snowchive-meta/data/gchq-software-reverse-engineer/metadata.json
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{
"title": "Software Reverse Engineering – GCHQ",
"type": "REPORTED",
"description": "GCHQ’s Network Defence unit runs software reverse engineering across both malicious and commercial code to map vulnerabilities, validate security claims, and feed CESG’s advice on electronic attack. Malicious code is fair game, but commercial RE hinges on GCHQ’s ISA s5 SRE warrant (GPW/1160), with local authorisers and audits—after a documented lapse in 2008 was retro‑authorised.",
"long_description": "This internal note sets out how Network Defence’s VR and ID teams perform software reverse engineering for Response and Information Assurance, and occasionally for other GCHQ customers and HMG. The mission spans translating binaries to human‑readable form to analyse functions, weaknesses, and tamper‑resistance; assessing OS/application exposure to electronic attack; and authenticating vendor claims about security products. Malicious code flows in via HARUSPEX/GORDIAN KNOT, OGDs, and commercial sources, while non‑malicious code is acquired through normal channels.\n\nThe legal framework draws a hard line: malware RE needs no warrant, but reverse engineering commercial products “needs to be warranted” under GCHQ’s SRE warrant GPW/1160 (renewed every six months), limited to UK law and SIGINT/IA purposes. Local authorisation forms are signed by named approvers (different pathways for VR and ID), with the ID team authorised en masse annually due to unpredictable workload. The document acknowledges a compliance lapse—ID did not follow internal authorisation until February 2008—reported and corrected, with retrospective authorisation applied. Auditing rests with local authorisers and designated leads; inputs from VR/ID support the periodic warrant renewal, and process guidance, warrant texts, and team records live on internal paths and pages.",
"tags": [
"CESG",
"network defense",
"reverse engineering",
"SRE",
"malware analysis",
"vulnerability research",
"electronic attack",
"Information Assurance",
"Response team",
"VR team",
"ID team",
"OGDs",
"commercial acquisition",
"tamper protection",
"tamper detection",
"CCNE"
],
"document": {
"creator": "GCHQ",
"date_created": "2008-07-15",
"classification": [
"TOP SECRET"
],
"dissemination": [],
"banner": "TOP SECRET",
"genre": "report",
"programs": [
"HARUSPEX",
"GORDIANKNOT"
],
"countries": [],
"people": []
},
"publication": [
{
"publisher": "The Intercept",
"date_published": "2015-06-22",
"title": "Spies Hacked Computers Thanks to Sweeping Secret Warrants, Aggressively Stretching U.K. Law",
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2015/06/22/gchq-reverse-engineering-warrants/",
"reporters": [
"Fishman, Andrew",
"Greenwald, Glenn"
],
"contributors": [],
"doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2015/06/22/software-reverse-engineering-gchq/",
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2106823/software-reverse-engineering-gchq.pdf"
}
],
"pdf_sha256": "a123e2d28465e661df086cd6723131a9a59011fd6887ede59fed133a6685ce9d",
"pages": 2
}