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TOP SECRET
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Communications Security Establishment Canada
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Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
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# IP Profiling Analytics & Mission Impacts
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[REDACTED]
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Tradecraft Developer
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CSEC - Network Analysis Centre
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May 10, 2012
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SIGINT
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Canada
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---
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TOP SECRET
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## Example IP Profile Problem
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Target appears on IP address, wish to understand network context more fully
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Example Quova look-up & response for [REDACTED]
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* Lat. 60.00 Long: -95.00 (in frozen tundra W. of Hudson Bay)
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* City: unknown
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* Country: Canada,
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* Operator: Bell Canada, Sympatico
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Issues with IP look-up data:
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* is it actually revealing, or is it opaque
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* is the data even current, or is it out-of-date
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* was the data ever accurate in the first place
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2
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---
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TOP SECRET
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## Objectives
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Develop new analytics to provide richer contextual
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data about a network address
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Apply analytics against Tipping & Cueing objectives
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Build upon artefact of techniques to develop new
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needle-in-a-haystack analytic – contact chaining
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across air-gaps
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3
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---
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TOP SECRET
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## Analytic Concept – Start with Travel Node
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Begin with *single* seed Wi-Fi IP address of intl. airport
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Assemble set of user IDs seen on network address
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over two weeks
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4
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---
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TOP SECRET
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## Profiling Travel Nodes – Next Step
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Follow IDs backward and forward in recent time
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Earlier IP clusters of:
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- local hotels
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- domestic airports
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- local transportation hubs
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- local internet cafes
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- etc.
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Later IP clusters of:
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- other intl. airports
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- domestic airports
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- major intl. hotels
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- etc.
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5
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---
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TOP SECRET
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## IP Hopping Forward in Time
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Follow IDs forward in time to next IP & note delta time
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```
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Next IP sorted
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by most popular:
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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1 Hr.
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2 Hr.
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3 Hr.
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4 Hr.
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5 Hr.
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Δ time
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Many clusters will resolve to other Airports!
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Can then take seeds from these airports and
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repeat to cover whole world
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Ditto for going backward in time, can uncover
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roaming infrastructure of host city: hotels,
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conference centers, Wi-Fi hotspots etc.
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```
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6
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---
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TOP SECRET
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## Data Reality
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The analytic produced excellent profiles, but was more
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complex than initial concept suggests
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Data had limited aperture – Canadian Special Source
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* major CDN ISPs team with US email majors, losing travel coverage
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Behaviour at airports
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* little lingering on arrival; arrivals using phones, not WiFi
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* still, some Wi-Fi use when waiting for connecting flight/baggage
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* different terminals: domestic/international; also private lounges
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Very many airports and hotels served by large Boingo
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private network
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* not seen in aperture; traffic seems to return via local Akamai node
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7
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---
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TOP SECRET
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## Tradecraft Development Data Set
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Have two weeks worth of ID-IP data from Canadian Special Source - [REDACTED]
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Had program access to Quova dataset connecting into Atlas database
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Had seed knowledge of a single Canadian Airport WiFi IP address
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8
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---
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TOP SECRET
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## Hop Geo Profile From CDN Airport Intl. Terminal
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```
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Long Longitude scale is non-linear
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a
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t
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most far-flung sites are wireless gateways with many other wireless gateways in set
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```
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Profiled/seed IP location: square = geographic location
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Hopped-to IP location: line height = numbers of unique hopped-to IPs at location
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Plot of where else IDs seen at seed IP have been seen in two weeks
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Plot shows most hopped to IPs are nearby - confirming reported seed geo data
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9
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---
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TOP SECRET
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## Effect of Invalid Geo Information
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```
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Long Longitude scale is non-linear
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a
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t
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Geo incongruence: displacement of seed location from distribution center strongly suggests data error
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```
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Profiled/seed IP location: square = geographic location
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Hopped-to IP location: line = numbers of unique hopped-to IPs at location
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Effect of invalid seed geo information readily apparent
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10
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---
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TOP SECRET
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## Hop-Out Destinations Seen
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Other domestic airports
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Other terminals, lounges, transport hubs
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Hotels in many cities
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Mobile gateways in many cities
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Etc.
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11
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---
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TOP SECRET
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## "Discovered" Other CDN Airport IP
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Domestic terminal
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Closeness of majority of hopped-to IPs confirms geo data
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But, domestic airport can also look like a busy hotel ...
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12
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---
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TOP SECRET
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## IDs Presence Profile at "Discovered" Airport
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```
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Each horizontal line shows presence pattern of one ID, sorted by order of appearance
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Time/days ->
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Dominant pattern is each ID is seen briefly, just once - as expected
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```
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13
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---
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TOP SECRET
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## Profiles of Discovered Hotel
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Many IDs present over a few days
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14
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Time/days ->
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---
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TOP SECRET
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## Profiles of Discovered Enterprise
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Time/days ->
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Regular temporal presence (M-F) with local geographic span
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Contrasts well against travel/roaming nodes
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15
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---
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TOP SECRET
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## Discovered Coffee Shop, Library
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Coffee shop
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Time/days ->
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Library
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Similar patterns of mixed temporal & local geographic presence
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16
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---
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TOP SECRET
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## Discovered Wireless Gateway
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Wireless gateway not unlike a hotel, except ...
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Time/days ->
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17
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---
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TOP SECRET
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## Partial Range Profile of Wireless Gateway
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```
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Number of IDs seen on each IP
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500
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400
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300
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200
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100
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0
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
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Individual IP number in range of 8
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ID Total on IP
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Common IDs
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```
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For wireless gateway, range behaviour is revealing
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Most IDs seen on an IP are also scattered across entire range
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ID totals & traffic across full range is very high
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18
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---
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TOP SECRET
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## Mission Impact of IP Profiling
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Tipping and Cueing Task Force (TCTF)
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* a 5-Eyes effort to enable the SIGINT system to provide real-time alerts of events of interest
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* alert to: target country location changes, webmail logins with time-limited cookies etc.
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Targets/Enemies still target air travel and hotels
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* airlines: shoe/underwear/printer bombs ...
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* hotels: Mumbai, Kabul, Jakarta, Amman, Islamabad, Egyptian Sinai ...
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Analytic can hop-sweep through IP address space to identify
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set of IP addresses for hotels and airports
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* detecting target presence within set will trigger an urgent alert
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* aim to productize analytics to reliably produce set of IPs for alerting
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19
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---
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TOP SECRET
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## IP Profiling Summary
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Different categories of IP ownership/use show distinct
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characteristics
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* airports, hotels, coffee shops, enterprises, wireless gateways etc.
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* clear characteristics enable formal modeling developments
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* clear identification of hotels and airports enables critical Tipping & Cueing
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tradecraft
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Geo-hop profile can confirm/refute IP geo look-up
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information
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* later could fold-in time deltas for enhanced modeling
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Can "sweep" a region/city for roaming access points to IP
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networks
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* leads to a new needle-in-a-haystack analytic ...
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20
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---
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TOP SECRET
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## Tradecraft Problem Statement
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A kidnapper based in a rural area travels to an urban area to
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make ransom calls
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* can't risk bringing attention to low-population rural area
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* won't use phone for any other comms (or uses payphones ...)
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Assumption: He has another device that accesses IP
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networks from public access points
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* having a device isn't necessary, could use internet cafes, libraries etc.
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* he is also assumed to use IP access around the time of ransom calls
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Question: Knowing the time of the ransom calls can we
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discover the kidnapper's IP ID/device
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* "contact chain" across air-gap (not a correlation of selectors)
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21
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---
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TOP SECRET
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## Solution Outline
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With earlier IP profiling analytics, we can “sweep” a
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city/region to discover and determine public accesses
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We can then select which IP network IDs are seen as active
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in all times surrounding the known ransom calls
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* reduce set to a shortlist
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Then we examine the reduced set of IP network IDs and
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eliminate baseline heavy users in the area that fall into the
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set intersection just because they are always active
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* that is, eliminate those that are highly active outside the times of the ransom calls
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* hopefully leaves only the one needle from the haystack
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22
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---
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TOP SECRET
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## First Proof-of-Concept
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Swept a modest size city and discovered two high traffic
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public access ranges with >300,000 active IDs over 2 weeks
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* used for initial expediency due to computational intensity
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Presumed that there were 3 ransom calls, each 50 hours
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apart during daytime, looked for IDs within 1 Hr of calls
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* reduce large set to a shortlist of just 19 IP network IDs
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Examined activity level of 19 IP network IDs – how many
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presences each had in 1 Hr slots over two weeks
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* main worry as the computation was running: there would be a lot of IDs that showed just a handful of appearances: e.g. 3, 4, 5 instances
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23
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---
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TOP SECRET
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## ID Presence of Shortlist
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Postulated presence of kidnapper/target
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Time/hour-slots ->
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Happy result: least active ID had appearances in 40 hour-slots!
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Thus could eliminate all, leaving just the kidnapper (if he was there)
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24
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---
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TOP SECRET
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## Big-Data Computational Challenge
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All the previous analytics, while successful experimentally,
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ran much too slowly to allow for practical productization
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CARE: Collaborative Analytics Research Environment
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* a big-data system being trialed at CSEC (with NSA launch assist)
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* non-extraordinary hardware
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* minimal impedance between memory, storage and processors
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* highly optimized, in-memory database capabilities
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* columnar storage, high performance vector functional runtime
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* powerful but challenging programming language (derived from APL)
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Result of first experiments with CARE: game-changing
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* run-time for hop-profiles reduced from 2+ Hrs to several seconds
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* allows for tradecraft to be profitably productized
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25
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---
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TOP SECRET
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## Overall Summary
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IP profiling showing terrific value
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* significant analytic asset for IP networks and target mobility
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* enables critical capability within Tipping & Cueing Task force
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* working to productize on powerful new computational platform
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* broader SSO accesses/apertures coming online at CSEC
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* look to formalize models & fold-in timing deltas
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A new needle-in-a-haystack analytic is viable: contact
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* chaining across air-gaps
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* enabled by sweep capability of IP profiling
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* should test further to understand robustness with respect to loosening
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* assumptions of target behaviour
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* beyond kidnapping, tradecraft could also be used for any target that makes occasional forays into other cities/regions
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26
|
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|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET
|
||||
|
||||
## [REDACTED] Tradecraft Studio Example
|
||||
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
Possible route for productizing analytics
|
||||
|
||||
27
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|
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@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
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|||
{
|
||||
"title": "CSEC Surveillance of Travellers Through Airport Wi-Fi Tracking",
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||||
"type": "REPORTED",
|
||||
"description": "The leaked 2012 top secret CSEC presentation details a trial program that used airport Wi-Fi metadata to identify and track travellers’ devices across Canada and internationally, developing advanced “IP profiling” techniques to map movements through hotels, airports, and public hotspots. The program, conducted with NSA support, aimed to build powerful analytic tools for surveillance and real-time alerts within the Five Eyes intelligence network.",
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||||
"long_description": "",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"CSEC",
|
||||
"NSA",
|
||||
"airports",
|
||||
"Wi-Fi geolocation",
|
||||
"WiFi",
|
||||
"metadata collection",
|
||||
"Canadian",
|
||||
"Five Eyes",
|
||||
"mass surveillance",
|
||||
"NSA collaboration",
|
||||
"travel",
|
||||
"IP profiling"
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||||
],
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||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "CSE",
|
||||
"date_created": "2012-05-10",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"TOP SECRET"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [],
|
||||
"banner": "TOP SECRET",
|
||||
"genre": "slides",
|
||||
"programs": [
|
||||
"SSO",
|
||||
"QUOVA",
|
||||
"ATLAS"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"countries": [
|
||||
"Canada",
|
||||
"India",
|
||||
"Afghanistan",
|
||||
"Indonesia",
|
||||
"Jordan",
|
||||
"Pakistan",
|
||||
"Egypt"
|
||||
],
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||||
"people": []
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "CBC News",
|
||||
"date_published": "2014-01-30",
|
||||
"title": "CSEC used airport Wi-Fi to track Canadian travellers: Edward Snowden documents",
|
||||
"link": "https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/csec-used-airport-wi-fi-to-track-canadian-travellers-edward-snowden-documents-1.2517881",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Weston, Greg"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": []
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "249625365ba028b7e7462ec27c246b970e73f9c733e4a304c61b7a8d412b5485",
|
||||
"pages": 27
|
||||
}
|
||||
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