84 lines
4.4 KiB
JSON
84 lines
4.4 KiB
JSON
{
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"title": "Intrusion Analysis – GCHQ",
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"type": "REPORTED",
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"description": "An internal GCHQ write-up defines the Intrusion Analysis team’s remit inside the Joint Electronic Attack Cell: all‑source analysis of emerging and active electronic attacks, stewardship of electronic attack signatures, and SIGINT‑driven targeting under EITT oversight. It details sources, reporting channels, legal authorities, and auditing controls that govern how signatures are deployed and how selectors are managed.",
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"long_description": "The Intrusion Analysis (IA) team sits within the Joint Electronic Attack Cell (JeAC) alongside EITT, JTRIG, and the EA Threat Team. Its mission is to analyze current and emerging electronic attack types, manage and release electronic attack (eA) signatures, and conduct SIGINT targeting subject to EITT oversight. Inputs span SIGINT collection, HARUSPEX sensors, MessageLabs data, tasking of computer network exploitation (CNE), and open sources. HARUSPEX monitors UK systems using known attack signatures tied to vectors, infrastructure, or entity identifiers; because foreign actors can stage from UK infrastructure, the write‑up acknowledges that UK‑to‑UK traffic may be collected, with “appropriate SIGINT processes” applied. Selectors include IPs, domains, and email addresses, and results are disseminated as standard JeAC EPRs via PROSPERO.\n\nGovernance and compliance are structured around specific legal authorities and audit mechanisms. CNE actions require ISA authorisation with section 5 or section 7 warrants depending on target location; use of SIGINT is under Part I of RIPA with all normal ops rules, while HARUSPEX information is said to be lawfully acquired under LBPR. EITT directs SIGINT use for eA, maintains formal audits, and enforces HRA checks so selectors age off unless re‑validated. The team keeps a local spreadsheet of roughly 1,500 signatures annotated for nationality, release status, and false‑positive rates, controlled by a signature release policy for deployment to HARUSPEX and external release. Notably, EITT is working with OPPLEG on eA‑specific CNE authorisations “to allow the targeting of UK‑based victims,” underscoring the sensitivity of domestic collection and warrant pathways. Selector management happens in CORINTH, reporting flows through PROSPERO, and oversight references two MIRANDA numbers tied to JIC requirements for current and emerging threats.",
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"tags": [
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"Intrusion Analysis",
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"Joint Electronic Attack Cell",
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"electronic attack",
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"signature development",
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"signature release policy",
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"HARUSPEX sensors",
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"MessageLabs data",
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"SIGINT targeting",
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"EITT oversight",
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"JTRIG",
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"EA Threat Team",
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"CNE tasking",
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"Computer Network Exploitation",
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"selectors",
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"IP addresses",
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"domain selectors",
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"email selectors",
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"PROSPERO reporting",
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"MIRANDA numbers",
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"JIC",
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"LBPR authority",
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"ISA section 5",
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"ISA section 7",
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"RIPA Part I",
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"OPPLEG authorisations",
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"domestic targeting controls",
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"foreign intelligence services",
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"attack vectors",
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"infrastructure mapping",
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"false positive rate management",
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"audit",
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"selector management",
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"reporting",
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"dissemination",
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"all-source analysis",
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"incident response",
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"threat detection",
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"data fusion",
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"oversight",
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"authorization"
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],
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"document": {
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"creator": "GCHQ",
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"date_created": "",
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"classification": [
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"SECRET",
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"STRAP 1"
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],
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"dissemination": [],
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"banner": "SECRET STRAP1",
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"genre": "report",
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"programs": [
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"HARUSPEX",
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"JTRIG",
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"PROSPERO",
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"CORINTH"
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],
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"countries": [],
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"people": []
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},
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"publication": [
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{
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"publisher": "The Intercept",
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"date_published": "2015-06-22",
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"title": "Spies Hacked Computers Thanks to Sweeping Secret Warrants, Aggressively Stretching U.K. Law",
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"link": "https://theintercept.com/2015/06/22/gchq-reverse-engineering-warrants/",
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"reporters": [
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"Fishman, Andrew",
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"Greenwald, Glenn"
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],
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"contributors": [],
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"doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2015/06/22/intrusion-analysis-gchq/",
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"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2106822/intrusion-analysis-gchq.pdf"
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}
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],
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"pdf_sha256": "9adf42a463af40657f79b6d960068c9df73ad81a0b967b4cbef1cdb9e57c4ca8",
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"pages": 2
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}
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