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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY
## (C//REL) Types of IAT - Advanced Open Source Multi-Hop
* (S//REL) Open Source Multi-Hop Networks
- (S//REL) Tor
- (S//REL) Very widely used worldwide
- (S//REL) Open Source
* (S//REL) Active Development
* (S//REL) Mitigates Threats
- (S//REL) Very Secure
- (S//REL) Low enough latency for most TCP uses
- (S//REL) Still the King of high secure, low latency Internet Anonymity
* (S//REL) There are no contenders for the throne in waiting
TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY
## (S//REL) Tor Operation (1)
```
EFF How Tor Works: 1
Alice
Step 1: Alice's Tor
client obtains a list
of Tor nodes from
a directory server.
Dave
Tor node
unencrypted link
encrypted link
Jane
Bob
```
TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY
## (S//REL) Tor Operation (2)
```
EFF How Tor Works: 2
Alice
Step 2: Alice's Tor client
picks a random path to
destination server. Green
links are encrypted, red
links are in the clear.
Dave
Guard
Middle
Exit
Jane
Bob
Tor node
unencrypted link
encrypted link
```
TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY
## (S//SI//REL) Passive Tor Traffic Analysis
* (S//SI//REL) For Normal SIGINT flow, need to identify Tor traffic!
- (S//SI//REL) Only outer TLS layer visible → How to Distinguish?
- (S//SI//REL) Tor developers attempt to remain anonymous by blending in
with myriad other TLS traffic
- (S//SI//REL) Tor TLS has changed over the years
- (S//SI//REL) There ARE some server → client features which are
recognizable
- (S//SI//REL) Certificate: Specific Diffie-Hellman (DH) Modulus - byte search
- (S//SI//REL) Certificate: Issuer and Subject random names of same form ex:
CN=www.ofzfkdjxvrss.net - regex match
- (S//SI//REL) Certificate: always 2 hour lifetime - ASN.1 parsing, more computation
- (S//SI) Multiple XKS fingerprints from multiple parties deployed
TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY
## (S//REL) Tor Project Censorship Driven Activity
* (S//REL) Driven by Censorship Circumvention, Hide Signature
- (S//REL) China and Iran still main adversaries
- (S//REL) Researching better bridge distribution strategies
* (S//REL) Claim by Tor Project is 8000 requests/day for <1000 total
- (S//REL) Around Feb 2011, changed the TLS handshake
* (S//REL) Signature more like Apache web-server
- (S//REL) Different DH Modulus
- (S//SI//REL) New XKS Signatures address this
- (TS//SI//REL) Proposed eventual change will kill identification!
* (S//REL) Each Tor node will generate random-ish signatures in a volatile
way specifically designed to look like normal website TLS traffic!
TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY
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---
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY
## (S//REL) Censorship Driven Protocol Obfuscation - Psiphon 3 / Tor
* (S//REL) Extreme Censorship blocking: Common encrypted protocols
* (S//REL) In the case of Psiphon 3: SSH
* (S//REL) In the case of Tor: TLS
* (S//REL) Make deep packet inspection (XKS :-) ) work harder
* (S//REL) Both use work of a open source project (brl/obfuscated-openssh)
* (S//REL) Idea is both sides transmit random seed and verifier information
* (S//REL) Verifier is hash of seed and other data
* (S//REL) If verifier passes data used from both side seeds to generate key
* (S//REL) Key used in symmetric cipher to encrypt native SSH or SSL protocol
* (S//REL) So for random stream, need to de-obfuscate and test for SSH / SSL
* (S//REL) Details for Psiphon 3
* (S//REL) Hash used for verifier, key generation: 6000 iterations SHA-1
* (S//REL) Symmetric cipher is RC-4
* (S//REL) Details for Tor Obsfproxy
* (S//REL) Hash used for verifier, key generation: 100K iterations SHA-256
* (S//REL) Symmetric cipher is AES-CTR-128
* (S//REL) Key uses seed from both sides!
TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY
## (S//REL) Tor Project and friends Recent Activity
* (S//REL) Tor on non-traditional platforms
- (S//REL) ORBOT, Tor for Android smartphones - Associated browser, easy to use!
- (S//REL) Tor Router Project - Modified Linksys Router (everything over Tor)
- (S//REL) Hide-My-IP-Address
* (S//REL) Proprietary replacement for Tor Browser Bundle
* (S//REL) From "WCCL Network" not part of Tor Project
* (S//SI//REL) Looked at based on reference by CT target
- (S//REL) Tor Project working on improving support for circumvention
- (S//REL) Handshake obfuscation (discussed)
- (S//REL) Better bridge proliferation / distribution
- (S//REL) Tails: Complete Bootable OS on CD for anonymity - includes Tor
* (S//REL) Adds Severe CNE misery to equation
* (S//SI//REL) Has been discussed by CT targets
TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY
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---
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY
## (S//REL) Tor Project and friends Recent Activity
* (S//REL) Advanced Tor "Obfuscation" Project: SkypeMorph
- (S//REL) Another option for pluggable transport
- (S//REL) More sophisticated concept than Obfsproxy
- (S//REL) Open connection to Skype server with "bridge Skype ID"
- (S//REL) Encapsulate Tor in encrypted data mimicking Skype Video Traffic
- (S//REL) Sort of traffic flow steganography vice content steganography
- (S//REL) True Public Key cryptography vice obfuscation with known key
- (S//REL) Product of University research - Non-trivial to deploy
* (TS//SI//REL) Most Recent SIGINT Work on Exploiting Tor
- (TS//SI//REL) REMATION II Workshop (US/UK) at MHS spring 2012
- (S//SI//REL) Unleashed Networking/CNE legions...
- (S//REL) See later talk by [REDACTED] for the scoop
TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY
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---
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY
## (S//REL) Tor Project and friends Recent Activity
* (S//REL) Online Feud between 2 IAT Products: Ultrasurf and Tor
- (S//REL) " Technical Analysis of the Ultrasurf proxying software" (Applebaum)
- (S//REL) Analysis (including some SRE) – highly critical
- (S//REL) Single hop, controlled by one authority
- (S//REL) Security by obscurity
- (S//REL) No perfect forward secrecy (forensic traces exploitable)
- (S//REL) Responsible Disclosure: Ultrasurf notified 12/2011, published 04/2012
- (S//REL) "Tor's critique of Ultrasurf: A reply from the Ultrasurf developers"
- (S//REL) Posted on Ultrasurf site days after Tor published critique
- (S//REL) All talk and no show
- (S//REL) Not fully analyzed
- (S//REL) One Approach to IAT: Tor - higher anonymity, smaller scale
- (S//REL) One Approach to IAT: Ultrasurf - focus on circumvention, massive scale
TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY
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{
"title": "Types of IAT - Advanced Open Source Multi-hop",
"type": "REPORTED",
"description": "This top-secret NSA/GCHQ document provides a detailed technical overview of the Tor network, including how it works, its strengths as the “king of high secure, low-latency Internet anonymity,” methods for identifying Tor traffic, censorship-driven protocol obfuscation, and ongoing intelligence efforts to analyze, fingerprint, and exploit Tor through passive SIGINT and active research, including collaboration between US and UK agencies.",
"long_description": "",
"tags": [
"Tor",
"anonymity",
"network security",
"traffic analysis",
"censorship circumvention",
"obfuscation",
"protocol obfuscation",
"PSIPHON",
"Obfsproxy",
"SkypeMorph",
"Firefox",
"Firefox exploit",
"exploitation",
"vulnerability analysis",
"passive traffic analysis",
"TLS",
"TLS fingerprinting",
"Diffie-Hellman",
"certificates",
"XKS",
"modulus",
"VPNs",
"Tor nodes",
"directory servers",
"latency",
"cryptography",
"pluggable transports",
"Tails",
"ORBOT",
"Android",
"routers",
"Internet freedom",
"intelligence operations",
"FVEY",
"UltraSurf",
"traffic shaping",
"TBB",
"Tor Browser",
"exploit development",
"law enforcement",
"de-anonymization",
"cable tapping",
"SIGINT collection",
"protocol analysis",
"network exploitation",
"online privacy",
"secure communications",
"intelligence cooperation",
"exploitation workshops",
"IAT",
"targeted surveillance",
"open source",
"low latency attack",
"deep packet inspection",
"OpenSSH",
"SSL",
"SHA-1. SHA-256",
"AES",
"Skype",
"public key cryptography",
"SRE",
"security by obscurity",
"PFS",
"perfect forward secrecy",
"forward secrecy",
"forensic traces",
"EFF"
],
"document": {
"creator": "NSA, GCHQ",
"date_created": "",
"classification": [
"TOP SECRET",
"SI"
],
"dissemination": [
"REL TO USA, FVEY"
],
"banner": "TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY",
"genre": "slides",
"programs": [
"XKEYSCORE",
"REMATION II"
],
"countries": [
"China",
"Iran"
],
"people": [
"Appelbaum, Jacob"
]
},
"publication": [
{
"publisher": "The Guardian",
"date_published": "2013-10-04",
"title": "NSA and GCHQ target Tor network that protects anonymity of web users",
"link": "https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/nsa-gchq-attack-tor-network-encryption",
"reporters": [
"Ball, James",
"Schneier, Bruce",
"Greenwald, Glenn"
],
"contributors": []
}
],
"aka_id": [
{
"id": "ACLU_-_tor-works"
},
{
"id": "nsa-iat-tor"
}
],
"pdf_sha256": "e62a602a4bacc625a82eecda733bb4278c7ed68f5a4e099ba78046d1484ae6c4",
"pages": 9
}