{ "title": "Tor Hidden Services - How Hidden is 'Hidden'?", "type": "REPORTED", "description": "A TOP SECRET GCHQ presentation analysing the security of Tor hidden services — covering the hidden service protocol architecture, possible exploitation vectors including the Coil Attack against introduction points, a beaconing pattern discovered in idle hidden services, and the HOMING TROLL bridge discovery capability — concluding that hidden services are \"near impossible\" to deanonymise but noting several research avenues including PRESTON integration.", "long_description": "This is a UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT GCHQ Applied Research presentation produced by ICTR Network Exploitation. The presenter describes their Tor research portfolio including HOMING TROLL (a bridge discovery capability), hidden services analysis, deanonymisation techniques, work with JTRIG and MCR (Maths and Crypt Research), and support to OP SUPERIORITY.\n\nThe presentation covers the Tor hidden services protocol in detail through an eight-step animated diagram showing how a hidden service establishes and maintains anonymity: the hidden service selects random Introduction Points and uploads its descriptor to Hidden Service Directories; a client learns of the service, requests the descriptor, selects a random Rendezvous Point, contacts an Introduction Point; the hidden service replies to the Rendezvous Point which then relays traffic between client and service. Both client and server remain anonymous to each other and to any observer.\n\nThe exploitation analysis systematically evaluates each component. Owning a Rendezvous Point yields only single-layer encrypted content with no knowledge of client or hidden service identity, and clients select RPs randomly making deliberate targeting unlikely. Taking down a Hidden Service Directory is ineffective as many remain. Acting as a Hidden Service Directory could allow collection of onion domains. Introduction Points are listed in the hidden service descriptor and are therefore known — a \"Coil Attack\" against the IPTs could disrupt connections, though hidden services can select new IPTs and can encrypt their IPT list in their descriptor. Direct exploitation of the hidden service itself is identified as the most promising vector: GCHQ identified a beaconing pattern from idle hidden services that could potentially allow identification of the IP address behind a hidden service, described as \"great for PRESTON\" — the targeted interception system. The beacon graphs show regular periodic patterns at approximately 100-minute intervals from both idle clients and idle hidden services.\n\nThe presenter's summary is candid: hidden services are \"near impossible\" to figure out in terms of who is talking to whom, but the beaconing discovery and other research avenues are noted. The final slide notes \"Until then... Doesn't stop us from using them\" — a remark whose meaning is ambiguous in context, potentially referring to GCHQ continuing to access or monitor hidden services for targeting purposes, to GCHQ operating its own hidden services as covert infrastructure, or simply to continued use of the Tor network for research while the harder deanonymisation problems are worked on. The document does not clarify which.", "tags": [ "Tor", "ICTR", "ICTR-NE", "network exploitation", "Applied Research", "JTRIG", "MCR", "Maths and Crypt Research", "OP SUPERIORITY", "hidden services", "guard node", "exit node", "bridge discovery", "Coil Attack", "beaconing", "traffic analysis", "de-anonymization", "anonymity", "packet timing" ], "document": { "creator": "GCHQ", "date_created": "", "classification": [ "UK TOP SECRET", "STRAP 1", "COMINT" ], "dissemination": [], "banner": "UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT", "genre": "slides", "programs": [ "HOMINGTROLL", "JTRIG", "SUPERIORITY", "PRESTON" ], "countries": [], "people": [] }, "publication": [ { "publisher": "Der Spiegel", "date_published": "2014-12-28", "title": "Prying Eyes: Inside the NSA's War on Internet Security", "link": "https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/inside-the-nsa-s-war-on-internet-security-a-1010361.html", "reporters": [ "Appelbaum, Jacob", "Gibson, Aaron", "Grothoff, Christian", "Müller-Maguhn, Andy", "Poitras, Laura", "Sontheimer, Michael", "Stöcker, Christian" ], "contributors": [], "doc_url": "https://cdn.prod.www.spiegel.de/media/6e98f79b-0001-0014-0000-000000035539/media-35539.pdf" } ], "pdf_sha256": "6471c8cc6e3fd20cf83aff483a1575d4c6c41355ec6aada09dedf254d3d54113", "pages": 26 }