{ "title": "PROFILING SSL AND ATTRIBUTING PRIVATE NETWORKS", "type": "REPORTED", "description": "A TOP SECRET GCHQ presentation introducing two prototype cloud analytics — FLYING PIG, a knowledge base for investigating TLS/SSL traffic at scale across approximately 20 billion events per week, and HUSH PUPPY, a tool for attributing private network traffic to identifiable organisations — with live interface screenshots demonstrating queries against mail.ru infrastructure and operational successes including identification of the Afghan Ministry of Defence network and a foreign Ministry of Foreign Affairs VSAT network.", "long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY presentation produced by GCHQ's ICTR Network Exploitation division, introducing two prototype bulk data analytics operating on unselected internet traffic.\n\nFLYING PIG is described as a TLS/SSL knowledge base running on a federated Query Focussed Dataset architecture, processing approximately 20 billion SSL/TLS events per week. Queries run across multiple QFDs simultaneously, returning results in separate panels covering certificate metadata, server IP intelligence, client geolocation, pattern of life analysis, and HTTP request history. The motivation for building FLYING PIG is stated explicitly: major internet services including Hotmail, Yahoo and Gmail had moved to TLS/SSL, and a knowledge base was needed to extract maximum intelligence from the unencrypted portions of that traffic. Live screenshots demonstrate queries against mail.ru infrastructure, showing 500 server IPs and 70 certificates associated with the domain, with over 42 million SSL events recorded for a single mail.ru hostname. The client filtering interface shows a capability to remove Five Eyes country IPs from results, leaving only non-allied traffic for analysis.\n\nThe document describes two cyber intelligence applications of FLYING PIG. The first is the 2011 DigiNotar certificate authority compromise, in which FLYING PIG was used to identify a foreign intelligence service using stolen DigiNotar private keys to launch a man-in-the-middle attack against its own citizens, with a diagram showing how the attacker logged into a router and added a static route to redirect target traffic through the MITM node. The FLYING PIG certificate table visible in the document shows the fraudulent DigiNotar-issued google.com certificate alongside legitimate certificates and corporate proxy certificates from Zscaler and L'Oreal, illustrating the breadth of non-standard certificate issuers visible in bulk SSL collection. The second application describes FLYING PIG being used to identify servers involved in data exfiltration linked to operations designated LEGION JADE, LEGION RUBY and MAKERSMARK, and to identify a mail server used by Russian intelligence.\n\nHUSH PUPPY addresses a different problem: private network traffic intercepted at collection points carries RFC 1918 private IP addresses which cannot be directly attributed. HUSH PUPPY correlates the same tracking identifier appearing first from a private address and then from a public address within a short time window, allowing the private traffic to be attributed to the organisation owning the public IP. The system uses Yahoo cookies, Kerberos and Lotus Notes domain data, HTTP intranet server heuristics, SSL certificate metadata and SMTP domain data as additional verification sources. It operates against both SSE cable tap and COMSAT satellite collection. In cases of good collection, the document states that 50-80% of private network traffic can be attributed. Operational successes cited include identification of a private network of approximately 800,000 correlated events belonging to the Afghan Ministry of Defence, confirmed through Kerberos domain mod.local, HTTP servers at *.mod.local, and SSL certificates with subject \"Ministry of Defense\" and geography \"AF,\" with content subsequently verified on XKEYSCORE. A second success describes identification of a VSAT private network belonging to an unidentified Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with NOSEY PARKER events correlated against SSE collection.\n\nTaken together, the document describes two complementary surveillance capabilities operating on bulk internet traffic. FLYING PIG gives GCHQ a searchable map of who is using encrypted connections across the internet — which servers, which certificates, which clients — allowing analysts to identify targets, track foreign intelligence operations, and detect attacks like the DigiNotar compromise by spotting certificates that should not exist. HUSH PUPPY solves a different problem: when intercepted traffic carries only private internal IP addresses with no obvious owner, it uses tracking cookies and other identifiers to work out which organisation that traffic belongs to. The Afghan Ministry of Defence example illustrates what this looks like in practice — a large block of internal network traffic, initially anonymous, pieced together into a complete picture of a government ministry's communications infrastructure and then handed to analysts for content review on XKEYSCORE. Both tools operate on data collected passively from internet cables and satellites, without targeting any individual in advance.", "tags": [ "Tor", "ICTR", "network exploitation", "TLS", "SSL", "QFD", "cloud analytics", "bulk collection", "certificate analysis", "private network", "DigiNotar", "MITM", "Mail.ru", "Afghan Ministry of Defence", "Ministry of Foreign Affairs", "diplomatic surveillance", "VSAT", "Yahoo cookies", "browser cookies", "Kerberos", "Lotus Notes", "COMSAT" ], "document": { "creator": "GCHQ", "date_created": "", "classification": [ "TOP SECRET", "SI" ], "dissemination": [ "REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL" ], "banner": "TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL", "genre": "slides", "programs": [ "FLYINGPIG", "HUSHPUPPY", "QUICKANT", "GEOFUSION", "LEGIONJADE", "LEGIONRUBY", "MAKERSMARK", "XKEYSCORE", "NOSEYPARKER" ], "countries": [ "Russia", "Iceland", "Pakistan", "Iran", "Iraq", "Spain", "Germany", "Norway", "Ireland", "South Korea", "Ecuador", "Malaysia", "Brazil", "Netherlands", "France", "Afghanistan" ], "people": [] }, "publication": [ { "publisher": "Der Spiegel", "date_published": "2014-12-28", "title": "Prying Eyes: Inside the NSA's War on Internet Security", "link": "https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/inside-the-nsa-s-war-on-internet-security-a-1010361.html", "reporters": [ "Appelbaum, Jacob", "Gibson, Aaron", "Grothoff, Christian", "Müller-Maguhn, Andy", "Poitras, Laura", "Sontheimer, Michael", "Stöcker, Christian" ], "contributors": [], "doc_url": "https://cdn.prod.www.spiegel.de/media/79584ee8-0001-0014-0000-000000035521/media-35521.pdf" }, { "publisher": "O Globo", "date_published": "2013-07-07", "title": "'Brasil é um grande alvo', diz jornalista sobre vigilância dos EUA", "link": "https://g1.globo.com/fantastico/noticia/2013/07/brasil-e-um-grande-alvo-diz-jornalista-que-divulgou-denuncias-de-espionagem-americana.html", "reporters": [ "Greenwald, Glenn", "Kaz, Roberto", "Casado, José" ], "contributors": [], "version": "globo-tv", "note": "O Globo showed some of the slides in their Fantástico TV broadcast, it didn't publish any files as PDF or images, these are screengrabs from the TV broadcast. On page 10, the mail.ru server IP is fully visible, which Der Spiegel redacted." } ], "aka_id": [], "pdf_sha256": "539f335cbb51a8a57fa415d6702f658bdbd75d5f3174c244979d45adbe3431ad", "pages": 19, "versions": { "globo-tv": { "pdf_sha256": "54f34c40c08d9d60cedee543cccaaedb0df2bd2a4911df5396a61cb1a2b795d4", "changed_pages": [ 10 ] } } }