{ "title": "Automated NOC detection", "type": "REPORTED", "description": "This slide deck lays out how GCHQ and Canada’s CSEC systematically identified and penetrated Network Operations Centers—most notably Belgacom—by automating NOC discovery and weaponizing that mapping for QUANTUM INSERT attacks. It reads like a blueprint for turning router configs, metadata, and bulk scans into cookie-based targeting against telecom engineers inside core networks.", "long_description": "The document details a multi‑phase effort to “find my NOC,” beginning with parsing router configuration files and ACLs to pinpoint privileged management ranges (NOCTURNAL SURGE), then modeling the tradecraft in Pentaho to scale across autonomous systems and countries with shared schemas (TIDAL SURGE, OLYMPIA). In parallel, GCHQ’s 5‑Alive and CSEC’s HYPERION harvest 5‑tuple metadata—especially SNMP and TELNET—to infer which IPs act as management terminals, distinguishing legitimate operator logins from scanning and password‑guessing. Where configs are missing, HACIENDA bulk port scanning fills gaps by enumerating hallmark NOC services. The result is a fused confidence‑ranked map of NOC IP ranges across ISPs and mobile operators.\n\nOnce the ranges are locked in, the playbook pivots from discovery to exploitation: selectors are pulled from NOC traffic in MUTANT BROTH—Google PREFID, Yahoo cookies, LinkedIn IDs—feeding real‑time dashboards (NRTA) for QUANTUM INSERT against named staff. The slides repeatedly reference Belgacom, including GRX router banners and Brussels‑geolocated NOC IPs, making clear the program’s in‑country focus despite the warnings that such prefix queries are “more likely to retrieve the communications of innocent individuals.” The tone is clinical, but the stakes are unmistakable: a Five Eyes joint capability that turns the heart of a European telecom’s operations into an attack surface.", "tags": [ "signals intelligence", "telecommunications", "telecommunications infrastructure", "mobile networks", "carrier networks", "roaming infrastructure", "international interconnects", "backbones", "packet backbone", "autonomous systems", "BGP", "peering relationships", "transit providers", "Operation Socialist", "BELGACOM", "Belgian telecom", "GRX", "GPRS", "CSEC", "Five Eyes", "NAC", "Network Analysis Centre", "5-Alive", "ACL", "access control", "VTY", "SSH", "telnet", "SNMP", "SYSLOG", "DNS", "TACACS", "router configuration", "CIDR blocks", "Global Database", "IPv4", "port scanning", "Metadata fusion", "5-tuple", "selectors", "selector targeting", "TDI", "cookies", "Google", "Yahoo cookies", "LinkedIn", "User-Agent", "NRTA", "IP prefix search", "HHFP", "Presence events", "NAT", "proxies", "network management", "management plane", "routers", "TCP", "UDP", "NTP", "TFTP", "NetBIOS", "Mobile OMCs", "ISP NOCs", "tradecraft automation", "Computer Network Exploitation", "Brussels", "Mechelen", "Internet Service Providers" ], "document": { "creator": "GCHQ", "date_created": "2011-01-01", "classification": [ "TOP SECRET", "STRAP 2" ], "dissemination": [], "banner": "TOP SECRET STRAP 2", "genre": "slides", "programs": [ "SURGE", "NOCTURNALSURGE", "RT", "NACSHACK", "CHAINGUARD", "TIDALSURGE", "GLOBALSURGE", "PENTAHO", "OLYMPIA", "HYPERION", "TERMINALSURGE", "HACIENDA", "QUANTUMINSERT", "MUTANTBROTH", "OPSOCIALIST", "SAMUEL PEPYS", "GEOFUSION", "FIVEALIVE", "NRTA", "RADIUS" ], "countries": [ "Luxembourg", "Belgium", "Netherlands", "United States" ], "people": [] }, "publication": [ { "publisher": "The Intercept", "date_published": "2014-12-13", "title": "Operation Socialist: The Inside Story of How British Spies Hacked Belgium’s Largest Telco", "link": "https://theintercept.com/2014/12/13/belgacom-hack-gchq-inside-story/", "reporters": [ "Gallagher, Ryan" ], "contributors": [], "doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2014/12/13/gchq-automated-noc-detection-2011/", "doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1379029/gchq-automated-noc-detection.pdf" }, { "publisher": "NRC", "date_published": "2014-12-13", "title": "Lees hier hoe de Britse geheime dienst GCHQ Belgacom aanviel", "link": "http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2014/12/13/verantwoording-en-documenten/", "reporters": [ "Modderkolk, Huib" ], "contributors": [] }, { "publisher": "De Standaard", "date_published": "2014-12-13", "title": "Britse geheime dienst bespioneerde jarenlang Belgacom-klanten", "link": "http://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20141212_01426880", "reporters": [ "Vanhecke, Nikolas", "Eeckhaut, Mark" ], "contributors": [] } ], "pdf_sha256": "5776d07736307256c3d1b03bc6e9f274fae8aca6f3ac2d901e3f644bcf89dd4b", "pages": 25 }