82 lines
5.6 KiB
JSON
82 lines
5.6 KiB
JSON
{
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"title": "TURMOIL/APEX/APEX High Level Description Document",
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"type": "REPORTED",
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"description": "NSA WikiInfo page providing the high-level design description of APEX — the Active-Passive Integration capability integrating HAMMERMILL router implants with TURMOIL passive collection — enabling real-time exfiltration of targeted VPN (HAMMERSTEIN) and VoIP (HAMMERCHANT) traffic from compromised routers directly into NSA's passive collection and cryptanalytic attack infrastructure, with TURBINE providing automated command and control of the combined active-passive system.",
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"long_description": "This is the NSA WikiInfo high-level description document for APEX, classified TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY and hosted on a system accredited to TOP SECRET//SI-GAMMA/TALENT KEYHOLE//ORCON/PROPIN/RELIDO/REL TO USA, FVEY. APEX represents one of the most architecturally significant capabilities described in the Snowden archive, bridging NSA's active hacking infrastructure — router implants — with its passive bulk cable collection infrastructure in a unified, dynamically controlled system.\n\nThe core insight of APEX is that router implants and passive cable taps are more powerful together than separately. HAMMERMILL is a family of router implant capabilities, with HAMMERSTEIN collecting IPSec VPN traffic and HAMMERCHANT collecting targeted VoIP calls from compromised routers. These implants exfiltrate traffic using the FASHIONCLEFT protocol to NSA's Common Data Receptor. APEX changes this architecture so that HAMMERMILL implants instead direct their exfiltrated traffic toward links monitored by TURMOIL passive collectors, where APEX components unwrap the FASHIONCLEFT protocol, reconstruct the original packets, and feed them into TURMOIL's existing processing pipeline as if they had been passively collected. This allows router-implanted traffic to benefit from TURMOIL's existing VPN decryption capabilities — including the PIQ blade that forwards IKE key exchanges to the CES Attack Orchestrator for key recovery — without requiring separate backend collection infrastructure for each implant.\n\nThe VPN capability is particularly detailed. TURMOIL's existing passive VPN processing already captures IKE key exchanges from cable taps, forwards targeted exchanges to the CES Attack Orchestrator, and buffers ESP encrypted traffic while waiting for recovered keys to decrypt it. APEX extends this to traffic exfiltrated from compromised routers, enabling the same decryption pipeline to operate on traffic that would otherwise be inaccessible to passive collection — for example VPN tunnels where TURMOIL can only see one side. The document explicitly notes that CES generally requires packets from both sides of an IKE exchange to recover keys, making the ability to capture both sides from a router implant — which sits in the traffic path — particularly valuable. VPN metadata flows to the TOYGRIPPE database via the METROTUBE analytics framework operating on PRESSUREWAVE, while decrypted content flows to corporate repositories.\n\nTURBINE provides the command and control layer, evolving through three phases from manual configuration through semi-automatic to fully dynamic targeting where TURMOIL can instruct HAMMERMILL in near-real-time to begin exfiltrating specific VPN flows based on KEYCARD target list matches — for example capturing a VPN's ESP traffic only after the IKE exchange reveals the endpoints are targeted.\n\nThe VoIP capability mirrors the VPN architecture, with HAMMERCHANT extracting call metadata and voice content from router-level SIP and H.323 signaling, delivering to PRESSUREWAVE and the FASCIA metadata database. Future phases would allow TURMOIL's VoIP processing to dynamically task HAMMERSTEIN to capture specific calls using 5-tuple port filters derived from passive signaling analysis.",
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"tags": [
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"CES",
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"IPSec",
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"IKE",
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"ESP",
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"VPNs",
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"VoIP",
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"SIP",
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"H.323",
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"RTP",
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"router implants",
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"active passive integration",
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"key recovery",
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"attack orchestration",
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"Tailored Access Operations",
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"VPN exploitation",
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"dynamic targeting",
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"covert implants"
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],
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"document": {
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"creator": "NSA",
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"date_created": "",
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"classification": [
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"TOP SECRET",
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"SI"
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],
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"dissemination": [
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"REL TO USA, FVEY"
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],
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"banner": "TOP SECRET//SI-GAMMA/TALENT KEYHOLE//ORCON/PROPIN/RELIDO/REL TO USA, FVEY",
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"genre": "wiki",
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"programs": [
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"TURMOIL",
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"APEX",
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"HAMMERMILL",
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"HAMMERCHANT",
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"HAMMERSTEIN",
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"FASHIONCLEFT",
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"TURBINE",
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"TOYGRIPPE",
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"METROTUBE",
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"CHIMNEYPOOL",
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"PIQBLADE",
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"KEYCARD",
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"FASCIA",
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"ISLANDTRANSPORT",
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"METROTUBE",
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"PRESSUREWAVE",
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"ASDF",
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"CONVEYANCE",
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"TURBULENCE"
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],
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"countries": [],
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"people": []
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},
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"publication": [
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{
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"publisher": "Der Spiegel",
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"date_published": "2014-12-28",
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"title": "Prying Eyes: Inside the NSA's War on Internet Security",
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"link": "https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/inside-the-nsa-s-war-on-internet-security-a-1010361.html",
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"reporters": [
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"Appelbaum, Jacob",
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"Gibson, Aaron",
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"Grothoff, Christian",
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"Müller-Maguhn, Andy",
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"Poitras, Laura",
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"Sontheimer, Michael",
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"Stöcker, Christian"
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],
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"contributors": [],
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"doc_url": "https://cdn.prod.www.spiegel.de/media/bc7b7c07-0001-0014-0000-000000035513/media-35513.pdf"
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}
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],
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"pdf_sha256": "33160bd4a728c2e204c4ff2e8573998b2b10099044a3b725b92c136c671510b0",
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"pages": 12
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}
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