70 lines
5 KiB
JSON
70 lines
5 KiB
JSON
{
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"title": "TURMOIL IPSEC VPN SESSIONIZATION",
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"type": "REPORTED",
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"description": "An NSA technical specification document describing how TURMOIL detects and sessionizes IPSec VPN protocol traffic — covering the six IPSec protocol stacks targeted for collection, the specific keyword and bitmask patterns used by the Atomic Event Generator to identify each packet type at wire speed, and the sessionization parameters used to group related packets into coherent sessions for downstream processing.",
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"long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY technical specification dated August 2008, published by Der Spiegel under the German title \"Technische Erläuterung, wie TURMOIL die IPsec Datenpakete von VPN Netzen abzweigt und angreift\" (\"Technical explanation of how TURMOIL intercepts and attacks IPSec data packets from VPN networks\"). The document defines the detection and sessionization requirements for six IPSec protocol stacks within TURMOIL's Packet Processing Framework.\n\nThe six protocol stacks covered are IP/ESP, IP/AH/ESP, IP/UDP/ISAKMP, IP/UDP/nulls/ISAKMP, IP/TCP/ISAKMP, and IP/TCP/nulls/ISAKMP. For each stack the document provides three things: the exact hexadecimal keyword and bitmask pair loaded into the First Stage Packet Filter by the Atomic Event Generator for detection, the set of packet fields used for sessionization, and an annotated packet header diagram showing which fields are used.\n\nFor ESP detection, TURMOIL uses a keyword matching IPv4 packets with IP Next Protocol = 0x32 (ESP) and ESP Sequence Number = 5, implementing a 1/16 sampling rate on ESP traffic to manage processing load — only every sixteenth ESP packet is selected for the AEG, with sessionization based on source IP, destination IP and ESP Security Parameter Index. For AH/ESP detection, packets must match both IP Next Protocol = 0x33 (AH) and AH Next Payload = 0x32 (ESP), with sessionization on both AH SPI and ESP SPI. The document notes that the DFCE does not currently recognise AH as a valid transport layer and that fixing this would be difficult, with a proposed workaround using application-specific demux components within the Transform Engine.\n\nFor IKE detection across UDP and TCP variants, the keywords match ISAKMP version fields (0x10 for version 1.0, with separate keywords for the non-standard version 9.9), along with Next Payload, Exchange Type and Flags field ranges and a packet length constraint of under 64KB. The nulls variants cover the common NAT traversal case where four null bytes are inserted between the UDP or TCP header and the ISAKMP payload. IKE sessionization in all variants uses source IP, destination IP, source port and destination port rather than ISAKMP-specific fields.\n\nThe summary table confirms that the FIP at the time of writing already handled UDP, TCP and ESP sessionization, while AH/ESP support required new development — specifically changes to both the FIP to recognise AH as a valid layer and the DFCE to pass those packets through. The document proposes application-specific demux components inserted into the Transform Engine as the longer-term solution for sessionization beyond the transport layer.\n\nTaken together this document provides the most technically granular published account of exactly how TURMOIL identifies VPN traffic at wire speed — showing the specific binary patterns used to pick IPSec packets out of bulk internet traffic before any higher-level processing begins.",
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"tags": [
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"IPSec",
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"VPN decryption",
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"VPN exploitation",
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"sessionization",
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"ESP",
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"IKE",
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"ISAKMP",
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"packet analysis",
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"keyword scanning",
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"bitmask",
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"FSPF",
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"First Stage Packet Filter",
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"FIP",
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"Fast IP Processor",
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"DFCE",
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"PPF",
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"packet processing",
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"Transform Engine",
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"demux",
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"NAT"
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],
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"document": {
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"creator": "NSA",
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"date_created": "2008-08-15",
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"classification": [
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"TOP SECRET",
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"COMINT"
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],
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"dissemination": [
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"REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL"
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],
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"banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20291123",
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"genre": "manual",
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"programs": [
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"TURMOIL",
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"AEG",
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"FIP",
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"PPF"
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],
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"countries": [],
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"people": []
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},
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"publication": [
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{
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"publisher": "Der Spiegel",
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"date_published": "2014-12-28",
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"title": "Prying Eyes: Inside the NSA's War on Internet Security",
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"link": "https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/inside-the-nsa-s-war-on-internet-security-a-1010361.html",
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"reporters": [
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"Appelbaum, Jacob",
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"Gibson, Aaron",
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"Grothoff, Christian",
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"Müller-Maguhn, Andy",
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"Poitras, Laura",
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"Sontheimer, Michael",
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"Stöcker, Christian"
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],
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"contributors": [],
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"doc_url": "https://cdn.prod.www.spiegel.de/media/0084f64c-0001-0014-0000-000000035528/media-35528.pdf"
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}
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],
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"pdf_sha256": "aeada037c8b18a7a81a1a15a3f7ba166100c883f0b8322e5de5cd6cb7a1145e9",
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"pages": 18
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}
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