snowchive-meta/data/gchq-pcs-harvesting-intercept-15-0219/metadata.json
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{
"title": "GCHQ - PCS Harvesting",
"type": "REPORTED",
"description": "A TOP SECRET STRAP1 report details how GCHQ industrialized the theft of GSM subscriber authentication keys (Ki) by automating trawls of bulk “C2C” content to extract IMSI/Ki pairs from emails and FTP transfers between SIM personalisation centers and mobile operators. It shows the program scaling key harvesting across networks and countries, complementing computer network exploitation against core mobile infrastructure to suppress billing and lift authentication secrets.",
"long_description": "This document lays out the nuts and bolts of GCHQ’s automated Ki theft circa early 2010. TDSD analysts moved from manual UDAQ queries to scripting bulk pulls via the LLANDARCYPARK research server, unpacking CCDF meshes, and applying rule‑based analytics to find IMSI/Ki pairs wherever they appeared in intercepted provisioning traffic. The team then packaged results for OPC‑CAP to decrypt and load into partner‑shared databases—explicitly targeting the weak links of the SIM supply chain, where keys routinely moved by email or FTP with “simple encryption ... or occasionally with no encryption at all.” Where strong PGP appeared, they flagged it but kept harvesting at scale.\n\nTrials over six two‑week runs delivered a steady stream of keys—thousands at a time from Afghanistan (AWCC, TDCA), Iran (MTN Irancell), Yemen (MTN/Sabafon), India (Idea), Tajikistan (Babilon), Iceland (Nova), and a 300,000‑key trove from a Somali provider the analysts admit “is not on GCHQ’s list of interest,” but was “usefully shared with NSA.” The automation also pivoted into target development: scraping associated emails and domains to surface high‑value actors (a top‑scoring huawei.com address, MTN Irancell, Belgacom) and revealing that most Ki traffic was tied to network operators and hardware vendors—not SIM suppliers—suggesting rising encryption among personalisation centers. Side‑by‑side tests showed the automated pipeline missed some manual finds when IMSI/Ki were split across lines or lacked the literal “IMSI” token, prompting calls to refine detection, expand bulk access beyond STRAP2, and extend harvesting to OTA and UMTS keys.\n\nWoven through the slides is the broader offensive context. Under DAPINO GAMMA, GCHQ set workshop aims to “get into French HQ … core data repositories” at Gemalto, fan out to non‑Five Eyes personalisation centers (La Ciotat, Pont‑Audemer, Tczew), and spin up targeting of competitor Giesecke & Devrient. The “mobile info on the go” section boasts active CNE inside core mobile networks—billing servers to suppress SMS charges; authentication servers to obtain K/Ki/OTA keys; sales and engineering machines for customer info and network maps—and a blunt line on Gemalto: “successfully implanted several machines and believe we have their entire network.” Taken together, the report reads like a blueprint for bypassing cellular cryptography at industrial scale: automate the harvest in transit, penetrate the cores, and turn the world’s SIM supply chain into a standing decryption service.",
"tags": [
"PGP",
"IMSI",
"cell phones",
"mobile phones",
"telephony",
"ClearCase",
"PCS harvesting",
"GSM authentication",
"SIM personalisation",
"Gemalto",
"Giesecke & Devrient",
"OPC‑TDSD",
"OPC‑CAP",
"CCDF",
"ICTR bulk access",
"C2C content",
"emails",
"FTP",
"OTA keys",
"UMTS",
"mobile core CNE",
"Computer Network Exploitation",
"authentication servers",
"billing suppression",
"MHET",
"CCNE",
"target discovery",
"domain scraping",
"Huawei",
"MTN Irancell",
"BELGACOM",
"AWCC",
"TDCA",
"Sabafon",
"Nova",
"Babilon",
"MIRANDA numbers",
"offensive tradecraft",
"cellular communications",
"telecommunications",
"telecommunications infrastructure",
"mobile networks",
"GSM",
"LTE",
"SIM cards",
"SIM personalization centres",
"subscriber authentication",
"Ki keys",
"HLR",
"AuC",
"core network",
"base station",
"mobile network operators",
"carrier networks",
"network mapping",
"billing servers",
"provisioning traffic",
"passive surveillance",
"active exploitation",
"supply chain vulnerability",
"decryption",
"partner sharing"
],
"document": {
"creator": "GCHQ",
"date_created": "2010-04-27",
"classification": [
"TOP SECRET",
"STRAP 1"
],
"dissemination": [],
"banner": "TOP SECRET STRAP1",
"genre": "report",
"programs": [
"UDAQ",
"LLANDARCYPARK",
"IIB",
"DAPINOGAMMA",
"JEDI"
],
"countries": [
"Serbia",
"Iceland",
"India",
"Afghanistan",
"Yemen",
"Iran",
"Tajikistan",
"Somalia",
"South Africa",
"Pakistan",
"Italy",
"Montenegro",
"Turkmenistan",
"Vietnam",
"Laos",
"Bangladesh",
"Indonesia",
"Côte d'Ivoire",
"Gabon",
"Zimbabwe",
"Namibia",
"Kuwait",
"Saudi Arabia",
"Bahrain",
"France",
"Poland",
"Finland",
"Brazil",
"China",
"Colombia",
"Czech Republic",
"Denmark",
"Germany",
"Japan",
"Malaysia",
"Mexico",
"Norway",
"Russia",
"Singapore",
"Spain",
"Sweden",
"Belgium",
"Monaco",
"Taiwan"
],
"people": []
},
"publication": [
{
"publisher": "The Intercept",
"date_published": "2015-02-19",
"title": "How Spies Stole the Keys to the Encryption Castle",
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2015/02/19/great-sim-heist/",
"reporters": [
"Scahill, Jeremy",
"Begley, Josh"
],
"contributors": [
"Fishman, Andrew",
"Gallagher, Ryan",
"McNeill, Sheelagh",
"Marquis-Boire, Morgan",
"Brown, Alleen",
"Williams, Margot",
"Devereaux, Ryan",
"Jones, Andrea",
"O’Rourke, Erin"
],
"doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2015/02/19/pcs-harvesting-scale/",
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1670902/pcs-harvesting-at-scale.pdf"
}
],
"pdf_sha256": "0a4f8c7fa20a9563d1e650164a51fbecb2329ae640203970f7328b40580c7f89",
"pages": 33
}