TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL NETWORK EXPLOITATION # PROFILING SSL AND ATTRIBUTING PRIVATE NETWORKS ## An introduction to FLYING PIG and HUSH PUPPY ICTR - Network Exploitation GCHQ TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL TR THIS INFORMATION IS EXEMPT UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (FOIA) AND MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER OTHER UK INFORMATION LEGISLATION. REFER ANY FOIA QUERIES TO GCHQ ON CONTAINS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNED AND/OR MANAGED BY GCHQ. THE MATERIAL MAY BE DISSEMINATED THROUGHOUT THE RECIPIENT ORGANISATION, BUT GCHQ PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE ORGANISATION. GCHQ --- TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL ## Motivations for FLYING P - More and more services used by GCHQ targets are moving to TLS/SSL to increase user confidence, e.g. Hotmail, Yahoo, Gmai - Terrorists and cyber criminals are common users of TLS/SSL to hide their comms (not necessarily using the big providers). --- TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL ## Query by certificate metadata ``` FLYING PIG ``` --- TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL ## Query by certificate metadata ``` FLYING PIG FLYING PIG TLS/SSL KNOWLEDGE BASE ``` TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL --- TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL ## Query by server IP ``` FLYING PIG TLS/SSL KNOWLEDGE BASE ``` --- TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL ## Query by server IP ``` FLYING PIG TLS/SSL KNOWLEDGE BASE ``` --- TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL ## Query by client IP ``` FLYING PIG TLS/SSL KNOWLEDGE BASE ``` --- TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL ## Query by ne ``` YING PIG SL KNOWLEDGE BASE cation | Query FLYING PIG - general SSL toolkit | Query QUICK ANT - Tor events QFD LYING PIG ork/certificate field: [REDACTED].0/24 Client IP Server IP Both or: Network [e.g. 1.2.3.0/24] or: Server Certificate [e.g. %example.com (use % for wildcards)] Network-specific panels: General network info SSL Clients present in network SSL Servers present in network HTTP requests to IPs in network ery! e field search: %mail.ru Server IP: 94.100.184.14 Client IP: [REDACTED].127 Network: etwork info for: [REDACTED].0/24 ion (?): R (M) UL (L) WHOIS info (?): Network: No results. Network type: No results. Company: No results. Domain: No results. AS info Advertis AS name s in network: [REDACTED].0/24: (?): iht click on a client IP to explore it further! 57 items 10 | 25 | 50 | 100 Client company info (from GEOFUSION export) First se 2011-0 ``` --- TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL ## Cyber app iginotar certificate authority compromise : - Private keys of legitimate certificate authority, Diginotar, stolen by hacker - FLYING PIG was used to identify a FI to launch a MITM against --- ### How the attack was done: ``` ┌───────────────────┐ │ │ │ Legitimate Google │◄────────────────┐ │ server │ │ │ │ │ └────────▲──────────┘ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ ┌───┴───┐ │ │ │ Non-target traffic │ MITM │ │ │ │ │ └───▲───┘ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ ─────Google request────────────►┌───┴────┐ │ │ │ │ ─────Google request────────────►│ Router ├─────────────────Target traffic │ │ ─────Google request────────────►└───▲────┘ │ │ │ [REDACTED].242 Logs into router and adds static route for target traffic │ │ │ ``` --- ation using SSL have been fou EGION JADE, LEGION RUBY, n FLYING PIG using known sig --- TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL ## Results – what do we find? * Foreign government networks * Airlines * Energy companies * Financial organisations * In cases of good collection, 50-80% of collected private network traffic has been attributed * Some false positives can arise if few events correlated, due to factors such as TDIs not being completely unique and public internet proxies giving misleading public IP results * Results can frequently be verified using Kerberos etc data TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL