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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//MR
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| Description of Information | Classification/ Markings | Reason | Declass | Remarks |
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|---|---|---|---|---|
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| b. (U) In association with NSA, SIGINT or Intelligence. | SECRET//COMINT | 1.4(c) | 20291123 | |
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| A3. (S//SI) The fact that NSA targets, collects, and processes GSM (encrypted or unencrypted). | SECRET//COMINT | 1.4(c) | 20291133 | (U) No additional details. |
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| A4. (S//SI) The fact that NSA can collect GSM calls through the global telecommunications infrastructure. | SECRET//COMINT | 1.4 (c) | 20291123 | |
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**B. (U) EQUIPMENT**
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| Description of Information | Classification/ Markings | Reason | Declass | Remarks |
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|---|---|---|---|---|
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| B1. (FOUO) Commerical and government equipment that consists of general purpose components, such as receivers, digital signal processors, personal computer, etc., when **not** running or loaded with GSM SIGINT collection software and **not** associated with a SIGINT system. | UNCLASSIFIED/ FOUO | N/A | N/A | (U) No association with NSA, SIGINT or Intelligence. |
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| B2. (S//SI) Commercial and government equipment that consists of general purpose components, such as receivers, digital signal processors, personal computer, etc, when running or loaded with GSM SIGINT collection software and associated with NSA, SIGINT or Intelligence. | SECRET//COMINT At a minimum | 1.4(c) | 20291123 | |
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**C. (U) PROCESSING**
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| Description of Information | Classification/ Markings | Reason | Declass | Remarks |
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|---|---|---|---|---|
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| C1. (S//SI) The fact that NSA can process **unencrypted** GSM. | SECRET//COMINT REL AUS/CAN/GBR/NZL/USA | 1.4 (c) | 20291123 | |
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| C2. (S//SI) The fact that NSA can process **encrypted** GSM when the cryptovariable is **known**. | SECRET//COMINT REL AUS/CAN/GBR/NZL/USA At a mimimum | 1.4 (c) | 20291123 | |
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| C3. (TS//SI) The fact that NSA can process **encrypted A5/1** GSM when the cryptovariable is **unknown**. | TOP SECRET// COMINT REL | 1.4 (c) | 20291123 | (U) Details may require protection via a special access |
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//MR
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| Description of Information | Classification/ Markings | Reason | Declass | Remarks |
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|---|---|---|---|---|
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| b. Technical reports (TACREPs or Klieglights) | SECRET//COMINT at a minimum | 1.4(c) | 20291123 | |
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| F3. (S//SI) Reporting locations of GSM users in:<br><br>a. SIGINT product<br>--country<br>--city<br>--VLR Global Title<br>--Location Area Code<br>--Cell ID<br>--Latitude/Longitude | SECRET<br>SECRET<br>SECRET//COMINT SECRET//COMINT SECRET//COMINT SECRET//COMINT | 1.4(c) | 20291123 | May be TOP SECRET//COMINT depending on the source. |
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| b. Technical reports (TACREPs or Klieglights)<br>--country<br>--city<br>--VLR Global Title<br>--Location Area Code<br>--Cell ID<br>--Latitude/Longitude | SECRET<br>SECRET<br>SECRET//COMINT<br>SECRET//COMINT<br>SECRET//COMINT<br>SECRET//COMINT | 1.4(c) | 20291123 | May be TOP SECRET//COMINT depending on the source. |
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| F4. (S//SI) Any reporting from GSM Short Message system (SMS) messages | SECRET//COMINT at a minimum. | 1.4(c) | 20291123 | May be TOP SECRET//COMINT depending on the source. |
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**G. (FOUO) GSM PRECISIONAL ACCURACY**
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| Description of Information | Classification/ Markings | Reason | Declass | Remarks |
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|---|---|---|---|---|
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| G1. (S//SI) The fact that GSM Cell Towers can be used as a physical- geolocational reference point in relation to a GSM handset of interest: | SECRET//COMINT | 1.4(c) | 20291123 | A GSM handset in relationship to a GSM Cell tower should be portrayed in a 2-3 KM ellipse estimate that takes into consideration urban and rural environmental dependencies (power, terrain and interference). |
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| G2. (S//SI) The fact of a singular SIGINT GSM handset metadata point with no exact timing | SECRET | 1.4(c) | 20291123 | GEO periodically issues a geospatially presented (ArcView, |
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//MR
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{
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"title": "How the NSA Pinpoints a Mobile Device",
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"type": "REPORTED",
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"description": "This document is an internal National Security Agency classification guide outlining the agency's abilities to intercept cellular communications.",
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"long_description": "This top secret NSA classification guide, shared with Five Eyes partners, provides handling instructions for information about the agency's GSM signals intelligence capabilities across collection, equipment, processing, reporting, and geolocation. The document is organized into sections covering general program facts, equipment, processing capabilities, reporting, and geolocation precision — each with specific classification levels calibrated to the sensitivity of the information disclosed.\n\nThe collection section establishes that the mere fact NSA targets, collects, and processes GSM — whether encrypted or unencrypted — is classified Secret/COMINT, as is the fact that collection occurs through the global telecommunications infrastructure. The equipment section draws a precise legal and security distinction: commercial components used for GSM SIGINT collection are unclassified when not loaded with collection software, but become Secret/COMINT at minimum once running NSA-associated software. The processing section reveals a graduated hierarchy of capability sensitivity: processing unencrypted GSM is Secret/COMINT releasable to Five Eyes; processing encrypted GSM with a known cryptovariable is Secret/COMINT at minimum; but the ability to process A5/1 encrypted GSM when the cryptovariable is unknown — meaning NSA can break the most widely used GSM encryption standard without possessing the key — is classified Top Secret/COMINT and may require special access program protection. A5/1 was the standard encryption used by the vast majority of the world's GSM mobile networks, making this capability one of the most significant mobile surveillance disclosures in the document.\n\nThe reporting and geolocation sections detail the classification levels for publishing user location data, with a granular hierarchy ranging from country-level location (Secret) through city, VLR Global Title, Location Area Code, Cell ID, and latitude/longitude coordinates (all Secret/COMINT, potentially Top Secret depending on source). The geolocation precision section establishes that cell tower-based handset location should be represented as a 2-3 kilometer ellipse accounting for urban and rural environmental factors including power, terrain, and interference — providing a rare public benchmark for the accuracy of NSA's GSM geolocation capability.",
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"tags": [
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"GSM",
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"cell phones",
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"mobile phones",
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"geospatial data",
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"cell towers",
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"handset",
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"mobile surveillance",
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"cellular interception",
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"encryption",
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"encryption breaking",
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"cryptographic key",
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"geolocation",
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"LAC",
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"CellID",
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"VLR",
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"latitude longitude",
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"SMS interception",
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"TACrep",
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"KLIEGLIGHT",
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"classification guide",
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"collection capabilities",
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"data processing",
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"equipment",
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"handset tracking",
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"mobile networks",
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"urban rural"
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],
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"document": {
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"creator": "NSA",
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"date_created": "2006-09-20",
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"classification": [
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"TOP SECRET",
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"COMINT",
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"MR"
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],
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"dissemination": [
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"REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL"
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],
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"banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//MR",
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"genre": "guide",
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"programs": [
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"ARCVIEW"
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],
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"countries": [],
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"people": []
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},
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"publication": [
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{
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"publisher": "The Washington Post",
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"date_published": "2013-12-10",
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"title": "New documents show how the NSA infers relationships based on mobile location data",
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"link": "https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2013/12/10/new-documents-show-how-the-nsa-infers-relationships-based-on-mobile-location-data/",
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"reporters": [
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"Soltani, Ashkan",
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"Gellman, Barton"
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],
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"contributors": [],
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"doc_source": "http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/how-the-nsa-pinpoints-a-mobile-device/645/",
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"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/888710/gsm-classification-guide-20-sept-2006.pdf"
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}
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],
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"aka_id": [
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{
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"id": "2013-12-10_GMS_Classification_Guide"
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},
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{
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"id": "EFF_-_20131210-wapo-gsm_classification_guide"
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},
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{
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"id": "nsa-gsm-tracking"
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},
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{
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"id": "gsm-classification-guide-20-sept-2006"
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}
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],
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"pdf_sha256": "d73a14649a953b8ba4ccffaac079dd0a4b2f1425d97e21744895009a7ffad501",
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"pages": 2
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}
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