61 lines
6.6 KiB
JSON
61 lines
6.6 KiB
JSON
{
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"title": "Kaspersky User-Agent Strings",
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"type": "REPORTED",
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"description": "This September 2008 NSA technical report reveals that the agency discovered Kaspersky antivirus software's user-agent strings contain encoded serial numbers and can function as unique machine identifiers, allowing tracking of individual computers running the Russian security software across intercepted network traffic collected through the YACHTSHOP surveillance program.",
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"long_description": "The document is a draft technical SIGINT report written at the Institute for Defense Analyses' Center for Communications Research in Princeton (IDA/CCR-P) and reviewed at its Center for Computing Sciences (IDA/CCS), analyzing user-agent strings transmitted by Kaspersky antivirus products when checking for updates. The research was initiated at SCAMP 2008 (presumably a cryptanalysis conference) at IDA's Princeton facility and utilized YACHTSHOP metadata records along with open-source information from Google searches. The analysis focuses on three Kaspersky products: Kaspersky Internet Security (KIS), Kaspersky Anti-Virus (KAV), and Kaspersky Mobile Security (KMS), noting that Kaspersky Lab is a privately held company headquartered in Moscow with regional offices elsewhere and that its products are \"quite popular in some parts of the world.\"\n\nThe report identifies three types of Kaspersky user-agent strings, with Type 3 being the most informative: it consists of multiple fields using base64-like encoding with characters [A-Za-z0-9-_], where the last 12 characters encode the version number (ranging from 6.0.2.614 to 8.0.0.357 in the dataset) and earlier fields contain encoded information about the installation. The NSA analysts discovered that Kaspersky clients send update requests to servers like dnl-r01.kaspersky-labs.com and dnl-us5.kaspersky-labs.com at regular intervals—typically every 20, 40, 120, or 140 minutes when machines are online—using these distinctive user-agent strings. Each update session begins with requests for index pages (/index/u0607g.xml.dif or /index/rt60.xml.klz) followed by requests for specific update files covering blacklists, intrusion detection signatures, antivirus definitions, and software patches.\n\nThrough detailed cryptanalytic work, the NSA reverse-engineered the encoding scheme: each field represents a base32-encoded number with flag bits indicating field boundaries, and the order of characters within fields must be reversed to obtain the actual values. The critical discovery is that fields two, three, and four encode the Kaspersky serial number. The analysts verified this by comparing parsed user-agent strings against serial numbers found posted on the Internet (from pirated or trial versions), finding exact or near-exact matches. For example, the user-agent string parsing to \"Dp Bk- Dp fj5m H47w\" converts to hexadecimal values 00000069 0000049e 00000069 000f8f26 0003e370, which matches the documented serial number 049e-000069-000f8f26. Field one correlates with version numbers and possibly activation dates, field five appears to be a random value up to 2^18, and field six functions as a counter that increments with each update check—ticking up by 30-34 (mod 63) for 20-minute intervals or by 24 or 39 (mod 64) for 120-140 minute intervals.\n\nThe report describes examining actual Kaspersky key files (with names like KI-KSS/00102CCB.key) which begin with the signature \"KLsw\" and contain structured records using type-length-value encoding. These key files store the serial number, license number, version number, a GUID (globally unique identifier), customer name, location, ISP information, email address, and base64-encoded key strings—potentially providing even more identifying information beyond the user-agent strings. The analysts note they observed various update file types identified by headers including APDB, AVZ, DIFF, DIFT, EK.8, KDC1, KL, KLBL, KLD2, KLZF, PK, SFDB, and SQZE, which contain base64-encoded strings though their purposes are not fully detailed. The report also documents activation keys being circulated on the Internet, either representing free trial keys or indicating the software has been cracked.\n\nThe conclusion explicitly states the intelligence value: \"It appears that the Kaspersky User-Agent string used to request updates is in general unique to the client, carries a coding for the serial number, and can be used for machine identification.\" This means the NSA can track individual computers across different network sessions, identify users who are using specific Kaspersky installations, and potentially correlate this tracking with other surveillance data. The distribution list reveals the report was shared across dozens of NSA divisions including cryptanalysis units (R1, R2, R21, R22, R23), SIGINT development (S3T, S31, S32), technology directorates (SSG1, SSG2), and all Five Eyes partners: CSE Canada (H4 and HIO divisions), DSD Australia, GCHQ UK (OPC-ALTO Technical Library and B13B division), and GCSB New Zealand. The classification marking TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL with declassification date of 20320108 (January 8, 2032) indicates the sensitivity of revealing NSA capabilities to fingerprint and track users of Russian security software.",
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"tags": [
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"user tracking",
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"User-Agent",
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"machine IDs",
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"technical analysis",
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"cryptanalysis",
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"encoding",
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"decoding",
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"customer identification",
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"ISP tracking",
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"activation keys",
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"pirated software",
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"metadata collection",
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"network traffic analysis",
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"antivirus",
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"personal security products"
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],
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"document": {
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"creator": "NSA",
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"date_created": "2008-09-01",
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"classification": [
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"TOP SECRET",
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"COMINT"
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],
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"dissemination": [
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"REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL"
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],
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"banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL",
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"genre": "report",
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"programs": [
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"YACHTSHOP",
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"B13B"
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],
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"countries": [
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"Russia"
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],
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"people": []
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},
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"publication": [
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{
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"publisher": "The Intercept",
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"date_published": "2015-06-22",
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"title": "Popular Security Software Came Under Relentless NSA and GCHQ Attacks",
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"link": "https://theintercept.com/2015/06/22/nsa-gchq-targeted-kaspersky/",
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"reporters": [
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"Fishman, Andrew",
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"Marquis-Boire, Morgan"
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],
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"contributors": [],
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"doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2015/06/22/kaspersky-user-agent-strings/",
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"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2106784/kaspersky-user-agent-strings-nsa.pdf"
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}
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],
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"pdf_sha256": "332a90aa41f4a622642affee58e0f0b2d4a2c2e752bb008556d683cc9a94c951",
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"pages": 14
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}
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