# (C//REL) Internet Anonymity 2011 * NSA (S31323) * [REDACTED] * [REDACTED] * [REDACTED] NSTS TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA, FVEY 1 --- ## (C//REL) What is Internet Anonymity? * (U) Many Possible Meanings/Interpretations * (S//REL) Simply Not Using Real Name for Email * (S//REL) Private Forum with Unadvertised Existence * (S//REL) Unlocatable Endpoint on Internet * (S//REL) This Talk Concerns Endpoint Location * (S//REL) The Network Address (IP Address) is Crucial * (S//REL) It is Not Always Sufficient, However * (S//REL) Dynamic IP Address * (S//REL) Mobile Device TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY 2 --- ## (C//REL) What is Internet Anonymity? * (S//REL) Anonymity Is Not Simply Encryption * (S//REL) Encryption Can Simply Hide Content * (S//REL) Anonymity Masks the MetaData and hence association with user * (S//SI//REL) Importance of MetaData to SIGINT post-2001 can not be overstated * (S//REL) There is also anonymity specifically for publishing information * (S//REL) Beyond the Scope of this Talk! * (U) Anonymity is the antithesis of most business transactions (but encryption may be crucial) * (U) Authentication for monetary exchange * (U) Marketing wants to know customer well * (U) The same goes for Taxing Authorities :-) TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY 3 --- ## (C//REL) Who Wants Internet Anonymity? * (U) All Technology is Dual-Use * (U) Nuclear Weapon to Plug Oil Well * (U) Homicide by Hammer * (U) Internet Anonymity for Good * (U) Anonymous Surveys (Ex: Diseases) * (U) Human Rights Bloggers * (U) HUMINT Sources TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY 4 --- ## (C//REL) Who Wants Internet Anonymity? * (U) Internet Anonymity for Bad (Semi to Really) * (U) Copyright Violators (File Sharing) * (U) Internet Scam Artists * (U) Pedophiles * (C//REL) Foreign Intelligence Agents * (S//REL) Terrorist Actors (Our Concern) * (U) Both Cases Use Internet Anonymity Technology (IAT) TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY 5 --- ## (S//REL) Internet Censorship: A "Dual" * (U) Different Scenario * (U//FOUO) User IP Address known * (U//FOUO) User Blocked from accessing certain site IP Addresses * (U//FOUO) Users get around it with Circumvention Technology - Mostly the same as Internet Anonymity Technology (IAT) TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY 6 --- ## (C//REL) Types Of IAT * (S//REL) Single Hop Proxies * (S//REL) Web Site Proxies * (S//REL) HTTP/SOCKS Proxies * (S//REL) Browser Configured to Access * (S//REL) Proxy Aggregator Sites for Both * (S//REL) May support SSL/TLS * (S//REL) HTTP Sites: Only User → Proxy * (S//REL) SSL Sites (HTTPS) * (S//REL) Transparent (Just Pass the Bits) * (S//REL) Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA, FVEY 7 --- ## (C//REL) Types Of IAT: HTTP Proxies/Aggregators * (S//REL) Web-Site Proxy Aggregator sites * (S//REL) May list thousands of proxies * (S//REL) Taxonomy may be country where hosted * (S//REL) Taxonomy may be ego/business related * (S//REL) Taxonomy may be proxy software related * (S//REL) Taxonomy may be provider related * (S//REL) Proxy Information IS Temporal * (S//REL) Requires active confirmation * (S//REL) Requires revisits TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY 8 --- ## (C//REL) Types Of IAT: HTTP Proxies/Aggregators * (S//REL) Web Proxy Sites (and Aggregator sites) – Info We Want * (S//REL) Domain Name (obvious :-) ) * (S//REL) Associated IP address(es) * (S//REL) Can get live (nslookup, host, dig, etc) * (S//REL) Can maybe get internally (Foxtrail, NKB, etc.) * (S//REL) "Exit" IP address (where does user appear?) * (S//REL) Obtaining manually easy (http://checkip.dyndns.org) * (S//REL) How to Automate? * (S//REL) Proxy Discoverer (Originally S31323) * (S//REL) Other miscellaneous (cookie modification, SSL support, etc.) TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY 9 --- ## (C//REL) Types Of IAT: HTTP Proxies/Aggregators * (S//REL) Web Proxy Aggregator sites Analysis * (S//REL) Proxy Discoverer * (S//REL) Scrapes Aggregator (ie www.proxy.org) * (S//REL) For each proxy, GET www.checkin.dyndns.org * (S//REL) Iterate over software, variations * (S//REL) Glype, PHProxy, CGIProxy, ASP.NET, cURLProxy, Surrogafier, Zelune * (S//REL) Try multiple times * (S//REL) Aggregator may give software hints * (S//REL) Failure may indicate site down, or proxy SW modification * (S//REL) Results from Proxy Discoverer must bridge low->high * (S//REL) Operationalized by NAC/RONIN with NTOC support (project PONTENTPOTABLES) * (S//REL) See SDC2011: [REDACTED] TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA, FVEY 10 --- ## (C//REL) Types Of IAT * (S//REL) VPN Anonymity Providers * (S//REL) Provider may offer multiple servers * (S//REL) Different Sovereign Nations * (S//REL) Different Bandwidths * (S//REL) Most fee based: Can vary on time/number of servers * (S//REL) May offer multiple VPN protocols * (S//REL) PPTP (No client software) * (S//REL) SSH * (S//REL) OpenVPN * (S//REL) L2TP/IPSEC * (S//REL) SSTP * (S//REL) Communications User ↔ Server Encrypted TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY 11 --- ## (C//REL) Types Of IAT * (S//REL) VPN Anonymity Providers * (S//REL) Plethora of providers (I found about 200) * (S//REL) 12VPN, Ace VPN, Air VPN, AlwaysVPN, Ananoos, AnoCentral, Anonine, Anonyproz, AnonymityNetwork, Anonymizer, Anti-Hadopi, Arethusa, ArtofPing, Astrill, BananaVPN, BeeVPN, BlackLogic, BlackVPN, BolchVPN, BuyProxyService, Change-Mon-IP, Cienen, ClearVPN, ConnectInPrivate, ConnectionVPN, CrackIP, Cryptline, Cryptocloud, CyberGhostVPN, DarknetVPN, DrakkerVPN, DoubleVPN, ExpressVPN, Eztun, FBVPN, FlashVPN, FQVPN, Freedur, FreeVPN, GateVPN, GoldenFrogVyprVPN, GoTrusted, HappyVPN, HideIPVPN, HideMyAss, Hideway, High-Speed-VPN, HostSpotVPN, HotspotShield, IAPSSecurityStore, ibVPN, IdealVPN, InvisibleBrowsing, iOpusiPig, IPJET, Ipredator, ItsHidden, Ivacy, IVPN, Ksecure, KeyVPN, Kryptnet, LamniaVPN, LeVPN, LibertyVPN, LifeVPN, Linkideo, Loki, MadVPN, MetroPipe, MicroVPN, MonkeyVPN, Mullvad, MyOpenGateway, MyVPN, Overplay, oVPN, PacketIX, PC-Streaming, PerfectPrivacy, Privacy.io, Privacy.li, PrivacyTunnel, PrivateInternetAccess, PrivateVPN, PRQtunnel, PublicVPN, PureVPN, Relakks, RemoteVPN, RoadWarriorVPN, RootPanama, RoxNetworks, SaferSurf, SecretsLine, SecureNetics, SecureSwiss, SecureTunnel, SecureVPN, SlickyProxy, SmallVPN, SofanetSofaLINK, SteganosInternetAnonymVPN, StrongVPN, SuperVPN, SurfBouncer, SurfoNym, SurfRescue, SwissPVN, SwitchVPN, TheSafety, Tiggerswelt, tonVPN, Trackbuster, trilightzone, TorrentFreedeom, Tunnelr, TUVPN, UkiVPN, UltraVPN, UnblockVPN, USAIP, VIPAccounts, VIPVPN, VPN4ALL, VPNDeutschland, VPNDog, VPNGates, VPNMaster, VPNonline.ru, VPNPrivacy, VPNProNet, VPNSeek, VPNSteel, VPNSwiss, VPNtraffic, VPNTunnel, vpntunnel.se, VPNSecure, VPNod, VPNout, VPNWorld, VyprVPN, Witopia, WorldVPN, WOWVPN, XeroBank, xtra-vpn, YourFreedom, YourPrivateVPN TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA, FVEY 12 --- ## (C//REL) Types Of IAT * (S//REL) VPN Anonymity Providers * (S//REL) Range of Sovereign Nations/Localities in this set huge! * (S//REL) Multiple Cities in more popular countries * (S//REL) Most fee based: Can vary on time/number of servers * (S//REL) Most notable exception: Hotspot Shield (Provider AnchorFree) * » (S//REL) Advertising supported * » (S//REL) Multiple OSINT reports of "most popular" * (S//REL) About a half dozen others claim they are free * (S//REL) Package deals (Europe, any 3 servers, etc.) sometimes available * (S//REL) Poster child for location selection: IAPS (www.intl-alliance.com) * (S//REL) AE, AG, AI, AM, AN, AQ, AT, AU, AW, BB, BD, BG, BM, BR, BS, BZ, CA, CH, CL, CN, CO, CR, CU, CY, DK, DO, EE, EG, FJ, GB, GD, GI, GL, GR, GT, HK, HU, ID, IE, IL, IN, IR, IS, JM, JO, JP, KN, KP, KR, KW, KY, LC, LI, LU, MA, MC, MH, MK, MN, MT, MX, MY, NI, NO, NP, NZ, OM, PA, PE, PF, PG, PH, PK, PR, PS, PY, QA, RO, RU, SA, SB, SC, SE, SG, SI, SK, SN, TC, TH, TR, TV, TW, UA, US, UZ, VA, VE, VG, VI, VU, ZA, TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA, FVEY 13 --- ## (C//REL) Types Of IAT * (S//REL) VPN Anonymity Providers * (S//REL) Search of SIGINT Forensics Lab Holdings for OpenVPN * (S//REL) Using SNAPE Portal * (S//REL) OpenVPN specifically because a client is required * (S//REL) Listing is just name of IAT provider * (S//REL) HotSpot Shield * (S//REL) Steganos Anonymous VPN * (S//REL) Securenetics * (S//REL) General references to using OpenVPN products * (S//REL) Several references to IP address only: Need more products in RONIN! TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY 14 --- ## (C//REL) Types Of IAT * (S//REL) VPN Anonymity Providers * (S//REL) What “we” want * (S//REL) Server enumeration * (S//SI//REL) SIGINT: Obvious – target using such a service * » (S//SI//REL) One hop, so enough coverage means success! * (S//SI//REL) Compliance: FAA – Is target in US is important! * (S//REL) Exploiting User ↔ VPN traffic * (S//SI//REL) Very case by case * » (S//SI//REL) Coverage (may need 2 sided collection) * » (S//SI//REL) Protocol (may or may not have vulnerabilities) * » (S//SI//REL) Settings (implementation important) * » (TS//SI//REL) “Collateral” - NCSC, TAO, FISA, etc. * » (S//SI//REL) Request sent to CES if important TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA, FVEY 15 --- ## (C//REL) Types Of IAT * (S//REL) VPN Anonymity Providers * (S//REL) Server enumeration * (S//SI//REL) Manual work with Covered Internet (Linux/Windows) * » (S//SI//REL) Sometimes info derived from documentation * » (S//SI//REL) Sometimes need to access service * » (S//SI//REL) May be a trial version to get "seed" * » (S//SI//REL) Even if paid may only get some servers * » (S//SI//REL) Some providers give you the works, YMMV * » (S//SI//REL) Try to minimize work! * » (S//SI//REL) Try to extend seed(S//REL) * » (S//SI//REL) DNS “Pattern”, ex. vpn01.hidegood.net * » (S//SI//REL) Use scripting/free Linux tools to exhaust space (try nslookup on vpn01.hidegood.net, vpn02.hidegood.net, etc.) * » (S//SI//REL) Open source DNS enumeration scripts (brief look) * » (S//REL) Where do results go? (Again, See NAC/RONIN talk) TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY 16 --- ## (C//REL) Types Of IAT * (S//REL) VPN Anonymity Providers * (S//REL) Server enumeration * (S//SI//REL) Use the XKEYSCORE, Luke – AKA Fun with X.509 * (S//SI//REL) Prompted by Hotspot Shield (HSS), the free service for which server lists are NOT readily available (Software Reverse Engineering required) * (S//SI//REL) OpenVPN, as well as SSL/SSTP, send a server x.509 certificate to client as part of setup * (S//SI//REL) XKEYSCORE sees a LOT of traffic worldwide * (S//SI//REL) XKEYSCORE fingerprints aren't too hard * » (S//SI//REL) Need unique string, usually CN and/or DN * » (S//SI//REL) Check for valid X.509 certificate * (S//SI//REL) Query safe: Traffic encrypted (still do 1-side defeat) TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA, FVEY 17 --- ## (C//REL) Types Of IAT * (S//REL) VPN Anonymity Providers * (S//REL) Server enumeration * (S//SI//REL) Use the XKEYSCORE, Luke – AKA Fun with X.509 * (S//SI//REL) Prompted by Hotspot Shield (HSS), the free service for which server lists are NOT readily available (Software Reverse Engineering required) * (S//SI//REL) fingerprint('encryption/hotspot_shield/x509') = $pkcs and $udp and 'metrofreefivpn'; * (S//SI//REL) fingerprint('encryption/easy_hide_ip/x509') = $tcp and from_port(8881) and ('\x06\x09\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x01\x01\x01'c) /*RSA*/ and'www.easy-hide-ip.com'; * (S//SI//REL) fingerprint('encryption/comodo_trustconnect/x509') = $tcp and from_port(443) and ('\x06\x09\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x01\x01\x01'c) /*RSA*/ and 'ComodoVPNS-'; TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY 18 --- ## (C//REL) Types Of IAT * (S//REL) Proprietary Multi-Hop Networks (Usually Circumventor Motivated) * (S//REL) Freegate * (S//REL) Ultrasurf * (S//REL) Gpass * (S//REL) Garden * (S//REL) Haystack (by Austin Heap – ruled bogus by community) * (S//REL) Movement to Secure US Government Support to Providers (Congress) * (S//REL) US Dept of State * (S//REL) Broadcasting Board of Governors (Independent USG Agency) * (S//REL) Has instructions for "Getting around Internet Blockage" on Radio Free Asia (RFA) and VOA Persian news sites TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA, FVEY 20 --- ## (C//REL) Types Of IAT * (S//REL) Anonymous Remailers (Multi-Hop) * (S//REL) Most Secure * (S//REL) Main examples: Mixmaster and Mixminion * (S//REL) Extremely High Latency (Random Delays) * (S//REL) Only useful for email, other store and forward communications * (S//REL) Not much use * (S//REL) NOTE 1: Usability and Anonymity are Foes! TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY 21 --- ## (C//REL) Types Of IAT (S//REL) Miscellaneous IAT Technologies (Single Hop) * (S//REL) PSIPHON * (S//REL) Discussed in Censorship Circumvention Circles * (S//REL) Technology for known associate to setup in appropriate place * (S//REL) Access via knowing obscure URL and Username/Password w/HTTPS * (S//REL) Miscellaneous Multi-Selectors * (S//REL) Some are just "HTTP and/or Socks Proxy Aggregators" * (S//REL) EasyHideIP.com * (S//REL) Real-Hide-IP.com * (S//REL) Found researching this presentation! * (S//REL) Both of these yield list with HTTP GET! * (S//REL) Postprocessing: Shell/PERL/etc. script to extract another to check w/Covered Internet (simple proxy option to wget) * (S//REL) NAC/RONIN will track these TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY 22 --- ## (C//REL) Types Of IAT (S//REL) Miscellaneous IAT Technologies (Single Hop) * (S//REL) Miscellaneous Multi-Selectors * (S//REL) Proprietary Proxy Provider/Chooser * (S//REL) Paid product, Client Software * (S//REL) Usually involves obfuscation and/or encryption * (S//REL) GHOSTSURF * » (S//REL) First analyzed 2006 – uses obfuscaton * » (S//REL) Server list has changed but all else same * (S//REL) Easy-Hide-IP * » (S//REL) Analyzed in 2011 – uses TLS on port 8881 * » (S//REL) Over 400 servers in 7 countries * (S//REL) Hide-IP * » (S//REL) Analyzed in 2006 – New product now * » (S//REL) Need to re-analyze TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY 23 --- ## (C//REL) Types Of IAT (S//REL) Miscellaneous IAT Technologies (Single Hop) * (S//REL) Bot-Based Proxy Networks * (U//FOUO) Kudos to [REDACTED], NGA, for pointing this out in her Intelink-TS blog, Sphinx1121 (Pointer to krebsonsecurity.com) * (S//REL) Bot owners drop socks proxies on compromised computers * (S//REL) Said proxies are then rented out to "customers" for anonymity * (S//REL) OSINT indicates a "product" called XSOX available on underground forums as a C&C for such a network * (S//REL) General Note for IAT analysts: Details IMPORTANT * (S//REL) Proof by example: EasyHideIp.com NOT the same as Easy-Hide-IP.com (Of course domains are not case sensitive) TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY 24 --- ## (C//REL) Types of IAT * (S//REL) Open Source Multi-Hop Networks * (S//REL) Jondo Anonymous Proxy (JAP) * (S//REL) Championed by German University (Dresden) * (S//REL) (Mostly?) Open source software – some Docs in German * (S//REL) Uses a technology known as Cascades * (S//REL) Each cascade is set of 2 or 3 Mixes * (S//REL) All internal traffic encrypted * (S//REL) Free service AN.ON: 5 Cascades * (S//REL) Premium service JonDoNym: 10 Cascades * (S//REL) Countries: BG, CA, CH, CZ, DE, DK, FR, GB, IT, LU, US, * (S//REL) Less than 50 mixes total TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY 25 --- ## (C//REL) Types of IAT * (S//REL) Open Source Multi-Hop Networks * (S//REL) Jondo Anonymous Proxy (JAP) * (S//REL) Comparison with Tor * (S//REL) Not nearly as well studied * (S//REL) Much smaller contained development community * (S//REL) More centralized structure (all mixes centrally approved) * (S//REL) Not as diverse geographically or scalable * (S//REL) Not as well used or publicized * (S//REL) Not analyzed in great detail here at NSA (or FVEY?) * (TS//SI//REL) Much better chance for Global Adversary (SIGINT :-) ) * (TS//SI//REL) Sessionization of DNI still would be a problem TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY 26 --- ## (C//REL) Types of IAT * (S//REL) Open Source Multi-Hop Networks * (S//REL) JonDo Anonymous Proxy (JAP) ``` Browser User A JAP Browser User B JAP Browser User XYZ JAP InfoService Mix 1 (First Mix) Mix 2 (Middle Mix) Mix 3 (Last Mix) Cache-Proxy Cache-Proxy Cache-Proxy Cache-Proxy Internet bidirectional TCP/IP connection ``` TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY 27 --- ## (C//REL) Types of IAT * (S//REL) Open Source Multi-Hop Networks * (S//REL) Tor * (S//REL) Very widely used worldwide * (S//REL) Open Source * (S//REL) Active Development * (S//REL) Mitigates Threats * (S//REL) Very Secure * (S//REL) Low enough latency for most TCP uses * (S//REL) Still the King of high secure, low latency Internet Anonymity * (S//REL) There are no contenders for the throne in waiting TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY 28 --- ## (S//REL) Tor Operation (1) ``` EFF How Tor Works: 1 Alice Step 1: Alice's Tor client obtains a list of Tor nodes from a directory server. Dave Jane Bob Tor node unencrypted link encrypted link ``` TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY 29 --- ## (S//REL) Tor Operation (2) ``` EFF How Tor Works: 2 Alice Step 2: Alice's Tor client picks a random path to destination server. Green links are encrypted, red links are in the clear. Dave Guard Middle Exit Jane Bob Tor node unencrypted link encrypted link ``` TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY 30 --- ## (S//REL) Mom: Where Do Tor Relays Come From? * (S//REL) Recall there is (well actually more than 1) Tor Directory server? * (S//REL) This is the pool * (S//REL) Choices made in terms of advertised capabilities: * (S//REL) Bandwidth * (S//REL) Uptime * (S//REL) Supported Protocols * (S//REL) Tor client has total final say TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY 31 --- ## (S//REL) Mom: Where Do Tor Relays Come From? * (S//REL) Pool is still currently about 1500 * (S//REL) Many countries represented * (S//REL) Most in DE * (S//REL) Second most in US * (S//REL) Anyone can set one up and register it * (S//REL) Exit nodes are scary (Kiddie Porn) * (S//REL) How about a private pool? (heh-heh) * (S//REL) Note 2: Private Resources and Anonymity are foes! TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY 32 --- ## (S//REL) Bridges: Special Tor Relays * (S//REL) Having the set of relays public makes it easy for government censors * (S//REL) Just block access to all relays from that country * (S//REL) Tor Project staffed with smart people! * (S//REL) Introduce new concept: Bridge Nodes * (S//REL) Unadvertised Entry Nodes distributed "out-of-band" * (S//REL) Project will hand out three at a time (weekly) * (S//REL) Email or surf bridges.torproject.org * (S//SI//REL) SIGINT: Use Tor Against Itself! (Bridge requests from exit nodes) * (S//REL) Circa April 2011: Tor Project claims around 600 Bridges TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY 33 --- ## (S//SI//REL) Tor and NSA Targets * (TS//SI//REL) Sophisticated CT Targets use TOR to access Terrorist Web Forums * (TS//SI//REL) Web Forums: al-Faloja, CEMF, al-Hisbah, shumukh, TRSC * (TS//SI//REL) Persona: DLW, Song of Terror, Time of Terror * (TS//SI//REL) Visible exit traffic allows for "All except the Client IP" SIGDEV * (TS//SI//REL) Solving (attempting to solve :-( ) this IP address problem was the work of NSA PARTNERSNIPPET team * (S//SI//REL) Also 80+ CT email selectors who have used Tor TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY 34 --- ## (S//SI//REL) Passive Traffic Analysis * (S//SI//REL) For Normal SIGINT flow, need to identify Tor traffic! * (S//SI//REL) Only outer TLS layer visible → How to Distinguish? * (S//SI//REL) Tor developers attempt to remain anonymous by blending in with myriad other TLS traffic * (S//SI//REL) Tor TLS has changed over the years * (S//SI//REL) There ARE some server → client features which are recognizable NOW TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY 35 --- ## (S//SI//REL) Passive Traffic Analysis (2) * (S//SI//REL) Tor TLS (server → client) startup features * (S//SI//REL) Certificate: Specific Diffie-Hellman (DH) Modulus (just string match) * (S//SI//REL) Certificate: Issuer and Subject random names of same form – ex: CN=www.ofzgkdjxvjrss.net (regex match) * (S//SI//REL) Certificate: Always 2-hour lifetime (ASN.1 format → more intensive computation) * (S//SI//REL) Several XKS fingerprints and a plugin implemented TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY 36 --- ## (S//REL) Tor Project Recent Activity * (S//REL) Driven by Censorship Circumvention, Hide Signature * (S//REL) New bridge nodes blocked in China * (S//REL) Researching better bridge distribution strategies * (S//REL) Claim by Tor Project is 8000 requests/day for <1000 total * (S//REL) Around Feb 2011, changed the TLS handshake * (S//REL) Signature more like Apache web-server * (S//REL) Different DH Modulus * (S//SI//REL) New XKS Signatures address this * (TS//SI//REL) Proposed eventual change will kill identification! * (S//REL) Each Tor node will generate randomish signatures in a volatile way specifically designed to look like normal website TLS traffic! TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY 37 --- ## (S//REL) Tor Project Recent Activity * (S//REL) Tor on non-traditional platforms * (S//REL) ORBOT, Tor for Android smartphones * (S//REL) Tor Router Project * (S//REL) Modified Linksys Router – everything over Tor * (S//REL) Hide-My-IP-Address * (S//REL) Proprietary replacement for Tor Browser Bundle * (S//REL) From "WCCL Network" not part of Tor Project * (S//SI//REL) Looked at based on reference by CT target * (S//REL) Tor Project working on better strategies to distribute bridges * (S//REL) Tails: Complete Bootable OS on CD for anonymity * (S//REL) Tor is a crucial component TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY 38 --- ## (S//REL) Tor Hidden Service URLs * (S//REL) Tor Hidden Services (HS) for anonymous publishing * (S//REL) Not real reliable, but Tor Project research continues * (U//FOUO) I said outside scope, sorry * (S//REL) Tor HS accessed via Tor only by http://xxxxxx.onion * (S//REL) There is the tor2web.com site which is a HTTP to Tor proxy * (S//REL) Loses some anonymity but easy to use * (S//REL) Good tool for Covered Internet research * (S//REL) Site on WikiInfo to document Tor HS URLs * (S//REL) "The Onion Realm" - [REDACTED] * (U//FOUO) Kudos to CES/CTSO (S314) for populating this TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY 39 --- ## (S//REL) Public IAT Resources Inside * (U//FOUO) General IAT * (S//REL) [REDACTED] * (S//REL) Tor * (S//REL) [REDACTED] * (S//REL) [REDACTED] TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY 40 --- ## (S//REL) References to IAT in SIGINT * (S//REL) “Grep” in SIGINT reports for relevant phrases (ex anonymity) * (S//REL) Most is FVEY (cited here) Majority US, also UK, CAN * (S//SI//REL) Format is TOPI / Type of Info * (TS//SI//REL) CT / Discuss Tor (6 reports) * (TS//SI//REL) CT / Use Tor or another proxy * (TS//SI//REL) CT / Create modified Tor * (TS//SI//REL) CT / Mandate use of Tor * (TS//SI//REL) CT / Tor for Censorship Circumvention * (TS//SI//REL) CT / Use Tor and a VPN (UltraVPN) * (TS//SI//REL) CT / Instructions for using Tor and other US Proxy * (TS//SI//REL) CT / Discuss us of (non-specified but non-US) VPN * (TS//SI//REL) CT / Discuss Tor and HTTP Proxies for anonymity * (TS//SI//REL) CT / Discuss Tor and RealHideIp (previously unknown IAT) * (TS//SI//REL) CT / Discuss use of Kproxy.com (HTTP Proxy) TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY 41 --- ## (S//REL) References to IAT in SIGINT * (S//REL) “Grep” in SIGINT reports for relevant phrases (ex anonymity) * (S//SI//REL) Format is TOPI / Type of Info * (TS//SI//REL) CT / Use of PimpMyIp (HTTP Proxy) * (TS//SI//REL) CT / Use of (masked US Company) VPN (L2TP protocol) for anonymity * (TS//SI//REL) CT / Instructions for use of VPNs for anonymity * (TS//SI//REL) CT / Use of VPN (HotSpotShield) and SSH tunnels * (TS//SI//REL) CT / Use of Tor and an unspecified VPN * (TS//SI//REL) CT / Use of Easy-Hide-IP (Socks proxy chooser) * (TS//SI//REL) CT / Use of unspecified anonymizing proxy * (TS//SI//REL) CT / Instructions on use of Tor and name-masked US program * (TS//SI//REL) CT / Use of VPN (Cyberghost) * (TS//SI//REL) CT / Use of unspecified HTTP proxy * (TS//SI//REL) CT / Questions on whether Tor is compromised * (TS//SI//REL) CT / Questions on whether associated compromised by IAT non-use TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY 42 --- ## (S//REL) References to IAT in SIGINT * (S//REL) “Grep” in SIGINT reports for relevant phrases (ex anonymity) * (S//SI//REL) Format is TOPI / Type of Info * (TS//SI//REL) Iran / Use of Freegate and Ultrasurf * (TS//SI//REL) India / Use of unknown proxy for anonymity * (TS//SI//REL) India / Use of Tor to access a webmail account * (TS//SI//REL) India / Use of Tor for hacking (2 reports) * (TS//SI//REL) India / Provision of list of socks proxies to use * (TS//SI//REL) Iran / Provision of list of socks proxies to use * (TS//SI//REL) India / Use of unknown proxy for anonymity * (TS//SI//REL) Cuba / Use of unknown proxy for anonymous research * (TS//SI//REL) Turkey / Use of Tor TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY 43 --- ## (U) Backup Slides * (S//REL) From Last years SDC Tor Talk TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY 44 --- ## (S//REL) Tor (The onion router) * (S//REL) Development originally NRL funded * (S//REL) Original developers from Anonymous Remailer Research Community * (S//REL) Project now a US non-profit (www.torproject.org) * (S//REL) User to Internet site interaction uses 3 hops through Tor "Relays" * (S//REL) Entry * (S//REL) Middle * (S//REL) Exit TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY 45 --- ## (S//REL) Tor Security * (S//SI//REL) As you can see from the diagram, everything except for final hop is encrypted. * (S//SI//REL) The final hop may be also in the case of Bob being an SSL site. * (S//SI//REL) Two-layer TOR encryption: Pipe between any 2 nodes TLS encrypted (Only thing seen externally). * (S//SI//REL) Inside the TLS is the Onion Routing (see following diagram): TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY 46 --- ## (S//REL) Tor Security (2) * (S//SI//REL) So each node can only decrypt data between its predecessor and itself and only knows about its predecessor and successor. * (S//SI//REL) The exit node can read the final traffic if it is not SSL. * (S//SI//REL) The user Tor client is in control of everything * (S//SI//REL) Setting up keys for cryptography * (S//SI//REL) Choosing the Entry, Middle, and Exit * (TS//SI//REL) Tor is very good – No passive exploitation :-( TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY 47 --- ## (S//REL) Tor Onion Encryption ``` Layers of the onion Router A Key Router B Key Router C Key Message Routing path Source -> Router A -> Router B -> Router C ``` TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY 48 --- ## (S//SI//REL) Passive Traffic Analysis (3) * (S//REL) NSA Network Analysis Center (NAC) data source GOLDENFORTIN * (S//REL) Cisco Netflow Records * (U) From IP Address * (U) To IP Address * (U) Time Up * (U) Time Down * (U) Number of Bytes * (U) Number of Packets * (S//REL) Heavy Representation of Tor Relays TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY 49 --- ## (S//SI//REL) Passive Traffic Analysis (4) * (S//SI//REL) How to use Tor network data? * (S//SI//REL) Attempt to work back from known exit traffic of interest all the way back to client user * (S//SI//REL) This is “Circuit Reconstruction” * (S//SI//REL) Requires great coverage * (S//SI//REL) Geography might be your friend sometimes * (S//SI//REL) Attempt to correlate known exit traffic to a small set of putative client traffic * (S//SI//REL) Client Geographical Assumption Required * (TS//SI//REL) No smoking gun yet :-( Optimism still lives! TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY 50 --- ## (TS//SI//REL) Active: Traffic Shaping * (S//SI//REL) This primarily means deny/degrade to date * (TS//SI//REL) If target is behind a choke point to Internet * (TS//SI//REL) Block all or a major subset of Tor Relays * (TS//SI//REL) Block all Tor TLS handshakes * (TS//SI//REL) Try to force target to use alternate communications means * (S//SI//REL) Always the (potential) Exploit vs Attack Tradeoff TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY 51 --- ## (TS//SI//REL) Active: Implants * (S//SI//REL) TorButton: A Thorn in the side of SIGINT * (S//REL) One of the components of The Tor Browser Bundle – AKA "Tor for Dummies" * (S//REL) Firefox browser plugin – on/off switch for Tor * (S//REL) Locks down browser REAL good (disables all active content things, sandboxes state, etc.) * (TS//SI//REL) No current bypass methods for CNE Exploits * (TS//SI//REL) Only hope is implanting web server with poisoned content document intended for target TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY 52