snowchive-meta/data/gchq-covert-mobiles-the-intercept-14-0812/metadata.json
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{
"title": "GCHQ Covert Mobile Phones Policy",
"type": "REPORTED",
"description": "A 2010 GCHQ policy lays out strict, granular rules for covert mobile phone use by traveling operatives, mandating geofenced device discipline around Cheltenham, non-attributable communications, and hard separations from personal devices to minimize traceability and exposure. It’s a clinical OPSEC playbook for the management plane of human mobility—battery pulls, charging only at the airport or destination, out‑of‑area routing—designed to reduce the digital exhaust that links officers to headquarters.",
"long_description": "The document, “OPA~TAS Covert Mobile Phones Policy” (Issue 1.0, 28 June 2010), codifies how GCHQ officers (“Tryst Travellers”) must use non‑attributable, official mobile devices while deployed overseas. Phones are treated as accountable kit: checked out from a secure store, used only for in‑country official business, and barred from personal calls back to the UK except via designated out‑of‑area contact numbers. The policy imposes a 50‑mile “Cheltenham ring‑fence”: covert mobiles must not be powered on within that radius, their batteries must be removed there, and charging is prohibited at home or hotels inside the zone—permitted only at airports or the destination. Contact with GCHQ is funneled through out‑of‑area numbers, calls between covert mobiles are allowed only when both are outside the radius, and carrying a covert phone prohibits carrying any personal communications device.\n\nOperational hygiene is backed by governance: chain‑of‑custody and accountability, compromise reporting, and references to broader COMSEC/INFOSEC policy. A “welfare” carve‑out directs officers to use airport payphones—or have OPA‑TAS relay messages—if travel disruptions require notifying family, keeping attribution barriers intact. Read together, these rules aim to reduce RF and metadata footprint, prevent co‑location with personal identifiers, and sever proximity signals to GCHQ headquarters—an institutional mirror of the OPSEC practices intelligence services often attribute to their targets.",
"tags": [
"GCHQ",
"covert communications",
"OPSEC",
"mobile OPSEC",
"device attribution control",
"non-attribution",
"communications discipline",
"COMSEC",
"INFOSEC",
"travel tradecraft",
"overseas deployment",
"minimization",
"geofencing",
"proximity risk",
"Cheltenham",
"airports",
"mobile charging",
"chain of custody",
"payphones",
"linkability",
"Bluetooth",
"side‑channel risk",
"triangulation",
"base station",
"IMSI",
"IMEI",
"mobile tracking",
"cell phones",
"smart phones",
"operational compartmentation",
"mission support",
"surveillance countermeasures",
"operational discipline"
],
"document": {
"creator": "GCHQ",
"date_created": "2010-06-28",
"classification": [
"SECRET"
],
"dissemination": [],
"banner": "SECRET",
"genre": "report",
"programs": [
"TRYST"
],
"countries": [],
"people": []
},
"publication": [
{
"publisher": "The Intercept",
"date_published": "2014-08-12",
"title": "NPR Is Laundering CIA Talking Points to Make You Scared of NSA Reporting",
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2014/08/12/nprs-dina-temple-raston-passed-cia-funded-nsa-contractor-independent-fear-monger-snowden-reporting/",
"reporters": [
"Greenwald, Glenn",
"Fishman, Andrew"
],
"contributors": [
"Chalak, Nadine"
],
"doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2014/08/12/gchq-covert-mobile-phones-policy/",
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1273603/gchq-covert-mobile-phones-policy.pdf"
}
],
"pdf_sha256": "22a27a6fbfc30373f42460097092833635381c34d5088d9b4f0706a742591fe6",
"pages": 6
}