{ "title": "SPIN 15 VPN Story", "type": "REPORTED", "description": "A TOP SECRET planning document describing two parallel workstreams in SPIN 15: the deployment of VPN decryption capabilities to SMOKYSINK (US-3237), a unilateral NSA RAMPART-T cable tap site operating without a third-party partner, and a risk reduction benchmarking activity measuring TURMOIL's VPN and SSL exploitation performance against the Net-Centric Capabilities (NCC) programme's Key Performance Parameters — which targeted 100,000 VPN decrypt requests per hour by the end of fiscal year 2011, and 10 million SSL sessions per day by the end of fiscal year 2012.", "long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY draft planning document describing two operational workstreams within SPIN 15, an NSA release cycle for VPN decryption capabilities under the VALIANTSURF programme. The document was published by Der Spiegel under the German title \"Beschreibung bestehender Projekte von VPN Entschlüsselungen\" (\"Description of existing VPN decryption projects\").\n\nThe first workstream concerns the deployment of VPN decryption capabilities to a site designated SMK — identifiable from other published Snowden documents as SMOKYSINK (SIGAD US-3237/KE), a RAMPART-T cable tap operating without a third-party partner, distinguished from the RAMPART-A sites which require foreign intelligence service cooperation. The document describes SMOKYSINK as \"a VPN rich environment with targets of high value\" whose SIGINT reporting reaches \"high levels of government,\" and notes that NSA leadership has tasked CES (Cryptanalysis and Exploitation Services) to deploy decryption capabilities there. SPFs had to be signed to authorise the deployment of TS//SI equipment to what the document describes as an S//SI-cleared site. The deployment plan covers two TURMOIL hardware platforms: T-16 development and live servers followed by Dell LPT systems, with tasks distributed across TURMOIL, CES and AMF teams spanning March through June. The pipeline involves loading SPIN 13 software, configuring PIQ services on Blade 14, configuring ISLANDHIDEAWAY for POISONNUT VAO messaging traffic, adding IP tasking to KEYCARD for VPNs of interest, evaluating decrypted data in XKEYSCORE for strong selectors, and verifying that decrypted data hitting strong selectors is forwarded through TURMOIL to PRESSUREWAVE for analyst retrieval and reporting. A note flags that an MDC upgrade and Site Store deployment at SMOKYSINK scheduled for March 16-31 may cause the VPN decryption deployment to slip.\n\nThe second workstream is a risk reduction benchmarking activity supporting Program B — the formal acquisition designation for the Net-Centric Capabilities (NCC) programme, which funded TURMOIL development under the broader TURBULENCE enterprise architecture. The document lists eight Key Performance Parameters with scaling targets across fiscal years 2009 through 2012. The most significant are: NCC decrypt requests per hour scaling from 1,000 (Q4 FY09) to 100,000 (Q4 FY11); full processing including decryption and re-injection of at least 20% of those requests; SSL session exploitation scaling from 10,000 sessions per day (Q4 FY09) to 10 million sessions per day (Q4 FY12); and password recovery detection scaling from 500 sessions per month to 20,000 sessions per month over the same period. These figures are directly cited in Der Spiegel's December 2014 encryption article, confirming this document as the source of those numbers. The benchmarking schedule covers April and May on T-16 Heavy and LPT platforms respectively, with review dates on April 16 and May 8 to guide architectural decisions needed to meet the September 30, 2009 KPP deadline.\n\nPIQ services referenced throughout the document operate under the PICARESQUE ECI compartment — the restricted access control covering NSA's cryptanalytic exploitation capabilities — and communicate with POISONNUT, the VPN Attack Orchestrator (VAO), via ITx (ISLANDTRANSPORT) and ISLANDHIDEAWAY. POISONNUT, also known as VAO, had existed since 2003 and was being redeveloped as the first component of the LONGHAUL programme at the time of this document.\n\nThe document's \"two thrusts\" framing takes on additional significance when read alongside the APEX (Active/Passive Exfiltration) programme being developed in parallel within the same SPIN 15 release cycle. APEX was designed to solve a problem the passive VALIANTSURF deployment at SMOKYSINK could not: many target VPNs are simply not visible to passive cable taps because the traffic does not cross a monitored link. APEX addressed this by combining TAO active implants — specifically HAMMERSTEIN, which could select and exfiltrate targeted packets from inside compromised routers — with TURMOIL's passive processing pipeline, allowing IKE key exchange packets captured from inside target networks to be fed back into TURMOIL's VPN decryption components. The SPIN 15 VPN Story document's two workstreams — passive decryption at SMOKYSINK and NCC performance benchmarking — were therefore being developed alongside a third effort to extend VPN key recovery beyond what passive collection alone could reach.\n\nTaken together, the document is a project plan for two things happening in parallel in early 2009. First, NSA was deploying its VPN decryption capability to a specific cable tap site — SMOKYSINK — that was intercepting internet traffic at a major congestion point and needed special authorisation because the cryptanalytic tools being deployed were more sensitive than the site's standard clearance level. Second, NSA was benchmarking how fast its TURMOIL collection systems could intercept, decrypt and re-inject VPN and SSL traffic, working toward formal programme targets that called for processing 100,000 encrypted VPN connections per hour and exploiting 10 million SSL sessions per day by the end of fiscal year 2012. These targets — which Der Spiegel later cited in its 2014 encryption investigation — give concrete scale to what the broader VALIANTSURF and BULLRUN programmes were actually trying to achieve operationally: not just the ability to break encryption in principle, but the industrial-scale infrastructure to do it continuously, automatically, and fast enough to re-inject decrypted traffic back into the collection pipeline before it was too late to act on it.", "tags": [ "CES", "VPN exploitation", "US-3237", "VPN decryption", "net-centric", "NCC", "Blade 14", "ECI", "VPN Attack Orchestrator", "AMF", "Application Messaging Framework", "SSL exploitation", "password recovery", "strong selectors", "MDC", "Site Store", "CA Server", "CA Services", "HPC", "High Performance Computing", "forward collection", "passive collection", "cable tapping", "unilateral access", "Special Purpose Funds", "SPF", "decryption", "attack orchestration", "SIGDEV", "release cycle", "benchmark testing" ], "document": { "creator": "NSA", "date_created": "", "classification": [ "TOP SECRET", "COMINT" ], "dissemination": [ "REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL" ], "banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL", "genre": "report", "programs": [ "TURMOIL", "SMOKYSINK", "ISLANDHIDEAWAY", "PICARESQUE", "KEYCARD", "XKEYSCORE", "PRESSUREWAVE", "ISLANDTRANSPORT", "PIQBLADE" ], "countries": [], "people": [] }, "publication": [ { "publisher": "Der Spiegel", "date_published": "2014-12-28", "title": "Prying Eyes: Inside the NSA's War on Internet Security", "link": "https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/inside-the-nsa-s-war-on-internet-security-a-1010361.html", "reporters": [ "Appelbaum, Jacob", "Gibson, Aaron", "Grothoff, Christian", "Müller-Maguhn, Andy", "Poitras, Laura", "Sontheimer, Michael", "Stöcker, Christian" ], "contributors": [], "doc_url": "https://cdn.prod.www.spiegel.de/media/e0511f52-0001-0014-0000-000000035522/media-35522.pdf" } ], "pdf_sha256": "55c866a264e5d212e535c11615dd7cf117571fbcfed18c58f37ff3d909695662", "pages": 4 }