TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY SIGDEV SIGINT DEVELOPMENT # Case Studies of Integrated Cyber Operation Techniques MISSION CAPABILITIES T1 CREATING THE FUTURE National Security Agency / Central Security Service Threat Operations Center [REDACTED] NSA/CSS Threat Operations Center VS TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY --- TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY ## (U//FOUO) TUTELAGE: Dynamic Defense * Inbound Threats Neutered * Interactive Threat Controlled * Outbound Threat Corrupted ``` Adversary Neuter Exfiltrate Data Corrupt Data Redirect Victim NIPRNET "SLEEP" Adversary Web Server NSA Web Server ``` TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY --- TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY ## (S//REL) Foreign Intelligence in Support of Dynamic Defense ``` U.S. Victim Victim Victim mil. NSA FBI DHS Foreign Intelligence Adversary [REDACTED] Attribution Access to their tools - so that we can defend Warn other U.S. victims ``` TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY --- TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY ## (U//FOUO) Counter CNE: Support to CND S//REL) Use CNE to penetrate the operations of foreign cyber actors U) Two major classes of CNE techniques * (U) Man-in-the-middle * (U) Man-on-the-side U//FOUO) Steal their tools, tradecraft, targets and take ``` Adversary Penetrated Foreign Host Adversary Penetrated Foreign Infrastructure Adversary Home Network ``` TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY --- TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY ## (U) Man-in-the-Middle Has Multiple Uses ``` Active Exploitation Target Implanted Router AnySite.com ``` TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY --- TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY ## (U) Man-in-the-Middle Has Multiple Uses ``` Active Exploitation Target Implanted Router Network Defense Good Guys Bad Guy CLOUDSHIELD PANDORASMAYHAM TURMOIL TUTELAGE AnySite.com ``` (S//REL) TUTELAGE is a man-in-the-middle technique (U//FOUO) Using TUTELAGE to enable active exploitation is integrated cyber operations. --- TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY ## (S//REL) QUANTUMTHEORY: Man-on-the-Side Active Exploitation Concerted Use of both Passive + Active SIGINT * Implant targets based on 'selectors' and/or behavior - e.g. users of al-Mehrab ISP (Mosul) who visit al-Hezbah extremist website * Requires target webserver responses be visible to passive SIGINT * Requires sufficient delay in target web connection for the hook to "beat" the response back to the target (typically means at least one satellite hop) * Requires target's client to be vulnerable to our tools * Cycle 3 4 must get to the target before 2 occurs * Once 'hooked,' the target is exploited with no time constraints * Different QUANTUM effects have different time constraints. 1 Target web connection/request via SATCOM or Fiber 2 Response MHS TARGET DESTINATION 3 SIGINT cue 4 Insert hook in addition to requested data 5 Hook calls to Covert Listening Post (LP): upload robust implant for sustained access TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY --- TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY ## (U//FOUO) BOXINGRUMBLE Case Study ``` INTERNET NIPRNET NSA and TAO Covert Infrastructure ``` * (S//REL) DNS requests entering NIPRnet domain - (S//REL) Destination IP not a NIPRnet DNS server - (S//REL) Domain name not within NIPRnet * (S//REL) DNS behavior of host is suspicious but not dangerous * (TS//SI//REL) TAO uses QUANTUMDNS to redirect the requesting host TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY 8 --- TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY ## (S//REL) QUANTUMDNS: An Integrated Cyber Operation ``` TARGET SPACE DNS query NIPRNET Anysite.mil? Local DNS Server I don't know, I'll ask. DNS Server Talk to the root DNS Server Where's Anysite.mil? Root DNS Server Root DNS Server, talk to the DNS Server Connect to server 1.2.3.4 Where's Anysite.mil? DNS Server I Know how to get to Anysite.mil DNS Server Where's Anysite.mil? DNS answer, Anysite.mil found and it's IP is 1.2.3.4 DNS query NIPRNET Anysite.mil? IP is 1.2.3.4 TAO Server mirrors Anysite.mil TAO Shooter LPT-D NIPRNET Blocked If DNS Server found DNS Server Anysite.mil Server Tip Sent NSA Command Sent TURBINE Implant Implant Command & Control ``` TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY --- TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY ## (S//REL) QUANTUMDNS: As Used Against BOXINGRUMBLE ``` TARGET SPACE Connect to server 1.2.3.4 IP is 1.2.3.4 TAO C2 mirrors Anysite.mil C2 DNS query NIPRNET Anysite.mil? DNS answer, Anysite.com found and it's IP is 1.2.3.4 TAO Shooter LPT-D NIPRNET Blocked Anysite.mil Server Tip Sent NSA TURBINE Command Sent Implant Implant Command & Control ``` TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY --- TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY ## (U//FOUO) BOXINGRUMBLE Case Study ``` TAO C2 Server Open Web Proxies Victims (Bots) NSA and TAO Covert Infrastructure ``` * (TS//SI//REL) TAO establishes itself as a trusted C2 node * (U//FOUO) Captured traffic indicates the existence of a bot net - (S//REL) Command and control split into two layers (C2 and C4) - (S//REL) C2 layer has a peer-to-peer mesh network topology with direct connection to a C4 node * (S//REL) C2 nodes connect directly to victims as well as through open web proxies TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL --- TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY ## (U//FOUO) BOXINGRUMBLE Case Study ``` Bot Commander Trusted C4 Nodes 2-3 Nodes Trusted C2 Nodes ~ 250 Nodes TAO C2 Server Open Web Proxies Victims (Bots) 200k Max ~ 30k Today NSA and TAO Covert Infrastructure DEFIANTWARRIOR Implant ``` * (TS//SI//REL) TAO C2 server can see all bot tasking * (TS//SI//REL) TAO C2 server can push tasking * (S//REL) BOXINGRUMBLE bots - (S//REL) ~ 45% Vietnamese dissidents - (S//REL) ~45% Chinese dissidents - (S//REL) ~10% Other * (TS//SI//REL) Adding BOXINGRUMBLE bots to DEFIANTWARRIOR TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY --- TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY ## (U) There is More Than One Way to QUANTUM TS//SI//REL | Name | Description | Inception Date | Status | Operational Success | | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | | **CNE** | | | | | | QUANTUMINSERT | * Man-on-the-Side technique
* Briefly hi-jacks connections to a terrorist website
* Re-directs the target to a TAO server (FOXACID) for implantation | 2005 | Operational | Highly Successful (In 2010, 300 TAO implants were deployed via QUANTUMINSERT to targets that were un-exploitable by any other means) | | QUANTUMBOT | * Takes control of idle IRC bots
* Finds computers belonging to botnets, and hijacks the command and control channel | Aug 2007 | Operational | Highly Successful (over 140,000 bots co-opted) | | QUANTUMBISCUIT | * Enhances QUANTUMINSERT's man-on-the-side technique of exploitation
* Motivated by the need to QI targets that are behind large proxies, lack predictable source addresses, and have insufficient unique web activity. | Dec 2007 | Operational | Limited success at NSAW due to high latency on passive access (GCHQ uses technique for 80% of CNE accesses) | | QUANTUMDNS | * DNS injection/redirection based off of A Record queries.
* Targets single hosts or caching name servers. | Dec 2008 | Operational | Successful (High priority CCI target exploited) | | QUANTUMHAND | Exploits the computer of a target who uses Facebook | Oct 2010 | Operational | Successful | | QUANTUMPHANTOM | Hijacks any IP on QUANTUMable passive coverage to use as covert infrastructure. | Oct 2010 | Live Tested | N/A | | **CNA** | | | | | | QUANTUMSKY | Denies access to a webpage through RST packet spoofing. | 2004 | Operational | Successful | | QUANTUMCOPPER | File download/upload disruption and corruption. | Dec 2008 | Live | N/A | TS//SI//REL --- TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY ## (U//FOUO) QUANTUMSMACKDOWN ``` Internet ACK Shooter Defensive TURMOIL CLOUDSHIELD RESET Client NSA Space TURBINE REPOSITORY NIPRNET ``` 1. A client requests connection to malicious server. Request is detected by TURMOIL. CLOUDSHIELD terminates client-side connection. 2. The malicious server's response is blocked by CLOUDSHIELD. 3. TURMOIL tips TURBINE, which then tasks a shooter to send the acknowledgement to the malicious server. 4. Malicious server assumes connection and forwards TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY --- TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY ## (U//FOUO) Future Capability: QUANTUMSANDMAN ``` * Take captured malware and execute in controlled environment. * Allow communication through QUANTUM technique with outside world * Will be able to see tasking, get later stages of malware to provide disinformation, and send implants. Internet Dummy Victim Shooter TURMOIL NSA Space ure Malware Test Environment TURBINE Victim ``` TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY --- TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY ## (U) Future Work * (U//FOUO) Develop lower latency guards * (S//REL) Use TUTELAGE inline devices as our "shooter" * (U//FOUO) Push decision logic to the edge * (U//FOUO) Identify more mission opportunities * (U//FOUO) Continue developing and deploying additional QUANTUM capabilities TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY 16 --- TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY ## (U) There is More Than One Way to QUANTUM TS//SI//REL | Name | Description | Inception Date | Status | Operational Success | | :---------------- | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :------------- | :----------- | :---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | **CNE** | | | | | | QUANTUMINSERT | * Man-on-the-Side technique
* Briefly hi-jacks connections to a terrorist website
* Re-directs the target to a TAO server (FOXACID) for implantation | 2005 | Operational | Highly Successful (In 2010, 300 TAO implants were deployed via QUANTUMINSERT to targets that were un-exploitable by any other means) | | QUANTUMBOT | * Takes control of idle IRC bots
* Finds computers belonging to botnets, and hijacks the command and control channel | Aug 2007 | Operational | Highly Successful (over 140,000 bots co-opted) | | QUANTUMBISCUIT | * Enhances QUANTUMINSERT's man-on-the-side technique of exploitation
* Motivated by the need to QI targets that are behind large proxies, lack predictable source addresses, and have insufficient unique web activity. | Dec 2007 | Operational | Limited success at NSAW due to high latency on passive access (GCHQ uses technique for 80% of CNE accesses) | | QUANTUMDNS | * DNS injection/redirection based off of A Record queries.
* Targets single hosts or caching name servers. | Dec 2008 | Operational | Successful (High priority CCI target exploited) | | QUANTUMHAND | Exploits the computer of a target who uses Facebook | Oct 2010 | Operational | Successful | | QUANTUMPHANTOM | Hijacks any IP on QUANTUMable passive coverage to use as covert infrastructure. | Oct 2010 | Live Tested | N/A | | **CNA** | | | | | | QUANTUMSKY | Denies access to a webpage through RST packet spoofing. | 2004 | Operational | Successful | | QUANTUMCOPPER | File download/upload disruption and corruption. | Dec 2008 | Live | N/A | TS//SI//REL --- TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY ## (U) QUESTIONS? For more information, please contact: * TUTELAGE – [REDACTED], VS ([REDACTED]) * QUANTUM – [REDACTED], S32X ([REDACTED]) * TURBINE – [REDACTED], T1412 ([REDACTED]) * BOXINGRUMBLE – [REDACTED], F22 ([REDACTED]) TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY 18