{ "title": "Sentry Eagle Brief Sheet", "type": "REPORTED", "description": "A classified NSA/JFCC-NW briefing document formally inducting cleared personnel into Sentry Eagle — the agency's most sensitive umbrella program protecting core secrets about its cyber operations — and enumerating, tier by tier, what the NSA conceals about its covert industry partnerships, encryption sabotage, network hacking, computer network defense, and human intelligence relationships.", "long_description": "This top secret draft brief sheet, which The Intercept dates to 2004, serves as the formal indoctrination document for personnel being read into Sentry Eagle — the NSA and JFCC-NW's overarching compartmented program protecting the most sensitive facts about U.S. cyber operations. The document opens by defining the scope of \"America's cyberspace\" as encompassing national security, military, intelligence, federal government, critical infrastructure, private industry, academic, and civilian systems, and frames Sentry Eagle as the protective shell around the combined CNO capabilities — SIGINT, Computer Network Exploitation, Computer Network Defense, and Computer Network Attack — used to defend and exploit that space. It explicitly warns that unauthorized disclosure would cause \"exceptionally grave damage\" to U.S. national security, potentially compromising cryptologic relationships, multi-year investments, and the ability to operate in foreign adversary cyberspace.\n\nThe document then enumerates the six ECI sub-compartments and their most sensitive facts in detail. Under Sentry Owl (industry relationships), the most classified facts include: that the NSA works with named U.S. commercial entities under contractual arrangements to make their devices and products exploitable for SIGINT; that it works with foreign commercial entities for the same purpose; that it runs FISA operations with U.S. industry; and that NSA personnel operate under cover in commercial entities, conducting covert communications related to SIGINT enabling. Under Sentry Raven (encryption), the highest-tier secrets include specific cryptographic weaknesses exploited, supercomputer and special-purpose hardware used for cryptanalysis, and the fact that the NSA is spending hundreds of millions of dollars to attack commercial encryption — and has worked with named U.S. companies to deliberately weaken their encryption products.\n\nSentry Hawk (CNE) protects facts about specific vulnerabilities successfully exploited in named targets, the exact timing and tools used for both on-net and off-net operations, hardware and software implant locations on target systems, and the NSA's access to non-U.S. worldwide cable and fiber optic infrastructure. Sentry Falcon (CND) protects the most sensitive defensive operations including honeypot and watermarking activities, network data redirection, and intruder attribution via counterintelligence methods. Sentry Condor (CNA) covers the provision of specific targeting materials and tools enabling offensive cyber attack mechanisms. Finally, Sentry Osprey (HUMINT) protects the identities of CIA National Clandestine Service human assets, specific target countries, and operational details of supply chain and other physical exploitation techniques — including the NSA's own TAREX human intelligence assets deployed in support of SIGINT operations.", "tags": [ "CNO Core Secrets", "ECI", "SAP", "compartmentalization", "Computer Network Exploitation", "Computer Network Defense", "Computer Network Attack", "humint", "TAREX", "CIA", "NCS", "backdoors", "covert agents", "industry relationships", "FISA", "cable access", "cable tapping", "fiber optic cables", "supply chain interdiction", "hardware implants", "implants", "cryptanalysis", "supercomputers", "JFCC-NW", "indoctrination", "need-to-know", "cyberspace", "offensive cyber operations", "defensive cyber", "surveillance", "corporate cooperation", "special access", "classification framework", "Computer Network Operations", "clandestine operations", "target exploitation", "undercover operatives", "U.S. companies", "foreign companies", "SIGINT enabling", "encryption weakening", "special purpose hardware", "commercial encryption", "undersea cables", "software implants", "Close Access Operations", "off-net", "on-net operations", "honeypot", "watermarking", "data tagging", "network redirection", "intruder attribution", "counterintelligence", "red teaming", "Blue Team", "NIPRnet", "Bluesash", "vulnerability exploitation", "firewall bypass", "operating system exploitation", "data exfiltration", "command and control", "cryptology", "foreign ciphers", "cyber doctrine", "information operations", "critical infrastructure" ], "document": { "creator": "NSA", "date_created": "2004-11-23", "classification": [ "TOP SECRET", "COMINT" ], "dissemination": [ "NOFORN" ], "banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20310524", "genre": "other", "programs": [ "SENTRYEAGLE", "SPARECHANGE", "WHIPGENIE", "AUNTIE", "AMBULANT", "OPALESCE", "REVELRY", "REFRACTOR", "SENTRYHAWK", "SENTRYFALCON", "SENTRYOSPREY", "SENTRYRAVEN", "SENTRYCONDOR", "SENTRYOWL", "BLUESASH", "TAREX" ], "countries": [], "people": [] }, "publication": [ { "publisher": "The Intercept", "date_published": "2014-10-10", "title": "Core Secrets: NSA Saboteurs in China and Germany", "link": "https://theintercept.com/2014/10/10/core-secrets/", "reporters": [ "Maass, Peter", "Poitras, Laura" ], "contributors": [ "Brown, Alleen", "Williams, Margot" ] } ], "pdf_sha256": "df22d085e77b63c6de0ea2bf24cc4bbb8762b7f3fce6d2ba7453badeb8544c4c", "pages": 13 }