{ "title": "CASCADE - Joint Cyber Sensor Architecture", "type": "REPORTED", "description": "This presentation outlines the Communications Security Establishment’s (CSE) plans to unify and expand its cyber sensor networks (ITS and SIGINT) to create a comprehensive, multi-layered national cyber defense system, enabling threat detection, intelligence collection, and defensive operations across Canadian and foreign networks. It emphasizes standardizing sensor deployments, integrating analytic capabilities, and preparing for “Effects” operations to mitigate cyber threats by 2015. The presentation is duplicated from page 33 onwards - three slides of the duplicated slides have internal CSE comments.", "long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY CSEC Global Access Cyber Defence Operation presentation describing CASCADE — the Joint Cyber Sensor Architecture project — published by CBC News and The Intercept on 23 March 2015 as part of reporting on CSEC's cyberwarfare capabilities. The document appears twice in slightly different versions, the second including presenter notes, suggesting it was prepared as both a briefing document and an internal presentation template.\n\nCASCADE is defined as a project to align passive cyber sensor capabilities and architecture across CSEC's two parallel missions — SIGINT collection and IT Security (ITS) defence of Government of Canada networks. The problem it addresses is divergence: EONBLUE software was deployed in both missions but with incompatible architectures, non-standardised configurations and differing software versions, creating duplication of effort and preventing full exploitation of available capabilities. The project proposes a four-phase approach moving from tracking and metadata alignment through full-take strategy, sensor interoperability and ultimately a unified sensor environment.\n\nThe sensor inventory section — titled \"Shades of Blue\" — provides the most detailed published description of CSEC's sensor family. EONBLUE is the primary sensor running at 10Gbps on Dell R610 1U hardware, performing Top Secret/SI processing for tracking and discovery and producing content metadata. INDUCTION is a distributed cloud-based processing system operating across multiple 10Gbps links, also performing TS/SI tracking and discovery with PXE boot infrastructure. THIRD-EYE is a cyber metadata processor operating at multiple 1Gbps links at unclassified processing level, producing metadata only. CRUCIBLE is a secure sensor operating at 10Gbps, derived from TS/SI signatures but operating in an unclassified environment for tracking — consistent with its earlier description in the CSEC Cyber Threat Detection document as a low-cost throwaway sensor deployable in non-SCIF environments.\n\nThe current deployment status reveals the operational footprint at time of writing. Under Special Source, INDUCTION had 100% coverage of main SSO sites with metadata production, THIRD-EYE was deployed at select new sites, and CRUCIBLE was being deployed to newly emerging sites in pre-SCIF environments for survey collection. Under Warranted Collection, EONBLUE was deployed for full-take collection. Under FORNSAT, EONBLUE had recently been upgraded using GCHQ's code base, with a CHOKEPOINT solution providing virtualised integration with the FORNSAT environment. SUNWHEEL/SMO work was underway with CHOKEPOINT en route to CASSIOPEIA — confirming both SUNWHEEL and CASSIOPEIA as named CSEC collection programmes. Under IT Security, EONBLUE was deployed at three edge gateway Government of Canada departments with dynamic defence enabled at two, and at the main government backbone across dual 10Gbps links.\n\nThe sensor interoperability section introduces two additional named capabilities. JAZZFLUTE is described as a system that should support ITS analysts in targeting SIGINT systems — enabling the IT Security mission to leverage SIGINT collection infrastructure. EBSH is described as a sensor with a custom CLI interface like a network switch that supports inline binary updates, enabling rapid deployment of new capability across all programmes and sites.\n\nThe Canadian Cyber Sensor Grid diagram shows the full architectural vision: Government of Canada departments connected through secure channels with defensive monitoring; Canadian Internet Space with Special Source, Special Access and Warranted Access coverage; Systems of Importance monitored separately; and three separate foreign internet space monitoring zones — one associated with FORNSAT collection and two associated with GAZEBO Access. GAZEBO appears here as a named access programme not previously seen in the archive, providing CSEC access to foreign internet space in a third distinct monitoring zone.\n\nThe Towards 2015 section describes CSEC's strategic ambition for the five-year planning horizon. Under \"Expand Our Access Footprint\" CSEC planned to increase Special Source access to include all international gateways accessible from Canada and deploy a protective sensor grid across all Government of Canada operations at all classification levels. Under \"Enable Effects for Threat Mitigation\" — the most politically sensitive section — CSEC stated it would \"seek the authority to conduct a wide spectrum of Effects operations\" and build the technical infrastructure, policy architecture and tradecraft necessary for such operations. The CBC article notes this language predates Bill C-51 and that experts believed the bill could legalise some of the 32 cyber tactics listed in a 2011 CSEC document.\n\nThe \"Network Is The Sensor\" vision section frames CSEC's ultimate architectural goal: integrating EONBLUE directly into the core of the internet rather than deploying it at gateways, enabling detection of threats before they reach targets, identification of exfiltration and command-and-control communications anywhere in national networks, and — most significantly — the ability to insert payloads to disrupt adversaries and silently discard malicious traffic at the network core. The document explicitly states that in cooperation with telecommunications partners, CSEC could modify traffic routes, perform hygiene filtering and insert payloads upon detection. The SEEDSPHERE threat actor is cited as a motivating example, with the document noting that from the time a malicious PDF is opened to SEEDSPHERE having interactive control of a workstation takes less than three minutes.\n\nThe document concludes with a reconceptualisation of tipping and cueing — arguing that in a Five Eyes context with full national infrastructure visibility, traditional T&C for defence purposes becomes unnecessary and should instead be repurposed to enable intelligence collection through cyber session collection, with analytic collaboration and knowledge transfer replacing second-party tasking requests.", "tags": [ "CSE", "cyber defense", "cybersecurity", "cyber warfare", "network defense", "ITS", "full-take collection", "metadata", "sensor unification", "sensor interoperability", "joint operations", "cryptology", "defensive operations", "Effects operations", "threat mitigation", "cyber threat", "foreign intelligence", "domestic defense", "Canadian national infrastructure", "internet surveillance", "Special Source Access", "distributed sensors", "host-based capabilities", "command and control", "exfiltration detection", "network monitoring", "dynamic defense", "analytic tradecraft", "network situational awareness", "cyber operations", "scalable sensor architecture", "network manipulation", "international gateways", "Government of Canada", "malware detection", "botnet monitoring", "network hygiene filtering", "cyber espionage", "nation cybersecurity", "mobile apps", "mobile phones", "smart phones", "mobile security", "DNS", "HTTP", "collection sites", "exploitation", "implants", "payloads", "Apple" ], "document": { "creator": "CSE", "date_created": "", "classification": [ "TOP SECRET", "COMINT" ], "dissemination": [ "REL FVEY" ], "banner": "TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY", "genre": "slides", "programs": [ "CASCADE", "PHOTONICPRISM", "EONBLUE", "INDUCTION", "THIRDEYE", "CRUCIBLE", "CHOKEPOINT", "SUNWHEEL", "CASSIOPEIA", "SCNET", "JAZZFLUTE", "GAZEBO", "SEEDSPHERE", "TEXPRO", "SSO" ], "countries": [ "Canada" ], "people": [] }, "publication": [ { "publisher": "CBC News", "date_published": "2015-03-23", "title": "Communication Security Establishment's cyberwarfare toolbox revealed", "link": "https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/communication-security-establishment-s-cyberwarfare-toolbox-revealed-1.3002978", "reporters": [ "Seglins, Dave", "Hildebrandt, Amber", "Pereira, Michael", "Greenwald, Glenn", "Gallagher, Ryan" ], "contributors": [] }, { "publisher": "The Intercept", "date_published": "2015-03-23", "title": "Documents Reveal Canada’s Secret Hacking Tactics", "link": "https://theintercept.com/2015/03/23/canada-cse-hacking-cyberwar-secret-arsenal/", "reporters": [ "Gallagher, Ryan" ], "contributors": [] } ], "aka_id": [], "pdf_sha256": "1ef804592b84f0df294b7f2b034c52be756addb1d89c5cf504bc206a430dc57c", "pages": 66 }