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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY//20320108
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(U) SIGINT Mission Strategic Plan
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FY2008-2013
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3 October 2007 Release
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[REDACTED] Signals Intelligence
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Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
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Dated: 20070108
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Declassify On: 20320108
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY//20320108
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY//20320108
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(U) BACKGROUND
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(U//FOUO) America invests in intelligence programs to detect, and to provide full and timely
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answers to questions about, the hidden pursuits of persons, states, or organizations. In the case
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of signals intelligence (SIGINT), the expectation is that surveillance of targeted electronic
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signals and systems will yield insight that's worth the costly capabilities and operations needed
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to obtain it. For over 50 years, from World War II through the global war on terrorism, this
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investment has been justified, but the mission is still rightly judged by the answers it delivers.
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The implied business model is to position the mission to cover enough priority targets to ensure a
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steady stream of valued products and services for decision makers and other SIGINT consumers.
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(U) This strategic plan seeks to maintain or enhance the mission's value in light of the challenges
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- and opportunities - of the unfolding network age. It frames and establishes several key aims
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and assigns responsibility for actions needed to attain them. At the highest level, success is
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defined as stable or improved responsiveness to customer needs, while doing best against the
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targets that matter most and avoiding strategic surprise.¹
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(U) The plan was developed through the on-line collaboration of over 250 SIGINT practitioners
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and partners, working within a framework created by the chief SIGINT strategist. It focuses on a
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small set of acts that should pay large dividends, and introduces data-driven processes to track
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progress, spot problems, and prompt adjustments. It's how we'll continue to modernize the way
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we prepare for, perform, and appraise SIGINT operations in a world in transformation.
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(U) DRIVERS
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(S//REL) Since 2003 the intelligence community has been guided by a national intelligence
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priorities framework (NIPF) that maps customer needs into bands (A, B, and C) of successively
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lower concern. "Band A" topics include those strategic, asymmetric, and other threats that have
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the potential to greatly harm the U.S. or its interests. Within each topic, a 1-5 priority is assigned
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to specific geopolitical or non-state entities of interest, with 1 being the highest. Of course, not
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all intelligence questions are necessarily best, or even reasonably, probed by SIGINT means.
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Potential customers are asked to request SIGINT only when they can characterize its expected
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contribution as supplementary, substantial, key, or extraordinary.
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(S//REL) Since October of 2005, a national intelligence strategy has provided additional
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direction. Its five overarching mission objectives are to defeat terrorism, prevent and counter the
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spread of weapons of mass destruction, bolster the growth of democracy, penetrate hard targets,
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and anticipate developments of strategic concern. Of course, neither these nor the roster of
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"Band A" topics represent a radical shift from prior thinking. For several years, the SIGINT
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system has pursued these issues, intensifying efforts to harvest data from computers, Internet
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traffic, and other packetized communications in the process. As the chart shows, there has in
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¹ (U) As outlined in Appendix A, end-to-end performance will be judged by quantitative and qualitative
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analysis of customer requests and mission deliverables, and by authoritative customer surveys.
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY//20320108
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2
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY//20320108
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fact been significant growth in the percentage of customer questions, and especially high priority
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ones, that are being at least partially answered by serialized SIGINT reporting.²
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(U) Percentage of Information Requests Addressed, Q3 FY04 to Q3 FY07
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```
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50%
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45%
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40%
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35%
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30%
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25%
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20%
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15%
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10%
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Q3 FY 2004
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Q4 FY 2004
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Q1 FY 2005
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Q2 FY 2005
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Q3 FY 2005
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Q4 FY 2005
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Q1 FY 2006
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Q2 FY 2006
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Q3 FY 2006
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Q4 FY 2006
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Q1 FY 2007
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Q2 FY 2007
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Q3 FY 2007
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"Band A" Requests
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quests
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"Band B" Requests
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"Band C" Requests
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U//FOUO
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```
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remains at a premium, as is information about asymmetric threats such as weapons of mass
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destruction, hostile cyber activities, and some terrorist organizations. Moreover, past gains are
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always under pressure from the relentless evolution of targets and technology.
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(TS//SI//REL) For instance, as Internet routing and service nodes become more dispersed, some
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lucrative SIGINT chokepoints vanish and it takes more access points or over-the-net operations
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to maintain the same coverage. As strong cryptography is applied to identity management,
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software attestation, protecting data at rest, and securing network metadata, we must comparably
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expand cryptographic enabling, sensitive commercial partnerships, and cryptanalytic processing
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capabilities. As users become more mobile and more anonymous, we must introduce new
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association and pattern detection technology, lest targets of interest be lost or overlooked.
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(S//SI//REL) At the same time, global modernization makes intelligence on economic, political,
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and other civil issues more valuable, and relevant targets tend to favor networks. Internet-centric
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activities such as e-commerce, e-voting, and on-net industrial and utility control beg to be mined,
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even as we expand existing operations against both public and private nets. Mounting interest in
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cyber security and the on-line aspects of crime and extremism also spur demand for network
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surveillance, as well as more interaction with atypical customers such as state and local
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governments, and tighter partnerships with consumers whose own target knowledge can help
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steer and interpret collection or whose operations can be "cued" by SIGINT.
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(S//REL) Some efforts to recruit, train, and direct Islamic and other extremists are already
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entrusted to networks, and so will be many plans and acts of the PRC as it rises to be a near-peer
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competitor. Ruling institutions of even rogue states make some use of Internet technology, as do
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the scientists and proliferators with which they work. In fact, fewer and fewer targets of any
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stripe or location are far removed from a colleague, confidant, or confederate that's in the know
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and on the net.
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² (U) "Questions" are defined here as desired essential elements of information specified in standing
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COMINT or FISINT requirements. They're considered "addressed" when cited in serialized reporting issued during
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the quarter.
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY//20320108
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3
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY//20320108
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(U) VISION, VECTORS, & VALUES
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(U) Our mission is to answer questions about threatening activities that others mean to keep
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hidden. This is the essence of what we accomplish for the American people, whether we're
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supporting the global war on terrorism, infiltrating the leadership circles of strategic rivals or
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rogue states, or anticipating geopolitical and target technology trends.
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(U//FOUO) Our vision, or aspiration, is to utterly master the foreign intelligence implications of
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networks and network technology. Even conservative people and institutions find themselves
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having to entrust their plans and operations to networks or else so limit their ability to acquire
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information, issue instructions, and move people, money, materiel, and ideas as to risk
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irrelevance. The mission must be planned, equipped, and executed for best effect, against the
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objectives that matter most, in this brave new digital world.
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(U) At the heart of the task is the need to sense, and make sense of, systems, traffic, users, and
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various types and levels of organizations. This is a circular and fast moving process. New
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insight leads to better sensing, which leads to still greater insight, and so on – sometimes in
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months, but sometimes in minutes.
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(S//SI//REL) Today, most of what we access goes unexplored or unexploited. Humans can
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neither follow network flows in real-time nor forge intelligence gold from an accumulation of
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isolated data points whose worth is only apparent when combined with one another and with
|
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what others may know. Our global sensors need to be able to think for themselves and talk to
|
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one another instantaneously. Our processing systems need to automatically find meaning in and
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across vast and dispersed data sets. Our analysts need new skills and new tools, and need to
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apply them in new ways, often in concert with customers. Our business processes need to
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promote data-driven decision-making and more disciplined end-to-end planning.
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(U) This will not happen without leadership and the courage to ask if the practices and structures
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that serve us well today will continue to do so in the future. At the same time, some immutable
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values must continue to influence our daily choices and behavior. All military and civilian
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employees are called to commit to lawfulness, honesty, integrity, fairness, accountability,
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loyalty, collaboration, innovation, and learning. As we in the SIGINT mission grapple with the
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peculiar risks and rewards of the times and tasks at hand, a few implications of these
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commitments warrant special comment:
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* (U) SIGINT professionals must hold the moral high ground, even as terrorists or dictators
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seek to exploit our freedoms. Some of our adversaries will say or do anything to advance
|
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their cause; we will not. All employees must have uncompromising devotion to personal and
|
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institutional integrity – doing the right thing, every time, regardless of how difficult it is.
|
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* (U) SIGINT professionals must be honest with themselves, colleagues, superiors, and
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overseers. When something won't work, isn't working, hasn't worked, or went wrong, we
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need to say so, with respect, but also with unmistakable clarity. We then find a different way
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forward.
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* (U) SIGINT professionals need to grow and prosper as mission assets and as individuals.
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We encourage career-long learning, periodic stretch assignments, and a balance between
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work and home life that honors duty to family, community, and self as well as to country.
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY//20320108
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4
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(U) KEY AIMS & ACTIONS
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(U) We seek to maximize the SIGINT mission's value to the nation in the context of the
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intelligence priorities and technological realities of the network age. Fortunately, no matter what
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streams of operational and engineering initiatives – from the incremental to the transformational
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– are running their course at a particular time, a few core structures can channel them for best
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effect. The following goals are intended to do just that. As implementation of the plan proceeds,
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the responsibilities described below will be further decomposed into subtasks for various mission
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elements and levels. Ultimately, much of the daily work of the SIGINT enterprise will benefit,
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including the immediate mission imperatives presented in Appendix B.
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(U//FOUO) Goal 1: Annually improve SIGINT on NIPF "priority I" tasks and "Band A" topics
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in general, as measured by more even performance across topics and rising performance overall.³
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A. (U) Responsibility and Accountability: Beginning in October 2007, the mission's Deputy
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Director for Customer Relationships (DDCR) will assess SIGINT mission performance
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against NIPF "Band A" tasks using methods outlined in Appendix A. The DDCR will
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provide the mission's senior leaders with quarterly "Band A" performance reports and
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quarterly identification of un- or under-satisfied "Band A" tasks.
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B. (U//FOUO) Responsibility and Accountability: Beginning in FY08, the DDCR will lead the
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missions Deputy Directors for Analysis and Production (DDAP) and Data Acquisition
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(DDDA), and Associate Deputy Director for SIGINT Development (ADD SIGDEV) through
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joint reviews of un- or under-satisfied "Band A" tasks to find and address problems. The
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DDCR will provide the SIGINT Director with quarterly improvement plans and progress
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reports, including concurrence, analysis, and commitments from the DDAP, DDDA, and
|
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ADD SIGDEV.⁴
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C. (U//FOUO) Responsibility and Accountability: By April 2008, the DDDA will begin
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tracking the current and expected purpose and (using documented business rules)
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productivity of 1st, 2nd, and 3rd party SIGINT accesses.⁴ The DDDA will provide the SIGINT
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Director with quarterly comparisons of the "Band A" tasks given to, and the disposition and
|
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use of the resultant collection from, each access, highlighting un- or under-satisfied tasks.
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D. (U//FOUO) Responsibility and Accountability: Beginning in FY09, the DDDA will
|
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systematically reengineer, retire, or replace (directly or though a partner) chronically
|
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|
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³ (U//FOUO) While performance against "Band A" topics is our benchmark, we will continue to work all
|
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high priority tasks, and lesser "Band B" and "Band C" issues when it's affordable and plays to our strengths.
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⁴ (U//FOUO) "Access" as used here refers to data sources that are at least partially funded via the collection
|
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and operations investment portfolio. The purpose or productivity of an access may relate to tipping, steering, or
|
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otherwise enabling other collectors, as opposed to collecting targeted information directly. Uniqueness and
|
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untapped potential are also factors to consider as is the expected contribution of an access in the event of a
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reasonably likely and significant future crisis or concern.
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY//20320108
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5
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY//20320108
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underperforming accesses. The DDDA will annually provide the SIGINT Director with a
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multiyear "access enhancement" plan as part of the program build cycle.
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E. (U) Responsibility and Accountability: Beginning in FY08, the Agency's Chief Technology
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Officer (CTO) – with the full support of relevant collection, analysis, and customer
|
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engagement elements – will start to systematically instrument SIGINT tasking, ingestion,
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processing, analysis, and delivery systems to automatically tag data so that its source and
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subsequent processing and handling can be associated with some categorization of its
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ultimate use or intelligence value. The CTO will provide the Agency's Senior Leadership
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with semi-annual reports on the percentage of data accessed that can be so associated.
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(U//FOUO) Goal 2: Field an analytic workforce that promptly and methodically discovers and
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exploits priority secrets entrusted to networks worldwide and helps customers turn this insight
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into significant national outcomes.
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A. (U//FOUO) Responsibility and Accountability: Beginning with FY08, the CTO will enable
|
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improved information discovery by orchestrating annual increases in the proportion of newly
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acquired and archived data and metadata that can be readily searched and retrieved by
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analysts across the enterprise using standard workstations. The CTO will develop baseline
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measures of accessible data, query times, and query difficulty, and provide the SIGINT
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Director with annual improvement reports, beginning at the end of FY08.
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B. (U//FOUO) Responsibility and Accountability: In FY08 and out, the NSA/CSS Senior
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Language and NSA/CSS Senior Intelligence Authorities will maintain a global training
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requirement for all cryptologic language and intelligence analysts performing various classes
|
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of missions and functions; will identify the types of learning activities that meet the
|
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requirement, based on current and projected needs and workforce statistics; and will provide
|
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data on organizational compliance to SIGINT mission and Agency leadership. The NSA/CSS
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Senior Language and Intelligence Authorities and line managers of relevant organizations
|
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will ensure that at least 80% of all cryptologic intelligence and language analysts will
|
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engage in 160 hours of prescribed approved professional development every two years, and
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that at least 10% of language and intelligence analysts working the counterterrorism mission
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will be engaged in advanced or specialized training at any given time.⁵
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C. (U//FOUO) Responsibility and Accountability: Beginning in FY08, the DDCR and the
|
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DDAP will cultivate client-consultant relationships with more customers to facilitate new
|
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and more productive tasking and consumption of SIGINT products and services. The DDAP
|
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will provide the SIGINT Director with an annual report on the number, disposition, and
|
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documented impact of analysts serving in full-time consultancy assignments.
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D. (C//REL) Responsibility and Accountability: Beginning in FY08, the DDAP will increase
|
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the practice of forward deploying analysts into customer workspaces to facilitate real-time
|
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analysis and iterative consultation where needed. The DDAP will provide the SIGINT
|
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Director with quarterly summaries of the number and location of forward deployed analysts
|
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and their operational impact as assessed by customer surveys.
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E. (U//FOUO) Responsibility and Accountability: Beginning in FY08, the DDAP will
|
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systematically hand off mature analytic tasks to qualified partners when doing so increases
|
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|
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⁵ (U) The latter is already a requirement of the National Counterterrorism Intelligence Plan.
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY//20320108
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6
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY//20320108
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the effectiveness or efficiency of the resources available to the U.S government and the
|
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SIGINT mission. The DDAP will provide the SIGINT Director with an annual report on the
|
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tasks so "franchised" over the previous fiscal year, how any recovered resources were
|
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reemployed, and the customer impacts of both.⁶
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(U) Goal 3: Annually increase the use of business cases to allocate pay and non-pay dollars and
|
||||
scarce skills for better returns on investment than alternative ways of using the same resources.⁶
|
||||
|
||||
A. (U//FOUO) Responsibility and Accountability: Beginning in FY08, the chief SIGINT
|
||||
strategist will identify those skills that, for lack of critical mass, keep us from meaningfully
|
||||
migrating to new net centric tools and techniques, even if resources are adequate to expand
|
||||
existing types of collection, processing, or analysis operations. Prior to each year's program
|
||||
build cycle, the chief SIGINT strategist will provide investment portfolio managers and the
|
||||
SIGINT mission's senior leadership with an annual list of work roles whose incumbents are
|
||||
to be considered "scarce resources" for business planning purposes.
|
||||
|
||||
B. (U) Responsibility and Accountability: Beginning in FY08, the DDCR and the ADD
|
||||
SIGDEV will fuse insight into technology and geopolitical trends and then clearly articulate
|
||||
the prioritized implications for the SIGINT mission. Prior to each year's program build
|
||||
cycle, the DDCR and the ADD SIGDEV will provide investment portfolio managers with
|
||||
easily consumable and actionable planning guidance aimed at avoiding technological or
|
||||
strategic surprise and optimally ordering potential investments.
|
||||
|
||||
C. (U) Responsibility and Accountability: Beginning with the FY10-15 program build, the
|
||||
Collection & Operations, Processing & Exploitation, Analysis & Production, and Mission
|
||||
Management investment portfolio managers will revalidate or construct new business cases
|
||||
covering ever larger proportions of their pay and non-pay submissions. As part of each
|
||||
year's program build cycle, each of the four investment managers will submit business cases
|
||||
to the SIGINT Director covering more of their portfolio than previous budgets.
|
||||
|
||||
(U) INVESTMENTS
|
||||
|
||||
(U) The national intelligence program allocates pay and non-pay dollars to the SIGINT mission
|
||||
through seven investment portfolios. As discussed below, the work of each must be tailored for
|
||||
success in a changing world. Ultimately, desired customer outcomes demand certain operational
|
||||
concepts and functions. These require sets of personnel and technical capabilities and supporting
|
||||
infrastructure, all playing the right role at the right time as scripted by system engineering.
|
||||
|
||||
(U) Collection and Operations
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI//REL) Historically, we've arrayed independent accesses against various streams of point-
|
||||
to-point communications. As we shift from intercepting links to exploiting networks though,
|
||||
multiple collection platforms must be engineered and outfitted to work in concert, and often in
|
||||
real-time. Vast quantities of message externals and other network metadata must be harvested,
|
||||
|
||||
⁶ (U) Such business cases should take into account national priorities, geopolitical and technology forecasts,
|
||||
mission assessment data, and defensible cost information.
|
||||
|
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY//20320108
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7
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY//20320108
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||||
|
||||
often via bulk "midpoint" collection of global backbones. Vendors and service providers must
|
||||
also be leveraged to obtain metadata and other targeting and vulnerability information, as well as
|
||||
traffic. "Endpoint" operations must expand, to retrieve more targeted data directly and to alter
|
||||
routing or encryption for the benefit of passive sensors.
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI//REL) Midpoint collectors will still be used to acquire content (and not just metadata), but
|
||||
with less success and at greater cost as traffic volumes and velocities rise. Mobile and tactical
|
||||
systems, covert and clandestine programs, and overhead assets will continue to perform their
|
||||
specialized tasks until the spread of network technology offers a better play, and will be
|
||||
modernized as the mission requires or when automation or new technology can significantly
|
||||
reduce long-term manpower or life-cycle support costs. Endpoint methods will be used for more
|
||||
ELINT and FIS tasks, gathering data on some weapons or emitters before they're deployed.⁷
|
||||
|
||||
(U) Processing and Exploitation
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI//REL) If collection operations around the globe are to work in tandem in real-time, then
|
||||
the processing and exploitation fabric of the SIGINT system must provide for distributed storage
|
||||
and robust messaging. Fast, flexible, front-end processors must spot targets based on patterns,
|
||||
events, or metadata rather than pre-defined selectors or brute force scanning of content. High
|
||||
performance computing systems must extract meaning from huge data sets and to negate data
|
||||
encryption and computer access controls.
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI//REL) New developments will stress standardized interfaces that let diverse applications
|
||||
share infrastructure, and will favor automation and off-the-shelf technology over manual
|
||||
processes and point solutions. New SIGINT system architectures will de-couple event detection
|
||||
from follow-on reaction and processing, so that applications can be added or deleted with little
|
||||
impact to ongoing operations and so that sensors and processors can serve many tasks rather than
|
||||
one operational stovepipe. All this – and increased use of remotely configurable commercial
|
||||
hardware will also cut the time needed to retool or refocus technical infrastructure as customer
|
||||
needs, target behaviors, or technical constraints change; they'll reduce life-cycle costs as well.
|
||||
|
||||
(U) Analysis and Production
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI//REL) In the aftermath of the digital revolution, powerful analytics and empowered
|
||||
analysts are how we discover targets and their secrets and how we harness our technical
|
||||
capabilities to our customers' missions. Advances in collection and processing must let us flag
|
||||
events of interest as they happen, accumulate far more context-rich metadata, and collate
|
||||
targeted communications and transactions across accesses. To take advantage of this, analysts
|
||||
must have new tasking, association, and presentation tools, and larger and more adaptable
|
||||
storage and retrieval systems. Fortunately, information management and mining is central to the
|
||||
Internet age and next-generation analytics can employ many commercial products and practices.
|
||||
|
||||
(S//REL) Looking forward, we will continue to devote more analysts to exploiting digital
|
||||
network intelligence and to working problems related to counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation,
|
||||
China, Iran, and the Middle East, aggressively investing in the necessary tools and training, and
|
||||
"franchising" some mature missions to qualified partners. We will deemphasize the traditional
|
||||
concept of a SIGINT storefront (requirements in/reporting out) in favor of having far more
|
||||
analysts working physically or virtually within the missions that they support. They will act
|
||||
more as a consultancy than a simple data source, helping shape customer plans to reflect the "art
|
||||
|
||||
⁷ (U//FOUO) Some characterization of actual emitters in real world operation may still, however, be
|
||||
necessary.
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY//20320108
|
||||
8
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY//20320108
|
||||
|
||||
of the possible" and giving each customer's own analytic workforce the power and knowledge to
|
||||
reap, rather than just consume, SIGINT.
|
||||
|
||||
(U) Mission Management
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) To optimize ever more complex, fast-moving, cross-access operations, we must
|
||||
introduce intelligent agent technology that automatically updates tasking and status as it interacts
|
||||
with technical infrastructure, visualization tools, and authoritative databases. To prevent
|
||||
strategic surprise, we must track geopolitical and technology trends to identify potential gaps and
|
||||
mitigate them before mission performance degrades. To accommodate an increased fusion of
|
||||
SIGINT analysis with customer activities, we must develop new mission management tools that
|
||||
capture and handle a freer flow of interactions and new forms of support. To pave the way for
|
||||
more meaningful productivity estimates and more enlightened investment decisions, we must
|
||||
instrument collection, processing, and dissemination systems so that sources can be linked
|
||||
through analysis to customer outcomes.
|
||||
|
||||
(U) Research
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI//REL) Our ability to master global networks and handle previously unimagined volumes
|
||||
of raw data from both passive and active collection will depend in large part on successful
|
||||
research. Requirements include ever more powerful methods of knowledge discovery and
|
||||
management, highly capable software implants and mobile agents, optimal distributed storage
|
||||
arrangements, and advanced analytic algorithms. Underpinning all this must be high
|
||||
productivity computing systems and world-leading cryptanalytic talent that can both cope with
|
||||
pervasive hard encryption and find and exploit meaning in large data sets generally. Researchers
|
||||
must also break new ground in the area of enterprise security management if we're to fully
|
||||
realize a more interconnected, distributed, and autonomous SIGINT operations fabric and
|
||||
geographically dispersed analytic collaboration.
|
||||
|
||||
(U) Enterprise IT and Enterprise Management
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) New operational strategies and capabilities can't deliver on their promises without
|
||||
the right military, civilian, and contractor workforce, a modernized enterprise information
|
||||
technology infrastructure, and an assured 21st century physical plant. The quantity and quality of
|
||||
language analysts, intelligence analysts, mathematicians, and computer network exploitation
|
||||
specialists are priorities, as is rebuilding the acquisition, system engineering, and
|
||||
business/project management workforce. Another imperative is modernizing enterprise
|
||||
networks, platforms, and services; this effort ranges from bandwidth expansion, to server
|
||||
consolidation and refresh, to introducing user tokens and other information assurance measures.
|
||||
A third is dealing with long-deferred real property maintenance and the mitigation of long-
|
||||
simmering power, space, and cooling shortfalls.
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY//20320108
|
||||
9
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY//20320108
|
||||
|
||||
(U) APPENDIX A: Assessing Overall Performance
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) Customers request SIGINT by specifying the "essential elements of information"
|
||||
(EEIs) that they want to uncover. The National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) maps
|
||||
each EEI into one of three bands (A, B, or C) of successively decreasing concern according to
|
||||
general topic, and assigns a 1-5 priority based on the combination of the topic and specific
|
||||
geopolitical or non-state entity involved. Responsive SIGINT is delivered in several forms, but
|
||||
serialized reporting dominates, and so one indicator of end-to-end mission performance is the
|
||||
percentage of requested EEls for which at least some responsive reporting is provided (i.e., the
|
||||
EEI citation rate).
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) At a macro-level, the overall citation rate for "Band A" EEIs should be greater than
|
||||
that for "Band B," which in turn should exceed that for "Band C". Beyond that, performance
|
||||
against each "Band A" topic is also weighed in accordance with the following first-order rules.
|
||||
Performance is poor if a "Band A" topic's rate doesn't even exceed the overall "Band B" rate.
|
||||
Performance is weak if a topic's rate is above the overall "Band B" rate, but less than the overall
|
||||
"Band A" rate. Performance is fair or good if a topic's rate is at or above the overall "Band A"
|
||||
rate, with the latter also requiring that the rate for the topic's "priority 1" EEIs be higher than that
|
||||
for the topic's EEIs generally.
|
||||
|
||||
(U) Citation rates reflect only the existence of responsive SIGINT, and not its impact. Moreover,
|
||||
they don't directly account for requests that are addressed entirely by other than serialized
|
||||
reporting, and they can be skewed by careless recordkeeping or differences in granularity
|
||||
between EEls. Therefore, quarterly citation rate assessments are complemented with two
|
||||
broader, more subjective, and more manpower intensive views of customer outcomes and
|
||||
satisfaction.
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) The first is a quarterly, manual assessment of performance against each NIPF "Band
|
||||
A" topic that includes niche interactions that don't involve EEls as well as deliverables beyond
|
||||
serialized reporting. Performance is graded on the extent to which records show that responsive
|
||||
information was pushed to or pulled by a customer, and sampling suggests that the records that
|
||||
tie deliverables to requests are accurate, and sampling suggests that the information delivered
|
||||
was germane vice just tangential. Performance is poor if responsiveness is well below average
|
||||
(relative to that for "Band A" tasks as a whole), weak if responsiveness is somewhat below
|
||||
average, fair if responsiveness is average or better, and good if responsiveness overall is average
|
||||
or better and is better still against high priorities.
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) The second is a quarterly survey of roughly 20 intelligence consumers, specified by
|
||||
position based on their ability to speak knowledgably and authoritatively about the SIGINT
|
||||
contributions to key civil or military customers. Those solicited represent the unified combatant
|
||||
commands and the Joint Staff; the Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce, Energy, and
|
||||
Homeland Security; the Central Intelligence and Defense Intelligence Agencies, the Federal
|
||||
Bureau of Investigation; the Drug Enforcement Administration; the National Counterterrorism
|
||||
Center; the U.S. Trade Representative; and the White House Situation Room.
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY//20320108
|
||||
10
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY//20320108
|
||||
|
||||
(U) APPENDIX B: IMMEDIATE IMPERATIVES
|
||||
|
||||
* (S//REL) Gain more pervasive and persistent insight into al-Qa'ida, al-Qa'ida affiliates,
|
||||
Hezbollah, and other terrorist targets, despite their increasingly aggressive COMSEC
|
||||
practices.
|
||||
* (S//REL) Infiltrate the most secret communications and data of the leadership, military,
|
||||
and security bureaus of Iran, North Korea, China, and similar targets of high concern.
|
||||
* (U) Better define and pursue immediate, near-term, and strategic mission management.
|
||||
* (U//FOUO) Optimize SIGINT discovery to find and follow targets, refine their
|
||||
prosecution, and anticipate their shifts.
|
||||
* (U) Identify and plan for geopolitical and technology trends.
|
||||
* (U//FOUO) Introduce productized net-centric capabilities into mainstream SIGINT
|
||||
operations on a scale that produces significant dividends in the counterterrorism arena
|
||||
and elsewhere.
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY//20320108
|
||||
11
|
||||
97
data/EFF_-_20131104-nyt-sigint_strategic_plan/metadata.json
Normal file
97
data/EFF_-_20131104-nyt-sigint_strategic_plan/metadata.json
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "SIGINT Mission Strategic Plan FY2008-2013",
|
||||
"type": "REPORTED",
|
||||
"description": "This five-year mission plan for the National Security Agency shows how the agency’s leaders view its mission and culture.",
|
||||
"long_description": "",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"CSS",
|
||||
"Central Security Service",
|
||||
"strategy",
|
||||
"mission management",
|
||||
"strategic surprise",
|
||||
"mission assessment",
|
||||
"key aims",
|
||||
"action plans",
|
||||
"performance management",
|
||||
"counterterrorism",
|
||||
"Al-Qaeda",
|
||||
"Hezbollah",
|
||||
"global network",
|
||||
"network-centric",
|
||||
"internet traffic",
|
||||
"metadata",
|
||||
"network traffic",
|
||||
"encryption",
|
||||
"cryptanalysis",
|
||||
"elint",
|
||||
"FISINT",
|
||||
"mobile networks",
|
||||
"data collection",
|
||||
"data tagging",
|
||||
"analyst training",
|
||||
"cryptology",
|
||||
"workforce",
|
||||
"property management",
|
||||
"cooling",
|
||||
"software implants",
|
||||
"counterproliferation",
|
||||
"bulk collection",
|
||||
"backbones",
|
||||
"fiber optic cables",
|
||||
"geopolitics",
|
||||
"strategic planning",
|
||||
"real-time analysis"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "NSA",
|
||||
"date_created": "2007-10-03",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"TOP SECRET",
|
||||
"COMINT"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [
|
||||
"REL TO USA, FVEY"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY//20320108",
|
||||
"genre": "report",
|
||||
"programs": [],
|
||||
"countries": [
|
||||
"China",
|
||||
"Iran",
|
||||
"North Korea"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"people": []
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "The New York Times",
|
||||
"date_published": "2013-11-02",
|
||||
"title": "No Morsel Too Minuscule for All-Consuming N.S.A.",
|
||||
"link": "https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/03/world/no-morsel-too-minuscule-for-all-consuming-nsa.html",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Shane, Scott"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"doc_source": "https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/11/03/world/documents-show-nsa-efforts-to-spy-on-both-enemies-and-allies.html"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "The Guardian",
|
||||
"date_published": "2013-11-02",
|
||||
"title": "Portrait of the NSA: no detail too small in quest for total surveillance",
|
||||
"link": "https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/02/nsa-portrait-total-surveillance",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"MacAskill, Ewen",
|
||||
"Ball, James"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"reporting_only": true
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"aka_id": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": "nsa-sigint-strategic-mission-2013"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "fc744238eabe77f27a85cd36c20ff76dfe5badc027260280eed31ece669434e5",
|
||||
"pages": 11
|
||||
}
|
||||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue