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{
"title": "Using XKEYSCORE to Enable TAO",
"type": "REPORTED",
"description": "A TOP SECRET training presentation from 2009, authored by a Booz Allen Hamilton contractor, teaching NSA analysts how to use XKeyscore to harvest the login credentials, router configurations, browser versions and server software details that the Tailored Access Operations hacking unit needs to break into foreign computer networks — with worked examples stealing Cisco router passwords, Iranian government webmail logins and jihadi web forum credentials directly from intercepted internet traffic.",
"long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL training presentation dated 16 July 2009, authored by a Booz Allen Hamilton SDS analyst from NSA's S2 analytical division, published by The Intercept as part of the XKeyscore document release. The presentation teaches S2 intelligence analysts how to use XKeyscore queries to extract information that TAO needs to conduct computer network exploitation — effectively showing how passive bulk internet collection directly enables offensive hacking operations.\n\nThe presentation defines four categories of information TAO requires from analysts: network information (login credentials and router configurations), software information (browser types, version numbers and operating systems), server information (web server software and versions) and target device connectivity details. A critical note warns that if a target device is under a satellite hop, the analyst should consult their TAO liaison before proceeding. The presentation explicitly instructs analysts never to use discovered credentials to log in as a target themselves — credentials must be recorded and passed to TAO.\n\nThe telnet exploitation section is the most technically detailed. Three types of telnet traffic are targeted using different XKeyscore queries. \"Banner grabbing\" uses Full Log DNI queries from port 23 and the target's IP address to capture the welcome messages that routers and servers broadcast when a telnet connection is established, revealing equipment manufacturer, model, software version and sometimes default credentials. The live examples show a Cisco SDM router in Saudi Arabia broadcasting its default username and password (\"cisco\"/\"cisco\") in plaintext, a Huawei IAD2000 Integrated Access Device in Cuba, a ZTE Full Service Access Platform also in Cuba, and another Huawei device in Cuba — all captured from Chinese IP addresses connecting to Cuban infrastructure. The login/password capture section uses Logins and Passwords queries targeting port 23 traffic to the target IP, with a live example showing a session from Yemen to China capturing FTP credentials (USER 123, PASS 321) and a file retrieval command for \"1.exe.\" The router configuration section uses Full Log DNI queries from port 23 with a minimum data length of 500 bytes — ensuring only substantive configuration dumps are returned — with a live example showing a complete Cisco IOS router configuration extracted from Iranian MOIS (Ministry of Intelligence and Security) infrastructure, including interface configurations and serial port settings. The annotation reads: \"Thanks for the router config — TAO.\"\n\nThe browser identification section demonstrates using HTTP Activity queries to profile visitors to websites of intelligence interest. One worked example targets visitors to known jihadi web forums — hanein.info, ansar1.net, ansarnet.info and others — with a country filter explicitly excluding Five Eyes nations (!US AND !GB AND !CA AND !NZ AND !AU), annotated with a smiley face and the word \"Foreign :)\". The results show visitors from Djibouti, Somalia, Pakistan, Austria, Indonesia, Lebanon and other countries with their full user-agent strings, enabling TAO to identify which browsers and operating systems to develop exploits against. A second example targets visitors to Iranian government websites (*.gov.ir) including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Industries, and health ministry domains, with visitors observed from China, UAE, Philippines, Japan, Iraq, Germany, Switzerland, Egypt and Pakistan — demonstrating that browser profiling was being conducted against visitors to government infrastructure, not just extremist forums. Mobile browser identification is highlighted as particularly valuable because Nokia Symbian user-agents include exact phone models, creating IMEI correlation opportunities.\n\nThe web forum and webmail login sections demonstrate credential harvesting at scale. Forum logins are captured by querying the Logins and Passwords search against known jihadi forum domains (moqawmh.com, al-shouraa.com, alhur) with Five Eyes country exclusion. A live example shows a vBulletin registration form captured from ashiyane.org — an Iranian security forum — with username, password, email address and security token all visible in plaintext. The webmail section targets Iranian government webmail users on *.gov.ir domains across ports 80, 3000 and 8080, with country filters for Iran, Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and South Africa. Port 3000 is specifically highlighted as carrying XDaemon webmail traffic. Live examples show Iranian MFA visa system credentials captured in cookie fields from a session transiting Guinea, Chinese 126.com webmail logins captured via Coremail webmail, and XDaemon credentials from Chinese users accessing Cuban-hosted mail servers. The presentation notes that webmail credentials are valuable not just for masquerading as the user but potentially for gaining full access to the web server itself — the secondary and more valuable use case for TAO.\n\nThe server identification section completes the intelligence cycle by showing how HTTP response traffic reveals web server software versions — Apache, IIS, PHP versions, SSL modules and operating systems — that TAO can match against known exploits. The worked example queries response traffic from Iranian MOIS IP ranges to catalogue all server software running on their network.\n\nThe document is significant because it's a detailed demonstration of the direct operational pipeline from passive bulk collection to offensive hacking enablement — showing that XKeyscore served not only as a retrospective analysis tool but as an active reconnaissance platform feeding TAO's targeting cycle. The Booz Allen Hamilton authorship — the same contractor firm that employed Edward Snowden — confirms that private contractors were developing and delivering training on offensive intelligence collection techniques. The Five Eyes country exclusion filter (\"Foreign :)\" with smiley face) appearing in many query demonstrates the USSID-18 compliance mechanism in practice while simultaneously illustrating its limitations — the filter is a voluntary analyst step, not a technical enforcement mechanism.",
"tags": [
"Tailored Access Operations",
"Booz Allen Hamilton",
"banner grabbing",
"telnet",
"FTP",
"router configuration",
"Cisco",
"Huawei",
"ZTE",
"login credentials",
"passwords",
"browser fingerprinting",
"User-Agent",
"HTTP Activity",
"server mapping",
"Apache",
"vBulletin",
"XDaemon",
"Coremail",
"MOIS",
"gov.ir",
"MFA",
"web forums",
"Computer Network Exploitation",
"USSID-18",
"Nokia",
"Symbian"
],
"document": {
"creator": "NSA",
"date_created": "2009-07-16",
"classification": [
"TOP SECRET",
"COMINT"
],
"dissemination": [
"REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL"
],
"banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20291123",
"genre": "slides",
"programs": [
"XKEYSCORE",
"UIS",
"AIRGAP"
],
"countries": [
"Saudi Arabia",
"Lebanon",
"China",
"Cuba",
"Yemen",
"Iran",
"Germany",
"Pakistan",
"Djibouti",
"Somalia",
"Austria",
"Indonesia",
"Malaysia",
"Philippines",
"United Arab Emirates",
"Japan",
"Mexico",
"South Korea",
"France",
"Netherlands",
"Italy",
"Egypt",
"Russia",
"Brazil",
"Venezuela",
"Colombia",
"Kuwait",
"South Africa",
"Guinea"
],
"people": []
},
"publication": [
{
"publisher": "The Intercept",
"date_published": "2015-07-01",
"title": "XKEYSCORE: NSA’s Google for the World’s Private Communications",
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2015/07/01/nsas-google-worlds-private-communications/",
"reporters": [
"Marquis-Boire, Morgan",
"Greenwald, Glenn",
"Lee, Micah"
],
"contributors": [],
"doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2015/07/01/using-xks-enable-tao/",
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2116255/using-xks-to-enable-tao.pdf"
}
],
"aka_id": [],
"pdf_sha256": "d33efaa2e364be1a4fb85e67d68fcdd5ff7f92947cf0fa77e8a533ff37bce813",
"pages": 47
}