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4. CSEC are able to make use of unselected (comment: do we need to define
"selected" and "unselected" and "unintentional" in the context of this section. As I
Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
Dated: 20070108
Declassify On: 20320108
SECRET//20320108
SECRET//20320108
<File Reference number>
recall, it was important that we all understand what we mean by such terms)
metadata for developing their capability. However, bulk, unselected metadata
presents too high a risk to share with second parties at this time, because of the
requirement to ensure that the identities of Canadians or persons in Canada are
minimised, but re-evaluation of this stance is ongoing .
5. DSD can share bulk, unselected, un-minimised metadata as long as there is no
intent to target an Australian national – unintentional collection is not viewed as a
significant issue. However, if a 'pattern of life' search detects an Australian then
there would be a need to contact DSD and ask them to obtain a ministerial warrant to
continue.
12. Consideration was given as to whether any types of data were prohibited, for
example medical, legal, religious or restricted business information, which may be
regarded as an intrusion of privacy. Given the nascent state of many of these data
types then no, or limited, precedents have been set with respect to proportionality or
propriety, or whether different legal considerations applies to the "ownership" of this
data compared with the communications data that we were more accustomed to
handle. It was agreed that the conference should not seek to set any automatic
limitations, but any such difficult cases would have to be considered by "owning"
agency on a case-by-case basis.
48. DSD do not share SIGINT metadata outside COMINT channels as there is no
expectation on them to do so. There is pressure to provide survey work to the
military, and in future DSD may be required to release SRI at non-codeword levels.
ASIO and Australian Federal Police are currently reviewing how SIGINT information
can be used by non-intelligence agencies.

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{
"title": "DSD’s Risky Metadata Sharing: Australian Citizens’ Privacy Jeopardized in 5-Eyes Surveillance",
"type": "REPORTED",
"description": "The document reveals that in 2008, Australia’s Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) was willing to share bulk, unselected, unminimised metadata about ordinary citizens with its 5-Eyes partners, including sensitive medical, legal, and religious information.",
"long_description": "",
"tags": [
"CSEC",
"CSE",
"Australian Signals Directorate",
"DSD",
"FVEY",
"bulk metadata",
"Canadian",
"Australians",
"citizens",
"metadata collection",
"pattern-of-life",
"medical data",
"legal data",
"religion",
"religious data",
"restricted business information",
"intelligence sharing",
"international surveillance",
"Cheltenham",
"Australian Security Intelligence Organisation"
],
"document": {
"creator": "DSD",
"date_created": "",
"classification": [
"SECRET"
],
"dissemination": [],
"banner": "SECRET//20320108",
"genre": "report",
"programs": [],
"countries": [
"Canada",
"Australia"
],
"people": []
},
"publication": [
{
"publisher": "The Guardian",
"date_published": "2013-12-02",
"title": "Revealed: Australian spy agency offered to share data about ordinary citizens",
"link": "https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/02/revealed-australian-spy-agency-offered-to-share-data-about-ordinary-citizens",
"reporters": [
"MacAskill, Ewen",
"Ball, James",
"Murphy, Katharine"
],
"contributors": []
}
],
"pdf_sha256": "a568cb0874dd2ba9bfd7ebbd5301081b24010a05e0030441b3a6fa3f9e43f68c",
"pages": 4
}