111 lines
5.8 KiB
JSON
111 lines
5.8 KiB
JSON
{
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"title": "VPN SigDev Basics",
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"type": "REPORTED",
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"description": "A TOP SECRET VPN signals development training presentation from NSA's OTTERCREEK team introducing analysts to the six-stage workflow for discovering, assessing and exploiting VPN traffic — covering TOYGRIPPE, XKEYSCORE, DISCOROUTE and other repositories with live interface screenshots showing Iranian-German IPSec traffic and UNAMI (UN Assistance Mission for Iraq) router configurations containing pre-shared keys, including a Cuban VPN pre-shared key recovered in plaintext from a compromised router.\n",
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"long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY VPN SIGDEV training presentation from NSA's S31244 OTTERCREEK team, providing analysts with a practical introduction to identifying and exploiting VPN traffic across IPSec, PPTP and SSL protocols. The document covers the full analyst workflow and provides working interface screenshots of multiple NSA analytical tools in operational use.\n\nThe document maps the VPN exploitation workflow as a six-stage sequential pipeline: know your target, find target VPNs, gain access, decrypt, determine intelligence value, and task and report — with S2 target offices responsible for both the first and final stages, forming a closed intelligence cycle while technical teams handle the middle stages. The organisational structure of the VPN exploitation community is mapped across this pipeline, with S2, NAC and OTTERCREEK handling target discovery; S2, S3112, TAO and OTTERCREEK handling access; S3117, S3142, OTTERCREEK, NSP and S313 handling decryption; and S2 handling evaluation and reporting. The VPN Working Group serves as the central coordination point across all these teams.\n\nThe XKEYSCORE section demonstrates the Full Log DNI search using vpn/* fingerprints, with a Metaviewer result showing 1,171 ESP and ISAKMP sessions from an Iranian-German IP pair, and a second result for a target system designated CREAKSTILE_HW_PK collected from SIGAD UKC-302A showing 298 IKEv1 sessions across two case notations. The HW component of the name likely refers to hardware-accelerated decryption — consistent with the broader VALIANTSURF/CAVIUM hardware acceleration programme described in other documents in this release — while PK is the ISO country code for Pakistan, suggesting CREAKSTILE_HW_PK is a sustained hardware-accelerated VPN decryption thread targeting a Pakistani-designated system, though the country fields in the results are redacted.\n\nThe DISCOROUTE section is particularly significant, showing the Network Knowledge Base DiscoRoute interface containing router configuration files collected through both passive interception and TAO active hacking. Two operational examples are shown. The first reveals a Huawei router configuration with IKE peer settings showing the pre-shared key \"Key4Cuba-A6\" in plaintext, using 3DES-CBC encryption in aggressive mode. The pre-shared key name \"Key4Cuba-A6\" may point to a Cuban VPN endpoint. The second shows multiple Cisco routers associated with UNAMI — the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq — collected from SIGAD UKC-125W. Several hostnames point explicitly to Kuwait: kuw-hub and r-unami-kuw-isp contain \"kuw\" (and VPN02-UNAMI-K ends in \"K\"), strongly suggesting Kuwait-based UNAMI infrastructure, while other hostnames including bdr01-unami-kir may reference Iraqi locations (such as Kirkuk) consistent with UNAMI's operational footprint. Router banner text confirms \"UNAMI — Authorized Personnel Only,\" making this a direct and unreported instance of NSA surveillance of United Nations mission infrastructure.",
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"tags": [
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"OTTERCREEK",
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"S31244",
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"VPN exploitation",
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"VPN decryption",
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"SIGDEV",
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"IPSec",
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"IKE",
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"ESP",
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"PPTP",
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"SSL",
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"pre-shared key",
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"router configuration",
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"Tailored Access Operations",
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"network security",
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"VPN Working Group",
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"S3112",
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"S3117",
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"S3142",
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"S313",
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"NAC",
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"NSP",
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"UNAMI",
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"united nations",
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"Huawei",
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"Cisco",
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"passive collection",
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"active collection",
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"network knowledge",
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"workflow",
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"intelligence infrastructure",
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"key recovery",
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"sustained exploitation",
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"surveillance architecture"
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],
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"document": {
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"creator": "NSA",
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"date_created": "",
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"classification": [
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"TOP SECRET",
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"COMINT"
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],
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"dissemination": [
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"REL TO USA, FVEY"
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],
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"banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL",
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"genre": "slides",
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"programs": [
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"BLEAKINQUIRY",
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"DISCOROUTE",
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"TOYGRIPPE",
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"MARINA",
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"MASTERSHAKE",
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"NKB",
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"PINWALE",
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"RENOIR",
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"TREASUREMAP",
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"TUNINGFORK",
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"XKEYSCORE",
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"GOLDPOINT",
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"PILBEAM",
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"RADIUS",
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"CREAKSTILE",
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"MAILORDER",
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"NKB",
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"MASTERSHAKE",
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"ROADBED",
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"BLEAKINQUIRY",
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"PINWALE",
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"MARINA",
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"DROPBOX",
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"PPF"
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],
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"countries": [
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"Iran",
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"Germany",
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"United Arab Emirates",
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"Cuba",
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"Iraq",
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"Pakistan",
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"Kuwait"
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],
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"people": []
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},
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"publication": [
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{
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"publisher": "Der Spiegel",
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"date_published": "2014-12-28",
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"title": "Prying Eyes: Inside the NSA's War on Internet Security",
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"link": "https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/inside-the-nsa-s-war-on-internet-security-a-1010361.html",
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"reporters": [
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"Appelbaum, Jacob",
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"Gibson, Aaron",
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"Grothoff, Christian",
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"Müller-Maguhn, Andy",
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"Poitras, Laura",
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"Sontheimer, Michael",
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"Stöcker, Christian"
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],
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"contributors": [],
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"doc_url": "https://cdn.prod.www.spiegel.de/media/0e5f7e7e-0001-0014-0000-000000035520/media-35520.pdf"
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}
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],
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"pdf_sha256": "950e3014ea368e740b45c4f59377131365a3e0e3a217516cf669b885b01cba6b",
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"pages": 30
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}
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