{ "title": "The SIGINT Philosopher: Descartes Would Have Been a Lousy SIGINT Reporter", "type": "SIDTODAY", "description": "A 2012 SIDtoday SIGINT Philosopher column using Cartesian epistemology to examine the fundamental reliability problem in SIGINT reporting — arguing that by the time raw intercepts pass through collection, translation, interpretation, and reporting, the finished intelligence product is several steps removed from ground truth and risks becoming little more than an analyst's painting of a scene described to them secondhand.", "long_description": "This SIDtoday column, published June 15, 2012 as the second installment of the new SIGINT Philosopher series, takes an epistemological turn to examine a structural problem in how NSA produces and disseminates finished intelligence. The author — who both translates and reports SIGINT while also participating in the tasking process — uses his unusually broad vantage point across multiple stages of the intelligence cycle to identify a compounding chain of information degradation: intercepts begin as partial communications between parties who share context the analyst lacks, may themselves not fully understand the subject, and are then subject to translation errors before an analyst attempts to interpret and report them. By the time a finished report reaches a customer, the author argues, the product is epistemologically several generations removed from the original facts.\n\nThe column traces a historical contrast between NSA's current practice of producing finished analytical reports and an earlier model of simply passing raw collection and transcriptions to customers — a model the author encountered in a foreign partner version of NSA. While acknowledging that almost no one, customers included, wants to return to raw data dumps, the author questions whether the current system's convenience comes at the cost of systematically obscuring uncertainty. He notes the irony that IC customers then use NSA reports as source material for their own assessments, further extending the telephone-game chain. The piece engages directly with the analytic modernization debate occurring within SID at the time, acknowledging the practical obstacles — including USSID 18 training requirements — that would accompany any move to bring customers further upstream in the information chain, while refusing to treat practicality as a philosophical resolution to the underlying epistemic problem.", "tags": [ "epistemology", "SIGINT reporting", "analytic tradecraft", "intelligence reporting", "translation", "raw SIGINT", "finished intelligence", "analytic modernization", "analyst culture", "philosophy", "SIGINT Philosopher" ], "document": { "creator": "NSA", "date_created": "2012-06-15", "classification": [ "CONFIDENTIAL" ], "dissemination": [ "REL" ], "banner": "DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL", "genre": "newsletter", "series": { "name": "The SIGINT Philosopher", "part": 2 }, "programs": [ "SCQAWK" ], "countries": [], "people": [] }, "publication": [ { "publisher": "The Intercept", "date_published": "2015-08-11", "title": "What Happens When a Failed Writer Becomes a Loyal Spy?", "link": "https://theintercept.com/2015/08/11/surveillance-philosopher-nsa/", "reporters": [ "Maass, Peter" ], "contributors": [ "McNeill, Sheelagh" ], "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2259079/descartes-would-have-been-a-lousy-sigint-reporter.pdf" } ], "pdf_sha256": "5110c0a6bbacd73bb44359beb11fe1448feb66a2118215f9bd3909b2859a8596", "pages": 4 }