TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL # An Easy Win: Using SIGINT to Learn about New Viruses Project CAMBERDADA By [REDACTED], I412 (IAD) & [REDACTED], V252 (NTOC) Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52 Dated: 20070108 Declassify On: 20370301 TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL --- TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL ## Overall classification TOPSECRET//COMINT// REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL --- TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL ## BRICKTOP (2009) * Tascom * RusComNet * Kaspersky * Rosoboron export * nstitute of Information & Analytical Technology (IIAT) * Moscow Telecommunication Corporation (ComCor) * Famatech * Comstar * Komet TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL --- TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL IR IN Антивирус Касперского JP JO PRC GE TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL --- TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL ## Sample Email Received by an AV Vendor PWZA20120510218350000197506 Good day, A phishing scam file is attached for your analysis. Zip file password = virus The file tricks the user into giving her/his bank account credentials. This can be verified by clicking on the Sign In button. FYI: https://www.virustotal.com/file/8fb6447fdc9cfe204cde... Regards, Francois Picard www.NewRoma.net Attachment: BMOFinancialGroup.zip TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL --- TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL Duh Duh Duh Duh TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL --- TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL ## Work Flow IR TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL --- ## Analytic value * SIGINT brings in ~10 potentially malicious files per day for malware triage * Over 500 potentially malicious files collected since 2009 * ~ 50 CAMBERDADA signatures deployed to NIPRnet for alerting * 9 domains mitigated --- ## DNS Interdiction * 9 domains under DNS Interdiction * Cloudshield intercepts the DNS request * Returns the address of a DoD listening post * Munged version of the request is sent out * DNS response is sent to a log --- TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL ## Current status * CRN * SSO * Overhead * SCS * FORNSAT * IN L-C-2010-147 - Multi-Country: Computer Network Ops * Dozens of CADENCE selectors * PINWALE daily queries; EXIT4 models * MAILORDER TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL --- ## What else can we do? * TAO can repurpose the malware * Check Kaspersky AV to see if they continue to let any of these virus files through their Anti-Virus product * Monitor the folks who provide the malware to see if they're into more nefarious activity * Establish automated reporting --- ## More Targets! * fsb-antivirus (France) * Bit-Defender (Romania) * Viritpro (Italy) * eAladdin (Israel) * F-secure (Finland) * AVG (Czech) * F-prot (Iceland) * Norman (Norway) * DrWeb (Russia) * k7computing (India) * Ikarus (Austria) * Hauri (Korea) * Arcabit (Poland) * Antiy (Chinese) * Avira (Germany) * Spy-Emergency (Slovakia) * Nod32 (Slovakia) * Ahnlab (S Korea) * Novirusthanks (Italy) * Emsisoft (Austria) * Eset (Slovakia) * Avast (Czech) * Checkpoint (Israel) --- TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL ## THANK YOU! [REDACTED] I4121 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] V252 [REDACTED] [REDACTED](s) [REDACTED](s) Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52 Dated: 20070108 Declassify On: 20370301 TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL