snowchive-meta/data/xks-for-counter-cne/metadata.json
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{
"title": "XKEYSCORE for Counter-CNE",
"type": "REPORTED",
"description": "A TOP SECRET presentation from March 2011 describing how NSA uses XKeyscore for counter-CNE — detecting and exploiting foreign hacking operations — including ingesting NSA's own TAO implant data, hunting for foreign intrusion sets like DISGRUNTLEDDUCK, and a success story in which Menwith Hill used TAO-stolen Iranian implant encryption keys to decrypt and read keylogger data the Iranian Revolutionary Guard's hackers were stealing from their own victims.",
"long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY presentation from March 2011 by the XKeyscore CNE team (xks-cne@r1.r.nsa). It describes using XKeyscore for Computer Network Exploitation work — both processing NSA's own hacking data and conducting \"counter-CNE,\" the detection and exploitation of foreign hacking operations. The presentation opens with a July 2010 quote from Menwith Hill Station: using the XKeyscore CNE dataset and a DISGRUNTLEDDUCK fingerprint, they identified at least 21 TAO boxes showing evidence of a foreign intrusion set, most associated with projects targeting Iranian WMD targets — meaning the same machines NSA had compromised were also being hacked by another actor.\n\nThe presentation reframes XKeyscore beyond its classic DNI processing role. The GUI screenshots reveal a CNE-specific navigation menu with searches for Keylogger, Machine Information, Network Information and Registry, alongside the standard email, extracted files and document metadata searches. One screenshot shows category hits geolocated to Neuilly-sur-Seine, France. The fingerprint/AppID language is named GENESIS (\"go genesis-language\") — providing the formal name for the syntax documented in the companion AppID presentations — with examples for Wikipedia detection and malware domain DNS fingerprinting. The document confirms three pattern types: appid (a contest where the highest-scoring wins), fingerprint (many per session), and microplugin (a complex fingerprint or appid that extracts and databases metadata).\n\nThe CNE data section reveals what flows into XKeyscore: TAO endpoint data (with no ECIs), GCHQ endpoint data (almost all of it), and limited flows from the SIGINT Forensics Center and TAO STAT. Payload types are labeled dnt_payload in the AppID/fingerprint ontology and include directory walks, extracted files, system surveys, network configs, captured credentials, registry queries and keylogger output. The DANDERSPRITZ example shows a full process list (dnt_payload/processlist) exfiltrated from a compromised Windows machine on 13 April 2011 (processes running since 5 April), listing every running process including lsass.exe, svchost instances, Symantec (ccSvcHst.exe), VMware services, an HP LaserJet service and various executables — the kind of host survey data a TAO implant collects after compromising a target. DANDERSPRITZ is the post-exploitation framework later exposed in the Shadow Brokers leak, here confirmed feeding data into XKeyscore in 2011.\n\nThe counter-CNE methodology section describes how foreign intrusions are hunted: hypothesis-driven research (e.g. \"could South Korean CNE be using similar selectors to FVEY CNE?\"), detection of bogus or unusual traffic (HTTP GET with content, HTTP POST at odd hours from Russia between 0200-0359Z, funky user agents), and known-host or drop-site driven discovery. CNE-specific techniques include registry searches (SIMBAR), fused active/passive search using common selectors and document hashes, known malicious process detection, and map-reduce within the CNE cluster using GENESIS calls. The resources slide reveals a Five Eyes-wide counter-CNE collaboration infrastructure: an MHS INDEX Foreign CNE Discovery wiki page, CSEC and GCHQ's DONUT project for unknown protocols, GCHQ research on detecting Man-on-the-Side attacks (MOTS), and the GCHQ DISCO team's intrusion proof-of-concepts and weekly \"Discovery Afternoons\" theories.\n\nThe success story is the document's most significant disclosure. The MHS INDEX team used TAO-obtained Iranian implant encryption keys to perform inline decryption via an XKeyscore microplugin, recovering keylogger data being collected by an IRGC-QF (Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force) operation. The recovered keylogger.txt shows captured keystrokes from a victim using Yahoo Mail and Yahoo Messenger, with the username mehrab.raisi visible and keystroke-by-keystroke capture including backspaces. The session is tagged with AMULETSTELLAR and AMULET fingerprints — connecting to the AMULET STELLAR case described in the ELEGANT CHAOS presentation, where the same IRGC-QF Ramazan Corps intrusion set was being exploited. This is a concrete example of fourth-party collection at the technical level: NSA stole the Iranian hackers' encryption keys, then read the data the Iranians were stealing from their own victims.\n\nThe document is significant for demonstrating the full circle of XKeyscore's CNE capabilities — it processes NSA's own implant exfiltration, hunts foreign intrusion sets compromising the same targets (and even the same machines) NSA had compromised, and enables fourth-party collection by decrypting stolen data using keys obtained through TAO operations. The recurring USSID-18 and Human Rights Act compliance banner on the GUI screenshots indicates these capabilities were shared with or used at GCHQ sites. The points of contact span MHS Index, CES/TRANSGRESSION (NSA's counter-CNE/fourth-party programme), NSA's Countering Foreign Intelligence element, NTOC and the XKeyscore CNE team.",
"tags": [
"Computer Network Exploitation",
"Counter-CNE",
"Tailored Access Operations",
"MHS",
"Menwith Hill",
"fingerprints",
"AppID",
"keylogger",
"process list",
"registry",
"machine information",
"network information",
"IRGC",
"Quds Force",
"Ramazan Corps",
"WMD",
"fourth party",
"implants",
"CES",
"NTOC",
"CSEC",
"GCHQ",
"man-on-the-side",
"drop site",
"DNI"
],
"document": {
"creator": "NSA",
"date_created": "2011-03-01",
"classification": [
"TOP SECRET",
"COMINT"
],
"dissemination": [
"REL TO USA, FVEY"
],
"banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY",
"genre": "slides",
"programs": [
"XKEYSCORE",
"DISGRUNTLEDDUCK",
"GENESIS",
"DANDERSPRITZ",
"SIMBAR",
"DONUT",
"AMULETSTELLAR",
"TRANGRESSION",
"TRANSGRESSION"
],
"countries": [
"France",
"China",
"Iran",
"South Korea",
"Russia"
],
"people": []
},
"publication": [
{
"publisher": "The Intercept",
"date_published": "2015-07-01",
"title": "XKEYSCORE: NSA’s Google for the World’s Private Communications",
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2015/07/01/nsas-google-worlds-private-communications/",
"reporters": [
"Marquis-Boire, Morgan",
"Greenwald, Glenn",
"Lee, Micah"
],
"contributors": [],
"doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2015/07/01/xks-counter-cne/",
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2116354/xks-for-counter-cne.pdf"
}
],
"aka_id": [],
"pdf_sha256": "540c6abbafecc53b2822fe78563e51a77e0f5c7212a4eb2ed1c907645baa0d48",
"pages": 21
}