84 lines
6.8 KiB
JSON
84 lines
6.8 KiB
JSON
{
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"title": "Net Defense from Encrypted Communications",
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"type": "REPORTED",
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"description": "A NSA Technology Directorate briefing from February 2012 describing BLUESNORT — a capability that repurposes GALLANTWAVE's SSL/TLS decryption pipeline for network defence, re-injecting decrypted traffic into TURMOIL Stage 1 Prime where BLUESNORT detects malware and other malicious activity — representing description of NSA using its own bulk decryption infrastructure for cyber defence as well as intelligence collection.",
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"long_description": "This is a SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY Technology Directorate briefing dated February 2012, published by Der Spiegel under the German title \"BLUESNORT - Ein Programm zur Entschlüsselung von Netzwerkverkehr, um Trojaner und andere Schadsoftware zu erkennen\" (\"BLUESNORT - A programme for decrypting network traffic to detect trojans and other malware\"). The document describes a three-component solution that integrates GALLANTWAVE's SSL/TLS decryption capability with BLUESNORT network intrusion detection for both SIGINT and network defence purposes.\n\nThe driving requirement is SYSREQ10322.2: \"TURMOIL shall reinject decrypted IP traffic into BLUESNORT for malicious network activity detection.\" The solution uses three components working together. First, a GALLANTWAVE application module supporting both network defence and SIGINT use cases, with dynamic targeting via UTT and static targeting file updates. Second, a GALLANTWAVE Reinjection application that takes the decrypted sessions produced by the CA Server and re-injects them into TURMOIL as packetized traffic for detection. Third, BLUESNORT running in TURMOIL Stage 1 Prime, which emits detection events off the decrypted, re-packetized, reinjected data.\n\nThe high level dataflow shows UTT providing targeting to GALLANTWAVE, which passes selected sessions to a CA Server communicating with LONGHAUL for key recovery. Decrypted sessions flow to the GALLANTWAVE Reinjection component which routes them both to XKEYSCORE for SIGINT purposes and to BLUESNORT for malware detection. PITBOSS provides signature updates to BLUESNORT. The Stage 1 Prime diagram shows BLUESNORT sitting alongside DNS Inspector, HIDDENSALAMANDER and other detection components processing the reinjected decrypted traffic, with outputs going to Events and Collect destinations.\n\nAt time of writing the capability was running on MHS DEV ESO T5 and T22 with Transform, Reinjection and Signature Hits confirmed, but signatures required further development to reduce false positives. NTOC was reviewing XKeyscore hits to generate new signatures. Key outstanding issues included ITx connectivity to LONGHAUL at network defence sites, NTOC requirements for separate development and live ITx fabric, hardware funding, firewall rule submissions, and SSH connectivity — with a short-term workaround using BLUEBOX CA Servers at the Pentagon.\n\nThe NCC-3 test event planning table shows CA Reinjection scheduled for two deployment targets in June 2012 and June 2013. DGO is listed as the SIGINT sensor target for June 2012. TTENT is listed as the defensive sensor target for June 2013. The significance of DGO as a deployment target is notable: NSA was planning to extend GALLANTWAVE SSL/TLS decryption and reinjection into DoD's own network infrastructure, meaning the same bulk decryption capability built for foreign intelligence collection was being deployed to detect malware in encrypted traffic on military networks. It should be noted that DGO is also used in other Snowden documents as the abbreviation for DANCINGOASIS (SIGAD US-3171), a separate SSO collection programme — the two uses of the abbreviation are unrelated.\n\nThe near-term schedule shows GALLANTWAVE Reinjection gates completed or in progress through May 2012, with initial live development testing at TURTLEZOO planned for approximately May 2012. The MAILORDER/NiFi (NIAGARAFILES) interface was not yet available, requiring manual static targeting file loading as a mitigation. The detailed architecture diagrams show the internal GALLANTWAVE component chain: GW-FIP, TE-GW, GW-SessionFilter, GW-FragmentFilter, GW-MI (MetadataInjector), GW-LoadManager, CoreSSC, GW-TargetManager and GW-SessionDistributor routing sessions to the CAServer and onward via XKS-Sessions interface to XKEYSCORE, and via the Desessionizer and Packet Injector to Stage 1 Prime.\n\nThe proposed TUTELAGE tasking flow diagram adds further context, showing CES and NTOC analysts using UTT to task network technology targets, with NiFi (NIAGARAFILES) instances at both corporate and NTOC levels passing IP tasking files through NTOC FIREWALL, with SSDM handling local data distribution at the TURMOIL site alongside NiFi Local.\nTaken together the document describes a dual-use architecture where NSA's SSL/TLS bulk decryption capability — built primarily for SIGINT collection — was being extended to serve as a network defence sensor, allowing NTOC to detect malware in encrypted traffic that would otherwise be opaque to intrusion detection systems.",
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"tags": [
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"Technology Directorate",
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"network defense",
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"malware detection",
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"intrusion detection",
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"SSL decryption",
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"re-injection",
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"dual use",
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"SIGINT enabling"
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],
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"document": {
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"creator": "NSA",
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"date_created": "2012-02-01",
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"classification": [
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"TOP SECRET",
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"SI"
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],
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"dissemination": [
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"REL TO USA, FVEY"
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],
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"banner": "TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY",
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"genre": "slides",
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"programs": [
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"TURMOIL",
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"BLUESNORT",
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"GALLANTWAVE",
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"UTT",
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"XKEYSCORE",
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"PITBOSS",
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"LONGHAUL",
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"NIAGARAFILES",
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"BLUEBOX",
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"MAILORDER",
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"TURTLEZOO",
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"ISLANDTRANSPORT",
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"NETFLOW",
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"FULLSNORT",
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"POPQUIZ",
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"CLOUDSHIELD",
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"TUMULT",
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"TUTELAGE",
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"HIDDENSALAMANDER",
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"ASDF",
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"TUIC",
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"BLUESNORT",
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"HIDDENSALAMANDER",
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"TUIC",
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"ISLANDTRANSPORT",
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"SSDM",
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"CORESSC",
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"TTENT",
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"FIP",
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"PPF"
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],
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"countries": [],
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"people": []
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},
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"publication": [
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{
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"publisher": "Der Spiegel",
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"date_published": "2014-12-28",
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"title": "Prying Eyes: Inside the NSA's War on Internet Security",
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"link": "https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/inside-the-nsa-s-war-on-internet-security-a-1010361.html",
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"reporters": [
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"Appelbaum, Jacob",
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"Gibson, Aaron",
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"Grothoff, Christian",
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"Müller-Maguhn, Andy",
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"Poitras, Laura",
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"Sontheimer, Michael",
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"Stöcker, Christian"
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],
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"contributors": [],
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"doc_url": "https://cdn.prod.www.spiegel.de/media/10298b26-0001-0014-0000-000000035534/media-35534.pdf"
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}
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],
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"pdf_sha256": "4bc901d64e3ece9cc32ff3ebbadcb555e1057a4f5e8a690c8196045340028035",
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"pages": 16
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}
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