TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA Communications Security Establishment Canada Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada # Hackers are Humans too ## Cyber leads to CI leads Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information Canada 1 --- TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA Communications Security Establishment Canada Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada ## Introductions * [REDACTED] * Cyber-counter intelligence * My primary focus is MAKERSMARK (Russia) * CSEC – Covert Network Threat (CNT) group * New name, same Cyber/CI group you know and love * Cyber and traditional CI sitting side by side * Focused on Foreign Intelligence, not Information Assurance Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information Canada 2 --- TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA Communications Security Establishment Canada Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada ## Goals * How do we attribute cyber intrusion sets? * How do we go beyond the hacking face of a CNE program? * Expose management structure, operators * Requirements, technological advances * This presentation portrays only one method * Passive infrastructure tasking/contact chaining * Many other are available Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information Canada 3 --- TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA Communications Security Establishment Canada Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada ## Initial Seed * Infrastructure tasking * Mostly exposed through malware/content delivery * Careful and manual monitoring of anomalous network sessions * Nothing fancy * Not Web 2.0, but it works Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information Canada 4 --- TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA Communications Security Establishment Canada Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada ## Overview * MAKERSMARK * Misuse of Operational Infrastructure * Poor OPSEC practices [REDACTED] Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information Canada 5 --- TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA Communications Security Establishment Canada Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada ## MAKERSMARK (Russian CNE) Designed by geniuses Implemented by morons Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information Canada 6 --- TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA Communications Security Establishment Canada Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada ## MAKERSMARK * The MAKERSMARK less attributed (LA) systems are really well designed * This has not translated into security for MAKERSMARK operators * Personal browsing through LA systems * Workshops, ORBs, and controllers * Development shop infected by crimeware * 4th party collection Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information Canada 7 --- TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA Communications Security Establishment Canada Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada ## MAKERSMARK: Less Attributed Overview ``` Downlink is collected by MM Satellite SIGINT Intercept Packet Returned to Attack Station Spoofed Source IP MAKERSMARK IP Routes to a Satellite Customer Satellite ISP Transmitter Response to Spoofed IP Destination Server ``` Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information Canada 8 --- TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA Communications Security Establishment Canada Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada ## MAKERSMARK: Misuse of Infrastructure * Less Attributable infrastructure used for highly attributable purposes: * Hosting implant callback servers * Live testing of new implant protocols * Collecting exfiltration * This is not CNE best practices Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information Canada 9 --- TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA Communications Security Establishment Canada Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada ## MAKERSMARK: Misuse of LA Systems * Personal Social Networking * Vkontakt * (mail/inbox/bk).ru accounts * Personal Email * Webmail/POP * Personal retrieval through masquerading infrastructure * Personal web browsing Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information Canada 10 --- TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA Communications Security Establishment Canada Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada ## MAKERSMARK: 4th party collection * Implant development shop infected by GUMBLAR botnet * Crimeware * Sends pharmaceutical spam * Exfiltration to Canadian "bullet proof" host * HTTP/FTP logins * Collection of MM operator browsing habits * MM LiveJournal accounts included in collection Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information Canada 11 --- TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA Communications Security Establishment Canada Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada ## Closing Remarks * You have to keep an eye out * A lot of value can be lost by not following leads * Typically the window to exploit information is short * Knowing what to look for is half the battle * These exploitation opportunities don't last forever * As a CNE program matures, so will its OPSEC Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information Canada 24 --- TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA Communications Security Establishment Canada Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada ## Questions? Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information Canada 25