{ "title": "Voice/Fax User Group Minutes of September 2008 meeting", "type": "REPORTED", "description": "Page 3 of 7 of the minutes of GCHQ's Voice/Fax User Group (VFUG), September 2008: plans for data-quality testing, a request that linguists flag \"Pick Your Own Number\" calls in the B3M voice database, and the B14/MCS team's update on the Diariser and on speaker and language identification. The Intercept's PDF shows only the speaker ID section; the rest of the page is in the file (see the archive comment).", "long_description": "The page opens with the next phase of User Confidence (data quality) testing, part of the next \"Stepping Stone\" and due to start on 9 October 2008, to be carried out by the newly formed Content PUT. A suggestion from the LISTEN 08 briefing, agreed at the meeting, asks linguists to record \"Pick Your Own Number\" (PYON) cases in B3M with a 'techref PYON' comment: calls where a speaker on a UK-code number turns out to be based in another country.\n \nItem 4 is the B14/MCS update on voice processing. Version 5.0 of the Diariser was deployed over the summer; its main change is a rewritten modem arbiter that better identifies V-series modems so that OPC~CAP can demodulate them. Since July, new speaker ID systems were deployed for OPI~MENA (against an Iraqi political target and a Saudi leadership target), for OPI~RCIT (against a Gazprom official) and for OPI~LANG/OPI~SC (a five-way multi-speaker system against Afghan counter-narcotics targets). Language ID had no new deployments: models were being improved with non-SIGINT language data from speech-to-text corpora, which the team notes is no substitute for linguist-verified SIGINT data, and identifying one target language among unidentified others is said to produce false positives.\n", "tags": [ "speaker identification", "voice analytics", "target identification", "multi-speaker systems", "leadership targets", "counternarcotics", "energy sector", "Gazprom", "VFUG", "OPI-MENA", "OPI-RCIT", "OPI-LANG", "OPI-SC", "traffic volume", "diarisation", "modem identification", "fax", "OPC-CAP", "language identification", "speech to text", "training data", "false positives", "data quality testing", "User Confidence Testing", "Stepping Stone", "Content PUT", "LISTEN 08", "Pick Your Own Number", "PYON", "B14", "MCS", "minutes" ], "document": { "creator": "GCHQ", "date_created": "2008-09", "classification": [ "TOP SECRET", "STRAP 1" ], "dissemination": [], "banner": "TOP SECRET STRAP1", "genre": "report", "programs": [ "DIARISER", "B3M" ], "countries": [ "Iraq", "Saudi Arabia", "Russia", "Afghanistan" ], "people": [] }, "publication": [ { "publisher": "The Intercept", "date_published": "2018-01-19", "title": "Finding Your Voice: Forget About Siri and Alexa — When It Comes to Voice Identification, the “NSA Reigns Supreme”", "link": "https://theintercept.com/2018/01/19/voice-recognition-technology-nsa/", "reporters": [ "Kofman, Ava" ], "contributors": [], "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/4352015/Pages-From-VFUG-minutes-Sept-2008.pdf" } ], "aka_id": [], "archive_comment": "The Intercept's PDF shows only an excerpt (the Speaker ID section) through a soft crop. The file itself contains the whole of page 3 of 7, including GCHQ staff names; the PDF is held as published. The page image and transcript show the visible excerpt only. The cropped-out content was described by Libroot ('Going Through Snowden Documents, Part 9' 2026-10-11 https://libroot.org/posts/going-through-snowden-documents-part-9/), with the names redacted.", "pdf_sha256": "b32baeff6d9d1637a841e835e35f275281c67902e1a8f5ec9bde1f27ef614fbd", "pages": 1, "versions": { "vfug-libroot": { "pdf_sha256": "80b5663fd3460f259f6327800ad78ee7c9f4e3b7345e6ca0556243386af4751b", "changed_pages": [ 1 ] } } }