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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY
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## (C//REL) Types of IAT - Advanced Open Source Multi-Hop
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* (S//REL) Open Source Multi-Hop Networks
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- (S//REL) Tor
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- (S//REL) Very widely used worldwide
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- (S//REL) Open Source
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* (S//REL) Active Development
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* (S//REL) Mitigates Threats
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- (S//REL) Very Secure
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- (S//REL) Low enough latency for most TCP uses
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- (S//REL) Still the King of high secure, low latency Internet Anonymity
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* (S//REL) There are no contenders for the throne in waiting
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TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY
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38
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---
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY
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## (S//REL) Tor Operation (1)
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```
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EFF How Tor Works: 1
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Alice
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Step 1: Alice's Tor
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client obtains a list
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of Tor nodes from
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a directory server.
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Dave
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Tor node
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unencrypted link
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encrypted link
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Jane
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Bob
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```
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TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY
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39
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---
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY
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## (S//REL) Tor Operation (2)
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```
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EFF How Tor Works: 2
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Alice
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Step 2: Alice's Tor client
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picks a random path to
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destination server. Green
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links are encrypted, red
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links are in the clear.
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Dave
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Guard
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Middle
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Exit
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Jane
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Bob
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Tor node
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unencrypted link
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encrypted link
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```
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TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY
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40
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---
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY
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## (S//SI//REL) Passive Tor Traffic Analysis
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* (S//SI//REL) For Normal SIGINT flow, need to identify Tor traffic!
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- (S//SI//REL) Only outer TLS layer visible → How to Distinguish?
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- (S//SI//REL) Tor developers attempt to remain anonymous by blending in
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with myriad other TLS traffic
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- (S//SI//REL) Tor TLS has changed over the years
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- (S//SI//REL) There ARE some server → client features which are
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recognizable
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- (S//SI//REL) Certificate: Specific Diffie-Hellman (DH) Modulus - byte search
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- (S//SI//REL) Certificate: Issuer and Subject random names of same form ex:
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CN=www.ofzfkdjxvrss.net - regex match
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- (S//SI//REL) Certificate: always 2 hour lifetime - ASN.1 parsing, more computation
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- (S//SI) Multiple XKS fingerprints from multiple parties deployed
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TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY
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43
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---
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY
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## (S//REL) Tor Project Censorship Driven Activity
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* (S//REL) Driven by Censorship Circumvention, Hide Signature
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- (S//REL) China and Iran still main adversaries
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- (S//REL) Researching better bridge distribution strategies
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* (S//REL) Claim by Tor Project is 8000 requests/day for <1000 total
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- (S//REL) Around Feb 2011, changed the TLS handshake
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* (S//REL) Signature more like Apache web-server
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- (S//REL) Different DH Modulus
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- (S//SI//REL) New XKS Signatures address this
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- (TS//SI//REL) Proposed eventual change will kill identification!
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* (S//REL) Each Tor node will generate random-ish signatures in a volatile
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way specifically designed to look like normal website TLS traffic!
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TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY
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44
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---
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY
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## (S//REL) Censorship Driven Protocol Obfuscation - Psiphon 3 / Tor
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* (S//REL) Extreme Censorship blocking: Common encrypted protocols
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* (S//REL) In the case of Psiphon 3: SSH
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* (S//REL) In the case of Tor: TLS
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* (S//REL) Make deep packet inspection (XKS :-) ) work harder
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* (S//REL) Both use work of a open source project (brl/obfuscated-openssh)
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* (S//REL) Idea is both sides transmit random seed and verifier information
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* (S//REL) Verifier is hash of seed and other data
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* (S//REL) If verifier passes data used from both side seeds to generate key
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* (S//REL) Key used in symmetric cipher to encrypt native SSH or SSL protocol
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* (S//REL) So for random stream, need to de-obfuscate and test for SSH / SSL
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* (S//REL) Details for Psiphon 3
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* (S//REL) Hash used for verifier, key generation: 6000 iterations SHA-1
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* (S//REL) Symmetric cipher is RC-4
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* (S//REL) Details for Tor Obsfproxy
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* (S//REL) Hash used for verifier, key generation: 100K iterations SHA-256
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* (S//REL) Symmetric cipher is AES-CTR-128
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* (S//REL) Key uses seed from both sides!
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TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY
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45
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---
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY
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## (S//REL) Tor Project and friends Recent Activity
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* (S//REL) Tor on non-traditional platforms
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- (S//REL) ORBOT, Tor for Android smartphones - Associated browser, easy to use!
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- (S//REL) Tor Router Project - Modified Linksys Router (everything over Tor)
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- (S//REL) Hide-My-IP-Address
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* (S//REL) Proprietary replacement for Tor Browser Bundle
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* (S//REL) From "WCCL Network" not part of Tor Project
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* (S//SI//REL) Looked at based on reference by CT target
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- (S//REL) Tor Project working on improving support for circumvention
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- (S//REL) Handshake obfuscation (discussed)
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- (S//REL) Better bridge proliferation / distribution
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- (S//REL) Tails: Complete Bootable OS on CD for anonymity - includes Tor
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* (S//REL) Adds Severe CNE misery to equation
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* (S//SI//REL) Has been discussed by CT targets
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TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY
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46
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---
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY
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## (S//REL) Tor Project and friends Recent Activity
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* (S//REL) Advanced Tor "Obfuscation" Project: SkypeMorph
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- (S//REL) Another option for pluggable transport
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- (S//REL) More sophisticated concept than Obfsproxy
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- (S//REL) Open connection to Skype server with "bridge Skype ID"
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- (S//REL) Encapsulate Tor in encrypted data mimicking Skype Video Traffic
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- (S//REL) Sort of traffic flow steganography vice content steganography
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- (S//REL) True Public Key cryptography vice obfuscation with known key
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- (S//REL) Product of University research - Non-trivial to deploy
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* (TS//SI//REL) Most Recent SIGINT Work on Exploiting Tor
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- (TS//SI//REL) REMATION II Workshop (US/UK) at MHS spring 2012
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- (S//SI//REL) Unleashed Networking/CNE legions...
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- (S//REL) See later talk by [REDACTED] for the scoop
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TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY
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47
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---
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY
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## (S//REL) Tor Project and friends Recent Activity
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* (S//REL) Online Feud between 2 IAT Products: Ultrasurf and Tor
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- (S//REL) " Technical Analysis of the Ultrasurf proxying software" (Applebaum)
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- (S//REL) Analysis (including some SRE) – highly critical
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- (S//REL) Single hop, controlled by one authority
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- (S//REL) Security by obscurity
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- (S//REL) No perfect forward secrecy (forensic traces exploitable)
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- (S//REL) Responsible Disclosure: Ultrasurf notified 12/2011, published 04/2012
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- (S//REL) "Tor's critique of Ultrasurf: A reply from the Ultrasurf developers"
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- (S//REL) Posted on Ultrasurf site days after Tor published critique
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- (S//REL) All talk and no show
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- (S//REL) Not fully analyzed
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- (S//REL) One Approach to IAT: Tor - higher anonymity, smaller scale
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- (S//REL) One Approach to IAT: Ultrasurf - focus on circumvention, massive scale
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TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY
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48
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123
data/EFF_-_20131004-guard-iat_tor/metadata.json
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123
data/EFF_-_20131004-guard-iat_tor/metadata.json
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{
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"title": "Types of IAT - Advanced Open Source Multi-hop",
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"type": "REPORTED",
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"description": "This top-secret NSA/GCHQ document provides a detailed technical overview of the Tor network, including how it works, its strengths as the “king of high secure, low-latency Internet anonymity,” methods for identifying Tor traffic, censorship-driven protocol obfuscation, and ongoing intelligence efforts to analyze, fingerprint, and exploit Tor through passive SIGINT and active research, including collaboration between US and UK agencies.",
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"long_description": "",
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"tags": [
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"Tor",
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"anonymity",
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"network security",
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"traffic analysis",
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"censorship circumvention",
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"obfuscation",
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"protocol obfuscation",
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"PSIPHON",
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"Obfsproxy",
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"SkypeMorph",
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"Firefox",
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"Firefox exploit",
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"exploitation",
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"vulnerability analysis",
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"passive traffic analysis",
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"TLS",
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"TLS fingerprinting",
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"Diffie-Hellman",
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"certificates",
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"XKS",
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"modulus",
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"VPNs",
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"Tor nodes",
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"directory servers",
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"latency",
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"cryptography",
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"pluggable transports",
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"Tails",
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"ORBOT",
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"Android",
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"routers",
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"Internet freedom",
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"intelligence operations",
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"FVEY",
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"UltraSurf",
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"traffic shaping",
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"TBB",
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"Tor Browser",
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"exploit development",
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"law enforcement",
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"de-anonymization",
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"cable tapping",
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"SIGINT collection",
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"protocol analysis",
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"network exploitation",
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"online privacy",
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"secure communications",
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"intelligence cooperation",
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"exploitation workshops",
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"IAT",
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"targeted surveillance",
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"open source",
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"low latency attack",
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"deep packet inspection",
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"OpenSSH",
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"SSL",
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"SHA-1. SHA-256",
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"AES",
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"Skype",
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"public key cryptography",
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"SRE",
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"security by obscurity",
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"PFS",
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"perfect forward secrecy",
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"forward secrecy",
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"forensic traces",
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"EFF"
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],
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"document": {
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"creator": "NSA, GCHQ",
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"date_created": "",
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"classification": [
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"TOP SECRET",
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"SI"
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],
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"dissemination": [
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"REL TO USA, FVEY"
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],
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"banner": "TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY",
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"genre": "slides",
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"programs": [
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"XKEYSCORE",
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"REMATION II"
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],
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"countries": [
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"China",
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"Iran"
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],
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"people": [
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"Appelbaum, Jacob"
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]
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},
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"publication": [
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{
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"publisher": "The Guardian",
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"date_published": "2013-10-04",
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"title": "NSA and GCHQ target Tor network that protects anonymity of web users",
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"link": "https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/nsa-gchq-attack-tor-network-encryption",
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"reporters": [
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"Ball, James",
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"Schneier, Bruce",
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"Greenwald, Glenn"
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],
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"contributors": []
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}
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],
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"aka_id": [
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{
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"id": "ACLU_-_tor-works"
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},
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{
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"id": "nsa-iat-tor"
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}
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],
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"pdf_sha256": "e62a602a4bacc625a82eecda733bb4278c7ed68f5a4e099ba78046d1484ae6c4",
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"pages": 9
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}
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