, with the Presidential
+Authorization set to expire, President Bush signed a new Authorization.¹⁶⁹
+In a departure from the past practice of having the Attorney General certify
+the Authorization as to form and legality, the March 11 Authorization was
+certified by White House Counsel Gonzales. The March 11 Authorization
+also differed markedly from prior Authorizations in three other respects.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The first significant difference between the March 11, 2004,
+Presidential Authorization and prior Authorizations was the President's
+explicit assertion that the exercise of his Article II Commander-in-Chief
+authority [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+As discussed above, FISA and the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
+Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (generally referred to as Title III) are by
+their terms the "exclusive means by which electronic surveillance, as
+defined in (FISA), and the interception of domestic wire, oral, and electronic
+communications may be conducted." 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f). This new
+language was based on the same legal rationale Yoo first advanced in
+support of the Stellar Wind program – that FISA cannot be read to infringe
+upon the President's Commander-in-Chief authority under Article II of the
+Constitution during wartime. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Steven Bradbury told the OIG
+that he believed the language was included in the March 11 Authorization
+as a way of indicating that the President did not agree with Goldsmith and
+Philbin's analysis, and to protect those who had been implementing the
+program under the prior OLC opinions. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Second, [REDACTED]
+
+¹⁶⁹ The March 11, 2004, Presidential Authorization stated that it would expire on
+May 6, 2004. (TS//SI//NF)
+
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+[REDACTED]
+
+¹⁷⁰ [REDACTED] (TS//SI//NF)
+
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+[REDACTED]
+
+According to Comey and Philbin, this new language was Addington's
+"fix."172 Philbin said he believed the new language was "sufficient" to
+address the Department's concern that the Authorizations did not
+adequately describe the [REDACTED] being carried out by the
+NSA, although he believed the new language was “cumbersome." [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+In his OIG interview, Gonzales declined to explain the significance of
+this new language, based on an assertion from the Special Counsel to the
+President that his answer would reveal internal White House deliberations
+[REDACTED]
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+¹⁷¹ [REDACTED]
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+¹⁷² Hayden and Philbin both told the OIG that Addington drafted the Presidential
+Authorizations. In his OIG interview, we asked Gonzales who drafted the March 11, 2004,
+Authorization. On the advice of the Special Counsel to the President, Gonzales declined to
+answer. (TS//SI//NF)
+
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+[REDACTED]
+
+The March 11 Presidential Authorization did not [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The third significant departure from prior Authorizations was the
+inclusion of a statement that [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Id.
+at para. 10. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+¹⁷³ [REDACTED]
+However, Gonzales told us that he found it "hard to believe" that no one at the
+Department understood that the NSA [REDACTED] Gonzales said he was aware
+that Philbin had been to the NSA several times and had met with NSA officials to gain an
+understanding of how the program was actually implemented. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
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+[REDACTED]
+
+We asked Gonzales why he signed the March 11, 2004, Presidential
+Authorization even though the Department could not support it. On the
+advice of the Special Counsel to the President, Gonzales declined to answer.
+However, Gonzales stated that the White House Counsel, like OLC, provides
+legal advice to the President and that his signature on the Authorization
+simply represented his advice as to its form and legality. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+NSA Director Hayden told us that Addington asked him whether the
+NSA would be willing to continue the Stellar Wind program without the
+Justice Department's certification of the Presidential Authorization. Hayden
+said this was a "tough question" and that he consulted with his leadership
+team at the NSA before making a decision. Hayden said that three
+considerations persuaded him to continue the program. First, the
+congressional members briefed on the situation on March 10, 2004, were
+supportive of continuing the program without Comey's certification.
+Second, the program had been operating for the previous two and a half
+years with Department approval. Third, the NSA General Counsel's office
+told him the program was legal. Hayden said he was unsure whether
+proceeding without the Department's certification was a sustainable
+approach, but that he was comfortable doing so when the issue arose in
+March 2004. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+B. Department and FBI Officials React to Issuance of
+March 11, 2004, Authorization (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Several Department and FBI leadership officials considered resigning
+after the Presidential Authorization was signed despite the Deputy Attorney
+General's refusal to certify the program based on the Department's
+determination that certain activities it authorized were without adequate
+legal support. Many of the Department, FBI, and White House officials we
+interviewed characterized the events immediately surrounding the issuance
+
+¹⁷⁴ In a closed session of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on June 26,
+2007, Comey described his belief regarding the new language, stating, "[T]here were some
+additions to the text that were an effort by someone to try and fix the record in some
+respect." (U//FOUO)
+
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+of the March 11, 2004, Presidential Authorization in dramatic, sharp terms.
+Several of the Department witnesses described the impasse as a "crisis" and
+described a sense of distrust and anger that permeated their relations with
+White House officials during this period. In a letter of resignation that
+Comey wrote but did not send, he described this period as an "apocalyptic
+situation." (TS//SI//NF)
+
+In this section, we describe the reactions of Department, FBI, and
+White House officials to the White House decision to continue the program
+without the support of the Justice Department. (U)
+
+1. Initial Responses of Department and FBI Officials (U)
+
+White House Chief of Staff Card informed Comey by telephone on the
+morning of March 11, 2004, that the President had signed the new
+Authorization that morning. At approximately noon, Gonzales called
+Goldsmith to inform him that the President, in issuing the Authorization,
+had made an interpretation of law concerning his authorities and that the
+Department should not act in contradiction of his determinations.
+Goldsmith took notes on the call. According to his notes, Goldsmith asked
+Gonzales, "What were those determinations?" and Gonzales responded that
+he would let Goldsmith know. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Later that day, Gonzales called Goldsmith again and told him that
+OLC should continue working on its legal analysis of the program. In a
+third call that day, however, Gonzales directed Goldsmith to suspend work
+on the legal analysis and to decline a request from the CIA General Counsel
+to review a draft of the new OLC memorandum. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Goldsmith followed up this series of calls with a letter to Gonzales
+seeking clarification on Gonzales's instructions. Goldsmith wrote that he
+interpreted the March 11, 2004, Authorization signed by the President to
+mean that "the President has determined the legality of [the program] in all
+respects based upon the advice and analysis of your office, and that officers
+of the Department of Justice should refrain from calling into question the
+legality of [the program], or from undertaking further legal analysis of it." In
+the letter Goldsmith recounted how Gonzales had then called him to advise
+that OLC should continue its legal analysis of the program, adding, "I am
+now uncertain about your direction based on the President's exercise of his
+authority." Goldsmith concluded his letter by reiterating OLC's position
+that its existing legal memoranda "should not be relied upon in support for
+the entire program." Goldsmith described the document he wrote as a "for
+the record" letter.¹⁷⁵ As described below, Goldsmith and Philbin delivered
+
+¹⁷⁵ Goldsmith said he discussed a draft of the letter with Comey, Rosenberg, Ayres,
+Olson, and others and edited it based on their suggestions. (U)
+
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+this letter to Gonzales at his residence at approximately 11:00 p.m. that
+night. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+At noon on March 11, 2004, Director Mueller met with Card at the
+White House. According to Mueller's program log, Card summoned Mueller
+to his office to bring Mueller up to date on the events of the preceding 24
+hours. Card recounted for Mueller the briefing of the congressional leaders
+the prior afternoon and the President's issuance of the new Authorization
+without the Department's approval. In addition, Card told Mueller that if no
+"legislative fix" could be found by May 6, 2004, when the current
+Authorization was set to expire, the program would be discontinued.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+According to Mueller's notes, Card acknowledged to Mueller that
+President Bush had sent him and Gonzales to the hospital to seek Ashcroft's
+certification for the March 11, 2004, Authorization, but that Ashcroft had
+said he was too ill to make the determination and that Comey was the
+Acting Attorney General. Mueller wrote in his program log that he told Card
+that the failure to have Department of Justice representation at the
+congressional briefing and the attempt to have Ashcroft certify the
+Authorization without going through Comey "gave the strong perception that
+the [White House] was trying to do an end run around the Acting [Attorney
+General] whom they knew to have serious concerns as to the legality of
+portions of the program." Card responded that he and Gonzales were
+unaware at the time of the hospital visit that Comey was the Acting Attorney
+General, and that they had only been following the directions of the
+President. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Mueller reminded Card that Mueller had told Vice President Cheney
+during their March 9, 2004, noon meeting that Mueller could have problems
+with the FBI's continued involvement in the program if the White House
+issued an Authorization without the Department's approval. Card said he
+understood Mueller's concern and told him to stop by Gonzales's office to
+pick up a copy of the March 11, 2004, Authorization, which Mueller did.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+Mueller met with Comey at 1:15 p.m. to review the Authorization, and
+he left a copy of it with Comey. During this meeting, Mueller told Comey he
+would be submitting a letter to Comey requesting advice on the legality of
+the FBI's continued participation in the program.¹⁷⁶ (TS//SI//NF)
+
+¹⁷⁶ According to the Mueller's program log, Gonzales called Mueller at 2:50 p.m. to
+tell him to "assure security of copy of President's order." (U)
+
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+Later that day, Mueller sent Comey a memorandum, prepared by FBI
+General Counsel Valerie Caproni and an FBI Deputy General Counsel,
+seeking guidance on how the FBI should proceed in light of recent
+developments. The memorandum asked whether FBI agents detailed to the
+NSA to work on Stellar Wind should be recalled; whether the FBI should
+continue to receive and investigate tips based on [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] and whether [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) Counsel James Baker
+also expressed his concern about the White House's action. On the evening
+of March 11, 2004, he drafted a memorandum to Comey containing what he
+later described as a series of "loaded questions" concerning whether it was
+"lawful and ethical" for OIPR to continue filing applications with the FISA
+Court under the circumstances.¹⁷⁷ (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Goldsmith and Philbin called Gonzales late in the evening of March 11
+to ask if they could visit him at his residence to deliver the letter Goldsmith
+had written earlier in the day. As described above, Goldsmith sought to
+make a record of his earlier conversations with Gonzales in which
+Goldsmith believed Gonzales had conveyed conflicting instructions
+regarding how OLC should proceed in light of the President's issuance of the
+March 11 Authorization. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Gonzales told us that Goldsmith drafted the letter because Goldsmith
+was "confused" about whether OLC should continue working on its legal
+analysis of the program. Gonzales said he recalled that Goldsmith and
+Philbin were "somber" during the meeting at his house. Gonzales said that
+he told them that the President had decided to go forward with the program,
+but that they should continue working to resolve the outstanding legal
+questions they had and try to find a solution. He said he tried to convey to
+them his confidence that everyone would "get through this." (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Goldsmith and Philbin told us that Gonzales was very cordial during
+the meeting and expressed regret for having gone to Ashcroft's hospital
+room that evening. Philbin stated that initially he believed that Gonzales
+had instructed him and Goldsmith "not to do our job, not to determine what
+the law is," but that it became evident to him that Gonzales "wanted to do
+the legally right thing." Goldsmith also stated that as a general proposition
+
+¹⁷⁷ These issues are described in Section II C of this chapter in connection with the
+Department's meetings with FISA Court Presiding Judge Kollar-Kotelly to discuss the use in
+FISA applications of information derived from [REDACTED] collected under the program
+following the March 11, 2004, Presidential Authorization and its subsequent modifications.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
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+he encountered more "pushback" from Addington than from Gonzales, and
+that Gonzales "wanted to do the right thing." (TS//SI//NF)
+
+2. Department and FBI Officials Consider Resigning (U)
+
+Comey told us he drafted a letter of resignation shortly after the
+incident in Ashcroft's hospital room on March 10. Comey said he drafted
+the letter because he believed it was impossible for him to remain with the
+Department if the President would do something the Department said was
+not legally supportable.¹⁷⁸ (U)
+
+Comey also testified that Ashcroft's Chief of Staff David Ayres believed
+Ashcroft also was likely to resign and urged Comey to wait until Ashcroft
+was well enough to resign with him. In written responses to Senator
+Charles Schumer following his testimony, Comey wrote that he believed the
+following individuals also were prepared to resign: Goldsmith, Philbin,
+Chuck Rosenberg, Daniel Levin, James Baker, David Ayres, Deputy Chief of
+Staff to the Attorney General David Israelite, and Director Mueller. Comey
+also responded to the question that he believed that "a large portion" of his
+staff also would have resigned if he had. (U)
+
+Goldsmith told us he was "completely disgusted" by his recent
+meetings with White House officials in connection with the Stellar Wind
+program and that he drafted a resignation letter at around the same time as
+Comey. The OIG obtained a handwritten list Goldsmith had compiled as
+these events were taking place to memorialize his grievances with the White
+House's actions during this period. The list includes:
+
+* the "[s]hoddiness of the whole thing," which Goldsmith told us
+referred to his belief that both the process by which the
+program was implemented and the substantive analysis
+underpinning it represented the extreme opposite of how to
+manage a program as important as the White House claimed
+Stellar Wind to be;
+
+¹⁷⁸ The letter was addressed to President Bush. Also, at 5:46 p.m. on the evening of
+March 11, 2004, Comey sent an e-mail to two Department colleagues stating in part:
+I have been through the roughest patch of my professional life in the last 24
+hours. You would not believe what has gone on. . . . I am hugely upset
+about the conduct of certain members of the executive branch. But I am
+also hugely proud of the Department of Justice, including SG, Associate AG,
+OLC, Ayres, my staff, the AG, and even Mrs. Ashcroft. I believe this has
+been our finest hour, although it is not over yet. . . . I suspect I will either be
+fired by the President or quit, but I will have done the right thing for my
+country. (U)
+
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+* "[o]ver-secrecy," both in terms of not reading in attorneys at the
+Justice Department and other agencies, and not keeping
+Congress informed;
+* the hospital incident, which Goldsmith described as "shameful";
+"[d]isregard of law" on the part of the White House (a reference
+Goldsmith did not expand upon with more specificity during his
+interview with the OIG); and
+* the White House's claim that a legislative fix could be achieved,
+which Goldsmith regarded as "irresponsible" because he
+believed at the time that a legislative remedy was not a viable
+option. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Goldsmith described three additional items on the list in particular as
+"false representations" by the White House:
+
+* "[l]ies re shutting down," referring to the White House's
+assurances to Goldsmith on several occasions that it would
+shut down the program if the Office of Legal Counsel could not
+find legal support for it;
+* "[l]ies re telling [the President] of problem," referring to
+representations that the President had been kept informed of
+the Department's concerns about the program; and
+* assertions by White House officials that they "[d]idn't know AG
+was incapacitated". (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Goldsmith stated that on Thursday, March 11, Ayres asked him not to
+resign because the Attorney General should have the chance to do so first
+once he had fully recovered from his surgery. Goldsmith said he was still
+"on the fence" the following Monday or Tuesday about resigning and that
+there was great concern that his and other resignations would “spark a
+panic" that might lead to the program being revealed publicly.¹⁷⁹ (U)
+
+Philbin told us that there was an “eerie silence" at the Department on
+March 11 as he and others awaited word from the White House on the fate
+of the program. Philbin said he and others believed they would have to
+resign. Philbin said his primary concern was that the White House planned
+to go forward with the Presidential Authorization and continue the program
+
+¹⁷⁹ Goldsmith ultimately tendered his resignation in June 2004, effective July 30,
+2004. Goldsmith told us he resigned in part because he did not believe he could be an
+effective head of the Office of Legal Counsel after his "unprecedented" withdrawal of several
+legal memoranda, including those drafted by Yoo. Goldsmith added that he also resigned
+because he was "exhausted" from his work in OLC and had recently been offered a teaching
+position at Harvard Law School. (U)
+
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+despite the flaws that the Office of Legal Counsel had identified in its legal
+analysis. Philbin said he was "absolutely serious" about resigning, adding,
+"[If] they're going to try to strong-arm the guy on morphine, what else are
+they going to do?" (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Baker told us that he also considered resigning after the President
+signed the Authorization but ultimately decided to remain in his position, in
+part because of his fear that if the White House was willing to tolerate mass
+resignations of senior government officials rather than revise the Stellar
+Wind program, "I don't know what this means in terms of the rule of law in
+this country." Baker also stated that he knew he had certain protections
+from removal for a period of time because he was a career official and that
+he wanted to remain as Chief of OIPR to protect the government's
+relationship with the FISA Court and to protect the attorneys in his office.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+Levin said he was willing to resign over the matter, and he gave a
+signed resignation letter to Comey to be used by him "however [he] felt
+appropriate." Levin said he did so "if it would help to get the White House to
+change its mind." Levin said that even though he was not certain he shared
+Goldsmith's view that the [REDACTED] was legally
+without support, he thought the White House's conduct during the incident
+at the hospital had been "outrageous" and he was willing to resign on that
+basis alone. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+FBI General Counsel Caproni told us that she also was prepared to
+resign. She said that the FBI's primary concern regarding the impasse
+between the Department and the White House over the program was not
+with issues of privacy and civil liberties, but rather with "the rule of law."
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+At approximately 1:30 a.m. on March 12, 2004, Mueller drafted by
+hand a letter stating, in part: "[A]fter reviewing the plain language of the
+FISA statute, and the order issued yesterday by the President... and in the
+absence of further clarification of the legality of the program from the
+Attorney General, I am forced to withdraw the FBI from participation in the
+program. Further, should the President order the continuation of the FBI's
+participation in the program, and in the absence of further legal advice from
+the AG, I would be constrained to resign as Director of the FBI." Mueller
+told us he planned on having the letter typed and then tendering it, along
+with his March 11, 2004, memorandum to Comey, but that based on
+subsequent events his resignation was not necessary. (TS//SI//NF)
+
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+3. Comey and Mueller Meet with President Bush (U)
+
+On the morning of March 12, 2004, Comey and Mueller went to the
+White House to attend the regular daily threat briefing with the President in
+the Oval Office. Comey said that following the briefing President Bush
+called him into the President's private study for an "unscheduled meeting."
+(U)
+
+Comey told us that President Bush said to him, "You look burdened."
+Comey told the President that he did feel burdened, to which the President
+responded, "Let me lift that burden from you." Comey told the President
+that he felt as if he were standing on railroad tracks with a train coming
+toward him to run over his career and "I can't get off the tracks." (U)
+
+Comey said he then explained to the President the three baskets of
+Stellar Wind collection and the issues and problems associated with each.
+President Bush responded with words to the effect, "You whipped this on
+me" all of a sudden, that he was hearing about these problems at the last
+minute, and that the President not being told of these developments
+regarding the program was "not fair to the American people." Comey
+responded that the President's staff had been advised of these issues "for
+weeks," and that the President was being "poorly served" and "misled" by his
+advisors. Comey also said to the President, "The American people are going
+to freak when they hear what collection is going on." President Bush
+responded, "That's for me to worry about." (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+According to Comey, the President said that he just needed until
+May 6 (the date of the next Authorization), and that if he could not get
+Congress to fix FISA by then he would shut down the program. The
+President emphasized the importance of the program and that it "saves
+lives." Comey told the President that while he understood the President's
+position he still could not agree to certify the program. Comey said he then
+quoted Martin Luther to the President: "Here I stand, I can do no other." At.
+the end of the conversation, Comey told the President, "You should know
+that Bob Mueller is going to resign this morning." The President thanked
+Comey for telling him that and said he would speak with Mueller next.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Comey said his conversation with the President lasted approximately
+15 minutes. Following the conversation, Comey went to Mueller, who was
+waiting in the West Wing, and started discussing his meeting with the
+
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+President. Word was then sent to Mueller through a Secret Service agent
+that the President wanted to meet with him.¹⁸⁰ (U)
+
+Mueller later made notes in his program log about his meeting with
+President Bush. According to his notes, the President told Mueller that he
+was "tremendously concerned" about another terrorist attack and that he
+had been informed that the Stellar Wind program was essential to protecting
+against another attack. The President cited an ongoing investigation
+[REDACTED]
+The President said he
+believed that he would be "justly held accountable" if he did not do
+everything possible to prevent another attack. The President explained to
+Mueller that for these reasons he had authorized the continuation of the
+program even without the concurrence of the Attorney General as to the
+legality of "various aspects of the program." (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+According to the notes, the President told Mueller that the
+congressional leadership had been briefed on the President's action to
+extend the program and was "understanding and supportive of the
+President's position." The President also told Mueller that he had urged
+Comey to agree to extend the program until May 6 and that he hoped for a
+legislative fix by that time, but that if no legislative solution could be found
+and the legality of the program was still in question by that time, he "would
+shut it down." (TS//SI//NF)
+
+According to Mueller's notes, Mueller told the President of his
+concerns regarding the FBI's continued participation in the program without
+an opinion from the Attorney General as to its legality, and that he was
+considering resigning if the FBI were directed to continue to participate
+without the concurrence of the Attorney General. The President responded
+that he "wished to relieve any burden (Mueller) may be laboring under" and
+that he did not want Mueller to resign. Mueller said he explained to the
+President that he had an "independent obligation to the FBI and to the
+Justice Department to assure the legality of actions we undertook, and that
+a presidential order alone could not do that." (TS//SI//NF)
+
+¹⁸⁰ At this point (9:27 a.m.), Comey sent an e-mail from his Blackberry to
+Goldsmith, Philbin, Ayres, Levin, and others, stating:
+
+President just took me into his private office for 15 minute one on one talk.
+Told him he was being misled and poorly served. We had a very full and
+frank exchange. Don't know that either of us can see a way out. He
+promised that he would shut down 5/6 if Congress didn't fix FISA. Told him
+Mueller was about to resign. He just pulled Bob into his office.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
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+According to Mueller's notes, the President expressed understanding
+for Mueller's position and asked what needed to be done to address
+Mueller's concerns. Mueller responded that Comey, the Office of Legal
+Counsel, the CIA, and the NSA "needed to sit down immediately" and assess
+the legal status of the program in light of OLC's doubts about the existing
+legal rationale and the March 11, 2004, Authorization. Mueller wrote:
+
+The President questioned me closely on the impact on national
+security from discontinuing elements of the program. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+According to Mueller's notes, the President then directed Mueller to
+meet with Comey and other principals to address the legal concerns so that
+the FBI could continue participating in the program "as appropriate under
+the law." (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Mueller told us he met with Comey an hour later to begin
+coordinating that effort. At 4:50 p.m. that afternoon, Mueller called
+Gonzales to request that additional Department lawyers be read into the
+program.¹⁸¹ Mueller told us that this request originated with Comey and
+that Mueller was merely acting as an "intermediary." (U)
+
+The President's direction to Mueller to meet with Comey and other
+principals to address the legal concerns averted the mass resignations at
+the Department and the FBI. According to Comey and other Department
+officials, the White House's decision to seek a legal solution and allow more
+attorneys to be read into the program was a significant step toward
+resolving the dispute, and in the words of one Department official provided a
+way of "stepping back from the brink." As we describe below, these
+Department officials still faced the challenge of finding a legal and
+operational remedy for the program that would address the concerns of the
+White House, the NSA, and Department. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+4. Comey Directs Continued Cooperation with NSA (U)
+
+On the morning of March 12, 2004, Comey decided not to direct OIPR
+and the FBI to cease cooperating with the NSA in conjunction with the
+program. Comey's decision is documented in a 1-page memorandum from
+
+¹⁸¹ At least three additional Department attorneys were read into the program on
+March 12, 2004, including OIPR Acting Deputy Counsel for Intelligence Operations Peggy
+Skelly-Nolen and two OLC attorneys. (U)
+
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+Goldsmith to Comey in which Goldsmith explained why Comey's action was
+legal. (S//NF)
+
+In his memorandum, Goldsmith stated that the President, as
+Commander-in-Chief and Chief Executive with the constitutional duty to
+"take care that the laws are faithfully executed," made a determination that
+Stellar Wind, as practiced, was lawful. Goldsmith concluded that this
+determination was binding on the entire Executive Branch, including Comey
+in his exercise of the powers of the Attorney General.¹⁸² (TS//SI//NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+5. Department Conducts Additional Legal Analysis (U)
+
+On March 12, 2004, an interagency working group was convened to
+continue the legal analysis of the program. In accordance with the
+President's directive to Mueller, officials from the FBI, NSA, and the CIA
+were brought into the process, although the OLC maintained the lead role.
+The working group included Deputy Solicitor General Clement, Baker, FBI
+General Counsel Caproni, Mueller, and several attorneys from OLC. Comey
+said CIA Director Tenet and his Deputy, McLaughlin, may have had limited
+participation as well. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+On March 13, Mueller asked NSA Director Hayden to assist FBI
+General Counsel Caproni in assessing the value of the Stellar Wind
+program. Mueller said he wanted Caproni to become more familiar with the
+program and to understand how the FBI's view of the value of the program
+
+¹⁸² Goldsmith told us his determination that the entire Executive Branch was
+bound by the President's interpretation of law was based on his discussions with several
+other Justice Department attorneys, as well as on long-standing OLC precedent. (U)
+
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+compared with that of the NSA.¹⁸³ Mueller said that Hayden provided slides
+highlighting cases in which the NSA believed Stellar Wind-derived
+information proved useful. (S//NF)
+
+Caproni told us that during this March 2004 period she and two other
+FBI officials made an effort to determine what value the FBI was getting
+from Stellar Wind-derived information. She explained that it was difficult to
+assess the value of the program during its early stages because FBI field
+offices at that time were not required to report back to FBI Headquarters
+with information about how information from the NSA program had been
+used.¹⁸⁴ (S//NF)
+
+On the afternoon of Sunday, March 14, 2004, the Department
+convened a large meeting in the Justice Command Center to review OLC's
+analysis on the legality of the program. Mueller, Comey, Goldsmith, Philbin,
+Baker, CIA General Counsel Muller, Caproni, Tenet, Hayden, Olson,
+Clement, and several NSA lawyers attended the meeting. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Prior to the meeting, Goldsmith and Philbin prepared a detailed
+outline of OLC's current analysis, which Goldsmith described to us as his
+"most honest take" of the legal issues at that time. Goldsmith said he
+distributed the outline to meeting participants and used it to walk the group
+through the analysis. (U)
+
+The outline highlights the evolution of OLC's analysis. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+¹⁸³ Caproni had been appointed the FBI General Counsel in August 2003 and was
+read into the Stellar Wind program in September or October 2003. She told us she did not
+give much thought to the program at the time because OLC had determined that it was
+legal. She stated that in 2004 she learned that OLC was re-examining Yoo's legal analysis
+and had concerns with it. She told us she later spoke with Philbin, who confirmed to her
+that he and Goldsmith had problems with the legal support for the program and that he
+was frustrated because the program was so tightly compartmented that he could not talk to
+anybody about it. Caproni told us that at some point she obtained a copy of Yoo's legal
+opinion. She stated that after reading it she immediately understood Philbin's concerns
+because the opinion appeared to lack analysis and simply concluded that the program was
+legal. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+¹⁸⁴ The FBI's Electronic Communications Analysis Unit compiled a summary of
+known [REDACTED] Stellar Wind tip results from January 1, 2003, through mid-December 2003.
+However, the data included in the summary was incomplete, and the summary did not
+contain any analysis of the effectiveness of these tips. Another study of the [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] tippers was conducted in 2006. The results of that study are discussed in Chapter Six
+of this report, along with the OIG's analysis of the effectiveness of the program.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
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+
+[REDACTED]
+
+¹⁸⁵ Goldsmith also noted that as of the March 14, 2004, meeting, the Attorney
+General had not yet reported to Congress on the program under 28 U.S.C. § 530D.
+However, as discussed above, the White House had briefed the congressional leadership
+about the program on March 10, 2004. In addition, the former Presiding Judge of the FISA
+Court, Royce Lamberth, and the current Presiding Judge, Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, had been
+read into the program by this time. (U)
+
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+[REDACTED]
+
+¹⁸⁶ [REDACTED]
+(Cont'd.)
+
+161
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+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+162
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+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Goldsmith told us that during his presentation of the legal analysis at
+the March 14 meeting he received "tough but fair and appropriate"
+questions from Mueller and Olson with respect to why the
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Goldsmith told us that the March 14 meeting was designed to achieve
+full consensus among the principals on the issues, and that the meeting
+was successful in this regard. (U)
+
+That evening, Mueller called Gonzales to report that progress had
+been made, although legal support for [REDACTED] still had
+not been found. Mueller also told Gonzales that in the future Gonzales
+should speak directly with Comey on these matters.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+6. Comey Determines that Ashcroft Remains “Absent or
+Disabled" (U)
+
+Attorney General Ashcroft was released from the hospital at noon on
+March 14, 2004. The next day, Comey advised Ayres by memorandum that
+Ashcroft's doctor believed that Ashcroft required additional time to
+recuperate at home and was not yet ready to resume his responsibilities as
+Attorney General. Comey's memorandum noted that the doctor intended to
+reassess Ashcroft's condition on March 24, 2004. Comey's memorandum
+stated that, based on these circumstances, Comey continued to believe that
+Ashcroft was "absent or disabled" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 508(a).
+Comey's memorandum concluded:
+
+As before, notwithstanding my continued temporary capacity as
+Acting Attorney General, I intend, where possible, to exercise
+"all the power and authority of the Attorney General" pursuant
+to the authority that 28 C.F.R. § 0.15(a) delegates to me in my
+regular capacity as Deputy Attorney General. (U)
+
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+A copy of the memorandum was sent to Gonzales at the White House and to
+senior Department officials.¹⁸⁹ (U)
+
+7. Judge Kollar-Kotelly Briefed on Lack of Attorney
+General Certification (U)
+
+As discussed earlier in this report, the extent to which OIPR could use
+Stellar Wind-derived information in FISA applications had been limited by
+Judge Kollar-Kotelly, the FISA Court's Presiding Judge. After her read-in to
+the program in May 2002, Judge Kollar-Kotelly had directed OIPR to
+continue, with some modifications, the "scrubbing" procedures for FISA
+applications in place at that time. [REDACTED]
+
+According to an OLC memorandum, on March 14, 2004, Judge
+Kollar-Kotelly was informed that the President had reauthorized the Stellar
+Wind program, but that the latest Authorization lacked the Attorney
+General's certification as to form and legality.¹⁹⁰ The memorandum
+indicated that as a result of Judge Kollar-Kotelly's uncertainty about the
+implications of this development, she intended to insist on a complete
+separation of any information derived from Stellar Wind, whether directly or
+indirectly, from all FISA applications presented to the FISA Court. The
+memorandum noted that "[b]ecause of the way tips get worked into (and lost
+in) the mix of intelligence information, that standard would have virtually
+crippled all counter-terrorism FISAs." [REDACTED]
+
+8. Comey and Gonzales Exchange Documents Asserting
+Conflicting Positions (U)
+
+According to Mueller's program log, on the morning of Monday,
+March 15, 2004, following the daily threat briefing in the White House
+Situation Room, President Bush remarked to Mueller that he understood
+"progress had been made," referring to the discussions on the legal basis for
+the Stellar Wind program. Mueller called Comey shortly thereafter to convey
+the President's remark. Mueller suggested to Comey that additional
+briefings on the program should be given to Congress, including to both the
+House and Senate Judiciary Committees. [REDACTED]
+
+Also on March 15, Goldsmith drafted for Comey a 3-page
+memorandum summarizing OLC's views with respect to the legality of the
+program. The memorandum recast in narrative form Goldsmith's outline of
+
+¹⁸⁹ As discussed below, Ashcroft's doctors later cleared Ashcroft to resume his
+duties as Attorney General as of March 31. (U)
+
+¹⁹⁰ The memorandum was prepared in anticipation of a briefing for the Attorney
+General on March 30, 2004. (U)
+
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+March 14, 2004 (discussed above), and noted that OLC had not reached any
+"final conclusions and [was] not yet prepared to issue a final opinion on the
+program." The memorandum also stated that the Stellar Wind program
+potentially implicated various congressional and intra-Executive Branch
+reporting requirements imposed both by statute and Executive Order. The
+memorandum stated that OLC was only beginning to analyze these
+reporting issues. [REDACTED]
+
+Goldsmith and Philbin went to see Gonzales on the afternoon of
+March 15 to explain what OLC had determined in its legal analysis to that
+point, and also to notify Gonzales that he would be hearing from Comey
+shortly about the Department's position as to the program's legality. (U)
+
+According to Philbin's contemporaneous notes on the events of the
+next two days, on March 16, 2004, following the morning threat briefing at
+the White House, Comey told President Bush that OLC had finished its
+preliminary legal analysis of the program.¹⁹¹ Comey asked the President if
+Comey should convey the details of the analysis to Gonzales, and the
+President indicated that Comey should do so. [REDACTED]
+
+After Comey returned to the Department, he signed a short
+memorandum to Gonzales that he had drafted the night before. In the
+memorandum, Comey first recounted how the President on March 12, 2004,
+had directed the Justice Department to continue its analysis of the Stellar
+Wind program and to "provide its best advice concerning ways to change the
+program to conform with the Justice Department's understanding of the
+applicable law." Comey then described the composition of the working
+group convened to accomplish this objective and how the group's efforts had
+resulted in Goldsmith's 3-page analysis, which Comey attached to his
+memorandum. [REDACTED]
+
+Comey then set out his advice to the President. According to the
+memorandum, Comey advised that the President may lawfully continue
+[REDACTED] Comey
+wrote that [REDACTED] involved "close legal questions, requiring
+legally aggressive - indeed, novel - supporting arguments...." Comey
+further wrote that the Department remained unable to find a legal basis to
+support [REDACTED] Accordingly, Comey advised that such
+[REDACTED]
+
+¹⁹¹ Philbin told the OIG he kept notes of these events because Comey had asked
+him to "keep a record." (U)
+
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+[REDACTED] Finally, Comey cautioned
+that he believed the ongoing collection of [REDACTED]
+raised "serious issues" about congressional notification, “particularly where
+the legal basis for the program is the President's decision to assert his
+authority to override an otherwise applicable Act of Congress." Comey wrote
+that the Department would continue to explore the notification issue.
+[REDACTED]
+
+Comey instructed Goldsmith and Philbin to hand deliver the
+memoranda to Gonzales at the White House, which they did. Philbin also
+delivered copies to Solicitor General Olson. Philbin's notes indicate that
+Olson was "annoyed" that Comey had sent the memoranda to the White
+House without consulting him, and asked Philbin several times, "What's my
+role supposed to be here?" Olson also said to Philbin that he thought the
+memoranda were a "poke in the eye" to the White House. Philbin wrote that
+Olson's reaction "raised concerns that [Comey] may have gotten himself too
+far out there alone" by not bringing Olson in on the Department's legal
+opinion in advance. (U)
+
+Comey told us that he knew his memorandum would anger people at
+the White House because he had put in writing the arguments questioning
+the legality of aspects of the program and that the memorandum and
+Goldsmith's attachment would become a part of the Presidential records
+and would be discovered later by historians. He stated he believed it was
+important to "make a record." (U)
+
+According to Mueller's program log, Gonzales called Mueller at 1:45
+p.m. on March 16 to discuss the situation. Gonzales explained to Mueller
+that, in view of the Department's tentative conclusion that legal support for
+[REDACTED] was still lacking, Gonzales would have to make a
+recommendation to the President on how to proceed. Gonzales told Mueller
+he needed to know whether Mueller would resign if the President decided
+[REDACTED] Mueller responded that he
+would have to take time to consider his actions, but that he "would have to
+give it serious consideration if the President decided to go ahead in the face
+of DOJ's finding." (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Later that afternoon on March 16, Card called Comey to the White
+House for a meeting. According to Philbin's notes, "the back channel word
+from Judge Gonzales" was that President Bush might be willing to
+[REDACTED] Prior to the meeting, Comey, Goldsmith, and Philbin
+agreed that Comey should be ready to convey to the White House that the
+Department would support [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+166
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+Philbin's notes indicate that at the meeting Card told Comey that the
+President was "wrestling" with the issue of whether to [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] and would decide "very soon." Card also expressed to
+Comey his displeasure that Comey had put in writing the Department's
+position on the legality of the program. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+That evening, while attending a farewell dinner for a Department
+colleague at a local restaurant, Philbin received a call from David Addington
+indicating that he wanted to deliver a letter Gonzales had written to Comey.
+Philbin met Addington at the Department at 8:30 p.m. that night to accept
+the letter. Philbin's notes also indicate that Gonzales had called Comey in
+advance to tell Comey "not to get too overheated by the letter." (U)
+
+Comey told us he recalled that Gonzales told him in the call that the
+White House would agree to work with the Department to fix the program
+and that Comey should not "overreact" to Gonzales's letter. Comey said he
+believed Addington, and not Gonzales, had actually drafted the letter, and
+that Gonzales sent it only to counter Comey's memorandum and to make a
+record on behalf of the White House. (U)
+
+Gonzales's letter stated that the President had directed him to
+respond to Comey's memorandum. The letter stated:
+
+Your memorandum appears to have been based on a
+misunderstanding of the President's expectations regarding the
+conduct of the Department of Justice. While the President was,
+and remains, interested in any thoughts the Department of
+Justice may have on alternative ways to achieve effectively the
+goals of the activities authorized by the Presidential
+Authorization of March 11, 2004, the President has addressed
+definitively for the Executive Branch in the Presidential
+Authorization the interpretation of the law.¹⁹²
+
+The letter also excerpted the language of paragraph 10 from the March 11,
+2004, Authorization, which recited the bases on which the President acted
+to reauthorize the program, and then concluded: "Please ensure that the
+
+¹⁹² Gonzales's letter also addressed Comey's comments about congressional
+notification. Citing Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988) and a 2003 OLC
+opinion, Gonzales's letter stated that the President has the constitutional authority to
+define and control access to the nation's secrets, "including authority to determine the
+extent to which disclosure may be made outside the Executive Branch."
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+167
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+Department of Justice complies with the direction given in the Presidential
+Authorization."¹⁹³ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+C. White House Agrees to [REDACTED]
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Notwithstanding Gonzales's letter, on March 17, 2004. the President
+decided to [REDACTED] effective at midnight on March 26, 2004.
+According to Mueller's program log, Gonzales called Comey to advise him of
+the President's decision on March 17, 2004, and Comey passed this
+information to Mueller later that day. Comey, in an e-mail dated March 17,
+expressed relief at the President's decision, writing:
+
+Today, in a remarkable development, we stepped back from the
+brink of disaster. All seems well in the Government. The right
+thing was done. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Gonzales told the OIG during his interview that he could not say
+whether the prospect of resignations at the Department and the FBI may
+have had an impact on the President's decision.¹⁹⁴ We were not able to
+interview others at the White House to determine what specifically caused
+the program to be modified in accord with the Department's legal position.
+(U)
+
+The President's directive was expressed in two modifications to the
+March 11, 2004, Presidential Authorization. These modifications, as well as
+the operational and legal implications of the President's decision for the
+Department and the FBI, are described in the next sections. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+1. March 19, 2004, Modification (U)
+
+On March 19, 2004, the President signed, and Gonzales certified as to
+form and legality, a Modification of the March 11, 2004, Presidential
+
+¹⁹³ Comey stated that he did not believe Gonzales wrote this letter. He stated that
+"Addington was the flame-thrower" and that Gonzales was generally more reasonable and
+moderate. Comey said that Gonzales had later apologized to both Comey and Ashcroft for
+his conduct during the March 10 incident at the hospital and had even come around to
+agree with Philbin and Goldsmith's analysis regarding the program. Gonzales told the OIG
+that he did not apologize to Ashcroft for the incident in the hospital because he had been
+instructed by the President to go there, but stated that he "regretted" the incident. (U)
+
+¹⁹⁴ However, when Gonzales commented on a draft of this report, he told the OIG
+that the prospect of resignations at the Department and the FBI were not the reason for the
+President's decision. Gonzales stated that he could not elaborate on this statement due to
+executive privilege considerations. (U)
+
+168
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+Authorization. The first paragraph of the Modification stated that [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The March 19 Modification made two significant changes to
+the existing Authorization and a third important change affecting all
+Authorizations. [REDACTED] these changes were to
+become effective beginning at midnight on [REDACTED]
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Modification, March 19, 2004, para. 2(a)(italics and brackets added). This
+additional language resulted in [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Second, the Modification [REDACTED] The language, with the deleted
+language in brackets and the insertion indicated in italics, was:
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+169
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+Modification, March 19, 2004 [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+Third, the March 19 Modification[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Modification, March 19, 2004 [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Each Presidential Authorization had contained a directive to the
+Secretary of Defense not to disclose the program outside the Executive
+Branch without the President's approval. The Modification reiterated that
+any change was not intended to reverse the President's control over access
+to the program. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+¹⁹⁵ The ultimate disposition of this previously obtained [REDACTED] was
+subsequently addressed in an April 2, 2004, Modification, and thereafter in an August
+2004 Presidential memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, as described below in
+subsection 6. [REDACTED]
+
+170
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]¹⁹⁶ The President's
+decision to [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+¹⁹⁶ Bradbury was nominated to be Assistant Attorney General for OLC in June
+2005. He was not confirmed for this position, and told us that after exhausting the time
+period for use of the "Acting" title under the Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 (see 5 U.S.C.
+§ 3345 et seq.) in April 2007, he reverted to Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
+the position he had held prior to his nomination. As head of OLC, Bradbury became
+responsible for briefing members of Congress on OLC's legal analyses concerning the
+program as well as on the Presidential Authorizations. Bradbury's access to these
+documents and the officials responsible for drafting them provided him significant
+background information on the changes to the program. (U)
+
+¹⁹⁷ [REDACTED]
+
+171
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+2. [REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+172
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+3. [REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+¹⁹⁸ [REDACTED]
+¹⁹⁹ [REDACTED]
+²⁰⁰ [REDACTED]
+(Cont'd.)
+
+173
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+²⁰¹ [REDACTED]
+
+174
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+4. [REDACTED]
+
+5. Judge Kollar-Kotelly is Presented with the OLC Legal
+Analysis Regarding [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+As noted above, Judge Kollar-Kotelly was made aware on March 14,
+2004, that the March 11 Authorization had been signed by the President
+
+175
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+but had not been certified as to form and legality by the Justice
+Department. On March 18, 2004, Goldsmith, Philbin, Baker, and Gonzales
+met with Judge Kollar-Kotelly to further brief her on the status of the
+program. According to an internal OLC memorandum, they advised her
+that forthcoming legal opinions from OLC would allay her concerns about
+the use of program-derived information in FISA applications.²⁰²
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The OIG reviewed a handwritten letter from Judge Kollar-Kotelly to
+OIPR Counsel Baker, which appeared to have been written just after the
+initiation of [REDACTED] mandated in the March 19, 2004,
+Modification. Baker told us that the handwritten letter should be viewed as
+an informal draft designed to convey Judge Kollar-Kotelly's preliminary
+understanding of the issues raised by the changes to the Stellar Wind
+program. In the letter, Judge Kollar-Kotelly reiterated her position that
+Stellar Wind-derived information should be excluded from FISA
+applications, writing, "so there is no misunderstanding, I will not sign a
+FISA application which contains any information derived from and/or
+obtained from the [Stellar Wind] program," including applications in which a
+Stellar Wind tip "was the sole or principal factor in starting an investigation
+by any of the agencies, even if the investigation was conducted
+independently of the tip from [Stellar Wind]." Judge Kollar-Kotelly also
+requested, as a precondition to her agreeing to sign FISA applications in the
+future, that OIPR clarify in writing its proposal for reviewing FISA
+applications to ensure that all Stellar Wind-derived information had been
+excluded. Baker told us that he had a lot of "verbal back and forth" with
+Judge Kollar-Kotelly to explain OIPR's scrubbing procedures.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+In late March 2004. OLC provided Judge Kollar-Kotelly with a draft
+analysis discussing [REDACTED]
+
+²⁰² As described below these legal opinions, which addressed the legality of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] were provided to Judge Kollar-Kotelly in late March and
+early April 2004. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+²⁰³ Chapter Three, Section II B contains a description of this process. (U)
+
+176
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+On March 26, 2004, OLC completed a draft memorandum for Baker
+entitled "Use or Disclosure of Certain Stellar Wind Information in
+Applications Under FISA." This memorandum addressed the inclusion in
+FISA applications of information derived indirectly from [REDACTED].²⁰⁵
+OLC also provided Judge Kollar-Kotelly with a copy of its draft legal
+analysis.²⁰⁶ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+²⁰⁴ This argument is discussed below in connection with Goldsmith's May 6, 2004,
+legal analysis. (U)
+
+²⁰⁵ With respect to [REDACTED] the memorandum stated that the
+Department did not believe the acquisition of such information was subject to any
+constitutional restraints or statutory restrictions, but that "[t]o the extent Judge
+Kollar-Kotelly has concerns about those conclusions, we note that the analysis in this
+memorandum independently demonstrates that there are no legal restrictions on the use of
+information indirectly derived from [REDACTED] tippers in FISA applications."
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+²⁰⁶ The draft memorandum did not address inclusion in FISA applications of
+information derived directly from the program because OIPR had successfully managed to
+address Judge Kollar-Kotelly's order to exclude such information.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+177
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+6. [REDACTED] Modification (U)
+
+Attorney General Ashcroft's doctors cleared him to resume his duties
+as Attorney General as of March 31. Comey advised Ayres in a March 30,
+2004, memorandum that as of 7:00 a.m. on March 31, the Attorney General
+was no longer "absent or disabled" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 508(a),
+and that as of that time Comey could no longer exercise the duties of the
+Office of Attorney General pursuant to the statute. A copy of the
+memorandum was sent to White House Counsel Gonzales and other senior
+Department officials. (U)
+
+On [REDACTED] President Bush signed, and Gonzales certified as to
+form and legality, a second Modification of the March 11, 2004, Presidential
+Authorization. This modification addressed only [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] activities of the Stellar Wind program. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Thus, under this new standard [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+178
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+²⁰⁷ An April 5, 2004, Goldsmith memorandum to file stated that OLC worked with
+Addington to craft the new [REDACTED] standard.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+²⁰⁸ Bradbury distinguished the limitation on [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+179
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+7. [REDACTED] Standard is Conveyed to
+the FBI (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The OIG sought to determine how the presidentially authorized
+limitations on [REDACTED] in the Modifications
+and subsequent Authorizations were communicated to FBI employees
+responsible for tipping Stellar Wind information to the field.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+A former Unit Chief in the Communications Analysis Unit (CAU)
+within the FBI's Communications Exploitation Section (CXS) of the
+Counterterrorism Division told us he became aware that at some point the
+scope of collection under Stellar Wind was narrowed to include only [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] He said this information was passed along to him
+and others at the FBI during either a monthly or quarterly meeting with
+NSA representatives. He said the [REDACTED] practice was "taken
+very seriously" by the NSA. As an example, he said that Requests for
+Information (RFI) from the FBI to the NSA on numbers not associated with
+[REDACTED] were rejected by the NSA as outside the scope of the
+revised Authorization. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+An FBI Supervisory Special Agent in the CAU's unit co-located at the
+NSA (called Team 10), told us that when he first began collection and
+analysis work under the program, [REDACTED] were
+"fair game." He recalled that at some later point the scope of collection [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] He said that [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] was rigorously adhered to and was "scrutinized very
+closely." He said that when the FBI requested that the NSA collect
+information on a particular number, the NSA closely analyzed the number
+and requested supporting information from the FBI before querying the
+Stellar Wind database. This supervisor also stated that the NSA did a good
+job of keeping the co-located FBI personnel informed of changes to the scope
+of collections. He said this information typically would be conveyed to
+appropriate personnel during the daily "all hands meetings."
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+8. Office of Legal Counsel Assesses NSA's Compliance
+with New Collection Standards (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Goldsmith told us that during the week of March 29, 2004, he and
+Philbin conducted an "audit" of the Stellar Wind program to ensure that the
+querying of [REDACTED] was being conducted in accordance with
+the Presidential Authorizations. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+180
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+Goldsmith said that while resources were not available to conduct a
+"professional" audit, he visited the NSA and reviewed with relevant NSA
+officials the legal parameters for querying [REDACTED]
+which as discussed above required a showing of reasonable articulable
+suspicion that the target belonged to a group that was engaged in
+international terrorism.²⁰⁹ Goldsmith told the OIG that as part of the
+review, he and Philbin familiarized the NSA with the new collection
+parameters [REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+To conduct their review, Goldsmith and Philbin requested that the
+NSA [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+On April 15, 2004, Goldsmith reported the results of his and Philbin's
+review to [REDACTED] the Assistant General Counsel for Operations in the
+NSA's Office of General Counsel. On April 22, 2004, Goldsmith
+memorialized his conversation with [REDACTED] in a memorandum to file. In the
+memorandum, Goldsmith noted four types of problems he and Philbin
+found in their review. [REDACTED]
+The memorandum stated that [REDACTED]
+Goldsmith also conveyed this advice to Vito Potenza, the NSA's Acting
+General Counsel at the time. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+9. May 5, 2004, Presidential Authorization (TS//SI//NF)
+
+As noted above, the March 11, 2004, Presidential Authorization, as
+modified, was set to expire on May 6, 2004. On May 5, the President signed
+another Authorization extending the Stellar Wind program through June 24,
+2004. Unlike the March 11 Authorization and the two modifications that
+
+²⁰⁹ [REDACTED]
+
+181
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+followed it, the May 5 Authorization was certified as to form and legality by
+Attorney General Ashcroft. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The May 5, Authorization contained the language from the March 11
+Authorization narrowing the scope of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The May 5 Authorization also
+included the paragraph defining the scope of [REDACTED] as
+modified on March 19 to encompass only [REDACTED]
+As to [REDACTED] the May 5 Authorization
+reiterated the new collection standard set forth in the April 2, 2004,
+Modification, which required that [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+With minor variations, the collection standards and other language
+set forth in the May 5, 2004, Presidential Authorization remained
+unchanged in all of the subsequent Authorizations.²¹¹
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+10. May 6, 2004, OLC Memorandum (TS//SI//NF)
+
+On May 6, 2004, Goldsmith completed a revised OLC memorandum
+on the legality of the Stellar Wind program. The 108-page document stated
+that it was written for the Attorney General in response to his request for
+OLC "to undertake a thorough reexamination of the Stellar Wind program
+as it is currently operated to confirm that the actions that the President has
+directed the Department of Defense to undertake through the National
+Security Agency (NSA) are lawful." (TS//SI//NF) —
+
+The memorandum traced the history of the program and analyzed the
+legality of each of the three collection baskets in light of applicable statutes,
+Executive Orders, cases, and constitutional provisions.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+²¹⁰ This Authorization also dropped the language describing [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] in the March 11,
+2004, Authorization. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+²¹¹ [REDACTED]
+
+182
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+The memorandum noted that Section 111 of FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1811,
+providing that the President "may authorize electronic surveillance without
+a court order . . . to acquire foreign intelligence information for a period not
+to exceed fifteen calendar days following a declaration of war by Congress,"
+made it clear that FISA expressly addresses electronic surveillance during
+wartime.²¹² The memorandum stated that the Authorization for Use of
+Military Force (AUMF) passed by Congress shortly after the attacks of
+September 11, 2001, gave the President authority to use both domestically
+and abroad "all necessary and appropriate force," including signals
+intelligence capabilities, to prevent future acts of international terrorism
+against the United States. According to the memorandum, the AUMF was
+properly read as an express authorization to conduct targeted electronic
+surveillance against al Qaeda and its affiliates, the entities responsible for
+attacking the United States. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The memorandum noted that the legislative history of FISA indicates
+that the 15-day window was "thought sufficient for the President to secure
+legislation easing the restrictions of FISA for the conflict at hand." Quoting
+H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1720, at 34, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 4048, 4063
+("[T]he conferees intend that this period will allow time for consideration of
+any amendment to this act that may be appropriate during a wartime
+emergency"). According to the OLC memorandum, "The Congressional
+Authorization functions as precisely such legislation: it is emergency
+legislation passed to address a specific armed conflict and expressly
+designed to authorize whatever military actions the Executive deems
+appropriate to safeguard the United States." (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The memorandum concluded that at a minimum the AUMF made the
+application of FISA in a wartime context sufficiently ambiguous that the
+doctrine of constitutional avoidance properly applied to avoid a conflict
+between FISA and the presidentially authorized Stellar Wind program.
+Alternatively, the memorandum argued FISA, as applied in the
+particular circumstances of a President directing surveillance of the enemy
+to prevent future attacks upon the nation, represented an unconstitutional
+infringement on the President's Article II Commander-in-Chief powers.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+These two arguments also were cited in support of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+²¹² As discussed in section I of this chapter, the legal implications of this provision
+of FISA was not addressed in the memoranda John Yoo had drafted in support of the
+program in late 2001. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+183
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+The memorandum also analyzed the legal rationale for [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+²¹³ [REDACTED]
+
+184
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Finally, the memorandum discussed the Fourth Amendment
+implications of the Stellar Wind program. To determine whether
+interception of [REDACTED] violated the Fourth
+Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches, the memorandum
+analyzed whether the importance of the government's interest in this
+collection outweighed the individual privacy interests at stake. Citing
+various authorities, including Supreme Court opinions, the Federalist
+Papers, [REDACTED] and congressional testimony, the memorandum
+concluded that "the government's overwhelming interest in detecting and
+thwarting further al Qaeda attacks is easily sufficient to make reasonable
+the intrusion into privacy involved in intercepting selected
+communications." The memorandum noted that the weight of the
+
+²¹⁴ [REDACTED]
+²¹⁵ [REDACTED]
+
+185
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+government's interest in this regard could change over time if the threat
+from al Qaeda were deemed to recede. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The memorandum also analyzed telephone and e-mail meta data
+collection under the Fourth Amendment. The memorandum concluded,
+based on the Supreme Court's holding in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
+742 (1979), that there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in the numbers
+dialed to place telephone calls. Referring to cases holding that no
+expectation of privacy attached to the address information on either letter
+mail or e-mail, the memorandum concluded that no Fourth Amendment
+privacy interests were implicated in the collection of e-mail meta data.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+In sum, the May 6 memorandum was the most comprehensive
+assessment of the Stellar Wind program drafted by the Office of Legal
+Counsel. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+III. OIG Analysis (U)
+
+A. Department's Access to and Legal Review of Stellar Wind
+Program Through May 2004 (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The Justice Department's access to the Stellar Wind program was
+controlled by the White House, and Gonzales told the OIG that the President
+decided whether non-operational personnel, including Department lawyers,
+could be read into the program. Department and FBI officials told us that
+obtaining approval to read in Department officials and FISA Court judges
+involved justifying the requests to Addington and Gonzales, who effectively
+acted as gatekeepers to the read-in process for non-operational officials. In
+contrast, according to the NSA, operational personnel at the NSA, CIA, and
+the FBI were read into the program on the authority of the NSA Director,
+who at some point delegated this authority to the Stellar Wind Program
+Manager. (TS//SI//NF)
+
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+
+Various officials we interviewed about the issue uniformly agreed that
+the White House sought to strictly limit overall access to the Stellar Wind
+program. We believe that this policy was applied at the Department in an
+unnecessarily restrictive manner prior to March 2004, and was detrimental
+to the Department's role in the operation of the program through that
+period. We also believe that Attorney General Ashcroft, as head of the
+Department, was responsible for seeking to ensure that the Department had
+adequate attorney resources to conduct a thorough and accurate review of
+the legality of the program. Because Ashcroft did not agree to be
+interviewed for this investigation, we were unable to determine the extent of
+his efforts to press the White House to read in additional Department
+officials between the program's inception in October 2001 and the critical
+events of March 2004. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+In Chapter Three we described how the Department's early
+involvement in the Stellar Wind program was limited to the participation of
+only three attorneys – Attorney General Ashcroft, OLC Deputy Assistant
+Attorney General John Yoo, and Counsel for Intelligence Policy James
+Baker.²¹⁶ Working alone, Yoo drafted several legal memoranda in 2001 and
+2002 advising the Attorney General and the White House that the program
+was legally supported. In reliance on Yoo's advice, Attorney General
+Ashcroft certified the legality of the Presidential Authorizations to implement
+the program. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Because Yoo worked alone, his legal analysis was not reviewed by
+other attorneys, either in OLC or elsewhere in the Department.²¹⁷ Even
+
+²¹⁶ Counsel for Intelligence Policy James Baker was read into the program in either
+late 2001 or January 2002. But Baker appears to have been read in only because he
+inadvertently came across information that suggested such a program existed. While Baker
+had involvement in several aspects of the program, he had no involvement in drafting or
+reviewing Yoo's legal memoranda supporting the program. Daniel Levin, who served as
+both Chief of Staff to FBI Director Mueller and briefly as a national security counselor to
+Ashcroft, also was read into Stellar Wind at the inception of the program. However, Levin
+only served for two months at the Department during this early phase of Stellar Wind and
+had very limited involvement in the program during this period. Levin told us he was read
+into Stellar Wind along with Director Mueller at the FBI and that he understood that he
+was being cleared into the program as an FBI official. We therefore consider Levin to be an
+FBI read-in, not a Department read-in. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+²¹⁷ Gonzales told us that he thought Yoo may have assigned discrete tasks to other
+attorneys in connection with his work on the Stellar Wind legal memoranda. Because Yoo
+declined our request for an interview, we were unable to confirm this. In any event, no
+other attorneys were read into Stellar Wind and therefore would not have been permitted to
+work on or review those portions of the memoranda that contained Top Secret/Sensitive
+Compartmented Information (TS/SCI) related to the Stellar Wind program. By contrast,
+Yoo had at least one other OLC attorney to assist him in drafting other OLC legal
+memoranda on the detainee interrogation program during the 2001 to 2003 period, and
+these memoranda were reviewed by another OLC Deputy Assistant Attorney General
+
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+
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+
+when Jay Bybee became the OLC Assistant Attorney General in November
+2001, and was therefore Yoo's supervisor, Bybee was not read into the
+program.²¹⁸ Bybee told us he also was unaware that Yoo was providing
+advice to the Attorney General and the White House on the legal basis to
+support the program. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+We believe that even before Patrick Philbin voiced his initial concerns
+with Yoo's analysis in 2003, the circumstances in 2001 and 2002 plainly
+called for additional Department resources to be applied to the legal review
+of the program and that it was the Attorney General's responsibility to be
+aware of this need and to take steps to address it. Moreover, because
+Ashcroft met frequently with the President on national security matters, he
+would have been well-positioned to request additional legal resources if he
+believed they were necessary. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The facts suggest that Ashcroft had some awareness and concern that
+Yoo was working on the legal justification for the Stellar Wind program
+without any Department assistance or oversight, and possibly was advising
+the White House directly of his findings. Based on accounts of the incident
+in Ashcroft's hospital room in March 2004, Ashcroft made specific
+complaints to Gonzales and Card about insufficient legal resources at the
+Department and that the Department had been “cut out of the whole affair.”
+He had also expressed frustration to Comey months earlier about being “in
+a box” with Yoo. Further, according to Goldsmith, when Goldsmith first
+interviewed for the position of Assistant Attorney General for OLC in 2003,
+Ashcroft and his Chief of Staff alluded to concerns over being kept informed
+of matters the Office of Legal Counsel was working on and the importance of
+keeping the Attorney General “in the loop.” We also note that Yoo's
+November 2, 2001, memorandum to Ashcroft indicated that “[b]ecause of
+the highly sensitive nature of this subject and the time pressures involved,
+this memorandum has not undergone the usual editing and review process
+for opinions that issue from our Office [OLC].” (TS//SI//NF)
+
+While we believe that Ashcroft may have been aware that Yoo was
+working alone on the Stellar Wind analysis and had concerns about this, we
+do not know whether or how hard he pressed the White House to read in
+additional attorneys to assist or supervise Yoo. At the same time, however,
+
+(Philbin) and approved by the OLC Assistant Attorney General (Bybee). The detainee
+interrogation program also was classified as TS/SCI. We also note that Philbin's
+background in telecommunications law would have made him a logical choice to assist Yoo
+on the Stellar Wind legal analysis. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+²¹⁸ In contrast, Bybee was allowed to supervise Yoo's work drafting legal
+memoranda concerning a detainee interrogation program during the same time period.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
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+
+we cannot assume that any requests by Ashcroft for additional attorney
+read-ins would have been granted by the White House. Gonzales told us
+that Ashcroft had requested that Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson
+and Ashcroft's Chief of Staff David Ayres be read in. However, neither
+request was approved.²¹⁹ Gonzales stated that he did not recall Ashcroft
+requesting additional read-ins beyond Thompson and Ayres. (U)
+
+In analyzing the read-in situation at the Department during Yoo's
+tenure, we also considered that Ashcroft certified the program as to its
+legality each time the program came up for renewal, and did so at a time
+when Yoo's legal advice was the only Department guidance available
+concerning the program's legality. We believe the fact that only three
+Department attorneys were read into Stellar Wind through mid-2003 may
+have been due at least in part to Ashcroft's routine recertifications of the
+Presidential Authorizations during this period. As noted in Chapter Three,
+Gonzales told us that it was up to the Attorney General to decide how to
+satisfy his legal obligations as Attorney General, and that if Ashcroft
+believed more attorneys were needed for this purpose, he could have asked
+the President to approve additional Department read-ins. Gonzales also told
+us that Ashcroft's continued certifications of the Presidential Authorizations
+supported Gonzales's belief that Ashcroft was satisfied with the quality of
+the legal advice he was receiving at the time within the Department.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+There is evidence as well that Gonzales, as White House Counsel, was
+satisfied with Yoo's legal memoranda supporting the program. Gonzales
+told us that although he did not believe Yoo's first two memoranda fully
+addressed the White House's understanding of the Stellar Wind program,
+Gonzales believed that they described as lawful activities that were broader
+than those carried out under Stellar Wind, and that Yoo's memoranda
+therefore “covered” the program.²²⁰ (TS//SI//NF)
+
+²¹⁹ Deputy Attorney General Thompson resigned from the Department in August
+2003, so Ashcroft's request to have him read into the program would have been made
+before that time. That neither Thompson nor Ayres was read in contrasts with the decision
+to allow in the case of [REDACTED] to be
+briefed about the program in 2002, and [REDACTED] to be read into the program in 2003. The OIG does not know who
+authorized these read-ins. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+²²⁰ We were troubled by Gonzales's suggestion that Yoo's memoranda covered the
+program because the memoranda determined to be lawful a range of “hypothetical”
+activities that were interpreted by Gonzales to be broader than those actually carried out
+under Stellar Wind. Such an approach, if deemed acceptable by the “client” (in this case
+the White House), would encourage the Office of Legal Counsel to draft broad and imprecise
+(Cont'd.)
+
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+
+However, even apart from the limited number of Department read-ins,
+we believe that the White House imposed excessively strict controls over
+access to the program in other ways that were detrimental to the
+Department's ability to provide the White House with the soundest possible
+legal advice. For instance, we found no indication that Yoo coordinated his
+legal analysis with the NSA. According to Michael Hayden, the Director of
+the NSA when Stellar Wind began, the NSA relied on its Office of General
+Counsel, and not the Department of Justice, for advice as to the legality of
+the program when it was created. However, we found that the NSA's Office
+of General Counsel did not coordinate its legal advice with the Department,
+and even as late as 2003 the NSA General Counsel was prevented by the
+White House from reviewing the Department's legal opinions on the
+program.²²¹ Hayden also told the OIG that he was “surprised with a small
+'s” that the Department did not participate in the early meetings with him
+and White House officials when Stellar Wind was first conceived. In
+addition, Addington instructed Philbin not to discuss the program with
+Baker, who as Counsel for Intelligence Policy was responsible for
+representing the government before the FISA Court.²²² (TS//SI//NF)
+
+We believe that that White House should have allowed and even
+encouraged coordination between the Department and the NSA regarding
+the development of the legal analysis of the program, especially as this
+analysis was first being formulated in late 2001. Such interaction between
+the Department and other Executive agencies is a mainstay of traditional
+OLC practice, and we believe its absence here contributed to factual errors
+in Yoo's opinions regarding the operation of the program. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Although we could not determine exactly why Yoo remained the only
+Department attorney assigned to assess the program's legality from 2001
+until his departure in May 2003, we discuss below our belief that this
+practice represented an extraordinary and inappropriate departure from
+OLC's traditional review and oversight procedures and resulted in
+significant harm to the Department's role in the program. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+When Yoo left the Department in May 2003, he was replaced by
+Patrick Philbin, who was read into the program to advise Ashcroft whether
+he could continue to certify the Presidential Authorizations as to their form
+
+legal analysis and would discourage the type of careful scholarship to which the OLC
+traditionally aspires. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+²²¹ In addition, the NSA Office of the Inspector General, which wanted to conduct
+an internal audit of the program during this period, was prevented by Addington from
+reviewing the Justice Department's legal memoranda supporting the program. (U//FOUO)
+
+²²² Philbin told the OIG that he spoke with Baker about the program despite
+Addington's instruction not to. (U)
+
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+
+and legality. When Goldsmith became the OLC Assistant Attorney General
+in October 2003, Philbin pressed Addington to have Goldsmith read in, and
+Goldsmith became the first head of OLC to be read into the program. As
+noted, Goldsmith's predecessor Jay Bybee was never read into the program.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+Thus, by the end of 2003, a total of only 5 Department officials – Yoo,
+Ashcroft, Baker, Philbin, and Goldsmith – had been read into Stellar Wind.
+By comparison, and as shown in Chart 4.1 below, we determined that many
+other individuals throughout the government were read into the program.
+Through the same period, [REDACTED]
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+The assignment of only one Department attorney, John Yoo, to
+conduct a legal review of the program without assistance or oversight from
+anyone else at the Department, combined with the White House's decision
+to prevent the NSA from reviewing Yoo's work, resulted in legal opinions by
+Yoo that were later determined by OLC to be so inaccurate and incomplete
+
+²²³ This table was derived from NSA read-in information. Justice Department
+read-ins include [REDACTED] OIG personnel who were read into Stellar Wind in 2006. (U//FOUO)
+
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+
+as to be regarded as not covering key aspects of the Stellar Wind program.
+Given the enormously complex nature of the program from both a technical
+and legal perspective, coupled with the fact that he was working alone, it
+was not altogether surprising that Yoo's analysis contained inaccuracies
+and omitted critical elements, particularly given the pressure to generate a
+legal analysis within weeks of the program's implementation. However,
+Yoo's analysis did not change or include a more accurate description of the
+program's operation over the course of his 20-month tenure with the OLC.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+After reviewing Yoo's legal opinions on the program, Goldsmith and
+Philbin quickly discovered what they characterized as serious flaws in Yoo's
+legal analysis. These flaws included Yoo's failure to describe [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] being conducted by the NSA under
+the Stellar Wind program and his failure to assess the legality of this and
+other activities as they were carried out by the NSA.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Specifically, both Goldsmith and Philbin stated that Yoo
+mischaracterized in his memoranda the nature and scope of the NSA's
+[REDACTED]. They stated that Yoo's
+characterization of this activity in his 2001 and 2002 legal memoranda was
+factually flawed and that Yoo appears to have based his legal analysis of
+this aspect of the program on an incomplete and inaccurate description
+both of [REDACTED] and the
+[REDACTED].²²⁴ Both Goldsmith and
+Philbin also acknowledged that they initially incorrectly believed the NSA's
+[REDACTED] was broader than it in fact was under the
+program. However, unlike Yoo, Goldsmith and Philbin accurately
+
+²²⁴ [REDACTED]
+
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+
+characterized the collection [REDACTED] and thus their legal advice was based
+on facts that more closely reflected the actual operation of the program.²²⁵
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+In addition, Goldsmith and Philbin discovered that Yoo's assertion
+that the President had broad authority to conduct electronic surveillance
+without a warrant pursuant to his Commander-in-Chief powers under
+Article II of the Constitution, particularly during wartime, never addressed
+the FISA provision that expressly addressed electronic surveillance following
+a formal declaration of war. See 50 U.S.C. § 1811. Goldsmith also criticized
+Yoo's legal memoranda for failing to support Yoo's aggressive Article II
+Commander-in-Chief theory with a fully developed separation of powers
+analysis, and instead offering only sweeping conclusions. As an example,
+Goldsmith cited Yoo's assertion that reading FISA to be the “exclusive
+statutory means for conducting electronic surveillance for foreign
+intelligence” amounts to an “unconstitutional infringement on the
+President's Article II authorities.”²²⁶ Moreover, noted Goldsmith, Yoo
+omitted from his separation-of-powers discussion any analysis of how the
+Youngstown Steel Seizure Case, a seminal Supreme Court decision on the
+distribution of governmental powers between the Executive and Legislative
+Branches during wartime, would affect the legality of the President's actions
+with respect to Stellar Wind.²²⁷ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+In reliance on Yoo's advice, the Attorney General certified the program
+“as to form and legality” some 20 times before Yoo's analysis was
+determined to be flawed by his successors in OLC and by attorneys in the
+Office of the Deputy Attorney General. We agree with many of the criticisms
+offered by Department officials regarding the practice of allowing a single
+Department attorney to develop the legal justification for the program
+
+²²⁵ [REDACTED]
+
+²²⁶ See Yoo Memorandum, November 2, 2001, at 9. Yoo went on to state that [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Yoo
+concluded that FISA “represents a statutory procedure that creates a safe harbor for
+surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes." Id. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+²²⁷ The Department's Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) intends to review
+whether Yoo's legal analysis concerning the Stellar Wind program violated any standards of
+professional conduct. OPR has similarly reviewed whether the legal analysis by Yoo and
+others concerning the detainee interrogation program violated standards of professional
+conduct. (TS//SI//NF)
+
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+
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+
+during its early stage of operation. We summarize these criticisms below.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+Goldsmith described as "crazy" and "outrageous" the assignment of
+an OLC Deputy Assistant Attorney General to provide legal advice to the
+White House without the knowledge or concurrence of the Senate-confirmed
+Assistant Attorney General for OLC, who is accountable for the legal
+positions taken by the office. (U)
+
+Goldsmith said that not a single critical eye reviewed Yoo's work on a
+program that Goldsmith described as "flying in the face" of the conventional
+understanding of the law at the time. Goldsmith noted that Yoo's legal
+memoranda did not include facts about how the Stellar Wind program
+operated in practice, and he surmised that Yoo instead might have "keyed
+off" the Presidential Authorizations rather than NSA's actual collection
+practices in developing his analysis. Goldsmith also said it was "insane"
+that Yoo's memoranda were not shared with the NSA. Goldsmith said that
+had the NSA reviewed these memoranda Yoo's failure to accurately describe
+the nature and scope of the collection by the NSA and the resulting
+"mismatch" between the actual practice and the wording of the Presidential
+Authorizations might have been detected earlier. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Similarly, Daniel Levin, who was one of the first FBI officials to be
+read into Stellar Wind and who would later become Acting Assistant
+Attorney General for OLC upon Goldsmith's departure in June 2004,
+criticized allowing a single attorney to be the sole voice of the OLC
+concerning a program such as Stellar Wind. Levin stated that OLC has a
+special role at the Department and within the government, especially with
+"highly secret programs where opinions may never see the light of day."
+Under such circumstances, according to Levin, it is very difficult not to say
+"yes" to the White House - OLC's client – in the face of national security
+threats. Levin stated that unlike situations where a court places limitations
+on the positions the government may take, there are no such limitations
+when OLC considers a position that will remain secret, and it is easier to be
+more aggressive and "cut some corners" under such circumstances.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Levin stated that Yoo's memoranda justifying the program suffered
+from too little circulation and a lack of alternative views. He said that the
+OLC memoranda produced under Goldsmith's tenure were better, not
+because the authors were "smarter" than Yoo, but because the authors
+benefited from multiple viewpoints and input. Levin also said that he never
+understood why the Stellar Wind program was deemed so sensitive at the
+operational level. Levin said he appreciated that the program was politically
+sensitive, but added that it was a "huge mistake" to keep the program so
+closely held within the Department. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
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+
+We believe that Goldsmith's and Levin's comments concerning the
+secrecy of Stellar Wind are especially relevant to the need for legally and
+factually sound OLC analysis with respect to classified national security
+programs. Because programs like Stellar Wind are not subject to the usual
+external checks and balances on Executive authority, OLC's advisory role is
+particularly critical to the Executive's understanding of potential statutory
+and Constitutional constraints on its actions. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Deputy Attorney General Comey also criticized the decision to allow a
+single person to assess the legality of the program on behalf of the
+Department. Comey told us that Goldsmith had once aptly described the
+Yoo situation to him as "the perfect storm" in which the following factors
+converged: the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; a "brilliant guy" at
+the Department who was "an aggressive advocate for executive power"; and
+a White House "determined to restore executive power." Comey expressed a
+degree of sympathy for Yoo, noting the extraordinary situation into which
+Yoo had been placed. Comey also observed that the response to
+September 11 essentially placed the policy burden on lawyers, who were
+now looked to by others for guidance as to what counterterrorism activities
+fell within the bounds of the law. However, Comey said that he believed
+White House officials "got what they ordered" by asking Yoo for opinions and
+restricting the number of persons with access to the program or the
+opinions.²²⁸ (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Attorney General Ashcroft declined to be interviewed in our review,
+and we were thus unable to determine what his views were on the
+assignment of Yoo alone to conduct the legal review of the program.
+However, as noted above, witness accounts of his statements concerning the
+Yoo situation leave little doubt that Ashcroft was plainly upset with the
+White House for putting him "in a box" with Yoo. According to Goldsmith
+and Philbin, Ashcroft was direct about his grievances when Gonzales and
+Card came to see him in the hospital on March 10, 2004, including
+complaining that Ashcroft's Chief of Staff and until recently the Deputy
+Attorney General had not been allowed to be read into the program, and
+that he found it "very troubling that [REDACTED] people in other agencies"
+had been read into the program. What remains unclear is whether Ashcroft
+came to the realization that the Department had been given an insufficient
+number of read-ins only after Philbin and Goldsmith presented him with
+their concerns about the quality of Yoo's legal analysis, or at some point
+before. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+²²⁸ As noted in Chapter Three, Yoo had been given the national security portfolio
+when he first joined the OLC in July 2001, several months before the attacks of
+September 11, 2001, and the inception of Stellar Wind. (U//FOUO)
+
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+
+We sought to obtain Yoo's and the White House's perspective on his
+selection as the sole Justice Department attorney to be read into Stellar
+Wind to provide advice on the legality of the program. We were not able to
+interview Yoo, who declined our request, or Addington and Card, who did
+not respond to our requests. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The OIG asked Gonzales about how the White House determined who
+in the Department could be read into the program, but on the advice of
+Special Counsel to the President, Gonzales limited his answer to his
+personal views and declined to discuss internal White House deliberations
+that may have factored into the read-in decisions. Gonzales stated that he
+believed it was necessary for national security reasons to limit the number
+of read-ins to those "who were absolutely essential." Gonzales also stated
+there had to be sufficient operational personnel at the NSA, CIA, and
+FBI read in for the purpose of running the program, while reading in
+additional lawyers at the Department had comparatively less value because
+all lawyers will "have opinions" about the program. Yet, Gonzales also
+stressed to us that he welcomed the Department's reassessment of Yoo's
+opinions and encouraged Goldsmith and Philbin to re-examine the legal
+basis for the program in 2003 and 2004.²²⁹ (TS//SI//NF)
+
+We think the proposition that the participation of Department
+attorneys to analyze the legality of a program as factually and legally
+complex as Stellar Wind should be limited for the reasons offered by
+Gonzales is shortsighted and counterproductive. First, it is evident that
+Stellar Wind was as legally complex as it was technically challenging. Just
+as a sufficient number of operational personnel were read into the program
+to assure its proper technical implementation, we think as many attorneys
+as necessary should have been read in to assure the soundness of the
+program's legal foundation. This was not done during the early phase of the
+program. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The full history of the program also indicates that the program
+benefited from additional attorney read-ins. In this chapter, we described
+how Philbin and Goldsmith - who held differing opinions on which legal
+theory best supported the program - discovered serious deficiencies in Yoo's
+analysis and together drafted more factually accurate and legally thorough
+support for the program. In Chapters Five, Six, and Seven we further
+describe how reading in additional attorneys facilitated the grounding of the
+program on firmer legal footing under FISA, allowed the Department more
+efficiently to "scrub” Stellar Wind-derived information in FISA applications,
+
+²²⁹ As discussed in this chapter, Comey, Goldsmith, and Philbin generally agreed
+that Gonzales supported the Department's legal reassessment of the program. They also
+characterized Addington as far less supportive of their work than Gonzales. (TS//SI//NF)
+
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+
+and improved the handling of Stellar Wind-related discovery issues in
+international terrorism prosecutions. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Second, we do not believe that reading in a few additional Department
+attorneys during the first 2 years of the program would have jeopardized
+national security as suggested by Gonzales, especially given the hundreds of
+operational personnel who were cleared into the program during the same
+period (see Chart 4.1). In fact, as noted above, we think the highly classified
+nature of the program, rather than constituting an argument for limiting the
+OLC read-ins to a single attorney, made the need for careful analysis and
+review within the Department and by the NSA only more compelling.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+In sum, we concluded that the departure from established OLC and
+Department practices resulted in legal opinions to support the program that
+were later determined to be flawed. We believe the strict control over the
+Department's access to the program undermined the role of the Department
+to ensure the legality of Executive Branch actions, and as discussed below,
+contributed to the March 2004 crisis that nearly resulted in the mass
+resignation of the Department's leadership. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+We recommend that when the Justice Department is involved with
+such programs in the future, the Attorney General should carefully assess
+whether the Department has been given adequate resources to carry out its
+vital function as legal advisor to the President and should aggressively seek
+additional resources if they are found to be insufficient. We also believe that
+the White House should allow the Department a sufficient number of
+read-ins when requested, consistent with national security considerations,
+to ensure that sensitive programs receive a full and careful legal review. (U)
+
+B. The Hospital Visit (U)
+
+The Department's reassessment of Yoo's analysis led Comey, who was
+exercising the powers of the Attorney General while Ashcroft was
+hospitalized in March 2004, to conclude that he could not certify the legality
+of the Stellar Wind program. In response, the President sent Gonzales and
+Chief of Staff Andrew Card to visit Ashcroft in the hospital to seek his
+certification of the program, an action Ashcroft refused to take. We believe
+that the way the White House handled its dispute with the Department
+about the program - particularly in dispatching Gonzales and Card to
+Ashcroft's hospital room to override Comey's decision was troubling for
+several reasons. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+As discussed in this chapter, by March 2004, when the Presidential
+Authorization was set to expire again, Goldsmith had placed Gonzales and
+Addington on notice for several months of the Department's doubts about
+
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+the legality of aspects of the Stellar Wind program. In particular, he and
+Philbin had made clear that the Department questioned the legality of the
+collections of [REDACTED].²³⁰
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+After Attorney General Ashcroft was hospitalized and unable to fulfill
+his duties, the White House was informed that Deputy Attorney General
+Comey had assumed the Attorney General's responsibilities. We found that
+the assertion by some in the White House at the time that they had not been
+informed of the situation was subsequently contradicted by the facts. In
+particular, Gonzales later acknowledged that he was aware that Comey was
+acting as the Attorney General.²³¹ (U)
+
+Before the Presidential Authorization was set to expire on March 11,
+Comey, who was exercising the powers of the Attorney General at the time,
+told top officials in the White House – including Vice President Cheney and
+White House Counsel Gonzales – that the Justice Department could not
+recertify the legality of the program as it was presently operating. The White
+House disagreed with the Justice Department's position, and on March 10,
+2004, convened a meeting of eight congressional leaders to brief them on
+the Justice Department's seemingly sudden reluctance to recertify the
+program and on the need to continue the program. The White House did
+not invite anyone from the Department to this briefing to describe the basis
+for its advice about the legality of the program, nor did it inform the
+Department of its intention to hold the meeting.²³² (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Following this briefing, Gonzales and Card went to the hospital to ask
+Attorney General Ashcroft, who was in the intensive care unit recovering
+
+²³⁰ Our conclusion that Goldsmith advised Gonzales and Addington of the
+Department's concerns in December 2003 is supported by his contemporaneous notes of
+these events. In addition, although Gonzales told us that the first time he recalled hearing
+of these concerns in detail was in early March 2004, he did not dispute that Goldsmith had
+first begun to advise him of the Department's general concerns months earlier. (U)
+
+²³¹ During his congressional testimony, when questioned about whether he knew
+that Attorney General Ashcroft's powers had been transferred to Comey, Gonzales
+responded, "I think that there were newspaper accounts, and that fact that Mr. Comey was
+the acting Attorney General is probably something I knew of." (U)
+
+²³² On the advice of White House counsel, Gonzales declined to provide a reason to
+the OIG why the Department was not asked to participate in the briefing. However, when
+Gonzales commented on a draft of this report, he stated that the purpose of the meeting
+was to inform the congressional leaders that the Department had a problem with the legal
+basis for aspects of the program, [REDACTED]
+and that a legislative fix therefore was necessary. Gonzales stated that the purpose of the
+meeting was not to have a "debate" between the White House and the Department
+concerning the legality of the program, but rather to explore just such a legislative "fix."
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
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+from surgery and according to witnesses appeared heavily medicated, to
+certify the program, notwithstanding Comey's stated opposition. Yet, they
+did not notify Comey or anyone else in the Department that they intended to
+take this action. Their attempt to have Ashcroft recertify the program did
+not succeed. Ashcroft told them from his hospital bed that he supported
+the Department's legal position, but that in any event he was not the
+Attorney General at the time – Comey was. (U)
+
+Gonzales stated that even if he knew that Ashcroft was aware of
+Comey's opposition to recertifying the program, Gonzales would still have
+wanted to speak with Ashcroft because he believed Ashcroft still retained
+the authority to certify the program. Gonzales testified before the Senate
+Judiciary Committee in July 2007 that although there was concern over
+Ashcroft's condition, "We would not have sought nor did we intend to get
+any approval from General Ashcroft if in fact he wasn't fully competent to
+make that decision." Gonzales also testified, "There's no governing legal
+principle that says that Mr. Ashcroft, if he decided he felt better, could
+decide, I'm feeling better and I can make this decision, and I'm going to
+make this decision.” (U)
+
+We found this explanation and the way the White House handled the
+dispute to be troubling. Rather, we agree with Director Mueller's
+observation, as recorded in his program log following his meeting with Card
+on March 11, 2004, that the failure to have Department of Justice
+representation at the congressional briefing and the attempt to have
+Ashcroft certify the Authorization by overruling Comey "gave the strong
+perception that the [White House] was trying to do an end run around the
+Acting [Attorney General] whom they knew to have serious concerns as to
+the legality of portions of the program." (TS//SI//NF)
+
+At a minimum, we would have expected the White House to alert
+Comey directly that it planned to brief the congressional leaders on the
+Department's position and that it intended to seek Ashcroft's approval of the
+program despite Comey and Goldsmith's stated legal position against
+continuing certain activities under the program. Instead, White House
+officials briefed congressional leaders and sought to have Attorney General
+Ashcroft recertify the program from his hospital bed without any notice to
+Comey or anyone else at the Department. We believe these actions gave the
+appearance of an "end run" around the ranking Justice Department official
+with whom they disagreed. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+C. Recertification of the Presidential Authorization and
+Modification of the Program (U)
+
+As described in this chapter, the Department had notified Gonzales
+and Addington of its concerns about the legality of aspects of the program
+
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+for several months. In fact, the Department had made clear to the White
+House in December 2003 and more emphatically in a series of meetings in
+March 2004 that it believed that aspects of the program could not be legally
+supported in their existing form. Comey and Goldsmith were clear in their
+advice to the President and other White House officials. At the hospital,
+Ashcroft also expressed deep concern [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] and told Gonzales and Card that he supported the position of his
+subordinates. We believe that Ashcroft acted admirably under arduous
+circumstances. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Despite the legal concerns uniformly expressed by senior Department
+of Justice leaders, the White House, through White House Counsel
+Gonzales, recertified the Authorization, allowing the program to continue
+substantively unchanged. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Only after Mueller, Comey, and other senior Department and FBI
+officials made known their intent to resign if the White House continued the
+program unchanged, despite the Department's conclusion that aspects of
+the program could not be legally supported, did the President direct that the
+issue be resolved, and the program be modified to address the Department's
+legal concerns. Because we were unable to interview key White House
+officials, we could not determine for certain what caused the White House to
+change its position and modify the program, although the prospect of mass
+resignations at the Department and the FBI appears to have been a
+significant factor in this decision.²³³ According to Comey, the President
+raised a concern that he was hearing about these problems at the last
+minute, and the President thought it was not fair that he was not told
+earlier about the Department's legal position. In fact, as Comey informed
+the President, the President's staff had been advised of these issues "for
+weeks." (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Finally, we believe that the Department and FBI officials who resisted
+the pressure to recertify the Stellar Wind program because of their belief
+that aspects of the program were not legally supportable acted courageously
+and at significant professional risk. We believe that this action by
+Department and FBI officials – particularly Ashcroft, Comey, Mueller,
+
+²³³ For instance, we found it significant that on March 16, 2004, White House
+Counsel Gonzales, who had to make a recommendation to the President about how to
+proceed with the program in view of the Department's conclusion that legal support for
+[REDACTED] called Director Mueller to ask him
+whether he would resign if the President did not [REDACTED]. Mueller
+responded that he "would have to give it serious consideration if the President decided to go
+ahead in the face of DOJ's finding." [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
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+Goldsmith, Philbin, and Baker - was in accord with the highest professional
+standards of the Justice Department. (TS//SI//NF)
+
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+CHAPTER FIVE
+STELLAR WIND PROGRAM'S TRANSITION TO FISA
+AUTHORITY
+(JUNE 2004 THROUGH AUGUST 2007)
+
+In this chapter we examine the transition in stages of the Stellar Wind
+program from presidential authority to FISA authority. We first describe the
+FISA Court's approval in July 2004 of the government's application to
+acquire foreign intelligence information through the collection of bulk e-mail
+meta data (basket 3 information). This application was based on a legal
+theory related to FISA's pen register and trap and trace device provisions.
+We next discuss the government's successful May 2006 application to the
+FISA Court for an order to obtain bulk telephony meta data (basket 2
+information) by the production of business records by certain
+telecommunications carriers. We then describe the government's
+interaction with the FISA Court to place under FISA the government's
+authority to intercept the content of certain communications involving both
+domestic and foreign telephone numbers and e-mail addresses (basket 1
+information). Finally, we summarize legislation enacted in August 2007 and
+July 2008 to amend FISA to address, among other concerns, the difficulty
+the government encountered in obtaining FISA authority for content
+collection, as well as the government's contention that certain provisions of
+FISA had failed to keep pace with changes in telecommunications
+technology. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+I. E-Mail Meta Data Collection Under FISA (TS//SI//NF)
+
+A. Application and FISA Court Order (U)
+
+[REDACTED] The FISA Court granted this authority
+on July 14, 2004 [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+1. Decision to Seek a Pen Register and Trap and Trace
+(PR/TT) Order from the FISA Court (TS//SI//NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
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+[REDACTED]
+
+Philbin told us that he encountered some opposition to the FISA
+approach from Counsel to the Vice President David Addington, who argued
+that the FISA Court was unconstitutional and questioned the need to seek
+its authorization for e-mail meta data collection. Philbin said that he
+responded that obtaining an order from the FISA Court was "ironclad safe."
+Baker recalled attending at least one meeting at the White House with White
+House Counsel Gonzales and Addington to discuss whether to seek an order
+from the FISA Court based on FISA's pen register and trap and trace device
+provisions (a PR/TT Order) and how the FISA Court should be approached
+to obtain such an order. Baker stated that during the meeting Addington
+said, "We are one bomb away from getting rid of this obnoxious Court."
+Baker said Addington also stressed to him that there is a lot riding on your
+[Baker's] relationship with this Court." (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+In contrast, Hayden told us that he did not have any concerns about
+transitioning the bulk e-mail meta data collection to FISA authority and was
+enthusiastic about the move. Hayden stated that while he believed the
+President had the authority to collect the bulk meta data for the NSA to
+conduct meta data analysis, he believes that involving an additional branch
+of government in the activity provided some clarity on this subject.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Gonzales told us that he did not recall much about the process of
+filing the application with the FISA Court to obtain e-mail meta data
+through a PR/TT Order, but stated that there may have been individuals at
+the White House who expressed concern that seeking the Order from the
+FISA Court was not a good idea. However, Gonzales told us that he was
+supportive of seeking the Order [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] He stated that he relied on what the intelligence
+professionals told him and that he would not have supported the PR/TT
+application if NSA Director Hayden and others did not believe the collection
+under the PR/TT Order provided the coverage necessary to protect the
+nation [REDACTED] Gonzales
+
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+
+also told us that there was concern at the White House that filing the PR/TT
+application could lead to an unauthorized disclosure of the program.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+2. Briefing for Judge Kollar-Kotelly (U)
+
+In [REDACTED] Baker, Philbin, and Goldsmith met with Gonzales
+and Addington at the White House to discuss how to approach Judge
+Kollar-Kotelly concerning the proposed PR/TT application, and it was
+decided to give her a "presentation" about the application. The presentation
+was provided to Judge Kollar-Kotelly on [REDACTED] Present
+were Attorney General Ashcroft, Central Intelligence Agency Director George
+Tenet, FBI Director Mueller, Hayden, Gonzales, OLC Assistant Attorney
+General Goldsmith, Philbin, Baker, and Director of the Terrorist Threat
+Integration Center (TTIC) John Brennan. According to an agenda of the
+briefing, and as confirmed to the OIG, the presentation was given in three
+parts. First, Mueller, Tenet, and Brennan described the nature of the
+terrorist threat facing the United States including concerns of [REDACTED]
+Second, Hayden
+described the technical aspects of the proposed bulk e-mail meta data
+collection, including how the information was to be collected, archived,
+queried, and minimized. This portion of the presentation stressed that the
+NSA required the collection of meta data in bulk to maximize analytic
+capabilities through contact chaining [REDACTED] to identify
+terrorist communications.²³⁴ Third, Philbin explained the government's
+legal argument that FISA authorized the Court to approve a broad
+application to collect e-mail meta data under the statute's pen register and
+trap and trace provisions. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//SI//NF)
+
+3. The PR/TT Application (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Philbin, Baker, and at least two Office of Legal Counsel attorneys
+assumed primary responsibility for drafting the PR/TT application to the
+FISA Court and a memorandum of law in support of the application.²³⁵
+
+²³⁴ The agenda refers to the "needle in haystack" metaphor to illustrate the need for
+bulk collection, noting "must transform streams of hay into haystack that can later be
+searched." (TS///SI//NF)
+
+²³⁵ The application package captioned [REDACTED] consisted of the application; a
+proposed order authorizing the collection activity and secondary orders mandating carriers
+to cooperate; a declaration of NSA Director Hayden explaining the technical aspects of the
+(Cont'd.)
+
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+
+Baker said that Judge Kollar-Kotelly was given a "read-ahead copy" of the
+application, since it was standard practice to give the FISA Court draft
+applications for review. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The final application was filed [REDACTED] A short addendum to
+the application filed [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] it
+sought authorization from the FISA Court to collect. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The objective of the application was to secure authority under FISA to
+collect [REDACTED] bulk e-mail meta data [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] the meta data to be collected
+under FISA authority would be stored in a database. According to the
+application, queries could be run against the database to identify [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] by looking for contacts with other
+individuals reasonably suspected to be [REDACTED] and to reveal
+communications links between such operatives. The resulting analytical
+products would then be tipped out as leads to the FBI and other elements of
+the U.S. Intelligence Community to find members of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] disrupt their activities, and prevent future terrorist attacks in the
+United States.²³⁶ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The Justice Department constructed its legal argument for this novel
+use of pen register and trap and trace devices around traditional authorities
+provided under FISA. Specifically, 50 U.S.C. § 1842(a)(1) authorizes the
+Attorney General or other designated government attorney to apply
+
+for an order or an extension of an order authorizing or
+approving the installation and use of a pen register or trap and
+trace device for any investigation to obtain foreign intelligence
+information not concerning a United States person or to protect
+
+proposed e-mail meta data collection and identifying the government official seeking to use
+the pen register and trap and trace devices covered by the application for purposes of 50
+U.S.C. § 1842(c)(1); a declaration of Director of Central Intelligence Tenet describing the
+threat posed by [REDACTED]; a certification from Attorney
+General Ashcroft stating that the information likely to be obtained from the pen register
+and trap and trace devices was relevant to an ongoing investigation to protect against
+international terrorism, as required by 50 U.S.C. § 1842(c); and a memorandum of law and
+fact in support of the application. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+²³⁶ The application emphasized that Internet e-mail is one of the primary methods
+by which [REDACTED] communicate. The memorandum of law in support of the
+application stated that Internet e-mail is particularly attractive to terrorists [REDACTED]
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
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+against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence
+activities, provided that such investigation of a United States
+person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities
+protected by the first amendment to the Constitution which is
+being conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation under
+such guidelines as the Attorney General approves pursuant to
+Executive Order No. 12333, or a successor order. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+FISA incorporated the definitions of the terms "pen register" and "trap and
+trace device" from 18 U.S.C. § 3127. Thus, FISA adopted as the definition of
+a "pen register"
+
+a device or process which records or decodes dialing, routing,
+addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an
+instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic
+communication is transmitted, provided, however, that such
+information shall not include the contents of any
+communication. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+18 U.S.C. § 3127(3). FISA also adopted as the definition of a "trap and trace
+device"
+
+a device or process which captures the incoming electronic or
+other impulses which identify the originating number or other
+dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information
+reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic
+communication, provided, however, that such information shall
+not include the contents of any communication. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+18 U.S.C. § 3127(4).
+
+In its application the government argued that the NSA's proposed
+collection of meta data met the requirements of FISA by noting that the
+meta data sought comported with the "dialing, routing, addressing, or
+signaling information" type of data described in FISA's definitions of pen
+registers and trap and trace devices. The government also noted that
+nothing in these definitions required that the "instrument" or "facility" on
+which the device is placed carry communications of only a single user rather
+than multiple users. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The government next argued that the information likely to be obtained
+from the pen register and trap and trace devices was relevant to an ongoing
+investigation to protect against international terrorism, as certified by the
+Attorney General under 50 U.S.C. § 1842(c). In support of this "certification
+of relevance" the government stated that the FBI was conducting more than
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//SI//NF)
+
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+
+The government acknowledged that "the overwhelming majority of
+communications from which meta data will be collected will not be
+associated with [REDACTED] However, the government
+maintained that FISA did not impose any requirement to tailor collection
+precisely to obtain only communications that are strictly relevant to the
+investigation. The government argued that, in any event, "the tailoring
+analysis must be informed by the balance between the overwhelming
+national security interest at stake... and the minimal intrusion into
+privacy interests that will be implicated by collecting meta data – especially
+meta data that will never be seen by a human being unless a connection to
+a terrorist-associated e-mail is found." (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The government also stated that the NSA needed to collect meta data
+in bulk in order to effectively use analytic tools such as contact chaining
+[REDACTED] that would enable the NSA to discover enemy
+communications. This argument echoed a premise many officials told us
+about the nature of intelligence gathering in general. For example, Baker
+likened the search for useful intelligence, particularly in the meta data
+context, to finding a needle in a haystack, stating, "the only way to find the
+needle is to have the haystack." Gonzales argued that "to connect the dots
+you first have to collect the dots." (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The application and supporting documents described the [REDACTED] types of
+e-mail meta data NSA sought authority to collect:
+[REDACTED]
+
+208
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+
+The application requested that the NSA be authorized to collect this
+meta data [REDACTED] were described as
+follows:
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+The application represented that for most of the proposed collection on
+[REDACTED] it was "overwhelmingly likely" that at least one end of the
+transmitted communication either originated in or was destined for
+locations outside the United States, and that in some cases both ends of the
+communication were entirely overseas.²³⁷ However, the government
+acknowledged that [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//SI//NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+²³⁷ [REDACTED]
+
+209
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+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED] As discussed below, the government argued and the FISA
+Court ultimately agreed that the above-described collection [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] satisfied the definitions of pen register and trap and trace devices
+under FISA and Title 18. See 50 U.S.C. § 1841(2); 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) & (4).
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+The application also explained the proposed archiving and querying
+process. According to the application, the collected meta data would be
+stored in a secure NSA network accessible only through two administrative
+login accounts and by specially-cleared meta data archive system
+administrators. Each time the database was accessed, the retrieval request
+would be recorded for auditing purposes. (TS//SI//NF)
+
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+
+The application proposed allowing 10 NSA analysts access to the
+database.²³⁸ The NSA analysts were to be briefed by the NSA Office of
+General Counsel concerning the circumstances under which the database
+could be queried, and all queries would have to be approved by one of seven
+senior NSA officials.²³⁹ (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The application explained that the bulk collection would be queried
+with particular e-mail addresses in order to conduct chaining [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The application
+proposed that queries of the e-mail meta data archive would be performed
+when the e-mail address met the following standard:
+
+based on the factual and practical considerations of everyday
+life on which reasonable and prudent persons act, there are
+facts giving rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion that a
+particular known e-mail address is associated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Under the PR/TT application, the
+government proposed that it be authorized under FISA [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] to use the reasonable articulable suspicion standard to query
+the database with specific addressing information [REDACTED]
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+In addition, the NSA proposed applying the minimization procedures
+in the United States Signals Intelligence Directive 18 (USSID 18) to minimize
+the information reported concerning U.S. persons. According to the
+application, compliance with these minimization procedures would be
+
+²³⁸ At the government's request the number of NSA analysts was increased to 15
+when the Order was renewed [REDACTED] (TS//SI//NFY
+
+²³⁹ When it granted the government's application, the FISA Court noted that in
+conventional pen register and trap and trace surveillances a court first reviews the
+application before a particular e-mail account can be targeted. The FISA Court stressed the
+importance of the NSA Office of General Counsel's obligation to ensure that the legal
+adequacy for such queries was met. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+211
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+
+monitored by the NSA's Inspector General and General Counsel. The
+government also proposed that in each renewal application the NSA would
+report to the FISA Court on queries that were made during the prior period
+and the application of the reasonable articulable suspicion standard for
+determining that queried addresses were terrorist-related. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The application and supporting documents explained how the NSA
+intended to use the collected meta data. The NSA sought to use the meta
+data [REDACTED] to apply sophisticated
+algorithms to develop contact chaining [REDACTED].²⁴⁰ In the
+application, the NSA estimated that through external intelligence gathering
+and internal analysis it would meet the proposed querying standard on
+average less than once a day. The NSA further estimated that these queries
+would generate approximately 400 tips to the FBI and CIA per year.²⁴¹ Of
+these tips to the FBI and CIA, the NSA projected that 25 percent would
+include U.S. person information, amounting to leads including information
+on about "four to five U.S. persons each month." (TS//SI//NF)
+
+4. Judge Kollar-Kotelly Raises Questions about PR/TT
+Application (TS//SI//NF)
+
+On [REDACTED] Judge Kollar-Kotelly wrote Baker to inform him
+that she was considering the application and was in the process of
+preparing an opinion and order in response to it. She wrote that before the
+opinion and Order could be completed, however, she required written
+responses to two questions:
+
+(1) Apart from the First Amendment proviso in the statute (50
+U.S.C. § 1842(a)(1), (c)(2)), what are the general First
+Amendment implications of collecting and retaining this
+large volume of information that is derived, in part, from the
+communications of U.S. persons?
+(2) For how long would the information collected under this
+authority continue to be of operational value to the
+counter-terrorism investigation(s) for which it would be
+collected? (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Baker responded in a letter to the FISA Court on [REDACTED]
+Concerning the first question, Baker's letter asserted that the proposed
+
+²⁴⁰ These analytic tools are discussed in Chapter Three. (U)
+
+²⁴¹ The NSA arrived at this estimate based on the assumption that each query could
+be expected to generate e-mail addresses "one level out," and [REDACTED] addresses "two levels
+out." The overall number of direct and indirect contacts with the initial seed address would
+be significantly reduced using "analytical tradecraft." (TS//SI//NF)
+
+212
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HES/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+collection activity was consistent with the First Amendment and that he
+could find no reported decisions holding that the use of pen register and
+trap and trace devices violated the First Amendment. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+In his letter, Baker argued that although the meta data collection
+would include entirely innocent communications, a good-faith investigation
+does not violate the First Amendment simply because it is ""broa[d] in
+scope" (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 10 (1972)). He also wrote that
+the use of the collected meta data would be "narrowly constrained" because
+the querying standard for the meta data would be subject to a "reasonable
+articulable suspicion" of a nexus to [REDACTED] (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Regarding Judge Kollar-Kotelly's second question concerning how
+long the collected meta data would continue to be of operational value,
+Baker wrote that, based on the analytic judgment of the NSA. such
+information would continue to be relevant to [REDACTED] for at
+least 18 months. Baker also advised that the NSA believed the e-mail meta
+data would continue to retain operational value beyond 18 months, but that
+it should be stored "off-line" and be accessible to queries only by a
+specially-cleared administrator. Baker proposed that 3 years after the
+18-month timeframe, or 4½ years after it is first collected, the meta data
+could be destroyed.²⁴² (TS//SI//NF)
+
+5. FISA Court Order (U)
+
+In response to the application and follow-up questions, on July 14,
+2004, Judge Kollar-Kotelly signed a Pen Register and Trap and Trace
+Opinion and Order based on her findings that the proposed collection of
+e-mail meta data and the government's proposed controls over and
+dissemination of this information satisfied the requirements of FISA.
+(TS//HCS//SI//NF)
+
+The Order granted the government's application in all key respects. It
+approved for a period of 90 days the collection within the United States of
+e-mail meta data [REDACTED] The Order
+also required the government to comply with certain additional restrictions
+and procedures either adapted from or not originally proposed in the
+application. (TS//HCS//SI//NF)
+
+In the Order, the Court found that the information to be collected was
+"dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information" that did not include
+[REDACTED]
+
+²⁴² On [REDACTED] the FISA Court issued an order authorizing the NSA to
+maintain bulk meta data on-line for 4½ years after which time it must be destroyed.
+According to the NSA Office of General Counsel, the NSA still follows this retention
+procedure. (TS//HCS//SI//NF)
+
+213
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+the contents of any communication. The Court stressed that it was only
+authorizing collection of the [REDACTED] categories of information delineated in the
+application, but acknowledged that additional information "could be
+gleaned" from that meta data, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The Court found that the means by which the [REDACTED] categories
+of meta data were to be collected met the FISA definition of a "pen register,"
+and that the means for collecting the [REDACTED] category of meta data satisfied the
+FISA definition of a "trap and trace device." See 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) & (4),
+as incorporated in FISA at 50 U.S.C. § 1841(2). (TS//HES//SI//NF)
+
+The Court further found that the government satisfied FISA's
+requirement that the application certify that the information likely to be
+obtained is relevant to an ongoing investigation to protect against
+international terrorism. The Court concluded that, "under the
+circumstances of this case, the applicable relevance standard does not
+require a statistical 'tight fit' between the volume of proposed collection and
+the much smaller proportion of information that will be directly relevant to
+[REDACTED] FBI investigations."²⁴³ (TS//HCS//SI//NF)
+
+The Court also agreed with the government's position that the privacy
+interest at stake in the collection of e-mail meta data did not rise to the
+"stature protected by the Fourth Amendment," and that the nature of the
+intrusion was mitigated by the restrictions on accessing and disseminating
+the information, only a small percentage of which would be seen by any
+person. (TS//HCS//SI//NF)
+
+In sum, the Court concluded that the use of pen register and trap and
+trace devices to collect e-mail meta data would not violate the First
+Amendment, stating that
+
+the bulk collection proposed in this case is analogous to
+suspicionless searches or seizures that have been upheld under
+the Fourth Amendment in that the Government's need is
+compelling and immediate, the intrusion on individual privacy
+interests is limited, and bulk collection appears to be a
+reasonably effective means of detecting and monitoring [REDACTED]
+
+²⁴³ The Court cautioned that its ruling with regard to the breadth of the meta data
+collection should not be construed as precedent for similar collections of the full content of
+communications under the electronic surveillance provisions of FISA. The Court noted
+important differences in the two types of collection, including the fact that overbroad
+electronic surveillance requires a showing of probable cause to believe the target is an agent
+of a foreign power, while the bulk meta data collection under FISA's pen register and trap
+and trace device provisions merely requires a showing that the overbroad collection is
+justified as necessary to discover unknown [REDACTED] persons. The Court also
+contrasted the high privacy interests at stake with respect to content communications with
+the absence of a privacy interest in meta data. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+214
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED] related operatives and thereby obtaining information
+likely to be [REDACTED] to ongoing FBI investigations.
+(TS//HCS//SI//NF)
+
+However, the Court also was concerned that "the extremely broad
+nature of this collection carries with it a heightened risk that collected
+information could be subject to various forms of misuse, potentially
+involving abridgement of First Amendment rights of innocent persons." The
+Court noted that under 50 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2), pen register and trap and
+trace information about the communications of a U.S. person cannot be
+targeted for collection unless it is relevant to an investigation that is not
+solely based upon the First Amendment. Therefore, the Court ordered that
+the NSA modify its criterion for querying the archived data by inserting the
+following underlined language, as shown below:
+
+[REDACTED] will qualify as a seed [REDACTED]
+only if NSA concludes, based on the factual and practical
+considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and
+prudent persons act, there are facts giving rise to a reasonable
+articulable suspicion that a particular known e-mail address is
+associated with [REDACTED]
+provided, however, that an [REDACTED] believed to be
+used by a U.S. person shall not be regarded as associated with
+[REDACTED] solely on the
+basis of activities that are protected by the First Amendment to
+the Constitution. (TS//HCS//SI//NF)
+
+Regarding the storage, accessing, and disseminating of the e-mail
+meta data obtained by the NSA, the Court ordered that the NSA must store
+the information in a manner that ensures it is not commingled with other
+data, and must "generate a log of auditing information for each occasion
+when the information is accessed, to include the . . . retrieval request." The
+Court further ordered that the e-mail meta data “shall be accessed only
+through queries using the contact chaining [REDACTED]” as
+described by the NSA in the government's application. (TS//HCS//SI//NF)
+
+The Court noted the "distinctive legal considerations" involved in
+implementing the authority the Court was vesting in the NSA. Specifically,
+the Court observed that conventional pen register and trap and trace
+surveillance required judicial review before any particular e-mail account
+could be targeted. However, by granting the government's application, the
+Court noted that the NSA's decision to target an e-mail address (sometimes
+referred to as a "seed [REDACTED]") would be made without judicial review.
+Therefore, the Court ordered that the NSA's Office of General Counsel would
+be responsible for training analysts to comply with querying standards and
+
+215
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+other procedures and "to review the legal adequacy for the basis of such
+queries, including the First Amendment proviso...." (TS//HCS//SI//NF)
+
+As suggested by Baker in his [REDACTED] response to Judge
+Kollar-Kotelly's inquiry regarding the useful life of the collected data, the
+Court ordered that the e-mail meta data shall be available for 18 months.for
+querying. The Court further ordered that after the 18-month period, the
+data must be transferred to an "off-line" tape system from which it could
+still be accessed for querying upon approval of the NSA officials authorized
+to approve queries, and that such meta data must be destroyed 4½ years
+after initially collected. (TS//HCS//SI//NF)
+
+The Court's Order was set to expire after 90 days. The Court required
+that any application to renew or reinstate the authority granted in the Order
+must include: a report discussing queries made since the prior application
+and the NSA's application of the requisite legal standard to those queries;
+detailed information regarding [REDACTED] proposed to be added to the
+authority granted under the Order; any changes to the description of the
+[REDACTED] described in the Order or the nature of the communications
+[REDACTED] and any changes to the proposed means of collection,
+including to the [REDACTED] of the pen register and
+trap and trace devices [REDACTED]
+(TS//HCS//SI//NF)
+
+Finally, the Court issued separate orders [REDACTED] to
+assist the NSA with the installation and use of the pen register and trap and
+trace devices and to maintain the secrecy of the NSA's activities. These
+orders [REDACTED] called "secondary orders," [REDACTED].
+[REDACTED] The NSA was directed to compensate the carriers for all
+assistance provided in connection with the PR/TT Order.
+(TS//HCS//SI//NF)
+
+Baker and other witnesses told us that obtaining the Order was seen
+by the Department as a great success, and that there was general
+agreement that the government had secured all the authority it sought to
+conduct the bulk e-mail meta data collection. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Comey told us that
+obtaining the Order from the FISA Court also provided an "air of legitimacy"
+to the program.²⁴⁴ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+²⁴⁴ Comey and others informally referred to the PR/TT Order as "the mother of all
+pen registers." (TS//SI//NF)
+
+216
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+B. President Orders Limited Use
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+E-mail meta data collection under FISA pen register authority began
+when the PR/TT Order took effect on July 14, 2004. As required by the
+Order, the data was placed in its own database or "realm." [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+We discuss below the President's directive and the OLC memorandum
+that was drafted to analyze its legality. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+1. The President's August 9, 2004, Memorandum to the
+Secretary of Defense (TS//SI//NF)
+
+On August 9, 2004, the same day a routine Presidential Authorization
+was issued to continue Stellar Wind, the President sent a separate
+memorandum to the Secretary of Defense regarding the use of the e-mail
+meta data collected [REDACTED]. The
+memorandum directed the Secretary of Defense that, consistent with the
+August 9, 2004, Presidential Authorization (and any successor Presidential
+Authorizations), the NSA was authorized to [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] e-mail meta data [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] when there was a reasonable articulable suspicion that (1) a
+party to the communication belonged to [REDACTED] and
+(2) the purpose of the search was to produce foreign intelligence information
+concerning threats [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]²⁴⁵ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+²⁴⁵ The President's Memorandum provided that the authority to conduct such
+searches was to terminate on September 23, 2004. In the September 17, 2004, Presidential
+Authorization, this authority was extended until November 18, 2004.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+217
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+2. Office of Legal Counsel Determines [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Jack Goldsmith resigned as Assistant Attorney General for the Office
+of Legal Counsel on July 30, 2004. Goldsmith was replaced by Daniel
+Levin, who served as the Acting Assistant Attorney General for OLC until
+February 2005. (U)
+
+During late 2004, at the request of Comey and Ashcroft, Levin began
+work on an OLC memorandum addressing whether it would be lawful for
+the NSA to analyze the e-mail meta data collected [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+²⁴⁶ The [REDACTED] e-mail meta data has since been placed on tape and is being held
+by the NSA Office of General Counsel pursuant to a preservation order.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+²⁴⁷ The final version of the OLC memorandum was signed by Levin on February 4,
+2005. Levin told the OIG that a "policy decision" was made to limit application of the
+memorandum to the specific purpose [REDACTED].
+However, Levin stated that, based on his analysis of the issue, he believed that [REDACTED]
+(Cont'd.)
+
+218
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+Thus, the President asserted extrajudicial authority to order the
+further use of e-mail meta data collected under Stellar Wind for the limited
+purpose described in his August 9 memorandum. The FISA Court was
+notified of this action, although the government did not seek its permission.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+C. Non-Compliance with PR/TT Order (TS//SI//NF)
+
+As with other orders issued under FISA, the PR/TT Order was
+renewed every 90 days. During the early renewals, two major instances of
+non-compliance were brought to the FISA Court's attention. As described
+below, these violations of the Order resulted primarily from the NSA senior
+officials' failure to adequately communicate the technical requirements of
+the Order to the NSA operators tasked with implementing them, and from
+miscommunications among the FISA Court, the Justice Department, and
+the NSA concerning certain legal issues. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+1. Filtering Violations (TS//SI//NF)
+
+On [REDACTED], OIPR filed a Notice of Compliance Incidents with
+the FISA Court. In the Notice, Baker stated that the compliance incidents
+cited in the Notice "raise compliance issues with about [REDACTED] of the
+collection authorized by the Court."²⁴⁸ The Notice included as an
+attachment a letter from NSA General Counsel Robert Deitz to Baker
+describing incidents that led to "unauthorized collection." Deitz learned of
+these incidents on [REDACTED].²⁴⁹ (TS//SI//NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED] could be queried for any purpose. Levin told
+us that, other than Addington, no one else was pushing to broaden the memorandum's
+application. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+²⁴⁸ Subsequent filings indicate that [REDACTED] of overall collections under the Order
+were affected by the violations. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+²⁴⁹ One tipper that was based on this unauthorized collection was disseminated as
+a lead to the FBI but was subsequently retracted. (TS//SI//NF)
+[REDACTED]
+(Cont'd.)
+
+219
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Baker told us that Judge Kollar-Kotelly was "not happy" about the
+violation. On [REDACTED] the FISA Court issued an Order Regarding
+[REDACTED] (Compliance Order).
+The Court wrote that the "NSA violated its own proposed limitations, which
+were attested to by its Director and, at the government's invitation, adopted
+as provisions of the orders of this Court." The Court found that the
+violations "resulted from deliberate actions by NSA personnel," as
+distinguished from technical failures. The Court stated it was also troubled
+by the duration of the violations, which extended from July 14 through
+[REDACTED] and that the Court was reluctant to issue a renewal of
+the PR/TT Order as to [REDACTED] (TS//SI//NF)
+
+That same day, the Court issued an Order to address [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (Order Regarding Required Information for Authorities Involving [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED], requiring that any application
+for renewal or reinstatement of PR/TT surveillance authorities [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] be accompanied by
+a sworn declaration by the Secretary of Defense attesting to the state of
+compliance with the PR/TT Order and a description of the procedures that
+would be used to ensure compliance. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+On [REDACTED] the government moved for an extension of time
+(until [REDACTED]) within which to provide the Secretary of Defense's
+declaration. The motion, which the Court granted, assured the Court that
+surveillance [REDACTED] had been terminated on
+[REDACTED] and that on [REDACTED] the NSA had moved to a
+separate database all meta data obtained [REDACTED] through
+[REDACTED] The NSA also represented that it reconstructed its
+contact chaining database using only properly obtained meta data and
+purged the unauthorized meta data from the system. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+A declaration by NSA Director Hayden accompanying the
+government's motion stated a total of [REDACTED] e-mail addresses were tipped as
+leads to the FBI and CIA during the violation period and that [REDACTED] of these
+leads may have come from the unauthorized collection. Hayden wrote that
+[REDACTED]
+
+220
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+this lead was purged from the FBI's and CIA's databases on [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The NSA Office of the Inspector General subsequently issued a report
+on its investigation of the unauthorized collections. The NSA OIG report
+stated that the filtering violations "probably led to actual unauthorized
+collection, but we have not been able to determine the extent of such
+collection, and we are not certain that we will be able to do so." The report
+further stated that the collection program under PR/TT Order authority was
+[REDACTED]
+(TS//STLW//HCS//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The report concluded that "there were systemic management failures
+within both [REDACTED]
+within the Signals Intelligence Directorate (SID)], and a complete lack of
+program management with regard to collection." The report stated that
+while the training provided by the NSA Office of General Counsel was
+"vigorous, conscientious, and compliant with the July 14 Order, it was
+inadequate in scope." (TS//STLW//HCS//SI//OC/NF)
+
+According to the report, the NSA removed as much of the tainted
+collection from the PR/TT database as possible. The NSA was unable to
+segregate unauthorized collection from [REDACTED] so it rebuilt
+that portion of the PR/TT database from [REDACTED] (the day after
+the violation was discovered), forward. Moreover, according to the NSA OIG
+report, analytical personnel were restricted from accessing the unauthorized
+meta data. (TS//STLW//HCS//SI//OC/NF)
+
+2. FISA Court Renews PR/TT Order (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The FISA Court's PR/TT Order expired on [REDACTED]. On that
+date the government filed its first renewal application. The Renewal
+Application sought authorization to collect e-mail meta data on [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] and stated that the NSA had fully complied with the PR/TT Order
+with respect to [REDACTED]. The government did not seek [REDACTED]
+reauthorization for collection [REDACTED] due to a variety of
+operational reasons which the application did not specify. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+221
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+Judge Kollar-Kotelly signed the Renewal Order on [REDACTED]
+authorizing through [REDACTED] the use of pen register and trap and
+trace devices at [REDACTED] to collect e-mail meta data. The
+Renewal Order and the original Order were similar in most respects.
+However, in the Renewal Order the Court required the NSA to submit
+reports every 30 days concerning queries made since the prior report and
+describing any changes made to [REDACTED] and the [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]²⁵¹ (TS//SI//NF)
+
+3. [REDACTED]
+
+Baker told us that during one of his "oversight" visits to the NSA
+following the FISA Court's PR/TT Order, he was given a demonstration of
+how the NSA analysts processed the e-mail meta data, including an
+explanation of how e-mail meta data is collected and queried. Baker said he
+was informed that among the pieces of data that might be used to meet the
+reasonable articulable standard for querying the e-mail meta data [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+²⁵¹ In the initial PR/TT Order, the Court required such a report only upon the
+government's submission of a renewal application every 90 days. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+²⁵² As noted above, seed [REDACTED] are e-mail addresses or telephone numbers for
+which a reasonable articulable suspicion exists to believe the [REDACTED] is related
+to a terrorist entity. Seed [REDACTED] are used to query the meta data database to reveal
+links with other addresses or numbers. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+222
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+223
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+D. Subsequent PR/TT Applications and Orders (TS//SI//NF)
+
+As described above, the PR/TT Order was first renewed on [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] and was renewed by subsequent orders of the FISA Court at
+approximately 90-day intervals.²⁵⁴ (TS//SI//NF)
+
+On [REDACTED] the FISA Court issued a Supplemental Order
+requiring the government to enhance its reporting to the Court of the foreign
+intelligence benefits realized under the PR/TT Orders. Writing for the FISA
+Court, Judge Kollar-Kotelly stated that the authority granted under these
+orders allowed the NSA "to collect vast amounts of information about e-mail
+[REDACTED] communications[,]" but that "the Court is unable on the
+current record to ascertain the extent to which information so collected has
+actually resulted in the foreign intelligence benefits originally anticipated."
+Supplemental Order at 1-2. The government responded with a motion
+requesting that, in light of prior briefings it had given the FISA Court, it not
+be required to fully comply with the Supplemental Order. It is not clear
+what if any specific action the FISA Court took in response to this motion,
+although based on the OIG's review of the PR/TT docket the government
+continued to submit regular reports to the FISA Court.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Under the PR/TT renewal applications the scope of authorized queries
+against the PR/TT database remained limited to queries that concerned [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+²⁵⁴ In these renewals, [REDACTED] were added and dropped from [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] that were approved in the July 14, 2004, PR/TT Order. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+224
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//SI//NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Although the FISA Court continued to renew the NSA's authority to
+collect and query e-mail meta data, and the NSA proceeded under that
+authority [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+II. Telephony Meta Data Collection Under FISA (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The second part of the Stellar Wind program brought under FISA
+authority was the NSA's bulk collection of telephony meta data (basket 2).
+As described in Chapter Three, under this aspect of the Stellar Wind
+program the NSA obtained the call detail records of telephone calls,
+domestic and international [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] As with e-mail meta data, the bulk [REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+257 As discussed in Chapter Three. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Call detail
+records consist of routing information, including the originating and terminating telephone
+number of each call, and the date, time, and duration of each call. The call detail records
+do not include the substantive content of any communication or the name, address, or
+financial information of a subscriber or customer. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+225
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+
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+
+nature of the telephony collection provided the NSA the ability to conduct
+[REDACTED] - contact chaining [REDACTED]
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The transition of bulk telephony meta data collection from
+Presidential Authorization under the Stellar Wind program to FISA authority
+relied on a provision in the FISA statute that authorized the FBI to seek an
+order from the FISA Court compelling the production of "any tangible
+things" from any business, organization, or entity, provided the items are for
+an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or
+clandestine intelligence activities. See 50 U.S.C. § 1861. Orders under this
+provision commonly are referred to as "Section 215" orders in reference to
+Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT ACT, which amended the "business
+records" provision in title V of FISA.²⁵⁸ The "tangible things" the government
+sought in the Section 215 application described in this section were the call
+detail records [REDACTED]. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+We describe below the circumstances that led to the government's
+decision to transition the bulk collection of telephony meta data from
+presidential authority to FISA Authority. We then summarize the
+government's initial application and the related Court Order.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+A. Decision to Seek Order Compelling Production of Call detail
+records (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The timing of the Department's decision in May 2006 to seek a FISA
+Court order for the bulk collection of telephony meta data was driven
+primarily by external events. On December 16, 2005, The New York Times
+published an article entitled, "Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without
+Courts." The article, which we discuss in more detail in Chapter Eight,
+described in broad terms the content collection aspect of the Stellar Wind
+program, stating that the NSA had "monitored the international telephone
+calls of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of people inside the United States
+without warrants over the past three years in an effort to track possible
+'dirty numbers' linked to al Qaeda." [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+²⁵⁸ The term "USA PATRIOT Act" is an acronym for the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). It is commonly referred to as "the Patriot Act." (U)
+
+226
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+
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+
+On December 17, 2005, in response to the article, President Bush
+publicly confirmed that he had authorized the NSA to intercept the
+international communications of people with "known links" to al Qaeda and
+related terrorist organizations (basket 1). On January 19, 2006, the Justice
+Department issued a document entitled "Legal Authorities Supporting the
+Activities of the National Security Agency Described by the President" and
+informally referred to as a "White Paper," that addressed in an unclassified
+form the legal basis for the collection activities that were described in the
+New York Times article and confirmed by the President.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+According to Steven Bradbury, the head of OLC at that time, the legal
+analysis contained in the White Paper [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Although the New York
+Times article did not describe this aspect of Stellar Wind, reporters at USA
+Today were asking about this aspect of the program in early 2006.
+Bradbury [REDACTED] anticipated that a USA
+Today story would attract significant public attention when it was
+published.²⁵⁹ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+²⁵⁹ On May 11, 2006, USA Today published the results of its investigation. The
+article, entitled "NSA Has Massive Database of American Phone Calls," reported that the
+NSA "had been secretly collecting the phone call records of tens of millions of Americans,
+using data provided by AT&T, Verizon, and BellSouth." The article stated that the program,
+launched shortly after the September 11 attacks, collected the records of billions of
+domestic calls in order to analyze calling patterns to detect terrorist activity. The article
+reported that the records provided to the NSA did not include customer names, street
+addresses, and other personal information, but noted that such information was readily
+available by cross-checking the telephone numbers against other databases.
+(TS//STLW//1//OC/NF)
+
+227
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+B. Summary of Department's Application and Related FISA Court Order (S/NF)
+
+As noted previously, applications to the FISA Court that seek an order
+compelling the production of "tangible things" are commonly referred to as
+"Section 215" applications, in reference to Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT
+ACT. Section 215 authorizes the FBI to request a FISA Court order
+
+requiring the production of any tangible things (including
+books, records, papers, documents, and other items) for an
+investigation to obtain foreign intelligence information not
+concerning a United States person or to protect against
+international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities,
+provided that such investigation of a United States person is not
+conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the
+first amendment to the Constitution. (U)
+
+50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1).²⁶¹ Section 215 does not require that the items
+sought pertain to the subject of an investigation; the government need only
+demonstrate that the items are relevant to an authorized investigation.²⁶² (U)
+
+On May 23, 2006, the FBI filed with the FISA Court a Section 215
+application seeking authority to collect telephony meta data to assist the
+NSA in finding and identifying known and unknown members or agents of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] in support of the [REDACTED] related FBI
+investigations then pending and other Intelligence Community operations.
+The application requested an order compelling [REDACTED] to
+produce (for the duration of the 90-day order) call detail records relating to
+all telephone communications maintained by the carriers. The application
+described call detail records as routing information that included the
+[REDACTED]
+
+²⁶¹ "United States person" is defined in FISA as a citizen, legal permanent resident,
+or unincorporated association in which a "substantial number" of members are citizens or
+legal permanent residents, and corporations incorporated in the United States as long as
+such associations or corporations are not themselves "foreign powers." 50 U.S.C.
+§ 1801 (i) (2005). (U)
+
+²⁶² Prior to the enactment of Section 215, the FISA statute's "business records"
+provisions were limited to obtaining information about a specific person or entity under
+investigation. Also, information could be obtained only from common carriers, public
+accommodation facilities, physical storage facilities, and vehicle rental facilities. (U)
+
+228
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+
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+
+originating and terminating telephone number of each call, and the date,
+time, and duration of each call. The application stated that telephony meta
+data did not include the substantive content of any communication or the
+name, address, or financial information of a subscriber or customer.
+According to the application, the majority of the telephony meta data
+provided to the NSA was expected to involve communications that were (1)
+between the United States and abroad, or (2) wholly within the United
+States, including local telephone calls. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED].²⁶³ (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The application acknowledged that the [REDACTED] collection would include
+records of communications of U.S. persons located within the United States
+who were not the subject of any FBI investigation. However, relying on the
+precedent established by the PR/TT Order, the application asserted that the
+collection was needed for the NSA to perform analysis to find known [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] and to identify unknown operatives, some of whom may be
+in the United States or in communication with U.S. persons. The
+application stated that it was not possible to determine in advance which
+particular piece of meta data will identify a terrorist. The application stated
+that obtaining such bulk data increases the NSA's ability, through
+contact-chaining [REDACTED] to detect and identify members of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]²⁶⁴ In other words, according to the application,
+meta data analysis is possible only if the NSA "has collected and archived a
+broad set of metadata that contains within it the subset of communications
+that can later be identified as terrorist-related."²⁶⁵ (TS//SI//NF)
+
+²⁶³ The NSA told us that the actual average amount of telephony meta data
+collected per day is approximately [REDACTED] call detail records and that the figure has not
+reached [REDACTED] (TS//SI//NF)
+
+²⁶⁴ [REDACTED]
+
+²⁶⁵ The FISA Court had stated in its July 2004 PR/TT Order that the FISA statute's
+"relevance" requirement is a relatively low standard and that in evaluating whether bulk
+meta data is "relevant" to an investigation into [REDACTED] "deference
+should be given to the fully considered judgment of the executive branch in assessing and
+responding to national security threats and in determining the potential significance of
+intelligence-related information." The government cited this precedent in the Section 215
+application, stating, "[j]ust as the bulk collection of e-mail meta data was relevant to FBI
+investigations into [REDACTED] so is the bulk collection of telephony
+metadata described herein." (TS//SI//NF)
+
+229
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
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+
+The application also explained how the meta data would be used. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]²⁶⁶ The database could be
+queried only if the NSA determined that, "based on the factual and practical
+considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent persons
+act, there are facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the
+telephone number is associated with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+the Section 215 application, like the PR/TT application and Order, added
+the following proviso to the query standard: "provided, however, that a
+telephone number believed to be used by a U.S. person shall not be
+regarded as associated with [REDACTED]
+solely on the basis of activities that are protected by the First Amendment to
+the Constitution." (TS//SI//NF)
+
+According to the application, the NSA estimated that only a tiny
+fraction (1 in 4 million, or 0.000025 percent) of the call detail records
+included in the database were expected to be analyzed. The results of any
+such analysis would be provided, or "tipped," to the FBI or other federal
+agencies (as was being done under Stellar Wind). [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The application also proposed restrictions on access to, and the
+processing and dissemination of, the data collected that were essentially
+identical to those included in the PR/TT Order. These included the
+requirement that queries be approved by one of seven NSA officials or
+managers and that the NSA's Office of the General Counsel would review
+and approve proposed queries of telephone numbers reasonably believed to
+be used by U.S. persons.²⁶⁷ (TS//SI//NF)
+
+²⁶⁶ [REDACTED]
+
+²⁶⁷ The application included several other measures to provide oversight of the use
+of meta data, such as controls on the dissemination of any U.S. person information, the
+creation of a capability to audit NSA analysts with access to the meta data, the destruction
+of collected meta data after a period of 5 years (the destruction period for e-mail meta data
+was 4½ years), and a review by the NSA's Inspector General and General Counsel
+conducted within 45 days of implementing the FISA Court order that assessed the
+(Cont'd.)
+
+230
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
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+
+On May 24, 2006, the FISA Court approved the Section 215
+application. The Court's Order stated that there were reasonable grounds to
+believe that the telephony meta data records sought were relevant to
+authorized investigations being conducted by the FBI to protect against
+international terrorism. The Order incorporated each of the procedures
+proposed in the government's application relating to access to and use
+of the meta data. These procedures included a requirement that any
+application to renew or reinstate the authority for the bulk collection
+contain a report describing (1) the queries made since the Order was
+granted; (2) the manner in which the procedures relating to access and use
+of the meta data were applied; and (3) any proposed changes in the way in
+which the call detail records would be received from the communications
+carriers. The Order also requires the Justice Department to review, at least
+every 90 days, a sample of the NSA's justifications for querying the call
+detail records. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Through March 2009, the FISA Court renewed the authorities granted
+in the May 24 Order at approximately 90-day intervals, with some
+modifications sought by the government. For example the Court granted a
+motion filed on August 8. 2006. requesting [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]²⁶⁸ [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Except for these and other
+minor modifications, the terms of the FISA Court's grant of Section 215
+authority for the bulk collection of telephony meta data remained essentially
+unchanged since first approved on May 24, 2006. through March 2009.
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Further, the FISA Court's Section
+215 Orders did not require the NSA to modify its use of the telephony meta
+data from an analytical perspective. However, as discussed below, the FISA
+Court drastically changed the authority contained in its March 2009 Section
+215 Order following the government's disclosure of incidents involving the
+NSA's failure to comply with the terms of the Court's prior orders.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+adequacy of the management controls for the processing and dissemination of U.S. person
+information. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+²⁶⁸ As noted above, the Court granted an identical motion at the same time in
+connection with the bulk collection of e-mail meta data. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+231
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+
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+
+C. Non-Compliance with Section 215 Orders (TS//SI//NF)
+
+On January 9, 2009, representatives from the Department's National
+Security Division attended a briefing at the NSA concerning the telephony
+meta data collection. During the course of this briefing, and as confirmed
+by the NSA in the days that followed, the Department came to understand
+that the NSA was querying the telephony meta data in a manner that was
+not authorized by the FISA Court's Section 215 Orders. Specifically, the
+NSA was on a daily basis automatically querying the meta data with
+thousands of telephone identifiers from an "alert list” that had not been
+determined to satisfy the reasonable articulable suspicion (RAS) standard
+the Court required be met before the NSA was authorized to "access the
+archived data" for search or analysis purposes.²⁶⁹ (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The alert list contained telephone identifiers that were of interest to
+NSA counterterrorism analysts responsible for tracking the targets of the
+Section 215 Orders [REDACTED] The list was used
+to compare the incoming telephony meta data obtained under FISA
+authority, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Under the procedures the NSA had
+developed to implement the Section 215 authority, alerts (or matches)
+generated from RAS-approved identifiers could be used to automatically
+conduct contact chaining [REDACTED] of the telephony meta data.
+However, automated analysis for alerts generated by non-RAS approved
+identifiers were not permitted; instead, the alerts were sent to analysts to
+determine whether chaining [REDACTED] was warranted in
+accordance with the RAS standard. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+On January 15, 2009, the Justice Department notified the FISA Court
+that the NSA had been accessing the telephony meta data with non-RAS
+approved identifiers.[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED].²⁷⁰ On January 28, 2009, the
+
+²⁶⁹ The term "telephone identifier" used by the government means a telephone
+number as well as other unique identifiers associated with a particular user or
+telecommunications device for purposes of billing or routing communications.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+²⁷⁰ Following the Department's notice to the Court, the NSA attempted to complete
+a software fix to the alert process so that "hits" against the telephony meta data generated
+by non-RAS-approved telephone identifiers were deleted and that only "hits" generated by
+RAS-approved identifiers were sent to NSA analysts for further analysis. The NSA also
+attempted to construct a new alert list consisting of only RAS-approved telephone
+identifiers. However, the implementation of these modifications was unsuccessful and on
+January 24, 2009, the NSA shut down the alert process completely. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+232
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+
+Court issued an order stating that it was "exceptionally concerned about
+what appears to be a flagrant violation of its Order in this matter[.]" The
+Court required the government to file a brief to "help the Court assess
+whether the Orders in this docket should be modified or rescinded; whether
+other remedial steps should be directed; and whether the Court should take
+action regarding persons responsible for any misrepresentations to the
+Court or violation of its Orders, either through its contempt powers or by
+referral to appropriate investigative offices." The Court also required the
+government to address several additional specific issues, including who
+knew that the alert list being used to query the meta data included
+identifiers that had not been determined to meet the reasonable and
+articulable suspicion standard, how long the "unauthorized querying" had
+been conducted, and why none of the entities the Court directed to conduct
+reviews of the meta data collection program identified the problem earlier.²⁷¹
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+On February 17, 2009, the government responded to the Court's
+Order and acknowledged that the NSA's previous descriptions to the Court
+of the alert list process were inaccurate and that the Section 215 Order did
+not authorize the government to use the alert list in the manner that it did.
+The government described for the Court in detail how the NSA developed
+procedures in May 2006 to implement the Section 215 authority that
+resulted in the NSA querying the telephony meta data with non-RAS
+approved telephone identifiers for over 2 years in violation of the Court's
+Orders, and how those procedures came to be described incorrectly to the
+Court. According to the government, the situation resulted from the NSA's
+interpretation of the term "archived data" used in the Court's Orders and
+the NSA's mistaken belief that the alert process under the Section 215
+authority operated the same as the alert process under the Pen
+Register/Trap and Trace authority.²⁷² The government told the Court that
+"there was never a complete understanding among key personnel" who
+reviewed the initial report to the Court describing the alert process about
+
+²⁷¹ The entities directed to conduct such reviews under the Section 215 Orders were
+the NSA's Inspector General, General Counsel, and Signals Intelligence Directorate
+Oversight and Compliance Office. (U//FOUO)
+
+²⁷² The NSA understood the term "archived data" in the Court's Order to refer to the
+NSA's analytical repository for the telephony meta data. As the term is normally used by
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The NSA believed that the requirement to
+satisfy the RAS standard was only triggered when the NSA sought access to the stored, or
+"archived," repository of telephony meta data. For this reason, in the NSA's view, it was not
+required to limit the alert list to RAS-approved identifiers. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+233
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+
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+
+what certain terminology was intended to mean, and that "there was no
+single person who had complete technical understanding of the BR FISA
+system architecture." (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The government argued that the Section 215 Orders should not be
+rescinded or modified "in light of the significant steps that the Government
+has already taken to remedy the alert list compliance incident and its
+effects, the significant oversight modifications the Government is in the
+process of implementing, and the value of the telephony metadata collection
+to the Government's national security mission[.]"²⁷³ Among the several
+measures the government highlighted to the Court was the NSA Director's
+decision to order "end-to-end system engineering and process reviews
+(technical and operational) of NSA's handling of [telephony] metadata." Less
+than two weeks after the government filed the response summarized above,
+the government informed the Court that the NSA had identified additional
+compliance incidents during these reviews.²⁷⁴ (TS//SI//NF)
+
+In Orders dated March 2 and 5, 2009, the FISA Court addressed the
+compliance incidents reported by the government and imposed drastic
+changes to the Section 215 authorities previously granted. The Court first
+addressed the NSA's interpretation of the term "archived data." The Court
+said the interpretation "strains credulity" and observed that an
+interpretation that turns on whether the meta data being accessed has been
+"archived" in a particular database at the time of the access would "render
+compliance with the RAS requirement merely optional." (TS//SI//NF)
+
+²⁷³ [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The NSA also
+determined that in all instances that a U.S. telephone identifier was used to query the meta
+data for a report, the identifier was either already the subject of a FISA Court order or had
+been reviewed by the NSA's Office of General Counsel to ensure the RAS determination was
+not based solely on a U.S. person's First Amendment-protected activities. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+²⁷⁴ The additional compliance incidents involved the NSA's handling of the
+telephony meta data in an unauthorized manner. The first incident involved the NSA's use
+of an analytical tool to query (usually automatically) the meta data with non-RAS approved
+telephone identifiers. The tool determined if a record of a telephone identifier was present
+in NSA databases and, if so, provided analysts with information about the calling activity
+associated with that identifier. The second incident involved three analysts who conducted
+chaining analyses in the telephony meta data using 14 non-RAS approved identifiers.
+According to the government's notice to the Court, the analysts conducted queries of
+non-FISA authorized telephony meta data and were unaware their queries also ran against
+the FISA-authorized meta data. The government stated that none of the queries used an
+identifier associated with a U.S. person or telephone identifier and none of the queries
+resulted in intelligence reporting. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+234
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+
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+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+The Court next addressed the misrepresentations the government
+made to the Court from August 2006 to December 2008 in reports that
+inaccurately described the alert list process. The Court recounted the
+specific misrepresentations and summarized the government's explanation
+for their occurrence. The Court then concluded,
+
+Regardless of what factors contributed to making these
+misrepresentations, the Court finds that the government's
+failure to ensure that responsible officials adequately
+understood the NSA's alert list process, and to accurately report
+its implementation to the Court, has prevented, for more than
+two years, both the government and the FISC from taking steps
+to remedy daily violations of the minimization procedures set
+forth in FISC orders and designed to protect [REDACTED] call
+detail records pertaining to telephone communications of U.S.
+persons located within the United States who are not the
+subject of any FBI investigations and whose call detail
+information could not otherwise have been legally captured in
+bulk. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The Court also addressed the additional non-compliance incidents
+that were identified during the initial review ordered by the NSA Director,
+observing that the incidents occurred despite the NSA implementing
+measures specifically intended to prevent their occurrence. In view of the
+record of compliance incidents the government had reported to date, the
+Court stated,
+
+[I]t has finally come to light that the FISC's authorizations of
+this vast collection program have been premised on a flawed
+depiction of how the NSA uses BR metadata. This
+misperception by the FISC existed from the inception of its
+authorized collection in May 2006, buttressed by repeated
+inaccurate statements made in the government's submissions,
+and despite a government-devised and Court-mandated
+oversight regime. The minimization procedures proposed by the
+government in each successive application and approved and
+adopted as binding by the orders of the FISC have been so
+frequently and systemically violated that it can fairly be said
+that this critical element of the overall BR regime has never
+functioned effectively. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Despite the Court's concerns with the telephony meta data program,
+and its lack of confidence "that the government is doing its utmost to ensure
+that those responsible for implementation fully comply with the Court's
+orders," it authorized the government to continue collecting telephony meta
+data under the Section 215 Orders. The Court explained that in light of the
+
+235
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+government's repeated representations that the collection of the telephony
+meta data is vital to national security, taken together with the Court's prior
+determination that the collection properly administered conforms with the
+FISA statute, "it would not be prudent" to order the government to cease the
+bulk collection. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+However, believing that "more is needed to protect the privacy of U.S.
+person information acquired and retained" pursuant to the Section 215
+Orders, the Court prohibited the government from accessing the meta data
+collected "until such time as the government is able to restore the Court's
+confidence that the government can and will comply with previously
+approved procedures for accessing such data."²⁷⁵ The government may, on
+a case-by-case basis, request authority from the Court to query the meta
+data to obtain foreign intelligence. ²⁷⁶ Such a request must specify the
+telephone identifier to be used and the factual basis for the NSA'S RAS
+determination. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The Court ordered that upon completion of the NSA's end-to-end
+system engineering and process reviews, the government file a report that
+describes the results of reviews, discusses the steps taken to remedy
+non-compliance incidents, and proposes minimization and oversight
+procedures to employ should the Court authorize resumption of regular
+access to the telephony meta data. The government's report also must
+include an affidavit from the FBI Director and any other government
+national security official deemed appropriate describing the value of the
+telephony meta data to U.S. national security. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Additionally, the Court ordered the government to implement
+oversight mechanisms proposed in the government's response to the
+compliance incidents. These mechanisms generally require the Justice
+Department's National Security Division to assume a more prominent role in
+the NSA's administration of the bulk collection program. For example, the
+NSA's Office of General Counsel must now consult with the National
+
+²⁷⁵ The Court also stated, "Given the Executive Branch's responsibility for and
+expertise in determining how best to protect our national security, and in light of the scale
+of this bulk collection program, the Court must rely heavily on the government to monitor
+this program to ensure that it continues to be justified, in the view of those responsible for
+our national security, and that it is being implemented in a manner that protects the
+privacy interests of U.S. persons[.]" (TS//SI//NF)
+
+²⁷⁶ The Court authorized the government to query the meta data without Court
+approval to protect against an imminent threat to human life, with notice to the Court
+within the next business day of the query being conducted. The Court also authorized the
+government to access the meta data to ensure "data integrity" and to develop and test
+technological measures designed to enable to the NSA to comply with previously approved
+procedures for accessing the meta data. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+236
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+Security Division on all significant legal opinions that relate to the
+interpretation, scope, or implementation of past, current, and future Section
+215 Orders related to the telephony bulk meta data collection.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+On May 29, 2009, the Court authorized the government to continue
+collecting telephony meta data under the Section 215 Orders for 43 days
+subject to the same limitations set out in its orders of March 2 and 5, 2009.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+III. Content Collection under FISA (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The third and last part of the Stellar Wind program brought under
+FISA authority was content collection (basket 1). The effort to accomplish
+this transition was legally and operationally complex, and our discussion in
+this section does not address each statutory element or the full chronology
+of the government's applications and related FISA Court orders. Rather, we
+describe the circumstances surrounding the government's decision to
+transition content collection from presidential to FISA authority [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] We also summarize the FISA
+Court's response to the government's content collection proposals and the
+orders it issued. In this section, we describe one FISA Court judge's
+rejection of the government's legal approach to content collection, a decision
+that hastened the enactment of legislation that significantly amended the
+FISA statute and provided the government surveillance authorities broader
+than those authorized under Stellar Wind. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+A. Decision to Seek Content Order (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The Department first began work on bringing Stellar Wind's content
+collection activity (basket 1) under FISA in March 2005, shortly after Alberto
+Gonzales became Attorney General. Gonzales told us that he initiated
+discussions about making this change with OLC Principal Deputy Assistant
+Attorney General Bradbury. Gonzales said that he had questions about how
+the NSA was conducting the collection in terms of audits and checks being
+performed, and he wanted to ensure that the agency was running the
+program properly. Gonzales told us that placing content collection under
+FISA authority would also eliminate the constitutional debate about the
+activity and would reassure people that the President was acting according
+to the Constitution and the law. Gonzales said that, in his view, it is better
+to conduct activities such as content collection without a direct order from
+the President when possible. Gonzales added that in 2001 nobody thought
+it was possible to bring Stellar Wind under FISA authority.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+237
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+When Gonzales became Attorney General in early 2005, however, he
+also knew there had been a leak to The New York Times about the NSA's
+content collection activity under Stellar Wind and that the paper was
+actively investigating the story. In November 2004, Gonzales (then the
+White House Counsel), together with Deputy Attorney General Comey and
+his Chief of Staff, had met with New York Times reporters to discuss the
+potential article.²⁷⁷ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+In response to Gonzales's request, Bradbury, working with attorneys
+in OLC and the Office of Intelligence and Policy Review (OIPR) as well as
+with NSA personnel, devised a legal theory, summarized below, for bringing
+under FISA the Stellar Wind program's content collection activities while
+preserving the "speed and agility" many Intelligence Community officials
+cited as the chief advantage of the NSA program. In June 2005, Bradbury,
+together with Associate Deputy Attorney General Patrick Philbin, presented
+the legal theory to White House officials David Addington, Harriet Miers, and
+Daniel Levin and received their approval to continue work on a draft FISA
+application.²⁷⁸ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Bradbury told the OIG that he also spoke to the Director of National
+Intelligence and to NSA officials about bringing Stellar Wind's content
+collection under FISA. According to Bradbury, the Director of National
+Intelligence responded positively to the proposal, but the NSA was skeptical
+as to whether a FISA approach would be feasible, in view of the substantial
+administrative requirements under the FISA Court's PR/TT Order. The NSA
+also believed that the FISA Court would be reluctant to grant the NSA the
+operational flexibility it would insist on in any content application, resulting
+in less surveillance coverage of telephone numbers and e-mail addresses
+used by persons outside the United States. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+As discussed in detail in Chapter Eight of this report, in December
+2005 The New York Times published its series of articles on the content
+collection portion of the Stellar Wind program, resulting in considerable
+controversy and public criticism of the NSA program. Through the spring of
+2006, the Department continued work on the content application. In May
+2006, at the first of the FISA Court's semiannual meetings that year, the
+Department provided the Court a draft of the application for content
+collection to obtain feedback on the government's unconventional approach
+to the FISA statute. None of FISA Court judges indicated whether the
+
+²⁷⁷ The New York Times held the article until December 2005, when it published a
+series of articles on the content collection portion of Stellar Wind. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+²⁷⁸ After serving as Acting Assistant Attorney General for OLC from June 2004 to
+February 2005, Levin joined the National Security Council, where he remained until
+approximately November 2005. (U)
+
+238
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+application would be granted if filed, but some identified concerns with
+certain aspects of the proposal. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+At this time, Congress and the Administration were also discussing
+how to modernize the FISA statute to authorize the type of electronic
+surveillance that the content application sought. Work on the application
+was temporarily suspended as the Department focused its attention on
+working with Congress to craft this legislation. However, this suspension of
+work on the content application was brief. Bradbury said he concluded by
+the fall of 2006, as Congress was heading for recess, that there would be no
+legislative reform of the FISA statute in the foreseeable future that would
+address content collection as it was being conducted under Stellar Wind. As
+a result, the Department pressed forward with the draft content application
+to the FISA Court. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+B. Summary of Department's December 13, 2006, Content
+Application (TS//SI//NF)
+
+In November 2006, at the second of the Court's semiannual meetings,
+the Department presented an updated draft of the application that
+incorporated feedback received from members of the Court during the
+previous semiannual meeting. On December 13, 2006, the Department
+formally filed the content application with the Court. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The government's December 13 application sought authority to
+intercept the content of telephonic and electronic communications of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED].²⁷⁹ The
+application stated:
+
+Speed and flexibility are essential in tracking individuals who
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] To follow the trails effectively,
+and to respond to new leads, it is vital for the U.S. Intelligence
+Community to be able quickly and efficiently to acquire
+communications to or from individuals reasonably believed to
+
+²⁷⁹ The content application included the following caveat:
+
+By filing this application, the United States does not in any way suggest that
+the President lacks constitutional or statutory authority to conduct the
+electronic surveillance detailed herein without Court authorization.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+239
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+be members or agents of these [REDACTED] foreign powers.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+According to the application, the goal was to establish "an early
+warning system" under FISA to alert the government to the presence of
+members and agents of foreign powers [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] and to assist tracking such
+individuals within the United States. The "early warning system" sought to
+replace the conventional practice under FISA of filing individual applications
+each time the government had probable cause to believe that a particular
+phone number or e-mail address, referred to by the NSA as a "selector," was
+being used or about to be used by members or agents of a foreign power.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+In the place of this individualized process, the application proposed
+that the FISA Court establish broad parameters for the interception of
+communications - specifically, [REDACTED] that can be targeted and the
+locations where the surveillance can be conducted - and that NSA officials,
+rather than FISA Court judges, determine within these parameters the
+particular selectors whose communications the NSA would intercept. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] albeit with FISA Court
+review and supervision.²⁸⁰ (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The legal arguments underlying the government's approach are
+complex and involve substantial communications terminology. They also
+require lengthy discussion of the FISA statute and previous FISA Court
+decisions. Rather than describe at length these issues, in this section we
+detail the two main components of the government's approach to content
+collection in the FISA application that are critical for understanding one
+judge's approval of the application and another judge's later rejection of
+essentially the same application. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+First, the government proposed an interpretation of the term "facility"
+in the FISA statute that was broader than how the term was ordinarily, but
+
+²⁸⁰ The Department's application provided an example to illustrate the risks
+associated with the existing requirement that FISA Court approval or Attorney General
+emergency authorization be obtained each time the government seeks to target a particular
+telephone number or e-mail address: [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] According to the application, valuable
+intelligence could be lost in the time it would take to receive FISA Court authorization or
+Attorney General emergency authorization to target the new address. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+240
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+not always, applied.²⁸¹ Section 1805(a)(3)(B) of FISA provides that the Court
+may order electronic surveillance only upon finding that there is probable
+cause to believe that "each of the facilities or places at which the electronic
+surveillance is directed is being used, or is about to be used, by" a group
+involved in international terrorism. The term "facilities" generally was
+interpreted to refer to individual telephone numbers or e-mail addresses at
+which surveillance is "directed." (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The government proposed in its content application that the term
+"facilities" be interpreted broadly to include [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]²⁸² Under this approach, instead of
+examining the target's use of particular telephone numbers or e-mail
+addresses, the Court would determine only whether there was probable
+cause to believe that the target was using [REDACTED] to
+communicate telephonically or by e-mail.²⁸³ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Second, the government's application requested that senior NSA
+officials be authorized to make individualized findings of probable cause
+about whether a particular telephone number or e-mail address was being
+used by a member or agent of one of the application's targets. Ordinarily, a
+FISA Court judge makes this probable cause determination. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+To implement this transfer of authority, the government proposed that
+NSA officials make the probable cause determinations as part of
+requirements called "minimization procedures," which are detailed rules
+
+²⁸¹ The government's Memorandum of Law filed in support of the content
+application described several instances where the FISA Court authorized surveillance of
+facilities that was not limited to particular telephone numbers and e-mail addresses.
+According to the application, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+The government's proposed interpretation of the term in the content application was far
+broader than previously authorized by the Court. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+²⁸² [REDACTED]
+
+²⁸³ As noted the targets of the content application were [REDACTED]
+The government's content
+application included a declaration from the NSA Director that addressed [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] use of the international telephone system and [REDACTED]
+communications. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+241
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+that govern how the government must handle communications that it
+intercepts pertaining to U.S. persons. The FISA statute provides that each
+FISA application must include, and the FISA Court must approve,
+minimization procedures that the agency will follow with respect to
+communications intercepted pursuant to a FISA Court order. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Minimization procedures, in the FISA context, ordinarily govern the
+handling of intercepted communications involving U.S. persons after the
+acquisition has been approved by the FISA Court. In other words, a FISA
+Court authorizes the agency to intercept the communications of particular
+selectors, and the agency follows the minimization procedures with respect
+to how it retains, uses, and disseminates any U.S. person information it
+collects under the Court's order. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+However, the government proposed as part of the content application
+that the minimization procedures also encompass how the NSA acquires the
+communications.²⁸⁴ Specifically, the application proposed that the NSA
+could intercept the communications of specific selectors if agency officials
+determined there was probable cause to believe that (1) the selector is being
+used by a member or agent of a [REDACTED]
+and (2) the communication is to or from a foreign country. The
+application referred to this as the "minimization probable cause
+standard."²⁸⁵ (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Thus, the content application had a two-prong “minimization probable
+cause standard": (1) probable cause to believe a selector is being used by a
+member or agent of a targeted group, and (2) probable cause to believe the
+communication intercepted is to or from a foreign country. [REDACTED]
+
+²⁸⁴ Bradbury told the OIG that this argument was based on the text of the FISA
+statute, which states that minimization procedures apply to the "acquisition" of
+communications in addition to their retention and dissemination. See 50 U.S.C.
+§ 1801(h)(1). Indeed, the government's Memorandum of Law filed in support of the content
+application described several cases in which the FISA Court authorized the government to
+conduct electronic surveillance that included minimization at the time of acquisition.
+According to the application, the cases involved surveillance broadly targeted [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] than those the
+government specifically sought to acquire. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//SI//NF)
+
+²⁸⁵ The proposed "minimization probable cause standard" was in addition to the
+standard minimization procedures that accompany every FISA application submitted by the
+government and that have been long-approved by the FISA Court. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+242
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+For the first prong - probable cause to believe a selector is being used
+by a member or agent of a targeted group - NSA analysts would assess
+sources of "reliable intelligence," defined in the application as information
+from a variety of domestic and foreign intelligence and law enforcement
+activities. Under the terms of the application, positive findings of probable
+cause would be recorded in a database and the assessment process would
+be subject to periodic internal review by NSA officials, including the NSA
+General Counsel and Inspector General. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+For the second prong - probable cause to believe the communication
+intercepted is to or from a foreign country [REDACTED].
+[REDACTED] For
+example, the application stated that there would be probable cause to
+believe [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]²⁸⁶ With respect to e-mails the application stated that
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]²⁸⁷ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+²⁸⁶ The application acknowledged that communications intercepted at the
+"facilities" could include some calls where [REDACTED] in the United States,
+or where [REDACTED] in the United States (even where there is probable cause
+to believe that [REDACTED] the United States). [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] If the NSA had probable
+cause to believe one of the communicants was a member of [REDACTED], the call could be
+intercepted. The application stated such communications would be handled in
+accordance with NSA's standard minimization procedures that apply to all of the agency's
+electronic surveillance activities. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+²⁸⁷ As it did with telephone communications, the application acknowledged that the
+manner in which e-mail communications are routed would cause the NSA to collect some
+e-mail communications that in fact are between communicants wholly within the United
+(Cont'd.)
+
+243
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+Thus, viewing the government's approach to both "facilities" and
+"minimization procedures" together, the December 13, 2006, content
+application asked the FISA Court to find probable cause to believe that [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] engaged in international terrorism, and that these groups use
+the international telephone system and the [REDACTED] communications
+system [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Then, within these broad parameters authorized by the
+Court, NSA officials would make probable cause findings about whether
+individual telephone numbers or e-mail addresses are used by members or
+agents of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] and whether the communications of those numbers and
+addresses are to or from a foreign country. If they were, the NSA could
+direct the telecommunications carriers to intercept the communications of
+those telephone numbers and e-mail addresses and provide them to the
+NSA. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Under the terms of the application, communications acquired by the
+NSA could be retained for 5 years, unless the Court approved retention for a
+longer period. The application also stated that the NSA expected to initially
+target [REDACTED] telephone numbers and e-mail addresses used by members or
+agents or [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+An additional aspect of the content application is important to
+understand. The "early warning system" the government proposed applied
+both to "domestic selectors" and "foreign selectors." Domestic selectors are
+telephone numbers and e-mail addresses reasonably believed to be used by
+individuals in the United States; foreign selectors are telephone numbers
+and e-mail addresses reasonably believed to be used by individuals outside
+the United States. Under Stellar Wind, the NSA intercepted the
+communications of both categories of selectors, although the NSA tasked far
+more foreign selectors than domestic selectors. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+States, even though the NSA had probable cause to believe the communication was to or
+from a foreign country. The application stated that the NSA would handle any such
+communications in accordance with its standard minimization procedures. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+244
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+The government proposed in its content application that the domestic
+selectors would be subject to more rigorous targeting approval and more
+frequent reporting to the FISA Court than foreign selectors, but the
+application sought to preserve NSA officials' authority to make the probable
+cause determinations as to each.²⁸⁸ As we describe below, the first FISA
+Court judge to consider the content application, Judge Malcolm Howard,
+was unwilling to extend this authority to domestic selectors. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+C. Judge Howard Grants Application in Part (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The Department's December 13, 2006, content application was
+assigned to Judge Howard, because he was the "duty" judge that week
+responsible for considering new applications.²⁸⁹ Judge Howard advised the
+Department orally that he would not authorize, on the terms proposed in
+the application, the electronic surveillance of selectors to be used by
+persons in the United States (domestic selectors). He did not issue a written
+opinion or order concerning this decision. The Department, in response to
+Judge Howard's oral advisement, filed a separate application requesting
+authority to conduct electronic surveillance on domestic selectors. This
+application, summarized below, was filed on January 9, 2007, and is
+considered the first "domestic selectors application"; the December 13
+application is considered the first "foreign selectors application."
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+Judge Howard also requested additional briefing from the Justice
+Department on the subject of whether [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] constituted "facilities" under FISA,
+and whether the surveillance authority sought in the government's content
+application would in fact be "directed" not at these "facilities" but rather at
+the particular telephone numbers and e-mail addresses the government
+would task for collection. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+In response, the Department filed a supplemental memorandum of
+law on January 2, 2007, arguing that the government's construction of the
+
+²⁸⁸ Under the terms of the original content application, domestic selectors tasked by
+the government would subsequently be reported to the Court for approval. The Court
+either had to approve each domestic selector within 48 hours of receiving the government's
+report or, if the Court did not agree there was probable cause to believe the selector was
+being used by a member or agent of a target of the application, provide the government 24
+hours to submit additional information establishing probable cause. Foreign selectors
+tasked by the government did not require subsequent approval by the Court, although the
+Court could direct that the surveillance of any selector cease. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+²⁸⁹ The Department offered to submit the application to the FISA Presiding Judge,
+Judge Kollar-Kotelly, but she said that it should be filed in the normal fashion, which
+meant it would be assigned to the FISA duty judge that week. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+245
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+terms "facilities" and "directed" was fully consistent with the text of FISA
+and supported by FISA Court practice and precedent. The memorandum
+further explained why the traditional approach to surveillance under FISA
+would not provide the speed and agility necessary for the "early warning
+system" the application sought to create.²⁹⁰ (TS//SI//NF)
+
+On January 10, 2007, Judge Howard approved the Department's
+content application as to foreign selectors, endorsing the legal framework on
+which the content application for foreign selectors was based, including the
+broad construction of the term "facilities” and the use of minimization
+procedures to empower NSA officials to make targeting decisions about
+particular selectors. Judge Howard's Order authorized the government to
+conduct electronic surveillance for a period of 90 days at the "facilities"
+identified in the application, and was set to expire on April 6, 2007. The
+Order [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED].²⁹¹ (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Judge Howard's Order also required that an attorney from the Justice
+Department's National Security Division review the NSA's justifications for
+targeting particular foreign selectors. The Order required the government to
+submit reports to the FISA Court every 30 days listing new selectors tasked
+during the previous 30 days and briefly summarizing the basis for the NSA's
+determination that the first prong of the minimization probable cause
+standard has been met for each new selector.²⁹² The Order preserved the
+Court's authority to direct that surveillance cease on any selectors for which
+
+²⁹⁰ On this point, the memorandum cited the government's limited resources as
+presenting a significant obstacle to filing a separate FISA application for each selector it
+wanted to place under surveillance. The government stated that it anticipated initiating
+collection on [REDACTED] new selectors each month, a figure that translates to filing a
+motion to amend a FISA order or seeking Attorney General emergency authority
+[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] times per day (or, alternatively, filing one motion or seeking one Attorney General
+emergency authorization covering [REDACTED] new selectors each day). The government
+stated that if the government proceeded under any of these options, valuable intelligence
+would be lost. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+²⁹¹ As noted earlier, the Order compelled [REDACTED] The Order
+also required that with each request for reauthorization, the government present a list of
+current selectors previously reported to the Court that the government intended to continue
+tasking, identify any selectors reasonably believed to be used by U.S. persons outside the
+United States, and assess the efficacy of the collection of communications that mentioned a
+tasked e-mail address [REDACTED] but that were not to or from that
+selector. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+²⁹² As noted above, the first prong of the standard is probable cause to believe that
+the selector is being used by a member or agent of a targeted [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//SI//NF)
+
+246
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+the Court found that the first prong of the standard has not been satisfied.
+In addition, the Order required the NSA Inspector General, General Counsel,
+and Signals Intelligence Directorate to periodically review the authorized
+collection activities. These NSA offices were required to submit a report to
+the Court 60 days after the collection was initiated under the Order that
+would address the adequacy of management controls and whether U.S.
+person information was being handled properly. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+According to several Department and NSA officials, the effort to
+implement Judge Howard's January 10, 2007, Order was a massive
+undertaking.[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+As a result of the Order, the Department and NSA submitted to the
+FISA Court for its review the factual basis for each selector supporting the
+government's determination that the "minimization probable cause
+standard" had been satisfied. The Department accomplished this pursuant
+to a schedule approved by Judge Howard under which the Department filed
+[REDACTED] foreign selectors every [REDACTED] days for the duration of the
+90-day Order. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The probable cause explanation for each foreign selector filed with the
+Court typically was described in several sentences. According to Bradbury,
+he impressed upon the NSA that Judge Howard would review each
+submission and inquire about how recently the NSA had acquired
+communications relating to a particular selector. According to Matthew
+Olsen, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Department's National
+Security Division who was responsible for overseeing intelligence matters,
+Judge Howard did in some cases inquire about the government's factual
+basis for believing the minimization probable cause standard has been
+met.²⁹³ Bradbury also said he stressed that the Court would scrutinize the
+NSA's probable cause determinations more rigorously than the agency had
+been doing itself and that the Court was more likely to approve a selector
+where the surveillance was current than it would a selector that has
+"remained dormant for months."²⁹⁴ (TS//SI//NF)
+
+²⁹³ Olsen was involved in the drafting and presentation to the FISA Court of the
+content application and the government's implementation of the related FISA Court Orders.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+²⁹⁴ However, Bradbury noted that the FISA Court's "tendency to look for recent
+information" in assessing whether the probable cause standard has been met is
+"problematic" because [REDACTED]
+(Cont'd.)
+
+247
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+Olsen told us that [REDACTED] foreign selectors ultimately
+were filed with the FISA Court under the terms of Judge Howard's Order.
+Olsen said that the NSA strived to submit selectors that were deemed high
+priority, that had a well-documented nexus to [REDACTED] foreign powers,
+and that had recent communications activity. Attorneys from OIPR, who
+under the terms of the Order were required to review the NSA's justification
+for each foreign selector that it tasked, worked with the NSA on this
+large-scale review process. According to Olsen, OIPR attorneys
+"double-checked" the NSA's probable cause determination for each selector,
+but did not conduct independent probable cause inquiries. This review
+identified [REDACTED] selectors that in OIPR's judgment required
+additional documentation before they could be submitted to the Court.²⁹⁵
+Olsen described the back-and-forth between OIPR and the NSA as
+"constant," and said the NSA was receptive to OIPR's involvement. Olsen
+stated that the NSA committed significant resources to the transition of
+foreign selectors. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Both Bradbury and Olsen observed that the transition of content
+collection of foreign selectors to FISA required some adjustment by the NSA
+in its approach to establishing probable cause. For example, while an NSA
+analyst might base a probable cause determination to some extent on
+intuition, similar to a "cop on the beat," it was a different proposition when
+that probable cause determination had to be reviewed by several OIPR
+attorneys trying to anticipate how the FISA Court might view the judgment.
+Olsen stated that it was also "new" for the NSA to document the probable
+cause to the level OIPR believed the FISA Court would require. According to
+Bradbury, the effort sought an equilibrium between "the necessary speed
+and agility" and the "multiple layers of probable cause determination."
+Bradbury and Olsen both told the OIG that the NSA had concerns about
+whether the FISA approach to content collection would work and the extent
+to which a measure of effectiveness would be lost under FISA Court
+supervision. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+D. Domestic Selectors Application and Order (TS//SI//NF)
+
+In contrast to foreign selectors, Judge Howard advised the Justice
+Department that requests for surveillance of the international calls of
+domestic selectors – telephone numbers or e-mail addresses reasonably
+believed to be used by individuals in the United States – should be filed with
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//SI//NF)
+
+²⁹⁵ Olsen told the OIG that he believes the NSA de-tasked some of these foreign
+selectors. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+248
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+the Court in a separate application. Judge Howard also advised OIPR
+officials that any such application should take a more traditional approach
+to FISA, meaning the "facilities" targeted by the application should be
+particular telephone numbers and e-mail addresses and that the probable
+cause determination for tasking a selector would reside with the FISA Court,
+not with NSA officials pursuant to minimization procedures. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+On January 9, 2007, the Department filed the first domestic selectors
+application. The application sought two things. First, the application
+requested authority to intercept the international communications of
+[REDACTED] specific domestic selectors.²⁹⁶ Second, the application
+sought, for purposes of future applications, approval to use a "streamlined
+version" of the emergency authorization procedures available under FISA.
+These emergency procedures authorize the use of electronic surveillance for
+a period of up to 72 hours without a Court order when the Attorney General
+reasonably determined that an emergency situation exists. See 50 U.S.C.
+§ 1805(f). The procedures required the Attorney General to inform the FISA
+Court that the surveillance has been initiated and required the Department
+to file with the Court an emergency application to continue the surveillance
+not more that 72 hours after the surveillance was authorized. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The goal of the Department's proposed streamlined emergency
+application procedures, referred to in the January 9, 2007, application as a
+"Verified Application," was to ensure that the emergency surveillance
+process be completed as swiftly as possible for qualifying domestic selectors.
+The proposal allowed the Verified Application to incorporate by reference the
+reasons or facts contained in the original domestic selectors application
+necessary to satisfy some of the statutory requirements under FISA, instead
+of reestablishing in each application for a new domestic selector that each of
+the requirements of FISA were met. The only new substantive information
+contained in a Verified Application would be the identity of the target, if
+known, the telephone number the target was using or was about to use, and
+the factual basis supporting probable cause to believe the target is [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] and is using or is about
+to use the identified telephone number. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Judge Howard granted the domestic selectors application on
+January 10, 2007, for a period of 90 days. His Order also approved the
+
+²⁹⁶ Unlike the December 13, 2006, application, the January 9, 2007, application
+did not seek authority to target agents of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] nor did the application seek authority to conduct content surveillance of
+e-mail communications. The declaration summarized for each of the domestic selectors,
+generally in two to three paragraphs, the facts that supported the government's belief that
+the telephone number was used or about to be used by a known or unknown agent of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] located in the United States. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+249
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+streamlined emergency authorization procedures proposed in the
+application for any additional domestic selectors whose communications the
+government sought to intercept during the 90-day period for which
+surveillance was authorized.²⁹⁷ (TS//SI//NF)
+
+NSD Deputy Assistant Attorney General Olsen told the OIG that in
+comparison with foreign selectors, the Department conducted a more
+rigorous review of the initial domestic selectors submitted to the FISA Court
+to ensure that probable cause was met. Olsen said a few domestic selector
+packages "on [their] face" lacked sufficient documentation and that these
+deficiencies were apparent to OIPR attorneys reviewing the information
+because the attorneys were looking at the information for the first time. He
+said that the NSA analysts responsible for the selectors, in contrast, were
+very familiar with the numbers and knowledgeable of details about the
+users that might not have been evident to persons reviewing documentation
+de novo. According to Olsen, for selector packages that were considered
+deficient, the NSA either provided the Justice Department attorneys with
+additional information or de-tasked the selector.²⁹⁸ (TS//SI//NF)
+
+E. Last Stellar Wind Presidential Authorization Expires
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+On December 8, 2006, the President signed what would become the
+final Presidential Authorization for the Stellar Wind program. The
+December 8 Authorization was scheduled to expire on February 1, 2007.
+However, Judge Howard's January 10, 2007, Orders relating to foreign and
+domestic selectors completed the transition of Stellar Wind's
+
+²⁹⁷ On January 22, 2007, the Department filed, and Judge Howard approved, the
+first Verified Application with the FISA Court using the streamlined procedures approved in
+the Order. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+²⁹⁸ Olsen and OIPR Deputy Counsel Margaret Skelly-Nolen told the OIG that during
+the application for and implementation of the domestic selectors Order, it became apparent
+that there were coordination problems between the FBI and the NSA. They noted that in
+many instances a domestic selector the NSA sought to task was already targeted by an FBI
+FISA order. According to Skelly-Nolen, in those cases problems can arise in providing
+accurate, current, and consistent information to the FISA Court about such selectors. She
+said the NSA's practice has been to consult with the FBI analysts assigned to the NSA and
+to request from them the most current information the FBI has about a particular
+telephone number or user of that number. The FBI analysts at the NSA have access to FBI
+databases to search for such information, although the most current information frequently
+can only be obtained from the operational personnel at FBI Headquarters. As a
+consequence, according to Skelly-Nolen, the FISA Court has on some limited occasions
+been provided inconsistent information concerning domestic telephone numbers or the
+users of those numbers. Olsen told the OIG that the domestic selectors Order has required
+a higher level of coordination between the FBI and NSA and that the National Security
+Division has worked to address this issue. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+250
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+communications and meta data collection activities from Presidential
+Authorization to FISA authority. Bradbury told the OIG that because it was
+believed that Judge Howard's Orders, particularly the foreign selectors
+Order, provided the NSA sufficient flexibility to conduct content collection, it
+was not necessary to renew the December 8, 2006, Presidential
+Authorization. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Therefore, on February 1, 2007, the Presidential Authorization for the
+Stellar Wind program officially expired.²⁹⁹ (TS//SI//NF)
+
+F. First Domestic and Foreign Selectors FISA Renewal
+Applications (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Judge Howard's January 10, 2007, Orders were set to expire after 90
+days. During the week of March 20, 2007, the government filed renewal
+applications to extend the authorities both as to domestic and foreign
+selectors. These applications were filed with Judge Roger Vinson, the FISA
+Court duty judge that week. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The domestic selectors application, filed March 22, 2007, was in all
+material respects identical to the government's original application. Judge
+Vinson granted the application on April 5, 2007.³⁰⁰ (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The foreign selectors application was filed on March 20, 2007. The
+content and construction of the March 20 application was substantially
+identical to the government's original application, and advanced the same
+broad construction of the term "facilities" and the use of minimization
+procedures to authorize NSA officials, instead of judges, to make probable
+cause determinations (subsequently reviewed by the FISA Court) about
+particular selectors. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+On March 29, 2007, Judge Vinson orally advised the Department that
+he could not grant the foreign selectors application. His decision validated
+some concerns within the Justice Department that Judge Howard's original
+
+²⁹⁹ On January 17, 2007, Attorney General Gonzales sent a letter to Senators Leahy
+and Specter, the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
+informing them of Judge Howard's Orders. Gonzales's letter stated that as a result of the
+January 10, 2007, FISA Court Orders, any electronic surveillance that was occurring under
+the Terrorist Surveillance Program would now be conducted under FISA, and that "the
+President determined not to reauthorize the Terrorist Surveillance Program when the
+current authorization expires." (TS//SI//NF)
+
+³⁰⁰ As noted previously, the domestic selectors Order presented special coordination
+issues between the FBI and the NSA, and [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The Order was renewed for the final time in [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] and has since expired. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+251
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+Order might not be a sustainable long-term strategy for intercepting the
+communications of foreign selectors. Judge Vinson's decision also
+accelerated the Department's efforts to obtain legislation amending the FISA
+statute to authorize the type of surveillance conducted under Stellar Wind
+and that was approved by Judge Howard. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+On April 3, 2007, Judge Vinson issued an Order and Memorandum
+Opinion explaining the reasoning for his conclusion that he could not grant
+the foreign selectors application. However, Judge Vinson did not deny the
+government's application. Instead, he encouraged the Department to file a
+motion with Judge Howard requesting a 60-day extension of the existing
+January 10, 2007, foreign selectors Order. In explaining why he was
+encouraging the Department of file the motion with Judge Howard, Judge
+Vinson wrote,
+
+I have concluded that an extension for this purpose is
+appropriate, in view of the following circumstances: that the
+government has commendably devoted substantial resources to
+bring the NSA's surveillance program, which had been
+conducted under the President's assertion of non-FISA
+authorities, within the purview of FISA; that a judge of this
+Court previously authorized this surveillance in [the
+January 10, 2007, foreign selectors Order], on substantially the
+same terms as the government now proposes; that it would be
+no simple matter for the government to terminate surveillance
+[REDACTED] phone numbers and e-mail addresses under
+FISA authority, and to decide whether and how it should
+continue some or all of the surveillance under non-FISA
+authority; and, importantly, that within the allotted time the
+government may be able to submit an application that would
+permit me to authorize at least part of the surveillance in a
+manner consistent with this order and opinion. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Judge Vinson wrote that the Department's foreign selectors renewal
+application concerns an "extremely important issue" regarding who may
+make probable cause findings that determine the individuals and the
+communications that can be subjected to electronic surveillance under
+FISA. In Judge Vinson's view, the question was whether probable cause
+determinations are required to be made by the FISA Court through
+procedures established by statute, or whether the NSA may make such
+determinations under an alternative mechanism cast as "minimization
+procedures." Judge Vinson concluded, based on past practice under FISA
+and the congressional intent underlying the statute, that probable cause
+determinations must be made by the FISA Court. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+252
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+In explaining his reasoning, Judge Vinson first rejected the
+Department's broad construction of the term "facilities," concluding that the
+"electronic surveillance" under the government's application - the
+acquisition of the content of communications was directed at particular
+telephone numbers and e-mail addresses, and not at broad swaths of
+communications [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED], as the
+government contended. Judge Vinson distinguished prior cases that the
+government cited for its broad interpretation of "facilities," observing,
+"[t]ellingly, none of the cited cases stand for the proposition on which this
+application rests - that electronic surveillance is not 'directed' at particular
+phone numbers and e-mail addresses, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]." (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Judge Vinson wrote that his conclusion was also supported by the
+government's and the Court's past practice, as well as the legislative history
+of FISA, which, according to Judge Vinson, made clear that "Congress
+intended the pre-surveillance 'judicial warrant procedure,' and particularly
+the judge's probable cause findings, to provide an 'external check' on
+executive branch decisions to conduct surveillance." He wrote that the
+government's proposal that "the Court assess [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] and make a highly abstract and generalized
+probable cause finding [REDACTED]" " removed from the
+Court's pre-surveillance purview the question of whether the
+communications to be acquired will relate to the targeted foreign powers.³⁰¹
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+Judge Vinson rejected the government's "minimization probable cause
+standard," stating that "[m]inimization does not provide a substitute for, or
+a mechanism for overriding, the other requirements of FISA." Judge Vinson
+concluded that government's proposed minimization procedures, by
+authorizing the NSA to make probable cause decisions, conflicted with
+specific provisions of FISA that govern electronic surveillance, such the
+requirement that only the Attorney General can grant emergency approvals
+to conduct surveillance (followed within 72 hours by an application to the
+
+³⁰¹ Stated another way, "[the application] represented that NSA will make the
+required probable cause finding for each such facility before commencing surveillance."
+Judge Vinson wrote, "[t]he application seeks, in effect, to delegate to the NSA the Court's
+responsibility to make such findings 'based on the totality of circumstances.' Obviously,
+this would be inconsistent with the statutory requirement and the congressional intent that
+the Court make such findings prior to issuing the order (emphasis in original)."
+[REDACTED]
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+253
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+FISA Court), and that renewals for surveillance coverage must be based on
+"new findings" of probable cause by a judge. Judge Vinson summarized his
+position:
+
+The clear purpose of these statutory provisions is to ensure
+that, as a general rule, surveillances are supported by judicial
+determinations of probable cause before they commence; that
+decisions to initiate surveillance prior to judicial review in
+emergency circumstances are made at politically accountable
+levels; that judicial review of such emergency authorizations
+follows swiftly; and that decisions to continue surveillance
+receive the same degree of scrutiny as decisions to initiate. The
+law does not permit me, under the rubric of minimization, to
+approve or authorize alternative procedures to relieve the
+government of burdensome safeguards expressly imposed by
+the statute. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Judge Vinson wrote that he was mindful of the government's
+argument that the proposed minimization procedures were necessary to
+provide or enhance the "speed and flexibility" with which the NSA responds
+to threats, and that foreign intelligence information may be lost in the time
+it takes to obtain Attorney General emergency authorizations. However, in
+Judge Vinson's view, FISA's requirements reflected a balance struck by
+Congress between privacy interests and the need to obtain foreign
+intelligence information, and until Congress took legislative action on FISA
+to respond to the government's concerns, the Court must apply the statute's
+procedures.³⁰² He concluded that the government's application sought to
+strike a different balance for the surveillance of foreign telephone numbers
+and e-mail addresses. Vinson rejected this position, stating, "provided that
+the surveillance is within FISA at all, the statute applies the same
+requirements to surveillance of facilities used overseas as it does to
+surveillance of facilities used in the United States."³⁰³ (TS//SI//NF)
+
+³⁰² Judge Vinson stated that he recognized that the government maintained the
+President may have constitutional or statutory authority to conduct the surveillance
+requested in the renewal application. Judge Vinson stated, "[n]othing in this order and
+opinion is intended to address the existence or scope of such authority, or this Court's
+jurisdiction over such matters." (TS//SI//NF)
+
+³⁰³ Judge Vinson wrote in a footnote that the status of the proposed surveillance as
+being within the scope of FISA was "assumed, but not decided, for purposes of this order
+and opinion." He continued, "I believe that there are jurisdictional issues regarding the
+application of FISA to communications that are between or among parties who are all
+located outside the United States." Judge Vinson suggested that "Congress should also
+consider clarifying or modifying the scope of FISA and of this Court's jurisdiction with
+regard to such facilities...." Bradbury told the OIG that Judge Vinson's suggestion was
+an important spur to Congress's willingness to consider FISA modernization legislation in
+(Cont'd.)
+
+254
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+Attorney General Gonzales told us that his reaction to Judge Vinson's
+decision was one of "disappointment" and that the decision “confirmed our
+concern about going to the [FISA Court]." Gonzales also said he believed the
+decision was "troubling for purposes of the national security of our country."
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Bradbury told us the government considered several options after
+Judge Vinson's ruling, including appealing the decision to the FISA Court of
+Review. However, he said the decision was made to attempt to work with
+Judge Vinson to craft a revised application and also separately to renew the
+Administration's efforts to obtain legislation to modernize FISA.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+G. Revised Renewal Application for Foreign Selectors and
+Order (TS//SI//NF)
+
+As suggested by Judge Vinson, in April 2007 the Justice Department.
+obtained from Judge Howard an extension of the existing foreign selectors
+Order until May 31, 2007, to prepare a revised foreign selectors application.
+In the interim, the Department filed two reports with Judge Vinson
+describing a new approach to foreign selectors that addressed the concerns
+expressed in his Opinion, and that sought input from the Court about how
+best to facilitate the submission of an application that would seek authority
+to direct surveillance at [REDACTED] selectors. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+On May 24, 2007, the Department filed a revised renewal application
+seeking to renew, with modifications, the authorities granted in Judge
+Howard's January 10, 2007, Order. However, the application did not
+include the broad construction of "facilities" and instead sought authority to
+conduct electronic surveillance of conventional facilities – telephone
+numbers and "e-mail [REDACTED]."³⁰⁴ The application
+also did not include the "probable cause minimization standard" approved
+
+the summer of 2007. In Section IV below, we summarize this legislation, the Protect
+America Act, and its successor, the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. (TS//SI//NF) -
+
+³⁰⁴ According to the May 24, 2007, application, such uses include Internet
+communications that are sent to and from a targeted e-mail "address," [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The May 24 application was the
+[REDACTED] to use the term "e-mail
+[REDACTED]" to describe the facility at which e-mail surveillance would be
+directed; [REDACTED]
+However, according to the application, the government "routinely requests, and the Court
+authorizes, electronic surveillance using [the e-mail [REDACTED] descriptor
+to identify this type of facility." (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+255
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+by Judge Howard that had the effect of shifting from the FISA Court to the
+NSA the probable cause determinations about particular selectors.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+However, the targets of the government's revised application remained
+selectors (telephone number and e-mail facilities) reasonably believed to be
+used outside the United States and for which there is probable cause to
+believe were being used, or are about to be used. by [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]³⁰⁵ The application also sought [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] and in the same manner as was approved
+in Judge Howard's Order.³⁰⁶ (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Specifically, the application requested authority to direct surveillance
+at [REDACTED] categories of foreign selectors:
+
+* Foreign telephone number and e-mail selectors presently known
+to the government. This category accounted for a portion of the
+[REDACTED] foreign selectors already under surveillance
+pursuant to Judge Howard's Order.³⁰⁷
+[REDACTED]
+
+³⁰⁵ The May 24, 2007, application explicitly stated that the government was not
+seeking surveillance authority for any new facilities reasonably believed by the NSA to be
+used by U.S. persons. The application stated that surveillance of those facilities would be
+initiated only through FISA's emergency authorization provisions and the streamlined FISA
+applications approved for domestic selectors. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+³⁰⁶ [REDACTED]
+
+³⁰⁷ The government submitted an appendix with the revised renewal application
+that identified [REDACTED] facilities and contained the factual basis for the NSA's
+belief that each of the facilities was being used by a person outside the United States and
+for which there was probable cause to believe were being used or about to be used by a
+member or agent of one of the targeted foreign powers. The government had provided
+Judge Vinson these facilities on a rolling basis during May 2007 for his consideration. The
+NSA discontinued the surveillance of facilities that were targeted under Judge Howard's
+Order, but that were not included among the facilities submitted to Judge Vinson for
+approval. The NSA told the OIG that the decision to discontinue surveillance on these
+[REDACTED] facilities largely was a resource decision and that [REDACTED] facilities figure
+was the amount the NSA could timely process for filing with the Court. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+256
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+* Foreign e-mail selectors (not telephone number selectors)
+presently unknown to the government but that "refer to" or are
+"about" known foreign e-mail selectors. This category of
+surveillance, which the NSA had been conducting under Judge
+Howard's Order, includes situations where an already targeted
+e-mail facility is mentioned in the body of a message between
+two third-party, non-targeted facilities.³⁰⁸ (TS//SI//NF)
+
+According to the application, the [REDACTED] of
+surveillance would enable the NSA to imuait survemance on newly
+discovered facilities "with the speed and agility necessary to obtain vital
+intelligence and to detect and prevent terrorist attacks." The application
+stated,
+[REDACTED]
+
+The collection authorities requested in the renewal application that
+pertained to currently unknown facilities would, according to the
+application, address this limitation.³⁰⁹ (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Judge Vinson granted the government's revised renewal application
+on May 31, 2007. His Order authorized, for a period of 90 days, each of the
+[REDACTED] categories of electronic surveillance described above, although the
+
+³⁰⁸ The category presented an issue under FISA in that communications are being
+acquired because they contain the targeted e-mail selector, and not because there was
+probable cause to believe the e-mail accounts sending or receiving the communications are
+used or about to be used by an international terrorist group. In such cases, the
+surveillance is not "directed at the targeted e-mail selector. The government argued that
+such acquisition was still consistent with FISA because, "at the time of acquisition, the NSA
+has probable cause to believe that the facilities at which the NSA is directing surveillance
+are being used by the foreign power target." (TS//SI//NF)
+
+³⁰⁹ The government argued that the FISA Court's authority to authorize subsequent
+collection against new selectors unknown to the government at the time an application was
+approved is rooted in section 1805(c)(3) of FISA. That provision imposes specific reporting
+requirements on the government where the FISA Court approves an electronic surveillance
+in circumstances where the nature and location of each of the facilities at which
+surveillance will be directed is unknown at the time of the application. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+257
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+Order defined the precise circumstances under which the NSA could acquire
+communications falling within the [REDACTED] category of surveillance.³¹⁰ The
+Order also included reporting schedules with respect to the [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] categories of surveillance, for which the government was required to
+submit newly discovered selectors to the Court. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Judge Vinson initially approved [REDACTED] foreign selectors
+under the terms of his May 31, 2007, Order (these selectors were submitted
+with the government's May 24, 2007, application). Shortly after the Order
+was issued, the FISA Court decided that the weekly reports filed by the
+government notifying the Court of newly discovered selectors, as well as the
+government's motions seeking approval to conduct surveillance on
+additional selectors, could be filed for review with any member of the Court.
+As the government received feedback from judges on the first reports and
+motions that were filed, it observed that judges were applying a more
+rigorous standard of review to the factual basis supporting the surveillance
+for each selector than Judge Vinson applied to the [REDACTED] selectors he
+approved. The government consequently adjusted the amount of factual
+information it provided the FISA Court in subsequent reports and motions
+and ultimately added [REDACTED] foreign selectors to Judge
+Vinson's Order. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+According to Bradbury, the more rigorous scrutiny applied by FISA
+Court judges after Judge Vinson's initial approval [REDACTED] foreign selectors
+caused the NSA place only a fraction of the foreign selectors under coverage
+than it wanted to. This concern, combined with the comparatively laborious
+process for targeting foreign selectors under Judge Vinson's Order,
+accelerated the government's efforts to obtain legislation that would amend
+FISA to address the government's surveillance capabilities within the United
+States directed at persons located outside the United States. The Protect
+America Act, signed into law on August 5, 2007, accomplished this objective
+[REDACTED]
+
+³¹⁰ [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] However, his Order
+authorized the surveillance of any previously non-targeted e-mail facilities that transmitted
+e-mail messages containing a targeted e-mail account only when the NSA determined,
+based on the acquired communication and other intelligence or publicly available
+information, that there was probable cause to believe the e-mail facility was being used, or
+was about to be used, by one of the targeted foreign powers. Judge Vinson agreed with the
+government's position that there was probable cause to believe that Internet
+communications relating to a previously targeted e-mail facility were themselves being sent
+or received by one of the targeted foreign powers and could be acquired. Judge Vinson
+called this holding "novel," but concluded that the decision was "consistent with the overall
+statutory requirements; it requires the government to promptly report and provide
+appropriate justification to the Court; and it supplies the Government with a necessary
+degree of agility and flexibility in tracking the targeted foreign powers." (TS//SI//NF)
+
+258
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+and effectively superseded Judge Vinson's foreign selectors Order. The
+government therefore did not seek to renew the Order when it expired on
+August 24, 2007. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+In the next section, we summarize the effect of the Protect America
+Act and successor legislation, the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. (U)
+
+IV. The Protect America Act and the FISA Amendments Act of
+2008 (U)
+
+In August 2007, the Protect America Act was enacted, amending FISA
+to address the government's ability to conduct electronic surveillance in the
+United States of persons reasonably believed to be located outside the
+United States. This legislation expired on February 1, 2008, but was
+extended by Congress to February 16, 2008. In July 2008, the FISA
+Amendments Act of 2008 was enacted, which, among other things, created
+a comprehensive process under FISA for content collection directed at
+foreign targets. These two laws modernized the FISA statute as it applied to
+the acquisition in the United States of communications of persons
+reasonably believed to be outside the United States. (U)
+
+As discussed in Chapter Three, FISA was enacted in 1978 when most
+international calls were carried by satellite. The interception of such calls
+constituted "electronic surveillance" for purposes of FISA only if the
+acquisition intentionally targeted a U.S. person in the United States, or if all
+participants to the communication were located in the United States. Thus,
+government surveillance of satellite communications that targeted foreign
+persons outside the United States generally was not considered electronic
+surveillance, and the government was not required to obtain a FISA Court
+order authorizing the surveillance even if one of the parties to the
+communication was in the United States. However, in the mid-1980s, fiber
+optic technology began to replace satellites as the primary means for
+transmitting international (and domestic) telephone communications. This
+change brought within FISA's definition of "electronic surveillance" the
+acquisition of telephone calls to or from a person in the United States if the
+acquisition occurred in the United States, thereby triggering the
+requirement that the government obtain FISA Court orders to conduct
+surveillance that it previously conducted outside of FISA. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Under the Stellar Wind program, the NSA collected international
+communications [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] by targeting facilities (telephone
+numbers and e-mail addresses) located outside the United States (foreign
+
+259
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
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+
+selectors).³¹¹ As noted in Chapters Three and Four, the Administration
+contended that FISA, as supplemented by a subsequent legislative
+enactment (the AUMF), did not preclude the surveillance activities under
+Stellar Wind, or in the alternative represented an unconstitutional
+infringement on the President's Article II authority as Commander in Chief
+to the extent it conflicted with these collection activities.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The Justice Department's effort to transfer content collection from
+presidential authority under Stellar Wind to FISA raised the issue of FISA's
+application to the acquisition in the United States of communications to or
+from targeted foreign selectors. The Protect America Act and the FISA
+Amendments Act, in slightly different ways, addressed this issue by treating
+the communications of persons reasonably believed to be located outside
+the United States differently from communications of persons located in the
+United States.³¹² (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+A. The Protect America Act (U)
+
+The Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, was a temporary
+measure signed into law on August 5, 2007.³¹³ The Protect America Act's
+chief objective was to exclude from the requirements of FISA the
+interception in the United States of communications of persons located
+outside the United States, the category of communications referred to above
+as "foreign selectors." (U)
+
+The Protect America Act amended FISA so that the interception of
+foreign selector communications fell outside the statute's definition of
+"electronic surveillance." Under the original definition of "electronic
+surveillance," FISA generally applied to any communication to or from a
+known United States person inside the United States if the communication
+is acquired by targeting the known United States person.³¹⁴ FISA also
+
+³¹¹ The NSA also targeted under Stellar Wind a much smaller number of facilities
+located inside the United States (domestic selectors). (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+³¹² The two laws did not substantially affect the provisions of FISA relating to pen
+register and trap and trace surveillance or to the production of "tangible things." The
+government continues to collect bulk e-mail and telephone meta data under the PR/TT and
+Section 215 Orders described in Sections I and II of this chapter. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+³¹³ The Protect America Act was set to expire 180 days after its enactment, or on
+February 1, 2008. However, Congress passed and on January 31, 2008, the President
+signed a bill to extend the Protect America Act for 15 days while further discussions on new
+legislation occurred. However, no agreement was reached on new legislation and the Act
+expired on February 16, 2008. (U)
+
+³¹⁴ The original FISA definition of "electronic surveillance" included:
+(Cont'd.)
+
+260
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+
+applied to the acquisition of other communications (such as
+communications acquired by targeting persons outside the United States) if
+the communication was a "wire communication" and the acquisition
+occurred inside the United States. (U)
+
+The Protect America Act amended FISA by stating: "Nothing in the
+definition of electronic surveillance... shall be construed to encompass
+surveillance directed at a person reasonably believed to be located outside
+the United States." The effect of this amendment was to exclude from the
+requirements of FISA any communication acquired by targeting a foreign
+selector, regardless of where the communication was intercepted or whether
+the communication traveled by wire. As a result, the Act eliminated the
+need for Judge Vinson's May 2007 foreign selectors Order, because the
+collection of communications targeted under that Order no longer
+constituted "electronic surveillance” under FISA and therefore no longer
+required FISA Court orders.³¹⁵ (TS//SI//NF)
+
+(1) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device
+of the contents of any wire or radio communication sent by or intended to be
+received by a particular, known United States person who is in the United
+States, if the contents are acquired by intentionally targeting that United
+States person, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable
+expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement
+purposes;
+
+(2) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device
+of the contents of any wire communication to or from a person in the United
+States, without the consent of any party thereto, if such acquisition occurs
+in the United States, but does not include the acquisition of those
+communications of computer trespassers that would be permissible under
+section 2511(20(i) of Title 18;
+
+(3) the intentional acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other
+surveillance device of the contents of any radio communication, under
+circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy
+and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes, and if both
+the sender and all intended recipients are located within the United States;
+or
+
+(4) the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance
+device in the United States for monitoring to acquire information, other than
+from a wire or radio communication, under circumstances in which a person
+has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for
+law enforcement purposes.
+
+50 U.S.C. § 1801(f). (U)
+315 [REDACTED]
+
+261
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+(Cont'd.)
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
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+
+In the place of individualized FISA Court orders, the Protect America
+Act also inserted several provisions into the FISA statute to govern the
+acquisition of communications from persons "reasonably believed to be
+outside the United States." These provisions authorized the Attorney
+General and the Director of National Intelligence to acquire foreign
+intelligence information concerning such persons for up to one year,
+provided these officials certified that there are reasonable procedures in
+place for the government to determine that a target is reasonably believed to
+be outside the United States and that the acquisition of the foreign
+intelligence therefore is not "electronic surveillance" under the amended
+definition of the term.³¹⁶ The targeting procedures accompanying the
+certification had to be submitted to the FISA Court for approval, based on
+the clearly erroneous standard, within 120 days of the Protect America Act's
+enactment. However, the certification was not required to identify specific
+facilities or places at which the acquisition of foreign intelligence
+information would be directed.³¹⁷ (U)
+
+In addition, the Protect America Act authorized the Attorney Gerieral
+and the Director of National Intelligence to direct a person
+(telecommunications carriers) to provide the government with "all
+information, facilities, and assistance necessary to accomplish the
+acquisition in such a manner as will protect the secrecy of the
+acquisition. ." Protect America Act, Sec. 2(e). The Protect America Act
+also authorized the Attorney General and the Director of National
+
+[REDACTED] The Protect America Act addressed this issue by excluding all
+surveillance directed at persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+³¹⁶ The Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence also had to certify
+that the acquisition involves the assistance of a communications service provider; that a
+"significant purpose" of the acquisition to obtain foreign intelligence information is for
+foreign intelligence purposes; and the minimization procedures to be used with the
+acquisition activity comport with 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h). Protect America Act, Sec. 2, codified
+in FISA at 50 U.S.C. § 1805B(a)(1)-(5). (U)
+
+³¹⁷ The Protect America Act left unchanged the procedures for acquiring foreign
+intelligence information by targeting foreign powers or agents of foreign power inside the
+United States, as well as the procedures under Executive Order 12333 Sec. 2.5 to obtain
+Attorney General approval before acquiring foreign intelligence information against a U.S.
+person outside the United States. Thus, FISA orders issued prior to the enactment of the
+Protect America Act, and FISA orders, including applications for renewals, sought after
+enactment of the Protect America Act but not pursuant to the Act's amendments
+(acquisition of foreign intelligence information from targets outside the United States) were
+still subject to FISA as it existed prior to the Protect America Act. The Protect America Act
+also provided, by means of an "opt-out" clause, that the government did not have to use the
+new procedures for new applications and could instead file applications under the
+provisions of FISA as it existed before the Protect America Act. See Protect America Act,
+Sec. 6(b). (U)
+
+262
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
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+
+Intelligence to seek the assistance of the FISA Court to compel compliance
+with such directives, and implemented procedures for the
+telecommunications carriers to challenge the legality of any such
+directives.³¹⁸ (U)
+
+The Protect America Act authorized the Attorney General and the
+Director of National Intelligence to issue orders without individualized FISA
+Court approval for up to one year targeting persons reasonably believed to
+be outside the United States. These orders remained in effect beyond the
+expiration of the Protect America Act on February 16, 2008. (U)
+
+On August 10, 2007, the Attorney General and the Director of
+National Intelligence filed a certification with the FISA Court, as required
+under the Protect America Act, relating to surveillance of persons
+reasonably believed to be outside the United States likely to communicate
+information concerning [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The certification included directives for assistance to specific
+telecommunications carriers. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+[REDACTED] foreign selectors under Judge Vinson's Order
+were "rolled over" to the new Protect America Act authority. A Deputy
+Assistant Attorney General in the National Security Division familiar with
+the transition of Stellar Wind to FISA Court authority told us that the
+government also began to "build new selectors" under the Protect America
+Act and worked toward restoring the universe of foreign selectors that were
+first authorized for tasking under Judge Howard's January 2007 Order
+when content collection under Stellar Wind initially had migrated to FISA
+Court authority. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Although the Department viewed the Protect America Act as an
+adequate temporary fix to those provisions of FISA seen as outdated
+because of changes in telecommunications technology, Department officials
+continued to press Congress for more permanent modernization legislation.
+(U)
+
+³¹⁸ The Protect America Act also stated that any person providing assistance to the
+government pursuant to a governmental directive would not be subject to any cause of
+action for providing such assistance. However, the Protect America Act did not grant
+retroactive legal immunity to any "person," a term defined in FISA to include "any group,
+entity, association, corporation, or foreign power." 50 U.S.C. § 1801(m). On August 22,
+2008, the FISA Court of Review upheld as constitutional the Protect America Act provision
+authorizing the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General to direct a person
+to assist the government in implementing the Act. See In Re: Directives (redacted text]
+Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, No. 08-01. (U)
+
+263
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+B. The FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (U)
+
+On July 11, 2008, the President signed the Foreign Intelligence
+Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008 (FISA Amendments Act).
+This legislation, composed of four titles, replaced the Protect America Act
+with similar but more comprehensive surveillance authority. The provisions
+of the FISA Amendments Act expire, with limited exceptions, on
+December 31, 2012. (U)
+
+A chief objective of the FISA Amendments Act was to change the rules
+for intercepting the electronic communications of persons reasonably
+believed to be outside the United States when the acquisition occurs in the
+United States. As discussed above, the Protect America Act accomplished
+this by amending FISA's definition of "electronic surveillance" to exclude this
+activity from FISA requirements. The FISA Amendments Act took a different
+approach. Instead of excluding the activity from the statute's definition of
+"electronic surveillance," the FISA Amendments Act created a new title in
+FISA to govern how the government may conduct this electronic
+surveillance. Under this approach, the FISA Amendments Act, unlike the
+Protect America Act, distinguishes between the targeting of non-U.S. and
+U.S. persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States.³¹⁹ (U)
+
+For non-U.S. persons, the new title created by the FISA Amendments
+Act provides for surveillance authority similar to the Protect America Act.
+Instead of requiring the government to obtain individualized orders from the
+FISA Court to intercept communications of non-U.S. persons reasonably
+believed to be outside the United States, the FISA Amendments Act
+authorized the government to conduct any such interceptions for a period of
+up to one year provided that it adopts, and the FISA Court approves, general
+targeting procedures designed to ensure that the new authority is not used
+
+³¹⁹ The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) prepared a
+section-by-section analysis of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 explaining the significance
+of the FISA Amendment Act's approach. According to the SSCI report, the goal of the
+Protect America Act in redefining the term "electronic surveillance" was to exclude the
+surveillance of persons outside the United States from the individualized order
+requirements of FISA. However, a consequence of the term's redefinition was to broadly
+exempt foreign surveillance activities both of non-U.S. and U.S. persons outside the United
+States. The FISA Amendments Act of 2008, instead of adopting the Protect America Act's
+modified definition of "electronic surveillance," explicitly stated that the targeting of
+non-U.S. persons outside the United States shall be conducted under the new FISA
+procedures, which does not require an application for a FISA order. In this way, the FISA
+Amendments Act accomplished the same goal as the Protect America Act without
+exempting the targeting of U.S. persons outside the United States from FISA's
+individualized order requirements. (U)
+
+264
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+
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+
+to direct surveillance at persons within the United States or at U.S. persons
+outside the United States.³²⁰ (U)
+
+In contrast, to conduct U.S.-based surveillance of U.S. persons
+reasonably believed to be located outside the United States, the FISA
+Amendments Act requires the government to obtain individualized FISA
+Court orders for 90-day periods based on a showing of probable cause to
+believe that the U.S. person is outside the United States and is a foreign
+power or an agent, officer, or employee of a foreign power. Such
+surveillance previously was governed by Executive Order 12333, and
+required only a certification from the Attorney General, not the FISA Court.
+(U)
+
+Compared to Stellar Wind, the FISA Amendments Act provides the
+government broader authority to acquire in the United States, with Court
+supervision, the communications of non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to
+be located outside the United States. Under Stellar Wind, the NSA was
+authorized to collect communications where there was probable cause to
+believe the communications originated or terminated outside the United
+States and a party to the communications was al Qaeda or a group affiliated
+with al Qaeda. Under the FISA Amendments Act, the NSA is authorized to
+collect in the United States any communications of non-U.S. persons
+reasonably believed to be located outside the United States, provided a
+significant purpose of the acquisition pertains to foreign intelligence. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+³²⁰ Like the Protect America Act, in addition to these targeting procedures the
+certification the government is required to file with the FISA Court must also contain
+minimization procedures and state that a significant purpose of the acquisition that will be
+conducted is to obtain foreign intelligence information. However, unlike the Protect
+America Act the FISA Amendments Act does not limit the FISA Court's review of the
+targeting procedures to a "clearly erroneous" standard. On August 5, 2008, the
+government submitted to the FISA Court a certification pursuant to the FISA Amendments
+Act. On September 5, 2008, the Court approved the certification and the use of the
+targeting and minimization procedures the government submitted. (S//NF)
+
+³²¹ On the other hand, the FISA Amendments Act does not similarly broaden the
+government's authority to conduct surveillance of U.S. persons reasonably believed to be
+located outside the United States. The Presidential Authorizations did not distinguish
+between U.S. and non-U.S. persons, and the NSA was authorized under Stellar Wind to
+intercept the communications of U.S. persons (domestic selectors) provided the
+communications originated or terminated outside the United States.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+265
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
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+
+In Chapter Three, we noted that under certain circumstances
+technological limitations associated with the e-mail content aspect of the
+Stellar Wind program caused [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The NSA undertook measures to identify and correct incidents [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] under Stellar Wind, and the government described the issue
+to the FISA Court in the December 2006 application that sought to bring
+Stellar Wind's content collection under FISA authority.[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//SI//NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+266
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
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+
+V. OIG Analysis (U)
+
+As discussed in this chapter, the government's effort to transition
+Stellar Wind from presidential authority to FISA, which began in March
+2004, eventually resulted in all three baskets of collection being authorized
+by FISA. While the legal theories supporting this transition were aggressive,
+we believe that the Department could have and should have pursued
+transition to FISA as a viable legal alternative earlier than it did, rather than
+operate aspects of the Stellar Wind program solely under presidential
+authority for several years. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+In Chapters Three and Four we discussed John Yoo's 2001 and 2002
+memoranda concerning the legality of Stellar Wind and his contention that
+FISA represented an unconstitutional infringement on the President's
+Commander-in-Chief authority under Article II of the Constitution to
+conduct electronic surveillance during wartime. We recognize that Yoo's
+analysis was to some extent a response to the extraordinary circumstances
+that confronted the federal government immediately after the September 11
+terrorist attacks and its effort to take emergency steps to thwart what many
+officials believed was an imminent second wave of attacks. Yet, even if one
+agrees with Yoo's Article II analysis and supports the decision to enhance
+outside the judicial or legislative process the NSA's signals intelligence
+collection capabilities, we believe there are strong countervailing
+considerations that favored attempting to transition the program to FISA,
+especially as Stellar Wind became less a temporary response to the
+September 11 attacks and more a permanent surveillance tool.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Chief among these considerations was the Stellar Wind program's
+substantial effect on privacy interests of U.S. persons. Under Stellar Wind,
+the government engaged in an unprecedented collection of information
+concerning U.S. persons. The President authorized the NSA to intercept,
+without judicial approval or oversight, the content of international
+communications involving many U.S. persons and the NSA collected large
+amounts of non-content data about U.S. persons' domestic and
+international telephone calls and to a lesser extent e-mail communications
+for possible analysis consistent with the extant Presidential Authorization.
+We believe the FISA Court, as an Article III court and the judicial authority
+charged by statute to oversee U.S.-based electronic surveillance and other
+collection activities affecting U.S. persons for foreign intelligence purposes,
+was the appropriate entity to monitor and approve such broad acquisitions
+
+267
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
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+
+of U.S.-person information conducted under Stellar Wind.³²²
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Second, as several Justice Department and NSA officials commented,
+the FISA statute offered a "firmer footing" for the NSA's collection activities
+under Stellar Wind. As discussed in Chapter Three and Four, the
+aggressive assertion of Article II authority on which Stellar Wind was based
+largely reflected the legal reasoning of a single Justice Department attorney
+working alone, without adequate review or scrutiny of his analysis. As we
+also concluded, this led to a flawed legal analysis on which the program
+rested for several years. This approach also led to a contentious dispute
+between Department and White House officials in 2004 involving renewal of
+aspects of the program. By contrast, the FISA statute provided an
+alternative basis for Stellar Wind-like collection activities that we believe
+should have been considered, and pursued, much earlier by the
+Administration. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+In this regard, the White House's strict control over the Justice
+Department's access to the program lessened the opportunity for lawyers
+with relevant expertise to advise the Administration on the viability of
+working within the FISA statute to achieve the same operational objectives
+as the Stellar Wind program. Moreover, as the limited number of
+Department read-ins persisted, meaningful consideration of FISA as an
+alternative to presidential authority for the program was limited.³²³
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+³²² For instance, under Stellar Wind the meta data querying standards did not
+include restrictions on acquiring data that may have been based solely on the exercise of
+First Amendment rights. When these activities were placed under the FISA Court's
+supervision, the Court required that this intelligence-gathering activity adhere to the FISA
+standard that an e-mail address or telephone number cannot be targeted for acquisition
+based solely on activities protected by the First Amendment. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+³²³ [REDACTED]
+
+268
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+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
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+
+We also found there were operational benefits to transitioning Stellar
+Wind to FISA. The PR/TT and Section 215 Orders to collect e-mail and
+telephone meta data that were eventually obtained from the FISA Court
+allowed the government to compel[REDACTED] the
+telecommunications carriers.[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The transition of Stellar Wind to FISA authority, together with the
+passage of the Protect America Act, allowed the NSA to begin the process to
+close, or "de-compartment," the Stellar Wind program. This change, which
+was not completed until mid-2008, has allowed agents in FBI field offices
+greater access to information about the telephone numbers and e-mail
+addresses being provided as leads. As described in Chapter Three, the
+principal complaint of agents who were assigned [REDACTED] and
+[REDACTED] leads was the lack of detail provided about the nature of the
+international contacts and the foreign entity allegedly involved with
+terrorism that was one of the communicants. These details often were not
+provided because of the highly classified and compartmented nature of the
+Stellar Wind program. Now that such information is gathered under FISA
+authority and not compartmented as it was under Stellar Wind, it is
+classified at a level that allows agents in FBI field offices to gain access to
+additional details upon request.³²⁴ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+We recognize that Stellar Wind's transition to FISA resulted in the
+imposition of new responsibilities and conditions on the exercise of these
+unprecedented collection authorities. In the PR/TT and Section 215 Orders,
+the FISA Court imposed significant oversight measures that were not
+required under Stellar Wind. To be sure, the government, particularly the
+NSA, must devote substantial resources to ensure compliance with these
+oversight measures. Yet, we believe that such requirements are
+appropriate, given the massive amounts of data collected and the potential
+impact on the privacy interests of U.S. persons. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+We also recognize that the transition of content collection from
+presidential authority to statutory authority under FISA resulted in
+significant diminution in authorized surveillance activity of the content of
+communications. We described in this chapter how first under Judge
+Howard's Order, and then more significantly under Judge Vinson's revised
+
+³²⁴ Chapter Six of this report discusses FBI agents' improved access to
+program-derived information under FISA after the Stellar Wind program was closed.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+269
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+
+Order, the NSA placed increasingly fewer foreign selectors under FISA
+coverage as compared to Stellar Wind. The NSA was tasking [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] foreign selectors under Stellar Wind at the time of the first content
+application in December 2006, but placed [REDACTED] foreign selectors under
+surveillance coverage under Judge Vinson's May 2007 Order. National
+Security Division officials told us that they successfully added
+approximately [REDACTED] foreign selectors under the terms of the
+Court's Order. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+However, we believe that such broad surveillance and collection
+activities conducted in the United States, particularly for a significant period
+of time, should be conducted pursuant to statute and judicial oversight,
+even though this resulted in a diminution of foreign selectors due to
+resource issues. We also believe that placing the activities under Court
+supervision provides an important measure of accountability for the
+government's conduct that is less assured when the activities are both
+authorized and supervised by the Executive Branch alone.³²⁵
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+In sum, we concluded there were compelling reasons to pursue
+beginning the process of transitioning the collection activities of Stellar
+Wind to FISA authority earlier than [REDACTED] 2004. These included the
+program's large collection of information about U.S. persons, which
+warranted judicial oversight; the instability of the legal reasoning on which
+the program rested for several years; and the substantial restrictions placed
+on FBI agents' access to and use of program-derived information due to
+Stellar Wind's highly classified status. We acknowledge that transitioning
+Stellar Wind's collection activities to FISA would have been an enormously
+complex and time-consuming effort that rested upon novel interpretations
+and uses of FISA that not all FISA Court judges would authorize.
+Nevertheless, the events described in this chapter demonstrate that a full
+transition to FISA authority was achievable and, and in our judgment,
+should have been pursued earlier. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+³²⁵ Even Judge Vinson's decision regarding the foreign selectors content
+application, [REDACTED] was not
+without benefit. Judge Vinson's decision reflected what some intelligence officials
+considered limitations in the FISA statute as it applied to the acquisition of
+communications in the United States of persons located outside the United States,
+especially non-U.S. persons. In this way, transitioning Stellar Wind's content collection to
+FISA helped the government make its case to Congress in concrete, non-hypothetical terms
+for modernization legislation amending the statute. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
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+
+CHAPTER SIX
+[REDACTED] (S//NF)
+
+The preceding chapters examined the evolution of the Stellar Wind
+program and its transition from Presidential Authorization to FISA
+authority. In this chapter, we examine more closely the FBI's involvement
+in Stellar Wind and the impact the program had on FBI counterterrorism
+efforts. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED] is the codename for the project, classified at the Secret
+level, that the FBI initiated in September 2002 to disseminate Stellar Wind
+information to FBI field offices in a manner that did not disclose the source
+of the information or the means by which it was acquired. The FBI
+originally opened [REDACTED] as an administrative file to serve as the
+repository for all communications FBI Headquarters disseminated to FBI
+field offices relating to Stellar Wind information, as well as all
+communications FBI Headquarters received from field offices reporting the
+results of any investigation conducted in response to the "tipped"
+information originating from Stellar Wind. In November 2006, the FBI
+opened an investigative file under the name [REDACTED]³²⁶ to
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Section I of his chapter summarizes how the FBI used [REDACTED] to
+disseminate Stellar Wind information to FBI field offices. Section II
+describes the FBI's decision in mid-2003 to make its headquarters-based
+Communications Analysis Unit (CAU), instead of FBI field offices,
+responsible for issuing National Security Letters (NSL) to obtain subscriber
+information for telephone numbers (basket 2 of Stellar Wind) disseminated
+under [REDACTED]³²⁷ Section III discusses the role the FBI played,
+beginning in approximately March 2004, in the process to "scrub"
+international terrorism FISA applications for Stellar Wind information.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Section IV of this chapter examines the impact of the information
+obtained from Stellar Wind on FBI counterterrorism efforts. It first provides
+statistics concerning the number of tippers the NSA derived from Stellar
+Wind information - telephony, e-mail, and content - disseminated to FBI
+
+³²⁶ As discussed in Chapter Three, [REDACTED] was preceded by the [REDACTED]
+which the FBI created in October 2001 to receive and disseminate Stellar
+Wind-derived information. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+³²⁷ The CAU is the successor to the Telephone Analysis Unit (TAU), which the FBI
+created after the September 11 terrorist attacks to analyze telephone communications. The
+CAU assumed TAU's responsibilities in late 2002. (S//NF)
+
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+field offices through the [REDACTED] process. Next, it describes how FBI
+field offices generally investigated [REDACTED] tippers and the typical results
+of the investigations. The section then summarizes two statistical surveys
+of meta data tippers the FBI conducted in 2006 to assess the value of Stellar
+Wind to FBI operations, and describes observations about the program's
+contribution and value provided by FBI officials and employees in OIG
+interviews and contained in documents the OIG obtained during the course
+of this review. In addition, the section examines five FBI international
+terrorism investigations commonly cited as examples of Stellar Wind's
+contribution to counterterrorism efforts in the United States.³²⁸
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Lastly, Section V of this chapter contains the OIG's analysis of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] impact on FBI operations. (S//NF)
+
+I. [REDACTED] Proces (S//NF)
+The [REDACTED] process was managed by a group of FBI employees
+from CAU, designated as "Team 10,” who in February 2003 were assigned
+full-time to the NSA to work on the Stellar Wind program.³²⁹ Team 10 was
+described to us as a "conduit" and a "curtain" between Stellar Wind and the
+FBI, in that Team 10's chief responsibility was to disseminate Stellar
+Wind-derived information to FBI field offices for investigation without
+disclosing that the NSA was the source of the information or how the NSA
+acquired the information. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Team 10 initially was staffed with two FBI special agents (one of
+whom served as supervisor) and two analysts. The CAU subsequently
+replaced one agent position with a third analyst and later added a fourth
+analyst. At the NSA, Team 10 was co-located in a large open space with
+dozens of NSA and other Intelligence Community personnel assigned to the
+Stellar Wind program. Each team member was provided a computer with
+direct access to NSA information associated with Stellar Wind. The NSA
+told the OIG that Team 10 members worked at the NSA under the authority
+of the NSA Director and as such were required to adhere to NSA
+minimization rules and attend the same training as NSA employees. Team
+10 members also were provided access to Stellar Wind-related systems and
+
+³²⁸ As noted above, our report examines the FBI's role in the Stellar Wind program
+and does not review the use of the program by other agencies, such as the CIA. (S//NF)
+
+³²⁹ The CAU is organized into ten teams, nine of which are responsible for providing
+communications analysis support to specific field offices and FBI Legal Attaches (Legat).
+According to an FBI organizational chart, Team 10 supports "Off-site Intelligence
+Community Special Projects." Team 10 was exclusively responsible for managing [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+(S//NF)
+
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+databases, and had access from their computers to FBI systems such the
+Automated Case Support (ACS) system and [REDACTED]
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The process under [REDACTED] to disseminate Stellar Wind
+information was similar to the process the FBI established under the [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] described in Chapter Three. In short, the NSA provided Top
+Secret, compartmented Stellar Wind reports to Team 10, which in turn
+converted the information into Secret, non-compartmented [REDACTED]
+electronic communications (EC) and disseminated the communications,
+referred to as [REDACTED] "tippers," to FBI field offices for appropriate
+action.³³⁰ The [REDACTED] process was applied, with some differences, to
+each of Stellar Wind's three "baskets" of information. The vast majority of
+Stellar Wind reports involved the NSA's analysis of telephony meta data –
+that is, basic information such as date, time, and duration, about contacts
+between foreign and domestic telephone numbers for which the NSA
+determined there was a reasonable articulable suspicion to believe were
+related to al Qaeda or an affiliated group.³³¹ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Each [REDACTED] EC included a paragraph that summarized the
+[REDACTED] project and explained that the CAU could not disclose the
+source of the information contained in the EC, but that the information
+came from a "sensitive and highly reliable" source. Each EC also included a
+paragraph advising the field offices that the information provided by the
+[REDACTED] source could be used for "lead purposes only" and could not be
+"incorporated into any affidavit, court proceeding, FISA application or
+
+³³⁰ [REDACTED]
+³³¹ [REDACTED]
+
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+
+unclassified investigative file." In addition, each [REDACTED] EC assigned a
+"lead" that instructed the field office what investigative action, if any, should
+be taken regarding the information provided. We further describe [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] leads and FBI field offices' handling of them in Section IV of this
+chapter. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Before Team 10 disseminated Stellar Wind-derived information to field
+offices, an analyst queried FBI databases for relevant information about the
+telephone number, e-mail address, or individual (in the case of a content
+report) identified in the Stellar Wind report. These queries often identified,
+for example, subscriber information the FBI previously obtained for Stellar
+Wind telephone numbers as part of a prior FBI investigation, or active
+counterterrorism investigations in which the subscriber to a Stellar
+Wind-targeted number was the subject or in which the number, and
+sometimes the subscriber, were referenced. Team 10 analysts also checked
+public and commercial databases, most commonly in connection with
+e-mail addresses. These checks sometimes identified the specific [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] and any domain names the user of an e-mail address
+had registered. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Any such information Team 10 located
+about a Stellar Wind-derived telephone number or e-mail address was
+included in the [REDACTED] EC as a "CAU Comment" or an "Analyst
+Comment" to differentiate the FBI information from the information
+provided by the Stellar Wind source.³³² (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Over time, Team 10 began to do more than receive and disseminate
+program-derived information. For example, Team 10 occasionally submitted
+telephone numbers to the NSA for possible querying against the database
+containing the bulk telephony meta data collected under Stellar Wind.³³³
+
+³³² In this respect, Team 10 handled Stellar Wind content reports differently from
+meta data reports. Team 10 analysts typically did not perform additional analytical work
+on the information provided in Stellar Wind content reports other than to identify any FBI
+cases to which the information was relevant. For example, a content report might
+summarize intercepted communications indicating that an acquaintance of the subject of
+an FBI investigation is traveling to or from the United States. The connection between this
+Stellar Wind information and the relevant FBI investigation would be reported in the [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] EC. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+³³³ As described in previous chapters, the purpose of the bulk collection of meta
+data under Stellar Wind was to allow the NSA to use analytical tools such as contact
+chaining [REDACTED] to identify known and unknown individuals associated with
+al Qaeda or an al Qaeda affiliate. The technique involves querying the telephony or e-mail
+database with a number or address for which an analyst had a "reasonable articulable
+suspicion to believe was used by persons involved in al Qaeda or an al Qaeda affiliate, and
+then examining any contacts with that number or address. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
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+
+The telephone numbers Team 10 provided typically were obtained from the
+FBI's domestic and international counterterrorism operations, such as a
+number identified during a phone conversation monitored under FISA or a
+number found in the address book of a subject arrested abroad. The NSA
+conducted independent analysis to determine whether telephone numbers
+(or e-mail addresses) provided by Team 10 met the querying standard
+established by the Presidential Authorizations that governed Stellar Wind
+(that is, a reasonable articulable suspicion to believe that communications
+from the telephone number relate to al Qaeda or an affiliated group).³³⁴
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Team 10 also contributed to the NSA's drafting process for Stellar
+Wind reports. Telephone numbers and e-mail addresses identified through
+queries of the databases that contained the bulk telephony and e-mail meta
+data were reviewed by NSA analysts to determine whether the contacts
+should be reported to the FBI in a Stellar Wind report. Team 10
+participated in this process by reviewing draft reports and providing any
+information from FBI databases that might be relevant to this
+determination.³³⁵ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+We were told that one of the benefits of Team 10's presence at the
+NSA and its involvement in the Stellar Wind report drafting process was an
+improvement in the quality of the information disseminated to FBI field
+offices. For example, the FBI Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) who
+supervised Team 10 from April 2005 to July 2006 told the OIG that he tried
+to reduce the NSA's reporting of telephone numbers that were several hops
+removed from the telephone number linked to al Qaeda or an affiliated
+terrorist group. He said that he wanted Team 10 to disseminate "solid
+numbers with value,” not numbers with questionable value such as "high
+volume numbers" (public telephones, for example) and [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The FBI SSA said that the NSA expressed the concern
+
+³³⁴ Team 10 analysts submitted such telephone numbers to the NSA electronically
+through "Requests for Information," or RFIs, which is the formal process by which the FBI
+and other agencies provide leads and request information from the Stellar Wind database.
+FBI records indicate that from April 2002 to January 2006 the FBI directed [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] to NSA analysts for possible analysis under Stellar Wind. The records do not
+indicate the disposition of each RFI. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+³³⁵ The NSA developed formal "checklists" to guide the Stellar Wind report drafting
+process for telephony and e-mail tippers. The checklists include over 30 steps that NSA
+analysts were required to complete, and a supervisor had to approve, before a report could
+be distributed to the FBI or any other Stellar Wind customers (the CIA and National
+Counterterrorism Center). A significant feature of the checklist from the FBI's perspective
+was the requirement that NSA analysts check any telephone numbers and e-mail addresses
+in a draft report with the FBI and "make best effort to include FBI... data in [the] tipper."
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
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+
+that it could not foresee whether any particular contact, although remote,
+might prevent the next terrorist attack, and did not want to find itself in the
+position of defending its decision not to pass that number to the FBI.
+However, he said the NSA took several steps to improve the quality of
+information such as [REDACTED] for the domestic contacts that
+were reported and including analytical judgments about the contacts.³³⁶
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+As discussed in Chapter Five, the government transitioned Stellar
+Wind's bulk e-mail meta data collection (basket 3) to FISA authority in July
+2004 with the Pen Register/Trap and Trace Order, bulk telephony meta
+data collection (basket 2) in May 2006 with the Section 215 Business
+Records Order, and content collection (basket 1) in January 2007 when the
+FISA Court granted the government's domestic and foreign selectors
+applications. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+However, after the transition was completed the NSA continued to
+produce reports within the Stellar Wind compartment to the FBI and other
+program customers, even though the information contained in the reports
+was derived from the FISA-authorized collection activities. Consequently,
+the FBI continued to disseminate the information under the [REDACTED]
+process. The current Team 10 supervisor told us that this decision, reached
+after consultation with the FBI's Office of the General Counsel (OGC), was
+made to adhere to the FISA Court's continuing requirement that
+international terrorism FISA applications be scrubbed for Stellar Wind
+information (the procedure for which is described in Section III of this
+chapter). (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The NSA received permission to begin the process to close, or
+"de-compartment," the Stellar Wind program after the Protect America Act
+was passed in August 2007. In mid-2008, the NSA officially closed the
+program and discontinued issuing "Stellar Wind" reports. In November
+2008, the FBI initiated a new investigative file, [REDACTED] to
+disseminate the NSA's FISA-derived information.³³⁷ The Team 10 supervisor
+
+³³⁶ The NSA told us that one of the difficulties it faced with the Stellar Wind
+program was that the NSA was serving two customers - the FBI and the CIA - but had just
+one set of reporting guidelines. This was so because the NSA traditionally does not provide
+single-agency reporting except in narrowly defined circumstances. [REDACTED]
+(S//NF)
+
+³³⁷ According to the FBI memorandum explaining the predication for opening the
+file, the focus of [REDACTED] investigation is on known and unknown operatives of [REDACTED]
+FBI had [REDACTED] The memorandum stated that as of August 2008 the [REDACTED]
+open national security investigations related to [REDACTED]
+of individuals believed to be associated with [REDACTED] (Contd.)
+
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+
+told us that the dissemination process and the FBI's coordination with the
+NSA under [REDACTED] is similar to what occurred under [REDACTED]
+However, one notable difference is that the NSA's FISA-derived reports,
+while classified at the Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information
+(TS/SCI) level, are not subject to the highly restrictive Stellar Wind
+compartment designation, which is significant from an operational
+standpoint. [REDACTED] ECs, like [REDACTED] ECs, can only include
+information classified Secret or lower because the FBI's primary computer
+network for disseminating communications cannot be used for Top Secret
+information. Unlike under [REDACTED] agents in field offices can now
+request access to additional information about [REDACTED] leads because
+agents have the appropriate clearances. As discussed in Chapter Three and
+addressed below, the chief criticism of [REDACTED] leads was the lack of
+detailed information that could be provided to field agents about tippers
+because of the highly compartmented nature of Stellar Wind.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+II. FBI's Decision to Issue National Security Letters under [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] to Obtain Telephone Subscriber Information (S//NF)
+
+From August 2003 to November 2006, as part of the [REDACTED]
+process the Communications Analysis Unit (CAU) assumed responsibility
+from the field offices for requesting National Security Letters (NSL) to obtain
+subscriber information for [REDACTED] telephone number tippers.³³⁸ The
+NSLs were authorized by the FBI's OGC and issued pursuant to the [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] project. As discussed below, however, this practice was contrary to
+applicable FBI investigative guidelines because [REDACTED] was opened as a
+non-investigative file and therefore under FBI policy should not have been
+used as the basis for issuing NSLS. (S//NF)
+
+The FBI uses NSLs to obtain information from third parties such as
+telephone companies, financial institutions, Internet service providers, and
+consumer credit agencies. NSLs, authorized by five specific provisions
+contained in four federal statutes, direct third parties to provide customer
+account information and transactional records such as telephone toll billing
+
+[REDACTED] of individuals believed to be associated with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] of [REDACTED] (S//NF)
+
+³³⁸ Field offices remained responsible for issuing NSLs in connection with e-mail
+address tippers, which was likely attributable to the comparatively low volume of e-mail
+tippers and the ability of field offices to handle them expeditiously. (S//NF)
+
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+records.³³⁹ The OIG issued two reviews in 2007 and 2008 examining the
+FBI's use of NSLS.³⁴⁰ (U)
+
+Justice Department investigative guidelines issued by the Attorney
+General govern the circumstances under which the FBI may use NSLs. The
+Attorney General guidelines in effect during the Stellar Wind program
+authorized the FBI to issue NSLs relevant to and in the course of an
+authorized national security investigation.³⁴¹ Further, FBI internal policy
+distinguishes between "investigative files" and non-investigative
+"administrative files" (commonly referred to as "control files"). This
+distinction is not a mere technicality. Investigative files, in the national
+security context, are opened based on evidence that a person, group, or
+organization is involved in international terrorism. From October 2003 to
+September 2008, the Attorney General Guidelines required the FBI to
+provide summary reports to the Justice Department at the end of each year
+
+³³⁹ The four federal statutes are the Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C.
+§§ 3401-3422; the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), 18 U.S.C. § 2709; the
+Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.; and the National Security Act, 50
+U.S.C. § 436(a)(1) (2000). NSLs issued under [REDACTED] relied on the ECPA statute, which
+provides that the FBI may obtain subscriber information from a communications service
+provider if the FBI certifies that the information sought is
+
+relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against international
+terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities provided that such an
+investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely on the basis
+of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution of the
+United States.
+
+18 U.S.C. § 2709(b)(2) (2000 & Supp. IV 2005). The statute also permits access to "toll
+billing records" or "electronic communication transactional records," 18 U.S.C. § 2709(a),
+but requires a warrant for access to the content of telephone communications. See 18
+U.S.C. § 2511 (Wiretap Act) and 3121 (Pen Register Act); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(8).
+(U)
+
+³⁴⁰ The OIG's first report on NSLs, issued in March 2007, was entitled, A Review of
+the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Use of National Security Letters. The OIG's second
+report, issued in March 2008, was entitled, A Review of the FBI's Use of National Security
+Letters: Assessment of Corrective Actions and Examination of NSL Usage in 2006. (U)
+
+³⁴¹ From March 8, 1999, through October 31, 2003, national security investigations
+were governed by the Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI Foreign Intelligence Collection
+and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations (FCI Guidelines). The FCI Guidelines were
+replaced, effective October 31, 2003, with the Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI
+National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (NSI Guidelines). (U)
+
+The evidentiary standard for initiating an investigation is the same under both sets
+of guidelines. To open a full investigation, the FBI is required to demonstrate [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] A preliminary investigation (or
+"inquiry," under the FCI guidelines) requires only a showing of [REDACTED]
+of such involvement. See NSI Guidelines, Section II.C. (October 31, 2003); FCI Guidelines,
+Section III.B. (March 8, 1999). (S//NF)
+
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+a full national security investigation continues. These requirements helped
+ensure that there was sufficient, documented predication for investigative
+activities FBI agents sought to conduct, such as requesting NSLs. (S//NF)
+
+Control files, in contrast, are "separate files established for the
+purpose of administering specific phases of an investigative matter or
+program." The files do not require any predication and remain open
+indefinitely without any reporting requirements for national security
+investigations. For example, the September 2002 EC requesting that a
+control file [REDACTED] be opened for Stellar Wind information stated that
+"a dedicated control file for this project will better serve the specific needs of
+the special project and will add an additional layer of security for the
+source." The file has remained open since September 2002 without any
+official documentation of need or justification. (As discussed below, in
+November 2006 the FBI opened an [REDACTED] investigative file; however,
+the [REDACTED] control file was not closed at that time.)
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The FBI's National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) Manual states
+that [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]³⁴² Thus, in accordance with the NFIP Manual, it was
+improper for the FBI to issue NSLs from control files during the Stellar Wind
+program. (9//NF)
+
+The OIG's March 2007 NSL report identified the [REDACTED] project as
+one of two circumstances where the FBI was using control files rather than
+investigative files to issue NSLs. The OIG report concluded that this use
+was contrary to FBI policy. However, our report also found that the CAU
+officials involved in the decision to issue NSLs from the [REDACTED] control
+file concluded in good faith that the FBI had sufficient predication either to
+connect the [REDACTED] NSLs with existing preliminary or full investigations
+of al Qaeda and affiliated groups or to open new preliminary or full
+investigations in compliance with Justice Department investigative
+guidelines. (S//NF)
+
+³⁴² [REDACTED]
+
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+
+As part of our review of the FBI's participation in Stellar Wind, we
+sought additional explanation for the use of NSLs under [REDACTED]. We
+were told the purpose of having the CAU instead of the field offices obtain
+approval for the issuance of such NSLs was to make the telephony tippers
+more "actionable" by ensuring that field offices at a minimum knew the
+subscribers for the numbers. As described in Chapter Three, the members
+of the [REDACTED] (the predecessor to [REDACTED]) had received
+complaints from agents in FBI field offices that [REDACTED] leads lacked
+direction about how to make investigative use of the telephone numbers and
+did not provide sufficient information to open national security
+investigations. This was problematic because leads disseminated under the
+[REDACTED] and for a time under [REDACTED] instructed field
+offices to obtain subscriber information for tipped telephone numbers.
+Thus, if agents could not locate the information in FBI or commercial
+databases, they faced a dilemma about how to proceed in the absence of
+what they viewed as sufficient predication. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The CAU's first Unit Chief (who served in an Acting capacity)
+discussed the problem in an EC distributed in January 2003 that addressed
+the [REDACTED] project. The EC stated,
+
+Depending on the nature of the information provided [in an [REDACTED]
+lead], field offices may determine this intelligence
+could be used to predicate either a criminal investigation or an
+intelligence investigation of someone in their territory. Some of
+the [REDACTED] leads may contain a request for a field office to
+confirm a subscriber in their territory, if possible, in addition to
+providing intelligence. The identification of some subscribers
+might actually require a National Security Letter (NSL) or a
+Grand Jury subpoena; however, the [REDACTED] control file
+would not be the appropriate legal authority for these requests.
+(S//NF)
+
+The Acting Unit Chief's supervision of the CAU ended in February
+2003. In March 2003, another FBI Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) was
+appointed as the CAU's first permanent Unit Chief. He told us that when he
+joined the CAU he was aware that field offices sometimes did not obtain
+subscriber information on tippers because some agents did not believe
+[REDACTED] ECs provided sufficient information to open a national security
+investigation. The Unit Chief disagreed, based in part on his insider
+knowledge about how Stellar Wind operated. He said that he believed the
+
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+
+[REDACTED] tippers contained sufficient information to open preliminary
+investigations and issue NSLs.³⁴³ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The Unit Chief wanted field offices at a minimum to know the identity
+of subscribers of tipped telephone numbers. He also said it was important
+to ascertain the correct identities of the subscribers at the time the tipped
+calls were placed. The Unit Chief stated that if the field office did not issue
+an NSL for subscriber information promptly, or if the field office relied only
+on publicly available information, the passage of time could cause the user
+of the phone to be misidentified. In addition, the Unit Chief said that even if
+a tipper did not result in any investigative value at the time of the tip, it
+nevertheless was important to identify the subscriber in the event the tipper
+became relevant in the future or to another investigation. For all of these
+reasons, the Unit Chief said he took steps to make the CAU, instead of the
+FBI field offices, responsible for issuing NSLs for telephone number tippers
+under the Stellar Wind program.³⁴⁴ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+In approximately July 2003, a CAU analyst was read into the Stellar
+Wind program to process [REDACTED] NSLs. The analyst told us she
+questioned the Unit Chief and the Team 10 supervisor about whether it was
+permissible to issue NSLs out of a control file. The Unit Chief told us that
+he was not aware at this time that a control file such as [REDACTED] could
+not be used to issue NSLs. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The analyst volunteered to approach FBI OGC and met with Marion
+"Spike" Bowman of the OGC's National Security Law Unit to discuss this
+concern. She said she told Bowman that the CAU wanted to know if it
+could issue NSLs under [REDACTED] in view of its status as a control file.
+She said she told Bowman that the NSLs would seek subscriber information
+only and that field offices would be responsible for seeking related toll billing
+records if warranted by additional investigation. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+According to the analyst, Bowman said that it would be permissible to
+issue NSLs out of the [REDACTED] file as long as only subscriber information
+was sought. The analyst said she could not recall whether Bowman
+affirmatively stated that issuing NSLs from a control file would be
+
+³⁴³ On January 16, 2003, 2 months before the FBI SSA was appointed Unit Chief of
+the CAU, Attorney General Ashcroft authorized the FBI to issue NSLs during preliminary
+investigations. Prior to this time, the FCI guidelines authorized the FBI to issue NSLs only
+as part of a "full investigation." (S//NF)
+
+³⁴⁴ The Unit Chief told us that he did not believe it was critical at the preliminary
+stage to also obtain telephone subscribers' calling records, or "toll records," identifying all
+outgoing and incoming calls. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+281
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+
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+
+permissible or whether he merely agreed that it would be permissible under
+the conditions the analyst presented.³⁴⁵ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Shortly after the meeting, the CAU implemented procedures for
+requesting that OGC issue NSLs to obtain subscriber information for each
+[REDACTED] telephone number tipper disseminated to field offices that the
+FBI was not already aware of or for which it did not have subscriber
+information. Under these procedures, the CAU analyst received a copy of
+each [REDACTED] EC with telephone number tippers as they were issued by
+Team 10 and drafted a separate approval EC to the NSLB that repeated this
+information and requested that the NSLB issue NSLs for the numbers listed.
+NSLB attorneys were responsible for determining whether the NSL requests
+were "relevant to an authorized investigation," as required by statute. If the
+attorneys determined that they were, NSLs were drafted and signed by the
+Deputy General Counsel for NSLB and forwarded to the CAU for service on
+the appropriate communications service providers. The providers returned
+the responsive records to the CAU, which in turn disseminated the
+information to the appropriate FBI field offices. From August 2003 to
+November 2006, the CAU issued over 500 NSLs under [REDACTED]
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+We interviewed FBI Deputy General Counsel Julie Thomas about NSL
+issuance practices under [REDACTED]. Thomas was read into Stellar Wind
+shortly after joining the NSLB in October 2004. She was responsible for
+reviewing and authorizing [REDACTED] NSLs requested by the CAU. Thomas
+said she was familiar with the operational reasons the CAU began issuing
+NSLs under [REDACTED], but stated that it was not until the OIG was
+conducting its first review of the FBI's use of NSLs in 2006 that she learned
+[REDACTED] was a control file and the significance of this status as it related
+to issuing NSLS. Thomas said that the CAU's requests to NSLB to authorize
+NSLS under [REDACTED] always identified the specific file number associated
+with the project and indicated that the CAU had initiated a preliminary
+inquiry in connection with the NSL request. Thus, in Thomas's view, the
+NSL being requested was "relevant to" an authorized investigation, as
+
+³⁴⁵ FBI General Counsel Valerie Caproni told the OIG that she believes Bowman
+based his guidance to the CAU on the understanding that the NSA, by reporting a tipper to
+the FBI, already had established a reasonable articulable suspicion that the foreign end of
+the contact was related to al Qaeda or an affiliated group. Caproni said that in view of the
+hundreds of al Qaeda investigations the FBI was conducting, Bowman likely concluded it
+was permissible to issue NSLs under [REDACTED] for the subscriber information of tippers
+even if at the time there was not a specific investigation to which each NSL could be
+connected. The Team 10 supervisor at this time told the OIG that he recalled the decision
+to issue NSLs from [REDACTED] was based on [REDACTED] close relationship to the FBI's
+ongoing investigations of al Qaeda and affiliated groups. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+282
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+
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+-TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+required by statute and Justice Department investigative guidelines.³⁴⁶
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+However, Thomas said she did not believe the [REDACTED] NSLs were
+improper even though they were issued from a control file. Thomas stated
+that the NSLs in fact were relevant to authorized international terrorism
+investigations in that the FBI was conducting hundreds of investigations of
+al Qaeda and its affiliates at the time the NSLs issued. Thomas told the OIG
+that, notwithstanding this position, in November 2006 the FBI converted
+[REDACTED] to an "umbrella investigative file" to reflect the program's
+relationship to international terrorism investigations. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The OIG reviewed the communication from the CAU opening this
+investigative file. It stated that a member of the U.S. Intelligence
+Community [the NSA] reported to the FBI that al Qaeda members and
+associates are using telecommunications systems to facilitate their terrorist
+activities, that the FBI has independently determined that this is occurring,
+and that "inasmuch that Al-Qa'ida is a multi-faceted and international
+terrorism organization, the FBI has determined it is appropriate to open a
+full field investigative [sic]." The communication stated that the CAU was
+using information obtained from the member of the U.S. Intelligence
+Community to issue NSLs and that the results are disseminated to the
+appropriate FBI field offices. The communication also advised that all
+investigative leads associated with the investigation would be titled
+[REDACTED] to protect the source of the information and the methods used to
+obtain the information. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The FBI currently is taking a similar approach to NSLs under the
+[REDACTED]. A field office (instead of the CAU) is authorized to issue an
+NSL under the [REDACTED] investigative file, even if the field office does not
+open its own investigation and the tipped domestic telephone number or
+e-mail address is not relevant to another open investigation. However, NSLs
+issued under [REDACTED] can request subscriber information only and may not
+request transactional records, as was done under [REDACTED]
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+The FBI's decision to restrict [REDACTED] NSLs in this way was not
+required by law, but was an operational decision. As discussed below, FBI
+
+³⁴⁶ The [REDACTED] file number is [REDACTED]. Thomas told us that she
+did not realize that the "C" designation stood for "Control File." In addition, in the approval
+ECs reviewed by the OIG that sought the issuance of NSLs, the CAU stated, among other
+things, that the [REDACTED] source" reported telephonic contact between possible al Qaeda
+or other international terrorism entities and numbers in the United States and that "a
+preliminary CAU inquiry was conducted for the US telephone numbers reported by this
+source." (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+283
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+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+field offices addressed most [REDACTED] tippers by conducting "threat
+assessments" to determine whether the tipper had a nexus to terrorism and
+warranted the field office initiating a preliminary or full investigation. The
+subscriber information for a tipper is sufficient for purposes of completing a
+threat assessment. The same is true for [REDACTED] tippers, and the current
+Team 10 supervisor told us that it would not be a "good business" practice
+to collect transactional records on a U.S. person unless a threat assessment
+justified the field office initiating its own preliminary or full investigation of
+the individual. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+We believe the FBI should have opened an [REDACTED] investigative
+file in July 2003 and used it to issue NSLs related to Stellar Wind
+information. The Justice Department investigative guidelines in effect at
+that time authorized the FBI to open full investigations of groups for which
+there were specific and articulable facts to believe were involved in
+international terrorism, such as al Qaeda. However, the FBI decided to
+issue Stellar Wind NSLs from an existing control file, which was contrary to
+FBI internal policy. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+We did not find evidence that officials from the CAU and OGC involved
+in the decision to use an existing control file to issue NSLs related to Stellar
+Wind information deliberately tried to circumvent FBI guidelines. The July
+2003 rationale for issuing the NSLs out of the control file – the close
+relationship between the Stellar Wind program and the FBI's ongoing
+investigations of al Qaeda and affiliated groups – essentially was the
+reasoning used in November 2006 to open the [REDACTED] investigative file
+and in November 2008 to open the [REDACTED] investigative file. As we found
+in our March 2007 report concerning the FBI's use of NSLs, the CAU and
+OGC officials involved in the decision to issue NSLs from the [REDACTED]
+control file concluded in good faith that the FBI had sufficient predication
+either to connect the [REDACTED] NSLs with existing preliminary or full
+investigations of al Qaeda and attiliated groups or to open new preliminary
+or full investigations in compliance with Justice Department investigative
+guidelines. Nevertheless, the decision violated FBI internal policy.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+III. [REDACTED] and Scrubbing Process (TS//SI//NF)
+
+As discussed in Chapter Three, the Department implemented a
+process imposed by the FISA Court to "scrub" FISA applications to account
+for Stellar Wind-derived information. The objectives of the initial scrubbing
+process were to determine whether any NSA information contained in
+international terrorism FISA applications was derived from Stellar Wind and
+whether any of the facilities (telephone numbers or e-mail addresses)
+targeted by international terrorism FISA applications were also targeted for
+
+284
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+Stellar Wind collection (commonly referred to as dual coverage).
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The scrubbing process was coordinated by the Justice Department
+and NSA, beginning in February 2002 after Judge Lamberth was read into
+Stellar Wind. In May 2002, Judge Kollar-Kotelly succeeded Judge Lamberth
+as Presiding Judge of the FISA Court and continued the scrubbing
+procedures. However, whereas Judge Lamberth required only that he be
+notified of applications that contained Stellar Wind information, Judge
+Kollar-Kotelly required that such information be removed.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+As described in Chapter Four, on March 14, 2004, OIPR Counsel
+Baker briefed Judge Kollar-Kotelly about the President's decision to sign the
+March 11, 2004, Presidential Authorization without the Justice
+Department's certification as to the Authorization's form and legality, and
+about subsequent changes the Authorization made to the Stellar Wind
+program. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+According to a handwritten letter Judge Kollar-Kotelly drafted to
+Baker following this meeting, Baker had informed her that the Stellar Wind
+program [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The letter also stated that Baker informed her that with these
+changes the Deputy Attorney General agreed to certify the program as to
+form and legality, and that OLC had prepared a new legal memorandum
+regarding the legality of Stellar Wind to replace the November 2001
+memorandum authored by Yoo. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Judge Kollar-Kotelly's letter marked the first time her expectations
+concerning the Department's use of Stellar Wind information in FISA
+applications was communicated in writing to OIPR. Judge Kollar-Kotelly
+wrote,
+
+Although the Court has every confidence in the oral
+representations of Jim Baker [and] does not have any reason to
+question his honesty or credibility with the FISC or this judge, I
+am requesting that representations, previously done orally, now
+be put in writing that relate to [Stellar Wind] and FISA
+applications so that there are no misunderstandings.
+...
+I want to emphasize my position which has been consistent
+since I came on the FISC in May 2002, the [Stellar Wind]
+program and FISA applications are to be kept separate, and no
+
+285
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+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+information direct or indirect, derived or obtained from [Stellar
+Wind] should be included in FISA applications. Only in this
+way can the integrity of the process and intelligence collected
+through FISA applications be maintained.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Judge Kollar-Kotelly also wrote that she would not sign any FISA
+applications that contained substantive information from Stellar
+Wind-generated tips or any applications where the Stellar Wind tip was the
+sole or principal factor for an agency initiating the underlying investigation,
+"even if the investigation was conducted independently of the tip from
+[Stellar Wind]." (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Baker told us that this letter was Judge Kollar-Kotelly's preliminary
+response to the changes in the Stellar Wind program. Through subsequent
+discussions between Judge Kollar-Kotelly and Baker, and between Baker
+and other Department and FBI officials, a more flexible arrangement was
+reached on scrubbing that addressed Judge Kollar-Kotelly's concerns
+without imposing an absolute prohibition on including certain Stellar
+Wind-derived information in FISA applications.³⁴⁷
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+In short, the scrubbing procedures implemented in March 2004, and
+that continue to the present day, substantially expanded the procedures
+OIPR originally developed in February 2002.³⁴⁸ In addition to determining
+whether any NSA information contained in international terrorism FISA
+applications was derived from Stellar Wind and whether there was any dual
+coverage, Judge Kollar-Kotelly required the FBI to determine whether any
+facility (telephone number or e-mail address) that appeared in a FISA
+application also appeared in a Stellar Wind report and, if so, whether the
+FBI had developed, independent of Stellar Wind, an investigative interest in
+the facility before it was the subject of an [REDACTED] tipper.³⁴⁹ This third
+
+³⁴⁷ FBI OGC said that it was not until these discussions that the FBI was aware of
+the scrubbing procedures OIPR had implemented in approximately February 2002 after
+Judge Lamberth was read into the Stellar Wind program. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+³⁴⁸ The scrubbing procedures described here apply both to NSA information derived
+from the Stellar Wind program and to information derived from the FISA Court's PR/TT and
+Section 215 bulk meta data orders. Until mid-2008 when the Stellar Wind program
+officially was closed, leads the NSA developed from the FISA-authorized bulk meta
+data collections were disseminated under the Stellar Wind compartment.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+³⁴⁹ As discussed in Chapter Three, Baker did not believe in May 2002, when he first
+discussed the subject with Judge Kollar-Kotelly, that such a scrub was possible. Baker
+told us that by March 2004 he better understood the NSA's and FBI's process for
+disseminating Stellar Wind information and the agencies' ability to track program-derived
+tips in a timely manner. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+286
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+scrub is coordinated among OIPR, the FBI's National Security Law Branch
+(NSLB), and Team 10. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The scrub requires NSLB to compile a list of all "facilities" – telephone
+numbers and e-mail addresses - that appeared in any draft international
+terrorism FISA applications.³⁵⁰ This list is compiled as FISA packages
+become ready for filing with the Court and is provided to an attorney in
+NSLB read into the Stellar Wind program. The attorney in turn forwards the
+facilities list to Team 10 at the NSA. Team 10 checks each facility against
+the NSA's Stellar Wind reports database to determine whether a listed
+facility is contained in any Stellar Wind reports and, if so, whether the
+facility appeared in the tearline portion of a report that was further
+disseminated to FBI field offices. If both inquiries are positive, Team 10
+notes the date of the relevant Stellar Wind report and searches the FBI's
+Automated Case Support System (ACS) to determine whether the facility
+appears in ACS and, if so, the date the facility came to the FBI's attention.
+Team 10 reports the results of these checks to the NSLB attorney for review.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NE)
+
+The NSLB attorney takes one of two steps at this stage. If Team 10's
+checks are negative - meaning none of the facilities are contained in a
+Stellar Wind report or contained in information below the tearline of a
+Stellar Wind report - the NSLB scrub attorney notifies the OIPR attorney
+and FBI case agent that the FISA application can be cleared for presentation
+to the FISA Court and that the application can proceed to final processing.
+If both checks on a facility are positive, the NSLB attorney will try to
+determine if there is a basis for the Court to allow the information in the
+application based on the theories, discussed in further detail below, that the
+FBI had an independent investigative interest in or would have inevitably
+discovered the facility in question. To determine this, the NSLB attorney
+researches FBI databases, analyzes records, and attempts to craft an
+argument under one of these theories. The NSLB attorney then provides
+this information to OIPR for presentation the Court. If the NSLB attorney
+cannot find a basis for including the information under either of the
+theories, and the facility is not essential to the showing of probable cause
+for the requested FISA coverage, the facility is excised from the FISA
+application, and processing continues. If the information is important to
+the probable cause showing, the NSLB attorney discusses with OIPR
+whether to make the argument to the appropriate FISA Court judge (initially
+
+³⁵⁰ [REDACTED]
+
+287
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+Judge Kollar-Kotelly and now, the judge assigned to case) that the facility
+nevertheless can remain in the application. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+According to the Deputy General Counsel for NSLB, the argument to
+keep such information in an application is based on "standard Fourth
+Amendment [exclusionary rule] analysis." The "exclusionary rule" generally
+holds that where the government obtains evidence in violation of the Fourth
+Amendment, the court will suppress, or exclude, the evidence from the
+prosecutor's case-in-chief in a criminal trial. Under the "fruit of the
+poisonous tree" doctrine, a corollary to the exclusionary rule, any evidence
+obtained directly or derivatively from the government's improper conduct is
+also excluded. However, there are several exceptions to the exclusionary
+rule, two of which were relevant to scrubbing: independent source and
+inevitable discovery. The independent source exception holds that the
+exclusionary rule does not bar the use of evidence obtained in violation of
+the Fourth Amendment if there is also an independent, legal source for the
+evidence.³⁵¹ The inevitable discovery exception applies when evidence
+obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment would have been obtained
+independently had the illegal search not occurred, which the government
+must prove by a preponderance of the evidence.³⁵² (U)
+
+Thus, in the scrubbing context, the issue is whether the Stellar Wind
+information contained in a FISA application should not be excluded, either
+because the FBI had an investigative basis independent of Stellar Wind for
+including the information in the application or because the FBI inevitably
+would have discovered the information in the absence of Stellar Wind. More
+specifically, under the independent investigative basis exception, if Team
+10's search of ACS shows that a facility came to the FBI's attention before
+the facility appeared in a Stellar Wind report, this fact establishes that the
+FBI has an independent, non-Stellar Wind factual basis to include the
+facility in the application.³⁵³ NSLB Deputy General Counsel Thomas told us
+that in her experience the FBI already is aware of the facility - meaning it
+appears in ACS or other FBI databases - in nearly every instance that a
+facility contained in a FISA application also appears in a Stellar Wind
+report. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+³⁵¹ See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 805 (1984). (U)
+
+³⁵² See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984). (U)
+
+³⁵³ For example, in one case the NSLB attorney's review of the underlying investigative file showed that the FBI had obtained the telephone number at issue in response to an NSL Letter. Because the NSL was dated earlier than the Stellar Wind report that also contained the telephone number, the FBI had an independent investigative basis for including the number in the FISA application. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+288
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+The inevitable discovery exception in the scrubbing context applies
+when Team 10's check of ACS indicates the FBI was not aware of the facility
+before the date of the Stellar Wind report containing the facility. Under this
+approach, the NSLB attorney attempts to demonstrate to OIPR that normal
+investigative steps in the underlying investigation inevitably would have
+identified the facility in question. The scrubbing attorney analyzes such
+case evidence as close associates and other relationships of the
+subjects of the investigation that could logically lead investigators - through NSLs, for
+example - to the facility contained in the Stellar Wind report.³⁵⁴
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Until January 2006, when the full FISA Court was read into Stellar
+Wind, Judge Kollar-Kotelly required that all applications the FBI determined
+contained facilities or information that also appeared in Stellar Wind reports
+be cleared with her before being filed with the FISA Court. As she wrote in a
+January 12, 2005, letter to OIPR, "I want to ensure, that, to the extent
+possible, [Stellar Wind] information is excluded from applications submitted
+to the FISC and that, if it is necessary to include such information, it is
+specifically identified to the FISC as derived from [Stellar Wind] collection
+when the application is presented." OIPR Deputy Counsel Skelly-Nolen –
+who was read into Stellar Wind on March 12, 2004, but who had been
+involved in the scrubbing process since 2001 – was responsible, along with
+Baker, for coordinating this aspect of the scrubbing process and, when
+warranted, for presenting the argument to the judge that an application
+containing information that was the subject of a Stellar Wind report to the
+FBI should nevertheless be approved for filing. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Skelly-Nolen characterized the applications she presented to Judge
+Kollar-Kotelly as either "vanilla" or "non-vanilla." Vanilla applications were
+those for which Skelly-Nolen could confidently represent that the FBI had
+an independent investigative basis for the facility identified in the
+application that was the subject of a Stellar Wind report (for example, a
+facility the FBI learned of through FISA coverage that pre-dated the Stellar
+Wind report). Skelly-Nolen told us that over time Judge Kollar-Kotelly
+allowed the vanilla applications to be handled telephonically in an
+unclassified manner, a departure from her general requirement that the
+discussions be held in judge's chambers. Non-vanilla applications typically
+involved those cases that required Skelly-Nolan to demonstrate that the FBI
+
+³⁵⁴ For example, in one case a telephone number of a particular business did not
+appear in an FBI database prior to the date it appeared in a Stellar Wind report. However,
+the subject of the underlying investigation was the target of an FBI national security
+investigation, and OIPR argued that the telephone number inevitably would have been
+connected to the subject through the "natural course of the investigation," possibly from
+toll records associated with other telephone numbers used by the subject, trash covers and
+open source information, or physical surveillance. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+289
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+inevitably would have discovered the facility in question during the normal
+course of investigation. Skelly-Nolen said these cases were always
+discussed with Judge Kollar-Kotelly in person. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Skelly-Nolen told us that there were instances when Judge
+Kollar-Kotelly requested additional information to support the proffered
+theory for including Stellar Wind information in the FISA application. In
+some cases, Judge Kollar-Kotelly simply struck a line through the
+paragraphs in the filed application that contained the Stellar Wind-derived
+information and annotated in the margin, "This section (strike) not
+considered in evaluation of probable cause," followed by her signature and
+the date. Skelly-Nolen also said that in one or two cases Judge
+Kollar-Kotelly required that certain Stellar Wind information arguably
+necessary for establishing probable cause be removed from the
+applications.³⁵⁵ However, in general Judge Kollar-Kotelly accepted OIPR's
+and the FBI's assessment that there was a non-Stellar Wind investigative
+basis for the information in question, or that the information inevitably
+would have been discovered even in the absence of Stellar Wind-derived tips
+to the FBI. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+After operating under the expanded scrubbing procedures for
+approximately 6 months, Judge Kollar-Kotelly agreed in November 2004 to
+allow other FISA Court judges who had not yet been read into the Stellar
+Wind program to handle scrubbed international terrorism applications.
+However, Judge Kollar-Kotelly still required that Skelly-Nolen bring to her
+attention all vanilla and non-vanilla applications so they could be "cleared"
+before being formally filed. As noted above, it was not until January 2006,
+when the full FISA Court was read into Stellar Wind, that Skelly-Nolen was
+able to discuss such cases with other judges. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Since that time, the basic scrubbing procedure described above has
+continued. The Office of Intelligence attorney primarily responsible for the
+process told us that each new FISA application that references a facility that
+was disseminated under Stellar Wind is brought to the attention of the
+judge assigned to the case.³⁵⁶ However, with limited exceptions, the FISA
+Court judges do not require that the government inform them of renewal
+applications that contain such facilities so long as they were previously
+brought to the Court's attention in the initiation application or prior renewal
+applications. The Office of Intelligence attorney told us that the government
+
+³⁵⁵ According to Skelly-Nolen, Judge Kollar-Kotelly nevertheless allowed OIPR to file these applications and approved them. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+³⁵⁶ The Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) became a part of the Department's National Security Division, which was created in September 2006. As of April 2008, OIPR was renamed the Office of Intelligence. (U)
+
+290
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+relies on the independent investigative interest theory in the majority of
+cases in which it seeks to keep a facility in an application. The attorney
+also said that from the perspective of the Office of Intelligence the scrubbing
+process is more manageable today than in the past because the process is
+better organized, additional personnel have been read into the program, and
+the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 extended the period of time the
+government must bring emergency applications to the FISA Court from 72
+hours to 7 days. However, from the FBI's perspective, the scrubbing
+process continues to be burdensome and requires a significant expenditure
+of time and other resources. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+IV. Impact of Stellar Wind Information on FBI Counterterrorism
+Efforts (S//NF)
+
+This section examines the impact of the information obtained from
+Stellar Wind on FBI counterterrorism efforts. It first provides statistics
+concerning the number of tippers from Stellar Wind information –
+telephony, e-mail, and content – disseminated to FBI field offices through
+the [REDACTED] process. Next, it describes how FBI field offices generally
+investigated [REDACTED] tippers and the typical results of the investigations.
+This section then summarizes two statistical surveys of meta data tippers
+the FBI conducted in 2006 to assess the value of Stellar Wind to FBI
+operations, and describes observations about the program's value provided
+to us by FBI officials and employees in OIG interviews and contained in
+documents the OIG obtained during the course of this review. Finally, the
+section examines [REDACTED] FBI international terrorism investigations commonly
+cited as examples of Stellar Wind's contribution to counterterrorism efforts
+in the United States. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+A. Stellar Wind/[REDACTED] Statistics
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+We reviewed FBI and NSA statistics relating to the Stellar Wind
+program. According to an NSA document, from October 1, 2001, to
+February 28, 2006, the NSA provided [REDACTED] telephone numbers and
+e-mail addresses under the Stellar Wind program. The FBI disseminated
+most of these as tippers to field offices. Chart 6.1 depicts the distribution of
+the telephone numbers and e-mail addresses the NSA provided the FBI by
+type. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+291
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+
+[REDACTED]
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
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+
+As described in Chapter Three, the NSA provided ratings, or
+[REDACTED] for each telephone number and e-mail address to help
+the FBI prioritize the tippers being disseminated to field offices. The FBI
+defined the rankings in ECs disseminated to field offices in the following
+manner:
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+The FBI included these rankings in [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
+ECs until early 2003. At that time, Team 10 began to make independent
+assessments about tippers' priority for the FBI, set leads on that basis, and
+generally discontinued including the ratings in [REDACTED] ECs. As
+discussed in this chapter, Team 10 usually set Action leads for telephone
+numbers and e-mail addresses the FBI did not already know and
+Discretionary leads for those the FBI was aware of in connection with closed
+or ongoing cases. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+We could not compare the relationship between the NSA's [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] and the FBI's leads because the FBI did not maintain statistics
+about the lead type for each tipper that Team 10 disseminated. However, in
+connection with our visits to the FBI's Detroit and Seattle field offices, we
+examined the number of individual telephone numbers and e-mail
+addresses provided to those offices and the type of lead assigned for each.
+We determined that FBI Headquarters assigned Action leads for
+approximately 50 percent of the total [REDACTED] leads sent to these offices.
+As depicted in Chart 6.2, of the [REDACTED] leads sent to the Detroit
+field office from December 2001 to December 2006, [REDACTED] as
+Action leads. During this same period, of the [REDACTED] leads sent
+
+293
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+
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+
+to the Seattle field office, [REDACTED] as Action leads. These figures,
+taken together with the fact that only 5 percent of the meta data leads the
+NSA provided the FBI from October 1, 2001, to February 28, 2006, were
+rated [REDACTED] indicate that FBI field offices were required to investigate a
+substantial volume of telephone numbers and e-mail addresses that NSA
+analysts had rated [REDACTED] in terms of their connections to
+terrorism. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+CHART 6.2: Percentage of Lead Types for Detroit and Seattle
+(January 2001 to May 2007) (S//NF)
+(Chart below is SECRET//NOFORN)
+
+DETROIT [REDACTED]
+For Information 10%
+Discretionary 40%
+Action 50%
+
+SEATTLE [REDACTED]
+For Information 29%
+Discretionary 19%
+Action 52%
+
+With respect to leads that provided the content of communications the
+NSA intercepted under Stellar Wind, the manner in which these leads were
+disseminated depended on the nature of the communication [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+294
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+
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+
+[REDACTED].³⁵⁷ The FBI did not maintain statistics on the number of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] content tippers disseminated to FBI field offices from Stellar Wind
+content reports. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+We also found that [REDACTED] leads were distributed unevenly
+among FBI field offices. The majority of tippers were disseminated to large
+offices with substantial counterterrorism programs, such as New York,
+Washington, Chicago, and Los Angeles, and to offices whose territory
+contained significant Middle Eastern populations, such as Detroit. For
+example, FBI records indicate that of the [REDACTED] leads
+disseminated in 2005, 50 percent were assigned to 10 field offices. Table
+6.1 depicts the distribution of [REDACTED] in 2005 among FBI field
+offices.³⁵⁸ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+TABLE 6.1: [REDACTED] Leads by Division (2005) (U//FOUO)
+(Table below is SECRET//NOFORN)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+³⁵⁷ [REDACTED]
+
+³⁵⁸ A "lead" in these figures does not equate to a single telephone number or e-mail
+address; each [REDACTED] lead could contain several telephone numbers or e-mail
+addresses. For example, the Detroit field office received [REDACTED] in 2005 containing
+[REDACTED] individual tippers. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+295
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+
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+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+B. FBI Field Office Investigations of [REDACTED] Tippers
+(S//NF)
+
+FBI field offices were not required to investigate every tipper
+disseminated under [REDACTED] ³⁵⁹ Rather, the type of lead that the [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] EC assigned - Action, Discretionary, or For Information – governed a
+field office's response to a tipper.³⁶⁰ [REDACTED] content tippers, which
+
+³⁵⁹ As discussed in Chapter Three, the practice under the [REDACTED] in the
+first several weeks of the Stellar Wind program was to set Action leads for all telephone
+number tippers. This practice was modified when the NSA began to designate each tipper
+in a Stellar Wind report [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+³⁶⁰ An Action lead instructs a field office to take a particular action in response to
+the EC. An Action lead is "covered" when the field office takes the specified action or
+conducts appropriate investigation to address the information in the EC. A Discretionary
+lead allows the field office to make a determination whether the information provided
+warrants investigative action. A field office that receives a "For Information" lead is not
+expected to take any specific action in response to the EC, other than possibly route the
+(Cont'd.)
+
+296
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+
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+
+provided information derived from communications of telephone numbers
+and e-mail addresses under surveillance, generally assigned Discretionary
+or For Information leads. The information in these tippers usually related to
+individuals already under FBI investigation and was provided to the agents
+responsible for those cases, [REDACTED] e-mail address tippers generally
+assigned Discretionary leads to field offices unless the information was
+particularly urgent. As noted above, content and e-mail address tippers
+accounted for a comparatively small portion of the [REDACTED] tippers
+disseminated by Team 10. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The vast majority of FBI investigative activity related to Stellar Wind
+information involved responding to [REDACTED] telephone number tippers
+that assigned Action leads. Team 10 generally assigned Action leads for
+telephone numbers that the FBI did not previously know or that Team 10
+otherwise deemed a high priority, such as a number that had a relationship
+to a major FBI investigation.³⁶¹ From approximately September 2002 (when
+[REDACTED] was created) to July 2003, Action leads instructed field offices to
+obtain subscriber information for the telephone numbers within its
+jurisdiction and to conduct any "logical investigation to determine terrorist
+connections." However, some agents complained that these Action leads
+lacked guidance about how to make use of the tippers, particularly given
+concerns that the [REDACTED] communications provided insufficient
+predication to open national security investigations.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Two changes in 2003 addressed some of these complaints. First, in
+July 2003 the CAU assumed responsibility from field offices for issuing
+NSLs, as we discussed in Section II above. Second, in October 2003 the
+Attorney General issued new guidelines for FBI national security
+investigations that created a new category of investigative activity called a
+"threat assessment."³⁶² [REDACTED]
+
+communication to the office personnel whose investigations or duties the information
+concerns. (S//NF)
+
+³⁶¹ Discretionary leads were assigned to telephone numbers that already were
+known to the FBI, meaning the number or the number's subscriber was referenced in an
+active FBI investigation. These leads identified the case number of the related investigation
+and advised receiving field offices to "use the information as deemed appropriate" to bring
+the information to the attention of the appropriate case agent. (S//NF)
+
+³⁶² As noted earlier, the October 2003 guidelines, entitled Attorney General's
+Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (NSI
+guidelines), replaced the Attorney General Guidelines for FBI Foreign Intelligence Collection
+and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations. In September 2008, the Attorney General
+issued Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations that replaced the October 2003 NSI
+guidelines with respect to domestic operations. The September 2008 guidelines use the
+term "assessment" instead of "threat assessment." (U)
+
+297
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+
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+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Thus,
+[REDACTED] beginning in October 2003, Action leads assigned by [REDACTED] telephone
+number tippers instructed field offices to conduct threat assessments.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+During our review, we visited the Detroit and Seattle field offices to
+review their handling of [REDACTED] leads. In addition, we interviewed
+several supervisory special agents at FBI Headquarters who had experience
+handling the leads in their respective field offices before being read into the
+program. In general, these agents' and analysts' experience with [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] leads was unremarkable. A threat assessment conducted by these
+agents and analysts typically involved querying several FBI, public, and
+commercial databases for any information about the tipped telephone
+number, and requesting that various state and local government entities
+conduct similar queries. Sometimes these queries identified the subscriber
+to the telephone number before the CAU obtained the information with an
+NSL. In other cases, the threat assessments continued after the field office
+received the NSL results.³⁶³ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Examples of the databases utilized in their threat assessments
+included FBI systems such as the Automated Case Management System
+and [REDACTED] other government databases such as the
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] state [REDACTED] databases, and local police
+department databases; and commercial databases, such as [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The results of their checks of these databases
+could sometimes be extensive and include personal information not only
+about the subscriber to the tipped telephone number, but also about
+individuals residing in the subscriber's residence or other acquaintances.
+In other cases, checks were negative or revealed little information about the
+number or the subscriber. (S//NF)
+
+³⁶³ We were told that it sometimes took [REDACTED] for field offices to receive
+subscriber information from the CAU. A Team 10 supervisor said field offices frequently
+contacted the CAU about the status of outstanding NSLs because the usefulness of threat
+assessments conducted on a telephone number were limited without the identity of the
+subscriber. (S//NF)
+
+298
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+
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+
+The agents and analysts said they reviewed the results of these
+database checks to determine whether additional investigative steps under
+the threat assessment were warranted or whether there was predication to
+open a preliminary inquiry. None of the agents we interviewed could recall
+initiating any investigations based on a threat assessment of an [REDACTED]
+tipper.³⁶⁴ They said they frequently closed [REDACTED] leads after
+conducting a threat assessment interview of the subscriber and determining
+that there was no nexus to terrorism or threat to national security.
+Alternatively, the leads were closed based solely on the results of database
+checks. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Under the Attorney General's October 2003 national security
+investigations guidelines, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Under [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] agents were not permitted to explain to subscribers how they
+obtained the information that caused them to seek an interview. Instead,
+agents simply asked subscribers about their contacts in certain countries
+and with specific telephone numbers. Agents told us that subscribers
+generally consented to these interviews and were cooperative and
+forthcoming. In a few cases, subscribers refused the request or sought the
+advice of counsel.³⁶⁶ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+³⁶⁴ Prior to the CAU's July 2003 decision to assume responsibility for issuing NSLs,
+agents in FBI field offices often opened investigations in order to issue NSLs to obtain
+subscriber information. These cases usually were closed after the agents conducted
+investigations and determined the domestic telephone number tipper did not have a nexus
+to terrorism. (S//NF)
+
+³⁶⁵ On September 29, 2008, the Attorney General issued new guidelines for
+domestic FBI operations, which includes national security investigations. These guidelines
+[REDACTED] Compare
+Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations, Section II.A.4.f. (September 29,
+2008), with Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and
+Foreign Intelligence Collection, Section II.A.6. (October 31, 2003). (S//NF)
+
+³⁶⁶ Several of the threat assessment interviews that agents described to us and that
+we reviewed in FBI documents provided examples of how some domestic telephone
+numbers appeared on their face to be in contact with an individual involved in terrorism.
+In the Seattle field office, several interviews revealed that the foreign telephone calls placed
+to domestic numbers were made using a pre-paid telephone service from local stores
+because the callers, often relatives of the domestic contacts, did not have telephone service
+at their residences. Thus, while the intelligence indicating that an individual involved in
+terrorism used the foreign telephone number might have been accurate, the number also
+was used by individuals about whom there was no reason to believe were involved in
+terrorism. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+299
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+
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+
+FBI field offices were required to report the results of the threat
+assessments to the CAU. In most of the ECs we reviewed, the field offices
+reported all of the information that was located about the telephone
+numbers, including the details of any subscriber interviews, and then stated
+that the office determined the tipped telephone number did not have a
+nexus to terrorism and considered the lead closed. Much less frequently,
+field offices reported that a preliminary investigation was opened to conduct
+additional investigation.³⁶⁷ Regardless of whether any links to international
+terrorism were identified, the results of any threat assessments and the
+information that was collected about subscribers generally were reported in
+communications to FBI Headquarters and uploaded into FBI databases.
+(S//NF)
+
+C. FBI Statistical Surveys of [REDACTED] Meta Data Tippers
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The FBI made several attempts, both informal and more formal, to
+assess the value of Stellar Wind to FBI counterterrorism efforts. The first
+was an informal attempt by the FBI's OGC. FBI General Counsel Valerie
+Caproni told us that in early 2004 she spoke with the CAU Unit Chief and
+the Section Chief for the Communications Exploitation Section about trying
+to assess the value of Stellar Wind information. According to Caproni, the
+two managers stated that based on anecdotal and informal feedback from
+FBI field offices, the telephony meta data tippers were the most valuable
+intelligence from the program for agents working on counterterrorism
+matters. However, Caproni told us it was difficult to conduct any
+meaningful assessment of the program's value in early 2004 because FBI
+field offices at that time were not required to report to FBI Headquarters the
+investigative results of the Stellar Wind leads disseminated under [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] FBI Headquarters did not make such reporting mandatory until
+October 2004. As a result, Caproni's discussions with the FBI managers did
+not result in any written assessment of the program.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+³⁶⁷ The CAU advised field offices that investigative feedback about [REDACTED]
+tippers was important because it informed the "reliable source's" (the NSA's) assessment of
+whether to continue analyzing the "foreign entity" that caused the tippers to be
+disseminated. An NSA official told us that such information was also important to
+improving the NSA's analytical process, but he said it was sometimes difficult to obtain
+such feedback. A CAU Unit Chief told us that the NSA expressed particular concern about
+insufficient feedback from the FBI regarding investigative results pertaining to the tippers'
+nexus to terrorism. He said this was a difficult situation in that [REDACTED] professed to
+be sending out high value information about known links to terrorism," and it was
+"uncomfortable" to receive little feedback from field offices other than, "You're sending us
+garbage." Members of Team 10 told us that efforts to improve field office feedback over time
+had mixed results. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+300
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+
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+
+The FBI's second informal assessment of the value of Stellar Wind
+came after the December 2005 New York Times articles that publicly
+disclosed the content collection aspect of the Stellar Wind program. Caproni
+said that in preparation for Director Mueller's testimony at congressional
+hearings in 2006 on the issue, she attempted to evaluate the Stellar Wind
+program. Caproni stated that because NSA Director Hayden asserted
+publicly that the program was valuable, she wanted Mueller's testimony to
+identify, if possible, any investigations that illustrated Stellar Wind's positive
+contribution to the FBI's counterterrorism efforts. Caproni stated that this
+effort was complicated by the fact that Mueller's testimony would be limited
+only to the aspect of the program disclosed in the New York Times article
+and subsequently confirmed by the President - the content collection
+basket. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+As discussed above, Caproni said that FBI field offices did not find
+this aspect of the program to be as useful as the telephony meta data,
+primarily because [REDACTED] was comparatively small and the FBI had FISA coverage on
+many of these already. Caproni told us that ultimately she was able to
+identify "a couple" of content tippers that contributed to FBI investigations,
+but she commented that there were not many. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The FBI subsequently conducted two more efforts to study the Stellar
+Wind program's impact on FBI operations, both in early 2006. The first
+study sampled the [REDACTED] tippers the FBI had received under
+Stellar Wind from 2001 through 2005. The second study reviewed [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] e-mail tippers the NSA provided the FBI from August 2004 through
+January 2006. In both of these studies, the FBI sought to determine what
+percentage of tippers resulted in "significant contribution[s] to the
+identification of terrorist subjects or activity on U.S. soil." We describe in
+the next sections the findings of these two studies.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+1. Early 2006 Survey [REDACTED] Telephony and E-Mail
+Meta Data Tippers (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Following the December 2005 New York Times article publicly
+disclosing the content collection aspect of Stellar Wind, additional members
+of the Senate and House Intelligence Committees were read into the
+program. During this time, the NSA provided to cleared members of
+Congress substantive briefings about Stellar Wind, and the FBI was asked
+to testify about its participation in the program. In preparation for these
+briefings and testimony, the FBI sought to quantify the value of Stellar Wind
+intelligence for FBI counterterrorism operations. The CAU conducted a
+statistical study for this purpose, and in May 2006 the FBI provided a copy
+
+301
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+
+of the statistical report to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The study, conducted during a 1-week period in January 2006,
+sampled [REDACTED] unique telephone numbers and e-mail addresses the
+NSA provided the FBI from the inception of the Stellar Wind program
+through 2005.³⁶⁸ The study sought to determine what percentage of the
+tippers resulted in "significant contribution[s] to the identification of
+terrorist subjects or activity on U.S. soil." Working with an FBI statistician,
+the CAU determined that [REDACTED] randomly selected tippers
+would be required to obtain statistically significant results.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Approximately 30 analysts from the FBI's Counterterrorism Division
+were assigned the task of reviewing [REDACTED] tippers to determine the
+disposition of each.³⁶⁹ The analysts sought to determine whether a
+particular tipper made a "significant" contribution to FBI counterterrorism
+efforts. For purposes of the study, a tipper was considered "significant if it
+led to any of three investigative results: the identification of a terrorist, the
+deportation from the United States of a suspected terrorist, or the
+development of an asset that can report about the activities of terrorists." A
+tipper that led to a field office opening a preliminary or full investigation was
+not considered "significant" for purposes of the study.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The analysts researched each tipper's disposition in investigative
+records contained in FBI electronic databases, beginning with the [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] EC that disseminated the tipper to the field. If an analyst concluded
+based on this research that a tipper was significant, a second analyst who
+was familiar with the Stellar Wind program further reviewed that
+determination. If the CAU analyst agreed with the initial finding, the tipper
+
+³⁶⁸ According to the CAU report the NSA had provided the FBI [REDACTED] tippers since
+the inception of Stellar Wind, but [REDACTED] were duplicates. [REDACTED] was the
+total number of unique tippers. The tippers by year were broken down as follows: [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The study also did not
+include content tippers. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+³⁶⁹ Most of the analysts were not read into the Stellar Wind program and were told
+that the study concerned the disposition of [REDACTED] leads. Of [REDACTED] tippers reviewed
+by the analysts, approximately 12 percent were e-mail addresses, a figure consistent with
+the overall tipper breakdown between e-mail addresses and telephone numbers.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+302
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+
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+
+and supporting information was presented to the CAU Unit Chief for a final
+review.370 (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Based on this methodology, the study found that [REDACTED] 1.2 percent,
+of [REDACTED] tippers were "significant." The study extrapolated this
+figure to the entire population of [REDACTED] tippers and determined that one
+could expect to find [REDACTED] tippers the NSA provided the FBI
+under Stellar Wind were significant. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The report documenting the study's findings included brief
+descriptions of [REDACTED] "significant" tippers. For example, according to the
+report, one tipper led to the opening of a full investigation that developed
+evidence that the user of the tipped e-mail address had "definite ties to
+terrorism." The user was arrested and pled guilty to charges of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Another tipper led to the identification of an individual who,
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Several of the "significant" tippers related to ongoing FBI
+investigations. For example, information from one tipper designated as
+significant was already known to the relevant FBI field office, which had an
+investigation ongoing concerning a subject associated with the tipper prior
+to receiving the [REDACTED] EC. According to the study's brief description of
+the case's significance, the investigative file stated that the tipper was "very
+beneficial in the on-going investigation" by connecting the subject to
+terrorism, without describing that connection. Another tipper caused a field
+office to change a preliminary investigation to a full investigation regarding
+the possible illegal [REDACTED] The tipper indicated a
+connection between one of the subjects of the preliminary investigation and
+a known terrorist. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The study also found that 28 percent of [REDACTED] tippers were never
+disseminated to FBI field offices for investigation. According to the report,
+the CAU filtered out these tippers based on "lack of significance" when they
+were first provided to the FBI by the NSA. These tippers were deemed
+non-significant for purposes of the study. In addition, the study found that
+for 22 percent of the sample tippers, FBI field offices did not report any
+
+³⁷⁰ According to a CAU analyst closely involved with the study, establishing a fairly
+"tight" criteria to identify "significant" tippers was necessary in order to obtain statistically
+significant results within the one-week time frame the CAU was given to complete the
+review. The analyst told the OIG that analysts initially applied a broader "significant"
+standard in their reviews of the tippers, but that it immediately became apparent that a
+stricter standard was required. The Unit Chief for the CAU told the OIG that the definition
+of "significant" ultimately used for the study was reached by consensus among
+Counterterrorism Division operational and analytical personnel. (S//OC/NF)
+
+303
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+
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+
+investigative results. The study assumed that the field offices investigated
+the leads that were set but did not document their work in ACS. These
+tippers were deemed non-significant for purposes of the study.³⁷¹ Thus,
+combining these two categories, approximately 50 percent of the tippers
+reviewed as part of the CAU study either were never disseminated to FBI
+field offices, or were disseminated but with unknown investigative results.³⁷²
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The FBI's report of the study did not explicitly state any conclusions
+about whether Stellar Wind was a valuable program. FBI OGC told the OIG
+that based in part on the results of this study, which found [REDACTED] of the
+leads were significant, FBI executive management concluded that the
+program was "of value." The FBI OGC also said that FBI Director Mueller
+and Deputy Director Pistole provided congressional testimony in February
+and May 2006, respectively, about the value of the program, which the FBI
+OGC stated was based in part on the results of the study.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+2. January 2006 Survey [REDACTED] E-Mail Meta Data Tippers
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The CAU conducted a second study of Stellar Wind tippers in January
+2006. According to Caproni, this study was in response to a request from
+the FISA Court about intelligence being obtained pursuant to the July 14,
+2004, Pen Register/Trap and Trace Order that authorized the bulk
+collection of e-mail meta data. As discussed in Chapter Five, e-mail meta
+data was the first basket of Stellar Wind's signals collection activity that was
+placed under the FISA Court's authority. However, as noted earlier, the
+
+³⁷¹ As noted, Caproni cited this lack of reporting from field offices as a reason for
+not being able to conduct a meaningful assessment of the Stellar Wind program's value in
+the spring of 2004. FBI Headquarters did not officially require field offices to report
+investigative results concerning [REDACTED] tippers until October 2004. According to the
+CAU analyst with whom the OIG spoke about the study, the idea of contacting field offices
+to discuss the disposition of tippers and to seek general observations about [REDACTED] was
+rejected because of the concern the inquiries might expose the Stellar Wind program.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+³⁷² By its methodology, the only tippers the study assessed for "significance" were
+those for which field offices reported investigative results to the CAU and therefore generally
+did not take into account tippers assigned as Discretionary leads. Discretionary leads, as
+distinguished from Action leads, did not require field offices to report to the CAU about how
+the tippers were used. Yet, according to FBI personnel, these leads sometimes were
+associated with ongoing investigations and sometimes provided new or additional
+indications of terrorist connections, or reported the content of communications indicating a
+subject's international movements. The "value" of this category of tippers was not captured
+in the FBI's study. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+304
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+NSA continued to provide e-mail addresses to the FBI in Stellar Wind
+reports. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+This second study, which reviewed each [REDACTED] e-mail tippers the
+NSA provided the FBI from August 2004 through January 2006, applied the
+same methodology for assessing "significance" that was used in CAU's first
+study. The second study found that none [REDACTED] e-mail tippers was
+"significant" under this standard. The report noted, however, that many of
+the investigations related to the reviewed e-mail tippers were still ongoing.
+In addition, the study observed that some of the tippers reviewed had only
+recently been disseminated to field offices for investigation and that it was
+possible investigation of these tippers had not been completed.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+D. FBI Judgmental Assessments of Stellar Wind Information
+(S//NF)
+
+To attempt to further assess the value of Stellar Wind information for
+the FBI, we interviewed FBI Headquarters officials and employees who
+regularly handled Stellar Wind information. We also interviewed personnel
+in FBI field offices who were responsible for handling [REDACTED] tippers.
+We asked these witnesses for their assessments of the impact of Stellar
+Wind or [REDACTED] information on FBI counterterrorism operations. We
+also recognize that FBI officials and agents other than those we interviewed
+may have had experiences with [REDACTED] different than those summarized
+below. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The members of Team 10 and its predecessor [REDACTED]
+were strong advocates of the program and stated that they believed it
+contributed significantly to FBI international terrorism investigations.
+Several claimed that program tippers helped the FBI identify previously
+unknown subjects, although they were not able to identify for us any
+specific cases where this occurred. Other witnesses cited the FBI's
+increased cooperation with the NSA on international terrorism matters as a
+side benefit of the Stellar Wind program.³⁷³ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+FBI officials and agents from the International Terrorism and
+Operations Section (ITOS) expressed a more moderate assessment of Stellar
+Wind. None of the ITOS officials we interviewed could identify significant
+investigations to which Stellar Wind substantially contributed. However,
+
+³⁷³ FBI Deputy General Counsel Julie Thomas also said that Stellar Wind helped
+improve the relationship between the FBI and CIA. She said the program provided an
+opportunity to demonstrate the "interoperability of different agencies," and based on her
+experience dealing with program-related matters the relationship between the FBI and the
+NSA was "better now than it has ever been." (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+305
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+
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+
+they were generally supportive of the program, often stating that it was "one
+tool of many" in the FBI's fight against international terrorism.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+ITOS personnel frequently noted for us the deficiencies in the Stellar
+Wind information disseminated to field offices, such as the lack of details
+about the foreign individuals allegedly involved in terrorism with whom
+domestic telephone numbers and e-mail addresses were in contact.
+However, these FBI employees believed the possibility that such contacts
+related to terrorism made investigating the tips worthwhile. Some ITOS
+witnesses also told us that in their experience the FBI was already aware of
+many of the telephone numbers and e-mail addresses disseminated under
+[REDACTED] but that this duplication did not mean the information was
+without investigative value. For example, one witness said such contacts
+could "help move cases forward" by confirming a subject's contacts with
+individuals involved in terrorism or identifying additional terrorist contacts.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+One FBI Headquarters supervisory special agent said that FBI field
+offices might have been less critical of [REDACTED] had there been agents in
+the offices read into Stellar Wind. He said that such agents would have
+been better positioned than FBI Headquarters' officials to assure others in
+their respective offices about the reliability of the information being
+disseminated. A former ITOS section chief told the OIG that he proposed to
+the NSA that the head of each FBI field office be read into Stellar Wind for
+this reason and to be able to make fully informed decisions about handling
+the Stellar Wind tippers. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The most critical comments we heard about [REDACTED] impact
+came primarily from the supervisory special agents we interviewed who
+managed counterterrorism programs at the two FBI field offices we visited.
+These agents said the [REDACTED] tippers and any information developed
+from the leads might be useful, but that the [REDACTED] program was not an
+effective way to identify threats. For example, one supervisor stated that
+[REDACTED] represented FBI Headquarters' failure to prioritize threat
+information. He said that by simply disseminating [REDACTED] tippers to
+field offices in ECs that often provided little in the way of details, FBI
+Headquarters effectively made the field offices "insurance carriers," placing
+the responsibility solely on them to timely and adequately investigate every
+lead. The supervisor stated that ordinarily he accepts this responsibility as
+part of his job, but that the [REDACTED] tippers were especially frustrating
+
+306
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+as compared to other counterterrorism leads the office received because
+they did not provide sufficient information for him to prioritize the leads.³⁷⁴
+
+Another supervisory special agent expressed a similar assessment of
+[REDACTED] stating that he felt the project "perverted the logical priority of
+tasking." He said that absent the leads' special status as part of [REDACTED]
+a very low percentage of the tippers would have been considered
+priority matters. He told us that he did not have the freedom to prioritize
+the leads in the manner he felt was warranted by the information provided
+in [REDACTED] ECs. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Field office agents who investigated [REDACTED] leads also were critical
+of the lack of details contained in [REDACTED] ECs about the nature of the
+terrorist connection to the domestic contact, or about the contact itself,
+such as the duration or frequency of the calling activity. Some agents we
+interviewed said they also occasionally were frustrated by the prohibition on
+using [REDACTED] information in any judicial process, such as in FISA
+applications, although none could identify an investigation in which the
+restrictions adversely affected the case. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Most of the agents we interviewed viewed [REDACTED] tippers as just
+another type of lead that required appropriate attention, and the agents
+generally did not handle the leads with any greater care or sense of urgency
+than non-[REDACTED] counterterrorism leads. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Moreover, none of the agents we interviewed identified an
+investigation in their office in which [REDACTED] played a significant role,
+nor could they recall how such a tipper contributed to any of their
+international terrorism cases. Nevertheless, the agents generally viewed
+[REDACTED] tippers as a potentially valuable source of information, noting
+that the information developed from the investigations of tippers might
+prove useful in the future. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Agents also stated that through the threat assessment interviews they
+conducted of the subscribers to tipped telephone numbers, [REDACTED]
+"opened a window" to populations within the field offices' jurisdiction that
+
+³⁷⁴ The supervisor stated that [REDACTED] leads had little investigative value to his
+office. First, he said the leads did not provide enough detail about the reliability of the
+information being provided. Such details might include, for example, what other
+individuals had access to the foreign telephone allegedly used by someone involved in
+international terrorism, and how many calls were made from that number and for what
+durations. These details would help evaluate the threat represented by the foreign
+number's contact with the tipped domestic number. Second, the supervisor said the
+[REDACTED] tippers lacked direction about what the office should do with a tipped number after a
+threat assessment has been conducted. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+307
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+might not otherwise be as accessible. For example. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+In 2007, FBI Deputy Director John Pistole briefed the Senate Select
+Committee on Intelligence concerning the FBI's participation in the Stellar
+Wind program. A document prepared in connection with that briefing
+addressed, among other subjects, the program's value in FBI national
+security investigations. The document stated,
+
+[S]uccessful national security investigations are rarely the result
+of a single source of information. Rather they occur after
+exhaustive hours of investigation and the use of legal process in
+which bits and pieces of intelligence from many sources are
+gathered and combined into a coherent whole. The success or
+effectiveness of any intelligence program - whether Stellar
+Wind... or anything else - is sometimes difficult to assess in
+the abstract because of that blending of multiple strains of
+intelligence and because success should never be measured
+only in terms of terrorist plots that have visibly been disrupted,
+but also in plots that never formed because our investigative
+actions themselves had a disruptive effect. (Italics in
+original.)³⁷⁵ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+We interviewed FBI Director Mueller in connection with this review
+and asked him about the value of Stellar Wind to the FBI's counterterrorism
+program. FBI Director Mueller told us that he believes the Stellar Wind
+program was useful and that the FBI must follow every lead it receives in
+order to prevent future terrorist attacks. He said "communications are
+absolutely essential" to this task and called meta data the "key" to the FBI's
+
+³⁷⁵ A "talking points" document the FBI drafted for Director Mueller also expressed
+this view. The document stated:
+[The] impact of any single piece of intelligence or program is difficult to
+quantify. Combination of various information, including humint, sigint, and
+elsur, is necessary to address the global threat. Accordingly, it is not
+possible to make an unequivocal "but for" connection between a tip and any
+particular FBI investigation that has resulted in a seizure or arrest.
+However, the information has amplified, corroborated and directed FBI
+investigative resources. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+308
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+communications analysis. Mueller also stated that to the extent such
+information can be gathered and used legally it must be exploited and that
+he "would not dismiss the potency of a program based on the percentage of
+hits." Asked if he was familiar with any specific FBI investigations that
+represent Stellar Wind successes, Mueller said that as a general matter it is
+very difficult to quantify the effectiveness of an intelligence program without
+"tagging" the leads that are produced in order to evaluate the role the
+program information played in any investigation. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+We also asked Mueller about the issue of allocating finite FBI
+resources to respond to Stellar Wind leads. Mueller said that in the period
+after the September 11 terrorist attacks, the FBI remained in a state of
+continuous alert for several years. Mueller stated that he understood the
+President's desire to take every step to prevent another terrorist attack, and
+believes that it would be wrong not to utilize all available capabilities to
+accomplish this, so long as it is done legally. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Mueller also commented on media reports regarding FBI agents'
+frustration with the volume of [REDACTED] leads. For example, articles
+described complaints of unidentified FBI field agents regarding the lack of
+information in the tippers they received under [REDACTED] and how the
+high volume of tippers necessitated devoting significant resources to what
+were described as "dry leads. "376 Mueller said that the agents' frustration
+was similar to that expressed about other sources for the thousands of leads
+the FBI received after September 11, such as calls from citizens. Mueller
+stated that he understood the frustration associated with expending finite
+resources on numerous leads unlikely to have a terrorism nexus, but said
+that his philosophy after September 11 was that "no lead goes
+unaddressed." Moreover, he stated that frustrations can result from any
+counterterrorism program. (S//NF)
+
+We also interviewed Kenneth Wainstein, the first Assistant Attorney
+General for the Justice Department's National Security Division, which was
+created in September 2006. Wainstein told us that he was aware of "both
+sides" on the question of Stellar Wind's value. He also said that he heard
+the government had not "gotten a heck of a lot out of it," but noted that NSA
+Director Hayden and FBI Director Mueller have stated that the program was
+valuable. (S//NF)
+
+Hayden told us that he always felt the Stellar Wind program was
+worthwhile and successful. [REDACTED]
+
+³⁷⁶ See, e.g., Lowell Bergman, et al., "Domestic Surveillance: The Program; Spy
+Agency Data After Sept. 11 Led F.B.I. to Dead Ends," The New York Times, January 17,
+2006. (U)
+
+309
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Hayden said the FBI
+believed the leads represented "something certain," when in fact the leads
+were only "narrow threads" and that the idea was to help build the FBI's
+intelligence base. Hayden also observed that the enemy may not have been
+as embedded in the United States as much as feared, but said that he
+believes Stellar Wind helped determine this. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+E. Examples of FBI Counterterrorism Cases Involving Stellar
+Wind Information (S//NF)
+
+As part of our review, we sought to identify specific FBI international
+terrorism investigations in which Stellar Wind information was used and to
+describe the information's specific contributions to the investigations. We
+agree with FBI officials that this is a difficult task in view of the nature of
+these investigations, which frequently are predicated on multiple sources of
+information. To the extent Stellar Wind tips played a role in an
+investigation, the tips could be one of several sources of information
+acquired over time and used by the FBI to pursue the investigation.
+Moreover, the FBI agents and analysts we interviewed during our review
+could not say that "but for" a Stellar Wind tipper a given investigation would
+not have been productive, and they were unable to recall specifically how, if
+at all, Stellar Wind intelligence may have caused their investigations to take
+a particular direction. (S//NF)
+
+Our review did not seek to describe Stellar Wind's impact on each FBI
+field office, and we recognize that FBI officials and agents other than those
+we interviewed might have had experiences with [REDACTED] different than
+those summarized in this chapter. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+Because such reporting was not disseminated to FBI field offices under
+[REDACTED] any contribution the information might have made to
+investigations FBI personnel we interviewed were familiar with might not
+have been accounted for in our questions about Stellar Wind and [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] information. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+In view of these difficulties, we examined several investigations
+frequently cited in NSA and FBI documents the OIG obtained during this
+
+310
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
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+
+review as examples of Stellar Wind information that contributed to the FBI's
+counterterrorism efforts. 377 For these investigations, we examined [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] ECs, FBI Letterhead Memoranda describing the status of investigative
+activities in specific cases, Counterterrorism Division responses to OIG
+questions about the role of [REDACTED] in specific investigations,
+government pleadings filed in international terrorism prosecutions, and FBI
+briefing materials. 378 (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+1. [REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+³⁷⁷ As noted above, the FBI was not the only customer of Stellar Wind information.
+The CIA and the National Counterterrorism Center also received Stellar Wind reports
+potentially relevant to their operations. Pursuant to a directive in the FISA Amendments
+Act of 2008, Intelligence Community OIGs are examining the impact Stellar Wind had on
+their respective agencies or if Stellar Wind information contributed to their agencies'
+operations. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+³⁷⁸ The briefing materials were prepared by the FBI's Communications Exploitation
+Section (CXS) shortly after aspects of the Stellar Wind program were publicly revealed in a
+series of New York Times articles in December 2005. The briefing materials were prepared
+at the direction of FBI General Counsel Valarie Caproni, who anticipated that Director
+Mueller and Deputy Director Pistole would be called to testify about the program. These
+briefing materials were intended to help prepare Mueller and Pistole for their testimony.
+The briefing materials include summaries of specific cases relating to Stellar Wind
+information that were highlighted by the NSA. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+311
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] This information generated
+several [REDACTED] leads for FBI field offices. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Several of these leads resulted in the FBI initiating investigations of
+[REDACTED] to identify any involvement in terrorism. In
+most cases, the FBI concluded that the individuals' connection [REDACTED] was
+not related to any involvement in terrorism. However, in one case FBI
+investigation determined that the individual was in contact with additional
+[REDACTED] engaged in activities indicating possible
+involvement in terrorist activities.³⁸¹ In another case, the FBI
+
+³⁷⁹ We described [REDACTED] in Chapter Three. (S//OC//NF)
+
+³⁸⁰ [REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+312
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] ³⁸² The individual, who had come
+to the FBI's attention [REDACTED] but who was
+not under investigation at the time of the [REDACTED] tipper, voluntarily
+departed the country [REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The subject of another of the [REDACTED] leads generated by
+[REDACTED] was already under investigation by an FBI field office. The
+[REDACTED] lead caused the FBI office to convert its preliminary
+investigation into a full investigation and obtain emergency authorization to
+conduct electronic surveillance under FISA [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] used by the individual. The FBI also interviewed the
+individual several times and issued National Security Letters [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] However, the FBI did not develop any
+information that linked the individual to terrorism or terrorist groups.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+2. [REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+On [REDACTED] the FBI's field office [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (S//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+313
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+314
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+However, according to documents provided to the OIG, the FBI was
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The FBI
+therefore was unable to establish that there was a nationwide conspiracy
+[REDACTED] to provide material support to
+terrorism. (S//OC/NF)
+
+Nevertheless, FBI documents state that after [REDACTED] was
+closed, field offices with [REDACTED] related investigations conducted
+"successful disruption operations” of criminal activities that were identified
+during the course of the investigations. (S//OC/NF)
+
+3. [REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+The FBI's [REDACTED] opened a full investigation on [REDACTED]
+based on his statements [REDACTED] (S//OC/NF)
+
+Acting in coordination with [REDACTED] law
+enforcement and intelligence agencies, the FBI learned that a group of
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] This investigation came to be known by the code
+name [REDACTED] ³⁸⁴ (TS//SI//OC/NF)
+
+³⁸³ [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+³⁸⁴ [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+315
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The EC set a discretionary lead for the FBI [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] but encouraged the field office to "provide any pertinent
+follow-up questions to . . . CAU, for submission to and consideration by the
+[REDACTED] source." (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+An FBI response to an OIG request for information about the role of
+[REDACTED] in [REDACTED] case stated that as a result of the [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] tipper, the [REDACTED] located [REDACTED] after [REDACTED] return to the
+United States and established surveillance on [REDACTED] In an FBI document
+entitled [REDACTED]
+
+³⁸⁵ FBI documents we reviewed do not indicate how this information was obtained
+or whether it was derived from Stellar Wind. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+³⁸⁶ The briefing materials state that it could not be verified whether [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (S//OC/NF)
+
+316
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HES/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]"it is noted that at the time [REDACTED] returned to the United
+States the FBI had FISA coverage on [REDACTED]
+According to the document, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]³⁸⁷ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+FBI briefing materials state that the FBI first began surveillance of an
+individual later determined to be misidentified [REDACTED] Through open
+source investigation, the FBI obtained the telephone number of the
+misidentified subject and was granted emergency FISA authority on that
+number. FISA surveillance was initiated on the telephone believed to be
+used [REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+On [REDACTED] the FBI employees located at the NSA (Team 10)
+submitted a request to the NSA for call chaining analysis and consideration
+for Stellar Wind "tasking," or content collection. The NSA initiated content
+collection on the erroneous telephone number the same day. Contact
+chaining on the telephone number did not reveal any contacts with any
+known terrorist-associated numbers. On [REDACTED] it was
+determined [REDACTED] was not using the telephone number tasked and
+chained under Stellar Wind authority. The FBI also ceased FISA-authorized
+electronic surveillance of the number [REDACTED] By [REDACTED] ongoing
+physical surveillance confirmed that the telephone number believed to be
+associated [REDACTED] had been misidentified. (PS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+On [REDACTED] the primary suspects in the [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] were arrested [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (S//OC/NF)
+
+An FBI document stated that since [REDACTED] arrest "has provided a
+wealth of intelligence to the FBI and the Intelligence Community," and that
+the intelligence [REDACTED] provided has been disseminated to intelligence services [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (S//OC/NF)
+
+³⁸⁷ A CXS intelligence analyst who drafted the summary of [REDACTED]
+for the CXS briefing materials told the OIG that she concluded that the FBI "probably
+would have figured out eventually" [REDACTED] was back in the United States based on [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+317
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+On [REDACTED] pled guilty to [REDACTED] of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] remains incarcerated [REDACTED]
+(S//NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+According to a [REDACTED] FBI PowerPoint presentation about the FBI's role
+in Stellar Wind, the [REDACTED] tipper "facilitated the FBI's
+ability to locate, initiate physical surveillance, and debrief [REDACTED] in a timely
+manner." The facts reviewed by the OIG show that [REDACTED] failed to
+result in notification to the FBI of [REDACTED] return to the United States, but
+that through Stellar Wind information the FBI was able to locate [REDACTED] and
+obtain surveillance of [REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+4. [REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+318
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+According to FBI briefing material, as a result of the [REDACTED] tipper
+the [REDACTED] opened a full international terrorism investigation on
+[REDACTED] (S//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+After receiving the [REDACTED] tipper in [REDACTED] the [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] requested that KBL Headquarters apply for a FISA order to
+conduct surveillance of [REDACTED] The FBI subsequently obtained
+[REDACTED] and began FISA electronic
+surveilance [REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+According to an [REDACTED] Letterhead Memorandum (LHM)
+drafted by the FBI case agent on [REDACTED] the FBI determined
+from [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+³⁸⁹ According to the EC [REDACTED] interviewed in connection with the FBI's effort to.........
+ascertain [REDACTED] who the FBI suspected of having ties to [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (S//NF)
+
+³⁹⁰ According to the EC, the individual was reported to have told the police [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (S//OC/NF)
+
+319
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+The [REDACTED] LHM described other evidence seized [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] In addition, the LHM described
+additional evidence gathered through several detainee interviews [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (S//OC/NF)
+
+The FBI arrested [REDACTED] and an associate [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] were indicted on [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] indicted on [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (S//NF)
+
+The arrest and indictment arose out of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (S//NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+320
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
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+
+[REDACTED]
+Following [REDACTED] trial, [REDACTED] was convicted on [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]³⁹³ He was sentenced to [REDACTED] prison term. (S//NF)
+
+In an undated summary of successes under the Stellar Wind program,
+the NSA characterized [REDACTED] as
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+³⁹³ [REDACTED] (S//NF) [REDACTED] was convicted on [REDACTED] against [REDACTED]
+
+321
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HES/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+The government's response to the [REDACTED] stated that
+the FBI initiated a national security-international terrorism investigation of
+[REDACTED] after receiving the [REDACTED] EC. The government stated that the
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+5. [REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+The FBI closed its preliminary investigation of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] after it concluded [REDACTED] had no nexus to terrorist activities.
+(S//NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+322
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+
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+
+[REDACTED]
+
+According to FBI briefing materials, based on the [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] investigation of [REDACTED] associates [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] a FISA order was obtained for [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] According to
+an FBI declaration filed in discovery litigation concerning [REDACTED] the
+[REDACTED] tipper in [REDACTED] investigation was not used to obtain the FISA
+order; however, the declaration stated that the tippen [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED] was arrested by the FBI later in [REDACTED] According to the
+FBI briefing materials, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (S//OC/NF)
+
+On [REDACTED] the FBI applied for and obtained a FISA order to
+conduct electronic surveillance and a physical search [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] By this time [REDACTED] had been in FBI custody for several days.³⁹⁵ In
+support of the FISA application, the government reported that [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] also in custody at that time, recently had [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+³⁹⁴ Based on the specific wording of the EC, it is evident that the tipper was derived
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+323
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
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+
+[REDACTED]
+
+On [REDACTED] pleaded guilty to [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]³⁹⁷ (S//NF)
+
+The NSA recommended that the FBI cite [REDACTED] investigation in
+briefing materials as an example of Stellar Wind's contribution to
+counterterrorism efforts. The FBI briefing materials also state that the
+tipper in [REDACTED] investigation was "instrumental in [REDACTED] becoming the
+subject of a Full Investigation on [REDACTED]" (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+In response to the OIG's request for information about the role [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] information played in the investigation [REDACTED] the FBI's
+Counterterrorism Division told us [REDACTED] that, based on its searches of
+internal FBI databases and discussions with the case agents, "no [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] reporting factored into [REDACTED] investigation." According to a [REDACTED]
+declaration the FBI filed in [REDACTED] prosecution, the [REDACTED] tipper in
+[REDACTED] investigation "did not directly lead to any information or evidence
+that was used in the prosecution of the case against [REDACTED] and was not
+incorporated into any application to a court, including the [FISA Court]."³⁹⁸
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+³⁹⁸ [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+324
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+
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+
+V. OIG Analysis (U)
+
+The FBI created the [REDACTED] project to disseminate Stellar Wind
+information as leads to FBI field offices and assigned the CAU's Team 10 to
+the NSA to work on Stellar Wind full-time for this purpose. We found that
+the co-location improved the FBI's knowledge about Stellar Wind operations
+and gave the NSA better insight about how FBI field offices investigated
+Stellar Wind information. We were told these benefits translated to
+improvements in the Stellar Wind report drafting process, and by extension,
+in [REDACTED] leads. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+One of the changes the FBI implemented to attempt to improve the
+investigation of [REDACTED] leads was to make FBI Headquarters-based
+CAU, instead of the field offices, responsible for issuing National Security
+Letters (NSL) to obtain subscriber information on tipped telephone numbers
+and e-mail addresses. This measure, initiated in July 2003, was intended
+to address agent concerns that [REDACTED] leads did not provide sufficient
+information to initiate national security investigations, a prerequisite under
+Justice Department investigative guidelines to issuing NSLs.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+However, we found that the CAU issued the NSLs from the [REDACTED]
+control file, a non-investigative file created in September 2002 to serve as a
+repository for [REDACTED] related communications between FBI
+Headquarters and field offices. Issuing the NSLs from a control file instead
+of an investigative file was contrary to internal FBI policy. The FBI finally
+opened an investigative file for the [REDACTED] project in November 2006.
+We believe the CAU and OGC officials involved in the decision to issue NSLS
+from the [REDACTED] control file concluded in good faith that the FBI had
+sufficient predication either to connect the [REDACTED] NSLs with existing
+preliminary or full investigations of al Qaeda and affiliated groups or to open
+new preliminary or full investigations in compliance with Justice
+Department investigative guidelines. However, we also concluded that the
+FBI could have, and should have, opened an investigative file for the [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] project when the decision first was made to have FBI Headquarters
+issue NSLs for [REDACTED] leads. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+We also described in this chapter a change the FISA Court made in
+March 2004 to the "scrubbing" process used to account for Stellar Wind
+information in international terrorism FISA applications. The change
+requires the FBI's Team 10 and FBI OGC, in coordination with the
+Department's Office of Intelligence (formerly OIPR), to determine whether
+any facility (telephone number or e-mail address) that appears in a FISA
+application also appeared in a Stellar Wind report and, if so, whether the
+FBI had developed, independent of Stellar Wind, an investigative interest in
+the facility before it was the subject of an [REDACTED] tipper, or whether the
+
+325
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+
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+
+facility would have been "inevitably discovered." FISA Court Presiding
+Judge Kollar-Kotelly imposed this additional scrubbing requirement after
+being advised of modifications made to Stellar Wind in March 2004 following
+the Justice Department's revised legal analysis of the program. The FBI and
+Office of Intelligence continue to expend significant resources to comply with
+this scrubbing requirement.³⁹⁹ However, we did not find any instances of
+the requirement causing the FBI not to be able to obtain FISA surveillance
+coverage on a target. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Our primary focus in this chapter was to assess the general role of
+Stellar Wind information in FBI investigations and its value to the FBI's
+overall counterterrorism efforts. Similar to the FBI, we had difficulty
+assessing the specific value of the program to the FBI's counterterrorism
+activities. However, based on our interviews of FBI managers and agents
+and our review of documents, and taking into account the substantial
+volume of leads the program generated for the FBI, we concluded that
+although the information produced under the Stellar Wind program had
+value in some counterterrorism investigations, it played a limited role in the
+FBI's overall counterterrorism efforts. (S//NF)
+
+The vast majority of Stellar Wind information the NSA provided the
+FBI related to telephone numbers and e-mail addresses the NSA identified
+through meta data analysis as having connections to individuals believed to
+be involved in international terrorism. The NSA rated a small percentage of
+these contacts [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+FBI agents and analysts with experience investigating [REDACTED]
+leads told us that most leads were determined not to have any connection to
+
+³⁹⁹ As noted earlier, the scrubbing procedure applies both to NSA information
+derived from the Stellar Wind program and to information derived from the FISA Court's
+PR/TT and Section 215 bulk meta data orders. This is so because until mid-2008, when
+the Stellar Wind program officially was closed, leads the NSA developed from the
+FISA-authorized bulk meta data collections were disseminated under the Stellar Wind
+compartment. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+⁴⁰⁰ Stated another way, the Stellar Wind program generated [REDACTED]
+leads for the FBI each month from October 2001 to February 2006.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+326
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+
+terrorism, and they did not identify for us any specific cases where leads
+helped the FBI identify previously unknown subjects involved in terrorism
+(although several stated that this did occur). This is not surprising given
+that the vast majority of leads sent to FBI field offices for investigation
+concerned telephone numbers and e-mail addresses that the NSA already
+had determined were at best one or two steps removed from numbers and
+addresses suspected of being used by individuals believed to be involved in
+terrorism. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The FBI's two statistical studies that attempted to assess the
+"significance" of Stellar Wind meta data leads to FBI counterterrorism efforts
+did not include explicit conclusions on the program's usefulness. The first
+study found [REDACTED] samples taken from [REDACTED] meta data leads the
+NSA provided the FBI from approximately October 2001 to December 2005,
+[REDACTED] or 1.2 percent [REDACTED] made "significant" contributions. The FBI's
+second statistical study, which reviewed each [REDACTED] e-mail tippers the
+NSA provided the FBI from August 2004 through January 2006, identified
+no examples of "significant" contributions to FBI counterterrorism efforts.⁴⁰¹
+The FBI OGC told us that FBI executive management's statements in
+congressional testimony that the Stellar Wind program had value was based
+in part on the results of the first study. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+While we believe Stellar Wind's role in FBI cases was limited,
+assessing the value of the program to the FBI's overall counterterrorism
+efforts is more complex. Some witnesses commented that an intelligence
+program's value cannot be assessed by statistical measures alone. Other
+witnesses, such as General Hayden, said that the value of the program may
+lie in its ability to help the Intelligence Community determine that the
+terrorist threat embedded within the country is not as great as once feared.
+Witnesses also suggested that the value of the program should not depend
+on documented "success stories," but rather on maintaining an intelligence
+capability to detect potential terrorist activity in the future. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+FBI personnel we interviewed generally were supportive of the Stellar
+Wind (or [REDACTED] program, calling the information "one tool of many" in
+the FBI's anti-terrorism efforts that "could help move cases forward" by, for
+example, confirming a subject's contacts with individuals involved in
+terrorism or identifying additional terrorist contacts. However, FBI
+personnel also frequently noted for us the deficiencies in the Stellar Wind
+information disseminated to FBI field offices, such as the lack of details
+
+⁴⁰¹ As described earlier in this chapter, the FBI considered a tipper "significant" if it
+led to any of three investigative results: the identification of a terrorist, the deportation
+from the United States of a suspected terrorist, or the development of an asset that can
+report about the activities of terrorists. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+327
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+
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+
+about the foreign individuals allegedly involved in terrorism with whom
+domestic telephone numbers and e-mail addresses were in contact. Yet,
+these FBI employees also believed the possibility that such contacts related
+to terrorism made investigating the tips worthwhile. Some FBI employees
+also cited the FBI's increased cooperation with the NSA on international
+terrorism matters as a side benefit of the Stellar Wind program.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+FBI Director Mueller told us that he believes the Stellar Wind program
+was useful and that the FBI must follow every lead it receives in order to
+prevent future terrorist attacks. He said "communications are absolutely
+essential" to this task and called meta data the "key" to the FBI's
+communications analysis. Mueller also stated that to the extent such
+information can be gathered and used legally it must be exploited and that
+he "would not dismiss the potency of a program based on the percentage of
+hits." (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+We sought to look beyond these comments of general support for
+Stellar Wind to specific, concrete examples of the program's contributions
+that also illustrated the role Stellar Wind information could play. We
+therefore examined five cases frequently cited in documents we reviewed
+and during our interviews as examples of Stellar Wind's contribution to the
+FBI's counterterrorism efforts. The cases include [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] In another case, Stellar Wind information revealed to the FBI that [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+In another case [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] According to the FBI,
+while the Stellar Wind information was either never used or "was of no
+value" in the criminal investigation that led to [REDACTED] arrest and conviction, it
+was an [REDACTED] tipper that led to the national security investigation that
+preceded the criminal prosecution. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The final investigation we examined [REDACTED] did not appear to result
+directly from Stellar Wind information. The NSA and the FBI at times have
+cited [REDACTED] case as an example of the contributions of Stellar Wind to
+
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+
+counterterrorism investigations. An FBI declaration filed in [REDACTED]
+prosecution indicated that [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Moreover, the FBI told us in response to our
+inquiry that Stellar Wind information did not "factor into [REDACTED]
+investigation." However, we concluded that Stellar Wind may have played
+some indirect role [REDACTED] becoming the subject of a Full Investigation by
+the FBI. Our review of documents indicated that [REDACTED]
+investigation, which appears to have been advanced by Stellar Wind
+reporting, might have caused the FBI to reopen its investigation [REDACTED]
+We were unable to describe with the same certainty as in [REDACTED]
+investigation the extent of Stellar Wind's contribution to [REDACTED]
+investigation, in part because of differing assessments in the FBI's own
+documents regarding the role of Stellar Wind this matter.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+In short, we found that Stellar Wind generally has played a limited
+role in FBI counterterrorism investigations, but that the evidence shows
+there are cases where Stellar Wind information had value. For example, in
+some of the cases we examined Stellar Wind information caused the FBI to
+take action that led to useful investigative results. However, in others the
+connection between the Stellar Wind information and the FBI's investigative
+actions was more difficult to discern. (S//NF)
+
+As discussed in Chapter Five and in this chapter, Stellar Wind's bulk
+meta data collection activities were transitioned to FISA authority and are
+ongoing... The FBI, under the [REDACTED] project (the successor to [REDACTED],
+requires field offices to conduct, at a minimum, threat assessments on
+telephone numbers and e-mail addresses the NSA derives from this
+FISA-authorized collection that the FBI is not already aware of, including
+numbers and addresses one or two steps removed from direct contacts with
+individuals involved in terrorism. In view of our findings about the Stellar
+Wind program's contribution to the FBI's counterterrorism efforts, we
+believe that the FBI should regularly assess the impact [REDACTED] leads
+have on FBI field offices and whether limited FBI resources should be used
+to investigate all of them. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Another consequence of the Stellar Wind program and the FBI's
+approach to assigning leads was that many threat assessments were
+conducted on individuals located in the United States, including U.S.
+persons, who were determined not to have any nexus to terrorism or [REDACTED]
+
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+
+represent a threat to national security.⁴⁰² These assessments also caused
+the FBI to collect and retain a significant amount of personal information
+about the users of tipped telephone numbers and e-mail addresses. In
+addition to an individual's name and home address, such information could
+include where the person worked, records of foreign travel, and the identity
+of family members. The results of these threat assessments and the
+information that was collected generally were reported in communications to
+FBI Headquarters and uploaded into FBI databases.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The FBI's collection of U.S. person information in this manner is
+ongoing under the NSA's FISA-authorized bulk meta data collection. To the
+extent leads derived from this program generate results similar to those
+under Stellar Wind, the FBI will continue to collect and retain a significant
+amount of information about individuals in the United States, including
+U.S. persons, that do not have a nexus to terrorism or represent a threat to
+national security. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+We recommend that as part of the [REDACTED] project, the Justice
+Department's National Security Division (NSD), working with the FBI,
+should collect information about the quantity of telephone numbers and
+e-mail addresses disseminated to FBI field offices that are assigned as
+Action leads and that require offices to conduct threat assessments. The
+information compiled should include whether individuals identified in threat
+assessments are U.S. or non-U.S. persons and whether the threat
+assessments led to the opening of preliminary or full national security
+investigations. With respect to threat assessments that conclude that users
+of tipped telephone numbers or e-mail addresses are not involved in
+terrorism and are not threats to national security, the Justice Department
+should take steps to track the quantity and nature of the U.S. person
+information collected and how the FBI retains and utilizes this information.
+This will enable the Justice Department and entities with oversight
+responsibilities, including the OIG and congressional committees, to assess
+the impact this intelligence program has on the privacy interests of U.S.
+persons and to consider whether, and for how long, such information
+should be retained. (TS//SI//OC/NF)
+
+⁴⁰² [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
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+
+We also recommend that, consistent with NSD's current oversight
+activities and as part of its periodic reviews of national security
+investigations at FBI Headquarters and field offices, NSD should review a
+representative sampling [REDACTED] leads to those offices. For each lead
+examined, NSD should assess FBI compliance with applicable legal
+requirements in the use of the lead and in any ensuing investigations,
+particularly with the requirements governing the collection and use of U.S.
+person information. (TS//SI//OC/NF)
+
+In sum, we agree that it is difficult to assess or quantify the
+effectiveness of a particular intelligence program. However, based on the
+interviews we conducted and documents we reviewed, we found that Stellar
+Wind information generally played a limited role in the FBI's
+counterterrorism efforts, but that the information had value in some cases.
+In addition, some witnesses said the program provides an "early warning
+system" to allow the Intelligence Community to detect potential terrorist
+attacks, even if the system has not specifically uncovered evidence of
+preparations for such an attack. Moreover, other OIGs in the Intelligence
+Community are reviewing their agency's involvement with the program and
+the results of those reviews, analyzed together, will provide a more
+comprehensive picture of the program's overall usefulness.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Finally, because the bulk meta data aspect of the Stellar Wind
+program continues under FISA authority, we recommend that the NSD take
+steps to gather information on the continuing operations of the program,
+including the use and handling of vast amounts of information on U.S.
+persons and the effectiveness of the program in FBI counterterrorism
+investigations. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+331
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+
+332
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+
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+
+CHAPTER SEVEN
+DISCOVERY ISSUES RELATED TO STELLAR WIND
+INFORMATION (TS//SI//NF)
+
+In this chapter we discuss the government's statutory and judicial
+discovery obligations in international terrorism cases relating to Stellar
+Wind-derived information. Under the Stellar Wind program, the federal
+government collected vast amounts of information, including the content of
+communications and meta data about telephone and e-mail
+communications involving U.S. citizens and non-U.S. citizens. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] potentially triggering an obligation under the Federal
+Rules of Criminal Procedure and applicable case law for the government to
+disclose certain information to the defendant. This obligation created a
+tension between the need to protect the secrecy of the Stellar Wind program
+and the need to comply with legal disclosure requirements.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+In this chapter, we examine the process by which the Department of
+Justice attempted to resolve this tension and meet its discovery obligations
+to criminal defendants.⁴⁰³ (U)
+
+I. Relevant Law (U)
+
+The government's obligation to disclose certain statements made by a
+defendant and to disclose other information concerning a defendant in a
+criminal proceeding comes primarily from two sources: Federal Rule of
+Criminal Procedure 16 and the U.S. Supreme Court case of Brady v.
+Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). (U)
+
+Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(B)(i) requires the
+government to make various disclosures at the request of a criminal
+defendant. Among other things, the government must disclose "any relevant
+written or recorded statement by the defendant if the statement is within
+the government's possession, custody, or control; and the attorney for the
+government knows - or through due diligence could know - that the
+statement exists[.]" Rule 16(a)(1)(E) provides that, upon a defendant's
+request, the government must allow a defendant to inspect and copy papers,
+
+⁴⁰³ In our review, we did not seek to determine what the government disclosed in
+specific cases. Rather, we focused on the adequacy of the process that the Justice
+Department implemented to comply with its discovery obligations in cases that involved
+Stellar Wind-derived information. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+333
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+
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+
+documents, data, and other materials "if the item is within the government's
+possession, custody, or control" and the item is material to preparing the
+defense; the government intends to use the item in its case-in-chief at trial;
+or the item was obtained from or belongs to the defendant. (U)
+
+Under Rule 16, a defendant's statements carry a "near presumption of
+relevance," and "the production of a defendant's statements has become
+'practically a matter of right even without a showing of materiality." United
+States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617, 621-22, 625 & n.10 (D.C. Circuit 1989).⁴⁰⁴
+(U)
+
+Disclosure of a defendant's statements is usually made by the
+government after receiving a request pursuant to Rule 16. However, even
+without making a Rule 16 request, a defendant has an independent right to
+discovery of his statements and certain other relevant information under
+Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Brady requires the government to
+disclose evidence in its possession favorable to the defendant and material
+to either guilt or punishment. Material evidence must be disclosed if it is
+exculpatory or if it could be used to impeach a government witness. (U)
+
+According to an Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR)
+memorandum on the government's Rule 16 and Brady obligations
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]⁴⁰⁵ (U)
+
+However, according to the memorandum, when production of the
+defendant's statements or other information would reveal classified
+information, the government may assert a national security privilege,
+sometimes known as the state secrets privilege.⁴⁰⁶ If the government
+asserts a colorable claim in a legal proceeding that classified information is
+privileged, the defendant must show that the information is not only
+
+⁴⁰⁴ See also United States v. Scarpa, 913 F.2d 993, 1011 (2nd Cir. 1990), citing
+United States v. McElroy, 697 F.2d 459, 464 (2nd Cir. 1982)("Rule 16 does not cover oral
+statements unrelated to the crime charged or completely separate from the government's
+trial evidence."). (U)
+
+⁴⁰⁵ Counsel for Intelligence Policy James Baker told us the memorandum was
+drafted at his request by an Assistant U.S. Attorney who had been detailed to OIPR. Baker
+said he requested the memorandum to refresh his understanding of the government's
+discovery obligations in criminal prosecutions. (U//FOUO
+
+⁴⁰⁶ The state secrets privilege is a common law doctrine asserted by the United
+States government to protect classified information. See generally, United States v.
+Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1952), (U)
+
+334
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+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+relevant but material. If the defendant can show materiality, some courts
+balance the defendant's need for disclosure against the government's
+substantial interest in protecting sources and methods associated with the
+sensitive information. See United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959, 965
+(9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Smith, 781 F.2d 1102, 1180 (4th Cir. 1985)
+(en banc). (U)
+
+The government can also invoke the Classified Information Procedures
+Act (CIPA), 18 U.S.C. App. 3, to protect classified information in federal
+prosecutions. CIPA does not expand or limit a defendant's right to discovery
+under Rule 16; rather, CIPA allows a court, "upon a sufficient showing" to
+authorize the government to delete specified items of classified information
+from otherwise discoverable documents, substitute a summary of the
+information, or stipulate to relevant facts that the classified information
+would tend to prove. (U)
+
+As detailed below, after aspects of the Stellar Wind program were
+disclosed in The New York Times and confirmed by the President in
+December 2005, the Justice Department invoked CIPA to prevent disclosure
+of the program and any program-derived information in [REDACTED]
+criminal cases [REDACTED]
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+II. Cases Raise Questions about Government's Compliance with
+Discovery Obligations (U)
+
+The tension between the highly classified nature of the Stellar Wind
+program and the government's discovery obligations in criminal cases
+initially arose in [REDACTED]
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+A. [REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The Department's awareness that Stellar Wind would have
+implications in criminal discovery arose in a case involving [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+¹⁰⁷ [REDACTED]
+
+335
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+(Cont'd.)
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+information collected under Stellar Wind would be discoverable and, more
+generally, how the Stellar Wind collections might be treated in view of the
+government's discovery obligations in criminal prosecutions.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Baker said he raised these issues with Attorney General Ashcroft, FBI
+Director Mueller, and other Justice Department, FBI, and NSA officials.
+Baker stated that they concluded that a determination should first be made
+whether the [REDACTED] obtained through Stellar Wind also
+were captured through FISA and therefore could be produced. Baker said it
+turned out [REDACTED] had been intercepted under FISA and
+could be produced under that authority rather than as a result of Stellar
+Wind collections. Baker told the OIG that he was relieved by this outcome,
+but continued to be concerned about future cases.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+B. [REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+336
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+On [REDACTED] Yoo orally recommended to Ashcroft that the
+Justice Department not disclose the Stellar Wind program intercepts to the
+[REDACTED] Yoo subsequently memorialized his advice in a
+memorandum. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+337
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Yoo finished his written memorandum regarding [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] ⁴¹⁰ [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+338
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED] ⁴¹¹
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+As a final point, Yoo wrote, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+⁴¹¹ [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+⁴¹² At the time Yoo wrote the [REDACTED] memorandum, he, Baker, and
+Ashcroft were the only non-FBI Justice Department officials read into the Stellar Wind
+program. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+413 [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+414 [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+(Cont a.)
+
+339
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+In another internal Justice Department review of his actions, Yoo has
+acknowledged that he is not well versed in criminal law. During an
+interview with the Department's Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR)
+in connection with its investigation concerning his legal opinions in support
+of a detainee interrogation program, Yoo stated that "criminal prosecution
+process in the Department was not my specialty," and "criminal law was not
+my area."⁴¹⁵ (TS//SI//OC/NF)
+
+III. Criminal Division Examines Discovery Issues (U)
+
+Following [REDACTED] the Justice Department's Criminal
+Division was tasked with developing procedures for handling Rule 16
+disclosure issues because the issues fell within its area of expertise. As a
+result, in [REDACTED] Patrick Rowan, a senior counsel in the Criminal
+Division, was read into the program to deal with Stellar Wind-related
+discovery issues. Rowan's supervisor, Criminal Division Assistant Attorney
+General Christopher Wray, was also read into the program at the same time.
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+⁴¹⁵ The OPR investigation concerned a Top Secret compartmented program relating
+to detainee interrogations. Yoo drafted legal opinions for this program while in the Office of
+Legal Counsel. However, as discussed in Chapter Four, in contrast with the Stellar Wind
+program at least four other OLC attorneys assisted Yoo with drafting the legal memoranda.
+Yoo was also able to consult with Criminal Division attorneys and the client agency on this
+matter. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+340
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+Wray and Rowan were the first Department attorneys with Criminal
+Division-level responsibility for terrorism prosecutions to be read into the
+program.(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Wray told the OIG that after his and Rowan's read-in, they "were kind
+of left on our own." He said that no one directed him or Rowan to continue
+studying the Rule 16 issues or the government's Brady obligations in
+connection with international terrorism prosecutions, nor did anyone tell
+them to develop any judgments or opinions on the subject. (U)
+
+Wray told us that at some point after his read-in he may have read
+Yoo's [REDACTED] memorandum on the Department's discovery
+obligations in [REDACTED] and he instructed Rowan to review the
+memorandum. Rowan told us that he was familiar with Yoo's
+memorandum, but stated that he could not recall whether the purpose of
+Yoo's memorandum was to lay out in general the pertinent legal issues or to
+document how [REDACTED] in particular was to be handled. Rowan
+told us that he did not recall having any problems with the conclusions Yoo
+reached. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+A. The "Informal Process" for Treating Discovery Issues in
+International Terrorism Cases (U)
+
+During his OIG interview, Rowan described the processes at the
+Department prior to the December 2005 disclosure of aspects of the Stellar
+Wind program in The New York Times to address discovery obligations with
+respect to Stellar Wind-derived information. He said that the NSA was
+generally aware of the Justice Department's international terrorism criminal
+cases, at least in part due to NSA's ongoing contacts with Patrick Philbin
+and others in the Department. According to Rowan, the NSA's general
+awareness of the Department's international terrorism docket amounted to
+an "informal process" for spotting cases that may present discovery issues.
+Rowan stated that prosecutors in U.S. Attorney's Offices typically would
+request the NSA to perform "prudential searches" of its databases for any
+relevant information concerning their prosecutions, including for discovery
+purposes, although this did not happen in every international terrorism
+case. Rowan stated that if the NSA located any responsive but classified
+information, it would be expected to notify senior Justice Department
+officials with the requisite clearances about the information. Rowan said he
+was confident that if Brady information were known to the NSA, it would be
+brought to the attention of the Department and steps would have been
+taken to dismiss the case or otherwise ensure the program was not
+disclosed. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+In addition to these routine communications between Department
+prosecutors and the NSA in criminal prosecutions, Rowan described other
+
+341
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+measures that were in place to keep Stellar Wind-derived information out of
+the criminal prosecution process. He stated that the FBI had "walled off"
+any evidence it collected from inclusion in criminal cases by tipping out
+Stellar Wind-derived information under [REDACTED] with a caveat that the
+information in the tipper was "for lead purposes only." Rowan noted that
+OIPR also had in place a scrubbing process to delete program-derived
+information from FISA applications. Rowan expressed confidence that these
+mechanisms ensured that no program information was used in
+international terrorism prosecutions.⁴¹⁶ Finally, Rowan stated that the FBI
+is "very quick to get FISAs up," thereby minimizing the likelihood that the
+NSA's Stellar Wind database would be the sole repository of Brady material.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+B. [REDACTED] Memorandum Analyzing Discovery Issues Raised
+by the Stellar Wind Program (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+At the direction of Assistant Attorney General Wray, Rowan
+memorialized his research regarding these discovery issues in a
+memorandum entitled [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Rowan said he worked on the memorandum largely alone,
+consulting occasionally with Wray. Rowan said it was very difficult to work
+on the matter because of the secrecy surrounding the program and the
+other demands of his job.⁴¹⁷ (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+In his [REDACTED] memorandum, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+⁴¹⁶ As discussed in Chapter Six, the caveats were intended to exclude at the outset
+any Stellar Wind-derived information from FISA applications and other criminal pleadings.
+The scrubbing process acts as a second check against including this information in FISA
+applications. However, neither the caveats nor the scrubbing process relieved the
+government of its obligations under Brady to disclose evidence in the government's
+possession favorable to the defendant and material to either guilt or punishment.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+⁴¹⁷ The memorandum noted, "Because there were no additional attorneys within the
+Criminal Division who were read into the program (and very few in the Department
+generally), we have been unable to assign work to others or to fully consult with others
+within the Division." (TS//SI//NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+342
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Rowan's memorandum also referred to guidance in the United States
+Attorney's Manual (USAM). For cases in which the Intelligence Community
+had no active involvement in the criminal investigation, the USAM stated
+that there are two circumstances in which the prosecutor must conduct a
+"suitable search" of Intelligence Community files: (1) where the prosecutor
+has "direct or reliable knowledge" that the Intelligence Community
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+343
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+possesses potential Brady or other discovery material; or, (2) in the absence
+of such knowledge, where "there nonetheless exists any reliable indication
+suggesting" that the Intelligence Community possesses such material.
+USAM, Criminal Resources Manual § 2052 (2002). The USAM stated that,
+as a general rule, a prosecutor should not seek access to Intelligence
+Community files unless there is an affirmative obligation to do so. However,
+it noted that certain types of cases, including terrorism prosecutions, fall
+outside this general rule. In such cases, the USAM advised that the
+prosecutor should conduct a "prudential search." Id.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Rowan wrote that the practice in several sections within the Criminal
+Division was to "generally go beyond both the legal obligations outlined [in
+his memorandum] and the general rule outlined in the USAM, initiating
+searches out of prudence, rather than a legal obligation." For instance,
+Rowan reported that the practice of the Criminal Division's
+Counterespionage Section (CES) was to search Intelligence Community files
+in almost every case, even in instances in which the Intelligence Community
+had no involvement in the investigation or prosecution [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] ⁴²⁰
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]⁴²¹ In cases involving the NSA, the typical practice
+
+⁴²⁰ The OIG interviewed John Dion, the Chief of CES. which became part of the
+National Security Division in 2006. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Dion stated that such searches are conducted in cases in
+which there is likely to be intelligence collection concerning the defendant as "suggested by
+the facts of the matter." He added that the searches were requested for a variety of
+reasons, including for purposes of meeting discovery obligations. Dion said that searches
+also were requested to determine whether the defendant has a "relationship" with an
+intelligence agency. He noted that CES does not request prudential searches as a matter of
+course to avoid making spurious requests. (S//NF)
+
+⁴²¹ [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Dion said CES was a proponent
+of the position that line prosecutors with whom CES co-prosecutes cases should have the
+same knowledge as CES concerning the "national security equities" involved in each case.
+Dion said this arrangement also allows for the AUSA, who is often the prosecutor most
+familiar with the case and the jurisdictional practices, to review any Intelligence
+Community material for Rule 16 and Brady purposes. Dion acknowledged the limitations
+to this arrangement concerning strictly compartmented programs such as Stellar Wind,
+where the NSA understandably would be reluctant to read in line prosecutors for the
+limited purpose of screening defense discovery requests. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+344
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+was for the CES attorney to use the provisions of CIPA to prevent disclosure
+of sensitive material. Rowan noted that other sections within the Criminal
+Division also relied on CIPA to protect Intelligence Community files found
+during searches. (TS//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Thus, although Rowan's memorandum did not contain a proposal for
+handling discovery requests in cases involving Stellar Wind, it identified key
+legal issues that would have to be addressed as a part of any such proposal.
+[REDACTED]
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+⁴²² When Rowan became principally responsible for coordinating the Department's
+responses to defense discovery requests as a Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the
+(Cont'd.)
+
+345
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HES/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+C. Office of Legal Counsel and Discovery Issue (U)
+
+Shortly before Rowan finished his memorandum in [REDACTED] OLC
+Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Steve Bradbury became the
+acting head of OLC. Bradbury told us that he recalled having some
+discussion with Rowan about how discovery matters should be handled in
+connection with the Stellar Wind program. Bradbury said that John
+Eisenberg, later a Deputy in OLC, also may have discussed the matter with
+Rowan. Bradbury stated that he did not believe that OLC followed up on
+Rowan's request that it continue researching these issues.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Eisenberg told us that he discussed the Rule 16 issue with Rowan at
+some point, but did not recall whether they discussed the Brady issue. He
+recalled discussing Yoo's [REDACTED] memorandum with Rowan and
+said he believes the Justice Department took the position that the Yoo
+memorandum was correct, at least with respect to Yoo's legal analysis in [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+When we showed Eisenberg a copy of Rowan's [REDACTED]
+memorandum, Eisenberg stated that he had not previously seen it.
+Eisenberg told us that OLC would not typically be responsible for
+addressing the discovery issues presented in Rowan's memorandum and
+that he was not aware of any OLC opinion on the subject other than Yoo's
+memorandum. Eisenberg also said he was not aware of any formal
+procedures for handling Rule 16 disclosure requests or the government's
+affirmative Brady obligations other than the ex parte in camera motions
+practice pursued by the National Security Division, discussed below.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+CES Chief Dion agreed that OLC would not be the appropriate entity
+to review discovery procedures in the context of Stellar Wind, in part
+because OLC attorneys generally do not have criminal litigation expertise.
+Dion suggested that if the Department were to develop procedures for
+handling discovery of Intelligence Community files, it should be done by the
+Department's National Security Division in coordination with United States
+Attorneys' Offices, and it should be binding only on those two entities.
+Rowan, while generally agreeing with Dion, told the OIG that he believed the
+OLC appropriately could have analyzed the legal issue of what impact a
+
+National Security Division in 2006 [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The results of these searches were produced to the courts ex
+parte, in camera, pursuant to CIPA. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+346
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+guilty plea would have on the government's Brady obligations.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+IV. Use of the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) to
+Respond to Discovery Requests (U)
+
+After publication of The New York Times articles in December 2005,
+the Justice Department received numerous discovery requests in connection
+with international terrorism prosecutions throughout the country. After
+these articles, additional officials in the Criminal Division were read into the
+Stellar Wind program, including the new Assistant Attorney General Alice
+Fisher and other senior officials, both to assist with the Criminal Division's
+investigation into the leak of information to The New York Times and to
+handle the discovery requests following the public confirmation of the
+program by the President and other Administration officials in December
+2005.⁴²³ After the National Security Division was created in September
+2006, it assumed much of the responsibility for handling the responses to
+discovery requests. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Typically, the defense motions sought to compel the government to
+produce information concerning a defendant that had been derived from the
+"Terrorist Surveillance Program," the term sometimes used by the
+government to refer to what the President confirmed after publication of The
+New York Times articles. The government responded to the discovery
+requests by filing ex parte in camera responses requesting to "delete items"
+from material to be produced in discovery pursuant to CIPA. (S//NF)
+
+In the following sections we provide a brief overview of CIPA and its
+use in international terrorism cases potentially involving Stellar
+Wind-derived intelligence. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+⁴²³ [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+347
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HES/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+A. Overview of CIPA (U)
+
+The Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. App. 3, was
+enacted in 1980 to provide procedures for protecting classified information
+in federal criminal prosecutions. When a party to a criminal proceeding
+notifies the court that classified information will be used in the course of the
+proceeding, CIPA requires the court to initiate procedures to "determine the
+use, relevance, or admissibility of the classified information that would
+otherwise be made during the trial or pretrial proceeding." 18 U.S.C. App. 3
+§ 6(a). Where the government holds the classified information, it may bring
+the matter before the court ex parte, but it also must provide notice to the
+defense that classified information is at issue. Id. at § 6(b)(1). (U)
+
+Protective procedures generally are established through a CIPA
+hearing with both parties present. The hearing may be conducted in
+camera if the government certifies that an in camera hearing is necessary to
+protect the classified information. Id. at § 6(a). Typically, the government
+seeks an order to protect against the disclosure of any classified information
+to the defense. The government may also seek to withhold production of the
+classified information in one of three ways: (1) deletion of the classified
+items from the material disclosed to the defendant, (2) summarization of the
+classified information, or (3) admission of certain facts that the classified
+information would tend to prove. Id. at § 4. Based on the OIG's review of
+CIPA filings related to the Stellar Wind program, the government has only
+used option 1 (deleting classified items from material to be disclosed to the
+defendant) in response to defense motions for Stellar Wind information.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+To prevent the disclosure of classified information, the government
+may make an ex parte showing to the court. To do so the government must
+submit "an affidavit of the Attorney General certifying that disclosure of
+classified information would cause identifiable damage to the national
+security of the United States and explaining the basis for the classification
+of such information." Id. at § 6(c)(2). If the court decides that the
+defendant's right to access to the evidence outweighs the government's
+national security interests, the government can choose to dismiss the
+indictment rather than make a disclosure. United States v. Moussaoui, 382
+F.3d 453, 466 n. 18, 474-76 (4th Cir. 2004). (U)
+
+B. Use of CIPA in International Terrorism Prosecutions Alleged
+to Involve Stellar Wind-Derived Information
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+We reviewed the CIPA pleadings files maintained in the National
+Security Division relating to the Stellar Wind program. In almost every
+instance, the CIPA litigation was handled by the National Security Division
+
+348
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+without the involvement of the line prosecutors in the U.S. Attorney's Offices
+who handled the underlying prosecutions but who were not read into the
+Stellar Wind program. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NE)
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Rowan, who became the National Security Division Acting
+Assistant Attorney General in April 2008 and was confirmed as the
+Assistant Attorney General in September 2008, told us that [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The scope and nature of the defense motions initiating the CIPA
+litigation varied, depending on the procedural posture of the case. For
+instance, some defense motions sought to compel discovery of NSA
+surveillance information, while others sought to suppress all government
+evidence and, in the alternative, have the government's case dismissed on
+the theory that illegal electronic surveillance caused the government to
+initiate its criminal investigation in the first instance. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Regardless of the varying procedural posture of the cases and the
+scope and nature of the defense motions, the government responses we
+examined were fairly uniform, consisting of a motion to delete items from
+discovery, a legal memorandum in support of the motion, declarations from
+senior FBI and NSA officials, and a proposed order.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The government's CIPA submissions asserted that the information at
+issue in the discovery litigation was classified and subject to the national
+security privilege as codified in CIPA. They generally described the types of
+information its searches of intelligence databases (including Stellar Wind)
+might reveal. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+349
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+⁴²⁴ [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+350
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED] ⁴²⁵
+
+The government's responses we reviewed uniformly stated that
+information in the NSA's intelligence reports had not been or would not be
+used as evidence, and that there was no causal connection between the
+information in the reports and any evidence used or to be used at trial, or
+was too attenuated from the evidence to be discoverable. The government
+argued that because the facts concerning the NSA's reporting would not aid
+the defense, the court need not explore the sources and methods used to
+acquire the information. The submissions also argued that the information
+collected by the NSA was not included in the government's FISA application,
+and therefore was too attenuated from the trial evidence to merit a review of
+the means by which the intelligence information was gathered. The
+government asserted that the "causal connection" between discovery of the
+derivative evidence and the alleged illegal search "may have become so
+attenuated as to dissipate the taint."⁴²⁶ It is important to note that the
+government did not argue in the CIPA responses we reviewed that [REDACTED]
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+C. Government Arguments in Specific Cases (U)
+
+In this section we describe [REDACTED] cases that illustrate the arguments
+made by the government in CIPA litigation with respect to defendant's
+requests for discovery of Stellar Wind-derived information.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+⁴²⁵ In several instances, the Stellar Wind information was disseminated within the
+FBI after the FBI already had obtained a FISA order to conduct electronic surveillance of
+the defendant, thus allowing the government to argue that the NSA reporting played no role
+in its acquisition of the evidence used or planned to be used against the defendant.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+⁴²⁶ Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). The government also
+argued in its submissions that suppressing its evidence would not serve any deterrence
+purpose. The government argued that the NSA acquires, processes, and disseminates
+intelligence not to produce criminal prosecutions, but to protect the national security. It
+asserted that any suppression of evidence would therefore frustrate a criminal prosecution
+and create an incentive for the intelligence community not to share information with law
+enforcement, thereby harming national security. (TS//SI//OC/NF)
+
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+
+V. OIG ANALYSIS (U)
+
+We found that the Department made little effort to understand and
+comply with its discovery obligations in connection with Stellar
+Wind-derived information for the first several years of the program. The
+Department's limited initial effort was also hampered by the limited number
+of attorneys who were read into the program. As a result, OLC attorney
+John Yoo alone initially analyzed the government's discovery obligations in
+one early case, and he produced a legal analysis that was based on an
+incorrect understanding of the facts of the case to which it applied. When
+other attorneys from the Department's Criminal Division eventually were
+read into the program [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] At that point, the Department eventually took steps
+to address [REDACTED] its discovery obligations. However, in
+our view, those steps are not complete and do not fully ensure that the
+government has met its discovery obligations regarding information
+obtained through the Stellar Wind program. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+As described in this chapter, in 2002 the Department first recognized that the Stellar Wind program could have implications for discovery obligations in terrorism cases. OIPR Counsel Baker raised with Department
+
+[REDACTED]
+
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+and FBI officials the question of how the government would meet its
+discovery obligations regarding Stellar Wind information. Despite
+awareness of this issue, the Department took no action at this time to
+ensure that it was in compliance with Rule 16 or Brady with respect to
+Stellar Wind-derived information. We believe that at this point senior
+Department officials were on notice that, at a minimum, the discovery issue
+merited attention. However, no concrete action was taken until early [REDACTED]
+in the context of [REDACTED] when the Department had to address
+how to handle Stellar Wind information that was not also obtained under
+FISA and that could be material to the defense under Rule 16. This issue
+was assigned to Yoo, who concluded [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+As with other aspects of the Stellar Wind program, we believe the
+error in Yoo's legal analysis may have resulted in part from the failure to
+subject his memorandum to typical OLC and Department review and
+scrutiny. Because other Department attorneys were not read into the
+Stellar Wind program, the risk that the Department would produce a
+factually flawed and inadequate legal analysis of these important discovery
+issues was escalated. As we concluded in Chapters Three and Four, we
+believe the lack of sufficient legal resources at the Department during this
+early phase of the Stellar Wind program hampered its legal analysis of
+important issues related to the program. We believe that Yoo's [REDACTED]
+memorandum is one more manifestation of this problem.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+In July 2004, Patrick Rowan, a senior counsel in the Criminal
+Division, was read into the program and conducted a more systemic
+analysis of the Department's discovery obligations with regard to Stellar
+Wind information. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
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+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+With his memorandum, Rowan initiated a request that the issue be further
+examined by OLC. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+However, other than in informal discussions with Rowan concerning
+Yoo's [REDACTED] memorandum, OLC did not further examine these issues or
+follow up on Rowan's recommendation. While we recognize that OLC was
+not responsible for developing litigative strategy on this issue, we believe
+that OLC or another appropriate Department component should have
+provided guidance on this important legal issue. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+We recommend that the Department conduct a comprehensive legal
+assessment of the important issues [REDACTED]
+that still remain unresolved [REDACTED] the legal
+ramifications of a guilty plea on the government's disclosure obligations
+under Rule 16 and in particular Brady. We believe the Department should
+carefully consider whether it must re-examine past cases to see whether
+potentially discoverable but undisclosed Rule 16 or Brady material was
+collected by the NSA, and take appropriate steps to ensure that it has
+complied with its discovery obligations in such cases. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The Department took steps to respond [REDACTED] to
+discovery motions [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+However, the Department's handling of these motions did not require the
+Department to identify the potentially discoverable information derived
+under the Stellar Wind program that may exist in other cases. We
+recommend that the Department, in coordination with the NSA, develop and
+implement a procedure for identifying Stellar Wind-derived information that
+may be associated with international terrorism cases, currently pending or
+likely to be brought in the future, and to evaluate such information in light
+of the government's discovery obligations under Rule 16 and Brady.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
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+CHAPTER EIGHT
+PUBLIC STATEMENTS ABOUT THE SURVEILLANCE
+PROGRAM (U)
+
+This chapter examines Attorney General Alberto Gonzales's testimony
+and public statements related to the Stellar Wind program. Aspects of this
+program were first disclosed publicly in a series of articles in The New York
+Times in December 2005. In response, the President publicly confirmed a
+portion of the Stellar Wind program – the interception of the content of
+international communications of people reasonably believed to have links to
+al Qaeda and related organizations. Subsequently, Attorney General
+Gonzales was questioned about the program in two hearings before the
+Senate Judiciary Committee in February 2006 and July 2007. (S//NF)
+
+In between those two hearings, former Deputy Attorney General
+James Comey testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee about the
+dispute between the Department and the White House concerning the
+program. Gonzales's and Comey's differing congressional testimony led to
+allegations that Gonzales had made misleading statements to Congress
+about the dispute and the program itself.⁴³⁴ (U)
+
+In this chapter, we examine whether Attorney General Gonzales made
+false, inaccurate, or misleading statements related to the Stellar Wind
+program. (U//FOUO)
+
+I. Summary of the Dispute about the Program (U)
+
+As described in detail in Chapters Three and Four, the Stellar Wind
+program is best understood as consisting of three types of collections,
+informally referred to as "baskets." Basket 1 related to the collection of
+e-mail and telephone content. Initially, the Stellar Wind program collected
+e-mail and telephone content when probable cause existed to believe one of
+the parties to the call or e-mail was outside the United States and at least
+one of the communicants was a member of an international terrorist group.
+
+⁴³⁴ For example, Senator Arlen Specter stated at a Senate hearing on July 24, 2007,
+that he did not find Attorney General Gonzales's testimony to be credible and suggested to
+the Attorney General that he "review this transcript very, very carefully." After this hearing
+Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy sent a letter to the OIG, dated
+August 16, 2007, asking the OIG to review Gonzales's statements to determine whether
+they were intentionally false, misleading, or inappropriate. Gonzales testified several times
+before the Senate and House Judiciary and Intelligence Committees about the program. In
+this chapter, we focus on his February 2006 and July 2007 testimony in which he
+discussed the events of March 2004. (U)
+
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+Basket 2 involved bulk collection of telephony meta data, and basket 3
+involved bulk collection of e-mail meta data. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+These collections were authorized by a Presidential Authorization that
+was re-issued at approximately 30 to 45-day intervals. Each Authorization
+was certified as to form and legality by the Attorney General. The Attorney
+General's certifications were initially supported by legal opinions from OLC
+attorney John Yoo affirming the legality of the program.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+As discussed in Chapter Four, after Jack Goldsmith was confirmed as
+Assistant Attorney General for OLC in October 2003, he, along with
+Associate Deputy Attorney General Patrick Philbin, conducted an analysis of
+the legal basis underlying each basket in the Stellar Wind program. As a
+result of this review, he, Philbin, and recently confirmed Deputy Attorney
+General Comey concluded that they could find no legal support for several
+aspects of the existing program. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+In early March 2004, the dispute between the Department and the
+White House over the Department's revised legal analysis of the Stellar Wind
+program came to a head. Deputy Attorney General Comey, who assumed
+the duties of the Attorney General when Attorney General Ashcroft was
+hospitalized, informed the White House that the Department could not
+recertify the program. This dispute culminated in the unsuccessful attempt
+by then-White House Counsel Gonzales and White House Chief of Staff
+Andrew Card to get Attorney General Ashcroft to overrule Comey and
+recertify the program while he was in the hospital. When Ashcroft refused
+to certify the program and said that Comey was acting as the Attorney
+General, not him, the President reauthorized the program without the
+
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+Attorney General's certification. Instead Gonzales, as White House Counsel,
+recertified the program. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+After the White House's actions to continue the program without
+Justice Department certification, Deputy Attorney General Comey, FBI
+Director Mueller, and many other senior Department officials considered
+resigning. When the President learned of this, he directed that the
+Department work with other involved agencies and the White House to place
+the program on a firmer legal foundation. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+II. The New York Times Articles and President Bush's Confirmation
+Regarding NSA Activities (U)
+
+In 2004, aspects of the Stellar Wind program were disclosed to two
+reporters for The New York Times. The reporters, James Risen and Eric
+Lichtblau, sought to publish an article about the program in late 2004.
+However, after a series of meetings with Administration officials who argued
+that publication of the story would harm the national security, The New
+York Times agreed to delay publishing the story. (S//NF)
+
+The New York Times eventually published a series of articles about
+the program on December 16 through 19, 2005. According to one of the
+reporters, the Times decided to publish the articles at least in part because
+the newspaper learned of serious concerns about the legality of the program
+that had "reached the highest levels of the Bush Administration."⁴³⁵ (U)
+
+The first article, on December 16, 2005, was entitled, "Bush Lets U.S.
+Spy on Callers Without Courts." This article stated that "Months after the
+Sept. 11 attacks, President Bush secretly authorized the National Security
+Agency to eavesdrop on Americans and others inside the United States to
+search for evidence of terrorist activity without the court-approved warrants
+ordinarily required for domestic spying, according to government officials."
+The article described in broad terms the content collection aspect of the NSA
+program (basket 1), stating that according to officials the NSA has
+"monitored the international telephone calls of hundreds, perhaps
+
+⁴³⁵ See Eric Lichtblau, Bush's Law (2008), p. 203. (U)
+
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+thousands, of people inside the United States without warrants over the
+past three years in an effort to track possible ‘dirty numbers' linked to al
+Qaeda." The article stated that the NSA continued to seek warrants to
+monitor purely domestic communications. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+The article asserted that "reservations about aspects of the program"
+had also been expressed by Senator Jay Rockefeller (the Vice Chair of the
+Senate Select Committee on Intelligence) and a judge who presided over the
+FISA Court. The article added, "Some of the questions about the [NSA's]
+new powers led the administration to temporarily suspend the operation last
+year and impose more restrictions, officials said." The article also stated
+that “In mid-2004, concerns about the program expressed by national
+security officials, government lawyers and a judge prompted the Bush
+administration to suspend elements of the program and revamp it."
+However, the article incorrectly tied this suspension of the program to Judge
+Colleen Kollar-Kotelly's concerns that information gained from the program
+was also being used to seek FISA orders, rather than to the March 2004
+dispute between Department officials and the White House about the
+legality of aspects of the program. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+On December 17, 2005, the day after The New York Times published
+the first article, President Bush publicly acknowledged the portion of the
+NSA program that was described in the article. President Bush described in
+broad terms these NSA electronic surveillance activities, stating:
+
+In the weeks following the terrorist attacks on our nation, I
+authorized the National Security Agency, consistent with U.S.
+law and the Constitution, to intercept international
+communications of people with known links to al Qaeda and
+related terrorist organizations. Before we intercept these
+communications, the government must have information that
+establishes a clear link to these terrorist networks.
+
+This is a highly classified program that is crucial to our national
+security. Its purpose is to detect and prevent terrorist attacks
+against the United States, our friends and allies. Yesterday the
+existence of this secret program was revealed in media reports,
+after being improperly provided to news organizations. As a
+result, our enemies have learned information they should not
+have, and the unauthorized disclosure of this effort damages
+our national security and puts our citizens at risk. Revealing
+classified information is illegal, alerts our enemies, and
+endangers our country . . . .
+
+The activities I authorized are reviewed approximately every 45
+days. Each review is based on a fresh intelligence assessment of
+terrorist threats to the continuity of our government and the
+
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+threat of catastrophic damage to our homeland. During each
+assessment, previous activities under the authorization are
+reviewed. The review includes approval by our nation's top legal
+officials, including the Attorney General and the Counsel to the
+President. I have reauthorized the program more than 30 times
+since the September 11th attacks, and I intend to do so for as
+long as our nation faces a continuing threat from al Qaeda and
+related groups.⁴³⁶ (U)
+
+III. Other Administration Statements (U)
+
+On January 19, 2006, the Justice Department issued a document,
+informally referred to as a "White Paper," entitled “Legal Authorities
+Supporting the Activities of the National Security Agency Described by the
+President.” The 42-page document addressed in an unclassified form the
+legal basis for the collection activities that were described in the
+December 16, 2005, New York Times article and other media reports and
+confirmed by President Bush. The White Paper stated that the President
+acknowledged that “he has authorized the NSA to intercept international
+communications into and out of the United States of persons linked to al
+Qaeda or other related terrorist organizations.” (U)
+
+The White Paper reiterated the legal theory advanced by the
+Department in Goldsmith's May 2004 memorandum about the revised NSA
+program, which concluded that the September 18, 2001, Congressional
+Authorization for the Use of Military Force authorized the President to
+employ "warrantless communications intelligence targeted at the enemy," a
+fundamental incident of the use of military force, pursuant to the
+President's Article II Commander-in-Chief powers. The White Paper also
+argued that the NSA's activities were consistent with FISA, as confirmed and
+supplemented by the AUMF. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+On January 23, 2006, the White House also issued a press release
+and memorandum to counter criticism of the NSA program by members of
+Congress. The press release was entitled “Setting the Record Straight:
+Democrats Continue to Attack the Terrorist Surveillance Program.” This
+document was the first time we found any official use of the term “Terrorist
+Surveillance Program” to apply to the NSA program or aspects of the
+program.⁴³⁷ (S//NF)
+
+⁴³⁶ The full text of President Bush's December 17, 2005, radio address can be found
+at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/print/20051217.html. (U)
+
+⁴³⁷ See http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/01/20060122.html. We
+found that the term was used in the media prior to this time. The first published reference
+(Cont'd.)
+
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+The following day, on January 23, 2006, President Bush referred to
+the “terrorist surveillance program” during a speech at Kansas State
+University:
+
+Let me talk about one other program ... something that you've
+been reading about in the news lately. It's what I would call a
+terrorist surveillance program. (U)
+
+In the speech, President Bush described the program as the interception “of
+certain communications emanating between somebody inside the United
+States and outside the United States; and one of the numbers would be
+reasonably suspected to be an al Qaeda link or affiliate.” (U)
+
+On January 24, 2006, Attorney General Gonzales delivered a speech
+at the Georgetown University Law Center which, according to his prepared
+remarks, began by stating that his remarks “speak only to those activities
+confirmed publicly by the President, and not to purported activities
+described in press reports.” Gonzales referred to the program throughout
+his speech as either the “terrorist surveillance program” or “the NSA's
+terrorist surveillance program.” (U)
+
+IV. Testimony and Other Statements (U)
+
+After the New York Times articles disclosed aspects of the NSA
+program, members of Congress expressed concern that the President had
+exceeded his authority by authorizing electronic surveillance activity
+without FISA orders, and Congressional hearings were held on the issue.
+Gonzales testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee on February 6,
+2006, and July 24, 2007, about the NSA's surveillance activities. We
+describe in the next sections his testimony and other statements he made
+about the NSA's activities, as well as testimony by former Deputy Attorney
+General Comey before the Senate Judiciary Committee on May 15, 2007.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+we found to the "terrorist surveillance program" in connection with the NSA electronic
+surveillance activities was in NewsMax, an online news website, on December 22, 2005. (U)
+See "Barbara Boxer: Bush Spy Hearings Before Alito," NewsMax.com, December 22, 2005,
+http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/ic/2005/12/22/173255.shtml. On January 20,
+2006, the term appeared again on another Internet blog called "RedState." See "Making the
+case for the NSA terrorist surveillance program," at
+http://redstate.com/story/2006/1/20/92630/0977. (U)
+
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+A. Gonzales's February 6, 2006, Senate Judiciary Committee
+Testimony (U)
+
+In his opening statement before the Senate Judiciary Committee on
+February 6, 2006, Gonzales began by saying that his testimony would
+necessarily be limited:
+
+Before going any further, I should make clear what I can
+discuss today. I am here to explain the Department's
+assessment that the President's terrorist surveillance program
+is consistent with our laws and Constitution. I am not here to
+discuss the operational details of that program, or any other
+classified activity. The President has described the terrorist
+surveillance program in response to certain leaks, and my
+discussion in this open forum must be limited to those facts the
+President has publicly confirmed - nothing more. Many
+operational details of our intelligence activities remain classified
+and unknown to our enemy – and it is vital that they remain so.
+(U)
+
+The questioning of Gonzales at this hearing focused primarily on the
+nature of the NSA surveillance activity and the legal basis for it.⁴³⁸ Senator
+Charles Schumer asked Gonzales specifically about accounts of a
+disagreement within the Justice Department over the NSA program:
+
+SEN. SCHUMER: But it's not just Republican senators who
+seriously question the NSA program, but very high-ranking
+officials within the administration itself. Now, you've already
+acknowledged that there were lawyers in the administration
+who expressed reservations about the NSA program. There was
+dissent. Is that right?
+
+ATTY GEN. GONZALES: Of course, Senator. As I indicated,
+this program implicates very difficult issues. The war on terror
+has generated several issues that are very, very complicated.
+
+SEN. SCHUMER: Understood.
+
+ATTY GEN. GONZALES: Lawyers disagree.
+
+⁴³⁸ Neither the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee at the time (Senator
+Specter), nor the Ranking Member (Senator Leahy), were read into the program or provided
+the underlying documents authorizing the program. Senator Leahy stated at the outset of
+the hearing that he and others had made a request to review the Presidential
+Authorizations and OLC memoranda about the program, but that these materials had not
+been provided to the Committee. (U)
+
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+SEN. SCHUMER: I concede all those points. Let me ask you
+about some specific reports. It's been reported by multiple
+news outlets that the former number two man in the Justice
+Department, the premier terrorism prosecutor, Jim Comey,
+expressed grave reservations about the NSA program and at
+least once refused to give it his blessing. Is that true?
+
+ATTY GEN. GONZALES: Senator, here's a response that I feel
+that I can give with respect to recent speculation or stories
+about disagreements. There has not been any serious
+disagreement, including - and I think this is accurate - there's
+not been any serious disagreement about the program that the
+President has confirmed.
+
+There have been disagreements about other matters regarding
+operations, which I cannot get into. I will also say -
+
+SEN. SCHUMER: But there was some – I'm sorry to cut you off.
+But there was some dissent within the administration, and Jim
+Comey did express at some point – that's all I asked you – some
+reservation.
+
+ATTY GEN. GONZALES: The point I want to make is that, to my
+knowledge, none of the reservations dealt with the program that
+we're talking about today. They dealt with operational
+capabilities that we're not talking about today.
+
+SEN. SCHUMER: I want to ask you again about – I'm just – we
+have limited time.
+
+ATTY GEN. GONZALES: Yes, sir.
+
+SEN. SCHUMER: It's also been reported that the head of the
+Office of Legal Counsel, Jack Goldsmith, a respected lawyer and
+professor at Harvard Law School, expressed reservations about
+the program. Is that true?
+
+ATTY GEN. GONZALES: Senator, rather than going individual
+by individual –
+
+SEN. SCHUMER: No, I think we're – this is –
+
+ATTY GEN. GONZALES: - let me just say that I think differing
+views that have been the subject of some of these stories does
+not – did not deal with the program that I'm here testifying
+about today.
+
+SEN. SCHUMER: But you are telling us that none of these
+people expressed any reservations about the ultimate program.
+Is that right?
+
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+ATTY GEN. GONZALES: Senator, I want to be very careful here,
+because, of course, I'm here only testifying about what the
+President has confirmed. And with respect to what the
+President has confirmed, I believe – I do not believe that these
+DOJ officials that you're identifying had concerns about this
+program. (U)
+
+Throughout the hearing, other Senators asked Gonzales questions
+relating to various aspects of the NSA program, and Gonzales would often
+qualify his answers by stating that he was not discussing activities beyond
+what the President had confirmed. However, in doing so Gonzales
+sometimes suggested that the NSA's activities under the program were
+limited to what the President had confirmed. In one exchange with Senator
+Leahy, for example, Gonzales suggested that the electronic surveillance
+activities the President had publicly confirmed were the only activities the
+President has authorized to be conducted. Specifically, in response to a
+series of questions from Senator Leahy regarding what activities beyond
+warrantless electronic surveillance Gonzales would deem legal under the
+Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Gonzales stated,
+
+Sir, I have tried to outline for you and the committee what the
+President has authorized, and that is all that he has
+authorized. . . . There is all kinds of wild speculation out there
+about what the President has authorized and what we're
+actually doing. And I'm not going to get into a discussion,
+Senator, about hypotheticals.⁴³⁹ (S//NF)
+
+⁴³⁹ On February 28, 2006, Gonzales wrote to Senator Specter to provide additional
+responses to questions that he had answered during his February 6 hearing and to clarify
+certain responses. Gonzales wrote that he confined his letter and testimony
+
+to the specific NSA activities that have been publicly confirmed by the
+President. Those activities involve the interception by the NSA of the
+contents of communications in which one party is outside the United States
+where there are reasonable grounds to believe that at least one party to the
+communication is a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist
+organization (hereinafter, the “Terrorist Surveillance Program”).
+
+One response Gonzales sought to clarify was this response to Senator Leahy.
+Gonzales wrote:
+
+First, as I emphasized in my opening statement, in all of my testimony at the
+hearing I addressed – with limited exceptions – only the legal underpinnings
+of the Terrorist Surveillance Program, its defined scope. I did not and could
+not address operational aspects of the program or any other classified
+intelligence activities. So, for example, when I testified in response to a
+question from Senator Leahy, “Sir, I have tried to outline for you and the
+Committee what the President has authorized, and that is all that he has
+authorized,” Tr. at 53, I was confining my remarks to the Terrorist
+
+(Cont'd.)
+
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+in response to Senator Sam Brownback's question about whether the
+FISA application process would include "even these sort of operations we've
+read about data mining operations? Would that include those sorts of
+operations, or are those totally a separate type of field?" (U)
+
+Gonzales responded:
+
+I'm not here to talk about that. Again, let me just caution
+everyone that you need to read these stories with caution.
+There is a lot of mumbling – I mean, mixing and mangling of
+activities that are totally unrelated to what the President has
+authorized under the terrorist surveillance program, and so I'm
+uncomfortable talking about other kinds of operations that
+might – that are unrelated to the terrorist surveillance program.
+(U)
+
+B. Comey's May 15, 2007, Senate Judiciary Committee
+Testimony (U)
+
+Former Deputy Attorney General Comey appeared before the Senate
+Judiciary Committee on May 15, 2007, in a hearing called to examine
+whether the Department had politicized the firing of U.S. Attorneys.
+Senator Schumer, who presided over the hearing, began the questioning by
+asking Comey about reports in the media that in March 2004 White House
+Counsel Gonzales and White House Chief of Staff Card had visited Attorney
+General Ashcroft in the hospital in an effort to override Comey's decision,
+made when he served as Acting Attorney General, not to certify a classified
+program. Comey was asked to recount the details of the incident. (U)
+
+After prefacing his remarks by stating that he could not discuss
+classified information, Comey described the events of March 2004, including
+the confrontation between the Department and White House officials in
+Ashcroft's hospital room. In describing these events, Comey referred to a
+single classified program. For example, Comey testified that:
+
+In the early part of 2004, the Department of Justice was
+engaged – the Office of Legal Counsel, under my supervision, in
+a reevaluation both factually and legally of a particular
+classified program. And it was a program that was renewed on
+a regular basis and required signature by the Attorney General
+
+Surveillance Program as described by the President, the legality of which was
+the subject of the February 6th hearing.
+
+Gonzales also attempted to clarify a response he had given to Senator Leahy about
+when the first Presidential Authorization was signed. Gonzales wrote that "The President
+first authorized the [Terrorist Surveillance] Program in October 2001...." (U)
+
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+certifying to its legality. And the – and I remember the precise
+date; the program had to be renewed by March the 11th, which
+was a Thursday, of 2004. And we were engaged in a very
+intensive reevaluation of the matter. (U)
+
+Comey also testified that "as Acting Attorney General, I would not
+certify the program as to its legality, and explained our reasoning in detail,
+which I will not go into here, nor am I confirming it's any particular
+program." As detailed in Chapter Four, Comey then described from his
+perspective the incident in the hospital room and testified that after that
+incident "[t]he program was reauthorized without us, without a signature
+from the Department of Justice attesting as to its legality...." (U)
+
+C. Gonzales's June 5, 2007, Press Conference (U)
+
+In light of Comey's statements, questions were raised about the
+accuracy of Gonzales's February 2006 testimony to the Senate Judiciary
+Committee. For example, in a press conference on June 5, 2007, called to
+announce the indictment of members of an international gang called MS-13,
+the first question a reporter asked Gonzales concerned Comey's testimony:
+
+REPORTER: Attorney General, last month Jim Comey testified
+about visits you and Andy Card made to John Ashcroft's
+hospital bed. Can you tell us your side of the story? Why were
+you there and did Mr. Comey testify truthfully about it? Did he
+remember it correctly?
+
+ATTY GEN. GONZALES: Mr. Comey's testimony related to a
+highly classified program which the President confirmed to the
+American people some time ago. Because it's on a classified
+program I'm not going to comment on his testimony. (U)
+
+As discussed below, when later asked about this statement, Gonzales
+said that he had misspoke, and that he did not mean to say that Comey's
+testimony related to the program that the President confirmed. (U)
+
+D. Gonzales's July 24, 2007, Senate Judiciary Committee
+Testimony (U)
+
+Gonzales was again called to testify before the Senate Judiciary
+Committee on July 24, 2007. In advance of Gonzales's July 24 appearance,
+Senator Leahy sent Gonzales a letter advising him of the questions that
+would be asked at the hearing.⁴⁴⁰ The letter referenced Gonzales's
+
+⁴⁴⁰ According to the letter, Senator Leahy took this step because in Gonzales's
+appearance before the Senate Judiciary Committee on April 19, 2007, to discuss the
+removal of nine U.S. Attorneys, Gonzales had responded to an estimated 100 questions that
+
+(Cont'd.)
+
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+February 6, 2006, testimony in which he stated that Department officials
+did not have "concerns about this program." The letter also referenced
+Comey's May 15 testimony concerning the incident in Ashcroft's hospital
+room in March 2004. The letter specifically advised Gonzales that he would
+be asked to provide a full explanation for the legal authorization for the
+President's warrantless electronic surveillance program in March and April
+2004.* (U)
+
+At the July 24 hearing, Gonzales was repeatedly questioned about
+alleged inconsistencies between his and Comey's accounts of the events of
+March 2004 and the NSA program. For example, Senator Specter asked:
+
+Let me move quickly through a series of questions – there's a lot
+to cover – starting with the issue that Mr. Comey raises. You
+said, quote, "there has not been any serious disagreement
+about the program." Mr. Comey's testimony was that Mr.
+Gonzales began to discuss why they were there to seek approval
+and he then says, quote, "I was very upset. I was angry. I
+thought I had just witnessed an effort to take advantage of a
+very sick man."
+
+First of all, Mr. Attorney General, what credibility is left for you
+when you say there's no disagreement and you're party to going
+to the hospital to see Attorney General Ashcroft under sedation
+to try to get him to approve the program?
+
+ATTY GEN. GONZALES: The disagreement that occurred and
+the reason for the visit to the hospital, Senator, was about other
+intelligence activities. It was not about the terrorist surveillance
+program that the President announced. (U)
+
+At other points in the hearing, Gonzales stated that the dispute
+referred to "other intelligence activities," and not the "terrorist surveillance
+program." (U)
+
+Senator Schumer also questioned Gonzales about his answer in the
+June 5 press conference in which he stated that Comey's testimony “related
+to a highly classified program which the President confirmed to the
+American people some time ago." Gonzales first responded that he would
+have to look at the question and his response from the press conference,
+and then he said “I'm told that what I'd in fact – here in the press
+
+he could "not recall." Leahy wrote that he wanted to assist Gonzales with his preparation
+for the July 24 testimony to “avoid a repeat of that performance.” (U)
+
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+conference – I did misspeak, but I also went back and clarified it with the
+reporter.”⁴⁴¹ (U)
+
+Gonzales then responded to Senator Schumer that “The President
+confirmed the existence of one set of activities,” and that “Mr. Comey was
+talking about a disagreement that existed with respect to other intelligence
+activities. . . . Mr. Comey's testimony about the hospital visit was about
+other intelligence activities, disagreements over other intelligence activities.
+That's how we'd clarify it." (U)
+
+Other Senators questioned Gonzales's responses on this issue. For
+example, Senator Feingold stated:
+
+With respect to the NSA's illegal wiretapping program, last year
+in hearings before this committee and the House Judiciary
+Committee, you stated that, quote, "There has not been any
+serious disagreement about the program that the President has
+confirmed," unquote, that any disagreement that did occur,
+quote, "did not deal with the program that I am here testifying
+about today," unquote, and that, quote, "The disagreement that
+existed does not relate to the program the President confirmed
+in December to the American people,” unquote. (U)
+
+Two months ago, you sent a letter to me and other members of
+this committee defending that testimony and asserting that it
+remains accurate. And I believe you said that again today.
+Now, as you probably know, I'm a member of the Intelligence
+Committee. And therefore I'm one of the members of this
+committee who has been briefed on the NSA wiretapping
+program and other sensitive intelligence programs. I've had the
+opportunity to review the classified matters at issue here. And I
+believe that your testimony was misleading, at least. I am
+prevented from elaborating in this setting, but I intend to send
+you a classified letter explaining why I have come to that
+conclusion. (U)
+
+Senator Whitehouse, also a member of the Intelligence Committee,
+similarly stated:
+
+Mr. Gonzales, let me just follow up briefly on what Senator
+Feingold was saying, because I'm also a member of both
+committees. And I have to tell you, I have the exact same
+
+⁴⁴¹ Gonzales also testified that he did not speak directly to the reporter (Dan Eggen,
+from the Washington Post) to clarify the comment. Rather, Gonzales said he told a
+Department spokesperson to go back and clarify the statement to Eggen. (U)
+
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+perception that he does, and that is that if there is a kernel of
+truth in what you've said about the program which we can't
+discuss but we know it to be the program at issue in your
+hospital visit to the Attorney General, the path to that kernel of
+truth is so convoluted and is so contrary to the plain import of
+what you said, that I, really, at this point have no choice but to
+believe that you intended to deceive us and to lead us or
+mislead us away from the dispute that the Deputy Attorney
+General subsequently brought to our attention. So you may act
+as if he's behaving, you know, in a crazy way to even think this,
+but at least count two of us and take it seriously.⁴⁴² (U)
+
+Gonzales also offered to answer a question about the terrorist
+surveillance program in closed session during this exchange with Senator
+Specter:
+
+SEN. SPECTER: Going back to the question about your
+credibility on whether there was dissent within the
+administration as to the terrorist surveillance program, was
+there any distinction between the terrorist surveillance program
+in existence on March 10th, when you and the Chief of Staff
+went to see Attorney General Ashcroft, contrasted with the
+terrorist surveillance program which President Bush made
+public in December of 2005?
+
+ATTY GEN. GONZALES: Senator, this is a question that I
+should answer in a classified setting, quite frankly, because
+now you're asking me to hint or talk - to hint about our
+operational activities. And I'd be happy to answer that
+question, but in a classified setting.
+
+SEN. SPECTER: Well, if you won't answer that question, my
+suggestion to you, Attorney General Gonzales, is that you
+review this transcript very, very carefully. I do not find your
+testimony credible, candidly. When I look at the issue of
+credibility, it is my judgment that when Mr. Comey was
+testifying he was talking about the terrorist surveillance
+program and that inference arises in a number of ways,
+principally because it was such an important matter that led
+you and the Chief of Staff to Ashcroft's hospital room. So
+my suggestion to you is that you review your testimony very
+carefully. The chairman's already said that the committee's
+
+⁴⁴² According to a May 17, 2006, letter from the Director of National Intelligence,
+two other members of the Judiciary Committee - Senators Dianne Feinstein and Orrin
+Hatch - also had been briefed on the NSA program. (U)
+
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+going to review your testimony very carefully to see if your
+credibility has been breached to the point of being actionable.
+(U)
+
+Near the end of the hearing Senator Schumer questioned Gonzales
+regarding the meeting at the White House with the "Gang of Eight"
+congressional leaders, just before Gonzales and Card went to Ashcroft's
+hospital room on March 10, 2004:
+
+SEN. SCHUMER: OK. But you testified to us that you didn't
+believe there was serious dissent on the program that the
+President authorized. And now you're saying they knew of the
+dissent and you didn't?
+
+ATTY GEN. GONZALES: The dissent related to other
+intelligence activities. The dissent was not about the terrorist
+surveillance program the President confirmed and . . .
+
+SEN. SCHUMER: You said, sir - sir, you said that they knew
+that there was dissent. But when you testified before us, you
+said there has not been any serious disagreement. And it's
+about the same program. It's about the same exact program.
+You said the President authorized only one before. And the
+discussion - you see, it defies credulity to believe that the
+discussion with Attorney General Ashcroft or with this group of
+eight, which we can check on – and I hope we will, Mr.
+Chairman: that will be yours and Senator Specter's prerogative
+was about nothing other than the TSP. And if it was about
+the TSP, you're dissembling to this committee. Now was it
+about the TSP or not, the discussion on the eighth?
+
+ATTY GEN. GONZALES: The disagreement on the 10th was
+about other intelligence activities.
+
+SEN. SCHUMER: Not about the TSP, yes or no?
+
+ATTY GEN. GONZALES: The disagreement and the reason we
+had to go to the hospital had to do with other intelligence
+activities.
+
+SEN. SCHUMER: Not the TSP? Come on. If you say it's about
+"other," that implies not. Now say it or not.
+
+ATTY GEN. GONZALES: It was not. It was about other
+intelligence activities.
+
+SEN. SCHUMER: Was it about the TSP? Yes or no, please?
+That's vital to whether you're telling the truth to this committee.
+
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+ATTY GEN. GONZALES: It was about other intelligence
+activities. (U)
+
+When we interviewed Gonzales, he stated that there was never any
+intent to hide the NSA program from Congress, and he said that Congress
+was briefed on multiple occasions about the program.⁴⁴³ Gonzales also
+stated that he could not explain to the Senate Judiciary Committee that the
+"serious" dispute concerned [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Gonzales said that he could
+not recall where the term "terrorist surveillance program" originated, but
+that when he used the term it referred only to the content collection
+activities the President had confirmed publicly, and that the rest of the
+program remained classified. Gonzales also asserted that this distinction
+should have been clear to those on the committee who were read into the
+Stellar Wind program. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+E. FBI Director Mueller's July 26, 2007, House Committee on
+the Judiciary Testimony (U)
+
+Two days after Gonzales's July 24, 2007, Senate Judiciary Committee
+testimony, FBI Director Mueller testified before the House Judiciary
+Committee. At this hearing, Mueller was asked about his conversation with
+Attorney General Ashcroft at the hospital on the evening of March 10, 2004.
+As discussed in Chapter Four of this report, Mueller arrived at the hospital
+just after Gonzales and Card left. Mueller was asked to recount what he
+learned from Ashcroft concerning Ashcroft's exchange with Gonzales and
+Card earlier that evening:
+
+REP. JACKSON LEE: Could I just say, did you have an
+understanding that the discussion was on TSP?
+
+MR. MUELLER: I had an understanding the discussion was on
+a-a NSA program, yes.
+
+REP JACKSON LEE: I guess we use "TSP," we use warrantless
+wiretapping, so would I be comfortable in saying that those were
+the items that were part of the discussion?
+
+⁴⁴³ Gonzales cited in particular the "Gang of Eight" briefing convened on March 10,
+2004, to inform congressional leaders of the Department's legal concerns about aspects of
+the program and the need for a legislative fix. We also reviewed Gonzales's closed-session
+testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), which he
+provided on July 19, 2007, just a few days before his July 24 Senate Judiciary Committee
+testimony. In his classified HPSCI testimony, Gonzales stated, "This disagreement [with
+Justice Department officials] primarily centered on [REDACTED]
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
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+MR. MUELLER: I- the discussion was on a national - an NSA
+program that has been much discussed, yes. (U)
+
+We asked Mueller about his understanding of the term "terrorist
+surveillance program." Mueller said that the term "TSP" was not used by
+the FBI prior to The New York Times article and the President's confirmation
+of one aspect of the program. Mueller said he understood the term to refer
+to what the President publicly confirmed as to content intercepts. Mueller
+said he believed the term "TSP" was part of the "overarching" Stellar Wind
+program, but that "TSP" is not synonymous with Stellar Wind.⁴⁴⁴ (S//NF)
+
+F. Gonzales's Follow-up Letter to the Senate Judiciary
+Committee (U)
+
+In an effort to clarify his July 24, 2007, Senate testimony, on
+August 1, 2007, Gonzales sent unclassified letters to Judiciary Committee
+Chairman Leahy and Senator Specter. Gonzales's letter to Leahy stated that
+he was deeply concerned with suggestions that his testimony was
+misleading and he was determined to address any such impression. He
+explained that "shortly after 9/11, the President authorized the NSA to
+undertake a number of highly classified activities," and that, "although the
+legal bases for these activities varied, all of them were authorized in one
+presidential order, which was reauthorized approximately every 45 days."
+Gonzales wrote that before December 2005 "the term 'Terrorist Surveillance
+Program' was not used to refer to these activities, collectively or otherwise."
+Rather, Gonzales wrote that the term was first used in early 2006 "as part of
+the public debate that followed the unauthorized disclosure [by the New
+York Times] and the President's acknowledgement of one aspect of the NSA
+activities[.]" (U)
+
+⁴⁴⁴ We also interviewed an NSA official, who serves as an original classifying
+authority for the NSA, about the use of the term "terrorist surveillance program" or "TSP" at
+the NSA. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
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+Gonzales also wrote in this letter that in his July 24 testimony he was
+discussing "only that particular aspect of the NSA activities that the
+President has publicly acknowledged, and that we have called the Terrorist
+Surveillance Program[.]" He wrote that he recognized that his use of this
+term or his shorthand reference to the "program' publicly 'described by the
+President" may have "created confusion." Gonzales maintained that there
+was "not a serious disagreement between the Department and the White
+House in March 2004 about whether there was a legal basis for the
+particular activity later called the Terrorist Surveillance Program." (U)
+
+Gonzales also wrote in his letter, "That is not to say that the legal
+issues raised by the Terrorist Surveillance Program were insubstantial; it
+was an extraordinary activity that presented novel and difficult issues and
+was, as I understand, the subject of intense deliberations within the
+Department. In the spring of 2004, after a thorough reexamination of all
+these activities, Mr. Comey and the Office of Legal Counsel ultimately agreed
+that the President could direct the NSA to intercept international
+communications without a court order where the interceptions were
+targeted at al Qaeda or its affiliates. Other aspects of the NSA's activities
+referenced in the DNI's letter [attached to Gonzales's letter] did precipitate
+very serious disagreement." (U)
+
+V. OIG Analysis (U)
+
+In this section, we assess whether Gonzales made false, inaccurate, or
+misleading statements during his testimony before the Senate Judiciary
+Committee. As discussed below, we concluded that Gonzales's testimony
+did not constitute a false statement under the criminal statutes. We also
+concluded that he did not intend his testimony to be inaccurate, false, or
+misleading. However, we found in at least two important respects his
+testimony was confusing, inaccurate, and had the effect of misleading those
+who were not read into the program. (U)
+
+At the outset, we recognize that Gonzales was in a difficult position
+because he was testifying in an open, unclassified forum about a highly
+classified program. In this setting, it would be difficult for any witness to
+clearly explain the nature of the dispute between the White House and the
+Department while not disclosing additional details about classified activities,
+particularly because only certain NSA activities had been publicly confirmed
+by the President. (U)
+
+However, some of this difficulty was attributable to the White House's
+decision not to brief the Judiciary Committee, which had oversight of the
+Department of Justice, about the program. As discussed in Chapter Four,
+the strict controls over the Department's access to the program hindered the
+
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+Department's ability to adequately fulfill its legal responsibilities concerning
+the program through March 2004. Similarly, the White House's decision
+not to allow at least the Chair and Ranking Members of the House and
+Senate Judiciary Committees to be briefed into the program created
+difficulties for Gonzales when he testified before Congress about the
+disputes regarding the program. This limitation also affected the
+Committee's ability to understand or adequately assess the program,
+especially in connection with the March 2004 dispute. We agree with
+Goldsmith's observation about the harm in the White House's "over-secrecy"
+for this program, as well as Director Mueller's suggestion, made in March
+2004, that briefings on the program should have been given to the House
+and Senate Judiciary Committees. This did not occur, and it made
+Gonzales's testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee unusually difficult.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+Yet, even given these difficulties, we believe that Gonzales's testimony
+was imprecise, confusing, and likely to lead those not read into the program
+to draw wrong conclusions about the nature of the dispute between White
+House and Department officials in March 2004. In addition, two Senators
+who had been read into the program stated that they were confused by
+Gonzales's testimony. Although we concluded that Gonzales did not intend
+to mislead Congress, his testimony nonetheless had the effect of creating
+confusion and inaccurate perceptions about certain issues covered during
+his hearings. (U)
+
+Gonzales, as a participant in the March 2004 dispute between the
+White House and the Justice Department and, more importantly, as the
+nation's chief law enforcement officer, had a duty to balance his obligation
+not to disclose classified information with the need not to be misleading in
+his testimony about the events that nearly led to mass resignations of senior
+officials at the Justice Department and the FBI. Instead, Gonzales's
+testimony only deepened the confusion among members of Congress and
+the public about these matters. We were especially troubled by Gonzales's
+testimony at the July 2007 Senate hearing because it related to an
+important matter of significant public interest and because he had sufficient
+time to prepare for this hearing and the questions he knew he would be
+asked. (U)
+
+At the outset of his testimony on February 6, 2006, Gonzales
+explained that he was confining his remarks to the program and the facts
+that the President publicly confirmed in his radio address on December 17,
+2005. In those remarks, the President had, in essence, confirmed the
+
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+content collection part, or basket 1, of the NSA surveillance program.⁴⁴⁵
+The President, and Gonzales, used the term "terrorist surveillance program"
+in connection with the President's confirmation of these NSA activities.
+However, as discussed below, it was not clear - even to those read into the
+program - whether the term "terrorist surveillance program" referred only to
+content collection (basket 1) or the entire program.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Nevertheless, Gonzales suggested in his testimony that the dispute
+between the White House and the Department concerned other intelligence
+activities that were unrelated to the content collection portion of the
+program that the President had confirmed. This was not accurate. (S//NF)
+
+We recognize that the term "terrorist surveillance program" was
+intended by Gonzales and other Administration officials to describe a limited
+set of activities within the Stellar Wind program and that the term was
+created only in response to public disclosures about the program. However,
+by using phrases such as the "terrorist surveillance program" or "the
+program that the President has confirmed," and setting that program
+distinctly apart from "other intelligence activities," Gonzales's testimony
+created a perception that the two sets of activities were entirely unrelated,
+which was not accurate. Gonzales's testimony suggested that the dispute
+that Comey testified about was not related to the program that the President
+had confirmed, and instead that the dispute concerned unrelated
+"operations" or "intelligence activities." Thus, while Gonzales may have
+intended the term "terrorist surveillance program" to cover only content
+collection (basket 1), it led to confusion and misperceptions when he
+testified that the dispute [REDACTED]
+was unrelated to "the terrorist surveillance program.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Gonzales reinforced this misperception throughout his testimony. For
+example, when asked by Senator Leahy what activities Gonzales believed
+would be supported under the Authorization for Use of Military Force
+rationale, Gonzales stated, "I have tried to outline for you and the committee
+what the President has authorized, and that is all that he has authorized."
+In fact, the President had authorized two other types of collections in the
+same Authorization. Gonzales himself subsequently realized that his
+response to Senator Leahy was problematic. In a February 28, 2006, letter
+to Senators Specter and Leahy, Gonzales sought to clarify his response,
+
+⁴⁴⁵ [REDACTED]
+
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+stating, "I was confining my remarks to the Terrorist Surveillance Program
+as described by the President, the legality of which was the subject of the
+February 6th hearing." However, in our view this attempt to clarify his
+remarks did not go nearly far enough. As discussed below, it was not until
+after Gonzales's next appearance before the Senate Judiciary Committee in
+July 2007 that Gonzales acknowledged that the President had also
+authorized a range of intelligence-gathering activities, including those
+described under the terrorist surveillance program, in a single order.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+We concluded that Gonzales created a misimpression for Congress
+and the public by suggesting that the March 2004 dispute between the
+Department and the White House concerned issues wholly unrelated to "the
+program the President confirmed," or the terrorist surveillance program. We
+believe a fairer and more accurate characterization would have been that
+the March 2004 dispute concerned aspects of a larger program of which the
+terrorist surveillance program was a part. As discussed earlier, the NSA
+viewed the three types of collections as a single program. The three types of
+collections were all authorized by the same Presidential order and
+administered by a single intelligence agency. Moreover, all three collections
+were known in the Intelligence Community by the same Top
+Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information program cover term, Stellar
+Wind. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+In addition, we believe that Gonzales's testimony regarding the
+dispute between the Department and the White House [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+was incomplete and not accurate. (TS//SI//OC/NF)
+
+When Senator Schumer asked Gonzales at the February 2006 Senate
+hearing whether media accounts that Comey "expressed grave reservations
+about the NSA program" were true, Gonzales responded that there was no
+"serious disagreement about the program that the President has confirmed."
+But there was a dispute about [REDACTED] As
+recounted in detail in Chapter Four of this report. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The dispute involving [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] was not resolved, and the March 11, 2004,
+
+381
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HES/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+Presidential Authorization continued to permit the activity [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+When we interviewed Gonzales, he told us that he was trying to be
+careful during his public testimony about discussing or characterizing a
+classified program with persons not read into the program, and that he used
+the term "serious disagreement" to distinguish the disagreement regarding
+[REDACTED] from other disagreements regarding the
+program. Gonzales told us that he believed his statement that there was
+"no serious disagreement" was accurate because he did not consider the
+Department's conclusion that [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] to be a point of "serious disagreement" between
+the Justice Department and the White House particularly when compared
+to the more serious disagreement related to [REDACTED]⁴⁴⁶
+Gonzales also told the OIG that he would not have gone to Ashcroft's
+hospital room solely over [REDACTED] and other evidence
+discussed in Chapter Four tends to confirm that [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] was not the critical issue in the confrontation with
+Department officials at the hospital or that it precipitated the threat of mass
+resignations by senior Department and FBI officials.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Yet, even if one agrees that [REDACTED]
+was not a "serious disagreement" between the Department and the White
+House, Gonzales's testimony is still problematic. When Senator Schumer
+pressed Gonzales on whether Department officials "expressed any
+reservations about the ultimate program," Gonzales replied: "Senator, I
+want to be very careful here, because, of course, I'm here only testifying
+about what the President has confirmed. And with respect to what the
+President has confirmed, I believe - I do not believe that these DOJ officials
+that you're identifying had concerns about this program."
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+We understand that it is possible to construct an argument that the
+Department officials did not have "reservations" or "concerns" about the
+[REDACTED]
+However, while such an argument at best might be considered technically
+accurate, it would still not account for key details that were omitted from
+
+⁴⁴⁶ While Gonzales may subjectively have believed the disagreement about this
+issue did not rise to the level of a serious dispute, he was aware that Goldsmith and
+Addington sharply disagreed about [REDACTED]
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+382
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+Gonzales's testimony that would be necessary for an accurate
+understanding of the situation. The Department clearly had reservations
+and concerns about the [REDACTED] of the program,
+[REDACTED] Moreover, Gonzales himself contradicted this attempted
+construction by stating in a February 28, 2006, letter to Senator Specter
+that the terrorist surveillance program was first authorized by the President
+in October 2001, years before the [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Gonzales knew that Comey,
+Goldsmith, and others at the Department had expressed "reservations" or
+"concerns" about [REDACTED] prior to the President's decision to [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+While we believe the evidence does show that [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] was more significant than
+the dispute about [REDACTED] the evidence is clear that Comey and others had
+strong and clearly identified concerns regarding the extent of the President's
+authority to conduct [REDACTED] These concerns had
+been communicated to the White House in several meetings over a period of
+months prior to and including March 2004, and the White House did not
+[REDACTED] part of the program in response to
+these concerns.
+However, Gonzales's testimony suggested that such
+concerns and reservations on the part of Justice Department officials never
+existed. To the contrary, the Department's firm objections to this aspect of
+the program were instrumental in bringing about [REDACTED]
+collection in "the program the President has confirmed."
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Following his July 24, 2007, testimony, Gonzales acknowledged in an
+unclassified August 1, 2007, letter to Senator Leahy that his use of the term
+"terrorist surveillance program" and his "shorthand reference to the
+'program' publicly 'described by the President' may have created confusion,"
+particularly for those familiar with the full range of NSA activities authorized
+by the President. Gonzales wrote that he was determined to address any
+impression that his testimony was misleading. In this letter, Gonzales
+attempted to describe what he had meant by the term "terrorist surveillance
+program," stating that it covered one aspect of the NSA activities that the
+President had authorized. His letter also acknowledged the dispute
+concerned the legal basis for certain NSA activities that were regularly
+authorized in the same Presidential Authorization as the terrorist
+surveillance program. Gonzales also acknowledged that Comey had refused
+to certify a Presidential Authorization "because of concerns about the legal
+basis of certain of these NSA activities." Yet, this follow-up letter, while
+providing more context about the issues than his July 2007 statements, did
+not completely address the misimpressions created by his testimony.
+
+383
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+Gonzales still suggested in his August 1 letter that the only dispute between
+the Department and the White House concerned aspects of the program
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+While we again acknowledge the difficulty of the situation Gonzales
+faced in testifying publicly about a highly classified and controversial
+program, we believe Gonzales could have done other things to provide
+clearer and more accurate testimony without divulging classified
+information. Similar to the import of his August 1 letter, and without
+providing operational details about these other activities, he could have
+clarified that part of the dispute with the Department concerned the scope
+of what he called "the terrorist surveillance program," while another part of
+the dispute concerned other "intelligence activities" that were either related
+to the terrorist surveillance program or, more accurately, a different aspect
+of the same NSA program. Gonzales also could have explained that different
+activities under the program raised different concerns within the
+Department because each set of activities rested upon different legal
+theories.⁴⁴⁷ (S//NF)
+
+Alternatively, Gonzales could have declined to discuss any aspect of
+the dispute at an open hearing.⁴⁴⁸ Or, short of seeking a closed session,
+Gonzales could have sought White House approval to brief the Chairs and
+Ranking Members of the Senate and House Judiciary Committees about the
+program so that they would fully understand the nature of the NSA program
+and the classified issues surrounding the dispute. Instead, Gonzales gave
+public testimony that was confusing and inaccurate, and had the effect of
+misleading those who were not read into the program, as well as some who
+were. (U)
+
+Concerning Gonzales's July 2007 testimony in particular, the
+questions Would be expected to answer were clearly foreseeable,
+especially in light of the disparities between his February 6, 2006, testimony
+and Comey's May 15, 2007, testimony. In addition, Gonzales had been
+provided a letter by Senator Leahy referencing Comey's testimony and
+advising Gonzales to be prepared to discuss the legal authorization for the
+"President's warrantless electronic surveillance program in March and April
+
+⁴⁴⁷ [REDACTED]
+
+⁴⁴⁸ As noted, Gonzales provided closed-session testimony before HPSCI on
+July 19, 2007, in which he described the March 2004 dispute between White House and
+Justice Department officials as [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+384
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+2004." Gonzales was therefore on notice that he would be expected to bring
+clarity to the confusion that existed following Comey's testimony. Rather
+than clarify these matters, we believe Gonzales further confused the issues
+through his testimony. (U)
+
+Finally, we considered whether Gonzales's testimony constituted
+criminal false statements and concluded that his statements did not
+constitute a criminal violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. A person violates that
+statute by "knowingly and willfully" making a "materially false, fictitious, or
+fraudulent statement or representation[.]" 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). We do
+not believe the evidence showed that Gonzales intended to mislead Congress
+or willfully make a false statement. Moreover, we do not believe a
+prosecutor could prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was no
+interpretation of his words that could be viewed as literally true, even if his
+testimony was confusing and created misperceptions.⁴⁴⁹ (U)
+
+In sum, we believe that while the evidence did not show that
+Gonzales's statements constitute a criminal violation, or that he intended to
+mislead Congress, his testimony was confusing, not accurate, and had the
+effect of misleading those who were not knowledgeable about the program.
+His testimony also undermined his credibility on this important issue. As
+the Attorney General, we believe Gonzales should have taken more care to
+ensure that his testimony was as accurate as possible without revealing
+classified information, particularly given the significance of this matter and
+the fact that aspects of the dispute had been made public previously. (U)
+
+⁴⁴⁹ See United States v. Milton, 8 F.3d 39, 45 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("defense of literal
+truth" applies to false statement prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 1001), cert. denied, 513
+U.S. 919 (1994). See also United States v. Hsia, 24 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C. 1998), in which
+the court stated, "A false statement is an essential element of a prosecution under 18
+U.S.C. § 1001, and if the statement at issue is literally true a defendant cannot be
+convicted of violating Section 1001." Id. at 58; United States v. Hsia, 176 F.3d 517, 525
+(D.C. Cir. 1999) (reversing on other grounds). (U)
+
+385
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+386
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+CHAPTER NINE
+CONCLUSIONS (U)
+
+Within weeks of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the
+National Security Agency (NSA) initiated a Top Secret, compartmented
+program to collect and analyze international and domestic telephone and
+e-mail communications and related data. The intent of the NSA program,
+which used the cover term Stellar Wind, was to function as an "early
+warning system" to detect and prevent future terrorist attacks within the
+United States. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The program was authorized by the President in a series of
+Presidential Authorizations that were issued at approximately 30 to 45 day
+intervals and certified as to form and legality by the Attorney General. The
+Presidential Authorizations stated that an extraordinary emergency existed
+permitting the use of electronic surveillance within the United States for
+counterterrorism purposes, without a court order, under specified
+circumstances. Under the program the NSA collected vast amounts of
+information through electronic surveillance and other intelligence-gathering
+techniques, including information concerning the telephone and e-mail
+communications of American citizens and other U.S. persons. Top Secret
+compartmented information derived from this collection was provided to,
+among other agencies, the FBI, which sent Secret-level, non-compartmented
+versions of the information to FBI field offices as investigative leads.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The Stellar Wind program represented an extraordinary expansion of
+the NSA's signals intelligence activity and a departure from the traditional
+restrictions on electronic surveillance imposed under the Foreign
+Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), Executive Order 12333, and other laws.
+Yet, the program was conducted with limited notification to Congress and
+without judicial oversight, even as the program continued for years after the
+September 11 attacks. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The White House tightly controlled who within the Justice
+Department could be read into the Stellar Wind program. In particular, we
+found that only three Department attorneys, including the Attorney General,
+were read into the program and only one attorney was assigned to assess
+the program's legality in its first year and a half of operation. The limited
+number of Justice Department read-ins contrasted sharply with the
+hundreds of operational personnel who were read into the program at the
+FBI and other agencies involved with the program.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+387
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+I. Operation of the Program (U//FOUQ)
+
+Under the program, the NSA initially intercepted the content of
+international telephone and e-mail communications in cases where at least
+one of the communicants was reasonably believed to be associated with any
+international terrorist group. These collections became known as basket 1
+of the Stellar Wind program. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The NSA also collected bulk telephony and e-mail meta data –
+communications signaling information showing contacts between and
+among telephone numbers and e-mail addresses, but not the contents of
+those communications. These collections became known as basket 2
+(telephone meta data) and basket 3 (e-mail meta data) of the Stellar Wind
+program. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Under basket 2 collections, [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] These call detail records included the originating and terminating
+telephone number of each call, and the date, time, and duration of each call,
+but not the content of the call. The NSA collected [REDACTED] "pairs"
+of contacts per day, including all domestic and international telephone calls
+[REDACTED]
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Regarding e-mail meta data (basket 3) the NSA collected and archived
+[REDACTED] Internet traffic [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]⁴⁵⁰ E-mail meta data included only
+the "to," "from," "cc,” "bcc,” and other addressing-type information, but
+similar to call detail records did not include the subject line or the message
+contents. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+NSA analysts accessed baskets 2 and 3 for analytical purposes with
+specific telephone numbers or e-mail addresses that satisfied the standard
+
+⁴⁵⁰ [REDACTED]
+
+388
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+for querying the data as described in the Presidential Authorizations. A
+small amount of the collected content and meta data was analyzed by the
+NSA, working with other members of the Intelligence Community, to
+generate intelligence reports about suspected terrorists and individuals
+possibly associated with them. Many of these reports were disseminated, or
+"tipped," to the FBI for further dissemination as leads to FBI field offices. As
+of March 2006, [REDACTED] individual U.S. telephone numbers
+[REDACTED] e-mail addresses had been tipped to the FBI, the vast majority of which were
+disseminated to FBI field offices for investigation or other action. The
+results of these investigations were uploaded into FBI databases.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The Justice Department had two primary roles in the Stellar Wind
+program. First, the Attorney General was required to certify each
+Presidential Authorization as to form and legality - in effect, to give the
+Department's assurance that the activities the President was authorizing
+the NSA to conduct were legal. In carrying out this responsibility, the
+Attorney General was advised by the Department's Office of Legal Counsel
+(OLC). As we described in this report and discuss in the next section, we
+found that during the early phase of the Stellar Wind program the
+Department lacked sufficient attorney resources to be applied to the legal
+review of the program and, due in significant part to the White House's
+extremely close hold over the program, was not able to coordinate its legal
+review of the program with the NSA. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The Department's other primary role in Stellar Wind was as a member
+of the Intelligence Community. The FBI was one of two main customers of
+the intelligence produced under the program (the other being the CIA).
+Working with the NSA, a small team of FBI personnel converted the NSA's
+Top Secret Stellar Wind intelligence reports into leads that were
+disseminated at the Secret level, under an FBI program called [REDACTED]
+to FBI field offices for appropriate action. As detailed in Chapter Six and
+discussed below, we concluded that although the information produced
+under the Stellar Wind program had value in some counterterrorism
+investigations, it played a limited role in the FBI's overall counterterrorism
+efforts. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+II. Office of Legal Counsel's Analysis of the Stellar Wind Program
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+As described in Chapters Three, Four, and Five of this report, the
+Justice Department advised the Executive Branch, and in particular the
+President, as to the legality of the Stellar Wind program. The Department's
+view of the legal support for the activities conducted under the program
+changed over time as more attorneys were read into the program. These
+
+389
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
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+
+changes occurred in three phases. In the first phase of the program
+(September 2001 through May 2003), the legality of the program was
+founded on an analysis developed by John Yoo, a Deputy Assistant Attorney
+General in OLC. In the second phase (May 2003 through May 2004), the
+program's legal rationale underwent significant review and revision by OLC
+Assistant Attorney General Jack Goldsmith and Associate Deputy Attorney
+General Patrick Philbin. In the third and final phase (July 2004 through
+January 2007), based in part upon the legal concerns raised by the
+Department, the entire program was moved from presidential authority to
+statutory authority under FISA, with oversight by the FISA Court.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+In Chapters Three and Four, we examined the Department's early role
+in assessing the legality of the Stellar Wind program. The Justice
+Department's access to the program was controlled by the White House, and
+former White House Counsel and Attorney General Alberto Gonzales told the
+OIG that the President decided whether non-operational personnel,
+including Department lawyers, could be read into the program. Department
+and FBI officials told us that obtaining approval to read in Department
+officials and FISA Court judges involved justifying the requests to Counsel
+to the Vice President David Addington and White House Counsel Gonzales,
+who effectively acted as gatekeepers to the read-in process for
+non-operational officials. In contrast, according to the NSA, operational
+personnel at the NSA, CIA, and the FBI were read into the program on the
+authority of the NSA Director, who at some point delegated this authority to
+the Stellar Wind Program Manager. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+We believe the White House's policy of limiting access to the program
+for non-operational personnel was applied at the Department of Justice in
+an unnecessarily restrictive manner prior to March 2004, and was
+detrimental to the Department's role in the operation of the program from
+its inception through that period. We also believe that Attorney General
+Ashcroft, as head of the Department during this time, was responsible for
+seeking to ensure that the Department had adequate attorney resources to
+conduct a thorough and accurate review of the legality of the program. We
+believe that the circumstances as they existed as early as 2001 and 2002
+called for additional Department resources to be applied to the legal review
+of the program. As noted in Chapter Three, Ashcroft requested to have his
+Chief of Staff and Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson read into the
+program, but the White House did not approve this request. However,
+because Ashcroft did not agree to be interviewed by the OIG for this
+investigation, we were unable to determine the full extent of his efforts to
+press the White House to read in additional Department officials between
+the program's inception in October 2001 and the critical events of March
+2004. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+390
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+Although we could not determine exactly why Yoo remained the only
+Department attorney assigned to assess the program's legality from 2001
+until his departure in May 2003, we believe that this practice represented
+an extraordinary and inappropriate departure from OLC's traditional review
+and oversight procedures and resulted in significant harm to the
+Department's role in the program. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+In the earliest phase of the program, Yoo advised Attorney General
+Ashcroft and the White House that the collection activities under Stellar
+Wind were a lawful exercise of the President's inherent authorities as
+Commander-in-Chief under Article II of the Constitution, subject only to the
+Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard. In reaching this
+conclusion, Yoo dismissed as constitutionally incompatible with the
+President's Article II authority the FISA statute's provision that FISA was to
+be the "exclusive means" for conducting electronic surveillance in the United
+States for foreign intelligence purposes, and he concluded that these
+statutory provisions should be read to avoid conflicts with the President's
+constitutional Commander-in-Chief authority. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+As noted above, during the first year and a half of the Stellar Wind
+program only three Department attorneys were read into the program – Yoo,
+Attorney General Ashcroft, and James Baker, Counsel in the Office of
+Intelligence Policy and Review. Jay Bybee, the OLC Assistant Attorney
+General and Yoo's direct supervisor, was not read into the program and was
+unaware that Yoo was providing advice on the legal basis to support the
+program. Thus, Yoo was providing legal opinions on this unprecedented
+expansion of the NSA's surveillance authority without review by his OLC
+supervisor or any other Department attorney. Rather, Yoo worked alone on
+this project, and produced two major opinions supporting the legality of the
+program. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+When additional attorneys were read into the program in 2003, they
+provided a fresh review of Yoo's legal memoranda. Patrick Philbin, an
+Associate Deputy Attorney General, and later Jack Goldsmith, Bybee's
+replacement as the Assistant Attorney General for OLC, concluded that
+Yoo's analysis was seriously flawed, both factually and legally. Goldsmith
+and Philbin concluded that Yoo's analysis fundamentally mischaracterized
+[REDACTED] by failing to address the fact
+that the NSA was collecting [REDACTED] and also failing to assess
+the legality of this activity as it was carried out by the NSA. Goldsmith and
+Philbin also pointed to Yoo's assertion that Congress had not sought to
+restrict presidential authority to conduct warrantless searches in the
+national security area, and criticized Yoo's omission from his analysis of a
+FISA provision (50 U.S.C. § 1811) that addressed the President's authority
+to conduct electronic surveillance during wartime. They further noted that
+Yoo based his assessment of the program's legality on an extremely
+
+391
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+aggressive view of the law that revolved around the Constitutional primacy
+of the President's Article II Commander-in-Chief powers, and he may have
+done so based on a faulty understanding of key elements of the program.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+As described in Chapter Four, Goldsmith and Philbin's reassessment
+of the legality of Stellar Wind began after Yoo left the Department in May
+2003, and culminated in a 108-page legal memorandum issued on May 6,
+2004. That memorandum superseded Yoo's earlier Stellar Wind opinions
+and premised the legality of the program's electronic surveillance activities
+on statutory rather than Article II constitutional grounds. 451 As a
+consequence of this new legal rationale, Department officials concluded that
+the President's authority to conduct electronic surveillance of the enemy in
+wartime was [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] The
+Department's advice to the White House that the scope of collection under
+the program [REDACTED] was legally problematic
+led to a contentious dispute in March 2004 (discussed below in Section III).
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+We agree with many of the criticisms offered by Department officials
+regarding the practice of allowing a single Department attorney to develop
+the legal justification for such a complex and contentious program without
+critical review both within the Department and by the NSA. These officials
+told us that errors in Yoo's legal memoranda may have been identified and
+corrected if the NSA had been allowed to review his work. They also
+stressed the importance of adhering to OLC's traditional practice of peer
+review of all OLC memoranda and the need for the OLC Assistant Attorney
+General, as a Senate-confirmed official, to review and approve all such
+opinions. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+These officials also stated that such review and oversight measures
+are especially important with regard to legal opinions on classified matters
+that are not subjected to outside scrutiny. We agree with these officials'
+comments and note that because programs like Stellar Wind are not subject
+to the usual external checks and balances on Executive authority, OLC's
+advisory role is particularly critical to the Executive's understanding of
+potential statutory and Constitutional constraints on its actions.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+⁴⁵¹ [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+392
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+We did not agree with Gonzales's view that it was necessary for
+national security reasons to limit the number of Department read-ins to
+those "who were absolutely essential," as distinguished from the numerous
+operational read-ins who were necessary to the technical implementation of
+the program. First, the program was as legally challenging as it was
+technically complex. Just as a sufficient number of operational personnel
+were read into the program to assure its proper technical implementation,
+we believe that as many attorneys as necessary should have been read in to
+assure the soundness of the program's legal foundation. This was not done
+during at least the first 20 months of the program. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Second, we do not believe that reading in a few additional Department
+attorneys during the initial phase of the program would have jeopardized
+national security, especially given the [REDACTED] operational personnel
+who were cleared into the program during the same period.⁴⁵² In fact, the
+highly classified nature of the program, rather than constituting an
+argument for limiting the OLC read-ins to a single attorney, made the need
+for careful analysis and review within the Department and by the NSA more
+compelling. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+We also found that the expansion of legal thinking and breadth of
+expertise from reading in additional Department attorneys over time
+eventually produced more factually accurate and legally comprehensive
+analyses concerning the program. Increased attorney read-ins also was an
+important factor in grounding the program on firmer legal footing under
+FISA. The transition of the program from presidential authority to statutory
+authority under FISA with judicial oversight was made possible through the
+collective work of the attorneys who finally were read into the program
+beginning in 2004. The applications to the FISA Court to effectuate this
+transition were produced by Department attorneys, working with both legal
+and technical personnel at the NSA, further reinforcing our view that such
+coordinated efforts are more likely to produce well-considered legal
+strategies and analysis. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+In addition, as discussed in Chapters Six and Seven, the increase in
+the number of attorneys read into the program beginning in 2004 helped the
+Department to more efficiently "scrub" Stellar Wind-derived information in
+FISA applications and improve the handling of Stellar Wind-related
+discovery issues in international terrorism prosecutions.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+⁴⁵² By the end of 2003, only Yoo, Ashcroft, Baker, Philbin, and Goldsmith had been
+read into Stellar Wind at the Department. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//SI//NF)
+
+393
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+
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+
+III. Hospital Visit and White House Recertification of the Program (U)
+
+In Chapter Four, we describe how the Department's reassessment of
+Yoo's legal analysis led Deputy Attorney General James Comey, who was
+exercising the powers of the Attorney General while Ashcroft was
+hospitalized in March 2004, to conclude that he could not certify the legality
+of the Stellar Wind program. In response, the President sent Gonzales and
+Chief of Staff Andrew Card to visit Ashcroft in the hospital to seek his
+certification of the program, an action Ashcroft refused to take. We believe
+that the way the White House handled its dispute with the Department
+about the program – particularly in dispatching Gonzales and Card to
+Ashcroft's hospital room in an attempt to override Comey's decision – was
+troubling. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+As detailed in Chapter Four, by March 2004 when the Presidential
+Authorization in effect at that time was set to expire, Goldsmith had already
+notified the White House several months earlier about the Department's
+doubts concerning the legality of aspects of the Stellar Wind program. He
+had made clear that the Department questioned the legality of [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+When Attorney General Ashcroft was hospitalized and unable to fulfill
+his duties, Deputy Attorney General Comey assumed the Attorney General's
+responsibilities. Before the Presidential Authorization was set to expire on
+March 11, 2004, Comey made clear to senior White House officials,
+including Vice President Cheney and White House Counsel Gonzales, that
+the Justice Department could not certify the program as legal. The White
+House disagreed with the Justice Department's position, and on March 10,
+2004, convened a meeting of eight congressional leaders to brief them on
+the Justice Department's decision not to recertify the program and on the
+need to continue the program. The White House did not ask Comey or
+anyone from the Department to participate in this briefing, nor did it notify
+any Department officials that the briefing had been convened.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+Following this congressional briefing, at the direction of President
+Bush, Gonzales and White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card went to the
+hospital to seek Attorney General Ashcroft's certification of the
+Authorization. Again, the White House did not notify any Department
+officials, including Comey, the ranking Department official at the time, that
+it planned to take this action. Gonzales's and Card's attempt to persuade
+Attorney General Ashcroft, who was in the intensive care unit recovering
+from surgery and according to witnesses appeared heavily medicated, to
+certify the program over Comey's opposition was unsuccessful. Ashcroft
+
+394
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+
+told Gonzales and Card from his hospital bed that he supported the
+Department's revised legal position, but that in any event he was not the
+Attorney General at the time – Comey was.⁴⁵³ (TS//SI//NF)
+
+On March 11, the following day, Gonzales certified the Presidential
+Authorization as to form and legality. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+We agree with Director Mueller's observation that the White House's
+failure to have Justice Department representation at the congressional
+briefing and the attempt to persuade Ashcroft to recertify the Authorization
+without going through Comey "gave the strong perception that the [White
+House] was trying to do an end run around the Acting [Attorney General]
+whom they knew to have serious concerns as to the legality of portions of
+the program." (TS//SI//NF)
+
+After Mueller, Comey, and other senior Department and FBI officials
+made known their intent to resign, the President directed that the issue be
+resolved, and the program was modified to address the Department's legal
+concerns. Because we were unable to interview key White House officials,
+we could not determine for certain what caused the White House to change
+its position and modify the program, although we believe the prospect of
+mass resignations at the Department and the FBI was a significant factor in
+this decision. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+We reached several conclusions based on our review of the
+Department's role in the legal analysis of this program and the events
+surrounding the dispute between the Department and the White House.
+First, legal opinions supporting complex national security programs –
+especially classified programs that press the bounds of established law –
+should be collaborative products supported by sufficient legal and technical
+expertise and resources at the Department, working in concert with other
+participating agencies, with the goal of providing the Executive Branch the
+most informed and accurate legal advice. By limiting access to this program
+as it did, the White House undermined the Department's ability to perform
+its critical legal function. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+⁴⁵³ Gonzales stated that even if he knew that Ashcroft was aware Comey opposed
+recertifying the program, Gonzales would still have wanted to speak with Ashcroft because
+he believed Ashcroft still retained the authority to certify the program. Gonzales testified
+before the Senate Judiciary Committee in July 2007 that although there was concern over
+Ashcroft's condition, "We would not have sought nor did we intend to get any approval from
+General Ashcroft if in fact he wasn't fully competent to make that decision." Gonzales also
+testified, "There's no governing legal principle that says that Mr. Ashcroft [...] If he
+decided he felt better, could decide, I'm feeling better and I can make this decision, and I'm
+going to make this decision." (U)
+
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+
+Second, we believe that if the OLC's traditional peer review and
+supervisory procedures had been adhered to at the outset, the prospect that
+aspects of the program would have rested on a questionable legal
+foundation for over 2 years would have been greatly mitigated.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+Third, we believe that the Department and FBI officials who resisted
+the pressure to recertify the Stellar Wind program because of their belief
+that aspects of the program were not legally supportable acted courageously
+and at significant professional risk. We believe that this action by
+Department and FBI officials – particularly Ashcroft, Comey, Mueller,
+Goldsmith, Philbin, and Counsel for Intelligence Policy James Baker – was
+in accord with the highest professional standards of the Justice
+Department. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+We recommend that when the Department of Justice is involved with
+such programs in the future, the Attorney General should carefully assess
+whether the Department has been given adequate resources to carry out its
+vital function as legal advisor to the President and should aggressively seek
+additional resources if they are found to be insufficient. We also believe that
+the White House should allow the Department a sufficient number of
+read-ins when requested, consistent with national security considerations,
+to ensure that such sensitive programs receive a full and careful legal
+review. (U)
+
+IV. Transition of Program to FISA Authority
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+We also examined the transition of the Stellar Wind program's
+collection activities from presidential authority to FISA authority. We
+believe there were strong considerations that favored attempting to
+transition the program to FISA sooner than actually happened, especially as
+the program became less a temporary response to the September 11 attacks
+and more a permanent surveillance tool. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Chief among these considerations was the Stellar Wind program's
+substantial effect on privacy interests of U.S. persons. Under Stellar Wind,
+the government engaged in an unprecedented collection of information
+concerning U.S. persons. The President authorized the NSA to intercept,
+without judicial approval or oversight, the content of international
+communications involving many U.S. persons and the NSA collected
+massive amounts of non-content data about U.S. persons' domestic and
+international telephone calls and e-mail communications. We believe that
+such broad surveillance and collection activities, particularly for a
+significant period of time, should be conducted pursuant to statute and
+
+396
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+
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+
+judicial oversight. We also believe that placing these activities under Court
+supervision provides an important measure of accountability for the
+government's conduct that is less assured where the activities are both
+authorized and supervised by the Executive Branch alone.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The instability of the legal reasoning on which the program rested for
+several years and the substantial restrictions placed on FBI agents' access
+to and use of program-derived information due to Stellar Wind's highly
+classified status were additional reasons for transitioning Stellar Wind's
+collection activities to FISA authority. We acknowledge that the transition
+would always have been an enormously complex and time-consuming effort
+that rested upon novel interpretations and uses of FISA that not all FISA
+Court judges would authorize. Nevertheless, the events described in this
+report demonstrate that a full transition to FISA authority was achievable
+and, in our judgment, should have been pursued earlier.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+V. Impact of Stellar Wind Information on FBI Counterterrorism
+Efforts (S//NF)
+
+As a user of Stellar Wind program information, the FBI disseminated
+leads or "tippers" to FBI field offices. These tippers primarily consisted of
+specific domestic telephone numbers and e-mail addresses that NSA
+analysts had determined through meta data analysis were connected to
+individuals involved with al Qaeda or affiliated groups. The tippers also
+included content of communications intercepted by the NSA based upon its
+determination that there was probable cause to believe that a party to the
+communication was al Qaeda or an affiliated group. From October 2001
+through February 2006, the NSA provided the FB[REDACTED] Stellar Wind
+tippers, the vast majority of which were domestic telephone numbers.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The FBI's chief objective during the earliest months of Stellar Wind's
+operation was to expeditiously disseminate program information to FBI field
+offices for investigation, while protecting the NSA as the source of the
+information and the methods used to collect the information. The FBI
+assigned this task to a small group of personnel from the Telephone
+Analysis Unit (TAU) at FBI Headquarters. This group developed a
+straightforward process to receive the Top Secret, compartmented Stellar
+Wind reports from the NSA, reproduce the information in a
+non-compartmented, Secret-level format, and disseminate the information
+in Electronic Communications, or ECs, to the appropriate field offices for
+investigation. These [REDACTED] ECs placed restrictions on how
+the information could be used, instructing field offices that the information
+
+397
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+was "for lead purposes only" and could not be used for any legal or judicial
+purpose. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The FBI's participation in Stellar Wind evolved over time as the
+program became less a temporary response to the September 11 attacks
+and more a permanent surveillance capability. As Stellar Wind continued to
+be reauthorized, the FBI tried to improve the effectiveness of its
+participation in the program. Most significantly, in February 2003 a team of
+FBI personnel (Team 10) was assigned to work full-time at the NSA to
+manage the FBI's participation in the program. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Team 10's chief responsibility was to disseminate Stellar Wind
+information to FBI field offices. However, over time Team 10 began to
+participate in Stellar Wind in other ways. For example, Team 10 submitted
+telephone numbers and e-mail addresses to the NSA for possible querying
+against the bulk meta data collected under the program, and Team 10
+regularly contributed to the NSA's drafting process for Stellar Wind reports.
+Overall, we found that the decision to assign Team 10 to the NSA improved
+the FBI's knowledge about Stellar Wind operations and gave the NSA better
+insight about how FBI field offices investigated Stellar Wind information.
+These benefits translated to improvements in the Stellar Wind report
+drafting process, and by extension, in [REDACTED] leads.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+One of the other changes the FBI implemented to attempt to improve
+the process for handling Stellar Wind leads was to make the FBI's
+Headquarters-based Communications Analysis Unit (CAU), instead of the
+field offices, responsible for issuing National Security Letters (NSL) to obtain
+subscriber information on tipped telephone numbers and e-mail addresses.
+This measure, initiated in July 2003, was intended to address agent
+concerns that the leads, which reproduced the information in a
+non-compartmented, Secret-level format, did not provide sufficient
+information to initiate national security investigations, a prerequisite under
+Justice Department investigative guidelines to issuing NSLs. Agents
+complained that the ECs suffered from vagueness about the source of the
+information being provided and lacked factual details about the individuals
+allegedly involved with al Qaeda and with whom the domestic numbers
+being disseminated possibly were in contact. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+We found that the CAU implemented this change by issuing NSLs
+from the [REDACTED] control file, the non-investigative file created in
+September 2002 as a repository for [REDACTED]-related communications
+between FBI Headquarters and field offices. Issuing NSLs from a control file
+instead of an investigative file was contrary to internal FBI policy. In
+November 2006, the FBI finally opened an investigative file for the [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] project. We believe the CAU and OGC officials involved in the decision
+
+398
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+
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+
+to issue NSLs from the [REDACTED] control file concluded in good faith that
+the FBI had sufficient predication either to connect the [REDACTED] NSLS
+with existing preliminary or full investigations of al Qaeda and affiliated
+groups or to open new preliminary or full investigations in compliance with
+Justice Department investigative guidelines. However, we concluded that
+the FBI could have, and should have, opened an investigative file for [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] when the decision was first made to have FBI Headquarters instead of
+field offices issue NSLs for [REDACTED] leads. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+We also tried to assess the general role of Stellar Wind information in
+FBI investigations and its value to the FBI's overall counterterrorism efforts.
+Similar to the FBI, we had difficulty assessing the specific value of the
+program to the FBI's counterterrorism activities. (S//NF)
+
+The majority of Stellar Wind information the NSA provided the FBI
+related to domestic telephone numbers and e-mail addresses the NSA had
+identified through meta data analysis as having connections to al Qaeda or
+affiliated organizations. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] Not
+surprisingly, FBI agents and analysts with experience investigating [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] leads told us that most leads were determined not to have any
+connection to terrorism. These agents and analysts did not identify for us
+any specific cases where [REDACTED] leads helped the FBI identify previously
+unknown subjects involved in terrorism, although we recognize that FBI
+officials and agents other than we interviewed may have had different
+experiences with Stellar Wind information. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Two FBI statistical studies that attempted to assess the value of
+Stellar Wind meta data leads to FBI counterterrorism efforts did not reach
+explicit conclusions on the program's usefulness. The first study found that
+1.2 percent of Stellar Wind leads made "significant" contributions.⁴⁵⁴ The
+second study did not identify any examples of "significant" Stellar Wind
+contributions to FBI counterterrorism efforts.⁴⁵⁵ The FBI OGC told us that
+
+⁴⁵⁴ As we described earlier in this chapter, the FBI considered a tipper "significant"
+if it led to any of three investigative results: the identification of a terrorist, the deportation
+from the United States of a suspected terrorist, or the development of an asset that can
+report about the activities of terrorists. (S//NF)
+
+⁴⁵⁵ As described earlier in this chapter, the FBI considered a tipper "significant" if it
+led to any of three investigative results: the identification of a terrorist, the deportation
+from the United States of a suspected terrorist, or the development of an asset that can
+report about the activities of terrorists. (TS//NF)
+
+399
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
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+
+statements by senior FBI officials in congressional testimony that the Stellar
+Wind program had value were based in part on the results of the first study,
+which found that 1.2 percent of the Stellar Wind leads made significant
+contributions to FBI cases. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+FBI agents we interviewed generally were supportive of Stellar Wind
+(or [REDACTED]), calling the information "one tool of many" in the FBI's
+anti-terrorism efforts that "could help move cases forward" by, for example,
+confirming a subject's contacts with individuals involved in terrorism or
+identifying additional terrorist contacts. However, FBI agents and analysts
+also told us that the Stellar Wind information disseminated to FBI field
+offices could also be frustrating because it often lacked details about the
+foreign individuals allegedly involved in terrorism with whom domestic
+telephone numbers and e-mail addresses were in contact. Some agents also
+believed that the [REDACTED] project failed to adequately prioritize leads sent
+to FBI field offices. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+FBI Director Mueller told us that he believes the Stellar Wind program
+was useful and that the FBI must follow every lead it receives in order to
+prevent future terrorist attacks. He stated that to the extent such
+information can be gathered and used legally it must be exploited, and that
+he "would not dismiss the potency of a program based on the percentage of
+hits." Other witnesses shared this view that an intelligence program's value
+cannot be assessed by statistical measures alone. General Hayden said that
+the value of the program may lie in its ability to help the Intelligence
+Community determine that the terrorist threat embedded within the country
+is not as great as once feared. Some witnesses also believed that the value
+of the program should not depend on documented "success stories," but
+rather on maintaining an intelligence capability to detect potential terrorist
+activity in the future. Several witnesses suggested that the program
+provides an "early warning system" to allow the Intelligence Community to
+detect potential terrorist attacks, even if the system has not specifically
+uncovered evidence of preparations for such an attack.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+As part of our analysis, we sought to look beyond these comments of
+general support for Stellar Wind to specific, concrete examples of the
+program's contributions that illustrated the role Stellar Wind information
+either has or could play in the FBI's counterterrorism efforts. We examined
+five cases frequently cited in documents we reviewed and during our
+interviews as examples of Stellar Wind's positive contributions to the FBI's
+counterterrorism efforts. The evidence indicated that Stellar Wind
+information had value in some of these investigations by causing the FBI to
+take action that led to useful investigative results. In other cases the
+connection between the Stellar Wind information and the FBI's investigative
+actions was more difficult to discern. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+400
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
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+
+In the end, we found it difficult to assess or quantify the overall
+effectiveness of the Stellar Wind program to the FBI's counterterrorism
+activities. However, based on the interviews conducted and documents
+reviewed, we concluded that although Stellar Wind information had value in
+some counterterrorism investigations, it generally played a limited role in
+the FBI's overall counterterrorism efforts. (S//NF)
+
+It is also important to note that a significant consequence of the NSA
+program and the FBI's approach to assigning leads for program information
+was that FBI field offices conducted many threat assessments on individuals
+located in the United States, including U.S. persons, that typically were
+determined not to have any nexus to terrorism or represent a threat to
+national security. As a result, the FBI collected and retained a significant
+amount of personal information about the users of tipped telephone
+numbers and e-mail addresses, such as names and home addresses, places
+of employment, foreign travel, and the identity of family members. The
+results of these threat assessments and the information collected generally
+were reported in communications to FBI Headquarters and uploaded into
+FBI databases. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The FBI's collection of information in this manner is ongoing under
+[REDACTED] project, the successor FBI project to [REDACTED] which
+disseminates to FBI field offices lead information the NSA derives from bulk
+telephony and e-mail meta data now collected under FISA authority. Like
+[REDACTED] project requires FBI field offices to conduct threat
+assessments on telephone numbers and e-mail addresses identified through
+the NSA's analytical process that the FBI is not already aware of, including
+telephone numbers and e-mail addresses one or two steps removed from
+direct contacts with individuals involved in terrorism. To the extent the
+leads derived from the FISA-authorized activities generate results similar to
+those under Stellar Wind, the FBI threat assessments will continue to result
+in the collection and retention of a significant amount of personal
+information about individuals in the United States, including U.S. persons,
+who do not have a nexus to terrorism or represent a threat to national
+security. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+We recommend that, as part of the [REDACTED] project, the Justice
+Department's National Security Division (NSD), working with the FBI,
+should collect information about the quantity of telephone numbers and
+e-mail addresses disseminated to FBI field offices that are assigned as
+Action leads and that require offices to conduct threat assessments. The
+information compiled by the Justice Department should include whether
+individuals identified in threat assessments are U.S. or non-U.S. persons
+and whether the threat assessments led to the opening of preliminary or full
+national security investigations. With respect to threat assessments that
+conclude that users of tipped telephone numbers or e-mail addresses are
+
+401
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
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+
+not involved in terrorism and are not threats to national security, the
+Justice Department should take steps to track the quantity and nature of
+the U.S. person information collected and how the FBI retains and utilizes
+this information. This will enable the Justice Department and entities with
+oversight responsibilities, including the OIG and congressional committees,
+to assess the impact this intelligence program has on the privacy interests
+of U.S. persons and to consider whether, and for how long, such information
+should be retained. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+We also recommend that, consistent with NSD's current oversight
+activities and as part of its periodic reviews of national security
+investigations at FBI Headquarters and field offices, NSD should review a
+representative sampling [REDACTED] leads to those offices. For each lead
+examined, NSD should assess FBI compliance with applicable legal
+requirements in the use of the lead and in any ensuing investigations,
+particularly with the requirements governing the collection and use of U.S.
+person information. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+VI. Discovery and "Scrubbing" Issues (TS//SI//NF)
+
+Although Stellar Wind was conceived and implemented as an
+intelligence-gathering program, it was inevitable that the information from
+this program would intersect with the Department's prosecutorial functions,
+both in criminal cases brought in federal courts and in seeking FISA orders
+from the FISA Court. We found that the limited number of Department
+read-ins also had adverse consequences on issues related to these
+Department functions. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+One such issue concerned the Department's compliance with
+discovery obligations in international terrorism prosecutions, which we
+discuss in Chapter Seven. We determined that the Department was aware
+as early as [REDACTED] that information collected under Stellar Wind could have
+implications for the Department's litigation responsibilities under Federal
+Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Analysis of this discovery issue was first assigned to John Yoo in
+[REDACTED]. Yoo, working alone, produced a legal analysis of the government's
+discovery obligations in the case of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
+REDACTED]
+
+402
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+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+[REDACTED]
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+No Justice Department attorneys with terrorism prosecution
+responsibilities were read into the Stellar Wind program until mid-2004,
+and as a result the Department continued to lack the advice of attorneys
+who were best equipped to identify and examine the discovery issues in
+connection with the program. Since that time the Department has taken
+steps to respond, [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] discovery motions
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] These responses involve the use of the Classified Information
+Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. App. 3, to file ex parte in camera pleadings with
+federal courts to describe any potentially responsive Stellar Wind-derived
+information. [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] we recommend that the
+Department assess its discovery obligations regarding Stellar Wind-derived
+information in international terrorism prosecutions. We also recommend
+that the Department carefully consider whether it must re-examine past
+cases to see whether potentially discoverable but undisclosed Rule 16 or
+Brady material was collected by the NSA under the program, and take
+appropriate steps to ensure that it has complied with its discovery
+obligations in such cases. We also recommend that the Department, in
+coordination with the NSA, implement a procedure to identify Stellar
+Wind-derived information that may be associated with international
+terrorism cases currently pending or likely to be brought in the future and
+evaluate whether such information should be disclosed in light of the
+
+403
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS//SI//ORCON//NOFORN
+
+government's discovery obligations under Rule 16 and Brady.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+In addition, we examined the issue of the Department's use of Stellar
+Wind derived information in FISA applications. We believe it was
+foreseeable that some Stellar Wind-derived information would be contained
+in the FISA applications filed by the Department's Office of Intelligence
+Policy and Review (OIPR). OIPR counsel Baker believed, and we agree, that
+it would have been detrimental to this relationship if the Court learned that
+information from Stellar Wind was included in FISA applications without the
+Court being told so in advance. As discussed in Chapter Three, White
+House officials initially rejected the idea of reading in members of the FISA
+Court, but after Department officials continued to press the issue,
+ultimately in January 2003 agreed to read in a single judge. In January 2002
+(Presiding Judge Lamberth, followed by Presiding Judge Kollar-Kotelly in
+May 2002). (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The “scrubbing” procedures imposed by the Court and implemented
+by Baker to account for Stellar Wind-derived information in international
+terrorism FISA applications created concerns among some OIPR attorneys
+about the unexplained changes being made to their FISA applications.
+These scrubbing procedures also substantially altered the assignment of
+cases to FISA Court Judges for nearly 3 years. We concluded that once
+Stellar Wind began to affect the functioning of the FISA process shortly after
+the program’s inception, the number of OIPR staff and FISA Court Judges
+read into Stellar Wind should have increased. Instead, read-ins were
+limited to a single OIPR official for over two years and to the Presiding Judge
+of the FISA Court for a period of four years. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+The Justice Department, together with the FBI and the NSA, today
+continues to apply scrubbing procedures to international terrorism FISA
+applications. Since January 2006, all members of the Court have been
+applied to the Stellar Wind program and all of the judges handle
+applications that involve Stellar Wind-derived information in FISA
+applications. While we found that the government has expended
+considerable resources to comply with the scrubbing procedures required by
+the FISA Court since February 2002, we did not find any instances of the
+government being unable to obtain FISA surveillance coverage on a target
+because of this requirement. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+VII. Gonzales’s Statements (U)
+
+As part of this review, the OIG examined whether Attorney General
+Gonzales made false or misleading statements to Congress related to the
+Stellar Wind program. We concluded that Gonzales’s testimony did not
+
+404
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS//SI//ORCON//NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS//SI//ORCON//NOFORN
+
+constitute a false statement and that he did not intend to mislead Congress.
+However, we concluded that his testimony in several respects was
+confusing, not accurately, and had the effect of misleading those who were
+not knowledgeable about the program. (S//NF)
+
+Aspects of the Stellar Wind program were first disclosed publicly in a
+series of articles in The New York Times in December 2005. In response,
+the President publicly confirmed a portion of the program – which he called
+the terrorist surveillance program – describing it as the interception of the
+content of international communications of people reasonably believed to
+have links to al Qaeda and related organizations (basket 1). Subsequently,
+Attorney General Gonzales was questioned about NSA surveillance activities
+in two hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee in February 2006
+and July 2007. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Through media accounts and former Deputy Attorney General
+Comey's Senate Judiciary Committee testimony in May 2007, it was publicly
+revealed that the Department and the White House had a major
+disagreement related to the program in March 2004. As discussed in
+Chapter Four, this dispute – which resulted in the visit to Attorney General
+Ashcroft's hospital room by Gonzales and Card and brought several senior
+Department and FBI officials to the brink of resignation after the White
+House continued the program [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+In his testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Gonzales
+stated that the dispute at issue between the Department and the White
+House did not relate to the Terrorist Surveillance Program* that the
+President had confirmed, but rather pertained to other intelligence
+activities. We believe this testimony created the misimpression that the
+dispute concerned activities entirely unrelated to the terrorist surveillance
+program, which was not accurate. In addition, we believe Gonzales's
+testimony that Department attorneys did not have "reservations" or
+"concerns" about the program the "President has confirmed" was incomplete
+and confusing because Gonzales did not account for the fact that the
+Department's concerns were what led to [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED] and that these concerns had been conveyed to the White House
+over a period of months prior to and including March 2004 when the issue
+was resolved. (S//NF)
+
+We recognize that Attorney General Gonzales was in the difficult
+position of testifying about a highly classified program in an open forum.
+However, we also believe that Gonzales, as a participant in the March 2004
+dispute between the White House and the Justice Department and, more
+importantly, as the nation’s chief law enforcement officer, had a duty to
+balance his obligation not to disclose classified information with the need
+
+405
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS//SI//ORCON//NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS//SI//ORCON//NOFORN
+
+not to be misleading in his testimony about the events that nearly led to
+mass resignations of the most senior officials at the Justice Department and
+the FBI. Although we believe that Gonzales did not intend to mislead
+Congress, we believe his testimony was confusing, inaccurate, and had the
+effect of misleading those who were not knowledgeable about the program.
+(TS//SI//NF)
+
+VIII. Conclusion (U)
+
+From the inception of the Stellar Wind program in October 2001, vast
+amounts of information about telephone and e-mail communications were
+collected and stored in databases at the NSA. The NSA used this
+information to conduct analysis and disseminate reports to support the
+government's counterterrorism efforts. We found that in the early years of
+the Stellar Wind program, the Department of Justice lacked the necessary
+legal resources to carry out an adequate review of the legality of the
+program. The White House strictly controlled the Department's access to
+the program. For the first year and a half of the program only 3 Department
+officials were read into Stellar Wind, and only 3 more officials had been read
+in by the end of 2003. Only a single Department attorney analyzed the legal
+basis for the program during its first year and a half of its operation.
+Beginning in mid-2003, after additional Department officials were read into
+the program, the Department determined that this attorney's initial legal
+analysis was legally and factually flawed. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+We believe that the strict controls over the Department's access to the
+program undermined the role of the Justice Department in advising the
+President as to the legality of the program during its early phase of
+operation. The Department's comprehensive reassessment of the program's
+legality beginning in mid-2003 resulted in a contentious dispute with the
+White House that nearly led to the mass resignation of the Department's
+senior leadership. In March 2004 the White House continued the program
+despite the Department’s conclusion that it found no legal support for
+aspects of the program. In the face of the potential resignations, however,
+the White House [REDACTED] in accord with the
+Department’s legal concerns. Eventually, the entire program was
+transitioned, in stages, to the authority of the FISA statute.
+(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Given the broad nature of the collection activities under the Stellar
+Wind program, the substantial amount of information the program collected
+related to U.S. persons, and the novel legal theories advanced to support the
+program, we believe that the Department should have more carefully and
+thoroughly reviewed the legality of the program, in accord with its normal
+
+406
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS//SI//ORCON//NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS//SI//ORCON//NOFORN
+
+peer review and oversight practices, particularly during its first year and a
+half of operation. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+We also concluded that the Department should have begun efforts to
+transition the Stellar Wind program to FISA authority earlier than March
+2004, when that process began, especially as Stellar Wind became less a
+temporary response to the September 11 attacks and more a permanent
+surveillance tool. We believe that such broad surveillance and collection
+activities conducted in the United States that impact U.S. persons,
+particularly when they extend for such a significant period of time, should
+be conducted pursuant to statute and be subjected to judicial oversight.
+Placing such activities under Court supervision, as now occurs, also
+provides an important measure of accountability for the government's
+conduct that is less assured when the activities are authorized and
+supervised by the Executive Branch alone. (TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)
+
+Finally, we believe that the Department should carefully monitor the
+collection, use, and retention of the information that is now collected under
+FISA authority, given the expansive scope of the collection activities. The
+Department and other agencies should also continue to examine the value
+of collecting such information to the government's ongoing counterterrorism
+efforts. (TS//SI//NF)
+
+407
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS//SI//ORCON//NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS//SI//ORCON//NOFORN
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS//SI//ORCON//NOFORN
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+
+APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN
+
+PREPARED BY THE
+OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GENERAL
+OF THE
+DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
+DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
+CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+
+(U) ANNEX TO THE REPORT ON THE
+PRESIDENT'S SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM
+
+REPORT No. 2009-0013-AS
+VOLUME III
+
+TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/FOXACID-OVERALL-BRIEFING-Third-Revision-Redacted/FOXACID-OVERALL-BRIEFING-Third-Revision-Redacted.md b/data/FOXACID-OVERALL-BRIEFING-Third-Revision-Redacted/FOXACID-OVERALL-BRIEFING-Third-Revision-Redacted.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..be70345
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/FOXACID-OVERALL-BRIEFING-Third-Revision-Redacted/FOXACID-OVERALL-BRIEFING-Third-Revision-Redacted.md
@@ -0,0 +1,359 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+# FOXACID
+
+ROC
+
+```
+SPAM
+made with FOX
+packed with ACID
+
+ACID
+Nutrition Facts
+Serving Size: A Pack
+Amount Per Serving
+Calories D
+% Daily Value
+Total Fur 10g 20%
+Sadism 4 whacks 51%
+Total Crap 10g 100%
+not a significant source
+of other nutrients
+PLEASE RECYCLE
+POOP IN YOUR GARDEN
+```
+
+CTN2 [REDACTED]
+FOXACID/STAT
+
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20070108
+Declassify On: 20291123
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+## Mission
+
+Mission Statement: Provide Points of Presence for follow on collection and exploitation through the deployment of content-based email, MitM/MotS Operations and Cross Site Scripting (XSS). In other words – provide "Initial Access".
+
+Accomplished by:
+* Development of XSS vulnerabilities against web mail services
+* Injection of FA tags utilizing MitM/MotS techniques
+* Maintenance of FA servers and exploit plug-ins
+* Deployment of emails to targets; special request and spam
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+## In layman's terms...
+
+FOXACID was once a mission name referring to CT targets within Al-Qaeda.
+
+It then became the name for the spam operation.
+
+Now, it basically refers to the exploit servers that we leverage to provide initial access through browser exploitation. If we can get a target to visit our URL in his web browser by any means, we can potentially exploit him and deliver a back-door implant.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+## The Spam Mission
+
+* FOXACID deploys "spam" email to targets. These emails are not like normal spam as they are malicious in nature, as opposed to just annoying.
+
+* Inside of each email, we can include several methods of exploitation, depending on the mail service and target. These techniques are discussed later in the presentation.
+
+* The overarching goal is to utilize social engineering via emails to gain access to a targets computer.
+
+*The emails themselves can either be very generic or very targeted, depending on the target and nature of request. For obvious reason, it takes higher authority to deploy very targeted emails because of the level of guilty knowledge they must contain about the target.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+## XSS
+
+* Cross Site Scripting can best be described as sneaking code, or more specifically JavaScript, into a webpage. Websites go to great lengths to prevent arbitrary code execution in user input (such as a search box, guest book, the content of an email, etc).
+
+* In addition to website-based filters, we must also defeat browser-based filters. This means that in order to find an exploit, two HTML parsing filters must be defeated.
+
+* The end goal is to somehow inject an `
+
+(S//NF) Orca circumvents PSP detection by launching processes disklessly. Essentially, Orca creates a clone of an in-memory process. After performing some cleanup on the clone, new executable code is mapped from Orca's memory into the memory of the cloned process. This capability has been tested and found to support most executables without requiring any modification to the executable.
+
+[edit]
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/TCB-Jamboree-2010-Abstracts-WikiInfo-NF-Redacted/metadata.json b/data/TCB-Jamboree-2010-Abstracts-WikiInfo-NF-Redacted/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e312aae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/TCB-Jamboree-2010-Abstracts-WikiInfo-NF-Redacted/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+{
+ "title": "TCB Jamboree 2010 Abstracts",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "This document discusses a 2010 CIA-hosted conference on trusted computing technologies, specifically focusing on security measures such as bypassing disk access for covert execution of code. It highlights a demonstration of Northrop Grumman Xetron's \"Orca\" system, which enables covert launching of Windows executables without writing to disk, circumventing personal security products that monitor disk activity for malicious software.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [
+ "CIA",
+ "TCB Jamboree",
+ "trusted computing",
+ "covert execution",
+ "disk access bypass",
+ "Orca",
+ "Northrop Grumman Xetron",
+ "rootkits",
+ "personal security products",
+ "Windows",
+ "implants",
+ "memory forensics",
+ "kernel exploits",
+ "malware evasion",
+ "WikiInfo"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "SI"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN/ORCON"
+ ],
+ "banner": "TOP SECRET//HCS/SI-GAMMA/TALENT KEYHOLE//NOFORN/ORCON/PROPIN",
+ "genre": "wiki",
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2017-03-30",
+ "title": "Meet the Midwestern Contractor That Appears Hundreds of Times in the CIA WikiLeaks Dump",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2017/03/30/meet-the-midwestern-contractor-that-appears-hundreds-of-times-in-the-cia-wikileaks-dump/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "McLaughlin, Jenna"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/3532266/TCB-Jamboree-2010-Abstracts-WikiInfo-NF-Redacted.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "e26e1c6abb83391ac322dd13d006dc4e2c7bd8ff9dbcb03442c4bc2c47b31744",
+ "pages": 2
+}
diff --git a/data/TCB-Jamboree-2012-WikiInfo-NF-Redacted/TCB-Jamboree-2012-WikiInfo-NF-Redacted.md b/data/TCB-Jamboree-2012-WikiInfo-NF-Redacted/TCB-Jamboree-2012-WikiInfo-NF-Redacted.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0d3ea0e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/TCB-Jamboree-2012-WikiInfo-NF-Redacted/TCB-Jamboree-2012-WikiInfo-NF-Redacted.md
@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
+The accredited security level of this system is: TOP SECRET//HCS/SI-GAMMA/TALENT KEYHOLE//NOFORN/ORCON/PROPIN *
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+(U) TCB Jamboree
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+From WikiInfo-NF
+Jump to: navigation, search
+
+(S//NF) The TCB Jamboree is a conference hosted on an annual basis by the Trusted Computing Base
+(TCB) Program within CIA's Emerging Technologies Branch within IOC. TCB Jamboree brings together
+CIA analysts and all of the various contractors performing research for the CIA TCB program. In past years
+CIA has also invited NSA to participate through the NSA TCB Program (the counterpart to the CIA program).
+
+(U//FOUO) The first Jamboree was held in 2006. Attendance is open only to US personnel.
+
+Note: (2/6/12) As of this morning,
+clearances were verified for all registered
+attendees from NSA that we know of. -
+[REDACTED]
+
+Contents
+[hide]
+
+* 1 TCB Jamboree 2012
+* 2 (U) Invitation
+* 3 (U) Registration
+ * 3.1 (U) Clearance Passing
+* 4 (U//FOUO) 2012 TCB Jamboree Presenters Deadlines
+* 5 (U//FOUO) 2012 TCB Jamboree Agenda
+ * 5.1 (U) Tuesday, February 7, 2012
+ * 5.1.1 (U) Schedule
+ * 5.1.2 (U) Abstracts
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * 5.1.2.2 (S//NF) Apple A4/A5 Application Processors Analysis
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * 5.1.2.9 (S//NF) Strawhorse: Attacking the MacOS and iOS Software Development Kit
+ * 5.2 (U) Wednesday, February 8, 2012
+ * 5.2.1 (U) Schedule
+ * 5.2.2 (U) Abstracts
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * 5.3 (U) Thursday, February 9, 2012
+ * 5.3.1 (U) Schedule
+ * 5.3.2 (U) Abstracts
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * 5.3.2.3 (U) Advanced Debugging and RE Techniques on Embedded Platforms
+ * [REDACTED]
+* 6 Past Jamborees
+* 7 Related
+
+[edit] TCB Jamboree 2012
+
+(S//NF) The Information Operations Center's Engineering Development Group (EDG) will hold its seventh annual Trusted Computing Base (TCB) Jamboree from February 7–9, 2012.
+
+Visit the TCB Program WIKI.CIA page at:
+
+https://[REDACTED]
+
+[edit] (U) Invitation
+
+(S//NF) The Information Operations Center's Engineering Development Group (EDG) would like to announce the seventh Trusted Computing Jamboree. The Jamboree is organized and sponsored by the Security Portfolio of EDG's Emerging Technologies Branch (ETB). As in past years, the Jamboree will be an informal and interactive conference with an emphasis on presentations that provide important information to developers trying to circumvent or exploit new security capabilities.
+
+(U) The Jamboree will be held Tuesday-Thursday, February 7–9, 2012 at the Lockheed Martin [REDACTED] Tuesday and Wednesday will run from 9am to 5pm, Thursday will run from 9am to 12pm.
+
+(S//NF) The TCB Program continues to explore architectures that will have a significant impact on future Information Operations. Technologies such as the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) pose both threats and opportunities for the Intelligence Community.
+
+(S//NF) The main purpose of the Jamboree will be to discuss how the results of the Security Portfolio research can be applied today. Rather than an overview of all the activities within the Program, we will present notable results that will provide developers insight into how to meet the threats of the TCG architectures and embedded architectures and how they can exploit new avenues of attack.
+
+[edit] (U) Registration
+
+(U) Pre-registration for this event is required; registration closes on February 1, 2012.
+
+(C) Please send an email (CWE Note or ICEmail) to [REDACTED] hat includes your full name, SSN, and contact number.
+
+[edit] (U) Clearance Passing
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+[edit] (U) Thursday, February 9, 2012
+[edit] (U) Schedule
+
+
+| Time | Presenter(s) | Talk Title |
+| :-------- | :------------------------- | :-------------------------- |
+| 09:00- 09:15 | [REDACTED] | (U) Welcome, EDG/ETB Trusted Computing Base Program |
+| 09:15- 09:45 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 09:45- 10:15 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 10:15- 10:30 | | (U) Break |
+| 10:30- 11:00 | (U//FOUO) [REDACTED] Northrop Grumman Xetron | (U) Advanced Debugging and RE Techniques on Embedded Platforms |
+| 11:00- 11:30 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| 11:30- 11:50 | [REDACTED] | (U) Jamboree Wrap-Up |
+
+[edit] (U) Abstracts
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+(U//FOUO)
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+[edit] (U) Advanced Debugging and RE Techniques on Embedded Platforms
+
+(U//FOUO) Presenter: [REDACTED] Northrop Grumman Xetron
+
+(S//NF) Embedded platforms present many additional challenges to reverse engineering. Therefore, it is often advantageous to employ dynamic analysis in the form of hardware or software debuggers to speed up the process of reverse engineering and developing implants. Manufacturers often leave hardware debugging features such as JTAG enabled on their products. We will explore methods that NG Xetron uses to locate these hardware debugging features and how these features are utilized for reverse engineering.
+
+(S//NF) Software based debugging facilities can also be very useful in performing initial reverse engineering and allowing the development team to scale rapidly without much additional equipment. We will look at common software debuggers that are used during development of embedded platforms including VxWorks shell, GDB and others. To facilitate rapid use of dynamic debugging and analysis capabilities on a wide range of embedded platforms, NG Xetron has developed a GDB server capability that can be added to existing firmware. This GDB server is very portable and reduces the dependence on the hardware and firmware of each platform of interest.
+
+(U) These techniques have been applied to a wide range of target systems, and have proven to greatly reduce the amount of time spent either in static analysis or in working to create a custom one-off dynamic analysis technique on each system.
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+[edit] Past Jamborees
+
+* TCB Jamboree 2011 Abstracts
+* TCB Jamboree 2010 Abstracts
+* TCB Jamboree 2009
+* TCB Jamboree 2008
+* TCB Jamboree 2007
+* TCB Jamboree 2006
+
+[edit] Related
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+Derived From: SI Classification Guide, 02-01, Dated: 20060711
+and NSA/CSSM 1-52, Dated: 20070108
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/TCB-Jamboree-2012-WikiInfo-NF-Redacted/metadata.json b/data/TCB-Jamboree-2012-WikiInfo-NF-Redacted/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8a24069
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/TCB-Jamboree-2012-WikiInfo-NF-Redacted/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+{
+ "title": "TCB Jamboree 2012",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "This document describes a 2012 TCB Jamboree conference highlighting research into security weaknesses in Apple technologies, including analysis of Apple A4/A5 processors and methods for targeting the MacOS and iOS software‑development ecosystem. The focus is on understanding and exploiting architectural or tooling vulnerabilities rather than user‑level devices, all presented in a high‑level research context.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [
+ "CIA",
+ "TCB Jamboree",
+ "trusted computing",
+ "information operations",
+ "Emerging Technologies Branch",
+ "IOC",
+ "Lockheed Martin",
+ "embedded systems",
+ "reverse engineering",
+ "debugging",
+ "VxWorks",
+ "GDB",
+ "Northrop Grumman Xetron",
+ "TPM",
+ "Information Operations Center",
+ "JTAG",
+ "software development",
+ "dynamic analysis",
+ "firmware",
+ "security research",
+ "ICEmail",
+ "classified event",
+ "U.S. personnel",
+ "CIA contractors",
+ "NSA contractors",
+ "technological research",
+ "TCG architectures"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "SI"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "banner": "TOP SECRET//HCS/SI-GAMMA/TALENT KEYHOLE//NOFORN/ORCON/PROPIN",
+ "genre": "wiki",
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2017-03-30",
+ "title": "Meet the Midwestern Contractor That Appears Hundreds of Times in the CIA WikiLeaks Dump",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2017/03/30/meet-the-midwestern-contractor-that-appears-hundreds-of-times-in-the-cia-wikileaks-dump/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "McLaughlin, Jenna"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/3532267/TCB-Jamboree-2012-WikiInfo-NF-Redacted.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "345e7cef9178bf39643d861c7ed81f25028990510d996d93b828db13f9193b4f",
+ "pages": 5
+}
diff --git a/data/TCB-Jamboree-TCB-Jamboree-2011-WikiInfo-NF/TCB-Jamboree-TCB-Jamboree-2011-WikiInfo-NF.md b/data/TCB-Jamboree-TCB-Jamboree-2011-WikiInfo-NF/TCB-Jamboree-TCB-Jamboree-2011-WikiInfo-NF.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dd3df97
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/TCB-Jamboree-TCB-Jamboree-2011-WikiInfo-NF/TCB-Jamboree-TCB-Jamboree-2011-WikiInfo-NF.md
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+The accredited security level of this system is: TOP SECRET//HCS/SI-GAMMA/TALENT KEYHOLE//NOFORN/ORCON/PROPIN *
+TOP SECRET//NOFORN
+(U) TCB Jamboree/TCB Jamboree 2011
+
+TOP SECRET//NOFORN
+From WikiInfo-NF
+< TCB Jamboree
+Jump to: navigation, search
+
+(S//NF) The Information Operations Center's Engineering Development Group (EDG) held its sixth annual Trusted Computing Base (TCB) Jamboree on March 15 – 16, 2011.
+
+Visit the TCB Program WIKI.CIA page at:
+
+https:/[REDACTED]
+
+Contents
+[hide]
+
+* 1 (U) Invitation
+* 2 (U) Registration
+ * 2.1 (U) Clearance Passing
+* 3 (U//FOUO) 2011 TCB Jamboree Agenda
+* 4 Presentation Abstracts – Tuesday, 15 March
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * 4.3 (S//NF) Driver Signing Footprint
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+* 5 Presentation Abstracts – Wednesday, 16 March
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+ * [REDACTED]
+
+[edit] (U) Invitation
+
+(S//NF) The Information Operations Center's Engineering Development Group (EDG) would like to announce the sixth Trusted Computing Jamboree. The Jamboree is organized and sponsored by the Security Portfolio of EDG's Emerging Technologies Branch (ETB). As in past years, the Jamboree will be an informal and interactive conference with an emphasis on presentations that provide important information to developers trying to circumvent or exploit new security capabilities.
+
+(U) The Jamboree will be held on Tuesday and Wednesday, March 15-16th, 2011 at the Lockheed Martin [REDACTED].
+
+(S//NF) The TCB Program continues to explore architectures that will have a significant impact on future Information Operations. Technologies such as the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) pose both threats and opportunities for the Intelligence Community.
+
+(S//NF) The main purpose of the Jamboree will be to discuss how the results of the Security Portfolio research can be applied today. Rather than an overview of all the activities within the Program, we will present notable results that will provide developers insight into how to meet the threats of the TCG architectures and embedded architectures and how they can exploit new avenues of attack.
+
+[edit] (U) Registration
+
+(U) Pre-registration for this event is required; registration closes on March 11, 2011.
+
+(C) Please send an email (CWE Note or ICEmail) to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] that includes your full name, SSN and contact number.
+
+[edit] (U) Clearance Passing
+[REDACTED]
+
+(U)
+[REDACTED]
+
+[edit] (U//FOUO) 2011 TCB Jamboree Agenda
+
+Schedule (U) Each day will run from 9am to 5pm. In order to facilitate planning, the topics presented on each day are highlighted below. The abstracts for each topic are on the following pages.
+
+Tuesday March 15th, 2011
+
+
+
+| Presenters | Talk Title |
+| :----------------------- | :-------------------------------------------------- |
+| [REDACTED] (Sandia National Laboratory) | (S//NF) Differential Power Analysis on the Apple A4 Processor |
+| [REDACTED] (Sandia National Laboratory) | (S//NF) Secure key extraction by physical de-processing of Apple's A4 processor |
+| [REDACTED] (Xetron) | (S//NF) Driver Signing Footprint |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
+
+
+[edit] Presentation Abstracts – Tuesday, 15 March
+
+[edit] (S//NF) Differential Power Analysis on the Apple A4 Processor
+
+(U) Presenters [REDACTED] (U) The Apple A4 processor contains an on-board, AES cryptographic key called the Global ID (GID) that is believed to be shared across all current "iDevices". This GID key is used to un-wrap the keys that decrypt the corresponding boot firmware code stored in system non-volatile memory. Currently, the only way to examine unencrypted boot code is to gain execution through an exploitable software security flaw. However, Apple is quick to address these flaws with
+
+[edit] (S//NF) Driver Signing Footprint
+
+(U) Presenter: [REDACTED] (S//NF) Driver signing requirements on the 64bit versions of Windows 7 and Vista are a challenge when trying to load kernel level drivers and implants. The aim of this study is to understand the observability and traceability of signature credentials used to sign kernel-level drivers. The eventual goal of the research is to: 1. Render improbable the detection of the signature credentials used to sign a kernel-driver 2. Where not impossible to remove credential artifacts, quantify the remnants and associated risk
+
+(U) This talk will discuss: (S//NF) The forensic data quantifying the residual footprint of the signature authority for drivers that have been installed and removed from 64-bit versions of Windows 7 and Vista. (S//NF) The analysis of the forensic results, providing insights as to the operational risk to Sponsor activities if this technique is used.
+
+[edit]
+[REDACTED]
+
+[edit] (S//NF) [REDACTED]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/TCB-Jamboree-TCB-Jamboree-2011-WikiInfo-NF/metadata.json b/data/TCB-Jamboree-TCB-Jamboree-2011-WikiInfo-NF/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..858d79e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/TCB-Jamboree-TCB-Jamboree-2011-WikiInfo-NF/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+{
+ "title": "TCB Jamboree 2011 Abstracts",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "This document discusses a 2011 CIA-hosted conference 2011 TCB Jamboree, focusing on research into emerging security technologies, their vulnerabilities, and methods for exploiting or circumventing trusted computing architectures. The event featured presentations—many redacted—on hardware and software security topics, including processor analysis, driver‑signing forensics, and other advanced techniques relevant to intelligence operations.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [
+ "CIA",
+ "TCB Jamboree",
+ "trusted computing",
+ "information operations",
+ "Engineering Development Group",
+ "Emerging Technologies Branch",
+ "Lockheed Martin",
+ "security research",
+ "TPM",
+ "Apple",
+ "iPhone",
+ "MacBook",
+ "Apple A4",
+ "differential power analysis",
+ "driver signing",
+ "Windows",
+ "kernel exploits",
+ "embedded systems",
+ "security vulnerabilities",
+ "software exploitation",
+ "cryptographic key",
+ "AES",
+ "forensics",
+ "reverse engineering",
+ "intelligence community",
+ "TCG architectures",
+ "classified conference",
+ "U.S. personnel",
+ "Sandia National Laboratories",
+ "Northrop Grumman Xetron"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "banner": "TOP SECRET//HCS/SI-GAMMA/TALENT KEYHOLE//NOFORN/ORCON/PROPIN",
+ "genre": "wiki",
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2017-03-30",
+ "title": "Meet the Midwestern Contractor That Appears Hundreds of Times in the CIA WikiLeaks Dump",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2017/03/30/meet-the-midwestern-contractor-that-appears-hundreds-of-times-in-the-cia-wikileaks-dump/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "McLaughlin, Jenna"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/3532268/TCB-Jamboree-TCB-Jamboree-2011-WikiInfo-NF.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "dcf29db9b7ce848026586c1838855083feb44591e02f85bcd608979c307a227e",
+ "pages": 4
+}
diff --git a/data/TWO-FACE-GCWiki-Redacted/TWO-FACE-GCWiki-Redacted.md b/data/TWO-FACE-GCWiki-Redacted/TWO-FACE-GCWiki-Redacted.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ba203bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/TWO-FACE-GCWiki-Redacted/TWO-FACE-GCWiki-Redacted.md
@@ -0,0 +1,278 @@
+TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
+The maximum classification allowed on GCWiki is TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT. Click to report inappropriate content.
+For GCWiki help contact: webteam [REDACTED] Support page
+
+TWO FACE
+
+From GCWiki
+(Redirected from TWOFACE)
+Jump to: navigation, search
+
+Small gold ndist logo.jpg
+Mtilogo cyberdef whitebg.gif
+
+Logon to PALANTIR OPERATIONAL
+Logon to PALANTIR REF
+Logon to FRACTAL JOKER
+Logon to FRACTAL WEB
+Logon to PENSIVE GIRAFFE
+Logon to LIVE
+Logon to XKEYSCORE Viewer
+
+Contents
+* 1 Vision
+ * 1.1 Targets
+ * 1.1.1 5 Eyes Collaboration
+* 2 Documents
+ * 2.1 How to Guides ...
+ * 2.1.1 Overview
+ * 2.1.2 Current datasources
+ * 2.1.3 Planned datasources
+* 3 Project Details
+ * 3.1 Ontology
+ * 3.2 Contacts
+ * 3.3 Training
+ * 3.4 Task
+ * 3.5 User Base
+ * 3.6 Logon
+* 4 Ontology
+ * 4.1 Requests and new requirements
+ * 4.2 Present Ontology
+* 5 Quick Questions
+
+[edit] Vision
+"To Drive forwards the mission for effective Analysis and Knowledge use for Cyber Defence by providing more efficient complex analysis and sharing of knowledge"
+
+[edit] Targets
+Next Deliveries will be:
+1. Automation of XKS importer
+2. Improve flexible importing of data
+3. Improved QFD Helpers (in no order): AutoAssoc / Social Anthropoid / Infinite Monkeys / Karma Police.
+4. Improve UI performance and look and feel
+
+[edit] 5 Eyes Collaboration
+* CD Target DSD Palantir
+* DSD-GCHQ Palantir Tests
+* SE diagram of the GCHQ - DSD Palantir Link up
+* Cyber Defence Targeting
+
+[edit] Documents
+See Palantir Documents or Online Instance
+
+[edit] How to Guides ...
+These are now starting to be generated so ideas are gratefully received.
+
+1. Getting started
+ 1. How do I...Get Started in Palantir
+ 2. How do I...Use the different entities in Palantir
+ 3. How do I...Get the accounts I need and set up a development environment (DISCOVER link)
+2. Importing X-KEYSCORE into Palantir
+ 1. How do I...Get Data from XKS in Palantir
+ 2. How do I...Select an XKS profile for importing my data
+ 3. How do I...Start an XKS search from Palantir
+ 4. How do I...Find which end is the server in Palantir NEW
+3. Working with data from QFDs
+ 1. How do I...Run Sam Pepys queries in Palantir
+ 2. How do I...Run HrMap queries in Palantir
+ 3. How do I...Run Mutant Broth queries in Palantir
+ 4. How do I...Associate Mutant Broth Presence Events with HRMap Request events in Palantir
+4. Working with the Graph view
+ 1. How do I...See an auto preview of a document or object properties? NEW
+ 2. How do I...Label objects with additional Properties using Bulk Object Editor NEW
+ 3. How do I...View lists of objects NEW
+ 4. How do I...View lists of objects with a given type or Property IN PROGRESS
+ 5. How do I...Change object type NEW
+ 6. How do I...Work with large groups in Palantir
+ 7. How do I...Rapidly find specific Properties in the Histogram IN PROGRESS
+5. Publishing Data
+ 1. How do I...Publish in Palantir NEW
+6. Find and view data within Palantir
+ 1. How do I...Find the Signatures in Palantir
+ 2. How do I...Use RT Tickets In Palantir
+ 3. How do I...Use the Histogram to filter events in Palantir
+ 4. How do I...Get a different view on existing events data in Palantir
+ 5. How do I...Rapidly view large numbers of events in the Browser NEW
+7. Searching
+ 1. How do I...Run a bulk search
+8. Miscellaneous
+ 1. How do I...Run bulk operations over my objects in Palantir
+ 2. How do I...Copy data from Palantir into Excel or Word NEW
+
+[edit] Overview
+This page details the datasources currently available within Palantir as well as other sources of data that are currently in development or planned. For current integration status, see the RTC project for TO120/144
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+Note that this page lists sources of data rather than helpers. For example, GEOFUSION HACIENDA and FOXTRAIL are all accessible through the same helper within Palantir.
+
+[edit] Current datasources
+
+| Datasource | Import method | Under development? | Deployed to PIT? | Deployed to OP? | Notes |
+| :--------- | :------------ | :----------------- | :--------------- | :-------------- | :---- |
+| CROUCHING SQUIRREL | Auto-resync | No | No | Yes | |
+| HALTER HITCH | Auto-resync | No | Yes | Yes | |
+| GEOFUSION | Analyst-driven helper | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
+| HACIENDA | Analyst-driven helper | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
+| FOXTRAIL | Analyst-driven helper | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
+| GORDIAN KNOT | Analyst-driven helper | No | No | No | GK Broke their PKI somehow; requires investigation |
+| XKEYSCORE | Analyst-driven helper | No | Yes | Yes | |
+| SAMUEL PEPYS | Analyst-driven helper | No | Yes | Yes | |
+| MUGSHOT | Analyst-driven helper | Yes | No | No | |
+| RAPID TAPIR | Analyst-driven helper | Yes | No | No | Deployment awaiting data owner OK |
+| NTOC reports | Manual import by analysts | Yes | Yes | Yes | Automation to be investigated |
+| FIVE ALIVE | Analyst-driven helper | No | No | Yes | |
+| GOOGLE FUSION | Tiles for map application | No | Yes | Yes | |
+| TO144-Notepit | Analyst driven external webpage | Yes | Yes | No | |
+| Open source malware info | Auto-Resync | No | Yes | Yes | |
+| INTEGER SPIN | Analyst-driven helper | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
+| HRMAP | Analyst-driven helper | Yes | No | Yes | Too highly classified for PIT |
+| NDIST RT | Auto-resync | Yes | No | No | Too highly classified for PIT |
+| MUTANT BROTH | Analyst-driven helper | Yes | No | No | Too highly classified for PIT |
+| OpenStreetMap | Tiles for map application | No | Yes | Yes | |
+
+[edit] Planned datasources
+
+| Datasource | Notes |
+| :--------- | :---- |
+| DEAD SEA | API needs investigation |
+| MOONRAKER/OBERON | Raptorable datasource |
+| Open source data | TO144 open source data. Some integration work done. |
+| 8ball | Analytic value needs investigation. Some initial scripts written, not deployed anywhere |
+| Global Surge | Highly nocon. Something to pass across to [REDACTED] in TDB? |
+| DISCOVER | Lots of politics required |
+| Oberon | Required for EPR. Needs further discussion with legal/policy |
+
+[edit] Project Details
+
+[edit] Ontology
+[1]
+
+[edit] Contacts
+
+Senior User: [REDACTED]
+SE Lead: [REDACTED]
+PM: [REDACTED]
+Data Owner: [REDACTED]
+Business Change: [REDACTED]
+
+[edit] Training
+Training is currently offered as 1-2-1 desk based training with a Palantir trainer. This gives you the opportunity to quickly apply Palantir to your current work task. If you would like to find out more about training please contact [REDACTED]
+
+[edit] Task
+As part of the Cyber Defence Theme, the strand that was searching for a Knowledge Storage tool. The results of the first part of this strand will be published shortly. As part of this process we determined that we really needed a bit of a kick forward in the technology we use. It was decided to trial Palantir to see what this could do for the business, and more specifically the Cyber Defence Mission. There is part of this strand to understand the gaps in our toolset. (more information here next week)
+
+This page will develop fairly rapidly as we understand how we use the tool. Ontology comes first! (hence it takes up most of this page)
+
+[edit] User Base
+The User base is specifically for CDO and CDL. The Ontology, the data sources, the focus is purely for the Cyber Defence/Network Defence remit. The operationally used version will be locked via PKI to these individuals. However, the development section will have a slightly wider audience. There will be access for people wider than NDIST to help build the understanding throughout the organisation.
+
+[edit] Logon
+Logon site is: Palantir
+
+[edit] Ontology
+Needs more here... Or a link.
+
+[edit] Requests and new requirements
+Please email [REDACTED] for any new requests or requirements. Also worth contacting the Palantir SU [REDACTED] to explain the context and importnace of request.
+
+[edit] Present Ontology
+So as many of the analysts now can access the tool themselves, removing the duplication of having the ontology on the wiki.
+
+[edit] Quick Questions
+This is a quick set of notes on things I get asked a lot:
+
+Is there an IM channel for us to chat informally? yes
+> There is a Jabber channel related to this topic:
+> palantir - palantir-gchq + User informal chat)
+
+Are people outside NDIST going to get Palantir?
+That's a question being answered by Transforming Analysis' CASK project. However, we're helping them by providing access to our Sandbox server, so they can try it without affecting CDO's operational use.
+
+I get a weird error and it won't open when I move desks?
+Yes, this is due to desktop set-up. Return to the launch page, and start from there instead of your local icon.
+
+Why do I have a bunch of burgundy coloured entities on my Graph?
+These are the results of your last search around, if you do another search around they change to normal colours.
+
+How does my team manage the results of our investigations?
+Management of 'investigations' isn't really in Palantir (yet), we are talking with Palantir about producing a solution. At the moment you have to do an investigation of those investigations (if that makes any sense).
+
+Why on import do I have loads of 'connections' as entities?
+Well each of those connections is something you might care about, at the moment it starts at the most information and lets you decrease what you see (select all those connections and 'link merge' to get rid of them). When we smooth out the helpers we will give you the option to swap between 'entity' and 'property'.
+
+Can I do some development in Palantir?
+Sure, just give us a shout at palantir-support-dl about what you want to do and we will try and help.
+
+I get an odd java error on startup (and there is a web-password issues here too)
+Make sure you set your Java settings to: Network Settings > Automatic Proxy > [REDACTED]
+
+My password doesn't work
+On the operational box it's your Corporate Directory password.
+
+But I'm not an NDIST user. What then?
+Email palantir-support-dl
+
+Retrieved from "https://wiki.gchq/index.php/TWO_FACE"
+Category: Palantir
+
+[REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
+* [REDACTED]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/TWO-FACE-GCWiki-Redacted/metadata.json b/data/TWO-FACE-GCWiki-Redacted/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ba4358c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/TWO-FACE-GCWiki-Redacted/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+{
+ "title": "TWO FACE",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "This document describes the GCHQ's TWO FACE project, a part of the Cyber Defence mission, which focuses on enhancing analysis and knowledge sharing tools using Palantir software. It outlines various data sources integrated with Palantir, such as XKEYSCORE and GEOFUSION, and the project's goals to automate and improve data importation, analysis capabilities, and user interface performance. The document also discusses training, user access, and collaboration within the Five Eyes intelligence community, as well as ongoing development to address gaps in existing cyber defense tools.\n\nIt provides detailed instructions for using Palantir's capabilities to analyze and visualize data from multiple sources, with a focus on cyber defense and network defense operations. Key features include handling large datasets, running complex queries, and automating data integration. The document also highlights ongoing improvements, such as the addition of new data sources and the refinement of analytic tools to better support the cyber defense mission.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [
+ "TWO FACE",
+ "XKS",
+ "Jabber",
+ "Five Eyes",
+ "data fusion",
+ "surveillance tools",
+ "NSA collaboration",
+ "DSD",
+ "knowledge management",
+ "database",
+ "NDIST",
+ "analytic tools",
+ "GCWiki",
+ "OPSEC",
+ "intelligence sharing",
+ "malware tracking",
+ "OSINT",
+ "targeting",
+ "automated analysis",
+ "graph analysis",
+ "bulk collection",
+ "surveillance infrastructure",
+ "PKI",
+ "RT tickets",
+ "social network analysis",
+ "intelligence cooperation",
+ "data visualization",
+ "maps",
+ "Google",
+ "OpenStreetMap",
+ "query database",
+ "histogram filtering"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "GCHQ",
+ "date_created": "",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "STRAP 1",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "banner": "TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT",
+ "genre": "wiki",
+ "programs": [
+ "TWOFACE",
+ "PALANTIR",
+ "FRACTALJOKER",
+ "FRACTALWEB",
+ "PENSIVEGIRAFFE",
+ "XKEYSCORE",
+ "LIVE",
+ "AUTOASSOC",
+ "SOCIALANTHROPOID",
+ "INFINITEMONKEYS",
+ "KARMAPOLICE",
+ "SAMPEPYS",
+ "HRMAP",
+ "MUTANTBROTH",
+ "GEOFUSION",
+ "HACIENDA",
+ "FOXTRAIL",
+ "CROUCHINGSQUIRREL",
+ "PITCHFORD",
+ "HALTERHITCH",
+ "GORDIANKNOT",
+ "SAMUELPEPYS",
+ "MUGSHOT",
+ "RAPIDTAPIR",
+ "FIVEALIVE",
+ "GOOGLEFUSION",
+ "INTEGERSPIN",
+ "HRMAP",
+ "DEADSEA",
+ "MOONRAKER",
+ "OBERON",
+ "DISCOVER",
+ "8BALL",
+ "CASK"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2017-02-22",
+ "title": "How Peter Thiel’s Palantir Helped the NSA Spy on the Whole World",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2017/02/22/how-peter-thiels-palantir-helped-the-nsa-spy-on-the-whole-world/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Biddle, Sam"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [
+ "Thomason, John",
+ "Cooper, Talya"
+ ],
+ "doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2017/02/22/two-face-on-gchq-wiki/",
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/3469344/TWO-FACE-GCWiki-Redacted.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "607b9d4d9ee98929c611561ed03d16e451bd1b69c5a4e724831365f8a58b8de7",
+ "pages": 5
+}
diff --git a/data/Tailored-Access-Operations-2007/Tailored-Access-Operations-2007.md b/data/Tailored-Access-Operations-2007/Tailored-Access-Operations-2007.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..777e136
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/Tailored-Access-Operations-2007/Tailored-Access-Operations-2007.md
@@ -0,0 +1,374 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
+
+CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICES
+UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
+
+# Development
+
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20070108
+Declassify On: 20360401
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
+
+Telecommunications Network Technologies
+
+This Briefing is Classified TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN
+
+## Tailored Access Operations
+
+This Briefing is Classified TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN
+
+DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSS Manual 1-52, Dated: 20070108, Declassify On: 20320108
+
+IOEC1000
+
+---
+
+SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+## TAO Mission
+
+* Sustain a deep, persistent, and pervasive presence on critical target networks
+* Rapidly penetrate and track the communications of high-value individuals
+* Continually execute CNE; support CNA and CND
+ * CNE: Exploit networks for foreign intelligence
+ * CNA: Provide access and capabilities to support authorized network attacks
+ * CND: Hunt foreign cyber actors on foreign networks
+ * Deconflict DoD CNO with IC/Foreign partners
+* Build the techniques, tools and infrastructure required
+ * Subvert endpoint devices
+ * Servers, workstations, firewalls, routers, handsets, phone switches, SCADA systems, etc.
+ * Covertly communicate with implants in target networks
+ * Automate CNE operations and maintenance of a large number of accesses
+
+Aggressively Scale CNO Capabilities and Operations
+
+SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+## TAO Organization
+
+TAO
+
+* Requirements & Targeting
+ * Manage ops requirements
+ * Perform target development
+* Remote Operations Center
+ * Conduct On-net ops (exploit, collect, geo-locate)
+* Data Network Technologies
+ * Develop operational concepts and software implants to exploit computer networks
+* Telecommunications Network Technologies
+ * Develop operational concepts and software implants to exploit phone switches
+ * Develop network warfare capabilities
+ * Network shaping
+* Access Technologies & Operations
+ * Conduct physical access (off-net) operations
+ * Conduct expeditionary CNO
+ * Develop hardware and firmware implants to access isolated or complex networks
+* Mission Infrastructure Technologies
+ * Design, development and delivery of the end-to end infrastructure that supports GENIE operations
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+---
+
+## Access Technology & Operations
+
+* conducts global off-net operations with HUMINT partners to develop and deploy technology that enables on-net operations targeting high priority target networks and individuals.
+* works closely with development organizations to create technical and operational solutions using specialized TAO hardware and software tools that are tailored to each mission and opportunity.
+* bring unique talents to gaining access to intelligence when conventional collection methods prove ineffective.
+* The diverse skill sets that ATO personnel bring to the mission leverages the support of our HUMINT partners, unique access, and sophisticated tools and techniques that provide physical access to networks and communications.
+
+---
+
+## Access & Target Development
+
+* (S//SI) Develop deep understanding of target communication techniques and practices of target entities with goal of identifying vulnerabilities that can be exploited via physical access.
+* Define and develop physical access strategies, aligned to national requirements and TAO priorities, with emphasis on hard targets and isolated networks.
+* Build and maintain significant relationships within the HUMINT community necessary for achieving access.
+* Drive resulting operations to achieve end-to-end SIGINT successes.
+
+---
+
+## Access Technology & Operations
+
+### Field Operations
+
+(TS//SI//REL) The Field Operations Division is responsible for the developing and deploying customized SIGINT collection and data exfiltration solutions that enable remote network operations by gaining access to isolated target networks. The Division is also responsible for maintaining access to selected targets, exploring methods of enhancing the value from existing access, efficiently managing sustained operations, and working closely with the FBI and other HUMINT partners to plan and conduct operations.
+
+### Expeditionary Access Operations (EAO)
+
+(TS//SI//REL TO USA FVEY) S3283 is the expeditionary arm of TAO which conducts worldwide Human-Enabled Close Access Cyber Operations to satisfy National and Tactical SIGINT access requirements.
+
+### Access and Target Development
+
+(S//SI) Develop deep understanding of target communication techniques and practices of target entities with goal of identifying vulnerabilities that can be exploited via physical access. Define and develop physical access strategies, aligned to national requirements and TAO priorities, with emphasis on hard targets and isolated networks. Build and maintain significant relationships within the HUMINT community necessary for achieving access. Drive resulting operations to achieve end-to-end SIGINT successes.
+
+### Persistence Divison
+
+(U//FOUO) The Persistence Division (S3285) conceives, develops, tests, and integrates sophisticated firmware and software-based capabilities and techniques to directly support three of Tailored Access Operations' (TAO's) mission technology focus areas: Persistence - IT/GEO - Computer Network Attack (TS//SI//REL FVEY) These firmware and software techniques are remotely deployable to target devices via a network connection or by physical interdiction. Regardless of the deployment methodology, these highly developed accesses operate covertly without any indication of their presence and provide TAO with unique and advanced capabilities that directly support NSA and its other Intelligence Community partners with some of their most significant successes.
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## Telecom Network Technologies
+
+* Providing logically intrusive methods of manipulating or extracting data from telecommunications networks.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET // COMINT // X1
+
+## TNT Mission:
+
+"Define, design, develop, & test, logically intrusive methods of manipulating & extracting data from telecommunication networks, public infrastructures, and public broadcasting networks - and supporting enabling efforts, remote operations, initial deployments, and information operations."
+
+```
+Fixed Satellite Systems
+Global Information Network
+PSTN
+Satcom Gateways
+Packet Data & Voice
+Control Links
+Tactical Comms
+GSMC
+MSC
+BSC
+BTS
+Abis
+Servers
+GPS
+Internet / Intranets
+Cellular Switches PBX
+Routers
+Pagers
+Telephones
+Modems
+FAX
+```
+
+TOP SECRET // COMINT //
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET // COMINT // X1
+
+## Targeted Technologies:
+
+* Telephony:
+ * VOIP - Voice Over Internet Protocol
+ * ISDN - Integrated Services Digital Network
+ * GSM - Global Systems for Mobile Communications
+ * GPRS - General Packet Radio Service
+ * 3G - 3rd Generation Mobile Telephony
+ * SMS - Short Messaging Service
+ * MMS - Multimedia Messaging Service
+ * SDH - Synchronous Digital Hierarchy
+* Facilities & Infrastructure:
+ * Data communications standards (ITU & IEEE)
+* Broadcast:
+ * ITU standards for digital video communications
+
+TOP SECRET // COMINT //
+
+---
+
+## CBND Overview
+
+* Control Platforms Branch
+ * Large Scale SCADA Energy Management Systems (EMSs)
+ * Vendors
+ * Siemens
+ * Areva
+ * ABB
+* Control Devices Branch
+ * Substation SCADA Technologies
+ * Technologies
+ * Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs)
+ * Intelligent Relays
+* Video Technologies Branch
+ * Video Teleconferencing Systems (VTCs)
+ * Personal Video Technologies
+ * Webcams
+ * Internet Chat (Skype, etc)
+
+---
+
+## Project Descriptions
+
+* OPERATIONAL
+ * GSM implants deployed in several target networks
+ * Geolocation tools used with great success
+ * Metadata and other voice collection tools
+* DEVELOPMENT
+ * GPRS and UMTS
+* STRATEGIC EFFORTS
+ * IP exfiltration
+ * Enabling passive SIGINT collection
+
+---
+
+## VND Overview
+
+* Enterprise Telephony
+ * Private Branch Exchanges (PBXs)
+ * VoiceMail Systems
+ * Network Management Systems
+ * Technologies
+ * SIP, H.323, SCCP
+ * Linux & Windows development platforms
+ * C, Assembly, Perl/Python
+ * Ghidra, IDA Pro, JTAG for reverse engineering
+* Transport Services
+ * SDH, SONET Multiplexers
+ * ATM Routers
+ * Technologies
+ * SDH, SONET, ATM
+ * Linux & Windows development platforms
+ * C, Assembly, Java
+ * Ghidra, IDA Pro, JTAG for reverse engineering
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## Data Network Technologies
+
+* Providing the software-based capabilities needed to surreptitiously exploit computer networks and the technology needed to covertly pass endpoint access commands and data across public networks to support endpoint operations.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+## Data Network Technologies
+
+### Access Division, S3231
+
+(TS//SI) The Chief, Access Division is responsible to the Chief, Data Net-work Technologies Office to develop access to targets of interest to NSA. The Access Division focuses on developing remote access techniques and tools, ensuring continued remote access through the deployment of tools via remote or human assets, and assisting with remote access operations under the authority of the Remote Operations Center. The Access Division will act as the front door for DNT-wide efforts. The techniques developed should be scalable, automatable, and robust.
+
+### Network Technology Division, S3235
+
+(S//SI//REL) The Chief, Network Technology Division is responsible to the Chief, Data Network Technologies Office for the development of tools and techniques to exploit components on global and private networks supporting endpoint operations.
+
+### Computer Technology Division, S3234
+
+(TS//SI) The Chief, Computer Technology Division is responsible to the Chief, Data Networks Technologies Office for collection against target networks. The Computer Technology Division focuses on the development of software implants, automation, and control tools to support endpoint operations.
+
+### Cyber Networks Technology Division, S3232
+
+(TS//SI) The Chief, Cyber Networks Technology Division (CNTD) is responsible to the Chief, Data Net-work Technologies Office to develop and deploy logically intrusive, software-based, end-point access techniques to enable Computer Network Operations (CNO) across multiple target operating systems and platforms. CNTD's purpose is to collect or enable collection of data for Foreign Intelligence and Operational Information and to include support to Information Operations.
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+## Data Network Technologies
+
+## Cyber Network Technologies Division (CNTD)
+
+* Mission:
+ * (TS//SI//NF) Develop and deploy logically intrusive, software-based, end-point access techniques to enable Computer Network Operations (CNO).
+* Purpose:
+ * (TS//SI//NF) Collect or enable collection of data for Foreign Intelligence and Operational Information, to include support to Information Operations.
+* The Bottom Line
+ * (TS//SI//NF) "Provide the War-fighter with a world class capability for computer network attacks and counter-computer network exploitations".
+ * (TS//SI//NF) Develop mission applications that Deny, Destroy, Degrade, Disrupt, Manipulate, Mislead, and Collect against enemy targets.
+ * (TS//SI//NF) Design and develop techniques that enable stealthy sustained operation of our mission applications on target.
+ * (TS//SI//NF) Accomplish the above points across many target operating systems and platforms.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+## CNTD Overview
+
+### Acquisitions and Evaluations Branch (AEB)
+
+* Search for or identify opportunities to purchase tools and their source code
+* Validate, prioritize opportunities with appropriate development organization
+* Acquire tools and their source code, provide in-depth evaluation to accurately assess the tools functionality
+* Productize tools by modifying/developing for OPSEC, tradecraft, integration, testing with other TAO capabilities in order to meet operational requirements.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+## Methodology
+
+```
++--------------------------+
+| Prioritization |
++--------------------------+
+| - Customer Requirements |
+| - Rogue Nations Systems |
+| - Intel Assessments |
+| - Toolbox Diversity |
+| - Research |
++--------------------------+
+ |
+ |
+ v
++--------------------------+ +--------------------------+
+| Acquisition |<--------| Sources |
++--------------------------+ +--------------------------+
+ | | - Industry |
+ v | - Academia |
++--------------------------+ | - NTOC, ANO, TAO |
+| Evaluation | | - Services |
++--------------------------+ | - CNO Community Agencies,|
+ | | Partners |
+ v +--------------------------+
++--------------------------+
+| Productized/Integration |<-----------(Code Modifications)
++--------------------------+
+ |
+ v
++--------------------------+
+| Testing |
++--------------------------+
+ |
+ v
++--------------------------+ +--------------------------+
+| Release |-------->| ROC Submission |
++--------------------------+ +--------------------------+
+```
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+## CNTD Overview
+
+### Forensics and Engineering Branch (FEB)
+
+* Mission:
+ * (TS//SI//NF) Evaluate, Reverse Engineer, Exploit, and Repurpose software for use in CNE, CCNE and CNA operations.
+* Purpose:
+ * (TS//SI//NF) Reverse engineer and evaluate software from malware, nation-state, and commercial sources for the purpose of identifying tradecraft signatures and vulnerabilities.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+## Questions???
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/Tailored-Access-Operations-2007/metadata.json b/data/Tailored-Access-Operations-2007/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d894f6c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/Tailored-Access-Operations-2007/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
+{
+ "title": "Tailored Access Operations 2007",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "This NSA document describes the Tailored Access Operations (TAO) division, which conducts sophisticated cyber operations to penetrate and maintain persistent access to target networks globally through both remote exploits and physical interdiction methods. The presentation outlines TAO's organizational structure, mission capabilities across telecommunications and data networks, development of hardware/software implants for devices ranging from servers to SCADA systems, collaboration with HUMINT partners for physical access operations, and specialized divisions focused on exploiting telephony systems, computer networks, and developing tools for computer network attack and exploitation.",
+ "long_description": "This NSA presentation reveals the sprawling infrastructure of Tailored Access Operations (TAO), the agency's elite hacking unit tasked with penetrating the world's most sensitive computer networks and telecommunications systems. TAO's mission, stated with remarkable candor, is to \"sustain a deep, persistent, and pervasive presence on critical target networks\" and to \"aggressively scale\" its capabilities for computer network operations (CNO). The document lays bare the agency's ambitions to subvert virtually every category of network device—servers, workstations, routers, phone switches, even industrial control systems—through a combination of remote software exploits and physical interdiction operations conducted in partnership with human intelligence operatives.\n\nThe organizational chart reveals a sophisticated division of labor spanning multiple specialized branches. The Telecommunications Network Technologies (TNT) group develops methods to manipulate phone networks including GSM, 3G, and VoIP systems, while also targeting SCADA energy management systems and video communications platforms. Meanwhile, the Data Network Technologies (DNT) division focuses on developing software implants and remote access techniques for computers, with explicit missions to \"Deny, Destroy, Degrade, Disrupt, Manipulate, Mislead, and Collect against enemy targets.\" The Access Technologies & Operations unit (ATO) conducts \"expeditionary\" physical access operations worldwide, working with FBI and international intelligence partners to deploy hardware implants when remote hacking proves insufficient. The Persistence Division specializes in firmware-level compromises that survive system reinstalls and operate \"covertly without any indication of their presence.\"\n\nWhat emerges is a portrait of an intelligence apparatus that has moved far beyond targeted surveillance of specific threats into wholesale compromise of global communications infrastructure. The document's references to automation, scalability, and maintaining \"a large number of accesses\" suggest mass exploitation capabilities rather than precision intelligence gathering. TAO's collaboration with Five Eyes partners (USA, UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) indicates these capabilities are shared among allied intelligence agencies. The casual discussion of computer network attack capabilities alongside intelligence collection blurs the line between espionage and offensive cyber warfare, while the targeting of industrial control systems and energy management platforms raises profound questions about whether these tools could be weaponized against civilian infrastructure. The presentation's matter-of-fact tone about subverting the security of telecommunications networks and \"public infrastructures\" reveals an agency operating with virtually no technical or ethical constraints.",
+ "tags": [
+ "Tailored Access Operations",
+ "Computer Network Exploitation",
+ "Computer Network Attack",
+ "offensive cyber operations",
+ "Five Eyes",
+ "FVEY",
+ "intelligence sharing",
+ "network penetration",
+ "supply chain attacks",
+ "persistent access",
+ "persistent malware",
+ "remote operations",
+ "remote access",
+ "Remote Operations Center",
+ "software implants",
+ "hardware implants",
+ "firmware exploitation",
+ "endpoint access",
+ "network compromise",
+ "telecommunications espionage",
+ "phone switches",
+ "GSM",
+ "3G networks",
+ "GPRS",
+ "UMTS",
+ "VoIP exploitation",
+ "ISDN",
+ "SMS interception",
+ "MMS",
+ "geolocation",
+ "metadata collection",
+ "scada",
+ "industrial control systems",
+ "energy",
+ "critical infrastructure",
+ "Siemens",
+ "Areva",
+ "ABB",
+ "programmable logic controllers",
+ "PLC",
+ "intelligent relays",
+ "substation SCADA",
+ "video teleconference",
+ "webcams",
+ "Skype",
+ "physical access",
+ "interdiction",
+ "off-net",
+ "on-net operations",
+ "humint",
+ "fbi",
+ "expeditionary operations",
+ "covert access",
+ "Close Access Operations",
+ "isolated network",
+ "hard targets",
+ "Data Network Technologies",
+ "DNT",
+ "Telecommunications Network Technologies",
+ "TNT",
+ "Access Technologies Operations",
+ "ATO",
+ "Mission Infrastructure Technologies",
+ "Persistence Division",
+ "firmware implants",
+ "software-based capabilities",
+ "reverse engineering",
+ "malware development",
+ "zero-day exploits",
+ "vulnerability exploitation",
+ "vulnerabilities",
+ "network shaping",
+ "traffic shaping",
+ "target development",
+ "requirements targeting",
+ "GENIE operations",
+ "automated exploitation",
+ "scalable operations",
+ "bulk collection",
+ "Computer Technology Division",
+ "Network Technology Division",
+ "Cyber Networks Technology Division",
+ "CNTD",
+ "Access Division",
+ "Forensics Engineering Branch",
+ "FEB",
+ "Acquisitions Evaluations Branch",
+ "AEB",
+ "exploits",
+ "nation-state malware",
+ "tradecraft signatures",
+ "OPSEC",
+ "stealthy operations",
+ "sustained access",
+ "data exfiltration",
+ "intelligence collection",
+ "foreign intelligence",
+ "private branch exchanges",
+ "PBX",
+ "voicemail systems",
+ "SIP",
+ "H.323",
+ "SCCP",
+ "Linux",
+ "Windows",
+ "SDH exploitation",
+ "SONET",
+ "ATM routers",
+ "multiplexers",
+ "transport services",
+ "enterprise telephony",
+ "cell phones",
+ "mobile phones",
+ "Ghidra",
+ "IDA Pro",
+ "JTAG",
+ "assembly language",
+ "C programming",
+ "Python",
+ "Perl",
+ "Java",
+ "target networks",
+ "High Value Individuals",
+ "high-value targets",
+ "target tracking",
+ "communications monitoring",
+ "network warfare capabilities",
+ "Computer Network Defense",
+ "cyber threat",
+ "foreign networks",
+ "DoD",
+ "intelligence community",
+ "IC partners",
+ "international collaboration",
+ "SAOSSM",
+ "telecommunications infrastructure",
+ "public infrastructure compromise",
+ "broadcast",
+ "satellite",
+ "PSTN",
+ "data packet",
+ "voice control",
+ "cellular switches",
+ "routers",
+ "servers",
+ "GPS",
+ "Internet exploitation",
+ "intranet",
+ "modems",
+ "fax interception",
+ "pagers",
+ "telephony",
+ "mobile communications",
+ "ITU standards",
+ "standards exploitation",
+ "IEEE standards",
+ "digital video",
+ "SDH technology",
+ "collection tools",
+ "voice intercept",
+ "IP exfiltration",
+ "passive SIGINT",
+ "strategic intelligence",
+ "information operations",
+ "IO support",
+ "deny destroy degrade disrupt",
+ "manipulation",
+ "misleading operations",
+ "multi-platform exploitation",
+ "operating system exploitation",
+ "cross-platform tools",
+ "mission applications",
+ "warfighter support",
+ "enemy targets",
+ "counter-exploitation",
+ "CCNE",
+ "tool productization",
+ "intelligence assessment",
+ "toolbox diversity",
+ "research and development",
+ "industry sources",
+ "academia",
+ "NTOC",
+ "ANO",
+ "services collaboration",
+ "CNO community",
+ "partner agency",
+ "evaluation",
+ "prioritization",
+ "tradecraft",
+ "vulnerability research",
+ "exploit development"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2007-01-08",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL"
+ ],
+ "banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL",
+ "genre": "slides",
+ "programs": [
+ "ATM",
+ "GENIE"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2019-01-24",
+ "title": "Everybody Does It: The Messy Truth About Infiltrating Computer Supply Chains",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2019/01/24/computer-supply-chain-attacks/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Lee, Micah",
+ "Moltke, Henrik"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2019/01/24/tailored-access-operations-2007/",
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/5691431/Tailored-Access-Operations-2007.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "418c4dac4a2a76e9686e64874c753686480266ab9d0d8232c5990ed5eb7585d3",
+ "pages": 20
+}
diff --git a/data/Tailored_Access_Operations-FOXACID-QUANTUM-Spiegel/Tailored_Access_Operations-FOXACID-QUANTUM-Spiegel.md b/data/Tailored_Access_Operations-FOXACID-QUANTUM-Spiegel/Tailored_Access_Operations-FOXACID-QUANTUM-Spiegel.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4afcd1f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/Tailored_Access_Operations-FOXACID-QUANTUM-Spiegel/Tailored_Access_Operations-FOXACID-QUANTUM-Spiegel.md
@@ -0,0 +1,382 @@
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+# Tailored Access Operations
+
+Texas Cryptologic Center
+NSA/CSS TEXAS
+
+* [REDACTED] - TAO
+* [REDACTED] - SSG
+* [REDACTED] - TAO / R&T
+
+tao inside
+
+OVERALL CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL to USA,FVEY
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+SPIEGEL ONLINE
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT/NOFORN
+
+## FOXACID
+
+ROC
+
+```
+SPAM
+made with FOX
+packed with ACID
+
+ACID
+Nutrition Facts
+Serving Size: A Pack
+Amount Per Serving
+Calories D
+% Daily Value
+Total Fur 10g 20%
+Sadism 4 whacks 51%
+Total Crap 10g 100%
+not a significant source
+of other nutrients
+PLEASE RECYCLE
+POOP IN YOUR GARDEN
+```
+
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20070108
+Declassify On: 20291123
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT/NOFORN
+
+SPIEGEL ONLINE
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+# What is QUANTUM?
+
+QUANTUM Generic Animation – High Level of How It Works
+
+* Target
+* Internet Router
+* Yahoo's Web Server
+* SSO Site
+
+SDS
+Booz | Allen | Hamilton
+SIGINT | Development | Support
+Team
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+4
+SPIEGEL ONLINE
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## What is QUANTUM?
+
+QUANTUM Generic Animation - High Level of How It Works
+
+1. Target logs into his Yahoo account
+* Target
+* Internet Router
+* Yahoo's Web Server
+* SSO Site
+
+SDS
+Booz | Allen | Hamilton
+SIGINT | Development | Support
+Team
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+4
+SPIEGEL ONLINE
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## What is QUANTUM?
+
+QUANTUM Generic Animation - High Level of How It Works
+
+1. Target logs into his Yahoo account
+* Target
+* Internet Router
+* Yahoo's Web Server
+* SSO Site
+2. SSO site sees the QUANTUM tasked Yahoo selector's packet and forwards it to TAO's FOXACID Server
+
+SDS
+Booz | Allen | Hamilton
+SIGINT | Development | Support
+Team
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+4
+SPIEGEL ONLINE
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## What is QUANTUM?
+
+QUANTUM Generic Animation - High Level of How It Works
+
+* Target
+* Internet Router
+* SSO Site
+* Yahoo's Web Server
+* NSA TAO FOXACID Server
+4. Yahoo server receives the packet requesting email content
+3. FOXACID injects a FOXACID url into the packet and sends it back to the target's computer
+
+SDS
+Booz | Allen | Hamilton
+SIGINT | Development | Support
+Team
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+4
+SPIEGEL ONLINE
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## What is QUANTUM?
+
+QUANTUM Generic Animation - High Level of How It Works
+
+* Target
+5. FOXACID packet beats the Yahoo packet back to the endpoint
+* Internet Router
+* SSO Site
+* Yahoo's Web Server
+* NSA TAO FOXACID Server
+
+SDS
+Booz | Allen | Hamilton
+SIGINT | Development | Support
+Team
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+4
+SPIEGEL ONLINE
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## What is QUANTUM?
+
+QUANTUM Generic Animation - High Level of How It Works
+
+* Target
+6. The target's Yahoo webpage is loaded but in the background the FOXACID URL loads which redirects to the FOXACID Exploit Server
+* Internet Router
+* SSO Site
+* Yahoo's Web Server
+* NSA TAO FOXACID Server
+
+SDS
+Booz | Allen | Hamilton
+SIGINT | Development | Support
+Team
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+4
+SPIEGEL ONLINE
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## What is QUANTUM?
+
+QUANTUM Generic Animation – High Level of How It Works
+
+* Target
+* Internet Router
+* SSO Site
+* Yahoo's Web Server
+* NSA TAO FOXACID Server
+7. If the browser is exploitable and the PSP is safe, FOXACID deploys a Stage 1 implant back to the target
+
+SDS
+Booz | Allen | Hamilton
+SIGINT | Development | Support
+Team
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+4
+SPIEGEL ONLINE
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## What is QUANTUM?
+
+QUANTUM Generic Animation - High Level of How It Works
+
+* Target
+* Target Implanted!
+* Internet Router
+* SSO Site
+* Yahoo's Web Server
+* NSA TAO FOXACID Server
+7. If the browser is exploitable and the PSP is safe, FOXACID deploys a Stage 1 implant back to the target
+
+SDS
+Booz | Allen | Hamilton
+SIGINT | Development | Support
+Team
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+4
+SPIEGEL ONLINE
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+## QUANTUM Capabilities – NSA
+
+(TS//SI//REL) NSA QUANTUM has the greatest success against , , and Static IP Addresses. New QUANTUM realms are often changing, so check the GO QUANTUM wiki page or the QUANTUM SpySpace page to get more up-to-date news.
+
+NSA QUANTUM is capable of targeting the following realms:
+
+* IPv4_public
+* alibabaForumUser
+* doubleclickID
+* emailAddr
+* rocketmail
+* hi5Uid
+* hotmailCID
+* linkedin
+* mail
+* mailruMrcu
+* msnMailToken64
+* mailruMrcu
+* msnMailToken64
+* qq
+* facebook
+* simbarUuid
+* twitter
+* yahoo
+* yahooBcookie
+* ymail
+* youTube
+* WatcherID
+
+SDS
+Booz | Allen | Hamilton
+SIGINT | Development | Support
+Team
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+5
+SPIEGEL ONLINE
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+## QUANTUMTHEORY – GCHQ
+
+If a Partnering Agreement Form (PAF) is set up with GCHQ for the CNO project, then the R&T Analyst can utilize GCHQ QUANTUMTHEORY to include additional capabilities such as:
+
+* ALIBABA
+* BEBO_EMAIL
+* FACEBOOK_CUSER
+* GMAIL
+* HOTMAIL
+* MAIL_RU
+* MICROSOFT_ANONA
+* RADIUS
+* TWITTER
+* YAHOO_L/Y
+* YOUTUBE
+* AOL
+* DOUBLE_CLICK
+* GOOGLE_PREFID
+* HI5
+* LINKEDIN
+* MICROSOFT_MUID
+* RAMBLER
+* SIMBAR
+* YAHOO_B
+* YANDEX_EMAIL
+* IP Address
+
+More information on: https://wiki.gchq/[REDACTED]/QUANTUM_BISCUIT
+If you cannot get to the link try: http://[REDACTED]
+
+SDS
+Booz | Allen | Hamilton
+SIGINT | Development | Support
+Team
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+16
+SPIEGEL ONLINE
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//MR
+
+## VALIDATOR
+
+VALIDATOR is a part of a backdoor access system under the FOXACID project. The VALIDATOR is a client/server-based system that provides unique backdoor access to personal computers of targets of national interest, including but not limited to terrorist targets. VALIDATOR is a small Trojan implant used as a back door against a variety of targeted Windows systems, which can be deployed remotely or via hands on access to any Windows box from Windows 98 through Windows Server 2003. The LP is on-line 24/7 and tasking is 'queued', that is, jobs sit in a queue waiting for the target to 'call home', then the job(s) are sent one at a time to the target for it to process them. Commands are Put a file, get a file, Put, then execute a file, get system information, change VALIDATOR ID, and Remove itself. VALIDATOR's are deployed to targeted systems and contact their Listening Post (LP) (each VALIDATOR is given a specific unique ID, specific IP address to call home to it's LP); SEPI analysts validate the target's identity and location (USSID-18 check), then provide a deployment list to Olympus operators to load a more sophisticated Trojan implant (currently OLYMPUS, future UNITEDRAKE). An OLYMPUS operator then queue up commands for the specific VALIDATOR ID's given by SEPI. Process repeats itself. Once target is hooked with the more sophisticated implant, VALIDATOR operators tend to cease. On occasion, operators are instructed by SEPI or the SWO to have VAIDATOR delete itself.
+
+SPIEGEL ONLINE
+
+---
+
+## OLYMPUSFIRE
+
+OLYMPUSFIRE is an exploitation system that uses a software implant on a Microsoft Windows based target PC to gain complete access to the targeted PC. The target, when connected to the Internet, will contact a Listening Post (LP) located at an NSA/USSS facilities, which is online 24/7, and get its commands automatically. These commands include directory listings, retrieving files, performing netmaps, etc. The results of the commands are then returned to the LP, where the data is collected and forwarded to CES and analysis and production elements.
+
+* ONTARGET COVERT CONNECTIVITY
+* FORESTPLACE COVERT CONNECTIVITY
+* Listening Post 2
+* Listening Post 3
+* Listening Post 4
+* Listening Post 7
+* Listening Post 5
+* Listening Post 6
+* Listening Post 8
+* Cisco 24-Port Switch
+* Cisco 24-Port Switch
+* Cisco 24-Port Switch
+* Cisco 24-Port Switch
+* Workstation
+* Workstation
+* Workstation
+* Workstation
+* Workstation
+* Workstation
+* Workstation
+* Workstation
+* Workstation
+* Workstation
+
+SPIEGEL ONLINE
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/Tailored_Access_Operations-FOXACID-QUANTUM-Spiegel/metadata.json b/data/Tailored_Access_Operations-FOXACID-QUANTUM-Spiegel/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8f489ab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/Tailored_Access_Operations-FOXACID-QUANTUM-Spiegel/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
+{
+ "title": "Tailored Access Operations, FOXACID, QUANTUM",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "These NSA presentation slides detail \"QUANTUM,\" a sophisticated system that allows the agency to intercept internet traffic and inject malware onto target computers with up to 80% success rates, far exceeding traditional spam-based methods. The system works by monitoring internet traffic for specific identifiers (like Yahoo or Facebook cookies), then racing to inject malicious code before legitimate web servers can respond, thereby compromising targets' computers without their knowledge and establishing persistent backdoor access.",
+ "long_description": "The QUANTUM system represents one of the NSA's most powerful and invasive capabilities for compromising computers worldwide, operating through what amounts to a parallel shadow internet infrastructure dedicated to surveillance and attack operations. The system achieves success rates of up to 80 percent—a dramatic improvement over the less than 1 percent success rate of traditional spam-based exploitation methods. QUANTUM works by continuously monitoring internet traffic at strategic interception points where the NSA and its Five Eyes partners have access, scanning for specific digital markers like email addresses, cookies from services like Yahoo and Facebook, or static IP addresses belonging to target individuals or organizations. Once a target's identifier is detected, the system springs into automated action, leveraging the NSA's privileged position within the global telecommunications infrastructure to execute man-on-the-side attacks.\n\nThe technical execution of a QUANTUM attack reveals the stunning sophistication of NSA capabilities. When a target attempts to access a legitimate website—say, logging into their Yahoo email account—the QUANTUM system detects this request as it travels through monitored network infrastructure. In a race measured in milliseconds, the system activates a FOXACID exploitation server that attempts to inject itself between the target and the legitimate destination. The FOXACID server sends a malicious response that arrives at the target's computer before the legitimate response from Yahoo's actual servers, exploiting browser vulnerabilities (particularly in Microsoft Internet Explorer) to silently install backdoor software like VALIDATOR. The target sees only their normal Yahoo page loading, completely unaware that their computer has been compromised. This initial implant then serves as a foothold for deploying more sophisticated malware like OLYMPUS or the future UNITEDRAKE, giving NSA operators complete control over the infected machine—the ability to steal files, activate webcams, capture screenshots, map surrounding networks, and essentially surveil everything the target does on their computer.\n\nDocuments reveal that GCHQ used QUANTUM methods to compromise the Belgian telecommunications company Belgacom, while the NSA targeted OPEC (the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries), mobile billing companies like Mach, and the consortium operating the Sea-Me-We 4 undersea cable system connecting Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. The system can exploit identifiers from an extensive list of online services including Yahoo, Facebook, Hotmail, LinkedIn, YouTube, Twitter, Gmail (via GCHQ partnership), AOL, and even Russian services like Yandex and Mail.ru. By 2013, the NSA maintained at least 85,000 \"presence points\"—compromised computers and network devices—ranging from individual desktops to infrastructure belonging to corporations and telecommunications providers. This infrastructure represents not just an intelligence collection system but an offensive cyber warfare capability that blurs the line between espionage and attack.",
+ "tags": [
+ "Tailored Access Operations",
+ "Computer Network Exploitation",
+ "MITM",
+ "packet injection",
+ "traffic interception",
+ "malware deployment",
+ "exploitation",
+ "browser exploitation",
+ "Internet Explorer",
+ "vulnerabilities",
+ "Microsoft vulnerabilities",
+ "backdoors",
+ "implants",
+ "RAT",
+ "persistent access",
+ "presence points",
+ "cookie tracking",
+ "cookies",
+ "web cookies",
+ "Yahoo",
+ "Facebook",
+ "email interception",
+ "web traffic analysis",
+ "passive collection",
+ "active injection",
+ "payload injection",
+ "exploit servers",
+ "listening post",
+ "covert communications",
+ "automated exploitation",
+ "real-time interception",
+ "network compromise",
+ "telecommunications interception",
+ "SSO",
+ "internet surveillance",
+ "global surveillance",
+ "mass exploitation",
+ "target identification",
+ "selector tasking",
+ "email addresses",
+ "static IP addresses",
+ "IPv4",
+ "Hotmail",
+ "LinkedIn",
+ "YouTube",
+ "Twitter",
+ "Gmail",
+ "Google",
+ "AOL",
+ "Yandex",
+ "Mail.ru",
+ "DoubleClick",
+ "web forums",
+ "forums",
+ "alibaba",
+ "QQ messenger",
+ "simbar",
+ "MSN",
+ "rocketmail",
+ "Hi5",
+ "telecommunications companies",
+ "millisecond attacks",
+ "race condition",
+ "speed advantage",
+ "network positioning",
+ "strategic interception",
+ "traffic analysis",
+ "implant deployment",
+ "Remote Operations Center",
+ "7 operations",
+ "command queuing",
+ "file exfiltration",
+ "system information gathering",
+ "webcams",
+ "screenshots",
+ "network mapping",
+ "netmap",
+ "directory servers",
+ "file retrieval",
+ "Windows exploitation",
+ "Windows Server",
+ "Microsoft Windows",
+ "PSP checks",
+ "browser fingerprinting",
+ "identity management",
+ "location verification",
+ "SEPI analysts",
+ "Olympus operators",
+ "implant lifecycle",
+ "surveillance infrastructure",
+ "Cisco",
+ "switches",
+ "botnet takeover",
+ "software manipulation",
+ "download interception",
+ "upload manipulation",
+ "connection hijacking",
+ "connection redirection",
+ "botnets",
+ "Computer Network Attack",
+ "Computer Network Operations",
+ "offensive cyber operations",
+ "deny destroy degrade disrupt",
+ "target networks",
+ "high-value targets",
+ "High Value Individuals",
+ "automation",
+ "success rates",
+ "80 percent success",
+ "parallel internet",
+ "shadow network",
+ "attack infrastructure",
+ "Texas Cryptologic Center",
+ "Requirements and Targeting",
+ "R&T analysts",
+ "SpySpace",
+ "realm targeting",
+ "PAF",
+ "partnership",
+ "GCHQ collaboration",
+ "CNO projects",
+ "exploit development",
+ "vulnerability research",
+ "zero-day exploits",
+ "silent compromise",
+ "covert access",
+ "tradecraft",
+ "packet processing",
+ "URL injection",
+ "redirect attacks",
+ "background loading",
+ "invisible exploitation",
+ "user deception",
+ "data theft",
+ "complete access",
+ "total control",
+ "remote operations",
+ "queued tasking",
+ "global reach",
+ "mass surveillance",
+ "critical infrastructure",
+ "telecommunications industry",
+ "ISP targeting",
+ "mobile network operators",
+ "network infrastructure",
+ "corporate networks",
+ "enterprise systems",
+ "personal computers",
+ "individual targeting"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN",
+ "genre": "slides",
+ "programs": [
+ "FOXACID",
+ "QUANTUM",
+ "QUANTUMTHEORY",
+ "QUANTUMBISCUIT",
+ "VALIDATOR",
+ "OLYMPUS",
+ "UNITEDRAKE",
+ "OLYMPUSFIRE",
+ "SSO",
+ "FORESTPLACE"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "Der Spiegel",
+ "date_published": "2013-12-30",
+ "title": "Quantumtheory: Wie die NSA weltweit Rechner hackt",
+ "link": "https://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/netzpolitik/quantumtheory-wie-die-nsa-weltweit-rechner-hackt-a-941149.html",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Appelbaum, Jacob",
+ "Rosenbach, Marcel",
+ "Schindler, Jörg",
+ "Stark, Holger",
+ "Stöcker, Christian"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [
+ "Müller-Maguhn, Andy",
+ "Horchert, Judith",
+ "Poitras, Laura",
+ "Reißmann, Ole"
+ ]
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [
+ {
+ "id": "ACLU_-_Tailored_Access_Operations"
+ },
+ {
+ "id": "nsa-quantumtheory"
+ },
+ {
+ "id": "EFF_-_20131230-spiegel-tao_quantum_theory"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "8aa778b1c82a347ad1cbcef99886b84a400d1ba2cca63957e20e58e00ed5efa1",
+ "pages": 14
+}
diff --git a/data/Telegraph3-SI-Redacted/Telegraph3-SI-Redacted.md b/data/Telegraph3-SI-Redacted/Telegraph3-SI-Redacted.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..19f70eb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/Telegraph3-SI-Redacted/Telegraph3-SI-Redacted.md
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY//20320108
+
+The TELEGRAPH
+Joint Defence Facility Pine Gap Customer Outreach
+
+January 2008
+
+(U) The TELEGRAPH is a quarterly publication designed to inform members of the Intelligence Community of the capabilities, developments, and collection highlights of the Joint Defence Facility Pine Gap.
+
+(U) Executive Summary:
+- (S//SI//REL) SIGDEV Efforts in Support of the United Nations Framework for Climate Change Conference, Bali, Indonesia
+- [REDACTED]
+
+Derived from NSA/CSS Manual 1-52, dated 8 January 2007
+Declassify on 20320108
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY//20320108
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY//20320108
+
+(S//SI//REL) SIGDEV Efforts in Support of the United Nations Framework for Climate Change Conference, Bali, Indonesia
+
+POCS: [REDACTED]
+
+(U) The United Nations Framework Climate for Change Conference (UNFCCC), held in Bali, Indonesia from 3-14 December, was attended by 10,000 conferees, activists, journalists, and high ranking representatives from 190 countries, including the newly elected Australian Prime Minister, Mr. Kevin Rudd, the U.S. Secretary of State, and former U.S. Vice President Al Gore.
+
+(S//SI//REL) Beginning on 29 November, the SIGDEV and Collection Operations Divisions executed a self-initiated network development effort, in coordination with the Defense Signals Directorate (DSD) and site leadership, in support of this target. The goal of the development effort was to gain a solid understanding of the network structure should collection be required in the event of an emergency. This involved identifying systems in use, isolating talk groups and TETRA towers of highest interest, determining network hierarchy, and reporting flow. Site produced a Telecommunications Information Report (TELIR) documenting network structure and activity. (Please contact [REDACTED] if you would like a copy of the TELIR.)
+
+(S//SI//REL) Although DSD's initial collection requirements were only for UHF push-to-talk communications collected via remote operations in Canberra, RAINFALL proposed a more in-depth SIGDEV effort. To start, a communications externals (COMEXT) task was generated to rapidly survey 100–3300MHz. Using this data, site analysis identified a previously unknown TETRA trunk mobile network with towers in both Jakarta and Bali. With this information, site analysts began a focused TETRA network development effort, which resulted in the identification of Indonesian security forces (POLRI) communications at both locations. At DSD's request, site dedicated a staff member (a trained Indonesian linguist) to this effort to monitor, scan, and transcribe the TETRA voice communications in order to provide daily summaries of network activity. Intercept ranged from network set-up to situation reports. Highlights include the compromise of the mobile phone number for Bali's Chief of Police and demonstration routes.
+
+```
+NO TAPE
+TCG 00:41:08:21
+WB
+A: IRIS
+DTL LEV: +10
+M. BLACK: -11
+STRETCH +0
+SHUTTER OFF
+F16
+OB
+5600
+```
+(S//SI//REL) Uplink video from conference facility
+
+(S//SI//REL) In addition, RAINFALL's unique capability to identify and locate satellite uplinks was utilized during ad hoc search efforts in Bali. One uplink, assessed as being a direct video feed from Bali for public relations purposes, showed the front of a possible hotel in Bali with conference flags visible at the entrance. Other uplinks located on Bali carried packet data. Technical parameters and locations of these links were passed to DSD for their target development efforts.
+
+(S//SI//REL) Site efforts revealed previously unknown Indonesian communications networks and postured us to increase collection in the event of a crisis. Site's quick response in support of the UNFCCC demonstrates an ability to rapidly focus resources and personnel and will serve as a model for future, similar SIGDEV efforts.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY//20320108
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/Telegraph3-SI-Redacted/metadata.json b/data/Telegraph3-SI-Redacted/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..621f5ac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/Telegraph3-SI-Redacted/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+{
+ "title": "NSA Telegraph: SIGDEV Efforts in Support of the United Nations Framework for Climate Change Conference, Bali, Indonesia",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "This NSA document from Joint Defence Facility Pine Gap reveals that the agency conducted surveillance operations during the 2007 UN Climate Change Conference in Bali, monitoring communications of Indonesian security forces, locating satellite uplinks including video feeds from the conference facility, and compromising the mobile phone number of Bali's Chief of Police. The operation, conducted in coordination with Australia's Defence Signals Directorate (DSD), was framed as a \"self-initiated network development effort\" to prepare for potential \"emergency\" collection, but effectively demonstrates intelligence agencies spying on a major international environmental and diplomatic gathering attended by 10,000 participants from 190 countries.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [
+ "Pine Gap",
+ "Joint Defence Facility Pine Gap",
+ "DSD",
+ "UN Climate Change Conference",
+ "Bali",
+ "conference",
+ "climate summit",
+ "diplomatic surveillance",
+ "international conference",
+ "SIGDEV",
+ "network development",
+ "Collection Operations Division",
+ "TETRA network",
+ "trunked radio",
+ "UHF",
+ "push-to-talk",
+ "Indonesian security forces",
+ "POLRI",
+ "police communications",
+ "Jakarta",
+ "telecommunications surveillance",
+ "mobile exploitation",
+ "Chief of Police",
+ "demonstration routes",
+ "protest monitoring",
+ "cell towers",
+ "spectrum analysis",
+ "remote operations",
+ "canberra",
+ "linguists",
+ "transcription",
+ "traffic monitoring",
+ "network scan",
+ "satellite communications",
+ "uplink location",
+ "video",
+ "conference video",
+ "hotel surveillance",
+ "Prime Minister",
+ "Secretary of State",
+ "Vice President",
+ "high-ranking officials",
+ "activism",
+ "journalist surveillance",
+ "environmental conference",
+ "diplomatic gathering",
+ "climate negotiations",
+ "international relations",
+ "ally surveillance",
+ "partner nations",
+ "friendly nation targeting",
+ "telecommunications infrastructure",
+ "video surveillance",
+ "conference monitoring",
+ "facility surveillance",
+ "entrance monitoring",
+ "VISINT",
+ "packet capture",
+ "data collection",
+ "voice communications",
+ "mobile communications",
+ "cellular surveillance",
+ "mobile tracking",
+ "network mapping",
+ "united nations",
+ "framework convention",
+ "climate change",
+ "diplomatic espionage",
+ "conference espionage"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2008-01",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "REL TO USA, FVEY"
+ ],
+ "banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY//20320108",
+ "genre": "report",
+ "programs": [
+ "RAINFALL"
+ ],
+ "countries": [
+ "Indonesia",
+ "Australia"
+ ],
+ "people": [
+ "Rudd, Kevin",
+ "Gore, Al"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2018-08-15",
+ "title": "The NSA's Role in a Climate-Changed World: Spying on Nonprofits, Fishing Boats, and the North Pole",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2018/08/15/nsa-snowden-documents-climate-change/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Brown, Alleen",
+ "Pensack, Miriam"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [
+ "Cooper, Talya"
+ ],
+ "doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2018/08/15/nsa-telegraph-sigdev-efforts-in-support-of-the-united-nations-framework-for-climate-change-conference-bali-indonesia/",
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/4757249/Telegraph3-SI-Redacted.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "054e3a5bc3c9906a11e17a71e175ab8ee2a0f138d1918199d9fc3592bd38573d",
+ "pages": 2
+}
diff --git a/data/The-Story-Behind-the-Move-Redacted/The-Story-Behind-the-Move-Redacted.md b/data/The-Story-Behind-the-Move-Redacted/The-Story-Behind-the-Move-Redacted.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2111b22
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/The-Story-Behind-the-Move-Redacted/The-Story-Behind-the-Move-Redacted.md
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
+TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
+
+(S//SI//REL) NSA SIGINT Site Relocated in Japan: The Story Behind the Move
+
+FROM: [REDACTED]
+Technical Support Program Management Office (TSPMO - S01X1)
+Run Date: 03/16/2007
+
+(S//SI//REL) How NSA's Hanza SIGINT collection site on the island of Okinawa was relocated to Camp Hansen.
+
+(S//SI//REL) In 1996, the US Government entered into a multi-pronged agreement with the Government of Japan (GOJ)* to relocate NSA's HF Remote Collection Facility on the island of Okinawa. The effort to execute this agreement was named Project CAMELUS. According to this agreement, the GOJ was to pay all relocation costs, including construction of the new site and acquisition of the new replacement mission systems (STAKECLAIM). This project is estimated to have cost the Japanese taxpayers in excess of 500 million dollars. The 10-year road to bring CAMELUS to its culmination was full of twists and turns, and can be only briefly summarized here.
+
+(U) The Players
+
+(S//SI//REL) NSA's Technical Support Program Management Office (TSPMO, S01X1) was the official liaison with US Forces Japan, which in turn was the interface between NSA and the GOJ. Radio Exploitation (REX, S3311) was the mission office for HANZA and was also the technical advisor for STAKECLAIM.
+
+(U) On the Agenda: Tough Negotiations
+
+(S//SI//REL) The GOJ elements involved with this program were not our Japanese SIGINT partners, and therefore their program objectives were purely political and dealt with the land return and cost and schedule; the Japanese court had issued a special land-use ruling that had a specific date assigned for land return (there have been three since the project began). Improving SIGINT collection from Okinawa was not on their agenda. NSA's objective, on the other hand, was to leverage the Japanese program/funding to maintain or modestly improve HF collection from Okinawa, all of which is remoted to NSA/CSS Hawaii and or the Meade Operation Center (MOC).
+
+(U//FOUO) These two objectives are clearly at cross purposes and resulted in many issues being elevated to very senior representatives of the two governments for resolution. The NSA CAMELUS team was called upon to participate in numerous discussions/meetings with the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs (DUSD AP) to help him establish a US Government negotiating position relating to land-return dates. The GOJ position was that the USG should shut down the Hanza site and return the land prior to the new mission system (STAKECLAIM) being ready to assume the mission.
+
+(U//FOUO) The CAMELUS Team attended several meetings between Senior GOJ officials (Director General Defense Facilities Administration Agency) who came to Washington to lobby their position with DUSD AP. The Japanese Defense Minister met with SECDEF Rumsfeld in November 2004, and this program was one of the topics of discussion. Full support for the Hanza mission vis-à-vis political pressure for land return was maintained throughout the project and, in the end, full land return was not accomplished until the new site was up and running. This level of visibility is more than most programs want or need.
+
+(U) Building the New Facility
+
+(U//FOUO) For NSA, this GOJ-funded program had two major deliverables; the first being new facilities with support infrastructure (roads and utilities) and the second being a replacement mission system (STAKECLAIM). The first deliverable was a major engineering undertaking in that the site needed to be carved out of dense, hilly Okinawa terrain being used by the USMC for small-unit jungle training.
+
+Aerial
+
+(U//FOUO) The "before" photo: View of Landing Zone Ostrich, Camp Hansen, taken in January 2000 before construction began.
+
+(U//FOUO) The facilities deliverable also included space for an antenna field (see photo). The construction of this antenna field turned out to be a major engineering task for GOJ contractors due to the amount of fill necessary to provide a flat and stable surface with a radius of 102 meters. We found that there is not a lot of experience amongst the Japanese trades in building an antenna field to NSA standards. In the end, we got what we asked for and believe the field will serve our needs for many years to come. NSA accepted the new facilities on 15 May, 2006.
+
+completed
+
+(U//FOUO) ...and "after": Completed antenna field at Camp Hansen
+
+(S//SI//REL) On 8 September 2006, the second major Japanese deliverable was accomplished when an Operational Acceptance Test and Evaluation of the SIGINT mission collection system (STAKECLAIM) at NSA Hawaii was successfully conducted and STAKECLAIM officially met desired operational capabilities.
+
+(U) Mission Complete!
+
+(U//FOUO) If ever a project showed the benefits of teaming among many, diverse government organizations and the positive results of all United States Government parties maintaining a strong and consistent message with external stakeholders, CAMELUS is a great example. Project success was not accidental and required a tremendous amount of hard work and persistence by the entire team. Credit and thanks to all team members.
+
+(S//SI//REL) If you'd like more information on Project CAMELUS or STAKECLAIM, see the TSPMO CAMELUS web page ("go CAMELUS").
+
+(U) Notes:
+
+\* (U) The agreement is officially known as the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Agreement.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/The-Story-Behind-the-Move-Redacted/metadata.json b/data/The-Story-Behind-the-Move-Redacted/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a53b89a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/The-Story-Behind-the-Move-Redacted/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+{
+ "title": "NSA SIGINT Site Relocated in Japan: The Story Behind the Move",
+ "type": "SIDTODAY",
+ "description": "This NSA SIDtoday newsletter article describes Project CAMELUS, a decade-long effort to relocate the agency's HANZA HF signals intelligence collection facility on Okinawa to a new site at Camp Hansen, with the Japanese government paying over $500 million for construction and new collection systems under political pressure to return occupied land. The article reveals tense negotiations where NSA leveraged Japanese funding to maintain surveillance capabilities while the Japanese government—notably not NSA's intelligence partners—pursued purely political objectives of land return, with disagreements escalating to cabinet-level discussions between the U.S. Secretary of Defense and Japanese Defense Minister.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [
+ "Okinawa",
+ "Camp Hansen",
+ "SIGINT relocation",
+ "Project CAMELUS",
+ "HF collection",
+ "high frequency signals intelligence",
+ "remote collection",
+ "Government of Japan",
+ "GOJ",
+ "Japanese funding",
+ "Japanese taxpayers",
+ "cost burden",
+ "host nation funding",
+ "foreign governments",
+ "SACO Agreement",
+ "Special Action Committee on Okinawa",
+ "land return",
+ "occupied land",
+ "base relocation",
+ "facility construction",
+ "Technical Support Program Management Office",
+ "TSPMO",
+ "S01X1",
+ "Radio Exploitation",
+ "REX",
+ "S3311",
+ "US Forces Japan",
+ "liaison",
+ "government interface",
+ "NSA Hawaii",
+ "remote operations",
+ "Maede Operations Center",
+ "MOC",
+ "high frequency",
+ "antenna",
+ "mission systems",
+ "collection systems",
+ "Operational Capability",
+ "high-level meeting",
+ "infrastructure",
+ "support infrastructure",
+ "engineering tasks",
+ "radio interception"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2007-03-16",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "SI",
+ "TK"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL"
+ ],
+ "banner": "DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL",
+ "genre": "newsletter",
+ "programs": [
+ "CAMELUS",
+ "STAKECLAIM",
+ "HANZA"
+ ],
+ "countries": [
+ "Japan"
+ ],
+ "people": [
+ "Rumsfeld, Donald"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2017-04-24",
+ "title": "Japan Made Secret Deals With the NSA That Expanded Global Surveillance",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2017/04/24/japans-secret-deals-with-the-nsa-that-expand-global-surveillance/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Gallagher, Ryan"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2017/04/24/the-story-behind-the-move/",
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/3675594/The-Story-Behind-the-Move-Redacted.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "publisher": "NHK",
+ "date_published": "2017-04-24",
+ "title": "アメリカに監視される日本 ~スノーデン“未公開ファイル”の衝撃",
+ "link": "http://www.nhk.or.jp/gendai/articles/3965/index.html",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Ikegami, Akira"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [
+ "Takeda, Shinichi",
+ "Tanaka, Izumi"
+ ],
+ "doc_url": "http://www.nhk.or.jp/gendai/articles/3965/snowden/snowden3.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "pdf_sha256": "47a30e093b60d4f59753658c7219c8091b3cdcc40a61cda7dd04433ef9497903",
+ "pages": 2
+}
diff --git a/data/Thieving-Magpie-Using-on-board-GSM-GPRS-services/Thieving-Magpie-Using-on-board-GSM-GPRS-services.md b/data/Thieving-Magpie-Using-on-board-GSM-GPRS-services/Thieving-Magpie-Using-on-board-GSM-GPRS-services.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..853b222
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/Thieving-Magpie-Using-on-board-GSM-GPRS-services/Thieving-Magpie-Using-on-board-GSM-GPRS-services.md
@@ -0,0 +1,303 @@
+GCHQ
+ITT.CAPABILITY.DEVELOPMENT
+
+# THIEVING MAGPIE
+
+## Using on-board GSM/GPRS services to track targets
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY STRAP1
+This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Infor[REDACTED]ther UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
+
+---
+
+GCHQ
+ITT.CAPABILITY.DEVELOPMENT
+
+## On board GSM Services
+
+* Many airlines are offering on-board mobile phone services, particularly for long haul and business class (list is growing)
+* At least British Airways are restricting the service to data and SMS only – no voice
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY STRAP1
+This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Infor[REDACTED]ther UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
+
+---
+
+GCHQ
+ITT.CAPABILITY.DEVELOPMENT
+
+## Access
+
+* Comms are 'backhauled' to global networks via Inmarsat BGAN satellite terminals
+* If flight is in Inmarsat's Europe, Middle East or Africa (EMEA) region we should have complete access (including content) via Project SOUTHWINDS
+* Global coverage via SOUTHWINDS is planned in the next year
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY STRAP1
+This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Infor[REDACTED]ther UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
+
+---
+
+```
+BGAN coverage post satellite repositioning
+
+I-4 Americas / I-4 EMEA / I-4 Asia-Pacific
+
+This map depicts Inmarsat's expectations of coverage post repositioning of its I-4 satellites. This map does not represent a guarantee of service. The availability of service at the edge of coverage areas fluctuates depending on various conditions.
+
+inmarsat.com/coverage
+inmarsat
+```
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY STRAP1
+This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Infor[REDACTED]ther UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
+
+---
+
+```
+Air France will begin commercial trials of mobile telephony on its A318
+
+1. Picocell/onboard channel selector
+This airborne system provides the radio interface to mobile phones in the cabin, isolating them from terrestrial phone networks.
+
+2. GSM server
+Manages communications (phone calls, SMS, etc.) centrally, connecting to the ground infrastructure via an air-to-ground link.
+
+3. Modem
+Manages the data link between aircraft and telecommunications satellite.
+
+GSM Control Panel
+* On/off
+* Tap don't talk mode (period 1)
+* Tap & talk mode (period 2)
+* On/Off
+
+AIR FRANCE
+
+Local operators
+
+Take-off/landing
+
+Cruising
+```
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY STRAP1
+This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Infor[REDACTED]ther UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
+
+---
+
+GCHQ
+ITT.CAPABILITY.DEVELOPMENT
+
+## GSM Services
+
+* Provided by two main providers, OnAir and Aeromobile (only access to OnAir at present)
+* Offer voice, SMS and data (when above 10,000 ft)
+* Mostly on newer aircraft, but is being fitted
+
+AeroMobile
+AIRBORNE MOBILE CONNECTIVITY
+A joint venture of ARINC telenor
+
+onair
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY STRAP1
+This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Infor[REDACTED]ther UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
+
+---
+
+GCHQ
+ITT.CAPABILITY.DEVELOPMENT
+
+## Airlines (Current and Planned)
+
+onair
+
+AIRBORNE MOBILE CONNECTIVITY
+A joint venture of ARINC telenor
+
+* OnAir
+ * BA
+ * Egypt Air
+ * Oman Air
+ * Royal Jordanian
+ * TAP Portugal
+ * Wataniya Airways (Kuwait)
+ * Libyan Airlines
+ * Air Asia
+ * TAM Airlines (Brazil)
+ * Hong Kong Airlines
+ * Singapore Airways
+ * Afriqiyah Airways
+ * Aeroflot
+ * Qatar Airlines
+ * Etihad
+ * Sharjah Ruler's Flight
+
+* Aeromobile (Telenor)
+ * Emirates
+ * Malaysian Airlines
+ * Virgin Atlantic
+ * Air New Zealand
+ * Turkish Airlines
+ * Cathay Pacific
+ * Lufthansa
+ * Malaysia
+ * Qantas
+ * V Australia
+ * DragonAir
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY STRAP1
+This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Infor[REDACTED]ther UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
+
+---
+
+GCHQ
+ITT.CAPABILITY.DEVELOPMENT
+
+## Tracking Targets
+
+* If a targets phone is switched on, it will attempt to register to its home network that it using the OnAir service – even if they don't actually make/receive a call
+* Registration requests can be combined with the flight number/callsign of the aircraft
+* Available in near real time (approximately 10 minute delay)
+* Additional & unique Geolocation events
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY STRAP1
+This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Infor[REDACTED]ther UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
+
+---
+
+GCHQ
+ITT.CAPABILITY.DEVELOPMENT
+
+## Cell-IDs
+
+* Each aircraft has at a dedicated GSM LAC with up to three Pico cells
+* Usually Cell-IDs begin 901-15, but Aeroflot use MNC 32 (Megafon) instead (presumably for legal intercept)
+* GSM reference data can be enriched with Airline name, but not location
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY STRAP1
+This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Infor[REDACTED]ther UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
+
+---
+
+GCHQ
+ITT.CAPABILITY.DEVELOPMENT
+
+## Event details
+
+```
+GSM events
+
+Refresh | Export | Columns | TDS | Create KR Rule Events 1 - 82 of 82 Sort By Timestamp (Asc / Desc) Geolocate: Seed Numbers (1672) / All Numbers (1672) MUSTANG
+```
+
+Network | Location Status | MSC | VLR | MCC | MNC | LAC | Cell ID | CGI | LAI | Cell Description
+OnAir | Confirmed | 8829800202 (I) | 8829800202 (I) | 901 | 15 | 4090 | 9001 | 901:15:4090:9001 | 901:15:4090 | Etihad Airways
+OnAir | Confirmed | 8829800202 (I) | 8829800202 (I) | 901 | 15 | 4090 | 9001 | 901:15:4090:9001 | 901:15:4090 | Etihad Airways
+OnAir | Assumed | 8829800202 (I) | 8829800202 | 901 | 15 | | | 901:15:: | 901:15: |
+OnAir | Unknown | 8829800202 | 8829800202 (I) | 901 | 15 | | | 901:15:: | 901:15: |
+OnAir | Unknown | 8829800202 | 8829800202 (I) | 901 | 15 | | | 901:15:: | 901:15: |
+OnAir | Unknown | 8829800202 | 8829800202 (I) | 901 | 15 | | | 901:15:: | 901:15: |
+OnAir | Unknown | 8829800202 | 8829800202 (I) | 901 | 15 | | | 901:15:: | 901:15: |
+OnAir | Assumed | 8829800202 | 8829800202 (I) | 901 | 15 | | | 901:15:: | 901:15: |
+OnAir | Confirmed | 8829800202 (I) | 8829800202 (I) | 901 | 15 | 4090 | 9102 | 901:15:4090:9102 | 901:15:4090 | Etihad Airways
+OnAir | Confirmed | 8829800202 (I) | 8829800202 (I) | 901 | 15 | 4090 | 9102 | 901:15:4090:9102 | 901:15:4090 | Etihad Airways
+OnAir | Confirmed | 8829800202 (I) | 8829800202 (I) | 901 | 15 | 4090 | 9102 | 901:15:4090:9102 | 901:15:4090 | Etihad Airways
+OnAir | Confirmed | 8829800202 (I) | 8829800202 (I) | 901 | 15 | 4090 | 9102 | 901:15:4090:9102 | 901:15:4090 | Etihad Airways
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY STRAP1
+This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Infor[REDACTED]ther UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
+
+---
+
+GCHQ
+ITT.CAPABILITY.DEVELOPMENT
+
+## Event Details
+
+```
+User A role | User A type | User A | User A raw value | User A display name | User B role | User B type | User B | User B raw value | User B display name
+
+Fri, 23 Mar 2012 13:56:22 GMT — telephony event (abis) unknown call, 2 selectors, duration: 00:00:00
+Active user: [REDACTED]
+Unknown | imei | [REDACTED] | | | Unknown | not_available | not_available
+Unknown | imsi | [REDACTED] | | | Unknown | not_available | not_available
+
+Locators:
+Source Cell-Global-Identifier [REDACTED]
+Source Flight-Number ETD8271
+
+Event & Intercept Protective Marking:
+SECRET STRAP1
+More
+```
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY STRAP1
+This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Infor[REDACTED]ther UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
+
+---
+
+GCHQ
+ITT.CAPABILITY.DEVELOPMENT
+
+## GPRS Events
+
+* Currently able to produce events for at least
+ Blackberry phones in flight
+* Able to identify Blackberry PIN and
+ associated Email addresses
+* Tasked content into datastores, unselected to
+ Xkeyscore, further details of usage available
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY STRAP1
+This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Infor[REDACTED]ther UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
+
+---
+
+GCHQ
+ITT.CAPABILITY.DEVELOPMENT
+
+## In-flight data
+
+* Data usage is largely as expected, with a couple of exceptions
+ * Webmail
+ * Social Networking (Facebook, Twitter etc)
+ * 'Travel apps' Google Maps, Currency converters
+ * Media
+ * VOIP
+ * Bitorrent
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY STRAP1
+This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Infor[REDACTED]ther UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
+
+---
+
+GCHQ
+ITT.CAPABILITY.DEVELOPMENT
+
+## Travel Tracking
+
+* We can confirm that targets selectors are on board
+ specific flights in near real time, enabling
+ surveillance or arrest teams to be put in place in
+ advance
+* If they use data, we can also recover email
+ address's, Facebook Ids, Skype addresses etc
+* Specific aircraft can be tracked approximately every
+ 2 minutes whilst in flight
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY STRAP1
+This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Infor[REDACTED]ther UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
+
+---
+
+GCHQ
+ITT.CAPABILITY.DEVELOPMENT
+
+## ANY QUESTIONS?
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY STRAP1
+This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Infor[REDACTED]ther UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/Thieving-Magpie-Using-on-board-GSM-GPRS-services/metadata.json b/data/Thieving-Magpie-Using-on-board-GSM-GPRS-services/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4e94f7b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/Thieving-Magpie-Using-on-board-GSM-GPRS-services/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+{
+ "title": "THIEVING MAGPIE: Using on-board GSM/GPRS services to track targets",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "A GCHQ capability-development presentation on THIEVING MAGPIE, which uses the on-board GSM/GPRS services airlines offer to track targets in flight: comms backhauled over Inmarsat BGAN and collected via SOUTHWINDS, registration events tied to a flight number or callsign in near real time, events for BlackBerry handsets with their PINs and associated e-mail addresses, and content tasked into datastores with unselected traffic to XKEYSCORE.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [
+ "GSM",
+ "GPRS",
+ "aviation",
+ "in-flight connectivity",
+ "BlackBerry",
+ "target tracking",
+ "travel tracking",
+ "airline surveillance",
+ "handset",
+ "OnAir",
+ "AeroMobile",
+ "Inmarsat",
+ "BGAN",
+ "satellite",
+ "Cell-ID",
+ "IMSI",
+ "IMEI",
+ "geolocation",
+ "picocell",
+ "Etihad Airways",
+ "Aeroflot",
+ "VoIP",
+ "social networking"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "GCHQ",
+ "date_created": "",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT",
+ "STRAP 1"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "REL TO USA, FVEY"
+ ],
+ "banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY STRAP1",
+ "genre": "slides",
+ "programs": [
+ "THIEVINGMAGPIE",
+ "SOUTHWINDS",
+ "XKEYSCORE",
+ "MUSTANG"
+ ],
+ "countries": [
+ "France",
+ "Australia",
+ "Brazil",
+ "Egypt",
+ "France",
+ "Germany",
+ "Hong Kong",
+ "Jordan",
+ "Kuwait",
+ "Libya",
+ "Malaysia",
+ "New Zealand",
+ "Norway",
+ "Oman",
+ "Portugal",
+ "Qatar",
+ "Russia",
+ "Singapore",
+ "Turkey",
+ "United Arab Emirates",
+ "United Kingdom"
+ ],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "Le Monde",
+ "date_published": "2016-12-07",
+ "title": "US and Britain refine their ability to tap into airline passenger’s mobile phones while they are in the air",
+ "link": "http://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2016/12/07/us-and-britain-refine-their-ability-to-tap-into-airline-passenger-s-mobile-phones-while-they-are-in-the-air_5044866_4408996.html",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Follorou, Jacques"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/3229456/Thieving-Magpie-Using-on-board-GSM-GPRS-services.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2016-12-07",
+ "title": "American and British Spy Agencies Targeted In-Flight Mobile Phone Use",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2016/12/07/american-and-british-spy-agencies-targeted-in-flight-mobile-phone-use/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Follorou, Jacques"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/3229456/Thieving-Magpie-Using-on-board-GSM-GPRS-services.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "publisher": "Metropolitan Books",
+ "date_published": "2014-05-13",
+ "title": "No Place to Hide",
+ "link": "https://www.glenngreenwald.net/#BookDocuments",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Greenwald, Glenn"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "version": "no-place-to-hide"
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "archive_comment": "Le Monde published fifteens of this slide deck. Glenn Greenwald's No Place to Hide published five of its slides, extracted from pages 88-92 of the compilation \"Documents from No Place to Hide.\" All five appear in Le Monde's copy, and the book's Access slide is the more redacted of the two: where Le Monde shows the Inmarsat BGAN backhaul and the Project SOUTHWINDS EMEA coverage bullets, the book's copy blacks them out.",
+ "pdf_sha256": "db8d8b84dc4d61fdafcf3e1f65a1318171943fd45bcb216b409001c643f31ee0",
+ "pages": 5,
+ "versions": {
+ "no-place-to-hide": {
+ "pdf_sha256": "cc479965c3bdfc576bcb4d3ff07d3502f3a3bf5d48346d9496ebc3fd8d35a696",
+ "changed_pages": [
+ 3
+ ]
+ }
+ }
+}
diff --git a/data/Thieving-Magpie-Using-on-board-GSM-GPRS-services/versions/no-place-to-hide/no-place-to-hide.md b/data/Thieving-Magpie-Using-on-board-GSM-GPRS-services/versions/no-place-to-hide/no-place-to-hide.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dad9cde
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/Thieving-Magpie-Using-on-board-GSM-GPRS-services/versions/no-place-to-hide/no-place-to-hide.md
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+GCHQ
+ITT.CAPABILITY.DEVELOPMENT
+
+# THIEVING MAGPIE
+
+## Using on-board GSM/GPRS services to track targets
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY STRAP1
+This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
+
+---
+
+GCHQ
+ITT.CAPABILITY.DEVELOPMENT
+
+## On board GSM Services
+
+* Many airlines are offering on-board mobile phone services, particularly for long haul and business class (list is growing)
+* At least British Airways are restricting the service to data and SMS only – no voice
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY STRAP1
+This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
+
+---
+
+GCHQ
+ITT.CAPABILITY.DEVELOPMENT
+
+## Access
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+* Global coverage via SOUTHWINDS is planned in the next year
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY STRAP1
+This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
+
+---
+
+GCHQ
+ITT.CAPABILITY.DEVELOPMENT
+
+## GPRS Events
+
+* Currently able to produce events for at least
+ Blackberry phones in flight
+* Able to identify Blackberry PIN and
+ associated Email addresses
+* Tasked content into datastores, unselected to
+ Xkeyscore, further details of usage available
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY STRAP1
+This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK
+information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on
+[REDACTED]
+
+---
+
+GCHQ
+ITT.CAPABILITY.DEVELOPMENT
+
+## Travel Tracking
+
+* We can confirm that targets selectors are on board
+ specific flights in near real time, enabling
+ surveillance or arrest teams to be put in place in
+ advance
+* If they use data, we can also recover email
+ address's, Facebook Ids, Skype addresses etc
+* Specific aircraft can be tracked approximately every
+ 2 minutes whilst in flight
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY STRAP1
+
+This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK
+information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on
+[REDACTED]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/Topic3docx-v1-0/Topic3docx-v1-0.md b/data/Topic3docx-v1-0/Topic3docx-v1-0.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6243d90
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/Topic3docx-v1-0/Topic3docx-v1-0.md
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, GBR
+
+(U) Topic: Global Collaboration Environment (GCE)
+
+(U//FOUO) Director's Talking Points:
+
+* (S//REL TO USA, GBR) Thank GCHQ for giving full support to GCE, and for partnering with NSA to engage in synchronized messaging to other organizations.
+* (S//REL TO USA, GBR) Encourage GCHQ to host the permanent facility for the joint SSEUR collaboration center, in order to maximize the benefit for the Five Eyes partnership.
+* (S//REL TO USA, GBR) Offer NSA's assistance in finding good solutions for incorporating GCE access into GCHQ's analytic workflow. Encourage GCHQ to engage with NSA's TD on this subject.
+
+(U) Background:
+
+(S//SI//REL TO USA, GBR) On 02 April 2013, SID Foreign Partner Strategist (FPS) [REDACTED] held a discussion with [REDACTED] (Head of Bilateral and Multilateral Relations, GCHQ International Relations) to discuss the future of GCE in a post-Afghanistan era. The two discussed the benefits of NSA and GCHQ having a united front in its dealings with the other foreign partners on this issue. They also discussed the possibility of the UK hosting a permanent facility where analysts from partner nations could be co-located, along with ways to better integrate GCE into each partner's analytic workflow.
+
+(U) Conversation Summary:
+
+* (S//REL TO USA, GBR) GCHQ is “all-in” on the GCE concept, both virtually and supporting some type of permanent facility where analysts could be co-located. GCHQ wants to be in sync with NSA in messaging the concept in Partner meetings. In [REDACTED] view, the SIGINT Seniors Europe (SSEUR) Principals are mostly “all-in” on GCE, but that message needs to be driven down to working levels in SSEUR nations where there is persistent pushback.
+* (S//REL TO USA, GBR) [REDACTED] wants GCHQ's technical personnel to engage with TD more vigorously so GCHQ can find good solutions for incorporating GCE access into their analytic workflow. He indicated GCHQ has some catching up to do regarding NSA's approach to how GCE will be integrated into NSA's analytic workflow. [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] that GCHQ should reach out to [REDACTED] (Chief, T32 – Enterprise Connectivity & Specialized IT Services) to discuss integration options.
+* (S//REL TO USA, GBR) [REDACTED] is going to explore whether the UK could host a permanent facility for a joint SSEUR collaboration center. Messrs. [REDACTED] (SID Foreign Partner Strategist) and [REDACTED] thought a UK-hosted facility would be optimal in terms of having the most flexibility in tuning the operation to benefit the Five Eyes. There was
+
+Classified By: jjgerst
+Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+Dated: 20070108
+Declassify On: 20380401
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, GBR
+
+discussion concerning the French hosting a permanent site, especially in terms of trying to incorporate a French-based collaboration infrastructure vs. GCE.
+
+* (S//REL TO USA, GBR) Some European nations may be leery about hosting a facility in their nation partly based upon uncertainty on what missions the center will support, and associated concerns for European human rights laws.
+* (S//REL TO USA, GBR) The discussions also included a Five-Eyes messaging approach, with the intent of encouraging coalition transition from the dated and functionally limited (but sovereign) SIGDASYS infrastructure to the advanced, US-hosted, COI-based GCE infrastructure. NSA's messaging is currently focused on presenting GCE as an additive capability providing a joint operational model based upon the Afghan SIGINT Coalition (AFSC) – which SIGDASYS doesn't provide. NSA has also started a messaging campaign with some trusted Third Party partners to encourage SSEUR mission groups to explore the GCE option once the SSEUR COI becomes fully operational and open to all members. NSA is working with Norway (who hosts SISECT) to do some initial testing of the SSEUR COI and plan to open it to all SSEUR members in the coming weeks.
+* (S//REL TO USA, GBR) There will likely be GCE-related discussions during GREY GHOST (SSEUR Conference in June 2013), along with a SIGINT Seniors Executive Board (SSEB) task force update on a recommendation for a temporary or permanent solution for future Support to Military Operations (SMO) or crisis support operations. Also expected is an SSEUR COI update and case studies/lessons learned from recent or ongoing crisis support missions (e.g., In-Amenas, Syria, Mali, Somali Piracy).
+
+(U) Potential Landmine: None.
+
+(U) Date of Material: 10 April 2013
+
+(U//FOUO) Originator: [REDACTED] Action Officer, SID FPS, [REDACTED]
+
+(U//FOUO) Alt. POC: [REDACTED] SSEUR Executive Officer, DP14, [REDACTED]
+
+(U//FOUO) Alt. POC: [REDACTED] SID Foreign Partner Strategist, [REDACTED]
+
+SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, GBR
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/Topic3docx-v1-0/metadata.json b/data/Topic3docx-v1-0/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..98c1235
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/Topic3docx-v1-0/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+{
+ "title": "Global Collaboration Environment: Director’s talking points",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "This NSA document reveals discussions between the agency and GCHQ about establishing a permanent joint surveillance facility in the UK to host the \"SIGINT Seniors Europe\" coalition, with both agencies coordinating messaging to overcome \"persistent pushback\" from some member nations. The memo indicates concerns that some European partners were reluctant due to \"uncertainty on what missions the center will support, and associated concerns for European human rights laws,\" while the NSA preferred UK hosting as \"optimal in terms of having the most flexibility in tuning the operation to benefit the Five Eyes.\"",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [
+ "SIGINT Seniors Europe",
+ "SSEUR",
+ "Global Collaboration Environment",
+ "GCE",
+ "UK hosting",
+ "permanent facility",
+ "joint collaboration center",
+ "foreign partner strategy",
+ "FPS",
+ "international relations",
+ "coalition",
+ "human rights",
+ "facility hosting"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2013-04-10",
+ "classification": [
+ "SECRET",
+ "SI"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "REL TO USA, GBR"
+ ],
+ "banner": "SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, GBR",
+ "genre": "report",
+ "programs": [
+ "SIGDASYS",
+ "GREYGHOST",
+ "SISECT"
+ ],
+ "countries": [
+ "France",
+ "Afghanistan",
+ "Norway",
+ "Syria",
+ "Algeria",
+ "Mali",
+ "Somalia",
+ "United Kingdom"
+ ],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2018-03-01",
+ "title": "The Powerful Global Spy Alliance You Never Knew Existed",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2018/03/01/nsa-global-surveillance-sigint-seniors/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Gallagher, Ryan"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2018/03/01/global-collaboration-environment-directors-talking-points-nsa/",
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/4390395/Topic3docx-v1-0.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "3abd868a86859506fcdaa6910440f1de6819c9a5a8b46edabfe0d295415d04b8",
+ "pages": 2
+}
diff --git a/data/Tracking-Targets-Through-Proxies-amp-Anonymizers/Tracking-Targets-Through-Proxies-amp-Anonymizers.md b/data/Tracking-Targets-Through-Proxies-amp-Anonymizers/Tracking-Targets-Through-Proxies-amp-Anonymizers.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7065b24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/Tracking-Targets-Through-Proxies-amp-Anonymizers/Tracking-Targets-Through-Proxies-amp-Anonymizers.md
@@ -0,0 +1,341 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+# Tracking Targets Through Proxies & Anonymizers
+## (and the air speed velocity of an unladen swallow)
+
+Also known as:TTTPaAatasvoaus
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+## CLASSIFICATION
+
+* Classification of this briefing is:
+
+TS//SI//REL 5EYES
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+## Agenda Items
+
+* The issue at hand... (proxies, anonymizers & TOR, oh my!)
+* What we do about, and how we approach, this issue...
+* A couple examples of tracking targets through anonymizers (AnchorFree & Tor)
+* Closing remarks and questions
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+## Up Front Caveat
+
+Before we begin this briefing, I want to set the stage by saying that there is no silver bullet for tracking target communications through anonymizers. Any methodology set forth in this briefing requires both manual analysis and (generally) luck.
+
+With that out of the way...
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+## The issue at hand...(proxies, anonymizers & Tor, oh my!)
+
+* Targets generally don't like to have their communications tracked by government agencies or filtered by national firewalls.
+* If they are tech-savvy enough, they will use anonymizers to try to mask their real IP/ location.
+* This generally makes for sad analysts. :(
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+## What we do about the issue at hand...
+
+* The only way to track communications through anonymizers is if you understand how those anonymizers work. If you don't know what the traffic looks like, how will you recognize it in SIGINT?
+* Generally our process is as follows:
+ * Identify new proxy/anonymizer
+ * Research/use anonymizer, document what happens, what does traffic look like, what client traffic does it pass through(if any)?
+ * Create fingerprints in SIGINT to identify such proxy traffic
+ * Correlate proxy traffic with known target activity
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+## Anchorfree
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+## Anchorfree
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+## Anchorfree
+
+AnchorFree owns a bunch of servers on the Internet.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+## Anchorfree
+
+Then you have a user that downloads Hotspot Shield to proxy their traffic...
+
+AnchorFree owns a bunch of servers on the Internet.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+## Anchorfree
+
+Then you have a user that downloads Hotspot Shield to proxy their traffic...
+
+AnchorFree owns a bunch of servers on the Internet.
+
+We'll pretend they want to go to Yahoo (or whereever else)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+## Anchorfree
+
+When the user starts HSS, their browser sets up an encrypted connection to a randomly picked server...
+
+AnchorFree owns a bunch of servers on the Internet.
+
+We'll pretend they want to go to Yahoo (or whereever else)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+## Anchorfree
+
+When the user starts HSS, their browser sets up an encrypted connection to a randomly picked server...
+
+AnchorFree owns a bunch of servers on the Internet.
+
+We'll pretend they want to go to Yahoo (or whereever else)
+
+Then they access the webpage from the AnchorFree IP address.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+## Anchorfree
+
+From testing, the IP address that the user connects to, and the IP they show up as are NOT the same. But there is a direct correlation between the two.
+
+When the user starts HSS, their browser sets up an encrypted connection to a randomly picked server...
+
+Then they access the webpage from the AnchorFree IP address.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+## AnchorFree....so what?
+
+We can build static mappings between the inside/tunnel IP address and the IP they show up as...
+
+So when we see a target access their account from an AnchorFree IP, we know which IP to go look for tunnel connections to in order to find their real client IP address...
+
+We can also write XKS fingerprints to look for AnchorFree tunnels en masse from interesting locations.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+## Tor
+
+Example of Tor user connecting to facebook.com
+
+TOR user
+
+Facebook.com
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+## Tor
+
+Example of Tor user connecting to facebook.com
+
+1) the user selects 3 relatively random Tor nodes to use.
+
+TOR user
+
+Facebook.com
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+## Tor
+
+Example of Tor user connecting to facebook.com
+
+1) the user selects 3 relatively random Tor nodes to use.
+
+2) The user then sets up layers of SSL tunnels through them all to get to facebook. A layer is stripped off along each hop.
+
+TOR user
+
+Facebook.com
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+## Tor
+
+Example of Tor user connecting to facebook.com
+
+1) the user selects 3 relatively random Tor nodes to use.
+
+2) The user then sets up layers of SSL tunnels through them all to get to facebook. A layer is stripped off along each hop.
+
+TOR user
+
+Facebook.com
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+## Tor
+
+Example of Tor user connecting to facebook.com
+
+1) the user selects 3 relatively random Tor nodes to use.
+
+2) The user then sets up layers of SSL tunnels through them all to get to facebook. A layer is stripped off along each hop.
+
+TOR user
+
+Facebook.com
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+## Tor
+
+Example of Tor user connecting to facebook.com
+
+1) the user selects 3 relatively random Tor nodes to use.
+
+2) The user then sets up layers of SSL tunnels through them all to get to facebook. A layer is stripped off along each hop.
+
+TOR user
+
+Facebook.com
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+## Tor
+
+Example of Tor user connecting to facebook.com
+
+1) the user selects 3 relatively random Tor nodes to use.
+
+2) The user then sets up layers of SSL tunnels through them all to get to facebook. A layer is stripped off along each hop.
+
+TOR user
+
+Facebook.com
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+## Interesting tidbits about Tor
+
+* TOR uses SSL tunnels for encryption, we are able to identify what their SSL certificates look like (which allows us to identify Tor circuits in SIGINT).
+* GOLDENFORTIN dataset and exit node traffic
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+## And now for something completely different...
+
+* A lot of research we do on anonymizers consists of open source research:
+ * The Interwebz (forums, RFC's, 2010 Circumvention Tool Usage Report, etc)
+ * Trial and Error / Wireshark
+ * Basically RTFM'ing about how stuff works and translating that to the SIGINT system.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+## Contact Info
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+## Questions?
+
+NOBODY EXPECTS THE SPANISH INQUISITION!!!!
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/Tracking-Targets-Through-Proxies-amp-Anonymizers/metadata.json b/data/Tracking-Targets-Through-Proxies-amp-Anonymizers/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a8f30ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/Tracking-Targets-Through-Proxies-amp-Anonymizers/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+{
+ "title": "Tracking Targets Through Proxies & Anonymizers",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "This NSA presentation details methods for tracking and de-anonymizing internet users who employ privacy tools like Tor, proxies, and VPN services such as AnchorFree's Hotspot Shield. The document explains how the agency reverse-engineers anonymization tools, creates \"fingerprints\" to identify their traffic in surveillance systems, and correlates encrypted connections to reveal users' real IP addresses and locations—acknowledging this work \"makes for sad analysts\" when targets successfully obscure their identities.",
+ "long_description": "This NSA presentation reveals the agency's systematic approach to defeating internet anonymization tools that individuals use to protect their privacy and avoid surveillance. The document, written in an unusually casual and irreverent style filled with pop culture references and humor, explains methodologies for tracking targets who use proxy servers, VPN services like AnchorFree's Hotspot Shield, and the Tor anonymity network. The presentation candidly acknowledges that tech-savvy targets \"generally don't like to have their communications tracked by government agencies\" and notes that the use of these privacy tools \"generally makes for sad analysts\" - followed by a sad face emoji. The author outlines a four-step process: identify new anonymization services, research and test them to understand how they work, create \"fingerprints\" in NSA surveillance systems to recognize their traffic patterns, and finally correlate that traffic with known target activity to reveal users' real identities and locations. The presentation admits upfront there is \"no silver bullet\" and that success requires \"both manual analysis and (generally) luck.\"\n\nThe technical details demonstrate sophisticated capabilities to unravel privacy protections. For AnchorFree's Hotspot Shield, the NSA discovered that while users connect to one IP address and appear to websites as coming from a different IP address, there exists a \"direct correlation between the two\" that can be mapped. This allows analysts to work backwards from a target's anonymized web activity to find their real IP address by examining tunnel connections. For Tor, which routes traffic through three randomly selected nodes wrapped in layers of SSL encryption, the NSA exploits the identifiable characteristics of Tor's SSL certificates to spot Tor circuits in intercepted traffic, and references a dataset called GOLDENFORTIN related to Tor exit node traffic. The presentation's methodology relies heavily on reverse-engineering these tools through open source research, packet analysis with Wireshark, and what the author cheekily describes as \"basically RTFM'ing about how stuff works and translating that to the SIGINT system.\"",
+ "tags": [
+ "Tor",
+ "proxies",
+ "anonymizers",
+ "AnchorFree",
+ "deep packet inspection",
+ "traffic fingerprinting",
+ "network fingerprints",
+ "traffic analysis",
+ "traffic correlation",
+ "anonymity",
+ "de-anonymization",
+ "privacy tools",
+ "VPNs",
+ "VPN analysis",
+ "proxy detection",
+ "IP address tracking",
+ "user identification",
+ "SIGINT analysis",
+ "encryption breaking",
+ "SSL",
+ "certificate analysis",
+ "network analysis",
+ "IP correlation",
+ "target tracking",
+ "communications tracking",
+ "network reconnaissance",
+ "connection mapping",
+ "SIGINT fingerprints",
+ "signature detection",
+ "traffic signatures",
+ "mass surveillance",
+ "identity revelation",
+ "tech-savvy targets",
+ "censorship circumvention",
+ "analysts",
+ "target analysis",
+ "proxy traffic",
+ "traffic classification",
+ "Monty Python",
+ "humor"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "SI"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "REL 5EYES"
+ ],
+ "banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY",
+ "genre": "slides",
+ "programs": [
+ "XKEYSCORE",
+ "GOLDENFORTIN"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2016-06-28",
+ "title": "He Was a Hacker for the NSA and He Was Willing to Talk. I Was Willing to Listen.",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2016/06/28/he-was-a-hacker-for-the-nsa-and-he-was-willing-to-talk-i-was-willing-to-listen/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Maass, Peter"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [
+ "McNeill, Sheelagh"
+ ],
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2919708/Tracking-Targets-Through-Proxies-amp-Anonymizers.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "86f9fde96a89b84519529d7eb18b20f94da4b70b2ac43547ef54fcc76fab2af2",
+ "pages": 25
+}
diff --git a/data/Traffic-series-is-your-collection-surveyed-or/Traffic-series-is-your-collection-surveyed-or.md b/data/Traffic-series-is-your-collection-surveyed-or/Traffic-series-is-your-collection-surveyed-or.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b6c00c5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/Traffic-series-is-your-collection-surveyed-or/Traffic-series-is-your-collection-surveyed-or.md
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
+TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
+
+(U//FOUO) Traffic Series: Is Your Collection Surveyed or Sustained?
+FROM: [REDACTED] CSRC/Integrated Collection Strategies (S342), and [REDACTED] Menwith Hill Station, Analytic Discovery Division (F77015)
+Run Date: 04/22/2009
+
+(U//FOUO) Editor's note: Analysts, here's part 3 in our 5-part series with tips on how to get the best traffic...
+
+(S//SI//REL) How often do you look at the case notation (CASN) and PDDG/SIGAD fields in your signal-related information (SRI)*? Do you know what they mean? Keeping track of the CASNs and FORNSAT collection sites for your traffic will help you optimize collection of your target's traffic; it can also alert you when you've been the happy recipient of traffic collected by another TOPI's sponsored collection requirement number (CRN) or a FORNSAT site's satellite survey activities.
+
+(U//FOUO) Sustained Collection vs. Surveyed Collection:
+
+(TS//SI//REL) Traffic is collected in two ways: sustained tasking through CRNs entered into SURREY (as was already discussed earlier this week), and by ad hoc surveyed collection performed by a FORNSAT site's collectors. Each FORNSAT Collection site is responsible for collection of one or more satellites as dictated by their location in a satellite's footprint/beam. While FORNSAT collection sites perform sustained collection of satellite links tasked with CRNs, they also perform self-driven surveys of the satellites for which they are responsible in efforts to map and understand the site's collectable environment and identify new target technologies.
+
+(TS//SI//REL) For example, MHS's MOONPENNY is responsible for 46 unique satellites. Of those, MOONPENNY is tasked to provide sustained collection on 163 unique satellite links/CASNs via SURREY CRNs. Between 1 January and 28 February 2009, MHS updated/entered 2975 CASNs in ROADBED. Of those CASNs, 112 were sustained; the 2863 remaining updates were from surveys performed by the collection site.
+
+(TS//SI//REL) If you see a spike in your traffic, or if your traffic is coming in sporadically, FORNSAT surveys might be the reason. Consider this:
+
+Unbeknownst to you, a FORNSAT collection site decides to spend a week surveying all the links on one particular
+satellite in its area of responsibility (AOR). You arrive at work on Monday morning to see that your target's
+communications have doubled or tripled in volume! Not only that, the traffic has more intelligence value than any you've seen before. You may think, "Wow, my targets have really ramped up operations." Then just as quickly it's gone -- your traffic is back to its usual level.
+
+(S//SI//REL) What happened? Did your target really slow its activity? Have you upset the Traffic Fairies? No. The most likely answer is that the FORNSAT collection site responsible for that link has moved on. Unless you tell them you need that link collected through a CRN, your traffic will be lost. Noting the CASN in your traffic's SRI will help you determine whether your traffic came from a sustained CRN or a survey.
+
+(S//SI//REL) What's in a case notation? How can you tell if a CASN is from a survey or sustained collection? Easy -- you can tell if your link was collected on survey or sustained collection just by looking at it. Here's how it breaks out:
+
+(S//SI//REL) FORNSAT Discipline Survey CASN: 3BV1256832400000
+The first two letters/numbers are the satellite digraph. (You can find a list of all the satellites and their digraphs in the Query section of ROADBED.) In this case, 3B tells us that the satellite collecting this traffic is Atlantic Bird 1. The third position of a FORNSAT survey notation will always be an H, L, R, or V. This indicates the polarization, and stands for horizontal linear, left-hand circular, right-hand circular, or vertical linear polarization. The series of numbers that follow show the frequency of the link/carrier. In this case, the carrier is on 12,568.324 MHz. FORNSAT survey CASNs provide you all the information you need for entering your sustained collection requirement in SURREY.
+
+(S//SI//REL) FORNSAT Sustained Collection CASN: 3BBAC A case notation that is on sustained collection will consist of five letters or numbers. Here 3B still indicates the Atlantic Bird 1 satellite. The three remaining characters are arbitrarily assigned and provide no significant information, other than to make it easy to tell that it's a sustained collection CASN.
+
+(S//SI//REL) Here is what the information would look like in ROADBED:
+
+| Satellite | ATLANTIC BIRD 1 | 3B | 347.5 | 27508 |
+| :---------------- | :-------------------------- | :--- | :---- | :---- |
+| Frequency (MHz) | 12568.324 | | | |
+| Polarization | VER | | | |
+| Direction | DOWN | | | |
+| Priority | MISSION TASKED | | | |
+| Status | ACTIVE | | | |
+| Case Notation | Survey: 3BV125683240000 Collection: 3BBAC | | | |
+| Site | MHS [USJ-759] | | | |
+
+(S//SI//REL) Armed with this information, you can assess the value of the data you're getting from a CASN and FORNSAT collection site to decide whether or not to enter your own CRN for sustained collection in SURREY. (In the examples above, the information derived from CASN 3BV1256832400000 was used to enter a sustained collection requirement, with a sustained CASN of 3BBAC.) This information may also help you discover what happened if your traffic decreases in volume or disappears altogether, or if you should edit or cancel a CRN that you already sponsor.
+
+(S//SI//REL) To learn more about entering CRNs and tasking FORNSAT collection sites, check out tomorrow's installment.
+
+(U) Note:
+
+\* (S//SI//REL) It is important to understand the difference between signal-related information (SRI) and metadata. In a nutshell, SRI is information about how the traffic was collected by a collection site; metadata is
+information about where the traffic actually came from and/or its intended destination.
+
+(S//SI//REL) Signal-related information usually includes information such as dates, times, phone numbers, frequencies, transmission modes, etc. plus protocol information such as IP addresses, port numbers, etc. as well
+as additional information retrieved from the data itself. It generally describes how an entity is communicating, but does not describe the actual content of the message.
+
+(S//REL) Signal-related information (SRI) is generated at the "front-end" of the SIGINT process -- from the collection source. [source: Signal-related information on WikiInfo]
+
+(S//SI//REL) In the SIGINT environment, we generally take [metadata] to mean the information contained in and
+associated with a communication to identify, describe, manage, or route that communication, but not the information which could reveal the purport of that communication, or the whole or any part of the content.
+
+(S//SI//REL) For COMINT, examples of metadata would be e-mail addresses, names, IP addresses, chat handles,
+transmission frequencies, telephone numbers, carrier IDs, Ethernet MAC addresses, data rates etc. The formal, legal, definitions of what constitutes metadata vary in detail across the Second Party partners, although the underlying intent remains consistent. -- [source: the COMINT Metadata Analysis WikiInfo].
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/Traffic-series-is-your-collection-surveyed-or/metadata.json b/data/Traffic-series-is-your-collection-surveyed-or/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..774ac76
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/Traffic-series-is-your-collection-surveyed-or/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+{
+ "title": "Traffic Series: Is Your Collection Surveyed or Sustained?",
+ "type": "SIDTODAY",
+ "description": "This NSA internal newsletter article explains how analysts can determine whether their collected signals intelligence traffic comes from sustained, ongoing collection (tasked through formal requirements) or temporary \"survey\" activities where satellite collection sites scan for new targets. The article teaches analysts how to read \"case notations\" (CASNs) to identify whether traffic spikes are from permanent collection or just temporary surveys—warning that valuable intelligence can suddenly disappear when survey activities end unless analysts formally request sustained collection through the SURREY system.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [
+ "traffic monitoring",
+ "sustained collection",
+ "collection survey",
+ "survey",
+ "case notation",
+ "CASN",
+ "collection requirement number",
+ "CRN",
+ "satellite collection",
+ "satellite surveillance",
+ "signal-related information",
+ "SRI",
+ "PDDG",
+ "SIGAD",
+ "collection sites",
+ "Menwith Hill",
+ "MHS",
+ "satellite communications",
+ "satellite",
+ "target technology",
+ "satellite mapping",
+ "collection optimization",
+ "traffic optimization",
+ "target networks",
+ "traffic volume",
+ "traffic spikes",
+ "Atlantic Bird 1",
+ "traffic analysis",
+ "email addresses",
+ "IP addresses",
+ "chat handles",
+ "carrier IDs",
+ "MAC address",
+ "WikiInfo",
+ "protocol analysis",
+ "port number",
+ "phone numbers",
+ "target discovery",
+ "FORNSAT"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2009-04-22",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "SI",
+ "TK"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL"
+ ],
+ "banner": "DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL",
+ "genre": "newsletter",
+ "programs": [
+ "SURREY",
+ "MOONPENNY",
+ "ROADBED"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2016-09-06",
+ "title": "Inside Menwith Hill: The NSA’s British Base at the Heart of U.S. Targeted Killing",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2016/09/06/nsa-menwith-hill-targeted-killing-surveillance/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Gallagher, Ryan"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/3089510/Traffic-series-is-your-collection-surveyed-or.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "f59c691fe1975d07d8de3500bf53061cd991402ffe3a3aa7c803c711c9a53be1",
+ "pages": 4
+}
diff --git a/data/U-RE-EHSANUL-SADEQUEE-FISA-REQUEST/U-RE-EHSANUL-SADEQUEE-FISA-REQUEST.md b/data/U-RE-EHSANUL-SADEQUEE-FISA-REQUEST/U-RE-EHSANUL-SADEQUEE-FISA-REQUEST.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8ed5a94
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/U-RE-EHSANUL-SADEQUEE-FISA-REQUEST/U-RE-EHSANUL-SADEQUEE-FISA-REQUEST.md
@@ -0,0 +1,378 @@
+From: [REDACTED] (CIV-NSA) [REDACTED] S112
+Sent: Friday, April 07, 2006 12:51 PM
+To: [REDACTED].
+Subject: [REDACTED] (U) RE: EHSANUL SADEQUEE - FISA REQUEST
+Signed By: [REDACTED]@nsa.ic.gov
+
+Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+
+
+Mike,
+
+Apologize I did not see your email until this morning. I was at class
+up at FANX all day yesterday. [REDACTED] is in and I have forwarded to him
+for action.
+
+Cheers, [REDACTED]
+
+
+NSA Representative to FBI (CID/CYBER/CD)
+Washington D.C.
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+-----Original Message-----
+From: [REDACTED]
+Sent: Thursday, April 06, 2006 7:41 PM
+To: [REDACTED] (CIV-NSA) S112; [REDACTED] (CIV-NSA)
+Subject: FW: EHSANUL SADEQUEE - FISA REQUEST
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+
+ I sent this to [REDACTED] yesterday. Apparently, he was out of
+office. Can you help us with this issue? Thanks
+
+V/r,
+
+[REDACTED], SrA, USAF
+HS2I2 Senior Analyst/Reporting Official
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+-----Original Message-----
+From: [REDACTED]
+Sent: Thursday, April 06, 2006 11:38 PM
+To: [REDACTED] (CIV-NSA)
+Cc: [REDACTED] (CIV-NSA)S112
+Subject: RE: EHSANUL SADEQUEE - FISA REQUEST
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+ Sorry to bother you with constant emails but did you receive any
+information on this. We attempted to task some of Sadequee's selectors
+in CADENCE yesterday but feel short as we did not have the FBI FISA
+justification. Any help you can provide would be most valueable.
+Thanks
+again.
+
+V/r,
+
+[REDACTED] SrA, USAF
+HS2I2 Senior Analyst/Reporting Official
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+
+-----Original Message-----
+From: [REDACTED]
+Sent: Wednesday, April 05, 2006 10:20 PM
+To: [REDACTED] (CIV-NSA)
+Cc: [REDACTED] (CIV-NSA)S112
+Subject: EHSANUL SADEQUEE - FISA REQUEST
+
+
+
+Mr. [REDACTED],
+
+ This is SrA [REDACTED] at NSA/CSS Hawaii HS2I2 (Sunni
+Extremism). I am writing you because I am attempting to retrieve a
+FISA
+justification on Al Qa'ida operative Ehsanul Sadequee. Currently,
+HS2I2
+in conjunction with HS32 (Network Development Department) and NSA are
+planning on conducting a TAO operation against Sadequee's email
+addresses. In order to conduct the operation HS2I2 needs the original
+justification as well as any followups and resubmittals. We were
+hoping
+that you would be able to retrieve this information for us so that we
+can submit a TAO on this target. Our intent is to begin the TAO before
+this weekend. Sorry about the short notice but the reason behind our
+request is that FBI is conducting an operation to apprehend Sadequee
+sometime this week. Once he is apprehended NSA can no longer conduct a
+TAO operation against him as the AG2.5 we currently have will be
+invalid. The reason we are pursing this is because we would like to
+retrieve a file that was passed between him and an associate about
+three
+weeks ago. The original FISA request was iniated in January 2006 and
+
+
+will expire in April 2006. We appreciate any help you can provide us.
+Thanks in advance.
+
+
+V/r,
+
+[REDACTED] SrA, USAF
+HS2I2 Senior Analyst/Reporting Official
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+
+Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+From: [REDACTED]
+Sent: Wednesday, April 05, 2006 10:20 PM
+To: [REDACTED] (CIV-NSA)
+Cc: [REDACTED] (CIV-NSA)S112
+Subject: [REDACTED] EHSANUL SADEQUEE - FISA REQUEST
+Signed By: [REDACTED] @nsa.ic.gov
+
+Mr. [REDACTED],
+
+ This is SrA [REDACTED] at NSA/CSS Hawaii HS2I2 (Sunni
+Extremism). I am writing you because I am attempting to retrieve a
+FISA
+justification on Al Qa'ida operative Ehsanul Sadequee. Currently,
+HS2I2
+in conjunction with HS32 (Network Development Department) and NSA are
+planning on conducting a TAO operation against Sadequee's email
+addresses. In order to conduct the operation HS2I2 needs the original
+justification as well as any followups and resubmittals. We were
+hoping
+that you would be able to retrieve this information for us so that we
+can submit a TAO on this target. Our intent is to begin the TAO before
+this weekend. Sorry about the short notice but the reason behind our
+request is that FBI is conducting an operation to apprehend Sadequee
+sometime this week. Once he is apprehended NSA can no longer conduct a
+TAO operation against him as the AG2.5 we currently have will be
+invalid. The reason we are pursing this is because we would like to
+retrieve a file that was passed between him and an associate about
+three
+weeks ago. The original FISA request was iniated in January 2006 and
+will expire in April 2006. We appreciate any help you can provide us.
+Thanks in advance.
+
+
+V/r,
+
+
+[REDACTED], SrA, USAF
+HS2I2 Senior Analyst/Reporting Official
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+
+From: [REDACTED]
+Sent: Thursday, April 06, 2006 11:41 PM
+To: [REDACTED] (CIV-NSA) [REDACTED] S112; [REDACTED]
+(CIV-NSA)
+Subject: FW: EHSANUL SADEQUEE - FISA REQUEST
+Signed By: [REDACTED] @nsa.ic.gov
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+ I sent this to [REDACTED] yesterday. Apparently, he was out of
+office. Can you help us with this issue? Thanks
+
+V/r,
+
+[REDACTED], SrA, USAF
+HS2I2 Senior Analyst/Reporting Official
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+-----Original Message-----
+From: [REDACTED]
+Sent: Thursday, April 06, 2006 11:38 PM
+To: [REDACTED] (CIV-NSA)
+Cc: [REDACTED] (CIV-NSA)S112
+Subject: RE: EHSANUL SADEQUEE - FISA REQUEST
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+
+ Sorry to bother you with constant emails but did you receive any
+information on this. We attempted to task some of Sadequee's selectors
+in CADENCE yesterday but feel short as we did not have the FBI FISA
+justification. Any help you can provide would be most valueable.
+Thanks
+again.
+
+V/r,
+
+[REDACTED] SrA, USAF
+HS2I2 Senior Analyst/Reporting Official
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+-----Original Message-----
+From: [REDACTED]
+Sent: Wednesday, April 05, 2006 10:20 PM
+To: [REDACTED]
+Cc: [REDACTED] S112
+Subject: EHSANUL SADEQUEE - FISA REQUEST
+
+
+
+Mr. [REDACTED],
+
+ This is [REDACTED] at NSA/CSS Hawaii HS2I2 (Sunni
+Extremism). I am writing you because I am attempting to retrieve a
+FISA
+justification on Al Qa'ida operative Ehsanul Sadequee. Currently,
+HS2I2
+in conjunction with HS32 (Network Development Department) and NSA are
+planning on conducting a TAO operation against Sadequee's email
+addresses. In order to conduct the operation HS2I2 needs the original
+justification as well as any followups and resubmittals. We were
+hoping
+that you would be able to retrieve this information for us so that we
+can submit a TAO on this target. Our intent is to begin the TAO before
+this weekend. Sorry about the short notice but the reason behind our
+request is that FBI is conducting an operation to apprehend Sadequee
+sometime this week. Once he is apprehended NSA can no longer conduct a
+TAO operation against him as the AG2.5 we currently have will be
+invalid. The reason we are pursing this is because we would like to
+retrieve a file that was passed between him and an associate about
+three
+weeks ago. The original FISA request was iniated in January 2006 and
+will expire in April 2006. We appreciate any help you can provide us.
+Thanks in advance.
+
+
+V/r,
+
+[REDACTED] SrA, USAF
+HS2I2 Senior Analyst/Reporting Official
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+
+From: [REDACTED]
+Sent: Thursday, April 06, 2006 11:38 PM
+To: [REDACTED] (CIV-NSA)
+Cc: [REDACTED] (CIV-NSA)S112
+
+
+Subject: [REDACTED] RE: EHSANUL SADEQUEE - FISA REQUEST
+Signed By: [REDACTED]@nsa.ic.gov
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+ Sorry to bother you with constant emails but did you receive any
+information on this. We attempted to task some of Sadequee's selectors
+in CADENCE yesterday but feel short as we did not have the FBI FISA
+justification. Any help you can provide would be most valueable.
+Thanks
+again.
+
+V/r,
+
+[REDACTED], SrA, USAF
+HS2I2 Senior Analyst/Reporting Official
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+
+-----Original Message-----
+From: [REDACTED]
+Sent: Wednesday, April 05, 2006 10:20 PM
+To: [REDACTED] (CIV-NSA)
+Cc: [REDACTED] (CIV-NSA)S112
+Subject: EHSANUL SADEQUEE - FISA REQUEST
+
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+ This is [REDACTED] at NSA/CSS Hawaii HS2I2 (Sunni
+Extremism). I am writing you because I am attempting to retrieve a
+FISA
+justification on Al Qa'ida operative Ehsanul Sadequee. Currently,
+HS2I2
+in conjunction with HS32 (Network Development Department) and NSA are
+planning on conducting a TAO operation against Sadequee's email
+addresses. In order to conduct the operation HS2I2 needs the original
+justification as well as any followups and resubmittals. We were
+hoping
+that you would be able to retrieve this information for us so that we
+can submit a TAO on this target. Our intent is to begin the TAO before
+this weekend. Sorry about the short notice but the reason behind our
+request is that FBI is conducting an operation to apprehend Sadequee
+sometime this week. Once he is apprehended NSA can no longer conduct a
+TAO operation against him as the AG2.5 we currently have will be
+invalid. The reason we are pursing this is because we would like to
+retrieve a file that was passed between him and an associate about
+
+
+three
+weeks ago. The original FISA request was iniated in January 2006 and
+will expire in April 2006. We appreciate any help you can provide us.
+Thanks in advance.
+
+
+V/r,
+
+ SrA, USAF
+HS2I2 Senior Analyst/Reporting Official
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+
+From: [REDACTED]
+Sent: Thursday, April 06, 2006 11:38 PM
+To: [REDACTED] (CIV-NSA)
+Cc: [REDACTED] (CIV-NSA)S112
+Subject: [REDACTED] RE: EHSANUL SADEQUEE - FISA REQUEST
+Signed By: [REDACTED]@nsa.ic.gov
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+ Sorry to bother you with constant emails but did you receive any
+information on this. We attempted to task some of Sadequee's selectors
+in CADENCE yesterday but feel short as we did not have the FBI FISA
+justification. Any help you can provide would be most valueable.
+Thanks
+again.
+
+V/r,
+
+[REDACTED], SrA, USAF
+HS2I2 Senior Analyst/Reporting Official
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+
+-----Original Message-----
+From: [REDACTED]
+Sent: Wednesday, April 05, 2006 10:20 PM
+To: [REDACTED] (CIV-NSA)
+Cc: [REDACTED] (CIV-NSA)S112
+Subject: EHSANUL SADEQUEE - FISA REQUEST
+
+
+
+Mr.[REDACTED]
+
+
+ This is SrA [REDACTED] at NSA/CSS Hawaii HS2I2 (Sunni
+Extremism). I am writing you because I am attempting to retrieve a
+FISA
+justification on Al Qa'ida operative Ehsanul Sadequee. Currently,
+HS2I2
+in conjunction with HS32 (Network Development Department) and NSA are
+planning on conducting a TAO operation against Sadequee's email
+addresses. In order to conduct the operation HS2I2 needs the original
+justification as well as any followups and resubmittals. We were
+hoping
+that you would be able to retrieve this information for us so that we
+can submit a TAO on this target. Our intent is to begin the TAO before
+this weekend. Sorry about the short notice but the reason behind our
+request is that FBI is conducting an operation to apprehend Sadequee
+sometime this week. Once he is apprehended NSA can no longer conduct a
+TAO operation against him as the AG2.5 we currently have will be
+invalid. The reason we are pursing this is because we would like to
+retrieve a file that was passed between him and an associate about
+three
+weeks ago. The original FISA request was iniated in January 2006 and
+will expire in April 2006. We appreciate any help you can provide us.
+Thanks in advance.
+
+
+V/r,
+
+[REDACTED] SrA, USAF
+HS2I2 Senior Analyst/Reporting Official
+Secure: [REDACTED]
+Unsecure: [REDACTED]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/U-RE-EHSANUL-SADEQUEE-FISA-REQUEST/metadata.json b/data/U-RE-EHSANUL-SADEQUEE-FISA-REQUEST/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..16fceeb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/U-RE-EHSANUL-SADEQUEE-FISA-REQUEST/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+{
+ "title": "Re: Ehsanul Sadequee FISA Request",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "This NSA email chain from April 2006 shows NSA analysts urgently requesting FBI FISA authorization documents for Ehsanul Sadequee so they could conduct a \"TAO operation\" (Tailored Access Operations hack) to retrieve a file he had shared, racing against the FBI's impending arrest which would invalidate their surveillance authority. The emails reveal the NSA's dependence on FBI-obtained FISA warrants to justify their operations and their need to complete the hack before Sadequee's arrest made their authorization \"invalid.\"",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [
+ "FISA",
+ "Ehsanul Sadequee",
+ "Tailored Access Operations",
+ "email interception",
+ "file retrieval",
+ "Al-Qaeda",
+ "NSA Hawaii",
+ "network development",
+ "email addresses",
+ "target email",
+ "selector tasking",
+ "associate network",
+ "file transfer",
+ "data retrieval",
+ "communications interception"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2006-04-07",
+ "classification": [
+ "UNCLASSIFIED"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "FOUO"
+ ],
+ "banner": "UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY",
+ "genre": "other",
+ "programs": [
+ "CADENCE"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "Sadequee, Ehsanul Islam"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2017-11-30",
+ "title": "NSA Secretly Helped Convict Defendants in U.S. Courts, Classified Documents Reveal",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2017/11/30/nsa-surveillance-fisa-section-702/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Aaronson, Trevor"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [
+ "Williams, Margot",
+ "Cooper, Talya"
+ ],
+ "doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2017/11/28/re-ehsanul-sadequee-fisa-request/",
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/4310979/U-RE-EHSANUL-SADEQUEE-FISA-REQUEST.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "pdf_sha256": "0e2c9a7490fd9dc135e57bb4b5f762ea39bc32fd2f4ca1f49215510db1928688",
+ "pages": 8
+}
diff --git a/data/U07June2012-SSO-WeeklyBrief-a-v1-0-Excerpt/U07June2012-SSO-WeeklyBrief-a-v1-0-Excerpt.md b/data/U07June2012-SSO-WeeklyBrief-a-v1-0-Excerpt/U07June2012-SSO-WeeklyBrief-a-v1-0-Excerpt.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9c3c80a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/U07June2012-SSO-WeeklyBrief-a-v1-0-Excerpt/U07June2012-SSO-WeeklyBrief-a-v1-0-Excerpt.md
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+SPECIAL SOURCE OPERATIONS
+
+# 07 June 2012
+
+# Special Source Operations Weekly
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+---
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+The overall classification of this briefing is:
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON/NOFORN
+
+Approval for dissemination of information contained in this briefing, in whole or in part, is required.
+
+DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52
+DATED: 20070108
+DECLASSIFY ON: 20370108
+
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+## (U) RAMPART-A
+
+(U//FOUO) BRIEFER: [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
+
+## (U//FOUO) SPINNERET HIGHLIGHTS
+
+(TS//SI//NF) On 30 May, SPINNERET enabled the flow of calling records into Real-Time Regional Gateway (RT-RG)/Texas via SHELLTRUMPET.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) SHELLTRUMPET obfuscates the source designators and only forwards call event metadata within NSA-T's AOR.
+
+(TS//SI//NF) SPINNERET is currently the second largest feeder of calling records and tips to SHELLTRUMPET.
+
+TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/U07June2012-SSO-WeeklyBrief-a-v1-0-Excerpt/metadata.json b/data/U07June2012-SSO-WeeklyBrief-a-v1-0-Excerpt/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..724ed49
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/U07June2012-SSO-WeeklyBrief-a-v1-0-Excerpt/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+{
+ "title": "NSA June 2012 SSO Weekly Brief Excerpt",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "This NSA Special Source Operations (SSO) briefing from June 2012 describes SPINNERET, a surveillance program that became the second-largest source of phone calling records and \"tips\" feeding into SHELLTRUMPET, a system that obscures the origin of collected metadata before forwarding it to NSA's Real-Time Regional Gateway (RT-RG) in Texas. The document indicates SHELLTRUMPET \"obfuscates the source designators\" and filters metadata to only include call events within NSA-Texas's area of responsibility.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [
+ "SSO",
+ "call detail records",
+ "cellphone metadata",
+ "metadata collection",
+ "Real-Time Regional Gateway",
+ "RT-RG",
+ "NSA Texas",
+ "Texas",
+ "source obfuscation",
+ "source designators",
+ "origin concealment",
+ "metadata forwarder",
+ "bulk collection",
+ "telephone surveillance",
+ "data sources",
+ "collection sources",
+ "geographic filtering",
+ "regional operations",
+ "surveillance infrastructure",
+ "metadata",
+ "telephony metadata",
+ "communications records",
+ "domestic surveillance",
+ "international collection",
+ "collection programs",
+ "dragnet surveillance",
+ "collection infrastructure",
+ "telecommunications",
+ "telecommunications surveillance"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2012-06-07",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "SI"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "ORCON, NOFORN"
+ ],
+ "banner": "TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN",
+ "genre": "slides",
+ "programs": [
+ "SPINNERET",
+ "RAMPART-A",
+ "RT-RG",
+ "SHELLTRUMPET",
+ "SSO"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2019-05-29",
+ "title": "Mission Creep: How the NSA’s Game-Changing Targeting System Built for Iraq and Afghanistan Ended Up on the Mexico Border",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2019/05/29/nsa-data-afghanistan-iraq-mexico-border/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Moltke, Henrik"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2019/05/29/nsa-june-2012-sso-weekly-brief-excerpt/",
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/6061129/U07June2012-SSO-WeeklyBrief-a-v1-0-Excerpt.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "publisher": "NRK",
+ "date_published": "2019-05-29",
+ "title": "Norges hemmelige krig i Afghanistan",
+ "link": "https://www.nrk.no/dokumentar/xl/norges-hemmelige-krig-i-afghanistan-1.14539055",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Skille, Øyvind Bye",
+ "Døvik, Olav",
+ "Hansen, Ståle Ellingsgard",
+ "Fjørtoft, Martin"
+ ],
+ "reporting_only": true
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "d85f80311845806b7da614703c0551ce3e303dd31524c0578c62c4f08fc92c05",
+ "pages": 4
+}
diff --git a/data/UFOUO23April2013BLARNEYECPReport/UFOUO23April2013BLARNEYECPReport.md b/data/UFOUO23April2013BLARNEYECPReport/UFOUO23April2013BLARNEYECPReport.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b89a755
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/UFOUO23April2013BLARNEYECPReport/UFOUO23April2013BLARNEYECPReport.md
@@ -0,0 +1,290 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+(Report generated on: 4/23/2013 7:00:17AM)
+
+Blarney-40-12
+Work in Progress
+ECP Lead: [REDACTED]
+
+Title of Change: DNI Processing of RINGBILL Access
+Site(s): TITAN POINTE :
+Project(s): No Project(s) Entered
+System(s): VISIONQUEST :
+SubSystem(s): No Subsystem(s) Entered
+
+Description of Change: This is a partially historical ECP to track efforts performed for processing the DNI portion of RINGBILL. The initial processing of RINGBILL will be performed on our legacy WC2/XKS systems (using Trireme for VoIP & VTC traffic). Once we stand up SKIDROWE, the processing will transfer to that solution so we will need to be cognizant of any and all requirements that should be defined for the SKIDROWE team to enable our solution.
+
+Because we are initially using our legacy systems there will be extra work required to configure them and the network to be capable of higher than normal throughput. There will also be work to determine what kind of filtering is required so that we don't overwhelm our PINWALE partitions. Finally, it is already apparent that further work will be required on the VoIP processing to associate signaling with media cuts. Once that is complete we will be able to look into filtering based on dialing patterns.
+
+Reason for Change: We now have access to the RINGBILL DNI and rather than waiting until the June/July timeframe to use the new solution for processing, we have developed an interim solution for processing the high data rates on existing architecture.
+
+Mission Impact: These efforts are an interim solution to process the RINGBILL signal months earlier than we orginally planned. Resources will have to be prioritized against other efforts.
+
+Additional Info:
+
+Last CCB Entry: 04/10/13 15:44:43 [REDACTED]
+09 Apr CCB - ECP status reviewed
+
+Work Task ID: WT00010435
+Status: Reassigned
+Life Cycle Phase:
+Last Log Entry: --- 04/11/13 08:31:14 --- 4/11/13 - NTR
+ECP Number: Blarney-40-12
+Description: Update Baseline - DNI Processing of RINGBILL Access
+Assigned To: [REDACTED]
+
+Work Task ID: WT00010584
+Status: Completed
+Life Cycle Phase: [REDACTED]
+Last Log Entry: --- 04/11/13 08:31:49 --- 4/11/13 - NTR
+ECP Number: Blarney-40-12
+Description: Enable DNI Processing of RINGBILL through [REDACTED] WC2 architecture
+Assigned To: [REDACTED]
+
+Page 23 of 51
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+(Report generated on: 4/23/2013 7:00:17AM)
+
+Work Task ID: WT00010585
+Status: Completed
+Life Cycle Phase: [REDACTED]
+Last Log Entry: --- 04/11/13 08:32:25 --- 4/11/13 - NTR
+ECP Number: Blarney-40-12
+Description: Enable VoIP processing of RINGBILL desk [REDACTED]
+Assigned To: [REDACTED]
+
+Work Task ID: WT00010586
+Status: Being Worked
+Life Cycle Phase: [REDACTED]
+Last Log Entry: --- 04/03/13 15:51:25 --- XKS has been loaded on the two SR systems at TP. The TW release is expected by the end of April, though this may push out again. There are some planned RPM updates for XKS that will be installed next week.
+ECP Number: Blarney-40-12
+Description: Deploy SKIDROWE solution for RINGBILL DNI Processing
+Assigned To: [REDACTED]
+
+Work Task ID: WT00010586-1
+Status: Completed
+Life Cycle Phase: [REDACTED]
+Last Log Entry: --- 04/11/13 08:33:02 --- 4/11/13 - NTR
+ECP Number: Blarney-40-12
+Description: Define RINGBILL Hardware Requirements
+Assigned To: [REDACTED]
+
+Work Task ID: WT00010586-2
+Status: Completed
+Life Cycle Phase: [REDACTED]
+Last Log Entry: --- 08/22/12 13:56:48 --- Order equipment for the RINGBILL SKIDROWE system
+ECP Number: Blarney-40-12
+Description: Order Skidrow Equipment
+Assigned To: [REDACTED]
+
+Work Task ID: WT00010586-3
+Status: Completed
+Life Cycle Phase: [REDACTED]
+Last Log Entry: --- 01/16/13 09:33:07 --- All equipment associated with the RINGBILL SKIDROWE has been ordered and received. Closing worktask.
+ECP Number: Blarney-40-12
+Description: Order Additional Parts
+Assigned To: [REDACTED]
+
+Work Task ID: WT00010586-4
+Status: Completed
+Life Cycle Phase: [REDACTED]
+Last Log Entry: --- 08/22/12 14:03:13 --- Receive equipment that was ordered.
+ECP Number: Blarney-40-12
+Description: Recieve Ordered Equipment
+Assigned To: [REDACTED]
+
+Page 24 of 51
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+(Report generated on: 4/23/2013 7:00:17AM)
+
+Work Task ID: WT00010586-5
+Status: Being Worked
+Life Cycle Phase: [REDACTED]
+Last Log Entry: --- 04/03/13 15:52:20 --- XKS has been upgraded to 1.5.11 and we have begun to test, though we need to install some patches before we can continue. We are still waiting for TW software.
+ECP Number: Blarney-40-12
+Description: Stand up Test System
+Assigned To: [REDACTED]
+
+Work Task ID: WT00010586-6
+Status: Completed
+Life Cycle Phase: [REDACTED]
+Last Log Entry: --- 12/05/12 15:57:17 --- Servers have been installed at site and powered on. Closing ticket.
+ECP Number: Blarney-40-12
+Description: Test the RINGBILL SKIDROWE Servers.
+Assigned To: [REDACTED]
+
+Work Task ID: WT00010586-7
+Status: Completed
+Life Cycle Phase: [REDACTED]
+Last Log Entry: --- 12/05/12 16:00:07 --- Completed.
+ECP Number: Blarney-40-12
+Description: Install 10G NICs in each RINGBILL SKIDROWE [REDACTED]
+Assigned To: [REDACTED]
+
+Work Task ID: WT00010586-8
+Status: Completed
+Life Cycle Phase: [REDACTED]
+Last Log Entry: --- 01/16/13 09:39:48 --- Rack elevations and network plan has been developed an has been incorporated into site documentation. Closing ticket.
+ECP Number: Blarney-40-12
+Description: Design Site Plan
+Assigned To: [REDACTED]
+
+Work Task ID: WT00010586-9
+Status: Completed
+Life Cycle Phase: [REDACTED]
+Last Log Entry: --- 02/21/13 14:50:16 --- Equipment has been shipped to site and installed. Closing ticket.
+ECP Number: Blarney-40-12
+Description: Transport Equipment to Site
+Assigned To: [REDACTED]
+
+Work Task ID: WT00010586-10
+Status: Assigned
+Life Cycle Phase: [REDACTED]
+Last Log Entry: --- 04/11/13 08:34:12 --- 4/11/2013 - NTR
+ECP Number: Blarney-40-12
+Description: Load System and Test Functionality
+Assigned To: [REDACTED]
+
+Page 25 of 51
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+(Report generated on: 4/23/2013 7:00:17AM)
+
+Work Task ID: WT00010586-11
+Status: Completed
+Life Cycle Phase: [REDACTED]
+Last Log Entry: --- 02/21/13 14:00:40 --- Signal has been duplicated with a 30/70 splitter. When [REDACTED] we're ready to start processing we'll have to see if the light levels are good enough. [REDACTED] also has a 50/50 splitter at site that we can try if need be. Marking as complete and will reopen if further work needs to be performed.
+ECP Number: Blarney-40-12
+Description: Duplicate RINGBILL Signal to the SKIDROWE [REDACTED]
+Assigned To: [REDACTED]
+
+Work Task ID: WT00010586-12
+Status: Assigned
+Life Cycle Phase: [REDACTED]
+Last Log Entry: --- 04/11/13 08:35:55 --- NTR
+ECP Number: Blarney-40-12
+Description: Declare System IOC
+Assigned To: [REDACTED]
+
+Work Task ID: WT00010586-13
+Status: Assigned
+Life Cycle Phase: [REDACTED]
+Last Log Entry: --- 04/11/13 08:36:10 --- NTR
+ECP Number: Blarney-40-12
+Description: Decommission WCT05
+Assigned To: [REDACTED]
+
+Work Task ID: WT00010586-14
+Status: Completed
+Life Cycle Phase: [REDACTED]
+Last Log Entry: --- 08/22/12 14:24:44 --- Completed 6/26/12
+ECP Number: Blarney-40-12
+Description: Perform Site Survey
+Assigned To: [REDACTED]
+
+Work Task ID: WT00010586-15
+Status: Completed
+Life Cycle Phase: [REDACTED]
+Last Log Entry: --- 01/16/13 09:35:03 --- This was completed as part of the ERB. Closing ticket.
+ECP Number: Blarney-40-12
+Description: Conduct System Design Review
+Assigned To: [REDACTED]
+
+Work Task ID: WT00010586-16
+Status: Completed
+Life Cycle Phase: [REDACTED]
+Last Log Entry: --- 01/16/13 09:35:34 --- Completed during the ERB for SKIDROWE. Closing ticket.
+ECP Number: Blarney-40-12
+Description: Obtain ETS TD Approval of System Design
+Assigned To: [REDACTED]
+
+Page 26 of 51
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+(Report generated on: 4/23/2013 7:00:17AM)
+
+Work Task ID: WT00010586-17
+Status: Completed
+Life Cycle Phase: [REDACTED]
+Last Log Entry: --- 01/16/13 09:36:08 --- ERB presentation was completed and approved. Closing ticket.
+ECP Number: Blarney-40-12
+Description: ERB Processing Recommendation Matrix
+Assigned To: [REDACTED]
+
+Work Task ID: WT00010586-18
+Status: Completed
+Life Cycle Phase: [REDACTED]
+Last Log Entry: --- 01/16/13 09:36:39 --- This was completed as part of the ERB. Closing ticket.
+ECP Number: Blarney-40-12
+Description: Schedule/Conduct Depolyment Readiness [REDACTED] (DRR)
+Assigned To: [REDACTED]
+
+Page 27 of 51
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+(Report generated on: 4/23/2013 7:00:17AM)
+
+Blarney-55-12
+Work in Progress
+ECP Lead: [REDACTED]
+
+Title of Change: Deployment of TURTLEPOWER system in VQ environment
+Site(s): No Site(s) Entered
+Project(s): No Project(s) Entered
+System(s): VISIONQUEST:
+SubSystem(s): No Subsystem(s) Entered
+
+Description of Change: This ECP will encompass working with CES [REDACTED] to stand up and forward deploy a TURTLEPOWER system for the purpose of processing VoIP. Installation will occur [REDACTED] followed by deployment to TP and testing against the RINGBILL data. If successful we could turn this into an operational system and work through the details for tasking and number normalization.
+
+Reason for Change: The primary purpose of this system will be to determine its VoIP processing capabilities, though other capabilities will likely be examined as well. Trireme requires some development to support desk phone conversations of the RINGBILL data and it has been conveyed that TURTLEPOWER has the capability already. We are proposing deploying a TURTLEPOWER system to test this capability and potentially provide a solution for forwarding SIGINT to the to TOPIs in a compressed timeframe (comparitvely to the Trireme solution.
+
+This also provides BLARNEY an opportunity to help TURTLEPOWER develop their capabilities by using potentially unique data found in the BLARNEY environments. Any derived enhancements to TURTLEPOWER will help the agency as a whole.
+
+Mission Impact: This effort will potentially allow us to deliver RINGBILL voice cuts to the TOPI sooner than waiting for the Trireme solution. It also allows us to make sure we're using the best processing solution for the job.
+
+This will be worked in accordance to priorites as set by the BAT branch so other mission will not be negatively impacted.
+
+Additional Info:
+
+Last CCB Entry: 04/10/13 15:47:00 [REDACTED]
+09 Apr CCB - ECP status reviewed.
+
+Work Task ID: WT00010899
+Status: New
+Life Cycle Phase: [REDACTED]
+Last Log Entry: None ATT
+ECP Number: Blarney-55-12
+Description: Update Baseline - Deployment of TURTLEPOWER system in VQ environment
+Assigned To: [REDACTED]
+
+Work Task ID: WT00010944
+Status: Completed
+Life Cycle Phase: [REDACTED]
+Last Log Entry: --- 12/05/12 15:50:37 --- System has been deployed, configured, and is processing operational data. A DMR was submitted and approved prior to going live with operational processing on November 16th.
+Marking ticket completed as this system is now in an operational capacity.
+ECP Number: Blarney-55-12
+Description: Installation and configuration of initial TP server
+Assigned To: [REDACTED]
+
+Page 29 of 51
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
+(Report generated on:4/23/2013 7:00:17AM)
+
+Work Task ID: WT00010945
+Status: Being Worked
+Life Cycle Phase: [REDACTED]
+Last Log Entry: --- 04/03/13 15:49:37 -- Test data has been provided to PE to further develop against non SKINNY protocols in an effort to perform processing against a broader scope of data. We are currently waiting for their feedback on progress and what it would take to improve the system performance.
+ECP Number: Blarney-55-12
+Description: Analysis of Turtlepower Proceessing in BLARNEY
+Assigned To: [REDACTED]
+
+Page 30 of 51
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/UFOUO23April2013BLARNEYECPReport/metadata.json b/data/UFOUO23April2013BLARNEYECPReport/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fff98bb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/UFOUO23April2013BLARNEYECPReport/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+{
+ "title": "BLARNEY report April 2013",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "This NSA document describes the deployment of surveillance systems (RINGBILL, TURTLEPOWER, SKIDROWE) at \"TITAN POINTE\" to process bulk communications data including VoIP and video teleconferencing traffic. The systems are designed to intercept, filter, and analyze high-volume network traffic using legacy architecture initially, with plans to transfer to newer processing solutions for long-term mass surveillance capabilities.",
+ "long_description": "This NSA document from April 2013 details the technical implementation of mass surveillance infrastructure under codename \"RINGBILL\" at a facility called \"TITAN POINTE.\" The project involves deploying multiple interconnected surveillance systems—including VISIONQUEST, SKIDROWE, XKeyscore (XKS), and TURTLEPOWER—to process what the document refers to as \"DNI\" (Digital Network Intelligence) at unusually high data rates. The NSA engineers describe using legacy WC2/XKS systems initially because newer solutions won't be ready until mid-2013, requiring special network configurations \"to be capable of higher than normal throughput.\" The document reveals concerns about overwhelming their PINWALE storage partitions (NSA's metadata repository) with the sheer volume of intercepted data, necessitating filtering mechanisms. Significantly, the engineers note they need to develop capabilities to \"associate signaling with media cuts\" for VoIP processing and implement \"filtering based on dialing patterns\"—indicating bulk collection of phone conversations that are then selectively stored based on call patterns.\n\nThe document also describes deploying TURTLEPOWER, a specialized VoIP processing system, specifically because it can handle \"desk phone conversations\" from the RINGBILL data stream faster than their existing Trireme solution. The justification emphasizes speed: delivering intercepted voice communications to analysts sooner by using \"potentially unique data found in the BLARNEY environments.\" The technical work tasks reveal the infrastructure's scale—ordering specialized equipment, installing 10-gigabit network cards, duplicating fiber optic signals with splitters, and conducting system design reviews.",
+ "tags": [
+ "fiber tapping",
+ "fiber optic cables",
+ "DNI",
+ "Digital Network Intelligence",
+ "VoIP",
+ "video teleconference",
+ "data filtering",
+ "dialing patterns",
+ "high data rates",
+ "throughput",
+ "surveillance architecture",
+ "optical signals",
+ "telecommunications cables",
+ "cable network",
+ "cable tapping",
+ "signal interception",
+ "optical access",
+ "passive collection",
+ "active taps",
+ "optical splitting"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2013-04-23",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "REL TO USA, FVEY"
+ ],
+ "banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEy",
+ "genre": "report",
+ "programs": [
+ "BLARNEY",
+ "RINGBILL",
+ "WEALTHYCLUSTER2",
+ "XKEYSCORE",
+ "TRIREME",
+ "SKIDROWE",
+ "PINWALE",
+ "TITANPOINTE",
+ "VISIONQUEST",
+ "TURTLEPOWER",
+ "SKINNY"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2016-11-16",
+ "title": "Titanpointe: The NSA’s Spy Hub in New York, Hidden in Plain Sight",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2016/11/16/the-nsas-spy-hub-in-new-york-hidden-in-plain-sight/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Gallagher, Ryan",
+ "Moltke, Henrik"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2016/11/16/blarney-report-apr-2013/",
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/3220482/UFOUO23April2013BLARNEYECPReport.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "4159b0f6e6d963622b10ba586d6f345daa37bc731f015fee52a2281ce0fd05f5",
+ "pages": 7
+}
diff --git a/data/UK-Airhandler-Trainees/UK-Airhandler-Trainees.md b/data/UK-Airhandler-Trainees/UK-Airhandler-Trainees.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2c46182
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/UK-Airhandler-Trainees/UK-Airhandler-Trainees.md
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+SECRET
+
+PROPOSED ARTICLE FOR GC LATEST
+
+UK AIRHANDLER TRAINEES CONTINUE TO EXCEL AT NSAG
+
+During the recent visit to NSA/CSS Georgia (NSAG) by [REDACTED] USAF, who is the Deputy Chief / Central Security Service (DCH/CSS)*, at NSAW, the UK Airhandler** Team, who are currently deployed to NSAG, were presented with one of the General's Coins, in recognition of their recent excellent operational performance and great team work.
+
+[REDACTED], the Senior UK AH Mission Manager, received the coin on behalf of the team (see below):
+
+Caption: [REDACTED] USAF, congratulating [REDACTED] following the UK AH Team's award.
+
+The General presented a number of individual coins during his visit, but this was the only team award, which speaks volumes for how well thought of the UK AH team is at NSAG.
+
+SECRET
+SECRET
+
+The UK AH Team has been established at NSAG since Feb 08. To date we have seen 2 tranches of 9 personnel successfully attend training and operational consolidation and we are getting ready to welcome Tranche 3, which comprises of a further 5 trainees from across the Joint Service Signals Organisation (JSSO).
+
+Caption: Members of UK AH Tranche 1 and 2. (L to R) [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]
+
+Well done to all personnel associated with the UK AH Team, who continue to fly the flag for the UK at NSAG and are helping to strengthen, what is already, a very close working relationship, between Digby and NSAG.
+
+\*As the DCH/CSS [REDACTED] is the principal advisor to the DIRNSA/CHCSS on military cryptologic issues. DCH/CSS oversees the function of the military cryptology system; develops policy and guidance on the contributions of military cryptology to the SIGINT/INFOSEC enterprise; considers issues and trends across the extended enterprise to ensure optimal use of military resources in accomplishment of NSA/CSS mission; manages and cultivates the partnerships between NSA/CSS and the Service Cryptologic Elements (SCEs); and ensures military capabilities to fulfill the National Cryptologic Strategy.
+
+\*\*AIRHANDLER is the SIGINT collection package used on the PREDATOR unmanned airborne vehicle (UAV). Currently NSAG is the only site equipped to handle the back end of the AIRHANDLER mission. The UK has purchased three PREDATORs and, once the JSSO operators have been trained, Digby will become the second site capable of providing this support.
+
+SECRET
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/UK-Airhandler-Trainees/metadata.json b/data/UK-Airhandler-Trainees/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2f12827
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/UK-Airhandler-Trainees/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+{
+ "title": "UK AIRHANDLER trainees",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "This GCHQ document from 2008 describes British AIRHANDLER trainees at NSA Georgia receiving recognition for their operational performance supporting drone surveillance missions, with personnel from UK's Joint Service Signal Unit Digby being trained to operate SIGINT collection packages on Predator unmanned aerial vehicles. The document reveals that Digby was being established as only the second site worldwide (after NSA Georgia) capable of handling the \"back end\" processing of Predator drone intelligence collection after the UK purchased three Predator drones.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [
+ "Digby",
+ "RAF Digby",
+ "JSSU Digby",
+ "Joint Service Signals Organisation",
+ "Predator drones",
+ "UAV",
+ "NSA Georgia",
+ "NSAG",
+ "training",
+ "drone surveillance",
+ "operational personnel"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "GCHQ",
+ "date_created": "",
+ "classification": [
+ "SECRET"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "banner": "SECRET",
+ "genre": "report",
+ "programs": [
+ "AIRHANDLER"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2017-09-13",
+ "title": "NSA’s Quiet Presence at a Base in England’s Countryside Revealed in Snowden Documents",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2017/09/13/digby-uk-nsa-gchq-surveillance/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Gallagher, Ryan"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2017/09/12/uk-airhandler-trainees/",
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/3990975/UK-Airhandler-Trainees.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "081fab8e2c5b0405684d4886219d3b5881dc64149a99a6d745d85d64f3f26f02",
+ "pages": 2
+}
diff --git a/data/UK-special-forces-Reaper-drone-Jan-Feb-2012/UK-special-forces-Reaper-drone-Jan-Feb-2012.md b/data/UK-special-forces-Reaper-drone-Jan-Feb-2012/UK-special-forces-Reaper-drone-Jan-Feb-2012.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5d37c0d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/UK-special-forces-Reaper-drone-Jan-Feb-2012/UK-special-forces-Reaper-drone-Jan-Feb-2012.md
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+AFGHANISTAN
+VSAT Geolocation QRC. Efforts between CARBOY and MHS GHOSTHUNTER to support a GCHQ VSAT request on behalf of UK Special Forces resulted in verifying the location of a specific terminal in the Sangin area, Helmand Province, previously unreported. Within an hour of collection British forces in Afghanistan dispatched an MQ-9 Reaper (Predator-B) to the location provided by MHS. (SMM Notes, 3/12)
diff --git a/data/UK-special-forces-Reaper-drone-Jan-Feb-2012/metadata.json b/data/UK-special-forces-Reaper-drone-Jan-Feb-2012/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..323827e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/UK-special-forces-Reaper-drone-Jan-Feb-2012/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+{
+ "title": "UK special forces Reaper drone (Jan-Feb-2012)",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "This NSA document from March 2012 describes how NSA and GCHQ geolocation efforts in Afghanistan pinpointed a previously unknown VSAT terminal in Helmand Province for UK Special Forces, who dispatched an MQ-9 Reaper drone to the location within an hour of receiving the intelligence.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [
+ "geolocation",
+ "VSAT",
+ "Helmand",
+ "Sangin",
+ "UK Special Forces",
+ "MQ-9 Reaper",
+ "Predator drones",
+ "UAV"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2012-03",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "genre": "other",
+ "programs": [
+ "CARBOY",
+ "GHOSTHUNTER"
+ ],
+ "countries": [
+ "Afghanistan"
+ ],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2016-09-06",
+ "title": "Inside Menwith Hill: The NSA’s British Base at the Heart of U.S. Targeted Killing",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2016/09/06/nsa-menwith-hill-targeted-killing-surveillance/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Gallagher, Ryan"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/3089520/UK-special-forces-Reaper-drone-Jan-Feb-2012.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "d8bec080b1b97853d90836f8eb4873a89935fdb640b13d86f2e4468183c6dc72",
+ "pages": 1
+}
diff --git a/data/VisWeek2008/VisWeek2008.md b/data/VisWeek2008/VisWeek2008.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d20e6f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/VisWeek2008/VisWeek2008.md
@@ -0,0 +1,521 @@
+UK CONFIDENTIAL STRAP1 COMINT
+
+ABSTRACT
+
+Three members of B17 travelled to Ohio to attend the VisWeek 2008 visualisation conference. This conference, run by IEEE, is really three conferences in one:
+
+* Visualisation (Vis)
+* Information Visualisation (InfoVis)
+* Visual Analytics Science and Technology (VAST)
+
+This paper highlights relevant papers containing new ideas, useful techniques or tools for Sigint visualisation research at GCHQ.
+
+Overall the conference is *very* relevant to visualisation research at GCHQ, and we would recommend a similar level of attendance next year. We should also consider attending the European version, EuroVis, or perhaps the CHI (Computer Human Interaction) conference, which also covers Human Factors.
+
+Soft copy location
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+For additional copies of this document or for general queries please contact:
+
+[REDACTED]
+B17 - Data mining Applied Research
+Government Communications Headquarters
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+United Kingdom
+
+Page 2
+
+[REDACTED]
+UK CONFIDENTIAL STRAP1 COMINT
+
+UK CONFIDENTIAL STRAP1 COMINT
+
+1. CONTENTS
+
+1. CONTENTS ......................................................................................................................3
+2. KEY POINTS FOR VISUALISATION WORK AT GCHQ ........................................4
+3. GENERAL VISUALISATION LESSONS .....................................................................7
+4. THE MOST RELEVANT PAPERS ................................................................................9
+5. POSTERS ........................................................................................................................16
+6. TUTORIALS ...................................................................................................................18
+7. WORKSHOPS ................................................................................................................19
+8. PALANTIR GOVERNMENT TOOL DEMO .............................................................20
+9. VAST 2008 CHALLENGE ............................................................................................27
+10. KEYNOTE SPEECHES ................................................................................................28
+11. LESS RELEVANT PAPERS (FOR REFERENCE ONLY) .......................................30
+
+Page 3
+
+[REDACTED]
+UK CONFIDENTIAL STRAP1 COMINT
+
+UK CONFIDENTIAL STRAP1 COMINT
+
+2. KEY POINTS FOR VISUALISATION WORK AT GCHQ
+
+Page 4
+
+[REDACTED]
+UK CONFIDENTIAL STRAP1 COMINT
+
+UK CONFIDENTIAL STRAP1 COMINT
+
+| | |
+| --- | --- |
+| Palantir Government | Palantir Government is a very significant and impressive commercial product, a complete "analysis and reporting solution", similar in scope to Security Service's IE domain, but in many ways much more impressive and extendable. See Palantir Government tool demo. |
+| Building up an analysis picture | Missing from MONTE VISTA is an "analyst notebook" capability – where the analyst can keep track of the progress of their investigation and build up their intelligence report, and annotate data with notes from the analysis. Several presentations showed the importance of this (e.g. EntityBasedCollaborationTools, GraphicalHistoriesForVisualisation). This also looked to be a major feature of Palantir. This could be a major new thread of the VisFus research task or new feature set in MAMBA. |
+| Collaborative analysis | Several presentations showed the power of allowing multiple users to collaborate on a piece of analysis. (e.g. EntityBasedCollaborationTools, CollaborationSynthesis). Related to the point above, this could be a major new thread of work for Applied Research. |
+| Linked views at different levels of detail | Use of linked views that are at different levels of detail seems quite powerful: e.g. ExplorationOverviewAndDetail. A practical thing to try in MONTE VISTA would be 2 graph views. If you click on an aggregate link in one, the expansion into its components is shown in the other. |
+| Graph layout algorithms | Lots of ideas relating to graph layouts: • Try constrained graph layouts (e.g. Cerebral) • Try edge-grouping techniques (e.g. GeometryBasedEdgeClustering). Might be useful for either the graph view or the geo-temporal view. Also for very large (bulk data) type graphs. • Another interesting point was that we could different layout algorithms for different sizes of graph (e.g. for very large graphs: RapidGraphLayoutUsingSpaceFillingCurves) |
+| Large-graph visualisations | Several techniques were aimed at allowing you to understand the structure of very large graphs. The Visual Fusion team should discuss whether any of these techniques would be useful to the profiling team (e.g. GeometryBasedEdgeClustering, VisSocialAndScaleFreeNetworks, RapidGraphLayoutUsingSpaceFillingCurves). Could we add more views that would be useful for profiling/EDA researchers into MONTE VISTA? Also, several presentations had 2 linked graph views one "micro" and one "macro" on the screen at the same time. |
+| Interesting new views | • Cross between a matrix and a graph view to really highlight clusters in the graph (we could try in MONTE VISTA): SocialNetworksWithNodeDuplication (does have problems though). This might work well with dense parts of a graph – e.g. recipient-to-recipient relationships in CHARTBREAKER. • Tree maps (maybe not many applications?): SpatiallyOrderedTreeMaps • Scatter plots with transitions (RollingTheDice) |
+| Windowing graph work | • Paper on how to explore massive time series quickly enough to maintain interactivity: MaintainingInteractivity – architecture for visualising window on very large data set. Looked relevant to windowing semantic graph work in VisFus task. |
+
+Page 5
+
+UK CONFIDENTIAL STRAP1 COMINT
+
+| | |
+| --- | --- |
+| Other relevant algorithms / techniques | • Clustering by trajectories (useful for PIGS EAR style profiling): VisualClusterAnalysisOfTrajectoryData • Clustering sets of ranks: IncompleteAndPartiallyRankedData • Aggregating and visualising routes or trajectories: SpatioTemporalAggregation |
+| Occulus geo-time | Tool for showing maps or node-link graphs in two dimensions, and time in the third dimension. Recommend we get involved in ATS evaluation of this tool – it may be a generally useful tool within B17 for exploratory analysis of graph or geo data. See ConfigurableSpaces. |
+| VAST 2008 Challenge | The VAST 2008 Challenge invited teams to submit visualisations to solve challenge 4 problems sponsored by the US Intelligence community. The synthetic data sets were very relevant to GCHQ and Many teams contributed. It would be a good idea for the VisFus research to spend some time looking through the contributions and extracting the best ideas. |
+
+Page 6
+
+UK CONFIDENTIAL STRAP1 COMINT
+
+3. GENERAL VISUALISATION LESSONS
+
+1. This table gives some general lessons about visualisations that we picked up at the conference.
+
+| | |
+| --- | --- |
+| Level of detail | Be able to present the information at any level of detail, to enable overview and detailed inspection. Moving up and down the scale may imply more than just re-scaling the view – for example, clustering at the higher level of abstraction. |
+| Context and detail | Be able to get a feel for the overall shape of the data then dive in to see the detail (and vice versa). Critically, this switch should be made seamlessly, so that there is no break in the user's perception of what is happening and they can build a mental map of where they are and where they are going. Animated transitions can assist here. |
+| Smooth Transitions | These aren't just pretty animation – conveying the flow, or linkage between two states can be very powerful. |
+| Query = Visualisation = Result | Try to integrate asking questions, getting results and visualising the results altogether as a framework. It aids the exploration process because the user does not have to change mode each time. KNIME might be considered a reasonable example of such. |
+| Save time not the world | It is highly unlikely that a visualisation tool can produce a fantastic insight every time it is used. However, enabling users to do their job faster is a massive benefit to the organisation and much more easily achievable. Therefore, the aim should be on user productivity and keeping it simple, not creating a massively complex system that may just find the needle in the haystack (but probably won't). |
+| Data objects = domain objects | The metaphors used in the visualisation should be recognisable to the user as entities from their problem domain and not abstract data structures. This helps the user build their mental model and interact with the system much more naturally. Use organisational knowledge to create the right domain objects. |
+| Topology | Related to the previous item about domain objects, this is about trying to use a reasonable "map" of the problem space as part of the visualisation. It might be a real map or just a logical breakdown of the domain. The topology helps the user shape the analysis and allows them to place concepts in a natural way. Use organisational knowledge to create the right topology e.g. a biological cell seen in cross section. |
+| Collaboration | Visualisation/analysis systems can enable to people to work together in ways never possible before. Need to absolutely maximise the massive potential here. |
+| Workspaces | Giving users a personalisable space to work in enables them to externalise and structure their private thoughts. Having shared workspaces allows collaboration, and a good link between the two allows the continuous cycle of private thinking and shared work. |
+| Roles | It seems highly likely that when a team of analysts are working together on a complex problem their work will break down into different roles and this needs to be taken into account. |
+| Stripy Teams | Build user interfaces in multi-discipline teams to get the best combination of the tech and domain knowledge. Learn with actual users on real problems not toy ones – that's where the limitations of tools are exposed. |
+
+Page 7
+
+UK CONFIDENTIAL STRAP1 COMINT
+
+| | |
+| --- | --- |
+| Toolsets not applications | Requirements and analysis strategies change quickly, so better to have a set of tools than a hard-coded application. |
+| Analysis, Communications, History, Stories and Insights | The analytical process is not a simply a case of the user absorbing data until an analysis is formed. Rather it is a complex, ongoing process of exploration where hypotheses are tested, searches are performed, ideas are externalised and eventually communicated to others. Therefore our tools should aim to support the whole process rather than just aim to convert data into pictures, which is a tiny subset of the process. Especially important are the history of the work and the story that the analysis results are trying to tell. |
+| Report = Analysis | Do not force the user to do their analysis and then try and hack a pale, static, deficient copy of it into power point. The whole analysis should be the communication, and the report. |
+| Support Iteration | Be able to move through the query/result cycle iteratively, to support the way that follow-up questions naturally arise. |
+| Semi-structured data capture | Lack of structure gives freedom to the user, but does not enable sharing or knowledge capture. Semantic schemas avoid those pitfalls but impose a heavy burden on the user, and struggle where the data is imperfect. There is probably a middle ground which is the best of both worlds. |
+| Comparison | Be able to see and compare two versions of a particular data set at the same time. Changing the parameters and redrawing the UI does not enable humans to do comparison (e.g. some of our tools). Automated comparison highlights can assist here. |
+| History and Re-find | Be able to go back and forth through the iterations of analysis and start a new branch at whichever point. |
+| Visualisation is not the data | The visualisation has to represent the data in the best way possible, but perhaps we too often try to represent the exact data structures as is. |
+| Visualise something interesting | Try to show the relevant underlying causes for effects as well as the interesting effects themselves. Predict what would happen if those drivers were changed. This is what leads to concrete actions. |
+| Aesthetics aid understanding | The use of colour, shading and clever presentation is not just polish – it can add significant value to understanding the work. |
+
+[REDACTED]
+UK CONFIDENTIAL STRAP1 COMINT
+
+UK CONFIDENTIAL STRAP1 COMINT
+
+8. PALANTIR GOVERNMENT TOOL DEMO
+
+3. This was so significant we have created a separate wiki page: [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
+
+4. The wiki page also contains videos and presentations about the product. The
+ following text is taken from the wiki page.
+
+5. In summary, from the demo and questioning, Palantir looked to be an extremely
+ sophisticated and mature system - a complete "analysis and reporting solution",
+ similar in scope to Security Service's IE domain. B17 are in a good position to
+ judge the system, due to related recent work on MONTE VISTA, and we were
+ very impressed. You need to see it to believe it.
+
+6. The tool has a very polished "thick-client" user interface with multiple views
+ (graphs, tables, geo). It is supported by a scalable back-end server architecture
+ (90% of the code) which federates to customer databases, and stores working
+ data sets in a fused semantic graph model. In many respects (such as analysts
+ working on collaborative projects, the backend data federation system and tools
+ for working with entities extracted from text documents) it would take an
+ enormous effort for an in-house developed GCHQ system to get to the same
+ level of sophistication. Unlike other systems in the same field (i2 or IE Domain),
+ it has open APIs which allow customers to easily plug in their own Java
+ software.
+
+7. Clearly, adopting this commercial system for visual analysis and reporting would
+ conflict with the current plan in Better Analysis Agility to develop our own
+ desktop integration framework based on Eclipse in collaboration with second
+ parties. However, we feel it is important that the System Engineers in Better
+ Analysis are aware of the product and its feature set.
+
+8. Links to videos and reports are below. The VAST challenge papers and video
+ give a good overview of the tool, and include screenshots and worked analysis
+ examples of an interesting, but fictional, intelligence data set from the VAST
+ 2008 challenge.
+
+Company Background
+
+9. Palantir are a relatively new Silicon Valley startup who are sponsored by the
+ CIA. The company was started as an offshoot of the team developing the fraud
+ detection system for Paypal. They claim to have significant involvement with the
+ US intelligence community, although none yet at NSA. They have approximately
+ 150 employees in the USA (with a current policy of US citizens only, presumably
+ because of clearances, so no Europeans yet) and are looking to double this
+ number over the next year. They sponsored the IEEE VisWeek 2008 with the
+ aim of recruiting some good people during the conference.
+
+10. Their largest customer is somewhere been 100 and 1000 users, but likely in the
+ 100-200 mark. They claim to be keen on getting more customers and adapting
+
+ Page 20
+
+[REDACTED]
+UK CONFIDENTIAL STRAP1 COMINT
+
+UK CONFIDENTIAL STRAP1 COMINT
+
+ the platform to new things - but how this might play out is unclear (eg if X
+ agency with 100 users buys in, and Y agency with 10000 users buys in then
+ which ones features get developed first?). There was a throwaway comment at
+ the end of their VAST competition presentation about wanting to try new areas
+ outside Finance and Intelligence - this might lead to abandonware.
+
+Palantir Government
+
+11. Palantir Government is a sophisticated integrated analytics platform. It provides
+ a very rich Swing based GUI, and potentially a thin client too. Some instances
+ of this are apparently forward deployed to US interests, and the tool has been
+ developed closely internally with intelligence community users (unspecified, but
+ likely to be the CIA given the funding) over the last two years.
+
+12. The platform is developed on 1 month internal cycles, with every third internal
+ release being a public release. Must-have functionality or fixes can be delivered
+ as hotfixes to clients typically within days (or faster if the business case
+ demands).
+
+Platform
+
+13. It is a complete open (but proprietary) platform. They give full API details for
+ their backend API, and every call available within the backend is available
+ within the GUI APIs. It is possible to completely replace their GUI product with a
+ custom one if desired, although this seems pointless given the richness. Their
+ aim is to ship a template product plus a platform to develop things further - and
+ they expect customers will do this to add support for their business.
+
+14. The API exposes a number of points for integrating tools - either as clients that
+ can request / manipulate data themselves (e.g. possibly for mining algorithms),
+ or as GUI plugins that sit inside their Swing tool. This allows complete new
+ views of the data, similar to how this is done in MONTE VISTA, to be created.
+ The server connections operate over HTTPS.
+
+15. There is substantial Microsoft Office integration, including some sophisticated
+ export to PowerPoint (see "History" below)
+
+16. Everything is fully Unicode compliant, and we saw data in Arabic alongside
+ other scripts.
+
+17. Schemas are possibly based on OWL from what is said in their literature. There
+ is a concept of a dynamic ontology - their videos explain this better, but it is
+ essentially the same concept as the MONTE VISTA "Semantic Model", but with
+ the ability to add and remove types at runtime (as long as they aren't in use).
+
+Desktop system requirements
+
+18. This depends on the deployed functionality:
+
+Page 21
+
+[REDACTED]
+UK CONFIDENTIAL STRAP1 COMINT
+
+UK CONFIDENTIAL STRAP1 COMINT
+
+19. The financial sector and advanced government sectors have dual / triple head
+ machines, multiple core machines, high powered graphics and loads of
+ memory.
+
+20. At the other end of the scale some intelligence agencies have slimmer
+ deployments but with most of the capability (processing is largely serverside)
+ running on single 15" monitors on a single core machine. Obviously it gets
+ harder to see relationships between larger amounts of data / views in this
+ configuration.
+
+Views
+
+21. Currently a couple of views are provided - a simple tiled imagery geo view and
+ a graph view. However, there are also lots of controlling panels / subviews in
+ the system, such as histogram / line plots, as well as providing attribute /
+ aggregate counts for drill down / graph element selection. The line/histogram
+ plot was very similar in concept to the valuebar in MAMBA but perhaps a little
+ more comprehensive.
+
+22. Data from one view can be visualised in another view by drag and drop into that
+ other view - this was a deliberate design decision from working with users as it
+ allowed them to work on something in detail in one view while foraging for data
+ in another view, then manually add that new data into their other working view.
+
+23. There was no automatic synchronisation of data between views in this release,
+ but it was being added in the next major drop as a toggle option.
+
+24. The graph view had a very powerful "split links to bipartite" function, which
+ looked like it could be quite powerful. It also allowed merging of entities, eg
+ adding a telephone number as a logical attribute of a person by simple drag and
+ drop of one entity over the other, followed by a wizard.
+
+25. Brushing and dimming were supported in all views, giving a good indication of
+ data in the context of the wider picture.
+
+26. KML export was provided, which appeared to be via network link. This meant
+ that changes in the data to be displayed in the geo view could all be managed
+ within the tool itself, and google earth just became a simple viewer. We didn't
+ see anything as sophisticated here, but this was relatively new capability.
+
+27. The graph view had the ability to overlay "flow" information - ie a red pulse
+ travelled down the links between nodes, which is useful to see how data,
+ money etc are flowing around a graph / social network (essentially this is adding
+ another complex dimension onto the visualisation without overloading existing
+ metaphors such as link direction, colour, labels etc). This was really powerful,
+ as the movement really stood out against the static graph and background.
+
+Page 22
+
+[REDACTED]
+UK CONFIDENTIAL STRAP1 COMINT
+
+UK CONFIDENTIAL STRAP1 COMINT
+
+Data import
+
+28. It is possible to set up persistent stored queries against datasources (eg the
+ RAPTOR federator) which can return data as it appears on the underlying
+ systems.
+
+29. There are four main import mechanisms:
+
+• Copy and paste as document - this creates a new document (file) entity within the
+ graph and immediately allows tagging to take place to extract information as other
+ nodes/links. This is very polished, intuitive, and easy to use.
+
+• Open existing document, e.g. .doc, .txt, .xls - for structured formats this is quite
+ sophisticated and uses a simple bayesian method to learn the most likely field
+ mappings into your semantic schema. Can also load their interchange xml format.
+
+• Direct JDBC connection to your database - you define a mapping between fields
+ and attributes / types.
+
+• RAPTOR / federation backend - you provide semantic mappings and connections
+ on the backend and it queries your stores.
+
+Project / Investigations
+
+30. Current work is stored in investigations (could be thought of as similar to a
+ project filtered graph, or an i2 chart of stuff known for a particular operation).
+
+31. Each investigation is a subset of a larger backend semantic graph, and these
+ are stored on the servers (as is all data) and shared on a publish / subscribe
+ model. It is possible to essentially fork investigations to support multiple users
+ going in different directions, or collaboratively work together (though we didn't
+ see this).
+
+32. Each investigation conforms to the security model in the system, and users that
+ don't have the right credentials wont see those entities or relationships in the
+ graph they do not have permission to see.
+
+33. It is also possible to "export and lock" investigations (or fork, then export and
+ lock) to allow users in the field or on poor network links to carry on working on a
+ standalone workstation with new data. The standalone version is currently
+ limited to 4GB of data as it uses Oracle XE as the backend database in the
+ absense of the network connection
+
+Analytics
+
+34. Some basic graph analytics are provided in the tool as standard, and we saw
+ things like centrality, shortest path between nodes, etc.
+
+35. A more sophisticated plugin was in development for a customer and this
+ provided much more in the way of social network metrics.
+Page 23
+
+[REDACTED]
+UK CONFIDENTIAL STRAP1 COMINT
+
+UK CONFIDENTIAL STRAP1 COMINT
+
+History
+
+36. The system tracks all changes to data through an "online history". This allows
+ very rich auditing, but also allows users to undertake multiple lines of enquiry.
+ This was very similar to some of the visual history talks that have been
+ presented over the years at VisWeek, but was much more friendly in that it
+ doesn't delete the redo histories when a different track is taken.
+
+37. The history stores "what we knew when" - ie snapshots of the current
+ knowledge - and can be used to automatically generate Powerpoint or export to
+ i2 Analyst Notebook charts.
+
+Structured Text Extraction
+
+38. The platform can connect to any of the major entity extractors for automatic
+ tagging of imported documents. There is also a very sophisticated and easy to
+ use interface for manually tagging data and (really cool) linking data together
+ (eg associating a telephone number with an identity). Phantom entities can
+ automatically be created, eg when creating a telephone number this can be
+ associated with a "dummy" person or entity and the rest of the details added as
+ they are discovered.
+
+Backend details
+
+39. The backend stores things as a semantic graph, similar to MONTE VISTA, and
+ is backed with Oracle. They do not use RDF for performance reasons. The rest
+ of their backend runs on a MapReduce architecture to allow rapid and huge
+ scalability, and they charge on a per-core basis.
+
+40. There are three main types of server involved in Palantir:
+
+• RAPTOR federator (for data import from customer systems - this is an analytics
+ platform, not a bulk store)
+
+• Versioning server (for the investigations)
+
+Search and the RAPTOR federator
+
+41. The RAPTOR federator is a query mechanism that can connect to legacy /
+ corporate stores and analytics and query them for data. The returned data is
+ adapted into the graph representation by a set of mapping functions very similar
+ to the transformer/adapter mechanisms in MONTE VISTA and Eclipse.
+
+42. This would be one way that users could easily access data from BROAD OAK,
+ HAUSTORIUM, SALAMANCA, and IIB etc. RAPTOR can be scaled horizontally
+ by adding more boxes / CPU licences.
+
+43. Data ingest goes through a custom data validation and transformation
+ mechanism for each source, where data can be transformed into
+ approximations for faster fuzzy searching later.
+Page 24
+
+[REDACTED]
+UK CONFIDENTIAL STRAP1 COMINT
+
+UK CONFIDENTIAL STRAP1 COMINT
+
+44. Data can be searched with "metaphone" approximations, or any other "approx"
+ method you choose to add to the search and import facilities. This was quite
+ powerful, but not as powerful as the B14 / NSA method of full phonetic space
+ edit-distance matching.
+
+45. There is a "google for knowledge" box - simply type something in a-la google
+ and it goes against the current graph, backend store and and the raptor
+ federator to find matches to your query and then import them.
+
+Data model / security
+
+46. The data model supports custom metadata, which works at both the entity and
+ the attribute level. This allows tracking of security information, as well as the
+ source of any information that is imported, entered or adapted within the tool.
+
+47. The security mechanism is pluggable, to work with most standard security
+ schemes (eg it ships out of the box working with Microsoft Active Directory, but
+ can easily interface with many PKI products).
+
+Licencing
+
+48. US export regulations apply, and UK intelligence would have. Applied Research
+ contacts have indicated that their evaluation of the product was not really
+ dropped because it was not technically suitable, but rather due to a wider
+ project being cancelled, so we shouldn't draw negative conclusions from this.
+
+Trial costs
+
+49. Approx USD $190,000
+
+50. 12 cpu core licences
+
+51. 12 months support and maintenance
+
+52. 90 hours integration effort with datasources etc
+
+53. 15 users basic training
+
+54. They demonstrated the system on November 4th to our partners in London. We
+ were invited, but felt that it would be better to discuss the system here first and
+ request an onsite demo where we could invite more people.
+
+Conclusions
+
+55. Clearly adopting this commercial system for visual analysis and reporting would
+ conflict with the current plan in Better Analysis Agility to develop our own
+ desktop integration framework based on Eclipse, and it would have a massive
+ effect on our ability to collaborate with second parties. However, the product
+ provides a lot of capability in a very well integrated product, and it is interesting
+
+Page 25
+
+[REDACTED]
+UK CONFIDENTIAL STRAP1 COMINT
+
+UK CONFIDENTIAL STRAP1 COMINT
+
+ to see how such a product works - especially given the similarities to inhouse
+ development.
+
+56. We should perhaps consider an on-site demo, but such a demo should be
+ carefully contained so as not to undermine the programmes of work, as these
+ will likely provide more long term benefit. We have also been invited any time to
+ their offices in Palo Alto for more demos and discussions, but they also have a
+ fairly large presence in Maryland and Washington D.C.
+
+Pros
+
+• It looks good and appears easy to use - but this could be partly marketing spin
+ from very good sales people.
+
+• It seems very powerful - for example, there are important capabilities (such as
+ collaborative workflow, analysis history, and use of extracted entities from text
+ documents) that would require effort to integrate quite so smoothly into a GCHQ
+ in-house tool - but nevertheless could be done.
+
+• It seems to scale well with federated access to very large databases (but note,
+ this is purely based on questions we asked rather than solid evidence)
+
+Cons
+
+• This is not in Eclipse RCP. If we produced our own tool in RCP then we would be
+ throwing away their GUI and any functionality from other agencies using the tool.
+ I.e. we would have to adopt this instead of Eclipse rather than merge the two.
+
+• Adoption would have huge monetary and IPR cost (ie its no longer our IPR, other
+ agencies would need to buy in too in order to share "plugins")
+
+• We would be buying a "complete architecture" and therefore would become
+ utterly dependent on a commercial product.
+
+• There are no British staff which has caused issues over integration during talks
+ with (unspecified) sister agencies in London.
+
+• This is a small company who initially would be very keen to please new
+ customers by adding new features. However, as their customer base grows we
+ might get frozen out.
+
+• It is possible there may be concerns over security - the company have published
+ a lot of information on their website about how their product is used in intelligence
+ analysis, some of which we feel very uncomfortable about.
+
+Page 26
+
+[REDACTED]
+UK CONFIDENTIAL STRAP1 COMINT
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/VisWeek2008/metadata.json b/data/VisWeek2008/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..55a91c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/VisWeek2008/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+{
+ "title": "GCHQ VisWeek 2008 Conference Report",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "This GCHQ document summarizes key findings from the VisWeek 2008 visualization conference in Ohio, highlighting techniques and tools relevant to SIGINT analysis including collaborative analysis capabilities, graph visualization methods, and the Palantir Government platform. The report recommends incorporating features like analyst notebooks for tracking investigations, collaborative workspaces for multiple analysts, and various graph layout algorithms into GCHQ's MONTE VISTA visualization system.",
+ "long_description": "This classified GCHQ report documents findings from the VisWeek 2008 conference in Ohio, where three members of B17 (GCHQ's data mining applied research division) attended to survey the latest developments in visualization technology relevant to signals intelligence analysis. The conference combined three major visualization domains—Visualization (Vis), Information Visualization (InfoVis), and Visual Analytics Science and Technology (VAST)—and the GCHQ attendees found it highly relevant to their work, recommending continued attendance and possibly expanding to related conferences like EuroVis or CHI. The report systematically catalogs papers, posters, tutorials, and tool demonstrations that could enhance GCHQ's visualization capabilities, with particular emphasis on applications for their existing systems like MONTE VISTA (a graph visualization tool) and potential new research directions for the Visual Fusion (VisFus) task.\n\nA central highlight of the report is the detailed assessment of Palantir Government, described as \"a very significant and impressive commercial product\" offering a complete \"analysis and reporting solution\" that the GCHQ analysts found superior in many ways to existing UK intelligence tools, including the Security Service's IE domain. The report identifies several critical capability gaps in GCHQ's current systems, particularly the absence of an \"analyst notebook\" feature in MONTE VISTA where analysts could track investigation progress, build intelligence reports, and annotate data with analysis notes—a capability prominently featured in Palantir. The document emphasizes collaborative analysis as a major emerging theme, with multiple presentations demonstrating how allowing multiple users to work together on analysis could significantly enhance intelligence work. Other technical recommendations include implementing linked views at different levels of detail, exploring various graph layout algorithms for handling both small and massive datasets, and developing new visualization types such as matrix-graph hybrids for highlighting clusters, tree maps, and scatter plots with animated transitions.\n\nThe report also articulates fundamental visualization principles that should guide GCHQ's tool development, emphasizing that the goal should be \"save time not the world\"—acknowledging that visualization tools are unlikely to produce spectacular insights every time but can dramatically improve analyst productivity through better workflow efficiency. Key design principles include seamless transitions between overview and detail, smooth animations to maintain mental continuity, integration of querying and visualization into a unified framework, use of domain-relevant metaphors rather than abstract data structures, and support for both individual workspaces and collaborative environments. The document recommends GCHQ participate in the VAST 2008 Challenge, which used synthetic intelligence datasets highly relevant to GCHQ operations, and evaluate the Occulus geo-time tool being assessed by another GCHQ division. Throughout, the report reflects a sophisticated understanding that effective intelligence visualization requires multidisciplinary \"stripy teams\" combining technical and domain expertise, working on real operational problems rather than toy examples to expose the true limitations and requirements of analytical tools.",
+ "tags": [
+ "Palantir",
+ "CIA",
+ "PayPal",
+ "Microsoft",
+ "Arabic",
+ "data mining",
+ "Applied Research",
+ "IEEE conference",
+ "Ohio",
+ "visualization conference",
+ "InfoVis",
+ "Information Visualization",
+ "Visual Analytics Science and Technology",
+ "SIGINT visualization",
+ "intelligence analysis",
+ "graph visualization",
+ "Visual Fusion",
+ "Palantir Government",
+ "commercial tools",
+ "analytic tools",
+ "reporting",
+ "collaborative analysis",
+ "multi-user analysis",
+ "linked views",
+ "EuroVis",
+ "European conference",
+ "CHI conference",
+ "Computer Human Interaction",
+ "IEEE",
+ "data visualization",
+ "trip report"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "GCHQ",
+ "date_created": "2008",
+ "classification": [
+ "UK CONFIDENTIAL",
+ "STRAP 1",
+ "COMINT"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "banner": "UK CONFIDENTIAL STRAP1 COMINT",
+ "genre": "report",
+ "programs": [
+ "MONTE VISTA",
+ "MAMBA",
+ "CHARTBREAKER",
+ "PIGS EAR",
+ "KNIME",
+ "RAPTOR",
+ "BROAD OAK",
+ "HAUSTORIUM",
+ "SALAMANCA",
+ "IIB",
+ "INFOVIS",
+ "PALANTIR"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2017-02-22",
+ "title": "How Peter Thiel’s Palantir Helped the NSA Spy on the Whole World",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2017/02/22/how-peter-thiels-palantir-helped-the-nsa-spy-on-the-whole-world/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Biddle, Sam"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [
+ "Thomason, John",
+ "Cooper, Talya"
+ ],
+ "doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2017/02/22/gchq-visweek-2008-conference-report/",
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/3472495/VisWeek2008.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "pdf_sha256": "c06832e1f2a7c30e52ff088d00ed3201c41e240be8a3826fea2cbd8699d5b57c",
+ "pages": 14
+}
diff --git a/data/WHERE_WE_ARE/WHERE_WE_ARE.md b/data/WHERE_WE_ARE/WHERE_WE_ARE.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c33faf5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/WHERE_WE_ARE/WHERE_WE_ARE.md
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+Where we are
+
+| Cable | Relationship | Access | Egress | A | B | S/W | S/E | N/E | N/W | Europe | C | S/W | S/E | N/E | N/W | Europe |
+| :------------------ | :----------- | :------------------ | :-------- | :--- | :--- | :-- | :-- | :-- | :-- | :----- | :-- | :-- | :-- | :-- | :-- | :--------- |
+| SMW3 (NUMDAH) | REMEDY | 20 x 2.5Gs, 6 x 10G | 3 x 10Gs | 55 | 5.5 | 11 | | | | | 11 | 3 | | | | |
+| SCEPTRE | REMEDY | 80 x 10Gs | 2 x 10Gs | 400 | 40 | | 80 | | | | 80 | | 2 | | | |
+| FEA (NIGELLA) | GERONTIC | 26 x 10Gs | 2 x 10Gs | 130 | 13 | 26 | | | | | 26 | 2 | | | | |
+| APOLLO (N) (LATUS) | GERONTIC | 118 x 10Gs | 28 x 10Gs | 590 | 59 | 118 | | | | | 118 | 28 | | | | |
+| APOLLO (S) (ARCANO) | GERONTIC | 218 x 10Gs | 12 x 10Gs | 1090 | 109 | | | | | 218 | 218 | | | | | 12 |
+| SOLAS (MONDELLO) | GERONTIC | 12 x 10Gs | 4 x 10Gs | 60 | 6 | 12 | | | | | 12 | 4 | | | | |
+| TAT-14S (GIBUS) | GERONTIC | 23 x 10Gs | 2 x 10Gs | 115 | 11.5 | 23 | | | | | 23 | 2 | | | | |
+| KIRKISTOWN | GERONTIC | 18 x 10Gs | 2 x 10Gs | 90 | 9 | | 18 | | | | 18 | | 2 | | | |
+| LINNELL | GERONTIC | 12 x 10Gs | 2 x 10Gs | 60 | 6 | | 12 | | | | 12 | | 2 | | | |
+| ELAPSE | GERONTIC | 20 x 10Gs | 4 x 10Gs | 100 | 10 | | 20 | | | | 20 | | 4 | | | |
+| GRASP | GERONTIC | 34 x 10Gs | 4 x 10Gs | 170 | 17 | | | | | 34 | 34 | | | | | 4 |
+| CATEGORY | DACRON | 10 x 10Gs | 2 x 10Gs | 50 | 5 | | 10 | | | | 10 | | 2 | | | |
+| KNAPWEED | DACRON | 10 x 10Gs | 2 x 10Gs | 50 | 5 | | 10 | | | | 10 | | 2 | | | |
+| TOTALS | | 592 x 10Gs | 69 x 10Gs | 2960 | 296 | 190 | 150 | 0 | 0 | 252 | 592 | 39 | 14 | 0 | 0 | 16 |
+
+1
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/WHERE_WE_ARE/metadata.json b/data/WHERE_WE_ARE/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..77867b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/WHERE_WE_ARE/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+{
+ "title": "Where we are",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "This GCHQ document is a table tracking the agency's access to undersea fiber-optic cables as of an unspecified date, listing 13 cables with their codenames, telecommunications company partners (primarily \"GERONTIC\"/Cable & Wireless and \"REMEDY\"), and the capacity of data access and egress points measured in 10 gigabit connections. The table shows GCHQ had access to 592 10-gigabit connections across these cables with 69 egress points, with an unlabelled column totalling 2,960, with GERONTIC (Cable & Wireless) providing access to 9 of the 13 cables including FEA (NIGELLA), APOLLO North and South, and TAT-14S.",
+ "long_description": "This GCHQ document, titled \"Where we are,\" presents a comprehensive surveillance infrastructure table that maps the British intelligence agency's access to major undersea fiber-optic telecommunications cables as of an unspecified date (likely around 2009-2012 based on context from the Süddeutsche Zeitung article). The table meticulously catalogs 13 different undersea cable systems, each assigned cryptic codenames like NUMDAH, SCEPTRE, NIGELLA, LATUS, and ARCANO, alongside the telecommunications companies providing GCHQ with access—primarily \"GERONTIC\" (the codename for Cable & Wireless) and \"REMEDY\" (another telecom partner). For each cable, the document specifies the technical capacity in terms of 10-gigabit connections available for interception (\"Access\"), the number of egress points where data can be extracted (\"Egress\"), and various geographic or operational distribution columns. The bottom row totals reveal the staggering scale: GCHQ had engineered access to 592 10-gigabit connections across these cables, with 69 egress points, and an unlabelled column \"A\" totalling 2,960.\n\nThe dominance of GERONTIC (Cable & Wireless) in this surveillance infrastructure is striking—the company provided access to 9 of the 13 cables listed, including critical international routes like FEA (Flag Europe Asia, codenamed NIGELLA), both the northern and southern segments of APOLLO cables, TAT-14S (GIBUS), SOLAS (MONDELLO), and several others. According to the Süddeutsche Zeitung reporting, some of these cables—particularly FEA and FA-1 mentioned in related documents—didn't even belong to Cable & Wireless but were owned by competitors like the Indian company Global Cloud Xchange (formerly Reliance Globalcom). The documents suggest Cable & Wireless leveraged its control over \"backhaul\" connections at landing sites like Skewjack in Cornwall to provide GCHQ with access to competitors' infrastructure, with one document noting GERONTIC had access to a rival's \"linux infrastructure\" and was \"delivering statistics and metadata.\" This raises profound questions about whether Cable & Wireless was effectively spying on its competitors' networks on behalf of British intelligence.\n\nThis document provides evidence that GCHQ through partnerships with telecommunications companies had constructed a comprehensive underwater cable interception network. The two other company codenames appearing in the table—REMEDY and DACRON—suggest that Cable & Wireless wasn't GCHQ's only corporate partner in this endeavor, though GERONTIC clearly dominated the operation. The geographic distribution columns (labeled S/W, S/E, N/E, N/W Europe, and C) hint at how GCHQ organized its access by regional routing or cable segments, ensuring comprehensive coverage of global communications infrastructure. This single-page table thus represents a blueprint for mass surveillance of international telecommunications at a scale that would capture communications of millions of people worldwide.",
+ "tags": [
+ "Cable & Wireless",
+ "undersea cables",
+ "fiber optic cables",
+ "cable tapping",
+ "submarine cables",
+ "telecommunications",
+ "telecommunications surveillance",
+ "fiber tapping",
+ "telecommunications partners",
+ "corporate partnerships",
+ "telecommunications companies",
+ "Vodafone",
+ "surveillance infrastructure",
+ "cable access",
+ "data interception",
+ "cable codenames",
+ "operation codenames",
+ "access capacity",
+ "egress points",
+ "data exfiltration",
+ "surveillance capacity",
+ "capacity measurements",
+ "technical access",
+ "cable inventory",
+ "backhaul connections",
+ "backhaul access",
+ "competitor access",
+ "data collection",
+ "metadata collection",
+ "Global Cloud Xchange",
+ "Reliance Globalcom",
+ "Indian telecom",
+ "industrial espionage",
+ "cable ownership",
+ "cable operators",
+ "transatlantic cables",
+ "international cables",
+ "global communications",
+ "intercontinental cables",
+ "corporate cooperation",
+ "communications interception",
+ "telecommunications espionage",
+ "signals intelligence",
+ "cable landing stations",
+ "landing partners",
+ "access points",
+ "interception points",
+ "traffic monitoring",
+ "data flows",
+ "international data",
+ "telecommunications industry",
+ "infrastructure access",
+ "network access",
+ "physical access",
+ "optical access",
+ "signal access",
+ "tap points",
+ "interception infrastructure",
+ "surveillance network",
+ "monitoring network",
+ "global network",
+ "cable network",
+ "communications network"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "GCHQ",
+ "date_created": "",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "genre": "other",
+ "programs": [
+ "NUMDAH",
+ "SCEPTRE",
+ "NIGELLA",
+ "LATUS",
+ "ARCANO",
+ "MONDELLO",
+ "GIBUS",
+ "KIRKISTOWN",
+ "LINNELL",
+ "ELAPSE",
+ "GRASP",
+ "CATEGORY",
+ "KNAPWEED",
+ "DACRON",
+ "GERONTIC",
+ "REMEDY",
+ "SOLAS",
+ "APOLLO",
+ "FEA",
+ "SCEPTRE",
+ "SMW3"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "WDR",
+ "date_published": "2014-11-20",
+ "title": "Vodafone – der lange Arm des britischen Geheimdienstes?",
+ "link": "http://www1.wdr.de/daserste/monitor/videos/videovodafonederlangearmdesbritischengeheimdienstes100.html",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Restle, Georg"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "reporting_only": true
+ },
+ {
+ "publisher": "Channel 4",
+ "date_published": "2014-11-20",
+ "title": "Spy cable revealed: how telecoms firm worked with GCHQ",
+ "link": "http://www.channel4.com/news/spy-cable-revealed-how-telecoms-firm-worked-with-gchq",
+ "reporters": [
+ "White, Geoff"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "reporting_only": true
+ },
+ {
+ "publisher": "NDR",
+ "date_published": "2014-11-21",
+ "title": "Der lange Arm des Geheimdienstes?",
+ "link": "http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/snowden-vodafone-101.html",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Strozyk, Jan",
+ "Moltke, Henrik",
+ "Poitras, Laura"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "reporting_only": true
+ },
+ {
+ "publisher": "Süddeutsche Zeitung",
+ "date_published": "2014-11-25",
+ "title": "Snowden-Leaks: How Vodafone-Subsidiary Cable & Wireless Aided GCHQ’s Spying Efforts",
+ "link": "http://international.sueddeutsche.de/post/103543418200/snowden-leaks-how-vodafone-subsidiary-cable",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Obermaier, Frederik",
+ "Moltke, Henrik",
+ "Poitras, Laura",
+ "Strozyk, Jan"
+ ],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "pdf_sha256": "fe50879bb9e8b188d41e5dd67494dcfbe570106dfe0ba2fc975e5f70255fdb3f",
+ "pages": 1
+}
diff --git a/data/WHERE_WE_WANT_TO_BE/WHERE_WE_WANT_TO_BE.md b/data/WHERE_WE_WANT_TO_BE/WHERE_WE_WANT_TO_BE.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f5929a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/WHERE_WE_WANT_TO_BE/WHERE_WE_WANT_TO_BE.md
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+Where we want to be
+
+| Cable | Relationship | Access | Egress |
+| :---------- | :---------------- | :---------------- | :-------- |
+| NUMDAH | REMEDY | 3 x 2.5Gs 22 x 10Gs | 6 x 10Gs |
+| SCEPTRE | REMEDY | 80 x 10Gs | 20 x 10Gs |
+| HIASCO | REMEDY | 120 x 10Gs | 20 x 10Gs |
+| NIGELLA | GERONTIC | 26 x 10Gs | 10 x 10Gs |
+| LATUS | GERONTIC | 118 x 10Gs | 20 x 10Gs |
+| PRESCOTT | GERONTIC | 36 x 10Gs | 10 x 10Gs |
+| ARCANO | GERONTIC | 250 x 10Gs | 80 x 10Gs |
+| MONDELLO | GERONTIC | 20 x 10Gs | 6 x 10Gs |
+| KIRKISTOWN | GERONTIC | 18 x 10Gs | 4 x 10Gs |
+| LINNELL | GERONTIC | 24 x 10Gs | 6 x 10Gs |
+| ELAPSE | GERONTIC | 24 x 10Gs | 10 x 10Gs |
+| CATEGORY | DACRON | 12 x 10Gs | 6 x 10Gs |
+| KNAPWEED | DACRON | 12 x 10Gs | 6 x 10Gs |
+| STELLABLUE | STELLABLUE | 32+ x 10Gs | 10 x 10Gs |
+| GRASP | GERONTIC | 40 x 10Gs | 10 x 10Gs |
+| Cable X | GERONTIC | 32+ x 10Gs | 10 x 10Gs |
+| VISAGE | GERONTIC | 32+ x 10Gs | 10 x 10Gs |
+| Cable Y | PINNAGE | 84 x 10Gs | 20 x 10Gs |
+| Cable Z | PINNAGE / LITTLE | 196 x 10Gs | 40 x 10Gs |
+| Cable A | | 164 x 10Gs | 20 x 10Gs |
+| Cable B | | 164 x 10Gs | 20 x 10Gs |
+| Cable C | | 32 x 10Gs | 6 x 10Gs |
+| Cable D | | 169 x 10Gs | 20 x 10Gs |
+| Cable E | | 128 x 10Gs | 20 x 10Gs |
+| TOTALS | | 1693 x 10Gs | 390 x 10Gs |
+
+1
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/WHERE_WE_WANT_TO_BE/metadata.json b/data/WHERE_WE_WANT_TO_BE/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7368661
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/WHERE_WE_WANT_TO_BE/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+{
+ "title": "Where we want to be",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "This GCHQ document outlines the agency's aspirational expansion plans for undersea cable surveillance, showing desired access to 24 cables (compared to 13 in the \"Where we are\" document) with a dramatic increase in surveillance capacity to 1,693 10-gigabit connections and 390 egress points—nearly triple the existing infrastructure. The document includes eight cables with generic names (Cable X, Y, Z and A to E), five of them with blank relationship fields, suggesting GCHQ was actively pursuing partnerships with additional telecommunications companies beyond GERONTIC (Cable & Wireless), REMEDY, DACRON, and newly mentioned partners STELLABLUE, PINNAGE, and LITTLE to achieve comprehensive global communications interception.",
+ "long_description": "This GCHQ strategic planning document, titled \"Where we want to be,\" reveals the British intelligence agency's ambitious expansion goals for its undersea cable surveillance infrastructure. The table dramatically scales up from the existing capabilities documented in the companion \"Where we are\" spreadsheet, outlining desired access to 24 different cable systems with a total capacity of 1,693 10-gigabit connections and 390 egress points—nearly three times the current 592 connections and more than five times the current 69 egress points. The expansion plan maintains heavy reliance on GERONTIC (Cable & Wireless), which would continue to dominate by providing access to 11 cables, including substantial capacity increases for existing cables like ARCANO (from 218 to 250 10Gs) and LATUS (maintaining 118 10Gs but reducing egress from 28 to 20), alongside new additions like PRESCOTT, VISAGE, and the mysteriously labeled \"Cable X.\" The plan also shows continued partnerships with REMEDY (for cables like SCEPTRE, NUMDAH, and the new HIASCO) and DACRON (CATEGORY and KNAPWEED), while introducing new telecommunications partners identified by codenames STELLABLUE, PINNAGE, and LITTLE—suggesting GCHQ was actively cultivating relationships with additional telecom companies beyond its established partners.\n\nPerhaps most revealing are the eight cables listed at the bottom with generic designations—Cable X, Y and Z, plus Cable A through E—with five showing blank \"Relationship\" fields, indicating these represented target cables where GCHQ had not yet secured telecommunications partner cooperation. These unidentified cables account for 969 of the desired 1,693 total 10-gigabit connections, or roughly 57 percent of the planned expansion capacity. The ambitious scale of these unknowns—Cable Z alone representing 196 10Gs, Cable D showing 169 10Gs, and Cable A and Cable B each at 164 10Gs—suggests GCHQ was eyeing some of the world's highest-capacity international cable systems. The blank relationship fields suggest that no partner had yet been found for these cables. This wishlist document thus represents not just an expansion of existing surveillance partnerships but GCHQ's strategic roadmap for achieving even more comprehensive global communications monitoring.",
+ "tags": [
+ "Cable & Wireless",
+ "undersea cables",
+ "fiber optic cables",
+ "cable tapping",
+ "submarine cables",
+ "telecommunications",
+ "telecommunications surveillance",
+ "fiber tapping",
+ "telecommunications partners",
+ "corporate partnerships",
+ "telecommunications companies",
+ "Vodafone",
+ "surveillance infrastructure",
+ "cable access",
+ "data interception",
+ "cable codenames",
+ "operation codenames",
+ "access capacity",
+ "egress points",
+ "data exfiltration",
+ "surveillance capacity",
+ "capacity measurements",
+ "technical access",
+ "cable inventory",
+ "backhaul connections",
+ "backhaul access",
+ "competitor access",
+ "data collection",
+ "metadata collection",
+ "Global Cloud Xchange",
+ "Reliance Globalcom",
+ "Indian telecom",
+ "industrial espionage",
+ "cable ownership",
+ "cable operators",
+ "transatlantic cables",
+ "international cables",
+ "global communications",
+ "intercontinental cables",
+ "corporate cooperation",
+ "communications interception",
+ "telecommunications espionage",
+ "signals intelligence",
+ "cable landing stations",
+ "landing partners",
+ "access points",
+ "interception points",
+ "traffic monitoring",
+ "data flows",
+ "international data",
+ "telecommunications industry",
+ "infrastructure access",
+ "network access",
+ "physical access",
+ "optical access",
+ "signal access",
+ "tap points",
+ "interception infrastructure",
+ "surveillance network",
+ "monitoring network",
+ "global network",
+ "cable network",
+ "communications network",
+ "strategic planning",
+ "expansion plans",
+ "aspirational goals",
+ "capacity expansion",
+ "infrastructure expansion",
+ "scaling",
+ "future capabilities",
+ "desired access",
+ "target cables",
+ "operational expansion",
+ "surveillance expansion",
+ "coverage expansion",
+ "geographic expansion",
+ "partner expansion",
+ "relationship development"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "GCHQ",
+ "date_created": "",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "genre": "other",
+ "programs": [
+ "NUMDAH",
+ "SCEPTRE",
+ "HIASCO",
+ "NIGELLA",
+ "LATUS",
+ "PRESCOTT",
+ "ARCANO",
+ "MONDELLO",
+ "KIRKISTOWN",
+ "LINNELL",
+ "ELAPSE",
+ "CATEGORY",
+ "KNAPWEED",
+ "STELLABLUE",
+ "GRASP",
+ "VISAGE",
+ "REMEDY",
+ "GERONTIC",
+ "DACRON",
+ "STELLABLUE",
+ "PINNAGE",
+ "LITTLE"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "WDR",
+ "date_published": "2014-11-20",
+ "title": "Vodafone – der lange Arm des britischen Geheimdienstes?",
+ "link": "http://www1.wdr.de/daserste/monitor/videos/videovodafonederlangearmdesbritischengeheimdienstes100.html",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Restle, Georg"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "reporting_only": true
+ },
+ {
+ "publisher": "Channel 4",
+ "date_published": "2014-11-20",
+ "title": "Spy cable revealed: how telecoms firm worked with GCHQ",
+ "link": "http://www.channel4.com/news/spy-cable-revealed-how-telecoms-firm-worked-with-gchq",
+ "reporters": [
+ "White, Geoff"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "reporting_only": true
+ },
+ {
+ "publisher": "NDR",
+ "date_published": "2014-11-21",
+ "title": "Der lange Arm des Geheimdienstes?",
+ "link": "http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/snowden-vodafone-101.html",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Strozyk, Jan",
+ "Moltke, Henrik",
+ "Poitras, Laura"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "reporting_only": true
+ },
+ {
+ "publisher": "Süddeutsche Zeitung",
+ "date_published": "2014-11-25",
+ "title": "Snowden-Leaks: How Vodafone-Subsidiary Cable & Wireless Aided GCHQ’s Spying Efforts",
+ "link": "http://international.sueddeutsche.de/post/103543418200/snowden-leaks-how-vodafone-subsidiary-cable",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Obermaier, Frederik",
+ "Moltke, Henrik",
+ "Poitras, Laura",
+ "Strozyk, Jan"
+ ],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "pdf_sha256": "8a7e311ab34615a3ace87b9cb666e64096dc8a5b8d4ae0fe6e195b4ca01be4d3",
+ "pages": 1
+}
diff --git a/data/What-Are-the-Japanese-Like-Redacted/What-Are-the-Japanese-Like-Redacted.md b/data/What-Are-the-Japanese-Like-Redacted/What-Are-the-Japanese-Like-Redacted.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..00c4fa2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/What-Are-the-Japanese-Like-Redacted/What-Are-the-Japanese-Like-Redacted.md
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
+TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
+
+(S//SI//REL) What's NSA's Reputation Among Third Parties? What Are the Japanese Like as
+SIGINTers?
+FROM: the SIDtoday Editor
+Run Date: 11/19/2008
+
+(S//SI//REL) SIDtoday recently interviewed the Chief, Special US Liaison Activity,
+Japan (SUSLAJ), [REDACTED] (pictured) while he was in town, to find
+out about NSA's dealings with Japan and other Third Parties, among other topics...
+
+* 1. (U//FOUO) You have many years of experience in working with foreign governments, including work as an official NSA representative to Third Parties. What is NSA's reputation among its Third Party SIGINT counterparts? ...Is that reputation fairly consistent across all countries, or does it vary greatly from one to the other?
+
+(U//FOUO) I believe that with Third Parties, NSA's reputation is very good across the board. Foreign countries recognize us as the best in the field. Foreign partners want to work with us, because they realize that cooperating with us is in their own self-interest -- it doesn't just benefit the US, but rather it helps them to become more secure as well. They trust us as a partner, because of who we are and what we do. NSA has expertise and integrity.
+
+(C//REL) In fact, we (NSA) are sometimes such a "hot commodity" that other US agencies, and even US ambassadors, have used a new or expanded relationship with NSA as a quid. The host government officials often are interested for their own security needs and for a perceived "chair at the table"... such a proposition may in turn pry open the door for other dealings between our countries.
+
+* 2. (S//SI//REL) You now serve as the chief NSA representative in Japan. What are the Japanese like as SIGINTers? Are their methods of conducting SIGINT similar to NSA's?
+
+(S//SI//REL) I'd say that in some respects DFS [Japan's Directorate for SIGINT] has a methodology that is similar to ours, albeit still caught in a Cold War way of doing business. They are very accomplished SIGINTers, especially in the areas of signals analysis and Technical SIGINT. There is a difference, however, in how they are organized. They treat SIGINT as a special-access program -- the most sensitive program they have. The result is that they are rather stove-piped, somewhat like NSA was 10-or-more years ago. Since they treat SIGINT in such a close-hold manner, it's very hard to engage them in multi-national forums or even to get them to collaborate across Japanese governmental lanes. Bilaterally (NSA-DFS) they are a good partner, but they are very reluctant to participate with mixed or larger groups.
+
+* 3. (U) What is it like to live in Japan?
+
+(U) Japan is a great place to live. It has a wonderful culture that embraces the past -- it's infused in all they do-- yet they incorporate the past with the present. Japan also has a lot of natural beauty. Japan is very safe -- a great place to raise a family. Sometimes driving can be difficult due to the traffic, but the mass transit system is very easy to use -- they have it down pat! Tokyo is expensive -- the second-most expensive city in the world. Overall, most Americans who PCS to Japan like it and extend. [Note: see a video about life in Yokota, Japan.]
+
+* 4. (U) How much international exposure did you have prior to joining NSA, and how did it happen that you came to work at the Agency?
+
+(U) I served in Vietnam in the military. A few years after I left the service, I backpacked from Australia to Europe for 11 months. I stopped off at different locations to earn money, thereby giving me the opportunity to live and work with the people. [REDACTED] Cornell University later sent me to Indonesia for further study of Indonesian language and culture. This was a total immersion program where I lived with an Indonesian family and all my lectures and papers were in Indonesian. So, those were my major international exposures prior to NSA. Each gave me an opportunity to not only live in a foreign country but to see it from the inside -- from the perspective of the natives of those countries. I was recruited by the Agency while at Cornell University in the early 1980s.
+
+* 5. (U) If you had to pick one or two of the most memorable experiences you've had during your NSA career, what would they be?
+
+(S//REL) It's hard to limit it to just two, since I have been fortunate to have so many "memorable experiences." One experience would be my serving as part of a team working the Philippine target in the 1980s. The then-Philippine Branch was awarded the DCI's Meritorious Unit Citation for exceptional intelligence support during a prolonged period of turmoil in that country. I was given the honor of receiving the citation on behalf of the Branch from the then-DCI, Judge Webster. During my tenure the Branch worked 13 coup attempts, a political assassination (Ninoy Aquino) and the "Yellow Revolution" [in which Ninoy's wife Corazon took power]. We also provided intelligence support to counter two and a half insurgencies - rebellions by: 1) the Communist NPA [New People's Army]; 2) two main factions of the Islamic secessionist (Moros) on Mindanao, and finally by a rebellious faction of the Filipino military led by Colonel Honosan (that's the "half").
+
+(S//REL) The second experience that comes to mind occurred when I was the first NCR [NSA/CSS Representative] to Pakistan in 2004. I was given the privilege to lead a top-notch team of NSAers (three were interns) that made-up the first NSA team to Islamabad. (We called ourselves "Team IBAD 1"). The CIA officials there in Pakistan were pleased that NSA had sent people to the fight in Pakistan, but they considered us to be two and a half years too late in coming! Some CIA officers in the Station doubted that NSA could really add anything beyond what CIA had already put in place. Needless to say, we were eager to prove them wrong. We didn't have to wait long...
+
+Pakistani armored vehicles in operations against Islamic militants in the Northwest Frontier of Pakistan (Reuters)
+
+(S//REL) On the very first day we were up and running, the Pakistani military got into a fight in the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan. At about 0200 or 0300 our team received a visit from the Station's Tribal Area Branch Chief. He told us that "you guys are the only game in town!" -- meaning that SIGINT was providing the only
+picture of events in the tribal area and we were getting that information into the right hands in a timely manner. It was great to be able to show right off the bat like that what NSA is capable of. When Team IBAD 1 rotated out the Chief of Station presented each member with a plaque with the inscription "Hearing is Believing."
+
+(U//FOUO) I could name a lot of other incidents, as well -- I've never had a bad job working for NSA. Working with good people has been the important ingredient to my good work experiences. In my view, the key to success is this: surround yourself with smart, motivated people, and you'll be guilty by association... I've had 17 different positions in my 27-year career -- usually to start up something new or bring about major changes.
+
+* (U) ...How did that come about?
+
+(U//FOUO) [Former NSA Deputy Director] Bill Black told me that the Agency leadership wanted to "stretch me." The thinking was that's how you develop leaders: you have to take them out of their comfort zone and be willing to accept some broken glass. I agree. You, as a leader, have to have confidence in people -- to give them confidence that no "rocks" will come crashing down on them. The rocks will stop at the supervisor's level. I, however, always tell the folks working with me that I would appreciate knowing when a rock is rolling my way! In my experience the end result is worth the risks.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/What-Are-the-Japanese-Like-Redacted/metadata.json b/data/What-Are-the-Japanese-Like-Redacted/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b98d66c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/What-Are-the-Japanese-Like-Redacted/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+{
+ "title": "What are the Japanese like as SIGINTers",
+ "type": "SIDTODAY",
+ "description": "This SIDtoday interview with the Chief of NSA's Special US Liaison Activity in Japan discusses NSA's reputation among Third Party intelligence partners (described as \"very good across the board\" with NSA seen as \"the best in the field\") and characterizes Japan's Directorate for SIGINT (DFS) as skilled but organizationally stove-piped and stuck in \"Cold War\" methods, treating SIGINT as their most sensitive special-access program.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [
+ "SUSLAJ",
+ "Special US Liaison Activity Japan",
+ "DFS",
+ "Japanese intelligence",
+ "Japanese SIGINT",
+ "foreign partners",
+ "foreign governments",
+ "bilateral relationship",
+ "international collaboration",
+ "NSA reputation",
+ "signals analysis",
+ "Tokyo",
+ "Yokota Air Base",
+ "Japan living",
+ "Japanese culture",
+ "Moros",
+ "Mindanao",
+ "Filipino military",
+ "Islamabad"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2008-11-19",
+ "classification": [
+ "SECRET",
+ "SI"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "banner": "DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL",
+ "genre": "newsletter",
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [
+ "Japan",
+ "Philippines",
+ "Pakistan",
+ "Vietnam",
+ "Australia",
+ "Indonesia"
+ ],
+ "people": [
+ "Black, Bill"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2017-04-24",
+ "title": "Japan Made Secret Deals With the NSA That Expanded Global Surveillance",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2017/04/24/japans-secret-deals-with-the-nsa-that-expand-global-surveillance/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Gallagher, Ryan"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2017/04/24/what-are-the-japanese-like-as-siginters/",
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/3675596/What-Are-the-Japanese-Like-Redacted.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "publisher": "NHK",
+ "date_published": "2017-04-24",
+ "title": "アメリカに監視される日本 ~スノーデン“未公開ファイル”の衝撃",
+ "link": "http://www.nhk.or.jp/gendai/articles/3965/index.html",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Ikegami, Akira"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [
+ "Takeda, Shinichi",
+ "Tanaka, Izumi"
+ ],
+ "reporting_only": true
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "pdf_sha256": "0ed3f413b54f9c6b157036be64d6c603915f3a5d00bb3e64cb3f8e8afbcb5052",
+ "pages": 3
+}
diff --git a/data/What-Is-the-Worst-That-Can-Happen-March-2010/What-Is-the-Worst-That-Can-Happen-March-2010.md b/data/What-Is-the-Worst-That-Can-Happen-March-2010/What-Is-the-Worst-That-Can-Happen-March-2010.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aed4458
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/What-Is-the-Worst-That-Can-Happen-March-2010/What-Is-the-Worst-That-Can-Happen-March-2010.md
@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+TOP SECRET STRAP 1
+
+What’s the worst that could happen?
+
+This document contains examples of specific risk which may affect operations and
+which may need to be considered when writing submissions. This is not an
+exhaustive list: any operation could involve new risks. It is also not a pick and mix
+list. It is here to help you think about the sorts of risk that might need to be included
+in a submission to ensure that the Secretary of State has all the relevant information
+available when deciding whether or not to approve the submission.
+
+Are you the most appropriate person to assess the risk of your operation? Are you
+capable of looking at all the areas of risk (eg, reputational, technical, legal)? If not,
+ask someone who is (eg, an IPT expert, PTD, OPP-LEG respectively).
+
+Risks to Personnel
+
+* discovery/compromise of personnel involved in installation
+* risks to personnel associated with housing operation if operation is compromised
+* risk to collaborators / enabling agents
+* adequacy of plausible cover leading to compromise of individuals
+* Risk of false attribution and dire consequences (if there were a risk of reprisals
+against SIS agents or Embassy staff, then an assessment from the relevant SIS
+Controller or Ambassador might be appropriate)
+
+Technical Risk
+
+Appropriate technical colleagues are best placed to provide this information, eg PTD,
+NDIST, GTE, JTRIG.
+
+* Compromise of technique leading to loss of capability
+* Definite technical attribution leading to loss of capability
+* Compromise of equity leads to loss of capability and discovery of other operations
+(eg by FIS)
+* Novel capabilities have unknown effects outside of lab testing conditions
+
+Political or Reputational Risk
+
+If you think that any of the following risks are significant in your operation, you should
+consider whether or not you have adequate operational planning and mitigation in
+place.
+
+* attribution to HMG
+* attribution to UK
+* attribution to GCHQ
+* presumed attribution to UK (the target knows it's been the subject of an attack
+and assumes the UK is responsible)
+* mistaken attribution (the target mistakenly blames a UK ally, who in turn attributes
+an effect to the UK)
+
+1 of 3
+
+This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under
+other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET STRAP 1
+
+TOP SECRET STRAP 1
+
+* Political fallout with foreign governments or intelligence partners
+* Media exposure
+* Compromise of commercial partners
+
+Humint
+
+* Talk to Humint partners if you think you have a significant Humint risk.
+* Risk of false attribution and dire consequences (if there were a risk of reprisals
+against SIS agents or Embassy staff, then an assessment from the relevant SIS
+Controller or Ambassador might be appropriate)
+* Vulnerability of collaborators and enabling agents
+
+Risks to Relationships
+
+* Discovery or attribution could adversely impact on working relationships and/or
+sharing arrangements with sister agencies and/or second parties
+* Discovery or attribution could adversely impact on working relationships with
+commercial suppliers and ultimately restrict GCHQ's sigint cability
+* Potential to compromise a partner's operation
+* See also Political or Reputational Risk section
+
+Operational Phase
+
+* See also Discovery
+* Compromise of operation during installation, the course of the operation itself or
+egress of traffic
+* Inadequate personnel security controls
+* Operation does not succeed because the installed hardware/software does not
+function as planned
+* Operation does not success because the installed hardware/software works, but
+is neutralized (eg because the target network/system is upgraded or replaced)
+* Operation does not succeed because the target system is not used in the
+expected way (eg expected commercial usage does not occur)
+* Operation does not succeed because of reliance on an uncertain supply chain or
+other risky dependence.
+* Proportionality - the operation is not specific in its targeting
+* Who will have direct access to the data resulting from the operation and do we
+have any control over this? Could anyone take action on it without our
+agreement, eg could we be enabling the US to conduct a detention op which we
+would not consider permissible?
+
+Discovery
+
+Discovery is a risk itself, which can lead to almost all of the other risks featured here.
+What follows is a list of circumstances which can lead to discovery.
+
+* Compromise of operation during installation
+
+2 of 3
+
+This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under
+other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET STRAP 1
+
+TOP SECRET STRAP 1
+
+* Inadequate personnel security controls and subsequent information leak
+* Discover of installed hardware (including post-operation)
+* Forensic discovery of installed software
+* Discovery of a suspicious audit trail/logs/registry
+* Discovery of suspicious RF energy
+* Suspicious profile caused by hardware/software malfunction
+* Discovery of egressed traffic
+* Discovery through other IT leakage
+* Vulnerability to HIS or other monitoring
+* Inadequate monitoring of profile generated by operation
+* Inadequate review of risks during the lifetime of the operation
+* Reliance on an uncertain supply chain or other risky dependencies
+* Failure by operators to cover tracks, including clearing logs/changing read status
+of emails
+* Novel capabilities and techniques having unknown effects outside of lab testing
+conditions
+* Unforeseen changes to hardware or software leading to compromise of
+techniques or installation
+* Hardware/software malfunctions leading change in target behaviour, potentially
+including forensic investigation (and potential discovery) and/or loss of target
+access
+
+Legality
+
+Any risks relating to legality of operation or of subsequent actions enabled by the
+operation will usually be addressed by lawyers in legal section of submission, but
+may include the following issues:
+
+* liability of enabling commercial partners
+* the principle of non-intervention in a sovereign country's affairs
+* Could the Law of Armed Conflict apply?
+* Who will have direct access to the data resulting from the operation and do we
+have any control over this? Could anyone take action on it without our
+agreement, eg could we be enabling the US to conduct a detention op which we
+would not consider permissible?
+
+3 of 3
+
+This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under
+other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET STRAP 1
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/What-Is-the-Worst-That-Can-Happen-March-2010/metadata.json b/data/What-Is-the-Worst-That-Can-Happen-March-2010/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..78c8ff5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/What-Is-the-Worst-That-Can-Happen-March-2010/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+{
+ "title": "What’s the worst that could happen?",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "This GCHQ document from March 2010 presents a checklist of factors analysts should consider before going ahead with an operation to infiltrate a communications network, by physical or other means.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [
+ "risk assessment",
+ "Computer Network Exploitation",
+ "implants",
+ "close access",
+ "OPSEC",
+ "attribution",
+ "forensics",
+ "legal authorities",
+ "proportionality",
+ "Secretary of State",
+ "humint",
+ "JTRIG",
+ "SIS",
+ "corporate partners",
+ "supply chain",
+ "cover",
+ "detention",
+ "sovereignty"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "GCHQ",
+ "date_created": "2010-03",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "STRAP 1"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "banner": "TOP SECRET STRAP 1",
+ "genre": "other",
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [
+ "United Kingdom"
+ ],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "Boing Boing",
+ "date_published": "2016-02-02",
+ "title": "Exclusive: Snowden intelligence docs reveal UK spooks' malware checklist",
+ "link": "https://boingboing.net/2016/02/02/doxxing-sherlock-3.html",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Doctorow, Cory"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [
+ "Moltke, Henrik"
+ ],
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2699620/What-Is-the-Worst-That-Can-Happen-March-2010.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "pdf_sha256": "2c0e33f8f5ddc7229de876fe5e0e4bfeb160cf6bbcc83d97828e400325ae79f2",
+ "pages": 3
+}
diff --git a/data/Work-is-progressing-on-Menwith-Hill-Station-s/Work-is-progressing-on-Menwith-Hill-Station-s.md b/data/Work-is-progressing-on-Menwith-Hill-Station-s/Work-is-progressing-on-Menwith-Hill-Station-s.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..011ab45
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/Work-is-progressing-on-Menwith-Hill-Station-s/Work-is-progressing-on-Menwith-Hill-Station-s.md
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
+TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
+
+(U//FOUO) Work is Progressing on Menwith Hill Station's New Operations Building
+
+FROM: [REDACTED]
+Menwith Hill Station (F77)
+Run Date: 01/06/2010
+
+(U//FOUO) As seen in the below photo, quite a lot of steel work has gone up on Project PHOENIX -- MHS's new operations building. The 95,000 square foot building¹ will be a purpose-built, state-of-the-art facility to accommodate the myriad missions on site. Although inconvenienced during building, the MHS workforce recognizes the necessity and benefits of the new structure.
+
+(U//FOUO) Since the pilings went in just seven months ago, 90 percent of the steel has already been erected, with the remainder to go up by the end of December. This will provide the skeleton frame for the entire building.
+
+(U//FOUO) The new operations building will provide NSA's first Tier III equipment room, meaning that the most critical mission systems will be protected by redundant power and cooling supplies; significantly reducing the risk of mission loss as a result of a power anomaly. In addition, the new operations building will bring to site a 200-seat auditorium with state of the art audio-visual systems capable of supporting the many conferences that are hosted at site each year. Everyone in Operations will benefit from MHS's Education and Training Division new spaces -- 10 new classrooms fitted-up with the latest in teaching-aid technology.
+
+(U//FOUO) Many construction milestones have been met to make the facilities listed above a reality. The underground service tunnel was completed in October, which allowed for follow-on works; the plant room slab and mezzanine and roof sheeting are finished. During the last few months, 740 tons of steel and 4,200 cubic meters of concrete were delivered to site, with over 6,000 vehicle movements passing the construction gate. In mid-December, siding was completed on the east elevation and concrete poured for the last 2-story communications closet tower.
+
+(U//FOUO) During December 2009 and January 2010, contractors will be continuing concrete and steel works, installing exterior siding, installing prefab chilled water piping modules in the service tunnel and plant room, weatherproofing and breaking through the current roofs of the Bldg. 45 lift (elevator) and stair shafts. While the steel work phase continues, contractors have already started the next major phase of construction: mechanical and electrical installations. In the next couple of months, contractors will begin installing transformers, fire alarms, and sprinkler systems, as well as major plant work. This phase will continue well into the next year.
+
+(U//FOUO) While final dates are still being developed, site expects the building works to be completed in early March 2011. Once construction is complete, the fit-up phase (another major, $40M project) will begin. Staff should start to move into the building in mid-2012.
+
+(U) We continue to update the Phoenix web page with construction progress photos, fit-up information and associated projects.
+
+(U//FOUO) INterior framing of new operations building
+
+(U//FOUO) Workers have already constructed approximately 50% of the interior block walls in the plant room of MHS's new operations building.
+
+(U//FOUO) POC: [REDACTED]
+
+(U) Notes:
+1. (U//FOUO) Approximately 37,000 square feet is plant room space, with 58,000 square feet for operational use.
+
+(U//FOUO) This article is republished from MHS's HORIZON newsletter, December 2009 edition.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/Work-is-progressing-on-Menwith-Hill-Station-s/metadata.json b/data/Work-is-progressing-on-Menwith-Hill-Station-s/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8ecb1b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/Work-is-progressing-on-Menwith-Hill-Station-s/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+{
+ "title": "Work is progressing on Menwith Hill Station’s new operations building",
+ "type": "SIDTODAY",
+ "description": "This NSA SIDtoday article from January 2010 describes construction progress on Project PHOENIX, a massive 95,000 square-foot state-of-the-art operations building at Menwith Hill Station in Yorkshire, England, featuring NSA's first \"Tier III\" equipment room with redundant power and cooling for critical mission systems, a 200-seat auditorium, and 10 new classrooms. The $40 million facility was expected to be completed by early 2011 with staff moving in by mid-2012, requiring 740 tons of steel, 4,200 cubic meters of concrete, and over 6,000 vehicle movements through the construction gate.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [
+ "Menwith Hill",
+ "MHS",
+ "Yorkshire",
+ "UK facility",
+ "operations building",
+ "new construction",
+ "surveillance facilities",
+ "construction",
+ "building project",
+ "mission protection",
+ "training facilities",
+ "NSA workforce",
+ "GCHQ",
+ "site personnel",
+ "operational infrastructure",
+ "facility expansion",
+ "infrastructure expansion",
+ "operational expansion",
+ "capabilities development",
+ "mission expansion"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "NSA",
+ "date_created": "2010-01-06",
+ "classification": [
+ "UNCLASSIFIED"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [
+ "FOUO"
+ ],
+ "banner": "DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL",
+ "genre": "newsletter",
+ "programs": [
+ "PHOENIX"
+ ],
+ "countries": [
+ "United Kingdom"
+ ],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2016-09-06",
+ "title": "Inside Menwith Hill: The NSA’s British Base at the Heart of U.S. Targeted Killing",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2016/09/06/nsa-menwith-hill-targeted-killing-surveillance/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Gallagher, Ryan"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/3089513/Work-is-progressing-on-Menwith-Hill-Station-s.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "c96490c4ee801ed80d12407a5fa0ce7e0fbcac2ccc43760f821487cb884b2731",
+ "pages": 2
+}
diff --git a/data/Xks-Helper-Notes-Redacted/Xks-Helper-Notes-Redacted.md b/data/Xks-Helper-Notes-Redacted/Xks-Helper-Notes-Redacted.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..91cd11b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/Xks-Helper-Notes-Redacted/Xks-Helper-Notes-Redacted.md
@@ -0,0 +1,378 @@
+TOP SECRET STRAP 1
+
+XKEYSCORE HELPER NOTES
+
+There are several new and updated features in this release of the XKEYSCORE Palantir helper:
+* Summary/Histogram import of data
+* Data sourcing for XKEYSCORE queries
+* Fixes for UI redraw bugs on query list refresh
+* Fixes for disappearing links
+
+Summary import
+
+This feature is intended to mirror the functionality in XKEYSCORE for creating histogram grids over a query. It allows for a large dataset to be reduced down in size considerably while still maintaining useful data. As an example this is a histogram grid view over a small query in XKEYSCORE, histogrammed by From IP, To IP and To Port:
+
+```
+Histogram Grid
+
+Page 1 of 1 Clear Selection Export Displaying 1-39 of 39
+| Filter | Fm IP | To IP | To Port | Count▾ |
+|--------|------------|------------|---------|--------|
+| | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | 20644 | 19 |
+| | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | 8676 | 7 |
+| | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | 38960 | 6 |
+| | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | 25193 | 4 |
+| | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | 53 | 3 |
+| | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | 27977 | 2 |
+| | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | 32768 | 2 |
+| | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | 53 | 2 |
+| | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | 53 | 2 |
+| | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | 52835 | 2 |
+| | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | 47565 | 2 |
+| | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | 27977 | 2 |
+```
+
+As you can see, there are 19 entries for the top line here. In the old XKEYSCORE helper this would create 19 new events. While you still have the option of importing every row in an XKEYSCORE query as a new connection, the summary import lets you cut this down a little. Once logged in to the helper, choose the "Summarise by..." button:
+
+```
+History | Timeline | XKEYSCORE (LIVE)
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+Add to graph
+Refresh query list
+Choose new node colour (First)
+Choose new node colour (Last)
+Summarise by...
+[ ] Summarise results
+[ ] Auto-merge links
+
+Add to Gra... | Import as | Query Name | Status | Query Type | Num Resu... | Num DBs | Datetime S... | [ ] | Classic | http_parser | finished | http_parser | 2974 | 3 of 3 | 2011-03-24 ... |
+[ ] | Classic | full_log | finished | full_log | 80 | 12 of 12 | 2011-03-22 ... |
+[ ] | Classic | full_log | finished | full_log | 85 | 12 of 12 | 2011-03-21 ... |
+[ ] | Classic | full_log | finished | full_log | 37 | 12 of 12 | 2011-03-21 ... |
+```
+
+1 of 6
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET STRAP 1
+
+TOP SECRET STRAP 1
+
+To mirror the histogram grid performed on the data, I've chosen to include to_port:
+
+
+```
+Choose fields
+
+Excluded | Included
+----------------------|-----------
+fm_port | to_port
+casenotation |
+sigad |
+fm_country_ip_ |
+fm_city_ip_ |
+to_country_ip_ |
+to_city_ip_ |
+session_length |
+appid_fingerprints_ |
+filepath |
+query |
+host |
+http_type |
+browser |
+application_info |
+bluesmoke_id |
+intrusion_set |
+organisation |
+implant_id |
+implant_name |
+attribute_name |
+attribute_value |
+browser |
+application |
+
+Save Cancel
+```
+
+Note that when doing a summary import, summarisations will be done on source and destination IP in addition to any included fields.
+
+2 of 6
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET STRAP 1
+
+TOP SECRET STRAP 1
+
+```
+Graph - Administrator Account 03/25/2011 12:02 GMT
+Investigation Edit Select Preferences Windows Help
+TS STRAP 1
+Import Click here to search Search
+Histogram Selection Filters
+Type: Connection
+Date Range: 2011/03/21 05:29:58.000
++00:00 to 2011/03/21 08:44:57.000 +00:00.
+Properties
+
+Type | Values | Classification
+Application | P2p/bittorrent | TS STRAP1
+ | P2p/bittorrent/bencoding | TS STRAP1
+IP Address (From) | [REDACTED] | TS STRAP1
+IP Address (To) | [REDACTED] | TS STRAP1
+Port (To) | 20644 | TS STRAP1
+Quantity | 19 | TS STRAP1
+Session Size | 1764 B | TS STRAP1
+
+Add Matches to Graph
+
+Related Entities
+
+Relationship | Related | Data | Data End | Test
+Appears In (2) | [REDACTED] |
+ | [REDACTED] |
+
+Add Entities to Graph
+
+Related Documents
+No related documents.
+
+Recent History
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+
+Current Selection
+Connection (1)
+[REDACTED]
+
+History | Timeline | XKEYSCORE (LIVE)
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+Add to graph
+Refresh query list
+Choose new node colour (First)
+Choose new node colour (Last)
+Summarise by...
+[x] Summarise results
+[ ] Auto-merge links
+
+Add to Gra... | Import as | Query Name | Status | Query Type | Num Resu... | Num DBs | Datetime S... | [ ] | Classic | id by | finished | http_parser | 2974 | 3 of 3 | 2011-03-24 ... |
+[ ] | Classic | full_log | finished | full_log | 80 | 12 of 12 | 2011-03-22 ... |
+[x] | Classic | full_log | finished | full_log | 85 | 12 of 12 | 2011-03-21 ... |
+[ ] | Classic | full_log | finished | full_log | 37 | 12 of 12 | 2011-03-21 ... |
+
+```
+
+In this example, I removed all the other data from the input from the graph.
+
+There are a few things to note from the results of this import:
+
+* Quantity records the number of results which matched that histogram criteria (In this case 19). This matches up with the XKEYSCORE histogram grid
+* Session size is a sum of all session sizes for this histogrammed piece of data. This allows you to see the total amount of data being sent from one IP to another, in this case also summarised by destination port.
+* "Application” shows the different fingerprints hit on for this summary event. For example, if X contacts Y and it is picked up by fingerprints foo on connection 1 and bar on connection 2, the summarised connection between X and Y will list "foo" and "bar" as applications
+* Time metadata is preserved in that you can view the first time this event occurred and the last.
+
+3 of 6
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET STRAP 1
+
+TOP SECRET STRAP 1
+
+Preferences for which fields to summarise by, whether you wish to summarise and whether you wish to automatically merge links between IP addresses and connections are saved per-user, so if you have a common histogram import then you don't need to re-select the fields to histogram on every time.
+
+Data sourcing
+
+Data imported into Palantir using the updated XKEYSCORE helper now has data sourcing.
+
+There are a couple of places this can be seen, the most evident is the "Data sources" application within Palantir. So, when you open up Data Sourcing:
+
+```
+
+Search
++ Data Repository
++ Manually Entered Data
+- XKEYSCORE
+ + XKEYSCORE QUERY [REDACTED]
+
+XKEYSCORE QUERY [REDACTED]
+Data Source has 72 records, now showing:
+32 Entities; 39 Events; 1 Document
+
+Contents of XKEYSCORE QUERY [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+```
+
+At the top level in this screenshot you can see there are three folders. The XKEYSCORE folder contains a list of the IP addresses and connection events associated with the query. Double clicking the document within this datasource opens up some metadata about the query run.
+
+4 of 6
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET STRAP 1
+
+TOP SECRET STRAP 1
+
+```
+XKEYSCORE QUERY [REDACTED]
+Data Source has 72 records, now showing:
+32 Entities; 39 Events; 1 Document
+
+Contents of XKEYSCORE QUERY [REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+[REDACTED]
+```
+
+```
+back fwd path map search extract export +font -font shot prev next add show/hide find+tag opts
+
+TS STRAP1
+Hide Summary
+
+XKEYSCORE QUERY [REDACTED]
+
+Related |
+--------|
+0 |
+0 |
+4 |
+0 |
+
+Object Info
+Type: Document
+Created by: Administrator Account
+Created at: 2011/03/25 12:31:36+00:00
+Classification: TS STRAP1
+
+Who's Watching This?
+No watchers
+watch this object
+
+Document | Properties | Related
+
+XKEYSCORE QUERY [REDACTED]
+
+Datetime: 2011-03-21 13:18:35
+Output [REDACTED]
+Query name [REDACTED]
+DBs: 12 of 12
+Hits: 85
+Status: 100%
+```
+
+5 of 6
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET STRAP 1
+
+TOP SECRET STRAP 1
+
+This information can also be accessed via an object imported into Palantir:
+
+```
+TS STRAP1
+
+[REDACTED] More...
+
+Related |
+--------|
+2 |
+0 |
+12 |
+0 |
+
+Type: Connection
+Created by: Administrator Account
+Created at: 2011/03/25 12:31:42+00:00
+Date: 2011/03/21 05:29:58.000 +00:00 to 2011/03/21 08:44:57.000 +00:00
+
+Who's Watching This?
+No watchers
+watch this object
+
+Summary | Properties | Related | Notes & Media | History
+
+Basic Info
+Type: Connection
+Label: [REDACTED]
+Classification: TS STRAP1 | Sourcing....
+
+Date Range
+Begin: Mar 21, 2011 05:29:58.000 +00:00
+End: Mar 21, 2011 08:44:57.000 +00:00
+
+Location
+Format: Lat/Lon
+Latitude:
+Longitude:
+
+Add to Map
+Sourcing...
+View Permissions
+
+Properties
+Search for Properties Add
+
+Type | Value | Classification
+---------------------|--------------------------|-----------------
+Application: | P2p/bittorrent | TS STRAP1
+ | P2p/bittorrent/bencoding | TS STRAP1
+IP Address (From): | [REDACTED] | TS STRAP1
+IP Address (To): | [REDACTED] | TS STRAP1
+Port (To): 20644 | 20644 | TS STRAP1
+Quantity: 19 | 19 | TS STRAP1
+Session Size: 1764 B | 1764 B | TS STRAP1
+
+Search Delete New Permissions
+
+Property Type: Session Size
+1764 B
+
+Property Fields
+Unit: B
+Number: 1764
+Role: None
+
+Date
+Metadata
+Created: 03/25/2011 12:31 GMT
+Last Modified: 03/25/2011 12:31 GMT
+
+Data Sources
+Data Sources: edit | view all documents
+- (1) XKEYSCORE QUERY (tcariso 1)
+ TS STRAP1
+
+Q Search | X Delete | View Permissions
+
+Number: 1764
+IP Address (To): 46.21.87.220 | TS STRAP1
+```
+
+After multiple imports of XKEYSCORE data have been done within the same investigation the list of data sources also grows appropriately:
+
+```
+Data Sources - Administrator Account 03/25/2011 12:02 GMT
+Investigation Edit Preferences Windows Help
+
++ Data Repository
++ Manually Entered Data
+- XKEYSCORE
+ + XKEYSCORE QUERY [REDACTED]
+ + XKEYSCORE QUERY [REDACTED]
+```
+
+6 of 6
+
+[REDACTED]
+
+TOP SECRET STRAP 1
diff --git a/data/Xks-Helper-Notes-Redacted/metadata.json b/data/Xks-Helper-Notes-Redacted/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ab645f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/Xks-Helper-Notes-Redacted/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+{
+ "title": "XKEYSCORE Helper Notes",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "This GCHQ document describes new features in the XKEYSCORE Palantir helper tool, including summary/histogram import capabilities that reduce large datasets by aggregating connection data rather than creating individual events for each entry, and data sourcing features that track which XKEYSCORE queries imported specific data into Palantir. The document provides step-by-step screenshots showing how analysts can histogram network traffic by source IP, destination IP, and ports, then import aggregated results showing metadata like total session sizes and connection counts.",
+ "long_description": "This technical guide documents enhancements to the integration between XKEYSCORE (NSA's massive signals intelligence database) and Palantir (the data analysis platform used by GCHQ and NSA). The primary innovation is the \"summary import\" feature, which mirrors XKEYSCORE's histogram functionality to dramatically reduce the volume of data imported into Palantir while preserving analytical value. Instead of creating separate events for each of 19 identical connection patterns (as in the example showing BitTorrent traffic), the new system creates a single aggregated \"Connection\" object with a \"Quantity\" property recording the count. The document walks through the workflow: analysts run queries in XKEYSCORE, select \"Summarise by...\" in the helper tool, choose fields to aggregate by (such as destination port), and import condensed results. The summarized connections preserve key metadata including the sum of all session sizes (showing total data transferred), the range of timestamps (first and last occurrence), and all application fingerprints triggered across the aggregated events. For example, if IP address X contacts Y multiple times triggering different detection signatures, the summary shows all fingerprints as \"applications\" on a single connection object.\n\nThe second major enhancement is comprehensive data sourcing, allowing analysts to trace any object in Palantir back to its originating XKEYSCORE query. The document demonstrates how imported data appears in Palantir's \"Data Sources\" application, organized hierarchically with folders for each query containing lists of IP addresses, connection events, and a document with query metadata (datetime, database coverage, hit count, status). Notably, the document includes an unredacted IP address—46.21.87.220—visible in one of the property panels, appearing as a \"To\" IP address in what the application fingerprints identify as BitTorrent peer-to-peer traffic. This data sourcing capability persists across multiple import sessions, with the system maintaining a growing list of XKEYSCORE queries that contributed data to an investigation. Analysts can view sourcing information either through the dedicated Data Sources application or directly from any imported object's properties panel, where a \"Sourcing...\" link and \"Data Sources\" section list contributing queries. The document emphasizes user convenience features like saving per-user preferences for histogram fields and auto-merge settings, eliminating repetitive configuration for common analysis workflows. These enhancements reflect the sophisticated integration between collection systems (XKEYSCORE) and analytical platforms (Palantir) that enable GCHQ and NSA analysts to efficiently process and investigate massive volumes of intercepted internet traffic.",
+ "tags": [
+ "Palantir",
+ "data fusion",
+ "data aggregation",
+ "data reduction",
+ "queries",
+ "connection events",
+ "IP addresses",
+ "network traffic",
+ "traffic analysis",
+ "BitTorrent",
+ "torrents",
+ "peer-to-peer",
+ "encoding",
+ "application fingerprints",
+ "quantity metadata",
+ "timestamp metadata",
+ "data collection",
+ "query tracking",
+ "target tracking",
+ "investigation",
+ "metadata storage",
+ "network infrastructure",
+ "workflow automation",
+ "implants",
+ "graph analysis",
+ "network analysis",
+ "internet traffic",
+ "intercepted communications",
+ "connection aggregation",
+ "connection mapping",
+ "event aggregation",
+ "collection systems",
+ "SIGINT collection",
+ "intelligence analysis",
+ "data processing",
+ "query integration",
+ "analytic tools",
+ "technical guide",
+ "screenshots",
+ "workflow",
+ "analyst workflow"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "GCHQ",
+ "date_created": "",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "STRAP 1"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "banner": "TOP SECRET STRAP 1",
+ "genre": "manual",
+ "programs": [
+ "XKEYSCORE"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2017-02-22",
+ "title": "How Peter Thiel’s Palantir Helped the NSA Spy on the Whole World",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2017/02/22/how-peter-thiels-palantir-helped-the-nsa-spy-on-the-whole-world/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Biddle, Sam"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [
+ "Thomason, John",
+ "Cooper, Talya"
+ ],
+ "doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2017/02/21/xkeyscore-helper-notes/",
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/3469345/Xks-Helper-Notes-Redacted.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "pdf_sha256": "7815098ddcccefb66fb802d8fd1cc01108ff158b89b2fc1eb11591ac14c8b5d6",
+ "pages": 6
+}
diff --git a/data/Yemen-backhaul-comms-collected-Jan-2011/Yemen-backhaul-comms-collected-Jan-2011.md b/data/Yemen-backhaul-comms-collected-Jan-2011/Yemen-backhaul-comms-collected-Jan-2011.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..36ea0dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/Yemen-backhaul-comms-collected-Jan-2011/Yemen-backhaul-comms-collected-Jan-2011.md
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+TOP SECRET//STRAP 1
+
+* During January GCHQ initiated OH tasking against Yemen microwave in order to confirm tower activity and to define emitter content. Analysis was performed on these backhaul comms (GSM & CDMA) using the ICS2 tool. Results have so far provided voice, SMS and at least one DNR hit. Collection has contributed highly to CT's work on this target. (GCHQ sources)
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/Yemen-backhaul-comms-collected-Jan-2011/metadata.json b/data/Yemen-backhaul-comms-collected-Jan-2011/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c8e816a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/Yemen-backhaul-comms-collected-Jan-2011/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+{
+ "title": "Yemen backhaul comms collected (Jan 2011)",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "This brief GCHQ document from January 2011 describes intelligence collection operations against Yemen's microwave telecommunications infrastructure, where overhead (OH) tasking confirmed tower activity and analyzed GSM and CDMA backhaul communications using the ICS2 tool, yielding voice intercepts, SMS messages, and at least one dial number recognition (DNR) hit that significantly contributed to counterterrorism work.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [
+ "microwave",
+ "OH tasking",
+ "OVERHEAD",
+ "backhaul connections",
+ "GSM",
+ "CDMA",
+ "ICS2",
+ "voice intercept",
+ "SMS interception",
+ "SMS",
+ "DNR",
+ "Dialed Number Recognition",
+ "DNR hit",
+ "counterterrorism",
+ "telecommunications targeting",
+ "microwave targeting",
+ "collection operations",
+ "signals analysis",
+ "communications analysis",
+ "mobile communications",
+ "cellular networks",
+ "telecommunications infrastructure",
+ "cell towers",
+ "emitters",
+ "backhaul access",
+ "mobile interception",
+ "cellular interception",
+ "network analysis",
+ "telecommunications surveillance"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "GCHQ",
+ "date_created": "2011-01",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "STRAP 1"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "banner": "TOP SECRET//STRAP 1",
+ "genre": "report",
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [
+ "Yemen"
+ ],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2016-09-06",
+ "title": "Inside Menwith Hill: The NSA’s British Base at the Heart of U.S. Targeted Killing",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2016/09/06/nsa-menwith-hill-targeted-killing-surveillance/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Gallagher, Ryan"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/3089517/Yemen-backhaul-comms-collected-Jan-2011.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "bb68ba2b6bb16a52088fd3f98dff35ec80bc44ec72798168f852d6ae0a78df73",
+ "pages": 1
+}
diff --git a/data/access-the-vision-for-2013/access-the-vision-for-2013.md b/data/access-the-vision-for-2013/access-the-vision-for-2013.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1900d80
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/access-the-vision-for-2013/access-the-vision-for-2013.md
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+SECRET
+
+ACCESS:
+THE VISION
+
+In 2013, we will have access to, and make readily available, data of the highest value possible to facilitate cyber operations and to enable IA, Effects and SIGINT. We remain committed to the principles of the Tordella doctrine and will be delivering dynamic and responsive access services to meet fast-changing customer requirements, providing a global reach through our assets in Cheltenham and at Extended Enterprise locations, and through multi-partner collaboration, shaping, and special relationships with industry.
+
+We will be using the world's biggest SIGINT engine to run cyber operations and to access better, more valued data for customers to make a real world difference. We will have exploited to the full our unique selling points of geography, partnerships, the UK's legal regime and our skilled workforce. We will have used our optimised SIGINT engine to support IA and Effects operations globally.
+
+As well as accessing events and content, we will have expanded our capabilities and abilities to perform CNE exfiltration, eAD, beaconry and geo-location, as well as gathering environmental information and various forms of 'Internet Pocket Litter' (e.g. cookies, delete keys). These new capabilities and forms of data have the potential to become our most highly valued and prized data.
+
+Version 1.0 – July 2010
+This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
+
+---
+
+SECRET
+
+ACCESS:
+THE STRATEGY
+
+Scale and Pace
+* Grow our Internet access to 800 10Gs
+* Transform to 40% UK-based / 60% overseas
+* Share challenges with 2nd/3rd Parties
+* Gain access to our most intractable and hard targets
+
+Balance
+* Obtain the most valuable data
+* Use the best tools
+* Increase innovative and experimental work
+
+Agility
+* Ready and able to respond at cyber pace
+* Meet enhanced security challenges
+* Better understand commercial trends
+
+Innovatively and legally deliver the highest value data using our global reach, skill and partnerships
+
+Legally
+* Necessity, proportionality and authorisation still apply
+
+Diversity, Integration, Co-operation
+* Access capabilities across all communications methods
+* Accesses act as force multipliers
+* Lower overall cost per unit of access
+
+Version 1.0 – July 2010
+This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
diff --git a/data/access-the-vision-for-2013/metadata.json b/data/access-the-vision-for-2013/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..287880d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/access-the-vision-for-2013/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+{
+ "title": "Access: Vision 2013",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "This July 2010 GCHQ strategic document outlines the agency's vision for 2013 to create \"the world's biggest SIGINT engine\" with access to 800 10-gigabit connections (up from existing capacity), expanding overseas operations to 60% while reducing UK-based to 40%, and developing new capabilities including computer network exploitation (CNE), exfiltration, beaconry, geolocation, and collection of \"Internet Pocket Litter\" like cookies and browsing data. The strategy emphasizes \"scale and pace,\" \"balance,\" and \"agility\" while claiming to operate within legal frameworks of \"necessity, proportionality and authorisation,\" and highlights partnerships with second and third parties to access \"intractable and hard targets.\"",
+ "long_description": "This classified GCHQ strategic planning document, dated July 2010, articulates an ambitious three-year roadmap for dramatically expanding the agency's global surveillance infrastructure and capabilities by 2013. The vision centers on building what GCHQ explicitly calls \"the world's biggest SIGINT engine\" by scaling internet access to 800 10-gigabit connections and fundamentally transforming the geographic distribution of collection assets from their current UK-heavy configuration to a 40% UK-based, 60% overseas model. This international expansion strategy relies heavily on \"multi-partner collaboration\" with second and third party intelligence agencies, \"special relationships with industry\" (telecommunications companies), and exploiting what GCHQ identifies as its \"unique selling points\": geographic positioning, partnerships, the UK's permissive legal regime, and skilled workforce. The document reveals GCHQ's intention to use this massive infrastructure not just for traditional signals intelligence but as the foundation for offensive cyber operations, information assurance (IA), and \"Effects\" operations globally. Notably, the strategy invokes the \"Tordella doctrine\"—a reference to NSA's former deputy director Louis Tordella, suggesting alignment with American intelligence principles around technical collection.\n\nThe most revealing aspect of the document is GCHQ's explicit prioritization of new forms of invasive data collection that go far beyond traditional communications interception. While acknowledging the continued importance of accessing \"events and content\" (metadata and message content), the strategy emphasizes \"expanded capabilities\" for Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) exfiltration (stealing data from compromised computers), eAD (likely electronic attack and defense or exfiltration and deployment), beaconry (implanting tracking mechanisms), geolocation, environmental reconnaissance, and gathering what GCHQ chillingly terms \"Internet Pocket Litter\"—including cookies, browsing histories, and \"delete keys\" (possibly referring to deleted data or encryption keys). The document states these new capabilities \"have the potential to become our most highly valued and prized data,\" suggesting browser cookies and web tracking data could be even more valuable than intercepted communications. The strategy's pillars—\"Scale and Pace,\" \"Balance,\" and \"Agility\"—reveal GCHQ's priorities: rapidly growing infrastructure to handle \"intractable and hard targets,\" obtaining \"the most valuable data\" using \"the best tools,\" and maintaining flexibility to \"respond at cyber pace\" to evolving security challenges and commercial trends. Despite boilerplate language claiming operations remain subject to \"necessity, proportionality and authorisation,\" the document's emphasis on \"diversity, integration, co-operation\" across \"all communications methods\" and treating different access points as \"force multipliers\" suggests a philosophy of comprehensive, bulk surveillance rather than targeted collection.",
+ "tags": [
+ "strategic planning",
+ "SIGINT engine",
+ "mass surveillance",
+ "global surveillance",
+ "internet access",
+ "capacity expansion",
+ "infrastructure expansion",
+ "surveillance infrastructure",
+ "international expansion",
+ "global reach",
+ "Extended Enterprise",
+ "Cheltenham",
+ "multilateral collaboration",
+ "industry relationships",
+ "telecommunications companies",
+ "corporate partnerships",
+ "partnership",
+ "Computer Network Exploitation",
+ "exfiltration",
+ "data exfiltration",
+ "eAD",
+ "beaconing",
+ "implants",
+ "tracking",
+ "cookies",
+ "browser cookies",
+ "delete keys",
+ "web browsing surveillance",
+ "highly valued data",
+ "new capabilities",
+ "expanded capabilities",
+ "Information Assurance",
+ "Effects operations",
+ "offensive cyber operations",
+ "SIGINT operations",
+ "events and content",
+ "metadata",
+ "message content",
+ "hard targets",
+ "target access",
+ "most valuable data",
+ "Louis Tordella",
+ "web browsing",
+ "browsing history",
+ "internet backbone",
+ "cable tapping",
+ "fiber tapping",
+ "fiber optic cables",
+ "undersea cables",
+ "submarine cables",
+ "telecommunications",
+ "telecommunications surveillance",
+ "cable access",
+ "data interception",
+ "access capacity",
+ "surveillance capacity",
+ "capacity measurements",
+ "backhaul connections",
+ "backhaul access",
+ "data collection",
+ "metadata collection",
+ "international cables",
+ "global communications",
+ "intercontinental cables",
+ "corporate cooperation",
+ "communications interception",
+ "traffic monitoring",
+ "international data",
+ "telecommunications industry",
+ "infrastructure access",
+ "network access",
+ "physical access",
+ "optical access",
+ "signal access",
+ "interception infrastructure",
+ "surveillance network",
+ "monitoring network",
+ "global network",
+ "cable network",
+ "communications network"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "GCHQ",
+ "date_created": "2010-07-01",
+ "classification": [
+ "SECRET"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "banner": "SECRET",
+ "genre": "slides",
+ "programs": [],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2015-09-25",
+ "title": "Profiled: From Radio to Porn, British Spies Track Web Users' Online Identities",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2015/09/25/gchq-radio-porn-spies-track-web-users-online-identities/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Gallagher, Ryan"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2015/09/25/access-vision-2013/",
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2432295/access-the-vision-for-2013.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "pdf_sha256": "6a4c0f75a0ec59296ed7c01038efc5749c2c23868a6925741b280a25e64fa726",
+ "pages": 2
+}
diff --git a/data/access_breakdown/access_breakdown.md b/data/access_breakdown/access_breakdown.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3582585
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/access_breakdown/access_breakdown.md
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+Access Breakdown
+
+| Access Point | Environment | x10G | Cables |
+|--------------|-------------|------|--------------------|
+| DONNINGTON | 214 | 2140 | Flag, Apollo South |
+| LATUS | 112 | 1120 | Apollo North & ? |
+| SCEPTRE | 80 | 800 | BT |
+| PRESCOTT | 36 | 360 | C&W |
+| GIBUS | 23 | 230 | SMW-3 |
+| KIRKISTOWN | 18 | 180 | C&W |
+| MONDELLO | 12 | 120 | Solas (BROKER) |
+| LINNELL | 12 | 120 | |
+| CATEGORY | 8 | 80 | Verizon |
+| KNAPWEED | 6 | 60 | |
+| ELAPSE | 20 | 200 | |
+| Total | 541 | 5410 | |
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/access_breakdown/metadata.json b/data/access_breakdown/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2459542
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/access_breakdown/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+{
+ "title": "Access Breakdown",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "This GCHQ document provides a technical breakdown of surveillance access points showing 11 different interception sites (with codenames like DONNINGTON, LATUS, SCEPTRE) accessing various undersea cables including Flag, Apollo North/South, BT, Cable & Wireless (C&W), SMW-3, Solas, and Verizon, totaling 541 10-gigabit connections representing 5,410 gigabits of surveillance capacity across the network.",
+ "long_description": "",
+ "tags": [
+ "Cable & Wireless",
+ "undersea cables",
+ "fiber optic cables",
+ "cable tapping",
+ "submarine cables",
+ "telecommunications",
+ "telecommunications surveillance",
+ "fiber tapping",
+ "telecommunications partners",
+ "corporate partnerships",
+ "surveillance infrastructure",
+ "cable access",
+ "data interception",
+ "cable codenames",
+ "operation codenames",
+ "access capacity",
+ "egress points",
+ "data exfiltration",
+ "surveillance capacity",
+ "capacity measurements",
+ "technical access",
+ "cable inventory",
+ "backhaul connections",
+ "backhaul access",
+ "competitor access",
+ "data collection",
+ "metadata collection",
+ "cable ownership",
+ "cable operators",
+ "transatlantic cables",
+ "international cables",
+ "global communications",
+ "intercontinental cables",
+ "corporate cooperation",
+ "communications interception",
+ "telecommunications espionage",
+ "signals intelligence",
+ "cable landing stations",
+ "landing partners",
+ "access points",
+ "interception points",
+ "traffic monitoring",
+ "data flows",
+ "international data",
+ "telecommunications industry",
+ "infrastructure access",
+ "network access",
+ "physical access",
+ "optical access",
+ "signal access",
+ "tap points",
+ "interception infrastructure",
+ "surveillance network",
+ "monitoring network",
+ "global network",
+ "cable network",
+ "communications network",
+ "Verizon",
+ "telecommunications interception",
+ "telecommunications companies",
+ "collection points",
+ "intelligence collection",
+ "SIGINT collection",
+ "bulk collection",
+ "mass surveillance",
+ "global surveillance",
+ "cables",
+ "telecommunications infrastructure",
+ "interception capacity"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "GCHQ",
+ "date_created": "",
+ "classification": [],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "genre": "other",
+ "programs": [
+ "DONNINGTON",
+ "LATUS",
+ "SCEPTRE",
+ "PRESCOTT",
+ "GIBUS",
+ "KIRKISTOWN",
+ "MONDELLO",
+ "LINNELL",
+ "CATEGORY",
+ "KNAPWEED",
+ "ELAPSE",
+ "BROKER"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": []
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "WDR",
+ "date_published": "2014-11-20",
+ "title": "Vodafone – der lange Arm des britischen Geheimdienstes?",
+ "link": "http://www1.wdr.de/daserste/monitor/videos/videovodafonederlangearmdesbritischengeheimdienstes100.html",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Restle, Georg"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "reporting_only": true
+ },
+ {
+ "publisher": "Channel 4",
+ "date_published": "2014-11-20",
+ "title": "Spy cable revealed: how telecoms firm worked with GCHQ",
+ "link": "http://www.channel4.com/news/spy-cable-revealed-how-telecoms-firm-worked-with-gchq",
+ "reporters": [
+ "White, Geoff"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "reporting_only": true
+ },
+ {
+ "publisher": "NDR",
+ "date_published": "2014-11-21",
+ "title": "Der lange Arm des Geheimdienstes?",
+ "link": "http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/snowden-vodafone-101.html",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Strozyk, Jan",
+ "Moltke, Henrik",
+ "Poitras, Laura"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "reporting_only": true
+ },
+ {
+ "publisher": "Süddeutsche Zeitung",
+ "date_published": "2014-11-25",
+ "title": "Snowden-Leaks: How Vodafone-Subsidiary Cable & Wireless Aided GCHQ’s Spying Efforts",
+ "link": "http://international.sueddeutsche.de/post/103543418200/snowden-leaks-how-vodafone-subsidiary-cable",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Obermaier, Frederik",
+ "Moltke, Henrik",
+ "Poitras, Laura",
+ "Strozyk, Jan"
+ ],
+ "contributors": []
+ }
+ ],
+ "aka_id": [],
+ "pdf_sha256": "c717131aab2e9ae7e7a1606e822076ed0d81c3e34bf3b7e5188f2c754600d2e6",
+ "pages": 1
+}
diff --git a/data/add-sd-blackhole/add-sd-blackhole.md b/data/add-sd-blackhole/add-sd-blackhole.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3eb2e30
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/add-sd-blackhole/add-sd-blackhole.md
@@ -0,0 +1,303 @@
+TOP SECRET STRAP1
+
+GCHQ
+GTAC
+
+# BLACK HOLE ANALYTICS
+
+[REDACTED]!
+
+ADD/SD briefing, September 2009
+
+TOP SECRET STRAP1
+
+This information is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and may be exempt under other UK information legislation Refer any FOIA queries to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET STRAP1
+
+## Contents
+
+* Describe the new breed of C2C tools developed in Applied Research (TR)
+* Scaling them up through the Next Generation Events (NGE) project
+
+This information is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and may be exempt under other UK information legislation Refer any FOIA queries to GCHQ O[REDACTED]
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET STRAP1
+
+## Next Generation Events Roadmap
+
+* Convergence 1
+ * ~8 x 10g
+* Cloud upscale
+ * ~50 x 10g
+* Internet Profiling 2
+ * ~200 x 10g
+
+* July 2009
+* Looking Glass deliveries
+* Looking Glass deliveries
+* Mar 2011
+
+* Internet Profiling 1
+ * ~80 x 10g
+ * ~260 experts
+* Capability development (including eA)
+* Large-scale contact chaining
+* Data mining and profiling
+
+New technologies (particularly from JCE) incorporated into solution as they are de-risked / proven
+
+This information is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and may be exempt under other UK information legislation Refer any FOIA queries to GCHQ [REDACTED]
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET STRAP1
+
+## NGE Analytical Capabilities
+
+Currently available on the desktop
+* Where?
+* When?
+* What?
+* With whom?
+
+Future desktop capability
+* Who is similar?
+* Who is suspicious?
+* Who does this thing?
+* When should I worry?
+
+* inmarsat
+* Google
+* VISA
+* facebook
+* skype
+* Google
+* BRITISH AIRWAYS
+
+This information is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and may be exempt under other UK information legislation Refer any FOIA queries to GCHQ O[REDACTED]
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET STRAP1
+
+## Some useful definitions
+
+* Presence Event
+ * Describes that an identifier was online, on an IP address, at a point in time.
+ * Simple, atomic element.
+ * Can be very easily developed so are very diverse
+ * Very useful!
+
+* TDI = Target Description Identifier
+ * Has a type, eg Yahoo-Y-Cookie
+ * And a value, eg tom123@yahoo
+
+* GTDI = Generic Target Detection Identifier
+ * Expands the TDI concept to telephony e.g. A GSM location update message
+
+This information is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and may be exempt under other UK information legislation Refer any FOIA queries to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET STRAP1
+
+## Some more definitions
+
+* BLACK HOLE: The large flat file storage where all the data sits
+ * After initial processing, and before being manipulated and correlated and loaded into the QFD database tables
+* QFD: Question Focused Dataset (Database)
+ * One for each tool: MUTANT BROTH, AUTO ASSOC etc
+
+This information is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and may be exempt under other UK information legislation Refer any FOIA queries to GCHQ O[REDACTED]
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET STRAP1
+
+### Probes
+
+* DATA FEED
+* TDI Extraction
+* HTTP Extraction
+* VBulletin Extraction
+
+### Flat Storage BLACK HOLE
+
+* TDIs
+* GETs
+* VBulletin
+
+### Structured Storage QFDs
+
+* MUTANT BROTH
+* KARMA POLICE
+* INFINITE MONKEYS
+
+This information is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and may be exempt under other UK information legislation Refer any FOIA queries to GCHQ [REDACTED]
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET STRAP1
+
+## QFD desktop...so far...
+
+* Enables analysts to:
+ * Create a profile of a target's online activities (Mutant Broth)
+ * Find other identifiers for a target (Auto Assoc)
+ * Create a social network (Social Animal)
+ * Investigate websites or web forums of interest (Karma Police, Infinite Monkeys, HRMAP)
+ * Find out who has been searching the web and for what (Memory Hole)
+ * Find out who has been looking at what on Google Earth (Marbled Gecko)
+
+This information is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and may be exempt under other UK information legislation Refer any FOIA queries to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET STRAP1
+
+## Converged QFD desktop...by Dec...
+
+* Enables analysts to:
+ * Create a profile of a target's online activities alongside telephony (Evolved Mutant Broth)
+ * Find alternative identifiers across telephony and the internet (Hard Assoc)
+ * Create a social network including telephony (Evolved Social Animal)
+ * Find out what has been happening in real time (Samuel Pepys)
+* All available on the desktop via Looking Glass plug-ins and Web GUIs
+
+This information is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and may be exempt under other UK information legislation Refer any FOIA queries to GCHQ [REDACTED]
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET STRAP1
+
+## Success story – TSS2 Nocon
+
+* Slides removed – contact [REDACTED] for full version
+
+This information is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and may be exempt under other UK information legislation Refer any FOIA queries to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET STRAP1
+
+```
+TR Lab, Benhall
+10g Bearers x 10-14
+Data Gateway
+TR BLACK HOLE
+Test new QFDs
+Processing Analytic Execution Environment (TR Lab, Benhall)
+NGE BLACK HOLE (Benhall)
+10g Bearers x 50
+IP Prob
+TELLURIAN
+SSE
+Other feeds
+BUFFER (Benhall)
+NGE BLACK HOLE (Benhall)
+Bulk extract
+NGE BLACK HOLE (Bude)
+10g Bearers x 34
+IP Prob
+Bulk extract
+TELLURIAN
+Direct Access
+SSE
+Other feeds
+BUFFER (Bude)
+NGE BLACK HOLE (Bude)
+Bulk extract
+Processing Analytic Execution Environment (Ops Community, Benhall)
+Operations
+Bulk extract
+Direct Access
+BLACK HOLE User
+Blazing Saddles
+```
+
+This information is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and may be exempt under other UK information legislation Refer any FOIA queries to GCHQ [REDACTED]
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET STRAP1
+
+## Capability Dev Workspace
+
+* I've just developed collection of My FaceSpace events!
+* Is that better?
+* I'll put that processing on a few more bearers...
+* Collection engineer/research team
+
+* This data might be best viewed like this; take a look
+* Is that better?
+* I'll just add in some of those results...
+* User-interface specialist
+* Easy access to data, however it is collected
+* Use live data to work on real problems
+* Put the latest results in front of analysts
+* Processing power ready to use
+* Rapid feedback and improvement
+* Analyst with an operational problem
+* Oh heck, I've caught Bin Laden
+* Hmm, new data... I wonder what happens if I mine it like this...
+* Will this NSA algorithm help?
+* Oh, this looks interesting – what does an analyst think?
+* Data miner
+* Analytics developer
+* Or this?
+* OK, but could you just...
+* Good, but how about...
+* Could you tweak it to...
+
+This information is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and may be exempt under other UK information legislation Refer any FOIA queries to GCH[REDACTED]
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET STRAP1
+
+## Data Mining at scale
+
+* Experiments with Cloud ongoing to enable analysts to request and run MOAGs (large TNN graphs) from the desktop
+* Distillery will enable analysts to spot real time changes to the data at scale (e.g. detection of impossible travel)
+* Joint Collaboration Environment (Innov8) – trialling running of large scale analytics using both GCHQ and NSA data
+
+```
+Phone 1
+Phone 2
+Phone 3
+Phone 4
+16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0
+0 10 15 20 25 30 35
+Time (weeks)
+```
+
+This information is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and may be exempt under other UK information legislation Refer any FOIA queries to GCH[REDACTED]
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET STRAP1
+
+## Future Implications
+
+* We shall be able to:
+ * easily monitor changes in our targets' profiles and networks
+ * develop and trial new capabilities using real life analytical experiments
+ * respond quickly in a crisis
+
+This information is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and may be exempt under other UK information legislation Refer any FOIA queries to GCHQ [REDACTED]
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET STRAP1
+
+## Questions?
+
+[REDACTED]/BLAZING_SADDLES
+[REDACTED]/NGE_BLACK_HOLE
+
+This information is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and may be exempt under other UK information legislation Refer any FOIA queries to GCHQ [REDACTED]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/add-sd-blackhole/metadata.json b/data/add-sd-blackhole/metadata.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..133c356
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/add-sd-blackhole/metadata.json
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+{
+ "title": "BLACK HOLE ANALYTICS, ADD/SD briefing, September 2009",
+ "type": "REPORTED",
+ "description": "This September 2009 GCHQ briefing describes the BLACK HOLE analytics infrastructure and Next Generation Events (NGE) project, which planned to scale from ~8 10-gigabit connections to ~200 10Gs by March 2011, storing intercepted data in massive flat-file repositories at Benhall and Bude before loading it into \"Question Focused Dataset\" (QFD) databases that power surveillance tools like MUTANT BROTH, KARMA POLICE, INFINITE MONKEYS, and others. The document outlines how \"probes\" extract Target Detection Identifiers (TDIs) from intercepted data feeds, store them in BLACK HOLE repositories, then enable analysts to profile targets' online activities, create social networks, investigate websites and forums, track web searches and Google Earth usage, and perform large-scale data mining across internet and telephony data.",
+ "long_description": "This classified GCHQ briefing from September 2009 provides a comprehensive technical overview of the BLACK HOLE analytics system and the ambitious Next Generation Events (NGE) roadmap designed to dramatically scale the agency's bulk surveillance infrastructure. The presentation describes a multi-phase expansion plan: \"Convergence 1\" with approximately 8 10-gigabit connections, followed by \"Internet Profiling 1\" (~80 10Gs serving ~260 experts), \"Cloud upscale\" (~50 10Gs), and ultimately \"Internet Profiling 2\" reaching ~200 10-gigabit connections by March 2011. The architecture centers on \"probes\" that tap into data feeds and extract various types of information—TDI (Target Detection Identifier) extraction, HTTP extraction, and VBulletin forum extraction—which then flows into BLACK HOLE flat-file storage systems located at GCHQ facilities in Benhall and Bude. The document explains that BLACK HOLE serves as intermediate storage \"after initial processing, and before being manipulated and correlated and loaded into the QFD database tables,\" with each specialized surveillance tool having its own Question Focused Dataset (QFD). The briefing proudly lists the analytical capabilities available \"on the desktop,\" showing logos of targeted companies and services including Inmarsat, Google, VISA, Facebook, Skype, and British Airways, organized around questions like \"Where?\", \"When?\", \"What?\", and \"With whom?\"\n\nThe document reveals how GCHQ's suite of surveillance tools integrates with the BLACK HOLE infrastructure to enable comprehensive monitoring of internet and telephony activities. Existing capabilities include MUTANT BROTH (creating profiles of targets' online activities), AUTO ASSOC (finding other identifiers for targets), SOCIAL ANIMAL (creating social networks), KARMA POLICE (investigating websites), INFINITE MONKEYS (analyzing web forums), MEMORY HOLE (tracking web searches), HRMAP (website investigation), and MARBLED GECKO (monitoring Google Earth usage). The briefing announces upcoming \"converged\" capabilities that will merge internet and telephony surveillance, including \"Evolved Mutant Broth\" for combined online and phone activity profiles, \"Hard Assoc\" for finding alternative identifiers across both domains, \"Evolved Social Animal\" for social networks including phone data, and \"Samuel Pepys\" for real-time monitoring. The presentation emphasizes the development of a \"Capability Dev Workspace\" where collection engineers, data miners, analytics developers, and analysts can collaboratively experiment with live operational data, with one slide humorously suggesting an analyst might exclaim \"Oh heck, I've caught Bin Laden\" while another character jokes about developing \"My FaceSpace events\" collection. The briefing highlights plans for \"data mining at scale\" using cloud computing to run large TNN (presumably Telephony Network Node) graphs, a system called Distillery to detect real-time anomalies like \"impossible travel,\" and the Joint Collaboration Environment (Innov8) for running large-scale analytics using both GCHQ and NSA data. The document concludes by stating future implications will enable analysts to \"easily monitor changes in our targets' profiles and networks,\" \"develop and trial new capabilities using real life analytical experiments,\" and \"respond quickly in a crisis\"—essentially describing an unprecedented capability for population-scale surveillance and profiling of internet users worldwide, all operating under the UK's permissive legal framework with minimal judicial oversight.",
+ "tags": [
+ "Next Generation Events",
+ "Applied Research",
+ "Benhall",
+ "Bude",
+ "GCHQ",
+ "structured storage",
+ "QFD",
+ "database",
+ "data feeds",
+ "HTTP interception",
+ "vBulletin",
+ "web forums",
+ "forums",
+ "TDI",
+ "GTDI",
+ "Generic Target Detection Identifier",
+ "Presence events",
+ "online identifiers",
+ "IP addresses",
+ "data processing",
+ "target correlation",
+ "data correlation",
+ "correlation",
+ "surveillance tools",
+ "analytic tools",
+ "internet profiling",
+ "profiling",
+ "JCE",
+ "Joint Collaboration Environment",
+ "INMARSAT",
+ "Google",
+ "VISA",
+ "Facebook",
+ "Skype",
+ "British Airways",
+ "targeted services",
+ "analysis",
+ "point in time",
+ "cookies",
+ "web cookies",
+ "browser cookies",
+ "telephony",
+ "GSM",
+ "surveillance architecture",
+ "direct access",
+ "fiber tapping",
+ "fiber optic cables",
+ "telecommunications",
+ "humor",
+ "real life experiments",
+ "web browsing",
+ "browsing history",
+ "probing",
+ "tapping",
+ "international cables",
+ "emails",
+ "instant messaging",
+ "social media monitoring",
+ "unique identifier",
+ "personal information",
+ "usernames",
+ "email addresses",
+ "monitor usage",
+ "de-anonymization",
+ "linking identifiers",
+ "web browsing history",
+ "single identifier",
+ "digital footprint",
+ "online activity",
+ "queries",
+ "search engines",
+ "MSN",
+ "Messenger",
+ "Windows Live Messenger",
+ "contact chaining",
+ "Google Maps",
+ "Google Earth"
+ ],
+ "document": {
+ "creator": "GCHQ",
+ "date_created": "2009-09-01",
+ "classification": [
+ "TOP SECRET",
+ "STRAP 1"
+ ],
+ "dissemination": [],
+ "banner": "TOP SECRET STRAP1",
+ "genre": "slides",
+ "programs": [
+ "BLACKHOLE",
+ "MUTANTBROTH",
+ "AUTOASSOC",
+ "INFINITEMONKEYS",
+ "KARMAPOLICE",
+ "SOCIALANIMAL",
+ "HRMAP",
+ "MEMORYHOLE",
+ "MARBLEDGECKO",
+ "HARDASSOC",
+ "SAMUELPEPYS",
+ "BLAZINGSADDLES",
+ "TELLURIAN",
+ "BUFFER",
+ "DISTILLERY",
+ "LOOKINGGLASS",
+ "NGE"
+ ],
+ "countries": [],
+ "people": [
+ "bin Laden, Osama"
+ ]
+ },
+ "publication": [
+ {
+ "publisher": "The Intercept",
+ "date_published": "2015-09-25",
+ "title": "Profiled: From Radio to Porn, British Spies Track Web Users' Online Identities",
+ "link": "https://theintercept.com/2015/09/25/gchq-radio-porn-spies-track-web-users-online-identities/",
+ "reporters": [
+ "Gallagher, Ryan"
+ ],
+ "contributors": [],
+ "doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2015/09/25/add-sd-black-hole/",
+ "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2432226/add-sd-blackhole.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "pdf_sha256": "55203ffc7941d2a4cbbd49fbf5f7b7246df4b0e1b84f0b4affb9dda155e25f59",
+ "pages": 15
+}
diff --git a/data/advanced-http-activity-analysis/advanced-http-activity-analysis.md b/data/advanced-http-activity-analysis/advanced-http-activity-analysis.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ad51e24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/advanced-http-activity-analysis/advanced-http-activity-analysis.md
@@ -0,0 +1,2072 @@
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+# Advanced HTTP Activity Analysis
+
+2009
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## Goal
+
+The goal of this training is to get you familiar with basic HTTP traffic and understand how to target and expliot it using X-KEYSCORE
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## Agenda
+
+* ?
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## What is HTTP?
+
+HTTP stands for Hypertext Transfer Protocol and it’s the primary protocol for transferring data on the World Wide Web
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## Why are we interested in HTTP?
+
+* facebook
+* Yahoo!
+* twitter
+* myspace.com a place for friends
+* CNN.com
+* Google Earth
+* mail.ru
+* Wikipedia The Free Encyclopedia
+* Gmail by Google BETA
+
+Because nearly everything a typical user does on the Internet uses HTTP
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## Why are we interested in HTTP?
+
+* Almost all web-browsing uses HTTP:
+ * Internet surfing
+ * Webmail (Yahoo/Hotmail/Gmail/etc.)
+ * OSN (Facebook/MySpace/etc.)
+ * Internet Searching (Google/Bing/etc.)
+ * Online Mapping (Google Maps/Mapquest/etc.)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## How does HTTP work?
+
+* HTTP is comprised of requests from clients to servers and their corresponding responses
+* Many analysts are already familiar with the terms “client-to-server” or “server-to-client” collection (also referred to as “client side” or “server side” collection).
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## How does HTTP work?
+
+* A “Client” is usually referring to a Browser (like Firefox or IE) which is also referred to as the “User Agent”
+* The “Server” can also be referred to as the “web-server” or “origin-server” which is the machine that is storing the data that is being accessed (like a web-page, a map, an inbox, etc)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## HTTP Activity
+
+* HTTP activity comes in two types:
+
+ Website.com
+ Client-to-Server “requests”
+ Server
+ Server-to-Client “responses”
+ Client
+ User
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## HTTP Activity
+
+* HTTP activity comes in two types:
+
+ Website.com
+ Server
+ Internet
+ Client
+ User
+
+While there may be a variety of Proxies, Gateways or Tunnels in between the client and the server, traffic is always going in one direction or the other.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## Client vs. Server Side Traffic
+
+* How do you know which side you’re looking at?
+* Client-to-Server requests are generally small in size and are computers talking to other computers
+* They contain standard HTTP header fields like “Host:” “Accept:” “Connection” etc.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## HTTP Activity Examples
+
+Client-to-Server request:
+
+```
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//20320108
+ID: sess_orig_proc
+Type: HTTP-GET
+Printer Friendly Version
+DNI Display | Raw Data | DNI Format
+Services
+
+GET /Hezbollah-Terrorism-Judith-Palmer-Harik/dp/1860648932 HTTP/1.1
+User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/525.19 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/1.0.154.48 Safari/525.19
+Referer: http://www.google.com.pk/search?hl=en&q=written books on hizbollah&btnG=Google Search&meta=
+Accept: text/xml,application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
+Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, bzip2, sdch
+Cookie: ubid-main=185-5525816-8765531
+apn-user-id=P1YXY7QF1PUYQ5
+Accept-Language: en-US,en
+Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,*,utf-8
+Host: www.amazon.com
+Connection: Keep-Alive
+```
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## Client vs. Server Side Traffic
+
+* Server-to-Client responses are generally larger in size and are what web-pages look like at the internet.
+* When you’re at a computer accessing the Internet, you’re only seeing Server-to-Client traffic.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## HTTP Activity Examples
+
+Server-to-Client Response:
+
+```
+ID: sess_orig_proc
++ Document information
+Type: HTTP
+Printer Friendly Version
+DNI Display Raw Data DNI Forma
++ HTTP Header Information
+Services
+Barca reinstates 6-point lead over Real
+Isfahan to exhibit expressionist art
+Home Page
+Iran
+Middle East
+Iraq
+Palestine
+Lebanon
+Turkey
+Persian Gulf
+Others
+US
+Asia/Pacific
+Africa
+Europe
+Americas
+Sci/Tech
+Health
+Kuwait government 'resigns' over economy
+Mon, 16 Mar 2009 19:07:16 GMT
+The Kuwaiti government has submitted its resignation to the county's emir amid a row over the premier's handling of the economic crisis. "The resignation has been submitted formally and it's up to the emir (ruler) to decide," Reuters quoted Nasser al-Duwailah, a parliamentarian, as saying on Monday. The resignation would further delay the approval of 5 billion dinars (USD 5.11 billion) rescue package which is to be injected to the Persian Gulf nation's economy to ease the impact of global financial crisis. The government has not commented on the report.
+Go
+Latest News
+Kuwait govern economy
+Childhood diet risk
+'US-Russian pa shield row'
+Judges want M confiscated
+Leader pardon
+Ancient book
+Lieberman eyes ally
+Intelligent peop
+```
+
+Bonus question: Why are the images in this web-page missing?
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## HTTP Activity
+
+* XKS HTTP Activity Meta-data differs greatly depending on which side of traffic we’re collecting
+* In nearly all cases it’s better to have client-to-server traffic
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## HTTP Activity Client-to-Server
+
+```
+GET /search?tab=urdu&order=sortboth&q=musharraf&start=3&scope=urdu&link=next HTTP/1.1
+Accept: */*
+Referer: http://search.bbc.co.uk/search?tab=urdu&order=sortboth&q=musharraf&start=2&scope=urdu
+Accept-Language: en-us
+Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
+User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
+Host: search.bbc.co.uk
+Cookie: BBC-UID=b479a5f4ad230a53063d513630203acb22584634a0e0b164c45f96efc054cf950Mozilla%2F4%2E0%20%28comp
+Cache-Control: max-stale=0
+Connection: Keep-Alive
+X-BlueCoat-Via: 66808702E9A98546
+Host
+search.bbc.co.uk
+URL Path
+/search
+URL Args
+tab=urdu&order=sortboth&q=musharraf&start=3&scope=urdu&link=next
+Search Terms
+musharraf
+Language
+en
+Browser
+Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
+Via
+66808702E9A98546
+Referer
+http://search.bbc.co.uk/search?tab=urdu&order=sortboth&q=musharraf&start=2&scope=urdu
+Cookie
+BBC-UID=b479a5f4ad230a5306d351630023cb2260463a40e0b164c45f9e6cf054cf950Mozilla%2F4%2E0%20%28comp
+```
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## HTTP Activity Server-to-Client
+
+```
+Application Info
+Press TV - Kuwait government 'resigns' over economy
+HTTP Type
+response
+
+ID: sess_orig_proc
++ Document information
+Type: HTTP
+Printer Friendly Version
+DNI Display Raw Data DNI Forma
++ HTTP Header Information
+Services
+Barca reinstates 6-point lead over Real
+Isfahan to exhibit expressionist art
+Home Page
+Iran
+Middle East
+Iraq
+Palestine
+Lebanon
+Turkey
+Persian Gulf
+Others
+US
+Asia/Pacific
+Africa
+Europe
+Americas
+Sci/Tech
+Health
+Kuwait government 'resigns' over economy
+Mon, 16 Mar 2009 19:07:16 GMT
+The Kuwaiti government has submitted its resignation to the country's emir amid a row over the premier's handling of the economic crisis. "The resignation has been submitted formally and it's up to the amir (ruler) to decide," Reuters quoted Nasser al-Duwailah, a parliamentarian, as saying on Monday. The resignation would further delay the approval of 5 billion dinars (USD 5.11 billion) rescue package which is to be injected to the Persian Gulf nation's economy to ease the impact of the global financial crisis. The government has not commented on the report.
+Go
+Latest News
+Kuwait govern economy
+Childhood diet risk
+'US-Russian pa shield row'
+Judges want M confiscated
+Leader pardon
+Ancient book
+Lieberman eyes ally
+Intelligent peop
+```
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## HTTP Activity – HTTP Types
+
+* Meta-data will also tell you which side of traffic you’re looking at
+* Client-to-server has two main types:
+
+ HTTP Type
+ get
+ HTTP Type
+ post
+
+* Server-to-client has only one:
+
+ HTTP Type
+ response
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## HTTP Activity – Get vs Post
+
+* A ‘GET’ is you requesting data from the server (most web surfing)
+* A ‘POST’ is you sending data to the server (i.e. signing in, filling out a form, composing an E-mail, uploading a file etc.)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## Let’s break down the important parts of a client-to-server request
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## HTTP Client-to-Server
+
+```
+GET /home.html
+Host: sample.website.com
+User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.9.0.10) Gecko/2009042316 (USG-25) Firefox/3.0.10
+Accept: image/png,image/*;q=0.8,*/*;q=0.5
+Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
+Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
+Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
+Keep-Alive: 300
+Connection: keep-alive
+```
+
+First thing to note is the Host: line which tells you the name of the server that the client is requesting data from
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## Host Field
+
+It’s important to note, that in many cases users think they’re at websites like www.yahoo.com, but behind the scenes data is coming from a number of different servers without the user knowing it:
+
+```
+GET /mc/modules/mr/abContacts?mcnumb=RIIDb59jm & jsrand=98037807 & rand=2127033459 HTTP/1.0
+Accept: */*
+Accept-Language: fa
+Referer: http://us.mc575.mail.yahoo.com/mc/showFolder?.ylc=X3oDMTBucmNobGR0BFSTA2M5ODMwMTAyNwRhYWNkZxNx2dz?mid=1_21857_AERkxEIAANvjSi6wUQ7fiLz4fY&fid=Inbox&sort=date&order=up&startMid=36&filterBy=
+x-requested-with: XMLHttpRequest
+Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
+User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727)
+Host: us.mc575.mail.yahoo.com
+Cookie: MG d=IvAXlFvaYnFGmmIfzw3zBCVVRe2jUKZLwwyoKSrjxxG0XVYaJhF95dLsZ5C0x1eDlcTcaHS_vpi
+Y
+```
+
+Bonus question: What would the impact of this be in how you formulate your X-KEYSCORE queries using the Host field?
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## HTTP Client-to-Server
+
+```
+GET /home.html
+Host: sample.website.com
+User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.9.0.10) Gecko/2009042316 (USG-25) Firefox/3.0.10
+Accept: image/png,image/*;q=0.8,*/*;q=0.5
+Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
+Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
+Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
+Keep-Alive: 300
+Connection: keep-alive
+```
+
+Second the GET line tells you which files the user is requesting from the server.
+If you simply take that line and append it to the Host line you have the live public URL that the user is requesting:
+http://sample.website.com/home.html
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## HTTP Client-to-Server
+
+```
+GET /example.php?region=iraq
+Host: sample.website.com
+User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.9.0.10) Gecko/2009042316 (USG-25) Firefox/3.0.10
+Accept: image/png,image/*;q=0.8,*/*;q=0.5
+Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
+Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
+Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
+Keep-Alive: 300
+Connection: keep-alive
+```
+
+When the GET line has a ? mark in it, then the GET request is also passing information to the server.
+So in this case the client is requesting the file example.php but it’s also passing along a value that could have been entered by the user.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## URL Lines
+
+When there is a ? mark in the URL line, then X-KEYSCORE is breaking it up into two parts. The first part is called the URL Path and the second part is called the URL Argument.
+
+| URL Path | URL Args |
+|----------|----------|
+| /search | tab=urdu&order=sortboth&q=musharraf&start=3&scope=urdu&link=next |
+
+Notice all of the “arguments” (each separated by &’s) in this URL:
+
+```
+GET /search?tab=urdu&order=sortboth&q=musharraf&start=3&scope=urdu&link=next HTTP/1.1
+Accept: */*
+Referer: http://search.bbc.co.uk/search?tab=urdu&order=sortboth&q=musharraf&start=2&scope=urdu
+Accept-Language: en-us
+Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
+User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
+Host: search.bbc.co.uk
+Cookie: BBC-UID=b479a5f4ad230a53063d513630203acb22b84634a0e0b164c45f96efc054c950Mozilla%2f4%2e0%20%2bcom
+Cache-Control: max-stale=0
+Connection: Keep-Alive
+X-BlueCoat-Via: 66808702E9A98546
+```
+
+Bonus question: Any idea what the information that is being passed in the URL Argument in this example are for?
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## HTTP Client-to-Server
+
+```
+GET /home.html
+Host: sample.website.com
+User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.9.0.10) Gecko/2009042316 (USG-25) Firefox/3.0.10
+Accept: image/png,image/*;q=0.8,*/*;q=0.5
+Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
+Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
+Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
+Keep-Alive: 300
+Connection: keep-alive
+```
+
+The User-Agent line gives you information on what type of client is requesting the data. In this case, we can see that it was a Firefox 3.0 browser from a Windows NT 5.1 (XP) machine.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## User Agents
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## User Agents
+
+The User Agent (also known as the “browser”) can be very valuable.
+While it can not be trusted to be absolutely unique, in many cases you can use it to unwind a proxy or multi-user environment.
+It can also help provide hints if the origins of the request came from a mobile device:
+
+```
+User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (SymbianOS/9.2; U; Series60/3.1 NokiaE63-1/100.21.110; Profile/MIDP-2.0 Configurat like Gecko) Safari/413
+User-Agent: NokiaN72/5.0706.4.0.1 Series60/2.8 Profile/MIDP-2.0 Configuration/CLDC-1.1
+User-Agent: iPhone Mail (5H11)
+```
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## HTTP Client-to-Server
+
+```
+GET /home.html
+Host: sample.website.com
+User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.9.0.10) Gecko/2009042316 (USG-25) Firefox/3.0.10
+Accept: image/png,image/*;q=0.8,*/*;q=0.5
+Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
+Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
+Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
+Keep-Alive: 300
+Connection: keep-alive
+```
+
+The various “Accept” lines instruct the server on the types of responses the client can accept back.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## Let’s look at a simplified version of a HTTP request and response
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+## What is Web (HTTP) Activity
+
+This shows how a person logs on to a webpage
+
+From Port 3434* (client)
+Click on http://www.hotmail.com GET Request
+To Port 80 (Server)
+MSN
+
+The client’s port can be any high-numbered port, 3434 is just an example
+
+## What is Web (HTTP) Activity
+
+---
+
+This shows how a person logs on to a webpage
+
+From Port 3434* (client)
+Click on http://www.hotmail.com GET Request
+To Port 80 (Server)
+
+To Port 3434* (client)
+"Welcome to Hotmail" HTTP Response
+From Port 80 (Server)
+MSN
+
+The client's port can be any high-numbered port, 3434 is just an example
+
+## What is Web (HTTP) Activity
+
+---
+
+This shows how a person logs on to a webpage
+
+From Port 3434* (client)
+Click on http://www.hotmail.com GET Request
+To Port 80 (Server)
+
+To Port 3434* (client)
+"Welcome to Hotmail" HTTP Response
+From Port 80 (Server)
+
+From Port 3434* (client)
+Email Address: me@hotmail.com
+Password: Admin123
+POST to the Web server
+To Port 80 (Server)
+MSN
+
+The client’s port can be any high-numbered port, 3434 is just an example
+
+---
+
+## What is Web (HTTP) Activity
+
+This shows how a person logs on to a webpage
+
+From Port 3434* (client)
+Click on http://www.hotmail.com GET Request
+To Port 80 (Server)
+
+To Port 3434* (client)
+"Welcome to Hotmail" HTTP Response
+From Port 80 (Server)
+
+From Port 3434* (client)
+Email Address: me@hotmail.com
+Password: Admin123
+POST to the Web server
+To Port 80 (Server)
+
+To Port 3434* (client)
+"Welcome to your Inbox/homepage" HTTP Response
+From Port 80 (Server)
+MSN
+
+The client's port can be any high-numbered port, 3434 is just an example
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## HTTP Activity
+
+* Real traffic, however, can be a little more complicated.
+* Almost all web pages are built from multiple files.
+* For example, every single image or banner ad on a web page is a separate file that needs to be individually requested before the server that has the file can respond
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## HTTP Activity – Real World
+
+* Let’s look at the “NSA Today” home page.
+
+```
+Dynamic Page -- Highest Possible Classification is
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
+UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
+NSA DAILY
+... the best minute you'll spend today
+Current Conditions
+Weather Information
+
+Daily's Hot Links Search | Searchlight | Ext. Connections | Orgs | Projects | EA Outages
+
+3 Oct 2009
+TAKE 2
+XmedMedia
+Agency Mass Mailers
+Today's EVENTS
+Multivision Ads
+Technology Expo
+Weight Watchers @
+NSA Daily "Need to Know"
+Past News »
+(U//FOUO) NSAG Hosts the CENTCOM Senior Enlisted Leader
+(U//FOUO) On 9 September 2009, NSA/CSS Georgia (NSAG) had the privilege of hosting a visit from Command Sergeant Major (CSM) Marvin Hill, Command Senior Enlisted Leader for United States Central Command (CENTCOM).
+FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+(U//FOUO) Pictured: NSA Georgia CSM Lori Brown welcomes Command Sergeant Major Marvin Hill, Command Senior Enlisted Leader for United States Central Command.
+(U//FOUO) This was CSM Hill's first visit to NSAG. The first stop during his visit was with ITD at the helpdesk. SGM Jacobs, of ITD, provided the CSM an overview of our maintenance operations and communications hub. CSM Hill told the ITD personnel, "you keep doing what you do, my comms run through here....and I need my comms"
+NSA IN THE NEWS
+From the DIRECTOR
+LTG Keith B. Alexander; United States Army
+Mission Messages
+Top IAD News
+(U) Securing the
+```
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## HTTP Activity – Real World
+
+* It looks like one page, but each of the images and banners are separate data files that your browser pieces back together
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## HTTP Activity – Real World
+
+* In fact, to build the NSA Today home page it takes 34 separate files from 4 different servers
+* However, most people probably don’t notice, because the entire page loads in <300 milliseconds.
+* If we had a slow internet connection, we’d notice the images would initially be missing.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## HTTP Activity Real-Word
+
+```
++ Document information
+Type: HTTP
+Printer Friendly Version
+DNI Display Raw Data DNI Forma
++ HTTP Header Information
+Services
+Barca reinstates 6-point lead over Real
+Isfahan to exhibit expressionist art
+Home Page
+Iran
+Middle East
+Iraq
+Palestine
+Lebanon
+Turkey
+Persian Gulf
+Others
+US
+Asia/Pacific
+Africa
+Europe
+Americas
+Sci/Tech
+Health
+Kuwait government 'resigns' over economy
+Mon, 16 Mar 2009 19:07:16 GMT
+The Kuwaiti government has submitted its resignation to the country's emir amid a row over the premier's handling of the economic crisis. "The resignation has been submitted formally and it's up to the amir (ruler) to decide," Reuters quoted Nasser al-Duwailah, a parlametarian, as saying on Monday. The resignation would further delay the approval of 5 billion dinars (USD 5.11 billion) rescue package which is to be injected to the Persian Gulf nation's economy to ease the impact of the global financial crisis. The government has not commented on the report.
+Go
+Latest News
+Kuwait govern economy
+Childhood diet risk
+'US-Russian pa shield row'
+Judges want M confiscated
+Leader pardon
+Ancient book
+Lieberman eyes ally
+Intelligent peop
+```
+
+Notice that all of the images are missing. They are all separate server-to-client responses and therefore completely separate “sessions” in X-KEYSCORE or PINWALE
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## HTTP Activity – Real World
+
+* It’s important to note that not all of the data on one web-page came from the same server.
+* For example, most of the NSA Today home page come from home.www.nsa, but the image of the current weather conditions came from wk-admiral208.corp.nsa.ic.gov
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## HTTP Activity – Real World
+
+* This happens all the time on the Internet.
+* The cnn.com home page, may have an ad on it that was from the Google ad server and etc.
+* And this does have an impact on our collection!
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## HTTP Activity
+
+* This is the traffic path for building the NSA today home page
+
+home.www.nsa
+corpweb1.nsa
+siteworks.nsa
+wk-admiral208.corp.nsa.ic.gov
+User
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## HTTP Activity
+
+* What happens if we only have collection on one of the paths?
+
+home.www.nsa
+corpweb1.nsa
+siteworks.nsa
+wk-admiral208.corp.nsa.ic.gov
+User
+
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## What would that traffic look like?
+
+```
+GET /current.jpg
+Host: wk-admiral208.corp.nsa.ic.gov
+User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.9.0.10) Gecko/2009042316 (USG-25) Firefox/3.0.10
+Accept: image/png,image/*;q=0.8,*/*;q=0.5
+Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
+Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
+Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
+Keep-Alive: 300
+Connection: keep-alive
+Referer: http://home.www.nsa/
+If-Modified-Since: Thu, 08 Oct 2009 19:31:56 GMT
+If-None-Match: "d945-16c1-842db643"
+Cache-Control: max-age=0
+```
+
+If we only saw this one GET request and not the other 33 required to build the NSA Today home page, would we be able to determine what the user was actually doing?
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## What exactly is that telling us?
+
+* First off, we know what file they are requesting.
+* They want current.jpg from the wk-admiral208.corp.nsa.ic.gov server.
+* That’s actually a live public URL (http://wk-admiral208.corp.nsa.ic.gov/current.jpg)
+* Do we have any indication why they wanted that image? Answer is yes! Look at the referer field.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## What exactly is that telling us?
+
+* They were referred from http://home.www.nsa/
+* The referer is in essence, telling you what site was “linking” to the new site.
+* Warning! The referer can act in misleading ways.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## Referer Field
+
+* The referer field is the address of the page that links to new GET request.
+* However, this link could have been automatic to the user.
+* I.e. in the case of the current weather image, the link was automatic and the user wasn’t even aware of the action
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## Referer Field
+
+* The referer field could also indicate a user action.
+* For example, imagine we were on the NSA Today webpage and clicked the link to the SID Today page.
+* What would that traffic look like?
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## Referer Field
+
+```
+GET /
+Host: sidtoday.nsa
+User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.9.0.10) Gecko/2009042316 (USG-25) Firefox/3.0.10
+Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
+Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
+Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
+Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
+Keep-Alive: 300
+Connection: keep-alive
+Referer: http://home.www.nsa/
+Cookie: CFID=565238; CFTOKEN=66534796;
+CFGLOBALS=urltoken%3DCFID%23%3D565238%26CFTOKEN%23%3D66534796%26jsessionid%23%3Da830dba3a04b67ae6e351b7463444f72496d%23lastvisit%3D%7Bts%20%272009%2D10%2D09%2015%3A38%3A04%27%7D%23timecreated%3D%7Bts%20%272009%2D06%2D19%2010%3A27%3A23%27%7D%23hitcount%3D13%23cftoken%3D66534796%23cfid%3D565238%23;
+JSESSIONID=a830dba3a04b67ae6e351b7463444f72496d
+```
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## Referer Field
+
+* Now we’re seeing a request go to host “sidtoday.nsa” with the referer from http://home.www.nsa
+* How can we tell from the traffic that the first automatic referer we saw for the current weather was any different from the user-generated referer we saw for the SID Today article?
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## Cookies!
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## Cookies
+
+* Cookies are small pieces of text-based data stored on your machine by your web browser.
+* Almost all websites have cookies enabled and they have a variety of uses, including to help the web-site track the activities of their users.
+* Most analysts are probably familiar with “machine specific cookies” like the Yahoo B cookie
+* However cookies are used for a variety of reasons
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## What can cookies be used for?
+
+* Cookies can be used to authenticate a user.
+* For example in many cases, the “active user” for Yahoo web-mail traffic is seen encoded in the I= part of the cookie string.
+
+```
+Y
+v=1
+n=4edg46n653aef
+l=eibj0d_10o0p838to (Yahoo login id: [REDACTED])
+p=f2kvvsy0120000000 (Gender: female, Birth year: 1984, Postal code: [REDACTED])
+iz=
+r=jb
+lg=en-US ( Language/content: English )
+intl=us ( Country: United States )
+```
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## What can cookies be used for?
+
+* Cookies can be used to store information about the user that the website is interested in
+* Look at how the p= value below tells the website information about the user of this account:
+
+```
+v=1
+n=4edg46n653aef
+l=eibj0d_10o0p838to (Yahoo login id: [REDACTED])
+p=f2kvvsy0120000000 (Gender: female, Birth year: 1984, Postal code: [REDACTED])
+iz=
+r=jb
+lg=en-US ( Language/content: English )
+intl=us ( Country: United States )
+```
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## What can cookies be used for?
+
+* Cookies can be used to identify a single machine from hundreds of other users on the same proxy IP address
+* The Yahoo B cookie is a “machine specific cookie”
+
+```
+B
+f6146fh596u4b
+b=4
+d=GtdlgXBpYEQvWQEGtVnWhaxIPNw-
+s=9e
+i=8OSsR4OwqEO5oGGF2kJh
+```
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## What can cookies be used for?
+
+* Important note: All three of those examples are just subsets of the full Yahoo cookie string
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## How do we know what each cookie value is used for?
+
+* Nearly every web-site uses cookies that in most cases they designed for their own uses, so how do we know what they all mean?
+* Protocol Exploitation can examine the traffic to try to determine if there is any information contained in cookie strings that we might be interested, for example we’d like to know if any part of the cookie acts like a “machine specific cookie.”
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## How do we know what each cookie value is used for?
+
+* However, there are far more cookie options out in the wild than PE can possible examine.
+* So even if they aren’t aware of a machine specific cookie, it doesn’t mean that it doesn’t exist.
+* X-KEYSCORE gives you access to the full cookie string, so if you’re adventurous enough you can do your own protocol exploitation.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## Remember: Cookies are there for a reason!
+
+* Websites put cookies on people’s computers for a reason.
+* If the data is valuable for a website, it may be valuable to us as well.
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## How long do cookies live for?
+
+* Cookies, like any other file on a computer, can be deleted by the user.
+* Almost all browsers give you the option to view, manage and delete your cookies
+
+```
+Cookies
+Search:
+The following cookies are stored on your computer:
+Site Cookie Name
+bblux110.gp.proj.nsa.ic.gov
+brain.r6.r.nsa
+calendar.ops.s.nsa
+centerjohn.hqs.do.nsa
+csrc.do.nsa
+cybertrans-secure.eitc.nsa.ic.gov
+journal.ibd.nsa
+Name:
+Content:
+Host:
+Path:
+Send For:
+Expires:
+Remove Cookie Remove All Cookies Close
+```
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## Cookies
+
+You can see what cookies have been stored on your machine by going into the "options" window of your browser and selecting ‘show cookies”
+
+```
+Options
+Main Tabs Content Applications Privacy Security Advanced
+History
+Keep my history for at least 90 days
+Remember what I enter in forms and the search bar
+Remember what I've downloaded
+Cookies
+Accept cookies from sites
+Accept third-party cookies
+Keep until: they expire
+Exceptions...
+Show Cookies...
+Private Data
+Always clear my private data when I close Firefox
+Ask me before clearing private data
+Settings...
+Clear Now
+OK Cancel Help
+```
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## Searches
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## Searching the Internet
+
+When a user searches the Internet from one of the many web-based search engines (Google, Bing, etc.) what does the traffic look like?
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## Searching the Internet: Client-to-Server
+
+* In most cases, the client-to-server traffic is a GET request where the search term is passed in the URL Arguments:
+
+```
+GET /search?hl=fr&q=iran&lr= HTTP/1.1
+Host: www.google.com
+Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-shockwave-flash, application/vnd.ms-powerpoint, application/vnd.ms-excel, application/msword, */*
+Cookie: PREF=ID=74f6d7addf51ccd4:U=ccbee9ee665a7dde:TB=2:TM=1255354439:LM=1255433264:S=_ M1i4RfO2ohI81maNID=27=cMFLkpovJCIWI0FC5E3Pu2C6-8_nsMS2zztfvOew9-QYDPWUza4AscyoglQRGNSkDZsi2jL65 flM-R4HgovMBEa66bfiTXn8TH3Ukm-X5hp45rLAb_Y3rNZ42HGIzyne
+Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
+User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1)
+Connection: Keep-Alive
+Cache-Control: no-cache
+```
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## Searching the Internet: Client-to-Server
+
+* Notice how the URL Path is /search and one part of the URL argument is q=iran
+* Each website can configure their URL’s differently, so while with Google the search term is contained in the q= part of the URL, a different search form might have it as query= or search\_term= etc.
+
+http://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=iran&search_type=&aq=o
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## Searching the Internet: Client-to-Server
+
+* X-KEYSCORE tries to account for all the variations of search terms contained in the URL Argument for what it extracts for the “Search Term” column.
+* However, there are always other varieties out there that we haven’t built it hooks for yet, so anytime you see something that you think should be extracted, please contact the team ([REDACTED])
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## “Referer Searches”
+
+* What happens when a user clicks on a search result?
+* Let’s start by showing the query itself, in this example, we’re going to query the NSANet Google for “XKEYSCORE”
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## What does that GET request look like?
+
+```
+GET /search?q=xkeyscore&btnG=Google
+Host: google4.q.nsa
+User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.9.0.10) Gecko/2009042316 (USG-25) Firefox/3.0.10
+Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
+Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
+Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
+Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
+Keep-Alive: 300
+Connection: keep-alive
+```
+
+We know from this session that the client is requesting the data from the host ‘google4.q.nsa” and we see the search term in the URL Argument
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## “Referer Searches”
+
+* What happens when a user clicks on a search result?
+
+```
+GET /redmine
+Host: xkeyscore.r1.r.nsa
+User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.9.0.10) Gecko/2009042316 (USG-25) Firefox/3.0.10
+Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
+Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
+Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
+Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
+Keep-Alive: 300
+Connection: keep-alive
+Cookie: _session_id=ffd87ac8682e8fa8f421b4ffdf9693ae
+Referer: http://google4.q.nsa/search?q=xkeyscore&btnG=Google+Search
+```
+
+First, we can determine the full URL by adding the GET line to the host: http://xkeyscore.r1.r.nsa/redmine/
+
+xkeyscore.r1.r.nsa/redmine
+XKEYSCORE - Overview - XKEYSCO...
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## “Referer Searches”
+
+* Secondly, we get some hints as to why the user was requesting that page from the Referer line:
+
+Referer: http://google4.q.nsa/search?q=xkeyscore&btnG=Google+Search
+
+* Note that it was the same URL that we were at immediately before we clicked the “result” link
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## “Referer Searches”
+
+* Let’s look at that process again:
+
+google4.q.nsa
+xkeyscore.r1.r.nsa
+First, a client-to-server request is sent that contains the query on "xkeyscore"
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## Referer Searches
+
+* Let’s look at that process again:
+
+google4.q.nsa
+xkeyscore.r1.r.nsa
+Second, the server responds back with the search results
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## “Referer Searches”
+
+* Let’s look at that process again:
+
+google4.q.nsa
+xkeyscore.r1.r.nsa
+Third, by clicking on one of the results, a new GET request is issued to retrieve the XKEYSCORE home page. In this request, the location of the original search is listed as the "referer"
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+google4.q.nsa
+xkeyscore.r1.r.nsa
+
+What will happen if we only have collection on this link?
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## “Referer Searches”
+
+* When XKEYSCORE sees a search contained in the “referer” field, we still extract it out as meta-data into the “search terms” but we append it with (referer) to denote where it was originally found:
+
+```
+Search Terms
+(referer) the legal status of the caspian sea
+```
+
+| HTTP Type | Host | URL Path | URL Args |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| get | www.parstimes.com | /law/caspian_status.html | |
+
+```
+Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=fa&source=hp&q=the+legal+status+of+the+caspian+sea&lr=
+```
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## “Referer Searches”
+
+```
+GET /law/caspian_status.html HTTP/1.1
+Accept: */*
+Host: www.parstimes.com
+Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=fa&source=hp&q=the+legal+status+of+the+caspian+sea&lr=
+Accept-Language: fa
+Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
+User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; InfoPath.2)
+Cache-Control: max-stale=0
+Connection: close
+X-BlueCoat-Via: 0A6F53530F3F63EE
+```
+
+Can we guess what happened here?
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## Another example
+
+```
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//20320108
+ID: sess_orig_proc
+Type: HTTP-GET
+Printer Friendly Version
+DNI Display | Raw Data | DNI Format
+Services
+
+GET /Hezbollah-Terrorism-Judith-Palmer-Harik/dp/1860648932 HTTP/1.1
+User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/525.19 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/1.0.154.48 Safari/525.19
+Referer: http://www.google.com.pk/search?hl=en&q=written books on hizbollah&btnG=Google Search&meta=
+Accept: text/xml,application/xml,application/xhtml xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
+Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, bzip2, sdch
+Cookie: ubid-main=185-5525816-8765531
+apn-user-id=P1YXY7QF1PUYQ5
+Accept-Language: en-US,en
+Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,*,utf-8
+Host: www.amazon.com
+Connection: Keep-Alive
+```
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## Proxy Information
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## Proxy Information
+
+* In a lot of cases we’re going to see HTTP Activity from behind a proxy or proxies.
+* What is a proxy?
+ * A proxy is a server that is acting as an intermediary for HTTP requests from clients
+* Why do proxies exists?
+
+* Performance: Proxy can cache responses for static pages
+* Censorship: Proxy can filter traffic
+* Security: Proxy can look for malware
+* Access-Control: Proxy can control access to restricted content
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## Proxy Information
+
+* Routinely, we’re going to see ISP level proxies.
+* That is, instead of having each individual user request web pages directly from the web servers, the ISP is going to collect all of those requests first, and then proxy them out through a handful of proxy IP addresses.
+* When the response is returned, the proxy passes it on to the appriopriate user
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## Proxy Information
+
+* Why would the ISP want to proxy traffic?
+* In many cases the ISP won’t have to supply public IP addresses to all it’s users
+* It can simply give them a private IP address, and then use a handful of public IP addresses for its proxies which are the machines actually requesting the traffic from the web-servers
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## Proxies on the Internet
+
+Web-Server
+Short-lived connections Single-user
+Web-Servers
+Short-lived connections Multiple-users multiplexed
+Web-Servers
+Long-lived connections Multiple-users multiplexed
+The Internet
+Direct-Connect
+Mixed-Gateway
+National-Level Proxy
+Cache
+Proxy-to-Proxy
+User-to-Proxy
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## Identifying a Proxy
+
+* How do you know that the IP address that you think is your target is really a proxy?
+* First step, check NKB.
+* They have services that attempt* to automatically detect proxies
+
+* These services are in no way 100% accurate so this is only the first step in checking to see if the IP Address is a proxy
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## Identifying a Proxy: NKB
+
+```
+Query: IP Address [REDACTED]
+Date: 2009-10-27@09:21:50
+```
+
+| Description | Value | Confidence | Classification |
+| :---------- | :------------------------------------------- | :--------- | :----------------------------- |
+| Location Add Analyst Input | | | |
+| IP Range | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) |
+| Lat/Long (precision) | (none found) | | (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) |
+| City | ZAHEDAN | 20 | (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) |
+| Country | (IR) IRAN | 91 | (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) |
+| Provider Add Analyst Input | | | |
+| IP Owner | RAYANE FARAZ IRANSHAHR COMPANY, INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDER | 82 | (U//FOUO) |
+| Autonomous System Route Prefix | [REDACTED]0.0/17 | 59 | (U//FOUO) |
+| Autonomous System Number | 12880 | 95 | (U//FOUO) |
+| Autonomous System Name | DCI-AS DCI Autonomous System | 95 | (U//FOUO) |
+| FQDN | (none found) | | (U//FOUO) |
+| Domain | [REDACTED] | 30 | (U//FOUO) |
+| Service | PROXY | | (U//FOUO) |
+| Service | TRANSPARENT PROXY | | (U//FOUO) |
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## Identifying a Proxy
+
+* Other things to be on the look out for:
+* X-Forwarded-For IP Address
+ * What is it?
+ * An X-Forwarded-For IP address the proxy passing on to the server what it thinks is the IP address of the user
+ * Think of it as the proxy telling the server “this is who I think this request came from”
+ * It’s important to note that multiple proxies can, and often, are present, so one proxy might just be reporting the IP address of another proxy
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## Identifying a Proxy
+
+* X-Forwarded-For IP Address as seen in traffic:
+
+```
+GET /HTTP/1.0
+User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
+Host: www.ebay.com
+Pragma: no-cache
+Via: 1.0 s.jonoobnet.com (squid/3.0.STABLE10)
+X-Forwarded-For: [REDACTED]
+Cache-Control: max-age=259200
+Connection: keep-alive
+```
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## Some Examples of X-Forwarded-For headers:
+
+```
+X-Forwarded-For: [REDACTED]
+X-Forwarded-For: [REDACTED]
+X-Forwarded-For: [REDACTED]
+X-Forwarded-For: [REDACTED]
+X-Forwarded-For: [REDACTED]
+X-Forwarded-For: 192.168.1.10, 10.0.0.22,[REDACTED]
+X-Forwarded-For: [REDACTED]
+X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1,[REDACTED]
+X-Forwarded-For: [REDACTED]google.com,[REDACTED]
+```
+
+Multiple-Layers of Proxies!
+
+In-general, the first IP is the one closet to the original requestor
+Keep in mind – these can be totally fake
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## Identifying a Proxy
+
+* Similar to the X-Forwarded-For Tag is the “VIA tag”
+* The VIA tag is the proxy identify itself
+
+```
+GET /HTTP/1.0
+User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
+Host: www.ebay.com
+Pragma: no-cache
+Via: [REDACTED] (squid/3.0.STABLE10)
+X-Forwarded-For: 217.219.95.135
+Cache-Control: max-age=259200
+Connection: keep-alive
+```
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## Identifying a Proxy
+
+* The Via: tag may even contain some good information about the proxy
+* Be careful though because this information could be falsified:
+
+Via: 1.0 tehran-proxy-srv:3128 (squid/2.5.STABLE1)
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## Identifying a Proxy
+
+* Remember though that the X-Forwarded-For and VIA lines can be falsified and don’t have to be present!
+* If they’re not present, how can you tell the IP address is a proxy?
+* Test it in MARINA!
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## Testing IP Addresses in MARINA
+
+* The primary side effect of a proxy is too many users online at the same time
+* So if all else fails, try querying on the IP address (assuming its USSID18 compliant of course!) in MARINA to see how many users were active within an hour time frame
+* It’s not scientific but generally it will help
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+---
+
+TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
+
+## Testing IP Addresses in MARINA
+
+For example look at these results:
+
+```
+Specify Date Range (YYYYMMDD [hhmmss]): 200910260100
+to 200910260200
+