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TOP SECRET//COMINT
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Communications Security Establishment
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Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
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## Cyber Threat Detection
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* Passive Cyber Threat Detection Platform - EONBLUE
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* Currently deployed alongside traditional DNI Collection (SPECIALSOURCE, Warranted Access, FORNSAT, etc)
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* Packet Processing capability tailored to Cyber built over a 6+ year period
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* Cyber Threat Tracking (Deep Packet Inspection signatures for 'known' intrusions)
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* Cyber Threat Discovery (Anomaly Detection for discovering unknown intrusions)
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* In 2009 an average of 115,000 Traffic Items collected daily from Canadian and Allied Sources
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* Collection from allies is crucial to success, but based on IP Address collection (causes over collect, sessionization corrupts data, difficult to analyze with Cyber toolkit)
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* POC: [REDACTED] Global Network Detection @cse-cst.gc.ca)
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Canada
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1
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT
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Communications Security Establishment
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Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
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## Holistic Cyber Threat Capability
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```
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?
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Selection and Filtering
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A
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Communications Security Establishment
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Processing and Enrichment
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Protocol Analysis
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Crypt Attack
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Data Repositories
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Network Analysis
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Cyber Analysis
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GoC
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S.16
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Canada
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Internet
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GOC Intelligence
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CSIS Counter Intelligence
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TS SEYES Mitigation
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Knowledge Transfer
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1. IT Security
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2. COVENANT
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3. Special Source
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4. 5-Eyes Network
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5. CNE
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```
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Canada
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT
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Communications Security Establishment
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Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
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## CSEC – SIGINT Supporting CND
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* Globally pervasive threat
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* Covered by 5-Eyes network
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* Utilizing encryption
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* Subject to CSEC cryptographic attack
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* Abusing telecommunications protocols
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* Understood and reverse engineered at CSEC
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* Communicate using foreign languages
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* Access to CSEC and partner linguistic community
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* Constantly changing modus operandi
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* Uncovered using sophisticated analytics and anomaly detection
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* Exfiltrate valuable intelligence
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* That we can collect and use to enhance our repositories
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* These operations are also directed against GoC networks
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* Which we can detect and mitigate using both SIGINT and domestic sensors
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* CSEC elements working as one...
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* providing unparalleled situational awareness of the threat
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* monitors health and status of government networks
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* coupled with the ability to stop or mitigate attacks and intrusions directed against networks of importance to the GoC
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```
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facebook SEEDSHERE Applications Inbox Home Settings Logout Search
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SEEDSPHERE
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is exfiltrating information from systems located across the globe
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and has no plans to stop anytime soon.
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Mini-Feed
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Today
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* SEEDSPHERE downloaded images from the Japanese Embassy in Romania 1:25PM
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* SEEDSPHERE added the Poison Ivy Application 2:13PM
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* SEEDSPHERE communicated using the Poison Ivy Application 2:47PM
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* VGhpcyBpcyBhbiBlbmNvZGVkIFN0cmluZyBUaGF0IFJIcXVpcmVzIERIY3J5cHRpb24
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Yesterday
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* SEEDSPHERE is abusing the DNS Protocol 4:36PM
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Last Week
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* SEEDSPHERE is taking the day off on Chinese New Year 12:00AM
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### The Wall
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SIENNABLUE wrote:
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すねみまけゑづぱぶぼろまおあかゆろをでぢび。ね
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てぽぴ?づてたはほよぷゅごひすせけうおへえ
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||||
ねか「ネマソカウユブザギゴァネニタセソコタン
|
||||
|
||||
See All Photos of Me (230)
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||||
See All Friends (23)
|
||||
Edit My Profile
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Share +
|
||||
I am online now
|
||||
|
||||
Friends
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||||
23 Friends
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||||
See All
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DIESELRATTLE
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SIENNABLUE
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DOWNGRADE
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|
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Places I've Been (125,234)
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See All
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Groups
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See All
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Windows Internals, 3322.org, bosee.net,
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lovequintet.org, lovetrio.com, chinese
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underground
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```
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Canada
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT
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Communications Security Establishment
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Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
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## Front-end Cyber Tradecraft
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* Deployed high-speed clustered storage to our collection sites
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* Enables extraction / storing and processing of all HTTP metadata to identify Cyber Threat Anomalies
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* Leveraged by CSEC's network knowledge engine to facilitate DNS Response harvesting and de-duplication
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```
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Cluster throughput (file system)
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400 Mb/s
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300 Mb/s
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200 Mb/s
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100 Mb/s
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06/11 06/14 06/16 06/18 06/21 06/23 06/25
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Inbound Outbound
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CPU usage
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100%
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80%
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60%
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40%
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20%
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0%
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06/11 06/14 06/16 06/18 06/21 06/23 06/25
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System User Total
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764.8 Mb/s
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611.9 Mb/s
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458.9 Mb/s
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305.9 Mb/s
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153 Mb/s
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06/12 06/13 06/13 06/14 06/15 06/16 06/17 06/18 06/19 06/20 06/21 06/22 06/23 06/24 06/25
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* Black Line: Total data into the Cluster
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* Blue Line: Data Outbound from SAN
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* Data deduplication at sight results in much better use of limited bandwidth
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* Data into the cluster is balanced across multiple nodes. Each color denotes a separate node, automatically dividing the load amongst all systems
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```
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Canada
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT
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Communications Security Establishment
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Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
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|
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## Joint Capability Development
|
||||
### SIGINT / ITS – Cyber Threat Detection
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||||
|
||||
* Fast Flux Botnet Detection – CROSSBOW
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* A target-discovery algorithm deployed at CSEC SSO sites (currently operational)
|
||||
* Detects botnets that use the DNS protocol for command and control (i.e. the technique runs exclusively on metadata)
|
||||
* Initial planning phase Tipping/Cueing trials between SIGINT/ITS and the 5Eyes (stand-alone source code has been shared with 5Eyes, i.e. through T3IO)
|
||||
* "Throw-away" Cyber Threat Detection Sensor – CRUCIBLE
|
||||
* A low-cost, rapidly-deployed passive cyber threat detection sensor designed for use with TS//SI signatures in a non-SCIF environment (cyber target-tracking capability)
|
||||
* Strength of the sensor is derived primarily by the logical countermeasures (i.e. cryptographic hashes and bloom filters)
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||||
* POC: [REDACTED] DG ITS Operations [REDACTED]@cse-cst.gc.ca)
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Canada
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5
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT
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Communications Security Establishment
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Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
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## Sample of Fast Flux Activity Detected
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Square nodes: contacted by fast flux "bots"
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Diamond nodes: fast flux "bots"
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Oval nodes: suspected fast flux domain
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1 week of detected fast flux activity for a particular fast flux domain at a CSEC access
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||||
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Canada
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT
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Communications Security Establishment
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Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
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## Joint Capability Development
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### SIGINT / ITS – Cyber Threat Detection
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||||
|
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* Scanning Detection - LODESTONE
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* [REDACTED]
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||||
* [REDACTED]
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||||
* [REDACTED]
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||||
* [REDACTED]
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||||
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||||
Canada
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||||
7
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||||
|
||||
---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT
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||||
Communications Security Establishment
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||||
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
|
||||
|
||||
## Cyber Threat Detection
|
||||
|
||||
* Passive Cyber Threat Detection Platform - EONBLUE
|
||||
* Currently deployed alongside traditional DNI Collection (SPECIALSOURCE, Warranted Access, FORNSAT, etc)
|
||||
* Packet Processing capability tailored to Cyber built over a 6+ year period
|
||||
* Cyber Threat Tracking (Deep Packet Inspection signatures for 'known' intrusions)
|
||||
* Cyber Threat Discovery (Anomaly Detection for discovering unknown intrusions)
|
||||
* In 2009 an average of 115,000 Traffic Items collected daily from Canadian and Allied Sources
|
||||
* Collection from allies is crucial to success, but based on IP Address collection (causes over collect, sessionization corrupts data, difficult to analyze with Cyber toolkit)
|
||||
* POC: [REDACTED] Global Network Detection @cse-cst.gc.ca)
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|
||||
Canada
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||||
1
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||||
---
|
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TOP SECRET//COMINT
|
||||
Communications Security Establishment
|
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Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
|
||||
|
||||
## Holistic Cyber Threat Capability
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
?
|
||||
Selection and Filtering
|
||||
A
|
||||
|
||||
Communications Security Establishment
|
||||
Processing and Enrichment
|
||||
Protocol Analysis
|
||||
Crypt Attack
|
||||
Data Repositories
|
||||
Network Analysis
|
||||
Cyber Analysis
|
||||
S.16
|
||||
GoC
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
Internet
|
||||
GOC Intelligence
|
||||
CSIS Counter Intelligence
|
||||
TS SEYES Mitigation
|
||||
Knowledge Transfer
|
||||
|
||||
1. IT Security
|
||||
2. COVENANT
|
||||
3. Special Source
|
||||
4. 5-Eyes Network
|
||||
5. CNE
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT
|
||||
Communications Security Establishment
|
||||
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
|
||||
|
||||
## CSEC – SIGINT Supporting CND
|
||||
|
||||
* Globally pervasive threat
|
||||
* Covered by 5-Eyes network
|
||||
* Utilizing encryption
|
||||
* Subject to CSEC cryptographic attack
|
||||
* Abusing telecommunications protocols
|
||||
* Understood and reverse engineered at CSEC
|
||||
* Communicate using foreign languages
|
||||
* Access to CSEC and partner linguistic community
|
||||
* Constantly changing modus operandi
|
||||
* Uncovered using sophisticated analytics and anomaly detection
|
||||
* Exfiltrate valuable intelligence
|
||||
* That we can collect and use to enhance our repositories
|
||||
* These operations are also directed against GoC networks
|
||||
* Which we can detect and mitigate using both SIGINT and domestic sensors
|
||||
|
||||
* CSEC elements working as one...
|
||||
* providing unparalleled situational awareness of the threat
|
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* monitors health and status of government networks
|
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* coupled with the ability to stop or mitigate attacks and intrusions directed against networks of importance to the GoC
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
facebook SEEDSHERE Applications Inbox Home Settings Logout Search
|
||||
SEEDSPHERE
|
||||
is exfiltrating information from systems located across the globe
|
||||
and has no plans to stop anytime soon.
|
||||
|
||||
Mini-Feed
|
||||
|
||||
Today
|
||||
|
||||
* SEEDSPHERE downloaded images from the Japanese Embassy in Romania 1:25PM
|
||||
* SEEDSPHERE added the Poison Ivy Application 2:13PM
|
||||
* SEEDSPHERE communicated using the Poison Ivy Application 2:47PM
|
||||
* VGhpcyBpcyBhbiBlbmNvZGVkIFN0cmluZyBUaGF0IFJIcXVpcmVzIERIY3J5cHRpb24
|
||||
|
||||
Yesterday
|
||||
|
||||
* SEEDSPHERE is abusing the DNS Protocol 4:36PM
|
||||
|
||||
Last Week
|
||||
|
||||
* SEEDSPHERE is taking the day off on Chinese New Year 12:00AM
|
||||
|
||||
### The Wall
|
||||
|
||||
SIENNABLUE wrote:
|
||||
すねみまけゑづぱぶぼろまおあかゆろをでぢび。ね
|
||||
てぽぴ?づてたはほよぷゅごひすせけうおへえ
|
||||
ねか「ネマソカウユブザギゴァネニタセソコタン
|
||||
|
||||
See All Photos of Me (230)
|
||||
See All Friends (23)
|
||||
Edit My Profile
|
||||
Share +
|
||||
I am online now
|
||||
|
||||
Friends
|
||||
23 Friends
|
||||
See All
|
||||
DIESELRATTLE
|
||||
SIENNABLUE
|
||||
DOWNGRADE
|
||||
|
||||
Places I've Been (125,234)
|
||||
See All
|
||||
|
||||
Groups
|
||||
See All
|
||||
|
||||
Windows Internals, 3322.org, bosee.net,
|
||||
lovequintet.org, lovetrio.com, chinese
|
||||
underground
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
|
||||
Speaker: [REDACTED]
|
||||
-Added the health and status of Government network bullet
|
||||
* Removed '4th party' and instead mention how it enhances our repositories (will introduce 4th party here)
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT
|
||||
Communications Security Establishment
|
||||
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
|
||||
|
||||
## Front-end Cyber Tradecraft
|
||||
|
||||
* Deployed high-speed clustered storage to our collection sites
|
||||
* Enables extraction / storing and processing of all HTTP metadata to identify Cyber Threat Anomalies
|
||||
* Leveraged by CSEC's network knowledge engine to facilitate DNS Response harvesting and de-duplication
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Cluster throughput (file system)
|
||||
|
||||
400 Mb/s
|
||||
300 Mb/s
|
||||
200 Mb/s
|
||||
100 Mb/s
|
||||
06/11 06/14 06/16 06/18 06/21 06/23 06/25
|
||||
Inbound Outbound
|
||||
|
||||
CPU usage
|
||||
|
||||
100%
|
||||
80%
|
||||
60%
|
||||
40%
|
||||
20%
|
||||
0%
|
||||
06/11 06/14 06/16 06/18 06/21 06/23 06/25
|
||||
System User Total
|
||||
|
||||
764.8 Mb/s
|
||||
611.9 Mb/s
|
||||
458.9 Mb/s
|
||||
305.9 Mb/s
|
||||
153 Mb/s
|
||||
06/12 06/13 06/13 06/14 06/15 06/16 06/17 06/18 06/19 06/20 06/21 06/22 06/23 06/24 06/25
|
||||
|
||||
* Black Line: Total data into the Cluster
|
||||
* Blue Line: Data Outbound from SAN
|
||||
|
||||
* Data deduplication at sight results in much better use of limited bandwidth
|
||||
* Data into the cluster is balanced across multiple nodes. Each color denotes a separate node, automatically dividing the load amongst all systems
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT
|
||||
Communications Security Establishment
|
||||
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
|
||||
|
||||
## Joint Capability Development
|
||||
### SIGINT / ITS – Cyber Threat Detection
|
||||
|
||||
* Fast Flux Botnet Detection – CROSSBOW
|
||||
* A target-discovery algorithm deployed at CSEC SSO sites (currently operational)
|
||||
* Detects botnets that use the DNS protocol for command and control (i.e. the technique runs exclusively on metadata)
|
||||
* Initial planning phase Tipping/Cueing trials between SIGINT/ITS and the 5Eyes (stand-alone source code has been shared with 5Eyes, i.e. through T3IO)
|
||||
* "Throw-away" Cyber Threat Detection Sensor – CRUCIBLE
|
||||
* A low-cost, rapidly-deployed passive cyber threat detection sensor designed for use with TS//SI signatures in a non-SCIF environment (cyber target-tracking capability)
|
||||
* Strength of the sensor is derived primarily by the logical countermeasures (i.e. cryptographic hashes and bloom filters)
|
||||
* POC: [REDACTED] DG ITS Operations [REDACTED]@cse-cst.gc.ca)
|
||||
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
5
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT
|
||||
Communications Security Establishment
|
||||
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
|
||||
|
||||
## Sample of Fast Flux Activity Detected
|
||||
|
||||
Square nodes: contacted by fast flux "bots"
|
||||
Diamond nodes: fast flux "bots"
|
||||
Oval nodes: suspected fast flux domain
|
||||
|
||||
1 week of detected fast flux activity for a particular fast flux domain at a CSEC access
|
||||
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT
|
||||
Communications Security Establishment
|
||||
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
|
||||
|
||||
## Joint Capability Development
|
||||
### SIGINT / ITS – Cyber Threat Detection
|
||||
|
||||
* Scanning Detection - LODESTONE
|
||||
* [REDACTED]
|
||||
* [REDACTED]
|
||||
* [REDACTED]
|
||||
* [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
7
|
||||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue