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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
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UNITED STATES
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FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
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WASHINGTON, D.C.
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IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
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BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
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ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
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OF TANGIBLE THINGS FROM [REDACTED]
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Docket Number: BR:
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08-04
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PRIMARY ORDER
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A verified application having been made by the Director of
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the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for an order pursuant
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to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the Act),
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Title 50, United States Code (U.S.C.), § 1861, as amended,
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requiring the production to the National Security Agency (NSA)
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of the tangible things described below, and full consideration
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having been given to the matters set forth therein, the Court
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
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Derived from: Pleadings in the above-captioned docket
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Declassify on: Determination of the President
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
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finds that:
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1. The Director of the FBI is authorized to make an
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application for an order requiring the production of any
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tangible things for an investigation to obtain foreign
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intelligence information not concerning a United States person
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or to protect against international terrorism, provided that
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such investigation of a United States person is not conducted
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solely on the basis of activities protected by the First
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Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. [50 U.S.C.
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§ 1861(c)(1)]
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2. The tangible things to be produced are all call-detail
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records or "telephony meta data" created by
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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Telephony meta data includes comprehensive
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communications routing information, including but not limited to
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session identifying information (e.g., originating and
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terminating telephone number, communications device identifier,
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etc.), trunk identifier, telephone calling card numbers, and
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time and duration of call. Telephony meta data does not include
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the substantive content of any communication, as defined by 18
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U.S.C. § 2510(8), or the name, address, or financial information
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
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2
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
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of a subscriber or customer.¹ [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)(A)]
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3. There are reasonable grounds to believe that the
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tangible things sought are relevant to authorized investigations
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(other than threat assessments) being conducted by the FBI under
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guidelines approved by the Attorney General under Executive
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Order 12333 to protect against international terrorism, which
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investigations are not being conducted solely upon the basis of
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activities protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution
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of the United States. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)]
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4. The tangible things sought could be obtained with a
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subpoena duces tecum issued by a court of the United States in
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aid of a grand jury investigation or with any other order issued
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by a court of the United States directing the production of
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records or tangible things. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)(D)]
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WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the application of the
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United States to obtain the tangible things, as described in the
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application, satisfies the requirements of the Act and,
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therefore,
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¹ The Court understands that the
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[REDACTED]
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
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3
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to the authority conferred
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on this Court by the Act, that the application is GRANTED, and
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it is
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FURTHER ORDERED, as follows:
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(1) The Custodians of Records of [REDACTED]
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shall produce to NSA upon service of the appropriate secondary
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order, and continue production on an ongoing daily basis
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thereafter for the duration of this order, unless otherwise
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ordered by the Court, an electronic copy of the following
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tangible things: all call-detail records or "telephony meta
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data" created by such companies as described above;
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(2) With respect to any information the FBI receives as a
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result of this Order (information that is passed or "tipped" to
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it by NSA²), the FBI shall follow as minimization procedures the
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procedures set forth in The Attorney General's Guidelines for
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FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence
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Collection (October 31, 2003).
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(3) With respect to the information that NSA receives as a
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result of this Order, NSA shall adhere to the following
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procedures:
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A. The Director of NSA shall continue to maintain
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² The Court understands that NSA expects that it will continue to
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provide on average approximately three telephone numbers per day
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to the FBI.
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
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4
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
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mandatory procedures to strictly control access to and use
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of the archived data collected pursuant to this Order. Any
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search or analysis of the data archive shall occur only
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after a particular known telephone number has been
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associated with [REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
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5
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
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[REDACTED]
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More specifically, access to the
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archived data shall occur only when NSA has identified a
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known telephone number for which, based on the factual and
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practical considerations of everyday life on which
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reasonable and prudent persons act, there are facts giving
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rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the
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telephone number is associated with [REDACTED]
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provided, however, that
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a telephone number believed to be used by a U.S. person
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shall not be regarded as associated with [REDACTED]
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solely on the
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
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6
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
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basis of activities that are protected by the First
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Amendment to the Constitution.
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B. The meta data shall be stored and processed on a
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secure private network that NSA exclusively will operate.
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C. Access to the meta data archive shall be
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accomplished through a software interface that will limit
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access to this data to authorized analysts.⁵ NSA'S OGC
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shall monitor the designation of individuals with access to
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the archive. Access to the archive shall be controlled by
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user name and password. When the meta data archive is
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accessed, the user's login, Internet Protocol (IP) address,
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date and time, and retrieval request shall be automatically
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logged for auditing capability. NSA's Office of General
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Counsel (OGC) shall monitor the functioning of this
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automatic logging capability. Analysts shall be briefed by
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NSA'S OGC concerning the authorization granted by this
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Order and the limited circumstances in which queries to the
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archive are permitted, as well as other procedures and
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⁵ The Court understands that for purposes of analytical
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efficiency a copy of meta data obtained pursuant to the Court's
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Orders in this matter will be stored in the same database with
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data obtained pursuant to other NSA authorities and data
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provided to NSA from other sources. Access to such records
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shall be strictly limited in accordance with the procedures set
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forth in paragraphs A-G.
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
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7
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
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restrictions regarding the retrieval, storage, and
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dissemination of the archived data. In addition, NSA's OGC
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shall review and must approve proposed queries of archived
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meta data based on seed numbers reasonably believed to be
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used by U.S. persons before any query is conducted.
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D. Although the data collected under this Order will
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necessarily be broad, the use of that information for
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analysis shall be strictly tailored to identifying
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terrorist communications and shall occur solely according
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to the procedures described in the application, including
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the minimization procedures designed to protect U.S. person
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information. Specifically, dissemination of U.S. person
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information shall follow the standard NSA minimization
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procedures found in the Attorney General-approved
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guidelines (USSID 18). Before information identifying a
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U.S. person may be disseminated outside of NSA, a judgment
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must be made that the identity of the U.S. person is
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necessary to understand the foreign intelligence
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information or to assess its importance. Prior to the
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dissemination of any U.S. person identifying information,
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the Chief of Information Sharing Services in the Signals
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Intelligence Directorate must determine that the
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information identifying the U.S. person is in fact related
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
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8
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
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to counterterrorism information and that it is necessary to
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understand the counterterrorism information or assess its
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importance. A record shall be made of every such
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determination.
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E. Internal management control shall be maintained by
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requiring that queries of the archived data be approved by
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one of twenty-three persons: the Signals Intelligence
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Directorate Deputy Program Manager for Counterterrorism
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Special Projects Analysis and Production; the Chief or
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Deputy Chief, Homeland Security Analysis Center; or one of
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the twenty specially-authorized Homeland Mission
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Coordinators in the Analysis and Production Directorate of
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the Signals Intelligence Directorate. Telephone numbers
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that are the subject of electronic surveillance authorized
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by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) based
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on the FISC's finding of probable cause to believe that
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they are used by agents of [REDACTED]
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including those used by
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U.S. persons, shall be deemed approved for meta data
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querying without approval of an NSA official. The
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preceding sentence shall not apply to the telephone numbers
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under surveillance pursuant to any certification of the
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
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9
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
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Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General
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pursuant to Section 105B of FISA, as added by the Protect
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America Act of 2007. At least every ninety days, the
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Department of Justice shall review a sample of NSA's
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justifications for querying the archived data. In
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addition, at least twice every ninety days, NSA's OGC shall
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conduct random spot checks, consisting of an examination of
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a sample of call-detail records obtained, to ensure that
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NSA is receiving only data as authorized by the Court and
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not receiving the substantive content of communications.
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F. The meta data collected under this Order may be
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kept online (that is, accessible for queries by cleared
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analysts) for five years, at which time it shall be
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destroyed.
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G. The Signals Intelligence Directorate Program
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Manager for Counterterrorism Special Projects; Chief and
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Deputy Chief, Homeland Security Analysis Center; and the
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Homeland Mission Coordinators shall maintain appropriate
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management controls (e.g., records of all tasking
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decisions, audit and review procedures) for access to the
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archived data and shall use the Attorney General-approved
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guidelines (USSID 18) to minimize the information reported
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concerning U.S. persons.
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
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10
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
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H. At least every ninety days, the NSA Inspector
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General, the NSA General Counsel, and the Signals
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Intelligence Directorate Oversight and Compliance Office
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shall review this program.
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I. Any application to renew or reinstate the
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authority granted herein shall include a report describing:
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(i) the queries that have been made since this Order was
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granted; (ii) the manner in which NSA applied the
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procedures set forth in subparagraph A above; and (iii) any
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proposed changes in the way in which the call-detail
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records would be received from the carriers.
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
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11
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
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Signed 04-03-2008 P03:53 Eastern Time
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Date Time
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This authorization regarding [REDACTED] and unknown persons in the United States and
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abroad affiliated with [REDACTED]
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and unknown persons in the United States
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and abroad affiliated with [REDACTED]
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expires on the 27th day of June, 2008,
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at 5:00 p.m., Eastern Time.
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COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY
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Judge, United States Foreign
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Intelligence Surveillance Court
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
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12
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36
data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_08-04/metadata.json
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36
data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_08-04/metadata.json
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@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
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{
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"title": "FISC Order BR 08-04",
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"type": "foia",
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"collection": "foia",
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"description": "Order of the FISC approving the Government. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
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"long_description": "",
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"tags": [],
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"document": {
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"creator": "FISC",
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"date_created": "2008-04-03",
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"classification": [
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||||
"TOP SECRET",
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"COMINT",
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"MR"
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],
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||||
"dissemination": [
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||||
"NOFORN"
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||||
],
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"programs": [],
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||||
"countries": [],
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"people": [
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||||
"Kollar-Kotelly, Colleen"
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]
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},
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"publication": [
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{
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"publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
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"date_published": "2014-01-17",
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"link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/fisc-order-br-08-04",
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"reporters": [],
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"contributors": []
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||||
}
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||||
],
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"pdf_sha256": "4490e77d222941801955952966f168d7765c81b63fd2909c7e14cdc0bcdba972",
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"pages": 12
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}
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