first commit
This commit is contained in:
commit
0d90363116
6510 changed files with 679146 additions and 0 deletions
99
data/2012-lawful-intercept-redacted2/metadata.json
Normal file
99
data/2012-lawful-intercept-redacted2/metadata.json
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "Exploiting Foreign Lawful Intercept (LI) Roundtable",
|
||||
"type": "REPORTED",
|
||||
"description": "Top-secret PowerPoint presentation, \"Exploiting Foreign Lawful Intercept Roundtable,\" highlights the agency’s strategy to exploit vulnerabilities in lawful intercept systems from telecom companies, such as Ericsson, Motorola, and Nokia, in countries like Mexico, Indonesia, and Egypt. The presentation also discusses NSA's use of various \"Fingerprints\" for identifying data and its collaboration with industry players and foreign lawful intercept systems.",
|
||||
"long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY presentation by S31122 on exploiting foreign Lawful Intercept infrastructure, describing a Five Eyes roundtable on the topic. The document is significant for confirming that NSA systematically targeted the lawful intercept infrastructure of foreign governments — meaning NSA was intercepting the same communications that foreign law enforcement and intelligence agencies were themselves intercepting under their own domestic legal authority, effectively piggybacking on foreign surveillance systems.\n\nThe definition slide establishes the technical framework. Lawful Intercept involves obtaining communications network data by legal authority, with a standardised architecture comprising internal interception functions, mediation functions and handover interfaces (HI1 for administrative information, HI2 for intercept-related information and HI3 for content of communication) connecting network operators to Law Enforcement Agency Monitoring Facilities. The standards landscape covers CALEA in the US, ETSI in Europe, SORM in Russia and various other national frameworks — each representing a different technical implementation that NSA needed to fingerprint and process.\n\nThe fourteen countries of interest are Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Yemen, Syria, China, Egypt, Algeria, Mexico, Indonesia, UAE, Saudi Arabia and Russia — essentially the full priority target list for NSA's counterterrorism, counterproliferation and geopolitical collection programmes.\n\nApproximately 60 XKeyscore fingerprints had been developed to identify LI-related traffic, covering twelve named vendors: Aqsacom, ATIS, Ericsson, ETSI, Huawei, Motorola, Nokia, Siemens, Trovicor, Utimaco, ZTE and a GENERIC fingerprint. The vendor list is notable — it covers the dominant global suppliers of lawful intercept infrastructure, meaning NSA had fingerprinted the LI systems of the majority of the world's telecommunications networks.\n\nFour access methods are listed: FORNSAT, Microwave (F6), Special Source Operations and TAO. The analytical work described includes developing taplist analytics to identify patterns in numbers being tasked by foreign governments for interception, creating a corporate database for LI-related information, discovering informal tasking, and mapping telecommunications and internet service providers alongside their LI vendors, IP addresses and likely transmission media. Processing solutions named are KITTYBINGE, TAO custom solutions and STARPROC.",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"lawful intercept",
|
||||
"telecommunications",
|
||||
"vulnerabilities",
|
||||
"Aqsacom",
|
||||
"ATIS",
|
||||
"Ericsson",
|
||||
"ETSI",
|
||||
"Huawei",
|
||||
"Motorola",
|
||||
"Nokia",
|
||||
"Siemens",
|
||||
"Trovicor",
|
||||
"Utimaco",
|
||||
"ZTE",
|
||||
"GENERIC",
|
||||
"SSO",
|
||||
"Tailored Access Operations",
|
||||
"metadata",
|
||||
"CALEA",
|
||||
"SORM",
|
||||
"Microwave (F6)",
|
||||
"Internet Service Providers",
|
||||
"Special Collection Service",
|
||||
"microwave",
|
||||
"FORNSAT",
|
||||
"taplist analytics"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "NSA",
|
||||
"date_created": "2012-01-01",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"TOP SECRET",
|
||||
"SI"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [
|
||||
"REL TO USA, FVEY"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"banner": "TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY",
|
||||
"genre": "slides",
|
||||
"programs": [
|
||||
"KITTYBINGE",
|
||||
"STARPROC",
|
||||
"XKEYSCORE",
|
||||
"MICROWAVE",
|
||||
"SSO"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"countries": [
|
||||
"Pakistan",
|
||||
"Afghanistan",
|
||||
"Iran",
|
||||
"Iraq",
|
||||
"Yemen",
|
||||
"Syria",
|
||||
"China",
|
||||
"Egypt",
|
||||
"Algeria",
|
||||
"Mexico",
|
||||
"Indonesia",
|
||||
"United Arab Emirates",
|
||||
"Saudi Arabia",
|
||||
"Russia"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"people": []
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "The Intercept",
|
||||
"date_published": "2015-09-28",
|
||||
"title": "A Death in Athens",
|
||||
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2015/09/28/death-athens-rogue-nsa-operation/",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Bamford, James"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [
|
||||
"Petropoulos, Aggelos",
|
||||
"Gallagher, Ryan"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "Kathimerini",
|
||||
"date_published": "2015-09-29",
|
||||
"title": "Americans and Greeks started the 2004 wiretaps together",
|
||||
"link": "https://www.ekathimerini.com/in-depth/special-report/202026/americans-and-greeks-started-the-2004-wiretaps-together/#firstPage",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Petropoulos, Aggelos"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": []
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"aka_id": [],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "46f23d8e60536eeaa52757421389f586dc6ff4b031668676a538ea76bc677083",
|
||||
"pages": 12
|
||||
}
|
||||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue