SECRET//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL (U) CLASSIFICATION GUIDE TITLE/NUMBER: Cuban Missile Crisis, 10-18 (U) PUBLICATION DATE: 30 July 2008 (U) OFFICE OF ORIGIN: Information Security Policy, DJP2 (U//FOUO) POC: DJP2 (U) PHONE:[REDACTED] (U) ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY: [REDACTED] Associate Director for Community Integration, Policy and Records (U) Unless otherwise indicated, the information included in this guide addresses activity during and related to the Cuban Missile Crisis ONLY. | Description of Information | Classification/Markings | Reason | Declass | Remarks | | :------------------------- | :---------------------- | :----- | :------ | :------ | | **(U) The following guidance (items 1-8) pertains to information related to the Cuban Missile Crisis during the time period 1 January 1959 through 31 December 1963.** | | | | | | 1. (U) The fact that the following entities were SIGINT targets during and related to the crisis:
a. The USSR
b. Soviet Forces in Cuba
c. Soviet Merchant Shipping
d. Cuba, to include Cuban Military Forces. | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | | | 2. (U) Information derived from, or pertaining to, unenciphered Soviet military communications during and related to the crisis. | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | | | 3. (U) Information derived from, or pertaining to, Soviet air-to-ground and ground-to-air GCI communications in Cuba during and related to the crisis. | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | | | 4. (U) Direction-finding results when applied to Cuban and Soviet Forces during and related to the crisis, to include merchant shipping involved in aid to Cuba. | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | | | 5. (U) Information derived from, | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | | SECRET//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL SECRET//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL | | | | | | | :-- | :-- | :-- | :-- | :-- | | or pertaining to, unenciphered Cuban internal military and governmental communications during and related to the crisis. | | | | | | 6. (U) Information derived from or pertaining to Cuban air-to-ground and ground-to-air GCI communications during and related to the crisis. | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | | | 7. (U) Information derived from category IIX product reports pertaining to Soviet and Cuban communications during and related to the crisis, including Soviet Merchant Shipping communications. | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | | | 8. (U) Information derived from category II product reports pertaining to unenciphered Cuban internal military and governmental communications during and related to the crisis. | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | | | **(U) The following guidance (items 9-10) pertains to information related to the Cuban Missile Crisis during the time period 1 January 1960 through 31 December 1962.** | | | | | | 9. (U) The fact that Czechoslovakia was a SIGINT target during and related to the crisis. | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | | | 10. (U) Information derived from, or pertaining to, Czech air and air defense communications during and related to the crisis, and ELINT related to those communications. | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | | | **(U) The following guidance (items 11-16) pertains to information related to the Cuban Missile Crisis for all time periods.** | | | | | | 11. (U) The fact of NSA/CSS targeting/collecting diplomatic and International Commercial (ILC) communications during and related to the crisis. | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | (U//FOUO) Details regarding this targeting/collection shall remain classified, to include identification of the specific diplomatic entity communicating or identification of the entity communicating using ILC communications.

(U//FOUO) Information from product reports derived from diplomatic and ILC communications shall not be released without approval from the Office of Policy and | SECRET//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL SECRET//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL | | | | | | | :-- | :-- | :-- | :-- | :-- | | | | | | Records. | | 12. (S//REL) The fact of targeting Soviet General Staff communications. | SECRET//
REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL | 1.4 (c) | 25 years* | | | 13. (U) Information contained in Category III SIGINT reports related to the Cuban Missile Crisis. | TOP SECRET//
COMINT

Releasability determined on a case-by-case basis. | 1.4 (c) | 25 years* | | | 14. (U) Information reflecting U.S. relationships with Second or Third party partners. | SECRET//COMINT

At a minimum.

Releasability determined on a case-by-case basis. | 1.4 (c) | 25 years* | | | 15. (U) Identification of SIGINT collection systems and techniques. | CONFIDENTIAL

At minimum.

Releasability determined on a case-by-case basis. | 1.4 (c) | 25 years* | | | 16. (U) Information contained in high-level summaries that contain substantial amounts of cryptologic material or high-level all-source conclusions relating to Soviet involvement. | CONFIDENTIAL

At a minimum.

Releasability determined on a case-by-case basis. | 1.4 (c) | 25 years* | | | **(U) ELINT** | | | | | | 17. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE ELINT targeting during and related to the crisis of any entities described as UNCLASSIFIED in this guide. | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | | | 18. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE ELINT targeting any countries or entities during and related to the crisis other than those described as UNCLASSIFIED in this guide. | SECRET//
REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL | 1.4 (c) | 25 years* | | | 19. (U) The fact of ELINT collection during and related to the crisis *of signals from a specific type of radar,* identified:
- by ELNOT (ELINT notation), **or**
- by nickname, or
- by identification of the associated system. | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | (U) The association of an ELNOT with its related system nickname or other system identifier is classified. | | 20. (U) The fact of ELINT collection during and related to the crisis *of signals from a specific type of radar,* identified:
- by ELNOT **and** by nickname, or | CONFIDENTIAL//
REL TO USA, AUS, CAN. GBR, NZL | 1.4 (c) | 25 years* | | SECRET//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL SECRET//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL | | | | | | | :-- | :-- | :-- | :-- | :-- | | - by ELNOT **and** by identification of the associated system. | | | | | | 21. (U) The fact of land-based ELINT collection during and related to the crisis. | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | | | 22. (U) The fact of airborne ELINT collection during and related to the crisis. | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | | | 23. (U) The identification of types of aircraft used for ELINT collection during and related to the crisis. | Classification determined on a case-by-case basis. | | | (U) Details relating to specific airborne platforms and systems used during the crisis should be treated according to applicable guidance. | | 24. (U) The identification of a specific aircraft used for ELINT collection during and related to the crisis. | CONFIDENTIAL//
REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL | 1.4 (c) | 25 years* | (U) Regardless of how identified. | | 25. (U) The fact of shipborne ELINT collection during and related to the crisis. | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | | | 26. (U) The identification of types of ships used for ELINT collection during and related to the crisis. | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | | | 27. (U) The identification of a specific ship used for ELINT collection during and related to the crisis. | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | | | 28. (U) The fact of satellite/overhead ELINT collection during and related to the crisis. | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | | | 29. (U) Details regarding satellite/overhead ELINT collection during and related to the crisis. | CONFIDENTIAL//
REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

At a minimum. | 1.4 (c) | 25 years* | (U) The association of a specific ELINT intercept with satellite/overhead collection is classified. | | 30. (U) The association of a specific ELINT intercept during and related to the crisis with a specific type of collection. | SECRET//
REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL | 1.4 (c) | 25 years* | | | 31. (U) The association of a Circular Error of Probability (CEP) or a confidence ellipse with an ELINT intercept during and related to the crisis. | SECRET//
REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

At a minimum. | 1.4 (c) | 25 years* | | | 32. (U) Parametric data derived from ELINT intercept during and related to the crisis. | SECRET//
REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

At a minimum. | 1.4 (c) | 25 years* | | SECRET//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL SECRET//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL (U) * 25 years: Declassification in 25 years indicates that the information is classified for 25 years from the date a document is created or 25 years from the date of this original classification decision, whichever is later. SECRET//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL