{ "title": "GALLANTWAVE", "type": "REPORTED", "description": "NSA presentation describing GALLANTWAVE — a LONGHAUL capability for VPN decryption — specifically its scaling architecture to handle increased collection volumes and a peering mechanism allowing partner agencies to share single-sided VPN key exchange events so that LONGHAUL can complete decryption attempts that would otherwise fail due to one-sided collection.\n", "long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL presentation from NSA's Digital Network Crypt Applications (DNCA) division describing the scaling and volume requirements for GALLANTWAVE, a VPN decryption capability operating within the LONGHAUL attack orchestration framework.\n\nThe document addresses two parallel development tracks. The @Scale track focuses on deploying GALLANTWAVE more widely through a peering mechanism between partner agencies — the architecture showing KPS (Key Processing System) communicating with LONGHAUL — allowing agencies to share copies of VPN key exchange events that have only been seen on one side of the connection. This is a direct response to one of the fundamental challenges of passive cable collection for VPN decryption: IPSec requires both sides of an IKE key exchange to recover the session key, but a given cable tap may only see traffic flowing in one direction. The peering architecture allows LONGHAUL to identify which events have not paired locally, request the missing side from a partner agency, and complete the key recovery process that would otherwise be impossible. The @Volume track addresses the hardware scaling challenge, with plans to increase system capacity from 10 gigabits to 40 and then 100 gigabits per second, and to increase target volumes under a programme called CORNERKICK.\n\nThe architecture diagrams illustrate two scenarios. Single-sided collection shows how LONGHAUL requests a missing B-to-A event from a peer's Key Processing System when it has only seen the A-to-B direction, receiving the event and completing the attack via the GW (GALLANTWAVE) component and MVR. The filtered pairing diagram shows a more complex multi-site scenario with two GALLANTWAVE nodes (GW-1 and GW-2) exchanging need and event messages to complete pairings across geographically distributed collection points, with an SF component mediating between them — the nature of SF is not defined in the document.", "tags": [ "VPN decryption", "IPSec", "IKE", "key recovery", "peering architecture", "Digital Network Crypt Applications", "DNCA", "Key Processing System", "single-sided collection", "partner peering", "encryption breaking", "cable collection", "passive collection", "scaling" ], "document": { "creator": "NSA", "date_created": "", "classification": [ "TOP SECRET", "COMINT" ], "dissemination": [ "REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL" ], "banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL", "genre": "slides", "programs": [ "GALLANTWAVE", "CORNERKICK", "LONGHAUL", "MVR" ], "countries": [], "people": [] }, "publication": [ { "publisher": "Der Spiegel", "date_published": "2014-12-28", "title": "Prying Eyes: Inside the NSA's War on Internet Security", "link": "https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/inside-the-nsa-s-war-on-internet-security-a-1010361.html", "reporters": [ "Appelbaum, Jacob", "Gibson, Aaron", "Grothoff, Christian", "Müller-Maguhn, Andy", "Poitras, Laura", "Sontheimer, Michael", "Stöcker, Christian" ], "contributors": [], "doc_url": "https://cdn.prod.www.spiegel.de/media/221fe9a4-0001-0014-0000-000000035514/media-35514.pdf" } ], "pdf_sha256": "8a53be36db1d732ff63d29ac9fcff6e6952025ec74bcbe5bb1e96f445eb98cbf", "pages": 5 }