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TOP SECRET//COMINT
|
||||
Communications Security Establishment
|
||||
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
|
||||
|
||||
## Cyber Threat Detection
|
||||
|
||||
* Passive Cyber Threat Detection Platform - EONBLUE
|
||||
* Currently deployed alongside traditional DNI Collection (SPECIALSOURCE, Warranted Access, FORNSAT, etc)
|
||||
* Packet Processing capability tailored to Cyber built over a 6+ year period
|
||||
* Cyber Threat Tracking (Deep Packet Inspection signatures for 'known' intrusions)
|
||||
* Cyber Threat Discovery (Anomaly Detection for discovering unknown intrusions)
|
||||
* In 2009 an average of 115,000 Traffic Items collected daily from Canadian and Allied Sources
|
||||
* Collection from allies is crucial to success, but based on IP Address collection (causes over collect, sessionization corrupts data, difficult to analyze with Cyber toolkit)
|
||||
* POC: [REDACTED] Global Network Detection @cse-cst.gc.ca)
|
||||
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
1
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT
|
||||
Communications Security Establishment
|
||||
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
|
||||
|
||||
## Holistic Cyber Threat Capability
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
?
|
||||
Selection and Filtering
|
||||
A
|
||||
|
||||
Communications Security Establishment
|
||||
Processing and Enrichment
|
||||
Protocol Analysis
|
||||
Crypt Attack
|
||||
Data Repositories
|
||||
Network Analysis
|
||||
Cyber Analysis
|
||||
GoC
|
||||
S.16
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
Internet
|
||||
GOC Intelligence
|
||||
CSIS Counter Intelligence
|
||||
TS SEYES Mitigation
|
||||
Knowledge Transfer
|
||||
|
||||
1. IT Security
|
||||
2. COVENANT
|
||||
3. Special Source
|
||||
4. 5-Eyes Network
|
||||
5. CNE
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT
|
||||
Communications Security Establishment
|
||||
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
|
||||
|
||||
## CSEC – SIGINT Supporting CND
|
||||
|
||||
* Globally pervasive threat
|
||||
* Covered by 5-Eyes network
|
||||
* Utilizing encryption
|
||||
* Subject to CSEC cryptographic attack
|
||||
* Abusing telecommunications protocols
|
||||
* Understood and reverse engineered at CSEC
|
||||
* Communicate using foreign languages
|
||||
* Access to CSEC and partner linguistic community
|
||||
* Constantly changing modus operandi
|
||||
* Uncovered using sophisticated analytics and anomaly detection
|
||||
* Exfiltrate valuable intelligence
|
||||
* That we can collect and use to enhance our repositories
|
||||
* These operations are also directed against GoC networks
|
||||
* Which we can detect and mitigate using both SIGINT and domestic sensors
|
||||
|
||||
* CSEC elements working as one...
|
||||
* providing unparalleled situational awareness of the threat
|
||||
* monitors health and status of government networks
|
||||
* coupled with the ability to stop or mitigate attacks and intrusions directed against networks of importance to the GoC
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
facebook SEEDSHERE Applications Inbox Home Settings Logout Search
|
||||
SEEDSPHERE
|
||||
is exfiltrating information from systems located across the globe
|
||||
and has no plans to stop anytime soon.
|
||||
|
||||
Mini-Feed
|
||||
|
||||
Today
|
||||
|
||||
* SEEDSPHERE downloaded images from the Japanese Embassy in Romania 1:25PM
|
||||
* SEEDSPHERE added the Poison Ivy Application 2:13PM
|
||||
* SEEDSPHERE communicated using the Poison Ivy Application 2:47PM
|
||||
* VGhpcyBpcyBhbiBlbmNvZGVkIFN0cmluZyBUaGF0IFJIcXVpcmVzIERIY3J5cHRpb24
|
||||
|
||||
Yesterday
|
||||
|
||||
* SEEDSPHERE is abusing the DNS Protocol 4:36PM
|
||||
|
||||
Last Week
|
||||
|
||||
* SEEDSPHERE is taking the day off on Chinese New Year 12:00AM
|
||||
|
||||
### The Wall
|
||||
|
||||
SIENNABLUE wrote:
|
||||
すねみまけゑづぱぶぼろまおあかゆろをでぢび。ね
|
||||
てぽぴ?づてたはほよぷゅごひすせけうおへえ
|
||||
ねか「ネマソカウユブザギゴァネニタセソコタン
|
||||
|
||||
See All Photos of Me (230)
|
||||
See All Friends (23)
|
||||
Edit My Profile
|
||||
Share +
|
||||
I am online now
|
||||
|
||||
Friends
|
||||
23 Friends
|
||||
See All
|
||||
DIESELRATTLE
|
||||
SIENNABLUE
|
||||
DOWNGRADE
|
||||
|
||||
Places I've Been (125,234)
|
||||
See All
|
||||
|
||||
Groups
|
||||
See All
|
||||
|
||||
Windows Internals, 3322.org, bosee.net,
|
||||
lovequintet.org, lovetrio.com, chinese
|
||||
underground
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT
|
||||
Communications Security Establishment
|
||||
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
|
||||
|
||||
## Front-end Cyber Tradecraft
|
||||
|
||||
* Deployed high-speed clustered storage to our collection sites
|
||||
* Enables extraction / storing and processing of all HTTP metadata to identify Cyber Threat Anomalies
|
||||
* Leveraged by CSEC's network knowledge engine to facilitate DNS Response harvesting and de-duplication
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Cluster throughput (file system)
|
||||
|
||||
400 Mb/s
|
||||
300 Mb/s
|
||||
200 Mb/s
|
||||
100 Mb/s
|
||||
06/11 06/14 06/16 06/18 06/21 06/23 06/25
|
||||
Inbound Outbound
|
||||
|
||||
CPU usage
|
||||
|
||||
100%
|
||||
80%
|
||||
60%
|
||||
40%
|
||||
20%
|
||||
0%
|
||||
06/11 06/14 06/16 06/18 06/21 06/23 06/25
|
||||
System User Total
|
||||
|
||||
764.8 Mb/s
|
||||
611.9 Mb/s
|
||||
458.9 Mb/s
|
||||
305.9 Mb/s
|
||||
153 Mb/s
|
||||
06/12 06/13 06/13 06/14 06/15 06/16 06/17 06/18 06/19 06/20 06/21 06/22 06/23 06/24 06/25
|
||||
|
||||
* Black Line: Total data into the Cluster
|
||||
* Blue Line: Data Outbound from SAN
|
||||
|
||||
* Data deduplication at sight results in much better use of limited bandwidth
|
||||
* Data into the cluster is balanced across multiple nodes. Each color denotes a separate node, automatically dividing the load amongst all systems
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT
|
||||
Communications Security Establishment
|
||||
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
|
||||
|
||||
## Joint Capability Development
|
||||
### SIGINT / ITS – Cyber Threat Detection
|
||||
|
||||
* Fast Flux Botnet Detection – CROSSBOW
|
||||
* A target-discovery algorithm deployed at CSEC SSO sites (currently operational)
|
||||
* Detects botnets that use the DNS protocol for command and control (i.e. the technique runs exclusively on metadata)
|
||||
* Initial planning phase Tipping/Cueing trials between SIGINT/ITS and the 5Eyes (stand-alone source code has been shared with 5Eyes, i.e. through T3IO)
|
||||
* "Throw-away" Cyber Threat Detection Sensor – CRUCIBLE
|
||||
* A low-cost, rapidly-deployed passive cyber threat detection sensor designed for use with TS//SI signatures in a non-SCIF environment (cyber target-tracking capability)
|
||||
* Strength of the sensor is derived primarily by the logical countermeasures (i.e. cryptographic hashes and bloom filters)
|
||||
* POC: [REDACTED] DG ITS Operations [REDACTED]@cse-cst.gc.ca)
|
||||
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
5
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT
|
||||
Communications Security Establishment
|
||||
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
|
||||
|
||||
## Sample of Fast Flux Activity Detected
|
||||
|
||||
Square nodes: contacted by fast flux "bots"
|
||||
Diamond nodes: fast flux "bots"
|
||||
Oval nodes: suspected fast flux domain
|
||||
|
||||
1 week of detected fast flux activity for a particular fast flux domain at a CSEC access
|
||||
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT
|
||||
Communications Security Establishment
|
||||
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
|
||||
|
||||
## Joint Capability Development
|
||||
### SIGINT / ITS – Cyber Threat Detection
|
||||
|
||||
* Scanning Detection - LODESTONE
|
||||
* [REDACTED]
|
||||
* [REDACTED]
|
||||
* [REDACTED]
|
||||
* [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
7
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT
|
||||
Communications Security Establishment
|
||||
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
|
||||
|
||||
## Cyber Threat Detection
|
||||
|
||||
* Passive Cyber Threat Detection Platform - EONBLUE
|
||||
* Currently deployed alongside traditional DNI Collection (SPECIALSOURCE, Warranted Access, FORNSAT, etc)
|
||||
* Packet Processing capability tailored to Cyber built over a 6+ year period
|
||||
* Cyber Threat Tracking (Deep Packet Inspection signatures for 'known' intrusions)
|
||||
* Cyber Threat Discovery (Anomaly Detection for discovering unknown intrusions)
|
||||
* In 2009 an average of 115,000 Traffic Items collected daily from Canadian and Allied Sources
|
||||
* Collection from allies is crucial to success, but based on IP Address collection (causes over collect, sessionization corrupts data, difficult to analyze with Cyber toolkit)
|
||||
* POC: [REDACTED] Global Network Detection @cse-cst.gc.ca)
|
||||
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
1
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT
|
||||
Communications Security Establishment
|
||||
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
|
||||
|
||||
## Holistic Cyber Threat Capability
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
?
|
||||
Selection and Filtering
|
||||
A
|
||||
|
||||
Communications Security Establishment
|
||||
Processing and Enrichment
|
||||
Protocol Analysis
|
||||
Crypt Attack
|
||||
Data Repositories
|
||||
Network Analysis
|
||||
Cyber Analysis
|
||||
S.16
|
||||
GoC
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
Internet
|
||||
GOC Intelligence
|
||||
CSIS Counter Intelligence
|
||||
TS SEYES Mitigation
|
||||
Knowledge Transfer
|
||||
|
||||
1. IT Security
|
||||
2. COVENANT
|
||||
3. Special Source
|
||||
4. 5-Eyes Network
|
||||
5. CNE
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT
|
||||
Communications Security Establishment
|
||||
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
|
||||
|
||||
## CSEC – SIGINT Supporting CND
|
||||
|
||||
* Globally pervasive threat
|
||||
* Covered by 5-Eyes network
|
||||
* Utilizing encryption
|
||||
* Subject to CSEC cryptographic attack
|
||||
* Abusing telecommunications protocols
|
||||
* Understood and reverse engineered at CSEC
|
||||
* Communicate using foreign languages
|
||||
* Access to CSEC and partner linguistic community
|
||||
* Constantly changing modus operandi
|
||||
* Uncovered using sophisticated analytics and anomaly detection
|
||||
* Exfiltrate valuable intelligence
|
||||
* That we can collect and use to enhance our repositories
|
||||
* These operations are also directed against GoC networks
|
||||
* Which we can detect and mitigate using both SIGINT and domestic sensors
|
||||
|
||||
* CSEC elements working as one...
|
||||
* providing unparalleled situational awareness of the threat
|
||||
* monitors health and status of government networks
|
||||
* coupled with the ability to stop or mitigate attacks and intrusions directed against networks of importance to the GoC
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
facebook SEEDSHERE Applications Inbox Home Settings Logout Search
|
||||
SEEDSPHERE
|
||||
is exfiltrating information from systems located across the globe
|
||||
and has no plans to stop anytime soon.
|
||||
|
||||
Mini-Feed
|
||||
|
||||
Today
|
||||
|
||||
* SEEDSPHERE downloaded images from the Japanese Embassy in Romania 1:25PM
|
||||
* SEEDSPHERE added the Poison Ivy Application 2:13PM
|
||||
* SEEDSPHERE communicated using the Poison Ivy Application 2:47PM
|
||||
* VGhpcyBpcyBhbiBlbmNvZGVkIFN0cmluZyBUaGF0IFJIcXVpcmVzIERIY3J5cHRpb24
|
||||
|
||||
Yesterday
|
||||
|
||||
* SEEDSPHERE is abusing the DNS Protocol 4:36PM
|
||||
|
||||
Last Week
|
||||
|
||||
* SEEDSPHERE is taking the day off on Chinese New Year 12:00AM
|
||||
|
||||
### The Wall
|
||||
|
||||
SIENNABLUE wrote:
|
||||
すねみまけゑづぱぶぼろまおあかゆろをでぢび。ね
|
||||
てぽぴ?づてたはほよぷゅごひすせけうおへえ
|
||||
ねか「ネマソカウユブザギゴァネニタセソコタン
|
||||
|
||||
See All Photos of Me (230)
|
||||
See All Friends (23)
|
||||
Edit My Profile
|
||||
Share +
|
||||
I am online now
|
||||
|
||||
Friends
|
||||
23 Friends
|
||||
See All
|
||||
DIESELRATTLE
|
||||
SIENNABLUE
|
||||
DOWNGRADE
|
||||
|
||||
Places I've Been (125,234)
|
||||
See All
|
||||
|
||||
Groups
|
||||
See All
|
||||
|
||||
Windows Internals, 3322.org, bosee.net,
|
||||
lovequintet.org, lovetrio.com, chinese
|
||||
underground
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
|
||||
Speaker: [REDACTED]
|
||||
-Added the health and status of Government network bullet
|
||||
* Removed '4th party' and instead mention how it enhances our repositories (will introduce 4th party here)
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT
|
||||
Communications Security Establishment
|
||||
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
|
||||
|
||||
## Front-end Cyber Tradecraft
|
||||
|
||||
* Deployed high-speed clustered storage to our collection sites
|
||||
* Enables extraction / storing and processing of all HTTP metadata to identify Cyber Threat Anomalies
|
||||
* Leveraged by CSEC's network knowledge engine to facilitate DNS Response harvesting and de-duplication
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Cluster throughput (file system)
|
||||
|
||||
400 Mb/s
|
||||
300 Mb/s
|
||||
200 Mb/s
|
||||
100 Mb/s
|
||||
06/11 06/14 06/16 06/18 06/21 06/23 06/25
|
||||
Inbound Outbound
|
||||
|
||||
CPU usage
|
||||
|
||||
100%
|
||||
80%
|
||||
60%
|
||||
40%
|
||||
20%
|
||||
0%
|
||||
06/11 06/14 06/16 06/18 06/21 06/23 06/25
|
||||
System User Total
|
||||
|
||||
764.8 Mb/s
|
||||
611.9 Mb/s
|
||||
458.9 Mb/s
|
||||
305.9 Mb/s
|
||||
153 Mb/s
|
||||
06/12 06/13 06/13 06/14 06/15 06/16 06/17 06/18 06/19 06/20 06/21 06/22 06/23 06/24 06/25
|
||||
|
||||
* Black Line: Total data into the Cluster
|
||||
* Blue Line: Data Outbound from SAN
|
||||
|
||||
* Data deduplication at sight results in much better use of limited bandwidth
|
||||
* Data into the cluster is balanced across multiple nodes. Each color denotes a separate node, automatically dividing the load amongst all systems
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT
|
||||
Communications Security Establishment
|
||||
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
|
||||
|
||||
## Joint Capability Development
|
||||
### SIGINT / ITS – Cyber Threat Detection
|
||||
|
||||
* Fast Flux Botnet Detection – CROSSBOW
|
||||
* A target-discovery algorithm deployed at CSEC SSO sites (currently operational)
|
||||
* Detects botnets that use the DNS protocol for command and control (i.e. the technique runs exclusively on metadata)
|
||||
* Initial planning phase Tipping/Cueing trials between SIGINT/ITS and the 5Eyes (stand-alone source code has been shared with 5Eyes, i.e. through T3IO)
|
||||
* "Throw-away" Cyber Threat Detection Sensor – CRUCIBLE
|
||||
* A low-cost, rapidly-deployed passive cyber threat detection sensor designed for use with TS//SI signatures in a non-SCIF environment (cyber target-tracking capability)
|
||||
* Strength of the sensor is derived primarily by the logical countermeasures (i.e. cryptographic hashes and bloom filters)
|
||||
* POC: [REDACTED] DG ITS Operations [REDACTED]@cse-cst.gc.ca)
|
||||
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
5
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT
|
||||
Communications Security Establishment
|
||||
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
|
||||
|
||||
## Sample of Fast Flux Activity Detected
|
||||
|
||||
Square nodes: contacted by fast flux "bots"
|
||||
Diamond nodes: fast flux "bots"
|
||||
Oval nodes: suspected fast flux domain
|
||||
|
||||
1 week of detected fast flux activity for a particular fast flux domain at a CSEC access
|
||||
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT
|
||||
Communications Security Establishment
|
||||
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
|
||||
|
||||
## Joint Capability Development
|
||||
### SIGINT / ITS – Cyber Threat Detection
|
||||
|
||||
* Scanning Detection - LODESTONE
|
||||
* [REDACTED]
|
||||
* [REDACTED]
|
||||
* [REDACTED]
|
||||
* [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
7
|
||||
102
data/20150323-CBC-Cyber_Threat_Detection/metadata.json
Normal file
102
data/20150323-CBC-Cyber_Threat_Detection/metadata.json
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "CSEC Cyber Threat Detection",
|
||||
"type": "REPORTED",
|
||||
"description": "This document details the Communications Security Establishment’s (CSEC) cyber threat detection and intelligence infrastructure, including systems like EONBLUE, CROSSBOW, CRUCIBLE, and LODESTONE, which enable passive monitoring, anomaly detection, and botnet identification through metadata and deep packet inspection. It outlines how CSEC integrates SIGINT, cryptanalysis, and network forensics to detect and mitigate cyber intrusions using both SIGINT and domestic sensors, while collaborating with Five Eyes partners to enhance Canada’s cyber defense and situational awareness. The presentation is duplicated from page 7 onwards - one of the duplicated slide has internal CSE comments.",
|
||||
"long_description": "",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"CSEC",
|
||||
"CSE",
|
||||
"ITS",
|
||||
"passive collection",
|
||||
"deep packet inspection",
|
||||
"metadata analysis",
|
||||
"anomaly detection",
|
||||
"botnets",
|
||||
"botnet detection",
|
||||
"FastFlux",
|
||||
"DNS",
|
||||
"network analysis",
|
||||
"cryptanalysis",
|
||||
"data deduplication",
|
||||
"HTTP",
|
||||
"Computer Network Exploitation",
|
||||
"cyber operations",
|
||||
"Five Eyes",
|
||||
"GCHQ",
|
||||
"NSA",
|
||||
"DSD",
|
||||
"CSIS",
|
||||
"Government of Canada",
|
||||
"GoC Networks",
|
||||
"threat attribution",
|
||||
"malware tracking",
|
||||
"exfiltration detection",
|
||||
"network monitoring",
|
||||
"infrastructure",
|
||||
"metadata repositories",
|
||||
"protocol analysis",
|
||||
"enrichment",
|
||||
"counterintelligence",
|
||||
"threat detection"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "CSE",
|
||||
"date_created": "",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"TOP SECRET",
|
||||
"COMINT"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [],
|
||||
"banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT",
|
||||
"genre": "slides",
|
||||
"programs": [
|
||||
"EONBLUE",
|
||||
"SPECIALSOURCE",
|
||||
"WARRANTEDACCESS",
|
||||
"COVENANT",
|
||||
"SEEDSPHERE",
|
||||
"DIESELRATTLE",
|
||||
"SIENNABLUE",
|
||||
"DOWNGRADE",
|
||||
"CROSSBOW",
|
||||
"CRUCIBLE",
|
||||
"LODESTONE"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"countries": [
|
||||
"Canada",
|
||||
"China",
|
||||
"Japan",
|
||||
"Romania"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"people": []
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "CBC News",
|
||||
"date_published": "2015-03-23",
|
||||
"title": "Communication Security Establishment's cyberwarfare toolbox revealed",
|
||||
"link": "https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/communication-security-establishment-s-cyberwarfare-toolbox-revealed-1.3002978",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Seglins, Dave",
|
||||
"Hildebrandt, Amber",
|
||||
"Pereira, Michael",
|
||||
"Greenwald, Glenn",
|
||||
"Gallagher, Ryan"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": []
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "The Intercept",
|
||||
"date_published": "2015-03-23",
|
||||
"title": "Documents Reveal Canada’s Secret Hacking Tactics",
|
||||
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2015/03/23/canada-cse-hacking-cyberwar-secret-arsenal/",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Gallagher, Ryan"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": []
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"aka_id": [],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "7f6a79f3fc3db53780d122f0be8b243c14635a989277ed34b87b7b2525959c44",
|
||||
"pages": 14
|
||||
}
|
||||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue