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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
# (S//SI//REL) Exploiting Foreign Lawful Intercept (LI) Roundtable
[REDACTED] S31122
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
## (U) Definition
Lawful Intercept (LI) – obtaining communications network data by legal authority for analysis or evidence
```
NWO/AP/SvP's domain
LEA
domain
NWO/AP/SvP's
administration
function
HI1
intercept related
information (IRI)
Network
Internal
Functions
IRI mediation
function
HI2
content of
IIF
communication (CC)
INI
CC mediation
function
HI3
LEMF
LI handover interface HI
IIF: internal interception function
INI:internal network interface
HI1: administrative information
HI2: intercept related information
HI3: content of communication
```
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
## (U) LI Standards
* CALEA (US)
* ETSI (European)
* SORM (Russian)
* Other
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
## (TS//SI//REL) Countries of Interest
* Pakistan
* Afghanistan
* Iran
* Iraq
* Yemen
* Syria
* China
* Egypt
* Algeria
* Mexico
* Indonesia
* UAE
* Saudi Arabia
* Russia
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
## (S//SI//REL) XKS Fingerprints (~60)
* Aqsacom
* ATIS
* Ericsson
* ETSI
* Huawei
* Motorola
* Nokia
* Siemens
* Trovicor
* Utimaco
* ZTE
* GENERIC
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
## (U//FOUO) Access Methods
* FORNSAT
* Microwave (F6)
* Special Source Operations (SSO)
* Tailored Access Operations (TAO)
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
## (S//SI//REL) Taplists
* Developing advanced analytics to determine patterns in numbers being tasked
* Creating database to store LI-related information
* Discovering informal tasking
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
## (S//SI//REL) Mapping Networks
* Telecommunication and Internet Service Providers in a region
* LI vendors/service providers
* IP addresses/ports of usage
* Likely transmission medium
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
## (S//SI//REL) Processing Solution
* KITTYBINGE
* TAO custom solutions
* STARPROC
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
## (S//SI//REL) Types of LI
* Telecommunication
* Internet
* Differentiating between regular voice/Internet traffic from tasked traffic. Protocol indications?
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
## (S//SI//REL) LI Pod
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
## (S//SI//REL) LI Discussion Topics
* Discovery
* Access Methods
* Taplist Analytics
* Corporate Database
* Corporate Processing Solution
* Other Issues/Roadblocks
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
---

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{
"title": "Exploiting Foreign Lawful Intercept (LI) Roundtable",
"type": "REPORTED",
"description": "Top-secret PowerPoint presentation, \"Exploiting Foreign Lawful Intercept Roundtable,\" highlights the agency’s strategy to exploit vulnerabilities in lawful intercept systems from telecom companies, such as Ericsson, Motorola, and Nokia, in countries like Mexico, Indonesia, and Egypt. The presentation also discusses NSA's use of various \"Fingerprints\" for identifying data and its collaboration with industry players and foreign lawful intercept systems.",
"long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY presentation by S31122 on exploiting foreign Lawful Intercept infrastructure, describing a Five Eyes roundtable on the topic. The document is significant for confirming that NSA systematically targeted the lawful intercept infrastructure of foreign governments — meaning NSA was intercepting the same communications that foreign law enforcement and intelligence agencies were themselves intercepting under their own domestic legal authority, effectively piggybacking on foreign surveillance systems.\n\nThe definition slide establishes the technical framework. Lawful Intercept involves obtaining communications network data by legal authority, with a standardised architecture comprising internal interception functions, mediation functions and handover interfaces (HI1 for administrative information, HI2 for intercept-related information and HI3 for content of communication) connecting network operators to Law Enforcement Agency Monitoring Facilities. The standards landscape covers CALEA in the US, ETSI in Europe, SORM in Russia and various other national frameworks — each representing a different technical implementation that NSA needed to fingerprint and process.\n\nThe fourteen countries of interest are Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Yemen, Syria, China, Egypt, Algeria, Mexico, Indonesia, UAE, Saudi Arabia and Russia — essentially the full priority target list for NSA's counterterrorism, counterproliferation and geopolitical collection programmes.\n\nApproximately 60 XKeyscore fingerprints had been developed to identify LI-related traffic, covering twelve named vendors: Aqsacom, ATIS, Ericsson, ETSI, Huawei, Motorola, Nokia, Siemens, Trovicor, Utimaco, ZTE and a GENERIC fingerprint. The vendor list is notable — it covers the dominant global suppliers of lawful intercept infrastructure, meaning NSA had fingerprinted the LI systems of the majority of the world's telecommunications networks.\n\nFour access methods are listed: FORNSAT, Microwave (F6), Special Source Operations and TAO. The analytical work described includes developing taplist analytics to identify patterns in numbers being tasked by foreign governments for interception, creating a corporate database for LI-related information, discovering informal tasking, and mapping telecommunications and internet service providers alongside their LI vendors, IP addresses and likely transmission media. Processing solutions named are KITTYBINGE, TAO custom solutions and STARPROC.",
"tags": [
"lawful intercept",
"telecommunications",
"vulnerabilities",
"Aqsacom",
"ATIS",
"Ericsson",
"ETSI",
"Huawei",
"Motorola",
"Nokia",
"Siemens",
"Trovicor",
"Utimaco",
"ZTE",
"GENERIC",
"SSO",
"Tailored Access Operations",
"metadata",
"CALEA",
"SORM",
"Microwave (F6)",
"Internet Service Providers",
"Special Collection Service",
"microwave",
"FORNSAT",
"taplist analytics"
],
"document": {
"creator": "NSA",
"date_created": "2012-01-01",
"classification": [
"TOP SECRET",
"SI"
],
"dissemination": [
"REL TO USA, FVEY"
],
"banner": "TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY",
"genre": "slides",
"programs": [
"KITTYBINGE",
"STARPROC",
"XKEYSCORE",
"MICROWAVE",
"SSO"
],
"countries": [
"Pakistan",
"Afghanistan",
"Iran",
"Iraq",
"Yemen",
"Syria",
"China",
"Egypt",
"Algeria",
"Mexico",
"Indonesia",
"United Arab Emirates",
"Saudi Arabia",
"Russia"
],
"people": []
},
"publication": [
{
"publisher": "The Intercept",
"date_published": "2015-09-28",
"title": "A Death in Athens",
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2015/09/28/death-athens-rogue-nsa-operation/",
"reporters": [
"Bamford, James"
],
"contributors": [
"Petropoulos, Aggelos",
"Gallagher, Ryan"
]
},
{
"publisher": "Kathimerini",
"date_published": "2015-09-29",
"title": "Americans and Greeks started the 2004 wiretaps together",
"link": "https://www.ekathimerini.com/in-depth/special-report/202026/americans-and-greeks-started-the-2004-wiretaps-together/#firstPage",
"reporters": [
"Petropoulos, Aggelos"
],
"contributors": []
}
],
"aka_id": [],
"pdf_sha256": "46f23d8e60536eeaa52757421389f586dc6ff4b031668676a538ea76bc677083",
"pages": 12
}