{ "title": "Israel-US 1999 Agreement", "type": "REPORTED", "description": "This July 1999 top secret agreement between the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency and Israel's Directorate of Military Intelligence establishes comprehensive intelligence-sharing arrangements covering Middle Eastern threats, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and foreign materiel exploitation, superseding previous agreements dating back to 1968 and including specific provisions for conferences, written requests, face-to-face analyst meetings, and security protocols.", "long_description": "The document represents a formal 20-year Memorandum of Agreement signed on July 15, 1999 by DIA Director Lieutenant General Patrick Hughes and Israeli DMI Director Major General Amos Mekah, continuing an intelligence partnership initiated in 1968 between President Johnson and Prime Minister Eshkol. The agreement traces its evolution through several iterations: the original CYR Agreement between DIA and DMI, followed by the 1988 ICE CASTLE agreement which \"adjusted, broadened, reinforced, and extended\" the relationship, and the 1996 STONE RUBY agreement which this 1999 document supersedes. The preamble establishes that all exchanges of military intelligence between any DoD and IDF organizations—whether through meetings, conferences, ad hoc gatherings, or communications media—must be conducted under this agreement's auspices. Notably, exchanges involving signals intelligence have been upgraded to TOP SECRET level, while all other intelligence exchanges operate at SECRET level and below, with DIA and DMI serving as the responsible parties representing their respective defense establishments.\n\nThe scope section (Annex 1) defines specific geographic and topical areas of cooperation with remarkable specificity. Priority targets include military and military-political developments in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Iran, along with these countries' activities within Lebanon, their intentions to use military force against Israel or the United States, and their development of weapons of mass destruction and long-range delivery systems. The agreement covers international terrorism and radical Islamic organizations threatening U.S. or Israeli interests worldwide, including indications and warning of terrorist operations, information on state sponsors of terrorism, and data on threatening organizations' capabilities, facilities, methods of operation, and leadership biographies. Narcotics activities by military or political-military figures in Syria, Libya, Lebanon, Iran, and Iraq are included where appropriate. The agreement also addresses military and military intelligence activities by an extensive list of \"Countries of Interest\" (COI) operating in the Middle East and North Africa region that impact mutual security interests: Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Slovakia, former Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, North Korea, China, and Vietnam. The scope includes characteristics of weaponry introduced into or developed within Syria, Iraq, Libya, or Iran, or intelligence indicating future introduction from COI countries within four years, with provisions for sharing information on military production infrastructures on a case-by-case basis.\n\nThe agreement establishes five annexes detailing operational procedures: Annex 2 governs military intelligence exchange conferences and meetings, providing that conference sites alternate between Israel and the United States with dates determined by mutual agreement, and that DIA may invite appropriate Unified Command J-2s, Service Intelligence Chiefs, and other DoD/intelligence community components while DMI may invite other Israeli government intelligence agencies. Annex 3 addresses foreign materiel exploitation, allowing combined exploitation of military materiel and material with potential military use by making such material available to each other and sharing technical exploitation results—requests and offers are evaluated case-by-case with neither party obligated to accept or provide, and material provided on non-reimbursable basis must be returned in the same condition after examination periods not exceeding one year unless extended by mutual agreement. Annex 4 establishes procedures for written requests through defense attaché channels, distinguishing between time-sensitive information and requests requiring research. Annex 5 governs attaché-to-analyst discussions, restricting exchanges to crisis and current information with agendas required no later than 18 hours before proposed discussions, and prohibiting exchange of written information during face-to-face meetings except as provided under written request procedures.\n\nThe security annex (Annex 6) contains extensive provisions for protecting classified information up to TOP SECRET for signals intelligence and SECRET for all other classified material, requiring that information bear classification levels, denote country of origin, conditions of release, and relation to the agreement. Each party must take all lawful steps to prevent further disclosure except with consent, ensure information receives equivalent protection, investigate losses or unauthorized disclosures, and limit access to persons with requisite clearances and need-to-know. Contractors under control of third-party nationals may only participate with prior written approval. The unclassified program nickname is MONARCH GATE, subject to periodic changes. The agreement establishes that its existence and contents are TOP SECRET/HVCCO (Handle Via COMINT Channels Only), that it will not be disclosed to other nations without permission of both parties, and that classified information involving signals intelligence must be handled according to the 1989 \"Guidelines for SIGINT Cooperation between the United States National Security Agency and the Israeli SIGINT National Unit\" as amended in November 1992. The agreement has a 20-year duration with reviews every 5 years, may be amended by mutual agreement, allows either party to terminate with written notice, and continues security provisions even after termination. Each party assumes its own costs with hosting parties bearing conference expenses, subject to fund availability.", "tags": [ "intelligence agreement", "DIA-DMI cooperation", "DIA", "Israeli Directorate of Military Intelligence", "intelligence sharing", "bilateral relationship", "WMD", "WMD proliferation", "long-range delivery systems", "Countries of Interest", "foreign material exploitation", "military technology" ], "document": { "creator": "", "date_created": "1999-07-15", "classification": [ "TOP SECRET", "HVCCO" ], "dissemination": [ "USA, ISRAEL" ], "banner": "TOP SECRET/HVCCO", "genre": "other", "programs": [], "countries": [ "Israel", "Syria", "Iraq", "Libya", "Iran", "Lebanon", "United States", "Ukraine", "Russia", "Belarus", "Georgia", "Moldova", "Kazakhstan", "Kyrgyzstan", "Tajikistan", "Uzbekistan", "Turkmenistan", "Azerbaijan", "Armenia", "Slovakia", "Libya", "Yugoslavia", "Albania", "Bulgaria", "Romania", "North Korea", "China", "Vietnam" ], "people": [ "Johnson, Lyndon B.", "Eshkol, Levi", "Hughes, Patrick M.", "Meka, Amos" ] }, "publication": [ { "publisher": "The Intercept", "date_published": "2014-08-04", "title": "Cash, Weapons and Surveillance: the U.S. is a Key Party to Every Israeli Attack", "link": "https://theintercept.com/2014/08/04/cash-weapons-surveillance/", "reporters": [ "Greenwald, Glenn" ], "contributors": [ "Fishman, Andrew" ], "doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2014/08/03/israel-us-1999-agreement/", "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1240001/israel-us-1999-agreement.pdf" } ], "aka_id": [], "pdf_sha256": "497d5948bb79850da3de32dbfd33a00ab515aca7a683e971905d63d6347a06e0", "pages": 16 }