151 lines
10 KiB
JSON
151 lines
10 KiB
JSON
{
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"title": "EP-3E Collision: Cryptologic Damage Assessment and Incident Review",
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"type": "REPORTED",
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"description": "A joint US Navy and NSA report from July 2001, prepared three months after a US spy plane was forced to land in China, assessing how far surveillance sources and methods were compromised and reviewing the emergency destruction that failed to prevent it. Damage to tactical SIGINT against the PRC is rated medium and overall SIGINT damage low, with the greatest loss the LUNCHBOX PROFORMA processor and MARTES signals analysis tools; COMSEC damage is rated low because keying material was superseded within 15 hours.",
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"long_description": "On 1 April 2001 a PRC F-8-II collided with a US Navy EP-3E (Bureau Number 156511) over the South China Sea on SRO track 5Q2002, about 70nm southeast of Hainan Island. The report fixes the sequence to the minute: collision at 0105Z at position 1735N 11055E, MAYDAY at 0113Z, a no-flap landing at Lingshui at 0134Z, and the crew ordered to deplane at 0200Z. The Chief of Naval Operations and DIRNSA stood up the EP-3 Cryptologic Assessment Team on 27 April; this is its final report, delivered that July.\n\nThe report's central argument is doctrinal rather than operational. Information Assurance assumes from the day equipment is issued that it will eventually fall into enemy hands, and protects the key instead of the device; SIGINT rests on a “no compromise” principle that assumes sensitive material will be protected or destroyed before it is lost. That is why COMSEC damage came out low and SIGINT damage medium. The authors call the SIGINT approach a relic of “an era when SIGINT capabilities resided on hardware and in hardcopy versus today's world where increasingly these capabilities reside in software,” and argue for replacing destruction with safeguarding — encryption and rapid overwriting — as the governing goal.\n\nThe forensic conclusion is sharper than the destruction narrative suggests. The SCARAB computer carrying the LUNCHBOX PROFORMA processor and the laptop holding MARTES both came back with their hard drives shattered, but laboratory reenactment at the Aberdeen Test Center — instrumented, filmed, with the cabin furniture rebuilt — showed the crew's drops, stomps and axe blows could not have caused that damage. The report concludes the PRC copied the drives and then destroyed them. Two signals-processing circuit boards were missing from the returned LUNCHBOX, and the tape of 45 minutes of PRC Navy communications had been removed from its recorder. Counterintelligence specialists stripped the returned aircraft at Dobbins Air Reserve Base, removing over 500 pieces of equipment and inspecting roughly 300 for tampering; they found no implants, “although it is possible that an implant could have been undetectable.” The PRC had barely concealed its work — one component was remounted upside down and others left unscrewed — while elsewhere the reverse engineering of boards and chips was detectable only under a microscope.\n\nOn the specifics: LUNCHBOX could process 40 worldwide PROFORMA signals and carried detailed working aids for 29 of them, along with the HUNTER and PREDATOR UAV datalinks and the JASSM seeker datalink. MARTES was COMINT version 1999.0.2 and shipped with source code, tutorials, real intercept samples and the RASIN manual — together “a comprehensive overview of how the U.S. Cryptologic System exploits an adversary's signal environment.” Among the 23 compromised USSIDs, 5511 governs NICKELBACK, the COMINT advisory conditions passed to reconnaissance aircraft; its loss raised the prospect of the PRC feeding the SIGINT system false information so that advisory conditions issued to mission aircraft would be wrong, though the report judges actual spoofing “extremely unlikely, since it would require the PRC to have both U.S. communications gear and daily crypto.”\n\nAppendix C records what NSA's Office of Foreign Relations decided to tell each partner, and the decisions are as revealing as the losses. Taiwan, Japan and South Korea were to be briefed because those relationships are classified in their own countries — the fact of the Taiwan relationship is itself TOP SECRET//COMINT. The appendix also attaches the releasability caveats to the partners they protect: South Korea is KAMPUS, SETTEE and SEABOOT, Japan is RORIPA, and the airborne reconnaissance sharing programmes are NIMROD with the United Kingdom and Project ARIEL with Japan. Thailand was deliberately not told that the EP-3 missions staging from its territory had been compromised, “because of the newness of the current partner leadership and the tenuous political situation in Thailand,” and neither India nor Pakistan was to learn that those flights targeted their communications; in-country NSA representatives were briefed “but not the partner governments.” Each item carries a contingency line: “If leaked, the Office of Foreign Relations recommends that a position of not commenting on the details of US intelligence activities be maintained.”\n\nThe institutional findings go beyond the destruction itself. Inside the aircraft, helmets acoustically isolated the crew and the public address system was unintelligible over the damage noise; the SEVAL's helmet microphone failed and he sent a runner to the cockpit; crew aft of the navigation station unplugged from the intercom so they could move while destroying material, so nobody heard the decision to land, and many realised the aircraft was landing rather than ditching only when they saw land or heard the gear. The COMEVAL, assuming a ditching, chose not to jettison COMINT material and told neither the SEVAL nor the Mission Commander, who left the aircraft believing only scraps remained and ordered no sweep. The debriefing was then compressed to 42 hours against JPRA's recommended 72 because of the crew's pre-Easter release, with no follow-up for over thirty days, by which point “accuracy of the individual accounts of events had degraded”; the assessment team was not formed for 26 days, and no guidance documents or directives existed for conducting an intelligence-compromise damage assessment at all. Separately, the Secretary of Defense restricted the transcript of the exchange between the PRC intercept controller and the surviving fighter pilot to selected Pentagon and CIA officials; the Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence had specifically requested it and was not added to the list, which “fostered a perception that NSA was holding back key intelligence.” Appendix G sets the EP-3E against every other tactical SIGINT platform the team visited — AFSOC operators destroy drives with a 9mm handgun or an axe and carry working aids on water-soluble paper, Army and Marine teams use thermite grenades, submarines carry sledgehammers, and the RC-135 runs a software disk-overwrite — against which the EP-3E had one dull 16-inch fire axe. The report closes with 62 recommendations, each assigned to a named action agency, and the judgement that failing to address these issues decisively “will not just continue the likelihood of future losses, it will guarantee it.”",
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"tags": [
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"damage assessment",
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"emergency destruction",
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"surveillance aircraft",
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"reconnaissance",
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"Sensitive Reconnaissance Operations",
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"aircraft collision",
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"South China Sea",
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"Hainan Island",
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"Lingshui Airfield",
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"COMSEC",
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"cryptography",
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"keying material",
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"signals intelligence",
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"signals analysis",
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"traffic analysis",
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"counterintelligence",
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"crisis response",
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"classified information",
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"crew training",
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"submarines",
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"radar",
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"Kunia",
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"Five Eyes",
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"foreign partners",
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"reverse engineering",
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"espionage",
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"GPS",
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"Taiwan",
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"data destruction",
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"PROFORMA",
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"ELINT",
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"USSID",
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"detention",
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"aviation"
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],
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"document": {
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"creator": "NSA",
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"date_created": "2001-07",
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"classification": [
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"TOP SECRET",
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"COMINT"
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],
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"dissemination": [
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"NOFORN"
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],
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"banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//X1",
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"genre": "report",
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"programs": [
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"LUNCHBOX",
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"MARTES",
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"NICKELBACK",
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"SENSOR PACER",
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"PROFORMA",
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"HULTEC",
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"STRUM",
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"TEXTA",
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"RASIN",
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"CRITIC",
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"KLIEGLIGHT",
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"XBIT",
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"BLACKMAGIC",
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"NOIWON",
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"ZIRCON",
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"MIDB",
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"EOB-LITE",
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"NIMROD",
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"ARIEL",
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"COBRA BALL",
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"COMBAT SENT",
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"RIVET JOINT",
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"SEABOOT",
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"SETTEE",
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"KAMPUS",
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"DRUID",
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"RORIPA",
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"MARKHAM",
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"FOREJUDGE",
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"SAM HEARTBURN",
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"NOVELETTE",
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"RSBN",
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"BEGGAR HAWK",
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"BEGGAR SHADOW",
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"CAPSULE JACK",
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"DISTANT WIND",
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"DISTANT SENT",
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"CHILING",
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"RIBBED",
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"UNACCENTED",
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"SLIPSTICK",
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"SIERRA ONE"
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],
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"countries": [
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"Australia",
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"Belarus",
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"Cambodia",
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"Canada",
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"China",
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"Cuba",
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"Egypt",
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"Georgia",
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"India",
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"Iran",
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"Iraq",
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"Italy",
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"Japan",
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"Malaysia",
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"New Zealand",
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"North Korea",
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"Norway",
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"Pakistan",
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"Philippines",
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"Russia",
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"South Korea",
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"Sri Lanka",
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"Taiwan",
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"Thailand",
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"Ukraine",
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"United Kingdom",
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"United States",
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"Vietnam",
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"Hong Kong",
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"Soviet Union"
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],
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"people": [
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"Meals, Charlie"
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]
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},
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"publication": [
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{
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"publisher": "The Intercept",
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"date_published": "2017-04-10",
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"title": "Burn After Reading",
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"link": "https://theintercept.com/2017/04/10/snowden-documents-reveal-scope-of-secrets-exposed-to-china-in-2001-spy-plane-incident/",
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"reporters": [
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"Zetter, Kim"
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],
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"contributors": [],
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"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/3546567/10th-Anniversary-Edition-EP-3-Damage-Assessment.pdf"
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}
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],
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"aka_id": [],
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"archive_comment": "Typos in the document: USSID 205 is given as STRUM on one page and SRUM on the next, NICKELBACK is spelled NICKLEBACK in three places in Appendix B, and several portion markings read (U/FOUO) with a single slash.",
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"pdf_sha256": "84c41ed71a524306c6bad8839609141ecb7655ada2feb2e3a924ade24da67d4b",
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"pages": 117
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}
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