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DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
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TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
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SIDtoday
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(TS//SI//REL) Alert: Voice Masking Is Discovered in SIGINT
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FROM: Adolf Cusmariu, HLT Operational Technologies (S24211), and
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[REDACTED] Deputy Chief, Levant Sunni Extremism (S2I24)
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Run Date: 03/22/2007
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(TS//SI//REL) Use of voice-masking devices complicate efforts to "voice ID" SIGINT targets.
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(TS//SI//REL) Earlier this month, Counterterrorism (S2I) Levant Sunni Extremism language
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analysts noticed that the intercepts of two prominent Al-Qai'da associated extremists in the
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Levant contained voice masking; the audio either sounded far too high, or too low in pitch.
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(TS//SI//REL) In one instance Saudi-based senior extremist financier Abu-Ubaydah used the
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voice-masking tool throughout his conversation dealing with his financing the travel of Yemeni
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suicide bombers to both Lebanon and Iraq. In another instance, Syria-based senior foreign
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fighter and facilitator Abu-Ghadiyah began in masked mode, went unrecognized by the
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recipient, turned the masking device off, and both had a good laugh.
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(TS//SI//REL) Of course, this is no laughing matter, since all efforts to identify any speaker -
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both human and automated - will fail when voice alteration is used. But why would a caller do
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this at all? Surely the recipient would also fail to recognize the speaker, so absence of this very
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human method of sound identification would only induce suspicion and mistrust. Disturbingly,
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could some terrorists be aware of efforts by SIGINT agencies to identify them by their voices and
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thus have begun to resort to masking?
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(TS//SI//REL) The devices used to alter voices in the few cases intercepted so far may not have
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been all that sophisticated. Simple changes in sampling rates done in mathematical software
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made the digital audiofiles sound more normal; in fact, two specific intercepts may have
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contained the same speaker. Still, automated detection of such anomalies will be difficult.
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(TS//SI//REL) A way to undo masking for an intended recipient would be to use the same device
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and agree on settings prior to each transmission, so that unmasking could be done near-real
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time. For example, if the sampling rates were increased by 25% to make the speaker's pitch
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sound far too low, sampling rate reduction by the same amount at the other end would return a
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normal voice. Even simpler, if only voice messaging is used, the masked recorded audio could
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be undone after playback through an (un)masking device.
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(TS//SI//REL) Because speaker identification services will continue to provide a key piece of the
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puzzle in tracking and capturing terrorists, voice-masking techniques need to be understood
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early. Tools developed for other intelligence applications are available and will be acquired to
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study this emerging problem.
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(U//FOUO) Do you have any comments on this topic? Post them on the SID today blog .
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"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet
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without the consent of S0121 (DL sid comms)."
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DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
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TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
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DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108
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@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
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{
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"title": "Alert: Voice Masking Is Discovered in SIGINT",
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"type": "SIDTODAY",
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"description": "This March 2007 post from the internal NSA newsletter SIDToday draws attention to voice-masking technology used by subjects of surveillance to frustrate the agency’s voice-recognition efforts.",
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"long_description": "",
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"tags": [
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"voice masking",
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"speaker identification",
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"Human Language Technology",
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"speech processing",
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"audio analysis",
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"language analysts",
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"surveillance countermeasures",
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"tradecraft",
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"counterterrorism",
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"Al-Qaeda",
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"sunni extremism",
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"levant",
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"foreign fighters",
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"terrorism financing",
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"target identification"
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],
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"document": {
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"creator": "NSA",
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"date_created": "2007-03-22",
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"classification": [
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"TOP SECRET",
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"SI"
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],
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"dissemination": [
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"REL"
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],
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"banner": "DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL",
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"genre": "newsletter",
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"programs": [],
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"countries": [
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"Saudi Arabia",
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"Yemen",
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"Lebanon",
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"Iraq",
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"Syria"
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],
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"people": [
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"Cusmariu, Adolf",
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"Ubaydah, Abu",
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"Ghadiyah, Abu"
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]
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},
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"publication": [
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{
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"publisher": "The Intercept",
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"date_published": "2018-01-19",
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"title": "Finding Your Voice: Forget About Siri and Alexa — When It Comes to Voice Identification, the “NSA Reigns Supreme”",
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"link": "https://theintercept.com/2018/01/19/voice-recognition-technology-nsa/",
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"reporters": [
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"Kofman, Ava"
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],
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"contributors": [],
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"doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2018/01/19/alert-voice-masking-is-discovered-in-sigint/",
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"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/4351994/2007-03-22-Alert-Voice-Masking-Is-Discovered-in.pdf"
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}
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],
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"aka_id": [],
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"pdf_sha256": "d1c9b4fbb7300732f97fe094817de3d03952b13c875c77632c789f7889506d66",
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"pages": 1
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}
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