{ "title": "OTR encrypted messages can't be decrypted by the NSA", "type": "REPORTED", "description": "Three intercepted chat sessions from 16 March 2012 collected under PRISM, showing a target switching mid-conversation from unencrypted to OTR-encrypted messaging — with NSA able to collect the session metadata and unencrypted portions but unable to decrypt the OTR messages, each annotated \"No decrypt available for this OTR encrypted message.\"", "long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS document dated 16 March 2012. It contains three consecutive chat session records collected through PRISM (SIGAD US-984XN, PDDG AX, Case Notation P2BSQC110024003), all involving the same target user over approximately thirteen minutes.\n\nThe document illustrates in a single sequence exactly how OTR encryption defeats NSA collection mid-conversation. The first session runs from 13:31 to 13:34 and contains four message events with no OTR annotations, indicating the conversation was unencrypted and readable. The second session runs from 13:35 to 13:39 and shows the conversation switching to OTR partway through — the first message at 13:37:51 is unredacted with no OTR notation, but from 13:37:59 onward four consecutive messages carry the annotation \"No decrypt available for this OTR encrypted message,\" before the conversation apparently drops back to unencrypted for the remaining messages. The third session runs from 13:40 to 13:44 and shows OTR in sustained use — after several initial unencrypted messages, eight consecutive messages from 13:41:58 through 13:44:46 all carry the OTR no-decrypt annotation.\n\nThe pattern across the three sessions — unencrypted chat visible, OTR activation mid-session, sustained OTR use — mirrors exactly the scenario described in the SIGDEV Conference 2012 risk matrix where OTR was rated as causing \"major\" loss of insight. NSA could see that communication was happening, could see the metadata, and could read the unencrypted portions, but the OTR-encrypted content was completely opaque. The classification restricted to USA, AUS rather than full Five Eyes is consistent with the PGP email document.", "tags": [ "OTR", "Off-the-record messaging", "chat", "no decrypt available", "FAA", "encryption breaking", "metadata collection" ], "document": { "creator": "NSA", "date_created": "2012-03-16", "classification": [ "TOP SECRET", "COMINT" ], "dissemination": [ "REL TO USA, AUS" ], "banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS//20320108", "genre": "other", "programs": [ "PRISM" ], "countries": [ "Australia" ], "people": [] }, "publication": [ { "publisher": "Der Spiegel", "date_published": "2014-12-28", "title": "Prying Eyes: Inside the NSA's War on Internet Security", "link": "https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/inside-the-nsa-s-war-on-internet-security-a-1010361.html", "reporters": [ "Appelbaum, Jacob", "Gibson, Aaron", "Grothoff, Christian", "Müller-Maguhn, Andy", "Poitras, Laura", "Sontheimer, Michael", "Stöcker, Christian" ], "contributors": [], "doc_url": "https://cdn.prod.www.spiegel.de/media/af108995-0001-0014-0000-000000035552/media-35552.pdf" } ], "pdf_sha256": "35542d335ea9547d348b5d9dd0aa57234f46da13395a3102e4e27f675b6e2971", "pages": 2 }