156 lines
7.5 KiB
JSON
156 lines
7.5 KiB
JSON
{
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"title": "Where we are",
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"type": "REPORTED",
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"description": "This GCHQ document is a table tracking the agency's access to undersea fiber-optic cables as of an unspecified date, listing 13 cables with their codenames, telecommunications company partners (primarily \"GERONTIC\"/Cable & Wireless and \"REMEDY\"), and the capacity of data access and egress points measured in 10 gigabit connections. The table shows GCHQ had access to 592 10-gigabit connections across these cables with 69 egress points, with an unlabelled column totalling 2,960, with GERONTIC (Cable & Wireless) providing access to 9 of the 13 cables including FEA (NIGELLA), APOLLO North and South, and TAT-14S.",
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"long_description": "This GCHQ document, titled \"Where we are,\" presents a comprehensive surveillance infrastructure table that maps the British intelligence agency's access to major undersea fiber-optic telecommunications cables as of an unspecified date (likely around 2009-2012 based on context from the Süddeutsche Zeitung article). The table meticulously catalogs 13 different undersea cable systems, each assigned cryptic codenames like NUMDAH, SCEPTRE, NIGELLA, LATUS, and ARCANO, alongside the telecommunications companies providing GCHQ with access—primarily \"GERONTIC\" (the codename for Cable & Wireless) and \"REMEDY\" (another telecom partner). For each cable, the document specifies the technical capacity in terms of 10-gigabit connections available for interception (\"Access\"), the number of egress points where data can be extracted (\"Egress\"), and various geographic or operational distribution columns. The bottom row totals reveal the staggering scale: GCHQ had engineered access to 592 10-gigabit connections across these cables, with 69 egress points, and an unlabelled column \"A\" totalling 2,960.\n\nThe dominance of GERONTIC (Cable & Wireless) in this surveillance infrastructure is striking—the company provided access to 9 of the 13 cables listed, including critical international routes like FEA (Flag Europe Asia, codenamed NIGELLA), both the northern and southern segments of APOLLO cables, TAT-14S (GIBUS), SOLAS (MONDELLO), and several others. According to the Süddeutsche Zeitung reporting, some of these cables—particularly FEA and FA-1 mentioned in related documents—didn't even belong to Cable & Wireless but were owned by competitors like the Indian company Global Cloud Xchange (formerly Reliance Globalcom). The documents suggest Cable & Wireless leveraged its control over \"backhaul\" connections at landing sites like Skewjack in Cornwall to provide GCHQ with access to competitors' infrastructure, with one document noting GERONTIC had access to a rival's \"linux infrastructure\" and was \"delivering statistics and metadata.\" This raises profound questions about whether Cable & Wireless was effectively spying on its competitors' networks on behalf of British intelligence.\n\nThis document provides evidence that GCHQ through partnerships with telecommunications companies had constructed a comprehensive underwater cable interception network. The two other company codenames appearing in the table—REMEDY and DACRON—suggest that Cable & Wireless wasn't GCHQ's only corporate partner in this endeavor, though GERONTIC clearly dominated the operation. The geographic distribution columns (labeled S/W, S/E, N/E, N/W Europe, and C) hint at how GCHQ organized its access by regional routing or cable segments, ensuring comprehensive coverage of global communications infrastructure. This single-page table thus represents a blueprint for mass surveillance of international telecommunications at a scale that would capture communications of millions of people worldwide.",
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"tags": [
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"Cable & Wireless",
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"undersea cables",
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"fiber optic cables",
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"cable tapping",
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"submarine cables",
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"telecommunications",
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"telecommunications surveillance",
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"fiber tapping",
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"telecommunications partners",
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"corporate partnerships",
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"telecommunications companies",
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"Vodafone",
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"surveillance infrastructure",
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"cable access",
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"data interception",
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"cable codenames",
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"operation codenames",
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"access capacity",
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"egress points",
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"data exfiltration",
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"surveillance capacity",
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"capacity measurements",
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"technical access",
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"cable inventory",
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"backhaul connections",
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"backhaul access",
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"competitor access",
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"data collection",
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"metadata collection",
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"Global Cloud Xchange",
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"Reliance Globalcom",
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"Indian telecom",
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"industrial espionage",
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"cable ownership",
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"cable operators",
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"transatlantic cables",
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"international cables",
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"global communications",
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"intercontinental cables",
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"corporate cooperation",
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"communications interception",
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"telecommunications espionage",
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"signals intelligence",
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"cable landing stations",
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"landing partners",
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"access points",
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"interception points",
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"traffic monitoring",
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"data flows",
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"international data",
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"telecommunications industry",
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"infrastructure access",
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"network access",
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"physical access",
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"optical access",
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"signal access",
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"tap points",
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"interception infrastructure",
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"surveillance network",
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"monitoring network",
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"global network",
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"cable network",
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"communications network"
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],
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"document": {
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"creator": "GCHQ",
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"date_created": "",
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"classification": [],
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"dissemination": [],
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"genre": "other",
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"programs": [
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"NUMDAH",
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"SCEPTRE",
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"NIGELLA",
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"LATUS",
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"ARCANO",
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"MONDELLO",
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"GIBUS",
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"KIRKISTOWN",
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"LINNELL",
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"ELAPSE",
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"GRASP",
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"CATEGORY",
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"KNAPWEED",
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"DACRON",
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"GERONTIC",
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"REMEDY",
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"SOLAS",
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"APOLLO",
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"FEA",
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"SCEPTRE",
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"SMW3"
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],
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"countries": [],
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"people": []
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},
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"publication": [
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{
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"publisher": "WDR",
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"date_published": "2014-11-20",
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"title": "Vodafone – der lange Arm des britischen Geheimdienstes?",
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"link": "http://www1.wdr.de/daserste/monitor/videos/videovodafonederlangearmdesbritischengeheimdienstes100.html",
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"reporters": [
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"Restle, Georg"
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],
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"contributors": [],
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"reporting_only": true
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},
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{
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"publisher": "Channel 4",
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"date_published": "2014-11-20",
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"title": "Spy cable revealed: how telecoms firm worked with GCHQ",
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"link": "http://www.channel4.com/news/spy-cable-revealed-how-telecoms-firm-worked-with-gchq",
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"reporters": [
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"White, Geoff"
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],
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"contributors": [],
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"reporting_only": true
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},
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{
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"publisher": "NDR",
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"date_published": "2014-11-21",
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"title": "Der lange Arm des Geheimdienstes?",
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"link": "http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/snowden-vodafone-101.html",
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"reporters": [
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"Strozyk, Jan",
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"Moltke, Henrik",
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"Poitras, Laura"
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],
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"contributors": [],
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"reporting_only": true
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},
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{
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"publisher": "Süddeutsche Zeitung",
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"date_published": "2014-11-25",
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"title": "Snowden-Leaks: How Vodafone-Subsidiary Cable & Wireless Aided GCHQ’s Spying Efforts",
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"link": "http://international.sueddeutsche.de/post/103543418200/snowden-leaks-how-vodafone-subsidiary-cable",
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"reporters": [
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"Obermaier, Frederik",
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"Moltke, Henrik",
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"Poitras, Laura",
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"Strozyk, Jan"
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],
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"contributors": []
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}
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],
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"aka_id": [],
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"pdf_sha256": "fe50879bb9e8b188d41e5dd67494dcfbe570106dfe0ba2fc975e5f70255fdb3f",
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"pages": 1
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}
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