57 lines
3.6 KiB
JSON
57 lines
3.6 KiB
JSON
{
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"title": "SOMALGET (2012)",
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"type": "REPORTED",
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"description": "This 2012 document provides an internal overview of SOMALGET, a sub-program of the MYSTIC surveillance project. It describes a radical shift in telephony intelligence: the move from \"targeted\" wiretapping to \"full-take\" nation-scale buffering. SOMALGET allows analysts to record 100% of a country's mobile phone audio and store it for a rolling period of 30 days. This capability, known as \"retrospective retrieval,\" allows the NSA to listen to conversations that occurred before a person was even identified as a target. At the time of this writing, the program was fully operational in the Bahamas and one other redacted location(s).",
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"long_description": "The document characterizes SOMALGET as a breakthrough in Target Discovery and Target Development. By capturing all metadata in real time and buffering all audio, the NSA created a \"time machine\" for phone calls. The system captures every call on a targeted GSM network. These audio files are kept for roughly 30 days, though this varies based on storage capacity and call volume. Analysts use metadata (who called whom) to form a theory. They then use SOMALGET to \"retrospectively\" pull the audio of those calls to immediately confirm their suspicions.\n\nThe document explicitly compares this to XKEYSCORE, the NSA’s system for searching global internet traffic. It argues that just as the NSA buffers internet data to find \"hidden\" intelligence, it should buffer telephony for the same purpose.\n\nThe document highlights specific outcomes from the Bahamian GSM access. Analysts identified international narcotics traffickers and \"special-interest alien\" smugglers. Analysts exploited specific target behaviors, such as the use of prepaid calling cards and newly activated mobile accounts, to filter the massive amount of data. Text messages were used as a \"trigger\" to identify which specific audio files should be retrieved and listened to.\n\nThe technical \"Notes\" reveal the massive scale of the backend. The system manages roughly 5 billion call events in an \"enterprise-class data warehouse.\" The authors argue that with \"proper engineering,\" this \"Collect it All\" model could be expanded globally to any network where the NSA can deploy compatible hardware.",
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"tags": [
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"retrospective retrieval",
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"full-take collection",
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"target discovery",
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"target development",
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"GSM",
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"mobile interception",
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"narcotics",
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"smuggling",
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"prepaid calling cards",
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"SMS interception",
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"telephony",
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"data retention",
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"collect it all"
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],
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"document": {
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"creator": "NSA",
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"date_created": "2012-01-01",
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"classification": [
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"TOP SECRET",
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"SI"
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],
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"dissemination": [],
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"genre": "report",
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"programs": [
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"SOMALGET",
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"XKEYSCORE"
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],
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"countries": [
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"Bahamas"
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],
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"people": []
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},
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"publication": [
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{
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"publisher": "The Intercept",
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"date_published": "2014-05-19",
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"title": "The NSA Is Recording Every Cell Phone Call in the Bahamas",
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"link": "https://theintercept.com/2014/05/19/data-pirates-caribbean-nsa-recording-every-cell-phone-call-bahamas/",
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"reporters": [
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"Devereaux, Ryan",
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"Greenwald, Glenn",
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"Poitras, Laura"
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],
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"contributors": [],
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"doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2014/05/19/somalget-memo/",
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"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1164088/somalget.pdf"
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}
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],
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"pdf_sha256": "3c08d3ec24d76d67be6b2e574659fb60286d260aefc2f35d10087e132f577745",
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"pages": 2
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}
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