snowchive-meta/data/spiegel_-_media-35526/metadata.json
2026-11-19 04:39:11 +02:00

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{
"title": "TURMOIL VPN PROCESSING",
"type": "REPORTED",
"description": "A TURMOIL VPN Processing technical briefing from October 2009 describing the full architecture for intercepting and decrypting IPSec VPN traffic within the TURMOIL passive collection platform — covering IKE/ESP protocol handling, five distinct data flow types, the Dell LPT hardware implementation, and live operational metrics showing over 8 million packets decrypted at Menwith Hill and 1.4 million at SMOKYSINK during a single week in October 2009.",
"long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY technical briefing dated 27 October 2009, published by Der Spiegel under the German title \"Verarbeitung von Daten aus angegriffenen VPN im TURMOIL Programm\" (\"Processing of data from attacked VPNs in the TURMOIL programme\"). The document provides a comprehensive technical overview of how TURMOIL intercepts, processes and decrypts IPSec VPN traffic, covering protocol fundamentals, customer requirements, data flow architectures, hardware implementation and live operational statistics.\n\nThe document opens with unclassified protocol background covering the four IPSec components TURMOIL targets: ISAKMP for key exchange framework, IKE for the key exchange mechanism itself, ESP for encrypted payload traffic, and AH for authentication and integrity. Packet header diagrams for IKE/ISAKMP (UDP port 500), ESP (IP protocol 50) and AH/ESP (IP protocol 51) are provided. A key operational constraint is stated explicitly: collection requires dwell time and link diversity because there is no guarantee that IKE and ESP traffic will traverse the same cable link — meaning a collection site may see the key exchange but not the encrypted payload, or vice versa, requiring multiple selectors targeting both external VPN tunnel IP addresses for decryption and internal IP addresses for content targeting.\nThe customer needs section maps four NSA organisations to their VPN intelligence requirements. SIGINT analysts (TOPI) need decrypted traffic for reporting. The Network Analysis Center (NAC) needs IKE and ESP metadata to identify target VPNs and report their IP addresses and links. The Office of Target Pursuit (OTP) needs metadata, encrypted surveys and unencrypted surveys to search for VPNs of intelligence value. The Systems Analysis Office (SAO) needs metadata, encrypted surveys and decryption quality data to identify VPN technologies and vulnerabilities.\n\nFive distinct data flow types are described, each serving different customer needs. The Metadata Dataflow provides full-take IKE/ISAKMP metadata and sampled ESP metadata (1/16th sampling rate) routed through TUBE, FALLOUT and EXOPUMP to TOYGRIPPE and PRESSUREWAVE. The Transform Dataflow decrypts selected VPN sessions and re-injects the recovered plaintext application sessions back into TURMOIL for standard selection and forwarding to TUBE, EXOPUMP and PRESSUREWAVE. The Survey Dataflow combines decryption with forwarding to XKEYSCORE, routing decrypted sessions to SIGDEV analysts for target development. The Analyze Dataflow captures raw encrypted IKE and ESP sessions without attempting decryption, forwarding them to PRESSUREWAVE via EXOPUMP for cryptanalytic analysis. The TransformQA Dataflow captures sessions that fail decryption using the POISONNUT-provided key, routing them for quality assurance investigation.\n\nThe Transform and Survey dataflow diagrams show the full component chain in detail: TURMOIL's PIQ Blade communicates with POISONNUT via ISLANDTRANSPORT with ISLANDHIDEAWAY encryption, sending IKE messages and ESP key requests and receiving decrypted session keys. The CES XML Gateway and CES Firewall mediate communications between TURMOIL and the CES enclave. GRAM (Grid Resource Allocation Manager) manages HPC resources for cryptanalytic processing, with CORAL REEF providing cryptovariable management. VPN Metrics are separately tracked.\n\nThe Dell LPT hardware implementation section shows a three-ENDACE-card architecture across two physical chassis, with POISONNUT handling IKE sessions and ESP key requests, PIQ Services performing decryption, and an IP Payload Decompressor and Packet Injector re-inserting recovered packets back into the TURMOIL Stage 1 pipeline via MBUS. A CCM/KEYCARD component handles IP address targeting for the re-injection stream.\n\nThe IKE metadata sequence diagram shows the detailed processing pipeline: raw IKE packets enter through FSPF keyword matching, pass through an AEG and DFID Allocator, proceed to IKE EventToBME for metadata extraction, through IKE SMG for sessionisation, to the ASDF Reporter, then via TUBE and FALLOUT to TOYGRIPPE.\n\nThe operational metrics section provides live statistics for the week of 14-22 October 2009 across four deployed systems. MHS_LIVE (Menwith Hill Station live system) processed 26,501 key requests, received 12,200 key responses, and decrypted 8,041,883 packets. SMK6 (SMOKYSINK) processed 43,087 key requests, received 4,755 responses, and decrypted 1,413,532 packets. MHS_DEV and MHS_LPT show zero key responses and zero packets decrypted, indicating development systems not yet in operational use. The SMK6 designation confirms this document was written contemporaneously with the SPIN 15 VPN Story document describing the SMOKYSINK deployment, with operational decryption already underway at that site by October 2009.\n\nTaken together this document is the most technically detailed published account of how TURMOIL's VPN decryption pipeline actually functions end to end — from passive interception of encrypted traffic at cable taps, through key recovery via POISONNUT, to re-injection of decrypted plaintext back into the collection stream for analyst access. The live metrics confirm the system was operational at scale at Menwith Hill and SMOKYSINK at the time of writing.",
"tags": [
"VPN exploitation",
"VPN decryption",
"CES",
"IPSec",
"IKE",
"ISAKMP",
"ESP",
"Dell LPT",
"T-16",
"Menwith Hill",
"MHS",
"NAC",
"Network Analysis Centre",
"OTP",
"Office of Target Pursuit",
"SAO",
"Systems Analysis Office",
"TOPI",
"SIGDEV",
"strong selectors",
"dwell time",
"link diversity",
"key recovery",
"packet reinjection",
"operational metrics",
"VPN metadata",
"full-take collection",
"surveillance architecture"
],
"document": {
"creator": "NSA",
"date_created": "2009-10-27",
"classification": [
"TOP SECRET",
"COMINT"
],
"dissemination": [
"REL TO USA, FVEY"
],
"banner": "TOPSECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY",
"genre": "slides",
"programs": [
"TURBULENCE",
"TURMOIL",
"EXOPUMP",
"TUBE",
"PRESSUREWAVE",
"METROTUBE",
"TOYGRIPPE",
"ISLANDTRANSPORT",
"MAILORDER",
"ASDF",
"FALLOUT",
"KEYCARD",
"PICARESQUE",
"POISONNUT",
"CORALREEF",
"XKEYSCORE",
"SMOKYSINK",
"ENDACE",
"FIP",
"PICARESQUE",
"PPF",
"AEG",
"PIQBLADE"
],
"countries": [],
"people": []
},
"publication": [
{
"publisher": "Der Spiegel",
"date_published": "2014-12-28",
"title": "Prying Eyes: Inside the NSA's War on Internet Security",
"link": "https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/inside-the-nsa-s-war-on-internet-security-a-1010361.html",
"reporters": [
"Appelbaum, Jacob",
"Gibson, Aaron",
"Grothoff, Christian",
"Müller-Maguhn, Andy",
"Poitras, Laura",
"Sontheimer, Michael",
"Stöcker, Christian"
],
"contributors": [],
"doc_url": "https://cdn.prod.www.spiegel.de/media/e73cdb4b-0001-0014-0000-000000035526/media-35526.pdf"
}
],
"aka_id": [],
"pdf_sha256": "c3002773957d4c8d6df7fa6210cec8f94b8403ad6fe1d2e85c8c9188fbd49cfb",
"pages": 20
}