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Op MULLENIZE and beyond - Staining machines
10/10/12
01:13:02 pm, by [REDACTED], 576 words
Categories: MCE, MCD, MISD
Op MULLENIZE and beyond - Staining machines
UK Top Secret Strap1 COMINT
The Problem: A large number of users on one Internet Protocol(IP) address at one time (e.g. in an Internet
café) means it is difficult for analysts to identify individual IP addresses or users.
The Solution: Working together, CT and CNE have devised a method to carry out large-scale 'staining' as
a means to identify individual machines linked to that IP address. Carried out as Op MULLENIZE, this
operation is beginning to yield positive results, particularly in [REDACTED]. User Agent Staining is
a technique that involves writing a unique marker (or stain) onto a target machine. Each stain is visible in
passively collected SIGINT and is stamped into every packet, which enables all the events from that stained
machine to be brought back together to recreate a browsing session.
Much of the work in CT operations involves understanding extremists' use of the Internet. Generally, this
is achieved by looking through passively collected SIGINT data and using that information to recreate an
Internet session, based on what was happening on a particular IP address at a particular time.
The location of collection assets or the telecoms infrastructure of some countries means that the IP address
seen attached to each event collected might not be the one actually used by the target to access the Internet.
These IP addresses might be servers, proxies or NATs (Network Address Translators – the Internet-facing
device in a private network of machines) and they can play havoc with the ability to recreate an internet
session for an individual.
[REDACTED] example of a region using massive NATs, with thousands of users on one IP address at
any one time making it virtually impossible to identify our targets in that country. The idea of large scale
staining of machines [REDACTED] seemed to present a solution to this problem.
In order to deploy these stains at scale across machines used by the extremist community [REDACTED]
decided to target machines where the users visited extremist web forums [REDACTED]
used to deliver the stains to each target machine [REDACTED] mechanism that leverages GCHQ's
huge passive SIGINT accesses to deliver CNE payloads to targets. As this is a very new approach to
tackling a tough target, it took 12 months for policy, collection, processing and CNE issues to be resolved,
but after a lot of hard work by some committed individuals across Benhall, Bude and SOUNDER,
successful implementation of staining at scale was achieved.
Over 150 stains are now deployed against machines [REDACTED] the technique has been adopted to help
with work agains [REDACTED] with nearly 200 stains deployed there in the last 2 months. Analysis
is becoming easier and the benefits are being felt outside of the teams that started the work. An unexpected
benefit from this work is that targeting any of the machines that have been stained for further CNE efforts
is much easier.
This is a great example of CNE effects enabling passive SIGINT and then this in turn enabling CNE and
will hopefully lead the way for future joint projects on hard targets.
If you would like to hear more about the techniques and tools used in Op MULLENIZE sign up for a
Mission News Live presentation on Tuesday, 16 October.

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{
"title": "Op MULLENIZE and beyond - Staining machines 10/10/12",
"type": "REPORTED",
"description": "This 2012 report from the NSA's British counterpart, the GCHQ, describes a method of \"staining\" electronic traffic to distinguish otherwise anonymous users. It is used to unmask Tor users and devices on networks in which many computers share the same Internet address. The method relies on planting code in a web browser to change the \"user agent,\" which is the way the browser identifies itself on the web. In a two month period, the report says, GCHQ managed to implant about 200 computers with uniquely identifying stains.",
"long_description": "",
"tags": [
"Operation MULLENIZE",
"internal report",
"briefing",
"MCE",
"MCD",
"MISD",
"staining",
"machine stain",
"stain marker",
"packet manipulation",
"unique identifier",
"de-anonymization",
"User-Agent",
"HTTP header manipulation",
"browser fingerprinting",
"code injection",
"client-side payload",
"Computer Network Exploitation",
"CNE payload delivery",
"passive SIGINT",
"passive collection",
"packet-level marker",
"session reconstruction",
"implanting code in browser",
"web-based implant",
"browser exploitation",
"browsers",
"targeted staining",
"large-scale staining",
"scale deployment",
"analysis",
"follow-on targeting",
"Benhall",
"Bude",
"extremist forums",
"forums",
"extremism",
"internet cafes",
"NAT",
"Network Address Translator",
"shared IP address",
"massive NATs",
"proxies",
"events",
"browsing history",
"forensics",
"operational tradecraft",
"technical exfiltration",
"operational success",
"target acquisition",
"signature stamping",
"network-level marking",
"traffic staining",
"analytic facilitation",
"collection assets",
"telecommunications infrastructure",
"implant delivery"
],
"document": {
"creator": "GCHQ",
"date_created": "2012-10-10",
"classification": [
"TOP SECRET",
"STRAP 1",
"COMINT"
],
"dissemination": [],
"banner": "UK Top Secret Strap1 COMINT",
"genre": "report",
"programs": [
"MULLENIZE",
"SOUNDER"
],
"countries": [],
"people": []
},
"publication": [
{
"publisher": "The Washington Post",
"date_published": "2013-10-04",
"title": "Secret NSA documents show campaign against Tor encrypted network",
"link": "https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/secret-nsa-documents-show-campaign-against-tor-encrypted-network/2013/10/04/610f08b6-2d05-11e3-8ade-a1f23cda135e_story.html",
"reporters": [
"Gellman, Barton",
"Timberg, Craig",
"Rich, Steven"
],
"contributors": [
"Soltani, Ashkan",
"Tate, Julie"
],
"doc_source": "https://web.archive.org/web/20131202233236/http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/gchq-report-on-mullenize-program-to-stain-anonymous-electronic-traffic/502/"
}
],
"aka_id": [
{
"id": "gchq-mullenize"
}
],
"pdf_sha256": "02e790fcdc28166ffa31d13c6e97ce32920c434d15d1839bbb750e6d5efc7e69",
"pages": 2
}