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TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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Special Collection Service
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# EINSTEIN/CASTANET
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TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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---
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TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR. NZL
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Special Collection Service
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# The SCS Cyber Advantage
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Integrated Mission
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Broad Spectrum of Capability
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Geographic Advantage
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Signal Access
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Analysis
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Dissemination
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Unique Platform
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for IC Operations
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SIGINT prowess provides cyber advantage
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Unified operations provides holistic approach
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The right intelligence delivered to the right customer
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Home field advantage in adversary's space
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Where our customers want us and our adversaries do not
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Capitalizing on the "element of surprise"
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Signal access for collection, exfil, and infil
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Microwave, WiFi, WiMAX, GSM, CDMA, Satellite, etc.
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Living in the environment
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Insights on infrastructure and configurations
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Discovery of targets, signatures, and behavior
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Tailored intelligence products
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Diverse products driven by national objectives and
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local needs through formal reporting, target packages,
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analytic insights, situational awareness, threat warning
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Unique platform for conducting
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and enabling IC operations
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Fully leveraging 30-years of experience within the NSA and
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CIA enterprises and using existing authorities
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TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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---
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Classification / Declassification Guide 356-01
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STATEROOM Guide
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(S//SI//REL) This guide provides classification of facts concerning
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covert SIGINT collection from Diplomatic facilities overseas (STATEROOM sites).
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| Information | Classification Markings* | Reason** | Remarks | Declas/ Exempt** |
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| :----------- | :----------------------- | :------- | :------- | :--------------- |
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| **1. GENERAL INFORMATION** | | | | |
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| 1.a (U) Coverterms or ECI names, such as STATEROOM, standing alone.| UNCLASSIFIED | | (U//FOUO) Association of the coverterm STATEROOM with intelligence or SIGINT is U//FOUO. However, additional details could result in the need for classification. ||
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| 1.b (S//REL) The terms "Special Collection Service" (SCS) or Communications Systems Support Group (CSSG), when not associated with NSA, CIA, or an intelligence mission. | UNCLASSIFIED | | (U) Any association with an intelligence agency or mission is SECRET.||
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| 1.c (U) SCS program and budget data (e.g., line item details). | SECRET | 1.5 (c) | | X1|
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7. GLOSSARY
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| | |
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| :---| :--- |
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| (S//SI//REL) STATEROOM sites | STATEROOM sites are covert SIGINT collection sites located in diplomatic facilities abroad. SIGINT agencies hosting such sites include SCS (at U.S. Diplomatic facilities), Government Communications headquarters or GCHQ (at British diplomatic facilities), Communication Security Establishments or CSE (at Canadian diplomatic facilities), and Defense Signals Directorate or DSD (at Australian diplomatic facilities). These sites are small in size and in number of personnel staffing them. They are covert, and their true mission is not known by the majority of the diplomatic staff at the facility where they are assigned. |
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| (C//REL) Concealed collection system | Collection equipment whose location on a building is concealed so as not to reveal a SIGINT activity. For example, antennas are sometimes hidden in false architectural features or roof maintenance sheds. |
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| (S//SI//REL) Mock site | A typical SCS site set up at SCS HQS primarily for demonstration purposes, but which is incidentally used for processing SIGINT collected overseas and forwarded back via the SCS wide area network. |
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| (U) Diplomatic facilities or premises | Embassies or Consulates.|
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76
data/EFF_-_20131027-spiegel-embassy/metadata.json
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76
data/EFF_-_20131027-spiegel-embassy/metadata.json
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{
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"title": "SCS - Embassies and Consulates",
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"type": "REPORTED",
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"description": "TOP SECRET Special Collection Service (SCS) documents about covert CIA/NSA spying sites operated from diplomatic facilities worldwide.",
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"long_description": "These are TOP SECRET Special Collection Service documents published by Der Spiegel on 28 October 2013, accompanying the article \"Der unheimliche Freund\" (The Uncanny Friend) that reported the US embassy at Pariser Platz in Berlin was used as a listening post to surveil the German government quarter, including Chancellor Angela Merkel's mobile phone.\n\nThe Special Collection Service (SCS) is a joint CIA/NSA unit that conducts covert close-access SIGINT collection from US diplomatic facilities. The \"SCS Cyber Advantage\" slide promotes the unit's capabilities under several headings: integrated mission (unified CIA/NSA operations), broad spectrum of capability (signal access for collection, exfiltration and infiltration across microwave, WiFi, WiMAX, GSM, CDMA and satellite), geographic advantage (\"home field advantage in adversary's space\" and \"where our customers want us and our adversaries do not\"), and the \"element of surprise.\" It describes SCS as a unique platform for conducting and enabling Intelligence Community operations, leveraging 30 years of combined NSA and CIA experience. EINSTEIN and CASTANET are named — EINSTEIN being one of the SCS antenna systems, identified in the accompanying article as the codename for an antenna system used to intercept mobile signals and simultaneously locate target persons.\n\nThe STATEROOM Classification/Declassification Guide (356-01) is the more revealing document. STATEROOM is the covername for covert SIGINT collection sites located inside diplomatic facilities abroad. The guide's glossary confirms that four Five Eyes agencies operate such sites: the SCS at US diplomatic facilities, GCHQ at British diplomatic facilities, CSE at Canadian diplomatic facilities, and DSD at Australian diplomatic facilities. These sites are described as small in size and personnel, covert, with their true mission unknown to the majority of the diplomatic staff at the hosting facility. The guide describes concealed collection systems — equipment hidden on buildings (for example antennas concealed in false architectural features or roof maintenance sheds) so as not to reveal SIGINT activity — corroborating the article's reporting that the Berlin embassy's rooftop featured window-like recesses blanked with dielectric material transparent to signals, behind which the intercept equipment and windowless SCS offices were located. The guide also references a \"mock site\" at SCS headquarters used for demonstration but incidentally processing overseas-collected SIGINT forwarded via the SCS wide area network. The classification rules confirm that association of the SCS or STATEROOM terms with an intelligence mission is classified.\n\nThe accompanying article provides significant additional context from other NSA documents. A 2010 document lists the SCS as operating from roughly 80 locations (see Snowchive doc-id cia-nsa-scs) worldwide, 19 in Europe (including Paris, Madrid, Rome, Prague and Geneva), with two sites in Germany — Berlin and Frankfurt — both at the highest staffing/equipment level. The BIRDWATCHER program, run directly from SCS headquarters in Maryland, is described as intercepting encrypted communications in foreign countries and searching for access points. Most significantly, the article describes an entry from the NSA's target database recording Merkel's mobile number (+49173-xxxxxxx) as a \"Selector Value\" with subscriber \"GE Chancellor Merkel,\" tasked by branch S2C32 (the European States Branch of the Signals Intelligence Directorate), entered into the National Sigint Requirements List in 2002, with status \"A\" for active, and assigned to Target Office of Primary Interest \"F666E\" — F6 being the internal NSA designation for the SCS. This indicated NSA had targeted Merkel's phone for over a decade, from her time as opposition party leader through her chancellorship, an operation that would have been authorised under President George W. Bush and NSA Director Michael Hayden and renewed into the Obama administration.\n\nThese documents describe covert SCS intercept sites in US embassies, whose true mission \"is not known by the majority of the diplomatic staff\".",
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"tags": [
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"diplomats",
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"diplomatic surveillance",
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"embassy",
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"ECI",
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"consulates",
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"CIA",
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"Special Collection Service",
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"close access",
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"covert collection",
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"diplomatic facility",
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"embassy surveillance",
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"concealed antenna",
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"dielectric",
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"GCHQ",
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"CSE",
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"DSD",
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"microwave",
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"WiFi",
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"WiMAX",
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"GSM",
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"CDMA",
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"satellite",
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"mobile interception",
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"geolocation"
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],
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"document": {
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"creator": "NSA",
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"date_created": "",
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"classification": [
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"TOP SECRET",
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"COMINT"
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],
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"dissemination": [
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"REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL"
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],
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"banner": "TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL",
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"genre": "other",
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"programs": [
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"EINSTEIN",
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"CASTANET",
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"STATEROOM"
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],
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"countries": [],
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"people": []
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},
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"publication": [
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{
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"publisher": "Der Spiegel",
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"date_published": "2013-10-27",
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"title": "Der unheimliche Freund",
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"link": "https://www.spiegel.de/politik/der-unheimliche-freund-a-f291ca2f-0002-0001-0000-000118184380",
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"reporters": [
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"Appelbaum, Jacob",
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"Blome, Nikolaus",
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"Gude, Hubert",
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"Neukirch, Ralf",
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"Pfister, René",
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"Poitras, Laura",
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"Rosenbach, Marcel",
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"Schindler, Jörg",
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"Schmitz, Gregor Peter",
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"Stark, Holger"
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],
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"contributors": [],
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"doc_source": "http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/photo-gallery-spies-in-the-embassy-fotostrecke-103079.html"
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}
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],
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"pdf_sha256": "7d99b26bfadc07bcc77a6f667d20b1b8fd70416e87dce2b1f738a1da19d625c4",
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"pages": 4
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}
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