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{
"title": "Peeling Back the Layers of TOR with EGOTISTICALGIRAFFE",
"type": "REPORTED",
"description": "An NSA Tailored Access Operations presentation describing EGOTISTICALGIRAFFE and EGOTISTICALGOAT — Firefox browser exploits targeting Tor Browser Bundle users — covering fingerprinting Tor users via the TorButton BuildID, the EGOTISTICALGOAT type confusion vulnerability in Firefox's E4X implementation enabling remote code execution, and the FINKDIFFERENT/FUNNELOUT callback infrastructure used to exfiltrate data from exploited targets.",
"long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY NSA Tailored Access Operations presentation from the Data Network Technologies division, covering the EGOTISTICALGIRAFFE and EGOTISTICALGOAT Firefox exploits targeting users of the Tor Browser Bundle. The document frames the challenge as three sequential problems: fingerprinting Tor users, exploiting them, and receiving callbacks through Tor.\n\nThe fingerprinting section demonstrates that TorButton's privacy hardening — designed to make all Tor Browser Bundle users look identical to each other — inadvertently makes them trivially distinguishable from non-Tor Firefox users. Regardless of the underlying operating system or Firefox version, tbb-firefox reports a BuildID of zero rather than a genuine timestamp, while regular Firefox reports a build timestamp such as 20121024073032. This single field is sufficient to identify any Tor Browser Bundle user in passive collection. The document notes: \"Thanks to TorButton, it's easy.\"\n\nThe exploitation section describes two named Firefox vulnerabilities. ERRONEOUSINGENUITY (ERIN) was the first native Firefox exploit available in a long time, working only against Firefox versions 13.0 through 16.0.2. EGOTISTICALGOAT (EGGO) is a type confusion vulnerability in Firefox's E4X implementation — a now-deprecated XML processing feature — enabling arbitrary read and write access to process memory and remote code execution via the CTypes module. EGGO was configured for Firefox 11.0 through 16.0.2 but the underlying vulnerability also existed in Firefox 10.0, which was the version shipped with the Tor Browser Bundle. The document notes that operating system, Firefox version and 32/64-bit architecture cannot be determined until code execution is achieved on the target machine, but frames this as acceptable since the exploit can be attempted without that information.\n\nThe callbacks section describes the infrastructure for receiving data exfiltrated from exploited targets. Initial tests on standard Firefox 10 ESR worked but tests on tbb-firefox failed — execution was achieved but FINKDIFFERENT (the callback payload) was not received. The failure was traced to prefilter hashing: the FOXACID infrastructure was computing EGGI as Hash(tor_exit_ip || session_id) and FIDI as Hash(target_ip || session_id), and because the exploit runs inside the Tor network the callback came from a Tor exit IP rather than the target's real IP, causing the hash mismatch. The fix was to disable prefilter hashing using FUNNELOUT, though this raised OPSEC concerns about pre-play attacks from personal security products (PSPs) and adversarial actors.\n\nTaken together the document describes a complete operational pipeline for deanonymising Tor Browser Bundle users through browser exploitation: passive identification via BuildID fingerprinting, exploitation of a type-confusion vulnerability in E4X, and receiving callbacks from Tor once prefilter hashing was turned off. This connects directly to the FOXACID and BLINDDATE documents, confirming the end-to-end exploitation workflow against Tor users.",
"tags": [
"Tor",
"Tor Browser",
"Firefox",
"browsers",
"exploitation",
"targeting",
"fingerprints",
"Windows",
"Linux",
"macOS",
"noscript",
"extensions",
"addons",
"vulnerabilities",
"remote code execution",
"OPSEC",
"web",
"dark web",
"anonymity",
"privacy",
"terrorism"
],
"document": {
"creator": "NSA",
"date_created": "",
"classification": [
"TOP SECRET",
"COMINT"
],
"dissemination": [
"REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL"
],
"banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL",
"genre": "slides",
"programs": [
"EGOTISTICALGIRAFFE",
"EGOTISTICALGOAT",
"ERRONEOUSINGENUITY",
"ERIN",
"EGOTISTICALGOAT",
"EGGO",
"FINKDIFFERENT",
"FIDI",
"EGGI",
"FUNNELOUT"
],
"countries": [
"China",
"Iran"
],
"people": []
},
"publication": [
{
"publisher": "The Guardian",
"date_published": "2013-10-04",
"title": "NSA and GCHQ target Tor network that protects anonymity of web users",
"link": "https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/nsa-gchq-attack-tor-network-encryption",
"reporters": [
"Ball, James",
"Schneier, Bruce",
"Greenwald, Glenn"
],
"contributors": []
}
],
"aka_id": [
{
"id": "EFF_-_20131004-guard-egotistical_giraffe"
},
{
"id": "nsa-egotistical-giraffe"
},
{
"id": "nsa-egotisticalgiraffe"
}
],
"pdf_sha256": "39a27194a4dc5c4d10b3ab7da1611a433af66c5bcd36a19a1ba007cec20329f5",
"pages": 20
}