[REDACTED] UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY UNITED STATES OF AMERICA # GRIMPLATE ## First Steps Toward Identifying Adversarial Use of BitTorrent [REDACTED] [REDACTED] NSA/R4 Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52 Dated: 20070108 Declassify On: 20370117 The overall briefing is classified TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY --- CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY UNITED STATES OF AMERICA RESEARCH DIRECTORATE ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE ## Agenda * Motivation * BitTorrent's TCP and UDP layers * DHT overview * What does it mean to crawl DHT? * Pilot implementation * Collaboration CONFIDENTIAL --- TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY UNITED STATES OF AMERICA RESEARCH DIRECTORATE ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE ## GRIMPLATE Motivation * BitTorrent sessions are seen on a daily basis between NIPRnet hosts and adversary space (PRC, RU, etc.) * NTOC has no way of knowing if this is innocuous file sharing or malicious activity. * Peer-to-Peer (P2P) is not allowed on NIPRnet, but most commands do not see it as harmful. * If we can glean some indication of the type of data that's leaving NIPRnet, we can build a case for shutting this activity down. * Interest is not limited to NIPRnet scenario TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY --- UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY UNITED STATES OF AMERICA RESEARCH DIRECTORATE ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE ## BitTorrent's TCP and UDP Layers * TCP * Used to exchange pieces of files amongst peers * UDP * Used to exchange routing messages * Who should I ask for file pieces? UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY --- UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY UNITED STATES OF AMERICA RESEARCH DIRECTORATE ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE ## BitTorrent DHT * Nodes: clients participating in DHT * Peers: clients participating in piece exchange to share file * DHT: distributed key, value store * Nodes have 160 bit pseudo-random node ID * Keys are 160 bit hash of .torrent file metadata - info_hash * Values are list of IP addresses and ports of peers mapped to info_hash UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY --- UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY UNITED STATES OF AMERICA RESEARCH DIRECTORATE ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE ## Mainline DHT Messages ping Query = {“t”:”aa”, “y”:”q”, “q”:”ping”, “a”:{“id”:”abcdefghij0123456789″}} ping Response = {“t":"aa”, “y”:”r”, “r”:” {“id”:”mnopqrstuvwxyz123456″}} find_node Query = {“t":"aa”, “y”:”q”, “q”:”find_node”, “a”:{“id”:”abcdefghij0123456789”, “target”:”mnopqrstuvwxyz123456″}} find_node Response = { "t":"aa”, “y":"r”, “r”:{“id”:”0123456789abcdefghij”, “nodes”:”def456...” }} get_peers Query = {“t”:”aa”, “y”:”q”, “q”:”get_peers”, “a”:{“id”:”abcdefghij0123456789”, “info_hash”:”mnopqrstuvwxyz123456″}} get_peers Response, with peers = { "t":"aa”, “y":"r", “r”:{“id”:”0123456789abcdefghij”, “token”:”aoeusnth”, “values”: ["axje.u”, “idhtnm″]}} get_peers Response, with closest nodes = {“t”:”aa”, “y”:”r”, “r”:{“id”:”0123456789abcdefghij”, “token”:”aoeusnth”, “nodes”:”def456..." } } Announce peer = {“t":"aa”, “y”:”q”, “q”:”announce_peer”, “a”:{“id”:”abcdefghij0123456789”, “info_hash”:”mnopqrstuvwxyz123456”, “port” : 6881, "token" : “aoeusnth"}} Response = {“t”:”aa”, “y":"r", “r”:{“id”:”0123456789abcdefghij″}} UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY --- SECRET //REL FVEY NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY UNITED STATES OF AMERICA RESEARCH DIRECTORATE ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE ## What's it mean to crawl DHT? * Goal: Harvest complete node list for entire DHT and peer list for info_hashes found in NIPRNET defensive tools or SIGINT * Regular client node lookup is iterative process * O (log n) search * routing table is starting point * Approach: * spray find_node messages across DHT and store responses * query for peers of info_hashes of interest SECRET //REL FVEY --- SECRET //REL FVEY NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY UNITED STATES OF AMERICA RESEARCH DIRECTORATE ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE ## What does DHT crawler collect? * For each node in the DHT: * 160 bit node ID * IP address * Port * For targeted info_hashes: * List of the node ID, IP address, and port of nodes sharing targeted file * Entries may be stale SECRET //REL FVEY --- SECRET //REL FVEY NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY UNITED STATES OF AMERICA RESEARCH DIRECTORATE ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE ## What value is the data? * Use "community detection" algorithms to identify swarms that are likely to be malicious * Download files being shared by likely malicious swarms * Build BitTorrent mitigation case for NIPRnet * General SIGINT reporting * File download without identification of likely malicious swarms impractical SECRET //REL FVEY --- TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY UNITED STATES OF AMERICA RESEARCH DIRECTORATE ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE ## Pilot on PACKAGEGOODS Server * Deploy modification of existing crawler – dedicated PG server * Run analytics on "swarm” metadata to determine malicious activity * Experiment with subnet range and ID space and message interval to determine server processing and bandwidth requirements * Test if crawler catches info_hashes we see from target in XKS * Must we proactively collect peers to address “SIGINT lag"? TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY --- TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY UNITED STATES OF AMERICA RESEARCH DIRECTORATE ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE ## SIGINT Lag * BitTorrent "swarm” may be inactive by the time target info_hash reported by SIGINT system * May require preemptive collection of peers * DHT has on the order of 8 active million nodes * info_hash/DHT address space: 2^160 TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY --- SECRET//REL FVEY NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY UNITED STATES OF AMERICA RESEARCH DIRECTORATE ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE ## Next Steps * Enhanced analytics * Community discovery * Distributed crawler * Peer pre-fetch * Target file download * avoid lending "utility” SECRET //REL FVEY --- TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY ## Prior Work GCHQ - SEBACIUM POC: [REDACTED] CES – XKS schema/micro-plugin Prototype analytics POC: [REDACTED] TAO-ROC – OGC approval for operational tests PACKAGEGOODS connection POC: [REDACTED] TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY --- TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY UNITED STATES OF AMERICA RESEARCH DIRECTORATE ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE ## GRIMPLATE Collaboration CES - Digital Network Exploitation Applications [REDACTED] NTOC V25 - Malicious Activity Discovery-Characterization V45/47 – Technology Development V46 - Technology Planning and Assessment S2B - Office of China and Korea, CNE Access Development Branch S2H – AP Russia Production Center, Russia SIGINT Development Division TAO-ROC - Production Operations Division TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY --- CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY UNITED STATES OF AMERICA RESEARCH DIRECTORATE ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE "go grimplate" CONFIDENTIAL --- UNCLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY UNITED STATES OF AMERICA RESEARCH DIRECTORATE ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE ## Questions Why am I grim? 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