# What is HACIENDA? * Data reconnaissance tool developed by the CITD team in JTRIG * Port Scans entire countries * Uses nmap as port scanning tool * Uses GEOFUSION for IP Geolocation * Randomly scans every IP identified for that country UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY --- ## Countries * Completed full scans of 27 countries including * [REDACTED] * [REDACTED] * [REDACTED] * [REDACTED] * [REDACTED] * [REDACTED] * Completed partial scans of 5 additional countries UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY --- ## Tasking & Access * To task HACIENDA with a Country or Subnet * [REDACTED]@gchq.gov.uk) * CITD alias [REDACTED]@gchq.gov.uk) * Access to the Data * At GCHQ, request a GLOBAL SURGE account from [REDACTED]@gchq.gov.uk) * At CSEC, contact [REDACTED] * At NSA, contact [REDACTED] * At DSD, contact [REDACTED] UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY --- ## Ports * Pulls back hostname, banners, application names and port status * Gathers additional information for... * 21 (ftp): directory listing * 80 (http): content of main page * 443 (https): content of main page * 111 (rpc): results of rpcinfo UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY --- Host 1 -> SYN (SEQ = x) -> Host 2 Host 2 -> SYN (SEQ = y, ACK = x + 1) -> Host 1 Host 1 -> (SEQ = x + 1, ACK = y + 1) -> Host 2 --- Host 1 -> SYN (SEQ = x) -> Host 2 Host 2 -> RST (SEQ = y, ACK = x + 1) -> Host 1 --- ## The Results... * All stored in JTRIG's internal database * Available in GLOBAL SURGE * NAC's Network Knowledge Base Prototype * Transferred by MAILORDER to * CSEC * DSD * NSA NTOC UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY --- ## How is it used? * CNE * ORB Detection * Vulnerability Assessments * SD * Network Analysis * Target Discovery UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY --- NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY SIGDEV SIGINT DEVELOPMENT TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL ## The Hacking Process 1. (R)econnaissance 2. (I)nfection 3. (C)ommand And Control 4. (E)xfiltration TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL --- NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY SIGDEV SIGINT DEVELOPMENT TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL ## Reconnaissance Publicly Available Information (Email Address, Location, Network Info, Passwords, etc.) Research Hacker * Enumerate (Network) * Scan (Services) * Operating Systems * Versions * Domain Names Victim **Reconnaissance** Infection Command and Control Exfiltration TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL --- NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY SIGDEV SIGINT DEVELOPMENT TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL ## Infection Hacker Email with Attachment or Link Victim Special Packets to Exploit Services Use Login Credentials Bad Web Site Reconnaissance **Infection** Command and Control Exfiltration TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL --- NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY SIGDEV SIGINT DEVELOPMENT TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL ## Command and Control Hacker Push Tools and Send Commands (Tasking, Survey, etc.) Victim Beacons and Responses Reconnaissance Infection **Command and Control** Exfiltration TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL --- NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY SIGDEV SIGINT DEVELOPMENT TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL ## Exfiltration Exfil using known and custom protocols (Known: HTTP, SMTP, ICMP, FTP, etc) Victim Hacker Reconnaissance Infection Command and Control **Exfiltration** TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL --- NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY SIGDEV SIGINT DEVELOPMENT TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL ## Reconnaissance ``` This system is audited for USSID 18 and Human Rights Act compliance CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL X-KEYSCORE C2C Session Viewer Datetime Case Notation From IP To IP From Port To Port Protocol 2012-05-16 13:03:20 2CBAB00000M0210 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 01701 01701 icmp Session | Header (3) | Meta (7) | GENESIS | Contexts (1) Formatter: WIRESHARD | Send to: Download Session | Mode: Snippet | Options | Search Content: Enter text to search Quick Clicks * Session * One-Click Searches * Find fingerprint * selector/cadence/task * udp/tunnel/ipv4 * netmanagement/icmp/e * Find traffic on * Find application * netmanagement/icmp Internet Protocol, Src: 8.8.8.8 (8.8.8.8), Dst: 192.168.0.83 (192.168.0.83) Version: 4 Header length: 20 bytes Differentiated Services Field: 0x00 (DSCP 0x00: Default; ECN: 0x00) 0000 00.. = Differentiated Services Codepoint: Default (0x00) .... ..0. = ECN-Capable Transport (ECT): 0 .... ...0 = ECN-CE: 0 Total Length: 60 Identification: 0x2d3c (11560) Flags: 0x00 0... = Reserved bit: Not set .0.. = Don't fragment: Not set ..0. = More fragments: Not set Fragment offset: 0 Time to live: 51 Protocol: ICMP (0x01) Header checksum: 0x897a [correct] [Good: True] [Bad: False] Source: 8.8.8.8 (8.8.8.8) Destination: 192.168.0.83 (192.168.0.83) Internet Control Message Protocol Type: 0 (Echo (ping) reply) Code: 0 Checksum: 0x51ec [correct] Identifier: 0x0001 Sequence number: 623 (0x026f) Data (32 bytes) 0000 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 70 abcdefghijklmnop 0010 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 qrstuwwabcdefghi ``` **Reconnaissance** Infection Command and Control Exfiltration TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL --- NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY SIGDEV SIGINT DEVELOPMENT TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL ## Password Guessing ``` USER Administrator PASS #mafiavafute197532@%!?* USER Administrator PASS sh3l5l1k3p4rty3v3r USER Administrator PASS Sh3I5Lik3P4rtY@v3r USER Administrator PASS Sh5I8LiK6P8rtY6v5r USER Administrator PASS kalimero4cappy USER Administrator PASS P@ssword USER Administrator PASS P@sswOrd USER Administrator PASS P@ssw0rd ``` Iraqi Ministry of Finance Reconnaissance **Infection** Command and Control Exfiltration TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL --- NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY SIGDEV SIGINT DEVELOPMENT TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL ## Windows cmd.exe ``` C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe Microsoft Windows XP [Version 5.1.2600] (C) Copyright 1985-2001 Microsoft Corp. U:\>_ ``` Reconnaissance Infection **Command and Control** Exfiltration TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL --- TOP SECRET//COMINT Communications Security Establishment Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications ## Presentation Outline * LANDMARK – automated tradecraft to further expand CNE covert infrastructure * [REDACTED] Canada 2 --- TOP SECRET//COMINT Communications Security Establishment Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications ## LANDMARK * CSEC's Operational Relay Box (ORB) covert infrastructure used to provide an additional level of non-attribution; subsequently used for exploits and exfiltration * 2-3 times/year, 1 day focused effort to acquire as many new ORBs as possible in as many non 5-Eyes countries as possible Canada 3 --- TOP SECRET//COMINT Communications Security Establishment Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications ## LANDMARK – the recent past.... * February 2010 * Operation encompassing the whole of LONGRUN solely using OLYMPIA (CSEC's network knowledge engine with automated tradecraft) * 8 teams of 3 network exploitation analysts busy for 5-8 hours * A list of 3000+ potential ORBs Canada 5 --- TOP SECRET//COMINT Communications Security Establishment Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications ``` Olympia version 0.5.0 File Tools Window Help Olympia | Gimme all you got Gimme all you got | Gimme all you got by Country Search Continent: africa Country: kenya Date Range: Last 30 Days Start Date: End Date: Commands ☐ Show VPNs ☐ Show Toygrippe Range Events ☐ Show CND Event Summaries ☐ Show User Online Events on IP ☐ Show router configuration information (TIDAL SURGE) ☐ Show IP Communications ☐ Show Geolocation Information ☐ Show Network Information ☐ Show SIGINT Observable Feature Information ☐ Show Survey Information ☐ Show Geolocation Map ☐ Reverse DNS Lookup ☑ Show Port Scans on IP Africa View (JPA) (10000) Showing page 1 ``` | Source | System | First Seen | Last Seen | Hostname | IP | Port | Protocol | Status | TTL | Product | Version | Banner Information | | ------ | -------- | ---------------------------- | ---------------------------- | ---------------------------------- | ---------- | ---- | -------- | ----------- | --- | ---------------------------- | ------------- | ----------------------- | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 08:11:03 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 08:11:03 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 80 | tcp | filtered | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 08:11:03 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 08:11:03 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 110 | tcp | filtered | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 08:11:03 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 08:11:03 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 111 | tcp | filtered | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 08:11:03 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 08:11:03 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 161 | tcp | filtered | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 08:11:03 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 08:11:03 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 162 | tcp | filtered | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 08:11:03 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 08:11:03 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 443 | tcp | filtered | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 08:11:03 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 08:11:03 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 500 | tcp | filtered | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 07:07:29 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 07:07:29 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 0 | unknown | unreachable | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 110 | tcp | open | 0 | Kerio MailServer POP3 Server | 6.3.2 | 4152.1242730171@kcv_svr | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 443 | tcp | open | 0 | Kerio MailServer Webmail | 6.3.2 | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 25 | tcp | open | 0 | Microsoft ESMTP | 6.0.3790.3959 | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 80 | tcp | open | 0 | Microsoft IIS webserver | 6.0 | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 21 | tcp | open | 0 | Microsoft ftp | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 22 | tcp | closed | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 23 | tcp | closed | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 111 | tcp | closed | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 161 | tcp | closed | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 162 | tcp | closed | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 443 | tcp | closed | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 21 | tcp | closed | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 22 | tcp | closed | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 23 | tcp | closed | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 25 | tcp | open | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 80 | tcp | open | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 110 | tcp | closed | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 111 | tcp | closed | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 161 | tcp | closed | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 162 | tcp | closed | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 443 | tcp | open | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 21 | tcp | closed | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 22 | tcp | closed | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 23 | tcp | closed | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 25 | tcp | open | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 80 | tcp | open | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 110 | tcp | closed | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 111 | tcp | closed | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 161 | tcp | closed | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 162 | tcp | closed | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue Jun 17 00:13:34 GMT 2008 | Tue Jun 17 00:13:34 GMT 2008 | | [REDACTED] | 0 | unknown | unreachable | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue Jun 17 00:13:34 GMT 2008 | Tue Jun 17 00:13:34 GMT 2008 | | [REDACTED] | 0 | unknown | unreachable | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue Jun 17 00:13:33 GMT 2008 | Tue Jun 17 00:13:33 GMT 2008 | | [REDACTED] | 0 | unknown | unreachable | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue Jun 17 00:12:49 GMT 2008 | Tue Jun 17 00:12:49 GMT 2008 | | [REDACTED] | 0 | unknown | unreachable | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue Jun 17 00:13:50 GMT 2008 | Tue Jun 17 00:13:50 GMT 2008 | | [REDACTED] | 0 | unknown | unreachable | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue Jun 17 00:13:59 GMT 2008 | Tue Jun 17 00:13:59 GMT 2008 | | [REDACTED] | 0 | unknown | unreachable | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue Jun 17 00:00:29 GMT 2008 | Tue Jun 17 00:00:29 GMT 2008 | | [REDACTED] | 0 | unknown | unreachable | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue Jun 17 00:03:13 GMT 2008 | Tue Jun 17 00:03:13 GMT 2008 | | [REDACTED] | 0 | unknown | unreachable | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue Jun 17 07:01:12 GMT 2008 | Tue Jun 17 07:01:12 GMT 2008 | | [REDACTED] | 0 | unknown | unreachable | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue Jul 07 07:30:40 GMT 2009 | Wed Feb 03 11:13:34 GMT 2010 | 80-247-147-41.reverse.newskies.net | [REDACTED] | 0 | unknown | unreachable | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue Jul 07 07:32:20 GMT 2009 | Wed Feb 03 11:14:55 GMT 2010 | 80-247-147-42.reverse.newskies.net | [REDACTED] | 0 | unknown | unreachable | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue Jul 07 07:31:23 GMT 2009 | Wed Feb 03 11:15:34 GMT 2010 | 80-247-147-43.reverse.newskies.net | [REDACTED] | 0 | unknown | unreachable | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue Jul 07 07:32:11 GMT 2009 | Wed Feb 03 11:12:30 GMT 2010 | 80-247-147-42.reverse.newskies.net | [REDACTED] | 0 | unknown | unreachable | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue Jul 07 07:30:20 GMT 2009 | Wed Feb 03 11:15:11 GMT 2010 | 80-247-147-44.reverse.newskies.net | [REDACTED] | 0 | unknown | unreachable | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue Jul 07 07:32:14 GMT 2009 | Wed Feb 03 11:13:15 GMT 2010 | 80-247-147-45.reverse.newskies.net | [REDACTED] | 0 | unknown | unreachable | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue Jul 07 07:32:13 GMT 2009 | Wed Feb 03 11:13:15 GMT 2010 | 80-247-147-46.reverse.newskies.net | [REDACTED] | 0 | unknown | unreachable | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue Jul 07 06:49:57 GMT 2009 | Wed Feb 03 11:14:00 GMT 2010 | 80-247-147-46.reverse.newskies.net | [REDACTED] | 0 | unknown | unreachable | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue Jul 07 07:47:17 GMT 2009 | Wed Feb 03 11:14:06 GMT 2010 | 80-247-147-47.reverse.newskies.net | [REDACTED] | 0 | unknown | unreachable | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue Jul 07 07:06:18 GMT 2009 | Wed Feb 03 12:02:07 GMT 2010 | | [REDACTED] | 0 | unknown | unreachable | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue Jun 17 00:30:20 GMT 2008 | Tue Jun 17 00:30:20 GMT 2008 | pool2-gw.emperion.net | [REDACTED] | 23 | tcp | open | 0 | Cisco router | unknown | unknown | | GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue Jun 17 00:06:36 GMT 2008 | Tue Jun 17 00:06:36 GMT 2008 | | [REDACTED] | 0 | unknown | unreachable | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown | BUT, network analysis still manual! Canada 6 --- TOP SECRET//COMINT Communications Security Establishment Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications ## LANDMARK today... * Network analysis tradecraft to determine vulnerable devices has been encoded within OLYMPIA [REDACTED] Canada 7 --- TOP SECRET//COMINT Communications Security Establishment Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications * [REDACTED] GSM provider * NSA TAO requested assistance gaining access to the network * Network analysis using OLYMPIA: * DNS query to determine IP address * IP address to network range * Network range to port scan * Are there any vulnerable devices in that range? * Duration: < 5 minutes Canada 8 --- UK TOP SECRET STRAP I ## Use Case 1: Finding Orbs * Combine Harvester * Mugshot QFD * Etc.. * Hacienda * DNS * Geo Fusion * CNE Orbs * Mugshot Control **MUGSHOT CORE – Q/A Framework** * Vulnerability Profile * Potential Orbs * Highnote * Orbs GCHQ © Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. --- UK TOP SECRET STRAP I ## Benefits * Automated Vulnerability Assessment * Using Vulnerability Profiles for Remote and Content Delivery vectors * Automated Target Development and Monitoring** * Identify and characterise target machines * Profiles machines, including: * Browser, OS, PSP, Patch History * Activity * Download * Automated Target Technology Tracking (Stats & Trends) * Browsers, OS, PSP etc * ORB Identification * Initial ten fold increase in Orb Identification rate over manual process GCHQ © Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. --- UK TOP SECRET STRAP I ## Defining Attributes Attribute Definition * Name * Description * Type * Data sources Machine Attributes * Open port (25, 80, 443) * Server banner (Server: Apache) * PSP fingerprint (Kaspersky v7.01) * XFF (192.168.2.1) * Web Request (test.exe, file.pdf) * DNS Name (webhost.com) * SNMP sysname Machine Communication Attributes * FTP login * DNS Request * HTTPS connection GCHQ © Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. --- UK TOP SECRET STRAP I ## MUGSHOT GOALS * Automated Target Characterisation and Monitoring * Automatically understand everything important about CNE target networks from passive and active sources. * Automated Un-Targeted Characterisation * Automatically understand everything important about all machines on the Internet from passive and active sources. GCHQ © Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.