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SECRET
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
# Cyber Network Defence R&D Activities
5IARC 2010
[REDACTED] CSEC N3C
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
1
---
SECRET
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
## CND R&D CSEC
* Most cyber defence R&D resides in Cyber Defence Futures
* Not a static picture
```
DCITS
DG Cyber Defence
Cyber Defence Operations and Capabilities Development
Security Posture Assessment
Technical Threat and Analysis
Cyber Defence Futures
Cyber Threat Evaluation Centre
DG Cyber Protection
```
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
2
---
SECRET
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
## Current Focus
* Current operations are passive
- Photonic Prism (aka P2)
* Slipstream
* Popquiz
* Email attachment scanning (via Pony Express)
* Snort
- Host based intrusion detection
* Soon deploying dynamic defence
- COTS hardware platform
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
3
---
SECRET
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
## N3 Research
* N3 is mostly a consumer of research
- Given our resources this is an appropriate model
* Very much relationship based
- SIGINT
- R23
- Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC)
- Royal Military College of Canada (RMC)
- Communications Research Centre (CRC)
* Integrees
- DRDC
- CRC
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
4
---
SECRET
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
## External Partners
* R23
* SIGINT
* *DRDC*
* *RMC*
* CRC
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
5
---
UNCLASSIFIED
## Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC)
* MulVal + AssetRank
* Joint Network Defence and Management Systems (JNDMS)
* ARMOUR
UNCLASSIFIED
Defence R&D Canada R et D pour la défense, Canada
---
UNCLASSIFIED
## MulVAL
```
Information about users
Information about data assets
Linux security behavior; Windows security behavior; Common attack techniques
Attack graph
System admin
Security expert
Reasoning System
Network configuration
Host configuration
Apache 1.3.4 bug!
CERT advisory
```
UNCLASSIFIED
Defence R&D Canada R et D pour la défense, Canada
---
UNCLASSIFIED
## Mulval + AssetRank ➔ Mulasses
```
execCode(databaseServer,oracle_user)
8
RULE 2 (9) : remote exploit of a server program
1 networkServiceInfo(databaseServer,oracle,tcp,1521,oracle_user)
7 netAccess(databaseServer,tcp,1521)
6
RULE 5 (28) : multi-hop access
1 hacl(webServer,databaseServer,tcp,1521)
5 execCode(webServer,system)
4
RULE 2 (14) : remote exploit of a server program
1 networkServiceInfo(webServer,iis,tcp,80,system)
1 vulExists(webServer,iis_vulid,iis,remoteExploit,privEscalation)
3 netAccess(webServer,tcp,80)
6 RULE 5 (30) : multi-hop access
1 hacl(userDesktop,webServer,tcp,80)
5 execCode(userDesktop,joeAccount)
4
RULE 3 (24) : remote exploit for a client program
1 isCompetent(joe)
1 vulExists(userDesktop,browser_vulid,privEscalation,remoteExploit,privEscalation)
3 canAccessMaliciousInput(userDesktop)
2
RULE 20 (19) : Browsing a website
1 hacl(userDesktop,attackerHost,tcp,80)
1 isWebBrowser(firefox)
1 installed(userDesktop,firefox)
1 attackerLocated(attackerHost)
1 hasAccount(joe,userDesktop,joeAccount)
2 RULE 6 (34) : direct network access
1 hacl(attackerHost,webServer,tcp,80)
1 vulExists(databaseServer,oracle_vulid,oracle,remoteExploit,privEscalation)
More dangerous
```
UNCLASSIFIED
Defence R&D Canada R et D pour la défense, Canada
---
SECRET
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
UNCLASSIFIED
## Royal Military College
* Support ~ 1 grad student per year
* Sliding Window Anomaly Detection (SWAD)
- Models normal traffic
- Applies the concept of hidden Markov model (HMM)
- Used to detect covert channels
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
9
---
SECRET
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
## CND Development
* Mix of internal development and external collaboration
* Current CND projects
- Some Pony Express
- Software modules for COTS hardware (dynamic defence)
- Streaming 10 Gb/s sensor (P2)
- Analyst data mining tools
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
10
---
SECRET
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
## Pony Express
```
Client traffic → FlowPony → SMTPPony → MailPony → MetaPony
MetaPony → [Metadata + attachments] → ScanPony
ScanPony → [Metadata] → AggPony → PonyExpress Output Buffer → SyncPony
SyncPony → PonyExpress Output
PonyExpress Output → [Metadata + Scan results] → Tonto
Tonto → [Formatted Alerts] → Alerts Database
PoolTable (Scanning Framework):
ScanPony → [Unencoded attachments] → Corner Pocket
Corner Pocket → Attachment Scanner
Attachment Scanner → PoolCue
PoolCue → [Scan results] → AggPony
```
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
11
---
SECRET
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
## Ponies of the PonyExpress
* **FlowPony** (flowp)
- TCP Session reconstruction
* **SMTPPon**y (smtpp)
- SMTP Parsing & Header Extraction
* **MailPony** (mailp)
- RFC822 E-mail Parsing & MIME Attachment Extraction
* **MetaPony** (metap)
- Evaluation & Scoring of Parsed Metadata
* **ScanPony** (scanp)
- Analysis Pre-Processing & Scan Dispatching
* **AggPony** (aggp)
- Scan Result Aggregation
* **SyncPony** (syncp)
- Transfers buffered output from local disk to the SAN
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
12
---
SECRET
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
## Ongoing Sensor Development (Photonic Prism)
* Integration of in-house and external partner anomaly detection tools and signature based detection
- Sliptstream
- Popquiz
- 8Ball
- Snort
* Updating our sensors for multiple 10 Gb/s sources
* Moving to full streaming with full capture
* Data analysis
- Improved analyst interface that fuse data from many sources
- Custom GUI (based on Eclipse framework)
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
13
---
SECRET
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
## Ongoing Sensor Development (Photonic Prism)
* Improved Analytics
- Better facilities for collaboration
- Near real time access to anomaly data
- Improved alert/pcap performance
- Knowledge database
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
14
---
SECRET
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
## Software modules on COTS Hardware (Dynamic Defence)
* Internal but close collaboration with NSA
* ~~Active~~ Dynamic defence (inline device)
* Modules for based device
- miniSSL (passive)
- SSLfuzzer
- DNS
- Data Extractor
- Synflood
* Legal and policy work ongoing
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
15
---
SECRET
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
UNCLASSIFIED
## Challenges
* Lots of standard development work to do
* Resources to pull through available research
* Length of Research Activities
* Translating classified requirements to an unclassified domain
* Properly engaging Industry and Academia
* Focusing external partners on R&D that is most valuable to us
* Policy
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
16
---
SECRET
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
# Cyber Network Defence R&D Activities
5IARC 2010
[REDACTED] CSEC N3C
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
1
Within the Cyber Protection Branch there is an Architecture and Engineering Directorate where most of the Research and Development Activities takes place.
---
SECRET
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
## CND R&D CSEC
* Most cyber defence R&D resides in Cyber Defence Futures
* Not a static picture
```
DCITS
DG Cyber Defence
Cyber Defence Operations and Capabilities Development
Security Posture Assessment
Technical Threat and Analysis
Cyber Defence Futures
Cyber Threat Evaluation Centre
DG Cyber Protection
```
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
2
The purpose of my talk is to characterize the R&D within CND at CSEC. I can not give a complete picture.
This is just to provide some context of where cyber defence research resides with CSEC.
This is a recent *partial* picture.
It is not static however, the org chart is evolving.
CTEC is very new and still defining its role.
Some future changes:
It is anticipated that **Cyber Defence Operations** and **Capabilities Development** will be become 2 separate directorates.
Cyber defence futures will be split into 2 sections. Eventually those sections will for the start of the Capabilities Development directorate.
---
SECRET
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
## Current Focus
* Current operations are passive
- Photonic Prism (aka P2)
* Slipstream
* Popquiz
* Email attachment scanning (via Pony Express)
* Snort
- Host based intrusion detection
* Soon deploying dynamic defence
- COTS hardware platform
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
3
At the moment most of our efforts are on incremental improvements on the current sensor.
Making it ready for > 10 Gb/s systems and beyond.
Our detection capabilities are based on 4 frameworks:
1. Slipstream
2. Popquiz
3. Pony Express
4. Snort
We should soon have our first dynamic defence deployment.
---
SECRET
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
## N3 Research
* N3 is mostly a consumer of research
- Given our resources this is an appropriate model
* Very much relationship based
- SIGINT
- R23
- Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC)
- Royal Military College of Canada (RMC)
- Communications Research Centre (CRC)
* Integrees
- DRDC
- CRC
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
4
It's difficult to speak about a research program that is virtual
We are a small group (but growing) trying to look at a lot of data.
Given our size, our best return on investment would not come from using current resources for low level research.
It make more sense to leverage the R&D of some external partners. There is already a large body of work out there that we can benefit from before we need to push it ourselves. This means our R&D program is mostly a relationship based program.
In fact, this model has already proven to be extremely valuable via the success of popquiz developed by R23 and our email attachment scanner from GCHQ.
In between in-house and external is the use of integrees.
---
SECRET
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
## External Partners
* R23
* SIGINT
* *DRDC*
* *RMC*
* CRC
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
5
The next set of slides provides some overview of the research done by our external partners that we are following/tracking/consuming.
Some is in use (popquiz)
Some will shortly be in production (Popeyesear)
Many are "for the future"
Some chosen examples follow.
---
UNCLASSIFIED
## Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC)
* MulVal + AssetRank
* Joint Network Defence and Management Systems (JNDMS)
* ARMOUR
UNCLASSIFIED
Defence R&D Canada R et D pour la défense, Canada
Defence Research and Development Canada is R&D arm of the Department of National Defence.
Within DRDC Ottawa is the Network Information Operations (NIO) section.
Within the Attack Detection and Analysis group, there are 3 projects of particular interest to us:
Mulasses, JNDMS and ARMOUR
DRDC also provides us a mechanism for working on NATO R&D projects as they already have a well established relationship with NATO.
---
UNCLASSIFIED
## MulVAL
```
Information about users
Information about data assets
Linux security behavior; Windows security behavior; Common attack techniques
Attack graph
System admin
Security expert
Reasoning System
Network configuration
Host configuration
Apache 1.3.4 bug!
CERT advisory
```
UNCLASSIFIED
Defence R&D Canada R et D pour la défense, Canada
Network based vulnerability analysis project.
Pure logical based reasoning engine that generates attack graphs. These attack graphs can be huge. A system to prioritize them needed to be created.
Based on Xinming (Simon) Ou PhD Dissertation from Princeton.
Simon is currently a professor at Kansa state University where he continues development of Mulval and related projects.
These are the 5 classes of input that go into MulVAL:
1. User and data asset information
2. Network configuration (hacls) – Basically describe which computers can talk and on which ports
3. Host configuration – software running on machines within the netwok
4. CERT (or other advisories) that contain information about vulnerabilites
5. Security expert information -- Logic to describe what can be accomplished on a computer given credentials
This input goes into a reasoning system (MulVal) which can then generate attack paths
---
UNCLASSIFIED
## Mulval + AssetRank ➔ Mulasses
```
(attack graph as reproduced on slide 8)
More dangerous
```
UNCLASSIFIED
Defence R&D Canada R et D pour la défense, Canada
Asset rank is an adaptation of the original Google page rank algorithm that can prioritize nodes of an attack graph (or any other logic based graph).
It is used to prioritize which network conditions (facts) are the most important to fix first in order to harden the network.
Attack graph:
Ellipse – AND nodes. True if all the dependencies are true.
Diamond – OR nodes. True if any of the children nodes are true.
Box – facts: network/host configuration, installed/running software, vulnerabilities
Together Mulval + AssetRank ➔ Mulasses!
Mulasses output is a prioritized list of network configuration properties to be modified to harden the network.
This project has potential value in network vulnerability shop.
---
SECRET
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
UNCLASSIFIED
## Royal Military College
* Support ~ 1 grad student per year
* Sliding Window Anomaly Detection (SWAD)
- Models normal traffic
- Applies the concept of hidden Markov model (HMM)
- Used to detect covert channels
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
9
Hidden Markov model – State of the system is not visible to the observer, only the output. System is assumed to be a Markov process.
Markov process – A stochastic process with the Markov property
Markov property – random phenomenon depends only on the present state of the system, (i.e. does not depend on the past or future state).
Why we are interested. Detecting covert channels is our business. If it is successful, it may prove to be a very valuable tool.
Other benefits of RMC collaborations – People! Several RMC students have become CSEC employees. They are cleared, and have a education centred on our mutual interests.
The current phase of the SWAD project is to built a user interface that is analyst friendly. Much of the work to date has been proof of concept work.
---
SECRET
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
## CND Development
* Mix of internal development and external collaboration
* Current CND projects
- Some Pony Express
- Software modules for COTS hardware (dynamic defence)
- Streaming 10 Gb/s sensor (P2)
- Analyst data mining tools
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
10
For the next couple of slides I will show some of our recent in-house development efforts.
We really do not have what I would characterize as **"research"** within Cyber Defence.
We do hope to get there.

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{
"title": "Cyber Network Defence R&D Activities",
"type": "REPORTED",
"description": "A September 2010 CSEC briefing to the Five Eyes 5IARC conference on cyber defence R&D, giving the full PONY EXPRESS email attachment scanning architecture and the PHOTONIC PRISM sensor, with speaker notes in which the presenter concedes CSEC does little research of its own.",
"long_description": "A September 2010 briefing by a redacted CSEC N3C presenter to the Five Eyes 5IARC conference, titled \"Cyber Network Defence R&D Activities\" and classified SECRET. The published file contains the deck twice: sixteen slides, followed by a speaker-notes printout covering slides 1 to 10, in which the presenter's own commentary is considerably franker than the slides.\n\nThe briefing locates cyber defence R&D within CSEC's organisation — under DCITS, through DG Cyber Defence and Cyber Defence Operations and Capabilities Development, to the Cyber Defence Futures section, with the Cyber Threat Evaluation Centre described in the notes as \"very new and still defining its role\" and the org chart as \"a recent partial picture\" that is still evolving.\n \nIts central claim is that CSEC does very little research of its own. The notes state plainly that N3 is \"mostly a consumer of research\", that it is \"difficult to speak about a research program that is virtual\", and that the best return comes from leveraging external partners rather than spending a small team's resources on low-level work — naming R23, SIGINT, Defence Research and Development Canada, the Royal Military College of Canada and the Communications Research Centre, supplemented by DRDC and CRC integrees. The model is said to have already proved itself through POPQUIZ, developed by R23, and an email attachment scanner obtained from GCHQ. The closing note is blunter still: \"We really do not have what I would characterize as 'research' within Cyber Defence. We do hope to get there.\"\n \nOperationally the deck states that CSEC's collection posture in 2010 was passive, resting on the PHOTONIC PRISM (P2) sensor and four detection frameworks — SLIPSTREAM, POPQUIZ, PONY EXPRESS and SNORT — alongside host-based intrusion detection, with 8BALL added on a later slide. One slide gives the full PONY EXPRESS architecture for email attachment scanning: client traffic passes through FlowPony (TCP session reconstruction), SMTPPony (SMTP parsing and header extraction), MailPony (RFC822 parsing and MIME attachment extraction), MetaPony (evaluation and scoring of parsed metadata) and ScanPony (analysis pre-processing and scan dispatching), which forwards unencoded attachments into the PoolTable scanning framework via Corner Pocket, the Attachment Scanner and PoolCue; results return through AggPony, an output buffer and SyncPony to a SAN, and are formatted into alerts by Tonto. A further slide names the components with their short forms. This architecture is the basis of the February 2015 CBC and Intercept reporting on CSE's scanning of email sent to the Government of Canada. \n\nThe deck also records work then in progress: updating sensors for multiple 10 Gb/s sources, moving to full streaming with full capture, and a first deployment of \"dynamic defence\" — an inline device built on COTS hardware in close collaboration with NSA, carrying miniSSL, SSLfuzzer, DNS, Data Extractor and Synflood modules, with \"legal and policy work ongoing\". On that slide the word \"Active\" is struck through and replaced by \"Dynamic\", recording the rename in the document itself.\n\nThree slides are reproduced from a DRDC deck under its own UNCLASSIFIED template, covering MulVAL — a logic-based reasoning engine generating attack graphs, based on Xinming (Simon) Ou's Princeton dissertation — and its combination with AssetRank, an adaptation of Google's PageRank that prioritises attack-graph nodes, together called Mulasses, plus JNDMS and ARMOUR. The RMC slide covers Sliding Window Anomaly Detection, which applies hidden Markov models to detect covert channels; the notes add that a secondary benefit of the RMC relationship is recruitment, since several RMC students have become cleared CSEC employees. A closing slide lists the obstacles: resources, the length of research activities, translating classified requirements into an unclassified domain, engaging industry and academia, and policy.",
"tags": [
"CSEC",
"CSE",
"Computer Network Defence",
"CND",
"cyber defence research",
"research and development",
"Government of Canada",
"GC networks",
"email interception",
"email attachment scanning",
"attachment scanning",
"SMTP",
"RFC822",
"MIME",
"TCP session reconstruction",
"metadata",
"metadata scoring",
"passive collection",
"full take",
"packet capture",
"full streaming",
"10 Gb",
"s",
"sensor development",
"anomaly detection",
"signature-based detection",
"intrusion detection",
"host-based intrusion detection",
"malware",
"dynamic defence",
"active defence",
"inline device",
"COTS hardware",
"SSL",
"SSL fuzzing",
"DNS",
"synflood",
"data extraction",
"covert channels",
"hidden Markov model",
"machine learning",
"attack graphs",
"vulnerability analysis",
"network hardening",
"asset prioritisation",
"alerting",
"pcap",
"data mining",
"analyst tools",
"Eclipse",
"knowledge database",
"SAN",
"external partners",
"academic collaboration",
"integrees",
"NATO",
"NSA collaboration",
"GCHQ collaboration",
"DRDC",
"RMC",
"CRC",
"R23",
"legal and policy",
"Five Eyes",
"5IARC"
],
"document": {
"creator": "CSE",
"date_created": "2010",
"classification": [
"SECRET"
],
"dissemination": [],
"banner": "SECRET",
"genre": "slides",
"programs": [
"PHOTONICPRISM",
"PONYEXPRESS",
"SLIPSTREAM",
"POPQUIZ",
"8BALL",
"SNORT",
"POPEYESEAR",
"FLOWPONY",
"SMTPPONY",
"MAILPONY",
"METAPONY",
"SCANPONY",
"AGGPONY",
"SYNCPONY",
"POOLTABLE",
"POOLCUE",
"CORNERPOCKET",
"TONTO",
"MULASSES",
"MULVAL",
"ASSETRANK",
"JNDMS",
"ARMOUR",
"SWAD",
"MINISSL",
"SSLFUZZER",
"N3C",
"N3",
"CTEC",
"DCITS",
"5IARC"
],
"countries": [
"Canada"
],
"people": []
},
"publication": [
{
"publisher": "CBC News",
"date_published": "2015-02-25",
"title": "CSE monitors millions of Canadian emails to government",
"link": "http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/cse-monitors-millions-of-canadian-emails-to-government-1.2969687",
"reporters": [
"Seglins, Dave"
],
"contributors": [
"Hildebrandt, Amber",
"Pereira, Michael",
"Greenwald, Glenn",
"Gallagher, Ryan"
],
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1676540/5iiarc-conference-september-2010-csec-briefing.pdf"
},
{
"publisher": "The Intercept",
"date_published": "2015-02-25",
"title": "Canadian Spies Collect Domestic Emails in Secret Security Sweep",
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2015/02/25/canada-cse-pony-express-email-surveillance/",
"reporters": [
"Gallagher, Ryan",
"Greenwald, Glenn"
],
"contributors": [],
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1676540/5iiarc-conference-september-2010-csec-briefing.pdf"
}
],
"aka_id": [],
"pdf_sha256": "adf29ba32d024e2bef92b06040d3146103fc7bdfc0b6cb25226e1042f7a0d15a"
}